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Rice University, 1988
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THE REALITY OF REALIGNMENT IN THE POST WORLD WAR II SOUTH

BY

GREGORY S. THIELEMANN

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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The Reality of Realignment in the Post World War II South
Gregory S. Thielemann
Abstract

In recent years, much has been written about the political change that is sweeping the South. This is unusual in that the history of the region is one of stability rather than change. Investigations into the political shifts have tended to center around shifts in partisan electoral preferences. In some cases, scholars even suggest that the South is undergoing a process of partisan realignment. This thesis dissents from that opinion. The historical/cultural explanations of Southern politics describe a society and political structure that was, and is dominated by the individual. Given the history of this one-party region, the competition which emerged was one of factionalism dominated by individuals. Even recent Republican gains reflect the power of individuals in Southern elections.

The thesis explores change at three levels. Initially, it analyzes change in partisanship. While the data indicate that survey respondents are less likely to claim loyalty to the Democrats, their actual voting patterns do not show any commitment to the G.O.P. This factor leaves partisan identification suspect as a predictor of change. The thesis follows with an analysis of inter-party competition by looking at the effects of incumbency and presidential coattails, and intra-party competition where Democrats have a long history of primary competition that Republicans do not share.

The final portion of the thesis links these electoral shifts to institutions by looking at the effects of change on conservative coalition support. In this regard the region's conservatism is shown to be bi-partisan. The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that political change is overstated in the South and not linked to the theory of partisan realignment.
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INTRODUCTION

The political landscape of the American South has undergone significant shifts in the years following World War II. What was primarily a one-party region has recently shown signs of competitiveness. Where Republicans never ran, they now occasionally win and this change has been a source of focus for scholars of political behavior in the U.S. Many of these scholars have argued that the South has become mainstream and no longer needs to be treated as unique from the rest of the nation. This thesis explores the degree of this political change and its implications.

To begin with, the South's history has placed it in a unique position. The extent of the change from 1946 to 1986 can only be understood through utilization of the historical literature. V.O. Key described the American South in 1950 as a region that trailed behind the rest of the United States. He pointed to the problems of disenfranchisement, malapportionment, Jim Crow racism and the staggering effect of the one-party system as causal agents for this uniqueness. In short, the South at the end of World War II was poorer, more racist and politically less developed than the rest of the nation. Political competition occurred between individual leaders of Democratic party factions as two-party competition did not exist. By and large, more recent scholars tell us that these problems have disappeared or at least become less important. The changes in the social policies and economic advancement in the South are irrefutable and this was exactly what Key suggested would happen if these four barriers to progress were removed. It may be, however, that this progress has occurred in spite of these problems in the South rather than as a result of their demise. In fact, the extent of the change may be greatly exaggerated.

Explaining the roots of these politics is also important in understanding the politics in the postwar period. In order to accomplish this task a general history of the region is explored in Chapter one. This chapter looks at the the role of the parties in the region and the way they develop through the different party systems in U.S. history. Chapter two follows this regional history with a discussion of the sub-regional patterns of politics that exist between the Deep South states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia and the Rim South states of Arkansas, Florida, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina. Thus, the historical section will provide a basis for the study of the shifts in the postwar period and justification for looking at the South in sections rather than as a unified region.
The extent of the change has often been a source of debate. Some have argued that the change is indicative of partisan realignment while others have argued that the Southern electorate has simply realigned creating a system with reduced importance on partisanship as a voting cue. Towards this end, this thesis examines electoral change in three regards.

Chapters three through five explore electoral change in the South by looking at competition and the increase of competitiveness in the region. Chapter three deals exclusively with competition in partisanship. Most of the recent work on Southern politics concentrates on partisan change in order to justify the position that the South has indeed shifted towards competition. On this subject, the National Election Study data provides a mechanism for determining the degree of partisan shift and is employed in the chapter. A second level of competition takes a more basic approach and simply looks at election results in the region. Chapter four deals with the actual results of inter-party competition by examining the wins and margins of victory at the various electoral levels in order to determine the shifts and safeness of the seats. In addition, the phenomena of incumbency advantage and Presidential coattails will be considered. Chapter five looks at intra-party competition. This chapter deals with the development of competition within the primaries in the South. It also quantifies the effect of primary competition on the outcomes of general elections.

Electoral change becomes important to government not only because it determines who wins, but also because it shifts the balance of power in the institutions of government. Chapter six explores the ideological makeup of the region and the way that transcends into institutional policy making. This chapter explores conservative coalition voting in the postwar era to test the effect of change on policy voting. The role of change in institutions is also important in the literature on realignment, which is so often referred to in writings on Southern political change. The conclusion of this thesis explains what this change means to Southern politics and theories of electoral change. This thesis suggests that the change may be greatly exaggerated. Initially, the historical/cultural explanations suggest that the South was never competitive and that the change could be significant. It also suggests that individual leaders are important to this process and thus, may be more important than party in this region. These explanations are coupled with the data on the region's competitiveness in the middle chapters of the thesis. Finally, the effect these electoral shifts have on institutions are considered. With the three levels of history, competition and institutions explored, the thesis can relate competition to the theories of electoral change and realignment.
CHAPTER 1- THE MODERN SOUTH FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to understand political change in the South since 1945 and the reasoning behind political science's attempt to place the South in the mainstream of American politics, the history of the region must be considered. For the South, history is paramount. Its development is molded by its ties to a past which have not always been ideal for the ego of the region's citizens. In spite of this, the Southerner has remained zealous in his regional pride. The thesis developed here and in the following chapters is that the South's history explains the type of politics that exist in its post WW II era. In some ways, the South has never really changed. The historical tradition of isolation and the experience of defeat and humiliation that accompanied the Civil War and Reconstruction have molded a particular type of politics. These factors created a one-party South, with all politics dominated by this party's leaders. These leaders were part of the Southern aristocracy; after the Civil War, they were called the Bourbon Oligarchy, and their domination of the Democratic party and Southern politics was complete. When the establishment was challenged and even defeated by the charismatic populists the theme of isolation remained. These leaders used the themes of the Civil War and the subsequent occupation to their advantage.

The tracing of these themes through Southern history explains why stability has been the rule and change the exception (when exceptions even existed). The postwar change has centered around the parties in the South and the strategies they pursue. In each party's case, history profoundly influences its current version. It has impacted both parties' strategies and candidates and is, thus, important in discussing the change that has occurred since 1945.

At present change and development are critical to the South. Jimmy Carter emphasized this when he was inaugurated as governor of Georgia in 1971. In his inaugural speech he quoted William Jennings Bryan, who in the century before had said, "It is not a matter of change, it is a matter of choice. Destiny is not a thing to be waited for. It is a thing to be achieved (Wooten, 1978, p. 301)." The South has certainly been trying to achieve this destiny of greatness, the real question has always been what that destiny entailed.

Those researching Southern politics will inevitably be faced with the difficult task of assessing the literature. Even the greatest scholar of the Southern political arena, V.O.
Key, lamented this in his preface to Southern Politics In State and Nation (1949). He wrote, "Of books about the South there is no end. Nor will there be as long as the South remains the region with the most distinctive character and tradition (p. ix)." Of course, the use of the words character and tradition signal difficulties in reversing the trend. As much as Key might have wished otherwise, character and tradition are ingrained in the South; despite the passage of time that historical tradition and character remains unique. Professor Key continued, "Yet in all the writings about the South there exists no comprehensive analysis of its politics (ibid)." None, that is, prior to Key's.

Contemporary scholars return to Key without exception. Many even borrow his state by state organization in their writings. In each case the themes of isolation and shared humiliation resurface. In some respects, the work of Key in 1949 is the guiding force behind this work as well. The question is how much change has occurred from the South that V.O. Key described. In order to explore this change, the relevant history of the South before 1949 needs to be discussed. Obviously, if the South's history has a stagnating effect, then change should not be expected or observed to any great degree.

The United States has consistently held to a two-party system. When the makeup of the parties who play a major role changes, the party system changes. In the first system, the South was distinct, but the problems were not as accentuated as they would be. The basic distinction was that these colonies were further away from Philadelphia and were geographically more isolated. If we look at the South in the colonial days, it is clear that the Southern settlers were already set apart from the rest of the colonies. This distinctiveness later grew into an economy that was primarily agriculturally based, and thus heavily dependent upon slave labor. The important consideration in the first party system is the South's initial geographic isolation.

In the second party system the South's isolation was on policy grounds. The issues more crucial to understanding the postwar era emerge with the third party system corresponding with the Civil War cleavages. The issue of slavery was a central concern. This does not mean that the slavery issue was a phenomenon which appeared in 1860. In fact, it was an important issue all during the second party system which began in 1824. This period was characterized by intense competition between the two dominant parties, the Whigs and the Democrats. Bartley and Graham (1975) note that this competition was significant even in the region of the South. In the 1830's the average margin of victory was 15.6 percent, but this was reduced to 4.1 percent in the 1840's (p.4). As would
follow in later party systems, each party also engaged in intra-party competition between its regional factions. Questions of slavery were often resolved by compromise; great statesmen like John Calhoun, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster charted a course that preserved unity in spite of these regional differences. In retrospect, the issue of slavery could not be compromised away. In spite of the Compromise of 1850, the division remained. Abolitionist forces had been growing in the North throughout the second party system and were often electorally significant. Neither party could address the question of slavery without agitating some sectors of their support bases. Thus, after 1850, slavery became a source of division between the South and the rest of the country. This division eventually led to the downfall of the Whigs and their subsequent replacement in the third party system by the Republican party.

This process of disintegration served to reinforce the isolation of the region. The Compromise of 1850 was barely tolerated by either side. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act signaled the end of the politics of compromise. The battle between anti-slavery and pro-slavery forces in these territories cut across existing party lines. Eventually, the anti-slavery forces won out by uniting under the common banner of the Republican party. Slavery had become an all-consuming issue. It had moral, social, and economic ramifications in addition to the obvious political ones. Thus, it is not surprising that as the issue took on more dimensions, its salience increased. Benjamin Ginsberg (1972) has demonstrated this in his analysis of issue salience in the pre-Civil War era. The two parties responded to this division with striking differences in their positions. The Republicans embraced abolitionist doctrines while the Democrats echoed states rights rhetoric and non-interference. The effect on the South was to drive it exclusively into the Democratic camp. This trend would outlive the third party system.

Southern historians reflect upon the Civil War in different ways. Its ramifications are important to understanding the South after World War II. To Key the two most important factors were the move towards internal division in the South and an increase in the xenophobia of the region, and thus isolation (Key, op.cit. pp.6-7). Each of these is important. The divisions would set the stage for one-party and, in fact, one-issue dominance over the political agenda of the region. The xenophobia would serve to further isolate the South from the rest of the country and reinforce the positions of those who clung to antiquated Southern values and myths.

The internal division of the South led directly to one-party Democratic dominance
in the third party system. By the emergence of the Civil War, it was clear that the Republican's was the party of the abolitionists and the Democrat's that of slavery. The defeat of the Confederacy did little to change Southern opinions about the Negro or the South's "just cause." The experience of the occupation and Reconstruction did little to change this basic attitude. In fact, it entrenched it further in the minds of the Southern whites, who felt increasingly threatened by the blacks. As a result, they turned to their trusted friend, the Democratic party. The Democratic party became, in Key's words, "a holding company" for the various democratic interest groups (p. 16). Black-belt whites and the traditional Bourbon Democratic elite formed a substantial base that dwarfed the Republicans in the South. Fraud ran high on all sides, but the general Democratic dominance persisted. In spite of this one-party, factionalized system, voter turnout was high. It averaged 66 percent in the region between 1868 and 1892. The lack of intra-party competition obviously did not reduce interest (Bartley and Graham, p. 4). Regional interest peaked in South Carolina's 1876 elections as 101 percent of the eligible voters turned out to exercise their constitutional right to vote. (ibid).

The xenophobic tendency of the region were increased by the Civil War. The experience of Reconstruction left a brand on the South difficult to erase. While membership in such extremist groups as the Klan certainly did not make up a majority of the Southerners in the post Civil War years, sympathy for the cause of the Confederate principle persisted. Beyond a mere resistance to recognize the freedmen as equals, the experience made the South more aware of its uniqueness in the national scheme. The prominent historian, C. Vann Woodward explained that the South is self-conscious of itself due to its experiences. One of these experiences weighing heavily in his analysis is the Civil War experience of failure and defeat (p. 36). In short, the history of the South explains the South's inertia (p. 21). The Civil War thus led to two important trends that would mold future Southern politics. Initially, it solidified the Democratic party as the party of the South, establishing the long tradition of one-party hegemony in the region. It also served to isolate the South by encouraging and accentuating its regional idiosyncrasies. This in turn increased Southern independence.

The fourth party system was established by the realignment of the 1890's. The end result was to establish the Republican party as the dominant political party in the U.S., but certainly not in the South. With the Compromise of 1876 and the subsequent end to Reconstruction, the visible reminders of the Civil War were removed; the
emotional scars remained. They were visible in the form of the free blacks. All the
bigotry remained, appearing in the form of segregation, discrimination, and violations of
Negro rights through such ingenious tools as the Jim Crow laws.

While change was taking place in this period, these changes did not make the
Democrats the majority party. The emergence of the Populists as a viable third party
further complicated the situation. In the South, the Democrats remained the dominant
party. The overall Democratic vote in the region dropped considerably in 1894 and 1896
(Brady, 1988). This was a result of the Populists more than any shift towards the
G.O.P. Only when the G.O.P. was able to combine their traditional mountain bases with
these Populist interests were they able to extract electoral gains (Tindall, p. 16). The rise
of the Populists did pose a threat to old line Democratic domination and thus demanded a
response. Following the close call of 1896, the Bourbon interests were forced to deal
with the people's party interests. The Democratic party had already become the free
silver party which was a critical part of the Populists' doctrine. This had made the
problem of the Populists moot. When the Democratic party was taken over by the free
silver interest and they opted to nominate William Jennings Bryan in 1896, they had
effectively ended realignment in the South. Bryan was a Populist in every way except
name (Sundquist, 1973, p. 140). This meant that the Populist idea of merging the toiling
masses of all races into coalition was destined for defeat in the South. The Democrats,
after all, were the party of the South. They had chased the "Negro-loving carpet-baggers"
out of the region. The coalition of Southern poor was significant due in part to the
abnormally high degree of poverty in the region (Woodward, p. 36). The populist party
regulars and the Democrats merged all over the region. In the South, the seniority of the
Democrats placed them at the head. This meant that the the Bourbon establishment was
secured and the Negro had been left high and dry. The Republicans alone could not
challenge the Democrats and a majority of the white Populists had joined the Democratic
ranks. That alone was insufficient to secure power for the Democratic establishment.
The disenfranchisement that became known as Jim Crow then took over. The South
developed requirements that served to limit Black participation. Poll taxes, literacy tests
and the "Grandfather Clause" were implemented to hold Negro voting to a minimum.
Black voting in the region declined markedly. Brady (1988) has noted that the Border
states deviate here in that after this realignment they begin to exhibit competitive two party
politics, a trend that carries through the post-WW II era this analysis will consider. The
final result of this realignment in the South was less significant than in the rest of the nation. Southern border states became competitive and the eleven Confederate states became more solidly Democratic. The populistic tradition was born, defeated, but not forgotten by Southerners.

Republicans dominated the White House and national politics for most of the fourth party system. The South remained solidly Democratic. The end of Reconstruction had not changed the basic attitudes of Southerners. In politics they were Democrats, and in the nation they were more often than not on the short end of the stick. They remained isolated and bitter from the Reconstruction experience. These politics were due in part to the Republican parties in the South. Theodore Roosevelt summed up the situation when he said,

"In the Southern Atlantic and Gulf States there has really been no Republican Party... simply a set of black and white scalawags... who are concerned purely in getting Federal offices and sending to the national conventions delegates whose venality makes them a menace to the whole party (Tindall, 1972, p. 18)."

By and large this was generally a period of prosperity. The Roaring Twenties did, however, have consequences. This period of non-interventionist policies in the economy led to industrial expansion and agricultural troubles. Brady (1988) has analyzed the period and notes that net farm income dropped by a third between 1919 and 1929; this hit hardest in the South, where the entire region fell below the national average of per capita GNP. All of these trends tended to reinforce the Democrats as the party of the South. Considering the words of South Carolina Senator Coleman L. Blease, this was taken for granted. After noting that Calvin Coolidge received 1,123 votes in the 1924 Presidential balloting in the state he said, "I do not know where he got them. I was astonished to know that they were cast and shocked to know they were counted (Tindall, p. 12)." This period marked the first significant departure from a solid South, demonstrating that not just any Democrat would do. While the Deep South stuck by Al Smith (the urban, liberal, New York Governor), the Rim South deserted the Democrats and became Hoovercrats. In the 1928 elections five Rim South states supported Hoover. Texas, Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Florida, and Arkansas all rejected Al Smith.

When the depression hit, conditions in the region did not improve.
Agricultural defaults and unemployment soared, and the Hoover administration showed a reluctance to act. Thus the primary issue that brought on the New Deal realignment was government intervention in the economy. The Democrats had been arguing for intervention for years and were therefore in a natural position to capitalize on the Republican's misfortune. Franklin Roosevelt put together an incredible coalition in order to win in 1932. At the heart of his coalition was a solid South. This stronghold combined with Blacks, organized labor, urban ethnic groups, farmers and liberal intellectuals (Bartley and Graham, 1975 pp. 8-14).

Voter participation increased in this period as well, reflected by a rise in electoral turnout (ibid, p. 16). This was, however, a particular type of turnout as the Blacks were certainly not included. When Plessy v. Ferguson 1896 limited the Fourteenth Amendment to the right to vote, it did not spell increased enfranchisement for Blacks. Cuudde (1971) has noted this as it relates to Jim Crow laws in Louisiana. There, between 1896 and 1900, Black votes declined 96 percent (p. 43). The Populist threat was the reason then, but the pattern of disenfranchisement continued long after the Populist fusion into the Democratic party was complete. This, of course, came to a head with Grove v. Townsend 1935, when the Supreme Court legalized the all-white primary in Texas, an act that spread like wildfire across the South. This trend continued until Smith v. Allwright reversed the precedent in 1944. When the war came to an end, the region faced the challenge of postwar integration. Black soldiers returned unwilling to accept the second class status Southerners were willing to afford them. The crisis demanded action, and Harry Truman responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1947.

As this section has demonstrated, isolation and humiliation are themes constant to the history of the South. Obviously, they are interrelated. The isolation in colonial days led to more isolation in future years. It built a xenophobia in the region that made secession and the Civil War possible. The consequence of the defeat was humiliation. Southern culture considered itself proud, and proud people do not take well to humbling themselves. This tended to make the Reconstruction all that much more damaging to the southern psyche. After the Civil War, the Democrats were established as the party of the South; and this one-party domination was still in place at the end of World War II.
THE POSTWAR ERA

The history of the South after 1948 is complex and two strategies are employed to explore it. In this introductory section specific topics are traced through the period. In the later analysis of election returns a chronological organization is pursued. The first topic of importance is the G.O.P. One of the major problems Key saw preventing the South from joining the rest of the U.S. was the presence of one-party politics. Its history is an important part of understanding this presence, because the isolation created a type of competition between the parties. In the same vein, the second topic is the internal change within the Democratic party. During this period the Democratic party's strategy and candidates varied considerably. This evolution is also important to understanding postwar change in the South. Finally the subject of race is explored. Each of these areas will serve to elaborate the more quantitative approach in the following chapters.

THE REPUBLICANS

The G.O.P. would have some positive moments after the war in the South. The nomination of national hero Dwight David Eisenhower didn't hurt in 1952. Because of his unique bipartisan appeal, he was able to attract considerable numbers of Democrats in the region where Dewey had failed four years earlier. Ike had ties to Texas which he could and did claim. He may have been a Republican, but he was a proud son of Dixie. Bartley and Graham recall the most telling evidence of this when they wrote of Eisenhower's trip to Columbia, South Carolina. While on the podium the band struck up Dixie. Ike responded instinctively by standing up. When asked about his actions he replied, "I always stand up when they play that song (p.86)." Of course, Republican gains were due to more than Eisenhower's instincts.

Important demographic trends were taking place in the South during the postwar period which served to benefit the G.O.P. Most important among these for the Republicans were an increase in urbanization and an increase in per capita income, which corresponded nicely with the G.O.P.'s fortunes in the region (Havard, 1972, pp. 12-15). The G.O.P. established a base in the suburbs that was quite different from its traditional mountain roots. This was what Jack Bass and Walter DeVries called "conservative chic (p. 52)." Affluent suburban whites began this shift to the G.O.P. as early as 1952. As Donald Strong (1972) has demonstrated, this was limited to the Presidential level, but it was still significant. This suburban shift is not entirely
unexpected. The Democrats had become the party of the poor and the party of labor. Not many skilled workers relished being associated with those groups and thus, for the new suburban affluent in the South, the Republicans became a logical alternative. Others have argued that the South had been too homogeneous in its outlook. This influx of skilled workers diversified the region and allowed a more conservative aspect to take root (Seagull, 1975, p. 7). The evidence from 1948 and 1952 tends to support this, since the overwhelming proportions of Ike's Southern votes were white collar (ibid. pp. 11-12).

The white collar vote explains a great deal of the shift towards the G.O.P., but the regional strategy is of equal importance. Prior to 1952 the Republicans had written off the region as a lost cause. With Ike's presidential bid in 1952, the South became a battleground. The philosophy changed as Ike and the new G.O.P. aggressively sought Southern votes. Eisenhower outcampaigned the Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson in the region. In 1952 Ike visited nine Southern states while Stevenson only came to four (Bartley and Graham, op.cit. p. 86). The G.O.P. was thus able to cultivate the new "conservative chic" that was growing along with the Southern economy. The fact that Eisenhower carried four rim states in 1952 tends to further emphasize the correlation between a changing economic base and G.O.P. fortunes. The relatively more developed states of Texas, Virginia, Tennessee, and Florida all supported the G.O.P. This continued into the 1960's as the Republican party's membership swelled to new highs in the region (Seagull, p. 14). This was markedly different from the G.O.P. of the South that Teddy Roosevelt saw. This aggressive behavior was in many ways limited to the presidential level. V.O. Key had described the G.O.P. as more interested in its machine than votes (p. 292). He found them responsible for the one-party South; the national Republican party was famous for taking money raised in the South outside of the region where it might do some good (p. 296).

Along with the change in strategy came a change in issues. The G.O.P. cannot be given credit for this; they were simply an alternative to some Southern voters. The Republicans, however, have had very little to do with that. The New Deal era brought along many changes that went far beyond the realm of policy. Most important among these was a nationalization of politics. This meant that Southerners were forced to integrate into the national political spectrum or at least think in national terms because the New Deal meant a more active national government (Seagull, p. 9). As long as this
active government was limited to the aiding of region in an economic sense, that is
giving money to the states, the South had no problems with it. When it meant racial
reforms it was not so well received. The Southern voter was experiencing political
stress. These voters felt tremendous crosspressure as they looked for a party to
support. As Seagull put it, they disliked the G.O.P. because of Reconstruction and the
domination of the national party by Eastern money, but they felt betrayed by the National
Democratic Party's stands on the race issue (p. 5).

Race would resurface as the critical issue in the 1960's. Truman began the
shift with his civil rights actions and Ike carried it over. In retrospect Eisenhower's
views on this issue were moderate. He refused to endorse the landmark Brown v.
Board of Education, Topeka Ka, decisions, even though his appointee, Chief Justice
Earl Warren, announced it (Bartley and Graham, pp. 86-87). Eisenhower was not a
civil rights crusader, although he did send troops to Little Rock to the dismay of many
white Southerners to enforce desegregation. As a testament to this ambiguity, the States
Rights protest party carried Virginia and Louisiana in 1956. In 1960, Nixon lacked the
national stature of Ike that had resulted in his bipartisan appeals. Nixon was able to
hang onto Florida, Tennessee and Virginia, but lost in the fertile grounds of Texas and
Louisiana. Bartley and Graham found the problem for the G.O.P. when they looked at
the coattails, or Presidential ticket strength resulting in vote shifts at lower levels.
Nixon had carried 46 percent of the Southern vote, and yet no coattails existed. The
Republicans made no gains in the Black Belt Dixiecrat areas (p.92). They did not elect
a Republican Senator until 1961 when John Tower won a special election to fill Lyndon
Baines Johnson's seat due to a quirk. The so called Kamikaze Democrats in Texas had
more to do with Tower's victory than even Tower did. These were liberal Democrats
who, when the party's nominees were too conservative for their taste, would bolt the
party figuring that a conservative Republican was better than a conservative Democrat.
In 1961 the Texas Democrat's choice of William A. Blakely was one example. Labor
and liberal groups across the state stayed away in droves by telling their followers that
voting in the special election was a waste of time and that they should use the free day to
"go fishin." They did, and Tower won the seat. What the Texas Democrats did not
know was how difficult getting rid of Tower would be. The G.O.P. did show some
signs of life at the Congressional level in 1962 when they added four seats. The South
was showing that the man not the party was the issue. Against that backdrop, the
candidacy of Barry Goldwater was born in 1964.

Most presidential elections in the U.S. are criticized for lack of ideological content. The 1964 contest was one that refuted that classification. Goldwater was an unabashed conservative and Johnson was a defender of the Kennedy/Johnson civil rights reforms. While the 1964 election was a huge defeat for conservatism and the G.O.P., it focused attention on the genius of V.O. Key once again. Key noted in 1950 that the G.O.P. had a major problem in the South; specifically, that in order to make gains in the region they would have to attract poor whites from the Black belt with conservative racial stands; they could not do this without offending their traditional support base in the region, the Mountain Republicans (p. 285). Goldwater would prove him correct. Goldwater went after Black Belt whites with unbridled passion. In the process he turned off the Mountain Republicans, which had an impact on how poorly he ran in the Rim states. He carried 59.6 percent of the Black Belt counties in 1964 where Kennedy only won 57.8 percent of these in 1960 (Bartley and Graham p. 101). The effect of Goldwater on the Southern Republican vote is seen in Table 1.1 Where the results of 1960 and 1964 are compared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC CATEGOR Y</th>
<th>% OF TWO PARTY VOTE 1964</th>
<th>% Nixon 1960</th>
<th>%G Goldwater 1964</th>
<th>% G.O.P. SHIFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHITE BELT</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>+7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUNTAIN</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South FLORIDA</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK BELT</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>+26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGOR Y</th>
<th>% OF TWO PARTY VOTE 1964</th>
<th>% Nixon 1960</th>
<th>%G Goldwater 1964</th>
<th>% G.O.P. SHIFT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>METROPOLITAN</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RURAL</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>+7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Bartley and Graham, op. cit., p. 107

Goldwater's strength was found primarily in the Deep South. While Eisenhower had
performed well in the rim states, he could not break into the heart of Dixie. By pursuing the strategy of seeking out Black-belt whites, Goldwater won Dixie, but lost the Rim. He won all five Deep South states and even lent some coattails to Deep South Republican Congressional hopefuls. The G.O.P. picked up seven new Deep South congressmen, five from Alabama alone. These freshmen did have common ground with Goldwater; they were extreme right wingers like the leader of their ticket (ibid., p. 109). In spite of this, LBJ still won a majority of the region. Some have credited the regional appeal of a favorite son as a deciding factor in this regard. This is no doubt true, but the Goldwater strategy also contributed. Many Republicans must have wondered in 1964 if they hadn't destroyed themselves. The strategy of Goldwater broke new ground in the South by hitting at the heart of Dixie. He did what he said he would. He "went hunting where the ducks were (Tindall, p. 60)." The problem was that this action cost him votes in other areas. The nomination strategy of seeking out these Southern votes had paid off and the South was the main reason Goldwater got the nomination. He had carried 271 of the 278 Southern delegates to the convention; the consequence was a commitment to the region in the general election that was out of step with the rest of the nation (Bass and DeVries, p. 64).

As is often the case in Southern politics, the phoenix will rise from the ashes. The mandate that LBJ received caused him to pursue the civil rights question further. The sweeping civil rights reforms of LBJ's first full term would reinforce Goldwater's gains in the black belt and give the G.O.P. a new life in the rim. The Democratic nomination of Hubert Humphrey made this even easier. Humphrey had served as LBJ's vice-president, which tied him to the Civil Rights reforms. This, coupled with the fact that Humphrey was from Minnesota, tended to severely reduce his appeal. Nixon strategists saw this and set out to capitalize (Dent, p.4). Nixon set out to color his appeal to the racist whites of the black belt. The cover was law and order. Its message sank in although his appeal was limited by the third party candidacy of native son George Wallace. Wallace won Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana and Mississippi. Humphrey was only able to win Texas. Nixon won five states. He took Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia. The G.O.P. strength was again centered in the Rim South. South Carolina followed the wishes of its most famous politician, Strom Thurmond and gave Nixon a 7.8 percent victory over Wallace, who finished second.
Winning in the South was difficult, but in the case of Presidential elections, the 1972 solid Republican South indicated that change had taken place and that when the National Democratic Party was too liberal it would lose and lose big. The Nixon success in 1972 links with what happened in the 1960's. Nixon used his incumbency to pacify the South. In 1972 Nixon supported the Anti-Bussing Bill; this followed his Textile Protection Bill in 1971, which pleased the Southern textile industry greatly (Ibid. pp.204-207). CREEP and the Democrat's gave Nixon the best weapon in 1972, the opportunity to run against the ultimate liberal, George McGovern. McGovern was overwhelmingly defeated in the South and in the nation. The Republican sweep of the region was unprecedented, and the potential for real permanent gains was visible. Watergate, the collapse of Nixon and Republican prestige followed and ended those dreams for the moment.

As Nixon took advantage of Johnson's sweeping reforms in 1968, the Democrats took advantage of the Watergate scandal in 1976. They nominated a Southerner in Jimmy Carter; this, coupled with the fact that Gerald Ford misread the nature of the South's conservatism and commitment to his party, led to the Democratic resurgence in the South. The G.O.P. only carried Virginia by a slim 1.3 percentage points. Carter put together a powerful black-white coalition in order to beat Ford, and this proved to be a successful strategy. It seemed the trend towards the growing G.O.P. was halted.

The failed presidency of Carter led to his demise in 1980 and Ronald Reagan was the beneficiary. Reagan forced Carter to defend his home South in 1980, which greatly taxed his resources. In spite of this, Carter was only able to carry his home state of Georgia. As Wayne Greenhaw explained, the South had always liked Reagan, so he had a natural base (p. 9). The movie star turned politician captured the presidency in 1980. The thought was that once the Southerner voted for Reagan it would be easier to vote for other Republicans. This theory held up as Reagan's coattails extended to other state and national offices. The results were striking. More Southern Republicans held office after 1980 than they had at any time since Reconstruction. This held for governors, senators, and congressmen. While Reagan won a solid South in 1984, the effects of his appeal down the ticket appear to be fading, as 1986 results indicate. The results of this "Reagan factor" will be more visible as the actual data is explored.
THE DEMOCRATS

Alexander Lamis has argued that the same New Deal cleavages are alive in the South today that existed at the end of World War II. The Democrats would like to think that it still works as well as it did for FDR. The legacy of the Democratic party in the postwar era is tied to two prior traditions. Initially, the New Deal traditions have provided a basis for the postwar coalition of the Democratic party in the region. Secondly, the populist traditions of Southern Democrats are equally important in fighting off the Republican challenge. The Southern Democratic parties are riddles in themselves. Since Harry Truman first proposed Civil Rights reforms they have had to deal with a major obstacle. Specifically, the national party does not concur with their position on this vital regional issue. The survival strategy has been a simple one; when the national party offers unacceptable candidates they desert the party. This is the tradition of the segregationist third party movements, which began with the Dixiecrats and was most recently seen with the Wallace candidacy. The New Deal legacy that Truman left did not disappear in 1948 and, in a sense, these New Dealers were also tied to the Populist movement. Many times they campaigned on the common man basis of populist politics, which were not in opposition to many of the New Deal's precepts. The combination often proved quite successful.

The importance of these liberal New Dealers increases when considering the context of Southern politics. It is important to remember that the G.O.P. did not become a significant force in the region until the late 60's. This meant that the region was dominated by one party; the Republican opposition, when there was any, was primarily token in nature. Politics, therefore, took place almost exclusively within the context of the Democratic party. The further down the ballot one looked the more dominant the Democrats would be. They built strong state and local organizations that to this day dominate the politics of the region.

The true impact of this one-party system was that the Democratic party became the place where choices were made. Factions within the party competed for power. In the 1950's this meant that New Dealers competed with traditional conservative Democrats. Often, these factions were based on personality, such as the Long/Anti-Long division in Louisiana. In spite of the conservatism of the region these New Deal descendants did win. W. Kerr Scott won in North Carolina, while John Sparkman and Lister Hill rode the New Deal to victory in Alabama. Johnson began to
build his base in Texas, while Long dominated neighboring Louisiana. Tennessee found New Dealers Estes Kefaufer and Albert Gore to their liking. These New Dealers survived the 1950's.

The trend that emerged as a threat to the New Dealers was the race question. Southern New Dealers were hardly radical Civil Rights activists, but they were only rarely affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan. Black registration in the region was growing, and as it did, the Negro became an important factor in close races. Registration was 5% in 1940, but jumped to 20% in 1952 and 29% in 1960 (Bartley and Graham, pp. 25-30). As many of these primaries were close contests between the liberal and conservative factions, the New Deal Populists relied on black votes. After the Brown decision, the paranoid South rejected liberals like Senator Claude Pepper in Florida. These liberals were in a tough position. They needed the votes in order to win, but that left them wide open to race baiters who used the Brown decision to stir racial tension.

Racial tensions did not affect the populist traditions of Southern politics. Key wrote in 1950 that the South was laughed at by the North for its demagogues. Clearly, politics followed a different set of rules, which often produced colorful politicians. The New Dealers who fell into this category were often the products of humble roots—true populists. LBJ in Texas certainly fit this mold. His people played politics for keeps; if that meant bending the results a little, that was acceptable. When Johnson first ran for the Senate he was involved in a tight primary with the Governor, "Coke" Stevenson. Stevenson represented the machine, but Johnson was the New Dealer and had powerful friends as well. In the end LBJ won, while Stevenson cried foul. The historian T.R. Fehrenbach described it better when he observed, "Johnson's men had not defrauded Stevenson, they had outfrauded him (1968, p. 659)."

In a similar vein, the Longs had dominated Louisiana politics. When Huey Long died in 1940, the legacy was removed for some eight years. It did return in 1948 with the same philosophy that made the Long's so popular to begin with. This philosophy is best summarized by Long in a speech he made while campaigning for Senator Hattie Caraway in Arkansas. He said,
"We have more food in this country... than we could eat up in two years if we never plowed another furrow or flattened another shoate-- and yet people are hungry and starving. We have more cotton and wool and leather than we could wear out in two years if we never raised another boll of cotton, sheared another sheep or tanned another hide and yet people are ragged and naked. We have more houses than ever before in this country's history and more of them are unoccupied than ever before and yet people are homeless (Williams, 1969, p. 558)."

In this way the Longs built a highly personalistic following. They rewarded their friends too; in 1948, after being elected Governor, Earl Long threw an inaugural party for the state at L.S.U.'s football stadium. The state paid for 200,000 hot dogs and 240,000 soft drinks (Bartley and Graham, p. 234). The Longs stands were centered around promises of equality and social justice for the common man. Race wasn't an issue unless it meant taking Black votes out of the Long column.

Others developed a populistic approach that was strikingly anti-black. In Alabama, Governor James Folsom was not about to befriend blacks. In fact, when Folsom ran against the progressives Hill and Sparkman he lost. These defeats were rare. He built a following by "dancing with those who brought him." When questioned about competitive bidding in his state he retorted, "I don't know why others should get the gravy. I'm the governor (Sherrill, 1968, p. 274)." This state would later be dominated by another Democratic populist, George Wallace, who would use the race issue to gain support. Others, like Faubus in Arkansas and Maddox in Georgia sought public office as segregationists, but Wallace was the most visible. Wallace became famous for standing at the University of Alabama saying, "Segregation Now! Segregation Tomorrow! Segregation Forever!", but any number of Southern politicians could have used the slogan. These race-baiting politicians would dominate the Democratic party in the South through the 1960's. Neither theme was far from the mainstream of Southern history. The themes of racism and populism are each tied to the isolation experience of the region.

In the 1970's, however, a new movement took hold in the Democratic party: the so-called New South politics. Bass and DeVries described them as being in the mainstream of the nation. Outward racism had become old hat and its acceptability was greatly diminished. These politicians were still pro-family, pro-religion and anti-busing, but they were not race-baiters (Bass and DeVries, pp.15-17). They remained
conservative on social issues, but they accepted the inevitability of equal rights. They were, as Ted Jelen said, "matured" (p. 73). The symbol of this maturity was Jimmy Carter (ibid). He came to power in Georgia by building a powerful black-white coalition. He, with other New South Governors, was more responsive to the needs of Blacks, and thus was able to please both the white and black populations (Bass and Devries, p. 12). The New South was the sign of a new Democratic approach to Southern politics. They would try to build black-white coalitions based on the New Deal cleavages. As Havard put it, "The promise of the New South was to bring the South into congruence with the rest of the nation (pp.10-11)."

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has important conclusions to make which are vital to understanding politics in the post-war South. The most general of these summations is that the history of the South is important to understanding its current status. Along those lines the vast nature of the literature makes interpretation difficult. Nevertheless, several important trends emerge.

When the South is viewed through the developing party systems, its isolation is evident. The colonial separation gave way to policy differences, primarily on slavery in the second party system. This system erupted with the Civil War, which tended to create two new trends: the xenophobia of the region and the Democratic dominance of the region. The fourth party system did not change these trends in the South, as the populists merely joined the Democratic ranks. The Depression led to the fifth party system and the consequence was the establishment of national Democratic dominance built around the New Deal coalition of Roosevelt.

This leads to the postwar era. Even in this era, the themes of isolation are evident. The politics of the region are so closely tied to history that the George Wallaces could belong in the Confederacy of 1860. The parties of the postwar period are also tied to the traditions that were rooted in history. Initially, the G.O.P. changed considerably in the period. From humble beginnings, it took advantage of demographic changes and grew. In spite of this, it is not a tradition, and neither is support for it. As a result, it has had to take advantage of Democratic blunders in order to win. Strategies and candidates varied considerably across the South. The Democrats changed considerably as well. The New Deal liberals were important, as they used their Populist roots and traditions to win. These New Dealers gave way to the race-baiting populists
who in turn were challenged by the New South Democrats. The issue important to all of these candidates was race. No issue has carried such overt impact in the region as race. From Truman to Johnson, it became a problem for Democrats and a life blood for Republicans. The data analysis in the coming chapters concurs with this theoretical framework.
CHAPTER 2 - SUB-REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE SOUTH

The preceding chapter dealt with the Southern states as a region separate from the rest of the country. Clearly, they share common historical experiences which helped to develop this regionality. In addition to the common traits, the region developed sub-regional similarities and differences. The differences between the states which generically are grouped as the South have become equally pronounced. This sub-regional variation has had a tremendous effect on the way that the South's parts have developed and the type of political competition in each state. Since Key, scholars of Southern politics have consistently referred to these geographic subdivisions as the Rim South and the Deep South. This chapter will argue that the grouping of Deep and Rim states is justified; states of each region share traits not found in the other which account for the different politics in these sub-regions. The presence or lack of these elements has profoundly influenced party development and competition in the different sub-regions.

Books on Southern politics often include a state-by-state analysis of the region. This chapter will follow that pattern by sub-region. Data analysis which follows in future chapters will make this distinction as well making a basic understanding of this split helpful. Initially, it will analyze states in the Deep South. This section will pay careful attention to the politics of race, which dominated these states, and the charismatic or demagogic populists who emerged as cult heroes in the postwar period. Subsequently, the Rim states will be investigated. In the Rim, the question of race was never as critical as in the Deep South. As a result, these states developed individual concerns which superseded race. As these states were often richer than the heart of Dixie, they were not good breeding grounds for the populistic appeals of the Huey Longs and Jim Folsoms. Thus, these states developed differently. The border states are different; they are more competitive, rejecting unquestioned Democratic dominance more often than the states of the Deep South. Thus, each sub-region will be treated as separate in this chapter.

THE DEEP SOUTH

The difference between the Deep South and the Rim and Border is one of degree. On the question of race, the salience is greatly increased in the Deep South due to the fact that the black-belt counties are more numerous there. These counties, where blacks outnumbered whites in population, but not political power, enfranchisement represented a threat to the ruling whites throughout the postwar period. These areas became the most racially paranoid in the postwar South. In terms of stigma, the Deep
South tended to be poorer and demonstrated less chance for significant economic improvement. The abject poverty of the Deep South produced the most colorful postwar politicians. Poverty provided a natural basis for these populist appeals. These politicians built huge personal followings and often expanded their influence to the national political arena. They were often ridiculed as demagogues, but were considerably more complicated. Even their detractors had to admire the power these men had. They reacted well to the times by telling the Southern electorate what it wanted to hear, which explains their electoral successes. To suggest that these men were political dinosaurs is incorrect. These populist leaders of Dixie told the truth as they saw it.

While others saw racial discrimination as degenerate, the South did not. Truth is only a virtue if it is believed by the majority and in the case of the South truth was sub-region specific. Southern politicians faced the same dilemma Voltaire described long before when he said, "I am very fond of truth, but not at all of martyrdom." These charismatic leaders were Democrats like practically everyone else in the South. The most important truth was re-election; thus they developed huge personal followings that allowed them to control the Democratic party machinery in the states they presided over. For a time, they demanded and received personal obedience. This did not mean that the Democrats lost anything. While these populists were individuals and support was given to them as individuals, they ran under the Democratic slate. An analysis of the Deep South states demonstrates this fact.

**ALABAMA**

As Alabama produced Folsom and Wallace, it seems a logical place to begin a discussion of the Deep South. In demonstrating how Alabama fits a pattern of Deep South development, three areas are discussed. They are Key's conception of Alabama, voting in the state, and party competition in Alabama. Many of the traditions Key described in 1949 hold today. He found Alabama to be a state that was anti-special interest. Alabamians showed "an inclination to defend liberty and bait the interest (p. 36)." In 1949 Key noted the poverty of the state as well. The political arena Key described was one run by and for Democrats. Alabama in 1950 was not a machine state dominated by one central boss. There were no dominating or even competing machines, which is in line with the state's anti-special interest philosophy. Democratic domination was without factions, which meant that everyone ran as an independent. Occasionally, popular candidates like Jim Folsom would appear on the verge of establishing a dynasty, but this independence prevented it. As Key noted in regard to the legislature, since they were all independents, Folsom couldn't control them.
consequences were a low degree of party unity in the Legislative Assembly and increased difficulty in passing an agenda (p. 44).

Alabama has a rich tradition of rearing colorful politicians. These men have been tied to the Southern Populist traditions and built intense personal followings in the state. The first of these is Big Jim Folsom who liked to call himself, "the little man's big friend." As governor, Folsom stuck to those roots, as he consistently baited interest. His leadership was a personal one; that was the image he kept at the forefront of his campaigns. This fit nicely with the "friends and neighbors" voting patterns that Key described. By "friends and neighbors" voting, Key meant that the home county and surrounding counties would deliver big margins to the candidates. Over time, Key found that internal Democratic factions never held together in Alabama, but county level support for the Democratic nominee remained relatively consistent (pp. 48-51). This voting pattern remained until the shakeup of the 1960's.

The Democrats enjoyed huge success in Alabama. Turnout was very low, making electoral control easier (Strong, p. 429). This changed in 1964 with the arrival of Barry Goldwater. He was able to exploit the Kennedy/Johnson record on civil rights and unite the white voters of Alabama under his banner. The results shocked Southern Democrats; not only did Goldwater carry the state, the G.O.P. also took 5 of the 8 Congressional seats from the state. The message was clear, Alabama would bait the Democratic party when it was out of touch with the Alabama citizen. The Democrats might have been in real trouble in 1966 had Big Jim Folsom's successor not appeared to rescue the Democrats. George C. Wallace brought back populistic roots and reinforced traditional Democratic loyalty. In spite of this the G.O.P. was able to hold on to the Congressional seats from Mobile, Birmingham and Montgomery. Wallace made himself the issue and built a personal following at the polls.

Wallace had first run for governor in 1958. At that time, he was very much a creature of Folsom (Frady, p. 124). He had the needed ingredients to be Alabama's next "big friend of the little man." He was born of poor roots and kept those ties alive even while serving in the Alabama Legislature (ibid, pp. 92-93). His election bid in 1958 failed but gave hope for his successful 1962 campaign. He lost the nomination in '58 to John Patterson due to one of the South's ultimate ironies: George Wallace was the racial moderate. Patterson accepted the Ku Klux Klan's endorsement while Wallace did not. Wallace learned a valuable lesson; after his defeat he is purported to have said, "they out-niggered me that time, but they'll never do it again (Sherrill, p. 267)." "They" did not. By 1962, the whites were firmly in his column. Frady called him a
racist-populist (p. 137) which suggested that he was a new breed. Folsom had been mild on the race issue, which eventually hastened his departure from Alabama politics, but Wallace knew about race first-hand and placed the issue at the center of his campaign rhetoric (Strong, p. 449).

Wallace must share part of the responsibility for the Democratic debacle in 1964. Following his belief that LBJ had betrayed the Democratic party, he replaced those electors pledged to LBJ with unpledged electors. The Democratic party at that point lost incentive and refused to spend a dime in the state. The results thus extended to the Congressional level (Frady, pp.208-209). The 68 elections demonstrated once again that Alabamians knew how to split a ticket. Since 1964 the Republicans have been competitive, with limited success. The largest constraint was George Wallace himself. Walter DeVries and Jack Bass argue that Wallace froze Alabama's political development (p. 57). To some extent, this is true.

The competitiveness of elections in Alabama have depended on Wallace. As Seagull put it. "Quite simply, when Wallace permitted it, the Republicans have run well at the polls; otherwise they have not (p. 88)." The G.O.P. continued to run well in the suburbs, holding on to the white collar votes (p. 93). They have not made gains with the poor white voters which dominate the state-except when Wallace let the G.O.P. borrow them. As the Blacks became stronger it alienated the whites, but even Wallace in his return to the Governor's mansion was able to put together a powerful black-white coalition. This is only possible as a result of the populistic roots that Wallace claims. When the New South politicians are able to de-emphasize race and talk economic issues, they win. As early as 1972, Wallace had shown the future Democratic candidates how to accomplish this. While campaigning for Sen. Sparkman in his race against the Republican William Blount he wondered out loud, "How a man who had air conditioned stables for his horses could be aware of the needs of the common man? (Seagull, p. 95)" The history of Wallace is a history of Alabama in the post-1950's era. He began as a racist-populist and dropped the racist part when he was convinced he could still win.

The issues in the postwar era have changed. Personalism is still a critical part of Alabama politics, but the competitive nature seems to have changed the nature of the personalist appeal. The G.O.P. has improved here, but the state is still Democratic below the presidential level. This Democratic party has resolved itself to living with both black and white members; when that coalition holds, the G.O.P. is again reduced to minor party status. In Alabama, as in the rest of the South, the individual is still more important than the party label he wears.
GEORGIA

When V. O. Key wrote Southern Politics he titled the chapter on Georgia "Rule of the Rustics." He described an early boss network based on the popularity of the Southern demagogues. It is not surprising to find personalistic control of the party machinery by charismatic demagogues in this state. As in Alabama, the only party machine in Georgia was the Democratic machine and it was that machine that the charismatic leaders took over for themselves. The period between 1926 and 1946 was known as the Talmadge period. Eugene Talmadge served in statewide offices for this period. He served three terms as agricultural commissioner and four terms as governor. In 1948 his son Herman stepped in and took over the seat of governor. As in the case of Alabama politics, the faction was based on personal loyalty to Gene. This meant that he became the issue. Unlike the context of Alabama politics, where independence was visible and machines impossible, in Georgia one could throw support to others. Talmadge was very successful at throwing support to other candidates (Key, pp. 107-116). The result of this was the development of bi-factionalism in politics by 1942. The "friends and neighbors" approach had given way to the Talmadge machine. The factions were centered around the issue of Eugene Talmadge. The Talmadge forces stayed close to the heart of rural Georgia and the anti-Talmadge forces used the growing Atlanta area to force him out. The one thing the opposition always lacked was Eugene Talmadge. His charisma could not be equalled by an opposition candidate. In Georgia, the county system tended to favor the rural counties, functioning as an electoral college with counties being the electoral units. This allowed Talmadge to stay close to his agrarian populism. In addition, it tended to accentuate the rural/urban cleavage which paralleled the Talmadge/anti-Talmadge split in the Georgia electorate. Talmadge once proclaimed that he "didn't want to carry a county that had a streetcar (Key, p. 116)."

This strategy would not work in the context of modern Georgia politics. While black voting has remained insignificant for most of the postwar period, (Bernd, pp. 282-299) recent successes like the election of Andrew Young as mayor of Atlanta, have shown the huge potential of the black vote. The elimination of the county-rule system as a result of Baker v. Carr, 1962 removed the barriers to direct voter control in the state. This did not mean that Georgia would become more liberal or urban dominated and this has certainly been the case (ibid, p. 358).

Georgia's voting was similar to Alabama's in the 1960's in that the turmoil around the race issue captivated Georgia as it did Alabama. The strength of Goldwater in 1964 was nothing more than a protest vote as the results were not duplicated down the
ballot. Georgia was Wallace territory in 1968, as the Democrats still could not satisfy the wants of the Deep South voter. The racist-populist type of candidate took the governor's mansion in 1966 with the election of the infamous Atlanta restauranteur Lester Maddox. Maddox had owned the Pickrick restaurant in Atlanta. Maddox's popularity soared when he refused to open his business as a desegregated institution. The menu changed from fried chicken to ax handles. Maddox was a Protestant Fundamentalist who equated social change with Communism. His cause was racism but it was also populism. One of the more popular reforms of Maddox was People's Day, in which the people could come and say whatever they wanted to the governor. This was a way of expanding the populist principles and keeping in touch with the common man.

This tradition continued with a new twist during the following administration. In 1970, Georgia elected its representative New South politician to office in the person of Jimmy Carter. Carter ran in 1970 as a racial moderate. He did, however, seek out and win the support of the traditional Maddox voter. What made this more amazing was that he combined this with a strong showing in the black community. As governor, he had an intense dislike for Maddox and followed his belief in the New South ideology of racial moderation and harmony. He did this while maintaining his ties to the peanut farm, which kept the populist spirit alive.

The G.O.P.'s troubles in Georgia can be traced to the the populist tendencies of Democratic candidates. Seagull has lamented this point highlighting the inability of the G.O.P. to capture the populist spirit (p. 100). While a demographic shift has taken place to the urban and suburban centers, and thus to the G.O.P., the Republicans have not overpowered the Democrats. Numan V. Bartley (1970, p. 7) declared the Georgia one party system "dead," but the evidence does not support that claim. The Democrats have a working knowledge of the effects of the black-white coalition and this, when combined with the populist charisma, has been effective enough to maintain their hold on Georgia politics.

LOUISIANA

When he wrote his chapter on Louisiana, Key must have been frustrated deciding which stories to tell. He appropriately titled this chapter "The Seamy Side of Democracy." No matter how one approaches it, Louisiana just stands out. In spite of this, it shares many common elements with the other Deep South states. There are significant religious cleavages here between the Catholic South and the Protestant North that are not found in other states. There is a different legal system not found in another
state: Napoleonic law. Most importantly, there is a different attitude about politics which has been brought on by the years of interesting characters who have run this kingdom. The state's own eminent historian, T. Harry Williams, summed up the typical Louisianan best when he said, "People in Louisiana have an ambivalent attitude about corruption. On the one hand, we deplore it. On the other hand we brag about it (Bass and DeVries, 1976, p. 158)." The modern Louisianan rarely takes politics seriously, feeling that they feel they have lost control of the process.

Key offered an excellent analysis of the family most responsible for this attitude when he discussed the Longs. The Longs reawakened the dormant populist sentiments that were so important to the South (Bass and DeVries, 159). In the process, Huey Long garnered a tremendous amount of personal power for fueling his political machine. Key often found this power excessive and even compared Huey to "a South American Dictator (p. 156)." Before the Longs, Louisiana was ruled by the New Orleans Democratic establishment. This old guard was called the Bourbon Oligarchy, and they mastered the art of rewarding support and punishing opposition (pp. 160-162). Long emerged as an alternative to this oligarchic control. He used his position as railroad commissioner to attack Standard Oil for stealing from the state (Williams, p. 146). In the process he angered the oligarchy, but made a name for himself as a crusader for "the little man." After failing in previous attempts to win the governor's mansion, he won the post in 1928. Because his machine was strong he was able to exercise considerable influence in the Louisiana Legislature as well as among the Bayou state's delegation in Washington. As governor he became a national political figure and mastered the art of pork-barrelling. He ran highly successful state slates. After his assassination, his brother Earl took up the family banner and was elected governor in 1948. Earl had learned from his brother the importance of maintaining the populists traditions. He also knew how to make a crowd happy in the process. The eight year absence of the Longs before his election in 1948 meant that Governor Earl had something to celebrate at the hot dog party discussed in the previous chapter.

The people liked this, or at least they were not opposed to free food and drink. This was reminiscent of Juan Peron's rallies in Buenos Aires, which makes Key's analogy seem appropriate. The real problem that faced Louisiana voters both in 1950 and today was the choice of a venal administration that offered a program of change or a honest do nothing administration (Key pp. 162-170). The election of Earl Long in 1948 and Edwin Edwards in recent years demonstrate that Louisianans like populist programs and are willing to tolerate the methods used to achieve them.
In the case of Long, voting tended to remain tied to slates. Machine politics and slates are still prevalent in Louisiana politics. Perry Howard has noted the continued importance of the religious and ethnic cleavages in the society (p. 525). The race issue has been lessened at times in Louisiana partly because until recently the oil reserves provided the state with enough resources to satisfy blacks and whites. Governor Edwin Edwards has reached new levels of corruption in his handling of state affairs, but he holds together the black/white coalition that has kept New South Democrats in power. The G.O.P. has shown strength at the presidential level and even elected a governor in David Treen, but these have been exceptions rather than rules. In Louisiana, the populist Democrats are tough to beat when they can hold the black/white coalition together.

In its modern context, Louisiana mirrors its past. It is a prisoner of the cynicism that T. Harry Williams described. The scandals have changed, but the results remain the same. The state is cynical from top to bottom and the average citizen feels powerless to change the course of history. A former Louisiana Congressional staffer summarized it best when he attempted to explain why the Superdome remained debt riddled after all these years of big events. He joked, "Are you kidding? They haven't even finished paying off the bribes to build the place yet!" The history of cynicism remains alive and well in the Bayou State. Louisiana is different than the other Deep South states in this regard, but it shares the history of personalistic populist intent on dominating the political process.

MISSISSIPPI

The remaining two states in the heart of Dixie are similar in regards to the racial question. In Mississippi, the race problem is more salient due to the tremendous numbers of blacks in the state. Key noted this in 1950 (p. 229) and Bass and DeVries confirmed its importance in 1976 (p. 186). Mississippi's politics have always led the way in racist rhetoric and the white poor of the state have remained vulnerable on this question. Key was disappointed by the fact that, in a state as poor as Mississippi, the politics of the have nots remained secondary to the politics of race.

The reality of political competition has always come down to a geographical division of the state. The battle was always between the Delta aristocracy, which was made up of large black populations and the plantation style white elites, and the hills population which has taken on the more modern connotation of "rednecks". The division was always clear in that the hills population did not have the same interest in holding the blacks down. None the less, the black belt whites of the Delta were able to
influence these hills people to follow the racist rhetoric. The Delta aristocracy lost control for the first time with the advent of Theodore Bilbo. Bilbo was another in the line of racist-populists who used the race baiting techniques to stir tension and capture votes. Bilbo was even more like an evangelist in a political crusade than other racist-populist were and his sermons were built exclusively around the question of race.

Competition within the Democratic party often took on these sectional cleavages, but factions and slates were practically non-existent. Key found this to be the case (p. 252) and there is little evidence to suggest that it has changed. Personalities like Bilbo could dominate the electorate, but with so many race baiters campaigning against one another, personality cults were slow to develop. The common political attitude in Mississippi was change. And as the Citizen's Council of the 1960's would clearly show, Mississippians had a extreme aversion to change. Modern scholars of Mississippi have noted this as well. Fortenberry and Abrey sum up this position best when they wrote, "Mississippi has a special aversion to change- even an inclination to live in the past (pp. 488-489)."

The race issue has also had a great impact on the Mississippi G.O.P. With race-baiting so prevalent on the Democratic side, the G.O.P. actively recruited blacks to their party (Bass and DeVries, p. 214). This reinforced white loyalty to the Democratic party and made local G.O.P. success quite limited. Mississippi has shown an ability to reject national Democratic nominees when they were offensive, but Mississippi remains essentially a Democratic state. Mississippi was the nations battleground on racial issues; as a result the issue's salience has persisted. Some have contended that the division of the economy has become more important, (Fortenberry and Abrey, p. 522) but the race issue retains its power. G.O.P strength in the 1964 election (Seagull, p. 102) and with Reagan has taken on the qualities of protest voting rather than partisan shifting. The Nixon policy of not challenging powerful Southern Democrats left the G.O.P. struggling below the presidential level. In 1972, for example, Nixon refused to let his party's senatorial nominee on a platform with him, in order to avoid offending Senator James Eastland, the incumbent Democrat. (Seagull, p. 103) In short, Mississippi has not demonstrated large degrees of political parity. The race issue is crucial and the Democrats are still the power brokers in the state. As Republican Congressman Thad Cochran has demonstrated, individual personalities can be more important at the district level as well as at the Presidential level.
SOUTH CAROLINA

The racial issue is very important in South Carolina as well. Key noted this when he found that the most vehement of the white supremacist were South Carolinians. As early as 1950, patterns of competition existed between the Plains, controlled by the Bourbon type Democrats, and the Piedmont which were dominated by populist radicals. This sectional competition was constant and emphasized the factional nature of the South Carolina Democratic party. Key called this competition, "latent bipartisanship smothered in racism (p. 142)." Neither of the two factions wanted to include the blacks in the political process. South Carolina had a Black population that was comparable to Mississippi's in percent which partly explains the extent of the racism. The Bourbon types had a long history of disenfranchisement, but when the first Piedmont farmer set out to challenge the old guard in 1912, he too preached anti-black philosophies. In 1912, this farmer was Ben Tillman, who became a U.S. senator. Later, Cole Blease followed in his footsteps. This tradition of racist-populists dominated South Carolina. In 1942, Olin Johnson was elected governor as a New Dealer. This gave hope to blacks in the state, but in 1944 he ran and won a Senate seat on a white supremacy platform (Key, 142-144).

This competition has changed very little in recent years. Blacks vote more frequently and have a strong voice in the context of the Democratic party. Traditional voter turnout in this state is abysmal, although black voting has shown significant increases since the 1960's. Competition is real in the context of South Carolina politics for a number of reasons. Initially, South Carolinians are very independent, tending to relegate parties to a status secondary to individuals. In this regard, South Carolina is right in step with the rest of the Deep South. The most important individual in South Carolina's postwar political arena is unquestionably Strom Thurmond. His defection to the G.O.P. was a major boost and may be the single reason why South Carolina has become more competitive.

The G.O.P. could never overcome the personality cult which had built up around Thurmond. In 1964 they were racist, but that was not enough as they lost to Senator Ernest Hollings in 1966 and 1968 (Seagull, p. 105). The only real difference in later Republican success was the switch of Thurmond. This one act institutionalized the G.O.P. in the state (Bain). This is why of all the states in the Deep South, South Carolina is the only one that can make a legitimate claim to competitiveness. Without question, the G.O.P. can pose a threat to any Democrat in the state. The colorful and popular Thurmond is powerful in the state and the result is institutionalized competition.
South Carolina, like all Deep South states, found personal leaders important to success. In all of these states race has been the issue that the personality cults formed around. South Carolina is not an exception, the primary cult figure simply switched parties.

THE RIM SOUTH

The Rim South differs from the Deep South in many ways. The most obvious difference is the decreased importance of the racial question. The South's population resides mostly in these border states, making their electoral votes more important and making the policy positions of Deep South residents more difficult to satisfy. Because of its electoral importance, the Rim is an active scene for politics. Unlike the heart of Dixie, it represents a variety of individual concerns and political cultures. While race questions are highly salient in the Deep South, the lack of large black populations in the Rim reduces its importance. Some of these states have long traditions of two-party support, while others do not. Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina share the Appalachians and their tradition of the Mountain Republican voter dating back to the Civil War. Texas has an economic base that was, until recently, far superior to the rest of the region. In addition, the Lone Star State has a Western influence on its politics. Arkansas shares some of that Western influence, but has a history of two-party competition. Florida is simply different. Its economic and population growth rates have created an electorate whose variation from the rest of the region is further exacerbated by the unique geographical division of the state. The common ground these Rim states share with the Deep South is the history of being a part of the Confederacy. They are grouped as rim states because they vary greatly from the Deep South in postwar politics. The Rim states do not follow the same pattern of politics like the Deep South states and that makes them more like each other than the Deep South states.

ARKANSAS

When V.O. Key described Arkansas in 1950 he called it "pure one party politics." Factions have periodically existed, but they have been transient in nature, usually based on loose personal alliances. Issues rarely divided these coalitions; in fact, issues never really played a part in Arkansas' politics. This was the opinion of Key when he noted that the only important consideration in an Arkansas election was clean government (pp.184-185). In the 1940's the competition was between two factions, the Atkins and the Baily factions. While this competition was tough, the perception of competence was more important than issues. In 1948, Sydney McMath united both factions under his banner, which demonstrated the loose nature of the one party competition. The critical issue emerging from this campaign was how to finance state
highways; this was Arkansas' experience with issues in campaigns.

Voters were only loosely tied to factions since there were always multiple candidates and no real issues (Key, p. 188). This also made "friends and neighbors" voting a reality in Arkansas' statewide elections. Issues were avoided in the elections. It was as if the people of Arkansas were unconcerned about them. They were concerned with character and competence and opinions of substance meant very little. In 1948, McMath won because his primary opponent pushed the race issue; the voters found that inappropriate. While alliances grew out of factions, they were not overt. In fact, they were generally avoided in order to prevent accusations of machine politics. In spite of this, cleavages existed in the electorate. Sectional variations served to accent the "friends and neighbors" patterns (Yates, pp. 233-235). Bass and DeVries agreed, referring to the battles between the hills and the lowlands as a "heritage of conflicting values and forces (p. 87)."

Several populist type campaigns were run as well. In fact, the tradition of the populist candidate is a recurring theme. All factions in Arkansas politics remain personally based (Yates, pp. 246-248). The first of these populists was Orval Faubus. There was no question of his racism. This, of course, was made more salient by the Little Rock crisis over desegregation. In Arkansas and the Rim states, these politicians were the exception rather than the rule. In this case, the race-baiter tradition was not carried on as the governor's mansion was captured by the G.O.P.

The lack of significant urban centers served to retard a parallel growth in the G.O.P. and maintain Democratic dominance in the state. In the modern context, the number of urban legislative seats has increased, but this has not resulted in shifts in the balance of power. The politics of race worked until the quiet unassuming Republican, Winthrop Rockefeller appeared. Rockefeller had worked for years establishing himself as a moderate. He personally built the Arkansas G.O.P. from the ground up and was in position to control this support base. By taking the moderate road, he defeated the race baiting James Johnson in 1966 and won re-election in 1968. In 1970 the Republicans were prepared to fight off another challenge from Faubus when the Democrats of the New South nominated Dale Bumpers instead. In Arkansas, race baiting did not carry the same clout as it did in the Deep South states and the lack of a race-baiting Democrat worked against the G.O.P. Bumpers was younger and equally moderate. This left the G.O.P. unprepared; they were defeated in 1970. Rockefeller lost the important white-collar votes to Bumpers which cost him the election (Seagull, p. 130). Rockefeller was able to win when the Democrats selected reactionary candidates and
extremes are acceptable only at Razorback football games in this state. By 1970, Arkansas had found a New South populist in Bumpers hobbling for the state's G.O.P. Republicans would return to the governor's mansion in 1980 on Reagan's coattails, but this faded by 1982 when Bill Clinton returned.

In order to draw conclusions about Arkansas politics during the 1980's, quantitative means must be employed to discern the patterns. The G.O.P. has not consistently won in the state; at the presidential level, as in the rest of the South, they run well. When the "fade" down the ballot is considered, the trend is abysmal for the Republicans. The consolation here is that the quality of Western independence is alive in the Arkansas voter. Consider that in the statewide contest of 1968, Arkansas voters gave majorities to the third party candidate of George Wallace at the Presidential level, the liberal Democratic Senator Fullbright in his re-election bid and the moderate Republican Governor Rockefeller in his reelection bid. In this state party takes a back seat to individuals.

FLORIDA

Key called Florida the "State of Change", but even he would have been shocked by the change that has taken place since 1950. This is the "different" state in the region. It differs in that its minor role in the Civil War left it feeling unchastised. Most Floridians migrated since 1945 which tends to make politics wide open. Key was aware that politics in the Sunshine State was an individualistic endeavor. Glancing at a map of the state explains this in part. The state is geographically expansive and isolated, which makes coalitions tough to form and tougher to maintain (Key, p. 83). Surpassed only by Texas, Florida has a more urban population than other Southern states; in 1950 it was already experiencing economic diversification and immigration (ibid., pp.84-86). This made voting highly volatile.

The politics that Key found were the politics of individuals. There were many competing factions and individuals, all of which resulted in a significant degree of change. The change continued, creating a situation that Key described as "political anarchy (p. 107)." Factions only exist around individual candidates. Senator Pepper was able to keep a New Deal faction intact for a number of years, but the diversification of the state makes maintenance of these factions nearly impossible. When factions were created, they often were tied to high degrees of localism in the voting (Key, p. 90).

Unlike Arkansas, issues are important to politics in Florida. The diverse nature of the various communities has forced candidates seeking statewide office to address
local concerns. As a whole, Floridians are moderate on racial policy, but tend to be quite conservative on foreign aid and defense policy questions (Dauer, pp. 144-145). The large Cuban exile population in Miami has tended to be extremely conservative on questions of Latin America and Central America since the Reagan tenure began. Economic growth and modernization have become paramount issues of concern in a state that has grown accustomed to a vibrant economy (ibid, p. 163). The political parties have been forced to pay lip service to these particular concerns.

Competition in the state is legitimate. The importance of the economic issues has served to open debate over fiscal concerns on which the G.O.P. has traditionally been conservative. The Democrats dominated the statewide contest for years until Claude Kirk won the governorship in 1967. His election marked the first time a Republican had won that post since 1877. The failure of the G.O.P. was really a result of a lack of effort. Before the Kirk election the state party only cared about the presidential voting and, as a result, they failed beyond the top of ticket (Seagull, p. 139; Dauer, p. 115). The growth in Florida tended to further enhance the chances of the Republicans. Florida began to sprout up many metropolitan areas; the state became a big suburbia which helped the Republicans (Dauer, p. 94). In 1967, Kirk was able to amass the suburban vote and win. Prior to that, St. Petersburg had sent Congressman Cramer to Washington since 1954. These two would later divide the party and allow the Democrats the opportunity to control. In Florida, power is in the governor’s mansion. The chief executive is strong; when the G.O.P. won in 1967 they had real power for the first time. In the 1970’s the factional fight between Kirk and Cramer caused them to lose this power. The Democrats ran Rueben Askew and swamped the opposition. This was another in the line of New South candidates that emerged around 1970. Later Bob Graham would follow in this tradition. Bass and DeVries recognized the importance of this type of candidate (p. 126). By finding moderates like Graham and Askew, the Democrats are able to maintain unity. The Wallace voters and the more moderate Democrats can unite under the New South candidates appeal. The 1986 elections demonstrated again that competition is real in Florida at the statewide level. The Republicans won the governorship with a conservative Cuban American, while Bob Graham defeated Paula Hawkins to regain a Senate seat. Dauer tells us that G.O.P. registration is increasing in Florida, but that may not be worth more than it is in Arkansas. In 1986, Floridians demonstrated an ability to split a ticket. As in the past, individualism is critical to elections in the “different state”.
NORTH CAROLINA

Myths surround the politics of North Carolina. In 1950, Key called the state a "progressive plutocracy" complete with competition and all the potential of the South. To Key, North Carolina was more energetic and ambitious which, when coupled with its lack of demagogic politicians, resulted in a state more conformable to the rest of the nation (p. 205). North Carolina has a progressive record in the areas of industrial development, racial policy and education. It also bears a different history from the rest of the South. Secession was never a high priority in the state, and was demonstrated by the fact that North Carolina, unlike the rest of the South, refused to secede until Lincoln requested troops. In addition, the state lacked the grandeur of other parts of the South, so the reality of Reconstruction was a relatively minor change.

Key saw a distinctive political system in North Carolina ruled by a financial elite. It was, as Key called it, an "economic oligarchy (p. 211)." The role of the businessman was important and a stark contrast to the aristocratic rule in other parts of the South. In fact, it demonstrated why North Carolina tended to be more progressive in economic development. Immediately prior to the postwar era, North Carolina politics occurred in the context of the Democratic party. Two machines, the Simmons and the Shelby, dominated politics in this period. The Simmons machine controlled the party until 1928, when Max Gardner of the Shelby machine beat the Simmons ticket and became the governor.

Cleavages still follow geographic lines. The northeast corner of the state is urbanized and part of the black-belt (Key, p. 217). The Western part of the state, called the Blue Ridge Counties, are Republican territory (ibid., p. 221). Competition has become institutionalized in the state, but the Democrats are still the majority party. Ideology plays a role in state politics as well. The lack of Bilbos or Maddoxs has fostered the notion that North Carolina is a progressive state, but the state has remained conservative in nature. The recent James Hunt- Jesse Helms contest demonstrated this as each spoke to conservative values. The real test may be the voting of the Congressional delegation and in this arena the North Carolina delegation has remained conservative.

This should assist the G.O.P. The Republicans have suffered from years of neglect in the South. The early strategy of the North Carolina Republican party left them in a situation similar to other Republican parties in the region. In the 1950's, the G.O.P. only worked for local concerns in the western counties (Key, p. 221). This is not surprising, even today this remains the heart of the Republican vote in the state.
(Seagull, p. 125; Edsall and Williams, p. 410). The party struggled in statewide contests until 1972, when they captured the governor's mansion and a Senate seat. Even then, the victories were due to Democrats rather than any particular strategy on the part of the state G.O.P. In each case, there was an ideological division, with the Republican being clearly more conservative. In addition, George McGovern headed the Democratic ticket and the outgoing Democratic Governor Kerr Scott had been involved in a scandal (Seagull, pp. 126-127). Using these advantages Jesse Helms became a senator and James Holshouser became governor. In 1974 the Democrats rebounded, but the redistricting of the 1970's worked against them. In 1972, redistricting increased Republican strength in seven of the eleven Congressional districts (Edsall and Williams, p. 408). In spite of these successes and maintenance of Helm's Senate seat, the Republicans have not shown an ability to convert the voters to regular Republicans. Party identification still lags behind votes (Bass and DeVries, p. 245). Future Republican success is tied to urban vote development in the state. The fact that factionalism is extensive in the Democratic party, (Edsall and Williams, p. 369) helps the G.O.P. by increasing its ability to divide and conquer.

TENNESSEE

Mountain votes in Western North Carolina provided the G.O.P. with a base, and those same mountains gave the Tennessee Republicans a base in the Eastern portion of that state. This was never a majority, but it dominated local politics in the 1950's. The state was solidly Democratic, and was run by a machine-type rule from 1932 to 1948. This was the machine of E.H. Crump. Politics in the state were the personal business of Mr. Crump and unlike other Democratic states, the party tended to work for Crump (Key, p. 69). Crump mastered the art of machine politics as he took advantage of a small electorate, a powerful base in Shelby County (Memphis) and an ability to intimidate the opposition. He also was alleged to cheat a little, but even Key found that to be of minor consequence in the outcomes (Key, pp. 60-61).

This domination worked as a result of the voting patterns in the state. Geographically, the division was simple. The eastern mountains voted Republican, while the middle Tennessee counties and the west voted Democratic. Race was not as relevant here as in other parts of the South, although it provided a basis for partisan division (Key, p. 77). The mountain regions never needed slaves, and were never particularly as radical as other parts of the state. Blacks were an insignificant voting force in the state, even in the west (Greene and Holmes p. 168). Tennessee has not experienced a great deal of growth; any gains on the part of the G.O.P. probably came
about as a result of political conversion. The fading of the Crump machine forced Democrats to compete individually. The Gore legacy has been an important one in Tennessee for the Democratic party, but the G.O.P. has challenged.

To some extent, the Republicans must still rely on Democratic votes to win in statewide elections, but the strength of the base in the east makes this a threat at any time (Greene and Holmes, p. 173; Key, p. 75). The G.O.P. tended to be unambitious until 1970 when they won both Senate seats and the governor's mansion (Seagull, p. 118). One of these seats went to Howard Baker who has had a tremendous impact on Tennessee's Republican party. Beginning in 1966, Baker established himself in the state by pulling in the growing white-collar vote (ibid, p. 119). This set a pattern in which the G.O.P. could combine the eastern base with a suburban white collar presence to win elections on their own. While the Democrats bounced back in 1974 and showed signs of resurgence, (Bass and DeVries, p. 299) the reality of competition in the 70's and 80's has shown through. In Tennessee, real two-party competition exists in statewide contests. Smaller electoral units have lagged behind, but the recent statewide successes are encouraging to the future of two-party competition in the state.

TENNESSEE

Texas is another Rim state with a distinct political culture. Key called it "The politics of economics" in 1950, and to a great extent that still holds today. Its uniqueness is traced to four basic factors. Initially, while Texas has been anything but progressive in regards to racial policy, the race issue has never been at the forefront. The small percentage of blacks tended to reduce the importance of black belt-whites' paranoia. Secondly, this smaller percentage of blacks tended to emphasize the Western independence of the state (Weeks, p. 201 and Key, p. 254). Texans have traditionally been independent in all regards and consider themselves Southern and Western. Thirdly, the economic prosperity of the oil boom placed Texas in a prosperous position among Southern states. The economy was able to develop and create a new class of rich. These new rich tended to be anti-New Deal and generally anti-government (Key, p. 255). This created a situation in which Texas became an economic enigma. The state was the richest in the South and yet it also had the largest number of people below the poverty line (Weeks, p. 338). Fourthly, The political structure, in spite of these varients, has remained structurally Southern. The old line conservative Democrats dominated the politics of the state.

In the postwar era, the Democratic party did undergo significant change. The party was divided as to the future of the New Deal coalition. The New Dealers, led by
Lyndon Baines Johnson, confronted the old gauld. When Johnson was elected to the Senate over Gov. Coke Stevenson in 1948, it signaled that the New Dealers were in control. One step taken was to purge the Dixiecrats who rebelled in 1948. This was a problem in the state, for while the G.O.P. posed no threat, the New Dealers knew the potential harm of rebellion. Texas conservatives had a tradition of protest voting. In 1944, the Texas Regulars had already bolted in their opposition to the New Deal (Key p. 256). Liberals usually lost in Texas politics to this conservative wing in the primary, and the later problems which resulted from these defeats opened the door for the G.O.P., as the first chapter demonstrated. The cleavage in the Democratic party was the New Deal. Key knew this in 1950 (p. 259) and the modern political observer is also aware of it. The liberals have traditionally been frustrated in the primary. This situation is aggravated by the fact that the large Mexican American community could be an excellent base, but has had horrendous participation rates. Ralph Yarborough would eventually gain a Senate seat for the liberals, but for much of the 1950's, LBJ was the lone success for the New Deal wing, while conservatives such as Allan Shivers dominated the state party machinery. The 1960's kept the Democrats in control as they rode the coattails of favorite son LBJ. In the 1960's, there were clear indications that political change between the parties was coming.

When LBJ sought the vice-presidency in 1960 he also ran for the Senate. This created resentment and an opportunity for John Tower in 1961's special election to fill the seat. The Texas G.O.P. was only a token opposition party until 1961. From 1923 to 1950, R. B. Creager of Brownsville ran the state party. He didn't expect to win and he was opposed to state primaries (Weeks, p. 209). This built a defeatist attitude in the state for all to see. The G.O.P. was anything but grand and in fact, was rarely taken seriously, in spite of the fact that the state had developed a significant suburban white collar sector which should have been ripe for Republican exploitation. When Tower won in 1961 he backed into it and this was not a reflection of growing Republican strength. Since Ike, the Republicans had only shown strength at the top of the ticket (Bass and DeVries, p. 322). Bruce Alger was the first Republican elected to Congress from the fifth district in 1954; in 1960 he was still the lone Republican in the twenty-two member delegation. In 1970, the G.O.P. had only three out of twenty-three. In 1980 they rode the coattails of Reagan and won five of twenty-four seats. The story has been similar in elections for State offices.

The Democrats have not been helped by national party nominees in this state. They have accentuated factionalism within the party and this division has helped
(Seagull, p. 137). The 1973 conversion of John Connally gave momentary legitimacy to the state party, but the "milk scandal", coupled with Watergate may have limited this effect. The Republicans have shown an ability to compete when the Democrats have been unable to hold their diverse coalition together. William G. Clements became the first Republican governor since Reconstruction in 1978. He was ousted in 1982, but took advantage of slumping oil price to regain the office in 1986 from the moderate Democrat Mark White. Texas is forever a political riddle. The competition is distorted by the independence of the voter. The historian, Lawrence Godwyn, put it best when he described Texas as "a clash between the optimistic Westerner and the pessimistic Southerner (In Bass and DeVries p. 305)." This contradiction has given the G.O.P. hope, but it is clearly the Democrats game to win or lose in elections below the presidential level.

VIRGINIA

Key called Virginia a political museum. Its history is so rich that it is easy to see his attraction. This is clearly a case in which the politics before the postwar era have a huge impact on the politics today. Of all the Southern states in 1950, this is the one most controlled by an oligarchy. The machine belonged to Harry Byrd and he used it to run the state until he passed the torch to his son in the 1960's. The Byrd oligarchy was built out of diverse elements and factions that had divided the Democratic party in the state. He combined competent management with a restricted electorate in order to dominate the political spectrum. The machine extended to all levels of government; each level had a high degree of discipline. To paraphrase Key, in state politics you had to go through Byrd (p. 25). The power was maintained by the fact that Byrd was careful not to force bad candidates on the public (p. 23).

The liberal challenge was doomed to failure until Harry's death. There was not much anti-organization sentiment, (Key, pp. 27-29) and the opposition had trouble developing good leaders to challenge the machine. (p. 33) The opposition was centered in the urban areas and began to grow in the 1950's (Eisenberg, p. 45). In 1954 the machine could not hold the discipline as a group of "young Turk" assemblymen revolted (ibid, p. 50). This division often affected the elections; in 1953, the division within the Democratic ranks led to the G.O.P.'s gubernatorial candidate receiving 44.3 percent of the vote. The 1960's brought the death of Harry Byrd and the collapse of Democratic dominance. By 1960, half of Virgina had become urban. The Byrd machine tried to ignore this, but their attempt at redistricting was declared illegal in Davis v. Mann, 1964. Increased urban power fostered G.O.P. presence in the state. The Byrd machine
weakened as in 1964 the convention chose LBJ over the wishes of the boss. Blacks refused to toe the machine line; in 1966 they cast anti-organization votes which resulted in the election of the opposition's William Spong as senator. The party infighting continued, as the Democrats tried to develop after years of stagnation. The result was a major division in 1969 which led to extreme infighting with the party itself losing credibility and the G.O.P. stepping in and taking control of the government.

The G.O.P. has taken full advantage of the increased urbanization and Democratic infighting. To describe Virginia as a two-party state is correct. If anything, the Democrats appear to be the underdogs. They have not been in the majority in the Congressional delegation since 1966. They have been able to compete, but the urban electorate has leaned toward the G.O.P. At the presidential level, only Truman and Johnson have won the state for the Democrats in the postwar era. It is, therefore, safe to say that significant change has occurred in Virginia since World War II.

THE BORDER STATES

The analysis of the Border States is limited here, because they do not resemble the South in every case. The primary reason one studies the Border States is to see if the Southern influence extends beyond its region. There are obvious differences between these states. New Mexico and Oklahoma are obviously Western, with Oklahoma sharing the common element of oil with Texas. Maryland is Eastern Mid-Atlantic. The history of Missouri and Kentucky are embroiled with the race questions of the Civil War. While each state had significant numbers of Confederate sympathizers, they did not actually secede from the Union. West Virginia was always anti-slavery and shared nothing with the Confederacy. In each of these states, the Democratic party developed as a strong majority party in the New Deal years. The G.O.P. always tried to compete in these states; thus the tradition of competition created closer races and legitimate two-party competition. In the following analysis, the Border States are excluded as the patterns of electoral competition are different.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter confirms the point that there are three Souths. The Deep South states share many common elements. They have been overwhelmed by the race issue. The Democratic party in these states has often been a captive tool of the demagogic populist, who ran the party for himself. Party support was secondary to a monolithic support of the charismatic leader. This was possible only because of the political climate that existed in these Deep South states. The fact that the people were poorer and the Blacks more numerous made the Deep South populists formidable opponents. The
Rim South is characterized by individual concerns which tend to dominate each state and make comparison difficult. They did develop parties which were not captured by populist characters. While one party won, the G.O.P. began its Southern surge by appealing to the developing middle class in the Rim. The Border South provides a test of the influence of the South on its neighbors, but it is not the same domination that the Democrats had in the other states. The fact that the Border States did not experience occupation and defeat in the same way may be the correct explanation. In the following analysis of the post-war voting, these sub-regional variations are important. Change will vary by sub-region. This chapter demonstrates that this variation is best understood when viewed in both the South as a whole and the sub-regions which divide it.
CHAPTER 3- PARTISAN COMPETITION IN THE SOUTH

There is no question that political change has occurred in the American South. Some scholars, such as Kevin Phillips (1969) have gone so far as to suggest that the South has evolved into a competitive two party system. The following three chapters will explore the amount of electoral competition that emerges in the postwar period. The South was ripe for change in the electoral arena; it had become economically more advanced, although whites were advancing more quickly than blacks (Black and Black, 1987, p. 55). The translation of economic improvement into electoral change remained nebulous. The South had been solidly Democratic from the Civil War until the 1960's. The G.O.P. made significant gains by the time Nixon swept the South in 1972; this success prompted predictions of change and realignment. Political science provided data through the Survey Research Center's National Election Studies (NES), which demonstrated that partisan identification was shifting. This shift was important, given the value of partisanship as a predictor of one's political behavior. Of course, the initial definition of competitiveness will impact the perception of the region's degree of competitiveness. Competition has accumulated three distinct meanings in the context of Southern politics. Initially, there is competition over partisan identification as reflected in survey research. While the NES data has indicated change in partisanship, serious questions about the predictive power of this variable are present. Specifically, does partisan change correlate with voting? Secondly, on a more basic level, competition between the parties in elections should be analyzed in order to assess the overall shift in seats in the region. Has the balance of seats shifted to the G.O.P. enough to warrant calling the South a competitive two party system? And thirdly, competition within the parties should be studied to assess the strength and pattern of development of the parties.

This chapter is devoted to competition reflected by partisanship. Of the three levels of competition, partisan change has received the most attention. This is due in part to the fact that partisanship was considered to be such an important factor. This chapter will demonstrate that looking at partisanship alone fails to explain electoral changes in the postwar South. In order to show this, the general literature on Southern partisan shifts and voting will be explored. This will be followed by a review of the literature which has attempted to explain the political shift in the South. Finally, NES data will test the role of partisanship as a consistent predictor of vote in the region.

THE LITERATURE

The study of partisanship as an influence in voting is at the heart of the electoral
behavior studies in political science. When Campbell, et al. wrote The American Voter (1960), parties were already perceived as important to the political process: They organized the electorate and provided voters with a basis for classification. Paul Lazarsfeld, et. al. (1944) provided a basis for looking to the party as an important part of the voting process. Thus Campbell, et al., felt justified in treating partisanship as an independent variable affecting one's vote. They attempted to explain partisanship by pointing to its psychological roots, arguing that the forces of socialization directs one to a party and thus influenced his vote (pp.66-70). From their 1952 and 1956 election studies they conclude that "The behavior of the American voter as a presidential elector can be described initially as a response to psychological forces (p. 120)." The American Voter argued that partisanship was highly stable in nature. The authors found that presidential voting chronologically demonstrated high degrees of partisan consistency. (p. 148) They further found that partisanship required practice; statistically, partisanship was reinforced by repeated voter participation (p. 161). They were careful not to deviate from the model of V.O. Key regarding critical elections. They noted that for some people, a national crisis made partisanship relevant; this fit nicely with Key's earlier writing on the subject.

Each year, increasing numbers of Southerners shifted out of the Democratic identifier's columns and into the Republican or independent columns. The American Voter suggested that younger voters should be more independent, but they could not explain the huge shifts in partisanship which occurred in U.S. history. Key (1955) outlined this when he described a critical election and subsequent realignment of the electorate. He described this phenomenon as a process where cross-cutting cleavages led to durable changes in partisan loyalty. The argument was compelling: some issue of great importance would redefine traditional partisan identification. Voters would reassign their loyalty on the basis of the positions of the parties. In the case of the New Deal period, the parties made clear their positions, affording the voters the opportunity to make a choice rather than rely on old cues. At these times, the voter is not a cue taker, but more closely resembled a rational voter who assessed the relative utility of the parties and voted accordingly. Key's voter more closely resembles the voter depicted by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). The American Voter hypothesis of partisan stability still managed to enjoy considerable support from the political science community. The National Election Studies consistently probe the topic of partisanship while the debate rages over its importance as an explanatory variable of voting behavior. The conventional knowledge remains: partisanship explained voting,
resulting from a response to a cross-cutting issue and subsequent partisan alignment.

In spite of this conventional knowledge, serious challenges have been raised about the role partisanship plays in voting. Some have taken issue to the psychological aspects of partisanship, arguing that partisanship is nothing more than the way people vote. If so, then partisanship simply is the vote, which accounts for the high degrees of correlation between the top of the ticket voting and partisanship. Straight ticket voters should thus enjoy perfect correlation to partisanship at all levels; that does not suggest a causal relationship, but rather a correlation. This attack has, at the very least, served to focus attention to the fact that partisanship may not have much impact on a voter's decision making calculus. James Campbell, et al (1986) found that a number of scholars accepting the psychological basis of partisanship deviate from The American Voter model. They argue that partisanship is not a unidimensional variable. Petrocik (1974), for example, found that partisanship was intransitive, in that participation and interest did not relate perfectly to the unidimensional projections of partisanship. In addition, independents fall into two categories, true independents and those who claim no partisan preference. Even after dismissing these notions of multidimensionality, the value of partisanship is still in doubt.

The literature on partisanship most appropriate to this thesis is the role of party identification as an independent variable. Initially, The American Voter model suggested that partisanship acted as a screen on information, which served to influence one's interpretation of issues and events (p. 135). It also suggested that partisanship influenced the actual vote of the citizen. Subsequent research has suggested that the second assumption may have been overplayed. Most certainly, partisanship's role in voting has declined since the 1956 NES survey (J. Campbell, op.cit. p.115). Secondly, party identification has taken on the characteristics of a two-way causal model, in that party identification is seen as affecting issues and being affected by issues. This is best described by Morris Fiorina in Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, 1981. His models suggest that partisanship is influenced by voter issues and individual candidates as well as past performance. This subject remains controversial. Converse and Markus (1979) used the CPS 1972-1976 panel study to suggest that party identification was an important vote determinant, determined by past party identification and past voting. (p. 1058) The issue that Marcus and Converse fail to address is the initial value of party identification. It is clear that party identification is related to past identification and voting, but the causal direction of this relationship is no so certain. It may be quite the opposite as Meier (1975) suggests.
An entirely different set of questions emerges when party identification below
the presidential level is studied. Most of this work has been done on the congressional
level, and the results are noteworthy. Angus Campbell noted that the greatest effect of
partisanship was found in regard to coattails in presidential election years (1966). An
interesting concept, it is one that does not support the theory of partisanship influencing
congressional votes. Simply put, coattails vary according to the individual presidential
candidate, regardless of party, which serves to question the role of partisanship in
influencing congressional voting. Below the presidential level, factors such as
incumbency also influence voting (Erikson, 1971; Collie, 1981). In addition, economic
influences on these votes were explored by Kerner in 1971; in each of these cases, the
attention shifted away from the role of party identification. Mann and Wolfinger (1980)
were finally able to address the question of partisanship's effects in congressional
contests with the 1978 National election study. They found defection rates to be higher
than in presidential elections, with considerably more variation in partisan defection in
these congressional elections. This, in addition to Mayhew's 1974 hypothesis that
incumbency replaces partisanship as a voting cue in congressional elections, casts even
further doubt on the importance of partisanship in voting behavior.

The literature on partisanship and its importance has evolved a great deal since
The American Voter. The psychological roots of partisanship have been questioned,
but the model still maintains a level of credibility within the political science community.
Partisanship's primary importance remains predicting the vote. This makes the South a
particularly good region for studies of the effects of partisan shifts. The region has
always remained highly partisan. Its loyalty to the Democratic party has withstood time
and critical elections. Recent Republican successes have caused many to explain the
growth as a result of partisan shifts, as reported in the National Election Study. This
makes the Postwar South a good case study on partisan change.

THE SOUTHERN LITERATURE

This thesis is not the first or last word on Southern partisanship. An extensive
literature has developed to explain partisan behavior in the South. Realignment
proponents focused on partisanship as they sought to explain the apparent shifts in the
South. Scholars began to search for the new cleavage which led to this realignment, a
search which has not yet resulted in a definitive answer. In attempting to substantiate
the presence of realignment, some found comfort in Key's later discussion of secular
realignment in 1959. Here he suggested that the change may not be dramatic because,
"Only events with widespread and powerful impact or issues touching deep emotions
produce abrupt changes. On the other hand, other processes operate inexorably and almost imperceptibly, election after election, to form new party alignments and to build new party groupings (pp.189-190)." Given the nature of partisan shift, this last approach seems more appropriate in the South.

Mixed in the middle of the realignment debate is an uncertainty over the treatment of partisanship. Much of the literature on Southern political change focuses on the shifts that have taken place in the NES data. This analysis will differ from the realignment literature in two ways. Initially, it will suggest that partisanship, as reported in survey research, is not always an accurate predictor of one's political behavior. Secondly, it will suggest that part of the problem is the inappropriateness of the traditional socialization model of partisanship in the South suggested by Key and adopted by The American Voter in 1960. The kind of competition that has evolved in the South has little to do with realignment and even less to do with partisan competition.

The literature on partisan change in the South reaches varied conclusions. Bruce Campbell (1977a) suggested that two types of influence could explain partisanship. One was the socialization model outlined decades earlier by Angus Campbell, et al. They argued that while ideology was highly unstable and, in fact, difficult to discern in American voting, partisanship was of a highly stable nature. By the time they published The American Voter in 1960, they had established partisanship as a stable "learned behavior" taught at an early age and lasting indefinitely, or until the generational realignment was commenced by the crosscutting cleavage.

Bruce Campbell also pointed to a second type of partisanship in the region, a partisanship that was based on issue interaction. As issues and parties' positions on issues changed, the partisanship would also change. This type of partisanship is highly unstable and varies greatly from the model of long-term socialization developed decades before. Issues became a convenient source to explain the shifts in partisanship. The change in the South could not be explained by the socialization factor; thus another explanation was required. This is not to suggest that only those writing about the South needed an explanation for unstable partisanship. Morris Fiorina (1981), for example, espoused the same position while developing his theory of retrospective voting. As a result, the Southern literature develops three basic hypotheses about the origins of the partisan shift. Those who clung to the socialization model suggested that migration was the reason for the shift; Northern Republicans had simply moved into the region and made it more competitive. Those who viewed change as a result of the issue interaction effect argued that either generational turnover or conversion was taking place.
The resulting analysis of the shifts leads to varied interpretations, each justified in its own way. The arguments fall into two categories, realignment and dealignment. Those who see the postwar South as realigning tend to use Key's concept of a secular realignment (1959) to argue that this shift has been of a secular nature, or slow gradual conversion of the voters. The dealignment scholars disagree. They argue that while the Democratic party has lost strength in partisan support, the Republicans have not necessarily been the beneficiaries. They suggest that the trend is towards increased independence in the region and that this means that the parties themselves are simply not as important as they once were. Obviously, the factors of generational turnover and conversion get involved in this debate and their relationship to each theory will be discussed.

The migration hypothesis is easily documented, but proves insignificant for a variety of reasons. In his defense of The American Voter, Converse (1966) found that the socialization model of partisanship was still appropriate. He argued that the partisan shift was not due to any radical change (pp. 212-213), but was rather a result of migration and population replacement. The assumption of the migration hypothesis is flawed at its core. The hypothesis assumes that the change is occurring externally. Partisanship is defined as highly stable, and the instability must have some basis. The assumption made is that the electorate is stable when, in fact, it is highly unstable in the last three decades of Southern politics. While the survey data Converse offered was clear, it was limited in that it did not explain shifts in the Democratic vote. It is true that the Republican parties in the South gained votes from in-migration; however, simultaneously the black voters in the South were being mobilized and incorporated into the Democratic party. Campbell (1977a) thus concludes "that migration has not been a major influence on change in the partisanship of the region (p. 737)." Paul Allen Beck echoes this when he argues that the net result of Republican in-migration and Democratic mobilization of the blacks is essentially a draw. Beck (1977) suggest that three "migrations" have taken place: immigration of "Yankee" Republicans, emigration of native Southern Democrats and mobilization of the black voters. The end result is little change. As he wrote, "In essence, the net advantage accruing to any one party is small because the Democratic losses arising from interregional population exchanges are largely counterbalanced by Democratic gains from the mobilization of blacks (pp. 483-484)." Thus, while this phenomenon has not been denied by Beck or Campbell, the in-migration of Republicans has clearly been offset by an increased mobilization of blacks, which renders the explanation useless regarding the overall change in the region.
The migration hypothesis, therefore, does very little in explaining the overall shift in partisanship.

The conversion hypothesis is consistent with realignment theory. Conversion, after all, implies a shift from one party to another; in this case from Democrat to Republican. These scholars concentrate on the white voters of the region in order to justify their contentions. For example, Campbell (1977b) noted that the change in partisanship in the region was linked to a change in the normal vote of the region (p. 37) and that the keys to the change were mobilization of the black voters to the Democratic party and a conversion of white voters to the G.O.P. He noted the highly interactive effect of the generational change hypothesis and the conversion hypothesis when he argued that the changes were most pronounced among younger Southern whites, but that conversion was occurring at all levels. In his opinion, this change was in line with V.O. Key's secular realignment thesis. In Campbell's Journal of Politics article (1977a) he explores the three hypotheses for the change in Southern voter. As to the conversion hypothesis, he finds strong support for blacks converting to the Democratic party and notes the increased importance of this due to black mobilization. (p. 755) Whites, on the other hand, also appear to be converting slowly in his analysis. He suggests that the change resembles secular realignment. (p. 756) The change with the blacks has been rapid due to mobilization. He more accurately describes the conversion process for whites when he borrows from Key's secular realignment theory.

Generational turnover is occurring among the younger white Southerners, who are much more likely to be Republican than older Southern whites. Older Southern whites are exhibiting movement too, making the secular hypothesis of Key seems valid. (p. 756) This conversion seems to support the issue theory of interactive partisanship rather than the socialization theory of stable partisanship. (p. 756) The final conclusion of the Campbell article is that the migration and conversion will counterbalance, leaving the South Democratic, although not solidly so. (p. 761)

The most notable change in the region is the rise in independents. The increase in independent voters is well-documented for the region. Some have argued this is a function of the type of questions asked and the scales used. Even with methodological questions expunged, the debate would be difficult to settle. E.M. Schreiber noted the shift as early as 1971, when he argued that the rise in Southern white Independents was really a boon for the G.O.P. His evidence was limited to the Nixon vote in the region in 1968. (p.167) The NES data for the Solid South (the eleven states of the old Confederacy) does note that independents have increased and the Democrats have
declined, reflecting this trend on a regional basis.

METHODOLOGY

Before proceeding with the analysis of partisanship, the methodology should be clarified. The data used in this paper is collected from a variety of sources. The data on partisanship is provided through the National Election Study, collected by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies. The studies are made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data set is made up of respondents from the eleven states of the old Confederacy. 1952 data excludes Tennessee, because the data was regionally grouped and the state was not included in the South for unknown reasons. In following years the NES selects its sample by regions. As Tennessee was placed in a non-Southern region, inclusion of it in this analysis does not lead to a perfect random sample of the South but rather an approximation where Tennessee is concerned. The 1962 sample is excluded because it was a "piggyback" sample, which did not afford exploration of the effect of partisanship at different electoral levels.

As to the questions used, the most important is the seven point scale on partisanship. In the early years, the scale was constructed, although in later years prompts were used to determine degrees of partisan loyalty. In each case the "N" is limited to the southern subsection of the national cross-section. Inclusion of other samples can alter the picture. For example, if the continuous monitoring survey in the 1984 sample is included, the effect boosts the G.O.P.'s percentages slightly. For these results and an interesting comparison to non-NES survey data, see Black and Black (1987 p. 237-238). The process of correlating identifiers to votes reduces the overall "N" significantly. The Democratic cases generally remain above 100 in most cases while the Independent and Republican cases rarely do. When the number of cases falls below 30, it is reflected as missing data.

RESULTS

The shifts in party identification are well-documented. Clearly, some partisan shifting has occurred in the South. The question concerns its extent. Figure 3-1 shows the NES data over time.
The realignment proponents suggested that the rise in independents was linked to the process of secular conversion in the South. Raymond Wolfinger and Michael Hagan (1985) agreed. They noted the shift in the South in terms of the G.O.P. gaining seats. In Congress, for example, they held 36 percent of the South's seats, compared to 44 percent nationwide. Partisan shifts, they argued, are much more dramatic when the researcher identifies leaning independents as partisans. When that occurs, Democratic identification drops, from 85% in 1952 to 46% in 1984 (p. 8-9). In their minds this is not a dealignment. As they argue, that would imply defection, which is lacking since the 1972 election (p. 9). They further point to the migration and younger voter hypotheses and argue that as the South develops economically, G.O.P gains will increase. (p. 13) Significant portions of the literature find this increase in the independents to be supportive of the conversion hypothesis, although an analysis of their self reported votes does not confirm this. When the NES Independents are analyzed for their self-reported votes, it is clear that they tend to favor Republican presidential candidates over Democratic ones and vary significantly as they move further down the ticket. The NES data demonstrates that the percent of independents voting for Democratic candidates at different electoral levels varies considerably. Their varied support for Democratic Senate and House candidates should also be noted in the same
breath, which tends to suggest that they may in fact be true Southern Independents.

Parts of the literature see the rise in independents as a phenomenon separate from the growth in Republicanism. These advocates of dealignment theory argue that the change is not a movement towards the G.O.P., but a movement away from any partisan alignment. Most vociferous among these is Paul Allen Beck. Beck first outlined his theory in 1977 when he noted that the G.O.P., while able to compete in presidential elections in the region, could do little at the lower levels of the ballot (p. 479). In his analysis, the migration hypothesis is inconsequential, meaning change would have to be explained from within the region. It was a simple proposition to Beck who noted a decline in the degrees of commitment to political parties. This trend was more easily observed in the younger voters, and thus, tied to the generational turnover hypothesis. As partisanship declined, so would the importance of partisan commitment and the rise of independents would have a negative effect on a previously dominant Democratic party. Figure 3-2 tends to support Beck's argument.
Dealignment proponents suggest that the region's parties have lost their distinctiveness, making dealignment possible. Some have explained these Independents as unrealized partisans, who cannot become partisans in a realigned electorate with ambiguity of party positioning and a stable agenda (Carmines et al., 1987). In 1982, Beck and Lopatto argued that the South had ceased to be a distinctive region. Dealignment proponents note that while political change has been "of earthshaking proportions," (p. 161) the causal factors have been a dealignment amongst younger voters (p. 162) and the erosion of political distinctiveness (p. 163). These are national trends in which the South is participating, which is important given that the realignments were usually viewed by Southerners only from a distance (Sunquist, 1973 pp. 120-154; Bensel and Sanders, p. 54). Scammon and Barnes (1985) concur with the Beck thesis. They argue that the ticket splitting is a result of a weakened effect of partisanship and that it has become so common that dealignment may have become a permanent feature (p. 14). This explains the rise in independents in the region, but it also points to weakened partisanship in general. The primary importance of partisanship is its role in explaining the behavioral activity of voting. This is why the voting of independents needs to be considered beside their proclamation, as in figure 3-2. By the same token, a declaration of one's partisanship should be considered in relation to the respondent's votes. The trend of varied voting loyalty at different electoral levels holds true for Democrats as well as independents in the NES samples. It is clear that, as in the case of independents, being a "Democrat" means different things in different elections at different levels of the ballot. Democratic votes for president by Democratic identifiers are less stable and generally fewer than in senatorial, congressional and gubernatorial elections. Democratic support is high, but more vulnerable at the top of the ticket.
Strong Democrats vote Democrat more often than weak ones, but the same pattern emerges. The data on strong and weak Democrats is provided in FIGURES 3-4 AND 3-5.
These figures indicate that, as expected, strong partisan identifiers are considerably more
stable in their support than are weak identifiers. The Democratic case shows the relative instability in support for presidential candidates, while the partisans remain loyal to candidates down the ticket. Republican identifiers in the NES data support their ticket's candidates at different levels as well. Unlike the Democrats, the Republicans show the most stable levels of support for the presidential candidates, and the weakest and most unstable levels of support for their congressional candidates. The important point is that, like the Democrats and the independents, partisanship means different things at different levels and is not an absolute guarantee of behavior. Republican identifiers are no more consistent in their voting than Independents or Democrats.

Clearly, Southern partisanship is unstable over time and is affected by the level of the election. This is not surprising as it concurs with the dealignment arguments. Scammon and Barnes agree and give a possible explanation for this instability (pp. 14-15). Initially, the voters relish their independent stature because of the flexibility it affords them. Secondly, because the Democrats control redistricting, they can isolate the Republican incursions. Thirdly, the Democrats realize that they have run ideologically unacceptable candidates in the past and are seeking to change their strategy and run moderates (p. 17). Fourthly, the U.S. House Speaker Jim Wright is a
Southerner, which prevents the G.O.P. from pointing to Tip O'Neill and suggesting that the National Democratic Party is run by liberal extremists. One attractive aspect of dealignment is that it need not lead to Kevin Phillip's misidentified Republican takeover. Scammon and Barnes are skeptical when they note that, in 1984, the Democrats won 73 of the Southern congressional districts in spite of the fact that Reagan won 66 of these same districts. These figures are in line with the general trends of the NES data. The dealignment hypothesis is compelling in light of the recent results from Southern elections. The Democrats have held their own below the presidential level and have adopted the advice of Jennings and Zeigler (1966) who suggested that they choose more moderate candidates (p. 122). Petrocik's (1987) analysis of G.O.P. growth leaves the question of why the G.O.P. failed to retain its gains in 1986 unanswered. The Democratic strategy of moderation is an obvious answer and this strategy is appropriate when linked to dealignment, but not synchronized with the conversion/realignment hypothesis.

In short, the argument that partisan change in the South is an indication of a realignment may be incorrect, and is at least an incomplete assessment. Partisanship is mostly important in that it provides an indication of one's voting behavior. In the case of the South, partisanship is ambiguous. As the NES data indicates, people will describe themselves as Democrats, Republicans or Independents, but this will not guarantee loyalty to that party's candidates during an election. This means that either the electorate is dealigned to some degree or that partisanship is not the independent variable political science believed it was. This conclusion is reinforced by the second level of competition, inter-party competition; the reason can be found in the patterns of intra-party competition that have emerged in the South.
CHAPTER 4- COMPETITION BETWEEN THE PARTIES

It is clear that partisanship is not the only way of looking at competition in the South. As an independent variable it is at best inconsistent in regards to the levels of competition and the time frame. An alternative approach is the analysis of election returns. By looking at the inter-party competition between the Democrats and the Republicans, the degrees of political change can be seen more clearly. Discussion of inter-party competition in the postwar South centers on three themes. What factors other than partisanship can explain improving G.O.P. fortunes? Secondly, how has this shift affected the different regions of the electorate, which includes the number of challenges and relative safeness of the seats? And, thirdly, how has incumbency worked to slow the change in region.

ISSUES AND DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH

As the first two chapters demonstrated, historical allegiance to the Democratic party was consistent and durable. However, recent shifts tend to raise questions as to its present stability. The politics of race in the region have obviously had effects on the electorate. When Campbell and Beck dismissed the migration hypothesis, they pointed to the shifting electoral base of the parties. The black vote has become solid in its support of the Democrats. While this was not a significant factor in the early postwar years, it has become powerful in the 1980's. Figure 4-1 demonstrates clearly that the black vote has increased.

This figure is informative in two regards. First, it points out that the black registration changes have been most dramatic in the Deep South. This is also due in part to the fact that the Deep South had the most room to improve with larger, more severely disenfranchised black populations. Secondly, it demonstrates that the two sections of the South are quite different in terms of the political makeup of the states. It is interesting to note that the two states with the smallest percentage of registered voters being black, Florida and Texas each with 11 percent, have been the states where the G.O.P. has shown the most improvement in the 1980's. So, while V.O. Key may have observed that race was not a great problem in the peripheral South, the lack of significant black votes is a problem for the Democrats in the Rim states.
This finding has had very clear effects on party strategy in the region. Earl and Merle Black (1987) have reached some conclusions about the importance of this increase in black registration. They argue that the Democratic strategy has been limited; they must gain black votes while distancing themselves from the Northern liberals (p. 287). Of course, the task of winning black votes has been ameliorated by the fact that the G.O.P. has run candidates difficult for blacks to support. Considering the Presidential standard bearers of Goldwater, Nixon and Reagan, this seems logical.

The Republicans have had to compensate for this increased black bloc by taking advantage of other changes in the region. The businessmen’s party has always been able to attract those interested in upward movement in the economy. The South was no exception. The G.O.P. of course, had its traditional roots in the mountain regions, which meant that Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina should have developed much more active Republican parties and be competitive sooner. The most prominent sources of G.O.P. growth in the postwar era have been with the urban/suburban Republicans and the interstate Republicans, who as a result of their proximity to the interstate were exposed to more of the changes in the region (ibid, pp. 268-269). The G.O.P. has recently capitalized on this shift and is running very well with the high and middle income Southerners. (ibid. p. 274) The G.O.P. does better in the Rim South where the urbanized middle class is largest. Tennessee and North Carolina rely on traditional Republicans for their successes, and thus have not shown the huge increases that Texas
and Florida have (ibid, p. 310).

The effect of party strategy has had a direct effect on the level of inter-party competition in the South. Inter-party competition has evolved differently in each section of the South. The Rim has shown much higher levels of G.O.P. support, while the Deep South has lagged behind. Most of the growth in the South has taken place in urban settings, where the G.O.P. has shown remarkable improvement. Black and Black note the effects of these different strategies in two regards. First, the G.O.P now has many more reliable Southern counties at the Presidential level than do the Democrats do (pp.265-266). This does not predict elections' outcomes. It only suggest that the Republicans are consistently winning in parts of the South. Black and Black also note the importance of the blacks to the Democratic party by separating statistics on black and white voters. To the outsider, it might seem plausible for the Democrats to revert to their old conservative ways and stop pushing the social legislation that blacks desire. The Democrats are aware that such a policy shift would affect the voting by ceasing to alienate Southern whites. It might also have consequences in the black voting column which might leave the Democrats without the advantage they hold. Black and Black estimate that the G.O.P. must win 3/5 of the white votes in Deep South states and 5/9 of the white vote in Rim South states to win elections (p. 289). This is a very difficult task and results in of high degrees of inconsistency in G.O.P. support. If partisanship was as important as proponents claimed, the region should be experiencing high degrees of inter-party competition. The results that follow will examine the increase in this competition.

INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

Inter-party competition implies competition at all levels of the electorate between the parties. As the NES data indicated, the levels of competition vary according to what office is under consideration. This section will discuss competition at the Presidential level, senatorial level, congressional level and gubernatorial level. Using the NES/SRC data as a guide, several hypotheses are confirmed. Initially, the Republicans should perform reasonably well at the Presidential level in the Solid South. They should be least successful at the level of the congressional elections. It is fair to say that the results are clear; the votes have been counted and recorded. The interpretation of this simple data is not very clear and is often biased by the normative expectations of the writer. This is certainly the case in Southern politics. The degrees of political change in the region are subject to interpretation and depend on the perspective of the writer. It is clear that the Democrats do much better than the Republicans at all levels except the
Presidential voting. It is also clear that the G.O.P. now wins at least some elections at all levels; they never did before the 1960's. An analogy might be two people in a desert looking at a glass of water one fourth full. The person with the full canteen is not greatly swayed by the glass. The person with no water is overwhelmed by it. So it goes in Southern politics as the trend points towards some change. Those who want to see the Democrats as dominant in the South are not impressed by the G.O.P.'s gains. Those who want to see the G.O.P. realigning the South are overwhelmed by the success and tend to exaggerate the implications of the Republican wins. Results of this research fall between those two extremes. The data which is presented here indicates that significant advances have been made, but that these shifts have not been the end of the Democratic dominance, as others have suggested.

The analysis will follow the different electoral levels using data coded by the author from the *Congressional Quarterly's Historical Guide to U.S. Elections* or the appropriate *CQ Almanac* or *CQ Weekly Report*. In addition to examining the different levels, this analysis will use three components to check the level of competition over time. Initially, the mean percent for the Republicans of the two party vote will be examined. Secondly, the actual results of the elections will be considered. The question emerges: does the margin correlate to a change in seats? Thirdly, in the case of non-presidential voting, it is important to distinguish what type of seat it is. In other words, is it safe or marginal? In order to analyze the two-party strength in the region, this paper employs a percentage scale based on the Republican portion of the two-party vote. This is explained in Table 4A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republican %</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>no Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-25</td>
<td>token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-44</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-55</td>
<td>competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-74</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-89</td>
<td>dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-100</td>
<td>safe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ELECTORAL COMPETITION**

The Republican success at the Presidential level is well documented; it provided motivation for Phillips and others seeking to paint the South as Republican or competitive. The data is firm in that the percentages are clear, yet the interpretation varies considerably. The G.O.P. has certainly advanced from the era of Coleman
Plese, but consistency is not yet present in G.O.P. voting. Eisenhower was the first Republican to make inroads in the region during the postwar era. He capitalized on the negative image of the Democratic party in the region lingering from the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948. Eisenhower was an unusual candidate in that he was a national hero and a regional native. Thus, the G.O.P. did well in 1952 and 1956 in the Southern Presidential voting. The G.O.P. failed to make any further significant gains in two-party voting until the Nixon campaign in 1972. Like Eisenhower, Nixon was able to take advantage of the failed protest votes of 1968, when many Democrats bolted the party to support the candidacy of George Wallace. In 1968, the Republican share of the two party vote remained small, although not so small as to prevent the Democrats from winning when the Wallace voters split off. While Humphrey won only Texas, the G.O.P. percentages had not increased that dramatically. 1976 signaled a return to the Democrats selecting Southerners as nominees. The success of Johnson in 1964 was duplicated as the South supported Carter. The G.O.P. percentage of the two-party vote remained significant. By 1980, Carter was embroiled in the Iranian hostage crisis and a failed presidency, and Reagan shot the G.O.P. margins back upward. In 1984, the presence of Walter Mondale moved the Republican percentages even higher as the Democratic balancing act between appeasing blacks and distancing themselves from Northern liberals proved impossible. Each state showed an increased rate of support for the G.O.P.

Of course the Rim states of Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Florida behaved differently than the Deep South states of Louisiana, Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi and Georgia. The Rim was generally more tolerant of Republicans except in 1964, when the Deep South supported Goldwater over Johnson and the Rim did not. In the Presidential case, the use of state-by-state analysis presents two findings. Initially, the Rim and Deep South states do behave differently. And, secondly, all states show a general increase. In the lower level elections a mean increase will be examined by region.
Republican Presidential percentages translate very well into victories in the Electoral College. Table 4B shows the number of states won by the Republicans,
Table 4B - State Wins in Presidential Voting by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DEM States</th>
<th>REP States</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a- Dixiecrats  b-Mississippi had unpledged delegates  c-American Independent (George Wallace)

The level of Presidential voting depends on the quality of the candidate as seen through Southern eyes. This is visible in the table. Individuality is most important at the Presidential level where past performance in that office is not a constant. This individuality explains the extreme disparity between the results in 1972, 1976 and 1980. The evidence does suggest that as long as the Democrats run non-Southern candidates with liberal voting records against more conservative Republicans they have little hope of providing the old solid block in the Electoral College.

In the Senate, the competition has been less obviously observable. At one level of competition, the average G.O.P. margins can be examined. They have increased consistently in all decades since 1960. If the elections are grouped by decade, according to the year the census changes House seats (i.e. 52-60, 62-70), this trend holds in the Deep South, the Rim South and thus in the South. Obviously, the mean Republican percentage in the Senate races has increased, but they have not become as competitive as the margins in Presidential elections.
A second measure of competition that is perhaps more important is the election's result. In the Rim South, the G.O.P. has become competitive, although not consistently so, as the decline in 1986 demonstrated. The Deep South has not been so kind to the G.O.P. In the old states of Dixie, the G.O.P. did not show signs of life until 1978 by winning four of ten seats and experienced the same decline in 1986. This peak in 1982 is also present when the results are scaled for the entire region. The area graph which follows demonstrates how recent and small the Republican success in senatorial elections has been. The division between the Rim South and the Deep South follows a similar pattern, in that the Deep South states took longer to develop a meaningful level of support for G.O.P. senatorial candidates. Appendix 4-A provides the division between these subgroups of the region.

The final consideration of competitiveness concerns how the G.O.P. senatorial candidates fare in each election. Are they becoming safer or do they remain vulnerable? In seats lost, are they competing any better? When the races are divided by decade again, an interesting pattern emerges. Each party offered competition by the 1982-1986 period save one, J. Bennett Johnson's seat in Louisiana, which went unchallenged in 1984. The Republicans do have some strong seats, where they poll between 56 and 75 percent, although they have more weak seats where they poll between 26 and 44 percent. Competitive seats show a big jump in the 1972-1980 period, but decline
thereafter. In the current decade, Democrats still have a definite advantage in regard to
competition. The column graph in FIGURE 4-5 is designed to vividly demonstrate that
Republicans are considerably more vulnerable than Democrats in Senate elections. The
darker the column gets, the stronger the Republican senatorial candidates are running.
The striped area represents competitive seats. It is clear that the striped area is very small
and not on the increase. Further, the Democratic area is much larger than that occupied
by the G.O.P. in every decade, although the difference is not as severe as it once was.

FIG 4-5 RELATIVE SAFENESS IN SENATE RACES AS MEASURED BY G.O.P. PERCENTAGES

In conclusion, the initial test of senatorial competitiveness shows that the
G.O.P. increased its margins. This was not translating as quickly into Republican
seats shown by APPENDIX 4A. The figure on G.O.P margins demonstrated that the
Republicans have not been successful in building solid safe seats to compete with the
Democrats. The Democratic edge in these safe seats means that even when the G.O.P.
holds a large number of Senate seats, these are not as safe as the Democrats'. Further,
the trend since 1982 is for the Democrats to reassert themselves in Senate elections; the
G.O.P. has consequently declined.

Competition for House seats has been the biggest disappointment for the
G.O.P. The Republicans always had seats in the Rim South; Tennessee provided two
from the beginning of the post-WWII era. In 1962, the G.O.P. launched a Southern congressional offensive and the Goldwater candidacy helped further. Since 1964, the Republicans have shown only marginal growth. While some of these seats have become safe, the great dominance of the Democrats in the region still has the G.O.P. outnumbered.

The analysis of the House elections will follow the senatorial analysis of competitiveness. Initially, the average margin for the G.O.P. is considered over time, although each election year is treated separately. Secondly, the actual balance of seats in the Southern delegation is traced over the postwar era. Finally, the margins reflecting Republican and Democratic safeness or vulnerability will be studied in order to assess the overall strength of G.O.P prospects.

As to the mean Republican margin, one would be tempted again to suggest that the G.O.P. is blossoming. In the 1940's and 1950's, the mean percent of the two party vote hovered around 10 percent. By the 1980's the mean percent rose to between 35 and 40 percent. As in the other cases, the Rim South appears more tolerant of Republican candidates than does the Deep South.

![Graph of mean G.O.P. percent in House races](image)

The shift in the mean Republican vote has not been translating into a shift in seats in the Southern delegation. The Democrats have declined from near unanimous
control of the congressional delegation to control of between 60 and 70 percent of the delegation; this has resulted in the Democrats maintaining around 80 seats, with the G.O.P. controlling the rest. These facts illustrate the tremendous advantage Democrats enjoy in the Southern House delegation. The Democratic share remains relatively constant, while the G.O.P. grows as the total number of seats grows. In addition, internal shifts in Southern population result in the Deep South losing seats, while the Rim South gains them. Given the tendency of the Rim to better support the G.O.P., this should result in a shift. As to the subsections of the Solid South, the Rim shows a Republican presence earlier than the Deep South does, although the Rim Republicans do not appear to fare any better than the Deep Republicans. This may be due in part to the population shifts within the region. Appendix 4B differentiates the subgroups, but points out the basic fact: the G.O.P. is still a definite minority at this level of election.

The final test of competitiveness involves the margin of the victory in the races. Each congressional election year is treated separately and the trend is clear. Most seats are Democratic and safely so. Competitive seats are rare and the Republicans have few dominant and safe seats. The area graph in Figure 4-7 shows this vividly. White areas indicate Democratic candidates' relative strength; darker areas show G.O.P. candidates relative strength. The marginal increases for the G.O.P. seem relatively unimportant when viewed in the context of the graph. At one level it is clear that safe seats are not only a Democratic phenomenon, however the Democrats have a much larger proportion of safe seats.
In summation, the congressional delegation from the South has changed to some degree; it now includes more than two Republicans. In spite of this, the body remains overwhelmingly Democratic. Once again, an increase in the mean Republican percentage did not translate into a similar increase in the number of seats. Further, the margins do not bode well for the G.O.P., as marginal seats are small in number and the G.O.P. has more vulnerable seats than do the Democrats.

The gubernatorial elections follow a similar pattern. In regard to the mean Republican percent of the two party vote, the G.O.P. has shown a large increase over time. The elections are grouped by decade in order to increase the number of cases and thus reduce the chance of one particular candidate unduly influencing the mean. It should be noted that the G.O.P. candidates tend to run better in non-presidential years. This runs counter to the notion of coattails, but it could be a result of candidates alone. Nevertheless, in each decade the G.O.P. increases its margin, and that is the initial point of the data.
In regard to actual Republican wins, the G.O.P. has never dominated the South's governorships. The results have been varied in spite of the overall increase in average margin. The 1986 results allowed the G.O.P. to save face, but the success of the G.O.P. has been varied and inconsistent. Appendix 4C subdivides the G.O.P. success by seats and sub-region. As Figure 4-8 suggests, the G.O.P. has done much better in the Rim states than in the Deep South.

The third part of inter-party competition involves the relative competitiveness over the decades. This data reflects a trend towards competition in half the races and Democratic dominance in the other half. This means that the Democrats are doing well and the Republicans are challenging. The G.O.P. rarely dominates a gubernatorial election in the region, a key factor emerging from Figure 4-9. It is clear that they are now, at least, running candidates.
The story of the G.O.P. repeats itself in gubernatorial elections. While the G.O.P. has increased its mean margin across the board, this has really not changed the shape of Southern politics as dramatically as one might expect. Never-the-less, there have been substantial increases in Republican voting in the South.

The area where the G.O.P. has run worst is in state and local elections. For whatever reason, the G.O.P. has failed to make inroads into these smaller electoral units. Thus, even when the G.O.P. manages to elect a governor, they are often at the mercy of the powerful Southern legislatures dominated by the opposition. Walter Dean Burnham has assembled data from the entire postwar period, and his results indicate that the shift to the G.O.P. in Southern legislatures has been much slower than in other areas discussed in this chapter. In addition, the Democrats are still in overwhelming control of the Southern institutions. Table 4C shows the breakdowns after the 1986 elections in the State Houses and State Senates of the South.
**TABLE 4C: G.O.P. STRENGTH IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>% G.O.P. IN HOUSE</th>
<th>% G.O.P. IN Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALABAMA</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISIANA</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENNESSEE</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIRGINIA</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that the G.O.P. has failed to make comparable inroads in the state legislative branches to accompany their gubernatorial successes. By 1986, only Florida had a sizeable Republican delegation in each house; making bipartisan coalitions possible there and difficult elsewhere. Both Tennessee and Texas have shown marked improvement on the House side, but the Senate lags far behind in these states, making gubernatorial influence in the legislature considerably more difficult for Republican governors.

Inter-party competition is a confusing topic to study. The G.O.P. has made progress where they were traditionally shut out, but significant opportunities remain unexploited; that is what the second component of inter-party competition, actual seat division, suggests. Finally, the margins of the interparty competition demonstrate that even where the G.O.P. has made gains in regards to the number of seats, their seats tend to be much more vulnerable than those won by the Democrats. The end conclusion must be that the electoral returns do not indicate stable competition in the region. They do, however, give the G.O.P. hope where there was none before the 1960's.

**THE LITERATURE**

One of the reasons the G.O.P. has been so slow to exploit the shifts in the region can be found in the area of incumbency advantage. The literature on Congressional elections suggests that this advantage is real. Charles Jones noted as early as 1964 that the House of Representatives was more stable than competitive (p. 475). Kostoski (1973) found evidence that the incumbency advantage was real in the Senate as well. This phenomenon was documented by Al Cover (1977) when he wrote about the vanishing marginal in congressional elections. Cover suggests that incumbents
use the structure of Congress in order to create safer seats every year. Cover and Mayhew (1974) have certainly demonstrated that marginal elections were vanishing rapidly. Sandy Maisel began to develop a model of rational challengers when he noted that the challengers were more likely to gravitate to open seats. He notes significant levels of primary competition, although he never advances beyond counting candidates.

The literature puts forth many hypotheses to explain the development of incumbency advantage. Certainly, candidates have a need to expand their margins. It is rational; the greater the margin, the less likely it is for a strong challenger to risk the campaign. In addition, this leaves the congressmen free of interest group demands exchanged for support. It has been said that the first job of a congressman is to get elected and the second is to get re-elected. There is some truth to that. Congressmen are keenly aware of this, as Fenno (1978) has found. Given that, they have every incentive to exploit the advantages of incumbency and increase their margins.

Many scholars have added insight to the understanding of congressional incumbency. Fiorina (1977), Mayhew (1974), and Ferejohn (1977) have offered summary articles on the subject. Their findings point to three areas. First, they all point to parts of the literature that suggest a structural advantage is derived from institutional control. Second, each point to the literature which suggests that the incumbency advantage is a natural phenomenon. Thirdly, all point to parts of the literature that argue the electorate has changed, making incumbency more important.

The institutional control argument is traced basically to Tufte. He argues that because incumbents control the redistricting process they are able to consistently make their seats safer (1973). Erikson (1972) found that gerrymandering had significant effects on the party makeup in Congress. Of course, Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964 abolished the political gerrymander. At the congressional level, however, there has been little evidence of the courts enforcing the provision. Pinning a party with political motivation is considerably more difficult than it would appear initially. In addition, Bullock (1975) raised serious questions about the entire notion of redistricting affecting outcomes when he found that incumbents won changed districts as often as they won unchanged ones. All of this leaves the redistricting hypothesis on questionable ground.

The second hypothesis suggested that the incumbency advantage was natural. Erikson (1971) framed the logic of the argument; he argued that incumbents have natural exposure that increases their visibility and name recognition. Thomas Mann and Ray Wolfinger (1980) confirmed when they wrote that incumbents are more liked because they have more resources and more name recognition. This held true in part, because
they realized that while voters could not recall names as the NES/CPS studies had asked them to do before 1978, they could recognize and evaluate them (p. 617). Jacobson (1978) went further when he explained the advantage being developed through advertising, credit claiming, issue stands and homestyle development. In any case, it is clear that House incumbents do better, in part because localism forces them to be district-oriented; this behavior makes them more recognizable. This allows them greater favor, and more contributions which allow them to fend off challengers with money and media.

The third hypothesis does not deny the truisms of the second; it simply argues that the effect has been to change the electorate. Ferejohn (1977) argues that the weakening of the party in a modern political context has left the electorate in search of an alternate voting cue. In his view that cue is incumbency. While he claims to disagree with the second hypothesis, he in fact, does not refute it. He simply looks at the effects of incumbency on the voter and concludes that it is important. The second hypothesis attempts to show why. Ferejohn is really an extension of Walter Dean Burnham (1974) who first argued that the vanishing marginals were a result of changed voting behavior. This hypothesis argues that the voters changed cues, making incumbancy more important. This is true, but it is also true that incumbency influenced the voters in the first place. It appears that incumbency is important in congressional elections. Its effect is certainly significant and has led scholars such as Collie (1985) to argue that incumbency has become more important than party identification in congressional elections.

Each of these hypotheses can be looked at in the context of the South, a setting where change has been minimal and incumbents have done exceptionally well. It is no secret that the most senior members of Congress and the Senate tend to be Southerners. It is, in fact, quite difficult to remove these members through inter-party competition. The questions are how has redistricting affected incumbents in the postwar South, and how important is incumbency in the postwar South?

The redistricting hypothesis is obviously limited to the congressional elections in the region. It is clear that the Democrats have been quite successful in retaining their seats in the region. Because the redistricting is controlled by the Democrats, every attempt has been made to insure safety for incumbents and thus, a safe Democratic advantage. Occasionally, the Democrats attempted to remove Republicans by districting them in with incumbent Democrats. This strategy proved disastrous for the Democrats on all three occasions, as the Republican defeated the Democrat. These
instances have been quite rare. The majority of postwar congressional elections in the South have been single incumbent races. A shift in the district boundaries in the South are rarely influential.

The second hypothesis of the literature suggested that the incumbents had a natural advantage in terms of name recognition and exposure and that the advent of the media campaign served to accentuate this. In the setting of the South, the incumbency advantage is real. Whether simple name recognition or media power as a result of over-financed war chest, Southern incumbents of either party rarely lose. This advantage holds true for both Democrats and Republicans which tends to suggest that the reason change is slow in the South is that incumbents usually win and there are many more Democrats than Republicans. Of the 1,163 elections since 1956 with one Democratic incumbent the Democrats won 1142 and lost only 21. This figure is truly overwhelming in numerical terms alone. The Democratic incumbents lost in less than two percent of their attempts to retain office. Republican incumbents have not enjoyed the same degrees of success, but they have not done poorly either. In spite of the inconsistency, Republican incumbents won in 298 of the 321 elections in which they ran between 1956 and 1986. While Republican incumbents lost more than two percent of the time, they still enjoyed a huge advantage, losing in only 7 percent of their attempts at retention. In each case, the overwhelming pattern is one of safety for incumbents.

The implication of the incumbency advantage in the Southern congressional contests is clear; it seems so overwhelming as to discourage quality competition. It has long been a contention of Gary Jacobson that the quality of the opponent is critical in congressional contests. In 1978, he wrote about the vanishing challengers; in making his argument he informally developed and outlined a model of challenger decision-making. He argued most convincingly that challengers reacted to the overwhelming margins in congressional contests by choosing not to run. Given the history of Southern congressional contests, the smart money would not challenge congressional incumbents, which leaves only a little money, which in turn is lost in almost every case.

It stands to reason then, that the intelligent challenger must wait until an incumbent retires to run for a congressional seat. Because more Democrats exist, more retire. Retirement provides a much better opportunity for a challenger. The only drawback for the serious challenger is that he or she might have a prolonged wait. Since 1956, the Democrats have only left 146 of their seats open (without a returning incumbent in the general election). Of these, in 111 cases the incumbency was
successfully transferred to another Democrat, while in 35 the transfer failed, resulting in a shift to the G.O.P. In 76 percent of the cases, Democratic incumbency was transferable, while in 24 percent it was not. A similar relationship exists with the G.O.P. retirements. In the same period, there have been 34 cases where the G.O.P. has had a retiring incumbent or a death. 71 percent, or 24 times, the incumbency was transferred, while the Democrats won in 29 percent (ten cases). Shifts in inter-party balance are more likely during a year with a retiring incumbent than one with an active incumbent. It is also true that the same party is able to win over 70 percent of the time in each case which suggests that the incumbency advantage may be transferable in the South.

As to the Ferejohn hypothesis on a changing electorate, it is obvious that they are responding to incumbents in the South. In order to suggest that the incumbency advantage is a new cue in the South, more extensive data needs to be collected. Unfortunately, the lack of a complete Southern database precludes any statement on this subject. The NES data points to a problem with partisan identification as was discussed in the previous chapter. Individual level data for the region as a whole is scarce, and thus so are conclusions about the validity of Ferejohn's hypothesis in the region. It is clear that incumbency matters and that a real advantage for incumbents exists.

The advantage of the incumbent is not, however limited to congressional contests. This thesis is concerned with behavior at other electoral levels as well. As a result, the incumbency advantage at senatorial and gubernatorial levels was explored as well. Barbara Hinkley (1988, Chapter 3) has argued that incumbency was important in the Senate elections as well. Later years tend to discount the relationship and documented that in the senatorial elections, incumbency meant less than in congressional races. Of course, this ran counter to the tradition in the South. In the South, the tradition of powerful Southern senators with huge seniority advantages started before the Civil War and continued well after. When congressional scholars began to argue that the incumbency advantage was disappearing in the Senate elections, Southern area specialists were puzzled. The Democratic senators from the South had sought re-election 100 times between 1946 and 1986, they had won 95 times and lost only 5 times, twice in the 1960's and three times in the 1970's. A five percent rate of defeat was greater than the two percent in congressional elections, but hardly indicative of a great shift away from incumbents. Republican incumbents were fewer in number, but still enjoyed an excellent rate of job retention. Seventeen Southern Republican senators sought re-election and thirteen won
(76 percent) while only four were defeated. Three of these were one-term incumbents defeated in 1986: Paula Hawkins lost in Florida, Jeremiah Denton lost in Alabama and Mack Mattingly lost in Georgia. Figures were equally sobering for challengers who wanted to make a run at incumbent senators from the region. The quality of the challenger is greatly improved at this level, as the margins in the senatorial figures indicated; however, the results are so overwhelming that few could find comfort in reduced margins. The number of Senate seats held by the G.O.P. indicate that the principal road to power in the Southern senatorial races is by finding an open Democratic seat rather than running against an incumbent. Case studies of the Southern Senate seats indicate that the G.O.P. has held 12 of the 22 potential seats at some time or another in the postwar period. Five of the twelve were held for only one term and then lost, while one was won in 1982 and won't be defended until 1988. An interesting pattern emerges in how these seats are initially won. Four times the Republican candidate defeated the Democratic incumbent. These four incumbents twice survived moderate challenges in the primaries and twice were unchallenged in the primary. Three of the initial wins for the G.O.P. resulted from defeating Democrats who had defeated the Democratic incumbent in the primary. Three of the wins followed Democratic retirements, one followed the independent Harry Byrd's retirement and one win resulted from Strom Thurmond switching parties. Of those seats held for more than one term, only one resulted from the defeat of an incumbent and one came after a Democratic incumbent was beaten in the primary.

The case studies suggest that the best way for the G.O.P. to establish dominance in a Senate seat is to win after an incumbent retires. The success of winning open seats is greater than defeating incumbents for both Republicans and Democrats. In 36 general elections lacking incumbents and Democratic in the prior term, the Democrats retained the seat in 29 cases, or 81 percent of the time. In the South, it is still difficult to defeat incumbent Democrats or to wrestle the seat from the party's control. The chances for success are much greater when the Democratic incumbent is not present in the general election. The Republicans have had minimal experience with retiring incumbents. There are five cases during the postwar period where the Republican incumbent was not running in the general election. The G.O.P. retained only two of these seats. This suggests that the G.O.P. does not transfer incumbency in Senate seats as successfully as the Democratic party. Thus incumbency is very important in the Southern Senate races. As to incumbency transfer in the Senate, the Democrats are much more effective at transferring incumbency than are the Republicans.
The final level of incumbency analyzed is at the gubernatorial level. This is considerably more difficult to assess and filled with caveats. Many states in the South prevent governors from serving consecutive terms. As a result, incumbency was interrupted for a term. In many cases, the results were clear as factions dominated the posts. In Alabama, George Wallace's wife ran to circumvent the rule. As a result, the number of cases of incumbent governor's seeking re-election are much lower. In the postwar South, 43 Democratic governors sought re-election in the general election. Forty-one of them won; the other two lost. The two defeated incumbents were Bill Clinton in Arkansas (1980) and Mark White in Texas (1986). Republican incumbents have had considerably less success in the general election. They have run in five general elections and won only once. This data suggests that at the state executive level, the Republicans have not yet achieved lasting competitiveness. Their candidates have not fared well against the Democrats as a whole. Not only have their incumbents fared poorly, their challengers have done poorly as well. There were 75 postwar general elections without Democratic incumbents. The incumbency was transferred in 63 of these cases or 84 percent of the time. In contrast, there were 10 general elections where the Republican incumbent was not present in the general election. The G.O.P. managed to win only three of these. Thus, Democratic gubernatorial incumbency is successfully transferred 84 percent of the time, while Republican gubernatorial incumbency is transferred successfully only 30 percent of the time.

A second area of explanation involves the role of coattails in affecting electoral outcomes. It has long been understood that the decision to support a Presidential nominee of one party can aid members of the same party down the ticket. When this nominee is extremely popular and coasts to an easy win in November, members of his party do very well in senatorial and congressional races. When the effect leads to significant shifts in the direction of the winners party the coattails are said to be long. Historically, there is considerable evidence to suggest that this effect is real. Kaplowitz (1971), Moreland (1973) and Jacobson (1983) have all found this to be the case. More recently, Ferejohn and Calvert (1984), have argued that these effects are greatly diminished. In the case of Southern politics, this would most certainly be expected. As the data have indicated, change is much slower in the Southern electorate below the Presidential level which suggests that the coattails of Presidential candidates are shorter in the South than elsewhere. More recent analysis by James Campbell is particularly useful in explaining this effect. He finds that the winning party can expect three seats for every percentage point the Presidential nominee pulls away (1986a). Further, his
application of this predictive model to the 1984 election proved accurate. Further, he suggests that these effects can reach the level of state legislative elections, but that these effects will be minimal in states that lack competitive parties (1986b). While these effects are real, regional idiosyncrasies should serve to hold them at a minimum in the tests which follow.

The glaring failures of the G.O.P. to compete successfully in inter-party competition below the Presidential level is not without explanation. The role of incumbency in these elections appears powerful. The case studies in the House tend to confirm the notion that the G.O.P. does best when they take advantage of a bloody Democratic primary and run against a non-incumbent. Incumbency is said to have importance across all of the three electoral levels discussed in the South. Certainly, that advantage flourishes in the House. The senatorial and gubernatorial elections should reinforce the idea that inter-party competition is partially determined by incumbency. It is not surprising that incumbency should play a large role in the fortunes of the two parties.

THE ANALYSIS

Three simple models are employed in order to explain the outcomes of Southern elections. The dependent variable is \( Y_1 \), the Democratic percent of the two party vote in the general election. In each case the type of election is reflected by three dummy variables which act as independent variables for the type of incumbency that exists and three additional dummy variables which reflect the coattail effect in each election. In the case of the type of incumbency the analysis is limited to four case types. Since 1956, the South has seen three cases where deliberate redistricting placed one incumbent from each party in the same district. There were 17 new districts created without an incumbent. These twenty cases do not fit the typology for incumbency; they have been removed from the analysis. The four classifications left are: elections with a Democratic incumbent \( (n=1163) \), ones with a Republican incumbent \( (n=321) \), districts that were Democratic and lack an incumbent \( (n=146) \) and districts that were Republican and lacked a G.O.P. incumbent \( (n=34) \). In these cases, those that were Democratic and lack an incumbent are removed from the equation, providing the basis of contrast for the other types. The three dummy variables thus reflect the difference between their type and the baseline districts that were Democratic and lack an incumbent. In the second set of dummy variables used in the model, the four typologies are: elections with Democratic Presidential coattails, elections with Republican Presidential coattails, off year elections
with a Democratic president and off-year elections with a Republican president. In this case the off-year Republican elections have been left out of the equation. Given the conventional wisdom on off-year elections, this would mean that the best case scenario has been left out and all the other dummy variables should be negatively related. The model is as follows:

\[ Y_1 = a + bx_1 + bx_2 + bx_3 + bx_4 + bx_5 + bx_6 + e \]

In each case \( bx_1 \) is the dummy variable for a Democratic incumbent, \( bx_2 \) is the dummy variable for a Republican incumbent, \( bx_3 \) is the dummy variable for an open Republican seat, \( bx_4 \) is the dummy variable for an election with Democratic Presidential coattails, \( bx_5 \) is a dummy variable for years with Republican Presidential coattails and \( bx_6 \) is the dummy variable for years with open seats that were Democratic in the previous term. \( E \) is the variance unexplained by the model.

In the first model, the percent of the Democratic vote in congressional elections is said to be determined by incumbency and coattails, the two most prevalent indicators from congressional elections literature. These models are duplicated for Senate and gubernatorial elections. The results appear as Tables 4D through 4F.

Three statistics are reported below for each variable: the parameter estimate, \( T \) for \( HO \) where parameter=0, and the level of significance. For the model as a whole, the \( R^2 \) statistic is reported as the way to assess the degree of variance explained; in virtually every case, these models are quite robust, in that the high explanatory power of each is clear. This statistic is not, however, an end in itself and this is particularly true here. For this analysis, the individual regression parameters tell a much more interesting story.

The reporting of the individual variables' effects follows in models 4-1 through 4-3. The first reported number in each model is the intercept. This is the point where the regression line intercepts the \( Y \)-axis. This is the expected Democratic vote if all the independent variables are equal to zero. In this case that means the expected vote in an open seat previously held by a Democrat in a Republican midterm election. You will notice that the Democrats begin at a high level in every case which is the expected finding given the nature of competition in the region. The line then slants up or down according to its slope. In multivariate analysis the slope is determined by the parameter
estimates of the independent variables and may be negative or positive. Initially, it is
important to dismiss the notion that the regression coefficients differ from zero and thus
establish that the independent variables are related to the dependent variable. In order
to test this, a null hypothesis is put forth, the null hypothesis which suggests that the
parameter estimate or B equals zero. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected then we
cannot place any confidence in the parameter estimate. Thus, by discounting the null
hypothesis, the potential validity of the model is increased. The degree of confidence
available for rejecting the null hypothesis for each independent variable is measured by
the T statistic. The statistic T measures its significance and is computed by dividing the
parameter estimate by its standard error. The size of the T statistic can then be used to
determine the probability that the parameters true value is zero. This probability is the
level of significance. When the probability is .05 or less, the null hypothesis can be
rejected with 95 percent certainty. While this is generally viewed as acceptable, in these
models the probability is often less than .01, which suggests that the likelihood that the
true parameter is zero can be rejected with 99 percent certainty. In this way, the
independent variables in the models are assessed for their explanatory power. The
findings in the Democratic model for congressional elections are typical. The
incumbency advantage is significant, as the literature suggests.

Table 4D DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE AS A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>PARAMETER ESTIMATE</th>
<th>T for H0: par=0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>68.83</td>
<td>42.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. incumbent</td>
<td>17.54</td>
<td>11.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. incumbent</td>
<td>-35.35</td>
<td>-20.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open was Rep.</td>
<td>-20.36</td>
<td>-6.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. on year</td>
<td>-2.66</td>
<td>-2.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. on year</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
<td>-4.89**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. off year</td>
<td>-4.52</td>
<td>-3.56**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**indicates significance at the .01 level
*indicates significance at the .05 level

The best way to understand the substantive meaning of the parameters is to
apply variables to the setting of voting. The intercept indicates the baseline, an open
seat that was Democratic. These are cases in which Democrats in the South do
reasonably well, as we have seen from the statistics on incumbency transfer. The three
contrast cases show the effect compared to the norm or threshold case of open Democratic districts. The presence of a Democratic incumbent can boost that to over 86 percent, which is reflective of the many safe seats the Democrats control in the region. Republican incumbents, however, lower the estimate below the 50 percent win/lose threshold and usually result in Republican wins, with the Democratic percent falling to 33.48. In this model, the greatest variation from the open Democratic norm is found here, which serves to reinforce the importance that incumbency has on election results at the congressional level. A significant difference also exists between the open Democratic and open Republican seats. In this case the parameter estimate moves the democratic percent to a level below the fifty percent threshold to 48.47. The three variables on coattails were hypothesized to take on a negative relationship and all did. Given that the comparison is between the dummy variables and the case of off-year Republican elections, this hypothesis was justified. The effects, while statistically significant, are far less important substantively than incumbancy advantage.

The effects of this variable can best be represented by computing the election results they suggest. Again, in an open seat that had been held by a Democrat, the expected Democratic vote in a Republican midterm election would be 68.83%. In a Republican on year the expected Democratic vote would fall to 63.55%. A Democratic midterm would yield an expected Democratic vote of 64.31%, and in a Democratic on year, the expected vote would be 66.17. The difference between the Democratic vote accrued in midterms with Republican presidents in the White House and the vote in years where a Republican wins the Presidency is 5.28 percentage points. Thus the difference between a Republican off year surge and off year decline is about five percentage points. The comparable figure for Democratic administrations is less than two percentage points. It is clear that the best of all possible scenarios for the Democrats is when they are running incumbent congressmen in off-year elections when the G.O.P. controls the White House. In contrast, the Democrats do the worst when they must deal with Republican incumbents in years where the G.O.P. is winning the Presidency. The fact that Republican coattails are stronger is probably a reflection of the difference between national party candidates during years that the G.O.P. won. In the case of table 4D, incumbency is of great importance to both parties; the relatively greater importance it holds in the model helps explain why few competitive seats exist in the South.

The second model attempts to relate these same variables to Senate elections in the region from 1946-1986. In the case of the Senate a greater number of years is available. CO's Almanac reports all primary elections in senatorial and gubernatorial
elections. They do not report congressional primary election results and these are obtained from Richard Scammon's *America Votes*. As this fact becomes critical in the following chapter, consistency is maintained by limiting the House elections to 1956 and beyond. The greater number of years and cases is, therefore, solely a function of the availability of data. As was the case above, the dependent variable is the percent of the vote for the Democratic candidates in the general election. The independent variables are the same two sets of dummy variables used in the congressional election regression. The same logic applies. This thesis has already demonstrated that partisanship has a different effect at this level; in the context of the region, competition between the parties differs greatly from level to level. The literature on the Senate takes these findings even further. In regard to incumbency, it is generally assumed that in the Senate elections incumbency is of less importance. It is also generally assumed that coattails will have a much greater effect at this level. The literature from the Southern context suggests otherwise. First, there is the issue of the dominance of the state Democratic parties. The effect of this dominance should serve to weaken the effects of the coattails in these statewide contest. The aggregate data alone suggests that while the Southern voter is willing to desert the national ticket in Presidential voting, they are not willing to continue the switch further down the ballot. In addition, while nationwide Senate incumbents benefit less from current office holding than do congressional candidates, the Southern senators continue to hold disproportionately more powerful positions in the upper chamber than non-Southerners (Manley, 1973). Thus it would appear that the incumbency advantage for senators should be relatively significant in the region and that the coattail effect should be weak. Table 4E attempts to clarify this by using data from the South's Senate elections between 1946 and 1986.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>PARAMETER EST.</th>
<th>T FOR H0: par=0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>63.72</td>
<td>17.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. incumbent</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>4.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. incumbent</td>
<td>-19.09</td>
<td>-3.77**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open was Rep.</td>
<td>-13.47</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem on-year</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep on-year</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
<td>-.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem off-year</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**indicates significance at the .01 level  
*indicates significance at the .05 level

In contrast to table 4D, this same combination of independent variables has less overall explanatory power when moved into the level of senatorial voting. While this combination of dummy variables only explains about half of the variance that it did in the congressional model, the equation does offer interesting findings. It suggests that the South is different from the rest of the country. While Incumbency advantage is much lower than in the region's congressional contests, it is nonetheless significant. The intercept of 63.72 again indicates the expected Democratic vote share in an open seat previously held by a Democrat. The presence of a Democratic incumbent drives the Democratic percent above 77 percent when the incumbent is compared to an open Democratic seat. The presence of a Republican incumbent causes the expected Democratic percent to fall to 44.63. An open Republican seat is essentially a toss up, with an expected Democratic vote of 50.25%, but the level of confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis associated with this estimate is only 90 percent.

The effect of coattails on Southern senators is both substantially and statistically insignificant. The tendency of the South to desert the national party and hold fast to the state level candidates is demonstrated here. In each case, the contrasting of the independent dummy variables for the various on year, and off year elections offer low parameter estimates and insignificant findings. These would not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis in the case of any of the variables relating to the coattails.

This model thus provides further evidence that the South remains a distinct region. Senate incumbency is a real advantage in the South, which might help account for the important positions that members of the Southern Senate delegation hold. National politics appear to make little difference in Senate elections in the South. The greater effect of coattails in congressional districts may be due to the reduced importance
of Republican clusters. In statewide elections, these pockets of Republicanism are often diluted to the detriment of Republicans running statewide. It is also notable that the addition of the other pre-1956 cases did not change the results significantly, which suggests that the analysis is not time-bound to the post-1956 era. The model was run for the '56-'86 period and no significant shifts occurred.

Table 4F DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE GUBERNATORIAL VOTE AS A FUNCTION OF INCUMBENCY AND COATTAILS, 1946-1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>PARAMETER EST.</th>
<th>T FOR H0: par=0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>67.62</td>
<td>24.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. incumbent</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. incumbent</td>
<td>-14.26</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open was Rep.</td>
<td>-17.18</td>
<td>-2.84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem on-year</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. on-year</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem. off-year</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**indicates significance at the .01 level
*indicates significance at the .05 level

The overall explanatory power of this model is low, which suggests that the variables of incumbency and coattails are quite weak in explaining outcomes. The context of Southern politics makes this expected. Considering the effects of incumbency first, only one variable is significant, the open Republican category, but the others are in the expected direction and are significant at the .01 level. The expected Democratic vote in an open race formerly held by a Democrat is 67.62%. This improves only slightly to 73.52% when a Democratic incumbent is running. The expected Democratic vote in an open race in a formerly Republican state is 50.44%, or a virtual toss up. Again incumbency is weak, in fact the expected Democratic vote is slightly higher, 53.36%, than in an open Republican race. The role of Southern gubernatorial incumbency is weak in part due to the fact that some states refused to allow incumbents to seek re-election. This tradition was more prevalent in the Deep South than the Rim South. In the Deep South, Alabama did not allow incumbents to serve consecutive terms, so while the incumbents are coded as such, they did not serve in the preceding term. Georgia and Louisiana did allow consecutive terms while Mississippi did not. South Carolina did not have an incumbent seek re-election until 1982.
The Rim states of Texas, Arkansas, Florida and Tennessee have solid traditions of incumbent governors in the postwar period. North Carolina elected their first incumbent governor in 1982 and Virginia has never had one. As a result, incumbency tends to be a very weak indicator in the South's gubernatorial elections. There is a significant tendency for the South to stay Democratic in these elections.

The coattail argument is given little support in this case because of the high probability that the parameter estimates are not different from zero. In addition, they are quite low. Part of the explanation may be the few cases in which governors are exposed to possible coattail effects. The Southern Democrats anticipated this problem, and took steps to insulate that state politics would remain free of national effects. Only North Carolina continues to hold its gubernatorial elections in Presidential election years. Georgia held elections every two years until 1950; then switched to off-years; Texas had a two-year term until 1974, and then moved to the off-year format, Tennessee switched from two-year terms to four-year off-year elections in 1954. Arkansas still holds elections every two years. Florida held concurrent elections until 1966 and then switched to the off-year elections. Louisiana held concurrent elections until 1975 when they switched to odd numbered year elections for four year terms. Virginia and Mississippi have held odd-numbered year elections for the entire postwar period. South Carolina and Alabama have always held off-year elections. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable for coattail effects to be held at a minimum in Southern gubernatorial elections.

It is clear that this model is not nearly as predictive as the congressional model. The simplicity of these models is intentional. They serve as a basis for the more complicated models developed in Chapter 5. Incumbency is important, and coattails are generally not. As was the case in the Senate model, the analysis is not time bound and the models' predictive ability of individual parameter estimates are not altered significantly by limiting the analysis to the 1956-1986 period. Chapter 5 will explain more of the variance by including variables that pertain to the levels of intra-party competition.

At the Presidential level, the G.O.P. has taken advantage of regionally unacceptable candidates offered by the Democrats and established a tradition of winning. The natural conservatism of the region has found a place in the national party politics of the G.O.P., while the Democrats have run candidates who failed to represent the Southern Democrat. Jimmy Carter is the exception, but other problems with his administration made him a weak candidate for reelection. In spite of the Presidential
strength of the G.O.P. in the South, the Republicans have not performed well in inter-party competition at other levels.

This chapter has led to several conclusions. Initially, it is clear that competition between the parties is not that great in the South. At the congressional level, while Republicans are winning more, and some of these are quite safe, Democrats still possess many more safe seats at the congressional level. These races are determined primarily by incumbency, although the presence of coattails does seem to have an effect. The tremendous domination of the House delegation by the Democrats tend to reinforce the notion that the South is different in terms of party balance and strength.

At the senatorial level, the Republicans are still not competing on equal ground. When the G.O.P. wins seats from the region, they have difficulty retaining them. This is partially due to the fact that the G.O.P. wins seats with small percentages, while the Democrats often win them by huge margins, making their seats safer. Senate seats take on the characteristic of Southern state party contests; the results remain relatively free from coattails which might otherwise have trickled down as fallout from the disastrous Democratic Presidential nominees. The incumbency advantage is significant and real in the region. While its powers are not as great as in the congressional contests, they are not insignificant.

At the gubernatorial level, the Democrats have gone to great lengths to assure themselves continued domination. Recent G.O.P. gains have only served to accentuate the fact that the G.O.P. usually wins by a small margin, and the Democrats are capable of routing the opposition. The relative safeness of the seats tends to emphasize the advantage held by the Democrats at this level of competition. The model of Democratic gubernatorial percentages demonstrates that neither incumbency nor coattails explains very much about Southern gubernatorial elections.

The findings of this chapter on inter-party competition suggest that the puzzle of Democratic dominance below the Presidential level is only half-solved. It is clear that the parties compete at different levels in the general election; these results are not completely explained by incumbency and coattails. The following chapter will look at the development of intra-party competition in the region, in an attempt to explain more variance than the simple models developed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 5 INTRA-PARTY COMPETITION

The analysis has discussed the voter's partisan support for candidates and parties in a simplistic way. This chapter will explore the development of this support in greater depth. The traditional approach previously presented suggested that a voter's partisanship was very stable over time, and would change only when a crosscutting issue of great importance realigned partisan support. The new alignment and subsequent loyalty would be highly stable until the next realignment took place. Parties became very important during these realignments. Traditional models of American political parties showed them to have weaker organizations relative to other Western democracies. They had little control over the voting behavior of their members in office, even when they did control the nominating process. The development of the primary election meant that the parties lost a degree of control over nominations as well. The problem in relating this body of literature to the postwar South is that the Republicans have not developed these primaries. Thus, the Southern Republican party's development cannot be seen through this traditional model. This chapter will explain this by looking at the development of intra-party competition in the postwar South.

This analysis contends that the most important area of competition is intra-party competition. This probably provides the ultimate test of one's partisanship. It may be simple for Southerners to claim they are Republicans and easy to vote for a few candidates who happen to be Republicans when the Democrats offer ideologically incompatible candidates; it is more difficult for Southerners to participate in meaningful Republican intra-party politics. This chapter will make three arguments. First, it will offer a theoretical justification for the study of intra-party competition. Secondly, it will explore the levels of intra-party competition; thirdly, it will argue that the truncated party development in the region's G.O.P. has led to the relatively weak Republican record in the South. The core topic under consideration is obviously participation in Republican primaries. This is the ultimate test for the G.O.P., because once a voter votes in a primary they have a greater chance of being meaningful partisans. The problem for the G.O.P. is that these primaries are a recent phenomenon. The Democrats are still the only option for many Southerners in the primary election season. This gives Southerners the option of voting in a meaningful election in the Democratic primary, or casting a relatively unimportant vote in the G.O.P. primary—if there is even an election. Given those choices, the Southern voter clings to the Democratic tradition.

Intra-party competition can be measured in a number of ways and these results
are not easily misconstrued. The glaring weakness of the Republican party in the South should be viewed in light of the intra-party competition through participation in primary elections. Voting in the Republican primary is not a traditional event. For the most part, these elections were non-existent in the pre-1946 period. They were slow to appear, as the Republican party leaders saw that their personal control over the machinery would not be subject to public participation. They anticipated a loss, and the party resembled the type Teddy Roosevelt described at the turn of the century.

Traditional party theory suggests that the party should develop leaders from within, building on local bases. Parties serve electoral functions in that they allow the voters to organize themselves. The traditional is partly based on the notion that parties offer simple cues to the voting population. The development of party systems in the South has led to complicated patterns of cuing, which seem to suggest that the voter does indeed consider more than party identification when casting his or her ballot. The data on partisan support presented in Chapter 3 suggest that voter loyalty is not constant over time or electoral level. This has led some scholars to reassess the role that partisanship plays in the South. Malcolm Jewell and David Olson (1988, pp.42-43), have recently suggested that the South has developed a split level partisan identification, with voters being loyal to the national G.O.P. and the state and local Democrats. They cite the fact that where party registration is required in the South, the voters overwhelmingly choose to register as Democrats.

Of course, Jewell and Olson are correct in asserting that the registration should lag behind the actual electoral strength of the minority party, but this presents a problem for the proponents of traditional theories of partisan change. Jewell and Olson adopt the traditional position when they argue that partisanship develops along these split levels. Thus, the vote remains the dependent variable with partisanship, albeit split partisanship, acting as the independent variable. This is helpful in predicting votes in the South, as the general pattern of Republican Presidential support and lower level Democratic support exists. While this approach is consistent with the traditional view, it is illogical. Party identification is a poor predictor if it changes merely to mimic the actual votes of the respondent. In a period of realignment with an increase of independent voters, the traditional model is of significantly less value. This analysis suggests that by looking at party identification as more than a response on a survey that predicts votes, a more accurate picture of partisanship in the South can be seen. Specifically, this analysis contends that party identification is useful only when it influences votes or is practiced regularly. It will further assert that such development is dependent on the development of partisanship in the
primary elections. Partisanship is a weak variable, because it is influenced by the behavior of the parties at this level, and at this level the G.O.P. has been woefully inadequate.

While these results are incongruous with the traditional notion that voting is dependent on party identification, it is in line with theories of party development. Sorauf's (1984, pp. 441-442) concept of the three stages of party development is a case in point. The initial stage of party development involves limited access and a narrow appeal. The mass public was removed from the party in this stage. Sorauf dates this era to the pre-1830's. The second stage is expansion. During this period, beginning around 1900, the parties added activists and membership. The third stage is diversification, where the electorate becomes involved and the parties become less useful as they cannot represent the diversity of interests. The problem for the G.O.P. in the South is that its parties have never developed fully. Sorauf explains it as follows:

"Especially in areas of one party domination, the real choice is made at the primary. Moreover, the nominees of the party bring their images and visibility, their priorities and positions on issues, to the party. In the eyes of many voters, they are the party. Their quality and ability also determine, to a considerable extent, the party's chances for victory in the general election."

Sorauf is correct in analyzing the importance that the primary elections hold. In the case of the South, G.O.P. candidates do not get the same chance to influence voters by staking out issue positions. In many cases, they are not challenged. This, of course, is common, given incumbency advantage, but in the case of the G.O.P., they are not incumbents. The voters receive less exposure, because they are not given a reason to seriously examine G.O.P. candidates. Competition draws interest and voters; in the case of the Southern Republican primaries, that is what is lacking.

Of course, there may be a reason why the competition is so weak in Southern Republican primaries. Key (1964, 379-380) suggested that competition would be greatest where the chance of winning was greatest. If the G.O.P. had little chance of winning in the pre-1960's, competition was not likely or expected. Thus Democratic competition in the South should have been, and was, strongest. Sarah Moorehouse (1981, pp.180-183) reached the same conclusion when she argued convincingly that one-party states have the most primary competition in the dominant party. John Bibby (1987) realized the importance of competition in motivating voters to participate in Southern primaries. He wrote, "Competition for a party's nomination spurs voters to participate in primaries. In the absence of a real contest for a nomination, voter turnout diminishes (p.144)." The Southern voter has shown a keen awareness of the importance
of the Democratic primary. Prior to 1970, it was not unusual for the turnout in the Democratic primary to be greater than the turnout in the general election. While participation in the Democratic primary consistently overwhelms the G.O.P., between 1971 and 1980, only in the Deep South states of Alabama and Mississippi has the Democratic primary turnout exceeded the general election turnout (Sabato, 1983 pp. 119-124) (see Bibby, 149).

The primary is not the final victory and, thus, its impact is not felt merely in terms of who wins and loses. Assessing the impact of the Southern primary is an important task. It is certainly a task independent of general election analysis. Initially, it is understood that the primary voter is significantly different than the general election voter. Studies of voters consistently find that the primary voter differs in many regards, ranging from demographic variables to ideological outlook. It is a logical conclusion that primary voters tend to be more interested and be more activist in their outlook. Primary voters tend to be more polarized than the median voters who dominate general elections. Initially, this seems to have implications for the study of Southern primaries. The impact of the extremists' higher turnout rates has a definite impact on the primary process in the South.

The first electoral level under consideration is the House of Representatives. Not surprisingly, the Democrats have many more primaries in the postwar era than the Republicans. In addition, their primaries tend to be much more competitive. In the South, the Democratic tradition of winning in the general election stimulated competition at the intra-party level. As the winner of the primary was virtually assured victory in November, it was simple for the Democratic party to recruit the best candidates. In fact, this recruitment was often self-selection. All aspiring politicians were aware of the propensity for Democratic wins and Democratic dominance. This tradition was visible in the postwar era as well. In the 1950's, the Southern delegation was dominated by the Democrats, except in a hand-full of Republican districts located in the Appalachian Mountains of Virginia, Tennessee and North Carolina and urban centers of Tampa/St.Petersburg, suburban Washington, D.C. and Dallas. Primary voting followed the pattern of Democratic dominance as often; even in these districts, the Democrats would outpoll the G.O.P. in primary ballots. The reasoning was simple—races higher on the ticket lacked strong Republican candidates, and as the voter could not vote in a Republican congressional primary and a Democratic senatorial or gubernatorial primary simultaneously, the voters often opted to vote as Democrats. The G.O.P. has shirked its part to encourage voters who might be ideologically closer to the Republican perspective to stay at home. Even if the voter wanted to support a Republican congressional candidate,
there was often little reason for him or her to do so. For that matter there still is very little motivation given by congressional primaries for the would be or open Republicans of the South to vote in the G.O.P. primary. As recently as 1986, the G.O.P. had multiple candidates in only 20 of the 108 congressional districts in the South with partisan primaries. They had no candidates in 24 of these districts. Consequently, the Republican party of the South has, in effect, left the voters to their old habits of voting in the Democratic primary.

If primary elections allow parties to stake out positions and thus introduce themselves to the potential voters, the G.O.P. has neglected a great part of the development stage. It seems that the burden of providing competition in the primary is greater for the G.O.P. than for the Democrats. The traditional behavior in the Southern primary has involved voting in the Democratic primary. If voting is a learned behavior, as The American Voter posited, then it rests with the G.O.P. to change that behavior. It is not surprising that the G.O.P. fairs so poorly in the inter-party competition in the South below the Presidential level. The Democrats do not have to offer competition to gain substantial voter participation in their primaries. Primary turnout figures since 1956 indicate this is true in congressional as well as other levels of Southern elections. The Democrats have dominated the primaries at the congressional level without doing significantly more than the G.O.P. In 1986, by comparison, the Democrats had competitive primaries in 39 of the 108 districts with partisan primaries leaving only 7 without a candidate. Considering that the G.O.P. competed in 20 and left 24 without a candidate, it is clear that the Democrats are more successful. The great bulk of all Southern districts in 1986 offered one-candidate primaries at the congressional level. Of the 108 districts, the Republicans had one candidate in 64 primaries, while the Democrats ran a single candidate in 62 of the primaries. Because competition is not the norm at this level, it has done little to change the tendency of the Southern voters to vote in the Democratic primaries.

Recent years indicate that intra-party competition at the congressional level is developing new trends in the context of the South. The G.O.P. has significantly reduced the number of uncontested seats in the region and the Democrats have been willing to admit defeat by running no candidates in a handful of districts. The dominant type of primary in each party has become the uncontested race. This was always significant, but it has shown a slight increase in the G.O.P. In the Democratic primaries, the number of uncontested primaries is comparable to the Democratic party in the pre 1972 era. Following 1972, single-candidate primaries decreased, only to increase again in 1980.

Very few of the primaries are competitive. Primaries without candidates are the
least competitive in that no choice is available. One-candidate primaries are non-competitive as well, in that they offer the voters no real opportunity for choice. These one-candidate primaries are treated the same as nomination by convention or petition. When multiple candidates exist, the extent of the competition is determined by the closeness of the election. Table 5A is a scale of competition in primary elections. The table looks at the margin in percentage points between the first- and second-place finishers. If candidate A receives 50 percent and candidate B 40 percent, the margin is 10. If there is only one candidate, the margin is 100 percent. There are four categories of competition used in this analysis and they are explained in the table that follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MARGIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMPETITIVE</td>
<td>&lt;=10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE</td>
<td>11-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKEN</td>
<td>26-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-COMPETITIVE</td>
<td>75+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most Democratic primaries fall in the token category with few in the non-competitive range. The G.O.P. primaries have few cases in the non-competitive range, but no other category seems dominant.

Figure 5-1 looks at the Democratic primaries over time; Figure 5-2 looks at the Republican primaries over time. These figures show the propensity towards single-candidate primaries in the South. In each figure, the lighter colored sections at the top of the stacks represent the competitive primaries.
Competition in Southern congressional primaries seldom resembles the description V.O. Key presented. Part of the reason that this may hold is the presence of long term
incumbents in the region. Incumbency has a way of reducing intra-party competition. The incumbent enjoys huge name recognition advantages, as well as the presumed support of the party machinery he or she represents. In fact, this has been the case in the Southern congressional elections. The presence of multiple-candidate challenges within the incumbent's party are rare. In the 1,164 congressional races since 1956 with Democratic incumbents seeking re-election, only 408 had primary challenges. Of the 408, 293 had a single challenger and 115 had multiple primary opponents. The same can be said of the incumbency factor in the G.O.P. primaries with incumbent Republican candidates. Of the 323 cases since 1956 with Republican incumbents, only 22 congressmen faced primary opposition and only 4 faced multiple candidate opposition. These figures suggest that the incumbency advantage is alive and well in Southern primaries of both parties. In each case, the incumbents served as a deterrent to intra-party competition. This explains the lack of competition reflected the margins as well. It may well be that the better potential challengers simply opted not to challenge with the chances of success are so small in defeating the Southern incumbent. This coincides with the concept of challenger weakness posited by Gary Jacobson (1983, pp.114-119).

The primary elections for the U.S. Senate follow a different pattern. Initially, the number of primaries is much higher. These races, higher on the ballot, no doubt have affected the G.O.P.'s tendency to run candidates. In addition, the fact that senators serve six-year terms rather than two-year terms makes the office more desirable to potential challengers. As a result, these races should offer better candidates and more competition. If the literature on incumbency holds true, the effect of incumbent senators on the number and quality of primary competition should not be as great as it was in the congressional races. In the early part of the postwar period, the Republicans had no chance of victory; the consequence of the one-party competition was heavy competition for the Democratic nomination and the eventual win in the general election. While the G.O.P. was able to advance in the isolated Republican pockets of the South at the congressional level, winning a statewide election proved considerably more difficult. These pockets were compact enough to insure some Republican wins at the district level, but were quickly diluted in statewide contests.

The result of this one-party domination was competition and continuation of the status quo, which translated into Democratic dominance of the Southern Senate delegation. Unlike the G.O.P., the Democrats have never left a Southern Senate seat uncontested. For the most part, these primaries have reflected competition in that multiple candidates have sought the office although these were often not competitive in terms of margins. The
occurrence of primary elections with multiple-candidates are common. In every decade since World War II, there have been more Democratic contested primaries in the South than uncontested ones. These figures demonstrate the propensity to compete in the Democratic senatorial primaries in the South. In many cases, the competition is not strong, but it is at least present. 73 percent of these primaries during the 1946-1950 period were competitive, 58 percent were in the 1952-1960 period, 92 percent were in the 1962-1970 decade, 84 percent were in the 1972-1980 period and 55 percent have been since 1982. These figures point to a tradition of intra-party competition in the Senate elections. As to the meaningfulness of the competition, it should be noted that 45 percent of these competitive elections fell in the token competition category while 22 percent fell in each of the competitive and moderate competition groupings. Figure 5-3 uses the same competitive scales and visually demonstrates the degrees of Democratic competition in the postwar South's Democratic Senate primaries.

![Figure 5-3: Democratic Senate Primaries](image)

In spite of this apparent lack of competition in the Democratic races, the Democratic tradition shines when compared with the G.O.P. As was the case in the House races, the burden of providing competitiveness lies with the G.O.P. alone. The Democrats, as Figure 5-3 demonstrates, enjoy a tradition of intra-party competition and inter-party dominance. In order for the G.O.P.'s candidates to win in the state, they had
to increase the numbers of practicing Republican voters in the South. In the area of Senate primaries, they have been relatively unsuccessful until this decade. The great tendency through 1960 was to simply concede defeat. Republicans rarely ran candidates at all; when they did, they were usually unopposed at the primary level. This served to perpetuate the feeling that the G.O.P. presented no serious threat. The 1960's and 1970's saw a reduction in the number of conceded seats, but the dominant trend was to replace the conceded seats with one-candidate challenges. All of this meant that the G.O.P. had to rely on Democratic weakness to succeed. As John Tower found out in 1960-1961, Republican voters were not going to win anything for the G.O.P., but a divided Democratic party could provide the needed margin. Thus, the strategy of divide and conquer was born in a Southern context. Considering the number of competitive primaries the G.O.P. held between 1946 and 1986, the continuation of the Democratic advantage is understandable. Four percent of the G.O.P. senatorial primaries were competitive in the '46-'50 period, five percent were from '52-'60, 27 percent were competitive between 1962-1970, 42 percent were from 1972-1980 and since 1982 60 percent have been. On the surface, the G.O.P. has progressed, but the degree of competition that is being offered is another story. Only 3 of the 41 Republican senatorial primaries since 1946 have had margins of ten percent or less. As was the case in the Democratic primaries, the token competition category is the most significant. 54 percent of the G.O.P.'s elections fall in that category. Unlike the Democrats who had 44 percent in the moderate to competitive categories, the G.O.P. had only 7 percent competitive and 20 percent moderately competitive primary elections. The remaining 20 percent of the primaries with more than one candidate had margins greater than 75 percentage points. Thus at the senatorial level, as at the congressional level, the G.O.P. found itself without comparable amounts of intra-party competition. Figure 5-4 explores the levels of Republican senatorial competition in summary form.
If House incumbents like to keep their jobs, senators are even more tenacious. Much has been written about the lack of an incumbency advantage in the Senate, however, long-term Southern incumbents have always been prevalent in the Senate. One look at Huey Long or Jesse Helms will illustrate this. Southern incumbent senators were traditionally returned to office due to the lack of inter-party competition and their considerable skill at pork-barrelling which their seniority afforded them. While this advantage may dissipate in the general election, it remains a strong deterrent to partisan challenges, even today. The period between 1946 and 1986 offered 100 Democratic partisan senatorial contests with Democratic incumbents, and 68 of them were primaries with multiple candidates. Of course, few of those primaries were competitive. Four percent of the 68 cases were competitive, with marginal differences not greater than 10 percent. Thirteen percent offered moderate competitiveness, while 60 percent were cases with token competition and 16 percent offered margins greater than 75 percent. Senatorial incumbency may not deter all potential challengers; it may just deter the good ones. When dealing with the G.O.P. primaries with Republican senatorial incumbents, the number of cases is greatly reduced. In the postwar period there are only 17 cases of Republican senators seeking re-election. Of those 17, only five experienced challenges in the primary. Of those five cases, two offered token opposition while the other three were races with a margin of differentiation over 75 percentage points. Republicans, it would seem, are even
less likely to mount primary opposition to their own incumbent senators than are Democrats. Thus the incumbency advantage not only translates into the general election, but it works in the primary as well. It is clear that good challengers choose to run only when their chances of winning are optimal. It appears that in the South, incumbency alone, from either party, is a significant deterrent to potential challengers. History tends to support the position of the Democratic primary as the arena for winners. Of the 68 cases with Democratic incumbents, the Democrat only lost twice in the general election, once after a marginal primary and once after a primary with moderate competition.

Initially, as was the case with the congressional and senatorial primaries, the actual occurrence of gubernatorial primaries is worth discussion. Republican gubernatorial primary contests did not occur with any regularity until the decade of the 1970's; after that they became institutionalized as regular events. This institution was absent prior to this period, as the G.O.P. offered Southern primaries in an inconsistent manner. It was difficult to get voters to regularly participate as Republicans in state level contests; this explains the Democrats' huge majorities in virtually every statehouse delegation in the South.

In addition to the rare occurrence of primaries and the fact that they are a relatively recent phenomenon, other problems emerged in regard to intra-party competition at this level. While the Republicans improved in the frequency of the primary elections, the level of competition in those primaries follows a pattern displayed at the previous two electoral levels. Specifically, the fact is that these events were, and still are, rarely competitive. Where there were no Republican primaries, the G.O.P. now offers voters non-competitive primaries. A great many of the primaries held by the G.O.P. in the postwar era are one-candidate races; these don't stimulate many voters. The obvious conclusion is that competitive Republican primaries are rare to non-existent in the American South. Thus, even though the G.O.P. was holding more primaries, they were not of the variety to stimulate great political interest. As a result, the G.O.P. has been slow to convert Southerners into practicing Republicans.

While the G.O.P. succeeded in offering non-competitive primaries in the years following 1970, the Democrats always offered competitive primaries. In each decade under consideration, the majority of races involved multiple candidates; many of which were decided with margins less than or equal to 10 percent. At the state level, the Democratic dominance of the South persists and is reflected by this intense competition. Figures 5-5 and 5-6 demonstrate the patterns of intra-party competition for both Republicans and Democrats between between 1946 and 1986.
If races for state offices are important, the Democrats continue to provide an incentive for the voters to stay home and cast Democratic primary ballots. The 1986 Texas gubernatorial election affords an example. The Republicans offered three strong candidates in the primary. William Clements, the state's only post-reconstruction Republican governor, Tom Loeffler, a United States Congressman, and Kent Hance, a former U.S. Congressman and unsuccessful Democratic senatorial candidate. These three relatively appealing candidates were on the Republican ballot. Incumbent Governor Mark White faced a number of unknown weak challengers in the Democratic primary, a primary whose conclusion was never in doubt. In spite of the relative excitement generated by the
G.O.P. primary and the complete lack of it on the Democratic side, 1,093,617 ballots were cast in the Democratic gubernatorial primary while only 543,172 ballots were cast in the Republican primary. Here was a rim South state in the 1980's that was supposed to be leading the surge of Republicanism in the South, and yet the Republicans were outvoted 2-1 at the primary level. In this case, the Republicans won the general election by taking advantage of a poor campaign strategy on the part of the incumbent, but the election would not have been close without the blunders of the incumbent. The G.O.P. starts out at such a tremendous disadvantage in regards to numbers that the Democrats must weaken themselves to give the Republicans a chance.

The incumbency advantage is alive and well at the gubernatorial level as well. In regard to the advantages felt by incumbents in primary elections, they are not visible by simply counting candidates, but they are clear when the marginal gaps are considered in the primary outcome. Practically speaking, House and Senate races are extremely difficult to win from an incumbent of the same party. This is not as true in the gubernatorial cases, but the quality of the competition remains steady across all levels. Of the 42 primary elections with Democratic incumbents who served the prior term since 1946, 40 have involved more than one candidate. The G.O.P. has had only five elections with prior-term incumbents; and four of those have involved more than one candidate. Quantity of candidates is no reflection on the quality of the competition, and that is true at this level as well. Of the Democratic races, seven were competitive (less than 10% margin), five had moderate competition, and 28 had token competition. Only twice did the Democratic incumbent survive an intra-party challenge and go on to lose in the general election. Ironically, there were two cases where the Democrat who defeated the incumbent in the primary lost in the general election as well. Of the Republican cases, every time an incumbent Republican faced intra-party competition the candidate lost in the general election. In Florida (1968), Arkansas (1970 and 1982) and in Texas (1982), the story was the same. Any challenge resulted in general election defeat for the incumbent. Of these four cases, one was a competitive primary, one had moderate competition, two had token competition, and one had margins over 75 percent. Given that, it is no great surprise why the G.O.P. has been slow to develop primaries at this level. Incumbency does not intimidate G.O.P. opposition the same way it seems to for the Democratic gubernatorial incumbent. One caveat is, that for the region as a whole, incumbency means less at this level. Many states prohibited consecutive terms for decades, neutralizing incumbency as a factor.
What do these results indicate? This chapter has reported all the information available about the status of partisan primaries at three electoral levels in the South. The literature on primary voting discussed at the outset, tends to suggest that it is important to the outcome of the general election. In addition, it emphasizes the role these intra-party elections play in the development of the political party. For the Southern political party this is critical. The modern day Democratic and Republican parties have changed since the end of World War II. This is quite clear. It is reflected in the degree of competition that emerges, despite the overwhelming barrier of incumbency. Intra-party competition is a reflection of the parties' diversity. Giovanni Sartori (1987) has written extensively about the nature of the fragmented party and its consequences. He concludes that in party systems, too much fragmentation or division is not a good thing. Should it not then also hold true for the party as a unit of analysis? In the context of the South, political parties are, in fact, coalitions of ideologies. Social choice theory tells us that rational coalitions win elections by keeping their bases large enough to win a majority. In the context of coalition governments, the members must cooperate in order to extract policy benefits. (Browne and Friendries, 1980) The problem is that the Democratic coalition in the South has been traditionally unstable. Not only do members fail to remain loyal to the party in policy voting, the infamous "Boll Weevils" of the Reagan tenure indicate, but the electorate follows its leaders and deserts the party in voting on regular occasions.

Robert Axelrod's theory of "connectedness" is a perfect basis for this argument. Axelrod (1970) had two hypotheses in regard to coalitions. Initially, the less conflict, the more likely it is to form; secondly, the less conflict, the more likely the coalition will survive. (p. 167) In the context of the South, there is great distance between the old guard conservative Democrats and the liberal wing of the party and on many occasion, each side has seen fit to sabotage the other. Whether it was the Texas liberal Democrats "going fishin'" in 1961 or the Conservative Democrats jumping party lines in 1978 to support a Republican, the results have been the same. In fact, the G.O.P. has depended on division within the ranks of the Democratic party for its successes. While the Democrats have trouble uniting, the united Democratic party overwhelms the G.O.P. The difficulty is finding a way to get all the Democrats to cooperate in order to inact the legislation they all agree on.

In the South we have two kinds of parties, which are reflected by the levels of intra-party competition each offers. The Democratic party is a diverse party with a broad range of supporters and policy demands. This division affords it a huge base of support in primary elections. As the literature suggested, the primaries often tend to slant the
results in favor of the extremes and away from the center of the base. If the result tips too far in one direction or the other, the advantages of the base are lost, as members are alienated. Selecting a candidate from a diverse party is a difficult task; practically every candidate will offend one branch of the party. When the primary competition is heated, as it usually is when an incumbent retires, the Democrats are at their most vulnerable state, as the division is clearly differentiated. The second type of party in the South is the monolithic Republican party. For the most part, the Republicans are all conservative and their difference is one of degree rather than substance. The Democrat's have differences on substantive points. For most G.O.P. voters, any Republican is preferable to any Democrat which makes the prospect of internal division destroying the party in November slim. As a result, the only problem the G.O.P. has is having an insufficient base. It is probably true, that as the Moral Majority extremists in the party grow stronger, the G.O.P. may face internal division. This will probably appear first outside the South, where the presence of moderate and liberal Republicans is more significant. This means that intra-party competition does have an impact on the outcome of general elections. It may not always be clear, but it does exist.

Given the importance of intra-party competition, the models for predicting Southern votes offered in Chapter 4 should also be expanded. This chapter has discussed variables that are associated with intra-party competition. The models presented in this chapter expand upon the two sets of dummy variables presented as \( b_1 \) through \( b_6 \) in the previous chapter. Thus, in addition to the type of incumbency and the presence of presidential coattails, the level of competitiveness in primary elections will be considered. The literature and this chapter have suggested that primary competition should add explanatory power to the models. The models for the Democratic general election percentages at the three electoral levels have been expanded to include these additional independent variables. These updated models are presented in this chapter as models 5B through model 5D. The same statistics: the parameter estimate, \( T \) for \( H_0:\text{par}=0 \), and the level of significance or confidence in rejecting the null hypothesis of \( B=0 \) are discussed. The meanings of each have not changed since chapter 4. The additional variables are as follows:

\[ b_{7} = \text{Dem Comp Scale (the scale of competition by margin for Democrats)} \]

\[ b_{8} = \text{Rep Comp Scale (the scale of competition by margin for Republicans)} \]

In each case the dependent variable will be the percentage of the general-election vote won by the Democratic party. The eight independent variables are used to predict vote,
attempting to offer a more complete explanation of the variance than the simple models in Chapter 4. The additional variables are reflections of the level of competition in the primaries. The variables Rep Comp Scale and Dem Comp Scale are measures of primary competition that correspond directly to table 5A. The four categories group the margin of difference between the first- and second-place finishers with the most competitive race receiving a 1 and the least competitive a 4. Races with only one candidate are considered to have a margin of 100 percent while races with no candidates are coded as missing data.

The findings in regard to intra-party congressional competition suggest that it is quite rare indeed. The tremendous power of the incumbency advantage at this level has already been demonstrated to have an effect on competition at the inter-party level; the basic assumption behind Table 5B is that intra-party competition will also affect general election results at the congressional level. Competition in a primary may be a reflection of the party's chances of winning, or in this model, getting larger percentages. High levels of competition should not have a positive effect on the outcome. The history of Republican incursions in the Solid South has consistently demonstrated that the more divisive the Democratic primary is, the better the Republican chances of winning. The more competitive the Democratic primary is, the lower the Democratic percent in the general election will be. For the Republican scale score (B8), the same relationship should hold. High levels of intra-party competition forces the winner to expend resources better spent in the general election and expose weaknesses and strategies to the other party.

The first model under consideration examines U.S. House elections in the South. In table 4D, incumbency had a strong effect and coattails a much smaller, although statistically significant, one. As was the case in the preceding chapter, this model is the most robust. The addition of the primary level variables in table 5B not only raises the R-squared, but it shows that primary elections are related to general election results in the region.
Table 5B Democratic share of the House Vote as a Function of Incumbency, Coattails and Primary Competition, 1956-1986

R SQUARED .7002  adj r-sq .6987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>PARAMETER EST.</th>
<th>T for H0: par=0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>78.95</td>
<td>45.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem incumbent</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>6.99**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep incumbent</td>
<td>-32.72</td>
<td>-21.59**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open was Rep</td>
<td>-23.28</td>
<td>-8.83**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem on-year</td>
<td>-2.56</td>
<td>-2.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep on-year</td>
<td>-5.26</td>
<td>-5.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem off year</td>
<td>-4.15</td>
<td>-3.80**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM COMP SCALE</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>8.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP COMP SCALE</td>
<td>-6.47</td>
<td>-23.69**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**significance at the .01 level
* significance at the .05 level

The robust nature of the congressional model is enhanced by the addition of the primary election variables shown in bold type. The high R-square suggests that the model does explain a great deal of the variance. The new variables point to an interesting phenomenon in the way that primary elections effect general election outcomes. The competition scale variables tell an important story. In the case of Democratic primary competition, the less competitive the primary is, the better the Democrats do in the general election. The less competitive the Republican primary is the lower the Democratic percentage will be in the general election. This is certainly in line with the development of G.O.P. wins in the region. When the primary divides the Democratic party, the Republicans' chances of "slipping in the back door" increase. Primary elections are indeed important to the general election results; this model demonstrates that point clearly. Of course, the other levels of elections must be considered as well.

Table 5C explores the importance of the partisan primary to the senatorial elections in the region. The evidence from table 5B suggests that the number of candidates will be positively related and the level of competition will be negatively related. The same logic should apply to the senatorial model.
Table 5C Democratic Senatorial Votes as a Function of Incumbancy, Coattails and Primary Competition, 1946-1986.

R-SQUARED .4467 adj r-sq .4178

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>PARAMETER EST.</th>
<th>T for H0: par=0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>intercept</td>
<td>65.64</td>
<td>13.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem incumbent</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>2.76**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep incumbent</td>
<td>-14.18</td>
<td>-3.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open was Rep</td>
<td>-10.22</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem on-year</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep on-year</td>
<td>-2.71</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem off-year</td>
<td>-.78</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM COMP SCALE</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>2.63**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP COMP SCALE</td>
<td>-4.40</td>
<td>-4.04**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* denotes significance at the .05 level
** denotes significance at the .01 level

The implications of the second model include the suggestion that in the South, primaries are important to general election results. In this model, the new variables are shown in bold print and, as would be expected, the old variables show the same basic relationships they did in Chapter 4. The findings in these Senate elections are twofold. As in the congressional model, each statistic on competition is significant and the parameter estimates explain a small amount of the variance. The Democratic competition statistic shows that as competitiveness declines, the Democratic percent increases. As Republican competition declines, the Democratic percent of the general election vote drops. Thus, primary competition is not a positive factor in improving the chances in the general election. In Senate elections, as in the House, having competitive primaries tends to reduce the general election percentages of the parties. The addition of the primary variables does tend to increase the explanatory power of the model, reflected by the R-squared statistic.

Of all the models in Chapter 4, the gubernatorial model presented the least robust set of results. This model succeeds in increasing the R-squared because the primary variables are all significant and meaningful. As was suggested in the previous chapter, the South's treatment of state level primary elections tends to works against coattails and the region's treatment of incumbency worked against those variables. Given that, the primaries become all the more important at this electoral level. Table 5D confirms this.
Table 5D Democratic Share of the Gubernatorial Vote as a Function of Incumbency, Coattails and Primary Competition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>PARAMETER EST.</th>
<th>T for H0: par=0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>78.47</td>
<td>18.98**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem incumbent</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>2.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep incumbent</td>
<td>-5.73</td>
<td>-.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open was Rep</td>
<td>-16.21</td>
<td>-3.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem on-year</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep on-year</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem off-year</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM COMP SCALE</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP COMP SCALE</td>
<td>-6.83</td>
<td>-6.14**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* denotes significance at the .05 level  
** denotes significance at the .01 level

The new variable on Republican competition is statistically significant while the Democratic competition scale is not. As before, competition is not good for general election outcomes in gubernatorial contests.

In each of these cases, the general election percentage for the Democratic candidates was greatly influenced by the type of primary election each party held. The number of candidates may reflect the level of primary constituency in the district or state, and the chance of winning in the general election, but it affords the voters more choices and the perception of importance. In the South, this data suggests that having multiple candidate primaries is highly desirable. It also suggests that it is not positive to have these primaries result in competitive dog fights. When this occurs, the result is a loss in support for the party in the general election.

This chapter began by pointing out the importance of the primary on party development in the South. It ends by confirming this with regression analysis. The models developed here reflect the reality of Southern competition. The Democrats have a much better track record in primary competition than the G.O.P. Since more Southerners are Democrats their primary takes on added strength. The burden of shifting voters lies squarely with the G.O.P. This analysis suggests clearly that the Democrats can subordinate, leaving room for Republican incursions. It also suggests clearly that these are protest votes rather than meaningful shifts in the primary electorate of the region.

The central conclusion to this point in the analysis has been that the levels of competition in the South are still relatively low. Incumbency advantage accounts for much of the success of each party at the congressional and senatorial level. The success of the
Democrats is only threatened when they divide themselves. On balance then, this analysis finds little evidence to support the claims of Phillips (1969) or the realignment proponents at the electoral level. This basic argument takes on even greater meaning when the South's shifts in issue positions and its congressional and senatorial voting records are analyzed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 6 IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The previous chapters have shown that the extent of electoral change in the South is greatly exaggerated. Some shifts have occurred, but they have been minimal below the Presidential level. The extent and importance of these electoral shifts is open to debate, but the tendency among scholars of Southern politics is to limit their discussions to this electoral arena. In the real world of politics, electoral shifts are only meaningful if they lead to a shift in policy outcomes. This chapter will explore the effects of electoral change on voting in the postwar South's House delegation. In other words, how have the electoral shifts changed voting patterns of congressmen? In this way, an analysis of the dynamics of change will link the setting of electoral politics to institutional politics.

The South's history indicates that electoral change and institutions have always been linked. Most of the debate over the extent of partisan shift in the region occurs at the electoral level. This analysis will argue that the real test of partisan change must be found in the institutions of government that actually vote on policy changes. Therefore, this chapter will test the degree of change in conservative voting in the House of Representatives' Southern delegation between 1958 and 1986. In order to facilitate a discussion of institutional change, two initial arguments are made: the institutions are premised as the natural setting for exploring partisan change, and studying the institution of the House and its Southern membership explains the region's conservatism better than an analysis of the region's survey respondents. After examining these points, conservative voting in the House of Representatives' Southern delegation will be explored, using the data compiled by congressional Quarterly on conservative coalition voting.

In spite of the overall importance of the institution to policy change, the institution of Congress goes largely unnoticed by scholars who attempt to argue that the Republicans have emerged as dominant in the region. To test this, the Southern delegation from the 11 Confederate states voting patterns are studied. While the predictions of Phillips and others have fallen short of their expectations, some shift has occurred in the delegation; Republicans now control over a fourth of the seats from the region. In spite of this, majority status of the Democratic party in the South has never been seriously challenged. This is partially explained by the fact that the Democratic party had been largely unopposed in general elections before the 1960's, and partially by the fact that the incumbency advantage leaves the Democrats at a position of relative advantage. Despite this, the difficulty of the National Democratic Party in keeping the Southern delegates in line has led
to frequent desertion of the national party by its Southern flank. In the Reagan years, these Democrats have taken on the unkind title of "Boll Weevils", well known in the region for their destructive powers to agriculture. These members are the nucleus of what Congressional Quarterly calls the conservative coalition.

Institutions are important in understanding the regions conservatism, but so is defining what the region means by the term conservative. Congressional Quarterly uses the term conservative in a general way and while the votes they study conform to a scholarly interpretation of the term on a liberal/conservative dimension, survey research makes the assumption that the region's respondents can as well. Only on rare occasions has the region's interpretation of conservatism been questioned. The mere use of the name "conservative coalition" indicates that the South is somehow set apart from the nation by this regional cleavage of ideological origin. Jerry Perkins called the South "inherently conservative" in 1982; few chose to question his wisdom. After all, scholars from V.O. Key to the present argued the South was divided and set apart on the question of race. On these questions, public opinion polls have shown the average Southerner to be less tolerant of civil rights programs and leaders. In 1968 Angus Campell found a bipolar civil rights dimension in the American public which polarized the Democratic party (p. 29). Of course, the degree of racial hysteria often varied by what part of the South one was speaking of. This was not a surprise, given that W.J. Cash argued in 1941 that the South was set apart by having more pride in the region, more pride in the family, more individualism, a narrow sense of social justice and deep-rooted prejudice (pp. 439-440). The Deep South states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina had larger black populations, and were more polarized on racial questions. The remaining Rim South states often experienced less tension on the questions of civil rights. In these states, race manifested itself as a secondary concern. This argument was put forth by Donald Matthews and James Prothro in 1962, when they suggested that white moderates and blacks would be able to reach accommodation in the Rim South more easily than in the Deep South (p. 108).

More recent analyses indicate that the conservative South remains intact. Earl and Merle Black write that "conservatism occupies an exalted ideological position in the South (1987, p. 213)." Baker, Steed and Moreland have found the average Southerner set apart from the rest of the nation by stronger support for religious values and the military, while offering less support for federal government programs, women's rights, gay rights and civil rights activists (1982, pp.200-211). Carmines, Renten and Stimson found that
the basis of ideology in the South was tied inherently to race; opposition to the federal government and its programs in the area of social welfare was just another dimension of the racism (1984). There is little question that on the issues of defense, race, and morality the South, with its particularly religious values, stands apart. Many scholars feel comfortable in describing these traits as the region's conservatism.

Deciding what conservatism means is often left up to the survey analyst. Its value to the understanding of Southern politics have often been assumed without being proven. For example, a close analysis of the survey data can lead to different conclusions. Ideology, in this case, means organizing political opinions under an umbrella. As public opinion polls have endured, analysts have become more comfortable accepting the responses at face value. It is understood, that the leading liberals in government favor civil rights and government intervention, while the conservatives oppose an active intervening federal government and favor a strong national defense. The National Election Study provides tests on both counts. Initially, NES asks respondents what their ideology is and follows up with a number of questions concerning the issues of the day. In each case, reasonable amounts of doubt make descriptions of the South, in ideological terms, seem shaky at best. The usefulness of asking a respondent his ideology explicitly is limited in the Southern context. While Southerners may take conservative positions, there is little evidence to suggest they do so with the intention of appearing ideological. Campbell, et al described this problem in The American Voter (1960) when they wrote, "The widespread lack of familiarity with prominent issues of public policy, along with the confusion on party position that remains even among individuals familiar with an issue, attests to the frailties of the political translation process (p. 188)."

Given this difficulty in voters using ideological concepts, discussion of partisan shifts on ideological grounds seems even less useful. For example, Campbell, et al had serious problems with the use of the liberal/conservative dimension; their study of attitude consistency in the areas of foreign affairs and domestic policy tended to confirm the inconsistency in the voter's perception of ideology. Patrick Cotter and Jim Stovall (1988) have recently challenged the use of ideology in the South, using the 1984 National Election Survey data. The trends they noticed were significant. In both the 1984 pre-election and post-election scales, significant numbers (20 and 28 percent respectively) were unable to place themselves on the ideological continuum measure constructed from three items in the NES survey. The tendency to select the middle position was also clear. On the seven-point scale, used by Black and Black, over 40 percent of the Southerners could not
identify themselves in terms of a political ideology. The high presence of the moderate
category is another problem area. The center may reflect true moderate ideology or merely
indifference or uncertainty. In the case of the seven point scale, 19 percent fell in the pure
moderate category. The point of Cotter and Stovall and of this chapter is that Southern
voters, or at least significant numbers of Southern voters, either cannot or do not think in
ideological terms. How those issues translate into ideological terms is also questionable.
Further evidence is found in a limited study of the Southern working class, by Robert
Botsch (1982). He found moves to liberalism to be issue-selective, which suggested that
economic and social liberalism were operating independently (pp. 43-45). Equally
uncertain is the degree to which Southern voters think along the liberal/conservative
dimension. As Barley and Graham put it, "Most Americans, North and South, appear to
possess little in the way of a coherent philosophy and therefore the group orientation of the
voter has been extremely significant to political behavior (1975 p. 195)."

The institution of Congress is more important in understanding the phenomenon
of conservatism than is the individual respondents answer to a survey question. The
conservatism of the South may be difficult to quantify in the minds of respondents, but the
leaders are probably more aware of this dimension than the average voter. As Gerald
Pomper wrote, "Ideology becomes important in ideological elections (1972, p. 416)."
Part of the reason is that the voters usually do not see the parties as being ideologically
different; this serves to further confuse their interpretation of ideology, especially given
the non-ideological nature of U.S. elections (ibid, p. 415). Thus, while ideology is of
questionable value in the general public, it may hold some merit in the context of the
institutions of government. This makes ideology a more useful measure in the context of
Congress than with the average voter.

The difference between the public and the institution of the Southern delegation
was first explored by Robert Erikson and Norman Luttbeg in 1973. They argued that the
Southern political leaders tended to be more ideological than the average Southerner
(pp.6-7). They found consistency in the political behavior of the Southern delegation, in
that the old agrarian elites were conservative just as the newer urban elites were. Neither
was fond of government intervention or civil rights, and they were able to unite together
under the conservative banner. As they put it, "The new economics has not obliterated the
old racism (p. 8)." They used data from Georgia to show that law and order concerns
and aid for blacks conformed to this conception of Southern conservatism. W. Wayne
Shannon's (1972) analysis of roll calls found that the Southern Democrats had become
increasingly hostile to Northern Democrats, turning to coalition building in order to win votes. There have been changes, however, since 1973. During the period of congressional liberalization in the 1970's, Bass and DeVries suggested that the ideological division in the Democratic party had ended the region's pure conservative outlook. They called this the "fading revolt" and argued that some Southern Democrats in Congress had become more mainstream, and the opposition to liberal concerns such as Civil Rights had lessened (p. 371). They cite the 1975 bill that extended the Voting Rights Act seven years, which Southern Democrats supported 52-26. However, the presence of the boll weevils in the 1980's indicates that the liberalization tide may have been halted or slowed. These findings suggest that conservatism in the Southern delegation is easier to grasp than conservatism in the individual voter. In the institutional context, the leaders' positions are clear, fitting one dimension or another. This conservatism in the Southern delegation was often out of step with the national party's positions; in order to stem that tide, Southern Democrats united with Republicans in forming a conservative voting bloc in the Congress.

The role of the institution of Congress is very important in understanding changes in the postwar South. To this point, it is clear that the realignment literature places heavy emphasis on the institutions of government, because of their role in policy shifts. In the case of the South's change, this should hold true. It is also clear that the ideological symbols may be of little value below the institutional level. The general assumption that the region is conservative seems both plausible and logical; however, the specific dimensions of conservatism are not all that apparent. The way survey respondents relate to ideological terms makes interpretation at that level even more difficult. In other words, what the survey analyst calls conservative may not correlate perfectly to the respondents' definition or grasp of the concept. These arguments become irrelevant at the institutional level. It seems clear that the political elites who make up the congressional delegation are not as easily confused by the terminology of ideology. At any rate, their votes are cast on issues, a public record of the dimensions of their ideological commitment. This is exactly what Erikson and Luttbeg suggested.

Within Congress, the body's conservative faction has often been forced to manifest itself in the form of coalitions. The measurement of that conservatism can be made by an analysis of the conservative coalition in Congress. This index was originally set up as a method of studying the voting patterns of Congress. CQ realized that partisanship was not the only cleavage that divided members of Congress. Given that the Southern Democrats shared a tradition of conservatism with the G.O.P., CQ decided to
study the frequency of the coalition's appearances. Thus, when a majority of Southern Democrats vote with a majority of Republicans against a majority of Northern Democrats (all 37 non-Confederate states except Kentucky and Oklahoma--only Kentucky and the Confederate states in 1959 and 1960--which are considered Southern) a conservative coalition roll call occurs. The core question of this chapter is how have electoral shifts affected the success rate and occurrence of the conservative coalition in the U.S. House of Representatives?

As the definition implies, the conservative coalition is really an informal voting alliance. Contacts between the participants were always informal, although apparently significant in the early days of its appearance. The early conservative coalition was described in some detail by John Manley (1973). While the members never carried cards or even held formal meetings, there is evidence it existed. One of the first floor debates on the subject occurred when Claude Pepper ridiculed the "designing alliance" of Southern conservatives and Republicans in foiling parts of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation (Manley, p. 225). Of course, no Southerners were ever implicated by name, nor would it have been possible to implicate any of them for collusion. This was one of the benefits of keeping the coalition informal. In reality, the coalition was only a voting alliance by members with like-minded ideological slants. The coalition most often took the form of informal cooperation between Southern conservative leaders and the Republican congressional leaders. The period following 1952 found Howard W. "Judge" Smith leading the Southern Democratic cause in cooperation with Republicans. During this period, the G.O.P. was led by Joe Martin. Cooperation was extensive during the 1950's and 1960's. On one occasion the G.O.P. even lent Smith staff support. Manley recounted Martin's description of the coalition; that description demonstrated the informal nature of its structure. In his testimony on the subject, he said,

"In any case when an issue of spending or of new powers for the president came along, I would go to Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia, for example, and say, 'Howard, see if you can't get me a few Democratic votes here.' Or I would seek out Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia and ask, 'Gene, why don't you and John Rankin and some of your men get me some votes on this?....it was unnecessary for me to offer any quid pro quo for conservative Southern support. It was simply a matter of finding issues on which we saw alike (1960, pp.84-85)."

Even Gerald Ford's attempts to break the alliance by declaring the G.O.P. independent of
Southern Democrats failed to eliminate the occurrence of this natural alliance of ideologically similar members of the House (Manley, pp. 232-234).

The casual nature of the coalition has not prevented the coalition from winning. David Brady and Charles Bullock (1980) argued convincingly that the term coalition was inaccurate, given that it held none of the basic qualities of coalitions. In their words, "The conservative coalition is best understood in terms of shared policy objectives which cut across party lines (p.550)." Their analysis of roll call voting yields insightful conclusions about the issue dimensions of the conservative coalition. In the postwar period, the issues concerning civil liberties, social welfare and foreign policy have served as consistent rallying points for the conservative coalition (p.551). In addition, and most importantly to this analysis, they found that the real strength and success of the coalition was not attributable to the Southern delegation's disproportionate committee strength, but was directly attributed to electoral results. In their words, "The conservative coalition wins when Northern Democrats are few and lack cohesion." (p.559) This conclusion implies two things: electoral results are linked to legislative outcomes and the makeup of the body is worth consideration. These suggestions will guide this analysis of the conservative coalition.

Brady and Bullock argue that the "strength and cohesion" of the Northern Democrats determine the success of the coalition. Given the electoral shifts in the South since 1960, it seems plausible that those electoral shifts should impact the success rate as well. As the inner city congressional districts have become more minority-dominated, the representatives of these areas have become more liberal. Thus, the Southern Democratic delegation is not the homogeneous group that it once was. In addition, the rise of suburban Republicans has led to a small, yet important, shift in the party delegations. This analysis will attempt to measure the impact of these shifts.

This analysis of conservative coalition voting since 1958 will attempt to answer questions pertaining to the impact of electoral change within the South on conservative coalition voting in the House of Representatives. Initially, the shifts in activity and success rates will be explored in order to see if the increase in Republicans impacted the process. Secondly, the differences in support from the different parties representatives in the region will be explored. Finally, the direct impact of replacement will be explored by looking at the districts where incumbents retire or lose. This approach will give a more complete understanding of the effects of electoral changes on conservative coalition voting in the Southern delegation.
The initial question concerns the shifts over time in conservative coalition activity and success in the House of Representatives. Between the years of 1958 and 1986, considerable fluctuations have occurred in coalition activity and success. In many ways, assessment of these simple indicators is difficult. The early years under consideration were years in which fewer roll calls were taken and recorded. With the advent of the record teller in 1971, the number of roll calls and the number of coalition appearances dramatically increased. The use of record teller voting which was authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, had a significant impact on the number of recorded coalition appearances. Under this rule, a recorded vote was mandated any time 20 members requested it. The appearances of the coalition surged concurrently with the number of recorded votes. To account for this, the appearance of the coalition is presented as both a percentage of all roll calls taken and as the actual number of times the coalition formed. These results are exclusive to the House of Representatives and the number of appearances does not reflect the success of the outcome.

**FIG 6-1 NUMBER OF CC APPEARANCES**

As Figure 6-1 demonstrates, the appearances of the CC varies greatly in the period following 1958. The record teller rule had an impact. In spite of this, the coalition appearances began to decline in 1979 and in spite of the slowing effects of Reagan's first three years, this trend has not been reversed. In short, the conservative coalition is
appearing less frequently. The best method of checking for the effect of the record teller rule and number of roll calls is to examine coalition appearances as a percentage of all roll calls taken. Figure 6-2 shows that using this criteria, the changes are less severe.

**FIG 6-2 HOUSE CC APPEARANCES IN PERCENT OF RECORDED VOTES**

![Graph showing percent of appearances over years]

While the effect is lessened when the number of votes recorded is controlled, the trend of decline in recent years is still present. Since 1975, when the coalition appeared on 28 percent of the roll calls taken, the trend been downward. The 11 percent appearance rate in 1986 matched the previous low recorded during the civil rights expansion of 1964. The overall decline in appearance is clear, both in percentages and votes.

This decline in appearance only tells half of the story. The real question is how successful the conservative coalition has been. As before, there are two ways of looking at the success rate. One is to look at the number of bills the coalition won. The number of successful votes is low in the pre-1971 years due, in part, to the low overall number of votes recorded. As Figure 5 shows, the years in which the conservative coalition was most successful in affecting legislation occurred during the Carter administration. The number of wins on roll call votes declines after 1980. Of course, the appearances declined as well, making that drop expected and thus, not necessarily suggesting the demise of the coalition.
The decline in the number of wins is important in that it demonstrates the decline of successful coalition strategies on legislation. However, the demise of the coalition is best seen in light of the wins as a percentage of the total coalition votes in the House. Figure 6-4 displays that data.
When displayed as percentages, it is clear that the demise of the conservative coalition may be greatly exaggerated. While the appearances and wins may have declined since 1979, the percentage of victories has actually increased slightly. This indicates that despite the fact that the coalition emerges less often, it wins more often when it does emerge. Since 1980, the coalition has consistently won in over 70 percent of its appearances in the House.

While the coalition may be an informal voting alliance, it is a powerful one. The number of appearances varies, but this is due in part to outside forces. The coalition has also been successful in influencing legislation over the years. In spite of its declining appearance rate in recent years, it wins much more often than it loses. This indicates that when the coalition emerges, its position is more often in the mainstream of Congress than not. This differs greatly from the traditional interpretations of the Southern congressional delegation, which was often characterized as "out of touch."

The overall figures suggest that the increase in Southern Republicans has not hurt this success rate. Bullock and Brady's analysis concluded that the success rate was attributable to the strength and cohesion of non-Southerners. They made the assumption that changes in the Southern delegation had little to do with coalition success. Part of the reason they made this claim was that all Republicans were treated alike in the
Congressional Quarterly's reports. A careful analysis of the Southern delegation from the 11 states of the old Confederacy indicates that this may overlook inter-party variation within the South.

The region's delegation has traditionally been among the most conservative. The role of parties in framing this conservatism is a different matter. Changes in the political chemistry of the region have served to alter not only the number of Republicans in the delegation, and the overall conservatism of the delegation in its voting. The coalition support scores for individual congressmen from the region indicate that point clearly. As was the case nationwide, Republicans tended to have higher support scores and lower opposition scores than did the Democrats. Figure 6-5 shows the combined coalition score calculated for each Congress. CQ reports the percentage of the bills supported and opposed, which means that the numbers do not always equal 100. The scores in each case are converted to a 100 point scale by calculating the support and opposition scores out of the total number of roll calls.

When the effects of the sub-regional variation are controlled for, the pattern shows that in each sub-region, the Republicans are more conservative than the Democrats. In addition, the lowest scores are found in the Rim South's Democratic delegation. Aggregate data at the subregional level tends to confirm that the Republican's scores are about 20 points
higher on the average.

This data suggests a partisan division in the region, with the G.O.P. being the more conservative of the two. That assumption could easily be drawn on the basis of the two preceding tables. Unfortunately, the actual picture is more complex.

The question of how conservatism works at the district level is an important one. The question that emerges is whether or not election results make any difference in conservative coalition support. In order to analyze the effects of electoral change on aggregate conservative coalition support, four subsets of elections are studied. There are four types of elections in which congressional districts change hands. Republicans can gain seats when a Democratic incumbent retires and his party's candidate loses or when the G.O.P. defeats an incumbent Democrat. Democrats can gain new seats in the same two ways. Because this analysis is concerned with the effects of electoral change on voting, new districts are purposely left out of the analysis along with those races that did not involve a change in the winning party. The purpose is to look at the amount of change in conservative coalition support from one session to the next. In order to do that, the support scores from two consecutive two year tenures are compared. When the change
score is negative it means that the district's representative became more conservative, while a positive score means that the district's delegate became less conservative. The results are seen in table 6A. These results are taken from elections with a change in party between 1960 and 1984.

TABLE 6A- Conservative Coalition Scores and Electoral Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF RACE</th>
<th>MEAN SCORE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRAT RETIRES</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICAN RETIRES</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEM INC DEFEATED</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP INC DEFEATED</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This evidence indicates that electoral change is indeed related to changes in conservative coalition support. It is not clear that this change in coalition support follows any party line. Three of the four types of change result in more conservative voting as Republican retirements with failed incumbency transfer still resulted in a negative score, or more conservative voting. This may be an artifact of the small number of cases although most do tilt in that direction. Where incumbent defeats are involved the picture is clearer as expected. When Democratic incumbents lose, the Republicans who replace them are much more supportive of the coalition. Conversely, when the Republicans are turned out of office the Democrats who replace them are much less supportive of coalition activity. Of course, the number of cases is small in any of the above cases, but they do point to interesting patterns. While these statistics seem to justify the argument that a change in party makes a difference, they are at the aggregate level. This in no way indicates that the Republican's have a lock on the region's conservatism.

There is some confirmation as to the voting patterns of the region, as the scores for both parties are quite high. This indicates an overall conservatism which dominates both parties' delegations. There is a difference of degree between support for the CC by Republicans and Democrats, but these aggregate means hide the fact that the great bulk of the regions Democratic Congressmen are in fact conservative. The Democratic averages are lower than the G.O.P. in the aggregate, but this is exactly what one would expect given the rise of urban Democratic districts in the South during this period. These liberal, and sometimes Black Democrats, would not be likely to support the conservative coalition; they drag down the Democratic average. When the number of Congressmen voting below
a 50 percent support rate is calculated, this fact becomes clear. Democrats are much more likely to oppose the coalition and thus lower the score. This is as expected given that the Republican party faces regional pressures to vote conservative and party pressures to vote conservative. Democrats, on the other hand are cross-pressured with regional ties to conservatism and national party ties to more liberal positions. During the Civil Rights years of 1964-1965, 40 Southern Democrats offered support below the 50 percent rate and 21 of those supported the CC less than 25 percent of the time. While the numbers of Congressmen voting below the 50 percent support level dropped over time, a block of the Southern Democrats always pulled the average down. In the 1980's, an average of 16 Southern districts per Congress offered less than 50 percent support, with roughly a third of these falling below the 25 percent threshold. Meanwhile, the G.O.P. averaged only 2 per Congress in the 1980's below the 50 percent threshold, the highest it had ever been.

When individuals are considered, there are always a significant number of Democrats who score above the Republican mean in support. When those Congressmen who support the coalition at a 75 percent rate or higher are considered, there are roughly equal number of Democrats and Republicans in every year after 1970. Prior to that year, there are many more Democrats than Republicans at that level, due to the numerical advantage of the Democratic delegation. The obvious conclusion is that if conservatism is important, it is not uniformly so across the region in House elections. The overlap of the delegations support scores at the individual level indicate that conservatism and support for its principles vary at the district level. It is clear that voters might have a hard time applying the conservative label to one or the other party in the region since many Democrats are as conservative as Republicans.

In conclusion, the American South’s electoral changes do affect institutional voting. There is a clear pattern between electoral change and congressional support for the conservative coalition. Given that ideology is suspect in the general population, this test became useful in assessing the conservatism of the region, seen through its congressional delegation. While the evidence indicates the Republicans in the House were more conservative, it also confirmed that the G.O.P. had no monopoly on conservatism. The conservatism of the Southern Democrats certainly makes partisan realignment difficult, if not impossible, to perceive in the minds of the Southern voter. This means that electoral change does result in a shift of the region's ideological balance as reflected by the conservative coalition support scores, but this change is a matter of degree rather than a complete shift in direction.
CHAPTER 7- SOUTHERN REALIGNMENT IN PERSPECTIVE

This thesis has made several arguments about electoral change in the post WW II South. Initially, it pointed to the unique history of one-party dominance in the region. Due to this distinctive pattern, the South has tended to stand alone throughout history. Its politics were one-party which meant electoral choice between candidates was based on the strength of the individual. Individuals dominated politics in the Deep South and, to a lesser extent, in the Rim South. Competition was rare in the years immediately following WW II. As Chapters 2 through 5 show, little has actually changed. Partisanship, at the level of the individual voter, is not the best indicator of meaningful change, although it suggests that some shifting has occurred. While it is very important at the presidential level as a predictor of votes, partisanship is much weaker further down the ballot, and even here it varies over time. When inter-party competition was examined, the regional dominance of the Democrats below the presidential level was confirmed. One reason for this dominance is found in the lack of meaningful intra-party competition in the region's G.O.P. When change is limited to the electoral arena, the amount since WW II is only significant at the presidential level; that may be a function of the candidates chosen by the Democratic party. History is explicit in showing that when the national party nominated candidates unacceptable to the region, they were rejected. Chapter 6 attempts to place the change in the context of an institution. The House voting patterns in regard to the conservative coalition are explored. While the term conservative has questionable value in the general population, the delegation's votes provided an interesting test. While the delegation becomes slightly more conservative when the Republicans' numbers increase, there is no clear ideological cleavage in the region's representatives. The concluding chapter will assess and interpret the various data presented in this research.

To this point realignment has only been discussed as it related to partisan shifts. In this concluding chapter, the issue of whether or not the South is undergoing a realignment will be addressed. Before summarizing the evidence, it will be necessary to review the current views on realignment. Literature on this subject is extensive, which leads to various interpretations of the change in the postwar South. Realignment literature has developed from a simple descriptive approach to an approach which uses complicated models that may or may not be limited to levels of the electorate. Without understanding the simple models, the complicated ones would be lost.

All realignment literature owes a considerable debt to V.O. Key. It is a credit to his genius that the father of contemporary Southern politics also played a critical role in the
development of realignment theory. In his first treatise on the subject (1955), he spelled out the electoral ramifications of realigning elections. He described critical elections which later took on the name realigning elections when The American Voter added a larger scheme of election classification. Key studied the New England elections of 1928 and noticed major shifts had occurred. His analysis of vote shifts in Somerville and Ashfield, Massachusetts led him to conclude that the election of 1928 had an impressive effect in changing voter's preferences. The election of 1928 forecast the success of Roosevelt in 1932. Historical analysis, performed by Key, found that these shifts were similar to the 1896 realignment in which the G.O.P. increased its margins in New England. These case studies led him to formulate a definition of realignment still widely accepted. He defined critical elections as "a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties..." (p. 16). In Key's analysis the change was not a natural event but was brought about by a national cross-cutting cleavage. In 1928, the separation of the classes played an important role in shaping electoral politics. As time went by, historical analysis yielded four cases of this "sharp and durable" realignment.

The concept of realignment was developed further by Angus Campbell, et al in 1966. They defined the concept of the normal vote. This concept suggested that in every election there is a standard division of the vote between parties. Any fluctuation, they hypothesized, would be a result of short-term fluctuations, unless it was a part of the major shifts common in periods of realignment. They were thus able to justify classification of elections into four categories. Elections in which no variation in the normal vote occurs were called maintaining elections. Some elections saw a shift that did not last, returning the normal vote prior to the change. These elections were called deviating elections. The elections where the normal vote returned were called reinstating elections. Finally, Key's conception of critical elections were called realigning elections. Stokes (1966) expanded the criteria to suggest that the change must carry over and result in a change in a party's base of support. Sundquist (1973) reinforced this theme when he emphasized the durable nature of the changes.

The cases of realignments all point to the same pattern of sharp, durable change. Historians generally agree that a realignment took place in the 1820's, as the Era of Good Feelings and its nonparty politics gave way to the first two-party system. The issues at this time involved the expansion of the American electorate and national boundaries. Andrew Jackson's desire to include the common man in the political process had the greatest impact in dividing the electorate. The division over the expansion westward highlighted the 1828 election and polarized the electorate. The election of Andrew
Jackson meant that the frontier and agrarian wings of the old Jeffersonian party were established as the dominant party in the U.S. They called themselves the Democrats (Sorauf, 1984, p. 21). The Democrats dominated politics for roughly a generation. The politics between 1828 and 1860 were characterized mostly by compromise. The great statesmen of the period were able to ease the tensions over slavery and industrial expansion in the South for a time, but finally these issues proved too substantial for compromise.

Out of the political chaos of the Kansas-Nebraska Act came the Republicans, and the second critical election in 1860. The Republicans were made up of Whigs, free soilers, abolitionists and some Democrats. By 1860, the party had developed nationally and prepared to challenge the Democrats for the White House. The Republicans were intent on stopping the expansion of the Southern economic and social structure beyond its present borders. The election of 1860 was filled with the dramatic shifts in partisan preferences described by Key and, with the aid of Reconstruction, these shifts were durable as well. Sundquist's study (1973) of this period offered convincing evidence that the issue responsible for this shift was slavery.

The next critical election occurred in 1896, when the G.O.P. was reinvigorated by making gains that Key found encompassed all social groups. Like the election of 1860, the realignment of 1896 involved the creation of a new party. The Populist party emerged from a perceived failure of the Democratic establishment to address the essential questions of agrarian expansion and free silver. This movement polarized the Democratic party and led to dual nomination by both the Democrats and the Populists in 1896 of William Jennings Bryan. Bryan described the troubles of the times when he spoke in Congress. He said,

Today the Democratic party stands between two great forces, each inviting its support. On the one side stand the corporate interest of the nation, its moneyed institutions, its aggressions of wealth and capital, imperious, arrogant, compassionless. They demand special legislation, favors, privileges and immunities. They can subscribe magnificently to campaign funds; they can strike down opposition with their all-pervading influence, and, to those who fawn and flatter, bring ease and plenty. They demand that the Democratic party become their agent to execute their merciless decrees.

On the other side stands that unnumbered throng which gave a name to the Democratic party and for which it has assumed to speak. Work-worn and dust begrimed, they make their sad appeal. . . .

This army, vast and daily vaster growing, begs the party to be its champion in the present conflict. (Quoted in Sundquist, 1973, pp.123-124)

The selection of Bryan by the Populists and the Democrats fused the parties together. It
clearly divided the electorate on the issue of free silver and business. The populistic policies proved out of step with the majority; the new Democratic party, with its populistic tendencies, was overwhelmed. The result was the establishment of a new, more solid Republican majority in national politics. Laissez faire economics dominated this policy period, as the brief attempts at regulation by Theodore Roosevelt and regulating size by Wilson proved inconsequential in altering the electoral preferences of the American voter. The Republican majority was durable through the 1920's.

The next, and perhaps most recent realignment in American politics, occurred in 1932. The event which precipitated this crisis was the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent Depression. Hoover's traditional Republican approach to the economy made him unable to act, and as the numbers of poor grew larger, the Democrat's base increased. The separation of the classes began even earlier in some regions, as Key's analysis of New England indicated. This division led to the New Deal proposals of Franklin Roosevelt and the subsequent domination of politics by the Democratic party. Shively (1971) has suggested that this realignment actually occurred in two stages, with New England leading a realignment on ethical lifestyles in 1928 and the economic realignment occurring in 1936 over the New Deal.

Beyond these four cases there exists little to no agreement. These four cases were all characterized by a major cross-cutting issue which served as a basis for the partisan realignment. In each case, the shifts were dramatic and durable. They also occurred every thirty to forty years. This has left many a political scientist waiting for the realignment to come, and puzzled at its failure to appear.

The South's role in these realignments is even more puzzling. Bensel and Sanders have observed that the South never seems to participate in realignments. The Jacksonians did well in the South and always enjoyed significant support. This was expected, as the themes of exclusion and expansion played well in Charleston and throughout the South. Every shift that followed found the Democrats remaining in control of the South. Why then has the South become the subject of realignment today?

The answer can be found in the theories of the political scientists who speak of realignments today. It is as if many have grown tired of waiting for realignments to occur. In their quest to locate one, they find solace in the Republican gains made in the region. At best, these conclusions are premature; at worst they are incorrect. The evidence shown in this thesis in regard to partisan shifts, seat changes, and primary competition shows the latter conclusion to be the case. Kevin Phillip's 1969 prediction of Republican dominance, for example, has clearly not materialized.
Part of the explanation for this failure can be seen in the way realignment literature has developed. Some, including Key, have weakened the definitional constraints of critical elections, thus explaining the lag in a recent appearance. Key did this by creating the concept of secular realignment (1959). He defined it as "a movement of the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections." (p. 199) Given that, the researcher was relieved of the burden of looking for any one dramatic shift in the electoral preferences of the voters. Nevertheless, it is difficult to suggest that the Republican growth over 30 years constitutes secular realignment. The data suggest that below the presidential level, growth has been quite slow. How secular realignments affect the institutions and policies of government are unclear as well, because no clear time frame for their occurrence exists. If we consider the postwar South, these effects are negligible at best.

This thesis demonstrates that when realignments are treated as exclusively electoral events, it is difficult to make a case for the South's realignment. Some have tried with the Reagan revolution of 1980, but the disastrous defeats which hit the G.O.P. in 1986 suggest that below the presidential level, not much has changed. The dramatic shifts described by Key in 1955 have clearly not happened. The extent of the secular shift is only visible, and then insignificantly, when the period between 1958 and 1984 is considered. It is doubtful that Key intended to suggest that secular realignments ought to last 26 years, for that is almost a generation in itself. Beyond the electoral arena, the realignment becomes less visible.

When scholars extended Key's theory, they most often did so by emphasizing the role of institutions. The importance of institutions in assessing the impact of electoral change cannot be overemphasized. This importance has been lost on scholars of realignment. This approach is rooted in the tradition of studying policy change in periods of realignment. Walter Dean Burnham (1970, p. 10) suggested that noticeable shifts in the policy agenda occurred in response to the New Deal realignment. This has led to an emphasis in the realignment literature on large policy changes around an issue or cluster of issues. Sundquist (1973) finds that the issue is most often a new one on the political agenda (p. 275). He also shows that this new issue must cut across the existing lines of partisan cleavage and be powerful enough to polarize the electorate. In this setting the political parties adjust by taking distinct and easily understood positions on the new issue (p. 278). In this setting, the natural tendency of parties to converge and be ambiguous by straddling the issues is not tenable (Shepsle, 1972). If they do, Sundquist suggests that
third parties will form.

Barbara Sinclair's classic studies on the transformation of the political agenda between 1925 and 1938 (1977) and on party voting and regional fragmentation between 1933 and 1954 (1978) served to emphasize the role of the institutions in bringing about noticeable policy change. She uses Clausen's typologies to show the importance of redistributive issues. In her book, *Congressional Realignment 1925-1978*, she offers firm support for the role of institutions in realignment, and more specifically, the House of Representatives. The linkage between policy shift and institutional change was seen as occurring in three areas: the agenda of Congress, the policy outputs, and the congressional alignments. These merge in the formation of what she called the Burnham/Brady/Cooper model. The model showed that the crisis that led to the vote shift is magnified by the perception that the old government's response is inadequate. Therefore, the old policies are rejected and the congressional alignment is shifted in favor of the new majority party. This shift leads to changes in committee makeup and a strengthening of the cohesion of the new majority party, which in turn allow for the policy agenda to shift. The analysis of Clubb, Flanagan and Zingale (1981) attempted to show this linkage between changes in elections and institutional agendas. This linkage between policy shift and institutional change is at the heart of modern realignment theory and can only be explored with an institutional perspective.

Studying policy shifts and party alignments are important in that they justify institutional studies during periods of electoral shifts. The development of the model Sinclair employs is an extension of the work of David Brady on congressional realignment. In his book, *Congressional Voting in a Partisan Era* (1973), he links the electoral shifts to voting behavior within the institution of Congress. According to Brady, the voting shifts that brought about the McKinley election and new party system of the 1890's resulted directly in the increased cohesion among the solidified Republican majority. Later analysis by Brady and Joseph Stewart (1982) reached the same conclusion when it extended the analysis to include the Civil War realignment and the New Deal realignment. The emphasis in each case was on the linkage between the electoral shift and the institutional behavior of the Congressmen. Later reevaluation of his theory (1985) found that national issues were the dominant driving force behind these realignments and the subsequent institutional change. In addition, he found that the degree of institutional change does vary from one period of change to the next, with the New Deal shift being the strongest. Brady's contribution is significant in that it emphasized the role of the institution in electoral shifts. From this perspective, electoral
shifts can only be viewed as realigning when they result in significant institutional and policy changes that divide the parties.

The effect on Southern institutions was studied in Chapter 6. While elections had an effect on the overall conservative coalition support, they certainly did not reflect sharp partisan division. It is also clear that a change in the institutional makeup of the body affects the internal working of the Congress. In commenting on the change in the House between 1887 and 1968, Brady, Cooper and Hurley (1985) found that both external and internal variables had a role to play. Brady (1985) found that the change had an effect on committees; the implications for that are obvious. Given the importance of the committee in the legislative process, (Smith,1984) a turnover in the balance of power and leadership could have a dramatic effect. This shift also leads to control of the policy-making structure and can lead to shifts in the agenda and the bureaucracy (Cooper,1975). When approached from the level of individual turnover, realignments can lead to the recruitment of new elites and a replacement of the "old guard" (King and Seligman, p. 267). All of these institutional changes lead to the overall change in the Congress, allowing the changes in policy to occur.

Realignment theory has developed over the years; the modern interpretation of realignments is significantly different from the simple findings reported by V.O. Key in 1955. Key himself pondered the impact of his study on public administration, the legislative process and operations of the economy. Scholars have followed his lead, and in the process they have expanded the meaning of the term realignment. Brady offered a useful summary in 1985 when he pointed out six common elements in traditional realignments. They were:

1. The parties take polarized positions on the cross-cutting issues.
2. The election results are national
3. New majority control of the Congress for at least a decade
4. Committee turnover is high
5. Party structure voting occurs in Congress
6. Big policy changes occur.

Given this summary, the potential exists to study change in the South and relate it to realignment theory. Of course, it is possible to test the presence of traditional realignment by applying Brady's criteria to the South. Others have argued that hybrid forms of realignment have occurred. Some suggest that a non-partisan realignment has occurred, others that a regional realignment occurred; finally there are those who find secular realignments every time the G.O.P. gains in the region.

In the case of traditional realignment, serious problems exist for the proponents.
Dramatic deviation from the normal vote has not occurred with any consistency. In addition, the parties have clearly not taken polarized positions on any issue. As much as the G.O.P. would like to paint the Democrats as the party of welfare and Blacks, they cannot do this across the board, as Chapter 6 has demonstrated with conservative coalition voting. Many have attempted to suggest that ideology provides the basis for this realignment, but the evidence is inconclusive at best. Obviously, the shifts have not been permanent or nationwide, as the G.O.P.'s growth has not been duplicated outside the region. New majority control of either the regional or the national delegation has not changed for a decade. Committee turnover has not approached the levels of change during the realignment periods and party-structured voting on the part of the Southern delegation is non-existent with defections regularly at the highest rates. Policy change was dramatic in the area of civil rights, but it did little to alter the majority status of the Democrats in the Southern delegation. Pomper has claimed that 1964 was a critical election and that the parties did change (p. 424). He thought the evolution of this realignment would lead to responsible two-party government, with parties being able to take meaningful positions. The effects on the South were not that dramatic, and we are still waiting for the advent of responsible two-party government. In short, this thesis concludes that no traditional realignment has occurred in the South in the postwar period.

The obvious shortcomings of the traditional theory has led to the development of hybrid theories of realignment. Burnham proposed that the change was a realignment without parties (p. 308). The immediate problem is on what basis the realignment occurs. His position hinges on the assumption that party dissolution and critical realignment are linked. In his mind, the shift is taking place on ideological grounds. He feels that people are becoming more conservative, breaking the New Deal coalition (p. 313). Chapter 6 points to serious problems in relying on ideology at the electoral level. While the lack of a role for parties offers interesting possibilities, the argument that a realignment is taking place lacks substance, given the results of the 1986 elections and the 1988 public opinion polls.

An alternate hybrid attempted to get around the apparent lack of national realignment by proposing the the shift was limited to the region of the South. This approach lacks support at the most basic level of electoral change. The results of comparing partisanship, inter-party competition and intra-party competition simply do not support that conclusion.

Still, a third hybrid was proposed by Chubb and Petersen (1985) when they argued that realignments would be greater understood by broadening our perspectives to
include "split level realignments." In their mind, realignment should be understood as voter unrest and government action. They argue correctly that change in the House and at the State level has been slower; realignment has not occurred at these levels. They argue further that realignment has taken place in the Senate, national parties and in presidential elections. While the evidence here suggests that this is an overstatement, a more basic problem exists. If we accept Chubb and Petersen's hybrid model, or any of the other hybrid models, we change the interpretation of a realignment. In this case, the failure to reach all levels also suggests a failure to offer meaningful policy change. In short, these hybrid cases are explaining electoral deviation, but not traditional realignment.

The most interesting alternative is the case of the secular realignment. In this scenario, the South has slowly converted to Republicanism. There were no polarized parties on cross-cutting issues, no national results, no new majority, just a slow movement towards the G.O.P. There is very little written past V. O. Key's initial work on the subject, although Sundquist argues along these lines in his commentary on the postwar South (1973). In his analysis, the change has been slow because of the slow conversion, the lack of clarity in policy variations between parties, and the time it took for the G.O.P. to mature (pp. 269-273). The real problem with this approach is the time constraint. Key specified no outer limit on the amount of time it would take to accomplish this secular shift. He argued that the change could cover several presidential elections, which suggests at least 12 years. The problem is that realignments need to lead to dramatic durable shifts, even if the time takes over a decade. A full decade has followed since the 1964 election, yet the G.O.P. has still not shown dominance at any level below the presidential elections in the region, the one thing that Key did suggest that the change should affect. In this case, like the others, there is compelling evidence to suggest that this is not a realignment comparable to the previous four.

Part of the reason realignments may be so difficult to understand in the postwar period is that the nature of our understanding of partisanship has changed very little. Since The American Voter, partisanship has been accepted as a stable force. The assumptions of Campbell et al still guide much of what is written about realignment. These assumptions are grounded in a behavioralist theory of voting. The theory holds that partisan identification is the most important factor in determining vote. Obviously, this has severe limitations in the South, and perhaps it has contributed to a failure to understand realignments in general.

Alternate approaches enhance the understanding of realignments in the region. Shifts in the postwar period make more sense when viewed through a relaxed model of
partisanship. Each of the claims in this thesis falls in line with Morris Fiorina's conception of partisanship. When Morris Fiorina wrote *Retrospective Voting In American National Elections* (1981), he probably did not have the American South in mind. Nonetheless, his theory of partisanship seems appropriate to the changing South. He suggested that both short-term and long-term factors account for an individual's current partisanship. He called these simple retrospective evaluations (SRE's) and mediated retrospective evaluations (MRE's) (pp.82-83, p.108). In addition, he stressed that partisan identification can change repeatedly and is not stable across a political generation, as the traditional realignment models suggest. If the South's flexible partisanship is considered, it seems to fit Fiorina's model; as he suggests partisanship varies over time, but in the South it also varies over the electoral level. There is not much appearance of durability in the shifts, but that poses no problem for Fiorina's model.

Given this, other variables besides partisanship can also impact voting. For example, as there is no lasting tradition of partisan voting in primaries, Republican candidates are more vulnerable in the South. The alternate model of partisanship proposed by Morris Fiorina is more useful in the case of the South than the model posited in *The American Voter*. Fiorina allows for the flexible voting behavior of the South and accounts for the variation in voting at different electoral levels by allowing for major impacts from non-partisan factors such as challenger strength and incumbency. In the South, these non-partisan factors explain variance that partisanship cannot. Partisan shifts are not a guarantee of electoral change, as the postwar South is demonstrating. Without a burning issue to propel the realignment, partisanship has tended to be flexible and the Southern voter has tended to continue supporting the Democrats. The extra-partisan advantages of the Democrats in the area of established primaries and incumbency, limit change and cloud the minds of voters. Given that the Southern delegation of both parties is conservative, the role of the party becomes secondary to the role of the individual. In the postwar South, more individuals, who happen to be Democrats, appeal to the voters of the region. These individuals secure Democratic dominance in local, state and congressional offices.

To suggest that change is a realignment is to overstate the degree and motivation for the shift. To argue on behalf of realignment is to ignore the peculiar history of the region. This region has always shown loyalty to charismatic individual leaders, regardless of party. Even individuals without much charisma have managed to switch parties and maintain support. John Connally, Strom Thurmond and Phil Gramm to name only a few, can attest to that fact. Given the evidence, it is much safer to conclude that the
change in the postwar South is not a function of traditional realignment, but rather a function of the G.O.P. finding more acceptable individuals in some cases. The long history of the region suggests that individuals have played an important role in its politics. This runs counter to the notion of partisan realignment and, in part, explains why the South has been the region that has traditionally remained free of realignments' effects. The difference in the latter years of the post-World War II era is that this importance of the individual is no longer the result of the South's one-party politics as it was in years prior, but is a result of the changing nature of modern politics. Above all the South remains independent at the presidential level. While some still insist that these Republican votes are simply protest votes, the truth is that partisanship has become highly unstable. The region is willing to support an individual who thinks like they do, regardless of party affiliation. Below the presidential level, other factors such as incumbancy and localism inflate the importance of the individual and move the voter away from strict partisan adherence. The individual, therefore, is politically more important than party in the 1980's as he was in the 1940's. In that sense, the adage that "the more things change, the more they stay the same" seems most appropriate in the postwar South.
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