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RICE UNIVERSITY

RHETORIC AND REALITY:
THE MAKING OF CHINESE PERCEPTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949-1989

by

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ABSTRACT

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When the people of a given society contemplate the outside world, they do so with inherited but constantly changing values, assumptions, preoccupations, and aspirations. Who they are, one might say, largely determines what they perceive. For a variety of reasons, the Chinese have long had a fascination with the United States—a country which has not only been an active participant in Chinese affairs for well over a century, but which has also served as an idea and an example. Naturally, China’s direct and indirect experiences with America, together with the vast cultural and political differences that still separate the two countries, have shaped Chinese perceptions. In China’s search for a new political, social and economic order, America, as both a world power and as a concept, has played a major role. This dissertation examines the way images of America were transmitted to China in the twentieth century, and how these images were debated and represented (or misrepresented) by three main social groups of Chinese—the Chinese state, Chinese intellectuals, and the Chinese masses. Although America has unquestionably
played a part in shaping modern China, the Chinese, for various reasons and in different ways, have constructed their own distinctive "America."
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................. 1

Chapter 1 Politicians, Scholars, and the Men in the Street, 1900-1949 11

Chapter 2 "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!": China Declares War on America, the Early 1950s 80

Chapter 3 Taboo of a Kind: America in China, 1957 126

Chapter 4 The Official America: Affirmed and Shattered Again, 1957-1979 183


Chapter 6 Popular and Unpopular America: the United States and the Chinese Masses, 1979-1989 281


Conclusion America as Metaphor 381

Bibliography ............................................. 390
INTRODUCTION

The Chinese have long had a "love-hate relationship" with the United States. The reasons are not difficult to find. Putting diplomacy aside, ever since the Opium War of 1839-1842, Chinese images of America have been confused and contradictory. They have viewed Americans as both imperialist aggressors and champions of democracy, as benign benefactors and racist oppressors, and they have seen the United States as an attractive model of successful modernization and as a negative example of selfishness and cultural decadence. This range of opinions is hardly surprising, since America is a complex society and even Americans themselves hold sharply conflicting views of their own country.

But the issue of how Chinese perceive America is further complicated by the problem of geographical and cultural distance. The Chinese have a proverb: "Outsiders see things clearly" (Pangguan zhe qing). Yet detachment has its obvious limitations, not the least of which is that the greater distance, the greater the distortion. In order to understand Chinese views of America, we must consider the way in which the Chinese have observed the United States, the way in which their perceptions have been shaped and disseminated. Just as with biology, a valuable way of understanding various organisms is to examine how they
originated and developed.

A crucial variable in the making of Chinese perceptions of the United States has been China's own historical experience. Whereas traditionally the self-styled "Middle Kingdom" possessed an unchallenged sense of cultural superiority, the West brought turmoil and uncertainty to the Chinese after the mid-nineteenth century. The West became at once a source of anxiety and an inspiration to the Chinese, who, after the 1860s, actively sought to modernize China to meet the political, economic and cultural challenge of modern times.

In China's modernizing effort, America—as a historical actor as well as an idea—played a vital part. At a time when China faced unprecedented problems both within and without, the United States emerged as a leading power in the world. To the extent that the Chinese people were aware of China's predicament and America's strength, they could not help but ask: What lessons might China learn from America's apparent success?

At least three different groups of Chinese have addressed some version of this question in the twentieth century, each from a different perspective. They are the Chinese state, the Chinese intelligentsia, and, for want of a better term, the common Chinese. To be sure, the line dividing these groups is hazy at best. For instance, although the Chinese term for "intellectual," zhishi fenzi,
generally implies a level of education and training higher than that of the so-called common people, not all well-educated Chinese have chosen to perform their culturally mandated role as the voice of China's moral authority, and those who have opted not to do so can be better categorized as part of the general populace or part of the state.

Despite this lack of definitional clarity, we can identify distinct tendencies of the three general groups in their perceptions of the United States, which, although never static and subject to constant contention and negotiation, can be roughly summarized in the following way. The Chinese state, in its pursuit of political stability and social solidarity, has been generally wary of American influence on China; its basic instinct has been to control and regulate American presence in China. The Chinese intelligentsia, anxious to explore "progressive" ideas, has enthusiastically embraced America and advocated American ideals. The "average Chinese," whether urban or rural, has tried to make sense of the United States in terms of their immediate interests and personal preferences, with only a vague idea of larger political or intellectual responsibility.

Regardless of political or personal inclinations, all three groups have viewed America through a cultural prism—a system of "interrelated perceptions, beliefs, values, and institutions that together shape the conscious and
unconscious behavior of that system's constituent members."¹

These "basic cultural attributes," which have "endured for hundreds or even thousands of years,"² contrast sharply with the tradition of the United States. For instance, for over two millennia, Chinese society has been fundamentally rural, agrarian, authoritarian, collectivistic, and conservative; modern America, on the other hand, has been far more urbanized, industrialized, democratic, individualistic, and progressive.³ Although these characteristics are obviously oversimplifications, they capture certain essential differences in orientation between the two national cultures.

It is in the interaction of political concerns and cultural preferences that Chinese perceptions of the United States have been formed and disseminated. A story related by anthropologist Laura Bohannan can be used here to illustrate the argument. Bohannan describes how once she tried to tell the story of Hamlet to some of her African tribesmen friends. She had hardly begun when her listeners started correcting her, asserting that she must have got things wrong, for people would never act the way she reported. The audience eventually took over, finishing the story as they deemed sensible and appropriate, and thus creating, in Bohanna's words, a "Shakespeare in the bush."⁴ Two factors seemed to have contributed to the natives' "failure" to understand Hamlet the original way—one, the
lack of knowledge concerning any culture other than their own, and two, the incentive on the part of the presenting elders to discredit the story for fear that their juniors would pick up the idea of the young seeking revenge against their seniors. Cultural limits and political considerations thus worked together to invent a tale drastically different from the original.

There have been few studies on Chinese perceptions of the United States following the approach outlined above. In fact, for various reasons, few studies of any kind have been conducted on the subject. To be sure, in recent years a number of case studies have surfaced, including several dissertations: Ye Huanian's "Literary Criticism and Culture: A Comparison of American and Chinese Criticism of American Literature;" Li Moying's "Hu Shi and His Deweyan Reconstruction of Chinese History;" and Li Tszesun's "A Comparative Study of Reciprocal Coverage of the People's Republic of China in the Washington Post and the United States in the People's Daily in 1986." These are valuable studies in themselves, but they are all close content analyses and lack a larger interpretative framework. A work with a somewhat longer view is Land without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-nineteenth Century to the Present, a collection of writings by Chinese visitors to the United States. Translators and compilers David R. Arkush and Leo O. Lee carefully selected their materials and
grouped them into several historical periods, thus providing their presentation with a certain thematic cohesion. The work provides some interesting impressions of Chinese travellers, but these Chinese were very small in number, and what awaited them and their writings at home makes a bigger story that remains untold.9

Moving in a different direction, a few other scholars have started investigating Chinese perceptions of the United States as a part of their research in Sino-American diplomatic history. A well-known work in this vein is Michael Hunt's *The Making of A Special Relationship: the United States and China to 1914*, in which the author examines how the American and the Chinese governments each misperceived the other's willingness to cooperate.10 More recently a number of Chinese scholars have expanded this field with their studies of Chinese Communist policies toward the United States during and immediately after World War Two.11 These studies have significantly improved our understanding of the political relationship between the two countries, but they do not shed much light on Chinese views of America. This is because, as many scholars have demonstrated, in foreign affairs, in pursuing China's geopolitical interests, Chinese leaders at times could be very pragmatic and refuse to allow mere perceptions, their own or other people's, of the outside world, to prevent them from making necessary deals. Mao Zedong's deal with "the
devil," Nixon, is just the most conspicuous example. In other words, images and diplomacy do not necessarily travel the same path in China, nor do China's domestic affairs and China's foreign relations generally. Thus, the study of Chinese perceptions and the study of China's foreign policies, when combined, could be productive in its own way, but the former essentially makes a topic in itself.

The most notable work up to date on Chinese perceptions of the United States is David Shambaugh's *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990*. This is a study of China's "America watchers," Chinese experts on the United States. Based on a careful reading of these experts' writings that appeared in various Chinese periodicals during the 1970s and the 1980s, Shambaugh reconstructs their views on the American economy, society, polity, and foreign policy. In doing so, Shambaugh ably accomplishes the first of the three goals he sets for himself at the onset of his project, that is, to establish "the content and variation of perception of the United States as articulated by China's America Watchers." Shambaugh is, however, less successful in achieving his two other goals--to explain "the variance and evolution of perceptions over time," and "to come to terms with the relationship between perception and policy, and the impact of the former on the latter." Shambaugh writes that upon the completion of his investigation, he remains "as convinced as ever of the empirical difficulties
involved in making categorical conclusions about the impact of China's America Watchers' perceptions of the United States on policy."\textsuperscript{14} As to "the variance and evolution of perceptions," Shambaugh discusses this issue primarily in terms of the continuing or waning influence of Marxist ideology on certain Chinese experts.\textsuperscript{15} In his "Conclusion" Shambaugh does suggest "domestic political climate" and "cultural differences" as contributing factors in Chinese American watchers' views of the United States, but his study does not well substantiate these general claims.\textsuperscript{16}

In this dissertation I attempt to go beyond perceptions\textit{ per se} and to look into the cultural and political construction of Chinese perceptions of the United States. My study deals with the twentieth century, with greater attention paid to more recent periods. The first chapter deals with the fifty years from 1900 to 1949, which is followed by three chapters on the Maoist era from 1949 to 1979, and the last three chapters focus on the 1980s. The twentieth century has been a turbulent time for China which witnessed some cataclysmic events, including the triumph of Communism, the Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the Open Policy toward the West. Although the long term implications of these earthshaking developments remains to be determined, there can be no question that these events both shaped and were shaped by Chinese views of America.
NOTES


11. For an example of such studies, see Yang Kuisong, "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy toward the United States in the 1940s," *Chinese Historians*, 5:1 (Spring 1992), 17-34.


13. Ibid., 36.

14. Ibid., 35.

15. Ibid., 284-91.

16. For more information on existing works on Chinese images of the United States or related works, see Bibliography--esp. Tu Weiming's article, "Chinese Perceptions of America," in Robert B. Oxnam and Michel C. Oksenburg, eds., *Dragon and Eagle: Unite States-China Relations, Past and Future* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973). In this article Professor Tu suggests that traditional Chinese values should be considered while studying Chinese images of the United States. He does not, however, elaborate. Daniel Aaron, for his part, identifies "American studies" in China as a problem to the state and refers briefly to the cultural implications of the problem. His article, although only four pages long, points in the right direction by discussing the multiple factors involved. See Daniel Arron, "American Studies and the Chinese State," *China Exchange News*, September 1990.
CHAPTER 1

POLITICIANS, SCHOLARS, AND THE MEN IN THE STREET, 1900-1949

On New Year's Eve, 1900, Liang Qichao, thirty-years old and already one of China's leading scholars and an exiled statesman, was aboard a steamer sailing across the Pacific to North America. Too excited to rest, Liang stayed up and composed a long, passionate poem to mark what he perceived to be a historic moment—"at the turn of the century/on the dividing line of the West and East."¹ In it, Liang took a broad look at the rise and fall of civilizations in human history and hailed the arrival of the Pacific Century, a new era that promised hope as well as a challenge to his own country, China, an ailing empire; he anxiously looked forward to reaching the United States, "the Republic," so he could "study its learning, inspect its politics, and witness its dazzling radiance."²

Liang reflected a general Chinese affection for the United States at the beginning of the new century. Five decades later, however, this warm sentiment had all but evaporated, replaced by suspicion, disdain, and outright hatred. This took place immediately after World War Two, in which the Chinese and the Americans fought as comrades-in-arms. What happened? Why and how did the Chinese view of America undergo such a drastic change? A brief examination
of the experiences of Chinese political leaders, Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese masses during the first half of the twentieth century may help explain this radical transformation.

I

Liang Qichao did not actually visit the American continent on his 1900 trip; upon reaching Hawaii, news came from China that some of his comrades in China were staging an uprising against the Qing Court and the infamous Empress Dowager Cixi. Liang rushed home, only to learn that the scheme had failed, and he had to flee again. It was several years later, in 1903, that Liang Qichao finally toured the United States--Meiguo, "the beautiful land" (Meiguo).

With the energy of a politician and the insight of an intellectual, Liang proved to be an outstanding observer, enthusiastic as well as contemplative. He had been a precocious young Confucian scholar who passed the provincial level of China's formidable examination system at the age of twelve. He played an active and central role in the reform movement launched by his visionary teacher, Kang Youwei, which culminated in the Hundred Days Reform of 1898. After the defeat of their endeavor, Liang went into exile abroad where he studied, wrote and continued to agitate for change.
A man who took pride in "waging a continuous war against myself of yesterday," Liang the scholar, politician, and popular journalist personified the great urgency with which the Chinese sought the knowledge of the modern world.

Like many Chinese of the time, Liang was fascinated by the United States. For a long time after 1784, when the first American sailing vessel Empress of China dropped anchor off Guangzhou, the United States remained obscure to the Chinese. As the 19th century progressed, however, the American nation grew larger in the Chinese vision of the world; it was greeted by many Chinese with less animosity, if not greater warmth, than any of the other major industrialized powers, for the United States did not wage a war against China. This does not mean, of course that the United States did not insist on the treaty privileges that other powers had ensured for themselves by force. In 1900, American forces participated in the allied expedition that crushed the anti-foreign Boxer's Rebellion, but the United States retained China's good will by advocating the Open Door Doctrine, which helped prevent the immediate dismemberment of China. More important than this relatively benign posture toward China were some American national characteristics attractive to the Chinese who were struggling to salvage China from under the gunfire of European, and later Japanese, colonialists and imperialists: the Americans had fought for and gained their independence,
the United States was a relatively new nation on the rise, and, by many accounts, the United States was the land of liberty and democracy.

When Liang Qichao set out for the United States in 1903, he had these positive images of America in mind. Upon winding up his six-month excursion, Liang published Xindalu youji (New continent travel notes), which made very popular reading among his compatriots eager to learn about a fascinating and yet largely mysterious land on the other side of the Pacific.

Liang stayed in the United States for only half a year and was therefore handicapped, as are all short-term visitors to a new country who venture to comment. But Liang was politically experienced and intellectually acute enough to make good sense of what he observed. He travelled extensively in the United States, from New England to the mid-Atlantic states, from Chicago down to New Orleans, across the great prairie and over the Rockies to San Francisco and Los Angeles. Although young, as an established former statesman, Liang had much wider access to American society than any other contemporary Chinese--most of whom were confined to either diplomatic circles or the low world of restaurants and laundries. During his trip Liang was able to walk New York's back alleys as well as exchange pleasantries with dignitaries like Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay.
Liang was highly impressed by the United States. He described the changing mental state of a Chinese travelling from China to the United States: Coming from interior China and arriving in Shanghai, the man marveled at the splendor of Shanghai and felt the shabbiness of inland China; having left Shanghai and turns up in Hong Kong, he, at the sight of Hong Kong, lamented the mediocrity of Shanghai; in a similar way, with an ever growing sense of awe and wonder, the man traveled to Japan, then to California. He finally reached the Atlantic coast. "New York," he remarked, "is the ultimate spectacle." Awed by America's economic success, Liang made a point of seeking out and meeting some American tycoons whom he had heard of. In New York, for instance, he went to see J. P. Morgan, "Napoleon in business," who advised him that the key to the success of any enterprise was preparation; Liang heartily concurred, probably recalling the ill-fated Hundred Days in Beijing. But Liang was not just a dollar worshiper; he was also interested in the spirit that, in his view, drove the United States as a nation. He discussed this issue with a travel companion and they agreed that to understand the secret of America one needed only to look at the upkeep of "an American school, an American platoon, an American drugstore, an American factory, an American family, and an American garden." These features, they believed, demonstrated the American spirit of independence, self-reliance, and
enterprise. The vigor with which the Americans and Westerners generally went about their daily business indicated an idealism which, according to Liang, had three aspects: aestheticism, heroism, and religious transcendentalism.6

Having achieved such an understanding, Liang concluded that the fundamental shortcoming of the contemporary Chinese was "the lack of high ideals."7 He had some choice words for his fellow countrymen. Forget about great ambitions such as national revival, Liang wrote, "We Chinese do not even know how to walk." When a Westerner walks, "his body is straight, his head is upright," and "his steps are fast, as if he is always busy with something important." When a Chinese takes a stroll, Liang went on to say, "his body bends, coils and twists, as if unable to bear any weight," and "he saunters ever so disgustingly slowly."8 This lack of a desire to exert, Liang believed, lay at the core of all China's problems.

By no means, however, was Liang fully satisfied with the America he discovered. Indeed, he had many reservations. He found American politics too noisy and boisterous--"like a market place," where everyone tried to sell himself for a good price.9 The officials in totalistic states, he wrote, strain to please their superiors, while the politicians in a democracy bend to lick the boots of the public. "There are some differences between the two," he
admitted, "but neither is the ideal system." 10

Liang considered politics in major cities such as New York "the darkest," and he obviously was aware of the Tammany Hall phenomenon. 11 He had misgivings about America's national politics too. The feeble presidency of the United States prevented office holders from accomplishing much, he observed: "Most American presidents are average men," saved five--Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Grant and McKinley. "Only a few decades have passed, but nowadays who on earth knows about Polk? . . . or Pierce?" Liang asked. 12 Although he understood the traditional American distrust of big government, he insisted that constitutional monarchy was a more sensible form of government. 13 Constitutional monarchy, of course, was what Liang and his comrades had attempted in Beijing in 1898.

Liang's foreboding about America's political system reflected, among other things, his general distaste for what he considered excessive freedom. Nowhere is this attitude more evident than in his views of social life in the United States. Complete economic freedom, Liang believed, produced the extreme disparity between the rich and the poor in the United States--"Seven-tenths of America's total wealth belong to 200,000 rich men, and three-tenths go to 79,800,000 poor people living in slums." 14 He could not quite make up his mind about the anti-trust issue. On the
one hand, he viewed great corporations as the embodiment of excessively concentrated wealth; on the other, he valued the efficiency of big business. In any event, he recognized the importance of the issue and took careful note of it: "America's gravest national concern in the past decade has been the trust;" "Those who want to understand the United States and the world today, should focus on the trust."\textsuperscript{15}

Liang was similarly ambivalent about rising labor unrest in America. On several occasions during his tour, socialist activists approached him, attempting to convert the Chinese celebrity to their cause. Liang replied that progress comes in stages and that socialism was not the "the thing of the moment"\textsuperscript{16} for his country. China's leading liberal of his time had not forgotten his true interest in America. But he sympathized with the socialist movement in America, and he wrote: "Having seen the slums of New York, I have to admit that socialist revolution is surely on its way!"\textsuperscript{17} He was intrigued by some socialist ideas—the nationalization of major industries, for instance—and he admired the enthusiasm of the socialists he encountered. "Socialism is a religion", Liang asserted, "Nothing in the world is more potent than religion, and that is why nowadays socialism is sweeping the globe."\textsuperscript{18}

Reinforcing Liang's cultural preference was a political necessity that he, as a politician, sensed keenly. China was struggling to survive against both the tenacious
cultural tradition of China and the menace of the Western powers. The magnitude and urgency of the task demanded resolute and prompt efforts by the Chinese people as a whole. In such a context, solidarity and devotion made more sense than liberty and individuality. Liang had long believed that the Chinese people were already too disorganized—"a heap of loose sand"—and he could not see how American individualism could work for China.

Not that Liang did not understand the importance of federalism in American politics. American federalism, Liang observed, "does not arise from the federation itself but from the states of the federation; and not from the states themselves but from the municipalities of the states"; "Only those who understand this phenomenon can talk about American politics." But American federalism had historical roots; the Americans had built their nation from the bottom up and in the process educated themselves for self-government.

China was quite a different story. Democracy was the rule of the majority, Liang reasoned, but "the majority, the great majority, the absolute majority of Chinese are in such a pitiful condition" that nothing but disaster would ensue if they were given American-style liberty. "I wish, I plead, I pray," wrote Liang in yet another of his emotional outbursts, that a few Great Men could be born in China.
Let them, like thunder and storm, with iron and fire, shape up the Chinese for twenty years, for thirty years and why not for fifty years; then, only then, let the people read Rousseau and discuss... the great enterprise of George Washington.22

Thus Liang Qichao declared his commitment to American ideals. But he cautiously kept a certain distance from them, for both cultural and practical reasons. A sensitive and perceptive man, Liang presaged the views of many Chinese politicians and intellectuals in the decades to come.

The most prestigious and influential political leader of China in early twentieth century was Sun Yat-sen.23 Whereas Liang was a reformed Confucianist, Sun received part of his early education at an Anglican school in Hawaii, where for a few years he stayed with his elder brother, a local businessman. This American connection later developed into a broader bond with the Chinese community in the United States, which would play a large part in Sun's political adventures. Compared to Liang's brief encounter with America, Sun's knowledge of the United States was more substantial, although perhaps not as satisfactory intellectually. Unlike Liang, who was a scholarly and gentlemanly reformer, Sun was primarily a doer, a quixotic republican revolutionary.

Sun derived a great deal of his revolutionary
inspiration from the United States. In 1904, in a public appeal to the American people for support, Sun declared that he considered the Americans natural allies of China's revolution "because you opened Japan to Western civilization, because you are a Christian nation, because we are going to model our new government after yours."[24]

Among America's "warriors for liberty and democracy"[25] Sun especially admired Washington and Lincoln and clearly identified himself with these American giants.[26] "No one," he once stated, "defines democracy better than the great U.S. president Lincoln: 'of the people, by the people, for the people.'"[27] In his pep-talks to his followers, Sun frequently referred to the humble origins of the United States and the hardship experienced by the American founding fathers.[28] His high regard for Washington might have contributed to the political blunder of his lifetime—relinquishing the presidency of China's new Republic in favor of his political enemy, Yuan Shikai, a military man, who turned out to be unworthy of the trust.

Having discovered that not everyone shared his idealism and noble mind—certainly not Yuan, who, after taking over the presidency, sought to install himself as an emperor—Sun became more worldly-wise. Events in China clearly were not following the pattern of the United States, and the political necessity that Liang had keenly sensed now now began to affect Sun. The pressure in Sun's case was even
greater because Liang was a political has-been, while Sun had an ongoing revolution to tend. Having surrendered the presidency in 1912, Sun now demanded members of his party to swear personal loyalty to him. Thereafter, people would hear from him less and less about liberty and democracy and more and more about devotion and sacrifice.29 Speaking at a YMCA conference in Canton in 1923, where he had established an opposition government in the chaotic period of warlordism following Yuan's death in 1916, Sun painstakingly drew a distinction between China and the United States. The YMCA in China had done commendable work, he noted, but the Chinese people should always remember that the wish for self-improvement was not a sufficient means of social reform in China. Gradual reform in America was possible and desirable "because they had a good government." The situation in China was completely different; here, "national salvation must be achieved through collective efforts."30 To make his point, Sun invoked the metaphor that Liang Qichao had used to describe the Chinese--"a heap of loose sand."31

To turn the loose sand into concrete, to draw the Chinese fully into his revolution, Sun had his "Three Principles of the People": Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood. Although Sun occasionally likened his basic doctrine to Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, for the people",32 the connection was rather
forced--especially in the case of the People's Livelihood, which was a mild form of socialism that had also intrigued Liang Qichao. Like Liang, Sun was rather dismayed by economic and social ills of the West, and he anticipated a revolution that would "first take place in the United States because great American capitalists have monopolized all economic means and privileges and virtually enslaved farmers and workers."33 When the Americans first gained independence from Britain, Sun explained to his comrades, they had grand plans for their nation; but within a century or so, economic and social problems had led the Americans onto a very different path. If the American founding fathers "could take a look at America today, he suggested, they certainly would cry out in disbelief, regretting the mistake they had made."34 The mistake to which Sun referred was not to have instituted measures to prevent the concentration of wealth. Sun would not repeat that mistake; he would take preemptive actions.

It is noteworthy that although Sun was critical of the American system, he was still operating under American influence. In this case, it was one particular American, Henry George, the self-made populist economist from the Midwest, who, like his contemporary Edward Bellamy, took on America's big business and urged social reforms. Sun came under the sway of this brand of socialism, particularly George's idea of a "single tax," a land tax that would
prevent real estate speculation and provide revenues to be used for the public good. This became the core of Sun's program for the "People's Livelihood." Under Sun's system, the state would collect land taxes according to the owner's estimate of the value of his property; any increase in the value of the property would be collected by the state to be invested in public projects such as railroads, utilities, and other key industries too important to be left to individuals.35 This program would, in Sun's view, enable China to pursue industrialization while avoiding the social evils that afflicted the West.

In terms of immediate political needs, Sun had expected the United States to support his on-going revolutionary efforts; when the expected assistance was not forthcoming, he looked elsewhere for help. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, he established close ties with the Bolsheviks, from whom he secured the kind of material and advisory aid which he had sought but never received from the West. In 1923, Sun's revolutionary government decided to take control of the maritime customs in Canton, a move that drew to the city gunboats of several Western powers, including the United States, which still recognized the warlord regime in Beijing. In response, Sun addressed an open letter to the American people, in which he wrote:

When we first started our revolution, . . . the
United States was an example and inspiration for us; ... now we wonder: has the nation of Washington and Lincoln abandoned the ideal of liberty and degenerated from a liberator into an oppressor. ...? We cannot bear the thought that this is true." 36

Sun's complaints had little effect in Washington and his revolutionary dream remained unfulfilled when he died in 1925.

Sun's successor, Chiang Kai-shek, provides yet another example of Chinese politicians' attitudes toward the United States. Unlike Sun, Chiang forged a close relationship of strategic cooperation with the United States, yet his reservations about the American system were no less profound than those of Liang or Sun before him. Having successfully carried out a "northern expedition" against the warlords in 1926-1928, and having established a new national government in Nanjing, which ended the Nationalist-Communist coalition that Sun had founded, Chiang soon won the recognition and support of the United States. Chiang's American connection was personalized by his marriage to the Wellesley-educated Soong Mei-ling, whose rich and powerful family had a strong American background. The union brought into Chiang's service a group of in-laws educated at leading American universities, and Chiang, for his own part, promised his bride's Christian family that he would study the Bible.
Politically, as China's relationship with Japan worsened, American support for Chiang's government increased, and eventually the United States fought as China's ally in the war against Japan. In view of all this, one might expect that Chiang Kai-shek, more than any other Chinese leader of his time, would find American ideas congenial. This was not the case, however; not if we look beyond state relations and diplomatic pleasantries.

In fact, Chiang Kai-shek was even further removed from America than his mentor, Sun Yat-sen. Sun Yat-sen received at least some American education; he knew America well and was truly committed to democratic ideals. The Western element in Chiang Kai-shek's education, on the other hand, was minimal. As a child Chiang received some traditional Confucian training as a child; he then attended a Japanese military academy, and his stay in Japan was his only substantial exposure to the outside world. In spite of his contact with Christianity through the Soong family, Chiang remained essentially an old-fashioned Chinese whose ideological world was limited to a kind of diluted Confucianism and a few Western and revolutionary slogans that he had borrowed from Sun Yat-sen.

Furthermore, Chiang Kai-shek was under even greater political pressure than his mentor. Sun Yat-sen headed a revolutionary movement, but he was never in charge of a national government. Chiang, on the other hand, assumed
national leadership after 1927. In this capacity Chiang faced grave challenges from several quarters: former warlords who had pledged nominal allegiance but who remained virtually independent; the Communists who, after being purged by Chiang from a Nationalist-Communist alliance in 1927, started a widespread rural revolution; and finally the Japanese who first took control of Manchuria in 1931 and then started a full scale war on China in 1937. Under all this pressure, Chiang's Nationalist government had a very precarious existence.

Under the circumstances and by personal inclination, therefore, Chiang found little use for ideas such as individualism or democracy. He needed and strongly believed in devotion and discipline on the part of his adherents--qualities that, as he saw it, would solve all of China's problems. Publicly Chiang extolled the United States enthusiastically, but, unlike Sun Yat-sen, he rarely talked about America as an idea. When he did, he usually tried to persuade his followers to stay away from it. For instance, Chiang insisted categorically on the superiority of Chinese culture to that of the West. "There is nothing in European and American political theories that is up to par with China's Great Learning and The Doctrine of Mean," Chiang once declared.37 While Sun Yat-sen used to liken his "Three Principles of the People" to Lincoln's definition of good government, Chiang, lecturing his officers, emphasized that
Sun had derived his thought from the "Great Way" of China's ancient saints and that Sun's ideology was primarily based on "China's political, ethical and philosophical tradition."\textsuperscript{38} Chiang once complained to an audience gathered at the Wucang Military Academy that nowadays "our schools have all but abandoned" the precious jewels of Chinese tradition; as result, "many students esteem only translated foreign works and dismiss Chinese teachings as useless."\textsuperscript{39} "We need not search abroad for the way to save the nation,"\textsuperscript{40} Chiang asserted; it is all within.

Chiang's connection to the highly Americanized Soong family had little effect on his ideological world. In the 1930s Chiang and his wife co-sponsored a New Life Movement, which was a curious combination of Chiang's attempt to encourage Confucianist and militaristic self-discipline and his wife's idea of Christian self-improvement. Chiang scolded his officers for their lack of vigor while Madame Chiang and her followers implored the Chinese masses to straighten out their personal life, starting with matters such as personal hygiene and public sanitation.\textsuperscript{41} In spite of its noble purpose, the hybrid movement had only superficial effects; the Chiangs' prescription was simply too ineffective for China in the throes of war and revolution.

It was from the conservative wing of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) that Chiang received much of his advice
and support on ideological matters. One particularly important influence was Dai Jitao, a fervent Buddhist, Confucianist and Sinophile. Dai ghost-wrote China's Destiny for Chiang Kai-shek, a major undertaking by Chiang to provide the Nationalist movement with a moral voice. In this work, communism and liberalism were vehemently denounced as mere echoes of Soviet Russia and the West respectively; it was China's uniqueness and virtue that would eventually save China.\(^{42}\) Dai never did get along with the Soong family and their crowd, who he believed were leading Chiang astray. In 1949, as the Nationalist rule on the mainland collapsed, Dai took his own life, as a good Confucian minister who had ill-served his emperor would have done in the old days.

Hence, in spite of China's carefully cultivated political relationship with the United States, America as an idea never truly flourished under Chiang's reign. Fighting a long, arduous war against the Japanese, and striving to subdue insurgent warlords and Communists, Chiang was in no mood to advocate liberty, democracy and individualism. As an ally in world politics, Chiang wanted to be as close as possible to the United States, but, as a Chinese and a Chinese politician, he stood far apart from America.

In this regard, Chiang and his nemesis, the Communists, shared a common experience. The latter did not start out as anti-Americanist; in fact, a number of China's influential
Marxists emerged first as liberals, who underwent a brief period of admiration for America. Take the case of Chen Duxiu. Before he converted to Communism and founded the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, Chen had been one of the leading intellectuals in the New Culture Movement of the late 1910s—an attack on China's traditional values and a search for a "new civilization." A native of Anhui province and veteran of the 1911 revolution, Chen studied briefly in Japan. Upon his return to China, he founded and edited the Xin Qinguian (New youth) magazine, which soon became the flagship of the New Culture Movement. Chen opened his journal with "A Call to Youth," in which he urged the Chinese to discard old ways and embrace a new world-view: "Be independent, not slavish;" "progressive, not conservative;" "active, not passive;" "cosmopolitan, not isolationist;" "pragmatic, not decorative;" and "scientific, not delusive."43

This first issue of the New Youth also contained selections from American authors W. A. Marwick and W. F. Smith,44 as well as a biographical piece, "Diligence and Success: Andrew Carnegie," which portrayed the steel baron as an altruistic industrialist.45 The second issue of the journal published the national anthem of the United States, translated by Chen Duxiu himself.46 Similar materials would appear in successive issues—selections from Benjamin Franklin's Autobiography, Edmund Burke's "The Spirit of
Liberty in the American colonies," etc. It was Chen's journal that first introduced to China's cultural circle a young man by the name of Hu Shi, then a graduate student in philosophy at Columbia University, who would later become the leading spokesman for America in China in the coming decades, much to Chen's great displeasure.

Chen's fancy on America was short-lived. His confidence in democratic politics had always been shaky, and after seeing the example of the successful Russian Revolution, he came to believe that only an uprising of force and violence could change China. Accordingly he developed a more negative view of America and the American presence in China. Whereas in the past he had cultivated and "returned students" like Hu Shi, he now demonstrated a vehement contempt and hostility toward them, their ideas, and pro-American feeling generally. When in 1924 some Chinese affiliated with the YMCA took part in anti-Japanese demonstrations in Manchuria, Chen wrote bitterly: "The best thing is to boycott the Japanese for China; next to best is to boycott the Japanese for Manchuria; the worst is to boycott the Japanese for America!"

When some Chinese students had problems entering the United States because of U.S. immigration measures, Chen expressed his "gratitude" to the United States:

It is a matter of record that almost every single
American-trained [Chinese] student opposes revolution and worships money and America. The fewer such people, the better; none would be the best thing for China! ⁵¹

Chen Duxiu never visited the United States. Among top Chinese Communist leaders, only one spent time in the United States, and his experience was a discouraging one. Zhang Wentian, who later served briefly as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, went to San Francisco in 1922, where he took some college courses while working for a local Chinese newspaper. He was not happy. Writing friends back home he complained of isolation and working "like a machine." "I am afraid that in America I will be a loner forever," he wrote. ⁵² In a novel Zhang published in 1924, Lutu (The journey), a young Chinese goes to America with great hopes of learning how to clean up the messy world of warlord politics in China; but reality in America lets the young man down: no revolution, only loneliness; eventually he winds up his sojourn, returns to China to join a revolution, and dies heroically as the commander of a revolutionary army. ⁵³ Zhang's art resembled his life. He returned to China after about one year in California, and, although he did not die in battle, within months upon his return, he was thrown out of the town where he taught by a local warlord for his "cultural radicalism." ⁵⁴

Meanwhile, in Europe, Zhou Enlai, the future premier of
the People's Republic of China, also became a Communist. Zhou had gone to France after the Great War as one of the many Chinese work-study students who sought an inexpensive Western education. But Zhou spent little time in school and came to lead Chinese communists in Europe. Writing in La Jeunesse (Shaonian), the mouthpiece of his organization, Zhou assailed the United States as an imperialist power driven solely by the hunger for profit that characterized monopoly capitalism. Commenting on the U. S. presidential race of 1924, Zhou claimed that the election might produce some differences in appearance, but that was all there was to it. "Let's remember this and fight them all just the same." 55

Back in China, Mao Zedong, son of a peasant, was doing his part to promote revolution in his home province of Hunan. Like many of his Communist comrades, Mao had spiritedly taken part in the New Culture Movement. Around 1920, with the idea that "Nothing is more urgent than spreading the [new] culture," 56 young Mao with some friends founded a book club, which they planned to expand into each of the seventy-five counties of Hunan Province. Among their best-sellers were works by the American philosopher John Dewey, who had gone on a lecture-tour in China in 1919 and made himself well known in the country. 57 Mao himself obviously picked up some liberal ideas from materials he was promoting. He was strongly for the kind of local autonomy
in the United States, and wanted "a Monroe Doctrine for Hunan," his home province.\textsuperscript{58} Still, it appeared that Mao during these years did not know exactly where he stood. Writing the opening statement for his \textit{Xiang River Review} (\textit{Xiangjiang pinglun}), the publication of the Hunan students' association, Mao advocated "peaceful petition" or "bloodless revolution" as means of social transformation.\textsuperscript{59} In the same issue, however, Mao seemed to applaud the bombings which had recently taken place in several major cities in the United States and which had set off the Red Scare in America.\textsuperscript{60}

As many of his friends at that time were going to Europe or America to study, Mao declared his intention to travel nowhere but Bolshevik Russia--although he would not actually make the trip until 1950. As a Communist participant of the Nationalist-Communist coalition of the early 1920s, Mao edited the "People's Movement Series." Of books on his list were no longer works by Dewey; in their place were propaganda pieces advocating for immediate revolution.\textsuperscript{61} A decade later, in the 1930s, Mao the communist rebel would write with unblinking certainty about the need to "Combat Liberalism." By this time, liberalism meant nothing to Mao but an "extremely harmful tendency" which "disrupts unity, undermines solidarity, induces inactivity and creates dissention."\textsuperscript{62} His youthful flirtation with America had not blossomed into romance.
In short, Chinese Communists like Zhang, Zhou and Mao represented a generation of Chinese who grew up in a revolutionary era and who committed themselves from an early age to a radical and often violent cause; and once they had made that commitment, they slammed the door on America. Compared with likes of Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen, they were much less enamored of American values and far more confident in their rejection of them. Ironically, in this regard, the Communists and Chiang Kai-shek differed little from one another, although they were deadly political enemies.

II

Unlike China's political leaders, Chinese scholars in the first half of the twentieth century found themselves relatively free to explore America; they were not as hard pressed to maintain the integrity of a political movement, and theirs was primarily an intellectual venture. This does not mean, of course, that somehow China's intellectuals were isolated from their surrounding world; far from it. In fact, it was precisely the interplay of their personal traits—their values, the degree of their exposure to America, etc.—and the impact of larger ongoing events in China that yielded the variety in their perceptions and
interpretations of the United States. Three prominent intellectuals of the period may serve to illustrate certain broad trends.

The first is Hu Shi, the American-trained scholar that Chen Duxiu first introduced in the pages of the New Youth magazine. Hu was a prime example of what the promoters of Sino-American educational cooperation in the pre-1949 years hoped for. Ever since the mid-19th century, the United States had played a leading role in educating Chinese students, on both sides of the Pacific. All in all, before 1949, about 30,000 Chinese students studied in the United States—a large number for a country like China where there was still little modern higher education to speak of. More Chinese students went to Japan, but the academic training they received there was less rigorous: in spite of the larger number of Chinese students who studied in Japan, twenty times as many received doctoral degrees in the United States. In other words, American-trained scholars dominated much of China's intellectual life.

Many bright young Chinese who did not go to America studied at American missionary colleges and universities in China, which accounted for all but one Christian missionary institutions of higher education in China. In 1937, the year when Sino-Japanese war broke out, nineteen American-supported colleges and universities were operating there. Additionally, there was Qinghua University, which had been
founded originally as a preparatory school for students who were going to study in the United States. It was supported with a special educational fund established with America's share of the war indemnity that China had incurred for the Boxer's Rebellion.

Hu Shi, a member of the second class of Chinese students supported with the Boxer indemnity fund, came to the United States in 1910, one year before the downfall of the Qing dynasty. The nineteen-years old son of a petty Qing official went to study agriculture at Cornell, but he soon found out that his true interest lay in the humanities. He moved on to work for a doctoral degree in philosophy at Columbia University.\textsuperscript{67} Hu spent seven years as a student in America, and, by the end of his life, he had logged about twenty years in the United States, including four years as China's ambassador to Washington in the late 1930s and early 1940s.\textsuperscript{68} Hu placed great value in his American education. He used to invite his radical countrymen to visit the United States and accused those who refused to go of being intellectually dishonest.\textsuperscript{69} "Do not be taken in," Hu warned young Chinese who had been advised to avoid America, "Do not use your ears as your eyes!"\textsuperscript{70}

Hu himself made good use of his time in the United States. As a student, he was keenly interested in American culture and institutions. "Wherever I live, I consider local social and political affairs to be those of my own
hometown," he wrote. He dutifully attended all kinds of public meetings, fairs, hearings, and trials, "investigating the strengths and shortcomings" of his host country, with the idea of applying his findings to China upon his return. He followed the presidential campaign of 1916 closely and was for Wilson, whom he described as "a first-class" president. He was quite impressed when the governor of New York, William Sulzer, was thrown out of office for misusing campaign funds. He viewed the incident in the light of Confucius' instructions on ethical politics, and wrote in his diary: "I forfeit passing judgement on politics in this country; I'm too busy lamenting the despotism of the wicked officials in my own!"

It was with such a mentality that Hu returned to China in 1917, where he rose quickly as a prominent liberal in cultural and intellectual circles. He was known for his strong advocacy of "wholesale Westernization," a term he coined, and he had little patience with those who insisted that China's misfortune in modern times was technological or perhaps even institutional, but certainly not cultural. It was ridiculous to label Chinese civilization "spiritual" and Western civilization "material," Hu stated, and he cited the three he considered the most obvious examples of idealism in Western civilization: Christianity in pre-modern times; "liberty, equality, fraternity" for the 19th century; and socialism in the 20th century (later in his life he
regretted that he had spoken so highly of socialism). Hu compared the good fortune of American "carpenters and bricklayers who drove to work" to the misfortune of Chinese coolies, and asked: What was so spiritual about the "culture of rickshaw-pullers and carriage-bearers"?  

Hu's confidence in America was affirmed by his observations on his trip to the United States in 1927--his first visit since his student days. He denounced those who suggested that the materialistic culture of the United States had run its course, and he considered Oswald Spengler's critical books "not worth reading." "I can declare securely," he said, "that no social revolution will take place in the United States, because the United States is involved in social revolution on a daily basis.

Hu's idea of "revolution on a daily basis" was at the core of his understanding of America. It was also his prescription for China, rooted in the pragmatist philosophy he had come to cherish both as a subject of study with John Dewey at Columbia and as a world view. The Chinese should, Hu believed, identify their problems, experiment to determine the most effective solutions, and then reform their nation gradually and steadily; wild revolution would not do China any good. He urged his Chinese compatriots to focus on "issues" rather than "doctrines," such as Marxism, which had captured the minds of quite a few intellectuals, including his former colleague at the New Youth magazine,
Chen Duxiu. Hu also frowned upon student movements, which he termed "heat that lasts only five minutes." In late 1936, when a Chinese student demonstration ended in violent clashes with the police, Hu castigated the students, contrasting their actions to the peaceful protests he had witnessed in America. His stance enraged some students, and one of them—who later served as a secretary to Mao Zedong—asked Hu pointedly whether authoritarian "Beiping [Beijing] today can be compared to democratic New York." "Dr. Hu should have no problem in answering the question," Li Rui asserted, "since he has studied in America."

All in all, Hu seemed to be arguing for an extreme goal—"wholesale Westernization"—while at the same time advocating a gradualistic approach. Both can be traced back to his American experience. His strategy made perfect sense from an American perspective, but the question was: How well did it accord with life in China? There was always the danger that gradualism would amount to nothing more than actual tolerance of the status quo in China and thus render Hu's extreme goal impossible.

In fact, Hu seemed to have a temperamental aversion to confrontation and a tendency to compromise. His marriage provides an illuminating example. In spite of his strong advocacy for the emancipation of the individual, Hu failed to liberate himself. His father died early and his widowed mother devoted herself to bringing up Hu, her only son; she
saw to it that Hu received a solid education and found a bride for him when he was still a boy. Hu did well academically but he resented the young woman whom he hardly knew and who was illiterate. To escape from being forced into this "marriage" Hu did not go home to bid his mother goodbye at the time he left for the United States. Yet, during his seven years of studying in the United States, Hu, the filial son, could not bring himself to reject his mother and the young woman who had already begun dutifully serving his mother as a daughter-in-law. After much agony, Hu gave in. He eventually came to terms with the union, but not before he had engaged in one or two extramarital affairs and his wife had threatened suicide, thus dashing his hope for a divorce.84 Hu continued to advocate the liberation of the individual, explaining his marriage in the following way: "It is my freedom to choose not to be free."85

While Hu's personal life should not be equated with his public views, his marriage does show how easily his American-style gradualism could easily slip into accommodation of the status quo. This may help explain why, in spite of all his liberal idealism, Hu tolerated and actually served Chiang Kai-shek, who was anything but a liberal. In an historical and cultural twist, the most ardent champion of American liberalism in China ended up a political conservative.

No less ironically, those with an attachment to America
weaker than Hu's developed more manifestly radical tendencies. One example was Tao Xingzhi. A native of Anhui Province, like Hu Shi, and of the same age, Tao also went to study at Columbia University. But while Hu made his journey to America as a 19 year-old high school graduate, Tao crossed the Pacific after he had done his undergraduate work in China, at the age of 23, and he stayed for a shorter period, two years, during which he acquired a Master's degrees in political science and education.\textsuperscript{86}

There is no doubt, however, that Tao's American education transformed him intellectually if not temperamentally, and that this education played a critical role in shaping his career. Like Hu Shi, Tao was influenced greatly by John Dewey. Tao once observed that Chinese intellectuals liked to talk about "National salvation through education;" "but not just any kind of education will achieve that goal," he wrote. "Let me tell you: only experimentalist education can save our country."\textsuperscript{87} In principle, therefore, Tao did not differ significantly from Hu Shi, particularly in the beginning. But subsequent experiences in China would send the two into different directions.

Unlike Hu Shi, who returned to China to became a big-name professor at Beijing University, Tao based his career in rural China, where his father had made a modest living as an old-fashioned tutor. Starting in the early 1920s, Tao,
together with a few similarly minded American-educated friends, initiated a rural education program. In their "Statement on the Reform of Rural Education," drafted by Tao, they declared that they would "gather one million comrades, establish one million schools, and transform one million villages." In 1927, Tao founded a teachers' school outside Nanjing, then the national capital. Tao organized and managed this unconventional establishment, the Xiaoazhuang School, which he intended as an application of Dewey's notion of "education of life." The institution placed heavy emphasis on practical aspects of life in order to prepare students for the realities of rural China. To reach more peasants, Tao introduced a "Little Master" program in which boys were trained to teach their family members to read--particularly their mothers and sisters, whom Chinese values prevented from socializing with male strangers. Tao was very fond of this invention and he used to say: "Long live the Little Master!"

Dewey's teaching thus led Tao into the Chinese context and away from America. Tao remained a liberal and understood well the value of laissez faire, but his experiences in the countryside gave a special cast to his egalitarianism. His formula for the relationship between liberty and equality was "Equal Footing, Free Growth". But the balance was hard to maintain and Tao's attention to "equal footing" gradually set him apart from the more
individualistic intellectuals like Hu Shi. In 1927, Hu Shi wrote an article defending America against the charge of materialism and arguing for the value of "worshipping money." Acquisitiveness was not all bad, Hu asserted; it brought out progress and prosperity. The Chinese, Hu suggested, were not qualified to criticize Americans on this account, destitute and miserable as they were. Tao took personal offense at this article and told his former friend that he was appalled by the unabashed denigration of the Chinese people.⁹¹

Tao's school did not last long. At a time when the newly established Nationalist government was scrambling to crush the rural revolution agitated by the Communists, Tao's activities of mobilizing and organizing peasants smacked too much of radicalism. When Jiang Menglin—an American-educated scholar of Hu Shi's style and at the time Chiang Kai-shek's education minister—advised Tao to heed the danger, Tao answered that "our mouths should not be sealed."⁹² In 1930, after a dozen teachers and students at Tao's school had been arrested for their Communist connections, Tao's institute was closed down, and Tao went into a brief exile.⁹³

By then, Tao had revised Dewey's idea of "education of life"; he now believed that "life is education."⁹⁴ As a gesture, he changed his given name, which used to be Zhixing, "knowledge and action," to Xingzhi, "action and
knowledge. In short, Tao was embracing life in China. In discussing the education of commoners, Tao pointed out that did not have to go through the experiences of America, Europe or Japan; introducing programs of these affluent countries into poverty-ridden China would be like making a Chinese peasant eat with a knife and fork; he would only cut his tongue.

Tao did not believe that his new emphasis on the Chinese context constituted a betrayal of his mentor Dewey. As he saw it, he was merely carrying Dewey's idea to its logical conclusion. Moreover, Tao remained committed to liberal and democratic ideals, and he still considered the United States to be a champion of these ideals. In 1937, while Tao was visiting the United States, Chiang Kai-shek's government arrested several of Tao's colleagues in the democratic movement. Tao lobbied Dewey and some other American notables into signing a petition for the release of his friends. As World War Two was drawing to a close, Tao, trying to come to terms with the changing conditions of the world, formed a hybrid notion of democracy for China. To him, Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, for the people" denoted political democracy; Sun Yat-sen's People's Livelihood and Roosevelt's "freedom from want" meant economic democracy; Commoners' Education--his calling--and the legacy of China's May Fourth Movement pointed toward cultural and social democracy; and Woodrow Wilson's
self-determination and Sun Yat-sen's nationalism promised international democracy. Significantly, he also believed that a contemporary of his, Mao Zedong, made many valid points in his recent work *On New Democracy*.99

In 1945, a few months before his death, Tao wrote Dewey, criticizing the United States' continuing support for Chiang Kai-shek in the emerging civil war in China. He suspected that American military industrialists were manipulating American policy toward China and he called on the American people to foster democracy in China. Democracy, Tao believed, could cure all political diseases infecting China; and the United States, being an advanced democracy, could lend China the greatest assistance. If the ideals of Sun Yat-sen, Lincoln and Roosevelt could be realized in China, Tao believed, the country would have a great bright future. American assistance for Chiang Kai-shek, however, seemed to be denying China such a future.100

Clearly, at the end of his life, Tao had developed bitter and mixed feelings about the United States. He continued to revere many ideals that America epitomized, but he was also deeply troubled by the tremendous difficulties in realizing these ideals in his own country--so much so that he started to have doubts about the United States itself. Unlike his friend Hu Shi who remained firmly pro-American all his life, Tao, in his attempt to transform China, was significantly transformed by realities in China.
Tao never turned against America, however, and this distinguished him from the third major strain of Chinese intellectuals, whose hostility toward America was unmistakable and profound. A leading example of this group was Zou Taofen. Raised in a family of modest means in the southeastern province of Fujian, Zou abandoned the family's plan for him to become an engineer and instead went to study literature at an American school in Shanghai, St. John's University. This constituted Zou's main exposure to American culture until his tour of the United States in 1935. Upon graduation in 1921 Zou worked briefly for a stockbroker and taught English for a local YMCA. He found his true vocation in 1926 when he took up the editorship of a small weekly newsletter for adult education and turned it into a immensely popular publication, raising the circulation from a couple of thousand to over a hundred thousand—quite an achievement in China then.\textsuperscript{101}

The secret to Zou's success lay in his ability to relate to young Chinese; a typical reader of his would be someone like an apprentice at a rice store who was emotionally and spiritually neglected in a country where guns spoke the loudest. This ability to understand and communicate enabled Zou to rise quickly as a influential journalist and publisher. He and his colleagues founded a publishing house and organized a bookstore chain which later consisted of 55 branch stores across the country.\textsuperscript{102} He
developed a loyal following and his progressive politics brought him into disfavor with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government.

In 1933, one of Zou's colleagues in the democratic movement was assassinated; fearing for his own life, Zou went overseas. During his two years' exile abroad, Zou spent two months in the United States. Zou reported his impressions to his readers back home, and, like his other writings, his tour accounts were received with great enthusiasm.

Zou was fully aware of the global importance of the United States and its impact on China. It is worthwhile, Zou wrote, to examine the United States "as a fully fledged and most advanced capitalist state, as a power in world politics, . . . and as a nation whose merits China could emulate and whose wrongs China could avoid."103 As it turned out, Zou found more wrongs than merits in America. Being a political exile seems to have contributed to his bitterness against the well-to-do, and well-to-do was certainly the United States. Unlike Tao, who utilized America as a weapon in his struggle for democracy in China, Zou tended to consider Chiang Kai-shek the incarnation of American evils in China. It did not help that his trip to the United States had been preceded by a visit to the Soviet Union, which deeply impressed him and of which he wrote most affectionately. In fact, the idea of visiting America came
partly from his liaison with a group of young Americans of the National Students League who toured the Soviet Union with him. The year was 1934, probably the least desirable time for America to impress a visitor.

His friendship with the above-mentioned young Americans notwithstanding, Zou started his trip to the United States with bitterness. While arranging transportation from London to New York, he was subjected to the kind of special attention accorded to Chinese citizens by American immigration officers, and his first report on the United States was about American racism.104 This sensitive issue remained a major preoccupation throughout his visit; in fact, later on his trip he went to Alabama just to take a look at the South, an experience that did not soothe him.105 The racial issue, of course, always played a role in shaping Chinese attitudes toward the United States, particularly among the educated Chinese, who consciously or subconsciously differentiated themselves from Chinese laborers and whose pride could be easily hurt. Zou took prejudice much harder than, for instance, Hu or Tao. Yet Zou also experienced that mixed feeling familiar to many Chinese in America, when he was advised by his American friends not to sit in the back of the bus while travelling in South.106

Zou was an intelligent and responsible journalist, and he endeavored to search out the true America. Still, a mere
two months in the country—compared to Hu's seven years and Tao's two years—limited the scope and depth of his observations. His first stop was New York, and, as had been the case with Liang Qichao three decades before, the mammoth city left Zou with a dark and depressing impression that set the tone for the rest of his trip. In his "Dissection of the Richest City in the World," Zou took his readers to East New York and Harlem. He wrote of the Wall Street tycoons that played with America as if it were a toy, using Andrew Mellon as an example. He acknowledged that the United States was technologically advanced but argued that American progress had not adequately improved the life of the masses; indeed, he wrote, the capitalist system hindered technological progress because of the lack of planning and coordination. In the cultural domain, Zou told his readers about William Hearst, "Public Enemy No. 1"—his reactionary politics, sensationalist journalism and extravagant lifestyle. Neither did he have any kind words for Father Coughlin, who, in Zou's view, was merely trying to divert the revolutionary deluge that would sweep the capitalist system off its foundation.

This anticipated deluge, the impending social revolt that would thoroughly reinvent America, largely accounts for Zou's harsh verdict on America. Being a political outcast himself, he naturally sympathized with the American labor movement; he used every opportunity to get to know the
participants of the movement and was deeply moved by many workers he met at small group meetings and on other occasions. They saw sixteen million laborers out of work and thirty million of their family members "starving," the American capitalist system could not pull through, Zou believed. He saw only three possibilities for the future of the United States: jingoism, fascism, and socialism. One thing was for sure—the "American Way" was finished. "We should open our eyes and see this fact," Zou told his compatriots back home, "and stop acting like fools!"

Zou sounded every bit the rebel. But was he? And if so, what kind of rebel was he? One of Zou's progressive American friends was the only son of a rich manufacturer and he constantly quarrelled with his parents over his neglect of college work in favor of political activism. Witnessing a few such exchanges, Zou, who stayed for a short time with the family, was quite startled by the way the young fellow confronted his parents, and he admonished his friend, noting that regardless of the issue, one ought to treat one's parents with filial respect. Zou gave the same advice to another American friend, this time a young woman, who had a similar problem. If indeed Zou was a rebel, he was a rebel against anarchism and chaos. This preference for order and harmony also manifested itself in the way he managed his rather sizable publishing enterprise back in China: he treated the organization like a family and
considered his employees to be like soldiers in a common cause. He called his management style "democratic centralization," a term that indicates Soviet influence. In a final display of his craving for collective identity and security, Zou, dying of cancer in 1944, made his last wish that the Chinese Communist Party admit him as a member posthumously and care for his three children. (The Party did not let him down. Zou Jiahua, his eldest son, trained in the Soviet Union, is currently Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China.)

Having started with the common denominator of an American-education, Hu Shi, Tao Xingzhi and Zou Taofen—three of China's leading Chinese intellectuals, ended up far apart from one another in their relations to America. All endeavored to translate the United States into a Chinese context. But, due to variables such as the nature of their contact with the United States, their individual experiences in China, and, of course, their characters and personalities, they produced "translations" of America significantly different from one another and also drastically different from the "original." Those of them who remained closest to America appeared to be the least effective in the Chinese context, and those who drifted farthest away from America joined the political tide that would eventually overcome China.
Zou Taofen did not live to see it, but the Chinese Communists' victory in the late 1940s validated his verdict on America in China, not so much through academic discussion but by the combined strength of China's political leaders and the Chinese masses.

In Chinese politics of the 1940s, the Communists were the primary movers and shakers; by the end of the decade they would be able to dictate China's fate. In so doing they achieved a dramatic comeback. In the mid-1930s they had been driven out of their bases in South China by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces and had been all but destroyed. When their forces re-grouped in China's remote northwest, their political future looked gloomy. But, as China's national crisis--caused primarily by the Japanese aggression--heightened and eventually broke into a full-scale war in 1937, the Communists made the wise decision to reconcile with the Nationalist government. This move not only fortified China in the war against the invading Japanese but also saved the Communists themselves from destruction. Exercising their extraordinary skills in social mobilization, the Communists rallied millions of Chinese peasants around them, even in Japanese-occupied areas.

Under the new circumstances, the Chinese Communists'
view of, and rhetoric on, the United States underwent notable changes. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Communists were fighting the Nationalists, they had found a deadly enemy of the Chinese revolution in the United States. By its very nature, they believed, this monopoly capitalist state would attempt world domination.\textsuperscript{120} With the establishment of China's anti-Japanese coalition, however, the Communist Party began to alter its assessment of the United States. In 1937, Zhang Hanfu, one of the earliest Chinese Communist specialists on the United States, published a booklet, \textit{China and America} (\textit{Zhongguo yu Meiguo}). Zhang filled his work with numerous direct quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and fierce denunciations of American capitalism and imperialism; nonetheless, he argued that as the "enemy of our enemy," the United States was China's friend.\textsuperscript{121} This did not change the imperialist nature of the United States, Zhang hastened to add, so the Chinese people should not let down their guard.\textsuperscript{122}

Zhang's ambivalent work illustrated the great caution with which the Chinese Communists presented their changing view of the United States. To them, the issue was not just one of international politics; it was also about political and moral legitimacy, critical to the very survival of their movement. Being revolutionary leaders, they needed to send out just the right messages in order to maintain the cohesion and morale of their cause. As with a group of men
pushing a heavy cart uphill, one wrong move could crush everyone involved in the effort.

In spite of their misgivings, the Communists publicized the positive role played by the United States and other Western allies in the war. Their knowledge of the United States was rather limited, but they said what they wanted to say very effectively. For example, when in the summer of 1944 a group of American pilots abandoned their plane above a Japanese-controlled area of northern China, they were quickly taken in by Chinese villagers and protected from the Japanese troops who were just a few miles away. The villagers recognized these strange-looking soldiers as friends because Communist guerrillas had taught them songs about the opening of the second front in Europe.\textsuperscript{123}

While the Communists' appreciation of the United States focused primarily on America's wartime contributions, the worldwide conflict also prompted them to reconsider the American system itself. For instance, discussing the situation with some of his associates, Chen Duxiu, the former editor of the \textit{New Youth} magazine and the founder of the Chinese Communist Party, recanted some of his earlier harsh words and spoke more agreeably of the United States. One should acknowledge, Chen wrote, that "a certain degree of democracy and liberty still exists in Britain and America"--a fact that "no one will deny but a Nazi fifth columnist."\textsuperscript{124} Of course it is true that Chen at the time
was not a typical Chinese Communist; he had been held responsible for the Communists' bloody setback in 1927 and was expelled from the party, and after which he had headed a small circle of Chinese Trotskyites. But his statements did represent a general change in the Chinese Communists' view of the United States. In 1944, Colonel David Barrett, the head of the U.S. Army Observers Group at the Communist headquarters in Yan'an, asked Zhou Enlai whether the United States or the Soviet Union was a greater democracy. Zhou thought for a second and answered: we Chinese Communists consider the Soviet Union "the greatest democracy in the world." "But," Zhou quickly added, "we know it may take a hundred years for us to attain that state of democracy. Meanwhile, we would be extremely glad if we could enjoy the same sort of democracy you do in the United States today."\(^{125}\) Zhou was being his tactful self as always, but he was not exactly lying: certainly he would not have complained if Chiang Kai-shek were to relinquish some of his political power.

Another factor influenced the Chinese Communists' views of the United States: Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal. As the Communists' saw it, the New Deal was a progressive movement moving the United States into the proper direction.\(^{126}\) They spoke highly of Roosevelt, calling him "a banner of democracy,"\(^{127}\) and when Roosevelt was elected for his fourth term, Mao Zedong sent a personal telegram to
congratulate him. Speaking at the Communist Party's Central Cadre School, Mao attributed Roosevelt's re-election to the strong support of the American working class. At one point, when the Communists were frustrated by the lack of progress in their relationship with the U.S. government, Mao and Zhou volunteered to go to Washington to meet Roosevelt, obviously confident that the great president would be able to understand the Chinese revolution better than many of his underlings. When Roosevelt died, the Communists eulogized this "democratic giant," remembering him both for his leadership in the anti-fascist war and his domestic policies. In the resolution passed by the seventh National Congress of the CCP (April 1945), Roosevelt was named together with Sun Yat-sen as a progressive forerunner, whose just cause the Communists vowed to carry on.

This is not to say that the Communists fully trusted Roosevelt; they always had their reservations and suspicions. The highest-level U.S. representative they ever received in Yan'an, Roosevelt's special envoy, Hurley, left a rather negative impression on them. The special envoy alienated the Communists not only as a politician who sided with Chiang Kai-shek but also as a man who seemed to have little respect for the Chinese. Stepping out of his airplane at the Yan'an airport in November, 1944, Hurley startled and puzzled the Communist dignitaries, who had
gathered to welcome him, by letting out a loud Indian warwhoop. Riding into town with Mao in a truck—the only motor vehicle in Yan'an—Hurley yelled at a peasant whose mule had been frightened and refused to leave the road. "Hit him on the other side, Charley!" Hurley shouted. \(^{133}\) Hurley's capitalist sentiments and personal wealth were no secrets, and, to the Chinese Communists, he seemed to epitomize a self-satisfied capitalist and a haughty imperialist.

After Roosevelt's death and the conclusion of World War Two, the Communists became increasing anxious over American intentions in China. Only a few months before the Japanese surrender, Mao had expressed his great confidence in the future of American-Soviet cooperation—"one hundred percent reliable, one thousand percent reliable." \(^{134}\) Now, with the prospect of a war with the American-supported Chinese Nationalists lying ahead, Mao swiftly changed direction. When, following the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945, some Chinese Communist propagandists who had not quite awakened to the new situation wrote to highlight and celebrate the power of America's atomic bombs, Mao was outraged. Speaking at a gathering of Party officials, Mao commented that some of his Communist comrades were far less enlightened than a bourgeois general, Lord Mountbatten, who did not believe that atomic bombs could dictate the outcome of the war. Mao warned his mistaken
comrades to "dust off the capitalist influence." Then, as the U.S. government under President Truman made increasingly clear its commitment to Chiang Kai-shek's government, the Communists concluded that reactionaries had taken control in the United States and betrayed the cause of Roosevelt. Now they had to prepare their people for an America which was bent on obstructing the Chinese revolution.

The party moved to achieve this goal. In June 1946, the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party decided to launch a nation-wide "American Troops Out of China" movement. In a circular to its regional leaders, the Party instructed them to mobilize people to urge the withdrawal of American forces and to protest Chiang Kai-shek's slavish policies toward the United States. In an editorial dated July 4, the Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao), the Communist Party's official organ, commemorated the issuance of the American "Declaration of Independence."

"This historic document," editorial stated, introduced a great tradition which was embodied by Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and Roosevelt. But the Truman administration, with its stubborn support of Chiang Kai-shek, was trampling on its great American heritage.

In September, the Communists' attention was drawn to what they called the "Wallace incident," when Henry Wallace spoke his mind on foreign policy and was forced out of his office as the Commerce Secretary. According to a Liberation
Daily editorial, the conflict between Wallace and U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes reflected the difference between small businesses and big capitalists in the United States. The former wanted to continue Roosevelt's policies, while the latter were out to defend the interests of a small group of monopoly capitalists and emerging "warlords." Another Communist publication, The Masses (Qunzhong), declared that there would be "a second Wallace, a third Wallace, and innumerable Wallaces to come." Meanwhile, although sporadic protests directed against the United States took place in China, the "American troops out of China" movement did not develop into a massive whirlwind as the Party had hoped. Only one year after the end of the war, positive feelings toward the United States still lingered in China.

This pro-American feeling went back not just to Sino-American cooperation during World War Two but to America's significant cultural presence in China in the pre-war years. In addition to the prominent role of the United States in China's higher education, American influences had reached ordinary Chinese through many channels. American missionaries of various denominations were the most visible. Before the outbreak of World War Two, more than half of all Christian missionaries to China came from the United States. In the nine years from 1928 to 1936, American Protestant churches provided about forty-five million
dollars to support missionary activities in China.\textsuperscript{142}

Much of this money was spent on education. In the 1920s, in Shangdong Province alone, American Presbyterian, Baptist and Methodist churches maintained about seven hundred elementary schools and high schools.\textsuperscript{143} Some of these schools were established through the cooperation between the missionaries and local people.\textsuperscript{144} In one case, for instance, a Taoist priest, upon his conversion to Christianity, volunteered his temple and land to the American Methodist mission for the establishment of a school. The transaction was approved and certified by the local gentry.\textsuperscript{145} During the Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s, an anti-missionary swept the country, but with the establishment of Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanjing, the tide subsided. In any event, because of the traditional Chinese regard for education, it was very hard for many Chinese parents to reject free education for their children who otherwise would go without any education at all.

Beside the churches, other American institutions also exerted their influence in China in the decades before the war with Japan. The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, committed large funds to the development of modern medicine in China, and at the center of its work was the Union Hospital and College in Beijing.\textsuperscript{146} By the end of the 1930s, 148 American-supported hospitals were operating in China.\textsuperscript{147}
Hollywood was another important player, and, in terms of number of people reached, perhaps the most important. According to some estimates, American productions accounted for seventy percent of all movies shown in China before 1949.\textsuperscript{148} One unfailing attraction of China's YMCA (established in 1885) and the YWCA (founded in 1890) was their frequent movie-showings.\textsuperscript{149} The educational authorities in Guangzhou even found a way to incorporate this popular hobby of many youngsters into the educational system: they requested pupils to watch American movies and then write essays about them.\textsuperscript{150}

After the United States entered the war against Japan, the American government made systematic efforts to enhance the positive image of the United States in China. One strong arm was the Office of War Information stations in China. The mobile movie team of the OWI based in the southwestern city of Kunming claimed a monthly audience of 250,000, and brought to the audience newsreels like "We Fly For China," showing Chinese aviators being trained in America; "Town," demonstrating American democracy in operation; and "Biography of [the] Jeep," which Chinese considered a symbol of "American resourcefulness."\textsuperscript{151} Before every show, a gong man would go through the village to sound the news, and as the "tooting vehicle crept up the narrow street", "The lone American uniform set off a chorus of Ding Hows--that thumbs up salute of good will."\textsuperscript{152}
This good will toward America was not to last, however. At the end of 1946 a massive anti-American movement suddenly broke out, causing severe damage to the Chinese image of the United States in China and accomplishing what the Chinese Communist Party had attempted but failed to do just a few months earlier. The anti-American outburst had its origin in growing tensions between the Chinese populace and American GIs stationed in China. These troops were part of a large American deployment on the Chinese coast in preparation for the anticipated Japan campaign. After the Japanese surrender, part of this American force stayed in China, as tensions between the Communists and Nationalists built up and civil war appeared inevitable. The expanded and extended direct contact between American troops and the Chinese resulted in increasing incidents of friction, which ate away at the positive image of the Americans as noble allies during the war. Eventually it led many Chinese to view Americans as arrogant and reckless brutes.

Two particular sources of this negative impression were traffic accidents and sexual relationships. Chinese streets and roads were ill-suited for motorized American forces, and soldiers stationed in a foreign land were certainly not among the world's safest drivers. In January of 1946, in Beijing, eleven traffic accidents involving American GIs took place, causing the death of one Chinese and injuring twelve. During the same period, in neighboring Tianjin,
seventeen wrecks involving American GIs killed three Chinese and injured fifteen; this was out of a total of twenty-two traffic incidents for the whole city during the month. \(^{154}\)

The psychological effect of such accidents far surpassed the actual number of casualties. The Nationalist government was high-strung about these incidents, and it made efforts to restrain the Chinese press in reporting them, anticipating rising public enmity toward the United States and toward the Chinese government. \(^{155}\) The government worried for good reasons; as the speeding, swerving, dust-throwing motorcars came to be associated with other undesirable influences, such as alcoholic and sex, they caused fear and disgust on the part of many Chinese. One popular term coined during this period--Jipu nulang, or "Jeep girl"--referred to young Chinese women who liked to hang out with American troops. One contemporary lyricist portrayed the "Jeep Girl" in the following terms:

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. . . . . . . .
What is she cruising in?
She is cruising in a Jeep.
What is she chewing?
She's chewing a piece of gum.
What is her religion?
Just worship of America.
Who is she anyway?
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An American made-in-China.\textsuperscript{156}  

Not surprisingly, sexual liaisons became an issue. They had always been a major concern of the Chinese. In the Communist base at Yan'an, one American officer stationed there with the Dixie Mission made a pass at a young Chinese woman. The matter was swiftly reported all the way to top CCP leaders, and Zhou Enlai personally contacted David Barrett, the head of the American group, "to register his disapproval."\textsuperscript{157} In the Nationalist camp, General Claire Chennault, the head of the American Aviation Group, was often bothered by reports concerning misconducts of some Group members; Chennault disciplined and discharged a few of those involved, but he also attributed the problem to the bad influence of some mischievous natives.\textsuperscript{158} The American authorities in Xi'an took such problems more seriously. Although only a small number of Americans were reportedly involved in these incidents, the impression on the Chinese populace had been striking. "All over this area," American authorities in Xi'an reported, "girls of middle school age are taught by their teachers in class that Americans are a dangerous bunch."\textsuperscript{159}  

Back in Washington, the State Department was concerned enough to consult with involved the offices of War, Navy, War Information, and Strategic Services. On April 27, 1945, the State Department instructed U.S. diplomatic posts around
the world to report on the issue. Responses received suggest that the problem was not confined to China. According to the consulate in Algiers, one of the most frequent complaints of the French was that "Americans are unable to distinguish between 'good' or 'bad' women," and that "many [Americans] tend to view all Frenchwomen as 'bad' and to behave toward them accordingly." Officials in Jerusalem reported Orthodox Jews were dismayed over Jewish girls going out with American soldiers. From Brussels, word came that while on the whole American troops conducted themselves in any exemplary way, sometimes their "free-and-easy manner" was "interpreted as rudeness, or even brutality", and "excesses committed by individual members . . . in [the] realm of wine and women, if not of the proverbial song, did not advance the cause of Belgian-American understanding." 

If any efforts were made to deal with these problems, they came too late in China. As 1946 came to an end, the news broke out in Beijing that, the night before Christmas, Sgt. Pearson of the U. S. Marines had abducted and raped a nineteen-year old Chinese girl and was arrested at the scene. Pearson was later convicted by a U.S. military court but absolved by the Department of Navy after he had been returned to the United States. Following the Chinese government's failure to keep the incident from being publicized, it caused a great uproar in China. To many
Chinese this was the last straw. The incident was highly visible, since it took place in Beijing and involved a prep-student of Beijing University from a prominent family, a granddaughter of a general under the former Qing Dynasty. The incident rubbed the raw nerves of a proud people whose country, after suffering years of war and chaos, stood on the brink of bankruptcy. Anger and frustration exploded. On December 30, mass demonstrations led by Chinese students took place in Beijing. Within days an "anti-American violence" movement spread to major cities all across the country.  

Although the new anti-American movement took place spontaneously, the Chinese Communist Party acted quickly to play a leading role in it. On December 31, 1946, the day after the demonstrations had started in Beijing, the central leadership of the Communist Party telegraphed party officials in both Communist controlled-areas and the underground in the Nationalist regions, directing them to take immediate actions to agitate for the movement. The explicit goal was the withdrawal of American forces from China and the end of American interference in China's internal affairs.  

Five days later, on January 5, 1947, the Communist headquarters sent another telegram to its regional leaders, providing further guidance on the anti-American movement. Party officials were to "recognize the great significance of
the movement", which, according to the central leadership, "marks the arrival of the high tide in the nationwide revolution." Fearing that some party cadres still did not truly understand the situation, the top leadership sent yet another telegram the next day, criticizing some party officials for being overcautious and "lagging behind the people." The telegram urge these cadres to be more agressive. The anti-American violence movement utterly embarrassed Chiang Kai-shek and his government. On January 1, 1947, a new constitution introduced by the Nationalist government came into effect; but instead of celebrating the dawning of a new era, the government found itself scrambling to suppress angry protesters throughout the country. Less than a month later, the U. S. government declared that it would withdraw all remaining American forces from China; this had been in the U.S. government's plan for some time, but the rising anti-American tide in China certainly made the early enactment of the plan more desirable. On January 31, in an inner party directive, Mao Zedong hailed the great progress achieved in "the nationwide struggle against imperialism and feudalism." "The student movement which began in Peiping [Beijing] has spread to other big cities all over the country," Mao noted--a movement that he later termed the "second front" in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. "All circumstances now show that the situation in China is
about to enter a new stage of development", Mao observed, and he expressed full confidence in an early Communist victory. Mao had good reasons to be optimistic. The anti-American movement drastically transformed the atmosphere in China, and put Chiang Kai-shek and the United States on trial for moral deficiency—an significant event in a country where all politics were cultural politics. Three years of war were still ahead, but the Communists had won a critical battle.
Notes

1. Liang Qichao, Liang Qichao shiwen xuan (Selected essays and poems of Liang Qichao), ed. Fang Zhiqin and Liu Sifen (Guangzhou, Guangdong: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 522.

2. Ibid, 521.


5. Liang Qichao, Xindalu youji (New continent travel notes) (Xinmin Congbao), 1.


7. Ibid., 191.

8. Liang Qichao, Xindalu youji (New continent travel notes) (Hunan Renmin Chubanshe), 151.


10. Ibid., 800.

11. Ibid., 801.

12. Liang Qichao, Xindalu youji (New Continent travel notes) (Hunan Renmin Chubanshe), 74-5.

13. Ibid., 78-9.


15. Liang Qichao, Xindalu youji (New Continent travel notes) (Xinmin Congbao), 35.

16. Liang Qichao, Xindalu youji (New Continent travel notes) (Hunan Renmin Chubanshe), 48.
17. Ibid., 45.

18. Ibid., 48.


20. Liang Qichao, "Meiguo zhengzhi lueping" (On politics of the United States), ibid., 792.


22. Liang Qichao, Xindalu youji (New Continent travel notes) (Hunan Renmin Chubanshe), 148.

23. In this article I have used the Pinyin system for all Chinese names except the following, which are better known in the West by these designations: Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Soong Mei-ling.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid., 323.


29. Ibid., vol. 8, 476-77.

30. Ibid., 320.


32. Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongshan quanji (Complete works of Sun Zhongshan), vol. 5 (1985), 475.
33. Ibid. 2:520.
34. Ibid., 333.
36. Ibid. 8:521-2.
39. Ibid.
40. Chiang Kai-shek, Jiang Zongtong ji (Works of President Chiang), vol. 1, 150.
42. Chiang Kai-shek, Jiang Zongtong ji (Works of President Chiang), vol. 1, 135.
44. Xing qingnian (New youth), 1915, no. 1.
45. Ibid.
46. Xing Qingnian (New youth), 1915, no. 2.
47. Ibid., 1916, no. 5; ibid., no. 6.
49. Ibid., 372, 483.
50. Ibid., 520.
51. Ibid., 556.
52. "You Meiguo ji lai de yifeng xin" (A letter from America), Minguo ribao, 20 February 1923.


55. Ibid.


57. Ibid., 33-5.

58. Ibid. 1:223.


61. Ibid. 9:181-7.


64. Ibid.


66. Ibid., 30.


70. Ibid., vol. 4, no. 4, 617.


72. Ibid., 268-9.

73. Ibid., 1051.

74. ibid., 149.

75. Having been criticized for the idea, Hu Shi later invented a substitute which he believed to be better: congfeng shijiehua, or "full internationalization."

76. Hu Shi, "Shiping suowei de 'Zhongguo beiwei de wenhua jianshe'" (On the so-called 'China-based cultural construction'), Duli pinglun (Independent criticism), no. 145, 4-7.

77. Hu Shi, Hu Shi wencun (Collected works of Hu Shi), 3:1, 10-12.

78. Ibid., 28.

79. Hou Wailu, "Jielu Mei Diguozhuyi nucai Hu Shi de fandong mianmao" (Uncover the true face of Hu Shi, a slave of American imperialism), in Hu Shi cixiang pipan (Criticism of Hu Shi thought), vol. 3 (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1955), 60.

80. Hu Shi, Hu Shi yanlun ji (Collected Speeches of Hu Shi), vol. 2 (1953), 35.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., 29.

83. Li Rui, Yaodong zashu (Notes from caves) (Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 293.


86. Zhongguo xiandai shi renwu zhuang (Characters in history of modern China), 696.

88. Li Xin, Minguo renwu zhuan (Characters of Republican China), vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1978), 343.

89. Tao Xingzhi, Tao Xingzhi quanji (Complete works of Tao Xingzhi), vol. 2 (1984), 700.

90. Ibid., 24.

91. Ibid. 5:188-91.

92. Ibid. 2:701.

93. Li Xin, Minguo renwu zhuan (Characters of Republican China), vol. 1 (1978), 344.

94. Tao Xingzhi, Tao Xingzhi quanji (Complete works of Tao Xingzhi), 2:180-4.

95. Ibid., 756.

96. Ibid., 757.

97. Ibid., 182.

98. Zhou Yi, Tao Xingzhi huaxing shijie lu (Tao Xingzhi's journey around the globe) (Nanjing, Jiangsu: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 98-101.

99. Tao Xingzhi, Tao Xingzhi quanji (Complete works of Tao Xingzhi), vol. 3 (1985), 567.

100. Ibid., 5:930-4.

101. Zhongguo xiandai renwu zhuan (Characters in history of modern China), 511; Zou Taofen, Taofen wenji (Collected works of Taofen), vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Salian Shudian, 1957), 5.

102. Ibid., 10.[5308]

103. Zou Taofen, Taofen wenji (Collected works of Taofen), vol. 3 (Hong Kong: Salian Shudian, 1957), 490.

104. Taofen, Pingzong yiyu (Travel recollections) (Shanghai: Shenghuo Shudian, 1937), 1-12.

105. Taofen, Pingzong yiyu (Travel recollections), 250-300.


108. Ibid., 48-55.


110. Ibid., 509-510.

111. Ibid., 145-52.

112. Ibid., 153-60.


114. Ibid., 595, 550.

115. Ibid., 540.

116. Ibid., 512.

117. Ibid., 688-9.

118. 5192-5191


122. Ibid.

123. Shi Xiangrong, "Heping meigui chuan youyi" (Rose is for peace and friendship), Zhongheng, no. 1, 1984, 95-98.

124. Chen Duxiu, "Wo de genben yijian" (My final opinion), in Zhanwang Editorial Board, ed., *Zongguo wenti lunji* (Essays on the China problem), 143.

126. Bai Laode, "Meiquo minzhu zhenxian de yingqi" (The emergence of America's democratic front), Quanzhong zhoukan, 2:3 (25 June 1938), 473-4.


128. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong ji bujuan (Supplementary to collected works of Mao Zedong), vol. 7 (1985), 205.

129. Ibid., 223.


131. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong ji bujuan (Supplementary to collected works of Mao Zedong), 7:255; "Minzhu juren Luo Sifu" (Democratic giant Roosevelt), Quanzhong (The masses), 10:7-8 (combined issue), 220.

132. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong ji bujuan (Supplementary to collected works of Mao Zedong), 7:281.


134. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong ji bujuan (Supplementary to collected works of Mao Zedong), 7:226.

135. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan (Selected writings and speeches on journalism by Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1982), 130.


137. In Quanzhong (The masses), vol. 11, no. 10 (30 June 1946), 7-8.

138. Editorial, "Lun Hualaishi shijian" (On the Wallace Incident), Liberation Daily (Liberation daily), in Zhengbao xunkan, No. 8 (October 1946), 5.

139. Zhiren, "Cong Beieinasi dao Hualaishi" (From Byrnes to Wallace), Quanzhong (The masses), 12:9, 81.
140. Qunzhong, 12:10; Zhengbao xunkan, no. 9 (October 1946), 26-7.

141. Wei Zichu, Meidi zai Hua jingji qinlue (Imperialist America's economic invasion of China), 27-9.

142. Ibid., 32.


144. Ibid., 157-8.

145. Ibid., 163.

146. Wei Zichu, Meiquo zai Hua Jingji qinlue (Imperialist America's economic invasion of China), 32.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid; Liu Kang, Wei Jian, and Qiu Qingrong, "Kangzhan shengli hou Meiquo dianyin zai Guangzhou de fanlan" (American movies flooded Guangzhou after the Resistance War), Guangzhou wenshi ziliao (xuanji) (Guangzhou historical materials [selected]), no. 20 (1980), 174.

149. Wei Zichu, Meidi zai Hua jingji qinlue (Imperialist America's economic invasion of China), 29.


152. Ibid.

153. Meijun zhu Hua shiqi de yuezhai (Crimes committed by American troops during the occupation of China) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1950), 2-3.

154. Ibid., 14-5.

155. Ibid., 17.

156. Dagongbao (Beijing), 31 January 1947, 10.

158. Claire Chennault to W. K. Lin, 12 December 1941; Claire Chennault to Peter S. T. Shih, 23 February 1942, the Claire Chennault collection, Box 1, Accession no. 67002-8M.39, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.


161. Department of State Decimal File, 811.22/7-1345.

162. Ibid., 811.22/7-245.

163. Ibid., 811.22/7-2345.

164. Qunzhong (The masses) (Shanghai), vol. 14, no. 1 (1 January 1947); vol. 14, no. 2 (13 January 1947).

165. Tuan Zhongyang Qingyun Shi Yanjiu Shi and Zhongyang Dangan Guan, Zhonggong Zhongyang qingnian yundong wenjian xuanbian (Selected Chinese Communist Party's documents on youth movement), 636-7.

166. Ibid., 541-2.

167. Ibid., 644.


CHAPTER 2
"FAREWELL, LEIGHTON STUART!":
CHINA DECLARES WAR ON AMERICA, THE EARLY 1950S

On October 1, 1949, atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Beijing, Mao Zedong pronounced the founding of the People's Republic of China. A new epoch had begun which would drastically alter all aspects of Chinese life, including America's role in China.

The Communist victors who came to power in 1949 owed little to the United States or the American Way. If anything, they had triumphed in spite of America. They had first endeavored, unsuccessfully, to break down American support for Chiang Kai-shek; they then fought a fierce war, crushing Chiang's American-armed Nationalist forces. In the eyes of Chinese Communists, the persistent American backing of Chiang Kai-shek simply confirmed the reactionary nature of the United States.

The American Way had no appeal to Mao and his revolutionary colleagues, either. In their long, strenuous struggle for power, the Communists had derived their strength from iron discipline and stringent indoctrination; laissez faire was not part of their strategy. They had briefly courted the Americans in the early 1940s out of pragmatic calculation as well as the wishful thought that
Roosevelt was turning America toward socialism—an idea that died hard. In philosophy as well as in temperament, Chinese Communists remained strongly hostile toward America. It was no surprise, therefore, that the victorious Mao and his comrades had nothing but harsh words for the United States, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War in the middle of 1950 when they clashed head on with the Americans; more noteworthy was how China's new anti-Americanism surged with the high tide of the social and political revolution that was sweeping across the country.

I

Looking back at the developments during the eventful year from mid-1949 to mid-1950, some Chinese and Americans may lament how the sudden eruption of the Korean War destroyed any prospect of a work relationship between the newly founded People's Republic of China and the United States. History being the way it happened, the Chinese and the Americans fought a bloody war on the Korean peninsula, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet started to patrol the Taiwan Strait, sowing the seed of the extreme anomosity between the China and the United States, an unfortunate condition that could only be remedied twenty years later when Mao and Nixon shook hands in Beijing. Had the Korean War not broke out,
would the history of Sino-American relations have been thoroughly different?

While the above-described speculation may seem to have some merit, a closer look at China's domestic scene at the time indicates otherwise. The great Chinese Revolution being what it was, it is hard to imagine that Chinese Communists would have drastically altered their views of the United States even if there had not been the Korea War. As Chinese Communists claimed China and set about to create a new revolutionary state, the conquerors had little to gain in a liberal liaison with the United States: it would only give false hope to certain elements in China who would like to think that the old days were not really coming to an end. It was, in short, much simpler for the Communists to start from a clean slate than to deal with all the political, economic, and ideological complications that a continuing American presence in China would cause. As Mao Zedong himself put it, he would rather "clean house first and invite guests thereafter."¹

Two sets of Chinese Communist documents on the United States published in mid-1949 emphasized this domestic dimension of China's America issue. The first was known as Meiguo shouce, or The United States Handbook, prepared for the use of Chinese Communist cadre; the second consisted of a number of commentaries that Mao Zedong penned for the New China News Agency. These two sets of works revealed how
Chinese Communists shifted their emphasis in their rhetoric on the United States, as the political landscape in China underwent rapid changes.

The United States Handbook was by far the most sophisticated work on the United States ever produced by the Chinese Communists up to 1949. A group of Communist experts on international affairs, led by Ke Bainian, a ranking Communist theorist, had begun writing it in 1947. The impetus to the project, as Ke reported in his preface to the book, was the desire to "provide a book that presents an authentic and complete picture of real America."² At this time, Chinese Communists were locked in mortal combat with the seemingly far stronger Nationalists backed by the United States, and the outcome of the conflict was far from certain. Quite naturally the Communists wanted to know all they could about the ally of their enemy. The participants of the project worked diligently and conscientiously. "A dozen or so of us," Ke reported, "labored on the project for a year and a half, discussing [matters] among ourselves profusely, and revising the manuscript several times, before we finally brought it to completion."³

Compared to Communist works on the United States produced after 1949, The United States Handbook is remarkable for its temperateness. To be sure, it is not free from ideological bias and indeed is studded with political verdicts throughout. But the general tone of the

The book opens with simple entries such as: "Where is the United States located?"⁵ "When was America discovered?"⁶ "Who were Washington, Hamilton and Jefferson?"⁷ No issues were too small or trivial for the compilers, who also answered questions such as "Does U.S. President wear a uniform?"⁸ and "What is the origin of the expression 'Uncle Sam'?"⁹

The comprehensiveness of the **Handbook** is matched by its candidness. It frankly acknowledges, for instance, the abundance of natural resources in the United States and the country's vast economic power. "The United States is the strongest of all the capitalist nations," the **Handbook** observes, noting that "before the War it accounted for thirty percent of the world's total coal output, . . . thirty-five percent of the world's steel. . . and sixty percent of the world's oil." The **Handbook** goes on to say that American farmers produce half of the grain in the world, American automobile manufacturers make eighty percent
of all the cars in the world, and, "after the War, the United States accounted for fifty percent of the world's total industrial capacity."\textsuperscript{10}

Similar candidness is evident in the Handbook's discussions of political issues. For instance, it introduces in great detail the Taft-Hartley Act, and although it argues that the law governing labor and management relations indicated the "further fascistization of the U.S. government,"\textsuperscript{11} it also points out that the Act had not been very popular with many Americans, and that in fact "Truman successfully ran for re-election . . . based on his opposition to the Act."\textsuperscript{12} The Handbook contains an entry on the Wagner Act, which, it states, is "the most important federal legislation that protects workers' right to unionize" and which "outlaws practices such as 'yellow dog contracts,' 'black lists,' and 'company unions.'"\textsuperscript{13} At another point, while applauding the "heroic growth"\textsuperscript{14} of the progressive movement in the United States, the Handbook provides a generally realistic estimate of it, acknowledging that most America's progressive organizations "are very small and instable," very often founded "to address specific issues and thus [they] exist only for short durations."\textsuperscript{15}

The Handbook includes a lengthy section on the American news media. It starts off with a discussion of the Daily Worker, but goes on to list eleven other important daily papers, the circulation numbers of which all towered over
that of the Daily Worker's modest 22,500. The New York Times, the Handbook declares, "represents the viewpoint of conservative Democrats," but "it turned to support the Republican Party in the 1948 election."\(^{16}\) The Chicago Tribune, "the third largest daily," "belongs to the MacCormick system and is a notorious fascist paper."\(^{17}\) The Christian Science Monitor, on the other hand, "is moderately enlightened on both domestic and international affairs."\(^{18}\)

The introduction to American journals and magazines starts with the Masses and Mainstream, "the authoritative publication of the American left,"\(^ {19}\) and follows up with twenty-five other periodicals. Time, Life, and Fortune, according to the Handbook, "are the three leading magazines owned by Luce... [and therefore] extremely reactionary."\(^ {20}\) The Reader's Digest, we learn, is another "widely circulated reactionary publication, strongly anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and anti-democratic." Its articles, says the Handbook, "used to be frequently cited by the Nazis."\(^ {21}\) In contrast, the Nation, "a liberal journal slightly to the right," supported "the deceased President Roosevelt's policies." The New Republic expressed the "liberal views of lower and middle bourgeois American intellectuals," although recently the journal "has turned against [Henry] Wallace," its former editor.\(^ {22}\)

Thus, although The United States Handbook was guided by Marxist ideology in its overall estimate of the United
States, it nonetheless provided a fairly thorough and reasonably balanced picture of the United States, with both positive and negative traits. Prepared in order to equip the Chinese with "knowledge of the enemy," it demonstrated a respect for the facts and even, perhaps, a respect for the adversary.

This was to change shortly. By the time Ke Bainian and his colleagues' Handbook made its appearance in July 1949, the conditions in China had changed greatly from one and a half years before. By this time, the Communist forces had swept through most of the country, smashing Nationalist remnants everywhere they went; their complete victory was now just a matter of time. At this point, it had also become clear that the United States would not intervene directly on the behalf of Chiang Kai-shek. In view of these developments, the Chinese Communists grew more confident in their relationship with the United States, or, to put it more precisely, they grew more confident in their lack of a relationship with the United States. They could now afford not to deal with the Americans, and would thus gain a completely free hand in China.

Obviously that was how Mao Zedong viewed the situation. Writing on June 30, 1949, in response to those who had charged the Chinese Communist Party with "leaning to one side" in the emerging Soviet-American confrontation, Mao stated emphatically and remorselessly that "leaning to one
side" was "exactly" what the new government would do. "Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road," Mao declared. He then added:

Only if we draw a clear line between reactionaries and revolutionaries, expose the intrigues and plots of the reactionaries, arouse the vigilance and attention of the revolutionary ranks, heighten our will to fight and crush the enemy's arrogance, can we isolate the reactionaries, vanquish them or supersede them.

In other words, the United States was now relevant to the Chinese Revolution only in the sense that it would help distinguish "them" from "us," the reactionaries from the revolutionaries.

On August 14, 1949, Mao penned a commentary for the Communist Party's Xinhua News Agency entitled "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle." This was the first of five articles Mao authored over the course of one month in response to the China White Paper that the U.S Department of State had recently released. Through these commentaries, Mao defined the America issue for New China and set the tone for his party's rhetoric on the United States in the immediate future.

It was clear from the very beginning that Mao was not writing for an audience in Washington. He was addressing
the Chinese people. Mao found one passage in Dean Acheson's Letter of Transmittal to President Truman particularly annoying. In it, Acheson stated:

\[\ldots\text{ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end.}\]

Mao reacted scornfully. He first laughed at Acheson, claiming that most "Chinese students, teachers, professors, technicians, engineers, doctors, scientists, writers, artists and government employees, were [already] revolting against or parting company with" Chiang Kai-shek. He then acknowledged that some of China's intellectuals "still want to wait and see." They are, he said,

\[\ldots\text{unwilling to draw a distinction between the U.S. imperialists, who are in power, and the American people, who are not. They are easily duped by the honeyed words of the U.S. imperialists. \ldots They are the supporters of what Acheson calls 'democratic individualism.' The deceptive maneuvers of Acheson still have a flimsy social base in China.}\]
"Flimsy" as this "social base" was, Mao somehow could not ignore the problem, and it remained a central issue in his subsequent commentaries on the White Paper. To awaken or discredit China's "democratic individualists," Mao kept hammering away at the United States. In "Friendship or Aggression?", Mao characterized the history of Sino-American relations from 1840 onward as one of American imperialist expansion in China, and suggested that "it should be written into a concise textbook for the education of Chinese youth."28 In "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!", Mao undertook to downplay the importance of America as an advanced and progressive nation. He admitted that the United States had impressive science and technology, but Mao pointed out that it was controlled by the American capitalists, who used it to "exploit and oppress the people at home and to perpetrate aggression and to slaughter people abroad."29 There is also "democracy" in the United States, Mao further wrote, but it is this so-called democracy that supported "the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, who are rotten to the core."30

In "Why It Is Necessary to Discuss the White Paper," Mao took on the issue of "informed and critical public opinion," which, Acheson had claimed, "totalitarian governments, whether Rightist or Communist, cannot endure and do not tolerate."31 Acheson's "informed and critical public opinion," Mao stated, was nothing more than the propaganda of the American capitalist media, "which are
controlled by the two reactionary parties in the United States. . . and which specialize in the manufacture of lies and in threats against the people."32 The U.S. government still holds up "a veil of democracy," Mao observed, but, as the class struggle intensifies, the veil "has been cut down to a tiny patch," and American democracy is no longer "what it used to be in the days of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln."33

In his last commentary on the White Paper, Mao warned his countrymen not to be deceived by American propaganda; Acheson's appeal to Chinese "democratic individualists" only revealed the American imperialists' evil intention to "organize a U.S. fifth column" to overthrow the new Chinese revolutionary government. This effort, Mao went on to say, "has . . . [only] alerted the Chinese, especially those tinged with liberalism, who are promising each other not to be taken in by the Americans."34

Obviously, however, the Chinese Communist Party felt that it could not rely entirely on voluntary "promising." Before long, therefore, a public campaign was under way attacking the White Paper and American influence in China. In Shanghai, for instance, Chen Yi, the Communist commander in East China and later China's Foreign Minister, spoke to a "study conference" for professors in China's largest city which had only recently been captured by the People's Liberation Army. "It would be naive," Chen stated, "to
think that the kind of "democratic individualists' anticipated [by Acheson] in the White Paper no longer exist in New China," and he urged his audience to "cleanse, organizationally as well as ideologically, so that imperialist viruses will not infiltrate."35

An agenda had thus been set. The goal was to eradicate American influence, which, in the form of "democratic individualism," constituted a significant obstacle to the Chinese Revolution. Under the pressure of this urgent agenda, no room existed for the relatively balanced exploration and exposition of America which had marked the approach of Ke Bainian and his colleagues in compiling their United States Handbook. "Why can't we live without the United States?"36 Mao had asked rhetorically, and the answer seemed to be that New China would be far better off without all the complications caused by lingering American influence. Indeed, a sweeping rejection of the United States would greatly boost the Chinese Revolution. A line had thus already been drawn in the sand, and the Korean War that broke out in mid-1950 only cut the groove deeper.

II

What was the experience of the "democratic individualists" in China, the mere mention of whom by
Acheson caused Mao so much anxiety? How did they fare during this period, now that the Chinese Communist Party had targeted them as the dangerous personification of American influence in China?

In fact, the people whom the Chinese Communist Party perceived as sinister trouble-makers behaved rather docilely; few of them ever openly expressed their reservations as the Communists established themselves in the country. Why? In the first place, the Communist victory marked the end of a long period of internal disturbances and foreign invasions, and this was a welcome development for many Chinese, regardless of the nature of the new authority. Secondly, Mao's aggressive assault on "democratic individualism" paid off; he intimidated many Chinese intellectuals into silence before they could decide what they would like to say. Thirdly, the outbreak of the Korean War seemed to validate Mao's conclusion that the United States posed a deadly threat to the Chinese Revolution; anyone who spoke on behalf of the United States would now risk the charge of treason. Last but not least—and this is our major concern here—Chinese intellectuals witnessing the Communist victory found themselves in a morally vulnerable position.

Prior to 1949, China's middle or upper-middle class "culture men," many of them educated in the West, had for decades advocated the liberal cause in China, only to see
their country sink ever deeper into chaos and anarchism. Then came the rescuers, simple, sturdy peasant-soldiers who were well organized and disciplined, and whose inarticulateness and lack of self-importance only underscored the fact that they were fighting for a goal larger than the individual. The bourgeois world view was thus challenged by the pastoral; the foreign by the indigenous; the individualistic by the socialistic. It was not an evenly matched contest. A sense of moral and cultural inadequacy thus overwhelmed many Chinese intellectuals, who became self-critical and actively sought to resurrect themselves. One means, of course, was to renounce their American connection.

The negation of self in favor of the Great Revolution came about early in the lives of at least a few young Chinese who became rising stars in New China's intellectual life. One of these early converts was Huang Hua. A former student at Yenching University, the American missionary school in Beijing, Huang had joined the Communists during the anti-Japanese war. In 1949, Huang appeared in Nanjing as a young Communist diplomat, and, in his new capacity, he chastized John Leighton Stuart, his former president at Yenching and U.S. ambassador to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, for his part in America's ill-conceived China policy.37

Sharing the same educational experience was Yang Gang,
another Yenching graduate and a strong-minded and quick-witted young woman who became a dazzling journalist for the prominent liberal newspaper Dagong Bao in the late 1930s and early 1940s. From 1944 to 1948, Yang lived in the United States, as a "student" at Radcliffe College and as a columnist for her newspaper back home. In her U.S. correspondence, Yang severely condemned America for putting money ahead of humanity, and for turning away from the great legacy of Franklin Roosevelt, and for drifting into an anti-democratic and anti-Soviet hysteria after World War Two.

In 1948, as the Chinese Communists tightened their hold on China, Yang Gang returned from the United States. Not surprisingly, she was warmly received at the Communist headquarters in North China where top Party leaders lavishly praised her reports on the United States. This prepared for her a glistening official career, which would eventually see her serving in the new regime's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Office of the Prime Minister, and as the Communist Party's press director on foreign affairs. When Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, Yang Gang, at this point still a journalist, was at hand to witness the event, which she reported in breathless exhilaration:

Our thousand years-old great hope, our thousand years-old quest for a state of independence, democracy,
peace, unity and prosperity, will no longer be just a
dream. . . it is coming true. I know, for yesterday I
 beheld the inauguration."\(^1\)

Yang's enthusiasm for New China fit well with her
negative views of America. Writing the preface for her
collection of writings on the United States to be published
in Beijing in 1951, Yang reasserted her opinion that the
United States was no more than a battleground for bull-
fighters who fought to kill. The United States possessed a
"raider's mentality," Yang stated, which encourages "people
to fend for themselves only and care little for others," and
which "exalts extreme freedom but calls for no
responsibility for fellow men and society."\(^2\) The year
before, Yang had written about F. O. Matthiessen, a leftist
professor she got to know while taking courses at Harvard
University, who had recently committed suicide by jumping
out of a window. Yang remembered Matthiessen as a warm,
progressive intellectual, and expressed her "shock and
anger" at his death, which she believed had resulted from
persecution for his political views. People like
Matthiessen, an "honest man with a conscience," indicated
that the "American bourgeois democratic tradition" was still
fighting the tide of "American imperialism and militarism,"
but his death revealed to Yang the "feebleness and
helplessness of that tradition."\(^3\)
Only a few Chinese intellectuals had achieved this level of "enlightenment" (to borrow a word from Yang Gang) by the time the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, and most of them had been forced to reexamine their own lives by the new reality now surrounding them. They were not all as enchanted with Communism as Yang Gang, but many of them did reveal varying degrees of guilt and remorse for their ineffectual past. For instance, when some fellow urbanites sneered at the crassness of the newly arrived Communist soldiers, Cao Juren, a West-educated writer came to their defense:

I myself have muddled along in metropolises for more than two decades, and I have felt as [Oswald] Spengler once did. We lived in a "modern civilized world": a 1950 car, sweet and charming socialites, air-conditioned skyscrapers, dazzling lights, dance and songs, so on and so forth. With all this, what did we achieve? Void and despair. . . . This metropolitan existence was nothing more than an imitation of Hollywood life.  

The suspicion of self-inadequacy and a proclivity for self-criticism, both of which were deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture, paralyzed many Chinese intellectuals facing the Communist conquest. Many of them
surely had serious doubts about various policies and practices of the Communists, but the general circumstances were such that they, the intellectuals, seemed to be on the lower end of the moral scale; they appeared to be the individualistic and the self-centered at a time when an historic experiment in collectivism was unfolding--one which seemed to be bettering the life of millions of common Chinese. The Communists, of course, did not miss an opportunity to reinforce this impression.

Thus, when many Chinese scholars and scientists confessed their "failings" and "vices," as was often the case in the early 1950s, they did so not just under political coercion, but also out of a genuine sense of inadequacy and imperfection. Most of their confessed deficiencies were personal traits that never sat very well with traditional Chinese mores and were now in conflict with the Communist revolutionary culture. Their only intellectual support--the Western individualist liberal tradition--could not withstand these twin pressures; it crumbled into fine pieces.

Since America-educated scholars and scientists constituted the dominant element in pre-Liberation China's academic life, the influence of the United States was often singled out as the main source of what was now considered immoral and ignoble. The most common theme was how the United States inspired a selfish, individualistic quest for
fame and accomplishment, and how such personal struggles diverged from the true interests of the "people." Thus we find Professor Zhou Peiyuan, a leading physicist and the Provost of Qingham University in Beijing, criticizing himself for "seeing only my own greatness and hardly anybody or anything else."\(^{46}\) Zhou wrote about how his study at Qinghua in the beginning of the century, then a prep school for Chinese students bound for universities in the United States, sowed the seed for his ambition to become a "scholar of international reputation,"\(^{47}\) and how, with such single-mindedness, upon his arrival in the United States in the 1920s, he "saw only skyscrapers and automobiles" but "not the miserable life of the working people."\(^{48}\)

Having returned to China with his individualistic world-view immensely reinforced, Zhou went on to say, he practiced and preached the doctrine of "expertise above everything else" and thus stayed away and kept others away from the rising revolutionary tide.\(^{49}\) Recently, however, even his children rebelled against him, Zhou related. His teenage daughter, in defiance of his father's plan for her to finish high school and then attend college, volunteered to join a corps of Communist cadres being transported to South China. When he attempted to sabotage her plan by sending her to a hospital, his daughter walked out.\(^{50}\)

This perceived conflict between personal interests and the greater good was also the theme in the self-criticism of
Dr. Zhou Jinhuang of the Beijing Union Medical College, the leading medical institution in the city founded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Zhou recalled that in 1949 he was considering leaving his job in the city of Wuhan to take up a position at his alma mater in Beijing when the newly established Communist government in Wuhan invited him to stay on; he struggled with himself for several months, and in the end decided to leave for Beijing. Although there were some respectable reasons for making this decision, Zhou confessed that he was concerned primarily with his own career. He had chosen the better working conditions at the Union College at a time when Wuhan urgently needed his services. He was "one of the `experts' trained at the old Union College," Zhou wrote, an education that had instilled in him an unhealthy "liberal individualism," which induced him to place personal accomplishment above everything else. According to the tradition of this institution, Zhou admitted, "no one Union man has worked for long periods of time" in the countryside "to serve the people." Moreover, his colleagues at the Union College had been notoriously slow in exploring medical treatments that were readily accessible to peasants.

In Shanghai, Zheng Junli, a celebrated film director, also dug deep into his background to account for the detestible "bourgeois individualism that has long pervaded me." Zheng grew up as the son of a petty grocer who was
constantly pressed and humiliated by his creditors; this experience, according to Zheng, made an ferocious individualist out of him, someone who was quite susceptible to American influences. In order to be successful in the movie industry, Zheng recalled, he "whole-heartedly embraced American cinematic commercialism," and, in doing so, he jettisoned himself "the little revolutionary education I had received in the past" and betrayed the progressive theater movement of which he had been a part. In fact, although Zheng did not mention it at the time, in the 1930s he had worked closely with a progressive actress named Lan Ping, who left Shanghai for the barren Northwest to join the Communists, and who later married Chairman Mao under the name Jiang Qing.

The search into the dark corners of one's mental world was conducted not only by established intellectuals but also by educated Chinese of lesser status. While the seniors bore a burden that was somewhat intellectual, the juniors' perceived problems had more to do with their growing up and were thus more personal in nature. Those with a substantial American element in their upbringing appeared to be the most problematic—what could be worse for a youth to be viewed and rejected by his or her "progressive" peers as a spoiled egoist? Chen Jieying, a woman student in architecture at Jiaotong University in Beijing, decided to come clean. Her father, an engineer, worked in the United States, and her
youthful fantasies always involved her father and America. As she grew up, Chen related, she started "modeling myself after American movie stars," indulging in expensive clothes and playing games with boyfriends.56

On the eve of the Communist takeover, Chen's father took her out of China, first to Hong Kong, then to a university in Illinois. But Chen was not happy; she remembered once hosting a party that lasted three days and nights, but she still felt an emptiness inside.57 At the university in Illinois, she abandoned home economics, experimented with journalism, and eventually majored in architecture. But she did not finish her study there, for, influenced by some progressive friends, she decided to return to China, now under Communist control. Back in the country, she and her fellow students were dispatched to countryside to organize and mobilize peasants, an experience that Chen considered the most satisfying and enlightening of her life. She was still quite wary of her past, however, and constantly inspected herself for signs of weakness. At the local school's dancing parties, for instance, she was still inclined to feel that Chinese music was not as "interesting" as American jazz. Furthermore, she had become accustomed to milk and bread, and since the school served only sorghum soup, she still had an "urge to eat out."58

Such soul-searching and self-criticism suggests that the war against "democratic individualism," which caused Mao
Zedong so much anxiety, was fought not only on the political front but also on the personal front. Indeed, it seemed that the personal nature of the struggle that formed the campaign's cutting edge, for, if not all Chinese were familiar with communist terminology, they had little difficulty understanding the "right" and "wrong" of certain personal behaviors.

Still, only so much can be achieved by tapping an intellectual's guilt. When the Communist forces first liberated China, their spartan vigor and infectious idealism overwhelmed many people. But, as the victors began to rule, and in the process revealed their own shortcomings, Chinese intellectuals became emboldened. In fact, even in the earliest stages of the Communist conquest, at a time when most Chinese liberals suffered from the heavy burden of contrition, there were those who refused to be humbled or silenced. One such individual was Shi Qili, a former student who had spent thirteen years in the United States before deciding to return to China in the wake of the communist victory. Like hundreds of other eager young Chinese living abroad, he believed that with the ending of the Civil War there would be many opportunities for them to serve their country.

Shi proved to be a strong-nerved skeptic who refused to allow the communist style of moralizing to eat into him. Partly this was because he had stayed in the United States
for too long to be easily shaken from his liberal beliefs, and partly this was because he had witnessed the terror with which the communist land reform had been carried out in his home village. The latter experience aroused in him great abhorrence of the new regime's fanaticism and underscored for him the preciousness of freedom and individual rights.\textsuperscript{59} After visiting a public library in China, he defended cultural life in the United States, claiming that in America "both socialist and capitalist materials are available," "whereas here. . . one does not smell one bit of capitalism."\textsuperscript{60} He attended the Revolutionary University in Beijing, a cadre-training camp for people with backgrounds like him, but the military way of life stringently maintained at the institution only further exasperated him, such as when one of the trainees was censured for his "degenerate" act of sipping tea at a teahouse.\textsuperscript{61} Before long, Shi left China again.

So not all was well with the combat against China's "democratic individualists." Obviously the situation did not get better as time passed, for several years into the Communist era, in 1954, the Chinese government would find it necessary to step up the effort by launching a major ideological campaign against Dr. Hu Shi, China's leading pro-American liberal who had left the country for safety in the United States in 1949. Every aspect of Hu Shi's scholarship and life came under fire, particularly his
intellectual debt to John Dewey and his political ties to the United States.\textsuperscript{62} A fierce campaign it was, but a shallow one, too, for it came out primarily as a political show without real personal appeal, a make-believe struggle in which a Chinese intellectual could participate with his soul safely tucked away; few bared their innermost feelings to rendered themselves vulnerable again.

III

If a key element in the Chinese Communists' battle with China's "democratic individualists" was the message that America equals individualism which in turn denotes selfishness, the effectiveness of their policy hinged not so much on the subtlety of the message as on the vigor and thoroughness with which the message was delivered. One secret of Chinese Communists' success had always been their superior capacity to mobilize the common people. Having come into power through mass mobilization, they certainly intended to continue to practice it after 1949. The outbreak of the Korea War in June 1950 and China's subsequent involvement as American forces approached the Chinese border provided a perfect opportunity for the People's Republic to instruct the Chinese people on the evil nature of the United States. This task the Chinese
government carried out speedily and effectively as a part of a comprehensive social reorganization.

In early November 1950, one month after Chinese forces had entered Korea, the Chinese government issued its guidelines for a nationwide anti-American campaign, aimed at demolishing any favorable impressions from the pre-1949 years that might still be lingering among Chinese. These guidelines, contained in a booklet entitled How to Perceive the United States, stated that, in the past many Chinese were misled to believe that "China depends on the United States"; that "the United States is a civilized democracy from which China should learn"; and that "the United States is immensely powerful and no one can afford its ill-will." All such beliefs were erroneous, the guidelines declared, and should be dispelled. The booklet went on to put forward three straightforward themes for the crusade: "First, hate the United States, because it is the Chinese people's deadly enemy"; "second, scorn the United States, because it is a corrupt imperialist state, the headquarters of world-wide debauched reactionaries"; and "third, look down upon the United States, because it is a paper tiger and is thoroughly defeatable."

The message was clear and simple enough. More difficult was getting it across to China's hundreds of millions of peasants and city residents. But, the state had a plan: to organize a propaganda network that would extend
its tentacles into every village and workshop in China. This idea predated the central government's decision to launch a mass anti-American movement. The concept originated in Manchuria, now more properly known as the Northeast. This was the first important territory the Communists secured after World War Two, but the people in the region, who were generally better off than their compatriots in poorer parts of China, were not particularly responsive to the Communists' revolutionary messages. To contend with this problem, in the spring of 1950, the Communist authorities in the region initiated a propaganda network, or xuanchan wang, a system consisting of local activists whose duty was to explicate and promote the government's views and policies on any given issue. By the end of 1950, the Northeast party authorities would have enlisted 117,238 folk propagandists throughout the region.65

After China entered the Korean conflict in October 1950, the Chinese government, now anxiously searching for ways to rally the Chinese people for the war effort, took interest in the invention of the Northeast party organization. On January 1, 1951, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a directive instructing the party to follow the example of the Northeast and institute a nationwide propaganda network.66 In this directive, the Central Committee expressed dissatisfaction with the current condition of the party's ideological work,
noting that "erroneous and reactionary propaganda and rumors have constantly circulated among the masses without being countered," clearly referring to doubts and speculations caused by China's entering the Korean War. Together with the directive, the central government issued a list of principal themes to be emphasized by the propaganda network's publicists. Topping the list was the theme that "China has emerged as a major political and military power in the world;" its first sub-theme was that "Great victories have been won by the Chinese and Korean people in their war effort resisting the United States." \(^67\)

Regional party apparatuses responded enthusiastically. The Party Committee of East China, for instance, passed a resolution demanding that its branch organizations set up a propaganda network in six months, holding leading party officials at all levels accountable for the task. \(^68\) In the Northeast, where the idea had been first conceived, encouragement from the Party's central leadership and the fact that the region shared a border with Korea, provided new incentives for the local authorities to expand and improve their network. The coordinators of the propaganda effort formulated a few simple themes on the Korean War for their activists to deliver, such as: "American demons are worse than the Japanese"; "American demons mean to follow Japan's example, using Korea as a springboard to jump into China"; "If the American devils
came here, we would not be living the good life we enjoy right now"; "Assisting Korea is necessary, just like helping your neighbors put out a fire"; "Fighting depends on men, on morale, not on weapons"; "We have five million soldiers"; "Americans have more airplanes, but they cannot hold territory with them"; "Battleships cannot sail on dry land, can they?" and finally, "We have the Soviet big brothers to help us, so victory is ours for sure."69

The network's activists delivered these messages with great effectiveness. They were, to be certain, rather crude publicists; at the First Machinery Factory in Shenyang, for instance, of the twenty-two activists engaged, only one had received a college education, three were high school graduates, seventeen had studied in primary schools, and the other one was "roughly literate."70 But, since all of the activists were recruited from their own neighborhoods or work places, they were able to speak with their neighbors and fellow workers informally and intimately and thus reach individuals who were beyond the need of the usual government officials. Moreover, the large number of these publicists meant they were everywhere on all occasions, delivering their messages. Meng Tai, a model worker at the Anshan Steel Plant, explained to his fellow workers the feebleness of the United States in the following terms: "It is like a beast with its body over the Americas, its hind legs way back in Europe, and its front limbs stretched way out to
Asia—how long can it hold up standing like that?"\(^7\) Zhao Guoyou, a worker at the Third Machinery Factory in Shenyang, combined his personal experience with his messages. He told, for example, of his drastically changed living conditions before and after the Liberation to show why he, for one, did not want to see the Americans bring back the old days. When setbacks for the Chinese forces in Korea caused panic among fellow workers in this city close to the Chinese-Korean border, Zhao moved to live in his factory to help shore up his friends' confidence.\(^7\)

Meanwhile, the Chinese government opened another front in its battle against American influence in China, this one directed at China's Christian community, particularly American-supported missionary schools. These schools included seventeen colleges, over two hundred high schools and some fifteen hundred primary schools.\(^7\) In December 1950, the Chinese government announced new regulations governing "cultural, educational, charitable and religious institutions supported by the United States." The following month in Beijing, a conference of the affected organizations voiced their "approval" of the new policy.\(^7\) Almost simultaneously, a mass campaign got under way to cleanse the Christian community of its profound pro-Americanism. At the former American missionary school for women in Fuzhou, Hua'nan College, for instance, the students' union now suggested that Americans had cultivated on their campus a
"culture of vanity," in which students "were truly into nice dresses, good looks, money, and English--things believed to ensure social respectability." The motto for these students, the student union now claimed, was "everything by American standards," so much so that "they could hardly remember that they are Chinese students."\textsuperscript{75}

Similar vices were identified at Huiwen High School in Beijing, the oldest American missionary school in the city. Here, American magazines and movies in particular were identified as a primary source of wicked influence on boys at the school: they either encouraged violence or led students to sexual thoughts and acts. One student recalled that he would skip class to watch American movies, as many as two or three shows a day. He confessed:

My life was really very empty. I did not know what I was living for. I thought I was happy as long as I had American movies to watch, chocolate to eat, and American clothes to put on. I drank and smoked, trying to imitate the heroes in the movies.\textsuperscript{76}

His life hung on such a thin thread, the boy continued, that when American movies were no longer available after the Communist victory, he attempted suicide. In a show of their wholesale rejection of American culture, students and teachers at his school handed out several hundred American
magazines, jazz records, star photos, etc., to be destroyed in a huge bonfire.  

The government did not leave the cultural vacuum thus created unfilled. In fact, ever since 1949, particularly after the beginning of the Korean War, all forms of mass media and all public forums in China had been mobilized by the state to reach as many people as possible in the campaign against lingering American influence. In 1950, the first year the Communists were in power, China's publishing houses brought out about 1,750 translated foreign works in the humanities and social sciences, about 1,250 of which were Russian originals. Of the few dozen works dealing with the United States, most were by Soviet authors. Three publishing houses produced their own editions of Maxim Gorky's essays on the United States, *On America*. A book by R. Parker, *Conspiracy against Peace*, came out in four different editions, as did A. Bucar's *The Truth of American Diplomats*. Few literary works were translated: Jack London's *White Fang* and *Call of the Wild*, Mark Twain's *Life on the Mississippi*, and H. Fast's *Freedom Road* made up virtually the complete list of American literary writers published in China in 1950.

The next year, 1951, witnessed an explosion in the number of publications on the United States—about two hundred came out in the first three months of the year alone. This, of course, took place as an earnest response
to the eruption of the Korean War, and, predictably, almost all of the productions were propaganda pieces, meant to enhance the war effort. As such, they tended to be rather crude in content, and plainly written to be accessible to the common man. One such publication was a pictorial pamphlet from the People's Pictorial Press in Beijing, entitled *Meiquo shenghuo fangshi*, or *The American Life Style*. The tract contains no lengthy discussions, only about two dozen photos (which must have been reproduced from various American periodicals) with such captions as: "Unemployment drives people to search for sustenance in garbage cans"; "According to statistics, one-third of Americans live in such run-down houses"; "Due to Fascist agitation and racial discrimination, blacks can be whipped or even killed on account of some frivolous charges against them, and all this is tolerated by U.S. law"; "Alcoholism is one way for many Americans to escape from their misery"; and "Poverty, unemployment, and persecution turn these people into psychopaths; . . . there are two hundred thousand such patients every year."81

In a similar fashion, the East China Military Command of the People's Liberation Army produced its own anti-American materials for its soldiers. The table of contents for a supplement to the district's newspaper, entitled "The True Face of American "Civilization," for instance, lists the following: "America--a world full of secret agents," "A
man who sells his blood," "Suicide, robbery, and striking it rich," and "Heaven for dogs, hell for people." 82

Like the publishing industry, Chinese theater was also enlisted in delivering anti-American messages. Crass but straightforward plays were quickly written and produced, some by eager amateurs, others by experienced playwrights who had decided to part ways with their individualistic past and start working for a good cause. In Zhuanbian (Change), a one-act play by a group of dramatists dealing with the last months of the American presence on the mainland, a family in Beijing cannot agree on what to think of the United States. The eldest son and his sister are diehard admirers of the United States, until they are cheated irrespectively—a commercial transaction and a "romantic" relationship with their American friends. 83 Again, the story exemplifies the common practice of equating personal conduct with national politics. Cao Yu, a prominent dramatist known for his depictions of the decaying bourgeoisie in pre-Liberation China, attempted something more upbeat in his Minglong de tian (Bright sky). In this play, Cao relates how an America-trained scientist finally awakens to the futility and injustice of his individualistic ways, bids farewell to American influence and devotes himself to serving the people. 84

A theatrical effort to tackle American life head-on was made by Hong Shen, another well-known Chinese playwright.
Hong had visited the United States in the late 1940s and thus possessed some first-hand knowledge of his subject. But his play--like many of its time and purpose--is a farcical assault on the United States. The drama features a senator who deals with everyone but always manages to do so within legal bounds; a former FBI agent who now edits Red Channels and who uses his publication to blackmail progressive Americans; an aerial industrialist who has recently discussed business with General McArthur in Tokyo; a school teacher harassed by a citizens' committee that questions her loyalty to the country; a black woman whose son is wrongfully accused of a crime, and a labor activist, the nephew of the unprincipled senator, who is shot and wounded for his support of a strike by dock porters. Hong entitled his play Zhe jiu shi Meiquo de shenghuo fangshi, or, This Is American Way of Life.  

Of particular importance was the change that took place in China's movie theaters, which reached a much larger number of people and which had been dominated by American productions up to 1949. Before World War Two, as many as 350 American films were imported to China every year; and in the years immediately after the war, the number increased to about 400. After 1949, the new government began to discourage screening and viewing American productions, but American films remained popular. In Shanghai, in May of 1950, for instance, seventy-five American movies were shown,
drawing about half a million viewers. But several months later, in November, 1950, the government abruptly proscribed all American movies and thus ended Hollywood's era in China. Followers of American productions were prodded to consider the ill effects of American films, which, in the general atmosphere of revolutionary heroism, were not hard to find. One young viewer, for instance, wrote about how Hollywood induced him to live in "a world of illusions," and, as result, he developed a strong "aversion for hard, honest work." In the coming decades, until the late 1970s, the Chinese had to live without Hollywood, with one notable exception: a film about a miners' strike in New Mexico, scripted by Michael Wilson, the turbulent production of which the Chinese followed closely, and which was finally shown in China in 1960.

The tide of anti-Americanism inevitably swept into China's new educational system. In November 1951, Xing Shiqing, a teacher at an elementary school in Jinan, Shandong Province, wrote to a professional journal to criticize the treatment of the United States in a new geography instructors' handbook. Xing decided that the author of the work still lived in the pre-1949 years and that he demonstrated very poor political judgment. The problem, according to Xing, was that the author seemed to take great pleasure in emphasizing the economic strength of the United States: that China's coal reserve averaged 500
tons for every Chinese, far behind America's 11,000 tons per capita, that seventy-seven percent of the world's automobiles were to be found in the United States, etc. "All these statistics and comparisons," Xing complained, "achieve nothing but to obscure our people's view of the total crisis in imperialist America." The handbook was "quite harmful," Xing concluded. 92

Xing was not alone in his anti-American enthusiasm. In Henan province, a first grade peasant/teacher was so fervent in this regard that he converted a traditional Chinese fairy tale into a piece of anti-American propaganda. The story concerns a grandpa who harvests an extraordinarily large turnip. According to the teacher, the turnip stands for American imperialism, and the grandpa, grandma, the little dog and cat who join forces to uproot it are the worldwide peoples determined to eradicate American imperialism. In his haste to inject anti-American politics into the tale, the peasant teacher overlooked how to explain the part of the story concerning how the grandpa has industriously cultivated the big turnip. His excessive zeal was gently admonished. 93

Outlandish as it may seem to be, this last example reveals to us both the strength and the weakness of the anti-American movement in China in the early 1950s. There can be no question about the massive scale of the campaign; it involved all sectors of Chinese society and reached deep
by means of the extensive propaganda network that the Chinese government so painstakingly constructed. In addition to the aggressive and meticulous political mobilization, the government significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the anti-American campaign by turning a political message into a cultural one—namely, that the rejection of the United States equals the renunciation of an immoral individualistic way of life which had caused the Chinese nation great misery. The combined force of political mobilization and cultural persuasion sparked China's great anti-American campaign in the early 1950s.

What made the anti-American campaign a success for the government, however, also contained the seed of its undoing. The anti-American movement had taken place as a part of the overall political and cultural reorganization that overwhelmed China after 1949. The trend ran in the direction of collectivization—hence the uninhibited and unreserved denunciation of individualism, political as well as cultural. But in the absence of any countervailing social or economic model, such as the United States would later provide, the Communist revolution went to extremes, and populist anti-individualism brought the affairs of the country to such a state of stagnation and rigidness that, by the middle of the 1950s, even Mao Zedong himself realized the grave danger of suffocation that China faced. Mao attempted to rectify the situation, but in so doing, he set
into motion a series of events that greatly surprised and dismayed him.
Notes


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid., 1.

5. Ibid., 2.

6. Ibid., 3.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 30.

9. Ibid., 29.

10. Ibid., 54-5.

11. Ibid., 294.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 291.


15. Ibid., 295.

16. Ibid., 378.

17. Ibid., 379.

18. Ibid., 380.

19. Ibid., 381.

20. Ibid., 384.

21. Ibid., 384.

22. Ibid., 382.
23. Ibid., Preface.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 447.

29. Ibid., 437.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 443.

32. Ibid., 444.

33. Ibid., 445.

34. Ibid., 451.


37. For further information on the episode, see Pei Jianzhang et al, Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun (Turbulences in New China's diplomacy) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1990), 22-32.

38. Xie Guoming, "Shilun Yang Gang xinwen huodong de fengge" (On Yang Gang as a journalist), Xinwen yanjiu ziliao (Materials on history of journalism), No. 18 (March 1983), 53.

39. Ibid., 60-1.

40. Ibid., 64.

41. Ibid., 62.

42. Yang Gang, Meiquo Zhaji (Notes on America) (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1951), 2.
43. Ibid., 6.

44. Ibid., 1.

45. Cao Juren, Xinshi shilun (On ten new things) (Hong Kong: Chuangken chubanshe, n.d.), 79.


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48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., 128-9.

50. Ibid., 133.

51. Zhou Jinhuang, "Chedi chanchu congbai Meidiquozhuyi de cixiang" (Uproot America worship), in ibid., 172-3.

52. Ibid., 173.

53. Ibid., 173.

54. Ibid.

55. Zheng Junli, "Wo bixu tongqie de gaizao ziji" (I must truly renew myself), in ibid., 209.

56. Chen Jieying, "Kongsu zicha jieji cixiang dui wo de fushi he duhai" (The wicked effects of bourgeois ideas in my case), in ibid., 1-2.

57. Ibid., 3.

58. Ibid., 7.


60. Ibid., 18.

61. Ibid., 185.

62. For attacks on Hu Shi, see Sanlian Shudian, eds., Hu Shi cixiang pipan (Criticism of Hu Shi thought), vols. 1-7 (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1955).
63. "Zhenyang renshi Meiquo" (How to Perceive the United States), Shishi shouce (Handbook on contemporary affairs), No. 2 (5 November 1950), reprinted in Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, eds., Gongfei de fan Mei yundong (Communist bandits' anti-American movement) (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1961), 205.

64. Ibid., 205.

65. Fu Zhensheng, Dongbei qu jianli xuanchuan wang de jingyan (The experience of Northeast in instituting the propaganda network) (Shenyang, Liaoning: 1951), 13.

66. "Zhonggong Zhongyang quanyu zai quan dang jianli dui renmin qunzhong de xuanchuan wang de jueying" (The decision by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the establishment of a whole party network of propaganda for the people), Xuanchuan Shouche (Propaganda handbook), No. 1 (16 January 1951), 2-6.

67. Ibid., 7.

68. "Zhonggong Zhongyang Huadong Ju quanyu zhixing Zhongyang zai quan dang jianli dui renmin qunzhong de xuanchuan wang de jueying' de zhishi (The East China Party Committee's instruction concerning the execution of the Central Committee's directive on the establishment of party-wide propaganda network for the people), ibid., No. 2 (1 February 1951), 1-4.

69. Fu Zhensheng, Dongbei qu jianli xuanchuan wang de jingyan (The experience of Northeast in instituting the propaganda network) (Shenyang, Liaoning: 1951), 20.

70. Ibid., 13.

71. Ibid., 39.

72. Ibid., 38.

73. Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, Gongfei de fan Mei yundong (Communist bandits' anti-American movement) (Taipei: Guofang Bu Qingbao Ju, 1961) 64-5.

74. Ibid., 62.

75. Qian Huanan Nuzi Wenli Xueyuan Xuesheng Hui, "Nanhua Nuziwenlin Xueyuan de duibian" (Changes at Huanan Women's Collage of Art and Sciences), Xiandai funu (Modern women), 2:5 (January 1951), 26.
76. Tao Qi, "Huiwen zhongxue shisheng jianjue suqing chongmei sixiang" (Teachers and students at Huiwen school wipe out America-worship), Jiaoshi yuebao (Teachers' monthly), No. 3 (May 1951), 13.

77. Ibid., 14.


79. Ibid.


82. Meiguo wenming zhenxiang (The true face of American 'civilization'), Supplementary No. 10 (15 January 1951)

83. Ding Ziming, et al., Zhuanbian (Change), Xiandai funu (Modern women) 2:2 (1 February 1951), 25-8.

84. Cao Yu, Minglong de tian (Bright sky), Renmin wenxue (People's literature), Nos. 1 and 2, 1954.

85. Hong Shen, Zhe jiu shi Meiguo de shenghuo fangshi (This is American way of life) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tushu Faxing Gongs, 1951).

86. Dazhong dianying (Popular cinema), 1:11 (November 1950), 1.

87. Ibid., no. 7, 1950, 10.

88. Ibid., no 11, 1.

89. Ibid., no. 1, 1950; no. 4, 1950, 10-11; no. 11, 1950, 26.

90. Ibid., no 9, 1950, 25.

91. Ibid., no. 10, 1953, 30; no. 21, 1953, 27-9; no. 8, 1955, 16-25; no. 8, 1960, 21.
92. Xing Shiqing, "Yi ben you hai de Deli jiao\textsuperscript{xue} shouce" (A harmful Geography Instruction Handbook), \textit{Xin jiaoyu} (New education), 4:3 (15 November 1951), 30.

93. Zhang Haisheng, "Wo suo jiandao de yuwen jiao\textsuperscript{xue} zhong de ji zhong pianxi\textsuperscript{ang}" (A few problems in teaching Chinese), \textit{Xiaoxue jiaoshi} (Elementary school teacher), July 1953, 17-8.
CHAPTER 3
TABOO OF A KIND: AMERICA IN CHINA, 1957

To Chinese intellectuals, 1957 was a year of great hope as well as great misery. In one gigantic outburst of discontent, Chinese critics expressed their true opinion of their government--feelings which had been pent up in their chests since 1949. Just as swiftly, the government fought back, and, within months, China's warm political spring had given way to an icy winter.

Oddly enough, the liberal movement of 1957 was initiated not by Chinese intellectuals but by Chairman Mao Zedong himself. By 1957, eight years after their conquest of China, the Communists had successfully consolidated their hold on the country. They had achieved stability, however, only after austerely stifling even the slightest dissent. Under Mao's heavy-handed government, problems accumulated--bureaucraticism, political persecution, and back-breaking financial burdens on the people, to name a few. Popular antipathy toward the young regime was building up. When in 1956 widespread unrest and uprisings jolted the Communist rule in East Europe, the Chinese government was understandably alarmed. Being a man who preferred offense to defense, Mao decided to confront his problems head-on. Starting in late 1956, he called for a "opening-up" of
China's political and cultural life, encouraging people to speak out freely and even to criticize the government--in Mao's own words, "Let a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools [of thought] contend."

Even on as sensitive an issue as that of America, Mao loosened the party's tight hold. On May 2, 1957, while delivering a keynote speech at a meeting of the Supreme State Council, which consisted of both Communist and non-Communist members, Mao on several occasions mentioned the United States. Discussing the rigid relationship between China's central government and provinces, Mao observed that New China had copied the constitution of the Soviet Union and that at the time he had doubts. "The United States has something different," Mao now pointed out. "The states in the United States have their own rights to legislate, and some state legislations even conflict with federal consitution." A little later, Mao commented that, according to some reports, for a long time, grain production in the Soviet Union could not match the best year in the Tsarist era. "If this is true," Mao continued, "it is a serious problem... How are you going to argue for the superiority of socialist system?" In contrast,

The United States is a developed country. It developed in just over a hundred years. This deserves our attention. We hate American imperialism, which is
truly bad, but there must be some good reasons that it has become such a developed country. Its political system should be studied. 

Mao then went on to suggest that China's central government should allow provinces and localities greater autonomy. All this may sound awfully strange coming from this Communist leader, but we should not be totally surprised if we look deep into Mao's past, to his early days when his battle cry was "a Monroe Doctrine for Hunan province!" After seven years of stringent control by the central government, Mao now decided that if his country was to achieve a higher rate of growth, he must allow and encourage regional--if not individual--autonomy and creativity.

Although Mao delivered his liberalizing speech at a meeting of high level government officials, and later only a much toned-down version of the speech was released to the general public, the country understood him well and responded enthusiastically in the following months. In the end, Mao got more than he had bargained for. Instead of the tactful and technical recommendations accompanied by lavish praise for the Communist government that he had expected, a storm of harsh criticism swept over the country, blistering government at all levels. Fearful of a total collapse, Mao went back on his word and ordered crackdown. The "blooming" and "contending" came to a sudden and ugly end, in the form
of a vengeful "anti-rightist" campaign. The liberal movement of 1957 was short-lived. Nonetheless, it exposed the true mind of the Chinese intelligentsia, including their views on China's America issue.

I

The liberal movement of 1957 unfolded at all social levels; millions of ordinary Chinese, for example, took the opportunity to settle old scores, while thousands of college students vented anger for various personal and political reasons. But from the government's standpoint, the established intelligentsia posed the gravest challenge to its authority. Only a few years had passed since the Communist take-over, and American-trained intellectuals still dominated China's cultural and academic circles.

These American-educated Chinese naturally had had the hardest time adjusting to the Communist reality in China after 1949. Even those patriots who genuinely desired to serve the New China found their situation difficult. Take, for instance, the case of Zhang Quan, an celebrated vocalist. Upon her return from the United States in the early 1950s, Zhang joined the Central Troupe of Experimental Opera in Beijing. She was given few opportunities to perform, however, because she was considered unfit to play
revolutionaries. Her outspokenness certainly did not help and she soon earned around the theater the nickname "the American lady"--a murderous epithet, considering the generous atmosphere then. When evaluating her, Zhang's supervisors consistently depicted her as "lacking a revolutionary world-view, politically backward, and exhibiting a strong individualistic tendency." "I shouldn't have studied in the States," the frustrated singer bemoaned, "I should have gone to the Soviet Union." 3

Even those who were pampered by the state for their valuable services found themselves ill at ease. Upon returning to China after the Communist victory, Qian Xuesen, a physicist trained at the California Institute of Technology, was appointed to lead China's emerging nuclear program. He was sent on a trip to the Soviet Union to consult Russian experts, but found that he was "almost suffocated" by the rigid Soviet system. Before long he discovered that the situation was worse back in his own country, where the Soviet system was reinforced by the traditional Chinese emphasis on seniority and authority. For the good of his program, Qian made efforts to encourage academic freedom within his own jurisdiction and even managed to enlist the help of Premier Zhou Enlai, who turned out to be a willing listener. 4

But not everyone was making atomic bombs for the government, and the complaints of most intellectuals fell on
deaf ears, particularly when it came to politics. The most prominent of these frustrated political hopefuls was Dr. Luo Longji, who would emerge as one of the top leaders of the "blooming and contending" movement and whom Mao personally attacked as one of the two "generals" of the rebel army. A graduate of Qinghua, the prep-school for students going to the United States (later Qinghua University), Luo went to Columbia University in 1921 and received his Ph.D. in political science in 1928. Back in China, Luo became an active if somewhat ineffectual player in Chinese politics. He maintained a liberal stance, first as a newspaper editor and then as a leader of the Democratic Alliance, a true party in the parliamentary sense, which struggled to survive the military conflict between the Nationalists and Communists in the 1930s and 1940s. During these years and particularly in the crucial late 1940s, Luo kept in touch with the United State. Thus, when in 1947 he was arrested by Chiang Kai-shek's government, it was Ambassador Stuart who personally persuaded Chiang to release him. Later, in 1949, Luo attempted to play the role of a go-between for Ambassador Stuart and the Communists, but had no luck with the effort.

After 1949, in recognition of Luo's influence on the liberal elements in China, the Communists took him into their new government. At the long last Luo came to hold an office, but not a very rewarding one. He was made the
Ministry of Timber Industry, a far cry from his ambition of
directing China's foreign relations. In spite of his
knowledge and experience in international affairs, "they
make me to oversee trees," Luo grumbled in private, "because
they don't trust me." Others knew better; even his own
secretary applied to join the Communist Party rather than
Luo's Democratic Alliance. But Luo did not give up. When in late 1956 the
political wind started to blow into the direction of
liberalization, Luo was revigorated, believing the time to
pursue real democratic politics had finally arrived and that
he was the man of the day. Particularly interested in the
Chinese government's treatment of intellectuals after 1949,
Luo travelled around the country collecting material for a
report on the issue, which, when finished, was 500,000 words
long. Based on his findings, he criticized the
maltreatment and persecution typical of the political
campaigns after 1949 and suggested that the People's
Congress create a multi-party commission to review
complaints and correct errors. At the same time, as a
Vice Chairman of the Democratic Alliance, Luo put together
task forces to study a number of issues, including the
dominant presence of the Communist Party at universities,
the role of non-communists in government, and the general
conditions of cultural and academic life in China.

In all these activities, Luo relied on individuals with
backgrounds similar to his own, those who, although small in number, held great sway in Chinese society because of their high social standing and prominent past. As an adversary later observed, Luo's "political capital" consisted primarily of "Qinghua graduates and American-trained students who refused to travel the socialist road."\(^{14}\) One of Luo's close associates was Zeng Zhaolun, also a Qinghua graduate and now a Deputy Minister of Higher Education. Zeng had studied chemistry at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he received his doctorate in 1926. Back in China, Zeng taught at China's leading universities and presided over China's Chemistry Society for over twenty years, establishing himself as a leader in scientific circles. Yet he, too, received harsh criticism as someone who "shamelessly revered American imperialist democracy, the American imperialist life-style and capitalist system, and actively promoted this sort of garbage."\(^{15}\) As a top administrator in China's higher education system, Zeng was instrumental in the liberal movement of 1957, which was the strongest on university campuses across the country. He led the effort to develop a liberal platform in culture and education, which later came under heavy fire of the Communist Party.\(^{16}\)

As mentioned above, both Luo and Zeng had graduated from Qinghua known for its long historical connection to the United States, and the institution was a hotbed for dissent
in 1957. One faculty member there who achieved nationwide "notoriety" was Professor Huang Wanli, a meteorologist educated at the University of Illinois. For a few years Huang had been an opponent to the government's plan to build a major dam on the Yellow River. He questioned the wisdom of the Russian advisors overseeing the project, which, in the eye of many Chinese at the time, was an appalling thing to do, and which put great pressure on Huang. When the "blooming and contending" of 1957 got under way, Huang wrote a sarcastic story for a newspaper, attacking bureaucrats responsible for the poor quality of some public works projects. In Huang's view, the so-called "corrupt politics in imperialist America" was nothing compared to what he had recently observed in China:

If maladministration of this sorts takes place over there, tax-payers will rise and holler, managers and engineers will be kicked out of their jobs, and the mayor will face a tough election next time around! But here our people are always so nice and easy to handle."

Later, when Mao cracked down on "blooming and contending" and initiated the anti-rightist campaign, the Chairman, in a speech, cited Huang as a malicious "rightist" who "considers the moon in America far rounder and brighter."
A similar case at Qinghua University was Xu Zhangben, a professor of physics educated at the California Institute of Technology. After 1949 Xu bull-headedly refused to denounce the United States, insisting that the American system serves the American people as well as American capitalists. Even after the anti-rightist campaign had started, Xu continued to defy his critics and became a leading target.\textsuperscript{20}

One man in particular was responsible for the hot liberal atmosphere at Qinghua University, and it was Qian Weichang, a talented engineer trained at University of Toronto, now the Vice President of the university in charge of academic affairs. Qian was very fond of Qinghua's tradition, and he had avowed to build the school into "China's California Institute of Technology." His American design for the school brought him into an inevitable clash with the Communist Party authorities at the university.\textsuperscript{21}

During the "blooming and contending," Qian was a dynamic figure both within and outside Qinghua University. He spearheaded the task force on science and education organized by Luo Longji and drew up a development plan. One feature of the plan was to shift the emphasis from Soviet-style, state-sponsored research institutes to universities where professors would combine teaching and research.\textsuperscript{22} At his own university, Qian tried to revive some of the old Qinghua traditions, not the least of which was a larger role for the faculty in the administration of the university--a
function that had long been superseded by the Communist Party and the government.  Qian also attempted to reverse the government's reorganization of China's universities and colleges after 1949 partly aimed to reduce strong American influence on certain campuses, Qinghua being one of them. He encouraged students to sign petitions to appeal for the merger, a strategy much feared by the government because of the already evident student unrest across the country. Later, in the anti-rightist campaign, Qian would be blasted for his effort to revive "Old Qinghua" which was, the authorities declared, an evil hybrid of "the United States, the number one imperialist power, and Chiang Kaishek dictatorship." 

Although Qinghua was the most notable base for the critical spirit of 1957, it was not the only one. At Beijing University, which encompassed of the former American Yenching University, one student leader proposed that, to find out the truth about capitalism and socialism, "let's invite over 'comrade' [John Foster] Dulles to Beijing University to 'contend.'" Similarly, Beijing Union Medical College became a hot spot of controversy in 1957. Established in 1921 by the Rockefeller Foundation as "a Johns Hopkins for China," the college produced leaders in Chinese medicine, and most of its graduates taught at or managed medical institutions in the country. After 1949 the Communist government nationalized the school and put it
under military control. The change did not rest well with many at the college, who, in 1957, let go their anger and frustration and demanded a return to the old ways in order to live up to the "Union Standard."²⁹ During the anti-rightist campaign, the U.M.C. was accused of being a stronghold for the "American imperialists' cultural aggression in China".³⁰

Outside Beijing, in the provinces, intellectuals like Luo, Zeng and Qian inspired further dissent. Although they did not form a conspiratorial clique, as the government later alleged, they did belong to an informal circle linked together by their common background, friendship and political outlook. In Sichuan province, for example, one of Luo's close associates was Pan Dakui, who, like Luo, was a Qinghua alumnus and also studied in the United States. In the political fracas of 1957, Pan vigilantly cooperated with Luo, and he and his friends would later be blamed for strong student protests at local colleges against various kinds of mismanagement and thought control.³¹ His detractors attributed his "crime" to his thirteen years of American education.³²

Similarly, in Lanzhou, capital of Gansu Province, a leading "rightist" was Chen Shiwei, a vice president of Lanzhou University. Chen spent some time at the University of Illinois, and his wife, chair of the Chemistry Department, was a former student of Zeng Zhaolun, the Deputy
Minister of Higher Education. As the university's vice president for academic affairs, Chen was confronted with many of the same problems facing Qian Weichang at Qinghua University in Beijing. Chen thus fell into constant conflicts with the Party authorities at the university. During the "blooming and contending," Chen pushed for faculty rule and encouraged students to send a delegation to Beijing to discuss the problems of the university. When the Communist Party fought back a few months later, Chen was attacked for his crime of "commending the United States and opposing the people." 

In Shanghai, several America-returned scholars stood out. One of them was Sun Dayu at Fudan University, professor of literature and a good friend of Luo Longji. During the "blooming and contending," Sun criticized the government on a wide range of issues, including the Communist Party's control of universities and the persecution of intellectuals. When the political tide reversed and he was accused of anti-revolutionary crimes, the Yale-trained professor announced that he was ready to fight any such charge in court. No legal proceeding took place, however; instead, "revolutionary masses" swarmed his house and demanded for a "debate" right there in his bedroom. Sun remained defiant, but decided to keep silence.

Another Qinghua graduate, Wang Zaoshi had studied at
University of Wisconsin before returning to Shanghai for a prominent law practice and political career. He became a nationally known figure for his struggles with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, and was among the political prisoners for whose release Tao Xingzhi had appealed to John Dewey in the late 1930s. After the Communist take-over, Wang held a seat in the National Political Consultative Conference, but Wang soon became disillusioned, sensing little change from Chiang Kai-shek's way of doing things, and in 1957 once again turned against the state.\(^{37}\) Being a lawyer and having been a political prisoner himself, Wang criticized in particular the Communist Party's lack of respect for the "rule of law." He compared this situation in China with the American system, declaring that "the rule of law in the United States is stringent, from which we can learn a great deal."\(^{38}\) Because of Wang's political credentials before 1949, his criticism of Communist rule was especially embarrassing to the government, and for this he would suffer in the anti-rightist campaign.\(^{39}\)

Evidently, eight years after the Communist take-over and not withstanding a major anti-American campaign, American-trained Chinese scholars seemed to hold steadfast to their American-education and ideas and remained a potent force of dissention. They did not advocate an all-embracing Americanization—that idea did not sell even before 1949; they did, however, utilize America as a weapon of critique.
The same practice, in a reversed form, can be seen in the Chinese intellectuals tussle with the government over the Soviet Union, the antithesis of America in China.

II

"Because they are all pro-American, they naturally disapprove of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union"—so one critic of the "rightists" diagnosed the situation. He was right; there was indeed such a connection. In 1957, just as there were those who spoke for America, there were those who spoke against the Soviet Union, which the government had promoted to counter and eliminate the persistent American influence that had survived from the pre-1949 era.

The issue was twofold: one was the state relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union, and the other concerned with the Soviet System as a model for New China. The two, of course, were interconnected—a closer relationship with either the Soviet Union or the United States would most likely tilt internal affairs in China in the same direction; conversely, certain changes within China could conceivably move the country toward either the Soviet Union or the United States. For this reason, the controversy over the Soviet Union in 1957 was not a purely
academic one; indirectly it was a referendum on America and ultimately a debate on the road China ought to take.

In 1949, as the Communist were driving the Nationalists off the mainland, Mao Zedong announced that the new government's policy of "leaning to one side," to the Soviet Union. Any other positions, including the so-called "third road," Mao declared, amounted to little more than "camouflage" for the anti-revolutionary cause. But from early on some Chinese had doubts on the intention of China's "elder brother." For instance, Luo Longji, the Timber Industry Minister with a taste for diplomacy, closely followed the government's dealings with the Soviet Union and disapproved. When the Korean War broke out, Luo and his friends' worst fear came true. They assembled to discuss the situation and concluded that, in contrary to what they were told, South Korea did not start the war. They also decided that Luo should try to persuade Mao to abandon the dangerous course of "leaning to one side." During the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, Luo commended Eisenhower's policy, claiming that pressure from the U.S. government prevented the escalation of the conflict. Following the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party where Khrushchev initiated the process of "de-Stalinization," and particularly after the unrest in East Europe in 1956, Luo concluded that Communism was on the wane worldwide; therefore keep a certain distance from the
Soviet Union, and that Chinese like himself should be prepared to play a greater role in Chinese politics hereafter. 43

In the "blooming and contending," Chinese grievances against the Soviet Union came into the open, focusing on two primary issues. One was the Korean War. Many Chinese regretted that China had taken on the United States in Korea, and resented the fact that the Soviet Union stayed out of the war. One such critic was Long Yun, a former warlord who had cooperated with the Communists since 1949. Not only had China fought the Korean War without the Russians, Long complained, but China had to foot the bill, with the Soviet Union pushing China to pay the debt. Long compared this situation invidiously to the aid given by America to its allies during the two world wars and grumbled that "The Soviet Union was not as generous as the United States." 44

The other major dissatisfaction of many Chinese with the Soviet Union arose out of the continuous presence of Russian military forces in China's northeastern provinces (Manchuria). The Chinese remembered very well the Communist denunciation of Chiang Kaishek for his toleration of American troops in China after World War Two; now what did the Communists have to say for themselves with respect to Russia? Wang Yunsheng, a prominent journalist and an expert on Sino-Japanese relations, reminded his readers of the
occupation of the Manchurian ports by Japanese and by Tsarist Russian troops in the past, and suggested that the Soviet Red Army's invasion of Manchuria at the end of World War Two was opportunistic, undertaken only after the United States had assured the Japanese surrender.\textsuperscript{45} Tan Tiwu, a former Nationalist official now working for the Communists, argued that by continuing to occupy Manchuria, the Russians were in effect holding China hostage to ensure China's compliance with the Sino-Soviet alliance signed in 1950. "Isn't the good will of 450 million people more dependable than two ports?" Tan asked.\textsuperscript{46} Upon hearing the official media compliment the Soviet Union for returning certain Chinese assets in Manchuria, Wang Zizhi, another former Nationalist, remarked impatiently: Why should we be grateful to those who have robbed us in the first place?\textsuperscript{47}

Although the Chinese government's single-minded political and military cooperation with the Soviet Union bothered some Chinese, it was the other aspect of the Sino-Soviet relationship that affected and incensed a far larger number of the Chinese. This was the government's all-out, relentless drive for "learning from the Soviet Union." After 1949, the Soviet Union was the only nation which was more advanced economically and technologically than China and willing to provide some assistance to China's industrialization. Further, operating under a modernist ideology--the Marxist idea that economic development
constitutes the foundation of social progress--the Chinese state had to have a concrete example to show the people a bright communist future and to counter the remnant of American influence in China. Under the circumstances of diplomatic and economic isolation, the Soviet Union was the best friend that China had. For both practical and ideological reasons, therefore, the Chinese government fervently promoted the Soviet Union in China during the 1950s. As Mao himself once explained, China "needed Soviet experience and experts to demolish China's old bourgeois authority"—an authority that was, of course, largely American by origin. As a popular saying back then goes: "The Soviet Union today is China tomorrow."

The state of China's high education after 1949 illustrates the fervor to conform to the Soviet way. In the few years from 1949 to 1957, Chinese universities and colleges hosted about 600 Soviet professors. During this period, the Russian experts fast-processed more than eight thousand Chinese graduate students and young teachers. The Russians also taught or helped to teach more than eight hundred new courses, and produced over six hundred textbooks. The Russian language was promoted all over the country, both in colleges and high schools, and it soon replaced English as the nation's first foreign tongue. Five colleges were established exclusively for the purpose of teaching Russian, and the largest of these--the Beijing
Institute of Russian Language--enrolled five thousand students.\textsuperscript{50} For those who did not learn Russian, there were plentiful of translations available--from 1952 to 1956, 1,393 Soviet textbooks were published in Chinese and used in college classrooms.\textsuperscript{51} Moreover, between 1949 and 1956, 2,683 Russian and Soviet literary works were brought out in Chinese, with total 67,600,000 copies in print.\textsuperscript{52}

As a result of such efforts, the craze for the Soviet Union very quickly developed into a kind of cult. Everything about China's "elder brother" was wonderful and nothing but superlatives could be used describe the situation in the Soviet Union. One Chinese government official made a trip to Moscow, a great honor and privilege. He erred, however, when upon his return, he mentioned to other people that, to his surprise, Red Square, about which the Chinese had heard so much, was actually smaller than Tiananmen Square. For his irreverent attitude the official had to conduct public self-criticism.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1957, Resentment against this kind of excess erupted. Chinese intellectuals castigated the government for its blind devotion to the Soviet Union, which they called the sin of "dogmatism." They told of ridiculous episodes they experienced, stories that greatly embarrassed the Communist Party, which had long boasted of championing Chinese nationalism. A scientist at the National Academy of Sciences reported, for example, that he had repeatedly
objected to making Russian the required foreign language because most references in his field were in either English or German, but to no avail. College instructors had the strongest anger to vent. At a forum held in Wuhan, a professor of Western literature complained that she was attacked for using a few English words in her lectures. Another professor reported that a senior colleague of his was pushed aside because young faculty members at the department alleged that he "knows no foreign language." By that they actually meant that the professor did not have Russian—he only knew English, German, and French. The angry professors attributed such outrages to the biased policies of the government.

Before long actions were taken to rectify the situation. The Beijing School of Law and Politics had used so many Soviet textbooks that its students began to complain that their education would be of no use unless they were going to be appointed judges in the Soviet Union. Instead of beating down such begrudging students as they would have, now the school commissioned Chinese legal experts to write their own textbooks—an event commended by the People's Daily. The publishing industry also reexamined their editorial policies and prepared to publish more inclusively. For several years now the list of literary works by the People's Press, the country's leading publishing house, comprised almost nothing but Soviet and Russian works. Now,
encouraged by the "blooming and contending," the establishment produced an ambitious plan to bring out hundreds of literary works from many other countries. The list of American authors remained modest, including the likes of Walt Whitman, O. Henry and Edgar Allen Poe, but the change in spirit was significant nonetheless.⁵⁹

In some cases, no special effort of rectification was necessary, for the Russian craze had reached the point where self-correction kicked in automatically. For instance, by 1957 colleges devoted to the study of Russian language had enrolled so many students that it became clear that the government could not provide jobs for all graduates, whom the government had actively recruited in the first place. This news sent students at Beijing Institute of Russian Language into rage. Furious students eventually marched on the State Council for a direct answer from Zhou Enlai, the Premier, and this became one of the many student disturbances in 1957.⁶⁰ Little had the government expected that the very students they had trained to counter the subversive American influence would rebel—even before they graduated.

The Chinese government of course understood only too well the meaning of Chinese intellectuals' resentment toward the Soviet Union both as a power and as a model for China. In the anti-rightist campaign that ended the "blooming and contending," those who had spoken unfavorably of the Soviet
Union came under heavy fire. By vilifying the Soviet Union, charged Qiang Jurui, a Communist specialist on foreign relations, the "rightists" attempted "to lure the Chinese people to the United States and enslave them to the American imperialists." "Mr. Rightist insists that we compare the Soviet Union and the United States," Qiang continued, but the Chinese people had done precisely that in the past decades and had decided to embrace the Soviet Union. He wrote:

The American system, the American lifestyle, suits no one but capitalists and their subservient intellectuals and it is despised by the great masses in this country and ever more people around the world. Regarding such an imperialist state, the collective will of our whole people is very clear: they want to stay away from it and never fashion themselves after it.⁶¹

The very need to make such a point indicates that the matter was far from resolved, and, in 1957, Chinese intellectuals did anything but stay away from America. In fact they actively sought to imitate some aspects of it, particularly in the realm of humanist and social studies.
China's academia had been on edge ever since 1949, especially after the intense anti-Hu Shi campaign of 1955 that was designed to attack pro-American intellectuals. Panicky scholars spent much of their time worrying about survival rather than pursuing their studies, and those who dared to try often found that they could not do what was expected of them. Many fields of humanities and social sciences lay fallow. Fei Xiaotong, a leading sociologist, wryly observed in early 1957:

Do British and American books take space on our shelves? Sell them as waste papers. Is it too late to learn Russian? Buy a few translated booklets. While teaching and writing, quote [Marxist] classics and choose a few British and American scholars to condemn. . . . All this can be easily done, just as a little kid watching one of those Chinese operas staged in countryside: he does not quite understand what's going on up there, so he bases his judgement on the make-up of actors; when a guy with a white face is beaten up, he applauds.62

While this bleak picture could depict any discipline of China's humanities and social sciences after 1949, it most accurately reflects fields such as sociology and economics, which had received strong American influence in the pre-1949
years, and which, with the total disappearance of political science, had the most direct bearings on contemporary affairs.

"Chinese sociology was 'single-handedly' created by some returned-students (mostly from the United States) and American missionary schools in old China," one critic of the "rightists" observed. The disparaging tone aside, his statement was true. In the early decades of this century, about fifty Chinese received doctoral degrees in sociology from American universities, and they laid the foundations of sociological studies in China. At Qinghua University, a major base of Chinese sociology before 1949, for instance, there was Chen Da, Ph.D., Columbia University, 1923, a pioneer in the field; Wu Jiangchao, Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1928; and Wu Wenzao, Ph.D., Columbia, 1929. One of Wu's students at Qinghua, Fei Xiaotong studied at London School of Economics and Politics before conducting research in the United States sponsored by the U.S. government. Back in China, Fei joined Qinghua University and emerged as China's most active sociologist. At Yenching University, the American missionary school in Beijing, the situation was similar. As one critic noted:

... before the Anti-Japanese War, courses offered at Yenching's Department of Sociology and Social Services could all be traced back to the University of Chicago,
with all the Chinese professors having been trained in the United States and with American and British bourgeois scholars such as [Robert Ezra] Park and [Radcliffe] Brown visiting and lecturing.  

Research conducted by scholars and institutions of this sort aroused great concerns in the Communists after they came into power. Unlike disciplines such as history or literature, the work of sociologists seemed to involve too much interaction with real people and their findings did not always correspond with what the government wanted to promote at any given point; it was a troublesome and threatening discipline. So in 1952, when the new government reorganized Chinese universities, it dissolved all sociology departments; sociology ceased to exist as a discipline in China. Fei Xiaotong moved to Central Institute of National Minorities, where he studied China's minorities, a relatively safe subject. Wu Jingchao, together with Li Jinghan, the former chair of the sociology department at Furen University, and Zhao Chengxin, the former Dean of Yenching Law School, had been tossed around for a few years before they were assigned to the newly-founded People's University. There Wu and Zhao taught subjects such as statistics. Li was less fortunate. He was made to work as a teaching assistant--first for a teacher in engineering and then in textile technology. To enhance his chance of
moving up, Li learned Russian, but all in vain—he never was
allowed to teach again.\textsuperscript{67}

The political thaw of 1957 brought some sociologists
back to life and they started a lively discussion on the
fate of China's sociology. This discussion soon acquired
symbolic significance to cultural and intellectual life in
the country generally. In January 1957, professor Wu
Jingchao raised the issue by publishing an article titled
"Does Sociology Have any Worth in New China?"\textsuperscript{68} Next,
professor Fei Xiaotong came out to "Speak on Behalf of
Sociology."\textsuperscript{69} At a Communist Party's conference held in
March, to which Fei had been invited, Fei made his official
request to resuscitate sociology in China.\textsuperscript{70}

Other sociologists soon joined the drive. The
Communist Party talked a great deal about "catching up with
the world in advanced sciences," but it got the wrong idea
where to look. So remarked Li Jinghan—still waiting for a
teaching job—alluding to the Party's obsession with the
Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{71} Meanwhile, American-trained sociologists
found new opportunities to ply their academic trade. This
was widely noted in the country. For example, the May 1957
issue of \textit{Jiaoxue yu yanjiu} (Teaching and Research) published
a study by Chen Da, the leading sociologist at Qinghua
University. It was a piece of old research Chen had
conducted before 1949 and now it appeared as a "model for
social investigation" for younger scholars. It was an
examination of Shanghai workers' living conditions, and involved comparisons with foreign countries, including the United States. It is easy to see why the Party feared work of this kind.

The sociologists then attempted an institutional restoration, obviously nostalgic of the heyday of sociology at Qinghua and Yenching. They petitioned the National Political Consultative Conference to consider the issue; they formed a task force under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences and planned to re-assemble the Association of Chinese Sociologists; and they started preparations for the establishment of several teaching and research centers in Beijing and other cities.

The fever of Chinese sociologists in 1957 was shared by Chinese scholars in other fields--economics, for instance. Like sociology, economics had a practical side that made the Chinese government nervous. The stake were particularly high in 1957, for after the swift recovery and growth of the early 1950s, China's economy entered a period of uncertainty, with the government finding it harder and harder to derive sufficient capital from the agricultural sector to finance industrial expansion. This raised a troubling question: Was socialism indeed the best system for improving people's lives? The government claimed that it was, but there were dissenting voices in China's academia.
As with sociology, most leading economists in China had been trained in the United States. In the decades before 1949, about one hundred and fifty Chinese received doctoral degrees in economics or business from American universities, enough for them to play a major role in China's emerging field of economic studies. In the eyes of the new Communist government, these so-called authorities were not only useless to China's socialist economy, they were also subversive. Thus, after 1949, the government had consistently and systematically ignored them, keeping these economists in wrong backgrounds in the dark by denying them access to vital information.

In 1957, Chinese economists did not hesitate to take advantage of the "blooming and contending" to make their case. Championing their cause was Chen Zhenhan, a Harvard-trained economist now teaching at Beijing University. In the spring of 1957, Chen called together a few prominent economists in Beijing to put together a platform. Of the four who gathered in response to Chen's call, two were Chen's Harvard schoolmates. One of the three, Wu Baosan, deputy director of the Institute of Economic Studies, Chinese Academy of Sciences, had been forced to give up his specialty of economic policy and turn to study economic history. Together the colleagues drafted "Our Opinions on the Current State of Economic Studies," which they circulated among economists for comment, with the intention
of turning it in for the consideration of the government. 77

The document came down hard on the government's attitude and policies toward economic science. The professors criticized the government's total rejection of what had been denounced as "old economics," or economics that Chen and his American-trained colleagues knew; and they also targeted on the government's general lack of economic sophistication. They cited a report, that the government's economic experts had recently discovered that deficit actually causes inflation. 78 Such absurdity resulted from "our failure to respect or even be aware of objective economic law" as well as "our reliance on Soviet experiences and practices," the professors wrote. To rectify the situation, they suggested that economists should be included in the decision-making process and that they should be allowed to pursue their own studies, including the investigation of "capitalist" ideas. They continued:

. . . capitalist economics have advanced significantly in the recent past; isn't there something in it that actually reflects. . . the conditions of modern capitalism, something that we can criticize or learn from? Can't some elements in the methodology of bourgeois economists be employed to serve our socialist economics and socialist construction? 79
Chen and his group's "Opinions" were echoed by others. At a symposium held by People's Daily in Tianjin in April, Professor Lei Haizong, Ph.D., the University of Chicago, 1927, emphasized the importance of studying modern capitalism. China did not undergo a capitalist phase of development, and the little direct knowledge of capitalism China had acquired came through Chinese students studying abroad. China now had Marxism, but since the death of Engels in 1895 Marxian social science had not kept up with new developments in the capitalist world. All this, Lei argued, demanded that Chinese economists carefully and vigorously study of modern capitalism. Although the People's Daily had held the symposium to encourage the "blooming and contending" in economics, the editors published Lei's speech only with an Editor's Note stating that they did not agree with Lei's estimation of Marxism.

Speaking for the need to study modern bourgeois economics, many Chinese economists cited John Maynard Keynes as the key to the understanding the history of capitalism after the Great Depression. There was an increasing interest in the subject: introductory articles were published; courses were offered in universities; and Keynes's works were translated and printed. Amid standard denunciation of the evils of capitalism, scholars suggested that China could benefit from certain Keynesian theories and practices. In their "Opinions," for instance, Chen Zhenhan
and his colleagues proposed that Keynesian concepts such as the "multiplier effect" be used in analyzing China's investment.\textsuperscript{85}

In addition to technical benefits like the multiplier effect, something more profound drove Chinese economists to Keynes: the need to explain the post-war economy in the West and particularly in the United States. A proper interpretation of the capitalist economy was of course vital to Chinese Communists; after all, the death of capitalism would mark the birth of socialism. The economic performance of the capitalist world after World War II, however, did not meet Marxian expectation, especially in the United States—the "last stronghold of capitalism." According to one news report on the \textit{Guangming Daily}, the fact of the matter was:

\begin{quote}
Before World War II, crises of over-production in the capitalist world repeated at certain intervals of time (for example, every eight or twelve years). After the war, however, the situation in the United States became abnormal. Although production fell by about ten percent in 1948-1949 and again in 1953-1954, neither resulted in a perilous crisis.\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

The political difficulty here concerned what was as opposed to what ought to be. There were so many pitfalls in studying the American economy. At one "blooming and
contending" meeting, professor Yan Rengeng of Beijing University complained that nowadays whenever an economist used some data of American origin, he was expected to preface it with something like: "Based on numbers greatly inflated (or reduced) by the U.S. government." It had become routine for people to make such claims, Yan said, without anyone ever bothering to find out whether the data had actually been manipulated. Qian Jiaju, an economist and editor-in-chief of Zhengming (Contending), the newly-founded journal of the Democratic Alliance, pointed out that Chinese journals published numerous works by Soviet scholars on the American economy but few by Chinese economists themselves.

Qian wanted to change the situation. In the February issue of Zhengming he published--as a lead article--"On the Question of a Post-War Economic Crisis in the United States" by Hu Dunyuan, an economist trained at Columbia University. Hu made the simple argument that in 1948-1949 the United States did not experience an "economic crisis" in the sense that the Chinese used the term, just a recession. In the May issue of Zhengming, Qian published a recent resolution by the American Communist Party, in which the Party censured itself for expecting a severe economic crisis in the near future and for basing its political strategy on such a forecast. This disclosure angered the Chinese government, which had chosen to remain silent on the resolution and had
released the resolution only as an "inner circle" document.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite its hostile attitude, even the Chinese Communist Party realized that some changes had to be made in interpreting the American economy. On May 11, 1957, the People's Daily offered a detailed examination of the U.S. economy in 1956, candidly recording continuing economic growth in the United States. Moreover, its prediction for a future down turn in the American economy appeared in a rather controlled tone, in contrast to the usual stern damnation.\textsuperscript{91}

A little more than a week later, the Daily published "On the Current State of Studies on the U.S. Economy" by Wu Dakun, an economist at the People's University in Beijing. In it, Wu argued that research on the American economy had been less than satisfactory, and the main reason was dogmatism. In shield himself from political criticism, Wu cited the above-mentioned resolution on the U.S. economy by the American Communist Party. Because of the U.S. government's anti-crisis measures, future economic problems in the United States would differ greatly from the Great Depression, Wu suggested; ". . . if we still dogmatically look for an immediate great crisis at the 1929 scale, we would only disappoint ourselves."\textsuperscript{92}

Similar discussions appeared elsewhere. In the first issue of the Shijie Zhishi (Knowledge of the world), Xie Yao presented some recent writings by American economists on the
left who rejected previous predictions of imminent trouble in the United States. Although one reader wrote to protest what he deemed to be suddenly fashionable "tendency to over-estimate the strength of the U.S. economy," the journal continued to publish other articles of the same nature. Meanwhile, the Institute on International Relations in Beijing organized five symposia on the American economy. Economists in attendance agreed on the need for serious studies of the post-war U.S. economy, and they put together an agenda designating nine topics that demanded immediate attention.

In addition to topics relating to cycles in the American economy, another focus of Chinese economists focused also on the living conditions of the working class in the United States. The central issue here was one Marxist concept first advanced by Soviet theorists: "absolute poverty"—the idea that the worker in a capitalist society is subjected not only to relative deprivation (the widening gap between him and the rich), but also to absolute poverty (outright decline in the worker's living standard). While the notion of relative poverty had posed few problems to Marxist theorists, post-war conditions in the West—the United States in particular—had put the idea of absolute deprivation to the test. In their "Opinions," Chen Zhenhan and his colleagues wrote:
... [Marxist] classic authors are not gods; ... many of their works were published one hundred years ago. They did foresee major trends in the coming century, but they could not spell out every detail. ... For years, however, who of us has ever openly questioned the concept of 'absolute poverty'?"

Now the questions began to appear. The June issue of Dushu Yuebao (Reader's monthly) published an introduction to the discussion of the subject carried on within the worldwide Communist community. In Shanghai, professor Yang Sizheng took the issue into the classroom, rejecting not only the idea of absolute poverty but also the concept of relative deprivation. "... the post-war income of the working class [in the United States] makes up a larger, not a smaller, percentage of the total national income," Yang told his students. Another economist in Shanghai, Wu Chengxi, had previously published booklets on the "total crisis of capitalism." When the "blooming and contending" started, however, he renounced his earlier views and adopted a more liberal position. In a public speech to businessmen in Shanghai, he not only claimed that the so-called absolute deprivation in America was groundless, but he also reported that the United States was doing much better than the Soviet Union and China.

By the middle of 1957, however, the Chinese government
had heard enough of such talk. During the anti-rightist campaign that followed, those Chinese scholars who had spoken out for their disciplines were sternly condemned. The sociologists's hope to revive sociology in China was crushed and their American background became a ready explanation for their anti-revolutionary behavior.¹⁰¹ In economics, the wind also changed direction. In the first half of a two-part article published in an issue of the Knowledge on the World in early June, Mei Sixiang had demonstrated how growing private investment and government spending effectively altered the economic cycle in the United States;¹⁰² but when he came to complete the article in the early July issue of the journal, Mei took care to stress that the economic crisis of capitalism was an "unbreakable law," and that "the United States, as the foremost capitalist nation, certainly cannot escape from this rule."¹⁰³ Others did not escape censure so deftly. Wu Dakun, for his view that future crises in the United States would differ from the Great Depression, was criticized as a "revisionist."¹⁰⁴ Qian Jiaju, who as editor of Contending had made his journal as a forum for the discussion on U.S. economy, had to make public self-criticism. Chen Zhenghan at Beijing University became the target of six "struggle meetings."¹⁰⁵ He was attacked for his "political conspiracy" in masterminding an "anti-socialist economic platform,"¹⁰⁶ and was accused of attempting to turn the Economics
Department of Beijing University into "a Harvard-style, reactionary training-camp for bourgeois economists." Only decades later, in the 1980s, would Chen be able to resume his studies on Schumpeter.

IV

While writing about Keynes in their "Opinions on the Current State of Economic Studies," Chen Zhenhan and his colleagues had described the concept of "multiplier" as simply a "mathematical" one, clearly believing that pure science, free of politics, was easier to sell. But even "pure science" could have a political dimension. A case in point is China's genetic studies in the 1950s. Although extreme and bizarre, the case certainly highlights the fury with which the Chinese contended over America.

How Trofim D. Lysenko, son of a Russian peasant, with the political support of Stalin, bullied agricultural scientists in the Soviet Union to defer to his dubious theories and practices, is well documented as one of the biggest scientific frauds of the 20th century. Less well known is the stir he caused in the People's Republic of China. There, the Russian biologist's influence produced heated conflict—not only because of the government's extreme policy of "learning from the Soviet Union" but also
because of the dominant position occupied by America-trained Chinese biologists. About four hundred Chinese received their doctoral degrees in the biological sciences from American universities in the forty years preceding 1949. In fact, the controversy was known in China as the "debate of the Lysenkoist and Morganist schools," since Thomas H. Morgan, the Nobel-laureate American biologist, exerted such a profound influence on Chinese biologists.

The close ties of Chinese biologists to the United States can be seen in the case of Dr. Tan Jiazheng, China's leading geneticist. Having received, his bachelor's degree in biology in 1929 from Dongwu University--an American Methodist school in Suzhou in East China--Tan did some graduate work at Yenching University in Beijing, where he studied with Li Ruqi, a Columbia Ph.D. With Dr. Li's recommendation, Tan went to study at the California Institute of Technology, where Thomas Morgan had migrated from Columbia. Upon receiving his receiving his doctoral degree and conducting a few years of research, Tan was invited by Dr. Zhu Kezhen, a meteorologist trained at Harvard make, to return to China to serve as the Dean of Sciences at Zhejiang University, an American Presbyterian institution. In due course Dr. Tan sent several students of his own to study in the United States, and a few of them returned before 1949 to lead genetic studies in China.110

Thus, in the case of Tan's intellectual "lineage," three
generations of scientists shared the same American educational background and had become respected scientific authorities when the Communists came to power.

In 1949, as the Chinese Communists overran China, in the Soviet Union Lysenko crushed his opponents at a fatal meeting at the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The effect was felt almost immediately in China, and the assault on the Morganist tradition in Chinese genetic studies began. Lysenko's speech at the 1949 conference was soon made mandatory reading in all biology departments and agriculture schools.111 One goal of the "thought reform" movement of 1952 was the elimination of Morganist influence in biology. An article in the People's Daily, dated on June 29, 1952, declared that "the present conditions in our biological sciences are intolerable," and called for a thorough reform.112 In the fall of 1952, biological courses reflecting the Morganist tradition were dropped from the college curricula, and research of the Morganist variety was terminated.113 Dr. Tan, now at Fudan University in Shanghai, tried to teach, but no student would register for his class.114 When he refused to acknowledge the "reactionary nature" of Morganism, the university reassigned him so he would not be teaching any kind of genetics at all.115

When in mid-1950s Lysenko's reign in the Soviet Union appeared to be faltering, a number of Chinese biologists took heart. Hu Xianxiao, Ph.D., Harvard, 1925, openly
criticized Lysenko in a book published in 1955. Although only a small part of his book touched on the Lysenko affair, Soviet advisers at China's Ministry of Higher Education protested Hu's "political slander of the Soviet Union." In October of that year, a rally was held in Beijing to denounce Hu, an event publicized nation-wide by the People's Daily.\textsuperscript{116}

The criticism of Hu was overshadowed by news from the Soviet Union concerning the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party and related events. In August 1956, an embarrassed Chinese government organized a major conference on genetic studies, allowing previously suppressed biologists to express their grievances. About one hundred and thirty biologists from across the country and a number of government officials attended the high profile meeting in Qingdao, Shandong Province. In documents prepared for the conference, information was presented on issues such as the contrast between the dramatic increase in U.S. grain production in the past decades and the absence of progress in the Soviet Union, a difference that had resulted partly from different approaches to research on seed-breeding.\textsuperscript{117} Fifty-six Chinese scientists spoke at the forum, about a third of them trained in the United States.\textsuperscript{118} The conference was a great success. Dr. Tan was so exilerated that, under the influence of alcohol, he spat out curses at the government and his persecutors. Annoyed government
officials reported the incident to Lu Dingyi, Communist Party's man in charge of ideological work, but Lu replied: "These people have been maligned by us for years; let them talk back for once." ¹¹⁹

At the Qingdao conference, Morganist biologists not only vented their anger but also put forward plans to revive Morganist genetic studies in China. They suggested that research institutes be set up and that courses on Morganist genetics be reinstalled into the college curricula. Furthermore, they argued that scientific communication and exchanges should be expanded beyond the Soviet Union; new findings from the West should be introduced, and Western scientists should be invited to meet and teach in China. H. J. Muller, whose work at C.I.T., like that of Morgan, was well known by many Chinese biologists, became one of several to be considered for an invitation to China--the icy-cold climate of Sino-American relations at the time notwithstanding. To preempt expected objections, the scholars emphasized that "Muller . . . believes in Communism." ¹²⁰ Significantly, it was Hu Xianxiao, the Harvard-educated scientist who one year earlier had been publicly denounced for his anti-Lysenko views, who now cautioned his enthusiastic colleagues that association with American scientists was inappropriate because "political problems with their country have not been solved." ¹²¹

The impact of the dramatic change in China's genetic
studies went well beyond the field. It proved, in fact, to be a critical event in the emergence of the liberal movement of 1957. For instance, Dr. Tan was invited as an observer to a conference on ideological work held by the Communist Party in Beijing in March 1957. By now he had become such a valuable scientific and political asset that several institutions competed to have him join them. Gone were the days when he was banned from teaching genetics. Reportedly it was Mao Zedong himself who arbitrated the dispute, and Tan stayed on at Fudan University.122

Mao had kept a close eye on the case of genetic studies as part of his preparation for the "blooming and contending." A few days after intervening in the dispute over Tan's appointment, Mao invited Tan and a few other scientists to have a talk. During the conversation Tan told Mao about the Lysenko-Morgan controversy in China and the new situation after the Qingdao conference. Mao admitted that there had been some errors in China's drive for "learning from the Soviet Union" and encouraged Tan to pursue research in his own way.123

In April, as the "blooming and contending" escalated, Mao again demonstrated his support for Chinese critics of Lysenko. While reading the Guangming Daily, China's leading newspaper on cultural affairs, Mao came across an article by Li Ruqi, the Columbia-educated biologist and Dr. Tan's professor at Beijing University. Mao liked the article, a
criticism of Lysenkoist suppression of Morganism in China, and, after providing a new title--"The Only Way of Scientific Progress"--he instructed the People's Daily, the Communist Party's official paper, to re-publish the piece. Mao also wrote an accompanying "Editor's Note" in which he declared: ". . . we support this article. We welcome thorough criticism of our mistakes . . . and constructive suggestions."124

Mao's endorsement was rather impressive considering the contents of Dr. Li's article. In it Li assailed dogmatism embodied in the "learning from the Soviet Union" campaign, which allowed only "the lonely voice of one school." Li also criticized the government's restrictions on the scientists' contacts with scientific community in the West. "Recently we have vowed to strive for "worldwide excellency,"" Li wrote, "but in genetic studies, we don't even know what constitutes "worldwide excellency."" Li called for greater freedom for Chinese scientists in communicating with the capitalist world.125

Encouraged by signals like this, the Morganist scientists became bolder. At a high level meeting of the Chinese Academy of Science, Dai Song'en, a Cornell-trained scientist, censured "leaders" who stuck to ideology and ignored reality. He claimed that certain discoveries had been made in the United States long time ago which raised the output of corn by sixty-five per cent. But Chinese
government officials kept denouncing Americans' "wrong theories" and brushing the facts away. These bureaucrats had lost touch with reality, Dai stated.126

Meanwhile some Morganist scientists began turning words into deeds. New courses were offered at universities, new research projects were launched, and new works found their way into publishing houses.127 At the Beijing Agricultural University, Morganist professors who had been effectively silenced since 1949 now rigorously reclaimed the campus for themselves. Li Jingxong (Cornell) was once again able to work with graduate students and was recently appointed the head of a new laboratory. Bao Wenkui (California Institute of Technology) offered a course which attracted a large crowd of students at the university as well as people from outside Beijing.128 In fact, the situation had changed so dramatically that now some young scientists who had just returned from the Soviet Union feared they would suffer discrimination.129 Also in Beijing, Dr. Li Ruqi, whose article on Guangming Daily Mao had endorsed, started a series on biology for Shengwuxue Tongbao (Biology gazette) to popularize Morganist theory.130

All this excitement came to a sudden halt when the political tide changed and the anti-rightist campaign began. Now many Morganist scientists started to regret their previous aggressive posture. In June, just a few weeks after the crackdown had started, Mao, in an effort to save
whatever credibility he had left, once again invited a few
scientists for a talk, among them, Dr. Tan of Fudan
University. Although the gesture did not, and was not
designed to stop the anti-rightist campaign, it did protect
Dr. Tan personally. At that time the authorities in
Shanghai was considering designating him a "rightist"; after
this second meeting with Mao, the charge was dropped.\textsuperscript{131}

Otherwise, nearly all that had been achieved in the
"blooming and contending" was nullified. Once against
genetic studies came to be considered a political matter.
In an article published in the February 1958 issue of
\textit{Biology Gazette}, a Jiang Younong conducted a ideologically
stringent analysis of the Lysenkoist and Morganist debate.
Lysenkoists, he argued, stress the effects of environment
and they are therefore laudable "materialists." Morganists,
on the other hand, believe in a mysterious substance inside
species that determines heredity and they are therefore
erroneous "idealists." Morganism, Jiang went on to say,
justifies an unjust capitalist social order by attributing
inequality and injustice in American society to "bad
genes,"\textsuperscript{132} a belief that also provides a "theoretical" basis
for racism and imperialism. "Under the banner of race
superiority," he railed, "British, French, and particularly
American imperialists have been savagely practicing racial
discrimination, enslaving or slaughtering colored
peoples."\textsuperscript{133} Morganist genetic study is thus a manifestation
of American imperialism and its evil influence in China should not be underestimated. Meanwhile, the series on genetics in the Biology Gazette begun by Dr. Li Ruqi was cut short. The author was "too busy" to continued the project, the journal's editor told its readers. 134 Most likely, Dr. Li was "too busy" shielding himself from the blistering fire of the "anti-rightist" campaign.

In general, the critical movement of 1957 revealed that amid the fierce hostility between China and the United States, America as an idea, be it "freedom" in scientific inquiry or "progress" in the form of economic development, cherished by a large number of Chinese intellectuals, remained a potent challenge to the Chinese state. America thus touched a sensitive nerve of the Chinese government; it aroused a deep fear in the government that had previously generated the ferocious anti-American campaign of the early 1950s. In 1957 the danger appeared to be as real as it had a few years ago, and the government became alarmed. During the anti-rightist campaign, the combatants for the government constantly referred to one theme, most markedly vocalized by Dean Acheson in 1949. In the "blooming and contending," some Chinese intellectuals seemed to be answering Acheson's evil and eery call. For the government, it was a struggle against the pro-American "democratic individualists" all over again, and it fought back with a vengeance. Firing away on the state's enemies at a meeting
of the National People's Congress, Zhang Hanfu, Deputy Foreign Minister, observed that the current U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had applauded the Chinese rightists' recent performance. This he considered sufficient evidence for the guilt of the "rightists." In the same vein, a commentator for the People's Daily suggested that the American commendment for the "rightists" was strong evidence that something was wrong with these "rightists." In this sense, Chinese people should thank Mr. Dulles, the Daily commentator observed, "for, you see, he taught the Chinese people yet another thought-provoking lesson on politics."

Most important of all, the Chinese government had learned a lesson. To play with the America issue was to play with fire. Communist China would be the better for it with the United State, the flame-spitting devil, banished far far away.
NOTES

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2. Ibid.

3. Zhongguo shiyan gejuyuan tongxunzu, "Guanyu Zhang Quan" (About Zhang Quan) Wenyi bao (Literature and arts), no. 21 (1957), reprinted in Xinhua banyuekan, no. 18 (1957), 110-12.


5. Editorial, "Wenhui bao de zichanjieji fangxiang yingdang pipan" (The bourgeois tendency of Wenhui daily must be criticized) Renmin ribao (People's daily), 1 July 1957, 1.

6. Luo Longji, "Wo zai Tianjin Yishi bao shiqi de fengfeng yuyu" (My days with Yishi daily in Tianjin), Wenhua shiliao (Materials in cultural history) (Beijing), no. 8, 1984, 82-93.

7. "Luo Longji zai zhengfeng hui shang de jiaodai" (Luo Longji's confessions at the rectification meeting), Renmin ribao, August 13, 1957, reprinted in Xinhua banyuekan (Xinhua bimonthly), no. 17, 152.

8. Ye Duyi, "Jielu Luo Longji de benlai mianmu, bing jiantao wo ziji de cuowu" (True face of Luo Longji and my own errors) Xinhua banyuekan, no. 17, 1957, 33.


10. Ibid., 167.

11. Ibid., 197.
12. Luo Longji, "Wo de chubu jiaodai" (Ny preliminary confession) Xinhua banyuekan, no. 18, 1957, 96.


14. Wu Han, "Wo fenhen, wo kongsu" (I'm angry, I confess) Xinhua banyuekan, no. 15, 1957, 101.


17. Jutao, "Jiechuan Huang Wanli de huazhao" (Huang Wanli's tricks), Shoudu gaodeng xuexia fan youpan douzheng de juda shengli (Great victory in anti-rightist movement in colleges and universities in Beijing), (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1957), 288-89.

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19. Mu Linsen, "Qiuqu Huanghe wanli sha" (Sands of the Yellow River), Minzhu Zhongguo (Democratic China) (Princeton, New Jersey) November 1993, 13-16.

20. Guangming ribao, 4 September 1957, 2.

21. "Zai 'fan jiaotiao' qizhi de yanhua xia fanmai zibenzhuiyi sihuo, Qian Weichang shi Zhang Luo lianmeng zi kexuejie de qianke" (Qian Weichang promotes bourgeois thoughts under the guise of anti-dogmatism. . .), Renmin ribao, 6 July 1957, reprinted in Xinhua banyuekan, no. 14, 1957, 183.

22. Ibid., 182.

23. "Qian Weichang yuzhong xinchang tan maodun" (Qian Weichang on contradictions), Renmin ribao, 17 May 1957, 3.


25. Zhang Wei, "Qian Weichang kuayao 'lao Qinghua' de yongyi shi shengme?" (Why did Qian Weichang boast of 'Old Qinghua'?), in Shoudu gaodeng yuanshao fan youpan douzheng de juda shengli (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1957), Vol. 2,
26. "Beida shisheng yuan gong tongchi youpai fengzi Long Yinhua niulun" (Students and faculty of Beijing University refute rightist Long Yinhua), ibid., Vol. 2, 193.


30. Ibid., 6 October 1957, 3.

31. Ibid., 22 August 1957, 4.

32. Pan Dakui, "Wo chengren cuowu" (I admit my mistakes), Xinhua banyuekan, no. 18, 1957, 111.

33. Beijing ribao (Beijing daily), 24 July 1957, 4.

34. Gansu ribao (Gansu daily), 14 July 1957, 3.

35. Jiefang ribao (Liberation daily), 7 August 1957, 3.


38. Guangming ribao, 14 August 1957, 2.

39. Ibid.


42. Pan Dakui, "Wo chengren cuowu" (I admit my mistakes), Xinhua banyuekan, no. 18, 1957, 109.
43. Ibid.; Xinwen banyuekan, no. 16, 1957, 159.

44. Xihau banyuekan no. 18, 1957, 64.

45. Wang Yunsheng, "Bixu kefu xiahai de minsu zhuyi" (Must overcome narrow-minded nationalism", Renmin ribao, 23 August 1957, 2.

46. Tan Tiwu, "Wo wei shenme fan liao yanzhong de cuowu" (Why have made serious mistakes), Xinhua banyuekan, no. 18, 1957, 105.

47. Jiefang ribao, 3 August 1957, 3.


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50. Guangming ribao, 6 April 1957, 3.

51. Yang Xiufeng, ibid.

52. Guangming ribao, 20 April 1957, 2.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., 19 May 1957, 3.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

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59. Guangming ribao, 6 May 1957, 2.

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62. Fei Xiaotong, "Zhishi fenzi de zao chun tianqi" (Intellectuals' early spring), Renmin ribao, 24 March 1957, 3.

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64. R. David Arkush, Fei Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), 106.

65. Xiang Chong, ibid.

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69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ruo Su, "Jielu Li Jinghan huifu zicha jieji shehui xue de yinmu jiqi shehui diaocha de fandong benzhi" (Disclose Li Jinghan's conspiracy to restore bourgeois sociology and the reactionary nature of his social investigation), Jiaoxu yu yanjiu, combined issues 8-9, 1957, 104.


73. Xinhua banyuekan, no. 18, 1957, 173-7.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Guangming ribao, 23 July 1957, 2.

77. Ibid., 4 September, 1957, 2.

78. Chen Zhenhan, et al., "Women duiyu dangqian jingji kexue gongzuo de yixie yijian" (Our opinions on the current state of economic studies), Jingji yanjiu (Economic studies), no. 5, 1957, 130.
79. Ibid., 133.

80. Renmin ribao, 22 April 1957, 3.

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82. For two examples, see Liu Tianyi, "Kaiensi jingji sixiang pipan" (Criticism of Keynesian economic ideas), Jingji yanjiu (Economic studies), no. 6, 1956, 39-59; Xu Yidan, "Kaiensi shi ziben zhu de baowei zhe" (Keynes defends capitalism), ibid., no 1, 81-104, and no. 2, 25-35, 1957.

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93. Xie Yao, "Zuijin guangyu ziben zhu yu guojia jingji weiji de kanfa he guji" (Recent opinions and estimates on the economies of the capitalist world), 19-21.

94. For example, Mei Sixiang, "Meiguo jingji weiji de tantao" (On economic crisis in the United States), Shijie zhishi (Knowledge of the world), no. 11, 1957, 15-7.

95. Guangming ribao 12 June 1957, 3.

96. Chen Zhenhan, ibid., 128.
97. "Guangyu wucha jieji pinkunhua de lunzhan" (On the debate over the poverty of the proletariat), Dushu yuebao (Reader's monthly), no. 6, 1957, 26.

98. Wang Wezhong, "Bochi youpai fenzi dui wucha jieji pinkunhua lilun de wumie" (Refute the rightists' ideas on the issue of poverty), Xueshu yuekan (Scholarship monthly), no. 12, 1957, 17.


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101. For criticism of the sociologists, see Jiaoxue yu yanjiu (Teaching and research), combined issues 8-9, 1957.

102. Mei Sixiang, ibid.


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113. Ibid., 4.
114. Zhao Gongmin, 15.
115. Ibid., 16.
117. Ibid., 408-9.
119. Zhao Gongmin, 16.
120. Li Peishan, et al., 301-11
121. Ibid., 312.
122. Zhao Gongmin, 19.
123. Ibid.
124. Li Ruqi, "Fazhan kexue de biyou zhi lu" (The only way of scientific development), Renmin ribao, 1 May 1957, 7.
125. Ibid.
126. Guangmin ribao, 28 May 1957, 2.
128. Guangmin ribao, 20 April 1957, 2.
129. Guangming ribao, 6 May 1957, 2.
130. Li Ruqi, "Yichuanxue jiben yuanli" (Basics of genetics), Shengwu xu tong bao (biological gazette), no. 2, 1957-no 3. 1958.
132. Jiang Younong, "Yichuanxue liang da pai zhenglu de xingzhi wenti" (The nature of the debates between the two schools in genetics), Yichuanxue tong bao (Biological gazette), 42.
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CHAPTER 4

THE OFFICIAL AMERICA:

AFFIRMED AND SHATTERED AGAIN, 1957-1979

The critical movement of 1957 taught the Chinese government a poignant lesson. Its prestige damaged and its confidence broken, the regime became ever more vigilant in shaping and cultivating the nation's public opinion. Guidance was to be constant and stray ideas were dispatched in timely fashion. As an important part of this endeavor, the government took an active role in explicating the United States to the Chinese people, and, in the two decades to come, an "official" vision of America dominated.

But with absolute power comes absolute responsibility. Now that the government had become the sole authority on America, it alone was responsible for telling a consistent story. This was no easy task as conditions in the country and the world fluctuated and the Chinese government's priorities also changed constantly.

In the course of the two decades from the late 1950s to the end of the Mao era in the late 1970s, the Chinese government faced three major problems. First, immediately after the liberal movement of 1957, the government had to reassert its command of the America issue. Then, it had to negotiate its way through the political complications of
radicalism at the end of the 1950s and in the late 1960s. Finally, in the early 1970s, the Chinese government's decision to build its relationship with the United States created an especially serious challenge to the government, and China's official America started to disintegrate. In the end, the government's effort to maintain an official America was self-defeating: the government's heavy investment in a fixed image of America would become a heavy liability in due time when situations in China and the world had changed.

I.

No sooner had the Chinese government decided to crack down on the dissident movement of 1957 than it started to reassert its opinion on the United States. In addition to attacking the "guilty" individuals, the effort took three main forms: first, an orchestrated press campaign; second, rectification of academic discourse (as with the debate on the American economy); and thirdly, the reinstitution of the Soviet Union as a model for China superior to the United States.

As we have seen, by late May 1957, the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party had realized that the "blooming and contending" of the previous months had gained
a life of its own and was rapidly getting out of control. A radical change in direction involved intricate maneuvering. The government started its campaign by sending out a number of somewhat circuitous messages. Starting on May 24, major Chinese newspapers reported extensively an incident of homicide in Taiwan, in which a U.S. Army officer shot and killed a Chinese and was later acquitted. While the Chinese media would not have missed such an event in any case, the extent and intensity of the coverage was extraordinary and recalled some of the ferocious anti-American publicity of the late 1940s. By voicing indignation against "sinister" American imperialists, the government was slapping the face of liberal critics who had been criticizing the Chinese government and commending the United States. "Slaves Live Hard Lives," the Liberation Daily in Shanghai thus headlined one of its report on the incident, suggesting that Taiwan under the Nationalist government was no more than a colony of the United States.

On May 27, the Chinese media reported the Civil Rights march in Washington, D.C., which had taken place ten days before. A commentator for the Guangming Daily in Beijing remarked:

Today we are publishing a detailed report on the march of American blacks in Washington. Our readers will see that in the heart of a nation in which the ruling class
makes its boast of democracy and liberty, sixteen million blacks are suffering endless humiliation, and in this so-called civilized country, innumerable medieval lynchings are still being carried out.³

Meanwhile, Chinese newspapers began to publish negative stories about the United States told by Chinese scholars and students who had recently returned to China from America. One student who had studied chemistry at Purdue University claimed that he had been locked up in a mental hospital for his political views.⁴ Two physicists told stories of McCarthysm, the "fraudulence" of "freedom of speech," and decadence of the American society.⁵ Lu Yuanjiu, a former researcher at M.I.T., on the other hand, related how he had successfully adapted to socialism upon his return to China and how he was completely satisfied with his new life.⁶ The People's Daily, in an eye-grabbing headline, quoted Qian Xueshen, the famed nuclear physicist, as saying: "Having Muddled in the United States for 20 Years, I Chose Socialism."⁷

Having fired such warning shots, the Chinese government came into the open in early June, and launched the "anti-rightist" campaign. The Chinese press accordingly stepped up its crusade against the United States. Major newspapers in Beijing inaugurated special columns for the purpose. For instance, under the title "The Reality of American Cultural
Freedom," the *Guangming Daily* carried excerpts from Corliss Lamont's new book *Freedom Is As Freedom Does: Civil Liberties Today*—a harsh critique of McCarthyist repression.8

Outside the national capital, provincial papers followed suit. In Hubei, for instance, the *Changjiang Ribao* (The Yangzi River Daily) introduced a question-answer forum —"Are There Democracy, Liberty and Prosperity in the United States?" One question went: "In America, even workers own automobiles. Doesn't this suggest an abundant life for the American people?" The columnist answered no, explaining that a car was an indispensable daily necessity for a worker, not a luxury, and that in fact an American worker with a car could still be miserable. To make his point, the columnist told the story of a retired American worker who, out of his loneliness and helplessness, petitioned the government to make things easier for him by sending him before a firing squad.9

Other installments in the series featured themes such as the terror of America's "secret police" (the FBI "has the finger prints of 131 million Americans");10 the myth of "Freedom of Speech" ("five financial groups control most newspapers"; novelist Albert Maltz flees to Mexico);11 inequality in education (forty percent of American high school students drop out to earn their bread);12 racial discrimination (the Governor of Virginia chooses to close down all public schools rather than allowing
desegregation);\textsuperscript{13} America's oppressive legal system (Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are executed);\textsuperscript{14} and the fraudulence of American democracy (contributions to the Republican Party in 1956: "Du Pont, $88,300; Mellon, $99,150; Rockefeller, $100,500."\textsuperscript{15}

Aside from such special columns, Chinese newspapers also published news reports on various aspects of American life. Some appeared trivial, but all made a point. For instance, the Liberation Daily in Shanghai headlined: "How Much Extra Income for Eisenhower? Accepting Bribery All of the Time, and Indulging in Luxury and Extravagance, Eisenhower Outclasses Emperors." The "bribery" referred to gifts sent to the White House, and the "luxury and extravagance" referred to Air Force One and the secret service.\textsuperscript{16} The Guangming Daily told the story of male students of M.I.T raiding Radcliffe College for female students' underwear. If the most brilliant young Americans acted in such a decadent manner, one could imagine what the rest of this society was like.\textsuperscript{17}

The tactic of making a substantial point out of an seemingly insignificant event quickly became standard fare. In its March 1958 issue, Xinwen Zhanxian (The Journalist front) recommended to China's writers a piece of model reportage--a story written by Fan Ruoyu for the People's Daily. Fan re-wrote a Newsweek article on water shortages in some areas of the United States in order to demonstrate
the evils of the American capitalist system. "At any given time of the year, one out of four Americans has to live without water." This, according to Fan was "indeed an unavoidable result of the capitalist mode of production." Fan went on to assail the "rightists" in China, "who oppose socialism ... [with its] planned production and distribution." "They are," he argued, "reactionaries because in effect they oppose man's rising above the world of animals." They are, he raged, "the filthiest beasts on the earth." This story, with its Marxist analysis and its moral for the Chinese, was what reporting on the United State should be.

While Chinese newspapers attempted to re-fashion the public image of the United States, efforts were also made to reshape views of America in academia, particularly in economic studies, where the most damage had been done by the "blooming and contending." Here, the government's job was made easier by a recession in the U.S. economy that started in late 1957.

The core issue here, as we have seen, was whether the Marxian theory on the periodic crises of the capitalist economy still held true after World War Two. Chinese official economists had been baffled by the postwar performance of the U.S. economy, and the issue, during the period of "blooming and contending," had prompted some "rightist" economists to search for a less rigid
interpretation of the American economy. Now, just as the political tide in China had turned, news arrived that the U.S. economy had fallen into a recession. Some official economists felt that they were vindicated. One of those elated was Chu Yukun. In early May 1957, Chu had written to Shijie zhishi (Knowledge of the world) to protest the suddenly trendy positive appraisal of the U.S. economy. But Chu's opinion was not very popular then. Now, two months later, as the "anti-rightist" campaign was well on its way, Chu published another article in the same journal, in which he argued that the new trouble in the American economy proved that Marx was right after all.

The recession of the U.S. economy in 1957 also drew the attention of Zhang Wentian, the Communist leader who, as a young man, had spent some time in California, and who was now serving as a Deputy Foreign Minister and an expert on international affairs for the Party. In the first issue of Hongqi (Red Flag), a journal recently created by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to strengthen the Party's ideological leadership, Zhang put forward the Party's authoritative analysis of the U.S. economy. Zhang characterized the recent downturn as one of the "periodic crisis of over-production," that is, a classical crisis as Marx had defined it. This characterization was important because previously Chinese Communist theorists had great difficulty explaining why the two previous dips in the
postwar U.S. economy—first during 1948–1949 and then in 1953–1954—did not display the strong symptoms of overproduction which Marx had emphasized. This "abnormal" behavior of the U.S. economy raised the forbidden question of whether postwar capitalism had somehow reinvented itself to defy Marx's prediction. But the new "crisis" of the U.S. economy clarified the matter, at least for Zhang. "Now bourgeois economists are no longer arguing over whether there will be a crisis (they call it 'recession'), but [only] how severe it will be and how long it will last."²⁴ "Let all the bourgeois spokesmen and various breeds of revisionists try to defend capitalism, especially American capitalism!" declared Zhang defiantly, "American imperialism remains the most reactionary, most decadent and most decrepit capitalism, with no future whatsoever."²⁵

Under these new circumstances, some economists who had previously spoken somewhat positively of the U.S. economy began to "correct" their views. As we have seen, during the "blooming and contending," Wu Dakun of the People's University in Beijing had tried to make the case that because of the U.S. government's anti-crisis measures, it was unlikely that the Great Depression of 1929 would repeat itself in postwar America. Now, however, Wu maintained that the current economic trouble in the United States was indeed a crisis characterized by over-production. His previous writing might have given a different impression, Wu
explained, but he had never meant to suggest the absence of an overall economic crisis; he had been merely trying to note that while tight credit had always accompanied traditional crises, in the postwar United States, inflation had become the major problem.\footnote{26}

But Wu's flip-flop did not satisfy his critics under the new circumstances. His students and colleagues at the People's University wrote to criticize him for placing too much emphasis on finance and thus implying that some relatively simple budgetary or monetary measures could solve the fundamental contradictions of capitalism. Wu's view was still "revisionist" and unacceptable, his critics determined.\footnote{27}

China's official economists stringently refused to entertain any kind of financial or monetary interpretation of the U.S. economy because it smacked too much of John Maynard Keynes, their archenemy, who appeared to be the savior of capitalism. Writing in \textit{Jingji yanjiu} (Economic research), Ding Gu, for example, took on Keynes's "multiplier" concept, which had been a hot topic during the "blooming and contending." Keynes, Ding wrote, surpassed other capitalist economists in that he recognized inherent problems of the capitalist system, but he erred terribly when he refused to face the real cause of the problems--the deprivation of the working people--and attributed the ills of capitalism to various "psychological" factors.\footnote{28} The so-
called "multiplier" was a myth and did not work, Ding believed; in times of economic adversity, not only will the people have no money to spend; but even if they do, the money will go first to meet their debts. Reviewing the case of the United States after World War II, Ding claimed that while government spending expanded drastically, consumers' purchasing power had not increased proportionately. The idea that some "super-multiplier" could stimulate the economy while keeping inflation in check was thus a total fraud. Capitalism, Ding observed, was as bankrupt and hopeless as ever—with or without Keynes.

In addition to the question of crisis, China's official economists also addressed the other major economic issue that had aroused debate in the "blooming and contending": whether the poverty of the working class under capitalism was "relative" or "absolute." In his Red Flag article, Zhang Wentian had adduced the new economic problems in the United States as strong evidence of a continuous and persistent deterioration of American workers' lives. He dismissed the U.S. government's unemployment figure (five million) as far too low, and put his own estimate, unemployed and underemployed, at above ten million. This, he said, "accounts for more than one-sixth of the country's total working population." Another economist, Guan Mengjue, put the figure at fifteen million. Such evidence "repudiates the attempt by the evil-minded bourgeois
rightists, revisionists and opportunists to deny the existence of the absolute poverty of the working class," Guan wrote, "and the unfolding events will further prove them dead wrong!" 33

But events did not unfold exactly the way Guan and his comrades had expected. The U.S. economy climbed out of the 1957-1958 recession with relatively little difficulty. But China's official economists would not give up; they simply looked farther down the road. In early 1959, Red Flag published an article written by Meng Yongqian to explain the developments. Some of the U.S. government's anti-crisis measures contributed to the recovery, Meng acknowledged, but, he emphasized, the fundamental contradictions within American capitalism continued to exist. Erratic expansion of investment, unreliability of artificially created demand (mainly military), and a persistent high unemployment rate portended future woes. The crisis of 1957-1958 did not occur, Meng observed, but "Obviously the postwar U.S. economy has been in constant fluctuation. Judging by conditions in the United States and in the capitalist world, we are sure that U.S. industry is heading toward another descent." 34

To further strengthen the impression of a feeble United States, the Chinese government resorted to another time-honored strategy: the promotion of the Soviet Union, the reputation of which had been questioned during the "blooming
and contending." It so happened that November 1957 was the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution, and the Chinese government intended to make good use of the occasion. It organized a comprehensive campaign of public relations to showcase the achievements of the Soviet state and to counter the pro-American inclination of the "blooming and contending." The organization of the campaign was thorough and conscientious, involving government offices at all levels and various mass organizations. The national headquarters of China's Labor Union, for instance, sent a directive to its regional offices one month in advance, instructing them to initiate and organize appropriate events utilizing various means—"Museums of Sino-Soviet Friendship," mobile performance teams, billboards, lectures, concerts, story-telling, poem-reading, and so forth.35

Chinese newspapers once again led the way, bringing to their readers a host of stories about China's northern neighbor. For several days on end the Beijing Daily carried full-page pictures and charts illustrating the accomplishments of the Soviet state.36 On October 24, for example, the paper compared industrial developments in the Soviet Union and the United States. The industrial production in the Soviet Union in 1957 was 330 times that of Tsarist Russia in 1913; during the same period, the figure for the United States was merely 4.1 times, Beijing Daily noted.37 Other newspapers were as enthusiastic and adroit
in making such comparisons. The *People's Daily*, for instance, in one of its reports, compared the Russian people's hefty bank deposits with the debt of $18.8 billion for American farmers.

The launch of *Sputnik* on October 4, 1957, greatly boosted the Chinese government's campaign to celebrate the Soviet system. For weeks Chinese newspapers reported the event in exquisite detail and published lengthy materials on space science, about which most Chinese had hardly heard anything until then. Numerous articles appeared expounding the significance of the feat. One article in the *People's Daily*, "Soviet Satellite Cracks the Myth of American Technological Superiority," called attention to the fact that with the new rocket technology revealed in launching *Sputnik*, the Soviet Union could carry a nuclear bomb to every single corner in the world, rendering American bases around the world useless. The *People's Daily* liked the article so much that it published three different versions of it. The launching of the second Soviet satellite in November kept the enthusiasm high, and the *People's Daily* found space to report that a young American woman telegraphed Moscow to volunteer to fly in space for the Soviet Union. The American government's reaction to the Soviet breakthrough, disbelief and dismay, was also extensively reported, and it became a source of much mockery and sarcasm. More ridicule was generated by the failure
of the United States to launch its own satellite in December 1957, as shown in "Alas! America's Little Moon!" a boisterous comedy caricaturing American government officials and American military industrialists. On a more serious note, the Guangming Daily commented: "Let the American ruling class tremble in anguish. Their satellite cannot fly up, and their capitalist system will surely crumble down."41

The message that the Chinese government intended to send through all these activities was, of course, a political one. One editorial in People's Daily stressed that the Soviet success in space adventure symbolized the strength of socialism: "Under socialism, an economically and culturally backward country can, within a short time, overtake the most advanced capitalist nation." "In the Soviet Union, this possibility has turned into reality."42

In early November, Mao, who rarely traveled abroad, went to Moscow to attend the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. There, speaking to the Supreme Soviet, Mao declared China's determination to follow the route of the October Revolution and his confidence in the eventual triumph of the communist cause. "Socialism will displace capitalism. This is an objective law that no human force can alter," Mao proclaimed. And he went on to say:

The American imperialists tried and are still trying to
II

The liberal movement of 1957 was thus put to rest; the vibrations created by the event, however, reached far and wide, well into the 1960s. The outburst of 1957 underscored a fundamental problem rooted in the very nature of a communist state. In spite of its many anti-modern elements, the communist ideology bases itself on industrialization, and is therefore a progressive, "modernist" teaching. Consequently, a communist state bears the constant burden to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism, as a stage of historical development. Failure to modernize will inevitably undermine the underlying rationale for the communist state and threaten its very existence. This burden weighed especially heavy on the Chinese Communists whose inheritance and dominion was rural, poor and backward. Impressive progress had been made since 1949, but it fell far short of what the Communists had claimed their cause up to be. Ironically, the harder the Communists tried to glorify their system the deeper in trouble they became.
In a sense, the dissident movement of 1957 was a challenge to the Communist government to make good on its promises. The government could not deliver, to its great embarrassment. It silenced the dissent and reestablished its political authority, but it knew very well that sooner or later it had to meet the expectations it had raised. By extolling the Soviet Union the Chinese government could temporarily relieve the pressure on itself, but it certainly could not count on the Chinese people living on that dream forever. The challenge was real, and the solution had to be equally substantial. This psychological and political dilemma underpinned the Chinese government's rhetoric on the United States through various political events in the coming decade: during the Great Leap Forward, in connection to its struggle against "revisionism" in the world communist movement, and on liberalism and the Civil Rights movement in the United States.

The Great Leap Forward of 1958-1959 was the Chinese government's wild bid for overnight industrialization. Mao Zedong was not a patient man, and the outcry of the liberal critics during the "blooming and contending" only further tested his temper. In the summer of 1958, with Mao's strong support, the Communist Party made a series of decisions to speed up China's economic development and set in motion what would become the Great Leap Forward. The campaign aimed to achieve what most economists would consider impossible
--for instance, a target of 10.7 million tons of steel, a 100% percent increase over the output of the previous year. Mao correctly recognized that such a goal could not be accomplished by conventional means, and he decided to pit shear human will against nature. It was an unprecedented economic experiment not even attempted by the Soviet Union. In fact, at a time when the Chinese government unflaggingly lionized the Russians, Mao found that even the Russian way could not move China forward fast enough. At a Party conference in August 1958, Mao spoke of the shortcomings of the Soviet experience and criticized some Chinese communists' slavish attitude toward the Soviet Union. He complained, for example, that when Chinese artists drew pictures of him with Stalin, he always appeared shorter than the Russian leader--and he knew the relative heights of the two. 44 The Chinese could do better, Mao said, and they must do better.

Meanwhile, the United States stayed in the picture. A resounding slogan for the Great Leap Forward was "chao Ying gan Mei"--"overtake Britain, race with the United States." Studies and analyses were conducted to show that Chinese economy could surpass that of Britain within fifteen years and that somewhere down the road it could catch up with the United States. At a meeting of the National People's Congress, the challenge was formally put to the country.45 The United States was left to the Soviet Union to tackle in
the short run, but it was China's eventual goal to outperform that economic giant too. And soon the government began to celebrate some Chinese successes in the contest. On July 23, 1958, for instance, the People's Daily reported with great fanfare that China's wheat harvest had exceeded that of the United States. The Red Flag published an article to commemorate the feat, which it attributed to the superiority of socialism and the failure of capitalism to "solve the problem of overproduction"--a curious argument.

Clearly, racing with the United States was becoming an obsession of sorts, at least for Mao, who had made the idea a part of his political vocabulary. At a party conference in December 1958, speaking of his intention to step down as head of state--though not from his party position--Mao explained that he was not running away from the battlefield: "I still want to work for a few years, ideally, until we have overtaken the United States, so I can face Marx."

Adding some urgency to China's desire to reach par with the United States was the pending issue of Taiwan, which the Seventh Fleet of the U. S. Navy had separated from the Communist mainland since the outbreak of the Korean War. After several years of fruitless talks with the United States, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw, the Chinese government grew increasingly restless over the issue, and in the summer of 1958 it took a series of actions, including
the bombardment of a few off-shore islands under Nationalist control, in what appeared to be preparations for an assault on Taiwan itself. If the government indeed had seriously considered such an attack, it backed off from that plan. The intensified contention over the Taiwan Strait, however, gave new meaning and greater urgency to the idea of a "race with the United States." Liu Yalou, Commander-in-Chief of China's Air Force, commented in an article in the Jiefangjun bao (Liberation army daily): "American imperialists are no big deal. They just have a few more tons of steel— temporarily." Liu then stated:

The American aggressors bully us because we have too little steel. This commands us to develop our steel industry as fast as possible. . . . The American aggressors still view us as the China of old, believing that we Chinese are just a pile of loose sand, easy to trample on. This requires us all to get further organized, . . . to act as if we six hundred million people were just one single man."

Clearly the Chinese viewed their Great Leap Forward not only as a drive for faster economic growth but also as a critical battle in their political and cultural contention with the American imperialists. Interestingly, Mao called on his party leaders to study the United States, not just
for the narrow purpose of diplomacy, but also to understand some larger issues. For instance, speaking at a party meeting in December 1958, Mao complimented John Foster Dulles as a good enemy. Unlike the British, who were crafty and shrewd, Mao observed, the U.S. government usually did not care much about strategy. Dulles, however, was an exception. In Dulles' recent speeches, said Mao, he talked about five international issues: nationalism, the Arctic and Antarctic, atomic energy, outer space, and communism. "This is a man who thinks", Mao said. "Read his speeches, word by word. Use a English dictionary."\textsuperscript{52}

In short, Mao was quite excited about the prospect of a showdown with the United States, the final stronghold of the capitalist world. Unfortunately for him, the Great Leap Forward turned out to be a great leap backward, which not only failed to build up China's industries but, through neglect and abuse, brought the nation's economy to the brink of collapse. The situation was worsened by several years of disastrous weather, and widespread famine visited the nation. China's ambitious campaign to "overtake Britain and race with the United States" ended in failure, and millions of Chinese lost their lives as a result of Mao's miscalculations.

The Chairman himself had to assume some responsibility for the calamity and was forced into semi-retirement. With him now in the back seat, some moderate leaders of the
party—notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping—adopted a series of rehabilitative policies designed to allow the country to recuperate. Peasants were granted greater freedom in cultivating their fields, and the production of consumer goods, which had been all but sacrificed in favor of heavy industries, was revived and expanded. The government even softened its rhetoric on the United States somewhat. For instance, at a national conference on cultural affairs held in 1962, Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, who had tried his hand as a writer before he joined the communist revolution, declared that "We should not force a returned student from America to give up what he learned in the United States and to conform to the Soviet way." "Soviet stuff and American stuff can co-exist," Chen said; "let them compete in real life."

But Mao, relegated to the passenger's seat, was not happy. He could not stand the permissive policies of his colleagues, which he considered tantamount to the abandonment of the Revolution. During 1961 and 1962, while reading a Soviet textbook on political economy, Mao pondered questions of peace, war and revolution, writing down lengthy notes. Can we say that the possibility of war with the capitalist world had been eliminated? Mao thought otherwise. You cannot eliminate war without having eliminated social classes, Mao believed. The confrontation between communism and capitalism could not be
avoided, and, in Mao's view, communism was winning the struggle. World War Two destroyed three imperialist powers and significantly weakened two others, and now the United States was in serious trouble too. Mao observed:

After World War II, economic crises in the capitalist world differed from those of Marx's time. Generally speaking, before the war, there was one [economic crisis] every seven, eight, or ten years. In the fourteen years from the end of World War II to 1959, three have already taken place."55

The death of capitalism was obviously imminent, Mao concluded. "Too bad there is only one United States," he told a party meeting at about this time, "if there were ten more, we could handle them all."56

Such wild talk by Mao frightened his comrades in Moscow, which eventually resulted in a breach between the two communist allies. But Mao and his radical theorists were not repentant; they had always been hard on the "revisionists" in the world communist movement, that is, those who appeared to be soft on the United States. During the Great Leap Forward the Chinese had assaulted these traitors to the revolutionary cause, and the primary target then had been Yugoslavia under Tito. The Chinese found the
strongest evidence of Tito's corruption in his association with the United States; certainly no true revolutionaries could have any common ground with the evil Americans. Writing for the People's Daily in June 1958, Kang Sheng, Mao's right-hand man in charge of ideology, had accused Tito of betraying communism on precisely this ground. Kang meticulously recounted the words and deeds of Yugoslavian leaders with respect to the United States in order to "expose the ugly face of the Yugoslavian revisionists." Tito was said to be independent and creative; "a so-called communist and revolutionary" who "openly sings his praise to the number-one enemy of peoples around the world"--this, Kang wrote, "must be some kind of ingenuity." Chen Boda, another of China's leading ideologues, accused Tito of being bought off by the Americans: "Judas was paid a meager thirty gold coins; American imperialists are paying Tito millions of times more." Now, a few years later, restless in his semi-retirement and angry with his moderate colleagues, Mao had even better reasons to step up his attack on the revisionists and what he perceived as their capitulation to the United States. What happened to Yugoslavia under American influence? asked a People's Daily and Red Flag editorial in October 1963. Capitalism had returned to Yugoslavia and the once-proud country had become merely a dependent state of the United States. Moreover, Tito's pro-American policy had resulted
in the pollution of Yugoslavia by decadent American culture. "Turn a few pages of Yugoslavian publications," went a Red Flag article, and "one will see what the so-called famous and popular Western authors write about, and what kind of American lifestyle 'Western' movies propagate." The so-called "artistic freedom," the journal pointed out, was nothing more than "the freedom for a corrupt and reactionary American imperialist culture to overflow." By this time, Mao's dissatisfaction with communist revisionism had gone beyond the Yugoslavians and extended to the Russians. Mao had had his disagreements with Stalin and his reservations about the Soviet Union as a model for China, but in all these matters he had been the radical party; in other words, he faulted the Russians for being too conservative. Now he saw his Chinese comrades back-peddling and the Russians under Khrushchev seeking to "co-exist" with the American imperialists. To Mao, this willingness to compromise with the Americans was intolerable. Consequently, just as the Chinese had attacked Tito a few years earlier, the Chinese now fired on the Russian communists. In their replies to the Russian Communist Party's "open letter" on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Chinese Communists denounced the Kremlin for its policies toward the United States. "It is the biggest hoax in the world to present the leading enemy of world peace as a loving guarding angel of harmony," the Chinese
proclaimed. The Russians were making a big mistake; it had always been the evil design of the United States to dominate the entire world, and it was self-deception to hope for the "peaceful coexistence" of two conflicting social systems. "It is very clear," declared the Party's Central Committee, "that imperialism remains the cause of armed conflict in the contemporary world, and American imperialism is the leading culprit of aggression and war." The leaders in the Kremlin failed to see this, the Chinese believed, because they themselves had degenerated into true bourgeois and pseudo-communists.

First the Yugoslavians departed from "the way"; then the Russians capitulated to the American imperialists. By stages, the Chinese Communists developed a mentality of being besieged, and they decided to do their utmost to see that the Chinese would not fall victim to the bewitching Americans. In this connection, the assumption of office by Democratic presidents in the United States did not relieve their anxiety; on the contrary, these Democratic presidents, more than their Republican predecessor, promised a more compassionate America, and thus seemed more dangerous in beguiling "revisionists" among the communist ranks. Mao and his followers were thus no fans of either Kennedy or Johnson.

The Chinese were particularly piqued by Kennedy's penchant for moralizing. This seemed to be an infringement
on their monopoly, and they strained to discredit his claims to moral legitimacy. Soon after Kennedy had assumed office, the Chinese began downplaying the existence of substantial difference between him and Eisenhower. If a difference existed, one Chinese wrote, it was that Kennedy was more deceptive. "Kennedy likes to talk about history, but it appears that he knows little of it," wrote Guo Jizhou in the Red Flag. Guo pointed out that six months after coming into office Kennedy had actually done nothing new; as result, Kennedy, like his Republican predecessors, would soon be "washed away" by the historic trend which he failed to recognize. Another Chinese commentator, Chen Yuan, noted that Kennedy, in his 1962 State of the Union speech, used the word "freedom" more than twenty times. But at the time Kennedy was making the speech, Chen wrote, the U. S. Supreme Court was preparing to put American communists on trial, and the State Department had revoked the passports of leading American communists. "In the 1930s," Chen fumed, ". . . Hitler staged a fascist "trial" of communists; now Kennedy has foolhardily stepped on the same road." 

The Chinese were no less harsh on Johnson, whom they considered, like Kennedy, a member of the American monopoly capitalist establishment. In an article for Red Flag, dated December 1964, right before the reelected Johnson took office, Guo Jizhou argued that in the United States, capital rules as the absolute authority; who was president really
did not make much of a difference. Thus, "... the Republican Eisenhower, the Democrats Truman and Kennedy ... were all brothers in the same family, agents of monopoly capital. Johnson is no exception."\(^7\) Another Chinese commentator observed that Johnson "owns tens of thousand acres of land as well as a TV station with exclusive rights."\(^7\) Yet another Chinese writer called Johnson a hypocrite for claiming to be in favor of Civil Rights; his record as a Congressman indicated otherwise.\(^7\)

By this time the Chinese had shifted their focus to the American Civil Rights movement. The Chinese had only scant knowledge of the movement and viewed it primarily as a part of the worldwide revolution which the Chinese saw themselves as leaders. They thus emphasized the political rather than the racial nature of the struggle. "The truth is," wrote one Chinese, "American blacks live at’the very bottom of the American system of exploitation, a mere source of surplus value for American monopoly capitalists." Therefore, racial oppression would vanish only together with American capitalist system; until then, no Civil Rights legislation could actually solve the problem.\(^7\)

In short, the Chinese considered the Civil Rights movement a good start for something more profound, and they reported its evolution extensively.\(^7\) Mao Zedong himself paid attention to the movement, and exercised "class analysis" of it. "Among the whites in the United States,"
pronounced Mao in a statement in 1963, "it is only the reactionary ruling circles who oppress the black people," and these reactionaries "do not represent the great majority of white workers, farmers, revolutionary intellectuals and other enlightened elements." Following Martin Luther King's assassination, Mao declared that "The conflict between America's black masses and the American ruling clique is one between classes." This struggle "will eventually converge with the American labor movement and terminate the evil reign of American monopoly capitalists," Mao predicted.

Mao's interpretation of the Civil Rights movement as a class rather than a racial struggle was consistent with his vision of a worldwide revolutionary attack, with the United States as the leading target, and in doing so he was obviously following the beliefs, strategies, and rhetoric of the Chinese civil war more than two decades before. In other words, he based his understanding and appraisal of the contemporary world almost exclusively on his past revolutionary experience, believing that if he could rally the support of all the poor and oppressed in the world—like the Chinese peasantry in China's Civil War—he could bring down the United States, the symbol of all wrongs in the world. After all, he had brought down Chiang Kai-shek two decades earlier, against all odds. Thus Mao could write:
The people in the socialist camp should unite, the people of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin-America should unite, the people of every continent should unite, all peace-loving countries should unite, all countries subjected to U.S. aggression, control, intervention or bullying should unite, and [all should] form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace.

The struggle of the people of the world against the U.S. imperialism is bound to triumph!

U.S. imperialism, the common enemy of the people of the world, is bound to fail!77

Generally, Mao's vision of and rhetoric on the United States in the 1960s typified what China had to say about America at this time. It had been about twenty years since mainland China had had substantial contact with the United States. Those who knew the "beautiful land" across the Pacific were resolutely suppressed in 1957; meanwhile, a new generation of Chinese were growing up, to whom the United States was literally "the other world," a place about which they had heard hardly any good words. There was less and less reliable information and ever stronger accusations. It no longer mattered what America actually was, because the Chinese now were thinking and speaking on the issue
primarily out of China's own experience, as Mao himself had done and was doing. Some old impressions of the United States lingered, but essentially America now stood as the embodiment of decadence. Several decades later, in a autobiographic novella, writer Zhang Xianliang recalled his life in a small village in China's remote Northwest in the early 1960s. The village folks believed that a certain woman among them received favors from village cadres by having affairs with them. Consequently, it was believed, the woman had enough to eat year round--quite a feat then and there. Tellingly, the villagers dubbed the woman's house "American Hotel"--bountiful but immoral.\textsuperscript{78}

Such a conception of America was perfectly consistent with the heightening radicalism in China in the 1960s. When, in the mid-1960s, Chairman Mao decided to launch the Great Cultural Revolution to cleanse Communist China of whatever Western bourgeois elements still left, and when China indirectly confronted the United States in Southeast Asia, culture and politics converged, and domestic affairs and international contensions converged to make the high tide of anti-Americanism in China.
Few Chinese, of course, were prepared for what happened a few years later: in 1972, Chairman Mao and President Nixon shook hands and formed a Sino-American alliance. This totally unexpected development threw many Chinese off balance and posed a completely new challenge to the Chinese government in its management of America in China. In view of the increasing tension between China and its northern neighbor the Soviet Union, which was marked by a series of border skirmishes in 1969 and could lead to a full-scale war, Mao's sudden embrace of the United States made good international politics, but the sudden change in policy toward the United States created daunting problems. China in the late 1960s was a theocracy of sorts, when Communist ideology achieved the intensity of a religion and dictated policies. Now the Chinese state, which had been rigorously moralistic in its stance on the America issue, had to explain why it was making a deal with the most depictable monster there ever was. An evil America had become such an integral part of China's revolutionary rhetoric, the sudden disappearance thereof, if not properly managed, threatened the political and moral legitimacy of the Chinese state.

The government's problems were further complicated by a fierce power struggle waged within the Communist Party at the time. As the great Chairman's health rapidly declined
in the early 1970s, party leaders scrambled to posture themselves for the post-Mao era. On the one side were leaders of the radical wing of the party, who had emerged during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and who were determined to carry on the legacy of that revolutionary crusade; heading this group initially was general Lin Biao, and after his demise in a failed coup, came Jiang Qing, Mao's ambitious wife. On the other side of the divide were officials of a moderate bent, led by Premier Zhou Enlai, who felt that it was time to give China a rest so the country could recover from the injuries caused by Mao's previous radical pursuits. Both of these two factions had a great interest in properly presenting the changing face of Sino-American relations, hoping that the blade of this two-edged sword would fall on the other side. This made an already difficult propaganda task even more challenging.

In the beginning, the government spoke two languages, one public and one secret. For instance, on May 20, 1970, Mao issued another of his white-hot statements advocating worldwide anti-American efforts, this time to honor the newly established Cambodian government of Prince Sihanouk. In this statement Mao reiterated his by now well-known views on the United States and called for the people of the world to "unite and defeat all American aggressors and their lackeys!"79 Privately, however, Mao gestured to the United States that he wanted to talk. Later that year, while
speaking with Edgar Snow, the American journalist who had first introduced Mao and his guerilla comrades to the world, Mao expressed the opinion that "the current problems between China and the United States should be solved with Nixon," and that he would not mind receiving Nixon in Beijing.\footnote{80}

By stages, the government also sought to prepare the country for what was coming. On April 27, 1971, in an editorial, the \textit{People's Daily} offered its "Salute to the Courageous American People." Commenting on the anti-war movement in the United States, the paper celebrated the great revolutionary tradition of the American people. "The American working class is the largest in the world," and the American blacks were the most rebellious; all were, the \textit{People's Daily} asserted, "grave-diggers for the American monopoly capitalists." The \textit{Daily} expressed its confidence that these people were definitely not the "silent majority that Nixon described," and they would eventually determine the fate of the United States.\footnote{81} This reference to the revolutionary nature of the American people was reminiscent of the Party's rhetoric on the United States under Roosevelt in the early 1940s; in other words, the United States was a country with revolutionary potential, and cooperation with the nation was thinkable and indeed desirable.

Out the eye of the public, the government was more candid on the change that was taking place. In November 1971, a few days after the Chinese government officially
announced an upcoming visit by President Nixon, which had been arranged by Kissinger on a secret trip to Beijing several months earlier, Premier Zhou Enlai briefed high level cadres on the issue. Zhou made cursive comments on the Soviet threat to China as a factor in Mao's new policy toward the United States; instead, he stressed the revolutionary nature of the new strategy. "An American imperialist chieftain's visit to China spells a victory for the people all over the world and the failure of previous U. S. policies toward China," declared Zhou. The United States had no choice, said Zhou; the fear of the Soviet Union, the pressure of an upcoming presidential election, and the rising tide of revolution--both around the world and within the United States, forced Nixon to "dress up and come knocking on our door." 82

Explaining "why we assent to Nixon's request to visit," Zhou cited the need to "improve Sino-American relations, so that we can work on the American people." "The revolutionary force of the American people is steadily strengthening, and we should heed it." In the meantime, said Zhou, in order to solve immediate problems, China had to deal with American conservatives--"not just the left in that country, or the middle, or even mere average conservatives," but diehard conservatives like Nixon who happened to be in power. 83

Clearly Zhou's job was a difficult one. He tried to
provide some practical explanations for China's new course, but he also had to maintain his revolutionary posture. General Lin Biao, before he died in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union, had characterized any reconciliation with the Americans as a "betrayal of [China's] principles, a betrayal of [the socialist] revolution, and a betrayal of Vietnam." Zhou dismissed this criticism as "nonsense," and defending the new policy by citing two precedents: Mao's negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek at the end of World War Two, and Lenin's recognition of China's warlord government, which accompanied his aid to China's revolutionaries. By improving its relationship with the United States, Zhou insisted, China could advance the revolution in America.

After Nixon's visit in February 1972, Zhou Enlai again briefed Party leaders. This time, with the success of the Nixon visit in hand, Zhou was more sure of himself and more forthright. "Combat 'two superpowers!' was only a slogan, he said; the Soviet Union was China's primary enemy. He also downplayed the theme of revolution, declaring that Chinese should not be adventuristic in supporting revolutions around the world. Instead, China's priority was to develop the country economically by learning from developed nations.

Still, Zhou refused to discard the theme of revolution altogether. China, said Zhou, "should continue to condemn the United States." "There is still the Pentagon," remarked
Zhou, resorting to China's traditional view of America, "which is a den of war-mongers and is backed by military industrialists." Zhou warned the cadres not to lower their guard against the United States. Here, of course, he was merely expounding the position of Mao, who once told Kissinger that, in order to rally domestic support, it was advisable for both China and the United States to denounce each other frequently. "It would not do to do otherwise," Mao observed.  

It was thus a carefully crafted, well-rounded message that the Chinese government wanted to send out to its people. In delivering the message the government first utilized well controlled channels rather than open public forums. Several months after Nixon's visit, for example, the People's Liberation Army's Central Department of Political Affairs ordered a new round of "education on situations," with one emphasis on world politics, relations with the United States in particular. The Army responded quickly and dutifully. Commissars of the Kunming Military Command, for instance, first tested their techniques in one company and then developed a set of educational materials labelled "Secret Document," which they distributed to the Party functionaries in the army units to be imparted to the soldiers.  

As Zhou Enlai had done at a higher level, the commissars of the Kunming Command represented the
reconciliation with the United States as a one step forward in China's revolutionary cause, "a great victory of Chairman Mao's revolutionary foreign policy." The Kunming educators pointed out that there had been some "slanders" as well as "misunderstandings" on the issue, which seemed to suggest that China was "colluding with" imperialists, but such views were totally wrong. 89 "When Chairman Mao invited Nixon [to China], his eye was really on the American people," they explained. Nixon opened the door of the United States, and, making use of this opportunity, revolutionaries could achieve "the fusion of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought with the reality of the American revolution." 90

Whereas the message sent through the channel of the army followed Zhou Enlai's lead, China's public media was less enthusiastic and more cautious about the new development. In part, this was because the public media was for the masses, and the government generally was more tactful in breaking news to them. More important, however, is the fact that the propaganda apparatus was under the control of the radical faction of the party, which was considering the effect of the new pact with the devil on China's internal politics. While these party leaders could not possibly defy a decision made by the great Chairman, they were not in a mood to celebrate either. Instead, they tried hard to keep alive the traditional Chinese rhetoric on the United States, hoping by doing so they would be able to
maintain the revolutionary morale of the people and thus ensure their political future in China. About two months after Nixon's visit, starting in April 1972, the Red Flag published three major articles, which, although never actually mentioning Nixon's visit, were clearly intended to provide guidance to a confused people.

It was already a confusing situation, and the Red Flag's theorists, in their effort to cover all bases, seemed only to have complicated the matter further. All the three articles urged the Chinese public to read more history—"history of the world," "history of the modern world," and "history of the imperialist world." In the most ambiguous terms, even for an age of innuendo and double-talk, the party theorists lectured their readers on the zig-zags of human history. Communism would eventually displace capitalism, they assured their readers, but along the way there would be some reversals. Take Latin America for an example; the Latin Americans fought and won their independence from Spain and Portugal, but what happened since then? The U.S. imperialists, by "waving the banner of 'Pan-Americanism,' and brandishing both 'sticks' and 'dollars,' harnessed many Latin-American nations under the yoke of neo-colonialism."91

It was critical, the Red Flag columnists warned, to be aware of temporary setbacks in history and to be confident in the eventual victory of the revolutionary cause. As for
the United States, even when it was still at its height of power, at the end of World War Two, Chairman Mao had considered it a "paper tiger." History had born out Mao's prediction, and the so-called "permanent prosperity" of the United States had become a "historic laughing-stock." The American imperialists, however, would not withdraw from the historical stage without a fight, and one of their important tactics was to cultivate "opportunists in the workers' movement." These "agents for the imperialists" endeavored to "beautify imperialism, spread capitalist ideas, disarm the world revolutionary people, and achieve what the imperialists themselves cannot accomplish." In other words, good revolutionaries might succumb to the spell of the American demons, as had the Yugoslavians, and then the Russians. This, warned the Red Flag theorists, was a great danger.

Such grave counsel was definitely not what Zhou Enlai and his faction wanted to hear. The struggle between the radicals and the moderates was still going on, and, as Mao's health declined rapidly, it would intensify. As long as the radicals controlled China's propaganda organizations, the media continued to supply pictures of a doomsday America. It also continued its attack on the "agents for imperialists" who polluted the Chinese revolution. Jiang Qing, who by this time could hardly contain her ambition to take over the party's helm, tried openly to capitalize on
her opponents' association with the Americans. Speaking to a gathering of government officials in 1975, she portrayed herself as a true revolutionary who stood firm against American imperialism. The prevailing trend in the world today, she observed, was upheaval in the third world—"independence," "liberation" and "revolution." The decline of the United States marked the "total collapse of old and new colonialism," and China should grasp this opportunity, mobilize peoples around the world and "achieve socialist revolution."96 She assailed those who ignored the rising tide of the world revolution and were busily engaged in "making backroom deals" with representatives of superpowers like Kissinger. "Like all reactionary politicians," said Jiang Qing, Kissinger was "an adventurist and a pessimist at the same time."97 To those who were fond of their "white friends, big friends and rich friends," Jiang Qing declared that she took pride in standing by China's "black friends, little friends and poor friends," as would any true revolutionary.98

Here Jiang Qing proved to be an able tactician but a poor strategist. It was true that, in the past few decades of Chinese politics, those who fraternized with the United States invariably fell to disgrace and those who crusaded against the United States consistently rose to glory; but by the mid-1970s, time had changed. By posturing against America at this time, Jiang Qing had little to gain and much
to lose. It was not yet very clear then, but after the
death of Mao in 1976, China would change dramatically, and
so would China's America.
Notes

2. Jiefang ribao, 1 June 1957, 1.
4. Ibid., 13 September 1957, 6.
5. Ibid., 3 September 1957, 6.
6. Ibid., 26 August 1957, 6.
7. Ibid., 22 June 1957, 5.
9. Changjiang ribao, 8 June 1957, 3.
10. Ibid., 18 June 1957, 4.
12. Ibid., 22 June 1957, 4.
13. Ibid., 21 June 1957, 4.
15. Ibid., 11 June 1957, 4.
18. Fan Ruoyu, "Tantan Meiguuo de da shui huang" (On water shortage in the United States), Xinwen zhanxian (The journalist front), 50.
19. Ibid.
20. Hu Bangdi, "Guandian he cailiao de jiehe" (The union of viewpoint and materials), ibid., 48.
21. Shijie zhishi (Knowledge of the world), no. 9, 1957, 30.


24. Ibid., 20.

25. Ibid., 27.

26. Wu Dakun, "Cong Makesi de jingji weiji lilun kan jingri Meiguo de jingji weiji" (A Marxist analysis of the economic crisis in the United States today), _Xinjianshe_ (New construction), no. 5, 1958, 7.[2994]


28. Ding Gu, "Kaiensi 'chengshu lu' de pipan" (Criticism of Keynsian "multiplier effect"), _Jingji Yanjiu_ (Economic research), no. 2, 1958, 66.

29. Ibid., 75-77.

30. Ibid., 73.


32. Guang Mengjue, "Lun dangqian ziben zhuyi guojia de wucha jieji juedui pinkunhua de wenti" (On absolute poverty of the proletariat in capitalist countries), _Renwen ke:xue xuebao_ (Journal of humanities and social sciences) (Dongbei Remin Daxue), no. 1, 1958, 63.

33. Ibid., 66.

34. Meng Yongqian, "Duiyu Meiguo jingji weiji de jidian kanfa" (A few thoughts on the economic crisis in the United States), _Hongqi_, no. 7, 1959, 18.

35. _Renmin ribao_, 7 October 1957, 1.

36. For examples, see _Beijing ribao_, 24 October 1957, 4; 30 October 1957, 4; 31 October 1957, 6.

37. _Beijing ribao_, 24 October 1957, 4.

38. _Renmin ribao_, 23 October 1957, 4; 5 November 1957, 4.

40. Ibid., 6 November 1957, 6.

41. Guangming ribao, 8 December 1957, 4.

42. Deitorial, "Wei Sulian de weida ke:xue chengjui huanhu" (Applaud for the great scientific achievements of the Soviet Union), Renmin ribao, 7 October 1957, 1.

43. Renmin ribao, 7 November 1957, 2.


45. Renmin ribao, 4 January 1958, 1; 5 February 1958, 3; 9 February 1958,12; 11 February 1958, 2.

46. As indicated in a report on China's economy in Renmin ribao, titled "To Catch up with U.S., Steel Industry Leads the Charge."29 May 1958, 1.

47. Renmin ribao, 23 July 1958, 1 and 6.

48. Meng Yongqian, "Wo guo xiaomai zong chanliang yadao Meiguo" (Our wheat output surpasses that of the United States), Hongqi (Red Flag), no. 4, 1958, reprinted in Xinhua banyuekan (Xinhua bimonthly), no. 15, 1958.

49. Mao Zedong sixinxiang wansui (Long live Mao Zedong thought) (no publication information), 268.


52. "Mao Zedong sixinxiang wansui" (Long live Mao Zedong thought), 254.

53. Chen Yi, "Zai quanguo huaju, geju, ertongju chuangzuo zuotanhui shang de jianghua" (Talk at the symposium on creation of plays, operas and juvenile shows), in Zhonggong Zhongyang Shujichu Yanjiushi Wenhuazu, eds., Dang he guojia lingdaoren tan wenyi (Party and state leaders on arts and literature) (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe, 1982), 121-2.

55. Ibid., 329.

56. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (Long live Mao Zedong thought), 197.

57. Kang Sheng, "Nansilaf de xiu zheng zhuyi qiaqia shihe Mei diguo zhu yi zhe de xuyao" (Yugoslavian revisionism meets the needs of American imperialists), Renmin ribao, 14 June 1958, reprinted in Xinhua banxuek'an, no. 12, 1958, 140.

58. Ibid.


62. Mu Hui, "Nansilaf you zhe zhenyang de 'chuangzuo ziyou'?" (What kind 'creative freedom' is there in Yugoslavia?), Hongqi, no. 5, 1964, 40-1.

63. Renmin ribao Bianjibu and Hongqi Zazhi Bianjibu, Zai Zhanzheng yu heping wenti shang de liang tiao luxian (Two different views on the issue of war and peace) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1963), 8.

64. Ibid., 43.

65. Ibid., 8-9.

66. Ibid., 12-29.

67. Ibid., 10.

68. Guo Jizhou, "Kennidi qi neng niuzhuan lishi chao liu" (Kennedy cannot reverse the historic trend), Hongqi, combined issue no. 15/16, 1961, 53-7.

70. Gu Jizhou, "Yuehanxun zhengfu shi ge shengma huose" (The nature of Johnson administration), Hongqi, combined issue 23/24, 1964, 50.

71. Hua Xuesi, "Yuehanxun de 'Minquan ziwen' shi qi shi huo zhong de da pianju" (Johnson's statement on the Civil Rights is a trick of deception), Zhengfa yanjiu (Political and legal matters), no. 2, 1965, 33.

72. Ibid.

73. Mei Zupei, "Cong Berminghan dao Caierma: Meiguo heiren douzheng de xin fazhan" (From Birmingham to Selma: new development in the American blacks' struggle), Guoji wenti yanjiu (Studies in international affairs), no. 3, 1965, 16.

74. For examples, see Si Mu, "Meiguo renmin de geming xinhao" (Signals for the American people's revolution), Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese youth), no. 23, 1965, 6-7; [4021]

75. Mao Zedong, "Huyu shijie renmin lianhe qilai, fandui Meiguo diguo zhuyi de zhongzu qishi, zhichi Meiguo heiren fandui zhongzu qishi de touzheng" (My call for all the people in the world united to oppose American imperialists racial descrimination and to support the American blacks' struggle against racial descrimination), Hongqi, no. 16, 1963, 2.


77. Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), People of the World, United and Defeat the U.S Aggressors and All Their Lackeys: Statements Supporting the American Negroes and the Peoples of Southern Vietnam, Panama, Japan, the Congo and the Dominican Republic in Their Just Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1966),

78. Zhang Xianliang, Luhushu (Tianjin: Baihu chubanshe, 1986), 244-245.

79. Mao Zedong, "Quan shijie renmin tuanjie qilai, dabai Meiguo qinluezhe jigyi yiqie zouguo!" (All people in the world unite and defeat American agressors and all their lackeys!), Hongqi, no. 6, 1970, 4.

81. Renmin ribao, 27 April 1971, reprinted in Guojin wenti pinglun xuan (Selected commentaries on international affairs) (Beijing: Beijing Renmin Chubanshe, 1971), 104.


83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., 359.


88. Zhonggong Kunming Junqu: "Xingshi jiaoyu cankao ziliao" (Educational materials on current situations), ibid., 361-3.

89. Ibid., 373.
90. Ibid., 374.

91. Shi Jun, "Xue yi dian shijie shi" (Let's study world history), Hongqi, no. 5, 1972, 24.

92. Shi Jun, "Du yi dian youquan diguo zhuyi de lishi" (Let's study history of imperialism), Hongqi, no. 6, 1972, 38.

93. Ibid., 39.
94. Ibid., 39-40.

95. See Guoji shishi (Current international affairs) (Guangzhou, Guangdong Province), nos. 4, 6 and 7, 1972, and nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1973.

96. Jiang Qing, "Dui Zhonggong lishi yi shang waijiao ganbu de jianghua" (Speech delivered to cadres in foreign relations, rank consul and above), 390.
97. Ibid., 391.
98. Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

A BALANCING ACT:

THE CASE OF THE PEOPLE'S DAILY, 1979-1989

When in 1973 Chairman Mao explained to Henry Kissinger that, in spite of the newly established strategic cooperation between Beijing and Washington, the Chinese would continue their verbal assault on "American imperialism," Mao knew what he was talking about. During the past few decades a wicked America had been so deeply and firmly integrated into the psyche of revolutionary China that tampering with that image could well prove damaging if not disastrous. Yet Mao must have sensed that a change had to come. And so it did. Within months of Mao's death in September 1976, the radical elements in the party, headed by Mao's widow, had lost out in a fierce power struggle. By 1978, Deng Xiaoping, the short, tough-minded Long March veteran, had achieved his third political come-back and had induced the party to re-invent the communist nation. China had entered an age of reform, which, among others things, would fundamentally alter the way in which the Chinese viewed the United States.

But this change did not make it any easier for the Chinese government to shape the image of America in China. Although the new "open policy" declared in 1978 freed the
Chinese state from the task of maintaining some of its most
dogmatic and untenable assertions about the United States,
other challenges proved equally difficult, if not more so.
The basic problem revolved around the question of how "open"
China should be. On the one hand, to overcome resistance to
the reform on the part of surviving Maoists and get the
reform going, the government had to argue for greater
openness toward the outside world; this meant some positive
words about the West, including the United States. On the
other hand, the Communist Party did not want the reform to
go so far as to throw the Party out of power. So whenever
things seemed to be getting out of hand, the government
would move to tighten its hold on Chinese society, and try
to discourage and suppress subversive ideas, of which
America was a major source.

Complicating matters further was the great expansion of
contact between the United States and China in the post-Mao
era. In the three preceding decades, the two countries had
been almost completely segregated from one another, and the
Chinese government had absolute command over the flow of
information concerning America into its country. In the
1980s, the government began to lose its monopoly, as Sino-
American exchanges and more open channels of communication
gave Chinese citizens ever more varied impressions of the
United States. Meanwhile, China was experiencing a
revolution in communication. What previously would have
been matters of elite interest only, now became matters of far more general concern; formerly, if the government flip-flopped on an issue, very few would have noticed; but now it was much harder to hide issues from the public.

The Chinese government's difficulty in controlling images of America during the decade of reform can be seen in the pages of the People's Daily, the number-one newspaper in the country. As with most other media organs in China, the People's Daily had long been two things in one—it was a news carrier as well as a government office; it not only informed but also directed and instructed. The People's Daily always publishes with a purpose, as if it were producing a few pages of a sacred scripture on a daily basis. This duty had to be taken most seriously, for officials and common people throughout the country looked to it for clear and constant guidance. By nature the Daily had opinions on all important issues, including that of America.

Not surprisingly, the People's Daily has occasionally found itself in a bind, especially in the post-Mao era when the Chinese government tried to handle two balls at the same time—reform and conservation. In the decade from 1979 to 1989, in tandem with major political and social developments in the country, the Daily's presentation of America unfolded in a number of distinctive stages.
The new age for America in China started with China's preparation for Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States, scheduled for January 1979. Up to this point, in the two years after Mao's death, the Chinese government had continued the practice of separating strategic cooperation with the United States from China's internal affairs; the official position remained that the United States was a dying capitalist empire, and that the duty of the revolutionary Chinese was to hasten the demise of that evil state. But things were rapidly changing on Deng's initiative, and his upcoming visit to the United States marked a symbolic turning point.

Deng's trip to the United States would be the first of its kind. Technically, the purpose was to formalize the diplomatic relationship between the United States and China, but more important, it constituted a step forward in China's new enterprise of economic reform and open policy. For both cosmetic and substantial reasons, therefore, the government had to invent a new kind of rhetoric on the United States.

It was not easy, of course, to transform a demon into a decent gentleman overnight. But the Chinese government was truly resourceful in matters like this, and it found ways to break the ice. Starting in mid-1978, the People's Daily brought out stories about China's "old friends," Americans
who had fraternized with the Chinese Communists before 1949. So, when former members of the Dixie Mission—the wartime U.S. Army observers in the Communist base at Yan'an—visited Beijing in May 1978, the Chinese government made it an occasion to celebrate old comradeship, and the People's Daily gave the event conspicuous coverage. Marshal Ye Jianying, chief of staff of the Communist forces in the 1940s and now the president of China's National People's Congress, reportedly reminisced with the American visitors. Deng Yingchao, according to the Daily in a touching story, brought to these "American friends" a bouquet of roses. She had picked the flowers, Deng explained, from a bush presented a few years earlier to her and her late husband, Premier Zhou Enlai, by an American lady whose deceased husband had fought in China against the Japanese and was once saved by Chinese guerrillas during the war. Deng expressed the wish that friendship between the Chinese and American people would flourish like the roses.¹

In a similar tone and as conspicuously, the Daily told the story of William Hinton. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Hinton, a young Pennsylvanian, had worked with the Communists as a agricultural technician. He returned to China in the 1970s to lend a hand to China's drive for agricultural modernization. This effort was highly appreciated, and Premier Zhou received him five times. The Daily related how this "American friend" had worked
tirelessly to help China, and the paper even quoted Hinton gently urging the Chinese to improve their productivity. He had good harvests at his farm back home, Hinton told his Chinese colleagues, but he constantly worried about bankruptcy; in socialist China the Chinese did not have this concern, but they ought to be more efficient.²

With reports like this, the People's Daily eased into the process of rehabilitating the United States, bypassing the issue of the voluminous anti-American rhetoric of earlier years. After all, the argument went, isn't the Americans' warm friendship for China the soundest evidence for the virtue of China? With this kind of self-congratulation China started to redeem America.

Reminiscences of old friendship created a congenial atmosphere for further actions. To prepare the way for Deng's upcoming visit, a few delegations of artists and journalists were sent to the United States. These carefully composed delegations were the first of their kind, and the People's Daily attentively relayed to its readers the experiences of these pioneers. A tour of Chinese performers was a sensational success, reported the Daily. In Washington, New York, Minneapolis and Los Angeles, "the warm and forthright American audience demonstrated immense interest in the performance of the Chinese artists and extended them a passionate welcome."

The members of the journalist delegation reported their
own favorable impressions of the United States, the first ever in the history of the People's Republic. With a journalist's special interest, one of them reported on the well developed mass media in the United States, and wrote in obvious wonder that the Sunday edition of a metropolitan newspaper, might have a couple of hundred pages, compared to the standard eight pages of the People's Daily. Another member of the delegation, Wang Ruoshui, a People's Daily editor who a few years later would turn into a leading political dissident, was more interested in the people he observed. He discovered that, "Although Americans like to say that theirs is a 'society of consumption,' they actually seemed to work pretty hard; 'the fact is, no production, no consumption,' he wrote.

In this connection, Wang also observed that, in spite of the iconoclastic sixties, most Americans were still religious, certainly from a Chinese viewpoint. "Few of us Chinese believe in religion, so we easily overlook the role of religion in other countries," Wang wrote. In his hotel bedroom there was a copy of the Bible, as there was on the President's desk in the White House which Wang and his colleagues toured. An old lady, with whom they ate, wondered how a person can live without a religion. At a Tennessee motel, a young man "with long hair and beard" approached them to discuss Asian philosophy. All in all, Wang observed, at least some Americans actually worked and
thought. As simplistic as this may sound, it was quite a discovery for the Chinese, and definitely a breakthrough for the **People's Daily** to inform its readers of such matters.

As the date for Deng's visit drew near, the **Daily** further stepped up its coverage on the United States, which became increasingly political in nature. In one article, the newspaper introduced "The Declaration of Independence," "the most important historical document" in American history, and "the pride of the American people." This document, the **Daily** noted, proclaimed the fundamental, unalienable rights of man and the principle of people's rule. "The progressive ideas in the Declaration spread beyond the borders of the United States and were embraced by the Europeans and peoples around the world", the **Daily** observed. Both Marx and Lenin, for instance, praised the document. A related piece told the story of the Plymouth settlement. "Deeply moved" by what he saw, one Chinese reporter praised the American people's pioneering spirit which "provokes us to ponder."

The **Daily** even invoked the memory of Mao, still a powerful figure, to legitimize the rehabilitation of America. On January 29, the very day Deng left for the United States, Wu Liangping, Mao's interpreter during World War Two, described to the **Daily** how on one occasion Mao asked him to draft a reply to an American woman who had written to express her support for China's war effort.
"Please tell [our] American brothers and sisters," Mao instructed, "that we stand together shoulder to shoulder." The story was accompanied by a photo of Mao's handwritten note to authenticate the event.  

Deng's one week stay in the United States naturally figured prominently in the People's Daily. Having been building up for the event for months, the Daily could now present Deng's liaison with the Americans with little inhibition or awkwardness, only confidence and a certain righteousness. An evening at the Kennedy Center was described as "Exhilarating and Touching." When Deng and President Carter spoke to reporters following their meeting, the headline read: "Spring Arrives at Rose Garden." Deng's visit to Washington marked a "New Chapter in Sino-American Relations." And when Deng travelled on to Atlanta and Houston, the Daily gushed over the "Warmth of the Sun Belt" and offered "A Hurray to the Cowboy Spirit." In short, Deng's trip was "A Historic Visit with Far Reaching Impact." "The friendship between American and Chinese people is very strong," asserted the Daily. Neither side had been happy during the thirty long years of separation, and when normalization finally arrived, the "deep feeling" of the two peoples erupted like a volcano. Differences in their beliefs and political systems, the Daily declared, "will not hinder the growth of the friendship."
Thus, Deng's visit in early 1979 not only formalized China's diplomatic relationship with the United States, but it also greatly boosted rehabilitation of America in China. Moreover, by portraying America so positively—even showing Deng all smiles under a Texas cowboy hat—the Daily made a great leap in presenting America. A new view of the United States, broader and more glowing than any previous official image, found its way to the Chinese people.

This change, as dramatic as it was, represented only a part of China's overall development at the time. Deng Xiaoping's economic reform program was swiftly picking up speed, taking the whole country on a spectacular ride. A sense of adventure, and the anticipation of a fantastic future, drove the Chinese people to reach out for the unknown. The People's Daily encouraged and indeed significantly contributed to this trend, and the new style of reporting on the United States was an integral part of it. After all, what could be more futuristic than the United States?

The new image of America challenged the imagination of most Chinese. Take, for example, agriculture, which was (and is) central to Chinese life; about 70% to 80% of the people still live off the land. Farming was one of the American wonders that first caught the attention of the Chinese. In September 1978 when the Daily first reported Hinton's visit to China, it reported that the Pennsylvanian
farmer tilled 1,700 acres of land, which produced 1.5 million jin [one jin equals half a kilo] of grain every year. "16 To the Chinese, who still worked small lots by hand, these figures sounded like they came out of some fairy tale.

In the wake of Deng's visit, the Daily organized a group of articles on American agriculture, focusing on methods of mechanization which the Chinese considered the hope for Chinese agriculture. (In the mid-1970s the Chinese government had already announced a plan to mechanize China's agriculture by 1980, a forecast that showed more eagerness than good sense). One of the articles was adapted from a Time magazine story. It described a farmer named Benny, who drove into his fields--1,900 acres owned by his family and 1,600 more rented. Benny grew sugar beets, and used his personal computer to process vital data concerning his business. He owned four large trucks, three pickups, and three tractors, as well as other machines. Benny even had a small telecommunication system, by which his wife at home could talk to him in the field.17 On average, the Daily informed its readers, one American farmer like Benny provided enough food for 59 people.18

Another new concept the People's Daily brought from America to China was the idea of a "third industry" or "service industry." The service sector in the United States, the Daily reported, employed more than 60% of the
total work force in America and accounted for about half of
the gross national product. The *Daily* noted, for example,
that 60,000 fast food restaurants were scattered across the
country.¹⁹ To the Chinese still under the influence of
traditional notions concerning the "unproductive" role of
merchants--views reinforced by the socialist emphasis on
heavy industry--the whole idea of a huge and vital "service
industry" was novel. On the other hand, at the time,
Chinese cities were flooded by millions of youths who had
been sent into countryside by Chairman Mao and were now
returning home in great waves; unemployment became a serious
problem, and the idea of an active "service industry" seemed
to be a solution. To be sure, the Chinese did not have to
derive inspiration from Americans to open restaurants or tea
stands, but it was definitely reassuring for a nation in a
dismal situation to learn that what they resorted to in
desperation was actually a "modern" device. They were well
on the way to modernization after all.

China's official media, now fully embroiled in the
clamor for "modernization," attempted to make of the United
States into an archetype of modernity. After Deng's trip to
America, an official delegation of China's leading economic
experts was dispatched to the United States to investigate
the training of executives, the findings of which the *Daily*
publicized. The itinerary of the group included a tour of
several business schools--Stanford, Harvard, the University
of Indiana and University of Pennsylvania. The Chinese visitors were quite impressed by the serious effort put into training future executives and expressed their opinions to the Daily. This simple acknowledgement of the need for a business manager to possess some expertise constituted quite a breakthrough for China where the Communists, like the traditional Confucian scholar-officials before them, emphasized ideological rectitude rather than technical specialization. In broader terms, this meant that an element of "science" was being injected into China's process of decision-making, in business and elsewhere. It was natural, therefore, for the Daily to report on the advisory council on science to the U.S. president, and, to discuss "think tanks" such as the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Hoover Institution, and so forth.

From talk of "people's friendship" to the topic of economic performance, and to the science of management, the Daily was presenting to its readers an America of increasing depth. Geographically, the paper was also expanding its view of the United States. In March 1980, the Daily's correspondents, who were based in the East coast, went on a tour of the West, and later, in April 1981, they went to South, presenting to their readers a picture of America in all its vastness. In San Francisco, the reporters observed an election in which Diane Feinstein won the mayoral office.
Echoing Liang Qichao some eight decades before, the newsmen expressed skepticism about this boisterous process. They then toured Los Angeles, "the City on Wheels," although by the time they left, they still did not know exactly where the city was. In Hollywood, the journalists felt that money overshadowed art. Having taken a look at Atlanta, they decided that the Civil Rights movement effected some meaningful changes: formal segregation in public places had disappeared; half of the city's councilmen were blacks; and some blacks were working at banks or insurance companies, although most blacks were still manual laborers. In Mississippi, the Chinese journalists noticed magnificent mansions as well as run-down shacks. Dallas and Houston, on the other hand, appeared to be full of energy, with new skyscrapers rising to alter the skylines of the cities.

The broadened view on the United States revealed to Chinese some surprising aspects of America. For instance, many Chinese had believed that the Americans, being the richest people in the world, all enjoyed and loved luxury. Certainly that was the assumption of some local officials in Shanxi province who played host to Carma Hinton, the daughter of William Hinton, who had come to study the area where she had been born and her father had worked with the Communists over thirty years before. The officials tried their best to make the young American woman comfortable, including treating her to one lavish banquet after another.
which the poor locals really could not afford. They were surprised, therefore, when the infuriated Hinton declared that she would take no more of this treatment. The *People's Daily* picked up the story—"American Youth Carma Boycotts Banquets"—and harshly admonished the government officials involved, who appeared to be less virtuous than their American guest.  

Thus, during the first few years of China's reform decade, China's official media bid farewell to the thoroughly negative America of old and welcomed a new America with quite a few admirable qualities. This is not to say that they completely ignored the less salutory aspects of American life. The *People's Daily*, for instance, dutifully reported events such as the Miami riot in May 1980, the assassination attempt on President Reagan, the murder of black children in Atlanta. But the fundamental change toward a positive image was decisive and unmistakable.

II

China's new official America had its detractors and enemies. From the very beginning of Deng's reform, there were skeptics in the Communist Party whose resistance to the Party's new adventure intensified as time went on. The
hardliners, led by the Party's senior leaders Chen Yun and others, were concerned with the rapid erosion of China's socialist system, and they were particularly appalled and disgusted by changes in the psyche of the nation--particularly, an increasingly strong individualism, which to them meant nothing but despicable selfishness. They attributed this new trend to the corrosive inroads of Western influence and blamed the development on the lenient and indeed promotional presentation of America in the People's Daily and other publications. As Deng's reforms deepened and widened, the conservatives' concern mounted; after 1981 they stepped up their demand for an ideological purification, an effort that culminated in the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign of late 1983.

The reformers had to be mindful of the conservatives' discontent. Indeed, although still supportive of economic reform, they sought to address the old guards' concerns. After all, they were still communists and, in any case, they could not afford to let the hardliners deprive them of their vital moral mandate. In January 1981, the Party's Central Committee passed a resolution on journalism, calling on the media in the country to keep in line with the government.31 A few months later, in November 1981, speaking to U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, who was visiting in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping stressed his commitment to a revolutionary ideology. His Party, said Deng, would call on
the Chinese people to carry on the spirit of Yan'an, the Communist base in World War Two. Deng's pledge, witnessed by an American, was of course prominently reported by the People's Daily.32

Hu Yaobang, the Party's General Secretary and Deng's leading protege at the time, spoke to the same effect at a Party meeting on ideological work. "As for news reports," Hu instructed in an April 1982 speech, "first of all, do not publish material that advances the veneration of foreign countries." Reporting on capitalist nations, he said, should be taken most seriously. It was fine to celebrate and introduce advanced science and technology, said Hu, but in general "do not beautify; do not practice so-called objective journalism."33

These gestures could hardly pacify conservative critics, who sensed, correctly, that the reformers were so deeply committed to the cause of reform that it was all but impossible for them to practice truly what they avowed. The hardliners continued their drive to purify the Chinese mind. In mid-1982, Hu Qiaomu, once Chairman Mao's secretary and now a prominent ideologue for the Party, published a major article in the Red Flag, "On Bourgeois Liberalization and Other Matters." As Hu defined it, "bourgeois liberalization" denoted the promotion of the Western concept of liberty and all other related ideas and institutions. The search for such liberty, warned Hu, would inevitably
lead to mindless adoration of the West and the rejection of socialism.\textsuperscript{34}

In his article, Hu referred to the movie Kulian (Bitter Love), which was quickly becoming a hot topic in China. Based on a script by the well-known writer Bai Hua, the film told the story of a Chinese artist, who, as a young man, returned from the United States after 1949 to serve his country. But, because of his Western connections, he was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution. The contrast in the movie between the comfort in America and the misery in China was so striking that the government sentenced the movie to death before its release to the public. Hu Qiaomu faulted the film for suggesting that

\begin{quote}
in China there is no sunshine, no freedom; Chinese intellectuals are destined to be persecuted and humiliated; sunshine and freedom only exist in America, in the capitalist world. . .\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Once again the reformers were forced to defend themselves. On March 14, 1983, the centennial of Karl Marx's death, speaking at a high-profile commemorative rally, General Secretary Hu Yaobang once again pledged the reformers' devotion to Marxist principles.\textsuperscript{36} But this performance failed to impress the hardliners, who believed Hu was lackluster at best and deceptive at worst. And there
were good reasons for the conservatives' suspicion.

One incident in particular provided China's hardliners with powerful ammunition. In late 1982, Hu Na, a top Chinese tennis player, sought political asylum in the United States where she was playing in a tournament. For a while, the Chinese media remained silent on the matter, but in early April, it was announced that Hu Na's petition for asylum had been granted. The Chinese government reacted strongly, denouncing the incident as a "political scam" concocted by agents from Taiwan and malignant Americans. This incident, in the eye of the conservatives, exemplified the ill effects of the party's celebration of the West, or at least its ineptitude in warning the Chinese against the lure of the capitalist world. The hawks strengthened their call for rectification, and broke through at a plenary meeting of the Party's Central Committee in October. The powerhouse for the conservative camp was Chen Yun, whose credentials and prestige in the party rivalled those of Deng Xiaoping himself. "Some people," the sharp-tongued Chen lashed out at the October meeting, "having had a glimpse of skyscrapers and freeways abroad," rushed to conclude "that China is inferior to foreign countries, that socialism is no match for capitalism, and that Marxism is no longer relevant." These people, Chen continued, should be "educated." Among them, those in charge of ideological work who refused to repent should be removed from their offices.
An obviously agitated Chen concluded his address to the gathering by calling out: "Long live socialism! Long live communism!"  

The leading architect of China's reform, Deng Xiaoping, could not exempt himself from the sins that Chen had condemned. Hadn't he had his "glimpse of skyscrapers and freeways" on his 1979 trip to the United States? And hadn't he, as recent as ten days before, in an inscription for a high school in Beijing, instructed the nation that "Education should face modernization, face the world, and face the future"? Sensing the mounting discontent of the conservatives, Deng, at the October party meeting, decided to go along with the conservatives' demand for a campaign against Western influence in China, which conservative theorists had deftly termed "spiritual pollution" (jingshen wuran).  

With Deng's tacit approval, eager hardliners jumped into action. Editorials agitating for the "campaign against spiritual pollution" were published; directives on the campaign sped through the party and state hierarchies; and prominent conservatives spoke out against Western influence on various occasions. A major political movement was well on its way.  

The political offensive by the old guards that had begun in 1981 and culminated in late 1983 naturally affected the People's Daily's coverage of America. Starting in late
1981, forsaking the open spirit with which the paper had explored various aspects of America in the two preceding years, the Daily now molded its reporting on the United States to fit the surging conservative tide. The result was a vision of America reminiscent of the Mao era, but enlivened by more colorful details, thanks to the direct contact with the United States in the previous few years. For instance, In early 1982, soon after Deng reaffirmed his commitment to communism during his talk with Donald Reagan, the People's Daily published some personal accounts by Chinese who had recently spent some time in the United States. The intent was clearly to shatter illusions about America. Under the title "Why I Returned from the United States Earlier than I Had Planned," a middle-aged school teacher recounted his visit with relatives across the Pacific. Life was hard and the people were cold, said the school teacher. Both of his brothers were professors, but they still had to work extra jobs during the summer. His sister, another Ph.D. in the family, lost her teaching position after giving birth to her baby, and, as many as twelve application letters later, she started working as a secretary. He himself felt utterly out of place in America, so he shortened his visit and came back.41 Others told similar stories.42

Even some familiar tales were now told in a different light. A couple of years before, when Chinese visitors to
the United States first laid eyes on Disneyland, they had been pleasantly surprised and had nothing but praise for it. Now, a few years later, when the Daily had another look at the amusement park, it saw "Tears in Heaven": the poor animal impersonators with their terrible work conditions and miserable pay. Disney World had been depicted as a heaven on the earth, penned the Daily writer, "but here the 'animals' who greet visitors with big smiles are trying to hold back their grieving tears. What a sad ridicule of 'Heaven.'" A cartoon accompanying the story showed a thin-legged forlorn-looking man taking off a monstrous Mickey Mouse head, splashing perspiration all over the place; the sweat rolls into dollar bills on the ground, which a fat, bald capitalist stuffs into his already over-crammed pockets. 43

A similar shift of emphasis was also evident in the Daily's handling of other topics--religion, for example. A few years earlier, when Chinese first discovered that religion continued to play a major part in American life, they spoke of it positively, as a sign of strength. Under the new political atmosphere, however, the Daily viewed the matter from a different angle. Fanatic religious devotion in the United States, one Daily reporter emphasized, reflected the severity of social problems in the United States; the mass suicides at Jonestown in 1979, he pointed out, provided a good example. "This," the Daily told its
readers, "is the lesson we should learn from religion and superstition in America."44

Like any good propaganda machine, the Daily tied its coverage of America with ongoing events in China, to create an effective contrast. As a prelude to the festivities of June 1, Children's Day, in 1983, for example, the Daily published several stories on youngsters in the United States. "Millions of Children Live Like Slaves in Capitalist World," reported the Daily on April 14. The article claimed that 800,000 children labored on American farms, in addition to one million Mexican children who toiled in the United States. The Daily vividly recounted their misery.45 On May 2, the Daily wrote about "The Tragedy of American Children": every year, it reported, 150,000 American children were kidnapped, of whom 80% would never be found and 10% would be found dead.46 On June 1, in another story of the same theme, the Daily reported that, in the United States, one million children were abused every year, and 50,000 were sold into prostitution. "Why should our world be like this?" the paper quoted an American teenager as asking.47

The economic recessions of the United States in the early 1980s provided more materials in the Chinese campaign against American influence. "More Americans Live in Poverty"—over thirty million, a record high since 1965. "It is maddening that while millions of poor people live in
poverty, a great amount of 'surplus' grain and other kinds of food are stored away," the Daily railed.48 In an article headlined "Tragedy without End," the Daily informed its readers that more than 11 million Americans were now out of work.49 "Tragedy in Heaven" described the situation in Detroit, where "one third residents of the city go to bed hungry."50 "Tragedy in Texas" focused on a Michigan couple in their fifties who moved to Texas in search of employment only to commit suicide in despair.51 In "Close Neighbors of the White House," Chinese readers learned of crosses that were erected at Lafayette Park in memory of five hundred homeless people who "starved and frozen to death" for lack of care.52 "Paradise in Winter" told O. Henry-kind of stories in which an Indiana man robbed a bank to get into jail to escape the cold, and an escapee from a Michigan prison returned voluntarily for the same reason.53 The Daily commented that the Founding Fathers of the United States had intended their nation to be a land of liberty, but now "two hundred years later, in order to survive, some Americans have to surrender their freedom and search for happiness in jail. . . . Isn't this ironic?"54

With reports like these, the Daily played its part in the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign and sharpened the once blurred distinction between socialism and capitalism, between China and America. At a more theoretical level, the case of Ru Xin exemplified of the changing political wind in
China. In 1980, Ru, a vice president of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, had published an article in the Daily in which he attempted to infuse humanism into the impersonalized Marxism. This "humanization" of Marxism was a fashionable thing to do in the early years of reform. But three years later, as the conservative tide mounted, Ru Xin found it necessary to disclaim some of his previous assertions, which he did in a long article published in the Daily in early January 1984. The gap between socialist humanism and the so-called humanism in capitalist world, wrote Ru Xin, was "as wide as that between the earth and the sky."

In a socialist society, public ownership ensures a natural bond among people, whereas "In the capitalist world, social relationships are dominated by bitterness, selfishness, deception and greed, and men are nothing but wolves toward one another." In other words, there were only human beings under different social systems and no such a thing as a "universal man."

Had Ru Xin held out for just a little longer, he might have saved himself from his retreat. On January 11, 1984, the day when the last installment of his three-part article appeared on the Daily, Zhao Ziyang, China's Premier, arrived in Washington, D.C., starting his one week visit of the United States. This event, as it turned out, marked the end of the two-year run of conservatism in China, and the beginning of yet another phase in the government's on-going
effort to present America properly in China.

III

In terms of its impact on Chinese views of America, Premier Zhao's visit to the United States in February 1984 closely resembled that of Deng Xiaoping, Zhao's mentor, five years before. In both cases, the journeys not only established or strengthened state-level relationships between the two countries, but they also had domestic consequences. In 1979, Deng had left for America from a country still devastated and demoralized by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; in a way, Deng's American tour put an end to the Mao era. Five years later, Zhao crossed the Pacific at a time when Chinese hardliners' strident criticisms threatened to derail China's reform. By design or not, visiting the United States at this juncture, Zhao contributed substantially to reversing the political tide in China.

Soon after the Party's Central Committee meeting in October, Deng Xiaoping started to regret that he had deferred to the Party's rebellious old guards and given the green light to their "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign. He had anticipated only a mild "cleansing" in ideological and cultural circles--one that would pacify his conservative
critics and allow him to get on with his economic reforms. But, to his surprise, the hardliners had come on very strong, questioning the very morality and legitimacy of the entire reform enterprise. Deng felt that he could not sit still and allow the hardliners to dismantle his program. He tried to reign in the conservatives and to counterattack. At the beginning of 1984, Deng, signalling his commitment to reform, went on an extended tour of the Special Economic Zones on China's south coast which had been established as experimental grounds to test aspects of a market economy. Manoeuvres like this imperial-style "tour of the south" (nan xun), produced the expected results, and the conservative surge started to wane. Zhao Ziyang, by traveling to the United State at this time and freely associating with the Americans, delivered yet another blow to the conservative cause.

Zhao had one advantage in that, highly concerned with the "face" of the Chinese government, Chinese leaders tend to maintain a high degree of solidarity when it comes to foreign affairs, no matter how fierce were the in-fights among themselves. Zhao and his reformist colleagues made good use of this situation. The Chinese press not just reported, but glorified, Zhao's tour of the United States, just as it had done Deng's visit five years before. At Andrews Air Force Base where Zhao arrived, Chinese and American national flags flew "high and proud in the wind,"
the Daily reported.\textsuperscript{58} Like their Confucian ancestors, Chinese Communists were also moralistic ritualists who injected political messages into certain rites, gestures, phrases, images, and so forth, and when they employed their poetic language to describe a scene, a judgement was made and a message delivered which the Chinese audience could sense and savor without quite aware of it.

The People's Daily maintained the festive atmosphere throughout Zhao's stay in the United States. A large, front-page picture showed Premier Zhao and President Reagan standing at attention while the national anthems of the two countries were played.\textsuperscript{59} Zhao was shown riding down the main street of Williamsburg in an old-fashioned carriage.\textsuperscript{60} Having watched a demonstration by printers dressed in 18th century attire, Zhao inquired whether "The Declaration of Independence" was printed in the same way. And speaking on behalf of Zhao, China's Foreign Minister remarked on "the glorious history" of the American people, and their struggle for independence--with which, ventured the minister, the Chinese people could well identify. The Daily added a soft touch to its report by mentioning that the children at a local kindergarten had sent Zhao a letter, telling him that they were making a dragon for a parade and that they liked pandas.\textsuperscript{61} The Daily's coverage of Zhao's other activities in the States was equally upbeat. There was, the paper proclaimed, "A Great Potential" for Sino-American economic
cooperation and "A Great Prospect" for Sino-American relations generally. All in all, Zhao's had been "A Successful Visit" which showcased "Heart-warming Friendship" and which would "Render the Pacific Ocean Genuinely Pacific."

When all the fanfare surrounding Zhao's visit was over, little of the strong anti-American rhetoric of the previous few months was left and the conservatives found it all but impossible to pick up from where they had left off. Back in Beijing, Zhao, together with other party leaders, were summoned to an audience with Deng Xiaoping, who had just returned from his inspection of the Special Economic Zones in South China. Deng informed them that China's reform and opening up to the world should move forward faster. Before long, the party formally decided to stop using the expression "spiritual pollution," on the ground that it was not a "scientific" term.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government received Ronald Reagan in April when he reciprocated Zhao's visit. In the spirit of openness, the government arranged for Reagan to speak to a large audience in the Great People's Hall, where the American president preached free enterprise; the Daily published the speech, although only in an abridged version. In an even more daring gesture, the government allowed Reagan the chance to speak to students and faculty at Fudan University in Shanghai, where the president
reiterated his favorite theme. The spotlight on Reagan's visit completely outshone May Day, a traditional time for all socialist governments to celebrate the solidarity of international labor.

By this time, the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign had collapsed completely, and gone was the intensive muckraking on the United States that had filled the pages of the Daily. China's official media, in its renewed effort to promote Deng's reform program, returned to the kind of reporting on America that had begun with Deng's visit to the United States in 1979. "What Is the So-called 'Capitalist Lifestyle' Anyway?" asked one Chinese in the Daily, deliberately employing a buzzword from the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign. A materially abundant life is not necessarily bad, argued the writer. "Frugality is a virtue, but that does not mean that we must be satisfied with poverty."

Another commentator wrote to reproach those who considered advanced science and technology to be "wicked" and foreign culture to be "immoral" and "subversive." He called for rational analysis of the outside world and for the acquisition of beneficial elements that other countries had to offer.

In making a case for such "beneficial elements," the Daily, in the wake of Zhao's visit to the United States, publicized the concept of a "new technological revolution." For instance, on March 4, 1984, the paper briefed its
readers on "The Rise of New Technology Industries in the United States." New technologies, the Daily reported, had become the major power behind recent economic growth in America. "A New Technological Revolution is sweeping the whole United States," the Daily enthused, "rapidly transforming human society."\textsuperscript{73} From May 18 to May 25, 1984, the People's Daily published an eight-part series on Silicon Valley in California. "The triumphs and setbacks, the joy and mastery of Silicon Valley reflects the journey of this most advanced capitalist nation toward the information society."\textsuperscript{74}

Soon, America achieved so much respectability in China that occasionally the government would invoke the United States as authority for Chinese policies. On June 24, 1985, under the headline "U.S. Banker Believes Reform Will Speed Up China's Economic Progress," the People's Daily cited Thomas Johnson, CEO of Chemical Bank, as expressing a fully optimist view concerning the prospect of China's new reform-oriented economy.\textsuperscript{75} Nor was this newly acquired respectability limited to technical matters alone; some civic merits of the American society also came to be acknowledged by China's official media, a development that marked even greater receptiveness toward America. In the above mentioned reports, the Daily's stories not only celebrated America's high technology but also the entrepreneurial spirit behind it, as personified by some
computer wizards about whom the Daily spoke most fondly and admiringly. Writing about "The Value of Man" in American society, Lin Xi told the story of an American he knew who worked his way up from a janitor to the personnel manager for his company. Zhang Hongyi, for his part, was enchanted by unpaid volunteers in the United States--from those helping out with the Los Angeles Olympic Games to those assisting patients at local hospitals. Searching for the source of American volunteerism, Zhang pointed both to religiously inspired charity and the immigrant origin of the United States. "American volunteers make me realize," Zhang wrote, "that even in a money-driven country like the United States, there exist precious virtues."

Fitfully, but inexorably, America in China was losing its old exoticism and acquiring a new familiarity. People like Yu Lihua, a Chinese-American academic and writer, helped pave the way by writing openly and at length about the United States. Starting in early 1985, the Daily carried a column by Yu, "Letters from America." Writing as if to her young Chinese friends, Yu discussed daily life in America: food, clothes, dating rituals, and so forth. In spite of the legendary permissiveness of American parents, wrote Yu in one episode, most American kids grew up to be responsible and well-behaved. One reason for this was that, in contrast to practice in China, American children were taught to work from an early age; a nine-year old boy
she knew, for example, got up early every morning to deliver newspapers, something Chinese parents in China would hesitate to let their children to do.\textsuperscript{80} And many students had to work their way through college--another thing Chinese youngster were spared from.\textsuperscript{81} This, Yu pointed out, was only one manifestation of the self-reliance that Americans cherished so much.\textsuperscript{82}

This stress on independence could go too far, Yu acknowledged, as was evident in Americans' treatment of their seniors. "Most Americans of an advanced age, no matter whether living in or out of nursing homes, are not happy," she wrote.\textsuperscript{83} As for food, contrary to conventional wisdom in China, American diet was rather simple and plain, and definitely Americans did not feed on lavish banquets every day.\textsuperscript{84} Yu carried on her chit-chat via the \textit{People's Daily} from April 1985 all the way through 1986.

While writings like those by Yu contained no explicit political messages, their political impact was in fact tremendous. They demystified America; they appealed to common sense and common human experience. The America thus revealed was not perfect, neither was it an unfathomable dark world operated by some unseen evil force.

So America seemed only a step away from some kind of political redemption. But it was a big step which China was not ready to take. By 1986, the contest between the reformers and the hardliners within the Chinese government
had once again heated up and would lead to an eruption before long.

IV

By the middle of the 1980s, China's reform program had reached another critical point. A few years of economic re-organization had revitalized China's economy, particularly in the rural sector, but it had also resulted in new problems, most notably high inflation and widespread corruption. The reformers attributed the problems to the incompleteness of the reform, namely, the coexistence of a market and a planned economy as well as the lack of political changes. They attempted to raise the issue. The conservatives thought just the opposite. In their view, the reformers had already messed up China's economic life, and they were not about to allow the reckless opportunists to touch China's political system. At a National Conference of the Communist Party held in September 1985, the conservatives made their position clear. The senior statesman Chen Yun once again led the charge, and this time he pointed his spear directly at Deng Xiaoping, warning the party to watch out for "despotism." Peng Zhen, another senior conservative leader and now president of China's Party Congress, asked bluntly: "Which of the two [systems]
is superior? Socialist democracy or bourgeois democracy?"

To him, the answer was obvious. However, he said, "Some people, yearning for bourgeois democracy, seem to see a rounder moon in the capitalist world"—an expression Chairman Mao had used in 1957 to deride a "rightist" professor who praised the United States.

The reformers tried to counter this assault. In August 1986, speaking to a gathering of the editors-in-chief of various newspapers across the country, Teng Teng, a reform-minded official in the Party's Propaganda Department, encouraged his audience to be assertive in writing about other countries. It had been a long-standing practice, said Teng at one point, that international news never made the lead story in Chinese papers. "Why should it be so?" he asked. Teng encouraged the editors in attendance to break the taboo. On August 26, the People's Daily cited an American political scientist's testimony that China was undergoing a comprehensive revolution—economic, social, ideological as well as political, and that this revolution would swiftly move China forward. On November 15, Deng Xiaoping did his part to enhance the cause of reform by receiving a delegation from the New York Stock Exchange, an event which the Daily prominently reported.

By the end of 1986, the strife within the Communist Party over political reform had become public knowledge, which weakened the party's hold on Chinese society. Radical
students, who had been agitating for swift political changes, seized the opportunity thus created and took the initiative. Demonstrations broke out in several major cities, which badly shook the Communist Party as a whole. In the student unrests, the Party's conservatives found the most obvious evidence for the grave error of the reformers on the ideological front. They asked for the heads of the floundering reformist leaders. Political tide in China once again reversed, carrying back with it America in China.

As the Chinese government hastened to contain student unrests, the People's Daily shifted its course again in an effort to discourage infatuation with "democracy" and "liberty." On December 27, the Daily enlisted the service of Zhou Gucheng, an old schoolmate of the late Chairman Mao and a scholar on world history. Under the lead "Western Democracy Is Not All Rosy," Zhou warned Chinese youth against the dangers of Western influence. Western democracy was not perfect, he emphasized, and, "everyday, sociologists, political scientists and philosophers in the West are scratching their heads over deficiencies of their own system," Zhou pointed out.90

In the following weeks, the Daily brought forward more academic authorities to testify to the same effect. On January 3, for instance, it was Lu Yizhong, a professor at Xi'an University of Technology. Lu, a Taiwanese who had come to work in mainland China upon studying in the United
States, reproved Chinese students for "blindly worshiping" the West. The political machine in the West, he concluded on the basis of his own experience, is "driven by money" and has little to do with the common people." On January 23, Qin Deqian, a Chinese-American writing from the United States, offered this blunt advice: "Quit Fooling around with 'Democracy and 'Liberty'!" Since the early 1950s Qin had visited America several times and had lived there since 1977, and he attested to the numerous problems afflicting America: "deficit in the billions of dollars; . . . crimes that amount to a new, never ending civil war; distrust among strangers and even among friends; . . . sexual diseases; overflowing drugs . . ." Qin also blasted Professor Fang Lizhi, China's leading dissent, for misleading Chinese students based on "the tidbits he picked up during his three-months stay" in the United States. 

In addition to utilizing these forms of "outside" assistance, the Daily also did its own home work. For example, on December 31, 1986, as the government was trying to clear students from the streets, the Daily informed its readers the "Eighteen Kinds of Free Speech That the U.S. Constitution Does Not Protect." In a longer piece, the paper invited its readers to take a look at "The True Face of Capitalist Democracy: the American Ruling Class." In 1972, the article stated, it took $150,000 to run for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, and from $500,000 to
one million dollars for a seat in the Senate. Citing statistics from *Who Rule America* by Domhoff William, the *Daily* showed that a small group of affluent Americans dominated the United States. The paper pointed to the background of recent U. S. presidents as further evidence for its argument: "All of the eight pairs of presidents and vice presidents from the end of World War Two to the present were either backed by certain monopoly financial groups, or members of such groups themselves." Most of Reagan's Cabinet members were top CEOs of big corporations, and "even Reagan himself, before becoming president, had not been the impoverished actor that many take him to be." In fact, he was worth two million dollars. In short, the *Daily* argued, America is a place where the rich have their say and their way.°4

Articles such as this by the *Daily* in the wake of student unrests in the late 1986 indicates the great anxiety felt by the Chinese government. For a while, it appeared that the conservatives might overwhelm the reformers at this point—especially after they succeeded in forcing Deng Xiaoping to sack Hu Yaobang, the Party's General Secretary, who was faulted for being too liberal and too lenient with students. But, as with the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign in 1983, Deng Xiaoping managed to limit the damage; in Hu's place Deng installed Zhao Ziyang, previously the Premier and a committed reformer, as made clear by his visit
to the United States two years before. The purge of Hu and his replacement by Zhao exemplified the kind of uneasy compromise that would define the Chinese political environment during the next two years.

Naturally enough, China's "official" America became a more fluid entity. Gone was the fierce condemnation of the United States prompted by the outbreak of student unrest, but praise of America had to be offered with special care. The compromise by the new leadership under Zhao Ziyang was to criticize undue Western influence in China in order to prevent further political turmoil, but to do so gently, rationally and selectively, so as to leave enough room for the cause of reform in China.

The first major action guided by such a strategy took place on January 12, 1987, only a fortnight after the student demonstrations in Shanghai had occurred. Chen Junsheng, chief of staff for Zhao Ziyang, published a long article in the People's Daily, in a bid to forge a new consensus, a new legitimacy. Chen disapproved those who advocated "Western democracy and liberty" in China, but, instead of denouncing and disparaging the West, as much of China's official media had been doing, Chen advocated a "pragmatic" approach. We should not keep comparing China to the United States, he said; it is not a "scientific" comparison. In the first place, the United States possessed vast natural resources and had enjoyed essentially peaceful
development for centuries—she was spared from both of the two world wars, for instance. Even among capitalist nations, the United States had to be considered an exceptional case. As Chen put the matter: "there are over a hundred nations under capitalist systems," and most of them are poor and backward. China, with all her difficulties and disadvantages, cannot simply implement the American way, and the Chinese should unite under the banner of socialism—the reformed version, of course.95

Chen's article thus outlined a new argument for the government concerning the West generally and the United States in particular; instead of depreciating and denouncing the developed nations, the government simply emphasized realities in China to justify China's particular political structure. A few months later, addressing the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party, the new General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, expanded this theme. Zhao stressed that that China was still in "the initial stage of socialism."96 By placing China in this position, the government could explain why a socialist country—which according to Marxist theory should be superior to any capitalist nation—was actually worse off. This was a critical strategy for the reformers, who ran political risks, if they abandoned altogether talk of socialism and communism. On the other hand, if they disparaged the capitalist world too much, they might undermine the reform cause: Why borrow from a system that
does not work? With this newly fashioned argument, the government hoped that it could maintain the communist political system and yet remain free enough to pursue reform and keep the open door ajar.

Further exemplifying this new approach was a major article in the People's Daily written by Zhao Fusan, another vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a specialist in religious studies. Published in two parts on March 23 and 24, 1987, and titled "Reflections on Modern Western Culture," the article took up almost two full pages of the People's Daily. In this piece, Zhao discussed Western, primarily American, cultural critiques, beginning with the likes of John Locke, Benjamin Franklin and Alexis de Tocqueville. He opened his discussion with a question raised by Jaques Barzun: "Can Democracy Be Exported?" Barzun, he argued, believed that democracy was a general principle rather than a fixed, well-organized theory that could be readily transplanted. In conclusion, Zhao recommended "selective absorption" to his readers as the proper approach to the acquisition of Western knowledge.

The People's Daily's presentation of America in the coming two years roughly followed the theoretical approach that Zhao Fusan had outlined. The paper did not devote itself exclusively to bashing the United States, as some conservatives would have wanted; but neither did it play the role of a cheerleader for America in China. On the whole,
the *People's Daily* brought its readers a little bit of everything about America, all presented straightforwardly, as matters of fact. It continued to carry bad news, of course, including the crash of the American stock market in October 1987. But for the most part, it reported facts and analyzed immediate causes rather than engaging in polemics. It also spoke positively about some aspects of America, such as the "success stories" of Chinese living in the United States, and the comparison between China's "Red capitalist," Rong Yiren, and the American businessman, Armand Hammer, who traded with Lenin. The new, laid-back style of the *Daily* in covering the United States was especially manifest in a number of "pointless" human-interest stories--"pointless" in the sense that the paper did not have a particular axe to grind in reporting these events. "Baby Jessica" was saved from a well; Nashville was the capital of American country music; mystery writer, John MacDonald, passed away, and so forth. One issue showed a picture of George and Barbara Bush in the 1970s, posing with their bikes in front of Tiananmen. On the same page the *Daily* reported that "Madonna Rocks Europe."

So America seemed to be becoming rather commonplace because of the tremendous changes China had undergone in the past decade. But this did not signal the end of America as a controversial issue; changes caused new problems. Throughout the decade since 1979, the Chinese government
continued to be torn between its desire for economic change and progress and its desire for political stability and control. The reformist and conservative elements in the Chinese government remained locked in a struggle over what to say about the United States to advance their respective causes. The political initiative on the issue changed hands several times, but a balance was never achieved.
Notes

1. Renmin ribao (People's daily), 20 May 1978, 1 and 4. Unless otherwise noted, citations in this chapter are from Renmin ribao (People's daily).

2. 23 September 1978, 2.

3. 4 October 1978, 6.

4. 19 October 1978, 6.

5. 18 October 1978, 6.

6. 18 December 1978, 6.

7. 18 December 1978, 6.

8. 29 January 1979, 3.

9. 31 January 1979, 4.

10. 1 February 1979, 4.

11. 2 February 1979, 5.

12. 4 February 1979, 4.

13. 4 February 1979, 4.

14. 7 February 1979, 5.

15. 7 February 1979, 5.

16. 23 September 1978, 2.

17. 28 February 1979, 6.

18. 28 February 1979, 6.


22. 6 May 1979, 6.
27. 2 May 1981, 7.
29. 8 July 1981, 5.

31. See Zhonggong Zhongyang (The central committee of the Chinese Communist Party), "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dangqian baokan xinwen guangbo xuanhuan fangzhen de jueding" (The resolution by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on propaganda work), in Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, eds. Jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze, fandui zhexiajieji ziyouthua (Insist on Four Cardinal Principles and oppose bourgeois liberaliazation) (Beijing: People's Press, 1987).

32. 18 November 1981, 1.
33. 2 January 1983, 4.

34. Hu Qiaomu, "Guanyu zicha jieji ziyouthua ji qita" (On bourgeois liberalization and other matters), Hongqi, no. 8, 1982, 11-24.

35. Ibid., 12.

36. Hu Yaobang, "Makesi zhuyi weida zhenli de guangmang zhaoyao women qianjin" (March on under the guidance of Marxist truth), 14 March 1983, 1 and 2.

37. To retaliate, the government announced that it would boycott sport events in the United States and cancel programs of cultural exchanges with the United States for the year. 8 April 1983, 1 and 6.

38. Chen Yun, "Zai dang de shi'er jie erzhongquanhui shang de fayan" (Speech at the second plenary meeting of the Central Committee of of the Chinese Communist Party), in Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, eds., Jianchi cixiang jiben


40. Ibid., 24-40. Speaking at a conference of National Academic Degree Committee on 24 September, Deng Ligun brought forward the idea of fighting "spiritual pollution." The Department of Propaganda, meanwhile, sent instructions to party organizations in the country, urging them to take action. 25 September 1983, 1.

41. 11 January 1982, 4.


43. 6 December 1981, 7.

44. 21 November 1981, 7.

45. 14 April 1983, 7.

46. 2 May 1983, 7.

47. 1 June 1983, 7.

48. 5 August 1983, 7.

49. 8 February 1983, 7.

50. 1 March 1983, 7.

51. 1 March 1983, 7.

52. 25 April 1982, 7.


55. 15 August 1980, 5.

56. 11 January 1984, 5.

57. 11 January 84, 5.
58. 11 January 1984, 1.
59. 11 January 1984, 1.
60. 11 January 1984, 6.
61. Ibid.
62. 15 January 1984, 1.
63. 14 January 1984, 6.
64. 18 January 1984, 6.
65. 15 January 1984, 6.
67. Hu Yaobao, the Party's General Secretary reaffirmed this policy at a Party meeting in February 1985. Several conservative leaders challenged him by interrupting his speech. See Hu Yaobang, "Guanyu dang de xinwen gongzuo" (On the Party's propaganda work), Xinwen zhanxian (Journalist Front), May 1985, 2-10.
68. 28 April 1984, 4.
69. 1 May 1984, 3.
70. 30 April 1984, 6.
71. 7 September 1984, 5.
72. 18 May 1984, 5.
73. 4 March 1984, 7.
74. 18 May 1984, 7.
75. 24 June 1985, 6.
76. 19 May 1985, 7; 20 May 1985, 6; 21 May 1985, 6; 22 May 1985, 7; 24 May 1985, 6.
77. 11 May 1984, 7.
78. 9 September 1984, 7.
79. 20 March 1985, 8.
80. Ibid.
81. 26 March 1985, 8; 27 Mary 1985, 8.
82. 30 July 1985, 8.
83. 17 April 1986, 8.
84. 17 June 1985, 8.
85. 24 September 1985, 2.
86. 27 November 1986, 4.
87. 15 January 1987, 5.
88. 26 August 1986, 7.
89. 15 November 1986, 1.
90. 27 December 1986, 1.
91. 3 January 1987, 1.
92. 23 January 1987, 4.
93. 31 December 1986, 6.
94. 30 December 1986, 4.
95. 12 January 1987, 5.
96. 4 November 1987, 1 and 4.
97. 2 March 1987, 5.
98. 23 March 1987, 5; 24 March 1987, 5.
99. 21 October 1987, 7; 22 October 1987, 7; 23 October 1987, 7; 28 October 1987, 7; 29 October 1987, 7.
100. 11 January 1987, 5.
101. 5 September 1987, 2.
102. 15 November 1987, 7.
103. 21 June 1987, 7.
104. 23 April 1987, 8.
105. 19 February 1989, 7.
CHAPTER 6

POPULAR AND UNPOPULAR AMERICA:
THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHINESE MASSES, THE 1980S

For the greater part of her long history, China existed as a society of two main social classes—peasants and scholars. Class distinctions revolved around land ownership, but literacy also played a prominent part in determining one's social status. The formidable examination system made it possible for a man of humble circumstances to move up and join the governing class, but its success also perpetrated the two-tier structure of the traditional Chinese society: a Confucian scholar-official class of moral and political authority ruling over, and speaking for, the substantially illiterate masses of Chinese peasants.

In a sense, when the Chinese state of the twentieth century struggled with the America issue, it was carrying on an age-old tradition. It was confronting a vital cultural and political issue on behalf of the Chinese masses, dissecting the problem and then drawing out the lessons to be learned by them. In executing its task of interpreting America, the Chinese state encountered many difficulties in the Maoist era, but an outright challenge by the Chinese masses was not one of them. In the first place, Chinese tradition dictated a rather passive role for the Chinese
masses; secondly, because the people had such scanty information on this particular subject, a truly informed and enlightened discussion was simply out of the question.

This situation started to change in the 1980s when economic reform, the "open door" policy, and a revolution in mass communication took place in China, creating a new social environment. This new development did not turn China's general populace into an fully enlightened "public," but it did bring the United States closer to the consciousness of a greater number of Chinese people, who now had to confront America as an integral part of their changing and unstable world.

I

A significant political phenomenon in China of 1978-1979 was the emergence of so-called "underground publications." Strictly speaking, these publications were not underground and they were publications only in the loosest sense. Found mostly in a few major Chinese cities, these materials took the form of either mimeographed pamphlets or dazibao, "big character posters," which were later transcribed and printed.

During the latter part of 1978 these posters appeared in endless proliferation throughout much of China,
sanctioned by the state as a reaction to the trauma of the Cultural Revolution. Shabby as they were, these tracts became the primary channel of some bold political criticism at the time. Most activists involved in the enterprise were young urban workers without a college education; the most famous of them, Wei Jingsheng, who was later sentenced to a long jail term for "betraying state secrets," was a former soldier in the People's Liberation Army and a mechanic. Before they were silenced, these critics voiced their opinions on a variety of important issues, including that of America.

In 1979 the time was ripe for a reevaluation of the United States. Like many other constructions of the Chinese government in the previous three decades, the official, negative image of America now could not be sustained. So many deeds and words of the Cultural Revolution had proved to be hollow that the Chinese people had little reason to believe their government's account of America. Moreover, the Sino-American rapprochment in the 1970s had aroused in some Chinese a desire to learn more about their new foreign "friend." For some, America became a fantasy object. One of the so-called "hand-copied novels" secretly circulating among Chinese in the late 1970s, for instance, was The Second Handshake. In this never-never story, a communist agent operating behind enemy lines in the 1940s, went to the United States, and made his triumphant return to China in
the 1970s to be greeted by China's Premier Zhou Enlai himself.¹

To many Chinese, the normalization of the relationship with the United States under President Jimmy Carter, together with Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in early 1979, legitimized America in China as a power in world politics and as a political and even a cultural entity. This seemed to be the conclusion drawn by some young Chinese operating "underground publications" in 1979, although in drawing such a conclusion they were running far ahead of the Chinese government. Ironically, these critics were about as poorly informed on the United States as most of their fellow countrymen. Their sources of information were no more than scraps of American periodicals they managed to find; their journalistic forays were erratic and sometimes even juvenile; but they certainly did not lack a desire to explore the hitherto forbidden in the name of progress.

This desire was manifest in a piece published in Zhongguo renquan (Human rights in China), one of the "underground publications." Commenting on a survey in the United States showing that a great number of Americans had only a vague idea of the difference between Taiwan and mainland China, the editor of the magazine noted the need for better communication on both sides. "To many of us Chinese, was not the American imperialist just a hideous red-headed, green-eyed monster? Such is the power of deception!"² In
Renmin zhisheng (People's voice), Xiaoming wrote to protest the prevailing practice of showing "inner circle movies"—films such as Star Wars and Gone with the Wind—that were not for general audiences but for the privileged such as party officials. This practice indicated not only class divisions, a "feudal" remnant, but also downright distrust of the people. He called for the elimination of such practices.³

Perhaps in part because of this belief in openness, the operators of the "underground publications" reported both the bright and the dark side of the United States. One story in Renmin zhi lu (People's road) in Guangzhou, for example, described the crime problem in the United States, citing statistics—"burglary, every thirty seconds," "assault, every two minutes," "kidnapping, every twenty seconds," "murder, every forty three minutes," and so on.⁴ Tansuo (Exploration) in Beijing, for its part, picked up the story of the mass suicide under American cult leader James Jones.⁵

In general, however, the "underground publications" revealed a positive attitude toward the United States, and they were willing to discuss many aspects of America that China's official media had consistently avoided. In December 1979, Renmin zhi sheng (The voice of people) in Guangzhou reported on unemployment in the United States. Unlike China's official media, which as a rule would simply
interpret the problem as a symptom of the terminal disease
inflicting the capitalist world, the dissident publication
informed its readers about the benefits for the unemployed
Americans, which are "considerable."  

Another example of such positive journalism on the
United States can be found in the opening issue of Qunzhong
cankao xiaoxi (The people's reference news), which carried
a story titled "Agricultural Mechanization in the World's
Leading Capitalist Countries." It reported that "the 2.8
million farmers in the United States not only feed 220
million Americans, but make America the world's largest
grain exporter." The story then listed some figures showing
the great disparity between China on the one hand and Japan
and America on the other: "GNP: Japan, $6,052; China, $254;
US, $8,715; . . . TV sets per 100 people: Japan, 23.6;
China, 0.04; US, 55.6; Automobile per 1,000 people: Japan
247; China: 1; US, 623"  

To the Chinese at the end of the 1970s, such figures
were both shocking (China was so far behind much of the
world) and inspiring (there was a way for China to move
forward--through Western-style modernization). As if to
explain America's success, in February 1979 the People's
Reference News published some translated materials under the
title "On Scientific Policies of the United States," a
discussion on how American scientists provided advice to
their government in decision making."
The operators of the "underground publications," who were in effect political dissidents, were clearly interested in the American political system, and the meagerness of their knowledge on this topic did not seem to dampen their enthusiasm. For their first issue, the editors of People's Road in Guangzhou translated and published "American Politics and Government," a Voice of America article.\(^\text{10}\) Qiushi bao (Search for truth) found its own way to make a point; it chose to republish selected comments by Karl Marx on Abraham Lincoln, in which Marx commended the American system for allowing a commoner like Lincoln to rise to greatness.\(^\text{11}\)

But not everyone thought highly of the United States. As Deng Xiaoping prepared for his visit to the United States in January 1979, debates on the merits and faults of the United States intensified. By this time, "Democracy Wall" in central Beijing had become city's primary unofficial public forum, where activist city residents expressed their opinions on various issues through "big-character posters." Expectedly most of such proclamations supported Deng Xiaoping's open policy and welcomed his upcoming trip to the United States, but there was a notable exception: a local resident put up a poster asking: "Is America a Democratic Paradise?," and his answer was a resounding "No." "I feel I must say something," he wrote, "having read so much on the Democracy Wall about America being an enlightened society
where common workers and monopoly capitalists enjoy equal
democratic rights." He invited his readers to look at the
record of the United States. In international politics, he
claimed, the United States has always associated with "the
most reactionary, the darkest regimes" around the world; in
its domestic affairs, racial discrimination, the
assassination of John F. Kennedy, the Watergate scandal, and
the Jonestown mass suicides all suggested the lack of
democracy and justice in the United States. "How could any
... responsible man," asked the indignant protester,
"whitewash an imperialist political system like this?"12

An angry answer soon appeared, also posted on the Wall.
In this rejoinder, titled "America Is a Paradise of
Democracy," Xie Jun disputed what he considered to be
erroneous practice of "constructing an image of the United
States in the 1970s ... with old materials from our
newspapers and journals dated the 1950s and 1960s."13 Xie
went on to say:

Our country and the United States have been separated
from each other for almost thirty years, and we do not
understand each other.... What does America in our
mind look like? It is simply slums, traffic accidents,
robbery, murder, ... 'blacks' rebellion and
workers' strikes, and we therefrom derive an
impression of a "sunset" America, a expiring America
gasping for air, an America headed to the museum--but this is... really a distorted image.\textsuperscript{14}

Further, he demanded:

How can anyone who has a head above his shoulders, who can do just a little bit of independent thinking, fail to ponder: Does the American people's modern life come only from the magic power of science and technology? ... Has it nothing to do with their social system? ... Facts are facts; you can make up one hundred theories to cheat and to fool people; you can label things as "sham" and "humbug" for a thousand times; you can slander for another twenty years; you can stifle millions of political prisoners who have uttered something good about America, but you cannot change the fact that America is more democratic than we are.\textsuperscript{15}

The dissident community's was thus clearly behind Deng's new pro-American policy, and when later some American leftist activists appeared in Washington to protest Deng Xiaoping's visit, Chinese like Xie Jun reacted quickly. Writing in \textit{Wusi luntai} (May Fourth forum), Gesheng ("A born revolutionary") derided the American protesters. "It is funny and unexpected that the ghost of the 'Gang of Four' surfaced in Washington and put on an awful show", he
wrote.\textsuperscript{16}

Unfortunately for individuals such as Gesheng, the openness of late 1978 and early 1979 didn't last long. Upon Deng's return from the United States, he decided that the democracy movement had served its purpose—to push aside some conservative Party leaders such as Hua Guofeng, who had been hand-picked by Mao Zedong to succeed himself; now that that mission had been accomplished, Deng wanted to stop the young Chinese advocates of democracy before they went too far. He therefore ordered a crackdown and threw a number of leading activists into jail. Most "underground publications" had to cease; the \textit{People's Road} in Guangzhou survived into the fall of 1979, and in September it published a piece of old news about a heated confrontation between Cornell students and the police in 1973.\textsuperscript{17} The piece was obviously intended as an inspiration for the young Chinese fighting for democracy, but it was just too little and too late.

II

With the end of the 1979 democratic movement, enthusiasm for America subsided temporarily. But before long the tide returned, although in a different form. Whereas in 1979 America had arrived in China through a
dissident movement involving a small group of rebellious Chinese, in the 1980s America made headway in China via the mainstream media. Deng Xiaoping and his experienced colleagues could recognize an old-fashioned rebellion the minute they saw it, but they were less alert to the new revolution in mass communications, even though in the long run the new revolution was far more powerful in reshaping the Chinese people's view of the United States.

Some modern means of mass communication had existed in China before the Deng era, of course, but during the Cultural Revolution, China's already heavily censored mass media suffered further, and by the end of the Mao era, a large portion of it had disappeared. Few publications existed aside from some absolutely necessary official dailies controlled directly by the central government or provincial authorities, and a small number of official monthlies—usually each in one field, with predictable titles like *People's Literature*, *People's Education*, and so on. It was in such a context that the "underground publications," including "hand-copied novels" like *The Second Handshake*, achieved popularity.

Soon after Mao's death in late 1976, the print media in China started to expand exponentially. In 1978, a mere 186 newspapers were published in China. Eight years later, there were 1,574 of them. During the same period, the number of journals and magazines jumped from 930 with total
760 million copies printed to 5,248 with 2,409 million copies produced.  

The electronic media also experienced an explosion. Although television had been known in China since the early 1960s, in 1975 only two or three out of one hundred Chinese had access to it. By 1979, an audience six times larger—120 million people—was watching TV in China. In the decade following 1978, the number of China's TV viewers would increase by an annual average of 60 million. In 1987, 590 million Chinese, or 55% of the total population—93% in urban area and 37% in countryside—were watching television.

China's new media brought the Chinese closer to the outside world than ever before, and viewers and readers rushed to the new cultural and political frontier with great interest. On TV, the most popular program was the Central Television's news at seven o'clock every evening. Of the half-hour news program, the last ten minutes was particularly welcome, and it happened to be "World News." The "World News" was based on footage provided by UPINT of the United States and VISNEWS of Britain, which China's Central Television received via satellites. To Chinese viewers, the "World News" was always fresh and fascinating, which made China's own routine reports on production and government policies look triter than usual. Inevitably the United States appeared on China's Central Television almost
every night. After the 1980 U.S. presidential election, Chen Hanyuan, Director of the Central Television, admitted morosely that during the campaign, "Carter, Reagan and other [Americans] virtually became the leading stars on our screen."20

Bearing this statement out were polls that consistently ranked the news program of Central Television number one, with the "World News" section being specifically favored.21 One viewer wrote to the station: "I love `World News'! Every evening I spend the brief ten minutes in front of my TV holding my rice bowl in my hand."22 "I watch your News every evening," another viewer wrote, "and I especially appreciate the `World News.'" He suggested the station to expand the `World News.' If that would not be feasible, the viewer added, the TV station might want to repeat its TV journal "World Today"--another favorite of the audience.23

Chinese readers felt the same way about international news in their newspapers. A 1982 survey conducted in Beijing and surrounding areas indicated that international news topped all subjects as the readers' favorite. The largest percentage of viewers (42%) listed international news as "the most interesting," followed by the numbers of viewers who favored reports on China's own politicians (38.9%) and those who preferred sports (23%).24

In the literary world, the Chinese also swerved to the West and to the United States in particular. In 1978, China
published 14,987 works of literature; in 1986, 51,789. The increase came primarily in Western works. In the thirty years up to 1979, including the years when China was on bad terms with the Soviet Union, 63.7% of all literary translations were those of Russian originals, and only 18.4% from the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan put together. This trend was reversed in the new era: from 1979 to 1986, 58.9% translated literary works came from the West.

Most dramatic was the increase in the number of American works brought to Chinese readers. This reflected an expanding market, for in the 1980s Chinese publishing houses increasingly came to operate as profit-oriented businesses. In 1976, the year Mao died, only one American work outside the field of science and technology was translated and published China for China's common readers--a booklet by W. E. B. Du Bois, John Brown, originally published in 1909. Next year, there was again only one, this time Ancient Society by the anthropologist L. H. Morgan, singled out because Frederick Engles had based one of his own works on it. In 1978, the situation began to change: about a dozen non-scientific, non-technological American works were published. In 1979, the number rose to about forty. In the following two years, the number climbed to 140 or so each year. In 1982, about 200 American works in the humanities and social sciences were
translated and published in China.\(^32\)

The greater numbers also meant a greater variety in the American works Chinese now were reading. After *John Brown* in 1976 and *Ancient Society* in 1977, there came in 1978, among the dozen or so American works published in China, Richard Nixon's memoirs, Leslie R. Groves's story about the first atomic bomb, *Now It Can Be Told*, and an abridged biography of Lincoln.\(^33\) The following year, Chinese readers found in their bookstores memoirs by Henry Kissinger and H. R. Haldeman, C. L. Sulzberger's *Seven Continents and Forty Years*, Paul Samuelson's *Economics*, Alex Haley's *Roots*, Isaac Singer's *The Magician of Lublin*, William Hoffman's *Paul Mellon: Portrait of an Oil Baron*, William Manchester's hefty but gripping *Glory and Dream*, and *The Greek Coffin Mystery*, the first novel of its kind in China in many years.\(^34\) The flow would continue, and some of the books did extremely well commercially. When Herman Wouk's *Winds of War* was published in 1981, for instance, the first printing numbered 280,000.\(^35\)

Those Chinese who did not want to confront big books or desired to catch up with the trendy works abroad in a more timely fashion could turn to the periodicals that began to mushroom all across the country. Between 1976 and 1986, there came into being about 20 journals and magazines devoted exclusively to Western literature.\(^36\) One of the most successful, *Wulin* (*Forest of Translations*), continues
to be a major quarterly specializing in translated best-sellers in full. Within one year of its launching in 1979, the magazine had already established a circulation of 300,000. There were periodicals with larger circulations than Yilin, but usually they were political and ideological publications with mandatory subscriptions for government offices and work units across the country. Yilin, on the other hand, supported itself entirely by telling foreign tales.

These were predominantly American tales. In 1982, for instance, of the eight full-size novels or movie scripts published in Yilin, six were by American authors, including, among others, Rage of Angels by Sidney Sheldon, Sphinx by Robin Cook, and Erich Segal's Love Story. Love Story, Segal's best-selling romance of a well-born and noble young man and a poor girl, was obviously well received, and Yilin promptly followed up with its sequel, Oliver's Story, in the next issue. A similar tale, The Promise by Danielle Steel, appeared in the same issue.

Readers of Yilin liked the stories not just as entertainment but also as mirrors of true American life. One of them read Segal's novel about a couple whose peaceful life was disturbed by the unexpected arrival of the husband's secret, nine-year-old illegitimate son; the reader wrote the magazine to express his gratification and gratitude. He encouraged the journal to bring forward more
works that would help the Chinese "to learn about the ever changing world."\textsuperscript{41}

Meanwhile, more lively images of American life, or of what the Chinese assumed to be American life, started to show up on the screen. Hollywood returned to China after decades of absence, to the eighty million Chinese who went to movie theaters on any given day, most of them youngsters.\textsuperscript{42} Compared to the introduction of American literature, the flow of movies from America into China was not as smooth, primarily for two reasons: first, the Chinese government took films more seriously and it selected only "appropriate" titles for its people; secondly, the Chinese had to pay to import American movies while, until recently, Chinese publishers could pick up any American book they wished for free. As a result, Chinese theater-goers were treated to a strange assortment of American films. In the first few years of the 1980s, among the American pictures shown in China were several Charles Chaplin productions, \textit{The Legend of the Lone Ranger, Shane, The Sweeney, The Illegal, End of the Game, Undercurrent, Wait until Dark, The Bat, Villa, Francis, Future World, Nightmare}, and \textit{Convoy}.\textsuperscript{43}

Needless to say, Hollywood would not claim all of the above listed with pride, nor would Americans consider them accurate representations of their life. One of the films, \textit{Convoy}, for instance, is described by an American critic as a mere "excuse for a series of chases and crashes".\textsuperscript{44}
Nightmare, on the other hand, is an ordeal of two female college students who, driving through a small town, are bullied and persecuted by a vicious sheriff who rapes one of them and sends them both to a labor farm, where the two suffer further. A film like this, featuring scantily cladded female prisoners and wardresses, the Americans would usually find in a certain section at their video rental stores, but the Chinese viewers, who had grown up under exclusive influence of Marxist literary realism, had no way to tell that it belonged to a certain genre. So when an American journalist in Guangzhou asked a native whether he had seen Nightmare, the Chinese answered: "Nightmare? . . . Yes, it was a film about capitalism."  

A number of more artistic American movies did find their way to China in the early 1980s, through two American film festivals in China sponsored by both sides. The one in 1981 brought to China Singin' in the Rain, Black Stallion, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?, and Walt Disney's Snow White. At the second event, held in 1985, five films were shown: Coalminer's Daughter, On Golden Pond, Kramer vs. Kramer, The Turning Point, and Star Wars. These films made brief appearances in China and then the Chinese were left with their normal fill of Hollywood productions.

One way or another, America made a deep impression on many Chinese. In one of his short stories, writer Cao Min tells the tale about a poor peasant of a hamlet in remote
northeastern China. When a "international train" starts running by--but never stopping at--his small village, it stirs up something in the usually humble farmer, and he begins to walk around telling fellow villagers that he has a relative in America, and that he has declined the relative's invitations to visit, for fear of getting lost among skyscrapers and for fear of aggressive American women.\(^{48}\)

In other words, although the Chinese had great enthusiasm for America, many of them remained abysmally ignorant on the subject. Consider the experience of the playwright Arthur Miller. In the spring of 1983, the People's Artistic Theater in Beijing, a reputable establishment, decided to stage Miller's *Death of a Salesman* and invited the well-known Miller to direct. Miller accepted the invitation, but he had no idea how difficult his job would be. Playing the leading role and serving as Miller's interpreter was Ying Ruocheng, an accomplished actor and a graduate of Yenching University, the American missionary school in Beijing before 1949; Miller had little problem with him. But most of the other players--many of them young and without college education due to the Cultural Revolution--knew so little about the United States that Miller found it extremely challenging to explain the play to them.

For instance, Linda, Willy's wife in the play, as rendered by a Chinese actress, was constantly in tears,
worrying about her husband and appealing to her sons in the fashion of a good Chinese wife and mother; to her, Miller's lecture on the toughness of American women simply didn't ring true. Another woman, playing a role in a bar scene, asked Miller whether her part was that of a prostitute. Miller answered "No" and told her she was supposed to be a "pick up." The actress was quite puzzled and wondered if a lone woman in a bar was not in the business of soliciting, what reason did she have for being there? Then, there was the actor who tried to play Willy's irreverent son; this former People's Liberation Army soldier could not possibly act like an American playboy, and Miller had to let him go. The Chinese drew the line, however, when Miller ordered them to throw away their wigs and wipe off the heavy make-up that made them look like Americans; the Chinese refused to listen to Miller's argument that the play would stand on its own without such artificial assistance. The actors had their way.

In the end, the play seemed to be a success. Many among the audience on the first preview night were peasants from surrounding countryside who were providers of meat and vegetables to the theater and whom the theater had invited for the preview as a treat. Miller was glad to see that the audience stayed long enough "to clap their hands and risk losing the last bus." Still, he could not help wondering whether the Chinese had really understood why "Willy is
desperate"; after all, Miller ruminates, Willy "owns a refrigerator, a car, his own house, and is willing to 'settle' for sixty dollars a week!"  

Miller's doubts were well justified. China's communication revolution had for the first time provided millions of Chinese with a closer look at America, but the suddenness and rapidity with which the revolution took place gave the Chinese at best an incomplete glance. The Chinese were fascinated and captivated, but their understanding of the subject was rather cursory. And as time passed and the initial excitement wore off, and as the Chinese came to worry about some new problems of China's reform age, a more somber mood overcame them.

III

One may identify three incidents concerning American cultural presence in China during the 1980s as indicators of an undercurrent beneath the general Chinese enthusiasm for things American: the controversy over a TV program called Garrison's Gorillas at the beginning of the decade, the public complaints over the movie First Blood in the mid-1980s, and the outcry over some sensualist American best-sellers in China a few years later. None of these occurrences were critically important in themselves; they
were simple, minor incidents during an eventful time. But they reveal how a burgeoning American popular culture haunted some Chinese without end.

The 1980s were destined to be a "material" decade for China, a practical if mundane correction to the fanatically ideological Cultural Revolution. But, although Deng's economic reforms put more food on their tables and finer clothes on their backs, many Chinese watched the changes with uneasiness and even outright disgust. This seeming ingratitude prompted some of Deng's reformers to grumble: "With all the rich food in their mouths, they still manage to say a few bad things about my mother."\(^{51}\)

The dissatisfaction arose from many quarters, but to a great degree it was cultural dislocation. The collapse of the People's Communes, the widening gap between the new rich and the poor, the increasing competitiveness and acquisitiveness that one now encountered everywhere—all this, to those accustomed to Mao's way of life, translated into bewilderment and a sense of loss. So when in 1980 a young woman named Pan Xiao wrote to Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese youth) and asked "Why is the road of life becoming ever narrower?" she attracted national attention and started a broad discussion in the country. One young Chinese-American woman then working in China, Yang Xiaoyan, a Harvard graduate, took part in the exchange by contributing a "dialogue" between her and a "Chinese friend." Many young
Americans were also struggling with "the meaning of life," Yang wrote, but they did not see any inescapable conflict between individual interests and the public good; Americans, she told her readers, tend to believe that individual achievement could serve the interests of society. For instance, if a waiter in the States "wants to make more money, he must provide better service; in return, others will tip him to express their appreciation. This is working for oneself and for others at the same time." From an American point of view, Yang stated, the Chinese might have put too much emphasis on the end but no enough on the means. Her Chinese friend seemed to agree, and expressed his respect for "young Americans' positive attitude as well as their realism."

Although the agony of people like Pan Xiao can be largely explained by their Maoist puritanical upbringing, their passage from the Mao era to the new age was made more difficult by some real contemporary problems. Crime, for instance, was on the steady rise. According to an official source, in the ten years from 1956 to 1965, the overall crime rate in China stayed a low 3 per ten thousand. The Cultural Revolution was a violent era, but since much of the violence was politically inspired, it somehow did not affect the Chinese the same way that robbery and other similar crimes would. Then, in 1981, according to the same source, the crime rate in China nearly tripled to 8.9 per ten
thousand.\textsuperscript{55} To curb the trend and ease public concern, in 1981 and then again in 1983 the government launched two major crackdowns, but those campaigns had only a temporary effect; throughout the 1980s the crime rate in China remained substantially higher than it had been before the Cultural Revolution. Particularly alarming to many Chinese was the involvement of youngsters in the crime wave. In 1986, the authorities in Beijing identified 30,000 delinquent youths, one fifth of them between the ages of 13 and 17. This fact generated new calls for attention to the crime issue.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition to crime, another sign of social instability and cause of cultural anxiety was family problems, including divorce. According to government statistics, 170,000 Chinese couples dissolved their marriages through courts in 1978. Three years later, the number more than doubled to 389,000, and in 1984 the number rose to 445,000.\textsuperscript{57} Although the divorce rate at 8.8\% in 1984 was much lower than the figures for most industrialized nations, the dramatic increase within such a short time span had a strong psychological impact on the Chinese and contributed to a growing fear of social disintegration.

Not surprisingly, in explaining mounting social problems in China, many Chinese pointed their fingers at the West. In 1984, the municipal government of Tianjin, one of China's largest cities, conducted a survey on crime, which
suggested that "bourgeois influences from abroad" was a major factor in the rise of wrongdoing. In his comments on the survey, Li Ruihuan, the Communist Party's Secretary in the city, and after 1989 China's culture czar, specifically called for a more vigorous review of "foreign films and TV programs which are known have a great following." In neighboring Beijing, concerns were expressed over the outflow of foreign printed materials--Playboy magazine among them--from certain hotels, and the tourist industry was instructed to take measures to stop the current.

Similarly, the influence of Western values was held partly responsible for the disintegration of many Chinese families. This can be seen in a discussion carried out in Beijing's Gongren ribao (Workers' daily) during the summer of 1982. The polemic was touched off by an article the newspaper published on July 14, in which a certain Lu Yao suggested that a more liberal attitude toward sex was not unfortunate; it was an integral part of modern life, a sign of progress. Lu's article prompted many readers to respond, most of them denouncing Lu's view, which they considered a good example of adverse Western influence in China. The chaotic social life in the United States, about which the Chinese had heard a great deal, was cited as an example for how things should not be.

Given their knowledge about the United States at this
time, it was almost inevitable that many Chinese would link the mounting social problems in their country to the influence of the United States. Although now the sources of information on America were not just government propaganda, movies such as Convoy and Nightmare did not paint the United States in a very favorable light. Moreover, some close-up observations made in the early 1980s did not seem to yield an America radically different from what was shown in these movies. In 1982, for instance, a group of Chinese writers briefly toured the United States. A number of them later presented some rather shocking images to their readers, in particular Jiang Zilong, a popular, home-spun author of strong nationalist sentiments and communist idealism.

Among the more memorable scenes described by Jiang occurred in New York. As soon as the travellers made it known that they would ride subway trains, their hosts and friends provided endless advice and precautions, including carrying just ten to twenty dollars to be robbed (Not long before, they were told, a Chinese group had brought one thousand dollars with them, their whole budget, and what a mistake they made). The New York subway system lived up to its reputation. It was dark, it was dirty, and some strange persons were hanging around, looking rapacious and brutish. They did not get on the trains, nor did they get out of the station; they just loitered
about, like ghosts. If you had a weaker nerve, you did not actually have to be robbed to feel the jerking in your knees.\textsuperscript{63}

Their mid-night adventure on Broadway at 42nd street was as eerie:

Adding a touch of terror to the neon-light dominated atmosphere were some men and women standing about, either drunk or drugged, a few with cigarettes in their mouths, their eyes following passers-by menacingly.

Policemen paced the street up and down, their walkie-talkies blaring, and their guns ready to go. At places there was one of them every several yards, all looking alert and deadly serious, as if waiting for the sudden arrival of swarms of enemies. By this time our two female companions had had enough sightseeing, and they took tight hold of our arms, urging us to return to the hotel.

This is the night scene of New York. What should I say? Pornography, greed, violence, lunacy... what else?\textsuperscript{64}

With such images of the United States in their mind, and confronted with their own mounting social problems at home,
many Chinese were horrified by the swift expansion of American pop culture in China. Thus the controversy over "Garrison's Gorillas."

In 1979 China's Central Television had broadcast China's first American TV series, NBC's "The Man from Atlantis." These "super hero" stories were such a sensational success among young Chinese that it was reported that while the program was on, there was a notable decrease of crimes in streets.65 Two years later, China's Central Television decided to follow up its success with another American show, this time "Garrison's Gorillas," ABC's World War Two adventure featuring a group of U.S. Army commandoes recruited from federal penitentiaries who operated behind enemy lines.

The show achieved great popularity among young Chinese, with unexpected consequences. It turned out that, inspired by the deeds of the former cons in the drama, some Chinese teenagers took to acting them out in real life, and the police in several cities soon found themselves dealing with so-called "Garrison's gangs," who boasted their burglarizing skills and tyrannized neighborhoods. With such unexpected publicity, the Central Television had to pull the series off the air half way through.66 But angry citizens did not let the matter drop there, and they would now periodically ask: "What was the point of putting on that show in the first place?"67
Several years later, in 1986, an American film product caused another round of public outcry. First Blood, featuring Sylvester Stalone as a Vietnam veteran avenging the deeds of his persecutors, was a big hit in China. "Within ten days of its opening in Beijing," a Western journalist reported, "a million people went to theaters to watch it, and black market tickets were sold at seven times the official price." But soon a great many Chinese began to voice their disgust toward the violent acts in the film. China's leading movie magazine, Dazhong dianying (Popular cinema) received many letters from its angry readers. One of them, Lu Hanwei, wrote:

... it is thrilling, it is awesome, but it is not beautiful; it is violence, it is the search for death, the thirst for blood. In the end, the worship of the so-called noble brute is the worship of robbers, murderers and arsonists, the worship of blood and corpses.

All this, Lu concluded, runs against "our national sentiment, our national aesthetics, our social system, and our political beliefs." In the late 1980s, American pop culture continued to incite spasms of public outrage in China. Many Chinese deplored the fad among young people started by the American
movie *Breakdance*. There was also criticism of the so-called "changing-shape warriors," (*bianxing jin'gang*), assemblage toys imported from the United States, with parts which children could use to put together tanks, battleships, rockets and other killing machines. A number of Chinese parents felt that the popular game encouraged reprehensible aggressiveness in China's preschoolers. Still, the greatest outrage was direct toward American best-sellers that contributed to the torrent of sensualist publications inundating China toward the end of the decade.

Chinese publishers of American literature had come a long way from their *Gone with the Wind* days in the early 1980s; they had gone well past the likes of Herman Wouk or Arthur Hailey, and in responding to the demand of an obviously lucrative market, they flocked toward authors who appealed to man's baser instincts. As a result, over the years, what the Chinese defined as "popular literature" accounted for an ever larger percentage of all foreign fictional works translated in China. In 1988 it reached 45%. The content of these works troubled many Chinese. One observer of China's publishing scene, Situ Shuzhang, wrote:

In 1986, most translations were adventures, detective stories, and classic popular works; prominent authors included Irwin Shaw, Herman Wouk, Somerset Maugham and
Sidney Sheldon. There were few works with heavy sex. A major change took place in 1987, when Irwin Wallace, Danielle Steel, and Jackie Collins surfaced as leading authors, a trend that resulted in the publication of many pornographic works.\textsuperscript{71}

Further testimony to the craze was the fact that in 1988 three publishing houses brought out their own versions of Nabokov's \textit{Lolita}; and there were also four translations of Jackie Collins's \textit{Hollywood's Wives}.\textsuperscript{72} One reporter passing by a graduate student's dorm saw an ad for a book rental business at the door. Following the instructions, he went in to the room, where the owner of the business, an enterprising student, warmly recommended a number of works by Jackie Collins and Irwin Wallace. The student told the reporter that these books are "rather popular among female students."\textsuperscript{73} By getting down to business in this way, the student was, of course, simply riding the tide of free enterprise that was running high in China. This explains why, in spite of a certain obvious and persistent animosity toward it, American culture survived and thrived in post-Mao China.
By the late 1980s, China's economic reforms had altered the Chinese mental world so much that what used to be scandalous a few years before was now defensible, even glorious. Some people might still lament the ill effects of "Garrison's Gorillas" or First Blood, but others were looking beyond these aspects of American culture. Their eyes were on places they were going, not distractions on roadside. China, like America, had become a land of opportunity.

In 1987, Zhu Mingying, a top pop singer, divorced her husband, a common worker, and made plans to study in the United States. The Chinese viewed all divorces with aversion, but this was the worst case possible: a successful woman ditching her husband for America, at a time when many Chinese brooded over the increasing social instability in China. Yet, in some reports of the episode Zhu was portrayed in a very sympathetic and even a positive light, as in Ling Ya's Ten Divorced Women. According to Ling, Zhu, in deciding to divorce and to expatriate, was inspired by noble goals--art, culture, and greater achievement in general. By this account, Zhu had an enterprising mind quite in the spirit of the time--one which society should endorse, not condemn. Zhu herself described her experience using a now-familiar American image: her parting with her
husband took place "just like in the movie Kramer vs. Kramer." 74

The most obvious connecting point between modern America and China in the reform era was a vibrant entrepreneurship, a spirit best exemplified by America and now embraced by increasing numbers of Chinese. Among the American popular heroes imported into China were thus not just Charles Chaplin or Sylvester Stallone but also, among others, Armand Hammer, the legendary capitalist who made his millions by trading with Lenin; 75 Ken Olsen who founded Digital Equipment with just $70,000; 76 or Peter Uberoth, the organizer of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. The Olympics in Los Angeles were the first Games that the People's Republic of China participated in and the first extensively reported on China's television. The great fanfare showcased the United States to a large Chinese audience as never before, and it made Uberoth an hero.

Only a few years before, the widely read magazine, Chinese Youth, had hosted the somber discussion on "Why is the road of life becoming ever narrower?" Now, the journal undertook to profile the man behind the Los Angeles Games. Time magazine had chosen Uberoth as the Man of the Year, Chinese Youth noted. "So What Do the Americans See in Him?" The answer: "the pioneering spirit." Readers of Chinese Youth learned that from his early years Uberoth displayed the characteristics of independence and self-reliance. His
mother died when he was four; he left home to work when he
was sixteen; he worked full time while studying at college,
selling women's shoes and helping out at a chicken farm.
Phenomenal successes followed: deals in the millions of
dollars were made, but the man remained a good citizen who
worked for the Olympics as an unpaid volunteer.77

Did the Chinese buy such stories? It seemed so. In
1986 when China's Youth first introduced Lee Iacocca, the
CEO of the Chrysler Corporation, it noted that this
"American business legend" was hardly known in China.78
Three years later, Iacocca's autobiography was a hot item
throughout China; the ever enterprising book-peddlers on the
streets quickly added Iacocca: An Autobiography to their
otherwise sensationalist offerings, even in such a remote
city as Chengdu in Sichuan Province.79

Among the Chinese publications that hailed American
rags-to-riches stories was Zhongguo qiyiejia, or Chinese
Entrepreneurs, a monthly for China's newly emerging
businessmen. The journal periodically published tales of
past successes in business world, and of course nowhere were
such stories more abundant and dramatic than in the United
States. One story opens with a scene at the New York
harbor:

... among the new immigrants arriving from England
there was a thirteen-years old boy... In the fifty
years to come, this thirteen-years old was to turn a
great 'American dream' into reality. From a penniless
immigrant he rose to be the world's richest 'steel
king.' He was Andrew Carnegie.⁸⁰

Then there was the story about George Eastman, founder of
the Eastman Kodak Company:

He was born in a remote little town in New York... lost his father when he was eight, and his family was
very poor... [He] worked as a mail-boy at three
dollars a week, ... stuffed his mother's small
kitchen with lots of little bottles full of chemicals.
... [and] set up Eastman Kodak Company... .
Eventually, fate smiled to this Rochester industrial
perfectionist.⁸¹

This was not just an American fairy tale; to those who were
riding the high tide of China's economic boom, it was very
real, an inspiration and an achievable end.

In the meantime, the arrival of American businesses in
China had established a direct link between Chinese and
American ways. One American establishment in China was the
famed Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise next to the
Tian'anmen Square. The Chinese manager there, a sixty-two
years old Communist veteran, once suggested that workers at
the restaurant should be allowed to take home with them any food unsold at the end of the day, but the American manager rejected the idea, on the ground that it would be a breach of discipline. Rather taken aback by the decision initially, the Chinese manager eventually came to agree that frugality did not always mean good management, and he was generally impressed by and applauded the American business's stern rejection of traditional Chinese tolerance of guanxi, "personal connections."\(^{82}\)

The American way overcame the aged Chinese manager, who had devoted most of his life to communism, because Kentucky Friend Chicken stood for success, notwithstanding the irony of a minimum wage-paying fast food restaurant leading the new business trend in China. The attraction was real. When in 1986 it was advertised in Shanghai that a Sheraton Hotel was opening for business and hiring a full staff, several hundred young men and women in the city with college and graduate degrees sent in their applications, making it a one-in-eight competition. Many Chinese felt uncomfortable with the situation and some considered it a disgrace that so many Chinese with advanced degrees were eager to work as virtual servants. Reportedly a high ranking Party official suggested the necessity of their "re-education;" others were said to be considering publicly identifying the applicants to humiliate them. When questioned by curious jounralists, many applicants said that they felt that there would be
greater upward mobility in an American business. In the end, few of the applicants actually joined Sheraton—not because the hotel rejected them but because their current Chinese employers refused to let them go.\textsuperscript{83}

While many of the Chinese who rushed to Kentucky Fried Chicken or the Sheraton Hotel no doubt had their eyes on money, such incidents also indicate an increasing recognition and affirmation of the American way. Moreover, this admiration was not confined to economic life; it extended to American culture as a whole. This took place not only because years of economic reform had created an environment receptive to American influences, but also because there had been a change in the nature of Sino-American contact.

Whereas in the early 1980s most Chinese learned about the United States primarily through media such as novels and movies, in the late 1980s ever more Chinese came into extensive and direct contact with Americans. Since the Chinese highly value interpersonal contacts and the information acquired therefrom, a more realistic America began to emerge, one which started to compete with the wild and exotic Hollywood versions of America that originated in the early 1980s.

In 1985, R. G. Chatterton came to China to preside over Beijing Jeep, a major Sino-American joint adventure. Chatterton was obviously not one of the boisterous cons or
cowboys the Chinese had seen in the American movies. By all accounts he was an ordinary but fine man, as the Zhongguo qingnian bao, or Chinese Youth Daily, reported to its readers: before he came to China, Mr. Chatterton had served in the Navy for six years, studied both engineering and business management, and managed a factory of eight thousand workers. During his tenure at Beijing Jeep, Mr. Chatterton demonstrated what many Chinese officials lacked—confidence in the young, as evidenced by his appointments of many junior members of the company to prominent positions. Mr. Chatterton was stable, responsible, and amiable—not bad qualities for an American.84

By observing Americans at close range, the Chinese started to see what they had not seen or had not recognized previously. A school teacher in Beijing, Ji Zhongliang, achieved a minor moment of enlightenment after his school hosted a large group of American high school students who came to China through an exchange program in 1986. Ji was surprised to see that the allegedly spoiled American children showed up very simply dressed, and that "they just sat on the concrete floor" when they did not find enough chairs for them. Ji and his colleagues had worried about getting the large group to do anything together on time, particularly when they found out that the Americans had no equivalent to China's class cadre—teachers' little helpers. To their surprise, when the time to get on a bus came, all
students showed up, ready to go, without being prodded. The American students were not hard to organize, wrote Ji, because "each of them has a mind and is responsive and able." The Chinese, Ji concluded, should learn from the Americans how to "let all kinds of young people... fully express themselves", for obviously independence and freedom do not necessarily result in chaos and anarchy.

Meanwhile, large numbers of Chinese had been going to the United States. Compared to their forerunners earlier in the decade, the Chinese visiting America in the late 1980s were better informed about their host country and had greater freedom in exploring it. When Jiang Zilong and his writer's group toured the United States in 1982, theirs was a very limited experience—a group of Chinese freshly out of the Cultural Revolution and rushed through a number of major American cities. Over the course of a few years, many Chinese got better acquainted with the United States, both those who stayed for longer periods and those who visited for a short while.

Consider the case of Wu Jisong. Wu was a science administrator who travelled extensively abroad, twice to New York, and whose account of the city differed significantly from the frightening picture drawn by Jiang Zilong the writer. Most notably, while Jiang's impression of New York was dominated by the chaos and terror of the subway and Broadway, Wu saw both sides of the city. When in 1981 Wu
was in New York for the first time, he took a walk in Harlem; on his second visit in 1985, Wu lived on Park Avenue. In particular he observed the difference between the Western and Eastern sections of 42nd street, divided up by Americas Avenue. On one side, Wu wrote, there were "soiled bars, sex shops, nightclubs, X-rated movie theaters, dirty and chaotic, swarmed by hooligans, thieves, drug dealers. . ." On the other side, "windows of big shops glistened, casually dressed persons ambled with ease, and corporate workers in suits bustled about, doing their business."86 Wu admitted to mixed feelings about New York, the city of both opportunities and decay, "the sweet Big Apple with bad spots."87

Some Chinese also branched out from the standard beaten path for Chinese sojourners in America--Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, etc.--and got to look at other faces of the United States. Zhao Jianjun, a farm worker from Xinjiang in the Northwest, came to the United States in 1986 through an agricultural exchange program and found himself in rural Massachusetts, where he worked for one year. Zhao left with a rather positive view of America. For instance, he found his American friends hard working. "In the United States," he wrote, "a society of high consumption and intense competition, you cannot stand up if you do not work hard." In particular he mentioned a young fellow named Bob who worked hard so he could save enough to ride bicycle around
the world—"a typical American youth." Zhao also found Americans friendly toward the Chinese. They even asked him about the *Classic of Changes* (*Yijing*), about which Zhao had to admit that he knew very little. "Yet these young Americans had in their hands the *Book of Changes* in English," he reminisced. "How strange." Other aspects of American life surprised him too: he put on his suit to look his best while shopping for groceries, only to be told by his driver, Mary, that actually Americans did not care that much about their clothes, at least not while shopping. He was fascinated to see that family members kept saying "Thank you" to one another, and he was quite moved by a restaurant worker who fed a wounded big bird for a week and then released it. As such impressions of America spread in China, they helped put nightmarish stories about the United States in broader perspective.

Contributing to the creation of a more realistic America were also those Chinese who stayed in America for a longer time, many of whom had to struggle to make a living. One Chinese student's report on his daily routine appeared in *Qingnian wenzhai* (Young reader's digest): get up at four-thirty; get to work at six at a local Chinese newspaper; finish work at twelve noon and have lunch on the subway train while doing the reading for classes in the afternoon; in the evening write book reports and watch news to prepare
for the next day's work. "On numerous nights I fell asleep on my typewriter," he wrote. Still, the student concluded his story with an upbeat remark: the United States is "a nation of immigrants, of people with diverse cultural and other backgrounds. But one thing is universal, that is, only those who make good use of their time and opportunities succeed."91

All of this new knowledge about America prompted some Chinese to revise their traditional views and to draw larger conclusions. A communist veteran who had joined the Revolution in the war against the Japanese went to Washington, D.C., to attend a conference. Speaking no English, he was quite helpless after he had landed at the airport. But a young black couple came to his rescue; they figured out where he wanted to go, sent him to the hotel, and left before the old man could thank them. Later the official commented to a companion: "Maybe the Americans are not the way we used to describe them after all."92 His young friend, one Zhang Mingshu, was less reserved. Zhang commented on Communist China's traditional practice of dividing "civility" into capitalist and socialist forms, with the former deemed far superior and the latter quite limited and paltry, and he wrote:

... having toured the worlds of both kinds of civility, I, and others with similar experience, feel
that such a division is not warranted. ... Honestly, there is not much of a difference between the so-called "socialist civility" and "capitalist civility," not so much as between civility period and the absence of it."\(^93\)

Zhang then recalled a church service he had observed in a small American town. Although he did not believe in religion and had no intention to make his children do so, he wrote, he thought that perhaps the Chinese should at least study this aspect of American culture and "find some other ways to promote friendship, love and mutual respect among our own people."\(^94\)

This last observation—in a way, a lament—of Zhang's should be considered in the light of its timing. His essay was published in March 1989, when the Chinese nation was coming dangerously close to a national crisis. Less than three months later, China would witness a great outburst of political and social discontent which ended in bloodshed at the Tiananmen Square.

V

The violent outburst at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 resulted from some great and persistent tensions within
Chinese society that had built up during the 1980s. Not incidentally, certain contradictions also persisted in the Chinese masses' views of America. The dynamic economic reforms had consistently reshaped the mental world of many Chinese and made it easier for them to see the United States in a positive light. But just as there were still millions of Chinese who remained skeptical of the economic reform, there were large numbers of Chinese who continued to fret over American influence in China—particularly the influence of American popular culture, which to them was synonymous with materialism and recklessness. This divergence in views of America was only amplified and intensified by China's overnight revolution in mass communication.

Of course, neither the negative nor the positive view of the United States worked to stabilize conditions in China. On the one hand, shoddy elements of American culture imported into the country heightened the cultural anxiety that many Chinese already felt amidst the drastic economic reforms, and this cultural anxiety easily slipped into cynicism and resentment. On the other hand, new converts to the American way rushed so eagerly toward their newly discovered "truth" that they undermined the Chinese government's effort to maintain political and cultural stability while seeking economic development. It is symbolic of this destabilizing duality that while some Chinese enthusiasts erected a replica of the Statue of
Liberty at Tiananmen Square at the height the 1989 upheaval as a gesture of defiance to the Chinese government, at a time other Chinese disparaged the government for its failure to rid China of the disgrace of four versions of Hollywood's Wives.

This was the high point of the Chinese masses' search for an "authentic" America. Obviously they did not develop a unified vision of America. But there is no more a truly unified America than there is a truly unified China. In this sense, then, by the end of the 1980s, the Chinese people had come to see a reasonably authentic America, one deeply divided, as was China itself.
Notes


3. Xiaoming, "'Neibu dianying' he shi liao?" (When will we see the end of "inner circle movies"?), Renmin zhisheng (People's voice), no. 9 (1979), in ibid., vol. 16, 114-15.


5. Tansuo (Beijing), February 1979, in ibid., vol. 2, 29-32.

6. "Meiquo shiyie zhuangkuang diandi" (Glimpses of unemployment in the United States), Renming zhi sheng (Guangzhou), combined issues 12/13 (December 1979), in ibid., vol. 16, 198.

7. The title of the publication was a play on China's official publication Cankao xiaoxi (Reference news) which was a daily on international affairs circulated among government officials.


11. Qiushi bao (Search for truth), no. 15 (October 1979), in Dalu dixia kanwu huibian, vol. 6, 65.


15. Ibid., 24.


17. "Meiguo xuesheng yundong de tedian" (Characteristics of American students' movement), Renming zhilu (People's road), no. 1 (September 1979), in Dalu dixia kanwu huibian, vol. 17, 290-1.

18. Editorial, "Dang de sanzhong quanhui yilai de chuban gongzuo" (The publishing industry since the Party's Third Plenary Meeting), Chuban gongzuo, no. 12, 1987, 11.


23. "Guanzhong dui zhongyang dianshi tai jiemu de fanying" (Viewers' responses to programs of the Central TV), in Zhongguo guangbo dianshi nianjian 1986 (China's broadcasting and TV yearbook, 1986), 625.

25. "Dang de sanzhong quanhui yilai de chuban gongzuo" (The publishing industry since the Third Plenary Meeting of the Party Central Committee), Chuban gongzuo, no. 12, 1987, 11.

26. Li jingrui, "Fanyi chubanxue chutan" (On translation and publication), Chuban gongzuo (Publishing), no. 6, 1988, 97.


29. Ibid., 1978 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), 595-96.


32. Ibid., 1982 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), 1262-75.

33. Ibid., 1978 (Beijing, 1982), 595-6.

34. Ibid., 1979, 745-50.


37. Zhongxuanbu chubanju (Bureau of Publications, Department of Propaganda), "Dangqian tushu chuban de jige tuchu wenti" (Some leading problems in publishing), Xuanchuan dongtai (xuanbian), 1980 (Trends in propaganda, 1980 collection) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1981), 84.


41. Chen Fan, "Xiwang duo liaojie bianhua zhe de dangjin shijie" (We want learn more about the changing world), Yilin, no. 4, 1984, 262.41.

42. Editorial, Dazhong dianying (Popular cinema), December 1983, 3.


47. John L Scherer, ibid., vol. 10 (1987), 305; introductions of the movies made in Dazhong dianying, no. 3 and 6, 1983.

48. Cao Min, "Zai guoji lieche tongguo de difang" (Where the International Train passes by), Xiaoshuolin (Fiction), June 1983, 38-41.


50. Arthur Miller, ibid., 86.

51. "Yibian chi rou, yibian ma niang."

52. Yang Yanzi and Wang Yaping, "Yige Meiguo qingnian he yige Zhongguo qingnian de duihua" (A dialogue between an young American and a young Chinese), Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese youth), November 1980, 8.

53. Ibid., 9.


55. Ibid., 4.


58. Xu Yamin, "Guanyu yi baimin shaonian fanzui de diaocha" (A study of one hundred cases of youth crimes), in Tianjin fanzui wenti diaocha wenji (Collected articles based on a survey on crimes in Tianjin) (Tianjin: Tianjin Remin Chubanshe, 1985), 102-03.

59. Li Ruihuan, "Jiaqiang zonghe zhili, cengqu shehui zhian de genben haozhuan" (Intensify systematic management and strive for fundamental improvement in social security), in ibid., 11.


63. Ibid., 183.

64. Ibid., 188.

65. John L. Scherer, ibid., vol. 6, 324.


67. Shao Daosheng, Zhongguo qingshaonian fanzui de shehuixue sikao (Sociological considerations of China's youth crimes) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1987), 149. Also, Shen Ying, "Zhongshi shehui xinxi dui qingnian de yingxiang" (Stress the impact of social information on the youth), Wenhui bao (Wenhui daily), 24 March 1982, 3.

68. Pico Iyer, 3.
69. Lu Hanwei, "Zhen shi nanxing mei ma?" (Is this muscularity?), Dazhong dianying (Popular cinema), November 1986, 19.

70. Situ Shuzhang, "Xin de qingshi, xin de wenti" (New trends, new problems), Chuban tong::un (Publisher's bulletin), June 1989, 34-5.

71. Ibid., 35.

72. Ibid., 40.

73. Zhuang Yu, "Bianji xianhua, 19" (Editor's notes, 19), Chban gongzhou (Publishing), no. 9, 1989, 29.

74. Ling Ya, Shi ge lihun de nuren (Ten divorced women), (Chongqing: Chongqing Chubanshe, 1988), 23.

75. Xiaoying, "Qiyiejia de qingnian shidai: Hamo" (Early years of entrepreneurs: Hamer), Zhongqingnian jingji luntan (Forum for young economists), March 1985, 76-78.

76. Zhongguo qiyejia (China's entrepreneurs), January 1987, 44-7; February 1987, 42-6; March 1987, 30-4.

77. Tian Xiaodong, "Meigu ren cong ta shenshang faxian le shengmo" (What do Americans see in him?), Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese youth), April 1985, 40-3.


80. Si Yan, "Gangtie dawang Anlude Kaniji de chenggong" (Steel king Andrew Carnegie), Zhongguo qiyejia (Chinese Entrepreneurs), June 1987, 47.

81. Liu Yibing, "Keda gongsi de chuangshiren: Jiaozhi Yishiman" (The creator of Kodak Company: George Eastman ), Dangdai qiyejia (Contemporary entrepreneurs), March 1986, 63.

82. Zhao Xiuyun, "Xin jueqi de Meishi kuican ting" (The rising American fast-food restaurants), Zhongguo qiyejia (Chinese entrepreneurs), May 1988, 17.

83. Zhang Yuan, "Xi'erduan jiudian de zhaopin fengbo" (The Sheraton Hotel incident), Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese youth), combined issues of January and February 1987, 45-7.
84. Ai Tiesheng and Xie Qiang, "Yige Meiguo ren yan li de Zhongguo qingnian" (An American and young Chinese), Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (Chinese youth daily), 5 January 1985, 2.

85. Ji Zhongliang, "Taipingyang bi'an chuilai de feng" (The wind from the other side of the Pacific), Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese youth), combined issues of January and February 1987, 28.

86. Wu Jisong, Yige Zhongguo ren kan shijie (The world through the eyes of a Chinese) (Beijing: Gongren Chubanshe, 1987), 318.

87. Ibid., 319.

88. Zhao Jianjun, "Meiquo qingnian zhi wojian" (American youth in my eyes), Qingnian (Youth), June 1988, 28.

89. Ibid., 29.

90. Ibid.

91. Li Cheng, "Zai Meiquo, tan shijian" (On time in America), Qingnian wenzhai (Your reader's digest), January 1987, 41.

92. Zhang Mingshu, "Meiguq jingshen wenming' yinxiang ji" (My impressions of 'American spiritual civilization'), Kaifang shidai (The era of open door), March 1989, 53.

93. Ibid., 53.

94. Ibid., 54.
CHAPTER 7

CHINESE REVIEW AMERICA:

THE CASE OF DUSHU MAGAZINE, 1979-1989

Dushu, or Reading, a book-review monthly based in Beijing, came into being in 1979, at a time when waves of radical change had just started to sweep across China. Riding the tide of reform, the journal soon achieved high respectability and popularity among the educated Chinese. The circulation number of Dushu has never been large, averaging roughly 40,000 annually over the years; but the relatively small number of issues is misleading because even during the reform era the frugal Chinese continued their old practice of sharing books and journals with one another. It was not uncommon for a piece of good writing to pass hands a dozen times or so in a college dormitory before it was laid at rest, and Dushu certainly was a favorite of young educated Chinese.

In part, the success of Dushu has arisen from its special character—intellectual but not overly scholastic. As a result, the journal suffers less from China's still rather strict censorship than most other journals. (The government keeps an eagle's eye on standard academic publications because of their semi-official status and on most popular magazines because of their mass audience.) In
other words, more than most other Chinese publications, Dushu can speak its own, true mind.

The greater liberty enjoyed by Dushu also came as a matter of tradition. The journal is published by the Sanlian Publishing House in Beijing, the origin of which can be traced back to Zou Taofen. Zou was the dissident journalist, publisher and harsh critic of Chiang Kaishek's Nationalist government in the pre-1949 years, whose experience in America we have briefly discussed earlier in this study. Because of Zou's revolutionary past, after the communist victory in 1949, his publishing business was allowed to continue to operate, in a consolidated form, and it came to specialize in publishing foreign titles and works on world affairs. This gave the press a special status and identity which partly accounts for Dushu's critical mind and sense of independence. In some ways, Dushu can be compared to the New York Review of Books--prestigious, liberal, and politically active.

While Dushu covers books of all sorts, one of its main functions has been the introduction of Western works--hardly a surprise after China's long period of cultural isolation. Naturally, American works, and writings on the United States, have always taken up considerable space in the journal. In the 1980s, Dushu served as an especially effective forum for the Chinese intelligentsia, which carried on a continuous discourse concerning the United
States—all in close connection to the heart-stirring developments in China throughout the nation's reform decade.

I

When Dushu made its first appearance in April 1979, it was just three months after Deng Xiaoping's historic visit to the United States. Officially a new era had dawned in China; in real life, however, the Chinese still lived under the long shadow of the Great Cultural Revolution. This was particularly the case with respect to the United States, for decades China's nemesis and the very embodiment of evil. But the impulse for change was strong, and so was the Chinese intelligentsia's desire to learn about the "beautiful country" on the other side of the Pacific. In the first few years of its existence, Dushu boldly took on what used to be a taboo subject, leading the way in introducing America to China.

Dushu expressed its philosophy straight forwardly in the lead article in the very first issue, titled "There Should Be No Prohibition in Reading." In this essay, Li Honglin, who would later rise to be an important reform theorist, blasted the severe censorship in China during the Cultural Revolution. Of hundreds of thousands books, Li wrote bitterly, only about one thousand or so were "kindly"
cleared [by the government] as fit for the public." Li called for the emancipation of all books, "Chinese or foreign, ancient or modern".¹

Li's article kindled an instant and heated debate. "The very sight of the article's title makes me sick," one reader began his tirade. Shouldn't "Reactionary" works be banned? Should pornography be allowed to flood the country? And what about those unfit foreign publications? "With no prohibition whatsoever, our world would be a total mess!"² No less furiously, another reader warned people about the importation of "spiritual opium," particularly the Western variety, which was supposedly the most poisonous.³ Yet another reader expressed his surprise that the matter should have become an issue in the first place. "What is there of the capitalist world worth our envy anyway?" he asked.⁴

In spite of such outcries, the conservatives did not stand a chance when the liberals counterattacked under the banner of "Freedom of Speech." The battle was not evenly matched, as the horror of the Cultural Revolution remained fresh in the memory of many articulate intellectuals. The liberals appeared to have won the day.

The theoretical establishment of the right to read freely does not, however, mean that the Chinese people could actually do so, if only for the simple reason that, at this time, there existed few worthwhile readings, and reliable information on America was singularly scarce. As result,
the Chinese waged war over some idiosyncratic and somewhat unlikely issues; such as the degree to which the novel *Gone with the Wind* depicted the "reality" of the American South.

The Chinese version of Margaret Mitchell's epic was first published in the pre-1949 years and achieved considerable fame. Upon coming to power, the Chinese communists labelled the novel a "reactionary" work, and for decades the novel was out of the public reach. In 1979, taking advantage of the more tolerant atmosphere in the country, one publishing house brought the book back to market. Benefiting from the great notoriety fashioned for it in the Mao era, the story of Scarlet O'Hara quickly became a symbol of the forbidden America which many Chinese now fervently sought. In no time, Mitchell's book, despite a decades-old, shoddy translation, caught on again. The splash made so loud a noise that, in early 1981, *Dushu* organized a forum on the book.

All three participants in the discussion took Mitchell's book seriously, either for its merits or for the damage it could do. They evaluated the work in the tradition of Marxist literary realism. The one who approved of the novel spoke of its "educational value." Mitchell, he asserted, truthfully presented life in the American South—slavery, the plantation system, the Civil War, etc. Hers, he claimed, was a faithful reflection of "a revolutionary era in American history". The other two panelists,
however, suggested that Mitchell had grossly distorted American history. "As we all know," Huang Songkang wrote, "slavery is the most brutal system of exploitation in human history"; yet, according to Mitchell's novel, blacks seemed to lead a life almost leisurely and joyous. To support his view, Huang compared Gone with the Wind with a novel by African American author Margaret Walker, Jubilee, the story about an irreconcilable relationship between a young black slave and her white father, a plantation master.

The discussion on Gone with the Wind in Dushu reveals the way Chinese intellectuals approached the America issue at this time. On the one hand, they seemed to be disgusted by what they perceived as the low taste of the Chinese public; on the other hand, they themselves were struggling with certain suffocating Marxist dogmas left over from the Cultural Revolution such as class-struggle, which dictated an all-encompassing and reductionist view of America.

Even before the Gone with the Wind debate, in the April 1980 issue of Dushu, Huang Shaoxiang, a leading Americanist, conducted a historical and political analysis of another American novel that had been recently translated into Chinese, Richard Hildreth's White Slave, originally published in 1852. In this book, Hildreth relates the adventures of a white slave who, in the end, ensured his freedom by serving the British in the war of 1812. Hildreth was a reactionary, Huang determined, for he valorized
someone who achieved his liberation not through his struggle against an unjust social system, but rather by serving the British imperialists in what Karl Marx clearly considered an act of aggression against the United States. In contrast, a black slave who chose to confront slavery suffered. In Huang's view, it was a credit to William Foster, the leading American communist, that when he wrote his book, The Negro People in American History, he did not bother to discuss Hildreth and his work.⁷

Soon after the appearance of Huang's article in Dushu, her own book, An Outline History of the United States, was reviewed in the journal. The reviewer, Deng Shusheng, was an editor by profession who also wrote frequently on the United States and who had the ill fortune of being labelled a "rightist" in 1957. Deng took a critical look at Huang's recently published book. Deng made a point of comparing this work to a similar book of Huang's published before the Cultural Revolution. One glaring difference, Deng pointed out, was the treatment of certain historical figures. Americans such as Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln about whom Huang wrote extensively in her earlier work, were all but absent in the new book, found only in footnotes. On the other hand, Americans such as John Brown and Eugene Debs figured prominently in her new history. Deng considered the imbalance unacceptable. He asked: Can we Chinese possibly write a history of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 with only
a nod to Dr. Sun Yat-sen? Deng urged Chinese scholars to eradicate all the ill effects of the Cultural Revolution and to be less doctrinaire in presenting America.

In the same fashion, Deng examined Liu Zoucang's *A History of the American Civil War*, another of the few works on the United States that had recently appeared. Professor Liu had been working on the book since the 1950s, but the chronic political turmoil prevented him from completing the project until the end of the Mao era. The work bore marks of its tempestuous history, Deng said. Deng took issue in particular with what he considered to be Liu's effort to discount President Lincoln. For instance, Liu emphasized that in issuing the Declaration of Emancipation, Lincoln had "doubtful motives and was largely pressed into action by circumstances." As in his criticism of Huang's work, Deng implored his fellow scholars to overcome political rigidity and do America justice.

It was not easy, however, for some Chinese to let go of their old impressions of America, which had been integrated into their way of thinking. Thus, when the word came that Walt Whitman, whom the Chinese had acclaimed as a model spokesman for working Americans, might have been less than puritanical in his personal life, some Chinese refused to accept the idea. Writing in the June 1979 issue of *Dushu*, Huangwu, a literary critic, categorically denied such charges, defending the reputation of Whitman as a highly
ethical man who would not utter even one word that might offend a grandmother.12

But, even at the time when Dushu was wrestling China's Monster Past, it had already started to look into the future. With vigor and enthusiasm, the journal undertook to broaden the Chinese vision on the United States by introducing American works hitherto unknown to the Chinese, particularly literary works which allowed greater liberty of interpretation. Ambiguity was no small advantage at a time when China's political chill lingered.

Some Chinese critics, for instance, made heroic efforts to decode modernism in American literature, which up to the 1970s had been condemned as a sign of decadence. In the September 1980 issue of Dushu, Qiu Xiaolong took on Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily," of which two Chinese translations had been published during the past year. What is the point, Qiu asked, of a story about a woman who for decades sleeps beside her lover's skeleton? In his answer to the question, Qiu sought to enlighten the Chinese on the intricacies of post-Freudian literature.13 Shi Xianrong, for his part, tackled "neo-surrealism" in American poetry. This latter undertaking did not appear to be very successful, however, for at the end of his article, Shi basically acknowledged that he actually did not know for sure how neo-surrealism differed from old-fashioned surrealism.14 But Chinese critics usually managed to draw a
message out of such media. For instance, in Terry Stokes's weird and irreverent Boning the Dreamer, Cheng Bukui saw the theme of rebellion against the capialist oppression of man.  

In the field of more traditional fiction the Chinese had a somewhat steadier footing. Here, Dushu's reviewers focused on contemporary works, for the Chinese had long been familiar with certain American writers like Mark Twain and Upton Sinclair. Gracing the pages of Dushu at this time were names such as Isaac Singer, James Michener, Irwin Shaw, Joyce Oates, and Herman Wouk, among others. Strangely enough, when Dushu first introduced and reviewed these authors, few of their works were actually available in Chinese and were thus out of the reach of most Chinese. In time this situation changed, but for a short while Dushu was ahead of the works it evaluated and its reviews were as original as the originals.

Of the American novels brought to the attention of the Chinese in this way, the most celebrated were those that "realistically" depicted daily life in contemporary America. The Chinese evidently held steadfast their belief in the educational value of fiction. A particularly popular novelist at the time was Arthur Hailey, who, although technically a Canadian, gained fame with his detailed presentations of various lines of work and life in the United States--Airport, Hotel, Wheels and The Moneychangers.
--all of which Chinese publishers rushed to their readers. One of Dushu's reviewers introduced Hailey in the December 1982 issue by remarking:

Have you never been in the "Golden State" of California? Never had a glimpse of the "motor city" Detroit? Then you must read Arthur Hailey. ... If Dreiser's America was suffering from a high fever, Hailey's America is agonizing in the ensuing cold that penetrates the very soul of America and freezes her light out.16

Similarly, in the May 1982 issue of Dushu, while writing about a list of "books of the year" compiled by Time magazine, Zhu Shida took the chosen works to be a true index of "America's spiritual world."17 On the Time list were, among others, John Irving's Hotel New Hampshire, John Updike's Rabbit Is Rich, Philippe Aries's The Hour of Our Death, and Diana Trilling's Mrs. Harris: The Death of the Scarsdale Diet Doctor. All these works, Zhu noted, convey a "poignant feeling of confusion, desolation and helplessness."18

Thus, by certain ironic logic, Dushu, which had set out to crusade for the freedom to read, often found itself reading America in the old, predictable way. But this does not mean that Dushu had been marking time on the same spot;
progress had indeed been made. Maybe the Chinese critics were drawing the same old conclusions, but they were doing so only after they had conducted some investigation, some reading; and as long as they were reading, there was the hope that they would advance. In short, in its early years, Dushu started a tradition of actually examining the United States. The process would build upon itself, and the rapidly changing conditions in China soon broadened the Chinese intelligentsia's view of America.

II

If literature was the focus of Dushu's investigation of America in the journal's first few years, after 1982 or 1983 there arrived a period when the key words in the journal appeared to be science and technology. Two major developments in China seemed to have contributed to this tendency. For one thing, by this time, the economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping had generated a great popular euphoria for a modernized China, a euphoria that also infected Chinese intellectuals. Under the new circumstances, literary talk suddenly sounded rather lame and irrelevant; now it was time to get practical, to participate in the great enterprise of modernization.

Equally important in producing the shift in the Chinese
intelligentsia's primary interest were political
developments in the country, particularly the "anti-
spiritual pollution" campaign focused on Western influence,
which the hardliners in the Chinese government had concocted
and which culminated in late 1983. The moralistic stance
adopted by the hardliners made it impossible for the
reformers to meet the conservatives head on, and the best
thing they could do was to outflank them. The reformers,
therefore, avoided moralistic politics and concentrated
their forces on the relatively safe ground of science and
technology. From here they could drum for the cause of
modernization without confronting the cultural
conservatives.

This was when America's image in Dushu improved
significantly. Insofar as Dushu focused on literature,
negative views of America prevailed, for the simple reason
that most writers thrive on the darker side of human
existence. Science and technology were a different story,
however, free from overt cultural and political agitation.
In October 1981, Dushu published an article celebrating the
launching of the Chinese edition of the Scientific American,
a Sino-American joint venture. The Dushu article pointed
out that the origin of the project went back to a talk
between Chairman Mao and the Chinese-American physicist and
Nobel laureate, Dr. Yang Zhengning, in 1972. After almost
ten long years, the idea discussed by Mao and Yang had
finally come to fruition. *Dushu* reported this development in an article titled "Science Has No National Boundaries."19

Clearly the implied sanction by Mao of science without national boundaries was invoked to justify China's new liaison with the outside world, the United States included. This was an effective tactic for the reformers to use against the hardliners, and *Dushu* would resort to it again and again. For instance, in February 1984, fighting the mighty wave of the "anti-liberalization" campaign, the editor of *Dushu* told a story about Lenin to its readers. On the eve of the October Revolution, it seems, Lenin came across a book on agriculture in the United States by someone named Haywood. After the Bolshevik victory, Lenin remembered that book and had it published, and he kept copies of it on his desk for the Soviet officials who visited him. Even after he fell seriously ill and was drifting toward death, Lenin asked that more materials on the subject be collected from abroad. The official charged with the job, however, was a bureaucrat who "rarely read and had never heard of the book," and he let Lenin down. The editor then drove his point home:

What we see here is a great far-sighted revolutionary who was truly concerned with the future, who ardently searched out everything worthy in the whole world, and who strove to create "a new landscape" for his own
country.\textsuperscript{20}

By the early 1980s, \textit{Dushu} had identified a number of Haywoods for China. Prominent among them were two American best-selling authors, Alvin Toffler and John Naisbitt, whose respective works, \textit{The Third Wave} and \textit{Megatrends}, appeared in 1980 and 1982. Both Toffler and Naisbitt were technomessiahs who envisioned a human society revolutionized by the introduction of new technologies, and their preaching soon caught the imagination of many Chinese in a big way. Toffler and Naisbitt arrived in China at the right time, a time when the whole nation thirsted for modernization, and, to many Chinese, Toffler and Naisbitt's teachings seemed to contain the secret of success for China: if only China would pursue the New Technological Revolution properly, the country could somehow skip the dusty and dirty Industrial Revolution and ride the "third wave" and "megatrends" directly into the postindustrial age.

In other words, Toffler and Naisbitt's futuristic vision and can-do spirit drove the modernization craze of the Chinese to a fever pitch, and the \textit{Dushu} cohort were among the earliest crusaders for a new technological revolution in China. In November 1981, just one year after the appearance of \textit{The Third Wave} in America, \textit{Dushu} set its eye on the phenomenon and started to run excerpts from the book.\textsuperscript{21} The same issue of the journal also published
results of a symposium, organized by Dushu, on the confluence of the natural sciences and social sciences.\textsuperscript{22} In October 1983, one year after the American publication of Megatrends and at the height of China’s "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign, Dushu brought out excerpts from Naisbitt’s work.\textsuperscript{23} Other pieces on the topic followed, including a two-part article by Yang Mu in the February and March 1984 issues, in which Yang evaluated the Toffler-Naisbitt thesis in the Chinese context. While carefully toeing the official line by noting the difference between the future envisioned by Toffler and Naisbitt and that predicted by Karl Marx, Yang called upon his fellow countrymen to give an ear to what Toffler-Naisbitt had to say. If China disregards the new technological revolution that is taking place and does business as usual, Yang wrote, the country is doomed to lag behind the West forever. “On the other hand, if we heed the new trend and adjust our technological strategy accordingly, we can greatly reduce the time needed for us to catch up with the developed nations.”\textsuperscript{24}

By now few Chinese were prepared to argue against such an estimate. Among the unlikely converts to the Toffler-Naisbitt cause was Xia Yan, an accomplished writer and one-time cultur czar of Communist China, now in his eighties. As Xia Yan himself reported in a Dushu piece, he kept a copy of The Third Wave on his desk and did not hesitate to
discuss with his visitors "the fifth generation computer" or "genetic engineering." Dushu also seemed to be practicing what it was preaching. In his Endnote to the January 1984 issue, the editor employed a technical vocabulary then fashionable to speak of Dushu's role in the "information society" ("merely a carrier of information"). Then, in the March 1984 issue, the editor explained the motive behind its introduction of Toffler and Naisbitt:

The rapid progress of human society and the unprecedented expansion of knowledge have made it possible for us to go beyond fantasizing about the future and actually predict it, thus readying ourselves for the time to come.

This same obsession with development brought Dushu to promote another American author, Thomas S. Kuhn, the historian of science, about whom Dushu published half a dozen articles in the two years from 1982 to 1984. The Chinese were fascinated by Kuhn's idea concerning the "structure of scientific revolutions," which became a focal point in the discussion on the causes of China's stagnation in modern times. Yang Yang, for example, wrote in Dushu to compare Kuhn to Liang Qichao, the leading Chinese scholar and statesman at the turn of the century. In his Qingdai xueshu qilun, or Intellectual Trends of the Qing Dynasty,
Liang traces the rise and fall of certain Chinese intellectual schools, primarily Confucian, from the 17th through the 19th century, and he suggests four stages of development, each with its own what Kuhn would have defined as paradigm, Yang noted. Kuhn and Liang wrote on quite different subjects—science and intellectual trends, respectively—but they made very similar observations and thus corroborated each other. Yang commented: "This is perhaps the so-called consensus of the wise." 29

It is obvious that the Chinese interpreted Kuhn very liberally, pushing him well beyond history of science. "It is only when Kuhn superimposes his picture of scientific progress on broader social history," Ji Shuli wrote in Dushu, "that his work shines before us in full colors." 30 To the Chinese, Kuhn's "structure of scientific revolutions" denoted not only a mechanism of the scientific community but also one of the larger political, economic, and social environment. 31 The implication of Ji's thesis was clear: China failed in modern times not because the Chinese were stupid but because Chinese society was not organized properly. Thus Kuhn, the historian of science, became the vehicle for a not-so-subtle social critique.

The Chinese were not the first to turn Kuhn into a social critic, but their eagerness in this regard was extraordinary. Another example of this eagerness is the attention accorded to Edward O. Wilson, the American
entomologist known for his book, *Sociobiology: the New Synthesis*. When Wilson first brought forward his theory of hybrid sociology and biology in 1975, he caused a stir in America's intellectual circles; a group of scientists wrote to the *New York Review of Books* and accused him of advocating racist gene-determinism, a story that made a cover story of the *Time* magazine. However, when, in March 1985, Li Kunfeng reviewed Wilson's work for *Dushu*, he seemed to be oblivious of the original controversy surrounding the book; instead, his mind was on Wilson's contribution to the "unity of sciences," a "Great Enterprise" in Li's view. Li lamented what he perceived to be the poverty of social sciences—"mediocre, banal, timid and despondent," having fallen far behind natural sciences. The so-called social sciences needed a big injection of scientific spirit, Li believed, and he went on to say:

> Today, science has yet to enter many fields of human life, where it has been brutally excluded. . . . And, wherever science is absent, theology thrives. And modern theology, which often disguises itself as science, reduces society into ignorance, backwardness and regression.

This critique, which seems to have drifted rather far from Edward Wilson, was, of course, a veiled attack on the
dominant Marxist influence in China. Many Chinese in the mid-1980s understood the reasons for Li's bitterness. The truth is, by this time, the obsession with science and technology on the part of many Chinese had been pushed aside by a new interest. The attention was no longer on the power of science and technology but on, to use Kuhn's term, a "structure"--a proper social and political system without which science and technology could not fully assert themselves. This prompted Dushu to take another fresh look at America.

III

Writing in the August 1984 issue of Dushu, the journal's editor declared his intention to encourage discussion on economic reform, which he had so far found lacking. Change in real life starts with change in our way of thinking, observed the editor, and one way to induce change in our way of thinking is "to consider China . . . in comparison with the outside world." This Endnote not only identified a major concern of the Chinese intelligentsia in the mid-1980s but also proposed an approach to the issue.

In the mid-1980s China was struggling with the nation's economic structure--the issue of a planned economy versus the free market. Since the onset of Deng's reforms in 1979
the Chinese government had allowed and encouraged individual initiatives. As a result, modest private and cooperative enterprises mushroomed across the country, forming a small but robust free market. All this, however, had taken place in a theoretical gray area as the Chinese state doggedly held on to communist doctrinal fundamentals. The obvious contradiction was torturing some logical minds in the country, many of whom wanted to see China make greater strides away from socialism and toward a free market.

Interestingly enough, the Chinese with this intention were inclined to downplay and obscure the distinction between the two economic systems. This seemed to be the case with Wang Yizhou when he, in the May 1985 issue of Dushu, introduced a book by American economists Egon Neuberger and Duffy Williams, Comparative Economic System: A Decision-Making Approach, recently published in Chinese. In their comparative study of economic systems, Wang observed, Neuberger and Williams paid little attention to the ideological divisions of capitalism, socialism and communism; instead, they concentrated on certain factors common to all economic systems and investigated how they functioned in different environments—factors such as decision-making, information, and motivation, known together as DIM. This was the way to go, applauded Wang, whose article was titled "From ISM to DIM."

Effacing the boundary between socialism and capitalism
naturally opened the door to some practices of the free market. Once the separation between the two systems had been obliterated, all ideas and measures could then be freely explored for their technical merits—that is if one accepted the notion that no more than technical differences existed between Marxian socialism and ideas of John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, and even Milton Friedman.

Keynes was no stranger to the Chinese academia; we have seen the ugly battle fought over him in 1957. Ever since then, Keynes had been condemned and denounced in China, although it was not quite clear what he was guilty of. The official line stated that Keynes was a banal bourgeois economist who attempted futilely to save the doomed capitalist system, but in reality the fierce hostility toward Keynes seems to have arisen primarily from the unpleasant notion that Keynes, or Keynesian thinkers, more than anyone or anything else, saved the United States from the Great Depression and contributed to America's postwar prosperity and power.

As China entered its reform decade, Keynes's reputation in the country started to improve; some Chinese scholars began to see Keynes in a much different light. To them, Keynes was a master economist whose success in blending the free market and state intervention was manifest in the post-Depression United States. Writing in the March 1985 issue of Dushu, Liang Xiaoming, therefore, called for a
"Reappraisal of the Keynesian Revolution." In terms of macro-management, Liang argued, "Keynesian ideas as well as the Keynesian policies of some capitalist nations contain many lessons for us." \(^{38}\)

It is noteworthy that while in the American context Keynes appeared as a leftish economist who advocated a greater role for the state, in China he was used to argue for the shift from socialism to a free market. Don't worry, Chinese reformists seemed to be saying, Keynes had long shown the feasibility of a hybrid economy.

It was in the same spirit that the Chinese interpreted Joseph Schumpeter. As in the case of Keynes, the socialist elements in Schumpeter made him a "relevant" economist to the Chinese. But Schumpeter's "socialism" was only a bridge to something else. In June 1980 *Dushu* had published an article that warned against the dangerous tendency to equate socialism with state capitalism. In 1987, when two young Chinese scholars, Zhang Weiping and Wu Xiaoying, commented in *Dushu* on Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, they all but ignored the socialist element in his thought and went directly to his ideas on business innovation, especially the concept of "creative destruction." "Schumpeter's prediction of the inevitable emergence of socialism notwithstanding, . . . his 'innovation theory' deserves our greatest attention," Zhang and Wu stated. \(^{39}\) In fact the two critics were so impressed
by Schumpeter's discussion of the critical role of entrepreneurs in economic development that they declared that the time had come for China to produce her own Fords and Rockefellers.40

Not surprisingly, those who could so decisively discard socialism did not find it too hard to make connections with an economist such as Milton Friedman, whose Free to Choose and Capitalism and Freedom were published in China in 1982 and 1986, respectively. To be sure, China was still a socialist country, and wholesale adoption of Friedman's system was out of the question. Thus, Nan Shizhong's review of Friedman's Free to Choose in the April 1984 issue of Dushu was titled "Not So Free to Choose." In it, Nan dismissed Friedman's explanation of the Great Depression as "philistine and bourgeois,"41 insisting that the "invisible hand" could no longer manage today's corporate capitalist economy.42 At the same time, however, Nan expressed his great admiration of many elements in Friedman's work, and in particular he commended Friedman's assault on the "welfare state." Friedman, Nan wrote, showed that "whatever domains the government steps in--be it social security, education, medical care, and so on--inefficiency, high cost, corruption, negligence and lethargy ensue."43

Nan's applause for Friedman was doubtlessly driven by his observation of China's own problematic economic system, although in his review he never explicitly made the
connection. Two years later, in 1986, Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom* was reviewed in *Dushu*, and the Chinese critics, Wu and Zhang who had applauded Schumpeter's idea on "creative destruction," were more forthright. For instance, in discussing Friedman's criticism of public housing in the United States, Wu and Zhang highlighted problems in China's own housing system:

... we have been singing to the tune of 'to each according to his labor' for over thirty years now, but our way of providing shelter, a fundamental for human existence. ... has never reflected that principle [and we have had] ... dismal results. This testifies to Friedman's belief: You cannot force equality to occur; in trying to do so, you will only sacrifice efficiency and freedom.  

To rectify this situation, Wu and Zhang suggested Friedman's concept of "customer sovereignty." Indeed, they fashioned their own slogan—one somewhat reminiscent of the resounding "Long live Chairman Mao!" during the Cultural Revolution—"Long live the customer!"  

In similar fashion, Wu and Zhang, now obviously *Dushu*'s principal writers on economics, went on championing other neo-conservative economists, under the overall title "Dialogues on Economic Liberalism."
Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty*, they agreed with the Reaganomists that persistent poverty exists only in a stagnant society and that economic growth can crack most of the hard nuts of poverty. They also paid homage to James Buchanan, the Nobel laureate, whose political economics inspired Wu and Zhang to ponder economic life in terms of the individual-state relationship. Buchanan's concepts of the "economic man" and "public choice" in particular bewitched them. In fact, they believed that these ideas constituted an effective instrument not only of economic analysis, but also of social analysis generally, and they did not hesitate in applying Buchanan's ideas to their scrutiny of the Chinese society.

The dominance of public ownership in China, Wu and Zhang wrote, had long ago driven the "economic man" away from China, producing grave consequences. The absence of the "economic man" not only reduced economic efficiency; it also paralyzed the Chinese people's ability to evaluate their government as an economic entity, that is, its cost-effectiveness. The Chinese thus never had an opportunity to make a true, rational "public choice." While in truth "the state merely results from the desire of traders to reduce the cost of their transactions," stated Zhang and Wu, "We Chinese top the world in our tendency to deify the state"; hence all of China's woes.

What would be the remedy? According to Wu and Zhang's
reading of Buchanan, it would be no more, and no less, than the dismantling of China's public ownership so as to create "economic men," who, as rational beings conscious of their own interests, would in turn make an enlightened "public choice" to create a responsive government. This was, then, not simply a proposition for economic change but a call for political revolution.

IV

One can only understand the significance of Wu and Zhang's column on Buchanan fully with the knowledge that it appeared in Dushu in January 1987, just a few weeks after a series of student demonstrations had rocked the nation's capital and resulted in the downfall of the Communist Party's General Secretary, Hu Yaobang. There can be no doubt that politics loomed large in the mind of the Chinese intelligentsia at this time.

Anxiety over the nation's political life had been consistently rising in the one or two years preceding the student movement at the end of 1986. Deng Xiaoping's reforms had set off an economic boom in China, but they had also caused new problems. Now, neither market mechanisms, nor state planners had full control over the country's economic life. The chaotic situation was only worsened by
high inflation and widespread corruption. Conservatives and reformers started to point fingers at one another, the former accusing the latter of throwing the country into turmoil, and the latter attributing China's problems to the incompleteness of the reform, which they ascribed to the obstruction of the hardliners. In order to ensure the success of Deng's economic program, the reform camp argued, political changes must take place. One example of this view was put forward by Su Shaozhi, a political scientist, in the September 1986 issue of Dushu. In the piece Su proposed political modernization as an addition to the so-called "Four Modernizations"--the modernization of China's industry, agriculture, science and technology and national defense--which ever since the end of the Mao era had been the nation's leading catchword. Efforts like Su's only further infuriated the conservatives, and now there was no escape from an eventual political show-down.

Reflecting this condition in the country, Dushu, in its coverage of America, displayed a growing interest in political history and political philosophy. One influential writer in this respect was Zhao Yifan, a young Chinese who had recently finished graduate study in American literature at Harvard University and who had then returned to work at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. For his first contribution to Dushu, which he penned in December 1986 at the height of the student unrest, Zhao chose to
write about the emergence of American party politics, as described in Richard Hofstadter's *The Idea of a Party System*. In contrast to Chinese conventional wisdom, noted Zhao, party politics had not always been an accepted and integral feature of American life; indeed, many of the revered American Founding Fathers had vehemently denounced partisan politics, which they believed would ruin their young Republic.

In other words, the party system now so central to American democracy emerged somewhat "unexpectedly." Some of the best minds of the time opposed it, and only under a rather modest and average president, Van Buren, did the critical principle of "legitimate opposition" finally prevail. Did the protesting students constitute a legitimate opposition crucial to democracy in China? Were the conservatives in Beijing, well intentioned as they might be, fighting against an inevitable historic trend? Zhao left these issues for his readers to ponder.

If Zhao's Hofstadter was a high-brow authority in *Dushu*, another American spoke in a more popular voice. He was Hendrik Willem van Loon, a best-selling history writer active in the early decades of this century. In 1985, Sanlian Press, *Dushu*'s parent company, brought out a book that Van Loon had written and published in the 1920s, *Tolerance*, a popular history of persecutions and suppressions from ancient Greece to the time of Tom Paine.
In October of 1985, Dushu carried excerpts from Tolerance. Commenting on Van Loon's long absence from China (Tolerance had been published there before 1949 but became unavailable thereafter), the editor wrote:

Now someone has dug him [Van Loon] out and has, from his voluminous works, chosen Tolerance in particular to publish. This may just be accidental, but in any case it will serve a good purpose."

"Accidental" it was certainly not. Tolerance soon became a fashionable and much-talked about work among college students and other restless young Chinese, and Dushu worked to maintain this political momentum. In April 1986, Zhu Houze, the head of the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department, delivered a notable speech at a national conference on ideological work, in which the liberal-minded and outspoken official emphasized the importance of preserving a relaxed intellectual atmosphere. At this time the power struggle between the reformers and conservatives within the government had entered a critical stage and Zhu's intrepid speech was clearly an effort by the reform camp to rally support. Dushu answered the call. The June issue of the journal published Zhu's speech as the leading piece, and it was immediately followed by a weighty article on Van Loon's Tolerance. In their article, Chen
Kuide and Chen Jiade explained to the significance of Van Loon for China today:

It does not take much to imagine the kind of feeling that the book awakens in contemporary Chinese—the people who have experienced the 'ten years of cultural disaster.' They must be overwhelmed by mixed emotions, and perhaps by an indescribable fear. And that is the so-called 'new meaning of old words.'"\(^5\)

In the event that the "new meaning of old words" had not come across loudly and clearly enough, the *Dushu* editor, in his Endnote to the June issue, linked Van Loon's book with the speech of the liberal official Zhu:

Van Loon . . . observed that intolerance occurred in the past, is taking place now, and we can only hope it will never happen again from now on. What is the situation in China in the 1980s? And what is in store for China in the future? To help our readers to reflect, we present comrade Zhu Houze's speech.\(^5\)

It was bold of *Dushu* to liken a communist theoretician to Van Loon, but not bold enough in the eye of some readers. In response to a *Dushu* endnote, which had stated that older people, because of their experience, tended to be more
tolerant, a reader argued in a Letter to the Editor (October 1986) that older people are often too sure of themselves and therefore conservative:

... those high-positioned, majestic seniors immerse themselves in the past; they refuse to consider new lifestyles, new ways of thinking, new ideas springing out of new historic circumstances; they implacably expect future generations to live in the way they have mapped out ... This definitely stifles people's minds and amounts to intolerance.55

This might simply have been a youth venting adolescent anger but for the fact that at the time students across the country were rising up against the old guards in Beijing. The outburst took place two months later, in December 1986, when student protests shattered the seeming political serenity of China. The conservatives, however, managed to hold their ground, and, to the surprise of the reformist camp, the call for swift political change only brought down the liberal-minded General Secretary Hu Yaobang. Gone was also Zhu Houze, the ideology chief, whom Dushu had applauded for his tolerant attitude.

The conservatives did not win a complete victory in late 1986 and early 1987, but they succeeded in blunting the drive for swift political change. With the moderate Zhao
Ziyang as the Communist Party's new General Secretary, a more delicate political situation set in. In the liberal camp, flamboyant agitation gave way to a more pensive mood. *Dushu*'s writings on America reflected this new disposition.

For instance, Zhao Yifan, who had earlier written about Hofstadter, continued to introduce American political thought to Chinese readers, but now with a somewhat different twist. Previously Zhao had suggested that perhaps China should first try out the principle of "legitimate opposition," at least first in academia if not in politics right away. The next time Zhao wrote about Hofstadter, in the March 1987 issue of *Dushu*, he chose to examine the historian's views on reform. Surveying American history as delineated by Hofstadter, Zhao identified three major dichotomies: radicalism vs. conservatism, anti-intellectualism vs. science, and morality vs. reason. According to Zhao, Hofstadter's story showed clearly that while it was the radicals, the anti-intellectualists and the moralists who initiated the major reform movements in America, almost invariably the moderates brought these political movements to fruition, the moderates who effectively brokered between the two sides of the divides. In other words, people like Wilson and the Roosevelts, not Bryan, had the future with them.

Zhao's new mood proved to be indicative of a larger trend in China's political and intellectual circles. With
increasing visibility and frequency a new term kept popping up in the Chinese media—jing ying zhengzhi, or "elite politics." This concept implied that popular democracy was no answer to China's problems, and that only an enlightened elite with real power could straighten China out. Among those pushing the "new" doctrine were some young and ambitious scholar-politicians who for some time now had been active in China's economic reform under the patronage of the state's former Premier and current General Secretary of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, people who had come to occupy important positions in the government. Operating in the middle ground between the Party's old guards and the bellowing students, these "inside" reformers naturally found "elite politics" an appealing idea.

Toward this new clamor for "elitism" Dushu seemed to have an ambiguous attitude. In the April 1987 issue of Dushu, noting that some people had characterized the journal as a part of the so-called "elite culture," the editor said, in effect, "Thanks but no thanks." He did, however, express the journal's aspiration to serve as a "bridge to the 'elite.'" 59

The Dushu editor's reluctance to characterize his journal as "elite" is quite understandable since a publication might well not want to claim to be exclusive and shut the door on a larger audience. On the other hand, the actual contents of Dushu did not demonstrate any substantial
disagreement with the notion of "elite politics." Zhao Yifan, continuing his well-written essays on American political thought, moved on from Hofstadter to discuss Alfred Chandler, Jr.'s *The Visible Hand*, Alvin Gouldner's *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, and C. Wright Mills's *White Collar* and *The Elite Power*. All these works shared one thing in common: a clear emphasis on the political role of an enlightened middle class or upper middle class. This sort of politics obviously differed from flag-waving, street-fighting populist rebellion. As Zhao intimated, newcomers in Chinese politics would have to build up their strength gradually and peacefully, as a part of the natural maturing of a modern society, and thus achieve a smokeless revolution. The only flaw in the scheme was that there existed no sizable middle class in China comparable to that of the United States. This was no small shortcoming and it threatened to turn a nicely designed peaceful revolution into a mere recognition of authoritarian politics.

The idea of authoritarian modernization had its American voice in the writings of the well-known political scientist, Samuel Huntington, who stood out in *Dushu* at this time. As Chinese intellectuals read him, Huntington, in his *Political Order in Changing Societies*, put political stability above democratization. An authoritarian government that can foster economic growth was, in
Huntington's view, far more desirable than one whose clumsy experiments with democracy only caused further confusion and chaos. The lesson that China could learn from Huntington, as one Chinese wrote in *Dushu*, was quite simple: "Forget Utopia." A ghost haunting China's modernization efforts, the writer claimed, had been the Chinese people's utopian craze; they were so taken by the idea of democracy that they were far too fanatic and impatient for their own good. The failed student movement of 1986 testified to the claim, the writer asserted. In the same vein, another Huntington advocate in *Dushu* called for a "powerful government" for China.

But even these self-appointed realists must have been shocked by the great violence that came in June 1989 when the Chinese government sent tanks in to crush the so-called "Democracy Movement." One Chinese, writing in *Dushu* on Huntington's *The Crisis of Democracy* as the Tiananmen Square tragedy unfolded, seemed unable to choose between Huntington's "political realism," which he appreciated in theory and its real implications in China, which were horrifying. "I put aside my pen," he wrote, "and turn over another page. It is going to be a long night."
The melancholy of Chinese intellectuals in the late 1980s did not result from political frustrations alone; cultural anxiety built up over the years also took a heavy toll. In spite of all the problems they witnessed, the early 1980s had been essentially a time of optimism, a period when the Chinese maintained great faith in the prospect of reform. As time went on, however, increasingly complicated problems in economic and political reorganization daunted many Chinese. Moreover, the very achievements of the reform created difficulties: a widening gap between rich and poor; a quickened and uncertain pace of life; a competitive spirit that eroded the traditional Chinese emphasis on harmony and cooperation and so forth. These problems wore off some of the luster of the reform and began to raise the demoralizing question of whether all the trouble was worth it. Chinese intellectuals pondering on America were not free of the influence of the melancholy atmosphere.

Dushu, always sensitive to new intellectual trends, took part in the search for meaning—an effort partly carried out through its continuous reflection on the United States. Back in 1982, when a Dushu writer reviewed Terry Stokes's poems, he could light-heartedly join Stokes in deriding the banal bourgeois values of the Reader's
Digest; now, several years later, a number of Chinese were no longer disposed to dismiss cultural conservatism so easily. In fact, some would embrace it like a drowning man clinging to a log. Writing in the wake of the 1986 student movement, Zhao Yifan lauded the "balanced" educational philosophy of Harvard's president Derek Bok and blamed Clark Kerr, the former president of the University of California, for what he considered America's ill-fated student activism in the 1960s. "Conservatism makes sense in its own way," Zhao decided.

In other American cultural critics Zhao discovered further support for cultural conservatism. In the case of Lionell Trilling, Zhao traced Trilling and his fellow New York intellectuals' footsteps leading to the "vital center"—from their early Marxist years to their moderation in the sixties, and from the alienated Jewish culture to their role in mainstream American life. Zhao summed up the lesson he learned from Trilling:

Traditional liberals revere reason and progress, and they are inclined to mark a clear and positive line between light and darkness, order and confusion. But we should remember that any kind of absolute will of man . . . , out of its wholistic impulse to explain everything and embrace the whole world, could damage human civilization.
The solution, according to Zhao, was to integrate various cultural elements, liberal as well as conservative.67

With such a disposition, Zhao naturally agreed with Daniel Bell who professed to economic socialism, political liberalism and cultural conservatism. In his Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Zhao wrote, Bell correctly diagnosed the cultural disease of capitalism as the disjoinning of its two original impetuses: acquisitiveness and religions. The former was still going strong while the latter had dwindled significantly. To cure this particular affliction, Zhao noted, Bell proposed the creation of what would amount to a new "religion." Could Bell's New Religion work? Zhao was not sure, but he certainly sympathized with Bell's lament over the problem of a "spiritual crisis."68

Zhao Yifan was not the first Chinese in Dushu to identify religion as a key cultural underpinning of capitalism. As early as 1985 Dushu had come to see the importance of Max Weber, and had organized a symposium on the renowned sociologist.69 Dushu then followed this up with the publication of excerpts from The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.70 In so doing Dushu helped focus Chinese intellectuals' attention on the cultural and religious aspects of capitalist development. Chinese intellectuals thus arrived in a new domain, from which their Marxist training had long kept them away.
Obviously, as the free market expanded in China and traditional communal values were bumped out of the way, many Chinese began to wonder what would be left to hold society together, and, against the backdrop of China's growing economic, political, and social frustrations, they found in Western-style spirituality unanticipated possibilities. After examining the case of the West, some Chinese came to the conclusion that a society does not have to be communal in order to be good or just--on the condition that a higher moral authority holds sway. This seemed to be the case with Zhou Guoping who wrote about Ralph Emerson in *Dushu* and declared that "Every Man Is a Universe by Himself."^{71}

Others also discovered Protestant Christianity. In the October 1986 issue of *Dushu*, Xu Haixin reviewed *The Puritans in America*, an anthology edited by Alan Heimert and Andrew Delbanco. Xu paid special homage to Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson, marveling at their whole-hearted devotion to a higher being, even though it cost them the good will of their community. Puritanism, Xu observed, emphasized man's inadequacy as well as his independence, and it demanded the submission of individuals not to the state but to a social order created by individuals committed to a higher moral principle. The Puritans were thus "constantly challenging themselves, challenging evil, and challenging their community," and "in their intolerance of the three lies the hope and inspiration for man and his society."^{72}
Zhao Yifan, in his investigation of American Puritanism, followed historian Perry Miller. Reviewing Miller's *The New England Mind* for *Dushu*, Zhao outlined the origin and transformation of American Puritanism and its role in shaping the American character. He thus presented a side of America rather poorly understood by the Chinese. It would be wrong to assume that American's were simply frivolous pleasure-seekers, he wrote; rather, the average American was "a two-headed being--the wild Bacchus and the gloomy Puritan in one".73 "How could this world carry on," asked Zhao, "with only Baccus but not the Puritan?"74

Other Chinese scholars had similar feelings. Toward the end of the decade, one frequent presence in *Dushu* was someone with the pseudonym Momo, "the silent one," who wrote on religion. In a piece in the January 1989 issue of *Dushu*, Momo commended American theologian and philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr's "Christian realism." Sermons and prayers alone would not eliminate social injustice, Momo acknowledged; on the other hand, history demonstrated time and again that while political movements can temporarily rectify wrongs in the society, sooner or later the political man reaches a point of diminishing returns. Worse, positive actions--reform movements and revolutions--often went wrong and resulted in utter destruction. Without faith, Momo asserted, no lasting peace is possible; hence the value of spiritual political activism as exemplified by Reinhold
Momo titled his article on Niebuhr "No Illusion, Nor Despair." Yet, compared to the optimistic writings in *Dushu* of the positivist early 1980s, Momo's writings in the late 1980s conveyed a much more somber mood—"The Love and Fear of Our Generation;" "The Crucified Truth;" and "Should We Remain Silent before God?" Behind the thin voice of Momo and others who spoke for religion as a solution to China's problems were men much humbled by the occurrences of the past decade. But their pessimist tone also indicated the recognition of a hard fact: China was not a Christian nation, nor, for that matter, a particularly religious one. The search for similarity between America and China in this respect did not seem to go very far.

Despite such often times fruitless explorations, the journey for Chinese intellectuals through *Dushu* had been a most remarkable and enriching experience. Due to the political circumstances of China after the Cultural Revolution, China's intelligentsia had an opportunity to re-acquaint themselves with America under relatively free circumstances. Inevitably, the Chinese often observed the terrain in haste, and the impressions they acquired were often vague and fragmented. The Chinese staggered and stumbled, but in the space of ten years, they had come a long way. In their observation of America in the pages of *Dushu*, the Chinese shifted their gaze from daily life as
revealed in literature to science and technology, to
economy, to politics, and then to culture and religion,
issues relevant to conditions in their own country at the
time. The Chinese were thus confronting the experiences of
two great nations at once. In the process they explored
questions of liberalism and conservatism in different
national contexts, the relationship between
industrialization and culture, and so on. To Chinese
intellectuals of the 1980s, the search for America was also
the search for a new identity for China. In the end, they
naturally did not arrive at any definite conclusions; but by
incorporating the America experience into their discourse on
China's fate, Chinese intellectuals made their arguments far
more powerful and effective than they would have been
otherwise.
Notes

1. Li Honglin, "Dushu wu jinqu" (There should be no prohibition in reading), Dushu, no. 1 (April 1979): 7. Unless otherwise stated, citations in this chapter are from Dushu, and with the exception for the year of 1979, month and year will be used to indicate the issue of the journal referred to.

2. Zhang Shoubai, "Dushu buneng wu 'jinqu'" (It won't do to have no prohibition in reading), no. 6 (September 1979), 7.

3. Duzhe laixin (Letters to the editor), ibid., 6.

4. Ziqi, "Ziben zhuyi you shenmo ke xianmu de?" (What is there of capitalism worth our envy), no. 3 (June 1979), 9.

5. Xiao Mu, "Meiguo nanbei zhanzheng yu Piao de renshi jiazhi" (America's Civil War and the educational value of Gone with the Wind), March 1981), 54.

6. Huang Songkang, "Cong lishi de jiaodu gan Piao he Huaanle de jieri" (A historical view of Gone with the Wind and Dushu, March 1981), 55.


9. Ibid.

10. Deng Shusheng, "Lincoln zhe ge ren" (Lincoln the Man), no. 1 (January 1979), 60.

11. Ibid.

12. Huangwu, "Mantan Weiteman" (On Whitman), no. 6 (June 1979), 35.

13. Qiu Xiaolong, "


16. Yu Jianzhang, "Dayang bian" (The other side of the ocean), Dushu, December 1982, 68.


18. Ibid.

19. Li Ping "Kexue meiyou guojie" (Science has no national boundaries), October 1981, 13-18.

20. "Bianhou shuyu" (Endnote), February 1984, 155.


25. Xia Yan, "Guanyu dushu wenti de duitan" (A dialogue on reading), April 1984, 27-33.


27. "Bianhou shuyu" (Endnote), March 1984, 155.


29. Yang Yang, "Kexue geming de jiegou yu xueshu sichao de bianqian" (Scientific revolution and progress in scholarship), October 1984, 40.

30. Ji Shuli, "Kexue lishi de banlan huamian" (Great scenes in history of science), March 1982, 118.
31. Li Xinhua, "Ku'en he ta de Kexue geming de jiegou (Kuhn and his Structure of Scientific Revolution), September 1984, 24.


33. Li Kunfeng, "Kexue de tongyi shi zhishi fazhan de da qushi" (Unification of sciences is the trend), March 1985, 9.

34. Ibid., 12.

35. Ibid., 14.

36. "Bianhou shuyu" (Endnote), August 1984, 155.


38. Liang Xiaomin, "Dui 'Kaiensi geming' de zai renshi" (A second thought on the 'Keynesian revolution'), March 1985, 35.


40. Ibid., 30.

41. Nan Shizhong, "Xuanze bingbu ziyou" (Not so free to choose), Dushu, April 1984, 44.

42. Ibid, 49.

43. Ibid., 45-6.


45. [1542]


48. Ibid., 33.

49. Ibid., 35.

50. Su Shaohzi, "Zhengzhi tizhi gaige chuyi" (A preliminary discussion on political reform), September 1986, 3-7.


52. "Bianhou shuyu" (Endnote), October 1985, 158.

53. Chen Kuide and Chen Jiade, "Kuanrong zhi dao" (The way of tolerance), June 1986, 12.


55. Ibid., 159.

56. Zhao Yifan, "Huofusitade yu Meiquo zhengzhi sixiang shi" (Hofstadter and history of American political thought), January 1986, 126.

57. Zhao Yifan, "Xiangdaihua lilun yu Huoshi gaige shiguan" (Theories of modernization and Hofstadter's view on history of reforms), March 1987, 122-26.

58. Ibid., 120-22.

59. "Bianhou shuyu" (Endnote), April 1987, 160.

60. Zhao Yifan, "Qiandele yu guanli geming lilun" (Chandler and the theory of the management revolution), October 1987, 130-40; "Bailing, guanli jingying, xing jieji" (White collar, power elite, and new class), December 1987, 115-125.


62. Shen Zhongmei, "Hantingdun yu ta de qiagida zhengfu lun" (Huntington and his theory on 'powerful government'), May 1989, 73-76.

63. Gu Xi, "Minzhu yu quanwei" (Democracy and authority), June 1989, 29.

64. Cheng Bukui, "Cong Situokesi de xizuo kan Meiquo shi de qingxian" (The trend in American poetry: the case of Terry Stokes), July 1982, 118.


67. Ibid.

68. Zhao Yifan, "Dannier Beier yu dangdai ziben zhuyi wenhua piping" (Daniel Bell and cultural criticism of modern capitalism), December 1986, 108-15.


70. "Xinjiao lunli yu ziben zhuyi jingshen" (The Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism), January 1986, 135-45.

71. Zhou Guoping, "Meige ren dou shi yige yuzou" (Every man is a universe by himself), September 1987, 33.


74. Ibid., 136.

75. Momo, "Bu bao huanxiang, ye bu juewan" (No illusion, nor despair), January 1989, 114.
CONCLUSION:

AMERICA AS METAPHOR

In this study I have attempted to illustrate the way in which the Chinese perceived and interpreted the United States. More specifically, I have endeavored to demonstrate how China's political and cultural realities informed and fashioned the Chinese discourse on America. With great passion and gravity the Chinese confronted the United States because they considered representations of America to be a matter of great consequence to China—not only in terms of geopolitics, but also in terms of their search for an ideal way of life.

The Chinese were not, of course, the first people in history who, pressed by circumstances, had to reexamine, reevaluate, and reinvent their culture and institutions. This is indeed a very old story. Among the better known instances are the ancient Romans, who initially resisted but then welcomed Christianity; Peter the Great, who boldly strove to recreate Russian in the image of Western Europe; and the Japanese, China's island neighbors, who had been under Asian continental influences for centuries before they switched to a new source of cultural inspiration and achieved industrialization with astonishing speed. Even Western Europe, which led the way in marching into the
modern age, once had its self-doubts. In the eighteenth century, some of Europe's best minds, troubled by the chaos and misery surrounding them, earnestly sought information on China, which seemed to promise a rationalist solution to the religious repression and carnage that so wasted Europe. In the nineteenth century, a new experiment in human life, the United States of America, drew the attention of Europeans like the young French noble Alexis de Tocqueville. Twentieth-century China was certainly in good company in seeking a new cultural inspiration outside its own borders.

Yet the conditions under which China embarked on its quest for a "new culture" set it apart from the examples noted above. In the first place, China's search took place in the context of a radically new international order—one marked not only by the rapid acceleration of imperialism (now perpetrated by Japan as well the West) but also by two cataclysmic world wars and a titanic ideological struggle between the ardent exponents of communism and capitalism. Cultural borrowing under these circumstances had unprecedented political consequences, and politics increasingly acquired a cultural dimension.

Modern industrialism posed the most formidable cultural challenge to China since the introduction of Buddhism nearly two thousand years before. But Indian Buddhism never superseded traditional Chinese culture; rather, this alien import became heavily "sinicized" over time. The modern
West, imbued with notions of "manifest destiny" and equipped with advanced technology, would not allow itself to be so transformed, however; thus industrialization posed a far greater challenge to China than Buddhism ever had. (Li Hongzhang, the Qing dynasty's leading statesman and diplomat in the late nineteenth century, clearly understood the problem when he observed that China was experiencing the greatest change in two thousand years of history.)

In any event, China had no time for a gradual process of cultural assimilation. Nor did the Chinese have the luxury of sustained borrowing from a closely related culture. To be sure, the Japanese, who had been borrowing substantially from the Chinese for well over a thousand years, emerged as a possible modernizing model for China after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. In fact, the so-called Imperial Reforms of the early 1900s were inspired directly by the example of Japan's successful Meiji Restoration. But Japanese imperialist adventures in East Asia, which began with the colonization of Korea in 1910 and culminated in the full-scale invasion of China in the 1930s, closed off the Japanese option.

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government flirted intermittently with the German model of military modernization during the late 1920s and early 1930s and later the Chinese Communists embraced the Soviet Union as a source ideological inspiration. But Mao Zedong's vision of
the future was substantially a Chinese one, reflected in his philosophical concept of the "sinification" of Marxism and underscored by the slogan, "Let foreign matters serve China" (Yang wei Zhong yong). In spite of all its Marxist lingo, the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 marked the high water of Chinese xenophobia and of Mao's emphasis on self-reliance; only after 1978 did the People's Republic open itself up to the outside world.

It is hardly surprising, then, that Chinese attitudes toward the United States fluctuated, often wildly, during the twentieth century, and even if America had not been involved (or at least implicated) in the destructive foreign invasions and devastating civil wars that afflicted China almost continuously from 1900 onward, Chinese images of the United States would have been fragmented and contradictory. For even those viewed America as a positive model of economic progress and/or democratic reform found themselves questioning certain American values—most notably, individualism.

Although many Chinese admired the liberty that released the American people's great energy to create the most powerful nation ever seen on earth, they never did quite comprehend American individualism as a moral principle. To be sure, there were many Chinese, particularly in the early decades of this century and once again in the 1980s, who were keenly aware of Old China's moral failings—subjugation
of the individual, informal but nonetheless substantial social inequality, and innumerable other forms of injustice. But the critics of old China had a hard time with the logical redress, emancipation of the individual, which in itself did not seem to be an inspiring goal. As result, too often and too conveniently perhaps, many advocates of the liberal cause in China reverted to mass movements, which they believed would result in the emancipation of the individual on a large scale, a dream, or illusion, that never came true. Consequently there have been many Chinese who have espoused American ideals such equality and democracy, but few who have glorified individualism with as strong a sense of righteousness. It has always been hard to find a Thoreau in China.

The difficulty experienced by the Chinese with American individualism reflects a fundamental cultural difference between the two nations, one that can be represented as a contrast between Confucianism and Christianity, Protestant Christianity in particular. It would be too simplistic to attribute American individualism exclusively to the Protestant tradition of the United States, but there is no doubt that historically the proud American individual derived much of his moral confidence from Protestant Christianity and its cultural implications. Confucianism, on the other hand, made a very different world for the Chinese. In this philosophy based on proper social
relationships, the Chinese man was defined not nearly so much by his connection to a divine authority as by his associations with the people around him. A world thus constructed allowed little room for individualism, which by its very nature nature would negate the established social order. Living in such a world, the Chinese simply could not image or comprehend a kind of individualism that was more than utilitarian, that is, one that was noble and moral.

The failure of the Chinese to appreciate American individualism seems to have contributed substantially to their disdain and hostility toward the United States in the twentieth century--negative feelings that cast the political struggle with the United States in a highly moralistic light. As China got on with its Communist revolution, which in a sense merely revived and confirmed China's collective way of life, individualistic America emerged as an emblem of everything that China should not be. The Chinese government avidly fostered this impression and made it a part of a cultural language that the Chinese masses could easily comprehend.

In the 1980s, more positive views of the United States emerged in China, reminding people of the early decades of the century. Once again the Chinese--the government, the general populace, and the intelligentsia--came to appreciate, to various degrees, the American way and its implications for China. In fact, it can be said that
greater progress in Chinese understanding of the United States was made in this one decade than during the previous seventy years. Rapid economic development created an environment receptive to American ideas; the revolution in mass communication for the first time brought American directly into millions of Chinese homes, undermining the monopoly of the Chinese state and the intelligentsia on the presentation and interpretation of the United States; expanded direct contact between the two countries also saw an increasing number of Chinese travel to the United States, thus circumventing the Chinese media altogether. All in all, it appeared that the time had finally arrived when the Chinese would be able to truly understand and appreciate the American Way.

But China's experience with America in the 1980s also had a gloomy side which blended more easily into the grim past than any sort of rosy future. As we have seen, even to China of the reform era, America posed problems, with which the Chinese state, the intelligentsia and the general populace continued to grapple. The essence of the problem remained the same: many Chinese acknowledged the effectiveness of individualism in re-energizing the country's economic life, but they could not easily accept the idea that individualism could be a way of life in itself. For a society to be good, there ought to be something larger than the individual, they felt, and they
saw nothing but the lone individual in America.

This view seems to be changing, as shown by developments in China in recent years. But, given the immense historical and cultural differences between China and America, and the enormous size and inertia of the Chinese nation, it is doubtful that a fundamental transformation in China’s basic understanding and appraisal of American individualism will take place in the near future. Meanwhile, the Chinese will continue their fragmented discourse on America, for it remains a valuable metaphor in their ongoing quest for a new way of life--one between the individual and society, between tradition and modernity, and between East and West.
Notes

1. For further discussion on this subject and related issues, please see Andrew J. Nathan's Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985).

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