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Talk of times past: On the interaction of cognitive systems in conversation

Meyer, Cynthia Ford, Ph.D.
Rice University, 1991
RICE UNIVERSITY

TALK OF TIMES PAST:
ON THE INTERACTION OF COGNITIVE SYSTEMS IN CONVERSATION

by

CYNTHIA FORD MEYER

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE

Professor Sydney Lamb,
Director
(Linguistics)

Professor James E. Copeland
(Linguistics)

Professor Philip W. Davis
(Linguistics)

Professor Linda Driskill
(English)

Houston, Texas

May, 1991
ABSTRACT

This study considers a corpus of conversational data from a cognitive perspective. The corpus is comprised of a set of dialogues involving a man interviewing his parents about memories of the Oklahoma frontier. The study views this conversation in cognitive terms as a process in which the interlocutors' separate cognitive systems interact by means of the speech signal and change as a result. Cognitive systems are viewed as networks of relationships. It is shown that the consideration of natural conversation yields insights into the cognitive structures and processing of interlocutors, and conversely, that an understanding of cognitive systems is needed to explain surface patterns observable in conversational texts.

Several issues concerning the interaction of cognitive systems are addressed. First, the patterning of conversational topic is investigated to discover how the speaker designates topics within his cognitive system and how speaker and listener coordinate their notions of topic. The behavior of cognitive topic is found to be governed by a principle of accessibility. Of all the information in the network that a speaker could designate as topic, that information which is most accessible will be selected. For the addressee, the less accessible a new topic is, the less likely he is to recognize it and the more carefully the speaker must prepare him.
Second, two cases of multiple tellings of a single experience are investigated to find what they reveal about how the speaker stores and expresses first-hand information. A continuum of storage types is proposed that is characterized by factors such as the number of times a memory has been related, the fluency of the delivery, and the amount of sensitivity shown to the listener’s cognitive needs.

Finally, the range of cognitive tasks interlocutors perform as they exchange information is explored. The functions served by statements in a portion of conversation are examined, and it is proposed that statement functions are unified by a prototypical function, that of reporting on information present in the speaker’s system. An interpretation of the cognitive effect of statements is suggested which recognizes five basic cognitive situations of information exchange in which statements are employed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many wonderful people have encouraged me in my research. I want first to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their invaluable insights and suggestions. Sydney Lamb has been helpful in every way. His views on language and linguistic systems are always intriguing and have provided me with a great deal of nourishing food for thought. James Copeland and Philip Davis have been most generous and insightful in responding to my ideas with their own. Linda Driskill has been supportive from beginning to end.

I am also grateful for my many other friends at Rice, all of whom have contributed to making these years of study a rich experience. In particular, I want to express appreciation to Pete Cobin, Chang-In Lee, Barbara Paskay, Carrie Cameron, Douglas Mitchell, Roy Jones, and Susan Lamb.

Finally, I owe deepest gratitude to my family, in particular to my husband, Mark Meyer, who has been unfailingly supportive and patient, and to my parents, LeRoy and Jeanette Ford, who have always been very special people. And of course I owe a great debt to my grandparents Walter and Lucinda Ford who have come alive for me once more through their recorded voices and to whose memory this volume is dedicated.
For Lucinda and Walter

In Memorium
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Chapter 1
Framework and Questions:

A Cognitive Model of Conversation

You know I enjoyed them days.
It was hard days but I enjoyed 'em.
I didn't- it wasn't just- too bad on me.

(You reckon) If anybody else
ever had experiences like that?

-Lucinda Lakey Ford to LeRoy Ford

General introduction. Conversation is among the most important and uniquely human forms of interaction. Conversation requires of interlocutors a complex mental and social involvement that allows them to share experiences with one another, mediate social relationships, monitor each other's understanding, and so forth. This study focuses on aspects of the cognitive processing that occurs in individuals as they converse. It proceeds by the observation of a few hours of dialogue involving a trio of ordinary speakers of English and by a consideration both of the cognitive structures that must be present to enable that conversation and of the processing that occurs in the cognitive systems of the interlocutors as the conversation is
produced and interpreted. It takes as axiomatic that certain aspects of conversation can best be understood by invoking the cognitive systems of the interlocutors and that examples of ordinary conversation provide an important window into human cognitive processing. It assumes that a speaker's utterances reflect his cognitive states and that a linguistic approach to the study of utterances in conversation can yield insights into these cognitive aspects.

The main purposes of this introductory chapter are first to sketch in broad terms the view of cognition that provides a framework for this study, and second to introduce the more specific research questions that become the focus of detailed analysis in the later chapters. It is the treatment of these research questions that forms the heart of the study. Before beginning our consideration of these theoretical issues, we briefly introduce here a sample of the conversation to be examined.

**Introduction to the data.** The conversations investigated in this study involve LeRoy, an English speaking native of southwestern Oklahoma, in dialogue with his elderly parents concerning their early memories of life in Oklahoma. The transcribed excerpt given below exemplifies the data and provides an initial illustration of the cognitive activity to be examined. In this excerpt, LeRoy asks his mother, Lucinda, about the habits of Indians on the Oklahoma frontier of the
late 1890's. The corpus exemplified here is described in more detail in Chapter 2.2

((13 second pause))

Did you ever see an Indian couple set up a tipi? 54

'Yeah.

One time they ((2))

w we- there was a creek up - real full of water. 3

We had camped there 'n-

come up a wagon with an- Indian man 'n a woman in it.

'N she jumped out 'n-

got the ax 'n-

commenced to cuttin' the poles for the tipi.

Hé just got out 'n went 'n sat down by a tree. 9

'N I just felt so sorry for him cause I thought he was sick. ((chuckle)).

He wasn't I found out later.

That's the way they done things.

The women done the work.

How'd they carry the tipi?

In a wagon?

Yeah. They alway had a wagon.

Ponies hooked it. ((1))

Hów ma- How tall was the tipi. ((1))

Oh- you've seen 'em! 1 haven't you?

No. Can't say that I have. ((1))

Oh I guess about ten or twelve feet.

Bout how many poles did they use?

Oh I couldn't tell you 'n but- they'd put 'em pretty close to gather. ((1))

Let 'em set 'em out you know- 'n come together in the top.

Uh- what was it covered with? Hide or- duck or what? 59

Duckin'. ((3))

Then what would they put inside the tipi after they set it up? 'Anything? 60

No.
Set it up to- get out of the weather\(^2\)?

\[^2\text{Yeah}\^3.\]

'N they'd build a fire in there.

It kinda drew the smoke out.

The hole in the top did\(^2\)?

\[^2\text{Yeah}\^2.\]

How'd it happen you sowed them\(^1.\)

Did they set one up near where you lived\(^2.\)

They put- set one up near where we camped\(^1\) that time.

What trip\(^1\) were you on that time\(^1\)?

Do you remember\(^2\)?

We 'uz comin' from Wise County up home\(^1.\) (1)

From Wise County up to Sayre\(^3.\)

No. Up to Washita\(^1\) County\(^1.\) (3)

Well that's when- you and your dad- moved up there\(^1.\)

\[^2\text{Yeah}\^2.\] (2)

No it's when- me 'n your dad moved up there\(^1.\) (3)

Well you were married at- (2) Cloud Chief?

\[^1\text{Yeah}\^2.\]

We went up there\(^1\) n.

Dad come out there 'n we got married 'n went back to Texas\(^1.\)

And then on your way back up to Cloud Chief-

\[^1\text{Yeah}\^2.\]

you camped one night- and- the Indians came 'n set up the trip\(^1.\)

Oh we had camps several nights\(^1.\)

It take about ten days to make the trip\(^1.\)

But one of those nights was just you and dad\(^2-\)

\[^1\text{Yeah}\^2.\]

'N the Indians came by and camped\(^1\) near you\(^1.\)

\[^1\text{Yeah}\^2.\]

What kind of food did they eat?

I didn't notice\(^2.\)

I don't know\(^2.\)

Do you know how they dried beer\(^3?\)

No. (2)
They'd eat raw beef.

They did?  
Yeah. ((2))
You told me one time about a cow dying in a prairie fire.
Yeah. They come around 'n wanted it 'n.
They eat that old cow. ((Chuckle))

Introduction to cognitive processing in the conversation. It is obvious that Lucinda and LeRoy are involved in a great deal of cognitive activity during this conversation. A large portion of this activity can be roughly characterized as follows. As the conversation progresses, each interlocutor must interpret the utterances of the other and must, at the appropriate time, produce an appropriate linguistic response that both adequately expresses his intended meanings and meets the listener's requirements for comprehensibility. In interpreting, he must parse the speaker's utterance, gleaning new information from it and relating it to his current store of knowledge, and he must, in fact, invoke previous linguistic and world knowledge in order to interpret the utterances in the first place. He must monitor incoming information and ask the other interlocutor for clarification of the ideas if for some reason he cannot make an interpretation. In producing utterances, he must recall and select thoughts from memory and create new thoughts, putting these thoughts into words in such a way that his listener can understand them. In addition
to dealing with his own production and interpretation problems, he must pay attention to the progress of the other speaker in producing and interpreting utterances. He must satisfy himself that he and the other speaker are talking about the same ideas. He must note how well his listener seems to be comprehending and retaining what he has said and must be ready to offer additional corrective information as necessary.

All of this activity and more comprises the cognitive processing of LeRoy and Lucinda during this conversation, and it is the aim of this study to identify and illuminate certain aspects of this processing. In order to approach the data and better understand these cognitive aspects, it will be helpful first to map out rough models of the individual interlocutors as cognitive systems and of the larger communicative system that results from the interaction in conversation of these individual systems. Such a bird's eye view provides a framework for the closer investigation of the data, helping in the identification of research concerns and providing terms with which to think and talk about them. This framework can be called a "cognitive model of conversation."

A cognitive model of conversation. The main features of a cognitive model of conversation are sketched here, beginning with the individual's system then turning to the larger system comprised of the interacting individuals. Many
of these notions, especially those concerned with the individual cognitive system, have their roots in a school of linguistic inquiry known as Cognitive Linguistics (CL) (e.g. Lamb 1971). To keep this outline as uncluttered as possible at this point, however, these notions are offered here with a minimum of attention to their histories and other details. In Chapter 2, more proper attention will be paid to the sources of these ideas and to theoretical issues related to them. Here, suffice it to say that none of these ideas is original with this study, and that although their very usefulness in leading to cognitive insights into conversation argues for their basic validity, it is not the main concern of this study to establish or defend these points. Instead they are stated as foundational notions.

The individual's cognitive system. Before turning to the overarching cognitive situation constituted by individual speakers interacting in conversation, let us begin with a consideration of cognitive facets of the individual speaker himself.

There are four major points to be discussed with respect to the individual. First is simply that the conversing individual can profitably be thought of as a cognitive system (CS) or information system. That is, each speaker knows many things. He stores a great deal of information in memory and makes use of that information in dealing with the world. These cognitive aspects of the individual can be singled out
for attention in contrast to other facets such as his social identity or his outward behavior. The cognitive system of the individual speaker is a worthy object of study.

Second, there are different kinds of information that can be identified within this cognitive system. One major sub-system of information that has been extensively studied is the linguistic system (LS). It consists of the individual's knowledge of how to pronounce words, how to combine morphemes and words together to form larger meaningful units, how to relate sentence patterns to the meanings they realize, how to interpret the pragmatic effects of utterances, the prosodic resources of language, and so on.

A great deal of the individual's total knowledge is linguistic knowledge, but by no means all. For example, much data comes to an individual visually and is stored cognitively in a visual sub-system. Other sensory input corresponds to other kinds of knowledge in the cognitive system. The cognitive system possesses psychomotor information that enables the individual to perform tasks such as walking or grasping objects. It possesses affective information. A complete list of kinds of information has not been and probably cannot yet be compiled, and the relationships among all these different kinds of information has not been fully elucidated\(^3\). This situation does not affect the idea that different kinds of information do exist, however. For this study of conversational data, the
linguistic system, the larger cognitive system, and their interrelationship are most important. This relationship is shown in a rough way in Figure 1. This diagram shows that the LS constitutes a subset, but not the totality, of the greater CS.

Figure 1

The third point, and one of central importance for this study, is that this cognitive system has a characteristic organization. In particular, it exists in the individual not as some sort of collection of things or symbols, as some views of cognition would have it, but as a network of relationships. Information is represented in the individual not in the form of symbols, but entirely in the connectivity of the network. The information lies totally in the relationships.

To illustrate this concept of network organization more concretely, we can consider how a portion of Lucinda's knowledge involving Indian tipis might be organized. Figure 2 shows how this information could be represented in a
diagram. Lucinda would have invoked this information in her system as she answered LeRoy's questions about tipis in the above conversational excerpt. The information represented in this figure is not the only type of information in Lucinda's system. There is also, for example, a great deal of sequential information in her cognitive system, and that is not shown here. Nevertheless, this figure is illustrative of the notion of network organization.

Before discussing this diagram, it should be noted that although it follows notational conventions carefully developed by Lamb and others (e.g. Lamb 1966, Lockwood 1972) to represent cognitive network organization, a knowledge of the details of this network notation is not necessary to understand the point made here, that information is organized in the individual cognitive system as a network of relationships. Nor is the bulk of this study concerned with such organizational details and notational diagrams. Instead, this diagram is included as illustrative of network organization and is intended to familiarize the reader with this notion. This orientation is important because although the present project does not apply itself to the study and development of such diagrams, the idea of the cognitive system being organized as a network is ever present and influential. The issues considered in the following chapters could be formalized and further investigated by means of such network diagrams.
The figure can be interpreted as follows. It consists of lines representing relationships in the cognitive system, and of various types of nodes where lines come together. The square nodes in the figure have lines leading to the linguistic system that indicate the linguistic expressions for these concepts, i.e. "TIPI", "DUGOUT", "HOUSE", "PLACES TO LIVE". The lines leading upwards from the semi-circular node above the "TIPI" node lead to defining properties of the concept "tipi" that Lucinda knows, such as the facts that Indians use them, that they are portable, that they have a conical shape. The rightmost line leads to a category, "PLACES TO LIVE", of which the concept "TIPI" is one subtype. "HOUSE" and "DUGOUT" are other subtypes of this category and
are distinguished from "TIPI" by certain distinctive properties. All of these subtypes inherit from the supertype category its defining characteristics. For example, houses, dugouts, and tipis all have an entrances, all provide shelter, etc.

The lines leading down from the "TIPI" node lead to nodes representing particular tipis (e.g. "tipi1", "tipi2", "tipi3") that Lucinda has experienced, such as the one she saw being assembled by an Indian woman on the banks of a flooded creek (cf. line 54.8 in the excerpt above). These particular tipis are at the bottom of the hierarchy of categories and have no subtypes. They represent the least abstract part of the hierarchy, the individual items of Lucinda's experience. Relations higher in the hierarchy represent abstract concepts that categorize the concrete particular items in various ways in Lucinda's information system. The relationship of the node "TIPI" to the node "tipi1" is that of domain to particular. "Tipi1" is a particular instantiation of the domain concept "TIPI". The node "PLACES TO LIVE" likewise serves as the domain of the more particular concept "TIPI". In CL terminology, a node configuration such as that labeled "TIPI" and including its upward and downward connections is called a notion.

The portion of information represented in Figure 2 exists in Lucinda's cognitive system somewhere outside or near the bounds of the linguistic system proper. As already
noted, the square nodes represent connections from the conceptual hierarchy to the linguistic system, in this case to the words that are associated with these concepts. Nodes for the particular tipis at the bottom of the hierarchy likewise have connections elsewhere, to sensory portions of Lucinda's cognitive system. "Tipi₁" is connected to Lucinda's visual image of that tipi in the visual portion of her system.

This diagram represents in simplified form a small portion of Lucinda's cognitive system. Having discussed the diagram, we are now ready to further clarify the third point mentioned above concerning the individual's cognitive makeup, that the information in the individual cognitive system is represented entirely in the connectivity of the network. Most importantly, it must be noted that the words appearing on the diagram are included for our convenience and in actuality have no theoretical status in the network. In reality, these words are nothing more than labels for further complexes of lines and nodes that could be drawn in the diagram. For example, "TIPI" is a label standing for a complex of nodes in the linguistic system representing the pronunciation, syntactic and morphemic relationships, etc. that are associated with this concept. Neither are the nodes themselves to be considered as symbols standing for concepts such as "tipi₁". The semi-circular node labeled "tipi₁" is identical to the semi-circular nodes labeled "tipi₂",
"tipi3", "dugout1", "house1", etc. and is distinguished only by its unique configuration of connections to other nodes. What counts is not which particular node it is, but what it is connected to. This is what is meant by the idea that the information lies totally in the connectivity of the network.

We have mentioned lines connecting certain information in Figure 2 to information in the linguistic and visual subsystems of the cognitive system. According to a network view of cognition, network organization characterizes all subsystems of the cognitive system, and ultimately all the subsystems are interconnected in one large network. With respect to the linguistic system, it is not possible to identify a place where it ends and the non-linguistic part of the cognitive system begins. For example, the complex of nodes in the linguistic system representing the way to pronounce a word such as "red" has connections to certain nodes in the visual system representing the percept of redness. Thus, the LS is intimately related to the whole of the CS. Nevertheless, certain parts of the linguistic system do appear to be uniquely linguistic. For example, phonological structures in the linguistic system serve specifically linguistic functions in the encoding and decoding of utterances. To reflect these notions, Figure 1 can be slightly amended as Figure 3 to show the fuzzy boundary between the linguistic system and the rest of the cognitive system. A few network lines and nodes have been
added to represent the many connections between linguistic and non-linguistic information. The line around the LS has been changed to a dotted line showing that while a concentration of linguistic information can be identified, it does not constitute a separate and autonomous component.

Figure 3

---------------------------------------------

Within Cognitive Linguistics, the linguistic system has been studied more than any other part of the cognitive system, and there is one feature of the relationships found in the linguistic system that is especially important to this study of conversation. This is the relationship of realization. The notion turns on the fact that the speech signal is made up of physical sounds that exist outside of the cognitive system, but that the cognitive system somehow makes sense of. In both producing and interpreting utterances, a certain speech signal, or expression, can be associated with a certain meaning or meanings in the cognitive system. We say that an expression realizes a content. This realizational relationship mediates between
the inscrutable cognitive system and the observable facts of utterances, making possible both the routine interaction of separate cognitive systems in ordinary conversation, and the more academic study of cognitive systems via linguistic study. Figure 3 may thus be revised as Figure 4 to show the linguistic system as it interfaces with the speech signal outside of the cognitive system. Other parts of the cognitive system also have interfaces with the physical world, but it is the linguistic system that most concerns us in this study.

Figure 4

So far we have said that the individual can be thought of in terms of a cognitive system, that the cognitive system has different, yet interconnected parts, and that it is organized in the individual as a network of relationships. Such a system of metaphors has been adopted because of its usefulness in yielding an understanding of conversation. We are now ready to turn to the fourth and last point concerning the individual cognitive system. That point is
that besides organization, the cognitive system is characterized by operation. Along with the structure there is process. The individual not only has information, he also uses it, and the details of this use are as important to a cognitive framework as are the details of organization.

The basic process is called activation, and it can be thought of as impulses moving through the network in patterns partly specified by the network structure and partly due to the nature (e.g. the strength) of the impulse itself. This activation spreads along all possible paths from its source. It may occur in different strengths and frequencies, and it decays rapidly, growing weaker with time and distance from the source. The network is structured in ways that direct the activation so that production and interpretation can take place. In the linguistic system, activation may come from the speech signal and move along realizational pathways in the system until a semantic interpretation is achieved in the form of activated clusters of concepts. Activation in the linguistic system may also originate in some other portion of the cognitive system and move in the opposite direction along realizational pathways until a speech signal is produced. Activation functions in the production and interpretation of utterances in the linguistic system and also functions to create and change the network itself. It is involved in the construction of new connections and in the strengthening of already existing ones in all parts of the cognitive and
linguistic systems. This basic activation process underlies the system changing cognitive processes such as adding new information and retrieving information.

As an individual thinks and interacts with his environment, certain portions of his cognitive system will be more activated than others. Thus a distinction can be made between what an individual knows and what he is thinking about at a given time. All the information in his system is part of his knowledge, but that selection of knowledge to which he is paying attention at a certain time will be the most highly activated. This distinction corresponds roughly to distinctions made and studied in psychology between different types of memory, e.g. long-term memory and short-term memory\(^9\) and also invoked at times by linguists, e.g. Chafe's high-cost and low-cost information (Chafe, in press).

**Cognitive systems interacting in conversation.** Having characterized the individual cognitive system, we now move on to a consideration of the larger system that results when two such systems join each other in conversation. In terms of the cognitive framework sketched here, **conversation can be viewed as a process in which several cognitive systems interact with each other by means of the speech signal and change as a result.** This interaction can be visualized graphically as in Figure 5 which represents a pair of cognitive systems interacting through the mediation of the speech signal.
Several points must be made with regard to these conversing cognitive systems. First, we point out that the cognitive systems involved are at all times autonomous entities. While the speech signal, along with various other sensory cues, does serve as an interface between cognitive systems, the systems remain separate from each other and inscrutable to each other except for the mediation of that interface.

Second, autonomy notwithstanding, the systems of the interlocutors do resemble each other extensively in many ways. The linguistic systems in particular must be very much alike, and to the extent that they are, it is said in ordinary parlance that the interlocutors speak the same language. Little conversation can take place unless the linguistic systems of the two interlocutors are quite similar. The cognitive networks of the interlocutors will also resemble each other to some extent with respect to the
cultural/world knowledge contained in each, especially if the interlocutors have had similar experiences and know each other well as is the case with LeRoy and his parents. Further, they will be similar in the memory that each retains of the current discourse and current situational context. This is not to say that the discourse is remembered verbatim, only that the interlocutors will have had similar activations from the discourse. Finally, the systems of the interlocutors will of course be similar in the basic sense that each is a human cognitive system and therefore characterized by universally human kinds of structures and processes. These similarities are important in enabling communication to take place by means of the speech interface.

Besides being similar, the systems will also differ. First, no two people have exactly the same linguistic knowledge. The linguistic systems even of two people said to speak the same language will differ in subtle ways. Second, because each person has a unique physical and social history, each person's cognitive system will contain world knowledge and experiential memories unique to him. Even two people involved with each other in the same experience will have had different vantage points and therefore different memories of the experience. Third, the interlocutors will differ in their precise memory of the discourse. For example they will have mirror image memories of the discourse. What one said, the other heard, and vice versa. Such differences may impede
communication, as for example when interlocutors have drastic differences in vocabulary. At the same time, they provide an impetus for conversation, for speakers tend to tell addressees about newsworthy information, i.e. information they think the addressee does not already know.

When two similar yet different cognitive systems interact in conversation, each one brings to bear on his interpretation and production of utterances his knowledge of his conversation partner. This is a major point with regard to a cognitive model of conversation. In terms of cognitive systems, we can say that each interlocutor has incorporated in his information system some kind of model of the other's information system, in other words, some idea of what the other interlocutor knows and what he is thinking about.\textsuperscript{10} This model of the addressee's system is constantly monitored and updated as the conversation progresses, and is referred to in making choices that affect the expression of information. The speaker especially keeps track of what information the other interlocutor should know and be thinking about as a result of having been a participant in the conversation up to a given point. Evidence that this tracking occurs is abundant in conversational utterances. In the excerpt cited above, for example, Lucinda's answer following LeRoy's question 63 indicates her expectation that LeRoy already knows the answer to his question. After all,
she has only recently provided that very information in the story in 54.1-.13.

((Lu3B))

How'd it happen you 3saw them1.
Did they set one up near where you 2lived2.

They put - set one up near where we 4camped1 that time.

The unusually high pitch on "camped" betrays her expectation. The existence and employment of this knowledge of each other's cognitive states has a major influence on realizational choices as utterances are produced. In this same question, for example, LeRoy, instead of using full noun phrases, chooses the pronouns "them" and "they" to refer to an Indian couple that Lucinda once watched setting up a tipi. He chooses to use pronouns because he knows that Lucinda is presently thinking about the Indians in question and will be able to identify the referents of "they" that LeRoy intends. She doesn't need the more explicit direction that a full noun phrase would have provided.

Another important point with regard to a cognitive model of conversation involves a contrast between the structure of cognitive systems and the structure of the speech signal used to express cognitive content. The speech signal occurs in one-dimensional sequenced time. Sound follows sound, and utterance utterance. Cognitive networks, however, are three-dimensional. A single node, such as the "tipi" node or
"tipi₁" node in Figure 2, has connections to multiple other nodes. Major portions of the cognitive processing required in conversation involve the engineering of a translation between cognitive structure and speech signal structure. Because the speech signal is one-dimensional, Lucinda and LeRoy, in expressing information about "tipi₁", find it necessary to refer to the tipi several times although it exists in their cognitive representations at only one location. They must do this in such a way that a new "tipi" is not invoked with every new reference. That is, they must find ways to describe their three-dimensional cognitive networks by means of a one-dimensional speech signal. The tasks of dealing with a one-dimensional speech signal, while at the same time tailoring utterances to the knowledge and current activational configuration of the addressee present speakers with quite a challenge.

Conversation, then, involves two cognitive systems that are similar in many ways, though not exactly the same. The systems are separate and individual, but because they are similar, communication between them is possible through the mediation of the physical speech signal. And because their systems differ, they have things to talk about. As the conversation proceeds, one interlocutor, the speaker, produces an utterance in response to internal activations coming from his cognitive system down through his linguistic system. In the other interlocutor, the listener, that same
utterance evokes a corresponding reverse pattern of activations, this time coming up through the linguistic system and culminating with an interpretation. The speaker/listener roles are then switched as that interpretation motivates further activations which are in turn encoded into a new utterance to be interpreted by the other interlocutor. Successful encoding and interpretation is aided by the sensitivity of the interlocutors to the knowledge and activations in each other's systems, and it must navigate through the one-dimensional channel of the speech signal.

As a result of these cognitive activities, involving whole cognitive systems and mediated by the physical speech signal, the two cognitive systems will change. Each will add to its system some information that has been constructed as a result of the interpretation of the other's utterances. This change may involve primarily a straightforward exchange of information, as in LeRoy's conversations with his parents in which they tell him facts that he did not know about their pasts. It may involve a persuasion of the addressee to change beliefs or habits. It may involve a change in attitude, and so on. The precise character of change notwithstanding, what happens is that through conversation, two cognitive networks which are already somewhat alike assimilate even further.
Observability, Cognitive Systems, and Network Models.

In contrast to Figure 5, which represents cognitive systems interacting through the mediation of the speech signal, Figure 6 shows only the speech signal.

Figure 6

speech signal

This figure is included to make clear that the cognitive systems are not directly accessible to the investigator. In the case of tape recorded conversations, the captured speech signal, as well as its derivative transcribed form, constitute the only observable data. The cognitive and linguistic systems must be inferred.

Most traditional approaches to linguistic data have focused on the observable spoken or written texts themselves as the object of study (cf. Figure 6) without considering the cognitive systems that are responsible for them. Goals have centered, for example, on the segmentation and classification of text units, the description of their distribution, and so forth. Some approaches, such as Chomsky's generative
approach (e.g. Chomsky 1965) have acknowledged the role of some sort of underlying system, one which could generate the sentences of the data. Unlike the approach taken here, however, such approaches do not conceive of linguistic information in terms of a vast network that is integrated into an even larger cognitive system.

In contrast with traditional approaches, this study does emphasize the role of the unobservable cognitive systems involved in conversation. Although the speech signal may provide the analyst with his only observable record of a conversation, it is clear that conversation involves much more than the speech signal alone. It involves in addition the non-observable cognitive systems that are responsible for creating and interpreting that signal and that interact by means of it. The recorded signal is the by-product of this process. In a cognitive study of conversation, the speech signal is studied as an indirect means of understanding those invisible cognitive systems. Concern does not center on the patterning of the surface signal itself, although such study is a necessary step, but on what that patterning suggests about the organization and operation of the cognitive systems behind the signal. In addition, this view of conversation involves the inverse notion that the surface patterns themselves cannot be truly understood except as effects of the cognitive systems that create them. That is, the facts of conversation do not explain anything. Instead it is the
facts themselves that require explanation in terms of the cognitive systems involved.

This study contrasts with generative "cognitive" approaches as well as with traditional taxonomic approaches in its adoption of a network view of cognitive and linguistic systems. In the view taken here, such a network conceptualization is necessary if we are to reach a meaningful understanding of the cognitive processes at work in conversation and also of the surface patterning evident in conversational data. In any conversation, speakers encode only a small portion of their total knowledge. Of necessity, most remains unsaid. A cognitive network approach models both unexpressed and expressed information and recognizes the crucial role of the unexpressed information in shaping the form of that which is expressed linguistically. A distinction can be made between the physical linguistic text, i.e. the conversational record, and the "cognitive" or "knowledge" text that is comprised all of the involved structures and activations of a cognitive system during the time of a conversation, whether expressed or not.

Some questions for research. Having provided a brief sketch of the view of cognition and conversation that forms the framework for this study, we here turn to an enumeration of and brief introduction to the specific research problems to be investigated in the following chapters.
We begin by stating the obvious, that the whole of the cognitive processing that occurs in connection with LeRoy's conversations with his parents is much too rich, too extensive, and too complex to be exhaustively treated in this or any other study. Every utterance and every part of every utterance both reflects structure and processing on the part of the speaker and effects certain processing on the part of the addressee. Until all of these cognitive dimensions are accounted for, a cognitive study of these conversations is not finished. In addition, although a record of conversation yields many clues as to the cognitive systems of the interlocutors, it does not reveal everything, and this fact limits the potential scope of a study as well. What follows is therefore necessarily a subset of the possible questions that could be formulated and examined.

The questions have been developed from two major sources. First, the cognitive framework described above has suggested certain cognitive issues for examination. Second, unique characteristics of the corpus examined have provided certain questions along with the peculiar data needed to investigate them. In general, the question selection has not relied heavily on an interest in explaining specific isolated features of linguistic expression such as sentence stress, word order, lexical choices, and so on. Although such formal features are recognized as needed, their identification and
examination has not provided the organizing principle for the study.

On conversation topic. When people converse, they converse about something. If individuals are viewed as cognitive systems, it becomes clear that the discourse topics they talk about must be chosen from within their cognitive systems. The first research problem, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, involves the problem of the interlocutors in coming up with topics for the conversation. LeRoy's conversations with Lucinda and Walter provide good data for this study because LeRoy takes on a role as interviewer that forces him to continually find new topics. The succession of topics he selects can be identified and inferences made about the cognitive organization and processing that their distribution betrays. Chapter 3 focuses on principles by which a speaker, usually LeRoy, selects a new topic. Once a topic is found, it must be rendered comprehensible to the other interlocutor so that he will know what is being talked about. Chapter 4 then deals with with principles of this process of topic coordination.

On the cognitive storage and expression of narrative information. In the interviews, Lucinda and Walter relate many personal experiences in narrative form. Cognitively, these remembered experiences, originally encountered with all of the sensory channels, have a complex network representation involving many portions of the cognitive
system. The verbalization of these experiences at some point requires a translation of the experiences into linguistic form by means of the linguistic system. Cognitive aspects of the storage and expression of this narrated information are explored in Chapter 5.

In the corpus, in addition to the expected plentitude of personal narrative, there are several cases in which Lucinda relates a single experience to LeRoy on two separate occasions. Although any narrative would be interesting to consider in terms of the cognitive system that produced it, these double tellings, which occur in a 1952 interview and later in an interview recorded in the 1960s, are of special interest. Comparison of the two tellings provides insights into such issues as what the cognitive analog of a text story is like, how non-linguistic information is stored and verbalized, and why text stories have a characteristic structure.

On the cognitive functions of utterances. Speakers expect listeners to perform a variety of cognitive tasks with respect to the information they encode, and they signal these tasks by means of utterances. These tasks involve cognitive functions such as the addition and retrieval of information. On the basis of structural criteria traditional linguistic study has identified three main types of sentences: statements, interrogatives, and imperatives. These sentence types tend to be used to make assertions, ask questions, and
issue commands respectively, and each of these is associated with a typical kind of cognitive processing.

It has long been noted, however, that sentence form is not isomorphic with utterance function. In speech act theory, for example, this discrepancy was recognized and dealt with in terms of indirect speech acts\textsuperscript{12}. An enduring problem, however, has centered on identification of the realizational relationships involved. Somehow a listener recognizes the type of cognitive processing that he is to perform as a result of parsing a certain utterance. Some, but not all, of the information concerning utterance function is explicitly expressed by means of utterance type, lexical clues, and so forth.

Chapter 6 outlines a general approach to the study of the cognitive functions of utterances and then focuses on the cognitive functions of a subset of the utterances, statements, as they are used in these conversations. The types of processing that statements require of the listener are catalogued. Realizational principles are then given, principles which guide the listener in recognizing the type of processing from among the possibilities that he is to perform. In addition, the speaker's problem of choosing an utterance type to effect a certain function is considered.

Other concerns. This chapter has outlined the scope of this study, sketching the cognitive framework it adopts and identifying research questions suggested by that framework
and by the data to be considered. Not much has been said yet concerning the methods by which these purposes are to be achieved. Before the specific research questions are addressed, these "how to" issues are dealt with more fully in Chapter 2. There the corpus is more fully characterized, the problem of data transcription is addressed, major techniques and concepts are explained along with citation of their sources in the literature, and epistemological issues concerning mentalism in linguistic studies are briefly discussed. Such detailed treatment of method is important here because in addition to yielding insights into the cognitive processes and structures involved in conversation, this study attempts to contribute to cognitive studies by offering a research approach for the study of conversational data.
The sources of these quotes are tapes Lu3B:25.2 and Lu40:121.1 respectively. This notation is described in detail in Chapter 2, pp. 44-45. The sources are given in full in Appendix 2.

This excerpt comes from a conversation recorded by LeRoy Ford in the early 1960s. Note that LeRoy's utterances are transcribed against the left margin while Lucinda's are indented. Other transcription conventions are listed in Appendix 1. The full set of conversation transcripts examined in this study is reproduced in Appendix 2.

I would like to thank Dr. Ford for making these tapes available for this study, and also for his generous provision of background information concerning the participants in the conversations and other features of the recording situation.

Lamb (1984:94) identifies the linguistic system as well as motor, perceptual, and conceptual modalities.

This crucial point can be traced to Hjelmslev, who said, "A totality does not consist of things but of relationships... the postulation of objects as something different from the terms of relationships is a superfluous axiom and consequently a metaphysical hypothesis from which linguistics will have to be freed." (Hjelmslev 1961:22-23).

See Copeland (1983) for discussion of sequencing and other types of information in the semological portion of the linguistic system.

For a fuller discussion of node types see Lamb 1966 and ms. The semi-circular "and/or" node is not properly described in the readily available literature. It is intermediate between the triangular "and" node and the three-sided "or" node.

The explication of this content/expression relationship in language forms a central task of all strands of functional linguistics, and Lamb's Cognitive Linguistics is functional in this concern as well. The widely used terms "content" and "expression" come from Hjelmslev (1954) although the notions did not originate with him. We use the term "content" consistent with current usage. In reality, an alternate term, such as "meaning" might be more apt because "content" suggests a container metaphor for the mind which is inconsistent with the notion of network.


Tulving and Donaldson (1972) discuss memory types.

See Copeland and Davis (1980a) for more discussion.
There are of course subtypes of each of these. See for example Bolinger's description (1957) of many different types of questions.

Levinson (1983:226-283) gives a concise review of this effort.
Chapter 2
On Methodology:

Tools for Analyzing Conversational Data

How'd you get ready to clér̂ar the lând?
How did you dig the wéll down there?
Hów did they set up a típ fé?
How'd you keep the ẃínd out?
Hów did you make a bróomweed bróom?

-LeRoy to Walter on frontier tools and methods

Introduction. Once goals are established, it is useful to think about the steps involved in accomplishing those objectives. In Chapter 1, the research questions of this study were introduced along with the view of cognition that serves as a framework. This chapter focuses on the "how to" aspects of the study, introducing tools helpful in the analysis of the data and necessary to the accomplishment of the research goals. We take time for this detailed account of method because the cognitive aspects of natural conversational data have not been widely studied, and as a consequence no adequate approach has yet been developed. The methodological issues elaborated here are thus intended as one of the contributions of this study.
The chapter begins with an orientation to the data examined, including a brief history and characterization of the conversations and the interlocutors, a discussion of the suitability of this data for this study, and a description of the interview situation and the general cognitive processing situation it sets up with respect to each interlocutor. It then proceeds to a consideration of the first tool of data analysis: the transcription process. The approach to analysis of the conversation is described next. In brief, this methodology combines concepts and techniques of two schools of research, one situated squarely within the discipline of linguistics, the other originating outside, in the discipline of sociology. The first, the Cognitive Linguistics (CL) school mentioned in Chapter 1, has concentrated on cognitive issues but has not dealt with the data of natural conversation. The other, the school of Conversation Analysis, has made important contributions to our understanding of conversation but has not focused on cognitive issues.

The Data:

Source of the data. Although conversation occurs wherever there are people, naturally occurring yet recorded conversation is a bit more rare. The data for this study is naturally occurring in that no linguist motivated its creation or participated in its collection. Instead, it originated with speakers who conversed entirely for their own
purposes, and who likewise recorded their talk for their own purposes. The corpus has its origins in events of about a century ago.

In 1896, a young couple began married life as farmers on the Oklahoma Indian Territory frontier. Walter Cynthia Ford was twenty-four years old. He had a fourth grade education. His bride, Lucinda Lakey, was an orphan fourteen years old. The extent of her formal schooling could be counted in weeks. In the following years, Lucinda and Walter lived at several locations in western Oklahoma and north central Texas before settling permanently on a farm near Erick, Oklahoma in 1899. During their married lives they had many typical rural Oklahoman pioneer experiences, and also many children, the last of whom, LeRoy Ford, was born in 1922.

After LeRoy was grown, he decided that his parents had lived interesting lives, quite different from his own, and that he would like to preserve something of their history in their own words for his family. He obtained a wire recorder and on Thanksgiving day, 1952, recorded a forty minute conversation with his mother Lucinda, by that time about seventy years of age, in which he asked her impromptu questions about her childhood and early adulthood experiences. The next summer, he recorded a similar interview, with Walter, who was at that time about eighty years old. After these first recordings were made, about a decade passed before LeRoy continued his project in the early
1960s. He recorded another conversation with Lucinda, who at the time was a patient at Presbyterian Hospital in Oklahoma City. In all, LeRoi collected about three hours of dialogue with his parents. Walter died in 1966 at the age of 93, and Lucinda two years later at the age of 86.

The tapes first came to my attention in 1988 when LeRoi, who is my father, remembered them and had them transferred to modern cassette tape format to share with his siblings and children just as he had originally planned over three decades ago. Besides appreciating their personal and historical value, I soon became interested in the interviews for their value as linguistic data.

The fit of data to study. As conversations go, this body of data, consisting of naturally occurring recorded English dialogues in which the interlocutors are concerned primarily with the exchange of factual\textsuperscript{3} information, is well suited to a cognitive study. It can be contrasted with conversations concerned primarily with other purposes such as persuasion, reasoning, phatic communion, encouragement, teasing, complimenting, problem solving, planning of activities, etc., as well as with conversations involving more than two interlocutors, conversations conducted in more exotic languages not as easily and completely accessible to analyst and reader, and monologues of various types.

Although cognition is involved in all types of conversation, this particular kind of data is especially
suitable for an initial study of the cognitive systems of interlocutors in conversation for several reasons. Dialogue concerned with the exchange of factual information provides a good beginning point for a cognitive study of natural conversation since much linguistic research, including work in Cognitive Linguistics, has centered on the structure and encoding of such factual information. In addition, a naturally occurring, spontaneous interaction provides clues to the on-line processing of the interlocutors that might be distorted in a rehearsed conversation in a more artificial setting. Furthermore, dialogue is a relatively simple situation, presenting only two cognitive systems for modeling at a time, not three, or ten, or twenty. Also, since writer and reader themselves have English-like linguistic systems, both can make subtle judgments about the cognitive effects of certain utterances without devoting a great deal of energy to the more mundane aspects of the parsing and understanding of each utterance.

Conversational data is not the only kind of naturally occurring linguistic data that could be used for a cognitive study. Other studies have focused on monological texts, both oral and written. For example, Chafe (in press) has studied cognitive aspects of spoken monologues with interesting results. Like us, he makes inferences concerning the speaker's processing based on patterns in such a text. It is in conversation, however, that the ongoing processes of
production and interpretation of text can best be observed. A speaker's utterances provide evidence for how he has interpreted, or not interpreted, previous utterances in the real time of the conversation. They also yield clues concerning the processing he experiences as he attempts to produce utterances. With carefully planned monologues, the interpreter's processing is idealized and many of the clues concerning the producer's processing that are present in spontaneous speech are edited out. We return to this point later in the discussion of method.

The cognitive situation. The circumstances and motivations behind these recorded reminiscences set up a particular cognitive situation for the interlocutors somewhat different from that associated with less formal conversations. These conversations are interviews, conducted so that the interviewer and other listeners may learn about the experiences of the interviewees. The interview genre can be characterized by text features such as a predominance of question/answer sequences and a non-symmetrical distribution of turns with respect to the interlocutors. Besides invoking text features, we can also think of a genre in terms of the cognitive processing it typically involves. In an interview, the interlocutors fulfill different roles with respect to the conversation, and here, LeRoy is the interviewer, and Lucinda and Walter, the interviewees. For Walter and Lucinda, the main cognitive activities involve the recall and linguistic
expression of requested information. For LeRoy, the main
cognitive activities involve the choosing of information to
elicit through questions and also the addition of requested
information to his cognitive system.

Recognition of this type of genre/speech event and the
typical cognitive activities that attend it is important in
that the interview speech event sets a limit to the kinds of
processing that can be expected, thus narrowing the study of
cognitive processing to manageable proportions. In terms of
the cognitive model of conversation, the dialogues result
mainly in the assimilation of LeRoy's cognitive system to the
systems of Lucinda and Walter. His system becomes more like
theirs as he adds to it the information that they encode for
him from their systems. The goals of the conversation center
on the exchange of factual information with LeRoy in a
learning situation and Lucinda and Walter in a teaching
situation. This study concentrates on cognitive aspects of
this information exchange.

Within this general characterization, two further points
must be made with regard to the specific cognitive situation
underlying these particular conversations. In considering
the cognitive processing involved it is important to note
that LeRoy conducted the interviews without a prepared list
of specific questions to ask and without taking notes on
anything that was said⁴. The conversation proceeds orally,
free of the interfering influence of written prompts. Any
perceived topical coherence in the interviews can therefore be attributed to the orderly organization and operation of information in the cognitive systems of the interlocutors.

Second, knowledge of LeRoy's, Lucinda's, and Walter's personal histories is important for understanding the cognitive processing. Because LeRoy is the son of Walter and Lucinda, and because he grew up on the family farm at Erick, albeit several decades after Walter and Lucinda first settled it, he already, at the outset of the dialogues, shares with them a tremendous amount of information. His cognitive system is already quite like theirs in terms of world knowledge, linguistic knowledge, and personal experience. This similarity must be kept in mind in understanding the way LeRoy, Lucinda, and Walter make sense of each other's utterances. A conversation involving individuals with less shared knowledge might proceed quite differently.

Transcription: the first tool of analysis. Conversational data, once captured on tape and selected for study, must for practical purposes be translated from the oral-temporal medium in which it was created into a written-spatial one that can become the subject of linguistic analysis. This translation, or transcription, is not a trivial task, for at the same time that it renders the data accessible to analysis, it also introduces some important differences.
Perhaps the most important of these differences is that the experience of reading the record of a conversation on paper is quite different from that of the interlocutors as the conversation unfolded. The spoken signal is ephemeral, fading, present only one sound at time in sequence. At any point in the conversation, all that will come remains a contingency, and all that has already past is only a memory. After the speech signal has faded, what remains for the interlocutors is not a verbatim record of the utterances, but a variety of changes in their cognitive systems. The experience is somewhat similar for a third party hearer as he listens to a tape of conversation.

Once the conversation is transcribed, however, all of it exists on paper simultaneously, a situation that never occurred as the conversation was originally produced. The roles that memory and contingency played in the original act of conversation are easily overlooked in consideration of the written transcript because pages that have gone before can be referred back to and pages to come have the inevitability that comes of having already been written down. The conversation appears as a textual artifact, not as a dynamic process of cognitive systems interacting and changing. For the analyst, it becomes much more convenient to study the structure of this residual artifact than to think about the cognitive context of the utterances at the time of their creation. There is no way to completely escape this
situation. The conversation must be transcribed in order to be carefully contemplated, and the written word will not be experienced as the original spoken word was. Recognition of the problem, however, can at least help keep the focus on the cognitive aspects of the on-going communication.

A second difference is that a transcribed version of a conversation cannot capture fully and accurately the richness of the spoken signal, especially with regard to prosodic and indexical features such as intonation, stress, breathing, and voice quality. A transcription will be selective, including only some features, and it will be only roughly accurate as the transcriber must rely on his human and inexact hearing and make subjective judgments. Furthermore, the benefits of detail in a transcription must be balanced against the demands of readability and utility. The result is a practical, but somewhat impoverished record, and this transcript at some point becomes the record that is actually referred to and accounted for in the analytic process. The transcription of LeRoy's interviews with his parents was conducted in accordance with the principles described in the following section.

**Transcription policy.** In an attempt to represent the data accurately, we purposely adopted a policy of "transcribing what was heard." In other words, no transcription theory that specified in advance what we were "supposed" to hear was used. This policy has two different
applications. First, there are several linguists who have devised transcription systems for English. Halliday, for example, has devised an elegant and attractive transcription system for British English that fits into his general theory of English grammar (1967). He made a careful study of intonation in a certain dialect of English, and from that study developed a theory that carefully describes the distribution of certain features of stress and intonation and that identifies these features as the realizations of certain semantic contents. In his system, for example, a single stressed syllable called the 'tonic syllable' realizes the 'new' information in what is called the 'information unit', which itself is realized in a 'tone group' (Halliday 1985:271-286). Though theoretically elegant, this approach runs into problems if used as a system for the initial transcription of conversation. Studies have shown that in actual practice, trained transcribers don't always agree on the boundaries of tone groups and the placement of stress. Instead, they encounter "problems in identifying the tone group by phonological criteria alone" (Brown and Yule 1983:158). In addition, contrary to the predictions of the theory, they find such things as "tightly rhythmically bound structures with several peaks of prominence" (Brown and Yule 1983:158). Owing to this sort of problem, it was judged best not to impose such an elaborate transcription system on the
data. Instead features such as stress and pitch are marked where heard.

The other application of this transcription policy has to do with the powerful influence that the conventions of written English have over the transcriber. This influence may lead him to transcribe utterances according to the rules of writing, even when these rules result in a distorted representation of oral data. For example, in written English periods occur at the ends of particular types of grammatical configurations that are called complete sentences. A complete sentence of written English, however, may have little to do with complete sentences in speech. The result is that we may be tempted to use a period in a transcription because of a criterion appropriate to writing, but not appropriate to speech. Consider, for example, the following passage from LeRoy’s early 1960s interview with Lucinda.

```
((Lu2A))
Uncle 3Jéfr 2- my 3ункle 2- 4hè 2drove the 3óxens 2 and 9.2
3dàddy 2 drove the 4tèam 1.
When we moved up 3hère 1. .3
From Wáshita 3cůny 1. .4
```

According to the conventions of written language, this sequence would qualify as a single sentence, and only one period would be used, after the word ‘county’. Such a rendering would not fairly represent the oral data. At the
end of line 9.3, Lucinda gives a final intonation contour indicating a close to the sentence. She then adds line 9.4 with its own full intonation contour ending with a final intonation. Finally she adds line 9.5, also with its own full intonation contour. In interpreting her message, LeRoy hears one line at a time, and at the end of each line hears a closure. At each such instant, there is no way for him to know that Lucinda will add more information to the sentence. To be cognitively accurate, then, the transcription indicates such closures, even when they fail to coincide with the closures syntactically and semantically acceptable in written English.

In an attempt to fully and accurately represent the oral data, the transcription records both the segmental features usually associated with the written medium, such as words, and suprasegmental features, such as intonation and stress, that are important to speech. The transcription also records typical disfluencies, such as false starts, that are characteristic of spontaneous spoken language and that can give important clues to the cognitive processing of the speaker. For the data considered in this project, in which Lucinda and Walter speak a non-standard dialect of English, accuracy has also involved an attempt to record features of this dialect, such as distinctive pronunciations and grammatical patterns.
In the interest of readability, the conventions of written English have been followed except when they contradict the policy of transcribing what is heard. English words are more easily read in traditional orthography than in phonemic transcription. Other conventions of writing, such as capital letters and punctuation marks have also been used to enhance readability. A few diacritics have been added as well to help the reader recreate in his mind's ear the characteristic pronunciations and intonations of the original conversation.

**Transcription conventions.** In light of the above observations, the conventions adopted to transcribe the corpus for this project are designed to facilitate the study of the cognitive processing of the individuals involved by recording the data as fully and accurately as possible without sacrificing readability. Although the conventions have been developed and tailored to this study, they draw upon conventions used by other transcribers. Hockett (1958:33ff) recommends the use of superscript numbers to indicate relative pitch. Many of Jefferson's conventions (reported in Schenkein 1983:xi-xvi) have been adapted as well. The transcription conventions are listed here and in Appendix I as follows.
Transcription conventions:

- Left margin lines record LeRoy's utterances.
- Indented lines record Lucinda's or Walter's utterances.
- Numbers in right margin identify interviewer turns.
- () marks transcriber doubt.
- () marks transcriber comments.
- () marks a pause of x seconds.
- [ ] marks simultaneous speech.
- ' marks stressed syllables.
- - marks a hesitation or sustained final intonation contour.
- . marks a final falling intonation contour.
- ? marks a final question intonation contour, appropriate to the type of question.
- 1 2 3 4 mark relative pitch levels from low to high.

The speaker is identified by indentation. LeRoy's utterances are not indented; the interviewee's utterances are. The header at the top of each page identifies the interviewee as either Walter or Lucinda. The utterances are numbered for reference purposes in the following way. LeRoy's turns are numbered consecutively in the right margin. If one of LeRoy's turns takes up more than one line on the page, each line is referred to by the number of the turn plus a letter, 'a' for the the first line, 'b' for the second line, and so on. These letters do not appear on the transcripts themselves, however. The interviewee's utterances are referred to by two numbers separated by a decimal point. The first number indexes LeRoy's preceding turn. The second number indexes the interviewee's lines.
within that turn. For example, in the following excerpt from interview 1A with Walter, the line that says, "What did that-" is called 19a. The next line is 19b and the next line is 19c. All of these are LeRoy's utterances. The line that reads, "Well it was just dug out in the ground-" is called 19.1. The next line is 19.2 and so on to 19.5. All of these lines are Walter's.

```((Walter1A))
What did that-
Do you remember what that dugout looked like? ((2))
1 How it was made? ((3))
 3 Well it was just dug out in the ground- ((2))
  'n- ((1)) part of the wall (was up 'n)
  went around with limbs I believe. ((2))
  Just big cottonwood limbs. ((2))
  And then covered over with dirt. ((2))
```

When an excerpt from one of the interviews is quoted as in this example, the interview is identified in double parentheses before the first line, e.g. ((Walter 1A)). This identification both identifies the interviewee as Lucinda or Walter and provides a number and letter indexing the tape and side from which the excerpt was taken. Tape numbers are those originally assigned by LeRoy. LeRoy's interview with Walter is divided among four locations on the tapes: tape 1 side A, tape 3 side A, tape 2 side A, and tape 2 side B, in that order. This sequence was identified by LeRoy and is confirmed by internal references. LeRoy's 1952 interview with Lucinda
appears on both sides of a tape called "Forty Minutes with Lucinda Lakey Ford, Thanksgiving Day 1952" and is identified in quoted excerpts as ((Lu40)). LeRoy's interview with Lucinda in the early 1960s is divided between two locations on the tapes: tape 2 side A, and tape 3 side B, in that order.

Line breaks within turns are made to enhance readability and do not necessarily correlate with a particular grammatical or phonological configuration. In general, however, a line break is made at the end of a clause or sentence, at the end of a phonological contour, or after a long pause.

Not all utterances on the tapes are easy to hear. Such unclear utterances or parts of utterances are enclosed in single parentheses. Words transcribed within parentheses represent the transcriber's best guess as to the words in the utterance. An empty set of parentheses represents an utterance that could not be understood at all.

Double parentheses enclose either transcriber comments or numerals indicating pause length. Comments give transcriber judgments or observations about an utterance or set of utterances that cannot be captured in the transcription of the utterance itself. Some comments note extra-linguistic features of the conversation such as chuckles, laughs, and sighs. Some mention unusual features of the way an utterance is said, such as with a high voice or
with an unusually strong sense of rhythm. Some serve to clarify the function of an utterance, for example to point out that a certain statement serves not as an assertion of a fact, but as a request for the listener to confirm the information expressed. Pauses are measured to the nearest second with an ordinary sweep second hand and also indicated in double parentheses. Pauses shorter than a second are not indicated, except that those occurring mid-clause and which noticeably interrupt the flow of the conversation are marked with dashes as hesitations. All of these uses of double parentheses are exemplified below.

((Walter3A))

It went 3east 1of Hext 3Swfch3?
Yeah. ((Very faint.)) ((15))
((Heavy sighs))
When you uh went to school down in 3Téxas2-

27

((Walter3A))

They called it 3kéel1.
I don't know what- what it really 3wás2.
That's what we 3càled it1. ((2))
And you'd shàrfen it up like a piece of chálk and use 3ft1. ((Confirmàtion)) 28
And you could just use it just like it was a- 3péncl12.

Occasionally, both speakers speak at the same time. Such overlaps are marked with the symbol ']' which appears between the overlapping lines. The '[' appears at the point below the previous speaker's line that the overlap begins.
The entire line following the overlap mark is part of the overlap. In the following example, Walter at 88.4 says, "3páy 'us" at the same time that LeRoy at 89a says, "You mean the dúmp-". The word 'didn't' in 88.4 is not part of the overlap, nor is LeRoy's line 89b.

(Walter 3A) 88.3

And he skipped 36ut1 you know1. (((1)))
Didn't 3páy 'us.
[
You mean the dúmp-
of dirt there before Turkey 2Créek2?

Suprasegmental features are marked as follows. An accent mark, '¨', marks syllables that are stressed strongly relative to other syllables in the utterance. As discussed earlier, stress is marked wherever heard, and not in accordance with any theory of sentence stress in English. Stress usually consists of a combination of high volume and high pitch. There may be more than one stressed syllable in a clause. Because it was usually difficult to identify any one stress in a clause as more phonologically prominent than the others, all were marked with the same diacritic, without any attempt to identify several different levels of stress.

Three symbols, '-' , '.', and '?' mark the end of intonational units in the conversations. The period marks the end of a sentence, which usually involves a slight fall in pitch. Although the unit marked with a period may not fit
the criteria for a sentence of written English, to the hearer
the unit so marked is a completed unit both phonologically
and semantically. The final intonation contour that is marked
with a period tells him that he does not need to keep
listening for more information in that unit. It is finished.
A period does not necessarily imply a pause although sentence
final pauses are common. Only sentence final pauses of a
second or more are marked, as discussed above.

Like the period, the question mark indicates the end of
an intonational unit. It does not, however, in itself
indicate the exact nature of that intonational ending.
Instead, the question mark indicates the final contour that
is appropriate to the type of question it is. A yes/no
question has a rising final contour. An information question
has a falling final contour like that of a statement. Usually
these contours are additionally marked by pitch superscripts
as described below. A question mark is used instead of a
period in information questions in keeping with the
conventions of written English.

A dash marks one of several things: one is a final
intonation contour. A dash sometimes marks a mid-sentence or
mid-phrase hesitation on the part of the speaker. This
hesitation may be quite brief, under one second long, and if
so is not marked with a pause number in double parentheses.
Nevertheless, it noticeably interrupts the flow of the
utterance, as in this example.
what did you-kids do to pass the time away?

Sometimes a dash marks an abrupt stop after a false start or stutter and is followed by the beginning of a new phrase or sentence. In such a case, there may or may not be a short hesitation. In this example, 'How-' is a false start that was abruptly aborted. A new phrase is attempted beginning with 'wh-'. It is itself aborted, and finally a successful utterance is completed.

How-wh-what did you sit on in the wagon?

Finally, a dash marks the end of a mid-sentence, sustained, non-falling, final intonation contour, if that contour involves a slight pause. Such hesitations, as in the following example, can be heard, but do not give the impression of interrupting the flow of the utterance since they occur at the end of phrases, which are natural hesitation places. For the hearer, the intonations so marked signal that more information is coming in the utterance. It is not yet finished.

Yeah-when we moved-we had two-1 wagons.
There is the possibility of a mid-sentence, sustained, non-falling, final intonation contour that does not cooccur with a hesitation. Such intonations, however, were difficult to identify consistently and were not marked in the transcription.

Intonational patterns in the data are hinted at by the period, question mark, and dash, as well as by accent marks. They are made more explicit by the use of superscript numbers that represent relative pitch levels at different places in the utterance, as in this example.

```
((Lu2A))
It was kinda 3crowded1 in the wagon 1wain't it3 1with all your 3furniture3? 9
((2))
Yeah- when we 3moved1- we had 3two1 wagons1.
Uncle 3Jeff2- my 3uncle2- 4he 2drove the 3oxens2 and 3daddy2 drove the 4team1.
```

Four pitch levels are marked. Superscript '1' marks the lowest pitch, '2' the next highest, '3' the next highest, and '4' the highest. The superscripts mark the relative pitch of the word or syllable beginning or ending to which they are attached. Above, for example, the word 'crowded' in line 9 begins on a high pitch, marked with '3' and ends on a low pitch, marked with '1'.

Besides the transcription features listed in the table of conventions above, there are a few others. Capital letters are used in accordance with the rules of written
English at sentence beginnings and at the beginnings of proper names. Regular English orthography is used except in cases where a slightly altered spelling better captures the characteristic pronunciations of the dialect without affecting readability too adversely. In addition, the spelling may be altered to represent the duration with which a word is pronounced. For example, 'ooohhh' represents the word 'oh' held out for a longer than normal period of time.

This set of transcription conventions records the main features of the data, yielding a reasonably full and accurate, yet readable record that is appropriate for the study of the cognitive processing of the interlocutors.

Beyond transcription: further analytical tools. The transcription itself comprises a necessary initial description of the corpus. Once the conversations are transcribed, however, they are ready for further analysis aimed at an understanding of the cognitive systems that created the texts. The tools for this further analysis consist of a collection of guiding concepts and assumptions as well as an array of practical techniques. Several guiding concepts have already been introduced in Chapter 1. Here, a more complete discussion is provided.

For the present study, there existed no ready made methodology. Instead, our approach has been synthesized from notions and practices originating mainly in two different areas of study. First, basic notions from the field of
linguistics in general and Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Lamb 1971) in particular have been adopted. Second, a fairly new
discipline within sociology known as Conversation Analysis or
Ethnomethodology (e.g. Atkinson and Heritage 1984) has
developed concepts and techniques of great relevance for us.
That these two areas would together provide the approach for
this study is not surprising. Cognitive Linguistics has been
concerned with the individual cognitive system but has not
dealt extensively with the data of natural conversation.
Conversation analysis, in contrast, has dedicated itself to
the study of natural conversational data but has not
concentrated on cognitive issues.

The following discussion treats linguistics and
conversational analysis in turn, identifying the notions of
most importance to this study and locating them in their
historical and intellectual context. Following this
examination, the particular blending of these notions that
constitutes the approach used in this study is outlined.

**Tools from linguistics.** In Chapter 1, the basic notions
of Cognitive Linguistics that serve as a framework for this
study were outlined. In summary, we said that each
individual can be viewed as a cognitive system. The
cognitive system exists in the form of a network of
relationships that can be characterized in terms of its
typical organization and operation. Information in the
cognitive system is represented entirely in the connectivity
of the network. The cognitive network has various interrelated parts, one of which is the linguistic system. By means of realizational relationships, the linguistic system links concepts in the cognitive system to linguistic expressions in the speech signal. Given this view of the individual cognitive system, conversation is understood as a process in which separate cognitive systems interact by means of the speech signal and change as a result. The text of a conversation that is captured on a recording device and transcribed onto paper is a residue of that interaction. It contains evidence concerning the cognitive systems that created it and can be accounted for in terms of those systems.

These are the concepts that are of most importance for this study for they provide the necessary conceptual background for framing and investigating research questions. These ideas did not originate in an intellectual vacuum, however, and a tracing of their development will contribute to a better understanding both of the ideas themselves and of how they relate to the present study. The following discussion gives an overview of Cognitive Linguistic studies, tracing the evolution of some of their basic notions and describing the issues they have been concerned with. It places Cognitive Linguistics within the context of the wider field of linguistics. In addition, it summarizes basic
techniques of linguistics in general and Cognitive Linguistics in particular.

Concepts from Cognitive Linguistics. Cognitive Linguistics (CL), like many American linguistic theories, developed out of Bloomfieldian and post-Bloomfieldian taxonomic structural linguistics. Unlike other American theories, CL was heavily influenced by the glossematic theory of Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev as well (Hjelmslev 1961). Its development began in the late 1950s when Sydney Lamb, trained in both structural linguistics and glossematics, became concerned with the relationship between the two widely accepted levels of linguistic structure: the phonemic and morphemic. Lamb's work with the Uto-Aztecan language Monachi led him to the positing of an additional level of structure between those two and eventually to the positing of additional levels above the morphemic.

An additional innovation in Lamb's thinking involved the notion that the levels were linked to each other by a relationship of realization rather than by a relationship of composition and/or class membership. In other words, a unit at one level was not "composed" of units at a lower level. Neither was it a class of lower-level units. Instead, the higher level unit was taken as an abstract entity that was "realized" by units at the lower level. A realizational view solved certain problems inherent in the traditional compositional and class models. For example, it eliminated
the need to posit some basic form of a morpheme, such as 
{-es} for the plural morpheme, that then must be changed into 
other forms to account for irregular forms, such as the 
plural forms "oxen", "geese" and "sheep"\footnote{8}. Instead, the 
realizational view provided for an abstract, formless, plural 
morpheme that would be realized at the lower level as the 
appropriate form via the realizational relationships. No 
transformation of one form into another was required\footnote{9}. The 
realizationaly related levels were called "strata"\footnote{10}, and 
Lamb's view of linguistic structure was known during this 
time as "Stratificational Linguistics". Much research during 
this period concentrated on enumerating and describing both 
the different stratal systems and their organization (e.g. 
Lamb 1964\textsuperscript{b}).

As this evolution of the theory was taking place, the 
notion of network organization germinated and grew as well. 
At first a network format was subtly suggested by the nature 
of realizational discrepancies between strata. Then in 
1964\textsuperscript{11}, under the influence of Halliday's systemic notation, 
Lamb began to devise a graphic network notation that rendered 
the network notion explicit and ultimately served to make it 
a centerpiece of the theory. Following this development and 
up to the present time, much research has centered on 
defining the precise shape of this network (e.g. Reich 1967, 
Ikegami 1970, Bennett 1970). Relational network drawings have 
been employed to account for problematic aspects of
linguistic structure, such as various aspects of the relationship between morphology and phonology.

The network notion is not new with or unique to Cognitive Linguistics. Lamb (1973:23) cites Hjelmslev and of course Halliday as direct influences. Hjelmslev suggested that linguistic structure consisted entirely of relationships, a notion conducive to network representation even if Hjelmslev did not himself offer further clarification (Hjelmslev 1943; 1961:22-3). Halliday used an explicit notation involving system networks of items and relationships to represent a speaker's choices of expressions (e.g. 1967-68). Lamb learned of and adapted certain features of this notation. He soon realized that the network needed no symbols to augment its relational connections.

Besides these direct influences, the idea of network representation was beginning to be "in the air" so to speak in many disciplines at that time and remains so still, although most network approaches have depended on symbols in addition to relationships. In linguistics, syntax trees suggested networks\textsuperscript{12}. In modern functional linguistics, Givón (1984:262-263) talks about cognitive language processing in terms of networks, albeit with less consistency than Lamb. In psychology, many theories have used networks as models of information storage. Quillian (1966) used networks for storage of dictionary information. Anderson (1983) provides a more recent example, modeling the whole of cognition as a
network. More recently, networks have also been prevalent in artificial intelligence studies\(^\text{13}\). Although networks are not unique to Cognitive Linguistics, however, Cognitive Linguistics is distinguished among linguistic theories for its early interest in developing network representations without symbols or items and for its demonstration of their usefulness as a tool for studying linguistic phenomena.

In its beginnings, Stratificational Linguistics was not a cognitive model, and networks were not necessarily viewed as cognitive representations. This characteristic was in keeping with its intellectual roots in post-Bloomfieldian linguistics. However, in 1965, under the influence of Reich\(^\text{14}\), Lamb became interested in the possibility of a cognitive interpretation. By 1971, Stratificational Linguistics was so focused on cognitive issues that Lamb changed its name to "Cognitive Linguistics" (Lamb 1971). This concern with cognition in Stratificational Linguistics reflects a larger trend in American linguistics that began in earnest with Chomsky in the late fifties in reaction to the anti-mentalistic behaviorism of American structuralist linguistics. A brief sketch of mentalism in modern American linguistics will be helpful in explaining the interest of Cognitive Linguistics in cognition.

**Mentalism in linguistic studies.** Mentalism in scientific studies involves the positing of the mind as an entity underlying observed data and responsible for its observable
characteristics. In linguistic studies, after an initial period of acceptance under linguists such as Saussure and Sapir, mentalism has had a rocky history in 20th century linguistics. Mentalistic approaches became decidedly tabu in the influential Bloomfieldian and Post-Bloomfieldian empiricist linguistics. This approach flowered under the influence of behaviorist psychology which pointed out that the mind, even if it existed, was not available to investigation. According to the behaviorist framework, science should constrain its purview to those aspects of behavior that are directly observable. Twaddell criticized mentalistic approaches as "notoriously a fire in a wooden stove" (1935:9). The basic arguments against a mentalistic linguistics were that "(1) we have no right to guess about the linguistic workings of an inaccessible 'mind', and (2) we can secure no advantage from such guesses" (Twaddell 1935:9).

In linguistics, the behaviorist approach translated into a suspicion of cognitive and even semantic constructs in language description and a resolve to keep interest focused on the surface features of text. Language was identified with sets of utterances, i.e. with directly observable phenomena, and the goal was to describe these phenomena.

The post-Bloomfieldian emphasis on describing observable linguistic products, i.e. texts, was motivated in part by a concern with promoting linguistics as a scientific
enterprise. Another facet of this concern involved a preoccupation with scientific method. In psychology, experimentation required careful control of variables and replicability of results. In linguistics, much energy was spent developing so called "discovery procedures" which were intended to yield a single objective and replicable description of a set of utterances, i.e. of a language. These methods involved the segmentation of texts and the classification the resulting segments and resulted in taxonomic descriptions of languages.\(^{18}\)

Chomsky was among the first and most influential in America to argue for the readmission of mentalism into linguistic investigations and to point out the limitations of the taxonomic paradigm in providing an adequate synchronic account of language behavior.\(^{19}\) He took an extreme position against behaviorist thinking and practice, esteeming it as valueless and barren. In spite of Chomsky's opinion, a linguistic approach influenced by behaviorism has in fact shown itself able to yield useful, comparable, and well organized descriptions of many newly investigated world languages. As long as that has been the goal, such an approach has served quite well, and continues to serve today in practical ways. According to Chomsky's view, however, such description could not explain a person's ability to produce the observed linguistic behaviors. It could not account for a speaker-hearer's ability to understand and
produce sentences never before encountered. It could not demonstrate the intuitively obvious relationship between agnate sentences. It could not deal convincingly with ambiguous sentences. It had little to say about language acquisition or the process of producing and comprehending utterances. In short, behaviorist linguistics, in philosophy and method, excluded at the outset many of the most intriguing questions about language.

Ultimately, the behaviorist paradigm faltered both in psychology and in linguistics. If behavioristic, taxonomic linguistics would not concern itself with such issues of theory and explanation, then perhaps it was time for a different approach. Both of Twaddell's basic arguments against mentalism in linguistics were questioned. First, scholars began to claim the right to speculate about the mind. Second, it was no longer clear that no advantage could be secured from such speculation.

Beginning in the forties and fifties, new approaches were developed that were less reluctant to posit abstract or mental entities not directly available to observation. These approaches involved a subtle shift in the object of linguistic investigation to include the systems underlying texts in addition to the texts themselves. In Europe, Hjelmslev argued for the admission of the abstract systems underlying texts as objects of study (1943). Halliday became interested in system networks underlying linguistic data.
Both of these approaches avoided mentalistic claims but nevertheless posited abstract underlying systems. In America, Chomsky defined the object of linguistic investigation not as some set of utterances but as the ideal speaker-hearer's underlying mental competence to produce and understand utterances (Katz 1964:130). This non-observable competence contrasts with a speaker's observable linguistic performance. Like Chomsky, Lamb also gradually redefined the object of his linguistic investigations, first to include Hjelmslev's abstract system, later reinterpreting it as a cognitive system. The task of Cognitive Linguistics involves "representing the speaker's internal information system which makes it possible for him to speak his language and to understand utterances received from others" (Lamb 1973:13). It is the non-observable information system, represented, of course, as a network, that is at the center of investigation.

Because notions such as Chomsky's "competence" represent inferred and not observable entities, their study went beyond the scope of what taxonomic linguistics considered possible and necessary to investigate. Chomsky's proposals had potential advantages, however. If an underlying mental reality were posited, then more satisfying explanations for certain surface phenomena, such as agnate sentences, could perhaps be given in terms of it. This hope rejected Twaddell's second argument against mentalism. The converse was involved as well. That is, certain properties of the
structure and operation of the mind itself might be inferred from the data and the mind itself studied. This hope contradicted Twaddell's first argument. The abstract systems of Hjelmslev and Halliday likewise offered the advantage of being able to deal with problematic surface data but avoided contemplation of the nature of the mind.

Chomsky's model never realized his goal of cognitive reality. For example, his generative theory did not include a plausible account of even such a central cognitive process as the interpretation of utterances. The generative mechanism could not be reversed for parsing. In addition, psycholinguistic studies suggested that transformations did not have psychological reality. Furthermore, although Chomsky claims to have progressed beyond taxonomy with his notions of the unobservable generative and transformational processes, in actual practice he defines generation, not as a process of producing utterances, but as the act of assigning a structural description to each sentence (1965:8,9). This goal has more in common with taxonomic linguistics and less in common with the true cognitive situation than he wants to admit. The extra machinery of underlying representation and transformation does transcend traditional taxonomic techniques of segmentation and classification of surface text, but certainly not to the point of dealing with how speakers and listeners actually produce and understand utterances. Nevertheless, his dissatisfaction with taxonomic
linguistics reflected a general attitude and heralded the
development of alternative approaches concerned with

cognitive issues.

The development of Stratificational Linguistics into
Cognitive Linguistics during the late sixties therefore
reflected contemporary trends in linguistic studies. In
addition, the network representation itself doubtless had
something to do with fostering CL concern with cognition.
Although Halliday did not attribute cognitive properties to
his networks, networks had been accorded cognitive status in
other disciplines such as psychology. Also, the neural
network structure of the brain inspired network views of
cognition. Furthermore, although Hjelmslev thought of his
theory as abstract and not cognitive, his view certainly
provided Lamb with a stepping stone towards a cognitive view
of networks. Hjelmslev's theory involved an abstract system
capable of accounting for the texts of a language, and his
goal was to describe or "encatalyze" this underlying system
based on the analysis of texts. Thus the abstract system
became an object for study in addition to the texts
themselves. Once some system behind the text was
recognized, the goal of identifying this system with
cognitive reality was not such a big step to take. Likewise,
Halliday's system networks of choices available to a speaker
were amenable to a cognitive reinterpretation. In addition,
the cognitive emphasis offered the advantage of relating linguistics to his interdisciplinary context.

Mentalism, method, and validity. It must be noted that the admission of the mind as an object of study does not imply a lack of concern for method and the validity of conclusions as Bloomfield and Twaddell feared. As Katz points out (1964:125), mentalism does not entail an abandonment of concern with predictability and with the cause and effect relationships so important to a stimulus-response psychology and to science generally. Unlike behaviorist approaches, mentalism recognizes that a number of important phenomena take place mentally, beyond the range of direct observation. If these phenomena are to be understood at all, they must be studied indirectly. Nevertheless, they are to be studied in a principled way.²¹

A basic method of modern mentalistic approaches involves constructing models of the mind based on inferences made from some sort of data. In the case of linguistic studies, texts provide the data. To the extent that the model can mimic patterns exhibited in the data, it can be said to account for the patterns as well as to replicate certain aspects of the mental structures and processes responsible for them. The idea is that the model must have at least a few characteristics of the mind in order to produce data exhibiting these same patterns.
The reasoning that develops the model consists of two basic steps. In the first step, patterns are observed and described in the data for which cognitive accountings are needed in terms of model\textsuperscript{22}. As an example from our text data, we can consider the occurrence of long pauses of about five up to about twenty seconds. Observation shows that these long pauses are not distributed randomly in the data. Instead, it often happens that immediately following such pauses, either the interviewer produces a story related to the topic discussed before the pause, as in the following example,

\begin{verbatim}
((Walter3A))
This was the year the Rock island 3Railroad\textsuperscript{1} went through.  87
    Might a been- it'd a been nineteen 3two\textsuperscript{2} or somethin' like 2at.\textsuperscript{2}  
    (15)
    That ole contractor 3there\textsuperscript{2} that built that dump 3there\textsuperscript{2}-
    he had just so 3much\textsuperscript{1} you know\textsuperscript{1}.
    'N he got his part 3do\textsuperscript{2}ne.
\end{verbatim}

or else the interviewer produces a question on a topic quite different from that discussed previously, as in this example.

\begin{verbatim}
((Walter1A))
    'N the w\textsuperscript{a}ter was- oh 3? I don know they said fifteen to sixteen foot 4deep\textsuperscript{1}. 78.2
    (3) Next to the 3bluff\textsuperscript{2}.
    (Now out) next to the 3west\textsuperscript{1} side why it wasn't 1deep\textsuperscript{2}. (9)
    Uh- (2) Somewhere in the records it says that uh- (1) you had a 3sister\textsuperscript{1}. 79
    (1) Who died\textsuperscript{1}.
    Do you remember what her 3name was\textsuperscript{3}?  
\end{verbatim}
Such pauses are not usually followed by interviewer questions on a topic closely related to those of the previous questions or by other kinds of utterances on the part of the interviewee. This distribution of pauses, and the typical content of the utterances following them are surface patterns in the data that merit a cognitive accounting.

In the second step of reasoning, characteristics of the system behind the data are inferred to explain such surface patterns\textsuperscript{23}. In the case of long pauses, the notions of networks and spreading activation help explain the surface distribution of the pauses. The spread of activation through a network involves time. In the interviewer a major topic change involves a long distance spread of activation. Likewise, in the interviewee, activation of stories not specifically elicited by the interviewer involves a long distance spread of activation, and therefore requires time. The pauses, therefore, can be associated with this cognitive processing.\textsuperscript{24}

These two steps of model building both nourish and feed on each other. That is, once cognitive entities are inferred on the basis of data, they can then be invoked in subsequent study to explain newly described phenomena. In the case of pauses described here for example, we invoke the network notion from previous research to explain newly noticed patterns. The posited mental entities always have their basis in data, however. Thus, far from being unscientific,
the mentalistic approach actually follows classical scientific method.

Although not confined to the consideration of observable entities, a mentalistic approach is not the same as a mystical approach, and it can yield valid conclusions. A number of constraints on modern mentalistic speculation help it to achieve valid results. Chief among these constraints is that a mentalistic understanding be accountable to linguistic data. Mentalism can and should be empirical, just as taxonomic approaches are, and although the posited cognitive system is not observable, the data from which it is inferred is. A posited cognitive system should therefore account for the observable data.

In addition, cognitive processes are posited as a set of orderly events. The mind is not invoked as some mysterious, capricious entity that does not operate according to consistent principles. In other words, once cognitive structures and processes have been built up in a model, they must not be arbitrarily suspended to account for recalcitrant data. They must apply consistently. This constraint is another facet of being accountable to the data.

Another constraint involves the cognitive plausibility of a model. It is this concern that separates cognitive accounts, such as Lamb's, from abstract accounts, such as Hjelmlev's. In particular, an acceptable cognitive model of language must provide a plausible account of how speakers and
listeners produce and understand utterances, and of how they learn, store, and retrieve information. An account that fails here is ipso facto invalid while one that succeeds has a greater possibility of being cognitively realistic. By way of illustration we can point out that Chomsky, despite his early optimism, ultimately had many problems with this constraint. Although his generative model seemed to have some way to simulate the production of utterances, for example, it offered no plausible way to reverse the transformations for utterance interpretation (Reich 1973:84). His generative component lacked plausibility as well. It posited that a speaker, having selected a thought to express, generates from his autonomous syntactic component a number of sentences, interpreting each one until he finds one that matches the selected thought. The matching sentence is then produced as an utterance (Katz 1964:132). This processing sequence is highly unlikely, however, given that there is an infinite number of possible sentences to be matched. Therefore, the generative model fails as a cognitively plausible model. The network model, in contrast, has shown more promise with respect to this constraint. The network organization stores knowledge while activation of the network accounts for both the production and interpretation of utterances.

Even given these constraints, mentalistic models are not meant to be replicable in the same sense that taxonomic
descriptions of languages were meant to be. Inductive
discovery procedures are not accepted as possible or even
desirable. There is no prescribed method for the creation of
explanatory models. Instead, a model is arrived at as a
creative act and then evaluated with respect to the data.
That model is best which accounts for the most data. Once a
model is developed, the results of applying it to data should
be replicable, but the construction of the model itself is
not. There is always the possibility of a different and more
comprehensive model. Of course, this process of model
building is not unique to linguistics but is characteristic
of science in general. In this light, it is not the
mentalistic approach, but the behaviorist one, with its
obsession with the observable, that is in spirit the less
scientific.

**Cognitive Linguistics methods.** Thus far we have traced
the development in Cognitive Linguistics of the notions of
strata, realization, network representation, and cognitive
plausibility. We have also characterized Cognitive
Linguistics in relation to other linguistic approaches that
have influenced it and to mentalistic studies in general. We
now turn to an examination of the more specific methods used
in Cognitive Linguistics and of some of the issues that it
has been concerned with.

The basic method of Cognitive Linguistic studies can be
summarized as follows: observe patterns in (a) linguistic
text(s) and make inferences concerning the cognitive structures/processes that must be present and operative to have produced that patterning. Cognitive Linguistics is a cognitive study concerned with understanding the cognitive systems that enable individuals to use language. As such, its method revolves around the modeling of cognitive systems in general and linguistic systems in particular. In addition to being a cognitive study, Cognitive Linguistics is, and originated as, a linguistic study. What this means is that in considering the individual's cognitive system, it employs peculiarly linguistic data and basic linguistic methods, and is particularly concerned with linguistic portions of the cognitive system.

There are other possibilities for cognitive studies. For example, cognitive psychology relies heavily on experimental data having to do with such phenomena as response times, eye movements, and verbal reports in response to some controlled stimulus. Its methods involve making and testing hypotheses as well as constructing models. In linguistics, however, the situation is different. What follows is a brief summary of the basic linguistic methodology that informs Cognitive Linguistics as well as other lines of linguistic research. Of course, as linguistics is a diverse field this summary is inevitably an oversimplification.
Since ancient times, most linguistic data has consisted not of experimental results, but of texts. These texts may be in any language. They may be written or spoken. They may be naturally occurring, constructed by the researcher, or elicited. They may be long or short, monologues or conversations, well-planned and organized or spontaneous and messy. They may be complete discourses or single words. In addition, the data includes the meanings and functions that can be associated with those texts. If the researcher knows the language of the text well, he can rely on his own knowledge of those meanings. If not, he can turn to a native language informant or to a gloss written in a language he does know.

The linguist's basic procedure is to select texts, look for patterns in them, and account for those patterns in some way. He finds pattern by carefully observing the text itself as well as its relationships to its meanings and to other texts. In studying the text(s), one type of patterning he looks for involves recurrent syntagmatic correlations. Concerning these he asks if certain combinations are possible or probable. He also asks questions about paradigmatic relationships. For example, what would it have meant to use one expression versus another? Or, is it possible to use this expression in this situation?

The linguist may have any of a range of purposes in mind as he examines texts. For example, he might want to produce
a relatively complete synchronic description of the language that his texts represent. He might want to give an account of patterns in terms of their historical origin. He might compare some aspect of the linguistic structure of a number of languages. In current functional linguistic studies, the focus of the inquiry centers on elucidating the nature of the relationship between content and expression. In its emphasis on realizational relationships, Cognitive Linguistics can be seen as part of this movement.

Cognitive Linguistics is a linguistic study in terms of its data and methods. In terms of its goals, it is a cognitive enterprise as well, attempting to account for observed patterns in texts in terms of the cognitive systems that produce and understand them. A variety of text types has been investigated in Cognitive Linguistic studies and a range of specific questions addressed concerning cognitive systems, but all fit into this general format. In the following discussion, we summarize the specific types of research interests that have been pursued in Cognitive Linguistics, citing representative studies.

Cognitive Linguistics studies. Much research in Cognitive Linguistics has been concerned with describing the details of the linguistic system network based on language data. Basic node structure, stratal organization, the nature of realizational relationships, the outlines of the system as a whole, and so forth have been specified and hypothesized
about (e.g. Lamb 1964b, 1966a, 1971b, 1975, 1983, ms.; Reich 1968b; Lockwood 1972). Particular aspects of linguistic structure have also received attention. For example, Lamb (1966b) deals with the phonological portion of the linguistic system. Lockwood (1973a) deals with the relationship of morphology and phonology. Lockwood (1973b) discusses inflectional morphology. Makkai (1969) treats the relationship of morphemes and lexemes. Semantics and the relationship of the linguistic system to the larger cognitive system is discussed by Lamb (1964a, 1971b, ms.).

The Cognitive Linguistics model has been employed in a practical way in a number of language descriptions. Beukema (1975) describes Quiche, or more accurately, the linguistic system of the typical Quiche speaker. Sullivan (1969) deals with Russian. Bennett (1970), Ikegami (1970), and Johanesson (1976) each describe an area of English semology. Edmiston (1988) provides a description of the overall linguistic system of a typical English speaker.

In addition to dealing with issues of network structure and language description, a number of other concerns have been addressed from within the Cognitive Linguistics framework. Copeland and Davis (Copeland 1980, Copeland and Davis 1980, Copeland and Davis 1983, Davis and Copeland, 1980) model certain aspects of discourse processing. In particular, they have been concerned with the types and activation of states of knowledge in the listener's system to
which the speaker attends as he encodes utterances. Lamb (in press) has also considered discourse, modeling the comprehension of a story in a line by line approach. Dell and Reich single out certain oddities of spontaneous utterances for study. Dell and Reich (1980) describe typical slips of the tongue and account for them with a network model. Reich (1984) describes and models the phenomenon of unintended puns. Cobin (1989), investigating bilingualism, models the linguistic system of a reputedly bilingual child. Applications of the Cognitive Linguistic model to computer translation have also been explored (e.g. Lamb 1973, Lee 1988).

Cognitive Linguistics has also influenced other linguists who have applied it to their own ongoing interests. Gleason (1968) develops a modified relational network to model the structure of narrative discourse in a number of languages. Fleming (1989) adopts and expands stratificational and realizational notions to provide SIL translators with a practical framework for language description and translation.

Within this body of work, certain trends can be identified. Of course, both the notion of cognitive modeling and the use of network notation as a tool are prevalent. In addition, reflecting the trend of linguistic research as a whole in this century, Cognitive Linguistics began with a concern for the lower levels of linguistic structure. Its
focus has gradually shifted to include higher levels and longer pieces of discourse, however, and it was, in fact, one of the first paradigms to propose a structural approach to semantics. And inevitably questions concerning the cognitive system as a whole and the place of the linguistic system within it have been raised. The network notion, originated to account for the linguistic system, has been invoked to understand the cognitive system as well.

As far as data is concerned, most studies have concentrated on short, normalized, mistake-free sentences and short discourses, often constructed by the investigators themselves. Only a few attempts have been made (e.g. Dell and Reich) to deal with the oddities of spontaneous speech. In addition, most of the modeling has focused on what happens in the system of a single individual, with less attention given to interactive situations.

In conclusion, we can say that Cognitive Linguistics has laid for itself a substantial groundwork of theory and method. However, there is ample room for more investigation concerned both with the general goal mentioned above of "representing the speaker's internal information system which makes it possible for him to speak his language and to understand utterances received from others" (Lamb 1973:13) and with the general method of observing patterns in linguistic texts and making inferences concerning the cognitive structures/processes that must be present to have
produced those patterns. The present study represents one potential avenue of expansion involving the consideration of the on-line processing of individuals interacting in naturally occurring conversational situations. We defer more detailed discussion of the method developed for this particular study until after the discussion about tools from Conversation Analysis.

Other linguistic work involving cognition. The school of Cognitive Linguistics has been concerned with cognitive aspects of language at least since 1966. However, interest in cognition has blossomed in the field of linguistics since that time, and there are a number of linguists now interested in cognition who are not "Cognitive Linguists." Of most relevance to this study has been Chafe (e.g. 1977, 1980b, in press), whose work we briefly characterize here. In considering cognition, Chafe has considered speech data somewhat similar to that examined in the present study, and he has employed methods similar to those sketched above. Although he has not studied conversation, he has investigated spontaneous spoken narratives, and like us, he has recognized in this type of data the value of various disfluencies or performance errors as evidence for the cognitive processing of the speakers. As such he provides us with a useful precedent.

Our work, though in much the same spirit as his, differs in some important respects. Most important is that our
investigation is informed by a network view of cognition that has been fully enough developed in previous studies to be useful as an investigative tool. Chafe does propose cognitive constructs, for example "self", "consciousness", "information", and "focus of consciousness" (1980b:11). These constructs, moreover, although vaguely defined are not without insight. In general, however, in our view the network model provides a more explicit, more thorough, and more useful avenue for making sense of the data. Another difference lies in the specific kind of spontaneous data studied, for although conversation and spontaneous spoken narratives have much in common, conversational data offers a few kinds of evidence not available in monologue speech. This evidence will be returned to in the section on specific methods for this study.

**Tools from Conversation Analysis.** The present study is a cognitive one that falls within the Cognitive Linguistic framework. It deals, however, with conversation, a type of data that has special characteristics and calls for special methods. While linguistic research has not in general concentrated on conversational data\(^3\)\(^1\), natural conversation has been extensively studied during the last twenty-five years by researchers in a non-linguistic discipline that has been called Ethnomethodology or more simply, Conversation Analysis (CA)\(^3\)\(^2\). We turn now to a consideration of tools
offered to this study by Conversation Analysis, contrasting them where relevant to the tools of Cognitive Linguistics.

Conversation Analysis is a study with its own characteristic goals and methods. Its researchers are not linguists, but sociologists who did not come to a study of conversational data because of an interest in language per se. Instead, they began studying conversation because it is among the most observable of social events and so promised insights into human social behavior. Dissatisfied with traditional methods of sociology, which they thought invoked too many unfounded theoretical categories, conversational analysts hoped that their observations or conversational data would move sociology in the direction of natural observational science (Sacks 1984:21)33.

Conversation as a social phenomenon. Being sociologists, conversation analysts have understood conversation as a means to effect various social actions. Conversation Analysis "seeks to describe methods persons use in doing social life" (Sacks 1984:21). Many studies have been devoted, for example, to social issues of conversation such as how interlocutors negotiate their social identities (Schenkein 1978b), how they accept or reject compliments (Pomerantz 1978), how they take turns speaking (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974), how they open and close telephone conversations (Schegloff 1979, Schegloff and Sacks 1973), and how they control conversational topic (Jefferson 1984).
This social view of conversation can be contrasted with a cognitive view in which conversation is understood mainly in terms of an information exchange involving cognitive systems. Of course conversation is at once both a social and a cognitive phenomenon. The social and cognitive aspects overlap, and the difference of emphasis is largely a matter of interest. Cognitive Linguistics focuses on the organization and processing of the individual information system while Conversation Analysis focuses on the social consequences of utterances in conversation. CA, therefore, tends to account for patterns in terms of social function while CL attempts an account in terms of the cognitive systems of the interlocutors. Jefferson (1984:216), for example, characterizes the utterance "uh" as a "floorholder". It functions to help the speaker prolong his turn. This is a social accounting. From a cognitive viewpoint, however, "uh" can be viewed as a signal of ongoing processing, and as such, it often occurs at points where active cognitive processing is to be expected, such as when an interviewer is searching for a new topic. Both the social and the cognitive accountings have value, and they can be thought of as complementary rather than competing explanations.

The cognitive and social emphases also lead to different questions concerning certain phenomena. With respect to conversation topic, for example, a conversation analyst might want to know how interlocutors manage to control the topic
(e.g. Jefferson 1984) while the cognitive linguist would be interested in how information is stored in the cognitive system and how a speaker selects a topic for conversation from within that stored knowledge (Ch 3, this study).

Although CA emphasizes social issues, it has implicitly recognized cognitive issues as well. Jefferson (1984:207), for example, mentions a phenomenon called "occasioning" in which a topic is introduced into conversation because previous talk has "occasioned" it or "brought it to mind". This "bringing to mind" is an essentially cognitive explanation of topic, much like that to be presented in Chapter 3 of this study. In the conversational analysis research, however, the cognitive mechanisms by which this bringing to mind operates are not emphasized. No cognitive representation is invoked, and the notion remains at a pretheoretical stage of development. As another example, CA has recognized that "talk is designed by conversationalists for what the other does and does not know" (Schegloff, 1984:50). This observation about the cognitive situation recalls the Cognitive Linguistic notion that interlocutors maintain an idea of each other's cognitive states during discourse and tailor their utterances to meet the ongoing cognitive demands of the hearer. In CA, although this fact is recognized, its cognitive representation and its consequences for the encoding of utterances are not detailed
as they are in Cognitive Linguistics (e.g. Copeland and Davis 1980, 1983).

An important insight into conversational data. Before outlining the basic method of Conversation Analysis, we introduce a basic CA insight that underlies all CA research and that has utmost relevance for cognitive studies of conversation as well. This insight involves the fact that conversational data offers a unique analytical resource not available in monologue texts:

What two utterances, produced by different speakers, can do that one utterance cannot do is: by an adjacently positioned second, a speaker can show that he understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that. Also, by virtue of the occurrence of an adjacently produced second, the doer of a first can see that what he intended was indeed understood, and that it was or was not accepted.

(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973:299)

That is, a speaker's utterances contain valuable clues concerning his cognitive and social orientation to the preceding utterances.

In addition to being well suited to the sociological studies favored by Conversation Analysis researchers, conversational data is also, by virtue of this fact, especially attractive for cognitively oriented studies. A speaker's utterances provide evidence concerning his actual cognitive processing of the conversation up to that point. The cognitive analyst who studies conversation is not confined, therefore, to using his own and his informant's
opinions when considering how an utterance is or might be processed upon interpretation, as he would be when considering a monologue text. Instead he has the interpreter's next utterance as an extra bit of concrete evidence. We differ from Schegloff and Sacks in our primary use of this evidence in that we are concerned not only "that" an utterance was understood, but also with the cognitive details of "how", i.e. by what cognitive structures and processes, it was understood. In addition, we are less concerned than they about the listener's social "acceptance" or "willingness to go along with" what the previous utterance was intended to achieve as these are primarily social issues. The applicability of this insight to both CA and CL studies is illustrated in the following discussion.

Conversation Analysis method. Conversation Analysis and its methodology have developed gradually since its introduction as a research field by Sacks in 1967. Although it is newer and considerably more unified than linguistics, CA, like linguistics, is not a monolithic discipline. Schenkein (1978c) avoids specific terms such as "theory", and "method" to define CA and characterizes it instead simply as a general "analytic mentality". Nevertheless, certain basic concepts and techniques have precipitated from CA research during its evolution, and these are summarized here.

In addition to the basic insight into conversational data discussed above, CA research begins with certain other
basic concepts. First, it recognizes that conversation is organized activity that can therefore be profitably studied. Next, it makes the assumption that the organizational patterns evident in conversation serve social purposes. They are "rational solutions to particular organizational problems" (Levinson 1983:323). Interlocutors must begin and end their conversations, for example, and a certain organizational pattern may serve to effect that opening and closing (e.g. Schegloff and Sacks 1973). Interlocutors make appeals or requests of each other, then grant or deny them. A certain organizational pattern characterizes that kind of exchange (e.g. Jefferson and Schenkel 1978).

Given these assumptions, CA has defined a basic goal for its studies and has developed a research approach. The objective of CA research is to discover "the set of techniques that the members of a society themselves utilize to interpret and act within their own social worlds." (Levinson 1983:295). Important facets of this goal are as follows. First, CA is not satisfied with describing an abstract set of techniques that speakers "might" be using. Instead, they are concerned with modeling the procedures and expectations that participants themselves actually do employ (Levinson 1983:319). This concern is akin to the CL goal of modeling not just abstract systems underlying texts, but actual cognitive systems. Second, the objective is couched in terms of speaker "techniques", that is, the purposeful
actions of interlocutors. A great deal of CA description is concerned with "action sequences" that embody these techniques and with explaining the interactional problems that they are designed to resolve (Levinson 1983:319). Third, as mentioned before, CA is interested in describing social behavior. As such, it is not concerned with cognitive representations of individual speakers. Because of the assumption that patterns serve social functions, the CA goal does guide research beyond description of surface patterns of conversational data. However, unlike cognitive studies, CA looks for underlying patterns in the shape of action sequences instead of in the form of cognitive structures and processes.

In general, Conversation Analysis methods for achieving its goal have developed as follows. First, like linguists, CA researchers identify and describe patterns in the data. The emphasis in CA falls on patterns observable in the "sequential organization" of speaker turns. After observing many instances of a certain type of interaction, for example one in which one speaker makes a request of another (e.g. Jefferson and Schenkein, 1978), the analysts propose a hypothetical and intuitively satisfying "action sequence" of turns. The action sequence is meant to describe both the actual turns in the conversations and the speakers' sequential expectations of the conversation. In the case of requests of salespeople to potential customers, for example,
Jefferson and Schenkein (1978:161) posit an appeal sequence of:

(I) A: Appeal
(II) B: Acceptance/Rejection
(III) A: Acknowledgement.

That is, after a salesperson makes an appeal, he expects, and usually receives, an acceptance or rejection from the other party. And once the acceptance or rejection is given, the potential customer expects and usually receives an acknowledgement from the salesperson.

Having hypothesized a basic action sequence, analysis moves on to establishing that the interlocutors actually recognize and expect the sequence to follow in the way described. In a case such as the appeal sequence above, in which the second turn may be either an acceptance or rejection, it is also of interest to establish which of these responses is "preferred", that is, which one speaker B will tend to encode with the least structural complexity. An interlocutor's implicit recognition of an action sequence is called his "orientation" to the sequence, and CA establishes the validity of a posited action sequence by demonstrating the interlocutors' orientation. This process is in keeping with the goal mentioned earlier of discovering the techniques interlocutors "actually" use. That is, CA seeks to avoid analyses that are only "figments of our (the analysts') technical imaginations" (Jefferson and Schenkein 1978:170).
Orientation is often demonstrated by reference to interactions in which something goes wrong with the hypothesized sequence or in which a dispreferred response occurs. In these cases, if the posited action sequence is correct the interlocutors should demonstrate orientation to it either by initiating some sort of "repair procedure" or else by drawing an inference based on the breakdown in the expected sequence. Jefferson and Schenkein (1978:162), for example, examine cases in which non-expected responses, which they call "passes", occur in the second slot of the appeal sequence in which the acceptance or rejection is expected. A "pass" gives some explanation for not granting the request and recommends another party who might be more inclined to cooperate. The speakers' orientation to the appeal sequence is demonstrated first by the fact that when such passes occur they are not interpreted as acceptances or rejections, and second by the fact that the acceptance/rejection and acknowledgement portions of the sequence inevitably occur later, in the predicted order. That is, the pass postpones the utterance of an acceptance/refusal but does not negate its expectability. Passes provide an example of a typical sequence called an "insertion sequence" that is inserted into another action sequence without nullifying the ongoing expectations of the expanded sequence.

The following example demonstrates interlocutor orientation to a dispreferred response (Levinson 1983:320).37.
T1 C: So I was wondering would you be in your office on Monday (. ) by any chance?
T2 (2.0)
T3 C: Probably not
T4 R: Hmm yes=
T5 C: You would?
T6 R: Ya
T7 C: So if we came by could you give us ten minutes of your time?

Turn one is an appeal. Turn two is a two second pause. Turn three demonstrates that the caller has interpreted, or oriented himself to the silence as a rejection on the part of the other interlocutor. The explanation for this interpretation of the silence lies in the caller's expectations. An acceptance is the preferred response to an appeal and is usually coded without delay. The two second delay, therefore, leads to the inference that the response is a rejection.

The discovery and verification of action sequences is at the heart of CA research. However, once orientation is established and the action sequence fully described with regard to preference organization and insertion sequences, Conversation Analysis turns to a social accounting of the speaker techniques that it has uncovered. What purpose does such organization serve? In the case of the appeal sequences, for example, Jefferson and Schenkein reason that passes give potential customers a reprieve from having to deliver a dispreferred, socially unpleasant rejection and
from having to listen to a salesperson's continued efforts to secure an acceptance (1978:168).

In summary, CA method involves the identification and description of action sequences that are oriented to by participants in the conversation. Description involves the enumeration of turns in the basic sequence as well as of possible insertion sequences. It also involves an account of the range of responses possible at a certain point in the sequence and their preference organization. The notion of orientation serves as a check on the research, insuring that posited action sequences are more than artifacts of analysis. Orientation is demonstrated by analysis of breakdowns in conversational exchanges. In conversation, a speaker's present utterance shows his orientation to previous utterances, and this observation constitutes an important insight of CA into conversational data.

Conversational Analysis and Cognitive Linguistics. From all of CA research, perhaps the most important and well-established finding has involved the extent to which conversational organization in general, and the position of an utterance in an action sequence in particular, is crucial to the way an utterance is interpreted. Sequential placement carries with it strong expectations about the function of a next turn, even without reference to the linguistic structure of that turn. We have already shown how a two second silence, by virtue of its place in an action sequence, can be
interpreted as a refusal to a request. And as Levinson (1983:329) puts it, if sequential expectations "can map 'meaning' onto silence, (they) can also map situated significance onto utterances." CA, in recognizing this principle and describing its workings in a number of specific sequential situations, has been quite successful in providing insights into how conversation works and how utterances are interpreted in context.

From a cognitive viewpoint, however, the notion of "situated significance" can be reinterpreted in broader terms. An interlocutor's on-line processing of a conversation of course includes knowledge of utterance sequences in that conversation. In addition, it invokes knowledge, built up from earlier conversational experiences, of the meanings of those sequences, i.e. knowledge of action sequences. However, a speaker's cognitive state at the time an utterance is made involves much more than knowledge of utterance sequence, and any portion of his knowledge can potentially influence his interpretation of utterances.

In cognitive terms it can be said that a speaker's total cognitive state at the time an utterance is made contributes to his interpretation of that utterance. In addition to his knowledge of action sequences and of the position of an utterance in an action sequence a speaker will have other relevant information as well. For example, he will have knowledge about the particular kind of speech event he is
involved in and his and the other speakers' roles in it. He will have some knowledge of the other speakers' particular conversational styles, of their current moods, of their previous knowledge, and of their current knowledge state as a result of processing the conversation. A cognitive approach to the study of conversation therefore has much to add alongside traditional CA studies.

A Cognitive Linguistic approach introduces into the picture specific linguistic concerns in addition to these other cognitive matters. Chief among the linguistic concerns is an interest in the nature of the realizational system of language, that is of the mapping of meaning onto linguistic structure. While the realizational system is sensitive to sequence, much of the system involves paradigmatic relationships as well. CA, however, although it has dealt with sequencing, has not concentrated on elucidating the role that linguistic structure and paradigmatic issues play in determining utterance meaning. For example, there are many ways to ask a question: with a tag, with word order inversion, with intonation, with a list of alternatives, etc. The choice of one over the others is certainly meaningful, but at a level more delicate than that which is amenable to CA sequential analysis techniques. Position in an action sequence contributes to an interpretation, but the particular structure chosen for that position plays a role as well.
Tools for this study: a synthesis. Research combining linguistic concepts and conversational data is not plentiful. This is, however, an important and promising area. As Firth states (1957:32), "it is here (in conversation) that we shall find the key to a better understanding of what language really is and how it works." Research combining cognitive concerns with linguistic concepts and conversational data is even rarer. As Chafe says, "The investigation of consciousness through careful observation of the properties of spontaneous speech is a line of research with almost no tradition behind it." (Chafe 1980b:49). Chafe himself, while he has looked at spontaneous spoken monologues, has not dealt with conversational data. In order to study conversational data from within a Cognitive Linguistic framework, this study combines concepts and techniques for both Cognitive Linguistics and Conversation Analysis. Most of the ideas discussed in this section have been introduced in previous sections along with an account of their original place within CL and CA frameworks. Now, however, we are ready to bring these ideas together as a statement of our own method and to illustrate them with examples from our studies.

We begin by restating our goals, first introduced at the beginning of Chapter 1. The general objectives of this cognitive study of conversation are to understand the cognitive systems of interlocutors as they exchange information, and conversely, to understand the patterns
exhibited in conversational texts by referring to the cognitive systems that produce them. This first goal shares with CL and cognitive studies in general an interest in the structures and processes of the cognitive system. The second goal shares with CA an interest in understanding how conversation works although it concentrates on cognitive rather than social questions and accountings.

Efforts to achieve these goals build on basic concepts and assumptions. First, like CA, this study accepts that conversation exhibits pattern and merits serious study. Although this assumption may now seem self-evident, it nevertheless runs contrary to the bulk of linguistic research which has traditionally viewed the sentence as the largest patterned linguistic unit.\textsuperscript{41}

Second, from CA studies we adopt the insight that conversational data provides valuable evidence, not available in other kinds of linguistic data, concerning the interlocutors' processing of the conversation. A speaker's utterance has within it clues that betray his actual on-line understanding of previous utterances. While CA uses this insight to study social aspects of conversation, we adapt it for studying the cognitive systems of the interlocutors. In addition, we add the observation that a speaker's utterance provides evidence not only of his understanding of prior discourse, but also of his processing as he works to produce the current utterance. Hesitations, for example, suggest
that the speaker is encountering certain problems with encoding the utterance. He may be searching for a word or struggling to recall a fact.

As an initial example of the applicability of this insight to cognitive studies, consider Lucinda's response in 66.1 and 66.2 to LeRoy's question in 66.

Well that's when- you and your dad- moved up there\(^1\). \(^2\)Yeah\(^2\). ((2))

No it's when- me 'n your dad moved up there\(^1\). ((3))

In 66, LeRoy is trying to learn the setting of an incident discussed in the earlier conversation. He believes that the participants in the incident were Lucinda and her father, but he is not sure when the incident took place. To draw Lucinda's attention to the part of the proposition that he is asking about, he stresses the word "moved" and pronounces it with high pitch. The part of the proposition that he is sure about, i.e. that the participants were Lucinda and her father, is not marked for Lucinda's special attention. It is pronounced with low pitch and no stress\(^4\).

Now, how does Lucinda process such an utterance as 66? We might hypothesize that she would concentrate her first efforts on the beginning part of the utterance because she hears it first. Alternatively, we might hypothesize that she would concentrate first on the part of the utterance
especially marked for her attention. Lucinda's response in this case suggests that the second hypothesis is more likely. In 66.1 she responds with a simple "yeah" confirming all of LeRoy's proposition including both the timing of the incident and the identity of the participants involved. In 66.2, however, after a two second pause, she responds with a "no", this time making a change in the participants involved though not in the timing of the event. It was LeRoy's father and not Lucinda's father who was involved in the move. If Lucinda had completed the processing of the first part of the sentence first, it is likely that she would have caught LeRoy's error, which occurred in the first part of the sentence, before confirming the proposition. Her initial confirmation in 66.1, however, suggests that she processed the stressed part of the utterance first, before completing the processing of the first, unstressed portion. Lucinda's response in the real time of the conversation betrays something of her actual on-line processing of the previous utterance. Such evidence is not available in other kinds of linguistic texts and needs to be recognized and studied.

Our third basic assumption, one adapted from CL, is that conversational patterns reflect the orderly structures and processes of the cognitive systems that create them, giving us indirect access to those structures and processes. This assumption has two parts. First, a speaker's utterance reflects aspects of his own cognitive state at the time of
the utterance and gives evidence of his own processing tasks. Second, utterances are meant to and do have cognitive effects on their recipients. They are designed with the listener's cognitive state in mind and thus give evidence concerning the listener's state, or more accurately, the speaker's idea of the listener's state at the time of the utterance. Thus, conversational data offers the basic materials necessary to achieve the research goals of finding out about cognitive systems. This assumption differs from that adopted in CA in which conversational patterns are assumed to serve social purposes. While not denying that CA assumption, we find that we can in effect subsume it in our cognitive framework, for a speaker's total knowledge includes implicit knowledge of the relationships of utterances to their social function.

These three concepts are the most fundamental, but there are others that have been developed in CL studies as well and are here taken as starting points\textsuperscript{43}. In short, the cognitive systems of interlocutors exist and operate as networks. The linguistic network system is characterized by a complex of realizational relationships that link meanings with each other and with linguistic expressions. Each interlocutor invokes during the conversation a great deal of knowledge including information about the other interlocutors in the conversation and their cognitive states at the time utterances are made.
Building on these assumptions, the methods of this study have developed as follows. Like other CL studies, this study attempts to reach an understanding of cognitive systems by modeling them as networks. For each utterance it is asked both what cognitive structures and processes must have existed/occurred for that utterance to be produced and what processing the utterance will spark in the interpreter. In Chapter 3, for example, the network organization of information in LeRoy's cognitive system and the activation patterns working in that network are characterized in a way that accounts for his sequence of topic selections in an interview. Unlike many CL studies, however, this study does not focus on the network details of cognitive systems, but rather on more general principles of network architecture and operation. The reason lies partly in the fact that network diagrams, originally used to study details of linguistic structure, quickly become too cumbersome for representing the larger portions of cognitive systems that concern us here. In addition, this study is concerned with initial investigation of relatively broad questions whereas detailed network diagrams are better suited to more delicate degrees of analysis. Nevertheless, the general picture of network organization worked out so far in CL is implicit in these studies.

As in other CL studies, the understanding of the cognitive systems that we arrive at is inferred from patterns
in the data. There are many patterns in conversation that could be studied. However, several types have proved most relevant. In general, the patterns relevant to this study involve pieces of discourse larger than individual sentences. First, we look for patterns in the distribution of certain features in the text. For this particular study, for example, we have examined the distribution of conversational topic, of disfluencies such as hesitations and false starts, and of information in stories. These distributions are discovered through observation of the text itself. Another kind of patterning involves the succession of turns of a single speaker. Because each participant in the conversation is an autonomous cognitive system, distributional patterns are relevant not only with respect to the conversation as a whole, but also with respect to a single speaker's successive utterances.

Second, we look at paradigmatic patterning that helps us understand the relationship of an utterance to its meanings/functions. For example, the discussion of statements in Chapter 6, is concerned with cognitive reasons for the fact that a certain utterance is expressed as a statement rather than in some other possible form. In comparing the effects of different paradigmatic possibilities we often refer to our own knowledge of English since only one possibility may be evident in the data. In some cases, however, different possibilities occurring in different parts
of the text can be compared directly. For example, Chapter 3 compares different strategies that LeRoy uses to introduce new topics and relates them to the likelihood that Lucinda will understand the new topic. Chapter 5 compares the organization of narrated incidents that are told about on two different occasions.

These kinds of patterns are typical of those studied in linguistics. In addition, from Conversation Analysis we adopt the practice of observing breakdowns in the conversation. The types of breakdowns relevant to us include the disfluencies already mentioned that reflect the processing the speaker as he works to produce an utterance. They also include misunderstandings that reveal the speaker's processing of previous utterances from the other interlocutor. The example discussed above in which Lucinda answers affirmatively and then negatively provides an example of such a breakdown (Lu3B:66).

The technique of studying conversational breakdowns is typical of Conversation Analysis but has in fact been employed in some Cognitive Linguistic studies as well. Dell and Reich's work on slips of the tongue (1980) and Reich's work on unintended puns (1984) are examples. They demonstrate that network understandings of cognition account for performance errors as well as competencies\(^\text{44}\). What is lacking is the more explicit articulation of the study of breakdowns as a research strategy for cognitive studies.
In addition to an interest in patterning in the data, we are concerned with the cognitive plausability of our findings. Here, the Conversation Analysis notion of orientation provides a helpful check on our mental speculations. As it is applied in this study, a concern for orientation means that the interlocutors' observable utterances and responses to utterances should not contradict our conclusions about their processing of those utterances. The orientation of interlocutors to previous utterances is demonstrated in their next utterances and is especially evident in breakdowns. For example, Lucinda's orientation in the affirmative then negative answer discussed above (Lu3B:66.1-2) supports the view that she completed the processing of the stressed information in LeRoy's question before completing the processing of the earlier unstressed portion. The orientation of speakers to the cognitive states of their conversation partners is shown in patterns involving such phenomena as their choices of referring expressions (e.g. Davis and Copeland 1980).

The studies in the next chapters follow these general research strategies. In each chapter, a question is defined concerning some aspect of the cognitive processing of the interlocutors. Then (a) representative portion(s) of conversational text is/are analyzed with that question in mind. Inferences are made based on relevant patterns and findings are summarized.
**Conclusion.** Natural conversation provides rich and as yet virtually untapped data for cognitive inquiries. Some cognitive processes, for example those involving the selection of conversation topics over time, are probably approachable only through this type of data. The cognitive study of conversation, however, requires suitable research methods, and the mapping out of the approach used here is intended as a contribution of this study. The collection of studies presented here does not exhaust the research potential suggested by this cognitive approach to conversation. It is, however, suggestive of the possibilities.
Sources of these utterances are Walter 3A:114, 121; Walter 2A/B:13, 36, 53b respectively.
2 Sanders (1987) provides a rare foray into this area of cognitive conversation analysis, though from a framework quite different from that used here. He focuses on what he calls "controlling understandings", i.e. on the way a speaker controls how and what the listener understands. He does not rely on mental representations, network or otherwise.
3 "Ideational" is Halliday's term for this type of meaning, "meaning in the sense of content", meaning that "represents patterns of experience" (1985:101). Other terms that have been used for this type of meaning are "propositional", "experiential", "representational", "descriptive", "conceptual" and "referential".
4 LeRoy Ford, personal communication.
5 It should be noted, however, that Hockett's specific collection of intonation contours is not imposed on the data. Pitch is marked where heard.
6 Other forms of expression are possible as well, for example written. It is the spoken signal that concerns us here, however.
7 For a more complete account of Cognitive Linguistics up to 1971 see Lamb (1971).
8 Bloch (1947) and Hockett (1947) exemplify this sort of analysis. See Lockwood (1973a) or Hockett (1961) for more detailed criticism of the traditional models.
9 See Lockwood (1973a) and Lamb (1975) for more complete criticisms of the traditional models and explanation of the realizational solution. Hockett (1961) arrived at similar notions at about the same time.
10 After Hjelmslev's expression and content strata (1954).
11 Lamb, p.c.
12 See for example Lyons tree diagram rendering of Bloomfield's immediate constituent analysis of "Poor John ran away." (Lyons 1968:210-211).
13 See for example Rumelhart and McClelland (1982)
14 Lamb, p.c.
15 See Skinner (1974) and Watson and MacDougall (1928) for fuller discussions of behaviorism.
16 See Bloomfield (1933:32ff) for further discussion.
17 See Bloomfield (1926).
18 There were actually two kinds of discovery procedures developed. Harris (1951) and Bloch (1947) outline theoretical discovery procedures. Nida (1948) and Pike (1947)
concerned themselves with practical techniques more suitable for field descriptions.

19 See for example Chomsky (1957, 1959 and 1965). Also see Katz (1964).

20 See Reich (1973) for more extended criticism.

21 Lamb (1986) distinguishes an acceptable form of mentalism which uses linguistic data as evidence for mental structures, from an unacceptable form which proposes vague mental explanations for descriptive linguistics.

22 Hjelmslev calls this step "analysis".

23 Hjelmslev calls this step "catalysis".

24 The cognitive processing that occurs during long pauses sketched here as an example is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

25 In actuality, Chomsky admitted that his procedure was not realistic for production even though he characterized his model with the rather misleading term "generative" (1965:9). In practice, his term "generative" was often interpreted in keeping with its connotation of "production", a good example of Tarzan reasoning.

26 Both cognitive linguistics and cognitive psychology can be viewed under the rubric of the new and loosely defined interdisciplinary field of Cognitive Science. According to Gardner (1985:37) this field includes portions of linguistics, psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, anthropology, and neuroscience. While each discipline tends to rely on its own traditional research paradigms i.e. data and methods, they are united by two basic characteristics. First, all have in common the research objective of studying cognition, and second, all "posit a separate level of analysis which can be called the 'level of representation'" (Gardner 38). That is, all rely on some sort of model. The model for CL is or course the relational network.

27 Fleming, however, does not use network representation. See Fleming (1986).

28 See for example Lamb (1964a).

29 But see Copeland and Davis (1983).

30 For example, Langacker (1987), Givon (1984), Davis (ms).

31 A moment's reflection reveals that while linguistic studies have a tradition of several thousand years, natural conversation has been available for intensive study only since the invention of sound recordings. Its relative neglect in linguistic studies is not therefore surprising.

32 Among the most notable of these researchers have been Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson. Schenkein (1978a) and Atkinson and Heritage (1984) are collections of representative CA studies and provide

33 This last reason recalls the preoccupation with scientific status that has also characterized much linguistic study.

34 A set of unpublished lectures by Sacks is often cited as being important for its initial statement of the program of Conversation Analysis. See Sacks (1964–72).

35 Much of this discussion comes from Levinson (1983:318ff). Also see Sacks 1984, Schenkein (1978c), and Heritage and Atkinson (1984) for accounts of CA methodology.

36 "Preference organization" is related to the linguistic concept of markedness. Dispreferred responses are often delivered after a delay, or with some account of why the preferred response cannot be given. See Levinson (1983:307) for a fuller treatment of preference organization.

37 This excerpt is transcribed as in Levinson.

38 The notion of knowledge built up from earlier experiences corresponds to the notion of inferential schema, or "frame" widely used in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. See Minsky (1977), Schank and Abelson (1977), Tannen (1979).

39 The concept of "speech event" comes from the study known as "ethnography of speaking". See Bauman & Sherzer (1974) for representative work.

40 See Bolinger (1957) for a description of different question types.

41 Dionysius Thrax took the sentence as the largest unit to be described in his important Greek grammar, ca.100 B.C. Also, see Chomsky (1957).

42 Halliday (1985:275, 316) identifies the stressed element with the "New" information in the clause, the "what I am asking you to attend to."

43 These notions are here taken as axiomatic although their usefulness in this study adds further support to their validity.

44 Note that unintended puns actually represent not errors but a special kind of competence that is somewhat extraordinary. Both puns and slips are alike, however, in being unusual kinds of phenomena in spontaneous speech.
Chapter 3
"What shall we talk about next?", Part I:
The Selection of Cognitive Topics for Conversation

Do you remember mama anything about when Oklahoma became a state?
Do you remember any of the talk about it?

-LeRoy to Lucinda

Introduction. Perhaps the most obvious characteristic of conversation is that when people converse, they talk "about" certain things. In his interviews with his parents, for example, LeRoy talks with his parents "about" their early lives, "about" running a blacksmith shop, "about" caring for a sick child, "about" oxen, wagon trips, oil lamps, visiting Indians, tipis, dugouts, home remedies, church meetings, sorghum taffy, and so forth. All conversation involves topic in this sense, and without it there would be no conversation.

This intuitive notion of conversational topic can in general terms be identified with the content or "referential system" of the text (Grimes 1982:165). That is, the conversation is about the concepts to which it refers. It should be noted that although this use of the term "topic" is
in accord with everyday usage and with the understanding of the term in Conversation Analysis studies, it differs somewhat from the way the term is usually used in linguistic studies. In short, most linguistic studies treat topic as a sentence and clause level phenomenon. They identify some constituent of the sentence or clause as its topic and describe its pragmatic functions in communication. Once a sentence topic is identified, the remainder of the sentence can be seen as providing information, sometimes called "comment" about that topic. In these views, topic is usually not explicitly designated as a property of stretches of discourse longer than a sentence. In addition, it is seen not as a cognitive entity, but as a text entity. At the end of Chapter 4 we return briefly to a consideration of these treatments, but for now we distinguish "sentence topic" from the notion of "conversation topic" or "discourse topic" that we have identified here.

In considering the cognitive systems of individuals conversing about certain topics, we conclude that this "aboutness" of conversation must have a cognitive source. What we might recognize in the text of a conversation as discourse topic or aboutness is selected and negotiated by the conversing individuals. They designate or discover what they will talk about from inside their cognitive systems. Here we can make a further distinction, differentiating the "discourse" or "conversational topic" that is evident in the
text from the cognitive source to which it corresponds. This cognitive counterpart can be called "cognitive topic" or more briefly "C-topic." Since individuals are here viewed as cognitive networks, the notion of C-topic will be developed in terms of activated locations in the network. The activity of C-topic in the cognitive systems of the interlocutors during conversation results in the patterning of discourse topic that is seen in the transcribed conversation.

This chapter and the next are concerned with exploring this aboutness of conversation and the cognitive structures and processes that interlocutors use to create it and comprehend it. The chapters proceed by tracing LeRoy and Lucinda's topic activities through an extended portion of conversation. They examine the topic related tasks required of the interlocutors as they converse. Data patterns relating to discourse topic are described as a basis for conclusions about the activity of C-topic. This concern with discourse topic and C-topic grows from the general goal in this study of accounting for the corpus in terms of the cognitive structures and processes that effected its production.

There are two major questions to be considered in this exploration of cognitive aspects of topic. First is the question of how the new topics that are introduced into an unfolding conversation originate. For example, how does
LeRoy, in Walter3A:29, come up with the notion of sorghum taffy as something to talk about?

((Walter3A))

You could shårpen it up- turn it around any shape you 3wanted2. 28.2
(you know) it jüst come in 3chunks1 and you- ((1))
you could 2cut it up2- 2strip it up2 'n. ((2))

Did you all ever make sórglμm 3táffy3? 29
Huh?
Did you all ever make sórglμm 3cândy3? ((2)) 30
'Yeah2, Used to make sórglμm 3cândy2.

How does Lucinda in Lu3B:80.5 think of telling this story about a long-haired Indian coming to visit?

((Lu3B))

What did their hair look like?
Oh the 3mén's 1hair was 3pûrty1.
But the 3wômen1 didn't do nothin 3to1 their hair but-
just let it hang 2down1. ((2))
But the mén 'd keep theirs 3combed1 'n plaited 3up1.
'N looked pûrty.
We had an old Indian come see dâd (at)- he'uz sîck.
His nâmé was Lông Hair. ((1))

These topics must exist somewhere within the cognitive systems of the interlocutors and must be motivated in some way on the occasion of their telling. The term "selection" or "designation" is used to describe this process of coming up with topics. Principles of cognitive topic selection are treated in this chapter.
The second question involves not the selection, but the "coordination" and "recognition" of topic, for topic selection on the part of one interlocutor is not enough to enable successful conversation. Once an interlocutor selects a topic for conversation, he must introduce this topic to his conversation partner in such a way that it can be understood. In the above excerpt from Walter 3A, for example, Walter is unsuccessful at 29.1 in recognizing the topic that LeRoy introduces in 29. In 30, therefore, LeRoy continues his efforts to coordinate his new C-topic with Walter. As each interlocutor has his own individual cognitive system, there is no automatic guarantee that the systems will be synchronized, and it is necessary for the interlocutors to continually coordinate their ideas of what they are talking about during the conversation. The one designating the topic from his cognitive system must assist the other in locating the corresponding topic in his cognitive system. Only when both are talking about the same thing can information be successfully exchanged. Principles of cognitive topic coordination are dealt with in Chapter 4.

On cognitive topic. Before tracing LeRoy's and Lucinda's cognitive topic selections in the conversation, we provide a more complete characterization of C-topic. It can be noted first that C-topic is a property not of any text, but of the individuals who produce the text. C-topic is a cognitive notion, having more to do with what is going on in
the minds of the interlocutors at the time the text is produced than with the residue of this activity that is left in the transcribed text as discourse topic. Of course discourse topic and C-topic are intimately related and it is discourse topic that provides a window into its cognitive counterpart. In the transcript of a conversation, whatever can be recognized as discourse topic is a reflection of cognitive topic. Patterns involving discourse topic reflect the activity of cognitive topic.

Next, in terms of the network cognitive systems of individuals, we can propose a working definition of C-topic. C-topic is an activated location in the memory (i.e., the cognitive network) of an interlocutor that guides him in the production and interpretation of conversation. Cognitive topic selection amounts to the speaker's activity of locating, i.e., activating, a place in his own cognitive system which once located can then be encoded in the linguistic signal as conversation topic. It is in this sense that cognitive topic guides in the production of conversation. Cognitive topic coordination amounts to directing the interpreter, via linguistic instructions, to activate a corresponding location in his system. Once topic is coordinated, the interpreter can properly construe forthcoming information from the talk (in the case of statements) or offer the proper information in his next utterance (in the case of questions), and it is in this sense
that cognitive topic guides in the interpretation of conversation. The addressee must have the proper cognitive topic activated in order to interpret the conversation. Cognitive topic designates the place in the network at which new information is to be added or from which information is to be retrieved, so to speak, depending on the interlocutor's role in the conversation at that point.

This initial picture needs refinement. The characterization of C-topic as "an activated location in memory" is not specific enough because activation exists at many different points of the cognitive network at one time. For example, any lexeme that is produced or interpreted corresponds to an activated portion of cognitive network. We can therefore adjust our understanding of C-topic by viewing it as a scalar property. All activated portions are topical. The important question is not whether or not a portion of memory is topical, but to what degree. The most activated part is the most topical, and the center of activation is the center of C-topic. As a further adjustment we can say that topic is implicitly a conceptual notion and that as a consequence activations involving the lower portions of the linguistic system are less topical than those involving the upper portions.

Another refinement involves the observation that C-topic can be seen to exist at different levels of generality. In the physical world, locations can be viewed as concentric.
To the question of "Where is Rice University?", possible answers, all of them correct, include "In Houston.", "In Texas.", "In the United States.", "In North America.", and so on. Because of the network structure of cognitive systems, a similar situation exists for C-topic. Information in the network is connected in an organized way, and there is not, at any point of the conversation, some unique correct answer to the question of where the center of the C-topic of an interlocutor is at that time. Instead, cognitive topics are nested within other cognitive topics in a topic hierarchy. For example, in LeRoy's question to Lucinda in 2A:29,

```
What were the 3walls' made out of? 29
Well 3they 'was just dug down 'n just dirt 3walls'.
```

LeRoy's topic equally involves Lucinda, Lucinda's memories, her memories of the farm at Erick on which she lived, her memories of the dugout on the farm at Erick on which she lived, her memories of the walls of the dugout on the farm on which she lived, and her memory of what these walls were made of. Building material, walls, dugout, farm, memories, Lucinda; all are at the center of LeRoy's cognitive topic at this one time, without conflict, when a certain single complex of nections representing these dugout walls and their possible material makeup is strongly activated. We can refer to topics near the level of this "building material" topic as
local or specific cognitive topics. Topics higher in the hierarchy, such as "Lucinda" or "the farm at Erick" can be referred to as more global or general topics.

Another important characteristic of C-topic activation is that it constantly moves through the cognitive system during conversation, at least at the local levels. In the interviews, the most global topic consistently involves the life history of the interviewee. At a more local level, however, the topic changes fairly often, moving within the larger topic of Lucinda's personal history. This characteristic is tied to the fact that the center of activation has a limited capacity. Although large portions of network may be weakly activated at a single point in time, a speaker's main attention remains focused on a small portion. This focus moves through the network. C-topic is a dynamic phenomenon, and it is this dynamic aspect of topic, coupled with the fact that each interlocutor maintains his own cognitive topic, that makes topic selection and coordination such important issues for the interlocutors.

A further note on terminology. We have distinguished cognitive topic from discourse or conversation topic. Part of the distinction is captured in the terms used to describe a speaker's topic activities. In describing cognitive topic, we say that a speaker "selects" or "designates" C-topic from within his cognitive system. In describing conversation itself and conversation topic in particular, however, we can
say that speakers "produce" the discourse topics observable in the conversation. Another difference involves the fact that conversation topics, because they are a feature of the text, are constrained to be produced one at a time, one after another. In contrast, C-topic, while it generally moves in a sequential pattern, is not of necessity bound by that linear constraint.

Although the terms "cognitive topic" and "conversation topic" denote distinct concepts, however, it is not always necessary, and in fact can be awkward, to emphasize this distinction on every mention. In most cases, the produced discourse topic corresponds fairly closely to the selected cognitive topic at the time, and the single term "topic" can be used as a cover term without confusion. This practice is followed in the following discussions. Where the distinction is important, it is noted.

The selection of cognitive topic. Having introduced the notion of cognitive topic, we turn to a more detailed consideration of topic selection as it occurs in an extended portion of one of LeRoy's interviews with Lucinda. The goal is to discover patterns in the operation of cognitive topic through observation of discourse topic patterns. The patterns of cognitive topic activity are then accounted for in terms of the network organization and operation of cognitive systems.
The analysis offered here proceeds line by line through the conversation giving a step by step account of the topic activities of the interlocutors. First, surface patterns relating to discourse topic are described. We will be concerned, for example, with questions such as what topics come up, which topics recur, how long topics are discussed, and how topics change. Next, we propose explanations for the discourse topic patterns in terms of cognitive topic. As we proceed, the cognitive topic patterns we infer are summarized in what are called "principles of cognitive topic designation."

This approach has advantages and disadvantages. The line by line account gives a wholistic view of topic activities reflected in a text and also lets the reader into the kitchen, so to speak, to see how the text analysis was done. However, because of the line by line analysis, the exposition becomes somewhat messy. The principles are noted as they are needed with no independent sequencing of their own, perhaps giving the impression of an unrelated collection of thoughts instead of a finished product. Moreover, the identification of separate principles implies a discreteness and finality that is neither intended nor warranted by the data. To overcome these disadvantages, the principles of cognitive topic designation that we discover are reconsidered and "boiled down" following the initial line by line analysis. Different principles are related to each other,
and all are more explicitly related to the characteristics of the structure and operation of cognitive networks.

The first sixty-four pairs of turns of conversation Lu2A are considered as representative of C-topic selection and coordination in the entire corpus. Further relevant examples are brought in as appropriate from elsewhere in the dialogues. Each portion of the discussion proceeds through the dialogue focusing on a specific facet of the interlocutors' selection of topic. In this chapter, we begin by tracing LeRoy's system in its designation of general level topics. Then we trace Lucinda's system as it selects general level topics. The next chapter focuses on LeRoy and Lucinda's coordination of these same general level topics and also concentrates on the selection and coordination of more local topics in a smaller portion of the text. It ends with a consideration of cognitive and discourse topic vis-a-vis the traditional linguistic notion of sentence topic and the Conversation Analysis notion of topic.

**LeRoy's selection of cognitive topic.** In this section, LeRoy's selection of general level C-topics for production as discourse topics is examined in detail. We identify the topics, attempt to show how they are motivated by structural and activational considerations within his cognitive system, and note some utterance features that accompany his processing in the selection of topics.
We do not in this section consider aspects of Lucinda's processing. Nor do we here concern ourselves with the subtle local topic changes that occur with every turn. We note again, as we did in Chapter 2, that LeRoy's social role in this interview as interviewer requires of him that he keep the conversation going by choosing topics for the conversation. This socially forced designation of topics on his part makes this interview an interesting place to examine cognitive principles guiding his topic selection. We also note again that LeRoy conducted the interviews without using or making any written notes that would influence his topic activities. He designates topics extemporaneously.

In order to talk about LeRoy's topic activity we need some way to recognize his cognitive topics based on examination of discourse topics in the data. As mentioned earlier, the measure of discourse topic used here is a rough one centering on the notion of referential information. When LeRoy's questions contain references to participants, events, and circumstances not mentioned in the immediately preceding context, this is evidence that he has selected a new topic, at least at a local level. Of course, topic is not monolithic, and there will be topic overlaps. Some participants may remain topically activated for a long time while others come and go more quickly. Major topic changes, however, can be identified in this way as involving a change in many of the participants, events, and circumstances.
For ease of exposition the topics identified are numbered. It should be borne in mind, however, that this numbering imposes an artificial discreteness on the phenomenon of topic and also that all topics so identified may not exist at exactly the same level of generality. For each topic identified, we tell what LeRoy's topic is at that point and give a cognitive account of how he may have chosen it. Findings are summarized as general principles of topic selection.

1. LeRoy's C-topic at the beginning of the 1960s interview (2A:1) is expressed in the phrase "anything about when Oklahoma became a state".

---

Do you remember mama anything about when Oklahoma became a state? 1
Do you remember any of the talk about it?

---

As this topic is expressed at the beginning of the interview, there is little text data to explain its particular motivation over a number of other potential beginning topics. It is known that LeRoy had a guiding motivation in conducting and taping the interviews. He wanted to make a permanent record of his parents' reminiscences about their early experiences (LeRoy Ford: p.c). This guiding motivation, though not overtly mentioned in the text, constitutes his most global topic for the entire conversation, and all of the
sub-topics he chooses occur within this general location in his cognitive system.

LeRoy's problem at the beginning of the interview is that he must start somewhere within this global topic. A request such as "Tell me about when you were young" would not be specific enough. Contributing to the choice of "when Oklahoma became a state" may be its salience in LeRoy's mind as an important historical event, one that he thinks Lucinda may have interesting memories about, and also the fact that statehood is a beginning, thus appropriate for the beginning of an interview.

Of course, the date of Oklahoma's statehood and Lucinda's presence in Oklahoma at that time are facts that are present in LeRoy's system before the beginning of the conversation or he could not have asked the question. LeRoy's topic selections throughout the dialogues demonstrate what is known from other sources, that he already has a great deal of relevant knowledge before the conversations begin about the history of Oklahoma, about his parents' personal histories, and so forth. His topic selections are from this knowledge which is structured in his cognitive system, and this constitutes a first principle of cognitive topic designation which can be called "Topic knownness": Cognitive topic activation moves along associations in the cognitive network that the speaker already has. It is a selection from
already existing knowledge. The speaker's knowledge serves as the source of topic for the conversation.

This first topic lasts for LeRoy through his second and third turns, as can be demonstrated by the fact that each of these turns could be extended felicitously with explicit mention of the topic, as shown here in italics.

([(Lu2A)])

You don't remember—about reading any papers or anything about it (when Oklahoma became a state)?

No—

You know we didn't take papers then.

We didn't have no—(1) paper 'comin'. (2)

How'd you get news (when Oklahoma became a state)? (3)

This topic is not activated for much longer, however, and it is never reintroduced into the conversation. For one thing, Lucinda designates and introduces a quite different topic concerning getting news of presidential assassinations. (2A:3.3) In addition, it seems that LeRoy's knowledge of Oklahoma statehood and what Lucinda might remember about it is not limitless. Neither have the questions he has asked Lucinda resulted in much additional information about it which he can then topicalize. In short, this cognitive topic turns out to be rather fruitless as a way of learning about Lucinda's past. In 6, after Lucinda's assassination topic, LeRoy does not reintroduce this topic but selects another. The observation that topics in discourse come to an end and
new ones are introduced can be summarized in terms of a second principle of cognitive topic designation which can be called "Topic exhaustion". Once the topic designator perceives that he has for practical purposes exploited a part of his network topically and that it will not serve as an effective vehicle for further communication, his topic activation moves elsewhere. A C-topic is exhausted when it becomes easier to look for a new topic than to develop a current one. This phenomenon has been noticed elsewhere as well:

(Keenan/Klein 1975, in p. 82 of Bublitz) 'the most essential and obviously recognizable motive for topic change in everyday conversation' is 'topic exhaustion' 'it is exhausted when it is of no further interest as topic on the content level, i.e. the topic subjects, whether persons, circumstances, events, states, or other entities are no longer new or can no longer be interpreted in a new context. i.e. if the interlocutors were to occupy themselves further with these subjects, their level of knowledge as far as it is concerned with these topic subjects as such, could not be extended.

2. LeRoy designates his second general level topic in (2A:6): "when you were going from say Pottawatomie nation to Cloud Chief."

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
When you all used to uh- ((Lu2A)) 6
when you were going from- ((1)) say Pottawatomie nation- to Clóud Chief- ((2))
what did you- kids do to pass the tíme away?
Huh?
How- wh- what did you sít on in the wágon?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here, LeRoy's previous cognitive topic, "when Oklahoma became a state" is no longer at the center of his consciousness and could not appear as a felicitous extension to this utterance as it could to utterances 2 and 3 above. The wagon trip of 6 and 7 occurred when Lucinda was a child, long before Oklahoma became a state in the early 1900s. LeRoy's topic has changed at this general level, moving to a different part of his cognitive system while remaining within the general area concerned with Lucinda's early memories that is defined by the global topic of the interview.

Again, the cognitive motivation for this second topic, because it occurs so early in the text, is obscure. This topic does originate, as do LeRoy's previous topic and all those following, from activation within the most global topic of the dialogue. That is, it is still about Lucinda's memories of Oklahoma and not about some less obviously related topic.

Accompanying the selection of this global topic, LeRoy designates a more local topic in 6d, that of "what the kids did to pass the time away". Just as all of LeRoy's cognitive topics during the whole conversation are chosen within the global area of his knowledge about Lucinda's past, so is this subtopic chosen from within its immediate super-topic, that concerning the move to Cloud Chief. In addition, all of LeRoy's subsequent questions up to question 13 are motivated within this immediate super-topic. All of these could have
been felicitously preceded by a phrase explicitly expressing this topic, as for example, in question 10.

______________________________

(Lu2A)

(When you were going from say Pottawatomie nation to Cloud Chief,)
When you stopped to camp at night did all the kids have chores to do?

______________________________

We observe, therefore, that in conversation, a number of contiguous utterances tend to cohere topically. Turns six through thirteen cohere at one level, and at a more global level, the whole conversation coheres. Why should this be? This question will be considered after another observation about the introduction of this topic.

There are some surface features of the text at 6 that correlate with LeRoy's introduction of this general level topic into the conversation. All of these features involve disfluencies. Line 6a constitutes a false start, and it ends with the non-word "uh". Lines 6b and c each has a pause. Line 6d has a hesitation mid-utterance. Similar disfluency marks the continued formulation of this topic in 7. There are no disfluencies, however, marking the subtopics of this topic that LeRoy expresses in 8 through 13. All are perfectly fluent. This situation, in which disfluencies cluster around LeRoy's introduction of a new general level topic, but are less characteristic of more local topic development within that topic, occurs many times in the data and warrants a cognitive accounting. Examples include Walter-
1A:79, 105, 143; Walter-3A:27, 38; Walter-2A:27, 90, Lu-40minutes:18, 33, 38, 70; Lu-2A: 6, 14, 48, 94, 100; Lu-3B:8, 18, 26, 29, 51, 86, 89, 92. These cases are all characterized by general level topic change on LeRoy's part coupled with disfluencies like those noted in 2A:6 and followed by a more fluent encoding of subtopics. Though not exemplified in 2A:6, one of the most common disfluencies in the other examples listed here, involves a lengthy pause immediately before LeRoy's utterance, see for example, the pause before 2A:14.

The topical coherence of a sequence of questions and answers and the concentration of disfluencies at the beginning of such a sequence suggest a third principle of cognitive topic designation, one that involves the organization of information in the network. This principle can be called "Local organization". Within a speaker's total knowledge there exist local configurations or sub-areas of knowledge that serve to direct topic designation. This second topic of LeRoy's, about a move to Cloud Chief, constitutes one such sub-area.\(^9\) It includes LeRoy's knowledge about trips like the one Lucinda might have been on. This knowledge includes facts such as these:

Trips involved wagons.
People sat in the wagons.
Possessions had to be moved in the wagons.
Travel took days and involved overnight camping.
Tents were available for camping.

In LeRoy's cognitive network, such information is stored as a group of nections closely related by virtue of their association to some central unifying nection, one which here can be identified as his cognitive topic, the nection that represents this trip in particular and is associated with domain nections representing trips of that time and area and trips in general. This complex of nections is not isolated from the rest of the system. Instead, each nection involved has other connections elsewhere along which topic activation may move under certain circumstances. The central nection, however, organizes the others into a cognitive unit by virtue of their common association with it. Once topic activation enters such a central nection, it tends to remain within the sub-area, affecting various associated subtopics in turn, and this is what happens in LeRoy's system during the portion of the conversation from 6 to 13. Activation tends to remain with the sub-area because of the closeness, strength, and density of the associations within it along which topic moves.

As for the disfluencies we observe and their distribution, they result from LeRoy's processing problems as his topic activation enters such a cognitive unit sub-area from another place in the network. Initial activation and selection of a new general level topic involves a search through large portions of cognitive network, a complicated
enterprise that requires time, hence the lengthy initial pauses. Initial activation of individual nections or parts of nections within the new topic also requires time, hence the occurrence of utterance internal pauses, hesitations, and filled pauses (i.e. "uh") before lexical items such as "Pottawatomie nation" in 6b. Once a localized topical portion of network is selected, however, further topical specification within that portion is simpler and less time consuming. The designation of these more specific topics involves a search through a much smaller section of network. Hence there are fewer disfluencies associated with the subsequent questions.

To summarize up to this point we have concluded that LeRoy's C-topic activities in this interview involve the locating and exploiting for topic (Principle 2) of a succession of local subareas of knowledge (Principle 3) that are already in his system (Principle 1) and that are all related in a larger subarea concerned with Lucinda's past experiences. This summary describes LeRoy's basic topic selection activities. This picture is refined as the next portions of the data are considered.

3. LeRoy's third general level topic is "when you were at the farm at Erick" (2A:14). This is a new global topic involving a new subarea of LeRoy's knowledge. It is chosen after the exhaustion of the previous topic and is encoded linguistically with two typical disfluencies: a four second
pause and a mid-utterance "uh". At this point, the previous topic, "when you were going from Pottawatomie nation to Cloud Chief" is no longer strongly activated.

((Lu2A))

((4))

When you were at the 3rām1 at uh- 3Erick1-
did you ever burn 3buffalo chips3? ((1))

This general level topic is accompanied by a more local topic, expressed in 14b: "burning buffalo chips". For this topic, unlike those previously described, the text provides good evidence as to its cognitive motivation. It comes from activations sparked by Lucinda's utterance in 10.1 and 10.2.

((Lu2A))

When you stopped to camp at 3night2- did all the kids have 3chořes to do3?
Well we'd- go around 'n pick up little pieces a wood- ((1))
to make the 3cāmp 1fire out of1. ((1))

Her mention of "little pieces of wood" and "campfire" causes LeRoy to activate the notions representing the corresponding concepts in his system. LeRoy has in his cognitive system the concept of "buffalo chips" that is closely associated with the concepts "campfire" and "pieces of wood". "Pieces of wood" and "buffalo chips" are related as separate particulars/subdomains of a single domain that can be characterized as "what campfires are made of". Activation from the concepts "pieces of wood" and "campfire", therefore,
easily spreads along this association pathway motivating "the burning of buffalo chips" as topic. This activity leads to a fourth principle of topic designation, one that can be called "Topic proximity". Closely associated information is most likely to be topicalized.

This is not to say that it was Lucinda who selected this topic. She was not talking about buffalo chips. In LeRoy's processing, however, he activates this notion as a result of processing her utterances and designates it as topic. This leads to a fifth principle of topic designation in conversation, "Outside influence". Concepts activated as a result of interpreting the other speaker's utterances influence cognitive topic designation. This is an outside source of topic activation in addition to that occurring totally within the designator's system.

Precise motivation for this new global topic, "when you were at the farm at Erick", is not as clear as was the motivation for the buffalo chip topic. This farm is, however, salient in LeRoy's knowledge about Lucinda's past because it is the farm where LeRoy was raised. It is not, therefore, a surprising topic for him to select given the fact that the previous global topic seems to be nearing exhaustion and a new global topic is needed. In addition, the selection of the local buffalo chip topic may have motivated the choice of this new global topic over other possibilities. LeRoy knew that there were buffalo wallows on
the farm so that if Lucinda had used buffalo chips, the farm would have been a likely setting. Therefore, "the farm" is accessed as topic through the local topic "burning buffalo chips", and not vice versa this time. Subsequently, "the farm" in turn leads to the activation of a number of other sub-topics.

The global "at the farm" topic comprises a rich sub-area of LeRoy's network, one that will not be as quickly exhausted as the topics concerning Oklahoma statehood and the trip from Pottawatomie nation to Cloud Chief. Because of his own personal experiences with the farm, he has a great deal of knowledge about it that can be tapped for topic selection. "At the farm" remains activated as cognitive topic for a long time in LeRoy's system and motivates the designation of a number of subtopics in the subsequent conversation all associated with the farm. Looking ahead, for example, the reintroduction of this topic in 47 and 59 can be observed.

4. LeRoy continues the conversation within the global "farm at Erick" topic for a long while, but the more local "burning buffalo chips" topic gives way to others. In 15 through 21 there is an intricate session of topic coordination in which LeRoy makes sure he understands where these buffalo chips were burned\textsuperscript{10}. The details of this coordination are not the subject of this chapter except for the observation that it culminates with LeRoy's selection of the topic "in the dugout at Erick" in 2A:21-23.
In the dugout at 3Erick1.

Yeah2. (3))

Was it in the end opposite the door?

Yeah2.
The door was in the west1'n. (3))

As well as I remember2.

What kind of furniture1 did you have in the dugout1? (2))

"The dugout" is an intermediate level topic. It is less
global, and subordinate to "on the farm at Erick", because
the dugout is located on this farm and existed for a short
period of time in the history of the farm. On the other
hand, it is superordinate to the more local "burning buffalo
chips" topic, because these chips were burned in the
fireplace in this dugout. The cognitive motivation for the
"dugout" topic comes both "down" from the "farm at Erick"
super-topic, because the dugout was a structure on this farm,
and "up" from the "burning buffalo chips" sub-topic as
LeRoy's activation moves through his cognitive system
searching for information about where the buffalo chips were
burned. In addition, its designation is motivated by
knowledge gained from interpreting Lucinda's utterances.
(principle 5). She mentions a fireplace in 17.1. LeRoy knows
that of the different dwellings that existed on the farm over
the years (the dugout, a boxhouse built later, and a frame
house built about 1917), only the dugout had a fireplace.
At first, LeRoy merely recognizes "the dugout" as part of Lucinda's designated topic, although she doesn't explicitly mention it. By 23, however, these sections have become fully topicalized. That is, LeRoy has designated this concept as his own cognitive topic and exploits it in further questioning. The sub-area of his knowledge about dugouts contains information about what a dugout looks like, what it has in it, and so forth, and it exists as a sub-area of the larger cognitive area of "the farm at Erick".

In 23, further specialization of topic within the dugout area concerns the subtopic "furniture in the dugout". The designation of this subtopic is motivated in two ways. First, it is motivated by virtue being part of LeRoy's knowledge about dugouts and about houses in general (principles 1 & 3). The necessary associations exist in this structure, and topic activation can move along them. Second, it is motivated by earlier activation of the concept "furniture" as demonstrated in the conversation in 9 and 7b.

This motivation of "furniture" as topic in 23 leads to a **sixth principle** of cognitive topic designation, the principle of "Lingering activation". Locations previously activated during the conversation remain weakly activated, and this activation facilitates their subsequent (re)designation as topic. The lingering activation primes the location for further topicalization, drawing topic back to it. There are several other subtopics within the dugout subarea that could
have been chosen as topic here. This previous and lingering activation of "furniture", however, led to its designation.

This principle can also be called the principle of "Multiple topics". Because conversation unfolds in a linear dimension, only one topic can be talked about at a time. However, although the topic under discussion at a certain time may involve the interlocutors' limited capacity, immediate attention/consciousness, there is also an activation of more remote, yet still recent topic activity in the discourse. Activation lingers and gradually decays here, but the activated area is ready to be brought back into immediate attention\textsuperscript{11}. By this principle, although discourse topics are set aside and then recur in conversation, previous cognitive topics remain while others are selected. Multiple cognitive topics exist at any one time. Another example of this principle follows.

The "dugout" topic is a super-topic with respect to the earlier "buffalo chips topic" and also to a number of other minor subtopics chosen up until 35. These include "furniture", "walls", and "roof" and are selected in accordance with principle 3. The topic activation moves through closely connected associations within the subarea (principle 4). The "dugout furniture" topic is interrupted, however, in 26 when topic turns to the identity of the one who made the trundle bed. Once that topic is completed, the dugout furniture topic continues in 27.
It was just a common 3béd'stéd2.

Iron3?

Dad made a- 3trúndle bed1 3wé1 called it2.

It'd push under you know.

Then we'd pull it out 'n

((Interrupts)) You mean 3Wálter1 did.

3Yeah2.

Oh I got so used to callin' him 3Dád2-

I'd ((Chuckles)) call him 3Dád1 all

((Interrupts)) You pushed it out 'n-

Pull it out over3night1. ((3))

This interruption provides another illustration of multiple topics. The topic of "dugout furniture" remains activated while the bed maker is identified and is resumed following the interruption.

5. In 35, LeRoy designates a topic expressed as "what the grass looked like in the country".

'N then we'd put- ((2))

Oh 3sómethin2-

1 don't know 4what2.

Gráss or- ((1))

Séem like (sh )

[ ((Interrupts)) Do you remémber what the 3gráss 1looked like in the country when you first got there1?

'Oh it 'uz just great big ole tall 2blúe 1grass1. ((Chuckles)) ((1))

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This topic is partly motivated in LeRoy's system by Lucinda's mention in 34.4 of the grass used to cover the roof of the dugout, in accordance with principle 5. In his system, the concept of "grass in Oklahoma" is associated with concepts involving the Oklahoma landscape before Anglo settlement occurred because he knows that there was a drastic change in the flora of the area after the settlement. Activation spreads along these associations, and this takes his main attention temporarily out of the current topic of "in the dugout" and "on the farm at Erick" to a topic involving "the country when they first got there." The topic "in the dugout on the farm at Erick" has an implicit temporal component in contrast with that of the topical concept "when you first got there". When Lucinda and Walter first arrived, there was no dugout and they had no farm. LeRoy's topic activation has moved, via associations with the concept of "grass" to the place in his network representing these pre-dugout times. The principle here, principle seven, is that under some circumstances, cognitive topic activation may move out of a subarea before that subarea is exhausted. This principle can be called "Topic detour." These circumstances often involve a topic designation sparked indirectly by something the other speaker said, as here (principle 5). Other times they involve a topic designated by the other speaker in his system and recognized and oriented to by the other. For example, in reference to the Kennedy topic introduced by Lucinda in 4.1,
we can observe that LeRoy orients himself to that topic even though it is not of his selection.

Cognitive topic may move in this way because, as mentioned above, subareas in a network are not discrete modules separated from the rest of the system. Instead, they have many connections elsewhere, and topic may potentially move along any of them. The tendency, however, is that topic will remain in the subarea because of the number of associations there. This principle will be illustrated in later examples as well.

6) LeRoy does not keep thinking about the grass for long. That topic is quickly exhausted (principle 2). In 37, his main topic activation has moved back to that of furniture in the dugout at Erick.

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((Lu2A))

What 3óther¹ furniture 'd you have in that dugout in 'Erick¹? 37
You had a 2béd² 'n a- ((3)) ((A "listing" intonation.)) 37
Yeah 'n he made us a what 3vé¹ called a 3cúpboard¹. ((2))
'N have it up beside the 3wáll²- for the 3díshes¹.

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Motivation for the reintroduction of this topic comes of course from LeRoy's previous topical activations involving the farm, which are recent and thus still activated (principle 6). The specific topic of furniture is resumed from turn 27 after several other topics have intervened. LeRoy knows that the information he has added to his system at that topical location is incomplete. Lucinda has told him
about both the bed and the trundle bed in the dugout (23-28), but there must be other furniture also, perhaps a table, chairs, etc. We can note that a category such as that of "furniture in the dugout" has certain prototypical members that LeRoy might expect. Until all of these members are mentioned, the topic is obviously incomplete, i.e. not exhausted. This observation leads to an eighth principle of topic selection, the principle of "Non-exhaustion". Sub-areas perceived to be non-exhausted remain strongly activated, relative to other parts of the network, for further topic designation.

This principle can be seen at a much later point in this interview as well. In 76, LeRoy asks about children born in the dugout.

="/Lu2A/"

Which of the children were born when you lived in the dugout? (1) 76
1 Etta2. (1)

="/Lu2A/"

Lucinda tells about some of the children, but not all. LeRoy then selects a few other topics. In 86, however, he asks about other children.

="/Lu2A/

((Interrupts)) 'N Hárry2- where was Hárry born? (2) 86
When you lived in the first house?
1 Yeah2. 'N Mártón was born in- the first house. (5)
'N Lucile 3tóó1. (2)"
The category of Lucinda's children forms a closed set of which LeRoy knows all the members. The unfinished topic has remained activated for further topicalization, and its perceived incompleteness draws activation back to it.

We have discussed the motivation for LeRoy's topics in some detail up to this point, summarizing our findings in principles of topic designation. During the remainder of this section, we trace his topics through turn 64 in less detail, showing how the principles developed above account for their selection.

7) By 43, LeRoy's topic involves "Lucinda's trips to a town called Mangum". LeRoy designates this topic gradually in accordance with principles 7 and 5. Lucinda's introduction of the concepts "town" and "Mangum" in 41.2 and 42.1 lead LeRoy to a topic outside of the previous "dugout on the farm at Erick" topic.

8) In 44, LeRoy designates "when Sayre was first started" as topic. Once "Mangum" is activated, this is not surprising. Sayre and Mangum are closely associated as two particulars of the domain "towns near the farm at Erick". This topic selection proceeds in accordance with principle 4.

9) By the end of 47, the topic of the founding of Sayre is exhausted (principle 2). LeRoy needs another general level topic, and after two long pauses he selects the global topic of "On the farm at Erick" and the local topic of "breakfast". This redesignation of "the farm at Erick" topic
is in accordance with principles 6 & 8. "On the farm at Erick" is a large general topic that is not easily exhausted, and to which LeRoy continually returns for topics. The precise motivation for the "breakfast" topic is obscure. However, just as knowledge of shelter is one important part of LeRoy's schematic knowledge of the farm, so is knowledge of food. "Breakfast" is therefore an available topic in accordance with principles 1 and 3.

10) In 49, LeRoy selects the topic of "chickenhouse". This topic is motivated by his knowledge of the farm (principle 1), by the fact that the "chickenhouse" and the previously activated "dugout" are both particulars of the domain "buildings on the farm" (principle 4), and more immediately by Lucinda's mention in 48.1 of eggs as an item on the breakfast menu (principle 5). LeRoy has an association, via "chicken" between the concept "egg", which Lucinda's utterance activates, and "chickenhouse". Multiple principles at work here motivate "chickenhouse" as topic.

11) In 51, LeRoy selects the topic of "barn". This choice is motivated by the association of the concept "barn" with the concept "chickenhouse". Both are particulars with respect to the domain "buildings on the farm" (principle 4).

12) In 53 through 58, LeRoy's topics include "Turkey creek" and "some of the Fords", both motivated by concepts in Lucinda's utterances in 51.3 and 53.8 respectively (principle 5). These topics take LeRoy out of the subtopics concerned
with farm buildings and the farm at Erick (principle 7). Such topic detours often follow particular activations resulting from the interpretation of Lucinda's utterances.

13) In 59, after these topics are exhausted (principle 2), and after a four second pause, LeRoy again returns to the general level "the farm at Erick" topic (principles 6 and 8). The specific topic chosen, "dinner", is motivated by association with the previously topicalized "breakfast". Both are particulars of the same domain (principle 4), one that is not exhausted as topic until "dinner" is topicalized (principle 8). Again, just as the domain of "furniture" has a number of prototypical particulars and the domain of "Lucinda's children" involves a closed set of particulars, here, the domain of "meals" has prototypical members. "Breakfast" recalls "dinner" and motivates its subsequent designation as topic.

To conclude this section, we list in one place these principles having to do with LeRoy's selection of topics in this passage. Following the next section, which deals with Lucinda's designation of topics, we return to these principles for further characterization in terms of network structure and operation.
1. **Topic knownness.** Cognitive topic activation moves along associations in the cognitive network that the speaker already has.

2. **Topic exhaustion.** Once the topic designator perceives that he has exploited a part of his network topically and that it will not serve as an effective vehicle for further communication, his topic activation moves elsewhere.

3. **Local organization.** Within a speaker's total knowledge there exist local configurations or sub-areas of knowledge that serve to organize topic designation.

4. **Topic proximity.** Closely associated information is most likely to be topicalized.

5. **Outside influence.** Concepts activated as a result of interpreting the other speaker's utterances influence cognitive topic designation.

6. **Lingering activation/Multiple topics.** Locations previously activated during the conversation remain activated, and this activation facilitates their subsequent (re-)designation as topic.

7. **Topic detour.** Under some circumstances, cognitive topic activation may move out of a subarea before that subarea is exhausted.

8. **Non-exhaustion.** Subareas perceived to be non-exhausted remain strongly activated, relative to other parts of the network, for further topic production.

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**Lucinda's selection of cognitive topic.** We now turn to a consideration of Lucinda's topic designation in this interview. Because of her role as interviewee, Lucinda plays less of a part in selecting major topics. For the most part, she follows LeRoy's lead, and her cognitive topic is controlled by his questions. There are occasions, however, when she does actively designate general level topics that
LeRoy does not directly elicit. We review some of these here with an account of their motivation in terms of the principles developed above. A ninth and a tenth principle will be discovered here as well. Again, we restrict our attention here to the processing involved in Lucinda's selection of topics, setting aside for now the issue of her efforts to coordinate these topics with LeRoy's system. We also neglect here a number of minor topics that Lucinda selects.

1) The first topic Lucinda designates is "President McKinley" in 3.3. Closely related to is is the topic of "our new president" in 4.1.

```
((Lu2A))

How'd you get news? ((3))
   We'll just- ((4))
   We'd just 3hear 1about 2it2.
   You know uh- President- President McKinley that was 3killed3?
   3He'd 2been killed for 2- 32guess two weeks afore 3we 1heard about 2it.
   ((Chuckles))
   Well 3I'll 3say! ((1))
   And you know- (2) President- our new president-
   It wasn't a hour after he 'uz shot til we knew he was he'z shot.
   In Dallas.
```

These topics are motivated by activation from LeRoy's question about getting news during the time that Oklahoma became a state (principle 5). Lucinda has in her system an association between the domain category proposed by LeRoy of getting news during the pioneer days and a specific instance
of getting the news about President McKinley's assassination in 1898 (principle 4). The killing of a United States president is an important event, and it is strongly imprinted in Lucinda's memory. In terms of the network representation, this would mean that the lines leading to this complex of notions are very strong and very sensitive to activation. LeRoy's question, therefore, leads to the selection of this topic. The topic selection principle here, principle nine, involves a further aspect of network structure. This principle can be called the principle of "conductivity". Topic activation tends to spread along strong lines of association, (i.e. lines of high conductivity). In retrospect, we can see that this principle was at work in LeRoy's continued return to the "farm at Erick" topic. LeRoy grew up on this farm, and his memories of it are vivid, much stronger than his second hand knowledge of events that occurred before he was born such as those connected with Lucinda's trip to Cloud Chief or Oklahoma statehood. The conductivity principle differs from the topic proximity principle (principle 4) in that it has to do not with the proximity of information but with the strength of the associative lines. Of course, strength and proximity often co-occur as here. Nevertheless, they are independent aspects of network structure.

After Lucinda selects the topic "President McKinley", activation spreads naturally across multiple lines
associating McKinley's assassination with Kennedy's assassination. McKinley and Kennedy are associated first in that both were presidents and second in that both were assassinated. They are further associated as two examples of news items that Lucinda remembers hearing about. In several ways then they are separate particulars representing a single domain, and the activation flows from the one particular to the other for topic selection. This observation leads to a tenth principle of cognitive topic designation, the principle of "Multiple Connection." Cognitive topic activation tends to move to sections of network that are associated by multiple connections.

2. The second topic Lucinda designates concerns a reading her son Willie said one time at school. (2A:14.2)

_______________________________

(Lu2A)

When you were at the \textsuperscript{3}farm\textsuperscript{1} at un- \textsuperscript{3}Eric\textsuperscript{1}-
did you ever burn \textsuperscript{3}buffalo chips\textsuperscript{3}? ((1))
\textsuperscript{3}Oh \textsuperscript{1}yes\textsuperscript{2}. ((Chuckle))
LéRo- uh \textsuperscript{3}Will\textsuperscript{1}ie said a little reading in \textsuperscript{3}scho\textsuperscript{1}ol-
Aunt Léla 'd lâugh about. ((1)) ((Chuckling))
He said the réason he liked Okla\textsuperscript{3}hóma\textsuperscript{2}--
the wînd pumped all the wâter- 'n the co\textsuperscript{3}ws chopped all the \textsuperscript{3}wood\textsuperscript{1}.
((Chuckling)) That was the reading he said in \textsuperscript{3}scho\textsuperscript{1}ol.
'N shé just lâughed 'n laughed 'n laughed. ((Trailing off Intonation))

_______________________________

Her motivation for this topic comes from an association between the concept of "burning buffalo chips" activated by LeRoy's question in 14 (principle 5) and the concepts evoked
by a line in the reading Willie said, "the cows chopped all the wood" (principle 4). Like LeRoy, she associates buffalo chips with wood. Both are subcategories of the domain notion of "things that can be burned for fuel." Likewise, she associates buffalo with the cows of the poem. Both are large mammals of Oklahoma whose dung can be used to build fires. Activation moves through these associations to select this topic, a story, about the telling of a poem, that is about something which is similar to buffalo chips.12

3. Lucinda selects the topic of "how she and Walter built the dugout" in 33.2.

Looks like it would have in that 3sånd1- 3dúnt it1.
It 3døes2- but it didn't do it (this time). ((6))
We built it up with lógs around on the outside.
'N then it had a cêntepole you know. ((1))
'N we had little things like 3póst1- ((1))
that went from the outside wall up to that cêntepole. ((1))

This topic is motivated in her system by activations coming from LeRoy's previous questions in 29 through 32 about the construction of the dugout, although LeRoy does not directly and intentionally lead Lucinda to provide this overall description (principle 5).
What were the 3walls\(^1\) made out of?  
Well 3they \(^1\) was just dug down \('n\) just dirt 3walls\(^1\).

Weren't they always crumblin' 3off\(^3\)?
Well 2yeh\(^3\). A 'lott\(^2\).

Now h\(\text{ow}\)- What'd you do when they crumbled 3off\(^1\)?
Well w\(\text{e}'d\) just sweep it up \('n\) carry it 3out\(^1\). (Chuck\(\text{ling}\))

Did you ever have to- prop up the roof because of the 3dirt'd cave in\(^3\)? 32

The six second pause in 33.1 coinciding with Lucinda's designation of this topic is worthy of note. Just as pauses often precede major topics chosen by LeRoy, they also often precede major topics selected by Lucinda and Walter. Other examples can be seen in Lu2A:44.1, 51.2, 68.2, 75.4, 87.2, 93.2; Lu3B: 25.1, 29.2, 77.2, 95.2, 102.2; Lu40min: 30.1; and Walter3A: 87.2. During these pauses, much of LeRoy's processing is aimed towards locating a new topic because it is his responsibility as interviewer to keep the conversation going. Lucinda and Walter are processing information during these moments also, however. Although they are not under pressure to designate topics for the conversation, these pauses do provide time for activation to spread through their systems unguided by LeRoy's subsequent questions. This sometimes results in the selection of motivated topics that are then contributed to the conversation before LeRoy has a chance to ask his next question.

4. In 44.2 Lucinda selects the topic of "when the colored people worked on the railroad." She finds this topic
in response to LeRoy's more general topic about the founding of the town of Sayre.

(\textit{Lu2A})

Do you remember when Sayre was first started?  \textit{[5]}

1'Yeah. ((5))

I remember that the-colored people worked on the railroad. ((1)) And some way (or another) they wouldn't let 'em go. ((2))

LeRoy's topic, "when Sayre was first started", is very general in the sense that there are many possible happenings that Lucinda might have associated with it in her memory. In Lucinda's processing, she locates in her memory the general topic that LeRoy has in mind. At this place in her cognitive system there is a connection to the information that a group of black people worked on the railroad. This specific topic, then, is motivated by activations spreading through her system from the sections representing the more general topic. That this processing took time is shown by the five second pause in 44.1.

5. Lucinda selects another topic in 51.3, again after a pause of a few seconds.

(\textit{Lu2A})

What kind of a barn was there? ((1))

Well he built a little shed of a thing- to put the grain in- after we laid some grain. ((3))

'N one time that ole Turkey Creek got up 'n- washed his- ((1)) bar- his- ((2))

Well we called it a 2ndink. ((Chuckling)) ((1))
This topic is a story about "Turkey creek and the crib" motivated by her memory of the crib Walter built, which is in turn a memory motivated by LeRoy's question (principle 5). The notion representing "the crib" is connected both to the notion of "barn" as a place to store grain and to the complex of notions representing this Turkey Creek incident in which it plays a role. The activation spreads through those associations.

6. The last of Lucinda's selected topics to be discussed here is one of the most challenging to the idea that cognitive topic activation spreads along close associations in the network. This topic concerns "a recent explosion in her house".

How'd you- ((1)) cán 'em? ((2))
Well 'i'd make jelly 'n presérvés 'n- ((2))
Wild plúms was my máín frúlt out there.
After we móved out there. ((1))
At háme.
Díd Lucíllé tell you about 'em havín' an explosíon in my 2hóuse²?
The other 2díy²?

Uh-Uh.
The wáter tank expéldéd. ((slíc))
The fólks was gone from háme-
or more 'n likely somebodí'd a been killed.

Here, in a context of thinking about canning plum preserves, and without any pause for processing a topic change or any hint of topic exhaustion, Lucinda chooses a topic about
something seemingly very far removed, an explosion in her house. At first glance, this seems like an unmotivated topic. It is not about plum preserves or any kind of food, it is not about the farm, and it does not concern one of Lucinda's memories of her distant past. According to LeRoy, however, (p.c.) home canning in the Ford household involved large kettles of boiling water whose lids were screwed down to create an internal heat and pressure necessary to seal the jars. In this volatile process, explosions were always a concern. Lucinda, therefore, has in her system an association between canning and explosion (principle 3). Furthermore, she has a recent, hence vivid and easily activated memory of an explosion in her house (principle 9). Activation naturally spreads from her memories of home canning to her memory of the recent explosion.

Consideration of Lucinda's topic selection has led to a ninth and a tenth principle of cognitive topic designation.

9. **Conductivity.** Topic activation tends to spread along strong lines of association (i.e. lines of high conductivity).

10. **Multiple connection.** Cognitive topic activation tends to move to sections of network that are associated by multiple connections.

**Review of the principles of topic selection.** The above principles of topic designation have been developed on the basis of a line by line analysis of the conversation. Patterns relating to discourse topics in the conversation
have been noted and the principles offered in explanation. In summary, we have observed and explained certain patterns involving the coherence of discourse topic in conversation. LeRoy's questions, for example, are not randomly mixed. Instead, a sequence of his questions often deals with a single topic. This surface pattern occurs because of the way information is organized in his network and the way his cognitive activations tend to move through closely related portions of network. Likewise, new discourse topics are designated and re-designated owing to the organization and activation patterns of the network. We have also observed a range of disfluencies, such as long pauses and false starts, that correlate with discourse topic changes. These have been accounted for in terms of the cognitive difficulty of searching for a new C-topic outside of an organized sub-area of information.

The ten principles were formulated as we stepped through the conversation line by line. Now however, having completed this analysis, a review of the principles reveals that they can be further reduced to a couple of more general cognitive principles. First, there seems to be a principle of "accessibility" that determines the direction that cognitive topic is likely to take:
The Accessibility Principle. Of all the information in the network that could potentially be designated as cognitive topic, that information which is most accessible will be selected.

There is a cluster of qualities that render information more accessible, and these qualities are those that have been identified in the principles. Known information is obviously more accessible than unknown information (principle 1). Knowledge that is unified and organized by a super-topic is more accessible than knowledge outside of that topic (principle 3). Closely associated information is more accessible than more distantly associated information (principle 4). Knowledge activated by the other speaker's utterances is made accessible to topicalization (principle 5). Knowledge that has previously been topicalized in the conversation is more accessible than knowledge that has not been topicalized before (principle 6). Conspicuously non-exhausted sub-areas are highly accessible (principle 8). Strongly associated information is more accessible than more weakly associated information (principle 9). Multiply associated information is more accessible than singly associated information (Principle 10).

Accessibility is not monolithic, and sometimes a conflict arises in which a potential topic is accessible by one criteria though not by another. For example, in principle 7, associations leading outside of a topic subarea
and activated by certain circumstances (i.e. by another speaker's utterance) render a certain part of the network accessible to topic activation although it is not a part of the subarea and the subarea is not exhausted.

Working against the principle of accessibility is the principle of exhaustion already formulated as principle 2. That is, an accessible potential topic is likely to be designated unless that topic is exhausted. An exhausted topic may be quite accessible by virtue of being previously activated, closely, multiply, and strongly associated, etc., but once exhausted it is not redesignated as topic. Instead, the topic search continues.

Conclusion. The guiding question for this chapter concerned the way in which discourse topics observable in conversation originate in the cognitive system of the speaker. The answer has come down to the accessibility of information in the cognitive system. The line by line analysis and resulting principles have shown what constitutes accessibility: factors such as topic knownness, local organization into subareas, proximity, outside influence, lingering activation, conductivity of lines, and multiple connections.

The network notion helps in defining topic activities explicitly. Instead of just saying a new topic is "touched off" (e.g. Sacks 1972), the network representation can provide a detailed cognitive model of how and why certain new
topics are motivated. At the same time, observation of topic patterns suggests and confirms clues about network organization and operation. The network organization is characterized by subareas of information and also by domain/particular relationships. Information organized within a subarea has some connections that reach outside of the subarea itself. Lines have different degrees of conductivity\(^{13}\). Nodes have different degrees of proximity to each other. Concepts can be related by multiple connections.

This study has involved a special kind of conversational data, a personal interview. The interview format forces LeRoy as interviewer to find and select topics from within a well defined super topic. LeRoy's task and the natural constraint on conversation topic render this data suitable for studying the question of topic origination. Most likely, in any conversation in which the interlocutors must think of things to talk about, the same principles described here well be at work. In this particular setting, however, the topic activities of the interlocutors stand out in relief and the patterns are easy to spot.

This chapter has dealt with the interlocutors' means of designating new topics. Chapter 4 continues the consideration of conversation topic, turning to the issue of topic coordination between interlocutors.
1 This excerpt is taken from Lu2A:1.
3 See for example Hockett (1958:201).
4 In addition, it is likely that C-topic is responsible for the patterning of sentence topic. Although sentence topic is not our main interest here, in the last part of this chapter we will make suggestions about this relationship.
5 Within the CL framework, this dichotomy applies at all linguistic levels. For example, just as there is cognitive topic corresponding to discourse and sentence topic, there is are cognitive representation of lexemes and phonemes that correspond to the lexemes and phonemes that can be identified in text data.
6 The notion of topic as a location in memory fits nicely with the Greek etymon of the word "topic": topos, a place.
7 This notion recalls Chafe's (1980b, in press) notion of limited capacity focal attention. The idea of limited capacity consciousness or working memory has been well supported in cognitive studies, especially in cognitive psychology. See Davis and Copeland (1980) for further discussion. In network terms, consciousness corresponds to the most activated part of the network. Consciousness is a selection from the whole network which corresponds to the individual's permanent store of knowledge.
8 For the fullest understanding of the analysis, the reader is urged to refer to the transcript of this conversation in Appendix 2. Relevant portions are also reprinted in the chapter.
9 The schemas, scripts, and frames in the cognitive science literature would be examples of such subareas of knowledge. See Tannen (1979).
10 For lack of space this interchange is not reproduced here. The reader is asked to refer to the text in Appendix 2, pp. 23-24.
11 With much the same intent, Chafe (in press) refers to information recently at the center of consciousness "low cost" information.
12 Often, the general level topics that Lucinda and Walter select involve anecdotal stories such as this one. Later in this same interview, for example, Lucinda tells a story about a lampglobe she once broke (2A:68ff), and a story about Willie going to meet Walter on his way home from work (2A:93). This observation can be accounted for in terms of principle 9.
13 This picture is a bit simplified because conductivity also has to do with the node characteristic of "thresholds" recently described by Lamb (ms.). Briefly, a node with a low
threshold does not require much input activation in order to send the activation on to further nodes. On the other hand, a high threshold node requires more input activation. A high conductivity line combined with a low threshold node will attract and pass on topic activation.
Chapter 4
"What shall we talk about next?", Part II:
The Coordination of Cognitive Topics in Conversation

When did you and dad- move to- the farm?
Out there in Téx-? uh-
No. Out where Marion lives.
'Oh. In uh- nineteen hundred.
-LeRoy and Lucinda

Introduction. Once LeRoy chooses a topic such as "Oklahoma statehood" or "wagon trips" that he wants to ask Lucinda about, he must let her know what he has in mind so that she can join in the discussion. Topic selection on LeRoy's part is not enough to enable successful conversation. In addition, the interlocutors must work to coordinate their individual C-topics. Lucinda must be able to recognize what LeRoy's C-topic is. Only when both are talking about the same thing can information be successfully exchanged.

That this recognition and coordination of cognitive topic is problematic to the interlocutors is obvious in examples such as Walter 3A:29 and 29.1 in which a breakdown in topic coordination occurs.
((Walter3A))
You could sharpen it up - turn it around any shape you wanted\(^2\).
\(\quad\) (you know) It just come in chunks\(^1\) and you - ((1))
you could cut it up\(^2\) - strip it up\(^2\) 'n.  ((2))
Did you all ever make sorghum \(^3\)taffy\(^3\)?
Huh?
Did you all ever make sorghum \(^3\)candy\(^3\)?  ((2))
\(^1\)Yeah\(^2\). Used to make sorghum \(^3\)candy\(^2\).

Walter is unsuccessful at 29.1 in recognizing the topic that
LeRoy introduces in 29. In 30, therefore, LeRoy must
continue his efforts to coordinate his new C-topic with
Walter.

Topic coordination/Recognition succeeds when the
addressee activates the portion of his cognitive system that
corresponds to the topically activated portion of the topic
designator's system. As cognitive networks and topical
activations within these networks are complex, so topic
coordination among interlocutors is a complex achievement. It
is not a simple task to direct a listener to precisely the
intended parts of his network so that information can be
successfully exchanged. Much of the linguistic signal is
devoted to this task of topic coordination.

Chapter 3 was concerned with principles by which
interlocutors designate cognitive topics (C-topics) within
their cognitive systems to introduce into conversation as
conversation topics. C-topic was described as an activated
location in the memory (i.e. the cognitive network) of an
interlocutor that guides him in the production and interpretation of conversation. This chapter turns to the coordination/recognition of cognitive topic. It seeks to answer the question of how separate cognitive systems synchronize their cognitive topics so that information exchange can take place. Cognitive conditions that cooccur with smooth coordinations are pointed out and various strategies that interlocutors use to achieve coordination in less than optimum cognitive conditions are described.

Since the speech signal mediates between the separate cognitive systems of the interlocutors, the strategies used for this topic coordination are linguistic and observable to analysts, as to listeners, in surface features of the text. In addition, since this is a conversational text, an interlocutor's response to previous utterances by the other speaker gives an indication of the success with which he has interpreted the speaker's topic. Thus the overall effectiveness of the interlocutors' topic coordination strategies can be judged.

Much of the following discussion is concerned with identifying such surface features in the LeRoy/Lucinda interview and relating them to the cognitive processes they evoke in the interpreter. We here reexamine the same portion of interview Lucinda 2A that was investigated in Chapter 3. This time, however, our interest is not in accounting for C-topic designation, but in observing how
LeRoy and Lucinda accomplish C-topic coordination. Examples from other parts of the data are brought in as appropriate. In general, this discussion concentrates on a consideration of topic coordination at more major topic junctures, although coordination involving minor topic changes are considered briefly. In the previous chapter, findings were summarized in principles of cognitive topic designation. Likewise, we here summarize our findings in principles of cognitive topic coordination.

The coordination of global topics. In this section, the first sixty-four pairs of turns of interview Lucinda 2A are examined for evidence of topic coordination activities. As in Chapter 3, the exposition proceeds through the interview line by line. However, since topic coordination involves both LeRoy and Lucinda, the discussion does not concentrate first, as in Chapter 3, on LeRoy's activities to the exclusion of Lucinda's before returning to consider Lucinda's system. For convenience, the discourse topics considered are numbered. It should be remembered, however, that such numbering imposes an artificial discreteness on the phenomenon of discourse topic.

1. In 2A:1, LeRoy designates the topic of "when Oklahoma became a state." In his linguistic encoding of this topic for Lucinda, he uses a number of strategies in order to help her locate the corresponding portion of her cognitive system.
Do you remember anything about when Oklahoma became a state? 1
Do you remember any of the talk about it?
   Of course I remember but— (2)
   We 'uz all seem like proud. (5)
   But I don't remember much about it all. (Chuckling)
You don't remember about reading any papers or anything about it? 2
   No-

One strategy he uses is to restate the original question of 1a in 1b. This second formulation helps Lucinda in two ways. First, it provides more time for her to interpret the utterances and locate the topic in her system. Second, it gives her a slightly different approach to the topic than that given in the original formulation. In this case, in 1b, LeRoy provides the extra idea that what she remembers about "when Oklahoma became a state" might be "the talk". This paraphrase strategy is used several times in the data, as in these examples.

(8) What were the different schools that you went to? 132
What was the first school that you went to? (5)

(10) Why did you all come to Greer County in the first place? (1)
How'd you happen to choose that part of the country? (4)

In addition to this paraphrase, LeRoy uses multiple sentence stress to draw Lucinda's attention to his topic.
Within the topic phrase, both "Oklahoma" and "state" are stressed. This double emphasis marks this whole phrase as introducing a new topic that Lucinda should activate, i.e. as asserted and not merely mentioned information. A single stress would have had a quite different effect. For example, stress only on "Oklahoma" would have contrasted Oklahoma statehood with that of other states already mentioned, marking only Oklahoma, but not the fact of becoming a state, as part of LeRoy's newly selected topic. The notion of statehood would in such a case have been marked for Lucinda as previously activated and therefore maintained from earlier in the conversation. At 2A:1, however, no other states have been talked about previously and a single stress on "Oklahoma" would have been misleading. On the other hand, stress only on "state" would have contrasted the property of becoming a state with other properties of Oklahoma presumably already mentioned, marking only the concept of statehood as LeRoy's new topic and the concept of Oklahoma as topically activated and maintained from a previous utterance. At 2A:1, however, no other properties about Oklahoma have previously mentioned. The double stress directs Lucinda to identify the whole complex of sections representing "when Oklahoma became a state" in her system as topic. This generous use of sentence stress gives the utterance it appears in a deliberate flavor as far as its delivery is concerned.
Stress is often used in the data to introduce new topics, as in these examples.

---

((Walter1A))
Uh- where were you just right before you all got married? 6c

---

((Walter1A))
Do you remember anything at all about your dad being in the Civil War other than the fact that he got shot in the leg? (Rhythmic)

---

LeRoy also uses lexical resources to help Lucinda identify topic. The word "about" in both 1a and 1b is a clear indicator of topic. It is used throughout the corpus.

---

((Lu40))
Wadn't it- Uncle Thomas that you told me about once who- (2) found a deer when he was out ridin' a horse- 'n he chased it down? 33

---

((Lu2A))
Did Lucille tell you about 'em havin' an explosion in my house? 62.5

---

((Lu2A))
I remember you tellin' one time bout when you were saved. (2) What uh- do you remember about that? (1)

---

((Walter 1A))
No I don't know (nothin') about that. 99.1

---

The phrase "do you remember" is another lexical indicator of the speaker's cognitive topic. In terms of topic as a location in a network, it means "do you have this information and can you locate it". It alerts Lucinda to the imminent
task of locating a certain topic in her system. It also demonstrates LeRoy's uncertainty about the knowledge in Lucinda's cognitive system and shows his openness to the possibility that she may not in fact have the information requested. Other examples in the data are as follows.

---

(Lu40)

Do you remember the time that you were saved?

---

(Lu2A)

Do you remember anything that happened about Dad's blacksmith shop at Hext?

---

The words "anything" and "any" are further lexical clues to LeRoy's topic. They indicate to Lucinda that he does not have his topic further specified for details but is interested in whatever information she has stored in her memory at the indicated location. These words are also commonly used in LeRoy's introduction of new topics, as can be seen by examining the examples cited above (cf. Walter1A:103 and Lu2A:93). In fact, examination of the examples cited above shows that most illustrate more than one of LeRoy's strategies for coordination of new major topics. Use of the signals of paraphrase, multiple sentence stress, and lexical clues tends to cluster at points of major topic change. This distribution suggests that their purpose lies in effecting cognitive topic coordination.

These surface features correlate with major topic change in the same way that the speaker disfluencies noted in the
last section do, but for a different reason. The disfluencies result from the speaker's own processing difficulties as he designates topical information and expresses it linguistically. These other surface features, however, represent strategies the speaker uses to aid the listener in recognizing his topic. Unlike disfluencies, these coordination signals do not interrupt the conversation. They are not breakdowns.

From Lucinda's response, we know that LeRoy's efforts to communicate his topic to her have in fact been successful. She uses the pronoun "it" to refer to "when Oklahoma became a state" in 1.3, and she reports the information she found stored at that location in 1.2. That is, the strategies that LeRoy has used seem to work.

LeRoy employs a number of strategies to help Lucinda recognize his C-topic, and existence and use of such strategies suggests a first principle of cognitive topic coordination which is simply that since each interlocutor has his own cognitive topic, topic coordination is constantly necessary. There is nothing automatic about topic coordination. It must be effected by means of the speech signal. This principle can be called "coordination necessity".

As mentioned above, the strategies LeRoy uses here to help Lucinda become topically oriented have a certain distribution. They are common at junctures where new high
level topics are introduced. Such strategies are less commonly used within a general level topic where topic movement is more gradual and predictable. This observation leads to a second principle of cognitive topic coordination which can be called the principle of "coordination difficulty". The difficulty of cognitive topic coordination/recognition correlates inversely with the accessibility of the intended new topic in the hearer's system.

At major topic junctures the speaker devotes more effort to the coordination to compensate for the difficulty he expects the listener to have, and it is at these points that the listener's topic recognition is most likely to fail. These correlations result from the speaker's assessment of the recognition needs of the listener with respect to each topic and his skill in meeting those needs by means of coordination signals.

Failure of cognitive topic recognition is doubly likely when the speaker fails to employ appropriate coordination strategies at these junctures. In the following example, LeRoy and Walter had been talking about tearing down a rail fence and stacking and selling the rails for cordwood. Then in 70, LeRoy introduces the very different topic of "plows", but without employing any topic coordination strategies to help Walter recognize the new topic. Walter's recognition fails in 70.1 because he in not expecting this new topic and has not been adequately prepared for it.
In 2A:1, at the beginning of the interview, LeRoy's designated topic is completely new and unpredictable to Lucinda and his careful introduction of it with linguistic signals helps her to recognize it.

2. In 3.3, Lucinda has designated and introduces the topic of "President McKinley". Lucinda judges that LeRoy will not expect this topic, so she carefully introduces it with signals like those noted already. The phrase "you know" prepares LeRoy to locate the imminent topic, much as the "do you remember" prepared Lucinda in 1. The question syntax and intonation of 3.3 also explicitly directs him to find and activate a previously unactivated part of his network. The phrase "that was killed" gives LeRoy additional information about President McKinley to help him locate the section representing McKinley. It also causes him to think of just that fact about McKinley that is relevant for interpretation of the next utterance. The entire question in 3.3 serves to help LeRoy locate the part of his system he needs to be thinking about in order to interpret 3.4. The purpose of
utterance 3.3 with respect to 3.4 is cognitive topic coordination.

\[ ((Lu2A)) \]
You know uh-President McKinley that was killed? 3.3
He'd been killed for 2 more weeks after I heard about it.
((Chuckles))
Well say. ((1))

LeRoy's response in 4 indicates his successful recognition of Lucinda's topic. The signals she used worked.

3. In 6, LeRoy introduces the global topic of "when you were going from Pottawatomie nation to Cloud Chief".

\[ ((Lu2A)) \]
When you all used to uh-
when you were going from Pottawatomie nation to Clóud Chier((2))
what did you kids do to pass the time away?
Huh?
How- what did you sit on in the wagon?
Did you have chairs? ((1))
Oh- sometimes we had a what we called a sprang seat.

One of his coordination strategies involves the use, as in 1a, of sentence accent on "you", "going", "nation", "Cloud", "kids", and "time" to mark part of the utterance as indicative of a new part of the topic in Lucinda's system. Another strategy, one not so far encountered in the analysis, involves the encoding of a general level topic first, and then of a more local topic within that general topic: "what did you kids do to pass the time away". The general topic
encoded first gives Lucinda the information she needs to interpret the local topic. Conversely, the local topic gives her a specific starting place within the global topic. The opposite ordering does not seem as natural in this context and would not have been as easy for Lucinda to process.

((hypothetical))

* What did you kids do to pass the time away
* when you were going from - ((1)) say Pottawatomie nation - to Cloud Chief?

LeRoy often uses this coordination strategy of expressing his global topic before his more local topic as shown in these examples.

((Walter1A))

Uh- on the 3cattle1 I drive2-
((Clears throat)) when you all moved to 3Erlick2- ((3))
why were you drivin' cattle from 3Texas1?

((Walter1A))

Well this cattle drive when mom carried- Rosie 'n Willie in the 3wagon2-
where was 3it from?
From 1where to 1where?

In the following example, the reverse order results in a breakdown. LeRoy begins with the local topic in the first part of 6c and follows with the global topic in the second part. When Walter does not understand (6.1), LeRoy restates the questions, switching the sequence to global topic first in 7a, local topic second in 7b. With this sequence, he
effects a successful coordination as shown by Walter's answer to his question in 7.1.

((Walter1A))

Uh-where were you just right before you all got married? Hm3.
You came- you came up to Cloud Chief to get married2- 7
Where were you before that1? ((4))
Park Springs1. ((3))

In the case of Lu 2A:6, however, topic coordination does not succeed despite LeRoy's efforts. Lucinda fails in recognizing the topic, as shown in 6.1 where she asks for a repetition. Her trouble in recognizing the intended topic presents us with a problem and warrants an accounting. To say simply that Lucinda made a processing error is unsatisfactory for what we want to understand is why she made the error4. To observe that this misunderstanding occurred at a major topic juncture provides a bit of explanation because such breakdowns are more likely at major junctures than at minor ones. However, it is not enough of an explanation because LeRoy used coordination signals, and they are usually adequate for effecting coordination in such places.

There is something else behind Lucinda's failure here to recognize the topic than the inherent difficulty in interpreting new global topics. An explanation begins to emerge when LeRoy's question in 7 and Lucinda's response in
7.1 are examined more carefully. These utterances show that Lucinda's misunderstanding in 6.1 involves the local topic expressed in 6c but not the global topic expressed in 6b. LeRoy proceeds on this assumption in his encoding of a local topic in 7 when he does not restate his global level topic. He does not repeat it because he believes that Lucinda has already recognized the global topic. And Lucinda's responses in 7.1 and more especially in subsequent utterances such as 9.1-4 indicate that as LeRoy concluded, she did not in fact have trouble coordinating to the general level topic. For example, in 7.1 she does not ask what wagon LeRoy is referring to with the phrase "the wagon". In 9.1, her phrase "when we moved" indicates that she is oriented to the particular wagon trip of her youth that LeRoy has directed her to in 6b, and not to some other trip or about wagon trips in general. Concerning 6.1, therefore, it is clear that it was the local topic and not the global topic that Lucinda had trouble recognizing.

Now the question concerns the reason that she failed to recognize the local topic of "what the kids did to pass the time away". Within the global topic expressed in 6b, there are many possibilities for a more local topic. LeRoy could have asked who drove the wagon, for example, or who went on the trip, and these sorts of questions would have obvious answers strongly coded in Lucinda's system. Given the global topic, she would expect such questions. The subtopic he
chooses, however, is much more vague and does not lead Lucinda along such obvious associations in her network. It may even seem contradictory to her. If the kids are on a trip, then they are passing the time away. The answer is in the question. Therefore, the question is non-interpretable. Lucinda's failure to coordinate is more of a function of the vague nature of LeRoy's topic than of her ability to recognize topic given adequate coordination signals. Her problem thus provides another example in support of principle 2 of topic coordination. Her difficulty correlated with the inaccessibility of LeRoy's intended topic in her cognitive system.

A similar state of affairs is also evident in the following example from Walter 3A.

```
(Walter3A)

We'd get that 3kée12-
............................ 27.10
........................................ 27.11-28.1
You could shárpen it up- turn it around any shape you 3wanted2.
( you know) it just come in 3chúnks1 and you- (1)
you could 2cút it up2- 2strip it up2 'n. (2)

Did you all ever make sórghum 3táffy3?
    29
Huh?

Did you all ever make sórghum 3cándy3? (2)  (2)
    30
1Yeah2. Used to make sórghum 3cándy2.
```

Here, in 29, LeRoy introduces the topic of "making sorghum taffy", a topic quite different from the preceding one about a substance called "keel" that Walter dug up from the ground.
when he was a boy to write on a slate with at school. LeRoy's selection of this topic is motivated by activation following an association in his system between the texture of the keel that Walter describes and the texture of a kind of candy that he knows about. LeRoy employs a few devices to coordinate this topic with Walter. Both "sorghum" and "taffy" are stressed. He uses the word "ever". These strategies are not enough to effect Walter's coordination, however, as he shows in 29.1. The new topic of "sorghum taffy", though motivated in LeRoy's system, is not an obvious topic development to Walter. He therefore fails in his interpretation.

Lucinda's misunderstanding in Lu2A:6.1 also points to a third principle of cognitive topic coordination. Both topic designator and topic recognizer are actively involved in topic coordination. The designator constantly makes judgments about the addressee's cognitive states and the accessibility to him of certain topics. He tailors his linguistic coordination signals in accordance with his perception of the addressee's needs. The recognizer can ask for help when the topic designator misjudges his needs. This often occurs at the beginnings of general level topics as here. A similar situation occurs at the beginning of the forty minute interview with Lucinda.
(Lu40)

(7)
Whéñ 2díd you and dad²- 3móvé 2to- (3) the 3fármland 1
Out there in 3Téx-3? uh-
1No². (1)
Out where 3Márión 1lives. (2)
3'Oh. 1 (1)
In uh- (3) nineteen húndred.

---

Here, part of LeRoy's cognitive topic involves the farm at Erick where Lucinda's son Marion lived at the time of the interview. He encodes this simply as "the farm", thinking, because this is the major farm in her experience, that Lucinda will know which farm he means. He has misjudged her system, however. In Lucinda's system there are several farms represented. There is the farm at Erick. There is the farm in Texas where she and Walter lived during the first year of their marriage. She is not sure which one LeRoy has in mind, i.e. which one he has topically activated. So she asks in 1.1 and LeRoy gives her the information she needs. In 2.1, she shows that the topic coordination has been achieved. In this example, the cognitive processing involved in the coordination is more complex than that in 6 of interview 2A. The principle is the same, however, that both parties are actively involved in the process of topic coordination. The addressee is also actively involved beyond asking overt questions. An example will be discussed later in which the addressee recognizes a problematic topic by thinking through
the possibilities himself, without requiring further clarification from the topic designator.

Returning to the consideration of Lucinda2A, we see that LeRoy seems to recognize the inadequacy of his local topic selection. In 7 he shows that he has selected an alternate topic, and he continues his efforts at topic coordination. Here his strategy involves abandoning the local topic Lucinda did not recognize in favor of another one that still fits within the same general level topic, "what you sat on in the wagon". He encodes this one with lots of sentence accent again, on "what", "sit", and "wagon". Then in 7b, LeRoy proposes a possible answer to this question, that they sat on chairs.

How- wh- what did you sit on in the wagon? 7
Did you have chairs? (1)

Oh- sometimes we had a what we called a språng seat.

This proposal constitutes a coordination signal that has not previously been encountered in this analysis. It helps Lucinda to interpret the topic by giving her a particular example realizing the domain of "what they sat on" that has been activated by the question. LeRoy uses this strategy over and over in the interviews, as shown in these examples.
This signal is similar to the paraphrase signal in 1b. Utterance 7b is not a paraphrase of 7a. Nevertheless, it does serve to give Lucinda extra processing time and also to activate for her a different approach to the desired topic. This time, the topic coordination succeeds. Lucinda's "oh" in 7.1 indicates that she has located the requested topic, and her answer in the same line begins her report of the information she finds at that location in her system.

4. Instead of moving right on to a consideration of topic coordination with respect to the next major topic (14), we here stop to take a closer look at the coordination of the more local topics that are expressed in utterances 8 to 13.
Did they have a cushion on it?

No— we just (doubled) a quilt and put on it. ((Chuckling)) ((2))

They hadn’t come to cushions then. ((Chuckling))

It was kinda crowded! In the wagon wasn’t it with all your furniture?

((2))

Yeah— when we moved— we had two wagons.

Uncle Jeff— my uncle drove the 6xens and daddy drove the team.

When we moved up here.

From Washita county.

When you stopped to camp at night did all the kids have chores to do?

Well we’d go around ’n pick up little pieces a wood—

to make the camp fire out of. ((1))

Who put up the tent? ((1))

Oh daddy used to done most that. ((3))

Did you put up a tent every time you stopped? ((1))

No— not ever time. ((1))

Did you sleep out in the open sometimes?

Yeah. ((4))

In accordance with the second principle of topic coordination we would expect that the coordination of these minor topics within a more global topic would be relatively simple, and this is in fact what we find. LeRoy does not in these questions use many of the strategies that aid in coordinating a major topic shift. There are no overt lexical indicators of topic such as "about" or "remember". There is much less use of sentence accent needed to mark totally new topics. For example, in 12, only "stopped" is stressed. "Tent", which was stressed in 11, has already been activated as part of the topic by this time, so is not stressed here.
are no paraphrases as in 1. And Lucinda has no trouble recognizing any of these minor topics as she does in 6.1. There is some extra topic coordination work done in 10, but this is expected because it involves the introduction of another subarea nested within the "trip" topic. A subtopic, "when you stopped to camp at night" is used to introduce an even more local subtopic, "the chores the kids did."

One of the most important observations to be made about the coordination of topic in this excerpt (6-13) is that although the global topic of "when you were going from Pottawatomie nation to Cloud Chief" remains cognitively active for both interlocutors during the entire exchange, it is encoded linguistically only once, in 6. Likewise, the subtopic within this topic, "when you stopped to camp at night", is encoded only once, in 10, yet remains cognitively active through 13 as all of these questions concern what happened when the family stopped to camp at night. That the global topics remain active is shown by the orientation of the interlocutors. For example, Lucinda's answers in turns 6-13 concern the wagon trip although the trip is not mentioned in each question. In response to LeRoy's questions she does not ask questions such as "when we stopped to camp when?" or "what tent?" that would betray a deactivation of the global topic.

The interlocutors' orientations demonstrate that these global topics remain activated until a new topic is
introduced to replace them, as happens in 14 when LeRoy introduces the "on the farm at Erick" topic. This constitutes a fourth principle of cognitive topic coordination which can be called "topic maintenance". Once announced, global topics remain active until explicitly changed. Their maintenance as cognitive topic need not be marked. This principle again has to do with the accessibility of information in the cognitive systems. Once an area is located/activated, it does not need to keep being located over and over again in every utterance.

This principle points out a distinction between the notion of topic as it is conceived of here and the notion of sentence topic as it has been traditionally viewed in linguistics. A view of sentence topic begins with the sentence or clause and expects to find the topic of a sentence expressed somewhere in that sentence. From a cognitive perspective, however, we see that everything that a speaker is thinking about as he utters an individual sentence is not encoded in that sentence. The topic of a sentence, that complex of information that must be activated to effect interpretation, may be expressed outside the bounds of the sentence, several utterances before, in several different places, and even then, it is never all expressed. Conversely, topical information expressed in one sentence may have scope over a large chunk of utterances.
5. In 14, LeRoy introduces the global topic of "when you were at the farm at Erick" along with the subtopic of "burn buffalo chips".

When you were at the ³farm¹ at uh- ³Erick¹-
14
did you ever burn ³buffalo chips³? ((1))
³Oh ¹yes². ((Chuckle))
LéRo- uh Wf³le said a little reading ln ³scho³l¹-
14.2-14.7
Were there buffalo chips around- the ³farm³? ((1))
15
Yeah they- it hád you know it hád that- buffalo waller out there.
South of the house.
But even th- though the buffaloes were góne- you still used buffalo chips for ³wóod¹. 16
¹Yeah².

To aid Lucinda in interpreting his topic he introduces the more global topic first as he does in 6 and 10. He helps coordinate his global topic with Lucinda by use of sentence accent on "farm" and "Erick". In encoding the local topic, he accents "buffalo" and "chips", but not "burn". This is because the concept of buffalo chips is topically new while the concept of "burn" remains topically coordinated from Lucinda's mention, with sentence stress, of campfires in 10.2. The word "ever" in 14 is a lexical means of directing Lucinda's topic, comparable to the use of the words "anything" and "any" in 1 as discussed earlier. It signals to Lucinda that LeRoy is interested in any memory she has stored about burning buffalo chips at the farm. His topic is not specified with regard to a particular instance or habit
or time of chip burning. LeRoy uses the word "ever" several times in the data as a coordination device:

((Lu2A))
Did you ever get to go to town when you were down in- Bellevue Texas? 99
((1))

((Walter1A))
Uh-huh. (4)
Did you ever hear of a ferry down the river at 3Cölbert3? 73

((Lu40))
Did you ever go down to their- (2) 3Cölony3 30
where they 3lived'n everthing3?

Lucinda's response in 14.1 shows she has successfully recognized this topic. However, in her system, she has a strong connection at this point to her knowledge about Willie's reading at school. Her activation is drawn along that pathway, leading her to designate a topic not intended by LeRoy in his question of 145. This topic is closely related to the local topic of "burning buffalo chips"6 but not as closely involved with the global topic of "on the farm at Erick." Willie said his reading at school, not on the farm. In 15 and 16, therefore, LeRoy continues his coordination efforts, attempting to have Lucinda move her topic activation back to his intended topic of burning buffalo chips on the farm. He gives no evidence, in fact, of
having processed Lucinda's story, nothing like the "Well I'll say" of 4 to show her that he has interpreted her topic.

In his coordination effort in 15, LeRoy assumes that his global topic of "at the farm at Erick" is still somewhat activated as topic in Lucinda's system. He therefore reminds her of this topic in the phrase "the farm" (in contrast to "the school"), yet does not introduce it to her as a completely new topic by identifying it more fully as the farm "at Erick". In 16, LeRoy judges that the global topic is fully activated for Lucinda and he does not mention it explicitly at all. LeRoy's extended efforts here to influence Lucinda's topic, and her concurrent designation of a topic in her system not intended by LeRoy lead to a *fifth principle* of cognitive topic coordination which can be called "topic conflict". *Interlocutors may designate conflicting topics in their respective cognitive systems.*

There are at least as many cognitive topics in conversation as there are cognitive systems involved. Conversation, however, is a cooperative enterprise, and such topic conflict must be resolved for communication to continue successfully. In general, only one topic can be expressed in the conversation at a time. In cases of conflicting cognitive topics, the speakers must take turns expressing themselves. Here, LeRoy allows Lucinda to complete the linguistic expression of her topic, but he does not encourage its further development. Then, when she has finished, he
immediately continues his efforts to have her coordinate her system to his designated topic.

Such topic conflict occurs in other places in the data as well. For example, in Walter3A:87.2-3, during a long pause, Walter designates as topic a specific incident in his memory concerning a contractor who cheated him.

---

((Walter3A))

(15) 87.2

That ole contractor 3thère2 that built that dump 3thère2-
he had just so 3mùch1 you know1.
'N he got his part 3dòne2.
('N he-)
[
Built a 3dump2?

1Yeah2. And he had- ((1)) 2oohh2- he got it all 3dòne2
and he 3owed1 us about- ((1)) thírty róty 3dollars2. ((2))
And he skipped 3out1 you know1. ((1))
Didn't 3pày 1us.
[
You mean the dump-
of dirt there before Turkey 2Créek2?
2Yeah2.
Hé was building that up so it'd be 3léve13?
2Yeah3. For the 4ráilroad2.
It was a 4ráilroad2 2dump.
Dumping 3dirt1.
1Yeah2.
To make it 3léve11. ((2))

Yeah hé had it- just so ma- so 3mùch1 of that you know.
Just a certain 3contract1.
He had his part 3dòne2- ((2))
and when he got- when he got it 3dòne2 he owéd us- ((2))
thírty róty 3dollars2 he hadn't never 3pày 1us you know.
And he skipped 'out 'n- T(1)
' n we had to- T(4) (you see) had to get the 'sheriff T1 after him. (Chuckie)
You got the 'sheriff T2 after him.
Yeah to get that 'money T1.
Did you get it 'back T2?
'Yeah T2 'oh 'Yeah T2. 'He 'got it.
Do you remember the fellow's 'name T3? T(1)
'No T2. I can't remember it 'now T2. T(3)

He begins to tell the story, but LeRoy soon interrupts him in 88 to ask about "the building of the dump", a minor part of Walter's overall topic, hence expressed in a relative clause, but a part that LeRoy is curious about and has designated as his topic. In 88.1, Walter shows in his one word answer to LeRoy that he has oriented himself briefly to LeRoy's topic before continuing to express his own topic. In 89, LeRoy interrupts again to ask about the dump once more. Walter suspends his story topic and orients himself to LeRoy's "dump" topic all the way through 92. At this point, LeRoy's "dump" topic is exhausted and Walter continues with his story in 92.1-92.7. Finally in 93, LeRoy orients himself to Walter's topic, commenting on the story and asking further questions about it in 94 and 95. Like 14 and 15 in Lu2A, this exchange illustrates the conflict of topics that is possible because each interlocutor has his own system. It is resolved as Walter acquiesces to LeRoy's topic, then resumes his intended topic when LeRoy's topic is exhausted.
6. In 16 through 21, of 2A, "the dugout" is introduced by a gradual process of local topic coordination in which LeRoy asks about where the buffalo chips were burned, then where the fireplace was in which the chips were burned, then where the dugout was in which the fireplace was located.

---

(Lu2A)

But even th- though the búffaloes were góne-
you still used búffalo chips for 3woód1.
1Yeah2.
In your 3cóokståvé? (11) 17
No- mostly in the fireplace. (11)
( )- ((Unintelligible syllable. Simultaneous start with LeRoy.))
[ ( -)- ((Unintelligible syllable. Simultaneous start with Lucinda.))
( )- (Same unintelligible syllable. Simultaneous start))
[ The fireplace where?
At- In-
[ In-
In the dúgout?
3Yeah1.
3Yeah1.

dúgout?
3Yeah1.

---

In all of this processing, LeRoy is attempting to connect the complex of sections in his system representing his knowledge from 16.1, that Lucinda burned buffalo chips as wood on the farm, to a complex of sections representing the more specific place within the farm that this burning took place. In
effect, he knows the buffalo chip nectons are associated in some way to Lucinda's knowledge of the farm, but he does not know the precise association. This complex of nectons representing the more specific place where the chips were burned may either already be in his system by virtue of his prior knowledge of the farm, e.g. the "in your cookstove" of 17, or it may be newly added to his knowledge of the farm, e.g. the "fireplace" of 17.1, 18, and 20. In 17.1, Lucinda provides the information that the chip burning took place in the fireplace, and LeRoy adds this information to his system. LeRoy then attempts to connect this resulting complex of nectons, representing the knowledge that Lucinda burned buffalo chips in the fireplace, to a group of nectons showing the location of the fireplace on the farm. This further connection occurs in 19 as he proposes "the dugout" as a likely candidate and Lucinda concurs. In 20 and 21, he summarizes and checks the topic coordination up to that point.

In this exchange, LeRoy's actions again support the third principle of topic coordination, "mutual coordination" which says that both interlocutors are actively involved in coordination. In this instance, however, LeRoy does more than ask for a topic restatement as Lucinda did in 2A:6.1. Instead, it is clear that he has attempted to work out the topic connection himself by making inferences within his own system.
The last utterance of this exchange, 21, challenges principle four of topic coordination (topic maintenance) because in it, LeRoy checks to make sure that Erick is still part of Lucinda's topic, i.e. is this the dugout at Erick and not some other dugout that she is talking about. The topic of Erick activated in 14, however, has not been explicitly changed. What seems to be going on here is that LeRoy has presupposed that the place on the farm to burn buffalo chips would be a cookstove, and he has had to change that idea at 17.1. He therefore wants to make sure that Lucinda has really intended for him to change his presupposition and is not just thinking of different dugout at a different place as a result of misunderstanding him or of some internal unannounced topic shift. LeRoy, then, has reason to recheck Lucinda's global topic, principle four notwithstanding.

By 23, the dugout is not only activated in LeRoy's system, it is fully topicalized. That is, it is the most activated part of his system and it serves to guide him in the production of his following questions. Up until 35, all of his questions concern different facets of the dugout. As expected from principle four (topic maintenance), in none of these following utterances is the concept of the dugout explicitly mentioned. Yet in all of them, it is activated, as shown by the interlocutor's orientation, and the conversation could not have been produced or have been interpreted during this time without its activation.
7. In 25.1, during the playing out of the dugout topic, Lucinda introduces the concept of "Walter" as part of her topic, referring to him as "Dad".

\[
((Lu2A))
\]

Dad made a- 3trundle bed 3wé called it. 2
It'd push under you know.
Then we'd pull it out 'n
((Interrupts)) You mean 3Walter 1 did.
3Yeah 2.

She judges that LeRoy will be able to coordinate topically because he has often heard her refer to Walter as "dad" and because Walter was the only father within the "farm at Erick" topic that could be referred to by this word. In 26, however, LeRoy shows a problem in interpreting the topic. In accordance with principle three of mutual coordination, he actively attempts to effect the coordination.

8. In 35, LeRoy carefully introduces the topic of what the grass looked like using the phrase "do you remember" to mark the topic change. He explicitly changes the global "on the farm at Erick" topic in accordance with principle four by announcing "in the country when you first got there" as topic.

\[
((Lu2A))
\]

((Interrupts)) Do you remember what the 3grass 1looked like
in the country when you first got there? 3
'Oh it 'uz just great big ole tail 2blue 1grass 1. ((Chuckle)) ((1))
This time, the global topic ("in the country when you first got there") is not expressed first as it was in 6 and 14. Instead, the local topic, "what the grass looked like", is expressed first. This reversal of the typical and cognitively sensible global then local ordering noted above requires explanation. The key factor seems to be that since Lucinda mentioned the concept "grass" in her previous utterance, LeRoy knows she is already thinking about it. Therefore, its expression felicitously comes first, before expression of the global topic. Lucinda in this case does not need the global topic information to enable her to recognize the local topic. Lucinda's response in 35.1 shows her successful interpretation of the topic.

9. In 37, LeRoy reintroduces the topic of "furniture in the dugout at Erick".

```
(Lu2A)
What 3óther1 furniture 'd you have in that dugout in Erick? 37
You had a 2béed2- 'n a- (3) (A "listing" intonation.)
Yeah 'n hé made us a what 3wé 1called a 3cúpboard1. (2)
```

The words "other" and "that" cue Lucinda that both the local topic of "furniture" and the global topic of "dugout" were previously coordinated in the conversation. Thus they help her to relocate these topics. In this case, it was not as important to Lucinda's processing for the global topic to be expressed first, before the more local topic, since both are
still accessible due to activation in 34. The phrase "in that dugout in Erick" reactivates the dugout and farm as topic after the interruption of the "grass". It was noted above that this phrase was not repeated with every question while the topic "the dugout at Erick" remained activated. Here, however, the topic has been interrupted, and its reintroduction requires explicit mention. Note, however, that in accordance with principle four, this phrase is not repeated in the subsequent questions in which the topic that it realizes remains activated. In 37b, LeRoy further helps Lucinda to interpret his topic by summarizing what he already knows about the furniture. With a listing intonation he mentions one item of furniture in the dugout and invites her to list others. This partial answer to his question is another aid to Lucinda in coordination, similar to those strategies above involving paraphrasing and proposing a hypothetical answer to a question. Lucinda's response in 37 shows her successful interpretation.

10. In 43, LeRoy leads Lucinda out of the "dugout at the farm" topic to a topic concerning "trips to Mangum".

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Do you ever remember any of your trips to 3Mángum3?  \hspace{1cm} 43
To 3tówn3?

1 never did 3go1- but I remember Dád a-goin.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
He helps Lucinda locate this topic in her system by means of the words "ever" and "any", and the phrase "do you remember" as discussed above. He helps her further in 43b with an alternate formulation of the topic. Lucinda's answer in 43.1 demonstrates her successful coordination.

11. In 48, LeRoy again reintroduces the "farm at Erick topic". This occurs after a sojourn beginning at 41 which involved other topics that have by now been exhausted. Along with it he introduces a subtopic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>((Lu2A))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uh- ((2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the farm at 'Erick- what'd you have for breakfast'? ((1)) 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oh- we usually had eggs 'n-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Erick" topic is explicitly mentioned here as in 37 because its activation has been interrupted (principle 4). The global topic is encoded before the local topic as it was in 6 and 14 to aid Lucinda's processing. Since the "breakfast" topic is new to Lucinda, the global topic expressed before it prepares her to recognize it. In 48.1, Lucinda demonstrates her successful recognition of the topic.

12. In 49 through 58, LeRoy and Lucinda's topic coordination moves gradually through a succession of concepts in a way that will not be detailed here. At first these topics remain within the global topic of the "farm at Erick": the chickenhouse (49), the barn (51), Turkey Creek (53). Then
his cognitive topic moves, because of Lucinda's mention of Walter's relatives in 53.8, outside of this global topic to the topic of "the Fords" in 56. "The Fords" remains as topic through 58.

In 59, LeRoy reintroduces the "farm at Erick" topic as he has before in 36 and 48. He does not, however, explicitly mark this return here as he did in those earlier cases. Only the more local topic of "dinner" is expressed. This is contrary to what would be expected by virtue of principle four of topic maintenance.

---------------------------------------------

((Lu2A))

What did you have to eat for dinner? ((1)) 59
2Oh2- just anything l 3gûess1- ((Chuckle)) we could 3gët1. ((3))

---------------------------------------------

Lucinda, however, has no problem interpreting the topic shift. She does not ask for clarification. Nor does she misinterpret, answering inappropriately by telling, for example, what she had had to eat for dinner the night before the interview. Instead, her answer refers, as LeRoy intended, to what she and her family would have for dinner on the farm at Erick. She has interpreted correctly, after a number of intervening topics and despite his lack of topic coordination signals.

We can account for this situation in terms of the accessibility of topics as described in principle 2 of topic coordination.
Coordination Principle 2: Coordination difficulty. The difficulty of cognitive topic coordination/recognition correlates inversely with the accessibility of the intended new topic in the hearer's system.

The notion of accessibility has already been defined in Chapter 3 to include factors such as proximity of information, the conductivity of lines, etc. Accessibility is relevant to topic coordination as well as to topic designation. Here the notion can be further refined if we think about it in terms of the similarity between Lucinda's cognitive state at this point and LeRoy's. The concepts of "breakfast" and "dinner" are very closely associated within both of their structures because they are both English speaking Oklahomans. Both "breakfast" and "dinner" are particulars of the same domain in the taxonomic hierarchy of knowledge because both are meals. In Chapter 3 in the discussion of LeRoy's designation of topic, it was pointed out that his production of "dinner" was motivated by its close association with the previously topicalized "breakfast". Furthermore, this domain is a small closed one, having a limited number of particulars. Therefore, after LeRoy's initial introduction of the "breakfast" topic in 48, an expected next topic selection would involve "dinner" by principle four of topic designation.
Designation Principle 4: **Topic proximity.** Closely associated information is most likely to be topicalized.

However, instead of dinner being topicalized immediately, other topics intervene in accordance with two other principles of topic **designation:**

Designation Principle 7: **Topic detour.** Under some circumstances, cognitive topic activation may move out of a subarea before that subarea is exhausted.

Designation Principle 5: **Outside influence.** Concepts activated as a result of interpreting the other speakers' utterances influence cognitive topic designation.

Lucinda's mention of eggs in 48.1 leads to LeRoy's activation of the "chickenhouse" topic in 49, then to "barn" in 51. Her mention of Turkey Creek in 51.3 and the Ford cousins in 53.8 likewise leads to their topicalization. However, LeRoy soon exhausts these topics and must find a new topic in accordance with principle two of topic designation.

Designation Principle 2: **Topic exhaustion.** Once the topic designator perceives that he has exploited a part of his network topically and that it will not serve as an effective vehicle for further communication, his topic activation moves elsewhere.
In accordance with designation principle eight, the topic of "dinner" is to be expected as next topic at this point, and that is just the topic that LeRoy in fact designates.

Designation Principle 8: **Non-exhaustion.** Non-exhausted topic areas remain strongly activated for further topic production.

Lucinda has a cognitive system that functions like LeRoy's. The non-exhausted topic area involving meals on the farm therefore remains strongly activated, hence accessible, in her system as in his. In addition, she has some idea of what LeRoy's cognitive system is like and how it is likely to function at this point. Therefore, when he mentions "dinner" in 59 without reminding her of the farm, her previous activation of "breakfast on the farm" as well as her empathy with his system nevertheless leads her to interpret his question as dealing with "dinner on the farm" as well. This analysis leads to a sixth principle of topic coordination, the principle of "system similarity". The more similar the cognitive systems of the interlocutors, the easier topic coordination becomes. Here, Lucinda's system resembles LeRoy's in two important ways. First, like him, she has a very close association between the concepts of "breakfast" and "dinner" in her cognitive system. Therefore, his mention of "dinner" reminds her of the concept "breakfast". Second, having shared the conversation with
him, she has, at the moment that he says "dinner", a similar distribution of activation in her system. That is, in reactivating the concept "breakfast" she remembers talking about breakfast within the context of the larger topic of "the farm". She therefore construes the question about dinner in a similar way. LeRoy could have been more explicit concerning the global topic in 59. In this case, however, Lucinda is able to recognize his topic anyway because her system resembles his and she can anticipate his topic designation. And LeRoy, knowing that she can, does not specify it more explicitly.

Such unmarked topic changes do not result in proper interpretation if the systems of the interlocutors are not similar enough. Recall LeRoy's topic of "sorghum taffy" discussed above. In that case, Walter did not share with LeRoy an obvious association between keel and sorghum taffy that would help him coordinate to LeRoy's topic move. Nor had anything in the previous conversation activated his concept of "sorghum taffy" preparing him to recognize it. His system was not enough like LeRoy's at the time, and his recognition failed.

13. In 62.5, Lucinda introduces the topic of "the explosion at her house".
Did Lucille tell you about 'em havin' an explosión in my 2hóuse? 62.5
The other 2dáy? 62
Uh-Uh.
The wáter tank exploded.

She uses the lexical pointer "about", and a question form to help LeRoy recognize the topic. As an extra aid, she expresses the temporal component of the topic in 62.6. She puts sentence stress on "explosion", "house", and "day" as all are new to the topic. Then, she waits for LeRoy's response in 63, indicating his successful recognition, before proceeding.

Summary of coordination. We conclude this examination of topic coordination in this portion of the data by enumerating the principles of topic coordination discovered above.

1. Coordination necessity. Since each interlocutor has his own cognitive topic, topic coordination is constantly necessary.

2. Coordination difficulty. The difficulty of cognitive topic coordination/recognizion correlates inversely with the accessibility of the topic in the hearer's system.

3. Mutual coordination. Both topic producer and topic interpreter are actively involved in topic coordination.

4. Topic maintenance. Once announced, global topics remain active until explicitly changed.
5. **Topic conflict.** Interlocutors may designate conflicting topics in their respective cognitive systems.

6. **System similarity.** The more similar the cognitive systems of the interlocutors, the easier topic coordination becomes.

The principles of topic designation developed in Chapter 3 have to do with aspects of the structures and processes associated with the cognitive system of a single individual. This is because topic designation is an essentially individual activity, even though it may be influenced by activations resulting from the interpretation of utterances of other interlocutors. The principles of topic coordination listed here, however, have to do with multiple cognitive systems in interaction with each other. The focus of these principles is not on the individual's system, but on that larger system created when two cognitive systems try to communicate with each other. Nevertheless, it is the shape and operation of the individual networks that is the source of both topic designation and coordination principles.

Topic coordination in this interview involves both parties working to make sure they are thinking about the same thing as they converse. Besides reflecting the topic designation activities of the interlocutors, the surface text gives evidence of strategies that speakers use to coordinate their topics with listeners. These include paraphrase, sentence stress, announcing of a global topic first, lexical expressions such as "about", "do you remember", "anything", 


and "ever", the proposal of a possible answer to a question, and so forth. Such strategies are employed when a speaker believes that the topic change will not otherwise be accessible to the listener, such as at major topic junctures. Topics accessible to the speaker and topics the speaker judges to be accessible to the addressee may not in fact actually be accessible to the addressee, leading to breakdowns in topic coordination. For their part, listeners are actively engaged in achieving coordination as well. They ask questions when they do not recognize a topic and make inferences about the speaker's topic based on their knowledge of the world and their notion of the speaker's current cognitive state, including his current cognitive topic. Once the cognitive topics of the interlocutors are coordinated, topic maintenance does not need to be marked in the linguistic signal even though the topic remains cognitively relevant.

**Minor topic changes.** This chapter has attempted to elucidate some cognitive aspects of topic coordination associated with an extended portion of conversational data. This decision to account for a long text led us to concentrate on the gross characteristics of topic, tracing its larger contours while neglecting some of the finer details. We have treated topic coordination mainly with respect to general level topics such as "the farm at Erick" and to the coordination of changes between such topics.
Topic is relevant at a much more delicate level as well, however, and must be coordinated at this level also\textsuperscript{10}. Most of the linguistic research on topic has concentrated on topic at these more local levels, and this research is reviewed below. Here we examine the coordination of topic in a few short passages, this time concentrating on the coordination of more local topics. This treatment is not meant to be exhaustive. It does mean to suggest, however, that topic coordination at a more local level seems to follow essentially the same principles discovered above. That is, speakers have an idea of the listener's cognitive state and try to make their topics comprehensible. They must work to introduce new topics, but once a topic is properly coordinated, its maintenance requires less effort.

Topical activation can be considered to apply to large sections of network in the case of global topics such as "at the farm at Erick", and also to smaller sections such as single sections representing single participants in a proposition. Starting at the topically activated place in his network, an addressee will either add new information to his system or search for requested information that he will then report to his conversation partner.

In the excerpt below, Walter introduces the topic of his "stepdaddy" in 43.1.
You said after you got bárbed ³wire²- that you ³sold¹ these. 43
Do you remémber uh-
   ((Interrupting)) (That's- th- that-) That's where my ³stèp¹ dad³dy come ³in².
Hé tore that fence ³all¹ down²- ((1))
cut them rails in ²two²- ((1))
hauled 'em up-
soô'd 'em for ³côrdwooḍ¹.
'N bought ³wire¹.

He designates this topic within his system in response to
LeRoy's previous remark, because it was his stepfather who
was responsible for selling the rails from the rail fence.
Walter introduces the topic to LeRoy in 43.1 with a full,
stressed noun phrase. This expression gives LeRoy enough
information to activate the notion in his system that
represents Walter's stepfather. Thus, this phrase
accomplishes the work of topic coordination. In 43.2 Walter
encodes this same topic again, this time with a stressed
pronoun. The pronoun is a less explicit encoding of the
topic than the full noun phrase. It serves a deictic
function, linking the topic activated in 14.1 to the comment
material that will follow. After the pronoun, Walter in
14.2-14.6, tells about five actions that his stepfather
performed with regard to the fence. Except for the pronoun
in 14.2, however, no other pronoun is used. LeRoy is to add
all of this information about tearing, cutting, hauling,
selling, and buying to his system at the topically activated
nection, the nection representing Walter's stepfather, just as in the 2A interview, he added information about the dugout, the other farm buildings, breakfast, dinner, and so forth to his complex of nections representing the farm at Erick. The "stepdaddy" topic is not marked in every line just as the "farm at Erick" topic was not marked in every question once it was coordinated. Nevertheless, it remains activated cognitively. "Stepdaddy" is a global topic with respect to all the things that stepfather did, and as in the case of the higher level topics such as "at the farm at Erick", once the topic is coordinated, its maintenance need not be marked.

In questions, LeRoy designates a topic and communicates it to Lucinda through the question. She then locates the corresponding location in her system, retrieves the information there, and encodes it in an answer. LeRoy then interprets the answer, adding it as new information at the place in his system that he has activated as topic. This process occurs, for example, in Lu2A:28.

```
What'd he make 'it out of'?
Just 'boards'. (3)
```

Here, LeRoy and Lucinda have been talking about a bed in the dugout. LeRoy designates the topic in his system concerning the material that Walter made the bed out of. Lucinda
answers LeRoy's question appropriately, evidence that she has located the requested topic in her system. Her cryptic answer reflects the fact that she knows LeRoy is already thinking about the correct topic. Because the topic has already been coordinated, she does not need to devote part of her utterance to that task.

In the following excerpt, Lucinda tells Leroy about her experiences trading with the Indians. Within this larger topic, there are two major participants involved: the Indians, and Lucinda's family. Each of these two parties is topical with respect to some of the information in Lucinda's memory. For example, LeRoy should connect the information that somebody raised watermelons to the section in his system representing Lucinda's family and not to the section representing the Indians. In telling about this incident, Lucinda switches between these two topics, and she must coordinate her changing topic designation with LeRoy.

---

((Lu40))

Did you ever 3tráde with 'em or anything3?

Wél2 ¡yéah2 they- they 1óved 3wátermelons1.
I don't know why they didn't 3ráise 'em2-
\ you know they could a raised 3ány 1kind of 3wátermelons2 | ((Rhythmic
down there on the Wáshita 3rínver2- but they 4dídn't1. / passage))
((2)) And wél 3raised 3wátermelons2-
'n théy'd come up thére
'n théy'd trade us just 4ánything1 for a 3wátermelon1 ((2))
In 23.1-23.4, Lucinda's topic is "the Indians", which she encodes with the unstressed pronoun "they". LeRoy is to add to his knowledge about the Indians the facts that they loved watermelons, they didn't raise them, they could have raised them. In 23.5, her topic changes away from the Indians to her family. This switch must be coordinated with LeRoy, and Lucinda achieves this by stressing the pronoun "we" in 23.5. In 23.6, her topic changes back to the Indians, and she also coordinates this change with LeRoy by means of a stressed pronoun. In 23.7, she continues with the topic of Indians, but since she has already coordinated its reintroduction with LeRoy by means of a stressed pronoun in 23.6, she here uses an unstressed pronoun. In summary, a stressed pronoun alerts LeRoy to a changed topic while an unstressed pronoun signals topic maintenance. At this microscopic level of topic coordination, as at the more macroscopic levels, topic change requires the speaker to employ coordination strategies.

This brief look at these three excerpts suggests that topic coordination at this fine level of topic proceeds in accordance with the same principles by which more general level topic coordination proceeds.

**Topic in previous research.** We have understood topic as a maximally activated location in memory that moves over time in accordance with certain principles and that guides in the production and interpretation of conversation. This conception of topic grows naturally out of a network
understanding of cognitive systems. Our concern with topic
designation and topic coordination likewise stems from a
cognitive model of communicating systems, for we know that in
conversation, interlocutors must find topics to talk about
and must be able to make their designated topics understood.

The notion of topic has been approached from a somewhat
different direction in linguistic studies during the past
sixty years, and here we orient our research with respect to
this tradition. We look at two major strains of thinking
about topic: first, at topic or theme, as it has been
conceived of by mainstream linguists beginning with the
Prague school, and second at the notion of topic as it has
been invoked in the Conversational Analysis research.

**Topic in linguistics.** Prague school linguists
introduced the concept of "theme", at times called "topic" by
some, in their functional studies of sentence semantics, and
this general notion has received a great deal of attention
ever since. Unlike our approach, which considers topic in
light of long stretches of conversational data, this approach
began by studying the sentence as the domain of topic. The
interest was to account for certain properties of sentences.
For example, why were there so many different possible
expressions (e.g. active sentences, passives, left
dislocations), corresponding to a single configuration of
propositional information?
One Prague school definition characterizes theme as "the sentence element that links up directly with the object of thought, proceeds from it and opens the sentence thereby" (Firbas 1964:269 citing Travnicek). Similar notions of theme or topic have been invoked in other linguistic schools of thought. In America, Hockett (1958:201) distinguished the "topic" and "comment" portions of a sentence saying "the speaker announces a topic and then says something about it. . . In English and the familiar languages of Europe, topics are usually also subjects and comments are predicates." In Systemic linguistics, stemming from the Firthian tradition, Halliday (1985:39, 278) defines theme as "the starting-point for the message", and what the speaker chooses to take as his "point of departure". It is what the speaker is telling the listener about. For English, he identifies the theme with "that element which comes in first position in the clause." As in Hockett's view, this element often turns out to be the subject of the sentence. Within the theme Halliday further specifies a "topical theme" comprised of the first ideational element of the clause, that is, of the first entity functioning as subject, complement, or circumstantial adjunct (1985:54).

Theme, or topic, in these views is the pragmatic element invoked to explain the difference between sentences such as, "A halfpenny is the smallest English coin" and "The smallest English coin is the halfpenny" (Halliday 1985:39). In the
first, the speaker is telling the listener something about "a halfpenny". In the second, he is telling him something about "the smallest English coin".

In all of these traditional views, theme is identified with some sentence constituent. The assumption is made that all sentences have topics/themes and that these topics are expressed somewhere within the sentence, usually in the first part. No consideration is given to the possibility that topical material may be left unexpressed. Thus, in these views, the notion of theme is tied to the text. Furthermore, the sentence is implicitly assumed to be the only, or at best, the most relevant domain of theme. Theme is viewed as linking the content of the clause or sentence with what has gone before in the discourse. That is, its choice is sensitive to context. Nevertheless it is the sentence or clause, and not some larger section of discourse, that is taken as its domain. The theme is to be found inside the clause, and it is the theme of that clause.

Given the millenia long tradition within linguistics that takes the sentence as the main object of study and explication, this early tendency to talk about topic with respect to the sentence was probably inevitable. However, this limitation on the purview of topic is artificial and leaves much relevant data unaccounted for. For example, it fails to account for the patterning of global topic in conversational data.
Chafe (1976), gives a slightly different interpretation, one that leads closer to the view of topic arrived at in the present study. In his view, English sentences do not have constituents that can be identified as topics. He comes to this conclusion after comparing English with other languages such as Chinese that do have topic constituents. With respect to the function of topic in these languages he says,

"What the topics appear to do is to limit the applicability of the main predication to a certain restricted domain. . . . Typically, it would seem, the topic sets a spatial, temporal, or individual framework within which the main predication holds." (1976:50).

"In brief, 'real' topics (in topic-prominent languages) are not so much 'what the sentence is about' as 'the frame within which the sentence holds'" (1976:51).

Since few English sentences have a single grammatically identifiable constituent that performs this function\(^{11}\), he concludes that English does not have topic like Chinese does. This is essentially a statement about the grammatical system of English, i.e. Chafe still identifies topic with a sentence constituent, a portion of the text. Since not all English sentences have such a constituent, English does not have topic. He does, however, hint that English accomplishes the same sort of function by different means, such as with adverbial phrases. He thus provides a functional notion of topic which at least for English, however, cannot be identified with some grammatically defined portion of the clause. He moves away from a concern with dissecting every
sentence to find the thematic or topical element. In addition, his functional explanation of topic as a spatial, temporal, or individual framework within which the main predication holds has the virtue of being somewhat clearer and more cognitively interpretable than the characterizations cited above, e.g. "that which links up with the object of thought", "starting point of the message", "speaker's point of departure", "what the speaker tells something about".

Li and Thompson (1976) agree with Chafe's definition of topic as setting the framework for interpretation (p. 464). They go a little further than Chafe, however, in recognizing a typical expression of topic for English. They say that for English,

"to express unambiguously the topic as the discourse theme involves a separate proposition whose only function is topic establishment. In English, for example, we might do it this way:
{You know} Tom? Well, he fell off his bike yesterday."  
{Remember}  
(p. 484)

This example is of course reminiscent of a number of utterances from our corpus. For example:

((Lu2A))

You know uh- President- President McKinley that was killed? 3.3
3He'd been killed for 2- 3I 2guess two weeks afore 3we 1heard about 2it.

((Lu2A))

And you know- ((2)) President- our new president- 4.1
It wasn't a hour after he 'uz shot til we knew he was he'z shot.

.
Uncle Jeff — my uncle — drove the oxens
and daddy drove the team.

That ole contractor there that built that dump there — he had just so much you know.

'N the woman ((1)) Mrs. Smith ((1))
she says to ( )

Boys — (was) you gonna give Walter that old fiddle?

The uh dugout at Erick did it have steps into it? ((3))

Did the one that had a round wall on it could you turn it up 'n down?

That great big (plot) of ole dead cows away out back there.

They called it the boneyard. ((Chuckle))

Pa he went out — there 'n hauled up some rocks. ((1))

Thus their view of topic in English moves beyond the limits of the single sentence just as Chafe's view moves beyond a Prague-like concern with a grammatically defined expression to a functional definition. They recognize that the topic of a sentence is not necessarily expressed within the sentence itself.
These notions of topic set the stage for a more overtly cognitive approach to topic in which topic is not identified as a property of the text, but of the speakers who produce the text. Davis (1989:71) leads in this direction.

It will be suggested here that TOPIC is not a category, but (part of) a process in which two intelligences are interwoven and melded; and as such, TOPIC itself is not an isolatable and delimited "thing". Because what we observe of language is the detritus of its process in the form of collected utterances or texts, cohering usually into some kind of sensible exchange, we are inclined to identify the phenomenon (both of language and of TOPIC) with (some portion of) those observations.

This conception clearly takes the notion of topic beyond the bounds of the text itself, seeing it as a cognitive process that leaves traces in the text. This is similar to the view of topic arrived at in this study in which cognitive topic is distinguished from the discourse topic that is observable in text. Cognitive topic is conceived of as a property of the interlocutors and not of the sentence or any other grammatical unit. Text features, however, do reflect the operation of cognitive topic, and certain constructions are employed to manage the coordination of cognitive topic.

Our view does agree with that of Chafe and Li and Thompson in recognizing the function of topic, in our sense of an activated location in memory, as providing a "spatial, temporal, or individual framework" for interpretation. That is, once a listener has activated the proper sections, e.g. those representing "the farm at Erick", he will be able to
add information to and retrieve information from his system at the proper place. Our observations of conversation have refined this view in several ways, however. For one thing, this framework is multilayered. In our data, for example, "on the farm at Erick", serves as a spatial and conceptual framework for interpreting "in the dugout", which in turn serves as a framework for interpreting "furniture". Second, this framework remains activated cognitively even though it is not expressed linguistically over and over in conjunction with each predication. That is, all utterances have cognitive topics associated with them, whether they are expressed or not. Also, an expressed topic may have scope over many utterances, not just one. It can be further noted in this context that there exist aspects of cognitive topic that will never find linguistic expression. For example, "in the dugout" implies, without its being overtly expressed, a temporal framework within the "farm at Erick" topic because the dugout existed only during Lucinda and Walter's first years on the farm, and not during the years when LeRoy was growing up. Because LeRoy and Lucinda share this knowledge of the temporal history of the dugout, that temporal aspect will automatically be part of the covert topic framework even though it never receives overt linguistic expression. The essential aspect of topic is not its linguistic expression. That expression is the detritus Davis mentions. Instead, the
essential aspect lies in the cognitive systems of the interlocutors.

Another important refinement to Chafe's view of topic as a framework for interpretation is that this framework guides the speaker in the production of conversation as well guiding the listener in their interpretation. Chapter 3 traced the way that LeRoy's global topics guided him to designate certain subtopics. For example, LeRoy's designation of "the dugout" as topic in his system leads him, because of the nature of activation spreading through the organized network, to designate and ask about further specified subtopics, such as "furniture" and "walls" within the "dugout" framework. In all of these other views, including Davis' cognitive view, topic has been considered only in its coordinating/interpreting/communicating aspect. The questions have not been concerned with how a speaker designates a topic to talk about in the first place. Perhaps the data of individual sentences and the notion of topic usually invoked has prevented this question from being noticed. In this study, however, the concern with conversational data and the conception of topic in network terms as an activated location brings up the question of topic designation and also provides a theoretical framework, i.e. the notion of memory as an organized network, for studying it. Topic selection can be studied by looking at stretches of conversational data, identifying the successive
topics selected by the interlocutors, and asking how they could have been accessed.

Although our conception of topic has developed in response to conversational data and a cognitive outlook, we are interested in the sentence as a domain for discourse topic as well. The section above dealt with the coordination of minor topics, noting topics expressed in individual sentences. While not an exhaustive examination, it did suggest that topic coordination at the sentence level works in substantially the same way as at the more global levels.

**Topic in Conversation Analysis.** Besides being of interest to linguists per se, topic has also been of concern to sociologists involved in conversational analysis. This alternative to the "linguistic" view of topic is especially relevant here because conversational analysis studies the same type of data that has been studied in this project and makes some of the same observations.

The conversational analytic approach to topic can be contrasted with the linguistic approach which was motivated by the desire to explain sentence internal phenomena. As sociologists, conversational analysts have approached topic not from the standpoint of individual sentences, working outwards to larger pieces, but from the opposite direction, beginning with the larger arena involving the whole of human social behavior and working downwards to a notion of what a whole piece of discourse, such as a conversation, is about.
In this context, conversational analysts have never been concerned to identify topic with a constituent of a sentence or to worry with the functions of individual sentence parts, but have taken a more obvious route (given the meaning of "topic" or "theme" in ordinary English), of invoking discourse topic as a "pretheoretical notion of what is being talked about" (Brown and Yule, 1983:71). This characterization is much the same as those offered by Hockett and Halliday, but without the desire to identify topic with grammatically defined features of text. Conversational analysts have not troubled themselves too much with precisely defining topic beyond this intuitive characterization. Wardhaugh (1985:139) offers this commonsense definition:

"The comments the participants make will cluster, and the focus of that cluster is a topic, whether it be the weather, movies in general, a particular movie, a current news story, a round of joke-telling, and so on."

However, as Brown and Yule say of the notion of topic in conversation analysis, it is the "most frequently used, unexplained, term in the analysis of discourse" (1983:70).

Nevertheless, conversational analysts have made insightful observations about topic, observations that concur with the findings of our study. Sacks, for example, describes the topical organization of conversation in a way that fits the conversations in our corpus very well.
A general feature for topical organization in conversation is movement from topic to topic, not by a topic-close followed by a topic beginning, but by a stepwise move, which involves linking up whatever is being introduced to what has just been talked about, such that, as far as anybody knows, a new topic has not been started, though we're far from wherever we began.\(^{12}\)

Following Sacks' lead, many Conversational Analysis studies of topic have been concerned with studying sequential aspects of topic in conversation. Keenan and Schieffelin (1976), for example, describe discontinuous discourse in which the topics of two adjacent utterances are different, and continuous discourse, in which the topics are the same. Such studies of sequence implicitly assume that topic is a property of discourse. Like traditional linguistic views of topic, therefore, the Conversation Analysis conception does not see topic as a cognitive notion, a property of the speakers. Instead it is a text notion.

Because conversational analysts study the same type of data with which this study of topic has been concerned, it is not surprising that they note similar phenomena with regard to topical organization of conversation. Part of the difference between the conversational analysis approach and the one pursued here lies in the kinds of questions pursued concerning these observations. In dealing with topic, conversational analysts concentrate on the social aspects. For example, Jefferson (1984) discusses the social problem speakers face in conversation trying to complete a discussion of troublesome topics and move on to more pleasant topics.
One of the goals an interlocutor has in such a case is simply to "remain in conversation". This is a social goal, and Jefferson accounts for utterances socially in terms of their role in achieving such social goals. Sigman (1983) reviews topic in the conversation analysis literature. He concentrates on the social "negotiation" aspect of topic and is interested in the "social constraints on the introduction, stability, and/or alteration of topics" (p. 183).

The questions identified in this study, in contrast, deal with cognitive aspects of topic instead of social aspects. For example, whereas "negotiation" carries the social connotations of give and take, agreement, compromise, and diplomacy, the concept of "coordination" with which we are concerned involves only the cognitive abilities of interlocutors to recognize each other's designated topics. Agreement on a topic is a separate issue. We are interested in the "cognitive" constraints on the introduction, stability, and/or alternation of topics.

Inevitably, conversational analysts do invoke cognitive notions to help explain what they observe. Jefferson, for example, mentions that topics can be "brought to mind" or "occasioned".
...it is possible that from an identifiable place in the course of the troubles-telling, the troubles-recipient is working toward the introduction of a particular item, an item that has been brought to mind, occasioned by something said in the course of the troubles-telling, but that is inappropriately introduced then and there ... (1984: 207). (emphasis mine, CFM)

Here, however, the focus is on the socially appropriate ways to introduce a topic already occasioned, not on exploring the cognitive mechanism behind the occasioning.

Just as inevitably, we recognize the role of social goals in the conversations we have studied, such as LeRoy's goal of eliciting and recording Lucinda's memories and his problem of keeping the conversation going. Our goals, however, have centered on exploring the cognitive aspects of topic. This we have done, understanding cognitive topic as a maximally activated location in memory that changes over time in accordance with certain cognitive principles and that guides in the production and interpretation of conversation.
1 Source is Lu40:1-3
2 I.e. "re-cognition".
3 Recall the Conversation Analysis technique of looking at breakdowns in conversation to gain insights into its function.
4 Such an explanation would be an example of the unacceptable sort of mentalism feared by Twaddell and berated by Lamb (1984) as well.
5 In accordance with the topic designation principle of conductivity (principle 9).
6 Recall the topic designation principle of proximity (principle 4).
7 In accordance with the topic designation principle of lingering activation/multiple topics (principle 6).
8 These negotiations lead us away from the purely cognitive aspects of topic and into the social aspects, and they will not be further considered here.
9 These topic designation principles were developed in Chapter 3. They should not be confused with the coordination principles developed in this chapter.
10 Topic designation is not such an issue at this level where the problem is not one of coming up with something to talk about, but of making it understandable to the listener.
11 Exceptions include left-dislocated sentences, e.g. "John's knife, I accidentally cut myself with it.", and so-called topicalizations, e.g. "This cheese we haven't touched yet." (examples from Foley and Van Valin 1985:355.)
Chapter 5
Telling the Same Story Twice:
Aspects of the Storage and Expression of Experience.

I remember you têllin' one time
bout when you were sâved.
What uh- do you remémber about thât?

-LeRoy to Lucinda

Introduction. LeRoy's interviews with his parents provide a setting in which Lucinda and Walter relate their memories of many long-ago happenings. Experience with casual conversation demonstrates that it is not uncommon for one person to talk about a single memory on more than one occasion. Lucinda is no exception, and in the interviews, LeRoy inadvertently captured several examples of this phenomenon on tape. In both the 1952 interview and about a decade later in the the early 1960s interview, for example, Lucinda tells about a personal spiritual encounter of her youth. In both interviews she relates an anecdote about a friendly Indian coming to visit her father during his final illness. And in both interviews she verbalizes a number of details about her family's church-going habits on the
frontier, about certain Indian habits, and about certain aspects of Anglo-Indian relations.

These "twice told" tales and details provide an interesting data set for cognitive analysis. All of these accounts involve Lucinda's recall and verbalization of personal experience, and they make possible a number of conclusions concerning her cognitive storage and expression of the information. These insights are not so obvious in a study of expressed experiences that are recorded only one time, for the comparison of double tellings of a single experience brings certain aspects of information storage into a stereoscopic relief not otherwise possible.

Such data provides several dimensions for useful comparison. First, each 1952 verbalization can be compared with its circa 1963 counterpart in an effort to discover characteristics of the stored information that lies behind both tellings. Second, various features of the retold experiences can be compared with each other to determine the extent to which different types of information are stored differently. This chapter examines these repeated memories with the following questions in mind. What do multiple tellings of a single experience reveal about how Lucinda stores the information? What do they reveal about her processing as she finds linguistic expression for the information? What do they reveal about her sensitivity to and reliance on the listener's cognitive system as she tries
to get her meanings across? Finally, how are different kinds of experience stored and expressed differently? The investigation begins with Lucinda's account of the spiritual experience, then continues with her tellings of the story about the friendly Indian. These two stories are then compared with each other. Conclusions are summarized as principles of the storage and expression of information.

A frontier salvation experience. Lucinda married Walter in 1896 when she was fourteen years old. Her mother had died approximately two years earlier, and at some time between these two occasions, Lucinda had a spiritual experience that had special meaning for her. Over fifty years later, prompted by a question in the 1952 interview, she recalls this experience as follows.

Lucinda's salvation experience, 1952 version.

((Lu40))

((4)) Do you remember the time that you were saved?
3oooh- yes. ((2))

Where was it?

Well- ((4))
1 don't know it seems like kinda peculiar- ((3))
that it happened that a way- but uh- ((5))
when they buried mother they buried her up on our place. ((1))
We didn't have no graveyard there then.

That was done by- ((Collows))

Yeah. ((6))
And uh- I'd been up to her grave-
'n uh- I'd- I got down 'n-
'n I - I just 3pray1.
I don't know- ((1)) how 4côme2 but 3anyway- ((2))
I was up there by my3self1.
'n as I was comin 2báck2- ((3))
from there- down there in the 3pásture1- ((5))
What'd you 3réel1 like?
2Well3- 1 3don't 1know2 1it just 3séem 1like that- ((5))
Thát's somethin' you can't hardly 3téll 1'fìn3t it3? ((Chuckel))
((Chuckel)) I guess it 3ís1. 82
((Chuckel))
It's pretty 3wónderful 1though1 3'fìn3t it2?
2Yeah3, ((3))

In the 1960s interview, Lucinda describes this same experience, again prompted by LeRoy's question, as follows.

Lucinda's salvation experience, 1960s version.

((Lu2A))

((3))

I remember you téllin' one time bout when you were sáved. ((2)) 94
What uh- do you remémber about 3'hat1? ((1))
Oh 'I just felt like uh-
I needed sómethin' (comin')-
and I went to- óut to where momma was búried 'n-
kneelèd down in prýayer.
I thought (there) where her héd was-
but 'I don't know whether- it was her héd or her 3féeft1. ((1))
'N I- ((8))

Go ahéad. ((2))

'n as I come back to the hórse-
séem like I can see them fencépostís now.
Everthing looked só gód to me. ((2))
But I didn't know the Bíble or (quote it). ((9))
Comparison of the two tellings. We begin the discussion by noting some similarities and differences in the two tellings. First, it can be noted that both tellings are elicited by LeRoy's preceding question (1952:78; ca 1963:94a and b). Neither account is volunteered by Lucinda.

Second, information expressed in each of the two versions shows that the tellings express a single memory from Lucinda's system, not two separate memories. In both versions, LeRoy elicits the information with the notion of the time when "you were saved" (1952:78; ca 1963:94). Both the definite article of "the time" of 1952:78 and the "when" of ca 1963:94 identify this as a unique experience in Lucinda's life. Knowledge of LeRoy's and Lucinda's shared Baptist culture further supports this view, for salvation is viewed in Baptist practice as a one-time experience. In addition, in both versions, Lucinda includes the information that her mother had been buried (1952:79.5; ca 1963:94.3), that Lucinda went to the grave site (1952:80.2; ca 1963:94.3), that she knelt and prayed (1952:80.3-4; ca 1963 94.4), and that she then returned from the grave site (1952:80.7-8; ca 1963:95.1). In other words, both tellings specify the same time, place, and action sequence.

Another similarity of the two versions lies in the frequency of the disfluencies that mark Lucinda's delivery. For example, both versions are marked by long pauses (e.g. 1952:79.1, 2, and 4, 80.1, 5, 7, and 8, 81.1; ca 1963:94.7,
95a, and 95.3). In addition, false starts, and filled pauses (i.e. "uh"'s) are common (e.g. 1952:80.3; ca 1963:94.1, 3). Perhaps most striking is that in both tellings, Lucinda leaves a sentence hanging unfinished for several seconds at the climax of the account until LeRoy finally prompts her to continue (1952:81; ca 1963:95). In short, neither version is fluent.

There are many differences as well. Obviously, the two versions are not word for word twins. Similar ideas are expressed in different wordings (e.g. "I got down 'n I just prayed" in 1952:80.3-4 vs. "I kneeled down in prayer: in ca 1963:94.4; "to her grave" in 1952:80.2 vs. "to where momma was buried" in ca 1963:94.3). Also, although both versions report the same basic facts, there are differences in the details included. For example, only the 1952 version tells that there was no graveyard (79.6) and that Lucinda's mother was buried on the family farm (79.5). And only the 1960s version tells that Lucinda did not know which end of the grave was which (94.6). Likewise, the 1952 version tells the origin of Lucinda's return trip after the prayer (80.7-8, "'n as I was comin back- from there- down there in the pasture-") while the 1960s version tells the destination of the same trip (95.1, "'n as I come back to the house-").

Besides these kinds of localized differences, the two accounts also show a marked difference in overall organization. In the 1952 version, Lucinda begins with an
evaluative statement in 79.2-3 that serves as an advance apology or excuse for the trouble she has expressing her feelings in the rest of the telling ("...it seem likes kinda peculiar that it happened that a way..."). Then in 79.5-80.4 and 80.6-8 she expresses factual information connected with the experience. Throughout this delivery, Lucinda makes explicit her trouble in expressing the deeper level of meaning behind the "facts" (e.g. the three "I don't know"s of 79.2, 80.5, and 81.1), and she finally gives up in 81.2 ("That's somethin' you can't hardly tell isn't it?"). That is, she recognizes that although she has cited the facts of the situation, she has not been able to express the more essential but ineffable spiritual and emotional content of the situation. LeRoy then offers help in 83 ("It's pretty wonderful though idn't it?"), and Lucinda concurs with this conclusion in 83.1.

The 1960s version, in contrast, has a much tighter organization, one that needs no advance apology and which is much more successful than the earlier version in expressing in words the emotional content of the experience. Here, Lucinda begins by posing a problem in 94.1-2 ("Oh I just felt like uh I needed somethin' (comin')-"). Within this "problem to be solved" framework, the juxtaposition of the factual information that follows (94.3-95.1) defines itself not as a random series of events but as a sequence of steps leading to a solution. Then, at the same point where in 1952 she had
given up expressing the meaning that the experience had for her, Lucinda in this version finds not one, but two ways. First, in 95.2 she reports her current visual state ("seem like I can see them fenceposts now"). This comment indirectly helps LeRoy appreciate the experience by making clear to him Lucinda's heightened sensory awareness in connection with it. An ordinary row of fenceposts became a memorable visual image. Then, in 95.3, Lucinda gives a more direct assessment of the meaning of the experience ("Everything looked so good to me"). These expressions show that she has found a solution to her initial problem of feeling like she needed something.

A comparison of the patterning of verbal semantics and tense and aspect in the two tellings also reveals differences. The 1952 version of the experience shows a complex pattern of tense/aspect marking relative to the much simpler 1960s version. In the 1952 version, a number of clauses refer to Lucinda's thoughts at the time she is speaking (e.g. "I don't know it seem likes kinda peculiar. . .", 79.2; "I don't know how come. . .", 80.5; "I don't know it just seem like that- that's somethin' you can't hardly tell . . .", 81.2). Of the clauses that encode the long ago experience, some are durative (e.g. "We didn't have no graveyard there then.", 79.6, "I was up there by myself", 80.6) while others encode punctual events (e.g. "they buried her up on our place", 79.5; "'n I just prayed", 80.4). Some
of the events are encoded in simple past tense (e.g. "'n I just prayed", 80.4) while others are in past perfect ("I'd been up to her grave.", 80.2) or past progressive ("I was comin' back.", 80.7) A false start, "I'd- I got down" (80.3,) betrays Lucinda's on-line difficulty in expressing the appropriate aspect.

While these observations do not completely exhaust the tense and aspect organization of this telling, they do serve at least to demonstrate the complexity of that organization. In the 1960s version in contrast, the pattern is much simpler. Two clauses do refer to Lucinda's processing at the time of the telling ("I don't know whether . .", 94.6; "seem like I can see them fenceposts now."). The remaining clauses, however, overwhelmingly encode a sequence of punctual events in simple past tense, i.e. "felt", "went", "kneeled", "thought", "come"³, "looked". In short, the tense/aspect organization is much simpler.

These observations about the two tellings of Lucinda's salvation experience are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1952 version, Salvation story</th>
<th>1960s version, Salvation story</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>elicited experience</td>
<td>elicited experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>concerns a unique personal</td>
<td>concerns the same unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience</td>
<td>personal experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>disfluent</td>
<td>disfluent</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e.g. unfinished sentence)</td>
<td>(e.g. unfinished sentence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>wordings peculiar to this</td>
<td>different wordings,</td>
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<tr>
<td>telling</td>
<td>peculiar to this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. &quot;got down&quot;)</td>
<td>telling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>details peculiar to this</td>
<td>different details, peculiar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>telling</td>
<td>to this telling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. &quot;no graveyard&quot;)</td>
<td>(e.g. &quot;her head or feet&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loose overall organization</td>
<td>tight overall organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relatively complex</td>
<td>(problem and solution)</td>
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<td>tense/aspect pattering</td>
<td>relatively simple</td>
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The storage and expression of the information. Based on these observations, a number of conclusions can be drawn concerning Lucinda's cognitive storage and expression of the information regarding her salvation experience. These conclusions are proposed and discussed below and summarized for convenience as principles of the storage and expression of personal experience. They are offered as cognitive explanations for the observed phenomena.

First, it can be noted that Lucinda's memory of the salvation episode is not a linguistic memory but a distinctly non-linguistic perceptual memory of a sensory experience. She did not merely hear about the experience through words, but experienced it herself with all of her senses. Therefore, even though she here attempts to express the experience linguistically, the informational content itself
experience linguistically, the informational content itself resides primarily within perceptual (e.g. visual and tactile) and affective portions of her cognitive system that are connected to, yet outside the area of the linguistic system proper. This constitutes a first principle of the storage and expression of personal experience which can be called the principle of non-linguistic storage. Memory of personal experience involves sensory percepts, i.e. it mainly involves non-linguistic portions of the total cognitive system.

This view of the non-linguistic storage of experience is perhaps most strikingly supported by Lucinda's report of visual sensation in ca 1963:95.2 ("seem like I can see them fenceposts now"). She recalls a portion of the visual context of the experience vividly enough to visualize it as she thinks and talks about it. This interpretation is also in keeping with surface patterns evident in the two tellings. For example, the large number of disfluencies Lucinda exhibits result from her struggle to find adequate linguistic expression for the information. The long pauses, false starts, etc, reflect her coding problem as she works to verbalize the perceptual memory of sensory stimuli. If Lucinda's memory of the experience were stored at the time of the telling in linguistic/propositional form, disfluencies would not occur in such numbers. We will return to this point later in comparing Lucinda's accounts of her salvation experience with her more fluent tellings of the friendly
Indian story. Lucinda's ultimate failure in the 1952 telling (81.2) to verbalize her feelings also reflects the fact that the memory of the initial experience is stored as sensory-perceptual information instead of as linguistic information. She remembers how she felt, i.e. the memory is obviously stored somewhere, but the task of expressing that feeling in words is a separate consideration, a problem she has not completely worked out as the story is told. If the memory of the feeling had been stored in the linguistic system before her account began, the verbalization would not have been so problematic.

In addition, many differences in the two tellings, including the overall organization as well as more local choices of expression (e.g. "got down" in 1952:80.3 vs. "kneeled down" in ca 1963:94.4) can be attributed to the non-linguistic nature of the storage. The perceptual storage of the experience does not determine in advance a particular linguistic expression, and differences result in separate tellings.

The transition from the perceptual storage of an experience to its linguistic expression involves complex processing. Chafe (1977) profitably distinguishes three levels of linguistic organization about which speakers make choices as they seek to express information: schematization, framing, and categorization. His notion of schematization corresponds to the overall organization noted here. For
example, we noted that Lucinda's 1960s telling of this experience treats it as a problem, steps-to-a-solution, solution sequence. In Chafe's terms, this treatment would constitute Lucinda's schematization of the event on that occasion. The earlier telling did not exhibit this particular schematization. In terms of a network conception, schematization would involve the division of a selected but undivided portion of memory into smaller configurations of concepts that are manageable for linguistic expression. Further, schematization involves the organization of these portions in some sequence that will show the listener the relationships of the different parts to each other. Due to the linear quality of the speech signal a memory cannot be expressed all at once, and schematization represents the first step from multi-dimensional memory to one-dimensional speech signal.

Whereas schematization involves an initial breakdown of the information for telling, framing refers to more specific choices. These involve the separating off of portions of the resulting smaller configurations of concepts for expression as discrete participants and events. Expressions such as "where momma was buried" and "her grave" represent different framings of a single situation. "Where momma was buried" presents the gravesite as a participant in an event of burying. In contrast, the lexicalized "her grave" packages the event participant complex as a single individual chunk.
Both "her grave" and "where momma was buried", however, are linguistic expressions of a single conceptual portion of memory. Categorization is even more specific and has to do with the choice of a lexical expression to denote a participant or event in a given frame, for example "kneel down" vs. "get down".

Chafe's point, similar to ours here, is that speakers make different choices at each of these levels in alternate tellings of a single experience. This fact suggests that particular schematizations, framings, or categorizations are not stored for each remembered experience. Instead such choices are made at the time that the non-propositionally stored information is expressed. In other words, as Chafe concludes, "knowledge is not stored propositionally at all" (1977:54). In terms of Lucinda's cognitive systems, we can say that Lucinda's memory of her salvation experience is not stored in the linguistic system. In expressing the memory of a personal experience linguistically, she must make a selection of non-linguistic concepts and then select a linguistic expression for them.

As mentioned above, one reason that such linguistic choices, which ultimately affect the surface organization of the narrated experience, tend not to be stored with the memory of the experience itself lies in a basic discrepancy between the structure of memory and the structure of the speech signal. In memory, three-dimensional network
information exists simultaneously. Lucinda knows all parts of the experience at once. The speech signal, however, is linear and sequential. Therefore, although all the information exists in the system at one time, it must be expressed in a sequence of utterances which in turn involve a sequence of smaller pieces. Thus the process of verbalizing the information forces different levels of organization or schematization in the telling that are not necessary to or typical of the original perceptual storage. Many choices about the expression of the information become necessary only when the one who experienced it wants to tell someone about his memory.

In summary, the memory of experience involves perceptual non-linguistic information storage that results from sensory stimulation. If memory of experience involves non-linguistic storage, then in order to inform another person about one's experience, a translation of perceptual memory into linguistic information is necessary. Moreover, as suggested above, this translation does not take place at the time of the original experience. These notions constitute second and third principles of the storage and expression of experience. Principle 2 can be called the principle of translation necessity. Perceptual memory of sensory experience must be translated into linguistic information for expression to another person. Principle 3 can be called the principle of translation timing. This translation is not completed at the
time of the experience. That is, the original perception and memory of experience does not necessarily involve linguistic storage. Instead a great deal of this translation occurs later, and as Lucinda's statement in 1952:81.2 shows ("That's something you can't hardly tell, isn't it?"), it is not necessarily successfully completed even by the time of telling. Instead, it seems to be the necessity of telling that forces the translation attempt. If a representation of experience were stored in the linguistic system before the occasion of the verbalization of that information, patterns such as marked disfluencies would not likely occur in such abundance.

The connections within the cognitive system between the sensory/perceptual modalities and the linguistic system have not been mapped, but it is clear that the relationships are complex. Moreover, it is clear that at least in the linguistic system, there is a layering of levels of information leading from conceptual content to linguistic expression. At its lower levels, the linguistic system contains information concerning such issues as the pronunciation of words and the combination of morphemes into words. At its higher levels, the linguistic system interfaces with the larger cognitive system. Morphemes, lexemes, phrases, sentences, etc. all have connections to concepts. There is no sharp boundary at this interface. Instead, there is a gradual transition between the linguistic
system and the rest of the cognitive system. Earlier discussion referred to the linguistic vs. the non-linguistic storage of experience, and these notions now need to be interpreted with respect to a system with no clear boundary between the two. In terms of network cognitive systems, the notion of experience being represented linguistically would mean that the information is stored somewhere within the linguistic system, at least within its upper areas, and that choices involving certain aspects of the linguistic expression have already been made. Minimally this means that some relatively abstract (from the point of view of the linguistic expression) propositional representation is stored in the higher levels of the linguistic system. This representation would include at least a few choices concerning notions such as Chafe's schematization and framing, choices that involve the initial stages of the accommodation of non-linguistic experience to linguistic expression. A more concrete linguistic type of storage, in contrast to pure sensory/perceptual storage, might involve a verbatim representation at the lexemic level, one in which most of the choices concerning the linguistic expression have already been made. Such storage would characterize remembered poems, for example, and they can be thought of, in contrast to first-hand remembered experience, as being stored primarily in the linguistic system rather than in the
sensory/perceptual modalities. Thus there is a range of storage possibilities.

The point here, with regard to principle 3 above, is that the translation of personal experience into linguistic expression is not an all or none operation. Instead, it may occur by degrees. For example, Lucinda may recognize a linguistic label for her experience, "salvation", at the time of the experience, long before she has chosen any propositions with which to talk about the experience. Clearly, however, the translation is not effected immediately upon the perception of the experience. Instead, the experience is stored in the sensory/perceptual modalities and then translation is attempted as needed. In this case, the original experience takes place in the 1890s, but its conversion into linguistic expression is not complete even by 1952. Lucinda clearly remembers how she felt (note the enthusiastic "Ooohh- yes" of 1952:78.1), but the memory of the feeling is not stored in linguistic form and presents a formidable challenge for translation.⁵

First hand experience is stored in non-linguistic portions of the cognitive system and then translated into linguistic expression as needed. A fourth principle of the storage and expression of experience involves the fact that some kinds of recalled experience lend themselves to linguistic expression more readily than do other kinds. This can be called the principle of translation ease. In the two
tellings of the salvation experience, Lucinda has relatively little trouble in expressing the participants and sequential events attendant upon the experience. She went to her mother's grave, knelt and prayed, and came back to the house. Such situations are not difficult to express in language and they often have a number of rather obvious encodings. That is, Lucinda has in her linguistic system obvious solutions to the problems of what to call a posture in which the knees are on the ground, how to refer to participants, how to signal that one event follows another, etc. Language, with its temporal sequential quality and its discrete recurring words and phrases is well suited for expressing such states of affairs.

The essential emotional impact of the experience, however, does not consist of these externally observable events, and in both tellings, it is near the end of Lucinda's account of this event sequence at the point that the feeling needs to be expressed that she experiences the most difficulty. In both cases, it is just here that LeRoy must prompt her to continue the account after lengthy pauses (1952:81; ca 1963:95). In the 1952 version, Lucinda fails outright in characterizing her emotion (81.1-2) following this prompt. In the 1960s version she achieves a characterization indirectly through visual report and metaphor. "Everything looked so good to me", she says (95.3). But this is not a description of her emotional
experience in the direct sense that "I went out to where momma was buried" is a description of a physical event. Although the language has names for a number of emotions, the lexicon and syntax is not rich in conventional, everyday ways to express such feelings. And the few words that are available, e.g. "good", "happy" are somewhat vague for providing detailed accounts of emotions. Instead, both speaker and listener have to be artful and indirect as Lucinda is here. In the 1952 version, LeRoy's suggestion in 83, "It's pretty wonderful though idn't it?", shows Lucinda that he has some idea, based on his own experience, of how she must have felt even though she could not tell him directly.

Speakers sometimes solve the problem of expressing emotions by resort to overt comparison, as Lucinda does in this excerpt which immediately follows the 1952 salvation experience account. She compares her feeling to a feather.

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((Lu40))

'I remember once you told about uh- the first time you ever gave a testimony1. 84 Do you remember 2that3?

2Yeah3.

1 re3mémber it.
2It uz uh it uz ss-
3we wálted to- ((1)) 3práyer 1'méetin' 1 3gúess it 1 was.
4Chúrch 1 anywáy. ((1))
3'N they had a 3téstímony1'méetin'2. ((4))
2'N I got up 'n 2'I don't know2
1 don't re3mémber2 what I 4sáid2
| but I de3cláre2 I just felt so-
| ((Rhythmic))
Such overt comparisons are rare in Lucinda's speech, however. That is, it seems to be relatively difficult for her to draw such analogies. They do not involve obvious translations of non-linguistic information into language in the same way that observable sequences of events do.6

It is not only emotions that are relatively difficult to express in language. Physical sensations pose difficulties as well. Visual information, for example, presents a similar challenge although there are more words, i.e. conventional expressions, for visual sensations than for emotions (e.g. red, shiny, dark, plaid, angular, translucent, splotched, etc). Note that while Lucinda in ca 1963:95.2 reports her own visualization of fenceposts, she does not describe the fenceposts so that LeRoy can visualize them too. Also consider this example in which Lucinda has trouble telling LeRoy the height of a tipi and tries instead to have him recall his own observations of tipis in 56.1.

Hów má- Hów ³táí was the tipi1. (((1) (Lu3B))

Oh- you've ³séen 'em1 'háven't you³?

²No2. Can't say that I ³háve1. (((1))

Oh I guess about ten or twelve feet ³táí²- ³gúess².
In this case, Lucinda recalls a visual image of tipis which undoubtedly includes a representation of tipi height. She knows how tall they are visually, and she also knows the linguistic conventions for expressing height in terms of feet and inches. However, her cognitive system lacks exact connections relating a particular visual image with its corresponding linguistic expression. The best she can do is to make a rough guess, and this she does in 57.1 carefully marking her tentative attitude towards her translation with the words "I guess" and "about". A person with more experience with measurements, a carpenter for example, would have less difficulty making this translation between visual and linguistic modes of information owing to richer connections in his system between the two.

Lacking clearly accurate or obvious linguistic translations of visually or emotionally stored information, Lucinda can, as we have seen here, resort to referring a listener to his own experience instead of attempting her own linguistic translation. If LeRoy had seen a tipi himself, then he could recall that memory and would not need to be told how tall they are. By this same principle, LeRoy professed understanding of Lucinda's salvation experience in 1952:83 even though she was unable to describe the emotional component. Recalling his own similar experience, he could imagine what hers felt like even without being told. These are extreme cases, but the processing involved does not
really differ from the processing involved with more routine language usages. The quite conventional expression "red", for example, refers the listener to his own visual system where his own memory of redness, based on his own personal experience, is stored. It is by recalling the red things that he has seen that the listener knows what the speaker is talking about. The main difference between the case of "red" and that of Lucinda's feeling on being saved is that the visual concept of redness has an obvious conventional corresponding translation in the linguistic system while the emotion does not. One reason that experience is not immediately translated into linguistic information and stored in the linguistic system is that there is not always an accurate or obvious propositional equivalent to which it corresponds. Information would be lost.

It was observed above that while certain information is expressed in both tellings of the experience, Lucinda does not express exactly the same information in each telling. In both tellings, for example, Lucinda tells that she got down on the ground and prayed. However, only in the 1952 telling does she mention that the family had no graveyard. Two further principles of the storage and expression of experience follow from this observation. Principle five can be called the principle of connected storage: More information is stored in connection with an experience than is ever expressed in a single telling. Principle six can be
called the principle of **chunked storage**: Experience is remembered in chunks consisting of an essential core of smaller bits of information.

In Lucinda's memory, the experience that is activated by the phrase "the time when you were saved" consists of the collection of the memories that she went to her mother's grave, knelt, prayed, and returned, and that on that return trip, some emotional change took place. These are the essential points to be communicated to the listener and they are thus included in each telling. In network memory, however, this core collection is not isolated from the rest of memory, but rather has many connections to it and can be fully understood only in relation to this larger matrix. The notion of "mother's grave", for example, has connected with it the information that the grave was located on the farm for lack of a proper graveyard. From the standpoint of the experience chunk indexed by "the time that you were saved", this locational detail is background explanatory information that need not be expressed in every telling. It is not central to the story although it is closely associated with it. Such information is, however, accessible for telling as Lucinda chooses at the time of the telling.

These last two principles demonstrate especially well the advantages of a cognitive network approach to conversational data for understanding the surface patterning in conversation. Interlocutors possess a great deal of
knowledge. However, only a small part of this knowledge can be expressed in conversation. In the comparison of twice told stories, we can get clear glimpses of the vast amount of unexpressed information that exists alongside that which is actually expressed during any one performance. A cognitive network view, by virtue of the connectedness of all information which it proposes, deals with this situation very well. Unlike more strictly text linguistic approaches to discourse, it enables us to see beyond to artifact of the text into the cognitive systems responsible for the text. In this case, we see beyond the structure of the surface "story" to properties of the storage of the original salvation memory.

Lucinda's decision to include certain non-central details is likely to be sensitive to a number of cognitive factors. Unique characteristics of her particular activation pattern during a particular recollection may motivate the expression of certain notions, for example. Such a situation may have motivated her expression of the idea that she did not know which end of her mother's grave was the head. This conclusion must remain quite speculative for now, but there is good evidence that her selection of some details for expression is sensitive to her notion of what the listener knows, is thinking about, and wants to find out. This factor constitutes a seventh principle of the storage and expression of experience which can be called listener sensitivity.
Expression of experience is sensitive to the listener's cognitive state (e.g., what he knows already and what he wants to know).

In the case of the salvation experience, LeRoy elicits both tellings by means of questions. His eliciting utterances differ from each other and this difference tells Lucinda something about his cognitive state. In the 1952 interview (1952:78), his cue question, "Do you remember the time that you were saved?", implies that he does not know much about the occasion although it does presuppose that Lucinda did in fact have such an experience. In contrast, in the 1960s interview (ca 1963:94a & b), LeRoy's cue question, "I remember you tellin' one time bout when you were saved. What do you remember about that?", makes clear to Lucinda that he already knows a great deal about her experience. In addition, LeRoy's questions in 1952 indicate that he has a special interest in the location of the experience (1952:79, 80; "Where was it? . . . That was down by (Collums)?") while his question in the 1960s interview (ca 1963:94b; "What do you remember about that?") indicates a more general interest. Lucinda, therefore, begins her accounts with different notions of what LeRoy knows and wants to know, and these notions influence the way she talks about the experience.

Lucinda's sensitivity to LeRoy's cognitive system is perhaps most evident in her expression of information about the location of her mother's grave. It is in the 1952
telling in which LeRoy shows an interest in the location of the salvation experience and professes little prior knowledge about the event that Lucinda includes the most background information about both the spatial and temporal setting of the experience. She contextualizes her mother's burial in a temporal setting (1952:79.5; "when they buried mother") and mentions the agent of the burying event (1952:79.5; "they buried her"). She identifies the location of the grave (1952:79.5; "up on our place") and explains why that location was chosen (1952:79.6; "We didn't have no graveyard there then."). This introduction serves both to satisfy LeRoy's expressed curiosity about the location of the experience as well as to provide for him a setting against which to interpret the main events, and it is only after this introduction that Lucinda begins to tell about her part in the events (1952:80.2; "And I'd been up to her grave"). In the 1960s version, in contrast, in which LeRoy claims to know something about the experience already and does not show special interest in the location, Lucinda skips this careful assertion of introductory background material about the grave site. Instead she mentions the grave only after she begins her account of the main event sequence, and she mentions it in a nominalized clause as a circumstance that she believes LeRoy is already familiar with (ca 1963:94.3; "and I went out to where momma was buried"). Since LeRoy claims to
know the story already, the setting need not be introduced as carefully.

Lucinda's sensitivity to LeRoy's cognitive state in the 1952 telling is also shown in her introductory statement (1952:79.2-3; "I don't know it seem likes kinda peculiar that it happened that a way."). This statement gives LeRoy warning concerning the admittedly bizarre circumstances of the experience and is thus appropriate to a situation in which the listener is learning about the experience for the first time. In the 1960s telling, in contrast, in which Lucinda knows that LeRoy already knows the outlines of the story, she does not begin with such a disclaimer. On the contrary, she tells about the experience as if it were an ordinary, matter of fact happening. Note especially the flavor given by the "just" of the "Oh I just felt like I needed somethin'" of ca 1963:94.1-2. This expression is more appropriate to a listener to whom the information is "old" news.

Lucinda's treatment of tense and aspect is also consistent with LeRoy's supposed prior knowledge of the experience. In the first telling, in which he does not profess familiarity with the course of events, Lucinda provides detailed aspectral information to help LeRoy build up step by step an accurate representation of the relative times and durations of the events involved. This aspectral organization also helps LeRoy identify the climax of the
story, the "I got down 'n I just prayed." of 1952:80.3-4. This utterance is rendered in simple past tense but follows a clause in past perfect, (1952:80.2; "I'd been up to her grave") and precedes a present tense clause (80.5), a past durative clause (80.6), and a past progressive clause, (80.7-8), all of which are backgrounded relative to the punctual past tense clause.7

In the 1960s telling, in which LeRoy claims to know about the experience already, Lucinda judges that such detailed aspectual information is not necessary. That is, she is reminding LeRoy of a story he already knows in its entirety, not trying to help him build up an initial representation. Likewise, if LeRoy already knows the story, it is of less importance that Lucinda point out a climactic event. The relatively simple sequence of simple past tense verbs efficiently serves a reminding function.

Summary of principles. Thus far, we have identified seven principles of the storage and expression of personal experience. These are reprinted here for convenience.
Seven Principles of the Storage and Expression of Personal Experience.

1. Non-linguistic storage. Memory of personal experience involves sensory percepts, i.e. it mainly involves non-linguistic portions of the total cognitive system.

2. Translation necessity. Perceptual memory of sensory experience must be translated into linguistic information for expression to another person.

3. Translation timing. This translation is not completed at the time of the experience.

4. Translation ease. Some kinds of recalled experience lend themselves to linguistic expression more readily than other kinds.

5. Connected storage. More information is stored in connection with an experience than is ever expressed in a single telling.

6. Chunked storage. Experience is remembered in chunks consisting of an essential core of smaller bits of information.

7. Listener sensitivity. Expression of experience is sensitive to the listener's cognitive state.

In the following considerations of other twice-told memories, these principles will be further illustrated and new ones formulated.

We have seen that Lucinda's task in telling LeRoy about her salvation experience has involved the translation of non-linguistically stored information into linguistic information that can be expressed to LeRoy by means of the speech signal. This translation has involved making choices about both the overall organization of the telling, and more locally, about the way aspects of the experience are framed and categorized.
In addition, Lucinda's task has involved a tracking of and orienting to the state of LeRoy's cognitive system.

All of these activities add up to a great deal of processing for Lucinda to be engaged in at one time, and the complexity of the task results in a highly disfluent performance. Not all of Lucinda's speech is this disfluent, however. The twice-told "friendly Indian" incident provides a good example of a more fluent expression of experience. The following section compares the tellings of that story. The subsequent section then turns to a comparison of the tellings of the Long Hair memory with the tellings of the salvation experience and includes further consideration of the relationship of fluency to the storage and expression of personal experience.

A friendly Indian comes to visit. Lucinda had many encounters with Indians in the Oklahoma territory. One Indian that she knew in her childhood particularly impressed her with his neighborliness during the time that young Lucinda's father was sick with his final illness. In 1952 she recalls this experience as follows. The bold faced portion of the excerpt is the part that is retold in the 1960s interview.
A friendly Indian, 1952 version.

((Lu40))

Did you ever go down to their- ((2)) 3Cóloný 3

1 where they 3lived' n everthing3?

[ No. ((3)) ]

→ There was 3óne ole- ((1)) 21Indian2-

→ his náme was 3Lóng Háir2. ((1))

→ 'N 3hé '1 visited us 3quite 2óften1 after 3dád 1got sick1. ((1))

→ He 2cámé one 2nífht 'n 1was 2sísttin 2there 1'n dád was 3áwrf 1sick 'n-

→ ((5)) 'n hél- hé could sáy enóugh that we'd understánd a 4lítl1.

→ He'd sáy hél's 4áwrf 1sick 1. ((2))

→ We could under3stánd 1that1. ((3))

'N hél' s come fn 'n-

3Thát's 1after we- uh built 3dúgout2 'n moved up there where-

3Alice's1 2pláce1 you know- 1where it blew 3away3?

The-

Uhm.

3hólse blowed3? ((5))

In the 1960s interview, Lucinda verbalizes the memory like this. Bold-face type marks the retold portion.

A friendly Indian, ca 1963 version.

((Lu3B))

What did their hair look like?

8 0

Oh the 3mén's 1hair was 3púrty1.

But the 3wómen1 didn't do nothin 3to1 their hair but-

just let it hang 2dówn1. ((2))

But the mén 'd keep theirs 3cómbed1 'n plátéd 3up1. 'N looked púrty.

→ Wé had an old Indian come see dád (at)- hél'uz sick.

→ His náme was Lóng Háir. ((1))

→ 'N hél' ((2)) have hís hair pláted 'n it'd hang way down to his wást.

→ ((2)) One níght he come- dád was pretty 3sick1. ((2))
Comparison of the two tellings. As in the treatment of the salvation story, we begin this discussion by noting some similarities and differences in the two tellings of the Long Hair incident before beginning a cognitive consideration of these characteristics.

First it can be noted that in neither telling does LeRoy elicit the account with his preceding question (1952:30; ca 1963:80). Instead Lucinda volunteers the incident in each case. This situation of course contrasts with that of the salvation experience accounts which LeRoy directly elicited in both instances.

Second, as in the case of the salvation experience accounts, information expressed in each of the Indian experience versions shows that the tellings express a single memory from Lucinda's system. In each telling Lucinda identifies the Indian as Long Hair (1952:30.3; ca 1963:80.6). In each she tells that he came to visit her father at a time of illness (1952:30.4; ca 1963:80.5). Both times she singles out one night in which Long Hair came to visit (1952:30.5; ca
1963:80.8), and both times she quotes Long Hair's comment, "He's awful sick" (1952:30.7; ca 1963:80.11-12).

The two tellings of the incident are also similar in the degree of fluency with which they are told. Although there are a few long pauses and false starts, both come across as relatively fluent, especially in comparison with the salvation experience verbalizations. In neither account does Lucinda come to a place where she is at a loss to express herself, and in neither one does LeRoy feels a need to prompt her to continue as occurred in the salvation story tellings.

There is one disfluency that occurs in a similar way and at a similar point in both tellings and thus deserves special mention. In the 1952 version (30.6, first two words: '"n he-"), Lucinda utters a false start immediately before commenting on Long Hair's language abilities (30.6, remainder). In the 1960s version (80.9: '"n he'd say"'), she utters a similar false start also immediately before commenting on Long Hair's language ability (80.10). Not only does this false start occur immediately before this comment in each case, but in addition, the false start and accompanying comment occur in the same slot relative to the sequence of event clauses. They come after the expression of the "one night he came" first event (1952:30.5; ca 1963:80.8) and before the climactic "he'd say 'he's awful sick'" event. Furthermore, in both cases, the false start seems to be a formulation of the climactic event that is cut off before its
expression is completed. This is especially clear in the 1960s "'n he'd say" false start. That this quite intricate four part sequence of (Event$_1$ - disfluent false start to Event$_2$ - background comment - Event$_2$) would occur in both tellings deserves careful consideration.

Another similarity in the two versions involves aspects of overall schematization. Both accounts begin by identifying Long Hair by name and by his habit of visiting the family after Lucinda's father became sick (1952:30.3-5; ca 1963:80.5-6). In both cases, it is Long Hair and not Lucinda's father or Lucinda herself who is treated as the central character in the story. After the initial introduction of Long Hair, both versions then continue with a short event sequence in which Long Hair comes visiting one night and says "He's awful sick" (1952:30.5-7; ca 1963:80.8-12). After the delivery of this climactic event, both add an evaluative comment (1952:30.8; ca 1963:80.12-14) and then segue to other related topics (1952:30.10-11; ca 1963:80.15ff.). The evaluative comment is unique in each case. Both comments do share, however, a shift in point of view from Long Hair to Lucinda and her family. In other words, while the story is told about Long Hair, who he was, what he did, and what he said, the evaluative comments shift the point of view to "we" (the "we could understand that" of 1952:30.8 and the "we got to where we thought quite a bit of ole Long Hair" of ca 1963:80.13). There are also
similarities in the treatment of information as foregrounded or backgrounded. In both accounts, for example, Lucinda treats as background the information that Long Hair visited repeatedly when Lucinda's father was sick (1952:30.4; ca 1963:80.5), that Lucinda's father was especially sick on the singled out night that Lucinda tells about (1952:30.5; ca 1963:80.8), and that Long Hair had a certain knowledge of English (1952:30.6; ca 1963:80.10).

These similarities are shown in Table 2 which aligns corresponding utterances from the two tellings for easy comparison. Each version is quoted verbatim. Lines connect corresponding utterances. Information expressed in only one of the tellings is indicated by a line joining the utterance to an 'X' on the other column of the table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long Hair, 1952 version</th>
<th>Long Hair 1960s version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There was 3õne ole- (((1))) 2'Indian2-</td>
<td>Wé had an old Indian come see dàd (at)- he'uz sick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>his nàme was 3Lóng Hair2. (((1)))</td>
<td>His nàme was Lóng Hair. (((1)))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>N hé'd- (((2)) have his hair plaited 'n it'd hang way down to his wàist.(((2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'N 3hé 1 visited us 3quite 2ôtten1 after 3dàd 1 got sick1. (((1))</td>
<td>One night he come- 'n 1 was 2sít tin 2there X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1'n dàd was 3awful 1 sick 'n- (((5)))</td>
<td>dad was pretty 3sick1. (((2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'n hé-</td>
<td>'N he'd say- hé could sày enough that we'd 4hé 1 could talk a little English. understand a 4lit tle1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He'd say hē's 4awful 1 sick1. (((2))</td>
<td>He'd say he's áwful sick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X (((chuckles)) (((14)))</td>
<td>He's áwful sick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We could under3stànd 1 that1. (((3))</td>
<td>We got to where wé thought- quite a bit of ole Lóng Hair. (((Cough)) (((8))) Cause he'd come to sée dàd. (((1))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to more local structuring, there are both similarities and differences. As with the two salvation experience verbalizations, the two Long Hair tellings are not word for word twins. Certain configurations of information are framed in similar ways (e.g. the "his name was Long Hair" of 1952:30.3 and ca 1963:80.6; the "he came one night . . . 'n dad was awful sick" of 1952:30.5 and the "one night he come- dad was pretty sick" of ca 1963:80.8). Other
information is framed in alternative ways (e.g. the "he could say enough that we'd understand a little" of 1952:30.6 and the "he could talk a little English" of ca 1963:80.10). While much information is expressed in each of the two tellings, certain details are included in only one telling. Only the 1952 version tells that Long Hair was seated, for example (1952:30.5). Only the 1960s version describes the appearance of Long Hair's hair (ca 1963:80.7).

The use of aspectual marking is also similar in the two versions, and this usage is noteworthy in that it involves an unusual mix of habitual and perfective aspect. Note especially in both tellings the occurrence of the habitual "would" (sandhi form "'d") among other places in the expression of the climactic event "he'd say 'he's awful sick'" (1952:30.7; ca 1963:80.11). This usage contrasts with the non-habitual perfective encoding of the previous event, "he came one night" (1952:30.5; ca 1963:80.8), and oddly presents the climactic event as a recurrent happening within the scope of the more unique "one night" setting. In contrast, the salvation accounts contain consistently non-habitual aspect, clearly marking the events as expressions of a unique one-time experience.

Table 3 summarizes these comparisons.
### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1952 version, Long Hair</th>
<th>1960s version, Long Hair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not elicited</td>
<td>not elicited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a personal experience</td>
<td>the same personal experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relatively fluent</td>
<td>relatively fluent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;'n he-&quot; false start</td>
<td>&quot;'n he'd say&quot; false start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30.6)</td>
<td>(80.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an overall schematization</td>
<td>similar overall schematization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certain wordings</td>
<td>similar wordings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. 30.3, &quot;His name was Long Hair&quot;)</td>
<td>(e.g. 80.6, &quot;His name was Long Hair&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wordings peculiar to this telling</td>
<td>wordings peculiar to this telling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. 30.6, &quot;n he could say enough that...&quot;)</td>
<td>(e.g. 80.10, &quot;He could talk a little...&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>details peculiar to this telling</td>
<td>details peculiar to this telling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. 30.5, &quot;he was sittin there.&quot;)</td>
<td>(e.g. 80.7, &quot;He'd have his hair...&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unusual aspecual marking</td>
<td>similar aspecual marking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The storage and expression of the information.** These observations support conclusions proposed from consideration of the tellings of the salvation experience and also suggest a number of further conclusions concerning Lucinda's cognitive storage and expression of personal experience. The following discussion, which is confined to a consideration based on the comparison of the two Long Hair tellings with each other, centers on the development of two more principles of the storage and expression of information. In the subsequent section, however, further conclusions will be made based on a comparison of the Long Hair experience with the salvation experience.

With regard to the salvation experience tellings, it was pointed out that "experience is remembered in chunks consisting of an essential core of smaller bits of
information" (Principle 5), that "more information is stored in connection with an experience than is ever expressed in a single telling" (Principle 6), and that "expression of experience is sensitive to the listener's cognitive state" (Principle 7). All of these principles are seen at work in the tellings of the Long Hair experience. The incident involves a core of information that is expressed in each telling and that includes information about Long Hair's identity and relationship to the family and his particular behavior. Other information, such as the memory of the appearance of Long Hair's hair, is connected in Lucinda's system to her memory of his neighborly actions, but such information is not central to the incident and is expressed only under certain circumstances. Finally, Lucinda's sensitivity to LeRoy's cognitive state is shown among other things by the way she carefully introduces Long Hair and her father's situation before telling about Long Hair's specific actions. In doing this, she provides for LeRoy a context against which he can properly interpret the main events. In other words, Lucinda's verbalization of her experience goes beyond a bare one sentence summary (e.g. "Long Hair came one night and said 'He's awful sick.'") in part because LeRoy's cognitive state requires it. If she had provided only a one sentence summary, LeRoy might well have responded with a question such as "who is Long Hair anyway?"
The first four principles listed above concern the non-linguistic storage of experience and its translation into language. These principles are not as obviously at work in the Long Hair verbalizations as they were in the salvation experience accounts, but this seeming lack of congruence will be accounted for when the tellings of the salvation story are compared with the tellings of the Long Hair story in the next section.

Some new conclusions about the storage and expression of experience are as follows. First, comparison of the two Long Hair tellings shows not surprisingly that memories of experience are accessed according to the principles of cognitive topic selection and coordination discussed in chapters three and four. This constitutes an eighth principle of the storage and expression of experience and can be called the principle of topical access.

In contrast to the salvation experience accounts, LeRoy elicits neither telling of the Long Hair experience. Instead, Lucinda volunteers the information, and in both cases her recalling of the experience is clearly motivated by the accessibility of the information to immediately previous activations. In the 1952 telling, the preceding conversation since turn 218 has concerned Indians. Among other things, the unintelligibility of the Indian language (turn 22) and the appearance of Indian hair styles were discussed (turn 24). Then, after several more turns and immediately before
Lucinda designates the Long Hair incident as something to talk about, LeRoy asks Lucinda (1952:30) if she ever visited the Indian reservation. During the three second pause after her "no" response in 30.1, Lucinda's processing results in the topical selection of the Long Hair incident. This memory is easily accessed because of its close and multiple connections to the already activated concepts of Indian speech (unlike most Indians, Long Hair could speak some English.), Indian hair (his name was Long Hair and he had beautiful long hair.) and the notion of socializing with the Indians (Lucinda did not visit their Colony, but Long Hair visited her home.). In addition, the Long Hair incident is especially meaningful to Lucinda since her father died of his illness not long after the visits occurred. The experience is therefore especially conducive to activation given the activation of these closely associated concepts.

In the case of the 1960s telling, the conversation has revolved around Indian topics since turn 54⁹. In turn 77 Lucinda volunteers information about the hairstyles of Indian children. Then in turn 80 LeRoy asks her about the hair of the adult Indians. She answers, and her volunteering of the Long Hair incident follows immediately after her description of adult Indian hair in 80.1-4. Its motivation clearly involves a close and strong connection between the currently activated notion of adult male Indian hair styles and Long Hair's status as an exemplar of "purry" (80.4) Indian hair.
It is not accidental that it is in this telling of the experience and not the other that Lucinda includes the detail that Long Hair would "have his hair plaited 'n it'd hang way down to his waist" (80.7). The inclusion of this detail does two things. First, it reflects the path of Lucinda's topical activation in 80 from "their hair" (80a) to "men's purty combed and plaited hair" (80.1, 80.3-4) to "Long Hair and his hair" (80.5) to "an important incident involving Long Hair" (80.5-14). Second, it serves a topic coordination purpose, helping to lead LeRoy's activation to move along a corresponding path.

Comparison of Lucinda's statements leading up to the climactic event of "he'd say 'he's awful sick'" (1952:30.7; ca 1963:80.11-12) and of her evaluative comments afterwards lead to a further conclusion about her storage of the information. Table 2 aligned utterances from the 1952 telling with their counterparts in the 1960s telling. As that side by side comparison shows, aside from a few details that are included in only one telling, both the information selected for expression, as well as the sequencing of that information is quite similar in the two tellings. This similarity holds true up until the climactic event rendered in both cases as "he'd say 'he's awful sick.'" (1952:30.7; ca 1963:80.11-12). Following this climax, however, this correspondence breaks down. The last lines of the tellings, while they are alike in their point of view shift from Long
Hair to "we", are quite different in content. The 1952 statement (30.8; "We could understand that.") presents as the point of the story that Long Hair could be understood. The final 1960s statement, however, presents as the point of the story that Lucinda and her family appreciated Long Hair for his compassion (80.13; "We got to where we thought quite a bit of ole Long Hair."). The question of interest here involves the aspects of cognitive storage and expression that can account for these rather different endings to what is essentially the same story.

Previous studies of conversational story telling (e.g. Labov 1972; Polanyi 1985) have pointed out that storytellers orient themselves to a social imperative that requires that a story have a motivating point, some merit that makes it worthy of the listener's time. In other words, storytellers attempt to tell their stories in such a way as to inhibit a "so what" response from the listener. They make the point as explicit as is necessary to secure an acknowledgement of the story's value from the listener. Listeners, for their part, tend to respond to a story in some way indicating that they accept it as a valid contribution to the conversation. They may laugh at an appropriate place, for example, or contribute a story of their own that makes a similar point. Polanyi (1985:63ff) goes on to argue that the point of a conversational story is not entirely under the control of the teller of the story. It is not preordained or immutable but
is in fact negotiated by the interlocutors at the time of the telling. If the point of a story is subject to negotiation and recipient design as she says, it follows that the point that actually emerges need not be the same at each telling.

These notions are borne out in the two Long Hair verbalizations. In each, Lucinda advances a different summary of the point of the story, and in each, her explicit statement of the point is motivated by LeRoy's neglect to acknowledge the value of the story. In the 1952 version, the evaluative statement "We could understand that" (30.8) comes after a two second pause which in turn follows the climactic event of the story, "He'd say he's awful sick" (30.7). During this two second pause, LeRoy passes up the opportunity to respond to the story. Lucinda therefore makes her evaluative statement (in 30.8) in an attempt to make the point more explicit and in hopes of eliciting a response. A three second pause then follows, again without the expected response from LeRoy. LeRoy's complete lack of acknowledging response in fact constitutes the mild equivalent of a the dispreferred "so what" response. Lucinda therefore struggles to repair this uncomfortable situation with a further detail, aborted in 30.9 ("n he'd come in 'n-"), and then with further information about the setting of the story in 30.10-11 ("That's after we built a dugout 'n moved up there where Alice's place you know where it blowed away"). This information, which seems better suited to the information
gathering "just the facts ma'am" stance that LeRoy has taken throughout the interview, finally garners a response from him in 31 ("Uhm"), thus ending Lucinda's uneasy situation.

In the 1960s telling, the evaluative "We got to where we thought quite a bit of ole Long Hair" (80.13) again comes after a long pause, this time very long (14 seconds), which in turn again directly follows the climax of the story (80.12; "He's awful sick"). During that long pause, LeRoy again passes up the opportunity to acknowledge the story, and Lucinda's statement in 80.13 ("We got to where we thought...") is again an attempt to make the point clear. LeRoy still withholds the expected response during an eight second pause (80.13). Lucinda continues unsuccessfully with her attempts to state the point satisfactorily in 80.14, and she eventually gives up and moves on to tell about other related memories.

Thus the tellings of the Long Hair story bear out Labov's and Polanyi's conclusions concerning the social function of a point to a story. A question that remains, however, concerns the reason one particular point and not another is formulated when needed for a given telling. Social and cultural factors undoubtedly play a part (Polanyi's "negotiation" and also "recipient design"), but they provide an incomplete answer with respect to the Long Hair story. Here, Lucinda verbalizes her experience to the same listener in similar situations. In both cases, LeRoy,
as listener, refuses to participate actively in the negotiation of the point. In both cases, therefore, Lucinda comes to a similar situation in which she must state the point. However, she does not select the same point in each case. Because the social and cultural factors here are relatively constant, it is evidently not they that are responsible. What differs seems to be the cognitive context of the storytelling, and it is here that at least a partial answer can be found.

While the data does not suggest a complete answer, it does show that routine cognitive topic considerations\(^{10}\) play an important part in the formulation of a point for a story. In the 1952 telling, Lucinda's point, "We could understand that" (30.8), recalls Lucinda's earlier observations (1952:21.6-22.2) about the unintelligibility of Indian speech.

\[\text{"'N they'd just yábbe 'n ³tálk² 'n}
\]
\[\text{((Chuckle))} \quad 21.6\]
\[\text{((Chuckle))} \quad 22\]
\[\text{'n we couldn't understand a ³wóooord they ³sáid".}\]

When the Long Hair story is told, Long Hair's ability to speak English contrasts with this information recently activated in Lucinda's system concerning the typical linguistic abilities of Indians. This contrast therefore easily presents itself as a reasonable point for the story
when one is needed. Examination of the 1960s interview does not yield such an obvious topical motivation for the point chosen for that version of the Long Hair story. It does at least show, however, that the linguistic abilities of the Indians had not been discussed prior to that telling. Hence a point turning on the contrast of Long Hair's linguistic abilities to those of the typical Indian is not topically primed.

All of this discussion leads to a **ninth principle** of the storage and expression of experience, the principle of **selection of the point**. The memory of experience is stored, but the point is selected according to cognitive and social principles operating at the time the experience is told as a **story**. This principle deals with the relationship between the structural discourse unit called a "story" and the memory of experience that serves as its motivating cognitive counterpart. A "story" is evident in the text of a conversation, and it has been identified by various structural characteristics. Text stories, for example, often contain an utterance that explicitly states the point of the story. The cognitive counterpart of text story, however, especially if the story encodes a personal sensory experience of the teller and not the repetition of a hearsay account, does not involve such a point.

This relationship between a text story and its cognitive counterpart involving the memory of experience is similar to
the relationship recognized in Chapter 3 between the topic of a conversation and its cognitive counterpart in the cognitive system of an interlocutor. Both of these in turn are examples of the general distinction drawn in Cognitive Linguistics between patterns observable in text and their corresponding cognitive structures. It is important to note this distinction because it underlines a basic contrast between the concerns of Cognitive Linguistics as opposed to the concerns of much other linguistic research. While much linguistic study focuses on the description of surface patterns in text, e.g. the structure of conversational stories, Cognitive Linguistics seeks to go beyond this description to account for the observed features in terms of the cognitive systems that produce them.

Summary of principles. Consideration of the tellings of the Long Hair experience have led of the statement of two additional principles of the storage and expression of experience:

8. Topical access. Memories of experience are accessed according to the principles of cognitive topic selection and coordination.

9. Selection of the point. The memory of experience is stored, but the point is selected according to cognitive and social principles at the time that the experience is told as a story.

Comparison of the two experiences and their expression.
The discussion thus far has compared Lucinda's two tellings
of the salvation experience with each other and has also compared her two tellings of the Long Hair experience with each other. Another fruitful parameter for comparison involves a consideration of the salvation experience tellings with respect to the Long Hair tellings. Here, observation of differences in Lucinda's verbalization of the two experiences coupled with a contrastive consideration of the experiences themselves will suggest other principles of the storage and expression of experience.

We can recall first that in terms of the aspectual development of the verbalizations, both Long Hair tellings exhibit a distinctive and unusual mix of habitual and non-habitual aspect while the salvation experience tellings are characterized by consistently non-habitual aspect. As pointed out above, the salvation incident was a unique experience in Lucinda's past. This conclusion is supported both by the particular configuration of events that constitute the experience and by cultural knowledge relating to Lucinda and LeRoy's religious beliefs. Both of them viewed the salvation experience as an experience that happens only once in an individual's life\textsuperscript{12}. The non-habitual aspectual encoding of the sequence of events reflects this interpretation and offers further support for it. Lucinda was saved only one time on one particular day.

In the case of the Long Hair experience, however, there are components of the situation that are clearly repetitive.
While both tellings do express the same memory, that memory is not a memory of an unambiguously unique experience in the same way that the salvation memory is. In particular, we know that Long Hair visited Lucinda's family on more than one occasion. Lucinda makes explicit in the 1952 telling that Long Hair visited "quite often". In addition, in both tellings Lucinda encodes the climactic event of the narrative with the habitual "would" suggesting multiple expressions of Long Hair's sentiment on various occasions (1952:30.7; ca 1963:80.11, "He'd say he's awful sick"). However, both of Lucinda's encodings also clearly identify a single instance of Long Hair's visiting by mentioning "one night" and using a simple past tense form of "come" (1952:30.5; ca 1963:80.8). In short, Lucinda is inconsistent in her rendering of the memory as a unique or as a repeated experience, and in both tellings she is inconsistent in the same way.

This inconsistency can be contrasted both with the consistently non-habitual rendering of the unique salvation experience and with the consistently habitual renderings of other experiences. Consider for example, Walter's discussion of the method for boiling down sorghum juice into sorghum molasses. In the following excerpt he tells about this process twice (Walter3A:34.1-14; Walter3A:36.1-16), both times using habitual aspect throughout the telling (marked in bold face).
What'd the vat look like that they boiled it in? (Walter3A)

Oh— just— ((1)) big long— ((2)) uh I guess it is— eight or ten feet long.

Something like— maybe eight feet long. ((2))

Just a— ((2)) pan of a thing. ((2))

(That)''d be bout the shape of this thing. ((2) knocks heard) I guess—

but it uz a whole lot bigger.

And then there'd be some little— ((2)) strips run across here.

From over here.

'N then there'd be one over here run across here.

Stopped here and it— ((2)) you see?

The juice'd run around— around this'un here here !you see.

Around that 'un 'n then come here 'n around this'n end.

'N then it'd come around over there 'n run (to) that end ('n) another 'un.

((Very fast))

((1))'N it'd get over there to that end

By the time it get there it'd be lasses. ((Chuckles, self-amusement.))

You mean the juice I just ran down—

2Yeah.

Through some little— uh— ((2)) channels in the ((1))

Like you— like you pour it in here— ((1))

and it had a— place here to draw it off.

That corner. ((1))

And th— there'd be a partition here !you see.

It'd run out here.

But it wouldn't go plumb to the end.

It'd stop here you see. ((1))

So it just could go around— around (way end a that). ((1))

And then it— then over here then it'd be another un come this way—

And it'd stop here.

And it'd come right around this way—

and around that un and then back—

and then around that 'n then back—

'round. around that 'un— til it get to that corner—

by the time it get here why ((1))

it'd be more lasses.
The boiling down of sorghum juice is a process that Walter must have witnessed numerous times, and in these verbalizations, he refers to all of these instances at once by means of "would", not singling out some one occasion of molasses making for special mention.

These observations lead to a tenth principle of the storage and expression of experience, one that can be called collective experience. Numerous individual yet repeated experiences are stored as a collective, non-individuated unit. In the interviews, "would" marks the repetitive yet non-individuated nature of the experiences. "Would" is often used, for example, in descriptions of typical pioneer activities such as that of boiling down molasses. Experiences such as the salvation incident, however, are encoded as unique experiences without habitual would. Lucinda's memory of the Long Hair incident represents an intermediate kind of experience and storage. That is, Lucinda recalls several instances of Long Hair's visits, and while she recognizes a similarity in all of the visits, the recollections have not completely lost their individuated character. At least one of the visits seems to stand out from the others in some way. Thus Lucinda is able both to focus on a single visit ("one night he come") and to recall the visits as a collective memory ("he'd say he's awful sick").
A cluster of other characteristics distinguishes the salvation tellings from the Long Hair tellings as well. Some of these involve the relative fluency of the tellings and the relative uniformity of the schematizations of the experiences. In contrast to the disfluent salvation experience verbalizations, Lucinda's tellings of the Long Hair experience are relatively fluent. In addition, whereas the two tellings of the salvation experience differ markedly in their overall organization, the two tellings of the Long Hair experience are much more similar to each other. As shown in Table 2, this similarity involves the overall organization and extends to the smaller details as well, going so far as to include the occurrence and sequencing of the "he'd say" false start mentioned earlier. Of course, for all this similarity it must be noted that the two Long Hair tellings, though more uniform than the salvation experience tellings, are far from rote recitals of a memorized text. Consider for example Lucinda's rendering of two poems in the 1960s interview.

\[(\text{Lu3B})\]

You told me one time about—some—(1) rhymes that you'd memorized. 8
One of 'em started out
Who taught you to sfng—my sweet pretty bfrd.
Do you remember the rest of that one? (1)
\[\rightarrow \text{Who taught you to } s\text{fng}^2—\text{my sweet pretty } s\text{bfrd}^1. (1)\]
\[\rightarrow \text{It was } G\text{od}^2\text{ said the } s\text{iârk}^2—\]
\[\rightarrow \text{as he rose from the } 3\text{earth}^1.\]
\[\rightarrow \text{'God (extended) our } s\text{wings}^2—\]
and give us our voice.
and finds (our for-) food.
and we go rejoin.

Do you remember another one said sister come and see? Yeah.
Sister come and see.
It is not a bird nor it is not a bee.
2 High it rises. Up it goes.
Now it settles on a rose.

Such memorized pieces are not expressions of personal experience. Instead, they constitute units of information that are stored word for word in the linguistic system, a lexemic storage rather than a sensory/perceptual storage.

Another characteristic distinguishing the salvation tellings from the Long Hair tellings involves the fact that both tellings of the salvation experience were elicited by LeRoy while both tellings of the Long Hair incident were volunteered by Lucinda. In addition, LeRoy (p.c.) recalls that in everyday conversation Lucinda told the Long Hair story on numerous occasions while she rarely talked about her salvation experience.

Further distinguishing characteristics of the experiences themselves can be noted also. The salvation experience is an intensely private, personal, spiritual experience. In contrast, the Long Hair incident, though certainly meaningful to Lucinda, constitutes a shared public
experience. While the salvation experience involves events in which Lucinda participated alone and to which she was the only witness, the Long Hair incident involves Lucinda's memories of the circumstances and actions of other people, i.e. Long Hair and Dad. In addition, while the salvation experience involves deep personal feelings that "you can't hardly tell" (1952:81.2), the meaning of the Long Hair experience turns more on the actions of the participants, especially those of Long Hair. Moreover, both Long Hair's actions and the emotional content of the experience (ca 1963:80.13, "We got to where we thought quite a bit of ole Long Hair") have rather conventional linguistic expressions.

These distinguishing characteristics of the salvation experience and its verbalization vis a vis the Long Hair experience and its tellings are summarized in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salvation experience tellings</th>
<th>Long Hair experience tellings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>relatively disfluent</td>
<td>relatively fluent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>different overall organization of each telling</td>
<td>similar overall organization of each telling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elicited</td>
<td>volunteered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>told rarely</td>
<td>told often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation experience itself</td>
<td>Long Hair experience itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private, personal, spiritual speaker as only participant and witness</td>
<td>shared, public third parties as participants, Lucinda and they as witnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>importance of unspeakable emotions</td>
<td>importance of actions of a third party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two further principles of the storage and expression of experience emerge from this comparison. The first is **principle eleven** which can be called the principle of **numerous tellings**. It says, **often verbalized experiences come to have linguistic storage in addition to non-linguistic perceptual storage**. Earlier principles, developed in reference to the salvation experience, pointed out that memory of personal experience begins with sensory memory that must be translated into linguistic information in order for the experience to be related to an addressee through the speech signal (**Principles 1 and 2 of "non-linguistic storage" and "translation necessity"**). It is Lucinda's struggle at speech time to translate her rarely talked about salvation experience into words that results in her disfluent deliveries. In the case of the oft told Long Hair incident, however, Lucinda at speech time has already made and stored many decisions about the way that the incident can be verbalized. Her previous verbalizations of the experience are remembered. In network terms, we can say that many lines connecting the experience with its potential linguistic expression are already in place by the time she tells the story in 1952, and these lines have become strong through numerous tellings. Because less on-line processing energy is needed for translation as Lucinda tells the story, the delivery is more fluent. Various tellings of the experience show similar organization for similar reasons. Choices about
organization have been worked out and stored in previous tellings. Therefore, Lucinda needs only to retrieve the organization she has previously chosen. She does not need to create an organization anew on each telling. In short, aspects of the linguistic encoding of the experience are remembered in addition to the original sensory aspects of the experience itself and are utilized in new tellings of the experience. That is, the sensory experience comes to have a linguistically stored counterpart.

A last principle has to do with further aspects of the nature and limits of the linguistic storage. It was noted earlier that although the two Long Hair tellings are very similar, they are nevertheless not identical in the way that alternate recitals of a memorized poem, such as the "sweet pretty bird" rhyme, are identical. In terms of a stratified network view of the linguistic system, the word for word memory of such poems can be seen to involve mainly the lower levels of the system below the conceptual level. Recital of the poem involves neither a translation of thoughts into words nor a constant tracking of and sensitivity to the listener's cognitive system in the way needed for more original, extemporaneous expressions. Instead it involves simply the recall and activation of the lexemic information. Very few choices remain to be made concerning the linguistic expression.
Linguistic storage of the Long Hair experience differs from the linguistic storage of memorized poems. Lucinda's verbalizations of the experience do show that she has already made many high-level decisions about the linguistic expression. However, they also show that many decisions about specific wordings and so forth are not made in advance, and additionally that on each telling she actively tracks the listener's cognitive system and his information needs. The occurrence and sequence of the "and he'd say" false start in both versions (1952:80.9; ca 1963:30.6) results from a confluence of Lucinda's two simultaneous processing tasks of getting the events in the narrative told while tracking the addressee's system. That the false starts are so strikingly similar can be attributed to the single linguistically stored memory that underlies each telling coupled with the fact that both tellings occur in a similar cognitive situation in which the addressee is presumed not to know any information about Long Hair. That is, in both cases, Lucinda comes to the point in the story in which the next event that she needs to tell about is the one in which Long Hair says "he's awful sick". As she begins to utter that statement, she realizes, because she is simultaneously tracking LeRoy's system, that LeRoy probably does not know that Long Hair could speak some English. Because he must know that information before he will be able to appreciate the story, she interrupts herself to provide it before continuing. This twelfth and final
principle can be called the principle of **non-rote linguistic storage**. **Linguistic storage of often told experiences does not imply rote (i.e. lexemic) storage.** This principle is not completely new but blends aspects of several of the principles identified earlier. It involves the speaker's sensitivity to the listener while telling about personal experience (Principle 7, listener sensitivity), the notion that practice results in some sort of linguistic storage (Principle 11, numerous tellings), and the notion that the translation of experience into speech is not complete at the time of telling (Principle 3, translation timing).

**Summary of principles.** Comparison of the Long Hair verbalizations with the salvation experience verbalizations has led to the identification of three more principles of the storage and expression of experience.

10. **Collective experience.** Numerous individual yet repeated experiences are stored as a collective, non-individuated unit.

11. **Numerous tellings.** Often verbalized experiences come to have linguistic storage in addition to non-linguistic perceptual storage.

12. **Non-rote linguistic storage.** Linguistic storage of often told experiences does not imply rote (i.e. lexemic) storage.

**General summary.** The twelve principles of the storage and expression of experience given here were developed through careful consideration of Lucinda's twin
verbalizations of two experiences recalled from her youth. This picture can be summarized as follows.

Lucinda experiences the world through her senses and stores memories of her experiences in sensory/perceptual portions of her cognitive system. Her memories include both highly individuated representations of unique experiences and less individuated representations of collective experiences. Furthermore, the memories are organized in cognitive units or chunks (e.g. the "salvation experience" unit) that have many connections to other information. These memories are accessed via these connections in accordance with topic selection principles\(^5\). In order for Lucinda to share information about her experiences with LeRoy, she must translate her sensory memories into linguistic information for expression in the one-dimensional speech signal. Initial stages of this translation may be begun at the time of the experience. For example, as objects and people are recognized, their linguistic labels (e.g. "Long Hair", "Indian") are likely to be activated as well. However, the translation is not completed at the time of the experience. Instead, it is the actual need to tell about the experience at a later time that forces the translation to be fully worked out. This conversion of information from perceptual to linguistic modalities is not a simple matter. One problem lies in the fact that some types of perceptual information (e.g. emotional and visual) are quite difficult to express
linguistically because they lack obvious and conventional linguistic expressions.

As Lucinda works to express the memory of an experience to LeRoy, she is ever mindful of his cognitive state. She structures the telling to provide him with needed information both at the time and in the quantity that he requires for successful interpretation. Her tasks of completing a linguistic translation and keeping track of LeRoy's cognitive needs tax her processing capacities. In extreme cases where an experience that is difficult to translate is also expressed linguistically for the first time, to a listener who knows little about the experience, the complexity of the processing results in a highly disfluent verbalization. After an experience has been verbalized a number of times, however, the tellings, which are themselves remembered, result in a degree of linguistic storage. This linguistic storage does not replace the original sensory/perceptual storage of the experience but exists alongside of it and primes linguistic choices in further tellings. It involves such matters as the schematization of the experience as a whole, the framing of individual propositions, and the categorization of individual events, participants, etc. This linguistic storage does not go so far as to involve the rote word for word memory that characterizes memorized poems. One reason for this limitation is that on each telling, Lucinda tracks the listener's system anew, and she must remain
flexible enough to adapt the telling to the needs of that receiving system. This adaptation involves cognitive factors such as the amount of background information the addressee needs to be told as well as social issues such as that involving the negotiation of the relevance or point of the story. After numerous tellings, as in the case of the Long Hair experience, Lucinda's task of initial linguistic translation moves towards a resolution, and more of her processing capacity is thereby freed for the task of orienting to the listener's system. Further expressions of the experience thus show evidence of being more tailored to the interpreter and less reflective, in terms of disfluencies, of the task of sensory/perceptual to linguistic translation. It is because of the effects of practice that the tellings of the Long Hair story show little evidence, as compared to the salvation tellings, of the principles of non-linguistic storage, translation timing, and translation ease.

Table 5 presents a continuum of memory types as evidenced in the Long Hair and salvation experience tellings as well as in the recital of poems such as the lark poem. It lists characteristics of the memory types as well as of the performances that correlate with the type of memory involved.
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<th><strong>Table 5</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>rote, lexemic</strong></td>
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<td>memory</td>
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<td><strong>nonlinguistic memory</strong></td>
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**The Lark**
- very fluent
- preformed, rote
- linguistic expression
- versions almost identical
- highly interpreter sensitive organization (in a non-spontaneous way)
- no effort needed for linguistic translation

**Long Hair**
- relatively fluent
- partially preformed, partially newly devised
- linguistic expression
- versions similar
- relatively interpreter sensitive organization
- some effort needed for linguistic translation

**Salvation**
- non-fluent
- newly devised
- linguistic expression
- versions very different
- less interpreter sensitive
- much effort needed for linguistic translation

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A note on story grammars. The "twice told tales" that have been examined in this chapter bring to mind recent research that has been concerned with story grammars, and we here briefly orient our findings with respect to that research.

One major strain of story research (e.g. Mandler 1987, Mandler and Johnson 1977, Thorndyke 1977, Rumelhart 1980) focuses on the construction of rather elaborate story grammars. Inspired by transformational grammar, these grammars take the form of lists of rewrite rules. The first three rules of Mandler and Johnson's grammar, for example, appear as follows (1977.117):
FABLE -> STORY AND MORAL

STORY -> SETTING AND EVENT STRUCTURE

{ STATE* (AND EVENT*) }

SETTING -> { EVENT* }

These story grammars are meant as general descriptions of the structure of some subset of stories such as traditional folk-tales and myths (Mandler and Johnson) or problem solving stories (Rumelhart). They are intended to be rigorous enough to define a set of well-formed stories. In a further step, this approach concentrates on the testing of the psychological validity of the units it discovers (See Beaugrande 1982 for a general review). The story grammars themselves are not usually claimed to have cognitive reality. They are, however, related to a cognitive counterpart known as a story schema, defined as "an idealized internal representation of the parts of a typical story and the relationships among those parts" (Mandler and Johnson 1977:111). This line of research proceeds mainly by means of psychological experiments involving subjects performing various tasks with respect to artificially constructed stories. It concentrates on the manner in which reputed story schemata aid a reader in the comprehension and recall of these stories. Since the addressee's comprehension and recall are more amenable to experimental investigation than is the processing of a speaker/writer as he produces a story, it is not surprising that the main investigations involve the
addressee's processing. In other words, while it is relatively easy to replicate the comprehension of a story, it is much more difficult to set up a situation in which a single story is produced a number of times. Another characteristic of this approach is that it relies on a situation in which the subjects receive all of their information about the story through linguistic means. Personal sensory experience is not involved, and questions concerning the storage and expression of first hand sensory experience do not come up.

The other major strain of story research (e.g. Labov 1972, 1982, Labov and Waletsky 1977, Polanyi 1985) concentrates not on folk tales but on examples of conversational narratives as they are told by real people in natural situations. In practice, emphasis is given to narratives that relate first-hand personal experiences rather than to stories learned through hearsay and not involving the speaker as a character or observer. Although this approach does describe story structure (e.g. Labov (1972.363) proposes Abstract, Orientation, Complicating Action, Evaluation, Result or Resolution, and Coda), it is not preoccupied with the construction of rigorous story grammars that can distinguish stories from non-stories. Instead, it concentrates on the social consequences of story structure. Issues include the relationship of stories to their cultural setting and the social functions of and constraints on the
"point" of stories. Cognitive issues are not systematically addressed although some issues are mentioned in passing from time to time. The issue of the speaker's sensitivity to the cognitive needs of the addressee is sometimes briefly addressed.  

Although the present study is concerned with cognitive issues, it actually shares more in common with the Labov type approach to stories than with the experimental Mandler and Johnson style approach. For one thing, it is not the text structure called a story that is our primary interest. We have no interest in writing story grammars or in trying to distinguish well-formed stories from non-stories. We have been concerned instead with aspects of Lucinda's expression of personal experience through the speech signal. What is of interest is the nature of the stored experience that motivates the stories and the way that multiple tellings give us entrée into that stored experience. That her twice told verbalizations result in texts recognizable as stories is more or less beside the point. The focus on Lucinda's expression of personal memories has further led us to be concerned with aspects of her storage and expression of the information rather than with the aspects of the addressee's comprehension that are emphasized in the Mandler and Johnson approach. Finally, our emphasis on conversational stories has involved us in the data of disfluent performances, a kind of data not examined in Mandler and Johnson's work.
While our approach is similar to Labov's approach in its concern for the expression of personal experience in spontaneous speech, it does differ in that it focuses mainly on cognitive issues rather than on social and cultural issues. The story structure that Labov describes is evident in Lucinda's tellings of her salvation and Long Hair memories. What needs to be explored is the notion that there are facets of this structure that are best accounted for in cognitive terms. Social explanations alone are not enough. For example, in cognitive terms it can be argued that an orientation section comes early in a story because it provides information that the addressee must know before he will be able to interpret the main events of the story. This sequencing is a facet of the speaker's sensitivity to the listener.

Neither is a cognitive story schema notion that is designed to account for comprehension adequate for accounting for Lucinda's production of these texts. The schema notion emphasizes the importance of the similarity of one story's structure to that of others. That is, a story is told in a certain sequence because that sequence characterizes other stories and thus satisfies addressee expectations. Such a view is likely to overlook the importance of the simple fact that much of the structure of Lucinda's verbalizations of personal experience can be attributed not to her abstract knowledge of story structure, but to more immediate aspects
of her on-line processing. That is, she tells a story in a particular sequence because that sequence provides the addressee with the information that is needed to make an interpretation at the point that it is needed. Story grammars, while they are useful taxonomic devices, can be seen as an epiphenomenal result of these communicative needs instead of as units with cognitive reality.
1Lu2A:94a & b.

2Due to space limitations, these last mentioned details will not be discussed in this chapter. Instead the reader is left to consider them at his leisure. For Lucinda's twice told comments about church-going habits see Lu40:16.8-9 and Lu3B:7.2-5. With regard to her comments on Indian habits and Anglo-Indian relations, compare Lu40:23a-23.7 with Lu3B:82a-82.3, Lu40:24a-24.5 with Lu3B:76.3-74.5, and Lu40:21.2-22.4 with Lu3B:80.16-81.1. In the remainder of this chapter, tape Lu40 will for convenience be referred to as tape "1952". Likewise, citations from tapes Lu2A and Lu3B, recorded in the 1960s interview, will be referred to as tape "ca 1963".

3In Lucinda's dialect, "come" alternates with "came" as the simple past tense form of "come".

4This point will be slightly modified when the tellings of the salvation experience are compared with the tellings of the Indian story.

5With regard to Lucinda's salvation experience being discussed here, it should be noted that first-hand sensory experience is not the only source of information in the cognitive system. In addition, humans routinely learn information by hearsay, that is, directly through their linguistic systems. In these cases, the issue of linguistic vs. non-linguistic storage of the information is somewhat different, not involving the problem of translating experience into linguistic form but rather heading in the opposite direction. In this study, however, it is the speaker's concerns with storing personal experience and converting it into language that are most central.

6Of course, it must not be overlooked that even the most routine language use depends on analogy. To call a four footed animal that barks a "dog" is no less an analogy than to say that your emotion is like a feather. Both require the recognition that a particular referent exhibits basic characteristics of a more abstract category which can qualify it as an instance of the category. In the case of "feeling like a feather", however, the analogy is both less conventional and less complete. Whereas a four footed barking animal is in all ways a dog, Lucinda after giving a testimony is not in all ways a feather. That is, it is more of a challenge for a speaker to describe a feeling than a common object or event, which is of course the point here, that some kinds of recalled experience lend themselves to linguistic expression more readily than other kinds.

7See Polanyi 1985:14-15 for discussion of ways that speakers make clear the message or point of their conversational stories. In general, this assigning of prominence is accomplished "by encoding the information to be accorded increased weight in a way which departs from the
local norm of the text." She mentions devices from all levels of linguistic structure, e.g. features of pronunciation, lexical choices, tense/aspect features, modality, repetition, reported speech, shift in point of view, explicit meta-comments, etc.

Refer to Appendix 2, tape Lu40:21-31 for the transcript of these turns.

Refer to Appendix 2, tape Lu3B:54-84 for the transcript of these turns.

Recall Chapter 3 for a characterization of these considerations.

As another example consider the way that Cognitive Linguistics recognizes phonemic patterning in texts but models text phonemes in cognitive terms as configurations of network relationships in the linguistic system.

LeRoy, p.c.

Note that in Walter and Lucinda's dialect of English the past tense form of "to come" is realized sometimes as "come" and sometimes as "came". The conditions for this distribution have not been studied. We can note, however, that this is not the only strong verb in their dialect that has non-standard past tense realization.

Note that unlike Lucinda's memory of other aspects of this experience, her memory of this utterance does involve linguistic storage since it was perceived through the linguistic system.

As discussed in Chapter 4.

For example, "Throughout the story, information important to understanding the state of affairs in the storyworld will be given at times appropriate to building and updating an adequate model of the changing world of the discourse", Polanyi (1985:12).
Chapter 6
Getting the Message and Getting the Message Across:
Aspects of the Cognitive Functions of Utterances

The b- uh yöke went around their neck like that-
'n then it had bow's comé around up here 'n run
through that- yöke.
Oh that was the loop.
Yeah. It had- they called them bows.

-LeRoy and Walter

Introduction. LeRoy interviews Walter and Lucinda with
the goal of learning about their lives. This information
exchange can be characterized in broad terms as follows.
First, LeRoy requests information from Walter and Lucinda.
Next, they, in responding to LeRoy's questions with
reminiscences about their lives, express information from
their cognitive systems which they expect LeRoy to add to his
system. Much of the cognitive processing involved in the
interviews is oriented towards mediating this interpersonal
exchange of information and effecting its successful
completion. That is, conversational utterances express more
than a bare list of propositions. In addition, speakers
provide information concerning both the cognitive status of

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the information in their own systems and the cognitive activities they expect listeners to perform with respect to the propositions expressed. With a question, for example, a speaker can signal to the listener that he does not have the information and wants the listener to retrieve it. With regard to this information exchange, speaker and addressee have complementary goals that are effected via the linguistic signal. The addressee's goal is to "get" a speaker's intended message. The speaker is concerned with "getting across" a certain message.

Some information exchange issues. A number of issues can be identified for study under the general rubric of the interpersonal exchange of information. For one thing, speakers demonstrate a concern with guaranteeing the quality of the information they express much as manufacturers wanting customers to buy their products issue product guarantees. In the interviews, both LeRoy and his parents continually demonstrate a concern for certifying the information they assert and for validating the information they receive. In the following exchange, for example, Lucinda makes clear her doubt as to the accuracy of the information she expresses. The bold face portions of 99.1 and 99.2 express her uncertainty as does the disjunctive "three four" (i.e. "three or four") of the basic proposition "we lived there three four years."
Well how long did you live there? 99
Ooohh I guess we must have lived there about (1) three four years-
3 if don't remember. (1)

Thus much of the utterance is devoted to expressing her attitude towards the proposition she encodes. Not only does Lucinda want to express a certain proposition; she is also concerned that LeRoy be able to evaluate the proposition fairly as he adds it to his system of information.

Another issue involves the fact that listeners routinely invoke stored knowledge not made explicit in the conversation to make sense of the information that is made expressly available to them by speakers. For speakers, getting a message across does not necessitate exhaustive expression of the information. Instead, a speaker can expect the addressee to use relevant information already in his cognitive system to interpret a message. In this example, Lucinda does not explicitly identify the referent of "it" in 61.3. In 62, however, LeRoy shows that he has nevertheless been able to identify a potential referent, "the hole in the top of the tipi". He is able to make this identification based on his prior knowledge of tipi architecture, of campfires, and of the physics of smoke.
Then what would they put inside the tipi after they set it up? Anything? No.

Set it up to get out of the weather?

Yeah.

'N they'd build a fire in there.

It kinda drewed the smoke out.

The hole in the top did?

Yeah.

These particular issues merit detailed studies of their own. However, this chapter concentrates on yet a third issue touching on the interlocutors' attempts to exchange information. This issue centers on the general kinds of cognitive processing that interlocutors are required to perform in order to exchange information. It also involves the nature of the realization relationships that link the linguistic form of an utterance with the cognitive states and processes that are associated with it on the part of speaker and hearer. This chapter is concerned with the types of cognitive processes interlocutors perform as they exchange information, the way that speakers choose utterance types most likely to have an intended cognitive effect on the addressee, and the way that addressees recognize, given the linguistic signal, the particular cognitive tasks expected of them.

The cognitive functions of utterances. With respect to the general kinds of cognitive processing interlocutors
perform in the interviews, Lamb (ms.) has identified two major tasks: information addition and information retrieval. In the interviews, much of Walter's and Lucinda's processing centers on retrieving information requested by LeRoy. As for LeRoy, much of his processing centers on adding information to his system. In the following example, Walter, in response to LeRoy's question about the way he and his stepfather hauled split rails to town (3A:47), retrieves the information that a wagon was used. Then LeRoy, in response to Walter's statement (3A:47.1) adds to his system the information about the use of a wagon. LeRoy's next question (3A:48) reflects his successful addition of the information in that the "cross wise" orientation he mentions is relevant to a wagon bed.

(Walter3A)

How'd you haul 'em?
On a 4wagon.
You put 'em four foot crosswise?

The addressee's tasks of addition and retrieval of information are intuitively obvious and predictable given a cognitive model of communication even before an example of conversation is analyzed. Observation of conversational data confirms the prediction. As for their formal expression, information addition and retrieval seem to be roughly associated with statements and questions respectively.
Addition and retrieval are not the only cognitive tasks relevant to the exchange, however. Others can be discovered as well. Neither is the initial recognition of these cognitive tasks sufficient to illuminate the ways they are linked to utterances. That is, it is not enough to say only that questions direct the addressee to retrieve information and statements direct him to add information. Such an understanding is neither accurate nor detailed enough. This preliminary picture must be refined, and the refinement can be achieved through further consideration of the demands of conversation and through empirical observation of natural conversation involving interlocutors engaged in information exchange.  

**Beyond addition and retrieval—other functions.** The cognitive activities of adding and retrieving information mentioned above are perhaps the most basic to information exchange, but others can be noted that will expand the list of cognitive utterance functions.

To begin with, we might expect that a speaker must get a listener's attention before attempting to obtain or give information. In the interview data we find address forms at precisely those points where attention either has not yet been established or else needs to be reestablished after an interruption. Address forms are lacking in other situations. LeRoy calls Walter by his family title at the beginning of
his interview (Walter1A:1) and directly addresses Lucinda at the beginning of the 1960s interview (Lu2A:1).

((Walter1A))
Dád- ((1)) 3wén 1'were you- ((1)) 'bón2? ((1)) 1

((Lu2A))
Do you remémber mama anything about when Oklahoma became a státe? 1

Such an address form is lacking at the beginning of Lucinda's 1952 interview, but this absence makes sense when we note that that tape begins with Lucinda's reading of a Psalm immediately before the interview itself begins. Therefore, at the first turn of the interview proper (Lu40:1), LeRoy can be sure that he already has Lucinda's attention, and address form is not needed.

In addition to addressing Lucinda and Walter at the interview beginnings, LeRoy addresses Lucinda directly after outside voices interrupt the interview (Lu3B:41c).

((Lu3B))
((Muffled voice of nurses: 'After while. This is just a wárníng.')) 40
((Chuckle))
A wárníng? ((Request for confirmation)) 41
((voices: 'We get real hungy.')) ((4))
I stíll can't uh- find in 3 história 'books 1'mom2- why- ((2)) your dád had to cross the Canádian 3říver2- ((1))

Only one other address form occurs in the interviews (Lu3B:58.1). This form does not occur at a point where
initial attention is established. However it can be explained in terms of Lucinda's difficulty in answering LeRoy's questions in Lu3B:56 and 58 and her need to alert him to the fact (i.e. get his attention) that his line of questioning is problematic for her to speak to.

```
((Lu3B))

How ma- How 3tall1 was the tip1. ((1))
Oh- you've 3seen 'em1 'hav'n't you3?
2No2. Can't say that I 3hâve1. ((1))
Oh I guess about ten or twelve feet 3tall12- 1 3gues2.
Bout how many poles did they use1?
Oh I couldn't tell you 1son2 but-
they'd pût 'em pretty close to3gêther2. ((1))
```

In summary, "attending" can be identified as a cognitive task in addition to those of adding and retrieving information. With respect to its realization, this task can be associated with direct forms of address, based on the occurrence of address forms in the conversation at points where attention needs to be established. The address form singles out the listener as addressee and instructs him to attend to the conversation and to be ready to perform further cognitive activities.

Then, after a speaker secures the addressee's attention, he must direct him to the location in his cognitive system at which further processing, be it information addition, retrieval, etc., is to take place. This topic coordination activity, already discussed at length in Chapter 4,
constitutes another cognitive task, one that is again clearly manifest in the data and is also to be expected given the characteristics of a cognitive model of communication. Topic coordination utterances function to direct the addressee to activate certain information in his system and to be ready to perform further processing at that location.

The additional cognitive tasks identified here, attention and topic coordination, illustrate types of processing beyond basic information addition and retrieval but still do not exhaust the cognitive tasks addressees are intended to perform.

Consideration of cognitive functions at greater levels of delicacy. In addition to cataloguing a number of general cognitive tasks such as those discussed above, the picture of the cognitive tasks needed in information exchange can be refined by investigation of these general tasks at greater levels of delicacy. The addition of information, for example, is an activity that can be broken down into a number of smaller tasks. In terms of network architecture, for example, Copeland and Davis (e.g. Davis and Copeland 1980, Copeland and Davis 1980a) distinguish actions such as adding new sections and adding new lines between existing sections. In the following excerpt, consider the way in which Lucinda introduces a preacher named Brother White.
Did you have any church or anything to go to?

'No.

But we finally had a preacher to come - oh - Brother White from down about (filler) or somethin'.

In adding this information to his system, LeRoy must create a new section that is a particular of the domain PREACHER. To this section he then adds information about the preacher's name, origin, relationship to Lucinda, etc.

In the following excerpt, however, the new information that LeRoy adds to his system is quite different. Lucinda does not intend in 13 that LeRoy maintain two separate sections representing two separate dugouts, one that dad and the men built and another one whose outline is still visible on the farm. Instead, the information that he is to add is an association between the complex of sections representing the dugout Lucinda is talking about and the dugout whose outline he remembers, identifying the one with the other. Instead of adding a new section, LeRoy is to unite what in his system were two different sections into one.
In both cases, LeRoy has added information to his system, but in terms of network structure, his precise activity in the two instances is quite different. Thus, at a delicate level, the umbrella activity of adding information is seen to involve quite different kinds of tasks.

Neither is all information retrieval the same. Questions generally function to cue the listener to retrieve information that the speaker does not have in his system. With many questions, as in Lu40:5, the addressee retrieves and makes available information that will be new information to LeRoy and that LeRoy will then add to his information system. In this example, Lucinda retrieves information about her mode of transportation for LeRoy to add to his system.

How'd you get here?
Well we come in- ((2)) in a wagon³.
has. In such a case, the addressee is asked to do more than simply make information available from a designated location in his system. In addition, as in Lu40:14, the addressee is asked to compare that information with the questioner's current belief about the information and to confirm or deny that belief.

Thus, within a general task such as information retrieval, there exists a variety of more delicate tasks that utterances can effect in the listener.

In summary, when considered at a more delicate level of analysis, each of the general cognitive tasks performed in conversation turns out to involve a of variety of smaller tasks.

**Functions of utterances—the realizational aspect.** In considering the cognitive tasks that interlocutors perform in exchanging information, one possible goal is to attempt a comprehensive catalogue, in the way begun here, of the general kinds of information exchange activities performed in connection with utterances. Even a delicate catalogue would yield at best an incomplete accounting, however, if it failed to consider the realizational relationships linking form to function. A study of realization would concentrate on the
way listeners recognize, given the linguistic signal, the particular cognitive tasks expected of them. It would also consider the speaker's complementary problem of selecting, given the meaning they want to convey and the task(s) they want the hearer to perform, the type of utterance to employ at a particular point in the conversation.

One possible relationship between form and function would involve a one to one mapping, as suggested above, between statement form and assertion function, question form and retrieval function etc. The most cursory examination of language use, however, reveals that the realizational relationships are not that simple. For example, a simple statement need not always signal an instruction to add information, as will be shown, and an instruction to add information need not always be expressed in a statement. Instead, there is considerable discrepancy to be found here. Despite the complexity, however, speakers are somehow able to choose utterance forms, and addressees interpret them as intended, with a high degree of efficiency and accuracy. The limits of the form/function discrepancies in the interviews and the nature of the realizational signals linking form with function merit careful study.

**Goal of this study.** The discussion thus far has mapped out a large area of study with respect to conversational data. A comprehensive account of the cognitive tasks that might conceivably be catalogued and the realizational
intricacies associated with them is an ambitious undertaking, however, that has not been achieved here. Although this discussion is thus not intended to be comprehensive, it is meant to be indicative of the kinds of results a more comprehensive account could produce. Following the discussion, suggestions will be offered concerning directions that further study could take.

In order to gain a foothold within the complex of realizational relations, we focus in the remainder of this chapter on the cognitive processing associated with one formally defined type of utterance in the data: the statement. The goal pursued is to account for the statement and the cognitive processing that occurs in connection with it on the part of both hearer and speaker. We ask what kinds of functions statements serve, how listeners can recognize the function of particular statements in ongoing conversation, and how speakers choose statements over other options to achieve the cognitive effects they want.

The analysis proceeds in this way. First, all of the statements from a long sample of data (the whole of Walter 1A) have been examined, and a number have been selected for presentation in this discussion. The sample is representative of the range of uses of statements in the conversations. For each statement presented, we describe both the cognitive state of the speaker at the time the statement is made and the cognitive processing the addressee
is intended to perform on parsing the utterance. This description rests both on evidence overtly present in the texts in the interlocutors next utterances and from my own judgments as a native speaker observer. This analysis results in a catalogue of the cognitive functions for which statements are used in the interviews. Next, it is proposed that all statements are unified by a semantics that is compatible with the functions they serve and that contrasts with the semantics of question utterances. Then, the context of the statements is studied in order to discover cognitive factors that lead the addressee to recognize the particular cognitive task that he is expected to perform in a particular instance. The discussion then takes the speaker's point of view, exploring the cognitive conditions leading to the speaker's selection of a statement utterance over other possibilities.

A note on the approach. In this chapter, one type of utterance, the statement, is taken as a starting point for understanding the cognitive functions of utterances. Given this type of utterance, we are interested in discovering the range of its functions and in unraveling a portion of the realizational relationships that link it to those functions. This is not the only possible approach, however. Alternatively, a specific cognitive process needed in conversation could serve as a starting point. The conversation could then be examined for clues concerning the
accomplishment of that cognitive task. For example, instead of asking what cognitive effects statements achieve, we could ask how speakers go about directing addressees to add information to their systems. In other words, the function, not the form, would be held constant. This approach was in fact the one taken in Chapter 4. There, cognitive topic coordination was identified as a chronic problem for the interlocutors. Strategies of topic coordination, such as encoding a global topic before a local one, were discovered through investigation of the text. These two approaches, one starting with a formal pattern and one starting with a functional need, are complementary in a study of the cognitive processing that occurs in conversation.

The statement. For our purposes, statements will be identified by typical kinds of statement syntax (e.g. non-inverted subject verb order) and by a non-rising final intonation contour. Statements involving elision are included as well. Other types of utterances are excluded: questions, whether identified by rising intonation or by morpho-syntactic features (e.g. inverted subject verb order, tags, question words), imperatives, exclamations, and agreement tokens (i.e. "yes", "no", "mhm", etc.). Also excluded from consideration are the less typical kinds of utterances Lucinda makes as she reads aloud before the Lu40 tape and prays aloud at the end of the Lu40 tape. Otherwise, this discussion is intended to account for all
statements in the interviews. In the next section, representative examples are taken in sequence from interview segment Walter1A. Supporting examples are cited from other parts of the data as well.

**A catalogue of statement functions.** Obviously, many statements appear in the transcripts. The following examples, culled in sequence from Walter 1A, are discussed in detail below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Walter1A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a.</strong> Will 'n 3Bélle(^2) had moved to Cloud Chief be 3fróre(^2) that. ((1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b.</strong> (They were) Three miles east of 3Clóud 1Chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c.</strong> You didn't just 3walk 1 into it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d.</strong> (It was called) 3Búrneyvle(^1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e.</strong> And your dad ran a 3férry(^1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>f.</strong> Well on the 3máp 1 there're- there're two 3pláces(^1) where there were- ((3)) 71a there was a 3férry(^1). ((1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>g.</strong> And the 3history(^1) books say that the Rock Bluff Cróssing was about a hundred miles- c down the 3ríver(^1) from- where the Chísoim 3Tráíl(^1) crossed-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which would be up close to 3Léon(^1). ((3))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>h.</strong> But this was- definitely called the Rock Bluff Crossing of the Réd River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>i.</strong> Uh- ((2)) Somewhere in the récords it says that uh- ((1)) you had a 3síster(^1). ((1)) 79a 1Who died(^1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>j.</strong> But you didn't 3háve(^1) a sister that died before you were 3bórn(^1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>k.</strong> You don't remember her náme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these statements share certain grammatical features. That is, they are identifiable as statements by both syntax and intonation. Out of their original context, as listed here, all tend to affect us as assertions. However, in Walter 1A they reflect a variety of cognitive states on the
part of the speaker and are intended to effect a variety of
cognitive processes on the part of the addressee. Consideration of these same examples in their original context yields a better understanding of the range of functions that statements serve in the interviews. The examples are here discussed in detail, paying special attention to the cognitive states of speaker and hearer at the time the utterance is made. Letters before the excerpts refer to the letter labels attached to the examples above.

a.

 '((Walter1A))

Were you 3Ifvin' 2on- the Ford 3fárm2- at Park 3Spríngs3
2before you went up to 3Míncó3?

Mhm.  ((4))

1'Yeah2,  ((4))

Will 'n 3Bélle2 had moved to Cloud Chief be3fóre2 that. ((1))
Will 'n 3Bélle 1had moved to Cloud Chief be3fóre 1that.  14

With Walter1A:13.3, Walter makes an assertion expressing information that he has in his cognitive system about Will and Belle's move to Cloud Chief. As far as Walter's view of the cognitive situation goes, he believes that LeRoy does not possess the information encoded in the statement about the timing of Will and Belle's move, and he expects LeRoy to add the proposition to his system at the appropriate location after parsing the utterance. This assertion is connected to LeRoy's cognitive task of adding information that was not
present in his system previously. LeRoy's response in 14 demonstrates his adding of the information. Many but by no means all of the statements in the interviews direct the addressee to perform this information addition task. Other examples are as follows.

((Walter3A))

While we 'uz 3ifvin' 1on- ((1)) my- 3dád's place2- at 3Érick2- 4Clóud Chier2-((2))
my 3stép-2daddy2- come 3úp there2- ((1)) one time to 3sée us2- ((2))

((Lu40min))

We 3fled2 in eighteen 'n- ((4))
ninety 3éight1 1 think2 'n then the next 3spring2- we 3mved1.

((Lu3B))

You know I 3joyed1 them 1days2. ((2))
It was hard days but ((1))
3en1joyed 2em.

It should also be noted that assertion statements are not equally characteristic of interviewer and interviewee. Most of Lucinda's and Walter's statements function as assertions while few of LeRoy's statements do.

b.

((Walter1A))

They were at- about three miles 3east2- ((1)) of 3Clóud 1Chier. ((2)) 15.1
Three miles east of 3Clóud 1Chier. ((2)) 16
Were they still livin' in the 3dugout3?
Statement 15.1 is an assertion equivalent to 13.3 above in terms of the type of cognitive processing it is intended to effect in LeRoy. Walter has made an assertion based on knowledge in his system, with the belief that LeRoy does not already have the knowledge in his system.

Although LeRoy's utterance 16 is an almost word for word echo of Walter's assertion, however, the cognitive processing connected with it is quite different. The repetition in 16 of the same proposition expressed in 15.1 reflects the fact that LeRoy has received the information in 15.1, and it informs Walter of that fact. Utterance 16 can be thus be called a reception statement. Because Walter and Lucinda make most of the assertion statements in the conversation, LeRoy makes most of the reception statements. A reception statement is associated with the cognitive task in the addressee's (i.e. Lucinda's or Walter's) mind of noting that the speaker has received asserted information and that the information exchange has been successfully completed.

In the case of utterance 16, there is little overt evidence about Walter's resulting cognitive processing. There is a two second pause and Walter does not respond. We will have more evidence about Walter's processing in section 'd' below in connection with another example from Walter 1A. Examples of reception statements from other parts of the interviews follow.
Well— I said it as a little speech at school. You said it as a speech at school. You know they used to—they had children to— ((1)) memorize little poems and say 'em ever Friday.

((Lu40))

In uh— ((3)) nineteen hundred.

Nineteen hundred.

Uh-huh. ((1))

((Walter2A))

(they) called it the boneyard. ((Chuckie))

Boneyard.

'Yeah. ((Chuckie))

((Walter2A))

Did the wagons you travelled in have the big bows over 'em?

'Yeah.

Sheet 'n bows.

Sheet 'n bows. ((Carefully pronounced to make sure he has the right words))

'Yeah.

((Walter1A))

Just plain lumber benches. ((3))

They were still benches. Kinda like—

Yeah.

((Walter3A))

'n we had to— ((4)) (you see) had to get the shériff after him.

((Chuckie))

You got the shériff after him.

Yeah to get that money.
Further examples include Walter1A:14 cited above as well as Lu3B:19, Lu40:92, Walter 2A/B:1, 19, 119, Walter3A:93, 124, and Walter1A:2, 16, 39, 54, 57, 68, 124, 126, 129, 142.

c.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

((Walter1A))

Did you have to climb steps down into it?  21

'Yeah'. ((2))

You didn't just walk into it.  22

Yeah- just come down steps into it just like goin' into the cellar. ((6))
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Utterance 22 is not an assertion statement. LeRoy expects that Walter already has in his system the information encoded in the statement and does not intend for Walter to add it as new information. Neither is 22 a simple reception statement, for the proposition expressed in 22 goes beyond any proposition explicitly expressed by Walter. Instead, LeRoy proposes the information encoded in 22 as a state of affairs that he thinks is entailed by the information made available in 21 and 21.1. Utterance 22 represents a conclusion that LeRoy has come to creatively by invoking portions of his own previous knowledge without Walter's explicit instruction. Walter's cognitive tasks with respect to this information are to compare it with information in his system and either confirm its validity or explain why it is a wrong conclusion. In the case of 22, he confirms LeRoy's conclusion. In functional terms, the statement in 22 can be called a conclusion statement.
Following are other examples of conclusion statements that are confirmed by Walter.

Had they smoothed it down with anything? ((Walter1A)) 108
'Uh-uh.
Still rough1.
Just holes bored in it. 109

((Walter1A))

You hold your book in your hand. ((4)) 112.2
'N you held your slate in the hand. 113
Yeah. ((7))

((Walter3A))
The b- uh ((1)) yoke went around their neck like that2- 55.3
then it had bows come around up here 'n run through that- yoke3.
Oh that was the loop1.
Yeah2. It had- they called them bows1. 56

In the following examples, LeRoy's conclusions turn out to be mistaken in some aspect and Walter offers appropriate corrections. The corrections support our view of the interviewee's cognitive processing in response to conclusion statements. The interviewee is either to confirm the conclusion or explain why it is mistaken.

How long did he operate this ferry? ((Walter1A)) 67
Oooh about a year1 I guess1.
I don't know2- just how long- but not very1 long- about a year2.
Just moved up there for a year1. 68
Yeah- Well- He just had the boat about that long2.
We fixed up in that country two years1 you see2. ((1))
Just plain lumber benches². ((3))
Th- they were still benches². Kinda like-

Yeah.

the logs¹ but made out a lumber¹.

Yeah but

they had benches¹.

Oh. ¹You know². ((2)) They had benches¹ to them¹.


d.

in Barnville¹ be²fe². ((3))
(it 'uz one of 'em) Barnville or 3Jefftown¹.

Bar- Barnville³?
Burney- Burneyville¹.
Burneyville¹.
Burneyville².
Burneyville².

¹Yeah². ((2))

As with 16, LeRoy's utterances in 31 and 32 are reception statements, displaying knowledge just obtained from Walter's assertions in 30.1 and 31.1. In this case, however, Walter
does not respond with silence as he did above in 16. His responses (to 31 in 31.1, to 32 in 32.1) show that his cognitive tasks go beyond simply noting that LeRoy has added information from previous assertions. In addition, he compares LeRoy's information with his own, as he does in response to conclusion statements described above. Then, as a result of that comparison he confirms that the information added is correct, as in 32, or alternatively offers a correction, as he does in 31.

In the reception example in utterance 16 above, Walter does not respond orally. The two second silence following 16a is interpreted by LeRoy as a weak confirmation, or at least as not a rejection, and he continues with other questions. In 32.1, however, Walter makes the confirmation explicit. In most of the examples of reception statements cited above, the confirmation was made explicit as well. Although explicit confirmation is not always needed for the conversation to continue, this explicitness of 32.1 is especially called for by the fact that Walter initially had trouble in recalling the requested information in 29.2-29.3 and 30.1, a situation potentially confusing to LeRoy.

It can here be pointed out that reception statements and conclusion statements share similarities in terms of the types of cognitive processing they evoke in the addressee. Both ask for the addressee's approval or correction of the information they encode. The two types of statements can,
however, be distinguished in terms of the processing of the speaker. In the case of reception statements, the speaker parrots a proposition made explicit by the other interlocutor. In the case of conclusion statements, however, he shows that he has made further inferences, invoking previous knowledge beyond that actually expressed by the other interlocutor. The addressee's processing in the two cases will differ slightly as well, for in the case of conclusion statements, the two propositions to be compared and evaluated (e.g. 'that he had to climb steps down into the dugout' (21) vs. 'that he did not just walk into the dugout' (22)) will differ more than the two propositions to be compared and evaluated in the case of reception statements (e.g. 'that the family was about three miles east of Cloud Chief' (15.1) vs. 'that the family was three miles east of Cloud Chief' (16)). Conclusion statements require more processing work from the addressee than do reception statements, but the difference is one of degree more than of kind.

e.

(\text{Walter1A})

And your dad ran a \text{ferry}!.
Did he \text{down} the \text{ferry}? Or did he \text{rent} it?\text{ }

In 51, LeRoy has reactivated a cognitive topic in his system from earlier in the conversation. The ferry had been
discussed in 42-45. Here it is reintroduced after a hiatus via the statement of 51a so that further questions can be asked in 51b. Utterance 51 can thus be called a topic coordinator or coordination statement, and the cognitive task expected of Walter is that of locating information already in his system in preparation for further processing at that location. Principles of topic coordination have already been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Other examples of coordination statements include the following.

---

((Walter1A))

You came– you came up to Clóud Chief to get 3married2–

Where were you before 3that1? ((4))

Park 3Springs1. ((3))

---

((Walter1A))

When you went to the– Fórd 3schóol3– ((2))

uh– you said one time they had 16g 3désks1.

What kind a– what’d they 3jók 1like?

Desks made out a 3jógs1.

Oh uh. Wéll they ‘uz just– just like you take a 3jóg 1’n saw it 4ºpen2. ((3))

---


f. g. h.

---

((Walter1A))

f. Well on the 3máp 1there’re–

there’re two 3plácés1 where there were–(3)

there was a 3ferry1. ((1))

g. And the 3hístory1 books say that

the Rock Bluff Cróssing was about a hunderd miles–
down the 3river1 from- where the Chisolm 3Tráill1 crossed-
which would be up close to 3Léon1. (3)

No I don't know any Chisolm 3Tráill1 crossed2. (3)

But this was- definitely called
the Röck Blüff Crossing of the Réd River.

[Yeah. The Röck Blüff
Crossing right there close to 3Léon1-

In 71a-g, LeRoy uses statements to make assertions. He does not believe that Walter knows the information he cites from "the map" and "the history books" and he wants Walter to add this information to his system. Walter is expected to do more than add information as a result of 71, however. The information LeRoy expresses in these statements conflicts with information that Walter had expressed earlier about his father's ferry being located at the Rock Bluff Crossing. Therefore, Walter, in addition to adding the information to his cognitive system, is expected to notice its contradiction with his own previous experience and to offer an explanation for the inconsistency. This is precisely what he does in 71.1, sticking by his own memory and eschewing responsibility for what maps and history books say. If Walter had treated 71 merely as an assertion, i.e. simply added the new information to his system, he would not have answered in this way.

LeRoy's statement in 71 can thus be called a contradiction statement or challenge statement in contrast
with ordinary assertions. Walter's intended cognitive activity in response to the contradiction statement involves reconciling in some way the information provided by LeRoy with the conflicting information he already has. He might do this by providing some additional explanatory detail, or as here, by simply stating his belief in one set of facts versus the other. LeRoy's statement in 72 continues the challenge asking Walter to confirm his opinion as to the still (to LeRoy) contradictory information about the identity of the crossing. Walter's response is to confirm the verity of the information he has asserted.

Contradiction statements are fairly rare in this conversation probably because LeRoy does not have a great deal of information that is in conflict with Lucinda's and Walter's memories. In other words, the cognitive situation is not often right for contradictions statements. Lucinda40:4 and Lucinda3B:41 cited here provide further examples.

---

In uh- ((3)) nineteen húndred. ((Lu40)) 2.2

Nineteen 3húndred¹.

Uh-huh. ((1))

2No³. ((2))

'I thought it was éighteen ninety 3éight¹.

[(Eighteen-
ninety 3éight¹.

Ninety 3nine¹. ((A self correction))

---
I still can't uh-find in history books mom why- (2) your dad had to cross the Canadian river if you lived in Potta county at the time of the run of eighty-nine because that was not the unassigned lands that were opened.

Well, you know why he had to cross the river? (2)

No but I thought we had to be out of that country a certain time. But I can't remember everything like that.

'N I never studied history a day in my life. (1)

Lu40:69, Walter 1A:44, 82, 83, 143, Walter2A/B: 105, 130 provide other examples.

**Summary of statement functions.** Up to this point, we have observed five different ways that statements are used in LeRoy's interviews with his parents. Before continuing with further analysis of statements from Walter 1A, we pause here to summarize these functions in tabular form along with the cognitive tasks that they direct the addressee to engage in and the cognitive state of the speaker as the utterance is made. The other examples to be examined will refine or add further support to the basic picture that has emerged so far.

To avoid confusion, the reader should note that the speaker/addressee roles mentioned in the table are in principle independent of the interviewer/interviewee roles that fall to LeRoy and Walter/Lucinda, respectively. LeRoy is always interviewer, but his role as speaker or addressee switches back and forth. The same can be said for Walter and
Lucinda as interviewees. Nevertheless there is some
correlation of statement function and interviewer/interviewee
role. Most of Walter's and Lucinda's statements are
assertions. Most of LeRoy's statements serve the other
functions. The names given in parentheses after the
statement function are therefore included for convenience and
to avoid confusion. They indicate the interlocutor who most
often, though not always, fills the speaker role with respect
to that function.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement function</th>
<th>Addrressee task(s)</th>
<th>Speaker state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertion statement (Walter/Lucinda)</td>
<td>add information</td>
<td>has the information, believes the addressee does not have it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reception statement (LeRoy)</td>
<td>note that speaker now has the information, compare it with your information and confirm or correct</td>
<td>has just added the information, but may have some uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conclusion statement (LeRoy)</td>
<td>compare the speaker's information with your own and confirm or correct</td>
<td>has drawn a conclusion beyond what addressee has expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Coordination statement (LeRoy)</td>
<td>locate information for further processing</td>
<td>is thinking about a certain topic but believes that the addressee is not thinking about it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further observations of statement function. The following analysis supports and builds on this picture. The functions of statements listed above account for most of the statements in the corpus. However, there are some more complex cases that combine certain of these functions into one utterance. The major refinements to follow include recognition of the multiple functions of some statements and the identification of an additional and rare statement function.

((Walter1A))

1. Uh-((2)) Sómewhere in the récords it says that uh-((1))
you had a 3síster1.(1)
1Who died1.
Do you remember what her 3námé was3?
((Walter tells about a sister who was killed in an accident)) 79.1-81.1

j. But you didn't 3háve1 a sister that died before you were 3bórn1. 82
3Oh1. (2)) Unless there was one they 3sáid2.
I don't re3mémbér1.
(that there's two)
[

k. You don't remember her námé.
2No1. She 'uz just- just an 3ínfant2. ((5))
'N seem to 3mé1 like it- ((4))
seem to me like there was a 3bróther2 3tóo1. ((2))
3I don't 1know.
Utterance 79 combines the functions of assertion and coordination statements. In it, LeRoy asserts in the main clause that the records say something, and in the subordinate clause asks Walter to locate in his system information concerning a sister who died. Thus, different clauses of a single complex statement serve different functions. It should be noted that LeRoy does not think that he is asserting the information that Walter had a sister. Instead, he assumes that Walter knows about the sister and that 79a, b, and c will be sufficient to effect the coordination. This is shown by his next question, 79d, which is not "do you know about her" but "do you remember her name".

Different functions may also be combined in a single statement in other ways. In 79.1-81.1 Walter talks about a sister other than the one LeRoy intended. In 82, therefore, LeRoy continues his topic coordination effort. The "before you were born" in 82 provides extra information designed to help effect the identification of the intended sister. Furthermore, LeRoy has concluded by 82 that Walter might not even know about another sister that died, i.e. that the requested information may not be present for topicalization. Therefore, 82 also asks Walter to confirm this conclusion. Thus this statement combines the two functions of topic coordination and conclusion statement. In addition, 82 serves as a contradiction statement in that it points out
that Walter's information is in conflict with what the records say.

Walter's answers in 82.1 and later in 83.1-3 demonstrate that he has responded to utterance 82 as a coordination statement, conclusion statement, and contradiction statement. He successfully locates the topic in his system based on the "before you were born" information, disconfirms LeRoy's conclusion that he did not have such a sister, and reconciles his knowledge about this sister with the information LeRoy has presented from "the records" by recalling the little information that he has about this sister as well as about a brother.

Statement 83 is a conclusion statement. By the time he utters it, LeRoy has concluded that Walter probably does not remember the sister's name. After all, Walter did not even remember her existence at first. As a result of 83, LeRoy expects Walter to confirm his belief, which he does in 83.1. Utterance 83 is more than a conclusion statement, however. In addition, 83 asks Walter to supply the sister's name if, against expectation, he does remember it. That is, a response of "yes, I remember" without supplying the name would be non-cooperative. Thus 83 serves as what can be called a retrieval statement as well, and this becomes a sixth function of statements in the interviews.
As another example of a retrieval statement, consider the following. As in the example above, 100 both expresses LeRoy's conclusion about Walter's knowledge and asks Walter to retrieve information if, against expectation, he has it. In this case, Walter's next utterance shows clearly that he has tried to retrieve the information requested.

((Walter1A))

Do you know if 3'all1 of these 3Ford's3
1including 3Molly 'n all of 'em came from Ala3bama3
or did just the two 3boys1?

No I don't 3know ('nothin') about 3that2.
( ) I just heared 'em say- dad say that he come from Ala3bama1.

'N that's all 31 2know.
Don't re3member1.

'N you don't know if 3George2 came from there or 3not1.

I guess he 3died2 though. ((5))
((I imagine) he 3died2. ((3))

It should be noted that statements rarely serve this function in the interviews. Instead, the retrieval function is usually signaled formally with a question as in 79c. The rarity of statements used to retrieve information identifies retrieval as a peripheral and not a basic function of statements. For now we set retrieval statements aside and
concentrate on the basic functions. However, more will be said later about the possibility and rarity of statements as retrieval signals.

In summary, the first five statement functions we have discovered are the main ones that occur in LeRoy's interviews. The interlocutors use statements to assert, demonstrate the reception of information, test conclusions, coordinate cognitive topic, and challenge information. These are the most common functions of statements in the data. Sometimes, several of these functions will be combined in a single statement. In addition to these usual functions, there is a potential in certain circumstances for statements to effect other kinds of processing as well. The retrieval statement provides an example of an unusual statement function. Further investigation of the interviews would doubtless uncover other such unusual cases. However, this examination has yielded a list of the the most common functions, and these are the ones of most concern here.

A unifying property of statements. In this section we consider the particular configuration of statement functions we have discovered before turning to the addressee's problem of recognizing an intended statement function and the speaker's task of choosing a statement over other utterance possibilities.

As shown, statements serve a variety of functions in the interviews, and there is no one to one mapping between
statement form and cognitive function. For example, it is not the case that all statements are assertions. The list of basic statement functions, however, is not endless. Neither does the particular set of functions that has been identified form a random collection. Instead there seem to be limits to the statement form/function discrepancy. What is of interest is the question of why statements would be connected with just this range of basic functions we have observed and not others. For example, why is assertion a common function of statements while retrieval is more rare?

The answer proposed here involves the fact that in each of its functions, the statement signals the presence of information in the speaker's system. The statement reports that information to the addressee. This unifying property characterizes all statement functions and also distinguishes statements from other types of utterances that do not signal the presence of information in the speaker's system. Questions, for example, signal the lack of information.

The differences that distinguish the various statement functions have to do with other aspects of the cognitive situation, e.g. with whether the speaker has just added the information or already knew it (reception vs. assertion), with the speaker's judgment about whether the addressee has the information already or not and is thinking about the information or not (coordination/reception vs. assertion), and with the speaker's recognition of possibly conflicting
information in the addressee's system (contradiction). These differences of cognitive situation were summarized in more detail in Table 1.

The rarity of retrieval as a function of statements is consistent with the view that statements signal information present in the speaker's system. Speakers usually want addressees to retrieve information that the speaker does not have, and questions therefore usually serve this function. For the addressee in most cases, a statement would fail as a retrieval signal owing to the contradictory signal it sends that the speaker already has the information. Although rare, the usage of a statement for retrieving information is possible under certain circumstances as has been shown. This possibility also merits explanation, but we defer that discussion until the section below concerned with conditions prompting the speaker choice of a statement over other options.

On the recognition of statement functions. Given the variety of functions that statements serve in the exchange of information in the interviews, it is of interest to ask how the addressee, when faced with a statement from the speaker, recognizes the type of cognitive processing he is expected to perform.

Overt clues. We can begin by noting that certain overt structural characteristics of statements influence their interpretation. First, and most obviously, the use of a
statement instead of some other kind of utterance is of importance. The addressee understands the typical functions of statements vs. other utterance types, and that knowledge greatly narrows the possibilities of utterance function. That is, a statement will ask him to perform some task consistent with a situation in which the speaker knows the information.

Second, many statements have further internal clues as to their function. For example, many topic coordination statements in the interviews contain phrases such as "I remember your saying X" or "you said one time that X". The bold-faced portion of statement Walter 1A:105b cited below helps to identify it as a topic coordination statement. Uttered without this phrase, the statement would have come across more like an assertion. The "you said one time", however, makes clear its coordination function by expressing LeRoy's belief that Walter already has this information. If Walter already has the information, he does not need to have it asserted to him.

```
(Walter1A)
When you went to the- Förd 3schóol3- ((2)) 105
uh- you said one time they had lóg 3désks1.
```

Other examples include Lu40:18, 84, Lu2A:66, 94, 96, 100, Lu3B:75, and Walter2A/B:116.
Contradiction statements may be marked internally as well. In the following example, the "I thought it was" makes explicit the conflict of information that must be reconciled.

```
((Lu40))

In uh- ((3)) nineteen húndred. 2.2
Nineteen 3húndred'. 3
Uh-huh. ((1))
2No3. (2)
I thought it was eighteen ninety 3eight'. 4
```

The "well let's see" in the following excerpt serves a similar function.

```
((Walter1A))

You go out east or- ((2)) 3wést2 or- a little ole place they called 3Léon1. ((3)) 43.2
Well let's 3see1. 44
3Léon2 1is further up- the 3rfver1. Did your-

1Yeah3. ((2))
Did- did you gu- uh- 3stépdad1 run 3twó ferries3? 45
```

In addition, markers like "well" and "but" often occur in challenge statements and help in signaling the conflict of information. Consider the following examples reprinted from the discussion of challenge statements above.

```
((Walter1A))

Well on the 3map 1there're- there're two 3plácês1 where there were-((3)) 71
there was a 3ferry1. ((1))
```

But this was definitely called the Rock Bluff Crossing of the Red River.

Conclusion statements are sometimes marked also. The marker "oh" precedes the conclusion in these examples. It signals the surprise that accompanies these conclusions in LeRoy's mind.

The b-uh ((1)) yóke\(^1\) went around their neck like thát\(^2\)-'n then it had bóws\(^2\) come around up here 'n run through that- yóke\(^3\).

Oh that was the ñoóp\(^1\).

We- That 'uz when he hâd the bóat\(^1\).

Oh he ówned it.

Yeah. ((3))

In these examples, the "you mean" and "so" signal that the statements are conclusions.

By the time it get þére\(^2\) it'd be þásses\(^1\).

((Chuckles, self-amusement.))

You mean the þúice \(^{}\) just ran down-

Yeah\(^3\).

So you really learned to write just so you could write to dâd\(^1\). ((1))

Well I uh-

I don't know I might not a ever learned if it hadn't a been for that 'n-
Finally, the particular function of a statement may be signaled outside the statement itself by means of its sequential position in the conversation. For example, reception statements typically follow assertion statements. Their sequencing, coupled with their echo-like quality with respect to the preceding assertion mark them as reception statements. As another example, assertion statements often follow questions and this sequential aspect helps to identify their assertive function.¹⁰

Thus, there are important overt clues within the linguistic signal that help the addressee recognize the function of a statement. Such clues, however, are not always present. Nor are they sufficient in some cases to completely specify the function of a particular statement. Conclusion statements are rarely marked overtly, for example. Not all assertions are marked by a preceding question. Topic coordinations and challenges are not always marked in the way described above. The addressee, therefore, must have additional means of recognizing statement functions.

Non-overt clues. Observation of conversation and reflection upon the cognitive systems of the interlocutors suggests that in addition to the overt signals, it is the addressee's notion of the total cognitive situation at the time a statement is made that determines his interpretation. In the interviews, we can identify several relevant elements
of the addressee's view that along with the explicit signals identified above help him recognize statement functions.

First of all, as has been noted, the interviews are instances of a specific kind of speech event that casts the interlocutors into certain roles, interviews in which LeRoy plays the role of interviewer while Walter and Lucinda are interviewees. These roles are associated with typical types of cognitive processing that can help the addressee to interpret a statement. LeRoy, for example, knows by virtue of the interviewee's role in the interview that he can expect mainly assertions from Walter and Lucinda. They, on the other hand know that they can expect few assertions from LeRoy. So a statement from Walter or Lucinda is likely to function as an assertion whereas one from LeRoy is likely to function as something else.

There are a few instances in the interviews in which LeRoy, contrary to his expected processing as interviewer, does make assertions. In many of these cases, he cites a source for his information, and these citations help Lucinda or Walter to recognize the statements as assertions even though this function is not in accord with LeRoy's role in the speech event. That is, when LeRoy uses statements in a way not consistent with his role, he marks that use, and the necessity of marking suggests something about Walter and Lucinda's expectations based on the speech event.
Well on the map there are two places where there were—
And the history books say that
the Rock Bluff Crossing was about a hundred miles
down the river from where the Chisolm trail crossed—
which would be up close to Léon.

Other examples include Walter 1A:79, 146, Lu 3B:26, 41.

In another instance, LeRoy makes an assertion based on his own memory. In Lu2A:89a and b he remembers something about his school days and asserts this information to Lucinda. The first person encoding of the information marks the statements as assertions.

Where was the first school that the kids went to?
It was what they called Old Héxt.
It was way down there by Mert Béry's.
That's where I went one time.
That's where I started.
No you— you started further up the hill.
They moved it up.

In addition to using their knowledge of speech event roles, addressees interpret statement functions by tracking the cognitive systems of the speaker, maintaining some sort of model of what he knows and is thinking about at a certain point in the conversation. This tracking helps LeRoy, Lucinda, and Walter recognize statement functions even when...
they are neither overtly marked nor predictable based on the speech roles of the interlocutors in the speech event.

This tracking is relevant in many different ways. Perhaps most important, LeRoy, Lucinda, and Walter have a good idea about the extent and source of each other's knowledge about early times on the farm at Erick. LeRoy knows that Lucinda and Walter remember many personal experiences. Lucinda and Walter know that LeRoy knows about many of their experiences from hearsay, that he was present as a child during some of them, and that there are other experiences about which he knows nothing at all. Therefore, when LeRoy hears a statement from Walter or Lucinda about a past experience, he can identify it as an assertion because he recognizes that Walter and Lucinda are authorities on their own memories. Furthermore, he knows that they know that he is not an authority and therefore needs to be instructed. In the example below, this knowledge helps LeRoy recognize Lucinda's statements about an Indian she remembers as assertions. Note that in this case, LeRoy's preceding question does not directly elicit the story about the Indian. Instead, Lucinda volunteers the story after a pause. In other words, it is not the overt question/answer sequence that helps identify the statements as assertions. LeRoy must have other means.
Did you ever go down to their- ((2)) C'olony 3 where they lived 'n everthing3?30

No. ((3))

There was one ole- ((1)) Indian2-
his name was Long Hairy2. ((1))

For their part, Lucinda and Walter, on hearing LeRoy make a statement about their past experiences know that LeRoy is not the authority on this information. Hence they can recognize the statement as something other than an assertion. In the following examples, the bold faced statements can be recognized as conclusions in part because LeRoy is known not to be an authority on the information they encode. Since LeRoy is not the authority, and since the information he expresses is on the same topic, yet represents reasonable inferences going beyond the information explicitly provided by Walter, the statements must be conclusions that LeRoy has submitted for verification. In Walter 1A:11, LeRoy concludes, based on his knowledge of trains and travel, that since the train stopped at Minco, Walter must have gotten off at Minco. In Walter 1A:113, LeRoy concludes, based on his previous knowledge of school materials during Walter's school days, that if Walter held his book in his hand (because there were no desks), that he must have held his slate in his hand as well.
Likewise, reception statements are not confused with assertions because they are addressed by one who is known not to be an authority to one who is known to be an authority. The addressee can distinguish them from other non-assertion statements in that they are on the same topic and include only information that the addressee has provided in the previous turn.

The recognition of topic coordination statements often depends on the addressee's memory of the conversation as well as on his idea of what the speaker knows. Each interlocutor tracks the conversational interaction and maintains an idea of the other's activational states at any certain point. Thus, the addressee has notions of what the speaker is thinking about at the moment and of how information is organized and accessed in the speaker's system, and these notions can help in the recognition of statement function. In the following example, Walter remembers that the ferry has
already been discussed in the conversation, and this discourse memory helps him identify 51 as a topic coordinator rather than as, for example, a conclusion statement. Principles of topic selection, which Walter implicitly knows, lead him to expect that LeRoy might reintroduce this previous topic after intervening topics have been exhausted.

((Walter1A))

And your dad ran a 3ferry1.
Did he 3own the 3ferry3? Or did he 3rent it3?
2No2. Just had it- 2leased1.

In this example, Lucinda can recognize 103 as a coordination statement both because she knows that LeRoy is not an authority on the information and because of her implicit knowledge of principles of topic selection. Here, LeRoy does not reintroduce a topic from earlier in the conversation, but he does topicalize information closely related to information that Lucinda has expressed in her previous turn.

((Lu3B))

Poor ole däd 'd get so mád at them ole 2óxen2- when they'd- ((2)) 102.3
rún off of us 'n come to the 3hóuse1.

...... 102.5-102.10

Your dad kept ône rópe-
tied to ône hórn of an ox for some reason when he was dríving 'em.
What was thát for?
Well- he gúled 'em mostlý by tálkin'.

----------------------------------------
In the immediately preceding utterances, Lucinda had talked about problems she and her brother had in driving her father's oxen. Because of the topical organization of information in his system, this talk reminds LeRoy of something he knows about how Lucinda's father drove oxen, and that information becomes selected as topic. In summary, there are a number of signals that help the addressee to recognize a statement function. The addressee knows that a statement signals information present in the speaker's system. He thus knows that the more specific function of the statement must be consistent with that general cognitive situation. He considers overt clues such as the sequential placement of the statement and the occurrence of certain phrases or markers. He has knowledge of the speech event in which he is involved and of the cognitive situation that it sets up. Finally, he maintains a model of the other interlocutor's cognitive system, including notions of what knowledge is present in that system and how it is organized and accessed, and notions of the activation status of that information as the conversation progresses. All of this information contributes to the recognition of the intended cognitive functions of statements. In short, the addressee makes use of the total cognitive situation, including both his knowledge of the meanings of overt signals and his knowledge of the speaker's knowledge and current cognitive state in order to recognize statement functions.
Cognitive functions of utterances and the speaker. The discussion so far has concentrated on the effect of statements on the addressee. We now turn to an examination of the cognitive state of the speaker as he utters a statement. The addressee's problem in connection with statements is to ascertain in each case the kind of cognitive processing he is expected to perform. The speaker has a different problem. For him, given his own cognitive state at the time of the utterance and the cognitive task(s) he wants the addressee to perform, the task lies in choosing from among several options the most appropriate utterance type.

The following discussion looks at LeRoy's processing in several examples of statements, both from Walter1A and from other portions of the interviews. An exhaustive description of LeRoy's options of utterance forms is not possible here. Instead, the discussion centers on some of LeRoy's considerations in choosing a statement vs. some other form. These considerations are such that they would be relevant also to LeRoy's choices of utterance types other than statements.
The statement as a signal of information receipt.

(Walter1A))

he married that 3 Indian1- ((1)) 1 woman1. ((1))
And we wuz on his- her- her 3 farm2.
Oh he had married an 3 Indian 2 woman
1 Yeah2.
'n they lived on her 3 farm1.
1 Yeah2. ((3))

Walter's statements in 39.5 and 39.6 are assertions concerning the family situation of a man who rented a farm to his step-father. LeRoy's utterance in 40 and 41 is a reception statement. As described above, Walter compares the information encoded in it with the information in his system and confirms it in 40.1 and 41.1.

Of interest here are aspects of LeRoy's processing that prompt the reception statement. First it can be noted that LeRoy has alternative means of signaling to Walter the receipt of information. Consider the "uh-huh" in Walter 1A:77.

(Walter1A))

'N there 'uz a road cut in- through them rocks down to the- 3 boat2.
Uh-huh. 77

Other "uh-huh" receipts include Lu40:31, Lu2A:34, Lu3B:102, and Walter1A:73, 78. The "uh-huh" signals to Walter the receipt of the information, showing that LeRoy is ready for
him to continue his talk. Unlike the repetitive reception statement, however, an "uh-huh" receipt does not display LeRoy's newly added knowledge to Walter so that it can be confirmed or corrected.

In addition, it can be noted that in most cases LeRoy uses no expression, "uh-huh" or otherwise, to overtly call attention to his receipt of information. In this excerpt, for example, LeRoy in 16 uses neither a reception statement concerning Brother White nor an "uh-huh" receipt to signal information receipt. Instead, in 16 he immediately continues his line of questioning.

---

Did you have any church or anything to go to? 15

1No.

But we finally had a preacher to come oh—Brother White from down about filler or somethin'. (2)

What'd he just come once a month or somethin'? 16

2Oh he came 'n held a meeting—

---

Of course, the question itself gives Lucinda or Walter some evidence of the success of LeRoy's processing. Here, the "he" in 16 referring to Brother White, as well as LeRoy's suggestion that he came to the area once a month (as LeRoy knew circuit preachers often did) suggest that he has successfully added the information from 15.2-3. It is not always the case, however, that LeRoy's next question provides such evidence of successful processing. At major topic
shifts, as in the following example, LeRoy's next question at
54 has little to do with Walter's preceding assertions, yet
no overt signal of information reception is provided.

((Walter2A))

Hôw did you make a 3bróom1weed 2bróom1? ((4))
((Chuckie))
You'd pull up old 3bróomweeds2 'n-
- wropped 'em around a 3bróomhole2 - 3bróom2handle
' n just tied a 3string 1around it is all 3'1 2know. ( ) ((4))
Just- took a 3hândle2 'n just-
got them 3wêeds2 'n just wrôpped 'em a3róund2 the end of that 3hândle2 'n-
tied a 3string 2around it good 'n 1tight2.

Did the wágons you travelled in have the big 3bóws over 'em3? 54
'Yeah2.
Sheet 'n 3bóws2.

In general, then, it can be said that LeRoy has a choice of
expression in response to the receipt of information from
Walter or Lucinda. He may use of an "uh-huh" receipt, a
reception statement, or no overt signal at all.

Where LeRoy has a choice of linguistic expression, there
is a likelihood that the choice is meaningful. Therefore,
given that LeRoy has this choice, we want to understand what
cognitive factors motivate his selection. We will
concentrate on factors motivating his use of the reception
statement over the other alternatives. Returning to the
reception statement of Walter1A:40 with which we began this
discussion, it can be noted that the "oh" in 40 reflects
LeRoy's surprise in response to the information that Walter
expresses in 39.5 and 39.6. The news about the Indian wife is unexpected information to LeRoy. The view that this news is unexpected is further supported by LeRoy's use of the indefinite article to refer to the woman in 40, "an Indian woman", even after Walter has introduced her as "that Indian woman" in 39.5. That is, in LeRoy's system, the woman was actually a new referent although Walter's encoding indicated that she was a recoverable referent.

LeRoy's choice in 40 of a reception statement instead of an "uh-huh" receipt or no signal at all can be related to this element of surprise. It is in just such instances of surprise that LeRoy would tend to be uncertain and would need to have his understanding explicitly confirmed. The use of a statement over these other options reflects a modal aspect of LeRoy's cognitive state, i.e. his degree of surprise, at the time of the utterance. In contrast, an "uh-huh" receipt or silence occurs when LeRoy has less uncertainty about the newly added information and feels no need of confirmation.

Reception statements, "uh-huh" receipt, and silence are not the only possibilities here. Another involves intonation questions, and their choice also reflects speaker modality. In the following example, LeRoy, in 88 signals the receipt of information from 87.3 with an intonation question instead of with a statement. His next two utterances (89, 90) are likewise intonation questions, this time expressing conclusions he has reached about the dump based on
information Walter has provided. LeRoy's next two utterances (91, 92) are conclusions given in the form of statements rather than intonation questions.

((Walter 3A))

((15))
That ole contractor 3th'ere2 that built that dump 3th'ere2—
he had just so 3'much1 you know1.
'N he got his part 3'done2.
('N he—)
[
Built a 3'dump2?
'Yeah2. And he had- ((1)) 2oooh2- he got it all 3'done2
and he 3'owed1 us about- ((1)) thirt/forty 3'dollars2. ((2))
And he skipped 3'out1 you know1. ((1))
Didn't 3'pay1 us.
[
You mean the dump—
of dirt there before Turkey 2Créek2?
'Yeah2.
Hé was building that up so it'd be 3'level3?
'Yeah3. For the 4'railroad2.
It was a 4'railroad2 2'dump.
Dumping 3'dirt1.
'Yeah2.
To make it 3'level1. ((2))
Yeah hé had it— just so ma- so 3'much1 of that you know.

In 88, the intonation question signals a great deal of surprise and uncertainty with respect to the received information, more than would have been signaled with a statement. The surprise is great enough that LeRoy wants explicit confirmation from Walter, and the question form
signals this desire. Relative to this paradigmatic alternative, a reception statement signals a greater degree of speaker certainty, one less concerned with confirmation.

It was proposed earlier that statements signal the presence of information in the speaker's system. With regard to this proposal, the cognitive contrast demonstrated here between statements and intonation questions can be interpreted as follows. LeRoy's use of intonation questions in 88, 89, and 90 occurs immediately after he has heard surprising information, information, moreover, that Walter believes should not be surprising and has encoded as unsurprising (Walter3A:87.3, "that dump there"). Because this information is so unexpected, LeRoy does not want to add it to his system until he has further verified it. In addition, until he knows more, he will not know exactly where to add the information. The intonation questions reflect this verifying stage of his processing, a stage that precedes the actual permanent addition of the information. Later on, after Walter has provided more information, LeRoy moves into a stage in which he is ready to add the information about the dump to his system. In 91 and 92, he uses statements instead of questions, and they reflect the fact that he is adding/has added the information.

LeRoy's alternatives of silence, "uh-huh", statement, and intonation question can now be seen to exist as paradigmatic alternatives along a continuum. LeRoy responds
to assertions from Walter with silence or "uh-huh" when he has no difficulty with the new information and needs no response from Walter. He responds with a reception statement when he is a little uncertain about the new information and wants at least to display his understanding so that Walter can correct it if necessary. LeRoy responds with an intonation question when he is more surprised by the new information and is not sure enough of its verity or its proper connection points in his system to add it without more direction from Walter.

We have seen that LeRoy's choice of a statement over other kinds of utterances is influenced by his cognitive state at the time of an utterance, e.g. his degree of surprise. Another factor that influences his choice of statement over question involves the kind of response that he wants the addressee to give in response to the utterance. In this example, Walter does not respond to the reception statement of 16a even though he has ample time to do so during the two second pause. His lack of response, however, does not upset the flow of the conversation, and LeRoy continues unabashed with his next question in 16b. Therefore, while a reception statement invites explicit response, it does not require it.
They were at about three miles east of Clúd Chief. 16

Three miles east of Clúd Chief. 16

Were they still livin' in the dugout?

'Yeah.'

In this next example, however, Leroy expresses a conclusion with an intonation question in 6a. In this case, Walter again neglects to respond, and a five second pause follows. Here, this lack of response constitutes a breakdown of the conversation, for following the pause, LeRoy issues a repair in 6b before beginning his next question in 6c. The repair is prompted by Walter's failure to comply with LeRoy's desire, expressed with the intonation question, that he explicitly confirm LeRoy's conclusion. With statements, however, as in Walter1A:16, an explicit response is not required from Walter.

You don't remember which year? 6

Well I can find that out later. 2

Uh- where were you just right before you all got married?

Thus, LeRoy's choice of statement over other alternatives is sensitive to the kind of response he wants to stimulate from the addressee.
We have talked in cognitive terms about LeRoy's use of statements to signal his receipt of information. Social considerations play a part as well, and will be briefly discussed here. Keenan (1975), for example, points out that the repetition we have called a reception statement serves to take up a speaker's turn without adding information to the conversation. It thereby shifts the burden back to the previous speaker to continue his comments in accordance with the social rules of turn-taking in conversation (described in Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974). An "uh-huh" receipt would serve this same function (See Heritage 1984), but with different cognitive effects as described above. With respect to our data, this social accounting is supported by LeRoy's memory concerning this interview. He recalls (p.c.) having difficulty getting Walter to talk at first, and many reception statements occur at the beginning of the interview where this problem is recalled. Thus they form part of LeRoy's strategy for getting Walter to talk.

The presence of a social function, however, does not discount the cognitive role of an utterance in information exchange, and in this study it is the cognitive aspects that are of interest. Cognitively, a reception statement demonstrates the receipt of knowledge and displays it for correction if necessary. This cognitive analysis is supported both by the responses of the addressee (e.g. the usual confirming "yeah") and by LeRoy's choice of the
statements over other "uh-huh" or silence in those situations in which he needs confirmation of incoming information. A social accounting of repetitions as "turn-takers" does help explain some facts about their distribution. It does not, however, provide an explanation for the choice of one kind of receipt vs. another. Here the recognition of cognitive factors is needed. In short, both social and cognitive factors play a role in utterance selection.

The statement as expression of a conclusion. In the last section we had occasion to mention some factors leading to the choice of utterance to express a conclusion. Here these factors are examined in a little more detail.

((Walter1A))

How was the schoolhouse 3hèated? ((2))
Oh it 'uz just heated with 3wood2. ((2))

What kind of a 3stôve1? ((2))
It didn't 3hâve 1any stove.

Didn't have any 3stôve1. It was a 3fireplace3?
1Fireplace of a thing1. ((1))
It 3did 3gôt 1to finally-
  have a 1stôve1 after a 3yèar2 the first 3yèar2 or two 1went to 1schôol2.

The first part of utterance 120 is a reception statement. Its occurrence here supports the view developed above that reception statements rather than "uh-huh" or silence tend to follow surprising information. LeRoy's question in 119 shows his expectation that it was a stove that heated the
schoolhouse. The news in 119.1 that there was not such a stove is thus a surprise, and a reception statement is used.\textsuperscript{11}

This utterance, "It was a fireplace?", evokes processing in Walter similar to that evoked by a conclusion statement. That is, LeRoy has concluded, based on his knowledge of heat sources, that if the schoolhouse had no stove, it may have had a fireplace, and Walter is to confirm or deny this conclusion. In this case, however, LeRoy does not choose a statement form. As with his choice of expression to signal the receipt of information, his choice here reflects his cognitive state at the time. The intonation question chosen shows that LeRoy is not certain that his conclusion is correct. It explicitly asks for Walter's confirmation. A statement here would have reflected a greater commitment to the correctness of the conclusion, as in this example.

\begin{verbatim}
\((\text{Lu40})\)

'n then- after it uz all \textsuperscript{3}over\textsuperscript{1} with why we moved \textsuperscript{3}back\textsuperscript{2}. 105.8
Moved back into the \textsuperscript{3}Territory\textsuperscript{1}. 106
\textsuperscript{2}Yeah\textsuperscript{3}.
Back over \textsuperscript{3}home\textsuperscript{2}.
\end{verbatim}

Thus, LeRoy may express a conclusion with either a statement or an intonation question, and his choice reflects the certainty with which he holds the conclusion.
LeRoy's state of mind is one consideration in selecting an utterance type to express a meaning. We have seen, for example, how his choice is sensitive to his degree of certainty with respect to a proposition. As a second factor, we have seen how LeRoy makes his choice based on the kind of response he wants the addressee to provide in a certain case. For example, he sometimes wants the addressee to give an overt response to an utterance. A third important consideration has to do with the way that LeRoy believes the addressee is likely to interpret the utterance. LeRoy must continually monitor the addressee's cognitive state as he encodes utterances so that his chosen expressions will have the intended cognitive effect. This concern is similar to yet somewhat different from the second factor noted above. That is, once LeRoy has decided what kind of processing he wants to evoke in the addressee (the second factor), he must choose the kind of utterance most likely to achieve that effect in the current cognitive situation (the third factor).
In 133 above, LeRoy expresses a conclusion using not a statement, but a tag question. The following excerpt provides a similar example.

```
((Lu40))
then we'd had church in the sun- in the- school 'house down there'. ((2))
That was the closest-place you had to go to church wasn't it? 39
2Yeah2. ((2))
```

In these cases, the tag makes explicit the speaker's intention that the addressee evaluate and confirm the expressed proposition. Without the tags, the utterances would be statements, and in these particular examples, the statements without the tags could have been interpreted as assertions instead of as conclusions. The reason seems to be that these conclusions are of a special type. Many conclusions involve inferences made on the spot on the basis of information provided by the addressee. Consider for example this conclusion that was discussed above.

```
((Walter1A))
Did you have to climb steps down into it? 21
'Yeah'. ((2))
You didn't just walk into it. 22
Yeah- just come down steps into it just like goin' into the cellar. ((6))
```

Other conclusions involve the clarification of referent identity. That is, if LeRoy is unsure of a referent that Walter or Lucinda has in mind, he may infer the referent and
propose it for their confirmation, as in the following examples. Here, the choice of statement vs. intonation question reflects LeRoy's degree of certainty.

\[ ((Lu3B)) \]

N they'd build a fire in there.  
It kinda drawed the smoke out.  
The hole in the top did?  
2Yeah2.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------

\[ ((Lu40)) \]

'n then- after it uz all over with why we moved back.  
Moved back into the Territory.  
2Yeah3.  
Back over home2.

In the case of tag question conclusions, however, LeRoy invokes his more remote memory of Lucinda and Walter's past. That is, he brings up details that he remembers from previous conversations and experiences. In such cases where the proposition is not as obviously related to the ongoing cognitive situation, Walter and Lucinda may potentially have trouble recognizing a statement as a conclusion that asks for their evaluation and confirmation. The tag helps to clarify for them their intended task.

In this example, LeRoy encodes such a remembered detail in a statement without the tag question to mark it (utterance 43).
Walter, in 43.1, fails to interpret the utterance, and this failure is consistent with the explanation offered here. It is likely that the utterance fails because the statement function is not clear. A tag question in 43 might have averted the confusion. At any rate, in 44, LeRoy recodes his meaning as a question, making more explicit the kind of processing he expects from Walter. This time, Walter does recognize and perform the desired processing.

The following example is similar. In 137, LeRoy encodes a conclusion as a statement. As shown in 137.4, Walter does not understand the statement. He fails to understand either because he was talking simultaneously with LeRoy in 137.2-3 or because the statement function is unclear, or both. In any event, LeRoy recodes the conclusion as an intonation question in 138, and Walter successfully interprets it in 138.1.
We lived just about in the line. On the line between all of 'em.

'N then after Glasgow you went to Ford school.

[ We'd just- we'd go to all of 'em.

Huh?

'N then after Glasgow you went to the Ford school house?

'Yeah.

LeRoy's recoding of the conclusion makes the intended cognitive processing clearer to Walter.

In summary, LeRoy chooses to use a particular sentence type in accordance with three general principles. First, he uses the sentence type that best reflects his own cognitive state. We have seen how the choice of a statement rather than a question or "uh-huh" is sensitive to his degree of certainty about the proposition expressed and his concomitant readiness and ability to add the new information to his system. Second, his choice is influenced by the kind of response he wants the addressee to give. For example, he is more likely to use a question than a statement to express conclusions and information reception when he especially wants Walter or Lucinda to give an explicit confirmation. Third, given the type of processing he wants the addressee to perform, he chooses the kind of utterance that he believes will, in accordance with the cognitive situation at that
point in the conversation, signal that kind of processing. In many cases, for example, he may use a statement to express a conclusion, and that statement will be sufficient to evoke a confirmation. In other cases, however, he may need to use a tag question to make clear to Walter or Lucinda that they are to confirm the information instead of treating the statement as an assertion.

*The retrieval statement revisited.* With these comments in mind, we now return briefly to the retrieval statement discovered above in an effort to show both how it is possible for a statement to serve a retrieval function and why it is rare for one to do so. We said earlier that utterance Walter1A:83 reprinted below serves a retrieval function as well as a conclusion function.

```plaintext
(Walter1A)
You don't remember her name.

2No1. She 'uz just— just an 3 infant2. ((5))

'N seem to 3mé 1like it— ((4))

seem to me like there was a 3 bróther2 3 too1. ((2))

3 I don't 1know.
```

The view that it serves a retrieval function rests on the facts that a "yeah" answer from Walter without the providing of the sister's name would have been uncooperative. Walter's expected answer in response to retrieval statements gives evidence of his attempts to retrieve the requested information.12
It was noted that retrieval statements are rare in the data. More commonly, questions are used to request information from other interlocutors. This rarity is easily accounted for in terms of the contrasting cognitive properties associated with statements and questions. Statements generally signal information that is present in the speaker's system. Retrieval processing, however, is prompted by a speaker ignorance and uncertainty, in other words by a situation in which the speaker does not have the information.

However, even though it is rare, the use of statements for retrieval is possible in some cases. The case of utterance Walter1A:83 can be explained in terms of the cognitive situation at the time of the statement, as described in the preceding sections. This cognitive situation includes the speaker's own cognitive state as well as his notion of the addressee's cognitive state.

LeRoy's use of a statement for retrieval purposes in 83 can be better understood if the cognitive situation reflected by and effected by the statement is contrasted with that which would have been involved with a formal question. If, for example, instead of saying 83, LeRoy had said "What was her name?" he would have signaled an expectation that Walter would know the answer. Such an implication would not properly reflect LeRoy's state of mind, however, for by the time 83 is uttered, he expects that Walter does not know the
sister's name. Just previously, in 82.1-82.2, Walter has shown difficulty in even remembering the infant sister's existence, much less her name. If, on the other hand, LeRoy had said "Do you remember what her name was?" (as he did in Walter 1A:79c) he would have shown a neutral attitude as to whether or not Walter would know the answer. This implication would not properly reflect LeRoy's state of mind either. With "You don't remember her name," however, LeRoy signals his current suspicion, of which he has grown more certain in the previous turns, that Walter does not remember the name. Thus, the selection here of a statement to fill the retrieval function more accurately reflects LeRoy's state of mind than the selection of a question would have.

Not only must this statement reflect LeRoy's state of mind, however. It must also result in the intended kind of processing on Walter's part. Here we can note first that Walter knows, by the time 83 is uttered, that LeRoy wants to know the name of this sister. LeRoy directly requested the name in 79c. Also, in 81, he requested the name of another sister who died. So Walter knows that LeRoy is interested in the names long before 83 is uttered.

((((Walter1A))

Uh- ((2)) Somewhere in the records it says that uh- ((1)) you had a 3'sister'. 79
((1)) 1Who died1.
Do you remember what her 3name was3?
Sister that 3died2?
1Yeah2. ((2)) 80
Second, it can be noted that Walter, in routinely processing 83 as the conclusion statement that it is (in addition to being a retrieval statement), will in fact attempt to retrieve the information. That is, his processing in response to this conclusion statement would resemble his processing in response to a direct question. If LeRoy is wrong in his conclusion that Walter does not know the sister's name, then Walter's retrieval of the name will be the correction that disconfirms the conclusion. Therefore, LeRoy's use of 83 to retrieve information is not all that inconsistent with the processing that a statement would evoke here anyway. It can also be noted that LeRoy's use of the phrase "don't remember" in 83 helps to mark the task that he wants Walter to perform. It suggests that the speaker wants the addressee to search his memory.

It seems then, that statements can be successfully used for a variety of purposes, even some that are somewhat unusual, if the total cognitive situation warrants it, and if the unusual purposes (e.g. retrieval) cooccur with and are consistent with other more usual purposes (e.g. conclusion).

Conclusion. In this section we summarize the main points of this chapter and conclude by proposing a slightly
different way to view these findings. In addition, a few suggestions for further study of the cognitive functions of utterances in conversation are offered.

In conversation, interlocutors are concerned with successfully completing an information exchange, i.e. with getting the message intended by speakers and with getting messages across to addressees. To effect this interpersonal exchange, speakers must, while expressing propositional information, provide information concerning the cognitive activities they intend for listeners to perform with respect to those propositions. To understand intended messages, listeners must interpret the clues explicitly provided and also refer to their previous knowledge. One aspect of this exchange that can be studied centers on the cognitive functions of utterances in conversation. Cognitive tasks such as attention and location, addition, and retrieval of information can be catalogued at various levels of delicacy and their linguistic realizations studied.

The functions and realizational relationships involved in the area of cognitive functions of utterances are indefinitely complex. In order to gain a foothold, this study has limited its scope to the cognitive processing associated with statements. From observation of conversation data, a catalogue of the cognitive functions of statements has been identified in terms of the cognitive state of the speaker as he utters a statement and the cognitive processing of the
addressee on hearing the statement. In the interviews, statements are used mainly to make assertions, to demonstrate the reception of information, to present conclusions for confirmation, to coordinate cognitive topic, and to challenge ideas of the other speaker. It has been proposed that statements in all of these functions are unified by the prototypical function of the statement, to report on information present in the speaker's system. This function contrasts with a situation of ignorance that is signaled by questions, in which information is not present in the speaker's system. Finally, it has been shown how the addressee recognizes, based on overt linguistic signals and on his unstated knowledge of the world and of the cognitive situation, the function of a particular statement, and how the speaker chooses a statement over other possible expressions based on his own cognitive state, his notion of the addressee's state, and the processing that he intends for the addressee to perform.

The findings of this chapter can be interpreted in a slightly different way. Much of this chapter has been concerned with the way addressees determine or recognize the kind of cognitive processing that is expected of them in connection with a statement. This way of thinking about the process is in fact somewhat misleading. It suggests that statements belong to different categories, and that the listener, on encountering a statement, goes through a
conscious, step-by-step procedure of picking out its function from a predetermined list. This investigation, beginning with the statement as its unifying focus and asking what different functions statements serve and how they are interpreted, may foster this way of thinking. No such deliberate action on the part of the addressee, however, should be assumed. As conceived of here, the addressee's processing does not involve conscious comparison of a statement with its possible functions. Instead, the processing of statements happens naturally (i.e. according to realizational relationships) given the addressee's knowledge of the speaker and the cognitive situation and his current activation status resulting from the unfolding conversation.

The basic statement functions we have identified are also somewhat illusory. The common functions are certainly demonstrable in the data. We have inevitably recognized them because we have framed our question in a certain way, asking what cognitive functions can be related to statements. However, the listing of five common functions suggests a reification that is not necessary. Another way to look at what is going on recognizes not five basic statement functions in the data, but five basic cognitive situations of information exchange in which statements are employed. These situations are what differ, and into them, the statement takes its own constant function of reporting on information in the speaker's system with different effects, depending on
the particular cognitive situation. Such a view helps account for situations in which a statement serves several functions simultaneously such as that discussed above in connection with LeRoy's statement 82. A particularly complex cognitive situation results in a multi-functional statement.

In this investigation, limited to a consideration of statement functions and realizations in a very few minutes of naturally occurring dialogue, it has not been possible to thoroughly study the issue of the cognitive processing that occurs in connection with utterances. This study is thus suggestive rather than exhaustive. It nevertheless goes beyond previous studies in its empirical concern with the cognitive processing of actual individuals involved in actual conversation. Further study might be profitably directed towards empirical observation of statement functions in other instances and genres of conversation, e.g. conversations involving more than two interlocutors, non-interview conversations, etc. In addition, statement functions can be studied at greater levels of delicacy. For example, main and subordinate clauses may tend to serve different functions. In our data, LeRoy often encodes firsthand memories in main clauses and hearsay information in subordinate clauses, as in this example in which the main clause is in bold face and the subordinate clauses in italics.
Utterances other than statements deserve study, as well. For example, there are many different kinds of questions, tag questions, intonation questions, negative questions, alternative, yes/no questions, information questions, etc., and conversation can be studied to discover the cognitive conditions prompting a certain question type as well as patterns of question processing in the addressee.

The isolation of a particular utterance type for investigation also leaves untouched certain larger patterns of cognitive processing in information exchange that merit study. Often a series of LeRoy's questions about a certain topic, for example, exhibits a pattern that reflects his step by step process of integrating the new information with his previous store of information. Such a series begins with questions of various types designed for initial information elicitation, and then progresses to a series of conclusion statements aimed at confirming the information and insuring that it has been added properly. LeRoy's sequence of utterances from Walter 3A:88-92 discussed above provides an example of such a series. Clearly there is room for much further investigation aimed at understanding the ways that
interlocutors use language to exchange information and the cognitive processing involved in such exchange.
This excerpt comes from Walter 3A:55.3-56.1.

2 This distinction forms the heart of Halliday's "mood" concept as well (1985:68, 71) which, along with his notion of modality (the speaker's attitude towards the proposition expressed) constitutes his interpersonal function of language.

3 This focus relates to but differs from concerns with given/new participant identification. The given/new dimension crosscuts the wholistic utterance function dimension dealt with here. Assertions have both given and new portions, but they are basically aimed at having the addressee add information. Questions also have given and new portions, but they are aimed at having the addressee retrieve information.

4 The complexity here has been pointed out in speech act theory (e.g. Austin 1962, 1970) where basic illocutionary forces are assigned to utterance classes (e.g. command force to imperative form) and discrepancies are dealt with under the heading of indirect speech acts (e.g. command force to question form). See Levinson (1983, pp. 226-283) for a critical discussion of speech act theory, especially of its failure to successfully describe the realizational dimension.

5 Statements are not always easy to recognize and distinguish from other types of utterances. The rough criteria used here, however, proved satisfactory. It is not necessary to our purpose here to give a more detailed definition of the statement.

6 Agreement tokens (e.g. "yeah", "no") could be included as statements characterized by extreme elision. They are excluded from the discussion here, however, because the distinctive agreement lexemes render their functions obvious to the addressee, hence less interesting to consider from the realizational standpoint, and because formally, they do not resemble more prototypical statements.

7 These utterances would be interesting to consider elsewhere, but are excluded here on the grounds that they are not primarily involved in the exchange of information as here conceived.

8 Understood sections are here inserted in parentheses.

9 Emphasis on this sequential aspect has been a major contribution of Conversation Analysis studies as they identify so-called "action sequences". Our point here, however, is that sequence is just one of several explicit factors signaling utterance function. Moreover, as will be shown presently, although there are a number of overt signals, listeners must also refer to knowledge beyond that overtly signaled in order to recognize statement functions.
In this case it should be noted that LeRoy's assertion is rejected by Lucinda. Her memory differs from LeRoy's, and she corrects him.

Note that in this case, the social explanation of a repetition as a "turn-taker" does not apply, for after this statement, LeRoy does not give Walter time to take a turn. Instead, LeRoy continues with the intonation question of the second part of 120.

Recall especially his response to Walter1A:100 discussed earlier in which Walter, although not in possession of the requested information, still makes a surmisal (a "guess" according to Walter 1A:100.1) concerning the information. That is, he tries to provide/retrieve the information.

This view contradicts speech act theory which attempts to specify a literal force for an utterance (e.g. statements as assertions) to which its indirect force is then related. In the realization view taken in this study, no function is deemed primary with the others derived from it indirectly. A statement is not first an assertion and secondarily something else by indirect means. Instead, literalness and indirection are moot points. The functions of all statements are combinations of the prototypical statement function with the cognitive situation. No statement is more literal or more indirect than the others.

Lu 3B:54-71 provides another and somewhat lengthier example.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

That's all I know.
You don't know if this trail went up that way—huh?
I imagined though it did.

-Walter and LeRoy

General conclusion. Conversation can be viewed as a process in which separate cognitive systems interact by means of the speech signal and change as a result. Interlocutors engage in a great deal of cognitive processing as they converse. They decode utterances, for example, add new information to their systems, search for information, and encode it in utterances. Although this processing cannot be directly observed, much of it is nevertheless accessible to analysis through indirect means because traces of cognitive processing are present in the record of conversational interaction. A speaker's utterance contains clues concerning his understanding of the preceding conversation, his notion of the cognitive state of the addressee, and his own on-line processing as he works to encode the current utterance. There is much to be gained, therefore, from a partnership between conversational data and cognitive study.
This study has sought to demonstrate in a practical way how consideration of the natural conversation of ordinary people can provide insights into their cognitive processing and into the cognitive structures that it involves. It has also demonstrated the converse notion, namely that an understanding of cognitive systems, in this case in terms of networks of relationships, can suggest explanations for surface patterns observable in conversational texts. Many patterns in a conversational text, such as the distribution of disfluencies, require a cognitive accounting. Social accountings of conversational patterning, though popular in Conversation Analysis studies and often insightful, are usually incomplete in themselves.

Summary of findings. A number of questions concerning the interaction of cognitive systems in conversation have been identified and addressed in the preceding chapters.

First, with respect to the patterning of topic in conversation, it was asked how the speaker designates topics within his cognitive system and how speaker and listener coordinate their cognitive topics so that information exchange can proceed (Chapters 3 and 4). These questions were addressed as follows. A notion of cognitive topic as an activated location in network memory was developed. Cognitive topic is a cognitive counterpart to the conversation topic that is observable in surface text. Through careful analysis of the patterning of conversation
topic and related disfluencies in a portion of conversation, ten principles of the speaker's designation of cognitive topic were discovered, here reprinted from Chapter 3².
Ten Principles of the Designation of Cognitive Topic

1. **Topic knownness.** Cognitive topic activation moves along associations in the cognitive network that the speaker already has.

2. **Topic exhaustion.** Once the topic designator perceives that he has exploited a part of his network topically and that it will not serve as an effective vehicle for further communication, his topic activation moves elsewhere.

3. **Local organization.** Within a speaker's total knowledge there exist local configurations or sub-areas of knowledge that serve to organize topic designation.

4. **Topic proximity.** Closely associated information is most likely to be topicalized.

5. **Outside influence.** Concepts activated as a result of interpreting the other speaker's utterances influence cognitive topic designation.

6. **Lingering activation/Multiple topics.** Locations previously activated during the conversation remain activated, and this activation facilitates their subsequent (re-)designation as topic.

7. **Topic detour.** Under some circumstances, cognitive topic activation may move out of a subarea before that subarea is exhausted.

8. **Non-exhaustion.** Subareas perceived to be non-exhausted remain strongly activated, relative to other parts of the network, for further topic production.

9. **Conductivity.** Topic activation tends to spread along strong lines of association (i.e. lines of high conductivity).

10. **Multiple connection.** Cognitive topic activation tends to move to sections of network that are associated by multiple connections.

These principles were reduced to a more general principle of topic accessibility\(^3\) which holds that of all the information
in the network that could potentially be designated as
cognitive topic, that information which is most accessible
will be selected, unless it has already been exhausted.

Attention was then turned to the speaker-listener
coordination of cognitive topics. Through analysis of the
same portion of conversation, six principles of cognitive
topic coordination were discovered, reprinted here from
Chapter 44.

Six Principles of the Coordination of Cognitive Topic
-----------------------------------------------------------------

1. **Coordination necessity.** Since each interlocutor has
   his own cognitive topic, topic coordination is
   constantly necessary.

2. **Coordination difficulty.** The difficulty of
cognitive topic coordination/recognition correlates
   inversely with the accessibility of the topic in the
   hearer's system.

3. **Mutual coordination.** Both topic producer and topic
   interpreter are actively involved in topic
   coordination.

4. **Topic maintenance.** Once announced, global topics
   remain active until explicitly changed.

5. **Topic conflict.** Interlocutors may designate
   conflicting topics in their respective cognitive
   systems.

6. **System similarity.** The more similar the cognitive
   systems of the interlocutors, the easier topic
   coordination becomes.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

These principles were also related to a more general
accessibility principle. That is, the less accessible a next
topic is to the addressee, the less likely he is to recognize
it and the more carefully the speaker must prepare him to interpret it.

Chapter 5 examined two "twice-told" stories, i.e. memories that Lucinda verbalized two times, once in each of her interviews with LeRoy. We asked what multiple tellings of a single experience reveal about the way Lucinda stores the information, what they reveal about her processing as she finds linguistic expression for the information, and finally, what they reveal about her sensitivity to the listener's cognitive system as she tries to get her meanings across. The two tellings of each experience were compared first, followed by a comparison of the two separate experiences tellings with each other. The findings were summarized as twelve principles of the storage and expression of personal experience.

Twelve Principles of the Storage and Expression of Personal Experience.

1. Non-linguistic storage. Memory of personal experience involves sensory percepts, i.e. it mainly involves non-linguistic portions of the total cognitive system.

2. Translation necessity. Perceptual memory of sensory experience must be translated into linguistic information for expression to another person.

3. Translation timing. This translation is not completed at the time of the experience.

4. Translation ease. Some kinds of recalled experience lend themselves to linguistic expression more readily than do other kinds.
5. **Connected storage.** More information is stored in connection with an experience than is ever expressed in a single telling.

6. **Chunked storage.** Experience is remembered in chunks consisting of an essential core of smaller bits of information.

7. **Listener sensitivity.** Expression of experience is sensitive to the listener's cognitive state.

8. **Topical access.** Memories of experience are accessed according to the principles of cognitive topic selection and coordination.

9. **Selection of the point.** The memory of experience is stored, but the point is selected according to cognitive and social principles at the time that the experience is told as a story.

10. **Collective experience.** Numerous individual yet repeated experiences are stored as a collective, non-individuated unit.

11. **Numerous tellings.** Often verbalized experiences come to have linguistic storage in addition to non-linguistic perceptual storage.

12. **Non-rote linguistic storage.** Linguistic storage of often told experiences does not imply rote (i.e. lexemic) storage.

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Questions dealt with in Chapter 6 involved the types of cognitive tasks interlocutors perform as they exchange information. An initial catalogue of these tasks was suggested which included attending to the speaker, coordinating topic, addition of information, and retrieval of information. The discussion then turned to a consideration of a particular type of utterance in the conversations, the statement. The statements in a portion of conversation were
examined and a list made of the cognitive functions they served.

Functions of Statements in a Portion of Conversation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement function</th>
<th>Addressee task(s)</th>
<th>Speaker state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assertion statement</td>
<td>add information</td>
<td>has the information, believes the addressee does not have it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Walter/Lucinda)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reception statement</td>
<td>note that speaker now has the information, compare it with your information and confirm or correct</td>
<td>has just added the information, but may have some uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LeRoy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conclusion statement</td>
<td>compare the speaker's information with your own and confirm or correct</td>
<td>has drawn a conclusion beyond what addressee has expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LeRoy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Coordination statement</td>
<td>locate information for further processing</td>
<td>is thinking about a certain topic but believes that the addressee is not thinking about it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LeRoy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Contradiction statement</td>
<td>add, compare, and reconcile conflicting information</td>
<td>has information that conflicts with addressee's information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LeRoy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Retrieval statement</td>
<td>locate and express requested information</td>
<td>does not have desired information but thinks addressee might</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After developing this list of functions, we proposed that statements with their various functions are unified by a prototypical function, that of reporting on information present in the speaker's system. Consideration was also given to realizational aspects of statements, i.e. to the way that addressees recognize, given the linguistic signal, the particular cognitive tasks expected of them, and the way that speakers choose utterance types most likely to have an intended cognitive effect on the addressee. The addressee recognizes the specific function of a statement based on overt clues such as the occurrence of certain phrases or markers and on his knowledge of the speech event in which he is involved and the general cognitive situation that it sets up. As for the speaker and his choice of statement over other utterance types, it was shown that LeRoy chooses the particular sentence type that best reflects his own cognitive state, e.g. his degree of certainty or surprise. In addition, his choice is influenced by his notion of the current cognitive situation and by the kind of processing he wants the addressee to perform.

Finally, an alternative way of interpreting the cognitive effect of utterances was suggested, one that recognizes not five basic statement functions in the data, but five basic cognitive situations of information exchange in which statements are employed. These situations are what differ, and into them, the statement takes its own constant
prototypical function with different effects, depending on the particular cognitive situation.

**Evaluation of findings.** Many of the findings of this study are intuitively obvious, or at least seem so once they are pointed out. For example, the fact that a speaker would experience extra difficulty at major topic junctures is hardly surprising. A question therefore arises in general about the usefulness of discovering the obvious and in particular about the value of such a study as this one.

In answer, we can point out first that what seems obvious in retrospect is not necessarily obvious in advance. In addition, in a scientific environment, even the seemingly obvious requires verification and study. For one thing, there is always the possibility of being surprised. For another, there is a level of delicacy beyond which intuition can not take us. In its stead, further more careful investigation is called for.

Furthermore, even obvious facts call for an accounting, and that we have attempted to provide in a systematic way in terms of the workings of network cognitive systems. For example, we have accounted for the coherence of topic through a stretch of discourse and for problems at topic junctures in terms of the organization of the cognitive systems and the operation of activations in those structures.

Another value of this study lies in an area separate from the findings themselves. Thus far, conversational data
has not been exploited to any great extent in cognitive studies. Therefore, the recognition of the value of conversational data for cognitive research and an initiation of methodology for investigating it are values of this study as well.

**Further research** These research questions have involved a cognitive model of communication that is comprised of separate network cognitive systems communicating information with each other by means of conversation. Although both Cognitive Linguistics and Conversation Analysis have a history of some decades, there is almost no tradition of studying conversational data for the purpose of learning about cognition. Any study of cognitive systems by means of linguistic data cannot be complete without taking into account naturally occurring conversation, however, for it is in conversation that many on-line cognitive processes are most accessible.

This study has contributed to a needed pioneering effort through the initial development of questions and methodology. Much remains to be done, and there are several obvious avenues along which further research could be directed. For one thing, different data sets need to be investigated in order to verify these results and suggest further conclusions. The interviews investigated here involve interlocutors who know each other very well and share many experiences in common. Study of conversation involving
individuals with little knowledge of each other would be of interest because the total cognitive situation would be somewhat different and the process of information exchange would likely reflect this difference. The corpus examined here offers the advantage of relative simplicity in that only two interlocutors are involved at a time and the language of interaction is English. However, conversations involving more than two speakers should be considered as well. In addition, study of conversation among speakers of other languages could be helpful in identifying the role of cultural as opposed to cognitive factors in the information exchange.

In addition to focusing on other types of conversational data, further research could center on refining the methodology and developing further research questions. In this study, for example, while network notions have been invoked and prose descriptions given of network phenomena (e.g. cognitive topic as an activated network location), detailed formal modeling of the cognitive systems in network diagrams has not been attempted. Attention has focused instead on describing the conversations and outlining the cognitive processing in terms of broad principles. Network diagrams aimed at modeling well-defined problems could further our understanding of these issues as they have in other CL studies. In addition, further research might examine conversational data with respect to current cognitive
notions such as the determination of given/new status and of foreground/background status which have thus far been studied mainly in monologue texts or short constructed dialogues.

Finally, it can be noted that this study has been a linguistic one and has confined itself to a study of linguistic data using the traditional linguistic approach of describing patterns in the data and accounting for that patterning in some way. The particular accounting given here has been cognitive, i.e. not historical, social, etc. Linguistics is not the only discipline with an interest in the mind, however. Disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, artificial intelligence, anthropology, and neuroscience have a stake in cognition as well and together with linguistics form a multidisciplinary enterprise that has been called cognitive science. There is much need for further research aimed towards integrating these findings about conversation with those of other cognitive disciplines.
The source of this excerpt is Walter 3A:20.2-21.1.

2 See pages 133-134, 142.
3 See page 143.
4 See page 185.
5 See pages 231, 249, and 258.
6 See pages 296 and 299.
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----- ms. "Notes on Cognitive Linguistics".


APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Transcription conventions

Transcription conventions:

Left margin lines record LeRoy's utterances.
Indented lines record Lucinda's or Walter's utterances.
Numbers in right margin identify interviewer turns.
( ) marks transcriber doubt.
(( )) marks transcriber comments.
((x)) marks a pause of x seconds.
[ ] marks simultaneous speech.
' marks stressed syllables.
- marks a hesitation or sustained final intonation contour.
. marks a final falling intonation contour.
? marks a final question intonation contour, appropriate to the type of question.
1 2 3 4 mark relative pitch levels from low to high.
Appendix 2: Transcripts of Conversations

In this appendix, LeRoy's interviews with Lucinda and Walter are presented in the order given in the table. The tape name/side is that assigned by LeRoy. Lucinda's 1960s interview begins on tape 2A and continues on tape 3B. Walter's interview begins on tape 1A and continues on tapes 3A and 2A and B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Tape name/no./side</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
<th>page #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Lucinda</td>
<td>40 minutes</td>
<td>Thanksgiving day 1952</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lucinda</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>ca 1963</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucinda</td>
<td>3B</td>
<td></td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Walter</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>ca 1953</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>3A</td>
<td></td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>2A/B</td>
<td></td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interview with Lucinda Lakey Ford (about age 71)
by her son, LeRoy Ford (about age 30)
Thanksgiving day, 1952
Tape "40 minutes"
Recorded on a wire recorder

The recording begins with an introduction added by LeRoy Ford in 1989 and continues with Lucinda's reading of a psalm. Neither of these appears in this transcription. The interview transcribed here occurred immediately following the reading of the psalm.

((7))
3When did you and dad move to the farm?
Out there in Texas? uh-

1No. ((1))
Out where Marion lives. ((2))
3'Oh. ((1))
In uh- ((3)) nineteen hundred.

Nineteen hundred.
Uh-huh. ((1))
2No. ((2))

I thought it was eighteen ninety-eight.

Eighteen-
ninety-eight.
Ninety-nine. ((A self correction))
We filed in eighteen 'n- ((4))
ninety-eight I think then the next spring- we moved.
Up here. ((2))
Moved in February.
Or about the first of March.

How'd you get here?
Well we come in- ((2)) in a wagon.
But we had-
Dad always kept a good team of horses.
He loved horses.
He takin' care of 'em just like ((2))
'Oh he'd just carry 'em you know 'n have 'em lookin' purty. ((2))
'N then he always kept a big yoke a oxens. ((2))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

And Uncle Jéff came with us-
'n hé drove the oxen 'n dad drove the uh- wagon.

What'd you 3live1 in when you first got out there1? ((3))
1Well2 we lived in a 2tent3-
'n we ((5)) finally built us a little dugout
back in the bank of the 3créek1. ((Chuckling))

((Chuckle))

'N I lived in 1there2. ((Chuckling))
Well thát is we 3cooked 2i- in the 3dugout2-
'n we- 3slept 2in the 3tent 1. ((4))

Did anybody live with you except just you 'n-
Well- Uncle 3Jéff2 came 1with us2 'n
he lived til he got his- ((2))
dugout 1made2- over there where 3Jáke1-
on past Jáke's home 3now1. ((4))

(Well) was it eighteen ninety-nine that y'all moved out 3here2 or down to- ((2))
Well it was eighteen ninety-three

Colony?
when we 3moved2.
Out 3here1.

What'd the 3place1 look like then1?
Well uh- wasn't uh- ((1))
You mean this uh- uh- our place out 3here3?

Well 1yeah3.

[ 
There wasn't 3anything1. \ 
Wasn't anything on it a 3tall1. \ ((Rhythmic passage))
Not a 3thing1. /

'N dad 'n- the men around went to c- the 3river2 'n cut 3logs1 'n- ((1))
built us a 3one room 3dugout1. ((Chuckle))
We-

Whén- was that dugout- dug that uh-
you can still see the 3hole2 out- in the 3pasture2 there by the 3créek1?
Well- that 'uz the 3one2.
That we dug 3then1. ((3))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

Didn't Uncle 3Thómas2 live with y'all 3thén3?

Yeah3- 3Thómas2 2did3.

I- of course I had forgoten about them. (Chuckle)

They 'uz (just one of the time that) 3Thómas2 1was2.

'N then (Lüff) stayed with us 3párt 1of the 1time2.

But Thómas 3lived1 with us. (3)

Did you have any 3church or anything to 3go to3?

1No2.

But we 3finally2- ((2)) had a ((5)) 3préacher to come3-

oh- Brother 3White1- from down about (3Wfiller1) or somethin1. ((2))

What'd he 3day2- just come once a 3month or somethin3?

2Oh he 2came 'n held a 3meeting2-

'n 2then 2he'd 2come2- ((2)) 'n then uh 'n preach- ((2))

3once or 1twice a month1-

2once 1a month 1guess1.

'N- 'N then the 3Méthodist 1préacher1 he- ole Brother- 3Cooper1-

from 3Delhi1- 1 think1 from Delhi1. (1)

He came 'n- ((1))

wé went- wé went ever 3Sunday2 'n-

If it 'uz a 3Méthodist we went3 1n if it uz a 3Báptist1 we went1. (Chuckle)

((2))

Hm. ((2))

Oh Brother Cooper was an awful good ole 3mán1.

Well what- what was the closest town? ((2))

1Mángum2. ((2))

I remember one time you told about 3Dád2 takin' a bale a 3cotton1- ((2))

to 2Mángum2 to buy- to sell to buy a new 2súlt2. ((2))

Did you tell about 3that once3? ((3))

I don't re3mémber3 1whether it 'uz 3Mángum3 or Ana4dárko1.

'N we- (better-)

we 3lived1 you know1 over there in 3Wáshita1 county

before we came 3hère 1a 1while2.

But- I don't-

(()Interrupts)) 3'Anyhow1 he took it to the 2gin2 'n- ((1))

spent all the money for a new 2súlt2- 'n lost the new 2súlt2 on the way back

2hóme2.
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

Oh well I forgot about that. ((2))

It happened though I didn't see it? ((3))

Well, I just don't remember now.

I've forgot a lotta things I used to know a long time ago.

((Chuckles, Sighs)) ((4))

Were there any Indians down at Colony when you moved there? 21

Oooh yes.

'N they'd come to visit us-

'N we'd offer 'em a chair-

'N they wouldn't even sit down in a chair-

they'd just sit down on the ground. ((1))

'N they'd just yabber 'n=talk 'n

((Chuckles))

((Chuckles))

'n we couldn't understand a word they said.

'N they'd sit there a while-

'n get up 'n go. ((2))

Did you ever trade with 'em or anything? 22

Well yeah they loved watermelons.

I don't know why they didn't raise 'em-

you know they could a raised any kind of watermelons but they didn't. ((Rhythmic passage))

((2)) And we raised watermelons-

'n they'd come up there

'n they'd trade us just anything for a watermelon. ((2))

Were they civilized at all or? 23

Well they'd begin over there at- (near the) the colony-

why the children the girls had their hair- ((1))

'all fixed up 'n had bangs-

'n the boys had their hair cut.

But the older ones the boy was just like they'd always been.

Did they ever have war dances? 24

Yeah - 'n we could just hear 'em of a night-

down there on Washita river justa beatin on-

sound like tin pans. ((Chuckles))

I don't know what it-
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

((Interrupts)) Did it scare you? 26

'No. 27

How old were you then? ((1))

Bout 1twelve2. ((4)) ((starts to say a syllable and is interrupted))

Did any of the Indians ever scare you? 28

'If don't 3re'member1 ever being scared 1about 3'em3 \ 
'1 wasn't very 3scary1 my3self2. | ((Rhythmic)) / 
But you know 3dad1'd have to 3go1 cleal off to- ((1)) / 
3then2 ((3)) to uh- when we lived over 3there2- 
why- he'd have to go to- 3Minco2 
I be4ive1 it was to- ((3)) 3town2- 
'n he'd be 3go'ne2 two or three or four 3days2 uh.

Wh- what did the Indians dress like? 29

Did they-

Oh they just had those little 3blankets1 wrapped around 'em. ((2))

Did you ever go down to their- ((2)) 3Colony3 
1where they 3lived 'n everthing3?

[ 

No. ((3)) 
There was 3one ole- ((1)) 2Indian2- 
his name was 3Long Hair2. ((1)) 
'N 3he1 visited us 3quite 2often1 after 3dad1 got sick1. ((1)) 
He 2came one 2night 'n 1was 2sittin2 there 'n dad was 3awful3 sick 'n- ((5)) 
'n he- he could say enough that we'd understand a 4little1. 
He'd say he's 3awful3 sick1. ((2)) 
We could understand 1that1. ((3)) 
'N he'd come in 'n- 
3That's 1after we- uh built a 3dugout2 'n moved up there where-

3Alice's1 2place1 you know- 1where it blew 3away3? 
The-

Uhm. 31

'House blew3? ((5))

How many were in the family then? ((2)) 32

While was 3born2 up there2. 
3Rosie was2- ((6)) 
Rosie was 3too1.
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

Both 1 of 'em.
Both 1 the children.
Rosie 'n Willie was both 1 borned up there in that dugout.
Wadn't it - Uncle Thomas 2 that you told me about once who - ((2))
found a deer when he was out ridin' a horse - 'n he chased it down?
Yeah.
Brought it in 'n doohh
I just thought that was the grandest thing -
It's so sweet 'n-
we kep it 'n I had it staked out 'n - ((1))
there was an ole cow came up
' n hurt it 'n it died.

That was out here on - the old home place wasn't it?
No. We 'uz then over there at the switch.
Livin' there.

Next Switch?
Yeah. ((1))
Dad run a blacksmith shop over there at the switch
' n we moved over there -
for two or three years. ((2))

Did he do anything besides blacksmithing?

No. ((3))

How old was Willie about then? ((2))

I guess he 'uz about 4 or 5. ((5))

What do you think helped you most -
when you'd come up against those hard times - ((1))

In those early 2 days?

What do you think - helped you most to get over them - ((1))

Live through 'em? ((3))

Well - of course we always - ((4))
de-pended a lot upon the Lord 'n the church. ((Chuckling))
After we got a church started -
we got a church started 'n -
we had a meetin' under a brush tree -
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

thén we'd had church in the sun- in the- ³schóol house down there¹. ((2))
That was the ³c³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³³
"40 minutes"

((Laugh))

‘N uh- I be3]fe1 that we- ((3)) 3spárê 1the rod sometime (doîn).
((Chucklê)) ((Sigh)) ((4))

How old was 3Márion1 when he had the uh- ((2)) had 3pólîo1?
3He ‘uz 2five mōnths old3. ((1))

How’d you know that he 3hâd it1?
2Wêl3- I didn’t 4know 2it til the doctor 3tólîd me2.
I was at 3chûrch2- with im one 1dày2-
’n he just commenced 3crûin1.
Jus- just a 3crûin2 4âwful1 ‘n I couldn’t do a 4thîng1 with him1
’n I took ‘im 2ôt3 ‘n-
1I walked the 2yàrd 3with ‘im3
’l until chûrch was 2ôver3 ‘n-
’l I brought ‘im 2hôme3 ‘n
he just 4kêp 1a-cryin ‘n-
we had the 2dôctor3 ‘n
there was a 3lôt of pólîo1- tha- that yér-
amongst 2chîlîren2-
2bábîes2- ((1))
mostly amongst 3bábîes1. ((2))
An uh- ((2)) Doctor 3Spêd2 2wàs 2gône. ((2))
And Doctor 3Wêndall1.
’n- 1hâd ‘im2.
’n Doctor 3Wêndall1 was- had 3spécializèd1 in 2bábîes1.
’n uh- wê wuz kinda glad for him to dôctor ‘im because- ((2))
he- ((2)) knew a lot 3bôut 1bábîes2-
’n he-
’n Doctor Spêd had gone fn to Nêw Yôrk to- study up on this- pólîo 1more2-
’n he got 3bâck2 why of course they 3bôth dôctored ‘im.1 ((2))
An uh- he wuz-
the doctor has tólîd ‘im not too long a3gô2
he was very 3fôrtûnâtê1 to get ôút- ((2))
with just- n- not 3crûpplêd2 any more than he 3fs1 you know1.
You think 3prâyin for ‘im when he had that3- 1helped ‘im get 3ôver it3?
2Wêl3- 1 3dô1.
Because uh- he cřed so that I jûst got to the place where
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

I didn't feel like I could stand it 'n uh-((3))
I re'member one 2day- (3))
that I just went out in the- ((2)) feedin' patch.
'N I just got down 'n I just prayed 'n prayed

((Chuckle))

that he 'ud s-
that he'd rest that night.
And then- when night come 'n he'd been to- (1))
kinda fret 'n like he's gonna go to cry in agin 2
I'd just- (2)) just talk to the Lord to myself if you know.
And seem like he just got- (2)) through the night-
so much better than- (2))

he had been that I've always thought the Lord had a hand in it.

Where was Rosie 'n Willie all this time?

Oh they 'uz there at home.

Were they married yet? ((4))

Rosie was. ((3))

Etta helped you an awful lot in takin care of- all the kids didn't she?

Etta just almost raised you 'n Lucille.

You all sure owe her- ((5))

Well- what-

((Chuckle))

What do you owe her? ((Chuckle))

Just owe her a lot a love don't ye?

Because I don't uh-

I 'uz gettin' 1oh 1'd be 2just 1she 2just helped s- a wonderful lot. ((3))

She made all Lucille's clothes- ((Listing intonation))

'N you know she uz always such a nice hand to do things. ((2))

'N she just- ((5))

she'd tat'er 'n crochet the prettiest little caps the prettiest little things. ((Listing make her dresses 'n- ((3))

/(intonation)

Who did all the cookin'? For a big family?

Did Etta help with that?

She come in ss- young.
A helpin.
'N then she was the 3máin cook2.
Whenever we wanted anything- 3cóoked1 uh 3spécial2- ((3))

'n we have cákes 'n pies 'n things2 she 3dóne it1.
Cause she was- shé just máde a- ((2)) a réal 3hánd2 in the 3hóme1.

'N I just th ínk of her so 3múch1 that 3how2-
and 4wónder2 how I'd a- got along with3 out her1. ((9))

You remémber those times when- Hárry 'n Márion used to go out on 2dátes2 53
'n you 'n I 'd - ((2)) uh-
((Chuckłe))
wálk down to the front gáte 'n strike
matchés

[ Oooooohhh. ((Chuckłe))
to see which way they'd 3tórn3d?

You thought the 3brídge1 had fallen through.

((Chuckłe)) Oh wásn't that sílly of 2mé2? ((Chuckłe))

((Chuckłe))
Well I just- you know-
3yóu know1 I can ré2mémér2 when I was a 3litte ole 3kíd1
'n 3dád2 went to- óff to Pur3cél1.

He- you know It'd 3táke1 I'm a good 3whíle2- goin' in the 3wágon2.

'N I'd go out the énd of the 3hóuse1 'n sét 3dówn1
'n just 3lisén1 for that 3wágon1 to come.

((Chuckłe))

I júst uh- I've 4álways1 been that way 'n
'n would be 3nów1 if I was expéctín'- y'all 3ín1 'n you didn't get 3ín1
why I'd be 3nérvous1 about it.

((Chuckłe, créears throáat))

I wísh I 3wádn't that a 2wáy1. ((2))

Well I guess that's a1 ríght2. ((Chuckłe))
2Well3- I guess it is 3tóó3

but its sometimes a lot a worry for 4nóthin'1 about it.

((Chuckłe))

((Chuckłe)) ((5))

How'd you manage to keep us all in 3schóol1 as long as you did? ((2))

2Well3- I just- ((2)) get up 'n get you 4réády2.
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

   Sometimes I had five at 4oncé 2 n had to uh-
   ((Chuckle)) fix lunches for 4all 2 of ya2.
   I don't 3know 3. Y'all might not a been too 4próud 2 a your lunch 2.

   Did any of us ever wanna 3quit 3 'n you'd have to make us go 3bác k 3? 62
   Oh 4Harry 2 wanted to 2quit 3 'n- ((2))

   ((Chuckle)) 63
   'n he 4díd 1 one day.
   'N- ((3)) I don't know whether 3hè 1 remembers that or 2nó t 3-
   but uh- ((2)) 3 I re1member 2it 2.
   'N uh-
   3hè 1 was a good 3bál l 1 player 2
   of 3córse 1 they couldn't do with 3out 1 'im 1 play 3bál l 2. ((Chuckle))
   'N they come 'n- ((3)) per 3suá ded 3him 2- 3hèlp ed 3 me 2 'n-
   we got 'im 3 bác k 1 all right.
   'N then I thought so 3múch 2 well what if he had a 3quit 1.
   3Harry 2 has uh 3 I think I made 3gód 1 at 2téaching 1 you know. ((1))
   I thí nk Harry has m- made a góod 3schóol 1 teacher. ((4))
   You know Ms. (3Raynor's 2) daughter here went to 3Harry 3
   to his 3fírst 3schóol 1.

Sure 3ênóugh 3?
   2Yeah 3
   'N shè told 3mè 2 she says
   I can just re 3mè mèb 2r Mr. 3Fórd 3 2by- how 3níc e 1 he was to us.
   Said 'e 3d us 3rí de 2 with us uh- with 'im of the 3even ins 1.
   When 'e- ((3)) would go 3hóme 2
   why said he'd let us 3rí de 1.
   'N said I just re mèmb er 'im bein' so 3níc e 1.

Hm. ((Chuckle)) 64
   That 'uz Harry's 3fírst 3schóol 1.
   Down there at Co 3yóte 3. ((1))
   You don't (re) 2 do you 3?
   'I remember it I 3thí nk 2. ((7))

   What'd you do when- ((1)) the first one of the kids got 3mír ried 1 did you 2 cry 2?
   2Well 3- ((1)) I 3gúss 2 I done kinda like I did when 4you 1 got married.
   ((Laugh)) The 3lást 1 un. ((Laugh))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

((Chuckle))

I- I didn't want Róisie to get marvied so young. ((4))

'N uh- I wa-

((Interrupts)) Because you'd got married-

How old were you?

I was 3 fourteen years 3 old. ((2))

Almost 3 fifteen.

Goin' on 3 fifteen. ((Chuckle))

Well. ( ) but I 'uz just about 3 middle- ((2)) way be 3 twéen.

I liked five months a bein' 4 fifteen. ((5))

'N uh- But after I 4 seen that she was gonna get 4 married

why of course I give 4 up to it-

because I didn't want her runnin' 4 off 'n gettin' 1 marvied. ((2))

When did- when did y'all move to 3 Sayre? ((2))

To 3 town?

That's where 3 I was born. I don't it?

Oh we just went down 1 there.

after Raymond 1 díed

'I don't know w- you know

'I was so torn up about 1 that that- ((2))

they thought maybe if I'd just get away from 3 home 'n- ((2))

I'd get 3 over 1 it 'better.

'N uh- ((3)) He díed just about six months before 3 you was 1 born. ((3))

'N uh we- we just stayed down there about- maybe one 1 year. ((2))

When did dad build that 3 house out on the farm? ((4))

Ooh- he built 3 that 1 before 3 Raymond 1 díed.

He built it in- ((7))

I just don't re mem'ber though.

How'd y'all build it?

Did you 3 plan it or I just start 3 building or 2 what1?

I think we 3 must la just start 3 building it. ((Laugh))

((Chuckle))

Cause we didn't- we didn't have no 3 closets or 3 nothin' like- ((Chuckle))

((Chuckle))

'N dad you know was always a good carpenter.

But 3 still- he didn't- take time to 4 plan 1 things 1 much.
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

Or maybe 3 couldn't2-
3 I don't 1 know2.
'N 3 'l wasn't much of a hand to plan 1 things2. ((1))

It's been a pretty good 3 house 1 though 1 hasn't it3?  ((Chuckle))
2 Yeah3.
It's still 3 standing2 with about the-
I don't 3 reckon2 there's ever been a 3 door2 that ever- drug or 3 anything2.
Hit's still- ((4))
It's been there about thirty-five 3 years2 1 2 guess3 'n-
Marion's fixin' to re-shingle1 it for the first

He 3 fis2?
3 time1.
Mhm.

For the 2 first time since it was built2?
2 Yeah3. ((4))

Do you remember the- time that you were 2 saved3?
3 Oooohh- 2 yes3. ((2))

Where 3 was it2?
2 Well2- ((4))
1 3 don't 1 know it 3 seem 1 likes kinda pe3 cullar2- ((3))
that it 3 happened1 that a 1 way2-
but uh-((5))
whén they 3 buried 1 mother2 they buried her up on our 3 place1. ((1))
We didn't have no graveyard there 3 then2.

That was down by- 2 (columns)3?
2 Yeah3. ((6))
And uh- 'l'd been up to her 3 grave2-
'n uh- 'l'd- I got 2 down2 'n-
'n I- I just 3 prayed1.
I don't know- ((1)) how 4 come2 but 3 anyway2- ((2))
I was up there by my3 self1.
'n as I was comin' 2 back2- ((3))
from there- down there in the 3 pasture1- ((5))

What'd you 3 feel1 like?
2 Well3- 1 3 don't 1 know2 it just 3 seem 1 like that- ((5))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

That's somethin' you can't hardly telled. Isn't it? ((Chuckle))

((Chuckle)) I guess it isn't.

((Chuckle))

It's pretty wonderful though. Isn't it?

Yeah. ((3))

I remember once you told about uh-the first time you ever gave a testimony. 84

Do you remember that?

Yeah.

I re-member it.

It uz uh it uz ss-

we walked to- ((1)) prayer meetin' guess it was.

Church anyway. ((1))

'N they had a testimonial meetin'. ((4))

'N I got up 'n I don't know. 85

I don't re-member what I said.

but I de-clared I just felt so-

((Rhythmic))

((Chuckle))

ight'n I felt-

when I uz walkin' home that night.

It seem like I could just walk just- ((Chuckle))

just like uh I uz a feather.

I could jus-

((Chuckle))

'N we-'n Rosie was-a baby then but she ((4))

She uh ((2))

We had to carry her 'n we-

It 'uz about two miles from the house. 4up 'there

I guess too.

To church?

Yeah.

But we-walked 'n-carried her. ((8))

Well where were you born? ((1))

Ooh down there about Bowie somewhere.

Bellevue Texas?

Yeah. 89
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

About 3five miles from 3Béllevue1.
I don't know which a 3way1 but- ((1))

Do you remember 3when3?
2Well2 ((Chuckle))

October the 3what2?
    Well October the twenty-eighth in eighty-3one2.

2Eighteen eighty-one2.
   ((Sigh))

How long did you live at 3Béllevue1?

Oh 3I don't know2.
We left there 'n went to 2Wáshington3 'n-
   ((Interrupts)) Washington 2state2?

2Yeah2.
2Stáyed awhile2 'n-
   dad got 2sick2 'n-
   then we come 2báck2 'n- ((1))
   he sold the 2place2 'n
   we 2moved over there across2-
   3you1 know where I tóld you.1

3Léxington3?
2Yeah2. Only it uz down-
Well 3Léxington's 1not 3very far from 1Pur3cél1 3is it?

3No1.
Well it uz on-
   It uz twenty-five 3míles1 up to Pur3cél1 'n it uz off down there-
   in the 3sticks1 2somewhere1.
   'N we lived in a 3house2 that uz built out a 1lógs2
   'n the logs settlin- 2up2-
   straight 3up1 ss-
   ((Interrupts)) You mean 3vérticle3? Up 'n 3dówn3?
2Yeah2.

Did your dad build 3that house3?
2No2.
   It- wé uz on a rented 3place2. ((2))

Well how long did you live 3there2?

Ooohh 1I guess we must a lived there about ((1)) three four 2years2-
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

3f don't re'member. ((1))

Uh- was that the South Ca'nadian that y'all uh- had to crossa- ((2))

1 when the- country was open to settlement in eighteen-eighty-nine?

2 Yeah.

We had to move out you know we wasn't allowed to be in the- ((1))

3n the- natio- or the-

3by where we 'uz in 3'fün' 3'Territory it was they called it I think. ((2))

N we moved over across the river.

N then we'd come back 'n forth 'n do our chores. ((1))

We-

[ ((Interrupts))]

Do you re'member when the country was open to settlement there? ((1))

The run?

3 Oh I remember a little 'bout it.

1 I wasn't very old but still I- ((2))

I remember that dad didn't wanna be in the run.

He'd just rather wait 'n come 'n buy out somebody you know after.

He wasn't in the run.

Was there much excitement about it? ((1))

Oh I guess there was I- ((1))

There was a lot of people that ((3))

wanted to be right there-

[ ([Interrupts]) Well y'all lived in the Territory 'n had to- ((2))

go up- ((1)) crossa the river to be out a there when the run started didn't ya?

Yeah.

N then you had to crossa the river to tend to the cows 'n all that-

2Yeah.

1 during that time.

3 I don't remember how long-

4 I don't know what that was after.

I guess you know more about that than I do because you've studied history 'n I haven't. ((4))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

But any way— we moved over there.
I remember that very well.
'N lived in a tent—
'n then— after it uz all over with why we moved back.

Moved back into the Territory.

Yeah.
Back over home.
'n then— then we come—
thât 'uz when— ((3))
I uz goin' to school down there 'n—
we moved out here.

In Washita County.

How old were you then? ((3))

I guess I must a been about seventeen.
Ten or eleven I don't— ((3))

'n then you stayed— stayed in Washita County til— ((2))

you went to live with who?

Well— we went down 'n lived with Uncle Thomas Lákey. 'n uh—
'n they uh— lived—
didn't live with 'em we lived in a dugout down there 'n.
They c— they watched after us— so.

'n then we went down in Texas it was— ((2))
I don't remember whether it was— ((3))
Right where it was at in Texas.
(Well) that is I don't remember the town.
To live with another uncle— Uncle Ben.

Yeah I remember him.

Well, We went to live with them.

Where'd you meet dad?

Well— Bélle had married.
Her 'n will.

'n will lived over there close to dad.
Right close to 'im.

'n then after Bélle married—
why— she (finally taken) all of us kids. ((3))
An uh— ((2)) we 'uz livin' down there just— ((4))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

Do you remember that ole place where dad used to

Uh-huh.

Well, We 'uz just livin' there in just three or four hundred yards so-

Of each other?

Uh-huh.

((Chuckle))

Well how'd you get back to Oklahomá?

Did you move back with dad then? ((1))

'N filed on the place. ((Chuckle))

2No we moved uh- from there

why Belle 'n Will moved back up on the ole homeplace.

Over here in Washita County.

'N we all moved back.

'n that's how come me to have to write to dad. ((Chuckle))

Cause ((Chuckling)) I didn't have him down there 'n.

3How'd you say you learned to write? ((2))

2Well ((2)) by ((4))

Blueback speller?

2Yeah 'n the letters the A B C's

(they) was jus up 'n down

a fine of 'em.

You know kids used to have to learn their letters.

Long time ago.

'N then the writing letters was right over by 'em.

And you learned what it

and I

looked like in writing from that.1

Yeah2.

'N put your words together.

Yeah2.

So you could write love letters to dad.1

((Laugh))

((Chuckle))
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

Ludn't that 2snilly? ((Chuckle))
((Chuckle))

((You reckon) if anybody else ever had experiences like that? ((Chuckle))
((Chuckle))

So you really learned to write just so you could write to dad!(1) ((1))

Well uh-
I don't know I might not a ever learned if it hadn't a been for that 'n-
((Chuckle))

I can't do a very good job of it yet ((Chuckle)) can I!
((Chuckle)) ((Sigh)) ((3))

I bet you're tired aren't you? ((4))

3000h3 - 3 feel better!
31 feel better 'n I've been.
31 just believe I'm better. ((Chuckle))
(I'm gonna try) (chuckle)

The doctor said keep my fängers crossed. ((Chuckle)) ((4))

Why don't you lead us in prayer for a few minutes?

2Well3. ((3))

Father we just thank you for being so good to us. ((2))
N we thank you blessed Lord that you've been with us- ((2))
just aaaaall the way along
't that you've been with us specially since I've been sick.
That I could uh- ((2)) look to you. ((4))
And we thank you Lord- ((2))
for the children that they're all so good to us. ((2))
'N we thank you for our home. ((2))
'N we thank you for our church. ((5))
And we just pray you that Father be with us uh-
that we'll just have patience. ((2))
Father thou knowest that I've always wanted to have patience. ((3))

'N blessed Lord- we just- ((3)) pray you now to be- ((3))
with us through the rest of the day.
'N we've enjoyed the day so far blessed Lord. ((5))
An we pray you to be with each one of the children
this Thanksgiving day Lord.
Lucinda, tape "40 minutes"

That they will take time to thank you. ((3))
For thy goodness toward them. ((4))

'N specially blessed Lord we - we pray you for Willie. ((5))
'N we thank you blessed Lord
that everthing's as well with us as what it was. ((7))
Help us that we'll have courage. ((5))
We thank you Lord for our pastor that comes down 'n visits us
'n has prayer with us so often.

'N we just thank you for all the Christian people everywhere. ((4))
We thank you for the children's pastor. ((7))

'N our prayer's blessed Lord
that they will all give their lives to you.
'N serve you. ((3))
The very best they can. ((8))

'N Father we pray you to protect the children
on the highways as they travel
'n go - here 'n there. ((6))

'N Father bless each 'n every one of 'em now. ((3))
'N all of our loved ones. ((7))
We ask those in the name of Jesus. ((2))
Amen. ((4))

You better turn over 'n go to sleep now a while. ((5))
Let me read you some of my favorite Psalms.

Well. ((6))

Trust in the Lord and do good.
So shalt thou dwell in the land/

End of tape.
Interview with Lucinda Lakey Ford (about age 80)
by her son, LeRoy Ford (about age 40)
Taped in the early 1960s, after the assassination of JFK, before 1966.
Tape 2A. Continued on tape 3B.

Do you remember mama anything about when Oklahoma became a state? 1
Do you remember any of the talk about it?
    Oh of course I re3member2 but2- ((2))
    We 'uz all seem like3 proud1. ((5))
    But 'I don't remémer much about it all. ((Chuckling))
You don't remémére- about reading any párpers or anything about it? 2
    No-
    You know we didn't tåke papers then.
    We didn't hâve no- ((1)) 3páper 1'comin'. ((2))
How'd you get news? ((3))
    Well just- ((4))
    We'd just 3hâér1 about 2it2.
    You know uh- President- President Mc3Kínley that was 3killed3?
    3He'd 2been killed for2- 3r 2guess two weeks afore 3we 1heard about 2it.
    ((Chuckles))
Well 3'll 3say1. ((1)) 4
    And you know- ((2)) President- our néw president-
    It wasn't a hour arter he 'uz shot till we knew he was he'z shot.
    In Dállas.
    Called Etta 'n said did you know that- ((1)) President-
    What's his-
    ((Interrinds)) 2Kénndey2.
    3Kénndey had been shot3? 'n-
    She turned on the 3rádio 2'n-
    we listened to everthing.
When you all used to uh- 5
when you were going from- ((1)) say Pottawatomie nàtion- to Clóùd Chíef- ((2))
what did you- kids do to pass the time away?
    Huh?
How- wh- what did you sit on in the wàgon? 7
Lucinda, tape 2A

Did you have châirs? (11)
  Oh- sometimes we had a what we called a sprâng seat.
 'n we could have more than one- sprâng seat. ((Chuckling))
 It was a sèat had sprângs on it. (11)
 That reached way across the wagon.

Did they have a cushion on it? 8
  No- we just (doubled) a quilt and put on it. ((Chuckling)) (22)
 They hadn't cóme 2 to cushions thén2. ((Chuckling))

It was kinda crowded in the wagon I wànnit it 3 with all your furnitüre? 9
 (22)
  Yeah- when we moved- we had two wagons.
 Uncle Jéff2- my uncle 2- 4he drove the oxens and
daddy drove the 4team1.
 When we moved up hère1.
 From Wàshita county1.

When you stopped to camp at night- did all the kids have chôres to do? 10
  Well we'd- go around 'n pick up little pieces a wood- ((11))
 to make the camp fire out of. (11)

Who put up the tênt? (11) 11
  Oh daddy used to done most a thât2. (3)

Did you put up a tent every time you stopped? (11) 12
  No2- not ever1 time. (11)

Did you sleep out in the open sometimes? 13
  Yeah2. (4)

When you were at the fârm at uh- Erick1- did you ever burn búffalo chips? (11)
  Oh yes2. ((Chuckle))
 LéRo- uh Willie said a little reading in school-
 Aunt Léla 'd laugh about. ((11)) ((Chuckling))
 He said the reason he liked Oklahôma2-
 the wînd pumped all the water- 'n the coûs chopped all the wood1.
 ((Chuckling)) Thât was the reading he said in school1.
 'N shë just laughed 'n laughed 'n laughed. ((Trailing off intonation))

Were there búffalo chips around- the fârm? (11) 15
  Yeah they- it had you know it had that- búffalo waller out there.
 South of the house.
Lucinda, tape 2A

But even though the buffaloes were gone
you still used buffalo chips for wood.

1Yeah.

In your cookstove? (1)

No-- mostly in the fireplace. (1)

(-) Unintelligible syllable. Simultaneous start with LeRoy.)

[ 

(-) Unintelligible syllable. Simultaneous start with Lucinda.)

(-) Same unintelligible syllable. Simultaneous start)

[ 

The fireplace where?

At-

[ 

In the dugout?

3Yeah.

Was there a fireplace in the dugout?

Yeah-- dad built one (on) the side.

In the dugout at Erick.

2Yeah. (3)

Was it in the end opposite the door?

1Yeah.

The door was in the west 'n. (3)

As well as I remember.

What kind of furniture did you have in the dugout? (2)

Oh we had a bedstead 'n-

((Interrupts)) What was it made out of?

It was just a common bedstead.

((Interrupts)) You mean Walter did.

3Yeah.

Oh I got so used to callin' him Dad-

I'd ((Chuckles)) call him Dad all
Lucinda, tape 2A

((Interrupts)) You pushed it out 'n-
Pull it out over night.

What'd he make it out of?
Just boards.

What were the walls made out of?
Well they were just dug down in just dirt walls.

Weren't they always crumblin' off?
Well yeah. A lot.

Now how- What'd you do when they crumbled off?
Well we'd just sweep it up 'n carry it out. (Chuckling)

Did you ever have to prop up the roof because of the dirt'd cave in?
No. The house didn't never cave in. (1)

Looks like it would have in that sand- didn't it.
It does but it didn't do it (this time). (6)

We built it up with logs around on the outside.

'N then it had a centerpole you know. (1)
'N we had little things like posts- (1)
that went from the outside wall up to that centerpole. (1)

'Mhm.

'N then we'd put- (2)
Oh something-
I don't know what.
Grass or- (1)
Seem like (sh)

((Interrupts)) Do you remember what the grass looked like
in the country when you first got there?

'Oh it 'uz just great big ole tall blue grass. (Chuckling) (1)

'N the grass was everywhere.

Was it in among the shinnery?

Yeah.
The shinnery'd finally taken it though. (3)

What other furniture'd you have in that dugout in Erick?

You had a bed- 'n a- (3) (A "listing" intonation.)

Yeah 'n he made us a what 'called a cupboard. (2)

'N have it up beside the wall for the dishes.
Lucinda, tape 2A

What'd he make it out of?
1Boards.
He put 3shelves across it. ((3))

Did it have any 3doors on it? ((1))
No I used 3côrtns on it. ((Chuckle))

Cloth 2côrtns?
1Yeah.

Where'd you get the 3cloth? 41
Oh I- I don't know.
We- Of course we could get cloth at 3town2. ((2))

What was town? ((1))
2Mângum2.

Do you ever remember any of your trips to 3Mângum3?

To 3town?
1I never did go- but I remember Dád a-goin.
He'd take some corn.
1I don't know- after we raised corn- he'd take it up there to mill.
Maybe be gone two or three days. ((3))

Do you remember when 3Sayre was first started3?
1Yeah. ((5))
I remémbér that the- ((2)) 3cólorèd people worked on the 2ráilroad1. ((1))
And some way (or another) they wouldn't let 'em go- ((2))
with the gang after it went to Téexas.
(They went) that far.
That ((simultaneous with LeRôy.))

You mean after they got in to 2Téexas2? ((1))
After they got a certain 3pláce.

'N after they built the railroad- 2wést- to a certain 2pláce- 46
they wouldn't let the colored people 2wórk on it? ((1))
Well if I remémbér right they didn't. ((2))
Seem like that was right down there- on Turkey Créek'z where they stopped. ((3))

Do you remember the first 3tráin you saw come through3?
2No. ((5))

Uh- ((2)) On the farm at 'Erick- what'd you have for 3bréakfast? ((1)) 48
Lucinda, tape 2A

Oh-we usually had 3eggs1 'n-
wé (just) nearly always had bûtter. ((2))

What kind? 481/2

[...

l'd make hot biscuits 'n-
we'd have bûtter 'n-
sômê kinda presêrves or 3jéîly2. (4)

What kinda 3chîckenhouse1 did you have? (1)

Oh he just built one out a lítte olé 3lôgs2.

A log 2chîcken house2? ((Confirmation))

2Yeah2. (1)

What kind of a 3bárn1 was there? (1)

Well he built a- ((1)) little shêd of a thing-
to put the- ((1)) gráîn in- after we lay some grain. (3)

'N ône time that olé Turkey Créêk got üp 'n-
washed his- ((1)) bär- his- ((2))

Well wé called it a 2crib1- I 2think1. (Chuckling) (1)

Washed it 2away2?

Yeah 'n- all the- 2gráîn1 there was in it.

[...

Did Turkey Creek get up pretty close to the dugout?

Well it wàsn't very 2fâr1.

You remember- where the dugout 3wás1 1doncha2? (6)

It uh

((Recording stops, then is resumed, presumably a few seconds later.))

When the 3big flood come2-
'n got the water so 3high2-
wé was a- wërent a 3hôme1.

Wé 'uz down in 3Texas1.

'N the 3(Blöck) 1people2- Dad's 3côusîn2-
had their- dugout built back in the second bânk. (1)

And it got clear up in their dugout.

What was the second bânk? 54
Lucinda, tape 2A

Well you know the créeek had a- the 3rfd bank-
'n then- a little further up there was a'nother bank.
Where was it? On-
(On down)
on Turkey Créeek by where Mert Berry lives now.
Some of the 4órds lived down there? ((1))
Mother 3Gaylor 1 lived down there1.
Did they all move back to 3Téexas? 3
2Yeah2.
Did they file on some land there too? 58
2No.2 ((1))
They didn't like out there.
3Shé 1 didn't. ((4))
What did you have to eat for dinner? ((1)) 59
2Oh2- just anything I 3gues1- ((Chuckler)) we could 3gét1. ((3))
Did you eat any wild rabbit or- ((1)) anything?
Oh if we could get a hold a one we have. ((6))
Dad- your dad really wadn't much of a hand.

Did you do any preserving of foods? 61
Yeah wild plums- 'n uh-
(((Interrupts)) What'd you do? ((1))
How'd you- ((1)) cân 'em? ((2))
Well 'd make jelly 'n preserves 'n- ((2))
Wild plums was my main fruit out there.
After we moved out there. ((1))
At home.
Did Lucille tell you about 'em havin' an explosion in my 2house2?
The other 2dáy2?

Uh-Uh. 63
The water tank exploded.
The folks was gone from home-
or more 'n likely somebody'd a been killed.
But he's got some folks livin' in the house. ((1))
A preacher-
(((Interrupts)) Did they get it fixed? 64
Lucinda, tape 2A

Yeah I think he told me the other 3-day- he had the water tank replaced.
It just blewed it into little (chitlins). (1)

When the kids would get sick—how did you doctor 'em?

What medicines did you use?

Well— I don’t know.

I— I was a great hand to givin'— castor oil. (Chuckling) (8)

You had to kinda learn— to do your own doctorin'.

Cause you couldn’t get a doctor close.

I remember seeing you eat the soot off of uh— underneath the stove cap.

Where’d you hear about that?

I don’t know.

Somebody said it was kinda good for a—kind of a— (1)

or indigestion one. (4)

Did the neighbors ever get together out there?

Not very much. (1)

What kinda dishes did you have?

Oh we just had ole common dishes. (2)

One time I was— cleanin’ up the house after I'd washed 'n— (3)

You know like we used oil lamps 'n the 2 globes? (1)

'N my globe was smoky.

'N I thought well I'll just put it in that boiler of water.

Where I'd been washin'. (1)

'N leave it to clean it real nice.

'N I hit it agin' the— side of the— (4)

Washpot?

Yeah the wash 3 boiler 1 it was.
Broke it all to 3 pieces. (Chuckling)

'N then I had to go clear to 3 mango 2 to get a 3 lamp 'globe 1.

'N I couldn’t hardly do without a lamp globe.

Cause— you know them old lamps 3 smocked 2—

If you didn’t have a 3 globe 1 on 'em 1.

Do you remember some 3 lamps 3 that didn’t have some square 3 wicks 3?

That just had a— round—

(Interrupts) Yeah we used to have a little ole thing.

It’s kinda like a cup with a little handle on it.
Lucinda, tape 2A

and a little- ((2)) a thing about as big around as my finger- for the wick to go up.

Did it look like a pitcher? ((1))
Well 2yéah2.
Just a little ole- ((1)) kinda like a cup or somethin'.

Did it have a spout on it- that the wick came out of?
No it had a- yeah I guess that's what you'd call it.
Just a little ole round thing.

Was it made of métal?
Yeah the lamp was- kinda 3brássy2 3lookin'1.
I don't know 3what2.
It might a been made out a 3cépper2.
I don't know. ((Chuckles))

What was it called?
Well 3wé I just called it a 3lamp1. ((Chuckles)) ((3))
'N we'd oh- 'n wé could turn that wick 3úp 1you know1. ((1))
But it didn't have a globe on it.

Wadn't 3supposed to have a globe3.

No. ((2))
Wé had these kind that I've got down in the dugout nów you know. ((2))
(Was) the kind wé had. ((1))
After we moved up théré. ((5))
Oh 'I can remember- how bad I hated it when I broke that- lamp-
((Chuckles)) 3chimney1 or 3globe1 4'1 3called 2it2. ((3))
Because I knówed wé'd have to go clear to Mángum to gét one.

Which of the children were 3bórñ2 when you lived in the 1dugout1? ((1))

1 'Etta2. ((1))

Is that áll? ((1))
Yeah2.

M- Willie 'n- Rosié was borned over at Clóud Chief in the (dugout).

((Interrupts)) How long did you live in the dugout? ((2))

'Oh we lived in there several 3yéars2.
Dád got a hold of some lümber 'n built us a- ((1)) a 3hóuse2-
I think it was fourteen by 3twénty1. ((1))
'N wé thought wé was all dressed 4úp1. ((Chuckles))
We had a bóx- ((1)) plank 3hóuse1.
Lucinda, tape 2A

Why did you move-
move from where the dugout was up to where the old house was built?
I-I just don't know.
We thought that- ((1)) maybe'd be a road go through there sometime.
((Chuckles)) ((1))

Was it built up close to where the old trail used to be?
Yeah.

Did that have anything to do with your moving up there?
I guess it did.
We thought maybe-
there might be a- trail come through up there
'n we wanted to be on the trail. ((1))

Did you find any Indian relics around on the farm?

No.

All the boys would find some all these ole-
Arrowheads?

Yeah.

They had found some on the farm?

Yeah. ((10))

Where'd you hear about using poke root to get rid of itch?

I don't know.
Somebody told me. ((Chuckles)) ((1))
I don't know where I heard about it. ((4))
I never did know where-
The kids got the itch at school so- ((3)) ((Interrupts))

'N Harry- where was Harry born? ((2))

When you lived in the first house?

Yeah. 'N Marion was born in- the first house. ((5))

'N Lucille too. ((2))

Do you remember their salling a bucket lid-
'n breaking out a-((1)) window?
No. ((3))

Oh I guess I am not much to remember things. ((Chuckles)) ((5))
I remember one time- ((2)) the kids was playin' the (clovis)
Stephen did you know where the crippled girl
that went on the crutch? ((name of the game))
Lucinda, tape 2A

And they had a baal. (3)

'N they was up. (1)

3 One of 'em kinda threw it up 'n-

Marion hit it with that crutch-

'n it went through a windo 'n broke it all to pieces. (7)

Where was the first school that the kids went to? (1)

It was what they called Old Héxt.

It was way down there by Mert Béry's.

That's where I went one time.

That's where I started.

No you - you started further up the hill.

They moved it up. (3)

Which way was the old Héxt from the one where I started?

It was noth.

'It was right down there by Mert Béry's house only across the str - the railroad.

Out close to where dad had the blacksmith shop?

Yeah. (2)

Is that where Etta went to school first?

Yeah. 'N Thomas 'n Willis 'n - he went there. (4)

Do you remember anything that happened about Dad's blacksmith shop at Héxt? (3)

No only I know he walked down there to work everyday 'n then walked back. (9)

'N Willie he'd see 'im a-comin' 'n - (1)

'n play sayin' I'm gonna meet Daddy 'n I'm gonna beat him. (Chuckles)

He'd start out on his hands 'n feet.

A-crawlin'.

That's the way he crawled.

Walked on his hands 'n feet.

He'd say 'I'm gonna beat Daddy. (3)

I remember you tellin' one time bout when you were saved. (2)

What uh - do you remember about that? (1)

Oh I just felt like uh-

I needed somethin' (comin')-

and I went to - out to where momma was buried 'n-
kneeled down in prayer.
I thought (there) where her head was—
but ’I don’t know whether it was her head or her 3 feet! ((1))
’N I— ((8))
Go ahead. ((2))
’N as I come back to the house—
seem like I can see them fenceposts now.
Everything looked so good to me. ((2))
But I didn’t know the Bible or (quote it). ((9))
I remember you all used to talk about uh—taking the kids to town once a year. 96
Or that you got to go to town once a year.
Was that you or— ((1))
Oh we’d always go in the fall.
’N get what things we needed. ((Chuckleg))
Was that down in Texas? 97
No it was over here.
We’d drive to Sayre in the— ((2)) wagon.
’N that was the only time of the year that you went to town? 98
Well I didn’t go much—
cause I always come home with a headache.
Did you ever get to go to town when you were down in—Bellevue Texas? 99
((1))
Oh yeah we’d go over to Bellevue ’n Park Springs. ((3))
That was close. ((2))
I remember— the kids used to say that they would uh—
dig a hole in a load a cotton ’n sit down in it— on the way to the gin.
Where was that? ((2))
Oh ’I don’t remember.
It would be I guess out back home.

End of tape. Interview continued on tape 3B
Interview with Lucinda Lakey Ford (about age 80)  
by her son, LeRoy Ford (about age 40)  
Taped in the early 1960s, after the assassination of JFK, before 1966.  
Tape 3B.  Continuation of tape 2A.

One of your neighbors where didn't have but one horse?  
Out there at home.

At ?

(Bout) where we lived out there- (2) on the old (McCoon) place.  
And he worked the cow and the horse together. (Chuckling),  
And he'd gone to church ever time- (2)  
with that cow and a horse.  
And that ole cow'd lay down 'n sleep.  
During the time of church. (Chuckles)  
One night I had the sick headache 'n I slept in the car.  
'N he- or in the wagon not the car. (1)  
I was (bad news.)  
They was over there in the Bible- they you know they- (1)  
they said they- (1)  
In my Bible said- they stopped the car.  
And I didn't like that- to read it that a way.  
Cause I knowed they was n'child-  
but what knew there wasn't no cars in them days.

((Interrupts)) How did- How did this old cow lie down?  
Was she still hooked up to the wagon?

Yeah. (1)  
But she'd lay down 'n sleep.  
He'd come out to go start home from church.  
Took- (1)  
Start home from church and run the ole cow up 'n-  
turn 'im around 'n- go on home. (A listing intonation) (1)

Was the old horse standin' up all this time?

2Yeah. He never did lay down. (2)  
Horses would- (1) use- I mean they used to tell mé-
Lucinda, tape 3B

they'd sleep a standin' up. (((Chuckle))) ((2))
But a cow-

((interrupting)) Was this after you all moved to the farm at Erick? ((2))
2Yeah. But-
Or was this when you were a child?
It's when we first moved up there. ((1))
On our old homeplace.

What church did you go to? (((Stress on 'go', not on 'church')) ((1))
Well- we'd just- ((2))
We went ever Sunday.
'N one Sunday the Methodist'd preach-
one Sunday the Baptist'd preach. (((Listing Intonation))
But everybody went. ((1))
We had a good time. ((4))
'N after while we had a church. ((4))

You told me one time about some- ((1)) rhymes that you'd memorized.
One of 'em started out

Who taught you to sing- my sweet pretty bird.

Do you remember the rest of that one? ((1))
Who taught you to sing- my sweet pretty bird. ((1))
It was God said the lark-
as he rose from the earth.
'God (extended) our wings-
and give us our voice.
and finds (our for-) food.
and we go re-joicin'. ((1))

Was that in a primer or something you studied? ((Not an 'alternative' question)) ((1))
Well- I said it as a little speech- at school.

You said it as a speech at school.
You know they used to-
they had children to- ((1)) memorize little poems and say 'em ever Friday. ((2))

Do you remember another one said sister sister come and see?
Yeah.
Lucinda, tape 3B

Sister 3sister\(^1\) come and 3sée\(^1\).
It is not a 3bird\(^2\) nor it is not a 3béé\(^1\).
\(2\)High it 1frises\(^1\), 2Up it 3goés\(^2\).
Now it séttes on a 3róse\(^1\).

Do you think that came from a McGuffey reader? 1 2
I think.
We 3had \(^1\) McGuffey's then I think\(^1\). \(3\)(3)

Do you remember any more of those rhymes? \(1\)(13)
2No 12-

\(\)(Interrupts) Guess it's hard to re3mémber 1them\(^1\) 3it'n it\(^1\)? 1 4
That far back it is- for 4mé\(^2\).
My sister 3Béél\(^1\) could remember things (a heap) better than 2I can\(^1\). \(3\)(3)
She never did forget nothin'.

How'd it happen on the 3wág-on trip\(^1\) and the 3ca'ltle drive trip\(^1\)-
you made- from- Fort Worth- to Oklahóma- with- Rosie and 3Willie\(^2\)-
that you were coming from there instead of 3Clóud \(^1\)Chief\(^1\)? \(5\)(5)

I thought you moved from Clóud Chief to Erick. \(2\)(2)
Well we 3did\(^1\).
But that was comin' from- 3Wise\(^1\) County to- up there where we 3lived\(^1\).
where the old place is 3now\(^1\). \(1\)(1)

What'd you 3do\(^1\)- just go down to 3Téx-as\(^3\)
1to visit the 3róiks\(^3\) and drive their 3ca'ltle up\(^3\)?
No wé had ca'ltle down there.
We had two 3wág-ons\(^2\) so-

\(\)(Interruption) 'N you just went down there to gét 'em. 1 7
2Yeah\(^2\). \(1\)(1)

Brother 3Thómas\(^2\) 'n- John 3Ford\(^2\) drove the 3ca'ltle\(^1\).
I drove one 3tém\(^2\)- \(1\)(1) and uh 3dád\(^1\) drove one\(^1\). \(3\)(3)
And I'd- hold Willie in my 3lap\(^2\)- and my árm around 3Rosie\(^1\).
Hold her to keep her- from fallin' down óut of it. \(\)(Chuckling)
Mother Gaylor'd say now Lú you can't 3do' it\(^2\).
I'd say you just 3thínk\(^1\) I can't dó it. \(\)(Chuckling) \(1\)(1)
I 3lové\(^1\) to drive 2hórses\(^1\)-
'N 2ríde 2hórses\(^1\) 'n. \(2\)(2)
I loved hórses- 'n my daddy did tóo. \(7\)

What kind of måttresses do you have- did you have in the- \(2\)(2)
Lucinda, tape 3B

3dugout1- where you lived? ((2))
Féatherbéd? ((1))
  2Yeah2.
    We had- wé'd make our- wé called 'em ûnderbèds. ((Chucklè))
 Önërbeds.
  2Yeah2.
    Where they'd 3béì.
    We'd use 3shûcks 1all tore 1up2- ((1))
      'n- 'n uh hây- or any good kind of hây.
    Or uh pôke straw.
    'N thèn wè'd put a féatherbed on top of 3thât2- n' it'd make a réal gòod 3béì.
      ((2))
What kepèd the màttress from fallin' to the flôôr?  20
    Oh wè just had slâts across.
    We didn't hâve no spràngs.
    We didn't know what spràngs wâs. ((Chucklè)) ((4))
What kind of ticking was on the mattress?  21
    Just règùlar ole- ((3)) féather ticking. ((1))
Strîped?
    Yeah. ((3))
When you were moving in a 3wàgon2- what'd you 3dòl-  23
    just throw the wàgon in the- the màttress in the 3wàgon3
    'n sleep on it when you 3càmpèd3?
    Yeah. ((2))
What'd you do with the hòrse òr the óxen when you stopped at night to camp?  24
    We'd tie 'em up to the 1wàgon2. ((8))
Did the wàgon hâve- ((1)) bòws 'n shëets over 'em?  25
    Yeah. ((4))
      You know I en3jôîèd1 them 1dàys2. ((2))
      It wàs hârd dàys but ((1))
      3'èn1 joyèd2 'em.
    I didn't-
      It wàsn't jùst- tòò bâd on 3mè2. ((14))
I read in somebòdy's lèttèr the other dày wère you made 3kràût2-  26
    by putting càbbàge in a 3bàrrel2-
    'n choppìng it uòp wìth a ((2))
spáde.
[   (Simultaneous pronunciation of 'spade'.)
spáde.
  Yeah däd'd- take the big ole hâdž 'n- cut 'em ³üp²- (2)
  Just kinda quàr't em.
  'N then he'd take a spáde 'n.
  He'd just churn it up and dówn in there and cut that kráut all to pièces. (4)
You remember anything ³élse¹ about different kîndz of ³food that you prepared³? 27 (2)
  Well we'd make ³pickles².
  If we didn't have ³cúcumbers² I've seen- ³hîm² use little ³wâter¹melons.
  ((Chuckles)) To make pickles out of. (5)
You remember ³hâw he ³máde 'em³? (1) 28
  Well he put 'em in sâlt- uh ¹brîne².
  Just so much sâlt per so much wâter. (1)
  But I don't remember how ³mûch². (5)
I remember you said you used to ³pêel²- (1) 29
or crack ³péach ¹sêeds to get the kérnals to give to your moþer for médecin.
What was thât about?
  Well it sêem like if she eat those (kérnals)-
  it kinda hêlpz her when she has ásthma.
  There was sómething' about 'em that kinda hêlpz her. (7)
  Bless her ole hârt.
  I've set up- got up and set up mány a night in óne chair-
  She'd set in óne chair 'n lean over on the óther'n you know. (1)
  On the bâck of the óther châir.
  'N I'd get up 'n sêt in that one she'uz lêánin' on.
  'N she'd say why ³Lú³- why don't you go to ³bêd¹?
  I'd say I don't wanna leave you up here by your³sêlf¹. ((Chuckles))
Don't tâlk so loud now. 30
You'll get yourself worn óút. (2)
And your neighbor tôo. (4)
  He sâys I don't bother.
  ((Voices heard in background, probably nurses, 10 seconds)) 31
What is it?
  ((Voices, 10 seconds))
Lucinda, tape 3B

Did the tent you lived in in Clóud Chief have a dirt 3ñoór3? Yeah. (2)

What kind of a bróom did you use for that one? You didn't have bróomweeds like you have in western Oklahóma. (3)

Well I believe I remember (if I ever used it)

we'd just use ole 3bróomweed1 you know1.

Did you use those at Clóud Chief too? (5)

Yeah. (20)

If it come a 3cóíd spell2-

we'd just stóp 'n stick up the tent 'n-

dad 'd take the shóvel 'n cut sód 'n make us a- (1) fireplace (too.) (1)

I have a good-

(Interrupts) That's when you and dad 'd be travelin'. Yeah when we was movin' from Téxas up here that time.

With the cows.

Is that when you crossed at Térrell?

Yeah. (4)

Does the word uh- the title- (1)

Róck Blúff Crossing 3méan anything- to you3? No. I don't re-

It's dad that'd know more about that than me.

He remembers better than I do.

Do you remember where you crossed the river that uh-

whether there was a big rock 3blúff 2on one 3side3? (8)

Yeah but I don't remember where it was 3átt.

You 2don't2?

Unh-un.

I think it's time for you to wash your hands now.

That means it's gonna be time to eat.

(Muffled voice of nurses: 'After while. This is just a wárning.

((Chuckling)))

A wárning?

((voices: 'We get real hungry.')) (4)

I still can't uh- find in 3history 'books 1mom2-

why- (2) your dad had to cross the Canádian 3river2- (1)

if you lived in Potta3wátomie 1countycounty2- at the time of the run of eighty-3nine1-
Lucinda, tape 3B

because that was not the unassigned lands that were opened.
Well.
You know why he had to cross the river? ((2))

No but I thought we had to be out of that country a certain time.
But I can't remember everything like that.
'N I never studied history a day in my life. ((1))
You remember anything that ever happened as you crossed the river? ((2)) 43

No, we just ((1)) we'd uh-
we lived over here- ((2)) on this side.
'N- we'd come over home 'n take care of our things overnight.
'N uh we didn't move over there.
we'd just stay over there for the day.
What'd you do? Carry a tent across there or what? ((2)) 44

No.
We had a house over there in the Pottawatomie nation you know.
But when you crossed the river- uh when your dad crossed the river- 45
during the run- 'n you stayed over there about two weeks-
what'd you do?
Just camp out over there?
Yeah. ((2))
Had a tent?
Yeah. ((2))
What'd you do?
Pack it across the river- or do you remember?
Well we had a wagon to take it.
You drove the wagon across the river- forded the river with it?
Yeah. ((5))
You remember how long you had to stay over there?
No I don't remember.
Daddy wasn't in the run.
He didn't wanna be. ((2))
He wasn't very well 'n he didn't-
he thought he'd rather come on later 'n just buy a place.
'N that's what he done. ((2))
How'd it happen that you and dad- filed on a place out- ((3)) at Hext?
Where did you hear about the land out there? ((3))
Lucinda, tape 3B

Well- I just don't remember how that happened. But one of dad's cousins lived over there.

Joe Cúin. (2)

He married one of dad's cousins!

And he heard about the land from them.

I guess that's where we heard about it. (4)

And one of his sisters was a- holdin' the old homeplace down.

'N she let us have it.

You know you could stake a place down for a few months to hold it.

'N she had staked that'n down.

'N she decided she- would give it up- 'n wasn't gonna file on it.

'N dad he- (1) bought off-

What was it they called 'em? Delinquents?

Delinquents.

Ah.

'N he filed on it in place of her. (12)

Did your dad make the oxen yoke that you used?

I gue- yeah. But we didn't- (3)

Oh we plowed 'n- used the oxen for our heavy work- but we didn't plow horses 'n oxen together. (4)

Like this little nei- neighbor of ours. (13)

Did you ever see an Indian couple set up a tipi?

Yeah.

Once they (2)

we- there was a creek up- real full of water.

We had camped there 'n- came up a wagon with an- Indian man 'n a woman in it.

'N she jumped out 'n- got the ax 'n-

commenced to cuttin' the poles for the tipi.

He just got out 'n went 'n sat down by a tree.

'N I just felt so sorry for him cause I thought he was sick. (chuckle)

He wasn't I found out later.

That's the way they done things.

The women done the work.
Lucinda, tape 3B

How'd they ³carry the tipi¹? 55
In a ²wagon²?
   Yeah. They alway had a ²wagon¹.
   ³Pónies² hooked ³t it¹. ((1))
Hów ma- How ³tall was the tipi¹. ((1)) 56
   Oh- you've ³seen'em¹ 'náven't you³?
²No². Can't say that I ³háve¹. ((1)) 57
   Oh I guess about ten or twelve feet ³tall²- I ³gúss².
Bout how many póles did they use¹?
   Oh I couldn't têll you ¹son² but-
   they'd pút 'em pretty close to³géther². ((1))
   Let 'em set 'em out you know-
   'n come togéther in the ³top¹.
Uh- what was it covered with¹. ²híd³ or- ²duck³ or ²what¹?
   Dúckin'. ((3)) 59
Then what would they put inside the tipi after they set it ³up¹? ¹'Anything³? 60
   No.
Set it up to- get out of the ²wéather³? 61
   ²Yeah³.
   'N they'd build a fire in there.
   It kinda drawed the smoke out.
The hole in the ²top did²?
   ²Yeah².
How'd it happen you ³såw them¹.
Did they set one up near where you ²lived².
   They put- set one up near where we ⁴cåmped¹ that time.
What ³trip¹ were you on that time¹?
Do you re²mémber²?
   We 'uz comin' from Wise County up ²hóme¹. ((1))
From Wise County up to ²Saýre³? 65
   No. Up to ³Wåshita¹ County¹. ((3))
Well that's when- you and your dad- ³móved up there¹.
   ²Yeah². ((2))
   No it's when- me 'n ³your dad moved up there¹. ((3))
Well you were mårried at- ((2)) Clóúd Chief? 67
   ¹Yeah².
Lucinda, tape 3B

Wé went up thére.'n.
Dad come out thére 'n we got married 'n went báck to Téxas.

And then on your way back up to Cloud Chief
1Yeah.

you cámped one night- and- the Indians came 'n set up the tipi.

Oh wé had camps several nights.

It táké about ten dásys to make the trip.

But one of those nights was just you and dad-

1Yeah.

'N the Indians came by and cámped near you.
1Yeah.

What kind of food did they eat?

I didn't notice.

I don’t know.

Do you know how they dried beér?

No. ((2))

They’d eat raw beef.

They did?

Yeah. ((2))

You told me one time about a cow dying in a prairie fire.

Yeah. They come around 'n wanted it 'n.

They eat that old cow. ((Chuckle))

Was this at Cloud Chief?

Yeah. It was over there- ((1))

down there in Wáshita County (at the) Washita river bottom. ((10))

They wasn’t civilized then.

The Indians wasn’t. ((4))

'N after they built the colony over there at-

where is that colony?

The Séger colony.

Yeah I know.

Why the uh- little ole boys got their hair cut.

'N the girls ’d have their bangs cut off.

'N they’d just look so nice ’n different than-

what they did before they started to that colony. ((3))
Lucinda, tape 3B

Did any of these Indians wear blankets around their shoulders?

'Oh yeah.

All the old women did. ((2))

They—squaws—wé called 'em.

Théy used blankets but the men wore— ((1)) clothes. ((4))

What kind of clothes?

Like—white people or were they—

Well they seemed to mé like khaki. ((2))

Most of 'em. ((5))

What did their hair look like?

Oh the men's hair was púrty!

But the women didn't do nothin' to their hair but—

just let it hang down. ((2))

But the men 'd keep theirs combed 'n plaited up.

'N looked púrty.

Wé had an old Indian come see dán (at)— he 'uz sick.

His name was Lóng Hair. ((1))

'N hé'd—((2)) have his hair plaited 'n it'd hang way down to his wàist. ((2))

'Oone night he come— dad was pretty sick. ((2))

'N hé'd say—

Hé could talk a little English.

Hé'd say he's awful sick.

He's awful sick. ((chuckles)) ((14))

We got to where wé thought— quite a bit of ole Lóng Hair. ((Cough)) ((8))

Cause he'd come to sée dad. ((1))

There wasn't many white people lived up there. ((Cough)) ((19))

Théy'd come visit ús.

Théy'd drive up in a wágon.

Théy'd get out 'n come sit down on the gróund.

We offered 'em a chár.

Théy wouldn't use it.

Théy sat down on the gróund. ((Chuckles))

((Chuckles)) ((2))

I guess that's the way they dóné it. (I dunno.)

Did you ever trade with 'em?

Yeah. Wé- wé made some watermelons 'n—
Lucinda, tape 3B

th'yd give just anything for a watermelon. (Chuckle) (3)
And th'yd trade us blankets 'n things for watermelons.

Were these blankets th'yd gotten from the government maybe?
Yeah. They got everything from the government. (4)
Does the government help them out?
I expect so.

Probably not as much as they used to. (7)
Well I sure thought it was nice-
when they got that colony 'n got those kids all started to school. (2)

Do you remember one time on the trip from Potawatomie Nation to-
Cloud Chief that uh- (3) a wagon rolled backward and broke your dad's rib?
No. (4) I don't.

Aunt Alice-
Richardson remembered that.
Well. (5)

When you would stop to camp at night - did you always put up a tent-
or did you just stay in the wagon?

We didn't always put a tent.
We'd just have a campfire out 'n cook on the-
We had a skillet with a lid on it.
We'd build a fire 'n we'd- (1) make bread if we wanted to 'n- (1)
puit it- (3) in that skillet 'n then put coals or fire on the lid. (9)

Do you re-member- (1) that you told me one time about- (1)

You 'n- Härbin- plowing with a team of oxen?
Oh we plowed all of our land.
Broke it- the sod up with oxen. (2)
'N th'yd get unruly 'n wanna come to the house.
We couldn't- we couldn't hol- make 'em stay in the fields.
Th'yd just come to the house. (2)
'N we got to where we'd- just (ground 'em) down2 bog 'em down.
(Chuckles)

And bog 'em down?
Or get 'em to where they couldn't pull it.
'N dad told us not to do thát.
They might- bend the beam or the plow- (1)
'N not to stick the plow in the 3ground 1that a way 1.
When you built the dugout at 2Erick 2did you use any 3sód 3? (1)
No. We used 3cottonwood 3logs 1. (2)
Did you use sod for 2anything 2? (1)
We built the 3chimney 1out of 1sód 2.
We had a 3chimney 1on it. (3)
Uh- (3) what kind of- when you had the 3dugout 2-
what kind of uh- 3out 1houses did you have?
Did you have toilets out 2side 3 or 3what 1?
(Chuckles) We took a treé. (Laugh) (7)
We didn't 3think 1about toilets 2them 1days 1. (Chuckle)
Uh- do you remémbér the 3câttle 1tráil 1that went by the 2hóuse 2?
Well it just looked like- it was an èteed 3wágon 1tráil 1.
That they w- was 1hád been cut out pretty 3deep 1you know 1.
Hadn't been used maybe for a long 3time 3?
Yeah. But it was still 3there 2. (1)
I don't know what trail that 3was 2.
I 3used 1to know 1- but I don't 3now 2.
Did it 3go to Mobéetle 3Téxas 3?
I think 2so 1. (3)
Went up there 3sôme 1where 1. (5)
Uncle Thomas- (2) always had quite a few 3stóck 2.
3Câttle 1.
Hé'd take 3hís 1câttle out west in the summer 1.
Where they's plenty of 3gráss 1. (2)
Uh- your 2dád's brother 2?
Yeah. (2)
What do you mean by the 2wést 1?
Well- it was west of- hé lived down at 3Minco 1. (1)
'N he'd go out 2wést 1. (2)
Do you remémbér when the the 3câttle 1inspector came 1 to-
check your ców's for 3ticks 3?
Yeah. 2Thât 1was when we was a 3móvin 2 3up 1there 1.
We couldn't croós a certain 3line 2 til 1the 3ców's 1was inspected 1. (1)
We had to camp 3out 2- a long time a wáitín' on the inhspéc 1tor 1to come 1.
I forgot 3what 1he 3dóne 2. (1)
Lucinda, tape 3B

I- It 3dil 1seem like they made us-
kinda 3lif1the cows or ûse some kind of dope on 'em. ((2))
You know they used to wouldn't let us brâng cows from- Têxas up héré
cause they didn't wanna get the ticks started. ((7))

Did you have a- an óxen named 3Spoîl3?
Yeah- 'n one named 3Blûe1.
'N they both had great long hôrns.
'N we'd- hîld that- ône end of the yôke-
we'd put ône end of the yôke ôn ône of the oxen.
Hárbin and me 1would2.
'N then we'd hold the other end up 'n-
say come 3ûnder1 1Blûe2. ((In another voice, a direct quote.))
We always- the side we pût it on (the side)
cause his hôrns was real long. ((1))
'N then we'd say- tell Blûe to come 3ûnder1-
'n hî'd just walk under that 3yôke1.
'N wë'd put the uh- the uh- ((2)) bow on the yôke you know.
You-
((Interrupts)) You always put the yôke on first and then put the bow on.
Yeah put the bow on after we got 'em- where we wanted 'em.

What kept the bow from fallin' 3out2?
We had uh- just a 3pin1 through there.

Uh-hm. ((1))

'N wë'd put that pin in 'n tûrn it. ((1))
'N it couldn't come out. ((7))
Poor ole dâd 'd get so måd at them ole 2ôxen2- when they'd- ((2))
rûn off of us 'n come to the 3house1.
He'd say I do wish I was able to be a get a hîld of 'em.
You know he had a great long ole 3ôx 1whîp2.
(That) he'd use to cut 'em open with that 3whîp1. ((Chuckling))
But wë couldn't do that. ((2))
All the way in the world wë could stop 'em was to put the plîw in the ground.
((10))

Your dad kept ône rôpe-
tied to ône hôrn of an ox for some reason when he was driving 'em.
What was that for?
Well- he guided 'em mostly by talkin'.
You know you- you-/
Interview with Walter Cynthia Ford (about age 80)  
by his son, LeRoy Ford (about age 30)  
Taped about 1953.  
Tape 1A. Continued on tape 3A and tape 2A and B

Dád- (((1))) 3whén 1were you- (((1))) 1bórın2? (((1))) 1
Was it 1February twenty-3nínth3?  
February eigh3téenth2.  
February eigh3téenth1.  
Yeah éightéenth.  
( )  
2Eighteen éighty2-
Eighteen-
2séventy2-
seventy 3thrée1.  
Eighteen seventy 3thrée1. (((3)))  
Uh whén did you 1n mom get 3márried1? (((3)))  
March the twenty 3thřđ2- 3sómětime2. (((3)))  
Do you remember which 3yěatr3?
  
Yeah It’d be in the 3spríng1.  
But I’ve forgotten 3whén2. (((1)))  
3Márc’h 1l 3gúeʃ2.  
3I don’t know2.  
You don’t remember which 3yěatr3? (((5)))  
Well I can find that out 3látěr1. (((2)))  
Uh- whěre were 3yōu2- (((2))) 1just right before yo- you all got 3márried1?  
Hm3.  
You came- you came up to Clóud Chřě to get 3márried2-
Where were you before 3thťat1? (((4)))  
Park 3Spríngs1. (((3)))  
You came 3up 1from Park 3Spríngs 1to 3Clóud Chřě 1to get 3márried3? (((3)))  
Anybody come 3wíth you3? (((3)))  
By your3self3?
  
1Yeah2.  
How’d you cóme- ride a 3hórs3?
Walter, tape 1A

[...
On the ³train¹.
On the ³train²? (4))
Where did the train ³stop¹?
³Mínco². (2)
You got off at ³Mínco¹.
³Mínco² ³in Texas². (2)
a ³mail¹. (6)
a ³mail² hack ³I guess² it was ³for-² (2) to ³Cloud² Chief.
You took a ³mail¹ hack- to ³Cloud² Chief from ³Mínco²? (4)
³It wasn't a ³háck¹ it 'uz just a ³buggy². (6)
Uh- (3) you were at Páirk Springs ³then²-
³How² long had you been- (1) ³there² right be³fore² ³that²? (2)
The ³family² had gone up into ³Oklahoma² ³some² time- ³hadn't² ³they²? (6)
Were you ³Ifvin² on- the Ford ³farm² at Park ³Springs³
²before you went up to ³Mínco²?
³Mhm. (4)
³Yeah². (4)
Will 'n ³Bélle² had moved to Cloud Chief be³fore² that. (1)
Will 'n ³Bélle¹ had moved to Cloud Chief be³fore¹ ³that².
³N Lú 'n (3)
³Lu 'n 'Alice' n all them was ³with¹ 'im ³you¹ see².
³Hé¹ had all ³them¹.
Lu 'n Alice 'n all the other kids were with ³them¹. (4)
Where were they ³Ifvin²? (2)
There on Alice Richardson's ³farm³? (1)
They were at- about three miles ³east²- (1) of ³Cloud¹ Chief. (2)
Three miles east of ³Cloud¹ Chief. (2)
Were they still livin¹ in the ³dúgout³?
³Yeah².
And the ³tent³?
²No². In the ³dugout¹.
Just the ³dugout².
³Mhm. (3)
What did that-
Do you remember what that dugout ³looked like²? (2)
Walter, tape 1A

1How it was 3mâde3? ((3))
   3Well3 it was 1 just dug out in the 3ground2- ((2))
   'n- ((1)) 3pârt 1 of the wall (was up 'n)
   went around with 3lôgs 1 I believe1. ((2))
   Just big cottonwood 3lôgs2. ((2))
   And then- covered over with 3dîrf2. ((2))

What was the front of it where the 3dîor 1 was made? 20
   Oh more like a- like these- dîgout 4dîors2.

Did you have to climb steps down 3into it3? 21
   1Yeah1. ((2))

You didn't just 3wâlk 1 into it. 22
   Yeah- just come down 4stêps2 into it just like goin' into the 4cêllar2. ((6))

What was the- first- other- place you 1lived2 be3fôre1 you were at Park Springs? 23
   ((2)) Right before you came up here to get 3marríed1? ((3))
   Wôe wasn't any place but Park 3Sprîngs2. ((Chuckling))

Well you- you went up to Chickasaw 3nâtion1 one time- 1 didn't 3you3? ((3)) 24
   Oh 3yêah1 a long time before 3thât2.
   That'd a been a long time before 3thât2. ((3))
   I wasn't more 'n about eigh3têen1 3thên2.

You were about eigh3têen1 when you went to Chickasaw 3nâtion3? 25
   Yeah.

Who- who was in the 3fâmîly1 when you sent 3up there1? 26
   Well there 'uz just 3mê 2'n 3Jôhn 2'n 3Fânny 2'n 3'Anna3- ((Listing intonation))
   ((1)) 3Má 2'n 3stêdpôd1. ((3))

What made 'em go 3ûp 1 there? 27
   Oh I guess- ((1)) I guess his 3bôther1- in-law lived 1there2. ((2))

At 3whêre1? 28
   In Chickasaw 1nâtion2.

Do you remember what 2tôwn3? ((3)) 29
   Lêmme 3sêê1. ((6))
   In 3Bîrmîvil1 I be3lîeve2. ((3))
   (It 'uz one of 'em) Barnîvil or 3Jîmtown1.

Bar- 3Bîrmîvil3?
   Bûrney- 3Bûrneyvil1.

3Bûrneyvil1. 30
Walter, tape 1A

3Burneyville.

3Burneyville.

1Yeah. ((2))

And what was the 3other one?

And then- the next year- ((1)) moved up to- 3Jimtown.

Close to 3Jimtown.

3Jimtown?

1Yeah. Called it 3Jimtown.

A little ole- 3oh (e'nough) about like 3Dehi I'll guess. ((2))

Was you uh- were you ever- close to a town called 3Cöbert? ((2))

2No. I don't re3mémber it if I did.

What did uh- ((1)) what'd they 3do 1up there to make a 3living?

Oh they just 4farmed.

Farmed 3in the Chickasaw 3Nation.

2Yeah. 1Farmed cotton 2corn.

Did he 3own a 3farm up there 3or did he 3lease it 3or 3what 3?

No we just 3rented it.

3Rented it. You remember who 3from?

Yeah. It's just only a 3rented 1farm. ((2))

2Now let's 2see what (he-) ((4))

that ole guy's 3name was. ((5))

3I can't think of his name 3now but- he married that 3Indian- ((1)) 1woman. ((1))

And we wuz on his- her 3farm.

Oh he had married an 3Indian woman

1Yeah.

'n they 3ived on her 3farm.

1Yeah. ((3))

Yeah I ( ) his name.

Well when did your stepdad run the 3ferry? ((3)) Or 3where? ((3))

Well it 'uz at what they called the RöckBluff 3Crossing.

'n I don't know don't remember what 3time or 1nothin'.

But this was at the Röck Bluff 3Crossing. Did your-

Röck Bluff 3Crossing.

You go out east of- ((2)) 3west of-

a little ole place they called 3Léon. ((3))
Well let's see. 3León 2 is further up the 3river. Did your-

1Yeah. (2)

Did you go up 3stépdad run 3two ferries?

No. Just the 3one. (3)

Just the one 4ferry. (2)

But 3this 1one was called 2Róck Bluff-

Rock Bluff-

3Cróssing.

1Rock 3Blúff 1Crossing. (2)

Was it a crossing for a 3tráil or something? (2)

(Oh I don't know.) Just a 3róad is all I know. (6)

Which di3réction 1from Fort Worth (or) from 3Dallas did you go to 3gét 1there? (2)

( ) (((Chuckles)))

Huh? Can't re3mémber?

(((Chuckles))) (3)

A long ways 3nórh from Fort Worth 'n 3Dallas. (4)

And your dad ran a 3ferry 1.

Did he 3own the 3ferry? Or did he 3rént it?

2No. Just had it- 2léased 1.

Had it 3léased 2.

Uh-hm.

What did the uh 3ferry boat look like?

Oh it just looked like any 4óther ferry 1boat.

only it didn't have the 3cable like most of 'em 'do. It- (1) you had to use 3öars 1.

I mean- 1yeah 2.

Use 3öars 1.

1Uh-2huh.

From the 3báck 1 is that where they- 3páddled it 3- 1from the 3báck?

Or side or 3what 1?

[ Oh I guess-

from the 2báck 2 or side any where which ever way you 3wanted 2 to.
Walter, tape 1A

You'd go first on side 'n then the 3ôther2. Whichever way you wanted to 3tûrn2.

What was it 3mäde 1out of? 1Wood3? or-

1Yeah2. Made out of 3wöod2.

The whole boat was made out of 3wöod1.

Made out of 3wöod2.

3Lûmber2. Just like any 3ôther1 ferry 1boat2.

Just- big enough for- long enough for two 3wågons2- ((1)) 'n 3tëams2.

Side by 3såde3 or-

2No2- ( ) one be3hînd1 the 1other2. ((13))

Moved 3båck1 from down there- 3båck1 to- Texas on the old home 1fårm2- why ((2)) we had a little bunch a 3cåttle2- ((Chucklè)) ((4))

Put them 3cåttle2 on- all all on that 3bååt2- whenever we crossed the river had- they couldn't 3wåde1 it you know.

It was about fifteen foot 3dåep2. 3Såmepin1 like 2lt. ((1))

Got out halfway across 'n one a them cows jumped 3åut1. ((Chucklè))

1Oh3?

((Chucklè)) ((5)) In the river 'n swum out on the wrong side of the 3råiver1.

((Chucklè)) ((4)) 'n went back to the old 3plåce2- where we had- 3rented 1there.

((1)) Went back afterwards 'n 3råund 1her. ((5))

Was there a 3råålling1 on the 3bååt3- 'n the 3råerry3?

Well j- just 3bånnisters1 up about so 3hågh2- She just jumped 4over1 that 'n on her 3wåy2.

Just jumped 3åver1 it 'n went in the 3råiver1 huh?

((Chucklè)) ((3))

Was there a 3cååble3?

3No 2no. Didn't have no 3cååble2.

It used just used big loooong 3påddles1.

3'Orås1 they 1called 2'em. ((2))

How long were they?

Oh the 3åår1- I guess is- eight or ten feet 3lång3. 2Såmpìn1 like 1at3. ((3))

It had the (håôoks) on the side of the 3bååt2.

You'd just stick them 3åår1 in just like 3thååt2 'n they'd reach away 3åut1 there you know.

'N- 'n you'd just- pull 'em like 3thåås2. ((3))

How much did it cost to take a 3bååt- 1and- 2cååttle1-
Walter, tape 1A

'n I mean take a 2wágón2- 'n 2cátte2 'n-
They charged fifty cents a 3wágón2- ((4))
Twééenty five cents for a 3sáddle1 horse-
If they had a 3sáddle1 on the 1horse2-
It 'uz twenty five 3cénts1.
'n If you just 3léd 1a horse- 3téén 1cents. ((3))

How much did they have to pay to take 3cóws 1across? ((1))

Oh 3 'I don't 1know.
( 1 ) That 'uz when he 3hád 1the 3bób 1you see. ((2))
Didn't cost us 3ánýthing1.
We- That 'uz when he 3hád 2the 3bób1.

Oh he 3ówned 1it.

Yeah. ((3))

How long did he 3óperate1 this ferry? 6 7

Ooooh about a 3yår1 13gúss.1
3 'I don 1know2- just 3hów 1long- but not 3véry 1long- 3bóut a 1yår2.

Just moved up there for a 3yår1.

Yeah- Well- He just had the 3bób 1about that 1long2.
We 3lífed 1up in that 3cóuntrý 1two 3yårós1 you 1see2. ((1))
One year at 3Búrnéyville2 'n- ((1)) 'n one at- 3Jímtón1.
'n then we moved báck to- Téxas on the 3frám1.

On the old 3Fórd fárnm3?

1Yeah3.

What made 'em go up to Chicksaw nation to 3bégín 2with?

Do you 3know3? ((2))

Well it 'uz 3stép 2daddy ( ) his his 3bróther-1 in-law you see
lived in- lived up 1théré2.
And hé wanted to go back there because 3hé 1lived there
'ñ he thought- that (it) mighty good 3cóuntrý2- ((1))
so he just all- ((1)) hooked up 'n went 3óver2 there.
That's all 3 'I 2know. ((5))

Well on the 3máp 1there're- there're two 3pláces1 where there were- ((3))
there was a 3frýrý1. ((1))

And the 3hís tór1 books say that the Rock Bluff Cróssing was about a hundred miles-
down the 3frívr1 from- where the Chísolm 3Tráil1 crossed-
which would be up close to 3Léón1. ((3))
No I don't know any Chisolm Tráil 1 crossed. (3)

But this was definitely called the Rock Bluff Crossing of the Red River.

Yeah. The Rock Bluff Crossing right there close to Léon 1 - a little place they called Léon 1.

Uh-huh. (4)

Did you ever hear of a ferry down the river at Cóibert 3?

Yeah there was a ferry down below there that run (then) with a cable 1.

At Cóibert 3?

Well I don know what - nó 3. I believe the one they called Jhfmtown 1.
The one they called - (2) was the one that the one I seen run with cable that's the only one I know of. (3)

'N then the one at the Rock Bluff 2 it didn't run 1 with cable.

It had you had to use - oár's 1.

What did the country thar around Rock Bluff - look like 2?

Was it uh was it Rock 2 goin' down to the River 3?

Well it uz a rock bluff on the west side 2. (2)

Just a rock Bluff 2.

'N on the ther side it uz just just well - just - you know plain dírt 2 just like - bout like you would here.

Did the Rock go down to the river so it'd be easy to get down there 3?

Well it's run - the rock just right next to the River 2 a bluff just as high as this house 1 I guess 2.

'N there uz a road cut out in - through them rocks down to the boat 2.

Uh-huh.

'N uh (3) looked like kinda went down kinda round a kinda vine 1 or sumpin'.

(3) Between the rocks.

( ) or somethin' like that I don't remem 2.

Then the road they'd had a road worked down through there - anyway down to the River 2

'n the Bluff 3 was right straight up down (near there)
right next to the river - on the west side.

Uh - huh.

Called the Rock Bluff. (8)

'N the water was - oh I don know they said fifteen to sixteen foot deep.

(3) Next to the bluff.

(Now out) next to the west side why it wasn't deep. (9)

Uh - (2) Somewhere in the records it says that uh - (1) you had a sister. 79

(1) Who died.

Do you remember what her name was?

Sister that died?

(2) Yeah. (2)

(I remember) one that got killed there at Park Springs. (2)

On a horse.

The horse ran away. (4)

What was her name?

(3) Annie. (3)

But you didn't have a sister that died before you were born.

(2) Unless there was one they said.

I don't remember.

(That there's two)

(No. She 'uz just - just an infant. (5)

'N seem to mé like it - (4)

seem to me like there was a brother 2 to. (2)

I don't know.

Where did the Bloxoms live at this time?

Bloxoms live at Tarrant County.

Down at Mansfield.

Tarrant County. Texas.

'Ms. Bloxom was your dad's sister?

(1) Yeah. (3)

Wonder when they came to Texas. (3)

I don't know.

Probably come with your dad?
Walter, tape 1A

course ( ) first 31 I knewed anything about 2'em.
(Then-) down there at ( )
[ ]

What was her 3'náme1? (2)
Her name was 2Móllly2- (3)
3Móllly1.

Uh-hm. Móllly 3Fórd1- (when before) she 3'marríed2. (9)

Let's see there was 3Géorge Fórd3 'n- 2Hény 2'n 3Móllly3 'n who 3'élse1? (3)

Yeah.
Uncle 3Géorge2 is- dad's 3'bóther2. ((4))
Was he 3'olde or 3'yóunger1 than your daddy?

Do you re3'méember3?
I don't knów.
I be3'Ifeve 1he was 4'yóunger1.
I don't 3'know 1for sure. ((4))

'N who was 3Will 1Fórd? (2)

I 3'dónt 1know2.
I remember 3'séein1 him but I don't knów.
That's all I 3'knów1.

(Guess) 1'l 'uz a little 3'bítty 1'thing (then). (2)

Think he might a been your dad's 3'bóther3?

1Yeah2. (1) 1Yeah2. Could a been his 3'bóther2.

But '1 don't-

((Interrupts)) Would he a been 2'ólder2 or 3'yóunger1 than your bro-
than your dad?

Well he'd a been he'd a been 3'yóunger2 or 3'course1
because he 'uz just a young 3'mán2 when I 3'knéw 1'im. (3)
I reméember 'im-
when he come in he'd táké me up in his árms 'n he'd pitch me way up
(attaway)'n he'd scáré me nearly to 3'déath1 you know.

Huh.

That's all I reméember. ((4))

'N that was De3'cáter1 Texas. ((4))

Was 3'Sóphía 2Ann 3'Lýnn3- (1)
Sophia 3'Ann 2Lýnn- was-

((Interrupts)) Was your 3'st'épmother3?
Walter, tape 1A

Yeah. ((3))

Yeah I 'uz the only 3âone1- I was the only step3chld2 in the 3bunch1. ((4))

She was the 3muthâer1 to all the 3rest1 of the kids. ((4))

Who was 3Lévi1? ((2))

Well 3Lévi2 was a 3cousin2.

He was Uncle 3Géorge's1 1boy2. ((8))

Do you know if 3âll1 of these 3Fórd's3

1 Including 3Molly 'n 'll of 'em came from Ala3báma3

or did just the two 3bôys1?

No I don't 3knów (1nothin') about 3that1.

( ) I just heared 'em say- dâd say that he come from Ala3báma1.

'N that's all 3 I 2know.

Don't re3mémber1.

'N you don't know if 3Géorge2 came from there or 3nôt1.

I guess he 3dfd2 thôugh. ((5))

(Imagine) he 3dfd2. ((3))

Do you remember what kind a hóuse you lived in in De3câter3? ((4))

Yeah it seem to me like it was a bóx 3hóuse2. ((1))

You know just a little ole box 3hóuse2. ((2))

Maybe a 3sún1 room on it.

I don't remémber. ((3))

It wasn't very big- very much of a hóuse.

Just- ((3)) a box 3hóuse2.

Was this Sóphia 'Ann Lýnn later Ms. 3Gáylor3?

2Yeah3. She married Mr. 3Gáylor1.

That was my 3stép1 daddy you 1see2.

'N that's how come us- to go to Chickasaw 3nâtion1.

Hís- ((1)) his- sfster- 'n bróther-in-law lived in Chickasaw 3nâtion1-

He wanted to go 2thère2- ((1)) so we all 3wënt1 thère. ((4))

Do you remember anything at all about your dâd bein' in the Civil Wár

other than-the fâct that he- got shot in the 3lég3? ((Rhythmic))

2No2.

Just- know- I know just what I was 4tól2 you know2.

I 4don't 2remember- about him 4bén2 in the war. ((1))

I just remember you know 4tálk3 about it.
Walter, tape 1A

His 'bein' in the war- 'n he got- wounded. ((2))
Him 'n Uncle George uz both in the war- (they said).
'N he got wounded 'n- ((1)) come home. ((3))
'N I think Uncle George stayed through the war.
I don't know. ((2))
You never did hear 'em tell about fightin' or anything other than that? 104
No. ((9))
When you went to the Ford school- ((2)) 105
uh- you said one time they had log desks.
What kind a- what'd they look like?
Desks made out a log.
Oh uh. Well they 'uz just- just like you take a log 'n saw it open. ((3))
Leave the bark on the bottom side?
Yeah.
I don't remember whether the bark was on it.
I believe it was.
I don't remember sure.
Just a split log?
( ) Well maybe it wasn't a whole half a log.
Maybe it 'z jus- ((2)) maybe they'd sawed
a few boards off or or somethin'.
But it 'uz just- flat ( ) the bottom side was just uh on-
( off).
Had they smoothed it down with anything?
'Uh- uh.
Still rough.
Just holes bored in it.
With pegs stuck up in there for to hold it up.
The legs.
How high was it?
Oh it 'uz just high enough about that high I guess.
High enough to sit on for seats.
Did you have a desk in front of it?
No.
Walter, tape 1A

You just sat on the 3lóg1 huh?
    Yeah on the 3lóg2.
    You hold your 3bóók 1 in your 3hánd2. ((4))

'N you held your 3sláté 1 in the hand1.
    1Yeah2. ((7))
    But that didn't last very 3lóng1—1you know1
    Just the first 3yéar or 2two.((1))
    'N then they got- ((2)) just 2wóoden2-
    1umber 2bénches- you know2. ((1))

You mean lumber benches like 3chúrch pews3 1or 2what1?
    Oh— like they 4úsed 2to use2.
    Just pláin lumber 3bénches2. ((3))

Th- they were still 3bénches2. Kinda like—

    Yeah.

the 3lóg1 but made out a 3lúmber1.

    Yeah but
    they had 3bácks1.

Oh.

1You 1know2. ((2)) They had 3bácks 1to 2them1.

How was the schoolhouse 3héated1? ((2))
    Oh it 'uz just heated with 3wóod2. ((2))

What kind of a 3stóvé1? ((2))
    It didn't 3háve 1any stove.

Didn't have any 3stóvé1. It was a 3fireplace3?
    1Fireplace of a thing1. ((1))
    It 3díd 3gét 1to 2finally—
    have a 1stóvé1 after a 3yéar2 the first 3yéar2 or two I went to 1schóol2.
    I 3mán 2to 1school very 3múc2. ((6))

Was the the 3hóuse 1made out a 3lóg3? Or 2what1?
    2No2.

This is the 3Fórd 1schoolhouse.

    No that Fórd schoolhouse it 'uz just— a lumber 3búldin1.
    2I don't remémer2 13gúss 1it 'uz a 3fráme 1búldin'.
    I don't 3knów1. ((1)) Don't 2mémber1.
Walter, tape 1A

Maybe it mighta been just a 3bóx 'buildin'.

What'd you carry your 3lúnch 1 to school in?

Just a ( ) we called 'em 3lárze 2buckets.

3Lárd 2buckets.

A 2lárd 1bucket.

Yeah gallon 3lárd 2buckets.

What'd you take to 3éat 1? ((1))

Bread 'n 3méat 2.

Bread 'n 3méat 2.

Yeah. (Chuckle))

What 3kínd 1bácon 1 did- was it 1?

3Bácon 2. Just

[ ]

Just fried 3bácon 1.

ole fried 4bácon 2. ((5))

What'd they 3dó 1at these exhíbibítons 1 at the school-

that you told about one time? ((4))

Exhibitions 2?

3Yeah 1. You said ever so often they had an exhibítion 1. ((2))

Oh I don't know 3what 1all.

We didn't do 3múch 2. ((2))

Weren't nothin' but we just had a kinda 3spéeches 2 or sumpin'. ((8))

What were the different 3schoöls 1 that you 3went 1 to?

What was the 3ffirst 1 school that you went to? ((5))

The first one that I went to 'uh they called it the s- 3Pringle 1 schoolhouse.

I be3lléve 2.

That was close to Park 3Springs 1 wasn't it 2?

1Yeah 2. Just 3sóuth 1 a Park Springs about ((2))

oohh two or three 1miles 2. ((3))

'N then you went to 3Glásgow 3?

'N then I went to 2Glásgow 3- 'n-

Where was 3Glásgow 1?

It 'uz- ((1)) on down- 3east 1 a there.
Walter, tape 1A

On down the 3créek^2- ((2)) down 3éast 1a where we lived
about the same distance as it wuz back- 3wést^1 from where we lived. ((2))

What made you change 3schóols^1?
Well! 1 l^3don't lknow just-
just whenever they'd have a school one place
'n didn't have it the 3óther^1
why we just went to 3ány 1of 'em. ((1))
We lived just about in the 3líne^2-
On the 3líne^2 between 3ált 2of 'em.

N then after Glasgow you went to 3Fór^d 1school.
[We'd just- we'd go to 3ált 2of 'em.
Huh?

N then after 3Glás^2gow you went to the 3Fór^d school house^3?
Yeah^2.
Was that the 21ást school you went to^2?
Yeah.

What 3gráde^1 was that? ((4))
Oh- I guey anywhere- from the first to the 3élách^1 l 3gúes^2. 2Éighth^2.
How- what was the last grade 3yóu lhad? 3Sixth^3?
2Fór^2.
3Fór^1. ((10))
(Soh so) ((6))

Uh- on the 3cáttle^1 1drivé^2-
(Clears throat) when you all moved to 3Érick^2- ((3))
why were you drivin' cattle from 3Téxas^1?
I thought you lived at 3Clóud 1Chief. ((3))
You drove some cattle from- Fort

[Well.

Worth to 3Érick^1.

After l come up there 'n 3márried^2- 1why- I didn't 3stáy 3thérè 1Long^2.
just moved (back) went right back 3dówn 1there. ((1))
Right back 3hóme^1. ((3))
(Lived down there-) ((1)) stayed 3thérè^2
'N then you moved from thérè1 up to 2Erick1.
    Stayed thérè2- ((1)) oh 31 I don't 1know2.
    Three or four 3yéars2. ((1))
    A 3cóulpé1 a years I 1guess2.

'N thén's 1 when we moved back- ((1)) from there to Oklá3hóma1. ((2))
Well on 3óne 2 of these trips um- Móm said that Rosie 'n J- Rosa 'n 3Wíllile1-146
1Uh-huh2.

I were on the trip1.
1Yeah2.

Were théy3- 1 where were théy 1born? ((3))
    They was both born at 3Clóúd 1Chíef.
    After I got- well we we come to Cloud Chief 3rst2-
    before we come down thérè 1 you 1 see2.

To 2Erick2.
    1Yeah2. ((1)) Stayed thérè 1 two 3yéars2 'n thén 1 moved to 3Erick2.

Well this cáttle drive when mom carried- Rosie 'n Wíllie in the 3wágon2-
    where was 3ft 1from?

From 1 where to 1 where?
    Well we just come from- ((1))
    (away) from Park 3Spríngs2 right to ((5)) 3Erick2. ((2))

They- théy 1 were born at 3 Clóúd 2Chíef-
    'n then you all went back
to 3Téxas1.

[ 'n then we went
    back 3dówn 1 there2- 'n we stayed down there 'n picked 3cóttón1 all 3ráll2 for-
    ( )

[ This was after Rosie 'n Wíllie were 3bórñ3?
    our old neighbor Ms.-
    3 Húh3?

This was after Rosie 'n Wíllie were 3bórñ3?

    Yeah.
Walter, tape 1A

Yeah. (2)

'N thén 1you drove the cattle- from down there-

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'N thén-
you see then we didn't 3hâve 2the 3câttle2 up here at 3Clóud 2Chier. ((1))

You'd left 'em down at 3Téxas3?

Uh thát 'uz just me 'n- 3Lú 1'n me1.
But this 3móvé2 was 3âll 1'of us 1you 1'see2.

All the 3Fórds5?

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3Stépdaddy2-
3Stépdaddy2 1'n- 3stép2mommy2 1'n all the câttle 'n 3'éverthing1.

All of you came at the same 3tîme1.

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Yeah.

'N- 'n then -((2)) come up here 'n then- ((1))
we were- Lú 'n me went 3bâck2- 3dówn 1'there- 'n 2'got the 3câttle1.

'N brought 3thêm 1'up. You 1'see2.

After everbody had been 3up 1'here once. 158

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After
after we done all moved 3up 2'here-
we went back 3dówn 1'there.

'N took the kids 3wîth 1'you.

1Yeah2. Took the kids 3wîth 2'us.

'N then we 3wê 1'brought the câttle back with 3ús1.

3Thât 1'tîme. ((1))

Whý did you all come to Greer County in the 3fîrst 1'place? ((1)) 160

How'd you happen to 3chôose 1'that part of the 3côuntry1? ((4))

Well- we didn't have any (to) 3chôose1. ((Chuck))

Because the land was 3frée3? ((1)) 161

3Well 1'yèah2. We could get us a free 3hôme2. ((1))
Come out here 'n 3fîle2. ((1))

How did you 3hêar1 about Greer county1? ((3)) 162

Oh. 3Shûcks1. ((2))
Bout 3'éverbody1 was 3tálkîn1' 1'bôt 2'it.
Walter, tape 1A

Bout the free 3homes 1 'n ever 1 thing 2. (5)
So- 3step 2 daddy come up where- when we went (2)
Well 2- after we 3married 1 we went 3back 2 down there 'n stayed 3two 3 years 1- a 3year 1 'll believe 1 it was.
1 A year 1. (4)

'N you just 3heard 1 a lot a 3talk 1 about-
'N then (3) then w- 3Lú 1 'n 1 me 2 'n-
w- we come 3back 1 there to 3Cloud 1 Chier 2-
'n stayed on 3her 3- (1) 1 father's 1 place 2.
Two 2years 1. (6)

Do you re 3membre 1 anything about the 3fight 2-

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'N then

that Texas 'n Oklahoma had over Greer 3county 3?

No. (I heard about it.)
I heard 'em tell about the 3run 2 'n all 3that 2 stuff. (2)
Whenever we went 3back 1 down there 2then 2- (3)
and- well the old man he thought that he'd come 3back 1 with us. (5)
So- (1) he come 3back 1 with 2us 'n we were there
'n he heard about all this down here around 3Erick 1 you 1 know 2-

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End of tape 1A. This interview continues on tape 3A.
Interview with Walter Cynthia Ford (about age 80)
by his son, LeRoy Ford (about age 30)
Taped about 1953.
Tape 3A. Continuation of tape 1A. Continued on tape 2A and B

While we 'uz 3 livin' 1 on- ((1)) my- 3 dàd's place- 2 at 3 Erick- 4 Clóud Chier- 2- ((2))
my 3 stép- 2 daddy- 2 come 3 up there- 2- ((1)) one time to 3 see us- 2- ((2))
eh- 3 hé 'uz telling about all this
' n hé ' uz- wantin' to come 3 out 1 here- 1, ((2))
2 So- 2 I went 3 with him- 2- 1 out there round Erick 1 there- 2-
went t- 2- ((1)) went to 3 Mángum- 2- 3 first- 2- 'n'-
out there to look at all that 3 iànd- 2- 
' n- try to find us a- 10 cation- 2- ((3))
'n we got to 3 Mángum there was- a chap there in the 3 wagon- 2 yard- 3-
'n- ((2)) there was a 3 restàurant- 2- 2 there- 3- ((2))
we went to the 3 restàurant- 2- ((2)) to 3 eat- 2- ((1))
And- ((1)) there was uh- Joe 3 Cain- 2 a- workin' in the 3 restàurant- 1.
And he had 3 màrried- 1- one of my 3 cousèns- 1. One of Uncle 3 George's- 1 girls- 1.
1 You 1 see- 2. ( ((3))
And- we didn't 4 know 1 him at 3 first- 1.
And- ((2)) so we went back to 3 camp- 2 and the 2 old man says- 2- ((4))
3 you know who that was there 3 waitin' on 4 us- 4? (Character voice.)
W- Was that 3 John- 2- ((1)) 4 Cain- 4? (Character voice.)
I said 3 wèl- 3- it look like 'im to 4 mé- 2.
And- ((2)) so- we went back the 3 next 2 time to 2 eat- 3 'n we 4 asked 'im him.
He said no it's 4 Joe- 1 Cain.
Well- (of course if it was) 3 Joe Cain- 2- I knew he 3 married- 2- ((1))
3 Jósé- 1 Ford- 2-
Uncle George's 3 girl- 2- ((1))
so- we got- talkin' to 1 gèther- 2
And ( - ) find out that 3 thèy 1 lived 3 then- 1 down here by- ((2))
down here where we are at 3 Erick- 2-

At 2 Erick- 2?
At 3 Erick- 2- ((2))
And ((2)) so— you—we were—he 'uz up there by his 3sél2—
'n Jósie 'n them was still down there on the— Turkey 3Créek 1there1—
and he went home on week 3ends2—
so— ((1)) he went 3with 1us— 1down1— back 3dówn2 there 'n—
and they got to— lookin' a'round2 'n—
at the 3countr2 'n—
finally got an ole (boy) sur3véyor2 |
1to come out 1there2— ((Listing intonation)) |
1show us a'round2— |
survey us the 1lánd2 and— ((5)) |
show us how everthing 1wás2— |
which is 1this2 and which is 1thát2 'n— ((2)) /
so I picked out 3mý 1place2
and he went— they went up on the 3rìver 1there2
and he picked out 3hím 1one2—
and John picked out 3hím 1one2— ((2))
Had the (ole surveyor out) and (he) come to find out the sur3véyor2
who was a-sur3véyin' 2It—
was a fella who I'd went to 3schoól1 with there wh—
when I went to Uncle 3Géorge's2— ((4))
And—

((Interrupting)) What was his 3náme1? Reménber? 3

hé was—
3Pútnam1. ((7))
So ( 'n—) ((3)) got the 3pláces1 all spade 1out2 'n ((2))
oh we went back— oh hé went back down to— Párk 3Spríngs2—
1 went back to 3Clóùd1 Chíer2. 
So— ((2)) (turned) around— got 3réady2 and moved 4out 1there2—
on our 3pláces2—
out there to— I went to— ((2)) 3Jóe's2— 'n 3Jósie's2— Joe 3Cáin's2—
stayed 3thére2 till I get me a 3dówgút2 built on that 3pláce2— ((1))
And that's all there is 3tő it1.

What made you build the 3dówgút1 where you did? ((1))
Well that's the only way you're going to 4búild it1. ((Chucklé))
Don't have 4ménéy2 to 1use.
Walter, tape 3A

At the 3plåce 1you built it. 5

Why did you build it at that 3plåce1? 6

2Well2- I don't 3know2- just-- ((2)) 1 I 3don't 1know1. 6

Just cause it's on the 3créek 1I guess1.

(Trying to--)

((Interrupts)) How close was it to this-- cåttle trail you used to talk about? 6

(On account) 3thåt2, ((2))

Well they was a cåttle tråill or ole tråill of 3såme 1kind they 1cålled 2it. 6
I don't know 3wåth 1it 3wås2.

It passed along there on the (3Téxås 1sidå.) ((4))

3Well2 it come down 3through2- ((2)) my 3plåce1 there.

The dugout was-- close to the 3tråll1 I wasn't 3it3?

1Yeah2- it was about a quårtår 1I guess from where the 3tråll1
went down to cross. ((3))

Did 3Maråñin1 ever-- take you out to the-- fårm to have you--
show him where that 3wås3?

((5))

Has he taken you out there 3récèntly3?

((6))

Were people still using that tråll to-- 3dråive up and down3?

Oh yéah-- yéah- i- it's 3tråvéåled1- a måin tråvéåled 4rååd2.

Everbody'd tråvel 4ålónå 2there.

(Yes there's) three or four- diffèrènt- 3ràåts1.

3Tråcks1.

3Wågon1 tracks along (on it.)

Side by 3sidå1. 3Parållél1

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1Yeah2.

1Yeah2.

Bout how 3wódå1 was it?

2Oh2--

Hundred 3yards3?

2No2- it 1wouldn't be a hundred yards 3wódå2.

It's just be- wide enough for- maybe--
two three wågonås to 3påss 1one another- like 3thåt1 you know.
Walter, tape 3A

Two or three-
((Interrupts)) Two or three sets of 3rúts1.
Two or three sets of 4rúts2. ((2)) ((Note slip of the tongue.))
2Trails3.
Where they drove 2cáttle3. ((3))
Did you ever sée 'em drive any cattle 3dówn it3?
1No2. ((1))
Had it sort of grown 2üp2-
by the time you all gôt there-- because they hadn't 3úsed it much3? ((4))
Well-- (we just plain (st-- ) plain tráveled 4róad2.
4Wágon1 road with (trade) 3trável2. ((3))
3Whére 1did it go after it left your house going-- south-3éást1?
Down toward 3Délhi3? ((3))
Well 1yeah2.
Down there in that di3réction2.
Is that the road that went to 3Mánjug3?
Yeah. ((2)) To 1Mánjug2 (out there on)-- ((3))
come right on down across to 3Délhi2 n 1right on 1dówn2-
well it went on up 3nórth2-
'n I don't know whére it 3went to1.
Did it go up to the 3Réd River3?
1Yeah2. I 3gúss2. ((4))
I guess it went on furtheer than the 3Réd 1River. ((3))
Did you ever- What do you know about Mobéetie 3Texas1?
What did you ever hear about Mobéetie 3Texas1?
Don't know nothín about it only just heared somebody say bout Mo3béetie1.
That's áll I 3know1.
You don't know if this 3tráll1 went up that way1- 2huh2? ((2))
1 I 3máginé1 though it 3díd2.
Do you know anything about any other 3róads3- 1going out there1?
Huh?
Were there any roads out by the sált lick down by 3Érick3?
Do you remember 2thát2?
1No2. ((2)) Don't know nothín' about 3thát2.
I never was át the salt lick.
I only just heared 'em 3tálk 1about it.
Walter, tape 3A

That's all I know about it.

Did this road go up toward where Hext Switch is now? (2)

From your house—your dugout? (7)

Noooo—don't be like it missed Hext Switch. (2)

Which side? Do you remember?

East.

It went of Hext Switch?

Yeah. (Very faint.) (15)

(Heavy sighs)

When you uh went to school down in Texas—

you said you used to use something called kée1 to write on a slate with. (2)

What school was that close to? (1)

The Ford schooshouse?

No—guess that was a—I guess that was uh—Pringle schoolhouse.

It used to be—(2)

a little ole branch just north a little ways from the schooshouse

in a little kind of a bank there—(2) with a—(1)

lot of—ole kée2 they called it.

And that (back) where we'd get—(2)

got them little ole lumps of kée2 there on that—bank2. (3)

You could use it to mark with.

Well 'n they had chalk too now. (1)

We'd get that kée2—

We thought that was runny to get that kée2 to write with. (2)

They called it kée1.

I don't know what—what it really was2.

That's what we called it. (2)

And you'd sharpen it up like a piece of chalk and use it. (Confirmation) 28

And you could just use it just like it was a—pencil2.

You could sharpen it up—turn it around any shape you wanted2.

(you know) It just come in chunks and you—(1)

you could cut it up—strip it up' n. (2)

Did you all ever make sorghum taffy?

Huh?

Did you all ever make sorghum candy? (2)

1Yeah. Used to make sorghum candy.
Walter, tape 3A

How'd you make it?

((Chuckle)) All I know is just put it on just—

put the sorghum on just—
boil it— till it gets thick. ((5))

Put in a little sugar or something in it.

I don't know just how I done it but then that's the way—
just put it on and cooked it down till— it get thick.

And you could just pull it if you know— stretch it around. ((2))

What'd the sorghum mill that George Ford had— look like? ((4))

Oh— I guess it's like a just a couple of big rollers uh— run together like— ((1)) like that you know.

Shunt up and down like that— ((1)) and then uh—

((Interrupts)) You mean like a washing machine— wringer?

'N then they had uh—
big ole sweep— ((1)) poles out way out that way
(and they'd) droop down—
single tree on that end.

They'd put a horse on that and that'd go round and these here rollers—
just go around like that you know.

Put the cane in there and grind it up. ((1))

What'd the vat look like that they boiled it in?

Oh— just— ((1)) big long— ((2)) uh I guess it is— eight or ten feet long. ((2))

Something like— maybe eight feet long. ((2))

Just a— ((2)) pan of a thing. ((2))

(That'd be bout the shape of this thing ((2 knocks heard)) I guess—but it 'uz a whole lot bigger.

And then there'd be some little— ((2)) strips run across here.
From over there.

'N then there'd be one over here run across here.
Stopped here and it— ((2)) you see?

The juice'd run around— around this un here 'n then come here 'n around this end.

'N then it'd come around over there 'n run (to) that end (n) another 'un.

((Very fast)) ((1))'N it'd get over there to that end
By the time it get there it'd be lasses. ((Chuckles, self-amusement.))
Walter, tape 3A

You mean the 3juice 1 just ran down-
2Yeah 3.

Through some little- uh- ((2)) 3chânnels 1 in the ((1))
Like you- like you pour it in 3hâre 2- ((1))
and it had a- place 3hâre 1 to draw it 3off 2.
3Thât 1 corner 1. ((1))
And th- there'd be a partition 3hâre 1 you see 1.
It'd run out 3hâre 2.
But it wouldn't "go" 1 plumb to the 3end 2.
It'd stop 1 here you 1 see 2. ((1))
So it just could go 3round 2- 4round 2 (way end a 1 that 2). ((1))
And then it- then over 3hâre 2 then it'd be a 3nôther 2 'un come 3this 2 way 2-
And it'd stop 4hâre 1.
And it'd come right around 3this 2 way-
and around 3thât 2 'un and then 3bâck 2-
and then around 3thât 2 'un 'n then 3bâck 2-
'n around 3thât 2 'un-
till it get to that 4corner 2-
by the time it get 3thère 2 why ((1))
It'd be mo 3lâsses 1.

Was this a 3métal 2-
a 3métal 2- ((1)) something with 3fire under it 3?

Yeah just a 3métal 3-
a 3métal 3- ((2)) 4pân 1 of a thing with a 3fire 1 under it. ((4))
Uh- how much râil 3fènce 1 did you all have on that farm at uh-
((1)) Pârk 3Springs 1!
Was the râil fence all a 3round it 3? ((4))
2Yeah 2.
I remember 'em makin' áll the 3râlls 1 'n 3everthing 1.
2Hîrin' 1 'em made 'n made 'em to 3gèther 2. ((1))
And fenced that 2whôôole 2- ((1)) 3fârm 1.
You see I think it just 3hâd 1forty 3acres 1. ((1))
1First 1. 3Fènced 2. ((1))
And that râil fence 'uz around that 3whole 3bûsiness 1. ((1))
Walter, tape 3A  472

Made out of them 3rails1. ((1))
About si- eight- or six seven or eight rails 3high1. ((2))

What did- what'd you 3call thóse3? 3Double1- 3sómethin3 1'n 3rider3?  39
(Daddy- he) he'd make a- build a 3fence1 about- ((2)) oh five six rails 3high2
I be3|feve1 it was six rails 3high2-,
and he'd put a stáke across 3hëre2
'0ne over 3thëre2 and (cröss it) it'd look like 3thât1 1you 1see2. ((1))
You put a 3rider1 cross 3thât1. ((1))
and it was called 2stáke 1'n 3rider1. ((2))

Were these 3split rails3?
1Yeah2. ((3))  40

Uh you said-

(((Interrupting)) (But-)) ((1))
Maybe some of 'em be 3poles2-
just round 3poles2 you 1knów2.

How 3lóng 1were they?
1Eight 2fëet2. ((2))  42

You said after you got bárbed 3wíre2- that you 3sóld1 these.  43

Do you remémbér uh-

(((Interrupting)) (That's- th- that-)) That's where my 3stép 1daddy come 1in2.
Hé tore that fence 3áll 1down2- ((1))
cut them rails in 2two2- ((1))
hauled 'em up-
sóld 'em for 3córdwood1.
'N bought 3wíre1.

Cut 'em in four foot 2lénths2?
Yeah.  44

To buy 3wíre.1
Yeah. ((1))  45

How much did you 3gët for 'em1 1you 3knów3?
2No2- I for3gót1.
I don't 2mémëber1.
Didn't get too 2múch1 though. ((1))

How'd you 3hául 'em?
On a 4wágon2.
You put 'em four foot 2cróss wíse2?  47
'Yeah². Had a 3frâme²-
take the bêd 4ôff 1of the 1wagon²
'n had a 3frâme¹ made out of- 2poîles². ((2))
3Standards¹ up 1on it².
'N he'd- put them four foot 3poîles² across-
across that 3frâme¹ like 1that². ((3))
And uh since it was so much a 4cord²-
'n a 3cord² was- ((1)) four foot 3high¹.
(now I order) them four foot- ((3)) 3chûnks². 3Stîcks². ((2))

Do you remember how long it 3toûk you³ 1how many 2loads there 3wêre³? 49
Nóoo- (I don't know.)
There was lots 3of 1'em though².
(Or) I remember hâulin' a lot of 'em 3ôver 1there²,
(in an- in an ole o-) [

Where'd you 3sêll 1'em? At 3Sûnsêt³?
'Yeah². Ole ox 3wàgon¹.
Stack 'em up there at 3Sûnset²-
cord 'em 3up²,
'N then they'd- ((1)) gonna come along 'n 3mèasure 2that-
'n 3pày ²you for 'em.
By the 3cord².

You hauled 'em in the 3ôx 1wagon? ((2))
With 4ôxens².
It wasn't any more a 3ôxen 1wagon than it was of any- ((1))
3ôther¹ kind of a 1wagon².

But you hooked ôxen 3toû' 'em³? 52
'Yeah². ((2)) Some of 'em-
Some⁴time 1we'd use 1horses².
1Sometime we'd use 3ôxens¹.

Did you all màke the ox yokes your³sêlf³? ((1))
²No². ((2)) It seem to mé like we made one or 3two². ((3))
But ³1 don't re'member². (You- y)
((Interrupts)) Could you bûy 'em at a s- ((2))
Could you 3bûy- 3ôx yokes³?
²Yeah³. You could 3bûy ²em-
Walter, tape 3A

'n then you could 4'mâke 1'em1.
And it seem to me like- stepdad 3'mâde 1'one or 3'two2.
And I m-1 3'knów 1'he made a lot of 3'bôws2.

What's a 3'bôw1? 55
Cause I 3'hêlped 1'make 2'thêm2.
It had- ((2)) 3'bôws2 to put around the ox's 3'nêck1 you 1'know2.
The b- uh ((1)) 3'yôke1 went around their neck like 3'thât2-
'n then it had 3'bôws2 come around up here 'n run through that- 3'yôke3.

Oh that was the 3'lôop1. 56
2'Yeah2, it had- they called them 3'bôws1.

(Interrupting) How'd you 3'mâke 1'em? 57

'N I uh-
Out of pecan- ((1)) 4'poîles2 (or) pecân- ((2))
2'oooln2- just round 2'sticks2 or you could get a 3'big 2'one 'n split it 3'open2.
Split it up 'n mâke it to round 2'sticks2.
'N just 4'bênd 2'em. ((1))
In hot 3'wàtér2. ((2))
Bend it a3'round2- till it be in 3'thât 2'shape- you see.

How long- how long would you 3'sôak 1'em in hot 3'wàtér1? 58
00hh- 1'I 2'don't 1'know1.
Maybe a 2'hôur2.
Somethin' like 2'thât2.

Was it real hot 3'wàtér3? 59
Boilln' 4'wàtér2. ((2))

What- what d'you 3'pût 1'em- what'd you- have the 3'wàtér 1'in? 60
A 2'wàsh 2'pot or 2'somethin'3?
Well- 1'yêah2.
A big ole 3'wash 2'pot2.
Therrrre's- ((2)) some of-
3'I 1'dunno 2'whât 1'though. ((2))
Anyways it- 3'boîled1.
Maybe we just put 'em a3'crôss 1'that 'n 3'pôured1 the water on it.
3'I 1'don't remember.
But then anyway they got- hit 'em with that hot 3'wàtér1- to 3'bênd 1'em. ((2))

How'd you smooth 'em 3'dôwn1 to keep 'em from-

(Interrupting) Oh just had ole- 4'drâwîn' 2'knives is-
Walter, tape 3A

all 3'1'- 1 ever seen. ((3))

Just had the 3dráwin'1 knives.

How long a piece of wood did you have to have to make a- bow?

1Oh3- ((3))

Oh I guess it's- maybe oh about from 2there 1to about 2there3.

Four 3réet3?

2Yeah.2 ((6)) It'd 3bé 1long enough to go around- the ox's- 3néck2 1you know 1
'n stfuck up through the 3yoke2.

'N then they'd put a key through that- ((1)) 3bow2 to hold it 3up 1there.

To keep it from coming 3down3.

Do you re3mémber 1the first time you ever 3héard1 about barbed 3wire3? ((2)) 64

No. That's about the first thing I 3knówed 1about barbed 3wire2.

3No3 1telling 1I seen 1a lot of barbed wire 4rénces1 before 1that2.

A-travelin' a3round2.

But 3wé 1never did have none1. ((1))

Was it something 3néw3?

Huh?

Was it something 3néw3?

2No3- 1not that 3 1know 1of2. ((5))

Bout what 3yér 1was it that you tore this 3réence 1down? ((2)) 67

How old were 3you2? ((3))

2Oooohhh2 I must a been about 2twélf3 I 2gúess3- about 2thát3. ((2))

Did you ride to town in the 3wágón3?

1Yeah2. ((1))

Instead of on 2top of it2? ((8))

1Load that wagon up with them1- and that- ((1)) 3wood2-
3 Córd 1wood they 1called 2it- ((1))

them 3ráils2-

we'd cut 'em in two in the 3middle2- was four feet 3long2- ((1))

and it had to be- four feet 3high2- ((2))

and eight feet 3long2 for a 3córd.1 ((3))

Four foot 2high3- four foot 2wide3- and eight feet 3long1 was a 3córd1. ((2))

What kind of 3plóws1 did you use? ((3))

Kind of 3what3?

1 Plóws2.

Oh just- ((1)) oohh- we had a- ((2))
Walter, tape 3A

pa 2nd a- ((1)) 3eight 3inch- ((1)) 3tūnūn' 1plov2-
and he had a 3tēn 1inch tūnūn' plov1.

And they was 3cāst 1iron they wasn't 3stēel 1plovs
like they make 3nōw2days2. ((2))
They (were) made out of 3cāst1. ((2))
And you couldn't 3shārpen1 them 3pōints2. ( )

((Interrupts)) You couldn't 3shārpen1 1'em2?
1'No2.

When they wore 3ōut 1they was wore 3ōut'. ((Chuckles)) ((4))

Hōw'd you get into doin' some 3blācksmith 1work? ((1))
1'I 3dōn't 1know2- just got 3fn 1to it is all 31 1know2. ((2))
Just come down.

((Interrupts)) How- how come you one time to have a blācksmith up- at 3Hēxt1?74 ((3))

Did you have a 2blācksmith shop at 3Hēxt one time3?
1'Yeah2. ((3))

They had- (yeah) the 3rāilroad1 was comin' through 1thēre2-
'n 3Lēvi1- ((3)) had come up to 2sēe us2 'n he stayed 3with 1us.
And him and 2mē2- ((2)) got in to 3gēther1 and-
put in that 3blācksmith1 shop. ((2))

3'I 1had just 3wōrked1 at it a 3little1 bit not 3mūch2. ((1))
3Hē 1hadn't worked at it a 3tāll2. ((Chuckle))
We just put- 2būilt us a little ole- 3hōuse 2up there-
and we went 3fn 2to it
'n- 3bōy 1we- we done pretty 3gōod2.

Was it thēre at the Hēxt 3Swītch3?
2'Yeah3.

Which side of the 3rāilroad1?
It was on the sōuth 3side2 of the 3rāilroad2- right there by- where- ((1))

(Bissit's) 2store2?
2'No3. Where uh- ((3))

(2Fīnder2)?
((Sighs)) ((10)) Wēll- what 4fs 1his name? ((3))

Where wās it from the Hēxt 3schoōlhouse1 now? ((3))

There's no Hēxt schoōlhouse 3thēre1 where that is 3nōw1.
It was down on the 3crēek1.
Walter, tape 3A

Waayy- 3éast2- ((3))
It was close to Hext-

(back)
by the 3Bérry 1place there.

Close to Hext 3rānch3? ((3))
Close to Mert 2Bérry's house2?
2Yeah3. 1Yeah2.
The Hext 3rānch 1place.
The old Hext 3rānch 1place.

They were south of the ráilroad 3there1.
They were south of the 3ráilroad1 (over here).
The Hext rānch house was on the 3nórh 1of the railroad1-
and the 3ráilroad1 was across
' n we was on the 3sóuth 1side in a- little ole 3stóre 1there. ((1))
Kinda had a little ole 3stóre 1there.
We built that little ole- ((1)) 3shóp 1there ' n they-
'N we done all the- 3work1 for that there- 3ráilroad1- 1outfit1. ((3))
Sharpened all their- 2plow5s 3' n- ((5))
shucked all of their- e5quipment2 tires-
I had one of those ole wooden 2whee12 scrápers2- you 3know3. ((2))

You mean that they scrape 3dirt with3?
1Yeah2.

And you sh-

\[Had 3wheels 1on 2em.
And that 2whee12- those 2tires'd get 2loose you know2
' n they'd 2b'ring 'em up 2there
and we'd- 2tighten them tires 2up3-
2tighten 'em up2 'n make 'em double trée ' n 'd break 'em 3rást1.((Laughs))
\]

You mean they did the 3digging1 with 3horses3 3'n 3plow5s1?

2Plows3.

'N them there 3scrápers2
The crew would have to have their 3mules2 2you know2-
1and those ole 2mules2- you could just hear 'em all day 3lóng1. ((1))
Walter, tape 3A

Heehonkin' a-round. (Chuckle) (13)

What year- what year was that? Do you re-member? (2)

No.

This was the year the Rock Island Railroad went through. (15)

Might a been- It'd a been nineteen two or somethin' like two. (15)

That ole contractor there that built that dump there- he had just so much you know.

'N he got his part done.

('N he-)

[ Built a dump?

1Yeah. And he had- (1) ooh- he got it all done.

and he owed us about- (1) thirty forty dollars. (2)

And he skipped out you know. (1)

Didn't pay us.

[ You mean the dump- of dirt there before Turkey Creek?

2Yeah.

He was building that up so it'd be level?

2Yeah. For the railroad.

It was a railroad dump.

Dumping dirt.

1Yeah.

To make it level. (1)

Yeah he had it- just so ma- so much of that you know.

Just a certain contract.

He had his part done- (2)

and when he got- when he got it done he owed us- (2)

thirty forty dollars he hadn't never paid us you know.

And he skipped out 'n- (1)

'N we had to- (4) (you see) had to get the sheriff after him. (Chuckle)

You got the sheriff after him.

Yeah to get that money.

Did you get it back?
Walter, tape 3A

2Yeah2 1oh 3yeah2. 3Hé 'got it.
Do you remember the fellow's 3náme3? ((1))
  2No2. I can't remember it 3nów2. ((3))
  An 3old 1like 1man2.
What'd you 3do1?
Ride a 3hórs3 or something back and forth from the 3dúgout3- ever 3dáy3? ((1))
  2Yeah2. 1Some2times2.
  Sometimes we 4walked1. ((3))
How much 3móney'd1 you make?
  Há. 3'1 ((Chuck1e)) I don't know. ((3))
How much did you 3chárgé1 for sharpening a 3plów1?

  Didn't make mucho- very 3múch2.
  Well that'd depend on the 4size1. ((5))
  For fourteen 3ínches2 we'd charge 'em a 1quárter2.
  Thirty cénits 'n twenty five (depending) on the 3size1 of it.
Were these cast iron plows 3tó03?
  3No1 they were 3stéel1 plows 2thén1. ((1))
  Steel- used 3stéel 1points.
  You see you could 3shárpen1 2them1.
  Them old 3cást 1points that 3pá 1had- why- ((1)) you couldn't- ((1))
  well the only way-
  the only way you could do 3thém2 was just take a 3hámmer2
  'n just 3chip 1'em around you 1know2.
  Chip 'em óff and maybe (and then)
  you could plow with 'em some 4móre2. ((1))
  And then- you'd have to buy a 4nów2 one. ((2))
  They only 3cóst1 about a quarter a 3píece2.
The 2plów sháfts2?
  2Yeah2. ((Chuck1es))
Did the 3plóws1 look like the old plows you used to plow our 2gárden with2?

  1The one that had two 2hándles on it2?
    Oh 1yeah2. 3Yeah1.
    It had 3hándles2.

  That's the kind of plow it 2waś2?
Walter, tape 3A

Just an old walkin' plow. ((3))

With one horse or two? 103

Yeah if it had a– you had (to run an) eight inch plow– you could use one horse.

If you had a ten inch– you used two horses on it. ((3))

'N if you wanted to plow corn–

why he never had no- cultivators nor double shovels nor two stocks nor nothing like that a tall to farm with.

All he had was that little six inch plow.

That is your dad? 104

Brekin' plow.

Yeah. ((3))

What did you break the land with out at– the farm at Hext? ((3)) 105

Wet just your common– ((2))

Same kind of plow? 106

[ I believe it was–

I believe it was a fourteen inch plow.

That I had.

I bought one from– over there at Price. ((1))

That'd be two horses wouldn't it? 107

Yeah. Two or three. ((2))

You got to use three to break with.

[ I

How'd you uh– 108

Was all that country covered with shinnery? 109

Yeah. Most of– most all shinnery.

All over it.

Just little ole shinnery.

Wadn't no– ((3)) weren't big like they are now– down there.

How tall was the grass? ((1))

Oh– (It'd reach to about here I guess.) (Muffled)

That's about six feet isn't it? ((Chuckie))

Blue stem?
Walter, tape 3A

'Yeah.
Was it real thick?
'Yeah. Pretty thick.
What'd you do?
Burn it off-

( )
(would be) put that on there (on there 'n) built that dugout-
and that wall around like at
'n then a- put a ridge pole across the center.
Then he would take some short poles 'n-
(the way we would) split 'em up some times.
Some of 'em be split-
Some of 'em wouldn't.
Lay 'em across this way I'n that a way across that ridge pole.
'N then we'd take that ole cottonwood bark-
peel them ole logs-
take that bark 'n lay it across 'n them-
(like be) like at.
And then- we'd- go out 'n cut a big load of that ole tall grass and lay on-
spread it out on top of that and then put dirt 'n on top or that-
and that's the roof we had for the dugout.

How'd you get ready to clear the land?

Would you burn the grass?
'Yeah. Burn it.
Then plow it up.
Burn the grass off and plow it up.

Didn't the shiny roots get in your way?
Well- some yeah.
'Yeah I there's some shiny roots in it.
It'd take a year or two to get them- to where they'd get out of the way.

I heard you all say you used to ship watermelons from Hext.

Did you all grow any?
Yeah I had two.

You did?

((Chuckle))
Walter, tape 3A

3Yeah1 everbody arround 2there2.
31 I had a little ole 3shół1 you see.
33 I didn't 3ráise 1watermelons. ((4))
Everbody arround 1there just had their whole 3fields2 full of 3water 1melons2.
You would just nearly 3wálk 1on 'em2. ((2))
('N they'd you know-) they would haul 'em up there
'n pile 'em down by side of that 3ráilroad 1track-
'n then they'd have a- just leave a 3cár 1there.
Load it 3üp1. Ship 'em 3órr2.

Do you remember how much they 3sóíd 'em for3?
1No2. I don't remember nothing about 3that2.
Not very 3múch 1though. ((5))
1They'd probably get ten cents a 1piece2.

Did you use góurd 3dippers3?
Well not 3there2 1no2.

Did you down in 3Txéx3?
Down in 3Téxas2 that's all they 4hád1 was 4góurd1 dippers- ((2))
that 3'1 I know anything a1bóut2. ((3))

How did you dig the 3well 1down there?

Did 3you 1help dig that well that's still 1there2? ((2))
1No.2 ((3))
I dug one out there at 3Héx2-.
Out there where we moved on the- ((1))

On the 2rárm3?
place out there1 'yeah2.
I dug 3that 1one. ((1))
But 3shúcks2 3'1 was just a little ole 3kíd1 when they-
dug that one out there- at Park 3Springs2.

Do you remember when they 3búilt it3?
'Yeah2. ((2)) 'Member all a3bóut 1lit.
(They dug) ((2))
Hired- hired one of the 3nérbhórs2 there to 3dig 2it. ((3))

Hired a 3nérbhórl to. ((1))
What did he-
[
'Yeah2.
He just made (3tréks2).
He just went all over the 3country2 diggin' 3wells1.
That's- (22) the way he made a 3livin'2.

How did he- fix 'em on the in3side1? 3Róck3? or 3what1?
He didn't fix 'em a 3tāl1.
He just 3dūg1 'em. (33)
And- (31) after a year or 2twō31 that one all caved 2fn like-
'n I remémber when- I was a-layin' in the 3béd1 one night1-
n' I could just hear that dirt a-fallin' in that 2wél2 you know2.
Kerbōom! Kerbōom! ((Very animated))
So. (22) It filled that thing up- 4wāy2 3úp1.
A great ole big- (spot) around towards the tōp there-
(big as) eight or ten foot a3round1.
Where it had caved 3ōff1. (11)
Pa he went out- there 'n haulled up some 3rōcks2. (11)
And he walled that up his3sél1.
And cleaned it all 1ōut2 'n- walled it up- his3sél1- with them 3rōcks1. (11)

What does the term ców on a lift 2mēān3? (11)
Cow on the 3lft2?

Uh-huh.

(Laugh))

Have you ever heard of 2thát3?
You never heard of a cow on the 3lft3? ((Chuckle))

2No3, What 3is 1lt?
((Chuckle)) When a 3ców 2gets so poor she- just lays there
'n she can't get 3úp2-
well she's on the 4lft1.

End of tape. This interview continues on tape 2 A and B.
Interview with Walter Cynthia Ford (about age 80)
by his son, LeRoy Ford (about age 30)
Taped about 1953.
Tape 2A second half and 2B first part. Continuation of tapes 1A and 3A.

The cow on the 3rd of the 1st was-

Wh- When pa

[ she was so poor that she couldn't get up.

pa 3died 2- he 31st 2 about- ooh I guess hundred head or 3cattle 2.

2Cows ( ) you know 2 ((3))

(then) when pa 3married 2 again-

that- Ellie 3Saylor 2- ((2))

that- there wasn't (really) didn't have a thing to 3reed 2 the cattle

but 3cotton 2seed-

and they got so 3poor 2-

what they'd just get down on the 3rd of the 2nd

and he'd just have to get out there ever 3morning 2 'n-

hep 'em 3up 1.

A 3lot 2 of 'em.

'n that 'uz (when) we called 'em

on a 3rd 1.

"lift" pronounced with extra volume)

Your cows 'uz on a 3rd 1. 'You see 1. ("lift" pronounced with extra volume)

And- then- there was about thirty or forty of 'em- 3died 2 that winter 2-

that 3great 2big (plot) of ole dead cows away out back there

(Sound of a falling glass)

the 3house 2 there-

(they) called it the 3boneyard 1. (Chuck)

3Boneyard 1.

1Yeah 2. (Chuck)

'N they'd get so poor- they couldn't get up by they 2selves 3-

he'd have to- have to get out there 3night 2 ((3))

'n- 'n- just ever 3day 1 or two one 'd 3die 2.

'N have to drag 'em 3off 2.

We lost over 3half 1 or 'em- that one 3winter 2.
Walter, tape 2A/B

Didn't have nothing to feed 'em on but - cotton seed.

How old were you then?

Oh I 'uz ((2))

(right there about) twelve or thirteen-
forteen or sumpin like 'at
I don't remember. ((14))

So when they'd get down there to where they couldn't get up
couldn't get up 'n you'd have to help 'em up
well we'd (say) the cows 'uz on the lift. (("lift" pronounced with extra volume))
You see.

You'd have to lift 'em up. ((4))

Then (after) you hop 'em up they'd stay up all day you know.
But- but when they'd get down at night
next morning you'd have to get up 'n lift 'em up again.

Uh- how many buffalo swallows were there on the farm at Erick?

5 when you got there?

Well I never seen but two.

Where were-
One was south west of the house.
Where was the other one?

Well south-
south of the house.

Just a little bit west of the house. ((3))

Well-

Were both or 'em there?

Yeah.

One of 'em was bigger than the other.

One of 'em was ((2)) pretty good size-
the other was just smaller but they wasn't very far apart.

Pretty close together.

Several years there when we had to plow around 'em
(we) you couldn't go across 'em.

How deep were they?
Walter, tape 2A/B

Well they wasn't—((1)) more than that 3dēep².

Two 3rēt³?
 1'Yeah².

How 3wīde¹?
  Oh—sōme of 'em was—I guess maybe—
  maybe the 3bīgest 1one 'uz as big as this 3hōuse².
  3Māybe². ((1))
  (The leāst one wasn't) that 3bīg¹.

Were there—buffalo 3bōnes around there³?
  Oh—(I found) buffalo 3hōrn²—1'n 1'things².
  I don't know—remember (being) 3bōnes².
  I guess there 3wās²—but I don't re3mēmber². ((5))
  Wouldn't know 'em from any 3ōther² cow bone if I 3sēe 'em¹. ((Chuckle))

Were there any 3Indians¹ around 3Erick when you were there³? ((3))
  2'No³. ((2))
  No Indians 3thēre² that 31 2knew anything about.
  Now at 3Ciōud 1Chēf there 1wās².
  We had two or three 3nēighbōrs¹ that wūz Indians. ((1))
  Some of 'em fūllblood 3Indians¹. ((3))

3Hōw 2did they set up a 3tēp²?

Did you ever 3wātch 'em³?
  No I never did—3wātch 2'em set it 3ūp²—
  but I've seen 'em set 3ūp¹. ((4))

How'd they 3cārry 1'em? ((3))

What—what'd they 3lōok 1'like?
  Oh they just—had great long 3pōles².

3Hōw long¹?
  2'Ooh² must a been—2twēlve²—2fōurteen root 2māybe³.
  Maybe 3lōnger².
  3I don't know how long they 1wās².
  But they'd set 'em 3ūp—1'like that—
  set 'em up down here 'n just slope 'em up to3gēther² like that at the 3tōp²
  'n tie 'em to3gēther².

What'd they 3tīf 1'em with?
  4I don't 1'know². ((Chuckle and high pitch on 'l'))
  3Rōpe² or 3sōmethin¹.
Walter, tape 2A/B

'N then- 'n then they'd stretch that 3tent² around them 3poles°.

Was the tent made of 3cánvass³?
²Yeah²- kind of a 1cánvass². ((3))
I never was right 3at 1one² ((extra volume on "at"))
I've just- ((2)) been 2clôse enough to ss-
I've 3seen 'em².

Bout how many 3poles² would you say were 3in 1'em? ((1)) ¹8
Oh 3'l 1don't 1know². ((1))
(Shucks) ((3))
There were 3several 1of 'em though. ((4))
(so ) if they had a very big 3tent² óh I guess it'd be-
probably that far a³párt¹ at the 3bóttom²
'n then they'd come up to the 3tóp¹ you 1know².
3'l 1don't 1know².

About 3threé 1feet a³párt
¹at the 3bóttom¹.
I don't know 3hòw 1many (de³pended) 1on.
I 1never² 1counted 'em¹.

Do you have any idea how 2wìde 2acróss¹ they would be at the 3bóttom³? ¹9
²Well²- ((3)) maybe they'd be different 3sízes¹ just like any 3óther 1tent².
They'd- Some tents 'd be 3bìgger¹ 'n others. ((4))
They'd be ((3)) oh big enough to put- big enough for them to 3five 2in
'n have their béd's 'n cóokin' outfits 'n everthing 3in 2there.
I don't know how 3big ¹they'd be. ((3))

You never did see 3in 1one ¹huh²?
No 1 never was 3ín 2one. ((3))

Whén did you start playin' the 3fiddle¹?
((Chuckle)) ((6))
Oh- I started 3trýn¹ when I was about- sixteen eighteen years 3óld¹ I guess¹.

Where'd you 3gét 1a fiddle?
Did you 3máke it³?
¹No².
One of the neighbors there 3give 1me one.
²Boy I thought I 'uz 3rfch 1there-
when (Everett) give me a- h- uh- ((3))
Walter, tape 2A/B

Yeah one of the neighbors lived uh-
I'd go- oh about three 3miles2- 3nor'th 1of us I 1guess2.
He had two 3boys2 that played all the 3time1. ((2))
And- ((2)) it had 3one 1that had-
it got the 3néck 1broke out of it.
And it was hangin on the 3wäll 1down there
'n they never did 3ûse it2. ((4))
So- ((1)) Jóhn 'n me 'uz over there one 1day2-
We went over there 'n- 3plåyed 1with the kids a 3låt2. ((2))
'N we was over there one 3Súndåy2- ((2))
We 'uz sittin' in the 3hóuse2 there
'n that ole riddle was a hangin up on the 3wäll 2there. ((2))
'N them boys was 3in 2there- ((1))
'N the- 3wóman2- ((1)) Mrs. Smíth- ((1))
she says to ( )
3Boys- (was) you 3gonna give Walter that old 3riddle3?
He says well I guess 4só2: "
(Chuckie))
So- he got (it) down 'n 3give 1it to me2
'n- that's the first riddle that 3'1 ever 1had2. ((3))
((Begins to speak but is interrupted))

Who gave you a 3lésson1?

How'd you know how to 3stårt1?

Took it- I took it hóme with me 'n just patched it 3úp2.
I kept that thing- ((2)) 2we'll2- ((1)) I don't know 3hôw 1many years.
Til we moved to 3Erick2.
'N I was just a little ole 3kid 3thén2.
We moved to 3Erick2- ((2)) 'n I still had it 3thérc2. ((5))
'N 2'1 don't know2- 3sómehow2 or nother the 3tåp 1got off of it
'n It stayed around there a long time with the 3tåp 1off of it
'n I don't know what 3fînålly2 went with it.
The rêst of it. ((5))

Did sómebody tell you how- to start 3plåyin' it3?
1No2.

You just figured it out your 3sélf3. ((3))
25

I just watched them 3boys2. ((15))
Walter, tape 2A/B

I just set around 'n when they 'uz 3pláyin'²
I'd just watch the 3héck² of that- (1)
3friddle² 'n them 3fingers²-
which fingers 'd go 3whére 2'n which fingers 'd go 3héré 2'n (5)
That's all 3'I 1know². (4)

Just watch their 3fingers²-'n the 3bów². (13)
The uh 3dúgout² at 3Erick¹ did it have 2stéps down 2'nto it²? (13) 27
Or was it a 3wálk¹'in dugout¹?

Yeah I think it had about two 3stéps 1'down- the first 'un.
'N I don't remember just for 3súre¹ but they-
((Interrupts)) What was the 3frónt 1'of it made of then? It had a-

( ) It had two steps 3dówn¹ 'n then- (2)
It's kinda in the síde of a little 1hillé² like.
'N 1'fter it I built a²nóther² r- 1róom²- in 3frónt 1'a that 2'un-
'n time I got 3ft 1'built on in 3frónt 1'of that 'un
why you didn't have to go 3dówn¹'those steps.
You could just go right straight 3fn¹.

Just like goin' in the 3hóuse¹.

What was the 3frónt 1'of it made out of¹? 1'lógs³?

Just 3lógs².

Did you stack lógs on-

[Yeah.
Yeah. It built up 3lógs² like that.
Yep. Like that. (2)]

Just like a log 3hóuse¹.

Yeah. (2) The 3frónt 1'of it.

What kind a logs did you 3úse¹? 3Cóttónwood³?

Cóttónwood 3lógs². That's all there was 3théré².

What'd you 3chínk 1'em with? (3) 33

We'd 3chínk 2'em with just anything we could get a²hóld 2'of-
just- 3chúnks². (3)
Maybe some of the 3póles²-
we (was on) 3póles² put in between them lógs. (3)

'N then we'd chínk 'em 3üp².
Walter, tape 2A/B

What did the- 34
What was the 3dőor 1made out of?
   Oh- just made it out of ( ) ole lumber and 3wőod 2is all 31 2know when 3f 2made 2em.
What kind of 3hínge 1did you have 1? A 3métal hinge 3?
   N- 1Yeah 2. Metal 3hínge 2s 2.
How'd you keep the 3wínd 1out?
   ((Chuckler)) Didn't 3kéep 1It out 3tőo 2much. 37
   ((Chuckler)) 3(5)
Did you get any 3máil 2out in those days 3? 3(1)
   Had to go to- plumb to 3Délhi 2- 3(2)
   to get the 3máil 2ever 3tíme 1. 3(2)
   About seven or eight 3míles 1.
How often w- did you go 3óver 1there?
   2Oooh 2- about twice a 2wéek 2.
Was that your 3póst office address 3? 3Délhi 3? 3(2)
   2Délhi 2- Indian 3Tércity 1. 3(6)
Did you ever find out on this 3tréáil 2that went through the fárms
did you ever find any uh- 3(1)
3wágon wheels or anything that people had 3léft 3? 3(3)
   3wágon 1wéels 2?
Did you ever find any- 3thing 2that uh might a been 3ón 2a wagon or something that-
any evidence that people had been up and 3dőwn it 3or any-
3Nő 3.
   Not that I 3knőw 2of. 3(4)
It fórded 3Tůrkěy 1creek.
  3Huíh 3
Did- did it fórde 3Tůrkěy creek 3? 3Whěře 1? 3(3)
   Well- down- 3(2)
   Well it wasn't 3that 1far from the 3hőuse 1.
   Where we 3lőved 1.
From the 3důgout 1.
   1Yeah 2. 3(2)
What would you 3sány 1? A hunderd- 46
There was two or thre3 cróssins2 on the way across the créek2. But 3f2 don't remember which place that tráill2 went across. (but it) múst a been right close to the hóuse2 though because the- ((3)) because the tráill2 come right along close to the hóuse1.

It wasn't very far off1.

To the důgout1 you mean.

1Yeah2.

Well we called it a hóuse2.

Did you build the důgout close to the tráil

so you'd have a róad t- t- up tó it3?

Is that it3?

1No3. (I think )

Just had old- wágón2 ((3)) róad2. (One of those) neighborhood róads2. (that cost)

It came off of the trail down to the důgout1.

1Yeah2. ((3))

Did you say the tráill1 was about a quarter of a míle1 from the důgout3?

Yeah- it 'uz súmpin1 like 'at.

Did it cróss down where the old brídge was3? Is tháth where it was3? ((4)) 51 1 don't remember just where it díd 1 cross the creek.

Seem to míle2 like it- ((1))

that it kinda túned 'n went dówn2 the creek on the west sidé1.

'N crossed way down théré sómewhere. ((3))

But I dón't 1 remember.

You mean- turned down the creek on the east sidé1.

1Yeah2.

'N thén 1 crossed. ((4))

Hów did you make a bróom1 weed 2bróom1? ((4))

(Chuckle)

You'd pull up old bróomweeds2 'n- wroppéd 'em around a bróomhole2- bróom2 handle 

' n just tied a string1 around it is all 3'1 know. ( ) ((4))

Just- took a handle2 'n just- got them wéeds2 'n just wrópped 'em a round2 the end of that handle2 'n- 

tied a string2 around it good 'n1 tight2.

Did the wágons you travelled in have the big bóws over 'em3?

54
Walter, tape 2A/B

Yeah².
Sheet 'n 3bówṣ².
Shéet 'n 3bówṣ¹. ((Carefully pronounced to make sure he has the right words))
Yeah².

How 3mány 1bows. ((3))
I belfeve it 'uz rive 3bówṣ¹. ((4))
((Begins to speak and is interrupted))

Did you call 'em a rive bow 3wágon or somethin³?
Didn't call 'em any 2bów nothín² about it-
just- shéet 'n 3bówṣ¹.
That's all. ((3))

Was the- shéet gáthered in a- círcle at the 3énd³?
( ) The back énd of it had a- ((2))
had a rópe in it 'n we'd gáther it up in the 2báck²-
'tie it to 2géther² 'n-
it'd come to 3géther¹ nearly at the 3báck².
'N have one at the 3frónt² but then you wouldn'- pull it- all to 3géther¹.
You could leave it where you could- see 3out² you see 'n 3dríve¹.

'N you sat back 3íìn 1there to 3dríve¹.
Yeah². Set back 3íìn 2there- on a 3spríng 2seat.

On a 2whát²?
On a 3spríng 2seat. ((4))

Did you ever-
We had 3spríng 2seats,
Y- you set 'em on théré 'n you'd sit on that 3spríng 2seat 'n 3dríve². ((2))

Did you- uh ever get out 'n 3wálk³? To drive the 3hórses³.

Oh yeah.
Yeah¹. Yeah¹. Oh all- 3lóts 1a tímés.

Why- What'd you 3wálk 1for? Just to 3rést a whíle³?

To- to- to-
get tíred- sétting there 'n get out 'n 3wálk 2a whíle. ((2))

When you drové 3óxen²- what'd you do with 'em at 3níght¹?
Ha.
Just turned 'em 3lóose¹ like you do anything 3élse¹. ((Chuckłe))
Walter, tape 2A/B

Didn't tie 'em 3down or 3anything3? 65
  3Unh-2uh.
  'N they wouldn't go 3off2. 66
    4No2. Just sit around there just like 3hórses2 'n any- 3câttle2 or 3anything2.
You didn't tie the 3hórses up1? 67
  2No3. (15 )
Did you ever see a 3prairie fire3? (1) 68
  Yeah,
[ 69
Out 3thér3? 69
  I seen what you call a 3prairie1 1fár2. (2)
Out close to 3Erick3? 70
  'N that 3prairie1 2far get out there in that big ole tall 3gráss2
    3bóy2 you had (it). (Chuckling) (10)
How did you 3sleep1 when you were uh- on the 3tráil1? 71
On the dri- uh on a 3tríp1? 72
  2Well2.
(Interrupting) Sleep in a 3wágon3? 72
  1Yeah3.
    Had a bed fixed back- back in the 3wágon2.
What kind of a 3máttress1 was it? 73
  [ (shéets on)
  I dunno- just ole common 3máttress2.
Feather2béd3 or 3what1? 74
  2Yeah2.
    Well we had 3one1 featherbed. I 3knów1 we had 3one2.
Did you ever use a 3shûckbéd3? (1) 75
  Well we had one with 3sóme2 shucks in it.
  I believe we 3hâd2 a shûckbéd. (2)
    But I don't know whether we brought one wîth us or 3nót2.
    I think maybe they 'uz 3côttôn1 mattresses1. (3)
What kind a 3wíndow1 did you have in the dugout- at Erick1? 76
  (Chuckling) (3)
Were they 3gláss3? 77
  Naw. I don't remember. (2)
Walter, tape 2A/B

Seem to me like we just had a 3hôle2 cut out there
 'n covered it up with sumpin when we wanted to shut off the 3wínkows2 3shút2 to it.
Shut it 3üp1 when we didn't want the wind 'n 3rán1 to blow 2fn.
Oh we just had a- ((2)) just the 3hôle2 left in the side of the 3wáí1 3n- ((3))
tryin' to- board 3thát 2up (around) had a 3shütter2 to it's all 1
((Interrupts)) A 3shütter2. 78
Yeah.
On the 2outside2?
Yeah. 79
That you could open and 3clóse3?
Ooooh I guess I think it's on the 4fnside1
I don't re3mémbér1.
I just don't re4mémbér1 any of them things1.
Just a 3bóard 1hinged onto it. 81
Anyway it shut them winds 3üp2
(when you want) the 3rán1 sumpin come 1 in 2. ((12))
Ah hum. ((5))
What kind a 3lámps1 did you use1? ((2))
1In the dugout at Erick1?
( ) Just coal 3lámps3?
2Yeah2.
Coal oil 3lámps2.
Just regular ole ((2)) coal oil 3lámps2.
Jus s s s s I think they are just little ole round 3wícks3 3tőo1.
Little 2bfty ole 2things2. ((2))
You mean it wasn't like the regular wicks we 2úsed to háve2?
| 84
No. Not like
them flát ones like we have 3nów2.
Like uh-
More like a little 3rópe1. 85
( ) we 3frnally1 got 1them2.
Yeah just like a little 3rópe1 stickin' up there 1around2.
Did it have a 3glóbe on it3?
1Yeaaah 3.
It had a 3glóbe2. ((3))
Now the 3frst1 ones we used didn't have no 1globe2- as I re1mémber2.
They didn't make much 3lífht1 3éfther1. ((2))

But it was the same 2kin1d of 1ámp2?

[ ]

( )

Finally got- to where we'd have a 3glóbe 1on 'em2.
They'd make more 3lífht2 3thát-a-way with less-
you could turn 'em 3dówn1 some you see1. ((3))
'N then we finally got them 3flát 2ones. ((4))
We didn't know what to 3thínk 1about it got them 3flát ones2.
Didn't know what to 3thínk 2about 'em.
Kinda 3fráid 2of 'em.
They might 3blów 2úp. ((Chuckle)) ((3))

Did the one that had a round 3wíck 1on it could you turn it up 'n 3dówn3?

1Yeaaah2. You could turn it up 'n 3dówn2. It had a little- ((3))

Did it smoke a whole 3iót3?

2Yeaaah2. It smoked up the 3hóuse1 quite a 3bit1. ((4))
3Dúgout1. No 3hóuse2.

( ) down in 3Téxas1 had the 1hóuse2 but-
after we moved up here to 3Eríck1 we didn't have no 1hóuse2. ((6))

If you had a 3máp 1of Oklahóma1 could you uh-
would you récogníze where- the 3frérry1 was that you 3used3? ((4))

Oh I don't 3knów2. ((4))

Did you ever hear of Rédd River 3Státiónn3?

Rédd River 3Státiónn2.

3Yeaaah1.

Well I've 4héeard2 of it. ((2))
You don't know where it 3wás1.
I don't know where it 3wás2. ((3))

Did you ever hear of Préston 3Róad3? ((2))

2No2- don't re3mémber2. ((6))
Well I bet you're getting 3tíred1- 3áren't 1you? ((2))

Did you ever hear of a Sháwnee 3Tráil3?

2Huh3?
Walter, tape 2A/B

Did you ever hear of a Sháwnée Trail?  
2No. ((4))  
Least I don't remember it. ((3))

On this drive from Texas when you moved the cattle-  
what were the towns you crossed after you came to Tell? ((2))
You came Tell from Fort Worth and then went up north. ((5))
(They was what.)

On the cattle move from Texas—y'all drove the cattle—  
you crossed at Tell, didn't you?  
Yeah.  
Tell Texas.

[What were the towns you went to after that in Oklahoma?]  
Well just come right on down there through Ryan and Rush Springs—  
I believe we turned off and came through Walters—

Turned off at Rush Springs?  
Yeah.  
Up there some where. ((1))
Then come through Walters 'n'n'n—  
oh I don't know.

Did you go north or south of the Wichita Mountains? ((4))
Or did you go through the mountains?  
[Seem to like we went up kinda through them—

Through the mountains.  
[Mountains.

Uh—  
[Up through Mountain Park 'n— ((6))
Uh—y'all mentioned having to stop a week or something  
for the cattle inspectors. ((2))
Where was that? ((2))
(That was— ((3))
(out) down there ((3))
Walter, tape 2A/B

out east of- 3Mángum. (3)
Where 3was that? (5)
(I don’t know if it was) east of Mángum there on the Red 3River
just cross the Red River east- thère.

But it was on the Nórh 3Fórk that you had to stop ’n wait for
the 3câttle 1inspectors.

[ 1Yeah2,
1Yeah2. (2)]

What would they 3dò when the câttle inspector came what would he 3dò? 106

Oh 3hè just got out there ’n roped them 3câttle 2’n- (2)
in3spéc téd 2 ’em- (2)
turned ’em 3lôose2.

He’d rope each 3one of ’em3? (1) 3Sêparâtely3?

3Huh3?

He’d rope each 3one of ’em3?

[ 1Oh yeah yeah-
each one. (2)]

What was he 3lôoking for1?

4Tîcks1. (Emphatic, impatient.) (2)
3Câttle1 ticks1.

3Yeah2. (2)

Did you have to have ’em in3spéc téd before you went in to Indian 3Tèrritory? 111
From Fort 3Wôrth3?

Or was that the only place they in3spéc téd them1.

[ 1No just
thère- (3)
before we come in to Oklâ3hóma1. (There is all.)
That’s the only 3pláce2. (2)
’N we was there about a 3wèek2 there or so
before we could 3gèt2 an in3spéc tòr1.

Which 3sèd1 of the river did they 3inspéc t1 ’em on? (2)
We was on thè-

Before you crósseed the river to come on to 3Mángum3?
Walter, tape 2A/B

[  
Yeah— before we crossed the 3ríver2. (7)  
Had to get 'em in3spécted2 before we could go across the 3ríver2. 

Did he give you some sort of a re3cípít or sómethin'3?  
To say that they'd been in3spécted3? (3)  
Nó he never did give us—(3) 1any kind of a s1íl1. 
I don't remémrber.  

Did he chárge you anything for 3ínspectíng 'em3?  
1No2. (3) They don't 3chárge 2us. (5)  

You said one time that when you— plówed with 3oxén2  
that sometimes they would pull a3párt1. 
What was 3thát1? (5)  
2Ooh2. ( ) I 3guess 1they'd get 3tíred1. 
'N they'd— 3púuuuuull like thís3. 
One of 'em 'd léán over this way 
'in the other 'n 'd léán over this way you know. 
Wálk sidéwáys— (4)  
Let's see what wás it they called that. (2)  
Layín' dówn or sómethin'.  

Pullín' apárt. Wadn't thát what they called it?  
Well that's what they was tryín' to dó anyway. 
Looks like. 
You couldn't get 'em to straighten up a 3tíl12. 
When they'd get tíred why they'd just— wálk thataway. 
That's all (the way) is tó it. (5)  

Tell me about how—  
[  
Pullin' óff. Pullin' óff.  

Pulling óff.  
Yeah. Pullin' óff. (4)  

---

End of Side 2A  
Continued on beginning of Walter 2B  

---
Tell me about the way that you loaded those—cottonwood logs on the wagon. 120

Those logs you got from—George Cain.  
To make—make the dugout. (5)
Well they’re great big ole logs that—  
Joe had—had heaved ’em off—on both sides ’n they ‘uz flat you know.

On two sides. 121

[  
Already hew—hewed logs.  
’N George—uh Joe had dec—cut ’em down to build his dugout.
’N he decided by— the time he got it all done  
said they’re so big ‘n heavy he decided he wouldn’t use ’em.
’N—he went ’n got some more to build his dugout  
’n he let 3mé have 3thém logs. (12)
    (  
(3))  
and—(4) the 3wagon² it maybe ( )
3hé 2had a wagon ( ) ’n we—3 1 2had a wagon—  
(4) My 3cousin’s 1husband 1.
3H²had a wagon ’n 3 1 2had one ’n (2)  
’n we’d done 3that² why—(12)
he let me have the 3front 2wheels a 3his 2wagon  
to put on in place of my 3back wheels².
They ‘uz 3tall¹ you see 1.
And he took my—3back 2wheels ’n put on the 3front 1wheel. ((Chuckles))
Front of 3his 1wagon².  
’N so 3 1 2had a 3low 2wheel wagon  
’n he had a great 3high 3wheel wagon all a3round 1 you see 1. ((Chuckles))
’N then we’d take—(2) ’n drive ’em up to the side of that 3log²—(1)
’n take two wheels 3o’er² next to that 3log² ’n lay ’em 3down²—  
lay the wheels 3down² ’n the spindle’s in the—3hub² you see so you— 
’n then we’d (  )

That’s two wheels on one 3side 1.

¹Yeah².
’n then we’d—have a (6)
oh—put some—(well) 3poles²—under the—next to that 3log²  
’n then up on top of the—3wagon²—1frame².
Put- put some
Yeah. ( )
[
Under 3néath 2 the log 'n then on to the 3wágon 1 frame.
Yeah.
'N then we'd- take a 3rópe 2-
'n wind it around that 3lóg 2-
just wind it around 'n around 'n around 'n around 'n around 'n a3róund 2- ((1))
'n then tie 3óne 1 end of it up to the (edge) of the 3wágon 2-
and- take the 3óther 1 end of it over to the 3óther 1 side of the wagon
'n hitch the 3téam to it 1.
'N the team would start 3úp 1 you see.
Why this rópe would un3wind 2 just roll that log right on úp- right on to the 3wágon 1.
But the- the rópe was 3tiéd 1 to the wágon before you wráppe it around the- 125
Yeah 4óne 1 end of it 2.

Tied to the- (went to) the 3fráme 1 on the opposite side of the 3wágon 2
so that the log would get ón to the 3wágon 1 you see before it got to the end of the 3rópe 2.
And then you'd wrop that lo- róunder wh- 3lóg 2-
just wrop it around 'n around 'n a3róund 2-
several 3tímes 1 you know so that it'd be 3shórè 2 'n be enough 3ór it 2-
til it get that log plumb on the 3wágon 2.
Before it'd get un3wónd 1.

'N- ((2)) 'n hitch the cháin over there to that 3síde 2- hitch the 3rópe 2-
'n it'd pull it- cross 3óver 2 there 'n-
on this 3rópe 1 you see it'd unroll on 3tóp 1 of the log 3hére 2-
and it'd 3róll 2- ((1)) 'n- just 3róll 2 that log right up on to the 3wágon 1.
'N then we'd- ((1)) then we'd just get hold a them there 3wéels 2- ((1))
(get) them 3wéels 2 there 'n raise 'em 3úp 1 like that.
put the 3núts 2 on- ((1)) 'n go a3héad 2.
Was he sur3présed 1 that you had figured out a way to 3dó that 3?
((Chucklé)) 3Wéll 2 no just- ((3))
just happened to figure it 4out 2 that way is all 3 2know.
Did you figure that out your 3self 1 or did- 128
Walter, tape 2A/B

No I guess Joe 'n me togaether^2
'n maybe he ss-- maybe 3hé 1'uz the bôss 3f don't know^1.
Don't remémber. ((1))
I know that's the way we dône it. ((8))

Was it the Chísolm Tråil you all came up from Térrell to Rush 3Sprîngs on^3? 129

((5))
I don't know 3what 3trail it was^1. ((1))
Might a 3been^2.

But you say the tråil that went through the farm at 3Erick^2-
looked like uh maybe-- twó or three parallel 3wågon 1 trails.

[yeah just looked
Yeah just looked like-- where it'd be
oh maybe three or four wagons in 3bråest^2 go down you know
it had that many 4tråcks^2.

How deep were the 3rüts^1?
Ooh-- 3sôme 1of 'em wånt 1dåep^2.
(Normally) wånt very 3dåep 1unless they'd be washed 3out 1or somethin^1.
((3)) Ordinary 3wågon 2rüts. ((3))

Were there any 3rénces^3 1between the farm 'n Delhi 'n 3Mångum^3?
No not 3måch-- cause there wånt much-- wånt any 3såttålement^1
(up that way).
((2)) There wånt much 3rénce^1 (it) went kinda across the 3cåunty^1.
Most of the 3wåy^1. ((1))
(Folks) just finally got-- ((1)) settled down 'n fenced 3åp^2. ((4))

How'd you get across the 3bråeks^1 at 3Dåeli^1?
Or did you come a3cråss 1em? ((4))

3Well 1we just 3dråve 1it across there 'n its all 3f^2know.

This same 3rååd^3?
1Yeah^2. ((2))

But this-- you'd get on this 3tråål^2 at the 3håuse^2-- at the 3dågåut^2 'n go-
you could go all the way to 3Mångum^1 on it.
1Yeah^2.

Were there other plåces where other råods came 3into it^3?
Oh 3yeah^1.
((Interrupts)) Or did it go into another 3måin 1one?
Walter, tape 2A/B

Other neighborhood roads'd come out 'n in it- like any other place. But it was the main road.
Yeah. ((4))

Did you ever hear of Sweetwater Creek? ((2))
'Yeah. ((2))
I heared a Sweetwater Creek.
But I don't know was I ever there. ((3))

What's this town Bénénine? 1
I've heard you talk about Bénénine.
What was that? ((3))

Bénénine was out- ((1)) west of us
(over in) Texas- ((1)) line. ((2))

End of tape. End of interview.