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Variations in formal structures of neighborhood organizations and their effects on member involvement

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Rice University, 1994
RICE UNIVERSITY

VARIATIONS IN FORMAL STRUCTURES OF NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MEMBER INVOLVEMENT

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Variations in Formal Structures of Neighborhood Organizations and their Effects on Member Involvement

by

Sara Jane White

The question of what effect formal structures of neighborhood organizations have on member involvement has largely been ignored in the body of research on neighborhood politics. Yet mandatory and voluntary neighborhood organizations have proliferated in recent years, motivating this research to address the gap in the extant literature. Findings based upon 164 neighborhood organizations surveyed in Houston, Texas, indicate that mandatory organizations are stronger than voluntary organizations in terms of financial capability, bureaucratization, member size and percent of neighborhoods formally represented, while voluntary organization structures are more democratic. Furthermore, the analysis supports the contention that decentralized participation structures and change oriented purposes and incentive structures significantly increase the proportion of members involved in the activities of the neighborhood organizations surveyed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In 1968, thirteen years after having completed two years of college, I went back in hopes of completing my undergraduate work. Thanks to the initial support and encouragement of Professor Winifred Murray at Incarnate Word College in San Antonio, I decided to pursue an advanced degree.

Thus I continued my academic quest in the Urban Studies Department at Trinity University in San Antonio, where I received a Masters degree in 1972, under the guidance of department chairman, Earl Lewis. For the next 16 years, I was a participant and an observer of urban politics, employed consecutively in two cities as a city planner. Yet, I never overcame the yearning to work in academia.

Therefore in 1988, I enrolled in the Political Science Department of Rice University to prepare, though belatedly, for this eventuality. I was truly fortunate for the opportunity to be associated with and to be taught by the splendid faculty in the Department of Political Science. I owe much gratitude to Keith Hamm, chairman of my dissertation committee, who on many occasions provided invaluable advice related to my dissertation. In addition, I am indebted to the other members of my dissertation committee, Robert Stein and
Peter Mieszkowski. I also give special thanks to John Alford, who went far beyond the call of duty to help me with complex maneuvers related to managing my computer database for the dissertation research. There are others too numerous to mention that assisted me, including the survey respondents who volunteered their time to complete a lengthy survey.

Finally, I thank my husband, Bob, for his patience and undying support. Our children, grandchildren and my mother have all cheered me forward, and I thank them too!
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Dissertation Thesis

This dissertation is about citizen participation within neighborhood organizations. There are a wide range of structured political and economic components in neighborhood organizations that have not been included in prior research efforts. They need to be examined for their possible effects on citizen participation within the context of diverse neighborhood environments. The major thesis driving this research is that neighborhood organizational governance structures and organizational incentive structures are devised and institutionalized by individual and collective human effort to mediate the effects of neighborhood environments (social, economic and physical) on aggregate levels of member participation in activities sponsored and coordinated by neighborhood organizations.

A political economy model of neighborhood organizations guides the analysis. Within this framework, a variety of formal governance structures and incentive structures in different neighborhood organizations will be examined to see if they work both independently from or simultaneously with neighborhood environments to effect citizen participation
within organizations that exist in the same municipality under the same larger governmental "roof".

A recent report from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations points out the rapid increase in all types of neighborhood organizations in the last two decades, particularly in the Sun Belt.¹ Also, the report notes that in the 1970’s and 1980’s, mandatory homeowners associations began to grow rapidly. The ACIR report suggests that all of these organizations are becoming a powerful force in the politics of American cities. Thus, the old concern of political scientists about citizen participation in neighborhood organizations and the question of how representative they are, has taken on new relevance. Yet little research has focused on the question of institutional differences between mandatory and voluntary neighborhood organizations and citizen participation.

It is clear that research into the structures of neighborhood organizations and the relationships of those structures to citizen participation in organizations is important in the idealistic sense of American democracy. This idealistic view was put most succinctly by Benjamin Barber who stated that in a strong democracy, politics is something done by, not to, citizens. Activity is its chief virtue, and involvement, commitment, obligation and service - common
deliberation, common decision and common work its hallmark.\textsuperscript{2}

Secondly and related to the first point, it is important in the practical sense of the question of legitimacy of neighborhood organizations as representative agencies of their neighborhood constituents. At the minimum, democracy calls for contested elections in order that the people can exert some control over their leaders.

In the third place, citizen participation in neighborhood and city politics has important implications with respect to the equitable distribution of resources by the city across poor as well as affluent neighborhoods. Clearly in democratic political processes, much is at stake on broadly based citizen participation in neighborhood organizations. Therefore more attention should be given to the variety of organizational mechanisms that are being used that encourage or discourage citizen participation.

\textbf{Citizen Participation in Organizations that Lobby City Hall}

Within neighborhoods, citizen involvement in organized collective action speaks directly to the issue of true representation of neighborhood interests within larger political jurisdictions. Through their activists, neighborhood organizations must compete with other frequently
more powerful economic interests within the city for outcomes that may have immediate and clearly discernable effects upon individual lives and opportunities of neighborhood residents. Activist need neighborhood organizations with broad support to legitimate their claims as representatives of the neighborhood and to mobilize the resources needed to produce collective goods.

Ordinary members of neighborhood organizations need to maximize their involvement in neighborhood organizations because leaders of neighborhood organizations are most likely to articulate predominant neighborhood values if there is a broad base of neighborhood residents who participate in the organizations. In addition, neighborhood organizations with broadly based citizen support are also more likely to gain credibility at city hall in the face of powerful economic interests, which may help them succeed in achieving their lobbying goals in the face of economically strong competing interest.

At best, when competing for benefits allocated by the city to achieve neighborhood goals, neighborhood organizations are inherently disadvantaged economically in relation to big business and industry. The problem is compounded for low income neighborhoods in that their organizations may also be disadvantaged in relation to higher income neighborhood
organizations when lobbying city hall or when attempting to marshall private resources for self help. Citizen participation provides a key political resource that may assist in creating a more level political playing field for less economically advantaged groups.

Yet prior research findings have shown that these are the very groups that have the hardest time involving their members in collective action. However, the influence of income, occupation, education and race have been shown to decrease in some neighborhoods when tested in conjunction with other neighborhood environmental characteristics such as age of the neighborhood, tenure of the residents and racial homogeneity; or when examined in conjunction with citizen participation programs sponsored by local government.\(^3\)

**Citizen Participation in Organizations Producing Collective Goods within Neighborhoods**

Without a broad base of citizen participation, there is less opportunity for neighborhood organizations to marshall the resources to implement self help projects and programs, and there is greater opportunity within the constraints of the resources that are available for the organization to distort the distribution of preferences within the neighborhood. In the absence of substantial numbers of involved and watchful
ordinary members, the organization’s resources may not be used efficiently to achieve its goals. This problem may be compounded, if financial contributions to the organization are mandated as a part of legally binding restrictive covenants, making it difficult to exit and to withdraw financial support. Mandatory neighborhood organizations as well as voluntary neighborhood organizations have proliferated in many urban areas in recent years stimulating renewed interest in the long neglected role of formal organizational structures in increasing the ranks of ordinary citizens involved in collective action at the local level.

The Formal Structure of Neighborhood Organizations

Renewed interest in the effects of organizational variables on democratic involvement is substantial not only because of the proliferation of interest groups, but also because any organization must to some degree seek through hierarchy and bureaucracy to structure the preferences of others. The precept of democratic society is that the collective will of the constituents should "structure the preference of leaders" to produce collective goods and to avoid conflicts of interests (i.e. the constituents are the "principles" in economic organizational theory terms as described by Moe and the elected officials are the "agents"). This very difficult arrangement logically
requires democratic organizational governance structures that encourage broadly based participation of the constituency within the organization while minimizing bureaucratic structures. Yet, as society has grown more complex, voluntary associations have become more than ever more bureaucratic and professional.

Recently some researchers have turned their attention to interest group organizations at the national level. However, neighborhood organizations differ in a number of ways from national interest groups that are discussed later in Chapter 3. Neighborhood organizations may operate with less centralized structures and bureaucracy than interest groups at higher levels of government. Therefore, findings from previous studies at the national level do not necessarily hold in relation to neighborhood organizations.

Neighborhood organizations may be the last bastion where conditions are optimum to provide organizational structures that will encourage citizens to choose to become politically active. Without empirical analysis of neighborhood organizations, it is premature and possibly misleading to conclude that their formal institutional structures do or do not make any difference in achieving goals of democratic representation through citizen participation.
From a theoretical perspective, the popularity and productivity of the behavioral paradigm in political science has dampened interest in organizational research. Nevertheless, it is important to explore all possible alternative explanations of citizen participation that may have some effect on diminishing or enhancing the explanatory power of SES status on citizen participation and on overcoming the economic disincentives of becoming involved in collective action to produce collective goods that apply to everyone.

Neighborhood based citizen participation is important from the standpoint of testing organizational theories of collective action, in order to expand the body of empirical research that has for the most part tested environmental and psychological explanations of citizen participation. Organization theory encompasses propositions linking organizational incentive structures, governance structures and resources with political and economic attributes of the environment in which the organization operates. As such it provides a framework to test integrated models of political and economic theory.\textsuperscript{5}

In this research, the political and economic structures internal to neighborhood organizations that exist across diverse neighborhood environments in Houston, Texas are examined to determine what if any part they may play in
raising or lowering the levels of citizen participation in collective action. To elaborate on the impetus of this research, an overview of collective action theory is provided in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, empirical research on neighborhood literature is reviewed and the remaining questions are identified. The review will demonstrate that the focus of the extant literature has been on individual and environmental/contextual explanations of citizen participation with scant attention paid to formal neighborhood organizational variables. The latter has inspired this research agenda as set forth in hypotheses discussed in Chapter 4. The research design and the findings are reported and discussed in Chapter 5 through 9. The findings are put into theoretical and practical perspectives with conclusions drawn and directions for future research suggested in the closing Chapter 10.

Notes


CHAPTER 2

Alternative Theories of Collective Action

Group Theory - Shared Values

American pluralist theory has been built upon the foundation of David B. Truman's theoretical perspective.\(^1\) Truman posited that groups arise spontaneously when disturbances occur in society, and that these groups share common values which will be represented by the group. He noted that frequently collective action involves making demands upon government, where government is perceived as the appropriate vehicle to address the "disturbance". The formation of one group to make demands upon government leads to countervailing pressures arising from the spontaneous formation of other groups representing competing interests. Truman's rather optimistic view of interest groups depicted them as operating in a democracy in a way that results in the maintenance of equilibrium because all interests are represented in a balanced or "equitable" manner.

However, also in the latter half of the 1950's, other political scientists were struck by findings that membership in voluntary associations was not very characteristic of the American public; and that in those instances where people did
join, there were empirical findings of significant relationships between socioeconomic variables and participation. Charles R. Wright and Herbert Hyman (1958) published descriptive information that was derived from national and local surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, containing questions on voluntary association membership.\textsuperscript{2} Their findings raised considerable doubt about Truman's assumption that interest representation was balanced across socioeconomic groups and thus equitable in the government process. From the early 1960's until the present, this question has motivated research at all levels of government, including local government and their neighborhoods.

\textit{Rational Choice - Individual Self Interest}

In 1965, Mancur Olson challenged some of Truman's basic assumptions with the publication of his book, \textit{The Logic of Collective Action}.\textsuperscript{3} He argued from the economic perspective of an idealized world of perfect information. From this viewpoint, he theorized that people with shared values do not organize spontaneously in response to disturbances in their environment in order to obtain collective goods. The nature of a collective good is that parties within the affected universe cannot be excluded from receiving it. Therefore potential members of a collective action organization know
that they can receive the benefits common to all without joining. Thus the rational thing to do is to take a "free ride".

However, Olson argued that large groups are more disadvantaged than small groups. In small groups, there are individuals that are willing to absorb the cost of free riders because the value of the benefit that they will receive is greater than the cost of carrying the burden of a few free riders. As group size increases, free-rider tendencies also increase because the contributors share of the benefit decreases in relation to the cost, thus further reducing the likelihood that the individual will continue to contribute if he or she contributed initially when the group was smaller. As the group grows larger, the problem is compounded in that the potential supporter knows that his marginal contribution would not appreciably affect the outcome of the effort to produce collective goods anyway. The quantity of collective goods produced in large groups, if any is produced at all, will be suboptimal, since with only a relatively few sharing the burden for a large group, there will be less collective good than is needed for everyone.

Olson reasons that the only way to obtain the necessary resources to produce an adequate amount of a collective good is to coerce individuals to join or to provide private
selective goods as incentives in order to get people to join. Olson considers coercion as a negative incentive. As an example, he cited the use of force against strike breakers. Other negative selective incentives could be compulsory membership in an organization such as a labor union when that is a prerequisite to getting a job. Mandatory homeowner associations are examples in subdivisions within some neighborhoods. Where membership in the home owners association is mandated by dedicatory instruments, refusal to join means that an otherwise willing buyer cannot purchase a home in that subdivision.

Positive selective incentives for Olson were pecuniary in nature. They could be anything from coffee mugs decorated with the organization's logo to group insurance -- but they must be tangible goods or services that can be selectively allocated to some (members) while excluding others (nonmembers). From casual observation it is well known that there have been many types of tangible benefits used to promote membership in voluntary associations.

By Olson's logic, ordinarily people only join organizations producing collective goods because they are forced to do so or because they wish to receive the private material benefits of membership. However, with respect to coercion, Olson notes that if the limitation on individual
freedom (coercion) were imposed through a democratic election in the interest of the group involved, then some would say the "compulsion" was not really compulsion. If the vote was unanimous to impose a compulsory rule, then there would be no infringement upon the freedoms of those involved -- no more so than when two people sign a contract. Olson says that this "unanimous" consent would be unusual. This description of origin may fit some mandatory homeowners associations that are established by the neighborhood residents in older neighborhoods as opposed to those that are established by developers prior to the residents moving in.

Nevertheless, Olson reasons that the production of collective goods are by products of group formation in that members do not join or remain in organization to provide the necessary resources for the production of collective goods. Therefore collective good outcomes do not necessarily represent the collective will of the membership. This in a nutshell is the problem of collective action as identified by Olson.

Olson's logic stirred the complacency of political scientists who had previously taken for granted that interest group representation insured broadly based democratic political processes as Truman had suggested. However, political scientists for the most part did not agree with
Olson that economic self interest was sufficient in and of itself to explain why people join or do not join interest groups. They observed that while some organizations, especially those that produce large economic lobbies, may fit Olson's assessment, other organizations (such as voluntary neighborhood organizations) may not fit so well. Even large organizations may in some cases attract volunteer supporters without coercion or material selective goods and also attract members in sufficient numbers to produce substantial collective benefits. This observation motivated revisions to Olson's theory and much of the subsequent empirical research that are summarized below.

*Exchange Theory and Collective Action Organizations*

Whereas Olson had focused on the ordinary member's rational calculations, Robert Salisbury (1969) shifted the focus to that of the leader or political entrepreneur. Thus incentives could be derived by both parties to an exchange, the leader and the ordinary member of an organization or interest group.

Olson had conceded that there were two categories of nonrational members in organizations. One category involved the member that is coerced into joining. The other involved the philanthropic member who joins to obtain benefits for
others. Salisbury brought the coerced member into a rational framework by reasoning that "coercion" could be a cost incurred by the member in an exchange with the leader. For example, at the neighborhood level, an entrepreneur may require joining and paying dues to a home owners association as a "cost" of purchasing the preferred home. In exchange for monetary support of the organization, the home buyer would receive the promise of the leader/entrepreneur that the neighborhood would be maintained and protected, thus the cost of mandatory dues is the cost of insurance that the value of the individual's home as a place to live and as an investment would be preserved or enhanced over time.

Salisbury's exchange theory suggests that there is a link between the preferences of the "purchasers" and the collective good outputs of the suppliers. In the case of mandatory and many voluntary neighborhood organizations, the collective good desired and presumably delivered at a cost, may be a stable neighborhood. A utilitarian good may result indirectly from the stable neighborhood in the form of protection or enhancement of private property values.

Salisbury also expanded Olson's incentive structure to include intangible goods that could be offered by leaders in exchange for support. This was based upon the prior work of Clark and Wilson. They had argued that nonmaterial goods
could be incentives as well as those that were material selective goods. They associated the type of incentive with different types of organizations.

Clark and Wilson introduced the notion into their analysis that leaders need a net surplus of incentives so that they could tailor them to the preferences of the membership that they wish to target. Specifically, they categorized three types of incentives organization leaders could offer members that corresponded to types of organizations as follows: (1) Material incentives which generally correspond to utilitarian organizations such as political party machines, where such incentives may take the form of rewarding constituents with government jobs, government appointments or government contracts in return for financial or other support for candidates and the party. (2) Solidary incentives which are intangible and typically found in philanthropic organizations, but also with social clubs and political reform groups. They include publicity, fellowship, prestige, recognitions and rewards. (3) Purposive incentives were identified as usually change oriented, group goals that may lack specificity. This type of joint and non-subtractable incentive provides a collective benefit and is the focus of Olson's problem of collective action as previously discussed.
Purposive goals are usually general and frequently require long term commitment, making it harder for leaders to demonstrate success in obtaining a specific benefit. For example, neighborhood organizations might have a stated goal of "neighborhood revitalization" or "improving the quality of the neighborhood environment". Since many actors outside of the organization may be involved in achieving such goals and since it may take extended periods of time to achieve the goals, the neighborhood leaders may stress "service", such as a newsletter, to overcome this problem.

Salisbury modified Clark and Wilson's purposive incentives. He preferred to describe the benefits one can derive from expressing certain kinds of values. People are willing to join groups that provide a channel for public expression of values, such as is currently the case with many anti-abortion, pro-choice groups and environmental groups. Salisbury uses this concept because he is distinguishing between intra-organizational incentives which were the focus of Clark and Wilson's analysis and an inter-organizational focus on lobbying in relation to collective organizational goals such as the right to life or neighborhood improvements.

In either event, once the group's primary goals are achieved, according to Salisbury, Olson's analysis may once again be applicable.\textsuperscript{7} This is because members may withdraw
unless selective benefits are introduced to maintain their organizations after their original substantive purpose is fulfilled. Salisbury adds that solidary incentives also may be injected into the organization at this point in order to increase stability of the organizations. (Salisbury indicated the converse may also occur, in that groups originally organized around solidary incentives may add expressive incentives to maintain their membership roles.)

In summary, Salisbury posits that the group entrepreneur/leader invests his capital to create a set or mix of benefits, which he offers at a price to a market. The price is group membership, which may cost as little as a supportive signature or as much as the heavy dues attached to some trade association memberships. The market is the unorganized group of people who have a preference for the incentives offered by the entrepreneur. Salisbury reasons that the motive of the entrepreneur/leader to provide collective goods is to obtain his own selective benefits (profits such as votes or campaign contributions). Nevertheless when collective goods are the motive for joining, exchange theory claims that there is a link or congruence between the leader and members.

When Salisbury shifted his focus from the ordinary member to the political entrepreneur, he still neglected to address
how the ordinary member would figure that his contribution would make a difference in achieving a collective good, a problem that in Olson's logic could not be overcome for large groups. Objecting to this, Frolich, Oppenheimer and Young (1971 contended that none of the prior literature on political entrepreneurs had explained the incentives that attract potential contributors to organizations that produce collective goods. They posited that important interactions occur not only between leaders and ordinary members but also strategic interactions occur between members. They claimed that the latter context is required because the potential voluntary contributor must believe that his contribution will make a difference or he will not contribute in the absence of personal benefits. Expectations as to what others plan to do will influence the decision to contribute. This is because any individual contribution will only make a difference if there are sufficient contributions coming from other members. Frolich, et al., cite others who have contributed to the theory of political entrepreneurship such as Richard Wagner and Albert Breton.9

Frolich, et al. agree with Olson that in large groups, no one is likely to value the collective good more than the cost of supplying it, since costs are high and marginal utility is low. However, they point out that since no one is likely to join, it is also true that no one taking a "free ride" is
likely to be a potential benefactor either. Therefore in this situation Frolich, et al. indicated that the members may decide on a strategy to pool their resources to produce a collective good through a central agency. In this way Frolich, et al. bring the organization into their formal model as a cost factor for the political entrepreneur and as a potential benefit for members who wish to coordinate expectations and pool resources.

In 1980, Terry M. Moe followed the lead of Frolich, et al. and shifted the focus of analysis from the individual leader and/or member to the organization. He examined leadership, member participation, staff and internal politics from a theoretical perspective. As Salisbury had claimed in relation to political entrepreneurs, Moe argued that the incentives organizations offered to induce members to join did not have to be pecuniary in nature. Specifically, he reasoned that the individual may be induced to join based upon ideological appeals, social pressure and/or efficacy perceptions. These may figure into the "rational" decision to join in that they have value or utility for some individuals.10

Addressing Salisbury's failure to explain why members would offer support in exchange for collective goods, Moe relaxed Olson's assumption that the rational individual
obtains perfect information. He argued that an individual may perceive that his support will make a difference because he lacks relevant information. Thus imperfect information may lead to a rational decision to contribute, even though there are others that will get a "free ride". Therefore, efficacy is viewed as a perception that a small contribution will have a small marginal impact yielding small net gains in exchange for joining.

Moe's notion of efficacy is similar to Salisbury's idea with respect to lobbying, in that the consumer may be convinced by the leader (correctly or incorrectly) that there is some threshold of membership that is necessary to improve bargaining power to the point that the desired collective benefit can be obtained and that his contribution to reaching that point is meaningful, even though small. Moe's notion of efficacy might also cover the contention of Frolich, et al. that strategic interaction of members occur based upon expectations an ordinary member has about what others will or will not do, because in large groups this expectation would probably be based upon imperfect information.

Moe's concept of "social pressure" is easily understood. If there is the prerequisite of interpersonal relations among "believers" and their neighbors, co-workers or other social contacts, then the cost of joining may be less than the cost
of holding firm in the face of real or perceived peer pressure. Other social scientists such as Robert Huckfeldt have emphasized the importance of social context in terms of influencing individual choice.\textsuperscript{12}

Moe moves further away from a pure economic model by injecting ideology as a factor in the decision to join. (Similarly Salisbury linked expressive incentives offered by leaders to ideological groups)\textsuperscript{13}. Ideology involves allegiance to a particular belief system and may lead to attempts to promulgate that particular belief system, or policies commensurate thereto. The pursuit of an ideological goal may be completely unjustified from an pecuniary point of view, in that an ideology may lead believers to actually sacrifice their own selective material, social or even physical well being for the cause. This may be the case when the ideologue and the formal group she joins exist in a milieu which is dominated by a different ideological belief system from their own. In such an instance rewards would most likely be solidary ones, intrinsic to the group.

Thus Moe approaches the question of collective action by assuming there is potentially a wide range of economic and non-economic values that may be involved. The end result is a conclusion that once again incorporates political, psychological and economic values into more complex but
adaptive framework in order to explain why people join and or remain in voluntary associations that produce collective goods.

*Commitment Theory*

Sabatier and MacCubbin (1990) have built upon the political notion of ideology as an incentive for the decision to join under the rubric of commitment theory.\(^\text{14}\) Sabatier, et al. argue that if Olson’s theory holds that people will only join if they receive selective benefits, then there would be no difference in the ideology of members and nonmembers of groups. An alternative view is that people join because of commitment to the collective—material and/or ideological goals of the group.

Exchange theory posits that congruence is high between leaders and members except when selective incentives are the motive for joining, thus implying members are of necessity more dedicated to obtaining collective goods than leaders. Commitment theory argues that leaders are more committed than members. Moderating theory (also addressed by Sabatier and McCubbin) posits that leaders are less committed than members since they become more pragmatic as they are faced with balancing competing objectives or interests.
Sabatier, et al. compared an environmental group and Chamber of Commerce group to determine whether or not "exchange theory" or "commitment theory" provided the best empirical fit. They find some support for commitment theory or ideological incentives attracting leaders and members. These findings were related to the environmental organization and suggest that leaders may be more committed to a policy stance than members who are in turn more committed than nonmembers. However their work did not entirely support this notion. Their was some deviation with the Chamber groups having leadership and nonmembers more conservative than rank and file members. Thus the Chamber results were more supportive of "by product" theory since Chamber members were not very conservative/ideological and since they do receive selective benefits such as promotion for their business or group insurance.

Patron Theory

Patron theory evolved from the exchange literature as applied by Jack Walker (1983) and others to organizations that receive outside funding sources and thus have patrons. Walker found that citizen interest groups at the national level received less than half of their support from member dues. About 42% came from external sources such as foundations. His point was that such patrons expect to receive benefits not
always public policy oriented in exchange for their support, and they are not likely to support organizations that do not share their views on social policy. He argues that increasing the numbers of interest groups through patrons may not achieve pluralist democracy. Thus, outside funding may serve to obviate broad representation even though the numbers of interest groups have increased through patrons.¹⁵

Political - Economy Theory of Organizations

Recently David Knoke analyzed across micro and macro levels of analysis to find support for a comprehensive theory of the political economy of collective action. He asked (1) How do organizational constraints influence individuals, and (2) How do individual's intentions and actions combine to affect the organizations?. He used National Association Study data which was taken from interviews with 459 leaders of 13,000 national organizations. Knoke's theoretical argument is that individuals choose to become involved in collective action, not by rational choice/self interest criteria alone, but also because of group norms to which they ascribe and/or because of attachments to the group that individuals may have.¹⁶ He relates relevant individual level data to organization level data and finds general support for his theory by examining 27 hypotheses related to the environments and their organizations.
Of importance to this research is Knoke's findings with respect to formal organization incentive structures and governance structures. His analysis did not support Olsonian logic of collective action that selective material incentives must be provided along with collective goods incentives to get people to join or participate in a nationally based collective action organization. He found that selective benefits that are provided are related to the interests of more apathetic members while public goods incentives are strong motivators of individual participation in the organizations surveyed. The types of interest inducements provided by organizations were dependent on the diversity of goals of the organization, rather than the interest preferences of members and potential members. While members expressed diversity in their interests, greater diversity in incentives offered by the organizations resulted in less member support. For highly political organizations this relationship was not only negative but significant. However, members did increase their support for organizations when their interests were congruent with incentives offered by the organizations.

Knoke concluded that democratic and voluntary structures do in fact result in member participation within the organization. However, while democratic control of the national interest organizations was widespread, Knoke found that bureaucratic characteristics also emerge as the national
organizations mature and become larger. Knoke acknowledges that bureaucratization of interest groups may be necessary for coordination and implementation of policy goals. Knoke points out that hierarchial and centralized structure is inherently in conflict with democratic controls that ideally are inclusive.17

Theoretical Guidance for Neighborhood Research

Frolich, et al., Moe and Knoke’s concern with the effects of the organization on democratic involvement is well placed because leaders through organizations must to some degree use a system of hierarchy to structure the preferences of members and nonmembers, when ideally democracy is about having things the other way around, where constituents structure the preferences of the leaders.18 This very difficult arrangement logically requires democratic organizational governance structures that encourage broadly based participation of the constituency and minimal bureaucratic structures. However, as society has grown more complex, bureaucratic and professional, neighborhoods may also fall heir to more reliance on centralized and bureaucratized structures.

What is of special interest to this research on neighborhood organizations is that Frolich, et. al., Moe and
Knoke contribute to a theoretical bases for bringing formal organizational structures into the empirical analyses of political and economic theories of collective action. Frolich et al. suggest that formal organization does make a difference by providing a mechanism for pooling resources and coordinating their use for collective benefits. Organizations also make a difference by providing a structure to facilitate individuals engaging in strategic behavior through interaction with others (thus communication within the organization and between the organization and its environment is important to efficacy perceptions).\textsuperscript{19}

Moe (1984) suggests that various incentive structures and governance structures should be taken into account because they may offset or compound (as the case may be) the problems of asymmetrical information in the exchange between leaders, staff and constituents of public bureaucratic organizations with respect to democratic processes of policy making. Policy directs and thus effects the production and distribution of collective goods.\textsuperscript{20}

Theoretical issues of the political economy within an organizational context are addressed by Knoke (1990) through micro and macro cross-sectional analysis in national interest group organizations. His theory is concerned with two interconnected organizational systems. One system is the
organizational economy which specifies how sets of incentives induce members and external constituents to contribute time, money and effort to the group. The other is the organizational governance structure, a mechanism for reaching collective decisions on the allocation of values to group goals.\textsuperscript{21}

While the organizational dynamics may play out differently in neighborhood organizations than they do in the national interest groups, the political economy theory of collective organizations that Knoke posits should be useful as a framework for analysis of neighborhood organizations as well. As with national interest groups, neighborhood organizations have incentive structures and governance structures that are formed and maintained within the context of their organizations' external environments. It is assumed that the structures are designed to draw from the environments the political and economic resources that they need to exist. Thus these structures are expected to intervene and modify environmental and contextual influences and the predispositions of individuals to participate within the organizations.

The political economy perspective applied to neighborhood organizations is useful in attempting to synthesize the other theories cited in this chapter. As Knoke (1990) indicated for
national interest groups, different pieces of the whole picture represented by group theory and economic theory should be reflected in the internal systems of organizations, their external environments and the levels of collective action within the organizations. The extent to which this has been accomplished through empirical investigation at the neighborhood level is discussed in the next chapter, along with questions that remain unanswered.

Notes


CHAPTER 3
Empirical Findings Pertaining to
Neighborhood Collective Action

The theories reviewed in Chapter 2 have guided much of the empirical research at the neighborhood level. As Olson's theory would predict, the research has led to many skeptical conclusions regarding the ability of neighborhood groups to organize with enough support from members to implement meaningful collective action. This is in part because, even at best, resources available to neighborhood entrepreneurs to create a surplus of profits for the provision of selective as well as collective incentives are generally limited when compared to large economic interests. This problem is especially evident in relation to neighborhood organizations that serve the lower end of the SES spectrum. In addition, problems of neighborhood based collective action for the purpose of lobbying city hall may be due in part to a lack of efficacy perceptions that citizens have in relation to city government when business interests are perceived to dominate as Peterson and others have found.¹

Patron Effects on Neighborhood Activism

With limited resources available within neighborhoods, it is not surprising that patrons and their effects upon
performance and other organizational dynamics have been of theoretical importance in relation to neighborhood research. A substantial amount of neighborhood collective action research has focused on low SES neighborhoods located in major cities where city governments have served as patrons to neighborhood organizations.

The patron literature on cities and their neighborhoods has usually been conducted in one major city at a time where there are low income neighborhood organizations that have received support from local government, such as official recognition by the City with formal access to city government and/or technical and financial support to organize and to maintain the organizations. Steven H. Haeberle, 1989, and John Clayton Thomas, 1986, have found positive outcomes when cities have given formal support to neighborhoods in low income areas.²

Haeberle examined the effects of the Citizen Participation Program sponsored by Birmingham. He found that it was effective in overcoming the negative impacts of low income status on citizen participation. In turn, this was found to result in expansion of democratic decision making, so that more resources were allocated to stabilize residential neighborhoods. Thomas found that neighborhood associations became a significant force in Cincinnati as a result of city
programs to assist neighborhoods, also stemming from Community Action Programs of the War on Poverty era. An emphasis on city services was found among black homeowners as well as black renters. For black renters, the services gave them their "stake" in the neighborhood, even as home ownership provided a stake for both blacks and whites. Thus white homeowners and black renters were found to join community councils despite SES status differences and ownership differences, but they joined for different reasons (protecting investment versus seeking services). This was not true for white renters who virtually did not join. Neither socioeconomic status nor service orientation tended to pull up the involvement of white renters. Black homeowners had a somewhat higher rate of council membership than white homeowners, though whites were still in the majority of all community council members in the city.

As did Richard D. Shingles before him, Thomas suggests that blacks historically have distrusted city hall. This makes it more important symbolically to have black leadership, whether homeowners or renters, operating through the community councils legitimized by official or quasi official status in the City. Overall, while only one in eight adults in Cincinnati were involved, community councils advocating services for their respective neighborhoods gave residents a "stake" in their neighborhood that resulted in more even
representation among diverse groups. Thomas, Haeberle and others who have studied the city as patron have obtained similar findings from their analyses.

Based upon the investigation of a neighborhood corporation in Los Angeles, California, Terry L. Cooper (1980) had previously argued that citizen participation decreased over time as patron sponsored professionalization and bureaucratization of community organizations increased. As the scope of the organization expanded to include planning and community development issues outside funding had to be accepted. Expansion, rather than the original limited scope of articulating needs for specific services within the neighborhood, led to increased dependency on outside funding for professionalization of the organization. This tended to diminish the connection between citizen preferences and the needs articulated by the development corporation to the city. Cooper’s analysis lends qualified support to earlier critics such as Saul D. Alinsky who strongly disagreed with cities serving as patrons. The Alinsky school argued that by coopting the leaders of such organizations, few significant gains are made for the neighborhood.

Another argument against the city as patron has been expressed by Douglas Yates (1977) and others. Yates conclusion was based upon a study of New York neighborhood
organizations. His research suggested that when a city legitimizes neighborhood groups, they may end up with too many demands for city government to handle. Like Cooper (1980), Yates had also found that a limited scope of articulating needs for specific services elicited more citizen participation than more general planning and community development goals.6

More recently in a much more extensive study involving 15 cities, Jeffrey M. Berry, Kent E. Portney and Ken Thomson (1993) add evidence to support the previous findings of Haeberle and Thomas. They argue that their data should lead the critics of the city as patron to revise their thinking. They selected five cities, four in which the city government had formally structured neighborhood participation. These five cities were compared to ten control cities without structured participation. However, of the five experimental cities, one did not fit very well with the others. This was because four of the cities had city sponsored community action programs while the fifth, San Antonio, Texas did not. San Antonio was included in the experimental group because it has a city wide community action program that has been effective for years. However, that program, Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), was privately sponsored, structured along parish boundaries of the Catholic church in the Hispanic section of the city with outreach throughout the city.7
In any event, their research was an attempt to understand city wide, comprehensive democratic structures. They did not investigate the variations in democratic structures of neighborhood organizations or their effects upon citizen participation. Thus no attempt was made to measure possible differences in neighborhood organizations and the effects of those differences on citizen participation. Respondents were not asked whether or not they belonged to neighborhood organizations.

Perhaps due to the focus of their particular research design which was away from neighborhood organizations, Berry, et al. found that the "experimental" cities had no more success in achieving low-SES citizen participation than the "control" cities. However, they did find that the cities with structured participation offered more meaningful channels of participation for those who did get involved. This effectiveness was measured in terms of policy responsiveness to neighborhood concerns across various segments of the population within a given jurisdiction. The city wide comprehensive structures for neighborhood involvement led business people to expect neighborhood involvement in decisions effecting neighborhoods. Thus business interests were more apt to seek solutions with neighborhood groups over development issues. The cooperative behavior was found to help businesses achieve their goals some times, though
neighborhood organizations won the battles over policy about one half the time, while businesses were successful only about one third of the time.\textsuperscript{8}

Given the broader scope of their research, and despite the sampling problems associated with San Antonio’s privately sponsored community action program, the Berry, Portney and Thomson findings provide broader support for the contention that patron roles played by the city have a positive influence on the decision of at least some individuals to participate who would not otherwise do so. The positive results also extend to facilitating more democratic processes at City Hall that lead to policy outcomes somewhat more favorable to the neighborhoods than might otherwise be predicted. On the other hand, San Antonio had a successful city wide neighborhood based organization, COPS, without the city serving in a patron role.

However, studies focusing on the effects of the city as patron to city wide neighborhood based organizations do not offer insights into institutional attributes within indigenous neighborhood organizations that may elicit or detract from meaningful neighborhood support for the production of collective benefits to the neighborhood. This omission could lead to the conclusion that in order to overcome the economic determinants of organizing the grass roots, particularly in
low income neighborhoods, help must always come from outside the neighborhood, usually from local government in the form of formal opportunities for access to city government, technical assistance and/or in financial support. Cities usually do not provide such assistance, and may be less likely to do so in periods of slow economic growth, compounded by high levels of demand for tax reductions.

Incentives that Motivate Individual Activist

Pamela Oliver (1984) examined the effects of private incentives, concern for collective goods, costs (education and income) and social ties on members and nonmembers of all-volunteer neighborhood organizations. She found a paradox: people who are willing to absorb costs of community activism have less respect and liking for neighbors and believe if they want something done that they will have to do it.

Oliver's psychological explanation emanates from social context, not collective goods. It was found to be the best predictor of willingness to be a leader. This is a form of leadership commitment that is at least indirectly related to collective goods incentives. While it is dangerous to generalize from observing one city, Oliver's study adds an interesting notion to research into the psychological
explanations of individual commitment to leadership roles. 9

The Neighborhood Environment and Neighborhood Activism

Acknowledging that the decision to participate is an individual one, Steven H. Haeberle, 1987, examined macro level influences upon the individual with respect to deciding to participate. 10 Using Birmingham with its community wide Citizen Participation Program as his research site, he tests two hypotheses. They are (1) the "standard model of community participation" that activists are demographically skewed along the lines of socioeconomic status, (in which case Haeberle argues that formal city support of neighborhood organizations would only serve the middle and upper classes in the city) and (2) environmental factors associated with size and degree of isolation from other neighborhoods (boundedness). He hypothesized that both are positively related to citizen participation. (Citizen participation was operationalized as total number of meeting attendance per year per 1,000 residences converted to a standardized measure - Z scores.) This measure does not reveal how citizen participation within individual organizations varies, nor does it address the question of the influence of organizational structures on member involvement within the organization. Nor does it even indirectly address how representative are the neighborhood
organizations' leaders in speaking for their neighborhood constituents.

As previously noted in the discussion on Birmingham as a patron city, none of the socioeconomic variables (median household income, percent high schools grads, percent black, median age and median age squared) were significant in predicting participation. However, of the environmental variables, total population (population size) and property value (reciprocal of median rent of non-owner occupied residences and percent of housing built before 1939) were significant in explaining participation. (Thus these patterns were not eliminated by the Citizen Participation Program.) Size was inversely related to citizen participation. Property value (reciprocal of median rent) and age of neighborhood were positively related to participation. Tenure was not significantly related. Like Oliver, Haeberle did not find a significant relationship between owner occupancy and citizen participation.

The assumptions with respect to the significant environmental variables were that neighborhood age (measured by age of housing stock) is associated with neighborhood identity. While it may also be associated with need, income was used as a control measure of need. Therefore the regression analysis enabled the testing of the independent
effect of age and indirectly, neighborhood identity, which as previously indicated was positively related to citizen involvement.

Haeberle also assumed total population to be related to neighborhood identity in that at the higher end of the range, it was expected that a feeling of community began to break down. Also as rental income increased, it reflected an atmosphere of "garden apartments" with a linear land use pattern along major arteries that Haeberle assumed was not conducive to a sense of neighborhood identification.

A strong sense of neighborhood identity among the residents, suggests group cohesion. Prior to Haeberle's work on neighborhood identity, Matthew Crenson (1978) studied the effects of neighborhood identity to the extent that neighborhood identity, or lack thereof, is tapped by social networks within the neighborhood. Thus Crenson examined the effects of social networks within homogenous neighborhoods. He challenges previous findings that participation in formal community groups is related to participation in informal groups, i.e. the more cohesion in the neighborhood, the more support residents will give to neighborhood organizations.
Crenson observed neighborhood organizations in predominantly white, middle income communities in a single city. He developed findings from interviews with 10 neighborhood leaders and then conducted interviews of active members of organizations in six neighborhoods from a random sample of about 40 residents from each neighborhood. He found that organizations in loose knit neighborhoods were more successful in obtaining recognition within the neighborhoods, had higher levels of participation and best represented concerns of the neighborhoods. However, disputes were more intense and more often within organizations of loose-knit residence who had also been found to develop closer personalities within the organization that the close-knits or cosmopolitans whose close friends lived elsewhere.

He suggests from this that different types of neighborhood organizations are likely to emerge from neighborhoods with different types of social networks. All organizations were found to expand their agendas over time, but there was more concurrence between neighborhood agendas and neighborhood residents in loose-knit and cosmopolitan neighborhoods than in close-knit situations. From these findings he speculated that neighborhoods of loosely-knit people may have the potential to carry out functions of urban governance without much reliance on city hall.
In a follow-up study, Crenson (1980) examined the potential effects of neighborhood identity on citizen involvement in collective action. He found that black respondents identified their neighborhood by name less often than whites. He speculated that if SES heterogeneity occurs when blacks are "compressed" into neighborhoods (not by choice), and that this socioeconomic diversity may take away from a the sense of neighborhood even in the presence of racial homogeneity.¹²

Crenson did not focus on the internal structures of the organizations and their explanatory power in relation to involvement of neighborhood residents in the neighborhood organizations that he examined. While he examined social context to determine impact of social networks upon citizen involvement and support within organizational settings, he did not examine how the organizations' internal structures worked to induce or discourage citizen to join and support the organizations, all else being equal.

*Neighborhood Organizations, their Structures and their Political and Economic Environments*

Richard Rich, 1980, suggests that closer investigations of the structures of neighborhood organizations in relation to neighborhood socioeconomic environments would be useful in obtaining a broader view of what involves the membership in
supporting neighborhood organizations. Therefore, he conducted in depth case studies of eleven neighborhood organizations selected from 122 organization respondents to a mailed questionnaire. Six were voluntary organizations, two neighborhood corporations that were federally sponsored and two municipally sponsored neighborhood corporations and one "contractual" home owners association in Indianapolis, Indiana.\(^\text{13}\)

Rich found patterns between socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhood environments and types of organizational incentive structures provided by organizational leaders. Formally coercive organizations were more likely to form in rich areas of the city and were more likely to be effective in mobilizing resources and applying them to collective goods than voluntary organizations, which are more likely to form in poor areas. In turn, organizational capacity to ensure adequate support by means of mobilizing enough resources to produce collective goods was related to the percent of contributions that leaders could apportion to production as opposed to overhead costs. He contended that this pattern should contribute to the uneven distribution of neighborhood representation and services across diverse neighborhoods.

In general, his findings supported his major hypothesis that the organization's structure has an independent effect on
performance, but not necessarily an effect on a broad base of voluntary support from the membership. For all of organizational types, he did not find evidence of much exchange occurring between leaders and a broad base of neighborhood residents. To the contrary, from the interviews with 54 officers in the 11 organizations, he found that officers of the organizations had little contact with the general membership.

The lack of an exchange relationship was also consistent with observations of the effects of internal mechanisms of the organizations on member involvement. While the organizations did have formal means of representation (popular election of officers, and meetings, etc), membership was small in all of the organizations in comparison to the total population of the neighborhoods represented, and only a fraction of the formal members actually participated in decision making.

Rich found that the likelihood that collective goods would serve as an incentive for leaders to be involved is directly dependent on the efficiency and effectiveness with which the organization promises to secure collective benefits. This in turn is effected by the powers vested in the association and its ability to overcome the logic of collective inaction by guaranteeing adequate participation and
mobilizing sufficient resources, thus reducing the cost of leadership.\textsuperscript{14}

In the second article "A Political Economy of Neighborhood Organizations", the same data base is used. In it he reported a conceptual scheme that focused on resources and structure for analyzing neighborhood associations. He based the analysis upon a theoretical notion that neighborhood associations are institutions used by persons who see themselves as members in order to promote interests that they share as a result of their locale. He found support for this and thus for theories of representative democracy more than participatory democracy at the neighborhood level.\textsuperscript{15} As Rich notes, the small number of cases for each type of organization precludes making inferences from his findings. But Rich's research is useful in setting an agenda for more definitive studies on neighborhood organizations.

\textbf{Summary of Findings and Questions that Remain}

As the review of the empirical literature on neighborhood collection action has revealed, we know a great deal about the decision calculus of leaders of neighborhood collective action. We have evidence that their motivations may be selective, but unlike leaders of many national and state interest groups, they are seldom motivated by selective
incentives that are pecuniary in nature. There is some evidence that collective goods incentives motivate neighborhood leaders. We know less about the incentives that motivate ordinary members of neighborhood organizations. More research is needed with respect to the explanations of why and how ordinary members are induced to support neighborhood organizations. Unfortunately, it is usually not feasible or possible to gather sufficient individual level survey data for the micro level analysis needed to gain more insights into their motivations.

Extant neighborhood research has led to conclusions consistent with those of research on national interest groups, by providing evidence that Olsonian theory gives only a partial explanation of individual motives in relation to collective action. Substantial evidence has been brought forward that collective goods and psychological factors related to intangible selective benefits have been a greater factor than the pecuniary self interests in motivating those who become neighborhood activists. In addition, neighborhood contextual variables have been found to place constraints on individual choice. For the most part, social interactions and their influence have been investigated in micro level investigations of neighborhood leaders and in cross level analysis.
There has been a great deal of research on Community Action Programs. From it, the city as patron seems to insure at least symbolic and in some cases substantive representation of low income and minority neighborhoods. However, this body of literature has not provided substantial evidence that there is broadly based participation resulting from Community Action Programs and thus from the city serving as patron. If this is true, then questions remain as to whether or not city sponsored neighborhood organizations are representing the predominant interests of their respective neighborhoods.

Rich (1980) provided evidence that a significant relationship does exist between neighborhood environments and neighborhood organization structural variables. His tentative conclusions need further study. In addition, there has not been much focus on the role of formal institutional arrangements within the organizations and their relationship to internal member involvement. The need for such a focus is compounded by the recent upsurge in neighborhood organizations and particularly mandatory organizational structures. The latter are especially noticeable by their near absence from the neighborhood literature.

Thus, it is evident that many questions remain as to whether or not neighborhood organizational structures make any difference in eliciting citizen involvement in collective
action and thus whether or not they can contribute to higher levels of citizen participation and the broader representation of interests in local government. To conclude anything about the effects of neighborhood organizational structures in relation to citizen participation from recent national level studies, may obscure important differences. It is important to investigate the wide range of formal structures of neighborhood organizations, including coercive structures as suggested by Rich, in order to determine what if any part they may play in raising or lowering the levels of voluntary support and participation.

If only marginal differences are found, it may not support the idea that participatory democracy is strong in neighborhood organizations. Yet even a marginal difference, if significant, would support the notion that the way neighborhoods are organized can intervene in diverse neighborhood environments to contribute to or detract from grass roots political participation.

Notes


8. Ibid., 135-165.


11. Matthew A. Crenson, "Social Networks and Political


Chapter 4

The Political Economy Theory Applied to Neighborhood Organizations and The Hypotheses to be Tested.

The theoretical framework for this dissertation is Knoke's political economy theory of organizations that he applied to national mass membership associations as discussed in Chapter 2. Based upon Knoke's theory, both political and economic environmental variables influence the way organizations are structured. These environments also directly influence individual commitment to collective action.

In addition, the internal formal structures of organizations, both political (governance structures) and economic (material incentive structures), influence the extent of member involvement in policy decisions and implementation activities within the organization. Knoke's theory also deals with how the organizations influence public policy decisions external to the organizations. This research differs from Knoke's in that it only focuses on the usefulness of macro level variables that are relevant to the theory. How organizational resources are applied to influence public policy and its effectiveness is also included in Knoke's theory and research, while omitted from this research.
Finally, this research differs from Knoke’s, and in this respect is similar to Rich, in that it is focused on neighborhood organizations rather than national interest group organizations.

The application of political economy theory to this research also differs from Rich (1980). Rich focused only on organizational characteristics which he thought were most susceptible to change through public policy. Thus he examined the degree of formal coercive power of the organizations or lack thereof, the frequency of the types of organizations in relation to neighborhood socioeconomic structures, and the effect of coercive authority upon the ability of neighborhood organization leaders to utilize their resources for the production of collective goods.

While this research also focuses on coercive versus voluntary structures, the emphasis and design is expanded to include Knoke’s concern with the effects of variations in democratic governance structures and the types of material incentives offered from within the organizations that cut across mandatory or voluntary organizations. Also like Knoke, and unlike Rich, this research design tests the political economy theory using multiple regression, whereby political and economic factors which are assumed to occur
simultaneously can be evaluated for their significance and their partial effects on member involvement.

The relationships Knoke specified between external environments and organizational components are adapted for application to neighborhood organizations as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. While recognizing that organizations may impact and alter their environments, Knoke did not consider reciprocal relationships in his theory. Nor will they be considered here, due primarily to the lack of longitudinal data.

Figure 4-1

Relationships Among the External Environment and the Internal Environment of Neighborhood Organizations

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<th>Macro</th>
<th>Neighborhood Environment</th>
<th>Org. Structure</th>
<th>Member Involvement</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro</th>
<th>Neighborhood Resident</th>
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Figure 4-1 above indicates the broad relationships across micro and macro level relationships. Only the macro relationships defined by continuous lines are tested in the empirical analysis that is described in subsequent chapters. There is no cross level empirical analysis conducted in this
research. However, based upon previous neighborhood research as discussed in Chapter 3, macro to micro relationships are assumed to exist. Discussion of key micro level assumptions is provided in order to demonstrate that the macro level hypotheses that are tested for the purposes of this research make sense at the micro level as well.

The macro level theoretical concepts regarding the political economy of neighborhood organizations give rise to the hypotheses presented later in this chapter. They form the bridge between the broader theory of relationships (Figure 4.1) and probable explanations of observed phenomena. The description of the way the relevant variables are operationalized and the delineation of the systematic tests of the hypotheses are not provided until the subsequent chapters. The operational variables that are described later will include several different measures of citizen involvement that are internal to the organization. These variables are the dependent variables on which the independent variables related to the formal organizational components are regressed to explain their success or lack thereof in inducing citizen involvement.

Fortunately, macro level data related to the neighborhood environments and the internal organizational structures are available to address the question of whether or not structural
components of neighborhood organizations are associated with certain neighborhood environmental factors, and then to determine whether or not these formal components of the organizations make any difference in relation to the aggregate levels of participation by leaders and ordinary members. This approach meets the requirements of normal science and research which is to develop scientific knowledge incrementally within the framework of an existing paradigm. The standard is met because there is a clear connection between the narrow research problem and related hypotheses to be tested and the broader theory of organizational political economies as illustrated in Figure 4-1.2

Neighborhood organizations are a special case of collective action organizations that need to be examined in their own right to determine if a political economy model is useful for gaining insights into how neighborhood groups organize and to what degree they are successful in involving members in leader selection, policy making and implementation. The distinct attributes of neighborhood organizations and their environments are discussed below.

The Macro Level

Neighborhood macro level political and economic variables are distinct from the macro level environments of national
interest groups in ways that may result in different patterns of relationships. For example, neighborhood organizations are geographically based and bounded, whereas national interest groups are functionally based with external environments that make boundary maintenance more problematic. Thus national mass membership organizations tend to operate in highly complex and uncertain external environments as Knoke claims. Yet those unbounded environments offer more potential resources for organization support than smaller bounded neighborhood environments. These differences have a bearing on the means of obtaining the resources which organizations must have to function to produce collective goods and to ensure member compliance, since those resources are drawn from the organizations' environments.

Knoke's political economy theory incorporates instrumental resources and infraresources. The former involve power to exert sanctions by one individual or group over another individual or group. The latter are resources such as information and available time. Infraresources are prerequisites of instrumental resources, even as the physical infrastructure of urban areas must be present to accommodate buildings if they are to be functional once constructed. As the organizational environments become more complex and uncertain, infraresources weaken or more specifically, information flow and available time to participate decrease.
Knoke posits that this generates the need for increasing levels of bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{3} This may or may not hold for neighborhood organizations, since complexity and uncertainty may be less a problem than in the environments of national organizations. Neighborhood environments and the close proximity of individuals and groups within them may be conducive to better flows of information and available time, by comparison to national organizations.

Nevertheless, when comparing across neighborhood environments, there are still varying degrees of complexity and uncertainty. Complexity of neighborhood environments as conceptualized for this research have several characteristics of diversity; diverse land uses, racial diversity and diverse property interests and conflict. These variables also may contribute to fragmentation of neighborhoods and may negatively impact neighborhood identity. Survey data of neighborhood residents is not available to measure the level of perceived uncertainty stimulated by social, economic or physical diversity within the neighborhood. For the purpose of this investigation, it can only be assumed that uncertainty stems from environmental complexity and the frequently related perceptions that racial diversity, diverse property interests and mixed land uses have or will eventually hurt the residential neighborhood. Thus complexity and uncertainty as operationalized by diversity and related environmental
measures in neighborhoods may result in confused, conflicting or blocked information flow similar to that to which Knoke referred, and it may reduce the number of neighborhood residents that participate in neighborhood organizations.

However in neighborhoods, such circumstances are expected to have the opposite effect on the likelihood of bureaucracy than posited by Knoke in relation to national interest group organizations in that diversity in neighborhoods should be associated with decreasing bureaucracy. This is because neighborhoods with conditions of diversity may be subject to greater scarcity of economic resources. There are generally more constituents or patrons available in the environments of national interest group organizations that have surplus financial resources that organizations may be able to extract, even though the organizations exist in complex and uncertain environments. Neighborhood organizations in complex and uncertain neighborhood environments are not expected to be able afford paid professionals and staff, nor have the incentive to do so, unless patron resources are obtained.

Knoke did not consider individuals and organizations outside an organization’s boundaries to be of major theoretical importance in the political economy model. Nor are they considered of major theoretical importance in terms of their influence on the incentive structure of neighborhood
organizations. Knoke did consider governments to be of theoretical importance with respect to external environments. This concept should apply to neighborhood organizations as well. However hypotheses related to governmental environments cannot be tested in this research. This is because all organizations in the sample are located within the same city government and virtually within all of the same jurisdictions that overlap city government. (Jeffrey M. Berry, et al. (1993) empirically observed the differences governmental institutions can make across five experimental cities and 15 control cities with results as previously summarized in Chapter 3.)

The physical boundedness of neighborhood environments is dissimilar from national interest group environments studied by Knoke and others. Well defined neighborhood boundaries are conducive to organizational ability to obtain formal coercive authority to mandate membership and the payment of dues, provided there are slack resources in the neighborhood, which is generally the case in more affluent neighborhoods. Coercion in terms of negative incentives to join is usually not found in national public interest groups, with the exception of labor unions and some professional groups that have the authority to bar from practice those who do not join. Therefore with respect to the internal components of neighborhood organizations, there is a special need to study
the partial effects of formal authority to use coercion in relation to volunteer citizen participation within the organization.

It is generally known that many mandatory neighborhood organizations are not formed democratically. They are often formed unilaterally by a "patron" developer. However, patrons may structure internal participation rules to be decentralized, resembling those of voluntary organizations. In some cases, they may be more even more decentralized and inclusive than in some of their voluntary counterparts. While voluntary organizations may be democratic at their inception, as previous research has suggested, this does not necessarily guarantee the ongoing maintenance of an open democratic process nor does it guarantee that the organizational goals and incentives will reflect the predominant collective values of the neighborhood. In addition, the relevance of goals and related incentive structures and financial capacity in mandatory organizations may vary in ways that are similar to their voluntary counterparts.

Thus, mandatory or voluntary organizations may or may not provide sufficient avenues of participation and relevant incentive structures. The other formal mechanisms provided may effect levels of member involvement within the
organization, regardless of whether or not membership is mandatory.

In national organizations, Knoke classifies utilitarian incentives as private goods in the form of direct services to members that are consumed on an individual basis. Private goods consumed on an individual basis are generally not provided by neighborhood organizations. However, here it is argued that certain types of collective goods provided by neighborhood organizations have utilitarian effects that may influence the decision of neighborhood residents to contribute voluntarily to their respective organizations.

In affluent neighborhoods, organizations may exist primarily for the utilitarian purpose of pooling relatively abundant private neighborhood financial slack for production or co-production of material collective goods and services that may protect or enhance individual property values. These collective incentives may consist of deed restrictions, maintenance of common areas, the maintenance and operation of recreational facilities available to all neighborhood residents, added security patrols or other maintenance or operational functions. These collective goods are categorized as "status quo" oriented activities for the purpose of this research.
When community goods and services are provided by neighborhood organizations and particularly if funded by mandated dues, neighborhood organizations are different from national interest groups in that they resemble minimal private governments more than they resemble interest groups. Therefore as previously suggested, there is the question with respect to the study of neighborhood organizations as to whether or not those in which dues are mandated are successful in inducing members into paying additional costs of voluntary contributions of time and money for providing collective goods from which they may receive a direct benefit.

Generally, even in affluent neighborhoods, the resources available to produce selective material goods of meaningful quality and quantity in addition to the collective goods incentives are limited by comparison to national interest groups. However selective incentives remain of theoretical importance in that contrary to Olsonian logic, neighborhood organizations in general must rely upon collective goods and services to attract membership and induce their continued support and compliance, unless they have the power of coercion through the negative selective incentive of mandatory requirements.

In summary, neighborhood organizations' environments are generally smaller in size and better defined with respect to
their service area and their constituency than national association environments. Also, their environments are generally less complex and may generate less uncertainty with which the organizations must cope. Neighborhood organizations have more limited sources of economic surplus or "slack" to draw from than do national organizations. But to the extent that they can marshall the resources, they can provide more direct and immediate collective benefits than their national counterparts. All of these factors may make for different structural components of neighborhood organizations and patterns of collective responses to the formal political and economic structures of neighborhood organizations than those found in national organizations.

The Micro Level

It is assumed that individuals may perceive their stake in the production of collective goods by their respective neighborhood organizations as being greater than do constituents of national voluntary organizations. This is due to the immediacy of the neighborhood concerns about property values, security and amenities and the potential for these to be impacted by neighborhood organizational outcomes.

While material selective incentives are an integral part of the inducements offered by many national associations,
their provision may not be necessary at the neighborhood level where individual preferences for collective goods may be relatively strong. Due to the smaller size of neighborhood organizations' constituent base and their ability to exclude from most collective benefits all but those within their service area boundaries, a favorable cost/benefit ratio for the expected utility of collective goods may exist to a greater extent than in functionally based interest groups at the national level. If status quo values are threatened, an individual may calculate that involvement in collective action to arrest decline will reap benefits that are in line with the costs, even though others in the neighborhood may benefit without contributing. Such benefits could be perceived as protecting or enhancing private property values, as well as the quality of life and the environment of the neighborhood as a whole.

However, if there are no apparent threats to the status quo, it is unlikely that collective goods incentives would induce much voluntary support. Thus the status quo incentives under homogeneous neighborhood conditions (minimal complexity and uncertainty) may tap rational choice orientations of the individual involved and create "free rider" problems of collective action similar to Olson's logic in relation to completely voluntary associations. This problem has been
addressed by making membership dues mandatory for homeowners in many subdivisions and neighborhoods.

Intangible benefits may be more readily available for neighborhood residents than for constituents of national interest groups. For example, it is assumed that opportunities for affective bonding provide intangible social and psychological selective benefits that are greater in neighborhood organizations than in national interest groups. Such intangibles should facilitate overcoming the problem of collective action in neighborhood organizations without the use of material selective incentives.

Finally even in loosely knit neighborhoods as Crenson (1978) suggested, it is assumed that the close connection of residents to their neighborhood environment allows neighborhood norms to exert stronger influences on individuals than normative values exert on constituents of national organizations. This should predispose citizens to participate within the neighborhood organizational framework to produce collective goods.

Individual level survey data is not available to test any of the micro level assumptions relevant to the political economy theory of organizations. But the framework (Figure 4-1) for empirical testing using available data at the macro
level for neighborhoods and neighborhood organizations is discussed below.

**Neighborhood Environments and Internal Formal Organizational Components**

The macro level political and economic components of neighborhood organizations and the environments that influence their structure are identified in Figure 4-2 below. They are the components of the empirical analysis of relationships between the neighborhood and formal organizational components.

**Figure 4-2**

Formal Components of Neighborhood Organizations and their Macro Environments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEIGHBORHOOD ENVIRONMENTS</th>
<th>NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS' FORMAL COMPONENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical diversity/</td>
<td>Membership requirements &amp; size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Diversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial diversity/</td>
<td>Stated purpose (status quo or change oriented) &amp; related incentive structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Interest diversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>Financial capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood wealth</td>
<td>Governance (Centralized or decentralized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service arrangements (Paid or volunteer)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Neighborhood Environments & Organization Membership**

**Requirements.** Mandatory membership requirements are a key factor in the incentive structure of many neighborhood
organizations. As previously discussed, they are the only theoretically important selective incentive found within neighborhood organizations. In Olson's terms, mandatory membership is a negative selective incentive. As such, it is a utilitarian incentive, simply because if potential homeowners are not willing to join the organization, they cannot purchase homes in the effected neighborhood. As the market value of housing increases, it is more likely that the homeowners and home buyers in the respective market segment will be willing and able to bear the marginal increase of housing costs imposed by mandatory extractions. As previously noted, mandatory associations are frequently established by the developer of a subdivision at its inception. In those cases there is no other explanation needed to explain this type of structure in a neighborhood, although mandatory organizations may be subject to dissolution by the vote of neighborhood residents after a specified period of time.

While most mandatory homeowners association are established by developer fiat, some have been established by vote of neighborhood residents. In either event, mandatory organizations are expected to be located in middle to upper income neighborhoods that have slack or surplus financial resources that can be extracted if the coercive power to do so is granted to the neighborhood organizations.
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood that neighborhood organizations are mandatory or that they were initially mandated by a developer will increase as neighborhood wealth increases.

Also diversity is not expected to be found in neighborhoods with mandatory organizations. This is because by definition, "status quo" purposes should not lead to change and the diversity in land use, property interest and racial groups that may follow. In addition, when diversity does exist in neighborhoods before a neighborhood organization is established, the residents are less likely to have homogenous values that would influence them to be potential supporters of a unified effort to establish or maintain mandatory homeowners associations.

Hypothesis 2. The likelihood that neighborhood organizations are mandatory or that they were initially mandated by a developer will decrease as neighborhood diversity increases.

If mandatory organizations are established by developers to protect the "status quo" or if formed by unanimous consent of the homeowners or a majority of the homeowners within established subdivisions or neighborhoods, it follows that the neighborhoods that they serve would contain housing that is for the most part is occupied by owners that are sufficiently committed by their investment to bear the burden of mandatory
dues and the costs of compliance with the organization's deed restrictions.

Hypothesis 3. The likelihood that neighborhood organizations are mandatory or that they were initially mandated by a developer will increase as the percentage of owner occupied homes increases in the neighborhood.

In neighborhood organizations, there are a variety of membership eligibility requirements which range from those that limit voluntary membership to homeowners (a characteristic found in many voluntary membership organizations as well as in almost all mandatory organizations) to those organizations with progressively open requirements that may make full membership available to renters, homeowners or in some instances even businesses in the neighborhood or interested citizens or other private interests from outside the neighborhood.

Thus is reasoned that as neighborhood affluence decreases and the rate of owner occupied housing decreases, organizers may deem it necessary to structure membership requirements to be more open, since the neighborhood organizations will probably need to draw upon resources from a broader range of groups and interests in order to develop and maintain adequate support for the neighborhood organization. It would follow that as neighborhood diversity increases, that more open membership requirements would be structured in order to
organize diverse interests to work together on behalf of the neighborhood.

Hypothesis 4. The smaller the percentage of homeowners, the less the neighborhood wealth and the greater the neighborhood diversity, the more open the membership requirements will be in voluntary membership organizations.

Neighborhood Environments and Organization Size.
Mandatory and voluntary organizations vary in size relative to the neighborhood in which they are located. Mandatory organizations may serve small enclaves of condominiums or townhomes that exist within larger neighborhoods that vary in their socioeconomic and physical attributes. Other mandatory organizations encompass large subdivisions that comprise homogeneous neighborhoods. Nevertheless if mandatory, a neighborhood organization represents, for better or for worse, 100% of organization membership and thus its service area. Therefore membership size is equal to the number of households within the legal jurisdiction of the organization. Generally, though renters may occupy some of the homes and benefit from the services provided, membership remains with the owners of the homes.

However for voluntary organizations, neighborhood attributes of residential wealth and owner occupied homes are likely to be even more influential in their effects on the
percentage of the neighborhood represented by organization. This is because increasing discretionary resources associated with the wealth of residents and increasing commitment associated with owner occupancy provide prerequisite resources for building of formal membership roles in voluntary neighborhood organizations.

For both Hypotheses 5 and 6, regarding the explanatory power of environmental variables on "service area representation", a control must injected to test for voluntary organizations only.

Hypothesis 5. The greater the neighborhood wealth and home-owner occupancy, the greater the percentage of the neighborhood represented by voluntary organizations.

On the other hand, diversity of racial groups, of land use and of property interests may be associated with smaller percentages of the neighborhood claimed to be represented by neighborhood organizations. This is because the potential of unstable information flows that arise in more complex environments may disrupt the organizational strategy for broad based representation of the neighborhood. In neighborhoods, diversity may lead to conflicting interests. As with national interest groups, this may lead to dissimilarities between many constituents and members of the organization. Thus diversity
may have an independent and negative effect upon the percent of the neighborhood represented by neighborhood organizations.

Hypothesis 6. The greater the diversity of the neighborhood, the less the percentage of the neighborhood represented by the organization.

**Neighborhood Environments and Organization Purpose and Incentive Structures.** In relation to the formal incentive structures of neighborhood organizations, environmental variables are presumed to generate "collective goods markets" that are either "status quo" oriented neighborhood markets or change oriented neighborhood markets; or in transitional neighborhoods, a mix of the two. It is argued that neighborhood organizations will be established and maintained for purposes that are relevant to the needs of the neighborhoods that they serve, if for no other reason that they cannot marshall sufficient resources to provide meaningful selective goods to maintain membership support and collective goods as well (with the exception of the negative selective incentive of mandatory homeowners associations). It is also reasonable to expect that formal incentives structures will be related to the purpose of the organizations in that they also respond to the neighborhood environment or "markets" that they generate.
For example, diverse and economically poor neighborhood environments would be more likely to have neighborhood "change oriented" collective goods markets. If the organizational incentive structure is relevant to the needs of diverse or poorer neighborhoods as reflected by attributes of the physical, social and economic environment, its purpose and predominant activities may be related to the provision of housing programs, social services, economic development and lobbying for improved city facilities or services.

In relation to the physical, social and economic environments, less diverse neighborhoods, wealthier neighborhoods and neighborhoods with higher rates of owner occupied homes are assumed to be indicators of neighborhood stability. Thus the organizations serving such neighborhoods are expected to structure "status quo" incentives, such as the enforcement of deed restrictions, maintenance of common areas and security. These organizations may also engage in lobbying. When they do, it is more likely to be to oppose outside agencies possibly in connection with public or private development proposals that would bring about a change of adjacent or nearby land uses.

As previously noted, a predominance of owner occupied homes as opposed to rented units may be found across neighborhoods that vary in measures of wealth and diversity.
Therefore it is necessary to investigate these neighborhood attributes separately in order to determine their independent effects on incentive structures.

Hypothesis 7. The more affluent the neighborhood, the less change oriented the purpose and the incentive structure and the more owner occupied homes, the less change oriented the purpose and incentive structure.

Increasing political complexity as manifested in racial, land use or property interest diversity in neighborhood environments from which neighborhood organizations draw most of their political resources should be associated with change oriented incentive structures that would be designed to reverse or arrest neighborhood decline.

Hypothesis 8. The greater the diversity of neighborhood environments, the more "change oriented" the purpose and the incentive structure.

More complex neighborhood environments are also more likely to influence organizations to sponsor solidarity activities such as neighborhood festivals and holiday celebrations to overcome fragmentation and lack of identity generated by complexity and uncertainty. Solidarity activities are collective benefits since residents of the neighborhood are not excluded from them, whether or not they are members of the neighborhood organization sponsoring them and whether or not residents who enjoy the social events
contribute to their production. In neighborhoods with racial and property interest diversity and conflict, leaders may use such events as a strategy to encourage neighborhood cohesiveness. These events may be one-time or annual events that have broad appeal and thus lend themselves well to voluntary contributions to offset lack of financial resources.

However, social events may be incorporated into incentive structures of homogeneous neighborhoods as well. As home ownership increases it is assumed that the likelihood of neighborhood organizations sponsoring celebration events may also increase. This is because home ownership should tap or even enhance the shared values related to neighborhoods, regardless of socioeconomic strata. Thus it is also posited that solidarity incentives are not dependent upon neighborhood wealth.

Hypothesis 9. The more diverse the neighborhood environment and the greater the rate of home ownership, the more likely the neighborhood organization is to include solidarity incentives in the incentive structure.

The conditions of unstable information flows in more complex neighborhood environments are also more likely to influence organizations to publish newsletters and directories to provide information to neighborhood constituents in efforts to induce broader based support. For national interest
organizations publications are frequently part of the selective incentive structure, in that newsletters or other communication products such as directories not only can be excluded from those who do not pay for them, but they also may assist members in the pursuit of private business promotional activities, investment activities, professional continuing education and other support services for the individual entrepreneur or professional.

However at the neighborhood level, while non-paying residents may be excluded from receiving publications, the purpose of such communications typically is not to provide information that can lead to private, pecuniary gains for the recipient. To the contrary, such newsletters are likely to provide information solely relevant to collective action and common goods. Directories are most likely to be for the purpose of assisting communication flow between officers and members and among members regarding common neighborhood concerns. Thus, these publications are categorized as collective rather than selective incentives. While diversity is expected to be associated with such publications for the reasons above, high production costs in time and money are likely to mean that neighborhood affluence and home ownership are also important. In addition status quo oriented organizations may use publications to inform neighborhood residents about the status of maintaining the "status quo".
As with publications, lobbying may be embraced by "status quo" and change oriented neighborhoods. However, it is expected that the less affluent the neighborhood, the greater will be the reliance on lobbying. Regardless of "status quo" or "change" orientation of organizational incentive structures, as neighborhood wealth declines, slack or surplus financial resources sufficient for private production of collective goods also declines in the absence of outside assistance. Therefore it is expected that there will be greater reliance on lobbying in less affluent neighborhoods. In addition to the direct relationship between declining wealth and declining owner occupancy in a neighborhood, there is another consideration. Declining owner occupancy means increasing absentee landlords, which may have an independent effect from declining neighborhood wealth.

Hypothesis 10. The more affluent the neighborhood and the higher the rate of owner occupied homes, the more likely the neighborhood organization is to publish newsletters and/or directories.

Hypothesis 11. The more diverse the neighborhood environment, the more likely the neighborhood organization is to publish newsletters and/or directories.

Hypothesis 12. The less affluent the neighborhood, the more diverse and the lower the rate of owner occupied homes, the more the organization will rely upon the lobbying incentive.

Neighborhood Environments & Organizational Financial Capacity. Neighborhood wealth should have an effect on the
financial resources that neighborhood organizations control, whether dues are mandated or not. Both mandated and voluntary dues logically would be set at higher rates in organizations serving wealthier neighborhoods with more surplus to contribute, and by the same reasoning, whether voluntary or not, dues are expected to be set at lower levels as neighborhood wealth goes down. Since member dues are the major source of revenue in Houston neighborhood organizations, neighborhood wealth is expected to have an independent effect upon the financial capacity of the neighborhood organization as reflected in organization’s budget.

Hypothesis 13. The more affluent the neighborhood, the greater the financial resources of the organization.

Owner occupied housing in neighborhoods should also be associated with increased financial capacity in voluntary neighborhood organizations, independently of neighborhood wealth. This is expected because homeowners have equity in their housing and a legally binding commitment to build equity through mortgage payments. Thus homeowners have a greater "collective" stake in preserving the quality of the neighborhood environment than renters. Renters probably are less committed because they can more readily move elsewhere if neighborhood conditions decline. Yet this does not mean that renters place little or no value on collective goods. They may also value such goods as increased neighborhood security,
recreational facilities or good drainage, streets and sidewalks. But without material investment in the neighborhood, the cost/benefit ratio of contributing may be relatively high and thus may translate into a greater propensity to "free ride" all else being equal. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that as the proportion of owner occupied homes increases, organizational leaders may expect more potential for voluntary financial commitment from their constituents and thus impose a greater financial burden on dues paying members.

Hypothesis 14. The more owner occupied housing in the neighborhood, the greater the neighborhood organization's financial capability.

Theoretically, Knoke's complexity and uncertainty is associated with unstable information flow across organizational boundaries. At the neighborhood level complexity means diverse and sometimes conflicting property interest and in general dissimilarities among constituents, which may as with national associations, translate into dissimilarities between many constituents and members of the organization. Complex neighborhood environments may also be associated with a weakening of the residential land use integrity of neighborhoods. Thus diversity in neighborhoods is used as a surrogate for Knoke's complexity which may also give rise to a sense of uncertainty at the micro level in
environments of national organization. Diversity, as a condition that evolves from changing circumstances in the neighborhood, may be associated with organizations having difficulty adapting their governance and incentive structures, thus reducing their capacity to exact financial contributions from sources within the neighborhood environment. Therefore diversity as a measure of complexity is expected to be associated with decreased financial capabilities of neighborhood organizations.

Hypothesis 15. The greater the diversity of neighborhood environments, the less financial capability the organization will have.

Neighborhood Environments and Governance Structures. Just as wealthy environments are posited to have "status quo" incentive structures, they are also expected to be associated with more centralized governance structures all else being equal. This is because in neighborhoods with more discretionary resources, organizations can acquire larger contributions to pay for staffing that may supplant a degree of volunteer participation in policy making as well as volunteer labor in production of collective goods. Under these conditions, governance structures are expected to become more centralized as the political economy theory would predict.
As wealth decreases, it is reasonable to assume that "sweat equity" needs to be substituted for financial capacity. Therefore strategically, decentralization structures may be designed to provide more opportunity for more people to contribute time and other human resources to support the organization and to compensate for low per capita budgets.

Hypothesis 16. The less affluent the neighborhood, the more decentralized the organizations governance structure will be.

Complex and thus uncertain political environments are posited to have decentralized governance structures. Knoke posited for national associations in complex and uncertain environments, that administrative structures would tend to be more bureaucratic as organizations attempt to cope with the attendant problems. At the same time Knoke posited that when conditions of complexity and uncertainty were combined with nonbureaucratic administrative structures, that governance structures would be more democratic. For neighborhood organizations, there may be more consistency, since complexity as manifested in the diversity variables in neighborhood environments is expected to be strongly associated with nonbureaucratic and decentralized structures and thus the most democratic governance structures.
Hypothesis 17. The more diverse the neighborhood environment, the more decentralized the organization’s governance structure will be.

Neighborhood Environments and Service Arrangements. As neighborhood wealth declines, slack or surplus financial resources sufficient to obtain paid staff or paid contracts to produce collective goods is expected to decline unless there is outside assistance. Therefore, it is expected that volunteers will produce increasingly greater proportions of the organization’s service incentives as affluence decreases in the neighborhoods.

Hypothesis 18. The less affluent the neighborhood, the more likely the incentive structure will be implemented by volunteer service arrangements provided by the organization.

Formal Organizational Components and Member Involvement

As previously contended, the formal components of neighborhood organizations should influence member involvement which should be reflected in the aggregate. In Figure 4-3 below, the formal organizational components of theoretical importance to the empirical analysis of relationships between the formal organizational structures and member involvement are identified.
**Figure 4-3**

Formal Components of Neighborhood Organizations and Member Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Organizations' Formal Components</th>
<th>Member Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership requirements &amp; size</td>
<td>Percent of nhbd. represented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated purpose (status quo or change oriented) &amp; related incentive structures</td>
<td>Leaders and Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial capacity</td>
<td>(Number volunteering and hours volunteered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance (Centralized or decentralized)</td>
<td>Percent of members attending meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service arrangements (Paid or volunteer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Membership requirements. Mandatory membership requirements (or the negative selective incentive of coercion) are expected to capture members willingly or unwillingly. Thus there should be more within the membership that are not predisposed to further involvement beyond the payment of mandatory dues. When membership is voluntary, there should be proportionately fewer who are not predisposed to make further contributions.
Hypothesis 19. Mandatory membership requirements are negatively related to voluntary member involvement within the organization.

In mandatory organization however, a few leaders may spend more time managing the organizations than their counterparts in voluntary organizations. This is because leaders of voluntary organizations are expected to have fewer and less reliable financial resources. These circumstances may translate into fewer activities for voluntary organization leaders to manage and thus less incentive for them to invest time in leadership activities than their counterparts in mandatory organizations.

Hypothesis 20. Mandatory membership requirements are positively related to leadership involvement within the organization.

As membership eligibility requirements are relaxed from mandatory to voluntary and then from the most restrictive eligibility requirements (homeowners only) to the most lenient for volunteer membership (i.e. anyone in or outside the neighborhood who is interested can join), it is likely that as a group, those who join will have less at stake in the outcome of organizational efforts and thus the percentage of the membership involved in voluntary participation of time will decrease.
Hypothesis 21. The more open the membership requirements of voluntary neighborhood organizations the lower the rate of member involvement in the organization.

Olsonian logic pertaining to organizational size is expected to hold for neighborhood organizations, all else being equal. This is because as Olson reasoned with increasing size of collective action organizations, the incentives to participate decrease.

Hypothesis 22. The larger the numeric size of the neighborhood organization, the smaller the percentage of members who will be involved.

Purpose and incentive structures. Logically, organizational goals are directly related to collective goods incentive structures. They are the means (first by promising and then by delivering on the promise) that organizations have to induce member support and compliance in order to obtain sufficient resources for allocation across organizational administrative and production costs.

As applied to national interest organizations, Knake categorizes incentives into three types, utilitarian, social and normative. He argues that utilitarian incentives stimulate rational choice responses from individuals who are willing to pay costs for receipt of direct, private goods and services. For neighborhood organizations, there are rarely
strictly utilitarian incentives as described by Knoke (private goods and services).

For example, social incentives provided by national associations are restricted to members. This is not typical of neighborhood organizations where if a collective effort is made to provide social incentives, it is typically provided for the entire neighborhood. Examples are holiday celebrations such as parades and carnivals.

Neighborhood organizations usually exist for the purpose of and rely primarily on the provision of some type of public goods. Knoke indicates that for national organizations that the provision of public goods require collective efforts to influence governmental policy makers. In neighborhoods, public goods are not necessarily limited to collective efforts to influence governmental policy makers. They may also involve production of collective goods by the organization itself. There are a wide variety of incentives offered by neighborhood organizations that meet collective goods criteria of joint and nonsubtractable attributes.

Organizational purposes are placed on a continuum from the most "status quo oriented" to the "most change oriented". Incentives are actually placed into four categories as previously noted in Figures 4-2 and 4-3.
The first two types of incentives are "status quo" and "change oriented" incentives and both contribute to a change oriented index as described in Chapter 5. The status quo incentives include maintenance functions such as deed restriction enforcement, maintenance of passive and active common areas and facilities and neighborhood security. These are not private goods consumed on an individual basis. Generally, they are joint and nonsubtractable. In relatively stable neighborhoods with little complexity or uncertainty in their environments, the typical resident is not threatened and will find political action less gratifying than other ways of spending private resources of time and money.7

Thus while these incentives have the potential for tapping normative values, under normal circumstances "status quo" incentives may not be very effective eliciting member involvement, while change oriented incentives are expected to be positively related to member involvement. Since neighborhood change goals require new policy formulation regarding future authoritarian allocation of values within the neighborhood they are expected to attract more member involvement. Change oriented incentives may include activities and programs such as economic development, physical improvements to the neighborhood infrastructure or social/philanthropic services to meet needs of youth, elderly or low income neighbors. These incentives are also assumed to
tap normative values for a common goods or causes. Since they are generally associated with neighborhood environments threatened by conditions of diversity, constituents and members of the organization offering change oriented incentives may become involved to either influence government action on behalf of the neighborhood or to enter into volunteer arrangements to privately produce the collective good.

Hypothesis 23. As organizational purpose becomes more change oriented, levels of member involvement within neighborhood organizations increase.

Hypothesis 24. As change oriented incentives increase, levels of member involvement within neighborhood organizations increase.

The third category of incentives are solidary incentives. They are festivities and neighborhood social events that may be designed to increase neighborhood identity. They rely on individual response emanating from affective bonding to other residents or perhaps a bonding to "place". For neighborhood organizations, solidary incentives are considered more change oriented than "status quo". However, Salisbury (1969) suggests that organization leaders may use them in lieu of selective incentives to increase the stability of organizations that have met their primary (purposive) goals.
Hypothesis 25. Solidarity oriented collective incentives are positively related to levels of member involvement within neighborhood organizations.

The fourth category is "communication oriented" activities such as the publication of newsletters and directories, provided primarily for the purpose of facilitating information flows regarding neighborhood issues and collective action within the neighborhood that cuts across the three other categories of incentives. These also are expected to be secondary incentives that may be mixed with either "status quo" or change oriented incentive structures to maintain support.

Hypothesis 26. Communication oriented activities are positively related to levels of member involvements within neighborhood organizations.

Another incentive that is treated separately is lobbying or contacting public officials. While organizations may lobbying for the "status quo" when they perceive that it is threatened, they also lobby for change, so it was not included in the change orientation index. However, since lobbying requires pressure on public officials which can be exerted by increasing the number of members actively involved, it is expected to explain increases in member involvement within the neighborhood organizational framework.
Hypothesis 27. Lobbying as an organizational incentive and increasing reliance on lobbying are positively related to member involvement.

Thus neighborhood organizations collective incentive structures may include a wide range of incentives that cut across these generic categories or they may be limited to one or more incentives that fall into only one of each of the categories. It is assumed that inducements for collective action are valued differently by different neighborhood residents within a given neighborhood. If this is true, then it should follow that the greater the scope of inducements (or the number of incentives provided), the higher the levels of member involvement.

Hypothesis 28. The greater the scope of inducements, the higher the levels of member involvement.

Financial Resources. Financial resources increase the capability of the organization to gain influence over others and to implement policies and programs. Leaders and ordinary members are expected to be stimulated to contribute more time to organizations that have the financial resources to assist them in implementation efforts.

Hypothesis 29. As financial resources of organizations increase, voluntary contributions of time by leaders and members will increase.
Governance Structures. The studies of collective action in neighborhood organizations have for the most part assumed that governance structures were democratic. Based upon this assumption, research has not gone very far in addressing the range of governance structures that may exist from the most centralized to the most decentralized and their effects on member participation. If research questions focus on such variations and their effects, the answers should shed light on the extent that neighborhood governance structures influence member involvement. Governance structures that are more decentralized offer multiple opportunities for member participation in policy formulation and implementation. Conversely, more centralized governance structures limit access to policy making and should be inversely related to levels of member involvement while more decentralized governance structures should have an additive effect on levels of participation within the organization.

Hypothesis 30. The more decentralized the governance structure, the broader the base of member involvement and the greater the contribution of voluntary hours to the organization.

Service arrangements. A variety of service arrangements are made by neighborhood organizations. Those organizations that include lobbying or production activities that involve volunteers in their implementation should be more effective in involving members in all aspects of the organization.
Hypothesis 31. The more services that an organization provides through volunteers, the broader the base of membership involvement and the greater the contribution of voluntary hours the members will contribute to the organization.

In Chapter 5, the operational definitions are defined that were used to test the hypotheses. These definitions form the bridge connecting the hypotheses to empirical observations. In the first part of Chapter 5, the research site, Houston, Texas, and data are also described in order to place this research into context of the particular city in which it is conducted.

Notes


4. Ibid., 54.

5. Ibid., 60.

6. Ibid., 55.
CHAPTER 5

The Research Design

The Research Site

The site selected for this research is the City of Houston. It is a sun belt city located in southeast Texas near the Gulf of Mexico. According to the 1990 Census, there are 1.6 million persons living within the city limits. Like many sunbelt cities, it has utilized liberal annexation laws to reach out and incorporate newly developed territory. As a result of this, the city sprawls over the Gulf Coast prairie and extends into the western edge of East Texas pine forests, engulfing a total of 581 square miles. As the "crow flies", in most areas of the city, one must travel 25 miles to get from one end to the other.

The city's population is multicultural, with citizens whose ancestry has come from 36 countries. According to the 1990 Census, 18% of Houston's population is foreign born and 30% of its population was born outside of Texas. In 1990, Hispanic, black, Asian and other minority persons together comprised almost 60% of the total population. This was the first Census count in which non-Hispanic white citizens of Houston were outnumbered by minority citizens.
Houston's economic development began to escalate from the beginning of the century with the famous Spindletop oil discovery in 1901 and the completion of the ship channel in 1914. With the growing economy, fueled by the ever increasing demand for oil and its products, the population also grew from 50,000 in 1900 to 1.6 million in 1980. By 1982, increased foreign oil production reduced the global demand which had a devastating effect upon Houston. Thus, after a population increase of 29 percent between 1970 and 1980, Houston experienced a population loss for the first time in the city's history in the early 1980's. However, by the time of the 1990 Census, the population had managed to register a small increase of 2% over the 1980 count. The stabilization and modest recovery of Houston's economy has been attributed to successful efforts by local government and the private sector to diversify the economy.

This giant metropolis, diverse in natural resources, population and the economy, is also diverse in its neighborhoods. Twenty percent of Houston's land area is comprised of single family residential subdivisions. Neighborhoods composed of one or more large single family residential subdivisions are found throughout Houston. According to Houston's Planning and Development Department (1992), the heaviest concentration of single family
residential subdivisions is in southwest Houston, and the
newest concentration is in the northwest quadrant of the city.
Older single family subdivisions exist in the inner city; the
Montrose area; the Third, Fourth and Fifth Wards and River
Oaks. These are inner city areas within or in close proximity
to the Interstate Highway-Loop 610. The old as well as the
newer residential subdivisions vary from low market range
housing (mostly in the northeast and southern areas of the
city) to very high market range housing (mostly in the west
part of the city and just southwest of downtown Houston).\textsuperscript{1}

Some of the older single family residential subdivisions
have deed restrictions that have expired. The impacts of the
expiration of deed restrictions are compounded in Houston, by
the fact that Houston does not have a zoning ordinance.
Therefore when deed restrictions expire, Houston neighborhoods
(apparently more so than in zoned cities) tend to become
mixed, with commercial and multifamily uses interspersed with
the original and, in most cases still predominant, single
family residential uses.

In some Houston neighborhoods, mixed uses exist
harmoniously. In other neighborhoods, the commercial uses
within residential neighborhoods are incompatible by virtue of
the type of use (bars or other uses that in some way adversely
impact the residential uses in the neighborhood) or by virtue
of increased traffic congestion, insufficient on-site parking, noise or drainage problems. Houston is also prone to incompatible land uses that impact deed restricted single family residential neighborhoods, where adjacent commercial and multi-family uses have been developed without adequate transitions in the height of the structures, their set backs or other design features that could mitigate their potentially adverse impacts. Such incompatibility between land uses gives rise to political activity over conflicting property interests as frequently reported by the Houston news media.

Mandatory homeowners associations are common within the City of Houston. Liberal annexation laws and the high growth rate in the Houston region during the 1970's and 1980's has led to their proliferation within the city limits. Often, mandatory homeowners associations are established in conjunction with Municipal Utility Districts (MUD's) outside the City of Houston. MUD's are mechanisms used by developers to create tax exempt bonding authorities to construct the new infrastructure necessary to serve new subdivisions. When subdivisions with MUD's are annexed by the city, the control of their mandatory associations usually shifts from the developers of the subdivisions to the homeowners. When this happens the predominant interest of the organization may turn to protection of the residential integrity of the neighborhood, particularly in the absence of zoning. As these
organizations proliferate within the city limits, they create a new and potentially powerful constituency that could influence public policy over and above the influence of less affluent and well organized neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{2}

As the above overview suggests, the City of Houston may differ in degree from other major cities within Texas and outside of the State in relation to characteristics of the natural and built environment, physical size, history of economic development, growth rate and perhaps in the extent and rapidity of growth in ethnic diversity. Why, then is it useful to study Houston, if in fact it is atypical?

Houston has a long history of civic associations, due to its most unique feature, the lack of zoning. Houston has been the locus of many active civic associations that were spawned by no zoning. At the same time, the city government has provided little in the way of incentives for participation in neighborhood organizations. As the review of neighborhood collective action literature in Chapter 3 suggests, most research has been conducted in cities where the city government has served as a patron to neighborhood organizations. Therefore the city sponsored systems rather than the internal institutional arrangements and internal dynamics of the neighborhood organizations themselves have
been the focus of much of the research on facilitating participation.

Yet it is assumed that in any given city, neighborhood organizations are not uniform in the internal structures and member involvement. As subsequent chapters confirm, in Houston, a large number of active neighborhood organizations exist that have different formal structures. In many instances they exist and are stimulated to act because of the lack of centralized land use regulations. In any event, they do not exist because the city sponsored their existence. Thus Houston provides a fertile field for research on the role of indigenous neighborhood organizations in facilitating "grass roots" collective action.

However, it is noted that recent research in Houston also indicates that there have been changes in how the city government operates. Changes have occurred whereby the public policy making process apparently has become more inclusive. This may have been brought about by a combination of the demographic and economic changes discussed in the preceding paragraphs, combined with institutional reforms in city government. The most notable institutional reform has been the change from at-large city council representation only to representation by nine districts as well as five at-large Council positions.
In the last decade, both the changing demographics and the institutional changes in government have apparently led to more involvement of some neighborhood organizations in the city's political arena, particularly around the issue of zoning. However, zoning remains an enigma and elusive for Houston at the time of this writing. Therefore neighborhood organizations as in the past remain active, but without any formal institutional linkages to city hall as zoning or perhaps other mechanisms could provide. These organizations remain without formal linkages to city hall in the way of financial assistance or quasi official status. Houston growth, politics and zoning have been the topic of numerous research pieces. While the lack of zoning and the city serving as patron may be viewed by many as unfortunate, it promotes an interesting research site and fertile field for the investigation of indigenous neighborhood organizations and how they overcome the problem of collective action.

During the span of time used in conducting this dissertation research and analyses, the City of Houston was going through its fifth attempt since 1947 to adopt zoning. Then within a two month period, it was twice defeated by the voters of Houston. First, on November 2, 1993, the proposed new zoning ordinance was defeated by a narrow margin. Then, on January 15, 1994, a referendum was held that was forced by a petition submitted by a "property rights" association. The
outcome of the second referendum insured not only that the currently proposed ordinance would not be adopted, but that no future ordinance would be adopted without voter approval. (Voter approval of an entire zoning ordinance is an option available to cities but it is not mandated under Texas statutes that enable cities to zone.)

Many neighborhood organizations were involved in the process in hopes of Houston adopting zoning. However, clearly from the outcome of election results, residents of neighborhoods were divided upon this issue. There were no questions asked in the survey about whether or not the organizations were for or against zoning, or whether they had been involved in any way in the zoning debate or other policy matters. Data gathered was for the purpose of addressing the narrow question of whether or not formal organizational structures influence levels of nonfinancial, voluntary member involvement within neighborhood organizations.

As previously referenced, the pros and cons of the city as patron recently have been researched in an extensive study by Jeffrey M. Barry, et al. For better or worse the City of Houston not only does not have zoning, but it is not a patron to its neighborhood organizations as that term has been used to describe assistance in the other cities in which recent research has been conducted.
Therefore, findings should be viewed with caution in terms of generalizing from them, because of the city's atypical characteristics. Yet in fairness, it is noted that similarities between Houston neighborhood organizations and those in other cities should exist despite Houston being unlike other major cities in some ways. Organizational types (such as mandatory and voluntary) and their internal, formal attributes (such as financial capacity, centralization and bureaucracy, and incentive structures) as found in Houston should have their counterparts in neighborhood organizations in other major American cities. In addition, the range of social and economic attributes in Houston neighborhoods should be found in neighborhoods in other American cities as well. Finally, while other major cities do have zoning, their civic associations are not always sponsored by their respective cities, and at least from time to time issues must arise that, like the issue of "no zoning" in Houston, test the capacity of their organizations as vehicles of citizen participation. Therefore, the investigation of Houston neighborhood organizations should produce results that are germane to the expanding pool of political science knowledge.

**The Data**

Two sets of data are used in this research: US Census Data (1990) and survey data on neighborhood organizations for
the year 1991. The purpose of the survey data was to obtain information on neighborhood organizations as vehicles for citizen participation. The information gathered for this purpose is related to the internal formal structures of the organizations, the environments in which they operate and the involvement of their membership in the aggregate.

No individual level survey data have been collected regarding perceptions, opinions and attitudes related to the neighborhood organizations. The lack of survey data from individual members and constituents of neighborhood organizations limits the research to a macro level analysis designed to obtain a better understanding of institutional differences between neighborhood organizations and whether or not they translate into different capacities to achieve citizen participation. The analysis cannot result in direct information as to any patterns related to psychological motivations or other characteristics of individuals that join and participate in neighborhood organizations.

The research would benefit from data that could be applied to cross level analysis including the individual, the neighborhood and the organization. It would also benefit from longitudinal data that could account for changed conditions over time that are not addressed within the limitations of cross sectional analysis. However, focusing on the available
environmental and organizational data in a cross section multivariate analysis has been lacking in previous research on neighborhood collective action. Thus, this focus will contribute to the ongoing efforts to integrate political economy theories that cover the question of citizen participation among neighborhood organizations.

The Survey Instrument

Houston has 443 neighborhoods as reported by the Bureau of Census, Neighborhood Statistics Program for 1990. The neighborhood census areas were defined for the Census by the city Department of Planning and Development and neighborhood organizations. One hundred and twenty three of the 443 neighborhoods have boundaries as defined by neighborhood organizations within them and the balance were defined by the City of Houston staff planners, based upon social, economic and physical criteria commonly associated with neighborhood composition.

The unit of observation is the neighborhood organization. Therefore the organizational survey was compiled and mailed to neighborhood organization leaders requesting information about the characteristics of the organizations and the neighborhoods that they served. Information was sought for the following categories:
• Neighborhood context
• Formation of the organization (When and why?)
• Membership type and characteristics
• Membership participation
• Leadership participation
• Method of selection of officers and the board of directors.
• Level of staff support
• Office facilities
  * Budget amount and budget preparation
• Funding sources
• Funding levels
• Services provision and service arrangements

The survey mailing list was taken from a list compiled in 1991 by the City of Houston’s Planning and Development Department. The Planning and Development Department staff developed as exhaustive a list of active organizations as they could, in order to facilitate their communication with neighborhood interest groups for purposes related to neighborhood planning and possible zoning. The list contained the names and addresses of 835 organizations.

Some of the organizations on the list were removed for the purpose of this research in order to obtain a list devoted entirely to neighborhood organizations within the city limits.
of Houston. The excluded organizations included those located in surrounding cities such as Humble and Sugar Land. (However as a pretest, the survey was sent to 40 of the organizations in surrounding cities that were taken from the original City of Houston list.) Also removed were organizations that were designated on the Houston list as "city-wide" as opposed to serving neighborhoods only. Finally, those organizations that could not be contacted through the mail for the lack of a current address were removed. From the remaining organizations (approximately 600) that were mailed surveys, 171 surveys were returned. Approximately 120 were returned as a result of the first mailing with the balance being returned as a result of two additional reminders that were mailed to urge recipients to respond, bringing the response rate to 29%.

From the 171 surveys returned, seven could not be used because they were not from neighborhood based organizations or the survey was mostly unanswered. Of the 164 surveys that qualified for inclusion in the data base, 151 organizations were located in 121 Census neighborhoods, which represents 27% of the 443 Census neighborhoods. The 1990 neighborhood Census data was matched to the survey data on the basis of the Census neighborhoods in which the 151 organizations were located. The remaining 13 returned surveys were from organizations located in areas of the city that were not designated and reported as Census neighborhoods. They were retained in the
sample by substituting the means for the Census data reported in Table 5-1.

The Census neighborhoods in which the sample organizations are located are representative of the population of the city as a whole. Table 5-1 reveals the similarity of the population characteristics of the City and the sample neighborhoods.

Table 5-1
Comparison of Population Characteristics of the City of Houston and Survey Sample Neighborhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POPULATION RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>CITY PERCENT</th>
<th>SURVEY SAMPLE NEIGHBORHOODS PERCENT (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHITE</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 (4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMERICAN INDIAN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER/HISPANIC</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1990 CENSUS (Percent sums to 101% due to rounding).

The Operational Definitions

Operational definitions are reported in three major groupings; member involvement within the organization, formal organizational components and the neighborhood environment.
Voluntary member involvement within different organizational structures and neighborhood environments is the primary focus of this research and the ultimate dependent variable to be explained. Consequently operational measures of voluntary member involvement will be discussed first in the sequence of operational definitions provided below.

Member Involvement within the Organization. The member involvement variables gauge different attributes of citizen participation within the neighborhood organizations. The measures are intended to tap both numbers of members and leaders volunteering time to the organization and the intensity of their volunteer contributions of time. Broadly based participation must be assessed not only on the basis of the percentages of total membership involved and but also on the intensity of that involvement. Therefore the variables are operationalized to tap the extent of member involvement in the organization as follows: (Data provided by the respondent was taken from actual records if available or given as a best estimate if records were not available.)

- **Leader involvement** = the percentage of members serving as officers and directors of the organization.
- **Leader involvement intensity** = the per capita hours of service donated by officers and directors.
• **Ordinary member involvement** = the percentage of members serving on committees and implementing projects.
• **Ordinary member involvement intensity** = the per capita hours of service donated by organization members.
• **Member attendance** = the percentage of the organization's members that attended one or more general meetings in the year of 1991.

Perhaps the most important aspect of broadly based member involvement is attendance at general meetings. It is assumed that this variable is important for several reasons. In many neighborhood organizations, elections are held at the meetings, rather than separately at precincts or by mailed ballots. Member involvement in voting to select leaders or to determine policy is, of course, the key to democratic collective action.

In addition, not withstanding the power of the vote, there is the power of information. The greater the attendance at general meetings, the more aware the constituency is of what is going on within the organization in terms of the allocation of neighborhood values. For these reasons, member attendance at general meetings is considered perhaps the most important measure of citizen participation in neighborhood organizations, as it is assumed (though not tested in this analysis) that with greater attendance at general meetings,
there is less discretion on the part of leaders and staff to act independently of predominant neighborhood values.

**Formal Organizational Components**

All operational definitions of formal organizational components are obtained from survey data. The measures are described below.

**Membership requirements and size.** There are three membership variables defined for the analyses: (1) the primary type of membership, which is either mandatory or voluntary; (2) the openness of eligibility when membership in the organization is voluntary and (3) membership size. These three types of requirements are operationalized as described below.

- The basic type of membership is a dichotomous variable, whereby membership is either mandatory or it is voluntary.

- The openness of eligibility variable is a score that was formulated from survey responses to statements concerning eligibility requirements for joining voluntary organizations.
With the exception of the first statement, the eligibility requirements reflected in the statements are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Therefore if the first statement was not true, then one or more of the succeeding statements could be true. Values are assigned so that the lower the score, the more restrictive the eligibility requirements and the higher the score, the less restrictive the eligibility requirements. The lowest possible score is 1 if membership is limited to homeowners. The highest possible score is the cumulative score of 14 (2+3+4+5) from the four questions.

Values to obtain the scores above are assigned as follows:

"1" if membership is limited to homeowners within specific boundaries served by the organization;

"2" if membership is open to renters and homeowners within the specific boundaries served by the organization;

"3" if membership is open to all residential and commercial interests residing within the specific boundaries served by the organization;

"4" if there is no residency requirement; and
"5" if there are different types of membership categories, such as individual, family, senior citizen or others.

- Membership size variables that are pertinent to the hypotheses are the following: (1) the percentage of the neighborhood households represented by the organization; (2) the percentage of the neighborhood service area represented by the organization, (this varies for voluntary organizations but not for mandatory organizations, since mandatory organizations are assumed to represent the entire service area for which they are mandated; and (3) the number of members of each organization reporting.

"Percentage of households" is a measure obtained by dividing the organizational membership reported in the survey by the number of households in the census neighborhood area. "Percentage of neighborhood service area" is taken directly from the survey as reported. "Membership number" is also taken directly from the survey as reported. The survey questions are provided in Appendix A.

Stated purpose. The stated purpose is tapped by a rank order variable based upon the primary reason the organization
was established. (Respondents were asked to select only one of seven reasons as the primary reason for the organization’s existence). The purpose is operationalized as a scale from one to seven, ranking from the lowest value, which is contended to be the most "status quo" oriented purpose, to the highest value, the most "change oriented" purpose. The ranking is on a scale from one to seven as follows:

"1" if the developer of the subdivision required the organization for maintenance purposes (not all such organizations have mandatory membership);
"2" if the neighborhood residents wanted better enforcement of deed restrictions;
"3" if the neighborhood residents wanted better protection against crime.
"4" if the neighborhood residents wanted better city services.
"5" if the neighborhood residents wanted to plan social events such as block parties and festivals.
"6" if the neighborhood residents wanted to organize self-help projects to generally improve the neighborhood.
"7" if the neighborhood residents wanted to foster housing and community services for low and moderate income residents.

Incentive structure. There are four measures of incentives. Two of them are the major categories, which are
"status quo" incentives and change incentives. There are also two support categories, both of which can be used to facilitate either the objectives of "status quo" or change or both. The two support categories are publications and lobbying.

Respondents were asked to indicate all of the services from the survey that they provided. From these data, a change oriented incentives index was constructed as the proportion of change oriented services to the total number of all of the services offered that are categorized as either as change oriented or status quo oriented. (Minimum = 0; Maximum = 1; Mean = .49; SD = .28) The two other service categories, publications and lobbying, are defined separately, since they may be used in conjunction with either change or status quo incentives.

Change oriented incentives are as follows:

- Cleaning up vacant lots in the neighborhood.
- Doing home repairs for senior citizens.
- Private fund raising for new park development.
- Private fund raising to improve existing parks.
- Installation of improvements to new or existing parks, tree planting, building park or playground equipment,
- Housing programs.
- Small business assistance.
• Business promotion.

Commercial revitalization and/or historic preservation.
• July 4th and other holiday celebrations, festivals, etc.
• Social services for the elderly.
• Social services for youth.
• Social services for low income families in the neighborhood.

Status quo incentives included in the change oriented incentives index base are as follows:
• The enforcement of deed restrictions.
• Operation and maintenance of swimming pools.
• Operation of tennis courts.
• Maintenance of streets.
• Maintenance of lighting.
• Provision of police/security services.
• Provision of fire protection services.
• Maintenance of landscaping.

The publication of community newsletters or directories and the representation of neighborhood concerns to public officials are operationalized as dichotomous variables. If an organization published community newsletters and/or directories, then the publications variable = 1, otherwise it = 0.
If an organization lobbied public officials, then lobby equals 1, otherwise it equals 0.

A second variable is constructed to measure the degree to which organizations rely on lobbying. The index of reliance on lobbying is a ratio of lobbying to all the services provided. (Minimum = 0; Maximum = 1; Mean = .17; SD = .18)

Social events such as July 4th celebrations are operationalized as a dichotomous variable, in addition to being included in the group of change oriented incentives. (They are not used simultaneously as exogenous variables.) Social events and celebrations are considered to be change oriented because neighborhood celebrations at a minimum represent change from the "status quo" for a day or for whatever period of time that is set aside for celebration. They also may result in more lasting cohesiveness in the neighborhood or at times, particularly in diverse neighborhood, they may be sponsored to assist merchants or to promote other forms of community development.

Financial capacity. Survey information includes the total budget amount for organizations for the year 1991 as well as the total membership. Total budget is divided by total membership to obtain the per capita budget amount, which is
the chosen measure of financial capacity for each organization.

It is argued that "per capita budget" figures provide a more valid "financial capacity measure" than the total budget amount, since any given financial capacity is diluted if spread too thinly over the membership served and by the same reasoning, strengthened if concentrated on an unusually small membership. The per capita budget amount also provides an indication of the financial burden of the organization imposed upon the membership, particularly if the sole or major source of the budget comes from member dues.

Governance structure. The survey elicits information regarding formal components of organizational governance structures that contribute to the degree to which the policy process is centralized or decentralized. There are three attributes of decentralization of policy and administration structures that are operationalized from the data and then combined to form an index of policy and administration decentralization. Data from the survey that contribute to this decentralization index are described below.

- The method of election of officers. The scores assigned are as follows: (Only one category could be chosen.)
"5" if elected by the neighborhood,
"4" if elected by dues paying members,
"3" if elected by outgoing board of directors
"2" if elected by another organization or individual.
"1" if self appointed.

- The number of paid staff members serving the organization. The scores assigned are as follows: (Only one category could be chosen.)
  "5" if there are no staff,
  "4" if there is one staff,
  "3" if there are two staff,
  "2" if there are three staff,
  "1" if there are four or more staff.

- The groups or individuals involved in budget preparation. The scores assigned are as follows:
  "5" if members are involved,
  "4" if committees are involved,
  "3" if a Board of Directors are involved,
  "2" if the president is involved, and
  "1" if staff are involved.

The maximum score for the three equally weighted variables is 15.
Another important measure of decentralization is access for rank and file members to the organization through general meetings. The variable measuring the extent that meetings are decentralized is taken directly from the data (Minimum = 0; Maximum = 13; Mean = 5.2 and SD = 2.56). Decentralization of meetings is operationalized as follows:

- The number of general membership meetings held per year. The larger the number of meetings the higher the decentralization score.

Service arrangements are the last of three measures of decentralization. This variable is an index of the extent of volunteer participation in the implementation of services. The services are the same services as previously listed in relation to incentives.

- The index of service arrangements = the total number of services provided by volunteers divided by the total number of services provided by any method. (Informants were asked to identify services arrangements for all of the services that their organization provided. The services arrangements are either provided by volunteers, paid staff or by contract to private or public entity.)

The Neighborhood Environment

The neighborhood environment variables are the following:
(1) diversity (physical/economic), (2) diversity (social/group interests), (3) the rate of owner occupied homes and (4) neighborhood wealth.

**Diversity.** Neighborhood diversity is represented by two dimensions; (1) economic and physical diversity and (2) social or interest group diversity. Factor analysis was used as a data reduction technique in order to reduce seven variables that indicate diversity to these two dimensions of diversity. The factor analysis as specified provided rotated orthogonal loadings (Varimax) on the two diversity dimensions. The loadings on diversity dimensions are reported below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical &amp; Economic Diversity</th>
<th>Racial &amp; Property Interest Diversity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rent dispersion:</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home value dispersion</td>
<td>.703</td>
<td>.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner occupancy dispersion</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed commercial &amp; residential dispersion</td>
<td>.571</td>
<td>-.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent interest conflict</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial diversity</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property interest pairs</td>
<td>.399</td>
<td>.686</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The eigenvalue for the rotated factors were 2.013 and 1.894, respectively. The percent of variance explained was 28.76 and 27.06 respectively. The diversity factors indicate diversity between blocks within their respective Census neighborhoods, but they do not tap diversity within blocks. Census data are not available to measure diversity within blocks at the neighborhood level.

The four variables that loaded on the physical and economic diversity dimension are as follows: (1) the coefficient of variation from the average rent for blocks within the neighborhood, (2) the coefficient of variation for the average value of owner occupied homes for blocks within the neighborhood, (3) coefficient of variation for the rate of home ownership for blocks within the neighborhood, and (4) a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not there is a mix of commercial and residential land uses within the neighborhood. These variables were obtained either from Census data or from the neighborhood survey as described below.

Economic diversity. All of the data for each neighborhood as defined in the 1990 Census is compiled from Census block data. As the measure of dispersion, coefficients of variation were computed for the average rent, the average home value and the overall rate of home
ownership for each neighborhood. The neighborhood averages were obtained from the block data (the sum of block averages divided by the number of blocks in the Census neighborhood). The neighborhood mean for the total number of blocks was then divided by the standard deviation for each variable. All three of the dispersion measures are included in the factor analysis of diversity, as it is reasonable to assume that they represent different facets of economic diversity in the neighborhood.

Land use diversity. Due the lack of neighborhood Census data related to commercial land use within the neighborhood, a dichotomous variable from the survey was used. The survey question asked whether or not the neighborhood is a mixed residential and commercial neighborhood. In this and all other instances of dichotomous variables, a positive response is coded as "one" and a negative response as "zero".

Racial diversity, property interest diversity, and property interest conflict variables that loaded on the second dimension of diversity (social/groups) were operationalized as described in the following paragraphs.
**Racial diversity.** A racial diversity index was obtained by using the formula attributed to Sullivan.\(^5\)

\[
A_w = 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{p} \frac{y_k^2}{V}
\]

The formula is where \(A_w\) = diversity within a population and \(y\) = the proportion of the population in each subcategory (or bracket) of each variable and \(V\) = the number of variables and \(p\) = the total number of subcategories (or bracket) within all variables. For racial diversity there is only one category which is race. The subcategories are the percentages of White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Other persons in each neighborhood census area in the sample neighborhoods as reported in the 1990 Census.

**Property interest diversity.** This variable is operationalized as the sum of the pairs of property interests reported by the survey respondent. The maximum number of property interest pairs that could be indicated as existing in any neighborhood is nine and the least number is zero, which is the case when all nine of the pairs were described as "not applicable". The nine pairs of interest included in the survey are the following:

- Tenants and homeowners
- Landlords and tenants
• Apartment dwellers and tenants
• Townhome owners and detached single family homeowners.
• Elderly and young families
• Home builders and residents
• Long time residents and newcomers
• Historic preservationists and anti-historic preservationists
• Commercial and residential property interests

Property interest conflict. A property interest conflict scale was developed for the intensity of conflict that was reported for each pair of interests. Respondents were asked to characterize the relationships of the nine pairs as either "very cooperative", "cooperative", "cooperative and conflictive", "conflictive" or "very conflictive". These characterizations were coded on a scale from 1 (very cooperative) to 5 (very conflictive) and totaled. The resulting scores could range from 0 (where none of the pairs were reported) as would be the case of single family residential subdivisions where most units are occupied by the owners) to a score of 45, where all property-related interests were evident in the neighborhood and all were characterized as very conflictive.
As previously discussed, neighborhood diversity factors are used in this research as surrogates for complexity and uncertainty as conceptualized by Knoke (47-65). For national organizations, Knoke posited that individual perceptions of uncertainty went hand in hand with environmental complexity. The social/group "diversity" variable for neighborhoods should tap social context that may influence micro level uncertainty.

**Owner occupied homes.** The average rate of owner occupied residential units as a percentage of all residential units within the neighborhood does not take into account whether or not there is diversity in the neighborhood as described above. (The neighborhood may consist of mostly single family homes and still have a low rate of owner occupied homes. On the other hand, a diverse neighborhood may have relatively few residences, yet a high rate of free standing owner occupied homes.) Therefore two variables measuring owner occupancy rates were created from census data. One measure is the ratio of owner occupied units to the total number of all residential units (single and multifamily) in the neighborhood. Multifamily units (attached townhomes or condominiums) may be owner occupied even as single family units may be owner occupied. For the first measure all residential units are included in the universe from which the percentage of owner occupied units is derived. A second measure is the rate of occupied single family units as a percent of single family
homes only. These measures are not applied simultaneously in any equation.

**Neighborhood wealth.** Neither block data nor any other level of income data is available from the 1990 Census that is suitable for aggregation to the neighborhood census area level. Two proxies are available that are at least blunt instruments to measure neighborhood affluence. They are the mean value of owner occupied housing and the mean value of rental housing. These variables do not correlate with their respective coefficients of variation. (For the average rent and coefficient of variation of rent, $r = .115$. For the average home value and coefficient of variation of home value, $r = .023$.)

The measure of neighborhood wealth that is needed for this research from a theoretical standpoint is a measure of "slack" (Knoke 52). For the purpose of neighborhood wealth, "slack" would be the extra financial resources of neighborhood residents that would not be encumbered by fixed expenditures such as rent or mortgage payments. Income, rent and home value all present problems as indicators of "slack" among neighborhood residents. This is because when controlled for ability to pay, it is assumed that individuals still vary considerably in the percentage of their income that they are
willing to commit to major, fixed expenditures such as homes or automobiles.

Additionally in Houston, housing values have followed the dramatic changes in the economy. Therefore, persons who bought homes before the extremely prosperous times of the late 70’s and early 80’s may live in homes that they could not afford even by today’s somewhat lower standards, particularly if they are living on fixed incomes. On the other hand, many people purchased homes in the Houston area during the prosperous times of the late 70’s and early 80’s, when home values peaked. By 1990, these persons may have had little slack income left after paying inflated mortgages on housing that has dropped in value. Rental rates are assumed to adjust more often to market demands. Yet as previously noted, individuals vary in the percentage of their income they are willing to pay for rent.

Therefore, even if income was accurately reported to the Census (which is questionable), the variable would not necessarily indicate slack. Data regarding disposable income after fixed expenditures are covered is needed to tap slack, but unfortunately it is not available.

While average home value and average rent are both initially evaluated as proxies for financial wealth in terms
of "slack" in the neighborhoods, the correspondence between average home value and average rent is high for the sample neighborhoods (r=.68). Average home value is selected as the most reliable gauge, since through credit requirements, it is more tied to personal income than the ability to rent.

All variables used in this research were operationalized to minimum multicollinearity among the variables that typically or necessarily are strongly related to one another. The extent to which the elimination of multicollinearity is accomplished will be evident in subsequent chapters in summary Tables of the correlation matrixes of the variables used.

The Approach to Analysis

Initially a descriptive analysis of the survey data related to organizational components and member involvement provides an overview of neighborhood organizations in Houston. Then comparisons are made between environmental and organizational attributes of mandatory and voluntary organizations using T-test (difference of means) analysis. Hypothesis testing follows by first applying bivariate analysis to determine the strength and significance of correlation between each two variables about which relationships are posited, before any controls are imposed.
Finally multiple regression analyses is used to control for alternative explanations and to determine partial effects that support the hypotheses made. Using multiple regression analysis, an Environmental Model is tested to examine environmental influences on organizational structure. An organizational model and then finally a combined environmental and organizational model are used to test propositions about the partial influence of each independent variable on member involvement and the combined impact of all on member involvement within the organization.

As previously noted, the objective of the testing is not to provide an exhaustive list of all probable influences, but the intent is to probe theoretically relevant probable connections between neighborhood environments and organizational structures and in turn, the influences of both on levels of citizen involvement within the organizations. Therefore no claims are made that the explanations are either necessary or sufficient for the establishment of neighborhood organizations or for the generation of member involvement in collective action.

Knoke (65) noted in relation to the 27 propositions that he posited about mass based national organizations, that "while no single one of these predictions is monumentally revealing, their combined quality gives the theory of
political economy great value in understanding collective action organizations" and he continued that "the failure of a single relationship to be consistent with the data is not reasonable ground for rejection of the entire theory". The same caveat is made for this research pertaining to the 31 hypotheses formulated to test the political economy theory as it relates to the special case of collective action in neighborhood organizations.

The Functional Form Selected for Multiple Regression Analyses

There are dichotomous dependent variables in relation to six of the thirty one hypotheses to be tested. They include hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, regarding environmental effects on the likelihood of organizations being either mandatory or voluntary, and hypotheses 9,10, and 11, regarding environmental effects upon the presence or absence of newsletters/directories and the presence or absence of social events.

Generally, a nonlinear model is the best estimate procedure when the dependent variable is binary. This is because the linear model, OLS (ordinary least squares), may predict values that are impossible in that their probabilities can exceed 1 or be less than 0. With OLS, it is also assumed that the error term will be unbiased, and with binary dependent variables with values of only 0 and 1, the variation
will be systematic. John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson provide a review of the assumptions of a linear model and the problems in relation to dichotomous dependent variables.\textsuperscript{6}

The nonlinear model solves these problems by assuming the dependent variable is binary and thus the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable is nonlinear. The nonlinear model also assumes that the marginal change in the dependent variable caused by the unit change in the independent variable is not constant and is thus better represented by a sigmoid curve. As with linear models, the nonlinear model assumes that the observations on the dependent variable are statistically independent of each other (thus no serial correlation), and that there is no problematic multicolinearity among the independent variables.

However, the interpretation of nonlinear models is not as straightforward as it is for linear models, and there are times when it is appropriate to substitute the linear equation when the dependent variable is binary. That is when the probability is about 50 percent for the outcome to go either way, all else being equal, and prior to testing for the partial effect of an independent variable. In such cases, the sigmoid curve does not materialize, and thus there is no substantial difference in the test results between nonlinear and linear models, which is the case for the dichotomous
variables being addressed in this research. Thus all of the Tables in Chapter 9 report results obtained from OLS models.

Notes

1. Planning and Development Department, City of Houston, *Demographic & Land Use Profile for Houston, Texas*, (Houston: n.p., June, 1992), 1-55.


CHAPTER 6

A Descriptive Overview of Neighborhood Organizations Responding to Survey

Houston has a long tradition of active civic associations. This is born out by the mean age of the sample organizations which is 21 years. The maximum age was 69 years and the standard deviation was 15 years. (The minimum age is "0", which applied to only a few organizations that were either less than a year old or were inactive in 1991 except for the core group attempting to activate them.) Clearly, in one way or another, many organizations have been able to maintain themselves over time. To the extent that people participate voluntarily in Houston's neighborhood organizations, "free rider" problems that curtail broad based participation are being overcome.

Member Involvement

Levels of member participation for each organization were surveyed in five categories to obtain the results shown in Table 6-1 below. Membership numbers range from the "sublime" (5,000) to the "ridiculous" (one voluntary organization claimed no members since the organization was an old inactive one that a core group was reorganizing).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in Organizations Surveyed</th>
<th>Level of Participation per Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Total number of members in the organization** | Mean = 320 (578)  
Min = 0  
Max = 5000 |
| **Percent of members attending one or more general meetings in last 12 months** | Mean = 29% (27%)  
Min = 0  
Max = 100% |
| **Total number of members volunteering in the last 12 months** | Mean = 21 (21)  
Min = 0  
Max = 134 |
| **Percent of members volunteering in the last 12 months** | Mean = 11% (18%)  
Min = 0  
Max = 100% |
| **Total hours volunteered in the last twelve months** | Mean = 362 (839)  
Min = 0  
Max = 5900 |
| **Number of officers serving in last twelve months** | Mean = 5 (4)  
Min = 0  
Max = 38 |
| **Number of directors serving in last twelve months** | Mean = 5 (6)  
Min = 0  
Max = 40 |
| **Number of volunteers serving on Standing Committees** | Mean = 5 (10)  
Min = 0  
Max = 60 |
| **Number of volunteers serving on Ad hoc Committees** | Mean = 5 (18)  
Min = 0  
Max = 200 |
Formal Organizational Components

Data on the formal organizational components that were obtained from the survey indicate that formal membership requirements and official size, the stated purposes for establishing the organizations, the incentives offered to induce member support and compliance and organizational governance are structured in a variety of ways. A descriptive overview of similarities and differences between the organizations surveyed is provided below.

Membership requirements. Houston neighborhood organizations employ different institutional arrangements to attract and maintain their membership. Organizations with mandatory membership requirements are in the best position to maintain their membership, but such membership, as discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, is usually narrowly defined to include only homeowners within their service area.

Voluntary associations may be more inclusive in establishing rules for membership. Table 6-2 summarizes the frequency of the membership categories reported by all of the responding organizations. These data come from actual records reported by the respondents, or estimates made by the respondents for each of their respective organizations where records were unavailable.
Table 6-2
Organizations by Membership Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF MEMBERSHIP</th>
<th>PERCENT OF ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING CATEGORY (N=164)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory membership</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership is limited to homeowners in service area</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership is open to all commercial and residential</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interests in the service area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No residency requirement</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are different types of membership offered</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The categories reported in Table 6-2 overlap since some organizations that have no residency requirement also have different types of membership categories. Then some organizations that are open to all commercial and residential interests also take members from outside the service area. One neighborhood organization noted that it has mandatory membership limited to homeowners in one at least one subdivision section of the neighborhood, but this is augmented by allowing homeowners from other subdivisions or sections in the neighborhood to join voluntarily.

Organization size. From the number of organization members reported, organization membership as a percentage of Census Neighborhood Area households was determined and is
reported in Table 6-3. In addition, respondents provided data as to the percentage of their organization service area that they claim to represent. The percentages of service area represented were often reported to be substantial, but the service areas themselves ranged from small enclaves within the neighborhoods to areas covering the entire neighborhood as defined by the Census.

Table 6-3 describes the frequency of the two categories of membership size ("census households" and "service area") and the number of members reported by each organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF SIZE</th>
<th>SIZE (PERCENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization membership size as a percent of Census households</td>
<td>Mean = 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Max = 100; Min=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Service Area households represented by organization</td>
<td>Mean = 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Min = 0; Max = 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There were three volunteer organizations reporting zero representation because their membership could not be defined on the bases of "percent of households" as defined in the survey question (Appendix A, Survey, 2.c.), One of the three organizations was currently inactive and leaders were reorganizing in 1991.
Neighborhood organizations vary widely in terms of the extent of their formal representation of the larger Census neighborhoods in which they are located. Though some organizations formally represent the entire Census neighborhood as reported in Table 6-3, overall the data suggest that on the average, the organizations do better in representing service areas that are smaller than the Census neighborhoods, and thus their interests are more narrowly defined geographically.\(^1\)

**Stated purpose.** Table 6-4 describes the reasons given for the establishment of sample neighborhood organizations. Of those organizations that were reported to have been required by the developer, not all are mandatory. Some developers originally established organizations without mandating member dues. Of the 66 that were mandatory, 55 were established by the developer when the subdivision was developed. Eleven mandatory organizations were formed by the neighborhood residents. Eighty nine of the voluntary organizations were reported to have been initiated by the neighborhood residents and eleven were initiated by the subdivision developer.

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\(^1\) The distribution of representation as reported in Table 6-3 was corroborated by a visual examination of service area boundaries submitted by most of the organizations responding to the survey. Many mandatory and voluntary organizations reported service areas that are smaller than the neighborhood Census area, while some reported contiguous boundaries.
Most, but not all neighborhood organizations, were established for "status quo" purposes of which deed restrictions are the usual focus. As Table 6-4 suggests, the organizations fall on a continuum of purposes, ranging from the most status quo purpose whereby the organization was required by the developer when the subdivision was developed in order to maintain it in its original condition, to the most change oriented purposes whereby a few organizations were established to assist low income families who have need of social, economic and physical improvements in the neighborhoods where they live and possibly, work and play.

Table 6-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHY ORGANIZATION WAS FORMED</th>
<th>SAMPLE FREQUENCY (N=164)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developer required it</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For better enforcement of deed restrictions</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For better protection against crime</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For better city services</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To plan social events</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General neighborhood improvement</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For assistance (housing, etc) to low income families</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Incentive structures and service arrangements. Different Houston organizations offer a variety of services as incentives to induce member support. The scope of services and the type of services offered suggest that Houston’s neighborhood organizations are earning a reputation for being entrepreneurial. The variety of service arrangements described in Table 6-5 and employed by neighborhood organizations from the sample do not involve material selective incentives, unless it is argued that the publications coming from neighborhood organizations are selective material incentives. It has already been argued that is not the case in civic associations. Instead they are incentives for participation in that they facilitate communication among members and between members and leaders to build and coordinate support for the organization and their collective goals.

Table 6-5 describes the frequency of services provided and the frequency of three types of service arrangements used across the sample organizations. Not all respondents that reported a service, reported the service arrangement used. In addition, while most respondents reported only one service arrangement per service, a few reported more than one service arrangement which is reflected in the data.
Volunteering is found among the sample organizations for every service included in the survey. In 10 service categories out of 15, the organizations utilizing "volunteers" as opposed to "staff" or "contract" were in the majority. However, the provision of services by paid staff and contracting suggests that neighborhood organizations are gaining significant resources to contract for or hire professionals. This is substantiated by the size of budgets as described in Table 6-6.

In relation to service arrangements, Table 6-5 shows a pattern of ongoing maintenance provisions that is skewed toward contracting, while volunteer arrangements tend to be used in programs and projects related to change or improvements in the neighborhood, or for lobbying or publications. The former are services that may require more skills and/or more continuous time spent on the job, such as fire and police protection. The one exception among maintenance ("status quo") services in the pattern of contracting is the enforcement of deed restrictions. While deed restrictions are a mechanism to guard the "status quo", there is no need for collective action to enforce them, unless a householder in the neighborhood breaks a covenant. Until there are noticeable violations, it is not likely to be cost efficient or affordable, even for relatively well financed neighborhood organizations, to provide ongoing in-house staff
or contracts for deed restriction enforcement. Therefore, volunteers apparently tend to be coordinated through neighborhood organizations to oversee enforcement, and to attempt to curb violations through peer pressure or imposing fines where the coercive authority exists, or as a last resort, to raise funds for legal defense when serious violations occur in spite of vigilance.

As previously indicated, the categories of newsletters and contacting public officials do not necessarily fall into either maintenance or change oriented categories of service, but neighborhood organizations do appear to rely heavily on volunteers in relation to these two activities. For newsletters, this may reflect an intent to facilitate "grass roots" communication among the constituency. Publications and newsletters may also be produced quarterly or otherwise sporadically by neighborhood organizations, thus being more adaptable to volunteer arrangements.

Contacting public officials is also assumed to be sporadic, and hired lobbyists are expensive in relation to most neighborhood organization budgets. Also organization leaders and members probably believe that the credibility of lobbying is enhanced if done by elected representatives or rank and file members volunteering their time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incentives Provided by Organizations</th>
<th>Orgs. Providing Service</th>
<th>Service Provided by Staff</th>
<th>Service Provided by Contract</th>
<th>Service Provided by Volunteer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deed Restrictions 76%</td>
<td>N=161</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>N=156</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation, Maintenance (pools/tennis) 35%</td>
<td>N=159</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police &amp; fire 45%</td>
<td>N=160</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>N=159</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streets &amp; lights 27%</td>
<td>N=159</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape maintenance 59%</td>
<td>N=157</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>N=152</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant lot clean-up 34%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N=156</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home repairs/low income services 15%</td>
<td>N=160</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>N=160</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park development &amp; improvements 31%</td>
<td>N=159</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N=159</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing programs 6%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business assistance 6%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hist. preservation 6%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festivals, celebrations 54%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services-youth 10%</td>
<td>N=157</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>N=156</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsletters &amp; directories 69%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>N=155</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on Lobbying 16%</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby (dichotomous) 82%</td>
<td>N=157</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>N=156</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Financial capacity. Houston neighborhood organizations responding to the survey suggest that there is a wide range of financial capacity across neighborhood organizations. Some organizations obviously rely solely on volunteers for "sweat equity" to get the job done. Others have the budget means to provide tools that strengthen the bureaucracy of the organization with staff, office space, materials, contracts for services and staff support and material support for volunteers.

The description of budgets (Table 6-6), underscores the virtual absence of financial assistance from outside sources for neighborhood organizations within the City of Houston. (The small percentage of funds reported as coming from the city was explained by respondents to be "credits" on garbage service provided by the organizations.) This suggests that in Houston, most funding comes from member dues, internal to the neighborhood organizations. According to the extant literature, this is likely to skew the distribution of neighborhood organizations to middle class neighborhoods, and also skew the financial capability to those organizations in the wealthiest neighborhoods, all else being equal. Studies conducted by Haeberle, 1987; Thomas, 1991; and Barry, et. al. 1993, as previously discussed in Chapter 4, suggest that there is a reduction in SES biases and a corresponding reduction in the uneven distribution of grass roots influence on city
policies that effect neighborhoods, when the cities serve as patrons to neighborhood organizations.

Nevertheless, neighborhood Census data matched to the organization survey data suggest that while neighborhood organizations may be skewed toward middle class neighborhoods, those neighborhoods are not monolithic. Racial composition and affluence vary, yet many of these diverse neighborhoods as indicated by the survey response have functioning neighborhood organizations without the benefit of patrons. The effects of neighborhood wealth and organizational financial capability in overcoming problems of collective action are explored in the subsequent chapters long with other attributes of the organizations and their environments.
Table 6-6
A Description of Neighborhood Organization Budget Size and Percentage of Budget by Source of Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Capacity Indicators</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total budget</td>
<td>N=151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range = 0 to $1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean = $89,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD = $204,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of organizations</td>
<td>N=143 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reporting a dues increase in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the last three years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Source (% total)</td>
<td>Mean Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>80.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Government</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdivision Developer</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>16.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The category of "other" was described as fund raising events sponsored by the organizations.

Knoke (1990) argued that for national interest groups, large centralized bureaucracies were necessary to attract outside funding. Table 6-6 indicated that with few exceptions, there is little evidence that Houston member based neighborhood organizations receive outside funding from governmental or private foundation sources, whether or not they have centralized bureaucracies. In the next section attributes of centralized and decentralized governance
structures as reported by Houston neighborhood organizations are examined.

**Governance Structures.** Formal components of the neighborhood organizations' governance structures strongly reflect democratic values, but vary in degree of centralization and decentralization as the descriptive statistics below indicate.

Leader selection in neighborhood organizations apparently is for the most part the domain of dues paying members. Nevertheless, there is variety in the methods reported, from the most participatory which allow all neighborhood residents to vote, whether or not they pay dues, to a small percentage that do not have elections of any kind, that either directly or indirectly involve the organization's membership.

Only 23% of the organizations reported that the officers are elected by the neighborhood. This along with their generally low representation of the Census neighborhoods (Table 6-3; mean = 23%), indicates relatively narrow interest representation in relation to the larger neighborhoods as geographically defined by the Census. The small area represented may facilitate congruence between members and leaders, but it may also mean that when lobbying city hall, interests of the larger neighborhood may not be represented by
persons speaking for the neighborhood organization.

Table 6-7

Frequency of Methods of Leader Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METHOD OF LEADER SELECTION</th>
<th>OFFICERS (N=164)</th>
<th>DIRECTORS (N=125)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By vote of nhbd. residents</td>
<td>Mean = 23%</td>
<td>Mean = 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By vote of dues paying members</td>
<td>Mean = 43%</td>
<td>Mean = 62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By an elected board of directors</td>
<td>Mean = 25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By the outgoing board of directors</td>
<td>Mean = 9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By an appointed board of directors</td>
<td>Mean = 3%</td>
<td>Mean = 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By another organization or individual</td>
<td>Mean = 4%</td>
<td>Mean = 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Budget preparation in neighborhood organizations is the principal means to set priorities and implement projects and programs in the organizations' service areas. Therefore the depth of involvement in budget preparation from the rank and file members of the organizational hierarchy is a meaningful indicator of the extent that the governance structure is decentralized. Table 6-8 suggests that while some neighborhood organizations in Houston involve the membership
in budgeting, that in most organizations the membership must rely on their representatives to establish the budget for the organizations.

Staff is also reported to be involved in budget preparation in some but not all organizations that have staff support. Nearly thirty percent of the organizations reported having paid staff or staff contracted from a management firm, and nineteen percent of these organizations reported that staff (including management firms) were involved in preparing the organizations' budget (Table 6-8).

Table 6-8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUDGET PARTICIPATION CATEGORY</th>
<th>PERCENT OF ORGANIZATIONS REPORTING (N=160)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The general membership</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Budget Committee</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Board of Directors</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The president</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-9 describes the frequency of staff in the organizations surveyed. While staff is a limited resource
where neighborhood organizations are concerned, it is interesting that 15 percent reported that they have "in-house" paid staff, while an additional 13% of the organizations reported that administrative operations are handled by a management firm and thus 28% of the organizations reported having paid staff or staff contracted from a management firm.

Table 6-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Paid Staff Categories</th>
<th>Percent of Organizations Staff Categories (N=164)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No paid staff</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One paid staff</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two to five paid staff</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over five paid staff</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract to Management Firm</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, while most organizations reported that they have no permanent office space, there are a few organizations that provide it. Table 6-10 shows the percentages of the organizations reporting temporary and permanent office arrangements. While 15 percent of the organizations have staff that is not contracted to outside management firms (Table 6-9), 21 percent have permanent office space, either provided to the organization rent free (a form of assistance not reflected in Table 6-6) or paid for by the organization.
This relationship suggests that organizations tend to position themselves to become more centralized in their governance structure by finding permanent office space prior to hiring staff. As shown in Table 6-9, an alternative approach used by 13 percent of the organizations is to contract with an outside management firm to provide administrative support to the organization from their own corporate offices. In some cases organizations may evolve from contracting for administrative services to hiring staff, as they become stronger and better organized in relation to having permanent office space.

Table 6-10
Office Arrangements of Neighborhood Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICE ARRANGEMENTS</th>
<th>PERCENT OF ORGANIZATIONS (N=161)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is no permanent office.</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent free office space is provided continuously.</td>
<td>09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent office space is paid for by organization.</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

The descriptive overview of Houston neighborhood organizations in the sample, indicates that organizations come in many sizes, in terms of numbers and the proportion of the neighborhoods that they represent. There are a variety of
incentive structures and scope of services provided, but the material incentives that they provide are collective in nature. Governance may be centralized or decentralized with components of both representative and participatory democracy present. The statistics describing member involvement suggest that involvement is not the sole realm of the formal leadership, but it spreads in varying degrees across substantial portions of the rank and file members.

The wide range of services and frequency of non-volunteer service arrangements, the advent of six and seven figure budgets, and the proportion of organizations with paid administrative staff or contracts in conjunction with the emergence of permanent office space, suggest that a shift may be occurring from less hierarchial types of neighborhood organizations that have been more limited to the customary roles of lobbying and/or volunteering in the neighborhood. Newer forms of more hierarchial and bureaucratic organizations that are indigenous to and firmly planted in the neighborhood are recurring features of neighborhood landscapes. The data also suggests that the more centralized neighborhood organizations assume roles that traditionally have been the exclusive domain of city government. In the future, longitudinal studies are needed to confirm what may be a trend toward centralized bureaucracies for neighborhood organizations in Houston and perhaps other cities as well.
VARIATIONS IN FORMAL STRUCTURES OF NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MEMBER INVOLVEMENT

by

SARA JANE WHITE
CHAPTER 7

A Comparison of Mandatory
and Voluntary Neighborhood Organizations

Like many sunbelt cities, Houston has basically two types of member based neighborhood organizations. They are either organizations with mandatory membership requirements or organizations in which membership is voluntary. With respect to mandatory or voluntary membership organizations, they are almost mutually exclusive. However, occasionally both of these characteristics occur in one organization. One survey respondent reported that their organization had both voluntary and mandatory memberships because one or more subdivisions within the neighborhood served had elected to make membership mandatory, while other subdivisions within the same neighborhood served by the organization had not elected to make membership for their homeowners a requirement.

Based upon the survey, mandatory organizations are estimated to be about 40% of the total number of operational member based neighborhood organizations. Beyond mandatory or voluntary membership requirements, characteristics of the organizations can and do overlap in terms of their purpose, their governance structures, their incentive structures and the neighborhoods that they serve. Nevertheless significant
differences exist within and between the two types of organizations with respect to the way that they are structured.

This chapter provides comparisons between mandatory and voluntary organizations. Differences are tested for significance between the means of the two groups in relation to member involvement, structural components and their neighborhood environments.

Organization Age, Representation and Membership Size

In relation to differences in organization age, another recent study of Houston neighborhood organizations suggests that most mandatory organizations within the City of Houston are newer clubs, while the history of voluntary organizations date back to much earlier times. However, a question on the voluntary or mandatory nature of membership requirements was not asked in the previous survey, whereas survey respondents for this research were asked the question and were also asked a question on the organization's age. The survey results show a similar range of organization ages for both types with no significant differences in the means of about 20 years as reported in Table 7-1. This is attributed in part to some older organizations having converted to mandatory membership requirements a number of years after the
organizations were originally established.

When age comparisons are made between organizations mandated by developers and organizations that were not mandated by developers, rather than between all organizations with mandatory membership requirements and all of those that are voluntary, the difference in the mean age becomes slightly greater. The mean age for the organizations not mandated by developers (volunteer and mandatory) is 23 years (SD=12) and the mean for their counterparts (organizations mandated by developers) is 20 years (SD=16), (P=.208).

However, regardless of the overall similarity in the ages, mandatory organizations have become more noticeable in Houston in recent years. Traveling through Houston neighborhoods, one can observe that relatively small enclaves have been developed within larger and sometimes diverse older neighborhoods which are not deed restricted. These enclaves include subdivisions of single family detached homes on individual lots, higher density townhomes connected by party walls or multi-family but individually owned condominiums. The returned surveys included mandatory organizations serving the smaller enclave subdivisions as well as the more traditional and larger single family residential subdivision that covers all or most of an entire neighborhood census area. In addition, as in past decades, developers continue to
establish mandatory organizations in new subdivisions developed on raw land within the City or in its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Generally, all of the mandatory organizations have status quo purposes related to maintenance, security and protection of property values by deed restrictions.

From Table 7-1, it is apparent that within and between the two types of organizations there is also variation in the percentage of the neighborhood households that are represented in the organization service areas as defined by respondents. Respondents for mandatory organizations for the most part claim to represent 100% of their service area while voluntary organizations report quite narrow to very broad representation. However, when membership size is measured as a percentage of the whole neighborhood as defined by the Census, there is no significant difference between mandatory organizations and voluntary organizations. This can be attributed to the popularity of relatively new "enclave" subdivisions in old neighborhoods as described above.

In relation to membership size, it is not surprising that mandatory organizations are significantly larger than their voluntary counterparts. However, the average membership size of voluntary organizations should not be dismissed as trivial, since the numbers suggest more than a handful of activists are
involved in many instances of voluntary organizations.

Table 7-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization Age</td>
<td>Mean=20</td>
<td>Mean=21</td>
<td>P=.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=11</td>
<td>SD=16</td>
<td>N=59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=85</td>
<td>N=85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Service Area Represented</td>
<td>Mean=98</td>
<td>Mean=42</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=09</td>
<td>SD=33</td>
<td>N=64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=64</td>
<td>N=86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Census Nhbd. Represented</td>
<td>Mean=33</td>
<td>Mean=27</td>
<td>P=.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=61</td>
<td>SD=63</td>
<td>N=64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=64</td>
<td>N=84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Members in</td>
<td>Mean=427</td>
<td>Mean=242</td>
<td>P=.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>SD=673</td>
<td>SD=522</td>
<td>N=65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=65</td>
<td>N=90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For "age", one voluntary organization was in the process of reactivating in 1991. It was assigned an age of zero, although it had originally been established years before.

Member Involvement

With respect to the percentage of members involved as leaders and the percentage involved as rank and file activists and the percentage attending meetings, the differences in member involvement are significant. These are the most crucial measures of citizen involvement in that they reveal how broadly based citizen participation is within the organizations. Mandatory organizations generally do not measure up to their voluntary counterparts in terms of broadly based citizen participation. Significantly larger percentages
of members serve as leaders or as active rank and file members in voluntary organizations. However, the overall incidence of rank and file volunteering typically goes beyond a core of leaders to include rank and file members, which is in line with Knoke's optimism regarding the role of collective action organizations as "reservoirs of the procedural norms of participativeness" and as associations that promote "nonauthoritarian integration of modern society" (p 218).

Table 7-2a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of leaders to total members</td>
<td>Mean= 6</td>
<td>Mean= 11</td>
<td>P=.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD= 13</td>
<td>SD= 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=63</td>
<td>N=83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of activist members to total members</td>
<td>Mean= 04</td>
<td>Mean= 18</td>
<td>P=.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD= 07</td>
<td>SD= 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=60</td>
<td>N=82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita hours volunteered by leaders</td>
<td>Mean=65</td>
<td>Mean=47</td>
<td>P=.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=74</td>
<td>SD=67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=61</td>
<td>N=71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita hours volunteered by activist members</td>
<td>Mean=23</td>
<td>Mean=61</td>
<td>P=.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=35</td>
<td>SD=253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=41</td>
<td>N=57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of all members attending meetings in one year</td>
<td>Mean= 24</td>
<td>Mean= 33</td>
<td>P = .045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD= 22</td>
<td>SD= 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=62</td>
<td>N=91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another aspect of member involvement is the percentage of all services offered by the organization that are provided in
whole or in part by volunteers. When analyzed from this perspective, the voluntary organizations' members are again significantly more involved than their mandatory organizations counterparts.

With the greater financial capacity and centralization of government within mandatory organizations neighborhood organizations as described later in this chapter, it is not surprising that there is overall a significant difference in the percentage of services that fall on the shoulders of volunteers in voluntary organizations as opposed voluntary service arrangements in mandatory organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of services provided by volunteers</td>
<td>Mean= 36 SD= .29 N=56</td>
<td>Mean= 82 SD= 30 N=76</td>
<td>P= .000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Purpose and Incentive Structures

With respect to the number of services offered by neighborhood organizations, mandatory organizations provide the greater number, supporting the often made observation that
they function like small (private) governments (Table 7-3). For the two basic categories of services offered by neighborhood organizations, which are change oriented (CO) and status quo oriented (SQO), where $\text{SQO} = 1 - P(\text{CO})$, the differences on the average between the organizations are also significant. As expected, volunteer organizations offer a significantly higher percentage of change oriented incentives and conversely, mandatory organizations on the average have a significantly higher percentage of status quo oriented incentives. Mandatory organizations, even if relatively weak financially, are assured of some kind of on-going financial support and may have authority to enforce deed restrictions, which should enable them to maintain the status quo primarily through deed restrictions. This should prevent deterioration of the residential character of the subdivision or subdivisions involved. Therefore they may be less likely to perceive the need for change than would be the case had there been encroachment on the residential character of the neighborhood through the absence of deed restrictions or the violation of them.

While there is not a significant difference in whether or not organization leaders or members have at one time or another contacted public officials, there is a significant difference in the extent to which the two types of organizations rely on lobbying to accomplish their ends (Table
7-3). Over three fourths of both types of organizations report that they participate in lobbying public officials, which suggests that the interest group function of neighborhood organizations is strong, regardless of whether or not they have taken on governmental attributes. Also, based upon the variation in their purposes and incentive structures, it is reasonable to assume that their respective interests are at least at times competing interests from the standpoint of public officials.

There is little difference between the two types of organizations in terms of the frequency of their providing members with newsletters and/or directories. Many (over two third) of mandatory organizations and nearly two thirds of voluntary organizations report that they publish newsletters or directories or both. Apparently leaders in both types of organizations believe that newsletters and to some extent directories are important tools for collective action organizations to use in order to facilitate communication between leaders and the general membership, and amongst the general members regarding their collective action purposes and the incentives offered in exchange for support. Examples of newsletters returned with some of the surveys are provided in Appendix C to illustrate this point.
Table 7-3
Purpose and Incentive Structures of Neighborhood Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization:</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of services provided</td>
<td>Mean=8</td>
<td>Mean=5</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD=7.9</td>
<td>SD=3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=59</td>
<td>N=83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of Purpose Orientation: most status (1) quo to most change oriented (7)</td>
<td>Mean=1.2</td>
<td>Mean=3.1</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD=.74</td>
<td>SD=1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=66</td>
<td>N=98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of change oriented services to service base</td>
<td>Mean=35</td>
<td>Mean=59</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD=22</td>
<td>SD=33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=56</td>
<td>N=75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of organizations publishing newsletter or directory</td>
<td>Mean=72</td>
<td>Mean=62</td>
<td>P=.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=66</td>
<td>N=98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on lobbying (Percent of lobbying to total services provided)</td>
<td>Mean=11</td>
<td>Mean=21</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD=7</td>
<td>SD=22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=66</td>
<td>N=98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of organizations lobbying public officials</td>
<td>Mean=76</td>
<td>Mean=79</td>
<td>P=.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=66</td>
<td>N=98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financial Capacity

Statistics in Table 7-4 below support the contention that mandatory homeowners associations fare significantly better in
terms of financial capacity than their voluntary counterparts. This is especially evident in light of the percentage of the budgets funded by members. However, the resources captured by voluntary organizations are impressive considering the voluntary nature of the contributions and the joint and nonsubtractable nature of the service incentives. Eighty six voluntary organizations reported their 1991 total budget amount. There were twenty that reported that they had no formal budget (some of these noted that they relied on raising funds on an ad hoc basis as needed). Other voluntary organizations had budgets ranging from $100 (3) to a maximum budget of $250,000. Of the 61 mandatory organizations that reported their 1991 total budget amount, only one indicated that they had no formal budget. The highest mandatory organization budget reported was $1.5 million.

On the average, voluntary member organizations rely slightly more on sources other than member dues to round out there budgets. This is not surprising since they may seek outside help more readily because they have no coercive power to extract member dues and also may operate in neighborhoods with little slack in the overall neighborhood wealth. Nevertheless, both types of neighborhood organizations rely predominantly on members dues for their financial support.
Table 7-4

Financial Capacity of Neighborhood Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>Mean=$174,121</td>
<td>Mean=$14,179</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=$242,409</td>
<td>SD=$39,558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=61</td>
<td>N=86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Budget</td>
<td>Mean=$840</td>
<td>Mean=$65</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=1,334</td>
<td>SD=171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=59</td>
<td>N=79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent funded by members</td>
<td>Mean=.91</td>
<td>Mean=.77</td>
<td>P=.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=.20</td>
<td>SD=.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=64</td>
<td>N=96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Governance Structures

There are significant differences between mandatory and voluntary organizations for all four measures of governance (Table 7-5). While both types of organizations demonstrate variation within the groupings, mandatory organizations are substantially more inclined to take on additional attributes of centralized structures than are voluntary organizations. Apparently this is because voluntary support and compliance are not as critical to their functioning, since mandatory organizations have the coercive authority to extract funds and to provide sanctions against violators of deed restrictions. This may in turn influence the leadership (or the developer) to establish more centralized governance structures to improve efficiency of service delivery. In this way, mandatory
organizations are taking on many characteristics associated with local governments, especially minimal governments. Like mandatory organizations, minimal governments tend to limit their services to the "status quo" and tend to implement a number of their services by contracting to other governments or private contractors.\(^2\)

As Table 7-5 and Table 7-2a indicate, the survey data provides the opportunity to compare structural differences that are characteristic of the two formal organizational types, with respect to the degree to which authority for policy and for administration is formally vested in few or many of the organization members. The comparison suggests that the more limited access opportunities for rank and file participation in mandatory organizations also reduces the base of member involvement by comparison to voluntary organizations (Table 7-2a). This is an important difference, to the extent that participatory democracy links leaders and members on policy matters.

Informal channels of communication and influence within mandatory as well as voluntary organizations may alter the centralization of formal power and authority within organizations as described by Knoke for national organizations (Knoke 143). However, informal networks are not addressed in this research, since to do so would require micro level data
that is not available. Yet it is possible that the physical proximity of constituents to neighborhood organizations and the usual status quo objectives reduce the need for formal linkages to insure that leaders within the organizations serve as their agents. Nevertheless, even for mandatory neighborhood organizations, the potential for policy incongruence is likely to be higher as formal structures become more centralized. This is because while informal networks of communication between leaders and members may provide some degree of linkage, this would not supplant the need for open and public debate as changing circumstances give rise to new policy issues that will effect the general membership.

Table 7-5
Characteristics of Association Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy/admin. Decentralization</td>
<td>N=66 Mean=8.65</td>
<td>N=98 Mean=10.92</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=2.50</td>
<td>Mean=1.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized Meeting Structure</td>
<td>N=66 Mean=2.72</td>
<td>N=98 Mean=6.88</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD=3.58</td>
<td>Mean=4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of organizations with no paid staff</td>
<td>N=65 Mean=42 SD= 50</td>
<td>N=96 Mean=92 SD= 28</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of general meetings per year</td>
<td>N=65 Mean=2.7 SD=3.6</td>
<td>N=95 Mean=6.9 SD=4.6</td>
<td>P=.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Neighborhood Environments

While mandatory neighborhood organizations have significantly greater financial capacity than voluntary organizations, the difference in the wealth of neighborhoods in which they are located is not so dramatic. While the mean and standard deviations are higher in neighborhoods in which mandatory organizations are located, both mandatory and voluntary have means located in the middle to upper middle market range of housing yet serve a wide range of affluence levels as indicated by the standard deviations from the means.

The most significant difference is the rate of owner occupancy in neighborhoods served by the two types of organizations, with the rates being significantly higher in neighborhoods served by mandatory organizations. (For owner occupied as a percent of all units including multifamily, the difference was also significant, P=.037.)

From the findings reported in Table 7-6, it is concluded that there is no difference in diversity in relation to the larger Census neighborhoods in which neighborhood organizations are located, but there is a significant difference in the percentage of owner occupied single family homes in the Census neighborhood and there is close to a significant difference in the average wealth.
Table 7-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mandatory</th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Significance of Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Wealth (Mean home value)** | Mean=$131,688  
D=$91,011  
N=66 | Mean=$106,600  
SD=$83,293  
N=98 | P=.070                       |
| **Physical/Economic Diversity** | Mean=0.061      
SD=635    
N=66 | Mean=0.041      
SD=.699    
N=98  | P=.346                       |
| **Racial/Property Interest Diversity & Conflict** | Mean=0.012      
SD=.610    
N=66 | Mean=-0.008     
SD=.716     
N=98  | P=.855                       |
| **Home ownership, Single family only** | Mean=.879       
SD=.171    
N=66 | Mean=.788       
SD=.290    
N=98  | P=.013                       |

**Conclusions**

Statistical comparisons provide strong evidence that there are significant differences between mandatory and voluntary member organizations. Out of the 26 possible differences covered in this analysis, there are 16 that are significant (p<.05), which is nearly 60 percent. In addition, there are two more comparisons for which the differences are close to significant. Review of how the two types of organizations differ suggests that mandatory organizations tend to be more centralized and less prone to participatory
democracy than their voluntary counterparts.

In relation to purpose and incentive structures (Table 7-3), in four out of six categories the differences are significant. These differences show that voluntary organizations are considerably more change oriented, and more apt to depend upon city government for benefits to the neighborhood and offer fewer services than their mandatory counterparts. Yet they may be in a weaker position to influence public officials, since their size, formal representation and financial capabilities are significantly less than mandatory organizations.

Much has been said about the impacts of centralization and bureaucratization and their effects on democracy within the systems being analyzed. Yet scholars, politicians and the public disagree as to the adverse effects, if any, that centralization has on democracy. But one thing is clear in relation to centralization. Centralization requires financial capacity that is sufficient to cover substantial overhead costs. Money equates with the ability of an organization to pay for the production and provision of services without the involvement of volunteers. Not only does this provide the possibility of more and better services, but money and staff may facilitate access to public officials by providing more man hours to devote to assembling information and presenting
it in order to influence public officials on policy and implementation of priorities related to specific neighborhoods.

Nevertheless, while it is beyond the scope of this research to empirically compare neighborhood organizations to business groups, it is expected that even neighborhood organizations with the greatest financial capacity would weaken by that comparison to most business interest groups. In any event, the mandatory organizations surveyed generally have more financial clout and serve more stable neighborhoods in terms of owner occupied homes than voluntary organizations.

In relation to broadening the base of participation in organizational activities, the voluntary organizations fare better than mandatory organizations. The analysis in Table 7-2a provides evidence that for all three categories addressing broadly based participation of the membership (or the lack thereof), voluntary organizations have significantly larger proportions of their membership involved. Thus the more decentralized structures of voluntary organizations apparently make a difference in providing a crucial link between members and leaders.

In the next two chapters, analyses dealing with other aspects of institutional differences and their effects on
member involvement will be added to the investigation. Multiple regression analyses will be applied in order to test all of the specific hypotheses related to the political economy theory of neighborhood organizations as presented in Chapter 4. Since there is overlap in the governance structures, incentive structures and member involvement between mandatory and voluntary organizations, these characteristics of the neighborhood organizations may have independent effects upon member involvement. In addition, neighborhood environments need to be taken into account in relation to their direct effects as well as their indirect effects through neighborhood organizations.

Notes

1. Fairbanks and Evans, 6-7.

CHAPTER 8
Bivariate Analyses of Environmental and Neighborhood
Organizational Influences on Member Involvement

Bivariate relationships are examined in this chapter, prior to presenting the results of multiple regression analyses in Chapter 9. Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in Tables 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3. From the tables, it is apparent that many of the correlations between neighborhood environmental characteristics, organizational structures and member involvement move in the expected directions, though many are relatively weak, suggesting that micro level factors are at work to contribute directly to formal organizational structures and member involvement. Nevertheless, there are significant relationships at the macro level, and the signs that are observed in the bivariate analyses are consistent with most of those set forth in the hypotheses initially presented in Chapter 4.

However, these correlations do not explain relationships in terms of the direction of causality or the independent and partial effects of the exogenous variables on member involvement. Multiple regression analyses are needed and will follow in order to test the independent relationships and the predictability of the models as a whole.
The bivariate analyses suggest that both internal and external political and economic factors are at work in influencing collective action. Environmental influences lag far behind the structural components of organizations in terms of the strength of significant relationships as discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

**Environmental Attributes and Organizational Components**

Hypotheses 1 through 18 posit relationships between neighborhood environmental attributes and formal organizational structures as shown in Table 8-1. Twenty one of the possible 112 relationships relevant to the hypotheses are significant, or about 19 percent. This suggests that environmental variables overall exert a modest but significant influence on the way organizations are structured. In relation to the control variables (percentage of the population that is black and the percentage of the population that is over 65 years of age), there are 12 significant correlations which is over one third of the total. Ten of the twelve significant relationships are concerned with the percent of the population that is black. All of the significant relationships are discussed below.

**Wealth and organization structure.** Associations between organization structures and neighborhood wealth are
significant for four of the 14 organizational components examined. Relationships in Table 8-1 indicate that as neighborhood affluence increases, organizations tend to formally represent larger areas, adopt status quo purposes and incentives and centralized governance structures. Wealth is also associated with the control variable, age of organization. These organizational variables in turn negatively influence the percentage of members involved as discussed later in this Chapter.

Increasing rates of ownership of single family residences are related to the way organizations are structured. Specifically, the percent of single family dwellings in a Census neighborhood is positively related to mandatory membership requirements and negatively related to change orientation, both in terms of purpose and in terms of incentives offered. Ownership is positively related to per capita budget and negatively related to decentralization through expanded meeting structures of organizations. This suggests that indirectly home ownership impacts member involvement negatively as found for neighborhood wealth.

Ownership as a percentage of all residential units within a Census neighborhood does not suggest much in terms of influence on the structure of organizations. The exception is the significant negative relationship to wealth. This would
suggest that per capita budget decreases as organizations take on a larger area with more diverse housing stock.

On the other hand, physical and economic diversity influences organizational attributes which are positively related to citizen participation. Physical and economic diversity is significant for four of the structural components (openness, percent of neighborhood area represented, change oriented goals or purpose, and organization age). It is positively related to openness of eligibility requirements (which in turn positively effects member involvement). It is negatively related to the size of the Census neighborhood represented (which indirectly assists increasing the base of member involvement). It is positively related to change goals. Physical and economic diversity is also negatively related to the control variable, organization age.

In addition, the control variable, percent of population that is black, is significantly related to decreasing size in terms of service area and neighborhood Census area. As the percentage of black residences increase, organizations are also more likely to be oriented toward change, both in terms of purpose and incentives. The percentage of black population is also significantly associated with decentralization both in terms of policy matters and meeting structure. In addition
"percent black" is significantly and positively related to reliance on lobbying.

Solidarity incentives (social events and celebrations) are significantly and negatively related to "percent black". Then, in in turn for one instance of member involvement (percent attending general meetings), solidarity is significant and positively related to citizen participation (Table 8-3).
Table 8-1

Bivariate Analysis of Environmental Variables and Organizational Components
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Mandated Membership</th>
<th>Openness</th>
<th>% Service Area</th>
<th>% Nhbd Area</th>
<th>Change Goals</th>
<th>% Change Incentives</th>
<th>Social Events or Solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td>.194**</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% All Units Owner Occ'pd.</td>
<td>-.163*</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys/Eco Diversity</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>.232**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Property Interest Diversity &amp; Conflict</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>-.154*</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Over 65</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *<=.05
### Table 8-1 continued

Bivariate Analysis of Environmental Components and Organizational Components
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1) 0.05 2) -0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1) -0.02 2) -0.38***</td>
<td>-0.40 0.27***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1) 0.08 2) -0.12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>1) -0.19* 2) -0.38***</td>
<td>-1.64 0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% All Units Owner Occ'pd.</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1) 0.08 2) 0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>1) 0.12 2) 0.06</td>
<td>1.83 0.20**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys/Eco Diversity</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>1) 0.13 2) 0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1) 0.04 2) 0.06</td>
<td>-0.46 -0.19*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Property Interest &amp; Conflict Diversity</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1) 0.17* 2) 0.00</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1) 0.02 2) 0.08</td>
<td>-0.35 -0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>1) -0.06 2) 0.20**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>1) 0.17* 2) 0.25***</td>
<td>0.65 -0.18*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Over 65</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>1) 0.00 2) 0.04</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>1) -0.01 2) 0.021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *<=.05
The Environment and Member Involvement

No hypotheses were made regarding the direct relationships between neighborhood environments and member involvement within the organizational structures. However, in general, it is readily apparent that environmental variables are not very successful in explaining member involvement in neighborhood organizations. Yet, the environmental variables are added as controls to the organizational model to satisfy the need for empirical observations in relation to previously established explanations. Therefore bivariate relationships between environmental variables and member involvement are reported in Table 8-2 and subsequently in the combined model using multiple regression analysis (Chapter 9).

Comparison of Table 8-2 and Table 8-3 reveal several interesting contrasts in relation to the three measures of the base of citizen participation in neighborhood organizations. In all, environmental variables are significant in only four out of 35 (11 percent) of the possible relationships, and none of the four exceed the .05 level of significance, whereas 56 percent of the 39 binary relationships between organizational components and member involvement are significant. This points in the direction of the political economy theory of organizations, which proposes that the way organizations are
structured may mediate other determinants of collective action.

The measure of wealth, which is assumed to tap socioeconomic status in general, is significant for one of the three involvement variables related to the base of member participation as a proportion of the total membership. It is significant and inversely related to ordinary member participation in committees and projects. Home ownership is also significantly and inversely related to member involvement in activities and the percent of members that are leaders. These negative relationships are counter intuitive, to the extent that one would expect that by providing surplus resources and a "stake in the system", wealth and home ownership would correlate positively to member involvement.

Another significant correlation is between the control variable, percent of the population that is black, and rank and file member involvement. Given that the research site is Houston, a city without a strong Community Action Program that empowers or facilitates neighborhood organizations, this relationship suggests that factors other than the city serving as patron may encourage participation by black residents in neighborhood organizations.¹

¹ The survey data does not include information on the racial composition of neighborhood organizations, but (continued...)
However, the environmental variables appear to do far less than the formal organizational components in explaining grass roots participation in neighborhood organizations.

### Table 8-2

Bivariate Analysis of Environmental Variables and Member Involvement
(Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Component</th>
<th>% Members Who Attend One or More Meetings</th>
<th>% Members Involved in Committee or Projects</th>
<th>Per Capita Hrs. - Members</th>
<th>% Members as Leaders</th>
<th>Per Capita Hrs. - Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% All Units Owner Occ'pd.</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Eco. Diversity</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Property Interest &amp; Conflict Diversity (Controls)</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Over 65</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *<=.05

---

1(...continued) telephone interviews with respondents and prior knowledge of some of the organizations confirm that their racial composition is predominantly black.
Organizational Components and Member Involvement

Thirteen variables pertaining to formal organizational components and the five types of member involvement were operationalized from the survey data as reported in Chapter 5. From the bivariate analyses (Table 8-3), it is apparent that organizational components generally are unrelated to per capita hours contributed by ordinary members or leaders, with one exception. There is a significant relationship between intensity of involvement ("per capita hours"), and the extent that the governance structure is decentralized.

In relation to the three measures of the base of participation (percentage of members attending meetings, percentage of members involved in other activities, and percentage of members involved as leaders), there are slightly over 50% of the thirteen structural components that are significantly related. The 22 significant bivariate relationships of the 39 possible relationships, suggest that overall, formal institutional structures are important in relation to participatory democracy. The bivariate correlations and related significance levels are reported in Table 8-3, and the significant relationships are discussed below.
Membership requirements and size. Mandatory membership requirements are significantly and negatively related to all three categories addressing the base of participation in neighborhood organizations as predicted (hypotheses 19). The size of the formal membership roles is also significantly and negatively related to all of the measures of the base of participation as predicted in hypothesis 22, while size as a function of area represented (service area or neighborhood) is negatively related in three out of four possibilities. These findings are instructive. When added to information reported in Chapter 7 that the mean size of mandatory organizations is significantly larger than their voluntary counterparts, it appears that the two variables (mandatory membership requirements and size) may often go hand in hand to encourage or discourage rank and file member involvement.

The significant and positive relationships between "openness" and the base of rank and file member participation do not support hypothesis 21, which conjectured that lenient membership requirements would attract members with less at stake in the outcome of organizational efforts and thus reduce the base of participation. To the contrary it appears that as eligibility becomes more open, organizations attract willing participants that would otherwise be excluded, resulting in a larger percent of members becoming involved by attending
meetings and/or contributing through committee work or projects to their respective organizations.

**Change oriented purpose and incentives.** These variables were both operationalized from the most "status quo" to most "change oriented" reasons as previously described in Chapter 5. The "purpose" variable is a seven point scale from the most "status quo" reason that the organization was established to the most change oriented. Change oriented incentives are the percent of change incentives to all status quo and change oriented services combined. Hypotheses 23 and 24 predict positive relationships between the two change oriented measures and the base of member involvement, which is supported in terms of the direction and significance levels in five out of six possibilities related to the base of participation for both rank and file member volunteers and the percent of members who function as leaders. As change orientation increases, the base of all members and leaders involved also broadens. These results suggest, contrary to purely economic arguments, that formally structured change oriented goals and incentives are influential in activating rank and file members. At the neighborhood level, goals and incentives related to collective goods are frequently tied to tangible benefits that are short to middle range (about one to five years) in terms of time required to achieve them. While collective goods benefit the entire neighborhood, organization
members may be more amenable to participating because they can frequently see the results of their collective efforts during their tenure in the organization and in the neighborhood.

Social events (solidary incentives). This variable was predicted to covary positively in relation to member involvement categories (hypothesis 25). For member attendance at one or more general meetings the prediction is supported. This may mean that while social events are of less concern to members than more substantive matters overall, they may meet with limited success in stimulating membership solidarity as reflected in attendance at one or more general meetings per year. This interpretation seems reasonable, and it is not incompatible with regarding the role of solidary incentives as secondary in relation to purposive goals and incentives.

Publications. This variable only covaries significantly and negatively with percent of members involved as leaders (Table 8-3). This is the opposite direction from that which was expected (hypothesis 26). This does not mean that publications do not facilitate information flow regarding neighborhood issues and actions taken by the leadership, a proposition that is not tested in this research. Publications may be produced in support of "status quo" oriented organizations as well as change oriented organizations. They are not "purposive" in that sense, but they too are secondary
to the primary incentive structure. Thus some publications may be used solely to inform, while others may be used at least some of the time to elicit compliance or support through participation in meetings or other organizational activities.

**Lobbying.** This function is inherent in interest group operations, whether it is all or only part of an organization's formal agenda. However, there is variation in relation to the extent to which organizations rely on lobbying to pursue neighborhood organization goals. Lobbying is also an activity used by both "status quo" and "change" oriented organizations to influence public policy that will effect their respective neighborhoods, as observing Houston public hearings before city council on neighborhood issues reveals. However, there are no significant relationships between the five member involvement variables and lobbying, neither in terms of "reliance" nor in terms of whether or not an organization lobbies at all. This lack of relationship leaves open the question of possible linkages between members and leaders representing them to public officials. This question is partially answered by the introduction of an interaction term (percent lobbying and percent of change oriented incentives) in the multiple regression analyses (Chapter 9).

**Total number of incentives (scope).** There are no significant relationships between the five member involvement
variables and the number of incentives that organizations extend to their membership. Comparison of these results to those related to purpose and incentives as determinants of member involvement suggests that the nature of purpose and incentives are stronger determinants of the proportion of members who are actively involved.

Per capita budget. Financial capability as expressed in the per capita expenditures is unrelated to the base of participation by members and members as leaders. This may be because financial capability puts organizations in a better position to pay for implementation of incentive structures, which then tends to reduce the need for voluntary involvement in implementation. To the extent that this is so, it may offset the otherwise positive effects that financial capability might have on participatory democracy, particularly since voluntary involvement extends to policy related activities.

Decentralization. Out of ten possibilities for significant relationships related to two decentralization variables, there are four significant relationships that materialize. The four relationships are important in they lend support to hypothesis 30, which predicts greater member involvement in relation to decentralized organization structures.
Policy decentralization covaries positively and significantly for one of the five member involvement variables, which is the percentage of members involved as leaders. This suggests that as structures become more decentralized in relation to who and how many elect the president of the organization, prepare the budget and administer the implementation of policies, more members have opportunities to become involved as leaders. Rank and file members, in turn, respond to the opportunities to become leaders. Apparently, the percentage of members who become leaders that serve on boards of directors or executive committees increases as governance structures become more open and horizontal.

As the number of general meetings held per year increases, the percentages of members involved by attending one or more meeting also increases. In addition, increasing opportunities to attend meetings is associated with increasing proportions of the membership involved in committee work and projects and in the time that is contributed. Apparently open meeting structures may stimulate levels of ordinary member involvement throughout the organization.

All four of the significant relationships are positive as predicted by hypothesis 30. The most important factor of decentralization as defined is clearly the meeting structure.
If more opportunities are provided for interaction among members and leaders through formal meeting structures, the "grass roots" apparently respond positively, thus giving rise to growth in the base of citizen participation within neighborhood organizations, as well as the intensity of the time commitments made.

**Volunteer service arrangements.** When organizations increase their reliance on volunteers to implement the incentive structure, the base of involvement of both rank and file and leadership increases significantly as expected (hypothesis 31). Voluntary arrangements are also positively related to increasing member attendance at one or more general meetings per year at a probability level that is close to being significant ($p=.06$). The high level of significance of this structural component in explaining involvement by rank and file volunteers is contrary to expectations arising out of the neighborhood leadership literature, which by and large leaves the impression that only a cadre of leaders within the neighborhood are willing to do the work.

**Organization age.** This variable was injected as a control variable for possible effects of Michele's "iron law of oligarchy" which Olson (1965), Knoke (1990) and others have often cited. The directions between age and broadly based member and leader involvement are not significant except in
relation to the percentage of ordinary members involved in committee work and projects. This negative and significant relationship may offer a grain of support for "oligarchy" theory, in that it suggests that as organizations age, fewer rank and file members are intensely involved.
Table 8-3
Bivariate Analysis of Organizational Components and Member Involvement (Pearson Correlation Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Component</th>
<th>% of Members Who Attend One or More Meetings</th>
<th>% of Members Involved in Committee or Projects</th>
<th># of Per Capita Involved Hrs. - Members</th>
<th>% of Members Involved as Leaders</th>
<th># of Per Capita Involved Hrs. - Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Membership)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.29***</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Size)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member #</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.26***</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Area</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.35***</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.17*</td>
<td>.100</td>
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<td>Nhbd. Area</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.30***</td>
<td>.078</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Purpose)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Change goals</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Incentives)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.044</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
<td>.103</td>
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<td>Rely Lobby</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.064</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.101</td>
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<td>Scope (#)</td>
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<td>(Financial)</td>
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<td>Budget PC</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
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<td>.103</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Governance)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy decentral'</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>-.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Mtgs. per yr.</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. Arrng.</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>-.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Control)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org. Age</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *=.05
Conclusion

The bivariate analyses are instructive in relation to patterns of citizen involvement within neighborhood organizations. Some findings run contrary to Olsonian logic and assumptions that collective action organizations are dependent on sufficient financial resources to provide selective incentives, resulting in collective benefits that are always by-products of the organizations providing them.

The bivariate analyses reported in Tables 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3 suggest that a political economy theory of organizations is appropriate. Neighborhood wealth does influence the structuring of membership, incentives and governance. Economic and physical diversity influence the structuring of membership, incentives and governance.

In the next chapter, bivariate relationships discussed above will be examined using multiple regression analyses applied to recursive models. The number of significant relationships between the independent variables and dependent variables will be reduced, since some of the environmental and structural components are explained by others.
Notes

CHAPTER 9
Multiple Regression Analyses

From T-Test analyses in Chapter 7, it has been established with a high degree of statistical confidence, that mandatory neighborhood organizations as institutions are different in many respects from the voluntary membership counterparts. The fact that the two types of neighborhood institutions are different does not explain why they are different in terms of the way that they are structured nor in terms of the effects that the difference may have on member involvement within the organizations. In the subsequent analyses, these questions are addressed by using multiple regression on environmental and related institutional explanations as proposed in Chapter 4 and as first examined through bivariate analysis.

Three types of multiple regression models are developed. They are (1) an environmental model to partially explain the formal structure of the organization, (2) an organizational model to explain member involvement, and (3) a combined organizational and environmental model to explain member involvement. The multiple regression models are guided by political economy theory applied to neighborhood environmental and organizational influences on levels of group involvement.
for the five types of nonmonetary contributions that have been identified and operationalized in Chapter 5. From the multiple regression analyses, conclusions will be drawn as to the level of support provided for the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 4 that were guided by political as well as economic considerations.

In relation to all of the models, the equations reported in the tables are those that provided the best overall fit as indicated by the percent of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model as a whole (Adjusted R2). This approach was started with an examination of all hypothesized relationships. Exogenous variables that failed to contribute to the explanatory power of the model or its overall ability to predict were eliminated.

The major problem faced, as expected with cross sectional analysis was multicollinearity, and in all cases where multicollinearity was the cause of poor performance of the model, the variables that explained the most were retained and the variables that reduced the explanatory power of the model were eliminated. Multiple regression analyses were also used
for multicollinearity checks on the independent variables.\textsuperscript{1}

The regression coefficients of the equations that explain the most are reported in Tables 9-1 through 9-8. Unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients and \(T\) scores (unstandardized coefficients divided by the standard error) are reported in the tables. Where the relationships are significant, they are indicated as follows; *** \(p \leq .001\); ** \(p \leq .01\) and * \(p \leq .05\) (two tailed probability).

The Environmental Model of Neighborhood Organizations

The environmental model examines empirical evidence from Rich (1980) that structural attributes of neighborhood organizations are influenced by neighborhood environments. Theoretically it is based upon guidance from Knoke (1990) regarding the relevance of external environments to the political economy of national mass membership organizations.

\textsuperscript{1} In relation to environmental variables, wealth (the average home value) explains the percent of owner occupied single family homes (\(p = .007\)). In relation to organizational components, the percent of change oriented incentives (\(p = .007\)) and openness of membership (\(p = .001\)) explains the purpose of the organization. The control variable, organization age, also explains purpose (\(p = .01\)). The interaction term for the dichotomous variable "lobby" combined with the percent of incentives that are change oriented eliminates the multicollinearity problem between "percent change oriented incentives" and purpose.
Twelve organizational attributes were regressed on five environmental variables as operationalized and described in Chapter 5. Two control variables initially were tested in all of the equations. They are the control variables for the percent of the population that is black and the percent over 65. Since "percent black" does not correlate with racial diversity or the more inclusive diversity dimension derived from factor analysis, it was necessary to control for influences that racial homogeneity among the black population might have on activism or citizen participation (Haeberle, 1989; Thomas, 1986; Crenson, 1980 and others).

Neighborhood population in the "over 65" category was also initially included as a control since age could effect organizations in a way that is not tapped by wealth (average home value), home ownership or diversity dimensions of the model. "Over 65" was significant and retained in one instance to be discussed below.

Membership requirements. As previously noted, mandatory membership is the only substantive selective incentive usually found within neighborhood organizations that is of theoretical importance. Since it has already been established that there are significant differences between voluntary and mandatory neighborhood organizations, the first organizational component examined in relation to neighborhood environments addresses
mandatory versus voluntary membership (ie. dues) requirements in relation to hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.

Hypothesis 1. The likelihood that neighborhood organizations are mandatory or initially mandated by a developer will increase as neighborhood wealth increases.

Hypothesis 2. The likelihood that neighborhood organizations are mandatory or initially mandated by a developer will decrease as neighborhood diversity increases.

Hypothesis 3. The likelihood that neighborhood organizations are mandatory or initially mandated by a developer will increase as the percentage of owner occupied homes increases in the neighborhood.

For the first equation, the dependent variable is the dichotomous variable for mandatory homeowners associations. The resulting findings are reported in Table 9-1. The overall model explains only four percent of the likelihood that organizational structures will be mandatory, and the only significant variable is home ownership. Home ownership is the significant environmental variable in influencing whether or not organizations are mandatory (Table 9-1). This is as predicted and suggests that the market for mandatory homeowners associations is as would be expected in neighborhoods with higher rates of owner occupied homes.
Table 9-1

Multiple Regression Analysis of Mandatory Membership on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Independent Variables</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mandatory Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhbd. Wealth</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Econ. Diversity</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Owner Occupied SFDU’s</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05

Membership eligibility requirements. Openness of membership was scaled on a continuum from the most restrictive to the least restrictive. As indicated by hypothesis 4, mandatory organizations are not included among those tested for environmental influences on the openness of eligibility requirements, since by definition and from the survey there is no variation from the requirement that membership is exclusive to homeowners. (Some respondents reported that renters could benefit, but not vote on policy matters.) Therefore this
analysis is for voluntary membership organizations only (Table 9-2).

Hypothesis 4. The smaller the percentage of homeowners, the less the neighborhood wealth and the greater the neighborhood diversity, the more open the membership requirements will be in voluntary membership organizations.

The results lend support to hypotheses regarding environmental influences on the eligibility structure of neighborhood organizations. Home ownership as predicted works against inclusivity of diverse interests. As the rate of owner occupancy increases in a neighborhood, homogeneous groups of homeowners may be able to form a more solid coalition with resources to protect their investments. Opening membership to others (renters or businesses) might lead to change in the organization purpose and incentive structure. Homeowners are apparently more "status quo" oriented in order to protect their interest in the residential integrity of the neighborhood. If there are enough home owners to marshall at least limited resources, then for political reasons, they may be more inclined to limit their membership to homeowners.

Physical and economic diversity have the most significant positive influence on inclusive eligibility requirements as expected. This is reasonable since organizations formed in the face of this type of diversity may acquire more abundant
and useful resources by being inclusive. Inclusivity may also facilitate political compromise by providing for debate among competing interests in the neighborhood, even though it raises the potential for conflict.

Table 9-2
Multiple Regression Analysis
Openness of Eligibility Regressed
on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
<th>Openness of Eligibility (Voluntary Organizations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstnd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>9.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td>-5.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Econ. Diversity</td>
<td>1.575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Interest Diversity</td>
<td>0.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05

Representation of neighborhood Census area and service area. The hypotheses related to the size of the organization as defined by the proportion of the neighborhood or service area represented are as follows.
Hypothesis 5. Neighborhood wealth and home-owner occupancy will positively influence the percentage of the neighborhood and service area represented by voluntary organizations.

Hypothesis 6. The greater the diversity of the neighborhood, the less the percentage of the neighborhood represented by the organization.

Including the neighborhood wealth variable and the owner occupancy variable resulted in over specification for both analyses. Therefore, the variable that performed the best was retained while the one with less explanatory power was removed, resulting in the equations as indicated in Tables 9-3 and 9-4.¹

In addition, for the specific service area as defined by the organization, the test is limited to voluntary organizations, since by definition, mandatory membership requires every one in the service area to be included while voluntary organization may attract some constituents of the service area but not others (Table 9-4).

The only significant environmental determinant is the physical and economic diversity dimension, which as predicted in hypothesis 8, is negatively related to representation of the Census neighborhood (Table 9-3). With this exception, the

¹ In multiple regression analysis, regressing owner occupancy on the other environmental variables, only wealth (average home value) is significantly related (p=.007).
results shown in Tables 9-3 and 9-4 lend only marginal support to the contention that the size of the neighborhood represented is influenced by environmental attributes, whether economic or social.

Table 9-3

Multiple Regression Analysis of Census Neighborhood Area Representation on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
<th>Neighborhood Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment Variables</td>
<td>Unstnd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Eco. Diversity</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/intr. group Diversity</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owner Occupancy</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**R2**
(N)
(164)

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05
Table 9-4
Multiple Regression Analysis of Service Area Representation on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Variables</th>
<th>Service Area Representation (Voluntary Organizations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>38.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Interest Diversity &amp; Conflict</td>
<td>-7.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (N)</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05

A multiple regression analysis was used to test the influence of the environmental variables in relation to the absolute size of neighborhood organizations as expressed by the reported number of members. None of the relationships were significant and the overall model was also insignificant and it is not reported.

Neighborhood Environments and Change Orientation. Change orientation applies to both the primary reason that neighborhood organizations were established as well as to their incentive structures. Hypotheses 7 and 8 set forth
theoretical expectations for orientation in terms of both organization purpose and organization incentives.

Hypothesis 7. The more affluent the neighborhood, the less change oriented the purpose and the incentive structure and the more owner occupied homes, the less change oriented the purpose and incentive structure.

Hypothesis 8. The greater the diversity of neighborhood environments, the more "change oriented" the purpose and the incentive structure.

Purpose. Both mandatory and voluntary organizations are included in this analysis. This is because many mandatory and some voluntary organizations responding to the survey indicated that their reason for being established was that the developer required it. A few respondents from mandatory organizations indicated that their organizations were established by homeowners later on in the history of the neighborhood. In addition, occasionally a respondent for a voluntary organization indicated that the developer required the organization, but did not establish mandatory dues. Since the most "status quo" purpose or reason for establishing organizations (developer required it) may be applicable to either mandatory or voluntary organizations, both types of organizations are included.

Two of the four environmental variables are significant influences effecting the reasons that neighborhood organizations are formed. They are the physical and economic
diversity dimension and the percent of owner occupied single family homes.

As indicated in Table 9-5, physical and economic diversity are significant and positively related to the change oriented purpose scale, as expected (hypothesis 8). This diversity dimension may tap the perception that commercial uses hurt the residential character of neighborhoods in which they are located. To the extent that economic diversity contributes to the diversity dimension, awareness may be heightened by day to day interactions among neighbors, which may in turn prompt a desire for collective action to attend to problems or needs arising out of uneven distribution of wealth within the neighborhood.\(^1\)

The owner occupancy variable is significantly and inversely related as expected (hypothesis 7). As explained in Chapter 5, the purpose scale of 1 to 7 increases as the reasons move from the "status quo" to change orientation. That is why the inverse relationship is expected and obtained between purpose and owner occupancy. This means that by

\(^1\) Forty percent of 155 respondents to the organization survey indicated that commercial development had hurt their neighborhood, while conflict between interest pairs was also reported that characterized the extent of conflict among diverse property interests. The highest was for commercial versus residential interests (mean = 3.22 on a scale from one to five).
either having or anticipating high rates of owner occupancy, developers and/or homeowners are likely to be influenced to establish organizations to protect the "status quo" or financial investment that has been made in the neighborhood. The most common "status quo" focus is on the enforcement of deed restrictions, but in some cases the purpose of developers and/or home owners is broader, and includes maintenance, not only of deed restrictions, but of common areas and facilities as well.¹

Some neighborhood organizations reported forming around the purpose of better security or protection of the neighborhood. Security issues are apparently of major concern to homeowners who are more tied through their financial investment to the neighborhood than renters. Thus their collective effort may reenforce maintenance of currently low crime rates in the face of perceived threats, or improve security in an area already hurt by increasing crime rates.

Overall, the results of this analysis lend support to the contention that neighborhood entrepreneurs do pay attention to collective goods markets that may be generated by environmental attributes of the neighborhoods by forming

¹ For "purpose", owner occupancy performed better than wealth. However, wealth apparently is a factor as well, at least indirectly through explaining home ownership as previously noted.
organizations to address relevant environmental issues. However, longitudinal data is needed to further substantiate this claim, since without longitudinal data it can only be assumed that current neighborhood environments are about the same as they were when their respective organizations were formed.

Table 9-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environment Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Econ. Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05

Incentive Structures. Knoke (1990) found that incentive structures were unrelated to environmental conditions. In addition to hypotheses 7 and 8 (above), hypotheses 9 through
12 are added to test possible relationships between incentive structures and the neighborhood environment.

Hypothesis 9. The more diverse the neighborhood environment and the greater the rate of home ownership, the more likely the neighborhood organization is to include solidarity incentives in the incentive structure.

Hypothesis 10. The more diverse the neighborhood environment, the more likely the neighborhood organization is to publish newsletters and/or directories.

Hypothesis 11. The more affluent the neighborhood and the higher the rate of owner occupied homes, the more likely the neighborhood organization is to publish a newsletters and/or directories.

Hypothesis 12. The less affluent the neighborhood, the more diverse and the lower the rate of owner occupied homes, the more the organization will rely upon the lobbying incentive.

Environmental explanations do not appear to do much better in explaining neighborhood organizations incentive structures than they do in explaining national organization incentive structures (Knoke, 1990). Only two of twenty explanations related to hypothesized relationships are significant.

The percent of owner occupied homes are significant in the expected, negative direction in relation to change oriented incentives, which constitutes the most theoretically important incentive variable as set forth in this thesis from the political economy perspective of neighborhood organizations.
Nevertheless, the overall model explains only .04 percent of the variation in the orientation of the primary incentive structures, while environmental attributes explain fifteen percent of the variation in relation to purpose. This suggests that neighborhood organizations like other collective action organizations tend to diversify their incentive structure, except (with the exception of mandatory dues requirements) neighborhood organizations apparently do this within a collective incentive framework, since generally there are no other material selective incentives provided.

The only other significant hypothesized relationship is the relationship between racial/property interest diversity and publications. This may mean that leaders hope to overcome some of the communication problems in diverse neighborhoods with conflicting interests, and in so doing, hope to elicit broader support and compliance.

The control variable "percent black" is the most important environmental variable. It was significant in relation to three of the four incentive structures. While 80% of the neighborhood organizations responding to the survey indicated that they contact public officials regarding their interests, they do not all rely heavily on lobbying. Neighborhoods that are predominantly black are disproportionate to the oldest sections of the city, where
infrastructure has deteriorated and where historically improvements by the city have been neglected. Thus it is not surprising to see a significant, positive influence between percent black and reliance on lobbying.

Table 9-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Attributes</th>
<th>Change Incentives</th>
<th>Solidary Incentives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstnd.</td>
<td>Stnd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys. Econ. Diversity</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Owner</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05
Table 9-6 cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Independent Variables</th>
<th>Publications</th>
<th>Reliance on Lobbying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd.</td>
<td>Std.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Econ. Diversity</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Interest Diversity</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.085***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(164)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<..001; **p<..01; *p<..05

Financial Capacity and Governance. The following hypotheses were tested with the results reported in the first and second equations in Table 9-7.

Hypothesis 13. The more affluent the neighborhood, the greater the financial resources of the organization.

Hypothesis 14. The more owner occupied housing in the neighborhood, the greater the neighborhood organization's financial capability.
Hypothesis 15. The greater the diversity of neighborhood environments, the less financial capability the organization will have.

Hypothesis 16. The less affluent the neighborhood, the more decentralized the organization's governance structure will be.

Hypothesis 17. The more diverse the neighborhood environment, the more decentralized the organization's governance structure will be.

Percent of owner occupied homes is the only significant environmental determinant of financial capacity and wealth is the only significant environmental determinant of decentralization. Both of these variables are instructive as to the connections between neighborhood environments and neighborhood organizations.

Per capita budgets of neighborhood organizations significantly increase with increasing rates of home ownership in the neighborhood as predicted (hypothesis 14).\(^1\) In the meantime, per capita costs of services probably decrease, due to the economy of scale. Thus there may be a critical mass of home owners that, once reached, results in acceptance of increasing financial burdens because of the probability that enough funds will be accumulated by the organization to effectively maintain, protect or to sometimes improve the neighborhoods in which their homes are located. Also, tangible collective benefits resulting from monetary

\(^1\) Since wealth explains home ownership, indirect support is provided for hypothesis 13 as well.
contributions stay "close to home", and thus may be more readily perceived as in line with monetary costs to the homeowners, who in turn may capitalize their contributions through maintenance or appreciation in home values.

Hypothesis 16 is supported in that neighborhood wealth is significantly and negatively related to decentralization in terms of meeting structure. The percent of owner occupied housing has a significant independent effect, also inversely related to meeting structure decentralization. Decentralization of policy and administrative structures is negatively related to the rate of owner occupied single family residences in the neighborhood. This may mean that leaders and perhaps constituents do not foresee the need for access in order to debate policy changes if change is not a preference, while the opposite is true as neighborhoods become less affluent and contain fewer owner occupied homes.

It is evident from this analysis that in neighborhood organizations, as Knoke (1990) observed for national member based organizations, there is a tendency to bureaucratize and centralize member based interest organizations. In Houston neighborhoods, the tendency to centralize emerges as neighborhood affluence increases and conversely decentralization tends to be utilized as affluence decreases.
Table 9-7

Multiple Regression Analysis of Financial Capability and Governance Structures on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Independent Variables</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Capacity</td>
<td>Decentralized Policy &amp; Administration</td>
<td>Decentralized Meeting Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-552.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhbd Wealth</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys./Econ. Diversity</td>
<td>127.87</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Owner Occupied SFDU's</td>
<td>1151.80</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>4.00***</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-2.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (N)</td>
<td>.099***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.026*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(164)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(164)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05
Service Arrangements. Wealth was expected to be the strongest environmental explanation in relation to volunteer service arrangements as indicated in Hypothesis 18.

Hypothesis 18. The more affluent the neighborhood, the less likely the incentive structure will be implemented by volunteer service arrangements provided by the organization.

Regression of "percent of volunteer service arrangements" on all of the environmental variables with or without the control variables, results in the home ownership rate of single family dwelling units emerging as the only significant influence. As with other dependent variables related to participatory structures of collective action organizations, home ownership is inversely related. As noted for other equations, home ownership is explained by wealth and thus indirectly wealth remains a factor as hypothesized.
Table 9-8
Multiple Regression Analysis of Percent Volunteer Arrangements on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Independent Variables</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Volunteer Arrangements Unstnd. Stnd. T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent All Units Owner Occupied</td>
<td>-.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N=164)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05

The Organizational Model of Member Involvement

The major question addressed by this model deals with how the internal political economy of neighborhood organizations affects levels of group involvement within the organizations. Table 9-9 (p.232) reports the results for the three categories of member involvement that represent the base or proportion of rank and file members that are participating either by attending general meetings or working on committees or by assuming leadership roles. Table 9-10 (p.234) reports the effects of organizational characteristics on the time that ordinary members and leaders contribute to the organization.
Hypotheses 19 through 31 are tested using the organizational model. The hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 19. Mandatory membership requirements are negatively related to voluntary member involvement within the organization.

Hypothesis 20. Mandatory membership requirements are positively related to leadership involvement within the organization.

Hypothesis 21. The more open the membership requirements of voluntary neighborhood organizations the lower the rate of member involvement in the organization.

Hypothesis 22. The larger the size of the neighborhood organization, the smaller the percentage of members who will be involved.

Hypothesis 23. As organizational purpose becomes more change oriented, levels of member involvement within neighborhood organizations increase.

Hypothesis 24. As change oriented incentives increase, levels of member involvement with neighborhood organizations increase.

Hypothesis 25. Solidarity oriented collective incentives are positively related to levels of member involvement with neighborhood organizations.

Hypothesis 26. Communication oriented activities are positively related to levels of member involvements with neighborhood organizations.

Hypothesis 27. Lobbying as an organizational incentive and increasing reliance on lobbying are positively related to member involvement.

Hypothesis 28. The greater the scope of inducements, the higher the levels of member involvement.

Hypothesis 29. As financial resources of organizations increase, voluntary contributions of time by leaders and members will increase.

Hypothesis 30. The more decentralized the governance structure, the broader the base of member involvement and the greater the contribution of voluntary hours to the organization.
Hypothesis 31. The more services that an organization provides through volunteers, the broader the base of membership involvement and the greater the contribution of voluntary hours the members will contribute to the organization.

Overall, there are fourteen organizational variables that were identified and initially considered in evaluating the effects of six categories of organizational components. The six categories and related variables are: (1) membership requirements - mandatory or voluntary and openness of eligibility requirements; (2) membership size - the number of members, the percent of service area represented and the percent of Census neighborhood represented; (3) purpose - the continuum of primary purpose from "status quo" to change orientation, (4) incentives - the primary incentive structure incorporating "status quo" and change oriented incentives and three dichotomous variables for solitary incentives, publications and lobbying and another continuous variable, the reliance on lobbying index; (5) governance - per capita budget, decentralization (policy/administration and meeting structure), and the percentage of incentives that are provided by volunteers as opposed to staff or contracts; and (6) the control variable, organization age. The relationships that are significant are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Broadly based citizen participation is the goal of participatory democracy. Therefore the three measures of the
base of member involvement are considered the most crucial to
the research question regarding possible influences of
institutional structures on levels of member involvement.
Generally, the results of the analyses support the contention
that formal organizational components do exert an influence,
one way or another on the base of member participation in
neighborhood organizations (Table 9-9).

There are nine significant relationships as shown in
Table 9-9 for the three dependent variables when taken
together (percent attending meetings, percent involved in
activities and percent involved as leaders). Multicolinearity
between some of the organizational components that were
originally identified reduced the number of significant
relationships from those that were found to be significant in
the bivariate analyses (Table 8-3).\(^1\)

Lobbying and change oriented incentive structures as an
interaction term contributes substantially to participatory
democracy within neighborhood organizations by raising the
proportion of members turning out for general meetings and by
increasing the proportion of the membership involved in

\(^1\) The extent to which organization purposes are change
oriented is explained by three other organizational
components: (1) whether or not membership is voluntary; (2)
the inclusiveness of membership; and (3) organization age. In
a multiple regression analysis of purpose on seven
organizational determinants, these three relationships had
probabilities of .05 or better.
committees and projects. In addition, the variable, change oriented purpose, also contributes significantly to the base of membership attending general meetings. The leadership base does not expand significantly in relation to change oriented variables for purpose or incentives, but does expand in organizations where service arrangements are assigned to volunteers.

When variables are considered in terms of the five theoretically important categories of organizational components, there were 15 possibilities for significant results in relation to the three dependent variables for member involvement variables. Significant relationships occurred eight times, or at least once for each category but the membership eligibility category.

Independent variables reported in Table 9-9 are only partial explanations of the dependent (member involvement) variables. Yet while other macro level variables and individual level variables are not explained, the models for the two rank and file involvement variables explain around one fourth of the total variance, and have substantial effects on member involvement as discussed below.

Percent of membership attending meetings. Large organizations are disadvantageous to turnout rates at general
meetings as predicted (hypothesis 22) and as Olson (1965) theorized on the basis of rational choice. However, though significant, the impact may be small as the unstandardized coefficient (B) indicates. On the other hand, the measure of size in terms of the percent of service area represented is positively related to member attendance. This concept of size apparently produces the different result because the percent of service area represented can be relatively large for a small organization that may represent only a small portion of the Census neighborhood. In such cases, the organization may have some of the efficacy and cost/benefit advantages for collective action that are associated with being small (Olson, 1965), while having the credibility that would come from more solid representation of the service area.

The general tendency of rank and file members not to attend meetings is offset by change oriented purpose as well as by lobbying interacting with the extent of change orientation in the primary incentive structure. With four organizational components contribute significantly to the model and two contribute modestly, the overall explanatory power is twenty two percent, nearly one-fourth of the total variance related to meeting attendance.

Percent of ordinary members in committee work and projects. Change oriented incentive structures interact with
lobbying to stimulate higher levels of member involvement in committee work and projects. This variable is significant and its impact may offset the negative effects of increasing organization size. Publications also negatively impact member involvement. The direction of this relationship is contrary to the positive impact that was anticipated, yet the unexpected direction is attributed to the fact that the variable taps organization size in terms of Census area represented.¹ Even so, the unstandardized coefficient for publications is smaller than the positive effect stemming from the interaction of lobbying and the extent of change oriented incentives, which in combination support hypotheses 24 and 27.

The control variable, organization age, may have tapped a tendency toward "oligarchy" in neighborhood organizations since its slightly negative impact on rank and file members involved in committee work and projects is significant. Nevertheless, it is offset by the positive impacts of change oriented purposes and change oriented incentive structures. Thus it appears that change oriented purposes and change oriented collective incentive structures curb tendencies toward oligarchy in relation to member involvement in

¹ Regressing neighborhood Census area on publishing, decentralized governance, change incentives and purpose resulted in one significant relationship, which was the dichotomous variable publishing (p=.01)
committees and project activities of neighborhood organizations.

Overall, with the significance of organization age added, there are three significant organizational components and four components exerting modest relationships that in combination result in an adjusted R2 of 26 percent in relation to the proportion of members involved in committees and projects. This is the best R2 ratio among the five equations (Table 9-9 and Table 9-10).

The percentage of the total membership participating as leaders. Volunteer arrangements contribute positively and significantly to the base of leadership within neighborhood organizations. The leadership variable was operationalized as percent of membership that serves as an officer and/or on the Board of Directors. Frequently organization by-laws set the lower and upper limits of the base of leadership which was evident from a review of organization by-laws submitted by some organizations returning surveys. Therefore there is less opportunity for other structural determinants of the leadership base. The size of the organization is a disadvantage in terms of leadership base as a percent of the organizational membership as expected. This may in part be due to the limited flexibility accorded the leadership base through by-laws. Voluntary arrangements are the only
significant positive influence on broadening the base of leadership. This relationship suggests that organizations tend to disperse leadership for coordination and oversight of activities implemented through voluntary service arrangements.

The organizational determinants contribute less to explanations of leadership base than they do to the base of ordinary member involvement. What is most notable about the effects on the three dependent variables as reported in Table 9-9, is that change oriented purposes and incentives combined with lobbying contribute significantly to collective involvement of members in pursuit of collective goods, amidst what is assumed to be variety of external and internal social, psychological and economic conditions, which may also constrain or facilitate collective action among rank and file members and leaders of neighborhood organizations.
Table 9-9
Multiple Regression of Member Involvement on Neighborhood Organizational Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Independent Variable</th>
<th>% Members Attend Mtgs.</th>
<th>% Members Involved</th>
<th>% Members as Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd.</td>
<td>Std.</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (Membership)</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness (Size)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Number</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-3.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Area (Purpose)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>2.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change goals (Incentives)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>2.64**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby*% Change (Governance)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>2.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Services (Governance)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Meetings per yr. (Control)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. Arrangements (Control)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj.) (N)</td>
<td>.228***</td>
<td>.255***</td>
<td>.123***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05
The Intensity of Participation. Only one structural component is significant in relation to per capita hours or intensity of participation of leaders. In relation to the intensity of involvement of leaders, hypothesis 21 is supported. The significance of whether or not the organization is mandatory, lends support to Rich’s contention (1980) that the formal power of mandatory organizations serves as an incentive for neighborhood organization leaders to produce collective for the neighborhood.

There are two significant relationships emerging between organizational components as operationalized and intensity of involvement in terms of the per capita hours spent by rank and file membership. They are both associated with decentralized government. The number of meetings per year contributes positively to the number of per capita hours spent by volunteers on organizational activities, but decentralization of policy and administration reduces the per capita hours of volunteers, possibly by spreading the work across more individuals.
Table 9-10
Per Capita Hours of Members and Leaders on Neighborhood Organizational Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Independent Variable</th>
<th>Members Per Capita Hours</th>
<th>Leaders Per Capita Hrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd.</td>
<td>Std.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>39.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Membership) Mandatory</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Incentives) Publications</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely lobby</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Governance) Decentralization</td>
<td>-2.08</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Meetings per yr.</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj.)</td>
<td>.041*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(164)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

The Combined Organization and Environmental Model of Member Involvement

The results of a combined organizational and environmental model are reported in Tables 9-13 and 9-14. However, prior to reporting the combined effects of organizational components and environmental attributes on member involvement, member involvement was regressed on the environmental variables alone with results as reported in Table 9-11 and 9-12.
Two of the individual environmental variables are significant in relation to member involvement. The percentage of owner occupied homes decreases the percentage of members attending one or more general meetings per year. Only one equation of the environmental model (related to the dependent variable "percentage of members involved") has any overall significance (P<.05). This significance comes from controlling for the percentage of the neighborhood population that is black which, without the controls for organizational components, significantly and positively relates to members involved (in committees and projects). These results demonstrate that the environmental model is much weaker than the organization model in explaining the specified forms of member involvement as they occur in response to formal structural components of neighborhood organizations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>% Members Attend Mtgs.</th>
<th>% Members Involved in Committees/projects</th>
<th>% Members as Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd. Std. T</td>
<td>Unstd. Std. T</td>
<td>Unstd. Std. T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Environmental)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (phys./eco.)</td>
<td>3.8 .10 1.22</td>
<td>-9.0 -.09 -1.16</td>
<td>-9.3 -.18 -2.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (race/int)</td>
<td>-3.53 -.09 -1.16</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership (Controls)</td>
<td>-18.6 -.16 -2.05*</td>
<td>-9.0 -.09 -1.16</td>
<td>-9.3 -.18 -2.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% black</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>1.4 .180 2.27*</td>
<td>.05 .13 1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% over 65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj.) (N)</td>
<td>.019 (.164)</td>
<td>.037* (.164)</td>
<td>.029 (.164)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<=.001; **p<=.01; *p<=.05
Table 9-12
Multiple Regression of Per Capita Member Hours on Environmental Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Leader Hours (per capita)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member Hours (per capita)</td>
<td>Unstd.</td>
<td>Stnd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (Environmental) Wealth</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (phys/eco)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (race/int)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership (Controls)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% black</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj.) (N)</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

As previously shown in Tables 9-1 through 9-9, environmental factors have some significant influences on the way organizations are structured. This suggests that there is an indirect relationship to levels of member involvement coming from some environmental influences on organizational structures.

When environmental variables are added to the combined model equations (Table 9-13 and 9-14), the explanatory power of the overall model is slightly improved from the organizational model (Table 9-9) as applied to the base of member involvement for two out of the three equations (percent
of members involved and percentage of members as leaders). For the two improved equations, the organizational variables that contributed significantly to the explanation remain the same, and the degree of significance varies slightly as indicated by comparison of Table 9-9 and Table 9-13. The control variable organization age emerges as significant in the combined model, inversely related to the percent of members serving as leaders, while the inverse relationship was not significant before.

Physical and economic diversity emerge as the only significant environmental variable in any of the combined equations as shown in Table 9-13. The impact is negative for the percentage of members that are involved on committees and projects. Wealth contributes positively to the overall explanatory power of the equation explaining the percentage of members involved as leaders, and it is close to being significant. Racial and property interest diversity though well short of significance, negatively effects the percent of the membership that attend meetings. Also as shown in Table 9-13, when controlled for organizational structures, the positive effect of "percent black" on member involvement is removed and none of the other environmental variables have any direct effect, except as previously discussed.
Table 9-13

Multiple Regression of Member Involvement on Neighborhood Environmental and Organizational Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Independent Variable</th>
<th>% Members Attend Mtgs.</th>
<th>% Members Involved</th>
<th>% Members as Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd.</td>
<td>Std.</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Organization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Number</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-3.68***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Area</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>2.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change goals</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>2.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby*% Change</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>2.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Meetings per yr.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>2.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vol. Arrangements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Environment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (phys./eco.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (race/interests)</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Adj.)</td>
<td>.244***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(143)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05
Table 9-14
Per Capita Hours of Members and Leaders on Environmental and Organizational Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Independent Variable</th>
<th>Members Per Capita Hrs.</th>
<th>Leaders Per Capita Hrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unstd. Stnd. T</td>
<td>Unstd. Stnd. T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (Organization)</td>
<td>38.91</td>
<td>24.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>30.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>21.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rely lobby</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>-2.05</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtgs. per year (Environment)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>2.79**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity (phys./eco.)</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (Adj.)</td>
<td>.048**</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

Summary

Neighborhood organizations in Houston serve diverse neighborhood environments which influence how organizations are structured. Formal organizational components have more effect on the base of member participation than environmental determinants have, either on organizational structure or on member involvement.

Of the eighteen hypotheses predicting relationships between the environment and organizational structures, eight received significant support. The most frequent environmental
influences on structure are related to owner occupancy, which was significant in eight out of twelve equations. The likelihood of mandatory organizations significantly increases as the percentage of home ownership increases. In addition home ownership is related to decreases in the openness of membership and to decreases in change orientation in terms of purpose and incentives. Home ownership increases financial capacity and decreases decentralization on all three measures (policy and administration, meetings per year and voluntary arrangements). Wealth is only significant in terms of its inverse relationship to meetings held per year. However, it is close to significant in the expected direction for the percent of service area represented, and of course through home ownership, wealth is indirectly related to all of the organizational components effected by the rate of home ownership.

Physical and economic diversity were significant in the expected directions in three equations. As physical and economical diversity of neighborhoods increases there is significantly more openness in terms of membership eligibility, there is a smaller percentage of the service area represented, and there is greater change orientation in terms of purpose. Racial and interest group diversity was significant in only one instance. It was significantly and positively related to publications as anticipated.
Of the control variables, the percent black was significantly related to three out of the four types of incentives as previously discussed, but percent of the population that is black does not effect any of the other structural components of the organization. The percentage of the population that is black positively impacts the base of membership involved in committee work and projects, but this relationship does not hold when organizational variables are taken into account.

While the neighborhood environments exert some influence on how neighborhood organizations are structured, much variation remains unexplained. The individual preferences of leaders and the informal social networks in which they operate should have independent effects that probably contribute much of the remaining variation, as previous research has suggested.

From this research, there is evidence that formal institutional structures do have an effect on levels of member participation to produce collective goods through neighborhood organizations. The organizational model and combined organization and environmental models explained about one fourth of the total variation in relation the rank and file member involvement in terms of meeting attendance and involvement in committees. As comparisons between regressions
on the five dependent variables indicate, the interplay between organizational structures and member involvement are different, depending on the way member involvement is defined.

Of the thirteen hypotheses predicting the direction of significant relationships to member involvement, seven (54%) received significant support in relation to one or more of the dependent variables. When viewed in terms of the five categories of organization structures (membership, size, purpose, incentives and governance), there were 25 possibilities for significant relationships and seventeen significant relationships were found, which is 68%, when controlled for environmental factors and organization age as shown in Tables 13 and 14. Originally for the five categories of organization structures, there were two measures of membership requirements, three measures of size, one measure of purpose, five measures of incentives, with one of those (change orientation) argued to be the most important part of the incentive structure. There were also three measures of decentralized government. The fourteen measures were originally tested in relation to the five categories of member involvement. However, using all of the variables in multiple regression analyses led to considerable over specification of the models, due to multicolinarity as previously discussed.
In terms of the percentage of rank and file members attending meetings or working in committees or on projects, purpose and incentives and the number of meetings held per year are important. The significance of change orientation has positive impact on meeting attendance and the percent of members involved in committee work or projects. The interaction of lobbying and the percent of change oriented services is highly significant. This has a large impact on the percentage of members attending one or more general meetings and the percentage that are involved in committee and project activities, while change oriented purpose is also significantly and positively related to meeting attendance.

In relation to the per capita hours of ordinary members, the significant determinants among the structural components as defined are decentralization of policy and administration, which unexpectedly is inversely related. However, this makes sense in terms of per capita hours spent. Since there are apparently more members contributing, the work load of each is reduced. Intensity of involvement may also be related to the type of committees that decentralized organizations have as opposed to centralized organizations, such as fund raising or budget committees, which may explain increases in total man hours as well as per capita hours, all else being equal. However, these variables are not tapped by the operational
definitions of governance structure as addressed in this research.

While many neighborhood organizations provide newsletters or directories, the presence of publications serve as a disincentive for the percent of members serving on committees and projects. Investigation of multicolinearity between publishing and percent of the Census neighborhood represented by the organization suggests that publications tap whether or not the organization is large which may lower the intercept for the percentage of members involved in committees and projects. Also, it is possible publications are more often associated with organizations that rely more heavily on staff than volunteers.

In one important way, leaders respond differently than members to the organization structure. The time leaders spend on policy matters is significantly greater for mandatory organizations than for voluntary organizations. This suggests that the coercive power to extract dues and to implement restrictive covenants derived from mandatory membership, provide incentive for leaders to invest their time. The same is not true for members. This supports Rich's findings previously reported in Chapter 3, that the coercive authority of mandatory organizations is an incentive for leaders to contribute their time to neighborhood organizations.
Finally as Olson logic predicts, size is negatively related to the proportion of the membership that is actively involved in all three categories (Tables 9 and 13). The exception is that the greater the representation of the service area, the greater the attendance at general meetings. This, as previously mentioned, may relate more to credibility in terms of interest representation and related homogeneity or cohesiveness, since small organizations are likely to carve out homogeneous interests to represent.

In the next and final chapter, areas of support as well as contradictions with the larger body of research on collective action are cited. Directions for future research guided by the political economy model as applied to neighborhood organizations is also discussed.
Chapter 10
The Houston Research in Perspective

The results of this analysis demonstrate the usefulness of the political economy theory as applied to macro level questions about neighborhood organizations and their environments. Prevailing thought emerging from the behavioral paradigm that the formal characteristics of democratic institutions do not matter is not supported by the findings of this research. At least for the City of Houston, certain characteristics of formal structures of neighborhood organizations do make a significant difference in levels of citizen involvement internal to the neighborhood organizations.

It is recognized however, that due to some of the unique features of Houston government, the results are limited in terms of generalizing from them to neighborhood organizations in other cities. The timing of the survey in relation to the zoning issue was fortuitous. The issues of whether or not to zone and of how to zone were top priorities of city government at the time data was collected for this research. They clearly served as a catalyst for involvement of neighborhood residents in the activities of their organizations. This provided an excellent research opportunity to examine what
effects, if any, organizational structures were having in increasing levels of citizen participation, all else being equal. It is possible that without the emergence of zoning as a city wide issue, that participation in neighborhood organizations during this time period in Houston would have been much lower and relatively flat across all organizations throughout the city. Therefore having a city wide issue affecting all neighborhoods served as a catalyst that may have made variations stemming from formal structural determinants more apparent.

Neighborhood Organizations and Democracy

Volunteering for collective action remains the ideal of American democracy in spite of the serious questions that have been raised regarding the efficacy of volunteering and the rationality of it. Volunteering is after all about the freedom to choose, an ideal that is hard to renounce. This research has shown that in Houston, the ideal of voluntary action is still alive in practice. This is evident from the survey data on the budgets of voluntary organizations, which are funded for the most part by member dues. It is also evident from the data on voluntary participation in organization activities.
Not only do organization leaders volunteer their time, but so do rank and file members. In addition, those who volunteer apparently do not require direct material rewards from the organization for their efforts, but their volunteering does depend in part upon the formal structural components, most notably the formal purpose and the type of collective incentives offered, that either encourage or discourage an actively involved membership.

Some of the differences in structural components are related to the neighborhood environments in which the organizations are located. The most consistent environmental influence upon the structure of neighborhood organizations is home ownership. The findings of this research regarding influence of home ownership on organizational structures are not surprising, since American democracy from its inception has thrived on a broadly based political culture that emphasizes a preference for some degree of independence from the State. Home ownership has been the primary means to that end, both materially and symbolically. Thus it is more than a "stake in the system". The value of home ownership reaches ideological proportions that cut across party politics and socioeconomic cleavages for those that have obtained this status.
Home ownership and the related protection that is apparently desired by homeowners are reflected in the importance of status quo purposes, especially deed restrictions in the absence of zoning in Houston. This situation has apparently given rise to the use of neighborhood organizations, many with bureaucratic and centralized governance structures, which are often mandatory and more efficient than voluntary organizations, since the former are not as dependent upon voluntary contributions of time or money. But the paradox is that a price is paid not only in terms of mandatory dues, but also in terms of democratic governance structures and in terms of some individual freedoms or personal property rights that are exchanged for the protection afforded.

On the other hand, decreasing rates of home ownership in Houston neighborhoods influences organization leaders to structure more open and democratic systems with change orientations that evoke greater voluntary involvement of the membership and thus more participatory democracy. The change oriented purposes do not preclude a focus on home owner interests, but may continue to promote such interests in increasingly diverse settings that may require compromise or taking into account other neighborhood interests as well.
Thus the dynamics of political and social variables that are internal and external to neighborhood organizations give rise to tensions between the ideal of grass roots participatory democracy to aggregate all interest orientations that may exist in diverse neighborhoods and ultimately the city, versus the pragmatic need for efficiency and effectiveness in producing collective goods that protect home owners and their environs. Neighborhood organization structures have a part to play in balancing these two poles, and thus they will continue to influence the way democracy works in neighborhoods for better or worse, and consequently in the city as a whole.

The Implications of the Findings

While the political economy model was useful in explaining voluntary member contributions to neighborhood organizations, there is a key difference in its application to the study of neighborhood organizations. The difference is in the analysis of incentive structures. Selective incentives that are positive and tangible are not a part of incentive structures of neighborhood organizations, except for the element of mandatory dues structures, and mandatory dues structures do not appear to make a difference in rank and file involvement in the organizations, when controlled for other organizational variables. What does make a marked difference
is the orientation of the organization purpose and the related primary incentive structure.

Organizational structures and citizen participation. In terms of participatory democracy, voluntary organizations have more democratic structures and a broader base of citizen participation. The smaller size of voluntary organizations is an advantage in this respect, as Olson's economic theory predicts. On the average, mandatory organizations are significantly larger than their voluntary counterparts in terms of formal membership base, thus compounding their problem of involving the rank and file membership, beyond the contribution of mandatory dues.

From the findings related to governance structures, there is one critical connection between member involvement and decentralization. That is the connection between the number of meetings held per year and the percentage of the general membership that become involved either by attending meetings or by participating in committee work and projects. However, active members spend fewer hours involved in committee work or projects in organizations that have decentralized policy formulation and administration. It is assumed that per capita work loads may be decreased by sharing the load among more members, or there may simply be less to do, with fewer financial resources and staff resources to support volunteer
efforts. In any event, broadly based participation in general meetings is the most crucial to participatory grass roots democracy, because it provides the most opportunity for many to be involved in exchange, in public debate between leaders and members, and in requiring accountability.

In general, the findings of this research suggest that mandatory organizations as well as voluntary organizations can at least marginally increase member involvement by revising their formal structures to be more open to participatory democracy. Also it is reassuring from the standpoint of political participation that apparently members will respond and become more involved as organizations become more change oriented, which is the most critical stage of the political process.

However, with respect to the distribution of influence in city wide politics, structures of strong democracy within the organizations may not translate into equity in terms of access and influence on public policy matters effecting neighborhoods. This is due to the disparities in organizational strength between mandatory and voluntary organizations, that are likely to put voluntary organizations at a distinct disadvantage in city wide politics by comparison to mandatory organizations.
Organizational structures, organizational strength and disparities. Clearly in relation to this research, a major factor contributing to differences in organizational strength are mandatory membership requirements. With the exception of Rich (1980), this important organizational attribute has been slighted in research on neighborhood politics.

Where applicable, mandatory incentive structures solve the first problem of collective action in neighborhood organizations, by insuring a formal membership of their entire service area. There are no free riders, every one must pay their dues. The service areas of mandatory organizations may be small or large, depending upon the size of the subdivision for which the mandatory organization has been established. Nevertheless, comparisons from these data show that mandatory organizations are usually larger in terms of the total number of members, and the percent of the neighborhood households that they represent. Voluntary organizations tend to be smaller in terms member numbers and formal representation of service areas and neighborhood areas.

Whatever the size of organizations, Salisbury (1969) contended that congruence is high between leaders and members of voluntary associations if selective incentives are not the motive for joining. If that is the case, then congruence between members and leaders should be very high within
voluntary associations but not within mandatory associations, all else being equal. Yet even with their propensity to be more centralized and more "status quo" oriented, mandatory homeowners associations may not necessarily result in policy congruence that is low within the organizations. As previously noted, whether or not a neighborhood organization is mandatory does not appear to effect rank and file member involvement, all else being equal. In addition, most neighborhood residents have "voted" to allow mandatory membership either by buying into the neighborhood, or have literally voted to convert voluntary associations into mandatory ones. As long as mandatory organizations are successful in "maintaining the status quo", members may be satisfied with paying dues in exchange for centralized management and leadership, which in some cases involves staff or contractors.

Even if voluntary organizations are more inclusive, more change orientated and more decentralized, and achieve higher internal congruency between leaders and members, they still may not reflect the predominant values of their neighborhood since they tend to be smaller and represent fewer households in the neighborhood and service area than their mandatory counterparts. Thus, the presumed congruence between members and leaders within the organization does not necessarily mean that increasing member involvement in voluntary neighborhood
organizations provides a strong linkage to the larger neighborhood on issues of neighborhood-wide concern.

While the connection between organizations' formal representation and substantive representation of neighborhood preferences is unclear, one thing is clear from comparisons made between mandatory and voluntary organizations in this research. That is that the mandatory dues give distinct economic advantage and related strength to mandatory organizations that are not enjoyed by their voluntary counterparts.

Mandatory organizations thus provide more incentives in terms of the scope and number of collective goods and services that they offer, and they are more able to operate without special fund raising events, dependence on the commitment of volunteers, or outside assistance. Olson cannot be denied the veracity of his argument with respect to the economic and political power that can be derived from negative selective incentives to overcome problems of collective action.

**Neighborhood environments and collective action.** With respect to neighborhood environments and established theories regarding the depressive effects of poverty and minority status on voluntary collective action, recent findings including this research are not entirely consistent with the
larger body of literature. This research suggests that neighborhood organizations are not necessarily the domain of middle class white neighborhoods, but that they are, for the most part, the domain of homeowners who apparently cover a wide range of lower-middle to higher income brackets.

Some neighborhood organizations are located in economically diverse neighborhoods with a mix of land uses, while others are located in residentially homogeneous neighborhoods. Many organizations are located in predominantly white neighborhoods, and others are in racially mixed neighborhoods. Still others are located in predominantly black neighborhoods. From this analysis, the extent of volunteerism within organizations located in predominantly black neighborhoods is for the most part no different than in predominantly white or racially diverse neighborhoods, when controlled for the mediating effects of organizational structures.

However, it is important to note that "percent black" has an independent and significant positive effect on an organizations tendency to rely on lobbying. Thomas (1986), found that in black neighborhoods, both homeowners and renters place emphasis on city services. This is logical in relation to Houston, in that black neighborhoods are often older neighborhoods in the Third, Fourth and Fifth Wards, where city
infrastructure, because of age, has deteriorated. Historically, this has been allowed to happen through neglect, while priority has been given to the public infrastructure in relation to new commercial and residential development. The problems of service delivery which are already compounded for historically black neighborhoods, could be further compounded by growing disparities in strengths between mandatory and voluntary interest groups and unorganized groups.

As noted in the ACIR report\(^1\), the organizational strength of mandatory organizations as compared to voluntary organizations comes as a mixed blessing, not only in relation to tensions between the need for protection and freedom to choose and to participate, but also in terms of the potential political problems associated with interest group influence in the distribution and delivery of city goods and services. The potential problems come from the possibility that greater organizational strength will be used to influence the city to formulate policy that is weighted toward the interests of the stronger organizations, as opposed to interests of weaker organizations or unorganized interests that have more difficulty accessing the city wide political system.

Even without zoning, the city formulates policies and development regulations related to infrastructure and land
use. If not balanced, these decisions can lead to a decreasing supply of affordable housing and the segregation of commercial uses, residential uses and multi-family uses in ways that extract social, economic and environmental costs that may exceed actual or perceived benefits. The city also must formulate policies allocating capital improvements, maintenance and service delivery. Equity in setting priorities that effect neighborhoods may depend upon a reasonable balance in organized strength among competing interests.

On the other hand, the success of mandatory organizations in mobilizing resources at the neighborhood level to ensure neighborhood maintenance, may offer hope to neighborhoods that are confronting physical decay and rising crime. An example of how this can happen is Waterman Place in St. Louis, a lower-middle class neighborhood, which is reported to have spontaneously formed residential community associations in the early 1970's. The residents chose to adopt covenants to assess themselves. They also requested and received a private street dedication from the city so that they could implement a partial street closure and related block watches, along with maintenance standards for the neighborhood. The ACIR report and others have suggested that this approach might become more widespread if facilitated by public and private sector "challenge grants" as incentives to neighborhood residents to
overcome the problems of decay and collective action in their neighborhoods. Since mandatory neighborhood organizations rely less on lobbying and are more oriented to private service delivery, there might also be the opportunity for greater use of mutually beneficial tax credits from the city on services that would relieve the neighborhoods of "double taxation", while allowing more city resources to be concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods that have the fewest resources to mobilize in their own behalf.

As suggested by findings in this research, challenge grants might also be used to encourage democratic participation and change orientation in new organizations. Proposal guidelines could encourage democratic participation structures for ongoing citizen participation and representation, as well as neighborhood organization incentive structures that demonstrate the most need of and commitment to change orientation that would arrest decay by benefiting not just homeowners, but all of the neighborhood interests.

Implications for Future Research

From this research, it is evident that still much more work needs to be done in relation to the explanations of rank and file participation in neighborhood organizations and the implications of mandatory versus voluntary neighborhood
organizations for neighborhood and city politics. Micro level findings about leaders of neighborhood organizations often have left the impression that leaders operate in a vacuum, with little or no contact with their apathetic constituents. In Houston at the point in time of this research, that conclusion is not supported. Thus, more investigation of formal institutional structures and institutional values in relation to broadly based participation should lead to new insights related to neighborhood collective action. In this research, patterns were uncovered that suggest that in the aggregate, leaders and members are effected in different ways by the same institutional structures, but more studies are needed before generalizations are made regarding the influences of formal structural components on member involvement of every kind.

Mandatory organizations should definitely be included along with voluntary associations in future studies as these institutions are increasingly important actors on the urban political stage. Studies conducted in other cities are needed to determine if the concept and measures of change orientation and "status quo" orientation produce similar results in different municipal environments.

In future studies of zoned cities, controls should be applied for the presence or absence of micro level zoning
issues or other salient issues effecting particular neighborhoods and their organizations at the time of the survey. For example, some organizations would probably be located in neighborhoods that might be the locus of developer requested zoning changes and related public hearings and debate, while other organizations would be located in neighborhoods that had not been the subject of recently proposed zoning changes. Proposed location of public facilities that homeowners do not want in their backyards, such land fills or other public facilities that can adversely impact neighborhoods are another example of issues pertaining to some neighborhoods and not others.

Future neighborhood research should use both micro and macro level data external to and from within the organizations. This is needed in order to fill in the blanks related to Knoke’s political economy theory of associations and its applicability to neighborhoods. Micro level data as to the individual motivations of homeowners and renters would shed more light on rank and file member involvement within organizations, and assist in further understanding the influence of context.

Studies are needed in which member involvement is an independent variable in order to address the need to know more about specific connections between levels of member
involvement and policy congruency between leaders and members. Congruency has important public policy implications since neighborhood organizations often contact city hall on behalf of their respective neighborhoods for "status quo" or changes oriented policy objectives that are presumed to reflect the predominant values of the neighborhoods that they represent. Also the effects of rank and file member involvement on success or failure in effecting public policy should be examined. The impacts of member involvement on the efficiency of neighborhood organizations in terms of controlling costs and producing services is another important area of investigation.

While the need for future research highlights the limitations of this research, it is hoped that this research is still useful in its own right, not only in pointing to new directions for future research about neighborhood organizations, but also in understanding the potential of neighborhood organizations in the context of the political economy of Houston and perhaps other major cities. It is hoped that the potential of neighborhood organizations as suggested by the findings herein, can be harnessed and used toward increasing neighborhood democracy and the effectiveness of neighborhood institutions in general, and by so doing help cities focus more attention on solving the problems facing the most disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Notes

1. ACIR, 1989, 86.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


APPENDIX A
Survey

NEIGHBORHOOD SURVEY
Rice University
Department of Political Science

Name of organization: ________________________________

Phone number of organization: __________________________
Name of survey respondent: _______________________
Office or position held by survey respondent: ____________

Part I. FORMATION OF ORGANIZATION.

1. Year organization was established: 19_____
2. Primary reason organization was established: (instructions: check only one)
   a. ___ Developer of subdivision required it for maintenance.
   b. ___ Neighborhood residents wanted better enforcement of deed restrictions.
   c. ___ Neighborhood residents wanted better protection against crime.
   d. ___ Neighborhood residents wanted better city services.
   e. ___ Neighborhood residents wanted to organize self-help projects to improve neighborhood.
   f. ___ Neighborhood residents wanted to plan social events (block parties, picnics, festivals, etc.)
   g. ___ Neighborhood residents wanted to foster housing and community services for low and moderate income residents.
   h. ___ If none of the above, please check here and describe primary reason organization was established below.

______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________

PART II. MEMBERSHIP

1. Listed below are statements that may or may not describe the type of membership of your organization. For each statement, please indicate that it is a correct by checking
"Yes" or incorrect by checking "No", or that you don't know by checking "DK" or that it is not applicable by checking "NA".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>b.</td>
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<td>c.</td>
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<td>f.</td>
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<td>g.</td>
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<td>h.</td>
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</table>

2. Listed below are questions related to member participation in your organization. Please answer each question based upon actual records if available or the best estimates if actual figures are not available.

   a. How many members does your organization have? ____
   b. Membership is by lot (one member per lot) or by person? ____________________________
   c. Approximately what percent of the households within the boundaries of your service area are represented by the organization’s membership? (% households) _________
   d. About what percent of your organization’s members have attended one or more general meeting(s) in the last 12 months? (% attendance per year) _________
   e. How many general membership meetings are held per year? (# per year) _________
   f. About how many of your organization’s members served in 1991 in a volunteer capacity and what were the
estimated volunteer hours served in each capacity in 1991? (Please give the approximate figures for total number of members serving and for total hours served in 1991 in each category in space provided on the next page.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th># of members</th>
<th># of hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Officers (Executive committee)</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Board of Directors</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Standing Committees</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ad hoc committees</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(List by committee name.)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Special projects and assignments</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
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<td>(List by project name or description.)</td>
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Part III. ELECTION OF OFFICERS

1. Different organizations have different methods for selection of their leaders. **Please check only one** of the methods listed below that best approximates the way your organization selects its officers (President, vice-president, etc).

___ a. By vote of neighborhood residents (residency is the only requirement).
___ b. By dues paying members of the organization.
___ c. By an elected Board of Directors or Committee.
___ d. By an appointed Board of Directors or Committee.
___ e. Other (please describe the situation, if none of the above are applicable.)

2. Please check the method (**only one**) used to select members of the Board of Directors other than the executive officers.

___ a. By neighborhood residence (residency is the only requirement).
___ b. By dues paying members.
___ c. By the outgoing board of directors.
___ d. Appointment by another organization or individual.
___ e. Other (please describe if none of the above accurately describe the selection process).
___ f. Not applicable. (There is no Board of Directors.)
PART IV. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORGANIZATION

Different organizations have different ways of addressing administrative needs of their organizations. Listed below are questions related to administrative staffing and office facilities. Please check only one answer related to staffing and only one answer related to office facilities.

1. How many paid staff members does your organization have? (Check only one.)
   □ No paid staff;
   □ One paid staff member;
   □ Two paid staff members;
   □ Three paid staff members;
   □ Four paid staff members;
   □ Five paid staff members;
   □ More than five paid staff members.
   □ The organization is under contract for staff/management services.
   □ The organization's administrative functions are handled entirely by volunteers.

2. Which of the following best describe the organization's office facility? (Check only one.)
   □ There is no permanent office. (For example, some organizations headquarter in the president's home, and office location changes as the presidents change.)
   □ Rent free office space is provided on a continuing basis.
   □ A permanent office is maintained and supported from the organization's funds.

Part V. BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

1. What was the organization's approximate total budget in 1991? $__________

2. Listed below are different groups or individuals that may be involved in budget preparation. Please check all of those listed below that are involved in the preparation of your organization's budget.

   □ The president.
   □ The Board of Directors.
   □ Paid staff/executive director.
   □ The general membership.
   □ A (budget) Committee.
   □ Other committees (name): ____________________
3. Please indicate about what percent of your organization's budget comes from the following sources?

Foundations: _______%
City gov.: _______%
State gov.: _______%
Federal gov.: _______%
Subdivision developer: _______%
Member dues: _______%
Other: _______% (Please identify) ____________

Total 100 %

4. If your organization's dues are mandatory, what percent of the dues were collected for 1991? ____% (Check one below) Was this better than usual __; below the usual collected __; about the same __.

Part VI. NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT

1. Listed below are statements that may or may not describe the neighborhood that your organization serves. If the following statements are correct in describing certain characteristics of the neighborhood that your organization serves, please check "Yes", or if they are not correct in describing the neighborhood your organization serves, please check "No". If you don't know please check "DK". If your organization is a townhome or condominium association, please answer the following based upon the neighborhood in which it is located.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>
| a.  |    |    | The neighborhood has well defined physical boundaries (such as streets, railroad tracts, bayous) that are easy to identify.
|     |    |    |
| b.  |    |    | The neighborhood is fragmented by physical barriers within it, such as a major thoroughfare, freeway, railroad, or flood control channel.
|     |    |    |
| c.  |    |    | The neighborhood has a name and most residents know the neighborhood by its name.
|     |    |    |
| d.  |    |    | The neighborhood is a pure single-family residential neighborhood.
The neighborhood has a mix of residential uses (single family, apartments, and/or townhomes, etc.)

The neighborhood is a mixed residential and commercial neighborhood.

The neighborhood’s residential character has been hurt by the encroachment of commercial uses.

The neighborhood is characterized by old homes which may have historic significance.

Many people living in the neighborhood have moved here within the last ten years.

All of the neighborhood is composed of subdivision(s) covered by deed restrictions that are enforced.

Part of the neighborhood is composed of subdivision(s) covered by deed restrictions that are enforced.

None of the neighborhood is composed of subdivision(s) covered by deed restrictions that are enforced.

The neighborhood’s subdivision(s) never had deed restrictions.

Some neighborhood organizations serve only one subdivision, while others serve two or more. Please provide us with the names of all subdivisions that fall within your service area.

If you know the Census Tract(s) in which your organization is located, please indicate here.
### Part VII. Service Provision Within the Service Area

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Provided now</td>
<td>B. Was provided</td>
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<tr>
<td>General neighborhood maintenance/improvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The enforcement of deed restrictions</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Operation and maintenance of swimming pools</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Operation of tennis courts</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Provision of police/security services</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>d</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Provision of fire protection services</td>
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<td>e</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Maintenance of streets</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>f</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Maintenance of landscaping</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>g</td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Cleaning up vacant lots in the neighborhood</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>h</td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Doing home repairs for senior citizens</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Private fund raising for new park development</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Private fund raising to improve existing parks</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>k</td>
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<tr>
<td>l. Installation of improvements to new or existing parks, etc.</td>
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<td>m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighborhood development initiatives</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>n</td>
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<tr>
<td>n. Housing programs</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
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<tr>
<td>p. Business promotion</td>
<td>q</td>
<td>q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Commercial revitalization/historic preservation</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>r</td>
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<tr>
<td>r. July 4th and other holiday celebrations/festivals</td>
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<tr>
<td>s. Social services for the elderly</td>
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<tr>
<td>t. Social services for youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>u. Social services for low income families</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
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<tr>
<td>v. Publication of community newsletter</td>
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<td>w</td>
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<tr>
<td>w. Publication of community directory</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>x. Representation of neighborhood to public officials</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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276
Part VIII. PROPERTY INTERESTS

Listed below are a series of property-related interests that may or may not exist within your organization's service area. Please characterize relations between the pairs by circling the letter in the appropriate column that describes the level of cooperation and/or conflict for each pair that you know about. If you do not know put your circle in the "DK" column. If the pair of interests are not represented put your circle in the "NA" column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Very Cooperative</th>
<th>Cooperative &amp; Conflictive</th>
<th>Conflictive</th>
<th>Very Cooperative</th>
<th>Conflictive</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>NA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Tenants vs. homeowners.</td>
<td>a.</td>
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<td>b. Landlords vs. tenants</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Apartment dwellers vs. occupants of single family homes.</td>
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<td>e. Elderly vs. young families.</td>
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<td>f. Home builders vs. residents.</td>
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<td>g. Long time residents vs. newcomers.</td>
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<td>h. Historic preservationists vs. anti-historic preservationists.</td>
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<td>i. Commercial vs. residential property interests.</td>
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Part IX. BOUNDARIES

Please provide a description of your organizational boundaries below. Give street names or other significant geographical boundaries, such as railroads, utility easements of bayous.

North
APPENDIX B.
Survey Sample Neighborhood Organizations

Advocates for Housing
Autumn Oaks Civic Association
Avalon Property Owners Association
Barkely Square Civic Club
Barker’s Landing Home Owner’s Association
Bay Forest Community Association
Bayou Bend Collection
Belfort Place Community Association
Binglewood Section V Home Owners Association
Binglewood Civic Club
Blueridge Civic Club
Braeburn Glen Civic Club, Inc.
Braeburn Valley Home Owners Association
Braeburn Acres Civic Club
Braeswood Place Home Owners Association
Briargrove Townhouse Condominium Association, Inc.
Briargrove Property Owners, Inc.
Briarmeadow Home Owners Association, Inc.
Broadacres Trust Civic Association
Bunker Hill Woods Association
Camp Logan Memorial Civic Club
Campbell Woods Civic Club, Inc.
Candlelight Oaks Civic Club
Castle Court Neighborhood Association
Catalina Square Improvement Committee
Central City Civic Club
Chevy Chase Civic Club
Citizens Planning and Neighborhood Association
Cloverland Civic Club
Colcuitt Court Civic Association
Colony Townhome Association
Concerned Citizens of Little York
Council For Community Improvements
Courtyards of 3 Fountains Association
Crestmont Park Civic Association
Crestwood Glencove Civic Club
Crestwood Subdivision Architecture Committee
Denver Harbor Civic Club
East Houston Civic Club, Inc.
East Sunnyside Court Civic Club, Inc.
East Houston Civic, Inc.
Eastwood Civic Association
Edgemont Civic Association
Falcon Wing Owners Association
Ferguson Street Citizens for Neighborhood Improvement
Fondren SW Neighborhood Association (A Coalition of Home Owners)
Fonn Villas Civic Association
Freeway/Pine Valley Civic Club
Frontenac Home Owners Association, Inc.
Gaywood Civic Club
Georgetown Home Owners Association
Glenshire Community Association
Greater OST Council
Greenway Park Townhomes Condo Association, Inc.
Heathercrest Civic Club
Hidden Valley Civic Club
Honey Circle Family Civic League
Hunting Neighborhood Council
Idylwood Civic Club, Inc.
Inwood Forest Community Improvement Association
Kentwood Manor Civic Club
Kirkwood Country II Home Owners Association
Knollwood Village Civic Club
Lakes of Fondren Association
Lakeside Improvement Association
Lakeview Civic Club
Lakewood Forest Civic Association
Leisure Place Civic Improvement Association
Lincoln City Neighborhood Council
Lindale Park Civic Club
Linkwood Civic Club
Lovett Square Townhomes Owners Association
Mac Gregor Place Civic Club
Madison Place Home Owners Association
Meadow Creek Village Club
Meadow Village Homeowners Association
Meadowbrook Freeway Civic and Recreational Club
Memorial Trails Civic Club
Memorial Forest Civic Club, Inc.
Middlebrook Community Association, Inc.
Midtown Civic Club
Mission Bend Home Owners Association, Inc.
Model Neighborhood Improvement Club
Museum Area Municipal Association
N. Montrose Civic Association
Neartown Business Alliance
Northbrook Property Owners Association
Northbrook Property Owners Association
Northbrook Village South Townhouse Association
Northeast Concerned City Civic League
Northfield Sections I & II Civic Association
Northmead Village Community Association
Oak Estates Property Owners Association
Oak Forest Home Owners Association
Oak Estates Civic Association
Oak Harbor Community Association
Old Braeswood Civic Club
Old 6th Ward Neighborhood Association
Outpost Estates Association
Park Place Civic Club
Park St. John Condo Association, Inc
Pine Shadows Civic Club
Pinecrest Neighborhood Civic Council
Pleasantville Civic League, Inc.
Pleasantville Civic League, Inc.
Precinct 195 Civic Club
Prestonwood Forest Maintenance Association
Private Sector Initiatives
Reveille-Park Place Civic Club, Inc.
Rice Military Civic Club
Riceville Civic Association
Richmond Plaza Civic Club
Ridgecrest Civic Club
Ripple Creek Townhome Association, Inc.
River Forest Civic Association
Riverstone Owners Association, Inc
Royal Oaks Civic Association
Ryon Civic Association
S. Main Plaza Hispanic & Neighborhood Citizen's Community
Sablechase Home Owners Association
Sagemont Civic Club
San Miguel Home Owners Association
Sharpstown Country Club Estates, East Civic Association
Shepard Forest Civic Club
Shepherd Park Plaza Civic Club
Sheraton Oaks Home Owners, Inc.
Sherwood Oaks Maintenance Committee
Silverdale Civic Association
South Acres West Civic Club
South Hampton Civic Club
South Main Center Association
Southgate Civic Club
Southwood Civic Club
Springwoods Civic Association
Sunset Heights Civic Club
Tanglewilde Property Owners Association
The Windermere Civic Association Corporation
The Huntleigh Committee
Townhouse Manor Fund, Inc.
Trinity Garden Civic Club
Trolley Square Association, Inc.
United Districts Civic Club
University Village Association
University Green Patio Home Owners Association
University Oaks Civic Club
Upper Kirby Association
Vassar Place Civic Club
Walnut Bend Home Association, Inc.
Washington Terrace Civic Association
West Main Civic Association
West Bellfort Property Owners Association
West 11th Place Civic Club
Westbranch Homeowners Association
Western Homes Civic Club inc.
Westhampton Village Home Owners Association
Westpark Village Maintenance Fund
Westridge Civic Association
Westview Terrace Civic Association
Westwood Patio Homes Home Owners Association
Willow Meadows Civic Club
Willow Bend Civic Club
Winlow Place Civic Club, Inc.
Woodland Civic Club
Woodway Place Condominium Association
Wynnewood Communities in Action
Yorkwood Civic Club
APPENDIX C-1
Sample Newsletter, Voluntary Organization

Willow Meadows News

December 1992

Willow Meadows Civic Club Meeting, Tuesday, December 1, 7:30 P.M.
Willow Meadows Baptist Church, 4300 W. Belfort

Letter from the President

It is hard to believe that a year has gone by since I was elected president. The past year has been very busy for me and the Civic Club. Even though the neighborhood faced a number of important challenges and changes, we had a number of successes during the past year. I sincerely hope that this coming year is much less eventful and that the neighborhood remains quiet and peaceful.

A lot of neighbors contributed their time and energy during this past year. I found that people were always willing to volunteer when needed. This kind of spirit only demonstrates the commitment people have to our neighborhood.

Over the next year the Civic Club will be facing a couple of important issues. Foremost is ensuring that Deed restrictions are enforced. As the City of Houston continues to settle on a zoning plan, ensuring the integrity of our own neighborhood becomes doubly important. As well, the Civic

New State of Civic Club Officers

Following the September general meeting an ad hoc committee was appointed to propose a set of officers for the Civic Club. This committee was headed by Leona Wroten, included Section leaders from all of the sections, and Doug Koy, the current Security Chair. The committee’s nominations for officers were:

- President: Rick Wilson
- Vice President: Stan Leachman
- Secretary: Barbara Click
- Treasurer: Steve O’Connor

At the meeting other nominations will be accepted from the floor. Election of Civic Club Officers will take place at the December 1 meeting.

Current Willow Meadows Civic Club Officers and Executive Board Members

| President: Rick Wilson (721-7520) | Security: Doug Koy (723-0067) |
| Vice President: Alan Gilmore (729-2162) | Maintenance: Tom Robin (723-1933) |
| Treasurer: Steve O’Connor (728-0073) | Beautification: Randall Doe (721-3020) |
| Secretary: Barbara Click (723-7260) | Past President: Donna Bryant (729-5685) |
| Deed Restrictions: Bob Stoll (721-4861) |
Club is going to have to resolve a potential budget shortfall in the long run. At the present we are exploring options other than raising dues. Finally, the neighborhood continues to be in a state of transition. Each month old faces move out and new faces move in. As one of the "newer" faces, even I have noticed considerable change. Welcoming these new neighbors into the Civic Club is rather important.

I hope the holidays are enjoyable for everyone in the neighborhood. Please be careful and keep an eye out for one another.

Sincerely,
Rick Wilson

Once again, special thanks are due to Stan Leachman and the Xerox Corporation! Stan, one of our newer Civic Club members, volunteers his time to run off this Newsletter. Xerox provides the copying facilities. As a result, we receive an excellent copy of the Newsletter and the Civic Club is spared a considerable expense.

David Montz
Real Estate Broker
"Area Specialist"
Office: 981-9200 Home: 721-8262

- Graduate Real Estate Institute
- #1 Listing Agent for 3 years
- $4 Million Producer
- 9 years experience in Willow Meadows
- Area Resident, Raised in Willow Meadows
- Certified Residential Specialist
- #1 National Real Estate Company
- Exclusive marketing package
Ritmo Latino Cantina

Over the course of the summer and early this fall Mr. Pablo Chavez sought a beer and wine license to operate the Ritmo Latino Cantina at 4107 W. Belfort. The Cantina was to be located on the east side of the railroad tracks next to Sunny's convenience store. On September 18, 1992 a hearing was held on Mr. Chavez's application. The master, Beverly Kaufman, ruled to deny the application. On October 13, 1992, Judge Jon Lindsay adopted Ms. Kaufman's ruling. The liquor license has been denied.

Early in July the Civic Club was notified by the President of the Westwood Civic Association that Mr. Pablo Chavez had applied for a beer and wine license in order to open a Cantina on West Belfort. The exterior decor of the proposed Cantina promised "wild times." The officers of our Civic Club agreed to join with Westwood in trying to block the license. At that time letters were sent to Judge Lindsay and Commissioner El Franco Lee indicating our opposition.

At a meeting in early September the Civic Club unanimously supported a motion opposing granting a beer and wine license for the Ritmo Latino Cantina. At that time volunteers were asked to help circulate a petition. The response was overwhelming. Over 40 Willow Meadows neighbors pitched in to help circulate petitions over the week of September 7. In less than four days the neighborhood had obtained 760 signatures. This amounted to signatures for just under 70 percent of the households in Willow Meadows. This powerful demonstration of support by the neighborhood was important. On September 18 a hearing was scheduled for the license application. Willow Meadows was represented by President Rick Wilson and H.J. Tollett a resident of the neighborhood. Also present were representatives of Westwood Civic Association, various Churches located in the area, and Attorney Bruce Schimmel, representing the area. At the outset of the hearing Mr. Chavez presented his reasons for requesting the license. He currently owns a taqueria but has never owned or operated a bar. He indicated that the Ritmo Latino Cantina would have a maximum occupancy of 66, food would not be served, there would be no live entertainment, and his hours would be 8:00 pm to 1:45 am. He indicated that two off-duty police officers would be hired to patrol the premise during hours -- one in the bar and one in the parking lot.

A number of speakers, representing different constituencies offered their objections to the license. Rick Wilson indicated some of the previous history of the area, including efforts to clean up the apartments off of Stella Link. He then stated that the Texas Alcohol and Beverage Commission regulations allow a license to be denied on the basis of "community standards." If issuing the license has an adverse impact on the community, then a case can be made that the license be denied. Since the Cantina would be placed in the midst of neighborhoods consisting of single family dwellings, he argued this would change the character of the neighborhoods. It was also noted that the Cantina was not intended to serve as a "neighborhood bar" and that the clientele would most likely come from outside the neighborhood. In support of these comments, he gave the petitions to the Commissioner's Court. At the same time he relayed the resolution adopted by the Civic Club at its September meeting, opposing granting of the license.

The findings by Ms. Kaufman included the following:

- The business would be located very close to three large, well-established Churches.
- The parking area is ill-suited for the anticipated traffic.
- Mayor Lanier opposes approval of the license.
- Petitions from Civic Associations in area demonstrate opposition.
- The property on which the strip center is located is deed restricted against business which may impose a nuisance.
Meyer Park Apartments

As you no doubt have noticed, the Meyer Park Apartments are proceeding apace. Most of the drainage and plumbing has been installed for the project. Over the next several months we should be seeing rapid progress on the project. On September 23, 1992, a delegation of Willow Meadows neighbors met with Rick Craig, who is managing the project for Trammell Crow Residential. Three residents appeared at the meeting: Rick Wilson, Dan Egging, and Arthur Jay. The primary purpose was to sit down with the Trammell Crow engineer and go over their plans -- especially with respect to flooding.

Overall the plans for drainage appear adequate. First, all of the runoff from the project is directed into the detention ponds that are currently on the Meyer Park property. These ponds were part of the original design and are certified to be able to handle all of the runoff when the entire Meyer Park complex is 100 percent completed. The three detention ponds are interconnected (underground via a 54" pipe). All of the water from the three detention ponds empties into Willow Waterhole via one 43" pipe. This is designed to minimize runoff during peak water flow conditions.

All of the runoff in the Apartments is directed to the detention pond in front of the development. All of the storm drains, from parking lots to buildings, flow into an interconnected set of pipes leading directly to the detention pond. Along Willow Waterhole Bayou, a set of detached, covered garages will be built. The road in front of these garages slopes toward the middle, creating a drain for the water (in fact storm drains are installed in the middle of these streets), which goes into the Apartment's storm drainage system.

According to the plans, the storm system Trammell Crow is installing is concerned with 50 to 100 year flood events. They are also quite concerned with flooding and have done what they can to minimize flooding in their project. At the same time, it does not appear that there will be any runoff from the project entering into Willow Waterhole, except that flowing through one 43" pipe from the detention pond into the bayou. It might be noted that the City of Houston has installed its own drainage system for the streets running through parts of Meyer Park. These drain directly into Willow Waterhole. The Apartments do not tie into the City's system.

In other building concerns, Trammell Crow is giving considerable thought to the kind of visual barrier it erects between the Apartments and Willow Waterhole. As mentioned, a series of garages will be backed up against the bayou. They will partly shield the neighborhood from the project. Trammell Crow is also considering some type of fence or wall.

Other information also surfaced during the meeting. First, Trammell Crow never obtained all of the funding it needed to begin the project. Instead, the Meyer Corporation bought into the project. In part this means that the Meyer Corporation has a strong vested interest in ensuring the long term success of the project. Second, the Meyer Corporation has its own, extensive, set of deed restrictions on the property. These restrictions range across the whole spectrum of matters having to do with the construction and future maintenance of the property. By and large these restrictions are aimed at ensuring that the project maintains standards they wish to set for Meyer Park. Again, this bodes well for the neighborhood. At least we may see these Apartments kept up.

At the present Trammell Crow intends for an upscale market. The apartments will range from a 630 square foot efficiency (with a rental rate between $600 and $700 per month) to 1300 square foot (and larger) units renting at a variety of fees. For those who missed the "artist" rendering in the newspaper several months ago, a picture of what the Apartments should look like is on the following page.
Treasurer's report

At the last general meeting of the Civic Club there was some discussion as to whether to raise dues. It was noted that the Civic Club faces a shortfall in collections. This is not because of many "free-riders" in paying Civic Club dues. In fact, during this past year almost 76 percent of the households paid their dues. However, the neighborhood is facing increasing costs for security patrol. The County decides the rates which are paid for security patrol and they are standard throughout the County. Over the past four years we have experienced an average increase of five percent.

While a dues increase may be necessary, we are going to try to avoid it. One approach we are going to try is creating a "business" membership to the Civic Club. We will be contacting businesses adjacent to Willow Meadows, businesses that we all use. In future issues of the Newsletter, we will list those business members. In addition we will urge your support of those businesses. Money collected from these associate memberships will be used to help maintain the esplanade along West Bellfort.
Ms. Kaufman, in a letter dated Sept. 22, 1992, noted:

"It is found that the application should be denied ... because the location is unsuitable for an on premise license which would adversely affect the peace, morals, health, safety and sense of decency of the people residing in the adjacent residential area, the children attending the schools in the immediate area and the members and attendees of the three area churches."

In a subsequent letter dated October 13, 1992, Judge Jon Lindsay agreed to Ms. Kaufman's findings and ordered that the application be denied.

Westwood Civic Club, which led the fight against granting the license, incurred some legal expenses. They asked whether Willow Meadows was interested in helping pay for some of those expenses. The Board agreed that we would pay $200.00 to help Westwood defray their legal expenses. After observing the job that Attorney Bruce Schimmel did in preparing for and conducting questioning during the hearing, this was money well spent. As well, it is clear that the boundaries of our neighborhood extend beyond the railroad tracks. What happens in Westwood is also very important for us.

While we thought the matter of the Ritmo Latino Cantina was finished, there is some indication that Mr. Chavez intends to turn the space into a restaurant. He currently owns one other restaurant, the Taqueria El Dragon on Chimney Rock. Both Civic Clubs are keeping their eyes open in the event that this is a ploy to gain a beer and wine license through the back door. Mr. Chavez will have to reapply for such a license and we will be notified prior to any hearing on such a license.

The real thanks for blocking this license go to all the Willow Meadows residents who circulated petitions and to everyone who was able to sign. It really showed the extent to which people in the neighborhood care. While a lot of people were very helpful, four individuals went above and beyond in organizing the petitions:

Norma Hageney
Cheryl Jensen
Jean Rhodes
Leona Wroten.

Again, thanks to everyone.

---

Senior Guidance Program

The Houston Junior Forum has contacted the Civic Club to announce an Information Helpline designed to answer questions, find resources, and solve problems encountered by Older Adults. The Senior Guidance Program is a non-profit agency and there is no charge for the services. In particular the Hotline can provide information pertaining to:

- Adult Day Care
- Home Care Assistance
- Home Delivered Meals
- Insurance
- Legal Questions
- Living Facilities
- Medical Concerns
- Medicaid, Medicare
- Nursing Homes
- Special Programs
- Transportation
- Recreation

For FREE assistance you may call 529-9991. The Helpline is staffed Monday through Friday, 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

$555 Advertising Rates $55555

| Business Card | $30.00 |
| Quarter Page | $45.00 |
| Half Page | $75.00 |
| Whole Page | $100.00 |

+++ These rates cover advertising for two editions +++
We are pleased to support Yard of the Month

Randall Doe
Neighborhood Specialist
Phone: (713) 721-3020
Pager: (713) 883-0421

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- Restaurant Consulting

CONSULTANT
THE NEWSLETTER FOR WESTBRANCH RESIDENTS
Local Branch

DECEMBER 1992
Editor: Henry van Dijk

"Yes, Virginia, There is Santa Claus"

"He exists as certainly as love and

generosity and devotion exist, and you

know all that you ought to give your life

its highest beauty and joy. All the

world will know him if you believe

him. Santa Claus. Thank God he lives

and he lives forever. He will continue to

make his own the heart of childhood."

F. Dooly New York Sun Sep 22, 1897

Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus
is the classic response to a child's simple
question of faith and it is still valid today.
Nowadays, the more we hear and see,
the less we actually believe - Faith is on
its way out, hard proof is what we need.
What a tragic development; we really
need to believe as Tinkerbell reminded
us in Peter Pan - believe in a new Spring,
blue skies, love and mankind.

We have become quite cynical about so
many things, because there is a lot of
deception and plain illegal behavior, so
much so that we have lost the child's
ability to dream, make believe and blind
trust in what we have been told.

Animation is make believe, but I bet that
a lot of adults cried when Bambi or
Dumbo or the Beast were misrepresented.
Christmas and Santa Claus - do you
believe in magic? If you haven't tried it
yet, give it a shot, be a kid again!

Henry van Dijk, Editor

Peace on Earth and
Good Will toward Men

God Jul
Joyeux Noel
Buon Natale
Feliz Navidad
Frohe Weihnachten
Kalé Ευτυχίαν
Chúc Mừng Giáng Sinh

What do you know about Christmas?

☐ I happened on 34th Street
☐ It was booked solid. When
it was born
☐ Little bearded man in red
☐ Let's get realistic!
☐ Tree decoration gone Hollywood
☐ On the 10th day of Christmas
☐ My true love gave me
☐ Matlby's beloved partner (first name)
☐ You guys are very good!
☐ He wrote "The Christmas Song"
☐ A traditional stocking stuffer
☐ One of 4 stars in the movie
☐ White Christmas (last name)

Welcome

Welcome
December Calendar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Board Meeting 7:30 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hanukkah</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>First Day of Winter</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Christmas</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>New Year's Eve</td>
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</table>

The WestBranch Community Yard of the Month Award

Mr. & Mrs. Lamar Keeler
4934 Shadowdale Drive
&
Marbell & Elena Benson
10603 White Fawn Drive

for their selection of Fall flowers
and great landscaping.

The WestBranch Community Association extends a warm welcome to
those who have recently become a neighbor. We have an active
board which meets monthly. This publication is in part paid for with
your assessment and is distributed to keep
you informed of current events. We
hope that you will become an active
member in our Association and benef
from its existence.
Restriction Violations 101

Covenant #2:

"No building or improvements of any character shall be erected or placed or the erection begun, or changes made in the design thereof, after original construction, on any lot until the construction plans and specifications and a plot plan showing the location of the structure or improvements have been submitted to and approved by the Architectural Control Committee consisting of three members appointed by the Board of Directors, or its assignee hereafter provided for as to the compliance with these deed restrictions, as to quality of material, harmony of the external design with existing and proposed structures and as to location with respect to topography and finish grade elevations. In the event the Committee fails to approve or disapprove within thirty days after the receipt of the required documents, approval will not be required and the related covenants set out herein shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied."

So there!

In plain English, this covenant states that a homeowner must seek approval from the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) before starting any building projects. Sentence one clearly states that a plot plan must be submitted, a telephone call will not do. Always consult your deed restrictions when considering a project. What you want to erect may be contrary to the covenants. Every homeowner received a copy of the deed restrictions when they purchased their Westbranch home.

...ignorance is no defense!

If you have lost yours, ask for a copy. The deed restrictions were written to protect all subdivision homeowners. Consult them and always consider your neighbor’s opinion before embarking on a project. Remember that they have to live with your masterpiece too.

Common Grounds

At the November board meeting a proposal was submitted for the planting of 15 trees in the playground area and pansies in the median across the street. By the time you read this, the trees and pansies will be planted. Proposed landscaping for the Shadowdale median was also presented. The board wanted to know more about the entrance marker that is to be placed on the median before voting. At the December 15th meeting both the marker and the landscaping proposal for the Shadowdale median will be presented for the board’s approval. Wouldn’t that be a wonderful Christmas present?

I am unable to comment about the Durban median. The Water Utility District Board cut a deal with the Clay Rd. project. As soon as the Durban median is in place, we hope to landscape it also.

If you need further information about the Durban median, call a WUD board director. If you are interested in seeing the drawings for the Shadowdale marker and median, I will be at the homeowner’s board meeting at 7:30 on Dec. 15th to field any comments or concerns you may have.

Barbara Stephens.

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NEED A SITTER WHILE YOU SHOP?
Do you have a Christmas party to go to or just want to go shopping alone?
I’ll watch your children in my home Hours: Mon-Sat, after 6 PM (except Wednesdays)
Give yourself some time off!
call Toni 890-7512.
CrimeWatch

At last month report of 7 break-ins I have the pleasure of reporting that everything is pretty quiet now in WestBranch. This is not without some effort on the part of Deputy "Red". There have been arrests of some WestBranch residents who were caught practicing their "trade" in other subdivisions. Since these arrests, no other burglaries have occurred here. There was an attempted break-in at a residence however; a 12 yr. old who was home at the time let the intruders (also a teenager) know that someone was home and then called 911. The invading teenager was charged with criminal trespassing. This is a good example of why we should teach our children what to do in case of an emergency.

"TIS THE SEASON" will be heard many times over the next few weeks. "Tis usually refers to merriment and good feelings, but it also refers lately to an increase in crime that has become a tradition however unwelcome. I have published in the past steps one can take to prevent or reduce the risk of becoming a victim. They do bear repeating at this time!
- Shop with a friend
- Carry small amounts of cash and don't overload yourself with packages.
- When approaching your vehicle in parking lots be aware of those around you and have your keys handy. If someone or something looks or feels funny go back into the store and ask for help.
- After you've opened the gifts, dispose of boxes away from home.

Don't advertise what Santa brought you!
- If you're travelling during the holidays ask a trusted friend or neighbor to collect the mail, newspapers, flyers.
- Leave lights on or better yet, put them on a timer, make it look like as if you're home.
- Call the Sheriff's Department and ask for Vacation Watch!

There will be no CrimeWatch meeting in December. The next meeting will be January 12th, 7:30 PM at the church.

HAPPY HOLIDAYS!

Pam Barwick

Welcome Wagon

We are looking for a resident to take on the responsibilities of assembling and heading the Welcome Wagon committee. This includes visiting new residents to acquaint them with our neighborhood and leaving a small welcoming gift from the subdivision. How important is this committee and their efforts? Well when we moved in some nine years ago, the first hello we got was a reminder to pay the assessments or else and since we moved in on Dec. 1 we didn't owe any. It did set the tone though and luckily the Board has hired since 1985 through the Welcome Wagon to change that negative impression to a positive one. We are glad that you've become a neighbor and we want to welcome you and make you feel comfortable. Anyone who is interested in joining this pleasant and important committee, please call Pam Barwick at 896-8345 and volunteer.

"It is our only chance to make a great first impression!"

While we are on the subject, the WestBranch Board wishes to thank Sharon Piper for her time and efforts to this important service to new residents over the past several months. Because of commitments to family, Sharon is having to relinquish her duties with Welcome Wagon and would like to pass the torch to other residents who enjoy meeting people and talking about a great place called WestBranch.

Pam Barwick

Branching Out

Go Sky Dancers

The Sky Dancers, Cy-Falls High School's drill team, begins preparations for the Miss Drill Team Texas Pageant which will be held at the school on December 12th. The 30 member all-sophomore drill team, under the direction of Mrs. Pam Link, has delivered a variety of half-time performances ranging from kick to pom dances. The Sky Dancers performed their routines in beautiful and versatile field uniforms and closed the '92 football season on November 4th. Line tryouts for new members will be held November 30 - December 4. Mrs. Link will be coordinating the Miss Drill Team Texas Pageant and all drill team members will be actively involved in making it a success.

Montgomery.

Delroy Ziese, Jr. (713) 937-6232
Owner

Z - Mechanical
A/C - Heating
Sales * Service * Installation
Leaflets

FOR THOSE TIMES
YOU’D LIKE TO KNOW

Alterations
Ha Nguyen
937-6312

Martha Loredo
466-3804

Amway Products
Charle Yost
937-7150

Avon Cosmetics, Jewelry
Ila Shah
937-5098

Shelley Hayes
896-1719

Baby Sitting
Aimee Lance
896-6851

Jennifer Blaha
466-6350

Evenings & Weekends
Patricia Doyle
896-7221

Nikki Lallonte
466-5908

Custom Stationary
Karen Kornor
896-0930

Discovery Toys
Kimberly Smith
466-5472

Anita Wolfe
486-3993

Lawn & Yardwork
Bobby & Cullen
896-6952

Michael & Randell
466-8524

Mary Kay Cosmetics
Lauren Glover
896-4145

Notary Public
Judy Drennon
466-9430

Lorna Estep
466-4852

Piano Lessons
Lisa Taylor
466-9040

Piano Tuning
Tim Bryant
896-0930

Word Processing
Judy Drennon
466-9430

Drenda Gribic
Would like to care for a three yr. old in her home during weekdays.
Drenda has a three yr. old boy herself and a 6 mo. old daughter.
466-1824

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581-8191
Wanzer Cable
402-0000
Westway Water
772-3631

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Cy-Falls High School
896-1000
Dee Ann Middle School
466-1453
Jersey Village High
896-3100
Truck Junior High
896-1100
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926-3191

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