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A philosophical semantic intentionality theory of metaphor

Deibler, Timothy Alan, Ph.D.
Rice University, 1989

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RICE UNIVERSITY

A PHILOSOPHICAL SEMANTIC INTENTIONALITY
THEORY OF METAPHOR

by

TIMOTHY A. DEIBLER

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Timothy A. Deibler

1989
A PHILOSOPHICAL SEMANTIC INTENTIONALITY
THEORY OF METAPHOR

Timothy A. Deibler

Abstract

This dissertation investigates some philosophical theories of metaphor, those of Aristotle, Black, Lakoff and Johnson, Kittay, Mac Cormac, Searle, and Davidson, then proposes a theory that incorporates some of their insights while seeking to avoid their weaknesses. Part I constitutes exposition and critique of these theories; Part II presents the outline of a resulting philosophical theory of metaphor, a semantic intentionality theory that mediates primarily between the theories of Searle and Kittay.

This semantic intentionality theory of metaphor is grounded in a compositional general semantic account and claims that for metaphor to be present, there must be 1) an appropriate conventional meaning of the linguistic item to be used, 2) a propitious discourse situation (context), and 3) a metaphorically competent speaker/writer who intends to speak/write metaphorically. Metaphor turns out to be a speaker/writer's semantic use of conventional meaning to express a meaning inexpressible in literal language. Most metaphor is therefore entirely novel; conventional metaphors are rare. There is a radical blurring of the traditional semantic and pragmatic categories. Metaphorical meaning is semantic in nature and must be sharply distinguished from metaphorical interpretation. It arises when speakers' metaphorical intentions (possibly not fully conscious) operate to select appropriate conventional meanings whose respective affinity and contrast relations with other items in their semantic fields are transferred to organize and structure a semantic field not previously structured by those specific relations. There is no special kind of metaphorical truth nor does the theory require a specific general theory of truth to the exclusion of others. Metaphor is more cognitively important and widespread in natural language than philosophers used to think. But it is less widespread than some current philosophical theories of metaphor claim: they tend to overlook the vast polysemy in literal language and often (wrongly) assimilate a synchronic account of metaphor to a diachronic account.
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all those who played a direct or indirect role in the progress and completion of this dissertation. To begin with, my parents, Dr. and Mrs. Edwin C. Deibler, instilled in me a love of learning and curiosity about the world around me, in many and various ways. My father in particular showed me by example how fascinating the world of scholarship can be. I also want to thank the philosophy graduate students and philosophy faculty of Rice University with whom I had seminars or simply fruitful contact of one form or another. I wish to single out for special acknowledgement my advisor and dissertation director Richard E. Grandy, whose philosophical example and acumen, incisive questions, and general guidance, not to mention graciousness and friendship throughout all my time at Rice, I have especially appreciated and benefited from. Special thanks are also due the others on my committee, Mark A. Kulstad, Steven Crowell, and James E. Copeland. Sue Brod provided much friendly help at many points along the way. Finally, without the constant support, encouragement, love, and devotion of my dear wife Carolyn this dissertation would certainly never have been possible. To her I owe the greatest debt of gratitude.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a philosophical investigation of the concepts of semantic meaning and truth as they relate to the natural language phenomenon of metaphor. I do not attempt to address every interesting question that can be asked about this fascinating, intriguing, and perplexing phenomenon. It would be folly to attempt answers to even the restricted domain of all philosophical questions about metaphor. This dissertation originally attempted a general philosophical account of metaphor via an investigation of the different metaphor-types, but even this proved too large a scope of inquiry. So my scope is much more limited. I focus on some of the major philosophical problem areas of metaphor.¹

One general problem area has to do with the question of what sort(s) of things metaphors are or may properly be said to be. That question is logically prior to the investigation of a second problem area, the set of questions this dissertation is mainly concerned with. This set of questions has to do with metaphorical meaning and truth. Among these are the questions of whether metaphors may properly be

¹ A terminological note to begin with—when I use the term 'metaphor' in the singular and without a preceding (definite or indefinite) article I shall be using it to refer to a particular linguistic phenomenon, the one known as 'metaphor.' Used in this way, the term 'metaphor' functions as a sort of 'mass noun.' When I wish to refer to specific instances of the phenomenon of metaphor, I shall employ the term 'metaphor' in the plural or preceded by an article.
said to have meanings and be true (or false); if so, how it is that meaning and truth (or falsity) attaches to metaphors; and whether the truth that belongs to metaphors (if indeed it does) is ordinary semantic truth or some special kind of truth, viz., "metaphorical" truth.

I examine a number of philosophical theories of metaphor particularly with a view to ascertaining their stances with regard to the above two problem areas. Unfortunately, their stances concerning the second part of the second area, the part having to do with metaphorical truth, is often less than explicit or perspicuous. In such cases the theory's position on the issue of metaphorical truth can be difficult to ferret out. In all cases, ascertaining the theory's position concerning this issue requires a relatively thorough exposition of the theory as a whole. I conclude by proposing the general outlines of what I regard as a philosophically satisfactory (in some suitably vague sense) theory of metaphorical meaning and truth.

David Cooper is surely on the mark in his identification of the logically primary question that must be asked in any philosophical investigation of metaphor: "The primary philosophical question to ask about metaphor is 'What is it?' How is the metaphorical to be distinguished from what is not metaphorical?" Cooper rightly calls this a "question of demarcation." He carefully notes that the question is one of logical primacy only, not necessarily one

of importance. Yet any question that takes logical priority in a philosophical inquiry will, by virtue of that priority, loom large throughout the investigation.

This demarcation question, has, to my knowledge, never received a fully satisfactory answer from a philosophical perspective. I seriously doubt that I will be the first to fill this vexing lacuna. Moreover, I find myself in agreement, for reasons that I hope will become clear later on, with Cooper's view as to the very possibility of obtaining a demarcational definition of metaphor in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions:

... the question is not to be read in the way that such questions were once wont to be read—as calling for an answer in the form of a crisp definition of 'metaphor.' I doubt that crisp definitions which are not circular are available. We seek an understanding of metaphor which, like our understanding of meaning or of truth, is unlikely to consist in grasping a traditionally-styled definition of a word—a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, say.4

Fortunately, a full and complete answer to the question of the proper demarcation of metaphor does not appear to be absolutely required for some insight at least into questions about metaphorical meaning and truth.

There has been an immense amount of philosophers' (and other scholars') ink spilled over the demarcation question and related issues in recent years.5 Indeed, van Noppen et

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Two such related issues are the questions of how metaphor "work(s)," and of the "cognitive status" of metaphor, to use Johnson's felicitous phrase, Mark Johnson, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 20. I doubt that
al list no less than 4,317 "recent publications dealing with various aspects of metaphor in a variety of disciplines" from 1970 through 1985, but must admit that not even this vast catalogue of theirs is exhaustive.6

Cooper, who describes his work as a "general philosophical account of metaphor," attributes the contemporary philosophical interest in metaphor to three fundamental factors:

First, the urge to construct general grammars and semantic systems, alongside dissatisfaction with some of the older concepts of philosophical linguistics, has created an appreciation of both the need for and difficulties in "fitting" metaphor into an overall account of language. Second, there has been increasing recognition of the pervasive ness which metaphor enjoys in everyday discourse; one which has carried in its wake the attempt to understand the roles which metaphor plays in social intercourse, and the subsequent liability of those roles to be distorted. Finally, . . . metaphor has come to enjoy a privileged position vis-a-vis the other categories of traditional rhetoric: a privilege based primarily on its alleged power as a vehicle of knowledge and truth.7

With regard to the third factor, I would add that in recent years the traditional taxonomic categorizations of figures of speech ("tropes", "rhetorical devices") developed by the venerable discipline of "rhetoric" have fallen under a great deal of suspicion. Consequently, the question how exactly one decides to categorize the figures of speech has become much less interesting to most investigators than the

Johnson is the originator of the phrase 'cognitive status'. I have found it at least as far back as Ian G. Barbour's Myths, Models, and Paradigms, e.g. p. 12, where he mentions the "cognitive status of religious language" (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).


7. David E. Cooper, Metaphor, pp. 43-44.
phenomenon of figurative language itself, which, in contrast to the former issue, has come to enjoy unparalleled interest of late.

Actually the demarcation question about metaphor, which I will now rephrase simply as the question of how we can or should identify and individuate metaphors, can quite correctly be viewed as entailing the questions of the cognitive status of metaphors and of how they work, and probably others as well. But as Johnson notes, "their artificial separation facilitates discussion," and, we might add, philosophical progress and insight thereby.

There are other crucial questions that arise in the philosophical study of metaphor and that overlap those already mentioned to a large extent. Included among these are the following:

* What (kind of) theory of truth is required to deal adequately with metaphors?

* What is the nature of metaphorical meaning (if indeed there even is such a phenomenon distinct from "ordinary" meaning)?

* Is there a genuine literal/metaphorical distinction?

* Is metaphorical language reducible to literal paraphrase (without any loss of "cognitive significance")?9

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9. Interestingly, the later Wittgenstein seemed to assume, naively, that metaphorical language must be so reducible, as a matter of definition!: "If I say 'For me the vowel e is yellow' I do not mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical sense,-- for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea 'yellow'." Philosophica 

The answers to these questions may be construed as constituting an elaboration of the cognitive status of metaphor. And once we have these answers in hand, we will also have our answers to the questions of the identity of metaphors and of the mechanisms of metaphor (i.e., how metaphor "works").

According to Beardsley, some of the most important philosophical questions about metaphor have to do with these "cognitive aspects of metaphor, that is, problems about its functions in the acquisition and communication of knowledge." He explains as follows:

By common definition, and by etymology, a metaphor is a transfer of meaning, both in intension and extension. The metaphorical modifier [this is the name Beardsley gives to the "metaphorical predicate or term", i.e., the word or phrase being used metaphorically] acquires a special sense in its particular context ... and it is applied to entities different from those it usually applies to, in any of its normal senses. Both of these features of metaphor have long been recognized, and some attempts have been made to explain them. The problem is to understand how that radical shift of intension comes about; how we know that the modifier is to be taken metaphorically; and how we construe or explicate its meaning correctly. The answers to these questions, and others, are in some dispute, and no fully satisfactory theory has been devised.10

There is another major question that any theory of metaphorical truth must face and get settled. It is generally accepted that semantic truth depends on semantic meaning. So metaphorical truth would depend on metaphorical meaning, if there is such a thing as metaphorical truth, and if there is such a thing as metaphorical meaning, and if metaphorical truth is a type of semantic truth. But these are a lot of 'if's'. The question raised by these considerations is whether or not a theory of literal meaning should be expected to incorporate a theory of metaphorical meaning.

This seems to be a purely theoretical question, depending solely on our views of the issues referred to in the three 'if' clauses above. For example, if we hold that there is no metaphorical meaning, then, so it would seem, there is no metaphorical truth (as a special kind of truth). Consequently, we obviously would need not worry about whether or not our theory of literal meaning could incorporate metaphorical meaning or metaphorical truth. Even if we hold that metaphors do have their own type of meaning, that would not necessarily settle the question whether or not a theory of literal meaning should incorporate a theory of metaphorical meaning. For if we relate this metaphorical meaning to uses of linguistic items rather than to the linguistic items themselves, then, for other theoretical reasons, we still might not want to include metaphor within a theory of literal meaning. And so forth.

11. Note carefully: this is not to imply that theory of truth depends on theory of meaning.
All philosophers need to be concerned with metaphor if for no other reason than that it can present serious difficulties at fundamental levels of their work. Logically deductive argumentation is perhaps the bedrock of philosophy. But metaphor, along with some other natural language phenomena such as differences of emphasis and "mere equivocation"\(^\text{12}\) (in different occurrences of the very same premise), can produce unsound arguments out of valid argument forms which are filled out with only true premises, at least according to some theories of metaphorical meaning and truth. According to the most elementary logic theory, such arguments should "guarantee" the truth of their conclusions. But they cannot do so if (at least) two inscriptonally identical premises carry different meanings, one literal and the other metaphorical. Example:

1. All lions are felines. (True)
2. Richard the Lionhearted was a lion. (True)
3. Richard the Lionhearted was a feline. (False)

According to the same theories of metaphorical meaning and truth mentioned above, it is crucial to recognize that both premises are true, though of course not in the same way, for if premise 2 is "read" (interpreted) literally, it is false. Thus the fallacy, due to a metaphor, is an instance of the more general fallacy of equivocation, the shift in meaning occurring between the (literal) meaning of the first premise and the (metaphorical) meaning of the second.

But this view of the matter is not shared by all theories of metaphor: some would argue that the second premise can only be read in one way, since there is only one kind of linguistic meaning, viz., literal meaning. Thus premise 2 is patently false, since its one and only (literal) meaning is that some human being, viz., Richard the Lionhearted, is really an animal of a different species entirely, viz., a lion. Thus there is no fallacy here at all-- the argument is unsound simply because it contains a false premise. Whichever course a philosopher chooses to take, it is clear that serious, critical thought about metaphorical meaning and truth is required so as not to prejudge the issue.

As stated earlier, I will be engaging in exposition and critical assessment of some of the more significant philosophical accounts of metaphor that have been put forward to date. I focus my attention on the classical accounts and formulations of Aristotle and Max Black and on some recent noteworthy theories of metaphor advanced by Searle, Davidson, Lakoff and Johnson, Mac Cormac, and Kittay. This examination constitutes Part I.

Some of these theories are incompatible with some of their competitors. But there is some truth in each one; each has produced some key insights into the nature and workings of metaphor. However, they all suffer from (at least) one common weakness, which renders them all ultimately inadequate: each one is incomplete.  

13. It is quite clear that metaphors come in different types. Each significant theory of metaphor seems to succeed
This fact cannot fail to impinge on their respective theories of metaphorical meaning and truth, whether these be explicit or merely tacit. Nevertheless, by taking account of the various strengths and weaknesses of these theories, particularly with respect to their positions on the issues of metaphorical meaning and truth, and by applying a few other independent considerations pertaining to these issues, I develop, in Part II, at least the skeleton of a philosophically acceptable theory of metaphorical meaning and truth.

in accounting for a certain range of these different metaphor-types, even if that range includes only one type. But because no theory to date has adequately accounted for all metaphor-types, they must each be judged ultimately inadequate.
PART I

EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE OF
EXTANT PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF METAPHOR

CHAPTER 1: ARISTOTLE.

Although metaphor played a large role in early (pre-Socratic) Greek literature and philosophy, the phenomenon of metaphor itself remained unexplored from a philosophical perspective. Johnson overstates the case when he asserts that "[the pre-Socratic philosophers'] fragments constitute one vast network of interrelated metaphors-- and to make sense of their thought is, above all, to unpack these metaphors."

1 For certainly most of the pre-Socratics at least regarded the bulk of their philosophical language as literal, despite their feeling "at home with the mythic modes of their predecessors."

2 Johnson's error here perhaps stems from a modern "charitable" (and unwittingly positivistic?) unwillingness to view their modes of thought and expression as deliberately literal, since doing so (so it is thought) would force us to regard the vast majority of their philosophical views as utterly mistaken and, indeed, absurd.

3 Not even Plato, the great "master of metaphor," ventured an explicit philosophical account of metaphor, his own most effectual mode of communication from a rhetorical and philosophical point of view. Partly because of this ne-

1. Mark Johnson, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, p. 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
glect, and partly because of a misreading of Plato's warnings against the misuse of metaphor, many philosophers and other intellectuals have wrongly viewed Plato as opposing all metaphorical language. It was left to Aristotle to provide the first philosophically explicit, and explicitly philosophical, definition of metaphor, as well as its first really extensive philosophical treatment.

The locus classicus of Aristotle's definition of metaphor is the Poetics, 1457b:

> Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.  

The major question we must ask about this passage is whether Aristotle intended it as a definition only of our modern use of 'metaphor' to denote a specific figure of speech (or trope), or as a broad definition of metaphor in general, i.e., as covering all figures of speech. According to at least one Aristotle scholar, the latter is the case, given the plausible assumption that Aristotle uses 'metaphora' the same way in both the Poetics and the Rhetoric. (It would be most surprising if someone of Aristotle's caliber used 'metaphora' differently in the Rhetoric and the Poetics without explicitly indicating this. One would expect him to

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4. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
5. Aristotle, Poetics 1457b.
use the word uniformly, either "equivocating" everywhere, or using it "univocally" everywhere.)

Interestingly, some writers on philosophical accounts of metaphor have failed to recognize this possibility that Aristotle may have used 'metaphora' to refer to all figurative language. For example, Mark Johnson misses this issue altogether. This is probably because, in his own use of 'metaphor,' he fails to consistently make the figurative language/specific trope distinction.

If Aristotle himself at times failed to make this distinction in the Rhetoric, conflating these two senses of 'metaphor' instead, it might be because the Greek word 'metaphora' at the time was not polysemic. Indeed, Aristotle does seem to equivocate here, as when he says "The Simile is also a metaphor; the difference is but slight" (Rhetoric 1406b), although for the most part he seems to use 'metaphora' to refer to the specific trope. But Johnson clearly has the two senses of the English word 'metaphor' at least available to him, yet he also equivocates. Compare:

... [Aristotle's] account of the relation of metaphor to simile.

and

... how we are able to identify metaphors and to separate them off from both literal and other non-literal expressions.

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8. Ibid., p. 20.
As we shall see, there are those who are more or less vociferous about the merits or dangers of figurative language in seeking after truth, but no radically new account of metaphor emerges until mid-twentieth century.9

The first two of these citations employ the specific trope sense of 'metaphor' while the latter has the general figure-of-speech sense.

If it is correct that 'metaphora' in Aristotle covers all figurative language, then this vaunted definition is not even about the specific trope of metaphor at all, and consequently loses a great deal of its interest and value as a characterization of what is special or unique to this most interesting, puzzling and recalcitrant of all figures. But note that the Aristotelian definition does not lose all its interest and value for this purpose, for, after all, the specific trope of metaphor would still remain a species of the genus of metaphor, to retain Aristotelian modes of expression. So the definition, while not characterizing whatever is unique to the specific trope, would still tell us something about it by virtue of defining its genus.

Aristotle analyzed words as being composed of two different and distinct aspects, the semantic and the structural. These two aspects of both nouns and verbs could be used to form two different and distinct classes of words, a semantic class and a structural class. Aristotle analyzed the latter category into two contrasting types of words: "kuria," words in general use, or, as Rhys Roberts trans-

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9. Ibid., p. 8, my emphasis.
lates in Rhetoric 1404b, "words (nouns and verbs alike) that are current and ordinary,"\textsuperscript{10} and "glottai," unfamiliar words, mostly either foreign words or neologisms. Similarly, Aristotle analyzed the former category, i.e., the semantic class, into two contrasting types of words: "oikeia," literal words, and "metaphorai," figurative words or metaphors.

Cross-classifications are certainly possible in this categorial schema: both oikeia and metaphorai may be either kuria or glottai; similarly, both kuria and glottai may be either oikeia or metaphorai.\textsuperscript{11} But the important and interesting question is whether Aristotle viewed each member of each pair of contrasting types of words as possibly having some overlap with the other member. Or, to put it in set-theoretic terms, is either intersection between either pair of contrasting classes non-empty?

With regard to the pair that interests us, i.e., the semantic pair, the question would be whether Aristotle thought that some literal words were (or could be) also figurative, or that some figurative words were (or could be) also literal. (It might be thought that the correct answer to the important question raised earlier concerning whether Aristotle viewed 'metaphora' as referring to figurative language in general or just to the specific trope of meta-


\textsuperscript{11.} This sentence, and the entire preceding paragraph, owe a great deal to William J. Jordan, "Aristotle's Concept of Metaphor in Rhetoric," pp. 236-237.
phor, might have some bearing on our present question. But this is not so, for, whichever extension of 'metaphora' Aristotle in fact thought was correct, he could still have consistently held that there is some overlap in the classes of "metaphorai" and "oikeia", the metaphorical and the literal.) However, we will keep this question in abeyance for the time being. Instead, we will content ourselves with that which we may clearly and easily ascertain about Aristotle's philosophical view of metaphor as embodied in the Poetics definition.

It is clear that Aristotle locates the phenomenon of metaphor at the level of words: "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else . . . ."\(^{12}\) The class of literal words contrasts with the class of metaphors. Aristotle evidently thought of metaphors as certain kinds of words, and of certain kinds of words as metaphors. It is unclear to me that he perceived one most obvious fact about metaphor, namely, that if, with respect to its semantic level, it is to be located at the level of words at all, it is surely not a specific, distinct type of words but is, rather, simply a different use of non-metaphorical words.\(^ {13}\)

From the Poetics definition of metaphor along with Aristotle's doctrines of genus/species and analogy, it becomes quite evident that he regarded all (successful) meta-

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12. Aristotle, Poetics, 1457b, my emphasis.
13. Cf. my fuller discussion of this point below, pp. 15-16.
phor as based on objective similarities between the two objects related by the metaphor. That is, apart from such objective similarities, the attempted metaphor would not be effective; it would not "work" or "come off". Aristotle clearly implies this in the Poetics definition (given his doctrines of genus/species and analogy), but he actually states it explicitly just a little later in the Poetics (1459a), where he is extolling the merits of metaphor for the poet:

It [the mastery of metaphor] is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars.

Aristotle's use of the term "dissimilars" for the two objects related by the attempted metaphor may at first appear somewhat contradictory to the point he is making, but his meaning is actually quite clear. It is the genius of the good poet's keen powers of observation, perception, and genuine insight into the nature of things that enables him to pick out, and focus our attention upon, those real but commonly overlooked similarities between the two objects, which Aristotle thus calls "dissimilars" only because they are commonly so perceived. In this we see the poet's and the rhetorician's kinship with the philosopher:

Metaphors must be drawn, as has been said already, from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related—just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances in things far apart.14

Moreover, it is clear that Aristotle regarded metaphor as a deviation from "ordinary" ways of talking. Like metaphor's dependence on objective similarities, its being a deviation from ordinary speech is implicit in the Poetics definition, but explicit in the very next section:

On the other hand the Diction becomes distinguished and non-prosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms, i.e., strange words, metaphors, lengthened forms and everything that deviates from ordinary modes of speech.15

It is because these types of terms deviate from the ordinary that they can save "Diction" from being "mean."

Actually, much of Poetics 1458 is given to an exposition of how best to render "Diction" both clear and non-"mean" at the same time. Aristotle says that clarity is best gained by employing "the ordinary words for things," but if no other kinds of words are used, the result will be "mean". The poet can avoid meanness by the use of the "unfamiliar terms" mentioned in the text. But similarly, if these are the only kinds of words used, the result will be "either a riddle or a barbarism, a riddle, if made up of metaphors, a barbarism, if made up of strange words."16

Interestingly, Aristotle concludes that the optimal way to "render the Diction at once clear and non-prosaic" is not by using either ordinary words simpliciter or metaphors, but by using "the lengthened, curtailed, and altered forms of [ordinary] words. Their deviation from the ordinary words will, by making the language unlike that in general use,

15. Aristotle, Poetics, 1458a, my emphases.
16. Ibid.
give it a non-prosaic appearance; and their having much in common with the words in general use will give it the quality of clearness. 17

How did Aristotle view the relation between metaphor and simile? The Aristotelian notion that (successful) metaphors essentially involve a comparison between two things that are objectively similar (possibly in more than one respect) is undoubtedly the explicit philosophical origin of the view of metaphor as elliptical simile. This common philosophical analysis of metaphor has it that metaphors are just similes in disguise, i.e., they are similes that simply lack any explicit comparative term such as "like" or "as".

Now while it is true, as I have pointed out, that Aristotle viewed successful metaphors as essentially based in objective similarities, such that the metaphor always leads us to see some previously unnoticed comparison lurking beneath the surface of things, this falls short of saying that all metaphors are simply elliptical similes. As I indicated earlier, it is possible that Aristotle used 'metaphorai' generically to denote all figurative words, as opposed to literal words (oikeia). This view of the matter also finds support in the discussion above of the two contrasting classes, metaphorai and oikeia.

17. Ibid.
If it is indeed the case that Aristotle used 'metaphorai' generically, it would provide a nice, natural explanation of why he describes simile in the following terms:

The simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the poet says of Achilles that he

Leapt on the foe as a lion,

this is a simile; when he says of him 'the lion leapt', it is a metaphor--here, since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of 'lion'.

This would make metaphor a genus and simile one of its species. (Yet we are still left with the difficulty of explaining why Aristotle adds that "the difference [between simile and metaphor] is but slight."

Johnson judiciously comments on this passage describing the relationship between simile and metaphor:

This remark has been taken throughout history as supporting the ever-recurring view that metaphor is an elliptical simile .... Aristotle's remarks do not necessarily imply that metaphors can always be reduced to literal statements of similarities between objects. Aristotle may have held such a view, but he need not have done so on the basis of his account of simile.

I concur with Johnson. We will probably never be able to discover from Aristotle's writings whether or not he himself held the elliptical simile view of metaphor. But more importantly, perhaps, it is at least clear that he was so interpreted by many subsequent generations of philosophers, rhetoricians, and poets in their investigation of metaphor.

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Before concluding my discussion of Aristotle's philosophical views on metaphor, I will make a stab at answering the interesting and important question left in abeyance earlier, viz., whether Aristotle thought that some literal words were (or could be) also figurative, or that some figurative words were (or could be) also literal.\textsuperscript{20} Recall that this is just to ask whether, for Aristotle, there is any overlap between the contrasting classes of metaphorai and oikeia. If there is any such non-empty intersection of these two classes of types of words, then it would follow that (at least some) oikeia could be used as metaphorai and (perhaps) vice-versa.

I have found no evidence whatsoever in Aristotle that would indicate that he viewed the two classes as possibly having any overlap. He definitely regarded both metaphor and "literal words" as a type of words. Moreover, he seemed to see these two classes as highly contrastive and divergent. Given these views, then, the most that can be said on this question is that it would be surprising if Aristotle thought that some literal words could also be, or be used as, metaphors.

What bothers me about this conclusion, however, is that it seems so counter-intuitive. On Aristotle's view of the semantic level at which the phenomenon of metaphor occurs, viz., the level of words, it would seem quite natural and

\textsuperscript{20} Surprisingly, I have found this question discussed nowhere in the philosophical literature on Aristotle's views on metaphor.
intuitive to hold that metaphors are simply literal words that are being used in an unusual way to accomplish a particular purpose, namely, to produce a particular effect upon or within the hearer or reader. But Aristotle nowhere, to my knowledge, explicitly (or even implicitly) expresses this view. This seems most remarkable and incredible considering his remarkable philosophical acumen. It is only this consideration that leads me to think that, given his own explicit views of the semantic level on which metaphor is located (the level of words), he must have, after all, held that metaphors are simply literal words being used metaphorically, even though he nowhere states or implies this view.
CHAPTER 2: BLACK.

After Aristotle, no truly significant philosophical advance in the study of metaphor appeared until the pioneering article "Metaphor" by the American philosopher of language Max Black only about thirty years ago.\(^1\) Throughout the intervening centuries between Aristotle and Black, most philosophical work on metaphor amounted to several long footnotes on Aristotle's views. Two exceptions of note were the work of Kant and Nietzsche.\(^2\) Some would want to argue that the twentieth century non-philosopher I. A. Richards, in his 1936 work The Philosophy of Rhetoric, also produced some work on metaphor with important implications for philosophical theory of metaphor. Yet Johnson overstates the case when he claims, "[Richards'] work has proved so prophetic and philosophically significant that it cannot be omitted from any serious treatment of the subject."\(^3\) (This is no doubt due to Johnson's own affinity with Richards' view, which certainly did challenge what Johnson calls "the dominant tradition," the view of metaphor stemming from Aristotle.)

I begin my exposition of Black's theory of metaphor with an observation about what kind of theory of metaphor it is. Some theories of what metaphor is also function as the-

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3. Ibid., p. 18.
ories of how metaphor works. The elliptical simile theory is such a theory. If metaphors are just elliptical similes (the theory which many have attributed—with little real support—to Aristotle), then this tells us also how metaphors do their job, for we already know how similes do theirs (viz., by drawing comparisons, pointing out ostensive similarities). Johnson explains the view thus: "A metaphor of the 'A is B' form is a means of indirection by which we get at the speaker's intended literal meaning 'A is like B, in the following respects: . . .'." By contrast, Black's theory of metaphor, which he calls, aptly, the interaction theory, seems not to be a theory of both kinds, at least, not on the surface. Rather, it seems to be only a theory of the latter sort, how metaphor works, although it may imply or presuppose a certain theory (or theories) of what metaphor is.

Johnson summarizes Black's interaction theory of metaphor as follows:

In the metaphor "A is B" (e.g., Man is a wolf), the "system of associated commonplaces" of A interacts with that of B to produce emergent metaphorical meaning. The "associated commonplaces" are whatever properties and relations are commonly believed to be true of an object, person, event, etc., even if they do not actually apply. For instance, "is a mammal," "is a pred-

4. Ibid., 24-27, author's emphasis. Johnson actually lists this as the "comparison view," and calls it one of the few "basic theories" of how metaphor works. But I think it is quite clear he's referring to the elliptical simile theory, regarded as a theory of how metaphor works.

ator," "travels in packs," "is fierce," and so on, might be commonplaces of "wolf" involved in our comprehension, regardless of the fact that wolves may not actually be fierce in the way or to the extent that they are believed to be fierce. The point here is that understanding a metaphor is not typically a matter of comparing actual properties of objects; rather, it is based upon what the terms of the metaphor call to mind for us.6

But described only in these terms, it is not clear that Black's interaction theory is very much different from an elliptical simile theory of how metaphor works, emended to take into account a particular objection to most elliptical theories. That objection says that frequently, those particular supposed similarities upon which a given metaphor must be said by the standard elliptical theory to be based do not in fact exist.7 Johnson provides a good example:

Richard is a gorilla may be true, for example, if it is taken to mean Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth. According to the comparison theory [the elliptical simile theory] this metaphor is based on the belief that Richard and gorillas are similar in being fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so on. But it is, in fact, false that gorillas have these characteristics. So the metaphor is true but the relevant statement of similarity upon which it is based is false.8 An emended elliptical simile theory that would cater for this objection would not seem, at least initially, to be incompatible with Black's interaction theory.

8. Ibid.
But when we proceed to focus on just what it is in the interaction theory that is supposed to "interact" with what, we can begin to see the major differences between it and any elliptical simile theory, even an emended one. For Black argues that in any metaphor, an entire system of "commonplaces" is used to filter, screen, and organize another one. The system doing the filtering, screening, or organizing is, of course, that system associated with the predicate, term, or phrase being used metaphorically (what Beardaley calls the "modifier" and Black the metaphor's "metaphorical expression"), while the system it is organizing is the one associated with the "subject" term. For example, in the metaphor "Man is a wolf," the system of commonplaces associated with 'wolf' is the organizing system and the system associated with 'man' is the system being organized.

Admittedly, the notion of a "system of associated commonplaces" is somewhat less than perspicuous. Black explains this notion, which is crucial to his account, as follows:

Imagine some layman required to say, without taking special thought, those things he held to be true about wolves; the set of statements resulting would approximate to what I am calling the system of commonplaces associated with the word "wolf." . . . . From the expert's standpoint, the system of commonplaces may include half-truths or downright mistakes (as when a whale is classified as a fish); but the important thing for the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but

that they should be readily and freely evoked. (Because this is so, a metaphor that works in one society may seem preposterous in another. Men who take wolves to beincarnations of dead humans will give the statement "Man is a wolf" an interpretation different from the one I have been assuming.)

Black provides two interesting analogies to illustrate how the metaphorical term's system of commonplaces is supposed to organize the subject's system. I quote only the first analogy:

Suppose I look at the night sky through a piece of heavily smoked glass on which certain lines have been left clear. Then I shall see only the stars that can be made to lie on the lines previously prepared on the screen, and the stars I do see will be seen as organized by the screen's structure. We can think of a metaphor as such a screen and the system of "associated commonplaces" of the focal word as the network of lines upon the screen. We can say that the principal subject is "seen through" the metaphorical expression--or, if we prefer, that the principal subject is "projected upon" the field of the subsidiary subject. (In the latter analogy, the implication-system of the focal expression must be taken to determine the "law of projection." )

Comparison or elliptical simile theories of metaphor seem to imply that the cognitive significance of metaphors can be reduced without loss to that of their corresponding similes. A metaphor says, accomplishes, and in general communicates nothing more than does its "literal" counterpart, the corresponding simile (though some would argue that no simile is really "literal," since, so they argue, even the most banal sounding simile is in reality just as much a true figure of speech as the most exotic metaphor). Thus, there

10. Ibid., p. 40.
11. Ibid., p. 41.
is nothing cognitively or epistemically special, unique, or indispensable about metaphor. The cognitive value of a metaphor is precisely the same as that of the simile. In contrast to this, Black's theory claims, as Johnson puts it, "that this projection of one system onto another is a distinctive intellectual operation not reducible to any mere comparison of objects to mark their similarities."^{12} As Black himself puts it,

[S]ubstitution-metaphors and comparison-metaphors can be replaced by literal translations . . . by sacrificing some of the charm, vivacity, or wit of the original, but with no loss of cognitive content. But "interaction-metaphors" are not expendable. Their mode of operation requires the reader to use a system of implications . . . as a means for selecting, emphasizing, and organizing relations in a different field. This use of a "subsidiary subject" to foster insight into a "principal subject" is a distinctive intellectual operation . . ., demanding simultaneous awareness of both subjects but not reducible to any comparison between the two.

Suppose we try to state the cognitive content of an interaction-metaphor in "plain language." . . . [W]e may succeed in stating a number of the relevant relations between the two subjects. . . . But the set of literal statements so obtained will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the original. . . . The loss in such cases is a loss in cognitive content; . . . the literal paraphrase . . . fails to be a translation because it fails to give the insight that the metaphor did.^{13}

Johnson adds, correctly, "If this is true, it might be possible to justify claims about the indispensability of metaphor for cognitive insight."^{14}

Perhaps the reader noticed in the above quotation that Black doesn't think that all metaphors are necessarily

^{12} Mark Johnson, Philosophical Perspectives, p. 28, my emphasis.
^{13} Max Black, "Metaphor," pp. 45-46, my emphases.
^{14} Mark Johnson, Philosophical Perspectives, p. 28.
"interaction-metaphors." In the paragraph preceding the above quotation he explains that

If we were to insist that only examples satisfying all seven of the claims listed above [to which the interaction theory is committed] should be allowed to count as "genuine" metaphors, we should restrict the correct uses of the word "metaphor" to a very small number of cases. This would be to advocate a persuasive definition of "metaphor" that would tend to make all metaphors interestingly complex. And such a deviation from current uses of the word "metaphor" would leave us without a convenient label for the more trivial cases. Now it is in just such trivial cases that "substitution" and "comparison" views sometimes seem nearer the mark than "interaction" views. The point might be met by classifying metaphors as instances of substitution, comparison, or interaction. Only the last kind are of importance to philosophy.[!] 15

I might note in passing that a point I made in the introduction, that all theories of metaphor put forward to date ultimately fail due to lack of comprehensiveness, finds support in the following words of Johnson's:

As one attempts to evaluate each of the major representative views [of how metaphors "work"] outlined so far, it soon becomes clear that they all share a common shortcoming—while each account highlights some important aspect of metaphor comprehension, no one theory comes even close to telling the whole story.

It is true that Johnson is referring specifically to theories of metaphor comprehension and metaphoric mechanisms; nevertheless, his remark implies a corresponding shortcoming among corresponding theories of what metaphor is.

Black summarizes his interaction theory and its differences from "substitution" and "comparison" theories as follows:

In the form in which I have been expounding it, the "interaction view" is committed to the following seven claims:

(1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects— a "principal" subject and a "subsidiary" one.

(2) These subjects are often best regarded as "systems of things," rather than "things."

(3) The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system of "associated implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject.

(4) These implications usually consist of "commonplaces" about the subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer.

(5) The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.

(6) This involves shifts in meanings of words belonging to the same family or system as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers. (The subordinate metaphors are, however, to be read less "emphatically."

(7) There is, in general, no simple "ground" for the necessary shifts of meaning— no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail.

It will be found, upon consideration, that point (1) is incompatible with the simplest forms of a "substitution view," point (7) is formally incompatible with a "comparison view"; while the remaining points elaborate reasons for regarding "comparison views" as inadequate. 

But it seems to me that this summary of his theory by Black himself fails to capture succinctly or explicitly (what I regard as) the three major novel contributions of Black's interaction theory to the philosophical study of metaphor. The first two of these I have already discussed: 1) the claim that in complex and interesting metaphors one "system of commonplaces" organizes another, and 2) the claim that these metaphors are cognitively special, unique, and

16. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
indispensable, being cognitively and epistemically irreducible to their corresponding literal similes or to other literal statements of similarities. These claims shook the very foundations of received philosophical views of metaphor, especially the then current logical positivist view, the extreme claim that metaphors make no truth claims whatsoever and (therefore) have no truth value. (This amounted to an emotivist theory of metaphor exactly parallel to logical positivist emotivist theories of ethics and religious language.) But if these first two claims of Black's shook the received views, the third was a veritable bombshell.

Black presents the third and boldest claim at the end of his discussion of the comparison view and just before he turns to his own interaction view. Yet strangely, he foregoes any elaboration of the claim. He states it as follows: "It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing."17 That is, some (successful) metaphors are not based on previously existing similarities between the objects related in or by the metaphor (contra Aristotle and all received views). Rather, these metaphors actually bring into existence the very similarities between the objects implied by the metaphor. Thus, this claim clearly foreshadows the later similar but more elaborate view of Lakoff and Johnson that

17. Ibid., p. 37, my emphasis.
metaphors actually create similarities. My critique of Lakoff and Johnson's view will serve as a critique of this third and boldest claim of Black's as well.
CHAPTER 3: LAKOFF AND JOHNSON.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, a well-known linguist and a philosopher, have produced a very popular and influential work on metaphor entitled Metaphors We Live By. It is one of only a few book-length treatments of metaphor that even purport to be philosophical in character and approach.

The most striking feature of the theory of metaphor presented in this book is the thesis that metaphor is virtually all-pervasive in natural language. While most theories of metaphor acknowledge that natural language is generously sprinkled with metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson see them almost everywhere. Much of the reason for this is that they do not believe there are any "dead" metaphors. Rather, those metaphors which most theories count as dead, they regard as very much alive and well. They even claim that these metaphors pervade most of our conceptual schemes, though we are usually quite unaware of such a phenomenon. Thus they believe that many, if not most, of our everyday concepts are metaphorically structured, at least in part.

How is this metaphorical structuring supposed to take place, and what makes it possible? According to Lakoff and Johnson,

> Because concepts are metaphorically structured in a systematic way, e.g., THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, it is possible for us to use expressions (construct, foundation) from one domain (BUILDINGS) to talk

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about corresponding concepts in the metaphorically defined domain (THEORIES). What foundation, for example, means in the metaphorically defined domain (THEORY) will depend on the details of how the metaphorical concept THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS is used to structure the concept THEORY.²

Although Lakoff and Johnson do call the domain structured by the literal concept the "metaphorically defined" concept, they claim, amazingly, that the metaphorical structuring of the metaphorically defined domain is "part of our ordinary literal language"³ about that domain. But it is only the "used" parts of the metaphor, i.e., those parts that are normally applied from the literal concept to structure the metaphorical concept, that are part of our "literal" language. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson countenance literal metaphors.

What about the "unused" parts of the literal concept, those that are not normally used to structure the metaphorical domain? Lakoff and Johnson maintain that these parts too can be used to further metaphorically and imaginatively structure the domain normally structured only by the "used" parts. Here is what they say about such cases:

These sentences fall outside the domain of normal literal language and are part of what is usually called "figurative" or "imaginative" language. Thus: literal expressions ("He has constructed a theory") and imaginative expressions ("His theory is covered with gargoyles") can be instances of the same general metaphor (THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS).

Here we can distinguish three different subspecies of imaginative (or nonliteral) metaphor:

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2. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 52.
3. Ibid., my emphasis.
Extensions of the used part of a metaphor. . .
Instances of the unused part of the literal metaphor. . . .
Instances of novel metaphor, that is, a metaphor not used to structure part of our normal conceptual system but as a new way of thinking about something, e.g., "Classical theories are patriarchs who father many children, most of whom fight incessantly." Each of these subspecies lies outside the used part of a metaphorical concept that structures our normal conceptual system. 4

Notice that these cases constitute what is normally meant by "metaphor," especially the cases that Lakoff and Johnson call "instances of novel metaphor."

Lakoff and Johnson distinguish between linguistic expressions on the one hand and concepts (metaphorical and non-metaphorical) on the other, and insist that "all of the linguistic expressions we have given to characterize general metaphorical concepts are figurative. . . . None of these is literal." 5 Thus, according to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are concepts, not linguistic items, though apparently linguistic items can be either literal or figurative. So while the language used to express the metaphorical concepts is said to be figurative, the metaphors (metaphorical concepts) themselves are said to be literal (or "conventional"). And thus it is that even these figurative, metaphorical expressions-- at least the non-"idiosyncratic" ones-- "like all other words and phrasal lexical items in the language, are fixed by convention." 6 So metaphorical expressions, like

4. Ibid., p. 53.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 54.
the metaphors they express, are both conventional (literal) and figurative.

The only metaphorical expressions which Lakoff and Johnson venture at all to label "dead" are those that they refer to as "idiosyncratic": these are metaphorical expressions that stand alone and are not used systematically in our language and thought. These are well-known expressions like the foot of the mountain, a head of cabbage, the leg of a table, etc. These expressions are isolated instances of metaphorical concepts, where there is only one instance of a used part (or maybe two or three). . . . The point here is that there are metaphors, like A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON, that are marginal in our culture and our language; their used part may consist of only one conventionally fixed expression of the language, and they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used. . . . They . . . are not metaphors that we live by. The only signs of life they have is that they can be extended in subcultures and that their unused portions serve as the basis for (relatively uninteresting) novel metaphors. If any metaphorical expressions deserve to be called "dead," it is these, though they do have a bare spark of life, in that they are understood partly in terms of marginal metaphorical concepts like A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON.7

Thus, according to Lakoff and Johnson, only the "idiosyncratic" metaphorical expressions are sickly, but not even they are terminally ill. Nevertheless, they do not reflect "metaphors we live by" like the non-idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions do. It is only the non-idiosyncratic metaphors that are "systematic metaphorical concepts that structure our actions and thoughts," and "[the] fact

7. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
that they are conventionally fixed within the lexicon of English makes them no less alive."\textsuperscript{8}

Lakoff and Johnson contend not only that "most of our normal conceptual system is metaphorically structured; that is, [that] most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts,"\textsuperscript{9} but go so far as to claim that "many of our experiences and activities are metaphorical in nature,"\textsuperscript{10} that "metaphors can create realities,"\textsuperscript{11} and that "[n]ew metaphors have the power to create a new reality."\textsuperscript{12} They are certainly correct in their recognition that these claims go against most traditional views of metaphor. They think that the reason for this is that "metaphor has traditionally been viewed as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a means of structuring our conceptual system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform."\textsuperscript{13}

In the latter chapters of Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson use their theory of metaphor to go after much bigger philosophical game such as "the myths of objectivism and subjectivism" and to propound their own alternative, "experientialism." In fact, as one reads the last part of the book, one gets the impression that attacking what they call "objectivism" and "subjectivism" and establishing their

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 56.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 147.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 145.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
own "experientialism" were what Lakoff and Johnson were after all along.

They are also much concerned to establish their own social and political interests. This comes out clearly when they admit that these concerns are what motivate them to reject "objective truth" and "the myth of objectivism":

We believe that the idea that there is absolute objective truth is not only mistaken but socially and politically dangerous. As we have seen, truth is always relative to a conceptual system that is defined in large part by metaphor . . . . In a culture where the myth of objectivism is very much alive and truth is always absolute truth, the people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define what we consider to be true-- absolutely and objectively true.

It is for this reason that we see it as important to give an account of truth that is free of the myth of objectivism (according to which truth is always absolute truth).14

Here we can readily see the subservience of Lakoff's and Johnson's theory of metaphor to their true concerns, viz., full-fledged philosophical theory of truth and their social and political purposes. The tail-- their social and political philosophy-- wags the dog-- their theory of metaphor. When questions of truth arise in their theory of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson are not nearly as troubled with the issues of how metaphors can be true and whether there is a distinction between literal and metaphorical truth as they are with what they think metaphor teaches us about truth itself. (Strangely, Lakoff and Johnson even think that most

philosophers hold the view that truth is "absolute" and "objective."^{15}

According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are not based upon pre-existing similarities between the things they mention; rather, metaphors actually create similarities between these things. This notion is of a piece with their view that metaphors define and create realities. They are particularly concerned with how metaphors (supposedly) create realities and similarities in the spheres of social relationships and politics.^{16} It is not just conventional metaphors that have this extraordinary power—novel metaphors can do it too. How exactly does this work? According to Lakoff and Johnson, it is the same process or mechanism as with conventional metaphors: "They do this through a coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others."^{17}

If Lakoff and Johnson mean only what Pascal means when he talks about the power of metaphor to promote obedience to authority, this would be fine. According to Cooper, Pascal advanced the "very modern claim that, in an age when sheer power is incapable of imposing obedience to authority, figurative talk can help strengthen those 'bonds of imagination' which are required for 'securing respect for a particular

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15. Ibid., p. 159.
16. Ibid., pp. 156-160.
17. Ibid., p. 157.
person'. But Lakoff and Johnson's claims seem to go well beyond this.

Since Lakoff and Johnson believe that most of our conceptual system is metaphorical in nature, most of what we take to be truths are in reality entailments of accepted metaphorical concepts (i.e., accepted metaphors). Now conventional (literal) metaphors are already accepted by the speakers of the language, or by the culture, of which they are a part. So the entailments of conventional metaphors are regarded as true by the language speakers or culture. Similarly for new metaphors: "The acceptance of the metaphor, which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that it highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true. Such 'truths' may be true, of course, only relative to the reality defined by the metaphor." But Lakoff and Johnson believe that how metaphors and their entailments lead us to behave in the future is much more important than whether they are true or false.

Lakoff and Johnson view truth as dependent upon, determined by, and relative to a culture's categorizations. These categorizations, in turn, are dependent upon, determined by, and relative to the culture's "purposes" and ways of interacting with the world. They describe a categorization as "a natural way of identifying a kind of

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19. Ibid., pp. 157-158.
20. Ibid., p. 158.
object or experience by highlighting certain properties, downplaying others, and hiding still others."21 And they believe that we make these categorizations in terms of "prototypes" and "family resemblances" to the prototypes, citing Rosch's work.22 But Lakoff and Johnson go far beyond these relatively tame and now commonly made assertions about human categorizing. They go on to make the following bold and sweeping claims:

Moreover, since [all?] the natural dimensions of categories (perceptual, functional, etc.) arise out of our interactions with the world, the properties of objects given by those dimensions are not properties of objects in themselves but are, rather, interactional properties, based on the human perceptual apparatus, human conceptions of function, etc. It follows from this that true statements made in terms of human categories typically do not predicate properties of objects in themselves but rather interactional properties that make sense only relative to human functioning.23

In this remarkable passage we see more evidence of Lakoff's and Johnson's "creative antirealism," as Alvin Plantinga would call it.24 Even if such a view were true, it certainly cannot be argued for on the basis of the alleged fact that properties of objects "given" by "the natural dimensions of human categories" are not properties of the things themselves. This is a blatant non sequitur, for such properties, regardless of the history of anyone's or everyone's epistemic access to them, may still in fact characterize the

21. Ibid., p. 163.
22. Ibid., pp. 71, 122, 162-166.
23. Ibid., pp. 163-164.
very objects themselves. To think otherwise is to make the all too common philosophical mistake these days of assuming that epistemic access determines metaphysics or ontology.

Lakoff and Johnson view sentences as either "fitting" or "not fitting" the situations they purportedly are about, and our understanding of sentences as either "fitting" or "not fitting" our understanding of the relevant situations. They say, somewhat vaguely, "We understand a sentence as being true when our understanding of the sentence fits our understanding of the situation closely enough."25 But they leave these crucial notions of "fitting a situation" and "fitting our understanding of a situation" totally unanalyzed. Nevertheless, Lakoff and Johnson contend that we understand conventional (literal) metaphorical sentences (which they seem to think constitute the vast majority of all natural language sentences) as being true in precisely this way, just as we understand the few nonmetaphorical sentences as being true.26

Lakoff and Johnson even claim that their "general account of truth" will accommodate "new" (nonconventional, nonliteral) metaphors. Recall that Lakoff's and Johnson's "new" metaphors comprise all those expressions normally taken to be metaphorical or figurative (except, of course, that for Lakoff and Johnson the new metaphors are not the linguistic expressions themselves but rather the concepts they express). The reason they think that new metaphors

25. Ibid., p. 169.
pcse no more problems for their "theory of truth" than do conventional metaphors or nonmetaphorical statements is that they believe our criterion of truth is the same for all. And this, they say, is simply seeing whether our understanding of the new statement (expressing the new metaphor) "fits" or "matches" our understanding of the situation it is about.27

Generalizing from this alleged criterion of truth for both new and conventional metaphorical statements, Lakoff and Johnson state as the "foundation" of their "experientialist" theory of truth the following: "We understand a statement as being true in a given situation when our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of the situation closely enough for our purposes."28 Concerning truth in general and the truth of metaphors (surely they mean metaphorical statements, in keeping with their view that metaphors are concepts, not linguistic items) in particular, Lakoff and Johnson conclude, "Truth is therefore a function of our conceptual system. It is because many of our concepts are metaphorical in nature, and because we understand situations in terms of those concepts, that metaphors can be true or false."29

Lakoff and Johnson dispute and reject those theories of meaning and truth they label "objectivist" and "subjectivist" (though as the reader may suspect, they have

27. Ibid., pp. 172-175.
28. Ibid., p. 179.
29. Ibid.
far fewer qualms about the latter than about the former). Lakoff and Johnson definitely reject the allegedly "objectivist" compositionality principle, which they label the "building block theory of meaning." They likewise reject the supposedly "objectivist" view that meaning is independent of use. They reject many more of what they take to be elements of objectivist accounts of meaning and truth, but I cannot here mention them all.

As for "subjectivism," Lakoff and Johnson reject the "one basic assumption" that lies behind positions espoused by what they aptly refer to as "café phenomenology." This is what results from picking and choosing "elements of antiobjectivist Continental philosophy" and thus distorting it. The "subjectivist" positions promulgated by this layman's phenomenology, which Lakoff and Johnson reject, include the following: meaning is private, experience is purely holistic, meanings have no natural structure, context is unstructured, and meaning cannot be naturally or adequately represented.

The one basic assumption lying behind all these positions, according to Lakoff and Johnson, is that "experience has no natural structure and that, therefore, there can be no natural external constraints upon meaning and truth." Their reply to this is based on their view of how one's con-

30. Ibid., pp. 182, 202-204, and passim.
32. Ibid., pp 223-224.
33. Ibid., p. 224.
34. Ibid.
ceptual system is grounded, viz., on the basis of experience, which is non-arbitrarily and holistically structured in terms of "experiential gestalts." They contend that

[t]hese gestalts have structure that is not arbitrary. Instead, the dimensions that characterize the structure of the gestalts emerge naturally from our experience.

This is not to deny the possibility that what something means to me may be based on kinds of experiences that I have had and you have not had and that, therefore, I will not be able to fully and adequately communicate that meaning to you. However, metaphor provides a way of partially communicating unshared experiences, and it is the natural structure of our experience that makes this possible.35

Thus Lakoff and Johnson use their theory of metaphor to attempt to justify their rejection of those elements of both "objectivism" and "subjectivism" that they find objectionable.

But there are other elements of these theories that Lakoff and Johnson find perfectly acceptable and in harmony with their own views on metaphor, meaning, and truth. They claim to synthesize these acceptable elements in their own "experientialism." Noting that "the myth of objectivism" focuses on the beliefs that there are human-independent "real things" that constrain our interaction with and comprehension of them, that factual knowledge of these realities is important for successful functioning, and that fairness and impartiality often matter to us and are achievable, Lakoff and Johnson claim there is no such thing as "absolute truth" about these matters, but that that is no problem.

35. Ibid., pp. 224-225.
They argue that concerns for knowledge of "real things" (in order to function successfully) and for fairness and impartiality can adequately be satisfied by truths that are relative to conceptual systems and cultural values, and thus to one's understanding which is (necessarily) based on one's conceptual system and culturally imposed values. They go so far as to claim, "[P]eople with very different conceptual systems than our own may understand the world in a very different way than we do. Thus, they may have a very different body of truths than we have and even different criteria for truth and reality." Nevertheless, they think objectivity is still possible, though they never explain exactly how.\(^\text{36}\) Lakoff and Johnson also claim that their "experientialism" preserves the legitimate concerns that motivate "the myth of subjectivism." These can all be boiled down to the view that meaning is never anything other than meaning to or for a particular individual. Such meaning involves that individual's own past experiences, feelings, values, insights, and imagination, and his own process of fashioning coherence for himself out of these elements. Lakoff's and Johnson's position diverges from what they call "subjectivism" only in its rejection of the total lack of constraints on individual imagination characteristic of some forms of subjectivism.\(^\text{38}\)

36. Ibid., p 181.
37. Ibid., pp. 226-227.
38. Ibid., pp. 227-228.
There is a good deal of Nelson Goodman in Lakoff and Johnson, though they never adduce Goodman for support. To begin with, there is the Goodmanian notion in Lakoff and Johnson that we humans make realities. (Goodman now says that we humans even make the stars!) Lakoff and Johnson claim that through our metaphorical concepts, we actually create similarities in the world, as well as other realities. Then there is Lakoff's and Johnson's notion of truth as the fit or match of our understanding of a statement (including metaphorical statements) with our understanding of the situation it is purportedly about. This is very reminiscent of Goodman's notion of truth as "rightness" or "rightness of fit."

Finally, there is in Lakoff's and Johnson's theory of metaphor the view that metaphor-making involves the application of concepts from one realm of experience to another realm of experience in the hope of better understanding the second realm. Goodman's theory differs from this only in that metaphor for Goodman is a matter of linguistic expressions and of physical objects, not of concepts as with Lakoff and Johnson. Goodman's theory, roughly, has it that

40. I do not believe, however, that Lakoff and Johnson could quite bring themselves to agree with the Goodmanian view that humans even create such physical objects as stars.
metaphor involves the transfer of a family of predicates ("schema") normally used to "sort" one set of physical objects ("realm") to another realm in order to sort it also. A schema invades and sorts a realm it does not usually sort.

The usual or conventional sorting is literal language; the new, nonconventional sorting is metaphorical language. Goodman holds to metaphorical meanings, but, as an extensionalist, construes both literal and metaphorical meanings referentially, i.e., extensionally. And Goodman clearly distinguishes literal from metaphorical truth, holding that the applications of a given schema to a new realm are almost always literally false. Thus, unlike Lakoff, Goodman thinks that conventional language is nonmetaphorical and that there is a genuine category of expressions that may be thought of as "dead" metaphors. Nevertheless, Lakoff's and Johnson's idea of metaphor as the sorting, organizing, and describing of one realm or set of things by means of an apparatus normally used to sort, organize, and describe another set of things is very Goodmanian.

Metaphors We Live By is open to much legitimate criticism, to which I now turn. As a whole, the book is imprecise and lacks philosophical rigor and philosophical argumentation. There are few footnotes and very few references to the actual details of existing philosophical accounts of metaphor. The few arguments spelled out in the text often turn out to be non sequiturs.
Dogmatic question-begging abounds, often in the manner of the work of the later Wittgenstein. Fundamental philosophical questions about important metaphysical and ontological issues are dismissed out of hand as arising from the existence of that class of "conventional metaphors" which Lakoff and Johnson label "entity and substance metaphors." This only evidences philosophical naivete, hinted at previously when I noted their belief that most Western philosophers think truth is "absolute" and "objective." They are apparently unaware that a philosopher's use of 'truth' and 'is true' as primitive, unanalyzed terms in a theory of meaning or a theory of metaphor entails no particular philosophical theory of truth, including what they call the "objectivist theory."

Question-begging also occurs in many of their (what I regard as) linguistically-insensitive analyses of various English expressions. For example, they just take it for granted, without argument, that the various senses of many polysemous linguistic expressions are actually instances of different conventional metaphors. So many examples of this irritating practice occur in the book that it's hard to know which to list here. Here are a few.

Among their "orientational metaphors" they list HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN and HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN. Alleged instances of the first "metaphor" are "You're in high spirits" and "I'm depressed," and of the second, "He's in the upper echelon"
and "His power is on the decline." They even attempt to explain how these "metaphors" have their bases in physical and/or cultural behavior and practices.\textsuperscript{41} Examples of their "ontological metaphors" are INFLATION IS AN ENTITY, instances of which are "Inflation is lowering our standard of living" and "Inflation makes me sick," and metaphors for quantifying such as "There is so much hatred in the world" and "DuPont has a lot of political power in Delaware."\textsuperscript{42} Lakoff and Johnson make the mistake of concluding that the natural language phenomenon of metaphor shows the inadequacy of the "myths" of "objectivism" and "subjectivism," when in fact it is only their account of metaphor that is at variance with these theories.

Another weakness of Lakoff's and Johnson's theory is its appeal to social and political concerns as motivating factors for criticizing theories of truth for languages and for developing their own alternative theory. There are too many motivating factors available within the philosophy of language and related areas to think it necessary to resort to social and political philosophy. There is nothing wrong with doing social and political philosophy. But in a work on metaphor from a philosophical perspective, it is inappropriate to advert to areas of philosophy outside the philosophy of language, except (perhaps) to appropriately related areas.

\textsuperscript{41} Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 14-21.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 26.
The problems discussed above significantly weaken the Lakoff and Johnson theory of metaphor, but could perhaps be overcome with sufficiently detailed exposition and argumentation. However, in addition to these significant handicaps, the theory suffers from even greater problems of a more conceptual nature, problems which almost certainly doom it to failure. These involve the notions of literal, conventional metaphor and of truth as the "fit" of our understanding of a statement to our understanding of a situation. Lakoff and Johnson take it as obvious that what "fit" means here is crystal clear and philosophically unproblematic. But it is neither, and stands sorely in need of elucidation and further analysis, especially since the notion plays such a crucial role in their theories of metaphor, meaning, and truth.

As for the crucial notion of conventional, i.e., literal metaphor, one is immediately struck by the blatant contradiction in terms. How can a concept or expression possibly be metaphorical if it is also literal, and how can it be literal if also metaphorical? Lakoff and Johnson are just not using the terms as they are normally used in English. Therefore, from the very point at which they introduce their concept of literal or conventional metaphor, one can only seriously doubt that Lakoff and Johnson are developing an account of what is normally thought of as metaphor.

While it appears that what they are up to is often quite interesting, one can't help but be amazed at their
view that typical English speakers, including philosophers and linguists, use the terms 'metaphor,' 'metaphorical,' and 'literal' incorrectly. Of course, Lakoff and Johnson don't put it this bluntly, but this is what clearly follows from their view that there are literal, conventional metaphors, and in fact, that most metaphors are literal and that most literal linguistic expressions actually express metaphorical concepts.

So I assume Lakoff and Johnson must think that most English speakers use the terms I've mentioned wrongly, simply because we don't know what metaphor is all about. Metaphor is mysterious, but it doesn't follow from this that English speakers literally don't know what they are talking about when it comes to distinguishing metaphorical from literal language.

I suppose that in their defense, Lakoff and Johnson could claim that they are introducing new, technical senses of the terms. After all, philosophers are often wont to engage in this technique in the process of doing "conceptual analysis" (now an outmoded project?). Yet Lakoff and Johnson do not give this impression, nor do they actually advance this claim.

Lakoff's and Johnson's accounts of specific instances of what they call "literal metaphors" all come off much better as plausible, or at least possible, explanations of how the "metaphors" arose in the first place, i.e., as ontogenetic accounts, than they do as explanations of how we cur-
rently understand and use them. It is one thing to analyze and show how a concept might have arisen via metaphor, but quite another to show that the concept is at present metaphorical, or metaphorically structured, i.e., a "literal metaphor." The ontogenetic or diachronic account of the concept by no means entails the synchronic account.

Finally, and this bears greatly on the viability of the Lakoff and Johnson theory of metaphor, it is unclear, given their theory, which of two (at least) possible pictures of how language is structured is supposed to obtain. In both pictures, language is said to express concepts, thoughts, and experiences. The first picture, call it picture A, divides language into two main parts—literal or conventional expressions and novel metaphorical expressions. The first main part is further divided into two subdivisions—1) literal, conventional, nonmetaphorical expressions, which express physical experiences, and 2) metaphorical expressions, which express nonphysical experiences and which constitute the great bulk of all literal language.

The second main part of language in picture A, novel metaphorical expressions, i.e., those that are imaginative and nonliteral, comprises only a tiny segment of all language. It is further divided into three subdivisions—1) extensions of "used" parts of conventional, literal metaphorical expressions, 2) instances of "unused" parts of literal metaphorical expressions, and 3) totally new metaphorical expressions, those that express new ways of
thinking about something. The first two of these three subdivisions comprise linguistic expressions which express new metaphors based on conventional metaphors, whereas the third subdivision comprise linguistic expressions for entirely new metaphors, metaphors not based at all on conventional metaphors.

In picture B, language again divides into two main parts. The first is the small fragment of language which is literal, conventional, and entirely nonmetaphorical. It is not itself further subdivided. The second main part comprises all metaphorical language and therefore subdivides into metaphorical literal expressions (which form the great bulk of conventional language) and nonliteral, nonconventional metaphors, i.e., the novel metaphorical expressions, which are broken down into the same three categories as in picture A.

Lakoff and Johnson seem to waver back and forth between A and B, making matters very unclear for the reader and rendering their theory of metaphor all the more dubious. But whichever picture Lakoff and Johnson finally wish to adopt, they are stuck either way with a serious paradox, if not an outright contradiction—there is either metaphorical language within literal language or literal language within metaphorical. So the Lakoff and Johnson theory of metaphor faces some very formidable internal problems.

In summary, Lakoff and Johnson are correct in their insistence that metaphor is more widespread, more philosoph-
ically significant, and more cognitively and epistemically indispensable than philosophers have generally acknowledged. But they are wrong in the great extent to which they take their views: they overrate the (admittedly great) significance of metaphor, and they wrongly find metaphor almost everywhere in natural language. And in the process, they beg many important metaphysical and ontological questions. One of these involves their firm conviction that metaphors actually create similarities in the world through the ways in which they structure and determine our experiences of the world. I have grave misgivings about such a Goodmanesque view of things.
CHAPTER 4: KITTAY.

Eva Kittay presents her philosophical work on metaphor in Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, a 360-page book.\(^1\) As an entire book it constitutes one of the few relatively fully developed philosophical theories of the workings of metaphor.

Her aim is to provide "a careful dissection of the microstructure of linguistic metaphor"\(^2\) as a means to eventually establishing the importance of metaphorical thought itself. This latter task still awaits Kittay's full attention, although other theorists of metaphor have addressed it.\(^3\) But since, as Kittay herself acknowledges, "[a] full account of the cognitive significance of metaphor requires a comparably detailed discussion of metaphorical thought,"\(^4\) the first part of the book's subtitle is probably a bit overstated.

This is not at all to imply that Kittay's contribution is anything less than first-rate: it is detailed, comprehensive, rigorous, sophisticated—philosophically, linguistically, literally—and replete with actual metaphors from literature, science, mythology, and everyday modern En-

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2. Ibid., p. 326.
3. These include those philosophers who have studied the use of metaphor in science, some cognitive psychologists, and perhaps most notably in recent years, Mac Cormac and Lakoff and Johnson.
4. Ibid.
glish. Yet Kittay herself regards her theory of metaphor as merely tentative:

The theory I present is to be understood not as an absolute and unqualified characterization of metaphor but as provisional: revisable given a more adequate characterization of literal meaning, and revisable given an available representation of an extra-linguistic conceptual structure-- if such were indeed possible.  

Kittay's Metaphor opens with a helpful overview of the history of philosophical theories of metaphor, along with a very general introduction to some of the main ideas in the book. Next comes an extended discussion of what she means when she calls her account a "perspectival theory of metaphor." It is in Chapters 2 and 3, "The Identification of Metaphor" and "An Interlude Concerning Context: A Relational Theory of Meaning", that Kittay presents the real core, the central tenets, of her theory. The remainder of the book consists of an explication and detailed development of the theory's roots-- its key concepts and the philosophical and linguistic apparatus utilized by the theory. Along the way, Kittay shows how each element in this foundation relates to her theory, and critiques unsatisfactory rival theories.

Kittay's theory of metaphor is eclectic, drawing from such sources as the "interactionist" tradition in philosophical theory of metaphor (from Coleridge, through I. A. Richards, to Max Black6), the formal symbolic resources of modern set theory, and semantic field theory. The critiques

5. Ibid., p. 15.
6. Ibid., p. 6.
she levels at rival theories and views of metaphor are on
the whole sharp and telling. And she boldly challenges, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, some well-entrenched notions
and views within more traditional philosophical theories of
metaphor and even within the philosophy of language gene-
 rally. These include the notion that the unit of metaphor is
either the word or the sentence, 7 possibly the principle of
compositionality, and most notably, the semantic/pragmatic
distinction, at least in its usual formulation.

It will not be easy to capture the essence of Kittay's
theory of metaphor briefly, but I will try. Kittay real-
izes, as few serious writers on metaphor (even philosophers)
seem to, that a philosophically sound theory of metaphorical
meaning must be grounded in an adequate theory of literal
linguistic meaning. Consequently, she details a quite fully
developed theory of literal meaning, a theory in which mean-
ing is not, as is generally assumed, context-independent.
Based upon a "relational," contextual, semantic-fields the-
ory of literal meaning, Kittay develops notions of first-
and second-order meaning and a "perspectival" theory of
metaphor. This complex theory of metaphor exploits in a
crucial way the notion and theory of semantic fields to ex-
plicate what Kittay calls the "double semantic content or
import" of metaphor.

7. In contrast, Kittay argues that the unit of meta-
phor is "any unit of discourse in which some conceptual or
According to Kittay, a perspectival account such as hers grows out of the interactionist theory of metaphor. Thus, to understand Kittay's account it is at least very useful, if not absolutely imperative, to understand the interactionist account. She provides the following helpful summary of the interactionist theory:

(1) [M]etaphors are sentences, not isolated words.
(2) [A] metaphor consists of two components.
(3) [T]here is a tension between these two components.
(4) [T]hese components need to be understood as systems.
(5) [T]he meaning of a metaphor arises from an interplay of these components.
(6) [T]he meaning of a metaphor is irreducible and cognitive.

The first four theses specify the structure of metaphor. The latter two pertain to the interpretation of metaphor. Each claim, when modified and elaborated, serves as an important element of the perspectival theory. Kittay's perspectival theory of metaphor consists primarily of a modification and elaboration of these six basic theses.

Kittay's theory of metaphor can rightly be labelled a "cognitive" theory for at least the following three reasons. First, Aristotle had claimed that analogies in language reflect analogies in being (what later came to be termed "the analogy of being"). Why did Aristotle hold this? Because, he supposed, without such ontological relations, analogical argumentation, which for Aristotle would include the use of linguistic metaphors in reasoning, would fail for lack of adequate grounding. Therefore, we must posit these rela-

8. Ibid., p. 23.
tions in the world itself. In contrast, Kittay justifies analogical and metaphorical reasoning and thought not on ontological grounds but on "cognitive" grounds: the ability of such reasoning, language, and thought to predict and explain. But of course, Kittay's theory of metaphor can legitimately be called cognitive in this respect only to the extent that it succeeds in exhibiting these alleged predictive and explanatory capabilities.

Second, as noted above Kittay calls her theory "perspectival," explaining that

To call our theory perspectival is to name it for the function metaphor serves: to provide a perspective from which to gain an understanding of that which is metaphorically portrayed. This is a distinctively cognitive role. Since perspectival implies a subject who observes from a stance, we can say that metaphor provides the linguistic realization for the cognitive activity by which a language speaker makes use of one articulated domain to gain an understanding of another experiential or conceptual domain, and similarly, by which a hearer grasps such an understanding.

To put the point slightly differently, "The key notion in seeing metaphor as cognitive is the recognition that in metaphor two concepts are operative simultaneously." And Kittay understands concepts not as "free-floating" but rather as emerging from the articulation of a domain by a set of contrasts and affinities available in an expressive medium. Without an expressive medium we most likely should not be able to form metaphors or even think metaphorically. Certainly we should have no access to metaphor.

9. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
10. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
11. Ibid., p. 15.
12. Ibid.
As "perspectival," then, the theory can legitimately be called cognitive.

I might note at this point that Kittay's view of linguistic meaning, concepts, and metaphorical thinking is quite Russian. According to Ross,

There simply could not be phenomena of the kinds I have described, which manifest an inertia-resistance structure that generates endless expansion of expressive capacity, and which depend only upon how words happen to be combined, if linguistic meaning were not something intrinsic to the language and distinct from speaker-meaning, referential meaning, ideas in the mind, and sense-meaning . . . . Expressing oneself in one's natural language(s) is a medium of thought. Some of our thoughts subsist in their verbal expression the way a Wyeth [which Wyeth?] painting subsists in egg tempura on board, having no existence apart from it and yet not being made out of it, as a chair is made out of wood, but being made in it, as joy can be, not merely be exhibited, in a dancer's movement. . . . If, to make [ordinary language distinctions of meaning among "co-occurent" expressions], we had first and separately to think them out, a speaker would have to have the best skills of the best linguistic analysts to make the kinds of statements that are second nature to him now. The language would cease to do part of our thinking for us. Now we can think in the distinctions of word meaning without having, continuously, to think of the distinctions of word meaning.13

Kittay's view of concepts and linguistic meaning doesn't seem to be quite this blatantly "linguistic," although her position does seem to rule out any sort of Fodorian language of thought. Elsewhere throughout Kittay's work other affinities with the work of Ross and L. J. Cohen14 crop up.

Third, as I mentioned earlier, Kittay sees a theory of metaphor at the semantic or linguistic level as logically and conceptually prior to a theory of metaphorical thought. This also seems evident from her notion of concepts as vitally dependent on an "expressive medium" such as natural language. She says, for example,

> Since our present understanding of language exceeds our understanding of any other expressive medium, an explication of metaphor in linguistic terms will do most to advance our understanding of the conceptual and cognitive significance of metaphor. I aim to understand the cognitive force of metaphor through the elucidation of metaphoric meaning.  

Although Kittay never explicitly indicates what she means by "metaphorical thought," she apparently has reference to those cognitive processes that operate by means of transfers or leaps from one conceptual or experiential domain to another, utilizing (some of) the relations within the first domain to (partially) structure those of the second. This would be much the same notion of metaphorical thinking as Lakoff and Johnson's. For Kittay, metaphorical thinking presumably would be an initial structuring or ordering of a previously "unarticulated" conceptual or experiential domain by an already "articulated" one (this metaphorical structuring providing the new domain's initial "articulation," though the structuring must be distinguished from the articulation) or a restructuring of an already "articulated" domain, again by an already "articulated" one. If Kittay's linguistic or semantic theory of metaphor (or

one sufficiently like it) is indeed a logical and conceptual prerequisite for such a theory of metaphorical cognition, then probably the semantic theory of metaphor itself can also legitimately be called cognitive.

Kittay makes the important point throughout her work that what counts as metaphorical is not absolute but relative--

relative to a given conceptual organization in which certain categorizations capture similarities and differences taken to be salient for that language community. I mean to say that metaphors are always relative to a set of beliefs and to linguistic usage which may change through time and place. . . .\(^{16}\)

Though important, this point seems entirely trivial and obvious, since the meaning and truth of all language, not just the metaphorical, is relative to its linguistic community's language ("linguistic usage").

There is a similar though less obvious point which Kittay lays much stress on-- she holds that although what counts as metaphorical is indeed relative to the beliefs, intentions, usages, etc., of the linguistic community, it is not relative to those of any individual metaphor utterer within the community. Note the following passages:

[I]f 'speaker's meaning' is a term which designates the actual intentions of actual speakers, then it is arguable that speaker's meaning is not pertinent either to metaphor or to indirect speech acts . . . .\(^{17}\)

I shall say little about individual speakers' intentions in making metaphor. Such intentions are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining that an utterance is metaphorical.

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17. Ibid., p. 44.
On the one hand, we may intend but fail to make metaphor—we may not be sufficiently competent in the language. On the other hand, we may interpret as metaphorical statements which were never so intended.  

... especially in the case of metaphor, ... how else are we to ascertain the occasion meaning of the sentence when it diverges from timeless meanings except by reference to the utterer's occasion meaning [i.e., his intended meaning]. None the less, we need to establish that metaphors, while diverging from the timeless meanings of the utterance-types, need not be dependent on utterer's occasion meaning. I shall show that the metaphorical use of language depends on systematic semantic features of language. It is this which allows them to be understood independently of speakers' intentions.  

The use of 'determine' without any qualifications in the sentence "Such [individual speakers'] intentions are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining that an utterance is metaphorical" is quite unfortunate, for it could be taken either objectively or subjectively. That is, does Kittay mean that speakers' intentions play no role in the conceptual account of what metaphor is (the objective 'determine'), or that they play no role in our everyday psychological processes used in identifying the metaphors in ordinary speech and writing (the subjective 'determine')? Presumably the former for Kittay emphasizes time and again that her account of metaphor is only a conceptual, not a psychological, account (see below). Further, she regards metaphorical interpretations by hearers/readers as (partly) constitutive of metaphor, as will become clear later on.  

19. Ibid., p. 46. See below for a rudimentary explanation of the Gricean terminology Kittay employs in this quote.
I believe this is a serious mistake that may be due, in large measure, simply to a failure to distinguish the two senses of `determine' I have just discussed. But this failure itself, as well as the position that metaphorical interpretations (partly) constitute metaphor, could be symptomatic of the currently fashionable tendency to emphasize "hermeneutics" at the expense of metaphysics/ontology.

The above citation is also misleading, in that Kittay implies that in her account, metaphors depend only on "systematic semantic features" of language. Yet she herself will later acknowledge that her account also requires recourse to pragmatic considerations. And these pragmatic considerations would be over and above those she already assimilates to semantics in her virtual obliteration of the semantic/pragmatic distinction. The quote is also ambiguous due to problems with `depend', `dependent' and `understand' parallel to that mentioned above with `determine'.

As noted above, Kittay is careful to distinguish between a conceptual and a psychological theory of metaphor. Hers, she claims, is an instance only of the former:

How do we recognize that an utterance is metaphorical rather than literal or inept and mistaken? Generally we have little difficulty making such distinctions. But what are the criteria we use in so identifying utterances which ought to be metaphorically interpreted? In asking how we recognize metaphors, I am posing not a psychological but a conceptual question; that is I am not asking for the psychological processes we undergo when we opt for a metaphorical interpretation. I am asking what conditions pertain when the appropriate interpretation of an utterance is metaphorical rather than literal, technical, fanciful, figurative
but not metaphorical, or simply [that the utterance is] mistaken.\textsuperscript{20}

Thus, when Kittay titles her second chapter "The Identification of Metaphor," she is not intending to present an account of how human beings actually in fact go about the process of identifying metaphors in natural language. Instead, she means only to indicate the contours of what conceptually counts as metaphor. That is, as I understand her own account of what she's up to, she is aiming to produce a good old-fashioned philosophically adequate definition or conceptual analysis of metaphor. (It's unclear why she doesn't just call it that.)

The notion of a "double semantic content/import" figures prominently in Kittay's theory of metaphor. To understand what she means by this it is first necessary to understand what she means by calling her account of metaphor "perspectival." Recall that Kittay describes a perspectival account as a development, a modification, an elaboration, of the interactionist theory of metaphor.

Of particular relevance to the "perspectival" character of her own theory are the interactionist theory's claims/theses that a metaphor consists of two components and that the metaphor's meaning arises from an "interplay" of these two components. "[I]n metaphor two concepts are operative simultaneously."\textsuperscript{21} One of these two components, the "subject" of the metaphor (i.e., what the metaphor is "about"),

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 40, my emphasis.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 15.
is seen from a certain perspective or point of view, viz.,
as described by or in light of the second component. Recall
Kittay's summary:

To call our theory perspectival is to name it for
the function metaphor serves: to provide a perspec-
tive from which to gain an understanding of that
which is metaphorically portrayed. . . . Since
perspectival implies a subject who observes from a
stance, we can say that metaphor provides the lin-
guistic realization for the cognitive activity by
which a language speaker makes use of one articu-
lated domain to gain an understanding of another
experiential or conceptual domain, and similarly,
by which a hearer grasps such an understanding.²²

Kittay first describes the double semantic content of
metaphor in general terms: "We want to say that in metaphor
one expression supports two contents: one is a content the
expression supports literally, the other is a content the
expression supports only in the given metaphor."²³ Without
going into all the intricate theoretical terminology and ap-
paratus which she next utilizes—let it suffice to say that
she critiques, corrects, and augments Black's terminology
and apparatus along Freganean and Saussurean lines—Kittay
concludes that "[i]n metaphor both the expression level and
the content level bear content, and thus the new meaning of
the metaphor emerges from some interrelation between the ve-
hicle and the topic."²⁴

Kittay retains I. A. Richards' somewhat vague terms
"vehicle" and "topic" but seeks to "precise" them for her
own purposes. She drops Black's "principal subject" and

²². Ibid., pp. 13-14.
²³. Ibid., p. 24.
²⁴. Ibid., p. 28.
"subsidiary subject" altogether. By "vehicle" Kittay means the metaphor's "focal term--that is, the label itself and the content that label conveys literally." (For Kittay, a "term" is a label plus the content to which it is attached.) She uses "topic" to mean "the second content, carried by the metaphorical expression . . . . not an expression in a text, but rather what a text is speaking about."25 While one may wonder, based on these definitions, whether Kittay really has succeeded in making Richards' terminology any more precise and utile, her subsequent usage of these terms is rather clear and specific, and does represent an advance over Richards. This is her initial explication of the observation/intuition that metaphors have a "double semantic content."

Kittay further explicates the notion of a double semantic content in metaphor by adducing the notion of a "connotative semiotic." She says that this notion "permits the two components not to be conflated but to be held in a tensive relation. In a connotative semiotic, the expression level itself consists of an expression and a content."26 Here again Kittay employs a Fregean framework, this time to explain how there can be a tension between the two components of the metaphor. Distinguishing between the "conceptual content" of these two components on the one hand and the meaning of the metaphor on the other, she says that

26. Ibid., p. 28.
... if there exists a topic, which is a conceptual content and not the meaning, and if the vehicle has a conceptual content as well, distinct from the meaning, then every metaphor involves two conceptual contents which function as two simultaneous perspectives or categories in [or from] which some entity is viewed. 27

This way of viewing metaphor, viz., as composed of two different semantic components neither one of which is to be identified with the actual meaning of the metaphor, allows Kittay to distinguish between literal identity statements (that kind of statements problems with which prompted Frege to develop his sense/reference distinction) on the one hand and apparent metaphorical identity statements on the other. This distinction follows from the analogous roles played by 'vehicle' and 'topic' in her theory of metaphor and 'sense' and 'reference' in Frege's theory of literal language. Kittay rightly attributes this achievement to Richards' initial distinction between vehicle and topic, despite its vagueness.

This makes it possible to distinguish between a metaphor's topic and the metaphor's meaning, which in turn makes it possible to identify apparently identity-asserting metaphorical statements as merely novel descriptions instead. Thus, Kittay explains, even though a metaphor such as Black's "Man is a wolf" may look like an identity statement, in reality it is a categorical statement "in which a given entity is placed under two (or more) concepts or in two (or more) categories which are incompatible." 28 That

27. Ibid., p. 29.
28. Ibid., p. 31.
is, the metaphor merely describes one kind of entity as belonging to another kind.

Without recourse to some such notion as Kittay's double semantic content, it would seem that the only way to account for the non-identity-asserting nature of metaphors would be the old and apparently ad hoc appeal to allegedly various senses of 'is.' One would have to posit a metaphorical 'is' in addition to all the other (alleged) 'is's.'

Apparently Kittay would be very happy with Nelson Goodman's account of the two interacting systems in a metaphor were it not for the "excessive extensionalism" and nominalism in his theory of metaphor (p. 33). It is interesting to speculate on how she would react to Catherine Elgin's and Israel Scheffler's strong and cogent defense of Goodmanian extensionalist-nominalist theory of metaphor in their recent "Mainsprings of Metaphor."29

Kittay agrees with Black that the two interacting components involved in any metaphor are systems. But whereas Black spoke vaguely of "systems of associated commonplaces" (systems of truisms about the entities referred to by the topic and vehicle), Kittay proposes that these systems be understood as semantic fields. However, Kittay is careful to note that in Black's 1979 essay on metaphor, he acknowledges that the systems of implications need not be "associated commonplaces."30 But the systems of implica-

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30. Ibid., p. 32.
tions will at least always take these associated commonplaces as background assumptions.

Aristotle called these assumptions 'endoxa,' the given linguistic community's shared beliefs. These are apparently the same as, or very similar to, Kittay's "default assumptions." We must rely on them alone only in the absence of sufficient contextual clues and constraints. The metaphor-producer herself will exploit the context to generate these contextual leads which in turn enable the hearer to determine what Black calls the "implication complex" intended by the speaker. Most metaphors will in fact be found to occur in such a context, in fact, a context rich enough to permit the construction of systems of implications based mainly on the contextual clues and constraints and only partly on background assumptions. Some contexts may even supply constraints that override some of the background assumptions.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the concept of semantic fields in Kittay's theory of metaphor. She carefully and quite fully sets forth modern semantic field theory and its historical development throughout the book. In fact she devotes two entire chapters (6 and 7) to semantic field theory and its application to theory of metaphor.

Kittay defines a semantic field as follows:

When a set of words, a lexical set, is applied to a domain unified by some content, a content domain, we have a semantic field. The semantic fields are comprised of terms which cover some specifiable conceptual ground and which bear
certain relations of affinity and contrast to one another.\textsuperscript{31}

She then employs this notion of semantic fields as a foundation on which to build her "relational" theory of lexical meaning itself, arguing that "a word's meaning is partially determined by its position in a semantic field."\textsuperscript{32}

So it's not just that semantic fields play a large role in Kittay's theory of metaphor and metaphorical meaning—they also play a large role in her theory of literal language and meaning. In fact, the reason they function so prominently in her theory of metaphorical language and meaning is precisely because they function so prominently in her theory of literal language and meaning. She summarizes the issue thus:

It should be possible to draw a specification of the systems operative in metaphor within a general account of meaning, where the general theory identifies the meaning of a term as systematically involving relations to the meaning of other terms in a language. Semantic field theory will provide for us just such a ground on which to build a theory of metaphorical meaning.\textsuperscript{33}

Finally, Kittay explains how the notion of semantic fields can be used to specify the nature of Goodman's systems of labels making "expeditions abroad" when they structure another such system in metaphor. In this explanation, she plainly exhibits the immense role semantic fields play in her account of the inner workings of metaphor:

\textsuperscript{31} Kittay, Metaphor, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 35.
Metaphorical transfers of meaning are transfers from the field of the vehicle to the field of the topic of the relations of affinity and opposition that the vehicle term(s) bears to other terms in its field. More precisely, in metaphor what is transferred are the relations which pertain to a second, distinct content domain. That, in short, is how I characterize metaphor.34

Black had contended that only the topic of a metaphor should be considered as part of a system. But Kittay holds that both topic and vehicle are parts of systems, and these systems are semantic fields, or at least content domains. The caveat must be added because Kittay argues that while the vehicle is always part of a semantic field, often (namely, whenever the metaphor is a novel one) the topic will only be part of a content domain, one that has not yet been "articulated" (structured and made explicit?). Its articulation is effected through its structuring by the semantic field of the vehicle. The unarticulated content domain (unnamed concepts?) is thus rendered explicit. Thus, the articulation of a previously unarticulated content domain produces a semantic field.35

Whenever the metaphor is a novel one, according to Kittay, it is an already articulated content domain, i.e. a semantic field, that produces this initial articulation. The articulation will endure diachronically if the novel metaphor becomes accepted by the language community. Of course, in that event the metaphor would "die" and pass into literal language.

34. Ibid., p. 36.
35. The notion of an unarticulated content domain will be seen to be rather problematic.
All serious philosophical theories of metaphor posit some distinction between literal and metaphorical language. Most also acknowledge that there is a distinct difference between literal and metaphorical meaning. Kittay's is no exception. Most seem to say that while the former is a matter of semantics alone, the latter has to do with pragmatics also (at least in part and to various extents, depending on the theory). But Kittay's theory says that pragmatic considerations are conceptually determinative not only of metaphorical meaning but of literal meaning as well. That is, Kittay regards even literal meaning as radically dependent on context. How then can her theory distinguish between literal and metaphorical meaning? The answer is by introducing a novel and interesting distinction between "first-order" meaning and "second-order" meaning, "a distinction that cuts across the semantic-pragmatic divide and is more useful in delineating metaphor."

In his rigorous but less than perspicuous 1968 article "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," Grice made some important observations concerning different kinds of meaning that can be found and distinguished from one another in a text. These include what he calls 'timeless meaning', 'applied timeless meaning', 'occasion meaning', and 'utterer's occasion meaning'. The final type

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36. Even Lakoff and Johnson must in the end distinguish between the literal and the metaphorical, though they appear very reluctant to do so.
37. Kittay, Metaphor, p. 42.
38. Kittay actually cites a 1969 Grice article, but I'm quite certain she intends the one I'm citing.
seems to be the same kind of meaning as what Grice had first called utterer's or non-natural meaning. And Kittay is correct when she explains, "We can say, provisionally, that timeless meaning and applied timeless meaning depend on conventional assignments of meaning to utterance-types."39 Kittay uses some of these different types of meaning in her analysis of what she calls first- and second-order meaning.

In some cases there will be a separate and distinguishable meaning of each type, but frequently tokens of each type will coincide: "The utterance-type's occasion meaning and the utterer's occasion meaning are often, but need not be, identical to some applied timeless meaning."40 Now Kittay is in a position to specify what she means by "first-order" meaning: "I shall say that when both the utterance-type's occasion meaning and the utterer's occasion meaning are identical to the appropriate applied timeless meaning, then we have first-order meaning."41 Which of several possible applied timeless meanings is appropriate is determined by the linguistic and situational context ("discourse situation") of the utterance.

A second-order meaning then is a meaning that the hearer or reader adopts whenever "features of the utterance and its context" indicate to her that a first-order meaning is "either unavailable or inappropriate."42 More rigorously, and in Gricean terms, "When there is a divergence be-

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 42.
between either the utterance-type's occasion meaning or the utterer's occasion meaning and the appropriate applied timeless meaning of the utterance, then I shall say that this is a case of second-order meaning.\footnote{43} Moreover, Kittay claims, a second-order meaning is always some function of a first-order meaning.

Two prime examples of second-order meanings, for Kittay, are indirect speech acts and metaphors. She even presents a distinctive function for obtaining metaphor when that is the appropriate second-order meaning (in the event the first-order meaning is "either unavailable or inappropriate").

Kittay's theory of metaphor proposes to countenance as metaphors units of text ranging in size from words to phrases to sentences and even to cohesive ("coherently organized") groups of sentences. Her theory may well be the only explicitly philosophical theory of metaphor to include units of discourse larger than the individual sentence. She accomplishes this by including much of traditional pragmatics, most notably contextual factors, within her general semantic theory, upon which she then seeks to build her theory of metaphorical meaning.

But as Kittay notes, some have thought that including as metaphors units of discourse longer than individual sentences would remove metaphor from the realm of semantics altogether, since metaphor would then be a matter of linguis-

\footnote{43. Ibid., pp. 43-44.}
tic use, not linguistic meaning. However, Kittay wants to retain the notion of metaphor's cognitive irreducibility to literal paraphrase. This forces her, she claims, despite an adequate account's inevitable appeal to pragmatics, "to demonstrate that an understanding of metaphor belongs, at least in part, to semantics." Again we find here an unfortunately vague use of 'understanding'—does Kittay mean the conceptual or the psychological notion? If the former, such an appeal to semantics would already include, for Kittay, a number of considerations traditionally associated with pragmatics. There seems to be something vaguely circular here.

Though highly noteworthy and laudable in many respects, Kittay's theory of metaphor is not without some troubling difficulties. These include:

1) The heavy reliance of its theory of literal meaning on contextual considerations, which entails a rejection, or at least a re-drawing, of the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction.

2) The rejection of individual speakers' intentions as conceptually determinative of metaphor.

3) The account of metaphorical truth (especially the referents of "we" in the "furniture of the mind" metaphor for metaphor).

4) The notion of unarticulated conceptual domains (just waiting to be articulated by some appropriate metaphor(s)).

44. Ibid., p. 41.
5) The possibility that the heavy reliance of literal meaning on contextual considerations may imply a denial of the principle of compositionality. There are other trouble spots as well; I will focus my attention, however, only on the first three I have mentioned.

I have touched on the first problem area previously. Kittay is quite explicit concerning her rejection of the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction. The real problem here is an old theoretical one--what are we to count as linguistic meaning? On the one hand, it seems that units of discourse do have some inherent, conventional meaning apart from any context, linguistic or situational. This even appears to be true of many metaphors. For example, even without a context, "Man is a wolf" seems to have a meaning, a meaning fixed by linguistic convention, and we seem to be able to focus on that meaning. (I am speaking here as devil's advocate, as will be clear from my own theory of metaphor in Part II.)

On the other hand, what if the speaker or writer means something else by his words than that apparent conventional meaning conveyed by them apart from context? This is clearly possible, though he is incapable, because of the inherent constraints on the communicative capabilities of language dictated and imposed by conventional meaning, to communicate just any meaning at all by his words.45 So the

45. Contra Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, who, when asked what he meant by saying so-and-so, replied that he was master of his words and meant whatsoever he wanted to mean by them. This kind of thinking seems to be ruled out by
speaker's intended meaning must clearly be related in some systematic way to his words' conventional meaning. It was just this theoretical issue, I take it, which motivated philosophers of language such as Grice to try to spell out this systematic relation.

But many philosophers of language would argue that the speaker's meaning neither plays nor should play any role in the specification of linguistic meaning. Thus, Davidson holds that metaphor, for example, has no meaning beyond the literal meaning-- the only meaning-- of the words it is couched in. He relegates metaphor, depending as it does on context and speakers' intentions, to the realm of use alone, i.e., pragmatics.

But Kittay wants to argue that even for literal language, context must enter into any specification of linguistic meaning. She says that we just don't know what a unit of discourse, however large or small, means apart from some contextual environment, either linguistic or situational or both. This appears to be an epistemic point. But does this entail the corresponding "ontic" point that a unit of discourse may have no linguistic meaning at all apart from some linguistic or non-linguistic environment? Not at all. (My own view, elaborated in Part II, is that most linguistic units have a set of conventional meanings specified contextually and compositionally. From among this set speakers'
intentions pick out one (sometimes more than one, but very rarely) as the meaning of the unit.)

At this point we should let Kittay herself explain at some length how her view of literal language as context-dependent affects the shape a semantic/pragmatic distinction would take in her semantic theory, specifically, whether metaphor would be considered a matter of language (and hence of semantic meaning) or only of language use:

Since contextual independence has generally been taken as the point of demarcation between language use and language meaning, is there still a useful distinction to be drawn between semantic and pragmatic concerns? And if so, on what side of the line does metaphor fall? In other words, the question still remains: Is it legitimate to speak of metaphorical meaning?

Searle thinks that the context-dependence of literal language does nothing to disturb the distinction between sentence and speaker meaning, a distinction he sees as coincident with the meaning/use distinction on which Davidson depends. Searle assimilates metaphor to speaker meaning, a move I have challenged, asserting instead the stronger claim that metaphorical meaning is significantly related to the nature of the utterance-type itself. But even on Searle's weaker claim, speaker meaning is meaning still and it bears on truth conditions. Once we allow context to function in the case of literal meaning, then, as Searle's move indicates, the distinction which remains between use and meaning shifts. The shift is such that metaphor influences meaning, and its truth conditions need consideration in a semantic theory.46

Kittay is saying, I take it, that the role context plays in (objectively) determining literal meaning has, as part of its significance, the consequence that metaphor belongs to linguistic meaning (semantics), not use (pragmatics).

46. Kittay, Metaphor, pp. 113-114, my emphasis.
Kittay buttresses this contention with a useful consideration of the difference between metaphors and irony, on the one hand, and lies on the other. She claims that for a liar's lies to be effective, i.e., for his lying to "succeed," his audience must be unaware that he believes his utterances are false. "The liar who can . . . be read as a liar is a poor liar indeed."47 She contrasts this with a speaker's or writer's use of metaphor and irony:

When teaching students to detect Socrates' irony, we must teach them how to read the text so that they recognize that the irony is evident in the text itself. . . . [M]etaphor, like irony, would be futile if it could not be 'read off the text'.48

Kittay concludes:

[L]ying is . . . a use of language which necessitates no further semantic explanation. . . . [But] because their proper interpretations require identifiable elements of what I call the discourse situation, metaphor and irony demand an analysis which is, at least in part, semantic; they are not simply forms of language use.49

Kittay's point is that metaphor and irony are not just uses of language like lying, but are features of language itself. This is a consequence of her re-drawing of the semantic/pragmatic distinction. Some traditional uses of language become part of language itself.

Nevertheless, we need to recognize that Kittay's view at this point is controversial from a theoretical viewpoint: the issue, again, is what we should count as linguistic meaning, i.e., what exactly constitutes linguistic meaning?

47. Ibid., p. 114.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
If linguistic conventions are all that should enter in (a big "if," granted) then Kittay is just wrong, and her entire theory of metaphor goes by the board, since it is built squarely on a purely contextual theory of literal linguistic meaning.

Moreover, I believe that Kittay's own use of semantic field theory in her account of general (literal) meaning militates against this purely contextual account of literal meaning. For linguistic terms in semantic fields presumably have their meanings independently of any specific contexts of use. Thus Kittay's contextual account of literal meaning vitiates her use of semantic field theory. I will return to this point later.

But of course her theory of metaphorical meaning does fit marvelously well with her general theory of linguistic meaning. The one major obstacle I see for Kittay here, apart from the controversial theoretical issue I have just attempted to expound, is that she seems to have arrived at this contextual theory of literal linguistic meaning because of or through a consideration of desiderata for an adequate theory of metaphor. That is to say, Kittay has let what is necessary for an adequate theory of metaphor dictate and determine her general semantic theory. It certainly appears, at least, that the tail is wagging the dog here, in much the same way that Lakoff and Johnson's general philosophical and even socio-political commitments determine their theory of metaphor.
But perhaps before we convict Kittay of semantic heresy on these points (letting theory of metaphor dictate general theory of meaning), we really need to settle a major question I asked near the end of the Introduction--whether or not a theory of literal meaning should be expected to incorporate a theory of metaphorical meaning. This is perhaps just another way of posing the question asked above: what should we count as linguistic meaning, i.e., what exactly constitutes linguistic meaning? Recall my comments on this question:

This seems to be a purely theoretical question, depending solely on our views of the issues referred to in the three 'if' clauses above. ["So metaphorical truth would depend on metaphorical meaning, if there is such a thing as metaphorical truth, and if there is such a thing as metaphorical meaning, and if metaphorical truth is a type of semantic truth. But these are a lot of 'if's'."] For example, if we hold that there is no metaphorical meaning, then, so it would seem, there is no metaphorical truth (as a special kind of truth). Consequently, we obviously would need not worry about whether or not our theory of literal meaning could incorporate metaphorical meaning or metaphorical truth. Even if we hold that metaphors do have their own type of meaning, that would not necessarily settle the question whether or not a theory of literal meaning should incorporate a theory of metaphorical meaning. For if we relate this metaphorical meaning to uses of linguistic items rather than to the linguistic items themselves, then, for other theoretical reasons, we still might not want to include metaphor within a theory of literal meaning. And so forth.

It is not yet time to answer this question, so we must postpone judging Kittay on these points for the present. Yet however we decide this issue, I think that Kittay's major reliance on a coupling of contextual considerations and se-
mantic field theory in her account of literal meaning will appear problematic.

As to how Kittay's reliance on context in theory of literal meaning and her consequent rejection of the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction affect or should affect her position with regard to the principle of compositionality, she seems to say very little, although she herself appears to be somewhat less than enchanted with it. But does her general semantic theory logically entail a rejection of compositionality? (For our purposes here, we will adopt a very simple version of compositionality, viz., that the meaning of the whole is a function of the meaning of its parts.)

According to Richard Grandy, no. For even if the lexical meanings of the words in a unit of discourse are not and cannot be fully determined apart from a consideration of their context (linguistic and/or situational), it is still the case that the conventional meanings of these very same words determine (both objectively and subjectively) the meaning of the larger linguistic context in which they are situated. Thus, the meanings of individual words in a given context both determine and are determined by the meaning of that context.

While this may seem somewhat paradoxical, and probably is, it is really just an instance of the truism that the meaning of the parts determine the meaning of the whole and

50. In a very helpful personal conversation.
the meaning of the whole determines the meaning of the parts. In its epistemic or subjective sense, this is a well-recognized hermeneutical principle—certainly circular, but not viciously so. Thus, because the determination of linguistic meaning is a two-way street, and Kittay's general semantic theory does not logically rule this out, compositionality is preserved in her theory.

Now it seems to me that this is a very complicated question and that the above solution is a bit confused and doesn't quite do the question justice. I would argue that the hermeneutical circle mentioned is just that—hermeneutical. As such, it is merely epistemic or subjective in nature. It has nothing to do with "ontologically" fixing whatever conventional meanings the constituent words have. All it does is to disambiguate the actual meanings of the words and the context they constitute from the possible meanings they both might have in light of the conventional meanings of the constituent words. This disambiguation must not be confused or conflated with an "ontological" determination of meaning. The confusion arises from a failure to distinguish the two senses of 'determine,' the subjective (epistemic) and the objective (ontic).

How does this argument bear on the question whether Kittay's general semantic theory, in its dependence on context, preserves compositionality? Well, presumably Kittay herself would give the same kind of answer given by Grandy above. That answer preserves compositionality, but I be-
lieve it to be an erroneous answer. I believe that because Kittay's theory allows context to dictate or determine (even if only in part) literal meaning, it is logically committed to a denial of compositionality.

Kittay argues that the semantic intentions of the speaker play no role in the conceptual identification of, i.e., the theoretical determination of what counts as, metaphor:

[I]f 'speaker's meaning' is a term which designates the actual intentions of actual speakers, then it is arguable that speaker's meaning is not pertinent . . . to metaphor . . . . 51

I shall say little about individual speakers' intentions in making metaphor. Such intentions are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining that an utterance is metaphorical. On the one hand, we may intend but fail to make metaphor— we may not be sufficiently competent in the language. On the other hand, we may interpret as metaphorical statements which were never so intended. 52

. . . especially in the case of metaphor, . . . how else are we to ascertain the occasion meaning of the sentence when it diverges from timeless meanings except by reference to the utterer's occasion meaning [i.e., his intended meaning]. None the less, we need to establish that metaphors, while diverging from the timeless meanings of the utterance-types, need not be dependent on utterer's occasion meaning. I shall show that the metaphorical use of language depends on systematic semantic features of language. It is this which allows them to be understood independently of speakers' intentions. 53

Her claim is that we can and must settle for the context to determine when we have a metaphor, and when we have literal discourse. Thus, she says

51. Kittay, Metaphor, p. 44.
52. Ibid., p. 14, my emphasis.
53. Ibid., p. 46, author's emphasis.
... [T]he situational and linguistic context of the utterance provides us with enough information to understand (most of the time, that is [?!]) the proper construal of the words uttered—so much so that even without having an actual speaker to whom to ascribe intentions we can recognize when the meanings properly attributed to the words are not simply their literal meanings.  

Interestingly, Kittay doesn't do away with intentions entirely in her general semantic account or in her account of metaphorical meaning— it's just the speaker's actual intentions that are irrelevant: "We need not rely on any actual intentions for meaningfulness; rather, what we do is impute intentions, and the imputed intentions derive from the regular and systematic interrelations of terms within a language."  

This concern of Kittay's to disengage metaphor from speaker's (actual) intentions is of a piece with her desire to provide a purely semantic account of metaphor. But does this desire alone logically require that she ignore speaker's intentions in the theoretical determination of what is to count as metaphor? I think not.  

First of all, Kittay, as we already know, rejects the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction, re-drawing it such that both situational and linguistic context (traditionally conceived of as part of pragmatics) become relevant to semantic (linguistic) meaning. But speaker's intentions are often considered to be integrally related to that context. Hence, including context in semantics will drag 

54. Ibid., p. 48.
55. Ibid., my emphasis.
speaker's intended meaning right along with it (into semantics).

Secondly, it seems plain that utterers' intentions do play an important role in the determination of what counts conceptually as a metaphor. Consider, for example, the case of a linguistically competent idiot. Imagine that he utters, without any intentions at all, let alone intentions to utter a metaphor, a sentence susceptible in its context and on Kittay's other criteria (e.g., the appropriate parts of the statement come from distinct semantic fields) of a metaphorical interpretation. Now if utterers' intentions play no role whatsoever in the determination of what counts as a metaphor, then according to Kittay's position what he uttered is a metaphor. But this seems highly implausible.

This scenario leads me to maintain that for an utterance or text to be a metaphor, the speaker or author must intend to produce a metaphor. We could, of course, give the utterance a metaphorical interpretation if we liked. For that matter, we could interpret any utterance at all in any way we pleased. But the question whether or not our interpretation was either wise or correct would remain. This is true, in particular, in the case of interpreting utterances metaphorically. The sets of metaphors and metaphorical interpretations are not co-extensive, although the sets of metaphors and correct or proper metaphorical interpretations are.
Richard Grandy has taken exception to the above scenario. He asks us to consider the case of a young child of limited vocabulary who doesn't know the first thing about metaphor(s). This young child wants to communicate something, say her impression that a beautiful sunset was indeed beautiful, for which she lacks the literal linguistic resources with which to express herself. So she utters something vaguely metaphorical, succeeding in communicating her aesthetic appreciation of the sunset in literal terms that she is familiar with but that are inappropriate for describing sunsets literally or in terms of a dead or dying metaphor. Grandy's claim is that she indeed uttered a metaphor. How should we respond to this?

It does seem that the child has uttered something non-literal and succeeded in communicating. But this does not entail that she uttered a metaphor. For metaphor does not exhaust the category of discourse that we call "figurative." So the answer is rather simple-- she uttered some sort of figurative statement, but not a metaphor. I still maintain that speaker's semantic intentions to produce a metaphor are essential for an utterance to be a metaphor, though not necessarily for us to give an utterance a metaphorical interpretation. (But if the utterance were not a metaphor, and we gave it a metaphorical interpretation or "construal", our interpretation/construal would just be wrong.)

56. In personal conversation.
Thirdly, some of Kittay's arguments for rejecting speaker's intentions as determinative of metaphor are erroneous. I will mention but two. First, speaking of an actor's words in a play, Kittay writes,

[T]he play may have been written by an author whose identity has been lost or never revealed, and hence whose intentions are inaccessible to the spectator or reader of the play. It seems odd to have to appeal to intentions to which we could not possibly have access.\(^{57}\)

Given a sufficiently wide hermeneutical principle of charity, there seems little reason to think that we can in principle have no access whatsoever to even an anonymous author's intentions. Of course, we might never be justified in claiming absolute Cartesian certainty about any particular "analytical hypothesis" we might formulate concerning the author's intentions, but attaining Cartesian certainty seems impossible in any endeavor. I doubt that Kittay would require it of us in our search for speaker's/author's intentions. But if not, then one wonders just what she is getting at. It does seem "odd to have to appeal to intentions to which we could not possibly have access." But the question is, are there any such inaccessible intentions? I don't think Kittay has shown there are, in any case.

Second, consider the following passage again:

... [T]he situational and linguistic context of the utterance provides us with enough information to understand (most of the time, that is [?!!]) the proper construal of the words uttered-- so much so that even without having an actual speaker to whom

\(^{57}\) Kittay, Metaphor, pp. 47-48.
to ascribe intentions we can recognize when the meanings properly attributed to the words are not simply their literal meanings.\textsuperscript{58}

The question-begging here is blatant. Kittay merely assumes we know beforehand, somehow, what counts as "enough" information, and a "proper" construal of uttered words, and when meanings are "properly" attributed to words. One must do more than just make these assertions. I conclude that Kittay has not made out her case for rejecting speaker's/author's intentions to produce a metaphor as part of the very concept of metaphor.

Kittay's account of metaphorical reference and truth is especially troubling. She employs an anaphoric account of metaphorical reference, filling it out with Chastain's notion of an implicit or "covert" context. Immediately there are two major problems. First, Chastain's definition of 'context' is so broad as to virtually render any account employing it trivially true, unilluminating, and uninteresting. Note what he includes in "context":

\begin{quote}
Context includes 'anything that has meaning or sense . . . Anything which expresses something or represents something . . . .' Contexts include not only discourses, texts, maps, paintings, statues, scale models, etc. but also mental states such as memory, imagination, and perception.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

Second, a serious problem of self-contradiction arises from Kittay's use of Chastain's "covert contexts." The problem is that covert contexts can be mental states and mental discourses. In fact, these are the most important

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 48.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 309.
kinds of covert contexts for Kittay's purposes. But her theory rules out speakers' actual intentions as theoretically determinative in any way of metaphor. Yet these covert contexts surely seem to be speaker's intentions, or at least something too close to them for Kittay to use without serious threat of self-contradiction.

Similarly, the notion of a covert context posits an epistemic connection between speaker and object referred to. But it seems contradictory or inadmissible for Kittay to appeal to epistemic connections in a theoretically explanatory way when she has already rejected speaker's intentions. Finally, Kittay wanted to eliminate speaker's intentions from contextual considerations, which she included as part of semantics proper. But now, here are speaker's intentions, or something very much like them, right in the context, albeit an "implicit" one.

I come now to Kittay's "rearranging the furniture of our mind" metaphor for metaphor, which lies at the heart of her account of metaphorical truth. Kittay says that she uses this metaphor "to make the case for the irreducibility of the cognitive content of metaphor and to demonstrate the relationship between meaning and truth in metaphor."60 I suppose I myself retain enough of the logical positivists' attitude toward metaphor that I wish Kittay could have spelled out her account of metaphorical truth without resorting to a metaphor. But this can be overlooked, as long

60. Ibid., p. 314.
as the account in terms of a specific metaphor is sufficiently cogent. Unfortunately, Kittay's may not be.

Specifically, she talks about metaphor's rearrangement of our conceptual scheme in terms of rearranging a roomful of furniture:

Working through the analogy we can say that the room, with the walls, windows, and doors intact, as well as the material of which the furniture is composed is the world we humans encounter, prior to our activity of structuring and creating our environment. The furniture, the relation the pieces bear to one another, and the rules we follow for placing and using the furnishings represent our creation and arrangement of the world we inhabit.

... As we find and arrange the furniture of the room, we set and define the order among things which we assume, given our knowledge, beliefs, and desires at that time, to be the best (or the only, or the only conceivable) way of arranging our world. To speak correctly is to utilize the furniture according to current conventions reflected in its correct placement or to make changes governed only by the rules of furniture arrangement. ... 61

Kittay seems to be talking about individual minds here. But sometimes it seems she is referring to a language community's collective conceptual scheme as well, as, for example, when she speaks of truth as relative to a conceptual scheme:

To assent to the proper placement of a piece of furniture is ... to speak the truth. Truth, then, is relative to what is the proper order. What is designated the proper order is the preferred or privileged conceptual scheme. 62

Is there more than one conceptual scheme then? It's hard to see how any given language community could have more

61. Ibid., p. 317.
62. Ibid., p. 318.
than one collective conceptual scheme. So in reality "the proper order," "the preferred conceptual scheme," and the "privileged conceptual scheme" not only all refer to one and the same scheme, they must also refer to the only one there is. Kittay's view, if she is consistent, would amount to something like Wittgenstein's theory (in The Brown Book) that the correct application of terms is ultimately determined simply by actual linguistic practice. Thus these designations are misleading since they imply there are other schemes either extant or possibly extant when the preferred scheme is already in place.

But apparently Kittay really is envisioning multiple general conceptual schemes among large segments of the community, for consider the following quotations (notice also the vagueness and confusion):

A conceptual scheme is a chosen ordering which will both reflect and shape what we take as true and meaningful, although the fact of alternate schemes need not be precluded by a given arrangement. 63

Once we settle on a furniture arrangement, a privileged conceptual scheme, we can indeed claim that there is a proper place for each piece . . . . 64

Who is the "we"-- one individual, a religious group, a language, a language community, or . . . ? Does Kittay really want to admit that truth may be relative to all of these? If not, then exactly what does she mean?

If Kittay does really have in mind the possibility of a variety of alternate schemes, from which any member of the

63. Ibid., p. 320.
64. Ibid., p. 322.
community may "pick", then the crucial questions become 1) which conceptual scheme is the "preferred" or "privileged" one, and 2) why (how did it get to be privileged)? Presumably, the preferred scheme is the one held by the majority of the language community. But how did it attain this privileged position? Unless Kittay's account of metaphorical truth can answer these questions, it will remain only trivially true at best, if not actually question-begging. For example, notice how circular and/or question-begging the following account is absent the kind of answers I've just indicated must be provided:

If what is meaningful and true has to do with proper arrangements then meaning and truth are mediated by what we take as proper. What we take as proper is, in turn, determined by those considerations which are pertinent to truth.65

In any case, rules or conventions for arranging one's own conceptual scheme and speaking "correctly" require and are relative to language communities, not just individual speakers or their minds. The problem is that throughout this metaphorical account of metaphorical truth, Kittay either keeps equivocating between individual persons' conceptual schemes and the overall conceptual scheme of a language community, or she seems to assume that one's own individual conceptual scheme can be formed and re-formed in isolation from that of one's language community.

According to Kittay, as we have seen above, truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, namely, the privileged or

65. Ibid.
preferred one that "we" (whoever this is) settle upon. In fact, this makes it seem as though truth is determined by this conceptual scheme. But it is implausible that truth is thus determined by whatever the majority or any subset of the population thinks is true. This would mean that various (apparently) contradictory statements from various cultures and historical periods are all true, provided only that they be based on their respective language community's preferred conceptual scheme. Granted that the truth values of two apparently contradictory statements are relative to the languages in which they are made, this does not entail that, should the meanings the statements express (relative to and determined by, among other factors, the languages in which they are expressed) be in fact contradictory, we would not have a genuine contradiction.

Worse, if "we" refers to any individual at all, then whatever she happens to believe will be true, provided only that it is based on her own preferred conceptual scheme. And any two people whose statements contradict each other will both be correct! Furthermore, what about a madman's preferred conceptual scheme? Aren't there some objective standards by which to judge that such a person's scheme is just plain wrong?66

66. I realize all this sounds like a very uncharitable reading of Kittay's position here. But I can think of no other possible construal of her words, if the words she is using have their usual meanings.
Now how does all this hook up with metaphorical truth, according to Kittay's account? The closest Kittay comes to answering this question is as follows:

The given arrangement yields what I have called a first-order meaning. Alterations which at once respect that order but answer to different constraints---constraints that call for a different sense of order---are species of second-order meaning, metaphor, in particular. If, as I have suggested, this sense of order is what we call a conceptual scheme, then metaphors introduce partial reorderings of our conceptual scheme. . . . If the altered scheme is accepted and becomes the 'proper ordering' then, what was once a metaphor can now be represented literally in the new scheme. 67

How exactly is this supposed to account for the truth of metaphors, when they are true? Is it that those metaphors that effect a re-ordering of a conceptual scheme are true? No, since all metaphors do that, on Kittay's view. Is it that metaphors whose re-orderings become "accepted" and "proper" are true? No, this is just the description of a successful metaphor dying and permanently altering a conceptual scheme. Is metaphorical truth, like truth simpliciter, relative to the (linguistic?) community's collective conceptual scheme, or to each and every individual's own conceptual scheme, or . . . ? All this is extremely foggy in Kittay's account. All in all, Kittay's theory of metaphor is much more successful and insightful in dealing with metaphorical meaning than with metaphorical truth.

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67. Kittay, Metaphor, p. 323. As Richard Grady has reminded me, this account of how metaphor reorders conceptual schemes is rather reminiscent of Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking.
CHAPTER 5: MAC CORMAC.

Earl Mac Cormac justifiably labels his theory of metaphor "cognitive." 1 Like Kittay, Mac Cormac claims that his theory is a development, a more rigorous, formalized version, of Black's interaction theory. But because Mac Cormac's theory has considerably less philosophical interest and insight than Kittay's, I will have less to say about it.

Throughout the book Mac Cormac emphasizes that metaphor has three levels, at least for purposes of philosophical analysis—1) "surface language", the most superficial level, 2) "semantics", the middle level, and 3) "cognition", the deepest level. These levels are not mutually exclusive and are linked by a "knowledge process." 2 Thus, he argues, an adequate account of metaphor must be able to account for all three levels.

But he sees metaphor as basically a cognitive process, a means of thinking. This sets him apart from Kittay who, while acknowledging the role of metaphor in actual thought processes, views it primarily as a linguistic phenomenon. This is why she deals with metaphor primarily at the semantic level while Mac Cormac focuses on the "cognition" level.

Mac Cormac believes that in their capacity as a cognitive process, metaphors "mediate between culture and the mind, influencing both cultural and biological evolution." 3 He shares Kittay's view that metaphor is cognitively irre-

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2. Ibid., p. 227.
3. Ibid.
ducible and indispensable and can thus convey truths apart from literal paraphrase. But Mac Cormac goes farther when he argues that no metaphors are even susceptible of literal paraphrase.

How are metaphors generated, according to Mac Cormac? "[M]etaphor results from a creative process in which widely disparate referents are drawn from the long-term memory and juxtaposed to produce new possibilities for knowledge." How exactly is this supposed to happen? As Lakoff points out in his review of Mac Cormac's book, Mac Cormac uses an (outdated) componential analysis and feature theory for his semantics to account for this juxtaposition.

Metaphorical meaning arises from "the semantical aspects of communication, the context in cultural settings, and the creation of new concepts." Thus, with Kittay, Mac Cormac is aware that context contributes to metaphorical meaning. But it isn't the same kind of context for Mac Cormac. He does not make the radical Kittayan move of including situational and linguistic context within semantics. He does agree with Kittay, however, that, whatever the correct theoretical account of metaphorical meaning, it must be based on and be very similar to an acceptable account of literal meaning: "Like the determination of meaning in ordinary language, metaphorical meaning arises from various di-

4. Ibid.
mensions of metaphor—communication, culture, and cognition."

Summarizing how literal language and a correspondence theory of truth provide for epistemic objectivity in his theory, Mac Cormac writes

I also claim that the literal offers an Archimedean point for objectivity in knowledge. The operation of the correspondence theory in metaphor links the abstractions of semantics to the attributes of the referents of metaphors by identifying some of the fuzzy sets (nodes in the hierarchical network) defining words with prototypical categories. Without this kind of linkage, my theory of metaphor would express truth solely by means of a coherence theory. As a theory of language, without some ground in the empirical world, my account of metaphor may have been relativistic.

This quotation points to one of the major problems of Mac Cormac's theory: it seems too inorganic, too hodge-podge—in a word, too ad hoc. While not in agreement with all of Lakoff's criticisms of Mac Cormac, I do find Lakoff right on the mark when he says

What is sad about the book is that the author doesn't know the empirical research in these fields [semantics, prototype theory, cognitive representations, speech act theory, etc.] very well, and winds up taking inadequate versions of each of them, patching them together into a bizarre quasi-formal theory that doesn't tell us much about anything.

The above quotation from Mac Cormac also exhibits his annoying and confusing tendency to employ long, verbose sentences. This will be all the more apparent in later citations.

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
Mac Cormac intends his semantic account of metaphor as a rational reconstruction of "a process by which individuals can comprehend metaphors."\textsuperscript{10} He first constructs a theory of how metaphor effects semantic changes, based on a general theory of semantic change in natural language. This theory of metaphorical semantic change goes as follows:

\ldots I begin by establishing the sets of members defined by semantic markers as fuzzy sets. I argue that the concept of a fuzzy set is not incompatible with the way in which classes of objects are perceived in the world as prototypical classes. Finally, I attempt to construct formal but flexible relationships among semantic markers defined as fuzzy, prototypical classes that alter semantic features of the referents of a metaphor.\textsuperscript{11}

In constructing this theory of semantic change wrought by metaphor, Mac Cormac makes use of Samuel Levin's "construal rules of adjunction and displacement of semantic markers to demonstrate the possibility of semantic change of meaning for metaphors within a theory of abstraction."\textsuperscript{12} He also adverts to Uriel Weinreich's "careful assessment of how semantic change occurs through the rearrangement of semantic features in linking and nonlinking relationships," adding that "Weinreich's position, like that of Levin, can be mated to the representation of semantic markers by fuzzy sets."\textsuperscript{13}

This theory of metaphorical semantic change then gets incorporated into a "full theory of semantics adequate to produce metaphors." This semantic theory for metaphor theory comprises the following elements:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Mac Cormac, A Cognitive Theory, p. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 85.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 61. See also pp. 111-113.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 113.
\end{itemize}
(1) the assumption of a conceptual semantic space represented in an n-dimensional matrix, (2) the semantic meaning of words generated by semantic markers represented as fuzzy sets, (3) the organization of semantic associations in quasi-tree-like hierarchies of clusters . . . , (4) a method for producing semantic rules of change of meaning grounded in cognitive processes rather than the invention of essential universal semantic rules of change.14

I will spare the reader the tedious details of Mac Cormac's quasi-formal, quasi-mathematical semantic theory of metaphor.

The notion of fuzzy sets enters Mac Cormac's theory of metaphor at several crucial points. First of all, words themselves are "formed by associations of semantic markers located in fuzzy sets." Secondly, fuzzy sets are used to explain how prototypicality works:

Lakoff and Johnson believe that one must be committed to prototypical categories rather than to fixed abstract sets if one wants to avoid successfully the pitfalls of an absolute objectivism. Fuzzy sets, however, are not necessarily incompatible with prototypical natural categories because members of fuzzy sets are members to a degree; the prototype can be a full member defying [sic.; probably 'defining' is intended] the nature of the set, whereas other entities bearing a family resemblance to the prototype can have a membership function of a lesser degree.15

Thirdly, fuzzy sets are used to claim that in metaphor there can be degrees of truth and falsity. Mac Cormac develops a "four-valued logic" based on Zadeh's fuzzy set theory to try to show this. This supposedly puts to flight the controver-

15. Ibid., p. 74.
sion theory's contention that metaphors are inevitably false, at least on a literal interpretation.

There don't seem to be any major problems in Mac Cormac's use of fuzzy sets in his definition of words. This move seems fairly close to current rigorous semantic field theory. The real problems arise in his use of fuzzy sets in connection with his prototype theory and theory of metaphorical truth (the "four-valued logic").

First of all, Mac Cormac uses fuzzy set theory to explicate his prototype theory. Lacking expert familiarity with current prototype theory, I will let Lakoff delineate Mac Cormac's failings in his application of fuzzy sets to that theory:

Rosch went through three stages in research on prototype theory. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, when research focused on categories such as color and shape, it appeared as if fuzzy set theory might be the right approach. In the mid-1970's, studies of family resemblances in categories of physical objects led to models using weighted feature bundles and similarity measures. By the late 1970's, it had become clear that prototype effects have a much more complex origin, and contemporary models make use of complex schemas and folk theories. Today, no serious prototype theorist uses fuzzy set theory. Unfortunately, Mac Cormac assumes that fuzzy set theory is still a viable approach to prototype theory, and bases his theory of metaphor upon it. Thus, even before Mac Cormac gets to metaphor, he has committed himself to an inadequate and long-outdated theory of semantics.16

However, I am familiar enough with rudimentary prototype theory of categories17 to know that it is not

17. From a seminar with Richard Grandy on aspects of the philosophical investigation of color, Rice University, spring 1986.
really necessary for an adequate account of the phenomenon of "fuzziness." For even the classical view of con-
cepts/categories (that they are strictly and rigorously de-
finied in terms of necessary and sufficient features and con-
ditions) is capable of handling this. This can be done sim-
ply by assuming that some of the defining features of any
candidate for possible inclusion in a given category are
themselves analog ("fuzzy"). The reason this possibility is
so widely overlooked is that the classical view is usually
taken to include the claim that all features are digital.
But this is not strictly a part of the classical view.

Furthermore, fuzzy sets/logic is not the only way of
"cashing out" prototypes. The cashing out of prototype the-
ory for any given prototypical category in terms of fuzzy
sets/logic would go like this:

"X is in (prototypical category) C to degree n"
iff X resembles Pc (C's prototype) to degree n.

But this cashing out can also be accomplished in terms of
sharp (non-fuzzy) boundaries thus:

"X is in C" iff X resembles Pc more than any Pc'
(any prototype of any other prototypical category).

It seems that Lakoff was making, in a roundabout sort of
way, this or a similar point in his criticism of Mac Cormac
quoted above. 18

18. Interestingly, Lakoff himself at one time defended
the use of fuzzy concepts for prototypes and "hedges", in
his "Hedges: A Study of Meaning Criteria and the Logic of
p. 458-508.
Mac Cormac also uses fuzzy set theory in his account of metaphorical truth. Specifically, he attempts to use fuzzy sets to develop a "four-valued logic" with which to rate the degrees of truth and falsity of any given metaphor. The idea is that the more (less) the metaphor's vehicle "resembles" its tenor (using the traditional designations for ease of reference), the more (less) true the metaphor will be. That is, in terms Mac Cormac borrows from Philip Wheelwright, the greater the resemblance, the more "epiphoric" the metaphor, and the less the resemblance, the more "diaphoric" the metaphor. What he means by this, briefly, is as follows:

Wheelwright characterized epiphors as those metaphors that express more than they suggest. Diaphors suggest more than they express. Since metaphors depend on both analogies and disanalogies among the attributes of their referents, all metaphors possess both epiphoric and diaphoric elements. Those metaphors possessing more analogy among the attributes of their referents, however, can be said to be epiphors, whereas those possessing more disanalogy can be said to be diaphors. 19

Let me try to delineate Mac Cormac's four-valued logic for metaphors a bit more fully. It is meant to be a means of evaluating the truth values of all metaphors without resorting to a merely two-valued logic, a logic which, Mac Cormac thinks, when applied to metaphors and metaphorical truth inevitably forces one to accept the controversy theory of metaphorical truth. Mac Cormac characterizes this theory as saying that "metaphors necessarily express falsity

when interpreted literally." Mac Cormac wants to avoid this if possible, for the following reason: "The controversy theory poses a dilemma for the philosopher seeking an explanatory account of metaphor: either metaphors assert falsehoods or the only legitimate metaphors are the least interesting ones, the ones that collapse into ordinary language or into explicit analogy." Mac Cormac wants no part of either horn of this dilemma.

Here, in brief, is how Mac Cormac views his semantics of metaphor's relation to his four-valued logic for metaphor, and how he plans for this account to avoid the controversy theory.

The conceptual process that generates metaphor identifies similar attributes of the referents to form an analogy and identifies dissimilar attributes of the referents to produce semantic anomaly. The degrees of similarity and dissimilarity determine the truth value of the metaphor. I employ a four-valued logic to express a range of truth values so that a metaphor need not be classified solely as either true or false in the standard form of two-valued logic. I deny the contention of the controversy theory of metaphor that metaphors necessarily express falsity when interpreted literally. I argue that metaphors can be understood as insightful and as conveying partial truth without first understanding the metaphor as an intentional expression of falsity.

So Mac Cormac proposes to evaluate a metaphor's truth value on the basis of a literal interpretation of the metaphor. From this it can be seen that Mac Cormac is, in effect, denying that there are metaphorical meanings, or at least

20. Ibid., p. 5.
21. Ibid., p. 29.
22. Ibid.
that, if there are, we need not take them into account when deciding the truth value of their corresponding metaphors.

Now how exactly is this four-valued logic for metaphors supposed to work? Mac Cormac begins by considering Zadeh's and Lakoff's work on fuzzy sets, specifically the notion of "tallness" and the (fuzzy) set of tall persons. Relative to this set, according to Mac Cormac, some persons may be both tall and not tall at the same time:

Consider the statement "John is tall and not tall," which normally seems to be a contradiction but under this interpretation of his membership in the fuzzy set of tall people may not be a contradiction at all. Relative to some people John is in fact tall and relative to others not tall. Recognizing that one need not assign the value of only true or false to the statement "John is tall," Zadeh noted the possibility of establishing a three-valued logic within the bounded relationship \[0 < b < a < 1\] such that

1. "x belongs to A" if \[f_A(x) \geq a;\]
2. "x does not belong to A" if \[f_A(x) \leq b;\]
3. "x has an indeterminate status relative to A" if \[b < f_A(x) < a.\]

This leads to a three-valued logic (Kleene, 1952) with three truth values: T (\[f_A(x) > a\]), F (\[f_A(x) < b\]), and U (\[b < f_A(x) < a\]).

Thus, according to Mac Cormac, membership in fuzzy sets can be nicely explicated in terms of a three-valued logic.

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24. \[f_A(x)\] is Zadeh's "membership function" for fuzzy sets. Its value at \(x\) represents \(x\)'s "grade of membership" in (fuzzy) set A.

25. Mac Cormac, A Cognitive Theory, pp. 86-87. But as Richard Grandy notes, this set-up isn't really truth functional when one looks at \`/\' and \`\' because of the specified ranges.
But things get even more complicated when Mac Cormac applies fuzzy set theory and its three-valued logic to the case of metaphor:

My strategy is to explore the semantic markers of the referents of metaphors and to interpret them in terms of the semantic truth values of Zadeh's notion of a fuzzy set. The truth values of these attributes express the degree to which each attribute of the referent of the metaphor can be a member in the set of attributes defined by a literal reading of that referent. The interpretation of the metaphor determines which attribute of the referent must be measured in terms of membership in the set defined by the literal reading of that referent. I am forced to compare two kinds of attributes for the same referent: (1) those presented by the metaphorical interpretation and (2) those presented by a literal interpretation.26

I find this account very difficult to follow. I am not sure if the problem is the inherent difficulty of the concepts involved, or a lack of clarity in Mac Cormac's exposition of these concepts, or both.

In any case, he continues with a specific example of a metaphor that has at least two metaphorical interpretations: "The locomotive is in bed." This can mean either that a dynamic person has retired for evening, or that a railroad car has been put in the roundhouse. Mac Cormac restricts himself to these two possible metaphorical interpretations, and so shall I. He acknowledges that

In ordinary circumstances, an individual locomotive seems to be a paradigm example of an entity with a membership $f_A(x)$ value of 1 in the set Inanimate. But in the metaphor the membership function shifts to a value less than 1 as one begins to see the similarity between the dynamism of a person and the obvious dynamism of the locomotive engine. The metaphor may become less diaphoric.27

26. Ibid., p. 87.
27. Ibid.
Notice here at the outset of this account of a four-valued logic for metaphor that the membership function's value depends on and is determined by the interpreter's own view of the metaphor. What if two interpreters differ as to how the metaphor strikes them? Are there then differing synchronous membership values for the same metaphor? This seems rather implausible, to say the least.

In any case, Mac Cormac avoids the controversy theory thus:

If we set the value of b low enough on Zadeh's scale, 0 < b < a < 1, and if an individual person has a degree of membership greater than b for the metaphor 'The locomotive is in bed,' then no contradiction need be produced.\(^28\)

Mac Cormac is now ready to add the fourth truth value to Zadeh's three:

Let me extend Zadeh's three-valued logic to a four-valued logic based on the interval 0 < b < g < a < 1. The truth values are now T (f_A(x) > a), F (f_A(x) < b), D (b < f_A(x) < g), and E (g < f_A(x) < a).\(^29\) As a approaches 1 and b approaches 0, if there are no members of the set with intermediate values, we have the situation of a classical two-valued logic. But for metaphors whose referents have values in the ranges of D and E, we can speak of diaphors and epiphors. Under this description of a range of likely and unlikely association, metaphors yield degrees of truth, falsity, diaphor, and epiphor.\(^30\)

With this apparatus in hand, Mac Cormac feels that he can now count appropriate apparently contradictory statements (or their metaphorical interpretations-- which is it?) as legitimate metaphors. Thus,

\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{29}\) 'D' and 'E' refer to diaphors and epiphors.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 87-88.
If considered as a person, "locomotive," an inanimate object, is a member of the fuzzy set Animate to a degree within the range D. We have produced a diaphoric suggestion rather than a false statement. If "roundhouse" can be thought of as functionally a member of Animate of degree D or E, then considering a "roundhouse" to be a "bed" generates a legitimate metaphor. By allowing the semantic markers of the referents of a metaphor to admit degrees of membership, it is possible to have unusual and creative juxtapositions of semantic meanings.

Finally, Mac Cormac seeks to use this account of the four possible truth values for metaphors to explain how metaphor can be accounted for within a general theory of semantics and how even diaphors can get incorporated into the literal segment of natural language:

As the referents of a metaphor move from E to T in their range of membership of a referent in the fuzzy set of a semantic marker, the metaphor becomes a well-recognized analogy and finally, when commonplace, a dead metaphor and part of ordinary language. The four-valued logic of membership of a referent in a fuzzy set defined by a semantic marker allows metaphor to be a part of a general theory of semantics rather than a special case. By locating D and E between T and F, I am not claiming that metaphors are completely excluded from considerations of truth and falsity but rather that they are between the two; a metaphor may be close to T or F and through usage become T or through the falsification of a hypothetical scientific metaphor become F.31

This account of the truth or falsity of individual metaphors in terms of a four-valued logic and fuzzy set theory is fraught with difficulties, in my view. First of all, consider the quote above wherein Mac Cormac said that "locomotive" is a member of the fuzzy set Animate to a degree within the "D" range when a locomotive is considered as a person. This is rather bizarre. It almost sounds as if

31. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
we are to think that the locomotive is a person. Further, this seems to be based on the assumption or premise that any metaphorical referent might be a member of any fuzzy set whatsoever, provided that one (who?) simply consider it to be in that set. The most disparate entities imaginable could thus be included in the same (fuzzy) set(s). But this seems absurd.

Next, two of the four truth values are (fully) true and (fully) false. Is it legitimate to speak of some metaphors as completely true or completely false in a theory that also allows for partial truth and falsity? I think not. Mac Cormac wants to say that "there are juxtapositions that are most unlikely and therefore false . . . ."^32 Yet we can almost certainly find some minimal analogy in even the most initially implausible "juxtaposition" of referents, as Mac Cormac himself acknowledges:

One may question whether any metaphors are produced in the ranges of T and F in the semantic markers of the referents of a metaphor. Because one can probably imagine at least some minimal analogy between any two or more juxtaposed referents, would the likelihood be great of producing falsity for the membership of one of those referents in the fuzzy set defined by a pertinent semantic marker? Probably not, for we usually discard those word combinations that do not produce at least enough similarity of features to warrant calling them diaphors. Similarly, could one produce a metaphor whose referents existed in the T range of membership in the fuzzy set defined by a pertinent semantic marker? Again probably not because referents so similar that they produce almost full rather than partial membership in the fuzzy set defined by the pertinent semantic marker would

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^32. Ibid., p. 88.
produce a combination of words that was no longer a metaphor but an analogy.\textsuperscript{33}

Why then doesn't Mac Cormac himself opt for this exclusively fuzzy scheme of truth values? In Mac Cormac's terms, "Why not define membership in fuzzy sets in terms of two values [only]-- diaphor and epiphor?" His answer is that he believes that "there are juxtapositions of referents that are most unlikely and therefore false and juxtapositions of referents that possess so many similarities that they are analogies rather than metaphors."\textsuperscript{34} That is, although Mac Cormac believes that the probability of producing such completely false and completely true metaphors is small, as indicated in the quote in the preceding paragraph, he does not believe it is nil. In fact, he thinks that there are such metaphors. But this is patently contradictory on his own account, at least in the case of the (completely) "true" metaphors. I will indicate why shortly.

Sometimes some of these initially implausible metaphors turn out to be the most insightful and fruitful of all. Mac Cormac tacitly acknowledges this when he admits that even some of the least true of all diaphors can become epiphors and can even eventually die and become part of literal language, they are so successful. This process, according to Mac Cormac, can take place when initially highly implausible speculative hypotheses suggested by diaphoric metaphors come to be seen as unusually insightful and

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
fruitful. How could this be the case if such diaphoric metaphors are actually false?

Mac Cormac actually wants to say that metaphors that get evaluated as false are so evaluated because they "have been discarded as [wrong-headed] diaphoric hypotheses."\textsuperscript{35} But then it would seem that they are not false metaphors, because they are not metaphors at all! They are attempts at metaphor that have failed, and in fact have been rejected for this very reason. Mac Cormac says that they are "nonsense."\textsuperscript{36} But nonsense, since meaningless, is not susceptible of bearing any truth value at all. So in particular it cannot be false.

Similarly, Mac Cormac wants to say there are juxtapositions that "possess so many similarities that they are analogies rather than metaphors."\textsuperscript{37} Most often, apparently, these are epiphors that are so successful they have died and been incorporated into literal language. But he has here provided a self-refutation. For if such juxtapositions of referents are really (literal) analogies, then either this fails to distinguish analogies from metaphors, or these true juxtapositions aren't metaphors at all— they're analogies. So either Mac Cormac must give up the literal/metaphorical distinction, in the case of "true" metaphors at least, or admit that true metaphors aren't metaphors at all! In light of these various considerations, Mac Cormac would do better

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 221.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 88.
to speak of just two truth values--1) "more true than false" ("epiphor") and 2) "more false than true" ("dia-
phor")--for his juxtapositions of referents from fuzzy sets. Better, but still far from correct.

The major remaining difficulty would be that all metaphors, on this theory of metaphorical truth, are partly true and partly false. For recall that even the truth values "true" and "false" in Mac Cormac's scheme cover a certain range of degrees of membership in fuzzy sets. But surely we shouldn't count really good metaphors as false to any degree whatsoever. They are just plain true. Nor should we assimilate them to analogies, as Mac Cormac proposed, or seemed to propose, in the above quote. They are not just analogies, they are metaphors, and distinctively so. One wonders what definition of 'analogy' Mac Cormac must be employing to thus reduce magnificent literary metaphors, for example, to cases of mere analogy.

I conclude that Mac Cormac's theory of metaphorical truth in terms of a four-valued logic based on a fuzzy set theory is a woefully inadequate account. (And consequently, the controversy theory of metaphorical truth must be shown to be false by some theory other than Mac Cormac's.)
CHAPTER 6: SEARLE.

John R. Searle is well-known for his defense of intentions and intentionality in modern philosophy of language and mind. His theory of metaphor 1 is in complete accord with this emphasis. Searle regards speaker's (utterance) meaning, determined by speaker's intentions, as crucial to any adequate philosophical account of metaphor:

To have a brief way of distinguishing what a speaker means by uttering words, sentences, and expressions, on the one hand, and what the words, sentences, and expressions mean, on the other, I shall call the former speaker's utterance meaning, and the latter, word, or sentence meaning. Metaphorical meaning is always speaker's utterance meaning. 2

Thus, according to Searle, there is such a thing as metaphorical meaning and this meaning is a matter of what speakers mean by their metaphorical utterances rather than (solely) a matter of what the words and sentences themselves mean which speakers use to express their meanings. This is how I understand Searle's claim that "metaphorical meaning is always speaker's meaning." (I added "solely" before "a matter of what the words and sentences themselves mean" because I think that not even Searle would want to say that speakers can mean whatever they want to mean by the words

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2. Ibid., p. 93.
they utter regardless of the actual meanings those words and sentences have independently in their language.)

In some ways Searle's insights and program in philosophical theory of metaphor parallel Kittay's. For example, he, like Kittay, is concerned to discover general principles for relating metaphorical and literal meanings. Such principles would guide metaphor producers, at least implicitly or from the point of view of a rational reconstruction of the metaphor production process, in determining which linguistic expressions to choose in order to express their intended meanings. Searle also argues that these same principles must be used by a hearer in order to systematically figure out what a metaphor producer means by his metaphor:

In order to understand the metaphorical utterance, the hearer requires something more than his knowledge of the language, his awareness of the conditions of the utterance, and background assumptions that he shares with the speaker. He must have some other principles, or some combination of principles and information that enables him to figure out when the speaker says, "S is P," he means "S is R." .... The basic principle on which all metaphor works is that the utterance of an expression with its literal meaning and corresponding truth conditions can, in various ways that are specific to metaphor, call to mind another meaning and corresponding set of truth conditions. The hard problem of the theory of metaphor is to explain what exactly are the principles according to which the utterance of an expression can metaphorically call to mind a different set of truth conditions from the one determined by its literal meaning, and to state those principles precisely and without using metaphorical expressions like "call to mind." 3

Like Kittay, Searle seeks to exhibit metaphor as systematically related to literal language:

3. Ibid., p. 99.
In order that the speaker can communicate using metaphorical utterances, ironical utterances, and indirect speech acts, there must be some principles according to which he is able to mean more than, or something different from, what he says, whereby the hearer, using his knowledge of them, can understand what the speaker means. The relation between the sentence meaning and the metaphorical utterance meaning is systematic rather than random or ad hoc. Our task in constructing a theory of metaphor is to try to state the principles which relate literal sentence meaning to metaphorical utterance meaning.

So Searle seeks to systematically relate metaphorical meanings, which according to him are always speaker's utterance meanings, to literal meanings; so does Kittay. But whereas Kittay views metaphorical meanings as independent of (individual) speaker's intentions, Searle thinks metaphorical meanings are absolutely dependent on them.

Another significant parallel between Searle's theory of metaphor and Kittay's is his recognition that an adequate theory of metaphor requires an adequate theory of literal language, i.e., a satisfactory general semantic theory, on which to build. This follows from the point just mentioned, Searle's concern to systematically relate the metaphorical to the literal. Both Searle and Kittay realize that providing this general semantic theory is a much more difficult task than is generally assumed, and that no serious philosophical theory of metaphor can take for granted that such a semantic theory is already in place:

Because part of our task is to explain how metaphorical utterances differ from literal utterances, to start with we must arrive at a characterization of literal utterances. Most—indeed

4. Ibid.
all-- of the authors I have read on the subject of metaphor assume that we know how literal utterances work; they do not think that the problem of literal utterances is worth discussing in their account of metaphor. The price they pay for this is that their accounts often describe metaphorical utterances in ways that fail to distinguish them from literal ones.

In fact, to give an accurate account of literal predication is an extremely difficult, complex, and subtle problem.  

Searle even agrees with Kittay to an extent about the vital role played by context not only in the determination of metaphorical meaning and truth conditions but even in the determination of literal meaning and truth conditions: "Notice, furthermore, that in each case the sentence only determines a definite set of truth conditions relative to a particular context." And like Kittay, Searle argues that background assumptions play a large role in the determination of meaning, or at least, of truth conditions:

But these sentences, like most sentences, only determine a set of truth conditions against a background of assumptions that are not explicitly realized in the semantic structure of the sentence.

I will later indicate why I believe it is that Searle and Kittay agree on the importance of context and background assumptions in the determination of all linguistic meaning, thus of both literal and metaphorical meaning. The main difference then, it seems to me, between Searle's project and Kittay's is merely that Searle thinks metaphor has to do

5. Ibid., p. 94.
6. In both of what I have called the objective and subjective senses of this term.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 95.
basically with speaker's intentions and utterance meanings whereas Kittay rules these out as relevant in any way for a philosophical theory of metaphor.

Searle singles out three salient features of literal utterances, discovered by an adequate general semantic theory, that are of particular importance for building an adequate theory of metaphorical meaning (which for Searle, recall, is an instance of speaker utterance meaning). These are as follows:

First, in literal utterances the speaker means what he says; that is, literal sentence meaning and speaker's meaning are the same; second, in general the literal meaning of a sentence only determines a set of truth conditions relative to a set of background assumptions which are not part of the semantic content of the sentence; and third, the notion of similarity plays an essential role in any account of literal predication.9

With regard to the third salient aspect of literal utterances, what Searle has in mind is that

[T]he literal meaning of any general term, by determining a set of truth conditions, also determines a criterion of similarity between objects. To know that a general term is true of a set of objects is to know that they are similar with respect to the property specified by that term.10

Searle next characterizes metaphor as one case, a very important case, in which speaker's utterance meaning and sentence meaning do not coincide but in fact diverge. (Other such cases that Searle mentions are indirect speech acts and ironical utterances.) This divergence of speaker's utterance meaning and sentence meaning in the case of

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9. Ibid., p. 96.
10. Ibid.
metaphor would seem to require two expressions for every metaphor--one to express the metaphorical sentence's meaning (the sentence itself will suffice for this) and another to express the speaker's utterance meaning. This latter expression will be a literal paraphrase of the metaphorical sentence. And in fact Searle advocates just this view:

Because in metaphorical utterances what the speaker means differs from what he says (in one sense of "say"), in general we shall need two sentences for our examples of metaphor--first the sentence uttered metaphorically, and second a sentence that expresses literally what the speaker means when he utters the first sentence and means it metaphorically.11

An interesting question surfaces at this point: must the divergence between speaker's utterance meaning and sentence meaning which Searle posits in the case of metaphor entail a literal paraphraseability theory of metaphor, as Searle seems to think and as I have indicated seems to be the case? I will not attempt an answer to this question as yet. Instead I will simply point out that Searle does acknowledge that in any case, for some metaphors at least, our paraphrases do not seem to capture all that was conveyed by the metaphor itself:

One of our tasks will be to explain this sense of dissatisfaction that we have with paraphrases of even feeble metaphors. Still, in some sense, the paraphrases must approximate what the speaker meant, because in each case the speaker's metaphorical assertion will be true if, and only if, the corresponding assertion using the [paraphrase sentence] is true... Sometimes we feel that we know exactly what the metaphor means and yet would not be able to formulate a literal [paraphrase sentence] because

11. Ibid.
there are no literal expressions that convey what it means. . . . And indeed metaphors often serve to plug such semantic gaps as this. In other cases, there may be an indefinite range of paraphrases.\textsuperscript{12}

After a perceptive critique of both comparison and interactionist theories of how metaphors work, Searle proposes general principles in answer to what he regards as the most pressing questions about metaphor:

How is it possible for the speaker to say metaphorically `'S is P' and mean `'S is R,' when P plainly does not mean R; furthermore, How is it possible for the hearer who hears the utterance `'S is P' to know that the speaker means `'S is R'?\textsuperscript{13}

Searle responds to these questions by considering the hearer's standpoint—what would the hearer have to do, in a systematic way, to understand the speaker's meaning? He proposes a three-stage process, suggesting that the hearer must rationally or logically, though not consciously, go through each step. So this is in essence a rational reconstruction.

The first stage for the hearer is to determine whether she should seek a metaphorical interpretation of the utterance. To do this she will need to employ a strategy or strategies.

[T]here must be some shared strategies on the basis of which the hearer can recognize that the utterance is not intended literally. The most common, but not the only strategy, is based on the fact that the utterance is obviously defective if taken literally.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 97.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 113.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 120.
\end{itemize}
Where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning.15

Interestingly, Pascal long ago proposed a quite similar criterion for the identification of metaphor: If an utterance is a "glaring and gross contradiction," then this fact serves as prima facie evidence that the utterance is not literal.16

The second stage is to determine possible values for R, once it has been determined to seek a metaphorical interpretation. Again, strategies or principles are required for this task:

[T]here must be some shared principles that associate the P term (whether the meaning, the truth conditions, or the denotation if there is any) with a set of possible values of R. The heart of the problem of metaphor is to state these principles. I have tried to state several of them, but I feel confident that there must be more.17

Finally, the third stage is to restrict the range of these possible values of R so as to decide upon the most likely candidate(s) for the speaker's meaning. Hopefully, of course, this will turn out in fact to be his actual meaning.

[T]here must be some shared strategies that enable the speaker and the hearer, given their knowledge of the S term (whether the meaning of the expression, or the nature of the referent, or both), to restrict the range of possible values of R to the actual value of R. The basic principle of this step is that only those possible val-

15. Ibid., p. 114, author's emphasis.
17. Searle, "Metaphor," p. 120.
ues of R which determine possible [actual?] properties of S can be actual values of R.\textsuperscript{18} All the principles involved at each of the three stages of this process are "individually necessary and collectively sufficient to enable speaker and hearer to form and comprehend utterances of the form 'S is P,' where the speaker means metaphorically that S is R (where P = R)."\textsuperscript{19}

Searle next compares and contrasts metaphor, irony, and indirect speech acts. He claims that metaphor and irony differ radically from indirect speech acts in that in the latter, the speaker means what he says and more besides, whereas in metaphor and irony the speaker does not in any sense mean what he says.\textsuperscript{20} Certainly we already know that Searle believes speaker (utterance) meaning and sentence meaning diverge in the case of metaphor. And it seems natural for one who subscribes to this view of metaphorical meaning to say the same holds in the case of irony. But should or must one then distinguish indirect speech acts from metaphor and irony with respect to speaker and sentence meaning divergence? I think not.

Take for example Searle's own illustration of a typical indirect speech act, the sentence 'Can you pass the salt?' used by a speaker to ask someone to pass the salt. Searle contends, correctly (on his theory of intentionality at least, i.e., a possible divergence between speaker meaning and sentence meaning), that the speaker is not interested in

\begin{itemize}
  \item 18. Ibid.
  \item 19. Ibid.
  \item 20. Ibid., p. 121.
\end{itemize}
knowing about the addressee's ability to pass the salt. What he is interested in is actually getting him to pass the salt. But if this is so, then in what sense does the speaker really mean the sentence 'Can you pass the salt'? It seems that speaker meaning and sentence meaning diverge in the case of the use of this particular sentence to accomplish a specific speech act. And this analysis would seem generalizable to all indirect speech acts, given a Searlian theory of speaker intentionality. So it seems that Searle is just wrong in holding, given his own theory, that a speaker means what he says in the case of indirect speech acts. For it seems that on Searle's theory, speaker meaning and sentence meaning diverge in (at least some and probably all cases of) indirect speech acts as well as in metaphor and irony.

Searle concludes his article on metaphor by addressing the question of whether all metaphorical utterances can be given a literal paraphrase. (My exposition of Searle's position on this question and my set of comments on that position constitute in part my own answer to the literal paraphraseability question that I earlier postponed.) It seems that his theory of metaphorical meaning as described thus far would have to require the literal paraphraseability of metaphors, unless some speaker's utterance meanings are inexpressible. Searle's own "Principle of Expressibility" comes into play at this point.
Searle formulates this principle as follows: "[A]ny meaning whatever can be given an exact expression in the language." The crucial word in this formulation is 'can'. Searle indicates that when the question of any metaphor's literal paraphraseability is construed as "Is it possible to find or to invent an expression that will exactly express the intended metaphorical meaning R, in the sense of the truth conditions of R, for any metaphorical utterance of 'S is P,' where what is meant is that S is R?", then the answer is in the affirmative because of Expressibility. Now this is correct given the principle and a sufficiently broad interpretation of the crucial modal term 'can'. But the important question is whether or not the principle itself is true.

Somewhat surprisingly, Searle argues that when the question of literal paraphraseability is construed as "Does every existing language provide us exact devices for expressing literally whatever we wish to express in any given metaphor?", then the answer is negative. This confirms that Searle is taking the 'can' in his formulation of the Expressibility Principle quite broadly, since even though there might not be "exact devices" already to hand in the language in which we want to do the paraphrase, nevertheless we can find (?) or invent them if we please.

To continue with Searle's negative answer concerning paraphraseability when there are no extant devices for every

21. Ibid.
paraphrase we might want, Searle says "It is often the case that we use metaphor precisely because there is no literal expression that expresses exactly what we want."\textsuperscript{22} Surely this is an important insight into metaphor and the motivation behind it, in many cases. Here we seem to have a case of a speaker meaning inexpressible except in the sentence uttered (unless we "find" or "invent" a new expression(s)!). But this seems to undercut his crucial speaker meaning/sentence meaning distinction because of the following two major difficulties.

First, if speakers are restricted in their thinking to the extant resources of their language, as many (most?) philosophers are now inclined to believe, then how in principle can speakers even formulate some meaning that can't be expressed in those extant resources?

Second, even if speakers are not so restricted in their thinking processes (to extant linguistic resources alone), it would seem that the only way to "find" or "invent" new linguistic resources adequate to paraphrase target metaphors would be to somehow extend the language. Now extending languages, by many (all?) accounts, is accomplished via non-literal, i.e., figurative (usually metaphorical), language and thought. But then the desired paraphrase would not be in literal language but in metaphorical. But what was wanted was a literal paraphrase. We would be left with metaphorical paraphrases of metaphors, which, to say the

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., pp. 121-123.
least, wouldn't get us very far either from the practical standpoint of actually understanding speaker's metaphorical meanings (assuming they are different from sentence meanings) or from the theoretical standpoint of justifying Searle's account of metaphorical meaning.

Now it seems that these difficulties cause serious problems for the idea that, as Searle puts it,

[I]n general we shall need two sentences for our examples of metaphor-- first the sentence uttered metaphorically, and second a sentence that expresses literally what the speaker means when he utters the first sentence and means it metaphorically.  

Surprisingly, Searle himself ends up rejecting the universal paraphraseability of metaphors, but for very different reasons. According to Searle,

It is often the case that we use metaphor precisely because there is no literal expression that expresses exactly what we mean. Furthermore, in metaphorical utterances, we do more that just state that S is R; . . . we state that S is R by way of going through the meaning of "S is R." It is in this sense that we feel that metaphors somehow are intrinsically not paraphrasable. They are not paraphrasable, because without using the metaphorical expression, we will not reproduce the semantic content which occurred in the hearer's comprehension of the utterance.

Searle's double-mindedness with regard to paraphraseability is reminiscent of Pascal's, who was one of the first "modern" philosophers to recognize the great importance and value of metaphor. According to Cooper,

. . . [Pascal] tells us that the figures of the Bible are 'ciphers' and that 'a cipher has two meanings', literal and figurative. Since the

23. Ibid., p. 96.
24. Ibid., pp. 121-123.
latter meaning is grasped by the 'righteous', it cannot be ineffable. But he also tells us that figures are necessary when 'the things of God are inexpressible'. Here the tension is between the idea of metaphors as 'decodable' [for our purposes, read "paraphrasable"] into literal sentences and the idea that translation from the metaphorical to the literal is not generally possible. Pascal himself does not seem to notice the tension. . . .23

But if metaphors are "somehow intrinsically not paraphrasable" and yet their meaning is an instance of speaker utterance meaning, then this seems to deny Expressibility. Furthermore, it seems to undercut the speaker meaning/sentence meaning distinction, in the case of metaphor at least, for how can the two be distinct if one of the two, viz. (metaphorical) speaker meaning, can't even be exactly expressed except in terms of the other? Of course, it is logically possible that this distinction does exist, i.e., that there really is such a thing as metaphorical speaker meaning distinct from the meaning of the sentence expressing it. But a sceptic might well conclude that to hold this in light of, or rather, in spite of, the foregoing considerations is just metaphysical "whistling in the dark."

Where does all this leave the literal paraphraseability theory of metaphor? First, nothing in the above discussion would seem to bear on it at all if metaphorical meaning is not reducible to speaker meaning. That is, paraphraseability remains untouched by the above argumentation if the determination (either objective or subjective) of metaphorical meaning need not involve an appeal to speaker's meaning.

25. Cooper, Metaphor, pp. 4-5.
For the above arguments militate against paraphraseability only on the assumption of the speaker meaning/sentence meaning distinction as applied to metaphors. (This is not to argue that the literal paraphraseability theory is true, only that it can't be shown to be false by the previous arguments if metaphorical meaning is not a type of speaker meaning.)

One possible way of trying to show that metaphorical meaning isn't a type of speaker meaning would be to argue that the principles needed by a metaphor producer to discover adequate metaphorical terms in which to express her (metaphorical) speaker meaning are not the same principles as those needed by a metaphor interpreter to figure out a metaphor's meaning. Anyone who thinks this route might have some merit could probably benefit from C. S. Lewis's "Bluspels and Flalansferes,"[26] in which that fine thinker helpfully distinguishes between two kinds of metaphors—"masters' metaphors" (metaphors viewed from the perspective of the metaphor producer) and "pupils' metaphors" (metaphors viewed from the hearer's perspective).

The second implication of my argumentation is that unless some speaker meanings cannot be expressed in literal language (i.e., unless Searle's Expressibility is false), literal paraphraseability and the speaker (utterance) meaning theory of metaphorical meaning cannot both be true.

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(This means, of course, that Searle must give up one or the other, if he wants to retain Expressibility.)

Thirdly, if the speaker meaning theory of metaphorical meaning and paraphraseability are both true, then it would seem that the cognitive indispensability thesis (about metaphors) must be false. For then one ought to be able to express his (metaphorical) meaning in literal language, viz. what would have been the literal paraphrase of the (or an) appropriate metaphor for expressing his meaning. That is, from a purely cognitive standpoint, the speaker would have two options for expressing his meaning—either a nice, brief, aesthetically pleasing metaphor or a longer, uglier, more banal literal expression. Thus, metaphor would be reduced to a purely aesthetic or rhetorical device and possess no special cognitive significance of its own; the positivists and virtually all philosophical theorists of metaphor since Aristotle would be right after all.

Finally, does paraphraseability depend on Expressibility? Not necessarily. This follows from the considerations in the previous paragraph. But if there is not, in fact, this dependence of paraphraseability on Expressibility, then again, it seems that metaphor could not retain its distinctive cognitive significance and role. One could express in literal language whatever meanings one could think of, including meanings that could also be expressed (more elegantly but no more correctly) in metaphors.
I will now take up the other question I earlier left dangling, the question of why Searle and Kittay agree on the importance of context and background assumptions for determining linguistic meaning (both literal and metaphorical). It seems likely that the most important factors for arriving at speaker's meaning are the immediate linguistic context and background assumptions. (The background assumptions themselves can be construed as a kind of context also. That is one of Mac Cormac's contributions to the philosophical study of metaphor.)

If one thinks that in order to determine (in either the objective or subjective sense) either literal or metaphorical meaning it is necessary to understand speaker's meaning/intentions, then one will be vitally interested in context and background assumptions since these are the best guide to speaker's meaning. This, I take it, is why Searle puts so much emphasis on these factors. Alston puts it this way (in developing a Searlean account of the irreducibility of metaphors in theology):

One might wonder how a speaker communicates what he is asserting in a metaphorical utterance if that is determined [Alston means in the objective sense] by his intentions, since these latter are typically unannounced. The answer is, of course, that this is effected by a variety of contextual cues. It may be that the verbal or non-verbal context of the utterance points to one rather than another way of exploiting the exemplar. It may be that the speaker can assume that any human being, or anyone in this culture, would be more struck by some of the existing similarities than by others.27

What about Kittay? Recall that she thinks an appeal to speaker's intentions (and thus to speaker's meaning) is absolutely inessential to a determination of linguistic meaning, both literal and metaphorical. Nevertheless, she lays great stress on the importance of context and background assumptions for determining linguistic meaning. What is important to see here, I think, is that an appeal to context and background assumptions as even partially determinative of linguistic meaning is tantamount to an appeal to speaker's meaning. This is because, as noted above, context and background assumptions are the relevant factors one would focus on if one did want to discover speaker's meaning. It seems then that to discover linguistic meaning, literal or metaphorical, via a consideration of contextual factors is just to discover speaker's meaning.

Note that this is a logical or conceptual explanation, not a psychological explanation, of how it is that Searle and Kittay can agree on the importance of context and background assumptions in the determination of linguistic meaning. In other words, I'm not saying that Kittay "down deep" or subconsciously somehow really wanted all along to appeal to speaker's intentions; all I'm saying is that in effect such an appeal (tacitly or implicitly) emerges in her approach.

At this juncture I must ask another question, a question of particular relevance to the topic of this disserta-
tion: What is the connection, if any, between the speaker meaning/intentions theory of metaphorical meaning and the issue of metaphorical truth? Initially there would seem to be no connection at all, for a metaphor's truth value seems to depend on its meaning alone; how the metaphor gets its meaning seems unimportant, even irrelevant, to its truth value. So whether the metaphor's meaning is determined by its speaker's meaning, its linguistic meaning, or whatever, would appear to have no bearing on whether it is true or false.
CHAPTER 7: DAVIDSON.

Donald Davidson sets forth his theory of metaphor in his essay "What Metaphors Mean." He opposes it to all those theories of metaphor that he takes to incorporate a certain "central mistake." This key erroneous notion, which according to Davidson has led so many astray, is "that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning." Davidson finds this mistaken idea in virtually all writings on metaphor: "[I]t is found in the works of literary critics like Richards, Empson, and Winters; philosophers from Aristotle to Max Black; psychologists from Freud and earlier to Skinner and later; and linguists from Plato to Uriel Weinreich and George Lakoff." According to Davidson, this notion that there are metaphorical meanings of linguistic expressions in addition to their literal meanings may appear even in theories of metaphor that seem rather similar to his own. For example, (some?, many?, all?) theories which maintain that "typically no literal paraphrase [of any given metaphor] can be found" make this mistake, as do (some?, many?, all?) theories claiming that metaphors inspire "special insights" which ordinary language cannot.


3. Ibid.
yield. According to Davidson, the reason even such relatively good theories fall short is that they too see metaphor as "a form of communication alongside ordinary communication." (Davidson takes this as another formulation of the "central mistake" which he is concerned to argue against.)

Given what I have just said about the "central mistake" which Davidson believes most, if not all, theories of metaphor make, it is not difficult to infer Davidson's own central thesis about metaphor. This main claim is that "metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more." Davidson explains this striking and iconoclastic claim: "[A] metaphor doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning (nor does its maker say anything, in using the metaphor, beyond the literal)."

This view can also be expressed in terms of attitude toward the possibility of paraphrasing metaphors (i.e., without loss of "cognitive significance," though Davidson never explicitly refers to this important qualification of his meaning). As noted above, Davidson disagrees even with those theories of metaphor that say no literal paraphrase of metaphors can be found if they say this because they view metaphor as "a form of communication alongside ordinary communication." Davidson agrees that metaphors cannot be paraphrased into literal language, but for a very different rea-

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
son: "I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase." 8

We must note that when Davidson asserts that "metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more," he claims to be speaking only of the "linguistic" or "lexical" meaning of the words. He distinguishes this level of meaning from the words' use in a given context by an author or speaker. Davidson says that this distinction is crucial for his account of metaphor:

My disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by the imaginative employment of words words and sentences and depends entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise. 9

Davidson claims to rely on the same distinction in his discussion of simile as well (as part of his critique of simile theories of metaphor):

In the case of simile, we note what it literally says, that two things resemble one another; we then regard the objects and consider what similarity would in the context be to the point. Having decided, we might then say the author of the simile intended us-- that is, meant us-- to notice that similarity. But having appreciated the difference between what the words meant and what the author accomplished by using those words, we should feel little temptation to explain what has happened by

8. Ibid., my emphasis.
9. Ibid., p. 31.
endowing the words themselves with a second, or figurative, meaning.\textsuperscript{10}

Finally, Davidson also uses this distinction to explain how lying differs from metaphor: "What makes the difference between a lie and a metaphor is not a difference in the words used or what they mean (in any strict sense of meaning) but in how the words are used."\textsuperscript{11} These citations should suffice to indicate just how important to Davidson's theory of metaphor is this distinction between word (and sentence) meaning and word (and sentence) use, at least, according to Davidson himself.

By adhering to this distinction and claiming that metaphor has to do with the uses of words and not their meanings, Davidson clearly seems to be making metaphor a matter of pragmatics and not of "semantics" (narrowly construed) or of "language" (narrowly construed). Davidson himself seems to confirm this conclusion when he says, for example, "I have been making the point by contrasting learning a new use for an old word with using a word already understood; in one case, I said, our attention is directed to language, in the other, to what language is about. Metaphor, I suggested, belongs in the second category."\textsuperscript{12}

While Davidson writes at some length about what metaphor "does," how metaphor "works," what metaphor's purpose is, what metaphor is a "matter of," and so on, he never really says what metaphor is. We are left wondering if

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 35.
Davidson thinks a metaphor is a "meaning" (and what kind of meaning: lexical or linguistic, author's/speaker's intended meaning, ... ?), or a function of the words or sentences the metaphor is couched in, or the words or sentences themselves, or a function of the words or sentences plus "context," and so on. Davidson does a fair job telling us what metaphor is not, but a rather poor job telling us what it is. But he is more explicit about what he thinks metaphor "does" and how it does it, to which I now turn.

Davidson agrees with the common view of what metaphors accomplish, i.e., the effects or results they produce:

It may be remarked with justice that the claim that a metaphor provokes or invites a certain view of its subject rather than saying it straight out is a commonplace; so it is. Thus Aristotle says metaphor leads to a "perception of resemblances." Black, following Richards, says a metaphor "evokes" a certain response: "a suitable hearer will be led by a metaphor to construct a . . . system." This view is neatly summed up by what Heraclitus said of the Delphic oracle: "It does not say and it does not hide, it intimates."13

But Davidson disagrees entirely with the common view of how it is that metaphor accomplishes this remarkable feat of producing new insights in us, of getting us to see a thing in a new way or in a new light, of leading us to a new "perception of resemblances."

The "common view" posits new, metaphorical meanings by which metaphors do all this. Davidson, however, says that metaphor does not do its work

13. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
by having a special meaning, a specific cognitive content. I do not think, as Richards does, that metaphor produces its result by having a meaning which results from the interaction of two ideas; it is wrong, in my view, to say, with Owen Barfield, that a metaphor "says one thing and means another"; or with Black that a metaphor asserts or implies certain complex things by dint of a special meaning and thus accomplishes its job of yielding an 'insight'.

Davidson charges such views with confusing the effects or results of a metaphor with the metaphor (or its "content") itself.

Davidson's view has it that "[a] metaphor does its work through other intermediaries"—intermediaries, that is, other than the commonly posited special metaphorical meanings. But just what these "other intermediaries" are, Davidson never seems to say. He does indicate that attempts to paraphrase metaphors are not attempts to give their meanings but rather "to evoke what the metaphor brings to our attention." And he claims that this is often nonpropositional, and never is it a cognitive content, some message the author/speaker wishes to convey. So perhaps these nonpropositional mental entities that the metaphor calls to our attention are the "other intermediaries" through which metaphors do their work. On the other hand, Davidson also says that "[metaphor] makes us see one thing as another by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight." According to this statement, it would seem that

14. Ibid., p. 44.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 45.
the "other intermediaries" are perhaps these literal statements that prompt our new insights. In sum, it's not clear just what Davidson thinks these mediating entities are.

Another instance of Davidson's theory's lack of detail and specificity as to how metaphor does whatever it does is its account of metaphor's alleged effects on the hearer. If, as Davidson thinks, metaphor belongs to the realm of use as opposed to meaning, pragmatics as opposed to semantics, conversational implicatures as opposed to logical implications, then if all that can be said about metaphor's effects is that a metaphor "invites some comparison" (which is all that Davidson does venture), this seems rather inadequate, to say the least. According to Davidson, the utterer's intention is merely to invite the hearer to make a comparison or find a similarity, not necessarily the comparison(s) or similarity(ies) the utterer herself has made.(!) 18 Besides this suggestion's utter implausibility, it also suffers from a lack of elaboration, as did the suggestion about "other intermediaries." So we must conclude that Davidson's essay is a good deal clearer about how he thinks metaphors do not

18. Davidson wasn't the first to hold that metaphors function by simply getting the hearer or reader to make or explore some comparison(s), to discover some similarity(ies). McCloskey ("Metaphors," Mind 73 (1964): p. 215) and Foss (Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949)) both make this suggestion, apparently because they (mistakenly) believe it follows from another view they hold about metaphor, viz., that metaphors are not susceptible of literal paraphrase. (They hold this thesis because of their belief that metaphors have an indefinite number of potentialities for articulation, i.e., that metaphors are essentially "open-ended.")
do whatever it is they do than about how he thinks they do do it.

Related to the Davidsonian theory's lack of detail and specificity is its failure to clearly delineate just what counts as a metaphor. Although earlier I said that by 'metaphor' Davidson intends all kinds of strictly figurative linguistic expressions, this is by no means crystal clear. Davidson never really indicates what he counts as a metaphor nor how we may know when we are in the presence of one. For example, Davidson's theory fails to distinguish simile from metaphor, even at the level of use.\textsuperscript{19} Note the following:

What words do do [sic] with their literal meaning in simile must be possible for them to do in metaphor. A metaphor directs attention to the same sorts of similarity, if not the same similarities, as the corresponding simile. But then the unexpected or subtle parallels and analogies it is the business of metaphor to promote need not depend, for their promotion, on more than the literal meanings of words.\textsuperscript{20}

If simile and metaphor both depend for what they accomplish only on the literal meanings of the words or sentences involved, then how are the two to be distinguished? I suppose Davidson could fall back on the old saw we all learned as schoolchildren, that a simile is a stated or explicit comparison whereas a metaphor is an unstated or implicit one. But this is so inadequate, so naive, so unhelpful for furthering our understanding of the complex character and mechanism of metaphor, that it is really not worth even mentioning in a philosophical discussion of metaphor. Thus,

\textsuperscript{19} Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," pp. 36-38.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 38.
Davidson never really delimits the realm of metaphor— we do not know precisely what gets left in or what gets left out.

Davidson does acknowledge the complexity and apparently non-rule-governed character of the common ability to make and understand metaphors: "Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules."

Further, he detects a certain "fatal defect" in some theories of metaphor, namely, that they make "the hidden meaning of the metaphor all too obvious and accessible." (Although Davidson himself rejects such hidden metaphorical meanings, since he rejects any metaphorical meanings whatsoever, he is here relying on the complexity of metaphor-making and metaphor-comprehension to reject theories of metaphor that are unable to account for this complexity even in their own terms.) Yet the very complexity that Davidson cites can be accounted for in his theory only by relegating metaphor to the realm of use and denying it any semantic meaning— a prima facie (at least) uninteresting and unilluminating move.

In sum, since Davidson's (positive) theory of metaphor at least seems relatively pale, non-specific, and uninteresting, his own claim to be praising metaphor, not burying it (as it surely seems he is), rings somewhat hollow. Consider for example this passage where Davidson sings metaphor's praises:

21. Ibid., p. 29.
22. Ibid., p. 37.
In the past those who have denied that metaphor has a cognitive content in addition to the literal have often been out to show that metaphor is confusing, merely emotive, unsuited to serious, scientific, or philosophical discourse. Such a view was typical of logical positivism's attitude toward metaphor. In fact, positivists often used the term 'metaphor' in a pejorative way. My views should not be associated with this tradition. Metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature but in science, philosophy, and the law; it is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and prescription. For the most part I don't disagree with Max Black, Paul Henle, Nelson Goodman, Monroe Beardsley, and the rest in their accounts of what metaphor accomplishes, except that I think it accomplishes more and that what is additional is different in kind.  

Davidson even exemplifies this purported attitude of his in "What Metaphors Mean" when he begins, "Metaphor is the dreamwork of language . . . ."  

Many extensionalists will probably be bothered by Davidson's account since it does rely on the notion of intentions, specifically, the intentions of the speaker/author in making and using the metaphor. Of course, they need not be troubled by this appeal to intentions, since intentions are not intensions, and intentions may be susceptible of explication in purely extensionalist terms. I note that H. P. Grice agrees with me in this assessment when he writes:  

The psychological concepts which, in my view, are needed for the formulation of an adequate theory of language may not be among the most primitive or fundamental psychological concepts . . . ; and it may be possible to derive (in some relevant sense of 'derive') the intensional con-

23. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
24. Ibid., p. 29.
cepts which I have been using from more primitive
extensional concepts.25

Nevertheless, both extensionalists and intensionalists
may feel, perhaps not without some justification, that
Davidson's appeal to intentions has not supplied us with an
adequate method for distinguishing such phenomena as lying
and irony from metaphor. For if the only way to distinguish
these uses of the same words from each other is by discover-
ing and appealing to the speaker's or author's intentions,
we seem on rather slippery ground. Davidson himself con-
cedes this, but chooses not to comment further on the point:

So a woman who believed in witches but did not
think her neighbor a witch might say, "She's a
witch," meaning it metaphorically; the same woman,
still believing the same of witches and her neigh-
bor but intending to deceive, might use the same
words to very different effect. Since sentence
and meaning are the same in both cases, it is some-
times hard to prove which intention lay behind the
saying of it; thus a man who says "Lattimore's a
Communist" and means to lie can always try to beg
off pleading a metaphor.26

Indeed so, if there is no other way to distinguish metaphor
from lying and irony.

Of fundamental importance to Davidson's theory of
metaphor is his distinction between meaning and use. Those
who reject this crucial (for Davidson's theory) distinction

25. H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-meaning,
For a succinct presentation of an extensionalist theory of
metaphor, see Catherine Z. Elgin and Israel Scheffler,
6 (June 1987): pp. 331-335. This article is strongly exten-
sionalist. The authors provide references to other extent-
sionalist accounts of metaphor, most of which, not surpris-
ingly, are in the works of Nelson Goodman.
26. Ibid., p. 41.
will likewise reject Davidson's whole account out of hand. Most philosophers of language and linguists do make this distinction, however. But, interestingly enough, one who no longer does is Davidson himself:

We may say that linguistic ability is the ability to converge on a passing theory from time to time--this is what I have suggested, and I have no better proposal. But if we do say this, then we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally. A passing theory really is like a theory at least in this, that it is derived by wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely. 27

It certainly seems that Davidson has here erased not only the boundary he mentions, that "between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally," but the boundary between meaning and use, and so that between semantics and pragmatics, as well. If so, then of course Davidson has abandoned his "What Metaphors Mean" account of metaphor.

In fact, in "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs" Davidson clearly seems to reject his whole truth-theoretic semantic program as misguided and fruitless. While a rejection of the meaning/use distinction would mean a rejection of his "What Metaphors Mean" account of metaphor, that distinction

itself seems to be a consequence of Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics. So, a fortiori, rejecting his truth-theoretic semantics entails a radical departure in theory of metaphor from the views Davidson so confidently (and iconoclastically) advanced in "What Metaphors Mean."

Yet Richard Rorty, in his recent "Unfamiliar Noises: Hesse and Davidson on Metaphor," presented at the International Congress of Philosophy, London, July 1987, amazingly sees no discrepancies whatsoever between these two papers of Davidson's. Indeed, he regards Davidson's anti-Kantian, naturalistic approach in "A Nice Derangement," which results in Davidson's erasing "the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally," as in perfect harmony with much of Davidson's earlier philosophy of language and epistemology, in particular his jettisoning the "third dogma" of empiricism, viz., the "scheme/content" distinction (pp. 13-14). 28 It seems to me that Rorty has probably misinterpreted Davidson's "What Metaphors Mean," probably because of insufficient attention to and appreciation of Davidson's commitment to a truth-theoretic (but quite "non-metaphysical") semantics.

Not only does Davidson's theory not posit special metaphorical meanings, it does not posit any special kind of truth either. In particular, it rejects any sort of "meta-

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28. Though Rorty makes no explicit reference to it, he is of course referring to Davidson's views in "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, pp. 183-198), in which Davidson apparently out-Quines Quine in his quest for the bare minimum (essence?!, sine qua non?!) of empiricism.
phorical truth." According to Davidson's theory, truth is truth, and truth is literal truth. Thus, most metaphors are false, for the (one) meaning of a typical metaphorical sentence is false. In fact, metaphors usually create in us the insights they do precisely through their blatant falsity. Only rarely are metaphors ever true. (An example would be "That is a blue painting" said of a painting that is blue both in color and in that it evokes sadness in us. Such a sentence would be true even according to Davidson's account.)

Not only does having just one kind of truth simplify matters, it is highly plausible as well. Davidson of course nowhere gives a traditional-type definition of "truth." The only "definition" of truth in Davidson's truth-theoretic framework would be the truth theory itself that generates the semantics' crucial "T-sentences." While the philosophical question what truth really is remains extremely important and interesting, though we are probably no closer to a satisfactory answer now than were the pre-Socratics, Davidson is surely correct that most competent English-speakers immediately and intuitively understand the meanings of these T-sentences. And surely the only obstacle to this understanding would be some degree of puzzlement over 'if and only if,' for we seem to understand what 'is true' and 'truth' mean in any common context virtually intuitively.

It is because Davidson is operating with only one notion of truth, rejecting such notions as "metaphorical
truth" and "ironical truth," that almost all metaphors come out patently false on his account. However, there are some metaphors that will be true, and obviously true, even on Davidson's account. Examples: "No man is an island" and the above-mentioned "That is a blue painting." But most of these metaphors are so obviously, so patently true (at least, when uttered in most contexts), that we wonder why they were offered at all, unless they are well-known, commonly used figures, or "sayings."

But consider again "That is a blue painting" spoken of a painting that is both blue in color and makes us feel depressed. (Assume for the sake of argument that this sentence could be metaphorical in such a circumstance, i.e., that 'blue' does not-- through the process of metaphorical dying-- have as one of its lexical meanings 'depressed' or 'causing depression.' 29) According to Davidson's account of metaphor, this sentence used in this situation (or in any other situation, for that matter) has but one meaning and is true in but one way-- its literal meaning (that the painting is blue in color) and its being literally true (since the T-sentence "'That is a blue painting' is true iff that is a blue painting" is true). Therefore, Davidson deals with the clearly metaphorical element in the sentence, in this situa-

29. In fact, I seriously doubt whether Davidson himself would analyze this sentence as a case of mere verbal or semantic ambiguity, since he clearly distinguishes this kind of ambiguity from metaphor. For he identifies some of a polysemous word's or phrase's senses with dead, and therefore not living, i.e., not genuine, metaphors. See, e.g., "What Metaphors Mean," p. 36.
tion, by assigning it to the realm of use, not meaning, thus making the metaphorical element a function of the context of utterance (and perhaps of the utterer's intentions also, although this is unfortunately unclear in Davidson's account).

But suppose there were metaphorical meanings and metaphorical truth. Even then, according to Davidson, "[no] theory of metaphorical meaning or metaphorical truth can help explain how metaphor works . . . . What distinguishes metaphor is not meaning but use--in this it is like assertion, hinting, lying, promising, or criticizing." In fact, this alleged lack of explanatory power of metaphorical meanings and metaphorical truth is surely one of the reasons he rejects them. But it is probably not the major reason. Later on I will indicate what I do take to be the major reason.

But surely those who posit metaphorical meanings and/or metaphorical truth have done so precisely because they do think these are useful in explaining how metaphor works. Consequently, I will now mention some more clearly problematic difficulties with positing some special kind of truth, namely, metaphorical truth. First of all, having more than one kind of truth in one's theory of metaphor is simply less simple and elegant than having only one kind. Much more importantly, however, one is faced with the problem of trying somehow to distinguish the good or successful metaphors from

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30. Ibid., p. 41, my emphasis.
the poor or unsuccessful ones, since presumably only the successful ones are to be counted (metaphorically) true.

But this is no easy task, and will depend on such factors as the interpreter's level of understanding, familiarity with metaphorical language, individual tastes, etc. Presumably the only criterion for metaphorical truth will be "aptness." Specifying intersubjective criteria of aptness will prove a major difficulty.

Those who posit metaphorical truth do not have open to them Davidson's move of counting virtually all metaphors false. Nor can they say with Davidson, with respect to distinguishing successful from unsuccessful metaphors, "[There] are no unsuccessful metaphors, just as there are no unfunny jokes. There are tasteless metaphors, but these are turns that nevertheless have brought something off, even if it were not worth bringing off or could have been brought off better."31 We may want to dispute Davidson's remarkable claims that there are no unsuccessful metaphors nor unfunny jokes, but we can't question his logical consistency for including such a claim within his theory of metaphor. The metaphorical truth school, on the other hand, must devise some way of distinguishing the successful from the unsuccessful metaphors (unless they wish to claim, utterly implausibly, that there are simply no false metaphors, or very few, at any rate).

31. Ibid., p. 29.
Davidson's theory of metaphor really amounts to a generalized account of H. P. Grice's "metaphor" class of "conversational implicatures," although Davidson does not avail himself of the Gricean framework. (I do not necessarily mean to imply that he should.) By way of analogy, imagine a teacher who says to the last student to enter the classroom, "The door is open." The teacher would normally be understood to be giving a command by hinting, suggesting, or intimating that the door be shut. This, according to Grice's account, would be a conversational implicature, since the actual words the teacher uttered say or mean nothing beyond the mere assertion that the door is open while what the teacher means (intends) by the use of those words goes beyond that assertion. Davidson would no doubt view this sentence as having no special, parallel, imperatival meaning. And he would add that metaphors work in exactly the same way as this conversational implicature— they direct our attention toward something other than the (literal) meaning of the words by hinting, suggesting, and intimating. Thus, for Davidson, as for Grice, metaphors depend on the utterer's intentions and on the context of use.

We might compare also their accounts of how to distinguish lying from metaphor. Recall that according to Davidson, the utterer of the sentence 'Jane is a witch' could be lying, or could be inviting a comparison of Jane with witchiness. In the latter case, there would be a metaphor. What we take the utterer to be doing, lying or metaphorizing,
will depend on the context of use and on what we take to be the utterer's intentions in uttering the sentence. Grice's account of distinguishing metaphor from lying is precisely the same. (A third and rather uninteresting possibility is, of course, that the utterer believes in witches and thinks that Jane is one.)

Thus, it seems somewhat surprising that Davidson never adduces Grice's theory of conversational implicature, in particular the parts about metaphor, in support of his own theory of metaphor.

What is the motivation behind Davidson's unique theory? What is it that drives Davidson to this unusual view of metaphor, in particular, to the rejection of any theory of figurative language which posits different kinds of meanings? (I am assuming that Davidson intends by 'metaphor' the generic sense, covering all figures of speech or tropes—except similes, of course, which are not strictly "figurative," as opposed to "literal," at all.) To answer this question, we must first understand some things about Davidson's overall philosophy of language.

Davidson holds, or at any rate held, that theory of meaning is the primary job of philosophy of language. And he held that a Tarski-type truth theory can serve admirably as a theory of meaning for natural languages. This is so because, on his view, all a theory of meaning need do is give a satisfactory account of how natural language users could, not necessarily how they actually do, acquire the
ability to generate and understand novel natural language sentences given an initial finite stock of semantic primitives and syntactic rules. Thus, according to Davidson, a theory of meaning is to provide a logic of grammar, and a theory of meaning exploiting a Tarski-type truth theory to do so would be a truth-theoretic semantics.

Part and parcel of such a theory of meaning is the compositionality thesis: the meaning of the whole is a function of the parts. So a sentence's meaning is determined by the meanings of the words which compose it (and by the way the words are put together). Davidson clearly holds this thesis. It is difficult to see how any truth-theoretic semantics could do without it and still remain a truth-theoretic semantics.

Davidson is Quinean enough to view language sufficiently holistically that he sees meaning as attaching primarily to sentences, i.e., as present most saliently at the sentential level. Presumably, this would impinge on the compositionality principle only with respect to the learning of the semantic primitives -- they would be learned mainly sentence-by-sentence, i.e., by how they are used to determine sentential meanings. On this assumption, compositionality could be consistently maintained.

Given this philosophy of language, then, there are at least two possible ways of accounting for the motivation behind Davidson's theory of metaphor. An uncharitable, "psychologistic" account would run as follows. If metaphors
have special, independent meanings, then Davidson's whole program, i.e., his truth-theoretic theory of meaning, would be much less general, since natural language is so rife with metaphor. Thus, Davidson's whole semantic program would seem to be at stake, or at least in jeopardy of trivialization. Consequently, in order to defend his overall program, Davidson must contend that there is really nothing special about the phenomenon of metaphor, and that it is only a matter of use or pragmatics, and not of meaning or semantics (narrowly or strictly construed): "[M]etaphors mean what the words in their most literal interpretation mean, and nothing more."32

A second, more satisfying (as well as more satisfactory), sympathetic, "conceptual" account of Davidson's motivation is more probably the correct one. Natural language users seem to readily understand metaphors. Now either they do this via an understanding involving special metaphorical meanings, or via an understanding that is noncompositional in nature, or via an understanding that is nonsemantic, i.e., pragmatic. The fact that language users understand an unlimited number (in principle) of novel metaphors seems to rule out the noncompositionality alternative. And the fact that they readily understand these metaphors seems to undermine the special meanings approach. Hence, Davidson is left

with compositionality and pragmatics as the key elements in his theory of metaphor.\textsuperscript{33}

Johnson correctly summarizes the philosophical impact of Davidson's theory of metaphor as follows:

The importance of Davidson's essay \ldots lies in its resurrection of fundamental questions about the nature of meaning and truth, as they are brought into focus by the investigation of how we understand metaphors. There is much at stake here concerning important semantic issues, and that is why Black and Goodman have both replied to Davidson's challenge, albeit from very different perspectives. Now that these issues have been raised again, it will be necessary for any adequate theory of how metaphors work to deal with these problems, such as whether there is such a thing as metaphorical meaning and whether metaphors are the kind of thing that can be true or false. It is this latter question in particular that raises the general question of the cognitive status of metaphor.\textsuperscript{34}

Davidson's desire to have a single theory of truth and of meaning for all kinds of language, literal and figurative (metaphorical) alike is on the mark. But the way he goes about achieving this goal, viz., by relegating metaphor to the realm of use without positing any semantic meaning for metaphor at all is probably wrong. This is mainly because such an approach would not seem capable of explaining the semantic "deviance" and "tension" so clearly felt in metaphor.

\textsuperscript{33} Professor Richard E. Grandy suggested the sympathetic account to me.
\textsuperscript{34} Mark Johnson, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, p. 35.
PART II

METAPHORICAL MEANING AND TRUTH
IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF METAPHOR

CHAPTER 1: THE SEMANTIC STATUS OF METAPHOR.

In this part of the dissertation, I distill insightful and useful elements from theories of metaphor I have examined (Chapter 1), develop a sketch of a semantic intentionality theory of metaphorical meaning (Chapter 2), and reflect on the concept of metaphorical truth and the implications of a semantic intentionality theory for that concept (Chapter 3). I conclude the dissertation by going back to the introduction and trying to answer philosophically salient questions about metaphor mentioned there but left, to that point, dangling (Chapter 4).

I have been engaged in philosophical exposition, reflection, analysis, commentary, and critique of various salient philosophical theories of metaphor. It is time to look even more carefully and closely at what is involved 1) in claiming either that metaphors have meaning or that they don't, and 2) in claiming either that metaphors have truth values or that they don't. To facilitate this, I will pull together some of the strands of insights these extant theories have proffered and try to develop an improved philosophical theory of metaphorical truth and meaning, if possible. I will not draw equally from each theory examined so far, but I will try to take at least something useful from each.
Recall that Kittay attempts to develop a theory of metaphor in which metaphorical meaning is a matter of semantics itself, not just of pragmatics. This controversial move does serve admirably to endow metaphor with meaning. And this move is apparently a direct consequence of her equally controversial apparent contention that even literal language has no semantic meaning apart from its "discourse situation."

My "apparent" and "apparently" in the preceding sentence are necessary. What I mean here is that if Kittay really is claiming that literal language has no semantic meaning apart from its "discourse situation," then in her theory it is clearly this claim that gives rise to the claim that metaphorical meaning also is a matter of semantics. In other words, if even literal semantic meaning is generated by discourse situation, then surely there is even more reason to think 1) that this is also how metaphor gets its meaning, and 2) that this metaphorical meaning is likewise semantic.

But there is a major difficulty with the foundational claim that literal semantic meaning is generated (only) by discourse situation: this would quite clearly be to deny conventional linguistic meanings of both words and sentences. And this in turn would seem to vitiate much of Kittay's fine work with semantic fields. Let me first explain what I mean by these contentions and then ask, in light of
them, whether Kittay really can be claiming that literal semantic meaning is generated (only) by discourse situation.

I take it that the linguistic-conventional/specific-meaning-on-a-given-speech-occasion distinction is the same as the usage/use distinction. This distinction distinguishes between, on the one hand, the conventional or linguistic meanings of words (i.e., word usage), phrases, and sentences and, on the other, the meanings of words, phrases, and sentences on specific occasions (i.e., word, phrase, and sentence uses). Conventional meanings or usages of words have their ontogenesis in specific occasions of use over time. That is, uses of words over time become fixed usages; usage thus supervenes, or is parasitic, on use. Phrase and sentence usages, i.e., conventional meanings of sentences, typically derive compositionally from the usages (conventional meanings) of their constituent words and phrases. This process is an ongoing one—speakers' current uses continue to shape and establish future usage, just as past uses shaped and established current usage. These word, phrase, and sentence usages then constrain future uses: one uses the (conventional) usages needed to express her meaning on a given occasion. This is her use of a usage.

Now to deny conventional meanings is in effect to deny the very possibility of linguistic communication. For no one would ever be able to understand another without shared meanings, and shared meanings require conventionality (unless we could understand the myriad private languages of
others). To deny conventional meanings is likewise to deny semantic meaning. For without conventionality the only semantic or linguistic meaning that would be possible would belong to private languages, but these are generally conceded to be impossible.

Kittay's claims about the importance of discourse situation to literal meaning sound very much as though she is saying that all literal meaning is generated solely by discourse situations understood as individual occasions of use by individual speakers in the present. That is, she doesn't seem to speaking of the past ontogenesis of semantic, linguistic, literal meaning by individual uses over time that I have just described, but rather of occasion-by-occasion causal determination of literal meaning in the present. This would evacuate literal semantic meaning of conventionality. In effect, Kittay seems to be denying the usage/use distinction. Or perhaps one could say she seems to be conflating diachronic with synchronic aspects of language. I will examine her actual statements in some detail shortly and will attempt to do so charitably and sympathetically.

I claimed in addition that Kittay's (apparent) denial of conventional literal meaning would seem to vitiate her reliance on semantic fields. This is because semantic fields seem to require the notion of linguistic conventionality. What I mean by this is the following.

First, recall that semantic fields do play a large role in Kittay's account of general (literal) meaning, not just
in her account of metaphorical meaning. In fact, the reason they function so prominently in her theory of metaphorical language and meaning is precisely because they function so prominently in her theory of literal language and meaning:

It should be possible to draw a specification of the systems operative in metaphor within a general account of meaning, where the general theory identifies the meaning of a term as systematically involving relations to the meaning of other terms in a language. Semantic field theory will provide for us just such a ground on which to build a theory of metaphorical meaning.¹

Now the linguistic items in semantic fields possess their meanings (occupy the positions and have the affinity and contrastive relations they do) independently of any specific current discourse situations. Otherwise, their conventionality would be lost and communication would be impossible. I'm not at all denying that conventional meanings in semantic fields are generated from individual discourse situations over time. What I'm saying is that it is for this very reason that present discourse situations (occasions of use) by themselves cannot account for the literal meaning of linguistic items in semantic fields. Any theory of literal meaning that makes use of semantic field theory must, it seems to me, accept current context-independent meanings for words at least, and probably for sentences also. Further, any appeal to "default assumptions" in the absence of any clear specific discourse situation seems to be tantamount

¹. Eva Kittay, Metaphor, p. 35.
to, or at least a tacit acknowledgement of, context-independent meanings.

It is time to try to discover whether Kittay really can be claiming that literal semantic meaning is generated only by current discourse situations. If so, this would deny linguistic conventionality. I will focus on two passages; they are both somewhat less than crystal clear, though unfortunately they are as clear as she gets:

Philosophers of language and most linguists are accustomed to speak of semantics in terms of word meaning and sentence meaning and, therefore, the inclusion of features from the discourse situation appears to be contextual and pragmatic rather than semantic. By investigating metaphor, we learn that not only does a word only have meaning in the context of a sentence, but a sentence, too, lacks a definitive meaning outside its linguistic and situational context—its discourse situation.²

What I have attempted to argue is that, within natural language, sentence meaning, if construed as independent of context, is an empty abstraction . . . .³

In order to evaluate these crucial claims properly, it would be valuable (perhaps even necessary) to know exactly what Kittay intends by "definitive meaning" in the first quote and "construed as" and "empty abstraction" in the second.⁴ But she supplies us with no further specific clarification. So in rendering a charitable, sympathetic interpretation, all we have to go by is her theory as a whole plus her almost certain realization that semantic determination

². Ibid., p. 115.
³. Ibid.
⁴. My emphasis.
by present discourse situations alone would allow no possi-

bility of linguistic conventionality.

Taking the first quotation at face value, Kittay is

saying first of all that "a word only [has] meaning in the

context of a sentence" and we learn this from an investiga-
tion of metaphor. If we had nothing else to go on, we would

have to conclude that she means that apart from current uses

of words in sentences, words have no meanings, for she

doesn't qualify the statement in any way. This seems to be

a straightforward denial of linguistic conventionality.

She then goes on to say that an investigation of meta-

phor also teaches us that sentences too lack "definitive"

meanings outside of discourse situations (linguistic and

situational contexts). Now this "too" is problematic for a

sympathetic interpretation of "definitive." If she had left

out the "too" I might be inclined to say that by the use of

"definitive" she might be meaning to allow for the possibil-

ity of conventional meanings for sentences apart from cur-

cent discourse situations. In that case, she would be

claiming (quite reasonably) that sentence usage delimits or

constrains sentence use, and that speakers' current uses of

sentences and/or their discourse situations also play a role

in causally determining the semantic meaning of sentences.

Notice that Kittay's latter claim is far different from

the more plausible one that speakers' uses of sentences

and/or their discourse situations play a significant role in

either determining hearers' disambiguations (interpreta-
tions) of speakers' sentences or causally determining the meaning of speakers' utterances of sentences (depending on one's view of the sentence/utterance distinction). Kittay herself admits that one might respond to her argument along these lines:

Whenever it is possible to construe the discourse in which the sentence is situated so that the proper interpretation of the sentence (and hence semantic properties such as truth conditions) depends on the discourse situation itself, we have language meaning. . . . The reader may grant the above arguments, claim that my argument applies to utterance meaning, and note that no one denies that context influences the meaning of utterances. 5

I am one who responds in just such fashion, with the proviso that one could take Kittay's arguments as applying either to meanings of sentence utterances or to interpretations of sentences.

However, to get back to the claim that "a sentence, too, lacks a definitive meaning outside its . . . discourse situation," the "too" here seems to connect sentences lacking "definitive" meanings with words lacking meanings outside sentential contexts (again, Kittay doesn't qualify this). And this certainly seems to imply that sentences also, like words, have no meaning apart from their discourse situations. This is confirmed by Kittay's footnote to the sentence I've quoted, in which she even drops "definitive" altogether in describing sentential meaning outside a context:

5. Ibid.
My claim is meant to be stronger than the claim which concedes that most sentences may have to be relativized to speaker, time, and place. . . . While I do not dispute that a sentence has a meaning only relative to a given language, a point which seems either quite profound or quite trivial depending on how it is taken, the claim that a sentence has a meaning only relative to a given context has an importantly different focus. It is neither a holistic nor an atomistic view of language.6

It might be suggested that in this footnote and the sentence to which it is appended Kittay is simply repeating the familiar and innocuous Fregean point that words remain ambiguous among their various senses outside sentential contexts. But if this is all she means to be saying, she has not expressed herself well at all. She does not refer to Frege's dictum, nor to any conventional meaning/occasion meaning (usage/use) distinction to indicate that this is all she has in mind. Indeed, she seems to state quite clearly that she is making a broadly theoretical point about semantics in general: "[T]he claim that a sentence has a meaning only relative to a given context has an importantly different focus. It is neither a holistic nor an atomistic view of language." I take it then that Kittay is going far beyond the Fregean point; I believe her words imply that she believes that words and sentences have no meanings at all apart from current discourse situations. And this in turn implies that neither words nor sentences have conventional meanings.

6. Ibid.
The result is that however we construe Kittay at this point, there is difficulty. For 1) taking the "too" into account, Kittay's position implies the non-conventionality of semantic meaning, and 2) charitably overlooking the "too," we are still left with the implausible claim that speakers' current uses causally determine semantic sentence meaning.

What about the second citation? The problem here was with her term "empty abstraction," referring to sentence meanings construed independently of contexts (discourse situations). Is Kittay saying that there is no such thing as sentence meaning apart from discourse situations, or that talk of such meanings, even if they exist, is unfruitful or misleading, or . . . ? If she doesn't mean that sentences have no meanings at all apart from discourse situations, it's very difficult to see exactly what she does mean here.

Does Kittay's overall theory shed any light on what she might mean by "definitive meaning" and "empty abstraction"? First, Kittay does not of course verbally deny the existence of linguistic conventionality; indeed she affirms it. She refers to linguistic items as "utterance-types" and states that in the case of the simplest of these, uncombined single words or "monolexemes," literal and conventional meaning coincide. And she claims that for all utterance-types of greater "grammatical complexity" than monolexemes, such coincidence of literal and conventional meaning is not guaran-

7. Ibid., p. 51.
teed, since, she says, they may have conventional meanings that diverge from their literal meanings. She cites idioms and "conventionalized metaphors" as examples.\footnote{Ibid.} I find nothing amiss so far. It is her account, or lack thereof, of how conventional meanings get attached to utterance-types that is problematic.

Kittay doesn't really trouble herself with this question. She contents herself with formalisms without ever even addressing the issue. All she says is:

I shall speak of each utterance-type, $\mathbf{u}$, as 'an element' of some $U^n$, that is, $\mathbf{u} \in U^n$. Each $\mathbf{u}$ will have an expression, $E(\mathbf{u})$, and a content $C(\mathbf{u})$. The ordered pair $\langle E(\mathbf{u}), C(\mathbf{u}) \rangle$ will be a 'term'. At each level of complexity we assign meanings to the elements which belong to the class. That is, there is some way in which we assign meanings to uncombined words, as there are rules for assigning meanings to phrases, sentences, and groups of sentences. More formally, we shall say that each unit in $U^n$ which we call the element $\mathbf{u} \in U^n$, is assigned a first-order meaning at each level of complexity $n$. First-order meaning is the most literal yet still conventional meaning of an expression.\footnote{Ibid.}

Notice the vagueness here: there is "some way" whereby we assign conventional meanings to the utterance-types of each grammatical level of complexity.

Of course I understand Kittay is talking only in "formalese," but the point is that it's crucial that she say exactly how these conventional meanings actually arise in natural language. The reason for this is that in the quotations we've been concerned with, she appears to deny linguistic conventionality. (A denial, by the way, which seems due to
a confusion of utterance meanings or hearers' disambiguations or interpretations, whichever you please, with conventional meanings per se.)

So it's not enough in Kittay's case just to say that somehow "we" assign conventional meanings: this seems like hollow handwaving in light of her apparent denial of these very meanings. But unfortunately, she doesn't say how conventional meanings are actually assigned or generated. So Kittay's overall theory appears inadequate to help us render a charitable interpretation of these problematic citations.

Our resources for interpreting the problem passages are thus reduced to only Kittay's own common sense to realize that conventional meanings must arise from uses in discourse situations over time, not in the present. Is this charitable (and reasonable) assumption by itself sufficient to ensure a charitable construal of the problem passages? (The likeliest such charitable interpretation has Kittay claiming merely that usage constrains speakers' uses in a major way (quite obviously true), but also that such uses themselves partly determine linguistic meaning (less obviously true).) Maybe. But in the absence of any account of how conventional meanings actually get generated or any other clues for a charitable interpretation in her overall theory, this interpretation must remain less than absolutely certain. In other words, it's quite possible that these problem passages contradict Kittay's earlier (sketchy and formalistic) affirmations of conventional linguistic meanings.
Finally, consider again the following important (and, I believe, conclusive) footnote to which I have already referred, which immediately follows the "definitive meaning" quote:

My claim is meant to be stronger than the claim that most sentences may have to be relativized to speaker, time, and place. Davidson (1967) remarks that a sentence has a meaning only in the context of a language, and at the same time maintains the contextual independence of the sentence. He is upholding the contextual independence of a sentence relative to a given language. While I do not dispute that a sentence has a meaning only relative to a given language, a point which seems either quite profound or quite trivial depending on how it is taken, the [Kittay's] claim that a sentence has a meaning only relative to a given context has an importantly different focus. It is neither a holistic nor an atomistic view of language. 10

Kittay is very plain here: "A sentence has a meaning only relative to a given context." I don't know how to interpret this except straightforwardly and in light of her other remarks on p. 115. Here is ample evidence, I believe, that Kittay, whether she realizes it or not, 1) is denying sentences context-independent (i.e., conventional) meanings by 2) (wrongly) conflating conventional meaning simpliciter with disambiguated conventional meaning (the conventional meaning(s) picked out by the context and the speakers' intentions, at least, according to my theory, which I will soon elaborate).

Notice that, by her own account, it is Kittay's investigation of metaphor that leads her to this radical view of the role of context ("discourse situation") in semantics.

10. Ibid., p. 115.
As noted earlier, this seems to be a case of the tail wagging the dog. It also begs the question of whether a semantic theory should be expected to give an account of metaphor in favor of an affirmative answer rather than dealing with this question in its own right.

Kittay's theory does have the happy consequence that some metaphorical sentences, viz., those that "succeed," turn out to be true, not just blatantly false like both false literal sentences and unsuccessful metaphorical sentences:

In the preceding discussion, I have proposed that the truth conditions of a sentence are altered when a sentence is interpreted literally rather than metaphorically (or ironically) and have taken this to indicate that whether an utterance is metaphorical is a semantic matter. That is to say, we have taken altered truth conditions as an index of semantic pertinence. This ought not to be understood as an implicit endorsement of a truth-theoretic semantics for natural language. Rather, the above arguments are meant to show that even within the framework of a truth-theoretic semantics, that is, within the constraints of what constitutes a semantic concern within a truth-theoretic semantics, metaphor must be given a semantic account.11

Thus, Kittay can easily capture the linguistic intuition of many that good metaphors ought not be considered false just because they are non-literal. This clearly and nicely does away with the old, unfortunate "controversy" theory of metaphor. And it results from considering context and metaphor as semantic, not just pragmatic, matters, that is, from considering metaphor not just as one kind of use of language but as a part of language itself.

11. Ibid.
Kittay contrasts her view of the semantic status of metaphor with Davidson's. She cites one of his own examples, "The men are pigs," and comments on it as follows:

The sentence would in most contexts be metaphorical, and literally false, regardless of how the indexicals are specified; but when uttered by Ulysses of his men in Circe's palace, we are to suppose that these are meant as literal and truthful words. In this example and others that he cites, Davidson recognizes that the context determines the metaphorical nature of the appropriate interpretation, but he does not attend to the natural corollary, that if the determining factor in the case of metaphor is context, then context plays the same determining factor if the sentence turns out to be literal.  

Here again Kittay fails to distinguish the inherent ambiguity of "determines" and "determining": does she mean that context actually makes an utterance either metaphorical or literal or merely that context leads us to the appropriate kind of interpretation of the utterance? Presumably the former, given her theory of metaphor. I believe that this passage, and other similar ones, indicate that Kittay is confused on this issue and that she has (wrongly) conflated metaphorical meaning and metaphorical interpretation.

Meanings and interpretations must not be confused or identified with each other. They are not the same thing, and they are conceptually distinct. This is easily demon-

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strated by the simple fact that hearers (interpreters) can fail to come up with the meaning of an utterance or text. Yet they do have their interpretations. It's just that their interpretations are wrong. Thus, interpretations and meanings don't always coincide, which suffices to show at least that they can't be identified with each other.

On my view, a view I think shared by many others, a semantic linguistic meaning is something that inheres in a linguistic item (Kittay's "utterance-type") by virtue of, among other things, its context and its utterer's intentions. It is one (or, rarely, more than one) of its possible conventional meanings, the one(s) determined or allowed by its context and utterer's intentions. Another way of putting this is that context and speakers' intentions objectively disambiguate the utterance, a disambiguation(s) available to interpreters.

Since speakers' intentions come into play to disambiguate the conventional meanings of utterances (without respect to any interpreter or interpretation), and speakers normally intend only one meaning in any given utterance, there will normally be only one disambiguated meaning. Yet it is possible for a speaker (even more so for a writer, perhaps) to intend more than one meaning. In such a case, he may intend for some interpreter to "get" just one meaning, or more than one, or all. (However, I think it is rare that a speaker or writer would ever intend more than two meanings.)
Now it's far from certain that all interpreters will "arrive at" or "come up with" this meaning or disambiguation. (For convenience in writing I restrict myself to the normal case in which there is only one disambiguated meaning.) This shows that (disambiguated) meaning and interpretation must not be confused or conflated. Kittay muddies the issue when she calls what I am calling "the meaning," "the appropriate interpretation." Granted that "the appropriate interpretation" and "the meaning" will coincide whenever the interpreter correctly identifies the meaning, using the two interchangeably as Kittay does makes it seem that contextual determination of meaning and contextual determination of correct interpretation are the same thing. I am arguing that they are not. For the context (and speakers' intentions as well, on my view) always determines meaning--even when there is no interpreter present to do any interpreting!

So there can be utterance occasions where there is meaning but no interpretation. How can there be an "interpretation" if there is no interpreter present? Clearly the concept 'interpretation' implies the action of an interpreter. That is, interpretation is a human epistemic process distinct from the contextual determination of meaning, which is interpreter-independent. Now if it is context and utterers' intentions that determine which of an utterance's possible conventional meanings is its actual meaning, then obviously the interpreter in his interpreting must focus on
these factors to arrive at the meaning. I hope this suf-
fices to indicate the relation between meanings and inter-
pretations (or at least my view thereof).

I believe that Kittay views even truth conditions of
sentences as depending (in part) on interpreters. I think
this is clear from the following:

Thus without any mention of metaphorical mean-
ings, it appears that the truth conditions ap-
propriate to a sentence's interpretation are
affected by the understanding, gained through
contextual considerations, of whether the utter-
ance is to be interpreted literally or metaphor-
ically.\textsuperscript{14}

She seems quite clearly to be saying that truth conditions
are somehow partially determined by understanding, based on
contextual considerations, how the sentence is to be inter-
preted.

Now such understanding is obviously a function of indi-
vidual interpreters. But I would claim that here also, as
in the case of meaning, truth conditions are determined in-
dependently of any particular interpreters. (Notice I did
not say, "Truth conditions are to be determined indepen-
dently of particular interpreters." That is, they are in
fact determined independently of particular interpreters;
individual interpreters play no part in such determination.)
Truth conditions are determined by the meaning of the utter-
ance, which is determined by context and speakers' inten-
tions. (Notice I did not say, "The meaning of the utterance
is to be determined by context and speakers' intentions.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 103.
That is, it is in fact determined independently of particular interpreters; individual interpreters play no part in such determination."

Consider next Kittay's comments on Davidson's example "Hemingway Lost in Africa," a headline the New York Mirror intended to use to report Hemingway's death (allegedly metaphorically), but which actually turned out to be literally true:

To say of Hemingway that he was 'lost' in Africa, thereby suggesting that he had died, did not necessarily preclude the additional meaning that he had literally been lost before he perished. We can say that the two readings have two independent sets of truth conditions. But to say this is to concede that how we assign truth conditions to a sentence depends on whether we understand it literally or metaphorically.15

Kittay's words seem to me to express a less than robust realism about what makes sentences true or false: "How we assign truth conditions to a sentence depends on whether we understand it literally or metaphorically." Again, truth conditions don't get attached to sentences by individual interpreters assigning them; such attachment occurs independently of individual interpreters.

In addition, incidentally, both Kittay and Davidson claim that for the headline to mean that Hemingway was dead, it would have to be metaphorical or at least be taken as metaphorical. But I would say that since "lost" is commonly (i.e., conventionally, hence literally) used to mean "dead," neither it nor the headline should be understood as

15. Ibid., p. 102.
metaphorical. This is just one more instance where a failure to recognize the abundant polysemy of linguistic items results in seeing metaphor where there isn't any.

If metaphorical meaning depends on context and in addition is a purely semantic matter of the same type and on the same level as literal meaning, as Kittay's theory seems to say, then this seems to destroy not only the conventionality of semantic meaning but its very existence as well. This is because by its very nature literal semantic meaning certainly appears to be context-independent, that is, independent of any particular contexts in the present (though not independent, of course, of the aggregate of past uses in various contexts, i.e., usage). Indeed the very concept of linguistic conventionality seems to include the notion of present-discourse-situation-independence, as I argued earlier.

Let me note here that even if the best general theory of linguistic meaning should turn out to be of a Heideggerian or Wittgensteinian "meaning as use" variety, this would not imply that there is no semantic/pragmatic distinction. It would only mean that conventional or lexical or linguistic meaning derives from how people use the various linguistic items they do. Context, interpretation, and the use of context in interpretation would remain separate from conventional meaning per se, as in other general theories of meaning.
As I mentioned earlier, Kittay takes Davidson as her foil in analyzing the semantic status of metaphor. Recall that Davidson clearly rejects any meaning for metaphors beyond the literal, making metaphor purely a matter of pragmatics, traditionally conceived. Since, on Davidson's view, the only meaning of metaphors is their literal meaning, he is forced to count all metaphors as false (except those that just happen by accident to be literally true). According to Davidson, since the only kind of meaning is literal meaning, the only kind of truth (or falsity) is literal truth (or falsity).

But are we forced to agree totally with either Kittay's or Davidson's view of the semantic status of metaphor to the exclusion of the other, or is there perhaps some mediating position that can take advantage of and incorporate relevant insights from each? I believe there is such a position. We should agree with Kittay against Davidson that metaphor has some sort of semantic meaning. But I think Kittay is unclear on how this semantic meaning comes to be attached to metaphor. We should agree with Davidson that metaphor is a matter of pragmatics, if that is taken to mean that context plays a major role in the determination of a metaphor. Davidson is wrong, however, in not allowing for genuine metaphorical meaning. These views may seem contradictory but I believe they can be harmonized in a satisfactory hybrid theory of metaphor's semantic status, some of whose
elements I have already mentioned. I will spell out this hybrid theory in some detail in the next chapter.

From Aristotle and Kittay, and to a lesser extent, Mac Cormac, my theory of metaphorical meaning and truth takes the insight that metaphor is not just a matter of larger semantically salient chunks of language such as sentences and discourses, but even of words (Aristotle) and semantic fields (Kittay). Black provides the crucial interactionist notion and framework which, I believe, any subsequent philosophical theory of metaphor must take into account. Since my theory is basically a modification of Kittay's and hers is fundamentally an interactionist approach in the tradition of Black, so is mine.

My theory takes from Searle the important element of speakers' intentions as constitutive of metaphor. From Davidson comes the desire for simplicity and elegance in semantic theory, the hope for a single, unified kind of meaning and truth. Kittay provides the vital notion of semantic fields, the insistence that metaphors have semantic meaning, and the emphasis on context and its importance for metaphorical meaning.

Mac Cormac and Lakoff and Johnson teach us that metaphor is widespread in natural language and plays a significant role in our cognitive processes. Aristotle was the first to stress the cognitive significance of metaphor, along with the rest of his pioneering work in the field of philosophical inquiry into metaphor. Since my theory in its
present state is only an account of the semantic status of metaphor, it doesn't deal with the cognitive significance of metaphor. To become a fully developed philosophical theory, it would have to deal with this issue as well.
CHAPTER 2: THE SEMANTIC INTENTIONALITY THEORY
OF METAPHORICAL MEANING.

The semantic account of metaphor I sketch seeks, like
Kittay's, to capture the intuition that metaphors ought to
be considered semantically meaningful and either true or
false. I seek, among other things, to avoid a radical Dav-
idsonianism that would rob metaphor of all semantic meaning.
In this chapter I sketch the semantic intentionality theory
of metaphorical meaning. In the next chapter I discuss what
sort of theory of truth this theory of metaphorical meaning
requires.

The semantic intentionality theory of metaphorical
meaning recognizes the need for a foundation in a general
theory of semantic meaning. That foundational theory is as
follows. There inhere in any linguistic unit or utterance
(Kittay's utterance-types), no matter of what size, a vari-
ety of conventional meanings. These conventional meanings
are built up compositionally and their presence results in
semantic ambiguity. Syntax contributes to even more ambigu-
ity. But increases in linguistic context narrow down the
conventional meaning possibilities: the larger the size of
the unit's linguistic and non-linguistic contexts, the
smaller the number of its possible conventional meanings,
i.e., the less ambiguity there is. This is the process of
disambiguation by context.

This linguistic context, then, is partially responsible
for determining, apart from the presence or activity of any
interpreters, which one(s) of the possible conventional
meanings of the linguistic unit, determined compositionally, is (are) the actual (allowable) meanings in that context. (Such determination is what I am calling "disambiguation.") Sometimes the linguistic context is the only context available—there will be no extra-linguistic context (other than the broad "background assumptions"). This is true in the case of some (most?) written linguistic units. Where there is extra-linguistic context as well, this will also function in the disambiguation process. I have said, then, that linguistic and extra-linguistic context are partially responsible for disambiguation. There is one further determinative factor for interpreter-independent disambiguation—speakers' intentions.

It is this meaning(s), determined (i.e., disambiguated or picked out from the rest of its fellow conventional meanings) by the combination of linguistic context and speakers' intentions, that interpreters must strive to discover. Their attempts to do so, whether successful or not, are their interpretations.

It seems to me that both Davidson and Kittay are wrong about how context functions, what it does or doesn't do, in the determination of literal as well as metaphorical meaning. Davidson seems to identify the meaning of any utterance with its literal (and only) meaning. He would construe all contextual matters as having to do only with pragmatics (use). I think this is wrong because I believe context is important in the interpreter-independent process of disam-
biguous, of fixing or picking out the semantic meaning(s) of an utterance from among its various conventional meaning possibilities.

Kittay on the other hand seems to wrongly say that context ("discourse situation") functions not only to disambiguate the actual meaning(s) of a linguistic unit from among its possible conventional meanings, but to actually determine these possible conventional meanings themselves. That is, Kittay wrongly conflates conventional meaning simpliciter with disambiguated conventional meaning. In fact, she doesn't seem to recognize that there are these two types of conventional meaning. I believe Kittay's silence about the process of disambiguation (she never even uses the word) and her apparent identification of semantic meaning with interpretation confirm this. For further confirmatory evidence that this is so, see my comments on the passage assigned fn. 9 in the previous chapter.

My theory differentiates sharply between the semantic meaning of a linguistic unit or utterance and its interpretation. They are two separate phenomena that are identified with each other only on pain of requiring the presence of an interpreter for there to be any fixed semantic meaning of the unit. (And this is why Kittay is wrong to (apparently or virtually) conflate meaning and interpretation.) Correct interpretation indeed depends largely though not solely on considerations of context (discourse situation). A careful consideration of discourse situation (I say "careful" but it
must be understood that in actual practice this of course typically occurs in only a matter of seconds) will help in identifying the speaker's intentions as literal or metaphorical, such intentions being crucial for the presence of either literal or metaphorical language. Correct interpretation also depends, naturally, on an adequate acquaintance with literal (lexical) meaning.

In the case of metaphor, there is an additional key reason why we must distinguish between (disambiguated metaphorical) meaning and metaphorical interpretations, which is in order to account for the evident semantic meaningfulness of metaphor. I argue that metaphors do indeed have meanings\(^1\) beyond the literal meanings of the sentences used to express the metaphors. That is, when a metaphorically competent speaker wishes to convey a metaphor, her meaning outstrips the literal meaning of her utterance. Thus, more meaning is conveyed by her utterance of a sentence in an appropriate context than by the sentence itself. I believe such metaphorical meaning should be considered semantic meaning; my reasons for thinking so are as follows.

First, if metaphors did not have semantic meaning, it would be difficult, among other things, to explain the manifest semantic tension and deviance we feel when confronted

\(^1\) What kind of general theory of meaning (i.e., Fregean or Wittgensteinian (meaning as use) or Quinean/behavioristic or Putnamian or . . .) for language in general is of no importance to the argument here. Hence, my use of the term 'meanings' should not be seen as either "theory-laden" or question-begging.
with metaphor. Granted that some theories that don't posit semantic metaphorical meanings may also be able to account for such semantic tension in their own way, I think that ceteris paribus this tension points to metaphors having semantic meaning.

Second, both Kittay and I attend to the intuition that metaphors can have truth values provided they are not nonsensical; and in order to have truth values they must be meaningful, i.e., have meaning.

Third, there is, I believe, a general feeling or intuition among metaphorically competent speakers that metaphors have meaning and even that this is obvious. Ceteris paribus, we should at least take such a general intuition into account.

Fourth, metaphors are generally understandable by metaphorically competent or sophisticated language speakers. But if they are understandable, they must be explicable both to oneself and to another in semantically meaningful language, since metaphor is a phenomenon of language. For if they had no semantic meaning, what could it possibly mean to explicate them?; in what would this consist?; how can something that has no semantic meaning be explicated at all? One can imagine how non-semantic phenomena could rightly be considered susceptible of analysis, dissection, or explanation (indeed, most non-philosophy-of-language philosophy typically engages in these very things); but I doubt that
non-semantic phenomena could properly be said to be susceptible of explication.

Fifth (this may be nearly identical to the previous argument), if it were possible in principle to explicate a metaphor even to oneself in other than semantically meaningful language (even if this never in fact occurs, which would amount to a universal non-explicatory "immediate" or "intuitive" grasp of metaphors' implications), then it would be possible to cogitate explicitly in modes other than natural language. But this is now generally conceded to be impossible.

Sixth, the most natural way to account for the regular, systematic way in which metaphor clearly seems to be related to literal language is by positing semantic metaphorical meaning. (Incidentally, this systematicity is also part of what enables competent hearers to readily recognize and interpret metaphors.)

Seventh, and lastly, we need some principled way to regard metaphors of the form "Man is a wolf" not as asserting identities, as they appear to, but as what they really are, novel descriptions/categorical statements "in which a given entity is placed under two (or more) concepts or in two (or more) categories which are incompatible." At the least, this will require some sort of semantic meaning for the metaphor different from its literal meaning. In addition, I think it will require some kind of Fregean account of the

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metaphor's topic and meaning, such as the one Kittay develops.

It is possible, I grant, that no one of the above seven arguments for semantic metaphorical meaning is sufficient by itself to "prove," or compel us to posit, such meaning. However, I do believe that taken together, they do provide quite a strong case for doing so. So I will operate under the assumption that metaphors do indeed have semantic meanings.

These semantic metaphorical meanings are produced when speakers' metaphorical intentions/meanings, acting upon some selected conventional meaning of some selected linguistic expressions(s), give rise to utterances such that, when they are uttered in appropriate discourse situations, metaphorically competent hearers/interpreters interpret them metaphorically in those situations. I call such discourse situations "metaphorically propitious." And I believe that the kind of semantic metaphorical meanings I have in mind are none other than Kittay's second-order meanings, which derive systematically from first-order meanings.

I believe that a great many linguistic items (or utterances thereof) which get identified as metaphorical by different theorists (especially by Lakoff and Johnson but even by Kittay to an extent) are in fact instances of literal language, not metaphorical. This is perhaps just to say that I see more (literal) polysemy, resulting from dead metaphors, in linguistic expressions than do many (most?)
writers on metaphor. That is, I believe that many of these uses that are thought to be live metaphors have actually deceased and hence, are part of conventional language. Thus, I see 'literal' and 'conventional' as virtually coextensive.

When these writers so frequently (mis)identify literal polysemy as metaphorical senses or uses, I believe it generally stems from their failure to distinguish a diachronic from a synchronic account of metaphor. That is to say, they mistake the metaphorical origins of a linguistic meaning for its present literal (i.e., conventional) semantic status and accordingly (mis)-identify the current meaning as metaphorical instead of literal. Alston puts the point as follows:

[0]ne originally spoke metaphorically in referring to something as the "mouth" of a river, the "hood" of an automobile, a "fork" in the road, or "knitting" one's brow. However, when we use such phrases we are applying the terms in senses they have in the language. The metaphor has "died", has "ossified", and has given rise to a new sense. It can be called a "metaphorical sense" but only by reference to its origin. Insofar as there is such a sense in the language, we are not speaking metaphorically, not using the term metaphorically, when we speak of the hood of a car.3

I agree completely with this account. So, in general, in order to qualify as metaphorical a linguistic item (or use/utterance thereof) has to be novel (non-conventional).

Moreover, other parts of my own theory of metaphor outlined in this chapter lead naturally to this conclusion. What I mean is that my theory sees metaphors as objectively

determined (i.e., constituted) in part by speakers' meanings/intentions. To express his meaning, a competent speaker has recourse to great linguistic resources: he may exploit all the literal, conventional semantic meanings he is aware of for all the linguistic items in his vocabulary capable of having such meanings, or at least those that are psychologically available to be him on the utterance occasion. (I take it this would include not only words but certain phrases and even sentences whose meanings are non-compositional, such as idioms.)

But what if even these huge resources available to the competent speaker on the utterance occasion fail to provide him with words (phrases, sentences) required, at least in his (probably subconscious) estimation, to adequately, or best, express his intended meaning? If he is a metaphorically competent speaker, he may then draw on an item(s) in his vocabulary that seems to him to possess some suitable conventional meaning which he can use metaphorically to express his intended meaning. He then utters a metaphor, the meaning of which is partly constituted by his own metaphorical intention. But the meaning is also partly constituted, and compositionally so, by the words in the metaphor used non-metaphorically and by one of the conventional meanings of the item(s) chosen to be used metaphorically, for it was chosen for the very reason that it possessed some conventional meaning deemed (by the speaker) suitable for metaphorical use.
Nevertheless, the metaphorical utterance (i.e., the metaphor) has a new semantic meaning, one not specified just by the conventional meanings of the linguistic items used in the utterance. The speaker's intentions have acted upon the selected linguistic item(s)'s relevant conventional meaning(s) to create a new semantic meaning. (He accomplishes this through the transference of semantic structure or relations that occurs when one semantic field is juxtaposed on another.) This is why I say that to qualify as a metaphor, a use of a linguistic item has to be novel. And this is also why I believe that most of those expressions generally considered to be live metaphors in fact expired long ago.

As an example, consider "There goes a pig" uttered by a hippie during a Vietnam War protest gathering at a time when 'pig' had already become entrenched in the hippie counterculture as a term for a policeman. Most writers on metaphor would say the hippie was using a (live) metaphor to refer to the policeman. But since 'pig' had the conventional meaning "policeman" in that speaker's culture, my theory says he was not uttering a metaphor, but was simply speaking conventionally or literally. For the hippie speaker's utterance to be considered metaphorical, he would have had to have used 'pig' in a non-conventional (for any culture he may properly have been considered a member of) way.

Bruce Fraser agrees with my account and gives several interesting examples in the following passage:

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4. Linguistic conventionality is of course always relative to a culture or sub-culture.
Although I shall talk as though all metaphors were the same, there is, in fact, a continuum. At one end there is what might be called the live metaphor, at the other end the dead metaphor. The latter is simply an idiom, which was once a live metaphor, but which is now to be treated as a conventionalized form in the language. The phrase "to kick the bucket," once used literally and then metaphorically to refer to the final struggles of animals lashed by their feet to a beam called a "bucket," has now lost any sense of its original source. On the other hand, there are expressions such as "John is married to his tennis game" or "irrigate your mind a little" that require both a context and a certain creativity to interpret adequately.  

Dead metaphors all die slowly. They undergo a long and gradual evolutionary process of ossification into literal (conventional) language. Thus, there is in natural language a continuum from metaphorical to literal along which various dying metaphorical expressions may be located. The boundary between the literal and the metaphorical blurs. Jerrold Sadock puts it this way:  

[A] large part of English (and presumably of other natural languages as well) is in flux; the pragmatic effect of numerous figures of speech are on the way to becoming part of the conventional content or the expressions that are used to convey them. But this process occurs by stages so that in most cases the communicative value of an expression that began life as a metaphor or as some other trope is partially conventional and partially not.  

According to Sadock, the fuzzy borderline between the literal and the "figurative" means that it can be difficult, in some particular cases, to determine whether we have literal

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or "figurative" language. Sadock concludes that there is less to the literal/metaphorical distinction than we thought.

David Rumelhart arrives at a similar conclusion from different considerations. His main point is that the psychological processes underlying and involved in the processing of both literal and metaphorical language are fundamentally the same. He also seems to conclude that the literal/metaphorical distinction is less well established than we thought.

Unfortunately, Sadock and Rumelhart both draw overblown conclusions from their admittedly worthy studies. Their generally well-established premises do not warrant their overly pessimistic conclusions. They both seem to miss the crucial point that fuzzy boundaries (in this case between the literal and the metaphorical) do not necessarily imply a fuzzy distinction. The distinction between the literal and the metaphorical remains firmly established in spite of the fact that both are located on a single continuum.

A small number of genuine metaphors are correctly described as conventional in nature. This appears to be somewhat of a problem for a theory such as mine that views metaphor as determined by speakers' intentions and as typically novel. This is because the conventionality of conventional metaphors is almost always restricted to one con-

ventional meaning and therefore the speaker's intentions don't even function to disambiguate a plurality of possible meanings. And needless to say there is nothing novel about a conventional metaphor. Though his account of metaphor differs from mine at significant points, I again advert to Alston for an appropriate (to my theory) solution of this apparent difficulty:

There are standard, well-known metaphors with standard interpretations, or at least standard cores of interpretations to which variations may be added. Thus if I were to say "Life's a walking shadow," meaning to assert that life is spontaneous and free-swinging, not "tied-down" nor rigid, that would be a strange use of the sentence. I would be violating a sort of convention . . . . We can handle this complexity by thinking of subsequent utterances of the sentence as simply repetitions or quotations of the utterance of some original or standard speaker, who is the source of the standard propositional content.8

My theory mediates primarily between Kittay's and Searle's theories, and Davidson's to a lesser extent. From Davidson my theory takes the position that literal truth is the only kind there is, and the key insight that metaphor cannot be a matter only of semantics, at least not on the traditional conception of semantics. But Davidson vehemently denies there is metaphorical meaning of any sort, whereas mine strongly affirms metaphorical meaning.

My theory takes from Kittay's the positing of semantic meaning for metaphor and the importance of discourse situation and semantic fields to the explanation of metaphorical meaning and metaphor's workings. There are two major dif-

ferences between my theory and Kittay's. First, my theory insists on the importance of speaker's intentions in disambiguating the conventional meanings of all utterances, literal as well as metaphorical. Kittay's theory, by contrast, assumes that speakers' intentions are absolutely unimportant in such determination of an utterance's semantic meaning. Second, and relatedly, my theory distinguishes sharply between, on the one hand, utterance disambiguated meaning, effected by discourse situation and speakers' intentions, and hearers' interpretations of utterances on the other. But Kittay's theory seems clearly to conflate these two distinct phenomena.

The crucial element I take from Searle's theory is the focus on the importance of speakers' intentions for metaphor. My theory differs from Searle's, I think, in two main ways. First, recall that Searle distinguishes between sentence and speaker's (utterance) meaning and seems to count only sentence meaning as semantically meaningful. But my theory claims that speaker's metaphorical meaning is also a genuine kind of semantic meaning. This should obviate all the problems Searle's theory had with the principle of Expressibility given his assumptions that there is a sentence/speaker meaning distinction, that metaphorical meaning is speaker, not sentence, meaning, and that literal paraphrasability fails for some metaphors.

Second, my theory adds certain elements from Kittay's, e.g. the crucial importance of overall discourse situation
to a metaphor's meaning and interpretation, and semantic
field theory to help account for metaphor's systematicity.
I agree with Grandy's explanation of how Kittay's use of se-
mantic field theory, specifically the critical concept of
'contrast set,' nicely accounts for how it is that in meta-
phors "structural" relations are systematically transferred
from the referent(s) of the metaphorical subject to the re-
ferent(s) of the principal subject:

[I]t is often claimed that 'the properties of the
objects ordinarily denoted by the metaphorical ex-
pression are transferred to the new subject.' And
there seems to be something to this, .... The
most promising and constructive suggestion I have
seen in this direction is that in metaphor one
transfers those general properties that are asso-
ciated with the metaphorical expression and that
the other members of its contrast set lack (Kittay,
1983 [sic]).

Thus metaphors, at least good ones, do not
simply relate two expressions but also bring into
focus a potential relation between two entire con-
trast sets. This approach accounts for how meta-
phors can be simultaneously novel and yet rule
constrained. In choosing what other contrast set
to invoke in the metaphor the author is taking a
novel and imaginative step, but for the metaphor
to work there must be interesting and significant
relations among the two contrast sets that can be
worked. The latter is not a matter of creation
but discovery.\footnote{9}

The differences between Kittay's, Searle's, and my the-
obies can be highlighted by considering what each one would
say about the presence of metaphor and metaphorical meaning
in each of the eight (2\(^3\)) possible cases generated from the

\footnote{9. Grandy here cites Kittay's "The Identification of
pretty much the same form in her book Metaphor, chapter 2.

10. Richard E. Grandy, "In Defense of Semantic
Fields," Chap. 8 in New Directions in Semantics, ed. Ernest
positive or negative values of the following three (possibly) salient indicators/parameters of metaphor (or metaphorical meaning): 1) context (both linguistic and non-linguistic), 2) speaker's intentions/meanings, and 3) hearer/interpreter. These possibilities can be displayed in the following truth-table-like chart. Explanations: '+' means that the factor indicates there is a metaphor present, '-' that it does not so indicate. The final column specifies, by initials, the cases in which each theory recognizes metaphor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>INTENTIONS</th>
<th>INTERPRETER</th>
<th>METAPHOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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Notice that all three theories definitely agree there is no metaphor in the last two cases. Notice what these two cases have in common only with each other—their context nor speaker's intentions point to metaphor or metaphorical meaning in either case. This shows how much all three theories depend on (at least) one of these factors.
Kittay's theory would say there is metaphor wherever context indicates one: this occurs in each of the first four cases. Notice here that it is speaker's intentions that are irrelevant and unnecessary for either metaphor or metaphorical meaning. Even though Kittay apparently conflates meaning and interpretation by failing to adequately distinguish between them (so that one would expect to find metaphor wherever there is even one of these), I have (charitably) refrained from marking cases 5 and 7 with a 'K' since I believe Kittay would insist (perhaps inconsistently) that there cannot be metaphor where context doesn't allow it. (Cases 6 and 8 are obviously ruled out for Kittay.)

My semantic intentionality theory recognizes metaphor wherever both context and speaker's intentions indicate metaphor; this is in the first two cases only. Even if the context is metaphorically propitious, if a metaphorically competent speaker does not intend a metaphor in that context, there is no metaphor. By the same token, a speaker who intends a metaphor in a non-metaphorically propitious discourse situation will fail to produce metaphor. Notice that in all cases, what the interpreter may or may not think (about there being a metaphor present) is irrelevant and unnecessary for metaphor or metaphorical meaning.

Searle's theory sees metaphor in at least the same cases as mine. The 'S' in parentheses in cases 5 and 6 is meant to indicate that I believe Searle would see metaphorical meaning here but not metaphor itself (although I don't
believe Searle specifically addresses these cases). This is because the speaker intends or means to produce metaphor here, i.e., there is metaphorical speaker meaning, but the context will not allow that meaning to result in an actual metaphor.

However, it is possible (probable?) that what Searle really wants to hold is that metaphorical speaker meaning is only possible where the context will allow for actual metaphor. If so, then Searle's theory will hold that there is metaphor or metaphorical meaning only in the first two cases. The only differences between his and my theories then would be that in my theory, speaker's metaphorical meaning is a genuine form of semantic meaning, and mine incorporates semantic field theory to explain how metaphor "works." Thus, I hope (and believe) that my theory is a bit more sophisticated than Searle's.

My theory countenances (at least) two different kinds of semantic meaning, the usual literal kind plus a metaphorical kind. Most utterances will have just one of these, as disambiguated by the discourse situation and speaker's intentions from among its conventional meanings. So the great majority of metaphorical utterances have only a metaphorical semantic meaning.

But it is possible for utterances to have both a literal and a metaphorical disambiguated conventional meaning at the same time. These will be those rare utterances whose discourse situations and speaker's intentions allow equally
for either or both types of meaning, in the same way that some utterances may have more than one disambiguated literal meaning if their discourse situations and speakers' intentions so allow. Consequently, when one of the meanings of such an utterance is true and the other false, the utterance will be simultaneously both true and false.

As a preview of the next chapter, I see no need for my kind of view of metaphorical meaning to posit more than one kind of truth or falsity; we can settle, with Davidson, for literal truth alone. This does not yet address the question what makes metaphorical sentences true or false on this view, but that issue does not bear on the question how many kinds of truth are required. It would be more elegant, of course, to also have just one kind of semantic meaning. But our investigation of philosophical theories of metaphor should have led us to expect at least a little messiness and complexity in any adequate philosophical account of such a complex phenomenon a metaphor.

What about the question whether a literal paraphrase can be given for every single metaphor that would adequately capture the entire meaning of the metaphor? Is this correct, or is it instead the case that something in all (or some) metaphors is inevitably "left over" and remains uncaptured by the paraphrase? This seems to be implied by today's usual "academic" concept of metaphor, though not by the general concept of metaphor. Recall that even Searle expressed such a view:
One of our tasks will be to explain this sense of dissatisfaction that we have with paraphrases of even feeble metaphors.

Sometimes we feel that we know exactly what the metaphor means and yet would not be able to formulate a literal [paraphrase sentence] because there are no literal expressions that convey what it means. . . . And indeed metaphors often serve to plug such semantic gaps as this.\textsuperscript{11}

My theory can easily handle this feeling that literal paraphrases can't capture all of what is conveyed in at least some cases of metaphor, while at the same time making it possible for this acknowledgment of (at least partial) failure of literal paraphrasability not to entail stripping metaphor of semantic meaning, as usually happens when adequacy of literal paraphrasability is denied. My theory can do both things at the same time because it posits a semantic meaning for metaphor, but of a slightly different kind than literal semantic meaning. Thus, the semantic gap left open by literal language gets filled with genuine semantic meaning by metaphor. Indeed, it is usually felt that this is one of metaphor's primary duties. I think so too, and my theory accounts quite easily and naturally for how this can occur. This is one of my theory's great strengths and serves to confirm my theory.

I call my theory of metaphorical meaning the semantic intentionality theory. I take speakers' metaphorical intentions as conceptually, objectively, and "ontologically" determinative, in propitious discourse situations, of what constitutes metaphorical language. One of my main reasons

\textsuperscript{11} Searle, "Metaphor," p. 97.
for doing so is that I think that most natural language speakers acquainted with metaphor would be surprised to find out otherwise. That is, I think a philosophical account of metaphor should not diverge, unless absolutely necessary for logical consistency, from the common, ordinary speaker's notion of metaphor. If the academic philosopher's account diverges too much from the ordinary notion, then I am dubious that we really have an account of metaphor. (I try to maintain this attitude across the entire spectrum of philosophical "conceptual analysis").

Because I think semantic field theory provides an exceptionally good way for the semantic intentionality theory to account for the simultaneously novel and rule-governed character of metaphor, I think it likely that my theory should resort to semantic field theory in its account of the literal (general) level of language as well. I would also cite the reasons given by Kittay for thinking general theory of meaning should use semantic field theory.

At this point let me attempt to dispel some qualms that some might have about the notion of semantic metaphorical intention I am employing. I am claiming that speakers intend to produce metaphors, and that these metaphorical intentions partially constitute their metaphors' meanings. I am also claiming that these meanings also depend on a speaker's competence to exploit semantic fields to produce

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12. See below for further reasons for thinking that speakers' intentions must at least partly constitute metaphorical meaning.
13. See Kittay, Metaphor, chapters 6 and 7.
metaphors. Now clearly such metaphorical intentions need not be conscious; we often are not fully aware that we are about to make metaphor. And certainly one does not consciously contemplate the semantic fields available to him for utilization in making metaphor. Indeed, most English speakers have never even heard of semantic fields. In light of these considerations, how can I claim that speakers can intend to speak metaphorically, to produce metaphors? Since intentions seem to be conscious mental acts, can what I'm calling metaphorical intentions really be intentions at all? How can I respond to these objections to my theory? I believe they are actually rather minor objections, and I can respond in several quite plausible ways.

First, those who object that intentions must be conscious because this is part of the definition of 'intention' have not learned their Quinean lessons about the dubiousness of the traditional notions of definition and analyticity upon which this objection seems to depend.

Second, my claim that speakers can have metaphorical intentions grows out of the much more initially plausible claim that speakers, in their communicating with others, are properly said to have very general intentions to communicate. They intend to convey certain overall meanings or messages. (These meanings are seen best at the more general linguistic units in their communication: the larger the linguistic chunk, the clearer it becomes what it is the speaker intends to convey.)
Yet surely not all such communicative intentions are fully conscious, not even where purely literal language is all that is employed. A competent English speaker's utterances of most grammatical, purely literal English sentences are surely intentional, in the sense that he wants to communicate something by uttering them, yet these intentions are usually and typically less than fully conscious. Perhaps this is not the common notion of "intention"; but most will agree, I think, that we should consider the uttering of ordinary English sentences by ordinary English speakers intentional at least in the sense I am here specifying. Moreover, a competent speaker of "ordinary" English will generally succeed in communicating what he has intended to communicate through his intentional (in the above sense) utterances of such literal sentences.

Viewed in this light, i.e., in analogy with typical utterances of "ordinary" English sentences, metaphorical communicative intentions are no different in kind than intentions to communicate literally. The only difference concerns the "level" on which one intends to communicate. And just as "ordinary" competent speakers do not generally fail to produce "ordinary" English sentences/utterances, so metaphorically competent speakers do not generally fail to produce metaphorical sentences/utterances.

Alston has the following helpful insight concerning this matter:

Speaker intentions can be of all degrees of explicitness. The speaker need not rehearse to himself
in so many words that he intends to be asserting that . . . In certain cases he may not even be able to say, in literal terms, what it is that he is asserting, but be asserting that nonetheless. (This might be elicited by skillful questioning.) What it finally comes down to is what the speaker would take as truth conditions of his utterance when they are presented to him.14

I think this point is quite obvious. Notice that Alston claims that a metaphor speaker need not be capable of expressing in literal terms what he is asserting metaphorically. This might be thought to vitiate Searle's Principle of Expressibility. However, Expressibility only requires that someone be able to find an adequate literal expression, or that this can be done in principle, i.e., from the point of view of a rational reconstruction.

Speaking of rational reconstructions, should an objec-
tor to my claim in favor of metaphorical intentions persist in spite of my above responses (unreasonably I might say), I simply ask him to consider my semantic intentional account of metaphorical meaning as a rational reconstruction, a plausible possible account, in the sense of Davidson's Tarskian truth conditional account of meaning in his In-
quiries into Truth and Interpretation. Perhaps considering my claims in this modest and reduced way will prove more palatable and perhaps even acceptable to such a critic. In any case, I conclude on the basis of these responses that qualms about my notion of metaphorical intentions qua intentions are groundless.

But there will also be those who object not just to my specific appeal to intentions, but to the general notion of intentions and intentionality, perhaps on extensionalist, physicalist, or behaviorist grounds. I will not say much about such objections, because they may be obviated from the start by the ploy, just appealed to, of regarding my theory as merely a rational reconstruction. I will only add that Searle asserts that his notion of Intentionality, of which meaning intentions are just one sort, is to be regarded as purely naturalistic and biological.\textsuperscript{15} So Searle himself, at any rate, believes that these kinds of scruples by themselves ought not keep someone from seriously considering/entertaining intentionalist theories.

We must not say that it is hearers' metaphorical interpretations of metaphorical utterances that constitutes such utterances as metaphorical. For it is quite clear that if a speaker/writer who is well-acquainted with the phenomenon of metaphor\textsuperscript{16} sincerely intends an utterance/sentence as metaphorical and utters/writes it in a propitious discourse/literary situation, it remains metaphorical regardless of whether it ever actually receives a metaphorical interpretation by any hearer/reader (perhaps no one ever even hears or reads it at all). This shows that speakers'
metaphorical intentions are (at least partly) conceptually determinative of metaphor and that hearers' metaphorical interpretations are not.

Now suppose that a metaphorically competent interpreter (hearer/reader) interprets as metaphorical an utterance/sentence that was never so intended by its equally metaphorically competent utterer/writer. Would we then have a case of metaphorical meaning? I am tempted to reply simply that such a situation could never arise because if it did, it would show that the interpreter was metaphorically incompetent, which contradicts the hypothesis. But such a response might be construed as somewhat question-begging. So instead I will content myself with answering that if a situation such as the one envisioned could arise, that would obliterate the distinction between meaning and interpretation, a distinction which, as we've seen, must be maintained if we are to allow for the (very real) possibility of misinterpretation, even by competent interpreters.

Thus, I insist on the strong distinction between metaphors per se and hearers' metaphorical interpretations of utterances. For their metaphorical interpretations may (mis)identify as metaphorical utterances which were never so intended by the competent speakers who uttered them. We are now in a position to critique in a principled way Kittay's argument against speakers' intentions as conceptually determinative (constitutive) of metaphor. That argument was as follows:
I shall say little about individual speakers' intentions in making metaphor. Such intentions are neither necessary nor sufficient for determining that an utterance is metaphorical. On the one hand, we may intend but fail to make metaphor—we may not be sufficiently competent in the language. [So the mere intention to speak metaphorically isn't sufficient to create a metaphor.] On the other hand, we may interpret as metaphorical statements which were never so intended. [So neither is the intention to speak metaphorically a necessary condition for the creation of a metaphor].

Let me begin by saying that Kittay's final statement in this quotation is nothing but a clear case of question-begging. Of course "we may interpret as metaphorical statements which were never so intended," but that would indicate metaphoricality only if it's already settled that metaphorical intentions aren't necessary for metaphoricality and that interpretation of an utterance as metaphorical is by itself sufficient to create metaphor. But these are some of the very issues in question. This shows merely that Kittay's argument doesn't prove her contention that metaphorical intentions are unnecessary for metaphor. But I believe there are at least three arguments each of which by itself disproves this claim. But even if not even one of these three arguments individually should suffice to disprove Kittay's position, the three taken together I believe would.

The first is the argument that because most metaphorically competent speakers have the general presumption that metaphorical intentions are necessary for metaphor, this is prima facie evidence that this is so. The second is that metaphorical speakers' intentions provide the most natural

way for distinguishing metaphor from other uses of literal language, including other figures of speech.

The third is the case of the linguistically competent idiot I described in the chapter on Kittay. Imagine that such an idiot utters, without any intentions at all, let alone intentions to utter a metaphor, a statement susceptible in its context and on Kittay's other criteria (e.g., the appropriate parts of the statement come from distinct semantic fields) of a metaphorical interpretation. Now if utterers' intentions play no role whatsoever in the determination of what counts as a metaphor, then according to Kittay's position what he uttered is a metaphor. But this seems highly implausible. All these considerations indicate, I believe, that we need to maintain a metaphor/metaphorical interpretation distinction and recognize speakers' metaphorical intentions as (conceptually) necessary for metaphor.

What of Kittay's argument for her claim that speakers' intentions don't suffice for the production of metaphor? First, does it make sense to think there could be a speaker of a language who knows enough about language to want (intend) to create a metaphor but is unable to accomplish it because of insufficient competency in the language? I doubt it. Such insufficient competency would most likely include ignorance of even the phenomenon of metaphor itself, but this contradicts our assumption. Further, suppose we limit the range of relevant speakers to metaphorically competent speakers, a not unreasonable restriction given that metaphor
is the phenomenon we're investigating. Clearly in their case, and this is the relevant case, an intention to speak metaphorically is sufficient (in propitious discourse situations—see next paragraph) for there to be a metaphor produced. Thus, Kittay's reason for thinking that speakers' intentions are insufficient for metaphor production—"we may not be sufficiently competent in the language"—fails to prove her case.

But I am the last one to affirm that speakers' metaphorical intentions by themselves do suffice for the creation of metaphor. I agree with Kittay that they do not. But her reason for thinking so was wrong. I would add the following necessary conditions, conditions I've already argued for. The speaker must also utter her metaphorically-intended utterance in a propitious discourse situation, and her choice of words must be limited to those with conventional meanings suitable for metaphorical extension and evocation of a different semantic field, such that she thereby creates a new semantic, and metaphorical, meaning.

But suppose someone objects that our earlier example "Hemingway Lost in Africa" suffices to show that it is possible for a metaphorically competent language user to intend to make a metaphor yet fail to do so. The reason would presumably be because the situation that would have allowed the statement to be metaphorical failed to materialize. However, all this actually shows is that metaphorical meanings of statements can be false! And one way they can be false
is by failing to accurately describe the situation they were intended to. Thus, the objection confuses false metaphors with the absence of metaphor.

My theory regards metaphor as a use of literal language, but a use with a semantic meaning. The use would in fact give rise to the meaning, as specified by Kittay in her account of how first-order meaning engenders second-order meaning. The literal level is required to serve as an adequate ground of all other meanings and uses. But I would personally not be unhappy or even see much reason to maintain any semantic/pragmatic distinction at all, at least for purposes of theory of metaphor, if some way could be found to sufficiently ground non-literal language (i.e., non-literal uses of literal language) within a semantic framework that totally obliterates the semantic/pragmatic distinction, for example Davidson's 1986 view of language and interpretation.18

How should my semantic intentionality theory of metaphor view the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction and Kittay's reshaping of it? I'm rather surprised at the only answer that seems possible here, for it seems, in a sense, to out-Kittay Kittay. Let me explain.

I believe Kittay was right to include present context (discourse situation) as a semantic consideration. But the way in which she did so seemed to obliterate the conven-

tional/use distinction since it made present context determine all semantic meaning. To remedy this defect in Kit-tay's theory, I see any utterance as having at least two types of semantic meaning—its set of compositionally determined conventional meanings and its (normally singleton) set of disambiguated conventional meanings. The latter will usually be just one because it is determined by its discourse situation and its speaker's intention, and speaker's intention is usually singular.

This disambiguated meaning will be literal when one of the utterance's conventional meanings suffices to convey the speaker's intention. When this is not possible, the disambiguated meaning is not literal and may be metaphorical; if it is metaphorical, the speaker will have created a new semantic using a suitable conventional meaning in a new way in a propitious discourse situation. Present context must function only to determine disambiguated meaning, not conventional meaning. (Otherwise conventional meaning wouldn't be conventional.) Again, this is why metaphor must be viewed as novel, not conventional. For if it were conventional, it would be literal, not metaphorical. Thus, when properly analyzed, 'conventional metaphor' should be considered a contradiction in terms, at least in most cases.

So present discourse situation does function semanti-
cally, but only to disambiguate or pick out one (rarely, more than one) of several conventional meanings, not to determine the conventional meaning(s) itself. The way in
which my theory goes beyond even Kittay's re-drawing of the traditional semantic/pragmatic distinction is in including speakers' intentions as a disambiguating factor, in addition to present discourse situation. Thus, I include not only present discourse situations but speakers' intentions as well in the realm of the semantic, since disambiguation is a semantic function. This makes metaphorical semantic meaning very similar to literal semantic meaning. The only difference is that metaphorical meaning, while extending an old meaning, is essentially brand new, since that part of its semantic content which is most salient in its discourse situation has just been created (by extension and transfer of structural relations between semantic fields). Literal meaning, on the other hand, is entirely an old one.

My semantic intentionality theory is, of course, a synchronic theory of metaphor: it seeks to account for the meaning and truth of metaphors as phenomena of the synchronic state of a language, not for how the general natural language phenomenon of metaphor has diachronically acquired the kind of meaning or place in language it now enjoys. Further, it is a conceptual rather than psychological account of metaphorical meaning and truth, in Kittay's senses of these terms.

How can my theory account for the difference between metaphor strictly conceived as one figure of speech distinct from other non-literal uses of language such as indirect speech acts and other figures of speech (such as irony)? I
cannot consider all figures of speech here, but I will say a few words about irony. First, my theory does not distinguish metaphor from irony on the same basis as does Searle's theory. For on his theory, it seems, indirect speech acts, metaphor, and irony alike are all examples of a divergence of speaker meaning and sentence meaning; they differ only in the method each uses to achieve its intended (speaker) meaning via the sentence meaning. In light of my general theory of semantic utterance meaning, I believe this distinction is too simplistic to account for the differences among these semantic phenomena.

Jerry Morgan comes to a similar conclusion. He agrees with Searle that given the assumptions of speaker rationality and linguistic competence, a "deviant" sentence meaning must indicate not only a divergence, but also an important connection, between sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Yet, objects Morgan, on Searle's account "it is not clear how to get to the inferred conclusion that the connection of sentence meaning to speaker meaning is a metaphoric one." Morgan adds that Searle's notion of "calling to mind"---that metaphor elicits a second meaning when the literal meaning is rejected as inappropriate---is insufficient to distin-


guish metaphor from other "callings to mind," since a great variety of non-metaphorical meanings (qua psychological phenomena) might be educed when the literal meaning seems inappropriate.\textsuperscript{21} At the very least then, and especially on an intentionalist theory such as Searle's, "there must be some condition to the effect that the thing 'called to mind' was intended by the speaker."\textsuperscript{22} Further, Searle seems unable to distinguish metaphor from more mundane tropes such as metonymy and synecdoche.\textsuperscript{23}

So instead of taking a simplistic Searlian line to differentiate metaphor from other similar semantic phenomena in which sentence and speaker meaning diverge, my theory can appeal to Kittay's theory's solution since my theory incorporates semantic field theory in the same way as does hers. That solution is that whereas metaphors are transfers of meaning between (at least) two distinct semantic fields, "hyperbole, litotes, irony, and metonymy are examples of intra-field transfers."\textsuperscript{24} What this means is that metaphors involve transferring whole systems or structures of related terms/meanings into novel semantic fields, imposing one term/meaning-system's structure on another.\textsuperscript{25} But irony, like the other figures Kittay mentions, only involves a related term/meaning from within the same semantic field.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., pp. 144-145.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 144.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 145.
\textsuperscript{24} Kittay, Metaphor, p. 291.
\textsuperscript{25} My theory insists that such a transfer must be both entirely novel and speaker-intended to qualify as metaphor; Kittay's has neither of these qualifications.
In irony, that related term and meaning is fairly easy to specify— it is the term and meaning "opposite" in meaning to the original term (the term being used ironically). For example, if one wishes to say that Rice University's football team doesn't have a prayer of going to the Cotton Bowl, he could express this ironically by uttering 'Rice's team is the greatest.' What he means/intends is that Rice's team is the worst, the semantic opposite of 'greatest.' Yet because it is the semantic opposite of 'greatest,' it belongs to the same semantic field. The meaning of 'worst' is transferred intra-field to 'greatest.'

If, on the other hand, one wished to express a similar thought metaphorically, he could say "Rice's team is a horror movie." Presumably football teams and horror movies don't belong to the same semantic field. Through the imposition of the structure of the latter's semantic field on that of the former's, suggestions are made about the ability and functioning of the hapless gridders. Further, this transference is sufficiently novel for my theory to countenance it as metaphor.

Yet I don't believe that Kittay's theory can sufficiently differentiate irony's uniqueness as a figure of speech from similar figures such as synecdoche and metonymy. Granted this is not a purpose of hers, it is yet true that she lumps them all together as "intra-field" transfers. My theory on the other hand, because it relies on speaker's intended semantic meanings, can distinguish not only irony
from metaphor, on the basis of different and distinct semantic intentions, but irony, synecdoche, metonymy, etc., from one another as well, on the same basis. It seems to be a clear and simple "brute" fact that my intentions/purposes to communicate something metaphorically are just different semantically from my intentions/purposes to communicate something ironically (etc.). Metaphorical and ironical purposes and intentions are clearly different in kind, even should it turn out that no instance of either kind ever reaches full consciousness. 26 But then the communication of anything whatsoever at even the most literal level of the English language is achieved at least in part by the non-conscious communicative intentions of English-speakers. 27

I have said here that metaphors can range in size from phrases to discourses. Some may think it somewhat unlikely that we could find examples of metaphor in these extremes of the alleged range, since we normally think only of sentences or utterances thereof as metaphors. So I offer the following examples, and trust they will indicate that many more like them are possible. Phrase: "Nixon's plumbers," uttered during the Watergate era. Discourse: Aesop's fables, Japanese haiku poetry, Jesus' parables, e.g. The Prodigal

26. Morgan goes so far as to claim (quite plausibly, I think) that the purpose of metaphor (and thus of metaphor users) is crucial to even understanding what metaphor is. See his "Pragmatics of Metaphor," pp. 146-147.

27. For completeness in describing how my theory distinguishes metaphor from irony, I should add that spoken irony is fairly easy to identify because of the speaker's special accompanying facial expressions and the audible emphasis on certain key terms in the ironical utterance, usually including at least the term(s) being used ironically.
Son. None of these examples is intended by its author or speaker to be taken literally. They are all constituted as metaphorical by the speaker's metaphorical intentions combined with an appropriate discourse situation, which may consist of nothing but general background information in the case of the literary metaphors.

The utterance's overall context or discourse situation (including general background information) gives the interpreter of the utterance whatever help (clues), beyond his own linguistic competence with respect to literal meanings in the language, he is to receive in order to identify the speaker's intentions as metaphorical. Hence these are the only possible clues to identify the utterance itself as metaphorical.

The discourse situation and the states of affairs referred to by a metaphorical utterance objectively determine the utterance's truth value. That is, because the metaphorical utterance has semantic meaning, truth conditions for the utterance's metaphorical meaning are established, and these truth conditions either are or are not satisfied by the discourse situation and by other actual states of affairs referred to by the utterance's metaphorical meaning. I will try to elaborate on this theory of truth for the semantic intentionality theory in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3: METAPHORICAL TRUTH.

In this chapter I consider how metaphorical meaning and truth might be related, whether there is such a thing as metaphorical truth (in addition to "literal" truth), and what sort of theory about the truth of metaphors my semantic intentionality theory of metaphorical meaning leads to.¹

In the philosophical study of metaphor, little has been said about metaphorical truth from an analytical philosophical standpoint.² This may be because analytic philosophy of language has tended to focus more on questions of linguistic meaning than on questions of truth. This analytic emphasis on meaning at the expense of truth in turn may be due to at least four factors:

1) Getting semantics right is difficult enough by itself and could easily occupy all of an analytic philosopher's efforts so that no time or energy is left for the even more difficult issue of truth.

2) Questions about truth have been perceived as less important than questions about meaning.

¹. Important caveat: I do not see that my semantic intentionality theory of metaphorical meaning logically entails one particular account of metaphorical truth to the exclusion of all others. Although it would clearly be logically incompatible with some accounts of metaphorical truth, there might be more than one such account with which it is logically compatible. It is important to bear in mind throughout this chapter that I am simply pointing to "natural" implications of my theory of metaphorical meaning for the issues of metaphorical truth and its relation to metaphorical meaning.

². Two analytic philosophers who have had a lot to say about metaphorical truth are Goodman and Wittgenstein. "It is interesting that both Goodman and Wittgenstein support their 'nominalist' account of that relationship [between "words and world"] by reflection on metaphorical application," David E. Cooper, Metaphor, p. 199-200.
3) An interest in truth is sometimes perceived as a less "purist" semantic interest than an interest in meaning. 3

4) There has been "an understandable cowardice in the face of of the battery of overblown and exotic claims which have been made about it." 4

Other brands of philosophy, on the other hand, have had a great deal to say about metaphor and have made claims as grandiose as that all language is at root metaphorical and that metaphor determines ontology and what truth itself is all about. For example,

[I]t is arguable that Heidegger wants to promote the way in which he thinks metaphors can be true into the very essence of truth. 5

... There is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is'. 6

Such inflated claims seem implausible in the face of the foundational nature of language's literal level, a feature I have argued must exist.

It seems to me that the most important philosophical question to ask about metaphorical truth is: When a metaphor is true (false), what is it that makes it true (false)? I view this question as including within it the question of whether there is such a thing as metaphorical truth construed as a type of truth additional to regular, literal truth. To lay the groundwork for answering these questions,

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3. Ibid., p. 198.
4. Ibid., p. 200.
5. Ibid.
I begin with some quite general reflections on the question of the relation between metaphorical meaning and truth, between a metaphor's meaning and its truth conditions and truth value.

With respect to the relation between a metaphor's meaning and truth, it seems we can hold constant either the metaphor's truth conditions or the meanings of the words in the metaphor, but not both. If we say the meanings of the words in the metaphor haven't changed from their usual meanings, then we seem forced to conclude that for the metaphorical sentence still to be true, the truth conditions must have changed. For example, if every word in the metaphorical statement "Whales are people" has its literal meaning and if the statement is true, then obviously the truth conditions must have changed, since literal whales are not literal people and literal people are not literal whales, i.e., "Whales are people" is literally false. And if we say the truth conditions are still the same, then for the metaphorical sentence still to be counted true, the meanings must have changed. (If the statement "Whales are people" is literally true and if its truth conditions have not changed, then its words obviously cannot have their usual, literal meanings.)

If we assume that good or acceptable metaphorical statements are true in the same way that true literal statements are true, then the word(s) being used metaphorically

7. Ross seems to hold this view, but not, I think, for the reasons I would give. See James F. Ross, Portraying
must have changed their reference (with a concomitant change in their meaning as well). Consider the following example: assume true the (metaphorical) statement, 'Ronald Reagan is a cobra.' The problem seems to be how to count as true both the statement 'Ronald Reagan is a cobra' and the statement 'Ronald Reagan is not a cobra.' For if the former is indeed an apt metaphor, we should want to hold both these sentences as true. Since it is false that Ronald Reagan is a cobra, for the metaphor to be true 'cobra' must have shifted from its usual, literal reference. But since sense determines reference (at least on Fregean theories of meaning), the sense or meaning of 'cobra' must also have shifted, i.e., a different sense of the word came into play.

My semantic intentionality theory of metaphorical meaning has some implications that nicely account for these observations about the truth of metaphors and the relation of such truth to metaphorical meaning. When a statement such as 'Ronald Reagan is a cobra' is intended metaphorically, we need not suppose, on my account, that the truth condition for the statement's most likely literal (conventional) meaning is altered from Ronald Reagan's being a member of a particular species of snake to his being a person with particular personality/character traits. The truth condition of the statement's literal semantic meaning remains unchanged. It is just that a different truth condition comes into play: the condition for the truth of the statement's metaphorical

meaning, its disambiguated meaning, viz., that Ronald Reagan is a person with certain personality/character traits. This is because when the statement is intended metaphorically, it has a new disambiguated (metaphorical) semantic meaning, the truth condition of which is entirely distinct from that for the literal meaning.

A further consequence of my theory is that the reference of 'cobra' is different in the metaphorical meaning—it now refers to a (class of) person with particular character traits. Thus, my theory has the result that when the truth conditions for the metaphorical meaning of 'Ronald Reagan is a cobra' are satisfied, both of the following statements are true: 'Ronald Reagan is a cobra' and 'Ronald Reagan is not a cobra.'

Thus, my theory need not resort to the following less acceptable alternative ways of handling the problem of the relation between the truth (falsity) of metaphors and their meanings:

1) Have a new sense of 'true' such that 'Ronald Reagan is a cobra' is literally false but metaphorically true. Why introduce a new kind of truth if it's not required?

2) Interpret the statement to mean "Ronald Reagan is metaphorically a cobra" and count this interpretation as literally true. This brings in the old confusion of meanings with interpretations.

Digression (though not totally unrelated to the preceding discussion): It is interesting to ask whether or not words for animals other than 'cobra' would have resulted in a metaphor in this example, at least on my theory. In Web-
ster's New World Dictionary, College Edition (1960), 'lion' and 'tiger', as well as many other words referring to animals, are said to have senses in which they refer to people. And on my theory, these senses would be literal senses since they do appear in the dictionary (i.e., they are conventional senses). In that case, even a sentence such as 'Ronald Reagan is a tiger' could be both literally true and literally false in the same discourse situation, since the sentence has (at least) two literal senses. It seems that the words for animals that frequently (conventionally) are used to refer to people are more generic than, say, 'cobra'. It is the more specific terms like 'cobra', then, that can be used to make metaphors, on my theory.

It is important to see that in order for it to be possible to assess an attempted metaphor as false, a necessary condition is that we be able to understand the statement in its (intended) metaphorical sense. This in turn necessitates that the metaphor have a metaphorical sense even when it is false. And this shows that of those theories that posit meanings for metaphors, the ones that say a new metaphorical sense(s) or meaning(s) is created only when the metaphor is true are in error. Also, by similar reasoning, theories that say we only have a metaphor at all when the statement is correctly assessed as true (i.e., that there are no false metaphors) can be shown to be incorrect.

With this groundwork in place, I come back now to the question, When a metaphor is true (false), what is it that
makes it true (false)? (Recall that I view this question as including within it the question whether there is such a thing as metaphorical truth construed as a type of truth additional to regular, literal truth.) Now the question what makes a metaphor true or false can be taken in at least two ways. First, there is a very general philosophical issue here: What is there about the phenomenon of metaphor that makes metaphors susceptible of bearing truth values or of being evaluable as either true or false? Second, there is a philosophically less important, though intrinsically more interesting, issue having to do with criteria: In the case of a given metaphor, what are the criteria or standards that determine whether it is true or false?

My semantic intentionality theory of metaphorical meaning yields a ready answer to the first construal of the question. Metaphors partake of a genuinely semantic type of disambiguated meaning, determined in the same way as is a disambiguated semantic meaning that is literal. These disambiguated meanings, since semantic, can bear truth values and thus render metaphors either true or false and evaluable in those terms. In fact, one of the reasons for thinking that metaphors' metaphorical meanings are semantic is our strong feeling that these meanings are assessable as either true or false. (I believe my argument would be circular and/or question-begging at this point had I not offered ad-

8. See note 1.
ditional reasons for thinking metaphors have semantic meaning.)

It should be noted that my account of the truth of metaphorical statements neither posits nor requires a notion of metaphorical truth as a special kind of truth in addition to normal "literal" truth. The disambiguated meaning of any statement, whether literal or metaphorical, is simply true or false. On those rare occasions when a statement might have two disambiguated meanings, one of which is literal and the other metaphorical, we simply say that one is true and the other false (whichever happens to be the case), or that they're both true or both false. Both meanings of the statement might be true, depending only on whether both meaning's truth conditions are satisfied. But no single semantic meaning of the metaphor is both true and false at the same time. Hence, there is no reason to think that metaphors partake of some special metaphorical kind of truth or falsity, for none is needed to cater for any possible contradictions in a metaphor's truth values.

Another reason why, on my theory, a special metaphorical kind of truth is not required is that it is semantic meanings that bear truth values, not the sentences themselves. If it were sentences that bear the truth values, then the vast majority of metaphorical sentences (which would be the metaphors) would be at once both true and false. There would then have to be a special kind of metaphorical truth (and falsity) to account for this fact.
Nor does my account presuppose or require a specific type of theory of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc.). The ontological question about the essence of truth, Wherein does truth consist?, lies outside philosophical theory of metaphor, on my view. My own theory of metaphor leads me to believe other theorists are wrong when they draw sweeping conclusions about the essence of truth from either the phenomenon of metaphor or their theory of metaphor. And if a theory of metaphor does yield sweeping consequences about the nature of truth, I believe that indicates there is something fundamentally wrong with the theory.

Let me at this point insert a reminder that two philosophical theories of metaphorical truth (and its relation to metaphorical meaning) which I examined, Kittay's and Mac Cormac's, proved quite unsatisfactory. Recall that Mac Cormac's four-valued system, allegedly based on fuzzy set theory, while ingenious on the surface, ultimately was seen to border on incoherence.

Kittay's theory was not only equivocal and confusing, it was also couched in metaphorical terms ("the furniture of the mind"). This is not to say that metaphor should always be avoided in philosophical writing. But one should resort to metaphor only when literal explanation proves impossible. It is all the more important to remember this principle when the explicandum in question is metaphor itself. I think it quite likely that Kittay's equivocation and confusion is due
to her conflating the two construals of the question, When a metaphor is true (false), why is it true (false)? That is, without realizing it, she was trying to answer two questions at the same time: 1) What is it about metaphor that allows individual metaphors to be true (false), and 2) What are the criteria for assessing the truth (falsity) of a given metaphor?

In sum, then, my theory interprets the term 'metaphorical truth' to mean simply the ('literal') truth of the metaphorical meaning of a metaphor. There is no such thing as a special kind of truth for metaphor over and above literal truth. This concludes my discussion of the first construal of the question, What makes metaphors true or false?, viz., What is it about metaphors that allows them to be either true or false? It is time to go on now to the second construal: What are the criteria for determining the truth (falsity) of a given metaphor?

This question is asking how the truth or falsity of a metaphor is determined, i.e., how it is determined whether a given metaphor is true or false. And this question is itself susceptible of at least two interpretations (due to the two uses of 'determine' I have noted previously): First, What objectively determines whether the metaphorical sentence is true or false? Second, How do we know whether a given metaphor is true or false?: i.e., What are the criteria we should employ to subjectively determine (assess, judge) the truth or falsity of metaphors?
The first of these questions has to do with the actual truth or falsity of a given metaphor, independently of whether or not any particular hearer/interpreter correctly assesses its truth value. Thus, it is a "metaphysical" or "ontological" question. The second question on the other hand is epistemic in nature, asking how it is that particular hearers should go about assessing the truth values of specific metaphors. This is to ask how hearers can come to know whether a given metaphor is true or false. Now it may be the case that both questions have the same, or very similar, answer(s). Nevertheless, they are two logically distinct questions and should be treated as such by a rigorous theory of metaphorical truth.

As for the first question having to do with the objective or ontological determination of a metaphor's truth value, it may initially seem that if the metaphor is "apt" or "appropriate" then it is true, and if not "apt" or "appropriate" then it is false. But upon further reflection this seems like an odd way for the truth and falsity of anything, including metaphors, to be determined. Surely there must be more to it than just that. Yet many theories of metaphor seem forced to give just this sort of simplistic explanation.

My own theory, on the other hand, can say that if the truth conditions of the metaphorical meaning of the statement are met (satisfied), the metaphor is true; otherwise it is false. This is what objectively determines whether a
given metaphor is true or false. On this view, the subjective determination (or assessment) of the metaphor's truth value is then made by the hearer asking herself whether or not the truth conditions for the metaphorical meaning are met.

Now one of her main clues for judging the metaphor's truth, i.e., whether its truth conditions are satisfied, of course will be whether or not the metaphor is "apt." Exactly what all the criteria are that (should) go into the subjective determination of any metaphor's aptness is a particularly intriguing question. It was primarily this that I had in mind when I called the second construal of 'What makes metaphors true or false?' a philosophically less important, though intrinsically more interesting, issue. However, I believe this matter ranges outside the scope of a strictly philosophical account of the truth of metaphor. This concludes my discussion of metaphorical truth.
CHAPTER 4: LOOSE ENDS.

I conclude the dissertation by trying to answer any philosophically salient questions about metaphor mentioned in the introduction but so far left outstanding.

First there is the question whether or not a theory of literal meaning should be expected to incorporate a theory of metaphorical meaning. I will not repeat here all the relevant considerations mentioned in the introduction. But I do want to add that the answer to this question depends in large part on what is meant by 'literal meaning.' Does it mean all semantic meaning, or only that part of semantic meaning that is deemed literal, or . . . ? Our answer seems to depend on our theory of semantic meaning, and this in turn could partially depend on our theory of metaphor. Thus, there is an interdependence among these issues.

Without going into great detail, suffice it to say that on my theory of metaphorical meaning, which I believe to be correct, a theory of semantic meaning includes accounts of both literal and metaphorical meaning. To give a complete account of semantic meaning, one must include both literal and metaphorical uses. But strictly speaking, a theory of literal language or meaning per se would not require us to include a theory of metaphorical language or meaning.

Second, there is the issue of the cognitive indispensability of metaphor: is metaphorical language reducible to literal paraphrase without any loss of "cognitive significance"? Because on my theory metaphorical meaning is a
genuine type of semantic meaning, this question becomes much less important than it appeared pre-theoretically. There is no logical problem raised if metaphor is cognitively indispensable (or irreducible to literal paraphrase), since metaphor itself partakes of the basic level of language, the semantic.

Third, the question of what (kind of) theory of truth is required to deal adequately with metaphors is readily handled by my theory. The answer is simply that no special truth theory is needed since there is no special kind of metaphorical truth. This concludes the dissertation.
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