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"PERMANENT FRIENDS, PERMANENT INTERESTS:"
ANGLO-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

"Permanent Friends, Permanent Interests:
Anglo-American Cooperation in Naval
Intelligence During the Second World War

by

Alan Harris Bath

Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence during
the Second World War was closer and more productive than any
similar relationship between other sovereign nations in
recent history. Although thought of as a product of the
"special relationship" between the United States and the
United Kingdom, intelligence cooperation was based less on
cultural affinities and more on practical considerations of
individual advantage to the nations involved. Cooperation
grew from British initiative, based on the need to involve
the United States as deeply as possible in the battle
against Germany. It was at its most productive in the
successful battle against German U-boats in the Atlantic.
As confidence in eventual Allied victory supplanted mutual
concern for survival, cooperation gradually weakened, and
post-war national interests began to overshadow wartime
exigencies; and naval intelligence cooperation waned.
CONTENTS

Introduction: 1

Chapter I: Uneasy Cooperative Beginnings: 1917-1937. 5

Chapter II: Changing Attitudes: January 1938 - August 1940. 41

Chapter III: Forging Cooperation: September 1940 - December 1941. 92

Chapter IV: Growth of Wartime Cooperation: December 1941 - November 1942. 167

Chapter V: The Culmination: November 1942 - December 1943. 242

Chapter VI: Cracks in the Cooperative Structure: 1943. 293

Chapter VII: The Pacific - Faltering Steps: 1940 - 1941. 331

Chapter VIII: The Pacific - Victory Without Cooperation: 1942 - 1945. 388

Chapter IX: Twilight of Cooperation: January 1944 - May 1945. 445

Chapter X: Cooperation in Retrospect. 483

Appendix I: Intelligence and the Intelligence Cycle. 497

Bibliography: Sources - A Personal View. 501
INTRODUCTION

*Nations don't have permanent friends or permanent enemies, they only have permanent interests...*

Chaim Herzog,
President of Israel

Anglo-American cooperation during the Second World War has been characterized as "not only very close, but perhaps unique in the history of war."¹ Recent writers, however, have pointed out that while Sir Winston Churchill may have seen this cooperation as the result of a "special relationship" between the British Commonwealth and the United States — "the political expression of an underlying cultural unity" — it was affected more by the political differences and the economic rivalries that marked the shift of power from England to America than by cultural influences.² This study will examine the history of the development and the interactions of both American and British naval intelligence before and during the Second World War to determine the extent to which the concept of the "special relationship" was present in the field of intelligence — particularly naval intelligence — and to
identify the political, military, and human factors that either aided or hindered the process of cooperation. To what extent did the external influences affecting naval intelligence cooperation mirror those driving broad strategic policy? Were these external influences the same for both nations and did they operate with equal force on both partners in the alliance? Did the process of cooperation proceed at the same pace in all theaters of the war? To what extent did intra-governmental rivalries affect Allied intelligence efforts? Since British naval intelligence had time to make mistakes and to grow in the two years prior to America's entry into the war, to what extent did the U.S. Navy's intelligence effort profit from British experience?

During the Second World War, Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation took place at all levels of decision-making, in all theaters of war, and at all points in the intelligence cycle (collection, analysis, and dissemination). Good intelligence can be ignored and bad accepted, and the countless permutations between these two extremes make it almost impossible to determine the value of intelligence in any given military decision. It is equally difficult to determine the effect of intelligence on the course of the Second World War. However, if one postulates

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\[\text{Intelligence as used in this study is defined, and the functioning of the intelligence cycle explained in Appendix 1.}\]
that intelligence cooperation among allies was in general a worthwhile goal, the degree of success in its achievement at various key points in the history of the Second World War can be determined with moderate precision. Examination of the progress of Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation — with its ups and downs — and of the contributions made by naval intelligence to the winning of the war will be major themes of this study.
ENDNOTES.

Introduction:


3. The difficulty in evaluating intelligence is illustrated by the complex system, adopted early in the war by the British and later by the Americans, that ranks an item of information according to the likelihood of its being true and to the reliability of its source, on scales of A to F and 1 to 6 respectively. A-1 would indicate that the information came from a completely reliable source, and is confirmed by other information. F-6 would indicate that neither the reliability of source nor the accuracy of information could be judged. A classic example of good intelligence being accepted is provided by the planning for the Battle of Midway in 1942. Admiral Nimitz received sound advice from his communications intercept team on Japanese intentions and acted upon it. The role of intelligence in the battle is detailed in E.B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1976), Chapter 7.
CHAPTER I

Uneasy Cooperative Beginnings: 1917-1937

What Allen Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has called "The Craft of Intelligence" has had a long, if not always savory, history. Moses, an early advocate of intelligence collection, sent men "to spy out the land of Canaan...and see the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many."¹ The more specialized field of naval intelligence developed somewhat later. In England its roots certainly extended back as far as Queen Elizabeth I and Sir Francis Walsingham, her Secretary of State, in his successful "agent operations" in Spain against the Armada of 1588.² A similar American tradition can be traced back to colonial times.³

Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence dated from the time of the First World War, and many themes present in the cooperation that developed in 1916-1918 were replicated in "special relationship" of 1940-1945 — among
them Admiralty's lead in championing the cause of Anglo-American naval cooperation, sensitivity of both governments to anti-British sentiments in domestic American politics, American naval leaders' unwillingness to accept a status subordinate to that of the "Senior Service," and British concern over American inability to keep secret matters a secret.

Intelligence sharing during the inter-war years did not cease but was limited in great part to informal exchanges between American and British naval representatives overseas; it was rarely a part of a coordinated Navy-to-Navy cooperative program. Depression-years limitations on funds for intelligence in Britain and America restricted cooperative growth as did fears of isolationists and pacifists on both sides of the Atlantic that preparations for defense would lead to war. However, by 1938 concern over German and Japanese aggression caused leaders in both the U.S. and Royal Navies to look to the condition of their respective intelligence establishments and to consider areas for mutual support.

Surprisingly, in view of Britain's reputation as a long-time naval and intelligence power, the first naval intelligence organization to be officially chartered on
either side of the Atlantic was in the United States. On 23 March 1882, the Navy Department issued an Order, signed by the Secretary of the Navy, establishing an Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) within the Bureau of Navigation, "for the purpose of collecting and recording such information as may be useful to the Department in time of war, as well as peace." Lieutenant Theodorus B.M. Mason became the first Director of ONI on 15 June and, with a staff of three, began to implement the directive given him by the Secretary of the Navy "to collect, compile, record and correct" information on such subjects as the fleets of foreign powers, their armaments, personnel and facilities, their coasts and ports, and their merchant navy—much the same mission that ONI has today.

In Britain the Royal Navy lagged behind the Army in recognizing the need for an intelligence department. The lack of the most basic information on the Crimea at the start of the war with Russia in 1854 gained the reluctant attention of the War Office, and the following year the War Office created the Topographical and Statistical Department that eventually became its first intelligence entity.

The Board of Admiralty began preparatory committee examination of the intelligence problem in 1879, established the Foreign Intelligence Committee in 1882, and officially created the Naval Intelligence Department in January 1887. The instructions to the Foreign Intelligence Committee were
essentially the same as those given ONI. They were to "collect, classify and record, with a complete index, all information which bears a naval character...to keep up our knowledge of progress made by foreign countries in naval matters and to preserve the information in a form readily available for reference."²

At inception both the American and British naval intelligence organizations were roughly equal in size, but the position of each in its respective naval hierarchy was vastly different. ONI lacked direct access to the naval policy makers, a situation that continued throughout the Second World War. While it was consulted from time to time, it was unable to convince any significant proportion of the leaders in the Navy Department of the need for intelligence or of its significance in their decision making.³ This subordinate organizational position coupled with a lack of acceptance of its product continued to limit ONI's growth in both size and influence during the 1930s and beyond.

At the time of its formation the British Department of Naval Intelligence (NID)⁴ was made responsible not only for the collection and dissemination of information but also for mobilization and naval war planning. Its Director had direct access to Admiralty's First Sea Lord and First Lord (titles of the military and political heads of the British naval establishment; similar to the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy in the
American system), giving the incumbent great authority both in the Admiralty staff and in the Fleet.\textsuperscript{11} NID "was in fact a Naval Staff in embryo."\textsuperscript{12} Although its non-intelligence functions were later transferred to other staff sections, NID retained its preeminent position in Admiralty until the end of the First World War.

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Formal intelligence cooperation between the American and British navies originated during World War I. However, rivalries internal to both naval staffs as well as external personal, political, and military relationships between the two countries intervened to limit or impede the cooperative effort.

The subject of cooperation in naval matters was first raised by the British ambassador in Washington in January 1917. He reported that the president "would not consent to naval agreement in anticipation of joint defensive measures," which presumably would have to await the formal entry of the U.S into the war.\textsuperscript{13} Prior to that time, the ambassador recommended that the British Naval Attaché in Washington make highly secret proposals to the American Navy Department concerning coordination of patrols along shipping lanes. These proposals were "not to be written down," nor was the British Ambassador himself to be informed of their
content. The reason given for this *sub rosa* approach was fear of its discovery by "Germans in the Navy Department," but one must not rule out the possibility that the Ambassador was preparing what has more recently been termed "plausible denial" of the proposals in case of leak. Both the secrecy of the approach and the reluctance of the President to become involved in open cooperation were to be reprimed in the events of the late 1930s. In February 1917 the British Foreign Office indicated that no secret information was to be exchanged officially with the Americans, "as secrecy [is] impossible with Congress." 

Although the American Naval Attaché in London had been supplied copies of British intelligence publications on German warships as early as February 1917, the first specific reference to intelligence cooperation was contained in a March Naval Staff memo in which NID suggested "co-operation between the two Intelligence Divisions." The type of cooperation was not specified; however, a month earlier, Admiralty indicated that the U.S. Naval Attaché London was not to be informed of "the most secret methods" — an undoubted reference to Admiralty codebreaking activities that were then providing such impressive results. Britain's cryptographic activities during the First World War were carried on almost exclusively by the Royal Navy. Room 40 of NID, under the close supervision of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Sir Reginald ("Blinker")
Hall, was the hub of the decoding operation. Room 40 began operations in 1914 with a small staff drawn mainly from the faculties of the Royal Naval Colleges of Osborne and Dartmouth. Some of these early recruits were German linguists, among them Alastair Denniston, who was to achieve discreet fame in World War II as head of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), better known as "Bletchley Park," the center of British codebreaking activities during the Second World War.18

Admiral Hall maintained an extraordinary control over the dissemination of Room 40's output, a situation that did not always work to the betterment of cooperation between NID and ONI. Hall did not choose to pass information to the U.S. Navy Department through the usual intelligence channel via the U.S. Naval Attaché in London; he preferred to pass specific items of "most secret" information to Mr. Edward Bell of the American Embassy in London, who was charged with maintaining liaison with the various British intelligence agencies.19 It was Bell that Hall summoned to Room 40 to see the decrypted translation of the famous Zimmermann telegram. On 16 January 1917 German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann sent a coded telegram to the German ambassador in Washington announcing Germany's intention to resume unrestricted submarine warfare and to attempt to bring Mexico into an alliance with Germany that would provide Mexico with "generous financial support and an undertaking
on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona."\textsuperscript{20} Once Bell had been convinced of its authenticity, he and Hall took the telegram to the American ambassador who transmitted it to Washington where the president was said to have "showed 'much indignation' on reading it."\textsuperscript{21} The story was published in the American press on 1 March and aroused in Congress and in the American public the wrath that Hall and the British government had anticipated. David Kahn, doyen of modern American cryptographic historians, has commented that "no other single cryptanalysis has had such enormous consequences.... For those few moments in time, the codebreakers held history in the palm of their hand."\textsuperscript{22}

Following the United States' formal entry into the war in April 1917, Admiral William F. Sims was ordered to London to command American naval forces in Europe. Sims, who in the course of his career had held several intelligence-related assignments including those of Naval Attaché Paris, and briefly Naval Attaché London (in 1898), considered himself fully as competent in intelligence matters as was the Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Sims soon took control of American naval intelligence in Europe at the expense of ONI's efforts in the area and built in his Planning Section an intelligence team that "resembled a second Office of Naval Intelligence."\textsuperscript{23}

Team members included Commander (later Commodore)
Dudley Knox, who subsequently became head of both the Office of Naval Records and Library, and Curator for the Navy Department; and Lieutenant (junior grade) Tracy B. Kittredge who, 25 years later, became both Command Historian and a close advisor to Admiral Harold R. Stark, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe during World War II. In a 1942 Memo to Stark, Kittredge outlined the organization of the American naval staff in Europe in 1917-19, and commented that "complete information [i.e., intelligence] was available only in London. The intelligence sources available to the British were placed at the disposal of the American Naval Headquarters."25 British DNI Hall had formed a friendship with Lieutenant Commander John R. Roys, the local ONI representative in London, and had assured the American DNI "of the close cooperation in Naval Intelligence matters which exists between your people and myself."26 Nevertheless, Hall tended to deal more often with Admiral Sims. Admiralty provided confidential books and periodicals "to Sims, to Benson [Admiral William S. Benson, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations] and to Roy [sic]. Day to day matters to Sims for transmission to Benson, also weekly appreciation."27

During a 1918 visit to London Benson designated Sims as Naval Attaché in order to reduce the friction caused in both Washington and London by differing assessments of British naval policy by Sims and by the incumbent naval
attaché. This appointment was another blow to ONI's prestige, since traditionally naval attachés reported to the Chief of Naval Operations via the DNI and not directly, as Sims did. Hall continued to provide Sims large amounts of information, particularly of the type derived from decrypts, yet refused all requests from Sims or from ONI for access to the technical secrets of Room 40, perhaps because the United States had nothing to offer in return. Hall's reticence may have contributed to the delay in the U.S. Navy's development of its own codebreaking capability, which did not take place until the 1920s.

During the period 1914-1918 Admiralty had but one Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral "Blinker" Hall - so called because of his habit of rapidly blinking his eyes. NID's great reputation rested as much on the influence of its leader as on its preeminent position in the British Naval Staff. Hall was a vigorous activist, "building up his own espionage system, deciding for himself when and how to release intelligence to other departments, and acting on intelligence independently of other departments in matters of policy that lay beyond the concerns of Admiralty."

Hall's "opposite number" in Washington, Captain Roger Welles, was appointed DNI in April 1917 and served in that post until January 1919. The pressures of attempting to meet increased wartime demands for intelligence with
inadequate resources, particularly personnel, took their toll on Welles' health, which continued to be a problem throughout his tenure as DNI and which was given as the reason for his being passed over in 1918 for promotion to rear admiral — although he was retained as DNI. Welles was successful in building a viable wartime intelligence organization, but his reputation never approached that of Hall's.

Despite Hall's great personal influence, NID exhibited weaknesses that limited its effectiveness during the First World War. NID was considered more as a source of raw information than of evaluated intelligence. Assessment was the prerogative of Admiralty's Operations Department, and the close association between intelligence and operations that developed during the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War did not exist during the First. A second weakness that existed at the start of World War I and gradually disappeared during its course was the lack of an operational intelligence capability — the ability to provide the tactical commander with timely information on the strength and location of enemy forces.

Immediately following the entry of the United States into World War I, Great Britain dispatched its foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, with a diplomatic mission that arrived in Canada on 20 April 1917, held conversations with — among others — the British naval Commander in Chief
North America and West Indies Squadron, then proceeded to Washington on 22 April, where the British diplomats prepared the groundwork for subsequent Anglo-American naval cooperation.\textsuperscript{34} After conversations with President Wilson's advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, the British ambassador informed London that the "best plan" would be an exchange of naval missions but that the British mission should not be headed by a "prominent person" and should operate in an "inconspicuous way" so as not to fuel presidential sensitivity to public charges that the United States was fighting an "English War."\textsuperscript{35}

In British eyes cooperation did not mean full partnership. The proposal for establishment of the British mission emphasized that "...it is of the greatest importance that the development of their [U.S.] Sea Forces should proceed along lines dictated by British War experience and be co-ordinated with British policy..." and that the officer in charge of the mission "...should encourage the Navy Bureau to make use of British standard of guns, ammunition and weapons and machinery generally...."\textsuperscript{36}

A divergence of views soon developed between the two navies as to the U.S. Navy's wartime role. The British, concerned about the German submarine threat, wished the United States to concentrate its resources on building up its merchant shipping and its anti-submarine craft. Admiral Benson and the American Navy Department, following the
precepts of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan that to succeed at sea a nation must build a balanced fleet, felt that the British approach "ignored American long-term interests." While the subordinate role proposed by the British had little effect on naval intelligence activities during the First World War, it colored attitudes of U.S. naval leaders towards British leadership that were to influence the development of American naval intelligence in 1941-43.

The British ambassador's proposal to establish a British naval mission in Washington made provision for an intelligence liaison organization under the general supervision of the Deputy Chief of Mission, but there is no indication in the British record that this body ever played an active part in intelligence cooperation. The primary British naval intelligence representative in the United States in World War I was Captain Guy Gaunt, RN, the naval attaché. In addition to his duties in Washington, Gaunt, who reported directly to Admiral Hall in London, was also busy in New York in counterintelligence duties directed against German agents in the United States. In a 1937 conversation with the British ambassador, President Roosevelt indicated that while he had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy between 1915 and 1917 a mechanism for the systematic sharing of intelligence had been organized and that Gaunt and Captain William V. Pratt, USN, Benson's assistant, had been the mediums for effecting the
exchange.\textsuperscript{39}

Perhaps the president exaggerated when he called the *ad hoc* and informal arrangements between Gaunt and Pratt "systematic sharing of intelligence," but at the very least a precedent had been established for future Anglo-American cooperative actions. Also, "sharing" may have been a misnomer, since the United States had little intelligence on Germany to offer the British, especially after diplomatic relations with Berlin were severed when America entered the war, and since the British were highly selective in material passed to the United States — information often chosen for its political or propaganda impact rather than for its military value. There is little to indicate that such Navy-to-Navy intelligence sharing as did take place had any great impact on the prosecution of the war by either Great Britain or the United States.

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The interwar years saw the dismantling of both the American and British naval intelligence organizations. At the end of the First World War the Office of Naval Intelligence had 306 officers in Washington. By 1 July 1920 "just 42 remained, and many of these faced imminent detachment."\textsuperscript{40} In 1935 ONI employed 20 civilian clerks and had an officer allowance of 21.\textsuperscript{41}
British naval intelligence was similarly reduced. Hall, who was replaced as DNI by Admiral Hugh Sinclair in 1919, retired from the Navy and later became a member of Parliament. His influence on British intelligence was once again felt on the eve of the Second World War when he provided both his vast experience and his London flat to Admiral John Godfrey, who had just joined the naval staff as Director of Naval Intelligence, Hall's old job.

In 1919 the British Cabinet, prompted at least in part by a desire to see that no future DNI could exercise the unbridled authority possessed by "Blinker" Hall, directed Admiral Sinclair to form a permanent codebreaking body under civil administration in the Admiralty. The new organization, named the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), was assigned both public and secret functions: "Public: advise on the security of government cyphers. Secret: 'to study the methods of cypher communications used by foreign powers.'" In 1921 control of GC&CS passed from Admiralty to the Secret Intelligence Service, which was under the loose supervision of the Foreign Office.

In the Royal Navy as in the U.S. Navy, budgetary cuts, lack of direction as to which foreign targets to concentrate upon, and a general apathy toward intelligence matters on the part of senior officers led to a vicious spiral in which less than top-flight officers were often assigned to intelligence duties, where they produced studies of marginal
value that strengthened the poor reputation of intelligence as a military career. This unfortunate situation persisted in the British Navy until at least 1937 and in the American Navy for an additional two years.

Although documentary evidence is scanty, intelligence cooperation between the two navies did not completely cease in the interwar years but in the main consisted of low-level, operational exchanges carried out informally by American or British naval officers in the fleet, or by naval attachés on foreign station. In 1928 American intelligence officers in the Far East discussed possible joint activities with their British counterparts in the event of hostilities in Asia. Again, in 1938 American marines in China gave the British Staff Officer (Intelligence) in Shanghai their intelligence reports on Japanese landing craft and operations in the Yangtze Delta "in exchange for two sketches of the [Japanese] landing craft carrier which were produced by this office."

Evidence of British interest in rekindling the cool embers of wartime cooperation was first reported early in January 1937. Robert W. Bingham, American ambassador to Britain, wrote President Roosevelt that "official orders have been given in the British Army and Navy that good relations with their American opposite numbers at home and abroad must be established and maintained. Similarly, the attitude of government officials in their daily contacts
with the Embassy...is marked with a progressive and almost bewilder ing friendliness that cannot pass unnoticed."48 While the ambassa dor did not speculate on the reason for this change in attitude, a growing awareness on the part of British leaders of the sad state of Britain's military defenses and of the need to cultivate allies may have prompted the change. British historian Martin Gilbert has pointed out that by this time (January 1937) Winston Churchill's long-standing anxieties over military and civil preparedness were increased by a "continued stream of letters and information from a wide and impressive variety of sources."49 Among his sources were official British intelligence reports, including those originated by the Secret Intelligence Service and by the Government Code and Cypher School. Although out of office, Churchill had since 1931 been granted access to British intelligence information. "Tell him what he wants to know," said Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to Desmond Morton, then head of the Committee of Imperial Defence's Industrial Intelligence Centre and subsequently Churchill's personal assistant for intelligence matters during the Second World War. This permission was put in writing and was ratified by both Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain while each was in office.50

Intelligence cooperation between sovereign nations depends to a great extent on the attitudes, prejudices, and
motives of their leaders. Therefore, in any study of intelligence relationships it is necessary to examine the dispositions of the leaders toward intelligence – judgments formed in the main by the leader and by his personal experience with intelligence. However, other factors, such as the leader's perception of the relative strength or weakness of his country vis-à-vis that of a potential enemy, also play a part. Michael Handel, Professor of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, emphasized this point in writing that Britain's weakness in 1940 "made its very survival dependent on the quality of its intelligence. Almost any British leader at that moment would have shown a keen interest in intelligence." While accepting Professor Handel's argument, it must be noted that Churchill was singularly well prepared, both by reason of background and inclination, to require the maximum effort from the British intelligence establishment. Churchill's knowledge of intelligence and its uses dated back to the Boer War and to his tenure as First Lord of Admiralty in 1911-15. From this experience he developed an appreciation for the critical importance of intelligence in war.

Churchill's great proficiency in the acquisition and the use of intelligence was perhaps lessened by what British historian Christopher Andrew has termed "his fascination with cloaks and daggers and his exaggerated expectations of what they could achieve." This predilection certainly
influenced his decision in 1940 to form the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which he ordered to operate on the Continent as a clandestine sabotage organization and which prompted his oft-quoted exhortation to Hugh Dalton, SOE's first chief, to "set Europe ablaze!"53

Churchill's enthusiasm for "cloaks and daggers" was shared in great measure by Franklin Roosevelt. A case in point occurred in the coordination of Plan Catherine. "Catherine" was the codename for an operation, strongly backed by Churchill who was then First Lord of Admiralty, for the British fleet to penetrate the Baltic, then gain control of the area through a series of rapid, massive strikes. The plan was first discussed in October 1939, but was overtaken by events before it could be carried out. Churchill briefed the American Ambassador, Joseph. P. Kennedy, on the details of Catherine and asked him to lay the plan before President Roosevelt for his endorsement during the ambassador's planned visit to Washington in December. Churchill wrote Kennedy on 10 December, "if you cable 'my wife cannot express an opinion,' I shall take it in a favourable sense. If you cable 'Eunice had better not go to the party,' I shall take it as forecasting bad trouble." Kennedy replied by commercial cable on 23 December, "My wife cannot express an opinion but is much more friendly to the idea than I had anticipated."54

The famous Roosevelt-Churchill wartime correspondence
had begun at the invitation of the President who, in an 11 September 1939 letter to Churchill, expressed his pleasure at Churchill's return to Admiralty and wrote that "I shall at all times welcome it if you will keep me in touch personally with anything you want me to know about."\textsuperscript{55} Churchill accepted with alacrity, and a regular flow of operational and intelligence information was opened to the president. On 16 October 1939 Churchill sent a memorandum to Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, requesting material for one such message and commenting "I think I ought to send something more to my American friend in order to keep him interested in our affairs," then added in a handwritten postscript, "We must not let this liaison lapse."\textsuperscript{56}

The president's pleasure at Churchill's return to Admiralty was shared by the Royal Navy. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet, later head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington and subsequently First Sea Lord, wrote in his diary that the news was received "with considerable satisfaction" by the fleet and that "though it might be that things might not always move in the direction we would like, yet they would move."\textsuperscript{57}

Like Churchill's, Roosevelt's involvement in naval intelligence dated from the First World War and from civilian service with the Navy. Roosevelt's interests had
ranged much more widely than were necessary to fulfill his duties as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, which were essentially those of management, and were concerned with civilian personnel matters and with the running of the Navy's large shore establishment. In 1917, when the Director of Naval Intelligence was forced to turn to the reserves to fill vacant positions in his organization, Roosevelt aided him with nominations. Roosevelt had been instrumental in the initiation of the naval reserve system a year earlier. Through this experience he was aware of the numbers of qualified young men who were eager to serve in Naval Intelligence, many of whom from backgrounds similar to his own — old money, Yankee aristocracy, "prep" school, and Ivy League education.\textsuperscript{56} ONI's recruitment effort was not unlike that of British intelligence organizations, particularly NID and GC&CS, that depended heavily on the "Old Boy" network to fill key positions as war neared.

There is an interesting parallel in the use to which Roosevelt and Churchill put the intelligence that was made available to them. During World War I Roosevelt allegedly passed "naval intelligence information to Republicans who used it in attacking Daniel's [The Secretary of the Navy, and Roosevelt's immediate superior] for naval unpreparedness,"\textsuperscript{59} while Churchill used his intelligence hand-outs to attack the defense policies of those British governments providing him the information!
When he became President of the United States, Roosevelt brought with him a management philosophy that was based on his receiving a flow of information from a number of sources, both official and personal. "Roosevelt's persistent effort therefore was to check and balance information acquired through official channels by information acquired through a myriad of private, informal, and unorthodox channels and espionage networks."\(^{60}\) "Roosevelt seemed at times like a sponge soaking up information and ideas indiscriminately."\(^{61}\)

Vincent Astor, millionaire businessman, yachtsman, and friend of the President, was an early recruit to Roosevelt's private information network. In 1927 Astor and a group of friends with interlocking business, social, and political ties banded together in a secret, informal organization known variously as "the ROOM" or "The Club" to study and discuss political, economic, and international topics. As early as 1933 Astor began to forward information derived from the deliberations of this group to the new president.\(^{62}\) He continued to do so until the United States entered the war. By that time Roosevelt had appointed Astor, a commander in the naval reserve, to the post of Coordinator of Intelligence in the New York area. Roosevelt informed the Chief of Naval Operations of Astor's assignment in June 1940, and asked that he be given "every assistance."

Roosevelt also indicated that he would like "to have great
weight given his [Astor's] recommendation on the selection of candidates [for naval intelligence] because of his wide knowledge of men and affairs in connection with general intelligence work." Astor wrote the president in April 1940 that he had made informal contact with Sir James Paget, a retired Royal Navy officer who directed the British Passport Control Office in New York. Paget was also the top British Secret Intelligence Service representative in the United States and the Passport Control Office was his somewhat transparent "cover." Astor reported that Paget had "gladly accepted" his offer of cooperation but, Astor noted, the arrangement was one-sided since "we, for obvious reasons, could not return the compliment in the sense of turning over to them any of our confidential information."

Astor continued as intelligence coordinator, reporting both directly to the president and to the Director of Naval Intelligence, until August 1944 when he requested and received permission from Roosevelt to be relieved of his intelligence duties and enter training to become a naval convoy commander. 

The same concerns that led the British government to seek closer cooperation with the American military in 1937 also prompted Admiralty to examine the condition of its
intelligence organization for war. Admiral Sir William James, who in 1917 had been in charge of Room 40 and, by 1937, had become Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, sent a memo to the DNI and to other staff sections on 11 February 1937 in which he stressed the importance of and the need for operational intelligence in time of war. He urged the staff to draw upon the experience that had been gained by the end of the First World War to "see how near we can get in peace time to the organization as it existed at the end of the war." To implement James' directive the DNI chose Lieutenant Commander Norman Denning, who was later to serve as DNI himself and subsequently as the first Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence). In June 1937 he was given the task of "creating an all source intelligence center" that was later to play a major role in Anglo-American intelligence cooperation.

Perhaps reflecting some of the concern felt by his British colleagues, the American naval attaché in London, at a luncheon with the British DNI a few days before Denning's appointment, raised the subject of a closer exchange of information between the two navies. This remark prompted Admiralty to review its policy, set the previous year, on information exchange with the United States. At the time it had been determined that "Great Britain could not participate in any arrangement for the exchange of information against a third power." In urging
reconsideration of this policy the DNI quoted a March 1937 telegram from the British ambassador in Washington to the Foreign Office in which he commented, "It seems to me that, for us, a nice balancing of information given against information received is entirely unimportant. What we want is the goodwill of the American General Staff just as much as their information." 69

At roughly the same time the U.S. Navy was not much more forthcoming on the question of information exchange than were the British. In August 1937 the State Department asked the Navy Department if it had any objection to a British engineer's proposed visit to the Bell Telephone Laboratories and to the Radio Corporation of America in connection with a grant he had been awarded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York to study short wave and ultra short wave radio-telephone transmissions. The Office of the Director of Naval Communications replied rather ungraciously that, while it could "raise no specific objections" to the visit, "it is considered an undesirable practice for this country to disclose its technical secrets to foreigners while getting nothing in return." 70

By 1937 American and British attention had become focused on the Far East and the Sino-Japanese conflict. In London the American ambassador called on Prime Minister Chamberlain to discuss Anglo-American cooperation in Asia. Both agreed that cooperation in naval matters had been
"satisfactory and beneficial." However, Chamberlain indicated that he felt "there should be other ways in which we might most usefully cooperate." \(^{71}\)

In November Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British ambassador in Washington, told Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles that the British government was considering "an overwhelming display" of naval strength in the Far East and wished to know if the United States would entertain the idea of staff conversations to discuss combined actions. Admiral William Leahy, who had become Chief of Naval Operations in January 1937, favored the conversations, but Welles rejected the concept. \(^{72}\)

It was the president who, perhaps stirred by the Japanese sinking of the *USS Panay* on 12 December 1937, unexpectedly revived the idea of Anglo-American staff discussions. After a 16 December reception at the White House, Roosevelt met privately with Ambassador Lindsay and the Secretary of State, "plunged at once into the question of staff conversations," and recalled his own contribution to the intelligence exchange between Gaunt and Pratt during World War I. \(^{73}\) Lindsay's cable sent Admiralty archivists scurrying to the files for evidence of presidential involvement in the exchange, which Lindsay "clarified" in a 2 January telegram quoting the president as having "begun with exchange of naval information," and having "gone on to exchange of all sorts of intelligence." \(^{74}\) No record of the
details of this exchange or of Roosevelt's involvement therein has been found in Admiralty archives.

"I want Admiral Leahy and Captain Ingersoll to be there [the president's office] at 1:30 and to come in the back way - through the White House." Thus did Roosevelt secretly set out on the path that would lead to pre-World War II naval cooperation with Great Britain. Ingersoll, who was then head of the Navy Department's Plans Division, has recalled that the 23 December 1937 meeting was attended by the president, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, in addition to the two naval officers. At that meeting it was decided to send Ingersoll to London immediately to arrange for "parallel action in the Far East." Accordingly, he sailed for Great Britain on Christmas morning. Captain Ingersoll registered at a London hotel under his own name, and later commented ingenuously in his memoirs, "There was nothing secret about it, except that the newspaper reporters didn't know about it until some time after I left Washington."

Admiralty saw it somewhat differently. "Captain Ingersoll was sent to this country direct by the President of the U.S.A. without the matter being handled in the normal way by the State Department or the American Embassy....the only ministers informed were the First Lord, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The more secret part of the conversations was contained in a
Plans Division paper which was not circulated in the ordinary manner, and the subject of the conversations was never referred to either the Cabinet or the C.I.D. [Committee of Imperial Defence]. This procedure was adopted at the special request of the U.S.A...."77

Ingersoll's conversations were in the main with Captain Tom Phillips, his counterpart as Director of Plans on the Naval Staff. Their talks were informal and exploratory, and little concrete agreement was achieved - but the ice had been broken. Ingersoll wrote a memorandum to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations concerning his discussions with Phillips and with Admiral Chatfield, Chief of the Naval Staff, a copy of which has survived in Admiralty records. Concerning intelligence, Ingersoll noted that an informal agreement was currently in effect between the British DNI and the American naval attaché for exchange of information on Japanese activities in the Mandated Islands, and he reported that "the British believe this should be extended now to include movements and locations of Japan's naval units." Admiral Chatfield also indicated that he thought it desirable for the British and American fleets in the Pacific to exchange intelligence, "whenever it became necessary."78

Meanwhile, back in Washington, the Chief of Naval Operations was busy assuring the press that Ingersoll's mission, news of which had by this time leaked, had nothing to do with "joint Anglo-American action in any part of the
world." Ingersoll completed his visit to London on 18 January 1938, returned to the United States, and reported verbally to the president on 29 January 1938. Admiral Leahy, the Chief of Naval Operations, also provided Roosevelt a written report of the discussions. A year later Leahy still considered the topic so sensitive that he asked Roosevelt's naval aide to retrieve the presidential copy, "if [it] can be found ... in order to destroy." This penchant for secrecy in matters involving Great Britain, generated in great part by concern over the reaction of American isolationist politicians, was to become the hallmark of the president's approach to Anglo-American military cooperation in any form from 1937 until the United States' entry into the war.

Many of the underlying differences in attitude between the American and British navies during World War I continued into the Second World War, coloring Anglo-American naval intelligence relationships. American political sensitivity to any type of overt military alliance with England, British perception that Americans were unable to keep secrets, lack of American material to make intelligence exchange mutually advantageous, and the U.S. Navy's fear of being maneuvered
into a subordinate position in the partnership all impeded development of the intelligence "special relationship." Insofar as these attitudes retarded American learning from British experience, so also did they slow the development of a purely American naval intelligence capability. Despite these problems, for the first time intelligence had been exchanged between the two navies, and the groundwork prepared for the cooperation that was to come.

By the start of 1938 both nations were awakening, more slowly in the United States than in Britain, to the need for rapid, accurate data on enemy forces in the event of war. Influenced by President Roosevelt's and Prime Minister Churchill's positive attitudes toward intelligence, leaders of both nations began to look to naval intelligence for much of the information they would require to defeat Germany or Japan at sea, and the intelligence organizations of both navies began to expand their efforts to meet the challenge.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 1:


2. Dulles, Craft of Intelligence, 19.


5. Secretary of the Navy to Mason, 25 July 1882, ibid., 185.


9. Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 141.

10. According to Beesly, "British Naval Intelligence," 255, the name, Department of Naval Intelligence, was not changed to the more familiar Naval Intelligence Division (NID) until about 1918. Throughout this paper ONI and NID will be used to refer to the American and British departmental intelligence organizations respectively.


Operation with the United States Navy in Event of U.S. Entry into Present War. 1940, 4. In 1940 the British Naval Staff prepared a study of the history of Anglo-American naval cooperation during the First World War for use as precedent for similar cooperative efforts in World War Two.

14. Ibid.

15. F.O. 37811, 19 February 1917, ibid.


18. Beesly, Room 40, 11.


22. Kahn, Codebreakers, 297.

23. Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 125.


25. Tracy B. Kittredge, "U.S. - British Naval Cooperation, 1940-1945" (Microfilm: Naval Historical Center, ca. 1950), vol. 1, chap. 2, app., World War II Command File, box 252, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


27. O.M. 260, undated, but probably September or October 1917, PRO: ADM 199/1157, 10.


31. Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 107.

32. Wells, "British Naval Intelligence," 50.


34. Undated handwritten entry following entry dated 3 June 1917, PRO: ADM 199/1157, 8.

35. Balfour to Cecil, 3 June 1917, PRO: ADM 199/1157, 12.


38. Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 70.


41. [Packard], "Early History," 179.


43. The abbreviation SIS is used to denote the organization variously known as the Special or Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6 (a hold-over from the days of its control by the War Office), or more informally "The Firm." A good general history of the organization and its activities is contained in Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service.

44. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:10.
45. Little material is available in either those American or British records that have been made public on the degree of intelligence cooperation that existed between the two countries during the inter-war years. The major culprit is British security regulations. In a 25 February 1965 letter to Admiral John Godfrey, Admiral Norman Denning, at that time Chief of Intelligence, Ministry of Defence, included "co-operation with other intelligence agencies" in his list of materials that "must never be released" to the public. (McLachlan-Beesly file, MLBE 1/2, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge). The U.S. Navy has followed the practice of not releasing any information of British origin that has not previously been released by them, even though by American security standards the material is considered declassified.

F.H. Hinsley, the leading official historian of British intelligence during the Second World War, has seen no indication of cooperation between the two naval intelligence organizations before 1937, and has stated that it was not until the winter of 1940-41 that intelligence provided by the United States "began to make a contribution, if as yet an insignificant one to Whitehall' appreciations." (Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:311).

46. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty, 140.


52. Andrew, "Churchill and Intelligence," ibid., 183.

53. Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-1945 (London: Frederick Muller, 1957), 366. Dalton was Labour Member of Parliament and Minister of Economic Warfare in addition to his duties as political head of SOE.


56. Churchill to First Sea Lord, 16 October 1939, ibid.

57. Cunningham Diary, ADD MSS 52580, Cunningham Papers, British Library, London, 97.

58. Dorwart, Office of Naval Intelligence, 109.


61. Ibid., 61.


63. Roosevelt to Stark, 26 June 1940, Official File 18x (Navy Intelligence), Roosevelt Library.

64. Astor to Roosevelt, 18 April 1940, PSF 116 (Astor), Roosevelt Library.

65. Astor to Tully (Grace Tully, Roosevelt's personal secretary), 14 August 1944, ibid.


70. Safford (Op-20-G) to Op-20-A, Navy Department, 20 August 1937; SRH-281, United States Navy, File of Correspondence with the Department of State 1919-1950; Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency (NSA); National Archives [hereafter NA], Washington, D.C.

71. Davis to the Secretary of State and the President, 29 April 1937, PSF 28, (GB: 8 March 1937 – 19 September 1938), Roosevelt Library.


73. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 17 September [sic], (probably December) 1937, quoted in a minute on "The Visit of Commander Hampton to the U.S." PRO: ADM 116/3922, Documents on US Establishment of "Neutrality Patrol" 1939.

74. Lindsay to Foreign Office, 2 January 1938, ibid.

75. Roosevelt to Leahy, 22 December 1937, PSF 78, (Navy Dept. 1936-7), Roosevelt Library.


77. Director of Plans, minute, 17 January 1938, PRO: ADM 1/9822, Record of Conversations Between Captain Ingersoll, U.S.N. and the Naval Staff at the Admiralty. (1937-38)

78. Ingersoll to CNO, January 1938, PRO: ibid.

79. Early (presidential press secretary) to Roosevelt, 28 January 1938, PSF 146 (Stephen T. Early), Roosevelt Library.

80. Memorandum, undated, initialled "DJC" (Daniel J. Callaghan, presidential naval aide), PSF 82, (D.J. Callaghan), Roosevelt Library.
CHAPTER II

Changing Attitudes: January 1938 – August 1940

In 1938, Hitler moved closer to the war he sought, first by annexing Austria to Germany in March, then by instigating the "Munich crisis" of September, in which Britain and France agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia. The Second World War began "officially" in September 1939 with Hitler's invasion of Poland and subsequent British and French declarations of war against Germany. After Poland's rapid defeat, a lull in the war on land – but not at sea – ensued. The period of "Phony War" ended with German attacks in Norway in April 1940, followed by the invasion of France and the Low Countries. After the collapse of France in June 1940, Hitler began preparing for an invasion of the British Isles. He undertook first to destroy the Royal Air Force and to soften-up British defenses and morale. During the ensuing Battle of Britain, England stood alone in Europe to face the German challenge.

As war came to Europe, Anglo-American cooperation in
Naval intelligence grew, but did so at an irregular rate. Belligerent Britain looked with misgiving at neutral America's attempts to obtain hard-won British information while offering little in return. The cooperative process was overshadowed by the course of the war and by United States' concern, which fluctuated with the ebb and flow of the war, over Britain's ability to continue resistance against Germany. Both British and American attitudes toward Anglo-American cooperation were to change as the war deepened and spread.

The seeds of cooperation sown during the Ingersoll discussions in London in early 1938 were slow to germinate. Admiralty cautiously continued to explore the possibility of giving the U.S. Naval Attaché a type of "most favoured nation" status. On 17 February 1938 the British Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral James A.C. Troup, had cautioned against the embarkation in wartime of neutral observers in Royal Navy ships, but added, "Should the United States remain neutral, the case of the U.S. Naval Attaché should be given special consideration."

For his part the U.S. Naval Attaché in London continued to generate a high volume of information during the late 1930s, dispatching 1,400 to 1,700 reports to ONI annually.
However, the record is silent both on the sources of these reports and on their quality. There is no indication during 1938 that exchange of intelligence extended beyond that already discussed concerning the situation in the Pacific. Admiralty files from January to March 1938 suggested that one possible reason for this slow growth in cooperation may have been reluctance on the part of the technical divisions of Admiralty to exchange technical (i.e., non-intelligence) "information laboriously acquired at great expense and trouble," even on a quid pro quo basis.\footnote{Admiralty's Plans and Intelligence Divisions, recognizing the politics of the question, recommended a much more forthcoming attitude.}

In spite of its reluctance to exchange technical information, Admiralty was willing to profit from American technical achievements. NID reports in early 1938, probably based on information collected by the British Naval Attaché in Washington, concerning American research on air-dropped torpedoes, infra-red gunfire control experiments, and the use of magnetic telephones in U.S. Navy ships received wide dissemination throughout the British Naval Staff and apparently aroused considerable interest\footnote{Reluctance to exchange technical information was equally strong on both sides of the Atlantic. The technical bureaus of the U.S. Navy were quick to deny the British information on American weapons in the experimental stages or those under development for the fleet. These}
restrictions continued in force well after the fall of France in June 1940 and even later on certain items deemed to be of critical national importance, such as the details of the United States' Norden bombsight.\textsuperscript{5}

Despite Admiral James' exhortations to the British Director of Naval Intelligence to prepare his organization for war, a pre-war recruit to Naval Intelligence Division commented that when he "joined the division [in March 1938] then under the directorship of Admiral Troup, it must surely have plumbed its greatest depth of inefficiency and no effort was being made to prepare for the war that by then seemed inevitable to all of us."\textsuperscript{6} This criticism seems somewhat harsh in light of the fact that NID's Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC), arguably the single most effective intelligence organization of the Second World War, had been developed and brought to its wartime personnel strength under Troop's direction. The OIC was the all source intelligence center previously mentioned that had originally been given the task of tracking the movements of potential enemy men-of-war. With the commencement of hostilities and of the Battle of the Atlantic, the OIC evolved into the primary intelligence weapon against U-boats, providing Royal Navy operational commanders with up-to-the-minute information on strength and locations of German wolf packs. Spurred on perhaps by a 6 October 1938 directive from the Committee of Imperial Defence calling on
the Services to identify shortcomings brought to light by the Czech crisis, Troup increased the manning of the OIC, from a skeleton crew of four, to fifty and put the Centre on a wartime footing in October, nearly a year before formal declaration of hostilities. That same month he encouraged establishment of a similar Operational Intelligence Centre in Singapore to serve the intelligence needs of Commander-in-Chief Far East and strengthened the naval intelligence organization in Capetown, South Africa. In addition, he proposed a plan for retention in intelligence assignments of naval officers with special skills such as "good language qualifications" and the ability "to deduce correct conclusions as to the future movements of foreign forces."\(^8\)

Despite Troup's organizational improvements Admiralty's intelligence system in 1938 suffered from a shortage of sources of information on the activities of potential enemy fleets. Overt material was obtained from quasi-official publications such as Lloyd's Register of Shipping that tracked merchant vessel activities worldwide and from naval attaché reports that were in great part based on official foreign government hand-outs. Covert material from the Secret Intelligence Service or other government agencies was minimal and communications (signals) intelligence was unavailable.\(^9\)

The American naval intelligence establishment was in no better condition. A British student of naval intelligence
has noted that prior to 1939, "Unlike its British
counterpart the American Naval Intelligence Division failed
to develop a clear plan for its own organization, nor did it
establish a workable scheme for classifying the type of
information deemed necessary for determining the purposes
and capabilities of potential enemies."\(^{10}\) In other areas,
however, progress was being made. Rear Admiral Ralston
Holmes, USN, who had become American Director of Naval
Intelligence in May 1937, inherited an organization that was
preoccupied with matters of domestic security and
counterintelligence and was hampered by lack of adequate
funds and by personnel shortages. Holmes revitalized the
American naval attaché system, which had been allowed to
decline in the mid-1930s, reopening key offices that had
been closed earlier and pressing for the establishment of
new ones. In addition, Holmes bettered the lot of his
attachés by improving relations with the Department of State
and by providing additional funds and equipment for attaché
use in their collection and reporting efforts overseas.
Professor Jeffery M. Dorwart, who has written extensively on
the history of ONI, has commented that, "Just in time, ONI
realized that the greatest menace to the United States came
not from internal enemies but from foreign aggressors."\(^{11}\)

In 1939 two naval officers, one British and one
American, were transferred to London where they were to play
major roles in Anglo-American naval intelligence
cooperation. Rear Admiral John H. Godfrey, RN, became British Director of Naval Intelligence, and Captain Alan G. Kirk, USN, became the American naval attaché. Captain S.W. Roskill, author of the official history of the Royal Navy in World War II, described Godfrey as "not only a man of unusually wide interests, but also gifted with an exceptionally powerful and original intellect." Roskill also recognized that Godfrey was "highly-strung...which made him unnecessarily combative and so created enemies."¹² Both of these facets of his personality—superior intellect and ill temper—were evident in his direction of NID and in his relations with the Service intelligence chiefs, his peers on the Joint Intelligence Committee.

By his own admission, Godfrey knew little about intelligence when he became DNI. Nor, he said, did his colleagues on the Naval Staff "because the subject was swept out of sight during the twenty years of peace."¹³ Godfrey chose to adopt much of the good counsel offered him by Admiral "Blinker" Hall, of World War I fame. Hall saw to it that Godfrey met key government officials as well as business and financial leaders in "The City." These men would later prove to be of inestimable value in assisting Godfrey to recruit the bright young people he required to staff his rapidly expanding organization. Hall also gave warning of the political dangers and lingering jealousies that surrounded the position of Director of Naval
Intelligence. "When in doubt," Godfrey said later, "I often asked myself what would Hall have done."\(^{14}\)

From the beginning of his tenure as DNI, Godfrey was a staunch advocate of increased intelligence cooperation with the United States. In 1940, prior to the fall of France, he was one of the strongest voices in Admiralty to urge dropping the requirement that intelligence must be exchanged, not given freely. In this regard, Godfrey's thinking was ahead of that of his political leader, the First Lord, Winston Churchill who at the time favored a strict policy of quid pro quo.\(^ {15}\)

Godfrey's ventures into intelligence cooperation with foreigners began early. In January 1939, before his installation as DNI and well before the British and French declarations of war against Germany, he visited Paris and held Admiralty-sanctioned but unofficial talks with the French Director of Naval Intelligence aimed at creating the "machinery of collaboration" between their two intelligence organizations. Godfrey found their discussions "cordial and co-operative" and agreed "to exchange information about intelligence centers abroad and to devise a simple method of communication."\(^ {16}\) The groundwork was thus laid for meetings that took place in June and July 1939 between senior British and French naval commanders in the Mediterranean and the Far East; these meetings were designed, among other things, to insure that their respective intelligence organizations
would cooperate and that information on sightings of potential enemy forces would be exchanged expeditiously.¹⁷

Alan Kirk, described by Godfrey as "a modest, shrewd and kind-hearted man,"¹⁸ arrived in London in June 1939. Like Godfrey, his previous intelligence experience was slight; but he was enthusiastic about the assignment and had sought the help of Captain Walter S. Anderson, USN, a former naval attaché in London and at that time the American DNI, in obtaining the posting.¹⁹ Kirk came well recommended to the American Ambassador in London, Joseph P. Kennedy, by mutual friends who had been associated with Kennedy on the Shipping Board before his confirmation as ambassador. Kirk's entry into the diplomatic world was also smoothed by his prior acquaintance with key members of the Embassy staff.²⁰

As he had done with Ambassador Kennedy, Godfrey went out of his way to establish a personal relationship with Kirk that was to serve both of them well in the next few years. Their paths were to cross often: in 1939-40 when Kirk was naval attaché, in 1941 when he served briefly as Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, and in 1942 when he again returned to London as Chief of Staff to Admiral Harold R. Stark, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.²¹

As was customary for newly-reported foreign attachés, Kirk paid a formal call on the British DNI. Kirk later
reported to Admiral Walter S. Anderson, the American DNI, that Godfrey had been "very agreeable" and had told him that "if there was anything I wished to know, just ask him." In the course of a subsequent and less formal chat, Godfrey was at pains to separate "material matters" from intelligence, indicating he wished to talk "most freely" about the latter. Godfrey told Kirk that in the event of war, "we will give you a dugout in the Admiralty."\textsuperscript{22}

Although they worked well together, Kirk remained reserved in his evaluation of Godfrey. While Kirk found Godfrey to be "perfectly civil and perfectly nice, he never was what you might call a really warm and outgoing person. He was by nature inclined to be crafty."\textsuperscript{23} Kirk later commented that when he arrived in London, British authorities were "pretty good" about providing information to the U.S. Navy and that while "in no case was there what you might call a wide-open exchange," the British were more willing to share than were the Americans.\textsuperscript{24}

At the same time he was cultivating the French in Paris and the Americans in London, Godfrey was working diligently to get NID ready for war. Noting that "there is a great deal to be done, and perhaps not much time in which to do it," Godfrey reported his progress to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff on 21 June 1939. Because he considered that the most important duty of naval intelligence in wartime was to provide information on enemy warships, Godfrey stressed
the work that had already been accomplished in readying the Operational Intelligence Centre for war: moving critical functions underground as protection against air raids, establishing "close touch" with the cryptographers at the Government Code and Cypher School to assure timely receipt of communications intelligence, and preparing for expansion "within a few hours" to meet a crisis. Godfrey indicated that he had reorganized those sections of NID that dealt with "static" intelligence — resources, shipbuilding, ports, etc. — to cope with the increased workload brought on by the tense political situation, by the addition of new sources of information, and by the growing numbers of short-notice tasks laid upon the Division. Godfrey also commented that his campaign to enlist support of those in the academic and business world was "beginning to bear fruit."25

While in London Anglo-American cooperation was being discussed openly in official circles, such was not the case in Washington. In March 1939 the Director of Plans in Admiralty wrote a minute to the Chief of the Naval Staff indicating that in the aftermath of the Ingersoll discussions in London the previous year the United States Government seemed more interested in exchanging intelligence than in sharing operational plans, a major British interest. The Plans Director therefore suggested that another meeting be held, this time with Kirk after his arrival in London, to discuss "these differences of view."
According to the British record, President Roosevelt agreed to renewal of the talks, but only in Washington and only under conditions of "complete secrecy" since "leakage might seriously compromise the pending [U.S.] neutrality legislation." The British government agreed and chose as its emissary Commander T.C. Hampton, RN, of the Admiralty Plans Division. "Cover" for his arrival was to be provided by a previously scheduled visit of HMS Exeter to Baltimore, where Hampton — unnoticed among the other British naval officers — could slip off to Washington.

The trip soon took on the trappings of a James Bond novel (Bond's creator, Ian Fleming, was a key member of Godfrey's staff in NID during the war). Instead of arriving by warship, Hampton, posing as a civilian "land agent," took passage on a merchant ship and disembarked in Montreal, Canada. Bypassing Baltimore, he arrived in Washington on 12 June 1939. There he held two meetings with Admiral Leahy, the American Chief of Naval Operations, on 12 and 14 June at his private residence. Attendance was limited to Leahy, Hampton and two others: Leahy's Director of Plans, Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, and the British Naval Attaché. Hampton subsequently reported to his superiors that "the British Minister in Washington gave instructions to the naval attaché that I was on no account to visit the Embassy or visit his [the naval attaché's] staff, and further that I was to leave Washington as soon as my
business was completed."

Hampton found the talks "somewhat disappointing" because they were "very general" and because Admiral Leahy "was most unwilling to put anything in writing...."27 Although no official record of the conversations has come to light, they dealt in general with plans for dispositions of the two naval forces in time of war. Admiral Leahy's biographer has indicated that one specific topic discussed was Leahy's view (in opposition to that of the President) that the United States should concentrate its strength in the Pacific and leave the Atlantic to the British and French navies. American forces in the Atlantic would "cooperate" by providing intelligence on movements of German shipping.28

Hampton ended his report on a provocative note. "In this connection [security arrangements] it is of interest that the [British] Naval Attaché in Washington was told by Admiral Leahy to arrange our meetings direct with him and that the U.S. Director of Naval Intelligence was on no account to be informed of my visit."29 Whether this restriction was imposed for security or for other reasons was never made clear. However, it might have had to do with the growing conflict between the Plans and Intelligence Divisions of the American naval staff as to which organization was to provide the CNO and the president with naval intelligence estimates for planning purposes.

During the waning months of what Neville Chamberlain
called "peace in our time," naval intelligence organizations on both sides of the Atlantic were beginning to prepare for war and to seek cooperation in intelligence matters. At the moment the British were more forthcoming in offering to share intelligence. However, their attitude was to change, at least temporarily, once actual fighting started and the United States remained neutral.

Great Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939. Since there was no immediate clash between British and German forces, within a few weeks some circles in London began making reference to the "Bore War." Not so His Majesty's Government. The Naval Staff moved quickly onto a wartime footing, and by early in 1940 Godfrey had accomplished most of the restructuring of NID to meet expected wartime demands. Kirk, in his report for the second half of 1939, indicated that relations with Admiralty "are considered to be on as satisfactory, close, and amiable a basis as wartime conditions permit." Nevertheless, he admitted "that the obtaining of information has been more difficult due to the belligerent status of this country." Later in the report he noted that "war conditions make all very guarded in their conversations" and concluded by saying that "the above applies equally to the Air Ministry - even
with greater emphasis."

Security had become a major concern of the British Chiefs of Staff. The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, which strengthened the government's ability to act against espionage, sabotage, and subversion, was passed on 24 August 1939 and was implemented by a series of Defence Regulations. These regulations provided for close controls over the travel, employment, and activities of both enemy and neutral aliens. Notwithstanding these restrictions, there was concern in Admiralty and elsewhere in the British government that information on military activities within the United Kingdom was reaching Germany. John Colville, who had recently left the Foreign Office to become a Junior Secretary to the Prime Minister, wrote in his diary on 5 November 1939, "we never seem to have accurate or certain information about German fleet and troop movements, whereas the Germans know all our movements within a few hours of their taking place...." As was the case in 1917, many officials in Admiralty felt that poor United States' security might be at least an indirect cause of this perceived leakage of information to the enemy. Doubtless this nagging worry served as a brake on British willingness to release secret information to the American government, especially that "Most Secret" type of intelligence derived from enemy communications.

Codebreaking, so important to the Royal Navy in the
First World War, had again begun to bear fruit. British codebreakers, who had been assembled in great secrecy at a country estate near London named Bletchley Park, scored their first major success against Germany during the Norwegian campaign of April 1940. For this operation the German Army and Air Force had introduced a special series of settings for their Enigma machine, the coding device in general use throughout the German armed forces and the government. These settings were used only for Norway but, from 15 April until the middle of May, the British continuously broke and read German Air Force operational messages from that region. By the time of the Battle of Britain, which followed a few months later, British cryptographers were providing timely access to much of the German Air Force operational traffic; however, similar success in penetrating the German Army and Navy systems was not to be achieved until later in the war.35

Concerns over American security practices, which led the British to deny "Most Secret" information to the United States, can only have been reinforced by the Tyler Kent case. Tyler Kent was a young American code clerk at the American Embassy in London. He had been transferred there from the American Embassy in Moscow in October 1939. On 18 May 1940, after months of investigative efforts by the Security Service (MI-5) and Special Branch, Scotland Yard, British authorities informed the American Embassy that Kent
had become involved with a group suspected of espionage and that Kent had apparently misused his position as code clerk to pass secret information to the group. Ambassador Kennedy was promptly informed of the allegations against Kent and agreed to authorize a search of Kent's London flat. At the same time the ambassador waived whatever diplomatic immunity Kent might have possessed.\textsuperscript{36} Two days later Kent was arrested and his flat searched. The search produced approximately 1,500 confidential telegrams and other documents from the embassy. Included among these were copies of some of the highly sensitive Roosevelt-Churchill messages that had been delivered directly from Admiralty to the embassy for transmission to the president. In October 1940 Kent was tried \textit{in camera} at the Old Bailey for offenses under the Official Secrets Act, found guilty, and sentenced to seven years in prison.

Those were the facts of the case. What lay behind those facts was unclear at the time and is still a matter of conjecture. Kent had apparently become involved in London with a group described as "right-wing, anti-Semitic extremists who were, at the time, denouncing war with Germany as a Jewish plot."\textsuperscript{37} One of the members of the group was Captain Archibald Ramsay, a Member of Parliament. Kent admitted at his trial that he had shown Ramsay embassy documents, including two from "Naval Person" to Roosevelt. Another member of the group was Anna Wolkoff, a Russian-born
naturalized British citizen, who allegedly was involved with an Italian assistant military attaché. During the course of a visit to Kent's flat by Ramsay and Wolkoff, she became aware of Ramsay's interest in the "Naval Person" messages, asked Kent for permission to borrow them, and took them to be photographed — later giving Kent two photographic negative plates of the documents. These plates were found during the search of Kent's flat incident to his arrest.\textsuperscript{38}

While it was never proven conclusively that Kent, Ramsay, or Wolkoff ever passed the confidential American material to an enemy agent, under the stringent security laws of the time there was sufficient evidence of a "smoking gun" to justify the arrest and detention of all three. The case against Kent and Wolkoff was further strengthened by summaries of intercepted Italian radio traffic suggesting that the German Ambassador in Rome was privy to the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence and was relaying the information to Berlin.\textsuperscript{39} If this were true, the correspondence might have reached Rome by the Kent-Wolkoff-Italian Military Attaché London link.

Kent said at his trial that he believed the American people were being unjustly kept in the dark about the true course of Anglo-American policy, and he indicated that he was collecting the confidential material as evidence of this duplicity, which he planned to reveal perhaps to the U.S. Senate or to the press. Since Kent had drawn the attention
of British security authorities shortly after his arrival in London, and since his position as code clerk was known to these authorities, it is probable that MI-5 discreetly informed other British government agencies – including Admiralty – of the possibility that information passed to the American Embassy in London was being leaked to the enemy. British awareness of this leak would help to explain the diminution in the flow of their intelligence to the United States that became apparent in late 1939 and continued until May/June 1940, coincident to the arrest of Kent.

The British slow-down in the exchange of information with the United States may have been prompted in great measure by concerns over American security practices, but it also may have been used to express a hint of pique. In October 1939 Kirk radioed Washington that "intimation received (of British) willingness to exchange full Orange (i.e., Japanese) cryptographic information if you agreeable." After respectful prodding from Kirk, the Navy Department replied in November that since it was "unable offer equitable exchange at present" it must "therefore regretfully decline for time being." It is probable that this refusal stemmed from objections by Army and Navy cryptographers, who felt that they were ahead of their British counterparts in solving Japanese codes and that they would gain little quid in return for their quo. How this
 rebuff was received is not known. Six months later, however, Godfrey produced a minute in which he stated, "in my opinion it would be most unwise to give the Americans details of our 'most secret' material."42

During the "slow-down" period, Kirk continued to encourage the Navy Department to exchange information with the British and to press Godfrey for release of more intelligence. In an attempt to gain high-level support on the exchange matter, the Navy Department sent the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, extracts from a Kirk letter in which he invited attention to the fact that "as the British Navy gains in war experience they will gradually out distance us in many technical subjects" and urged that the Department "seize any opportunity for making exchanges."43 Judging from Godfrey's remarks, Kirk made little progress in obtaining release of technical material but was more successful in the intelligence field. Godfrey wrote in February 1940 that the Americans "have already helped us a good deal, though not technically" and commented that they have been "thoroughly unneutral" in providing attaché reports from Berlin, information on the Japanese Navy, and sighting reports from U.S. Navy ships.44

In the end, even Godfrey started to lose patience with Kirk's complaints of Admiralty foot-dragging on his requests for information. The DNI informed him that the delays were necessary and warned that "some British officers were asking
why they should do anything for the Americans."\textsuperscript{45} Following the fall of France in June 1940, as Britain stood alone against the Axis, the reasons for "doing anything for the Americans" became somewhat clearer.

\textit{iii}

As the war entered the second half of 1940, official British attitudes began to shift from a feeling of irritation that the United States was not playing a greater role in the fight against Germany to a search for measures that would encourage rapid American intervention. One such initiative was to seek ways to increase technical and intelligence cooperation between the two navies. British distrust of American security, especially their concern over the unregulated American press, continued unabated. Martin Gilbert reflected this pervasive attitude in his study of the Second World War, in which he commented that "a considerable amount of German information...came not from an individual spy, but from a careful reading of the uninhibited American press."\textsuperscript{46} British fears could not have been much allayed by Roosevelt's June 1940 appointment of Frank Knox, publisher of the \textit{Chicago Daily News}, to the post of Secretary of the Navy. There was, however, good reason for both the United States and Great Britain to keep secret their joint activities. As one military historian has
pointed out, "At this time [Summer 1940] the political situation in the United States and national pre-occupation with the Presidential Campaign of 1940 made it necessary for the administration and for the Navy to maintain complete secrecy on discussions of detailed arrangements for American British Naval cooperation."  

As British interest in wooing the United States increased, so did American interest in assessing the course of the European war and in estimating the survivability of England. Following the defeat of France in June 1940 American strategic thinking had to take into account the possibility that Germany would invade the British Isles. Could the British successfully defend themselves against such an attack? If defeated, would they sue for peace or elect to continue the fight from bases elsewhere in the Empire? To aid him in addressing vital questions such as these, Roosevelt utilized the "myriad of private, informal and unorthodox channels" previously mentioned.  

In addition to the normal official sources — State, War and Navy Departmental assessments and telegrams from overseas — Roosevelt received information on the situation in England directly from Churchill, both when he was First Lord of Admiralty and later when he became Prime Minister. Personal emissaries, either acting in a quasi-official capacity (Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles' March 1939 London visit), or unofficially (World War I military hero
William J. Donovan's July 1940 London visit) provided the president with direct channels of information. Of course, Ambassador Kennedy wrote directly to the president, bypassing official channels, but so did his naval attaché, Kirk, sometimes without telling the ambassador. The White House received Admiralty papers from the U.S. Naval Attaché in London (via ONI), direct from the British Embassy in Washington, and from the British Naval Attaché, Washington, (also via ONI).49

This multiplicity of sources presented the president with a wide range of views but risked misleading him through what is called in intelligence jargon "false confirmation." False confirmation can occur when the same item of information is provided from a single source but reported via two separate channels. Intelligence analysts tend to put great weight on information reported by one source and confirmed by another that is totally separate. If, in fact, there is no separate source, but there has been duplicate reporting, then the information may be given greater credence than it deserves — hence "false confirmation." Duplicative reporting became increasingly common as cooperation became closer and more information channels opened up among the civil and military leaders of both nations. It was a problem that took several years to bring under control.

One month after the Government of France had asked
Hitler for an armistice and during the first month of German massive air attacks against Britain, a visit took place that was critical, both to President Roosevelt's evaluation of Great Britain's chances of survival and to Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. On 14 July 1940 Colonel William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, successful attorney, Republican, and subsequently the founder and director of the American Office of Strategic Services, departed for London. An unofficial representative of the president, Donovan was charged with two responsibilities: to seek ways to encourage greater cooperation between the American and British naval intelligence organizations and, more significantly, to assess and report to the president on the British capability and will to resist Germany.

The impetus for the trip remains unclear. British versions of the events leading up to the visit indicate that the idea of using Donovan as a fact-finder originated with William F. Stephenson. Known as "Little Bill," or "The Quiet Canadian," Stephenson had arrived in New York from London in June 1940 to take charge of the British Secret Intelligence Service's New York office. His principal assignment, however, was to act as the Prime Minister's private representative in the United States for coordination of sensitive Anglo-American activities. Like Donovan, with whom he was to become closely associated, Stephenson was a highly decorated veteran of the First World War. He
later became a successful businessman-scientist, with excellent contacts on both sides of the Atlantic. His "cover" in New York was that of head of British Security Coordination, the intentionally vague title given the successor organization to the British Passport Control Office, the traditional "cover" for Secret Intelligence Service officials operating in foreign countries.

Stephenson's biographers have indicated that he and Donovan were acquainted prior to Stephenson's coming to New York in 1940 and that shortly after his arrival he urged Donovan to go to Great Britain and, as an unbiased observer, report the political and military situation as he saw it to Secretary of the Navy Knox and other American government leaders. In later years, however, Donovan indicated that he did not know Stephenson before the trip to London. While it is probable that London made Stephenson aware of the visit and that he had an input into Donovan's British schedule, Frank Knox was the one most likely to have chosen Donovan and to have gained presidential approval for the visit. Knox attended the meeting in which Roosevelt asked Donovan to undertake the trip, and Knox and Donovan were dinner guests of the British ambassador the night before Donovan left for England.

In London the American ambassador was less than sanguine about prospects for the trip's success. In response to instructions from the Secretary of State to make
such arrangements "as will facilitate Col. Donovan's mission," Kennedy replied tartly, "...to send a new man here at this time, with all due respects to Col. Knox is to me the height of nonsense and a definite blow to good organization." British officials were already concerned about weakening resolve in Washington and defeatist attitudes among American officials in London. Godfrey, who saw to it that all important English doors were open to Donovan, commented in a 2 August report that Ambassador Kennedy "has for some time been preaching the gospel of 'all is lost'" and that his influence "has unfortunately spread to the Embassy staff and infected the Naval Attaché...."

There is no doubt that Kirk was pessimistic. On 21 May he had written the American DNI, "my private view of the military situation is that Great Britain is not prepared to resist with success such an attempt [a German invasion]." To counteract this "defeatist" attitude, the British were determined to put on a good show for the unofficial representative of the President of the United States. Donovan's schedule was arranged to include calls on King George VI, the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff, and on Stewart Menzies, head of the Secret Intelligence Service. Godfrey and Kirk jointly planned the military portion of the visit, providing Donovan with a carefully calculated mix of meetings, social events, and visits to operational military units, all designed to show Britain's capabilities and
resolve in the most favorable light.\textsuperscript{56}

From both American and British viewpoints Donovan's mission was highly successful. Roosevelt gained the personal insights he sought concerning the morale of British leadership. Britain gained some assurance that her pressing economic and military needs would receive a sympathetic hearing in the United States. After the military visits, Godfrey reported that Donovan would take back a "message to the effect that there is still time for American aid, both material and economic, to exercise a decisive effect on the war." In later years Godfrey commented that "it was obvious that we had a good friend in Donovan and one who had the ear of the President and knew how to work with the British."\textsuperscript{57}

Kirk, too, was impressed. He wrote Donovan on 14 August that "it has been very evident here that your return [to the United States] produced lots of action..." and Donovan himself seemed pleased. "I think that so far as the restoration of morale here was concerned the trip was worthwhile," he wrote Kirk from Washington on 27 August.\textsuperscript{58}

Concerning intelligence, Godfrey reported that Donovan "will urge full intelligence collaboration and the placing at our disposal of reports by U.S. consular officers especially in French ports, direct liaison between myself and the U.S. D.N.I., and the establishment of Secret and direct methods of communication."\textsuperscript{59}

Following Donovan's visit, personal diplomacy was, at
least for the time being, to give way to more institutionalized contacts. The rules of the game were beginning to change. Admiralty was now more interested in strengthening its ties with the U.S. Navy than in worrying about the potential security risks involved therein. Kirk had been quick to note the shift in policy. On 24 June 1940 he wrote the American DNI, "It is perfectly evident now, not only to me but to many others attached to the Embassy, that the British Government, the Armed Forces, and the people as a whole are counting on intervention by the United States."60 ONI's administrative history offers further indication of the British change in attitude. In the section detailing liaison with British agencies in Washington, reference was made to an Aide-Memoire given Roosevelt by the British ambassador on 8 July 1940 that requested an interchange of secret technical information. According to ONI, it was not the wish of the British government to make the exchange "the subject of a bargain," but to give the United States "full details...without pressing the United States for information," hoping it would reciprocate.61 Reciprocity was not immediate, but by the end of the year the effects of British openhandedness in information exchange would be seen.
In the late summer of 1940, following the defeat of France and at the height of the Battle of Britain, a major concern on both sides of the Atlantic had been the future of the Royal Navy. What would become of the British fleet in the event of a successful invasion of England? Churchill had assured Roosevelt that the Royal Navy would never be allowed to fall into enemy hands, but the Prime Minister was adamantly opposed to permitting the subject of the transfer of the fleet to the Western Atlantic to become a bargaining chip in discussions with the United States. Churchill was equally concerned about the adverse effect on British morale of any consideration of withdrawing the fleet from home waters.\textsuperscript{62}

Despite Churchill's reluctance to discuss removal of Royal Navy units to safer havens, the issue had been raised in Canada, and active preparations undertaken to receive all or part of the British fleet.\textsuperscript{63} As might have been expected, relations between the Royal Canadian and Royal Navies were extremely close, to the point that at the start of the war British naval officers filled some of the key positions on the Canadian Naval Staff — including that of Canadian Director of Naval Intelligence.\textsuperscript{64} Naval leaders in
Washington, London, and Ottawa saw it as almost axiomatic that their efforts to counter the German U-boat threat in the Western Atlantic would have to be fully integrated and that the intelligence with which to conduct the anti-U-boat war would have to be equally well coordinated. As will be seen later, the anticipated close working relationship among the three Operational Intelligence Centers did eventuate.

As early as 14 June 1940, coincidentally the day that Paris fell to the Germans, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King had discussed with the newly-accredited American Minister, Jay Pierrepont Moffat, some of the practical problems that both countries would face if a portion of the British fleet were to be moved to Canadian waters. The Prime Minister had suggested that, should the president be willing, the time might be ripe for Canadian-American military staff talks. The next day when Canadian officials in Washington presented a similar proposal to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, it received a chilly reception. Hull was, however, overruled by Roosevelt, and informal U.S.-Canadian staff talks were held in Washington on 12 July. The talks were apparently inconclusive, and there is no indication that any consensus was reached concerning the exchange of intelligence.65

Canadian-American defense relationships strengthened dramatically the following month. On 17 August Prime Minister King met President Roosevelt in Ogdensburg, New
York, on the U.S. side of the St. Lawrence River. Roosevelt first briefed King on the successful negotiations recently concluded with Great Britain concerning the exchange of U.S. destroyers for American base rights in the British West Indies. The president then suggested the establishment of a U.S.-Canadian board to plan for defense of North America. The next morning the two leaders issued a joint statement, to be known as the Ogdensburg Declaration, which announced that "the Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States" and are forming a Joint Board on Defense. The official history of the U.S. Army in World War II portrays the agreement as "the personal creation" of the president. "The War and Navy Departments were not consulted as to their views on the need for such a board or on its composition and terms of reference, and were not even aware of the President's intention to set up a board."66 Presumably, "mutual defense" was a less pejorative concept than "mutual cooperation" in election-year politics.

While the Canadians were making headway with their plans for U.S.-Canadian military cooperation, the British were pursuing a like strategy. In Washington the British ambassador initiated a campaign to gain presidential approval of an Anglo-American naval conference, while in London Admiralty attempted to come to grips with questions of how much and what kind of cooperation should be sought
and what should be offered in return.

On 11 June 1940, only a few days before the Canadians were to approach the Secretary of State on the possibility of joint military staff talks, the British Ambassador had presented the Secretary with a proposal from Churchill, who had become Prime Minister on 10 May, for naval staff conversations. Hull was cool to the idea but agreed to pass the "suggestion" on to the president. The Secretary of State had also reacted unfavorably to the ambassador's inquiry as to whether members of the War Department might talk to British attachés in Washington about the effects of British and French bombing of Germany, saying that "...of course, we [presumably the U.S. officially] could not be connected with any exchange of information of that nature."

Two weeks later the ambassador again raised with Hull the subject of confidential military and naval staff conferences, saying that "it might be very important to have conversations with respect to these possible future [military] movements so each government would know what was in the mind of the other." Hull once again agreed to bring the matter to the attention of the president but suggested that the talks might better be pursued through diplomatic channels rather than through those of the Army and Navy. Hull emphasized, "it was all important to avoid publicity."67

Similar discussions, later known as the Standardization
of Arms Committee meetings, were planned in London with the British the following month. In both cases the U.S. imposed requirements for secrecy and for non-binding decisions as prerequisites to meeting. The guarded and low-key American responses to both the Canadian and British initiatives were driven in great part by domestic political considerations stemming from the forthcoming November presidential election. Roosevelt was more forthcoming than was his Secretary of State. On 12 July he discussed the matter with Secretary of the Navy Knox and Admiral Harold R. "Betty" Stark, who had replaced Leahy as Chief of Naval Operations in August 1939. They suggested sending Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, former head of the Navy Department's planning staff and one of the attendees at the secret meetings with Admiralty's Commander Hampton and CNO Leahy the previous year in Washington. The president agreed but chose to expand the group to include representatives of the Army and Army Air Corps, although for a shorter visit than that proposed for Ghormley. Brigadier General George V. Strong, a War Department planner who was later to become the chief of Army Intelligence (G-2) for the greater part of the war, and Major General Delos C. Emmons, head of Army Air Corps Headquarters in Washington, were selected. 68 Ghormley was told of his new assignment on 15 July and on 6 August sailed with Strong and Emmons for England on board the SS Britannic. 69
In June, at much the same time that the British ambassador in Washington had made his first representation to Hull for naval discussions, Churchill's War Cabinet had directed Admiralty to form a special committee "to examine all aspects of problems of America-British naval cooperation." Admiral Sir Sidney R. Bailey, RN, had been selected to chair the committee that henceforth would bear his name. The Bailey Committee first met on 20 June 1940 and produced its report on 6 August, just in time for the arrival of Ghormley and his party. To prepare and gain approval of a major policy paper, such as this, in less than two months was a major accomplishment, and one that indicated how important such cooperation was to the British government.

Bailey was an excellent choice to head the committee. A former head of the Admiralty Plans Division, he had been recalled to active duty for this critical assignment. At his death in 1942 The Times commented that "his connections with and knowledge of the United States [his wife was American, daughter of a U.S. Army colonel] made him the ideal liaison officer with the United States Naval Observers in this country, an appointment he held to the time of his death."  

There is no doubt that Bailey's great stature at Admiralty worked to the advantage of the U.S. Navy. Ghormley's Administrative Assistant, Lieutenant Commander
(later Vice Admiral) Bernard F. Austin, USN, recalled an incident in which Ghormley had been directed by the Navy Department to obtain urgently needed information thought to be in Admiralty files concerning the Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific. When approached on the problem Godfrey demurred, saying that the only way he could provide the information would be to turn his department's entire portfolio on the area over to Ghormley, and this Godfrey could not do without approval of the Board of Admiralty. Austin took the problem to Bailey, who saw no reason the files could not be loaned to Ghormley, and that he would approach the Board on the matter. "Later that afternoon," Austin recounted, "sirens sounded, and up to the Embassy drove a couple of motorcycles with sidecars and riders around them to guard them. And in came this officer messenger and plunked down on my desk the entire portfolio of the Far East from the British Admiralty, and asked me to sign a receipt for it.... Admiral Bailey was, throughout our dealing with him, one to inspire confidence and to promote real smooth cooperative effort."72 Bailey's openness, and his effectiveness in spurring unprecedented action from the bureaucratic machinery of Admiralty, were indicative of the magnitude of British government interest in making common cause with the United States during England's dark days in the summer of 1940.

The Bailey Committee began its task by directing the
major sections of the Naval Staff to submit a "wish-list" of those items of support they desired from the U.S. Navy and what specific points of cooperation they were prepared to offer in return. While the resulting report covered all aspects of Anglo-American naval cooperation, a significant portion of the committee's findings dealt with intelligence relationships. In response to the Bailey Committee's direction, Godfrey prepared a memorandum in which he stated that, while he did not want to reveal the whole of the British naval intelligence organization to the United States, he did wish to exchange lists containing the locations of "Reporting Officers," i.e., those individuals at locations around the world who were specifically tasked to collect and provide information to NID and ONI. He did not desire local cooperation between British and American Reporting Officers but would encourage liaison between U.S and Royal Navy intelligence centers that were located in the same general area.

When he specified "intelligence centers," Godfrey was either unaware that the U.S. Navy had none or was thinking of those British and American units in the Pacific that were separately engaged in communications intelligence collection against the Imperial Japanese Navy. Admiralty was particularly interested in obtaining cooperation among British and American direction finding stations scattered throughout the world. These highly specialized units
intercepted radio signals from ships at sea, plotted multiple lines of bearing to the transmitter, and established ship positions through triangulation.

In addition to sharing some information on their respective intelligence organizations, Godfrey desired a full exchange of intelligence generated by the two navies. This exchange could best be achieved, he believed, by stationing American naval officers in NID and British naval officers in ONI to transmit information back and forth. He urged that "as soon as United States co-operation is envisaged, a U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer be appointed to work in N.I.D., ...where he will be in a position to study our Intelligence organization, sources of information, and to assist in establishing close co-operation prior to the arrival of the Staff advocated [in his recommendation to assign U.S naval officers to NID]."^3

Admiral Bailey signed the final report of his committee on 6 August 1940. It is clear from the wording of the report that the drafters did not assume that the War Cabinet had determined on a policy of expanded Anglo-American cooperation. The recommendations were offered should such a policy be adopted. What was assumed, however, was that at some point the United States would enter the war on the Allied side. Section VII of the report dealt with intelligence cooperation, enlarging upon and making more precise the Godfrey recommendations. The section detailed
cooperative initiatives that could be undertaken prior to United States' entry into the war and other initiatives that would be more appropriate afterwards.

No new sources or types of information were to be offered for exchange when the transition from peace to a wartime relationship took place. The embryo intelligence liaison channels that were recommended for immediate opening were to be greatly expanded both in Washington and London once the United States entered the war. In wartime, ONI and NID would continue to operate as separate (as opposed to combined) intelligence centers and would function in close coordination with each other and with the intelligence department of the Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa. Perhaps fearing the Monroe Doctrinaire attitude of the United States toward foreign intelligence activities in Latin America, the British felt "it would be undesirable at present to refer to our intelligence centers at Montevideo and Callao."

The Bailey Committee report was an internal British government document of a type which in more recent times would have been stamped "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals." It was meant to be used by Admiralty representatives at the forthcoming talks with Ghormley and the others in his delegation. However, after Ghormley's arrival in London and prior to the start of the talks, the document was apparently leaked. Austin, Ghormley's
assistant, recalled that "Admiral Pound [the First Sea Lord] inadvertently or advertently, I don't know; disclosed the existence of the paper." Bailey did not want to give the Americans a copy of the report but eventually did so, and it became, according to Austin, "a sort of departure for each phase of our talks with the British." In Austin's view, "the ABC conference, which took place later, [beginning officially on 29 January 1941] was shorter and smoother and produced more agreement as a result of the conversations which we had had with the British on the chapters of this paper."

In deference to Secretary of State Hull's desire to avoid publicity concerning Ghormley and his "observers," the British Chiefs of Staff directed their intelligence sub-committee to examine ways of providing "cover" (their word) for the planned program of visits. The sub-committee adopted the suggestion of Colonel Raymond Lee, the U.S. Army Attaché, that the group should be treated "as ordinary visitors coming to this country to study war conditions. It was inadvisable for them to be met, or in any other way treated as out of the ordinary." To disguise their true purpose, the meetings were to be called those of the "Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee" and, to provide even greater security, Standardization of Arms Committee matters would be referred to only by the code word "Buffalo."
Ghormley and the "observers" arrived in London on 15 August and spent the next few days closeted with American Embassy officials and the naval and military attachés. While Ghormley was en route, his title changed. He had originally been assigned as a naval attaché, but since he was senior to Kirk, there was no way in which he could assume that title without dealing a significant blow to Kirk's standing in the eyes of the Royal Navy and therefore to his effectiveness. Evidently Kirk had discussed the problem with Donovan during his late July visit to London. Kirk wrote Donovan the day before Ghormley's arrival that "the decision to call Rear Admiral Ghormley 'Special Naval Observer' was a good answer. It saves face – which is quite important over here." In later years Kirk admitted that Ghormley's arrival was "a little awkward" and indicated that perhaps the Navy Department had considered "that a young captain of 50 or so was not competent to deal with the British authorities at a high level...." With the protocol problem solved, the two American naval officers worked well together, and as Kirk later said of his time in London with Ghormley, "he is a fine man, a friend, and we never had any friction of any sort." 

Ghormley's first official contact with Admiralty began on 19 August with a call on A.V. Alexander, who had replaced Churchill as First Lord. Alexander, Ghormley reported to Secretary of the Navy Knox, "was most considerate and
cooperative," and he said that "if there was any hesitation in giving me information on the part of officers in the Admiralty to let him know and I would obtain any information I desire."81 This offer appears somewhat ironic in the light of post-war revelations that Alexander, presumably with the concurrence of Churchill, was not on the list of those cleared to receive communications intelligence; nor was he privy to the secrets of the Operational Intelligence Centre or the Lower War Room which, during his visits, had to be "suitably camouflaged for his benefit."82

Early in the course of their discussions with the British, the American observers were given a secret briefing on the organization of His Majesty's Government for the Higher Direction of the War, designed at least in part to acquaint the visitors with the local framework within which cooperation would have to be shaped. Similarities between the British and American systems were noted, such as Churchill's role as both Prime Minister and Defence Minister, making him responsible for both the political and military conduct of the war – analogous to Roosevelt's position as both President and Commander in Chief. Differences were also highlighted. Undoubtedly the virtues of the British system of high-level joint committees, such as the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, were extolled.83

The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee
met during the last two weeks of August and completed its deliberations on the 31st. Since the Americans were merely "observers," they were not empowered to reach agreements and no joint document was issued. However, many sensitive areas of potential cooperation were explored "in principle." Just how sensitive the talks became was illustrated in the minutes of the final meeting in which it was recorded that General Strong indicated he felt the time had come for exchange of intelligence "on a regular basis." "He outlined certain methods by which the sources of information at the disposal of the United States might be placed at the disposal of the British Government" — a near-certain reference to communications intelligence — since the matter was to be taken up with the Prime Minister.  

By the late summer of 1940 the imminent threat of a German invasion of the British Isles had receded. American concerns over British will to continue the war had been in great measure laid to rest, and the first steps toward a mutual understanding on Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation had been taken.

More rapidly in the case of Admiralty than in that of the U.S. Navy Department, the weak inter-war intelligence
departments of Admiralty and the U.S. Navy were strengthened by infusions of talent and money. Driven by considerations of wartime security and by a sense that sharing of information with the United States would be essentially a westbound one-way street, the British were reluctant to provide information to the neutral United States. For its part, Washington's response to Anglo-American cooperation in principle was tempered by concern over England's survivability and by fears that too overt support of the British cause would have political repercussions at home that would be detrimental to Franklin D. Roosevelt's unprecedented bid for a third term as president. Following the defeat of France, British disinclination to share gave way to the realization that cooperative intelligence arrangements would help lead the United States to increased involvement in European affairs, vital to British conduct of the war. What had been in early 1939 a mutually suspicious acceptance in principle of the need for *quid pro quo* information exchange arrangements had, by the late August 1940, given way to a search for ways to reach the goal of complete intelligence exchange with no strings attached.

The meetings of the Standardization of Arms Committee marked a significant milestone on the road to Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. Martin Gilbert summed up the importance of the "observers" in the cooperative process. "Under the guise of being a relatively low grade mission to
discuss the standardization of arms, the three Americans constituted in fact the first Staff Conversations between Britain and the United States, the one belligerent, the other neutral, but both united in a common and ever closer purpose. Not only were British and American military, naval and air matters becoming more closely interwoven, but in the sphere of Intelligence there was a growing realization of the need to share what was known.\textsuperscript{85}
ENDNOTES

Chapter 2:

1. Tromp minute, 17 February 1938, PRO: ADM 1/9546, Embarkation of Allied Naval Attaches or Observers in HM Ships.


4. NID, "Foreign Development of the Torpedo as an air Weapon," PRO: ADM 1/9649. NID, "USA - Control of A.A. guns or Searchlights by infra-red cell Radiation," PRO: ADM 1/9713. NID, "Magnetic Telephones in U.S. Ships; Possible Adoption for Damage Control Purposes," PRO: ADM 1/9741. This latter report is of interest as an example of the perfectly legitimate collection activity of the British Naval Attaché in the United States who, having received a report on a new type of phone from a Canadian source who had visited a U.S. Navy ship, procured one openly from the U.S. manufacturer for testing purposes at the behest of NID.

5. Secretary of the Navy Confidential letter (Op-16-F), to Distribution, 28 September 1940, file 181, "Exchange of Technical Information with the British government," COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


8. Troup to Rushbrooke, 18 October 1938, PRO: ADM 1/10226, Operational Intelligence Centre, Singapore. PRO: ADM 1/9567, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Capetown. PRO: ADM 1/9679, Provision of Career Path for Officers Involved in Operational Intelligence Duties.


18. Godfrey, Memoirs, GDFY 1/6, 5:139. Apparently this opinion of Kirk was widely held in NID. Beesly (Very Special Admiral, 173) and McLachlan (Room 39, 217), both of whom were assigned to NID during the Kirk/Godfrey era, used this quote in their characterizations of Kirk.


20. Ibid., 122.


24. Ibid., 133.

25. Godfrey to D.C.N.S., 21 June 1939, PRO: ADM 1/10218, Adapting Naval Intelligence Division to War Conditions.


27. Hampton to Director of Plans, 23 June 1939, ibid.


34. Colville, Fringes of Power, 48.

35. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:103. "The Polish, French and British Contributions to the Breaking of the Enigma," Appendix I to this volume, 487-495, is a particularly good treatment of the subject.


37. Rupert Allison, The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch 1883-1983 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1983), 113. Mr. Allison, who is a Member of Parliament, has written extensively about British intelligence under the pen name, "Nigel West".


40. Joan Miller, One Girl's War: Personal Exploits in MI 5's Most Secret Station (Dingle, Co. Kerry, Republic of Ireland: Brandon, 1986), 30-31. Apparently Miller was one of several MI 5 agents used to penetrate the Ramsay/Wolkoff group.
41. ALUSNA LONDON to OPNAV, message of 31 October 1939.
ALUSNA LONDON to OPNAV, message of 27 November 1939. OPNAV
to ALUSNA LONDON, message of 28 November 1939; file 1,
ALUSNA and SPENAVO LONDON messages, September 1938–September
1941, COMNAVEU Series I, Operational Archives, NHC,
Washington, D.C. ALUSNA, which stands for American Legation,
U.S. Naval Attaché, is one of several military acronyms
still in common use whose original meaning has all but
disappeared.

42. DNI Minute, 4 May 1940, PRO: ADM 116/4302.

43. Bloch (CINCUS) to Andrews (Commander Scouting Force,
U.S. Fleet), letter of 8 December 1939, Bloch Papers, box 1,
folder: Adolphus Andrews, Manuscripts Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C. The acronym CINCUS (Commander in
Chief, U.S. Fleet) carried unfortunate connotations
subsequent to 7 December 1941 and was changed to COMINCH.

44. DNI Minute, 26 February 1940, PRO: ADM 116/4302.

45. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 66.

46. Martin Gilbert, Second World War (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1989), 37.


48. Footnote 60, Chapter 1.

49. Kennedy to Roosevelt, PSF Diplomatic File 53, folder:
G.B. Joseph Kennedy, Roosevelt Library. Leutze, Bargaining
for Supremacy, 130. JIS Appreciation of Germany's
Intentions, No. 230, PSF 5, Roosevelt Library. N. Butler,
British Embassy, to Roosevelt, PSF Diplomatic File 47,
folder: G.B. Jan – June 1941, Roosevelt Library. British
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Department File 78, folder: Navy Department, Jan – April
1940, Roosevelt Library.

50. Sir William Stephenson. Foreword to William Stevenson, A
Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1976), xi.

51. H. Montgomery Hyde, Room 3603: The Story of the British
Intelligence Center in New York During World War II (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1962), 34. Stevenson, Man
Called Intrepid, 111.

52. Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the C.I.A.: A History of the
Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. Center for
the Study of Intelligence, 1981), 36.


54. DNI to VCNS (Vice Chief of the Naval Staff), minute of 2 August 1940, PRO: ADM 223/84.

55. Kirk to Anderson, letter of 21 May 1940, box 227, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Record Group 80, NA, Washington, D.C.

56. "Program, Colonel Donovan, 22 July - 1 August 1940," Papers of Alan G. Kirk, box 3, folder: Correspondence 1939-41, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


59. PRO: ADM 223/84.

60. Kirk to Anderson, letter of 24 June 1940, box 227, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Record Group 80, NA, Washington, D.C.

61. ONI Administrative History, 360-61.


65. Ibid., 17.

66. Ibid., 29.


73. Godfrey, minute of 2 July 1940, PRO: ADM 199/1158, Bailey Committee.

74. Section VII, Bailey Committee Report, 6 August 1940, Bailey Committee Memoranda, file 20, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


77. Ibid., 2.

78. Kirk to Donovan, letter of 14 August 1940, box 3, folder: Correspondence D, Kirk Papers, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


80. Ibid.

81. Ghormley to Knox, letter of 23 August 1940, folder: 1, Ghormley Correspondence, 1940, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


84. Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 31 August 1940, PRO: ADM 199/1159.

CHAPTER III

FORGING COOPERATION: SEPTEMBER 1940 – DECEMBER 1941

The period from the start of Hitler's "Blitz" against England until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was characterized by the spread of the war from Western Europe, to Egypt and North Africa in the fall of 1940, to Yugoslavia and Greece the following spring, and to Russia in the summer and autumn of 1941. Having failed to gain mastery in the air over the British Isles—a necessary prelude to invasion—Hitler shelved plans to attack England and began to look eastward. German forces scored spectacular successes in North Africa, the Balkans, and Russia in late 1940 and 1941. In the Far East the threat of war grew as Japan eyed European colonial holdings in Southeast Asia as potential sources for badly needed raw materials.

As the military situation grew grimmer, Anglo-American relationships in naval intelligence began to take shape and expand from informal liaison to formal intelligence cooperation. This expansion was accomplished through a
series of conferences of American and British military leaders and through subsequent agreement on administrative measures to place into effect the policy decisions that the conferences had produced. Intelligence organizations on both sides of the Atlantic were fine-tuned to fulfill their wartime responsibilities through critical self-examination of their own operations and through a series of visits by U.S. and Royal Navy intelligence officers to each others' organizations to observe, learn and prepare.

The Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee finished its deliberations at the end of August 1940. Although the talks had been exploratory and the decisions non-binding on either nation, there remained a mutual sense that the essential first steps toward creating the machinery for formal military cooperation had been taken, especially in the field of intelligence. A year of war had pointed up weaknesses in the British intelligence structure and had provided the impetus for needed changes. Improvements in intelligence techniques and organizations, derived from lessons learned "the hard way," would take place. During the months to come the foundation of the future Anglo-American intelligence edifice would be put in place. Planning for future intelligence liaison would proceed from
the general to the specific. The American Army and Army Air
Force representatives to the Standardization of Arms
discussions would return home, but Ghormley would remain in
London working with the Bailey Committee. Their new task:
to reach common agreement on the unilateral proposals
contained in the Bailey Committee report.

The events of the war literally punctuated their
deliberations. German planning for a successful invasion of
England was predicated on removal of the Royal Air Force as
a threat, and on the "softening-up" of British defenses and
British morale by means of a massive air war. The resulting
Battle for Britain began in early August 1940 and lasted
approximately two months. As the Royal Air Force and
Luftwaffe fought for control of the skies over London,
Ghormley, Bailey, and their staffs began the painstaking
task of turning the "wish list" embodied in the committee
report and the "agreements in principle" of the
Standardization of Arms Committee into concrete agreements
that both sides could accept. They approached the problem
on two levels. In early September 1940 Kirk was invited to
a meeting of the Bailey Committee to discuss implementation
of the Standardization of Arms Committee agreements. He was
asked to clarify what General Strong had meant by his call
for an exchange of "information". Kirk replied that "he
understood the reference was to Intelligence information,
particularly cryptography, rather than information on war
experience or technical matters." It was explained to him that henceforth "on technical matters"—non-intelligence questions, such as those concerning operations or weapon systems—he was to address the Bailey Committee. The committee would in turn make the necessary representations to the other divisions of the naval staff and expedite their replies. Other official correspondence would continue to go to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and liaison on intelligence matters apparently would continue unchanged with the DNI.¹ Three days later Kirk informed Washington that a "special committee headed by Admiral Sidney Bailey [has been] formed in Admiralty for ALUSNA's consultation in order [to] expedite and assist collection [of] information" and that "this [is] entirely their own idea and I believe in good faith and for [the] purposes stated." Kirk also indicated that "this procedure appears very satisfactory from our point of view."²

While conducting what in later years would become known as "working level" discussions with Kirk, the Bailey Committee was also preparing for "high level" negotiations with Ghormley. The first item of business was to produce an updated copy of its 6 August report. Section VII of the resulting document, which was dated 11 September 1940, was essentially the same as that issued in August. The potentially sensitive references to British intelligence activities in South America were excised and a few terms
were more fully defined. The term "Anglo-American" of the first iteration was replaced throughout with "British-U.S.," perhaps for greater precision. Finally, some of the actions recommended for inauguration in the first version were now shown as ongoing programs.³

Ghormley began his review of the 11 September document the following day. Subsequent meetings were essentially one-on-one. Ghormley and his aide Bernard Austin attended for the American side while Bailey and one or two experts in the specific topic under discussion represented Admiralty. Upon completion of the review, the committee sent the First Sea Lord twelve specific proposals. The seventh dealt with liaison between the intelligence services of the Admiralty and of the Navy Department and reiterated the provisions of the 11 September paper.⁴

The Navy Department, presumably following instructions from Roosevelt and Knox, carefully restricted the scope of Ghormley's power to reach an agreement with the British. Should any hint of Anglo-American military concert become public, the ensuing political repercussions could be unfortunate, especially on the eve of the presidential election year. In answer to Ghormley's request for guidance as to the extent of his authority, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, added a handwritten postscript to a letter of 16 October that cautioned "get in on any and all staff conversations you can — go as far as
you like in discussions — with the full understanding that you are expressing only your own views as what best to do — 'if & when' — but such must not be understood to commit your government in any manner or to any degree — whatsoever."5

The British, who were pressing for cooperative measures in order to increase the United States' stake in the war, must have found these instructions as irksome as one might expect Ghormley had.

Detailed discussions on the implementation of the proposals dealing with intelligence began on 23 September 1940 during the sixth meeting of what was by then being referred to in British minutes as the "Joint Bailey Committee." Ghormley and Bailey examined the specifics of Section VII and made recommendations as to those actions that could be undertaken immediately and those that must wait until American official entry into the war. For example, sharing of information on U.S. — British intelligence centers was marked "exchange now," while cooperation between direction finding stations was marked, "discuss now. Action on intervention."6 Regarding the agreement to exchange locations of direction finding stations, Austin made a note to himself to "send [the list] to Dept as soon as possible. Br. Specially [emphasis Austin's] anxious to know where our high freq. stations are."7 By this time operational, technical, as well as intelligence information was beginning to flow both ways.
On 28 September 1940 the Secretary of the Navy signed a letter drafted by ONI in which he offered for release to the British government "all devices, instruments, or systems in use, developed for use or under development by the Navy Department" excepting only the bombsight and one type of antenna mine. He further stated that "should the British Government...request drawings, specifications...and any other detailed information on this matter, they shall be furnished the information."  By 19 October Kirk was able to report that "the bars are down, and it is just a question of knowing exactly what is wanted and who had sufficient technical background to absorb the information furnished."  

The fourteenth meeting of the committee dealt with the specific question of intelligence cooperation in the Far East. As the war at sea intensified in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, the British were forced to withdraw ships from the Pacific, thus lessening the Royal Navy's ability to deal with the growing Japanese threat in Asia. Of primary concern was Singapore, considered by the British to be the key to the defense of the Malay Barrier and in turn to the protection of the Imperial lifeline to Australia and New Zealand. Japan's signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on 27 September 1940, had done nothing to lessen British anxiety. 

As early as 1939 Admiralty had asked the U.S about the possibility of exchanging information on Japanese activities
derived from communications intelligence but had been, as we have seen, rebuffed. British naval intelligence remained eager to tap this source of information and to gain access to other types of intelligence produced by the U.S Asiatic Fleet's listening posts in China and in the Philippines. Because the United States had something of value to offer, intelligence cooperation in the Far East became a major goal of Admiralty in implementing the informal agreements made by the Standardization of Arms Committee. The participants in the 16 October meeting urged their governments to establish both intelligence liaison mechanisms and secure communications channels in advance of potential hostilities. They suggested these ends could best be met by a prompt exchange of liaison officers between the U.S. Asiatic Fleet staff and the Royal Navy Chief of Intelligence Staff, Singapore. Additionally, "the importance of inter-change of information between British and United States Naval Attachés at Tokyo was mentioned."10

By November 1940 Ghormley's proposals and those of the Bailey Committee had reached Washington. Section VII, which dealt with communications as well as intelligence matters, was sent for comment to both the Director of Naval Communications and to the Director of Naval Intelligence, and their responses were to be coordinated by the Director of War Plans. Whether it was because of the ongoing feud between Plans and Intelligence for hegemony in the
intelligence field or because of a reluctance to commit himself, the DNI's response was cool. Concerning the recommendation that information should be shared now on intelligence centers, the DNI huffed that "steps will be taken to effect any further exchange which may appear necessary or desirable." Regarding direction finding stations, the DNI deferred to the Director of Naval Communications on the question of "what further information, if any, should be furnished the British and requested from them." Despite the attitude of the DNI, by 26 November Ghormley had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that he was in general agreement with Section IV (Intercommunication) and the communication portions of Section VII, which included exchanging codes for intelligence use as well as sharing direction finding site information.

Once consensus had been reached and the resulting agreements passed to the British Naval Staff and the American Navy Department for ratification, the long-term work of the committee began. Until it was disbanded in September 1941, the Bailey Committee received and processed requests for operational, technical, and intelligence information from the U.S. Naval Attaché. Conversely, it levied on the naval attaché British requests for information from American sources. By 6 May 1941 Bailey was able to report to the First Sea Lord that, "So far 433 memoranda
have been addressed by the Committee to the U.S. Naval Attaché, and 331 memoranda have been received from him."¹³

Unfortunately, the numbers are not a good indicator of which side received the greater benefit from the exchange. Memoranda were numbered consecutively without regard to whether they were a request or a response, so there is no way of telling how many actual requests were made by either side. For example, in Memorandum 16 of 19 September 1940, the U.S. requested copies of interrogations of captured U-boat crews, and in Memorandum 381 of 9 June 1941, the U.S. provided data on the Japanese naval building program, "specifically requested by the Admiralty."¹⁴ The relative value of the exchange to either side becomes even more difficult to assess when one remembers that, under the terms of Section VII of the Bailey Committee agreements, the British Naval Attaché in Washington was also providing information to the Department of the Navy and was receiving requests for information from it. The British certainly felt it more blessed politically to give. After several months of the program, Bailey recommended to his superiors that, "in order to emphasize in higher places the wealth of hardly bought information which the Navy Department are getting from us...the British Ambassador in Washington be informed."¹⁵ Bailey's superiors agreed.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the Bailey Committee to the development of Anglo-American
naval intelligence cooperation. In the first phase of its efforts the committee put in order Admiralty's intelligence needs from the United States and defined with greater precision than ever before what the Royal Navy was willing to offer in return. The committee then met with its American peers to reach agreement on a document that would serve as a model for the many specific wartime protocols that were to follow. Finally, the committee implemented its own program and pioneered in the orderly matching of intelligence needs to intelligence holdings on both sides of the Atlantic. What had been an informal *modus vivendi* reached between the British and American naval attachés and their respective host governments for the exchange of intelligence in London and Washington had become formalized by the terms of Section VII. Henceforth, "the British and the U.S. Naval Liaison Missions in Washington and London respectively should...include an officer solely for intelligence duties and liaison...."

Despite the improvement in intelligence exchange brought about through the efforts of the Bailey Committee, snags appeared from time to time in the system — on both sides. In January 1941 the British Naval Attaché in Washington complained to his DNI, Godfrey, that he had to depend on the "spontaneous disgorging" of hand-outs from the War and Navy Departments. "As yet there is no offer from the Navy Department to see their files of documents and
information is received on unsigned, unheaded slips of paper, the same method being employed by the War Department."¹⁷ This unstructured, almost clandestine, provision of information to Admiralty's representatives in Washington was indicative of the U.S. Navy Department's determination to avoid becoming too involved with the British at a time when the United States was at least nominally neutral.

At the same time in London, the U.S. Military Attaché, newly-promoted Brigadier General Raymond Lee, was complaining, apparently to anyone in the British intelligence establishment who would listen, about the withholding of information from his office. On 6 January 1941 he approached the new British Director of Military Intelligence, General Francis Davidson, and asked for special treatment for U.S. military attachés and for daily reporting on the general situation.¹⁸ Two days later Lee again raised the intelligence flow question, this time with General Hastings "Pug" Ismay, Military Secretary to the War Cabinet. Ismay told him that one of the reasons for the reduction in information was that "the Prime Minister is completely rampant on the question of secrecy and is cutting down the number of people in the British government who know anything about what is going on."¹⁹ Since the efforts of the Joint Bailey Committee were relatively unpublicized, naval intelligence was able to maintain a low profile and
escape this particular round of the Prime Minister's periodic security purges.

Despite its government's security concerns, British naval intelligence continued to take the initiative in exchanging information with the U.S. Navy. In late January 1941 presidential confidant Harry Hopkins went to London on a mission similar to that undertaken by Donovan in July 1940. The avowed reason for the trip was to determine what immediate aid the United States could provide Great Britain. President Roosevelt, perhaps triggered by a stream of pessimistic telegrams in the final weeks of 1940 from Joseph Kennedy, the American Ambassador in London, had sent Hopkins to England with the underlying purpose of assessing Churchill's and the nation's will to continue resistance to the Germans.20

As they had in Donovan's case, British leaders prepared carefully for the visit. Admiralty canvassed its various divisions for items to be considered for discussion with Hopkins. While most responses dealt with military equipment, NID wished to ask Hopkins "to try to get a better U.S. intelligence service organized in places where we cannot keep consuls ourselves, e.g. French ports." Admiral T.S.V. Phillips, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, concurred and recommended that U.S. "naval officers in a civilian capacity" be assigned to ports in Metropolitan France and North Africa.21 Apparently previous British appeals to
Donovan to provide American consular reporting from French ports had been only marginally productive.\textsuperscript{22} The abortive British attempt to seize the Vichy-controlled port of Dakar in September 1940 and the Royal Navy's July bombardment of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir (near Oran) had — as Martin Gilbert noted in a masterpiece of understatement — "caused considerable bitterness in France."\textsuperscript{23} As a result, most British sources of intelligence in French territories had dried up.

In March 1941 the United States government concluded the Murphy-Weygand Agreement, an economic accord with Vichy France that provided for American shipment of food and raw materials to North Africa in return for a French promise that these goods would not be transshipped to Europe or be allowed to fall into German hands.\textsuperscript{24} The agreement was negotiated by Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of the United States Embassy in Vichy, and General Maxime Weygand, Vichy's proconsul in North Africa. To insure that the terms of the accord were carried out, the French permitted the United States to station "Control Officers" at various ports in North Africa. By agreement among the State, War, and Navy Departments, these new vice-consular positions were filled by military officers. They were to operate in civilian clothes and were to "observe the military and naval situation in North Africa while carrying on their control work."\textsuperscript{25}
Robert Murphy remained in North Africa to supervise the intelligence collection team that not only provided current information to the Anglo-American intelligence community but also collected basic information on terrain, coast and landing beaches, and ports and harbors that was later used in the November 1942 American landings in North Africa. The seed of an idea, planted by Admiralty intelligence, seemed to have germinated.

By the Spring of 1941, with the exception of reports resulting from the Murphy-Weygand Agreements, the British gained little new intelligence from increased cooperation with the United States. In British eyes the significance of cooperative efforts such as those illustrated by the Bailey-Ghormley negotiations was not in the value of the information gained but in the development of the sharing process itself. For one country to share its intelligence secrets with another involves what is in effect a surrender of a portion of national sovereignty, a step not lightly taken. In the secret world of intelligence, to expose sources, to share methods, is to make oneself vulnerable. With vulnerability comes dependence. For Britain, early wartime exigencies made the risks inherent in Anglo-American inter-dependence in intelligence acceptable.

As shown by the work of the Joint Bailey Committee, United States and British naval intelligence relationships had progressed from the unstructured initiatives of 1939 to
an ordered approach to the problem of mutual fulfillment of intelligence needs. The goal of full coordination and sharing of responsibility for provision of needed intelligence remained elusive, but a start had been made.

As the British rushed preparations to withstand the German invasion expected in the fall of 1940, the government became intensely concerned with the ability of its intelligence organizations to fulfill their wartime responsibilities. On the Continent the agent networks of the Secret Intelligence Service were in a state of disarray. Communications intelligence, while helpful, was spotty. Even the intelligence prowess of the Royal Navy was in question. ''It is most galling,'' the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, wrote Admiralty in June 1940, ''that the enemy should know just where our ships, from battleships to cruisers, always are, whereas we generally learn where his major forces are when he sinks one or more of our ships.''

Ever since the start of hostilities in September 1939, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service had lost ground on the Continent. First to go were SIS stations in Berlin, Vienna, and Warsaw, followed in due course by those in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France. By the fall of 1940 SIS had stations only in the neutral capitals of Stockholm, Berne,
Madrid, and Lisbon. The "Venlo Incident" in November 1939 had added insult to the real injury that had been done to SIS agent networks in Western Europe. The "incident" took place when a German agent in contact with the British Passport Control Office, the SIS "cover" in The Hague, planted a false story about the likelihood of a revolt in Germany. The German agent offered to put SIS representatives in touch with one of the "plotters," who was in fact a German security official. Two SIS representatives travelled to the Dutch border town of Venlo to meet with the "plotters" and on 9 November were forcibly taken across the border into Germany and arrested. The gleeful German publicity given the incident was painful. Even more painful was the realization, stemming from Venlo, that the British agent networks in Holland had been penetrated by the Germans as early as 1935.

By the latter part of 1940 SIS had begun rebuilding in Europe and, despite the "considerable hope" held out by its chief, Colonel Stewart Menzies, "of being able to provide a rapid and efficient intelligence service," Churchill was not impressed. His government directed Maurice Hankey, the supervising minister of both the SIS (MI-6) and the Counter Intelligence Service (MI-5), to conduct a "full and searching inquiry" into the activities of the two organizations. The report to the Prime Minister that resulted was considered so sensitive that "during the
invasion scare in the fall of 1940 an order was given to destroy all copies — lest they should fall into the enemy's hands."31

As the British examined their intelligence needs, they grew to realize that no single type of information could, without integration of data from many other sources, provide a sufficiently authoritative picture of what to expect from their enemies. The mechanism for coordination of multi-source intelligence had existed since 1936 in the form of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which the British Chiefs of Staff had created to provide intelligence support to its planning staff. For a variety of reasons, including individual Service hostility toward any intelligence not produced "in-house" and the Joint Intelligence Committee's failure to take the initiative in providing assessments on important questions, the committee did not play a major role in the pre-war intelligence process.32

As he had done in the case of the Secret Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services, Churchill ordered a review of naval and military intelligence and their role in governmental decision-making. As a result of the inquiry, "the JIC was given new terms of reference which confirmed it as the central agency for producing operational intelligence appreciations and for bringing them to the attention of the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff."33

In essence the British government had opted for a
single central point for intelligence production instead of accepting the uncoordinated inputs of the individual Service intelligence organizations. This move to provide coordinated intelligence "appreciations" to top-level British leaders was extremely significant to the development of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. From the autumn of 1940 onward, the British, convinced that a joint intelligence product was superior to that achieved by the American way of allowing each Service to provide its own intelligence, lost no opportunity to urge the United States to adopt the British system. Dissimilar national intelligence structures probably retarded overall Anglo-American intelligence cooperation but may have worked to the advantage of Navy-to-Navy intelligence ties since, in the absence of an American JIC, there was really no other path to choose. As we shall see, later intelligence cooperation between the two naval staffs began to suffer as a more structured joint and combined system for direction of the war emerged.

U.S. Navy interest in the British JIC organization was slow in developing. In June 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a report on the composition and functions of the British JIC that he had found "instructive and important" to the Secretary of the Navy. While the CNO did not urge the Secretary to consider a similar organization for the U.S. military, he did point out how such a group
could be accommodated within the then-current Army/Navy administrative structure." The report set forth in detail the composition of the British JIC, a pattern that was generally followed when the U.S. JIC was formed some months later. The report summarized the role of the JIC as providing "the principal and critical place in the central British war machine where intelligence from all Bureaus and Ministries is considered for application to Joint War Plans."  

Contributing to America's delay in adopting the British JIC system was the inability of the U.S. War and Navy Departments' intelligence organizations to work together. This failure to cooperate was one that dogged American intelligence throughout the war and one that by extension adversely affected the progress of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. The situation was not unique to the Army's G-2 and Navy's ONI but rather was a manifestation of a traditional unwillingness to coordinate between the Services themselves and, in a larger sense, between the Services and the many government agencies involved in wartime information and security matters.

Lacking the stimulus provided the British by an enemy poised to invade, American military leaders were much slower than their British counterparts to embrace the concept of coordinated decision-making generally and coordinated intelligence specifically. A Joint Army Navy Board had
existed in the United States since 1903. The Board had been organized by agreement of the Secretaries of War and Navy to coordinate inter-service planning and consisted of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the heads of their war plans divisions.36

The Joint Board's chief weakness, and one that persisted until the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942, was that its authority was limited to making policy recommendations that could be ignored by either service if it so chose. In 1938 a Standing Liaison Committee, consisting of the Undersecretary of State and the two Service chiefs, was created to insure that military and diplomatic policies were coordinated. This body, too, lacked binding authority. It met sporadically. "During 1940, for instance, it met only nine times."37

In the 1930s there had been even less coordination of military and naval intelligence activities or assessments than there was of strategic planning. The General Board of the Navy, established before the First World War to advise the Secretary of the Navy on policy, became concerned. As late as October 1939, after the German defeat of Poland, the board noted that the Navy was deficient in its strategic planning, in part because of inadequate intelligence.38 Similar intelligence shortcomings existed in Great Britain at roughly the same time, prompting Churchill, as we have seen, to order searching reviews of the government's civil
and military intelligence structure.

Unlike Admiralty's NID, ONI had been unsuccessful in convincing Navy Department leaders of the need for its intelligence in their decision-making. What intelligence was used in planning was provided by the planners themselves. Even the CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark, looked to the War Plans Division rather than to ONI for intelligence and analysis. Because of this de facto shift in intelligence responsibility, the British problem of which administrative entity to approach on questions of information exchange—Plans or Intelligence—became more vexing.

Nor was the situation much different in the Army. General Dwight D. Eisenhower commented that, just prior to the onset of hostilities, "within the War Department a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning existed in the field of intelligence" and drew attention to "the stepchild position of G-2" in the Army's General Staff System.

In addition to the growth of internal power struggles between plans and intelligence within the Army and Navy staffs, keen inter-departmental rivalries developed in providing intelligence to the president and his closest advisors. At times these rivalries led to compromises that bordered on the absurd. In the field of communications intelligence, for example, it was determined that
"responsibility for transmitting special material to the President...will rest with the Chief, Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, during January, March, May, July, September, and November and with the Director, Naval Intelligence during the alternate months of February, April, June, August, October, and December."

The first formal attempt to systematize American intelligence activities did not originate with the military, nor did it involve foreign intelligence. In addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the military departments, most of the major U.S. government agencies by the late 1930s had their own investigative organizations examining domestic subversive activities. There was no clearly defined coordinating agency, and the FBI's attempts to establish its primacy among the various warring civilian departments - State, Treasury, and Post Office, to name but a few - met with predictable bureaucratic opposition. Finally, on 26 June 1939, President Roosevelt sent a directive to the Cabinet in which he indicated that "investigation of all espionage, counterespionage and sabotage matters was to be controlled and handled only by the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department and the Navy" and that "the heads of these three agencies were to constitute an Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee." This committee functioned only with regard to matters internal to the United States
government, and there is no indication that it ever conducted liaison with any foreign intelligence agencies. Foreign cooperative arrangements, such as those between the FBI and the British Secret Intelligence Service and between ONI and the same Secret Intelligence Service, were carefully compartmented on an Agency-to-Agency basis and the relationships jealously guarded — to the detriment of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation.

As the conflict in Europe deepened and spread in 1940, United States' interest in foreign intelligence grew dramatically. The number of U.S. government agencies jockeying for the opportunity and the means to provide the desired intelligence grew equally. Extension of the formal domestic coordination machinery to the field of foreign intelligence activities soon became a necessity. Vincent Astor, Roosevelt's private intelligence agent in Manhattan, may have acted as a catalyst in bringing intelligence coordination problems to the president's attention. He wrote Roosevelt in April 1940 that the Department of State had lodged a complaint in London that a British Secret Intelligence Service representative, under diplomatic "cover" in New York, was passing information directly to U.S. intelligence agencies rather than going through State Department channels. The British government subsequently instructed the SIS to deal only through the Department of State and this, Astor believed, was causing unacceptable
delays in the material getting to those who needed it. Citing a recent example, Astor informed the president, "It is certainly a bit difficult to conduct a blitzkrieg of our own against malefactors when information becomes stymied in department files for six weeks." Astor must have seen the State Department as threatening his carefully cultivated ties with the SIS in New York that were providing a channel for sensitive information from London to reach the Office of Naval Intelligence and, if of sufficient importance, the president.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State and chief advisor to Roosevelt on intelligence matters, was added to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee. He noted in his diary on 4 June 1940 that he had met with J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI and others on the committee. "We had a pleasant time, coordinating, though I don't see what the State Department has got to do with it...." Within a few months State's participation in intelligence activities had grown to the point that Berle wrote, "We started work on organizing the Intelligence Division for the Department. Intelligence is beginning to be interesting in the Department now, so everybody wants to be in on it." Berle's diary entries from June through November 1940 indicated regular intelligence coordination activities. During one of these meetings he commented that "we [the committee] likewise decided that the time had come
when we would have to consider setting up a Secret Intelligence Service" — a step that was not taken until July 1941 when William J. Donovan's Coordinator of Information organization, the forerunner of the Office of Strategic Services, came into existence.45

At the end of June 1940, Berle had written his colleagues on the committee that the president had directed him to inform them that foreign intelligence responsibility was to be divided among the FBI and Army and Navy intelligence. The FBI would be charged with foreign intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere, while "the existing Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence branches should cover the rest of the world, as and when necessity arises."46 Despite the presidential directive, no real degree of coordination was achieved, and inter-agency struggles over intelligence "turf" continued. However, one positive result of the president's decision was that it gave ONI official sanction to strengthen its ties with several British intelligence organizations, including Admiralty, that heretofore had been cooperating informally in the exchange of foreign intelligence.

The final attempt to coordinate Army and Navy intelligence policy prior to 7 December 1941 ended in failure. Commander Edwin T. Layton, USN, staff intelligence officer to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor, has written that "the tragedy...might have been avoided if only the attempt by the Joint Board to set up a body to coordinate Army and Navy intelligence functions had been successful." Layton's thesis is strengthened when considered in the context of Roberta Wohlstetter's cogent argument, expressed in *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, that there was a large amount of evidence available in Washington to point to a Japanese attack on Hawaii. However, the pertinent intelligence was fragmented — in the hands of many different agencies — and "embedded in an atmosphere of 'noise', i.e., in the company of all sorts of information that is useless and irrelevant for predicting the particular disaster." Layton stated that on 26 September 1941 senior officers of the Army and Navy plans and intelligence divisions met "to establish a system for coordinating and handling important strategic and tactical information." However, their hopes for a cooperative approach to intelligence analysis foundered on the refusal of Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Navy War Plans Division chief, to permit joint evaluations. "Admiral Turner, like many naval officers of his generation harbored a hearty distrust of his sister service." The group ended the day deadlocked and did not meet again until 9 December 1941.

The lack of coordinated policy and prevalence of bureaucratic infighting among members of the fledgling American intelligence community did not go unremarked in
London, by both American and British observers. Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, the American Military Attaché, commented on 27 May 1941 that "it has come to a pretty pass when the American Navy can come to an agreement with the British Navy and the American Army can come to an agreement with the British Army, more easily that the American Army can come to an agreement with the American Navy."\textsuperscript{50}

Lee's sentiments were shared by Admiral Godfrey. Following a May 1941 visit to Washington the British DNI wrote, "we already knew that the relations between the U.S. Army and Navy were bad, but we did not realize how bad until we tried to get them to see eye to eye and collaborate with each other and with the State Department about this supremely important matter of intelligence and its allied activities."\textsuperscript{51} Unfortunately, this situation was to persist until well after United States' entry into the war. The failure of U.S. intelligence agencies to coordinate their activities and analyses not only hindered effectiveness at home, but also hampered intelligence cooperation abroad. Born of wartime necessity, British achievements in coordination of planning and of intelligence matters were not to be emulated in the United States until 1942 and, even then, reluctantly. The infighting between the U.S. War and Navy Departments would continue its adverse effect on Anglo-American Naval intelligence relationships until Navy-to-Navy cooperation in planning was supplanted later in the war by
the Allied combined staff system.

While the United States was attempting to get its intelligence house in order and to promote cooperation among the several government departments engaged in intelligence matters, pressure was increasing on both sides of the Atlantic for high-level military staff talks to build on the cooperative foundation laid at the Standardization of Arms Committee meetings. On 12 November 1940, shortly after the U.S. election results were known, the Chief of Naval Operations prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy in which he reviewed the current world situation and offered four alternative courses of action for the U.S. Navy. Admiral Stark designated these alternatives in military terminology as Plans ABLE through DOG. Plan DOG, the one favored by Stark, called for recognition that the Western Hemisphere and the Atlantic were the areas of paramount strategic concern to the United States and that the Pacific was of secondary import.

Stark called for a coordinated, government-wide strategy that recognized the primacy of the Atlantic and recommended staff conversations, with the British and Canadians in the Atlantic and the Dutch and British in the Pacific, to implement the concept. The U.S. Army concurred
that the defeat of Germany should be the primary U.S. policy goal.\textsuperscript{52} However, it was not until January 1941 that the president agreed and issued instructions that the concepts embodied in Plan DOG be used as a basis for strategic planning.\textsuperscript{53}

The U.S. Navy's shift in strategic emphasis from the Pacific to the Atlantic was of great significance to the British, who had been pressing for a United States' commitment in the Far East to aid in the defense of Singapore. The gist of Plan DOG was made available to the Royal Navy in both London and Washington. Stark sent a copy to Ghormley and Kirk with the admonition that the document was unofficial and that "under no circumstances should the British be given a copy and in fact I [Stark] think it would probably be best for the British not to know that it is in your possession."\textsuperscript{54} In the same letter Stark indicated that he would let Captain Arthur W. Clarke, RN, read the plan in the Navy Department but would not permit him to make any notes. Clarke had been sent from Admiralty Plans Division to Washington in July 1940 as Assistant Naval Attaché to advise on questions of naval cooperation.\textsuperscript{55}

Even before the results of the American elections were known, Britain had started to consider additional initiatives that would build on the foundations laid by the Standardization of Arms Committee understandings. By October 1940 the threat of imminent invasion of the British
Isles had diminished to the point that Admiralty could look beyond the day-to-day problems of survival and focus on the slightly less immediate question of improving Anglo-American naval ties. British naval planners began by giving thought to selection of delegates for staff conferences with the Americans. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, alerted Rear Admiral R.M. Bellairs on 9 October that he should be prepared to lead the Admiralty delegation. Bellairs had retired from the Royal Navy in 1932 and had participated as an advisor in the arms limitations treaty conferences of the 1930s, thus gaining negotiating experience with the U.S. Navy. At the beginning of the war he had been recalled to active duty in Admiralty, where he had served primarily as a planner.⁵⁶

Pound pressed the case for Anglo-American naval staff conferences on American Special Naval Observer, Robert Ghormley, and also urged their consideration on British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Lothian, during his visit to London in November. Following his return to the United States, Lothian was able to inform London on 29 November that the president had agreed to staff talks in Washington, to take place as soon as arrangements could be made. The resulting American-British Conversations, known as ABC-1, took place from 29 January to 27 March 1941.⁵⁷

While the American War Department and the British War Office and Air Ministry were in favor of the talks, the real
impetus came from the two navies. Both the Navy Department and Admiralty prepared carefully and both were well represented. The U.S. Navy delegation was led by Rear Admiral Ghormley, recalled temporarily from London for the discussions, and included among others Navy Department Plans Division chief, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, who was also deeply involved in the Department's intelligence process, and Captain Alan G. Kirk, who returned from London to participate but remained in Washington after the conference to become the new Director of Naval Intelligence.

In addition to Rear Admiral Bellairs, the British delegation included Rear Admiral Victor H. Danckwerts, former Director of Plans in Admiralty. Joining them in Washington was Captain Clarke, the Royal Navy coordination expert to whom Plan DOG had been revealed. Ghormley and Colonel Lee, the U.S. Military Attaché, London, travelled with the British delegation on board Britain's newest battleship, *HMS King George V*, that was transporting Lord Halifax, the new British Ambassador, to Washington. At this rather low point in the war, one suspects that the pride of the Royal Navy was selected to carry the delegates, more for reasons of prestige than for the relatively greater protection against U-boat attack that its speed provided.

British positions on potential conference issues had been prepared in detail and in great secrecy. Lee noted in his diary that the British delegation had declined to give
its American fellow-travellers any information on what it planned to propose prior to embarkation, ostensibly for reasons of security, but agreed to do so once at sea.59

The U.S. Joint Planning Committee prepared with equal care. In late January 1941 the committee recommended to the Joint Board that ONI should summarize intelligence on the strength, disposition, and building programs of the British, French, German, and Italian navies. In addition, ONI should prepare brief estimates of the political, economic, and financial situations of each country with respect to its ability to sustain military operations. ONI was also asked to provide statistics on British merchant shipping losses and on the British merchant navy building program. In the same memorandum the Joint Planning Committee recommended that the U.S. delegation adopt a firm position vis à vis the British proposals "because the United States can safeguard the North American Continent...whether allied with Britain or not," but "Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the United States provides that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far greater degree of material aid than is being given now." The committee warned that "never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests."60 Concern for protection of national interests was a preoccupation of U.S. navy planners also, even when cooperation was at its most
fruitful, and was a theme that was to recur with increasing frequency in the later years of the war.

Even as both sides prepared for an historic meeting to create the machinery for arguably the closest and most extensive cooperative effort ever achieved between sovereign nations, the seeds of discord were being sown. Mutual suspicions of seeking post-war advantage were to become a leitmotiv running through the Anglo-American wartime cooperative experience, affecting intelligence as well as other cooperative ventures.

ABC-1, the short title given to the 27 March 1941 report of the United States - British Staff Conversations, "must be recognized as the true opening of formal permanent relations between American and British Staffs." The stated purpose of the conversations was "to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied to her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war." To realize the objective of defeating Germany, "the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater." Were Japan to enter the war, "the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive." To implement the agreements contained in ABC-1, the conferees agreed to exchange military missions. The missions were to be composed of one senior officer of each
military service, plus appropriate staff. The senior members were to represent "jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff" and individually "their own Military Services." Provision was also made for exchange of U.S. liaison officers with those of the Dominions: Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. By July 1941, Canadian-American cooperation had progressed to the point that a joint defense plan had been prepared.\textsuperscript{63} Anglo-American talks, in which Australia and New Zealand participated, were also underway in the Far East. Representatives of the Dominions sat as members of the British ABC-1 delegation in its private meetings but were not present at the combined U.S-U.K. discussions.

Intelligence cooperation, while not a burning issue during the ABC-1 discussions, was addressed. The final report, issued on 29 March 1941, contained provisions that served to formalize existing \textit{ad hoc} information exchange arrangements. More important, an annex to the basic report contained instructions concerning the composition and duties of the military missions and provided that three U.S. Navy officers be sent to London and two Royal Navy officers be sent to Washington for the specific purpose of intelligence coordination.\textsuperscript{64}

Once again, the British were more willing to explore the uncharted waters of full intelligence exchange than were the Americans. On 6 March the British delegation to ABC-1
submitted the following draft paragraph for consideration. "Intelligence. All relevant information about enemy or neutral powers that may come into the possession of the United States or British Governments will be fully and promptly exchanged. United States and British intelligence officers will be associated with the appropriate intelligence organizations in the United States or Great Britain and in their overseas territories as required." The thrust of the British paragraph on intelligence was significantly altered through negotiation. In its final form the ABC-1 agreement stated that "existing Military intelligence organizations of the two Powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations." In all probability the American negotiators were unable to accept two major points in the original British proposal. The first British version called for exchange of "all relevant information on enemy and neutral powers." Should the U.S. have agreed, all information derived from codebreaking activities would have had to be revealed — something the Navy Department would have found premature at
best, considering that the United States was not even officially in the war. Limiting the terms of intelligence exchange to "pertinent information concerning war operations" considerably narrowed the scope of the agreement. The British draft also called for Royal Navy intelligence officers to be physically located in U.S. Navy intelligence centers. Imbued with a strong traditional distrust of British motives, the U.S. Navy Department might well have seen exchange of personnel as an underlying move to gain national advantage rather than to promote wartime cooperation. In the months that followed, the United States was to be equally unresponsive to subsequent British offers to combine American and British intelligence-producing organizations.

Admiral Ghormley returned to his duties in London shortly after the conclusion of the ABC-1 agreements. On 26 April 1941 he wrote Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord, that President Roosevelt had approved "the methods envisaged by ABC-1" for Anglo-American cooperation and that the CNO desired that terms of ABC-1 be placed into effect "as rapidly as practicable." In the case of intelligence, however, the CNO did not instruct his attachés and observers abroad to implement the provisions for close cooperation contained in ABC-1 until less than two weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Until his hand was forced by the deteriorating situation in the Far East, CNO may have felt
more comfortable with retaining closer control over intelligence liaison with the British by keeping it on a Headquarters-to-Headquarters basis, rather than by authorizing cooperation at all echelons of command.

By April 1941 the war had intensified and widened. Italian dreams of a second Roman Empire in Africa had been shattered by British successes on land and at sea. British and Commonwealth forces had soundly defeated Italian armies in Africa, driving them from East Africa and pushing them back in western Egypt. At sea, in late March, the Royal Navy all but eliminated the Italian Navy as a factor in the Mediterranean at the Battle of Cape Matapan, off southern Greece. By April Hitler had reluctantly begun to assist the faltering Il Duce. German troops had successfully invaded Yugoslavia and Greece, forcing the British expeditionary force sent to aid the Greeks to begin its withdrawal. General Erwin Rommel had arrived in Tripoli in February 1941, and by April German forces under his command were reversing British successes in North Africa. Although the air battle to halt a German invasion of Britain had been won, the RAF was unable to halt the Luftwaffe's savage pounding of British cities; and the Battle of the Atlantic continued in full fury. However, Britain no longer stood
alone. The U.S. Congress had passed the Lend-Lease Bill in March, opening the way for massive American military and economic support to Great Britain. Anglo-American cooperation, underscored by the Bailey Committee agreements and those of ABC-1, drew the two nations ever closer together.

Ghormley’s return to London in April 1941 was marked by a significant increase in his authority. Although his title remained Special Naval Observer, he and his small staff began to operate as the nucleus of the United States Military Mission called for under the terms of the ABC-1 Agreements. It will be remembered that when Ghormley first arrived in London in the early fall of 1940 he had been directed to operate in a quasi-private capacity— all views expressed by him were to be considered as personal and not as a commitment on the part of the U.S. government. On 5 April the Chief of Naval Operations sent Ghormley a new letter of instruction broadening the scope of his activities. In addition to performing his purely naval duties as the representative of the CNO, he was to negotiate with the British "on military affairs of common interest" that bore on the implementation of ABC-1. All matters arising in London that required joint decisions of the U.S. and British military chiefs were to be communicated to Washington via his office and not through any other military or diplomatic channels. In the event of U.S. entry into the
war, Ghormley was told to expect orders designating him the Naval Member of the U.S. Military Mission in London, as well as Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in North Europe, and to plan accordingly.\textsuperscript{70}

Prior to Ghormley's return, changes had taken place in the American team in England. Kirk had remained in Washington as the new Director of Naval Intelligence. In March Captain Charles H. Lockwood, USN, had assumed Kirk's duties as U.S. Naval Attaché in London and, in addition, had been designated Chief of Staff to the Special Naval Observer. This "double-hatting" had the effect of placing all American naval liaison activities, including those concerning intelligence that previously had been within the purview of the naval attaché, directly or indirectly under Ghormley's control.

Also in March John Gilbert Winant, twice governor of New Hampshire and former chairman of the Social Security Board, had replaced Joseph P. Kennedy as U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain. Apparently Winant was not overly impressed with the U.S. naval representation in London at the time of his arrival. In early April he cabled the president that he should consider sending a ranking naval officer, such as Admiral Stark or Admiral Pratt, "over here for a brief period in order to bring you first hand the total picture of high naval policy as it has been developed so far in this war." Winant felt that there was "some hesitation" in
giving the military attachés complete information but that "the Prime Minister and all others concerned would gladly give...a man, known to be in immediate personal contact with you, the whole story." Winant may have felt more comfortable that "high naval policy" was being adequately reported after Ghormley's return to his post. A few months later he cabled the president about the difficulties in synchronizing actions in London with developing military policies in Washington but stated that "Ghormley has been most helpful in keeping me informed."

While the United States was making substitutions in its team in London following ABC-1, the British were working to improve intelligence liaison with the U.S. Navy by relaxing some of the restraints previously imposed on intelligence sharing. American observers had been assigned to certain Royal Navy ships and shore stations since September 1940, but observers' access to operational and intelligence information had been strictly limited. Admiralty had directed that the Americans were not to be shown certain recognition manuals, aircraft recognition signals, certain intelligence reports, and "information and intelligence from Most Secret sources."

The post-ABC-1 change in attitude was reflected in the instructions issued in April 1941 by Admiralty to Commander in Chief Western Approaches. American observers were to be "granted every facility to study the organization and
working of your Headquarters." The observers were to be afforded access to all types of information but were to be asked "in the interests of security, to confine this information to as few persons as possible and to limit its intercommunication as narrowly as practicable for efficiency."  

Anglo-American initiatives to develop a common attack on German and Japanese codes were indicative of the new spirit of cooperation engendered by ABC-1. Information derived from communications intercepts had been exchanged previously. However, little had been accomplished in the area of sharing the methods and equipment by which the codes were broken. The first major Anglo-American cooperative efforts in the field of codebreaking, as opposed to merely exchanging decoded information, occurred in the spring of 1941. When HMS King George V returned to England in February 1941, following her delivery of the new British ambassador to the United States, she carried as passengers four American officers, two Army and two Navy. They were to remain in the U.K. for a ten week period "to confer with the British Code and Cipher Section on general problems of cryptography and cryptanalysis."  

The Navy report of this mission has either disappeared or is still being withheld from the public. However, the Army officers' report, made in April 1941 to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 (Intelligence), War Department, is held
by the National Archives in Washington. The visiting Americans found the British both "cooperative" and "open-handed" in sharing information. "We were invited to ask questions about anything we saw, no doors were closed to us and copies were furnished of any material which we considered of possible assistance to the United States."76

In addition to a thorough exposure to the codebreaking activities at Bletchley Park, the visitors were shown the British direction finding network, nearby communication intercept sites, the Admiralty's communications center, and the Operational Intelligence Centre.77

One probable reason for their warm reception in Britain was that the Americans brought with them two copies of the "Purple" machine, created by U.S. Army personnel to decrypt high-level Japanese diplomatic traffic. The nickname "purple" was used to denote both the cryptographic system as well as the machine, which duplicated those in actual use by the Japanese. For security reasons, all American work on Japanese military and diplomatic crypto-systems had been hidden behind the term "magic." Supposedly President Roosevelt was the first to use the term when he was introduced to the results of the American attacks on Japanese codes.78 Similarly, the British used the term "enigma" to refer to their machine used to decrypt German military traffic, and the term "ULTRA" as a general coverword for "high grade cypher intelligence."79 One of
the American machines was later shipped to Singapore to assist in British codebreaking efforts against the Japanese and was again moved to New Delhi following the fall of Malaya to the Japanese in 1942. Admiral Layton, Admiral Kimmel's intelligence officer prior to Pearl Harbor, has stated that one of the Purple machines diverted to the British was originally intended for the use of Navy codebreakers in Hawaii. Even if the machine had been delivered as originally intended, it is doubtful that Hawaii's ability to predict the Japanese attack would have been significantly improved, for the real clues to the Japanese Navy's plans were hidden in its operational traffic, which was not read regularly by American codebreakers until well after 7 December 1941.

The Americans spent much of their time at Bletchley Park explaining the workings of the Purple machine to their British counterparts. In return, the visitors received information on British success against Italian codes and against Enigma, including word of Bletchley Park's largely unsuccessful attempts to date to break into the German naval Enigma system. No offer of a reciprocal gift of an Enigma machine for the United States was made. The British wished American cryptographers to continue their concentration on Japanese codes and to leave German naval enigma to them. This attitude would change by 1943 when the U.S. Navy's newly-developed cryptanalytical equipment proved
superior to that of the British. The Army report indicated that the two naval officers also were successful in receiving assistance from the British. "The Naval officers spent a good deal of their time on technical matters such as intercept and radio-direction finding (D.F.). They have brought back a complete D.F. installation which represents Britain's furthest advances along these lines."  

In the period from the fall of France until the spring of the following year the realization grew on both sides of the Atlantic that to be effective cooperation in intelligence, whether intra or inter-national, must have a defined organizational structure. Preliminary steps were taken in the fall of 1940 by the American "observers" and their British colleagues at the Standardization of Arms Committee meetings in London. Their agreements "in principle" were followed by the implementation work of the Joint Bailey Committee. The February-March 1941 ABC-1 discussions in Washington expanded and formalized the cooperative efforts that had gone before. Gradually the administrative machinery with which the Allies were to conduct wartime intelligence activities was put in place.

Events of the summer of 1941 gave further evidence of
the shift in Anglo-American intelligence relationships from those of generalized cooperation to specific coordination. High-level American and British naval intelligence personnel exchanged visits, and the formal coordinating machinery envisaged by the Standardization of Arms and ABC-1 agreements was developed and put into operation.

In May 1941 Admiral John Godfrey, the British Director of Naval Intelligence, travelled to Washington for a series of meetings with American and British intelligence officials. His visit, perhaps the most significant of all Anglo-American naval intelligence contacts prior to the United States' entry into the war, was prompted by a growing appreciation in high British military circles of the need for closer intelligence interaction with America. One can imagine that only the most serious considerations would cause the British DNI to leave his post for an extended journey to a neutral country at a moment when the Royal Navy was deeply involved in the struggle for both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Godfrey had several reasons for a trip to the United States and Canada at this critical moment. Since he had become Director of Naval Intelligence, most of Godfrey's experience with the workings of American intelligence had been gained not from personal observation, but from his relationships with Americans in London and from reports by the British Naval Attaché in Washington. The product of
this experience was both encouraging and frustrating. Much had been accomplished, but much more remained to be done if full partnership in naval intelligence was to be realized. The time for personal diplomacy seemed at hand, especially since his "old friend" and colleague in London during the 1940 Blitz, Alan Kirk, was now the American Director of Naval Intelligence. In addition, American Ambassador to Great Britain, John Winant, was to be in Washington in May 1941 during the time of Godfrey's planned visit. Godfrey had gone out of his way to cultivate Winant's friendship since his arrival in the United Kingdom earlier that year. "I saw that he (Winant) got all the news, bad and good, and took him into my confidence before my 1941 and 1942 missions to America." Winant's fortuitous presence opened doors of American political leaders who otherwise might not have paid great attention to the visit of this relatively low-ranking British government official. Winant's good offices may well have been instrumental in securing Godfrey's invitation to dinner at the White House and in arranging the private discussion with President Roosevelt that followed.

By the spring of 1941 Godfrey had become increasingly concerned over the problem of coordinating American, British, and Canadian intelligence on German U-boat activities in the Atlantic. In March 1941 Germany had expanded the zone in which her submarines were allowed to operate without restriction to include the area around
Iceland. The following month the United States expanded its security zone eastward to include Greenland and Iceland, overlapping that of Germany and increasing the likelihood of hostile encounters between U.S. Navy units and German U-boats. At that time neither Ottawa nor Washington possessed a focal point for anti-submarine warfare similar to that of Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre which brought together in a single location all the various types of information necessary to provide a comprehensive picture of enemy U-boat operations Atlantic-wide. Godfrey hoped to set in motion the machinery to develop similar centers in Canada and in the United States.

Godfrey had heard from the British Naval Attaché in Washington of the inter-agency rivalries among American intelligence organizations, of the attaché's problems in obtaining desired intelligence from American sources, and of his perception that American intelligence reporting was of a lesser quality than that of similar British products. Godfrey determined that the way to remedy American shortcomings in intelligence was to share British methods and experience through a "complete fusion of the British and American intelligence services." Godfrey was backed in this ambitious plan by his colleagues on the Joint Intelligence Committee and by their superiors, the British Chiefs of Staff, who lent Godfrey their authority to pursue his intelligence integration goals while in Washington.
Godfrey also planned to urge the United States military departments to rise above parochial concerns and adopt a Joint Intelligence Committee type of structure similar to that in the United Kingdom. In addition, Godfrey was concerned about the lack of a single organization to coordinate the secret intelligence activities of the various American government agencies. He wished the United States to profit from what he perceived as a British error in having four separate organizations, all involved in clandestine operations and secret intelligence activities, and to adopt a single, unified, American structure.92

Godfrey departed for New York on 24 May 1941, stopping en route to meet with British naval intelligence representatives in Lisbon. Because of Portugal's position as a neutral it had become a key listening post for both the Allies and the Axis and was, therefore, of particular interest to the British DNI. Godfrey was accompanied by his personal assistant, Lieutenant Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR. Fleming's presence on the trip was no accident of protocol. In the spring of 1939 Godfrey had selected Fleming, then a rising young stockbroker in "The City", as his personal assistant on the advice of highly placed persons in the British financial community and had done so both for Fleming's contacts in the British establishment and for his ability to get along with people. Fleming's role was greater than his title "Personal Assistant" would imply. He
became Godfrey's personal trouble-shooter within the Naval Intelligence Division as well as the DNI's representative to numerous inter-departmental government committees and conferences. Admiral Sir Norman Denning, one of Godfrey's senior assistants throughout his time as DNI who subsequently became DNI himself after the war, commented of Fleming that "he could fix anyone or anything if it was really necessary." Godfrey planned to use Fleming's skill with people and his ability as a negotiator to help smooth the path in the forthcoming Anglo-American discussions on intelligence cooperation, which Godfrey expected would be difficult.

Godfrey's visit to the United States has been described as "a friendly, intelligent conspiracy [among British intelligence officials in America and Godfrey] to hurry on the process of change." Viewed in this light his success was spotty, at best. On their arrival in New York Godfrey and Fleming met with "Little Bill" Stephenson, the leading British Secret Intelligence Service representative in the United States, who also pursued Admiralty's specialized intelligence interests, particularly those concerned with port security for shipment of war materials to England. Stephenson's official points of contact with the American intelligence community were through the State Department and, on matters of counterintelligence and security, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Stephenson had
informal entrée into American naval intelligence through Vincent Astor who, it will be remembered, had been chosen personally by President Roosevelt to be the naval intelligence coordinating authority in the New York City area. Encouraged perhaps by Stephenson, Godfrey was prompt to pay a call on J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI. Fleming later described the visit, saying that Hoover "received us graciously, listened with close attention...to our exposé of certain security problems, and expressed himself firmly but politely as being uninterested in our mission...."95

Kirk and the Office of Naval Intelligence proved more forthcoming. Admiral Arthur H. McCollum, who in 1941 headed ONI's Far Eastern Section, recalled that Godfrey and Fleming "were shown the works — taken around to anything in ONI and down into the Communications Intelligence set-ups and so on and so forth."96 Despite his warm reception in ONI, Godfrey soon realized that inter and intra-departmental resistance to any type of joint organization was too strong to be overcome without assistance from the highest levels of the American government. According to Godfrey's biographer,97 Godfrey approached Stephenson and Sir William Wiseman for assistance. During the First World War Sir William had headed the British secret service organization in New York and was still resident there. Both men agreed that Godfrey should attempt to bring the intelligence coordination
problem to President Roosevelt's attention. An invitation to the White House, arranged by Arthur H. Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*, gave the British Director of Naval Intelligence the opportunity to state his case for a unified American intelligence organization to the president. After he left the White House, Godfrey was concerned that his arguments had made little impact on Roosevelt. However, shortly after his meeting with Godfrey, on 18 June 1941, the president directed the establishment of the Office of Coordinator of Information with William J. Donovan as its first director.  

Stephenson and others in the British intelligence establishment were delighted that the president had selected "Big Bill" Donovan, who had served the British cause so well in the dark days of 1940, to lead the new intelligence agency. In his memoirs Godfrey admitted he "discussed" the appointment of a single American intelligence coordinator with Roosevelt but stated that it was Ambassador Winant, not he, "who advocated Donovan's appointment." The idea of a single coordinator of U.S. intelligence did not originate with Godfrey, nor was the concept new to the president. All that can be claimed for Godfrey's intervention was that it may have helped crystallize Roosevelt's thinking on the subject. Godfrey's initiative had one unfortunate, if only temporary, result. "Old friend" Kirk, who felt that Godfrey had gone over his head in approaching Roosevelt, became
distinctly cool to Godfrey and "could not disguise his suspicions of my presidential activities."\textsuperscript{100}

Godfrey's trip to the United States and to Canada had its positive aspects, despite its lack of success in achieving instant integration of American and British intelligence activities. The British DNI's initiative was later called the precursor to "formal alliance and the first stage in the process towards Allied integrated intelligence that would reach its zenith in [General Dwight D.] Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Intelligence Staff."\textsuperscript{101}

The concept of an all-source information center controlled by Intelligence rather than Operations was a novel one for the American Navy Department and one that took over a year to come to fruition. However, during Godfrey's visit, the seed had been planted.

Before departing for home Fleming prepared and presented for Donovan's consideration a detailed resumé of the Admiralty's needs for specific types of intelligence that appeared susceptible of being obtained through American sources. Subsequent collection based on Fleming's list resulted in an increased flow of more useful information to the embattled British. Finally, Godfrey left America with a far better grasp of the capabilities and weaknesses of Kirk's organization which, within a few months, would be officially allied with his own in the war against Germany and Japan.
During his visit to ONI, Godfrey had pressed Kirk to send some of his key staff to London to meet their counterparts in Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division and to study British intelligence techniques. The invitation was accepted, but with tragic consequences. Four officers were selected for the trip: Captain Sherwood Picking, Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence for Foreign Intelligence; Commander Arthur McCollum, head of ONI's Far Eastern Desk; Lieutenant Commander Walter Chappell, assistant head of the British Desk; and Lieutenant Colonel A. Wrangham, Royal Marines, who had been serving as a British liaison officer with ONI. The visit was scheduled for late August 1941. The party was split into two groups, with Picking and Wrangham going on ahead, and McCollum and Chappell following on a later plane. The aircraft carrying Picking and Wrangham crashed while approaching Prestwick, Scotland, killing all on board. McCollum and Chappell received the bad news upon their arrival in London on 1 September 1941. A message from ONI directed McCollum to head the delegation and to "carry out [his] instructions." Since the "instructions" had been given to Picking, not McCollum, the visit was put on hold until Washington could provide additional information.

ONI subsequently directed McCollum to study the British naval intelligence system in detail and to "obtain full info [information on] Joint Intelligence Committee organization,
procedure and output.\textsuperscript{104} McCollum found Godfrey and his staff in the Naval Intelligence Division to be cordial and forthcoming on all subjects except communications intelligence. McCollum reminded Godfrey that while in Washington he had been shown American progress against Japanese codes. Godfrey was reluctant to reciprocate until Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, instructed Godfrey "'to take his hair down and get off this secretive kick and give you [the American visitors] the works' – or words to that effect."\textsuperscript{105} When McCollum was finally made privy to British codebreaking activities, he found that the American Navy was "very much ahead" of the British "in relation to Japanese things," and he was not impressed with the validity of British information on the Japanese Navy – his specialty.\textsuperscript{106}

In the fall of 1941, at the same time that McCollum was studying British efforts against Japanese codes in England, the head of the British codebreakers was visiting those engaged is similar efforts in the United States. Commander Alastair Denniston, a cryptographer in Admiralty's famous "Room 40" during the First World War and in 1941 head of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, was in Washington to urge America to concentrate its efforts on Japanese military codes and leave German military and other diplomatic ciphers to the British.\textsuperscript{107} This suggested division of cryptographic labor was one that the British
continued to urge well into 1943 and one that the United States was never willing to accept completely.

Visits such as those of Godfrey, McCollum, and Denniston were not critical to the development of Anglo-American high policy, but they did serve several useful purposes. The intelligence professionals on both sides of the Atlantic came to know their opposite numbers and to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of their respective organizations. New techniques in fields such as prisoner of war interrogation and aerial photographic analysis were developed by British intelligence and shared with its American allies. Despite British concern that the U.S. Navy was unwilling to learn from British wartime experience and would insist on "reinventing the wheel," American naval intelligence was profiting from exposure to the Royal Navy's methods of operation. As McCollum pointed out, Admiralty was much more involved than was the U.S. Navy Department in the tactical direction of warships at sea.\textsuperscript{108} Therefore, Admiralty's Intelligence Division was much more concerned with providing tactical or current intelligence to the Commander in Chief Home Fleet than was its counterpart in Washington to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The significant differences in mission of the two intelligence organizations mandated differences in methods of operation, but as their knowledge of the British system improved, the Americans were coming — albeit slowly — to
appreciate the responsiveness of the British naval intelligence system to the needs of the forces it supported and to adopt similar procedures.

vi

The dramatic growth in number of the British military liaison personnel in the United States in the summer immediately preceding America's formal entry into the war prompted Admiral Sir Charles Little, Head of the British Admiralty Delegation to Washington, to comment that "Sir William Douglas of the Treasury is pursuing his difficult task here and before he leaves I hope he will be able to reduce the number of British in Washington to below the numbers that were here in 1814 when we burned to capitol." Naval intelligence shared in the population explosion.

At the conclusion of the ABC-1 meetings in March 1941 Admiral Victor H. Danckwerts, a senior member of the British Delegation, was directed by his government to remain in Washington and to form the nucleus of the British Admiralty Delegation. The Admiralty Delegation would, in turn, provide the naval portion of the British Joint Services Mission, the liaison group called for under the terms of ABC-1. The senior Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and Army officers of the Joint Services Mission were to constitute an overseas extension of the London-based British Chiefs of
Staff, itself a joint organization, to present its views to the individual American Chiefs of Staff, who were at the time still operating as separate entities. Captain Clarke, already in Washington as British Assistant Naval Attaché for matters of naval cooperation as well as Danckwerts' assistant on the British delegation to ABC-1, became his Chief of Staff. Danckwerts was replaced in June 1941 by Admiral Charles Little, who since 1937 had been Second Sea Lord at Admiralty in charge of all naval personnel matters.¹¹⁰ By June some 100 British naval personnel had arrived in Washington to staff the new organization.¹¹¹ Despite its increased visibility through sheer numbers in Washington, the British military presence remained, until after Pearl Harbor, hidden under the umbrella designation of "advisors to the British Supply Council in the United States."¹¹²

Shortly before leaving Washington Admiral Danckwerts wrote a letter to the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in which he outlined his dual role: first, as the representative of the First Sea Lord to the U.S. Navy, and second, as the senior naval member of the British joint military mission to the United States. At that time he provided the CNO with a description of the British Admiralty Delegation's organization that included, inter alia, an intelligence section of four officers, headed by a captain.¹¹³ These officers had been drawn in part from the
British Naval Attaché's staff in Washington and in part from Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division. As time went on the naval attaché offices in both London and Washington were to play a smaller and smaller role in intelligence exchange as that function was assumed by the Anglo-American military missions to their respective governments.

An early and important question confronting the American Observers in London and the British Mission in Washington was that of establishing lines of communication between the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff and their respective military service departments. After some discussion it was agreed that "if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff wish to raise a matter with the British Chiefs of Staff which concerns an area of U.S. responsibility, they will raise it with the [British] Joint Staff Mission in Washington, and the subject will be discussed in Washington." However, if the matter affected an area of British responsibility, the question would be raised by the U.S. Mission in London and discussed there. Questions raised by the British Chiefs of Staff were to be dealt with in a similar manner.\[^{14}\]

These procedures were important not only to avoid confusion but also, for reasons of security, to avoid compromising British and American codes. It was essential that messages sent in British channels not be duplicated in American systems. To do so was to run the risk of allowing
German cryptographers access to identical plain language texts, enciphered twice, which enhanced the possibility of their being broken. Generally, questions raised in one channel were to be answered in the same channel, and the American and British missions were to be kept informed "of all matters of importance which are discussed between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff and Service Departments." Intelligence matters, even the most secret, were subsequently relayed through the military missions, for the most part following the information paths agreed upon.

In time the mission staffs grew to include specialists in such matters as communications intelligence and secret agent operations. By the late summer of 1941, the naval intelligence organization within the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington was reconstituted as an integral part of the Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division in London and given the staff designation NID 18. NID 18 continued to function as the major channel for Admiralty requests for intelligence from the U.S. Navy Department throughout the war.

While the American and British military were developing and installing the machinery of cooperation, a new combatant entered the war. On 22 June 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union. As early as 9 May British intelligence had received information through Enigma decrypts that German troops were massing on the Soviet border. On 12 June a
Japanese message in diplomatic cipher from Japan's ambassador in Berlin to Tokyo was decrypted on the Purple machine that the American codebreakers had provided their British colleagues. The message indicated that Hitler had told the Japanese ambassador that Russia must be "eliminated" and that, on the basis of the conversation, the ambassador had concluded that a German invasion of Russia was imminent.\textsuperscript{117} Churchill subsequently provided details of the German military build-up to Stalin who, apparently considering the warning a British provocation to drive a wedge between Germany and the Soviet Union, received the information with suspicion.\textsuperscript{118}

While the German invasion of Russia significantly altered the political and military relationships between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, it had little effect on intelligence cooperation. In 1941 the British government began to provide the Russians with bits of information derived from German communications, carefully selected and "sanitized" to disguise their source. Little was received from the Russians in return.\textsuperscript{119} Admiralty persisted, however, and weekly intelligence meetings were held in London during 1942 and 1943 between representatives of the Naval Intelligence Division and members of the Soviet Naval Mission. In an unprecedented burst of generosity, NID went so far as to give a captured German Enigma machine and instructions for its use to a representative of the Soviet
Naval Mission.120

There was even less cooperation between American and Soviet naval intelligence. Jeffery Dorwart, writing about the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence during World War II, commented that, according to Admiral Harold C. Train, Director of Naval Intelligence in 1942 and 1943, "during his entire directorship, the Russians never sent ONI one shred of valuable information about Japan, the Far East, or the Pacific Ocean, denying even meteorological data necessary to U.S. Fleet operations."121

The final milestone along the road of Anglo-American cooperation in the pre-Pearl Harbor period was put in place at Argentia, Newfoundland, in August 1941. President Roosevelt, embarked in the USS Augusta, and Prime Minister Churchill, in HMS Prince of Wales — which had recently been in action against the German battleship Bismarck — held an historic meeting in Placentia Bay from 11 to 13 August. Both leaders were accompanied by key advisors: Churchill departed London, according to his private secretary, "with a retinue that Cardinal Wolsey might have envied."122

Three sets of discussions took place simultaneously, those between Roosevelt and Churchill personally; those between their military staff members; and those between Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and American Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. The Roosevelt-Churchill meetings produced the
"Atlantic Charter," a broad statement of Anglo-American principles to be followed once peace had been achieved. The military talks were a follow-on to ABC-1 and covered questions of allocation of American military supplies and of major military strategy in Europe and the Middle East. The diplomatic discussions dealt mainly with provision of support to the Soviet Union. The British Chiefs of Staff reported to Churchill as follows: "We neither expected nor achieved startling results.... Nevertheless, the personal contacts with our American colleagues will prove of the greatest value for our future collaboration."123

Although intelligence was not a major topic of discussion, the meetings were well supplied with current information. Prior to leaving the United Kingdom Churchill had directed "competent people" to choose an assortment of Enigma decrypts to be sent him in paraphrased form.124 The Joint Intelligence Committee had briefed the British participants in the Argentia conference prior to their departure from London and provided them with a daily intelligence summary while they were away.125 The American military delegation, with less notice of the meetings, was less well prepared. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, was first told of the planned discussions by the president on 30 July. He, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and a few assistants sailed four days later, with the leaders on one ship and their staffs on
another. The two groups were not able to get together until 7 August. Major General H.H. "Hap\" Arnold, who was to represent the U.S. Army Air Corps, recalled that "as far as I knew, we were going into this one cold.\"^{126}

From the standpoint of intelligence cooperation the chief value of the military discussions in Placentia Bay was to refine Anglo-American strategy, thus permitting Allied intelligence agencies to focus their scarce intelligence resources on targets that were of particular interest to the planners.

Between September 1940 and December 1941 the British government worked to overcome its concern over America's ability to protect British secrets while the United States strove to assure itself of England's ability to continue the war. The U.S. Navy Department's reactions to Admiralty's initiatives in the field of intelligence cooperation were colored by domestic political considerations that precluded overt alliance and by vague feelings of disquiet that opening the cooperative door too far at this stage of the war might lead to a less than equal partnership later. Despite American misgivings, intelligence cooperation did increase and was characterized by exchange of information
through the good offices of the Joint Bailey Committee, by British relaxation of restrictions on sharing of information with American liaison personnel, and by increasing numbers of reciprocal visits by American and British intelligence officers to observe and to learn from each other.

By the late fall of 1941 all the major Anglo-American agreements affecting naval intelligence sharing on a nation-to-nation basis had been implemented and the machinery for cooperation was in place and operating. What had started informally and in great secrecy with the reciprocal visits of Captain Ingersoll to London in 1938 and Commander Hampton to Washington in 1939, had grown and — albeit still in secret — become formalized through a series of increasingly binding commitments: the Standardization of Arms understandings, the Bailey Committee agreements, and finally the specific provisions of ABC 1. America's entry into the war would have little effect on the terms of these agreements but would increase the volume and perhaps the sensitivity of the information exchanged.

The role of the attaché in naval intelligence decreased markedly as military missions on both sides of the Atlantic began to perform the liaison and intelligence duties traditionally carried on by the naval attaché. Intelligence exchange moved from the realm of diplomacy to that of the military staff. This shift in locus heralded a much more significant change in cooperative intelligence activity. As
will be seen, beginning in mid-1942 with planning for Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, intelligence needs of commanders in the field (or at sea) would be more often met directly by their own Allied staffs than from their individual Service intelligence resources.

The dominant theme of the period from late summer of 1940 until the fall of 1941 was one of ever-expanding intelligence cooperation. However, contrapuntal themes of inter-service rivalries, especially between the American Army and Navy Intelligence organizations; traditional Anglo-American mutual distrust of motives; and xenophobic post-war considerations continued to impede progress toward complete sharing. Cautious Anglo-American feelers toward increased exchange of information had expanded into a major cooperative effort despite the adverse undercurrents. The products of the intelligence process were being shared, and the methods by which these results were attained were being traded. All that was lacking was United States' formal entry into the war to bring about the complete integration of both nations' intelligence resources. Or so it seemed.
Chapter 3:


2. ALUSNA London, 071321 September 1940, Action to OPNAV. ALUSNA and SPENAVO London messages, September 1938-September 1941, file 1, folder 1, COMNAVEU Series 1, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

Sometime between September 1939 and September 1940 the Navy Department changed its method of referencing naval radio dispatches. Previously they were identified by originator, day, month, and year (e.g. ALUSNA London 0027 Nov 1939). When multiple messages began to be transmitted from the same location on the same day the system broke down. To end the confusion, the transmission hour, using the 24 hour clock, was added in what was later called a date-time group (DTG). The above reference (ALUSNA London 071321 Sept 40) translates to "U.S. Naval Attaché, London, message originated at 1321 (1:21 pm) on 7 September 1940." A later refinement was made to use standard Greenwich mean time (GMT) in place of local time in most references. This permitted messages from different locations to be ordered sequentially. GMT is indicated by putting the letter "Z" after the DTG. The complete modern reference would then be: 'ALUSNA London 0713212 Sep 40.'


5. Stark to Ghormley, letter of 16 October 1940, file 79, Ghormley Correspondence, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


7. Bernard L. Austin, handwritten note, undated, file 19, Austin, Bernard L., LCDR USN, Notes and Correspondence 1940-1941, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


11. Director of Naval Intelligence to Director of War Plans, memorandum of 14 November 1940, box 227, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Record Group 80, NA, Washington, D.C.


17. Pott to Godfrey, letter of 14 January 1941, PRO: ADM 223/84.


19. Ibid., 212.


27. Home Waters and the Atlantic, vol. 2 of Naval Staff History (London: Admiralty, 1961), 60-61. British source, Box 50, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C. Naval Staff History is Admiralty's once-classified report of the war at sea. Seventeen volumes of the set are in the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical Center in Washington. All but two volumes were declassified by the British in 1989; however, I found no reference to them in the Public Record Office of the United Kingdom. Volume two carries the serial number BR1736(48). F.H. Hinsley, in his bibliography to British Intelligence in the Second World War, indicated that other historical accounts in the BRI736 series "have not been, and may never be, released to the public domain." (vol. 3, part 2, 964).


29. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:57. The story of Venlo is told in some detail in Anthony Read and David Fisher's biography of Colonel Claude Dansey of the SIS, Colonel Z (New York: Viking, 1985), 201-20. Details of the incident are even now unclear. The only contemporary account, by one of those captured, Sigismund Payne Best [The Venlo Incident (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1949?)], is thought to be suspect as self-serving, and Foreign Office files on the incident are closed at least until the year 2015 (Hinsley, ibid.).


32. Ibid., 36-7.
33. Edward Thomas, "The Evolution of the JIC System Up to and During World War II," in Intelligence and International Relations, ed. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, 228.

34. Stark to Knox, 23 June 1941, Box 228, RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

35. Military Attaché, London, Intelligence Report, BES-175, 4 June 1941, forwarded by Stark to Knox 23 June 1941, ibid.


37. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 163.


39. Dorwart, Conflict of Interest, 117.


43. Astor to Roosevelt, 18 April 1940. Astor to Roosevelt 20 April 1940, PSF 116, Roosevelt Library.


45. Ibid., 321, 323, 337 and 351.


49. Layton, "And I was There", 168. Ronald Lewin, *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982), 67, indicates that the joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not authorized until 11 October 1941, and that it did not meet until after 7 December 1941.


52. Watson, *Chief of Staff*, 118. Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy*, 183-196, contains a detailed discussion of the political atmosphere affecting the development of Plan DOG.


54. Stark to Ghormley, 19 November 1940, Ghormley Correspondence, file 79 COMNAVEU, Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


58. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack [hereafter PHA], *Hearings*. 79th Cong., 1st sess. Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 3:1052. At the hearings, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1940-41, testified that "Admiral Stark brought up the proposition (for the talks) and I acquiesced. He arranged the meeting."


60. Joint Planning Committee, 21 January 1941, Papers of Admiral Richmond K. Turner USN, box 20, folder: Director Joint War Plans Division, Special File #1, 1937-1941, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

61. Watson, *Chief of Staff*, 384.


64. Annex I, to ABC-1, 27 March 1941, PHA Hearings, 15:1497.


66. ABC-1, 27 March 1941, PHA Hearings, 15:1495.


68. Stark to U.S. Naval Attacheés and Naval Observers, 27 November 1941, box 228, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Record Group 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

69. Note 7, supra.

70. Stark to Ghormley, 5 April 1941, Papers of Harold R. Stark, series II, box A1, folder: Stark Correspondence April June 1942 (sic), Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

71. Winant to Roosevelt. STATETEL 1309, 3 April 1941, PSF 9 (Winant), Roosevelt Library.

72. Winant to Roosevelt, STATETEL 3338, 31 July 1941, ibid.

73. Admiralty message to all major commands, 18 December 1940, PRO: ADM 199/1156. "Most Secret sources" almost certainly refers to information derived from analysis of enemy communications.

74. Admiralty to C-in-C Western Approaches, 22 April 1941, SPENAVO London, General File 1940-1941, file 162, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

76. A. Sinkov and Leo Rosen to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, *ibid*.


81. Layton, "And I was There," 93.


85. Sinkov and Rosen to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 11 April 1941, SRH-145, RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C., 004.


92. *Ibid*.

94. McLachlan, Room 39, 228.
100. Godfrey, ibid., 5:139.
102. Ghormley to Stark, 2 September 1941. King, FADM, Correspondence, box 1, file: "September 1941", Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.
103. McCollum, Reminiscences, 342.
104. OPNAV 032240 SEPT 41, ACTION ALUSNA LONDON. ALUSNA & SPENAVO London messages, series I, file 1, folder 6: Secret messages August-September 1941, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.
106. Ibid., 350.
110. A.V. Alexander, 1st. Lord to Knox, 15 May 1941, PRO: ADM 1/14994, Correspondence with COL KNOX.


CHAPTER IV

GROWTH OF WARTIME COOPERATION:
DECEMBER 1941 - NOVEMBER 1942

On the morning of 7 December 1941 Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the principal U.S. naval base in the Pacific, and on U.S Army and Army Air Corps installations nearby. Concurrently the Japanese attacked American forces in the Philippines and British outposts in Malaya and Hong Kong. "It was a bad day all around" Presidential advisor Adolf Berle noted in his diary, "and if there is anyone I would not like to be, it is the Chief of Naval Intelligence."¹

By the end of 1941 the Second World War had become a world war in fact as well as name. The major world powers were locked in combat in the skies over Europe; on and under the waters of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean; and on the ground (and in the air) in Russia, the Middle East, North Africa, the Far East, and the islands of the Southwest Pacific.
The entry of the United States into the war against Germany and Japan removed a major bar to Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. However, achieving full sharing was not to be that easy. Personal antipathy on the part of the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet to "mixing" U.S. and British naval forces often served to frustrate British efforts to establish jointly manned intelligence centers, while the advent of the combined Anglo-American staff system worked against Navy-to-Navy intelligence relationships. Despite these setbacks, intelligence cooperation between the two navies continued to expand in the year after Pearl Harbor.

Reading of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages had provided Anglo-American leaders clear warning of impending hostilities with Japan, but American intelligence had failed utterly to pinpoint Pearl Harbor as the chief target. On 27 November the Navy Department alerted the U.S. Asiatic and Pacific fleet commanders to the seriousness of the situation in a message which began, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning...an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." To underscore the seriousness with which the United States viewed the Japanese military threat in the Far East, Admiral Ghormley, the American
Special Naval Observer in London, was specifically directed to inform the British that this "war warning" had been sent. In this and in another message three days earlier alerting all its military commanders in the Pacific, Washington had suggested the Philippines, Siam, Borneo, or Guam as potential first strike targets; but Hawaii was not on the list.¹

British intelligence was no more prescient than its American counterpart. While the British government realized that Japan's entry into the war was imminent, London was no better advised than Washington as to where the first blow would fall. As late as 6 December the British Chiefs of Staff were debating the destinations of heavily escorted convoys of Japanese troop transports, reported two days previously as having departed ports in Indo-China. "We examined the situation carefully, but from the position of the transports it was not possible to tell whether they were going to Bangkok, to the Kra Peninsula [which separates the South China Sea from the Indian Ocean], or whether they were just cruising around as a bluff."² At the same time that American aircraft were being destroyed on the ground in Hawaii and the Philippines, Royal Air Force units were suffering a similar fate in Malaya.³

The United States and Great Britain both declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941. However, the United States did not issue a simultaneous declaration of hostilities with
Germany. Germany declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, in what Martin Gilbert has described as "perhaps the greatest error, and certainly the single most decisive act of the Second World War." In so doing, Hitler closed the door on the remote possibility that America would choose to devote its exclusive attention to Japan and leave Europe to its fate.

After a terrible beginning at Pearl Harbor, the Allied war against Japan went rapidly downhill. On 25 December Hong Kong surrendered. By the end of 1941 American forces in the Philippines had evacuated Manila and had transferred their headquarters to the island of Corregidor at the mouth of Manila Bay. Japanese troops were pushing American and Filipino forces slowly but inexorably down the Bataan Peninsula toward Corregidor and their eventual extinction.

Despite the Pearl Harbor and Philippine disasters, the U.S. Navy had fared somewhat better than had the British in the early days of the Pacific war. American shore facilities in Hawaii were for the most part intact, and the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers had escaped damage because they were at sea on 7 December. The Japanese continued to advance southward along the Malay Peninsula toward Singapore — "the Gibraltar of the East" — which fell to the invaders on 15 February 1942. The British battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle-cruiser HMS Repulse, ordered to the Pacific in late 1941 as a "visible deterrent" to Japanese
ambitions in Southeast Asia, were sunk by Japanese aerial torpedo attacks on 10 December. The loss of these two capital ships and of the naval bases at Hong Kong and Singapore essentially removed the Royal Navy as a fighting force in the Pacific from the early days of 1942 until the spring of 1945.

The Royal Navy had also suffered serious reverses in the Mediterranean. German submarines, sent to the Mediterranean to relieve some of the pressure on Rommel's resupply lines from Europe, sank the aircraft carrier *HMS Ark Royal* on 11 November off Gibraltar. A few days later the battleship *HMS Barham* was lost to a submarine attack off Egypt. On 19 December two British battleships had been severely damaged in Alexandria harbor by Italian frogmen. The same day a British cruiser was sunk by mines near Tripoli. As a result of their naval losses, coupled with the reappearance of German air power in the Mediterranean, the British were — at least temporarily — unable to interdict German sea routes to Libya, and supplies continued to reach Rommel freely.10

In the Atlantic the battle between convoy and wolf pack continued, with the momentary advantage going to the convoy. U-boat losses in Mid-December and lack of success against the convoys in the preceding two months had caused members of the staff of Admiral Karl Dönitz, Commander in Chief of German U-boats, "to voice the opinion that we were no longer
in a position successfully to combat the convoy system."\textsuperscript{11} However, this did not mean that the threat to the British supply lifelines across the Atlantic had disappeared, as the first months of 1942 would painfully demonstrate. Despite some degree of success in the Atlantic, in the opening months of 1942 Allied military fortunes were at their lowest ebb since the fall of France in the summer of 1940.

Following America's entry into the war, the British renewed pressure for the closest possible cooperation in intelligence matters. The first opportunity to address the intelligence question, post-Pearl Harbor, occurred in a series of conferences between the American and British Chiefs of Staff held in Washington from 24 December 1941 to 14 January 1942. The impetus for the meetings, covenamed "Arcadia," came from the Prime Minister. Churchill had decided as early as 8 December 1941 that he and his top military leaders needed an immediate conference with their now-official American allies to "review the whole war plan in the light of reality and new facts."\textsuperscript{12} Churchill and his advisors departed for the United States aboard \textit{HMS Duke of York} on 14 December.

In the military discussions that followed the British delegation's arrival in Washington on 22 December, the U.S. Navy was represented by, among others, Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations and administrative head of the Navy; by Admiral Ernest J. King, former Commander in
Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, who only a few days before the meetings with the British had been named Commander in Chief of the whole of the U.S. Fleet and was thus the head of the operating forces of the Navy; and by Admiral Richmond K. Turner, the Navy Department's Director of Plans, who spoke for his own organization and often for naval intelligence as well. The Royal Navy delegation was headed by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, and included Admirals R. M. Bellairs and Victor H. Danckwerts, who were "old hands" at Anglo-American negotiations. Both had held responsible wartime positions in the Plans Directorate of the British Naval Staff and both had participated in the U.S. - U.K. staff conversations (ABC-1) in Washington earlier in 1941. In addition, both were "in close touch" with the British Director of Naval Intelligence, were his friends, and could be counted upon to protect the Naval Intelligence Division's interests in talks with the Americans.

The British must have looked with misgiving upon Admiral King's elevation to high office in the U.S. Navy and on his presence at the Arcadia consultations. King had been present at the Anglo-American military staff meetings in Argentia the previous August but in a subordinate role. By January 1942 King had become America's leading naval officer and would remain so throughout the war. King was approached in influence only by Admiral William D. Leahy, a former Chief of Naval Operations, wartime Ambassador to Vichy,
France, and, as first Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs, the president's personal chief of staff. In British eyes King was, "if not actually anti-British...he was certainly not over-receptive to ideas and suggestions from the Admiralty."\textsuperscript{15}

The British had good cause for concern. In August 1941, while he was Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, King had written the Chief of Naval Operations, "All in all, I think — as usual — that the British are much too intent on managing our affairs." Again, shortly before his December assignment to Washington, King had grumbled in a letter to one of his subordinate commanders that "the Admiralty in London appears to insist on knowing where each and every one of our ships are at every hour of the day and night, and the Navy Department seems to acquiesce in this 'curiosity'."\textsuperscript{16} King, once described by his daughter as "the most even-tempered man in the Navy...always in a rage,\textsuperscript{17} was to have a profound influence on Anglo-American wartime naval relationships and on the course of Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation.

So too would the joint/combined intelligence staff system that emerged from the Arcadia conferences. In an early session the British demonstrated their strong commitment to close intelligence ties by initiating a proposal for post-Arcadia collaboration that went considerably farther than the U.S. side was willing to go.
Internal papers of the British delegation reiterated the position expressed by Admiral Godfrey in his 1941 visit to the United States that a single controlling body for American intelligence was badly needed. "It is hoped," one such paper stated, "that the activities of the various Intelligence organizations in the United States (Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Colonel DONOVAN’S organization and the State Department) will become more closely co-ordinated in the future."\(^{18}\) To this end the British Chiefs of Staff agreed "to press the United States Chiefs of Staff to set up a joint intelligence organization for the co-ordination of United States intelligence with which the Joint Intelligence Committee of the British Staff Mission should have contacts."\(^{19}\)

The United States was reluctant to accept the British position on the intelligence question probably because of objections by Admirals King and Turner, who were known to be wary of joint action - what King would later call "mixed Forces" - whether with other U.S. non-Navy organizations or with foreigners. The original British proposal was submitted on 10 January 1942 and stated in part that "the arrangements for production of complete intelligence to serve the Planning Staffs are of great importance and we suggest that this matter should either be referred to the Combined Planning Staffs for report or considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their next meeting."\(^{20}\) Three
days later the draft was modified to delete any consideration of the intelligence question by the Combined Chiefs. Apparently the United States was unwilling to afford intelligence this prominent a position in the hierarchy of problems confronting the Combined Chiefs. In its final agreed form the Arcadia Conference's statement on intelligence read: "The question of the production and dissemination of complete Military Intelligence to serve the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Staff Planners has been referred to the latter body for a report. Here also, it is contemplated that existing machinery will be largely continued." It is clear that this wording, emphasizing "existing machinery" instead of a joint organization, represented a victory for the more cautious American approach to Anglo-American intelligence cooperation.

The British may have lost this skirmish, but they eventually won the organizational war. The following month the Joint Planners recommended and the Combined Chiefs approved the establishment of a U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee similar in function to the British JIC. The Combined Chiefs also directed that a Combined Intelligence Committee be formed to meet its own and its planners' requirements for intelligence. The sources of intelligence for grand strategy were gradually changing from estimates prepared by individual military organizations, whose conclusions often varied widely from Service to
Service, to joint estimates, whose conclusions were a product of inter-Service effort.

As has been suggested, America's entry into the war and her close alliance with Great Britain mandated a form of coalition warfare that affected every level of cooperation, from long-range strategy down through tactical planning. The "combined" approach to what became known as "total War" extended well beyond the fields of military planning and strategy, embracing such diverse areas as logistics and supply, economic and political warfare, propaganda, and — of course — intelligence. The changes in the procedures by which Admiralty and the U.S. Department of the Navy traditionally had furnished intelligence to those who required it came about as a result of an organizational structure imposed upon the two navies from the highest levels of their respective governments and one not necessarily of their own choosing. The saving grace of the system, from the viewpoints of both navies, was that the system provided a reasonably clear demarcation between intelligence required for current naval operations, which was to be provided directly from the operational headquarters to the forces involved, and intelligence for planning, which was to be provided via the joint/combined
staff system.

The joint/combined staff system\textsuperscript{23} — joint committees whose members were all from the same nation and represented individual military or government departments, and combined committees whose members represented their country in a multi-national organization — was a creature of wartime necessity and one at its inception not looked upon with great favor by the U.S. Navy. The Arcadia conferences of late 1941-early 1942, in addition to fixing Allied strategic objectives for the coming months, developed an agreed framework for the American-British combined staff system, described in the U.S. Army's official history of World War II as "a unique accomplishment in cooperative effort by the military staffs of two great sovereign powers.\textsuperscript{24} Another, and almost accidental result of the adoption of the combined staff organization was the creation of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system.\textsuperscript{25}

To grasp the way in which Anglo-American intelligence cooperation functioned in the post-Arcadia world, one must first understand the system for the strategic direction of the war that developed from the decisions taken at Arcadia. The combined staff system that eventuated was essentially three-tiered. At top were the President, as Commander in Chief of the United States' Armed Forces, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, who was also Minister of Defence.\textsuperscript{26} Field Marshal Sir John Dill, until October 1941
Chief of the British Imperial General Staff and senior member of the British Chiefs of Staff, remained in Washington following the Arcadia conferences to represent the Defence Minister on the highest organizational plane.

On the next level were the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At Arcadia it had been agreed that this body should be resident in Washington and should consist of the American Chiefs of Staff and of their British counterparts. The senior members of the British Joint Services Mission (Washington) were to represent their Service chiefs at those times when the British Chiefs Staff were not present to meet directly with the U.S. Joint Chiefs.

The third tier consisted of the various specialized committees created to support the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The most important of these, the Combined Planning Committee, was supported in turn by the Combined Intelligence Committee, which received both its representatives and its intelligence from the individual British and American Joint Intelligence Committees. These national Joint Intelligence Committees were staffed and provided intelligence by the several individual Service intelligence agencies: Army, Navy, and air (Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Corps respectively). In addition, the American Joint Intelligence Committee had a sub-group to represent its interests in London, as did the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington! Despite its
complicated structure the system worked.

In the combined staff system, the Combined Chiefs of Staff or its planners generated intelligence requirements that were then passed to the Combined Intelligence Committee. Since this committee had no "in-house" capability to provide the desired information, the request was sent to the American and to the British Joint Intelligence Committees. They, in turn, called upon the resources of their national naval and military intelligence organizations to provide the required information and to do the preliminary analysis.

The intelligence "product" then started back up the line. Individual Service intelligence organizations provided responses to their staff members on the Joint Intelligence Committees, who attempted to reconcile any differences in analysis and to produce a document that would represent the coordinated position of the United States or the British government on the given question. These national position papers would then be furnished to the Combined Intelligence Committee for resolution of any differences, and an agreed estimate would be sent to the Combined Planning Staff or the Combined Chiefs as appropriate.

From the intelligence standpoint, the great danger of such a system was that, in an effort to achieve consensus at all the various staff levels, the final product might become
so "watered-down" as to be of little concrete use to the recipients. This undesirable result was avoided in some measure by permitting the views of the individual intelligence chiefs, such as the Directors of Naval Intelligence, to percolate up through the system as a result of the multiple roles — Service, Joint, and Combined — played by many of the participants in the process. For example, in Great Britain the Director of Naval Intelligence would state his views on a given intelligence question by means of an "appreciation" prepared by his staff according to his guidance. The Director also sat as Admiralty's representative on the British Joint Intelligence Committee in London and was, therefore, able to defend his views in that forum. As a senior member of the Naval Staff, the DNI could make his views known directly to the First Sea Lord, who served as the naval member of both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In Washington, the Royal Navy member of the Combined Intelligence Committee also represented the Director of Naval Intelligence on the national staff of the British Joint Services Mission and was his voice on the British Joint Intelligence Committee (Washington). Therefore, the British Director of Naval Intelligence was able to have an impact on the intelligence process, directly or indirectly at all levels in the combined system, on both sides of the Atlantic.
While the structure for providing intelligence for grand strategy was being created in Washington and London, the mechanism already in place for intelligence cooperation in wartime fleet operations was being sorely tested in the waters of the Western Atlantic.

Operation Paukenschlag (drumbeat), better known to the German submariners who participated as the "Happy Time," began off the east coast of the United States in January 1942 and continued until June of that year. During this six month period approximately 2 million tons of Allied merchant shipping — over 360 vessels — were sunk by German submarines operating in the western Atlantic within 300 miles of the North and South American coasts.\textsuperscript{27} Churchill summed up the magnitude of the submarine assault in saying that "for six or seven months the U-boats ravaged American waters almost uncontrolled, and, in fact, almost brought us to the disaster of an indefinite prolongation of the war."\textsuperscript{28}

The United States Navy was both ill-equipped and ill-prepared for antisubmarine warfare on the scale necessary to defeat the German threat. It took several months to muster sufficient air and surface escorts to institute a convoy system along the East Coast, and even longer to develop a unified command structure to control all aspects of antisubmarine warfare.\textsuperscript{29} As a result of these shortcomings in equipment and doctrine, individual German submarines were able to choose lucrative targets at will. It was only after
the introduction of the convoy system that Admiral Karl
Dönitz, German Commander of U-boats, found the operation of
single boats in so distant an area to be "uneconomic" and,
in July 1942, shifted his forces to resume attacks on the
North Atlantic convoy routes.30

Intelligence shortcomings also added to Allied problems
in defending against the German U-boat attacks. On 1
February 1942 the Germans introduced a change to the coding
machines used by the long-range boats operating in the
Atlantic. The modification caused a "black-out" of
Bletchley Park's ability to decrypt this type of traffic
that lasted until the end of the year.31 While the British
were losing their ability to read German long-range U-boat
communications, German cryptographers were improving their
capability against British naval codes. Although the time
required for decryption remained a problem, by the end of
1942 German codebreakers were able to decrypt almost 80
percent of intercepted communications sent in British Naval
Cypher No. 3, which was introduced in June 1941 and was used
extensively in the Allied North Atlantic convoy system.32

During periods when German codes became unreadable,
British intelligence officers usually fell back upon traffic
analysis and direction finding to follow German activities
at sea. Traffic analysis was the art of studying the non-
encrypted portions of messages sent in Morse code, such as
the list of addressees, to gain information from the use and
frequency patterns that emerged. Direction finding was the process of locating a radio transmitter at sea by having several sites on shore take a series of lines of bearing "cuts" on the same transmission. The point of intersection of the lines of bearing gave the approximate location of the sending unit. Direction finding was at its most effective in detecting German submarine wolfpack operations in the central and eastern Atlantic, which required a good deal of message traffic back and forth between the U-boats and their coordinating authority in the German-occupied Atlantic port of Lorient. However, the German submarines that were wreaking havoc in the western Atlantic were operating independently and, while they could send and receive radio traffic to and from U-boat headquarters, even while off the U.S. East Coast, they usually kept transmissions to a minimum while in their pre-assigned operating areas. They were, therefore, relatively immune from detection through their communications.

The Royal Navy looked with dismay upon the mainly ineffective efforts of their American colleagues to detect and attack German submarines operating in American waters. British naval intelligence was particularly concerned that the U.S. Navy had failed to develop any type of centralized organization to collect and analyze the countless bits of information needed to determine the numbers and locations of enemy U-boats. Antisubmarine intelligence was fragmented;
developed at several levels of command, with little exchange of information among intelligence officers at each echelon. The Office of Naval Intelligence "was far too static to play an important role in as dynamic an activity as the U-boat hunt." Relations between intelligence and operations were not particularly close, exacerbating the problem of providing timely and believable intelligence to those who needed to act upon it.

The U.S. Navy was not as unwilling to profit from British experience in intelligence as the Royal Navy might have imagined. When Admiral Alan Kirk departed London and his assignment as U.S. Naval Attaché for his new post as Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington he brought with him an awareness of the value of Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre and an enthusiasm for establishing a similar organization somewhere within the U.S. Navy Department. As a result of an early January 1941 meeting presided over by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, a "Chart Room" was established in which operational and intelligence information on U.S. and foreign ship movements was brought together and plotted. While this rudimentary effort was a far cry from Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, it was a start.

President Roosevelt's Executive Order of 18 December 1941 placed all of the U.S. Navy's operating forces under one organization, the United States Fleet, and under one
man, Admiral Ernest J. King. At the same time the president separated King's responsibilities as Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet from those of Admiral Harold R. Stark who remained, at least temporarily, the Chief of Naval Operations. The CNO retained responsibility for the administration of the Navy Department, for long range planning, and for personnel and material support. In intelligence matters the Chief of Naval Operations retained direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence, "which office furnishes information to the Commander in Chief [King]." For his part, the Commander in Chief "maintains a fleet intelligence section in close contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence and other sources of information."  

King's reputation as a martinet was in no way diminished by his performance under the dual pressures of high command and the war. At the time that the staff of Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet was formed, Rear Admiral Frank T. Leighton [not to be confused with Edwin T. Layton, Admiral Nimitz' Staff Intelligence Officer at Pacific Fleet Headquarters during the same time period], who had headed the "Chart Room" in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, was moved to the newly-created position of Fleet Operational Intelligence Officer in the Plans Division of the Commander in Chief's staff and given the task of directing the activities of a new Fleet "Chart Room." His summary departure from that post a few month's later, as
recalled by his relief, George C. Dyer, who held the rank of Commander at the time, exemplified King's personnel management techniques. Dyer remembered that he had been with the U.S. Fleet staff for about three months, with duties in both intelligence and planning, when one day King summoned him. "You go down and take over the operational intelligence office in addition to your present duties," King ordered, adding "you relieve Admiral Leighton and I want Admiral Leighton out of the Navy Department by four-thirty this afternoon."39

When Dyer took over the fleet operational intelligence office from Leighton he also inherited a rudimentary plotting room for U-boat movements, but nothing that could compare to the Tracking Room, headed by Commander Roger Winn, RNVR, in the Operational Intelligence Centre in London. Winn, a rising young (age 37) barrister in London before the war, came into the Operational Intelligence Centre in August 1939 as a civilian assistant to the head of the Submarine Tracking Room, a Royal Navy captain. Because of the uncanny success he soon enjoyed in predicting German U-boat movements, in late 1940 Admiralty took the unprecedented step of appointing Winn to the key position as head of the Tracking Room and of giving him a direct commission as a Commander in the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve. Patrick Beesly, foremost biographer of British naval intelligence during World War II and Winn's deputy
from 1942 on, has commented that "it was a stroke of singular good fortune that someone so ideally suited to the job in hand was available and was selected."\(^{40}\)

Under Winn's leadership the Tracking Room established an extremely close working relationship with Admiralty's Operations and Anti-Submarine Divisions, and with the Movements Section of its Trade Division - the organization that did the routing of convoys passing through the submarine-infested waters of the North Atlantic. So great became Winn's personal reputation and that of his Tracking Room for predicting enemy ship movements that Admiralty adopted what Winn called his "working fiction" for evaluation of German submarine activities. "What could only be an estimate and a guess," Winn said, "was to be taken as a fact and acted upon."\(^{41}\)

Winn's singular ability in U-boat intelligence analysis was not lost on those few Americans in London who were privy to the secrets of the Tracking Room. Admiral Robert Ghormley, the U.S. Special Naval Observer in England and one of three U.S. naval officers admitted to the Tracking Room, encouraged the Navy Department to invite Winn to the United States, so the U.S. Fleet's intelligence staff could benefit from his experience. In April 1942, at the height of the German submarine attacks off the U.S. East Coast, Ghormley sent King a letter which enthusiastically supported Winn's prospective visit, told the Commander in Chief of the
Tracking Room's accomplishments, and commented that "the work they do here is really remarkable."  

Admiral John Godfrey, the British Director of Naval Intelligence, was as anxious as Ghormley for Winn's visit to take place. Admiralty's concern over Anglo-American merchant ship losses in the Western Atlantic had been growing, and Godfrey had selected Winn for the delicate task of "selling" the U.S. Navy on adopting British methods of antisubmarine warfare. Winn was chosen not only for his expertise in U-boat intelligence analysis but also for his background as a skilled advocate. It was thought also that his pre-war experience as an exchange scholar at both Yale and Harvard might improve his chances of "getting on" with the Americans.  

Winn arrived in Washington on 19 April 1942 and the next day met with the American Director of Naval Intelligence and his deputy. It became immediately obvious to Winn, as it was to the Director, that Winn was talking to the wrong people. The division of responsibility between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet had placed operational intelligence matters clearly within the latter's scope of responsibility. Winn was, therefore, taken to the Fleet Operational Intelligence Officer, Commander George Dyer. Winn soon formed the opinion that Dyer, "an able and forceful officer," occupied "a key position in relation to my objective."  

It took
Winn three days to overcome Dyer's "initially skeptical and critical attitude" toward the idea of a submarine tracking organization that was the focal point of all intelligence on U-boat activities, and one that worked in close harmony with the Fleet Operations staff. Once Dyer had been brought on board, Winn subsequently reported to Admiralty, it took another four days to "win over and convince" Dyer's superior, Admiral Richard S. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff. Once Edwards had agreed and had given the orders to "get the right room and the right men and get going," matters progressed rapidly. Before Winn left for home on 11 May the American U-boat tracking room "was a going concern."45

As an inducement to Edwards to organize a U-boat tracking facility, Winn had "hinted" that should this be done, the British might have "better information to impart." The veiled reference to communications intelligence was not lost on Edwards, who agreed to the inauguration of a special communications channel between the British and American submarine tracking rooms, by which informal messages containing highly sensitive material might be exchanged. On 3 June 1942 the first of some two thousand such signals passed between the American Submarine Tracking Room in Washington and the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre in London, a flow that was not to end until June 1945.46

The establishment of the American Submarine Tracking Room and its close tie-in with Admiralty's Operational
Intelligence Centre represented particularly significant steps in the development of Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. For the first time the products of this cooperative effort, particularly the contribution of intelligence to the evasive routing of convoys away from threatening U-boats, had a visibly beneficial effect on the course of the Battle of the Atlantic. Allied shipping losses in the North Atlantic dropped from a 1942 monthly high in June of 124 ships, totalling 623,545 tons, to the year's low in December of 46 ships, totalling 262,135 tons. While intelligence could not claim credit for all of this improvement, there was no doubt that intelligence cooperation was beginning to pay off.

Locating the Tracking Room in the U.S. Fleet's operations staff instead of within the Office of Naval Intelligence was of significance to the future development of American naval intelligence. Heretofore the U.S. Navy had followed the British model, combining long range or strategic intelligence and short range or operational intelligence analysis and production in a single organization. With the advent of the U.S. Fleet structure a sharp demarcation became drawn between these two types of activity, with strategic intelligence, including intelligence requirements for combined planning, remaining with ONI; and intelligence needed for operational purposes, for example, antisubmarine warfare, becoming the
responsibility of the fleet staff. This division of authority did much to define ONI's wartime role as a producer of intelligence to support the combined intelligence staffs' planning operations such as the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942 and in Western Europe in 1944. As will be seen later, Admiral Chester A. Nimitz followed the opposite course in the Pacific Theater and established a single intelligence center, separate from but serving both his single-service Fleet staff and his Pacific Theater joint staff. Even though other Allied nations such as Australia and New Zealand were involved, there was never a combined planning organization in Nimitz' Pacific Theater.

By mid-1942, with the roles of the producers of strategic and operational intelligence determined, the Americans at last convinced of the value of an all-source current intelligence center to support antisubmarine warfare, and the tracking rooms on both sides of the Atlantic closely tied together, the scene was set for the definitive battle to come against the German U-boats in the Atlantic and for the closest Anglo-American intelligence cooperation that was to be achieved during the whole of the Second World War.
more areas of the world, so also did intelligence expand into new sources of information and new methods of analysis. War itself had changed. Unrestricted submarine warfare was now accepted as the norm, as was aerial bombing of civilian and military targets by both sides. Fast-paced mechanized operations, exemplified by the massive tank battles in the North African deserts, had largely supplanted the static trench warfare of World War I. Soon, amphibious invasion, with its new techniques of coordinated air/sea attacks, would play a decisive part in Allied strategy to turn the tides of battle in Africa, Europe, and the islands of the Pacific.

One of the first of the new sources of intelligence to have an impact of wartime planning and operations was that of aerial photographic reconnaissance and the subsequent interpretation, or "read-out," of the photographs. Military aerial photographic reconnaissance had first been used in the 19th century when, during the Franco-Prussian War, the French took photographs from a balloon to aid in identifying German positions during the siege of Paris. However, it was not until 1937 that Admiralty began to show interest in aerial reconnaissance and aerial photo interpretation as a valuable source of information about the movements of German warships. Immediately prior to the start of the war the British Secret Intelligence Service, not the Royal Navy, flew photographic reconnaissance flights in August and
September 1939 over the port of Wilhelmshaven to locate the major units of the German fleet. With the fall of France in 1940 British photographic reconnaissance concentrated on those occupied French ports in which the Germans were massing their forces for the invasion of England.

In the early months of the war aircraft used for photographic reconnaissance were relatively slow and unarmed, and losses were severe. However, as the higher levels of the British government began to appreciate the value of aerial reconnaissance, steps were taken to improve photographic equipment and to procure faster aircraft, with longer operating ranges, especially configured for photographic work. In 1941 the British Chiefs of Staff determined that photographic reconnaissance was to be used primarily against strategic targets. Tactical reconnaissance was to be the responsibility of armed fighter aircraft. This limitation of photographic reconnaissance to strategic targets was of great significance to the development of photographic interpretation, as it implied a need for continuing and detailed study of the photographs obtained.

Photographic interpretation was conducted in three phases. First phase interpretation consisted of a brief examination of the film immediately upon the return of the reconnaissance aircraft for items of particular significance. Observed naval activity was immediately
reported to the Operational Intelligence Centre by fastest available means. Second phase interpretation was carried out within 24 hours and consisted of a more detailed read-out of the targets covered and comparison of the current photographs with those obtained previously to detect changes of importance. Third phase interpretation was the most detailed and was often performed by specialists in various subjects such as German submarine construction or electronic installations. During this third phase bomb damage assessments were made to determine which targets needed to be struck again.

All photographic interpretation took place at a single location, staffed by the Royal Air Force and called the Central Interpretation Unit. Admiralty did no original photographic interpretation itself but did maintain a small staff in the Naval Intelligence Division to coordinate Admiralty's requirements for photographic coverage of naval targets for immediate use by the Operational Intelligence Centre and others of the Naval Staff.⁵²

Prior to the start of the Second World War the United States Navy had no photographic intelligence organization and its aerial photographic activities were limited to experiments in aerial mapping and charting.⁵³ Shortly after he arrived in London in the spring of 1941, Admiral Ghormley was made aware of British activities in the field of photographic reconnaissance for intelligence purposes and
became interested in its potential for use by the U.S. Navy. He asked that a "competent officer" be sent over from Washington to study British methods.\textsuperscript{54}

The officer selected, Lieutenant Commander Robert S. Quackenbush Jr., was at the time head of photography at the U.S. Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics. After reporting to Ghormley in London, he was posted to the Central Interpretation Unit for a three-month course, from which he emerged greatly enthused about the prospects for the U.S. Navy's gathering intelligence from aerial photographs. Apparently he communicated his enthusiasm to Admiral Ghormley, who cabled the Navy Department in June 1941 requesting that four additional aviation officers be sent immediately for training in England and recommending that specially selected Navy and Marine officers, not necessarily aviators, be subsequently ordered over for training as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{55} Throughout the month of June, Ghormley continued to badger the Navy Department for additional personnel to train in photographic interpretation, strengthening his arguments with the fact that the "British [are] employing in excess [of] two hundred officers and four hundred rates [specialized enlisted personnel] in this work alone."\textsuperscript{56}

Commander Quackenbush returned to Washington in the summer of 1941 and began the task of planning a U.S. Navy Photographic Interpretation School. The Chief of Naval
Operations directed the establishment of the school in September 1941 and, with impetus from the events of 7 December 1941, the school opened its doors in January 1942. The first instructors were those American Navy and Marine officers who had followed Quackenbush at the Central Interpretative Unit in England. Teaching procedures, texts, and photographic examples were borrowed from the British since there was neither time nor local expertise available to develop a home-grown product.57 British wartime experience, once again shared freely with the U.S. Navy, allowed American naval intelligence to enter the war much better prepared than they might otherwise have been to utilize new techniques of photographic intelligence against new techniques of warfare.

No single source of intelligence, no matter how productive, can of itself meet all needs for information. Communications intelligence, which located German U-boats at sea, and aerial photographic intelligence, which helped establish submarine building rates and track enemy warship movements, were vital to success in the Battle of the Atlantic. Other sources of information, however, played lesser but highly significant roles in winning the battle. Stephen Roskill, official historian of the Royal Navy in World War II, recognized both the contribution of aerial reconnaissance as well as its limitations in noting that photographic interpretation tended to exaggerate the
importance of any movement by a major enemy warship. "Photographic reconnaissance cannot therefore eliminate the need for intelligence about the enemy's intentions derived from other sources." 58

A traditional, but nonetheless valuable source of intelligence was interrogation — the questioning of "those who had been there" — both friend and foe. The first British interrogations of the Second World War were performed not on captured Germans but on the great numbers of European refugees who had fled to England in the 1930s to escape Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism. The object of the questioning was not so much to elicit information, although the Secret Intelligence Service did participate in the interrogations for that purpose, as it was to determine who should be interned as an undesirable enemy alien. 59 With the fall of France this flow of refugees was swollen by Polish, French, Belgian, Dutch, and Scandinavian military personnel, all coming to England to join their nations' armed forces in exile. Even after the French defeat, a constant stream of military "escapers and evaders" continued to reach England, all of whom had to be questioned to determine their bona fides, as well as to gain the latest information on the situation in occupied Europe. 60

In addition to the influx of foreign troops, British soldiers and airmen began to return home. Some had escaped from German prisoner of war camps and others, who had never
been captured, had made their way to neutral countries with
the aid of local residents. These returnees, too, were
questioned upon arrival in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{61}

British interrogation of prisoners of war began in
1939. As in the case of aerial photographic interpretation,
prisoner of war interrogation was carried out at a single
location. Under the management of the War Office, the
Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre developed
and practiced the "art" of extracting information from
usually reluctant prisoners.\textsuperscript{62} Successful interrogation
often depended on the quality of the material furnished the
interrogator. Detailed briefs were prepared on the
prisoner's military unit, his comrades, and his technical
specialty. These briefs were used in an attempt to convince
the prisoner that his interrogator already knew all there
was to be known, so there was no reason not to respond
truthfully. Stool-pigeons and microphones hidden in
prisoners' detention cells were also used to good effect to
obtain information that would assist in building up the
attitude of omniscience sought by the interrogators.\textsuperscript{63} Each
military service provided its own interrogators, many of
whom possessed specialized backgrounds that were of great
value in eliciting technical information.

As early as October 1939 British Naval Intelligence
began to receive reports from interrogations of German
crewmen captured after successful attacks on their U-
boats. It was not, however, until 1942 that the British naval staff began to give any great credence to information derived from prisoner of war interrogations. Until the information had been confirmed from other sources, Admiralty refused to believe early interrogation reports that the Germans had developed supply U-boats and reports that enemy U-boats could dive as deep as 600 feet.

In mid-1941 the British Director of Naval Intelligence warned his American opposite number "on the dangers of premature questioning by enthusiastic amateurs," citing as an example a case in the early days of the war in which cigarettes, thought to be Irish, were found on a German submarine prisoner, "from which it was wrongly deduced that the submarine had visited a port on the West Coast of Eire." From 1942 on, due in part to improvements in interrogation techniques, more and better information was furnished and more attention was paid to that provided. As the war progressed the Royal Navy developed a "healthy respect" for prisoner of war intelligence.

An administrative history of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence was prepared at the war's end, but was never published. In the section dealing with prisoner of war activities the comment was made that, "prior to World War II, no organized procedure for the interrogation of naval prisoners of war existed within the United States Navy."

However, early in the war the U.S. Navy began to show great
interest in the results of British interrogations. In September 1940 the U.S. Naval Attaché in London used the good offices of the Bailey Committee to obtain copies of British interrogations of captured German submarine crew members conducted in late 1939 and 1940. By the summer of 1941 the U.S. Navy Department felt the need to establish a capability separate from that of the British for the systematic interrogation of "prisoners of Oriental nations" and began to look for persons with the special qualifications required. In addition, the Navy Department made plans to send Americans to the United Kingdom for training in "the handling of European prisoners."\textsuperscript{70}

British and American naval intelligence organizations maintained "full and complete liaison" in matters concerning prisoner interrogation from mid-1941 until the war's end. A U.S. naval officer was attached to the staff of the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre in England before Pearl Harbor and, following America's entry into the war, a British naval officer from the center was sent to Washington for nine months to help develop the U.S. naval interrogation capability.\textsuperscript{71}

Despite these close initial ties, American and British methods of conducting and reporting interrogations began to vary as time passed. In British eyes, this non-parallel development was unfortunate. An Admiralty post-war internal paper on wartime prisoner interrogation stated that "it
would be ingenuous to maintain that the United States naval interrogation section was as successful as we were ourselves." Reasons given for the American shortcomings included over-staffing and retention of less able personnel who, allegedly, took less interest in their work than did their British counterparts. The insulation of the American Office of Naval Intelligence from the producers of operational intelligence and from those directing U.S. naval operations was also cited as a weakness. "This reflection [on the relative lack of success of the American naval interrogation effort] is not made in the spirit of idle criticism," the writer commented, "but rather to reinforce the lesson which we learned that naval interrogation can never be successful unless it is closely correlated not only with all other sources of intelligence but also with the day to day work of those responsible for formulating technical and tactical strategy."\(^{72}\)

While British naval interrogation mentors may not have been entirely satisfied with the results produced by their American pupils, a mutually profitable cooperative effort was maintained throughout the war. Naval prisoners were interrogated in the country in which they were first landed, irrespective of which country had sunk their ships, and the resulting interrogation reports were provided to both countries by American and British naval liaison officers stationed in London and Washington respectively for that
purpose.

It is an unfortunate fact of intelligence life that basic information on friendly territory is not collected when it is readily available. Only after the once-friendly area is in enemy hands does the need for detailed data on its ports, roads, terrain, beaches, and climate become apparent and pressing. Lack of what is now known as "topographical intelligence" contributed to the British defeat at Gallipoli in 1915 — a lesson either ignored or overlooked until after the fall of Norway in 1940.\textsuperscript{73} Fully aware of Admiralty's shortcomings in basic intelligence, the British Director of Naval Intelligence called upon three men: "a Royal Marine officer with considerable intelligence experience, one captain, Royal Navy, with considerable hydrographic experience, and one Oxford Don with knowledge of the resources of the academic world," to attack the problem.\textsuperscript{74} They were charged with the extraction, collation, and production of topographical intelligence to meet the needs of the naval staff planners. They produced two types of reports: topographical studies in what came to be known as the Inter-Service Information Series, or ISIS, and short-term "spot" reports on specific areas of immediate interest to the planners. Much of the information from which these studies were prepared was found in what is today called "open source" materials. Public and private libraries, trade and technical journals, foreign and
domestic government publications were culled for vital bits of information. Travellers to foreign lands, whether for business or pleasure, were sought out and their brains picked. For example, in 1941 the British Broadcasting Corporation issued an appeal to the general public for family photographs, such as those of holiday visits to French beaches, that might contain items of potential military interest. "Instead of the 10,000 [photographs] hoped for, this [request] produced no fewer than 80,000 replies."\(^7\)

In 1941, following his own dictum that "somewhere in or near London can be found the great authority on any subject – the problem is to find him,"\(^7\) Godfrey organized a Contact Register Section within his intelligence staff specifically to ferret out those in the civil population with specialized information of potential military value. "By 1943 there was hardly an area in the world or a likely subject without the name of some specialist recorded on the 10,000 cards of its index."\(^7\)

At inception the topographical studies were prepared "in-house" by Admiralty solely for its own use. However, it was not long before War, Air, and other ministries were calling upon the section to assist them in obtaining topographical information. The topographic section soon outgrew its space in Admiralty and moved to Oxford, where it could command not only the vast resources of the University,
but also those of the Oxford University Press, a production facility of the highest quality. To accommodate the needs of the other Services, the organization was enlarged to include Army and Royal Air Force officers and was renamed the Inter-Service Topographical Department (ISTD). Nevertheless, Admiralty retained overall supervision of the program.  

Although the U.S. Navy developed a topographical department in the Office of Naval Intelligence that shared its products with ISTD and received theirs in return, the American organization most resembling ISTD was located in Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services. President Roosevelt had given Donovan a vague and all-encompassing charter "to collect and analyze all information and data which may bear on national security." To carry out this portion of his mission, Donovan formed a Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) in OSS that produced political and economic studies as well as basic intelligence handbooks. From 1942 until its dissolution at the war's end, William L. Langer, former holder of the Coolidge Chair of Diplomatic History at Harvard, headed R&A. Langer assembled a team of distinguished scholars, whose academic credentials fully equalled those of the Oxbridge Dons of ISTD. Some forty professional historians served in R&A during the war, "including no less than seven future presidents of the American Historical Association." Gordon Craig, Felix
Gilbert, Walt Rostow, Arthur M. Schlesinger, and Carl E. Schorske were all alumni of the R&A Branch of OSS.

According to Admiral Godfrey, Donovan visited ISTD at Oxford on one of his early trips to Britain and was "immensely impressed." Donovan returned to Washington determined to give "whole-hearted support" to ISTD. "This [support]," Godfrey commented, "took the form of lending us just the sort of staff we [at Oxford] needed and could no longer obtain in the U.K." Most of these reinforcements came from the ranks of R&A, although the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence also provided officers to ISTD, both from its own staff and from the Intelligence Division of Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

In addition to assisting ISTD with naval personnel, the American Office of Naval Intelligence, in partnership with Army G-2, commenced in early 1943 to produce its own topographical reports known as JANIS, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies, in response to the needs of the U.S. Joint Chiefs. Later in the war OSS played an important part in the production of these studies, which were then issued by the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board. R&A liaison officers at OSS headquarters in London worked to obtain topographic materials from Britain for American use, as British Naval Intelligence Directorate officers in Washington did for ISTD.

As had been the case with aerial reconnaissance and
photographic interpretation, British initiatives in the
development of topographic intelligence materials had
preceded similar efforts in the United States, and again,
America profited from British trail-blazing. Other types of
intelligence sharing, especially in the fields of
counterintelligence and deception, grew as the war
progressed and U.S. participation increased. However, these
disciplines for the most part developed later and thus did
not share in the lineage of early war cooperation enjoyed by
photographic interpretation and prisoner of war
interrogation.

By the summer of 1942 all the basic avenues of
intelligence cooperation between the American and British
navies were open. Henceforth, growth on a Navy-to-Navy
basis would be achieved more by applying proven cooperative
mechanisms to new intelligence situations than by
innovation. Although new types of intelligence, such as
aerial photographic reconnaissance, prisoner of war
interrogations, and topographic intelligence production
received great attention, the more traditional areas of
cooperation were not neglected.

The split leadership in the Navy, which resulted
shortly after Pearl Harbor when the duties of Chief of Naval
Operation and Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet were separated, persisted until March 1942 and proved, at best, an "awkward arrangement." On 8 March Roosevelt accepted Stark's resignation as Chief of Naval Operations and appointed King to the post. The operational and administrative responsibility for direction of the Navy were, therefore, combined under King. Rather than go into retirement, Stark chose to accept the president's offer of assignment as Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. In keeping with the president's desire that Stark's departure from Washington not be seen as a demotion or as punishment for indirect culpability in the Pearl Harbor disaster, the London command was upgraded to that of a four-star, or full Admiral's, position as it had been during World War I under Admiral Sims. Stark took a month's leave before departing for London, where he replaced Vice Admiral Ghormley as both Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Special Naval Observer on 30 April 1942.

Stark was a particularly felicitous choice for the British assignment. As a young officer he had served on Admiral Sims' staff in London during the First World War and therefore had background knowledge of the types of problems he might face in his new command. In his former position as CNO, Stark had attended all the major Anglo-American military conferences in 1940 and 1941 and was fully "up to speed" on cooperative ventures currently underway between
the two navies. He was well thought of by the Lords of Admiralty, who professed to admire Stark "both for his sympathy in their darkest hour and for the manner in which he implemented the generous policy of his Government."87

During the course of the Anglo-American military conferences of 1941-1942, Stark had become a personal friend of First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound. They realized that it was in the mutual interest of their naval services that the closest possible working relationship be established between the Admiralty staff in Whitehall and the American naval staff in Grosvenor Square. Both men used their personal friendship as an informal avenue of approach to difficult problems. Their relationship strongly resembled that of General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. Like Stark, Dill had been "turfed out" of the top post in his military service — in Dill's case, Chief of the Imperial General Staff — and moved to a key liaison post in the capital of a wartime ally. Also like Stark, Dill called upon his personal friendship with Marshall to deal with ticklish questions. Both men found themselves in posts where they had, in Dill's words, "plenty of influence but no power."88

The Bailey Committee, heretofore the chief pipeline for exchange of information between the U.S. Navy in London and Admiralty, had ceased operations in September 1941, and no
formal organization had as yet replaced it. Although Stark's command was primarily administrative in nature, Pound wished to keep Stark fully acquainted with the operational picture and to this end offered Stark the services of a close friend and colleague, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake, RN, as personal liaison officer between the two men. Blake had enjoyed a distinguished career at sea in the inter-war years, had served as Naval Attaché to the British Embassy in Washington, and was currently Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff for Foreign Operations. Stark accepted; and Blake took up his new duties as FOLUS — Flag Officer Liaison U.S. Navy — in the early summer of 1942.89

Blake's appointment was of significance to intelligence cooperation because it increased both the volume and quality of British information furnished American naval authorities. The increase was achieved, ironically, because FOLUS supplanted Admiralty's Intelligence Division as the chief arbiter of what should be released. With the concurrence of the First Sea Lord, Pound, Blake made arrangements for very sensitive message traffic, carrying the highest British security classification, "HUSH MOST SECRET," (roughly corresponding to the U.S. Navy's "TOP SECRET") to be passed to him personally at Stark's headquarters. Heretofore this category of traffic had been rigidly controlled by Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division and only a very small percentage made available to the Americans. Other
types of traffic of a lower security classification, which previously had been screened for release by Intelligence, were now passed in greater numbers and without restriction directly to Blake for his use with Stark and his staff.

In addition to messages, Blake was able to gain the Prime Minister's permission to show Stark and one or two of his principal staff officers two reports of extremely limited distribution within the British government. The first of these, the Cabinet War Room Record, summarized in never more than two pages the military events of the previous 24 hours. The second, the First Lord's Report, was prepared by the captain on duty in the Admiralty Operations Room and covered naval activities of the previous 24 hour watch period. This latter record was prepared specifically for the eyes of His Majesty and for the First Lord and its distribution had been limited to 39 persons until the exception was made for Admiral Stark.\(^9\)

The great increase in the flow of British information into the American naval headquarters made it impossible for Stark to read each document, no matter how sensitive or interesting it might be. Blake, therefore, performed the additional service of screening the mass of incoming British material and of preparing for Stark's attention a daily summary of the most important items. Should Stark wish to go deeper into any subject, Blake would provide him with the original report or message. The following spring Stark was
to become privy to even more sensitive British information when, at the request of the First Sea Lord, the Prime Minister invited Stark to attend meetings of the top-level Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee. Stark was one of only two Americans to be so selected. The other, W. Averell Harriman, attended because of his status as President Roosevelt's Special Representative "in regard to all matters relating to the facilitation of material aid to the British Empire." 

Stark considered the information he received from these highly restricted British sources to be so valuable that in June 1942 he requested and obtained permission to send the Cabinet War Room Record and the First Lord's Report to Washington for the personal attention of Admiral King. The following month King visited London and was shown copies of Blake's daily summary. On his return to the United States, King asked the British Admiralty Delegate "if something of the same sort could be supplied to him in Washington."

While Admiralty and the American naval staff in London were drawing ever closer together, the same could not be said in Washington. In April 1942, shortly after Admiral King had assumed the additional responsibilities of Chief of Naval Operations, the Prime Minister felt it necessary to cable President Roosevelt that relations between the two navies were not as close as might be hoped. "We have established the most intimate contacts with the United
States Army and Air Force, but as Harry [Hopkins] will tell you we are not nearly so closely linked up on the Navy side."

King may have welcomed British intelligence information, but he was less receptive to other British cooperative initiatives, particularly to those suggesting that American naval personnel or naval units be assigned to operate under British (or other foreign) military authority. King expressed himself forcefully on this point in remarks to American, British, and Canadian naval and air officers attending an antisubmarine warfare conference. "A point upon which I have a very strong personal opinion," King said, "is the avoidance of mixed forces. It is always a great pleasure to work with our Allies, and we can always learn something from each other, but, nevertheless, I have had to me what is conclusive proof that these advantages are more than nullified by the handicap of effort that is inherent when forces of different nations, with different customs and systems of command, are brigaded together."55

King's dislike of mixed forces apparently extended even to the exchange of liaison officers. In response to a "feeler" from the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington concerning closer relationships between the American and British naval forces operating in the South Atlantic, one of King's aides wrote on 25 February 1942, "Admiral King directs me to tell you 'the answer is no. These people are
too busy to be exchanging visits; I do not desire that liaison officers be exchanged," "I am leaving out of the [previous] quotation," King's aide commented, "the appropriate adjectives and modifiers." 36

Admiral King found the exchange of officers for intelligence liaison purposes to be equally distasteful. The British Chiefs of Staff informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs on 28 July 1942 about the British organization for strategic deception and suggested that, should the U.S. be considering the formation of a similar body, "collaboration should begin immediately with an exchange of liaison officers." Saying that "he had decided objections towards the interchange of liaison officers for this purpose, particularly since liaison officers appointed by the British usually lack the authority to make any decisions," King was able to get the British proposal shunted off to committee. 37

While King deplored the inability of British liaison officers to make decisions, he was equally unresponsive to their recommendations. A member of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington, a Royal Navy captain, wrote a memo to his point of contact in the Navy Department's Convoy and Routing Section, a U.S. Navy captain, suggesting changes to convoy routing in the Caribbean that would result in faster turn-around time for the ships. In a 29 December 1942 memo to Admiral Sir Percy Noble, head of the British Admiralty
Delegation, King took strong exception to the fact that a RN captain was "engaging in the practice of conferring with (addressing memos to) subordinates of Rear Admiral Metcalf, who heads up the Convoy and Routing Section," on a matter that "had to do with the handling of convoys wholly under U.S. management." No wonder British liaison officers were reluctant to make decisions or offer suggestions on matters affecting the U.S. Navy!

Assignment of liaison officers was not always to British liking either, but for somewhat different reasons. The British Naval Staff would have preferred to see American naval officers appointed directly to Admiralty, as opposed to having them there in a liaison status. Shortly before his departure for Washington in June 1942, to head the British Admiralty Delegation, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was briefed by Godfrey on Anglo-American naval intelligence relationships. At that time Cunningham expressed the view that "liaison and collaboration were not enough, and that the time had come when British officers should work actually in the Navy Department in Washington...not as liaison officers and observers, but as actual working members." A proposal to assign U.S. officers directly to Admiralty was circulated among the British Naval Staff for comment, to which the Director of Naval Intelligence responded on 10 August 1942 that he had already asked for the assignment of one American naval officer to the Operational Intelligence
Centre and for three others, to become "an integral part of N.I.D. ." Although Godfrey at the same time expressed his hope "that they [the four officers] will be shortly appointed," no such assignments were made until much later in the war and then not to the Operational Intelligence Centre. Nor were Royal Navy officers ever offered posts in the OIC's sister organization, the U.S. Navy Submarine Tracking Room.

While the failure of the British proposal to put American naval officers to work in Admiralty cannot be traced directly to Admiral King, it is reasonable to think that his strong antipathy to mixed forces and to liaison officers was well known to his subordinates in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and was a significant consideration in their personnel decisions. As was seen in the case of Admiral Leighton, former head of operational intelligence on King's staff, angering the boss meant a speedy departure from Washington. It is equally probable that King's negative attitude toward intelligence personnel exchanges impeded progress toward the more fully integrated intelligence program desired by Admiralty. Later, policies driven by post-war political and economic considerations were to have an adverse effect on the course of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, but in 1942 the main impediment to a closer integration of the British and American intelligence organizations was the unfavorable
attitude of the leader of the U.S. Navy.

In 1941, prior to the United States' entry into the war, British naval intelligence focused on German activities, particularly in Europe, but elsewhere as well. American naval intelligence, while alert to the German danger, concentrated its attention more on Japanese activities. Both countries, however, were highly sensitive to Axis penetration of the Western Hemisphere, and cooperative efforts to counter perceived threats to this area commenced early.

Germany had become interested in Latin America in the 1930s, not so much as a target for subversion but as a listening post to gain information on its potential enemies Great Britain and the United States. The German overseas organization (Auslandsorganisation) recruited potential agents in Argentina and Chile, and German military and naval attachés in Brazil and elsewhere in South America were actively involved in espionage.

The British, too, were active in intelligence in Latin America during the 1930s. An August 1940 draft copy of the Bailey Committee Report, which offered a blueprint for increased Anglo-American intelligence cooperation (Chapter II), indicated that the British already had secret
intelligence centers in Peru and Uruguay. Additionally, an Admiralty minute of 17 June 1941 discussed the advisability of a pay raise for Royal Navy "intelligence officers" in Callao and Montevideo.

The U.S. Navy moved promptly to authorize its intelligence officers in South America to make contact with their British counterparts. On 12 June 1941 the American Director of Naval Intelligence wrote the U.S. Naval Attaché in Montevideo, Uruguay, that "the war is hot and close. We are cooperating thoroughly here (in Washington) with your British friends, so do not hesitate in your area."

One of the earlier Anglo-American cooperative intelligence projects in the Western Hemisphere had to do with censorship of private communications originating from Latin America. Censorship, both to deny information to the enemy and to screen mail for useful intelligence, had a long history in Great Britain, where the legitimacy of intercepting postal communications for the good of the State had been established by Parliament as early as 1710. This authority was later extended to cover communications by telephone and telegraph. During the early months of World War II Bermuda had become a hub of British censorship activities since most of the mail from Latin America to Europe funneled through there. British authorities would secretly open foreign mail as it passed through, extract whatever tidbits of information they found interesting,
reseal the mail in a manner that concealed its having been examined, and send it on its way.  

Anglo-American cooperation in censorship dated from late 1940. Earlier British diplomatic attempts to enlist U.S. aid in controlling the flow of information from South America to Germany had not always been either successful or tactful. Adolf Berle, at the time Assistant Secretary of State, had noted in his diary a 15 March 1940 meeting with a Special Envoy of His Majesty, "who served notice that the British propose to intercept our clipper planes, which now, of course avoid British censorship by not calling at Bermuda." "After a brief moment of silence," Berle had written, "I observed that the first time a British air squadron shot at an American plane there would be the duce to pay."  

The Bermuda leak in Anglo-American censorship was not fully plugged until May 1942 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed by British experts that German agents in South America were sending home information on merchant ship traffic in the Caribbean and on movements of naval units through the Panama Canal. Pan-American clippers en route from Brazil to Lisbon were subsequently rerouted through Trinidad instead of going direct, so they would become subject to Allied censorship regulations.  

By December 1941 reasonably effective coordination in censorship matters had been effected among the governments
of the United States, Britain, and Canada. Information derived from British censorship was passed to William Stephenson's British Security Co-ordination organization in New York City and from it to the FBI, which placed the data into U.S. intelligence channels. The U.S. Navy had instituted partial censorship in April 1941. By the following month naval censorship operations in coordination with the British were underway in Bermuda, and the resulting reports were furnished to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence for analysis.

British security authorities, perhaps remembering German sabotage in the United States during World War I, became concerned in 1941-1942 about the possibility of a similar campaign in North and South America. That the campaign never materialized was due more to Hitler's reluctance than to British counterintelligence skills. As the flow of American material to Great Britain increased in mid-1941 the British government felt it prudent to send a team from the Naval Intelligence Division of Admiralty and from MI 5, the British Security Service, to the United States and the West Indies to alert American naval authorities and its own colonial governors to the sabotage threat and to British methods of countering it. The team visited New York, Philadelphia, and Washington "to assist in improving American Naval security of ports and installations." In addition, the team members visited
American military posts in the Panama Canal Zone and inspected British intelligence and security arrangements in the Caribbean. They found that, with the exception of Jamaica, none of the colonial authorities "had the slightest conception of what security is about."114

In Latin America as elsewhere, the United States' becoming a full-time partner in the war against the Axis was a catalyst of cooperative intelligence efforts. In early 1942 the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington approached the American Director of Naval Intelligence with a proposal from Admiral Kennedy-Purvis, RN, Commander in Chief, America and West Indies Station, to convene an Anglo-American conference on intelligence relationships in the Caribbean area. "It seems important that, in order to avoid duplication and waste," the British admiral commented, "that the two Services should now work in the closest co-operation, where possible combining Intelligence centres in one office, or at least in adjoining offices."115

Somewhat surprisingly, in view of Admiral King's aversion to "mixed forces," the proposal to combine naval intelligence centers in the Caribbean met with favor in Washington, and the suggested conference took place in Jamaica in late March 1942. Kennedy-Purvis reported to the First Sea Lord that the meeting had produced "excellent results and it is hoped to establish there [in Jamaica] a combined intelligence centre."116 A second combined center
was also planned for Balboa, Canal Zone. It is unclear whether the plan for a Balboa center was ever realized, but the combined center in Jamaica was established, and the American side staffed by officers hand-picked from the Office of Naval Intelligence. By the latter part of 1942 the threat from German intelligence activities in Latin America had diminished significantly, but Anglo-American naval intelligence organizations in the Caribbean and South American continued to operate in close coordination until the war's end.

While intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Royal navies was being strengthened by British generosity in sharing of intelligence techniques and sensitive intelligence materials with the American naval staff in London and while the ground was being prepared for combined intelligence activities in Latin America, Allied plans for taking the war to Hitler were beginning to take shape. In the summer of 1942 Allied planning shifted from preparation for an early invasion of France to that of mounting an attack on North Africa. This significant strategic change was prompted in great part by the desire of both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to commence a major campaign in 1942 as well as by their military planners'
realization that Allied forces in England could not be made ready for a large-scale attack on France prior to 1943.\textsuperscript{120}

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had arrived in London on 24 June 1942 to take command of U.S. Army forces in Europe, was charged with planning the North African operation, now codenamed "Torch." On 27 July he prepared a memorandum outlining his staff requirements for Torch, in which he suggested that the chief intelligence planner be British.\textsuperscript{121} His recommendation was accepted, and a British Army brigadier was chosen to head the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of the Allied Forces Headquarters Staff. In addition, most of the key positions in the intelligence section were filled by British officers.\textsuperscript{122}

In response to a query from General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, asking for Eisenhower's views on how intelligence needs for Torch should be met, Eisenhower replied on 6 August that "all measures of intelligence...should be handled by existing agencies after close coordination" by the Joint Intelligence Committees in London and Washington. "It is not repeat not believed that any intelligence group of a separate service either in Great Britain or in the United States can handle this work independently, but that in both countries it must be controlled by the joint bodies established for this purpose."\textsuperscript{123} In short, Eisenhower was proposing that the combined staff system for the provision of intelligence,
agreed to at the Arcadia Conference in early 1942, be put to the test. However, he did recommend that the final decision on all intelligence activities in connection with Torch rest with the supreme commander. Eisenhower was particularly concerned that subversive activities, propaganda, and political warfare should be closely coordinated with the Torch military planners and specifically approved by the supreme commander. "I am convinced," he wrote, "that... disaster will inevitably follow mistaken and uncoordinated efforts of agencies not fully informed as to the scope and timing of contemplated operations."\(^{124}\)

After some political infighting between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff as to whether the American principle of "unity of command" or the British method of "control by committee" would prevail in Torch command relationships, the American position was accepted. Unity of command meant that all forces involved in Torch, irrespective of national origin, would be under the direct command of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Combined Chiefs named Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander and Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, RN, as his naval deputy. Despite Admiral King's opposition, the U.S. naval force commander, Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, USN, was to report directly to the British admiral and not to Eisenhower, as King would have preferred.\(^{125}\)

Integral to the Torch concept of operations was the amphibious assault, an ancient form of naval warfare, but
one little employed in modern times and never on the scale envisaged for Torch. Final Torch planning called for the Western Naval Task Force, under Admiral Hewitt, to land approximately 35,000 Army troops and some 250 tanks at three locations along the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Admiral Hewitt, since April 1942 commander of the Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet, was charged with both the planning and execution of this vast amphibious operation. According to World War II naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, "Admiral Hewitt, who had seen active service in the Navy for thirty-five years, was admirably adapted for this position by his seagoing experience, his organizing ability, and his tact." This latter virtue was probably put to the test in dealing with his counterpart, General George S. Patton, commander of the Western Landing Force United States Army.

Intelligence planning for the American landings was carried out by Hewitt's staff in Norfolk, Virginia. The planners assembled information from a wide variety of American sources including the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Army's Military Intelligence Service, the Office of Strategic Services, the Department of State, the Hydrographic Office, and various weather bureaus. British contributions were received via Eisenhower's combined planning staff in London, and the British provided "thousands of photographs" taken by reconnaissance aircraft that were used in choosing the "most feasible" landing
areas.\textsuperscript{128} Despite the multiplicity of sources, gaps in the needed information persisted and inaccuracies crept in. During the American debarkation in Oran, which began on 9 November 1942, one of the beach approaches, evaluated as "excellent" in the intelligence appreciation, was found to have a sand-bar that caused landing craft to ground two hundred yards offshore.\textsuperscript{129}

The Allied naval role in Torch was to be both major and complicated. American troops destined for the attack on Casablanca (Hewitt's Western Naval Task Force) were to embark from eastern U.S. ports and sail directly to their objective area. While the convoys were in the western Atlantic, they were the responsibility of the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet. From mid-Atlantic to the waters off the North African coast they were Admiralty's responsibility and, as they neared their objective, they "chopped" (Navy jargon for "changed operational control") to the invasion Commander in Chief and his naval deputy, Admiral Cunningham. Cunningham, who was Admiralty's commander of British naval forces in the Western Mediterranean and North Atlantic, in addition to his role as Eisenhower's naval deputy, was also responsible for those U.S. and British men and ships coming from the British Isles that were earmarked for the assaults on Oran and Algiers.\textsuperscript{130}

Planning for the Torch landings afforded intelligence a challenge different from any it had faced since the German
invasion of Poland in 1939. For the first time the Allies were on the offensive, and intelligence was being called to perform the unaccustomed task of predicting enemy reactions.\textsuperscript{131} Questions, such as the degree of French opposition to be expected, Spanish reaction, and the likelihood of German intervention, were subjects of debate and compromise. Assessments made shortly before the 8 November landing indicated that Allied forces faced their greatest danger at sea en route to their objectives but that once ashore, they should experience no great difficulties\textsuperscript{132} — a less than prescient estimate, as things worked out.

Intelligence, especially the naval intelligence required by the attacking forces, came primarily from the British. Aside from those American intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover as consular officials monitoring American food shipments to French North Africa, the United States had almost no intelligence "assets" in the area. On the other hand, the British, with strategically important locations such as Gibraltar, Malta, and the Suez Canal to defend, were long-time players in the Middle Eastern intelligence game.

Admiralty's involvement in Middle East intelligence activities dated from 1892, when it first began to receive reports from the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Station.\textsuperscript{133} In the summer of 1939 Admiralty established a scaled-down version of its own Operational Intelligence Centre at Malta,
so that "the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, should have more immediate intelligence of movements of foreign war and merchant ships in the Mediterranean than could be afforded direct from London." The Malta Operational Intelligence Centre obtained much of its information from intercepted communications, especially from Italian naval traffic, and from direction finding analysis. A small team of communications intelligence specialists were embarked in the fleet flagship, "to produce 'red hot' deduction for the information of the Commander in Chief." The existence of this operational intelligence group, ashore and afloat, was treated as "most secret," and its activities were kept entirely separate from the "above ground" world-wide naval intelligence organization, which had offices in Malta, Alexandria, and Cairo.

In counteracting the greatest potential threat to the Allied convoys bound for Torch, that of German U-boats, naval intelligence was hampered by its inability throughout most of 1942 to read German submarine communications. However, Italian naval codes had been broken in the summer of 1941, and the use of this source, as well as that of other types of intercepted German communications and of extensive photographic reconnaissance, enabled intelligence to gage enemy reactions — or, in this case, the lack thereof — to Allied maritime activities. Although the Western convoy from the United States and the Eastern convoy from
the British Isles were detected on occasion during their transits, the enemy was unsuccessful in determining their ultimate destinations, and both convoys reached their objectives without coming under serious attack.\textsuperscript{137}

Admiralty provided the intelligence on landing beaches, ports, and objectives ashore required by the Intelligence Section of the Allied Forces Headquarters staff, much of it coming from the labors of the Inter-Services Topographical Department (Chapter IV, \textit{iii}). The official history of British intelligence in the Second World War noted that "there was little opposition during the landings and this makes it difficult to judge the quality of the intelligence ...provided by ISTD. But there is little doubt that its reports...were of high quality."\textsuperscript{138} ISTD was complimented on its contribution to the success of the landings by both Eisenhower and his naval commander, Cunningham. Intelligence preparations for Torch proved, if nothing else, an excellent practical test of the joint/combined intelligence planning system and an opportunity to work out procedural kinks before the major effort, intelligence planning for Overlord – the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944 – got underway in earnest.

At roughly the same time as the successful Allied landings in North Africa, November 1942, British forces under General Bernard L. Montgomery defeated Rommel's tanks at El Alamein in the Western Desert of Egypt and began a
drive to push the Germans and Italians back to Tobruk. The arrival of a major British convoy lifted the siege of Malta. The Russians continued to hold at Stalingrad in the face of a furious German assault. In the Pacific, Americans were slowly taking back territory from the Japanese in the battle for Guadalcanal. The tide of battle was beginning to turn.139

In the year from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to the Allied landings in North Africa, significant changes had taken place in Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. The post-Arcadia conferences between the American and British Joint Chiefs in early 1942 had paved the way for the institution of the joint/combined intelligence system. Provision of single-service, uncoordinated intelligence estimates began to give way to preparation of an integrated, joint and combined intelligence product. The new system received its first test in the planning for Torch and proved workable.

Additional types of intelligence began to come on stream during the year. Information from aerial photography, prisoners of war, topographical intelligence, and censorship were combined with that from communications
intelligence and agents to provide the planners with the most comprehensive picture possible of enemy capabilities.

The British took the lead in perfecting new techniques of intelligence, and Americans profited from British knowledge. At Admiralty's urging, the U.S. Navy established a submarine intelligence center and located it in naval headquarters, next door to the operators of the Tenth Fleet staff who were actually directing the fight. This juxtaposition of intelligence and operations mirrored British experience in their successful battle against German Up-boats.

In 1942 Admiralty continued its efforts to obtain closer integration of its intelligence activities with those of the U.S. Navy, and Washington continued to resist. The U.S. Navy's reluctance to move more rapidly in the field of intelligence cooperation at least indirectly reflected the attitude of its leader, Admiral Ernest J. King, who continued to look with disfavor upon permitting American ships and sailors to serve under foreign commanders. Post-Arcadia, Navy-to-Navy cooperative ties were also weakened by Allied adoption of the joint/combined staff system. As the year 1942 ended and the tide of battle began to turn, the Allies started to bend their efforts towards the invasion of "Fortress Europe." Intelligence, too, prepared to go on the offensive.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 4:

1. Berle, Navigating the Rapids, 383.

2. OPNAV to CINCAF and CINCPAC, 272337, 27 November 1941, Strategic Plans Division Records, box 147J, folder: WPL-46 (and WPL-44, Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 3), Letters and Dispatches 12/40 - 12/41, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


5. Ibid., 283.


8. Ibid., 300.


16. King to Stark, 29 August 1941, King to Ingram, 20 September 1941, Papers of FADM Ernest J. King; series I, Correspondence 1918 - Feb 1942; box 1, file: September 1941; Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


19. Meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff held 13 January 1942, concerning post-Arcadia collaboration. COS(42)79. PRO: CAB 80/34.

20. JCCS-8, 10 January 1942, PSF 1, (Arcadia), Roosevelt Library.


22. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:42.

23. Post-Arcadia Collaboration, ABC-4, 14 January 1942, Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca 1943 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1968), 233, wherein it was determined that "the word 'joint' should be applied to Inter-Service collaboration [within a single nation] and the word 'combined' to collaboration between two or more United Nations." These definitions were not in effect in mid-1940 when the British Chiefs of Staff instituted an inter-service Combined Intelligence Committee. A sub-committee of the JIC, the Combined Intelligence Committee was organized as a special warning body for the specific purpose of bringing together all sources of information that bore on the German invasion threat. By the time the "combined/joint" system came into effect in 1942, the Combined Intelligence Committee had outlived the reason for its creation, was for all practical purposes defunct, and therefore caused no definitional problems.


25. Ibid., 98.

27. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, 126 (table).

28. Ibid., 109.


32. Ibid., 279.

33. Kahn, Seizing the Enigma, 215-16, provides a vivid picture of a direction finding station in action.

34. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 107.

35. Farago, Tenth Fleet, 76.


38. COMINCH (Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet) War Diary, 7 December 1941 - 31 December 1942, entries for 15 January 1942 and 18 February 1942, World War II War Diaries, box 1, file 1, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


40. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 58.

41. McLachlan, Room 39, 115, quoting Winn.
42. SPENAVO (Ghormley) to King, 6 April 1942, Papers of FADM Ernest J. King; series I, correspondence; box 2, March - August 1942; Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


46. SRH 208, "United States Navy Submarine Warfare Reports, COMINCH to Admiralty;" RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C.


55. SPENAVO 130941 June 1941, Action to OPNAV. ALUSNA and SPENAVO London messages, September 1938 - September 1941, file 1, folder 7, COMNAVSEU Series I, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

56. SPENAVO 161330 June 1941, Action to OPNAV. *Ibid*.

57. "History of U.S. Navy School of Photographic Interpretation."

59. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 4:71. The authority for the SIS involvement in refugee interrogations is, according to Hinsley, contained in CAB 93/2. This is one of the many references to Public Records Office files that are not open to the public.


62. Head Foreign Intelligence Branch to Director of Naval Intelligence, memorandum of 27 June 1941, quoting Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR, who stated that "successful interrogation of prisoners of war, as practiced in the United Kingdom, is more of an art and not a science; that it depends, in obtaining successful results, upon the understanding and personality of trained interrogators." Box 228; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

63. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:282.

64. U.S. Naval Attaché London to Admiral Bailey's Committee, memorandum of 19 September 1940, file 20, Bailey Committee Memoranda 1940-1941, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

65. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:33, 229.

66. Godfrey to Kirk, letter of 15 July 1941, box 228; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

67. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:34.

68. ONI Administrative History, 854.

69. U.S. Naval Attaché London to Admiral Bailey's Committee, memorandum of 19 September 1940, file 20, Bailey Committee Memoranda, 1940-1941, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

70. OP-16-F to OP-16-F-9, memorandum of 2 July 1941, box 228; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

72. Ibid., 54, 55.

73. McLachlan, Room 39, 292.

74. S.J. Basset, "A Brief History of the Inter-Service Topographical Department (I.S.T.D.)," (Statement circulated as a Memorandum of Information by the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, 23 October 1943), entry 421, box 225; RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; NA, Washington, D.C., 1.

75. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:483.

76. Godfrey to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, minute of 21 June 1939. PRO: ADM 1/10218.

77. Beesly, Very Special Admiral, 211.


82. COMNAVEU Administrative History, 125.

83. ONI Administrative History, 99. A Joint Intelligence Study Production Board flow chart is in entry 1, box 1, folder: JANIS; RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services; NA, Washington, D.C.

84. Simpson, Stark, 118.

85. COMNAVEU Administrative History, 83.

86. Simson, Stark, 136.


90. Ibid., 6.

91. Churchill to Stark, 13 March 1943, Stark papers, box A1, Correspondence, January-March 1943, Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C. See also PRO: ADM 205/27 for the First Sea Lord's highly pragmatic reasoning behind the request.


95. King, Remarks to Officers Attending the 1 March 1943 Conference on Anti-Submarine Warfare, King Papers, box 3, Correspondence, March 1943, Series I, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


98. King to Noble, 29 December 1942, King Papers, box 3, Correspondence, December 1942, Series I, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


103. Chapter II, footnote 70.


105. Kirk to Loftin, letter of 12 June 1941, Kirk Papers, box 4, Correspondence Official and Personal 1941, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

106. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 4:12.


109. Combined Chiefs of Staff, Minutes of Meeting 26 May 1942, box 35, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Minutes, April 1942-April 1943, COMNAVEU Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

110. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 4:144.

111. ONI Administrative History, 353.


113. CNO to Major Divisions of OPNAV and Bureaus, 30 June 1941, Box 228, SecNav-CNO, 1940-1941; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

114. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 4:145. Quotation from a source not released to the public.

115. Hastings to Wilkinson, 10 February 1942, box 296, SecNav-CNO 1942; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

116. Kennedy-Purvis to First Sea Lord, 7 April 1942. PRO: ADM 205/22a, First Sea Lord's Records, 1942, Part II, Correspondence with various Flag Officers - British and Allied (non-U.S.).

118. ONI Administrative History, 1412-1413.


120. Cline, Washington Command Post, 164.


124. Ibid.

125. Ibid., 1:584.


127. Ibid., 21.

128. Ibid. 26.

129. Ibid., 237.


131. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:463.

132. Ibid., 2:475-76.

133. Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service, 15.

134. Godfrey to Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Fleet, 6 July 1939. PRO: ADM 1/10212, Intelligence Organization, Mediterranean Area.

135. Ibid.

136. See Endnote 32, supra.


CHAPTER V

THE CULMINATION: NOVEMBER 1942 - DECEMBER 1943

As the war in Europe entered its fourth year, the tide of battle was beginning to flow in favor of the Allies. In the Mediterranean, after successfully driving the Germans and Italians out of North Africa, Allied forces moved to occupy Sicily on the way to their eventual conquest of Italy. Allied strategic planners began to look beyond the immediate fighting, to prepare for the eventual definitive attack on German forces in Europe - whether across the English Channel, northward from the Mediterranean coast of France, or through the Balkans, the "soft underbelly" of Europe.

In the Atlantic the battle with German U-boats for the sea lanes between the United States and Great Britain peaked in May, then gradually abated. The Soviet Union, having stopped the German drive on Stalingrad and the Kursk salient, was beginning to force the invaders westward. In the Pacific, American forces had halted the Japanese
advance, begun their great dual counter-offensives across the Central and South Pacific, and were gradually reducing the perimeter of Japanese control — island by island.

The period from the successful Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942 until the December 1943 selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces preparing to invade Continental Europe marked the high point in Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. The carefully orchestrated British campaign to establish close working ties between the U.S. Navy's submarine tracking room and Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre was beginning to pay major dividends in the anti-U-boat war. Intelligence activities in all theaters were driven by the strategic decisions taken by Roosevelt, Churchill, and their advisors at Casablanca in January 1943. The combined American and British intelligence structure that had been created to prepare for the North African invasion had proven its effectiveness under actual combat conditions and would serve as the model in planning for subsequent campaigns in the Mediterranean and, more important, for the invasion of Continental Europe.

By the spring of 1943, while Allied naval fortunes in the Mediterranean were improving, the same could not be said
in the Atlantic. After a lull in January, Allied shipping losses, especially on the convoy routes in the Atlantic, increased alarmingly, peaking in March when U-boats destroyed over 625,000 tons of Allied merchant shipping. Following the strategic line agreed upon at Casablanca in January 1943, the highest Allied naval priority became, if had ever ceased to be, defeat of the German U-boat fleet. Allied leaders saw clearly that the Battle of the Atlantic must be won before an invasion of northwest Europe or major offensives in other theaters could be undertaken. Not only were shipping losses unacceptably high but, as American naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison pointed out, "Hitler was still building 'em [U-boats] faster than we could sink 'em."

To meet the continuing U-boat threat in the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy formed the Tenth Fleet on 1 May 1943. With no ships to call its own the Tenth Fleet staff, including its intelligence component, waged war from an office in downtown Washington, D.C., where staff members worked hand in glove with their counterparts at Admiralty in London. Commander Tenth Fleet and Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet were one and the same—Admiral Ernest J. King. King's expert on German U-boat intelligence, Commander Kenneth A. Knowles, was also "double-hatted," with duties on both Fleet staffs. Coincident with the creation of the Tenth Fleet, King, acting in his capacity as Chief of Naval Operations,
realigned the activities of his naval intelligence organization to provide closer support to the U.S. Navy's operating forces.

Despite the mounting evidence that the war in Europe would be won or lost on or under the Atlantic, and in the face of the collective wisdom of the strategists at Casablanca, not all Allied leaders saw the battle to come with the same sense of urgency. British naval historian Stephen Roskill has commented that Admiralty's inability to convince Churchill of the mounting U-boat threat and of the need for increased countermeasures "was, perhaps the most far reaching and tragic strategic error which can, at any rate in part, be laid at Churchill's door."³

In December 1942, Admiralty had reviewed the principles on which its convoy defense doctrine was based and had informed the First Sea Lord that "experience shows quite clearly that surface escorts without air co-operation cannot give sufficient security to convoys, unless they are in overwhelming strength."⁴ However, rather than increase the number of aircraft employed on anti-submarine and on convoy support missions, in January 1943, at Admiralty's urging, the British War Cabinet ordered massive bomber attacks on German U-boat building yards and bases, especially those in southwestern French ports along the Bay of Biscay. British and American bombers struck these bases and the towns surrounding them heavily and repeatedly
between January and May 1943. "But we now know," British naval historian Stephen Roskill has written, "that not one U-boat was put out of action, nor was the German building programme appreciably delayed [by the bombing]."5 Air Chief Marshal "Bomber" Harris, in a March 1944 letter to the British Director of Naval Intelligence, took strong exception to the conclusion reached by the DNI, and after the war by Roskill, that bombing had little effect on the number of U-boats in operation. In his response to the irate airman, the DNI was forced to point out that the conclusion was the product of a joint Royal Navy and Royal Air Force committee, which had included one member from Harris' own organization, Bomber Command.6

At the war's end Captain Kenneth Knowles, USN (Retired), who, as a Commander had been Admiral King's chief advisor on U-boat intelligence, responded to a query from the Director of Naval History on points that should be covered in preparation of a planned command history of the Battle of the Atlantic. Knowles commented that, among other things, the Atlantic was "unique among the campaigns of the war in respect to Allied command relations. There was no supreme commander in the Battle of the Atlantic."7

Although Knowles observation was accurate, during the dark days of 1942 and 1943 British and American leaders considered establishing a unified antisubmarine command for the Atlantic; and Parliament had even debated the question.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert of RAF Coastal Command and several officers on the staff of Admiral Harold R. Stark, Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, favored the idea of a single controlling staff for the whole of the U-boat war. Admiralty, however, remained firmly opposed. The First Sea Lord wrote the Prime Minister that if a British officer were to be chosen as supreme commander there would be friction with the Americans and that selection of an American was "unthinkable" because Americans lacked the necessary knowledge and experience.

Knowles also reminded the Director of Naval History that "the Atlantic was divided [between the United States and Great Britain] for purposes of administrative and command requirements, but the Battle of the Atlantic was a single operation." Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the provision of intelligence to the forces engaged in the anti-U-boat war. The U-boat tracking centers of the American, British, and Canadian navies kept their own national identities; no "combined" center was ever seriously contemplated, nor were personnel exchanged—except for short visits. Yet the three centers thought and acted as though they were one, in what was probably the most complete and most effective naval intelligence cooperative effort during the Second World War.

By January 1943 the section of the British Naval Intelligence Division designed specifically to counter the
U-boat menace, the Submarine Tracking Room, was operating at peak efficiency. In May the Royal Canadian Navy, which had been providing the two Anglo-American naval intelligence centers with valuable signals intercept and direction finding information since the early days of the war, upgraded its Tracking Room with a direct communications link to Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre and entered into full partnership with London and Washington in the intelligence war against the U-boat.11

The American counterpart, the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet's U-boat tracking room, better known as the "Secret Room" because of its exclusive use of communications intelligence, had come into being in late December 1942 and was playing "catch-up."12 "The teamwork between us [U.S./U.K.] was superb," Knowles later said, "and we were ever grateful for their more experienced counsel and advice."13

The British and American U-boat tracking rooms were remarkably similar in their physical characteristics and – except that the British room worked round-the-clock and the U.S. room did not – in their methods of operation. This was perhaps not too surprising, since Winn had been instrumental in organizing the U.S. tracking room during his visit to Washington in April 1942,14 and Knowles had visited Admiralty's Tracking Room and its U-boat guru, Commander Roger Winn, on several occasions during the war, including a
two-week indoctrination tour in May 1942. Both tracking rooms were small adjuncts to larger plot rooms. In Admiralty the larger of the two rooms was the Main Trade Plot, where Allied and enemy naval and merchant shipping information not directly attributable to communications intelligence was displayed. In Washington the U.S. Navy's main operational plot room was located in the COMINCH Combat Intelligence Division's Atlantic Section. Here, as in London, all-source information (disguised or "sanitized" as necessary) was maintained on Allied and neutral naval ships and merchant convoys, as well as estimates of the locations of enemy surface and subsurface forces.\textsuperscript{15}

The missions of the small tracking rooms were essentially the same. Both were to receive intercepted and decoded enemy communications and to display the information they contained. In addition, data from other sources such as traffic analysis, direction finding, and sighting reports from ships and aircraft were presented, along with information derived from TINA, a "rather intricate process" of identifying individual radio operators (and, by extension, the ships in which they were embarked) by their "fists" — "the inherent characteristics of their hand-sending of the radio code."\textsuperscript{16} Knowles and Winn would then use the sum of all this information to estimate the locations, movements, and — when possible — intentions of enemy U-boats.
Because it contained information almost exclusively derived from intercepted enemy communications, the American "Secret Room" was "off-limits" to most of the U.S. Navy Department. Knowles and his assistant, Lieutenant John E. Parsons, USNR, and two others were the only persons to enter the room on a regular basis. Knowles has indicated that "perhaps a half dozen senior officers within the combined [COMINCH/Tenth Fleet] staffs had knowledge that 'Ultra' existed." 17 Entry to the British Submarine Tracking Room was also restricted to those who were permitted to see Ultra material, but despite Churchill's concern for the security of his communications intelligence "eggs," 18 many more in Admiralty had access to this "Most Secret" intelligence source than was the case in the U.S. Navy Department. When Churchill was informed in September 1942 that 90 officers in Admiralty received this type of information he directed the First Sea Lord to cut the number almost in half. 19

The relative anonymity of those assigned to the two tracking rooms also worked to their advantage in producing intelligence estimates unbiased by political or other extraneous considerations. Both rooms were headed by men with the rank of Commander — considered the bottom grade in the "Senior Officer" category. Their assistants held even lower Navy ranks and worked behind closed doors, doing their jobs in a superb manner while remaining virtually unremarked in their respective naval headquarters.
The daily routines of the two tracking rooms differed only slightly. Because of its limited access and of the time delays inherent in intercepting, decrypting, translating, and analysing intelligence derived from enemy communications, the American "Secret Room" did not operate on an around-the-clock basis. Collateral information, such as sighting reports and Direction Finding positions, went to the main plot next door. The British Tracking Room, which by the beginning of 1943 had a staff of fourteen, maintained a 24-hour watch that brought together in one place all operational information on the U-boat picture.

The real work of the day began with the early morning arrivals of the senior analysts: Winn and his assistant Patrick Beesly in London, Knowles and his assistant John Parsons in Washington. Information that had arrived during the night was reexamined and was correlated with data previously received and held in the voluminous files on individual U-boats that both tracking rooms maintained. Plots of current U-boat positions were updated, and both Winn and Knowles began to order their thoughts for the daily briefing on the submarine picture that each of them presented to the senior officers of the British Naval Staff and those of the U.S. Navy Department respectively.

Winn and Knowles exchanged daily U-boat message summaries, which also contained analytical comments and questions. To encourage the most frank and unconstrained
exchange of ideas, these messages were treated as personal notes and no regular dissemination of their contents was made outside of the two tracking rooms, although on occasion the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet and the First Sea Lord used this "back-channel" to exchange views on submarine matters.21 By the war's end over 2,000 serials had passed back and forth between the two tracking rooms. Knowles sent a final message to Winn on 5 June 1945 in which he announced the dissolution of his organization and paid tribute to Winn's accomplishments. "May I express to you my deepest appreciation for your most helpful cooperation during the momentous three years our tracking rooms have worked together. Yours has been the greater burden and responsibility and you have completed your task magnificently."22

Admiralty's naval intelligence organization, including that of the Operational Intelligence Centre and within it the Submarine Tracking Room, had changed little since 1938, nor had its relationship to the other divisions of the British Naval Staff. The same could not be said for American naval intelligence and its relationship to the rest of the Navy Department. Ever since Admiral Ernest J. King had become Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet in December 1941 and Chief of Naval Operations in March 1942, the organizational structure of the U.S. Navy's shore establishment had been in an almost constant state of
change. Finally, in August 1943 an exasperated President Roosevelt directed his Secretary of the Navy to "tell Ernie [King] once more: No reorganizing of the Navy Dept. set-up during the war. Let's win it first."\(^2^3\)

After becoming both the administrative and operational head of the U.S. Navy, King moved rapidly to delineate the respective intelligence responsibilities of the CNO and the COMINCH staffs. At its inception the COMINCH staff did not contain an Intelligence Division — only Plans, Operations, and Readiness. An Operational Intelligence Section had been created in the Operations Division, and on 15 February 1942, the additional position of Fleet Intelligence Officer was established in the Plans Division.\(^2^4\) As previously noted, the intelligence responsibilities in both the Operations and Plans Divisions were subsequently assigned to a single person, Commander George C. Dyer; but his time remained divided between the two Divisions.

Early in the summer of 1943 Admiral King called upon the President of the Naval War College, Admiral W.S. Pye, to study the COMINCH staff organization with the goal of improving its efficiency. Pye recommended that a fourth division, Combat Intelligence, be formed to consolidate the intelligence functions then being performed by different parts of the staff. This was done on 1 July 1943.\(^2^5\) The "Secret Room" became a part of the Combat Intelligence Division's Atlantic Section, headed by Commander Knowles.
An additional complication to the intelligence picture, if such were needed, was the establishment on 1 May 1943 of the Tenth Fleet.\textsuperscript{26} Tenth Fleet was "homeported" in "Main Navy" — as the headquarters building in downtown Washington was called — and commanded by Admiral King. The fleet was formed so that all the antisubmarine forces in the Atlantic would be responsible to a single commander who could then issue orders directly to operating forces without going through the slow and cumbersome chain of command.\textsuperscript{27} Convoy and routing became a responsibility of the new organization, and much of its small staff was drawn from the larger COMINCH structure. Many officers were "double-hatted," with responsibilities on both staffs. This was the case in intelligence, where Commander Knowles was both Head, Atlantic Section, COMINCH and Chief, Intelligence Staff Tenth Fleet. In a later move, the Assistant Chief of Staff (Combat Intelligence), COMINCH, was double-hatted as Director of Naval Intelligence in the CNO organizational chain.\textsuperscript{28} Thus were the intelligence responsibilities of the CNO, COMINCH, and the Tenth Fleet staffs intertwined under a single ultimate authority, Admiral Ernest J. King.

From the standpoint of intelligence, the result of all this administrative reshuffling was to permit the Secret Room's analysis to be employed in much the same direct manner as that of the British Submarine Tracking Room. Until the consolidation brought about by the establishment
of the Tenth Fleet, the U.S. Navy's decentralized command structure had made it impossible to adopt British operational intelligence methods. In his "hat" as Commander Tenth Fleet, King could now exercise the same amount of control over his portion of the U-boat war as his counterpart, First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, had been doing since the start of the war. Knowles, like Winn, now had immediate access to those who were routing the convoys and to those who were directing the protective forces. U.S. naval intelligence was now in a position to exert greater influence than ever before on the Battle of the Atlantic.

Fortunately, coincident with intelligence's opportunity to have greater influence on operations, came improvement in the quality of intelligence that made it of much greater value to the operators. It will be remembered that in December 1942, British codebreakers were able once again to break the German codes used to transmit orders to U-boats. Generally German U-boats did not receive assignments to patrol areas until they had put to sea. From that time, until they transmitted the mandatory signal requesting permission to return home, the submarines were under the constant control of U-boat Command. To effect this close supervision required a great volume of message traffic. This traffic "presented the Allies with an unprecedentedly rich flow of operational intelligence."\textsuperscript{29}

Even though the cryptographers in Bletchley Park had
devised the method for breaking the German U-boat code, doing so in a manner rapid enough for the information to be used effectively in antisubmarine warfare was a continuing problem. To increase security, the Germans had introduced an additional rotor wheel in the coding machines carried by the Atlantic U-boats. As a result, the "Bombes," an early form of data processor that the British had constructed to test likely rotor positions for German Enigma machines, were appreciably slowed in finding correct solutions to the daily settings on the German machines.  

In the summer of 1943 American built, high-speed "Bombes," especially designed to defeat the German Navy's four-rotor encryption system, came into use. Each of these new "Bombes" had an output equivalent to six of the older British models. These machines were located in Washington and were operated by the U.S. Navy to produce the solutions, called "cribs," used to decrypt German Atlantic U-boat traffic throughout the remainder of the war. The British gave American codebreakers naval messages to and from German naval units operating out of range of U.S. intercept stations. In return, the Americans provided successful "cribs" produced by the "Bombes" to assist in the British attack on German naval codes. By August 1943 German naval traffic encrypted on the Enigma machine was read "regularly and rapidly without significant interruption."  

In addition to the Anglo-American failure to break the
German U-boat cipher before December 1942, another factor contributing to the German Navy's success in the Atlantic was its ability to read the Allied convoy code. The German Naval Cryptographic Service (B-Dienst) had been able to break British Naval Cypher #3 through most of 1942. Improvements made in late 1942 interrupted the German success until February 1943, when B-Dienst again mastered the British code and continued to read it until its use was discontinued in June 1943.\(^3\)

As British success against the German U-boat codes was determined in great measure by the large volume of traffic intercepted, so German success against the British convoy cypher "was made possible by the many routine signals necessary to direct the complicated convoy routing system."\(^3\) According to the British government's official history of intelligence, "between February and June 1943 the battle of the Atlantic hinged to no small extent on the changing fortunes of a continuing trial of cryptographic and cryptanalytic resourcefulness between the B-Dienst and the Allies."\(^3\) While the German Navy, in the face of evidence to the contrary, continued to consider its codes impenetrable, the Royal Navy realized that its codes had been compromised and changed them.

May 1943 is generally accepted as the month that the battle against the U-boats turned in favor of the Allies.\(^3\) The initiative never again passed to the German Navy. In
the first 22 days of May, 31 U-boats were destroyed. Admiral Dönitz, by this time head of the German Navy, ordered his submarines withdrawn from the North Atlantic convoy routes."

The Allies tended to use information on U-boat positions derived from communications intelligence in a defensive sense, routing convoys away from known German wolf-pack positions. Limiting the use of Ultra in this manner served the twofold purpose of protecting the convoy, while at the same time protecting the source of the information that caused the convoy route to be shifted. Because of its defensive use, it is difficult to assess the impact of intelligence on winning the Battle of the Atlantic with any degree of assurance. There is little question that intelligence played a significant role, but so did many other factors. Greater air cover from land-based aircraft and from the new escort carriers was vital, as were advances in airborne radar and in antisubmarine weaponry, expansion of the High Frequency Direction Finding system, and growing numbers of surface escort ships.

Another factor in the Allied success even more difficult to quantify was the effect of a loss of élan on the part of German submariners, the elite of the German Navy. A British Tracking Room report issued in late 1943 stated that "the outstanding impression felt on reading recent U-boat traffic is that the spirit of the crews which
are at present out on operations in the North Atlantic is low and general morale is shaky." 38 This must have been welcome intelligence to the British Naval Staff, whose own morale had been none too high a few weeks before when Allied shipping losses in March approached 500,000 tons in the North Atlantic alone. 39

Jürgen Rohwer, a leading authority on German naval operations in World War II, has placed exploitation of Ultra at the top of his list of factors contributing to the Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic. 40 Without Ultra, he concluded, "many more ships, aircraft and support groups would have been necessary...and they became available only from the late summer of 1943." Many more tons of Allied shipping would have been lost in the summer of 1943 and in all probability the Allied timetable for the invasion of Normandy would have been upset. 41

While the relative value of intelligence in winning the Battle of the Atlantic is open to debate, there is no question that the synergetic efforts of the American and British naval intelligence organizations provided more and better information on U-boat operations than either could have done alone. Patrick Beesly summed up the situation accurately when he wrote that in the three years of their joint existence the cooperation between the American Combat Intelligence Division and the British Operational Intelligence Centre "was probably closer than between any
other British and American organizations in any Service and in any other theatre."

Shortly after the successful Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942 (Torch), Sir John Dill, head of the British Joint Services Mission to the United States, wrote his countryman and former colleague in Washington, Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, who was then serving as Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower's naval deputy for Torch. In the course of the letter, Dill commented that Cunningham's previous experience in Washington as head of the British Admiralty Delegation must be "of great value" in getting along with Americans in his current assignment. "In that short time [in Washington] you got to know a great deal about the Americans — their methods and their points of view. We go on fighting our endless battles and I fancy that the closer our operations become interwoven the more difficult those battles will be."

The year 1943 had opened with evidence, if such were needed, of the correctness of Dill's observation. President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and their key political and military staff members met in Casablanca from 11 to 25 January to hammer out details of the Allied military strategy to be followed once victory in
Tunisia had been achieved. As was generally the case, the British came to this conference well prepared — even to the extent of sending to Morocco, in advance of the meeting, a 6,000 ton ocean liner to serve as a floating staff headquarters and communications center. They also came prepared to speak with one voice against any major cross-channel attack on Germany and in support of a Mediterranean strategy that had as its objective defeating Italy, commencing with an assault on Sicily. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, then a planning officer in the Operations Division of the War Department, accompanied Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to Casablanca and noted that the British military at the conference "always knew in advance what they wanted. They had aims. Usually their aims could be related to Empire or to their postwar position in the world of commerce." Wedemeyer's comments reflected an increasing awareness among American negotiators of the influence of postwar considerations on current strategic decisions and a growing recognition on their part that Allied postwar agendas were potentially divergent.

American military leaders, marginally accepting a strategy urged by Marshall, favored an attack somewhere in Northwest Europe in 1943. In addition, Admiral Ernest J. King wished to commit more American resources to the fight against Japan. Both King and Marshall concurred with their British colleagues that the paramount Allied problem was to
answer the German U-boat challenge but agreed with the British on little else. After a series of sometimes emotional exchanges of views, which today would be characterized as "full and frank," Allied military leaders agreed to both an invasion of Sicily and the formation of a staff to proceed with detailed planning of a cross-Channel invasion of Western Europe. Eisenhower was chosen to lead the Allied forces against Sicily, 47 and the Chief of Staff to an as yet unnamed Supreme Allied Commander was to be placed in charge of cross-Channel attack planning in London.

These decisions, with their underlying perceptions of divergent post-war agendas, were to have a significant impact on the course of Allied intelligence cooperation. As will be seen, cooperative ventures after the Casablanca Conference came to be measured in terms not only of wartime gains but of post-war advantage. Eisenhower's selection to command the Sicilian operation and subsequent appointment in December 1943 as Supreme Allied Commander for the invasion of northwest Europe made it almost inevitable that Allied joint and combined staff agencies, rather than individual Service intelligence organizations, would provide the information needed by his planners. Use of a combined Allied staff, supported by joint organizations drawn from individual nations — such as the American and British Joint Intelligence Committees — had proven successful in planning the North African invasion, and Eisenhower saw no reason to
change.

As American participation in the war expanded into North Africa and the Mediterranean, new opportunities appeared for intelligence support to the fighting forces involved. On 1 January 1943 Admiral King, in his capacity as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, approved naval participation in a new American Army and Navy intelligence organization called the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency — or JICA.\(^4\) The mission of the JICA was "to eliminate duplication in the collection, swift transmission and reception of intelligence sent to Washington, and to procure intelligence from Washington and sources within the theater and disseminate it to theater activities."\(^5\) With the blessing of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and following approval by General Eisenhower on 23 January 1943, the first unit, JICA North Africa, was established in Algiers at Allied Forces Headquarters and immediately became active in gathering information for use in the Allied invasions of Sicily and Italy. Sub-offices soon followed at Casablanca, Port Lyautey, and Tunis. A second JICA covering the Middle East was established in Cairo on 21 June 1943. The agency soon went world-wide, opening offices in India and China and contemplating additional offices in the Pacific and even in London.\(^6\)

The establishment of the JICA system was significant for several reasons. For the first time since the start of
the war, American Army and Navy intelligence organizations had put aside their differences to form a truly joint intelligence agency — something the British had done several years earlier when they created the Middle East Intelligence Centre in Cairo in June 1939. Also, for the first time, American intelligence attempted to come to grips with the problem of providing from anywhere else but Washington the intelligence needed by American forces operating in the European and Middle Eastern theaters. Additionally, it will be remembered that prior to the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, the American intelligence "presence" in the Mediterranean area was negligible. Penetration by the United States into that Mare nostrum of British intelligence served to put England on notice that the U.S. intelligence structure was coming of age and in the future could be expected to pay an increasingly larger role in shaping Allied decisions. No longer would Eisenhower's combined staff be totally dependent on British sources for the intelligence it required.

"I consider this [the establishment of JICA North Africa] one of the most important projects that ONI has ever undertaken," wrote Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, to Captain Earl Major, USNR, who had been selected to head the naval portion of the JICA. Zacharias, who saw himself as father of the JICA concept, had noted that American forces in North Africa
had failed to realize the importance to future operations of intelligence collected in combat. "After culling the immediately usable tactical intelligence data from the material to which they [the American forces] obtained access in combat, they discarded the rest."\textsuperscript{54} Zacharias' plan called for the establishment of specially trained teams that would operate in combat areas to collect and forward documents and other intelligence materials to Washington for analysis.

Zacharias' JICA concept struck a responsive chord with both the Department of the Army and, more surprisingly, with Admiral King, who was not noted for his receptiveness to plans calling for joint Army-Navy action.\textsuperscript{55} In this case, however, King apparently saw the JICA organization as a step toward his goal, discussed with British DNI Godfrey during the latter's visit to Washington in the fall of 1942, of eventual integration of the Navy's ONI and the War Department's Military Intelligence Division.\textsuperscript{56}

In addition to obtaining information from American sources, the JICAs were authorized to work with British intelligence units in the field, and to collect information from them for transmission to Washington. All JICA reports, regardless of source, were passed to a central clearing house in Washington, the Joint Intelligence Agency Reception Center, for screening and dissemination to appropriate government departments.\textsuperscript{57}
What the Army called "combat intelligence" and the Navy called "operational intelligence," such as order of battle information, was specifically excluded from the JICA's reporting charter. The British were particularly insistent that all order of battle information be exchanged via previously established channels in Washington and London.\(^5\) Their concern was not surprising since, in the past, they had been "burned" by unauthorized American reporting of British estimates of enemy order of battle figures. In one case in 1942, the year prior to the establishment of the JICA system, the American Naval Attaché in Cairo gave a copy of a British naval intelligence estimate on the number of Axis transport aircraft in the Aegean to his colleague, the U.S. Army Attaché. The Army Attaché promptly transmitted it to the War Department along with a British Army estimate on the same subject that contained different figures. Washington, helpfully, pointed out the discrepancies to the British in London, who apparently "were not amused" and so informed the British naval staff in Cairo, with the result that the U.S. Naval Attaché was told "...unofficially that I might, as a result, be prepared to receive even less information than the limited amount I was then receiving."\(^5\)

Within the scope of their rather broad charter to collect all but combat (or operational) intelligence, the JICAs received information from a number of sources including naval and military attachés, Office of Strategic
Services field agencies, Office of War Information, Department of State, and Allied military forces. By centralizing collection of information from military and non-military sources, the JICAs performed a valuable service in helping to reduce duplicative and overlapping reporting.

A major strength of the JICA system was its ability to move vital information and documents rapidly from the combat zones to the military theater commander's staff and to the intelligence agencies in the United States. JICA couriers received priority seating on trans-Atlantic flights and on those between military theaters. Using the JICA courier system, even in those sub-sonic flying days, information could be hand carried from Cairo to Washington, via Athens and Naples, in two to three days. In its post-war analysis of the effectiveness of the JICA system, the Navy Department commented that, "Despite...the difficulties encountered in blending independent agencies into a joint activity, JICA-JIARC (Joint Intelligence Agency Reception Center) produced more intelligence in volume, value and timeliness than any other American intelligence agency."

At roughly the same time that Captain Zacharias in Washington was working on the problem of timely collection and reporting of combat-derived information, Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR, Personal Assistant to the British DNI, was tackling the same problem in London. Fleming had studied the operation of German naval assault companies (Marine
Einsatz Kommando) in Yugoslavia and Greece. These self-contained units were designed to accompany front-line troops in attacks on naval objectives and had proven successful in capturing intelligence materials and in preventing the destruction of secret documents. Fleming drafted plans for a similar joint Service British group and obtained the concurrence of his Director, Admiral Godfrey. The DNI proposed the concept to the Joint Intelligence Committee and, after considerable bureaucratic infighting, obtained its approval and that of the British Chiefs of Staff. Many years later, Godfrey wrote that "for such a novel enterprise, it is essential an officer with drive and imagination of the highest order is supervising matters at headquarters and looking after the 'Whitehall front.'" Fleming provided "the driving force...[that] ensured rapid transit [of the concept] through the departments with the minimum of red tape." The resulting unit had several names during its life, which extended until the fall of Japan, but was best known as "30 Commando."

The 30 Commando was formed in November 1942 and operated with success in the North African landings. From its inception, one of the unit's chief tasks was the capture of Axis cryptographic materials, especially rotors for the Enigma machine and lists of the daily settings for its wheels. The Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park provided and updated a "Black List" of
especially wanted enemy signals material and held periodic briefings for individual 30 Commando teams on the locations of specific signals intelligence targets. Captured material was not examined in the field but returned to Bletchley Park for analysis.

The official history of the 30 Commando credits it with doing "good work in Sicily and Italy, capturing a substantial quantity of documents and equipment of operational value." Captured material of interest to American cryptographers was probably provided under terms of previously drawn Anglo-American signals intelligence exchange agreements, rather than through the JICA mechanism. To assist in the activities of 30 Commando and to insure American interests in the materials captured were not overlooked, U.S. naval intelligence officers, on loan from the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe staff in London, were first directly attached to 30 Commando in May 1944, prior to the Allied landings in France, and remained with it until the end of operations in Europe in 1945.

While the JICA system and 30 Commando were not designed as combined Anglo-American cooperative ventures, both contributed to the body of information that was shared at the local and theater levels and at the national level in London and Washington. Both organizations dealt with separate aspects of the same problem, that of timely acquisition and processing of information that had become
available during the course of battle. The 30 Commando tended to concentrate on rapid acquisition of high-interest materials, while the JICA's strength lay in its ability to screen large amounts of information and to move that which was truly important quickly from the field to the analysts who needed it.

More was involved than just the capture of enemy papers and equipment. Zacharias told the story of a senior U.S. Navy logistics planner in Washington who complained, "do you know that I have one hundred and eighty million dollars worth of material waiting to go to Oran and I don’t know whether they have a single damned crane with which to take it from the ships?" Zacharias contacted the JICA office in Oran and within two weeks an up-to-date port study was on the planner's desk. An impressive achievement, considering the state of wartime military communications in 1943.

Allied intelligence cooperation with the official French government, which had ceased at the time of the defeat of France in 1940, did not resume until early 1943. In the interim, intelligence contacts in Europe with the various French resistance groups and the followers of Charles de Gaulle had been maintained at first by the
British Special Operations Executive and later expanded by the American Embassy in London.

Despite the lack of formal intelligence ties from 1940 to 1943, the Allies were kept well informed of French activities through exploitation of French radio communications. Even before the French were driven out of the war in 1940, the British Chief of Naval Staff "decided that we must obtain access to the French cyphers and were not to be squeamish in our methods."69 In what British Director of Naval Intelligence, John Godfrey, described as a "rather picturesque incident," a James Bond-like plan (in all probability originated by James Bond's creator, Ian Fleming) was concocted to steal the code books from the safe of the French Liaison Officer to Admiralty. When the plan proved infeasible, an alternative scheme was put into effect whereby the officers of a French submarine lying at Malta were duped into leaving the boat. The submarine was then raided, and the required material seized and flown back to Bletchley Park where, thanks to the stolen goods, the cryptographers "had difficulty in coping with the [quantity of] French traffic pouring in."69 The British continued to intercept French naval messages until the 1942 Allied North African invasion,70 after which the French were — after some controversy — welcomed back into the Allied intelligence camp and Bletchley Park's "reading their mail" ostensibly ceased.
Events both coincident and connected paved the way for the regularization of intelligence cooperation between the Allies and France. The Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in November 1942 triggered the German occupation of the remainder of Metropolitan France. Shortly thereafter, the bulk of the French fleet, long a serious concern to Allied naval strategists, was scuttled in Toulon harbor by the French to keep it from falling into German hands. The Allies reached agreement with the French that allowed them to keep administrative control of North Africa, while the Allies retained military rights.\textsuperscript{71} A point of contention disappeared when Eisenhower's plan, which had caused "widespread dismay" in France,\textsuperscript{72} to install Admiral Jean Darlan, French Premier Henri Pétain's second in command, as the official leader of the French government in North Africa ended with Darlan's assassination on 24 December 1942. Three days later the French Council of Ministers in Algiers selected General Henri Giraud to be High Commissioner. As a result, North Africa once again had an "official" French government, with which Allied intelligence agencies could conduct liaison.

On the heels of the Allied invasion of North Africa, the French Intelligence Service moved its headquarters from Vichy to Algiers. As early as March 1943 the Intelligence Service approached the newly formed U.S. Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA) at Allied Forces Headquarters in
Algiers for assistance in providing basic information for its files, most of which had been abandoned in Metropolitan France, and for help in establishing radio communications with its subordinate units in North Africa.  

The following month the U.S. Navy section of JICA Casablanca called upon the local French naval intelligence representative to establish "a free and prompt exchange of information between our organizations." In reply the French assured JICA Casablanca of their intention to cooperate locally and that their representatives in Oran, Algiers, and Dakar were "being notified of the existence of JICA and ordered to cooperate with this organization to the fullest extent." By July JICA North Africa was able to assure the American Director of Naval Intelligence that "cooperation with British Security Intelligence and the [French] Deuxième Bureau is satisfactory, and considerable information of an intelligence nature has been submitted by the latter activity."  

Liaison between the French and the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency offices in North Africa and the Middle East continued to be productive for the Allies. The administrative history of the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence noted that the JICA system was "particularly active in securing information for the invasion of Sicily and Italy." It is highly likely that much of this information came from French sources, many of whom had been
resident in the Mediterranean area for years. The French were particularly helpful in assisting JICA personnel who were interrogating refugees arriving in Casablanca. The willingness of French intelligence authorities to combine their interrogation personnel with those of the JICA "made it possible to interview the maximum number of refugees and [has] provided for a complete interchange of the material thus secured."  

Although the French were helpful in providing information to American and British intelligence, France was not considered an "Ally" to the extent that it was represented on Eisenhower's intelligence staff. The combined intelligence organization that had served Eisenhower during the planning phase of the North African landings continued to provide him with the intelligence support he required during the battle for Tunisia. The mostly British-staffed Intelligence Branch moved with the main part of Eisenhower's Allied Forces Headquarters from Gibraltar to Algiers on 24 November 1942. Shortly afterwards, a seasoned British intelligence officer from Cairo visited the branch and described it in these unflattering terms: "The British staff were plainly the cream which had been produced by the Intelligence training installations over the past three years. The trouble was that not only did they not know what they ought to be doing, they had learnt a whole lot of wrong things which they ought
not to be doing." The same officer's reports of his subsequent visits down the line to the intelligence staffs at Army and Corps Headquarters levels proved no more reassuring.

Eisenhower's combined intelligence organization was amply provided with a wide variety of information sources including high-grade communications intelligence from Bletchley Park, tactical communications intercepts from the local area, photo reconnaissance, prisoner of war interrogation, captured documents, and tactical intelligence derived from battlefield reconnaissance. Of this myriad of sources, probably the single most important was the so-called "Ultra-material" supplied by Bletchley Park, which provided intercepts of messages passing between senior enemy commanders. Valuable as this information was, it contained gaps, and still had to be correctly interpreted.

During the Second World War, one of the problems inherent in the use of communications intelligence was that those few persons "in the know," tended to rely on intercepts to the exclusion of other sources of information. Often estimates of future enemy actions were based solely on whether activity indicating a specific move was or was not reflected in enemy communications. Apparently the intelligence staff at Allied Forces Headquarters was not immune to this type of self-deception.

During 13-14 February 1943, the Germans attacked and
soundly trounced Allied forces, primarily American, in the Kasserine Pass/Sidi Bou Zid areas in south central Tunisia. While communications intelligence contained indications of an impending German thrust, according to the British official intelligence history, "...the Enigma provided evidence about them [German intentions] that was so incomplete as to be wholly misleading." British Brigadier Kenneth Strong, who was soon to become Eisenhower's chief intelligence officer and was to remain so throughout the war, commented in his memoirs that "accurate reports of the strength and direction of the impending attack had been sent from the front but it appears that they had been discounted both at First Army Headquarters and Allied Forces Headquarters, as being an exaggeration on the part of green and untried troops."  

Today there is some question as to whether these field reports were available in time to affect the intelligence assessment, but in 1943 there was no doubt that the inability to predict the strength and direction of the German attack was looked upon by Eisenhower and Roosevelt, among others, as an intelligence failure. As a result, on 20 February 1943, Eisenhower sent a personal, "eyes only" telegram to General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, requesting that Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, Eisenhower's intelligence officer at Allied Forces Headquarters since August 1942, be relieved
and replaced "with an officer who has a broader insight into German mentality and method" and also one who possessed "a little more inquisitiveness and greater attention to checking and cross-checking reports from various sources."

This latter comment on "cross-checking of various sources," plus a veiled remark to General Marshall that he was "provoked that there was such reliance placed on particular types of intelligence" indicated that Eisenhower was well aware of his Intelligence staff's propensity to overestimate the importance of communications intelligence.

What could have resulted in a set-back to Anglo-American intelligence relationships was avoided when Eisenhower specifically requested a British officer to replace Mockler-Ferryman. Brigadier Kenneth Strong was nominated. Strong, who arrived in North Africa less than a week later to assume his new duties, came with the type of credentials Eisenhower had requested. In 1935 he had served in the German Intelligence Section at the British War Office and two years later had become British Assistant Military Attaché in Berlin, returning to the War Office in August 1939. After a tour as battalion commander, Strong became chief of intelligence for Home Forces, a command originally formed to repel the expected German invasion in 1940 but by 1942 thought of as the spearhead for Allied forces in any invasion of Europe. Strong's posting to Allied Forces Headquarters as Chief of Intelligence was, in his words,
"the start of long and happy associations." Eisenhower, who later in the war referred to Strong as one of "my most trusted staff officers," must have agreed.

In Tunisia all organized enemy resistance ceased by May 1943, leaving Allied forces unopposed along the whole of the North African littoral. Allied convoys were again able to cross the Mediterranean and transit the Suez Canal in relative safety. In the words of Admiral Henry Hewitt, commander of American naval forces in the Mediterranean, "the severed life line of the Empire was spliced."  

iv

Planning for the Allied conquest of Sicily (codenamed "Husky") began long before the final victory in Tunisia in May 1943. By the date of the invasion, 10 July 1943, the German Navy was a negligible factor in the Mediterranean; only six U-boats operated against Husky and two of those were sunk during the operation. However, the Italian Navy, although it had already suffered significant losses in 1943, was still a force to be reckoned with. For that reason, the chief role assigned the Allied navies in Husky was to protect the troop transports while they were en route to their objectives; and, as Allied naval commander Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, RN, put it in his message to his forces on the eve of Sicilian invasion, "our primary duty is
to place this vast expedition ashore in the minimum time and subsequently to maintain our military and air forces as they drive relentlessly forward into enemy territory."92

As was the case in the intelligence planning for Torch, Eisenhower's staff sought the information necessary to prepare the invasion of Sicily primarily from the British, with lesser inputs from Washington and from the recently-established U.S. Joint Intelligence Collection Agency offices in Casablanca and Cairo. As before, a primary source of information on Axis military plans came from enemy communications intercepts. Eisenhower's biographer, Stephen E. Ambrose, credited Ultra with giving the Supreme Allied Commander "well before Husky was launched...a complete picture of the enemy's order of battle on Sicily and in Italy. Equally valuable," Ambrose argued, "Ultra allowed him [Eisenhower] to penetrate the German mind and judge how successful Allied deception measures had been."93

In addition to communications intelligence, photographic reconnaissance and interrogation of German and Italian prisoners of war taken during the Tunisian campaign provided major sources of pre-invasion intelligence. As the official history of British World War II intelligence has indicated, the quality of the intelligence used for planning Husky was difficult to determine. Planners complained that beach intelligence derived from photographic reconnaissance
was inadequate and that the most recent pertinent maps and charts were often pre-war.\textsuperscript{94} However, Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that American naval commanders were provided with "excellent" Admiralty Hydrographic Office maps "giving complete land and hydrographic data, with a grid for artillery and naval gunfire." Morison concluded that "the Western (American) Task Force was unusually well supplied with information."\textsuperscript{95}

No account of intelligence activities in connection with the invasion of Sicily would be complete without mention of "Operation Mincemeat," one of the most famous and arguably one of the most successful deceptions carried out by the Allies during the Second World War. In essence the plan, "probably as old as war itself,"\textsuperscript{96} was to plant false papers in such a way that the enemy would find and accept them as true. "Mincemeat" was designed to mislead the Germans into thinking that the next blow in the Mediterranean would not fall on Sicily, the obvious target, but on Greece and Sardinia. As Churchill was reputed to have said, "Everybody but a bloody fool would know that it's Sicily."\textsuperscript{97}

The deception involved planting the body of a British courier carrying the false documents into the Mediterranean at a place where it would wash up on the shores of Spain. The British were convinced, correctly as it turned out, that the thoroughly unneutral Spanish would find the papers and
turn copies over to the Germans. In his book, *The Man Who Never Was*, distinguished British jurist Ewin Montagu, who co-authored the scheme while serving as a Commander in British naval intelligence, detailed the search for an "appropriate" body, the care taken to create a personality for the fictitious "Major Martin," and the extreme attention paid to detail in attempting to mislead the Germans.

American cooperation in "Mincemeat" was marginal. The operation had to be approved in both Washington and London, and by Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower, who lent his name to one of the documents carried by the Major. However, it was basically an all-British show.

Montagu claimed with justification that "the dividends from the 'Operation' were indeed enormous — far greater than we had ever anticipated even in our most sanguine moments." These "dividends" included the Germans shifting troops away from the planned Allied landing beaches in Sicily, sending an additional division to protect Greece, transferring a number of German motor-torpedo boats from Sicily to the Aegean, and reinforcing Corsica and Sardinia.

Montagu indicated indirectly that the success of "Mincemeat" could not be judged until after the attack on Sicily was underway and that the extent to which the Germans were fooled was not known until German documents were examined after the war. For reasons of security, Montagu was less than candid in his assessment. Intercepted German
communications showed that the planted papers had been accepted by German intelligence as being authentic and that the German general staff, based on its evaluation of the information contained in the false documents, had commenced altering plans for defense of the Mediterranean some two months before the Allied attack on Sicily. Montagu, "who was 'on the Ultra list' handling those 'most secret sources' for the Admiralty," was certainly aware of "Mincemeat's" achievements prior to the 10 July assault on Sicily, which was successful and led to the Allied push across the island that culminated in the evacuation of remaining German forces to the Italian mainland on 13-14 August 1943.

The American Office of Naval Intelligence also entered the murky waters of deception and covert operations in connection with the Sicilian campaign, but with much less success than the Royal Navy had enjoyed with "Mincemeat." In their attempts to plug leaks of information concerning Allied merchant ship departures from the U.S. East Coast, ONI's agents in New York City had made contact with various underworld figures, including members of the Mafia, who were active along the waterfront. From these contacts grew an understanding, in which the Mafia allegedly agreed to "conduct clandestine operations on the island of Sicily in return for parole of Mafia chief 'Lucky' Luciano." Whether anything of value ever resulted from this "deal" is unclear, but at the war's end a petition for executive
clemency in Luciano's case was sent to the Governor of New York on the grounds that the Mafia leader had rendered "definite service to the war effort" and "had helped shorten the war in Sicily and Italy." The petition was approved and Luciano was subsequently deported.104

Deception was not possible in the pursuit of the next major Allied objective—capture of Naples and of all of the Italian mainland south of a line from Naples to Bari on the Adriatic. An intercepted German message reported on 14 August that the head of Italian intelligence was forecasting an attack in the Naples-Salerno area, and German intelligence messages in the next few days predicted landings in the Gulf of Salerno and in Calabria, across the Strait of Messina between Sicily and Italy.105

Planning for the attack on Naples ("Avalanche"), which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had ordered on 26 July, began on 1 August with selection of Eisenhower and his team to command the operation. Planning, in the words of Samuel Eliot Morison, was "even more dispersed, hectic, and exasperating than for 'Husky'."106 Time was short, since the actual attack on Naples took place during the night of 8-9 September 1943. Intelligence did not apparently play any great role in the selection of the attack objective or in the planning of the attack but did give warning of the spirited German land and air defense that was to follow the landings. Intercepted German Army and Air Force messages
indicated that the Germans planned to throw all forces in the Naples-Salerno area into an all-out battle to drive the invaders back into the sea.¹⁰⁷ But after sharp fighting around Salerno, on 17 September German forces began to withdraw to defensive positions in the north, and on 2 October Allied forces entered Naples. By 9 November, the first anniversary of the Anglo-American landings in North Africa, Eisenhower could tell the forces under his command in all sincerity that they "had written a memorable chapter in the history of...arms."¹⁰⁸

Even as the fight for Italy was just starting, the Allies began to focus their attention on planning for the cross-channel invasion ("Overlord") and on preparations for the battle for northwest Europe that was to follow. The year 1943 closed with President Roosevelt's announcement on 24 December that General Dwight D. Eisenhower had been selected to lead Allied forces in the battle for Europe. Intelligence began to reorient much of its now vast resources, excepting only those committed to the Pacific, to support the massive planning effort required to surmount Eisenhower's next and greatest challenge.

At the end of 1943, in naval intelligence, the cooperative structure that had been carefully crafted in the
immediate pre-war and early wartime years was in place and was functioning smoothly. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the successful battle against German U-boats in the Atlantic, in which the efforts of the mutually supportive submarine tracking rooms in London and Washington marked the culmination of Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence.

In the European and Mediterranean theaters, no matter how effective, Navy-to-Navy intelligence collaboration was less important to the conduct of the war than was the development of the Joint/Combined intelligence organizations. With the liberation of French North Africa in early 1943, valuable information from French sources began to flow into Allied Forces Mediterranean headquarters, and, beginning in North Africa and spreading eventually to the rest of the Middle East and the China-Burma-India theaters, joint U.S. Army and Navy Intelligence Collection Agencies were established to rationalize the collection of the vast mass of foreign information required by the American military. However, the Anglo-American intelligence structure was approaching the eve of its most severe test—the Allied invasion of western Europe.
Chapter 5:


6. Harris to Rushbrooke, 7 March 1944; Rushbrooke to Harris 10 March 1944. PRO: ADM 223/209, Receipt of Special Intelligence in Admiralty and its Dissemination.

7. Knowles to Director of Naval History, letter of 23 October 1945, file 105, Knowles, Kenneth A., CAPT, USN, Report. 1946, COMSAVEU, Series II, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C. Knowles was later selected by the Director of Naval History to be Anti-Submarine Warfare historian for the Department of the Navy.


10. Knowles to Director of Naval History, letter of 23 October 1945.


12. F-211 (Lt John E. Parsons, USNR) to F-21 (Commander Kenneth A. Knowles, USN), memorandum, undated, box 10, SRMN-032, COMINCH File of Memoranda Concerning U-boat Tracking Operations, 2 January 1943 - 6 June 1945; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C.


18. Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64. According to Lewin, "Churchill himself, asking for Ultra papers, would say, 'Where are my eggs?': he had a way of referring to the people at Bletchley as 'the geese who laid golden eggs and never cackled.'"


20. Several sources exist for descriptions of the activities of the two submarine tracking rooms. On the American side, Parsons' memorandum on the functions of the "Secret Room," (Note 66, Supra) is of great value, as is Farago's description of Knowles and the Tenth Fleet/COMINCH Staff's Atlantic Section (Farago, Tenth Fleet, 213-17). On the British side, Patrick Beesly's account (Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 167-171) remains definitive. More recently Michael Gannon has offered his portrait of a "normal" day in the British Submarine Tracking Room that is clearly based on extensive research (Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, 154-160).

21. F-211 to F-21, undated memorandum, box 10, SRMN-032; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C.

22. COMINCH to Admiralty 051330 June 1945, SRH-208, United States Navy Submarine Warfare Reports, COMINCH to Admiralty; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C.
23. Roosevelt to Knox, handwritten memorandum, undated, but received by Knox on 16 August 1943, Knox Papers, box 4, General Correspondence 1943, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The underlining for emphasis was presumably done by FDR.

24. COMINCH to CNO, 15 January 1942, COMINCH War Diary, box 1, World War II War Diaries, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


42. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 110.

43. Dill to Cunningham, 15 November 1942, Cunningham letters 42-43, ADD MSS 52570, Cunningham Papers, British Library, London.

44. Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 541.

45. Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 22.


48. ONI Administrative History, 658.

49. Ibid., 98.


51. H.O. Dovey, "The Middle East Intelligence Centre," Intelligence and National Security 4 (October 1989): 802.

52. Zacharias to Major, letter of 27 January 1943, box 640; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.


54. Ibid., 298.

55. CNO/COMINCH to VCNO, Memorandum of 4 June 1943, Box 641; RG 80; NA, responding to the proposal contained in VCNO to CNO/COMINCH, letter of 28 May 1943, Box 640; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C., outlining the world-wide JICA concept.

56. ONI Administrative History, 1470.

57. Ibid., 1493.
58. Naval Liaison Officer with G-2 to ONI, memorandum of 3 July 1943, Box 638; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

59. ALUSNA Cairo to DNI, letter of 11 April 1942, box 296; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

60. ONI Administrative History, 1510.

61. Ibid.


65. Ibid.


67. Zacharias, Secret Missions, 300.


69. Ibid. In British Intelligence in the Second World War, Hinsley indicates (1:152, 153) that "copies of the French cyphers had been provided voluntarily by the commander of the (French) submarine Narwal after her arrival at Malta and flown to the United Kingdom." However, the account of the theft of the cyphers is taken from an official document, only recently opened to the public at the Public Record Office, and is thought to be accurate.

70. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:154.


73. Senior Naval Officer, JICA (North Africa) to ONI, 8 March 1943, Enclosure A (French memorandum for Major Delaney), box 644; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.
74. Officer-in-Charge, JICA, Navy Section, Casablanca to Lieutenant de Vaisseau Lux, French Liaison Officer (Bureau des Affaires Américaines), letter of 23 April 1943, box 644; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

75. État Major, F.M.A. (Staff, French Naval Forces in Africa) to Officer in Charge, JICA, Navy Section, Casablanca, letter of 29 April 1943, box 644; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

76. JICA North Africa to DNI, memorandum of 25 July 1943, box 640; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

77. ONI Administrative History, 659.

78. Atlantic Base Section, Casablanca, memorandum of 7 July 1943, (forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence by JICA, North Africa), box 638; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

79. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:484.


81. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2:584.

82. Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 81.

83. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 152.


86. Ibid., 2:971.

87. Strong, Intelligence at the Top, 81.


90. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, part 1:232.

92. Andrew B. Cunningham, message of 2 July 1943, quoted in Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, 66.


94. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, part 1:85, 86.

95. Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, 23.


97. Montagu, Beyond Top Secret U, 143. Ewin Montagu commented in a footnote that when he wrote The Man Who Never Was (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1954), "the Prime Minister's secretariat insisted that a Prime Minister could not be recorded as having said 'bloody' and insisted on its being altered to 'damned'. Today (1977) we are more realistic and permissive!" Ibid.


100. Howard, Strategic Deception, 90, 91.


102. Dorwart, Conflict of Interest, 193.

103. Smith, OSS, 86.


105. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, part 1:85, 86.


CHAPTER VI

CRACKS IN THE COOPERATIVE STRUCTURE: 1943

A turning point in Anglo-American strategic relationships had been reached at Casablanca. Before the Allied victory in North Africa helped decide the issue, and the question of who would win the war remained moot, Allied military councils reflected an underlying sense of "cooperate or perish." By the spring of 1943 the growing realization that the Allies would eventually win caused Anglo-American military relationships to become colored by the idea of victory with national post-war advantage, rather than merely defeating the enemy. A result, noted in intelligence as well as other aspects of the war, was that Great Britain slackened its push for ever-increasing cooperation and became less willing to give way to American desires simply to nourish a cooperative climate.

Despite the signal success of the American and British Tracking Rooms' alliance in defeating the German U-boat menace in the Atlantic, strains were appearing elsewhere in
the Anglo-American intelligence structure. Several developments tended to blunt the thrust for increasing intelligence cooperation. The British Director of Naval Intelligence, long a staunch supporter of stronger intelligence ties with the U.S. Navy, was removed. Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division on occasion continued to display a patronizing attitude that rankled its American colleagues, and intelligence cooperation in the neutral countries of Europe was often less than ideal.

On 28 November 1942, as Allied forces in North Africa began the first phase of their drive to capture Tunis, an event took place in London that was to have a lasting effect on the course of Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. Vice Admiral John H. Godfrey turned over direction of Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division to his successor, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Edmund Rushbrooke. Godfrey's dismissal — for this was no routine change of assignments — and the manner in which it was carried out are of significance.

Godfrey was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral on 15 September 1942. The following day he received a memorandum from the First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, which stated that the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff had conducted an
investigation into Godfrey's relationship with the other members of the Joint Intelligence Committee and had concluded "that co-operation amongst the Members of the J.I.C., which is important for its proper functioning was not possible as long as you [Godfrey] were a member.... I endorse his [the Vice Chief's] opinion," Pound continued, "and it is therefore with the greatest regret that I am informing the First Lord that I consider your relief is necessary."!

Despite Pound's terse dismissal of Godfrey, which left no doubt that the First Sea Lord had lost confidence in Godfrey's ability to function effectively as Director of Naval Intelligence, his relief did not take place for over two months. During the interregnum the "lame-duck" DNI visited Washington and Ottawa to meet with top government leaders of both countries in an effort to improve the effectiveness of intelligence cooperation between Britain and her allies in the Western Hemisphere - a somewhat surprising assignment for one who had just been fired for his inability to cooperate!

As Pound's memoranda to Godfrey and to the First Lord made clear, Godfrey was replaced because of his inability to get along with the other members of the Joint Intelligence Committee. However, cooperation is a two-way street. How had Godfrey so angered the other members of the JIC that they felt obliged to demand his recall? Without question,
Godfrey was difficult to like. His biographer and admirer, Patrick Beesly, often used words such as "impatient," "tactless," and "overbearing" to describe his manner.² "I have never used the word genius of anyone else," wrote Ewin Montagu, a member of Godfrey's staff during the war who later became Judge Advocate of the Fleet. "This tribute [to Godfrey's skill in intelligence work] is the more sincere as, in most ways, I disliked him as a person."³ Surely Admiralty would be reluctant to lose Godfrey's "genius" in intelligence, at a critical point in the war, merely because of personality clashes with his peers.

Beesly speculated that each of the members of the JIC might have had hidden reasons for speeding Godfrey's departure. The Army Director of Military Intelligence was unhappy when he became aware, in August 1942, that, in addition to purely naval information, Godfrey was including matters within the purview of the War Office in the summaries of pertinent communications intelligence intercepts that he regularly furnished Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington. The root of the problem seemed to be, in Godfrey's words, that "Naval procedure is to give people the truth and let them draw their own conclusions. If comments are needed they are shown separately from the intelligence itself. Military procedure is to give the Commanders what the War Office think Commanders ought to know."⁴ Over Army
protests, Godfrey continued to include such material, but in a reduced amount.

Godfrey had also refused to give in to pressure from the Army Chief of the Imperial General Staff to agree that the German Army had large uncommitted forces that were being held in reserve for either the Eastern or Western Fronts. Godfrey's refusal blocked the JIC from accepting the Army assessment that these forces did, in fact, exist. An agreed JIC paper accepting the Army estimate would have bolstered the British strategic position, later expressed with force at the Casablanca Conference, against an all-out Allied cross-channel invasion. The British Chiefs of Staff favored strategic bombing and encouragement of resistance in occupied countries to wear down Germany, coupled with small peripheral incursions against the Continent, rather than a major frontal assault.

The Royal Air Force, too, had reason to wish for a less redoubtable naval member on the Joint Intelligence Committee. A key mission given the RAF was to destroy German submarine construction and replenishment locations. Godfrey recalled that his analysts had "the painful duty" of examining photographic evidence from RAF bombing of German submarine bases to determine its effectiveness. "The sincerity with which claims were pressed and the heavy casualties among bomber crews created a tense and unhappy atmosphere in which the truth could only too easily become
obscured." The RAF, naturally, could not have been pleased to have Godfrey document its lack of success against naval targets.

Beesly has also argued, without offering much corroborative evidence, that Stewart Menzies, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, may have seen Godfrey as a threat to his own position and therefore may have supported Godfrey's dismissal. Menzies, an Army man, had been Deputy Director of the SIS under Admiral Hugh Sinclair and had succeeded him at Sinclair's death in November 1939. The post as Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service was one traditionally held by a naval officer, and Sinclair had been Director of Naval Intelligence prior to his appointment as head of SIS.

Sinclair was known to have cancer well before his death from the disease. In August 1939 Godfrey, then Director of Naval Intelligence, approached Sir Maurice Hankey, a long-time civil servant of great repute and éminence grise of the British intelligence establishment, about the possibility of Godfrey's following Sinclair as Chief of SIS. Hankey's biographer indicated that the idea of a naval officer holding the appointment had some support in the Foreign Office, "But nothing came of the approach." Had Menzies known of Godfrey's previous initiatives concerning the SIS job, Menzies might well have wished Godfrey elsewhere.
Godfrey's valedictory visit to Washington was more in the nature of an assessment of the progress of cooperation since his previous trip in May 1941 than a vehicle for new initiatives. As before, he was accompanied by his personal assistant, Commander Ian Fleming. Fleming remained with Godfrey during the Washington portion of the visit then, while Godfrey went off to talk to the Canadians, Fleming accompanied Captain "Eddy" G. Hastings, the senior Royal Navy intelligence officer in Washington, to Jamaica to assess the effectiveness of the newly-organized, combined American-British intelligence center there.

Upon arrival in Washington Godfrey met with Admiral Cunningham, head of the British Admiralty Delegation, who was to leave that post shortly to become General Eisenhower's Naval Deputy for Torch. Cunningham and Godfrey examined the process by which the American Office of Naval Intelligence and the British representatives in Washington exchanged intelligence and operational information and found that the chief problem seemed to be the obtaining of information from the Pacific area, needed both by Admiralty and by Admiral James F. Somerville, Commander in Chief of the British Eastern Fleet operating in the Indian Ocean. Following the Royal Navy's withdrawal from the Pacific in the spring of 1942 the U.S. Navy, seeing little to be gained from an exchange of intelligence with British forces no longer directly engaged in the fight with the Japanese, had
reduced its intelligence support to the British Eastern Fleet. In his report to the First Sea Lord following the visit, Godfrey was optimistic: "machinery has been planned which should ensure a very much greater flow of information both on operational matters (such as U.S. submarine patrols) and on tactical and technical lessons learnt in the Pacific, to the Admiralty or to Admiral Somerville direct." Godfrey also worked to increase the flow of Japanese prisoner of war information reaching his and Somerville's staffs. To better the quality as well as the quantity of the information, Godfrey detailed a specialist from his POW Section to join an American team, en route to Honolulu and Australia, that was looking into ways to improve interrogation methods.

After completing his tour d'horizon with Cunningham, Godfrey called upon the American Director of Naval Intelligence, at that moment, Admiral Harold C. Train. During Godfrey's tenure as British Director of Naval Intelligence from 1939 until 1942, no less than six American naval officers held the post of DNI in the U.S. Navy Department. The rapid changes in the U.S Navy's intelligence chiefs were a distinct detriment to effective Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. Just as Godfrey would start to know his American opposite number and to work comfortably with him, he was gone, and the mutual learning process had to begin all over again. Godfrey could
not be expected to be equally impressed with them all. Of his visit to Admiral Train, Godfrey commented, "Relations with O.N.I. continue most cordial. Admiral Train (the U.S. D.N.I.) and Captain Zacharias (the Assistant Director) are both extremely co-operative, and the latter, at any rate, is very competent and knowledgeable."\(^{11}\)

In his report Godfrey put his finger directly on a major impediment to continued improvement in relations between the British Naval Intelligence Directorate and the American Office of Naval Intelligence. While NID was closely involved in direct intelligence support to the Royal Navy's operating forces, "the O.N.I. is firmly wedded to 'security' as opposed to 'operational intelligence,' and large staffs of able-bodied naval officers in Washington and in every naval district are devoting their energies to keeping track of aliens and checking up on reports of suspicious lights, etc., ...the waste of personnel and effort can be imagined."\(^{12}\) American naval historian Jeffery M. Dorwart had written of ONI's mission in late 1941, "unfortunately, while focusing on security aspects, naval intelligence's traditional information-gathering work was reduced to what...was a decidedly 'secondary concern.'"\(^{13}\) Little seemed to have changed in a year.

Godfrey also had an interview with the U.S. Navy's top admiral, Ernest J. King. King expounded at some length on his plan to organize an American inter-Service intelligence
body to meet the specific needs of the military, a scheme which Godfrey saw as clearly directed against the Office of Strategic Services. Godfrey thought, but probably did not tell King, that such an umbrella organization would be both "vast and clumsy." It was probable also that Godfrey did not tell King that he had been to see OSS chief, Colonel Donovan, who had promised to send OSS personnel, including geographers and photographic experts, to the Royal Navy-run, Inter-Service Topographical Department at Oxford to assist in providing combined Anglo-American intelligence planners with the basic information that they required.

"Looking back on my visit in July 1941," Godfrey commented, "I think we may regard progress [in intelligence cooperation] as satisfactory...." Echoing an unfortunately all-too-common British view, Godfrey concluded, "In assessing their [American] efficiency and receptivity [to British methods] we must be patient and bear in mind that mature officers in the British Navy have, since 1914, been at war for seven years whereas their American colleagues have had barely three years' experience."14

This patronizing attitude toward cooperation with the American intelligence community became a continuing stumbling block to closer integration of American and British naval intelligence efforts, especially as the war progressed and the U.S. Navy gained confidence in its own intelligence abilities. With Godfrey's departure from NID,
much of the impetus for closer ties with the U.S. Navy disappeared.

While in Washington, Godfrey received an unexpected message from the First Lord offering an appointment as Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy, a Vice Admiral's post. As he knew that his only alternative would be forced retirement, Godfrey accepted with alacrity. The appointment was made, "Subject to the concurrence of the Government of India,"15 which was slow in coming. Apparently Godfrey's reputation for inability "to suffer fools gladly" was international. The Indian Government approved the posting in late December 1942, but not until the First Sea Lord had assured the First Lord that Godfrey was "keen" to accept the new assignment and that both Admiral Somerville, Commander in Chief of the British Eastern Fleet, and Field Marshal A.P. Wavell, Commander in Chief of British Forces in India, had agreed to the posting.16

Godfrey's dismissal came at the zenith of Anglo-American Navy-to-Navy intelligence cooperation and also at the height of his Naval Intelligence Division's influence, both in Admiralty and in the councils of those directing the British war effort. Godfrey's successor, Captain Edmund Rushbrooke, was promoted to Commodore shortly after becoming Director of Naval Intelligence, but was not raised to Rear Admiral, the traditional rank of the incumbent DNI, until the war's end. The practical result of this lowered grade
was that Rushbrooke found himself outranked by his peers on
the Naval Staff and on the Joint Intelligence Committee,
with a concomitant loss of influence. When Churchill asked
Admiralty's opinion on the changes in the German high
command that had taken place in the spring of 1943, the
question was referred to the Director of Plans for response.
Nowhere in the file was there any indication that the Naval
Intelligence Directorate was ever asked for its analysis or
that the draft reply was ever sent to NID for comment.¹⁷
This bypassing of NID would never have happened in Godfrey's
day.

Rushbrooke was a talented naval officer and had been
assigned as DNI after a series of commands at sea. He was
not without intelligence experience, having been Chief of
the Intelligence Staff, China Station, in 1937-38. However,
he does not seem to have felt completely comfortable in the
role of DNI. "No, I don't think I got much of a kick out of
being DNI," Rushbrooke wrote after the war, "I found it a
tremendous strain and often wondered whether I was the right
person for the job."¹⁸

Rushbrooke was a competent DNI, but his stature as an
intelligence officer never approached that of John Godfrey,
his predecessor, nor that of DNI "Blinker" Hall in the First
World War. That was probably just the way that the British
intelligence establishment – burned by Hall and therefore
twice shy of Godfrey – wanted it. "Godfrey," noted Stephen
Roskill, author of the official history of the Royal Navy in World War II, "was the only British admiral to receive no recognition at all for his war service."19

Intelligence cooperation with the French government had, as we have seen, been successfully resumed in North Africa in early 1943 following the German occupation of that portion of Metropolitan France that had been ruled by Vichy. However, British cooperation with the French in exile had started much earlier and had been following an erratic course in London since mid-1940. Anglo-French cooperation had been complicated by the multiplicity of agencies involved on both sides. Two major French resistance organizations were headquartered in London, both of which had contacts in Metropolitan France capable of producing important information. One of these groups was composed of strongly anti-Nazi Frenchmen who were also anti-de Gaulle; the other, the Free French, were equally anti-Nazi, but were opposed to all who were unwilling to follow de Gaulle's leadership. Antipathy between the two groups was so strong that the Special Operations Executive, the British organization charged with coordination of resistance (but not intelligence) activities in France, had to set up two completely separate sections to deal with the two warring factions.20
In addition to Special Operations Executive, other British organizations involved with the French in one way or another included the military Chiefs of Staff; the Security Service (MI 5), for counter-intelligence matters; and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI 6), for intelligence collection. Predictably, bureaucratic, intra-government struggles ensued.

Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services was the first American organization to establish intelligence contacts with the French resistance. The first OSS agents arrived in London in November 1941 to be trained in what author and wartime member of the British Secret Intelligence Service, Malcolm Muggeridge, has termed "our frowsty old intelligence brothel." Soon the trainees, showing what was from the British point of view a lamentable degree of independence, began to establish direct information exchanges with the various foreign intelligence services represented in London, including the French.  

The U.S. Navy had not been slow in developing its own contacts in London's foreign intelligence community. In January 1942 the Intelligence Division of Admiral Robert H. Ghormley's Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe staff first established liaison with the governments in exile. In June Admiral Harold R. Stark, who had replaced Ghormley two months previously, recommended to Washington that a naval attaché be assigned jointly to his staff and to that of
Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, the American Ambassador to the Governments in Exile. The naval attaché was to be accredited to the governments in exile in London, all of which were thought to have "exceptionally good sources of military and political information" and many of which had naval attachés in Washington. State and Navy approved, and Captain John C. Callan, USNR, was appointed to the new post.23

Prior to Callan's arrival, Admiral Stark's personal representative to the governments in exile had been Commander Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR. Kittredge, who, with Stark, had been a member of Admiral Sims' staff in London during the First World War, had lived abroad for much of the interwar period, was fluent in French and German, and was well versed in European politics. According to Stark's biographer, "Kittredge became indispensable to Stark in the discharge of his political and diplomatic duties."24

Kittredge turned most of his representational responsibilities to the foreign intelligence community in exile over to Callan upon the latter's arrival in London in September 1942 but remained as Stark's personal representative to the French. Kittredge was particularly useful in keeping his commander informed on the resistance movement in France, receiving information directly from de Gaulle's organization in London and from the British Special Operations Executive via the London office of OSS.25
Captain Callan soon realized that the road to meaningful intelligence exchange with the governments in exile had been booby-trapped, apparently intentionally, by the British. He reported to the American Director of Naval Intelligence that the governments in exile received their information in two ways: directly from their sources in occupied Europe and through communication channels controlled by the British. In the first case, the information was coming to him "without hinderance." Callan alleged that in the case of information sent by British channels, "much of the material...is not made available to the officials of the governments concerned in London." In those cases where the British did deliver the information, the countries "are, in many cases, specifically instructed not to pass it to American authorities here." Instead the British gave the exile governments "'handouts' of intelligence items, generally old and of indifferent value," to be used to "placate American demands for information."

Callan concluded by saying that in view of the numerous instances of "whole-hearted" cooperation, "it may be unfair to intimate that the British are following a deliberate policy of keeping all intelligence of real value concerning the occupied countries to themselves. This, however, seems to be the case...."26

When Callan's letter reached the Navy Department the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Office of Naval
Intelligence admitted that "the situation outlined by Captain Callan undoubtedly exists." However, far from expressing outrage at British undercutting the effectiveness of its man in London, ONI's Foreign Intelligence Branch suggested that Callan be directed to limit his contacts with governments in exile to operational matters, since "the procurement and transmission of ordinary intelligence items...appear to be beyond the scope of the Naval Attaché's duties" - strange words indeed from an organization whose chief reason for existence was to process and disseminate information received from its agents in the field!

In addition to hindering the U.S. Naval Attaché's efforts to obtain information from the governments in exile, the British were less than totally open with the Americans in other intelligence matters. In the original liaison agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British cryptographic authorities, made in the spring of 1943, the British reserved the right to withhold from the Americans messages they considered "too hot" for general dissemination. This type of intercept traffic was placed in a special system called "Res" (Reserved) and given limited distribution.

After a year's intermittent agitation by the Americans the agreement was renegotiated. Messages in the "Res" series were to be screened and divided into four categories: Those that could be released for general circulation. Those
that could be sent to Washington on a "limited distribution" basis. Those that could be read by the American liaison officer but not retransmitted even in substance. Finally, "Items that would continue to be unqualifiedly withheld." Since the U.S. Army and Navy Signals Intelligence agreements with the British were negotiated individually and the Navy document has not been released to the public, it is not possible to say if similar restrictions were imposed on traffic of naval interest, but it is reasonable to believe that this would have been the case.

Another crack in the structure of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation was revealed when the OSS and other American intelligence agencies attempted to stage their own operations from the British Isles into occupied Europe. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to consider a British paper that would, if approved, give the British what was in effect veto power over all such operations. Commenting that "we are not a refugee government," the OSS pointed out that JCS approval would "reduce the OSS Secret Intelligence Service to a subordinate and subservient status" and would "...ultimately not only do harm to the good relations between the two countries but will hamper the united war effort by destroying any effective American intelligence service in that [the European] theater." The OSS objection concluded with the thought that the British recommendations did not disclose "the fact that all raw material
intelligence, no matter how obtained, is processed and evaluated through British machinery." Therefore, the Supreme Allied Commander "will have only that intelligence which has met the British test." 

The less than complete intelligence cooperation that began to surface in the spring of 1943 appeared traceable to the growing realization on the part of both Allies that the issue of which side would win the war was no longer really in doubt. Sooner or later the Allies would defeat the Axis and Japan. Both American and British politico-military strategists began to look beyond victory toward post-war relationships. Secretary of the Navy Knox reflected this type of thinking in a 5 May 1943 letter to Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific. "The British have always been very intelligently aware of their own interests in world affairs," Knox wrote. "In fact, their international policy has been a pretty concrete demonstration from the British point of view of an enlightened self interest. Consequently, in the pursuit of such a policy, there are many things now transpiring which seem to us to indicate at least as great a concern about postwar conditions as it does concerning the winning of the war." 

Mention has been made previously of the Contact Section of the British Naval Intelligence Directorate, whose job it was to dig up experts and sources of information on any conceivable subject that might be of interest to naval
intelligence. As American intelligence became more active in providing for its own needs by establishing its own sources, it ran afoul of the British policy that any such approaches in London had to be made through the Contact Section of the naval intelligence staff. In Admiralty's post-war history of NID 21, the Contact Section, it was stated that "by forcing the American outposts in London to deal through the Admiralty section, British firms were protected from being directly approached in London. This not only saved further duplication, but enabled us to keep an eye on what the Americans were seeking; for there was a strong reciprocal mistrust on the part of Britain that these requests might supply material for post-war economic penetration."

British naval intelligence was not the only body to harbor suspicions of post-war motives. In a 13 January 1943 conference of U.S. Navy counterintelligence officials at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington a question was asked concerning policy on cooperation with the British. "What we would like to do, of course," the responder stated, "and what we should always try to do, is to have a one-way pipeline coming this way, but you have to trade. You have to give them something. You have to cooperate wholeheartedly on the war effort, but we don't propose to give them anything that will prejudice the interest of the United States after the war."
The cooperation between the submarine tracking rooms in Admiralty and the Navy Department during the Battle of the Atlantic demonstrated how close operational intelligence ties could become. This unity of effort was not, unfortunately, always found in other parts of the American and British naval intelligence organizations. In the spring of 1943 NID 17-Zed, the section of the British Naval Intelligence Directorate charged with psychological warfare and "black" (unattributable) propaganda against the German Navy, invited the head of Op-16-W, the section of the American Office of Naval Intelligence assigned a similar mission, to London. The object of the visit was, once again, to study British operations and work out methods of cooperation. The American officer returned to Washington confident that his trip would produce "extremely satisfactory" results.33

However, according to the administrative history of the American Office of Naval Intelligence, misunderstandings arose during the summer of 1943, "since 17-Zed tended to restrict Op-16-W to purely theoretical discussions of the naval war and, in fact, seemed to regard our branch as an auxiliary of their own." The hoped for cooperation was not realized, and "contacts with 17-Zed were reduced to a minimum." When scripts were forwarded to 17-Zed for clearance, they either "brought forth a 'no comment' or some acrimonious remarks on their [the British] part." In 1944,
"for all practical purposes, liaison was discontinued."

Intelligence had begun to regain some of its traditional paranoia concerning the motives of others — even close friends. Without doubt the shift in focus from the immediate problem of self-preservation to the longer range questions of national interest in the post-war world retarded the growth of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, but did not by any means destroy it. Those actions on both sides that were detrimental to intelligence cooperation should be examined within the context of the closest intelligence relationship that had ever been achieved between two sovereign nations. The course of true cooperation was never completely smooth, nor should it have been expected to be.

iii

During 1943 the Allied intelligence war was not confined to the major combat zones of the Atlantic and North Africa; it continued with varying degrees of success in the neutral peripheries of Sweden and the Iberian Peninsula. Sweden was of particular importance because it offered Admiralty a window on the Baltic from which to observe German naval activities and to gain advance warning of any German attempt to break out into the North Sea through the narrow waters of the Kattegat between Denmark and Sweden.
Germany was as aware of Sweden's strategic location as the British were and kept pressure on the Swedish government to observe the strictest neutrality in its dealings with both sides. Strict neutrality did not make the Allied naval attachés' job any easier. Captain Henry Denham, who held the post of British naval attaché in Stockholm throughout the war, commented ruefully that "reticence was brought to a fine art in the conversation of every Swedish officer or Foreign Office official. They were unwilling to discuss any subject which might have some professional savour.... It was most disheartening to find that all doors expected to lead to sources of intelligence were literally slammed in one's face."\(^{35}\) Despite these handicaps, Stockholm became one of the most productive Allied listening posts for naval information during the war.

Since direct access to the Swedish government was blocked, Denham soon learned to approach his targets indirectly by exploiting his contacts with foreign naval officers who were members of the various military missions resident in Stockholm and by cultivating Swedish nationals who favored the Allied cause. One of his early successes became the first chapter in the story of the sinking of the German battleship *Bismarck*. She and the cruiser *Prinz Eugen* departed the port of Gdynia in the Baltic on 18 May 1941. Two days later the ships and their escorts were spotted by the Swedish cruiser *Gottland* exiting the Kattegat.\(^{36}\) Denham
received word of the deployment from the Norwegian Military Attaché, one of his regular sources, who had learned of the sortie from a friend in Swedish intelligence. Denham informed Admiralty immediately, and the hunt was on. On 28 May Admiralty sent Denham a message from the First Sea Lord stating, "Your 2058/20th May initiated first of a series of operations which culminated yesterday in sinking of the Bismarck." Over time Denham was able to provide equally important, if less dramatic, information to Admiralty on German U-boat and warship construction; military movements; and scientific advances, including the first reports of the flight-testing of the German V-1 rocket on 16 April 1944.

Unfortunately, Denham's relationship with the U.S. Naval Attaché was not as productive as might have been anticipated. In the post-war narrative of his activities in Sweden, Denham indicated that "the American Attaché...whom we had hoped might be helpful, turned out to be if anything a slight hindrance. The first embarrassment arose after one of Colonel Björnstierna's [Chief of Swedish Combined Intelligence and one of Denham's sources] reports on German military 'leaked' from the American Legation to the German Legation." The report had been sent to Washington in the U.S. naval attaché's code; however, "it was never actually proved whether this message was intercepted in its cyphered form or whether a copy of the message was stolen from the American Legation in Stockholm and handed to the Germans,
but probably the latter."39 Although Denham thought his contacts with the U.S. Naval Attaché in Stockholm were "of no value at all," at Gothenburg "an excellent US Consul-General helped us all through the war."40

"A high proportion of German intelligence operations against Britain [during the Second World War] were mounted from the Iberian Peninsula."41 We have this assessment from no less an authority than "Kim" Philby, "one of the most remarkable [British-Soviet] double-agents who have been exposed in our time."42 In 1941 Philby had become head of the British Secret Intelligence Service's section dealing with counterintelligence activities in the Iberian Peninsula and was, therefore, in a unique position to assess Allied and Axis espionage and counterespionage operations in that part of the world. The United States and Great Britain carried on extensive intelligence activities in both Spain and Portugal – not, however, without considerable inter and intra-mural infighting.

Unlike in Sweden, where the chief object of Anglo-American intelligence was to gather information on the Germans, in Spain the Allied goal was essentially one of counterintelligence: to deny the Germans access to the information available in Spain by reason of its proximity to the Straits of Gibraltar and to insure that Spanish territory was not used by the Axis for purposes hostile to Allied interests. As early as November 1941 the U.S. Naval
Attaché in Singapore had informed Washington of indications, probably received from British sources, "that the Jap embassy Madrid is obtaining [the] sense of our diplomatic traffic to that capital."43

British naval historian Stephen Roskill wrote that in the early days of the war Spain had repeatedly violated neutrality by helping German Navy raiders and U-boats, as had occurred in the summer of 1940 when the Spanish government permitted "the tanker Winnetou to use the Canary Islands as a base from which to fuel U-boats...."44 The German intelligence network in Spain enjoyed a virtually unstoppable flow of information on Allied ship movements in and out of the British naval base at Gibraltar and through the Straits from a variety of official and unofficial Spanish sources. "On one occasion, when the Germans thought that a convoy might have slipped through in bad visibility one night, they got the Spaniards to lay on a special air reconnaissance flight for their benefit."45

Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation in Spain dated from the early days of 1941, when the U.S. Navy wished to place a Naval Observer in the strategically important Balearic Islands, a Spanish province in the western Mediterranean off the east coast of Spain. The Spanish government refused to permit a U.S. naval officer to be stationed anywhere except Madrid. The U.S. Department of State refused to approve a Navy plan to assign a consular
officer to the Balearics to provide the necessary reporting. Fortunately, Alan Hillgarth, a retired Royal Navy officer, was British Vice-Consul in Palma, Mallorca, the capital city of the Balearics. Through his good offices the American Office of Naval Intelligence was able to receive the information it desired. Hillgarth was subsequently recalled to active duty and assigned, at the behest of Director of Naval Intelligence John Godfrey, to Madrid as the first British Naval Attaché to Spain. Hillgarth, who spoke excellent Spanish and had good contacts in high Spanish political and social circles, did much to counteract German influence within the Franco government. His colleague, the American Naval Attaché in Madrid, was able to return the favor done the U.S. Navy in the Balearics by sharing — quite unofficially — with Hillgarth reports made by the U.S. Naval Attaché in Berlin. In its efforts to monitor German activities in Spain the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence was willing to consider any source of information, no matter how unusual. In November 1942 Mr. Sidney Franklin, "a U.S. citizen and well known professional bullfighter," approached the American Naval Attaché in Mexico City and stated that he had learned from Spaniards in Mexico that the Germans were refuelling and repairing submarines in Spain. Franklin indicated that, because he was well known in the
bullfighting world, he had "access to many circles not ordinarily open to most persons" and offered to go to Spain at his own expense to gather information that might be of value to the U.S. Navy. The archives reveal that the U.S. Navy gave serious consideration to Franklin's offer but do not indicate whether his initiative was ever acted upon."

The arrival of American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents in the Iberian Peninsula seemed to throw a mouse into the intelligence stew in both Madrid and Lisbon. In February 1943 the American Ambassador to Spain informed the State Department that he did not feel that increasing the number of OSS agents in Spain would of necessity improve "our means of procuring information" and reminded the Department that "the Embassy has not had a happy experience with the Office of Strategic Services." "They have," the ambassador continued, "in my opinion, hampered rather than assisted us, notwithstanding the unlimited amounts of money and unusual facilities which have been placed at their disposal." Kim Philby expressed a similar point of view, speaking (one presumes) as a British rather than Soviet intelligence officer. "With respect to my own work in the Iberian Peninsula, the arrival of OSS was a pain in the neck." Later that year, in November, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Lisbon informed the Office of Naval Intelligence that "in Madrid it is understood that the situation [of overlapping intelligence responsibilities] became so acute
that an agreement known as the 'Madrid Agreement' — not between Intelligence and Diplomatic Services of different Allied Nations, but between U.S. Services — has recently been executed.  

Despite jurisdictional differences, Allied intelligence in Spain performed well in its attempts to frustrate German efforts to gain information on Allied activities in the Mediterranean. In Portugal, however, the situation was not all that clear, and results harder to judge. Portugal's international position was, in Philby's estimation, "horribly complicated and fuzzy," and its leaders more cautious and therefore more neutral than those of Spain. In the field of intelligence, "neutrality" translated into willingness on the parts of some senior Portuguese government officials to accept money from both the British and the Germans. Philby commented that "it was usually impossible to assess which side derived most advantage, if indeed any, from this tangle."  

From the early days of the war, Portugal had a reputation as a hotbed of espionage. In the summer of 1940 American diplomat Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen, then a relatively junior member of the American Embassy Staff in the Soviet Union, was directed by the Department of State to serve as a courier for "our most secret diplomatic code" from Washington to Moscow. Bohlen protested to no avail that his route passed through Portugal, which "was infested
with intelligence agents."

The Germans used Portugal as an outpost for dispatching and controlling agents destined for assignments in Great Britain, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere as well as for collecting information on Allied shipping and on the flow of American arms and equipment to England and the Mediterranean. British attempts to counter German espionage efforts were carried on mainly by agents of the Security Service (MI 5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI 6), assisted by the military and naval attachés. In addition, there was a contingent from Special Operations Executive, the British group charged with sabotage and other non-intelligence missions against the Germans. The SOE Lisbon group, according to a knowledgeable insider, seemed "to spend as much time fighting the other secret British organizations as it spent in dealing with the enemy's."

American contributions to the Lisbon intelligence community included the military and naval attachés and the representatives of the Office of Strategic Services. Another American player, U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, Lisbon, joined the game when the U.S. Navy formed the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters (COMNAVNAW) staff shortly after the Allied invasion of North Africa. Whatever his primary mission, the U.S. Naval Liaison Officer also had intelligence responsibilities, having been directed by COMNAVNAW to collect information on such espionage
"targets" as the activities of the Japanese Embassy staff in Lisbon.57

American naval intelligence in Portugal suffered from a twofold coordination problem. At the local level meaningful coordination of intelligence reporting to reduce duplication or false confirmation was almost totally lacking. In addition, information from Lisbon reached the U.S. Navy department via a large number of overlapping and confusing paths. Information developed by the British Secret Intelligence Service in Lisbon on activities of the Portuguese Ministry of Marine reached the American Office of Naval Intelligence from the Washington representative of British Security Coordination, New York. Information developed by the British Embassy in Lisbon reached ONI, not from the U.S. Department of State or from the U.S. Naval Attachés in Lisbon or London, but from the U.S. Military Attaché, Lisbon, via the War Department in Washington. The Federal Bureau of Investigation provided ONI information of naval interest intercepted on a German clandestine radio circuit from Hamburg to Lisbon. Where the FBI got the information in the first place is not known, but it may well have come from a British source via British Security Coordination, New York. In one instance ONI learned of the arrival in Washington of an OSS shipment of papers taken from the office of the Japanese Naval Attaché, Lisbon. ONI found out about the papers, not from the OSS, but from the
U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, Lisbon, via Commander U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters.  

Jurisdictional disputes were also rife in Lisbon. The U.S. Naval Attaché complained to ONI that each representative of "Other U.S. Services" arrived in Lisbon thinking "— probably sincerely — that he brought the latest word from Washington on Counter-Intelligence." "Additional confusion," the attaché added, "has arisen from frequent changes of the heads of other intelligence Services and the fact that many times the new incumbent brought with him a program which was different from that expounded and followed by his predecessor." The American Military Attaché in Lisbon from mid-1942 until the war's end was a U.S. Army Colonel who previously had been the OSS representative in Portugal until fired by his chief, General "Wild Bill" Donovan, for insubordination — a situation that must have added to a general feeling of malaise in Lisbon's American intelligence community.

The intelligence problems in Portugal were not attacked seriously until the fall of 1942 when George F. Kennan was assigned to the American Embassy in Lisbon. Kennan wrote in his Memoirs that, in addition to his normal duties as Counselor of the Embassy, he was asked, "privately and informally, to take the lead in trying to straighten out the dreadful confusions which our various intelligence people had created, among themselves and with the British, in their
efforts to insert themselves into the already seething cauldron of espionage and counterespionage that wartime Lisbon constituted." There is no indication that he was successful.

The year 1943 marked a critical phase in the development of Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. Naval intelligence had followed dichotomous paths. At the same time that Anglo-American naval intelligence reached its closest and most effective levels of cooperation in the mutually supportive submarine tracking rooms during the Battle of the Atlantic, it was also entering into gradual decline as the influence of joint and combined intelligence grew to overshadow Navy-to-Navy relationships. Admiral John Godfrey's dismissal from his post as British Director of Naval Intelligence had stilled a strong voice for increased intelligence cooperation between Admiralty and the U.S. Navy Department. American problems — thought by them to be British inspired — in obtaining information from governments in exile in London, served also to cloud the cooperative horizon.

By the end of 1943 American intelligence was feeling increasingly restive in its perception that the British were attempting to perpetuate a teacher-pupil relationship.
Cracks in the structure of cooperation in intelligence, as in other Anglo-American wartime relationships, were beginning to appear as both sides recognized that the tide of battle had turned and competition for post-war hegemony began to supplant cooperation born of the wartime necessity.
ENDNOTES

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50. U.S. Ambassador, Madrid, to Secretary of State, telegram 354 of 17 February 1943, box 356; entry 421; RG 165; NA, Washington, D.C.

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52. U.S. Naval Attaché Lisbon to Director of Naval Intelligence, letter of 23 November 1943, box 648; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

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CHAPTER VII

THE PACIFIC: FALTERING STEPS: 1940 – 1941

Anglo-American involvement with the Pacific began long before the events of the 1930s that led to the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. The drive — particularly in the nineteenth century — to "open" China and Japan to the blessings of western religion and commerce took place under the protection of British and American warships as well as those of France, Germany and Russia.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, it would have been difficult to see Japan as a potential threat to Anglo-American interests in the Pacific. From the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry's small U.S. Navy squadron in Tokyo Bay in July 1853 until the end of World War I Americans watched, often patronizingly but without apprehension, Japan's progress from feudal empire to modern nation. The Imperial Japanese Navy offered so little threat to American interests in the Pacific that until 1907 the U.S. Navy had not even contemplated drawing up a War Plan
Orange (orange was the color assigned Japan for war gaming purposes, just as blue always denoted U.S. forces and red, British). In that year attacks on Oriental immigrants in California triggered a "War Scare" in the sensationalist American press and aroused sufficient concern in the U.S. Government to cause the Naval War College to consider for the first time a Blue-Orange war contingency.¹

Naval intelligence cooperation in the Far East between the United States and Great Britain had its roots in the shared experience of the First World War and in mutually supportive actions in China during the inter-war years. Growing concerns on the part of both navies over Japanese expansionist activities in the mid-30s notwithstanding, intelligence cooperation was in the main low-level and informal. Both navies were working to break into the numerous Japanese naval codes, with varying degrees of success; however, their efforts were uncoordinated and their results were unshared. By the fall of 1941, when both navies had begun to look seriously at increased intelligence cooperation, it was too late.

¹

American and British maritime interest in the Far East had long pre-dated Perry's arrival in Japan. In 1579 Sir Francis Drake crossed the Pacific in his ship the *Golden
Hind — visiting the Palau Islands, the Philippines, and the Spice Islands of the Malay Peninsula — and returned to England the following year laden with a cargo of the riches of the Orient.² Word of fortunes to be made in trade with the East spread rapidly in Elizabethan England, and in 1599 the East India Company — "the greatest of all joint-stock companies" — was founded to exploit this new source of potential wealth.³ One hundred years later the company began trading operations in Canton, and by the mid-eighteenth century was deeply involved in the China trade.

By 1900 British influence in the Far East was at its zenith. Protected by the ships of the Royal Navy operating from Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Weihaiwei, British merchants controlled almost three quarters of the China trade.⁴ However, in this Golden Age of Colonialism Britain's position in East Asia was challenged not only by France, its usual opponent, but also by Russia and Germany.

Unlike its rapid involvement in the China trade, Britain's interest in Japan, which dated from the early nineteenth century, was slower to develop. As early as 1808, by threatening bombardment, a Royal Navy frigate was successful in obtaining supplies from the reluctant Japanese in Nagasaki harbor. Thus began a period of British "gunboat diplomacy" with Japan that culminated, in 1863, in the ships of the Royal Navy flattening much of the city of Kagoshima on the southern island of Kyushu. This successful shelling
convinced Japanese leaders of the superiority of Western naval power over their own and led, ironically in the light of Japanese naval victories in 1941 and 1942, to a Japanese decision to seek British aid in training the future Imperial Japanese Navy in the image of the Royal Navy.⁵

Imperialism was one of the many Western ways Japan embraced as it emerged from isolation at the end of the nineteenth century. During the period 1890 to 1910 Japan acquired, among other places, Taiwan and southern Sakhalin island, and gained control over south Manchuria and Korea. Japan entered the First World War on the Allied side and "sat at Versailles as one of the Five Great Powers — the only non-Western nation to have been accepted as a full equal by the great nations of the west."⁶

While Great Britain and the other European Great Powers vied for wealth and influence in Asia, the United States, too, had been looking toward the Pacific. American interest had been piqued by publication in 1890 of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Motivated by Mahan's "Strong-Navy" argument; by the need to defend Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines (new American outposts in the Pacific acquired in 1898); and by the idealistic and economic appeals of the American "Open Door" policy of free trade with China, the U.S. Navy sharply increased its attention on the Far East. As a consequence, immediately after the Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese war
in 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt asked the United States Congress for funds to expedite a shipbuilding program designed to allow the U.S. Navy to maintain a two-to-one superiority in the Pacific.\footnote{1}

The United States had long operated in Asian waters with an impunity gained from sharing the protective umbrella created by the Royal Navy ships on the China Station. U.S. Navy ships had paid regular visits to Chinese ports since the mid-nineteenth century, and in June 1854 the USS Susquehanna sailed upriver from Shanghai and, "although the Navy would not know what to call it for many years, the Yangtze Patrol was born."\footnote{2}

There was no formal cooperative naval agreement between the United States and Great Britain. U.S. and Royal Navy ships in the Far East worked together informally on occasion, including one incident in 1859 in which Commodore Josiah Tattnall, U.S. Navy — coining the phrase: "Blood is thicker than water!"\footnote{3} — violated American neutrality and went to the assistance of a British admiral wounded in a skirmish with the Chinese.

By the end of the nineteenth century the British government, aroused by concern over the activities of other European powers in Asia, had started to examine ways to strengthen its own Far Eastern position. Britain's approach to the problem was twofold: first, to seek an alliance, in this case with the newly-emerging world power Japan; second,
to support the United States in the Open Door policy. Britain's informal and secret efforts in March 1898 to enlist American cooperation in countering other European nations' attempts to obtain preferential treatment by annexing portions of China met with firm rebuff.¹⁰ This rejection of joint action, particularly joint naval action, was to set the pattern for Anglo-American Far Eastern relations for the next forty years.

In the 1920s informal cooperation between the men and ships of the U.S. and Royal Navies on the China Station "probably was," according to author and former Yangtze 'River Rat,' Admiral Kemp Tolley, USN, "at an all time high. This was due partly to camaraderie built up during World War I and partly to the pure practicality of cooperative enterprise." This was particularly true in the case of Anglo-American efforts to deal with Chinese river pirates that attacked ships flying the flags of both nations.¹¹

While the United States and Great Britain were dealing with pirates and protecting Western commerce in China during the years immediately following the First World War, Japan was expanding into the former German territories in the Pacific and into the northeast Asian mainland area it had occupied during the Allied "Siberian Adventure" that began in 1918. The United States, seeking — among other things — stability in the Far East and hoping to curb Japanese expansionism, called the five-power Washington Conference in
1922 to discuss disarmament.

Under the terms of the resultant treaty, Japan gave up most of its territorial gains made following World War I and agreed to a naval limitation in the form of a capital ship ratio vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain of 3-5-5. In return, Anglo-American negotiators agreed that their governments would develop no naval bases east of Singapore or west of Hawaii — thus assuring that Japan would have no naval rival in the Western Pacific. The United States Navy had decided as early as 1908 that Pearl Harbor would be its chief naval base in the Pacific, but it was not until 1921 that the British Committee of Imperial Defence elected to turn Singapore into the "Gibraltar of the Far East."

The rise of militarism in Japan during the 1930s, which led to the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931 and to full-scale war with China in 1937, further increased Anglo-American concern over the course of events in Asia. On 12 December 1937 the American gunboat, USS Panay, at the time engaged in evacuating Americans — including State Department officials — from war-torn Nanking, was bombed and sunk in the Yangtze river by Japanese naval aircraft that subsequently machine-gunned the survivors.

In Tokyo United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, fearing that this affront to American sovereignty might lead to an immediate break in diplomatic relations, "began to plan the details of hurried packing in case we might have to
leave." However, Japan's prompt admission of responsibility and tendering of an apology with promise of compensation served to defuse the immediate crisis. Grew later wrote Admiral H.E. Yarnell, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, that the president's decision to strengthen the U.S. Navy was in response to "incidents" such as that of the Panay. "I have steadily advocated such action [strengthening the fleet]," Grew told Yarnell, "ever since coming to Japan in 1932."

The British government, whose gunboats on the Yangtze were attacked by the Japanese at the same time as the Panay, had, since November 1937, been trying without much success to encourage the United States to a combined show of naval force in the Far East. President Roosevelt, with the Panay incident fresh in mind, rekindled British interest in cooperative action by sending the U.S. Navy's Director of Plans on a secret mission to the Admiralty in London in January 1938 to explore the possibility of "parallel actions" in Asia. While little concrete came of the ensuing discussions, at least the first faltering steps toward Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific had been taken.  

One of the greatest of American pre-world War II cryptographic successes was the breaking of the Japanese
diplomatic code, which allowed American negotiators at the 1922 Washington Conference full access to the secret instructions being cabled from Tokyo to the Japanese delegation—a success the Americans chose not to share with the British.  

Great Britain fully reciprocated this lack of cooperative spirit. Not only had the British broken the Japanese diplomatic codes themselves but were, in addition, reading some American diplomatic traffic. One British cryptanalyst recalled that at the end of the First World War, as the flow of foreign military traffic declined, diplomatic traffic grew in importance and, "in the early days of 1920 the strongest section of the G.C.&C.S. [Government Code and Cypher School — the codebreakers] was the United States Section...."  

Although the United States had succeeded in penetrating the Japanese diplomatic code prior to the 1922 Washington Conference, the breakthrough was not a joint Army-Navy effort, it was purely an Army success. The U.S. Army and U.S. Navy approached the Japanese cryptographic problem in a secretive and generally uncoordinated manner that, unfortunately, was to characterize information sharing on their individual codebreaking activities during all of the pre-World War II period and much of the early wartime days. This lack of inter-Service coordination in cryptography eventually forced the British government to conclude separate cooperative agreements between Bletchley Park and
the American Army and Navy respectively. "In all matters of Sigint policy, GCCS (the British Government Code and Cypher School) could present a single British position, while Sigint officials of the U.S. Army or Navy usually could not."²⁰

Since the war against Japan was primarily a maritime struggle, "it is not surprising," as British military historian Ronald Lewin has pointed out, "that almost from the beginning the richest and, at times, the decisive source of information was the system of codes used by the Japanese Navy."²¹ Recognizing that this might be the case, both the Admiralty and the U.S. Navy Department began independent attacks on Japanese codes well before World War II. Following the formation of a Naval Section at the British Government Code and Cypher School in 1924 work began on breaking Japanese naval codes and, despite the difficulties involved in training intercept operators in the special Morse code symbols used for the Japanese language, "a number of Japanese cyphers were duly broken."²² To intercept the Japanese radio traffic needed for analysis the Royal Navy established a listening post afloat in one of its ships attached to the China Station.²³

Unlike the U.S. Army, whose "Black Chamber" was established in 1917, the U.S. Navy apparently did not engage in codebreaking activities during the First World War.²⁴ The Navy created its first communications intelligence staff
positions in 1924 in the Code and Signal Section of the Navy Department's Office of Naval Communications under the cover name of the "Research Desk." That same year the Navy's first shore-based intercept station was officially established in Shanghai. Prior to Shanghai, the only station charged with intercepting foreign communications had been on board the USS Huron in Far Eastern waters.25

Lieutenant Laurence L. Safford, an Annapolis graduate, became the first head of the "Research Desk." Safford shortly realized, and was able to convince his superiors, that without a constant flow of traffic for analysis, little could be accomplished in breaking the Japanese naval codes. "A single code message is worthless except as a curiosity," Safford wrote. "We must have all the traffic to and from a given station and messages by the hundreds and by the thousands to have any chance of solving foreign codes."26 To fill the need for a large volume of coded Japanese messages, in addition to Shanghai, intercept stations were positioned in Peking, Guam, Hawaii, and Manila.27

Safford was not exaggerating the value of large amounts of "raw" traffic. In his history of codebreaking against Japan during World War II, The American Magic, Ronald Lewin made the point that "unless you acquire a minimal number of signals in a particular code or cipher, it is often intolerably difficult — if not impossible — to identify the particular characteristics of the traffic. These things
have their hallmarks, but they often become obvious only after intensive study of many signals."^{28}

As well as a lack of Japanese naval messages for analysis, two other elements critical to the breaking of Japanese naval codes were in short supply—enlisted radio operators able to copy the Japanese language KANA^{29} code, and officers skilled in the Japanese language to do the actual cryptanalysis. Radio operator training programs were instituted, and the rate of establishing follow-on intercept stations was adjusted to match the availability of trained operators. In the 1920s the Navy also attacked the problem of the lack of officer translators, but by 1941 only thirty-six Japanese language officers had been produced. A number, Samuel Eliot Morison commented, that was "inadequate for the task," but without which, countered Lewin, "naval intelligence in wartime would have been paralyzed."^{30}

Several circumstances combined to limit the number of officers sent for language training. The costs involved in keeping two language trainees per year resident in Japan for the three-year-long program represented a considerable outlay to the money-strapped Navy of the 1930s. Additionally, language training could be expected to lead to a number of future assignments in either communications or intelligence. Neither field was considered particularly "career-enhancing" for the ambitious junior officer in the pre-World War II Navy.
Despite the perceived drawbacks to language training, the names of those who succeeded in the program read like a "Who's Who" of U.S. Naval Intelligence in the 1940s. Ellis Zacharias, who eventually became Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence; Edwin Layton, Nimitz' intelligence officer throughout the war; Arthur H. McCollum, who held a variety of pre-war and wartime intelligence posts; and Rufus L. Taylor, a member of the Navy codebreaking team on Corregidor at the war's start, Director of Naval Intelligence in the post-war period, and subsequently Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; were promoted to the rank of Admiral. Joseph J. Rochefort headed the Combat Intelligence Center for the Pacific Fleet before and during the war and was described by Admiral Nimitz as an officer who "deserves a major share of the credit for the victory at Midway."31 Henri Smith-Hutton was Admiral King's intelligence officer for much of the war. All were illustrious graduates of the Navy's pre-war Japanese language training program.

By 1940, as the possibility of conflict with Japan grew, the U.S. Navy awoke to the realization that its supply of Japanese linguists was woefully inadequate. Few American universities offered Japanese studies, and those programs that did exist did not meet the Navy's needs. The Navy subsequently sponsored two training centers designed to meet its specific Japanese language requirements, one at Harvard and the other at the University of California, Berkeley.
The University of California course proved particularly successful, and it is ironic that the Navy's Japanese language program there had to be terminated and transferred off the West Coast when all persons of Japanese ancestry in California, including the Navy's language instructors, were "relocated," ostensibly for reasons of security. The Japanese Language School was moved to the University of Colorado at Boulder in June 1942, where it continued to employ the same instructors who had been considered security risks in California! The following year the first British naval officers reported to Boulder for Japanese language training, and others followed in 1944.

While many of the Navy's Japanese language officers went to specialized assignments involving cryptography, others served in more traditional intelligence billets: foreign shore duty as Assistant Naval Attaché in Tokyo, sea duty as Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, or domestic shore duty on the Far Eastern Desk in the Office of Naval Intelligence. During the 1920s and 1930s, from posts such as these, the language officers provided the bulk of non-cryptographic information on the Japanese. The U.S. Army, too, had military attachés reporting from the Far East, but, at least until 1940, Army G-2 in Washington was more concerned with domestic subversive activities than with foreign intelligence. Representatives of the Department of State serving in Asia
also sent aperiodic reports on Japanese activities, which produced little "feedback" from Washington to the reporters in the field on the quality or accuracy of the information provided — shortcomings that led Ambassador Grew to comment soon after his arrival in Tokyo in June 1932 that the State Department's "whole system of intelligence should be vastly strengthened, and it should be systematic, not haphazard...."\textsuperscript{35}

In their quest to solve the Japanese codes, American Navy cryptographers were not above augmenting the product of their undoubted talents through "dirty tricks." Laurence Safford wrote in a post-war study of the beginnings of the U.S. Navy's cryptologic program that in the early 1920s representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New York City police entered the offices of the Japanese Consul General, opened his safe, and photographed a Japanese Navy code book left there for safekeeping by a Japanese naval inspector.\textsuperscript{36} Shortly thereafter Ellis Zacharias, then serving a tour at sea, was suddenly recalled to Washington to concentrate both his knowledge of Japanese and of the naval profession on the task of making sense of the information developed from the "borrowed" code book.\textsuperscript{37}

The Navy was prompt in putting its newly-established Far Eastern eavesdropping capabilities to good use. Intelligence reports from the U.S. Naval Attaché in Tokyo,
among others, indicated that the Imperial Japanese Navy was planning a major fleet exercise in October 1927. By this time Zacharias had completed his duties in Washington and had been sent to the staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet under "cover." His true assignment was to lead the team of Navy personnel who were copying and studying Japanese naval communications. Realizing that his nominal home port of Shanghai was too far away from the anticipated Japanese maneuver area to intercept tactical communications, Zacharias and a small contingent of radiomen and equipment moved aboard the *USS Marblehead*, which was about to depart for a series of well-publicized courtesy visits to various Japanese ports.

Zacharias' report to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, later forwarded to the Director of Naval Communications in Washington, analyzing the results of his successful mission has been preserved in the National Archives. The efforts of Zacharias and his team, the first such directed against Japanese fleet maneuvers, proved remarkably fruitful, both in quantity of coded information obtained and in quality of tactical data, such as individual Japanese ship call signs, recovered. Zacharias' small detachment was the forerunner of the Mobile Radio Intelligence Units that were first embarked in 1942 to give commanders at sea rapid access to information, derived from on-board analysis of Japanese tactical communications that
bore on their current operations. By the latter days of the
Pacific War, these RIUs, as they were called, had proven
their worth to the extent that one carrier Admiral wrote,
"No Task Group Commander in the Fleet can now afford to be
without an RI unit." 39

During the inter-war years of the 1920s and 1930s, as
the supply of intercepted Japanese coded communications
increased with the establishment of additional listening
posts, so did U.S. Army and Navy codebreaking activities,
which were primarily centered in Washington. By the 1930s
two machine ciphering systems had come into use in Japan.
The first, called the "Red" machine by U.S. analysts, was
used by the Foreign Office and came under study by both the
U.S. Army and Navy in addition to their work on Japanese
military and naval codes. A second machine system,
nicknamed "Purple," came into use for Japanese diplomatic
traffic around 1937, in addition to — but not supplanting —
the Red system. In a rare show of pre-war cooperation the
Navy attacked the Red and other Japanese diplomatic systems,
leaving the Army free to concentrate on the Purple code. By
the latter part of 1940 American analysts were successfully
reading both the Red and Purple systems. 40 The information
derived from messages sent via the Purple machines came to
be nicknamed "Magic." 41

British cryptographers continued their work on
Japanese codes both in the Far East and in the United
Kingdom. However, as the possibility of war in Europe increased in the 1930s, the British Government Code and Cypher School authorities tended, naturally, to place the bulk of their efforts on the codes of the more likely potential enemies — in particular those of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. According to the official British history of intelligence in the Second World War, by the end of 1939 the German Enigma machine was beginning to yield its secrets to British cryptographers and, even before Italy's entry into the war in June of 1940, the British were reading most of the Italian diplomatic and military cryptographic systems. Allegedly, all British work on Soviet codes stopped after 22 June 1941, with the German attack on Russia.42

The main bastion of British intelligence in Asia during the 1930s was the Far East Combined Bureau. First established in Hong Kong in 1935 and moved to Singapore in 1939, the Combined Bureau grew out of the Royal Navy's intelligence organization on the China Station. It was charged primarily with collecting and evaluating intelligence on the possibility of an attack by Japan.43 All three British Services were represented by the heads of their local intelligence organizations, but with the Royal Navy's Chief of Intelligence Staff, China Station, *primus inter pares*. With a Royal Navy man at its head and with its administrative control vested in Admiralty, it is not
surprising that Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, RAF, Commander in Chief of British Forces in the Far East at the time of the Japanese attacks in 1941, found the Combined Bureau "somewhat unbalanced in that attention was mostly concentrated on Naval intelligence, while Army and Air intelligence took a minor place, the latter especially being quite inadequate." There is evidence of discord among the various organizations and intelligence disciplines contained in the Combined Bureau, "though," as Professor F.H. Hinsley pointed out, "there was not much inter-Service friction there was a considerable amount between the Sigint [Signals intelligence] group and the COIS [Chief of Intelligence Staff] on the Station." This type of rivalry between those in the communications intelligence "club" and outsiders who depended on traditional sources of intelligence was not unusual in Washington and London as well as in the Far East. Like the blind men in the fable, those who were unable, by reason of inclination or security restrictions, to see the whole of the intelligence elephant, were often led to incorrect analysis.

In addition to the Service intelligence organizations and Government Code and Cypher School, the British Secret Intelligence Service was also active in the Far East during the inter-war period, apparently with mixed success. Brooke-Popham commented in a draft copy of a July 1942 report that he submitted on the history of his then-defunct
Far East Command that "the weakest part of the intelligence system was the Secret Intelligence Service." It is of interest to note that these and other unflattering remarks by Brooke-Popham concerning the performance of the Secret Intelligence Service in the Far East were deleted from the final version of his report.

Apparently the Secret Intelligence Service was aware of its own shortcomings. In 1937 the SIS had invited the attention of all its overseas posts to the serious gaps then existing in its knowledge about the intelligence services of several foreign nations, including Germany and Japan. Therefore, the SIS representative in Singapore may have been unaware that the German military intelligence organization (Abwehr) had an overseas branch (Kriegsorganisation) under cover in Shanghai that was gathering intelligence on British activities in the Far East and conducting liaison with the Japanese.

By the late 1930s it seemed increasingly likely that the United States would become involved in war with Japan and would join in the world conflict, which by that time had spread to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. American and British naval intelligence had long been active in the Far East, but they had been acting not in concert, but independently. Working in their own watertight compartments, British and American codebreakers had achieved varying degrees of success against many different Japanese
codes, but the solution to the one of chief concern to both navies, the major Japanese Navy operational code — called JN-25 by the American codebreakers — remained elusive.

The tentative approaches to cooperation that by 1940 had been taken in London and Washington had yet to exert much influence on actions in Singapore or Manila. The American and Royal Navies had been involved in the Far East for a longer time and to a greater extent than had their sister land and air services. They, therefore, had more to gain (or lose) should cooperative measures succeed (or fail).

iii

On 25 July 1939 Admiral Thomas C. Hart broke his flag in the cruiser USS Augusta, anchored in Shanghai harbor, and assumed command of the United States Asiatic Fleet, relieving Admiral Harry E. Yarnell as Commander in Chief. The fleet's impressive title belied its small size and its complete inadequacy to defend American interests in the Far East. Since Hart was one of the very few four star admirals in the pre-war U.S. Navy, he might have been expected to command a larger and more powerful force — one more in keeping with his high rank. However, in the case of the Asiatic Fleet, both the title and the commander's rank were matters of "face," determined more by the representational
aspects of the assignment than by the strength of the fleet. Four stars made Hart equal or senior to the foreign naval officers — British, French, or Japanese — with whom he would have to deal.\textsuperscript{49}

Hart had previously been stationed in Washington in the post of Chairman of the General Board of the Navy, the body that served as chief advisor to the Secretary of the Navy on matters of policy. After his assignment to the Asiatic Fleet had been announced in early March 1939, Hart, with characteristic thoroughness, began to prepare for his new duties, visiting both the Department of State and the Office of Naval Intelligence. At State, Hart found that "the top two men in the Far Eastern Division either had the situation summarized in notes or had it in their heads so that I could be given the picture as they saw it concretely and completely. In our own Office of Naval Intelligence," Hart added gently, "the situation was not quite the same."\textsuperscript{50}

After several months on station in the Far East Hart complained, in a memorandum which he noted he "produced in Jun 1940 (but) never sent to anyone," that information flowed from China and Japan to ONI; but "the Commander in Chief [Asiatic Fleet] gets nothing \underline{from} ONI."\textsuperscript{51} Three months previously Hart had asked the Chief of Naval Operations that ONI send him information on any significant changes in merchant ship traffic patterns in the Pacific. "I can't think of any better barometer," Hart wrote.\textsuperscript{52}
There is no indication that his request was ever honored.

Since, according to Hart's biographer, "a major part of Hart's mission was to find out what the Japanese were up to," he was forced to become his own intelligence analyst, using funds specially provided for the purpose to collect information and to produce his own evaluations of the situation in Asia, which he dutifully shared with the Navy Department.53 When these reports produced no reaction from ONI, he wrote acerbically to the Chief of Naval Operations, "I do at least directly request that we be informed of those respects in which our own estimates [similar to the one going forward in this mail] are disagreed with by your own people."54

In his efforts to provide his own estimates, Hart used all the sources of information available to him. He depended heavily on the work of his intelligence officer Lieutenant Commander Redfield ("Rosey") Mason, one of that small band of U.S. naval officers trained in the Japanese language, and on the talents of his codebreaking group on Corregidor, known as Station CAST. Rufus L. Taylor, at the time a young Japanese language officer newly assigned to Station CAST, later recalled that Admiral Hart used to visit CAST regularly in 1941 and was always interested in the "bits and fragments of information that no one could do much with." Taylor, who shared the common view that Hart was a "stiffnecked old disciplinarian," was impressed that "there
he was sitting around informally on the edge of peoples
desks picking their brains and putting it all together in a
highly competent manner."^35

Admiral Hart's efforts to promote Anglo-American naval
cooperation began early in his tour of duty. Shortly after
his change of command, Hart paid a courtesy call on Vice
Admiral Percy Noble, commander of British naval forces in
Chinese waters, who, later in the war, became head of the
British Admiralty Delegation in Washington. During the
course of what had been arranged as a visit of protocol, as
opposed to a discussion of substantive issues, Hart
nevertheless planned on holding a "very confidential" talk
with Noble about what might be done in the case of "actual
hostilities with the Japs."^36 The call took place on 25
August 1939, but the hoped-for private discussion did not.
The increasingly volatile situation in Europe forced Noble
to cut the visit short, collect his ships, and depart
suddenly for Hong Kong.

The next tentative steps toward naval cooperation in
the Far East took place in Singapore in November 1940 and
Batavia, Dutch East Indies, in January 1941. These
conferences were, however, more Anglo-Dutch than Anglo-
American in composition, although Captain William R.
Purnell, USN, Admiral Hart's Chief of Staff, attended both
as an observer.97 Apparently little of substance was
accomplished at either of the meetings, but they did help
set the scene for an April 1941 Singapore conference. This was the only pre-war conference held in the Far East of the then and future Allies in which the United States was a full participant. Again, Captain William Purnell was the lead U.S. military representative and was the sole American to sign the meeting report.

The American-Dutch-British Conversations (short title: "ADB"), which began on 21 April 1941 in Singapore, included delegates from Australia, New Zealand, and India as well as the three principals and was called to plan for concerted action against the Japanese should they resort to military force against any of the attending nations.58 The meeting was an outgrowth of the American—British Conversations (ABC-1) that had been held in Washington in March 1941, after which the American and British Chiefs of Staff had agreed that a subsequent meeting should be held in Singapore "as soon as practicable" to draw up a "practical operating plan" to implement the agreements—a goal that was to prove elusive.59

Following the March 1941 ABC-1 meeting, Rear Admiral V.H. Danckwerts and his Chief of Staff, Captain A.W. Clarke, both of whom had been members of the British delegation to the ABC-1 conversations and had remained on in Washington with the British Admiralty Delegation, visited Hawaii to confer with Admirals H.E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and C.C. Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District. The purpose of their visit was to further Anglo-American naval planning efforts in the Pacific and, in Clarke's case, to see his daughter, who was in Hawaii "for the duration." If the British officers had hoped to forge an agreed Pacific strategy to present at the forthcoming Singapore conference they were disappointed, for their Hawaiian interlude proved unproductive.

In the spring of 1941, while the possibility of Japanese attacks on American and British possessions in the Pacific was real and was recognized as such by both countries, the threat in Asia did not appear as imminent as that posed by the Germans in Europe. Therefore, both parties approached the problem of cooperation in the Far East with less selflessness of political purpose that they had shown by moving in concert to counter the German juggernaut in the West. During the March 1941 ABC-1 conversations, the British representatives had insisted that the agreed outline of defense policies include the statement that "a cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort." The ensuing American, Dutch, British Conversations in Singapore were in great measure an unsuccessful British attempt to translate the policy of defense of its Far Eastern empire into practical military plans.
Both the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark rejected the agreement reached in Singapore. They found the plan too "political" in nature and therefore beyond the scope of their authority as military leaders – at variance with parts of the ABC-1 Agreement and, at least on the naval side, too much concerned with defensive measures such as convoy and escort duties, rather than with potential offensive actions.\textsuperscript{63}

The Americans took exception to the fact that the proposed plan called for U.S. naval forces to defend British possessions in the Far East without any help of significance from the Royal Navy. The American Army and Navy chiefs therefore advised their British counterparts that "until such time as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British position in the Far East Area, they [the U.S. military leaders] will be constrained to withdraw their agreement to permit the United States Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that area."\textsuperscript{64} Needless to say, Washington's repudiation of the combined planning efforts in Singapore did little to improve local climate of cooperation among the Americans, Dutch, and British in the Far East.

During the immediate pre-war period in the Pacific, despite the strains caused by political issues, Anglo-
American naval intelligence cooperation seemed to have a life of its own that did not necessarily depend on or replicate the ups and downs of what one historian has termed the "bargaining for supremacy" that went on in the late 1930s between British and American military leaders.

American and British naval intelligence officers in Far Eastern waters had been working together since the late 1920s and exchanging information that might help to counter Japan's expansionist plans. During the late 1930s British forces and American Marines in Shanghai had shared tactical intelligence. Captain Ingersoll's mission to Admiralty in 1938 and the subsequent return visit of Commander Hampton, RN, to the American Chief of Naval Operations in 1939 dealt primarily with operational cooperation in the Pacific. However, the discussions did disclose the existence of an ongoing, if informal, program to exchange intelligence concerning Japanese military activities. During the Ingersoll visit, "it was agreed that a wider exchange of intelligence on all subjects connected with Japan was desirable."\(^{67}\)

The next link in the chain of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in the Pacific was actually forged in England in the fall of 1940. It will be recalled that in the summer of 1940, just prior to Special Naval Observer Admiral Robert L. Ghormley's arrival in London, Admiralty formed the Bailey Committee to study potential areas for
Anglo-American naval cooperation. The Bailey Committee's recommendations formed the basis of British discussions with Ghormley and the other American Observers at the series of meetings covered naming "Standardization of Arms." To implement the mutually agreed measures, including intelligence cooperation, the Joint US/UK Bailey Committee was formed in London and met at regular intervals until the eve of the U.S. entry into the Second World War.68

The fourteenth meeting of the Joint Committee, held on 16 October 1940, dealt specifically with the exchange of intelligence between U.S. and British naval authorities in the Far East. "In particular the desirability of the exchange of information regarding the movement of Japanese forces was stressed."69 In addition, provision of secure communication channels for exchange of intelligence between the British Commander in Chief, China, and the U.S. Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, was explored as was the possibility of exchanging liaison officers between the two fleets. As a result of the Joint U.S./U.K. Bailey Committee meeting, or of a local initiative between Admiral Hart and his British opposite number, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, (who had taken Vice Admiral Sir Percy Noble's place as Commander in Chief, China Station) liaison officers were exchanged in November 1940.70

During 1941, the last year of relative "peace" for Anglo-American forces in the Pacific, concern increased in
both Washington and London over the slow growth of naval intelligence cooperation in the Far East. Both governments realized that intelligence cooperation in Asia did not approach the closeness that was being achieved in the Atlantic/European area, but neither the Office of Naval Intelligence nor Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division seemed able to do much to improve the situation.

In addition to working with London to improve Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in Asia, the U.S. Navy Department had taken unilateral steps to put its own intelligence house in order. In January 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations had sent Commander John L. McCrea, USN, to the Far East as a courier to bring Admiral Hart the latest edition of war plan Rainbow Three, to obtain his comments, and to answer Hart's questions about the plan.71 Probably because of Hart's often repeated dissatisfaction with the support he was getting from ONI, the CNO sent McCrea to see the Director of Naval Intelligence prior to McCrea's departure. The DNI and his Far Eastern Desk officers had a number of suggestions of ways in which ONI might increase its support of Hart's intelligence efforts. McCrea was told to ask Hart if his relations with British intelligence were all he wished them to be. "If not, ONI can put pressure on the British Embassy in Washington and can get cooperation."72

In the summer of 1941 Admiral Godfrey, the British
Director of Naval Intelligence, shared the general uneasiness over the state of intelligence cooperation in the Pacific. He was concerned that the British and American intelligence organizations in the Far East might not have the "big picture" as seen from Washington and London and that they might be overly occupied with local problems. Despite assurances from the British Commander in Chief, China, that "the present liaison with Manila is excellent," Godfrey thought that an Anglo-American intelligence conference in Hawaii "would be a good opportunity to resolve any doubts which may exist as to the efficiency of our intelligence organizations in the Pacific." Godfrey saw the proposed conference as an opportunity "to examine intelligence resources open to the British and U.S. authorities in the Far East, to enquire into deficiencies in the existing organizations, and to propose immediate remedies, where necessary." Godfrey's representative in Washington suggested that in view of the reluctance of Commander in Chief, China, to send his intelligence officer to Hawaii, "the incentive must therefore come from here [the U.S. Navy Department]."

There is no indication that the U.S. Navy had any interest in pursuing the idea, and the meeting never took place. Once again, as had often been the case in the period from the fall of France in 1940 until America's entry into the war in December 1941, the British took the initiative in
attempting to enlist the U.S. Navy in a cooperative intelligence program. That they were less successful in the Far East than in Europe was in part because of a U.S. perception that the threat to American interests was less serious in Asia than in Europe, and in part because of the feeling that closer alliance with the British in the Far East might lead to Americans being forced to pull British Imperial chestnuts out of the fire.

There is no question that the American and British cryptographic organizations in the Far East were in contact with each other prior to December 1941. However, since most nations prefer to make public as little as possible about their cryptographic activities, it is difficult to measure with any degree of certainty the extent of cooperation between the two groups of codebreakers. Nor is there any indication that their cryptographic collaboration bore any fruit in the form of greater success in penetrating Japanese Navy codes.

As has been noted, in the 1920s both the British and the Americans established cryptological organizations in Asia. Because the Admiralty had assumed overall responsibility for British cryptographic activities in the Far East, the codebreakers, drawn from the Royal Navy and from the Government Code and Cypher School, were first assigned to the Chief of Intelligence Staff, Commander in Chief, China, in Hong Kong. In 1935, when British
intelligence activities in Asia were centralized with the establishment of the Far East Combined Bureau in Hong Kong, the cryptographic unit was included and when the Combined Bureau moved to Singapore in 1939, the cryptographers moved also.⁷⁸

The U.S. Navy's cryptographic efforts in the Far East, which had started originally in Shanghai and aboard ship, soon expanded to include locations in Guam and in the Philippines. The Radio Security Station of the Marine Detachment, Peking, was established in 1927 and for a time replaced Shanghai as the major U.S. Navy intercept location on the Asian mainland; but in 1935 Peking was disestablished, in part because of the threat to its security posed by Japanese military activities in Northern China, and its personnel were sent back to Shanghai.⁷⁹ Shanghai, in turn, was closed in December 1940 and its staff transferred to the Philippines, ultimately to staff Monkey Point on Corregidor, a site then under construction in a tunnel, which had been authorized because the Navy felt the need for "a secure COMINT post in the Ultimate Defense Area of the Philippines."⁸⁰

Cryptographic cooperation in the Far East probably dates from the historic spring 1941 visit of four American Army and Navy codebreakers to the British Government Code and Cypher School outside London.⁸¹ At that time American-made copies of the Japanese coding machine (called the
Purple machine by the United States) were given to the British and technical details of American success in breaking the Japanese diplomatic codes were provided. One of the American party, Captain Abraham Sinkoff, U.S. Army, who later in the war headed the U.S. Army's contingent of codebreakers at MacArthur's Headquarters in Australia, reported that the British "were enthusiastic about future cooperation along cryptographic lines" and that "one important point in the program [of proposed cooperation] was a request for cooperation in the Far East."

Shortly after the American trip to Bletchley Park, a similar small group of Americans visited the Combined Bureau in Singapore to exchange information and to plan a concerted attack on the Japanese codes. Following this conference, Commander Malcolm Burnett, RN, previously stationed at the Government Code and Cypher School in England, and currently attached to the Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore, travelled to Station CAST, the U.S. Navy's codebreaking site in the Philippines, to study its work against Japanese naval codes. The visit, however, did little to increase the negligible cooperation between the American and British codebreaking organizations in the Far East and did not result in any cryptographic break-throughs in solving the key Japanese Navy operational code.

By the summer of 1941, the machinery for Anglo-American naval cooperation in the Far East had been discussed and, at
least in the case of naval intelligence, had in some measure been put into place. However, concrete results from the cooperative efforts were slight. Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison has commented that "in contrast to the Atlantic war, where the United States and Royal Navies cooperated as virtual allies before the German declaration ... the three future allies in the Pacific failed to cooperate before 8 December 1941, and did 'too little and too late' thereafter." 86

iv

By the summer of 1941, as the realization that war with Japan was impending, both Washington and London became acutely conscious that intelligence cooperation in the Far East was not all that it should be. In mid-July the U.S. Naval Attaché in London cabled the Navy Department that the "British War Council composed of representatives Navy Army and Air Force is desirous of obtaining full exchange of information on Far East" and listed more than a half dozen locations in East and Southeast Asia where the British were "especially" interested in trading intelligence. 87

The Navy Department replied promptly, agreeing to the proposed exchange and stating that "instructions to effect full and continuous interchange of information on matters concerning Far East have been issued to [U.S.] Naval
Attachés and Observers" at the locations specified by the British. Washington requested that Admiralty issue similar instructions and that the U.S. be informed when this had been done. The message concluded by indicating that the U.S. Army was taking similar steps. 88

Early in August 1941 the U.S. Naval Attaché, London, was able to assure the Navy Department that appropriate British intelligence organs had been instructed to undertake the exchanges and that "Admiralty suggests contact with Far East Combined Bureau Singapore with view to maintaining touch with Sail Item Sail." [SIS, in the phonetic alphabet then in use. SIS referred to the British Secret Intelligence Service representatives operating in the Far East.] 89

In making this suggestion Admiralty was either unaware of what was going on between the SIS and the U.S. military in the Pacific, or was being disingenuous — or, perhaps, both. In July 1941 a SIS representative in the Pacific, operating under cover as a manager of the British trading firm Theo H. Davies, approached the FBI in Hawaii and informed the Bureau that one Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul, was the SIS man in Honolulu. The FBI agent was told that Dawson would pass on information received through SIS Channels to Naval Intelligence, Army G-2, and, the FBI in Hawaii. 90

On 3 December 1941 the SIS station in Manila sent a
message to its representatives in Hawaii warning of extensive Japanese troop movements and warlike preparations in Indo-China. The message indicated that SIS Manila had furnished the information to American military intelligence in the Philippines and recommended the information also be passed to American military and naval intelligence in Honolulu — which was done.91

As late as 2 December 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, radioed his Asiatic Fleet commander, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, that "in view of existing situation CNO considered [sic] it very important that you exchange full military information with the British and Dutch naval Commanders in Chief except in cases where you consider it definitely inadvisable." Stark suggested that the information exchanges be channeled through the U.S. Naval Observers in Batavia and Singapore.92 This advice, however sound, came too late to do much good.

In the waning weeks of relative peace in the Far East, two top British military officials made visits to Manila that contributed to the climate of cooperation, even if the visitors did little to offer practical steps to achieve the desired result. Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander in Chief of all British forces in the Far East, visited General MacArthur in early October and wrote him warmly after the trip, "I know you agree with me that these personal meetings develop cooperation far more effectively
than any amount of writing."³³

Following Brooke-Popham's visit to Manila, U.S. Army
implementation of the Anglo-American information sharing
program was subsequently confirmed in a late October message
from the U.S. Army Observer in Singapore to General
MacArthur in Manila, which stated, "this Office has received
instructions from War Department that there will be free
exchange of information except cryptography between
intelligence agencies of British and United States" and that
"British are complying fully."³⁴

Despite British willingness to share, MacArthur was to
prove a difficult partner. In responding to a request for
information from Brooke-Popham's staff, MacArthur sent
nothing but equivocated. "I am completely in accord with an
interchange of information but do not wish to let it
degenerate into stereotyped form which so frequently
characterizes the intelligence activities of military and
naval officers."³⁵ In the latter part of November MacArthur
replied curtly to a personal request from Brooke-Popham for
information on current Japanese naval activities in Camranh
Bay, Indochina, "this Headquarters has no information not
known by British intelligence."³⁶

It is not clear whether Admiral Hart was present at the
Manila meeting with Brooke-Popham, but previous contacts
with the British commander had left Hart unimpressed. In a
report following the ADB conference the previous April, Hart
had written, "We don't think much of Brooke-Popham. ... The Air Marshal is considerably a politico. ... He seems rather muddle-headed, personality is not that of a leader of large, diverse forces." Brook-Popham's naval commander was much more to Hart's taste. "Vice Admiral Layton has my peoples entire liking and respect — as a fine example of the blue-water school of the Royal Navy. He is direct, frank and forceful. Inasmuch as he holds back on anything to do with long-range planning, there is the possibility that important decisions may not be reached soon enough" — good insight on Hart's part!

The final British visit before the outbreak of the war with Japan took place on 5 December 1941. Vice Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, RN, called by Samuel Eliot Morison, "one of the youngest and most able flag officers in the Royal Navy," arrived in Manila with key staff members to confer secretly with Hart and MacArthur.

Phillips had been detached from his duties as Vice Chief of the Naval Staff in London the previous month and had been directed to proceed to the Far East with the modern battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser HMS Repulse. The transfer of additional ships to the Far East fulfilled Prime Minister Churchill's promise made the President Roosevelt at the Atlantic Charter conference to provide visible deterrence to Japanese aggression in Asia by strengthening British naval forces in the area. The ships
Phillips brought were to form the nucleus of a new Eastern Fleet, which Phillips was to command, and for which he had been promoted to full Admiral — thus avoiding a precedence problem with the more senior Vice Admiral Layton, who remained Commander in Chief, China Station.¹⁰¹ As he prepared to meet Hart, Phillips must have felt a rueful sense of déja vu, since it had been he and Captain Ingersoll of the U.S. Navy that had met with equal secrecy in London in 1938 to discuss cooperation in the Pacific — the first milestone on the road to pre-war, Anglo-American planning for concerted action in the Far East. A road that to date had led nowhere.

Hart was as impressed with Phillips as he had been with Layton. Hart found Phillips to be made of "good stuff...decidedly the intellectual type with a first rate brain."¹⁰² During their brief and occasionally heated discussions the Admirals examined potential joint measures to counter the imminent Japanese attack anticipated by both. In the end Hart agreed to send four U.S. destroyers to participate in the defense of Singapore and to operate under Phillips' command, requiring only that Phillips augment his forces by recalling three Royal Navy destroyers from Hong Kong to join the Eastern Fleet.¹⁰³

Phillip's stay in Manila was cut short by receipt of intelligence indicating that a large Japanese convoy had been sighted steaming westward through the Gulf of Siam,
destination unknown. Hart relayed the information to Washington, as did American officials in Singapore — presumably from British sources. The American Embassy in London also sent Washington reports on the convoy given it by the British. Sighting of the convoy was one of the few concrete bits of warning intelligence on impending Japanese activities to reach the policy makers in Washington before the actual Japanese attacks. On 6 December, Phillips returned to Singapore to resume command of his small "Fleet." Within a week both the Admiral and his fleet had ceased to exist.

v

War came as promptly and destructively to the Far East as it had to Hawaii. In Manila, Admiral Hart was awakened at 3 AM with an unofficial, but accurate, report that the Japanese had struck Pearl Harbor. In advance of official confirmation Hart immediately notified the Asiatic Fleet of the start of hostilities, thus alerting his Striking Force of cruisers and destroyers, which he had prudently deployed to the south of Luzon in late November. Some seven hours later he received orders to execute the war plan against Japan. At noon on 8 December a strong force of Japanese aircraft attacked U.S. Army airfields in the Manila area.
As in Hawaii, the bulk of the American aircraft were caught on the ground, and the resulting losses were so severe that the U.S. Army Air Forces Far East was never again able to offer any serious challenge to Japanese superiority in the air.

Without air cover, Manila became open to attack at will by the Japanese. On 10 December Japanese bombers struck the U.S. Naval Base at Cavite for over two hours, destroying the yard and crippling several ships and submarines that had been in overhaul there. The Asiatic Fleet's patrol aircraft were similarly attacked from the air and many destroyed at their moorings. "By 11 December," Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, "it was unpleasantly clear that the Navy, without shore based aircraft, could not control the seas around the Philippines."106

The British in the Far East were faring no better than the Americans. Hong Kong was bombed almost immediately. Japanese troops entered Thailand and began a simultaneous attack on British forces in Malaya. An American observer in Malaya later reported to the U.S. Navy Department on British unpreparedness, stating that "the British policy had been to prevent a Far Eastern war by any means, important among which was publicity. In order to discourage potential attackers, therefore, it was consistently given out that Malaya, and in particular Singapore, was very strongly fortified and defended, and any news stories to the contrary
were strictly suppressed." This propaganda did not fool the Japanese, the observer noted, "but did deceive the publics of friendly powers."107

Upon hearing that the Japanese were making amphibious landings in Malaya, Admiral Tom Phillips put to sea from Singapore on the evening of 8 December with the bulk of the Eastern Fleet's combatants, now codenamed Force Z, hoping to engage the Japanese invasion armada in the Gulf of Siam. On 10 December, caught in the open with no air cover of its own, Force Z was no match for the attacking Japanese aircraft. *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, so recently arrived in Far Eastern waters, were sunk, and Admiral Tom Phillips was lost, along with the ships that were the pride of his fleet.108

In the Far East, the joining of the United States and Great Britain in war against a common enemy, Japan, did not have the unifying effect in either operational or intelligence matters that might have been expected. On 11 December Washington ordered Admiral Hart to recall the four U.S. destroyers that he had sent Admiral Phillips to aid in the defense of Singapore. Their recall was both a "bitter disappointment" to Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, who had succeeded to command of the British Eastern Fleet upon Admiral Phillip's death, and an impediment to future cooperative action.109

In early January 1942 at the "Arcadia" Conference in
Washington, the American and British Chiefs of Staff decided to form the first of what would grow to be a number of Supreme Commands—combined Allied staffs, each charged with management of the war in its own area of responsibility. On 10 January 1942 the ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) combined command came into being in Java under the leadership of British General Sir Archibald Wavell who, when informed of the appointment, reportedly said, "I've heard of [being left] holding the baby— but this is twins!"\textsuperscript{110} The next day the Japanese commenced their attack on the Dutch East Indies.

With the formation of the ABDA Command, Admiral Hart became the senior American officer on the staff, with the title of Commander Combined Naval Forces ABDA Area. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet passed into history, to be replaced by U.S. Naval Forces Southwest Pacific, commanded by Admiral William A. Glassford, who had previously led Task Force 5, the Scouting Force of the Asiatic Fleet.\textsuperscript{111} Hart was removed one month later, a victim, according to his biographer, of Dutch and British political pressure in Washington.\textsuperscript{112} On 15 February 1942 Singapore surrendered to the Japanese, and on 21 February Wavell informed Churchill that "the defence of the ABDA area has broken down" and that "I see little further usefulness for these headquarters."\textsuperscript{113} The command was dissolved four days later.

In this time of confusion Anglo-American intelligence
in the Far East was plagued more by dispersal than by disunity. By 1 February 1942 the British intelligence personnel at Combined Bureau Singapore had been withdrawn. Some went to Java to form the nucleus of the intelligence staff in the ABDA Command. The bulk of the Combined Bureau's cryptographers was relocated to Colombo, Ceylon, leaving the Americans at Station CAST on Corregidor as the chief Allied codebreaking facility remaining in the Far East.

The men of Station CAST were of vital importance to the U.S. Navy and to the war effort, not so much for their current contribution as for their potential. The official history of the Naval Security Group noted, "the fact that these 61 persons [of Station CAST] formed a significant proportion of the small number of experienced COMINT personnel available to the Navy made the possibility of losing them a matter of extreme concern." Should these men be captured and subjected to torture, "the possibility of losing the intelligence advantage gained by seventeen years of study and solution of Japanese codes and ciphers would be real and dangerous."

On 1 February Admiral King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, directed Admiral Hart to evacuate his codebreaking personnel by submarine. The CAST staff was divided into four officer and enlisted teams, each one containing the nucleus of a codebreaking organization: that is, each team
had its share of technical and language officers, cryptographic trained yeomen\textsuperscript{117} and intercept radiomen. The first team was removed by the submarine Seadragon on 4 March, two teams departed on the submarine Permit on 14 March, and the final team — including the Commanding Officer of CAST and the young language officer, Rufus Taylor — left in Seadragon on 6 April 1942.\textsuperscript{118} All the teams eventually found their way to Melbourne, Australia, where, in cooperation with the Royal Australian Navy, they organized the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (FRUMEL), which was to play a significant role in intelligence activities throughout the bulk of the war in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{119}

There was intense competition between the U.S. Army and Navy for places on the few submarines and aircraft able to leave the Philippines. In one case, the passengers on the submarine Seawolf, which departed Corregidor on 27 January 1942, were designated by name — half by Hart and half by MacArthur. Among those selected was a person identified only as "a British intelligence officer."\textsuperscript{120} Unfortunately, it is not known whether this officer came under the Hart or MacArthur quotas.

Following the fall of Singapore, the dissolution of the ABDA Command, and Allied losses at sea (including the British, Australian and American cruisers Exeter, Perth, and Houston respectively), those Royal Navy ships that were able to do so withdrew to Ceylon, there to join a reconstituted
British Eastern Fleet then being formed by Admiral Sir James Somerville. In essence, the Royal Navy disappeared from the Pacific, not to return until April 1945.

Historian James Leutze, in his epitaph for the short-lived ABDA Command said, "Perhaps nothing could have saved it [American and British colonialism in the Far East], but there can be no question that the lack of unified goals, the absence of coordinated plans, and the inability of commanders to subordinate narrow national interests to the common good contributed to the disarray and ultimately to the disaster." The same underlying explanation applies equally well to Anglo-American cooperation in Far Eastern naval intelligence.

It is difficult to determine why Anglo-American naval cooperation flourished in the Atlantic and founder in the Pacific. One reason may have been that intelligence cooperation in the Atlantic was based on a series of Navy-to-Navy agreements between Washington and London, crafted and implemented by skilled, high-ranking liaison officers in both capitals whose major assignment it was to smooth the cooperative path. In the Far East, the Allied fleet commanders, half a world away from Europe and North America, were powerless to conclude all but the most minor agreements
without referral to their respective seats of government. The abortive American, British, Dutch agreements reached in Singapore in 1941, only to be torpedoed later by the War and Navy Departments in Washington, exemplify this problem.

Political stratagems, too, entered in. In Europe, as has been shown, it was in the British national interest to involve neutral America in the war with Germany to the greatest extent possible. One approach to heightening America's awareness of the seriousness of the German menace was for Admiralty to be openhanded in supplying intelligence to the U.S. Navy, with or without a quid pro quo. The same urgency to obtain American support was not as manifest in the Pacific. With London's political problems far away, and time and experience in Asia on its side, the British Combined Bureau Singapore must have seen little reason to cultivate the American naval intelligence. For its part, the U.S. Navy felt it was being asked to pull British imperial chestnuts — if Singapore can be so characterized — out of the fire, and the British saw American reluctance to do so as a Yankee plot against the post-war survival of its Empire.

Progress in breaking Japanese naval codes, key to intelligence success in the Pacific, remained largely unshared between the U.S. Navy's analysts at CAST and those of the Royal Navy at the Far Eastern Combined Bureau. Anglo-American planning for structured intelligence exchange
in Europe was not replicated in the Far East, and Admiralty initiatives to improve the situation met with resistance in Singapore and indifference in Hawaii. Last minute attempts on Washington's part to encourage intelligence sharing before the Japanese attacks were futile.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 6:


6. Ibid., 312.

7. Costello, Pacific War, 27.


11. Tolley, Yangtze Patrol, 89,90.

12. Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia, 675.

13. Costello, Pacific War, 8.


16. For details of U.S. Navy Plans Chief, Captain Royal Ingersoll's inconclusive visit to London, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation.


26. Safford to Director of Naval Communications, memorandum of 27 October 1924, *ibid*.


29. This writer, a latter-day, U.S. Navy-trained Japanese linguist remembers painfully that written Japanese employs, in addition to Chinese characters, two alphabets — Hiragana and Katakana — to convey meaning. Katakana is usually employed to render foreign words into Japanese, perhaps making it more appropriate for Morse code.


32. ONI Administrative History, 709-712.
33. Ibid., 714.
34. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 75.
36. SRH-149; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C., 6.
40. Lewin, American Magic, 44.
41. e.g., The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, vol. 1 of U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941 (Washington: GPO, 1943).
42. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:99 and footnote, 492-493.
43. Ibid., 1:40.
45. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:40.
47. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 4:11.
48. Howard, Strategic Deception, 46.

51. Ibid., 2.


53. Leutze, Different Kind of Victory, 150.


56. Hart Diary, entry for 24 August 1939, quoted in Leutze, Different Kind of Victory, 152.

57. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 53, footnote 12.


61. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy, 263.


   The Observers were directed to inform the British Chiefs of Staff of the American Chiefs' rejection of the
Singapore report. It is unclear why the American Chiefs chose to employ this rather unusual informational channel in preference to the more customary one via the American military and naval attachés in London, or to use the information exchange system newly authorized by the Anglo-American military chiefs in the ABC-1 conversations the previous month.

64. Ibid.


66. Footnotes 46 and 47, Chapter 1, supra.


68. For detailed information on the Bailey Committee and the "Standardization of Arms" discussions, see Chapter II, iv, supra.

69. B.C.J. Fourteenth Meeting, United States Naval Co-operation, Minutes of Meeting held on Wednesday, 16th October (1940). PRO ADM 199/1159.

70. Leutze, Different Kind of Victory, 186.

71. Ibid., 187.


75. Ibid.

76. Lewin, American Magic, 47. Lewin comments in a footnote that "statements made by authorities like Safford and Layton before the Congressional Inquiry into the Pearl Harbor Attack amply confirm the extent of Anglo-American cooperation in this field before December 1941. Fabian
testified that 'we had an established liaison with the British at Singapore' in evidence at the Hewitt Inquiry."

77. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 1:24.

78. Ibid., 1:40.

79. SRH-178, Radio Security Station Marine Detachment, Peiping, China, 1927-1935; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C.

80. Spector, Listening to the Enemy, 9.

81. For details of the visit, see Chapter III of this dissertation.


83. A. Sinkov and Leo Rosen to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, report of 11 April 1941, SRH-145; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C.

84. Lewin, American Magic, 47.

85. Information developed from a telephonic interview with Captain Duane Whitlock USN(Ret), who was assigned to Station CAST at the time of Burnett's visit and remained with the unit until after its evacuation from the Philippines in early 1942.

86. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 49.

87. ALUSNA & SPENAVO LONDON TO OPNAV, message, date-time group 140751 June 1941; folder 7, Secret/Confidential messages, May-June 1941; file 1, ALUSNA & SPENAVO London Messages, September 1938-September 1941; COMNAVEU Series I, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

88. OPNAV to ALUSNA & SPENAVO LONDON, message, date-time group 152120 July 1941; folder 9, Secret/Confidential messages, 4 July-15 July 1941; file 1, COMNAVEU Series I, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

89. ALUSNA & SPENAVO LONDON to OPNAV, message, date-time group 051443 August 1941; folder 11, Secret/Confidential messages, 29 July-17 August 1941; file 1, COMNAVEU Series I, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

91. Ibid., 113.

92. CNO (Stark) to CINCAF (Hart), message, date-time group 012358, 2 December 1941; Navy Department, Strategic Plans Division Records; folder, "WPL-46, letters and dispatches, 12/40-12/41;" Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.


95. MacArthur to Brink, message of 30 October 1941, ibid.

96. MacArthur to Brink, message of 18 November 1941, ibid.


98. Ibid., 196.

99. Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, 156.

100. Costello, Pacific War, 115.


102. Leutze, Different Kind of Victory, 225.


104. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, 272.


106. Ibid., 174.


108. The last battle of Force Z is well described in Gray, Operation Pacific, Chapter 3.


111. Secretary of the Navy to All Ships and Stations,, 4 February 1942, COMINCH (Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet) War Diary, 7 December 1941 – 31 December 1942, file 1, box 1, World War II Diaries, Operational Archives, NHC, Washington, D.C.

112. Leutze, *Different Kind of Victory*, 275,76.


114. "ABDACOM," An Official Account of Events in the Southwest Pacific Command, January – February 1942. Section III; paragraph 12, Organization of Staff; (g) Intelligence Branch; PSF 1, Roosevelt Library.


117. In the U.S. Navy of 1942 men (since there were no women in the Navy at that time) serving in the Yeoman rate specialized in administrative and personnel matters and staffed ship's offices. In today's Navy, persons performing duties similar to those of the Yeomen at CAST would probably be designated Communications Technicians.


120. Blair, *Silent Victory*, 1:150. One tantalizing supposition is that the mysterious officer might have been Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, reputedly the British Secret Intelligence Service representative in Manila and the pipeline for British COMINT from Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore to reach MacArthur. For information on Wilkinson, see Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment* (New York: Crown, 1992), 112, 119, 141.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PACIFIC – VICTORY WITHOUT COOPERATION: 1942-1945

"I do not need Paul Revere (with three lanterns) to tell me that the British are coming," Pacific Theater commander Chester W. Nimitz wryly informed the Navy Department in December 1944. "The attached paraphrase of six Top Secret dispatches reads like an operation order for an occupation force. Perhaps it is intended to be an occupation force." Thus did the U.S. Navy welcome the idea of the Royal Navy's return to the Pacific and to the war at sea with Japan.

Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation, which had enjoyed a spurt in growth immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, entered a period of decline that started with the departure of the British fleet from the Pacific in 1942 and ended only with its return in 1945. In the interim, hardening American attitudes, especially that of Admiral Ernest King, leader of the U.S. Navy, toward Royal Navy participation in the largely American Pacific
war, impeded intelligence cooperation — as did internecine warfare between Hawaii and Washington for primacy in Pacific intelligence analysis.

As one British naval historian observed, "After the destruction of Force Z [whose two capital ships the battleship, *HMS Prince of Wales*, and the battle cruiser, *HMS Repulse*, were both sunk off the coast of Malaya in December 1941] it was more than three years before major British units again operated east of Singapore. By that time, a whole war had gone by."

The Pacific war that the Royal Navy missed was largely American and predominantly naval. Following the 25 February 1942 demise of *ABDACOM*, the American, British, Dutch and Australian command in Java, the American and British Combined Chiefs of Staff — with the blessing of Churchill and Roosevelt — agreed to parcel out the war into three strategic areas. The Pacific was to be the primary concern of the United States. The Middle East, India, and parts of Africa and Southeast Asia were to be regions of primary British concern. Western Europe, the third major strategic area, was to be treated as a matter of common Anglo-American concern. Only the Russian front and China were excluded. In March 1942 the United States agreed to carry out its
responsibilities for strategic direction in the Pacific through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would retain overall responsibility for conduct of military operations in the area.

"Against all common sense," one American historian has commented, and "against the dictates of military doctrine...the Pacific was divided into two theaters." The lion's share of the region went to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who became Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA) under the JCS structure, in addition to his purely naval responsibilities as Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. What remained of the Pacific (which included Australia, large segments of Japanese-occupied territory in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and the Philippines as well as the intervening waters) was designated the Southwest Pacific Area and was to be commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. The U.S. Navy assumed executive agency for the Pacific Ocean Area and the U.S. Army for the Southwest Pacific Area. The lack of an in-theater, single decision-making authority led, according to the U.S. Army's official history of the Pacific war, to "duplication of effort and keen competition for the limited supply of ships, landing craft and airplanes; and it placed on the Joint Chiefs the heavy burden of decision in many matters that could well have been resolved by lesser officials." This division of authority along Service lines led also to the growth of two dissimilar intelligence
organizations to serve the two equally dissimilar Commanders in Chief.

Admiral Nimitz subdivided his territory into three regional commands: the North Pacific Area, centered around the Aleutian island chain; the Central Pacific Area, which included Hawaii, the Gilberts and Marshalls, and Japan; and the South Pacific Area, whose waters extended from the equator southward and whose western boundary abutted that of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command. Nimitz and his staff in Hawaii retained direct control of operations in the North and Central Pacific Areas but created a subordinate organization, Commander South Pacific Area (COMSOPAC), to direct all naval and military activities in that region.

The first COMSOPAC, Admiral Robert W. Ghormley, had been transferred from London to the Pacific in early 1942 when the ex-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, became Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. Ghormley's tenure as COMSOPAC was short lived. In an unexpected and rapid move that surprised even his Chief of Staff, Nimitz replaced Ghormley with Admiral William F. ("Bull") Halsey on 18 October 1942. Halsey, who was on his way to the South Pacific to take over a carrier task force, received dispatch orders cancelling his expected assignment and directing him to relieve Ghormley as COMSOPAC. Admiral Ghormley, who had performed with success in a variety of planning and staff positions, apparently was not up to the
rigors of wartime operational command. Entries in the CINCPAC Command Summary, a daily diary of important dispatches and events affecting the Pacific Command Headquarters, indicated that Nimitz had lost confidence in Ghormley's fighting spirit. Concerning the change of South Pacific commanders, Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote Stark in London, "apparently the strain of command was greater than Ghormley could sustain." Knox also wrote the President that Ghormley, "who is, in my [Knox's] judgment a very fine officer but [one] who could not stand only two hours sleep out of twenty-four in the Southwest Pacific."  

MacArthur, too, had a Navy. Briefly commanded by Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary, USN, and subsequently by Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender, USN, Commander Allied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific was a small force composed of what remained of the former U.S. Asiatic Fleet – mostly submarines – and units of the Royal Australian Navy, including the cruisers HMAS Australia, Canberra and Hobart. A force of this size was obviously incapable of providing the support required for any major move to retake lost ground in the Southwest Pacific, leaving MacArthur the unappetizing prospect of having to go cap in hand to Nimitz and Halsey for naval forces to transport and protect his troops.

In the spring of 1942 Japanese military leaders agreed to a two-pronged strategy. To strengthen its newly-
established defensive perimeter in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Oceans, Japan would mount an offensive to capture Port Moresby in New Guinea. To gain the decisive victory over the U.S. Pacific Fleet, seen by Admiral Yamamoto as key to defeating the United States, the Imperial Japanese Navy would attack Midway and the Aleutians and force the U.S. Navy to fight.\textsuperscript{10} Japanese attempts to carry out this strategy resulted in the naval battles of the Coral Sea in May and Midway in June 1942, which together marked a turning point in the war against Japan. Japanese territorial expansion was halted, and the United States prepared to go on the offensive.

In both the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, intelligence played a vital role. By April 1942 the Navy codebreakers of station CAST in the Philippines had been successfully evacuated to Australia and had set up shop in Melbourne as FRUMEL — Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne.\textsuperscript{11} Prior to leaving the Philippines, CAST, along with sister units HYPO in Hawaii and NEGAT in Washington, D.C., had been hard at work on the Japanese Navy's operational code. A major breakthrough had been achieved in February 1942, and according to the senior historian at the National Security Agency's Center for Cryptological History, by April Navy codebreakers were reading "virtually all intercepted messages the Japanese Navy sent in this code."\textsuperscript{12}

From the early days of the war in the Pacific,
MacArthur was dependent on Navy codebreakers for the bulk of his communications intelligence support. It was not until late 1943 that U.S. Army cryptographers in Washington and MacArthur's codebreaking unit, The Central Bureau in Melbourne and later in Brisbane, began to read Japanese Army communications with any degree of regularity. The mainline Japanese Army code did not yield until its codebooks were captured in January 1944.13

MacArthur's chief source of non-communications intelligence in 1942 was derived from aerial reconnaissance provided by Allied aircraft operating from Australia and New Guinea. Thanks to the divided command system in the Pacific, at the Battle of the Coral Sea, which took place well within MacArthur's area of responsibility, the fleet fighting the battle was under Nimitz' overall command. The land-based aircraft, upon which the fleet would have to depend for long-range reconnaissance, were controlled by MacArthur, a situation fraught with opportunities for misunderstanding.14

Through a combination of aerial reconnaissance and intercepts of Japanese communications, Nimitz and MacArthur knew where the Port Moresby invasion force was and when it entered the Coral Sea. During the battle itself, radio intercept detachments that had been placed aboard their flagship prior to leaving Hawaii provided the American Task Force commanders with tactical intelligence support.15
Although useful, this tactical or "combat" intelligence support proved of considerably less value than would be the case later in the war. This lessened utility was in part a result of the fragmentary nature of the tactical messages intercepted. Also tactical intelligence support mandated a close rapport between the provider, often a very junior officer, and the recipient, usually a senior admiral. Faith in both the provider and in his intelligence product was sometimes slow in developing.16 When Admiral King indicated his concern over a lack of aggressive tactics by the American on-the-scene commander, Admiral Nimitz responded that this perception "can be charged partly to the lack of sufficiently reliable combat intelligence on which to base operations" and exonerated his tactical commander, Admiral Fletcher, from blame.17

The Battle of the Coral Sea consisted of a series of carrier-based aircraft attacks in which the Japanese lost one light carrier and had two large carriers put out of commission at least temporarily from a combination of battle damage and loss of aircraft and flight crews. The U.S. Navy lost several ships, including the carrier Lexington, and had another carrier, the Yorktown, damaged. During the course of the battle, Nimitz, in Hawaii, found himself in the unique situation of receiving reports of damage to his own forces faster through intercept of Japanese communications than from American reporting.18
Samuel Eliot Morison has termed the Battle of the Coral Sea "a tactical victory for the Japanese, but a strategic victory for the United States." While the Japanese inflicted the greater damage, the invasion of Port Moresby was thwarted, and the two Japanese aircraft carriers that took part could not be made ready in time to participate in the battle of Midway.

For the first time in the Pacific War, intelligence had been able to give adequate warning of enemy plans. According to the author of the Imperial Japanese Navy's post-war battle history, "if the Japanese had any great disadvantage...it was the relative inferiority of their intelligence about the size and numbers of U.S. and Australian ships in the area." This disparity in intelligence would continue and would grow wider as the Pacific War progressed.

If the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was the greatest intelligence failure of the Pacific War, Midway was its greatest intelligence success. On 4 May 1942, just as the Battle of the Coral Sea was about to begin, Commander Joseph Rochefort and his band of codebreakers in Hawaii began to receive hints in intercepted communications that another major Japanese naval operation was in the offing and that it might be aimed at a location in the Central Pacific. By 8 May analysts in Hawaii were beginning to describe the Japanese units involved as the "Midway Strike Force." The
invasion date was first projected to be around the end of May, but as evidence in Japanese communications grew, Rochefort became more precise and on 27 May estimated that the attack on the Aleutians would begin on 3 June and on Midway on the 4th.\textsuperscript{22} On 3 June Japanese carrier aircraft bombed Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and on the following day the battle of Midway commenced.\textsuperscript{23}

Although Nimitz and his intelligence officer, Edwin T. Layton, had accepted Rochefort's analysis that Midway was to be the Japanese target, others in Hawaii and Washington were not convinced. Key to the problem was correct identification of the location designated as "AF" in Japanese communications. With Nimitz' approval Rochefort concocted a fake administrative message, which was sent from Midway to Pearl Harbor in plain language (\textit{i.e.}, uncoded), indicating that Midway's distilling plant had broken down and the island was running short of fresh water. In the words of W.J. Holmes, Rochefort's assistant, "The Japanese took the bait like hungry barracuda. The next day Wake Island Radio intelligence (Japanese) reported that AF was short of water because of a distilling-plant breakdown."\textsuperscript{24} AF was clearly Midway.

Samuel Eliot Morison described Midway as "a victory of intelligence."\textsuperscript{25} Japanese survivors agreed, but commented that, "viewed from the Japanese side this success of the enemy's intelligence translates itself into failure on our
own part.... Had the secret of our intent to invade Midway been concealed with the same thoroughness as the plan to attack Pearl Harbor, the outcome of this battle might well have been different."  

Historians and participants on both sides have characterized the battle of Midway as the "decisive" battle, the "turning point" in the Pacific War, and a "devastating defeat for Japan." However, both sides paid dearly for the American victory. Postwar examination of wartime estimates indicated that Japanese losses were not as severe as had been thought but were still great. The Japanese Navy had four carriers and one cruiser sunk and another wrecked, and a large number of planes and experienced pilots lost. The United States lost one carrier, the Yorktown, and one destroyer, as well as 147 aircraft. However, the long range significance of Midway was not in ships and aircraft lost. It lay in the frustration of Admiral Yamamoto's plans for a quick and decisive victory over the U.S. Navy. "At Midway the United States laid aside the shield and picked up the sword, and through all the engagements to follow, never again yielded the strategic offensive."  

While the United States was assuming primary responsibility for the war in the Pacific, Anglo-American
naval intelligence cooperation in the Pacific Theater was deteriorating. Intelligence cooperation among the Allied forces in the Far East had gotten off to a quick start after the Japanese attacks in Hawaii and in Asia. Then, at least in the case of the United States and Great Britain, cooperation slowly faded. Despite constant, quiet pressure by Admiralty representatives in Washington and London, there was little improvement in the flow of U.S. Navy intelligence to Admiral Somerville's British Eastern Fleet until early 1945 when the Royal Navy began preparations to reenter the Pacific.

There were several reasons for this lessening of naval intelligence cooperation. Once the British Eastern Fleet had withdrawn to the Indian Ocean in March 1942, its need for detailed operational intelligence on Japanese naval activity in the Pacific became much harder to justify. More or less concurrently with the British fleet's departure from the Pacific war, Admiral King, who was not overly fond either of the British or of intelligence liaison with their forces, became Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Finally, in March 1942, shortly before the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, a power struggle began to develop between the Navy in Washington and in Hawaii for primacy in analysis of naval intelligence on the Pacific. This struggle was waged on two fronts: one, to determine which organization—the Office of Naval
Intelligence or the Director of Naval Communications - would control the codebreakers; the other, to establish whether Pearl Harbor or Washington would be recognized as the authority on naval intelligence in the Pacific. This intramural warfare was to affect both the amount of Pacific intelligence provided the British, as well as the choice of who would do the providing.

Intelligence sharing with newfound Allies started quickly following Pearl Harbor. The war in the Pacific was less than two months old when the intelligence officer for the New Zealand Naval Board, the controlling organization for the New Zealand Navy, arrived at Admiral Nimitz' headquarters in Hawaii to discuss intelligence cooperation. By the end of January 1942, both Australia and New Zealand were providing the U.S. Pacific Fleet intelligence on Japanese activities. Similarly, Combat Intelligence Bulletin #1, produced by Rochefort's codebreaking team on 16 January 1942, was sent "To the Britishers in Another [cryptographic] System," according to its distribution list. Shortly thereafter, the British Eastern Fleet; the Chief of the Naval Staff, Melbourne; and the New Zealand Naval Board appeared in the Bulletin's distribution list as individual recipients. Intelligence sharing was not limited to the top command levels alone. On 20 January 1942 Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet authorized exchange of "information considered essential for others to know" between commands.
"of approximately equivalent echelons operating in adjacent areas." Now Navy Task Force commanders in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas could exchange information directly with each other and with their counterparts in the Australian and New Zealand navies without routing everything through their respective national military and naval headquarters. The Navy Department followed this general permission with specific direction on 11 February to include COMANZAC [Commander Australia New Zealand Area Command] "for all intelligence concerning enemy."

Even before 7 December 1941 Admiralty had an officer assigned to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. On 8 January 1942 the First Sea Lord sent the Prime Minister a report on the damage at Pearl Harbor "from our Liaison Officer to the U.S. Pacific Fleet, who was in [USS] Pennsylvania (BB-38) at the time of the attack...." When he had finished the report, Churchill made a marginal note that "no one should be told who does not know [the details] already. What a holocaust!" When Admiral Sir James Somerville became Commander in Chief of the Eastern Fleet in February 1942 he immediately asked Admiralty to approach the U.S. Navy for assignment of a liaison officer to his staff. The request was apparently granted since a later note in the First Sea Lord's files discussed details of the American officer's passage to the Far East.

Roughly coincident to 26 March 1942, when Admiral King
became Chief of Naval Operations, intelligence liaison with the British in the Far East became more restrictive. Sharing of information also began to suffer. In early April COMINCH directed the U.S. Naval Observer in Colombo to inform Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, former British Commander in Chief, China, and now Commander in Chief, Ceylon, that the scope of information exchange envisaged by him was "unnecessary and undesirable" because the "Indian Ocean and Pacific Theaters are entirely separate strategic entities."³⁶

The British were not slow to take umbrage. The next month the U.S. Naval Observer, Colombo, informed the American Director of Naval Intelligence that "on two occasions when I wanted to send some dope on the [British] fleet," local naval authorities indicated that if the U.S. Navy Department required the information, "it should be released by the Admiralty through B.A.D.[British Admiralty Delegation] Washington."³⁷

Admiral Somerville visited Washington in mid-1943, in his capacity as Commander in Chief British Eastern Fleet. At that time he indicated to Admiral King the "desirability" of an American naval liaison officer being assigned to the intelligence organization of the Eastern Fleet as well as British naval intelligence officers to the staffs of CINCPAC and COMSOWESTPAC [Commander Southwestern Pacific - MacArthur's Navy]. Admiralty concurred, and went so far as
to nominate one of its most experienced intelligence
officers, Captain D.N.C. Tufnell, former British Naval
Attaché to Japan, 1939-1941, and currently head of the
Eastern Fleet's Intelligence Staff, for the CINCPAC
position.38 In response to Somerville's overtures, King
commented that, "inasmuch as the results of intelligence are
furnished in finished form for digest by operations
officers, the assignment of additional officers as
intelligence liaison officers does not seem warranted."39

In those rare cases in which Admiral King was agreeable
to the assignment of British liaison officers, there were
strings attached. Lord Louis Mountbatten, at the time head
of the British Commando organization, approached King in
August 1943 with a proposal to send liaison officers to both
the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Amphibious Forces. King
agreed to the assignments, but with the proviso, "it is
understood, of course, that these officers, acting in their
capacity as Liaison Officers, will function only as
'observers.'"40 No "Brit." was going to tell the U.S. Navy
what to do, or how to do it.

British authorities continued to be concerned by the
delays in receiving what little naval intelligence they did
get from the Pacific. According to Samuel Eliot Morison,
when Nimitz asked the British to lend one of their three
carriers then in the Indian Ocean to assist in defending
Midway, "he received the discouraging reply on 19 May that
none could be spared," and that British intelligence indicated no threat to the Aleutians or the Hawaiian Islands.41 British naval historian Stephen Roskill, in defending the refusal, stated that "it was clear from Admiralty's records that neither the nature nor the quality of the American Navy's intelligence regarding Japanese movements reached London until the 19th or 20th May." Roskill blamed any "misunderstanding" that might have occurred, "partly on American slowness in giving the Admiralty the full intelligence of which they were possessed by the middle of May."42 The official Australian naval history supported the British position by adding that "records disclose no inkling" of Rochefort's early May analysis of Japanese intentions as ever "having reached Australia."43

Throughout all of 1942 the feeling persisted among British leaders in both London and Washington that "we are not obtaining all we should from the Pacific."44 When British Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral John Godfrey, visited Washington in October 1942, as much of his time was consumed in addressing the problem of information flow from the Pacific as was devoted to intelligence collaboration, the stated reason for the trip. Fortuitously, at the same time as Godfrey's trip, the American naval liaison officer to Admiral Somerville was in Washington on much the same mission — to increase the amount
of U.S. Navy operational and intelligence information passing from the Pacific to the Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet. Godfrey reported that as a result of their combined efforts "machinery had been planned which should ensure a much better flow of information...," but he was realist enough to add the caveat, "time will tell how the machinery works in practice...."45

The battle between the codebreakers in Hawaii and Washington for leadership in Pacific intelligence analysis had the effect, intended or not, of reducing or at least delaying the provision of intelligence to the British. As Washington moved to limit distribution of Hawaii-produced intelligence to the Pacific Command area, Royal Navy subscribers elsewhere, such as the British Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, were forced to depend on intelligence from the Pacific that had been filtered through Washington and London, with a concomitant loss in timeliness and therefore usefulness. As Lord Curzon, fighting for increased funds for the Government Code and Cypher School in the 1920s, put it, "the practical use to which the information can be put is proportionate to the rapidity with which it can be made available. The minimizing of delay is a matter of supreme importance."46

The struggle between Washington and Hawaii arose because, as Admiral Nimitz' intelligence officer Edwin Layton emphasized often after the war, radio intelligence
was not an exact science. Layton has indicated in his memoirs, "And I Was There", that in examining the intelligence available before the battles of both the Coral Sea and Midway the analysts in Washington reached erroneous conclusions, while those of the Pacific Fleet analysts were correct. Samuel Eliot Morison referred obliquely to the differing points of view prior to the Midway battle, when he wrote that "certain important officers, both in Honolulu and in Washington, believed that all these indications were an elaborate hoax of the Japanese to cover another raid on Pearl Harbor or even on the West Coast. Admiral Nimitz made the first vital decision of the campaign in accepting the estimate of his fleet intelligence officer...." In both cases Washington was forced to issue hasty revisions to its original estimates as evidence mounted that it had guessed wrong.

No matter how diplomatically handled, being right when your boss is wrong — especially if your boss is the Chief of Naval Operations — is bound to draw a reaction. In mid-March 1943 a staff officer in the Department of Naval Communications in Washington recommended to his superiors that the CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletin not be sent to the British, Australians, or New Zealanders. He suggested instead that the Bulletin be prepared in the Navy Department, "because COMINCH [Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet] would want to pass on what was being sent to these [foreign]
addressees" and that the Navy Department's Bulletin be given only to Admiralty, "and they take care of their own people." 49

After a series of messages between Washington, Hawaii, and London, COMINCH determined that his organization would control distribution of the CINCPAC Bulletin. Nimitz' intelligence staff was permitted to send the Bulletin only to those U.S. Navy subscribers within his command area. OP-20-G, the codebreakers in the Department of Naval Communications, not the Office of Naval Intelligence, would pass the Bulletin to their counterparts at Bletchley Park for further transmission to Admiralty and to the CinC Eastern Fleet. The U.S. Navy's Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, would provide the Bulletin to the Australian and New Zealand Naval Boards. 50

While the change in who controlled the Bulletin's distribution was a clear-cut political victory for Washington over Pearl, it was, on a more subtle plane, a defeat for Naval intelligence, because distribution of information derived from intercepted communications was now vested in the Communications as opposed to the Intelligence Directorates of the Navy Department. Once again, ONI's stature was diminished in eyes of the Anglo-American intelligence community as a whole.

There the matter of distribution of the Bulletin rested until 8 July 1944, when COMINCH notified the British that
publication of the CINCPAC Bulletin was to be discontinued immediately. A similar message sent to Pacific Fleet Commands stated that "as the strategic or tactical situation develops CINCPAC will address bulletins to appropriate commands." In effect, this move cut the Australians and New Zealanders as well as the British off from formal, automatic distribution of U.S. Navy intelligence originated by Commander in Chief Pacific. Considering the close working relationships that had been established between the U.S. Navy codebreakers in Melbourne and their colleagues from Australia and New Zealand working in MacArthur's Combined Operational Intelligence Center, it is highly probable that an informal exchange of information continued.

The cooperative door was closed even further on 2 August, when Washington directed Hawaii to limit information passed to the British on communications channels specifically designed for transmission of Radio Intelligence, "to that which has a bearing upon areas in which the British have strategic responsibility." It will be remembered that the United States had sole strategic responsibility for the Pacific, and the British for the Middle East, Africa, and India.

Thus did the U.S. Navy gradually but inexorably cut off Admiralty and the British Eastern Fleet from direct intelligence support by U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. The situation would start to improve in late 1944 as the
Royal Navy made plans to return once again to the Pacific but would never reach the high plateau of shared intelligence achieved by the two navies during the Battle of the Atlantic.

As Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, marked a turning point in the war in the West, so did the Battle of Midway in the Pacific. Henceforth, slowly at first but with increasing momentum, American and Allied forces in the South and Southwest Pacific would go on the offensive, carrying the battle to Japan, island by island. As was the case in North Africa, the switch from defense to offense called for a change in sources and types of intelligence to meet the needs of the advancing forces.

In the Pacific, naval warfare was itself undergoing dramatic change. The Battle of the Coral Sea, as Samuel Eliot Morison had pointed out, "will be ever memorable as the first purely carrier-against-carrier naval battle in which all losses were inflicted by air action and no ship on either side sighted a surface enemy." Newly developed techniques of replenishment at sea gave Nimitz' fleets the ability to range over vast areas of the Pacific without having to return home to refuel or reprovision. Amphibious warfare, while not new, certainly reached new levels of
success in developing doctrine that permitted air, land, and sea power to operate as a balanced team. The fast carrier task force came into its own as the cornerstone of amphibious warfare, providing both aerial protection and direct support for amphibious operations.

The United States Marine Corps, whose troops would spearhead so many of the amphibious assaults to come, recognized early in the war that the evolution of amphibious warfare demanded changes in the traditional methods of intelligence support. In March 1942 the Commandant of the Marine Corps recommended that the Navy Department establish a series of Advanced Intelligence Centers in various parts of the Pacific to support future offensive operations. The Chief of Naval Operations agreed and asked the Commandant to develop a plan for such centers. The resulting study was then sent to Commander in Chief Pacific for his comments.

At the time that the Marines raised the question of Advanced Intelligence Centers, Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii had the U.S. Navy's only functioning intelligence organization in the Pacific. It had received some unexpected personnel augmentations in the form of officer linguists when the overseas Japanese language program ended in November 1941 and of enlisted band members from the crew of the battleship, USS California, who had become "technologically unemployed" when their ship was sunk at Pearl Harbor with
all their instruments aboard. However, the intelligence unit remained entirely too small to support operations of the size contemplated to fight the Pacific war.  

The Pacific Fleet intelligence organization consisted of Rochefort's codebreakers, who worked directly for Admiral Nimitz but were controlled administratively by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at Pearl Harbor, a small unit called Combat Intelligence that provided reference support to the codebreaking team and served as liaison between the team and the Pacific Fleet staff, and Nimitz' tiny headquarters intelligence division, led by Commander Edwin T. Layton and charged with keeping the Commander in Chief Pacific and certain of his key subordinate commanders informed of current operational intelligence, drawn principally from radio intercepts.  

With the inadequacies of his own intelligence organization clearly in mind, Admiral Nimitz informed Washington that, while he agreed in principle with the concept of intelligence centers scattered around the Pacific, his own needs would have to come first. "In view of the nature of the war in the Pacific, it is essential that combat and other intelligence be made constantly available to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, in a form which will permit its ready use for his own purposes and for his dissemination to proper commanders in time for effective action." To meet his needs, Nimitz proposed
The immediate establishment of a Joint Intelligence Center at Pearl Harbor, with follow-on centers at Dutch Harbor for the North Pacific Area, and at Auckland and Melbourne for the South and Southwest Pacific areas respectively. Admiral King agreed, and ordered the Director of Naval intelligence to get on with the task.  

The Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, was officially established in June 1942 and began to function as a unit some two months later. Its structure was to provide a pattern for the ensuing Advanced Centers elsewhere in the Pacific. In its basic form the center consisted of an intelligence situation plot, which displayed all known or suspected locations of enemy forces, and major sections dealing with Radio Intelligence, Air Intelligence, and Photo Interpretation. The center also contained counterintelligence and security sections as well as units specialized in exploitation of prisoner of war interrogation reports and of captured enemy equipment.

When Admiral Nimitz' headquarters staff became truly "joint" in September 1943, with the addition of Army and Marine officers in all major divisions, its intelligence support structure also evolved. On 7 September the Intelligence Center was reconstituted as the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) under the command of an Army officer who was also the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence on the Pacific Joint Staff.
Layton continued as Fleet Intelligence Officer on Nimitz' purely naval staff. Thus, there were two separate but closely-tied staffs to fulfill the Commander in Chief Pacific's dual responsibilities as theater commander under the JCS and as a naval commander under the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

It was a complicated intelligence structure, but it worked. When an operation was approved by the JCS in Washington and passed to CINCPAC for planning, the Joint Intelligence Center would begin preparation of an "Intelligence Book" that listed information either on hand or needed to carry out the operation successfully. The Center then began compilation of the required data, tasking its subordinate commands and the Office of Naval Intelligence to provide pertinent information. When the headquarters staff was in agreement as to the major aspects of the operation, the plan and its "Intelligence Book" were passed down the line to the operational commander for detailed planning and implementation. Because of time pressures, overall and detailed planning often took place simultaneously at different command levels.66

While there was no question that Nimitz needed comprehensive intelligence support in Hawaii to fulfil his overall responsibilities, the need for operational intelligence was as pressing in the South and Southwest Pacific areas as it was in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Halsey's
South Pacific Force, redesignated Third Fleet in March 1943, received its intercepted communications intelligence initially from a small Fleet Radio Unit at Auckland, New Zealand, which was in operation by late June 1942. Later this unit moved to Melbourne, Australia, where it was collocated with Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne (FRUMEL).  

At the same time that the South Pacific Force became Third Fleet, MacArthur's Southwest Pacific naval force became Seventh Fleet. In the early days, FRUMEL was MacArthur's chief source of naval intelligence support and, as has been pointed out previously, his major source of all types of information derived from intercepted Japanese communications. FRUMEL was itself a "combined" intelligence unit with Royal Navy, Australian, and New Zealand naval personnel in addition to those from the United States assigned to it. Through a series of British and American liaison officers, FRUMEL kept in touch with British codebreaking activities in Ceylon and, indirectly, with Bletchley Park. In addition to its direct access to MacArthur, FRUMEL maintained close liaison with his cryptographic unit, the Combined Bureau, that was concentrating on Japanese Army codes.

Since FRUMEL was under the direct command of the Navy Department's codebreakers in Washington, it remained outside of the group of intelligence agencies that was under the operational control of MacArthur's headquarters —
situation that caused his intelligence officer considerable distress. In the preface to his history of the G-2 (Intelligence) Section of the Southwest Pacific staff, General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, commented sourly that agencies such as FRUMEL "...were integrated into the general structure of theater intelligence but from their faltering infancy all possessed an incurable trend toward independence." What disturbed Willoughby the most about FRUMEL was that he was not on the very short list of MacArthur's staff officers cleared to see Navy "Magic" communications intercepts. Willoughby's displeasure over FRUMEL and its activities could only have been exacerbated by reported instances of Navy officer-couriers showing the Magic intercepts to MacArthur alone, then ostentatiously burning them in Willoughby's presence.

MacArthur's intelligence organization differed from that of Nimitz in several significant respects. The staff itself was not "combined" in any real sense of Allied participation, nor was it "joint," as was Nimitz's. With the exception of Australian general, Sir Thomas A. Blamey, commander of Allied Land Forces, MacArthur's key staff officers were drawn from the U.S. Army. Most of them, like Willoughby, were members of the "Bataan Gang" that had come with MacArthur from the Philippines. Nimitz's intelligence organization consisted of a small nucleus on the Pacific Fleet staff, with decentralized supporting
agencies, such as the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific and the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area, feeding information into the central headquarters. On MacArthur's staff, the G-2 (Willoughby) "made strenuous efforts to maintain and defend basic staff principles, particularly the absolute centralization of intelligence and the operational control of all GHQ [General Headquarters] intelligence agencies." The only GHQ staff agency producing intelligence to escape Willoughby's control was the Central Bureau, the U.S. Army's codebreaking unit in the Southwest Pacific. Made up of Army personnel who had escaped from the Philippines and supplemented by cryptographers from Washington, the Central Bureau was under the control of MacArthur's chief signal officer, General Spencer B. Akin, one of the few staff officers to have direct access to the Commander in Chief. The Bureau was "combined" in composition and included signals intercept groups from the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force. British Army codebreakers from units evacuated from Singapore were also attached to the Combined Bureau and provided a channel for British intelligence to reach MacArthur."

Despite, or perhaps because of, Willoughby's desire for tight control of intelligence, a structure of Allied intelligence agencies — those of the "incurable trend toward independence" — grew up outside of Willoughby's direct authority. One of these, the Combined Operational
Intelligence Center (COIC), staffed principally by Australian and British personnel, was a particular thorn in Willoughby's side. He saw its output, "a sort of daily situation report," as giving rise to "the suggestion of competition" with his own daily product and thus "proving a constant source of embarrassment." Other Allied agencies, such as the Australian Coast Watchers and the Inter-Allied Services Department, a subversion-sabotage organization in many ways similar to the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, operated under G-2's overall intelligence coordination authority. More directly controlled were agencies such as the Allied Geographical Section, which produced terrain and hydrographic studies of the largely unmapped and uncharted Southwest Pacific area, and the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, which performed valuable services in the fields of enemy document translation and prisoner of war interrogation. All of these Allied intelligence organizations contained Australians and New Zealanders who were in touch with their national intelligence headquarters, which in turn were in regular contact with British intelligence organizations in England, the Indian Ocean, and in India; therefore, U.S. forces in the South and Southwest Pacific had indirect access to British intelligence, even though no purely British intelligence organizations remained in the Pacific.

MacArthur's navy component, Commander Southwest Pacific
Force, drew on all of the Allied and combined intelligence activities in the theater for its support, especially on the Combined Operational Intelligence Center, the Allied Air Intelligence Center, and the Allied Intelligence Bureau, which directed the activities of the coastwatchers. Despite the magnitude of this support, Admiral A. S. Carpender, the force commander in late 1942, felt the need of an advanced intelligence center directly responsive to his needs and requested that Washington provide the required personnel "as soon as they do become available." 76 Admiral Carpender's initiative led to the formation of what was later to be known as the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center (SEFIC).

SEFIC was officially established on 18 May 1944, as a separate command under Seventh Fleet. At that time Captain Arthur McCollum, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, was assigned additional duty as Commanding Officer of the new Center. 77 McCollum was one of the Navy's leading specialists on Japan, having been Assistant Naval Attaché in Tokyo in the 1930s and subsequently head of the Far Eastern Desk in the Office of Naval Intelligence. While with ONI McCollum had been instrumental in developing the concept for the U.S. Navy's Advanced Intelligence Centers, which he patterned after the British Operational Intelligence Centres in London and the Far East. 78 By the time of its constitution as a separate command, SEFIC had become a major producer of tactical, strategic, and technical intelligence
in support of U.S. operations in the Southwest Pacific area.\textsuperscript{39}

In the Northern Pacific Area an Advanced Radio Intelligence Unit consisting of one linguist and three radiomen was established in January 1943.\textsuperscript{40} Although it remained small in comparison to its sister organizations, by November 1943 the unit had grown to the status of an Advanced Intelligence Center and was reporting intelligence to Hawaii and Washington.\textsuperscript{41}

The network of purely American Advanced Intelligence Centers throughout the Pacific notwithstanding, the U.S Navy needed and received assistance from the intelligence organizations of its allies. One of the more successful contributions to Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation in its broader sense was that of the coastwatchers. The Coastwatching Service had been organized by the Royal Australian Navy after World War I and came under the jurisdiction of the Director of Naval Intelligence in Melbourne.\textsuperscript{42} The coastwatchers were volunteers, drawn mainly from the planters and government officials that in the years prior to World War II worked in the Australian and British Protectorates that made up the Solomon Islands chain, located off the Northwest coast of Australia - lands unknown to most Americans in 1941 but soon to become a part of their history: Bougainville, New Georgia and, above all, Guadalcanal.
As the Japanese extended their conquests in early 1942 to include the Dutch East Indies and the Bismarck Archipelago to the northeast of the Solomons, the coastwatchers stayed behind as their code name "Ferdinand" implied, not to fight, but to provide warning of Japanese movements at a time when other methods, such as Australian Radar or reconnaissance aircraft, were either in short supply or non-existent. To afford its members the dubious protection of status as combatants, the coastwatchers were integrated into the Royal Australian Navy in March 1942, where they subsequently performed with great success in the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle for Guadalcanal. Using clandestine radios the coastwatchers sent reports on Japanese defenses as well as troop and aircraft locations to Australian Naval Intelligence who then relayed the information to the U.S. Marines in the South Pacific Force. Immediate warning messages were sent in the clear on radio frequencies that the U.S. Navy could monitor. In return, Allied forces supported the coastwatchers with air drops of food and supplies.

As the war progressed the coastwatchers were integrated into the Allied Intelligence Bureau, under the overall direction of MacArthur's staff, but remained for administration of their activities under the Australian Director of Naval Intelligence, who was responsible for providing information to both Halsey in the South Pacific
Area and to Carpender in the Southwest Pacific Area.\(^{86}\) Willoughby's history of his G-2 organization called the coastwatchers, "by far the best organized and most productive of all intelligence agencies operating in the Southwest Pacific area" and one that "continued to render increasingly spectacular service."\(^{87}\) According to Admiral Halsey, "The coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific."\(^{88}\)

In early 1943 as the U.S. Army and Marines fought land battles to recapture Japanese-held islands, U.S. Army and Navy cryptographers—working separately—made breakthroughs that were to prove of immense significance to the conduct of the war at sea or, more precisely, to the course of the war under the sea in the Pacific. Following Midway, but unrelated to the outcome of the battle, the Japanese Navy changed its main operational code. Recovery of the new code was slow; however, by early 1943 the United States was again reading many of the messages sent in this system. At roughly the same time Navy cryptographers broke what they called the "Maru code"—Maru being a Japanese word often used with the names of merchant ships, transports, and tankers. The Maru code was used by the Japanese to transmit details about their convoys, such as routes and schedules, and its penetration allowed the U.S. Navy's Commander Submarines Pacific to position his boats along a convoy's proposed track, rather than have to play
hide-and-seek throughout the vast Central Pacific area.\textsuperscript{99} In April 1943 U.S. Army cryptographers in Washington and in Australia solved a low-level (relatively less sophisticated) Japanese Army water transport system code used to coordinate the movements of Japanese Army units and, like the Navy Maru Code, to give details of sailing times, destinations and cargos of Japanese ground forces moving by sea in the Southwest Pacific Area.\textsuperscript{90} Knowledge of these movements gave MacArthur's Army forces insight into where the next Japanese military thrusts might be expected and afforded U.S. submarines a unique opportunity to attack the transports and supply ships while en route.

No account of naval intelligence in the Pacific would be complete without mention of possibly the most dramatic use of communications intelligence to have occurred during the war — the death of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. On 13 April 1943 the Admiral's staff administrative officer sent a message to all the commands involved that Yamamoto would inspect his forward naval bases in the southern Bougainville area on 18 April and gave a detailed itinerary for the flight. The message was intercepted and broken by FRUPAC in Hawaii and taken immediately to Admiral Nimitz. Nimitz consulted his intelligence officer, Edwin T. Layton, on the pros and cons of attempting a shoot-down. Nimitz decided that the potential gain from the removal of Japan's foremost naval
officer was worth the risk that the Japanese would learn that the United States had broken their codes and ordered Halsey to attempt the intercept.\footnote{91}

The successful attack was carried out by Army aircraft from Guadalcanal, and the Admiral's death announced in the Japanese press on 21 May.\footnote{92} Although there were widespread rumors in American military circles that the attack was the result of codebreaking activities, apparently the Japanese were not as convinced. Captain Roger Pineau, USNR, Samuel Eliot Morison's assistant, has pointed out that when he interviewed Japanese naval officers in 1949, they were still unsure as to how the United States had found out about Yamamoto's trip.\footnote{93}

Throughout 1943 and 1944 American forces under Nimitz and MacArthur continued to move island by island toward the Japanese homeland, with little but moral support from the Royal Navy. After a bitter battle between Churchill and his military leaders, a British Pacific Fleet was created to fight alongside the U.S. Navy in the final assault on Japan. Its newly-selected commander, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, left Ceylon for Hawaii on 4 December 1944, uncertain of the reception that his news of the Royal Navy's impending return to the Pacific would bring.

Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation during the years 1942-1944 in the Pacific essentially did not exist. The few cooperative activities that did take place
were carried on by surrogates — Australia and New Zealand — either directly through such organizations as the Coastwatchers or indirectly through Royal Navy liaison officers who were receiving information from Admiralty that was subsequently passed to the U.S. Navy. Cooperation on intelligence matters dealing with the Pacific Theater did take place outside of the area: in London and Washington and on the periphery, in the Indian Ocean and Ceylon; but even these efforts declined as the United States gained the upper hand against the Japanese.

In the Pacific the Anglo-American break-down in cooperative intelligence arose more from distance than animosity — although some U.S. Navy suspicion of motives certainly carried over from pre-war differences. As the United States had found out, intelligence cooperation was hard enough to achieve within one's own house. Witness the squabbles for "turf" between the U.S. Army and Navy. Where a third party, not physically active in the war zone was involved, the problems grew in a geometric progression.

As the year 1944 began, it seemed for a time as though the British Pacific Fleet might never be formed, and that the Pacific war might be left entirely in the hands of the United States. In London the Prime Minister and his
military advisors were at odds over strategy, and in Washington Admiral King worked to make sure that the Royal Navy's return to the Pacific would be, if at all, on his terms.

At Sextant, the November 1943 Allied conference in Cairo, it had been agreed that the main thrust against Japan should be made in the Pacific, as opposed to Southeast Asia. The Royal Navy was to implement this strategy by reducing the size of its Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean and, drawing units from the Eastern and Mediterranean Fleets, to make a new force, the British Pacific Fleet. This fleet would be based in Australia and would operate either with MacArthur's forces in the Southwest Pacific or with those of Nimitz in the Central Pacific Area, as the military situation at the time dictated.94

When the Cairo report was submitted, the Prime Minister initialled it, signifying its acceptance. However, when the British Chiefs of Staff followed with their implementing plans the Prime Minister took exception to the whole idea. Churchill wished to see British strategy centered upon the Indian Ocean and on an effort to liberate former outposts of Empire in Southeast Asia, particularly the Malay Peninsula. The Prime Minister was concerned that the Royal Navy would play second fiddle to the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, and there was no assurance, he felt, that the United States would welcome the British back.95
British misgivings about the Royal Navy's potential reception had been fueled by a March 1944 letter from President Roosevelt to the Prime Minister which stated in part that "there will be no specific operation in the Pacific during 1944 that would be adversely affected by the absence of a British Fleet detachment"96 — hardly a pressing request for help! In addition, Admiral King's objection to combined operations with the Royal Navy in Pacific waters gave rise to additional concerns.

The degree of King's personal animosity to the British has for years been a topic of debate by naval historians on both sides of the Atlantic; however, in the case of the British Pacific Fleet, there were sound operational considerations for his uncompromising attitude. King's objections were echoed by the Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer to the British Eastern Fleet who, in November 1944, would inform Nimitz that "the British Fleet is not sufficiently trained to keep up with the standard of performance maintained in our own fleet, either in combat operations or in refuelling at sea." The Liaison Officer concluded that "the obvious solution, as Admiral King has already stated, is to assign them [the British] a specific objective where they can operate more or less independently of our principal naval force."97

Since the Royal Navy's supply system had been built around a string of naval bases, once scattered throughout
the world, which were now non-existent, King was also concerned about Admiralty's ability to provide logistic support to a major fleet far away from home waters. In a more personal vein, King saw the British return as an "intrusion" and objected to having a fleet arrive at the end of the fight to share in the victory.\(^8^{9}\) The British were keenly aware of King's misgivings but saw them as arising more from political than operational considerations. "I have a feeling," wrote the head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington to the First Sea Lord, "that King does not want to see too powerful a British Fleet in being when peace eventually comes."\(^9^{9}\)

Admiralty's reasons for wishing to return to the Pacific were as strong as King's objections. First there was the matter of pride. The British Naval Staff History of the War with Japan put it that "no opportunity must be given for critics to say that England, having taken all she could from America to help her to beat Hitler, stood out of the war against Japan and left the U.S.A. to fight alone."\(^1^{0^{0}}\) The British felt it of critical importance that their fleet join Nimitz' forces in the main move against Japan rather than allow it to be relegated to a sideshow in the Southwest Pacific under MacArthur. Admiral Fraser realized that the Royal Navy must learn to perform in the modern environment of the fast carrier task force or be willing to accept a post-war status as a second-class navy. Operating in a back
area, no matter how well suited the task to British capabilities, would be, Fraser felt, "nothing less than disastrous to our national prestige."\textsuperscript{101}

By the time of the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff had resolved their differences, and all were agreed that the British Pacific Fleet should be formed and that it should play a significant role in the defeat of Japan. During the conference Churchill offered the services of the fleet to Roosevelt, who interrupted him to say, "no sooner offered than accepted."\textsuperscript{102} With or without Admiral King's blessing the Royal Navy was returning to the Pacific.

Although unstated in any official British naval history, a compelling reason for choosing Admiral Bruce Fraser to lead the Royal Navy back into the Pacific must have been his potential for establishing friendly working relations with Nimitz, Halsey, and their staffs. A recent biographical evaluation of the leading British admirals of the Second World War found Fraser to be charming and intelligent, technically aware, with great personal and Staff Officer skills. "It is difficult not to see Fraser as a symbol of all that the Royal Navy had been working towards throughout the war."\textsuperscript{103} A hero at sea (it was he who led the ships that sank the German battlescruiser \textit{Scharnhorst} at the Battle of North Cape), he was self-effacing ashore. When Churchill offered him the post of First Sea Lord, the
highest position in the Royal Navy, Fraser asked him to reconsider and put forward the name of Admiral Andrew Cunningham as one in whom the whole navy had the greatest confidence. Although he found Fraser's attitude "most becoming," Churchill "took him at his word" and selected Cunningham.\textsuperscript{104}

Intelligence impacted upon the December 1944 Fraser-Nimitz discussions in Hawaii both early and indirectly. In late November 1944 Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, who was described has having "been on intelligence duty with the [British] Eastern Fleet," appeared in Hawaii bearing a message from Admiral Fraser that discussed the reasons for his impending visit.\textsuperscript{105} Fabian was U.S. Naval Intelligence's own Will-O-the-Wisp in the Pacific. As a lieutenant, Fabian had been the leader of the CAST codebreakers evacuated from the Philippines to Australia in early 1942. He was subsequently attached to Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne, leaving there for Colombo in January 1944, where he worked with the British cryptographic organization. By then promoted to Commander, Fabian served as Acting Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer to the Royal Navy's East Indies Station in addition to his radio intelligence duties.\textsuperscript{106}

Considering the vocation of his chosen messenger, it seem reasonable that one of the goals of Fraser's Hawaiian visit was to seek ways to improve the near-dormant intelligence cooperation between the two Pacific fleets.
Fraser's party of accompanying staff members included two Royal Navy intelligence officers. They held separate meetings with representatives from Nimitz's intelligence staff and from JICPOA, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area. This intelligence sub-committee was to report the outcome of its discussions to the Third Session of the main group on 20 December 1944.  

Intelligence started flowing promptly. In early January a Royal Navy intelligence officer visited JICPOA to arrange support for the British Pacific Fleet. Distribution lists for current Pacific Fleet intelligence publications were changed to add appropriate British commands, and in addition the British were offered basic intelligence publications, charts, and aerial photographs from the large inventory maintained by JICPOA for issue to U.S. fleet units on their way to the war zone. "We took the British intelligence officer into our stockroom to select what he wanted," the senior U.S. naval officer at JICPAC recalled, "He wanted nearly everything. When it was added up...there were two plane-loads of intelligence material to be transported to Sydney."  

On 15 March 1945 the British Pacific Fleet reported to Admiral Nimitz for duty as Task Force 57 and received U.S. Navy teams to assist in adjusting to American tactical and communications procedures. British access to American intelligence derived from intercepted Japanese
communications had been assured a few days earlier when Admiral King had agreed to provide the needed information. In thanking King for his assistance, Admiral Somerville, former commander of the Eastern Fleet and now head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington, wrote on 8 March that "I am most grateful to you for responding so generously and so promptly to my request to be given Japanese naval intelligence obtained from most secret sources."\(^{110}\)

Provision of intelligence on Japanese aviation had previously been assured in an agreement worked out by the Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington and agreed to by the American Army and Navy chiefs and the British Air Ministry, whereby the exploitation of Japanese aviation-related materials would be done by various American military agencies, including the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the results furnished to Great Britain.\(^{111}\)

Tactical or operational intelligence support was also provided the British Task Force. In preparation for operation "Iceberg," the invasion of Okinawa, Royal Navy units that were to take part were given results of American photographic reconnaissance of the islands, which was, as British naval historian S.W. Roskill has pointed out, the chief source of intelligence available to the invading forces.\(^{112}\)

Despite an increase in the flow of intelligence once the British Pacific Fleet had become a part of Nimitz'
armada, American intelligence support to the British force was less direct, and therefore less timely, than that provided the U.S. Navy. In December 1944, as the war moved closer to the Japanese home islands and farther from Hawaii, Admiral Nimitz chose to move to an advanced headquarters on Guam, taking with him a small intelligence staff to provide operational intelligence to the Central Pacific force. One of the officers chosen to serve in the advanced intelligence unit has recalled that, in general, the Royal Navy provided intelligence directly to its forces through use of its own embarked Radio Intelligence support teams similar to those assigned to U.S. carriers, and that, "from our headquarters on Guam, we were not giving intelligence support directly to the British Pacific Fleet."

Less than nine months after the Royal Navy had reentered the Pacific, and five months after Task Force 57 had taken part in its first major amphibious assault, the invasion of Okinawa, Japan surrendered. Shortly before the war's end, Admiral Nimitz ordered Admiral "Bull" Halsey, Commander Third Fleet, to destroy what remained of the Japanese Navy through aerial attacks. In a deliberately political move, Halsey assigned only minor targets to the British aviators of Task Force 37 (As the British forces operating with Halsey were now designated), and reserved the major naval base at Kure and the port of Kobe for the Americans. "'I hated to admit a political factor into a
military equation,' Halsey recalled. 'My respect for Bert Rawlings [Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, at-sea commander of the British Pacific Fleet] and his fine men made me hate it doubly, but Mick [Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Staff to Admiral Halsey and a post-war Chief of Naval Operations] forced me to recognize that statesmen's objectives sometimes differ widely from combat objectives, and that an exclusively American attack was therefore in American interests.'115

In the formal surrender on the deck of the USS Missouri, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, representing His Majesty's Government, signed in third position following the representatives of the United States and China. Delegates from the Soviet Union, which had been in the war against Japan for less than thirty days, and from the remaining British Commonwealth and Allied nations then signed, completing the ceremony. There is little doubt that signing in third position after China must have rankled the British, but if so they remained silent. British historians of the period have made little mention of the "pecking order" of the signatories, while American historians have generally taken note of it.116

After the surrender, the United States Navy's intelligence organization in the Pacific, built painstakingly during the wartime years, was dismantled with great haste. The first to go – even before hostilities
ended — was Fleet Radio Unit Melbourne (FRUMEL). Field processing of intercepted Japanese communications had dwindled in the final stage of the Pacific war and was supplanted by increased production in Washington and Hawaii. By December 1944, most of the American members of the FRUMEL team had been withdrawn and the station turned over to the Australians.\textsuperscript{117}

The Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center (SEFIC), which had followed MacArthur's advancing forces from Brisbane to Hollandia and finally to Manila, was dissolved shortly after the Japanese surrender.\textsuperscript{118} The advance intelligence unit on Guam moved back to Hawaii in September 1945. Within three months of the war's end, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area, which in its heyday employed over 1,800 persons, had closed its doors.\textsuperscript{119} With the dismantling of the U.S. Naval intelligence organization and the gradual fading away of the British Pacific Fleet, Anglo-American intelligence cooperation in the Pacific returned to its pre-war level of ineffectiveness.

The story of Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation in the Pacific was not inspiring. Cooperation grew more slowly and was less extensive than that in the Atlantic. The measures agreed upon in the months just
before the Japanese attacks were too little and too late to affect the events of 7 and 8 December 1941. Nor could those agreements have been implemented in time to have had much impact on the Anglo-American defeats in early 1942 that forced the Royal Navy's withdrawal from the Pacific.

The departure of the British fleet from Pacific waters in 1942 removed any pressing need for intelligence exchange, and the Royal Navy's return in 1945, recognized by both parties as motivated more by matters of political "face" than by military necessity, blunted any push for increased intelligence cooperation, despite U.S. Navy generosity in supplying intelligence materials to the British Pacific Fleet.

Infighting between U.S. Navy staffs in Washington and Pearl Harbor for preeminence in Pacific intelligence analysis and reporting did its share to hamper Anglo-American intelligence cooperation by delaying or restricting distribution of intelligence to the Royal Navy. Admiral Ernest King's uncompromising attitude toward Royal Navy participation in the Pacific war restricted intelligence as well as other forms of Anglo-American naval cooperation. Filtering of British intelligence through Australian and New Zealand surrogates in combined intelligence organizations in the Southwest Pacific hampered receipt of the information by MacArthur's intelligence staff that was already burdened by the multiplicity of American and Allied intelligence
organizations competing within his area of responsibility.

Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation's lot in the Pacific was not a happy one. Whether closer coordination, undertaken sooner, would have affected either the start or the course of the war with Japan is moot. There was never a good opportunity to find out.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 7:

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43. Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 59.

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57. King to Commandant of the Marine Corps, endorsement dated 31 March 1942, to CMC letter dated 24 March 1942, box 293; RG 80; NA, Washington, D.C.

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64. Enclosure A to Vice Chief of Naval Operations letter, "Establishment of Advanced Intelligence Centers," of 8 September 1942, SRMN-015; RG 457; NA, Washington, D.C., 27.


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68. Footnote 13, supra.


70. Preface to "A Brief History of the G-2 Section GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units," Record Group 23, Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, USA, Reel 924, Library and Archives, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia. Although this is a staff study, with the authors or the editor unnamed, the preface was almost certainly written by Willoughby himself, and is certainly an accurate statement of his views.


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86. Naval Staff History, Campaigns in the Solomons and New Guinea, 33.


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CHAPTER IX

TWILIGHT OF COOPERATION: JANUARY 1944 - MAY 1945

In 1943, General Eisenhower led his armies in the Mediterranean "from victory unto victory:" first North Africa in May, then Sicily in July, followed by successful landings on the Italian mainland and the armistice with the Italian government in September. Nine months had passed since the Allied decision at Casablanca in January to undertake a cross-channel invasion of Europe. In August at Quebec Churchill and Roosevelt accepted the recommendations of their Combined Chiefs of Staff and set "D-Day" for the invasion, now named Operation Overlord, as 1 May 1944. In December 1943 General Eisenhower was chosen to lead the Allied forces in the campaign. The final phase of the war in Europe was about to begin.

Anglo-American naval intelligence faced its most severe test in preparing for the Allied invasion of Normandy. Detailed planning for the seaward aspects of the invasion centered in the intelligence staff of the Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force which, after a period of
adjustment, created a smoothly running organization to tap American and British intelligence resources for the intelligence it required. Navy-to-Navy intelligence sharing became largely a thing of the past, replaced by the corporate system of collection and analysis embodied in the combined staff system. As the end of the European war neared, America and Britain each shared a common suspicion that the other was moving to gain post-war advantage and their war-time cooperation in intelligence as in other fields suffered as a result.

Throughout 1943 in London, an Anglo-American staff had been hard at work planning the myriad of details involved in an undertaking of the magnitude of the cross-channel invasion. To head the planning effort, a British army officer, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, had been selected as COSSAC—Chief of Staff to the as yet unnamed Supreme Allied Commander. Morgan, who had served under Eisenhower as early as October 1942, was well versed in combined operational planning. From his headquarters in England Morgan had been in charge of planning contingency landings in connection with Torch in North Africa, should they have been required. He was then directed to plan the invasion of Sardinia, and when that idea was shelved, the
invasion of Sicily.¹

Admiral Bertram Home Ramsay, RN, was selected to plan and command the naval side of Overlord (or Neptune, as the actual assault phase was codenamed) with the army and air portions led by General Sir Bernard Montgomery and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Ramsay had been involved in Allied preparations for the invasion of northwest Europe since May 1942, when Admiralty had appointed him "Naval Commander Expeditionary Force" with duties that involved planning of the naval side of the operation and direction of all naval forces involved.² After planning and operational assignments in the Mediterranean, Ramsay returned to London in October 1943 to resume his former post, now titled Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, unpronounceably abbreviated ANCF. In addition to his skills as a planner, Ramsay brought to the assignment a proven ability to work in harmony with Americans and, as his biographer has indicated, "a capacity to learn from experience...a sense of humour; an uncompromising ability to know when to stick to a point and a wholly unflappable approach that commanded the respect of all of those who came within range of his powers."³

The initial Joint Plan for Overlord/Neptune was issued in February 1944 and called for a two-pronged assault on beaches in the Normandy area. United States forces were assigned the Western Area and British forces the Eastern.
Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, was designated commander of the Western Task Force and charged with landing the First U.S. Army on "Utah" and "Omaha" beaches. Rear Admiral Sir Phillip Vian, RN, who, in 1945 would lead the British carrier task force attached to Nimitz's Pacific Fleet into the final battle with the Japanese, was chosen Eastern Task Force commander.

Admiral Kirk, called by Samuel Eliot Morison "the key American Naval figure in Neptune-Overlord," arrived back in London in mid-October 1943 to participate in the planning that led to his new appointment. Kirk's previous tours in England — first as U.S. Naval Attaché and subsequently as Chief of Staff to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Admiral Harold R. Stark — were an excellent preparation for combined planning with the Anglo-American COSSAC staff. In addition, his exposure to naval intelligence matters in his London assignments, as well as his service as Director of Naval Intelligence in 1941, gave him an insight, rare among American flag officers of his time, of the value of intelligence to operations.

Intelligence planning for OVERLORD/NEPTUNE was, as one might expect, done on a greater scale and in more detail than had ever before been attempted. Although it is nowhere specifically stated, there was a de facto division of intelligence responsibility, with Admiral Ramsay's staff (ANCXF) concerned with intelligence required to put the
allied forces successfully ashore in Normandy and the
Supreme Commander's staff concentrating on post-landing
intelligence needs. This division of responsibility was
reflected in the composition of both organizations.
Although both staffs were organized in the joint/combined
form mandated by Eisenhower, the ANCF intelligence staff
was more combined than joint, since most of its personnel
were drawn either from the U.S. or Royal Navy. The same was
essentially true in the case of the Intelligence Division of
the Supreme Commander's Headquarters Staff, where the Allied
Army and Air personnel far outnumbered those of the Navy.

Eisenhower's first choice to head his intelligence
staff, and the person eventually given the task, was British
Major General Kenneth W. D. Strong, who had been
Eisenhower's G-2 at Allied Forces Headquarters in the
Mediterranean. However, until May 1944 another British
former staff officer of Eisenhower's, Major General John
F.M. Whitely, was assigned as G-2. The British War Office
had refused Eisenhower's request for Strong on the grounds
that the London staff assignments were draining too many
experienced senior officers from the Mediterranean Theater.
Strong, however, felt that the War Office refusal was at
least in part based on its concern that Strong had become
"too American" in outlook. After acrimonious discussions
between General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of
Staff, and General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, had failed to resolve the problem, Eisenhower successfully appealed to Churchill for Strong's services.\textsuperscript{7} Strong's Intelligence Division had two prime responsibilities: first, to collect and analyze all types of information on the enemy; and second, to deny the enemy information on Allied invasion planning. The division's organization reflected these two major responsibilities. The Operational Intelligence Sub-Division was headed by Brigadier E. J. Foord, whom Strong called "one of the outstanding British Intelligence officers of the war."\textsuperscript{8} The Counter Intelligence Sub-Division was led by an American, Colonel H.G. Sheen, and the smaller Naval Intelligence Sub-Division by Commander J. Richardson, RN.\textsuperscript{9} Strong's primary deputy was an American, Brigadier General Thomas A. Betts, one of the few key staff members not to have come out of the Mediterranean. Betts was, however, an experienced intelligence staff officer, having served in the G-2 section of the War Department and as the G-2 representative on the American delegations to the major Anglo-American strategic conferences in Washington, Quebec, and Cairo in 1942-43.\textsuperscript{10}

The SHAEF Intelligence Division did not itself collect information directly, nor did it directly task the collectors. Rather it worked through the already established intelligence organizations of its subordinate commanders, giving them general guidance on collection areas of interest as well as providing "spot" requirements of
special urgency or importance.\textsuperscript{11} In addition to information furnished by its subordinates, the Intelligence Division received reports and estimates from the American Office of Strategic Services, from Resistance groups in occupied Europe, from the Political Warfare Executive, and from the Army and Navy Departments in Washington and the British Joint Intelligence Committee in London.\textsuperscript{12} The Intelligence Division provided its subordinate commands intelligence summaries and intelligence annexes to staff reports. It also issued Special Top Secret digests, which gave, among other things, the Intelligence Division's prognosis of what courses of action the enemy might take.\textsuperscript{13}

As early as October 1941 the British Army had recognized the need for a specialized organization to concentrate on intelligence requirements that would arise from any plan to regain Continental Europe. In response to this need the Army formed a section under General Headquarters, Home Forces, to study German defenses on the coast of France. In early 1942 representatives of Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division joined the organization, which was renamed the Combined Intelligence Section (CIS). Since the organization contained no Americans at the time, the word "Combined" in the title was a misnomer under the definitions adopted by the British and American Chiefs of Staff in February 1942; however, the title had been selected before the Anglo-American
definitions were agreed upon.

After COSSAC became SHAEF in early 1944, the Combined Intelligence Section, which had added American personnel and had been renamed the Theater Intelligence Section (TIS), was taken over by the SHAEF Intelligence Division.¹⁴ Since the Theater Intelligence Section was essentially a collector and producer of operational intelligence on German defenses and troop dispositions along the French coast, its amalgamation violated at least in part SHAEF's intelligence charter not to become directly involved in collecting intelligence but to leave that task to the subordinate army, navy, and air commanders.

As more and more special agencies were added, the Headquarters intelligence staff grew from 35 officers (20 British and 15 American) at the end of 1943, to over 160 by May 1944.¹⁵ Included in this 160 was the staff of the Theater Intelligence Section, which had grown to 50, at least 6 of whom were U.S. naval officers employed primarily in photo interpretation.¹⁶ According to an Admiralty representative attached to the Theater Intelligence Section, relations between the Royal Navy members of the Section and their American Navy colleagues were excellent. "We never had one difficulty or dispute with...the U.S. Naval officers [at T.I.S. or on Admiral Ramsay's Staff, ANCXF]," perhaps, the writer commented, because of "very careful and considerable lobbying of the American intelligence officers
over the luncheon table, or over drinks...."\(^{17}\)

While COSSAC/SHAEF directives made it clear that operational intelligence was to be the concern of the individual subordinate commanders, what was not made clear was the relationship between SHAEF and its subordinate commanders and their parent Service Headquarters, such as the British Naval Staff in the case of the Allied Naval Commander. An Admiralty report made shortly after the successful invasion of France in May 1944 indicated that in the early planning stages COSSAC had not made proper use of the Naval Intelligence Directorate's resources. "It is not an exaggeration to say," the report continued, "that the Admiralty had to force their attention on to S.H.A.E.F. to bring about the 100% co-operation required to ensure a successful outcome of such complicated planning."\(^{18}\)

Gradually all the strands of the British Naval intelligence were gathered together in support of Overlord. In November 1943 the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence began holding a series of informal weekly meetings to discuss Neptune/Overlord support. Attending, in addition to members of the Naval Intelligence Directorate's staff, were the head of the Naval Section in the Theater Intelligence Section, SHAEF; The Staff Officer, Intelligence, on the Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force staff; a representative of 30th Assault Unit, the group charged with front-line intelligence collection; and the Royal Navy
member of Intelligence Section (Operations), a sub-
or-organization of the British Joint Intelligence Committee
that served as liaison and point of contact between the
intelligence producers and the joint users.

In February 1944 Naval Intelligence Division support to
invasion planning became more formalized with the formation
of an Overlord Committee, which was composed of essentially
the same organizations as the informal group that had been
meeting since the previous November but with higher ranking
participants. Also in February the Director of Naval
Intelligence upgraded the level of his representation on
Admiral Ramsay's Naval Expeditionary Force staff to the
grade of Captain to fill a newly-established position of
Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence). With the formation
of the Overlord Committee and the assignment of one of their
own to Admiral Ramsay's staff, "we in N.I.D. felt that at
last we were properly welded on to A.N.C.X.F.'s set-up." ¹⁹

Timely provision of communications intelligence to the
planners and later to the operating forces at sea in the
invasion armada and ashore in France became a primary
concern. "To prevent delays detrimental to the conduct of
operations which would result from any attempt to canalise
information through the Supreme HQ," the Combined Chiefs of
Staff instructed London and Washington to send Ultra
information directly to the major headquarters in the field
as well as to the Supreme Allied Commander's staff. ²⁰ The
first message to reach Eisenhower's Headquarters from Bletchley Park without going through one of the Service Ministries was dispatched on 26 January 1944.  

Sending Ultra information directly to field commands was a relatively new concept, requiring new procedures that were first developed by the British and later adopted, with one significant variation, by the United States. Special Liaison Units (SLUs) were attached to major American and British commands to receive Ultra from Bletchley Park and provide it to those who were cleared to see it. In the British system, according to American historian Stephen Ambrose, "the SLUs were only glorified messengers who handed on the complete Ultra intercepts to their superiors." In the case of the American SLUs, "their primary responsibility will be," Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall wrote Eisenhower, "to evaluate Ultra intelligence, present it in usable form to the Commanding officer,[and] assist in fusing Ultra with intelligence derived from other sources...." Professor F.H. Hinsley has indicated that "the system operated without any serious hitch" in providing the necessary communications intelligence support both to the Overlord/Neptune planning staffs and to the forces in France once the invasion was underway.  

By the time of the invasion the American naval staff in London, Admiral Stark's Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, was much less involved in cooperative ventures with
Admiralty — including intelligence cooperation — than it was in the immense task of providing logistic support to U.S. naval forces involved in Neptune/Overlord. The Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington also had little direct input into intelligence planning for Overlord, other than to help provide the trained personnel required to fill the various U.S. Navy billets in the intelligence Staffs of Supreme Allied Headquarters and of its subordinate naval commander, as well as assignments to combined intelligence organizations — such as those providing topographical, aerial reconnaissance, and prisoner of war interrogation support to the Overlord planners.

Overall the Allies won the intelligence battle that was a part of the successful invasion of Europe. Had German intelligence on what was taking place in Great Britain been anywhere near as good as Allied information on German activities in France, Overlord might have had a much different outcome.

"Truth is so precious that it should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies," Churchill told Roosevelt and Stalin as they discussed deception planning for Overlord at their meeting in Teheran in November 1943. Providing this "bodyguard" and its henchman, secrecy, became one of the
main tasks of Anglo-American intelligence in the months before the invasion of France.

As Professor Michael Howard emphasized in his history of Anglo-American strategic deception in World War II, "deception becomes possible only when operational intentions have been determined." Therefore, deception planning for Overlord/Neptune could not get underway until the operational plan for the invasion, including the locations of the beaches to be assaulted, was reasonably firm, roughly in late summer 1943. Planning began in earnest after the Combined Chiefs of Staff made the strategic decision at Teheran and Cairo in November-December 1943 to proceed with Overlord the following May. The resulting deception plan, called by Howard, "perhaps the most complex and successful deception operation in the entire history of war," was first called Bodyguard, in honor of Churchill's famous phrase, then later became known as Operation Fortitude.

In the early days of the war Great Britain had used deception in its various forms against the Axis, with limited success. British Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral John Godfrey, was an early and strong proponent of the use of deception and, among the Service intelligence chiefs, took the lead in organizing the machinery for control of deception operations. During the "phony war" of 1940 Admiralty proposed a scheme to construct dummy destroyers using old coastal steamer hulls, in an attempt to
convince the Germans that the Royal Navy had a larger number of ships to counter the anticipated invasion of Britain than actually existed. When the air Battle of Britain began in earnest later that year, Admiralty considered it prudent not to try to attract German attention to concentrations of warships — even dummy ones — and the scheme was abandoned.\(^{28}\)

The British used deception with greater success against the Italians and later the Germans in the Middle East. With the enthusiastic support of General A.P. Wavell, British Commander in Chief, Middle East, deception's techniques — dummy equipment, false reporting, faked radio traffic, and the like — were all employed by the Long Range Desert Group to harass the Italians in late 1940. "Every commander," wrote Wavell, "should constantly be considering methods of misleading his opponent, of playing on his fears and of disturbing his mental balance."\(^{29}\) It was at Wavell's direction that the 'A' Force, under command of Colonel Dudley Clarke, was established to plan and carry out deceptonal activities to support current operations. An elaborate deception plan, drawn up to conceal British intentions to go on the offensive at El Alamein in October 1942, achieved a remarkable degree of success.\(^{10}\)

The tangled web of deception, particularly when double agents were involved, must be closely controlled to insure that the strands of false information planted by various agents form the desired pattern and are not contradictory.
To maintain their *bona fides*, double agents must feed their enemy handlers some information accurate enough to be verified, and great care must be taken to insure that the true information provided cannot harm one's own side. Getting reluctant civilian and military agencies to provide "good, but not too good" seed information also creates a massive coordination problem. Great Britain attacked the coordination problem in January 1941 by forming a highly informal and unstructured group that called itself the W-Board and that was designed to act quickly in developing situations. Membership consisted of the three Service Directors of Intelligence and representatives of the Security Service (MI-5) and Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6). The Board's Secretary and a member of Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division, Ewen Montagu, has written that the volume of work soon became too great for these busy gentlemen to handle and they created a working group named the Twenty Committee, that was usually known by its Roman numeral XX (or double-cross) designation.\(^31\)

By October 1941 it had become apparent to the British Chiefs of Staff that in addition to the Twenty Committee, which was chiefly concerned with supplying good and bad information for double agent use, a separate body was needed to plan and execute deceptonal operations. For this purpose the London Controlling Section of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was formed with a charter to "prepare
deception plans on a world-wide basis with the object of causing the enemy to waste his military resources." The following August the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized forming a two-man body known as the Joint Security Control to coordinate U.S. deception activities with those of the British. The U.S. Navy member of the Control was Commander George C. Dyer, USN, Admiral King's intelligence officer on the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet staff and not a representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence as might have been expected.

Since a military commander is responsible for all aspects of planning a military operation, the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) staff and its predecessor the COSSAC staff both had sections charged with deception planning for Overlord. Overall responsibility was assigned to a special section in the SHAEF Operations Division and, as planning became more specific, was passed down to the Army and Navy Expeditionary Force commanders for detailed planning, which was done in conjunction with the London Controlling Section, MI-5 and MI-6. On the Naval side, Admiralty and Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe provided the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (ANCXF) commander with a special staff for deception planning that was supported primarily through Admiralty resources.

Charles Cruickshank, who has written extensively on the subject, has defined deception in war as "the art of
misleading the enemy into doing something, or not doing something, so that his strategic or tactical position will be weakened."35 In the case of Overlord there was no real possibility of fooling the Germans into thinking that the main Allied attack would fall anywhere but along the coast of occupied France. The best that could be hoped was that the enemy could be misled about the exact time and place of the assault and about the strength of the Allied forces involved. Fortitude was designed to achieve these ends and did so with remarkable success.

One of Fortitude's primary objectives was to convince the Germans that the main point of attack of the invading Allies would be in the Pas de Calais area, well to the northeast of the Cherbourg Peninsula where the actual landings were to take place. The plan called for an attempt to convince the Germans that the main thrust against the Pas de Calais region would occur only after diversionary attacks in Norway and on the Cherbourg Peninsula to draw German forces away from Calais. Additionally Fortitude was designed to exaggerate U.S. military strength in the United Kingdom so that the Germans would accept the fabrication that the Allies had sufficient reserves to mount a major attack on Calais even after the landings in Cherbourg had taken place, thus forcing the Germans to keep forces in reserve for the battle that would never take place. This deception scenario was helped immeasurably by the German
predisposition, known by the Allies through intercept of
German radio traffic, to believe that the main Allied
invasion would, in fact, take place in the Pas de Calais
area.\textsuperscript{36}

The strategic deception plan was divided into two
parts. \textit{Fortitude North} was concerned with selling the
Germans on the idea of the Norway attack, and \textit{Fortitude
South}, with the Pas de Calais operation. The Anglo-American
intelligence planning staff at Naval Expeditionary Force
Headquarters became active in providing all types of
information and resources to add verisimilitude to
\textit{Fortitude}. Dummy landing ship concentrations were created
at likely embarkation points in the hope they would be
noticed by the sporadic German reconnaissance flights.
Bogus radio traffic, transmitted on U.S. Navy communications
channels, was designed to indicate to an enemy traffic
analyst a larger build-up of naval forces than had actually
taken place. These deceptive radio traffic patterns were
begun long before the actual date of the invasion and served
the additional purpose of masking the real increase in
communications that took place as the invasion became
imminent.\textsuperscript{37} In addition U.S. naval officers took an active
part in preparation of deception plans. During the summer
of 1943 Captain Paul H. Bastedo, USN, who was assigned both
to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe's intelligence staff
and as U.S. Naval Attaché London, was borrowed from COMNAVEU
to assist Royal Navy planners on the staff of Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, who were then working on deception operations Wadham and Cockade, forerunners to the Fortitude deception plan later adopted for Overlord.  

Perhaps the most successful disinformation on Allied invasion planning was provided German intelligence by the double agents who had been co-opted by British intelligence early in the war and who by now had gained the full confidence of their German handlers. Many of these double agents were assisted in their reporting by notional sub-agents that existed only in the fertile minds of the members of the Twenty Committee and the London Controlling Section.  

The U.S. Navy was called upon from time to time to provide a plausible, but fictitious, "source" of the information to be planted. Such was the case with double agent Tate. In the story devised for him, Tate had a notional girl friend Mary who was allegedly on loan from Admiralty to the U.S. Navy mission in London. Through Mary, Tate was to have met both U.S. and Royal Navy officers, who, according to Michael Howard's account of the deception, "displayed deplorable laxity in the custody of classified documents."  

In sum, Howard commented, "naval deception provided a substantial proportion of the traffic of all double agents; and although at the operational level radio, sonic and visual deception assumed the highest importance, that [double agent] traffic was probably the principal
channel used by the Admiralty to deceive the enemy."

The opposite side of the deception coin was secrecy, vital in masking the true plans for the invasion of France. A special system, covernamed *Bigot*, was instituted to provide special protection and highly limited distribution to documents that revealed the time or areas of the invasion. Loose talk was punished summarily and severely. In one instance a general, guilty of talking out of turn in a public restaurant, was removed from his post, sent home and reduced to his permanent rank of colonel by General Eisenhower, his West Point classmate.  

In early March 1944, at Eisenhower's insistence, the British War Cabinet imposed a ban on civilian travel to beaches in the invasion staging areas. Military leaves were suspended and travel to Ireland was halted. Despite protests from the Foreign Office, in April the Cabinet issued a prohibition on foreign diplomatic travel — except U.S. and Soviet — in or out of the United Kingdom and banned foreign diplomatic missions from sending uncensored or coded radio communications and from the use of diplomatic couriers.

Good security and deception planning paid off. In his report on the results of Operation Neptune, Admiral Bertram H. Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, stated without qualification that both the deception and security plans had met their goals. "The cover plan achieved complete success," Ramsay said, and added later that
"complete tactical surprise was achieved by the assaults.... Major breaches of security before D day were rare, were promptly dealt with, and certainly did not reach the enemy."43

As with other forms of intelligence cooperation in Overlord, deception and security planning were highly structured within the combined staff organization. Overall intelligence policy was set by the Supreme Commander's staff then passed down to the component Army, Navy, and Air commanders for specific planning. It was the responsibility of SHAEF's Theater Intelligence Section to collect, analyze, and produce intelligence of inter-service interest such as coastal defenses. Officers skilled in naval intelligence were assigned at all staff levels to formulate requirements and to process and disseminate the intelligence required by both the American and British naval task forces. ONI in Washington was tasked to provide recognition material for ships and aircraft and summaries of naval intelligence from non-Anglo-American sources. Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Directorate furnished information on enemy mining, ship dispositions, and landing beach charts and mosaics. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe provided special studies as requested on topics such as enemy capabilities in chemical warfare.44

Unlike the intelligence process used by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the responses to Overlord requirements went
directly from the providing agency to the requestor, for example from Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Directorate to the Allied Naval Commander's intelligence planners, without the intervening step of being passed through some type of Joint Intelligence Committee for coordinated response. Except for the informal liaison that had grown up in London between the intelligence staffs of Admiralty and of Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, there was no real Navy-to-Navy cooperation involved. Provision of intelligence had become corporate.

iii

As D-Day approached, the problem facing the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force commander's intelligence staff was not so much one of obtaining the necessary intelligence but rather one of dissemination. "The size of the [dissemination] task may be judged," the naval Commander-in-Chief wrote in his After-Action Report, "from the fact that 15,000 Annexes, each one a small book in itself, had to be distributed without the individual recipients being on one hand overburdened or on the other under-informed." The assault forces received last minute reconnaissance information on underwater obstacles guarding the beaches, enemy strengths, and dispositions — especially positions of German naval units expected to oppose the seaward portion of
the invasion — and on enemy minefields. This type of information was provided on an increasingly frequent basis as D-Day approached and was updated by means of regular Situation Reports once the battle had been joined. Items of operational significance were immediately passed by radio to those requiring the information. In return, operational commanders who obtained useful intelligence during the course of the landings were to report it back to the Expeditionary Force Commander-in-Chief.46

Provision of intelligence prior to D-day received good marks both from the Naval Commander-in-Chief and from his principal subordinate commanders. "On the whole the intelligence provided was accurate, and several references in reports from Force Commanders testify to this fact...in general all the defences were accurately foretold, and there were no major surprises."47

Almost immediately after D-Day, intelligence began to flow back from the assault areas. The 30th Commando, the highly-trained intelligence collection unit described earlier,48 went into action with the first British forces that landed at H-hour on D-day. Their targets were German coastal radar locations and missile-launching sites, which intelligence had determined the previous December were targeted against Bristol,49 and eventually German Naval Headquarters in Cherbourg. In the course of these operations, "large amounts of documents and equipment of
very high grade intelligence value" were seized and returned to the United Kingdom for exploitation.50

Once the beachhead had been secured and forces began to move inland, responsibility for naval intelligence processing in U.S.-controlled occupied areas on what was then called "The Far Shore" shifted from the Naval Expeditionary Force commander to Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe. COMNAVEU provided intelligence and photographic personnel for reconnaissance parties to accompany the U.S. Army in securing port areas and also furnished translators and prisoner-of-war interrogators, specialized in naval matters.51 These reconnaissance parties would disseminate time-sensitive information to U.S. Army commands in the immediate area, then return the bulk of the material to London for further processing by appropriate intelligence agencies, both British and American, with the results being fed back into the system to the SHAEF staff and to its field commanders. As was indicated earlier, intelligence derived from intercept of enemy communications was provided the operational commanders by Special Liaison Units attached to each major headquarters for that specific purpose.

iv

While victorious Allied forces were in the process of mopping up the Germans on the Contentin Peninsula and making
secure its vital port, Cherbourg, planners in the Mediterranean were preparing for the invasion of Southern France. Operation Anvil, as it was then called, had been tentatively adopted at the Quebec Conference in mid-1943 as a diversionary attack in the south to support Overlord in the northwest. Since that time, differences in strategic thinking had surfaced between the American Joint Chiefs, who wished to continue the operation in support of Eisenhower, and the British Chiefs of Staff, strongly backed by Churchill, who wished to concentrate available forces for an all-out push to bring the Italian campaign to a successful conclusion, then continue the drive northeast into the Danube valley. Even though it could not be timed to coincide with Overlord, Anvil was still vital to Eisenhower's strategy because its success would give him a second French port, Marseille, to reduce the pressure on Cherbourg, where supplies were becoming backlogged. Once again, differences in military strategy were manifestations of underlying differences in post-war political agendas and gave warning of the weakening of cooperative ties that would follow victory.52

Churchill continued intense pressure on Eisenhower to change his mind on Anvil — now renamed "Dragoon" by Churchill — "perhaps because he felt the new title expressed his resentment over the pressure to which he had been subjected to make him accept an undertaking in which he did
not believe." The final decision to proceed was not made until 8 August, one week before the planned invasion date; however, preparations had continued even as the strategists wrangled.

The overall outline of Dragoon had been completed by Christmas 1943, and detailed planning had commenced early in the new year. Unlike Overlord, Dragoon was to be primarily a U.S. operation, with additional participation by the Royal Navy and French forces. Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Eighth Fleet was in charge of the naval portion of the assault. With a wide variety of beaches along the French Mediterranean coast to choose among, landing site selection became a major problem. Samuel Eliot Morison commented that "Captain Leo A. Bachman, Admiral Hewitt's Intelligence officer, probably came to know more about the beaches of Provence than anyone in the long and varied history of that region." In the end, areas to the east of Toulon, near Frejus and St. Tropez, were selected because German defenses were thought to be lighter there than around the ports of Toulon and Marseille.

Intelligence from decrypted German Army messages assisted in estimating the strength and locations of German forces capable of resisting the landings and was of particular value in giving notice that Allied bombing had been successful in destroying the bridges across the Rhône river, thus greatly hampering German troop movements.
Communications intelligence also indicated that the German Air Force in southern France could expect little in the way of reinforcement. Good information on German movements was critical because it soon became apparent that the minor attempts at deception made to protect the specific landing areas had not been particularly successful. Aerial photography was also used extensively in gathering the intelligence required for the operation.

Following the pattern set by Overlord, overall intelligence planning for Anvil/Dragoon was carried on by the combined Anglo-American intelligence staff of General Sir Harry M. Wilson, who had replaced Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. Specific intelligence planning was delegated to Admiral Hewitt's staff, which performed its tasks in coordination with the intelligence staffs of the U.S. Army force commanders whose troops would make the landings. Again, the Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation that did take place was more of the corporate variety than Navy-to-Navy.

Admiral Hewitt's report of intelligence activities following the landings indicated that U.S. Navy intelligence officers, who had been briefed in detail about the types and possible locations of desired enemy material, made valuable finds. German mine-field charts and cryptographic material were recovered, the report stated; but "the greatest aid to the operating forces, however, occurred upon capture of
Toulon and Marseille when intelligence officers located German harbor-blocking, demolition, and mining plans which greatly facilitated the task of harbor clearance.\textsuperscript{57} Captured documents were sent to a joint Royal Navy - U.S. Navy document exploitation center in the Mediterranean theater and the results provided both to Admiralty and to the U.S. Navy Department, as well as to local commanders. Prisoner of war exploitation was also handled cooperatively by teams that included specially-trained U.S. Navy officers from the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center's branch in Rome. Captured enemy equipment was sent for joint U.S. and British examination in theater, then forwarded for further analysis "in accordance with agreed policies of the Admiralty and the [U.S.] Navy Department."\textsuperscript{58} Cooperation was still taking place, but no new ground was being broken.

Overlord's and Dragoon's success in northwestern and southern France brought to an end significant naval participation by the U.S. and Royal Navies in the battle to defeat Hitler in Europe. Minesweeping, convoy, and anti-U-boat operations continued in the Atlantic and Mediterranean; but the Allies began a major repositioning of their naval forces, as the British Eastern Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Fleet were beefed up with men and ships no longer required
in Europe. Anglo-American naval cooperation in the war's closing months was marked by an agreement between the two navies to carve out separate spheres of control rather than to act in concert. On 14 November 1944 Admiral Ramsay, who had remained as Eisenhower's principal naval commander, and Admiral Stark, commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, agreed, "after protracted staff discussions," on a post-hostilities plan that called for the Royal Navy to withdraw from all French ports and turn their administration over to U.S. and French authorities. The British would have sole responsibility for those ports lying to the northeast of the French border, except for a small American presence at Bremen and Bremerhaven.59

The physical separation embodied in the 14 November agreement was symptomatic of a more general divergence in outlook and post-war goals that had been apparent since early 1943 at Casablanca and that had since grown, coloring high-level strategy for both Overlord and Dragoon. By early 1944 this divergence had begun to show itself in Anglo-American naval intelligence relationships. On 12 January Admiral Percy Noble, head of the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington, complained to the First Sea Lord that he sensed a "tightening up on the part of Americans to our requests" and stated "there is no doubt that the Americans have stiffened up in there attitudes towards us..." — a change, Noble felt, that was at least in part
because "the Americans think that the war in Europe may end fairly soon" and that they do not want too strong a Royal Navy when that happens.\textsuperscript{60} In the weeks to follow Noble sent the First Sea Lord other letters enlargeing on his perception of the change in American attitude and speculating on the reasons therefore. A 5 February minute from Admiralty's Director of Plans to the First Sea Lord echoed Noble's concerns.\textsuperscript{61} Another straw in the wind of lessened cooperation could be seen in a January request from Commodore E. N. Rushbrooke, the British Director of Naval Intelligence, to Admiral Harold Stark at U.S. naval headquarters in London, for his assistance in getting the Navy Department in Washington to send Admiralty copies of technical documents, particularly those dealing with communications, captured from the Japanese. Stark's reply was supportive, but noncommittal.\textsuperscript{62} One would not have expected a matter apparently so routine to receive such high-level attention had the cooperative machinery been operating smoothly.

Elsewhere in the Anglo-American intelligence community the winds of change were beginning to blow. In his history of the Research and Analysis Branch of Donovan's Office Of Strategic Services, Barry Katz pointed out that "at the broadest level, the priorities of R&A London, like those of the Office of Strategic Services generally, began at about that time [March 1944] to experience 'a shift in major
emphasis, so far as Europe is concerned, from studies for military plans to those of post-hostilities, primarily military government and civil affairs." Historian Felix Gilbert, at the time head of the German Section of R&A London, commented that there was a perception of differences in approach between the U.S. and Great Britain with regard to post-war civil government in Germany. Gilbert did not find Britain's position this issue to be "wholly innocent" of desire for post-war political advantage and noted that "the English have a very clear realization of the changes in the power constellation which the war has brought about." By the spring of 1945 the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee had become reluctant to share its working papers, especially those dealing with post-war U.S. plans for the Pacific. In recommending refusal of a British request for "all U.S. J.I.C. papers referring to the war against Japan," the U.S. J.I.C. commented that "such a policy would not be at variance with British practice. Although the British J.I.C. has been generous in sending us copies of its papers, we do not receive them all." An Appendix to the J.I.C. paper contained a list of J.I.C. studies on the Pacific since October 1944, which indicated that less than 20% had been furnished to the British. At the war's end it appeared as though the days of unstinting Navy-to-Navy cooperation in the exchange of intelligence were over and the return to pre-war *quid pro quo* had begun.
On 6 June 1945, one month after Germany's surrender and one year after the successful Allied landings in France, Admiral Stark announced that not one U.S. Navy ship remained in British waters. On 13 July General Eisenhower formally disbanded the SHAEF staff. The war in Europe was over. There was very little intelligence structure to dismantle. The war's most successful cooperative effort in naval intelligence, that of the U.S. and Royal Navy Submarine Tracking Rooms, had ended on 21 June 1945 with the disbanding of the current intelligence section of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet staff. One week earlier Admiral King's anti-submarine command, the Tenth Fleet, had been similarly disestablished. Royal Navy presence in Washington diminished rapidly, leaving only a small British naval staff to carry on intelligence and other liaison duties with the U.S. Navy Department. In London, under a variety of post-war names, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe remained active, carrying out liaison with Admiralty and its Naval Intelligence Directorate, but on a much reduced scale. The corporate intelligence structure, formed with SHAEF Headquarters at its apex, wound up its affairs and disappeared, as did the Anglo-American intelligence committees that had been created to support the Combined Chiefs of Staff. U.S./U.K. coordination of communications intelligence matters in the post-war world may have fared somewhat better than did other forms of intelligence.
cooperation, but records of these activities are still shrouded in secrecy in the archives of both nations.67

As Navy-to-Navy intelligence cooperation reached its highest point during the battle of the Atlantic in 1943, combined naval intelligence cooperation had its finest moments in the successful Allied invasions of Normandy and of Southern France in 1944. Anglo-American naval forces and their supporting intelligence organizations played an increasingly less significant role in the final battles against Germany. Provision of naval intelligence to Allied forces on the European continent and in the Atlantic and Mediterranean continued to function smoothly, but without new initiatives. As Allied planners' thoughts turned toward Japan and the Pacific, leaders in the Royal Navy found an increasing resistance on the part of the U.S. Navy to share strategic intelligence on Japan—especially intelligence that might bear on the future United States' role in the Far East.

Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence did not, however, disappear at the war's end. After sharp retrenchment, intelligence cooperation rose again Phoenix-like from the ashes of the immediate post-war period in response to the nascent threat to both nations from the
spread of Communism. Cold war cooperation between the intelligence organizations of the U.S. and the Royal Navy would, however, never match in commitment or effectiveness the level of mutual support reached during 1942 and 1943 in the winner-take-all battle against the German U-boats in the Atlantic. In the years that followed the Second World War permanent interests would once again determine the relationship between permanent friends.
ENDNOTES

Chapter 8:


7. *Ibid*.


17. "Remarks by Mr. Pritchett on Preparation of Intelligence for Overlord." PRO ADM 223/287.

19. Ibid.


22. Ambrose, Ike's Spies, 66.

23. Marshall to Eisenhower, letter of 15 March 1944, quoted ibid. Hinsley (British Intelligence, 3, part 2:781, footnote) claimed that just the opposite was the case; that the British SLUs presented Ultra to their commanders that had been "collated with other sources," whereas American SLUs handled Ultra "in isolation from other intelligence..."

24. Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3, part 2:783.


27. Ibid.


30. Cruickshank, Deception, 33.


32. Directive to Controlling Officer, 21 June 1942, reproduced in Howard, Strategic Deception, 243.

33. Ibid., 28.

34. COMNAVUE Administrative History, 5:137.

35. Cruickshank, Deception, xi.


37. COMNAVUE Administrative History 5:162-3.

39. The story of double agent operations has been well told in Masterman, *The Double Cross System*, supplemented by Montagu, *Beyond Top Secret U*, on deception. However, Michael Howard's official account, *Strategic Deception*, is the latest, best and probably the last official word on the subject.


45. Covering letter to "Report by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation 'Neptune,'" Appendix 3, 50.


47. Covering letter to "Report by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation 'Neptune,'" Appendix 3, 51-52.


56. Morison, *Invasion of France*, 244.


58. Ibid., 162.


60. Noble to Cunningham, letter of 12 January 1944, Cunningham, ADD MSS 52571, letters 1943-1944, British Library.


64. Gilbert to Hajo Holborn, et al., 28 November 1944, *ibid*.

65. "Distribution of U.S. J.I.C. Papers to the British J.I.C.," 10 March 1945, folder: ABC 344.8; Box 225; Entry 421; Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs; NA, Washington, D.C.

66. Ibid., 329-30.

CHAPTER X

COOPERATION IN RETROSPECT

If the course of Anglo-American cooperation in Naval intelligence during the period 1939-1954 were to be displayed in graphic form, one would see a line, rising sharply from its inception until late 1942, then levelling off in a high plateau during the period from late 1942 until the end of 1943, then gradually declining until the war's end in 1945. This pattern was unique to Europe (i.e., the whole of the Europe-Atlantic-Mediterranean area). In the Pacific the graph would rise slowly from 1939 until December 1941, show a brief, sharp rise until March 1942, then decline and remain flat until the spring of 1945, when the line would again show a brief upward turn until the Japanese surrender. The high points on the Pacific graph would be well below those on the European, nor would the Pacific graph show an extended period of fruitful cooperation in 1942-1943 as seen in the European picture.
Although the overall patterns of European and Pacific cooperation were dissimilar, in both cases the rising line from 1939 into 1942 resulted from the same underlying circumstance - British initiative. With only brief and minor exceptions, the impetus for cooperation in naval intelligence came from the British not the American side. Admiralty took the lead, either in relaxing pre-war regulations against information sharing, in abandoning its traditional quid pro quo intelligence exchange policy, or in stifling its well-founded concerns about the U.S. Navy's ability to keep a secret. In addition, the latent Anglophobia of some U.S. Navy leaders had to be overcome, or at least accepted in encouraging cooperation.

The more politically sensitized divisions of the British Naval Staff, Plans and Intelligence, were in the vanguard of those urging greater cooperation. The Operations and Technical divisions, unable to see any concrete professional advantages to be gained from increased cooperation, were more reluctant. Winston Churchill, both during his tenure As First Lord of Admiralty and later as Prime Minister, gave Admiralty the push required to move it in the direction of Anglo-American naval cooperation. It was he who saw more clearly than others how vital it was to British interests to involve the United States, in whatever ways possible, in the battle to save Europe from Hitler. Considering the American political climate of isolationism
in 1939-1940, Britain could not hope for open support of the United States. What, therefore, could more effectively bind America to the British cause than secret agreements to exchange secret information?

Other British leaders, such as Admiral John Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence, had equally pragmatic reasons for encouraging a one-way intelligence sharing, not only of information but of techniques, with the U.S. Navy. The more the Royal Navy could induce its American potential colleagues to adopt British methods, the easier and quicker the transition period when the inevitable wartime coalition took place. Long before America's entry into the war, the British government was willing to make room in its schools to train American naval aviators in photographic interpretation and to make badly needed prisoner of war interrogators available to teach their skills to the U.S. Navy. It was, as Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox put it, a matter of "enlightened self-interest" to have Allies-to-be in the United States Navy trained as early and as 'properly' as possible.

Almost every British writer of naval history, when dealing with the havoc created by German submarines along the East Coast of the United States in the early months of 1942, has bemoaned the U.S. Navy's failure to learn from two years of British wartime experience in countering U-boats. What many of these authors failed to realize was that the
American concept of decentralized operational command did not readily lend itself to adoption of British methods, which were designed for Admiralty's more centralized command structure. In the case of intelligence, there was no way of organizing a U.S. Navy counterpart of Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre until an American Navy operational staff existed for a center to support. Such an operational staff did not come into being until Admiral Ernest King formed the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) staff after the U.S. entry into the war. Nevertheless, in the period 1939 to the latter part of 1942, Anglo-American cooperation, to many on both sides of the Atlantic, meant adoption of British ways— which caused cooperation to be either encouraged or resisted according to one's point of view.

In the Pacific the pre-war cooperative graph sloped upward at a less sharp angle than in Europe, suggesting that Pacific cooperation was of less importance and harder to develop. The pressures for and against cooperation were essentially the same but differed in degree. In Europe the British were fully occupied with the problem of survival and tended to see differences with Japan as somewhat less critical. Therefore, the cooperative impetus was less strong. Conversely, many Americans viewed British calls for Far Eastern military cooperation as masking imperial ends, such as use of the United States Navy as a British surrogate
to protect Singapore and, for that reason, to be resisted all the more firmly.

The Golden Age of Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence was in the main confined to a single threat, in a single theater, and for a single — relatively short — period of the war. While German U-boats remained a matter of concern from 1939 until 1945, the problem was critical in the Atlantic from the beginning of 1942 until mid-1943. Britain could not be protected, nor could the war be taken to Germany, until the Atlantic sea lanes were relatively secure. Anglo-American, Navy-to-Navy intelligence cooperation was at its closest and most successful in the Battle of the Atlantic against the German U-boat threat. Key was the relationship between the Submarine Tracking Rooms located in Washington and London. Although separated by over four thousand miles, and without physically exchanging personnel, the two centers thought and acted as one. That they were so successful resulted in great part from their very facelessness. Staffed by relatively junior officers, hidden away from the limelight in the interiors of their respective Naval Headquarters, the two tracking rooms were able to exchange views openly and informally and perform their analysis without constraints of national pride or the pressures of naval policy. Their combined effort, incorporating when available the priceless information derived from intercepted German communications, provided the
operational commanders with a weapon of inestimable value, both defensively, to move Allied convoys out of harm's way, and offensively, to position Allied antisubmarine forces to best hunt and kill enemy U-boats. If there is one aspect of the Second World War in which the contribution of intelligence to victory cannot be questioned, it is in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Yet while Anglo-American naval intelligence was enjoying its greatest success in the Atlantic, there was no comparable cooperation in the Pacific. With the departure of the Royal Navy from Far Eastern waters in the spring of 1942, combined operations against a common enemy became impossible, and the intelligence structure to support Anglo-American naval cooperation in the Pacific died aborning. Such naval intelligence cooperation as did take place in the Pacific did so on purely American terms, with the Royal Navy as petitioner. Unable to build a convincing case for its need of operational intelligence on the Japanese and with little to offer in return, the Royal Navy was placed in an untenable position in seeking cooperation. American intelligence, in whatever measure provided, was impeded in reaching the British by inter and intra-Service struggles for intelligence primacy in the Pacific. What little information the British had to offer was, in its turn, impeded in reaching American naval forces in the South and Southwest Pacific by filtration through Washington or
through British Commonwealth intelligence organizations in Australia and New Zealand.

Even in Europe close Anglo-American intelligence cooperation was relatively short-lived. The diminished cooperation in Navy-to-Navy intelligence that was becoming increasingly evident by the spring of 1944 was an outgrowth of organizational and political shifts that had started much earlier. The Casablanca Conference marked a turning point in Anglo-American perceptions of the Second World War. Fears for survival began to give way to confidence in an eventual Allied victory. Concern over post-war political and economic relationships grew apace with confidence in Germany's defeat. The gradual shift in national attention from winning the war to positioning for peace that was becoming increasingly evident at the highest levels in the Allied strategic direction of war was mirrored in Anglo-American naval intelligence relationships. Britain gradually lost interest in expanding Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation. Constraints on the types and quantities of information exchanged began to appear on both sides of the Atlantic, as information was scrutinized for post-war advantage as well as wartime utility.

At the same time that cracks began to appear in the wall of Anglo-American cooperation, the way in which naval intelligence was exchanged began to change dramatically. Navy-to-Navy intelligence relationships began to give way
to intelligence by committee - to what might be called the incorporation of intelligence. In most cases, and certainly with the significant exception of the U-boat war, the direct link between the producer of naval intelligence and the operator who used it began to disappear. In the case of American naval intelligence this change was first seen in early 1942 when naval intelligence, instead of passing directly from the Navy Department to the Chief of Naval Operations/Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, took the longer and less direct path from producer, through a Joint U.S. Army-Navy Intelligence Committee, then through a Combined U.S.-U.K. Intelligence Committee en route to its eventual user, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The identity of the intelligence was lost in the multi-layered staffing, hence its "incorporation." In the case of operational planning, such as that for Torch in North Africa or Overlord in Europe, the path was shorter - from producer to Allied Headquarters' Intelligence Section; but again the Navy-to-Navy partnership had been superseded by the corporate planning structure. In rationalizing intelligence support, many of the positive aspects of Navy-to-Navy cooperation disappeared; and this disappearance, coupled with growing concern over post-war influence, caused the cooperative graph to show a downward slope in the final year of the war in Europe.

Two aspects of intelligence provision in the Pacific
during the latter part of the war set it apart from the European pattern. First and most obvious was that intelligence was not combined, in the sense that British input was almost non-existent. Second, at least in the case of the South and Central Pacific areas, the war was not really joint operation, but an all-Navy show. The process of intelligence incorporation never really enjoyed a climate in which to develop. The power struggles for intelligence primacy between Washington and Hawaii hurt Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation by slowing and perhaps reducing the flow of Pacific intelligence to the British, but it was a comparatively minor problem. When the Royal Navy returned to the Pacific in the spring of 1945, American intelligence support to British forces increased dramatically, both from Washington and Hawaii; but while cooperation was great in quantity, it was limited in scope to that required for immediate operations and, since the flow of information was essentially one-way, could not be termed a mutual sharing.

Events and politics influenced naval intelligence cooperation, but so did individuals - both positively and negatively. Without question the strongest individual impetus for greater Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence came the British Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral John Godfrey. During his tenure as DNI, from early 1939 until late 1942, Godfrey constantly
strove to expand Anglo-American naval intelligence relationships, both by using his not inconsiderable influence in Admiralty to encourage increased cooperation and by sending his best and brightest from the Naval Intelligence Division to America to preach the gospel of mutual support. The record does not show any significant initiative toward improvement of naval intelligence cooperation between London and Washington to have been undertaken subsequent to November 1942, the date of Godfrey's untimely departure from Admiralty.

Godfrey had no peer in American naval intelligence. The rapid turn-over of Directors in the Navy Department and the low esteem in which the Director's position was held almost guaranteed that the incumbent would have little influence in U.S. Navy councils. The American naval officer with the most influence, albeit indirectly, on Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation was the Chief of Naval Operations/Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest King. King's often stated aversion to mixed forces and to foreign liaison officers, while not specifically directed against naval intelligence cooperation, had the effect of limiting it. On a more positive note, President Roosevelt's and Prime Minister Churchill's favorable inclination toward the Navy, toward intelligence, and toward cooperation in general, created a climate that was particularly helpful in the pre-Pearl Harbor period when the
structure of intelligence cooperation was first being crafted. Undoubtedly the President's prompt and unqualified acceptance of the Prime Minister's offer of a British fleet for the war against Japan smoothed the way for the Royal Navy's return to the Pacific in 1945 and reassured Admiralty that its forces would receive the intelligence support they needed from the U.S. Navy.

Intra-mural feuding between Hawaii and Washington was detrimental to Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation in the Pacific in that it decreased both the quantity of information provided and the timeliness with which it was delivered. Even more detrimental in a larger sense was the inability of the intelligence organizations of the United States' War and Navy Departments to work together, or at the very least to present a united front to the British. During his May 1941 trip to Washington Godfrey was concerned that U.S. Army-Navy intelligence rivalries would block any American move toward a single intelligence service (which they did) and, more important, would preclude formation of an American Joint Intelligence Committee (which they did not) to work in concert with the British JIC that had already proven its worth in the previous two years. In the field of communications intelligence, the need for the British Government's Code and Cypher School to deal separately with the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the U.S Navy Department's Op-20-G cannot have built much
confidence in the cooperative process.

Unlike the situation at the end of the First World War, when wartime Allied intelligence cooperation virtually disappeared in the conflicts of national interest at Versailles, Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation in World War II survived the precipitous post-war reduction of American and British armed forces. The partnership that emerged was much smaller but in some respects even closer than that of the latter months of the war. By an agreement drawn up by the American and British Directors of Naval Intelligence shortly after the war's end, American naval intelligence officers stationed in London were "seconded" (released from their primary duties at U. S. Naval Headquarters) to the Naval Intelligence Division in Admiralty, to fill three billets that were fully integrated into the British organization and otherwise would have been filled by Royal Navy officers. These assignments were designed to provide a trained cadre of active-duty naval officers should a rapid expansion of Anglo-American naval intelligence be required in the event that the Cold War heated up. Apparently the program was not reciprocal, and no British officers are known to have been stationed in Washington under this agreement. Much of the Americans' duties in Admiralty involved study of the Soviet submarine force, and the Anglo-American partnership in Soviet naval analysis grew into an annual Canadian-United Kingdom-United
States (CANUKUS) Conference to exchange views on Soviet naval developments that continued at least into the 1980s.

When all is said and done, what effect, if any, did Anglo-American cooperation in naval intelligence have on the outcome of the war? Was intelligence the key to winning the war? Obviously not. Commanders, armies, and navies and, increasingly, economic resources win wars. Good intelligence can be rejected, and erroneous information accepted. In the end it is the commander's decision that counts. Without the high quality of Allied intelligence the war might well have dragged on for another two years. Without Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation, the period of delay in winning the war would probably have been even longer. If Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation helped in any way to shorten the war, we are in debt to those on both sides of the Atlantic who overcame national pride and prejudice, and together fought the secret war.

As its graph indicates, cooperation did not show a continuous upward movement as the war progressed but varied in pace and degree under the influence of factors external to the two naval intelligence organizations. If one were to construct a continuum with Churchill's Special Relationship at one extreme and — as some recent historians have suggested — a struggle of Suspicious America against Perfidious Albion at the other, Anglo-American cooperation
in naval intelligence would fall somewhere near the center. What is important to remember is not so much the degree of cooperation attained as it is to recall that meaningful and valuable cooperation did take place — and it did — in a field as traditionally unilateral and secret as intelligence. Herein lies the uniqueness of the Anglo-American naval intelligence relationship during the Second World War.
INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Intelligence has been defined in many ways, but at its most basic it is the product of a process of collection and analysis of information: "It deals with all things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." Traditionally intelligence is divided into three major and often overlapping categories: strategic, operational/tactical, and security/counterintelligence. Yale historian and later Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, has provided a perhaps more useful breakdown in terms of time: long, medium, and short range intelligence. Long range intelligence deals with questions arising in the formation of grand strategy and is required by the highest levels of government decision-makers such as the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Medium range Kent defines as intelligence necessary at the departmental level such as that required by the State, Army, and Navy Departments. Short range includes what the U.S.
Navy calls "operational intelligence," sometimes known as "tactical intelligence." Counterintelligence and deception, those activities designed to deny to others the same types of information we seek concerning them, are found in all three time ranges.\textsuperscript{2} During the Second World War the lines between the long and medium ranges became extremely blurred, and even operational intelligence — such as the numbers, types, and locations of German U-boats — had impact on high-level decisions.

The picture is further complicated by the multiplicity of intelligence sources and by the varied ways in which the information derived can be employed. For example, an American naval force operating in the Pacific in World War II contemplating an attack on Japanese units would use its aircraft for visual and photographic reconnaissance, its radar for electronic intelligence, and its embarked linguists and communications specialists for tactical enemy strength and location information. The information from these various sources would be passed back to the Joint Intelligence Center in Hawaii for use in theater operational planning, and even farther back to the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington for use in long range strategic studies. At the same time the intelligence staff embarked with the U.S. force would be receiving updating information from both Hawaii and Washington to round out its store of local knowledge on enemy intentions.
Collection of information forms a portion of what is called the intelligence cycle, whereby the planners determine what information is required — often referred to as Essential Elements of Information — and formulate requirements, which are passed on to the collectors. To fulfill these requirements the collectors assign appropriate collection "assets," which may be electronic (radio or radar intercepts), human (military attachés, spies), or visual (aerial reconnaissance), or a combination thereof. The resultant information is analyzed and correlated with other data. The product, intelligence, is then disseminated to the planners, who refine their requirements based on the new intelligence, and the cycle starts over again.
ENDNOTES

Appendix:


Archival:

More by good fortune than good planning, I started my archival research at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. Because of its smaller size and a particularly helpful staff, the FDR Library was "user friendly" for the beginner, and its holdings provided valuable leads to persons and events that could be further researched in Washington and London. For my purposes the most useful collections were the President's Secretary's File, 1933-1945; the President's Personal File, 1933-1945; and the President's Official File, 1933-1945. Other specialized collections of value included the President's correspondence with Vincent Astor, 1932-1944, and the papers of various Naval Aides to the President.

My six months in the Washington, D.C. area were divided almost equally between the National Archives in the District of Columbia and the Operational Archives of the Dudley Knox Center for Naval History in the Washington Navy Yard. Holdings in the Manuscript Division of the Library of
Congress were utilized as time allowed, and excursions were made to Annapolis, Maryland, to the United States Naval Academy Library and to the Oral History Collection of the U.S. Naval Institute; and to Norfolk, Virginia, to examine material on the Southwest Pacific Command contained in the Douglas MacArthur Memorial Bureau of Archives.

At the National Archives, by far the most useful body of information for my research was contained in Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency, which contain all the material that has been released to date on codebreaking activities of the U.S. government. Included in the SRH Series are topics of general interest on the history of the cryptographic activities of the Navy's Op-20-G, the forerunner of the Naval Security Group, and the Army's Signal Intelligence Service. These records contain good information on Anglo-American wartime cryptographic relationships, with the U.S. Army material somewhat less heavily (or less obtrusively) censored than that of the U.S. Navy. Key documents from this series concerning the war with Japan have been organized, annotated and published by Ronald. H. Spector in *Listening to the Enemy.* The SRMD and SRMN Series are of specific Navy interest and contain excellent historical and operational records of codebreaking.

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* Complete citations for all material used in this paper have been given in the Endnotes at time of first appearance and will not be repeated in this essay. Material of importance to the subject but not used in the paper will be given full citation in the essay.
activities before and during the Pacific War.

The National Archives' Record Group 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, files of the Offices of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, contain much useful information on Naval Intelligence, including a large segment of administrative correspondence between the Director of Naval Intelligence and his corps of Naval Attachés around the world. The material is voluminous and organized by date, which made researching a specific topic difficult. I was given to understand that much additional Navy material was held in storage at National Archives' Suitland, Maryland, Annex, and that it had yet to be processed and cleared for security. However, archivists at the Navy historical center said all Naval records had been declassified prior to being sent to the National Archives. From contacts with other retired naval officers and civilians, who have maintained their security clearances to work on official histories, I believe that a large amount of information on the wartime activities of the Office of Naval Intelligence remains classified — fifty years after the fact.

Record Group 226, Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, provided helpful information on wartime relationships among various American and British intelligence organizations, particularly those in London. Also, Record Group 165, Records of the War
Department General and Special Staffs, was useful for information on the activities of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and on the War Department's interactions with the Navy Department.

The Operational Archives of the Center for Naval History contain much more material than the name implies. One of their holdings, The Records of Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe (COMNAVEU), is a major source of information on Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation in the early 1940s. These records contain voluminous files of messages that the U.S. Naval Attaché London, The Special Naval Observer (Admiral Ghormley), and the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe sent to the Navy Department, and the replies thereto. Papers detailing the cooperative negotiations with Admiralty are in the COMNAVEU file, and on occasion copies of British papers provided to the Americans in London can be found in the COMNAVEU records, but not in those of the British Public Record Office. Additional records of interest in the Operational Archives include the "Double Zero" files of Admiral King's Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet Headquarters and the personal papers of several U.S. Naval officers who play major roles in my story, among them Ernest King, Harold Stark, Chester Nimitz and Thomas Hart. A copy of Admiral Alan Kirk's Reminiscences, on loan to the Operational Archives from the Oral History Collection of Columbia University's Butler Library, saved me a trip to
New York City.

In addition to the specialized Navy-related materials one would expect to find there, the Nimitz Library at the U.S. Naval Academy holds several unpublished Ph.D. dissertations that were relevant to my research. One - Michael Doyle, "The U.S. Navy; Strategy, Defense and Foreign Policy" - offered good background on intelligence shortcomings in pre-war naval strategic planning. More productive, however, was the time spent in the Oral History collections of the U.S. Naval Institute. Transcripts of interviews with Admiral Bernard Austin, who served under Admiral Ghormley in London; Admiral George Dyer, Admiral King's intelligence officer; Captain Thomas Dyer, one of the Navy's foremost codebreakers; and Admiral Arthur McCollum, a Japanese language specialist and probably the U.S. Navy's most experienced Far Eastern intelligence analyst; all provided information not available elsewhere. The MacArthur Archives in Norfolk, Virginia, furnished — in addition to material on intelligence activities of the Southeast Asia Command — an unexpected bonus in the form of records of intelligence cooperation between MacArthur and Hart in Manila, and the British in Singapore in the months immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

In England, my chief interest lay in the records held by the Public Record Office at Kew, on the outskirts of London. The Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge
University, also contained a wealth of useful information. Visits to specialized collections in the University of London library, the Manuscript Division of the British Museum, the Historical Section in Admiralty, and the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich were all rewarding.

At the Public Record Office, most of the information I was seeking was to be found in the records of Admiralty, (class code: ADM). A more selective search of Cabinet Office (CAB), Ministry of Defence (DEFE), and War Office (WO) records also proved worthwhile. Within the ADM series ADM 223, Reports and Papers of the Naval Intelligence Division was of primary interest. The fact that I have at least scanned every document in the ADM 223 series is no tribute to my zeal, but a comment on the paucity of information that has been released to the public. File ADM 223/84 contains photocopies of documents not yet made public, but cited by Professor Hinsley in British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 1. These papers are internal Admiralty documents and include Admiral James' comments on the need for operational intelligence in wartime, Admiral Godfrey's report to his superiors on William Donovan's visit to London in 1940, and 1941 correspondence from the British Naval Attaché in Washington complaining about American unwillingness to share intelligence with him. ADM 1, Admiralty and Secretariat Papers, has good information on the Naval Intelligence
Directorate in pre-war years and complements the holdings of ADM 199, documents culled by historians from other files for use in official histories of the Second World War—a vast, unordered collection of immense significance. The overriding frustration in archival research in the Public Records Office is evidence from Professor Hinsley and others of how few intelligence records have been made public. Unlike the United States, where at least some cryptographic records have been released by the National Security Agency, its British counterpart, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has permitted virtually nothing of the official record of Bletchley Park's codebreaking activities to reach the public domain, except for translated files of intercepted German messages in the DEFE 3 Series. Almost all of the Cabinet (CAB) records dealing with Joint Intelligence (CAB 56) and much of the Records of the Chiefs of Staff committees (CAB 81) have been "retained," as have all the records of the Combined Intelligence Committee (CAB 88/57-62).

The Churchill College Archives contain portions of the unpublished, multi-volume autobiography of Admiral John Godfrey, British Director of Naval Intelligence in the critical early-war years, that detail his overtures toward intelligence cooperation with the U.S. Navy. These memoirs were the chief attraction, but in addition I found excellent material on British wartime intelligence activities in
Stockholm in the DENHAM files, and in the DENNISTON files, a monograph on the early days of the Government Code and Cypher School — the best single source of historical information on that codebreaking organization. Also of interest to the intelligence researcher are the McLachlan-Beesly (MLBE) files, which contain correspondence and background information dealing with these authors' works on naval intelligence.

A.R. Wells' Ph.D. dissertation, "Studies in British Naval Intelligence, 1880-1945," is on file at the University of London. Although quoted by British authors in the intelligence field, this paper was not the fount of information that I had anticipated. Wells' information on the wartime organization of Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division was very useful as was his discussion of NID's relations with ONI. However, Wells tended to oversimplify in discussing American naval matters and in some cases was not accurate. On page 80 he wrote that "...in 1939 they [the Americans] were much behind the British. Their equivalent to O.I.C. was very ineffectual and its close ties with the State Department inhibited its main work." The U.S. Navy Department did not have anything like Admiralty's OIC until mid-1941 at the earliest and the Navy and State Departments rarely saw eye-to-eye on anything during this period.

The Manuscript Division of the British Museum contains
limited collections of papers of various 20th century British naval officers, the most important of whom, for my purposes, was Admiral Andrew B. Cunningham, Naval Commander in Chief under Eisenhower in the 1943 invasion of North Africa and later First Sea Lord. The holdings of the Maritime Museum at Greenwich are also limited but do contain some of the missing pieces of the Godfrey autobiography not held in the Churchill College Archives. The history section of Admiralty holds some material on Admiral Godfrey, but it either duplicates information elsewhere or deals with the later part of his career, after he left Admiralty.

Had I to do it over again, there are four archives that I would definitely try to visit. In England the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College, University of London and the Imperial War Museum library appear essential. I avoided them, thinking them too Army oriented for my purposes, at a time when I had not fully understood the joint nature of coalition warfare planning — what affects the Army pertains in equal measure to the Navy. In the United States, a visit to the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, would have been worthwhile if for no other reason than to look into the papers of General "Wild Bill" Donovan, founding head of the Office of Strategic Services, and a key player in Anglo-American intelligence before and during the war. The Naval War College, Newport, R.I., has holdings on naval intelligence,
of which I was completely unaware at the time, and holds papers of several American senior naval officers who played important roles in Anglo-American naval relationships during the Second World War. Finally, the best single source for information on locations of archival material concerning the U.S. Navy remains *U.S. Naval History Sources in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1979). *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of American Naval History* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), compiled by Paolo E. Coletta, was helpful, but its section on intelligence is weak.

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**Published Sources:**

subject. Although unpublished, it is available from the Center for Naval History on microfilm. James R. Leutze, *Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration 1937-1941*, is first-rate among the published works. While all of these works deal with various aspects of Anglo-American cooperation, none attempt to focus on the development of intelligence cooperation—and more specifically naval intelligence cooperation—during the war years. Herein lies the purpose and hopefully the value of this study.

General, one volume histories of the Second World War. Because it was the most current book on the subject at the time (1990), I chose Martin Gilbert, *Second World War*, published in 1989, as my basic, quick reference source. It was adequate for my needs, but how I wish that the just-published, Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at War: A Global History of World War II* (Cambridge University Press, 1994) had been available four years earlier! Professor Weinberg's new book places more emphasis on the role of intelligence and espionage in the conflict than have previous general histories and will, I suspect, become the standard single volume work on World War II for years to come.

Official histories. The single most valuable source of information for this paper was the F.H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*. This five volume set not only
provided a wealth of British information but also was rich in American material. Next in importance was Samuel Eliot Morison's fifteen-volume, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. This highly readable work was prepared without knowledge of the role that communications intelligence played in the events of the war because, unlike British official historians, Morison was never given access to COMINT material. Had he been afforded such access, he might well have given greater credit to the role of intelligence in the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and in the remarkable success of American submarines in destroying Japanese shipping from 1943 on. His conclusions, however, seem as sound today as they were when first written and need no great revision based on more recent material. United States Naval Chronology, World War II and Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, help round out the official Navy picture.

On the U.S. Army side, the multi-volume, The United States Army in World War II, is essential. In the series covering the history of the War Department, Ray S. Cline's, Washington Command Post: the Operations Division, provides an excellent discussion of early wartime joint and international staff planning. Forrest C. Pogue's, The Supreme Command, in the "European Theater of Operations" series, gives a clear picture of the functions of the SHEAF
staff as it planned for Overlord, and SHAEF's relationship to the other British and American organizations engaged in the strategic direction of the war. Maurice Matloff's, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944*, offers a good lead-in to an examination of the fissures that began to appear in the Anglo-American alliance in the later war period. Finally, Louis Morton's, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, in "The War in the Pacific" series, is most helpful in understanding the command inter-relationships of Washington, Hawaii, and the South and Southwest Pacific areas.

Other official documents of great use to me included the Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, especially the early Anglo-American cooperation detailed in *The Washington Conferences 1941-1942* and the cryptographic material revealed in the volume on *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*. Another fruitful source of pre-war documentation on Anglo-American and Dutch coordination in the Pacific is contained in the Congressional reports of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings.

Unlike the United States, Great Britain does not break the official history of the war into separate compartments, but has one multi-volume series covering all aspects of government wartime activities. The *History of the Second World War*, of which Professor Hinsley's work on Intelligence is a part, also includes Stephen W. Roskill's series, *The*
War at Sea, the logical starting point for any examination of the Royal Navy's role in the Second World War. In the British official series, M.R.D. Foot, SOE in France, and J.M.A. Gwyer and J.R.M. Butler's volumes, Grand Strategy, were also helpful. Admiralty has published a multi-volume series, Naval Staff History. Originally intended for official use and classified as "Confidential," this series has now been declassified and is available in the Operational Archives of the Center for Naval History in Washington. On balance, Roskill's account is as good, probably better, and much easier to come by. G. Hermon Gill's official history, Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945 filled in many gaps in my research on Allied organizations in the Southwest Pacific area. Although not official, Jürgen Rohwer and Gerhard Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945, is most useful in keeping events in their proper order when drawing information from a number of varied sources.

For background on events leading to United States' involvement in the war, I used William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War; for background on President Roosevelt, Arthur Schlesinger's' three-volume, Age of Roosevelt, and James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. I consulted a number of works by and on FDR's cabinet members and advisors, the most useful of which for my needs was Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971: The Papers of
Adolf A. Berle, since Berle came the closest of anyone to being Roosevelt's advisor on intelligence matters.


As indicated earlier, I soon realized that I could learn a great deal about what happened to the U.S. Navy by studying the U.S. Army. One of my most productive sources in this respect was Alfred D. Chandler Jr., et al, five-volume set, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years, both for intelligence, Anglo-American relations, and a day-by-day appreciation of the war at the top. Eisenhower's own work, Crusade in Europe, supplemented by his naval aide Harry C. Butcher's autobiographical, My Three
Years with Eisenhower were also helpful, as were The Papers of George C. Marshall and Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall.

Winston S. Churchill: his relationship with Roosevelt, with the Royal Navy, and his dominant (and domineering) persona in leading wartime Britain, is an essential ingredient in understanding Anglo-American naval relations of the period. I found his six-volume autobiographical study, The Second World War, to be key — when expanded by Martin Gilbert's multivolume series of the Churchill papers, especially The Prophet of Truth 1922-1939 and Finest Hour 1939-1941, and his relationship with the Royal Navy put in perspective by Stephen Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals. One of Churchill's private secretaries, John Colville, has provided a useful picture of the British wartime government in The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries. Recent studies on British military leaders by Martin Stephen, The Fighting Admirals, and John Keegan, ed., Churchill's Generals were a great help.

The Pacific has been treated almost as though it were separate from the rest of the Second World War. I used John Costello, The Pacific War, and Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan as my basic texts and was well satisfied with both. The U.S. Navy's story in the Pacific War is best told by biographers. E.B. Potter, Nimitz, and Bull Halsey are two of the best. I
depended heavily on James Leutze, *A Different Kind of Victory: A Biography of Admiral Thomas H. Hart* for information on Anglo-American naval relationships in the Far East just before Pearl Harbor. On Pearl Harbor—a personal note. Dr. Charles C. Tansill was one of the first of the Pearl Harbor revisionist historians. In 1951 I was one of his graduate students at Georgetown, where he expounded at great length on his theory of a Roosevelt conspiracy. I was not convinced then, nor am I now, that any such thing ever existed. Without going into detail on the literature of Pearl Harbor, I think that Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, published in 1962—although outdated in some respects—still offers the most cogent argument on the subject.

its participants, Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, in *Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan*, is of particular interest for its discussion of Japanese naval intelligence failures in preparing for the battle.

Naval intelligence. The wartime history of the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence has been neglected, both officially and by historians. A draft history of ONI lies buried in the unpublished manuscript, "United States Naval Administration in World War II," in the Operational Archives, and Jeffery M. Dorwart has studied ONI's role in counterintelligence and security in *Conflict of Interest: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945*. While Professor Dorwart's study afforded me valuable background material on ONI's wartime activities within the United States, it contributed relatively little to my information on Anglo-American naval intelligence relationships. A comprehensive study of the role of U.S. naval intelligence in the Second World War has still to be written.

Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Directorate has been much better served. Patrick Beesly, who during the war was assistant to the Officer in Charge of the Submarine Tracking Room in Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Center, has written three books, all of which are essential to understanding NID's position in Admiralty and in the British intelligence community. *Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918*, provides necessary background. It deals with the
career of Admiral "Blinker" Hall, NID's most famous Director, and of his staff's highly successful codebreaking activities during the First World War. Very Special Intelligence: The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, and Very Special Admiral: The Life of Admiral J.H. Godfrey, CB, written by Beesly in 1977 and 1980 respectively, are designed to expand on important themes introduced a few years earlier by Donald McLachlan in Room 39: A Study in Naval Intelligence. Together the three books offer a remarkably comprehensive record of what is essentially a secret organization's wartime activities. They were most useful in furthering understanding of the wartime relationship between the British Operational Intelligence Centre in London and the U.S. Navy's Submarine Tracking Room in Washington and in documenting the key role played by Admiral Godfrey in Anglo-American naval intelligence cooperation.

A general examination of intelligence and its effect on pre-World War II policy in both the United States and Great Britain should start, in my opinion, with a thorough study of Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). Edited by Ernest R. May, this series of essays includes Donald Cameron Watt's, "British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe," and David Kahn's, "United States Views of Germany and Japan in 1941,"
both helpful to understanding how governments collect intelligence and how they use the information collected. If I could recommend but one book in the vast literature of intelligence to the interested non-specialist, this would be the one.

The British intelligence community in general has been well surveyed by Christopher Andrew in *Her Majesty's Secret Service*. "Nigel West," reputed pseudonym of Rupert Allason, covers the wartime activities of the Security Service in MI 5, and rounds out the counterintelligence picture under his true name in *The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch 1883-1983*. Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower's intelligence chief for much of the war, provides useful, if very discreet, recollections of wartime military intelligence in *Intelligence at the Top*. Soviet agent and wartime member of the British Secret Intelligence Service, H.A.R. "Kim" Philby, in *My Silent War*, offers a less than flattering portrait of the SIS in action and of its relationship with American intelligence, especially in the Iberian Peninsula. Memoirs, varying widely in quality, of Britons engaged in wartime intelligence abound.

The contribution of U.S. naval intelligence to the Pacific war is made clear in W.J. Holmes, *Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II*. Ellis M Zacharias, wartime Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, and a pre-war Japanese
language officer, has written entertainingly of the life of an intelligence officer in the inter-war years in Secret Missions. Admiral Nimitz' intelligence officer, Edwin T. Layton's autobiographical, "And I was There:" Pearl Harbor and Midway — Breaking the Secrets is notable for its excellent information on the Navy's intelligence activities — even if one does not completely accept Layton's argument that "Admiral Kimmel had been a victim of circumstances and became a convenient scapegoat [for Pearl Harbor] in order to cover up navy department derelictions."

Since Great Britain lifted the official ban on public discussion of "Ultra" in 1974, writing on the role of communications intelligence in the Second World War has become a growth industry. In my opinion the best single source of basic information on cryptography remains David Kahn's, The Codebreakers, published in 1968. His most recent work, Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, is equally valuable in studying the Battle of the Atlantic. Ronald Lewin's more general book, Ultra Goes to War, and one specifically concerned with United States' penetration of Japanese codes, The American Magic, are both excellent. Ralph Bennett has written well on codebreaking in individual theaters of the war in two books, Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944 1945, and Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow, 1989). Edward J. Drea's recent (1992) MacArthur's
Ultra is far and away the best source of information to date on codebreaking activities in the South and Southwest Pacific areas. There are many more, but these studies were of most use to me. Two quarterly journals, Cryptologia and Intelligence and National Security, have proven a rich vein of information on Ultra and on other facets of intelligence history. One of the most interesting books in the field, although not that pertinent to my own work, remains Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram, the World War I German plot to foment war between the United States and Mexico, discovered by codebreakers in British Naval Intelligence and leaked to the U.S. government by Admiral "Blinker" Hall.

Specialized intelligence activities have been well covered. Constance Babington Smith, Evidence in Camera: Photographic Intelligence in World War II, and M.R.D. Foot and J.M. Langley, MI 9: Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1979) are examples. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, is a primer on the subject and complements Michael Howard's Strategic Deception, the final volume of Hinsley's British Intelligence in the Second World War series. J.C. Masterman, The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, remains the best source on British wartime, double-agent operations. Finally, Ewin Montagu, The Man Who Never Was, is a classic account of a successful deception operation in which the body of a presumed British courier
was placed in the ocean so that it would wash up on the shores of Spain, be recovered, and hopefully the false information on the body would be passed to the Germans by the Spanish. It worked, as intercepted German communications later revealed.

Finally, on mechanics. I used the 13th Edition of The Chicago Manual of Style for format, and Webster's, Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, for usage.