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The dynamics of Latin American insurgencies: 1956–1986

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THE DYNAMICS OF LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES: 1956-1986

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

THE DYNAMICS OF LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES: 1956-1986
Jeffrey J. Ryan

The level of popular support accorded to either a regime or an insurgent movement has long been considered a principal determinant of revolutionary outcomes. Rather than assume a priori that these support levels are somehow inextricably linked with the conditions which spawn revolutionary movements, we have tried to focus on the sequence of events by which the behavior of the two primary actors in insurgent conflicts (regime and guerrillas) is translated into support and how in turn this support produces an outcome.

We have suggested that support decisions among the public at large are based on a number of different criteria, and have attempted to distill what we feel are the most important from the literature. In an attempt to balance completeness with parsimony, we have identified three dimensions which capture the "minimum requirements" that must be satisfied by an actor in the eyes of an individual in order for that person to accord support. These are inclusiveness (incorporation), contributions to material welfare (performance), and the provision of defense (protection/coercion).

In evaluating our model, we examined six cases of insurgency in post-war Latin America, two cases each of insurgent failure (Venezuela & Peru), insurgent success (Cuba & Nicaragua), and two cases of ongoing insurgency (FMLN in El Salvador & Sendero Luminoso in Peru).

Our analysis suggests that outcomes unfold from the interaction of the two actors across several dimensions. This implies that "success" for a single actor is predicated not only on that actor's "strengths", but also on the opponent's "weaknesses." This, in turn, suggests that outcomes will only occur at the point in time at which some "interlocking" of strengths and weaknesses of the two actors takes place. Additionally, our analysis of the two ongoing cases provides some preliminary indications that our model may also be applicable to situations in which "alternative outcomes" emerge, such as negotiated settlements, truces and chronic stalemate.
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In accomplishing any work of this sort, one necessarily accrues substantial debts both professional and personal, and my experience has been no different. I am particularly indebted to a number of the professors I have had the good fortune to be associated with. Without the encouragement and assistance of Dr. Val Asseto at Colorado State University I would never have presumed to pursue graduate studies in the first place. My thesis director, Dr. Robert H. Dix, has been my mentor in every sense of the word. With patience and dedication, he has taught me a great deal, not only about political science, but about kindness and decency. To both of these people I owe a profound debt of gratitude, and a pledge that I will endeavor to some day pass on their lessons to others.

I dedicate this work to my parents and to my wife. The support of my parents throughout my many years of education is the sole reason that I have been fortunate enough to reach this point. From my earliest memories through to this day, they have recalled to me the value of education, and their love and support has enabled me to pursue my dreams. My greatest debt of all is owed to my wife, Jong Im. With patience, love and gentle prodding she helped me through what would have otherwise been an unbearable experience. Perhaps ironically, having finished writing this lengthy piece of work, I find myself at a loss for words to describe the depth of my love and respect for the remarkable woman with whom I share my life.
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CHAPTER ONE
THEORY & BACKGROUND

There has been extensive work done on the conditions surrounding revolutions and insurgency, but comparatively little attention has been paid to the actual process of fighting guerrilla wars. The work that has explicitly concerned itself with the processes of insurgency has largely been of the "how to" variety, i.e., how to conduct a guerrilla/anti-guerrilla campaign successfully. The authors of such works, from either the incumbent (Kitson 1971; Galula 1964; Osanka, in Little 1971; Furniss 1966; Barber & Ronning 1966) or insurgent (Guevara 1966, Mao 1961; Marighela, in Moss 1971) perspective, have generally concerned themselves less with theory than with questions of tactics and logistics.

Among those who are concerned with theoretical issues, the tendency in the majority of works is an analytic focus on the conditions or situations that attend to the phenomenon of revolution, rather than on the dynamics of the power struggle itself. This is not to suggest that these theorists explicitly ignore revolutionary processes in their analyses, nor that a focus on situations which surround revolution is unwarranted. On the contrary, emphasis and sound theorizing on the conditions which portend or activate revolutions and/or which account for revolutionary outcomes and transformations is clearly requisite for any complete understanding of the phenomenon. Yet any understanding of revolution which accounts for all or most of the conditions which make such an event possible, yet which fails to trace the mechanisms by which it takes place is necessarily incomplete. As Rod Aya points out, "All the rules of chess and points of strategy cannot predict the course of a game. Why should it be different with the more complex competition of revolutions?" (Aya 1979, p. 78)

The task, then, of this analysis is to attempt to generate and test models of the dynamics of the conflict itself. In a broader sense, this study will attempt to contribute to the
understanding of revolution and insurgency by examining the processes they entail, a vital link between the more frequently studied "origins and outcomes" aspects of the topic.

Before attempting this, though, it is necessary to briefly review the contributions and limitations of existing theoretical models of revolution in order that the key insights they afford might be incorporated into this study.

As suggested above, much of the prominent literature on revolution and insurgency tends to primarily focus either on the conditions under which societies are "compelled" to revolt or the conditions under which the incumbent regime "allows" people to revolt.

Analysis of the former category is typified by the work of Ted Robert Gurr, James Davies and others who seek to explain the occurrence of revolution, or more accurately, of revolutionary conditions, with reference to the aggregate level of societal disaffection and grievances. Specifically, these theories are based on the psychological concept of the "frustration-aggression" nexus, wherein individuals (and by extension, societies) are compelled to violence when their aspirations, both material and general, remain unsatisfied.

Gurr outlines the conceptual basis of these psychologically rooted studies in his seminal work, Why Men Rebel:

The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. Discontent, arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence. Relative deprivation is defined as a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. (Gurr 1970, p. 12-13)

For Gurr, and other exponents of psychologically-based models, the focus of analysis is squarely on the ruled, i.e., society at large: revolutions are the result of a people "pushed" to the breaking point by intolerable discrepancies between what is and what they feel should be. This mass discontent is largely the explanatory basis of the three aspects of political
violence under examination in Gurr's study: its sources, magnitude and forms.

Davies as well focuses on mass discontent, and attempts to specify the point at which societal "frustration" becomes translated into revolution through reference to what he calls the "J-curve." He describes the process as follows: "The J-curve is this: revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes intolerable." (Davies 1962, p. 6) Thus, for Davies, as well as other psychologically-based theorists, the key to explaining revolutions lies in identifying the existence of widespread social grievances which are not being resolved by the incumbent regime.

Charles Tilly, in an analysis which Theda Skocpol says, "was born in polemic opposition to frustration-aggression explanations of political violence such as Ted Gurr's" (Skocpol 1979, p. 10), develops an alternative model of collective violence. Tilly explicitly rejects the notion that political violence is merely a manifestation of pent-up frustration suddenly released. He identifies problems in both the measurement of the critical variable, relative deprivation, and in the retrospective methods of theorizing which he claims are characteristic of analyses such as Gurr's:

All the attempts to test these attitudinal versions of the theory have been dogged by the difficulty of measuring changes in expectations and achievements for large populations over substantial blocks of time and by the tendency of most analysts to work from the fact of revolution back to the search for evidence of short-run deprivation and the further back to the search for evidence of long-run improvement, not necessarily with respect to the same presumed wants, needs, or expectations. The latter procedure has the advantage of almost always producing a fit between the data and the theory, and the disadvantage of not being a reliable test of the theory. (Tilly 1978, p. 207)

For Tilly, the necessary components in collective violence are mobilization and organization, for they provide the means by which the widespread social grievances cited by Gurr are translated into concrete collective action, in this case, political violence. Also in
contrast to Gurr, Tilly stressed that conflict was a characteristic of the normal processes of politics, and thus, to paraphrase Clausewitz, that political violence is simply an extension of politics by other means. This violence, then, is only likely to occur when the disgruntled members of a society possess both the wherewithal and organization to perpetrate it.

To account for the appearance of political violence, Tilly develops two models: the "polity model", which identifies the relevant actors in the political system under examination and their positions relative to one another; and the "mobilization model", which describes the characteristics and behavior of each of these relevant actors.

The former model outlines the relationships between different sets of actors within a given political population. It includes the Government, which maintains coercive control of the population at large; and Contenders, who are both "members" of the polity (possessing "routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the government") and "challengers" (all groups which are not "members"). Also included in the polity model are Coalitions, which represent coordinated collective efforts between a set of actors.

The latter model is integral in explaining both the likelihood and extent of an actor's collective action, and the likely responses to that action by other actors. It is the general relationship between these sets of actors within the polity, rather than the level of frustration or disillusionment within any single actor, which lies at the heart of revolutions. When a set of contenders with sufficient organization and resources appears, and advances claims for control contrary to those of the government, then a situation of what Tilly calls "multiple sovereignty" exists:

   In order to produce multiple sovereignty, and thus become revolutionary, commitments to some alternative claimant must be activated in the face of prohibitions or contrary directives from the government. The moment at which some people belonging to members of the alternative coalition seize control over some portion of the government, and other people not previously attached to the coalition honor their directives, marks the beginning of a revolutionary situation. (Tilly 1978, p. 208)

Whereas Gurr's work sees revolutions and political violence in largely deterministic
terms (i.e., violence "erupts" when social frustration reaches a given boiling point), Tilly's model portrays these events in more voluntarist terms as primarily the work of calculating actors using a specific set of means (political violence) to achieve identifiable interests. In this sense, Tilly shares common ground with theorists and practitioners of revolution who adhere to the writings of Lenin. Like Lenin, Tilly sees an organized, conspiratorial element as essential to the successful instigation of revolutions. Describing the onset of multiple sovereignty, he writes, "The presence of a coherent revolutionary organization makes a great difference at exactly this point." (Tilly 1978, p. 208)

At the same time, Tilly recognizes that there are inherent problems in attempting to explain or understand phenomena in which "voluntarist" elements are prominent: "...the existence of such an organization also makes the start of revolution more closely dependent on the decisions of a small number of men -- and thus, paradoxically, subject to chance and idiosyncrasy." (Tilly 1978, p. 208)

In an effort to remove the theoretical problems associated with voluntarist explanations, Theda Skocpol and others have developed a "structural approach" to the study of revolutions. Explicitly rejecting the notion that revolutions are "made" by purposive movements of dedicated revolutionaries, Skocpol argues instead for a theoretical focus on the class structure of states and their relationship to international historical developments.

For Skocpol, it is the collapse of the state's capacity to rule that creates the fissures through which revolutionary masses arise, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, this collapse is primarily the result of forces outside the domestic arena, specifically competitive pressures from other states. These external pressures, when viewed in conjunction with the structural class relationships between the state and elites, explain why some states experience revolution while others do not. Faced with competition to modernize and develop from external actors, states with a power base which is sufficiently autonomous from elite-controlled resources are capable of adequately responding to the
external threat without jeopardizing their internal control. On the other hand, states which do not enjoy a power base that is independent of elite control are essentially caught between a rock and a hard place. They feel compelled to initiate changes in the society to respond to external threats, yet in so doing they set the stage for open conflict between themselves and the powerful elite, and ultimately create the conditions for the demise of both parties through peasant revolution.

Skocpol's analysis introduces important new theoretical elements into the study of revolution with regard to the nature of the process of revolution, the nature of the state, and the role of international forces in domestic conflict. As mentioned above, Skocpol rejects the portrayal of revolutionary processes as the product of purposive, avowedly revolutionary vanguard organizations: "... in no sense did such vanguards -- let alone vanguards with large, mobilized and ideologically imbued mass followings -- ever create the revolutionary crises they exploited." (Skocpol 1979, p. 17)

With regard to the state, she departs from the conventional view held (implicitly or explicitly) by theorists from Marx to Gurr that the state is essentially the executive committee of the ruling class. Instead, she argues that, "it is essential to conceive of states as administrative and coercive organizations -- organizations that are potentially autonomous from (though of course conditioned by) socioeconomic interests and structures." (Skocpol 1979, p.14)

Finally, given that revolutions are not "made" by revolutionaries and that states are potentially autonomous units with goals and interests that may conflict with those of domestic elites, Skocpol asserts that we must look for pressures on the state which will exacerbate these conflicts. If these pressures do not, as Skocpol claims, arise from the lower classes or revolutionary organizations, then where do they come from? The world-historical situation of the state in the international community is the source of these pressures. As states face severe political and military competition from other states, they
will be faced with the option of either submitting to a foreign competitor or restructuring their society in such a way as to increase the state’s resource extraction capabilities.

It should be obvious at this point that there is a great diversity of thought as to what constitutes the most fruitful approach to the study of revolution. Despite this diversity, there is an underlying similarity in each of the approaches discussed above: all seek to identify the conditions under which revolutions occur. In so doing, however, they tend to overlook an important part of the phenomenon of revolution, namely the dynamics of the process itself. As a result, there exists a gap in our understanding of revolution. We are incapable of explaining why certain revolutionary movements are able to achieve their aims of overthrowing incumbent regimes while others are not, save with reference to the presence or absence of the specified conditions.

For Gurr, societies are "compelled" to revolt when their situation becomes intolerable. Gurr does include a series of mediating variables (eg., "regime coercive potential, institutionalization, facilitation, legitimacy"), yet these factors are essentially static in that their values at the onset of the conflict are carried through the entire episode. In other words, there is no satisfactory mechanism for dealing which either the interaction of these variables with each other, or with changes in the variables themselves over time. In this framework, then, the only explanation we can offer as to why a given insurgency fails is that either the level of relative deprivation was not sufficiently high to produce revolution or that the intervening variables prevented the translation of discontent into revolution. In short, if deprivation is "high" and the mediating factors do not "block" the frustrated social elements from initiating widespread violence against the incumbents, revolution will occur.

Skocpol turns the analytic focus around, concentrating instead on the conditions under which states "allow" revolution to occur through fissures in its coercive capacity. In this conception, revolution is the result of a collapse of the state brought about by international competitive pressures. If a given state is confronted by such pressures, and it is of a given
structural type, revolution will occur.

For Tilly, who perhaps comes closest to a dynamic approach to revolution, the theoretical focus must include both the regime and its opponents. Yet even Tilly's model stops short of explicitly analyzing the process of revolution, i.e. the strategic interactions of the two actors. He speaks of "revolutionary situations" arriving, but does not account for the differing degrees of success which insurgents enjoy once these propitious moments appear. To be sure, he outlines what sort of requirements the insurgents face in order to be successful: organization, mobilization and coercive capability. But at the heart of it, Tilly's model is also essentially concerned with "necessary" conditions. If a revolutionary situation arises, and if the opposition possesses the requisite characteristics, then revolution will occur.

What is missing in all theoretical constructions of this sort is a model which accounts for the different courses that revolutionary movements have taken after they have appeared. The fact remains that many more revolutionary movements appear than are ever successful. Given this, approaches which concentrate on "necessary" conditions are faced with a host of questions which are unanswerable in any prospective, as opposed to retrospective, manner. This difficulty is easily illustrated with a hypothetical case: if we see an insurgency in Country X, then logically extending the "conditions" argument, we can expect either a fairly quick defeat of the movement ("insufficient" conditions) or an insurgent victory ("sufficient" conditions). What to make, then, of an insurgency which persists in a state of stalemate for a long period of time? The arguments discussed thus far would leave us little in the way of predictive explanation, at best we would have to wait until the process sorted itself out and then seek to identify the levels (sufficient or insufficient) of the critical variable in order to explain the outcome.

It is this gap in our understanding that this analysis will attempt to bridge. In this sense, it is narrower in scope than the existing theories of revolution, for it does not seek to
support or refute alternative explanations, but to supplement them. To do so, it will develop models designed to explain variable outcomes in the process of insurgency through reference to the strategic interactions between the contenders for power. Clearly, this attempt could benefit greatly from an incorporation of the relevant features of existing theoretical frameworks. For instance, this analysis will only seek to explain what the result of a particular set of strategic interactions will be. It will not, however, attempt to explain why a particular actor opted for a particular strategy. This is where existing theories provide valuable insights as to the conditions which produce certain behavior. Yet it is equally important, and the task of this analysis to explain what the effects of this behavior are on insurgency outcomes.

CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES/RECURRING THEMES

The challenge facing this analysis, and others seeking to explain various aspects of the process of domestic conflict is cogently outlined in an essay by Charles Tilly:

In International Relations, a large share of all theories are purposive: they state how an actor or set of actors with a given array of orientations and a given set of means might be expected to behave. The literature of domestic conflict contains relatively few purposive theories, especially theories sufficiently specified to yield predictions about real events. Instead, theories of domestic conflict are largely causal: they aim implicitly at stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for different sorts of action, such as nationalist movements, revolutions or strikes. (Tilly, in Luthebacher & Ward 1985, p. 527)

In developing the models used in this analysis, which will hopefully contribute to the sort of theory building suggested by Tilly, three broad sets of assumptions will form the basis of the analytical framework:

1. Insurgency is not entirely reducible to either deterministic or voluntaristic elements, but involves a combination of both. Actors make behavioral choices within a range of constraints imposed by their circumstances. Given this, it is implausible to assume a priori either that certain preconditions generate "inevitable" behavior, or that the actions of a single actor are solely responsible for outcomes. The need for a multi-actor focus which assumes
that outcomes are the result of strategic interactions becomes apparent if one pictures insurgency as analogous to war. A study of war which assumed either a wholly determinist (i.e., the outcome was inevitable from the start) or a wholly voluntarist (i.e., the outcome is entirely attributable to the actions of one actor) outlook would be regarded with suspicion. It is argued here that the same applies to studies of insurgency.

2. The process of insurgency is a dynamic event, with an inherent logic that merits consideration independent of the preconditions which led to its occurrence. Consequently, the process is best explained by dynamic models which are capable of generating probabilistic predictions for the outcomes of a range of possible strategic interactions between the actors involved.

3. The struggle for power in insurgent conflicts is marked by competition between rebels and incumbents in both the military and political spheres for the support (or at least non-interference) of the population at large. The central actors in the process are using both political and military tactics as a means to achieve the end of mobilizing sufficient popular support to become the locus of administrative and coercive power within the national territory. It is assumed that compliance by the population to the directives of one or the other opposing programs is achieved by a combination of coercion and persuasion, that different members of society respond to a variety of incentives and disincentives at different periods of time. The central assumptions behind this concept are that winning coalitions in insurgencies are constructed through a mixture of support and submission, and that, consequently, there are combinations of political and military tactics for each actor which maximize the likelihood of that actor building a coalition of sufficient size to prevail.

As these sets of assumptions are central to the subsequent analysis, it is necessary at this point to discuss them in greater detail.

FOCUS ON INTERACTION: Options & Constraints

The need to include all the relevant actors in an analysis of insurgency seems, on the
face of it, to hardly need justification. Yet the prevalent theories on the subject, tending as they do to rigidly adopt either a determinist or voluntarist perspective of the conflict, often implicitly ignore this seemingly fundamental precept. For the voluntarists, revolutions are either "won" through the tactical genius of the guerrillas or "lost" through the incompetence of the incumbents. For the determinists, historical or structural conditions are the primary forces driving the process of insurgency, relegating the behavior of the actors involved to irrelevant motions in an inevitable dialectic.

It is suggested here that neither approach, employed in absolute terms, is sufficient to account for the complex phenomenon of revolution. Rather, an approach which synthesizes both voluntarist and determinist elements is necessary.

The limits of relying on one or the other perspectives, implicitly or explicitly, have been pointed out by adherents of opposing perspectives. The structuralist argument against a voluntarist (or "purposive") image of revolutions is made forcefully by Skocpol:

... the purposive image is very misleading about both the causes and processes of social revolutions that have actually occurred historically. As for causes, no matter what form social revolutions conceivably might take in the future... the fact is that historically no successful social revolution has ever been "made" by a mass-mobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement... True enough, revolutionary organizations and ideologies have helped to cement the solidarity of radical vanguards before and/or during revolutionary crises. And they have greatly facilitated the consolidation of new regimes. But in no sense did such vanguards -- let alone vanguards with large mobilized, and ideologically imbued mass followings -- ever create the revolutionary crises they exploited. (Skocpol 1979, p. 17)

For Skocpol, and other structuralists, revolutionary crises arise not from the behavior of a single actor or even set of actors, but instead from forces beyond the control of the participants in the revolutionary process. Given this, she goes on to outline what the proper analytical focus should be:

To explain social revolutions, one must find problematic, first, the emergence (not "making") of a revolutionary situation within an old regime. Then, one must be able to identify the objectively conditioned and complex intermeshing of the various actions of the diversely situated groups -- an
intermeshing that shapes the revolutionary process and gives rise to the new regime. One can begin to make sense of such complexity only by focusing simultaneously upon the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies within world-historically developing international structures. (Skocpol 1979, p. 18)

Skocpol is making two related sets of arguments in justifying her adherence to a structural perspective. First, that revolutionary situations are characterized by the complex interactions of a wide variety of groups, both within the state and society and outside of them. Second, the complexity of these interactions makes the designs and intentions of any particular actor largely irrelevant, and therefore a perspective which "rises above" such intentions is called for.

This argument stands in stark contrast with the position of those who suggest that revolutions are "made" by revolutionaries. Not surprisingly, it is most often the case that this is precisely the position adopted by those seeking to "make" a revolution. Guevara, for example, is perhaps the quintessential advocate of the voluntarist perspective. For Guevara, one of the three "fundamental lessons" of the Cuban revolution was that, "It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution to exist; the insurrection can create them." (Guevara, in Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 47)

Non-practitioners as well have attributed primary importance in the explanation of insurgency outcomes to the purposive behavior of a single actor. Soderlund, for example, argues that outcomes depend little on the actions of the insurgents, as Guevara claimed, but rather are a function of the response of the incumbents to the guerrilla threat. For him, "the success of an insurgency . . . must be attributed in large part to the failure of the domestic regime and its international supporters to respond intelligently to the threat, rather than to any inherent strength of the insurgency as a technique of political violence." (Soderlund 1970, p. 353)

The argument to be made here is that adherence to either a determinist perspective, which acknowledges the participation of a variety of actors but attaches primary importance
to factors beyond their manipulation, or to a voluntarist perspective, which emphasizes the role of a single actor at the expense of others, results in an incomplete picture of the insurgency process. A number of authors have suggested that a more appropriate perspective is obtained through synthesizing voluntarist and determinist elements. Himmelstein and Kimmel, in a critique of the perspective taken by Skocpol, make such an argument:

... although [Skocpol] has a great deal to say about the causes and consequences of revolution (and the correlations between them), she devotes scant space to the process of revolution, to how human beings actually make a revolution. This omission arises directly from her insistence on a structural perspective with no admixture of voluntarism. Because of her uncompromising stand against voluntarism, Skocpol forgets that human beings thinking and acting (however haphazardly) are the mediating link between structural conditions and social outcomes. Structural conditions, moreover, do not dictate absolutely what humans do; they merely place certain limits on human action or define a certain range of possibilities. Structural conditions may define the possibilities for mass uprisings or the options available for consolidating state power in a revolutionary situation, but they do not fully explain how particular groups actually act, what options they pursue, or what possibilities they realize. (Himmelstein & Kimmel 1981, p. 1153)

What is needed, then, is an approach which distills elements of both perspectives to provide a balanced picture of the insurgent process. From the determinist perspective, we need to incorporate the notion that the behavior of any single actor is subject to constraints, and from the voluntarist perspective, the notion that the choices made by individual actors ultimately do have an impact on outcomes. We are left with a view of insurgency which assumes that revolutions are neither "made" by the actions of a single actor nor by conditions beyond the manipulation of any of the actors involved, but that insurgent outcomes arise from the interaction of behavioral choices made by the two primary actors, the regime and the insurgents.

FOCUS ON DYNAMIC PROCESS: Prospective Theorizing

There are two advantages in a theoretical focus on dynamics and process in the study of insurgent conflict: 1) it bridges the analytical gap between the origins of the conflict and its
outcomes; 2) it is not inherently restricted to post-hoc explanations of revolutionary events, and instead may be capable of generating empirically verifiable predictions.

With regard to the first point, Aya suggests that,

Revolutions, like collective violence generally, being the offspring of political contests, must be analyzed accordingly. A logical first step, therefore, is a political demarcation of the explicandum, revolution, as an open ended revolutionary situation -- thus avoiding the pitfalls of conventional definitions that short-circuit history, yoking outcomes to intentions in an ersatz totality, The Revolution, which unfolds toward an end state inherent in its "project." (Aya 1975, p. 78)

Analyses all too often link the origins of revolutionary crises to their eventual outcomes without adequately accounting for the intermediate process which connects the two, namely the insurgent conflict. In so doing, they create a number of theoretical problems when faced with the empirical historical evidence. For instance, carrying the "preconditions determine the course of revolutions" argument to its logical conclusion, we must assert that insurgencies which succeed are qualitatively different from those that fail. To do otherwise would clearly be tautologous, i.e., successful insurgencies are different from failed ones because they succeed.

If we do assume that insurgencies which succeed are of a different variety than those which fail, a host of troubling questions remain. It may be plausible to categorically differentiate between winners and losers in insurgencies which occur over a relatively short time span, but what of those which persist? In the case of insurgencies which eventually win, how do we account for their success? Did the "necessary" conditions appear in the course of the struggle, or were they present from the outset? In the case of those which eventually lose, why were they able to persist for so long in an environment which, presumably, lacked the "necessary" elements for revolution to take place? If we take the position that conditions can change in the course of the struggle, then it is clearly necessary to examine the process.

If, on the other hand, we stick to the argument that there were qualitative differences
between winners and losers from the start, how do we account for the significant
differences among winners (and losers, for that matter) in terms of the length of the
conflict? In short, are we prepared to say that conditions in Cuba were "more"
revolutionary than they were in Nicaragua, since the insurgency unfolded in less time in the
former?

The problems inherent in theorizing about revolution with primary reference to the
precipitating factors associated with it are to be found in each of the major works discussed
above. Tilly admits this of his own model, and accurately captures the inadequacies of
others when he says, "Thus, the model ends up like many other insufficiently dynamic
models of conflict (including my own): at best a statement of preconditions for alternative
outcomes to interaction." (Tilly, in Luterbacher & Ward 1985, p. 529)

These shortcomings highlight the need for models designed not only to link
revolutionary preconditions to outcomes, but to hazard short-term predictions as to the
probable course of a struggle which is underway. This is not to suggest that the models
developed in this study will be of the "crystal ball" variety, capable of forecasting with a
high degree of accuracy what the outcomes of a particular insurgency will be. The strategy
instead is to develop models which explicitly tie specific strategic interactions to specific
short-run outcomes.

These models will not seek to predict what the particular behavior of any of the actors
involved will be at any given point in time. Instead, they will be designed to generate a
series of possible paths that, depending on the tactical choices made by the participants, will
chart the course of the insurgency.

Adam Przeworski, discussing the separate but related topic of regime transition,
suggests that this sort of model-building lies at the heart of theorizing about dynamic
phenomena:

Questions concerning possibility are quintessentially theoretical in the
sense that they are not reducible to the description of the actual outcomes.
Assertions of possibility necessarily involve propositions about actions that are contrary to fact, that is, statements that "if someone had done something different under the same conditions, the outcome would have been (or might have been) different." (Przeworski, in O'Donnell, et. al. 1986, p. 48)

Our approach will enable us to both test the predictions generated by the models in light of empirical data on past conflicts to determine their reliability, and to then refine and apply those models to insurgencies currently in progress. The goals and advantages of this type of approach are discussed by Allan and Stahel, who employ dynamic mathematical modeling to analyze the guerrilla conflict in Afghanistan:

Our method allows us to assess the impact upon the course of the war of various strategies one can envision for the parties to the conflict . . . we investigate a current event with the help of a model built on the basis of empirical information obtained from other similar events. (Allan & Stahel 1983, p. 591)

The authors suggest four ways that such an approach can help to enhance our understanding of the phenomenon: 1) by assessing the importance of various facts; 2) by discriminating among alternative assumptions by making explicit their predictions; 3) by rigorously describing the future evolution of the phenomenon on the basis of the assumptions made; and 4) by generating important insights by playing with a model of the phenomenon. (Allan & Stahel 1983, p. 591)

FOCUS ON POLITICAL-MILITARY CONFLICT: Dual Nature of Insurgency

The need for a synthesized approach to insurgency with regard to determinist and voluntarist elements of the struggle applies as well to the characterization of the nature of that struggle. The manner in which theorists of revolution characterize that phenomenon stems in large part from their assumptions as to what constitutes the basis of stability (and by extension, instability) of an existing form of government. Again, all too often these theorists tend to adopt one or the other perspectives rather than an admixture of the two. The perspectives being referred to here are those factors assumed to be responsible for a given regime's stable existence and they fall into either the political (ie., legitimacy, support)
or military (i.e., coercion, submission) category. Depending on whether the theorist sees the
continuance of a particular regime as contingent on one or the other of these sets of factors,
the insurgency will be characterized as either primarily political or military in nature. Thus,
for Gude, the basis of the state is popular support, and consequently the insurgency is a
battle over "legitimacy":

Before violence can become a factor, there must be a governmental
failure to maintain support or legitimacy; otherwise there would be no basis
for a serious threat to it. . . . Officials naturally tend to see problems in a
legal perspective, in terms of the prescribed rules governing peaceful
political bargaining as well as personal behavior. A legal system can
function, however, only so long as there is popular consensus and
legitimacy for that system of laws and rules. The introduction of violence
as a means in the political process indicates that there has been at least a
partial breakdown in support. . . . One of the primary tasks of a regime is to
avoid losing further support; the goal of the insurgents is the converse . . .
the political tasks of a government faced with revolutionary violence must
determine and take precedence over the military tasks. (Gude, in Sarkesian
1975, pp. 570-4)

Similarly, Allan and Stahel see the process of insurgency primarily in political terms:

Guerrilla war is thus a predominantly political war, and the crux of its
success or failure resides in the support of the population. This support
cannot be taken for granted in the long run, even in situations favorable for
the guerrillas. It needs to be consistently gained through a variety of
political measures. But this presupposes a military command that has to
remain subordinate to an efficient guerrilla political command. (Allan &
Stahel 1983, p. 597)

The alternative view, that the basis of the state lies in its ability to monopolize the means
of coercion in society, is taken by others, including Skocpol:

What is wrong with the purposive image of how revolutions develop?
For one thing, it strongly suggests that societal order rests, either
fundamentally or proximately, upon a consensus of the majority (or of the
lower classes) that their needs are being met. This image suggests that the
ultimate and sufficient condition for revolution is the withdrawal of this
consensual support and, conversely, that no regime could survive if the
masses were consciously disgruntled. . . . Yet, surely, any such consensual
and voluntaristic conceptions of societal order and disruption or change are
quite naive. They are belied in the most obvious fashion by the prolonged
survival of such blatantly repressive and domestically illegitimate regimes as
the South African. (Skocpol 1979, p. 16)
Leites and Wolf are even more succinct in their characterization of the insurgent struggle, saying, "the contest between [the insurgents and the regime] is . . . a contest in the efficient management of coercion." (Leites & Wolf 1970, p. 56)

Once again, however, it is apparent that neither perspective can claim exclusive analytical superiority and that attempting to employ one without the other will result in a distorted view of the process. A synthetic approach, one which assumes neither that regime survival depends solely on support or on submission, provides a more viable way of conceptualizing the nature of insurgency.

Przeworski, for example, points out that a loss of "legitimacy" alone can certainly not predict the demise of a particular regime, pointing out that

... if one cannot engage in [anti-regime] behaviors without risking an almost certain extinction, one may believe that the regime is totally illegitimate and yet behave in an acquiescing manner. If legitimacy is in fact efficacious in maintaining a particular regime, it is precisely because it constitutes organized consent. If the belief in the legitimacy of the regime collapses and no alternative is organized, individuals have no choice. (Przeworski, in O'Donnell, et. al. 1986, p. 53)

It should be added, however, that even where anti-regime behavior does carry with it the risk of "extinction", as is the case in many if not all of the insurgent situations under examination here, some individuals choose to accept these risks. This suggests that if legitimacy alone is insufficient to explain regime survival, then pure coercion as well must be considered an incomplete mechanism for regime maintenance.

The perspective taken here is that individuals respond to a variety of incentives and sanctions, responses which can and do vary over time. This perspective is similar, in the sense that it imposes no restrictive assumptions on the possible range of individual responses, to the one adopted by Gerald Platt when he says, "no individual lives solely in the world of mundane interests or in the spirituality of cultural beliefs. Rather both are simultaneously operative in every act of every individual." (Platt 1984, pp. 111-2)

Given this, then, our analysis will model the behavior of the population at large on the
assumption that there are modal, society-wide responses to the particular mixture of political and military tactics pursued by the combatants in insurgencies. This implies that there are "optimal" strategies or tactical mixtures which can maximize the support of the actor employing them among the targeted population.
CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH DESIGN

A. CONCEPTS & ASSUMPTIONS

THE NATURE OF SUPPORT

The issue of support, we believe, is grounded in the fundamental relationship between
the citizen and the state. Without becoming overly bogged down in a complicated and hotly
debated topic of concern, we suggest that the roots of popular support lie in the expectations
and beliefs of individual citizens with regard to the role of government and authority.

In evaluating the extent to which he or she should grant support (or at least,
acquiesence) to the state, the individual could conceivably take into account an infinite
number of criteria, from the relevant to the frivolous. What these criteria boil down to,
however, is the individual's definition of the minimalist conditions that an entity must
satisfy in order to qualify as a "government."

There are two types of situations where the individual's evaluation would lead him to
submit to the authority of such an entity: 1) the individual's minimal conditions are satisfied
by the entity, or 2) no alternative entity exists to which the individual can transfer
"allegiance."

In the framework of our analysis, considering as we are only cases where support
choices do exist, the second situation is irrelevant. It is important to note that we are not
suggesting that the recognition of an entity's authority by the individual constitutes any
affective attachment to that entity on his part. The individual may loathe the entity, yet
submit to its authority out of fear of sanction. Nor are we suggesting that the individual can
only lend "allegiance" to a single entity at a time. Indeed, it is frequently the case in
situations of insurgency that individuals recognize one authority by day and another by
night.

The process we envision runs something like this: As an existing government fails to
fulfill its "obligations" (as these are subjectively defined by different citizens) and an alternative entity, the insurgent organization, satisfies these requirements, some segment of the population will transfer its recognition of authority from the state to the insurgents. In short, as the guerrillas begin to act more like a government, and the incumbents less like one, more people will comply with the directives of the insurgents. Of course, the converse is also true.

A number of authors have noted that there seem to be fairly recurrent patterns of relations between authority and individuals which make possible the identification of the minimalist definitions of "government" mentioned above. Moore, for example, has suggested that there are essentially three basic requirements, or obligations, which have traditionally faced authorities: "protection from foreign enemies... maintenance of peace and order...[and] contributions to material security of the subjects." (Moore 1978, pp. 21-2)

Moore and others have further suggested that it is the failure of authorities to meet these obligations, or to break the "implicit social contract" which binds rulers and subjects, which creates a vacuum within which a "counter-state" can take hold. Timothy Wickham-Crowley outlines this argument in the form of a proposition, "The more extreme the decline or absence of legitimate authority [ie, one which meets its obligations] in a region, the more the populace becomes 'virgin territory' for those who would become a 'counter-state' or alternative government. Corollary: The more that legitimate authority persists in a region, the more likely that the populace will reject the claims of the challengers." (Wickham-Crowley 1987, p. 478)

We will operate throughout our analysis with the assumption that it is this relationship between authority and individuals which lies at the heart of support decisions, and ultimately, to insurgency outcomes.

**TACTICS, INTERACTION & SUPPORT**

As was suggested earlier, we will explicitly assume in our model that popular support is
mobilized. What we mean by this is that the decision to support or defect from the side of either the regime or the insurgents is made by individuals based on their assessment of the behavior, or tactics, of these two actors. Clearly, this is a rather idealized portrayal of the individual's decision calculus, assuming, for example, such unlikely conditions as complete and accurate information and zero-sum support options. But as an aggregate conceptual tool it is a useful way of portraying the decision environment in which the individual finds himself during cases of insurgency. For our purposes, the assumptions of idealized decision-making conditions are not especially harmful or distorting for several reasons. The question of information availability would be critical, for example, if we wished to evaluate the decision-making of an individual or small group, but in terms of large social sectors it tends to average out for several reasons.

One is that in the overall melange of misinformation, disinformation and rumor prevalent in insurgent situations, individuals will tend toward "attentisme", or fence-sitting, rather than making immediate support decisions based on what they likely know is incomplete or distorted information. Another is that, although in an idealized sense our model is designed to be based on the "actual" behavior of the primary actors, it is in fact based on the available information concerning that behavior. In other words, the model will essentially be forced to operate under approximately the same informational constraints that prevail for those within the society seeking to make their decision as to which side to support.

Thus, the model, like the individuals, will characterize a given set of tactics by weighing the available information concerning both stated intentions and actual implementation. We don't seek to downplay the dangers inherent in an approach which relies on available information. Clearly there are a number of possible sources of error, given the problems of differential media access and the conscious manipulation of information by those involved for political reasons. Yet these same distortions are present in the decision environment of the individuals under examination, and since it is essentially
impossible to obtain completely accurate first-hand information on tactical behavior throughout the course of an insurgency, both for involved citizens and researchers alike, our approach would seem to be a viable one.

The second assumption, that individuals face a basically zero-sum choice in making their support decision, also raises some questions which need to be addressed. Obviously this constraint on the possible option set facing individuals is a simplified portrayal of the actual decision environment. There is certainly a wide range of possible responses to the political chaos of insurgent situations. What, then, is our justification for portraying support decisions as zero-sum? We are examining a fairly specific phenomenon, armed revolutionary insurgency, and its relationship to popular support. In doing so, we are narrowing our research focus to exclude a host of other situations which also concern political support choices, such as elections, protests and even non-violent anti-regime movements. By including only those cases in which an armed group explicitly seeks not only to remove the incumbent regime, but to restructure the political system itself, we are limiting our focus to situations of essential polarity. To be more specific, we would define revolutionary insurgent conflicts as situations in which some subgroup of the society seeks to effect fundamental changes in the existing sociopolitical system (i.e., class relations, modes of citizen participation, distribution political and economic power, elite membership, etc.) by overthrowing the incumbents through the use of a variety of means, including armed attacks.

Of course, even in these situations the option set does not break down to only two possibilities. Yet there are, in a broad sense, only two distinct support choices to be made: Does the individual support the goal of replacing the existing political system with another one (whatever its configuration) or does he support the maintenance of the current structure (with or without the incumbents retaining office)?

Support for the former goal would constitute, in our conceptualization, support for the insurgents, while support for the latter would be regarded as regime support. Again we
need to point out that support is a potentially misleading term in this sense, since we do not stipulate that "insurgent supporters" actually agree with the specific political program of the guerrillas, only that they agree with the goal of a revolutionary overthrow of the existing system of government. For our purposes, then, characterizing the decisional environment as zero-sum does not oversimplify the actual process to a degree which would seriously undermine our model.

It would be useful at this stage to explain just what we mean when we speak of "tactics" and "tactical interaction." At the most elementary level, a tactic is any particular instance of behavior on the part of an actor. This could include virtually any and all acts undertaken by the actors: guerrillas kidnap a diplomat, army troops detain suspects, the government opens a new school, etc. Clearly this definition of tactics would at the least present the researcher with overwhelming problems of measurement and data availability. Additionally, there are conceptual reasons why, for our purposes anyway, we would want to use a less unwieldy definition of the term. We are concerned with tactics in terms of their relationship to popular support. During the course of an insurgency, both primary actors engage in literally thousands of instances of behavior. If we were to attach conceptual meaning to each and every such instance, we would in effect be suggesting that individuals in the society were making virtually instantaneous calculations concerning their support decision and constantly updating their political positions on the basis of these calculations. This would appear to be counterintuitive at best. Individuals do not tend to make serious political decisions in very short periods of time, especially not when these decisions are accompanied by the grave consequences prevalent in insurgent situations. Instead, we are concerned with a broader picture of the behavior by both sides. Our definition of tactics, then, will focus on aggregated patterns of regime and insurgent behavior instead of individual instances, or programs rather than specific acts. Our justification for using this conceptualization of tactics lies in our assumptions about how individuals make political decisions. We assume that citizens base their support decisions on a fairly sophisticated
calculus of self-interest. Like the consumer in the economist's mythical marketplace, individuals evaluate the probable "payoffs" of the competing political programs and opt for the higher return on the investment of their support. When we use the term "tactics", then, we refer to the specific program of political and military measures undertaken by an actor in the course of the insurgency.

Having discussed support decisions at some length now, our next question concerns how these assessments are arrived at. We will attempt in our model to strike something of a middle ground between those who feel that the primary actors have little or no influence on the outcome of the process and those who see one or the other side as primarily determining the outcome through their actions. We will argue that both sides exert a great deal of influence over the level of support each enjoys in the society at large, but at the same time neither can "impose" an outcome on the situation solely through their tactical decisions. Instead, the primary actors are constrained by the tactics of their opponents. Thus, if one of the actors employs a particularly "effective" (i.e., support maximizing) combination of tactics, their "success" will be discounted by the "effectiveness" of their opponent's tactics. In order to achieve one's objectives, then, it is necessary not only to pursue an effective strategy, but also to face an opponent who pursues a less effective strategy. In short, we are looking at interactions. It is not so much the specific tactical program of an actor which is important, rather it is the relative effectiveness of that program in relation to the actor's competitor.

B. MODEL

INTRODUCTION

The model to be employed in this analysis will consist of a computer simulation based on hypothesized relationships between specific tactical behavior on the part of the primary actors and the support accorded them by the population at large on the basis of that behavior. The simulation will be run on evidence gathered from case studies of various insurgency situations. A more detailed outline of the simulation will follow, but a brief
description is in order here. (See Fig. 2.1)

The first step for each case will entail accumulation of information concerning the behavior of the insurgents and regimes beginning from the outset (first identification of an armed revolutionary organization in operation) through the outcome (collapse of either insurgents or regime) of the event. This information will then be coded such that each actor will receive a political and military tactical score for each six-month period according to scales developed from the hypothesized tactics-support relationship. These tactical scores will then be converted into support differential scores which will reflect the predicted support levels resulted from the interaction of the two actors. This support differential score will form the basis for an outcome prediction.

**Figure 2.1: SIMULATION OUTLINE**

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CASE STUDIES USED TO GENERATE TIME-SERIES DATA (6-mo intervals) ➔ DATA CODED INTO POL-MIL TACTICAL SCORES FOR EACH ACTOR ➔ TACTICAL SCORES CONVERTED INTO SUPPORT DIFFERENTIAL SCORES ➔ SUPPORT SCORES USED TO PLOT OUTCOMES
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With this brief outline in mind, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the various elements which make up the model. We will first cover the hypothesized relationships between tactics and support at a general level, move on to discuss the specific tactical scales to be used for the actors in both the political and military spheres, and conclude with an outline of the mechanics of the simulation.

**TACTICS & SUPPORT**

As our model is based on the assumption that popular support is a function of the behavior of the two primary actors, a fundamental aspect of our analysis is the specification of just how support and tactics are related. The relationships we suggest are of necessity hypothetical. In the absence of continuous, universal polling of individuals during cases of insurgency concerning their response to particular acts on the part of the combatants, it is
difficult to see how empirically verified relationships could be specified.

We will instead suggest relationships which are plausible, seeking to test their validity to the extent possible when the model is applied to actual cases. Obviously this process involves making assumptions about the behavior of individuals. In this sense, it is similar to much of the theorizing in social choice theory, where individuals are assumed to act "rationally" to maximize their self-interests. Of course such assumptions are abstractions, but on the whole they provide a useful conceptual tool for the understanding of aggregate behavior.

The first set of relationships we consider encompasses the realm of political behavior. Within the category of political tactics, we will specify two dimensions: incorporation and performance. Both are concerned with the relations between the individual and the actor which seeks to establish authority over that individual, or in other words, seeks to mobilize his support.

The first dimension, incorporation, refers to the extent to which the individual evaluates himself to be integrated into the system under the authority's jurisdiction. Since it would be difficult, if not impossible, to directly measure this dimension at the individual level, we will be using the surrogate measure of group incorporation.

We envision several modes of incorporation. The most clearly identifiable would be formally announced coalitions or alliances between an actor and an existing group. Perhaps the purest manifestation of this type of coalition would involve the support for an actor, in this case almost certainly the incumbent regime, by a political party which had an extensive network of both vertical and horizontal social ties. Where such ties exist, there is little room left for challengers to mobilize significant numbers of people into their coalition. When challengers are faced with situations where pervasive organization and mobilization has already taken place, they operate in what Alexander has called "occupied ground", and their prospects for success are dim. (Alexander 1973, p. 227)

Of course, this does not imply that once this ground is occupied the situation is
irreversible. In cases where existing ties decay or are broken, there once again appears an organizational vacuum within which contenders can operate. Wickham-Crowley has aptly described such situations as "virgin territory" for counter-mobilization, as opposed to "occupied ground." (Wickham-Crowley 1987, p. 478)

Yet this mode of incorporation, wherein formal organizational ties exist between social sectors and actors, is less common than more subtle forms of incorporation, particularly with reference to the insurgents. The reasons for existing organizations to favor less explicit linkages to insurgents are fairly self-evident. A public pronouncement of the establishment of an alliance between such a group and the patently illegal insurgents would immediately expose that group to the same sorts of punitive measures taken against the insurgents. In effect, the group would be subjecting itself to all of the risks involved in "subversive" activity with none of the (presumed) protection that an armed revolutionary apparatus affords. A more judicious strategy would entail implicit support for the insurgents, which would allow the group to avoid the de facto withdrawal from the sphere of "legitimate" political activity which formal alliances imply.

Another mode of incorporation would involve the actual formation of support groups at the instigation of one of the actors. To a large extent, the objectives of this type of action are quite similar to those of the implicit coalitions mentioned above, and in fact differs only in terms of the identity of those who actually establish the organization in question. This distinction is, for our purposes, essentially irrelevant. In any case, the difficulties in assessing accurately whether or not a particular support group was created as a front by one of the actors or simply acts on the basis of concurrent interests are manifest. What is of concern to us here is the fact that such groups provide the actors with a vehicle for projecting themselves as representative of a social spectrum which extends beyond their immediate organizations.

A final mode of incorporation, considerably more nebulous, consists of broad appeals made by the primary actors designed to promote the notion among members of the targeted
social sector that their interests are coincidental, or at a minimum not contradictory, with those of the actor. Such appeals are fashioned such that they identify which social sectors are considered "worthy" allies of the actor, or in other words, demarcate the lines between enemies and friends. This process, when undertaken by an actor seeking to broaden his support base through wider incorporation, will often entail the modification or obfuscation of the actor's position on relevant issues. It is generally noted that building "winning coalitions" involves maximizing the number of people you appeal to, and minimizing the number you alienate.

The only two successful insurgencies in recent Latin American history provide examples of this approach. In Cuba, and to a lesser extent, Nicaragua, the insurgents sought to limit the degree to which the anti-government movement, as a whole, was identified with "radical" ideological positions during the course of the struggle. Observers such as Weitz suggest that these "public professions of moderation" were significant factors in the construction of broad anti-regime coalitions in these countries. (Weitz 1986, pp. 400-1)

Regimes as well have undertaken "position modifications", perhaps the most far-reaching being the extension of amnesty programs to guerrillas who agree to participate within the proscribed political limits. Such programs, for example in Venezuela and El Salvador, are designed to demonstrate that the political system is maximally incorporative, i.e. anyone who agrees to "play by the rules" is allowed to participate. (Levine 1973, pp. 223-4)

Seemingly, we have to this point covered quite a variety of different phenomena when we speak of incorporation. At the heart of it, though, we are interested in the efforts on the part of the actors to make targeted social sectors "feel welcome" in the coalition. In the abstract, it would seem possible for both actors to pursue a total incorporation strategy, in which all social sectors are recognized as legitimate participants. As a consequence, incorporation would be neutralized, since social sectors would presumably be "welcome" in
either coalition and the support decision would be a function of other factors.

In practice, though, this is probably never the case, since both primary actors have at their foundation some core interests which would stand in opposition to the interests of some social sectors. In other words, there is almost always a "cost" to the targeted sector associated with incorporation. For example, the insurgents might welcome members of the ruling class, the military, the bourgeoisie provided they were "progressive", meaning they supported certain key elements of the insurgents' political program. Or a regime might offer amnesty or legalization for revolutionary groups provided they agree to work within existing political constraints.

With these limits in mind, let us now turn to our hypothesized relationship between incorporation tactics and popular support. As our discussion to this point suggests, we see a positive linear relation holding between the efforts of the actors to incorporate and the support accorded them. (See Fig. 2.2)

**Figure 2.2: INCORPORATION TACTICS & POPULAR SUPPORT**
We see incorporation tactics as a continuum, ranging between extreme exclusiveness (low) to extreme inclusiveness (high). We will address the specifics of incorporation tactics in the next section and need only note here that the hypothesized relationship is based on the assumption that as an actor moves from low to high on this scale, constraints on the potential size of the actor's coalition are removed.

The second dimension of political tactics, performance, refers to the individual's evaluation of the costs and benefits associated with the relationship between himself and the authority. This evaluation is rooted in the concept of the "implicit social contract" between governors and governed discussed earlier. In short, it is the individual's perception of the value of the services provided by the authority relative to the resources extracted by it. If the individual perceives the relationship to be largely parasitic on the part of the state, little support will be forthcoming. On the other hand, if the relationship is felt to be highly beneficial from the individual's perspective, there will be a high level of support.

One of the difficulties in trying to utilize the concept of performance is its diverse impact across social sectors and the complex nature of the political repercussions associated with this impact. The root of these difficulties lies in the alternative implications of assuming either a variable-sum or zero-sum description of the distribution of goods and services by an actor.

A variable-sum assumption would posit that a growth in the provision of "goods" for one social sector would not by necessity involve a commensurate decline in the goods provided for other sectors. While this assumption might hold reasonably well at the level of what are normally considered "public goods" (e.g., water, roads, etc.), it becomes increasingly less convincing when we look at more fungible resources and redistributive programs.

In such instances, a zero-sum assumption would seem, at first glance, to be more plausible. Thus, a program which involves the redistribution of a given tangible resource, such as land, almost by necessity implies that a gain in that resource by some entails a loss
by others. This situation becomes greatly complicated when we consider the political ramifications implicit under the two types of assumptions. In the variable-sum situation, an actor would face a fairly straightforward decision in attempting to increase popular support. Quite simply, he would attempt to do the most "good" for the most people.

In the zero-sum situation, however, the question of tradeoffs becomes central to the quest for support. Since the allocation of resources to one social sector implies the extraction of those resources from another, fundamental consideration must be given to the question of the relative importance of support by the various sectors. Such situations are fairly easy to imagine, and also quite probably reflect the greater part of reality in modern politics.

A regime considering a land reform program must weigh the benefits to be gained (in terms of support) by the recipients, presumably landless peasants, against the costs of the land owners who would lose some of their resources. What poses the greater risk, the long-term possibility of peasant revolution or the short-term possibility of a catastrophic withdrawal of upper class support? Yet portraying such tradeoffs in a strictly zero-sum manner doubtless oversimplifies the process, since in all likelihood the regime is not faced with such a limited choice set, i.e., land for either peasants or elites.

More specifically, such a portrayal ignores the probability that some sort of compensation is made by the state to landowners whose assets are to be redistributed. Thus, the tradeoff picture becomes much more like a variable-sum situation, with the key questions concerning how much various groups (i.e., peasants and landowners) will benefit rather than who will benefit and who will "lose out" (i.e., peasants or landowners).

Another reason why we believe an approach which essentially assumes a variable-sum situation may be viable for our immediate purposes has to do with our analytic focus. We are concerned in this analysis with revolutions, a phenomenon which is distinguished from other forms of violent regime transformation by virtue of the extent of the society involved in the process. In this sense, we are ignoring another class of such phenomena, specifically
coups-d'état.

The scenario suggested by our above example of the dilemmas facing a regime pondering land reform illustrates to an extent why we will not be assuming a zero-sum situation. In such a scenario, we would be interested in the response of the regime to a situation of widespread social unrest, i.e., a revolutionary situation, rather than the alienation of an upper class base of support, i.e., inter-elite conflict. The latter situation would in all likelihood result in some sort of transformation with which we are not concerned, for example, a coup-d'état or "revolution from above." Consequently, in situations which most closely approach a zero-sum nature, where the regime simply seizes the land from the elite and redistributes it to peasants, we would likely see an outcome which falls beyond the scope of this analysis (i.e., either a preventive elite coup or an elite "revolution from above").

That said, it remains for us to describe the relationship we see obtaining between performance tactics and popular support. As with incorporation, we essentially operate from the perspective that "more is better", that is, a positive linear relation. (See Fig. 2.3)

Figure 2.3: PERFORMANCE TACTICS & POPULAR SUPPORT
The final relationship which concerns us is that between military tactics and support, what we will call the protection/coercion dimension. As noted earlier, one of the principal elements of the "implicit social contract" between a political entity and those it seeks to exercise authority over is the provision of defense. This "duty" on the part of the authorities obliges them to provide protection for the general public against threats both external (invasion or attack by "foreigners") and internal (anarchy, lawlessness or extralegal persecution). The latter is more commonly thought of in terms of the maintenance of law and order.

As with the dimensions previously discussed, popular support for an actor is conceived to be a function of the degree to which that actor fulfills these obligations. Military tactics differ from political tactics, however, in that the maxim "more is better" does not apply as it does in the political incorporation and performance dimensions. The difference is grounded in the fact that military tactics imply the application of sanctions, as opposed to the provision of certain political "goods" (e.g. greater participation, more public services). Thus, the issue of fundamental importance in the protection/coercion dimension becomes a question of who rather than of what.

Given this, it is fairly easy to hypothesize where the point of maximum support lies in relation to military tactics. When an actor is capable of protecting all those who support him, while at the same time applying sanctions against all those who do not, he will have maximized his potential support level in this dimension. We can see that such tactics involve the efforts of the actor to minimize the cost to any potential supporters (protection) while maximizing the costs of any potential opponents (coercion or deterrence).

The dual nature of this task suggests that there are two possible ways in which the actor could fail in his objective of increasing support: either by minimizing costs to opponents (coercing no one) or maximizing costs to supporters (coercing everyone). In less abstract terms, we can speak of two situations wherein the actor will approach a nadir of support.
The first would be an utter incapacity to maintain order or enforce authority, or a lack of protection from non-regime forces. The second would be an application of sanctions in a completely nonselective manner, without regard to the norms of the (presumably) existing legal system, or a lack of protection from regime forces. In such instances, an individual has the costs of opposing the actor removed, since sanctions will be applied regardless. DeNardo notes, "When repression becomes indiscriminate, the deterrent effect [of coercion] is negated." (DeNardo 1985, p. 193)

What we have, then, is a case where the increasing use of the tactics (in this instance, the application of sanctions to a greater number of people) first approaches a maximum level in terms of support and then drops away, or in other words, a curvilinear relationship between protection/coercion tactics and support. (See Fig. 2.4)

**Figure 2.4: PROTECTION/COERCION TACTICS & POPULAR SUPPORT**

![Graph showing the relationship between protection/coercion tactics and popular support](image)

We are suggesting, then, that the effects of an inability to maintain order (low) and indiscriminate, extralegal repression (high) are roughly equal with regard to the actors' attempts to build support, both are negative and result in low support scores. The highest point on the support curve will be reached when the actor employs an "appropriate" level of
military tactics (meaning highest possible coercion of opponents and protection of supporters), the specifics of these tactics will be discussed later in the chapter.

**SUPPORT & OUTCOMES**

A final relationship we need to outline is that between support and outcomes. The notion that the level of popular support accorded or withheld from revolutionary forces determines the outcome of the struggle, is suggested by a number of authors. Robert Dix addresses the question directly in his article, "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail." After finding little support for alternative explanations, such as level of socioeconomic development, growth rates or land and income distribution, Dix suggests that, "the principal difference between our cases of revolutionary success and failure has been political, involving the willingness and ability of the revolutionaries to construct wide-ranging alliances or coalitions of opponents of the government." (Dix 1984, p. 432)

Samuel Huntington, as well, has argued that one of the distinguishing characteristics of successful revolutions has been the mobilization of an anti-regime coalition. He points out that, "One social group can be responsible for a coup, a riot, or a revolt, but only a combination of groups can produce a revolution." (Huntington 1968, p. 277) Zimmerman echoes this argument when he suggests that, "...there seem to be a number of conditions underlying successful revolutions in general, the first being that successful revolutionary overthrows presuppose coalitions between different social groups." (Zimmerman 1983, p. 321)

We don't wish to belabor the point, only to present some justification for our assumption that the mobilization of some level of popular support is a necessary and sufficient cause of "successful revolutionary overthrows."

We have already noted the process by which we assume support is mobilized. Further, we have suggested that we view support in relative rather than absolute terms. The key to the link between support and outcomes, then, lies in what we will call the support differential. Quite simply, this refers to the relative differences in support mobilized by the
two actors. Based on this concept, we introduce here the idea of a series of thresholds designed to indicate the scale of the support differential, and by extension, the predicted impact of this difference on outcomes. Each threshold, in fact, is a short-term outcome prediction based on the support differential.

We will postulate the existence of both an upper, or "success" threshold and a lower, or "failure" threshold. The former indicates the level of popular support which the insurgents must accrue in order to achieve their revolutionary goals. The latter indicates a minimum level of support without which the insurgency is incapable of maintaining itself as an armed revolutionary force operating within the country.

We now have a three-stage model linking support with outcomes. At the lowest stage, from the insurgent's perspective, there is insufficient popular support to sustain the revolutionary effort. Put differently, the insurgents are unable, due to the lack of support, to replace losses in both supplies and personnel inflicted by the regime's counterinsurgency effort. They are faced with the option of either abandoning the armed struggle, being annihilated piecemeal by the superior forces of the incumbents, or degenerating into mere banditry.

At the highest stage, the insurgents have mobilized an anti-regime coalition which is overwhelming when compared to the pro-regime coalition. The incumbents are incapable of generating any meaningful support for their continuance in power among the population at large, much less extract the human and material resources from society necessary to maintain the counterinsurgency campaign.

Between these two thresholds, there exists what might be called the stalemate stage. At this level, the insurgents have garnered sufficient support to maintain themselves as a revolutionary organization, but not enough to be able to overthrow the regime. From the regime's perspective, the stalemate level represents an inability to eradicate the insurgents, but no imminent threat of a guerrilla victory.

Since this middle stage encompasses a fairly broad spectrum of possible situations, it
will be more analytically useful to incorporate further distinctions. Within the middle stage, we will establish three separate levels: two on the outer ranges representing a relative advantage for either the insurgents or incumbents in terms of popular support, and a central level more closely portraying a situation of "true" stalemate in the insurgent process.

What we are left with, then, is a five-stage model of popular support. (See Fig. 2.5) For purposes of consistency, the stages refer to support for the insurgents. Since we are essentially assuming a zero-sum situation, the level of regime support can be calculated as the converse of insurgent support. At the first and fifth level, we have a situation in which "success" is imminent in the short-term for either the incumbents (first level) or the insurgents (fifth level).

In the middle three levels, an outcome to the insurgency does not appear likely in the short-term. At the second (regime) and fourth (insurgents) levels, one of the two actors possesses a relative advantage over the other in terms of popular support and, perhaps accordingly, in momentum. At the central level, the third, we have a situation in which there is a rough equality in the amount of popular support for the two actors, neither side seemingly capable of breaking the hold of the other over its "constituency" and little momentum in bringing the process to a conclusion any time soon.

**Figure 2.5: SUPPORT LEVEL THRESHOLDS & SHORT-TERM OUTCOMES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL 5</th>
<th>Insurgent Victory Imminent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL 4</td>
<td>Relative Advantage: Insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL 3</td>
<td>Stalemate: No Relative Advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL 2</td>
<td>Relative Advantage: Regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL 1</td>
<td>Regime Victory Imminent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTORS & SCALES**

In order to run our simulation, we will use scales which attach a numerical value, designed to represent a support level, to a series of tactics using the relationships between support and tactics described above as our basis. The scales encompass two broad
groupings, Political, which includes the incorporation and performance dimensions, and Military, which includes the protection/coercion dimension. The ranges of the two groups of scales are somewhat different. For political tactics, the values run from 0 to 5, and for military tactics, the range is from 1 to 5. The reason for this difference is fairly straightforward: in our scales of political tactics, the scores representing the minimum level (0 for insurgents, 5 for regime) are designed to portray a situation in which the actor is quite simply "doing nothing" on that particular dimension. If we were to include a similar minimum level in our military tactics scale we would, in effect, no longer be describing an insurgent situation, since by our definition, such a situation entails military conflict between the two actors. In short, if one or both of the actors was "doing nothing" in terms of military tactics, the situation would cease to be an insurgent conflict, at least according to our definition of such events.

One more explanatory note is in order before we begin our discussion of the tactical scales. For the sake of maintaining clarity throughout the analysis, the scales are structured to reflect the threshold model illustrated above, meaning that the scores generated by our model illustrate overall insurgent support. In this sense, the scales for the two actors are reverse images of one another, with the insurgents seeking to produce the "highest" scores (ie., approaching 5) and the regime seeking to produce the "lowest" scores (ie., approaching 0). Because of the way the scales are structured, then, they must be interpreted in a somewhat different manner. For the insurgents, the scales are quite straightforward, a "high" level score means a "high" level of insurgent support. For the regime, however, the opposite is true, a "low" level score means a "high" level of regime support (or, viewed differently, a "low" level score for the regime means a "low" level of support for the insurgents).

As we noted in our earlier discussion of the relationship between different tactical dimensions and support levels, on the political side of the equation, we see a linear relation which can roughly be described as following a "more is better" pattern. For the
incorporation dimension, this quite simply means that the greater the number of people who are made to feel "welcome" in an actor's coalition, the more support that actor will receive. In generating scores for this dimension, we are looking for evidence which suggests that first, the actor is "willing" to incorporate given social sectors into his coalition, and second, that the actor is making some effort to facilitate these sectors' participation in the coalition. For example, we could envision a situation in which a regime states its desire to incorporate the "masses", but at the same time effectively excludes this sector from the regime coalition through restrictions on voting or other modes of participation. In such an instance, the regime's score would not indicate incorporation of the targeted sector. The same would be true if, for example, the insurgents expressed a willingness to include elements of the country's armed forces in its anti-regime coalition, but then executed or otherwise harmed government soldiers who attempted to defect.

The scores on our incorporation dimension scales are designed to reflect the presumed "difficulty" involved in the process of coalition-building from each actor's perspective. Thus, the more "difficult" it is for an actor to recruit a given social sector, the higher the incorporation score will be. We assess difficulty, in this sense, with reference to the notion of "natural constituencies." Those sectors whose interests are most closely tied with an actor are assumed under our model to be easier for that actor to incorporate. Consequently, our scales suggest that it is "easiest" for the regime to incorporate elite elements (political, economic, military) and most difficult to incorporate both the lower-class "masses" (i.e., divergent economic interests) and the "disloyal" opposition (i.e., divergent political interests). The reverse is assumed for the insurgents.

To clarify, we define "disloyal" opposition as those sectors whose conceptions of the "proper" political system differ fundamentally from those currently operative in the country. It is important to keep in mind here that the term "disloyal" opposition does not refer to groups who have taken up arms in order to install a new political system (these would be classified as insurgents), but rather refers to groups who desire an alternative system of
government, but are not by necessity averse to working within the existing system to achieve this end. Orthodox or "electoralist" Communist parties and "radical" student groups would probably be the most ready example of what we mean by "disloyal" opposition elements. "Loyal" opposition elements are defined as those sectors who are (at least at the outset of the conflict) committed to working within the existing political system and, in the event of achieving power, would be expected to change policy direction rather than the structure of the system itself. Most non-Communist or non-"radical" political parties and interest groups would probably fall into this category. Table 2.1 illustrates the scales for insurgents and regime on the incorporation dimension.

**Table 2.1: INCORPORATION DIMENSION SCALES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSURGENTS</th>
<th>REGIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0=None</td>
<td>5=None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=Ties to Lower Classes/&quot;Disloyal&quot; Opposition</td>
<td>3=Ties to Elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3=Ties to Middle Class/&quot;Loyal&quot; Opposition</td>
<td>1=Ties to Middle Class/&quot;Loyal&quot; Opp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5=Ties to Elites</td>
<td>0=Ties to Lower Classes/&quot;Disloyal&quot; Opp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The scales for tactics on the performance dimension are similar to those for the incorporation dimension, in that they also operate according to the "more is better" principle, but slightly different in that "more" in this dimension operates on both the qualitative and quantitative levels. This means that higher performance scores for the actors reflect tactical "effectiveness" in terms of both the number of people effected and the extent to which they are effected.

From the regime's perspective, the lowest level on the performance dimension would reflect a situation in which the existing system was perceived by a substantial proportion of the population as "predatory" rather than beneficial. Clearly, this is a somewhat vague description of the situation to which we refer. What exactly constitutes either "predatory" behavior or "substantial" numbers of people? It is a truism that every political-economic system generates benefits (power, wealth, etc.) in a non-uniform manner, with certain sectors of the population benefiting more than others. In market systems particularly
(though not exclusively) there are generally enormous discrepancies between those who benefit "most" from the system and those who benefit "least", both in terms of the level of benefit and in the numbers of individuals who fall in each category.

Consequently, the structure of regime-individual exchange (i.e., the benefits which are provided the individual in return for support/obedience of the regime) varies across social sector. This exchange relationship is not necessarily symmetrical, but if certain minimum "obligations" are met by the regime, the relationship can be considered "legitimate" by individual citizens. (See Moore 1966; Scott & Kerkvliet 1977; and Wickham-Crowley 1987 for further discussion of the social exchange concept)

This means that the notion of "predatory" behavior on the part of a regime (i.e., behavior which is perceived as "illegitimate") is a relative one. For elites, an extractive regime may be one which harms their capacity to enhance or maintain their economic interests, while for peasants, an extractive regime may be one which threatens their very subsistence. It is when a majority of social sectors come to the conclusion that the existing regime is extractive that we give our minimum score on the performance dimension.

As we move up the scale, the first step for the regime is the provision of a national infrastructure, by which we mean such public goods as energy, water and transportation. Such goods are of benefit to virtually every individual, but they are of more benefit to certain sectors than others. In particular, such goods are of more benefit to those who are not in need of other basic goods and/or services. It is as the regime provides these other needed goods and services that it moves up the scale. Thus, the next highest level is the provision of basic "intangible" services such as education and health programs. Finally, the highest level represents the provision of "tangible" goods to the largest number of people, namely the poorest sectors. Land reform and housing programs would be examples of these types of tangible goods.

For the insurgents, the concept is the same but the scale is somewhat different. Again, the lowest level represents an extractive insurgent presence. The sporadic distribution of
goods (eg., "Robin Hood" - type distributions) by insurgents benefits the recipients, but generally both the number of recipients and the degree of benefit are fairly small. Moving up the scale, the insurgents begin to look more like a "government", yet act in this way only on a "part-time" basis. The sort of situation we refer to here is sometimes called "shadow government", where the insurgents acquire some administrative presence in a region, but only when regime forces are absent. The guerrillas may occasionally conduct literacy classes, or provide small-scale health care such as dentistry, but they only do so intermittently between "visits" by government troops.

Finally, the highest level represents situations in which the insurgents have established what have been called "liberated zones", that is, areas in which they, rather than regime forces, represent the authoritative governing body. In these areas the insurgents perform virtually all of the functions traditionally associated with governments, they build schools, health care facilities and maybe even roads. They also may engage in the same sort of redistributive policies characteristic of the highest performance level of the regime, such as land reform and housing. (See Table 2.2)

Table 2.2: INSURGENT PERFORMANCE DIMENSION SCALES

REGIME
5=None/Extractive
3=Provision of Basic Public Goods (water, energy, transport)
1=Provision of Intangible Public Services (health, education)
0=Provision of Tangible/Redistributive Goods (land reform, housing)

INSURGENTS
0=None/Extractive
1=Sporadic Goods Distribution
3=Shadow Government (Concurrent with Regime Presence)
5=Parallel Government ("Liberated Zones", Regime Displaced)

Our final set of scales establishes scores on the protection/coercion dimension. As we noted in an earlier section, the scales on this dimension differ from those on the other dimensions in that they are curvilinear, meaning that identical scores can be generated by two very different sets of tactics.
For the regime, the two sets of tactics which will generate the lowest possible support scores involve: 1) the absence of applications of sanctions (i.e., no protection from non-regime forces); 2) the unlimited application of sanctions (i.e., no protection from regime forces).

We can see in both of these situations that an individual making a support decision is unlikely to opt in favor of the regime, to do so in the first case would be risky and foolish, and in the second case, masochistic. At the moderate levels, the regime provides limited protection from either non-regime forces or regime forces. In the first case, the regime is, in a sense, under-responding to the insurgent situation (i.e., incapable of significantly coercing anti-regime elements), while in the second case it is over-responding (i.e., significant coercion of anti-regime elements, accompanied by a degree of coercion of non-participants as well).

An example of the former might be a regime which, faced with an insurgent situation, responds as if it were simply facing an outbreak of common criminal activity, continuing to utilize the normal forces of law and order in a situation where these forces are no longer sufficient.

An example of the latter might be a regime which enacts extraordinary measures (e.g., martial law, state of emergency) under which individuals who are even remotely suspected of connections to the insurgents are subject to sanction.

At the highest level, the regime strikes a balance between these two moderate-level responses: it employs extraordinary measures to coerce those participating in the insurgency, while at the same time taking steps to minimize the "spillover" of coercion to non-participants. Thus, martial law may be imposed, but certain judicial procedures are retained (e.g., habeas corpus, due process, etc.) to ensure protection of those who are not directly involved in the insurgency. (See Table 2.3)
### Table 2.3: REGIME PROTECTION/COERCION DIMENSION SCALES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW LEVEL-INACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>5=Inability to maintain civil order or prevent insurgents from operating at will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW LEVEL-ACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>5=Indiscriminate coercion of non-participants through utilization of all means at regime's disposal (high probability of individual suffering sanctions regardless of participation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODERATE LEVEL-INACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>3=Limited protection of regime and citizens through normal (police, constabulary) mechanisms, little coercion of insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODERATE LEVEL-ACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>3=Use of extraordinary measures to protect against insurgent violence, with extensive curtailment of protection from coercion of non-participants by regime forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH LEVEL</strong></td>
<td>1=Use of extraordinary measures to coerce participants while retaining protections for non-participants against coercion by either regime or insurgent forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the insurgents, the lowest levels represent again, either an inability to protect supporters from the regime or indiscriminate use of violence (i.e., no protection of supporters from insurgent coercion). At the inactive level, this would involve tactics which are somewhat similar to common criminal activity, namely bank robberies and small-scale destruction of property. At the active level, it would involve tactics which are non-selective in their targets, meaning that supporters as well as opponents are likely to suffer, and would include such things as bombings and wholesale assassination programs. (See Table 2.4)

### Table 2.4: INSURGENT PROTECTION/COERCION DIMENSION SCALES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW LEVEL-INACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>1=No capacity to protect supporters, very limited capacity to coerce regime forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW LEVEL-ACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>1=Indiscriminate application of coercion to opponents and non-participants as well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODERATE LEVEL-INACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>3=Some capacity to coerce regime forces but no capacity to protect supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODERATE LEVEL-ACTIVE</strong></td>
<td>3=Capacity to coerce regime supporters, some capacity to protect supporters but occasional coercion of non-regime supporters as well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH LEVEL</strong></td>
<td>5=Capacity to both protect supporters and significantly coerce opponents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At the moderate levels, as with the regime, there is some mediation of tactics which limits the undesirable effects on support encountered at the lowest levels. For the moderate-inactive level, this would mean an escalation of the application of sanctions against regime forces, but limited capacity to protect supporters. Tactics at this level might include intermittent kidnapping or assassination of regime representatives and economic sabotage. For the moderate-active level, the insurgents would demonstrate an enhanced ability to inflict damage on regime forces and provide some protection for supporters, but also suggests an "overreliance" on violent means which occasionally results in coercion to individuals who may not be directly associated with the regime. Tactics at this level might include programatic assassination, kidnapping and bombing, mostly selective, and intermittent or short-term occupation of territory.

Finally, at the highest level, the insurgents would demonstrate a capacity to both protect supporters and coerce opponents. On the protective side, this would be indicated by prolonged occupation of territory (i.e., ability to hold ground against regime assaults), and on the coercive side, would be indicated by large-scale, coordinated assaults on regime forces and installations. In short, this level would represent the capability of the insurgents to wage a more or less conventional-type war.

**EXTERNAL FACTORS: Some Conditioning Variables**

Now that we have discussed the mode by which the tactical behavior of the two primary actors relates to the insurgent process, we turn to the impact of external factors on the conflict, namely the provision or withdrawal of support by external actors. We are specifically interested in how external support effects the internal support mobilization efforts of the two primary actors.

Before going further, we need to outline the three variables we see as important conditioning factors on the relationship between external support and internal behavior: 1) the type of support (material vs. political), 2) the timing of the support (in our terminology, low level vs. high level insurgency), and 3) the source of the support. In short, we are
interested in the answers to the questions of what, when and who in terms of external support.

A number of authors have noted that external support can be broken down into several important types. O'Neill, for example, suggests the following typology: 1) moral, 2) political, 3) material, and 4) sanctuary. For our purposes, we will not distinguish between O'Neill's first two types, since the differences appear more a matter of degree than of kind. (He defines these two types in the following manner: "Moral support...involves public acknowledgment that the insurgent movement is just and admirable. Political support advances a step further, since the donor nation actively champions and supports the strategic goal of the insurgent movement in international fora." O'Neill 1980, p. 15)

Neither will we utilize sanctuary, since in a way, we will be dealing with what seem to be the two principal components of this type of support, political and military-tactical, in other ways. We will instead subsume sanctuary under the two broad types of support that will be dealt with here, political and material.

By political support, we essentially use the same definition as O'Neill. Namely, we refer to public expressions of agreement with the goals and aims of the insurgents' cause by external actors. By material support, we refer to the transfer of tangible items from external sources to be utilized by the internal actors which can be broadly defined as beneficial to their conflict efforts. Principally this translates into foreign economic and military assistance.

A second conditioning variable we see as important in the determination of the impact of external support is the stage of the insurgency at which the support is accorded (or conversely, withdrawn). By stage, we refer to the concept of support thresholds introduced earlier. For purposes of simplification, we will categorize the first two levels as "low" (regime advantage), the last two levels as "high" (insurgent advantage) and refer to the stalemate level as "middle/stalemate."

Finally, we will consider the source of external support as a third important factor
relating to its eventual impact on the insurgent process. The distinctions we will employ here are, again, grounded in the concept of "natural constituencies." We will distinguish between three types of external support sources in terms of their assumed ideological or political predispositions toward the primary actors: Friendly/Like-minded, Neutral, and Hostile.

In practice, what we are referring to here is the ideological distance between the external and internal actors along a hypothetical spectrum. The operating assumption is that it should be easier for an actor to mobilize support from external actors whose ideological position lies closer to its own along the spectrum.

In a sense, we assume a sort of Guttman-scale progression from Friendly to Hostile (i.e., an actor will not mobilize Hostiles without first mobilizing Friendlies and Neutrals). In Latin America, this translates into an assumption that Marxist nations will be friendly to radical revolutionary movements, while the U.S. can be expected to be hostile to such groups, with the converse true for regimes. By Neutrals, we mean those nations both within Latin America and elsewhere which have no readily identifiable predisposition to support either incumbent regimes or challenging insurgency movements.

The three categories outlined above have been identified elsewhere as representing broad trends in the international arena, trends which reflect the positions of global actors with regard to our concept of "natural constituencies." Specifically, Wolf Grabendorff has typed these tendencies as follows:


2) Social-Change Alliance/Neutrals—Mexico, Socialist International, France, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela.

3) Revolutionary Change Alliance—Cuba, socialist nations, Libya, the PLO, Algeria and Nicaragua. (Grabendorff 1984, p. 167)

As Grabendorff is referring in his typology to the relatively recent time period (1980's),
we will employ a somewhat modified scheme, placing Costa Rica in the Neutral or Social-Change Alliance, and also (by logical necessity) removing from the list those countries which are under examination during a particular case study (eg., during the Nicaraguan insurgency, Nicaragua obviously cannot be considered an external actor).

Having briefly introduced the variables we see as important conditioning factors, we now turn to a discussion of how the impact of external support will be integrated into our model.

**PROVISION & WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT**

The key to the relationship between the stage of the insurgency and the impact of external assistance, from the rebel perspective, lies in its challenge to the legitimacy of the incumbent regime as a national government.

From the earliest stages of the struggle, one of the most fundamental objectives of the insurgents is to undermine the claim of the regime to be the sole legitimate representative of the people within the state's territory. In fact, it is this objective which makes the opposition revolutionary, as opposed to reformist. Consequently, the movement must simultaneously portray the regime as illegitimate and itself as the rightful representative of the people. This relies heavily on competing claims of nationalism.

At low levels of insurgency, the rebels are at a distinct disadvantage in this competition for the mantle of nationalists. Regardless of the popularity of the incumbents, they have a de facto stronger claim than the insurgents simply because, for better or worse, they do represent the state. They receive foreign ambassadors, conclude agreements with other countries, legislate domestic policy and conduct all the official business done in the name of the nation. The insurgents, on the other hand, do none of these things and furthermore violate the laws embodied in the national constitution (legitimate or not).

In a sense, the goal of the insurgents is to separate the state (ie., the government apparatus) from the nation (ie., the abstract notion of a common identity) in the minds of the population. If they succeed in doing so, they may then be able to compete on a very
different level, namely that of two "states" (incumbents and insurgents) battling for control over the single "nation."

As they seek to shift the balance of popular support in their favor, it is essential that the insurgents not make themselves vulnerable to charges of foreign sponsorship, which can be the functional equivalent of anti-nationalism in such situations. In this regard, material external support represents much more of a potential liability in terms of the insurgents' goal than does political support. In the all-important game of image-building, material support can earn the rebels the reputation of mercenaries in the pay of foreign enemies. Rather than appearing as representatives of a legitimate indigenous challenge to the incumbents, the insurgents can be portrayed as agents of external aggression, a threat to the "nation."

Greene notes, "where revolutionaries are heavily dependent on external support, they compromise their popular appeal in terms of nationalist sentiment. They become vulnerable to the government's counterrevolutionary propaganda, which can claim that the struggle is not against domestic forces but against foreign invaders." (Greene 1984, p. 156)

Thus, at the low levels of insurgency external material support can be considered a liability for the insurgents (in our scoring scheme we will deduct 0.5 from the insurgents' overall average), while external political support probably does not produce significant change in either a positive or negative direction in the insurgents' score.

As the insurgency escalates to stalemate, the role of external support changes somewhat. At this stage, material aid represents, to an extent, less of a potential liability for the insurgents than it does at an earlier stage. Political support becomes more important at higher stages as well. By this point in the conflict, the rebels have presumably succeeded in convincing at least some portion of the population that they represent an indigenous alternative to the incumbent regime. To maintain, and further develop, this image it is important that, 1) external material support does not constitute a majority percentage of the total amount of resources employed by the insurgents, and 2) external political support comes from several sources, rather than a single source, and most beneficially from
"Neutrals."

With regard to the first point, while material assistance from external actors may be desirable for the insurgents from a purely tactical standpoint, it is politically volatile. In order for the rebels to convince greater numbers of people that they not only represent a nationalist movement, but are a capable, independent military apparatus, they would ideally demonstrate their ability to be largely self-sustaining. Thus, material support from external actors could hamper the expansion of the insurgent coalition inside the country.

At the same time, it is unlikely that external material assistance would seriously jeopardize the insurgents’ existing coalition, since their supporters would probably tend to view such assistance as a necessary, if perhaps somewhat distasteful, means to achieving a much-desired end: the removal of the regime. For these reasons, we will not include external material support to the insurgents at the middle-level conflict stage among the list of external factors which actually result in a changed score.

The progression of the conflict to the stalemate stage also presents the insurgents with a need to acquire the external political support which may have been less necessary at lower levels. In a sense, the rebels must try to do the same thing in the international arena that they are trying to do domestically: broaden their base of support. By expanding the ideological spectrum of their support internationally (i.e., moving beyond their "natural constituency"), the insurgents can accomplish two important objectives: 1) establish themselves as a globally "recognized" political force within the country while simultaneously portraying the incumbents as "isolated", and 2) enhance their ability to attract middle-class or elite defectors into the anti-regime coalition by projecting a greater likelihood of eventual victory.

What is important at this stage is the relative balance of the external political support coalitions of the insurgents and regime. If the insurgents are unable to broaden their base of support internationally, they may lose momentum and allow the regime to gain the upper hand. If they are able to obtain (and maintain) rough parity with the incumbents in terms of
foreign political support, they are likely to be able to, at a minimum, prolong the state of stalemate.

At the highest level of conflict, both material and political external support assume added importance to the efforts of the insurgents. Whereas material support posed a potential liability to the rebels at lower levels, it becomes an increasingly necessary component of the struggle as the insurgents are poised to assume power. Once they have moved past the stalemate level, it is vital for the insurgents to move quickly to destroy the remaining opposition presented by the incumbents for two reasons: 1) the nature of rebel domestic support at the higher level, and 2) the likely preemptive maneuvers of the regime's external supporters.

By this point, the rebels have mobilized a significant proportion of the populace into an anti-regime coalition, but the coalition is fragile and fleeting. This is largely due to the fact that a number of the members of that coalition joined in a "bandwagon" effect. When the insurgents acquire a momentum which appears sufficient to propel them to victory, they will also acquire a large number of "supporters" who don't want to be caught on the wrong side after the conflict comes to its conclusion.

This does not mean to imply that these late joiners are cynical bystanders. On the contrary, they may sincerely support the rebel movement, but in accordance with a "rational" approach to decision making, feel compelled to join only after it becomes apparent that the costs of doing so are not likely to be unbearable. In order for the rebels to continue to attract such individuals it is vital that they be able to offer protection in return for support, and this requires military resources which are probably in excess of those obtainable domestically. Thus, the need for external material support for purposes of defending the insurgents' supporters may become greater as the conflict reaches this stage.

The second reason a rapid conclusion to the conflict (and by extension, the material assistance necessary to achieve it) is vital to the success of the insurgents concerns the likelihood that, as the situation becomes desperate in the eyes of the regime's foreign allies,
there will be attempts to "short circuit" the revolution.

By this point, it has probably become apparent to all that the regime cannot survive intact. Faced with the options of either doing nothing or continuing to support what has clearly become a losing cause, and alarmed at the prospects of the installment of a hostile revolutionary regime which is likely to result from both courses of action, the incumbents' foreign patrons will begin to seek alternatives. As direct intervention is generally prohibitively costly, the foreign patron may seek to cut its losses by throwing its support behind a "moderate" replacement for the incumbents.

If the insurgents are incapable of seizing power in fairly short order, these preemptive maneuvers stand a chance of being successful, owing largely to both the "war weariness" of the general population and the fragile nature of the insurgent coalition discussed above.

External political support is important for reasons similar to those outlined for material aid. By building a coalition of international supporters, the insurgents can effectively neutralize the efforts of the regime's supporters. Briefly put, the costs of maintaining support for an internationally unpopular regime rise dramatically as the insurgents' foreign coalition grows. For one, the external incumbent supporter runs the risk of sticking with a collapsing regime for too long and creating an atmosphere of hostility between itself and the insurgent government which will likely emerge. More potentially damaging to the external regime supporter is the likelihood that it will jeopardize its relations with other international actors (most notably the "Neutrals" who support the insurgents) by appearing to unnecessarily prolong a conflict in which the outcome is seemingly inevitable.

In terms of our scores, then, we will make the following adjustments to the insurgents' score based on external factors: at the middle/stalemate level, provision of material support produces no change, provision of political support from "Neutrals" produces a 0.5 point gain; at the high level, provision of either political or material support (again, from "Neutrals") produces a 0.5 point gain, provision of both a 1.0 point gain.

If the capability of the insurgents to mobilize external support is beneficial to their
cause, then the converse is likely true as well. The failure to attract external support may be detrimental to the insurgents' efforts to move from a stalemate stage to higher conflict levels. Such a failure would at a minimum seem to increase the probability that the regime would be able to retain the unqualified support of its international allies, thus reducing the external pressures on the regime. For the withdrawal of external support, then, we will make adjustments to the insurgents' scores which are exactly the same as the adjustments for provision of support, but are negative (i.e., where a gain is stipulated above, a reduction of the same amount will be applied in cases of withdrawal).

For the regime, the provision of external material or political support at all conflict levels will not produce a change in our scores. In our view, the withdrawal of such support represents a much more significant development, since the regime, as the recognized "legitimate" authority in the country, can be expected to be accorded the support (or at least non-interference) of external actors.

In this sense, the provision of external support does not seem to derive from any particular effort on the part of the regime, but rather stems simply from its incumbent position. In other words, whereas the insurgents are seeking to create an external coalition, the regime is in a position of maintaining an external coalition which already exists.

Of course this is an oversimplification, but we cannot envision a satisfactory method for incorporating the complexities of the relationship between the regime and all external actors into our model. The question of material assistance, in particular, highlights the difficulties involved in attempting to produce a meaningful and uniform measure of external impact. On the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that an "overreliance" on external material support could tarnish the nationalist image of the regime, making it vulnerable to the insurgent challenge.

On the other hand, even if it were possible to establish a threshold beyond which "overreliance" occurs, it is possible that the external support could free up resources for the regime to employ in improving its performance in other areas, such as social welfare
spending. In short, we tend to assume that the impact of the provision of external support for the regime is primarily dependent on internal factors (i.e., what the regime does). For this reason, we will not alter the regime's scores as a result of external support provision.

The withdrawal of such support, however, is a different matter. In terms of material support, we will reduce the regime's score by 0.5 for a withdrawal occurring during the middle/stalemate level of conflict, and by 1.0 for a withdrawal during a high conflict level. These changes are based on our assumption that external material support provides the regime with at least the option of improving its performance on other dimensions by "freeing up" resources at the regime's disposal, as we noted above. Withdrawal of this support constrains such options and consequently exerts a negative impact on the regime which is aggravated as the conflict moves to higher levels.

In terms of political support, we see the question of "who" as more important than "when" in determining the impact of external support withdrawals. A reduction of 0.5 will be made to the regime's score for a withdrawal of political support by "Neutral" actors, while such a withdrawal by an external actor who is considered "Friendly" to the regime will result in a 1.0 point reduction. These adjustments are designed to reflect the importance of the regime's external coalition and the loss of legitimacy status that a decay of that coalition implies.

Admittedly, our scheme for dealing with the impact of external factors may appear chaotic, or even arbitrary. Given the limitations of the scope of our analysis, though, we feel this framework gives us a sufficiently workable means of incorporating a complex host of variables within our model. Now that we have outlined the concepts, assumptions and variables to be used in our simulation, we need to conclude our discussion of our research design by describing the mechanics of the simulation itself.

SIMULATING INTERACTION BETWEEN INSURGENTS & REGIME

The single operative assumption behind the construction of our simulation is simplification. In the well-known tradeoff between complexity, which provides higher
degrees of specificity, and simplicity, which provides greater generalization, we have firmly opted for the latter. The easiest way to explain how our simulation works is to run through the steps involved in the same sequential manner that the simulation operates.

Step 1: Scores on each of the three dimensions are generated for each actor. The incorporation and performance scores are then averaged \(((\text{INC} + \text{PERF})/2)\) to yield a "political" score \([\text{POL AVG}]\) for each actor.

Step 2: These political scores are then averaged with the "military" score on the protection/coercion dimension to yield a single overall score for each actor \([\text{OVERALL AVG}]\).

Step 3: The overall scores for each actor are then averaged together to yield a final score \([\text{SCORE}]\) for each time period. This score represents the total level of predicted support for the insurgents during this time period which corresponds to the support threshold construct described earlier. To briefly review, this construct posits a range from 1 to 5 which represents the stage of the insurgency in terms of relative popular support levels, with 0 hypothetically indicating no support for insurgents and 5 indicating no support for the regime.

Two other mechanisms of the simulation also require specification. First, when external factors are determined to exert an impact on the insurgent process, we will, according to the scaling framework outlined in the previous section, incorporate the specified adjustments into the overall average score of the affected actor. Thus, if the regime's overall average is 4, and a 1.0 point reduction due to external factors is called for, the new overall average for the regime will be 3. Such adjustments will be clearly identified in the listings of scores which accompany each case study.

A second type of adjustment that will occasionally be employed is a "decay factor." This factor will be used when evidence from the primary data sources suggests a decline between two non-contiguous time periods which is of a gradual, rather than abrupt, nature. When adjustments of this sort are made, they will be discussed in the case studies.
themselves and will be made to scores prior to the averaging process which takes place in the simulation. We want here only to alert the reader to the possibility of encountering these types of adjustment in the course of reading the case studies.

Now that we have outlined our model in detail, we move on to a discussion of our analytical framework.

C. ANALYSIS

CASE SELECTION

In selecting the cases on which to run the model, we will seek to introduce elements of both control and variation in our design. Control elements are important in that they will allow us to hold certain factors constant which might otherwise be considered possible explanatory variables, thus weakening the explanatory power of our variables. Some of the factors we will attempt to control for have elsewhere been suggested as important explanatory variables: specific country, historical setting, and the demographics/location of the insurgency. By holding at least one of these factors constant, we can hope to minimize or eliminate the possibility that it is exerting an important influence on the dependent variables.

Perhaps the most basic element of control in our case selection is that of the broad cultural/historical background of the insurgent situations. Although there are quite clearly important distinctions in terms of the cultural and historical experiences of the various countries in our analysis, there is also some degree of commonality to be found among the nations of Latin America. Although the differences between the various countries in our study should not be underemphasized, these differences would not seem to be of the same degree as those between cases drawn from, for example, Latin America, Asia and Africa. We are using cases drawn exclusively from Latin America in an attempt to minimize the range of factors which could potentially "cloud" or confound our findings. If, for example, we were to include cases from a variety of very different cultural and historical backgrounds, and we found our model to be "faulty", we could not be certain if these
negative findings were the result of flaws in the model itself, or if the differences in culture and history between our cases accounted for our findings. In other words, we wouldn't know whether our model was able to account for cases sharing a given background, but not others, or whether it was simply unable to account for the phenomenon in general. By restricting our analysis to Latin American cases we can minimize this source of potential confusion.

The control element for unique country characteristics will be the selection of two cases of insurgency, by different groups at different times, within the same country, Peru. To control for historical setting, we are selecting cases which roughly extend from the 1950's to the 1980's, some overlapping and others not. Finally, to control for the possible influence of the country demographics and primary location of the conflict, we will include cases which, at times, were almost exclusively urban (FALN in Venezuela) and rural (ELN in Peru) movements.

The elements of variation are closely linked to those of control, and in some sense they represent the other side of the coin. Control elements allow us to hold specific factors constant, thus enabling comparisons between two given cases in which the influence of those factors are negated. Variation elements, on the other hand, allow comparisons between a wider number of cases. The disadvantage of wide variation is that it does not permit the evaluation of the relative influence of specific factors on the dependent variables which controlled cases provide. Yet it does allow us to examine the broad applicability of our model across the universe of possible cases.

By doing this, we can seek to demonstrate that the variables included in our model have greater explanatory power than alternative variables. For example, if our model provides some satisfactory degree of prediction for several cases which vary across a given dimension, say, rural versus urban guerilla activities, than an alternative explanation based on this dimension would by necessity prove less satisfactory.

The selection of our cases is designed to provide as much possible variation, across
many dimensions, while retaining some degree of control, as noted above. These
dimensions include: success vs. failure of insurgents, region (Central vs. South America),
fairly high vs. low level of development, rural vs. mixed urban and rural concentration of
activities, and historical period.

Table 2.5 is a list of the cases of insurgency which will be included in our analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>INSURGENT ORG.*</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>M-26</td>
<td>1956-9</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>FMLN/FDR</td>
<td>1981-</td>
<td>[Ongoing]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>1974-79</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>1964-6</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td>1981-</td>
<td>[Ongoing]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>FALN &amp; MIR</td>
<td>1961-8</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full names of insurgent organizations are:

M-26=Movimiento 26 de Julio
FMLN/FDR=Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional/Frente Democrático Revolucionario
FSLN=Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional
ELN=Ejército Liberación Nacional
SL=Sendero Luminoso
FALN=Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional
MIR=Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria

DATA SOURCES

The data which will be used in our analysis will generally fall into two categories: that
which is used to generate the scores which run our simulation, and that which is used to
evaluate the validity and explanatory power of our model. Clearly the use of identical data
to both construct and then test our model would seriously undermine the validity of our
results. On the other hand, the constraints of data availability and reliability in an area as
murky as guerrilla warfare present real obstacles to conducting rigorous tests of hypotheses.
By segregating the data used in construction from that used in testing, we hope to avoid the validity threat noted above to the extent possible within the constraints posed by the available data.

The scores used in the simulation will be generated from events data gleaned from "realtime", or contemporary, sources. The principal source of this data will be the New York Times. Using the cumulative Times annual indices as a primary source poses certain well known problems, such as questions about the inherent bias of the source, possible over- or under-reporting of a particular region, and accuracy in general. Yet questions like these can be asked of virtually any data source, and especially any source which involves a subject as hotly "subjective" as insurgency. Given the limitations of any one source, it would seem that using a single source at least provides a measure of consistency, however biased, to the data. Using multiple sources, particularly if they did not overlap on different cases, would seemingly only magnify the problems of reliability posed by a single source. In short, the systematic bias of one source could feasibly be dealt with more easily than the random bias of many sources. If our model, run on a single source, proved unsatisfactory, we could run it again using an alternative source. If it again was unsatisfactory, we could be fairly well assured that it was the model which was flawed rather than the data which powered it. If, on the other hand, we used several sources, and the results were disappointing, we could never quite be certain whether, "the fault lies not in our stars, but in ourselves."

Unfortunately, the gaps likely to be found in the data provided by the Times cannot be left unfilled. One particular area in which the newspaper can be expected to provide insufficient information is the political activities of the insurgents. While it may be possible, to an extent, to piece together enough data from the Times' reports to generate a score for the guerrillas on the incorporation dimension, information concerning their behavior in the performance dimension is likely to be sparse at best. This void is doubtless due to the nature of political performance "events." Under the standards employed by most
commercial media, activities which we group under the performance dimension would not generally be considered "newsworthy." Additionally, often these activities take place in isolated rural areas, which limits the access of reporters even if they wished to investigate.

In cases where no information concerning the performance activities of the insurgents is available from our primary source, secondary sources will be utilized. In order to prevent possible contamination of testing, these secondary sources will not be used in the evaluation stage. Where it becomes necessary to use these backup sources, explanations and descriptions will be included in the case study.

The sources used to evaluate the predictions generated by the model will be primarily post-hoc historical accounts and analyses of the insurgent episode. In contrast with the single-source method described above, in the evaluation stage every effort will be made to utilize the greatest variety of sources. This is necessary for at least two reasons. First, very few sources of this kind are exhaustive, in the sense that they would provide us with the information necessary to conduct a thorough evaluation of our model. Second, historical accounts, involving as they do individual interpretation and perspective, are generally heavily subjective, at least in comparison with event reporting. The fact that many of the authors of these accounts are either openly supportive of one or the other actors, or were actual participants themselves only increases the need for consulting a wide variety of sources in order that some "median" interpretation of the cases is possible.

PRE-TESTING

Despite our efforts to segregate the data sources, there remains the possibility that, consciously or unconsciously, the selection of data from event sources will be guided by our previous familiarity with the interpretive accounts. Good intentions aside, there is little to prevent the "selective collection" of data to run the simulation, data which will later be supported by the historical narratives.

In order to provide some measure of insurance against this possible source of data contamination, we will conduct a pre-test of the simulation on a case which will not
subsequently be included in the final analysis. This test will involve "reverse coding", that is, we will first generate scores to run a simulation using the evaluation (post-hoc) data sources. Then, using the results of the simulation, we will go back to the event (contemporary) data sources to find "supporting" evidence. In this way, we hope to establish some set of guidelines for data collection which will standardize the process for all of our cases. In a sense, we will be establishing a sort of content-analysis coding scheme. If in our pre-tests we can determine that a certain type of event reporting appears to be an effective indicator of a given behavior, as suggested by our reference to the evaluation sources, we will be able to search specifically for that information when gathering data from event sources for our cases. Likewise, if a certain type of behavior which appears in our evaluation sources is consistently absent from our event sources, we will be alerted to the need to look elsewhere for that information.

In selecting our pre-test case, we must find an insurgent situation which is essentially comparable to those which will be used in our analysis. This could present some problems, not because each case is unique and therefore not comparable to others, but because of a fairly limited "universe" of possible cases from which to choose. Furthermore, within that universe, there are distorted numbers of cases in each category on the success-failure continuum. While there is a fairly significant number of cases of insurgent failure, there are considerably fewer cases of stalemate, and only two of insurgent success. Since both of these cases, Cuba and Nicaragua, are included in our final analysis, it is impossible to conduct a pre-test on a case of insurgent success.

With this in mind, we have chosen the Guatemalan guerrilla groups Movimiento 13 de Noviembre (MR-13) and Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) for our pre-test case. This case seems to provide a mixture of characteristics which are sufficiently comparable to our other cases to make it a useful exercise. It lies roughly in the middle of our time period (1962-71), it represents a case of insurgent failure, and it entails periods of both rural and urban activity.
D. EVALUATION

The evaluation, or testing, of our model will be conducted on three separate, but related, dimensions. The model is designed to generate a number of predictions concerning both relative levels of popular support for the primary actors and outcomes of insurgent episodes. These predictions are the basis for two of the evaluation dimensions: tests of support level predictions (point testing) and of outcome predictions (outcome testing). Additionally, the model is constructed such that the underlying "causes" behind both types of predictions can be outlined. In other words, some evaluation of the model below the level of point and outcome predictions is possible. The three types of evaluation are outlined in more detail below.

POINT TESTING

The first evaluation of our model will concentrate on the degree of correlation between the support levels yielded by the simulation at a specific point in time and the "actual" support levels described in the historical accounts. Where possible, this will involve examination of specific key incidents which seem to provide clear indications of the relative support levels in the population at large. For example, the voter turnout in a national election can provide an estimate of the degree of support for the regime, especially when accompanied by a corresponding call for an electoral boycott by the insurgents. In a sense, this situation provides us with something of a national referendum. If turnout is large, support for the regime can be assumed to be high (remembering that we refer not to support for the incumbent only, but for the political system itself). If turnout is very small, then we can assume a substantial number of people heeded the insurgents' calls for boycott, and consequently support their cause. Similar events, such as massive demonstrations either for or against the regime, or nationwide strikes or work stoppages, can also serve as key point prediction indicators.

In addition, evaluations of a more general sort will be made to determine how well our predictions of support at a given point match the levels cited in the narrative sources. Often,
these sources will try to pinpoint either the apogee or nadir of support levels for one or both actors. This provides us with a basis of comparison with regard to our own predictions. There is frequently, of course, a good deal of disagreement among the sources in terms of popular support levels. But by using the disparities in these accounts to project something of a median level, we can at a minimum determine the degree to which our predictions are supported by "common knowledge."

OUTCOME TESTING

The second area of evaluation is similar to the first: we want to see how well our model predicts a given phenomenon at a given time. In the case of outcome testing, we will be looking at how well our model predicts both in terms of timing and actor. Our questions in this phase, then, are: Do the narrative sources identify the insurgency as reaching a conclusion at the same point in time as our model does? Does our model correctly identify the "winners" and "losers" in the process?

In order to allow for an evaluation of the timing question, we will define an outcome as having taken place when the overall support score falls within 0.5 or less of either the maximum or minimum possible support score. In concrete terms, this means an outcome will be identified when the overall support score reaches 0.5 or below (insurgents lose) or goes above 4.5 (insurgents win).

UNDERLYING "CAUSE" TESTING

One of the useful features of charting out the scores for both actors is that it enables us to speculate as to the relative "responsibility" of each actor in generating the overall support score. Basically, it allows us to ponder "what-if" questions in the sense that we can hold one actor's behavior constant, and then examine the impact of the other actor's real and hypothetical courses of action on the overall support score. In short, we can ask, given that actor A behaved in this way, what would the overall support score have looked like if actor B behaved differently?

The possibilities of this sort of manipulation can be demonstrated with an example.
Consider a case in which, for a single time period, the insurgents' support score (based solely on their tactics, before discounting for interaction with the regime's tactics) was 2, while the regimes' was 3. The overall support score would be 2.5 (the average of the actors' scores, which represents the total amount of predicted support for the insurgents).

Since we know what the maximum and minimum possible support scores for each individual actor given our scales (5 and 0.5), we can calculate a minimum and maximum potential score range for each actor based on the opponent's "true" score. (See Fig. 2.6) In this case, the insurgent's potential range is 1.75 to 4. Conversely, the regime's potential score range is 1.25 to 3.5. In other words, given that the regime had an actual score of 3, if the insurgents had achieved their highest possible score (i.e., the support acquired solely through their tactics, before discounted by interaction with the regime's tactical score), they would have received an overall support score of 4 (interaction score). If they had achieved their lowest possible individual score, the overall support score would be 1.75.

Figure 2.6: Calculating Potential Score Ranges--An Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High/Low Possible Individual Score</th>
<th>Opponent's Actual Score</th>
<th>Interaction Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSURGENTS:</strong> High = 5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low = 0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIME:</strong> High = 0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low = 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential Score Range = Average(Opponent's Actual Score + Actor's High/Low Possible Individual Score)

With this range in mind, we can begin to examine the sorts of questions which have long plagued historians: What if someone had acted differently? Clearly, we enter the realm of the proverbial Monday-morning quarterback here, but at a minimum we have a set of guidelines to structure our inquiry to an extent. These guidelines can, as well, be subjected to a certain degree of validity testing. The narrative accounts which form the basis of our point and outcome testing frequently include interpretations on the underlying "causes" of a
particular episode or outcome. The scores generated by our model can be compared to these accounts to evaluate the degree of correspondence between the two, just as with our point and outcome predictions. Thus, the manner in which the model is constructed also allows us to test for correspondence at this lower level as well. In this sense, the scores become "falsifiable" both at the level of their point and outcome predictions, and at the underlying "cause" level. For example, if there is a good degree of correspondence between the narrative accounts and our model on the overall support level for the insurgents at a given point in time, there exists the possibility of a "spurious" correlation between the point predictions and accounts. We can attempt to minimize this possibility by checking further to see if the reasons behind the specific support level cited by the accounts are in accordance with those generated by the model. Thus, if our support levels match those in the accounts, but we cite political factors as primarily "responsible" for those levels while the accounts attribute them to military factors, we will have cause to question the model's validity.

In conclusion, then, let us reiterate our research strategy. We will first conduct a pre-test of our model in an attempt to establish guidelines for data collection in our actual cases and to avoid potential problems in this aspect of the analysis. Next, we will move on to our six case studies, two in each of the following categories: insurgent failure, insurgent success, and ongoing stalemate. Our rationale for including these different types of situations is to test the applicability of our model to the widest variety of cases. We have argued that in order to contribute to our understanding of the insurgent process, it is necessary to develop a model which can account for insurgencies without reference to their eventual outcomes. To do otherwise, we feel, is to suggest that insurgencies which eventually succeed are somehow qualitatively different from those which fail at the outset of the conflict. Such explanations must by necessity focus on the Preconditions which led to the outbreak of the insurgent situation, and by extension, must overlook the aspect of the conflict with which we are primarily concerned: the process of insurgency.
CHAPTER 3
PRE-TEST: GUATEMALA 1962-71

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we will be conducting a pre-test of our analysis. The chapter is organized as follows: For each actor we will first utilize evaluation source data to generate support scores on each dimension according to our scales. This will be followed by a discussion of what we should look for as indicators in the event data, and a search of the event source to identify the existence of such indicators and examine the degree to which they correspond with the information obtained from our evaluation sources.

We will conclude with an overall assessment of effectiveness of the event source as a basis for generating scores for our simulation, using the scores derived from our evaluation sources as a benchmark, and a discussion of potential problems with the event source data.

We do not suggest that this piece of analysis constitutes a rigid pre-test in the sense that it provides us with quantifiable standards of coding reliability and validity. Instead it is meant to provide us with some rough guidelines for our data collection in a manner which does not "contaminate" the cases to be studied in our final analysis.

INSURGENTS—Incorporation

EVALUATION SOURCE DATA

The position of the Guatemalan guerrillas in terms of incorporation is somewhat difficult to pin down since it appears to vary both over time and across different insurgent organizations. The composition of the earliest guerrilla groups, as well as its appeals, suggest a very broad incorporative perspective, and goals which had much more in common with the traditional Latin American coup than with social revolution. The insurgents' origins can be traced to an abortive attempt by young military officers to spark an insurrection against what they saw as the anti-nationalist regime of General Manuel Ydígoras Fuentes. After the rebellion in November, 1960, failed, a number of the officers
involved fled to neighboring countries, resolved to return and eventually achieve their original goals.

During their exile and in subsequent contacts with leaders of the existing Guatemalan political parties, though, these nationalistic officers, who had originally envisioned a reformist-type coup, began to reconsider their goals. Convinced that the only option available for lasting change in their country was armed struggle, the former military men returned to Guatemala committed to waging an insurgency and began seeking allies for their cause. What emerged, according to Loveman and Davies, was an, "eclectic guerrilla cadre of nationalists, Communists, reformists, and peasant soldiers. . . Lacking any clear ideological underpinnings or direction from revolutionary cadres, the insurgents sought to win over dissident military officers (their former colleagues), students, and middle-class professionals." (Loveman and Davies 1985, p. 225-6)

Two of the military men involved in the original failed revolt, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa and Luis Turcios Lima, went on to become the leaders of the principal guerrilla groups in the country, the Movimiento 13 de Noviembre (MR-13) and the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR). Originally operating together under the aegis of MR-13, Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima eventually split over tactical and doctrinal differences, a split which had implications for the incorporation tactics of the insurgents.

The history of the two movements and their relationship to one another is somewhat contorted, but needs to be mentioned at least briefly here. The first group to engage in armed resistance to the government was MR-13, which began operations in 1962 and was routed in fairly short order. The survivors of this group, including Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima, joined a student group (Movimiento Abril 12) and the Guatemalan Communist party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores, PGT) to form the FAR in December 1962. The FAR was further integrated into a broader umbrella resistance organization, the Frente Unido de Resistencia (FUR) and relegated to an essentially subservient role to the dominant member of FUR, the Communist party. (O'Neill 1980, p. 126)
Yon Sosa, chafing under the domination of the guerrilla forces by the Communists, removed MR-13 from FAR in July 1964. One of the principal points of contention between MR-13 and the PGT concerned revolutionary goals, and by implication, the nature of the revolutionary coalition. The PGT advocated a, "national democratic revolution that would carry to power a bloc of four classes: workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie." (Gilly 1965a, pp. 17-8) Yon Sosa and MR-13, on the other hand, envisioned a much more fundamental transformation of Guatemalan society, and one which by its nature was more restrictive in terms of membership. Theirs was a, "program of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolution, of socialist revolution and, . . . of a government of workers and peasants." (Gilly 1965a, p. 19)

There is some ambiguity, though, concerning the actual stance of MR-13 on who should be allowed membership in the revolutionary coalition. They are seemingly adamant in their rejection of the more inclusive revolutionary "bloc" of the PGT ("We are against such a bloc; we are for the workers' and peasants' alliance, with a proletarian program and proletarian leadership." Gilly 1965a, p. 36), yet at the same time made appeals to the military to join their cause (Gilly 1965a, p. 31) The most likely explanation of such seemingly contradictory positions is that the MR-13 guerrillas were willing to make common cause with any group whose goals were in coincidence with their own, but were unwilling to alter their ultimate goal in any way in order to form a coalition with other groups.

As mentioned earlier, Turcios Lima eventually split with Yon Sosa and MR-13 in 1965 to revive the then dormant FAR in concert with (although not under the leadership of) the PGT. Thus, by 1965 there were two active guerrilla groups in Guatemala, each pursuing a somewhat different policy in terms of incorporation.

The incorporation tactics of the two groups were somewhat different, not surprising given their divergent views on revolutionary goals. As noted above, both actively sought to incorporate the lower social strata, namely workers and peasants, and the FAR also
attempted to recruit from the middle-class and professional sectors. According to contemporary observers, "FAR has... tried to attract members of the middle class. Doctors work with them. Students, teachers, writers, and other professionals form the core of their teaching and organizing personnel." (Ehrenreichs 1967, p. 27) Both groups also apparently made some attempts to attract supporters from within the military.

There is evidence of strong ties (at least at the outset of the struggle) between the guerrillas and existing illegal opposition groups. The original FAR, as we noted above, was in fact a coalition of three such groups: the survivors of the unsuccessful military revolt of November 1960, the student opposition group Movimiento Abril 12, and the PGT.

There are indications as well that the guerrillas at one point sought to form an alliance with a legal opposition party, Unidad Revolucionaria Democrática (URD), headed at that time by Francisco Villagran Kramer. Gott suggests that the guerrillas were extremely interested in establishing linkages with other organizations. He notes Villagran Kramer's meetings with the head of MR-13: "Yon Sosa was so desperate for support from an existing organized group that, in November 1963, he told Villagran Kramer he would accept assistance from 'the Communists or anyone else.'" Kramer reported that an alliance between the URD and the guerrillas was, "seriously considered", but eventually rejected by the party. (Gott 1971, p. 61-2)

Where organizations did not exist, or were not especially strong, the insurgents sought to build their own. This was particularly the case in rural areas among the isolated peasants of the highlands, and to a lesser extent, among the workers in the cities. Gilly describes in detail the efforts of the guerrillas to create a network of peasant supporters throughout the regions of Zacapa and Izabal. (Gilly 1965a & b) As well, there is some evidence of linkages between the insurgents and urban workers. One author, for example, describes FAR involvement in a labor dispute:

On one occasion the workers of a certain factory were on strike. FAR intervened by kidnapping the managing director of the firm, thus hastening the breaking of the company's resistance. But the resulting increase in pay
was accompanied by a speed-up, with fewer men being made to do more work. FAR intervened again, warning the management to return to the old work norms, and the matter was immediately set right. (Short 1967, p. 35)

The insurgents, then, appear to have had some success in establishing ties with at least two social sectors in their early years: the "disloyal" opposition (PGT, radical student groups), and elements of the "loyal" opposition (peasants, workers, some professionals). As the regime's counterinsurgent efforts stepped up, though, much of the organizational and incorporative work of the guerrillas seems to have come undone. By the late-1960's, there are reports of insurgents being turned over to authorities and even being lynched by peasants who had previously cooperated with them. (Fried 1983, p. 263) This suggests that the insurgents had lost most of whatever links to the "loyal" opposition they had previously enjoyed by this time. By 1968, even their ties to the "disloyal" opposition had largely dissolved. In January of that year, the guerrillas had officially broken with the PGT in a bitter dispute over tactics. The depth of the antagonism between the former allies is readily apparent in a statement issued by the guerrillas announcing the break: "After four years of fighting, this is the balance sheet: 300 revolutionaries fallen in combat, 3000 men of the people murdered by Julio César Méndez Montenegro's regime. The PGT (its ruling clique) supplied the ideas and the FAR the dead." (cited in Gott 1971, p. 508)

According to our scales, then, the guerrillas would have had a low incorporation score (1) for their earliest years of 1962-63; building up to a moderate score (3) for the middle years of 1964-66; falling back to a low score (1) for 1967; and dropping to the lowest score (0) for the remainder of the conflict from 1968-72.

EVENT SOURCE DATA

When we look at the event sources for data concerning the incorporation activities of the insurgents, we are primarily looking for descriptions of either existing ties between the guerrillas and other social groups or efforts on the insurgents' part to establish such ties. By ties we refer not only to formal "alliances", but also to informal "agreements" between a particular social group and the insurgents. Evidence of these types of relations might
include references to cross-membership (which could be described in reports as "infiltration"), statements of support by the social group for the broad program of the guerrillas, descriptions of a particular group as a "front organization" for the insurgents, and more specific references simply to "ties" between a group and the insurgents.

By social group we mean either an established organization (unions, parties, peasant federations, interest groups, military units, etc.) or a more generalized social sector (workers, intellectuals, students, urban poor, professionals, etc.).

Let us move now, then, to specific evidence concerning the insurgents' incorporation activities in our contemporary event source (the New York Times). This data, not surprisingly, is fairly limited. There are, however, some accounts which provide information about the efforts of the guerrillas to establish ties with other social groups. The first concerns possible contacts with student organizations which were engaged in anti-government demonstrations and riots in early-1962. The description of these contacts, though, is somewhat ambiguous. The actual report reads in part:

[The president of the student group] maintained that his association had no political ties. He did not deny that it had been infiltrated by Communists, but he said that all types of ideologies were represented. . . Pamphlets distributed at the student meeting were alleged to be from the Guatemalan Workers party [PGT]. . . It appears certain that the Communists have been trying, probably with some success, to join the attempt to overthrow the Government. (NYT 3/20/62)

The confusion stems from the lack of a distinction in the report between members of the guerrilla groups and PGT personnel, both of whom are described elsewhere simply as "Communists." While this particular article seems to be referring to "official" Communists, i.e., PGT members, a report one month earlier reported that an attack at a United Fruit plantation was also the work of "Communists", in this case referring to MR-13 guerrillas.

This failure to distinguish between insurgents and party members, as well as other instances of vague identification, is something which is certain to be encountered elsewhere in our analysis. We will discuss the problems posed by this ambiguity at the end of this
section.

While the precise linkages between guerrillas and students are not clearly spelled out in this report, it appears that the event source description of tentative ties between student opposition groups and "Communists" can be viewed as roughly consonant with our low incorporation score for the insurgents at that point.

The next piece of information concerning insurgent incorporation in the event source is an article which mentions discussions between Yon Sosa and the opposition party URD. The report describes the meetings as follows:

At one time Mr. Villagran Kramer and his party [URD] contemplated a union with the Yong (sic) Sosa organization... Representatives of the two organizations... held a series of conferences, but these were broken off when the Villagran Kramer party decided to go to the polls on its own last May. This decision, Mr. Villagran Kramer said, was made over the heated objections of the Yong Sosa group, which maintained that a revolutionary overthrow of the Peralta government was Guatemala's only political solution. In November 1963, according to Mr. Villagran Kramer, Mr. Yong Sosa said he would accept assistance from, "the Communists or anyone else." (NYT 12/20/64)

This report suggests that, although the insurgents were unsuccessful in gaining the "official" support of the URD, there were fairly significant efforts underway to establish contact between the guerrillas and existing "legal" opposition groups. If viewed in isolation, we would tend to score this data at the low (1) level of our incorporation scale, since the attempt was seemingly not productive.

A later report, though, changes the context somewhat. In 1966, Times reporter Alan Howard visited Guatemala and spent time "in the field" with Turcios Lima and his FAR units. His account of the guerrillas' efforts to organize supporters in the countryside suggests that the contacts with the URD noted in the earlier report were, although unsuccessful, indicative of a broader mobilization program by the insurgents. Howard describes how the guerrillas moved from village to village engaging in "armed propaganda", during which they, "talked to the peasants, organized them in groups, but did not form military units until they were certain of peasant support." He suggests that, "the guerrillas
seem to have developed a broad base of collaborators among workers, students and intellectuals, and even among younger army officers." (NYT 6/26/66)

Even allowing for the probability that Howard may have overestimated (or been misled about) the actual extent of guerrilla support, we would be inclined to give the insurgents a moderate (3) incorporation score for the period between the two reports (1963-66), which again roughly matches the score derived from evaluation sources.

A final piece of evidence concerning the incorporation scores of the insurgents is a report which describes the war-weariness of the Guatemalan general public following years of violence. The report cites a "growing fatalism" among the masses, caused by, "rampant assassinations and violence by both left-wing and right-wing extremists." (NYT 6/13/71)

This seems to suggest a general alienation among much of the population, an alienation which probably stemmed largely from the climate of fear and helplessness which pervaded Guatemalan society at the time. In terms of incorporation, this indicates a serious flaw in the efforts of the insurgents to mobilize support.

The guerrillas were quite "successful" in provoking the regime into repressive measures, but in the process they reduced the general public to the role of spectators by engaging in conspiratorial tactics which required restricted rather than expanded participation. Our scores for insurgent incorporation during the latter period match fairly well the situation described in this report.

Overall, then, what we have seen in the event sources does not appear to diverge significantly with the scores we developed through our evaluation source data on this dimension.

INSURGENTS—Performance

EVALUATION SOURCE DATA

In the early years of their operations, the guerrillas do not appear to have done much in the way of our performance dimension. There are occasional references to some goods distributions, but little other evidence with regards to performance behavior in the years
1962-63. During this time, though, the insurgents were active in attempting to build a rural organizational structure among the peasants. By 1964, there is evidence that this structure had taken root, at least in the areas of guerrilla concentration (Izabal and Zacapa states), and a fairly significant insurgent administrative presence seems to have been in place in these areas from early-1964 through 1966.

Eduardo Galeano, a Uruguayan journalist who traveled for a time with the insurgents, describes the process by which the infrastructure was established:

> In the case of MR-13, the guerrilleros create..."peasant committees" which dispute the *real* authority in each village with the military commissioners and the auxiliary mayors, impart justice "outside the framework of bourgeois justice," coordinate efforts to repair the damage the army provokes in its excursions into the zone, and economically sustains the families of comrades incorporated into the guerrilla struggle or killed by the army... The committees have public existence, and are appointed in an assembly of all the inhabitants of the village. (Galeano 1969, p. 31 italics in original)

The FAR had a somewhat less overt presence in the villages than did MR-13, but it appears that both insurgent groups had established a fairly significant system of "shadow governments" in the rural areas. While in some areas the guerrillas were successful in scaring off or eliminating local administrators, though, they never actually fully displaced the forces of the regime, as Gilly notes in 1965: "Even though it has not yet, properly speaking, liberated a territory—that is, an area in which the army can no longer operate—it has in fact a substantial area under its control, in which it can function with relative mobility, security and freedom." (Gilly 1965b, p. 18)

There are also reports that the guerrillas opened schools or otherwise attempted to teach peasants in the areas under their influence. (Fried 1983, p. 262) Elsewhere, an observer of the FAR in 1967 noted that, "government-financed literacy schools are run by guerrilla sympathizers who use the facilities to give the peasants political orientation." (Short 1967, p. 35) The evidence thus suggests a fairly well-coordinated and reasonably successful effort on the part of the insurgents to establish what we have called a "shadow
administration" in their areas of operation.

This state of affairs seems to have held from roughly 1964 through late-1966. An intensive counterinsurgency campaign got under way in November 1966, and, by most accounts, had virtually wiped out the guerrillas' rural infrastructure by early-1967. The surviving insurgents fled to the city. While there seems to have been an urban organization with some degree of support among students and some blue-collar workers, there is little evidence of activity which could be classified as insurgent "performance" under our coding scheme. (O'Neill 1980, p. 127) Rather, the urban guerrillas functioned primarily as a military underground, occasionally issuing propaganda statements to accompany their operations, but doing little else in the way of political work.

The insurgent scores on the performance dimension, then, would be as follows: low (1) for the years 1962-3; moving up to moderate (3) during the period of their strong rural administrative presence from 1964 through 1966; and dropping to the lowest possible level (0) after their flight to the city, 1967-71.

EVENT SOURCE DATA

Fundamentally, what we are looking for in the event sources on this dimension is some evidence that the insurgents are providing goods and/or services to their supporters. More broadly speaking, we are seeking to answer the question: Are the guerrillas supplanting in any way the political (i.e., non-military) functions traditionally expected to be performed by the state? Such functions would include administrative duties, provision of education and health assistance, and help or direction of "community" activities, such as crop harvesting and house building.

The range of this type of behavior, as indicated in our scales, would span from "Robin Hood"-type expropriations and redistributions of goods (Low level) to "infiltration" or cooptation of local governments (Moderate level) to guerrilla "zones of control", where an insurgent "government" has been established (High level). Reports suggesting these types of activities are what we are looking for in the event sources.
The only clear-cut example of such a report in the case of the insurgents in Guatemala comes in the aforementioned article by Alan Howard. In it, he describes how the insurgents sought to establish an administrative presence in the rural areas: "During the initial contact with the community, the rebels would seek out the village leaders, hoping to make them the nucleus of a Local Clandestine Committee— a tightly organized unit that, in its most advanced stage, acts as the final political authority of the village." He goes on to note the attempts by the guerrillas to coopt local government officials, first by seeking to win them over to the rebel cause, or, this failing, to persuade them to remain neutral. If the officials refused to cooperate and actively opposed the insurgents, they were executed. (NYT 6/26/66)

In the scores generated from our evaluation sources, we gave the insurgents a moderate (3) figure for the 1964-66 period, indicating a "shadow" administrative presence. This appears to be supported by the Howard article, with the "Local Clandestine Committees" serving the function of counter-government units.

INSURGENTS—Protection

EVALUATION SOURCE DATA

The first military operations by the insurgents, in early-1962, were limited to attacks on small military garrisons and symbolic targets of "imperialism," such as United Fruit Company property. (Johnson 1972, p. 5) The guerrillas were quickly routed by government forces, though, and retreated later that year to regroup. Dormant during late-1962, the insurgents resumed military operations in early-1963 with attacks on army patrols. (Gott 1971, pp. 56-60) From early-1963 through early-1964, the guerrillas continued operations at a fairly low level, minimizing their encounters with government forces, but being fairly successful in those engagements which did take place. Most of their military operations were designed to further their organizational efforts in the rural areas, and thus frequently entailed low-level ambushes or assassinations of government personnel (administrators, police, militia) who were actively working against them. (Gilly 1965b, p.
Beginning in late-1964 and 1965, the insurgents stepped up their military operations in
the countryside, and also initiated a campaign of kidnapping and assassination which was to
continue virtually until the end of the conflict. O'Neill describes the development of
insurgent military operations:

Throughout 1965 the guerrillas conducted small-scale attacks and ambushes on
military outposts and patrols... By early-1966, they were staging larger raids,
some of which resulted in the deaths of as many as a dozen government troops. It
was in 1965 that the guerrillas initiated a series of spectacular political kidnappings...
. From 1963 to mid-1966 the insurgents in the countryside enjoyed their greatest
successes as the army and police appeared incapable of countering them. (O'Neill
1980, pp. 112-5)

The insurgents' rural military operations, though, were seriously damaged, if not
destroyed, by the previously noted counterinsurgency campaign launched in late-1966. The
Guatemalan army, with substantial assistance from the United States, used a three-pronged
approach in their anti-guerrilla effort: 1) aggressive use of regular forces to attack guerrilla
strongholds; 2) civic action among the peasants of the affected areas to generate support for
the government; and 3) the creation of irregular militias designed to root out (and usually
eliminate) actual or potential guerrilla supporters. (O'Neill 1980, pp. 115-6) This last
component was given particular credit for breaking the back of the guerrillas' rural
organization among analysts sympathetic to the insurgents' cause, as with Gott:

Whoever authorized the use of these paramilitary vigilante groups, they
proved to be remarkably successful in slowly eroding the guerrillas' peasant
base. This was an area, after all, in which the guerrillas had been active for
five years or more. Yet, faced by a systematic military push, and the use of
informers, civic action programs, and indiscriminate methods of attack
which led to huge casualties among innocent peasants, the guerrillas soon
found themselves very much on the defensive and forced to adopt a strategy
of mobility. (Gott 1971, p. 101)

This "strategy of mobility" in fact represented a virtual halt of the insurgents' rural
military operations. It did not, however, signal an end to the guerrillas as a military entity,
they had simply shifted to the urban arena. If anything, the insurgents' attacks stepped up
following this shift, but there was a distinct change in the kind of tactics employed. From 1967 onward, the kidnapping and assassination programs which had begun in 1965 came to form the core of the insurgents' military operations. To be sure, isolated attacks on army troops in the countryside, and occasionally even the city, continued. But they were greatly overshadowed by the more spectacular political abductions and murders. The kidnappings were of two types: the purely political, in which representatives of the government or their overseas allies were held to facilitate exchanges for political prisoners; and what might be called the "fundraisers", in which wealthy individuals or members of their family were held for substantial ransoms.

The insurgents proved remarkably adept at kidnapping, and equally so at assassination, counting among their victims an extraordinary litany of powerful and important government figures, both Guatemalan and foreign: several U.S. military advisors, the American and West German ambassadors, the Guatemalan foreign minister, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the head of the secret police. (Johnson 1972, p. 7)

Despite their success, though, the guerrillas suffered serious losses during their period of urban operations. Johnson, writing in 1972, noted, "Although the FAR received considerable publicity its forces were decimated by the Guatemalan Army and police units between 1967 and 1970. . . . At the time of writing the indications were that the guerrilla insurgency from the Marxist left was either dead or very well contained." (Johnson 1972, p. 7)

According to our scales, the insurgents scored low (1) on the protection dimension for early-1962, lowest (0) for late-1962, back to low (1) from 1963 to early-1964, moving up to moderate-active (3) from late-1964 to 1970, and dropping off to lowest (0) again in 1971.

**EVENT SOURCE DATA**

Coding event source data on the protection/coercion dimension, as compared with the other dimensions, should be relatively straightforward. Our scales are constructed such that
they describe specific types of acts likely to appear in event sources. Bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations are inherently more "newsworthy" both because of their spectacular nature and because they require little or no special access to information sources on the part of the reporter, which is in contrast with the type of access required to report on the incorporative or performance activities of the insurgents.

As we noted in an earlier chapter, the military activities of the insurgents are designed to perform the dual functions of reducing the costs of their supporters (protection) and raising the costs of their opponents (coercion). Our scales are constructed to capture this dual nature. In a sense, though, they focus on both the capacity for and targets of insurgent coercion. The lowest levels reflect either an inability of the insurgents to coerce anyone, or a practice of coercing everyone (i.e., opponents and potential supporters alike). The highest level indicates the use of military tactics by the insurgents to demonstrate a capacity to defend those who support them against attacks by the regime and a willingness to "punish" those who actively oppose them.

There are numerous reports of insurgent activities in this dimension in the event source, but two examples should illustrate how this data fits with our coding scheme. The first indicates an insurgent capacity to coerce opponents. It refers to a series of kidnappings by the guerrillas in late-1965:

Four kidnappings that netted the kidnappers more than $300,000 in ransom were carried out in November and December with such adroitness that the criminals are now viewed with profound terror. The attacks, which sometimes took place in daylight in frequented parts of the capital, caused the Government's standing to fall so heavily in December that there was a strong conviction that it would go out the way it came in. [i.e., through a coup d'etat; NYT 1/15/66]

A second example involves actions which come closer to what we mean by "protective" actions. Although it does not directly entail actual defense of insurgent supporters, it does involve efforts by the guerrillas (even if largely symbolic) to impair the capacity of the regime to attack these supporters. There are two brief reports of insurgent actions coming about a month apart in both the countryside and the city:
Nine guerrillas attacked a small army garrison . . . Three government soldiers were killed. (NYT 10/21/64)

Guerrilla terrorists . . . carried out a mortar attack against the headquarters of customs guards [in Guatemala City] . . . In full view of nearby residents, four attackers arrived in a truck and began shelling the barracks . . . There were no casualties, but one office was heavily damaged. (NYT 11/15/64)

These two examples (kidnapping & attacks) both fall within the period where the insurgents received their highest scores, the moderate-active level (3), on the protection/coercion dimension in our evaluation source coding. The complete absence of any reports on insurgent military activity during late-1962 also corresponds to our evaluation data score of low-inactive level (0) during this period.

REGIME--Incorporation

EVALUATION SOURCE DATA

At the outset of the insurgency, Guatemala had an elected government headed by Manuel Ydígoras Fuentes. While not a model of genuine popular democracy, the regime did at least permit political parties to function fairly freely and maintained ties to the middle class as well as the elites. Ydígoras' perceived inability to cope with the insurgent threat, though, resulted in a coup led by Defense Minister Enrique Peralta Azurdia in March 1963.

Peralta essentially tore up the Guatemalan constitution, suspending all political activity indefinitely in his effort to rescue the country from, "the brink of an internal conflict as a result of subversion promoted by pro-Communist sectors." (Gott 1971, p. 58)

Peralta Azurdia remained in power from early -1963 until late-1966, and in that period practiced what has subsequently become called by political scientists as "anti-politics."

Virtually all modes of access linking citizen to government were blocked and organizations designed to foster such access were actively suppressed.

Opposition political parties and trade unions were especially targeted for repression by the military regime. Leaders of these groups were routinely arrested, exiled or simply
"disappeared." In short, the Peralta Azurdia regime severed its ties with all but the very highest social sectors during its three year tenure. (Adams 1970, pp. 107-8 & 206-7)

In March, 1966, the military lived up to its promises of being only a temporary, caretaker government (Peralta Azurdia had ceremoniously refused the title of president during his years in office) and held elections under a newly written constitution. In July, the winner of those elections, civilian Julio Cesar Méndez Montenegro, took office.

Méndez Montenegro campaigned as a moderate reformer, calling for an end to the violence and direct talks with the insurgents. Swayed by such conciliatory rhetoric, as well as by the fact that the only other two candidates in the election were both Army colonels, the guerrillas urged their followers to support Méndez Montenegro.

Méndez Montenegro won the election, and shortly thereafter appeared ready to make good on his campaign promises by apparently offering an amnesty to all insurgents who laid down their arms. It quickly became the case, though, that the amnesty entailed more rhetoric than substance. Conservative elements in government and the military succeeded in tacking so many qualifications on the offer as to make it meaningless. Even the PGT, which presumably was very anxious for some sort of negotiated return to legal political existence, was compelled to reject the amnesty in its final form.

It is difficult to accurately assess the extent to which the amnesty offer succeeded in driving a wedge between those advocating armed struggle and those in favor of peaceful reform. It is clear, though, that the insurgents' rejection of the offer did provide the military with important leverage against the civilian president in their call for a vigorous prosecution of the counterinsurgency campaign.

Nonetheless, Méndez Montenegro's regime did allow a greater measure of political activity than had his predecessor. Political parties were once again permitted to function, although subject to fairly stringent restrictions under the new constitution.

Despite such apparent openings, some authors argue that the political system was, in fact, almost completely circumscribed:
Any threatening opposition outside an Army-decreed spectrum was constitutionally neutralized or explicitly banned.

"The formation of parties or entities which adhere to the communist ideology is forbidden, as are those which through their doctrinal tendency, means of action or international links attack the sovereignty of the state."

The final clause restricted such "exotic ideologies" as social democracy and Christian Democracy, at that time a fast-growing new current. (Black 1984, p. 22)

Other observers seem to suggest a somewhat less restricted political atmosphere, though hardly one of total incorporation. (Adams 1970, p. 450) Given the varying estimates, it seems plausible to assume that Méndez Montenegro's regime was able at least to incorporate elements of the middle class which had been largely ignored during the previous military regime.

This state of affairs held until 1970, when Carlos Araña Osorio was elected president. During his first months in office, there is some ambiguity concerning Araña's position on incorporation. On the one hand, he could not by any stretch of the imagination be accused of taking a "conciliatory" stance towards the guerrillas. Indeed, he had promised during his campaign to pacify the country even if it meant turning Guatemala into a vast cemetery. On the other hand, Araña had startled many observers by calling for reforms in taxation, banking and agrarian policy. (O'Neill 1980, p. 114) As there is no evidence of either further expansion or contraction of the political system during Araña's early years, we will assign the same incorporation score as during the previous Méndez Montenegro regime. The scores for incorporation, then, are moderate (1) for 1962, low (3) for 1963 to early-1966, and moderate (1) again for the remainder of the conflict period, late-1966 to 1971.

EVENT SOURCE DATA

As with the insurgents, when we look at the event source data for information concerning the incorporation activities of the regime, we seek evidence of ties between the
incumbents and other social groups. The mechanisms by which these ties are established or sought may be somewhat different for the regime than they are for the guerrillas, but the overall objectives are the same: to establish a coalition of sorts between the actor and the targeted social sector.

For the regime, this end can be accomplished by a number of different means, most of which are sufficiently "public" as to warrant mention in our event sources. Evidence concerning the incorporation efforts of the regime would include reports on elections (especially information on the extent of citizen participation and what restrictions were placed on it), political party activities (again, in terms of parties' willingness and ability to participate in the political system), attitudes of elites (e.g., conflict or cooperation between regime and economic or military elites), and relations between the regime and the "masses" (e.g., recognition of or consultation with mass organizations such as trade unions or peasant federations).

There are numerous reports in our event source which provide indications of the incorporative activities of the Guatemalan regime. We will concentrate on a few such reports which seem to be particularly relevant to the scores which were generated with data from our evaluation sources and the changes in these scores over the course of the insurgency period.

The first concerns an effort by the Ydigoras regime to mobilize support among "anti-communist" parties following a spell of urban unrest early in his tenure.

President Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes has appealed for help from three Anti-communist parties that sought last last week to overthrow his regime. He asked them to stop supporting his Communist opponents. Representatives of the three parties met secretly yesterday with a Government representative. . . it is known that the meeting was attended by [leaders] of the Christian Democratic party, which is Rightist and pro-Catholic, . . . the moderate Leftist Revolutionary party, . . . and the [extreme Right] National Liberation Movement . . . The meeting adjourned without the Opposition parties having committed themselves. (NYT 3/23/62)

Despite the apparent strains in the relationship between the regime and the
parties noted, it is clear that Ydigoras was at a minimum seeking to maintain some ties with the existing parties which he considered legitimate (i.e., "anti-communist"). We gave the regime a moderate (1) score for this period, suggesting ties with the middle class. In this case, it is possible that the score was too high, that it indicates closer links than actually existed. But it could be argued that there was at least an effort on the part of the regime to establish a dialogue with opposition parties, and that regardless of its immediate success it represents significant incorporative activity. Consequently, we don't feel that the possible discrepancy between our coded score and this piece of evidence indicates a serious flaw in our analysis.

A second case involves the reporting of the coup d'état which removed the Ydagoras regime from office.

The government of President Manuel Ydagoras Fuentes was overthrown last night and a military government has taken over. The new Government is headed by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azuridia, 55-year-old Minister of Defense in the former regime. His first orders as Chief of State were to suspend the Constitution and dissolve the Legislature. . . All political activity has been prohibited. (NYT 4/1/63)

This report is quite clearly compatible with our evaluation source score of low (3), which indicates that the regime only maintains ties with the elites. This state of affairs remained static throughout Peralta's period in office, changing with the election of a civilian regime in late-1966.

The next significant event in terms of incorporation came in July of that year: "The Guatemalan Congress last night approved a broad decree granting immediate amnesty to all political prisoners. . . The decree includes members of the leftist guerrilla movements." (NYT 7/28/66) When we discussed incorporation tactics in an earlier chapter, we suggested that an amnesty extended to those seeking to overthrow the government indicated the broadest possible type of incorporation. This perhaps needs clarification. In the abstract, we still believe that amnesties reflect very broad incorporative efforts on the part of the
regime. Yet we also feel that such measures must be viewed in context, and special attention must be paid to the terms of the amnesty offer.

The highest score would be given to an amnesty which sought to truly reincorporate those who had been operating "outside" the system, offering them genuine opportunities to participate in political affairs. On the other hand, an amnesty which offered only a promise of non-prosecution in return for a de facto unilateral surrender by the insurgents would receive a lower score.

It is clear that the Guatemalan amnesty was much closer to the latter type of offer than to the former. It called for both the surrender of weapons and the release of insurgent kidnap victims as a prerequisite to qualifying for the pardon. As well, the Constitution written under the direction of the previous military regime proscribed political activity by any organization remotely supportive of "Communist" ideas, a proscription which effectively barred the guerrillas from political participation. Given this, we would argue that the event source evidence supports our moderate (1) incorporation score for this period.

The final piece of evidence is a report on the presidential election of 1970 and the political climate which accompanied it:

About 700,000 men and women will vote for president on Sunday and the election is expected to be close. Despite the terrorist actions of a small but well-organized group of extreme left-wing urban revolutionaries, the campaign has been one of the freest and most vigorously waged in Guatemalan history. (NYT 2/23/70)

In our evaluation source analysis, we did not identify this election as an event which warranted a change in the incorporation score for the regime. According to event source data, though, the election would seem to represent broad incorporation by the regime. Yet it is important to remember that the 1970 presidential election, like the one in 1966, was conducted in a political environment which had been circumscribed by the restrictive clauses of the 1965 Constitution. While this fact is more clearly elaborated in our evaluation sources, it also appears in the event source. We feel justified, then, in suggesting that the
above report should be viewed as a continuation of, rather than a change in, the incorporation activities of the regime. Such a perspective would reflect agreement between the scores in our evaluation source analysis and the evidence from event sources.

REGIME—Performance

EVALUATION SOURCE DATA

There is little evidence of positive action on the part of the regime in the performance dimension during the early years of the insurgency. On the contrary, administration and services seem to have been steadily declining from the time of the "liberation" in 1954 until roughly late-1966. In terms of our scores, the performance of the Ydígoras and Méndez Montenegro regimes are somewhere between minimal provision of public goods and a complete lack of services.

Beginning in late-1966, though, the Army began making "civic action" an important component in its counterinsurgency effort. Under the "Plan Piloto", government troops initiated a number of activities designed to counter guerrilla influence in their zones of operation. These activities included school lunch programs, construction of schools and hospitals, drilling wells, building roads, developing a literacy program and providing medical care, vaccination and vitamins. In addition, programs to improve agricultural techniques, electrification, water supply and housing were introduced. (O'Neill 1980, pp. 116-7)

These efforts were quite specifically targeted in areas where the insurgents were perceived to be most active, as the sardonic comments of a Guatemalan peasant to author Eduardo Galeano reveal: "You have to have a guerrilla unit nearby to get drinking water." (Galeano 1969, p. 79)

These projects continued throughout the conflict period, giving the regime a fairly high (1) performance dimension score from late-1966 to 1971. For the previous years, 1962 to early-1966, most accounts place regime performance between low (3) and least (5) in terms of our scales, so we will use the average of the two figures (4) for our score.
EVENT SOURCE DATA

In searching the event source for evidence of regime activity on the performance dimension, we are looking as much for what is not reported as for what is. Significant projects designed to benefit the population can be expected to be the subject of extensive publicity campaigns on the part of the regime. The political capital to be gained from the execution of such projects is almost certainly as important to the regime as are the benefits which would accrue to the recipients. Consequently, if there are no reports of governmental action on the performance front, we feel reasonably comfortable in assuming that substantial efforts are not going unreported. This lack of news on performance activities is what characterizes the early part of the period under study in Guatemala. One of the only references to be found prior to 1966 concerns an apparent regression on the performance dimension: an austerity drive ordered by Peralta in 1965. (NYT 3/7/65)

Beginning in 1966, though, the regime appears to have committed itself to improving its standing among the public, particularly those considered "vulnerable" to guerrilla influence. There are two reports which describe the civic action projects of the regime:

... the Méndez administration has prepared programs that attempt to alleviate some of the conditions on which extremism feeds. One calls for the development of the basic economic and social structure--roads, housing, water supply, electrification and port expansion. Another makes a cautious start on agrarian reform... In three months, more than $16 million in long-term loan agreements has been signed and some $48 million is pending. In addition to filling the long-term [development] requirements, the projects that these loans make possible will furnish much-needed work. In addition, some projects such as roads, water supply and low-cost housing, will affect the rural areas most heavily infiltrated by the guerrilla movement. (NYT 10/15/66)

The army... changed its tactics toward the peasants. It had a tendency to treat them with a heavy hand, as if all were incipient or disguised guerrillas. Its civic action program had been reserved for the "good" towns, those were the guerrillas had not gained any entry. Now road-building, well-digging, and literacy and nutritional centers have been extended to places where soldiers run heavy risks. (NYT 7/17/67)

These reports suggest a significant improvement in the performance of the regime, an improvement which is also reflected in our evaluation source scores. After 1967, there are
scattered references to the performance activities of the regime, including one in 1970 which notes that implementation of U.S.-sponsored aid programs was being delayed pending the results of that year's presidential election. (NYT 2/24/70)

This report seems to suggest that, despite some delays and other problems, the performance efforts of the regime which had their origin in the civic action programs had not been abandoned. This is essentially compatible with the interpretation in our evaluation source scores.

PROTECTION—Regime

EVALUATION SOURCE DATA

By most accounts, the regime was somewhat unprepared to deal with a serious insurgent threat at the conflict initially broke out. The authorities apparently had little difficulty in quashing the periodic outbursts of student or labor unrest, but were less capable of containing a coordinated and well-organized campaign of political violence. O’Neill describes the early years:

During the initial period of the insurgency from 1962 until mid-1966, the government was very ineffective. . . the army did destroy the insurgent forces in 1962, but this was as much due to insurgent ineptitude and impatience as it was to government effectiveness. . . Speaking in January 1967, Minister of Defense Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque said that instead of taking the initiative, the Peralta Azurdia regime (March 1963-July 1966) would only react to guerrilla strikes and then only with isolated operations. It seems that the Peralta regime thought of the insurgent problem as one of isolated banditry rather than as a threat to the central authorities. (O’Neill 1980, p. 115; italics in original)

Things began to change in 1966, though. We noted earlier that when the civilian Méndez Montenegro came to power, his situation with regard to the military was tenuous. Once the offer of amnesty had been rejected by the guerrillas, the army was essentially given a free hand to conduct the counterinsurgency campaign. By this time, the military had come to recognize the insurgents for what they were, an armed revolutionary organization, and moved to respond to the threat accordingly. On the political side, this involved the civic action programs mentioned above. On the military side, the security forces were revamped,
irregular militias created, and aggressive pursuit tactics were adopted.

In a conventional sense, the performance of the Guatemalan security forces greatly improved beginning in late-1966. Instead of simply "reacting" as they had during the Peralta Azurdia regime, the army was now actively seeking out and engaging guerrilla units in the countryside. While this was taking place, the militias were engaged in efforts to eliminate insurgent support networks in the villages, and in the process were killing not only actual supporters, but potential ones as well. In addition to the militias, right-wing terror groups which were nominally independent, but largely believed to have been formed by elements within the military, began to surface. These groups, which regularly distributed lists of those marked for assassination, were responsible for a large amount of the indiscriminate terror which characterized Guatemalan political and social life during the latter stages of the conflict.

Both the regular and irregular forces worked together closely in attacking the guerrilla infrastructure, with the latter being primarily responsible for much of the "dirty work" involved in the effort. There is little question that both types of forces were "enthusiastic" about their missions. O'Neill notes that the army was particularly efficient is striking at the insurgent military apparatus: "By mid-January 1967, the government claimed to have killed 200 guerrillas, though independent sources reported only about 90. In any case, these were serious losses since the hard-core rebel forces probably never exceeded more than two or three hundred men." (O'Neill 1980, p. 116)

The irregular forces, including the militias and right-wing terror organizations, were equally vigorous in their attacks on the bases of insurgent support. If these groups were not entirely successful in eliminating all support for the guerrillas, it can in no way be attributed to a lack of effort on their part. While they certainly did little to generate support for the regime through their ruthless activities, they most assuredly demonstrated the incapacity of the insurgents to protect their followers. Johnson notes the grim statistics: "The Report of the Guatemalan Committee in Defence of Human Rights claimed that the clandestine groups
had been involved in the deaths of some 6,000 persons between 1966 and 1968 (this figure, supposedly, included leftist guerrillas as well as innocent persons). The August 1971 denunciation of the Mexican 'committee of sixty-five' gave 9,000 as the 1966-71 figure of deaths that could be attributed to official terrorism." (Johnson 1972, p. 14)

Terror remained a part of Guatemalan political life throughout the period under study, but diminished somewhat in scale from late-1968 to 1971. When the guerrillas shifted their operations to the urban arena, the security forces responded by tightening their control over these areas. The army retained primary responsibility for maintaining pressure on the now-dormant rural guerrillas. Additionally, it bolstered the capabilities of the increasingly effective police forces in the city by providing intelligence and logistical support.

Soldiers and policemen enforced tight security measures that included guarding all government buildings, key intersections, banks, embassies, and overpasses. Well-armed patrols constantly cruised the streets. At times whole neighborhoods would be cordoned off and then methodically searched by the army and police. The police would make lightning raids at night to arrest individuals and search for arms. (O'Neill 1980, p. 119)

This type of tactical program corresponds closely to the middle level-active (3) score on our protection dimension scales. Overall, then, the regimes score on this dimension are as follows: From the onset of the insurgency in 1962 until early-1966, the regime's protection scores are at the middle-inactive (3) level. In late-1966, the scores change as a result of the counterinsurgency campaign, composed of several different types of tactics, launched at that time. The mixture of indiscriminate terror and "conventional" army counterinsurgency tactics employed in this campaign seems to straddle two separate categories, the middle-active (3) and the low-active (5) levels, in our scaling scheme. Consequently, we will use an average figure (4) lying between the two for our score. Beginning in late-1968, the score moves back to the middle-active (3) level, remaining there until late-1971, when it rises to the high (1) level.

EVENT SOURCE DATA

As our scales indicate, we are primarily concerned in coding events on the
protection/coercion dimension which reflect the manner in which the regime utilizes its military and coercive capabilities in response to the insurgent challenge. Again, this encompasses the dual tasks facing the regime of protecting supporters (and itself) and punishing those who seek to overthrow it. Thus, the maximum score represents extensive protection of those who abide by the established legal norms and effective repression of those who do not. The lowest scores represent either an inability of the regime to effectively defend itself or a program of wholesale persecution of the population at large, regardless of whether or not individuals defy existing laws.

In more specific terms, we are looking for evidence concerning how the regime uses its military or police apparatus, upon whom it brings its coercive resources to bear, and the extent to which it establishes and follows legal parameters to define the limits of "tolerable" political behavior. Such evidence would include information on the use of troops in a role normally performed by regular police forces, the implementation of martial law or other states of emergency, the use of "special" courts (e.g., military tribunals) as opposed to civilian courts, the suspension of constitutional guarantees, and the extent of active military engagement of insurgent forces by regime forces.

There are numerous reports in our event source which provide the sort of information we need to generate scores on the protection/coercion dimension. Indeed, there are no fewer than 13 reports of the imposition of some sort of martial law, emergency rule or state of siege. One report is typical of this type of response on the part of the regime to a perceived threat: "The army took over Guatemala City today in an effort to put down student-worker demonstrations against the Government... The army planned to have a total of 40,000 men in the capital to help put down disorders and insure the Government's safety." (NYT 3/17/62)

Elsewhere we find evidence of an active effort by the regime to pursue the insurgents in their rural strongholds, as in this brief report: "Guatemalan Army units reported a major victory yesterday over a guerrilla band commanded by a former lieutenant Marco Antonio
Yon Sosa. Nine guerrillas were killed and four rebel camps were destroyed in a three-day battle that began Sunday." (NYT 11/13/65) Another report, early in 1967, also describes the more "activist" approach taken by the military and suggests it had helped to promote a, "perceptible decrease in the peasants' support of the guerrillas."

Last fall, for the first time, the army launched sustained operations against the guerrillas and all accounts agree that the operations are paying off... the Minister of Defense contrasted the present attitude with the one taken by the previous military regime, which would merely "react" to guerrilla strikes by launching isolated operations... [Also] officials are showing more discrimination and courtesy in handling the peasants. (NYT 1/15/67)

Each of the above reports reflects what we refer to in our scales as the "utilization of extraordinary means" accompanied by "extensive curtailment of 'normal' judicial processes" by the regime to respond to the insurgent threat. This would translate into a moderate-active (3) score in our coding scheme. Our evaluation source analysis does in fact give such a score for the regime from 1962 to early-1966, but shifts the score upward (4) for the late-1966 to early-1968 period. If we viewed the two reports above which lie within this latter period in isolation, there would appear to be a discrepancy between scores generated by event versus evaluation source data. But another event report, this one in late-1967, suggests that the army was not strictly practicing "discrimination and courtesy" in its dealings with civilians.

The Communist-led guerrilla movement has been put on the defensive in Guatemala and its effectiveness drastically reduced in the last six months. But in the process, a new threat has risen to the Constitutional regime—right-wing terrorism... no amount of army denial has been able to shake the conviction, widely held among informed persons here, that most of the rightist, Anti-communist groups are, in fact, a creation of the army and that many of their members are junior army officers. Moreover, there exists a strongly held belief that the Government gave at least tacit consent to the underground operations... These armed irregulars have been criticized for being so indiscriminate in their attacks that a large number of innocent persons... have been tortured, killed or terrorized... estimates of the number of persons actually killed, some after torture, have gone as high as 1000. On the other hand, estimates of the actual number of guerrillas have never gone beyond a few hundred and many of them are still at liberty. (NYT 7/15/67)
This sort of behavior does not quite qualify for our maximum level, indicating wholesale indiscrimination in coercion of civilians. It does, however, represent in our opinion sufficient "excess" in the use of force by the regime to justify a higher score on the protection/coercion dimension from our event data, which accords with that generated by our evaluation data. In short, we see the event data as providing the same general picture of the scene on this dimension as that provided by the evaluation data.

CONCLUSION

The pre-test was conducted in order to help us develop guidelines and identify potential problems in the data collection process. It was not structured to provide us with a rigorous or complete evaluation of our analytical design. It will not, for example, enable us to examine the testing process to be used in our analysis. We could, presumably, engage in a mock "test" of our model, but we feel this would not be very productive for two reasons. First, we conducted the pre-test using a "reverse-coding" process, which means that the sources to be used for testing in our final analysis (evaluation sources) were instead used to generate the simulation scores. Consequently, any mock "test" of this case not provide us with a meaningful estimate of how well the model could in fact be tested.

Second, one ostensible purpose for conducting some sort of mock test would be to determine the degree to which there is an element of falsifiability in our model. If it was demonstrated that there was a perfect correlation between our two sets of sources, our results would certainly have to be called into question. Such a high level of correspondence between the sources would likely suggest that, in effect, there was no possibility of falsification in our model, a fatal flaw in any research design. We feel that our pre-test did identify areas of discrepancy between our two sets of sources sufficient to suggest a potential for falsification of our model.

This said, we turn now to some potential problems in the data collection process which were identified in our pre-test.

1) Data Availability—for a variety of reasons, some of which have already been alluded
to, the availability of data sufficient to suit the needs of our model is likely to present some problems. We foresee this problem as being "unevenly distributed" across both tactical dimensions and historical period. First, we will most probably be faced with the problem of data availability with regard to the political (i.e., incorporation and performance) activities of the insurgents. We noted earlier some of the reasons behind this lack of information (limited media access to insurgents, perception of such events as not "newsworthy", etc.). Second, there appears to be a distinct trend toward greater data availability, particularly in reference to these previously "underreported" dimensions, over the historical period covered in our analysis. There are a number of possible explanations for this trend, including greater awareness or interest in the subject by the media, a recognition on the part of the guerrillas of the value of publicity, etc. In short, the problem of data availability is likely to be most acute in our earlier cases. In an earlier chapter, we noted our strategy of making use of alternative sources where availability precludes our preferred use of the single event source.

2) Scope/Range--a second potential problem area relates to questions of the scope and range of tactical behavior by the actors. Scope refers to the extent of the total population of a given social sector affected by an actor's behavior. This primarily concerns behavior in the incorporation dimension. By range we mean the geographical distribution of a particular behavior, and this could feasibly be concerned with behavior in any of our three dimensions. Our potential problems stem from the fact that we do not include factors which distinguish between differences in both scope and range. In terms of incorporation, for example, we would equate a coalition between the insurgents and a peasant federation with ties between the insurgents and all peasants, which clearly may not be the case. In terms of range, we make no effort to discriminate between local, regional or national level activities by the actors. Again, this makes implicit assumptions, i.e., that all behavior is nationally oriented, which may not be justified. We recognize that failing to make distinctions on the basis of scope and range may reduce the descriptive power of our model, but offer here
some justification for our design. First, the question of scope, we feel, is not particularly relevant in light of our conceptualization of incorporation. Since, as was discussed earlier, we are concerned primarily with the efforts of the actors to make certain social sectors "feel welcome" in a coalition, we don't feel it is necessary to identify precisely what proportion of the sector is "formally" incorporated. Presumably, if the insurgents formed a coalition with a peasant organization, even peasants not belonging to the group would get the message that they, as a social sector, were welcome in the coalition. The question of range is somewhat more complicated, and the only justification we can offer is that to include it would create more problems than it would solve. The principal problem we see in dealing with differences in the range of behavior is one of ranking. Were we to introduce this variable, a host of uncomfortable questions would arise: Are national level tactics inherently more "important" than regional level ones? Should behavior in one region, say the capital city, be ranked "higher" than behavior in another? We cannot offer any clearcut answers to such questions, which seem to be largely dependent on subjective interpretation. Consequently, we choose to accept the limitations accompanying an approach which does not include distinctions in terms of scope and range.

3) Vague Identification—a last potential problem area concerns the possibility of confusion concerning the identity of the actor engaging in a particular behavior. It is possible that in a given report there will be ambiguity regarding the perpetrator of an action, which could result in an attribution of that action to one primary actor, when in fact the action was carried out by the other primary actor or even by another group. For example, the term "terrorists" could refer to either guerrillas or regime-sponsored irregulars, and the term "Communists" might refer to either the actual insurgents or to an official party organization which is not affiliated with the insurgents.

This type of ambiguous reporting will probably occur in particular under two sets of conditions: 1) the early stages of an insurgency, where there is little familiarity with the guerrilla group as a more or less autonomous organization; and 2) situations where the
insurgents do not enjoy a monopoly on the practice of political violence, i.e., where violent right-wing groups are operating simultaneously.

While both of these types of confusion are undesirable from our standpoint, they are not, in our view, particularly damaging to our analysis. Our reasoning in this regard goes back to our discussion in an earlier chapter about the differences between access to "perfect" versus incomplete information. We argued that, since we are attempting to model the support decisions of individuals in insurgency situations, the use of incomplete information on our part is not problematic, as this is the same sort of information available to those making these decisions.

To sum up, we feel our pre-test provided us with a valuable set of guidelines which will assist us in the data collection process, and directed our attention to some of the potential problems we face.
CHAPTER FOUR
VENEZUELA: 1961-1968

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter and the next we will examine two cases of insurgent failure, those of Venezuela and Peru, in an attempt to evaluate the validity of our model of the process of insurgency. As we have earlier stated, we feel that any meaningful explanation of revolutionary outcomes must be capable of accounting not only for instances of insurgent success, but of failure as well. We hope that by first examining cases of failure, and then moving to cases of success, the contrasts between the two types of cases will be made clearer, and the impact of the variables we have argued are critical to outcomes will be more easily distinguished.

Major Actors

REGIME: President Rómulo Betancourt, Acción Democrática (AD) Party, (1958-63); President Raúl Leoni, AD, (1964-69); Other Parties: Comité Pro Elecciones Independiente (COPEI); Unión Republicana Democrática (URD).

INSURGENTS: Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR); Partido Comunista Venezolano (PCV); Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN).

The origins of the Venezuelan guerrilla movements of the 1960's can be traced to that country's turbulent political history in the years preceding the outbreak of insurgency. Prior to 1945, Venezuela had experienced the sort of traditional personalist rule which characterized much of Latin America in the post-independence period. From the turn of the century until 1935, the country was ruled in classic caudillo style by the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, who prohibited any activity by political parties. Under the subsequent regime of General Isaías Medina Angarita (1940-45), political parties were allowed to operate freely, although they were effectively denied the opportunity to participate in the electoral sense.

This paradoxical state of affairs, that parties were allowed to function, yet had no
meaningful role in the political system, led to the formation of parties which represented virtually every sector of the Venezuelan population except those who ruled the country. Jorge Ahumada suggests why this was the case: "There is a plausible explanation for the indifference of the economically powerful groups to party organization. Their alliance with the army assured their domination without the need to enter the political arena." (Ahumada, in Fagen & Cornelius 1970, p. 51)

The newly emerging political parties took advantage of the opportunity to establish large scale organizations encompassing the middle class, workers and peasants both in the cities and the countryside. One of the most effective, Acción Democrática (AD), eventually was able to align itself as well with a group of younger, disgruntled army officers. In 1945, these progressive elements in the military joined the AD in sparking a coup which established a civilian-led, electoral regime.

Under the leadership of Rómulo Betancourt, a provisional government enacted a wide-ranging series of social, economic and agrarian reforms from 1945 to 1948. In 1948, Rómulo Gallegos of AD became the first president elected by the general public under the new provisions of a universal suffrage law. Venezuela's democratic experiment, subsequently dubbed the trienio, was short-lived, though. Intense disagreements and in-fighting among the major civilian parties left the newly created political system in disarray, and the military, led by Marcos Pérez Jiménez, displaced the regime less than three years after it came to power. For ten years, from 1948-1958, Pérez Jiménez ruled the country in much the same manner as his autocratic predecessors.

Despite intense and often brutal attempts by the regime to eliminate political activity throughout the country, the major parties survived. The parties did, however, develop a somewhat schizophrenic character during the long years of dictatorship. Serious rifts began to appear within the parties between the exiled leadership, and those who remained behind in the underground. At the same time, relations between the parties had markedly improved as a result of the common struggle against Pérez Jiménez.
The ten-year rule of Pérez Jiménez, then, had two primary effects on the major Venezuelan parties, both of which were to have important implications for political relations during later years. On the one hand, their shared experiences of repression under the dictatorship convinced the parties that cooperation was essential if they hoped to avoid a recurrence of the aftermath of the trienio. On the other hand, the different perspectives of those in the underground and the exiled leadership created deep divisions within the parties themselves. These divisions were at the root of the conflict which eventually erupted into insurgency. Levine explains:

Perhaps the most important result of the lengthy resistance to military rule was the cooperation that resistance forced on the parties. This softening of divisions led to clear decisions among the top leadership of AD, COPEI, and URD to seek a permanent reduction of the sectarian and partisan tone of political conflict, thereby enhancing the chances for the maintenance of a stable, democratic system in the postdictatorship era.

It is important to remember, however, that these arrangements were made largely at the level of top party leadership. For AD this posed a sharp problem. For all the major parties, AD was the most bitterly persecuted. Its underground organization was shattered and rebuilt many times. The net result was a growing dissociation between the top leadership in exile and those who carried on the day to day struggle underground.

While AD's exile leaders agreed on the need for cooperation with URD and COPEI, the major allies of AD's underground cadre were the Communists. When the exile leadership returned to take over the party, and began to press for concessions to old enemies as the necessary price of stability and survival, they met growing opposition from the underground generation of leaders... these men rejected the new alliances, and the concessions made, and later came to form the nucleus of revolutionary opposition to the post-1958 political arrangements, expressing their opposition in guerrilla warfare. (Levine 1973, pp. 42-3)

In 1958, a series of nationwide strikes coordinated by the underground organizations forced Pérez Jiménez from office. Shortly thereafter the three major parties, AD, COPEI, and URD, signed an agreement (the "Pact of Punto Fijo") in which each pledged to respect the outcome of pending elections and to work cooperatively in establishing national policy. It was this agreement which laid the basis for the coalition government that came to power under Betancourt of the AD following national elections in 1958. The first years of the new regime were marked by significant progress in implementing the reforms initiated during the
trienio, but were also marked by serious internal difficulties, including economic crises, student and labor unrest, and right-wing conspiracies. It was in this atmosphere of both promise and turbulence that the insurgency began to develop.

REGIME--Incorporation

The regime's incorporation scores for 1961 are moderate, reflecting reports indicating that significant opposition from both the Right and Left continued to be viewed as serious "threats" to the existence of the government (1/25/61); the occurrence of splits within the ruling party itself (12/23/61) and formation of new opposition parties (5/14/61); tensions between government and industry/banking leaders over pace of reforms and cooperation of private sector (7/29/61); and government requests to remove the parliamentary immunity of two members based on their "anti-government" positions (7/5/61).

Scores for early 1962 remained low due to some of the same troubles of the previous year: ruling party splits (1/14/62); student and other strikes and disorders (1/20/62). The regime appears to have resisted temptations to make moves toward exclusionary policies in the face of domestic unrest. In response to an assassination attempt, President Betancourt first ordered the arrest of all Communists in the country, only to reverse himself two days later and limit arrests to "terrorists" (6/15/63). Reports indicate that most major social sectors remained committed to working within the political system rather than outside it: military and labor leaders conferred on cooperating to curb terrorism (10/21/62); the Workers Confederation planned "retaliation" if terrorism continued (2/21/63); labor and business leaders formed a committee for the defense of democracy (11/23/63).

The incorporation scores reached the highest possible level beginning in 1964, and remained at that level through the end of the conflict. The change in scores reflects two major developments: the Presidential election of December 1963, and the issuance of an amnesty law in the latter half of 1964. The election is important both in terms of its inherent significance as a vehicle of mass incorporation (all Venezuelans over age 18 are eligible to vote, and over 90% exercised this right in the 1963 elections) and the relatively
non-exclusive nature in which it was conducted (all parties, including the Communist Party of Venezuela, or PCV, were allowed to participate, although the PCV chose to boycott in protest over an earlier suspension of its activities). Following the election, the new president, Raul Leoni, stressed national conciliation (3/12/64); and later named a coalition cabinet composed of members of all three major parties (10/28/64). The amnesty law, promulgated by Leoni, provided an opportunity for those working outside the political system to return without penalty (12/25/64). The significance of this move is that it broadened incorporation to the widest possible spectrum, i.e., all those who renounced violent means to overthrow the government. The law (and thus the high incorporation score) continued to be operative throughout the period under study, resulting in both pardons of ex-guerrillas (4/27/68) and the surrender of some of those insurgents who were still operative (2/15/66).

REGIME—Performance

Performance scores remained moderate from 1961 to late-1962 as a result of poor economic conditions, which prompted cuts in government services and higher taxes: a call for all government agencies to reduce the budget by 20% (4/16/61); followed by the proposal by the President of a budget which included new taxes, spending cuts and a 10% reduction in government salaries (5/7/61). Despite the serious economic problems, development and reform programs were still being pursued, including the establishment of a government corporation designed to create a "Ruhr-type" industrial area in an underdeveloped, rural region of the country (1/23/61).

By late-1962, the reforms and development programs were apparently beginning to take hold. A report issued in mid-1962 cited improvements in housing, education and agrarian reform (6/10/62). Further projects, including a bridge across Lake Maracaibo were personally inaugurated by the President (8/27/62).

Steady growth continued throughout the period, as noted in the report of the Central Bank (9/16/63), and by 1966, many of the development projects were yielding significant
dividends: the construction of the "Venezuelan Ruhr" cited above, called Ciudad Guayana, was well under way, creating a "major industrial center" in the previously underdeveloped state of Bolivar (2/15/66); and a self-help program for barrio residents, initiated by a private American group, was placed completely under Venezuelan control. The program, designed to benefit urban slum areas, set of more than 5,000 improvement projects and stimulated investments totalling nearly a half million dollars by early-1966 (1/28/66). Another project was an executive management training course sponsored by the government (8/27/67). These steady, incremental improvements are reflected in the regime performance scores, which reach the maximum level in early-1966 and remain there throughout the rest of the period.

REGIME—Protection/Coercion

The regime's scores on this dimension were in the moderate (active) level for the majority of the conflict, from 1961 to early-1967, primarily due to the employment of extraordinary measures by the regime. Principally these measures entailed the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the use of military forces in conjunction with regular police to maintain order in both the cities and rural areas. Rights were restored occasionally for brief periods, but the suspensions were in operation for the majority of the time span. These generally involved restrictions on public assembly and broadened powers of security forces regarding search and seizure and the detention of suspects without specific charges (1/24/61; 10/9/62; 5/5/62; 12/14/66; 3/5/67). Other restrictions on civil liberties included the censorship and/or closing of newspapers and magazines (11/19/61; 5/27/62; 9/22/63); suspension of political parties (10/10/62); public school and university closures and occupations (12/2/61; 1/22/62; 12/17/66); and the transferral of trial jurisdiction from civil to military courts in some cases of "subversion" (11/29/64).

In addition to these measures, the regime made extensive use of the military to respond to a perceived domestic threat, rather than its traditional role as defender against external foes. This included the placement of all police forces in Caracas under the command of an
Army officer and assignment of military units to protect oil installations and private enterprises (9/15/63); the introduction of paratroopers into the capitol in response to civil disorders (10/3/63); and Presidential authorization of a troop call-up to restore public order during an election (10/6/63).

By late-1967, the regime's score on this dimension shifted to the high level. Constitutional guarantees had been partially restored (7/19/67) and troops had largely been withdrawn from the cities, being called in only in response to specific incidents. The urban areas had reverted to the traditional control of the police forces (12/20/68).

**REGIME—External Factors**

For the majority of the conflict period, the Venezuelan regime enjoyed fairly steady and widespread support from external actors, particularly from the "friendly" United States. In 1961, President Kennedy visited Venezuela and praised Betancourt's contributions to development and democracy in the country, as well as issuing a joint statement which "reaffirms U.S.-Venezuelan amity and cooperation." (8/18/61) Similarly warm sentiments were exchanged between Betancourt and the president of neighboring Colombia when they forged an agreement on economic cooperation during a meeting in 1963 (8/18/63).

Perhaps the high point of foreign support for the Venezuelan regime (as against the insurgents) came in late-1963 and early-1964 in response to the discovery of an arms cache destined for the guerrillas on the northern coast. The government claimed that the arms were part of a shipment sent by the Cubans to aid the insurgents, and immediately brought the case before the Organization of American States (OAS). In December 1963, a special investigative commission established by the OAS was reportedly convinced of "terrorist links" to Cuba (12/22/63), and shortly thereafter formally charged Cuba with aggression against Venezuela (2/25/64). As a result of this charge, and the heavy lobbying of the Venezuelan and U.S. governments, the OAS voted 15-4 in favor of imposing sanctions on Cuba (7/26/64). The votes in this case indicate that the regime clearly maintained the support of all "friendly" nations, although it did not succeed in obtaining unqualified
support from all its "neutral" neighbors (Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia voted against sanctions). Later in that same year, though, it did garner the support of "neutral" France, strengthening ties with that country following a state visit by President DeGaulle (9/23/64). The OAS once again supported Venezuelan charges of Cuban-sponsored subversion in 1967 (9/25/67), and that same year U.S. officials stated that Venezuela had been successful in beating the insurgents without direct U.S. (material) help (9/11/67).

INSURGENTS—Incorporation

Incorporation scores for the insurgents are moderate, and reports seem to indicate that the guerrillas sought to develop ties to a wide range of social sectors in the early part of the conflict. They evidently had some ties to a number of political parties and their links to elements within the ruling party eventually precipitated a split within that organization (12/23/61). Additionally, there is some evidence of insurgent activists holding positions within the labor movement (5/21/61) and seats in the national assembly (7/15/61).

By 1962, there are indications that the insurgents were operating on a cooperative basis with a number of social sectors, for example, their coordination of nationwide demonstrations in support of striking transportation workers (1/20/62). The insurgents' incorporation score peaked at the maximum level in early-1962 as a result of their involvement in two major military uprisings. The first revolt took place at a naval base in Carupano (5/5/62), the second at a marine installation in Puerto Cabello (6/3/62). In both cases the military personnel who participated in the revolts were identified as "Leftists", and prominent members of the insurgent organization were arrested for their involvement in "provoking" the mutinies (5/11/62; 6/3/62). The fact that the revolts took place in two separate segments of the armed forces, coupled with the significant scale of both events (extensive force was required to put down the uprisings) indicates that the insurgents had quite close ties to at least a portion of the military and were willing to include soldiers in their anti-regime coalition.

Following the failure of these uprisings, though, the insurgents appear to have found
themselves more isolated politically. Opposition parties expelled any members thought to have links with the guerrillas (7/3/62); reached an agreement with the ruling party to reject any attempts to overthrow the government by force (7/9/62); and continued to distance themselves from the insurgents as time passed (9/4/63). There are indications that the general public rejected the insurgents as well, as suggested by the report of "widespread complaints" in Caracas against terrorist violence (7/18/62).

In short, there is no evidence of the insurgents broadening their base of support beyond the "disloyal" opposition. On the contrary, following the failed uprisings in 1962, this base appears to have continually contracted. By the latter half of 1965, the insurgents had dropped to the lowest possible score on the incorporation dimension by virtue of their break with even the disloyal opposition, namely the Venezuelan Communist Party (8/30/65; 6/22/68). INSURGENTS—Performance

The data on which the insurgents' performance scores are based was primarily obtained from three sources, all self-reporting by guerrillas. This is clearly not the most desirable of situations, but it is made necessary by the virtually total absence of news (however slanted) on the political performance activities of the insurgents in our primary event data source, the New York Times. In one instance, the claims made by the guerrillas are supported by a report in El Nacional, a Caracas newspaper with a reputation of being objective. The report notes that the insurgents had been operating a roadside medical clinic which provided free care to local peasants (El Nacional, 9/17/62; cited in Wickham-Crowley 1987, p. 484).

The other sources are accounts by the guerrillas themselves. The first is that of Pedro Duno, an officer in the FALN, who claims a fairly extensive administrative presence by the insurgents in several regions. It is worth quoting Duno at length, keeping in mind that his is not an wholly objective perspective:

...the peasant population is with us, it protects us, it guides us, it supplies us, it brings arms to our side when necessary. Now, having established a number of fronts—Lara, Falcón, La Portuguesa, Oriente, Caracas itself—we could declare a "free territory" if we wanted to. We can and do walk for kilometers with our guns on our shoulders and with the
insignia of the FALN on our jackets, without the danger of an ambush or the slightest hostile act being committed against us. In Lara, for example, we represent sanitation, education, government. We have opened schools, we cure the sick, and we even baptize newly-born Venezuelans. Together with the local people, we have formed civil institutions of power which are in fact organs of government. (Domingo 1964, p. 543)

Elsewhere, Angela Zago, a guerrilla leader in the rural state of Lara, describes the efforts of the insurgents to establish "order" in a remote village. Their principal problems, according to her, were curbing such social disruptions as truancy, the consumption of alcohol "en abundancia", and machete fights among the locals. Zago suggests that the insurgents succeeded in establishing a "gobierno de arriba" (government in the hills). She describes the formation of a civil tribunal to resolve local disputes, as well as guerrilla efforts to promote school attendance by young children in the area. (Zago 1972, pp. 60-1)

Both of these accounts are the basis of the moderate level performance scores for the insurgents from late-1962 until early-1965. In late-1965, there is no evidence to suggest the guerrillas' administrative presence was expanding, and a fair amount of evidence which would suggest the converse. Since it is unclear as to the exact timing and or extent of the decline in this presence, we have subjected the score to a decay factor.

For the earlier period (1961 through early-1962), the insurgents' performance score is low, since the above reports indicate that the guerrillas had not established any significant administrative presence prior to late-1962. The score is not the lowest possible, though, since there are some accounts of sporadic goods distribution by the insurgents, particularly in Caracas. Teodoro Petkoff, for example, has described at least one guerrilla operation in the capitol wherein a grocery truck was hijacked, driven into the barrios, and its contents distributed to the residents (Gall 1972, p. 15).

INSURGENTS—Protection/Coercion

From the outset of the conflict period through early-1963, the insurgents are given a moderate-active score on the protection/coercion dimension. During this time, the guerrillas were very active throughout the country, although the bulk of their operations were carried
out in Caracas. Their actions in this stage included: numerous cases of bombings and sabotage, usually directed against "symbolic" targets such as government or foreign-owned buildings (2/15/61; 1/18/62; 1/23/62; 5/1/62; 10/29/62; 2/11/63; 5/5/63); propaganda missions, such as the hijack of an airliner which was used to drop leaflets over Caracas (11/28/61) and the capture of government radio stations (4/13/62); and riots and demonstrations (1/20/62; 5/10/62; 1/26/63).

By late-1963, actions of this sort continued to be carried out, but the involvement of the insurgents in two particular events resulted in a shift in their protection/coercion score to the low-active level. The first was an attack on a train carrying holiday passengers by the guerrillas in which several civilians were injured and five National Guardsmen were killed (9/30/63). The second was the attempt by the insurgents to disrupt the 1963 presidential elections. The guerrillas threatened to shoot anyone standing in line to vote and engaged in a series of sniping attacks which left 21 dead and 100 wounded, including civilians (11/21/63). These and other acts suggested that the insurgents were exercising little caution with regard to the potential casualties of their operation, or in other words, they were engaging in indiscriminate terror.

There followed something of a shift in tactics from 1964 through 1965, in essence a return to the earlier pattern of sabotage (1/3/64; 4/13/64; 7/15/64; 10/9/64); coupled with bank robberies (6/16/64; 8/28/64); and kidnappings (10/10/64). Additionally, the guerrillas began to mount what appeared to be substantial rural operations, including the invasion and short-term occupation of towns in the countryside (9/24/64; 3/14/65; 5/8/65; 7/22/65).

By 1966, though, attacks again appeared to become less discriminate and more ruthless. Several supermarkets and other stores were machine-gunned or bombed (11/22/66; 11/26/66). Widespread assassinations began to take place, including killings of victims in their homes (12/16/66) and the murder of persons who had been kidnapped (3/4/67). Scores were accordingly on the low-active level until late-1967, when guerrilla activity appears to have declined considerably. At this point, the score shifts to the
low-inactive level, since from late-1967 through 1968, the guerrillas seem to have been limited to isolated encounters with the security forces, many of which were apparently not of their choosing (9/11/67; 10/20/67; 4/22/68; 6/10/68; 12/20/68).

The only other reported guerrilla activity in this period was the machine-gunning of an army officer's home (9/12/67) and the robbery of an estate owned by Nelson Rockefeller (9/30/68).

INSURGENTS—External Factors

Virtually throughout the conflict period, the insurgents were hindered rather than helped through their relations with external actors. The principal foreign ally of the guerrillas was Cuba, although there is some mention of support by the Chinese as well. It was Cuba, though, which was most vocal and active in attempting to further the cause of the Venezuelan revolutionaries. At the outset, from 1961 to early-63, these efforts were primarily political and symbolic. In late-1961, Ché Guevara, representing the Cuban government at an Inter-American conference, produced secret documents which had been stolen from the U.S. ambassador's car during an attack by Venezuelan students in Caracas earlier that year (8/16/61). Late in 1962, the Venezuelan government offered evidence to the OAS suggesting Cuban involvement in a sabotage attack by Venezuelan guerrillas against an oil installation. The evidence consisted of messages sent from the Cubans to Venezuelan students promoting violent action against the regime (11/10/62). Shortly thereafter, in early-1963, Cuban national radio was reported to have urged the disaffected to stage a revolution in Venezuela (2/13/63).

By late-1963, the Cubans had (at least according to physical evidence) shifted from purely political support to the actual supply of military equipment to the insurgents. In November of that year, it was reported that the government had evidence that a large arms cache discovered in the northern state of Falcón was of Cuban origin (11/9/63). One year later, Guevara publicly acknowledged that Cuba had provided military training to the Venezuelan insurgents (12/14/64).
Evidence of the involvement of other external actors, primarily some of the Communist parties of Europe, began to appear in 1965. In that year, the government arrested three Italian communists who were carrying $330,000, ostensibly headed for the guerrillas (4/11/65), and later captured a Spanish national carrying $250,000, apparently for the same purpose (11/6/65). Venezuelan officials also suggested that the Chinese had provided $300,000 in aid to the insurgents in 1965 (10/17/65).

Finally, near the end of the conflict there is evidence that Cuban support extended to the actual supply of military personnel to aid the insurgents. In 1967, two Cuban army officers were captured along with the group of Venezuelan guerrillas they were operating with (5/13/67).

**Figure 4.1**

Venezuela 1961-68

POINT TESTING

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1963

The Venezuelan presidential election of 1963 is probably the single event which
provides us the clearest "snapshot" of popular support levels during the insurgent episode. The context of the election makes it particularly suitable for the point testing we hope to employ throughout this analysis: the insurgents' call for an electoral boycott established national turnout as a benchmark in what could be called a support referendum. The results, furthermore, seem to represent an unambiguous response by the Venezuelans: 93% of all registered voters participated.

Our overall support score for the period is 1.75, which falls between Level 2 (Relative advantage: Regime) and Level 1 (Insurgent defeat imminent). Given the evidently overwhelming support for the regime demonstrated by the turnout figures (recalling here that we refer to support for the democratic process rather than the incumbents), it seems our scores somewhat overestimate insurgent support in late-1963. One feasible explanation is given by two supporters of the insurgents, who suggest that the "relatively unsuccessful" boycott campaign was the product of voting laws:

...the holding of the election per se hardly proved that Betancourt's democracy won a mandate from the people. Under Venezuelan law citizens are legally required to vote and are subject to a maximum of three months in jail for failure to exercise this civic duty. The citizen's voting credential, properly stamped, is his only valid identification. Without this cedula, he has no constitutional protection, and cannot hold a government job or register for employment. (Harding & Landau, p. 125n, italics in original)

We are much more reluctant to make this kind of apologist argument with any degree of conviction. It seems clear that if a voting requirement is sufficient to deter insurgent supporters from heeding the guerrillas' call to action, that support cannot be construed as very firm.

The observations above notwithstanding, virtually all of our evaluation sources identify the 1963 election as an important political "victory" by the regime over the insurgents. The guerrillas themselves, in retrospect, suggest that they seriously misread the political situation prior to the election, and compounded the error by threatening to shoot voters waiting to cast ballots. Teodoro Petkoff, in particular, repeatedly refers to the the election
as a turning point in the conflict:

The general strike we called for November 19, 1963, ten days before the elections, was the swan song of the FALN... One leftist politician said that the elections were ruined, but what was actually ruined was the FALN. (Gall 1972, p. 16)

Perhaps our greatest error of this period was to try to stop the elections instead of participating in them. The party's leadership during all of this period was mistaken in its failure to understand the modes of revolutionary warfare under Venezuelan conditions. There was no dictatorial regime like the right-wing military dictatorships in other parts of Latin America, nor a colonial regime as in Algeria or Vietnam, but an electoral democracy that in Venezuela was something new... democracy in Venezuela was a new toy recently taken out of the box and it still remained unbroken in the eyes of the masses. It contained escape valves for revolutionary tensions such as freedom of the press and assembly, parliamentary debate, and labor unions, while in combating a dictatorship everything is reduced to the armed struggle. Under these conditions, it was obvious that the armed struggle had to be just one element of an overall policy of the revolutionary movement, which could not ignore the other political processes taking place in the country... We did not understand that under the conditions of the time, in a country shaken by the armed struggle, with a democracy still unstable, with the army restless, these elections could have aggravated the contradictions in Venezuelan society and our movement could have emerged much stronger by participating in them. (Gall 1973, p. 4)

Even Douglas Bravo, arguably the most intractable of the guerrilla leaders, admitted that the abstention campaign had done serious damage to the insurgent movement:

We can affirm that the first great defeat suffered by the armed movement and by the popular movement in general was that of the elections of December 1, 1963. Then Doctor Leoni triumphed, producing a moral weakening in the ranks of the revolutionary movement. The popular masses felt deception, disillusionment, and skepticism. Thus, by the beginning of 1964, a great period of crisis was beginning for the armed and popular movement. (Bravo, in Fagen & Cornelius 1970, p. 90)

Elsewhere, Alexander makes a similar assessment:

The effect of [the abstention] campaign by the extremists proved exactly the opposite of what they had apparently expected. The vast majority of the voters seemed anxious to demonstrate their repudiation of the extremists in the election... It definitely demonstrated that the [insurgents'] line had failed to win significant support from the Venezuelan masses. The majority of the peasantry in particular had proved still loyal to Acción Democrática; the urban workers widely distributed their support among Acción Democrática and other democratic parties. (Alexander 1969, pp. 88-9)
All of our evaluation sources echo this conclusion to a greater or lesser extent. (Gude, in Sarkesian 1975, p. 582; Gott 1971, pp. 171-2; Ray 1969, p. 124; Levine 1973, p. 53; Martz, in Fagen & Cornelius 1970, p. 70; Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 250)

Consequently, we feel our score, while possibly slightly generous in terms of insurgent support, is in line with the evaluation sources on this point prediction.

OUTCOME TESTING

Our scores indicate an outcome, insurgent failure, as occurring in late-1967. Of the evaluation sources that identify an outcome date, this appears to be an accurate assessment. Cross, for example, notes: "From 1967 onward, those who clung to the pursuit of armed struggle were to convey the impression of being variously medieval debaters, irreconcilables, desperate revolutionaries, or just plain criminals and robbers." (Cross 1973, p. 59)

Likewise, Loveman and Davies suggest, "By 1968, FALN's situation appeared pathetic. . . . Nevertheless, MIR proclaimed its determination to carry on the revolutionary struggle, 'despite the torture, the desertions, the assassinations, and the vicious propaganda of the enemy.' Its revolutionary proclamations did nothing, however, to overcome reality." (Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 255)

Levine also argues that the guerrillas had been essentially "liquidated" by 1967. (Levine 1973, p. 53) Finally, Teodoro Petkoff, in describing the ostensibly most active of the guerrilla fronts, noted in April 1968 that, "At present, the Bravo group exists chiefly in foreign propaganda reports." (Petkoff 1968, p. 61)

In terms of identifying an outcome, then, our scores appear to be supported by those evaluation sources which provide a date for the "end" of the insurgent conflict.

UNDERLYING CAUSE TESTING

Having found no serious discrepancies between our scores and the evaluation sources in either our point or outcome tests, we now turn to an examination of the underlying causes cited for the failure of the Venezuelan insurgents. In general, our sources seem to focus on
three facets of the conflict in explaining the eventual outcome: the use of terror and the political deficiencies of the guerrillas, and the political effectiveness of the regime. Not surprisingly, there are some differences among the sources in terms of the relative "causal weight" associated with each of these facets. None, however, appear to identify a specific "determinant" factor which is at odds with our scores. That is, each of the three most frequently mentioned facets accords with the picture generated by our event data scoring. We would like to address each of these facets in turn.

Insurgent Terrorism—This is perhaps the most frequently cited reason for the failure of the guerrillas. Although some sources argue that the insurgents were guilty of terror throughout the conflict (Martz, Lieuwen, and Special Operations Research Office, in Cornelius & Fagen 1970), most suggest that the rise in terror accompanying the insurgents' shift to urban operations in 1965-66 hastened their decline. Ray gives an indication of the effect of the terror on potential supporters in the urban slums:

The FALN's urban guerrilla warfare proved to be a grave tactical error. Its success in creating a climate of uneasiness, and to a lesser extent, generating a feeling of hostility toward the government's methods of repression was more than offset by the mood of revulsion that developed in the barrios. Terrorist activities struck much too close to home for barrio families to look on dispassionately at the fate of the victims. Almost all the murdered policemen were barrio residents. In many instances, they were shot to death while walking home from work or sitting in their ranchos at night; families, friends and neighbors were witnesses. Some of those killed were elderly men who had been working for the force for years . . . and were considered about as politically harmful as traffic cops. (Ray 1969, p. 133)

A similar assessment is made by Cross:

By 1966 [the PCV, MIR & FALN] probably could not have claimed the support of 5% of the labor force, and they had immeasurably damaged their image among the poor of both the cities and the countryside by their terrorism. (Cross 1973, pp. 58-9)

These descriptions and others in the evaluation sources are in agreement with our scores, which show the most rapid decline in insurgent support occurring after the move to terror in 1966. (Gall 1972, p. 15; Gall 1965, p. 7)
Insurgent Political Deficiencies--A second factor cited as responsible for the conflict outcome is the failure of the guerrillas to mobilize support through political tactics. Petkoff, for example, notes that the 1965-66 period saw the guerrillas achieving some "success", but then qualifies his remark: "When I say success, I mean military success, not any gain in political influence." (Petkoff 1968, p. 61) Several reasons are suggested in the sources for the political failures of the guerrillas: overreliance on military tactics, internal factionalization and an absence of ties to organized political groups. The FALN, in a self-criticism, admitted that the group had been guilty of, "trampling on the wise teaching that 'the Party guides the rifle."") (FALN 1964, p. 130) Our analysis shows a steady decline in the political scores following 1965. Most sources, though, referred to the political problems of the insurgents in comparison with the behavior of the regime.

Regime Political Effectiveness--Our scores indicate a steady progress on the political side for the regime from roughly the outset of the conflict. This, combined with the fact that the regime apparently resisted the temptation to employ indiscriminate military force, seems to have been the key to the ultimate demise of the guerrillas. Loveman and Davies portray the situation in terms suggestive of our own scores:

The Betancourt administration responded with vigorous military repression and with socioeconomic progress that dealt political defeat to the guerrilla movements. . . Political defeat of the guerrillas occurred long before the revolutionary leaders acknowledged the futility of further armed struggle. (Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 253)

One of the guerrilla leaders, Américo Martín of MIR, eventually concurred with this assessment, although he appeared reluctant to specifically grant credit to the political tactics of the regime. In retrospect, he noted:

The failure of the rebels coincided with an improvement in oil prices and the general economic situation in Venezuela. What hopes the guerrillas had of inspiring mass revolt were dashed. There was an increase in the number of collective bargaining contracts, salary increases, as well as higher profits for businessmen. . . President Raúl Leoni came into office with a pacified nation. (cited in Alexander 1982, pp. 496-7)
It appears, then, that in general our scores do not differ significantly from the evaluation sources in terms of the underlying causes of the conflict outcome. What we mean by this is that there don't seem to be any causes cited which are completely at odds with our description. There are, however, some differences in terms of the importance attached to the three facets noted above.

If we were forced to make a judgement as to the relative "causal weight" attached to each of these facets, we would probably place the bulk of the responsibility for the outcome on the insurgents. We see something of a two-phase decline on the part of the guerrillas, beginning with the erosion of their political scores, and accelerating with their shift to terror tactics. On the regime side, we would probably credit the political tactics over the military for the government's eventual success. In fact, looking at our model, we would suggest that the regime's military tactics may have actually postponed the outcome for roughly 18 months. We can see that by early-1966 the regime had achieved its maximum political score (0), yet did not reach its maximum military score until late-1967. Since this gap coincides with a period of rapid decline in the insurgents' overall score, our scores would suggest that, had the regime reached its maximum overall level (0.5) by late-1966, the conflict would have ended.

This assessment differs from at least one of our evaluation sources. Gude places priority on the "measured" military response of the regime in explaining the eventual outcome. He is, however, focusing solely on the Betancourt administration, and thus his analysis period does not completely coincide with ours. During this period, though, he suggests that the regime's military tactics were highly justified by the situation, noting that the measures taken: ". . . were carried out with the strong support of the military and the public at large. . . the Betancourt response to insurgent activity appears to have been commensurate with public judgments about what was appropriate." (Gude, in Sarkesian 1975, p. 582) This assessment is somewhat different than our own, as it seems to indicate a military tactical score of maximum effectiveness (1), whereas we show a score of
moderate-active effectiveness (3) for this period. Aside from this discrepancy, our model seems to be fairly well supported by the evaluation sources.

CONCLUSION

The case of insurgent failure in Venezuela provides what we feel is strong support for our contention that conflicts of this nature must be viewed as dynamic and interactive processes which take place across several dimensions. The Venezuelan insurgency most clearly demonstrates that outcomes in such struggles essentially emerge from the process itself, and consequently, that process must be examined independently of the preconditions which led to the outbreak of insurgent violence in the first place.

The course of the insurgency in this case illustrates the difficulties inherent in attempting to explain an insurgent outcome through reference to pre-existing factors. Take, for example, the regime's military response to the guerrilla challenge. How does one account for the relatively moderate (i.e., not indiscriminate) yet determined (i.e., not ineffective or "do-nothing") course of action on the part of the government? One possible explanation would refer to the strong degree of "commitment" to democratic principles by the regime, which impelled it to practice restraint and selectivity in the application of sanctions. Yet clearly such an explanation relies heavily on unique (and perhaps subjective) factors to account for the outcome, and is consequently ill-suited to explain other cases of insurgency.

Another potential explanation would perhaps attempt to generalize the notion of democratic restraint implied above, suggesting that democratic systems as a class are inherently more capable of waging "humane" or "selective" counterinsurgency programs. Although such an approach offers a more generalizable explanatory framework, it unfortunately runs counter to historical evidence. Elsewhere, democratic regimes have either waged less than selective counterinsurgent campaigns themselves or fallen to military governments prepared to do the same (e.g., Uruguay).

We don't mean to imply here that our framework provides an answer to the question of why an actor opted for a particular tactical program. We do, though, attempt to answer the
question of what happens once these choices are made, and in so doing, we are able to posit alternative "paths" leading to outcomes. In the Venezuelan case, for example, the actual course taken by the regime, in terms of behavior on the protection/coercion dimension, was a "moderate" one. This "moderate" approach is cited by some sources as prompting the insurgents to largely abandon the countryside and move into the urban areas, which in turn was responsible for less discrimination in the targets of insurgent violence. The interaction of these factors led ultimately to the decline in the insurgents' support scores. Yet, as we have pointed out, there does not seem to be compelling evidence to suggest that the "moderate" course was the only option available to the regime. Had the regime instead pursued a course (in military terms) which was either ineffective (i.e., weak response) or indiscriminate, the insurgents may well have been able to demonstrate that the regime was incapable of defending its supporters (from the insurgents in the former case, from itself in the latter). This in turn might have resulted in a higher level of insurgent support, and ultimately, a different outcome.

It is important to remember here that we have made abundant use of terms like "might" and "may have" in this discussion. This, again, is due to the fact that we are not seeking to explain the process by which an actor chooses a particular course of action. Rather, we are trying to describe what the subsequent results of those choices are. The two questions are linked, but distinct, in our opinion. Even if a satisfactory explanation can be developed which predicts how an actor will behave, it is important to understand what the implications of that behavior will be, and it is this type of understanding which we seek to promote here.
CHAPTER FIVE
PERU: 1964-66

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we examine our second case of insurgent failure. Our first case, Venezuela, seemed to support our conception of the insurgent process as a dynamic and multidimensional competition between the two primary actors. We now turn to the case of the Peruvian guerrillas of the 1960's, a case which is similar to the Venezuelan example in terms of outcome, but which differs substantially in terms of the conflict duration. Again, the reason we have chosen cases which are similar in certain ways, but differ in others, is to evaluate the applicability of our model and its underlying assumptions about insurgent episodes to the widest range of situations.

Major Actors

REGIME: President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, Acción Popular (AP) party (1963-68); Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA); General Manuel A. Odría, Unión Nacional Odrísta (UNO).

INSURGENTS: Luis de la Puente Uceda & Guillermo Lobatón, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR); Héctor Bejár, Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN); Hugo Blanco, Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria (FIR).

In addition to sharing the experience of a failed insurgency during the 1960's, the Peruvian and Venezuelan political histories have several factors in common. Both experienced alternating periods of autocratic and populist military rule, as well as civilian democratic government, in the post-war years. As well, this century saw the birth of mass-based, vertical parties in both countries, AD in Venezuela and APRA in Peru. And pertinent to our study, it was splinter groups from these mass parties which eventually formed the nuclei of the guerrilla movements in both nations.

Since its formation in 1924, APRA has been a central, some might say preeminent, force in Peruvian political life. A complete analysis of the intricacies of aprismo, the ideology of APRA and its founder, Haya de la Torre, is beyond the scope of our brief
introduction. Indeed, there appears to be a good deal of disagreement as to just what APRA does in fact represent. Loveman and Davies suggest a fairly wide range of interpretation:

The party has been pictured by its admirers as a grassroots lower- and middle-class reform movement designed to end foreign and oligarchical domination of the economy, to raise the standard of living of all Peruvians, to incorporate the Indian mass into national life, and to democratize the sociopolitical structure of the country. In contrast, opponents of the party and its leader point to their propensity for violence and usually characterize their program as being designed to obliterate all that was good in Peruvian society and replace it with a godless form of communistic dictatorship that would reduce everyone to the level of pack animals. (Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 300)

In its early years, APRA was forced to operate underground during three successive authoritarian regimes, Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro, General Oscar R. Benavides, and Manuel Prado, from 1931 to 1945. With the exception of Benavides, who was appointed to replace the assassinated Sánchez, each ruler was elected, but each also tolerated no dissent and APRA remained an outlawed party until 1945. That year saw the election of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, who finally legalized the party and supervised elections in which APRA gained a substantial portion of the seats in congress. The brief period of liberal democracy ended in 1948, though, after the Apristas, seeking to exercise their newly-won political power, forced a showdown with Bustamante which resulted in the removal of both hIM and APRA from the political scene once again. Senior military officers launched a coup and installed General Manuel A. Odría, who although certainly not a liberal democrat, did practice a degree of populism in his rule, particularly seeking to garner the support of urban workers through wage hikes and social security packages. In 1956, Peru saw the return of both multiparty democracy and Manuel Prado. Prado, a conservative, came into office and ruled with the avid support of APRA under an arrangement known as la convivencia ("living together"), which had the net effect of driving the radical Apristas from the party.

In 1962, APRA won a plurality of the votes in the presidential election, but did not receive the required one-third of the vote. Subsequently, a deal was struck between Haya
of APRA and Odría, who had formed his own party, UNO, and come in third in the
election, behind Fernando Belaúde Terry of the newly formed Acción Popular party. The
military intervened, however, and Belaúde came to power in elections held a year later.
During his first years in office, Belaúde followed a decidedly reformist path, seeking to
genuinely improve the lot of both the landless peasant and the urban proletariat. His reform
legislation, though, was either watered down or blocked by the APRA-UNO coalition each
time it went to the Congress.

Outside the official political spectrum, the rising tide of frustration, fueled by promises
of reform, led to the emergence of one of Latin America's most effective peasant organizers,
Hugo Blanco. Blanco moved into the La Convención valley in the Peruvian highlands in
1958 and lent direction and organization to an already emerging peasant union movement.
In the roughly four years he operated in the region, the number of peasant unions grew
from six to over a hundred, and he effectively coordinated a series of strikes and land
invasions which effectively acted as a land reform program. Blanco was principally an
organizer, not a guerrilla fighter, despite being a dedicated Trotskyist. In 1961, an
organization established to support Blanco's efforts, the Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria
(FIR), moved hesitantly and clumsily toward the path of armed struggle. After a series of
more or less bungled operations, and the appearance of deep divisions within the
movement, the FIR fell into disarray and Blanco was forced underground. He was
captured by the police and jailed a short time later in May 1963.

The problems encountered by Blanco and the FIR were symptomatic of the Left as a
whole in Peru, which has been characterized as among the most splintered in Latin America.
It was from this milieu that the guerrillas of the MIR and ELN emerged.

REGIME--Incorporation

The information available to determine an incorporation score for the regime is sparse,
but that which is to be found suggests no active efforts on the part of the government to
exclude any social sector from political activity. On the contrary, there appears to be an
established pattern of give and take between the regime and its opponents. In early-1964, there was an orderly transition of government following a vote of censure in the parliament, suggesting that political disputes were being resolved within the existing governmental framework rather than outside it (1/1/64). In late-1964, President Belaunde is described as a, "popular moderate compromising on legislation with Opposition Congress." (8/2/64) As guerrilla activity stepped up, there are reports of "tension" between the executive and legislative branches, and of a governmental "crisis" which eventually leads to the resignation of the Cabinet. (9/11/65; 9/14/65; 9/17/65) Yet these events again suggest that the regime sought to stick to the rules of the game, maintaining the constitutional process of compromise that is at the foundation of democratic systems. It avoided creating a Government vs. Anti-government conflict axis by keeping open channels of legitimate and genuine recourse for opposition elements.

One final piece of evidence suggesting broad incorporation is a report in early-1966 concerning a presidential project designed to, "integrate backward Indians into national life." (3/27/66) While the terminology certainly betrays a degree of bias, it does indicate a commitment to broaden the political sphere as widely as possible. Consequently, we have given maximum incorporative scores (0) for the regime throughout the period.

REGIME—Performance

The performance scores for the regime are quite high from the outset to the end of the insurgency. Two reports in the first time period, early-1964, are indicative of the regime's tactics in this dimension. The first notes a development plan for the rural eastern area of Peru which included an end to all taxes for 10 years for residents of the zone and housing and road construction in the area. (1/15/64) The second describes the promulgation of a land reform law which was to provide land, technical assistance and credits to 21,000 coastal and 8,000 highlands families. (5/23/64) These types of measures on the part of the regime would qualify for high (0) performance score according to our scales.

Two more reports later in 1964 indicate that these programs were not simply empty
promises, but were in fact being implemented. The first notes an investment of $30 million in middle and working class housing in the cities, and describes the construction of rural schools, roads and waterworks. (8/2/64) The second report gives more information regarding the actual performance of the programs (170 miles of roads, 23 health centers, 70 irrigation projects and 2349 schools built), and cites the use of students in the civic action campaign. (19/11/64)

Throughout the rest of the conflict, a number of references are made to the progress of the reforms, and their success in depriving the guerrillas of social grievances to exploit. (3/3/65; 9/28/65; 10/11/65; 1/7/66; 3/27/66) On the performance dimension, then, the regime would seem to be providing all the sorts of services (i.e., roads, health, education, land) which are characterized by our highest score (0) from the beginning to the end of the insurgent episode.

REGIME--Protection/Coercion

The protection scores for the regime show a bit more variation than scores in the other dimensions. At the outset, the regime was utilizing protection tactics in a manner which appears to be completely commensurate with the guerrilla "threat" at that time. In early-1964, the regime reported stopping a "Communist terrorist plot" by arresting the alleged perpetrators and confiscating some explosives, and some time later reported "smashing" an arms smuggling plot linked with those earlier captured. (1/7/64; 2/3/64) As it appears that the regime was capable of effectively responding to the perceived threat within the existing legal framework, we gave a score of high (1) level during 1964.

In early-1965, though, an outbreak of violence by the insurgents seems to have caught the regime off guard. Guerrilla attacks on two police posts, resulting in an undisclosed number of government casualties and captures, were reported to have forced the regime to, "admit the existence of Communist-led guerrillas." (6/13/65; 6/25/65) This doesn't appear to indicate a complete breakdown of the protective capacity of the regime, but neither does it suggest an effectively prepared response to the insurgent challenge. Thus, we gave a score
of moderate-inactive (3) for the regime in early-1965.

By late-1965, the regime had stepped up its counterinsurgency effort. In July, it suspended civil rights for 30 days to "combat Communist guerrilla activity," and began a number of mass arrests. (7/5/65; 7/6/65) Shortly thereafter, President Belaunde authorized army troops to assist the national police in the anti-guerrilla effort. (7/9/65) In August, the state of siege was extended for another 30 days, but apparently actually remained in effect until early October. (8/6/65; 10/11/65) Also in August, the President signed a law which provided for trial by military court and the death penalty for "Communist traitors." (8/21/65) Taken in sum, these measures indicate a shift from moderate-inactive to a moderate-active (3) score on this dimension during late-1965.

By early-1966, the only reported incidents with a bearing on the regime's protection score are favorable, namely reports of guerrillas being killed and captured by government troops. (1/13/66) Constitutional rights had been restored, and by all accounts the regime's activity on this dimension had dropped back down to the level it had been at the outset, high (1).

REGIME—External Factors

External factors appear to have played little role in the insurgent process, with the regime essentially maintaining the status quo in its foreign relations.

INSURGENTS—Incorporation

Information concerning the incorporation tactics of the insurgents in such a brief conflict is, not surprisingly, extremely scarce. In fact, there is a virtually complete lack of information in the primary event source. The only evidence which might be considered relevant in the New York Times are two articles in late-1965 which note that the guerrilla groups are, "recruited largely from urban youths" and include, "some university students." (7/19/65; 8/1/65)

From another source, a member of the Peruvian Communist Party, it is possible to document what appears to be the only significant ties established by the guerrillas. Writing
in 1966, this source notes that the party adopted a position of "critical support" for the insurgents from the outset, yet reevaluated this position in late-1965: "At a Central Committee meeting held in August 1965 our Party made a careful analysis of the new situation. . . [and] noted that a revolutionary situation which would warrant armed struggle. . . did not exist in our country." (Levano 1966, p. 48) Later, the author notes that other leftist groups in Peru abandoned the guerrillas once their defeat seemed imminent:

The splinter group which publishes the Bandera Roja newspaper. . . [branded] Luis de la Puente Uceda and the other leaders of MIR guerrilla detachments as adventurers. . . [they] at first proclaimed armed struggle as the only correct form of struggle and later, when the bullets began to fly, beat a hasty retreat, leaving to their fate the sincere but misguided young men who believed in them. (Levano 1966, p. 48)

Our scores, then, reflect an initial incorporation of the "disloyal" opposition (1) from early-1964 through early-1965, which drops to no incorporation (0) for the rest of the conflict.

INSURGENTS—Performance

Again, we have essentially a complete lack of information in the primary event data source on the performance activities of the insurgents. The only evidence we could find concerning this dimension comes in a report made in June 1965 by guerrilla leader Guillermo Lobatón and cited in Gott which describes the first set of actions carried out by the insurgents:

We held meetings and gave out food from the stores, all along the road, from the lorry which we captured and returned undamaged. . . and the next day shared out all the possessions of our deadly enemy, Julio Dávila. . . a crooked lawyer. The next day, the 11th, we accounted for the Alegria hacienda, which belonged to one of our worst enemies and a scourge of the poor. . . We turned it into a commune and the goods (animals and produce) were shared out among the peasants. (Gott 1970, pp. 356-7)

Aside from this brief mention, we can find no evidence of efforts in the performance dimension by the insurgents. Consequently, we have given the guerrillas the lowest performance score (0) for all but the period described above, early-1965, for which they
received the "sporadic goods distributions" score (1).

**INSURGENTS—Protection/Coercion**

At the beginning of the conflict period, the only evidence of insurgent activity seems to be of a preparatory nature, namely arms seizures by government troops. (1/7/64; 2/3/64) The first real action on the part of the guerrillas comes in early-1965, with the reported attacks on two police posts cited in the earlier section on regime protection scores. In late-1965, the evidence consists primarily of reports of attacks by army troops on guerrillas, with the exception of one reported bombing in Lima (7/5/65) and a bank robbery linked to the insurgents (7/19/65).

Throughout late-1965 and early-1966, the insurgents appear to have been capable only of being routed by government forces. (7/11/65; 8/14/65; 8/22/65; 9/12/65; 9/28/65; 10/11/65; 10/25/65; 1/13/66) In fact, the only reported action by the insurgents once the counterinsurgency campaign was underway is a claim by the Peruvian authorities that six members of a peasant family had been beheaded for refusing to cooperate with the guerrillas. (12/24/65)

The final mention of the insurgents comes in June 1966, when the Army reported that guerrilla activity was, "at an end." (6/19/66) It appears clear that the insurgents were unable to undertake serious military action against the regime throughout virtually the entire conflict. The only point at which they rise above the minimum protection score (1) is during early-1965, when we gave a score between the minimum and moderate-low levels (2) based on the attacks on police bases.

**INSURGENTS—External Factors**

As with the regime, external factors do not appear to have exerted much influence on the insurgent process. The only mention made in the event source which relates to this dimension is a charge by President Belaunde that Cuba and the Soviet Union were "helping Communist gangsters" in Peru. (7/22/65) No specific evidence was given to support the charges, and they were never mentioned again, which suggests that even if such assistance
was rendered it was minimal.

Figure 5.1
Peru 1964-66

**OUTCOME TESTING**

The brevity of the insurgent episode in Peru makes for a situation lacking any single event suitable for point testing of our model. Consequently, we will only conduct outcome and underlying cause tests for this case.

Our model identifies an outcome, insurgent defeat, in early-1966. All of the evaluation sources, with the apparent exception of one, place the outcome either at this point or earlier, in late-1965. The only source which suggests the insurgents continued to operate following our identified outcome date is Petras, who, writing in late-1967, notes that, "de la Puente urban units are active and functioning in Lima." Earlier in the article, though, Petras does point out that Peruvian army units had, "succeeded in killing most of [the] guerrillas." (Pettras 1967, p. 94)
The discrepancies between our outcome date and those who place the outcome earlier probably stems from the fact that of the three guerrilla fronts operative in Peru, two were eliminated in late-1965, and the final one was destroyed within the first week of 1966. Loveman and Davies provide a chronology:

Guillermo Lobatón and the Túpac Amaru group were the first to go into action in June 1965. . . By November the army had the guerrillas on the run and on January 7, 1966, Lobatón and the remnants of his band were killed. Despite his ultimate failure, Lobatón had at least lasted seven months. Luis de la Puente and the Pachacutec group were destroyed almost before they could go into action. . . When Lobatón went into action in June, Béjar and the ELN foco had been in the Ayacucho region only since April. Though unprepared to launch a full-scale guerrilla war, the ELN chose to move in support of the MIR focos. On September 25, they attacked the Hacienda Chapi and executed the owners. Since the Peruvian army was already fighting a two-front operation against Lobatón and de la Puente, military units were not dispatched against Béjar until the end of November. Once contact was made, however, the guerrillas were quickly defeated on December 17, 1965. (Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 317-8)

This portrayal of the sequence of events in the insurgent episode is echoed in all of the evaluation sources we have found. (Campbell 1973, p. 46; Gott 1971; Whyte & Alberti 1976, p. 215; Cotler 1978, p. 194; Chaplin 1976) It appears, then, that if anything we have overstated the period of activity of the insurgents. This is probably a function of the nature of our time series intervals, which are perhaps somewhat too large to capture the dynamics of such a shortlived conflict.

Unfortunately, given the scope of our analysis and the number of cases included therein, it is not feasible to significantly shorten the intervals. Moreover, if the intervals were shortened to smaller units, weeks for example, we would run the risk of incoherent or misleading score shifts which would mask more long-term trends, a "missing the forest for the trees" phenomenon. Thus, while our interval structure may prove somewhat inadequate in extremely brief episodes such as Peru, we feel that it does represent the most satisfactory option for dealing with a widely divergent (ie., long vs. short) group of cases. In this case, then, the underlying cause testing might prove more suited to evaluating our model's performance.
UNDERLYING CAUSE TESTING

A number of our evaluation sources provide checklists of factors responsible for the failure of the insurgents. Chaplin, for example, compares the conditions facing the Peruvian guerrillas with those in Cuba during Castro's struggle. Among the factors which account for the collapse of the insurgency in Peru, according to Chaplin, were:

1) The National Political Situation—the Peruvian guerrillas faced not a repressive, personalistic dictatorship, but a recently elected, reformist regime which maintained a fairly high degree of political freedom and appeared, at least, committed to improving the lot of all citizens.

2) Effectiveness of Government Military Forces—whereas Batista's army seemed to all but evaporate in the face of the insurgent challenge, the Peruvian military constituted a, "formidable counterrevolutionary organization."

3) Knowledge of Peasant Life/Language Problem—the insurgents appeared woefully unfamiliar with the realities of peasant existence, not only incapable of effectively interpreting the wants and needs of their would-be supporters, but frequently unable to even communicate with them in their native tongue. In contrast, the Peruvian military appears to have been well prepared for conducting operations in the rural areas: "No one who reads the account of the military intervention in the Convención valley... can fail to be impressed by the intimate knowledge of the local scene upon which the leaders based their civic action and military campaign."

4) Lack of Organizational/Urban Linkages—the guerrillas, convinced of the supremacy of rural warfare and fearful of maintaining control over an urban organization, eschewed cooperation with potential support groups in the cities, mainly student radicals and leftist parties. This enabled the government to quickly isolate insurgents, both physically and in terms of information flow. (Chaplin 1976, pp. 215-22)

Campbell, too, suggests four principal reasons for the rapid defeat of the insurgents: 1) lack of support from the left; 2) lack of adequate planning; 3) insurgent misunderstanding of
both the circumstances in which they were operating and the models of warfare which they were supposedly following; and 4) political isolation as a result of the regime's reform programs. (Campbell 1973, p. 46)

Both of these sources appear to be in agreement with the picture provided by our model. The principal factors responsible for the insurgent failure lay both in the movement itself and in the regime's response. According to our scores, the potential support score for the insurgents never exceeded 3.25, or roughly the stalemate level (this is calculated by combining the maximum score of the insurgents, 1.5 in early-1965, with the lowest possible score for the regime, 5). Conversely, the same figure (3.5) is obtained when we calculate the lowest potential support score for the regime (combining the regime's lowest score, 1.5 in all of 1965, with the highest possible insurgent score, 5). In other words, the stalemate level represents both the best the insurgents could have done, and the worst the regime could have done, given the actual scores of their respective opponents.

Our other evaluation sources seem to support the suggestion of our model that the Peruvian case is one of a largely inept guerrilla organization confronting a politically and militarily effective regime, with predictable results. (Campbell 1973, p. 46; Gott 1971; Whyte & Alberti 1976, p. 215; Cotler 1978, p. 194; Chaplin 1976; Whyte 1969, p. 43) Perhaps the most telling of these sources is the account of the only surviving guerrilla leader, Hector Béjar. He notes first the military failure of the insurgents: "The guerrillas made many friends, but they did not know how to take care of them. Everyone knew their supporters, and when the army came all it had to do was to shoot them in order to terrorize the rest of the population." (Béjar 1982, p. 290) He then describes the lack of understanding between the insurgents and their potential allies:

The ideals proclaimed by the guerrillas necessarily appeared remote to the peasants, who were interested above all in their concrete and even local demands. Whereas the guerrillas advocated social revolution, the peasants wanted more tangible things—the realization of small demands that the revolutionaries were not always successful in incorporating into their program... The guerrillas' program was much more complicated and their goals much more distant... It is true that the peasants understand the
meaning of the problems if they are explained in clear and simple language, but they do not feel them in their own flesh as immediate, pressing issues that would make them fight. (Béjar 1982, p. 294)

CONCLUSION

Given that our model is more or less supported by the evaluation sources, then, how does the Peruvian insurgency of 1964-1966 relate to our conception of the dynamics of insurgency in general? Principally, it seems to confirm our proposition that explanations relying exclusively on revolutionary preconditions are inadequate. Non-voluntarist analyses would appear ill-equipped to explain why two separate avowedly "revolutionary" challenges to the Peruvian regime emerged within a seven-year period, namely Hugo Blanco’s organization of peasant unions and land invasions from 1959-63 and the armed insurrection of the MIR and ELN from 1964-66. An argument suggesting that structural changes sufficient to significantly alter the revolutionary potential of Peru could occur within the brief two-year period between these two challenges would seem to rest on shaky ground. To be sure, certain changes had taken place, but these more properly belong in the realm of choices exercised by the primary actors. In particular, this case appears to support our notion that it is the combination of tactical choices made by the actors which ultimately determines the outcome of the insurgent process. Gott sums up this interaction nicely:

... it is against this background that there took place the short-lived but momentous revolutionary movements, led first, in the period 1959-63, by Hugo Blanco, and then, in 1965, by de la Puente himself. Although they both chiefly took place in the region of the Valley of La Convención, tragically they failed to overlap in time. For Hugo Blanco’s movement consisted of organized peasants in desperate need of guerrilla support, while de la Puente’s well-armed guerrillas had no peasants to defend. The reason is simple. In the years between 1963 and 1965—in between the fall of Blanco and the rise of de la Puente—the government enacted a land reform. Though hopelessly inadequate, it gave the peasant just sufficient hope for the future to dampen his revolutionary zeal. (Gott 1971, p. 313)

Elsewhere, Chaplin also suggests that the outcome of the insurgency was dependent on the willingness of the Peruvian regime to rely on political means, i.e., land reform, rather than military ones to mobilize support among the peasant population. Otherwise, things
could have been different: "If [the peasants] had met an intransigent urban elite determined to defend the isolated landowners, the situation would perhaps have polarized in the fashion de la Puente hoped for." (Chaplin 1976, p. 281)

In other words, the failure of the insurgents was the result both of their shortcomings and the effectiveness of the regime's response, in short, on tactical interaction.
CHAPTER SIX
CUBA 1956-1958

INTRODUCTION

We move now to our two cases of successful insurgency, beginning in this chapter with Cuba, and in the next, Nicaragua. We have seen in the preceding two chapters that our model is fairly well supported and seems capable of providing insights into why the insurgent movements in Venezuela and Peru eventually failed in their attempts to overthrow the respective governments of those countries. It is our position that the factors responsible for the outcomes in these cases, namely the differential support levels mobilized through the behavior of the two primary actors, are equally applicable to cases with different outcomes. In other words, by testing our model on cases of successful as well as failed insurgencies, we are in effect evaluating the extent of applicability of our underlying conception of the insurgent process.

Major Actors

REGIME/"LEGITIMATE" OPPOSITION: President Fulgencio Batista (1952-59); Ramón Grau San Martín & Carlos Prío Socarrás, Authénticos (Party of the Cuban Revolution); Eddie Chibás, Ortodoxos (Party of the Cuban People).

INSURGENTS: Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, Frank País & Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Movimiento 26 de Julio (M-26); José Antonio Echeverría, Directorio Revolucionario (DR).

At the turn of the century, Cuba had achieved independence from Spain, yet remained firmly under the influence of the United States, whose help in driving out the Spanish had come at a price. The U.S. had formalized its "right" to intervene in Cuba under the Platt Amendment, which was drawn up in the U.S. Congress and incorporated into the Cuban Constitution at American insistence. As well, American economic penetration of the island was substantial. Indeed, some American observers noted in 1935 that Cuba had, "as a consequence of its struggle for political independence lost control over its economic resources." (cited in Goldenberg 1965, p. 102)
Nonetheless, the 1901 Constitution had established a liberal democratic system which saw some degree of electoral competition, punctuated by U.S. military interventions in 1906 and 1917. In 1924, Gerardo Machado was elected president promising economic development and social reform. Initially, he fulfilled these promises to a degree, but his administration became increasingly personalist and authoritarian as time passed, first obtaining constitutional extension of the presidential term from four years to six, then winning a second term in dubious elections in 1928. By 1933, Machado had become highly repressive, corrupt and isolated, sparking widespread unrest. In that year, he was overthrown by a military coup which saw the appearance of both an alliance between enlisted military men and the Cuban intelligentsia and of the pivotal actor, Fulgencio Batista. Batista emerged from the coup as the focus of power within the military, and in 1934, once again intervened to remove Ramón Grau San Martín, a civilian installed to replace Machado.

In 1940, Batista was elected president, after exercising de facto power behind the scenes for six years. Batista portrayed himself as both nationalist and progressive (indeed, he was the candidate of the Communist Popular Socialist Party), and in these early years, seemed to live up to this image: he oversaw the creation of a Labor Ministry, the enactment of social security laws, and the adoption of the 1940 Constitution, considered one of the most progressive in Latin America at that time. After his hand-picked successor was defeated in the 1944 election, Batista stepped down and left the country. That election saw the return of Grau to office, this time under the banner of the Auténticos. Grau was succeeded by another Auténtico, Carlos Prío Socarrás, in 1948. Although nominally reformist, in rhetoric and in performance both administrations were seriously tainted by widespread corruption, which led to the formation of a breakaway party, the Ortodoxos.

In the months leading up to the presidential election of 1952, opinion polls suggested that the Auténtico candidate held a slight lead over the Ortodoxo in a tight race. Batista, who had returned to Cuba in 1948 and was now running for the presidency, fell far behind. In March, 1952, some two months before the elections were scheduled to take place, Batista
once again mobilized support within the military for a coup against the civilian leadership. The former sergeant had, initially, a healthy degree of support, due to his image both as a nationalist and as a friend of the lower classes cultivated during his earlier tenure.

Despite the apparent potential for a successful administration, though, the political climate began to turn stormy. Goldenberg describes the situation:

...everything did not go as smoothly as Batista had hoped. Many of the bourgeoisie continued to express democratic sentiments. Not all the opposition leaders were prepared to sell themselves or to emigrate. And the emigrés began to form an active opposition abroad. The Auténticos, the Orthodoxos and the Communists came out against the new dictatorship. Even the press made repeated protests: in October 1952 all newspapers published a joint manifesto demanding the restoration of the constitution and of democracy. Highly critical speeches were often made on the radio. Above all, there were the students, who had voiced the loudest protests immediately after the coup d'état. Havana University became the breeding ground of conspiracies, and of fighting units. (Goldenberg 1965, pp. 112-113)

Among those caught up in the university tempest was Fidel Castro. Castro had joined the Orthodoxos in 1947, and participated in the violent student underground in the post-coup period. On July 26, 1953, Castro and a group of followers launched an attack on the military barracks at Moncada. The attack was largely a disaster, and the majority of those who participated were either killed outright or executed afterwards. Castro was captured, tried, and sentenced to prison, only to be released a short while later under a Batista amnesty. He fled to Mexico, where with the help of his brother Raúl, Che Guevara and others he organized an expedition to initiate a revolutionary movement in Cuba. According to the plan, Castro was to land with his group in Oriente province and launch a rural guerrilla struggle against Batista. Simultaneously, the urban underground, composed primarily of students under the leadership of Frank País and José Antonio Echeverría, was to spark an insurrection in the cities. The combination of the rural and urban operations was supposed to result in a spontaneous uprising that would oust Batista and restore the democratic constitution of 1940.

In December, 1956, Castro and his group landed, and almost nothing went according to
plans. The urban uprisings took place, apparently with some success, in November, but a variety of problems had delayed Castro's landing, and by the time he arrived, the army and police were once again in firm control. When the group, now named the Movimiento 26 de Julio (M-26), finally reached shore, they were met with a savage assault by the regime's forces. Most of the incipient rebels were killed, the dozen or so that survived scrambled into the hills and made contact with some of the peasants in the area. It was from these unpromising beginnings that the insurgents began their struggle to overthrow the Batista regime.

REGIME--Incorporation

The evidence for the incorporation activities of the regime in the earliest part of the conflict is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, there appears to be a certain lack of cooperation between the regime and legal opposition parties, even when the government was undertaking a policy which would nominally be considered inclusionary. We refer here to a report that Batista had set Congressional, provincial and municipal elections for the coming year, but had done so without consulting the opposition. (7/7/56)

On the other hand, a report following the initial outbreak of armed insurrection notes that Batista retained the, "solid backing of commerce, industry, capital and a large part of the working classes." (12/29/56) What this suggests to us is a more or less complete incorporation of the elites, a significant majority of the middle class, and linkages with at least some segments of the masses. We feel this situation probably most closely corresponds to our moderate-high (1) level.

In early-1957, there are still reports that the regime retained its ties with many of the same groups (2/25/57), but there are additional signs that cracks were beginning to appear in the regime coalition. In January, following a wave of assassinations of opposition figures, primarily attributed to government forces, these parties petitioned the Supreme Court to probe terrorism. (1/10/57) Relations between the regime and opposition parties began to decline thereafter: in March, the opposition abstained from voting on a
regime-sponsored motion in Congress to suspend constitutional guarantees (3/5/57) and later that month, accused the government of murdering the leader of the Ortodoxo Party after he was arrested (3/15/57); in April, the opposition distributed leaflets urging citizens not to attend a pro-Batista rally (4/7/57) Substantial numbers of citizens (250,000 according to the government, other estimates were lower) did show up for the rally. The attendees were described as, "representatives of labor, commerce, industry, Government, political parties, and supporters of the Administration." (4/8/57)

By June, though, the regime was described as having the support only of elites ("...important business, banking, and landowning elements" plus the Army and police). (6/10/57) The head of the Cuban Workers Confederation stated that his organization was "neutral" on Batista, and that four other large labor groups were opposed. (6/28/57) We would argue, then, that there was some slippage in the regime's incorporation score, probably down to a point (2) midway between moderate-low and moderate-high.

In late-1957, the downward trend continued, most clearly illustrated by attendance at three separate rallies held early in the period. Two were organized by backers of Batista and designed as a demonstration of support for the regime: attendance was 4,000 at the first, 1,500 at the second. (7/1/57; 7/16/57) In contrast, some 20,000 turned out for the funeral of one of the leaders of the urban insurgency killed in a clash with police. (7/2/57)

Other indications, some noted earlier, that the regime was becoming increasingly distanced from a number of social sectors include: the revolt of naval units at Cienfuegos military base (9/6/57); the denunciation of government "terror" by the Cuban Medical Association (12/24/57); and reports that military authorities were, "forcing many professional men to leave nation" (11/15/57)

This we see as evidence of decay in the regime's coalition, yet not as indicative of a complete isolation, particularly from the elites. This trend continued into early-1958, which saw a call by the powerful Roman Catholic hierarchy for a national unity government (3/1/58); reports of increasing defections from the regime's coalition by "professional and
middle-class groups" (3/2/58); and schisms within the government itself, including the collapse of two cabinets within nearly a week (3/7/58; 3/13/58) and the purge of lower court judges by the Supreme Court for protesting against the military's disregard of court orders. (6/13/58) Consequently, we give a score of moderate-low (3) for the late-1957 and early-1958 period.

Finally, in late-1958, there are indications that the regime's coalition had largely disintegrated. The most telling evidence for this is a series of reports describing the collapse of the military, including reports of up to 30 officers being arrested for refusing to fight the guerrillas (11/30/58) and of increasing numbers of mass desertions of government troops. (12/11/58) For this period, we give the minimum score (5) on the incorporation dimension.

**REGIME--Performance**

The activity of the regime on the performance dimension appears to be fairly stable from the outset of the insurgency until the latest stages of the conflict. From late-1956 until early-1958, reports indicate that the regime was able to maintain a moderate (3) level of performance, with serious decline coming only in late-1958. There are no reports which suggest significant improvement on this dimension (e.g., provision of health or education facilities, or land reform), but the regime does appear to have been relatively successful in the provision of public goods (e.g., transportation, water, etc.).

Most reports suggest that a steady improvement of the Cuban economic situation enabled the regime to implement a public works program initiated in 1954. It was reported that $200 million had been spent on the program in 1956, which provided, "much employment and accomplishment." (1/4/57; 2/26/57) As a result of both this program and favorable conditions in the world sugar market, wages were reported to be rising throughout the period, up 4% in 1956 (8/30/56) and 10% in 1957 (1/8/58), with more increases expected. Furthermore, Batista ordered a 5% wage increase for government workers in early-1957 (3/30/57), and both the distribution of $17 million in bonuses to sugar workers (1/8/58) and a raise in the minimum wage (2/21/58) in early 1958.
Yet by late-1958, the effect of the conflict were beginning to be felt by the regime. In October, the government ordered new taxes on sugar producers to finance the counterinsurgency program. (10/7/58) By November, the regime appeared incapable of maintaining basic services, particularly transportation, as reports indicate that rebels had taken control of rail, road and water transport in vast sections of the country. (11/26/58) Factories were reported slowing down or closing, unable to run their machinery or move their goods. (12/14/58) Roughly 75% of the sugar producing areas at harvest time were reported to be in areas of guerrilla operations, threatening the lifeblood of the Cuban economy. (11/26/58) By most accounts, then, the national administrative capabilities of the regime, as well as the economy, had considerably, though not completely, broken down by the end of 1958, and we give an average score (4) between the minimum and moderate levels for performance in late-1958.

REGIME—Protection/Coercion

The evidence for regime activities on the protection/coercion dimension for the late-1956 period seems somewhat mixed, though leaning toward a rather heavy-handed approach to the insurgent challenge. In early December, following the outbreak of rural guerrilla activity, the regime ordered a round-up of opposition elements, and was apparently less than discriminating in its determination of who fell into this category. Over 500 persons were officially reported held, and even the government noted that only about 40 of these were "active rebels." (12/2/56) These arrests occurred under a state of emergency, which was in effect for the majority of the late-1956 period, and indeed, of the entire insurgency (Constitutional guarantees were suspended on no less than 12 separate occasions during the 2 1/2 year time span under study). Later that month, Batista ordered the Army to, "end the rebellion as soon as possible with the least possible casualties." (12/11/56) But by the end of December, the bodies of at least 60 opposition members had been found, and the deaths were widely attributed to government forces. (12/28/56) While these tactics clearly imply a regime willingness to apply "extralegal" sanctions against those
who opposed it, they don't seem to suggest the widespread use of terror that is represented in our minimum-active (5) scale level. Instead, they seem to fit more closely with our moderate-active (3) level.

The evidence for early-1957 is again somewhat mixed. On the one hand, there are reports which seem to fit our maximum (5) level: active pursuit of insurgents by regime forces (5/31/57; 6/18/57); and a trial of alleged rebels which results in 40 convictions and 110 acquittals, suggesting a certain degree of compliance with the existing judicial framework. (5/12/57) On the other hand, there are also reports which would seem to approach our minimum-active (5) level of indiscriminate terror: increasing reports of torture and killings by government forces (2/25/57); and a report on the newly-appointed police chief of Oriente province ordering random beatings of citizens on the streets and leaving "Christmas presents" of dead bodies littering the streets. (6/10/57) We feel the reports of increasing violence against non-combatants merits a slight decline in the protection score from the moderate-active level (3.5).

Late-1957 saw a continuation of the decline in the regime's score on this dimension. Reports of government torture were on the rise (8/10/57; 9/10/57; 12/24/57); doctors and lawyers were arrested in large numbers for protesting the murders of colleagues charged with assisting the insurgents (11/14/57); round-ups of youths and "professional men" were also reported (12/1/57); and troops were ordered to fire on "suspicious" persons in cane fields to prevent sabotage. (11/23/57) Accordingly, we see a decay of the regime's protection score to 4.

At the beginning of 1958, more evidence surfaced concerning regime actions against civilians. In addition to reported instances of torture (1/18/58; 3/2/58), there was a report of a nationwide student strike to protest the government's killing of two medical students and a 16-year-old boy (3/6/58), and charges by an ex-general in the Cuban Army that the regime was "systematically killing" hundreds of civilians. (4/24/58) There was also the first evidence of the use of government aircraft to bomb and strafe suspected guerrilla targets,
which suggests a significant possibility of indiscriminate casualties. (6/4/58) As there is only one report concerning the use of this tactic, and it occurred in conjunction with a military drive against the guerrillas, we feel that the regime's protection score of the previous period (4) applies to the early-1958 period as well.

By late-1958, however, it appears that this tactic had come into widespread use. There are several reports: a protest by an anti-Batista group in New York against the "barbaric and inhuman bombing of cities, towns and villages" by the government (12/31/58); reports of Cuban Army planes "bombing and strafing" towns in rebel territory, prompting residents to flee (12/28/58); and the defection of a Cuban Air Force pilot, who said he fled, "because I don't like to bomb cities and kill innocent women and children." (12/28/58) Other reports suggest that the "brutality of troops to the populace" on the ground (7/21/58) and torture/killings of innocents (7/10/58) continued unabated. Consequently, we feel the regime had by this point had nearly reached the minimum-active (5) level on the protection dimension, and give a score of 4.5.

REGIME—External Factors

Cuba provides perhaps one of the best examples of how external factors can exert a significant impact on the insurgent conflict. At the outset, there were few indications that the regime's external coalition was in jeopardy. Relations with the U.S., the regime's principal "friendly" ally, appeared stable, and an important regional "neutral", Mexico, had promised to prevent any further sailings of hostile exiles to Cuba following the initial Castro expedition. (12/4/56) As the situation began to deteriorate, however, relations started to show evidence of strains. In late-1957, the United States ambassador expressed some dismay at the heavy-handed treatment of demonstrators by Cuban police, sparking protests by the Cuban government of "meddling" (8/2/57), and a motion in the Cuban Congress to have the ambassador removed from his post. (8/3/57)

In early-1958, the U.S. decided that Batista's use of American weapons contravened the agreement under which they were provided, since they were being employed for
internal, rather than the specified external, defense. Accordingly, they ordered an embargo on further arms shipments to Cuba. (4/3/58) A short while later, the U.S. Secretary of State may have compounded the political damage done to the Cuban regime when he explained the embargo by saying, "The U.S. prefers not to have defense weapons used in a civil war." (4/9/58) This statement seemed to simultaneously represent a condemnation of the regime and an implicit recognition of the "belligerent" (rather than "bandit" or "subversive") status of the guerrillas, something the insurgents had been trying for some time to achieve. This implicit recognition was further enhanced when U.S. government officials held direct talks with rebel leaders concerning the return of American citizens kidnapped by the insurgents, talks which the Cuban regime decried as having granted the rebels, "international status." (10/28/58)

In light of these politically damaging events, we have discounted the regime's overall average scores by 0.5 for the early- and late-1958 periods.

**INSURGENTS--Incorporation**

The first information concerning the incorporation activities of the insurgents comes in a report in late-1956 which notes that the rebels had as yet succeeded only in attracting disaffected youth to its cause, and that opposition parties, "have no direct connection with the insurgents." (12/29/56)

By early-1957, though, there is evidence of rebel ties with a broader spectrum of the Cuban population. In February, Herbert Matthews reported on a growing "civic resistance movement of business, professional and Army elements" that were, "lining up with students and Castro rebels." (2/26/57) This appears to be overly optimistic at best, and elsewhere in his article, Matthews himself concedes that a majority of the sugar cane and other workers, not to mention the military and police, were still solidly behind Batista.

Yet in the following months, there are reports of more civilians joining the anti-Batista coalition (3/22/57), and by June 1957, Matthews placed a significant segment of Cuban society in the insurgents' camp, including: 90% of the youth, virtually all of the population
of Oriente province, "some highly placed industrialists, bankers, professional men and important elements in civic organizations like Rotary Clubs and [religious groups]," as well as a, "majority of the rank and file of workers." (6/16/57) Again, while Matthews may have been overstating the scope of the insurgent coalition, it appears that the guerrillas had succeeded in establishing some ties beyond the "disloyal" opposition.

The next major event relating to the incorporation scores for the insurgents is an uprising of naval units and maritime police at the military base in Cienfuegos in support of the guerrillas. (9/6/57) Although the mutiny, which took place in September, 1957, was crushed in fairly short order, it implies a certain level of penetration of the military by insurgent forces. Other reports in late-1957 also suggest a degree of success on the part of the guerrillas in terms of incorporation. One article pointed out that, "Castro is seen gaining leadership over hitherto disunified opposition to Batista." (7/23/57) Later, members of the professional associations of lawyers and doctors, while not committing themselves to the insurgents, did stage protests against the regime (8/1/57) and charged the police had murdered at least two doctors for treating wounded rebels. (11/4/57) This clearly cannot be construed as the complete incorporation of these professional classes into the insurgent coalition, but does suggest again that there were some linkages between the two parties. At a minimum, it implies that at least some of the professionals were made to feel "less welcome" in the regime camp than in that of the insurgents.

In early-1958, there are additional reports of "professional and middle-class groups" supporting the guerrillas (3/2/58), and a Roman Catholic priest is quoted as saying the clergy backed the rebels. (4/6/58) In April, though, an insurgent call for a general strike fizzled, and the movement was described as "waning", which suggests that the incorporation level had probably roughly stabilized during this period. (4/17/58) Another report, describing a call by some civic groups in the city of Bayamo for the guerrillas to end their "senseless" struggle, seems to corroborate a levelling off of insurgent incorporation. (6/11/58)
By late-1958, though, there are increasing reports of defections from the highest levels of the regime coalition to that of the insurgents. As well, there are reports that the guerrillas actively sought to incorporate all those who were against the regime, including the military, into their movement. In particular, there are numerous reports of the early release of unharmed military personnel taken prisoner by the rebels (7/27/58; 8/8/58; 11/12/58), and a call by Castro for the Army to "overthrow Batista or face defeat." (8/21/58) As the year wound down, there are at least three reports of elite defections: two Congressional candidates of Batista's own party going over to the rebels (10/28/58), 30 military officers reportedly under arrest for refusing to attack the guerrillas (11/30/58), and reports of a large increase in defections among ground troops (12/11/58).

Our incorporation scores for the insurgents reflect a steady progress in the tactics of coalition building on their part, beginning low (1) in late-1956, rising to moderate (3) in early-1957. From late-1957 to early-1958, we have given a score between the moderate to high level (4), and gave a maximum score (5) for late-1958.

INSURGENTS—Performance

In our event data, there is little information on the performance activities of the insurgents until the latter stage of the conflict. Consequently, we are forced to rely on relatively contemporary accounts of one of the more celebrated participants, Ernesto "Ché" Guevara. Clearly, this is a less than ideal arrangement for our analysis. Not only are these accounts potentially "tainted" by their somewhat post-hoc nature, but they are also subject to the biases inherent in participant reporting. Unfortunately, in the absence of other sources of information, we have few alternative options.

For the early years of the conflict, then, we refer to three separate accounts of the events of that time by Guevara, two books, Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War from 1968 (excerpted in Cháilaind 1982); Episodes of the Revolutionary War from 1963 (Guevara 1968); and an interview given to Chinese journalists in April, 1959, just three months after the rebels seized power (in Che Guevara Speaks, G. Lavan, ed. 1967).
The first reports concerning the performance activities of the insurgents in these accounts refer to the provision of minimal health care by Guevara himself to the peasants they encountered: "...we received a great welcome from the peasants and established good relations with them thanks to my new profession as 'tooth-puller,' which I practiced with great enthusiasm." (Guevara 1968, p. 81) This report refers to the early days of the insurgency, probably around the beginning of 1957. Elsewhere, reference is made to the "scrupulous" payment for all goods received from the peasants by the guerrillas during the same period. (Chaliand 1982, p. 182) The latter point is supported by Matthews' reporting in the New York Times in early-1957. (NYT 2/26/57) Thus, the insurgents' performance scores for the late-1956 and early-1957 period would at a minimum appear to be non-extractive (Guevara's dental activities notwithstanding!).

Beginning in late-1957, the insurgents appear to have increased their performance tactics. Another medical doctor is reported to have joined the group, and, "He, too, practiced his profession within the limitations of the Sierra." (Guevara 1968, p. 88) Furthermore, according to Guevara, the insurgents by this time had been able to establish what appears to be a fairly significant presence, something at least resembling a counter-government:

...we were able to install a shoe factory and a saddlery, an armory with an electric lathe, a tinsmith and smithy...We also built schools, recreation areas and ovens, to bake bread. Later on, the Radio Rebelde transmitter was installed, and our first clandestine newspaper...was published. (Guevara 1968, p. 123)

By early-1958, the insurgents appeared to be building upon this base, and establishing what looks very much like a solid administrative presence. In the 1959 interview, Guevara reports that the Rebel Army had begun carrying out its "basic duties," which were:

...to improve the status of the peasants, to participate in the struggle to seize land, and to build schools. Agrarian law was tried for the first time, using revolutionary methods we confiscated the extensive possessions of the dictatorial government and distributed to the peasants all of the state-held land in the area. (Guevara 1967, p. 11)
By late-1958, our primary event data source, the Times, was reporting that the insurgents' power was at a "peak." Castro was reported to "exert supreme authority" over large areas outside the cities, controlling a significant amount of territory to the extent that he was capable of imposing a tax on sugar and coffee mill operators. (11/2/58) By year's end, the insurgents were reported in control of 12 Cuban ports, compared to four controlled by the regime. (12/4/58)

On the performance dimension, then, the insurgents started off at a low (1) level in late-1956 and early-1957, moved up to a moderate (3) level in late-1957, a moderate-to-high (4) level in early-1958, and reached the maximum (5) level in late-1958.

**INSURGENTS—Protection/Coercion**

The period from late-1956 to early-1957 primarily saw the insurgents engaged in an extensive bombing campaign (7/29/56; 8/31/56; 11/16/56; 12/21/56; 12/27/56; 1/2/57; 2/16/57; 3/12/57; 5/23/57; etc.), coupled with assassination and assassination attempts (10/29/56; 1/15/57; 6/25/57). As well, there are at least two reports of small-scale attacks on government installations, the first noting that insurgents had attacked, "police stations and rural guard posts in Oriente Province and Cienfuegos." (12/1/56) The second chronicled an assault on the presidential palace by a number of youths linked to the insurgency. (3/14/57) There are also several references to clashes, which appear to be of a relatively small scale, between government troops and rebels. (12/5/56; 1/19/57; 5/29/57) This activity would seem to fall into our moderate-active (3) level.

In late-1957, insurgent military activity increases. There are numerous reports of clashes, some of which are even described as battles, throughout late-1957. (7/1/57; 7/18/57; 7/30/57; 8/3/57; 8/22/57; 9/20/57; 10/2/57; 10/13/57; 11/16/57; 12/19/57) There are also increased reports of assaults by insurgents against military and government installations, including attacks on military bases in Estrada Palma (7/28/57), Bupecito and Minas (8/2/57), and Central Mabay in Oriente Province (11/17/57). There is another report noting, "rebel raids on villages and military posts to replenish supplies," were on the rise in
Oriente and elsewhere. (12/26/57)

Other reports suggest a broadening of the scope of insurgent operations: a clash in Las Villas Province, the first reported activity in central Cuba (8/10/57); the seizure by insurgents of two radio stations in Havana (7/1/57); and reports of the establishment of rebel radio stations (9/13/57).

These activities seem to fall somewhere between our moderate-active (3) and high (5) levels. There appears to be an escalation from the sort of lower scale harassment tactics of the former level, particularly a rise in direct confrontations and attacks on regime targets. At the same time, the assaults do not seem to be of the large-scale indicated by our high level, nor of prolonged occupation of territory. Consequently, we give an average of the two scores (4) for the late-1957 period.

The trend of greater effectiveness on the protection/coercion dimension continues for the insurgents in the first part of the early-1958 period. In at least two reports, the rebels are described as "roving freely" and "operating more openly." (1/15/58; 1/25/58)

Elsewhere, there are indications that the military situation is approaching almost a conventional warfare stage: several towns are reported "under attack" by rebels (2/13/58); new "fronts" are said to be established throughout the country (1/28/58; 3/1/58; 4/3/58); insurgents are reported to be in control of all but the capitol city of Oriente (4/3/58).

But the failure of a general strike called by the guerrillas, coupled with an Army offensive in April led to reports variously describing the insurgents as, "shaken", "weakening", and "waning as forces and arms supplies dwindle." (4/13/58; 4/15/58; 4/17/58) The insurgents then are portrayed as undergoing a period of reorganization, as urban units headed out of the cities for "mountain hideouts." (4/19/58) The activities in the first three months of 1958 would seem to indicate a rise in the protection score of the insurgents, then, but the retrenchment of the latter half of the period suggests that the net effect of early-1958 was probably simply a continuation of the level (4) reached in the previous period.
By late-1958, though, the insurgents would seem to clearly fall into the high (5) category on the protection/coercion dimension. In addition to numerous reports of increasingly large-scale confrontations, we see the first evidence of "liberated zones" (10/21/58; 11/2/58; 11/10/58), the capture of entire towns (11/13/58), blockades of provincial capitolos (11/27/58), and even the declaration of a "Republic in Arms." (8/13/58)

On this dimension, then, the scores for the insurgents are moderate-active (3) for late-1956 and early-1957, rising to a moderate-to-high level (4) for late-1957 and early-1958, and finishing at the maximum level (5) in late-1958.

**INSURGENTS—External Factors**

Overall, external factors did not appear to have a very significant impact on the insurgents, although we saw earlier the same cannot be said for the regime. At the outset of the conflict, there was evidence of political support from a "friendly" country: a Soviet official, in a speech to the United Nations, asked why that organization had not sent observers to Cuba and charged that the "dictator Batista" was fighting "progressive" elements in the country. (12/11/56) A more ambiguous situation existed at this time with regard to an important "neutral" actor in the region, Mexico. Mexican officials first announced they had arrested a group of Cubans (led by Castro) on charges of plotting to assassinate Batista, yet some time later apparently released the group and did not prevent them from launching their "invasion" from Mexican territory. (12/3/56) While it is entirely plausible to assume some tacit condoning by Mexican officials for this expedition, such action does not constitute the sort of public support described in our model.

This type of vocal political support for the insurgents was primarily obtained from private groups overseas, particularly in the United States. There are numerous references to demonstrations in support of the guerrillas and against the regime in the U.S. throughout the conflict. ((5/20/57; 6/9/57; 7/1/57; 9/22/57; 3/15/58; 3/30/58; etc.) These and other groups were the source of material assistance for the insurgents as well. There are equally numerous reports of fundraising on behalf of the guerrillas and the interception of weapons
shipments destined for the Cuban rebels. (8/14/57; 9/5/57; 11/20/57; 11/30/57; 2/5/58; 2/19/58; 3/28/58; etc.) While this support may have been helpful to the guerrillas, it probably did not exert significant influence on the insurgent process for two reasons: 1) The material assistance at no times appears to have reached the guerrillas in sufficient volume to have a decisive military impact on the conflict; 2) Both types of assistance were primarily proferred by private groups (in "hostile" or "neutral" countries, no less), rather than governments, which probably diluted the potential "anti-nationalist" effect that can accompany such aid delivered to insurgents. Consequently, we see external factors as not effecting the scores for the insurgents.

Figure 6.1
Cuba 1956-58

POINT TESTING
GENERAL STRIKE: APRIL 9, 1958

In early-1958, the insurgents were convinced that they held a decisive advantage in the
conflict. Not only had they proven themselves capable of withstanding the regime's military assaults, but the Batista coalition appeared to be crumbling, the most telling evidence of this being the arms embargo enacted in March by the regime's principal foreign ally, the United States. Under these conditions, the insurgents decided to attempt to deliver a death blow to the regime in a coordinated uprising that combined a national general strike in the cities with rural attacks by the guerrillas. It was the strike which was to spark a mass insurrection beyond the control of the regime. The action was to be a combined operation conducted by units of both the rural and urban M-26, as well as the Directorio Revolucionario, an urban underground organization. The operation was planned as follows:

The main objective of the revolutionary action was to create general confusion and chaos, in order to prevent the workers from returning to their jobs. Violence was to give the workers the perfect alibi for staying at home after lunch, while work stoppages and street fighting were effected throughout the island, Castro and his guerrillas would move into the valleys, engage the regular troops, and occupy towns and cities in Oriente province. Once this was accomplished, the general uprising was assured, as thousands would join the revolutionaries through the country. At least this was the sort of revolutionary outcome envisioned by the M-26-7 strategists... (Bonachea & San Martín 1974, pp. 208-9)

When the call for the strike finally came, however, the mass insurrection anticipated by the insurgents did not materialize. In fact, by most accounts the action was a more or less complete failure. Thomas describes the outcome:

When 9 April came, there was a good deal of confused violence, but most shops were open, as were most factories and the harbour. Neither the CTC [trade union federation] nor the Communists took any notice of the 26 July's calls and the transport system therefore worked normally. Some electric companies were sabotaged, some buses overturned, two big shops were attacked, but the Havana electricity supply was left alone, though that had been supposed to signal the beginning of the strike. About twenty civilians were killed, as were three policemen, but probably another eighty revolutionaries were shot... many workers who had struck in the morning went back to work in the afternoon. In Santiago, where a similarly abortive attempt was made, thirty were killed... It was a bloody day but not a very successful one for the forces of protest. (Thomas 1971, p. 208)

There are a host of reasons given in our evaluation sources for the failure of the strike.
Some appear to attribute the disaster to conflict within the insurgent movement, resulting in a lack of sufficient support of the urban units by the rural organization. (Bonachea & San Martín 1974, pp. 208-9) Interpretations of why the workers failed to join the strike vary widely, from economic self-interest (Domínguez 1978, pp. 122-3) to opposition within the unions to the insurgents in general (V.A. 1959, p. 185) to poor planning and regime repression (Huberman & Sweezy 1960, p. 62).

More important, from our perspective, are the interpretations of what the state of relative support for the two primary actors at this time. According to our model, the conflict had reached Level 4 (Relative advantage: Insurgents) by early-1958, suggesting that momentum was on the side of the guerrillas and the regime was largely on the defensive. On the face of it, the failure of the strike would appear to belie this assessment. Our sources, though, suggest that while our score may somewhat exaggerate the level of insurgent support, it does not completely distort the situation. Those sources which do identify relative support levels appear to be in agreement that early-1958 saw a situation of rough stalemate (Level 3 in our model). Thus, Bonachea and San Martín note, "The guerrilla movement was at this time clearly in its second stage of development, that is, quite capable of maintaining a core territory, but not yet strong enough to make the transition from a guerrilla to a more conventional army." (Bonachea & San Martín 1974, p. 223) Matthews also writes, "In the spring of 1958, it looked like a draw so far as the Sierra Maestra rebels and the government were concerned. The same could be said of the Civic Resistance and the government. Batista could not defeat the guerrillas or crush the civilian underground, but neither could they overthrow his government." (Matthews 1975, p. 104)

Finally, even Castro himself seemed to recognize a state of stalemate at the time. Shortly before the strike, he wrote in a letter, "If he [Batista] succeeds in crushing the strike, nothing would be resolved. We would continue to struggle and within six months his situation would be worse." (cited in Judson 1984, p. 185)

It appears, then, that our model overestimates the level of support at this point. In
examining the evaluation sources, the explanation of this discrepancy seems to lie in our incorporation score for the insurgents at that time. The lack of support for the strike, particularly among organized labor in Havana, would indicate that the linkages between the insurgents and this sector were far from complete. In our defense, though, we would argue that the structure of our time series may have more to do with this discrepancy than a misreading of the event data. While it seems apparent that our support estimate is overly generous for April 1958, this may not apply to the remainder of the early-1958 period, namely May-July 1958. Most of our evaluation sources suggest that it was during this latter period that the M-26-7 succeeding in consolidating an opposition coalition under its leadership. In fact, most point to the failure of the strike as a catalyst for the establishment of this coalition, as it grimly demonstrated the need for unity among anti-Batista elements, particularly to Castro, who had been lukewarm at best to joining forces with elements such as the Communists prior to the strike (Thomas 1971, pp. 209-10; Domínguez 1978, p. 127; Judson 1984, p. 188; Goldenberg 1965, p. 160). Thus, while our incorporation scores (and consequently, support scores) may be somewhat overstated for the early part of this period, we think they are roughly consonant with the later part.

OUTCOME TESTING

A test of our model's success in predicting the outcome of the Cuban insurgency would not seem to be a very meaningful exercise. While there was, to be sure, a good deal of uncertainty over the structure and direction of the new regime once Batista had fled, our analysis is not specifically concerned with the post-revolutionary consolidation process. Admittedly, this could create serious problems in cases where the collapse of the incumbent regime does not signal the inauguration of a new political system. Huntington's delineation of differences among "Western" and "Eastern" revolutionary patterns is relevant here. He suggests revolutions of the former type are characterized by the collapse of the existing regime, followed by a lengthy consolidation struggle between contenders with varying political goals seeking to mobilize previously "inert" supporters, while in the latter type of
revolution mobilization precedes the downfall of the incumbents. He explains:

In the Western revolution the principal struggles are between revolutionary groups; in the Eastern revolution they are between one revolutionary group and the established order. . . In the Western revolution the revolutionaries come to power in the capital first and then gradually expand their control over the countryside. In the Eastern revolution they withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military operations. . . Eventually they are able to defeat the government troops in battle. The last phase of the revolutionary struggle is the occupation of the capital. . . The end of the revolutionary process [in the Eastern model] . . . can be precisely dated symbolically or actually by the final conquest of power by the revolutionaries in the capital of the regime. (Huntington 1968, p. 271-2)

We would argue, as indeed Huntington does, that the Cuban case falls into the Eastern category. Consequently, we feel our exclusion of the period following the collapse of the Batista regime is less problematical than it might have been in a Western-type revolution. For these reasons, we will not conduct outcome testing in this case.

UNDERLYING CAUSE TESTING

It is perhaps not surprising that there is a wide range of opinion concerning the "causes" of the outcome in the Cuban case. Successful revolutions tend to generate a great deal more interest, and consequently more analysis, than unsuccessful revolutions. Broadly speaking, the range of explanations in our evaluation sources can be boiled down to two categories: Why the regime "lost" and why the insurgents "won." To focus our testing in this section, we will compare the factors identified in our evaluation sources with those in our model as being responsible for the respective "loss" and "victory" of the primary actors. In other words, we will seek to identify the "weakest" dimension scores for the regime and the "strongest" dimension scores for the insurgents, and then examine the evaluation sources for correspondence.

In our model, the insurgents seem to do well in nearly equal measure on both the incorporation and protection/coercion dimensions. The evaluation sources frequently mention both of these factors as principal determinants of the guerrillas' eventual success.
Most sources see the insurgents as having created a broad anti-regime coalition by the end of the conflict:

The more organized sectors of the working class supported Castro in the last stages of the revolution. It was really the urban middle classes, including business and the professions, that were the important source of money and supplies, responding to Castro's stated objective of resolving the economic difficulties associated with Batista. Pro-Castro support from the Catholic hierarchy and the urban middle classes, even tacit support from the Cuban upper classes, increased after Batista's resort to terror in 1958. . . the core alliance of intellectuals, students, and a small part of the Cuban peasantry mobilized support from all the major sectors of Cuban society. (Greene 1974, p. 46)

Bonachea and San Martín suggest a fairly steady growth in the size of the insurgent coalition, similar to that shown in our incorporation scores: "As the insurrection gained momentum, more and more people turned against Batista. By late 1958 the majority of the population despised the regime." (Bonachea & San Martín 1974, p. 132) Others, as well, have argued that the key to the outcome of the Cuban insurgency was the guerrilla movement's ability to construct a "majority", though there are differing views on the underlying causes of this successful mobilization. (Dix 1984, pp. 434-8; Draper 1965, pp. 78-80; Thomas 1971, p. 257; Bonachea & Valdés 1972, p. 48) We will discuss these differing interpretations and the implications for our analysis in more detail in our conclusion. It appears, then, that the evaluation sources see an insurgent incorporation process similar to the one portrayed by our model, namely a steady upward trend culminating in a more or less majority coalition.

A similar trend in the protection/coercion dimension is suggested by our model and by evaluation sources. When these sources deal with the military side of the conflict, they do so most frequently by contrasting the behavior of the two actors in this regard, particularly with reference to two aspects: the treatment of noncombatant civilians and of captured prisoners. Civilians in areas of guerrilla activities, both rural and urban, were subject to an increasing probability of being subjected to coercion by government forces as the conflict escalated, and captured guerrillas faced virtually certain torture and execution.
The insurgents, on the other hand, appear to have been fairly rigorous in applying "humane" standards of conduct by their forces towards both civilians and captured soldiers. This is not to say the guerrillas never killed outside of combat. There were a substantial number of "executions" carried out under the rubric of "revolutionary justice." Yet these killings do not appear to have been detrimental to the insurgents' attempts to mobilize support and may have actually been beneficial in this regard for two reasons: 1) they were not secret and arbitrary, but conducted in public and only after an investigation had revealed violation of a clearly established set of "rebel laws"; 2) the victims of these executions were most often persons whom the insurgents' supporters (real or potential) had reason to fear (landlords, bandits, etc.), and therefore the killings were perceived by residents as "self-defense" of sorts. (Judson 1984, pp. 141-4; Bonachea & San Martín 1974; Domínguez 1978, pp. 127-31; Thomas 1971, pp. 166 & 216-7; Huberman & Sweezy 1960, pp. 63-4)

What we see in both the evaluation sources and our scores, then, is a steady deterioration of the regime's performance on the protection/coercion dimension concurrent with a steady progression of the insurgent's performance on this dimension. We feel that overall our scores are supported by the evaluation sources in terms of the underlying "causes" of the outcome.

CONCLUSION

We feel our model is supported by the testing we've done on the Cuban revolution. More interesting, perhaps, is the support for our overall picture of the dynamics of insurgency that the case of a successful guerrilla movement provides. In explaining the success of insurgent groups, most analysts tend to agree that it is the ability of these groups to build a broad-based anti-regime coalition that is a critical determinant of the outcome. There are, however, substantial disagreements over the factors which make the construction of these coalitions possible. A complete delineation of these different views is beyond the scope of the present discussion, but it is relevant to look at differences among those
specifically concerned with the Cuban case. Some authors see the nature or behavior of the regime itself as responsible for driving a majority of the population into the insurgent camp. These observers blame both the "illegitimacy" and terror of the Batista regime for alienating virtually every sector, but most importantly the middle- and upper-classes (Domínguez 1978; Dix 1984; Thomas 1971; Lacqueur 1976). Others feel the insurgents themselves were the catalyst for creating the anti-Batista coalition, either because of their "moral superiority" (Huberman & Sweezy 1960; Bonachea & San Martín 1974; Judson 1984) or because the vagueness of their ideological appeals enabled the guerrillas to avoid "frightening" potential allies in the upper-classes (Weitz 1986). We are no doubt guilty of some degree of oversimplification of the views of these authors, but it does give an idea of the divergent emphasis among various treatments of successful insurgencies.

We feel a more satisfactory explanation would start from the premise that all of these factors are interrelated, creating a dynamic process which we feel is captured by our model. In other words, we believe that to focus on a single factor, for example, the vague ideological stance of the Cuban insurgents, is to miss the more complex pattern of insurgent-regime interaction. True, the fuzzy appeals enabled certain sectors of Cuban society to feel non-threatened in the insurgent coalition, but it is doubtful that the elites would have abandoned Batista had he also succeeded in appearing to be a viable, "safe" option. Conversely, regardless of how "narrow" the regime became, elite desertion would have been equally unlikely had Castro portrayed his envisioned revolution in the stark class terms of hard-line Marxism.

It was only the interaction of these two sets of incorporation tactics, as well as interaction on the other dimensions, that produced the eventual outcome. The construction of the anti-regime (or anti-insurgent, for that matter) coalition is thus dependent not on factors inherent to either party, but to the multi-dimensional, dynamic competition between the two. This is the premise of our model, and we feel this case of successful insurgency, perhaps even more clearly than the unsuccessful cases, illustrates the utility of this
approach.
CHAPTER SEVEN
NICARAGUA 1974-1979

INTRODUCTION

Having found our model fairly well supported in our first case of insurgent success, we now move to our second case in this category. Clearly our options in terms of case selection in this category are limited, as Cuba and Nicaragua represent the only two instances of successful armed insurgency in Latin America in the post-war era. Yet we feel confident that these countries are also sufficiently similar in a number of respects to other states in the region to render a comparative analysis such as ours meaningful. That is to say, we would argue that there is nothing so inherently unique about Cuba and Nicaragua as to make them incomparable to our other cases. Indeed, this is what we have tried to demonstrate through the application of our model to cases of different insurgent outcomes, and what we hope to do with this case.

Major Actors:


INSURGENTS: Augusto César Sandino; Carlos Fonseca Amador, Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN); FSLN Members and Factions: Bayardo Arce Castaño & Tomás Borge Martínez, Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP); Daniel Ortega Saavedra & Humberto Ortega Saavedra, Tendencia Insurreccional/"Tercerista"; Jaime Wheelock Román, Tendencia Proletaria (TP).

In the early years of the twentieth century, events in Nicaragua took place which were to shape that country's destiny in profound ways. On the surface, the situation in Nicaragua did not appear fundamentally different from the prevailing social and political climate prevailing in Latin America at that time. Politically, the Nicaraguan system was essentially a forum for personalistic elite conflict played out through individualist parties. Socially, as elsewhere in the region, a small group of landowners and businessmen
dominated economic life with little regard for the largely illiterate, poor and disorganized masses. Another feature which Nicaragua shared with other Latin American nations at that time was the enormous influence wielded by the United States in domestic affairs. Although Nicaragua was not alone in this sense, some observers argue that it was the peculiar configuration of developments relating to U.S. involvement in that country which set it apart from others in the region:

The uniqueness of the Nicaraguan situation resided in the almost permanent presence of U.S. troops in the country from 1912 to 1933 and the unusually close association between U.S. government officials and U.S. policy in the establishment of the Somoza dynasty. Nowhere else in Latin America had U.S. policy been so consistent, so uncompromisingly committed to a personalist, then dynastic dictatorship. Likewise, nowhere else in Latin America did there exist the legacy of a nationalist hero who had successfully resisted, through guerrilla warfare, the first large-scale counterinsurgency adventures of the United States in the hemisphere. (Loveman & Davies 1985, pp. 353-4, italics in original)

In many ways, the stage was set for the future of Nicaragua during the U.S. occupation of that country which ended in 1933. Two developments in particular were to influence the subsequent course of Nicaraguan history. The first was the success of a dissident Liberal Party member, Augusto César Sandino, in leading a small scale guerrilla campaign against the American occupying forces under the banner of nationalism and anti-imperialism. Sandino, using classic hit-and-run harassment tactics, was eventually able to convince U.S. policymakers to withdraw their troops from the country. The second major development stemmed directly from the desire of the U.S. not to entangle itself in a large scale civil war. Unwilling to either become more deeply involved or to allow American influence to wane, the U.S. decided to support the creation of a military force under its supervision which would be both capable of maintaining order and receptive to American pressure. This force, known as the Guardia Nacional (GN), was left under the command of Anastasio Somoza García upon the U.S. military withdrawal in 1933. Somoza quickly established the GN as one of the principal power bases in the country, and used his position as its leader to assume de facto control of Nicaragua. This early chapter in Nicaragua's
contemporary history came to a close when, in February 1934, Somoza invited Sandino to dinner and later had him murdered.

With Sandino and his small guerrilla force out of the way, Somoza rapidly expanded his control over the country, both political and economic. Over the next four decades, the Somoza regime evolved from a personalist to a dynastic system. Through a series of puppet governments and constitutional revisions, actual power was passed from Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza, assassinated in 1956, to his first son Luis, and finally to Anastasio Jr. ("Tachito"). The Somoza family dynasty presided over a period which, although marked by occasional turbulence, was on the whole stable. Millet describes the "arrangement" which allowed the Somozas to maintain control for so long:

... middle- and upper-class loyalties were ensured by "giving them a piece of the pie, but not of the action." This meant that they could maintain or even improve their economic status if they accepted Somoza domination over the nation. A certain degree of opposition was allowed these classes, but they never had an opportunity to gain control... Another effective Somoza tactic in dealing with the traditional sources of internal opposition--such as the newspaper La Prensa, the Conservative party, labor movements, university students, and the business community--was to divide and conquer. Pacts would be made with various sectors. Offices, favors, and economic opportunities were bestowed in return for gestures of support or even a moderating of opposition. The ultimate tactic for keeping most of the upper and middle classes in line was to present the Somoza family as the only alternative to communism, a tactic made more credible as years of co-optation, acquiescence, and humiliation undermined the prestige and credibility of the traditional opposition. (Millet, in Grabendorff 1984, p. 40)

The system began to unravel, though, following a devastating earthquake which levelled much of Managua in 1972. In the aftermath of the disaster, Somoza and his associates embarked on a spree of corruption which was unprecedented even for his regime: relief supplies, including blood, were stolen and resold, international assistance money wound up in the pockets of the Somoza clique, and the vast majority of the reconstruction effort was funneled through Somoza-owned businesses. Adding to the spectacle, in the days immediately following the quake, the respected (or feared) Guardia all but disintegrated, with officers and men either deserting to see to their families, or engaging in
widespread looting. These events further damaged the regime's already tarnished reputation among the traditional opposition, but more importantly, they created a schism between the regime and elites which was to ultimately lead to Somoza's downfall. By encroaching on the economic interests of the wealthy but politically powerless elite, the regime removed the last remaining obstacle to the formation of a broad anti-regime coalition representing virtually every segment of Nicaraguan society.

The process of forging this coalition had, in a sense, begun a number of years earlier with the formation of an armed revolutionary organization in 1960. In that year, Carlos Fonseca and Tomás Borge founded the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) and began recruiting members for a guerrilla struggle against the regime. Inspired by the example of Sandino and the success of the Cuban guerrillas, the FSLN initiated a series of armed actions beginning in 1963. Essentially following the "foco" theory of guerrilla warfare, in which small, armed units generate spontaneous uprisings among rural peasants, the insurgents attempted over a number of years to establish a presence in the Nicaraguan countryside. Like their focuista counterparts elsewhere in Latin America at this time, they met with little success in recruiting peasant support and the guerrilla columns were largely destroyed by the Guardia in short order. Yet much of the leadership survived these early failures, and learning from their experience, began dedicating themselves to a long-term process of "accumulating forces in silence" beginning in 1970. By 1974, the insurgents were ready to go back into action, and the conflict which had its roots in developments 40 years earlier began to unfold.

REGIME--Incorporation

In late-1974, Anastasio Somoza was elected president of Nicaragua, an event which might suggest a functional incorporative political system. But the circumstances under which the election took place tend to indicate that this was not necessarily the case. Somoza had previously been elected president in 1967, and at the end of his term in 1971, in order to sidestep a constitutional provision barring consecutive presidential terms, he dissolved
the government, handing it over to a three-man provisional junta. The junta, which was to oversee a constitutional reform process, scheduled new elections, in which Somoza would be allowed to run, for 1974.

Further tarnishing the elections was the fact that numerous prominent political opponents were charged by the government with "endangering the welfare of the state" several months earlier, charges that most Nicaraguans felt had been orchestrated by Somoza. (7/7/74) The election was duly held, and notsurprisingly won by Somoza. (12/1/74) We feel the circumstances under which the election took place suggest a fairly, though not completely, exclusive regime. Consequently, we give a moderate (3) incorporation score for late-1974.

In fact, there is little evidence concerning change in this state of affairs, either for better or worse, from this point until early-1977. In that period, there are two reports which suggest that important sectors of the population were becoming increasingly distanced from the regime. Both reports have perhaps a more direct bearing on the activities of the regime in other dimensions, but are relevant to the incorporation dimension as well. The first refers to a public condemnation of the regime's human rights practices by Roman Catholic bishops. (3/2/77) The second details the investigation of charges by the U.S. Agency for International Development of massive corruption by the regime related to reconstruction projects following the massive earthquake of 1972. The report notes that this corruption did not benefit the elite in general, but only the "family, friends and military supporters" of the Somoza regime. (3/23/77) Thus, by 1977, it appears that the regime had significantly alienated segments of the church and business community, indicating a drop in the incorporation score to between moderate and low levels (4).

By early-1978, it becomes clear that the regime was viewed as increasingly exclusive. A report in April notes that, "Somoza appears politically isolated, sustained only by the police and National Guard." (4/25/78) The validity of this observation was most clearly demonstrated in municipal elections held in February, in which reports noted that, "voters by the thousands" boycotted the elections "to support demands for Somoza's resignation."
(2/6/78) Turnout was roughly 20%, and of that, 95% voted for Somoza's Liberal party, which suggests that very few people outside of his party felt the election was meaningful.

(2/7/78)

Yet perhaps in contrast to the Cuban case, Somoza appears to have retained the support of his armed forces virtually until the end. Despite occasional references to unrest within the military (8/3/78), there are reports as late as June, 1979, that the National Guard remained loyal to the regime. (6/24/79) On the basis of this evidence, we have left the regime's incorporation score at the same level (4) rather than dropping it to the minimum level.

**REGIME—Performance**

There is almost no direct evidence of the performance activities of the regime in the first few years of the conflict, but data from the later stages makes some inferences concerning the level of performance in the earlier period possible. We have already noted above the reports concerning a massive corruption scandal surrounding the regime's earthquake reconstruction efforts. This would seem to indicate that the regime's score on the performance dimension was less than optimal in the early stages, and another report in late-1977 appears to support this assessment. It noted that "influential church, business and political groups" were demanding change, including, "measures to improve the living conditions of [Nicaraguans], who suffer from levels of illiteracy, poverty, malnutrition and unemployment that are high even by Latin American standards." (10/30/77)

This suggests to us that the regime was probably performing at the moderate (3) level from late-1974 through late-1977, meaning that certain basic public goods, such as water and transportation, were being provided. It does not appear that the regime was performing at a higher level, which would reflect the significant provision of education, health and other social services.

In early-1978, the conflict began to take its toll on the performance of the regime. A report in August suggests that the year to date had seen "economic havoc" in Nicaragua, and
goes on to list the unpleasant statistics: economic growth, which had averaged 5.5% for the previous 20 years, was expected to be 0% or negative in 1978; unemployment had reached around 20% and inflation was at 18%; less than 4% of the households in Nicaragua had the same living standards of a middle-class U.S. family; and the government was spending as much on defense as it was for education. The report went on to say that growing numbers of businessmen were dissatisfied with Somoza's mismanagement of the economy and his "grip on the nation's business." (8/21/78)

The situation continued to deteriorate in late-1978. Leading business groups described the economic and political system as in "crisis" and suggested that the situation was so bad that even the Somoza clique's interests were being harmed. (8/28/78; 10/2/78) In September, one report noted that a general strike, supported by the insurgents and other opposition elements, had succeeded in closing down roughly 80% of the national economy for four weeks and had, "seriously undermined Somoza's ability to govern." (9/22/78)

Finally, in early-1979, the government's capacity to administer the country appears to have largely collapsed. In March, a report notes that the nation was being, "slowly torn apart" and suggests the regime no longer has control. (3/21/79) By June, the situation seems to be anarchic, with widespread looting reported in the capital, and the President expressing his regrets that the city is "paralyzed" and promising food distribution in a national TV address. (6/14/79) On the performance dimension, then, we see a steady deterioration in the regime's score from moderate (3) in late-1977 to moderate-low (4) in 1978 to low (5) as the administrative capacity of the government crumbled in early-1979.

REGIME—Protection/Coercion

The first evidence of the regime's activities on the protection/coercion dimension is a report on the declaration of martial law following an insurgent operation in which high-level Nicaraguans were taken hostage. (12/29/74) This state of emergency entailed the indefinite suspension of constitutional guarantees and allowed the regime to arrest individuals without warrant or explanation. Additionally, the President ordered the immediate creation of a
special counterinsurgency force to "concentrate on the fight against the guerrillas." (1/3/75)

Shortly after martial law was introduced, the regime announced that it had ordered one of its most visible and vocal critics, the editor of the opposition newspaper *La Prensa*, to appear before a military court on charges of anti-government activity. (1/18/75) These actions seem to coincide most closely with the moderate-high level (3) on our scales.

This score appears to be applicable as well to the next several time periods, from late-1975 until late-1976. During that time, there are reports of the arrest and killing of insurgent "collaborators" during government military operations in the countryside (8/6/75); and evidence of an active counterinsurgency campaign which was apparently fairly successful, e.g., death of guerrilla leader Carlos Fonseca. (11/14/76)

Beginning in early-1977, there are reports that the regime's methods were becoming less discriminate. In March, 1977, the report of the Roman Catholic bishops which we referred to earlier was released. In it, the clergymen accused the regime of, "widespread torture, rape and summary executions of civilians" and cited two mass executions by government troops involving a total of 86 people, including 29 children. (3/2/77)

The trend towards an increasing use of indiscriminate violence appears to continue through late-1977 and early-1978. The bishop's report was followed by a similar condemnation by Amnesty International in late-1977. (8/16/77) In early-1978, there were reports of such incidents as the assassination of leading opposition figures, widely attributed to regime elements (1/11/78; 5/14/78); the bombing and strafing of opposition newspaper offices (4/22/78); and government troops firing machine guns into crowds of demonstrators. (1/13/78) We feel the rising tide of regime violence against "noncombatants" indicates a drop in its score on this dimension to 4 from early-1977 through early-1978.

In late-1978 and early-1979, this score drops to the minimum level (5) as a result of the increasing use of tactics by the regime which made virtually no distinction between insurgents and citizens. There were continued reports of summary executions (7/26/78;
9/21/78), but more significantly in terms of our scores were the reports of an increased use of air and artillery attacks by the regime on "guerrilla targets." The reports of heavy bombing and strafing of cities under guerrilla influence, eventually including even the capital, suggest a nearly complete lack of discrimination on the part of the regime in applying violence. (11/18/78; 4/13/79; 5/1/79; 6/18/79) These sorts of wholesale attacks suggest the high probability of an individual suffering sanctions regardless of participation which is characterized by our active-terror (5) category.

REGIME--External Factors

In early-1977, the first signs that the regime's external coalition was in jeopardy began to appear. To be sure, the Somoza government's relations with other countries, particularly in the immediate region, had never been idyllic. Yet the special relationship between the Somoza family and the United States had, by extension, acted as something of a damper on other regimes in the region who may have been tempted to confront the Nicaraguan government directly.

In April, 1977, though, the U.S. sought to pressure Somoza into improving his human rights record by suspending military aid, and either wittingly or unwittingly opened the door for those who sought to isolate the Nicaraguan regime. The immediate impact of the suspension does not appear to have been especially damaging, at least based on the information in our event sources. Specifically, it does not seem that the U.S. sought to withdraw its political support in a wholesale manner from the Somoza government. There were, for example, more frequent references by American officials to the improvement of Nicaragua's human rights situation than to the regime's shortcomings. (10/26/77; 2/17/78) The U.S. also seemingly made efforts to limit the political fallout from the suspension, noting that it preferred a "quiet unpublicized approach" over public confrontation. (2/8/78) Finally, the U.S. continued to furnish Nicaragua with economic assistance even after military aid was suspended. (5/16/78)

"Neutral" actors in the region, however, began to make their distaste for the Somoza
regime known. In early-1978, Venezuela publicly requested an investigation by the Organization of American States (OAS) into human rights violations by the Nicaraguan government. (2/8/78) By late-1978, it became clear that the tide had turned against Somoza. Regional and other "neutrals" began to line up firmly in the anti-regime camp: Venezuela and Colombia jointly denounced the Nicaraguan government and called for "swift United Nations action against it" (9/29/78); the following day, the Socialist International joined in the denunciations and called for a complete withdrawal of U.S. support for the regime (9/30/78); and near the end of the year, Costa Rica officially severed diplomatic ties to Nicaragua. (11/26/78)

More ominous, perhaps, were reports during this period concerning the changing attitudes of the United States. First, American officials noted that the U.S. was seeking to further distance itself from a "crumbling regime" (8/25/78); and later, that it was "deeply involved in trying to force President Somoza to resign and replace him with a stable democratic government." (11/16/78)

The isolation of the Somoza government became virtually complete in early-1979, as both Mexico (5/17/79) and Brazil (6/26/79) broke off diplomatic relations; the OAS voted 17-2 to call for the "immediate and definitive replacement" of the regime (6/24/79); and the U.S. officially severed its military ties to the Nicaraguan government. (2/9/79)

We have translated the trend of increasing international isolation into a one-half point (0.5) reduction of the regime's overall average score from early-1977 through early-1978, and a full one point (1) reduction in late-1978 and early-1979.

INSURGENTS—Incorporation

Strictly speaking, there is no direct evidence concerning the incorporation activities of the insurgents in the initial time period, late-1974. Within three days of the end of that period, though, a report noted that the guerrillas had emerged as a, "political force capable of inflicting stinging defeat on the government and proving the vulnerability . . . of the regime," and that sympathy for their cause was growing, "among the repressed peasants of
northern Nicaragua, the students of the cities of Managua and Leon, and even middle-class professionals." (1/3/74) For the first period, then, we give a score of low (1), and a score between low and moderate (2) for the early-1975 period, indicating some degree of incorporation of the "loyal" opposition.

This score rises to the moderate (3) level in late-1975 on the basis of a report that the guerrillas were gaining strength and that discontent was spreading among the middle-classes and "previously passive" groups, including wealthy farmers. (8/6/75)

Yet from early-1976 until late-1977, there is no evidence of either an expansion or even maintenance of the insurgents' coalition. In the absence of any indication that the guerrillas were active on the incorporation front during this time, we have used a decay factor of 0.5 for each period, resulting in scores of 2.5 for early-1976, 2 for late-1976, and 1.5 for early-1977.

In late-1977, there are several reports indicating that the insurgents had substantially expanded their anti-regime coalition. In October, a report chronicling a renewed military offensive by the guerrillas notes that the movement, "has been joined in its actions by non-Marxist opponents of the regime and has even received public support from some conservative sectors." (10/20/77) The report goes on to describe how "The Twelve", a group of respected anti-Somoza elites living in exile, had praised the "political maturity" of the guerrillas. One month later, another report suggests that, coinciding with the recent insurgent military campaign, "a political campaign against the Government was also initiated, with an unlikely coalition of academic, business and church interests." (10/30/77)

In early-1978, the trend toward broader incorporation appears to continue. In April, a report quotes the somewhat prophetic observations of a foreign diplomat in Managua: "Opposition has spread like a brush fire, consuming one sector after another. It's like watching a slow-motion revolution." (4/25/78) We feel the evidence suggests a fairly solid incorporation by the insurgents of the opposition, both "loyal" and "disloyal", as well as some segments of the elite. Consequently, we give a score (4) between moderate and high

Late-1978 saw developments on the incorporation dimension which are extremely infrequent in cases of Latin American insurgency, and indeed, perhaps in nearly all cases of insurgency: the establishment of a more or less formal coalition linking the guerrillas with a wide range of other social groups, including members of the traditional elite. This coalition, called the Frente Amplio Opositor (FAO), was reported as, "incorporating sectors as different as conservative businessmen, Christian Democrats and Marxist guerrillas." (8/24/78) The FAO continued to function through early-1979 and its continued links to the guerrillas are mentioned frequently. (10/23/78; 12/11/78; 1/17/79; 6/5/79) This sort of incorporative arrangement is, we feel, best captured by our maximum (5) score on this dimension and this is the score we give for the late-1977 and early-1978 periods.

INSURGENTS—Performance

As with our other cases, there is extremely little evidence concerning the performance activities of the insurgents. From the fragmentary information available, it does not appear that the guerrillas were particularly successful in establishing an administrative presence until perhaps the very latest stages of the struggle. An article in the Latin American Political Report of June 29, 1979, provides the only hint we have found of such a presence, noting, "The FSLN has already set up courts in the areas where it claims control." (LAPR 6/29/79, pp. 194-6)

There are scattered references in the reminiscences of FSLN guerrilla Omar Cabezas, *Fire from the Mountain*, to encounters with peasants in which the insurgents purchased or traded for food and occasionally dispersed medicines or money to potential supporters. (Cabezas 1985) One article in the New York Times also mentions these sorts of transactions. (NYT 8/6/75) This type of behavior seems to coincide with our low (1) level on the performance dimension, rather than the minimum score (0) which suggests an extractive or predatory exchange between insurgents and the population.

We must stress the fact that our scores on this particular dimension are based on an
accumulation of evidence which is quite skimpy. It is entirely possible that we have underestimated by a greater or lesser margin the performance activities of the insurgents. In the absence of information which suggests a higher activity level, though, we would prefer to err on the side of understatement. We will, then, give a score of low (1) for virtually the entire period, moving it to moderate (3) only in the last time frame, early-1979.

INSURGENTS—Protection/Coercion

The first evidence of activity by the insurgents on the protection/coercion dimension are reports of the spectacular kidnapping of a number of prominent Nicaraguans, including relatives of President Somoza, at a Christmas party in 1974. (12/29/74) The operation, in which the hostages were exchanged for captured FSLN members, suggested a fair amount of tactical sophistication on the part of the guerrillas. Yet while it certainly shattered the regime's aura of invincibility, it did not indicate a capacity on the part of the insurgents to protect potential supporters from retaliation by government forces. Therefore, we give a score of moderate-inactive level (3) for late-1974.

For the next year, there are reports of scattered activity on the part of the insurgents, most of which appear to be of a fairly low level, such as bank robberies and assassination of rural constables. (1/3/75; 8/6/75) The apparently isolated nature of these actions suggests a slight drop in the score (2) for 1975.

From early-1976 through early-1977, there are only two reports concerning the activities of the insurgents on this dimension, and neither indicates much success from the guerrilla perspective. The first notes the death of one of the FSLN's founding members, Carlos Fonseca, in a skirmish with government troops. (11/14/76) The second, in March 1977, points out that since the 1974 kidnapping, the, "regime has decimated the ranks of the Sandinists." (3/2/77) During this period we feel the insurgents had dropped down to the minimum-inactive level (1) on the protection/coercion scale.

Beginning in late-1977, though, the guerrillas appear to be back in action. In October, there are reports of four "major attacks" and two minor ones, all of which were against
government targets. (10/20/77) For the rest of the period, though, the insurgents seem to have been quiet, and we give a score of moderate-active level (3) for late-1977.

By early-1978, there was a considerable escalation in both the scope and frequency of insurgent military operations. These included clashes and attacks on government forces, some of which stretched across several days (2/4/78; 2/28/78; 3/2/78); bombings and machine-gun attacks (2/15/78; 4/22/78); riots, strikes and demonstrations (1/13/78; 1/31/78; 2/24/78) and the assassination of a high military official (3/10/78).

This pattern continued into late-1978, with reports of another spectacular kidnapping, this time at the national legislature (8/23/78); bombings and riots (7/13/78); and "heavy fighting" between guerrillas and government troops, occasionally resulting in the short-term occupation of large cities by the insurgents (9/12/78; 9/19/78; 11/27/78; 12/20/78; 12/26/78).

The guerrillas don't seem to have been capable of the long-term occupation of territory that is indicated by our high (5) level. A report in August 1978, for example, notes that the insurgents lacked the military capacity to defeat the National Guard, and quoted a guerrilla as saying, "When we take a town for a few hours, the population cries out for arms so they too can join the fight. If we are going to defeat the guard, we'll need to be able to hand out arms in each town as we advance on Managua." (8/24/78) For 1978, then, we give a score (4) between the moderate and maximum levels.

By early-1979, the insurgents appear to have crossed the threshold to the maximum level. They are reported to have control over increasing numbers of major cities throughout the period (4/14/79; 6/12/79; 6/18/79) as well as certain portions of the capital (6/14/79), and by June the conflict is described as a "conventional-style war." (6/5/79) This seems to correspond closely to our maximum (5) level. The pattern, then, of guerrilla behavior on this dimension would indicate moderate scores early in the conflict, dropping down to low levels in the middle years, and turning upward again in late-1977 with a steady rise to the highest level at the end of the episode.
INSURGENTS--External Factors

The Nicaraguan insurgents, perhaps more than any other guerrilla group in Latin America, were given substantial assistance by external actors. That is not to say the FSLN received more support in a quantitative sense, but rather that the support they did receive was acquired in such a way as to exert a significant beneficial impact on their struggle. The timing and source of external assistance appears to have been particularly important in creating the circumstances under which that assistance could play a positive role, from the insurgents' perspective, in the conflict. We will discuss this in more depth in our conclusion.

The first clear evidence that external assistance was being provided to the insurgents comes in late-1978. Reports suggest a steadily increasing supply of material assistance to the guerrillas during this period, assistance whose value was enhanced significantly by the fact that it was coming from regional "neutrals." In September, there are reports that Venezuela, Panama and Costa Rica were providing support and sanctuary to the insurgents (9/21/78); in October, these same actors were reported to be stepping up their support (10/4/78); and by November, there were reports that an actual "brigade of Venezuelan, Panamanian, Mexican and Costa Rican guerrillas" had crossed the border to fight alongside the Nicaraguan insurgents. (11/19/78)

Early-1979 saw continued material assistance provided by these actors, as well as by Cuba. (6/23/79) It also witnessed the virtual diplomatic recognition of the insurgent organization by a substantial number of regional actors, as the Andean Pact nations (Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia) granted the guerrillas belligerent status by classifying them as "legitimate combatants in a state of war." (6/18/79)

We feel the impact of these external factors on the insurgents' score is best represented by an increase of one-half point (0.5) in the overall average score for late-1978, and a one point (1) increase in early-1979. These adjustments reflect our view that the insurgents rapidly expanded the base of their external support, beginning in late-1978 and culminating

**Figure 7.1**

Nicaragua 1974-79

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**POINT TESTING**

The Nicaraguan insurgency provides us with an opportunity to conduct point testing of our model across several time periods. This testing will compare trends described by our model with those mentioned in the evaluation sources. We will also seek to identify specific events which appear to indicate relative support levels and use these to evaluate the levels given by our model.

In terms of trends, our model suggests a small rise in the insurgent support score early in the conflict, which then drops off in the middle years, and begins rising fairly sharply in late-1977. Most evaluation sources tend to generally support this picture of the process, though there are some differences with regard to timing. Specifically, most sources point to the assassination of Pedro Chamorro in January 1978 as signalling the upturn in insurgent

There seems to be a fairly good fit between the timing of the drop in insurgent scores and the evaluation sources. Vanden, for example, notes that the regime's response to the FSLN "Christmas party raid" in late-1974, "caused the mass movement to undergo a sharp downturn." (Vanden, in Walker 1982, p. 53) Nolan, as well, suggests that by late-1976 or early-1977, the guerrillas "ceased to be a credible threat to the Somoza regime" and that their "prospects for survival in early 1977 appeared to be at the lowest point since the destruction of the foco at Pancasán ten years before." (Nolan 1984, p. 46 & 60)

There does appear, though, to be some discrepancy between our model and the evaluation sources as to the timing of the upturn in the insurgents' fortunes. Booth seems to suggest that most of the growth in support (and size) took place from 1978 onward. He notes, "In 1978, the institutional support and military strength of both sides [insurgents and regime] began to equalize . . . In June 1979, the coercive balance shifted definitively to favor the insurgents, and their victory became inevitable." (Booth 1982, p. 222) The latter assessment, that an insurgent victory was imminent in early-1979, certainly accords with ours. But our model would indicate that the sort of parity described by Booth was reached in late-1977 (when the scores reach stalemate level), and that by 1978 the insurgents held a relative advantage over the regime. Our model, then, shows evidence of a more gradual upward trend in the support score than is suggested by Booth, who seems to argue for a sharper rise occurring later in the process.

The assessment of Richard Millet also appears somewhat at odds with ours, though the extent of actual disagreement is not clear. He notes, "In October 1978 the major issues seemed to be when Anastasio Somoza Debayle would go and what type of government would succeed him. Prospects that the FSLN would defeat the Guardia and that Nicaragua's next government would be Sandinista-controlled seemed highly unlikely."
(Millet, in Grabendorff, et. al. 1984, p. 45) It seems that Millet is arguing that the defeat of the regime was more or less imminent, but that insurgent victory was much less assured. In other words, he feels that there were a number of possible successors to the collapsing regime, of which the insurgents were only one.

If we look closely at the structure of our support scores, it seems that Millet's assessment does not differ fundamentally from our own. By late-1978, our scores show the regime had reached its minimum possible support level (5), which would appear to be in line with Millet's characterization of the Somoza government at that time. At the same time, we show the insurgents at a high level (4), but not yet at their maximum potential level.

Testing our model at specific points in relation to events which provide rough comparisons of relative support levels for the actors also generates these sorts of mixed results. One example would be the municipal elections held in February 1978. Turnout in those elections was only 20%, indicating that support for the regime, which had actively encouraged people to vote, was extremely limited. This is in accordance with our model, which shows the regime at a very low (4.5) support level. Yet this opposition to the regime does not necessarily translate into support for the insurgents, who in our model are at a slightly more than moderate (3.5) support level in early-1978. Again, this points up the fact that our model is not producing scores which indicate absolute support levels, but rather relative ones. Thus, the overall score (the final averaged support scores of regime and insurgents) of 4 in early-1978 represents a relative advantage for the insurgents, meaning the guerrillas enjoyed an edge over the regime in terms of support. Returning to Millet's observations, we can see that this does not mean that the insurgents had an absolute advantage, since there were, in fact, other contenders for authority in the wake of Somoza's collapse.

Overall, then, we feel the model is generally supported in our point testing, with the exception of perhaps the "angle" of the upward trend in insurgent support in the latter stages of the conflict.
OUTCOME TESTING

As in the case of Cuba, a test of our model's identification of an outcome point does not seem particularly useful under the circumstances. We cite early-1979 as the period in which an outcome occurs. The actual date of the final outcome would probably be placed some 17 days following the end of this period, on July 17, when Somoza fled the country. As we have noted earlier, though, our conception of an outcome is the point in the conflict at which the process becomes "irreversible", meaning that the situation has reached a level in which the position of the "losing" actor is untenable beyond the short-term (i.e., one time period in our analysis). Virtually every evaluation source agrees that by the end of June 1979, our outcome date, the final collapse of the regime was imminent. To be sure, heavy fighting was still going on in early July, and in fact, the National Guard succeeded in late June in driving FSLN forces from many parts of Managua. But by this point, the regime's time had run out, as Nolan notes, "Somoza had won Managua, but he had lost the war." (Nolan 1984, p. 100)

UNDERLYING CAUSE TESTING

In searching the evaluation sources for evidence concerning the underlying causes of the Nicaraguan revolution, we find a number of interpretations similar to those expressed in the Cuban case. Among the wide range of reasons given for the insurgents' success, the most frequently mentioned are: 1) the ability of the FSLN to forge a broad anti-regime coalition, or conversely, the inability of the regime to maintain or expand its coalition; 2) indiscriminate repression on the part of the government; 3) external factors.

The first set of reasons relates to the comparative success of the two actors on our incorporation dimension. For the insurgents, we see an uneven trend toward increased incorporation of various social sectors. The regime, on the other hand, starts off rather poorly and declines from there. As we noted above, the timing of these two trends in our model may not correlate directly with the descriptions offered in the evaluation sources, but the general portrayal of an increasingly broad insurgent coalition facing an increasingly
narrow regime coalition is certainly supported by those sources. (Hoehn & Weiss, in Fauriol 1985, p. 18; Dix 1984; Evans, in Wiarda 1984, pp.178-9; Ebel, in Wiarda 1984, p. 90; Anderson, in Wiarda 1984, pp. 124-5) Many cite these developments as the crucial determinants of the eventual outcome:

[The] breakup of the dominant bloc of power, in which the non-Somocist bourgeoisie expounded the overthrow of the dictatorship, may have been of fundamental relevance to the end of the dictatorship, along with the economic power of the bourgeoisie to support the insurrection and the general strikes that preceded Somoza's fall. Probably the bourgeoisie's main contribution consisted in projecting an image of national unity both at home and abroad. (Castillo Rivas, in Grabendorff 1984, pp. 56-7)

The basic reasons for the phenomenal growth of the FSLN in the early months of 1979 and for its ultimate success were political. . . In order to increase its internal and international support, the FSLN . . . modified some of its rhetoric and programs. Emphasis was now placed on unity of all patriotic forces. . . Elements of the middle class were invited to join with the FSLN and were promised that they would be included in any post-Somoza government. . . The results were highly effective. Popular support for the Sandinistas grew rapidly as more and more Nicaraguans came to visualize them as the only viable alternative to the dictatorship. (Millet, in Grabendorff 1984, pp. 48-9)

A second frequently mentioned factor is the level of repression applied by the regime against its opponents, both real and potential. (Chavarría, in Walker 1982, p. 38; Loveman & Davies 1985, pp. 375-6) A number of observers note that the indiscriminate nature of regime coercion produced a situation where joining the insurgents became something of an act of self-defense, particularly for young people. Millet, for example, writes, "the Guardia's tactic of executing young men found in areas recaptured from Sandinista control made it clear to many that if the Sandinistas withdrew from an area they would be wise to join with them. Otherwise, they might expect a summary execution by Somoza's troops." (Millet, in Grabendorff 1984, pp. 49-50)

Booth, as well, notes, "Especially for youths, joining the FSLN at least gave them arms, training and organization to help protect themselves from an enemy that could torture or kill without provocation. (Booth 1982, p. 219)
These assessments certainly appear to be in line with those of our model. Our scores show a steady decline for the regime on the protection/coercion dimension throughout the conflict, reflecting a situation in which the latter was clearly much more prevalent than the former.

A final factor mentioned as an underlying cause of the outcome is the behavior of international actors. The influence of external actors on the insurgent process is primarily seen in terms which resemble the domestic incorporation dynamic, namely that the guerrillas succeeded in acquiring a broad array of international support while the regime became steadily more isolated. (Millet, in Grabendorff 1984, pp. 50-1; Hoehn & Weiss, in Fauriol 1985, p. 19; Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 384; Booth 1982; pp. 127-32; Castillo Rivas, in Grabendorff 1984, p. 61; Dix 1984, p. 444)

Our assessment of external factors suggests their primary impact was an accelerant rather than a critical determinant of the outcome. According to our scores, even if effects of external factors are removed, the insurgency had reached a level (4.38) just short of that which we identify as indicating an outcome (>4.5). This seems to be in agreement with the interpretation of the evaluation sources. Booth, for example, describes the nature and impact of external factors on the insurgent process:

By 1978 the Costa Rican government clearly supported the FSLN, permitted large arms shipments to the insurgents, and collaborated with the rebels' provisional government in San José. Other governments in Latin America (Mexico, Venezuela, Panama) provided the rebels with important diplomatic backing and opposition to the Somoza government that neutralized its potential support from neighboring conservative regimes. Without such support for the insurgents and without the erosion of foreign support for the regime, the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty would surely have taken much longer. (Booth 1982, p. 218)

Elsewhere, he also notes, "In no case was external intervention decisive, but the policies of foreign governments generally weakened the Somoza regime and strengthened the insurgents." (Booth 1982, p. 127) This would seem to be in accordance with our contention that changes in the international environment largely mirrored rather than shaped
the internal situation, hastening to conclusion a process already headed in that direction.

Overall, then, the testing of our model against the evaluation sources appears to produce generally supportive results. There don’t seem to be any fundamental differences between the portrayal of the insurgent process in these sources and that depicted by our model. The principal discrepancies seem to lie in the area of timing, with some disagreement both between our model and the sources and among the sources themselves concerning the “slope” of the insurgents’ rise to power. Paradoxically, perhaps, these discrepancies may provide support for our underlying conception of the insurgent process, and we will turn now to a discussion of this possibility.

CONCLUSION

Just as in the case of Cuba, we find that virtually every explanation of the Nicaraguan revolution sees the process of coalition-building (or conversely, decay) as a fundamental determinant of the ultimate outcome. And again we are confronted with the question of how to account for the fact that the structure of the two actors’ coalitions shifted sufficiently during the course of the conflict to produce an outcome. In our view, this process required the dynamic interaction of virtually all of the dimensional factors specified by our model.

On the regime side, this means that the Somoza government failed to adequately perform (both in the economic and administrative sense), incorporate and protect (both against threats from insurgents and from arbitrary coercion). Evidence of all three “failures” is present throughout the evaluation sources. Booth highlights the interaction of factors responsible for the regime’s ultimate collapse:

... the capacity of the Somoza regime to deal with disaffection began to decline during the 1970’s, especially following the 1972 earthquake. This disaster undermined or began to erode the (already often limited) capability of public institutions to solve problems because of the wave of corruption and mismanagement from the bottom to the top of the regime, unprecedented in scope even in Nicaragua. The regime’s legitimacy plummeted as the state proved itself not only incompetent but venal, rapacious, and viciously repressive. (Booth 1982, p.221)
Booth and other sources’ interpretation of why the regime’s coalition disintegrated, and particularly why elite and middle-class elements deserted Somoza, is quite similar to our own, namely that the regime ceased to effectively perform the major functions traditionally associated with a governing authority. In short, by the end of the conflict, the regime came to be perceived by nearly all social sectors as threatening (rather than enhancing) their political, economic and security interests. Yet these factors alone cannot account for the eventual success of the insurgents. The crucial variable in determining whether or not the sort of widespread alienation from a regime described above is translated into a revolutionary outcome is the existence of an alternative pole around which disaffected elements can coalesce. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the insurgents will represent the sole anti-regime pole. In Nicaragua, for example, there were significant anti-regime elements, the so-called “moderate opposition”, which were not explicitly linked with the insurgent coalition until the very latest stages of the conflict. The manner by which these elements ultimately became either aligned with or superseded by the insurgent coalition provides what we feel is substantial support for our conception of the interactive, dynamic insurgent process.

The ascendancy of the insurgents to the position of the principal axis of anti-regime opposition was made possible by the conjuncture of a number of different factors. First was the massive alienation of the population from the regime. Second was the unwillingness of the Somoza government to relinquish power and its capacity to retain the military, if not the political, means of regime maintenance. Third was the capacity of the insurgents to challenge the regime militarily. Loveman and Davies describe the situation:

As the war continued, the moderate [opposition coalition] gradually lost credibility and the Sandinistas emerged as the clear vanguard of the anti-Somoza struggle. To solidify their position, the Sandinistas invited anti-imperialist, anti-dictatorship forces to join them... with their immediate objective the destruction of the Somoza regime. Remarkably, many units of the Guardia continued to protect the dynasty. Unlike Batista’s Cuban army in 1959-59, the Nicaraguan Guardia fought fiercely to the end and even defeated the anti-Somoza forces in some encounters. Thus, by February or March 1979 the FSLN military force represented the
only viable instrument to overthrow Somoza. (Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 382)

In other words, it was the interaction of several factors which provided the opportunity for the insurgents to emerge as the only viable alternative to the continuation of the regime, none of which were "inevitable." If Somoza's Guardia had collapsed, or if the FSLN was unable to mount an effective military challenge to the government forces, it is entirely plausible that the "moderate opposition" would have eventually come to power. As well, the previously noted differential in the incorporation tactics laid the original foundation for the situation which ultimately developed. We feel this case substantiates our claim that a dynamic model of interaction is best suited to explain the process of insurgency.
CHAPTER EIGHT
EL SALVADOR 1981-1986

In the next two chapters, we will be applying our model to cases of ongoing insurgencies in El Salvador and Peru respectively. We have included these cases for several reasons. First, they are considered by many observers to be among the more significant of the guerrilla movements operative in Latin America today, and consequently have attracted considerable attention. Second, in both cases the insurgent organizations have shown a degree of resiliency which has led many analysts to suggest that an outcome to these conflicts is unlikely in the short-term. We have opted to end our period of study in both cases in 1986 for the simple reason that it was necessary to leave some "lag time" in which the documentary sources we utilize in our evaluation could appear. Were we to carry our cases through to a later date, we would be hard-pressed to find such sources in sufficient number to allow us to carry out any evaluation of our model. The persistence of the insurgent groups in both these cases also allows us to examine situations where the conflict has become roughly stalemated, and thus enables us to assess the applicability of our model as a tool for analyzing insurgencies without specific reference to their outcomes.

Major Actors:

REGIME/"LEGITIMATE" OPPOSITION: President José Napoleón Duarte, 1984-86, Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC); Roberto D'Aubuisson, Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA); Provisional President Alvaro Magaña, 1982-84 (Independent); Other Parties: Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR); Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN); Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCS).

INSURGENTS/"ILLEGITIMATE" OPPOSITION: Salvador Cayetano Carpio, Joaquín Villalobos, Fermán Cienfuegos & Schafik Jorge Handal, [Frente] Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN); Guillermo Ungo & Rubén Zamora, Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR).

The roots of the current conflict in El Salvador can be traced to a pivotal series of events which occurred over 50 years ago. In 1931, this country saw relatively free and open
elections for virtually the first time in its history. The victor of that election, Arturo Araujo, was a landowner who had come to office offering a reformist platform and who was supported by an, "ad hoc coalition of labor, peasants, students, professionals, and intellectuals." (Diskin & Sharpe, in Blachman et. al. 1986, p. 51) Irritated by Araujo's calls for a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth, the elites supported a military coup against the civilian government led by General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in December 1931. The coup sparked a sizable peasant uprising, led by Communist leader Augustín Farabundo Martí, in January 1932, which was quickly put down by the new military government. Not satisfied with simply containing the revolt, though, Martínez unleashed his troops against the peasants to eliminate any notion that dissent would be tolerated. The slaughter that followed, known as the matanza, claimed the lives of between 10,000 to 30,000 peasants and set the stage for a bloody future. It established the ground rules of Salvadoran politics for the next 50 years: "The matanza marked a turning point: the revolt and the bloodshed created a fearful oligarchy willing to cede political power to Martínez, thus beginning a period of military rule that has never really ended." (Diskin & Sharpe, in Blachman et. al. 1986, p. 51)

Indeed, to see the extent to which this turning point in Salvadoran history remains relevant today, one need only look at the names adopted by some of the antagonists in the current struggle: the main guerrilla coalition is named for Farabundo Martí, while a prominent rightist death squad is known as the Maximiliano Hernández Martínez Brigade. (Arnson 1982, pp. 93-5)

A series of military regimes followed after Martínez left office in 1944, and presided over a period of significant economic growth during the 1950's and 60's. The growth was not accompanied by either an expansion of the political or economic opportunities for the lower classes however. In an attempt to stabilize and legitimize their rule, the military created a political party in the early 1950's (Originally named Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática, PRUD, it was renamed Partido de Conciliación Nacional, PCN,
in 1961). Modeled after the successful ruling party in Mexico, the military's party was designed to serve as a vehicle for establishing a system of patron-client ties between the rulers and the lower and middle classes. The crucial distinction between the Mexican ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), and the PRUD/PCN is that the "demilitarization of the party" in Mexico eventually established a pattern of civilian supremacy over the military, a pattern which never truly emerged in El Salvador. (Baloyra 1982, p. 21)

During the 1950's and 60's, a number of other parties had been formed as well, and in 1972 they presented a serious challenge to the supremacy of the PCN. In the elections of that year, presidential candidate José Napoleón Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and vice-presidential candidate Guillermo Ungo, a Social Democrat (MNR), appeared to be winning when the vote count was suspended and the PCN candidate, Colonel Arturo Armando Molina, was declared the victor. The blatant fraud stirred widespread discontent both among civilians and junior military officers, but an attempted revolt was quickly and harshly put down. The 1972 fraud clearly demonstrated the limited potential for achieving true reform by working within the political system. This sparked a rapid growth in organized opposition which engaged in non-violent direct actions, such as strikes and protests, and also led to the formation of armed revolutionary groups. By the end of the 1970's, five such groups existed: the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL), the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (FARN), the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (FAL) and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC). (Diskin & Sharpe, in Blachman et. al. 1986, pp. 53-4)

In October 1979, a reformist coup initiated by junior officers brought to power a coalition of "progressive" military men and civilians, including the Social Democrat Ungo. The junta moved quickly to introduce reforms by nationalizing the coffee export sector, raising minimum wages, disbanding the repressive rural constabulary force ORDEN, and
freezing all landholdings in preparation for an agrarian reform program. (Baloyra 1982, pp. 90-1) But the shaky coalition between the reformist officers and civilian junta members soon broke down amid continuing violent repression of the popular organizations by hard-line elements who remained in the military. A series of four juntas followed in quick succession between October 1979 and December 1980, as the Social Democrats withdrew from the original ruling group in protest over the ongoing repression. They were replaced by the Christian Democrats, represented by Duarte, and differences within that party over participation in the junta soon led to a sizable number of defections. In its final configuration begun in December 1980, the junta was led by Duarte, nominally the provisional president, but under the de facto control of the military commander, General José Guillermo García.

The insurgents as well had undergone a process of organization and reorganization, which led to a coalition of the five major groups in the [Frente] Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN), founded in October 1980. This military opposition was mirrored by an organization of political opposition which found expression in the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR), formed in April 1980. The FDR represented an, "alliance of union, professional, and university groups, as well as the Social Democrats and a splinter of the Christian Democrats." (Arnsen 1982, p. 94) The FDR and FMLN developed tenuous links to one another in what one observer calls, "a pact for survival." (Baloyra 1982, p. 155) The nature of this alliance will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. For now it is sufficient to note that by early-1981, the battle lines appear to have been drawn between the elites (represented in the political realm by such parties as Roberto D'Aubuisson's ARENA), military and Duarte's Christian Democrats on the one side, and the FMLN and FDR on the other. We have chosen to begin our analysis in 1981 for the simple reason that this seems to be the first time period in which a fairly clear identification of the two principal antagonists can be made. That said, we now move on to our case study.
REGIME--Incorporation

The incorporation scores for the regime in the early years of the conflict reflect a somewhat chaotic political situation, not dissimilar to that found in the early period of the Venezuelan case, wherein threats to the regime were emanating from both the Left and the Right. This situation produces seemingly contradictory evidence concerning the efforts of the regime to incorporate various social sectors into its coalition.

On the one hand, there are reports suggesting a regime either unwilling or unable to resist the exclusionary tendencies of the country’s rightist elements: the President claimed that the principal threat to democracy in El Salvador stemmed not from leftist opposition, but from conservative forces (7/2/81); a former official in the national land reform agency argued that proposed elections were "worthless since all meaningful opposition is either dead or outside the country" (3/13/81).

On the other hand, there are indications that the "moderate" elements within the regime were making some attempts toward broader incorporation: the president of the ruling junta, José Napoleon Duarte, was reported to be making efforts to "reach out to the democratic opposition" (3/6/81); after the imposition of martial law in 1981, seven "right-wing and centrist" political parties were exempted from bans on freedom of expression and press (11/1/81).

In early-1982, elections for the national assembly took place, but rather than giving us a clearer picture of the incorporation process, continued to provide ambiguous information. The elections, which theoretically should have functioned as a mechanism for greater incorporation, instead seemed to reflect the ongoing polarization within the Salvadoran political system. In the runup to the election, the electoral commission responsible for overseeing the process was reported to have "moved sharply to the right" on the orders of the ruling junta. (1/10/82) Although specific figures were not given, turnout was reported to be higher than expected, particularly in rural areas under guerrilla influence. (3/29/82) Despite the fact that the "moderate" Christian Democrats won 41% of the vote, though, a
coalition of five right-wing parties combined in a coalition designed to relegate the Christian Democrats to minority status in the assembly. (3/31/82) This prompted a spokesman for the leftist parties affiliated with the insurgents to assert that the elections had "served to restore the power of the local oligarchy" and would prolong the civil war. (3/31/82) When the rightist coalition took power in April, they were reported to have "locked out" the Christian Democrats from all key legislative positions. (4/23/82) A resolution to the situation came only when the armed forces intervened to pressure the assembly into selecting a "centrist", Alvaro Alfredo Magaña, as provisional president. (4/30/82) Magaña at least gave the appearance of filling his prescribed role as moderator between center and right, for example, ruling out direct negotiations with the insurgents, but noted that a "dialogue" with the (presumably unarmed) left was still an option. (5/14/82) But it certainly appears that his power was minimal at best, with the rightist coalition exercising true control over the assembly, as when they reversed a land reform program begun under the earlier provisional junta. (5/25/82)

The balance of political power did not settle, though, and continued to be unstable through the next year, with the "moderates" regaining some measure of influence in 1983. The rightist coalition was reported to be weakening in early-1983 (1/29/83); and Provisional President Magaña noted that the government's main task was to "bring the leftist opposition" into the political system (3/18/83); and was reported to be working with all opposition parties to arrange presidential elections in the coming year. (7/31/83) For this complicated period, we have given a moderate (3) incorporation score for the regime, suggesting a political process which was not marked by extensive meaningful participation of social sectors outside of the elites.

This situation seems to have changed in 1984, following presidential elections held in March. Voters were reported to have "surged" to the polls in the first election, in which neither the Christian Democrat Duarte nor the rightist ARENA candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson received a majority, resulting in a runoff. (3/26/84) Duarte eventually won
that runoff election (5/17/84); and was reported to be moving quickly to bring unions into his coalition by giving them prominent positions in his administration, for example, naming the leaders of peasant unions to head the land reform agency and agriculture department. (6/3/84) A later report notes that Duarte was actively trying to unite farmworkers, entrepreneurs, and his party in an "us versus the left" coalition. (7/29/84)

As a result of these developments, we moved the regime's incorporation score up one point, to a level (2) suggesting some success in bringing a slightly broader spectrum of society into the regime coalition, but not indicating a massive shift toward an all-encompassing alliance on the part of the regime. This score remains active for the rest of the period under study, primarily because there are indications that Duarte's movement towards broader incorporation were only partially effective, either because of unwillingness or inability on his part. His relationship with unions is particularly illustrative of this. Responding to the political opening presumably proffered by Duarte once he was in office, unions were reported to be active again, pressing demands on the regime. The president's response was to accuse the unions of working in unison with the insurgents and warn against any disruptive activity by the trade organizations. (6/16/85) At best, it appears that by 1986, the unions were divided in their loyalties, as a report notes: "The labor movement is highly politicized and is the scene of furious battles between supporters of the Government, independents and backers of the leftist guerrillas." (3/16/86) We feel, then, that the intermediate level score (2) given first in early-1984 applies through late-1986.

REGIME—Performance

As with incorporation, the regime's scores on the performance dimension reflect a situation rife with contradiction. Central to the regime's activities on this dimension is a land reform program initiated shortly prior to the period under investigation here. In the abstract, the program would seem to indicate a fairly high score on our performance scales. In practice, this does not seem to have been the case. The earliest report on the program, indicative of the "good news-bad news" nature of the program virtually throughout,
suggests some of the problems encountered by the ambitious legislation. The Institute of Agrarian Transformation, the government agency responsible for implementing the land reform, reported that 386,000 Salvadorans had benefitted from the program. At the same time, the report noted that many of the leaders of the cooperatives established under the program had been killed or forced to pay "protection money." (2/22/81)

In late-1981, another report gave the land reform program "mixed reviews" and noted that less than 10% of those who were in need of land had been affected by the reform. But, indicating perhaps an element of the underlying logic of the program, the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development noted the reforms had been a political, if not an economic success: "There does seem to be a direct correlation between the agrarian reforms and the peasants not having become more radicalized." (8/3/81)

From this point until the program appears to have met its demise in early-1984, the mixed reviews continued. Some reports noted that the process was "irreversible", "going reasonably well", and that peasants, despite the problems, still preferred working on the cooperatives to the situation that existed before the program was initiated. (2/13/82; 7/3/83) Other reports documented the many problems, variously describing the program as "poorly run", marred by "corruption and mismanagement", "bogged down", and suffering "significant setbacks." (6/28/81; 7/24/81; 9/25/81; 6/5/83)

A similar fate seems to have met an attempt by the regime, and the military in particular, to implement a widespread civic action campaign beginning in early-1983. (3/13/83) The campaign was designed to win over peasants who had come to view the military as abusive and threatening, rather than a force for security. One report notes that over 10,000 civilians were employed on public works projects included in the campaign (8/28/83); and another described such projects as school and road construction and a vaccination program undertaken by the military in provinces under heavy guerrilla influence. (9/11/83) Yet the same report pointed out that "some of the residents are grateful for the new security, but many are unimpressed by the aid programs." Within the year, the program was described
as "failing" due to the unwillingness of the military to prevent insurgents from penetrating the area and disrupting regime-sponsored projects. (12/18/83)

The regime appears to have had little success in areas other than these two special projects as well. The economy was clearly in very bad shape, and worsening. For example, in May 1981, unemployment was officially at 30% and basic food prices had risen by 50% since the beginning of the year. (5/24/81) By early-1982, a report noted that without $232 million in U.S. economic assistance, the GNP growth rate for that year would be -20%. (3/18/82) In early-1984, economic prospects were described as "dim", with production of virtually all the country's major exports down significantly and investment practically non-existent. (2/5/84) By 1986, the government was forced to institute an austerity plan which called for a devaluation of the nation's currency and sharply raised gasoline prices, although it also froze prices for basic consumer goods and raised wages. (1/23/86)

To sum up, then, it appears that despite attempts to extend economic benefits and opportunities to a wider spectrum of the population, the regime was not able to significantly enhance the standard of living, or put another way, it essentially maintained a status quo. For this reason, we have given a moderate (3) score, reflecting the provision of simple, basic services and administration by the regime, throughout the entire period.

REGIME—Protection/Coercion

The activities of the regime on the protection/coercion dimension, for the majority of the period under study, appear to have been harmful rather than helpful in government efforts to generate support. In particular, this harm seems to stem less from the inability of the regime to protect citizens from insurgent violence, though this protection was frequently less than complete, than from the regime's inability to protect against violence emanating from government forces themselves.

From early-1981 through late-1983, the evidence concerning regime behavior on this dimension seems to fall into two categories: 1) reports of activities suggesting an
"extraordinary" response to the insurgent challenge by the regime, with extensive
curtailment of normal constitutional protections; and 2) reports suggesting the widespread
and systematic use of violence by regime forces against non-combatant civilians, including
detention, torture and murder. The first category would fall into the moderate-active (3)
level on our tactical scales, while the second comes closer to our low-active (5) level,
representing indiscriminate terror.

Examples of evidence from the first category during this period include reports
concerning raids on guerrilla camps or positions in which insurgent deaths are reported
(3/29/81; 6/27/82; 8/12/82; 12/25/82); reports of government "sweeps" or
"counteroffensives", sometimes involving up to 5,000 troops (4/24/81; 8/6/81; 9/15/81;
6/10/82; 7/1/82; 8/25/82; 10/15/82; 3/13/83; 7/16/83); and the employment of martial law
and/or curfews in response to guerrilla activity (1/12/81; 11/1/81).

Examples of the second category of activity, extensive repression of non-combatants, is
also quite abundant, including reports of security forces "dumping" bodies or dragging
people from their homes and executing them (1/11/81; 2/1/82); reports of "massacres" or
high civilian casualties, with up to 300 dead, during government operations (4/24/81;
7/13/81; 8/6/81; 8/13/81; 9/10/82); the indiscriminate use of artillery or aerial bombing
tactics which resulted in civilian deaths (11/23/81; 8/12/82; 2/7/83); and a denunciation by
the archbishop of San Salvador of the "massive level of repression" employed by the regime
against innocent citizens. (12/7/81) We have given a score which is between the two levels
noted above for the period from early-1981 to late-1983.

From early-1984 through early-1985, there is evidence which suggests that the regime
was able to curb the repression somewhat, while maintaining some capacity to inflict
damage on the insurgents. There are a number of reports which note that abuses by
government troops dropped "substantially" during this period and that the regime was
working to improve its image. (2/13/84; 3/15/84; 8/26/84; 1/31/85)

As one part of this effort, the president issued strict guidelines limiting the use of the
indiscriminate air attacks that had been earlier employed. (9/13/84) Additionally, the regime forces appear to have enjoyed some measure of success in their operations against the insurgents, mounting offensives and becoming more "confident" in their ability to fight the guerrillas effectively. (3/15/84; 10/19/84; 1/29/85) For this period, then, we have moved the score to the moderate-active level (3), reflecting the apparent decline in the level of non-combatant repression by regime forces. This lull in government violence was short-lived, though. By late-1985, there are reports that the strict guidelines limiting indiscriminate air attacks were largely being ignored, and that civilians were once again being killed in such attacks. In fact, some reports suggest that the security forces had in effect established "free-fire zones" in territory under guerrilla control, and operated under the assumption that anyone living in those areas was to be considered a legitimate target. (7/18/85; 12/20/85; 1/13/86) Evidence of continuing operations against the insurgents, e.g., "offensives", also appears, suggesting a situation basically similar to that found in the earlier period. (2/4/86) Consequently, we have given the same intermediate level score (4) as during the first few years of the conflict for the late-1985 to late-1986 period.

REGIME—External Factors

We have not made any adjustments in the regime's scores based on external factors principally because the evidence seems to indicate no significant change in the international coalition structure of the two primary actors. This is not to say that external factors were irrelevant in the conflict process, but rather that there do not appear to be any shifts in the external support environment which would warrant an adjustment to the scores based on domestic factors. That is to say, the regime doesn't appear to have succeeded in generating substantial new support in the international arena, but neither did it seem to lose existing external supporters. The possible exception to this is the role played by Neutral actors, where the regime did garner a measure of support. But the Neutrals appear to have split among themselves in terms of which side they supported in the conflict. (We will discuss the evidence for this in more detail in the section on external factors and insurgent scores.)
The regime, despite ongoing and sometimes intense political pressure from the U.S. Congress, clearly retained the virtually unqualified support of the Reagan Administration. Throughout the conflict, the regime received substantial material support from the United States in the form of military equipment, training and advice, as well as economic assistance. (3/3/81; 5/13/82; 5/24/83; 5/24/84) The U.S. (at least the Executive Branch) also provided clear political support for the regime, as when Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that the U.S. would do "whatever is necessary" to prevent the collapse of the Salvadoran government. (2/3/82)

We feel, then, that the regime largely succeeded in simply maintaining the status quo in terms of its external coalition, and consequently, that no score adjustment is in order.

**INSURGENTS—Incorporation**

Our scores for the insurgents' incorporation tactics during the early part of the conflict reflect a somewhat ambiguous situation within El Salvador. The guerrillas had established ties with a variety of different social sectors, but the extent of the ties and the nature of some of these sectors make the picture somewhat unclear. At one level, the insurgents appear to have had significant success in incorporating peasants into their coalition. (5/24/81; 2/22/82; 7/10/82; 7/1/83) There is evidence as well that the insurgents had ties to opposition political parties, for example, an announcement was made in early-1981 that the guerrillas were forming a "political-diplomatic" commission which including non-Marxist representatives of the opposition. (1/15/81) These parties, by and large, were what we would normally consider in our scaling scheme as "loyal" opposition, e.g., Social Democrats. Yet the instability and polarization which marked this period in El Salvador had essentially forced these parties into a stance more closely captured by our "disloyal" opposition category: they did not meaningfully participate in national politics and were advocating substantial systemic changes. Finally, there is some evidence of ties between the guerrillas and urban workers, though these ties do not seem to have been as widespread or deep as those between the insurgents and peasants. For example, an insurgent call for a
general strike by urban workers met with limited success in early-1981, with roughly 20,000 workers participating. (1/14/81)

Reports from early-1981 until late-1983 seem to indicate essentially the same state of affairs in terms of incorporation by the insurgents, with the "bad" and "good" news coming in roughly equal measure: the Roman Catholic church was reported moving to a more "centrist" position, loosening somewhat its ties to the insurgents (3/22/81); a report noting that the "alliance of political groups and guerrilla forces", still intact, was pressing the regime for a "political solution" to the conflict (10/8/81); a call by the rebel leaders for a "broad-based interim government that would include representatives of the army, conservative political parties and the private sector" as well as the insurgents and their political allies (3/18/82); a report that the insurgent coalition was "increasingly confident about its military capacity" but was "struggling" to develop a political response to elections taking place in the country (7/11/82); and finally, a report suggesting that neither the insurgents nor the regime had been successful in incorporating the middle-class, which was described as "fervently apolitical" (2/15/83).

For this period, early-1981 to late-1983, we have given an incorporation score (2) which lies between the moderate and low levels, reflecting some of the ambiguities of the insurgent coalition described above.

In early-1984, the insurgents engaged in tactics or behavior which seems to have undermined their possibilities of attracting a broader spectrum of Salvadorans into their coalition. In June, they reportedly began a program of "forced recruitment" of individuals in areas under their control, prompting an estimated 1,500 peasants to flee these zones. (6/7/84) This practice would appear to be seriously at odds with our description of incorporation as making social sectors "feel welcome" in the actor's coalition. Later reports suggest that this insurgent conscription was not an isolated incident, but a general policy, as one guerrilla commander defended the practice by saying it was designed to preempt regime conscription in the area. (7/4/84)
Regardless of the underlying motive, we see such tactics as damaging to the insurgents' incorporation score. Some months later, the guerrillas abandoned the tactic, suggesting that they recognized the negative political repercussions associated with such behavior. (10/7/84)

Nonetheless, we feel this period marked a downward turning point in the conflict in terms of insurgent incorporation.

Other events are also suggestive of a general decline in the efforts of the insurgents to mobilize a broader base of support. In late-1984, they issued a denunciation of the Catholic church, charging that the church had begun to favor the rich over the poor in El Salvador. (7/5/84) In late-1985, the top military commanders of the insurgent movement announced they were trying to unite into a "single Marxist-Leninist political party", a move which, given the nature of such parties, would seem to close off potential channels of incorporation to the upper classes at a minimum, and probably inhibit incorporation at other social levels as well. (12/22/85) Finally, in early-1986, there were reports that some of the center-left parties which had originally been quite close to the insurgents, such as the Social Democratic parties, were beginning to "loosen their ties" to the guerrillas in preparation for a testing of the electoral waters. (1/22/86)

These developments seem more indicative of a constriction in the range of social sectors potentially incorporated by the insurgents than of a general collapse of their coalition. In other words, it seems as though the guerrillas maintained a fairly tight linkage with certain social sectors, namely peasants and some workers (12/26/85; 1/12/86), but from early-1984 on were unable to retain their looser ties with other sectors, or to expand their coalition. Our scores, then, drop to the low (1) level from early-1984 until late-1986, down from the level (2) of the earlier period.

INSURGENTS--Performance

For the first year of the conflict, there is no direct evidence that the insurgents were providing either significant services or goods to their supporters, but there are likewise no
indications that the insurgents were engaging in "predatory" behavior. We have given a low (1) performance score for the insurgents in 1981, rather than the minimum (0) score primarily on the basis of a report early in the next year which suggests that the insurgents had established an administrative presence in areas under their influence. The report notes that the guerrillas, "have established a primitive network of schools and clinics and even an embryonic judicial system" in an area which encompassed an estimated 5,000 people. (2/22/82)

Reports over the next several years seem to suggest a pattern whereby the insurgents first drove regime representatives (army troops, militia, administrators) out of an area, either by military force or intimidation, and then established a system of control over the zone which eventually came to represent, essentially, guerrilla government. For example, in addition to the report mentioned above, there is another piece in 1982 describing a military training school for insurgents. (1/28/82) In 1983, a report notes that the insurgents controlled roughly two-thirds of Chalatenango province, receiving "moral, but little active support" from residents of the region. (7/1/83)

By 1984, the guerrillas were reported to be operating a "rudimentary" judicial system and dictating to local planters a minimum wage level for farm laborers, but otherwise not "making major changes" in a town under their control. (1/13/84) Later that year, an estimated 80,000 people were reported living in guerrilla zones, and the reporter noted, "many of these help different rebel groups by growing corn for food, buying supplies from Government-held towns and sometimes passing along intelligence about troop movements." The report goes on to say that in this particular area, the insurgents were "unable to offer the civilians in the region much in the way of services. Unlike other guerrilla-controlled zones that have been established for years, there are no schools or clinics." (8/10/84) This appears to support the idea that the insurgent administrative presence took time to become rooted. The apparent culmination of these efforts is suggested in a report in late-1985 which describes an insurgent administrative structure in Chalatenango as "the only political
authority known to the 3,000 to 4,000 people who remain here." (12/26/85) Guerrilla services in the region were said to include repair shops, stores, three hospitals, military training schools, weapons factories, a rebel radio station, and even a "guerrilla mailman." Local political posts in the insurgent administration were filled through local elections, and the reporter noted that in the zone, there seemed to be a "much higher degree of participation in village life than in most Salvadoran peasant communities."

In early-1986, though, it appears as though the army was making a concerted effort, with some success, to destroy the insurgent infrastructure. A report in March indicates that a number of insurgent facilities, including "one of the largest guerrilla-run hospitals" in Chalatenango province, were destroyed in regime military sweeps. (3/20/86)

We have given scores designed to reflect the apparent trend of increasing administrative presence by the insurgents through late-1985, then tailing off somewhat as a result of the regime counteroffensive. From early-1982 until late-1983, the score is moderate (3), rising to a level (4) between moderate and high for early-1984 through early-1985, and high (5) for late-1985. A decay factor of 0.5 for the next year reflects the lack of any information of expansion on this dimension by the insurgents, combined with regime success in destroying some of the existing facilities, and leaves the scores at 4.5 for early-1986 and 4 in late-1986.

INSURGENTS—Protection/Coercion

The evidence concerning insurgent activity on the protection/coercion dimension is abundant, and is suggestive of a significant guerrilla military capability. In most time periods, there are a substantial number of reports, at times almost daily, of insurgent operations. Rather than citing every reported instance of such operations, we will instead concentrate on several broad categories of military action and list some of the more important instances in each category.

In the first time period, early-1981, there are a number of reports which indicate strong military capacity, but a tactical style in which both the control of territory and direct,
large-scale confrontations were avoided. For example, a provincial capital was attacked and held briefly, with the guerrillas withdrawing shortly after regime troops arrived. (1/14/81) More frequent were references to economic sabotage, such as the bombing of a major oil compound (2/3/81), the dynamiting of a key power station (2/7/81). Other actions include the seizure of a radio station (1/12/81) and a grenade attack on the U.S. embassy. (3/26/81) We have given a moderate (3) score for early-1981.

The scope and level of insurgent military operations appears to have escalated significantly from late-1981 through early-1984. There are reports of insurgent attacks on regime military installations in which as many as 500 guerrillas participated. (8/14/81; 11/8/81; 1/28/82; 10/12/82; 2/5/83; 12/31/83; 1/3/84; 1/7/84) There are also numerous references to "guerrilla-controlled" territory, including reports which indicate that regime forces were incapable of recapturing some of these zones, despite fierce offensives. (12/11/81; 7/10/82; 10/14/82; 3/23/83; 11/4/83; 1/13/84) Finally, there are reports of sabotage actions by the insurgents which, by any measure, inflicted enormous damage on the economic infrastructure of the country, including a series of attacks on electric stations which at one point left roughly half of El Salvador without power, the demolition of key bridges and railways, and the overrunning of the country's largest hydroelectric dam. (10/16/81; 11/2/81; 9/2/82; 9/10/82; 4/7/83; 6/29/84) We feel the activities of the insurgents for this period are best captured by our maximum (5) score on the protection/coercion dimension.

Beginning in late-1984, though, we feel a change in this score is called for. The change is not the result of a decline in the activities described for the preceding period. The insurgents continued to demonstrate a capability to control territory (8/10/84; 12/26/85) and conduct large-scale assaults against regime installations. (7/31/84; 3/14/85; 10/11/85) They also, however, demonstrated an increased use of tactics which resulted in non-combatant casualties. In late-1984 and early-1985, the insurgents embarked on an extensive assassination campaign, killing a high number of local officials, militia members and
individuals accused of collaborating with the regime security forces. (11/4/84; 3/8/85; 3/26/85; 5/12/85; 6/20/85) In some cases, such as an attack on a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador, the operations were carried out in such a way as to almost guarantee civilian casualties (e.g., machine-gunning a crowded restaurant). Another tactic which contributed to a decline in the protection/coercion score of the insurgents was the use of guerrilla land mines, which although effective against military troops, also was killing non-combatants. By late-1986, human rights organizations and the U.S. Embassy were reporting that the "indiscriminate use of mines now seems to be one of the major causes of civilian casualties." (8/26/86)

We see a significant drop, then, in the insurgent scores on this dimension, to a moderate (3) level in late-1984 (when only one instance of civilian casualties was reported), to a level (2) between moderate and low for the remainder of the period under study, from early-1985 until late-1986.

INSURGENTS—External Factors

Although the conflict in El Salvador came to occupy a prominent place in international affairs, and involvement of outside actors in the internal dynamics of the struggle was significant, we have not adjusted the scores for the insurgents based on external factors. This is due primarily to the timing, type and sources of the external assistance provided to the insurgents. It is also due in part to the ambiguity surrounding the conditions under which this assistance was provided.

Part of the ambiguity stems from conflicting claims about the level of material assistance received by the insurgents from external actors. The United States, particularly during the earlier years of the conflict, went to great lengths to demonstrate that the guerrillas were receiving massive amounts of material assistance from such countries as Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union. (2/20/81; 8/29/81; 3/3/82) For their part, the insurgents admitted receiving minimal amounts of material assistance but stated that the vast majority of their military equipment was either captured from government forces or bought on the black
market. The alleged providers, as well, denied supplying the levels of assistance indicated by Washington. (3/13/82; 4/11/84) The veracity of the competing claims is not really an issue for us, though. Under our scoring scheme, the provision of material assistance by external actors, while the conflict was at the middle/stalemate level, would not generate an adjustment in the insurgents' score, nor would the absence of such assistance.

The ambiguity surrounding the provision of political support by external actors stems principally from the fact that neither the insurgents nor the regime was able to "capture" the support of the Neutrals, but rather these external actors split in their support decisions. In late-1981, France and Mexico issued a statement recognizing the insurgents as "representative political forces", and were joined in this position shortly thereafter by the Socialist International. (8/29/81; 9/26/81)

**Figure 8.1**

El Salvador 1981-86

[Graph showing trends from 1981 to 1986]

Had the insurgents been able to obtain similar support from other Neutrals, or at a minimum, if these Neutrals had remained silent following the French-Mexican initiative, we
would likely have made an adjustment in the scores. However, shortly after the declaration, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela joined in condemning the action and declaring their support for the regime. (9/2/81) Given the divisions among external actors concerning support for the insurgents, we feel no adjustment in the scores are necessary.

**POINT TESTING**

On the surface, it would seem that the series of elections held in El Salvador throughout the period under examination here would provide convenient reference points for testing our model. Unfortunately, the elections took place under circumstances which make specific point testing difficult at best. There are a number of reasons that make such testing problematic. First, one of the key components of this type of test is turnout figures, and these figures are quite literally unknown in all of the elections. The reason these figures are unknown is fairly straightforward: There has been no national census in El Salvador for more than 10 years, and consequently, since all Salvadorans over the age of 18 are legally eligible to vote, it is impossible to calculate the number of eligible voters. (Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984, p. 237) Not surprisingly, this lack of data has generated a great deal of confusion and controversy over actual turnout levels in the various elections.

Following the 1982 National Assembly elections, for example, there was vigorous debate over the turnout figures released by the government. Government figures put the number of voters at 1,551,687, but studies conducted by researchers at the University of Central America in San Salvador suggested that the turnout figure was probably in the range of 600,000 to 800,000, and no more than 1,281,600. (Bonner 1984, p. 302)

Even if accurate turnout figures were available, however, problems would remain. For one thing, voting in each election was mandatory, and the important national identification card that each citizen carries was stamped to indicate those who had voted. This in itself may not seem a sufficiently compelling reason for guerrilla supporters to go to the polls, but the environment surrounding the elections suggests otherwise.

While many Salvadorans voted in 1982 in spite of fears of guerrilla
retaliation, another fear contributed to the massive turnout. That was fear of reprisals by the Salvadoran armed forces against those who did not vote... Minister of Defense García and other senior government officials publicly declared on numerous occasions that not to vote was treason. Lynda Schuster, of The Wall Street Journal, reported that soldiers had surrounded the village of San Benito, threatening to kill everyone who didn't vote. In January 100 people had been massacred there... Salvadoran citizens, like those in most Latin American countries, are required to carry identification cards, called cédulas. On election day each cédula was stamped after the person had voted. Thousands of Salvadoran peasants walked many miles, endured long lines, stood in the blistering sun solely because they wanted their cédulas stamped, not because they had faith in the democratic process or were opposed to the guerrillas. (Bonner 1984, pp. 300-1)

Thus, it doesn't appear that, given the context of the elections, these events represent an opportunity for a true measure of popular support for the regime. This problem is compounded by the fact that the insurgents as well don't appear to have acted in a manner which sent a clear message to their supporters regarding participation in the elections. There were sporadic efforts to disrupt voting, but these were irregular both in the sense that they did not represent a concerted effort by the entire guerrilla organization to boycott the elections and that the insurgent response was different across various elections. As Bonner notes,

While Roberto Roca, leader of the tiny and militarily almost insignificant guerrilla group the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers, declared that "we will defeat the elections, not by attacking voters or polling booths, but by making the war felt at all levels everywhere," the most powerful and influential guerrilla leader at the time, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, argued that they [the elections] were insignificant in the long struggle. On election day it was quiet in Chaltanengo, the stronghold of Carpio's FPL forces... Moreover, five days before the elections the guerrillas' clandestine Radio Venceremos advised rebel supporters "not to worry" about whether or not they voted. "There should be no concern about whether or not one votes, because the elections have no significance for the Salvadoran people."... On the advice of Ungo, Zamora, and other FDR leaders, the FMLN guerrilla commanders announced in February 1984 they would not interfere with the March 1984 elections. (Bonner 1984, p. 300)

The elections, then, do not seem well suited to the purposes of point testing, primarily because they do not appear to have represented a "referendum" on support for one or the other primary actors. Those who voted may or may not have done so to indicate either
support for the regime or repudiation of the insurgents. The elections do represent, though, convenient benchmarks for measuring the trends in support over time. In this section, then, we will use the elections as reference points to examine the degree to which the evaluation sources are in correspondence to the support levels suggested by our model.

The first identifiable trend in our model is a growth in insurgent support from early-1981 to the National Assembly elections in early-1982. This upward trend is supported by at least two of our evaluation sources. Dunkerley notes, "In the first three months of 1982 the FMLN demonstrated that it had built on the steadily developed advances of the previous year." (Dunkerley 1982, p. 197) And Jung, writing in early-1983, said, "Since December 1981 the military initiative has gone over to the guerrilla groups of the FMLN." (Jung, in Grabendorff, et. al. 1984, p. 93)

Unfortunately, no specific references to this time period are made in our other evaluation sources, but a number of these sources indirectly suggest support for the trend portrayed in the model. In particular, there seems to be much agreement that the interim period between the 1982 elections and the presidential election of 1984 saw a situation of stalemate. Karl, for example, states that ". . .by 1983, the FDR-FMLN had demonstrated that it was too strong, both politically and militarily, to be defeated by the Salvadoran military alone. Since it could deny an economic recovery or peace until its political demands were met, the FDR-FMLN retained the power to prohibit a viable centre-right alliance in El Salvador." (Karl, in DiPalma & Whitehead 1986, p. 199) Other sources agree with this assessment as well. (Diskin & Sharpe, in Blachman, et. al. 1986, p. 70; Findling 1987, p. 158; Aronson, in Grabendorff, et. al. 1984, p.107; North 1985, pp. 115-6)

Even the insurgents themselves seem to have felt a stalemate existed in this period. According to Joaquin Villalobos, leader of the Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion, "In 1983, despite the fact that the FMLN's military strikes had pushed the army to the edge of military collapse, the lack of decisive activity in the popular movement prevented these military victories from leading to more significant changes in the correlation of forces." (Villalobos
Not all sources agree, though, with at least one suggesting that the 1982 elections were damaging to the insurgents' cause: "In the short run... the elections were a major setback for the left. Not only did they demonstrate a lack of popular support, but they also brought out all the old tendencies toward disunity, confusion, and triumfalismo (triumphalism)." (Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984, p. 238) The author does note, however, that the setback was short-term, and says of the regime, "the success of the March 1982 elections was a high point. Almost everything else for months to come would be downhill." (Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984, p. 239)

The next identifiable trend in our model is a decline in the insurgent support levels from early-1984 to their lowest point in early-1985. Several sources point out that this period, which encompassed both the presidential elections that brought José Napoleón Duarte to power in mid-1984 and the municipal elections of March 1985 which solidified his party's control within the government, witnessed a setback to the insurgents. Baloyra, for example, seems to suggest essentially the same trends illustrated by our model, namely a drop in insurgent support which continued until late-1985 and then stabilized at a lower level stalemate:

...the guerrillas have lost ground but can go on fighting. The increased ability of the Salvadoran military to take the war to the guerrillas... has forced the rebels to adopt a strategy of low intensity conflict. This has implied a downgrading of their struggle from national liberation into terrorism, with subsequent loss of support and prestige for the FMLN-FDR. The PDC [Christian Democrat Party] has tried to take political advantage of its control of government and improved military situations to regain the initiative which it had enjoyed up to October 1985; but the guerrilla campaign of economic sabotage and violence against government officials and their relatives changed that. (Baloyra 1986, pp. 123-4)

Dillon also reports that the insurgents had experienced a substantial drop as of mid-1985. Writing shortly after the March elections, he notes:

In recent weeks El Salvador's president, José Napoleón Duarte, has triumphed as never before... Meanwhile, the guerrillas have blundered
their way into political and military reverses unprecedented in the five-year insurgency. Attacking unarmed peasants in La Paz province, razing municipal halls in nearly three dozen villages, executing two town mayors, and kidnapping several others, the insurgents have handed the government a series of unequivocal propaganda victories... The [military] high command is... gleeful over the political ineptitude of the guerrillas' recent return to terror-style tactics. (Dillon, in Gettleman, et al. 1986, pp. 181-2)

It seems, then, that the evaluation sources tend to support our portrayal of the trends in insurgent support over the course of the period under study, with an early rise in guerrilla support stabilizing slightly above the exact stalemate level (3), followed by a decline beginning in early-1984 which more or less levelled off at a level slightly below stalemate. Obviously, in this case and the next, in which we examine ongoing insurgent situations, we cannot conduct outcome tests of our model. We move now, then, to an examination of the underlying causes cited in the evaluation sources and their correspondence to the scores generated in our model.

UNDERLYING CAUSE TESTING

Some of the more frequently mentioned factors responsible for the ebbs and flows of popular support during the course of the insurgency have already been hinted at in the preceding section, namely the use of indiscriminate violence by both insurgent and regime forces, and in the case of the regime, an inability or unwillingness to generate significant economic/political benefits for supporters.

According to our scores, the two dimensions on which the insurgents appear to have fared rather poorly are protection/coercion and incorporation. The decline in the guerrillas' support levels after 1983 seems to have been a result of the interaction of activities on both of these dimensions, that is to say, an increased use of indiscriminate military tactics by the insurgents which in turn had an adverse impact on their social coalition. Baloyra describes the impact of such tactics, and the subsequent insurgent justifications for using them, on the opposition coalition:

The actions and rhetoric bode ill for the FMLN-FDR alliance. The FDR finds itself in an untenable position. As the FMLN copes with military adversity, engages in terrorism, and lashes out in anger, the Social
Democrats find it more difficult to justify these acts... This being the case, the FDR can no longer dismiss FMLN extremism as part of the politics of negotiation, nor can it subordinate its own views to those of the FMLN for the sake of unity. In a nutshell, the extremism of the FMLN may have made the survival alliance between the FMLN and the FDR too costly for the FDR. (Baloyra 1986, pp. 133-4)

Others as well have noted the rise of "terror" tactics on the part of the insurgents and their adverse effect on mobilizing support. (Neier, in Gettleman, et. al. 1986, pp. 272-4; Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984, p. 215) Blachman and Sharpe point out, "...certain aspects of the FMLN's own military and economic strategy--sabotage, the execution of informers, use of car bombs in urban areas--have alienated many would-be supporters. Some of the FMLN's closest supporters in the FDR recognize that unless the insurgents alter these practices, they will not draw the support they need from the populace." (Blachman & Sharpe 1988, p. 131)

The problems created for the FMLN after the turn to more violent tactics were compounded by the fact that, while they have succeeded in mobilizing what appears to be substantial support among certain social sectors (ie., peasants, some workers), they do not appear to have been able to broaden their coalition to include other sectors, a factor which was critical in our two cases of successful insurgencies. As Schulz points out, "...the contrasts with the Nicaraguan and Cuban experiences are instructive. Unlike those revolutions, where broad multiclass alliances toppled unpopular dictatorships, the Salvadoran struggle has been primarily a class conflict, a war of the haves against have-nots." (Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984, p. 215)

The corresponding improvement in the regime's scores, at least from early-1984 to early-1985, seems to stem from improvements on the same two dimensions which were responsible for the decline in insurgent scores, incorporation and protection/coercion. Diskin and Sharpe note, After Duarte's inauguration [in early-1984] there was a marked improvement in the treatment of those arrested by the security forces. The acknowledgment of arrests and permission for families and lawyers to see those arrested accounted for this decline in torture. The number of
death-squad killings and disappearances declined. Increased labor and peasant organization, while still severely restricted, was tolerated. In sharp contrast to previous years, some strikes and demonstrations by unions were handled relatively peacefully by the security forces. (Diskin & Sharpe, in Blachman, et. al. 1986, p.75)

The fact that indiscriminate violence on the part of the regime was largely responsible for its problems in mobilizing support is noted in numerous evaluation sources. (Dunkerley 1983; North 1985; Arnson 1982; Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984; Blachman & Sharpe 1988; Loveman & Davies 1985) It appears that when the regime was able to limit the use of indiscriminate tactics, as during the short period noted above, it was also able to facilitate incorporation into the regime coalition.

Overall, then, we feel the model is supported by the evaluation sources, although the nature of this case (ie., ongoing conflict) makes more comprehensive testing infeasible.

CONCLUSION

This case, and the one that will follow, provide us with the opportunity to, in a sense, take out our crystal ball. One of the more interesting aspects of this conflict that is suggested by our model is the fact that roughly mid-way through the period under study, the actors "flip-flop" positions relative to the interaction score. What we mean by this is that whereas prior to early-1985, both actors were "helping" themselves (ie., insurgents bringing the score "up", regime bringing it "down"), after that point both actors were "hurting" themselves (ie., insurgents bringing score "down", regime bringing it "up"). This is perhaps the clearest example yet in our analysis of two actors who were failing to achieve their potential support levels, or put in other words, were squandering opportunities presented by their opponents. Both the insurgents and the regime, according to our scores, could have pushed the conflict out of the stalemate range and decisively (though not conclusively) toward their advantage in 1985, as indicated when we calculate potential high scores for each actor (Interaction of actor's highest possible score and opponent's actual score). The insurgents' potential high score at that time was 4.125, while the regime's potential high score was 1.75.
What is perhaps more interesting is the fact that the first set of face-to-face negotiations between the insurgents and the regime took place in October 1984, precisely the point at which the scores of the two actors coincide on our chart. Numerous authors have pointed out that one of the necessary preconditions for a negotiated settlement between the two primary actors is a perception of stalemate, in which victory for either is recognized as unlikely, and a settlement presents itself as a "second-best alternative." (Diskin & Sharpe, in Blachman, et. al. 1986, p. 85; Baloyra 1986, p. 140; Sharpe 1986) Schulz notes, "... a negotiated settlement will occur only when a balance has been reached wherein both sides perceive the war to be stalemated and either lose hope of breaking that deadlock and winning a military victory or recognize that the risks and costs of such a triumph are greater than any benefits likely to be obtained." (Schulz, in Schulz & Graham 1984, p. 257)

Of course, the conflict continued after the negotiations at La Palma in October 1984, so clearly they had not succeeded. Nonetheless, they did represent an important recognition on the part of the primary actors that at a minimum, an attempt to achieve a settlement had to be made. One reason the process may have broken down is the fact that the stalemate indicated by our model shifted following late-1984, which may have altered the conditions conducive to negotiations suggested above. Thus, it may be necessary for these conditions to prevail for a longer period, as suggested by Karl, "The realities of a stalemated war have created powerful incentives to forge a compromise which might represent a 'second-best' option to prolonged mutual destruction. Successful democratisation, however, is far from certain... this stalemate must be maintained over time." (Karl, in DiPalma & Whitehead 1986, p. 213)

What of the future, then? Our model indicates a trend toward convergence near the end of our time frame, suggesting perhaps that the stalemate conditions which led to the La Palma negotiations might prevail again. Of course, this is sheer speculation, but it does point up another potentially useful facet of our approach to the problem of insurgency, and one that was frankly not anticipated at the outset of the analysis. That is, by examining the
internal dynamics of insurgent conflict in the manner we have suggested could feasibly also lend insight into outcomes other than the two (insurgent or regime "victory") we have been concentrating on, namely, negotiated regime transitions. Such transitions represent, in a sense, the middle ground between the collapse of either of the two primary actors, and would be expected to occur following an extended period of stalemate during which both sides scores were quite close to one another. This does not mean all cases of stalemate, as defined by our interaction score, would likely generate such an outcome. For example, in our model, a stalemate can also be produced when both actors are achieving their "maximum" scores. This situation would indicate a profound polarization of society, and would not be likely to yield a negotiated settlement. To be more clear, this latter situation would represent a case in which the relative support levels for the two actors were roughly equal (stalemate), but were also quite high, perhaps 50% each. In the former situation, the type which would favor settlement, the relative support levels are also roughly equal, but probably much lower, perhaps 20% each, with 60% of the population supporting neither actor.

We feel this case has given new support to our conception of insurgent conflict as a dynamic process capable of generating outcomes which are not necessarily predictable through reference to the preconditions which may be responsible for the initiation of the conflict.
CHAPTER NINE
PERU 1981-1986

We move now to our last case study, and our second examination of an ongoing insurgency. As we found in the previous chapter, our model may be capable of explaining alternative outcomes (i.e., stalemate, negotiated settlement) in addition to accounting for simply success and failure outcomes. The case of Sendero Luminoso in Peru is also interesting in that it provides some contrast to our other case of ongoing insurgency, the FMLN in El Salvador. Whereas the latter insurgent organization has on occasion been considered by observers as constituting a real and present danger to the survival of the Salvadoran regime, few if any observers have suggested that Sendero has exhibited the capacity to successfully carry through its revolutionary plans in the foreseeable future. Thus, whereas we suggested in the previous chapter that some sort of negotiated settlement may be the most probable outcome to the Salvadoran conflict, the same probably cannot be said for the Peruvian conflict. Although no one has suggested that Sendero is likely to overthrow the Peruvian regime anytime soon, most observers also feel that the regime is unlikely to completely eliminate the guerrillas in the short-term. This persistence on the part of the insurgents, combined with their hard-line intransigent stance, is likely to lead to a different sort of "alternative outcome", namely a stalemate marked by chronic, relatively low level violence. This fact makes the Peruvian case an interesting test of the applicability of our model to a range of potential outcomes and will hopefully further illustrate the utility of our approach to the analysis of revolutionary situations.

Major Actors

REGIME: President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, 1980-85, Acción Popular (AP); President Alan García Perez, 1985-present, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA).

INSURGENTS: Abimael Guzmán, Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL); Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA).

In 1966, as we have seen in a previous chapter, the Peruvian regime succeeded in
crushing a rather feeble attempt to spark an insurgency based on the *foco* conception of guerrilla war. Yet while the insurgents clearly failed to achieve their immediate task of creating a revolution, their movement did initiate a series of events which would deeply shape the direction of that country over the coming years. Ironically, perhaps, the failure of the guerrillas gave impetus to a process of transformation in Peru which was considerably more significant than anything the insurgents had achieved while they were in operation.

On October 3, 1968, the Peruvian military which had destroyed the insurgent movement two years earlier now moved against the civilian regime. In a bloodless coup, the military ousted President Belaúnde and installed what they called the "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces." Such military takeovers are not especially rare in Latin America, but this particular action was different, because as Palmer points out, "Unlike Brazil in 1964 or Chile in 1973, the Peruvian military replaced its own country's elected civilian president in 1968 in large measure not because he had been too reformist but because he had not been reformist enough!" ( Palmer, in Wesson 1982, p. 132)

The 1968 coup, which has been studied extensively, was apparently the result of a number of factors. As noted above, one of the most important was the failure of the Belaúnde administration to successfully implement its reformist programs, a failure largely attributed to the fact that his party did not hold a majority in the legislature and was subjected to foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of the APRA-led opposition coalition. Other reasons suggested include increasingly serious economic problems in the country, high-level corruption in the government, and the historical animosity between the military and APRA, which seemed poised to assume the presidency in the upcoming 1969 elections. This animosity stemmed from an incident in 1932 in which APRA militants had killed a large number of troops in an attack on military barracks, followed by an equally bloody reprisal by the military. (Palmer 1980, pp. 98-9)

The final spark for the coup was the apparent mishandling by the Belaúnde regime of the nationalization of subsoil mineral rights owned by the International Petroleum
Company, a multinational corporation with significant holdings in Peru. The nationalist sensibilities of the military, already troubled by the perceived ineptitude and corruption of the civilians in power, were pushed to the breaking point on the IPC issue, and they decided to take action.

Yet while these events may help explain why the military opted to seize power, they do not explain its reformist orientation. Compared to the deeply conservative military institutions which have taken power elsewhere in the region, the Peruvian military government of 1968, led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, seemed practically radical in its commitment to fundamental social reform.

Many authors have argued that one of the principal factors behind the reformist position of the military in 1968 was its experience in fighting the insurgents two years earlier. In crushing the guerrilla movement, the military was directly exposed to the pitiful socioeconomic conditions which prevailed in the countryside. They came to perceive the continued existence of these conditions as the primary threat to stability in the country, since the grievances that extreme poverty generated provided the fuel for future insurgent outbreaks. In the future, according to military thinking, such insurgencies might not prove so inept as had the movements of 1964-66, and thus, national security had become inextricably linked to national development. (Einaudi, in Chaplin 1976, pp. 410-1)

Once in power, the new government moved quickly to initiate its reformist programs. Although there are many different interpretations of the actual impact of these programs, most sources agree that, at least in the early years, the military government undertook substantial efforts to promote national development. Palmer argues that,

In quantitative terms, the reform process was quite successful. Public sector expenditures as a percent of GNP increased from 24.7% in 1968 to 49.9% by 1977. Half a dozen new ministries were established and total state employment increased from about 8% to about 14% of the workforce. . . The agrarian and industrial reforms of 1969 and 1970 and subsequent modifications provided substantial transference of land, profits, and management responsibilities to several hundred thousand workers who formerly earned only a daily wage, if that. In the agricultural sector, some 356,000 families were beneficiaries from the expropriation of some 8.4
million hectares, and about 90% of the new owners received land in one or another of the cooperative farms that had been established. Among the massive lower-class urban neighborhoods considerable resources were expended once pressure was exerted to establish basic services and to process and grant land titles. (Palmer, in Wesson 1982, pp. 139-40)

By 1975, though, the reform process had run into serious obstacles, and the stage was set for a "coup within a coup" which ousted General Velasco and replaced him with General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. Again; Palmer describes the process by which the military eventually extricated itself from power:

...the military government had carried out major reforms designed to benefit the country and large sectors of the population. However, growing economic difficulties reduced the capacity of the government to keep up the momentum after 1974 and 1975. The popular protests of 1974 and 1975 suggested that the regime never succeeded in fully legitimizing its leadership role. Apparently, its major shortcoming was that it never developed or allowed to develop adequate citizen-system mechanisms for full exchange and communications in both directions. By 1976-77 most military authorities agreed that the reform process was not as easily managed as they had originally believed. Furthermore, the years of military rule had sapped their individual and collective energies because of the ambitious program they had tried to carry out and the modest human resources within the officer corps available. Institutional fatigue was one result. Once the military leadership recognized this, it moved toward the only reasonable option available--turning power back to civilians. (Palmer, in Wesson 1982, p. 142)

Beginning in 1977, the process of returning civilian government to Peru was initiated and in May 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, ousted 12 years earlier, once again assumed the presidency. It was, in fact, during the election which brought Belaúnde to power that a new guerrilla organization, the Partido Comunista del Perú--Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL), initiated its insurgent struggle.

We have chosen to begin our case study somewhat later than this, in late-1981, primarily because there is no mention of the insurgents in our event data source prior to this. Since the earliest activities of the guerrillas were quite limited (they burned ballot boxes in rural Ayacucho and hung dead dogs from lampposts in Lima), we don't feel the short interim between these acts, which technically mark the onset of the insurgency, and our choice of a starting period is particularly problematic.
One other note is in order before we begin our analysis. In late-1984, another guerrilla group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), emerged in Peru. We have not incorporated the activities of this group into our study for several reasons, not the least of which is the fact that they were largely inactive during the period under examination. Essentially, the only operations we have found in the event data sources are the seizure of a Lima radio station to announce the formation of the group in September 1984 (New York Times, 9/30/84) and a similar operation less than a year later in which the guerrillas announced a "moratorium" on actions to give the newly-elected president, Alan García, time to "run the Government for the benefit of the poor." (New York Times, 8/17/85) As we can find no other evidence of actions by the MRTA in the period under examination, we don't feel it is necessary to incorporate them into our case study. That said, we move on to our analysis of the tactics of regime and insurgents.

REGIME--Incorporation

The first evidence of the regime's activities on the incorporation dimension comes in a late-1981 report which notes that the administration was attempting to integrate organized workers into the policy-making process. It said there was "tripartite consultation" on important economic issues which brought together labor, business and government representatives. (10/12/81) This type of activity would seem to suggest a fairly solid incorporation of the lower class sectors, but there are also a number of reports which tend to indicate a less than harmonious relationship between the regime and working classes.

Primarily, these are reports of harsh treatment for labor representatives stemming from a series of large-scale strikes. For example, in early-1983, the "leader of Peru's largest labor coalition is arrested on charges of creating 'public disorder' by staging nationwide strikes in 1981 and March 1982 and planning a third in defiance of a state of emergency." (6/21/83)

What is perhaps more indicative of the strained relations between the regime and labor is that in addition to charging the aforementioned leader with creating "public disorder", the
regime asserted that he had been training guerrillas as well, thus linking him with the "disloyal" or "subversive" opposition.

Overall, though, the regime appears to have managed to incorporate most of the society into the political system throughout the period, and the primary mechanism by which this was accomplished was regular and open elections.

In late-1983, nationwide municipal elections were held and parties from across the political spectrum competed, with "left-wing and center-left" candidates scoring "major victories", including the election of a Marxist candidate to the position of mayor of Lima. (11/14/83)

In early-1985, a similar array of parties competed in the presidential elections which saw Social Democrat Alan García take office. (4/16/85) In that contest, the Social Democratic and Marxist candidates combined for a total of 70% of the vote, with the conservatives garnering about 11% and only 3% of the vote going to the ruling party.

We feel the elections suggest a system of substantial incorporation, and have given a moderate-high (1) score to the regime on this dimension throughout the period.

REGIME—Performance

The evidence which exists concerning the performance activities of the regime relates primarily to economic conditions within the country, and for much of the period, these appear to have been less than ideal. In early-1982, one of the first in a series of nationwide strikes were held to protest the government's inability to stem inflation, which was running around 70% at the time. (3/11/82) These actions continued virtually throughout the period under study, and so did the rising inflation.

By early-1984, consumer prices were reported to have risen by 124% in the last 12 months alone (2/3/84), and one year later inflation was estimated at a staggering 230%. (4/16/85) Other indications of the economic distress were reports that more than half of the working population of Peru was either unemployed or underemployed (7/24/82), and that per capita income had dropped to 1965 levels. (4/16/85)
News on the government's response was somewhat mixed. One report in late-1984 noted that the lame-duck government was "seemingly unwilling to adopt new austerity measures" prior to the elections scheduled for the following April, resulting in a serious fiscal crisis for the state. (12/25/84) But a report written one day later suggests that despite the economic constraints, the administration "maintained investment in electrification and housing programs." (12/26/84)

These grim economic conditions prevailed through 1985, but we feel the report above suggests that, despite the decline, the regime was at least capable of maintaining a minimum level of public service, and we have given a low-moderate (3) score for the regime from late-1981 to late-1985.

The last year of our period, 1986, saw something of a comeback in the Peruvian economy, which was reported to be gradually "coming alive" and growing at a rate expected to be the highest since 1974. (11/12/84) Furthermore, the regime undertook a community development program in the rural areas which "focused on the needs of Indians in education, health, transportation and farming" and was designed to fund self-help projects in these areas. (11/18/86)

Given the scope of the problems facing the residents of these areas, and the relatively limited budget of the program, it is doubtful that the regime was generating fundamental improvements in the standard of living of rural dwellers. Nonetheless, we feel the program, as well as the improvements in the economic conditions, merits an upward adjustment of the regime's performance score to a moderate (2) level for 1986.

REGIME—Protection/Coercion

From virtually the outset of insurgent violence, the regime responded in a vigorous fashion, acting primarily through the use of extraordinary measures such as states of emergency. The area affected by such measures, under which normal constitutional guarantees were suspended, gradually expanded throughout the period: from "five Andean towns" (10/13/81); to "three Andean provinces" (7/13/82); to the capital city of Lima and the
port of Callao (8/21/82); and eventually, to the entire country. (5/31/83) For the most part, these measures were of limited duration, usually 60 days. But at least some portions of the country, and frequently large parts of it, were under states of emergency for virtually the entire period.

The military came to play a significant part in the counterinsurgency operations beginning in late-1982, when they were ordered to "take control of three provinces" in the area of guerrilla activity. (12/30/82) Prior to this, the Peruvian police and civil guard units had been primarily responsible for combatting the guerrillas.

During the earlier years of the conflict, the application of sanctions permissible under the suspension of constitutional guarantees seems to have been fairly limited. A report in late-1982 noted that the suspensions were most frequently used to make arrests and searches without benefit of warrants, and that some of the more restrictive clauses governing guarantees of speech and assembly were rarely invoked. (8/30/82)

By 1983, though, reports of abuses on the part of the military against civilians began to surface. In June, an intelligence official, discussing civilian casualties of army violence, was quoted as saying that "many more are being killed [than official reports indicate], and they are not dying in combat." (6/8/83) By the end of that year, the military command was said to be investigating reports that police were involved in a "massacre" of 32 peasants. (11/25/83)

In late-1984, there appears to be virtual confirmation by the military itself that army tactics were producing non-combatant casualties. The report, which is said to be based on interviews with police and military sources, says the regime had "adopted a more severe and systematic counterinsurgency strategy" which involved the "use of terror as a dissuasive method." (8/18/84) In the same report, Peruvian judicial and church sources stated that "kidnappings, torture and summary executions of civilians" were on the rise.

One year later, a Peruvian academic described the strategy, and its inevitable consequences, in the following manner: "The approach of killing reds, pinks, and anyone
who might look pink gets results. It would be absurd to talk of respect for human rights in this strategy." (4/12/85) Reports of army massacres of peasants continued to follow (9/14/85; 10/24/85), and in 1986, uprisings led by captured guerrillas in several prisons resulted in a large number of prisoner deaths at the hands of security forces, many of the dead being executed after surrendering. (6/20/86; 6/28/86)

We feel the activities of the regime on the protection/coercion dimension in the earlier years of the conflict, from late-1981 through early-1983, are best represented by our moderate-active (3) level score, while the shift toward increasing repression on the part of the military beginning in late-1983 indicates a drop to a lower level (4) from that point until the end of the period.

REGIME—External Factors

There is almost no evidence whatsoever concerning the involvement of external actors in the insurgent conflict in Peru, and what little information does exist suggests that international factors did not exert any significant impact on the process. The only reports of the regime's relations with external actors (with regard to the insurgency) indicate that the government essentially experienced little if any change in its external support coalition: In early-1985, the U.S. was reported to be considering an increase in military assistance to Peru (1/30/85); and in late-1986, the U.S. was described as "anxious to avoid an open clash with Peru over its new nationalist tone and radical economic policies, preferring to stress more positive developments." (12/23/86) These reports, in our view, do not indicate any changes of a degree sufficient to warrant an adjustment of the regime's scores based on external factors.

INSURGENTS—Incorporation

There is almost a complete lack of evidence concerning the activities of the insurgents on the incorporation dimension. What evidence does appear in the event data sources suggests a highly restricted incorporative approach on the part of the guerrillas, as in a late-1984 report which, in describing the insurgents, noted: ". . . they have been disowned
by leftist Peruvian politicians, and they spurn all other regimes, with the exception of
China's deposed leadership, the Gang of Four. They seek no outside help in their quest to
cause a revolution, and their center is the Peruvian Andes, among the Quechua Indians."
(9/7/84)
The image of the insurgents presented in that report, namely an organization focusing
almost exclusively on rural peasant support and strictly eschewing other class or
international alliances, is fairly similar to the one presented by the guerrillas themselves.

In a publication issued shortly before the 1985 presidential elections, entitled *Don't
Vote! Instead, Expand the Guerrilla War to Seize Power for the People!*, the insurgents
state: "We base ourselves on the masses of the country who support us, principally the poor
peasantry. We are not linked and will not be linked to any superpower or any other
power." (PCP-SL 1985, p. 35) In that same publication, they assail the candidates of
virtually every party participating in the election, from the conservatives to the Marxists, as
"well-known defenders of the old order" and "parliamentary cretins." (PCP-SL 1985, pp.
29-30)

In another publication, the insurgents describe their movement as based on a
"worker-peasant" alliance, but at the same time, express their clear distaste for organized
labor groups, as the following passage demonstrates:

> We...draw a sharp line of demarcation between the broad masses, who ascend from the depths, and the filthy, decaying scum that floats unsteadily
> on the waves as a fragile base for bureaucratic trade unionism and counterfeit proletarian parties, truly "bourgeois workers' parties." (PCP-SL
> 1982, p. 9)

Thus, we can find no evidence, either in the event data sources or in the statements of
the insurgents themselves, that the guerrillas are making any attempt to broaden the social
base of their movement beyond the poor peasantry, and possibly the urban poor.
Consequently, we have given a low (1) incorporation score for the insurgents throughout
the entire period.
INSURGENTS—Performance

If the information concerning the incorporation tactics of the insurgents is sparse, that concerning their activities on the performance dimension is nonexistent. There are absolutely no reports which suggest any time of activity on the part of the guerrillas which falls under our performance category.

The only information we have been able to find concerning such activities is in the aforementioned insurgent publication of 1985. In it, the guerrillas appear to claim to have established a network of clandestine administrative bodies, although they are vague on the exact nature of what they call the "People's Committees", describing them only as, "embryonic forms of the New State." (PCP-SL 1985, p. 34)

As we can find no mention of such bodies in any other sources, we have opted to give the insurgents the minimum possible performance score (0) throughout the period under examination.

INSURGENTS—Protection/Coercion

The first reported activity of the insurgents on this dimension is a series of bomb attacks in the capital city in late-1981 (9/1/81), followed a month later by an attack on a rural police station in which three people were killed. (10/13/81) These tactics seem to be best represented by our moderate-inactive (3) level score.

The guerrillas moved quickly to the moderate-active (3) level in 1982, though, with a number of small-scale attacks on rural outposts or patrols (7/14/82; 8/23/82; 8/26/82); an attack on a prison during which 230 suspected insurgents were freed (3/4/82); assassinations of local officials (7/18/82, 12/22/82); and sabotage actions. (8/21/82; 12/5/82)

Beginning in 1983, the character of the insurgents' protection/coercion tactics changed. The guerrillas displayed a fairly substantial capacity to engage in the same sorts of operations as they had in 1982, such as bombings (5/29/83; 10/23/83; 6/24/84; 5/17/85; 7/28/85; 2/23/86; 12/22/86); sabotage, especially black-outs (7/24/83; 11/7/84; 1/31/85;
6/8/85; 9/22/85); and attacks, on isolated patrols, police stations, and other government facilities. (5/22/83; 9/6/83; 2/14/84; 3/27/84; 7/8/84; 8/13/85; 11/10/85; 1/22/86)

But the insurgents also undertook a significant program of assassination and execution of mostly low-level government officials, such as mayors, and political party representatives. (4/25/84; 3/13/85; 3/28/85; 4/25/85; 5/27/85; 2/5/86; 8/5/86; 9/13/86; 11/9/86) Worse still, from the perspective of our scales at least, was a sharp increase in the number of reports of insurgents killing large numbers of peasants. These killings were generally said to be acts of retribution on the part of the guerrillas against peasants who had failed to cooperate, and the number of dead sometimes reached as high as 80 at a single time, and once was said to reach over 200 in a five-day period. (4/7/83; 4/22/83; 6/8/83; 11/17/83; 4/27/84; 5/20/84; 6/25/84; 7/20/84; 12/27/84; 1/1/85; 10/23/86)

As seems clear from the number of reports of such activities, the killing of peasants by insurgents had apparently become programatic, rather than isolated, beginning in early-1983. Consequently, we have adjusted the insurgents' score downward to a level (2) between the moderate-active and active-terror levels from early-1983 through late-1986.

INSURGENTS--External Factors

As we alluded to in the section on insurgent incorporation, the Peruvian guerrillas vigorously sought to distance themselves from virtually every external actor in the world community. In equal measure, they vilified the United States, the Soviet Union, and, at least in its current manifestation, the People's Republic of China. (6/5/83; 9/7/84) Indeed, the only external actors the insurgents expressed any admiration for were either long dead (Marx, Lenin) or in prison and repudiated within their own country (the Maoist "Gang of Four" faction in China). It is clear, then, that no adjustment of the insurgent scores based on external factors is necessary.
POINT TESTING

Our evaluation sources provide information which enable us to evaluate the scores generated by our model at several points in time. One of these points is early-1984, at which time a survey was conducted by a respected opinion polling firm in the capital of Lima and the port city of Callao. The results, as reported by McClintock, indicate a substantial difference in support for the regime as against the insurgents: 72% of the respondents reported that "a democratic government (in power through votes)" was the most desirable system of government for Peru, while only 13% favored "a socialist government (in power through revolution)." (McClintock 1984, fn. p. 50) What makes this data even more interesting is the fact that another poll taken in mid-1983 had placed the "popularity curve" of the ruling administration at only 20%, an all-time low. (Taylor 1983, fn. p. 23) This suggests that although support for the incumbents had reached a quite low
level, support for the system (which, by our definition, is regime support) had remained relatively high.

These results, of course, probably should not be considered a completely accurate measurement of the support structure, particularly with regard to insurgent support levels. The most obvious reason the figures probably don't reflect "true" guerrilla support is that the bulk of insurgent activities, at least to this point, had been carried out in rural areas, which were not included in the survey. Nonetheless, even if we substantially discount the regime support figures, and inflate those for the insurgents, it is clear that the former were higher than the latter at that point. This is certainly indicated in our model, which puts insurgent support in early-1984 slightly below the stalemate-regime advantage level.

A second point of reference for evaluating our scores is the 1985 presidential election. The only source which spends much time on this event suggests that it was indicative of a low support level for the insurgents:

...the failure of the insurgents to disrupt the presidential elections of April 1985 does appear to have been a severe reverse; the campaign 'Strike a blow at the elections' launched in early 1985, was a flop. A leaflet issued in April which spoke of 'hundreds of people's committees exercising state functions, support bases in formation' seems to have been wishful thinking. The voter turnouts in Huamanga and Huanta [areas of guerrilla activity], for example, were extremely high--almost 100% in the latter. (Harding, in Miller 1987, pp. 198-9)

Again, this assessment seems to be in agreement with the insurgent support scores in our model for early-1985.

By far the most often cited point in the evaluation sources, though, is an apparent shift in tactics by the insurgents coming in late-1982 which had negative effects on the guerrillas' relations with their principal constituency at that time, the highlands peasants. Virtually every source agrees that this shift marked a turning point, to the disadvantage of the insurgents, in the support structure. Harding describes the shift:

There seems to have come a moment, however, when relations between the visiting guerrillas and the comuneros began to change. At some point towards the end of 1982 Sendero's leadership decided that the time had
come to move on to the next stage of the war, which involved establishing direct control over the internal organization and economy of the peasant communities in areas where the guerrillas had a more or less free hand. Public executions of local, government-appointed officials...began around mid-1982, and the incidence of killings in the comunidades seems to have increased from about that time...In order to prepare the ground for building peasant support areas high priority was given to eliminating all possible informers and anyone suspected of disloyalty...This change in policy appears to have caused some serious differences between guerrillas and villagers...by the time the armed forces were sent into the Ayacucho region in December 1982 enough comuneros appear to have been alienated by Sendero's change of tactics to go over wholesale to the other side. (Harding, in Miller 1987, p. 191)

Nearly all the other sources agree that the attempt by the guerrillas to impose direct control over the lives of the peasants in regions where they were active, and more importantly, their increasing use of terror against those who resisted, led to a decline in insurgent support. (Reid 1985, p. 111; McCormick 1987, p. 20; Taylor 1983, p. 38; McClintock 1984, p. 82)

Another source also points out that the regime was quick to capitalize on the situation: "After June 1982 peasants became victims of Sendero actions...leading to passive resistance against Sendero by the peasant population. Half a year later this passive resistance was utilized by the police to encourage the peasants into more active opposition." (Gianotten et. al., in Slater 1985, p. 188)

Yet the "utilization" of peasant resistance to the insurgents by the security forces was not always carried out in a manner which necessarily generated support for the regime. In many cases, the military simply encouraged vigilantism and played inter-village animosities in order to prevent insurgent consolidation. This practice frequently entailed abuses by the army and police of the same kind and intensity as those committed by the guerrillas.

It appears, then, that both the regime and the insurgents were not very successful in generating wholesale support among the peasants of the rural highlands, a point made by McClintock:

Sendero's own actions during this period may have alienated the peasants. It has been reported that Sendero became more ruthless and wanton in its attacks...Probably most important, Sendero was unable to
protect its peasant allies from counterinsurgency offensives; when Ayacucho's pro-Senderista villages were assaulted, the guerrilla leaders fled elsewhere. Yet it does not appear that the security forces won many peasants to their side during 1983. The behavior of Peru's security forces in Ayacucho was generally reported to be poor. The counterinsurgency personnel were regarded by many as arbitrary, brutal and corrupt. (McClintock 1984, p. 82)

This assessment seems to fit rather nicely with the trend in our model. Overall, we see a decline in the scores for both actors, primarily on the basis of their activity on the protection/coercion dimension. The interaction score, which represents the relative distances between insurgent and regime support, also drops somewhat, which suggests that the insurgents' support declined, probably by virtue of it being lower to begin with.

On the whole then, our model seems to be in accordance with the picture of the insurgency given in our evaluation sources in terms of relative support levels at various points in the conflict. As in our previous case, outcome testing is not feasible in a case of an ongoing insurgency, and we now move on to a comparison of our scores with the evaluation sources with reference to underlying causes.

**UNDERLYING CAUSE TESTING**

The most obvious reasons suggested by our model for the inability of the insurgents to move beyond a fairly low support level lie in their activities on the incorporation and performance dimensions. Although few of our sources focus on the guerrillas' shortcomings in the latter dimension, at least one source does seem to touch on the fact that the insurgents provided little beyond revolutionary rhetoric to their potential supporters. Citing a report in the Peruvian journal *Qué Hacer*, the source points to a number of reasons "why Sendero was not able to win over the well organized communities of the marginal provinces of Ayacucho", including, "contempt for the actual problems of peasant communities, the rejection of larger union organizations in which the communities participate, the opposition of Sendero to formal education for the peasant youth, and Sendero's intolerance of religious activities by the peasants." (Gianotten et. al., in Slater 1985, p. 198)
It seems clear, from this source at least, that the insurgents were not only failing to provide some of the services we include on the performance dimension (ie., education), but were actively intervening to prevent the peasants from benefiting from such services altogether.

A more frequently cited reason for the inability of the insurgents to mobilize a greater level of support concerns their unwillingness to broaden their anti-regime coalition. McCormick suggests that the insurgents position on the coalition question contrasts sharply with that of revolutionary movements elsewhere, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, which have ultimately been successful:

...Sendero's isolation and extremism, though an early source of strength, will ultimately prove to be a serious detriment to its ability to adapt to changing circumstances, expand, and possibly even maintain its membership... During its early years of operation, Sendero's sectarian quality helped to give the organization a distinct identity and probably played some role in boosting its early membership. Today there is reason to believe that its parochialism may have already become a serious liability. This rigid belief system has prohibited Sendero from creating a united opposition front against the regime and severely restricted its base of potential supporters. The united front concept has played an important role in most successful revolutionary struggles... The purpose of the united front, as demonstrated most recently by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), is to mobilize the largest possible level of opposition against the target regime by appealing to a broad range of potential supporters. The magnitude of the resulting opposition provides the revolutionary movement with an aura of legitimacy and a sizable base of militant support. Sendero, however, has moved in quite the opposite direction. Its parochial view of Peruvian society and uncompromising ideology have made any association with even the underground left impossible, with a resulting diminution in both its support and effectiveness. (McCormick 1987, pp. 17-18)

Other sources point out that the "non-alliance" policy of the insurgents is not only detrimental in and of itself, but also leads to tactical choices by the guerrillas which amplify their difficulties in support mobilization. We have already noted that one consequence of the insurgents' practically exclusive focus on the "peasant-worker" alliance was a guerrilla-enforced program of peasant self-reliance, which all but eliminated the perceived need for any insurgent activity on our performance dimension (ie., provision of goods, education, etc.)
Another consequence, mentioned in one of our sources, was an increasingly broad definition of "traitors" or "collaborators" by the insurgents, which resulted in guerrilla attacks on individuals who would seem to represent potential allies: "...not only are representatives of government institutions and members of the government parties to be killed, but also peasant leaders of the CCP and CNA [peasant unions], authorities of the communities and leaders of the agrarian cooperatives." (Gianotten et. al., in Slater 1985, p. 193)

As for the regime, the two most frequently cited factors which contributed to a lack of support (or perhaps more accurately, an inability to mobilize greater support) concern economic decline and regime violence in the areas of highest guerrilla activity.

McClintock suggests, in fact, that the peasant population in the zones where the insurgent movement originated are undergoing what she calls a "subsistence crisis" in which their very ability to survive is threatened. The regime, she argues, has done little to alleviate the problem in these areas, and this has generated support among the peasants for the guerrillas. She says, "When southern highlands peasants began to realize the threat to their subsistence, many blamed the government for their plight. Past and present governments have indeed been, at best, oblivious to the problems in the southern highlands." (McClintock 1984, pp. 62-3)

Other sources seem to place greater emphasis on the use of "terror" by the military in accounting for the low levels of regime support in the countryside. Harding, for example, notes that a local analyst of the insurgent conflict described a sort of negative ebb and flow of support levels between regime and insurgents as both sides inflicted violence on the peasants: "Gonzalez wrote in late-1984 that the counter-terror unleashed by the armed forces had driven many campesinos back into the arms of Sendero, after they had become disillusioned with the guerrillas in 1983." (Harding, in Miller 1987, p. 197) Reid, as well, suggests that regime violence played a key role in driving peasants to support the insurgents. He writes,
...counter-insurgency policy hardened after the first Senderista assault on a police post, at Tambo in October 1981... a detachment of elite Sinchis ('those who can do anything' in Quechua) counter-insurgency battalion of the Civil Guard was sent to Ayacucho. However, the Sinchis proved to be effective recruiting sergeants for Sendero. The poorer sections of the peasantry were initially not greatly troubled by the guerrillas, who restricted their killings to the campesino's traditional enemies. By contrast, the well-armed Sinchis stole, raped and killed indiscriminately, and failed to prevent further attacks on police posts. (Reid 1985, pp. 110-1)

Our scores for the regime suggest that regime tactics on both the performance and protection/coercion dimensions were not especially effective in mobilizing support, though after roughly the middle of the period we would tend to place more emphasis on the latter in this regard. This seems to be in accordance with the information provided by the evaluation sources in terms of the underlying determinants of differential support levels in the conflict. We have not found what we consider to be any serious discrepancies, then, between our model and the evaluation sources in either our point prediction or underlying cause testing.

CONCLUSION

As in our previous case of an ongoing insurgency, we feel the Peruvian conflict provides some interesting support for our contention that such struggles are best characterized as dynamic, interactive and multidimensional. In particular, this is because the development of the Peruvian conflict appears counterintuitive when viewed by a number of existing explanatory frameworks.

On the one hand, there are difficulties in explaining either why the insurgency broke out in the first place or why it has survived. Authors from a wide range of different perspectives have suggested, for example, that democratic systems are somehow particularly well-suited to alleviating sociopolitical pressures which might otherwise be vented in violent opposition. Even Guevara, perhaps the quintessential voluntarist, argued that, "Where a government has come to power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been
exhausted." (Loveman & Davies 1985, p. 48)

Yet it was precisely at the moment when Peru was experiencing a transition to democracy, after 12 years of military rule, that the insurgency broke out. What's more, the democratic system appears to be functioning fairly well, with regular elections and smooth transfers of power, yet the insurgency remains.

From the other end of the spectrum, traditional Marxist analysis appears equally ill-equipped to explain, if not the appearance, at least the survival of Sendero. By virtually all accounts, there are profound contradictions between the guerrillas' analysis of the "objective conditions" obtaining in Peru, and the actual conditions. Sendero continues to base its strategy and tactics on the assumption that Peru represents a semi-feudal, pre-capitalist economic system, a fact which has been empirically demonstrated to be false. On the face of it, then, from a Marxist perspective it is difficult at best to explain how Sendero has managed to survive despite this fundamental misreading of the situation. Furthermore, the insurgents have, by most accounts, been guilty of violating a number of the most basic "laws of conduct" prescribed for revolutionaries by their own acknowledged role model, Mao, namely the use of violence against peasants.

On the other hand, if we accept the appearance (and continued survival) of the insurgents as evidence that revolutionary conditions must have existed, how do we account for the fact that the guerrillas have not yet been able to seize power, and seem highly unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future? There seem to be a few ways to reconcile these apparent anomalies, yet none appear terribly satisfactory if we are seeking a broadly applicable framework for explaining insurgent outcomes. For example, one could suggest that insurgency and the revolutionary conditions which make a favorable outcome possible did not necessarily overlap exactly in time. Yet this leaves unanswered the question of why no "watershed" event has yet taken place, an event which would be expected at the point where the insurgency and revolutionary conditions coexist simultaneously. Such an event could go either way for the guerrillas (i.e., if conditions existed, but then subsided, the
insurgents would falter; if conditions "ripened" in the course of the struggle, the insurgents would advance), but we must envision some sort of movement, and that, to our mind, has not taken place.

An alternative explanation would focus on the differential distribution of revolutionary conditions, i.e., they exist only regionally, not nationally. This is the argument of McClintock, who demonstrates that the "subsistence crisis" which she feels is responsible for the insurgent outbreak is largely restricted to the southern highlands of Peru. Yet this explanation is not only highly context-specific, and therefore not applicable to a broad range of cases (e.g., did such a subsistence crisis exist in each case of insurgent outbreak?), but also fails to account for the fact that insurgent activity is not restricted to the areas posited as conducive to such activity.

We feel, then, that it is only by taking into account the dynamic, interactive and multidimensional nature of insurgency that one can account for the apparently counterintuitive developments in the case of Peru. In our view, this case suggests that there may be "niches" in which the weaknesses of one actor are exploited by the other, leading to some sort of stalemate which otherwise might not be expected.

In Peru, it seemed unlikely that an insurgency would erupt at almost the precise moment the system was transformed from a military regime to an incorporative democracy, and in a country which had experienced significant reforms. Yet at the outset, shortcomings in these reforms probably provided a "crack" which was exploited by the insurgents, and the harshness of the regime's response beginning in about late-1983 probably offset the decline in insurgent support which would be expected following their increasing use of indiscriminate violence.

Thus, we can suggest a number of possible "what-if" scenarios. The insurgents probably would have either have failed to get off the ground at all, or at least been crushed quickly, if more had been done by the regime for the highlands peasants in terms of performance. Alternatively, once the insurgency had started, the regime could have
eliminated the guerrillas, even without improving its performance, if it had responded
"correctly" in terms of military tactics (ie., if it had not "overresponded"). Both of these
first two scenarios are implied in an analysis by Palmer, who notes,

\[
\ldots\text{a key element of the [regime's] response to the challenge posed by}
\text{Sendero should be economic assistance. An exclusively military response,}
\text{which seems to be the dominant action to date, treats symptoms rather than}
\text{causes.\ldots The central authorities' tardy response to the developing crisis in}
\text{the Ayacucho area, along with their emphasis on force and repression rather}
\text{than economic and social development assistance, seem likely to prolong the}
\text{cycle of violence. (Palmer, in Fauriol 1985, pp. 89-90)}
\]

Finally, the insurgents could have improved their support level, even without increasing
their political scores, had they avoided the overuse of violence against non-combatants; and
they could have substantially improved their support had they attempted to either expand
their coalition or improve the well-being of their supporters.

We see our conception of the insurgent process, and the model we have developed to
describe it, as being more capable of handling the broadest array of conflict situations,
including those which appear to run counter to prevailing logic, and consequently more
useful for analyzing the actual dynamics of the struggles once they are underway, than are
explanations which focus on the conditions presumed to give rise to insurgent outbreaks.
CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION

We have been concerned in our analysis with explaining outcomes in cases of insurgency and have argued that in order to understand such events it is necessary to focus on the process of the conflict itself. We have further suggested that this process is best characterized as dynamic, interactive and multidimensional. In contrast to what we have called deterministic approaches, which link revolutionary preconditions and outcomes, we have attempted to illustrate the utility of incorporating the "missing link" in this equation, the process of insurgent conflict, in enhancing our understanding of revolutions.

The level of popular support accorded to either a regime or an insurgent movement has long been considered a principal determinant of revolutionary outcomes. Rather than assume a priori that these support levels are somehow inextricably linked with the conditions which spawn revolutionary movements, we have tried to focus on the sequence of events by which the behavior of the two primary actors in insurgent conflicts (regime and guerrillas) is translated into support and how in turn this support produces an outcome. In a sense, we have tried to answer two questions: How do actors mobilize support? How are support levels related to outcomes?

With regard to the first question, we have suggested that support decisions among the public at large are based on a number of different criteria, and have attempted to distill what we feel are the most important from the literature. In an attempt to balance completeness with parsimony, we have identified three dimensions which capture the "minimum requirements" that must be satisfied by an actor in the eyes of an individual in order for that person to accord support. These are inclusiveness (incorporation), contributions to material welfare (performance), and the provision of defense (protection/coercion).

With regard to the second question, we have argued that popular support is the critical variable in explaining outcomes of insurgent situations, but that it is important not to view this variable in an absolute quantitative sense, but rather in a relative sense. That is to say,
we are less concerned with absolute support levels of the actors than we are with the support levels of each actor relative to the other.

Unfortunately, for all those seeking to explain revolutionary situations and outcomes, it is all but impossible to accurately measure overall support levels. We certainly make no claim to have done so here, but we have attempted to construct a plausible model which links behavior to support, and support to outcomes. We feel that our analysis has demonstrated that this approach, in which the focus is squarely on the insurgent process, is better able to explain certain facets of revolutionary conflict than are more deterministic perspectives. Specifically, our approach enables us to account for two broad aspects of revolutionary situations that are problematic for "preconditions"-based arguments: 1) Differences in the "paths" that conflicts sharing similar outcomes display; and 2) Alternative types of outcomes (i.e., outcomes other than "success" and "failure").

The first of these aspects refers to the fact that certain cases falling within the same outcome category (i.e., insurgent successes and failures) display very different characteristics in terms of the paths leading from revolutionary outbreak to outcome. Two areas of discrepancy among insurgencies sharing similar outcomes which come to mind here are differences in the total support levels mobilized by revolutionary movements and variations in the durations of insurgent conflicts.

Concerning the first area of discrepancy, we can point to the fact that both regimes and insurgent movements have been "successful" (i.e., they prevailed in conflict situations) with what appear to be very different levels of overall support in a quantitative sense. Thus, some observers suggest that there were differences in the total number of individuals supporting the revolutionary organizations which came to power in Cuba and Nicaragua, with the latter mobilizing a significantly higher percentage of the population than the former. Greene, for example, notes that in the Cuban case, ". . . there was nothing approximating mass participation in the revolution until its successful end was a foregone conclusion." (Greene 1984, p. 91) In contrast, Chavarría suggests that the Sandinistas had succeeded in
mobilizing a much larger number of supporters than had Castro, and argues that, "The
extensiveness of the armed struggle, both geographically and demographically, was ... more significant in Nicaragua than in Cuba." (Chavarría, in Walker 1982, p. 38) As well, one need only look to the contrasting examples of the Russian and Chinese revolutions for evidence that similar outcomes can result under conditions of vastly different overall support levels in terms of total numbers. Likewise, our two cases of insurgent failure, Venezuela and Peru in the 1960's, display fairly significant differences in the total numbers of supporters backing the respective guerrilla movements. While the Peruvian insurgents are widely felt to have been unable to recruit no more than a small handful of supporters, the Venezuelan movement is regarded by some to have mobilized a rather substantial number of supporters at certain points during the conflict. (Wickham-Crowley 1987)

Why do we feel that our model is more capable of accounting for these situations? To reiterate, we have suggested that popular support is linked to outcomes in relative, not absolute, terms. Thus, we have suggested that outcomes occur at points in time where the relative distance between support levels of the two actors crosses a certain threshold, rather than when the support level of a single actor crosses a given absolute threshold (e.g., insurgents "win" if they mobilize 80% of the population or more). Hence, in our view, it is possible for similar outcomes to occur under conditions of different overall support levels.

Although we have not specified precise thresholds, we can suggest hypothetical situations which would run counter to an absolute quantitative view of support and outcomes. In one country, the insurgents have mobilized a "majority" of the total population, yet the regime has mobilized the support of the remainder of the population (55% vs. 45%). In another country, the insurgents have mobilized fewer supporters than the first movement, in numerical terms, but the regime has failed to acquire the support of all those not mobilized by the insurgents (40% vs. 10%). In our perspective, the latter insurgency would be more likely to "win", since the distance between the two actors in support levels is greater, while in an absolute quantitative perspective, the former group
would be expected to prevail, since it had "more" supporters. In other words, the thresholds we posit as producing outcomes are based on that segment of the overall population which has made a support decision, rather than basing the thresholds on the total population. This enables us to account for the apparent differences in total numbers of supporters across cases of both insurgent success (Nicaragua and Cuba) and failure (Venezuela and Peru).

The second area of discrepancy between cases sharing similar outcomes concerns the duration of the conflict. In short, we seek here to answer the question of why it takes a long time for some insurgencies to produce an outcome while others reach their endpoint relatively quickly.

We have argued that outcomes unfold from the interaction of the two actors across several dimensions. This implies that "success" for a single actor is predicated not only on that actor's "strengths", but also on the opponent's "weaknesses." This, in turn, suggests that outcomes will only occur at the point in time at which some "interlocking" of strengths and weaknesses of the two actors takes place.

Our cases of insurgent success seem to best support our view that conflict duration is related to the timing of the exploitation of one actor's weaknesses by that actor's opponent. In Cuba, we see a more or less high degree of correlation between the tactics of both regime and insurgents, in the sense that as the regime became less "effective" across each dimension, the insurgents in turn became more "effective." Consequently, the interlocking of insurgent strengths against regime weaknesses proceeded in a more or less simultaneous fashion, and the result was a conflict which produced an outcome in a short amount of time.

In Nicaragua, though, the insurgents did not exhibit this degree of simultaneous interlocking. Virtually throughout the conflict, the Sandinistas "lagged behind" the regime in terms of improvement in their scores. They never achieved the degree of success reached by the Cuban insurgents on the performance dimension, for example, despite the fact that the regimes in both cases were roughly similar in terms of their performance scores. In
other words, whereas the Cuban insurgents had matched a strength in performance scores against a regime weakness on this dimension, the Nicaraguan guerrillas did not capitalize on a similar weakness on the part of the Somoza regime.

The weaknesses of the Somoza regime which the Nicaraguan insurgents did capitalize on were the high degree of isolation and the repressive tactics of the government, and it is the timing of this exploitation on the part of the insurgents, we feel, which accounts for the differences in duration between the Cuban and Nicaraguan conflicts. In the 1960's, the Nicaraguan guerrillas adopted a *foco* strategy that relied primarily on military tactics, to the detriment of the political mobilization of support, and were annihilated in short order. Even during the 1970's, when the more experienced guerrillas had resumed operations with new emphasis on mass organizing, they initially concentrated on largely class-based (peasants, workers, students, etc.) recruiting, and did not appear to have had significant potential for truly threatening the existence of the regime. In fact, they were largely perceived to be in no position to take power until the point in time at which the "broad-front" strategy (incorporating virtually anyone who opposed the regime) came into prominence in the internal debate within the FSLN. Marifeli Peréz-Stable places this point in late-1977, and suggests that the adoption of this new element of strategy marked a turning point in the conflict which saw the guerrillas move from a level of regime harassment to one in which the regime's survival was in doubt. (Peréz-Stable, in Walker 1982) In other words, it was only when the insurgents exploited the weaknesses of the regime that an outcome resulted, suggesting on the one hand that had Somoza faced a different guerrilla group (like that in Peru in the 1960's, for example) he may have prevailed, and on the other hand, that the conflict was prolonged by the delay on the part of the insurgents in capitalizing on Somoza's isolation.

Likewise, the case of El Salvador suggests that outcomes only stem from the interlocking of weaknesses and strengths on the part of both actors. Like the Sandinistas, the FMLN in El Salvador has attempted to create a broad opposition front. Yet the regime
in that country does not exhibit the same weakness in terms of isolation that characterized the Somoza and Batista governments, and consequently an outcome has not yet occurred.

This leads us to one other area, which, although not sufficiently examined here, may represent another application of our model concerning the possibility of outcomes other than insurgent failure or success. In situations where there is no interlocking of strengths and weaknesses sufficient to produce an outcome, we are likely to see a condition of stalemate. Such stalemates, though, are not necessarily static. What we mean by this is that stalemates do not always represent situations of stable support levels (i.e., both actors may be losing or gaining support, but at the same rates) but rather stable support differentials.

Nor are these stalemates necessarily the same across different situations. In terms of our model, we can envision two possible different types of stalemate, each with different probable (short-term) outcomes. The first, where scores "stabilize" outside of the range of rough parity (approximately 2.5-3.5), is most likely to produce a situation of prolonged, endemic violence, perhaps as illustrated in the case of Sendero Luminoso in Peru today. This is the case because the actor with an advantage is unlikely to seek negotiated settlement, but rather a resolution of the conflict in their favor.

In the second, where scores stabilize within the parity range, negotiated settlement becomes more probable. This would particularly be the case where, although "stalemate" exists, both sides are actually losing support. In these situations, it is possible that both actors may come to the conclusion that not only can neither win, but both could potentially "lose" if some "third force" were to emerge in the vacuum left by their declining support. El Salvador may represent such a case, although we hasten to point out that we are merely speculating in our discussion of stalemate situations, since both the Peruvian and Salvadoran cases are ongoing.

Of course, these two types of situations are not mutually exclusive, and it seems more probable that they simply represent trends within a condition of long term stalemate. For example, a prolonged period of chronic violence might be punctuated by short periods of
regime-insurgent "truces," as may be the case in Colombia. We feel the admittedly unexpected insights afforded by our model into these sorts of alternative (ie., other than success or failure) outcomes offers a fruitful avenue for future research. We are not aware of any analytical approaches which have sought to account for such things as stalemate and settlement, as well as success and failure, with reference to the same set of underlying factors. To do so, we feel, would represent an advance in our understanding of political violence by enabling us to explain a broader array of phenomenon with a consistent set of variables. Of course, it is premature to say that we have done so here, but we think our analysis has demonstrated that this is a potentially valuable approach.

To sum up, then, we have attempted to develop a model which is capable of explaining the dynamics of Latin American insurgencies through reference to the process of these conflicts. We see several advantages to such an approach, including the ability to account for both differences among cases with similar outcomes and for outcomes other than insurgent success and failure. We do not see our work as superseding or competing with existing work on revolutions, but rather as supplementing them. Even if it could be demonstrated, for example, that the preconditions which lead to revolutionary outbreak are causal determinants of the behavior of the principal antagonists in such struggles (thus rendering false our assumption of each actor's behavioral autonomy), we still feel our model would provide insights into the consequences of these predetermined patterns of interaction. In addition, we hope to have contributed to a better understanding of the process of revolution by broadening the scope of comparison. Having demonstrated that our model seems capable of accomplishing this task with reference to cases of Latin American insurgencies, we can see no compelling reason to assume that it could not be as fruitfully employed to cases of insurgency elsewhere. There is nothing built into our model or assumptions which would preclude application to similar instances of insurgent conflict in other regions of the world. This is not to say our model is universally applicable to all cases of revolutionary activity, it is not and was not designed to be. Yet in cases where
there is an armed revolutionary movement seeking to overthrow an indigenous regime, we see our model as an appropriate analytical framework. This would not be the case in instances of other types of internal conflict, such as those in which an external actor becomes actively involved in the process of combat (eg., "anti-colonial" wars, occupations, etc.) or in which the goals of the insurgent movement do not include the eventual assumption of national power (eg., secessionist or irredentist movements). Such instances differ sufficiently from our stated universe of cases as to probably render our model inapplicable. Nonetheless, we feel our analysis has made some small steps in contributing to the understanding of one aspect of the broad range of phenomena known as revolution.

In other words, while we have much in common with the proverbial blind men feeling their way around an elephant, we hope to have succeeded in at least laying our hands on more of the beast.
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