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Knowledge and power: Guided social change in the Philippines

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KNOWLEDGE AND POWER:
GUIDED SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PHILIPPINES

by

Priscilla Weeks

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Abstract

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Priscilla Weeks

This is a study of Third World developers - those involved in the development process in their own countries. Using an integrated development project in the Philippines as an example, it tries to portray the complexity of the position of these Third World elites as nationalists, post-colonial intellectuals and activists engaged in an endeavor which has the potential to make their countries independent but which often reinforces dependence on the First World. What these developers want to accomplish, how they see their work, some of the unintentional consequences of their projects and the criticism levelled against them by their colleagues will be explored.

Third World intellectuals engaged in development have come under increasing criticism from a sector of their peers who maintain that modernization theory is based on false Western premises and development, as currently practiced, only serves to perpetuate dependence. They feel that social science theory has aided in the maintenance of Western hegemony and therefore needs to be reformulated i.e. indigenized, in order to rid it of its colonial bias. The literature on modernization and development is perhaps most closely associated with colonialism because of the ideology of progress which underlies both colonialism and development, development's role in pacification campaigns, and the fact that old colonial powers
heavily contribute to development projects in their former colonies.

Given such a critique of their efforts, why do developers persist? My contention is that a combination of factors contribute to this paradox. As Third World intellectuals calling for appropriate social science models maintain, education based in Western models is important. Theoretical rigidity, however, is mediated by career goals, personal past, bureaucratic milieu and acceptance of government modernization goals.
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PREFACE

This is a study of Third World developers - those involved in the development process in their own countries. Using a development project in the Philippines as an example, it tries to show the complexity of the positions of these Third World elites as nationalists, post-colonial intellectuals and activists engaged in an endeavor which has the potential to make their countries independent but which often reinforces their dependence on the core. The intellectual and technological tools used in development come from the West, and some would say these borrowed tools cannot serve to break the old colonial bonds. Third World developers who are sincerely nationalistic exist in an uncomfortable political and cognitive space.

This study will look at what these developers want to accomplish; how they see their work; some of the unintentional consequences of their projects and the criticism levelled against them by other nationalist peers.

This is not a study of poor implementation of what was a good idea, nor is it a study of how development is structured to benefit the First World, though both of these issues will be addressed. What I hope to portray is the complex reality of these developers who act as intermediaries between national and international politico/economic structures and development beneficiaries. They are the users of economic and development theory. They are the ones who try to carry out the plans made by the World Bank, national governments and private foundations. If these plans are ultimately harmful to their intended recipients, as much of the anthropological literature suggests, why do local developers carry them out?

My contention is that a combination of factors contribute to this paradox: career goals, personal past, acceptance of government development goals and academic training.
Third World intellectuals engaged in development related pursuits - education, project design and implementation, policy setting - have come under criticism from a sector of their colleagues who claim that development theory is based on false "Western" premises and development action only serves to perpetuate dependence. They feel that social science theory needs to be reformulated (in the Third World) to rid it of its colonial bias. The literature on modernization and development is perhaps most closely associated with colonialism because of the ideology of progress which underlies both colonialism and development, development's role in pacification campaigns, and the fact that old colonial powers heavily contribute to development projects in their former colonies. Third World developers' place in the liberal democratic tradition places them in opposition to their more radical colleagues who speak of development as neocolonial, dependency maintaining and a symbol of the colonized mind.

Chapter One will look at the calls by some Third World academics for a body of indigenous social science theory. Chapter Two will look at the critique of borrowed theory and will specifically target education and theory which prepares future developers for their work. Chapters Three and Four will explore these issues in the context of a development project called the Nutrition Integrated Approach (NIA), sponsored by the Philippine Agricultural University (PAU). The names of the project, the sponsoring universities, the municipalities and the individuals have been changed. My informants requested that I did not use a tape recorder because they felt it would hamper their spontaneity. I obliged them and relied on note taking (by myself and my assistant). There are, therefore, few direct quotes in the text.

Field work was conducted from January to December 1985 while I was a visiting research associate at the Institute of Philippine Culture at Ateneo de Manila University.
Chapter One

*Social Science: A Discourse of Domination?*

The earliest social scientists in Africa were historians and social anthropologists, bent on studying the social systems of so-called primitive cultures. Thus, in most African territories studies were made of indigenous tribes - their systems of government, land tenure, marriage customs, war, religion, witchcraft, economy, etc. These studies often served, as intended, to reinforce existing colonialist conceptions regarding the supremacy of European culture and the overriding importance of the colonials' "civilizing mission." They also provided the rationale needed for the spread and consolidation of colonialism, and for the more complete subjugation of the colonized peoples. (Temu, 1975:191)

Social science research, it will be recalled, was aggressively promoted for its possible application to the ambitious development programmes that were being formulated and launched by Third World countries under Western inspiration and expertise. The relationship in this enterprise was largely one of dominance and subordination between Western and indigenous social scientists. In the early phase of "technical assistance" and "co-operation in change," the social sciences were evolved along with development ideologies of the West. This, in a sense, was the undoing of Western-style social science research in the Third World. The touchstone of applicability was soon to prove the hollowness of the many claims that were made for Western social sciences in this regard. (Dube, 1982: 496)

Temu's and Dube's critical portrayal of social science as the handmaiden of colonialism invokes the type of discourse analysis employed by Foucault and Said. They are concerned with both the inadequate (sometimes almost malicious) representations of the Third World (lack of fit between construction and reality) and the relations of power which make it possible for the First World to "construct" the Third. Like Foucault, they see social science discourse as breaking through its textual boundaries, making analysis of both the discourse and the institutions with which the discourse has symbiotic relationships necessary. Specifically, they scrutinize what they perceive to be the role of social science in the political and economic hegemony of North over South.
The concerns of Temu and Dube are shared. Academics in both the First World and the Third World are re-reading social science "classics" with a new sensitivity to ways in which the Other is represented (Marcus & Fischer, 1986; Said, 1978; Mazrui 1975; Temu, 1975). This reappraisal has taken two major forms: a modified dependency approach and a deconstructive approach. The former focuses on the politico-economic structures of dominance in the neocolonial context and has provided the theoretical grounding for Third World academics who desire an indigenous body of social science theory for Third World countries. The latter analyzes the relations of dominance inherent in social scientific discourse.

Those academics lobbying for Third World theoretical innovation contend that "imported" theory cannot adequately describe Third World reality i.e. there is a lack of fit. The more caustic of these critics portray Western theoreticians as being in league with big business and other imperialist agencies to distort images of the colonized. They see the structures of Western domination as legitimated through ideologically embedded social science representation. If the peoples of a country can be shown to be unable to adequately survive/compete in a complex world, or if they are revealed as being morally inferior, the core countries not only have an excuse, but a mandate to mediate between the "barbaric/naive" and the "civilized/rational" societies.

The calls for accurate representation are related to a third concern on which calls for indigenization are based: nationalism (Constantino, 1979; Temu, 1975; Singh, 1979). First World misrepresentations of the Third World result in negative stereotypes of the latter which both the West and the "natives" come to believe (Constantino, 1978; Fanon 1963; Alatas, 1974). Therefore a corrective is needed to show not only the First World but also the Third World, the value of the native culture. An indigenous representation of social life would draw upon native values and cultural forms, thus valorizing them.

These three issues - misrepresentation, structural inequality and nationalism - play a part in Third World academics' calls for an indigenous social science.
The New Dependency

First World academics like to believe that an international intellectual community exists (Alger & Lyons, 1974; Gareau, 1983; Kerwin, 1981; Storer, 1970). They feel that although social, political and cultural differences are maintained, they are minor hindrances in the wider search for knowledge. The academic "we" is an international "we." But current political and economic differences have reinforced historical trends towards the international division of academic labor. This division is rooted in colonial times when wealthy students were sent abroad to study in the hopes they would disseminate the ideas of the "mother country" on their return. Later, universities were built for the native elite and staffed by foreign nationals. The flow of knowledge, therefore, has historically been from the developed country to the colony.

Dependency theory has been adapted to explain the continuing institutional and theoretical dependence of peripheral academics upon their metropolitan counterparts in the First World. Like economic dependency, academic dependency entails the export of raw materials (in the form of data collected by foreign academics) from peripheral countries to core countries. The raw data is fashioned into theories and exported back into the peripheral countries making the latter dependent on the core for theoretical models (Alger & Lyons, 1974; Gareau, 1983; San 1982). This situation arises out of, and is exacerbated by, the following conditions:

1. **The disproportionate amount of research and development money controlled by the core.** It is estimated that 90% of world wide research funds are spent on core controlled research projects. (Kerwin, 1981)

2. **The control of scholarly journals and organizations by core countries.** Prestige accrues to those who are members of international organizations and publish in international journals. Thus a dichotomy is set up between Western "international" social science and peripheral, "national" social sciences. For many, this translates into tough decisions which pit national needs against career goals. (Akiwao, 1974; Gerholm & Hannerz, 1982).

3. **The political and ideological "contamination" of social theory and its consequent political use.** Many Third World academics cite the need for social scient...
tists to take a definite political stance. They consider a neutral social science to be really the same as a Western one. However, they fear the political cooptation of Western social scientists into their respective national political structures as harmful for the Third World. This holds true for both past colonial and current conditions. Anthropology has been especially condemned as lending justification to colonization by reifying native stereotypes in theoretical models. (Prewitt, 1983; Atal, 1983; Navarro, Cassanova & Karp A., 1978; Temu, 1975; Alger & Lyons, 1974; Said, 1978).

Those worried about the international division of academic labor agree that the first step would entail a revision of the current institutional structures which perpetuate intellectual dependency. They point to the need to "decolonize" Third World universities which are modeled after European and American institutions and which by teaching Euro-American style courses, largely ignore native concerns. The stress on the history of the colonizer over that of the colonized, the use of colonial languages in the classroom and textbooks which use examples from Western countries have been cited as manifestations of the disregard for native concerns (Constantino, 1978; Mazrui, 1975; Dube, 1982).

According to Atal, even in today's nationalistic climate, the work of Western academics is favored over native ones in both the classrooms and in local and national publications.

To be sure, because of the bias against indigenous scholarship, very few books and research writings by local scholars are ever set in the curricula ... (Atal, 1983:370)

A review of publications suggests that there is a greater tendency to quote and refer to foreign scholars than to local scholars. (ibid:370)

Bias against indigenous scholarship forms part of the syndrome of the captive mind which values the culture of the colonizer over that of the colonized. This apparent preference for the foreign has a structural component and is at least partially due to the inaccessibility of local scholarship (Caoli, 1983; Gonzales, 1982). Societies geared for development feel they do not have the resources to expend on a large intellectual infrastructure. As much research is mission oriented, it remains in the development
domain - published as project reports, feasibility studies etc. which are distributed to
the relevant parties. Though there are centers which hold these reports along with
other unpublished manuscripts, (the Philippine Social Science Research council for
example) they are still largely inaccessible to scholars outside Manila. Budgets are not
large enough to handle travel to libraries and centers of research, xeroxing and mailing.

The new dependency theorists would also correct the information imbalance
between the North and the South, providing Third World scholars more access to
journals (as a publishing arena) and situating more headquarters of international
scholarly organizations in Third World countries. The ultimate test of equality, as
outlined by Mazrui (1975), would be the penetration of Third World thought into
Western theory.

A more radical and overtly political approach calls for a moratorium on
international cooperation in the social sciences to give Third World academics time to
work out their own theoretical stances without input from the West. Such a moratorium
would prevent Western academics from conducting research in Third World countries
and would curtail other forms of cooperative ventures between metropolitan and
peripheral academics (Fahim & Helmer, 1982).

The new dependency theorists trace the academic hegemony of the West to the
"colonial encounter" which institutionalized Western economic hegemony. Academic
hegemony is therefore a reflection of economic hegemony and is maintained through
the same institutions which perpetuate economic dependence. According to this
scenario, the multi-national corporations play a significant role in setting educational
priorities. The needs of the multi-nationals are disguised as national development
priorities e.g. higher agricultural productivity (to feed new urban workers) or tax
incentives for foreign companies to spur technology "transfer" and industrialisation.
Under the education for development mandate, (see chptr 2) curricula are designed to
produce the skilled labor needed to man the export processing zones and
multi-nationals. The critical educational skills needed to design alternative, long term
development plans are ignored.

By focusing on structures of dependency however, a modified dependency approach can only offer a rather flat portrayal of a kind of conspiracy of First World academics against Third World academics. The social science community in core countries is portrayed as being fully integrated into a somewhat amorphous body called "the West" and as such, it serves a definite function in the support of the present global structure. The failure of Western paradigms to deal adequately with Third World culture is associated with those structures that perpetuate the "captive mind" i.e. the "state of intellectual bondage and dependence on an external group through the operation of media such as books, institutions, the radio, the press, television, conferences and meetings" (Alatas, 1974:692) which are controlled by the core.

The captive mind is produced in a web of relations of power. It exists in a complicated space because the educational (and international economic) system which produces the captive mind also produces the critical mind - Alatas' own, for instance. The colonial educational heritage has been blamed/credited for both colonizing and liberating Third World thought. It has been accused of being manipulated by outside economic interests. If this is so, then liberation is an unintended consequence - a failure on the part of the global system. But in fact, liberating ideas have been institutionalized in the Philippines through such entities as the Third World Studies Program at the University of the Philippines. According to Rodriguez (1979) Argentine universities favor neo-Marxist approaches to social science. Though Marxism is also a "borrowed" discourse, it is one which is critical of the current core-periphery relations. Multiple discourses, then, do exist in the Third World.

If control from the center is incomplete, one needs to look at the intellectuals themselves, in addition to the macro-structures, to get an idea of how truth is constructed and passed on. When we look at the level of the university - as in the example of the Nutrition Integrated Approach (NIA) (chptr 3) - we can see that various conditions of life contribute to the maintenance of the intellectual milieu. Things as
mundane as where one was trained, the politics of the university and one's personal background provide a filter for the processing of ideas encountered in the educational system. The NIA director, for example, had a personal agenda for the project - to recreate the process by which she herself escaped poverty (education) on a village level. She was trained in a university which shared land with an international agricultural institute and social science, therefore, was geared toward development (largely in the domain of food production) and diffusion of the innovations coming out of the institute. If she had been trained by the Third World Studies Program, her approach to the development process would have been different, probably more critical. After the NIA director received her degree, she was channeled into the program by bureaucratic mandate and her actions in the role of project leader were constrained by the wishes of her superior, cooperation of her colleagues and her role as mediator between the village, university and political structure. In addition, she was constantly searching for funds for income generating projects and training and the type/design of projects had to fit in with goals of the university and funding agencies. NIA, therefore, did not operate in a structural void in which theory (her educational training) had free reign over the landscape of development. The project was pulled and pushed by various parties. To link NIA directly to the international economic system is too simplistic. It is true that the consequence of NIA's actions might coincide with the goals of the international economic order as dictated by wealthy countries, but one cannot say for sure whether this was part of a grand plan, as dependency theorists would maintain, or simply the failure of NIA to liberate the peasantry.

Deconstruction and Social Science

Academics working in core countries\(^1\) have also been critical of social scientific representation in grand theory. While new dependency theorists situate domination in the global politico-economic sphere, a deconstructive approach explores the ways domination is part of the theoretical discourse itself.

The Western critique of social science can be situated in several historical moments. First, the "rediscovery" of Marx provided a structural means for talking
about domination. Second, the development of social science in former colonies turned the "natives" into colleagues and students - some of whom were critical of the way their cultures had been ethnographically portrayed. Their criticisms added another dimension to notions of Western hegemony. Third, the "diffusion" of French philosophy to other disciplines provided a method (deconstruction) for looking at the domination inherent in anthropological discourse.

Grand theory gains a large measure of its authority through its claims of validity based in objectivity i.e. its scientific nature. It also derives authority from the relational position of the Western institutions from which it is generated. The new dependency theorists focus on the latter aspect of theory building to talk about both the hegemony of First World over Third World academics and stereotypical representations in theory. Some deconstructionist works do openly address structural dominance (Said 1978, Foucault, 1969). It is not, however, the starting point from which they question representational authority because they feel that more than the dismantling of current academic structures is needed to diffuse the crisis in representation.

Accusations that social science has offered stereotyped versions of other cultures has led to a self-consciousness about the way the ethnographic Other is represented. A self-conscious critical approach to representation of the Other must ultimately question the authority of the social scientist as representor, translator.

One response to this dilemma has been the inclusion of other points of view (to use a visual metaphor) or other voices (to use an aural metaphor) (Marcus, 1988). If ethnography proceeds according to standard scientific method, the field of inquiry is narrowed to allow the investigator to fully research "one piece of the puzzle." The research problem is focused, confined, manageable. This restrictive approach can lead to reductionist formulations and a decontextualization of social forms. Taking the role of peasant behavior in development as an example: by restricting the inquiry to peasant psychology, political and economic structures and processes are ignored to the point where resistance to change becomes the key hindrance to development.
Related to problems of formulating the research question, is the dilemma of choosing which anthropological other to use as a vehicle for the ethnography. Again using development as an example: different analyses result depending on whether one focuses on the local developers, the foreign consultants, the national level planning agencies or the peasants.

One way to alleviate possible tunnel vision in microanalysis is the inclusion of other perspectives; perhaps to the point of decentering the intended object of study. This technique has been used by Marcus (1988) in his study of dynastic families in which he included the discourse of family retainers, news media and others involved with the family along with the discourse of the family members. This type of approach is especially relevant to development ethnographies. Fischer, (1980) in his study of the Persian Gulf, maps the ideological discourses of the competing religious and political groups and their relation to modernization.

Another strategy of the deconstructive method is to make explicit the hegemonic power which resides in discourse. The ways in which social science discourse has been used by governments to further political ends has been explored by the new dependency theorists. This type of critique gave rise to the accusation that social science aided colonialism. Yet scholars can disclaim responsibility for how their works are used by maintaining that they lose control of their representations after they are published. This type of analysis of social science’s contribution to colonialism separates the discourse from political power and mimics scientific disclaimers that knowledge in and of itself is neutral. Foucault, however, has included both knowledge and power in his analysis of discourse.

Discourse analysis for Foucault includes not only an analysis of textual representations, but also the ideological milieu in which they are formed and which they inform, and the institutions based on insights, theory etc. as constituted in texts. Therefore one cannot look only at the ethnographies and theories, but must look at the power relations inherent in their construction. The ability to define the Other is situated
in relations of power and that representation reinforces power. The First World defines the Third World, not vice versa. The political and economic dominance of core countries over peripheral ones is structurally and ideologically constituted.

Taking development discourse as an example: the ideology of the modern offers modernity as the norm; other states/stages of being are abnormal. The words *underdeveloped*, *preliterate* and *backwards* place the bearers of those adjectives in an unequal and abnormal position vis-à-vis their counterparts. The implication is that if the South had proceeded along the normal course of social evolution, it would be on par with the North. The abnormality of the South allows the North to dominate it and prescribe solutions to normalize it.

**INDIGENIZATION OF THEORY**

Previous mention has been made of the three related and overlapping concerns of scholars who are skeptical of the usefulness of grand theory in post-colonial societies: lack of fit of Western theory, the power differential and the need for a national consciousness. Several questions arise. How would an indigenous body of social science theory be constructed in post-colonial intellectual space? What strategies should be employed in this endeavor? Is indigenization necessary in order to alleviate the problems cited above?

How could a body of indigenous theory be constructed in the post-colonial intellectual milieu? Indigenization has been variously defined. Atal (1983) says it involves the *replacement* of Western models with local ones. To Singh (1979), it is a body of theory based on indigenous categories and native models. Jones calls it native anthropology and agrees with Singh that it is a "set of theories based on non-Western precepts and assumptions" (1970:251). Mazrui (1975) uses the term *domestication* of foreign models and others have called for culturally relevant models (Gonzales, 1982;
Caoili, 1983). The terms domestication and culturally relevant invoke the idea of adaptation, even though this concept has negative associations. In development, adaptation has often meant transfer.

From the various interpretations of indigenization, it is clear that there seems to be a range of possibilities for Third World theory construction.

In the Philippines, the conscious search for a native (pre-colonial) construction of reality takes several forms: exploration of travel accounts, archaeology, folklore and the study of living groups which are considered to be less acculturated into Western culture than the urban and elite i.e. tribal minorities and peasants. This last strategy can lead to a kind of pastoralism in which certain social groups and cultural forms are held up as examples of "the real Filipino." The common tao - which usually means the rural poor - are lauded as reservoirs of traditional values.

But this culture that Spanish imperialism instituted to hold the colony together was an imported one. Some scholars have recently pointed out that the Hispanic-Christian culture of the Filipinos is merely a facade. Closer analysis of people's behavior would show that, especially among the rural folks, indigenous elements have survived centuries of foreign rule, hence the attempts to explain Filipino political behavior in terms of utang na loob, pakikisama, etc. (Nemenzo, 1981:6)

Nemenzo goes on to comment that such indigenous interpretations do not work on the national political level - thus reinforcing ideas of the cultural/traditional gap between the upper and middle classes and the poor tao; the urban and rural; national and local.

Confusion sets in when one tries to identify traditional elements. In regards to the Philippine peasantry, the term traditional sometimes means pre-American and can be a blend of Spanish as well as Malay cultural forms. One example is Mercado's (1979) attempt to use indigenous elements gathered from folklore and anthropology to explain the precepts of Western theology. A similar attempt was made in the field of

It is virtually impossible, however, to separate out the "roots" of various cultural forms in order to ascertain some essence of Filipiniana after over 300 years of colonialism. The pre-colonial past cannot be recovered, it can only be reconstructed - and this entails the use of "Western" tools (travel accounts, archaeology etc.). Again using development models as an example: how could one go about constructing a pre-colonial indigenous model of development when the very concept of modernization - certainly the theory of it - is Western and based on ideas of progress. Development's link to modernization theory has been its major flaw according to the majority of its critics.

The impossibility of reviving pre-Hispanic culture does not mean that there is nothing which is uniquely Filipino. The Philippines' Malay/Chinese/Spanish/American heritage is itself unique, making for various combinations, interpretations, and creations of cultural forms.

Their "multi-cultural culture" is recognized by Filipinos and I take the discourse around the calls for indigenization to be calls for culturally relevant models, more sensitive representation and an opening up and equalization of the international academic arena.

But we cannot turn back the clock. We cannot, by wishful thinking, erase our history, or cancel the past four centuries and go back to the original Malayo-Polynesian culture of these islands. We are no longer purely Malayo-Polynesian. We have been subjected to influences from Europe and Asia and America. We have experienced many things. We are what we are. (Bernad, 1983:56)

Let us now turn to the second set of definitions of indigenization; those dealing with a body of culturally relevant theory. One theme which frequently is mentioned by Third World academics is the need for interdisciplinary approaches (Temu, 1975; Singh, 1979; Caoili, 1983). The division into disciplines is called into question and is
accused of fostering theoretical rigidity. The majority of social scientists in the South are involved in some way with development and an interdisciplinary approach is more useful in this endeavor. Other areas of interest include the use of native languages in research (Temu, 1975; Enriquez 1977, 1979); a development economics geared toward self-reliant growth; Neo-Marxist approaches (Caoili, 1983). Domestication, then, is the strategy of taking what seems appropriate and making it one's own (Gonzalez, 1982).

Is indigenization necessary? The call for indigenization is based in both theoretical and structural concerns. It is true that some of the theoretical issues which concern scholars calling for native theory have been, and are being, addressed internationally. The models which come under the most frequent attack both for their lack of fit and for their hegemonic stance (modernization; Keyensian economics; values studies and diffusionism) face mounting criticism internationally. Is indigenous theory really unique in its realization of the inadequacy of grand theory or is the debate an aspect of a period in international social science?

The discourse for culturally relevant models might now be part of a larger discourse, but it is much older than that discourse. In India, at least, calls for indigenization date from the 1920's (Singh, 1979) and they have broadened and continued to the point where their concerns can be appropriated into other discourses about hegemony e.g. dependency and deconstruction.

Deconstruction offers a valuable way to think about power and representation. It also offers anaytical methods - the searching for subjugated discourse; the inclusion of many perspectives. The problem with the deconstructive method for Third World academics is that it does not immediately help to correct the unequal relationship between academics in the core and periphery, thus the flow of knowledge is still from core to periphery. The impact of Third World literature is still minimal (except for dependency theory) on the First World. One example is the indigenization debate itself. Confined for almost 50 years to the journals and conferences of the South,
academics in the First World have begun addressing these issues relatively recently.

Dependency theory is a good heuristic tool to bring the inequality of First and Third World academic institutions into relief and to discuss theoretical dependency. It does not, however, offer any real strategies for analysis other than vague notions about the need for native constructions of reality and the dismantling of the current international academic structures. Plus, it will take along time for new constructions to enter the policy arena - the arena in which a major part of Third World social science ultimately ends up. As Said points out in his conclusion to *Orientalism*, orientalist thought still informs much of academic and popular thought and policy making. Perhaps it will be more difficult to correct the imbalance between the academic institutions of the core and periphery. The most prestigious schools are still in Europe and the U.S. The First World has much more money to spend and is willing to spend it in basic research while Third World funds are still heavily committed toward applied research.

The construction of a social science based on pre-colonial culture is an impossible task, and would not in any case address the needs of post-colonial society. If the term native/indigenous includes post-colonial society, then it is certainly possible to construct indigenous models. It is possible to base models in native categories of thought, but not possible to construct whole disciplines upon native categories unless one is willing to begin totally anew - erasing even the concepts of political science, sociology, psychology etc.

**CULTURALLY RELEVANT MODELS IN THE PHILIPPINES**

In the Philippines, there have been several attempts to construct culturally relevant models. In the pages below, I will discuss attempts in the fields of psychology,
history and development. I see these as discovering hidden discourses. Foucault defines subjugated discourse as that which has been alienated and disvalued (especially in relation to scientific discourse).

**Psychology**

Indigenous language, which is disvalued compared to colonial language, especially in the academic arena, could be considered a subjugated discourse. In his construction of a Filipino psychology, Virgilio Enriquez uses native language as a heuristic tool to discover native categories of thought which he claims are lost to the English language user.

While recognizing that contemporary Filipinos are a product of many traditions in a colonial context, Enriquez looks to native (Malay based) dialects to explain Filipino psychology. He tries to identify "an existing, meaningful, and lexicalized concept in the Filipino national language which might provide a key to understanding Filipino psychology" (Enriquez, 1979:6). Enriquez is interested in setting the record straight concerning Filipino values. He claims that previous work on values studies, (e.g. Kaut, 1961; Hollensteiner, 1973; Lynch, 1973) a lot of which was either conducted by Americans and or under American tutelage, takes individual concepts out of the network of concepts to which they belong. One example he uses is utang na loob, or a debt of gratitude. Utang na loob is part of a standard list of Filipino values along with pakikisama (yielding to the will of others, getting along), bayanihan (togetherness in common effort) and hiya (shame) of which every foreigner working in the Philippines is informed. What Enriquez tries to do is to recontextualize these values by relating them to their linguistic relatives. Utang na loob is one of many psycho-social concepts which use the root loob (roughly translated as inside). His method is to explore the values complex surrounding the term loob: sama ng loob (resentment), kusang loob (initiative), lakas ng loob (guts) etc. He advocates working and publishing in the native dialects - which are peripheral and outside of the usual English language scientific domain. If one does not construct psychology in the dialects, trying instead to
plug core values into American psychological models, the Filipino values will be misunderstood, trivialized and out of context.

Enriquez claims that not only did American oriented values studies not capture the rich field of Filipino psychology, the American constructions aided in the colonial endeavor. Utang na loob was identified as a core Filipino value and as such was a valuable tool in the maintenance of the colonial structure. It was "natural" (i.e. a native attitude) that Filipinos be grateful for the American intervention and "aid." The American sponsored values studies have been incorporated into development theory and contribute to the construction of the traditional peasant for whom getting along (pakikisama) is more important than getting ahead (in a rationalized, modern sense).

History

Renato Ileto's study of the Katipunan provides a good example of retrieval of a subjugated discourse. The Katipunan was a peasant group of revolutionaries during the revolt against the Spanish and later the Americans. These peasant revolutionaries blended the harsh social lessons learnt through appropriations of land and corvée labor with their interpretation of Catholic religious forms to produce a revolutionary ideology. Ileto has identified the Pasyon, a Spanish religious epic which is included in Easter week ceremonies and is generally well known throughout the Christian peasantry, as the discourse which best encapsulates the peasant view of the revolts - what he calls "history from below" (Ileto, 1977). He identifies the specific themes which articulated the dialectic of desperation and hope felt by the peasantry and which encouraged the active attempt to model a better social reality: empathy (damay) which spurs one to action when another is in trouble; the identification of the elite with Christ's oppressors; Jesus as a subversive figure who entices the masses to follow him; loob - personal inner strength or spirit; and criticism of the social hierarchy.

The radical differences between peasant and elite perceptions of independence are made evident when one contextualizes the cognitive systems of Philippine peasant
revolutionaries within the tradition of the Pasyon and the elite cognitive system within the larger Western framework. The elite view of what liberation would be was as follows. The Philippines would become a sovereign nation composed of all persons residing within the territory the Spanish called the Philippines and loyal to one government—which would be composed of elites whose education and wealth qualified them as leaders in the Western liberal democratic tradition. International relations were of utmost importance to the elite as was the Philippines’ taking its place among the "civilized" nations. The peasants had a different construction of the revolution. They saw in independence the unification of all Filipinos as one brotherhood in a state of equality, contentment and material abundance. Being of one loob means being purified/strengthened through action, not idea. The elite, who not only did not fight in the revolution but were initially adverse to it, were not unified in spirit and were considered interlopers.

Ileto rescues the discourse of the Katipuneros and recontextualizes it within its liberatory religious domain. Standard accounts of their actions portray the peasant revolutionaries as religious fanatics and/or communists. They cite the use of amulets for protection and good luck and the incorporation of dead heroes into a core of saints as evidence for the former. They mistake the egalitarian nature of the katipuneros and their agonistic stance towards their landlords for the latter. Amado Guerrero, one of the Philippines’ leading communist intellectuals, claims that the katipuneros were proletarians who suffered from a religious false consciousness (Guerrero, 1971). But the Marxist notion of infrastructure as the determinant of superstructure is radically opposed to the vision of a new social order based on divine teachings which the religio-political revolutionaries strove for.

The revival of subjugated discourse in the creation of Philippine models is more than the Malayization of culture. Enriquez recognizes the colonial heritage in psychology, but uses native language to better understand native constructs and to identify Filipino values. Ileto looks at the role of Spanish colonial structures to weaken Spanish and American domination. New meanings were assigned to a colonial import
to form a revolutionary ideology as the Katipuneros appropriated Spanish religious constructs into native memory. The Katipuneros’ image of pre-Hispanic Philippines was drawn from Spanish ideas of heaven and projected into the past as mythic memory; revolutionary heroes were added to a core of saints; previously secular sites (certain mountains) became religious shrines.

Development

For the most part, efforts to construct culturally relevant development models are more rhetorical than real but some inroads have been made with the advent of liberation theologies. In the Philippines, religion is playing an increasingly important role in the formulation of development ideology. It takes the form of a re-interpretation of the Bible (especially the Gospels) which focuses on the Church’s interest in the poor. The concept of salvation is broadened and liberation theology insists "on the urgency of a salvation that must take place in the historical moment in which we live..." (Martinez, 1985:15) Salvation in the "historical moment in which we live" involves liberation from poverty and powerlessness. The Church’s mission is redefined to incorporate interest in the physical as well as spiritual well being of its flock. In the Philippines, where the gap between rich and poor is great, this means a preferential stance vis a vis the poor.

The point of departure is the conviction that it is not possible to build up an authentic Christian theology unless it starts from the poor and from the point of view of the poor. (Martinez, 1985:15)

Part of the Church’s duty to the poor is to support them in their struggle to liberate themselves from poverty. This self-liberation depends upon their (the poor’s) conscientization - the process by which they come to understand their place in social, economic and political spheres in the Philippines. The process of conscientization takes place in the Basic Christian Communities. These are small local groups which meet to pray, reflect on God’s word and to decide on solutions to concrete problems. The Basic Christian Communities take place under the auspices of the Church. They
are not political organizations, though such organizations often begin there.

Liberation can only take place in a democratic atmosphere and the Basic Christian Communities signal the Church's recognition that the laity (the poor) are capable of deciding their own futures. The clergy cannot lead them in their struggle to leave poverty behind and development will come only when the poor are supported in their desires. Developers must ask the poor what they want. Bishop Labayen (1985) points out that, despite current rhetoric about participatory development approaches, this is a departure from mainstream development efforts. He feels that most developers are usually not flexible enough to, for example, focus educational efforts on adults rather than children or redesign health care systems to focus on traditional medicine.

The movement towards reinterpretation of religious texts in the Philippines is reminiscent of the Katipuneros' reinterpretation of the Payson. Like the revolutionaries at the turn of the century, liberation theologists employ a colonial import - Christianity - in their struggle to gain power from educated elites who have a different vision of where the future of the Philippines lies. Like the Katipunan, liberation theology is a movement of the economically and politically dispossessed.

Religion is a potent vehicle for political movements in the Philippines. Secularization was forced on the country by the American regime and it is sometimes still associated with colonization.

There is another dimension in which the system of education that the Americans brought here was seriously defective. It was a system that not only did not give due recognition to the importance of religion, but that in effect denied the educational value of religion. (Bernad, 1983:68)

Despite the secularization of Philippine public institutions by the Americans, the appropriateness of religion in the public sphere is still an issue. A 1981 conference on ideology and education included "love of God" as an important construct in Philippine ideology. "Literature Without Spirituality? God NO!" was one of the papers presented this conference. It was offered as a response to a paper on the history of literature
which was secular in tone. Andres' 1981 book on management also includes a section on the primacy of religion in the Philippines.

Andres suggests that Filipinos are able to creatively use Christianity because they have what he terms a "split level religiosity" in which "natural heredity, heritage and environment combine with religious doctrine" (Andres, 1981: 33). The more common way to talk about this phenomenon is to refer to Philippine Catholicism as a folk religion. The creative use of this spiritual import has been called by Phelan (1959) the "Philippinization of Catholicism." Christianity, then, is considered to be an indigenous cultural form. It stands in opposition to institutional secularization which still has close ties to the American colonial era.

The creative and politicised use of Catholicism has historical precedent in several "nativistic" revolutionary movements lending credence to liberation theology as a possible culturally relevant response to underdevelopment. Its use of religious texts and symbols seem to offer a usable model of development in a country where religion is accepted as part of the public domain.

Despite Christianity's prominent place in the Philippines, liberation theology is not widely accepted throughout its development community because it is associated with Marxism. The fact that several "renegade priests" have taken up arms and joined the New People's Army (communist insurgents) has widened the gap between mainstream developers - those relying on government and foreign funds and the liberation theologists. The two groups, however, do share some of the same rhetoric about the need to uplift the poor. Mainstream developers have even coopted some Marxist terminology. For instance, it is not uncommon for them to refer to "the masses" when talking about the poor. But they do not believe in the restructuring of society and pacification is still a development goal. One of the speakers at the conference on ideology commented that

Rural development is a "must" if dissidence is to be contained. (Guillermo, 1981:27)
Like the discourse of the Katipuneros, liberation theology is still a subjugated discourse. It is caught in the controversy about how development should take place. Who should have the power to control the development process? How is development to be defined? Liberation theologists would say that development involves the economic and political liberation of the poor. Mainstream developers would say that it involves bettering the conditions of the poor within the existing social structure and in addition to meeting the country's capital needs.

The indigenization debate mirrors the controversy about appropriate development strategies (see ch.2). The issues of political and economic autonomy, which are at the center of the controversy about education and development, are focal to discussions about intellectual autonomy. In her book on rural development, Po (1980) encapsulates the debate on development into one issue: will the Philippines develop as a dependent or an independent nation? This is exactly the issue the New Dependency theorists are dealing with. Development planners are grappling with issues of autonomy in the political and economic spheres. The ultimate question for those concerned with issues of dependency and development is what trade-offs in the autonomy sphere are necessary to ensure growth. They are trying to define the difference between dependence and interdependence; interdependence and independence. Should development efforts be focused on industry or agriculture? Should industry be export oriented or geared toward domestic needs? The same question applies to agriculture. What should be the role of multi-nationals?

For those advocating the indigenization of social science theory, one can only arrive at the correct answers to such questions of strategy when one stops accepting "foreign" modernization models. For them, the Philippines must define modernization on its own terms. Independent development in the political and economic spheres is impossible without independent development in the intellectual sphere. Thus, for them, the future of the Philippines is intricately tied with indigenous models.
Notes

1. By situating the deconstructive movement in the First World academic arena, I do not mean to suggest that there are no Third World academics using this method, (e.g. Spivak, Dlaz) nor that there are no First World academics using dependency theory to discuss the need for rethinking grand theory (e.g. Gough).

2. Indigenization vis 'a vis anthropology is sometimes used to refer to anthropologists working in their own countries. (Fahim & Helmer, 1982)

3. Here I use Enriquez' translations.

4. The Nutrition Integrated Approach, which provides the case material for this study is a case in point. Despite rhetoric surrounding the program about empowering the masses, grassroots participation and bottom up approach, NIA ideology and strategy are part of the international trend towards integrated approaches which began in the mid- seventies under FAO auspices. This will discussed more fully in chptrs. 2 and 3.

5. For a review of nativist movements see Ileto, 1979.
Chapter Two

**Education and the Colonized Mind**

The debate about the need to indigenize social science and to engage in basic research in the "hard" sciences is part of a larger politico-educational controversy. There is disagreement among politicians, technocrats, academics and aid agencies about how national development should take place and what role education will play in this process. Arguments are couched both in educational and political terms.

Educators are concerned with the relationship between curriculum and national development. One camp believes that all educational efforts should be directly linked to national development and students should be tracked into programs designed to address particular development needs. The scenario they describe is similar to the one painted by the NIA director: the dire condition of the poor makes immediate action mandatory. On the educational scene, this translates into giving pupils skills they can use in the factory and farm.

The opponents of this view feel that critical thinking and creativity should be fostered through general education. They feel that the emphasis on meeting immediate needs (jobs, food) to the neglect of working toward more long term goals brings a false development and fosters intellectual as well as economic dependence. They point to the interrelationship between government and aid agency policies and big business to illustrate how the latter informs the former.

Controversy vis 'a vis the relationship between education and development has been a hallmark of the Philippine system. The Spanish, American and Filipino educational administrations have vacillated between general "liberal arts" and "education for development." This type of educational soul searching is not unique to
post-colonial societies. The "Western World" debates the advantages of general versus technical education (and vice versa) too. The difference between discussions of these problems in the West and the discussions of Third World countries lies in the sense of immediacy which the technological, power and economic gap between core and peripheral countries brings to questions of educational strategy.

An underlying theme in the controversy is that of education's role in controlling the people who receive it. Is education a liberating force, a way to conscientize the masses ('a la Friere), or is it a method of control through the inculcation of agreed upon truths ('a la Foucault)? According to Mazrui, it is both and colonial education especially serves the paradoxical role of assimilating and revolutionizing students. Speaking of African colonial and post-colonial universities he says:

African universities were capable of being at once mechanisms for political liberation and agencies of cultural dependency. University graduates in Africa were the most culturally dependent. They have neither been among the major cultural revivalists nor have they shown respect for indigenous belief systems, linguistic heritage, modes of entertainment or aesthetic experience. The same educational institutions which have produced nationalists eager to end colonial rule and to establish African self-government have also perpetuated cultural colonialism. (Mazrui, 1975:194)

Ultimately, assimilation and revolution are the two strategies being debated by educators and researchers when they discuss the merits of indigenous versus borrowed approaches: assimilation (into "Western" culture) through borrowed models or revolution against them through indigenous ones.

**COLONIAL EDUCATION**

Formal education in the Philippines was initiated by Spanish friars through a system of private elementary and secondary schools based on the European pattern. During the liberalizations in Spain in the mid-1800s, free primary schools were introduced in the colony and run by parish priests. These first schools focused on the "three R's" and theology - the ultimate aim of literacy being the widespread perusal of
Catholic dogma. The bulk of literature available to the natives \(^1\) was religious in nature and consisted of the Lives of the Saints, moro-moros (plays in which Christians defeat Muslims) and the Pasyon (Life of Christ). Non-religious literature consisted of the romances (romanizas) and epic tales (corridos) - both centered on the peoples and values of foreign countries. Religious literature taught native Filipinos to be obedient to God and his representatives (the Spanish friars) and to submit to one’s fate (Constantino, 1978). Corridos and romanizas provided an escape from everyday drudgery and inculcated a sense of the value of foreign culture - implying that indigenous culture lacked value.

Later on, Spanish and agricultural methods were included in the primary schools (though fluency in Spanish never became widespread) (May 1980). For the first 200 years of Spanish rule, all interactions with the natives were conducted in the regional dialects. At first glance, the use of the vernacular might seem to be a statement of regard for native culture. Spanish friars compiled dictionaries and catechisms in the vernacular; thus preserving some remnant of native life. Simultaneously, however, such exclusive access to the Spanish language effectively served to constrict the masses’ access to outside, possibly liberating, influences (Constantino, 1978).

At the same time that general primary education was instituted, tertiary education in the form of private Catholic universities was opened to the native elite. Many of these youth chose to go abroad for their university education and were sent to Spain. There they encountered the ideas of equality and liberal democracy which helped formed the later elite response to Spanish rule.

Because of its stress on humanities, European education has been criticised as inadequate in a colonial setting. Colonial humanistic education downgraded technical and scientific skills. Some believe such an education is responsible for the low status of technical labor in Third World countries and has therefore contributed to the gap between core and periphery (Braveboy-Wagner 1986; Lillis 1984; Clarke 1984; Constantino 1978). Spanish education in the Philippines has been particularly
criticised for institutionalizing the social hierarchy. The late introduction of the Spanish language to the masses and the restriction of access to universities created a cultural and ideological gap which divided the nation's future leaders from their followers (Constantino 1978).

At the turn of the century, the United States seized control of the Philippines. Management of the new possession was through the Philippine Commission, whose second and most well-known director was William Taft. Though the ostensible mission of Taft's group was to prepare the Philippines for independence; at the time of his appointment Taft felt the islands should be held indefinitely (May,1980). He saw no signs of Filipino ability for self-government i.e. they were not yet sufficiently "Americanized".

The Philippine Commission felt that a necessary precursor to independence was universal primary education. Though initiated 50 years before by the Spanish, it had not succeeded in producing a large, literate public. The Americans themselves had also briefly been associated with education in the Philippines during the Philippine-American War. The first American teachers were soldiers and their primary goal was to pacify the Filipino "rebels" through the inculcation of American values and a show of good will.

The mandate of the Philippine Commission was different from that of their predecessors. Primary education under the Commission was to accomplish three things: 1. cure Filipinos of "undesirable traits" 2. teach them the art of democratic politics 3. create conditions for economic development.

Though these broad goals were generally agreed upon by the colonial administration, there was controversy about which type of educational experience would best produce the desired results. Specifically stated, the debate focused on the extent schools should favor academic over technical subjects (or vice versa). The two approaches were based in opposing political ideologies and strategies for
independence.

The "radical social engineering approach" (May's term) would conscientize peasants in order to weaken the oligarchy of the native elite. Such a strategy would favor academic subjects which would foster critical analysis of the Philippines' Spanish colonial heritage. Development would be in part monitored through social indicators such as democracy and equality of opportunity and a meritocracy would replace the privileged position of the native elite.

The industrial education model advocated a stress on industrial arts and agricultural methods. Courses included basket making, embroidery, animal husbandry etc. as well as some academic subjects. Character training was included with the goal of instilling the proper work ethic in the students. Industrial education was favored by administrators whose primary concern was the poor living conditions of the majority of Filipinos. They felt that liberal arts were a luxury in such conditions and that the first order of business was to improve material well-being. Such a strategy included increased expenditure on infrastructure and teaching Filipinos the productive skills needed for economic development.

The early years of American educational policy were marked by vacillation between these two positions. Each was development oriented but differed in the way progress was defined. The social engineering approach tried to modify social structure; thus paving the way for a "modern" political system and providing the proper milieu for capitalism.² The technical approach tried to lay the productive foundations necessary for economic development.

The Americans' approach to tertiary education was similar to that of the Spanish. They founded universities and staffed them with professors from the "mother country." At the same time, they sent Filipino students to the U.S. for undergraduate and graduate degrees. The universities begun by the Spanish were still (and are still) producing students. The American effort therefore was in addition to, not to the
exclusion of, the Spanish one.

As they returned with their graduate degrees in the 1950's and 60's, the repatriated students joined, and then largely replaced, their American mentors. Textbooks and other references, however, were still written by foreign scholars (some of whom were colonial officials\(^3\)) and several scholarly journals (some still in existence today) were begun by the same (Caolli 1983; May 1980).

By the time the Americans left the Philippines (after WWII), the majority of faculty were Filipino. Though students were still sent abroad for study, graduate programs were in place in many disciplines making it possible for Filipino scholars to reproduce themselves.

The Spanish colonial educational system has been criticised for its elite focus (based in its stress on the humanities) and for the tight control it exercised over the intellectual growth of its dominions. The American system has been criticised for its internal inconsistencies \(^4\) (May 1980) discussed above and for the sophisticated methods used to implant American values in Filipino minds (Constantino 1978).

English was used as the medium of instruction in schools and Filipinos were encouraged to adopt American cultural traits. Some nationalist scholars view the introduction of American culture to the Philippines as the major factor contributing to the decline of "traditional" (indigenous) values and the rise in "modern" (colonial) ones (Constantino, 1978; Ferrer, 1984). In other words, it is the presence of American mass culture and the indoctrination of Filipinos with American ideology which sustains the colonial mentality.

Because of the widespread use of English, the Americans were much more successful than the Spanish at cultural transformation. But before it is possible to mold the colonized into the image of the colonizer, it is necessary to separate the former from their indigenous culture (Fanon 1963; Carnoy 1974). In the colonial educational milieu, this meant an American interpretation of Filipino history and the institution of
an educational system based in meritocracy.

According to the American version of history, the U.S. liberated the Philippines from Spanish colonialism. The bloody repression of Filipino nationalists by U.S. soldiers which followed Filipino realization that their liberators were not going to grant them independence but instead hold on to the islands, was left out of the history books. All those not favoring U.S. "protection" were branded as insurrectionists. There were however, Filipino nationalists who could be recognized for their fight against Spain providing they did not later oppose American rule. Political moderates such as Rizal and Silang⁵ were portrayed as nationalist heroes while revolutionaries such as Bonifacio⁶ were portrayed as radical reactionaries (Constantino 1978). Thus the textbooks used during the American regime provided images of heroic Filipinos while simultaneously stressing the positive role which the U.S. played in the expulsion of the Spanish. Nationalists were those revolutionary leaders willing to collaborate with the Americans. Such a historical account implies two things about the Philippine-American relationship: 1. Filipinos would not have been able to break the bonds of Spanish colonialism without American aid and 2. the U.S. had only the Philippines' best interest in mind when it "liberated" and later seized the islands. The Americans misrepresented themselves (as liberators) and the Filipinos (as weak and backward) in the U.S. written histories which were a staple of the colonial educational system. Such a representation paved the way for acceptance of American culture (Constantino 1978).

The Spanish wanted to Christianize the Philippine islands. The Americans wanted to democratize and modernize them. The latter stressed the importance of equality of opportunity and the ability of individuals to enhance their social position through intelligence and hard work. In addition to being important to individual advancement, the institution of a meritocracy would help the country in its drive towards modernization by "rationally" re-ordering the social structure. Therefore the vehicle for both state and individual advancement was education.
In an ideal meritocracy, equality of opportunity assures each individual the chance to better his/her life conditions through either native intelligence or hard work. One’s failure in the system is the result of lack of ability and attention is shifted away from social structural inequalities. The fallacy of educational equal opportunity in a meritocracy is well documented (Carnoy 1974; Clarke 1984; Udagama 1980; Willis 1977). In underdeveloped countries, access to formal education is not equal. Resources have been put into urban areas before rural ones and into higher education (which is too expensive for all but a few) before primary education (Carnoy 1974). Rural education is not of the same quality as urban education and neither the rural nor the urban poor have access to the better schools because of their inability to compete successfully against those from more privileged backgrounds. The result is an educational gap between rich and poor and between rural and urban populations. The ascriptive social hierarchy of the Spanish period was thus maintained during the American period because the elite had greater access to education in a system in which one’s educational background determined one’s position in the decision making hierarchy. The American instituted meritocracy has been criticised not only because it did not work well as a social leveller, but also because it carried within it justification of the status quo. Those who had failed did not complain of unfair treatment, believing the positive relationship between "ability" and positions of power to be a just one. Educational meritocracy reinforced the feelings of inferiority which American written Filipino history helped to instill and which portrayed the Filipinos as "little brown brothers" incapable of acting independently on the international scene. Only those Filipinos who were sufficiently assimilated into American (modern) culture would succeed.

POST-COLONIAL EDUCATION: THE DEBATE CONTINUES

Philippine post-colonial education is structurally similar to the American system of primary, secondary and tertiary schools - all three are manifested in public and private institutions. Primary education, consisting of grades one through six, is free and
compulsory. Secondary education consists of four years. Tuition is charged, making highschool either unavailable or attendance sporadic for many.

The colonial controversy vis ‘a vis the correct proportion of academic and technical/agricultural subjects still continues in the post-colonial era. This is now a three party debate. In addition to the vocationalists and generalists in educational and political circles, there are the parents of school age children.

Higher education is important to Filipino parents. They will save, borrow and mortgage land in order to send their children to highschool and/or college. A university education however does not guarantee one a job. The Philippines has a disproportionately large number of colleges for a nation so small and there is no dearth of bachelors level graduates. Fairly often these graduates cannot find work and return to their barangays (villages) as overeducated farmers - carrying degrees in psychology, business and even agriculture. (In 1985, only 11% of Philippine Agricultural University (PAU) agriculture graduates found jobs.\textsuperscript{8}) Though one might argue that certain degrees would be useful in maintaining the family farm, it must be remembered that there are not enough farms for the graduates to manage. (chptr 4)

Nor do all of the graduates wish to return to their villages where they will most likely be underemployed and/or underpaid. Returning to one’s barangay can also be socially problematic. Despite current rhetoric about the honorable position of the farmer, more status and prestige is granted a college graduate. Parents who have scrimped and saved for their children’s education are not always happy when they return to farming. The former had hoped their investment would bring the family both more money and more prestige. One extension agent for the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources commented that he wanted to return with his agricultural degree and improve his farm but that it was very difficult back home. His relatives and neighbors did not think it proper that he actually go into his field and work. As a college graduate, the most expected of him was to supervise others. He felt that a barrier had been erected between himself and his former neighbors.
Government officials, aid agencies and some academics are worried about the labor market becoming saturated with degree people and attempts have been made to funnel rural students into non-degree vocational and agricultural schools.

One such attempt was made at PAU in 1973 under a World Bank Loan. Rural youth were brought to the university to learn the latest agricultural techniques within the context of a terminal highschool curriculum i.e. they would not qualify to take national college entrance exams. It was hoped that they would return to their barangays and become local agricultural experts and development workers. In addition to coursework, they were expected to work in the university fields in order to gain hands on experience.

The program was unsuccessful in providing "indigenous" agricultural technicians who would return to their respective barangays and diffuse agricultural innovations. At the end of the course, parents demanded that it be expanded to enable the students to take the college entrance exams. Regarding the failure of many terminal vocational highschools, one university president wrote:

Let us not also forget that training the vocational program as a terminal course in the secondary level imminently (sic) goes against the psychological grain of the Filipino parents - they simply want their children to go through college at all costs. (Campos, 1985:3)

Development, Research and Education

Campos' words encapsulate the ideological rift between rural parents and rural planners in many Third World countries. Parents' desire to give their children advanced education is considered by some development scholars and planners to be inappropriate and has been cited as an expression of the elitism which is part of the colonial legacy (Braveboy-Wagner 1986; Clarke 1984). Both the Spanish and the Americans are cited as being responsible for the higher status which white collar jobs enjoy in relation to manual labor in the Philippines. The Spanish introduced "delicadeza," a sense of privilege, status and honorific titles (Andres, 1981). The
Americans are responsible for the meritocracy in which higher education serves as the means to rise socially and economically. A degree in the Philippines is more than a credential, it bestows honor and prestige on the bearer which has little to with the technical knowledge the degree represents. Professional degrees are used as honorific titles; an engineer is addressed as Engineer so and so rather than Mr. Likewise, a lawyer is always Lawyer or Counselor so and so; an architect is Architect so and so, etc. While farmers (and sometimes workers) are lauded as being the backbone of the Philippines," and farming is called an honorable profession, this is a rhetorical gesture and does not reflect the true status differential between manual labor and white collar labor.

A sense of urgency exists among those academics, aid agencies and government officials advocating applied technical training over generalized higher education. They see the people of the Third World slipping deeper into poverty at the same time that these countries are losing ground in the world economy generally. Rapid rural and industrial development is imperative and development centered education is therefore a priority (Gihring 1976; Thompson 1976; Raman 1977). They advocate: prudent technical borrowing; adaptation of technology from abroad to fit the national situation; encouraging students sent abroad for graduate work to focus on problems occurring in their own countries - both in the technical and social sciences (Raman 1977; Thompson 1976); supporting applied in-country research and appropriate technology (Alliband 1985). In short, education should be designed to fit the manpower needs of national development.

To those advocating the marriage of development and education, focusing on immediate needs is both practical and nationalistic. Practical, because the country cannot afford to waste precious resources on the luxuries of basic research, advanced science or theory construction and because the job market cannot absorb even the students now graduating from college. Nationalistic, because appropriate technology, also called indigenous technology, encourages a kind of native ingenuity which is unique to each country. Indigenous technology is viewed as a revival of traditional cultural forms and has become a symbol for nationalism. The attempt to reverse the
hierarchical relationship between mental and manual labor is also an attempt to value a pre-colonial agrarian heritage. Advocates of development centered education (and research) see it as being a people-centered approach based in existing human needs.

To those on the other side of the fence, this is a shortsighted view. The existence of a parallel system of vocational/technical and academic curricula sustains the core-periphery and class structures on the national level. Poor and rural youth are tracked into terminal agricultural and vocational courses while the urban middle and upper class youth receive quality secondary and tertiary education (Udagama 1980). They feel such an approach is also harmful for the country because the rural and poor are not included in the decision making process by virtue of their limited formal education. The elite becomes more firmly entrenched and interested in maintaining the status quo whereas a heterogeneous leadership might be more creative in its approach.

Research is a function of the educational system and the stress on applied education is paralleled by a stress on applied research. Scholars favoring a long term view of development claim that the exclusion of basic research (in all disciplines) keeps peripheral countries dependent on core countries for new information and technology. Neither the promotion of applied agricultural technology nor the adaptation of imported technology will enable Third World countries to compete in the world market. Nor is the latter strategy always successful - the list of failed adaptations is long (Colin 1981). Some view the lack of basic research as a major factor in the political and economic disparity between rich and poor nations (Posadas, 1982). At the same time, it prolongs the latter's intellectual dependence; their collective colonized mind (Constantino 1978; Enriquez 1977).

Filipino scientists talk about mission and vision oriented research. The former relates specifically to immediate developmental problems; the latter to long term goals. Currently, resources for research are poured into mission oriented activities such as agriculture and fisheries. Chemistry, math and physics are almost ignored. Graduates
in these disciplines routinely have to find jobs in related fields or abroad (Diliman Review 1980). Scholars lobbying to get a portion of research expenditures appropriated to vision oriented research claim the government is not forward looking, causing it to set research priorities in response to crisis. Energy research has been used as an example. In 1970, three universities in the Philippines tried to get government funding for research in energy and were denied. In 1973, when the energy crisis hit, there was a flurry of funding for research on energy and the government expected results very quickly. Another example critics of mission oriented research cite concerns the parasite schistosomiasis. Research has focused on projects with immediate returns such as pesticides and medical treatment rather than more basic topics such as parasite life cycle and disease carriers (Diliman Review 1980).

The social sciences are also differentially supported. Those disciplines directly related to development such as socio-economics, demography and communication are well funded. Research is packaged into projects and when one project is finished, another is begun - limiting a scholar's ability to sustain a long term research interest. The function of social science research in this context is to monitor the success/failure of specific development programs. There is a heavy reliance on quantitative and survey methods to the exclusion of more in-depth studies (Caolini, 1983; Ferrer, 1984). Much of what passes as research is the collection of benchmark data before a program begins and the program impact statements which are sent back to funding agencies. This was definitely true of NIA.

The ties between the government and social sciences are multi-stranded. In addition to participation in government sponsored research, social scientists have positions in national and local governments as administrators and advisors. They staff the government research and planning institutes such as the Development Academy and Philippine Center for Advanced Studies and government agencies such as the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Several cabinet level positions have been given to social scientists (Caolini 1983). The social scientist as technocrat institutionalizes the bond between research and national development and those individuals who are in the
position to offer alternative ways of conceiving the development process by virtue of their training are put into the position of perpetuating existing development models by virtue of their institutional positions.

The advocates of theory building see two problems with the tying of research and education to development needs. Firstly, the stress on applied research has been to the detriment of basic research and critical thinking and therefore borrowed, possibly inadequate models have been perpetuated. Development related social science research relies heavily on modernization models and on values studies generated in the 1960's (Caoili 1983). Secondly, critics trace the symbiotic relationship between research/education and development to funding agency guidelines. Funding agencies are in turn responding to the needs of the international economic community (Ferrer 1984; Posadas 1982).

Education and the World Economy

The role of education in the perpetuation of the international division of labor has been discussed at length elsewhere (Carnoy 1974). I briefly refer to it now because critics of development centered research and education use it to support their arguments that 1. intellectual division of labor and the economic division of labor are inextricably linked 2. those advocating the development centered approach have a mistaken notion of nationalism which has led them to set inappropriate priorities.

Taking the second point first: according to development oriented educators, there are two social groups which should receive terminal education: farmers and workers. Vocational education is designed to "take care of" those individuals who are not able to excel in the academic milieu and therefore are not able to find "good" jobs. It helps them find their appropriate niche in the economic order and at the same time it provides the workers needed to increase production for national development. Agricultural training is provided through rural development programs such as NIA and through various types of terminal agricultural institutes similar to the one initiated at
PAU. Farmer training introduces new technology while encouraging indigenous technology when appropriate. New technology is most likely to be developed at local universities and is based in the scientific method. Indigenous technology refers to traditional farming practices. The incorporation of both traditional and "scientific" methods allows the Filipino farmer to be "modern" without losing his "culture."

A more radical critique would point out that although indigenous technology is appropriate in some cases, it is not a substitute for economic independence. The encouraging of indigenous technology will not right the core-periphery imbalance. Those scholars critical of the focus on vocational and agricultural terminal education feel that at present, such a strategy is helping to sustain core-periphery divisions. Vocational education provides workers to be sent abroad and to work in multi-national industries. Agricultural training contributes towards increased food production, thereby freeing agricultural labor for the export sector.

International funding agencies have been accused of conspiring to keep peripheral countries peripheral by focusing on applied, relevant research and terminal, vocational education to the detriment of basic research and advanced education. According to this scenario, national development policies are linked to the prescriptions of international funding agencies. The funding agencies are in turn the lackeys of big business.

Regarding vocational education:

At present, the administration is focusing most of its educational efforts at providing technically trained manpower to man the labor intensive but low technology machineries of big manufacturing firms. In turn, international lending institutions such as the United States Assistance in Developing Countries (USAID), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank and foundations like the Ford and Rockefeller, are pouring in large sums of loans to finance educational programs geared towards vocational and technical training. (Ferrer 1984:2)

Regarding the stress on mission oriented research:

While it cannot be denied that this new development strategy, if carried out properly, can help alleviate some of the worst conditions of underdevelopment, it must be realized at the same time that this is essentially a scheme to keep Third World countries trapped at the poor end of the international division of labor. For it is
designed to divert the national development efforts of Third World countries from the knowledge-intensive or capital-intensive technologies, which form the basis of genuine industrialization, to the labor-intensive, low-level, obsolete technologies, which perpetuate technological inferiority and dependence. (Posadas, 1982:38)

The businesses which Posadas and Ferrer refer to are controlled by First World corporations. Therefore, they consider an educational system which prepares students for positions in these organizations as ultimately helping the core countries maintain their economic hegemony.

Aid for education includes funds for curricular design, textbooks, buildings, equipment and scholarships. Though specific project goals may be the product of the recipient, they must be in line with the developmental vision of the donor.\(^\text{11}\)

The World Bank, for example, has questioned the utility of widespread tertiary education, citing the poor job market as its reason (World Bank 1986). A related concern is that the corollary of a large university educated public would be a dearth of technicians and others willing to engage in manual labor. The Bank has recently advocated a return to basics in primary education and the inclusion of more vocational subjects in secondary schools. This curriculum, ostensibly designed for the humanitarian purpose of spreading literacy through its back to basics approach, is in reality, according to World Bank critics, training workers for the import-export market by equipping students with enough math and English to operate industrial machinery. They view the stress on vocational training as being to the detriment of existing academic programs. Increasing amounts of funds are being used to purchase vocational equipment while textbooks are shared among several students and labs are not equipped (Ferrer 1984).

While critics of the education for development approach concede that it has alleviated some of the country’s most pressing problems, they assert that it is a stop gap measure at best and at worst it inhibits true development. They also believe that it is a way of controlling the Third World by continuously reinforcing economic and
intellectual dependence. They feel economic dependence perpetuates intellectual
dependence because scarce resources are not allocated to those activities which foster
creativity and critical thought i.e. general education and basic research. Resources are
instead used for more "practical" purposes - food, shelter, water, jobs. Intellectual
dependence in turn sustains economic dependence because attention is shifted away
from the true source of continued under-development (economic dependence) and
directed toward more peripheral problems through the education for development
agenda.

**Intellectual Passivity**

The new dependency theorists feel the existing economic order depends upon an
intellectually passive workforce. But it is not only the "uneducated" which are passive.
Some Filipino academics are worried about what they perceive to be an intellectual
malaise in their students and in younger faculty. They complain that students are grade
conscious and job oriented instead of intellectually curious (Feria, 1982). According
to one senior faculty at a prestigious Manila university, students are overly docile in the
classroom. They remain quiet about even the most controversial of subjects - listening
attentively and scribbling down key words.

The newest cliche thrown at him is Education for National Development, which he
is too immature to see in context but which makes profit-oriented sense to his
parents. He wants to get the whole general education stage over with as fast as pos-
sible down to the last borrowed term paper and true-false test so that he can get on
with the true business of National Development, which for him coincides with being
accepted in a graduate professional school like the Institute of Tourism or the School
of Economics. A correspondence course would do just as well, but it won't get him
a job as a junior executive. (Feria 1982:4)

In the above scenario, students have accepted the liberal view that national
development and individual economic well being are related and that school is the
means to accomplish them both. A person's ability to think critically is not part of the
equation. Creativity and critical thought have been sacrificed in the race to "catch up";
in the pursuance of a higher GNP and in the drive to provide basic human needs to all
Filipinos.
According to a dean at a major provincial university, the same attitudes can be seen in some faculty members. They are reluctant to engage in non-honoraria bearing research projects. Of her faculty of 65, only 5 were conducting research. Research did not figure into the advancement scheme of the university and so most were apathetic towards it. She also bemoaned the shallow, misleading social research which relied heavily on survey methods and which came up with the same prosaic "insights" time after time. The gathering of "benchmark data" (demographics) and program evaluations were often funded as research projects. Research was "packaged," tied to specific development projects and no attempt was made to continue on one’s own when funding ended. Instead, a new research thrust might accompany a new development project.

Research at PAU was often assigned and sometimes was not within the area of expertise of the principal investigator. A common paractice in one department was for the graduate students to complete their thesis research before reviewing the related literature. The literature search was not understood to be a part of the process of learning, but rather functioned to make up a bibliography, which was understood as being necessary to a thesis. Graduate research was also often assigned - breaking up the unity between interest and research. As one university administrator commented, the thesis was an end in itself, necessary for a better position and to fulfill funding agency requirements for personnel.

Likewise, area of expertise/interest was not the most important criteria when choosing junior faculty to send abroad for graduate study. Development needs determined future research thrusts and the needs of upcoming research projects in turn determined what type of expertise was needed. A slot would open for a Ph.D. in genetics, for example. Instead of choosing the faculty member with the Masters in genetics or one with an interest in the subject, the most senior Master level faculty would be sponsored for further study. S/he could have been a nutritionist but would become a geneticist. Individual intellectual interest must give way to development needs.
I am not suggesting that this is a necessarily inappropriate way to choose researchers; only that it does not foster intellectual curiosity, but instead selects for institutional loyalty. The latter is important in keeping researchers in the universities because a better salary awaits them as consultants or as administrators.

This seeming intellectual malaise has been attributed to several factors. Unquestioned submission to authority is a legacy left by both the Spanish and the Americans (Manalang 1982; Constantino 1978). The Spanish taught submission to God and to them, as God's representatives on earth. The Americans instilled a respect for rationalism and science. The institution of a meritocracy gave rise the reign of "experts" who were empowered to make decisions for all.

Concomitant to the institution of a meritocracy is credentialism. Grading systems, admissions tests and licensing exams encourage rote learning and memorization instead of creative thinking and critical analysis (Klitgaard 1986).

The declaration of Martial Law in 1972 also contributed to the reluctance to criticise. Radical students were expelled from the universities (Feria 1982) and social research was allowed only if it was not openly critical of the government. The latter move led to self-censorship on the part of many academics (Makil & Hunt, 1981).

All of these factors come together under the rubric of development. The education for development agenda has been accused (by intellectuals advocating independent development) of encouraging uncritical adoption of development models in an effort to quickly catch up with the First World. On the other hand, the development for education advocates would claim that the urgency of underdevelopment calls for swift action. I emphasise these last two words. They feel that development must happen as soon as possible, therefore, there is not time for contemplative theory building. Development must be action oriented: researchers belong in the field with the people. Research becomes redefined to include surveys and evaluations which are, under less urgent circumstances, considered to be inherent in
the development process itself, not part of the process of building knowledge.

While I was in the field, I was not aware of the debates concerning indigenization of theory and culturally relevant models. It was my experience in the villages (chptrs. 3 & 4) which led me to think in those terms. I do not, therefore, know how the NIA staff perceived these arguments. We did, however, talk about academics and intellectuals who were critical of the way that the Philippines was developing but who were not actively involved in the process. The NIA staff were not very complimentary about this type of critical approach. The project director would often repeat the phrase "If you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem" when discussing people who she felt were too "ivory tower" in their critiques and who confined their development ideas to paper.

The divisions among the academic community about education reflect the divisions within that community about development. At present, those involved in rural development at the village level are not communicating with those academics who critique their efforts. They are, however, aware of each other. The Manila professor lamenting the lack of creative thinking and the students' affinity for rote learning was talking (categorically) about the NIA director who was trying to introduce that kind of learning in the villages. Likewise, when the NIA director complained about academics in Manila who were not involved on a day to day basis in development, she was categorically referring to this Manila professor who had critiqued several projects. Where would a dialogue between the two groups begin? I think it would most likely be in the universities. Those academics and developers working in the villages have access to the ethnographic material which would enable them to construct culturally relevant models. They need, however, to be encouraged to do so. This means that some time needs to be taken for creative contemplation. The sense of urgency that is instilled in student developers needs to be modified and the expediency of lifting borrowed models intact needs to give way to a more critical analysis of these models and an ethnographic sensitivity.
Notes

1. During much of the Spanish colonial period the term "Filipino" referred to those of Spanish descent born in the islands. Therefore, when talking of the Spanish colonial period I refer to those peoples living on the islands when the Spanish came.

2. The Philippines at the time of the American takeover has been called semi-feudal.

3. Dean Worcester and David Barrows are examples.

4. Here I refer to the alternating of industrial arts curricula with academic curricula.

5. Jose Rizal was chosen by the Americans as the national hero of the Philippines (Constantino, 1978). He was an intellectual and author who was critical of Spanish rule. He did not, however, advocate armed rebellion.

6. Andres Bonafacio was a revolutionary who fought against the Spanish but continued fighting after the American "liberation" of the Philippines.

7. The pouring of resources into tertiary education was a strategy for industrialization and to form an educated native political hierarchy.

8. Interview with Director of External Affairs at PAU.

9. Those advocating terminal education see parental preoccupation with higher education as irrational. Despite the fact that good paying jobs are scarce in rural areas, parental concern with higher education is rational in a system where a college education is necessary for professional jobs.

10. The definition of what constitutes "basic" research varies. An administrator of a national level agricultural research coordinating board used the identification of different fish strains as an example. In the U.S., this would clearly fall under the rubric of applied research. There were several other instances in which a researcher involved in rural development would identify as basic research a project which U.S. researcher would call applied. Those not directly involved in development projects seem to take a broader view. See Posadas, 1982.

11. Some donors exercise more control over the day to day functions of the project than others. The World Bank for example lets recipients choose their consultants from a list compiled by the Bank. FAO designates which consultants go where.
Chapter Three

"EVERY SAINT HAS HIS MIRACLE": AN INTEGRATED APPROACH IN THE PHILIPPINES

RURAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Rural development has been on the Philippine government’s agenda since the 1950’s. Both government and private agencies have been involved in this process with the financial and technical support of international aid organizations. The earliest attempts were designed to upgrade all aspects of rural life: agriculture, health, education, income etc. These community development programs were characterized by: elaborate organizational structures designed to coordinate various governmental and non-governmental development agencies; emphasis on peasant education through literacy campaigns, farmer training schools and leadership training; use of local leaders and multi-purpose village workers; attempts to include village people in planning and implementation of projects; emphasis on self-help and mobilization of community resources.

Abueva (1959) speaks of two types of involvement of government agencies at this time. First, existing government agencies such as the Bureau of Public Schools, Bureau of Agricultural Extension and the Social Welfare Administration expanded their services and became involved in community organization work. The second type of organization came under the auspices of the military. The expressed purpose of the community development efforts of these agencies was the rehabilitation of Huk rebels through resettlement farms.
Private organizations involved in community development in the 1950's and 1960's shared the government's desire to "stem the tide of communism" by improving living conditions in potential hot spots. The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement was introduced to the Philippines by Dr. James Yen, who began the seminal project in China but who fled his country after the communists gained power. He believed the peasantry to be basically non-political but open to communism if their living conditions were poor.

A similar strategy had been used by the United States during the U.S.-Philippine War at the turn of the century. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the first American style schools in the Philippines were run by U.S. soldiers in a public relations move designed to demonstrate U.S. goodwill.

The 1960's witnessed the beginnings of a change in approach toward rural development. The production oriented "Green Revolution" was partially a response to the failures of the community development approach. Referring to this change in strategy Ruttan (1976) says of community development programs:

They had been based on the assumption that the mobilization and development of community resources - human and physical - motivated by the multi-purpose village worker and supplemented by credit and limited grants of materials would lead to the modernization of rural society. The community development programs of the 1950's were least successful in efforts designed to expand the economic base needed to support rural development, efforts to introduce changes in farming practices that were capable of increasing agricultural productivity, or to generate employment and income through expansion of village industries. (Ruttan, 1976:9)

At the same time that rural areas were being developed in a small scale fashion through community development projects, urban areas were experiencing a rapid growth based on commerce, services and manufacturing. Farms had been destroyed during WWII and there was increased out-migration from the rural areas to the cities. The problem of food shortages was exacerbated by the consigning of prime agricultural land to cash crops. Increased production of food crops was therefore imperative. In the mid 1960's, the Philippine government began promoting High Yielding Varieties (HYV's) of rice and corn.
The HYV's were introduced through what is called a technological package (tech pack for short) which included inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides as well as infrastructure - irrigation, marketing and credit. Tech packs have been designed for other agricultural introductions such as pigs, cattle etc. Because the cluster of "innovations" introduced are all related to one primary commodity, this type of extension has been called "commodity oriented." Innovations are introduced to rural areas through short visits, radio programs and literature. Developers do not live in the villages, nor do they endeavor to restructure social forms. Attention is given to technology and the relationship between technology and socio-cultural factors is only minimally addressed. The term "commodity oriented," therefore, has been used in a pejorative manner by social scientists who criticize it for its reductionist approach.

According to Ruttan (1976) commodity oriented approaches were a reaction to the community development strategies which were perceived by technical experts to be all organization and no substance. Today we have come full circle as criticisms of the commodity oriented approach have sparked a new interest in community development strategies. As sometimes happens, an old idea arrives under a new name. In the 1970's, "integrated rural development" replaced community development as the "people oriented" approach. Though commodity oriented models have not totally disappeared, integration is the current favorite son of rural developers and is being promoted by bilateral aid organizations, the United Nations, volunteer organizations and Third World governments.

"Integration" is manifested in several ways. On the institutional level, various agencies involved in rural development work together on a common focus such as improved nutrition or better health. Agency activities are coordinated through the formation of an umbrella organization charged with ensuring that each agency fulfills its obligations and that no overlap occurs in services. This aspect of integration is sometimes called "complementation." Integration also occurs vertically because local programs are designed to conform to regional and national mandates. Because a high level of communication and coordination is necessary in integrated approaches, they
are site specific. An area which ranges from a village to a region in size is targeted to "receive" a program. Various projects such as irrigation, introduction of new crops and infant health care are coordinated within the target area. Integrated rural development has also been called integrated area development for this reason.

When I went to the Philippines in 1985, I was not familiar with the distinction which developers make between commodity oriented and (what is now called) integrated approaches although the anthropological literature offers many examples of the relationship between project failure and the elision of socio-cultural factors. My initial plan called for the study of an extension project conducted by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. The Bureau's station was on the land of the Philippine Agricultural University (PAU). Because I would be living on campus for the first part of the study, I was told that it would be politic to pay a courtesy call to the Director of Research and Development at PAU before engaging in any research of my own. She channeled me to her second in command, Maria Gomez, who was the Director of the Technology Dissemination Department - the extension arm of the university. The latter was very hospitable and took me on several trips to the pilot areas of the integrated development project in which she was in charge, the Nutrition Integrated Approach (NIA).

I was intrigued by a program run by social scientists (her degree was in development communication) instead of by biologists, engineers or agricultural specialists. It was apparent the very first visit to NIA's "model municipality" that a lot of social science was being disseminated along with the usual technology. Several village leaders had quite a command of development jargon which they sprinkled in with their Taglish (code switching between English and Tagalog) while explaining the project to me.

The enthusiasm of Dr. Gomez and the municipal leaders combined with the nature of the project led me to alter my original plan and study an integrated program - an approach which I was told was "a social innovation."
Integrated approaches are intrusive. Under the rubric of "guided social change" they channel the participation of program recipients in ways commodity oriented approaches do not. The way NIA controlled the participatory process is the subject of the next two chapters. NIA tried to exercise control over both the villagers and other (non-NIA) developers, especially those of PAU. This control was both structural - it tried to limit interactions between villagers and other developers, thus channelling all introductions through NIA, and cultural - it endeavored to socially reconstruct the villagers and form them into modern men and women.

This chapter will discuss the program in the context of the university. I give a fairly detailed account of NIA's inception and the university politics that surround it because I contend that the tight reign the NIA director kept on the program's implementation in the village (the subject of the next chapter) arose both from her ideas of appropriate guided social change (her interpretation of the concept of integration) and her need to protect her position within the university.

**NIA: THE BEGINNING**

The Nutrition Integrated Approach (NIA) was launched in 1978 by Island University, the Philippines' premier agricultural school, under the name of Improvement of Barangay (village) Nutrition Program. This program was piloted in five municipalities covered by the university's extension mandate. Though nutrition is considered to be the salient parameter with which to assess a given population's development, the Improvement of Barangay Nutrition Program addresses all aspects of barangay social and economic well-being and by so doing, is considered an "integrated social approach" (NIA Handout, 1985).

In 1980, the Southeast Asian Bureau of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) held a meeting of its constituent countries on the need to integrate nutrition "concepts" into agricultural curricula. The meeting was part of UNESCO's move
towards integrated, participatory approaches. Participants of that meeting were given two tasks: 1. to develop an agriculture curriculum which included nutrition "concepts" and 2. to design an "action" (extension) component to supplement the new curriculum. The delegates had to bring with them ideas of how this could be implemented in their own countries so the Island University representative used the Improvement of Barangay Nutrition Program as an example of a program which used nutrition as the focus of development. In addition to the task of integrating nutrition and agriculture programs in their own universities, the participants were urged to disseminate what they learned at the FAO seminar to other agricultural universities in their countries.

In 1984 Island University held a symposium on the integration of nutrition and agriculture for five public agricultural universities. Each was to send a delegation consisting of a rural sociologist, an agricultural economist, a nutritionist and a development communications expert. The senior "development communicator" from Philippine Agricultural University (PAU), the university which is responsible for the geographical area in which this study takes place, was not able to attend and sent her second in command instead. (This greatly affected the implementation of the program as will be discussed later.)

Somewhere along the way, no one could provide me with an exact date, the name was changed to the Nutrition Integrated Approach (NIA). It will be referred to as such from now on.

PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY AND NIA

The four representatives of PAU to the meeting hosted by Island University were drawn from different disciplines and different colleges within the university. Three of these held strictly academic positions. The fourth, the development communicator,
(Dr. Gomez, assistant to the senior development communicator who could not attend) was assigned to the Technology Dissemination Department which is the extension arm of the university. After the Island University seminar and before the implementation of NIA at Philippine Agricultural University (PAU), the director of the Technology Dissemination Department left the university and was replaced by her assistant, Dr. Gomez. The latter was given the task of implementing NIA. Another member of the team was charged with the integration of nutrition and agriculture courses. They were to work together in soliciting other university personnel, both academic and extension, to aid with the program. For example, one department which did not get the opportunity to send a representative to the Island University meeting was the Rural Development Department. This department was charged with conducting research on conditions in the countryside, development strategies and technology packages and their findings were to be channeled to the Technology Dissemination Department for use in NIA. Students studying extension methods, rural sociology and rural development would use NIA project sites as field sites and research projects. NIA, therefore, was to be the coordinator of all of PAU's extension. This meant that all of the university's outreach programs would be under the auspices of NIA and considered as a part of that program's efforts.

NIA's takeover of all of PAU's development activities was troubled on two related fronts. One, not everyone agreed that NIA offered the right kind of method for guided social change and two, some felt it potentially threatened their own projects and favored development methods. In order to understand the controversy NIA caused at PAU, it is necessary to briefly discuss the NIA strategy and where it fit in the range of extension activities at the university.

PAU was responsible for extending extension services to 13 municipalities which fell within its 35 km range. It was not located in a remote area and personnel from virtually all of the national bureaus responsible for extension were available to PAU's "client farmers." Extension for PAU then, was a matter of field testing new technology on the surrounding farms and of providing field experience to PAU's extension
students. The director of Research and Development was well known in Southeast Asia as a developer and was constantly trying to attract international projects to PAU. FAO was working with PAU and Island University on a carabao breeding project. Kansas State University, under the auspices of AID, had built a food processing plant on the campus for the surrounding municipalities to process their vegetables. The Fisheries Department had an ongoing research project with the International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management. All of these projects were commodity oriented but entailed some extension component. PAU personnel would carry out the extension function, sometimes alone and sometimes in conjunction with the personnel from the international agency.

In addition to these internationally funded programs, PAU carried out small scale research and extension. Though the Technology Dissemination Department was theoretically the extension arm of the university, other extension related departments were also involved in extension either through the training of students, the testing of new technologies in the field or the testing of new extension methods in the field.

PAU had developed several technological packages and was involved in commodity oriented extension in the fielding of these innovations. New seed strains, methods for fertilization, agricultural and aquacultural methods were disseminated through farmer tours and training sessions at the university and through the efforts of various department personnel when they went to the field with their students.

Another approach which PAU had tried was the social laboratory, introduced to the Philippines by Dr. Yen and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement. The name was a double entendre. The village was a laboratory in that projects were tested there. It was a social laboratory in that the experiment involved either altering existing or creating new social forms connected with development. An example would be the institution of cooperatives in an area with no previous history of that kind of venture. Research/extension agents lived in the villages for extended periods of time with the idea of initiating projects and then training the villagers to take them over. PAU had
initiated social labs in at least two of the surrounding barangays a few years before I arrived there. Both were now defunct, the projects failing when the agents left. The NIA director, Dr. Gomez, was skeptical about the efficacy of other programs at PAU. The tech packs and the FAO project were "too commodity oriented" and the social lab was not participatory because it did not involve "indigenous workers" (trained villagers who acted as extension agents). She considered NIA to be "a social innovation" (NIA Handout, 1985). It was unclear to me as to exactly where the innovation lay. Dr. Gomez claimed it was in its attention to culture and its involvement of the entire village. But all integrated approaches pay attention to the socio-cultural aspects of development and try to involve the entire village in development. Perhaps the real way in which NIA was different was in its intensity: 1. it incorporated the entire local political structure into the NIA structure and 2. it stressed social science training of village leaders over actual income generating projects.

Though it is common to involve some political leaders in projects, NIA was unique in its incorporation of the entire structure so before discussing the NIA hierarchy in the villages, it is necessary to outline that structure.

The rural Philippines is composed of municipalities. Each has a mayor and council as well as a constabulary. The municipalities resemble U.S. counties in that their boundaries butt up against each other, leaving no land outside of some municipality. Each is broken up into barangays or villages having a body of elected officials which report to the mayor. Government agencies concerned with development (usually referred to as line agencies) such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health have extension agents assigned to the municipalities.

In the NIA structure, (Figure 1) the mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council members) compose the Management Team along with the Municipal Treasurer, Heads of Line Agencies and the Municipal Action Officer. (The Ministry of Agriculture gives this title to its chief executive in each municipality). The Supervisory Team is composed of line agency technicians. Next comes the Program
Figure 1. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN/AMONG NIA PROGRAM COMPONENTS
Planning and Implementing Committee which is the barangay level planning body and is made up of the barangay captain (the top elected official) and other elected barangay officials along with local unofficial leaders. This body guides the Barangay Nutrition Scholar-Development Worker (BNS-DW). The BNS-DW is appointed by the barangay captain as "an indigenous change agent" - i.e. a local extension worker. The person must be literate, over seventeen and be a recognized "opinion leader." In one barangay I lived in, it was a teacher; in the other a housewife. Mostly, the BNS-DWs were farmers. It is this appropriation of virtually all elected and appointed officials into the NIA organization which sets NIA apart in its use of local elites.

Training of these indigenous developers was a crucial aspect in reshaping village life and will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. Each level of "change agent," from the BNS-DW to the heads of the Management Teams received training in modernization theory, communication, management and planning. The training component of NIA was considered to be the core ingredient to its success as it was this aspect which transformed traditional politicians into development leaders.

**Problems at PAU**

Immediately following the return of the PAU delegates from Island University's training program, dissension arose over who would lead the interdisciplinary team responsible for the institutionalisation of the new program. The development communicator from the extension arm of the university was junior to the rural sociologist who had no extension duties. Being a full professor and a dean, the latter felt he was the natural candidate for the position. Due to her role as head of the Technology Dissemination Department, the development communicator felt she was the most logical choice. Compounding this confusion was the head of the Rural Development Department who had not been sent to the meeting at Island U and who perceived the new program as a potential threat to her position as provider of the "basic" research on which university extension programs were based.
Four factors come into play in the political infighting and jockeying for position which accompanied the inception of NIA at PAU: money, access to the office of the university president and career goals. The fourth, theoretical differences, was both a "real issue" and provided an acceptable arena for discussing the other three.

Academic salaries are incredibly low in the Philippines and with the economic recession of the past few years getting worse. Academics find themselves sliding downward, out of the middle class. Most professors at PAU were forced to have "sidelines" in order to make ends meet. There was, however, one way to increase one's salary without having to leave the academic framework - research.

Teaching loads are very heavy in most universities and it is not uncommon for a normal semester load to consist of five courses. Though it is preferred that one engage in research, it is viewed as an "extra" in that there are special rewards for being an active researcher. Prestige, of course, is one. The other is honoraria. A stipend commensurate with one's position vis a vis the research project is given to the investigators. I do not mean to suggest that Filipino academics engage in research for the honoraria. It does, however, give academics extra income which affords them the time to conduct research by freeing them from the need to engage in sidelines. One way of surviving as an academic is to be involved with as many honoraria-bearing projects as possible.

Another aspect of PAU which needs to be explained is how research projects are generated. Projects are born in one of three ways:

1. They are assigned to the university by the national coordinating research board for agriculture and the university level Director of Research and Development parcels them out.

2. An individual researcher comes up with a project and gets it approved for funding with the national board. These projects however can be assigned to some one else by the Director of Research and Development after they are approved.
3. The Director of Research and Development designs them and assigns researchers to them.

The power of the Director of Research and Development was wide ranging. She was in charge of the Research and Development Department and as such was ultimately responsible for the extension arm of the university and contacts with national and international development agencies. In addition, she was the university president's wife. It was rumored that the "good" projects went to her favorites whether or not a certain project was in their area of expertise.

The Director of Research and Development at PAU was Dr. Gomez' direct supervisor and the latter was somewhat devoted to her. When Dr. Gomez was given the role of principal investigator/director of NIA, it was widely assumed to be due to her close relationship with the Director of Research and Development as much as to her institutional position. Indeed, the president's office did intervene on her behalf by running interference with the rural sociologist who was the senior member of the team sent to Island University.

NIA received university wide publicity. As the university's newest development approach, many thought that it was well funded and knowing the Director of Research and Development's history of assigning projects to favorites, they felt unfairly excluded. Dr. Gomez knew this and explained it variously as: jealousy, because those not directly involved with NIA thought they were missing honoraria; and as a misunderstanding both of program goals and of the entire university's role in the program. Just as NIA served as the umbrella organization in the villages for development; it served as the umbrella for all extension related activities of PAU. Therefore, any development efforts at PAU automatically fell under the NIA rubric. This seemed natural to the NIA director because she was also in charge of extension but it did not seem natural to her colleagues who viewed it as the expropriation of their work.

Department heads of development related disciplines and their faculty voiced their feelings of alienation from NIA. Most often their dissatisfaction was couched in theoretical terms peppered with an occasional aside about the over-zealous
development communicator and her political position within the university. Here, career goals and theoretical training reflect upon each other.

Development theory is made concrete through programs. An innovative, successful program brings rewards to its creator in the form of good students, travel stipends, grants, prestige and the satisfaction of feeling one has contributed something real towards nation building. According to the head of the Rural Development Department, the need to make a unique contribution to one's field fosters the illusion that new development models are constantly being created. When discussing the different approaches, she said that "Every saint has his miracle." She personally felt that NIA was a rehash of the social laboratory and, like the social lab, would not be self-sustaining when the university pulled out.

Criticisms of NIA therefore, reflected disagreement with the "innovations" in NIA as well as the perception that one's own theoretical contribution was being undermined. Such reservations were expressed in the interviews with PAU development specialists not directly involved with NIA.

The past director of the Technology Dissemination Department (who left to take a position with a national agency) was concerned that NIA was taking the university too far in the direction of pure extension and away from its use of extension as a theatre for training and research. In her view, part of the problem lay in the NIA director's total identification with the project which she approached with missionary zeal. The past director felt that the current director was using NIA to prove herself in her new position. She also expressed disappointment that her own contribution to the department (the connection with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture) had been forgotten. The current "in" program relied on her previous work but that debt was not often openly recognized.

The NIA director did succeed in getting aid from teachers and researchers in other departments. This was most often in the form of helping to provide training to the "indigenous leaders" who were eventually to take over the program. At first people
complied fairly willingly. But after it became evident that there would be a lot of
trainings and that many of them were in the barangays instead of at the university,
people began to complain about the investment (in time) they were being asked to
make. The Director of Rural Development was especially vocal about the compulsory
(a directive from the President's office) use of her people and while the NIA director
was out of the country, successfully lobbied to get her staff relieved from some of the
NIA trainings. The argument used was that NIA had become too involved in the
extension aspects of the program by focusing on the training of indigenous leaders. She
pointed out that according to university mandate, extension projects were only the
medium through which research and training of students took place.

In general, there seemed to be a reticence among the staff of other departments
to be identified with the NIA program. Individuals whom the NIA director had claimed
as being of great importance to the program demurred when interviewed. Many said
they did not really know very much about NIA. Most said they were only "resource
speakers" at the training sessions and played no real part. In addition to this confusion
about who was "in" the program and who was not, the division of labor which was agreed
upon in the program guidelines was muddied. Theoretically, all extension related
research and training would be done in conjunction with NIA. The research component
of NIA was small and ideally other departments, especially the department of Rural
Development, would feed NIA research information. Theoretical differences,
personalities and politics interfered with the sharing of information. When asked how
much she relied on the department of Rural Development for basic research, the
director of NIA stated that she had found it best to work separately. In fact, she
intervened when the Director of Rural Development sent a proposal to the national
council to evaluate NIA. According to Dr. Gomez, it was best if her own staff do
research related to NIA because only they "understood" the program.

Though this type of attitude seems pretty self-serving in that it simultaneously
provides more research money and protects the program from outside criticism, the
director was not being consciously cynical. She believed that one needed to have a
certain theoretical background to really appreciate the innovative features and strengths of NIA. Her constant refrain that it was only those people who did not understand the program did not like it was based on this idea.

NIA AND OTHER DEVELOPERS

During my stay at PAU, there were several instances in which Dr. Gomez tried to intervene or appropriate the projects of other developers. Despite the NIA stated position as development umbrella for PAU and for the pilot villages, the director had a difficult time riding herd on all extension related activities. Some of these had been in place before NIA and just kept operating without going through her; sometimes because they did not know they were supposed to; other times because they did not like being appropriated; and others, like the FAO insemination project housed at PAU, had its own agenda and extension expert who disagreed with methods used by NIA. One point on which the FAO manager was quite antagonistic towards NIA was the latter's insistence that insemination begin first in NIA pilot areas. Had all of PAU's efforts been directed towards the 7 pilot barangays, perhaps a 100 villages would have received no attention at all from the university.

Another agency which was not institutionally linked to PAU but which worked closely with it was the Bureau of Fisheries. Here again, Dr. Gomez wanted to control visits of the agents and flow of inputs to the pilot areas.

The attempt to control development activities in NIA areas extended to private agencies. A visit by the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement to Marquez was a cause for concern and the director informed them that they should have gone by the university and checked in with her before proceeding to the village.

These attempts to coopt/control other's work arose, in part, from the NIA director's insecurity as a newly minted PH.D. (her degree was about a year old) and
her new position as head of Technology Development and Dissemination at PAU. She would discuss with me her feelings of insecurity when crises arose in the program: "had she handled this correctly? What did I think of the project?" etc. They also arose as a bi-product of the building process. In order to create model villages, Dr. Gomez felt she needed to make sure that other, less appropriate, less proven methods did not muddy up the development process as she saw it.

The comment that "every saint has his miracle" is appropriate. There are many kinds of modernization miracles, but for each developer, there is only one - the one s/he uses.

THE NIA DIRECTOR

Dr. Maria Gomez had a Ph.D. in development communication from a top level Philippine agricultural university. Coming from a poor family, she described her childhood as insecure and unhappy. She often commented that she considered herself very fortunate to be able to attend college because it was through higher education that she was able to develop as an individual as well as to better her standard of living. Getting a higher education, however, was difficult. Her husband, a career army officer, was assigned to a distant province and she had to leave her children with caretakers at PAU while she got her degree at Island University, about a six hour bus ride away. She told me that it was her resolve to help the poor that gave her the strength during this difficult time.

Her unhappy background gave her an emotional energy and intensity which was manifested in her sense of urgency about the need to improve conditions in the countryside. About half way into my study of NIA, the people in Marquez began to call her "Dr. Urgent" because many of her communications to the mayor there were labeled as such and required immediate action or reply. One time, she interrupted the mayor in a meeting to request his presence at an NIA training. He left immediately to lecture on the benefits of the program to out of town developers.
The director had a complex relationship with the people she was trying to help. Though she felt herself to be "one of the common tao" (the masses), she realized that her education and status had somehow alienated her from them. She was accorded a great measure of respect and had become a sort of patron, bringing education which would hopefully become the tool with which they could improve their lives. They would be transformed as a class (through economic gains) and individually. The mayor of Marquez' educational and social transformation (which will be discussed in the next chapter) was proof of the latter.

Dr. Gomez' commitment was evidenced in two ways. One, she worked long, hard hours spending a lot of time in the barangays. Second, she became emotionally attached to the villagers both as an underclass (the people of her roots) and as individuals, becoming involved in their personal lives. Program and personal problems became intertwined.

One example: the mayor of Marquez' wife and son were not pro-NIA. It was well known that this was the source of family arguments which caused the NIA director a lot of pain. She was concerned about the possible negative consequences for the program in Marquez but also about the personal conflict that it presented for the mayor. She told me she spent many sleepless nights and had shed countless tears over the situation.

The fond feelings the director felt for the tao were reciprocated by them. When she left for a three week training abroad, the people in Marquez gave her a despedida (a going away party). Perhaps more telling is the fact that when problems arose with the project, no one that I spoke to felt the fault lay with the director.

As we have seen in the description of NIA at PAU, Dr. Gomez' sense of urgency, zeal and sincerity were not universally lauded by her colleagues. Many of them felt her sense of urgency (that NIA came first) interfered with their own projects and that her zeal was a sign of her naivete. The most cynical questioned her sincerity, pointing to
her position as a new Ph.D. and the new TDD director and her consequent need to prove herself through NIA.

Though integrated approaches are designed to control the development process by means of one guiding body, the paternalistic attitude the NIA director had towards the project and its recipients contributed to an intensification of control over project sites. The attempt to regulate every interaction between developers and farmers stifled initiative in project areas and slowed the development process instead of fostering local level initiative (see chptr. 4) and giving the villagers a range of project opportunities, as could have been offered by free access to all PAU developers.

Notes

1. The Huk rebellion occurred right after WWII. The Huks began as an anti-Japanese fighting force during the war and evolved into an organization for peasant rights. They were not recognized by the returning U.S. forces, continued to fight for peasant rights and were branded as communist.

2. One faculty member raised chickens; another was a middleman for rice; another sold clothes. Sidelines were a controversial endeavor and were not universally approved because they took time away from academic pursuits.

3. These theoretical innovations were really "variations on a theme" and were reconstructions of commodity and integrated approaches.

4. The Department of Rural Development designed the "tech packs", conducted demographic and economic surveys. An example of the latter concerned the use of usurers in the villages. NIA staff also engaged in research projects on extension but virtually all of these related to NIA and served as "benchmark data" or as evaluation tools.
Chapter Four

GUIDED SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PHILIPPINES: MODERNIZATION AND CONTROL

Grace Goodell, (1986) in her study of Iranian development under Muhammad Reza Shah, demonstrates how modern centralized development projects are designed, inadvertently or not, to control their recipients in destructive ways. Though she acknowledges that developers are not necessarily power hungry elites, cynically crushing peasant lifestyles and livelihoods, development is still largely based on theories of social change which pit traditionalism against modernization.

"Social Scientists like Gunnar Myrdal (1968, p. 52-53, 60-64) have long argued that to liberate the factors of production for their most rational allocation - to disembed labor, integrate markets that are segmentary, remove "blockages," and so forth - and to weld together a "nation" obedient to the State's plan, first these stubborn structures of society must be atomized." (Goodell, 1986:8)

Alternative modernization models exist in the anthropological and sociological literature. Both liberation theology and the Katipuneros (see chptr 1) provide examples in the Philippines of how traditional forms can provide a vehicle for social change. NIA staff, however, used the preservation of traditional forms as nationalist rhetoric but did not see them as vehicles for social change. In their inspirational speeches on development, they would cite Filipino traits, such as bayanihan (working together), as examples of Filipino virtues which could aid the modernization process and would talk about keeping Filipino traditions (in general) alive. But these social forms were not tapped when planning projects. The NIA organizational structure displaced them.
In his discussion of Goodell’s study, Fischer describes what he has termed "the oriental despotism paradox": there is a "contradiction between wanting to direct social change from the top in order to speed it and knowing that eventually self-sustained growth depends on local initiative" (Fischer, 1980:38).

Unlike the Dez Irrigation Project which Goodell studied, NIA was not controlled at a national level. National guidance was diffuse and in the domain of development ideology: integrated approaches were mandated by the Five Year Plan, which echoed the latest trends in the international development community. The mechanics of integration were left up to each project designer. However, if one takes the university as the highest level of control, NIA does fit Fischer’s observations about centrally planned projects. The more control NIA was able to exercise in the villages, the more initiative was stifled - in spite of the explicitity stated goal of teaching the people to develop themselves. NIA was so tightly organized that any loosening of control which resulted in a flowering of initiative on the part of the villagers would come as a result of, and was considered to be due to, bureaucratic failure, not project design. As we will see in this chapter, it was the municipality NIA had least control over and considered unsuccessful in which positive local initiative took place. Though integrated approaches rhetorically call for bottom up planning, unchanneled initiative undoes the NIA process which is designed so that each higher level exercises control over that below it.

**NIA IN THE VILLAGES**

The last chapter looked at the ways the NIA director exercised control, albeit incomplete, over development activities at PAU by supervising access to NIA pilot areas and by appropriating all development projects into the NIA framework. NIA exercised the same kind of structural control in the villages by creating a development hierarchy and outlining how it should function. The project also had a more pervasive type of authority which was manifested in its attempt to create a new peasantry i.e. a modern one.
NIA control over its pilot areas falls along two related axes: structural/cultural and creative/inhibitory. In discussing these aspects of NIA, I will borrow Foucault's synthesis of power and knowledge as used in his analysis of discourse. In the context of NIA and development discourse, one must look not only at the theories on which development action is based, but also the structures and actions themselves.

The ability to control is one aspect of power. We have seen NIA's inhibitory power in its ability to control access to NIA sites. Power is also productive and NIA's coveting action was related to this aspect of its power, namely the ability to define the appropriate development method to be used at PAU.

NIA synthesized elements from various development related theories (modernization, peasant behavior, values studies, communication) to produce a development model and create a structure in which that model was made concrete. The director not only created an administrative structure through which modernization was able to take place, she also created the indigenous developers who would bring the structure to life. In order to do this, those norms/cultural forms which impeded development had to be discarded to make space for the new, modern ones on which a modern society can be built.

The first part of this chapter will look at the ways NIA created a development structure in order to rationalize the modernization process. To accomplish this it had to proceed in two ways: control outside interference (one aspect of which was the supervision of other developers) and create a development oriented elite through education.

The second section will explore NIA's attempt to create a climate amenable to rational development by reconstructing salient parts of peasant culture.

Just as NIA was not totally successful in its attempts at PAU, its power in the villages was not complete. Not only did the structure not work as planned, indigenous innovations sometimes interfered with and sometimes aided the NIA process.
Examples of these "lapses" of control and creative uses of the program by the recipients will be interspersed throughout.

CREATING INDIGENOUS DEVELOPERS

By incorporating the political structure into NIA, its staff hoped to transform politicians into community developers and to institutionalize their new roles as such. NIA's creators felt that if "modern" values and life skills such as efficiency, the ability to plan and a desire for modernity could be passed on to community leaders, the latter would be able to guide their village mates toward development.

The use of "indigenous change agents" is not unique to NIA. In other programs however, these village level developers often rely on their positions as "natural" leaders and use "traditional" methods of dissemination of information and technology. The word traditional reflects on both the villages and extension programs as it is common in extension to use "appropriate" existing cultural forms to spread technology. One traditional strategy used by effective local leaders is mimicry. For example: one day in Buendia, the barangay captain began clearing the irrigation canal in front of his house. I was told by my research assistant that soon his nearest neighbors as well as other local leaders would do the same. When I asked if he had instructed them to do so, she replied no, they would do it automatically or else they would be ashamed. This type of cooperation/competition she placed in the realm of traditional village life. In like manner, extension agents often give technology first to identified "opinion leaders" in the hopes that if they are successful, others will follow their example. This strategy was adopted by NIA but it was supplemented with training in communication and management techniques and social theory in an attempt to strengthen local leaders and to make them more modern in their approach.

In fact, the bulk of NIA funds was used for training instead of for the more usual
expenditures related to technological and capital buildup programs. There were training sessions to address the needs of the different levels of the local NIA structure i.e. one for mayors, another for the barangay captains and another for the BNS-DW's.

After the assignation of the various participants, a two day training session is held in which they are introduced to their new roles. This training gives them an overview of the program. A few weeks later a 10 day session is held in which the participants are expected to stay at the university or in another NIA village. In this session, they are taught some personell management, communication techniques, rural sociology, population control methods and planning skills. The participants return to their homes half-way into the session to meet with fellow villagers and draw up a three year plan. The time spent in their home towns is called rural immersion - the same term used to describe the time spent in the villages by the rural development students at the university. The training session ended with the creation of a three year development plan for each barangay. (See Appendix I for a sample plan)

After the intensive preliminary sessions, trainings would optimally be held once a week for 3 to 4 hours. The outline used for these was the graduate level course in development communication taught at PAU. The goal was to help "the participants to internalize and use devcom concepts and theories in field-level implementation of the program." (NIA mimeo, 1985:16)

A condensed list of topics follows:

- managerial styles and decision making
- communication techniques
- lines of communication
- planning strategies
- budgeting
- PAU extension activities
- PAU research
- morality
- modernization theory
- project evaluation (complete with calculation of standard deviations)
- parliamentary procedure
Interspersed were inspirational talks about the need to pull together, the necessity of development and the positive features of NIA. Sometimes the participants were tested over the material covered. (See Appendix II for sample test) At the end of formal training sessions certificates of attendance were given. A few of the sessions ended with an inspirational ceremony and testimonials from participants about their commitment to development and NIA. (see Appendix III for some of the testimonials)

The topics of the training sessions were so varied because the ultimate goal of the program was "the upliftment of the common people." The term upliftment was construed broadly to include both economic gain and social/moral evolution. The training sessions were part of a re-education scheme designed to create a modern peasantry (with the help of the newly trained indigenous developers) within the context of the "Seven Basic Concerns":

- food production
- health and nutrition
- infrastructure
- sports and cultural development
- education and technology transfer
- justice, peace and order
- spiritual development

NIA's educational efforts were vital to controlling village level modernization. They were involved in inculcating elites with a development ideology congruent with their own. The repetition of themes and the numerous meetings served to reinforce the developer's stance. Trainings were also an occasion for monitoring progress in the villages - for supervision and surveillance, as was the three year plan.
The Mayor of Marquez: A Case Study of the Creation of an Indigenous Developer

The mayor of Marquez had been in office for 21 years. He had a fourth grade education and knew only minimal English when his town was slated to receive NIA. At first he was resistant because Marquez had received programs before which had not succeeded. However, after his training in development methodology, he was able to identify their shortcomings: their failure lay in their stress on technology and their subsequent inattention to the social aspects of development. According to him, "Their intentions are on the theoretical side; they don't have projects which will have impact on social studies."

In other words, other programs were not able to transform the traditional into the modern.

Dr. Gomez had spent a lot of time transforming the mayor. She taught him English and then lent him books; one of the first of which was a Vanderbilt book of etiquette because she thought him too abrupt and authoritarian. The mayor and NIA director agree that it was only through her intervention that he was able to realize the importance of development.

When visitors came to Marquez, they wondered aloud at the mayor's erudition and often asked what degree he held. Dr. Gomez would proudly say he was her best student and he in turn, was eager to show off his new knowledge. Upon learning that I was a graduate student in anthropology, he explained to me the difference between synchronic and diachronic anthropology. During my tour of the projects in his municipality that first day, he and Dr. Gomez were reviewing communication terminology: what terms like gatekeeper, communicator and Newcombe's model meant. After breakfast one morning with the mayor and Dr. Gomez, the mayor asked the latter whether we had had an "interpersonal relationship" or a "dialogic one."
He was reading *Mein Kampf* in order to learn how to appeal to the emotions of the masses. Hitler's greatest accomplishment, he informed me, was his ability to motivate the masses who are very emotional (as opposed to the rational middle and upper classes).

He also used many of the development communication techniques taught to him by the NIA director in his motivation campaign. The first thing one noticed when entering Marquez were the numerous signs on buildings and public transportation exhorting people to "Join NIA." It is important, according to the mayor, to use various "channels of communication." Another channel available to him was the NIA seminars which he opened with a testimonial on development, exhortations to be productive and modern and to give up those traditions which hampered modernization.

The mayor "put his money where his mouth was." Not only did he participate in lectures, he used his considerable financial resources to help the poor in two ways: traditional patronage and supporting NIA guests and staff. As mayor, he was often called upon to pay for a constituent's wedding or funeral or lend him money until harvest. This type of activity is pursued both by "non-development oriented" politicians as well as "enlightened" ones. It forms the most basic link between voter and elected official (Agpalo, 1972). Though traditional in nature, this type of activity contributed to the image of the mayor as a developer.

The mayor was also a "patron" of NIA. He would send his private car and driver to fetch Dr. Gomez to Marquez. Food was provided at his expense for all NIA visitors as well as housing for overnight trainings. And he used his political contacts to benefit the program (which will be discussed shortly).

Since NIA's perceived success in Marquez, that town was highlighted on the "rural development tour" of PAU. Faculty from other universities, personnel from government and private agencies and even international visitors were brought to Marquez to meet the mayor and to hear him speak about rural development. He was
becoming very well known for the leader of such a small municipality. In addition to playing host to development professionals, he accompanied NIA staff on their trainings. PAU was responsible for the dissemination of NIA in thirteen municipalities and for the training of project staff in several provinces. The mayor was involved in most of these trainings and eventually received a small stipend for his work. Though this barely covered his expenses, it was a tangible sign that he was being taken seriously as a development professional.

The mayor of Marquez was a strong supporter of the governor. The president of the university was not. Because Philippine politics is oriented towards patron-client relationships, this meant that PAU did not get all the support that the provincial government was capable of giving it. The president of PAU needed an "in" to the governor’s office and this came through the appropriation of the mayor by the university.

After the program became recognized outside of the province, the NIA director requested permission from the PAU president to make the mayor of Marquez a consultant to the program and to give him an office at PAU. As an NIA (and consequently a PAU) functionary, he became a liaison between the governor’s office and the university. As a result of the mayor’s semi-official tie to PAU and his lobbying on its behalf, provincial funds were released for NIA trainings. Later, all of the mayors of the province, the majority of whom had been reluctant to adopt the program, were called into the governor’s office for a NIA meeting. This greatly facilitated the program’s growth and PAU was able to claim it had implemented the program province-wide. This looked good for the university and for the governor.
An Incomplete Transformation

The mayor of Marquez was a strong leader. One manifestation of this was his unofficial discarding of the position of vice-mayor in Marquez. He considered himself to be part of a modernizing trend in Philippine politics. By this self-description he meant that he was originally elected because the people believed he could do a good job, not because of patronage. He had won the election from a member of an old and powerful family. "Traditional" politics are not cause oriented - all one needs to be a politician, the mayor confided, were guns, money and a private army. The money bought votes and created followers through patronage. Guns and the private army kept constituents in line and took care of strong rivals. Wolters (1984) in his book on local elections, substantiates the mayor’s view through some of his discussions of the violence surrounding local elections.

Though the mayor of Marquez asserts that he beat the incumbent mayor of 21 years ago because of his qualifications, he too, upon his own admission, now relies on guns, money and a private army in addition to his reputation for "doing something." His dual nature as a traditional/modern politician both aided and impeded the implementation of NIA while NIA definitely strengthened his political position. His involvement in the program was the sign of his modern, rational, cause-oriented stance while his position in the patronage system and the strength that his guns, money and army gave him made the rapid diffusion of NIA possible.

One of the mayor’s good deeds was the "lending" of 100 hectares of his land to the landless to grow mung beans and fish. The question arises as to why a person who is truly interested in uplifting the masses still had that much land after the land reform in 1972. The exact mechanics of his escape were not explained to me but there are three ways many large landowners were able to keep their holdings. The first is by willing it to one’s children. Two and three involve the removal of tenants followed by mechanization or a change of crop since only tenanted corn and rice lands were redistributed. Through his political connections in Manila, the mayor would have known the conditions of the reform long before his tenants, making all three routes
open to him.

It is true that land reform was decreed long before the mayor found his true career as a developer. It is also true that the landless were now farming his land as a part of NIA. The exact agreement between the mayor and the landless was not told to me but I do know he received some share of the harvest - an arrangement which invokes a return to sharecropping and brings his motives into question.

The NIA director not only tried to teach the mayor management techniques and communication, she tried to "uplift" him morally because she knew that only through a moral transformation could he become a modern politician. When she first met him, he had a reputation for being a "naughty boy"; drinking, gambling, womanizing and unmannered. The director would chide him for spending so much money at the cockfights (he had over 200,000 pesos invested in his cocks; the exchange rate then was 20 pesos to the dollar), trying to convince him that the poor were the ones to lose at the games. Not only was he setting a bad example for his constituents, he was cheating the poor. She also tried to induce him to stop the all male drinking parties because it set a bad example. This moral upliftment was part of enlightened development in which money was spent rationally and frugally. It was also based in ideas of the exemplary role of leadership. How could he teach the poor to economize and plan ahead if he indulged in bad spending habits? How could he morally uplift others if he himself were immoral?

Despite his failings, the NIA director was determined that the mayor of Marquez was her best bet for establishing NIA in the province. His money, influence and willingness to participate were more important that his faults. His instrumental role in obtaining the support of the governor translated into provincial funds for training sessions and a stipend for the BNS-DW. Support also meant that the provincial office could run interference should NIA staff have trouble with line agency personnel who were under its authority.
Often during his lectures to visitors, the mayor would claim that he had been so transformed, he would not seek re-election, devoting himself instead to development full time.

However, private conversations with him revealed a hidden agenda. Marquez’s mayor did not feel the need to run for re-election because he would install his brother as a puppet mayor and bring his son back from a job in another province to be the city secretary. The mayor’s large following, added to the political debt the other two would owe him insured his ability to see the municipality run according to his wishes and there were advantages to abdicating the mayoralty.

Financial considerations were important. Though the mayor was wealthy, there were no stories about his enriching himself through office. He was ready to let someone else take on the financial responsibilities of patronage, campaigns and the support of NIA. Besides, his reputation as a development leader had the potential to bring him a wider audience (the provinces under NIA supervision) and enhance his prestige.

Many people at PAU felt the mayor of Marquez had his eye on a provincial level office. The mayor’s colleagues in the governor’s office teased him about his ambitions to be a permanent resident there. To my knowledge, such musings were not discussed in Marquez but the mayor was quite open about the positive impact NIA could have on a politician’s election campaign. Local elections were slated to occur about nine months from the time of NIA’s inception in Marquez and although no one had begun to campaign actively, looking good was uppermost in politicians’ minds.

The mayor’s career in NIA encapsulates the same types of struggles which the NIA director faced in implementing the program at the village level (which will be the subject of the next section). She realized that she needed to harness the mayor’s political strength in order to make NIA work in Marquez. This she accomplished by appropriating him into the NIA and the university structures. The basis of his political strength, however, lies in the realm of traditional Philippine politics and the total
transformation from politician to developer would destroy his ability to act effectively for NIA. Were he actually to give all of his holdings over 7 hectares to the poor (in compliance with land reform), he would not have had the financial resources to support the program as he did. Were he not able to bypass the regular bureaucratic channels to get the NIA director access to his patron the provincial governor, the program would not have spread so rapidly. Had he not been able to command his gun toting constabulary to round up line agency personnel and others for NIA meetings, what he called communi-coercion, he would not have gotten the high level of "cooperation" from his constituents that he did.

The NIA director then, was forced to abandon her idea of total transformation and settle for strategic character changes - ones which were sufficient to change his image as a "naughty boy" while not eroding his power base. This compromise made her control over him incomplete and towards the end of my stay in Marquez it became clear that he was giving her trouble. The mayor had begun to feel that he was vital to the success of NIA. Knowing he was instrumental in diffusing NIA province-wide, he felt that the program was incapable of growing on its own.

The dependency relationship between the mayor and NIA, however, was not one sided. NIA had definitely aided the mayor. His command of English and his new found appetite for reading were a real source of pride to him. Though he had access to higher levels of the political structure, his relationship with the university gave him access to other developers through the Technology Dissemination Department. He was now a neophyte development professional himself and this new role was, in his words, "a status conferment" on him.

The mayor appropriated NIA into traditional politics in one other way; it became a channel for his political patronage. Positions as leaders of projects and committees were appointed by the mayor and what individuals received new technology and loans was decided by him. Because it was common development practice to give "opinion leaders" goods first, the mayor was able to strengthen his traditional position under the
rubric of rationalization by rewarding his political cronies with NIA goods.

NIA IN MARQUEZ AND BUENDIA

When I arrived in mid-January of 1985, PAU was operating the NIA program in pilot barangays in three municipalities. According to the evaluation of NIA staff, the program was going very well in one municipality, so-so in the second and it was almost non-functional in the third. My research proposal called for the comparison of a successful and a non-successful program as identified by the developer so I chose to study the first and third municipalities. The first eight months were spent at the university, accompanying NIA staff on their visits to the project sites; the last three months in a barangay in each municipality.

The contiguous municipalities of Marquez and Buendia are located in the central Luzon plain, occupying areas which were once lush forest and swampland. Central Luzon has been called "the economic and cultural heartland of the Philippines" (McLennan, 1980:16). It's people have been prominent in shaping the Philippine republic by providing both peasant and elite leadership in the turn of the century revolts against Spain and the United States; the peasant revolutionaries of the 1940's (the Huks) and the current revolutionaries of the New People's Army; the Philippine national language, Pilipino, which is based on Tagalog; and many of the Philippines' prominent families, including that of the current president, Cory Aquino.

The central plain has been the country's leading producer of commercial rice since the 1920's. Irrigation projects were begun under the American regime and continued under the republic. The most recent, the Pantabangan Dam built in 1975, made double cropping widely possible and has further entrenched the American initiated practice of rice monoculture.
The province of Nueva Ecija, in which Marquez and Buendia are located, has no heavy industry. In the last few years, interest has been expressed in large scale aquaculture projects but as of 1985, the time of my field work, only one had been initiated. Light industry such as timber and rice mills and cottage industries in furniture making, rattan processing, shoe making and pottery are scattered along the main highway and in the large municipalities. Rice monoculture, however, is still the economic backbone of the province.

Nueva Ecija suffers from a land shortage. Settlement programs under the American regime included virtually all available lands meaning that young people today have little chance of acquiring farms large enough to support them. According to the land reform decree, five hectares in rainfed areas and 3 hectares in irrigated areas are needed to operate an economically viable farm. Mathematical reality imposes itself in a country which had 1.3 million hectares for redistribution among 1.07 million tenants as of 1975 (Rocamora & Conti, 1975). People marry young and are often in their early forties when their grown children begin looking for land. Some parents have responded by lending or giving a portion of their own farms to their children. Most simply incorporate married children and their families into their households. In either instance, more people become dependent on less land. Youth with technical skills or a degree try to find work elsewhere - in the nearby provincial capital, Manila or even abroad. The Middle East, Singapore and Taiwan are the areas in which most of these workers find employment. Employment is often on a contract basis for a set period of time and opportunities range from engineering and nursing to housekeeping and types of manual labor which citizens in better off countries don't want to perform. The usual pattern is for male skilled and technical labor to go to the Middle East and female domestics, nannies and nurse aides to go to other parts of Asia (de Guzman, 1984). These expatriates complain about cultural differences and their low social standing in wealthier countries. Still, they are considered lucky by their village mates. Often landholders engage in this activity and use the money earned towards maintaining the farm. Remittances from expatriates form a significant portion of the Philippines' foreign exchange ($955 million in 1983) and people are encouraged by the government
to work abroad. Workers are then required to route their money through the Central Bank.

The road from Manila to several important tourist spots and lumber concessions runs through Cabanatuan, the provincial capital. Both tourism and lumber are sources of foreign exchange. The central highway running through Nueva Ecija is therefore maintained and transporation is relatively easy. One can reach Cabanatuan from either Marquez or Buendia via a twenty minute bus ride. From Cabanatuan, it is only two more hours by bus to Manila. Unlike remote areas to the north, Nueva Ecija has no infrastructure-based problems getting rice to distribution sites and getting inputs to the farms.

Cabanatuan is a major rice processing and distribution center; home to colleges and technical schools as well as a large market and movie theatres. Travel to and from the city is frequent. One can obtain nicer clothes at the Cabanatuan market and the "fixed price" stores there, as well as make phone calls to Manila, buy luxuries such as real ice cream or see a movie.

Central Luzon is ethnically diverse, being home to Pampangos, Pangasinanos, Tagalogs, Ilocanos and Chinese. The last three groups make up the majorities in Marquez and Buendia. There is some ethnic tension. Differences between Tagalogs and Ilocanos are expressed through jokes and stereotypes-related in a laughing manner and often in front of the victim. Relations between these two Malay groups and the ethnic Chinese are more strained because the latter make up a large proportion of the moneylenders, rice dealers and warehouse owners. The farmer-Malays feel they are economically controlled by the merchant-Chinese.

Marquez and Buendia share the same settlement history. Early Ilocano migrations from the north were followed by Tagalog immigrants coming from the south. These settlers formed communities which were incorporated into an existing municipality called Garcia. As their populations grew and formed offshoot barangays,
Marquez and Buendia became independent municipalities. Not only do they share a similar pattern of settlement, the same prominent families can be found in the histories of both and at least one large landowner held substantial haciendas which covered parts of both.

The land reform decree of 1972 applied to all rice and corn lands, making large amounts of land in Marquez and Buendia available to tenant farmers. Under this decree, no household can own more than 7 hectares. There is still confusion about who actually owns what lands because the transfer of titles has been slow and many are being contested. According to the 1984 "benchmark data" collected by PAU on NIA pilot areas, about half of the farmers in these two municipalities were still leaseholders.

Rice monoculture was the primary source of income. Average farm size in Marquez and Buendia mimicked the provincial pattern of 1 - 2 hectares. Average yields ranged widely depending upon weather; where one’s field was placed (rainfed vs. irrigated and place along irrigation canal); amount of pesticides and fertilizers used etc. The lowest estimate for yield was during rainy season: 15 cavans/ hectare (1 cavan is roughly 50 pounds) to a high yield in dry season of 130 cavans/ hectare. 90 - 100 cavans/hectare was average in dry season; 70-90 in wet season. After paying debts the modal range of unhusked rice left over was 10-25 cavans. Some is converted into pesos and some is stored in the house for food. Depending on the quality of the rice, net income for one harvest had a monetary value of between 1000.00 and 4375.00 pesos. Input needs for one crop were estimated (through interview) from 2000.00 - 5000.00 pesos.

The majority of farmers interviewed relied at least partially on usurers for living expenses as government loans did not cover illness, death, school, clothes, etc. After paying their debts, many farmers had to borrow rice before the next harvest. Those left with no rice at all borrowed immediately. They referred to their situation as one of constant utang-utang (literally debt debt).
Not all of the barangays in Marquez and Buendia were irrigated and there were some problems in those that were. Farmers located at the end of the canal complained that their neighbors upstream had used more than their allotment, leaving their downstream neighbors with insufficient water. According to my interviews, yields were consistently lower for those at the end of the irrigation canal. Because of irrigation, many farmers were able to get two rice crops. This was the preferred strategy. Those in rainfed areas grew one crop of rice and planted mung or soy beans in dry season.

Houses in both municipalities were either a combination of hollow block and bamboo or built in the traditional style of bamboo and thatch. People were increasingly planting houseplot gardens though it was still more common to see ornamental houseplants (kalanchoes were a favorite) than vegetables. This was the result of Imelda Marcos’ beautification campaigns. Some native leafy green vegetables and tubers grew along the irrigation canals. Potable water was obtained through deep wells; better off villagers had their own private well. Most had a few chickens for special occasions but few could afford to raise pigs or water buffalo. A few small holders made extra money by acting as day laborers for their neighbors. Virtually all of the landless were day laborers. One family in Buendia had a small pool table which they let others play on for a fee. One woman was a vendor, buying pigs and selling pork in the market. Several women in Buendia and Marquez sold various items such as Avon, Playtex and Tupperware in addition to their farming duties.

Both communities were economically stratified. Those former landowners who decided not to move to Manila after World War II were still living in their old barangays or in the municipal centers. College educated government workers also lived in the villages and town centers; some worked in Cabanatuan and others were teachers or line agency personnel assigned to the area. Some of this latter group were landless. Teaching and low level clerical work give one a steady income, but these people were not necessarily significantly better off than their farmer neighbors. Those landless who did not have non-farm skills, made a living by working as day laborers on their neighbors’ farms, catching and selling fish and growing and selling vegetables.
According to NIA staff, Buendia and Marquez were chosen to be pilot NIA areas because of their Technology Utilization Rates (TUR). No one could give me a working definition of a TUR nor tell me how to calculate one. Nor was the TUR data upon which the sites were chosen available. It was hinted through informal channels that Buendia was chosen because the mayor was the brother of the governor and Marquez was chosen because it had been the pilot area for the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement. After living in the municipalities, I learned that barangays in each had received other programs. The barangay I stayed in in Buendia had in fact received an award in the First Lady's beautification program.

There were political similarities as well. Both mayors were senior politicians with ties to the provincial governor. As mentioned before, one was the governor's brother and the other, the mayor of Marquez, was a political crony of the governor and had received such fringe benefits as municipal buildings and trips abroad through the latter's patronage.

Both mayors were wealthy. The mayor of Marquez owned at least 100 hectares. The amount of land the mayor of Buendia still held was not mentioned but he did come from an old and prominent family in Buendia who owned substantial amounts of land before reform.

The mayor of Marquez, however, appeared to be the stronger of the two. This statement I make with some reservations. The mayor of Buendia was sheltered by his political subordinates. He was ill and elderly and did not often appear in public. I was allowed to meet him only twice - both times were short courtesy calls before the municipal level NIA meeting which he did not attend. (This is in sharp contrast to the many and informal meetings I had with the mayor of Marquez.) The illness of the mayor of Buendia and his absence could have signaled political weakness. However, the ability to surround oneself with loyal retainers can come from a position of strength. Possibly the stress on his frailty was a ruse to avoid dealing with NIA. He did, however, "abdicate" his position as mayor shortly before I moved to his municipality because his
son, the vice-mayor, had returned from an extended stay abroad. In any case he did not work actively in NIA, nor did the councillor he assigned to take his place as head of the Management Team.

The different approaches of the two mayors greatly affected the level at which NIA operated. In Buendia, where the mayor removed himself, municipal level involvement in the program was weak, making the salient political level the barangay. The senior member of the Municipal council was instructed by the mayor to assume the role of chair of the Management Team. Except for the barangay in which I lived, village leaders were not very enthusiastic about the program and the appointed chair of the Management Team did not have the clout to make them attend NIA meetings. Nor did he have power over line agencies, only a few of which seemed interested in working through the NIA structure. In fact, several times the appointed chair expressed his desire to quit his position in NIA.

In contrast to the weak leadership at the municipal level in Buendia, both the barangay captain and the BNS-DW were strong and active in the village in which I lived. The barangay captain was enjoying his first term in that position and NIA gave him a vehicle through which to accomplish some of his goals. He was known for his appreciation of grass roots projects and was a member of a "leftist" farmer's union. In contrast to the rich mayor of Marquez, the barangay captain in Buendia was one of the "better off peasants" who suffered shortages himself right before harvest. He had a sense of the power the "people" had when they put their minds to a task and told me the "peasant's version" of the struggle for independence from the Spanish - a version which stressed the common man's role in the revolution over that of the elite. He told me that the peasant's version is not taught in school, but is part of the oral tradition of the peasants in this region.

The BNS-DW of my barangay captain in Buendia was a barkada (one of a group of friends) of the barangay captain's wife and it was the barkada group who would often implement the projects planned and drum up support for them (as will be described
In Marquez, control of NIA was at the municipal and university levels. The captain of the barangay I lived in was weak and the first BNS-DW was the mayor’s personal secretary. Projects began at the municipal level as directives of the mayor who often planned them with the NIA director. Other barangays had stronger, more autonomous barangay captains yet their projects also usually came from above.

**Marquez: Portrait of Success**

Though only three of Marquez’ 10 barangays were targeted to receive the program, within six months of its introduction it was being implemented town-wide. According to the NIA director, this was due to the very pro-development attitude of the mayor who had even constructed a small NIA office made of native materials and then vacated his office to move into the development office. This action was considered to be an appropriate symbol for NIA’s grassroots, populist approach. In his thatched office were numerous charts outlining development progress and a map which included every house in the municipality (these were numbered and demographic data was stored on index cards.) Inspirational sayings and pro-development slogans were hung on the walls and several books on social science, including an introduction to anthropology, were on his desk.

My first visit to Marquez was calculated to impress me with the complete acceptance of NIA and with the scope of its implementation. I am not suggesting that this was a cynical act; one merely designed to put the best NIA foot forward. That afternoon was filled with tours of mushroom cultivation, a blacksmith, fishponds and mung bean fields - all of which were NIA projects. I was told of other successful projects such as the recycling of remnants and shoe making.

The fishponds and mung bean cultivation were particularly appealing since they involved the lending of over 100 hectares of the mayor’s land to the landless to use. The barangay in which the fishponds were situated was begun as a part of NIA and
carried the name of the program - thus making 11 barangays. It also was located on the mayor’s land and was supplied by water he had diverted from a nearby river. The mayor’s brother had been appointed by him to be the barangay captain.

During my subsequent visits to Marquez I was apprised of various projects which were being added. Markets were found for the municipality’s products and two loans were obtained to start cooperatives. Word spread that the NIA director and mayor had been successful and they became known as a sort of development team. Students from other universities as well as other developers were coming to see the transformation in Marquez. There were weekly management team meetings and training sessions in development communication. Management team meetings were in Taglish and development communication courses were in English. Visitors were invited to these seminars and were very impressed by the mayor’s command of social science rhetoric. To everyone who had visited Marquez, it seemed that they had accomplished much in six short months.

Visitors however were not free to go anywhere in the municipality and speak to just anyone because not all of the villagers had adequate knowledge about the program to be able to explain it to outsiders. Visitors were encouraged to interview members of the NIA hierarchy who were in the best position to describe the program accurately. Again, I want to withdraw from a cynical appraisal of this sort of impression management to comment that civic pride and loyalty to the mayor and to Dr. Gomez required that those locally involved in NIA portray it in its best light.

A few weeks into my life in Marquez I learned that the implementation of NIA had not been as complete nor as smooth as the written reports and the seminars suggested. Many of the gaps in implementation were not known to university personnel, and might be considered by some to be the product of political corruption. In other instances, NIA staff and I would not agree on where implementation faltered.

An example of the first type of gap. NIA received a grant to begin a goat dispersal
scheme. My barangay was slated to be a recipient. Each of the barangay councillors received a goat whether or not he already had them. This is a strategy which, though falling in the category of political patronage, is also used in development. "Opinion leaders" are given new technology first so others will be inclined to follow their example. What separates this instance from that approach is the fact that when asked, the councillors did not say they had a responsibility to disperse the goats. That was up to them. This places the goat scheme more firmly in line with strategies of political patronage when cast in a somewhat positive light and misappropriation of funds when cast more negatively. One man who already had seven goats used the money for something else. When the NIA university staff came around to check the project, he would point to another goat and claim it was the one he bought with NIA funds. Not until it was time to repay the loan did the director learn that the project was a paper one; there being no breeding or distribution of goats.

Two things contributed to the disagreement between my appraisal of NIA in Marquez and that of the NIA director: the inflation of the numbers of projects falling under NIA and the reliance on written reports, meetings and formalization of management structures over the institution of new income generating or agricultural projects as a criteria for success.

Because NIA purported to be the umbrella for all development activities in the pilot areas, projects begun long ago were "counted" as NIA projects. The mushroom technology had been brought to the area by a private organization. The shoemakers were a family operation which hired a few villagers and they did not even know they were an "NIA project." The blacksmith also predated NIA. Of all the projects shown to me that first day in Marquez, only the fishponds and possibly the mung beans (no one could date their inception for me) were initiated under the auspices of NIA. They were continued under its development umbrella because it had appropriated their success as an example of grassroots initiative - which they were. The initiative, however, was not NIA's.
According to NIA criteria, Marquez was a success. NIA staff used the development communication framework to gauge the differential implementation of the project in the two municipalities. The projects were evaluated informally through a kind of "intuitive sense" about the level of project related action and enthusiasm and as part of NIA's research effort. Students conducted guided but informal interviews with key village leaders and program participants. They also conducted household surveys and attended a few training sessions. Three elements seemed to provide justification for the good evaluation of Marquez and the poor evaluation of Buendia:

1. number of program related trainings and town or barangay meetings

2. ability of local leadership to articulate goals of the program and to inspire participation

3. number of planned or already implemented income generating and agricultural projects

NIA staff perceptions of success/failure in the first two overshadowed perceptions of success/failure in the third. Even though the stated ultimate goal was better nutrition, and income generating and agricultural projects were the means by which to buy/grow more quality food, greater attention was paid to the intermediate goals of training the leadership than to technology transfer - in other words to the instruments of control and regulation.

**Buendia: The Problem Child**

The NIA director attributed Buendia's poor progress to its lack of leadership. Unfortunately, the lack of leadership was partially on the side of NIA. The slow pace of progress on the part of the municipality and the consequent lack of positive feedback to the developers influenced the actions of the latter. Buendia was not visited often. The NIA director, who would go to Marquez two or three times a week, did not even attend all of the monthly meetings in Buendia. When she did, she would exhort them in a polite way to perform as well as Marquez. This embarrassed the head of the
Management Team and reinforced his desire to quit. Local elections were less than a year away. Being the leader of a program that did not receive wide municipal support put him in a politically sticky situation. This, added to the fact that Marquez' success was viewed as a reflection of outstanding leadership on the part of the head of its Management Team (the mayor) was an added injury. The implication was that the program in Buendia was slow because the head of its Management Team was not a good leader; and in fact, his inactivity was viewed by the director as a major cause of Buendia's seeming indifference to the program. She told me that the reason he wanted to quit was because he was not an innovator. However, it must be remembered that he was fourth in the formal political structure; behind the mayor, absent vice-mayor (in the U.S. on an extended stay) and acting vice-mayor. In addition, he did not have the same access to the governor's office as the mayor of Marquez and his own mayor, who did have connections, but was not interested enough in NIA to intervene on its behalf.

The director and her staff were not totally insensitive to their role in Buendia's slow progress and a few times staff commented that they realized Marquez received a lot more attention from them than Buendia. The idea that frequent meetings and visits are important in implementation is a principle of development communication and management theory. The director felt badly that she did not spend much time in Buendia but she was overburdened with other responsibilities. In addition to NIA, her duties included teaching and the administration of her department. The decision to expend more effort on the successful project site was both strategic and emotional. Strategic in that a model municipality might encourage other mayors to adopt the program. Emotional in that during the course of her professional involvement with Marquez, she had become very attached to it. During its harvest festival, she had been adopted as a "child of Marquez." In addition she now had a small farm there, "purchased from the mayor."
Benign Neglect and Success in Buendia

In Goodell’s (1986) discussion of the role of elementary and intermediate communal structures and development, she makes the point that centralized control must sometimes destroy elementary and always impede the formation of intermediate structures in order to control the development process. The NIA strategy was weighted more towards appropriation and control rather than destruction. In Marquez, after instituting the project through the existing political hierarchy, NIA exercised control over the development process through frequent visits, collection of data and progress reports. In Foucault’s terms - through surveillance and supervision.

The inattention of the NIA developer to Buendia left a space for the incorporation of some of NIA’s ideas into existing structures. NIA did ask for project reports, but did not engage in much on site supervision nor did they constantly re-educate Buendia’s NIA leaders. There were no weekly development communication trainings and Management Team meetings. In general, the training was not as intrusive as it was in Marquez. In this space, preliminary steps were taken towards the institution of a grassroots development project.

During my stay in Buendia, two barangay level NIA meetings were held. One was conducted by the barangay captain and the BNS-DW without the NIA director. The other involved the director. Both meetings were well attended; they were at least as large as the municipal level meetings in Marquez even though no constabulary were sent to round up the "laggards." There were a few speeches about development as an ideal, but most of the discussion revolved around concrete issues such as the need for a curfew for the youth, information about new projects and requests for project ideas.

At least four projects were begun from the time I first began visiting Buendia: pig dispersal; seed dispersal; snail production; and a fishpond. All were the result of the initiative of the BNS-DW who contacted the university for information and inputs and all were first carried out by her barkada group who would disperse offspring and information to their neighbors.
The Barkadas

Barkadas are a group of friends, usually an age cohort. The barkada which the BNS-DW belonged to consisted of the BNS-DW who was also a teacher and the wife a barangay councilman; the barangay captain’s wife; the only female member of the barangay council (she inherited the position when her husband died); a landless teacher; and a woman who was fairly well off compared to other former tenants. The barkadas (as they referred to themselves) were always together. They commented that where you find one, you find them all and that every invitation which one received was interpreted to mean that all were invited.

The barkadas were barangay leaders before NIA was introduced to Buendia. They formed the core of the barangay women’s group and were active in all of the other programs the barangay had received. These included Mrs. Marcos’ version of the "green revolution" - the planting of vegetables in one’s yard; the nationally mandated beautification projects which promoted houseplants and fences; and weekly nutrition classes sponsored by the Ministry of Health. One sign of their self-recognition as barangay leaders was their incorporation of the barangay captain’s wife when her husband was elected to that position. She had been a member of this group for only two years. I was also immediately incorporated into the group and became the American barkada.

The BNS-DW and barangay captain would go to PAU and request certain tech packs. It was on their initiative that Buendia acquired vegetable seeds, tilapia, snails, piglets and gabi (a water growing plant) from PAU. The innovations would be distributed to the barkadas, who would distribute them to their neighbors, kin and kumares³. Most of these innovations had to be purchased from the university. The piglets were the most expensive item. They were distributed to the Programm Planning and Implementing Committee (PPIC - the NIA label for the barangay council). This same strategy had been used in Marquez with goats. There were some differences however in the implementation. The goat dispersal scheme in Marquez was the result
of a loan from a Manila based volunteer organization which NIA staff initiated and which PAU guaranteed. The project mechanics were decided by NIA staff and the lending agency. The loans were given for only female goats, the recipients being responsible for the purchase of a male goat. No male was ever bought, however. The reason for this failure was that the project members did not have the money to pool (or were unwilling to pool their money) to buy a male goat. In Buendia, the PPIC secured pigs from PAU on credit for which they were the guarantors. They decided who would receive the piglets and when there was not enough money left over to buy a boar, one of the PPIC members offered to loan his free in the interest of NIA.

It is true that NIA opened up the university to these local leaders by introducing them to the various extension divisions of the university. However, these leaders did not always use the mandated NIA channels to acquire the tech packs - causing misunderstanding and trouble between Marquez and PAU. At one point, the BNS-DW bypassed the NIA hierarchy by going straight to a line agency extension agent in an attempt to get fingerlings for a fishpond project. The NIA director informed her that the correct procedure would be to request the fish from NIA who would request them from the bureau.

Despite the initiation of these projects, the NIA staff had "trouble" with Buendia because the latter had not conformed to the NIA process. Their reports were not turned in on time which made it difficult to know if they were proceeding in the correct manner. Gomez would often often complain that she did not see any progress in Buendia and was worried that the barangay captain was not strong - he did not use the communication and management techniques taught to him by NIA as the mayor of Marquez did.
NIA AND THE FARMERS: 
The Construction of Model Peasants

In his book *Orientalism*, Edward Said uses Foucault’s notion of discourse to analyze the discipline of the same name. He claims that Orientalist scholars invented the Orient by first separating it from the Occident; then filling it with exotic people. This invented Orient was "an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness" (Said, 1978). According to Said, the focus of one’s attention vis ‘a vis this invention should not be its veracity (the fit between reality and representation) but the relationship of power which is inherent in it.

The two are intertwined in development projects because it is the portrait of the recipients as backwards people, (the invention) which justifies the transformative action. If the lack of the construction's veracity was acknowledged, different sorts of projects might be undertaken. I stress the word might, because even project designs for remote areas ultimately conform to broader plans by the state and the wishes of the people these projects affect are often not taken into consideration (Goodell, 1986). The justification for not being responsive to the wishes of "the masses" is grounded in the construction of them as unable to cope/compete in a modern international system.

In order to know how to go about transforming traditional peasants into modern ones, one must have a conception of the traditional peasant. Development related models create their objects (the peasant in this case) through models of peasant behavior; judge the peasant to be unequal to the task of living in the modern world through the modernization model; and then offers a method for peasant improvement through (in the NIA case) communication and education. The power the developer has over the beneficiary is based not only in the developer’s structural position vis ‘a vis the other, but also in the ability to invent/define the peasant through totalizing models of peasant behavior. It is this invented model of how peasants behave in any given situation, compared against a model of behaviors appropriate to a modernizing
society, which inform the developer's actions.  

The "social innovation" called NIA was based in and a reaction to, the various bodies of theory from which development models are constructed. It was grounded in a belief in the process of modernization, the backwardness of the peasantry and the effectiveness of communication and education. It was simultaneously a reaction to the literature which specifically deals with the process of guided social change.

Social Science Literature and Development

Modernization theory attempts to explain cultural diversity by viewing differences as cultural stages. Western nations are most advanced, and depending on the particular evolutionary model prescribed to, other societies are ranked along the evolutionary continuum according to religious, kinship, technological, economic and political factors. During the late colonial and early post-colonial period, Western nations felt the need to "develop" the "undeveloped" nations. Evolutionary and modernization paradigms provided the theoretical framework for this action. Development, or as Temu (1975) refers to it, the West's "civilizing mission," was viewed as guided social change in which the "advanced" Western countries would "modernize" the "traditional" societies through the introduction of information and technology. It would aid the developed countries by:

1. *expanding markets for their products (a non-technological society cannot use technology until it has the means to do so)*

2. *increasing agricultural and technological output from undeveloped countries which would then supply the developed countries with food and goods*

3. *stemming the tide of discontent in a post colonial era thereby impeding communism.*

The undeveloped countries would benefit by the increase in productivity, education, health, comfort and economic gain which development brings.
Development then, was originally viewed in the West as an "everyone wins" situation. It was accepted on both humanitarian and capitalist grounds and was considered to be a manifestation of enlightened self-interest. But over a quarter of a century later, the majority of "undeveloped" countries have been transformed into underdeveloped countries and discontent and disillusionment with Western motives is growing.

Social scientists have variously been apologists for and critics of the modernization model of development. There is no generally held view about either the success rate of projects or of their effects on those who are supposed to benefit from them. Roughly speaking, the literature on development can be divided into the following types of studies:

1. those which focus on the adverse effects of guided social change.

2. those which address issues of success and failure. (Failure for projects has been laid on the shoulders of both developers and peasants)

3. those which focus on the international political and economic structures which make meaningful development impossible

Literature critical of guided social change stresses the incompatibility of some imported technology with tropical ecology and indigenous farming systems (Canela, 1979; Smith, 1981; Norman, 1981). The social structural and cultural changes attendant to the disruption of traditional life are also part of this literature. New technology is viewed as a disruptive force which destroyed existing cultural values and social patterns. Case studies demonstrate how the social equilibrium of a society can be destroyed by the introduction of modern technology (agricultural machines, new seeds with a shorter growing time etc.). Such innovations could alter existing social relations by requiring a new division of labor, a different allocation of resources (such as the increased water required by some improved rice varieties) or increased capital input. (Norman, 1981).
The literature on development criticises not only the unforeseen social and cultural effects of projects but also their failure to better the lives of recipients. There are two general explanations for project failure. One focuses on personnel and institutional problems of development agencies; the other on farmer recalcitrance.

Class, educational and regional differences between the extension worker and the farmer; lack of farmer participation in planning; and the bureaucratic rigidity of development and government agencies cause problems for modernization efforts (Po, 1980; Castillo, 1983). Extension workers are portrayed as either incompetent or uncaring and incapable of relating across educational and class barriers to the farmers. Institutional support for programs is lacking. The national and local elites themselves often in charge of programs, try to protect their privileged positions and are therefore dedicated to the status quo (Po, 1980; Goodell, 1986). Critics also stress the irrational and traditional nature of those organizations planning and administering programs which lead them to design new projects according to models which had failed in the past (Goldschmidt, 1982; Hoben, 1980).

Developers are not uniformly cited as the culprit in project failure. A parallel body of literature borrows psychological and communication models to aid in theory building vis-à-vis development. The notion of cultural relativity loses ground and project failures are blamed on the traditionalism of the peasant farmer whose reticence becomes the major obstacle to modernization efforts. Borrowing heavily from Rogers' (1962) development communication model, farmers are labeled as either innovative or resistant to change and statistical methods help to project which personality traits are needed in the receiving party for a project to be successful. Some of these are correlation studies which group variables such as degree of education and access to media, to personality traits such as resistance to change or innovativeness. Though no longer in vogue in anthropological literature, this uncritical (vis-à-vis the development process itself) view is still promulgated both in the development communication (a disciplinary offshoot of communication and rural studies) literature and in the field by extension agents and rural planners.
NIA was designed with the failure of other projects in mind. The NIA director would refer to the certain failure of those projects which were too technically oriented and which did not take social factors into account and she seemed to rely heavily on the literature which addressed issues of success and failure.

The two bodies of theory which the NIA director would repeatedly refer to were the literature on the peasantry and development communication. The two are related in that the former provides the context for the latter. From the broad literature on the peasantry several themes were considered appropriate by the NIA director to the development process: corporate peasant; peasant irrationality; the negative relationship between traditionalism and modernization; indolence.

One recurring theme found in the field experiences cited below is the ambiguity the developers had toward their farmer clients. This led to behavioral vacillation on the part of the developers causing them to alternately appeal to the corporate, moral peasant ('a la Redfield and Scott) and to the self-maximizing, rational peasant ('a la Popkin) depending on the particular requirements of the project engaged in. They were therefore frustrated when villagers did not act within the "appropriate" behavioral model invoked. A more coherent image of peasant behavior and motivations, articulated with recognition of structural constraints on the project, would have better accommodated the range of behaviors found – though it would not necessarily have changed the NIA agenda.

**Bahala Na: The Irrational Peasant**

The development staff generally felt that farmers/peasants were not able to plan for their future needs because they could not delay gratification and lacked the planning skills - attributes related to their fatalistic outlook on life. They referred to this as the "Bahala na" (God willing) syndrome.

The syncretic nature of indolence and inability to plan for the future was analyzed
for me by one NIA staff member who thought it was related to climate. Because of their cold winters, temperate countries have only one harvest and because of their mild climates, tropical countries have two. People living in temperate climates are therefore used to working harder and having to save, like Aesop's ant, for the winter; while tropical peoples are used to depleting all of their resources immediately and don't know how to save and plan for the future. There were other comments about Filipino indolence which were usually said in jest. But enough seminars were given by project staff (and later by local leaders) about the need to act rationally, use time and resources wisely and drop those traditions which hinder development, that I suspect the developers' jests had serious undertones. On one level, the joke was directed at all Filipinos and therefore the developers were laughing at themselves too. But it was really aimed at the farmers and was exhorting them to overcome such faults.

A commonly referred to example of economic irrational farmer behavior, again related to indolence, was the high incidence of default on low interest loans provided by the government and rural banks. Several lending programs were set up during the Marcos era. All of these loans were to be paid back because Marcos felt that give-aways would sap the motivation of the people, encouraging them to be dependent on the government (National Livelihood Program, 1981). This position is seconded by the NIA developers who consider default to be the result of a "dole out mentality."

Default has presented problems for the individual farmers involved who are restricted from further government borrowing and return to the usurers. It has also hurt rural banks. Because of the high rate of arrearages, many such banks lost their credit with the Central Bank and are now disqualified from participation in those programs. According to rural bankers, this leads to even more defaults as farmers are unwilling to repay loans when not assured they will be available next planting season (Concepcion, 1984). A cycle is created in which farmer default leads to rural bank default which leads to the closing of banks which leads to more default. Low interest loans become harder for everyone to obtain.
Farmer and NIA accounts of default differed. Some farmers cited lost crops due to disease or storm as reasons for non-repayment. Others explained that the new loans put them even further in debt, coming on top of debts already contracted to cover subsistence needs or that other expenses arose. They always used the wording "unable" or "unlucky" to pay instead of "unwilling" to pay. On the other hand, staff felt that those farmers who did not repay their loans were relying on the government too much. Some staff members couched this in the stronger terms of relying on government handouts. And though they sincerely sympathized with the farmers' poverty, they felt farmers were hurting themselves and others by not fulfilling their obligations and many lectures were devoted to the evils of the "dole out mentality," the need to work hard and the necessity of planning for the future. The underlying message of course, was that default was based in the peasants' lack of economically rational behavior.

There is another aspect of the "dole out mentality" however, which was expressed through farmer complaints about political and organization leaders. It was a generally accepted "fact" that politicians, government employees and even businessmen contracting with the government skimmed off the top for personal use. Farmers had access to newspaper and radio reports about corruption on the national level and suspected the same locally. In such matters, it was definitely "every man for himself." To add insult to injury, barangay services were poor and if a politician had the road repaired or provided sports equipment or school supplies, it was couched in terms of a personal favor to the people rather than as part of routine government services. The dole out mentality described by developers and sociologists arises in part from their ideas about the willingness of peasants to live on government handouts. This explanation does not easily fit with the ambivalence the villagers showed towards the government and the confusion they had vis-à-vis the duties of it. Though the "government" in the abstract might be expected to provide services in exchange for taxes, road repair, a new school building or other barangay services, specific services were viewed as being the result of the patronage system. It was therefore individual officials who were relied upon when in need, not "the government." It was also as individuals that money was pocketed which had been earmarked for other things.
Given this ambivalence, there were those in the village who were unsure as to where the money from repaid loans would go; possibly into the pockets of corrupt government and bank officials.

On the other hand, the granting of "free" inputs (through default of the loan) for one planting season freed up funds which could be used in other ways: children's education, purchase of needed household items, the downpayment on agricultural tools etc. whereas the repayment of the loan placed them back into the debt-repayment cycle with nothing concrete to show for the extra money.

But what about the sanctions against using what was meant to be recurring credit as a one time dispersement? Farmers viewed the inability to get low interest loans a second time as the negative consequence of their "inability to pay." They were aware, however, that that was the only consequence of default. The bank would send reminders about the loan, but would not appropriate part of the harvest in return for repayment (as the usurer would). Viewed in these terms, default could in some cases, constitute economically rational behavior; in opposition to the developers' view of default as one more sign of peasant irrationality and inability to plan for the future.

The Corporate Versus the Individualized Peasant

NIA had no financial resources for the introduction of new technology. Its budget was used for staffing, training and travel. Part of the staff's responsibility therefore was to find seed money from other sources to be used in cooperative "commodity" (goats, pigs, vegetables etc.) projects. These were usually in the form of commodity associations and dispersal projects. For example, a group of people interested in raising goats would form an association. A loan would be secured by NIA through an outside source. Each member would then receive either a female goat or the money for one and each would contribute a certain amount of personal money towards the purchase of a communal male goat to be cared for by one of the members. After the members' animals gave birth to several litters, each individual farmer would repay his part of the
loan, presumably using the money gotten from selling the baby goats. A portion of these profits would be put into a communal fund from which money could be borrowed by members. The goal was two fold: the establishment of individual breeding programs and capital buildup. If for some reason other than negligence, a farmer would lose his brood goat or another calamity prevented the repaying of his portion of the debt, the other members would make up his part or the money would be taken out of the community fund.

On one occasion, the NIA borrowed money from a non-profit organization to begin a goat raising venture in Marquez. The price of a female goat was distributed to six farmers who were to pitch in to buy the male goat. One councilman had seven goats already and not wanting another used the loan for other purposes; a strategy suggested to him by the mayor.

When the recipients received the money for their goats, they were told that it would be good to disperse some of the offspring to their kababayan (village mates). This would be done on a voluntary basis yet it was the probability of dispersal to others which justified giving the first loan to officials (opinion leaders) who were relatively well off rather than to the more needy in the barangay. As lay community developers it was expected that their sense of community would predispose them to sharing the fruits of this project with others.

The project, however, did not distribute any baby goats. Not only were no kids dispersed, no male was ever bought because no money was collected to do so. The members either did not have the cash to contribute; were unwilling to put in towards a communally shared goat; or viewed the female goats as a reward for political loyalty rather than as part of the development program.

Tension was created in such cooperative ventures by competing values. NIA staff relied on the self-maximizing, economically rational peasant (in the form of barangay elites who were considered to be more educated and less traditional) to successfully
carry out the technical part of the scheme. At the same time though, the project relied on the corporate peasant who would agree to participate with the project as planned even though he might not need any goats; share the risk of project failure with others in the cooperative; and finally, to dispense the fruits of his labor to those less fortunate when the time came.

Similar problems occurred in almost all of the cooperative and dispersal schemes tried by NIA.

Though the ethic of sharing is necessary to the success of a cooperative, farmer sharing behavior is viewed by NIA staff as being sometimes rational and sometimes not. The animals bred are meant to be sold for individual profit and sharing of those resources is considered to be appropriate only if done within the guidelines of the program (i.e. planned dispersal). The process of gaining self sufficiency is shared; the gains are individual. NIA personnel are upset (and projects fail) when farmers slaughter the goat or pig dispensed for breeding purposes on occasions such as fiesta, birthdays or weddings. (Though I never witnessed this type of "inappropriate" use of the project, I was assured by NIA staff and other PAU developers that it was an ongoing problem.) Though the farmer participants are sharing resources given to them by the program, it is not in the manner intended. One can understand the developers' viewpoint. First, there is only so much money available for these projects and second, project goals are long term in nature.

I did witness other forms of sharing in which the "right to survive" (Szanton, 1972) ethic took precedence over individual maximization. Recipients of government loans would often share these with others. If one is able to avail of production inputs and his friend or relative is not, he might share these with the less fortunate one. Because the inputs are only enough for the hectarage of one farm and it is stretched to cover two, optimal yield is not achieved on either one. People also shared land (housetlots and fields) with poor relations as well as shared food. This represents redistribution to a specific group of people chosen by the one with the resources to be shared. When
designing the commodity oriented cooperatives, the developers ignored the reality of pre-existing social alliances and its inverse, the factions which hamper cooperation.

These non-cooperative sentiments were most often displayed through mistrust of members of the other faction and ironically, are based in the ethics of sharing. A good example is the situation surrounding aid given after Typhoon Saling. The first donation received was 1000 pesos from a private source to be distributed to the most needy i.e. those who lost their homes. The barangay captain argued that to distribute the donation in such a manner would cause jealousy among the people not receiving aid and invite comments that he gives community resources only to his friends. Consequently, the donation was used to buy nails and each household received about 1/2 a kilo whether or not the house was damaged. When the second donation arrived, this time from the government to be used in the same manner (i.e. given to the most needy), the captain was out of town. The officer-in-charge, who was on the mayor's staff, decided to disperse the donation as directed. The criticism was so loud and prolonged that every subsequent donation, whether in cash or in-kind, was distributed equally. One cash donation gave each household 12 pesos (about 50 cents). Another donation resulted in the distribution of 1/2 kilo of dried milk to every household, regardless of need or the presence of children.

The farmers distinguished between general and particular patterns of distribution of goods and services. Those goods considered as belonging in the sphere of what was to be shared were not to be distributed to individuals and especially not along kin, friendship or political lines. The official who dispersed large sums to those he considered to be the most needy was labelled corrupt as he was viewed as misappropriating goods meant for the entire barangay in order to give them to his cronies. The moral basis of this attitude was the feeling that each family in the barangay was poor and though levels of desperation were recognized, each considered himself to be deserving of public aid. One farmer repeatedly expressed the sentiment that the poorest members of the community should be helped. He did what he could to help them. But though his house was barely damaged, he also applied for aid. While
expressing a communal "right to survive" sentiment, he sought to maximize his situation because he, too, was poor. His maximizing behavior was informed by the communal moral stance regarding the redistribution of public goods. In this regard, the "rational peasant" was informed by the "moral peasant."

There were other signs of tension between stated ideals and actual behavior which the developers did not consider. The term bayanihan originally referred to the practice of community members helping a barangay mate move his house. In the barangays studied, it was extended to refer to unpaid labor either on a community wide project such as a road or help in a neighbor's field. The term then evolved to encompass paid field labor when the laborers are from one's barangay. All three usages are current among farmers and it can be confusing when one talks about the bayanihan method. In the interviews I conducted, some would use the term to describe paid labor; others, family labor. Yet if one asks for a definition of the term, invariably the "pure definition" removed from a specific situation, always referred to unpaid help rendered by community members. The term was used rhetorically by both developers and farmers to describe the Filipino ethic of helping out and implicit in its meaning was the notion of self help. NIA staff kept trying to invoke the spirit of bayanihan through the cooperatives and in speeches given during trainings. While the mood invoked by the term remains unchanged, the community spirit on which it is based is not always present but depends on the particular situation and the individuals involved.

**Intended and Unintended Consequences**

NIA's main tool was persuasion - the goal being to persuade less technologically advanced groups to adopt certain technological advances. Because groups which are not technologically advanced are seen as being "traditional" (with all of the psychological/cultural baggage that word implies), a subsidiary goal is to "modernize" these "traditional" social groups. NIA was not successful in its attempts to create a model development project by creating model peasants because the latter insisted on intervening in the process and interjecting traditional cultural (and political forms) -
forms which NIA staff rhetorically sanctioned but in practice, stifled.

One of NIA's stated goals was the transformation of community leaders, particularly politicians, into developers. As we have seen, the politicians were able to coopt the project and use it to strengthen their positions. However, NIA was partially successful in its educational efforts. Some of the community leaders did learn planning, communication and management techniques - the most notable of these were the barangay captain and BNS-DW of Buendia and the mayor of Marquez. In several others was instilled a desire for some types of education. One councilman in Marquez commented that he wanted to learn to "speak like the mayor."

NIA also succeeded in reinforcing PAU's image as a center for innovative development plus the project gave the university access to the provincial government which it did not previously have.

In Buendia, NIA was not able to transfer social science theory and terminology but was able to be the catalyst for the initiation of projects. The Oriental despot paradox is present in that it was in Buendia, the town where NIA control was weak, that more development related action (versus training and planning) took place. A non-coercive space was created in which village level development could occur. In Marquez, which was controlled by the center (NIA), initiative was stifled as it was channeled through the bureaucracy.

Development and Farmer Initiative

I have maintained that NIA stifled development in Marquez by overdetermining the development process and aided it in Buendia through benign neglect. It was this paradox which led me to the libraries of Manila to read about the indigenization controversy. I felt that if the NIA staff loosened up theoretically, they would have seen "what was going on" in Buendia - that projects were being started and that these were due to the leadership of the BNS-DW and the barangay captain. As I have tried to
illustrate in the last chapter, it was more than theoretical rigidity which prompted Dr. Gomez to adhere to the NIA structure so very strictly in the villages. However, her strategies were based in a developmental model (NIA) grounded in the cluster of theories which informed her view of social change - modernization, peasant behavior, communication. The emphasis on the role of communication and management led to definitions of project success that valued development on paper over development in the field. Turning in reports, attending trainings and seminars and mastering development jargon seemed to be the criteria by which success was judged. Program institutionalization became the goal instead of the means to achieving a goal (project initiation).

The intent of integrated approaches is to teach "the people" to develop themselves. In this sense, institutionalization is the final goal. But what if the people only need a little information and/or direction and then can take over themselves? In Buendia, where this happened, NIA staff felt that the project had failed because project institutionalization was incomplete - even though the end result was the creation of indigenous developers.

Though I have stressed the positive role of NIA’s benign neglect in Buendia, I do feel that NIA training was valuable to its recipients there. As mentioned previously, training was not as intrusive in Buendia as in Marquez. Only a few sessions were conducted. NIA opened up the development process in Buendia by giving its indigenous developers access to the extension bureaucracy. They were informed about the directives of the various extension organizations; given tours of the university and told about what was happening there in the way of new agricultural techniques. The request for fingerlings was a direct result of one of these tours. They were introduced to university personnel involved in extension and taught to "speak their language." Problems arose when Buendia’s indigenous developers tried to take initiative on their own by going straight to the agency responsible for whatever commodity they were interested in. Buendia’s indigenous developers were frustrated in their efforts because NIA insisted that it be the umbrella for all development related activity in NIA areas.
NIA, then, both stimulated development, by opening up the process, and stifled it, by trying to control the process.

The ostensible reason for controlling interaction between NIA villages and other developers was to guard against duplication of services. Duplication of services in some areas is certainly a problem. One developer at Island University informed me that a child might be weighed 11 times by 11 different agencies. The bureaucratic remedy is to centralize control. Another remedy might be to loosen control; to let the villagers decide what they need and initiate requests to the various development agencies. Currently, areas are targeted to receive projects which have already been designed. The participating agencies are decided by the project designers. If instead, villagers are given access to developers and kept informed about agency activity, they are able to decide what "innovations" they want and request them. The Bureau of Fisheries station near PAU was constantly getting requests for their "latest fish" by farmers who had heard about the research there. Similarly, farmers who had heard about NIA would request training.

An example of the villagers' ability to articulate their concerns is their preoccupation with rice. Several times, they commented that they felt they needed more help growing their stable crop. The NIA strategy was to diversify the peasant economy by introducing income generating projects based on animal raising and cottage industry. Neither of these sideline activities brought in the the kind of revenue that a good crop of rice would. According to NIA "benchmark data," the average yearly income from rice was roughly double the average yearly income from other activities. According to interviews I conducted in Marquez and Buendia, NIA's estimated income from other activities might be high because it averaged in the few people who had relatively large scale income generating projects. One woman sold ready-to-wear clothes; a few people had tricycles, hand tractors or mini-threshers which they rented. The majority of secondary income sources were less-capital intensive and on a smaller scale. Vegetable gardens were common, but virtually all of them, along with poultry raising were for home consumption. Pigs were raised in order to be sold, but there was
a high mortality rate (as will be discussed later).

Getting the money together to buy inputs for new income generating projects was a problem for many. Loans were often paid in cavans of rice, meaning that farmers had to dip into future food supplies in order to purchase inputs for other financial endeavors. The arenas in which improvement were needed were credit, storage, pricing, crop insurance. The typical scenario involving farmers who relied on usurers went like this. Either money is borrowed for inputs, or borrowing is in-kind, most often the latter. Every bag of input (fertilizer, seed) is paid back with 3 bags of palay (unhusked rice). Interest rates on borrowed money range from 30-100%. If the lender also owns a mill, the farmer is required to process his rice there. The price of rice is set low during harvest and increases as the season goes on. Farmers cannot usually afford, nor do they have room, to store their rice and wait for a better price. They are in a double bind. They often don’t have enough rice for their own use after paying their debts, and when they need to buy rice, towards the end of the season, the price has risen - the rate is one cavan of rice for 3 cavans of unhusked rice from the upcoming harvest. This cycle is well known and well documented. NIA staff tried to solve it through diversification.

It is true that monocropping is a risky endeavor. Typhoons, pests and world markets make the farmer’s position unstable. The small vegetable gardens, goat, pig and mushroom projects, if successful, would ensure farmers a little extra money and better nutrition, but these small scale projects were not enough to tide them over in a bad year. In some instances, they were a drain on household finances. Pigs are a good example of this. They require feeds and medicines. In my interviews with them, former pig raisers explained how they had purchased their piglets with harvest money in hopes of fattening them and selling them later on. They were able to support their animals for a few months, but when the money ran out, they resorted to feeding them rice hulls and were unable to protect them from disease. The pigs had consequently died, and the farmers had nothing to show for their investment. One NIA response to this problem was to suggest that only those farmers with the economic ability to care for
the pig be a project candidate. This, however, leaves out those people for whom the proceeds from the sale of a pig might have a greater economic impact. A parallel response is to initiate low input projects such as vegetable gardens for the poorest villagers. This is definitely a good strategy if one is interested in upgrading nutrition, but it does not help household finances unless it is done on a large scale, and then one is talking about input expenses.

Farmers knew this and tried to express their desire for more help in rice related marketing, credit and technology. NIA’s diversification scheme had potential but would have been more effective if it first strengthened farmers’ positions as rice growers. As it was, inputs needed for rice competed with inputs needed for other income generating projects. The secondary projects were supposed to provide income to be used for rice inputs, but the reverse was true. Instead of paying back goat association loans from the sale of goats, farmers paid them back after rice harvest.

It would have been problematic for NIA if it included credit for rice related inputs and devised its own marketing structure because such efforts would have interfered with national level programs (that were geared towards production, not equity) and the local private economic structure. This latter sector was represented in NIA by some of its municipal level leaders. The mayor of Marquez’ wife was a usurer as was the wife of one of NIA’s resource speakers in Marquez. The mayor’s brother, who was minimally active in the program, owned a warehouse and rice mill. These private systems, however, were not working to the farmer’s advantage - if by advantage one is talking about development and improving the conditions of the poor. They were, however, adequate as systems of subsistence. It was necessary for NIA to ignore farmer requests for help in the credit and marketing domain in rice and focus on technical advice (for rice) and diversification into other areas. Therefore, the farmers’ ability to act in regards to certain interests was curtailed.
Development and Traditional Forms

NIA staff equated their control of the development process as part of the process of rationalization which is necessary to modernization. Traditional forms were not seriously considered as vehicles for modernization. What traditional forms could NIA have mobilized for development?

In Buendia, the barkada group offers a good example. Because "modern" groups accomplish things in committees and other universalistic aggregates, NIA attempted to rationalize the diffusion of innovations by the institutionalization of various utilitarian groups - a goat raising group, vegetable group etc. All individuals interested in raising goats were supposed to join the group, usually a cooperative. As mentioned earlier, these cooperatives fell apart. NIA did not recognize the village factions which existed before NIA was introduced and which had not been eradicated with NIA testimonials and training. The barkadas, on the other hand, succeeded in diffusing commodities within the barangay and because kinship affiliations crossed barangay and status boundaries, to other barangays and to the landless.

Compadrazgo (Godparenthood) system also formed far reaching horizontal and vertical alliances. In this ritual kinship system, sponsors are chosen for baptism and marriage. There is no limit to the number of sponsors one may have. Compadrazgo forms bonds between both the person sponsored and his/her parents. The parents and sponsor become kumares and kupaes (the Tagalog version of compadre and comadre). Several of the sponsors may be friends of the parents who are on the same social strata but always one or two influential and well-off people are chosen. These are people who can be called on for favors. I was told by my barkadas in Buendia, that in their barangay, the kumare of one's kumare was considered one's own kumare meaning that the whole barangay was ultimately related through ritual kinship. The bonds between people were not equally strong and there were divisions within the barangay. Ritual kin relations formed a web which overlay the political factions and though they could not unite the factional groups, certain individuals acted as points of
interaction between them and could be used to disseminate goods and information. This type of non-structured dissemination through individual interaction differs radically from NIA's vision of rationalized commodity based dissemination groups.

Scheduling is another sphere in which NIA staff could have been more ethnographically sensitive. The NIA weekly training sessions were maintained during times when the agricultural workload was heavy. The HYV's introduced during the Green Revolution have a very small harvesting threshold - they cannot be left in the field after they are ripe. When attendance was low at meetings during harvest, Dr. Gomez would comment that training was vital to the success of the project and cite studies which indicated the positive correlation between frequency of meetings and group cohesion. Attendance would fluctuate wildly and though she would discuss the need to work in the fields when explaining the low turnout to me, she would still have meetings at inopportune times.

There were also problems with the overnight trainings which were set up according to the university schedule and did not take the schedules of the participants into account. A nine-day overnight training was scheduled during the school semester. The BNS-DW of Buendia was a head teacher in the barangay elementary school. Rural schools do not have a substitute teacher system. Either the principal would have to take over her classes or they would be dismissed. The BNS-DW tried to explain this to Dr. Gomez, but the latter informed her that it was vital she receive training. Dr. Gomez' strictness in this case was puzzling considering that this particular BNS-DW was working on her masters in psychology and was already familiar with the development concepts which would be introduced at the seminar.

Similarly, a two day training for all NIA barangay captains had been planned when Typhoon Saling hit Nueva Ecija. Despite the heavy damage in Marquez and Buendia, NIA staff still held the training the day after the typhoon. The captains did not want to leave their barangays because they said they needed to assess the damage, make damage reports and request government aid. Dr. Gomez told them that as the umbrella
organization, NIA would teach them how to deal with the disaster and that attendance was mandatory at the meeting. However, disaster relief was not a subject at that meeting, the time being devoted to lectures in development communication and nutrition.

Basically, I believe that two related things need to change in order for NIA (and projects like it) to be successful in affecting villagers’ lives in a significant way. First, NIA staff need to recognize the various contributions which traditional forms play in modernization. Number one can only happen in number two: an atmosphere which is considerably less controlled than it currently is. The idea of guided social change is inconsistent with the theatrical metaphor which Dr. Gomez was so fond of: "the villagers are the players and NIA supplies the props." In reality, NIA supplied the props, script, director, and producer; the villagers were the actors.

NIA staff did not filter everything they saw in the villages through the lens of development theory. They would sometimes comment that they knew that a meeting time was inconvenient for farmers, or that this faction did not get along with that faction. They would rhetorically laud Filipino traditions while they were in the process of rationalizing them. It was not ignorance of village life which led to overdetermination of development but the belief that development proceeded in certain ways and that indigenous systems played no real part in the development process. Culturally relevant development models are possible only if the potential which traditional forms have in aiding social change is recognized. NIA’s constant surveillance and control of the development process belies a mistrust on the part of developers of the peasants’ ability to act in their own behalf. Loosening of control would give project recipients a chance to act on their own initiative. How could NIA have loosened its grip?

NIA’s main problem was that it went too far in its efforts to organize the barangay and was too intrusive. Training sessions devoted to planning, agricultural and household finances, technical advice and available extension services were often effective. The devotion to chart making and reporting, however, served only to
separate those who had a command of "social science" from those who did not. If one judges NIA according to level of indigenous participation and projects begun, it was most successful when it introduced the barangay people to technicians in the line agencies and university departments through tours and invited seminars; conducted a few training sessions; offered help in acquiring inputs and then *informally* monitored the level of development by attending barangay meetings.

The advent of appropriate technology signaled the decline of rural developers' fascination with Western technology and the recognition of the role which indigenous technology can play in development. The same type of opening is needed in development ideology. Notions of modernity, rationality, and their relationships to both rural development and peasant strategies need to be examined.

Integral to the process of "de-rationalizing" development would be a movement towards a de-emphasis on the details of project design. Currently project design serves symbolic as well as developmental purposes: different approaches (as designated in the planning process by different designs) signal an individual project's uniqueness and the creativity of its planners. But what rural developers see as major differences, recipients see as rhetorical differences. In my interviews in Marquez and Buendia, villagers categorized the various projects according to the consistency of visits from its agents and their sincerity. Their most frequent complaint was that agents stopped checking up on their progress. This is radically different from the developers who categorize projects according to organizational structure and integrated versus commodity focus. The developers' emphasis on organization arises in part, from their devotion to rationalization.
Notes

1. For a good discussion of the worker-peasant strategy see Holmes 1983.

2. In our conversations, the NIA director used the term "sold" to describe the transaction between herself and the mayor. Whether it was really a sale or some other type of arrangement I am not sure because this arrangement came after land reform.

3. Kumare (or kupare) is derived from the Spanish compadre and compadre. It is the term applied to one's children's baptismal and wedding sponsors.

4. Though other models of peasant behavior are being constructed in the Philippine context (Enriquez, 1986; Kerkvliet, 1979), the NIA director did not incorporate them into her strategy. Given her singular attention to development communication models, I am fairly certain she was not acquainted with constructions of peasant behavior which fell outside of this rubric.

5. According to Hollensteiner (1963), general patterns of distribution include shared goods such as roads, water; particular patterns of distribution benefit individuals or small sectors of a society.

6. I am not advocating a "felt needs" approach. "Felt needs" still relies on an outside intermediary to articulate and rationalize peasant concerns. This person is sent from an agency in order to coax villagers into expressing their desires through the medium of an interview schedule. For a good discussion of "felt needs," see Castillo, 1983.

7. Certain sectors of the rural economy operate on the exchange of money or the exchange of cavans of unhusked rice. Rent of agricultural machineries was often appraised on a peso basis: 450 pesos/ha for a hand tractor. At the same time, interactions with the government could be on a cavan basis: 3.5 - 4.5 cavans/ha irrigation fee. Day laborers made .04 pesos a seedling for transplanting but received a portion of the harvest for harvesting.
Chapter Five

THE NEED FOR "LOOSENING UP" THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

According to Po (1980), there are only two basic categories into which all development approaches fall: dependent and independent. Her categorization has been echoed by critics of the education for development approach which place this type of education firmly in the sphere of dependent development. It is also a dichotomy which proponents of the indigenization of theory would agree. Using a new dependency perspective, NIA would be considered a dependent approach. It relied on a "foreign" modernization model; tried to channel farmer behavior in a way that paid only rhetorical attention to indigenous forms; employed a method (integration) advocated by the international development community and used foreign funds when available.

NIA staff did not, as none of the PAU developers I interviewed, employ that sort of scheme for categorizing development projects. They used a more focused approach: projects were categorized according to method, not effect. Therefore, they would discuss commodity oriented and integrated approaches and criticized the strategies of their colleagues in the development community along these lines.

The two sets of critiques of development are the property of different academic communities: the sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists who are only peripherally involved in development (I call them the critics of development [as it is practiced now]) and the rural planners, development communicators, extension specialists and technical staff who design and implement the projects (I call them extensionists). Planners and bureaucrats who work on the national and international
levels (government bureaus, in-country AID and FAO stations) comprise another sector. The way each group defines the problems/issues of development are different.

Both planners/bureaucrats and critics are concerned with development in the national and international arenas. They try to see "the whole picture," consider how the Philippines fits into international political and economic spheres. The extensionists work on the micro level and rarely address issues of dependence and independence except rhetorically (as NIA developers did in their testimonials on nationalist development). They focus on small victories: village level cooperatives, animal dispersal etc. instead of taking a broader tack, the goal of which is national economic independence. When NIA staff looked for markets for Marquez' commodities, they were concerned with getting the farmers more income, not with how the local level is tied into the international level through the distribution of commodities. This is a crucial point because it helps explain why the extensionists are not participating in the debates about dependent and independent development.

Critics are often pit against both planners and extensionists as they analyze the actions of the latter two: what development "really" does (increase income disparity; underdevelop the Third World etc.). Planners and extensionists often see these critiques as unhelpful because they rarely offer usable alternatives; the word usable refers to alternatives which would fit within the existing system. Marxist critiques do not, therefore are not usable.

Just as NIA tried to control development on the village level, bureaucrats and planners control extensionists in a manner which inhibits creative approaches to development. They do this in two interrelated ways: education (of extensionists) and accountability (to the bureaucracy).

Development, as an academic subject, has been fragmented into many different disciplines, each having a particular focus and methodology. To use economic phraseology, the development market has become disciplinarily saturated. The process
of packaging development into projects and competing for funding has contributed to theoretical rigidity. Different approaches are housed in different departments at PAU and the funding structure is such that they must compete for grants in order to carry out their research and extension mandates. At PAU, degrees were offered in rural sociology, rural development, extension, agricultural economics, development communication, nutrition and various agricultural foci. Graduates of these different departments would enter the various extension related government bureaus where they would try to institutionalize the special approach they learned at school. As different departments (development strategies) compete, the development process becomes atomized. Each competitor must emphasize how his/her approach is different and better.

The funding process segments the development process into discrete packages i.e. projects. Each project has a beginning, middle and end. When the reports are turned into to the funding agency, the project is over and it is time to begin a new one. The barangays surrounding PAU had a history of receiving projects, most of which failed when the university pulled out. Social change, then, is viewed as resulting from the introduction of projects. It is not the result of any internal dynamic nor is it an ongoing process, but one which must be packaged and managed by outside experts.

The packaging of projects and the system of reporting contributes to passing obenchmark data and project reports as research. The amount of time and paperwork which accountability requires inhibits creative research (that might perhaps lead to more relevant models) in two ways: it is time consuming and it reinforces the idea that social scientific research consists only of quantifiable data: a complaint I heard from several educators and which has been the subject of several papers.

Given the constraints discussed above, can development models be made more culturally relevant? Despite their insistence that the development process be made to conform to the NIA model, NIA staff were sensitive to "what was going on" in the villages and in two cases, the NIA director changed her strategy accordingly.
The first involved the mayor of Marquez and the mayor of another NIA municipality - the one in which PAU was situated. Dr. Gomez wanted the mayor of Marquez to speak at an NIA meeting in PAU’s home municipality. The latter felt it would be an insult to the other mayor. Gomez did not agree; he would be acting as an NIA functionary, not as a mayor. NIA had incorporated him and transformed him so the mayor of the PAU home town would understand and not be insulted. Though it took three days, Dr. Gomez was finally persuaded that traditional courtesy should win out over NIA strategy.

The other incident involved the mayor of Marquez’ wife. After her refusal to be a part of NIA (her outright antagonism towards the project), Dr. Gomez decided that the NIA structure had to be altered to include a place for the spouses of important NIA participants. The recognition that politicians must be incorporated was extended to include their spouses.

I included these examples to make the point that local developers, sharing the same cultural background as their clients, are sensitive the needs of the latter and are able to open up the development process to include traditional forms. They need, however, to be given more freedom to do this intellectually - by training them to be more responsive to traditional forms instead of focusing extension training on the restructuring of them. In the cases cited, the loosening of control was theoretically sanctioned because they were of a political nature and the developers had been trained to be sensitive to barangay politics: being insensitive insures project failure. If this kind of ethnographic sensitivity could be expanded to include other cultural forms, more culturally relevant development models would result.

Local level developers (extensionists) also need to be released from some of the accountability which formed the paper trail from the village to NIA to PAU to the national funding agency to AID, FAO etc. Dr. Gomez’ near obsession with reports was in part theoretically based: training the indigenous developers to write reports was part of the process of rationalizing development in the villages. They were also
a way to prove to her superiors and funding agencies that the project was working, that it was worth funding, that it was in line with the international trend in participatory development. Progress reports written by the indigenous developers offered proof of their participation. Like all local level developers whose work is funded and guided at the national level, Dr. Gomez was held accountable to the development hierarchy (local, regional, national, international). If she wished further support, she must show that NIA deserved it i.e. that it "worked."

This type of accountability is manifested throughout the development hierarchy. In his study of the Agency for International Development (AID), Hobern (1980) discusses the agency's "institutional incentive" to move money. AID's largest financial commitments are in those countries which the U.S. Congress and administration believe to be of strategic importance and Congress individually approves funding for each AID project. Though development is one goal of international aid, other goals, like pacification and a show of support for a certain government are important: often central. After Congress has elected to show support for a government by committing a certain amount of funds, it is AID's job to disperse these monies. One AID official in the Philippines told me how difficult it was to disperse monies in the Philippines. He was frustrated because the Philippine government was holding up the disbursement process and if something was not done quickly, the funds would have to be sent back. His job, then, would not have been done. Like NIA, AID institutional goals begin to take precedence over development goals in an effort to satisfy the bureaucratic requirements of the agency(ies) on the next rung up in the development hierarchy.

Goodell's study of the Dez Irrigation project seems to suggest that after an initial infusion of monies and inputs, villagers should be largely left to their own devices in order to give them the space they need to use their own initiative. My own study of a small scale project, NIA, also suggests that local initiative is best encouraged when the development process is not overdetermined. Development "clients" need to be given access to the development process by being introduced to institutions, individuals and ideas and must be given the freedom to incorporate these into existing structures. I am
not suggesting that social change should not be guided. It is naive to think that rural areas will be "left alone" to development independently of the international economic system. The job of local level rural developers then is one of mediation - between the national and local levels. They already occupy the structural position which allows them the mediative role. They need, however, a different kind of introduction to the process of development - training which allows them to be creative and flexible, to realize that there are different paths to development and that tradition has a useful role to play in this process.
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Appendix I

Acronyms

BNS-DW  Barangay Nutrition Scholar - Development Worker
BSK  A nationally coordinated barangay level women’s group
FMT  Farm Management Technician
MAF  Ministry of Agriculture and Food
MAR  Ministry of Agrarian Reform
MECS  Ministry of Education and Sports
MPH  Ministry of Public Health
NACIDA  National Association of Cottage Industry and Development Authority
NFA  National Food Authority
NIA  National Irrigation Administration
NNC  National Nutrition Council
PAU  Philippine Agricultural University
RHU  Rural Health Unit
## Appendix I. Barangay Integrated Development Framework Plan - Buendia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>When to Begin</th>
<th>Persons Involved</th>
<th>Agencies</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Resources Needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Low Food Production:</td>
<td>Increase yields:</td>
<td>- from 70 cavans to 80 cavans/ha.</td>
<td>- 100% of farmers</td>
<td>- encourage farmers to use high yield varieties</td>
<td>Jun - Dec 1986</td>
<td>- farmers, PPIC, BNS-DW</td>
<td>- MAF, MAR, NIA, NFA</td>
<td>- seminars, home visitation, follow-ups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) rice</td>
<td></td>
<td>- 100% of households</td>
<td>- plant vegetables, raise fish &amp; livestock</td>
<td>Oct - Dec 1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) integrated farming</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to have another source of income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) lack of home industries</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to have another source of income</td>
<td>- dressmaking, hair science, light mechanics, brick making masonry</td>
<td>1986 - 1989</td>
<td>- BSY, landless, home-makers</td>
<td>- MECS</td>
<td>seminars, trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) compost into fertilizer</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to have another source of fertilizer other than inorganic</td>
<td>- to teach people how to use organic fertilizer</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>- barangay people, FMT</td>
<td>- MECS</td>
<td>training &amp; demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) no pre-school</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to have a pre-school</td>
<td>- children 4-6 years old</td>
<td>1986 - 1989</td>
<td>- parents of children 4-6 years old, PPIC, BNS-DW</td>
<td>- MECS, local government</td>
<td>training for teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) low attendance at meetings and not coming on time</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to get people to attend meetings on time and regularly</td>
<td>- barangay people</td>
<td>PPIC meetings (2nd Sunday of the month) and assembly meeting</td>
<td>PPIC; BNS-DW; barangay people</td>
<td>- local officials</td>
<td>- give notices; encouragement by PPIC; discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Spiritual Development:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no chapel</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to have one chapel</td>
<td>- chapel</td>
<td>1985 - 1987</td>
<td>- barangay people</td>
<td>- parish council</td>
<td>PPIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Infrastructure:</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) bad road</td>
<td></td>
<td>- to have improved road; always dump anything on the road and make canals for flooded areas</td>
<td>- barangay road</td>
<td></td>
<td>- barangay people</td>
<td>- MPH, local government</td>
<td>- barangay (self-help)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) tree limbs which hinder vehicles</td>
<td>-cut all limbs hanging over road</td>
<td>-barangay road</td>
<td>-encourage people to cut limbs</td>
<td>-barangay people</td>
<td>-barangay council</td>
<td>-barangay (self-help)</td>
<td>——</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) bridge</td>
<td>-to improve the flooded area</td>
<td>barangay road</td>
<td>-to make a resolution or petition paper</td>
<td>1985 - 1989</td>
<td>barangay people</td>
<td>barangay council</td>
<td>barangay (self-help)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>e) barangay hall</td>
<td>-to build a barangay hall</td>
<td>barangay hall</td>
<td>-cooperation of barangay people</td>
<td>1986 - 1989</td>
<td>provincial government</td>
<td>barangay council</td>
<td>barangay (self-help)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| V. Sports & Culture | -to have sports equipment for baseball, volleyball and basketball | -sports equipment | -as recreation for and old | Jun - Apr 1986 | -student, farmers, home-makers | -MECS; Nueva Ecija Sports Association | -PPIC; private persons | -PAU for training seminar |

| VI. Justice, Peace & Order | a) troubles among neighbors | -to lessen barangay troubles | -persons involved | -to let them be friends again | anytime | -PPIC; barangay tanods; people | -Philippine Constabulary & Integrated National Police | -lessen/avoid troubles |
| b) stealing (minor cases) | -to lessen/prevent stealing | -unpleasant cases | -provision of barangay tanod (peace officers) | 1985 - 1989 | barangay tanods; people | -Philippine Constabulary & Integrated National Police | -catch thieves; inform leaders | —— |

| VII. Health & Nutrition | a) sanitary toilet | -to have water served toilet | -100% of the households | -to make or buy water served toilet | Oct - Dec 1985 | -all families who do not have a water served toilet | -RHU | -seminar about health -puruk visitation to select needy houses |
| b) clean surroundings | -sanitary drains -garbage dumping area -good fences | -to have clean yard for each household | -to have/make dumping area for garbage -to make fences | Oct - Dec 1985 | barangay people, PPIC, BNS-DW | local officials (barangay level) | —— | -self-help |
| c) lack of herbal plants and coconut trees | -to learn how to grow herbs and coconut trees | -100% of households to have herb gardens and 2-3 coconut trees | -to let people know the importance of herbal plants | 1985 - 1986 | barangay people, PPIC, BNS-DW | barangay people | —— | -Chairman of education committee |
| d) knowledge of balanced diet and birth control | -to gain knowledge in nutrition and family planning | -couples and adult members of barangay | -encourage people to attend trainings | 1986 - 1987 | BNS-DW, PPIC, barangay people | -Population Control, NNC, RHW | -seminar, trainings, field trips | -PAU, pre-formal education |
Appendix II

Selections from Test for NIA Indigenous Developers

The following questions were lifted from a 160 question multiple choice test given after the 10 day training session. Technical sections were administered in English. Sections such as "Diversion of Vices into Productive Endeavors" were administered in Tagalog.

1. The incharge of the project is A) B) C) D) - four names of university personnel follow.

2. The integrated farm at the university gained full operation in a) 1977 b) 1978 c) 1979 d) 1980.

3. The farm also serves as a model farm for a) farmers b) extension workers c) visitors d) all of the above.

4. Vegetable cropping pattern is principally influenced by a) soil types b) climatic distribution c) variety d) marketing.

5. In vermiculture the biogas by-product utilized as bedding material is a) sludge b) slurry c) all of the above.

6. Classes are automatically suspended when storm signal no. a) I b) II c) III d) IV is hoisted.

7. Flood condition No. I is under a) watch period b) alert period c) calamity period d) flood mitigating period.

8. The most needed qualification of a BNS-DW is that a) he is a high school graduate b) he shows deep concern on the welfare of his barangay c) he is not less than 25 years of age d) he possesses leadership qualities.

9. India was the first Asian Country have to launched a series of Five-year Development plans which started in a) 1952 b) 1954 c) 1950.

10. There are at least a) 8 steps b) 6 steps c) 7 steps in planning.

11. Mobilization is a) tapping people and moving them into concerted actions b) introducing new concepts c) evaluating the program.
12. When one is able to predict the possible behavior of the other documentation, communication is said to be a) interpersonal b) mass c) intrapersonal d) cultural.

13. Communication is a) hindrance b) intentional c) symbiotic d) obvious.

14. The idea of complementation was born February of a) 1982 b) 1981 c) 1979 d) none of the above.

15. Some of the consequences of overpopulation are a) hunger and abortion b) irreversible brain damage c) inadequate education d) none of the above e) all of the above.
Appendix III
Testimonials from NIA Initiation Ceremony

During a candlelight ceremony which followed the initial municipal wide training session for NIA, each participant was asked to say a few words about the program.

"First of all, by this time I am calling to our Lord Jesus Christ so that this NIA will be attained by the people, especially the people of the barrio, not only in this town, but all over the Philippines."

"May the Lord give us a longer life so that the attainment of the program NIA will be found out. If we are not given a longer life by our Lord, we won't be able to realize our ambition to succeed the NIA." (sic)

"There are many projects that have been given to our barangay, but for me, only this NIA will be successful."

"I will do my best in whatever project that my townmates will launch in NIA."