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RICE UNIVERSITY

DECISION MAKING IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS:
A DIACHRONIC ANALYSIS

by

MARK A. MORGAN

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

DECISION MAKING IN THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS:
A DIACHRONIC ANALYSIS

MARK A. MORGAN

This study examines the manner in which the House of Representatives has dealt with the appropriations of money. To that end I focused this research on two major areas: (1) the importance of factors external to Congress, and (2) internal factors, primarily membership and career patterns and the reasons for, and the results of changes by the House to the rules under which appropriations were made.

The findings indicate that (1) in the absence of external factors such as major political realignments, or internal changes such as the move to decentralize in the 1885-1889 or recentralize in 1920, the Committee, and the entire process operates in a fairly predictable manner; (2) committee actions generally conform to what one would expect if the norms of subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization and apprenticeship offered by Fenno (1966) are followed; (3) a change in party control is accompanied by non-incremental changes in the budget, especially during periods of political realignments; and (4) even when major political events occur (e.g., "external" events such as realignments or "internal" events such as the rules changes), the resulting change is short-lived.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Any contributions this dissertation may make to our understanding of the workings of the political world are due to the combined efforts of many friends and teachers. The faults and shortcomings rest only with me. I have been aware for some time that I am and have been one of the lucky ones. I have been blessed with being able to pursue my interests relatively unencumbered by the hardships which befall many. I am not blind to my good fortune. I would rather, like to celebrate my association with those who have made this part of my journey so personal and so rewarding.

My most obvious debt of gratitude is owed to David W. Brady. Without his help and guidance this dissertation would truely have been impossible. David's accepetance of me as student and colleague will remain as one of my major accomplishments.

My association with the other Political Science members of my committee has been rewarding personally as well as professionally. Bob Stein, Ric Stoll, and I came to Rice together in 1979. They have always been available for help and direction. I owe them each an enormous debt beyond this research. I value their advise and the friendship, and trust neither shall soon be depleted.
I also wish to recognize the contributions of Joseph Cooper who was instrumental in helping me in the early development of this topic and Peter Mieszkowski for his willingness to serve on my committee.

Emotional support during the trials and tribulations of graduate school and the writing of a dissertation are important, and so are supports of a monetary kind. In that regard I wish to thank the Rice University Advanced Studies and Research Division for their financial support and ICSA for its generous computer support.

On a more personal level I owe thanks to the support of many. Meliane Morgan has been, and shall always remain my very good friend. She has offered support and encouragement in ways and times which only she and I can fully appreciate and understand. Thank you.

Melissa Collie, Andree Reeves, Luis Fraga, Patty Renfrow, and Mark Ishimatsu have added spice and genuine friendship to my years at Rice. Elisabeth Brocking has provided excellent editorial assistance at short notice, but cannot be held libel for my errors.

Margaret Greenwood has always been helpful and caring and such qualities were not lost to me. Jacqie Ehlers has been a joyful adversary and one which I shall miss. And finally, a special thanks to Beth Sinclair. She has provided help and understanding which let me place this all in perspective. Appropriations are important, but they do not de-
fine what is important in life; happiness and the simple joys of caring do, and she has provided both.

And of course, I wish to thank my family. Toni, my sister, and Randy, my brother have been understanding and supportive of all the decisions I have made. While they may not understand them, they have always believed in me. And lastly, to my mother, Thyra Morgan; I finished, and I am happy. I know you are proud, and I am certain he is, too. Thank you for all you have done. Raising children is a difficult task. You have done so with grace and wisdom and I am glad you have never stopped.

It is to my mother, and the memory of Gus Morgan, my father, that this work is dedicated.
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CHAPTER ONE

This is a study of institutionalized decision making. It is an examination of the structure, the purpose, and the development of the processes used in the appropriations process in the United States House of Representatives. Appropriations -- the determination of who receives the revenue raised by government -- is central to the governmental process. In allocating funds, government places a value on its various policies. While proclaiming the importance of each sector of governmental activity, government explicitly rank orders programs or policies. It does so by placing a dollars and cents value on them. It does so by determining what share of federal expenditures each department or program receives. The allocation of monies are decisions which determine the direction of a government. Guns or butter, education or industrialization; in whatever form one wishes to define the dilemma, the division of revenues is a central problem for any government.

In this dissertation I will examine the manner in which the House of Representatives deals with the conflict inherent in its work. I will then review how changes in the internal structure of the House, its membership and committee composition, influence those norms of behavior which allow
the House to function. I will then turn to an investigation of the importance of those factors exogenous to the Congress and how they change the behavior of the House. Finally I will examine the effect internal, structural changes have on the appropriations process.

Conflict is inevitable within any body which must deliberate the fate of public policies. The extent to which a government can manage that conflict and reach workable solutions is indicative of the maturity and stability of that government. That the United States Congress has functioned continuously since its formation is testimony to its ability to deal with that conflict. One should not infer from this, however, that the process is or has ever been free from disagreement. Rather, the ability to promote and implement a workable budget, replete with contradictions, is indicative of a willingness of the body as a whole to support a system which imperfect in the particular, is capable of providing a way in which the government can proceed, and those areas of high dispute can be at once continued and contested. The committee structure of the Congress is such a system. The Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives is and has been an ideal example of how an organization such as the Congress creates, modifies, and institutionalizes a process which handles a volatile issue in an orderly manner.

Even cursory examination of the U.S. budget confirms that most of the time the process is marked by steady but
unspectacular growth. There have been numerous theories offered to explain the reasons for and the products of such growth. The first of these theories has centered on the nature of the budget to grow in a steady manner. This growth by small increments has been termed "incrementalism" and previous research into budgetary decision making has focused mainly on incremental nature of the process.

The need for a theory of the budgetary process was stated by V.O. Key as early as 1940. Since then a number of scholars have proposed a variety of theories and explanations for how and why budgets emerge as they do. Simon's *Administrative Behavior* (1947) is one of the first works to present a theory of how scarce resources are allocated within the context of the firm. In this work Simon introduces the term "satisficing" as an explanation of how less than optimal choices are made. Lindblom (1959) rejected the concept of comprehensive rationality commonly used in economic literature and provided an explanation which has become known as the incremental approach to budgetary decision making. In "The Science Of Muddling Through" Lindblom depicts the decision maker as constrained by limited cognitive capacity, excessive information to attempt to evaluate, and a shortage of time. This is no attempt to belittle the bureaucrat; it is rather an attack on an economic theory that proposes that actors who confront problems actually do so in a comprehensive manner. Lindblom contended that due to hu-
man limitations comprehensive rationality was impossible. The impossibility of a comprehensive rationality leads Lindblom's decision maker to adopt short cuts in the budgeting process. The short cut that emerged from the Lindblom article was the incremental change process. By simply taking the previous year's budget and adding or cutting a small amount, the decision maker can reach a decision which should approximate a satisficing solution. The budget maker, by reducing costs in reaching a decision, while providing a satisfactory budget has behaved, Lindblom contends, in a rational manner.

Wildavsky's THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1966) followed the Lindblom thesis and found the budgetary process to be incremental and not comprehensive. His examination of agencies uncovered that entire budgets are almost never entirely reviewed. Wildavsky introduced the idea that agencies develop a base from which to expand, and that the expansion of one year is incorporated into the base of the following year; thus, while an agency may continue to grow at a fixed increment (e.g. 10 percent), the absolute size would grow at a faster rate. Fenno's CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEE (1973) details how such incremental decision making is used in the Appropriations committee. Fenno contends that the committee has institutionalized its role as "guardian of the public purse" and routinely cut the budget requests, often using a fixed percentage to make those cuts.
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky's "A Theory Of The Budgetary Process" (1966) presents the budgetary process as "...in aggregate...similar to (decision rules) produced by a set of simple decision rules that are linear and temporally stable." (p.538) Davis et al. presented the budgetary process in the form of a number of regression equations and found that the best predictor of the current year's budget is last year's budget, plus an incremental increase, plus some random change. In their 1966 work, as well as those which followed (1974) Davis et al. pointed to their belief that decision makers think in terms of percentages.

The budgetary process of the municipal government was examined by Crecine in GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING, A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF MUNICIPAL BUDGETING (1969). Crecine took the notions of incrementalism and added the constraint of revenue expectations.

Theoretical and Methodological Criticism of Incrementalism.

While incrementalist arguments were dominant in the early 1970's recent criticisms have been convincing: (1) the inability to focus on portions of the budget, which are "controllable"; (2) the lack of budgetary studies which focus on the proper level of government; (3) the inability of incrementalism to differentiate between actual process and random process; and (4) the general inability of incrementalism to provide any useful aids in the development of social science theory.
Bailey and O'Connor (1978) argue that there exists a confusion in the interpretation of Davis, Dempster, and Wil- davsky that has led to misunderstanding by critics such as Gist (1977) who contend that incrementalists overlook very pertinent factors due to their failure to differentiate between "controllable and uncontrollable" elements of the budget. Nachez and Bupp (1973) argued that the Davis et al. model fails to capture the conflict over budgets below the agency level. They propose examination of programs rather than agencies and point to budgetary dynamism at the lower levels.

Wanat (1974) contended that the Davis et al. model is methodologically flawed and that a random process is consistent with their findings. Simulating a process in which requests were random increases over the previous years budget, and appropriations were random cuts over the requests, his results showed consistent explanation of nearly all of the variance.

LeLoup reviewed most of the budgeting literature in "The Myth of Incrementalism" and drew upon the criticisms previously noted here. He contends that incrementalism's "self-fulfilling nature renders (it) nearly useless for social science theory." In response to what he regards as obvious shortcomings LeLoup offers his own framework for developing budgetary theory and contends that "the relevance of budgetary theory depends on its ability to comprehend the
changing composition of the budget within the context of a set of external and internal constraints on the actions of key actors in the budgetary process." (1978; p.491).

Dempster, Davis, and Wildavsky clearly intended for their model to serve as an explanation of process as well as outcome. The power of this model as a predictive tool is beyond question. The reason for the success is not. I believe that the arguments previously presented are all accurate to a degree; none is so damaging as to warrant the rejection of incrementalism as a way of predicting what next year’s budget is likely to be. Wanat is correct in contending that incrementalism can be used in a descriptive sense or explanatory sense: a system is incremental if it experiences marginal shifts from the status quo. The Gist argument of controllability contrasts with the recent findings of Crecine (1977) that allocational changes in OMB’S controllable and uncontrollable elements are virtually indistinguishable. Wanat’s simulation, as Padgett (1978) points out, is not quite the random process he presents it as. Wanat’s model incorporates the Davis et al. notion of the importance of "base." The Wanat model only permits increases in requests over appropriations and only decreases in appropriations over requests. This creates a model which is necessarily monotonic in nature. It is this monotonicity which Padgett claims is the villain in the high R^2’s presented by incrementalists.
Padgett frames one of the central questions which needs to be addressed by the budgetary theorist: "How do decision makers structure their individual decision processes both in a way which allows them to make choices responsive to their perhaps conflicting and ambiguous goals, and in a way which is sensitive to their potentially overwhelming environments of complex and voluminous issues and information?" (1978; p.45)

In any attempt to respond to such a task a number of considerations should be made: (1) data should be disaggregate enough that obviously different processes are reflected in the data; (2) data should be grouped so as to not promote monotonicity; (3) programs may be grouped by different types of decision making norms, informational cues, and goals. Toward these ends, data should be grouped by major program types and structured in terms of change rather than absolute levels. This first-differencing would remove much of the collinearity as well as the monotonicity. As Padgett points out, cross program groupings should be discarded in favor of more formally described processes depicting the budgetary process as one dominated by decision makers who are forced to operate in an environment he described as promoting "bounded rationality." Simple autoregressive models which predict levels of expenditures at t based on levels at t-1 have proven to be highly accurate in conventional terms (Padgett, 1978: p.246).
While such methodological objections are important and must be of some concern when examining data, the concern we have as social scientists is not so much "how much" as "how." While predictions of future expenditures serve useful purposes, other than demonstrating that, in the aggregate, the American system provides a stable environment for policies, they do little to enlighten us as to the dynamics of the process which fosters such stability. The work of the incrementalists portrays the budgetary process as highly deterministic. Budgets are seen as the products of bureaucrats and legislators who mindlessly pass laws using the simplest of decision rules. We know, however, that such is not the case. Figure 1 provides graphic proof that the U.S. budget frequently departs from incremental change.

Even when one controls for the effects of inflation there is evidence of real, dramatic increases in government spending (see Figure 2). Central to an understanding of the appropriations process is knowledge of what causes these apparent discontinuities. Events which we know lead to dramatic turnabouts -- wars for example -- are clearly reflected in the sharp peaks of the graphs. I will not attempt to explain the effects which such catastrophes have on the process; such effects are largely self-evident and have been documented elsewhere (Schattsneider, 1969).

If one wishes to understand the processes used by government rather than simply predict the levels of outputs a
FIGURE 2

TOTAL BUDGET (CONSTANT DOLLARS)
BY YEAR 1888-1974

YEAR
different dependent variable must be examined. To this end I will make use of two measures of Congressional involvement in the budgetary process: (1) the change in the budget between time one and time two, and (2) the proportion of executive agency estimates reported to the House floor by the appropriating committee(s). The first of these is an indication of how much the budget has grown. The second captures the dynamic between internal and external explanations of change. Those who contend that the process which drives the budget is totally exogenous to the institutions which finally pass the laws tend to look only at the final results (i.e., the final budget). By using a measure of change which reflects the differences in executive agency estimates and committee approval an indicator of agreement or disagreement is tapped. By examining changes in terms of percentages instead of absolute amounts possibly confounding factors such as dramatic increases fueled by war and inflation are avoided. Examination of the differences between the committee(s) reports and the final floor action of the House allows some insight into the degree of conflict present within the House.

Neither political scientists nor politicians believe that the governmental process is driven exclusively by such "external" factors as war or depression. Such large, system-wide shocks undeniably lead to changes in the status quo. These interruptions in "normal" periods are infre-
quent, however. Cooper and Brady (1982) have pointed to the importance of examining the context in which politics takes place as well as those institutional factors which shape the manner whereby decisions are reached. Factors defining the "context" within which such policy is made are both internal and external to the Congress. I wish to examine here how those internal variables, which are largely political in nature, change the product of the appropriations process. It seems reasonable to assume that member norms, committee composition, committee turnover, member experience, as well as Congressional turnover may influence the process. In the following section I will examine how these "internal" factors influence the appropriations process and whether they are central in affecting significant change from the incremental process which is the status quo.

**Member Norms and the Decision Process**

Members of the House Appropriations Committee have, according to Fenno (1966) the dual responsibilities of (1) providing adequate funding to insure that House programs may be carried out and (2) protecting the purse by continually looking for ways to cut the budget requests. It is easy to see the conflict inherent in these two endeavors. On the one hand, if the members on Appropriations are too vigilant in their pursuit of economy they run the risk of losing their mandate as sole guardians of the purse as they did in
the 1885-1921 period, or they witness the erosion of their domain through the increased use of "backdoor" spending (Schick, 1981; p.4). On the other hand, if the members are not diligent enough, their primary mandate of spending containment is seriously endangered and the relative influence of the Committee is diminished.

Perhaps no other committee is so dependent on the use of norms in preserving its operational manner as is the Appropriations Committee. Fenno has shown that the Committee has ". . . elaborated a more complex set of informal decision-making norms . . . (than five other powerful committees in the House)" (1973; p.94). The underlying purpose for such rules and attention to norms is the need to insure a stability to the decision making organ that avoids those very obstacles which lead to conflict in the political arena.

In order to assure that the norms of subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization, and apprenticeship are recognized and practiced by the new members of the committee, appointments to fill vacancies have traditionally been limited to nonfreshmen. Membership is and has been virtually exclusive to more senior members and movement from Appropriations to other committees almost never takes place (Fenno, 1966). Members, Fenno contends, are chosen in part for their ability to "fit in" (1966). Given this expressed preference for "team players" it should not be surprising one of
the characteristics of the Committee is reciprocation on matters before subcommittees. As an integrative mechanism, the right to proprietorship over particular appropriations serves to limit potentially disruptive fights over portions of the total appropriations package.

Those norms which Fenno cited as leading to stability in decision making primarily insure that the membership of the Committee adopt the Committee norms of subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization, and apprenticeship. While it is difficult to measure membership norms directly, examining those factors which facilitate the adoption of existing norms can serve as a surrogate which allows us to infer changes in norms from changes in those factors.

**Composition, Turnover and Prior Experience.**

In this section I will examine effects of composition, turnover, and experience prior to appointment of committee members on the Committee's behavior. The rationale for examination of committee as a group of individuals as opposed to committee as a faceless collection of members is the belief that members share the sentiment of John H. Reagan:

"I cannot speak for any one else; for myself, I do not feel that I was sent here to act as clerk for any member or any committee, and, if I retain my reason and my self-respect, I surely shall never do so" (McConachie, 1898; p. 124).

Members have sought to serve on Appropriations because of the power and prestige of membership. This power and prestige is realized through the member's perception that
they may either affect the national economy, affect their constituent's economy through subcommittee appointment, or through an advantage gained by membership which may serve them in dealing with other members outside the Committee (Fenno, 1966; p.83). Thus, one may assume that the behavior of Committee member will demonstrate an attempt to negotiate the rather perilous path between committee norms, House expectations, and personal goals.

In examining turnover, tenure, and composition I have done so with the full recognition that the work of the Committee regarding the actual changes in executive agency estimates are achieved in subcommittee. Fenno has stated:

"If there is any generalization about Appropriations Committee activity that is fully supported by past research, it is the proposition that the tasks of the Appropriations Committee are accomplished by its subcommittees (1966; p.134)."

One must also be cognizant of the role of the subcommittee chairmen in this period prior to general pre-subcommittee reforms. The immunity of the subcommittee chair to electoral woes is apparent by their status within the Committee. While the influence that they may have exercised in the period in question is beyond this work, it is recognized that the chair could often assume the role of autocrat. While the impact of the subcommittee in the modern era is undeniable, the existence of the subcommittee in the appropriations process is relatively recent. If we are to examine the Committee behavior over time one must use a consist-
tent unit of analysis. Since my primary concern is in behavior of the Committee, it is the decision of the Committee that will be examined, and research into the behavior of the explicit subcommittee must be the subject for further works.

**Dependent Variable.**

There are two major phases of the appropriations process I wish to examine in this research -- the report and the final law. The report is the official Committee action, and refers to the amount the committee reports to the floor of the House for consideration by the entire body. Formally, the Committee acts on the estimates presented for its examination by some requesting agency or department. Between 1920 and 1974 the estimates came from the Bureau of the Budget. Prior to that time, as we shall see in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four, estimates came from a mixture of Executive Departments and Agencies. The final law is the action of the Congress, which actually appropriates the monies to be spent.

To test the effect that changes in the aforementioned member norms or political variables have on the appropriations process I will examine their effect on the decisions reached by the Appropriations Committee. To that end I have chosen to use as the dependent variable the extent to which the Committee changes the estimates it receives from department / agency and the amount reported by the appropriating committee(s) to the floor.
The reports will be measured a percent change rather than in raw dollars. There are a number of reasons for the use of percent rather than examination of absolute amounts. There exists a body of literature on decision making which suggests that, when faced with making decisions about increases and decreases individuals use proportionality in helping make such choices. Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (1966) point to the use of "percent" as a cognitive process used by decision makers in describing how they decide. Secondly, the use of percent is consistent with the type of non-comprehensive rationality offered by Simon (1947) and Lindblom (1959). Inflation, increases in the budget requests themselves are often cited in terms of percent increases over the previous time period. If there exists a decision rule which is the product of some form of continued group activity it seems reasonable to find that process manifesting itself in a manner which may be uncovered through examination of percent changes.

**Independent Variables.**

(1). Δ REPORT - change in report. This is the dependent variable at t-1. The rationale for the use of a lagged variable in this case is based on the assumption that the previous year's decision serves as a starting point or a guide for the current year. This variable also serves as a test for patterned decisions. If significant betas are found in the presence of controlled membership variables one
possible explanation is a reliance by the Committee on the previous year's decision as guidance for the current year's decision.

(2). DEMOCRATS - The nonpartisanship Fenno referred to was tempered by the fact that the effect of partisan behavior within the Committee was masked by the norm of not writing minority reports. The number of Democrats was included in order to test if the "form" of behavior differs with the number of Democrats or Republicans. This also serves as an indication of the relative strength of each party in the House as a whole as proportionality on the Committee is closely observed. If domination of one party or the other influences the behavior of the Committee in a manner which varies from the norm we can expect the coefficients from this variable to be significant.

(3). SDYRS - standard deviation of member years on the Committee. This is based on the assumption that as membership stabilizes on the Committee that Committee norms become stabilized. As increases in the variability of Committee membership (meaning a wider distribution of tenure on the Committee) occur, Committee norms give way to individual norms and predictable behavior declines. Thus, one would expect increases in SDYRS to be associated with exaggerated variations in the dependent variable (w Report-Estimate).

(4 and 5) DTERMS / RTERMS - These are the mean number of terms served in Congress by Party prior to joining the
Committee by those members who are new to Appropriations in the current Congress. Table 1 shows the extent to which which the Committee has grown since the 68th Congress with respect to the Congressional experience of the new members. Note that while the actual number of members entering the Committee from either party may vary a great deal in any given year, the variation around the mean terms served prior to Committee membership (3.47 for the Democrats and 3.33 for the Republicans) is not nearly so erratic.

This is, of course, not surprising. The importance of observing committee norms would lead one to expect that members should have considerable experience in the House prior to joining the Committee. What I am seeking with these variables is to determine what effect, if any, inexperience has on Committee decisions. One would not, initially, expect any effect since new members are viewed as serving an apprenticeship and are fully participating in the process only in the sense that they are furthering the existing norms. Large numbers of newcomers, however, signal the necessity of increased participation by all members. There have been Congresses (72nd, 74th, 75th, 78th, and 81st for the Democrats; 68th, 73rd, 80th, and 83rd for the Republicans) in which the new membership of a single party comprised over 20 percent of the entire Committee. In these periods it would not seem unreasonable for the new members to have had some affect.
## Table 1
### Appropriations Committee Composition
1924 - 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Cong</td>
<td>mem</td>
<td>new</td>
<td>fr</td>
<td>mean*</td>
<td>mem</td>
<td>new</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1941</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1953</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*mean - this refers to the mean number of terms served in Congress prior to joining the Committee by those new members.*
(6 and 7) RSWITCH / DSWITCH - These variables are dummies for periods in which control of the Committee changed hands. They are coded 0 if control of the Committee remains in the hands of the party which controlled it in the previous year or 1 if the control of the Committee switched from Democratic to Republican or vice versa, respectively. The rationale for these variables is obvious, since we seek to determine if changes in the control of the Committee, from one party to the other, led to variations from normal patterns of request responses. Possibly, when one party gains control after being in the minority, it may use its newfound advantage to "right" the wrongs it was forced to endure in the past. In Appropriations, of course, the change could take the form of increased cuts or increases in the amount allowed. The party which has just taken control may wish to express its preference against the departments' estimate, for example, over economy, or it may view its current advantage as the opportunity to promote increased thrift by cutting requests more extensively.

(8) FRESHMEN - is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the year was 1949 or 1953. In these two years, as noted in Table 1, the number of freshmen joining the Committee drastically differed from normal behavior. 1949 was marked the addition of 12 new Democrats to the Committee when they recaptured the committee after having had the edge since the New Deal. Committee size increased to 45 from 43
and a full 33 percent of the new Democrats to join the committee were freshmen. This was, in fact, the only year during the over 50 years being studied here that the Democrats had more than one freshman added to the committee. 1953 was the Republican's turn to regain control and 13 new Republicans joined Appropriations. Among these new members were 6 freshmen. On two other occasions the Republicans saw fit to add more than one freshman, 1924 and 1933. In fact, while 1933 was a year of almost complete turnover for the Republicans -- 11 of their 14 positions were held by newcomers -- only two were freshmen. Such increases in the number of newcomers on the Committee could result in an increase in the number of members following individual instead of committee norms.

Periods characterized by higher than average party changes or large numbers of newcomers should be associated with non-patterned or non-incremental behavior than are those periods in which the status quo is maintained. Marked by a shift from the status quo, these periods are far more likely to be times in which "mandated" Congressional behavior is perceived. To facilitate such changes in incremental behavior, abandonment of standard operating procedures may be observed and major adjustments to departmental/ executive requests may result. The increase of members less willing to observe the apprenticeship norm and the decrease in the proportion of experienced members should mark the be-
ginning of a period in which the process of supressed conflict through the observance of norms is shaken. After the initial fights over levels and cuts subside and the norms of subcommittee autonomy and reciprocity are reinforced, patterned behavior returns. This is because quarrels within the committee, if the aforementioned norms are observed, should take the form of disagreements new programs and areas of jurisdiction, not over whether particular portions of appropriations legislation should be funded. Given the relatively small part of any given budget the new programs constitute, the processes should adopt a steady pattern of increases or decreases with little fluctuation.

The regression model takes the form:

\[ \Delta Y = \alpha + \beta \Delta \text{ESTIMATE} + \beta \Delta \text{DEM} + \beta \Delta \text{SDYRS} + \beta \Delta \text{TERMS} + \beta \Delta \text{RTERMS} + \beta \Delta \text{DSWITCH} + \beta \Delta \text{RSWITCH} + \beta \Delta \text{FRESHMEN} + \varepsilon. \]

**Findings.**

Table 2 shows the results of separate regressions for selected agencies / departments as well as for the total appropriations. The model performed fairly well for most of the departments, and not so well for the total appropriations. The R²'s ranged from a low of .14 for Agriculture to .59 for appropriations for the Department of Labor. The influence of the individual variables can best be described as mixed.
TABLE 2

THE EFFECT OF COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP STABILITY ON APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPT</th>
<th>ΔEST</th>
<th>DEM</th>
<th>SDYRS</th>
<th>DTERMS</th>
<th>RTERMS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(-1.79)</td>
<td>(-.07)</td>
<td>(-.06)</td>
<td>(-.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.69)**(-1.32)</td>
<td>(1.77)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.01)* (-.48)</td>
<td>(2.51)* (0.09)</td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.83</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>(-1.33)</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.0)** (-1.09)</td>
<td>(2.01)* (-2.9)**</td>
<td>(-.36)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPT</td>
<td>RSWITCH</td>
<td>DSWITCH</td>
<td>FRESH</td>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-6.39</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.93)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(-.14)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
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<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.24)</td>
<td>(-.14)</td>
<td>(-.01)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
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<td>-3.99</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.2)*</td>
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<td>(-.90)</td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.55</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(-2.71)*</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
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<td>-1.43</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>11.68</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.54)*</td>
<td>(-.51)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
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<td>-1.34</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.74)**</td>
<td>(-.32)</td>
<td>(2.23)*</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - significant at .10 level    ** - significant at .05 level

Note: All models were tested for 1st order Autocorrelation. * indicates Durbin's h where it could be calculated. All regressions were calculated using SHAZAM (White, 1978).
The lagged dependent variable ΔREPORT proved to be significant for Commerce, Interior, and Treasury. This is one of the more interesting findings from the model. Regressions for these three departments showed that shifts in membership resulted in above average change in the dependent variable (Δ Request - Report). It is not so much that the increases are dramatic, or that one finds increases instead of decreases to be the rule but rather that without change in membership the committee does not significantly change requests. This is indication that a decision rule of the type suggested by organization theorists may exist (March and Simon, 1958).

The variable intended to test for the effect of party size, DEM, failed to be significant for any of the Departments. This tends to support Fenno's notion of nonpartisanship. It appears that who is in control at any given time may not matter, that the decision patterns and the norms observed continue. The measure used to test for the effects of longevity, SDYRS, was successful only in the cases of Interior and Treasury. This indicates that diversity of membership tenure is either not significant or is not being identified. DTERMS, RTERMS, and FRESHMEN are unrelated to the dependent variable. It appears that the lack of variation in the variables DTERMS, RTERMS, and FRESHMEN confirms that the appointment of members who are not newcomers to the House provides the continuity of norms which the Committee
has come to rely on to insure smooth operation. That com-
mittees operate in a manner which is conducive to achieving
their ends is not surprising, and this tends to confirm that
the party in power is not the determining factor in how de-
cisions are made.

The reasons for my belief that the substance and not
the style varies with the party is bolstered by the results
of RSWITCH & DSWITCH. The variable Dswitch showed to not be
significant for any of the agencies examined. Rswitch, how-
ever, demonstrated results which prevented all party factors
from being insignificant. For all departments the coeffi-
cients were quite large and for all but Agriculture, signifi-
cant at at least the .10 level. Rswitch, as noted earlier,
indicates a switch in party control from Democratic to Re-
publican. The coefficients are all negative which indicates
that Republican control of the committee was marked by in-
creased budget cutting. The Dswitch variable indicates that
while the Democrats have also pursued economy, the switch to
Democratic after Republican control is not marked by in-
creases in the estimates, but rather by smaller cuts.
Again, due to the use of percentage change we cannot attri-
bute these changes to external factors which would affect
levels, such as changes in the executive.

What these findings suggest is that changes in the com-
position or experience of the membership does influence sub-
committee behavior. This is not, of course, a startling
revelation. It has been long recognized that it is the members that do matter, and that the House is not dependent solely on external sources of change. A variation on the perceived effect of membership, however, is observed. The nonpartisanship previously discussed appears to be the normal behavior in periods in which a party has assumed control. There also appears to be a perceptible change in the Committee's product when control is shifted. What we observe are efforts by the party gaining control to alter the course of the Committee. The reasons for such changes are as many and varied as the members who make up the Committee and really need not be enumerated here.

Change in committee composition in and of itself serves as a surrogate for change in the internal context within which decisions are made. Committee members' behavior is marked by the conflicting pressures of individual and committee norms. Committees which have a stable membership have a much greater chance of institutionalizing their norms than do those which undergo rapid shifts.

Committee Longevity.

If one assumes that the Appropriations Committee as a body of career oriented, concerned, hard-working members who are primarily interested in gaining power in the House, then it is easier to understand how such norms as guarding the Treasury or reciprocity are maintained. Fenno's works (1966, 1973) indicate that the membership on the Committee is atypical of the House as a whole.
Table 3 shows the longevity of members of the Appropriations Committee since 1924. The measure MEAN YEARS is the total number of years served in the House by each Committee member divided by the number of Committee members. The increase in the total years served is not surprising. There was a steady rise from the 75th through the 81st with only slight deviations. The most obvious decline begins in the 88th Congress and continues through the 93rd.

As Table 3 demonstrates, however, the Appropriations Committee members experienced a steady increase in the amount of time during their career spent on the Committee. This indicates a greater emphasis on Committee service as an in-House career. It may also demonstrate a realization of members of the importance of establishing themselves as being dedicated servants of the House.

As the breadth of governmental activity grew the work of the Committee naturally expanded. To accommodate the increasing work load, as well as incorporate a larger portion of the Whole into the appropriations process the size of the Committee has grown from 35 members in 1924 to 40 in 1941 to 50 in 1951 to 55 members in 1974. The reason for the Committee expansion was not always a clear decision to "get more help", but was frequently a method by which to insure continued membership status while allowing the new guard to take its place in the process.
### TABLE 3
AVERAGE MEMBER YEARS ON APPROPRIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MEAN DEMOCRATIC YEARS</th>
<th>MEAN REPUBLICAN YEARS</th>
<th>MEAN COMMITTEE YEARS</th>
<th>Percent of Career Spent on Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(n)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>68 (35)</td>
<td>6.00 (3.42)</td>
<td>5.14 (3.20)</td>
<td>5.49 (3.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>69 (35)</td>
<td>6.86 (3.90)</td>
<td>6.29 (3.12)</td>
<td>6.51 (3.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>70 (35)</td>
<td>7.71 (4.76)</td>
<td>7.05 (3.26)</td>
<td>7.31 (3.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>71 (35)</td>
<td>7.57 (5.61)</td>
<td>7.90 (3.37)</td>
<td>7.77 (4.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>72 (35)</td>
<td>7.05 (5.82)</td>
<td>10.86 (2.68)</td>
<td>8.57 (5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>73 (35)</td>
<td>7.71 (5.15)</td>
<td>3.14 (2.80)</td>
<td>5.89 (4.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>74 (39)</td>
<td>5.48 (5.04)</td>
<td>5.67 (3.06)</td>
<td>5.54 (4.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>75 (39)</td>
<td>6.00 (5.36)</td>
<td>5.64 (4.45)</td>
<td>5.90 (5.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>76 (39)</td>
<td>6.92 (4.53)</td>
<td>6.00 (4.14)</td>
<td>6.56 (4.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>77 (40)</td>
<td>7.44 (4.95)</td>
<td>7.07 (4.77)</td>
<td>7.30 (4.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>78 (43)</td>
<td>6.24 (4.67)</td>
<td>7.56 (5.29)</td>
<td>6.79 (4.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>79 (43)</td>
<td>7.36 (5.02)</td>
<td>7.78 (5.69)</td>
<td>7.53 (5.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>80 (43)</td>
<td>7.11 (4.96)</td>
<td>6.80 (5.94)</td>
<td>6.93 (5.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>81 (45)</td>
<td>5.85 (4.86)</td>
<td>9.00 (6.80)</td>
<td>7.11 (5.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>82 (50)</td>
<td>7.20 (5.00)</td>
<td>7.50 (7.22)</td>
<td>7.32 (5.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>83 (50)</td>
<td>10.00 (5.47)</td>
<td>6.20 (6.79)</td>
<td>7.72 (6.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>84 (50)</td>
<td>8.87 (6.36)</td>
<td>10.10 (7.66)</td>
<td>9.36 (6.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>85 (50)</td>
<td>10.47 (6.72)</td>
<td>11.40 (8.11)</td>
<td>10.84 (7.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>86 (50)</td>
<td>12.00 (7.22)</td>
<td>8.80 (9.00)</td>
<td>10.72 (8.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>87 (50)</td>
<td>12.93 (7.82)</td>
<td>10.40 (9.00)</td>
<td>11.92 (8.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>88 (50)</td>
<td>12.20 (9.27)</td>
<td>8.40 (5.68)</td>
<td>10.68 (8.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>89 (50)</td>
<td>10.55 (8.66)</td>
<td>6.71 (4.00)</td>
<td>9.24 (7.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>90 (51)</td>
<td>11.47 (8.52)</td>
<td>7.43 (4.48)</td>
<td>9.80 (7.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>91 (51)</td>
<td>13.13 (8.86)</td>
<td>8.87 (4.62)</td>
<td>11.29 (7.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>92 (54)</td>
<td>12.67 (9.39)</td>
<td>8.67 (5.95)</td>
<td>11.15 (8.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>93 (55)</td>
<td>13.27 (9.73)</td>
<td>8.00 (5.45)</td>
<td>11.16 (8.63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If organizational theorists are correct, there should be a positive relationship between committee experience and the predictability of outcomes. This is due to the unwillingness of members to challenge each other's domain, as well as a recognition of the destructive nature of refighting settled battles. Lindblom's rationality points to the benefits of not annually reinventing the wheel, so it may be with particular appropriations. Disagreements within the Committee should be over new items and areas of jurisdiction, not over whether particular portions of appropriations legislation should be funded. Inasmuch as new items comprise a relatively small part of any given budget, the process should adopt a fairly steady pattern of increases or decreases with little fluctuation. I believe it is reasonable to expect that if one subcommittee absorbs most of the cuts in one year that we could expect it to be granted some favorable treatment in the ensuing years. Similarly, we should not expect one department to go unchecked year after year without receiving cuts in line with those of the other departments. While such behavior may not be the most efficient way to appropriate monies to run a government, it is a way to maintain morale and serves to facilitate norms conducive to smooth committee operations. Members are more likely to accept cuts in their particular areas if they are reasonably certain that they have not been singled out for such "special" treatment.
What I propose in this section is to examine the influence which committee experience has on the Appropriations Committee. The hypothesized relationship is that increased experience leads to greater observance of committee norms which, in turn, results in incremental spending decisions.

The dependent variable is measured as the percent change between the amount requested and the amount reported to the floor. The dependent variable I am examining as mentioned before is the report made by the Committee as a response to the estimate made by the departments or agencies. This is measured as the percent increase or decrease in the amount reported to the floor by the Committee.

Figures 3 - 7 are graphic displays of the reports made by the Appropriations Committee to the estimates made by the departments. When examining the Committee responses to the estimates of the various departments two things are evident. First is the fluctuating pattern of responses. Extended periods of large cuts or increases are rarely found. Secondly is the marked absence of increases in the budget estimates in the post 1946 period. Only the Departments of Commerce and Labor showed any increases in the 1946-1974 periods, though prior to 1946 increases were not only common but were frequently rather large. This varying pattern is in keeping with the hypothesized behavior of reciprocation.
FIGURE 7

COMMITTEE ACTION ON TREASURY
DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES 1924-1974

CHNGEST
10
0
-10
-20
-30

YEAR
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
8 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
4 6 8 0 0 2 4 6 8 0 0 4 6 8 0 8 4 6 8 0 0 8 4 6 8 0 0 2 4
Independent Variables.

The independent variables I have chosen for each of the separate agencies are:

SDYRS - this is the standard deviation of member years on the committee. The argument, as elaborated earlier, is that if membership of the Committee is more diverse as to Committee experience, the likelihood of patterned behavior declines. Thus, one would expect increases in SDYRS to be associated with large variations in amount reported.

RESPOND - this is a dummy variable: it is coded 1 if the percent change in year t-1 is greater than 1 standard deviation away from the mean percent change over the entire period. This variable measures large variation from "normal" behavior. This variable is intended to test the share and share alike proposition. If such a system is at work one can expect to find coefficients which are negative. The reason is, again, major cuts are expected to be followed by a reciprocating increase (or at least not more major cuts).

REFORM - this is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the year is post-1946 reform and 0 otherwise. This variable is intended to tap the influence of the 1946 Reorganization Act. If the Act had a stabilizing influence on the process then, again, negative coefficients are expected. If this is the case, the Act may have achieved its purpose of forcing the Appropriations process to consider the budget in its entirety rather than considering appropriations while disre-
garding the revenues. Thus the regression model takes the form:

\[ y = \alpha + \beta SDYRS + \beta RESPOND + \beta REFORM + \epsilon \]

Table 4 shows the results of the separate regressions for each of the departments as well as for the total appropriations. The model performed fairly well for all departments. The R2's ranged from a low of .15 for the Total Appropriations to .56 for appropriations for the Treasury Department. When examining the influence of each of the variables the results are quite mixed. The measure used to test for the effect of longevity, SDYRS, met with a mixed fate.

Only in the Commerce Department was the continuity of membership significant. While this research will not deal with the subcommittee question, such findings should serve as a starting point for greater examination of subcommittee role and influence. The variable RESPOND was intended to test for the negotiation pattern discussed earlier. The results indicate such a pattern does apparently exist for Interior, Treasury, and, with less certainty, Labor. All coefficients were in the predicted direction and were quite large. The size of the \( \beta \)'s are not necessarily surprising. When one examines Figures 5 and 7 it is apparent that Interior and Treasury have both experienced very large cuts during this period. The return to "normal" cuts after such massive cuts may provide much of the impetus for RESPOND.
TABLE 4

EFFECT OF MEMBERSHIP STABILITY AND PREVIOUS REPORT ON APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPT</th>
<th>SDYRS</th>
<th>RESPOND</th>
<th>REFORM</th>
<th>CONSTANT</th>
<th>R2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>-5.92</td>
<td>-2.56</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.356)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(-1.69)*</td>
<td>(-.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>-16.36</td>
<td>-15.40</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(-2.55)**</td>
<td>(-1.63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>-3.75</td>
<td>-16.88</td>
<td>-16.00</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38)**</td>
<td>(-1.27)</td>
<td>(-2.98)**</td>
<td>(-2.29)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>-16.60</td>
<td>-7.81</td>
<td>-7.17</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.74)</td>
<td>(-3.98)**</td>
<td>(-1.18)</td>
<td>(-.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-3.08</td>
<td>-4.27</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(-1.76)*</td>
<td>(-1.40)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-20.26</td>
<td>-4.20</td>
<td>-5.32</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.75)</td>
<td>(-6.06)**</td>
<td>(-1.16)</td>
<td>(-.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - significant at .10 level
** - significant at .05 level
The influence of the variable REFORM was a surprise. It is clear from Figures 3 - 7 that the cuts or increases stabilize considerably in post-WWII period. While this may support the hypothesis that the Reorganization Act of 1946 achieved its purpose, an alternative explanation may be closer to the mark. It may be the case that the late forties signaled the emergence of the subcommittee as the functional equivalent of the special interest committees of 1880-1920.

It has been demonstrated that during that period the substantive committees appropriated more for their own interests than had been the case when appropriations were consolidated in the Appropriations Committee (Brady and Morgan, 1983). Shick (1979) pointed that by the 1970-75 period there were instances of subcommittees increasing the requests of Departments. While I have found few instances of increases in the departments under consideration here, increases are not a necessary indication, and indeed, are not sufficient to warrant a blanket condemnation of subcommittees as protectors of their departments. If a "close" relationship exists between subcommittee and department, there is no need for the subcommittee to take the initiative to increase expenditures. This is not to imply collusion, for along with a working relationship comes an implicit understanding of the acceptable limits for increases. As one would expect, once the Department knows the extent to which it can increase its budget it is simple to increase the es-
timate above the amount they expect to be cut. This process, when employed with full information should lead to a more stable series of committee responses. This appears have occurred with Agriculture (Figure 8), but is not the case with Commerce (Figure 4). Commerce is characterized by a dramatic turnaround during the mid-forties. Prior to that time Commerce experienced only small changes in its requests, but after a large jump in the 1942-43 period there are only 2 years in which Commerce did not experience sizable cuts. Why the major differences between Agriculture and Commerce? I believe the variation may well be explained by the composition of the subcommittees -- the Agriculture subcommittee in particular. While I intend to restrict this research to entire committee action, it is noteworthy that Agriculture has long been a bastion for Southern Democrats. The staying power of these members undoubtedly led them to postions of power on those subcommittees with which they have traditionally been associated. As Agriculture has a fairly narrowly defined clientele, membership could be expected to indicate an affinity with the interests represented by the subcommittee. Commerce, on the other hand, has a wide range of duties and concerns which may breed subcommittee conflict as the various interests vie for resources. It is also involved, of course, with foreign trade which has been the subject of numerous Congressional actions to insure a balance of trade. Such ad hoc measures to deal with trade
inequities should be expected to lead to large swings in the amounts requested for Commerce.

Requests and Committee Action

Much of our view of how the appropriating committee is doing its job is based on our expectations of its role. If we view it as the guardian of the purse, then where do we look for evidence of this behavior?

Since 1880 appropriating committees have cut agency requests by an average of between 1.5 and 7 percent annually. Yet total appropriations rose 12 percent annually for the same period. This apparent contradiction is easily explained by the increases in the estimates from executive agencies. While the committee appears to be consistently pursuing its role as watchdog of the purse, its tradition of making small cuts does not make up for the increases requested by the executive agencies.

It appears unquestionable that the committee responds to budget estimates. In this respect one may see the committee as fulfilling the role of providing program support. If one only examines the relationship between estimates and amount reported for the total appropriations we see a simple correlations of .998. This relationship holds across all departments as shown in Table 5.

So, does this indicate the appropriating committee is purely responsive to departmental demands or to the demands
TABLE 5

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEPARTMENTAL ESTIMATES
AND APPROPRIATING COMMITTEE / HOUSE ACTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Committee Action</th>
<th>Floor Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>.998</td>
<td>.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>.991</td>
<td>.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>.999</td>
<td>.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>.983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the House which are in implicit accord with those requests? If the Committee were acting contrary to House wishes, major changes to Committee reports should be in evidence. Again, Table 5 indicates that in terms of simple correlations the relationship between what the Committee reports and what the House approves is very high. Table 6 shows the average floor action given committee reports during the 1920 - 1974 period. Changes to these reports are quite small and variations from this behavior are uncommon given the sizes of the standard deviations. As is obvious from the Table, the Committee reports are, for all practical purposes, sacrosanct.

Table 7 gives the summary statistics for each of the departments under study. Examining only Committee response to budget estimates we observe that most changes in the estimates are large enough to be noticed, but small enough to preclude any real damage to the program, given the size of the increase in the estimate.

Can we infer from this behavior that post - 1920 reforms have resulted in an automated appropriations process operating as Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) posited, by the use of simple decision rules? If the Committee is reduced to such predictable behavior and decisions are based solely on percentage changes to requests, where does the power of the Committee lie? A process which is as predictable as appropriations appears to lend itself to considerable
TABLE 6

ANNUAL INCREASES IN DEPARTMENTAL ESTIMATES - SELECTED DEPARTMENTS AND TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS*
1920 - 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Average Absolute Change</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>16.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>18.49</td>
<td>31.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This indicates the change in Departmental requests between one year and the next.
### TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTION ON DEPARTMENTAL
ESTIMATES - SELECTED DEPARTMENTS
AND TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS
1920 - 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Average Change</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes war years.
abuse through fairly simple strategies. If one expects a 10% cut; one simply increases the estimates 10%. As previously discussed this strategic behavior is both expected and corrected for.

It is folly to assume that a committee which has long been held in such high regard is ineffectual within the very process it is believed to control. The difficulty is in discerning the point of influence. By examining particular agency behavior we can gain some insight into this question. To that end I will now turn to a brief examination of agricultural appropriations.

Agricultural Appropriations.

Agricultural appropriations have been a stable part of the appropriations process since the Committee's formation and allows us a steady frame of reference over time. The analysis in the preceding pages showed that the models for agriculture accounted for the least variance. To recap briefly, agriculture was one of the first concerns to be afforded the luxury of appropriating for itself. The importance of Agriculture relative to the rest of the economy can be seen in Figure 8, which shows the proportion of total appropriations that goes to Agriculture. The growth of this sector of the total appropriations shows that agriculture grew at a rapid rate through 1914 and then again showed expansion through the end of the series when one excludes the massive increases in spending for WWII and Korea. One must
infer this was due to increased Congressional support for such programs.

There was marked growth from the last quarter of the 19th century through the pre-WWI period. As the budget reflected the nation's switch to a wartime economy agriculture's relative position declined. A sharp increase in 1923 continued in a fairly unabated manner with agriculture appropriations consuming over six percent of the total budget by 1931. As the New Deal took effect agricultural appropriations dropped to slightly less than three percent in 1936 just prior to a massive four year expansion which peaked in 1939 when agriculture received over eighteen percent of the total budget. In 1941 agriculture received the second highest amount of appropriations in its history (only exceeded in 1956), but its share of the total budget was diminished due to World War II. Not until 1956 did agriculture regain its place in the overall appropriations when it reached 3.6 percent and it maintained a position of four to seven percent of the entire budget though the 1960s.

Having thus established agriculture's position and its capacity for growth, a brief examination of those factors which affected agricultural appropriations is in order.

It has been previously shown that Agriculture was dramatically influenced by structural shifts (Brady and Kursman, 1984). Figure 8 graphically demonstrates that agricultural expenditures demonstrated few real cuts in
FIGURE 8

AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATIONS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL BUDGET
appropriations, in spite of the fact that the 1920–1974 period showed average cuts of eight percent of requests. What this indicates is that Committee action served only to slow growth, and did not actually lead to retrenchment of appropriations.

Does this apparent hesitancy to firmly control the budget indicate that the Committee is without real influence? If such were the case then should one surmise that the shifts witnessed in the decentralization–recentralization period are nothing more than statistical artifacts? Perhaps, but such a view contradicts the evidence earlier presented. There is another explanation which is consistent with both the earlier findings of structural effect and the findings that Committee action is relatively consistent regardless of the size of absolute amounts of increases being requested, and that is the recognition that the political world of appropriations does not exist in a vacuum. Estimates are made based on a plethora of factors exogenous to the Congressional process. Demands from the public, response to disaster, direction from a new executive are all considered when drafting proposals for new budgets. But so is the realization that Congress can and must play a role in the process. The bureaucrats who pore over figures and make proposals do so in full recognition that some things will and some things will not be approved. Members of Congress who desire more spending in some areas and less spending in
others know that politics is a process which demands compromise. I believe one reasonable explanation of things is that those who formulate estimates respond to Congress in much the same way that Congress itself responds to political pressures. Perfect influence may be described as influence which need not be exerted. The very recognition that it exists is enough to ensure that any objectionable legislation will not even be considered for fear of "awakening the beast". Laws affecting the interest are drafted with its cooperation and under its control. Debate on the proposals is limited to fine tuning. Approval is always assured and the final product is one with which all interests can live.

So it may be with the appropriations process. Requests from the agencies, BOB, or OMB have always been made following input from the legislative branch. Committees are never startled by the figures they receive, they are and have been instrumental in the process which produces the requests. So the question now becomes, are requests subject to the same factors which influence the appropriating committees? While much of the request or estimate process is beyond the scope of this study, some preliminary questions may be raised. Do the requests operate in a sheltered environment, safe from those things which affected appropriations? Namely, did the structural shifts (such as the decentralization of the appropriations process in 1885 or the recentralization in
1920) in the legislative side of the process show up in the requests made of the Committee? Since the departments of Commerce, Interior, Labor, and Treasury did not become part of the regular process until after the 1920 recentralization, I will examine the effect of the structural changes on the estimates and subsequent reports as they pertain only to agriculture and the total budget.

In order to test for the effect of structural changes I employed a Multiple Interrupted Time Series analysis. If, in theory, the requesting agency were truly separated from the legislative process and the influence of the Congress, we would expect to find that the structural changes which had such apparent effect on Congress should have no effect on the requests or estimates. Indeed, if the process used to determine the needs of the various departments and agencies operated in a political vacuum there would be no interest in how the final appropriations were reached. This is not, of course, the case. That particular structural shifts should influence exogenous factors may indicate that there exists a recursive if not simultaneous process at work. The periods which were examined to determine what, if any, influence they had on the estimates or reporting process were 1920, 1933, and 1946. 1920 was examined for the obvious effect of the recentralization of the appropriations process to a single committee; 1933 to test for the effect of the realignment in the Congress with the beginning of the New
Deal; and 1946 to test for the effect of the Legislative Re-
organization or the advent of the subcommittee as advocate
period proposed by Fenno (1973). The results can be seen in
Table 8.

These findings tend to confirm the notion that those
who create the estimates for the departments or agencies are
not acting outside the influences of the political world.
We can see that there were marked changes in the levels of
appropriations in the 1920 period marking the return to a
centralized process. The New Deal period of 1933 showed
significant changes in the slope which, of course coincide
with the cuts in Agriculture spending just prior to the
adoption of the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the corre-
sponding jump in appropriations (Brady and Kursman, 1984;
p.31). We again see that the 1946 period showed another
significant shift in the pattern of request increases.

While these results are not conclusive evidence of col-
lusion between committee and department, it does indicate
that the estimating authority is aware of shifts in the
structure of the appropriating process, and by doing so, one
may conclude, behaves in a rational manner. The findings of
this section should show that gaining control of the appro-
piating committees appears to have some effect on the com-
mittee's voracity, that committee decisions seem to follow
fairly patterned behavior, regardless of which party con-
trols the committee, that the pattern seems to follow a cut
TABLE 8

MITS ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON AGRICULTURAL APPROPRIATIONS 1888 - 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>(4.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope 1920</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>(-1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope 1933</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>(-2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>(-2.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope 1946</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>(-0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D.W. = 1.99

$R^2 = .26$
increase rather than cut / cut pattern and that there is reason to believe that those elements which determine how much to request from the Congress do so with behavior which may only be described as quite rational.

We know, however, that the budget has demonstrated non-incremental change. The greatest periods of non-war growth of the budget occurred in the realignments of the 1890's and the realigning New Deal period 1932 - 1939 (Brady, 1985). I have shown that Committee changes in department or agencies estimates are rare and are relatively small. In order to account for those departures from incrementalism I will change the principal unit of analysis from the change between estimate and report to the changes in the budget from one year to the next. The shift to a increased role of government in public and private economic matters was prefaced by a dramatic and long-term swing of political allegiances from Republican to Democrat. Such political swings have occurred before, and the influence of such realignments on the appropriations process will be the subject of the next chapter.
NOTES

1. There is an extended discussion of the decentralization - recentralization reforms of 1885 and 1920 in Chapters Three and Four. Briefly, the Committee was stripped of much of its appropriating autonomy in 1885 in response to member demands for more spending. In 1920 in an effort to curb spending the appropriations process was recentralized into one Committee on Appropriations. For a further discussion see (Brady and Morgan; 1983).
CHAPTER TWO

The previous chapter showed that Appropriations Committee's responses to requests are quite stable over time. The factors which affect the decision processes of the Appropriations Committee in the House only serve to create minor and very short lived fluctuations in highly predictable behavior. What is generally observed is a cautious, careful group trapped between cross-cutting pressures to spend or save. I found nothing that led the Committee to prolonged periods of either steep increases or to sharp cuts in requests. The committee appears to adopt fairly predictable behavior of cut a little, and, if you must cut a lot, give a little back next time.

And yet, the budget continues to increase. The appropriating committees serve to lessen the spending increases perhaps, but, as part of the body which spends the money, so are the members the providers of aid to their own constituents and financiers of government growth. I have demonstrated that there exists a more than casual relationship between estimates and the amount appropriated. But why the increases in estimates? The simple answer is that the budget goes up because demand increases. In order to understand the connection between public demands and congressional ac-
tion a bit better, lets examine the linkage between public demands, party voting in congress and congressional action.

**Party Voting and Policy Shifts.**

Brady and Ettling (1984) found that from the 19th to the 20th century, changes in the electoral system were weakening the connection between party in the electorate, party as organization and the congressional parties. Internally the loss of sanctions available to the leadership, plus the increasing role of specialization and thus committee's power, weakened party strength in the House (Brady and Ettling, 1984; p.31). That these two phenomena are related is not in doubt; however, the state of our knowledge about the specific linkages between these exogenous and endogenous factors is limited (Sorauf, 1975). Thus to try to tie these elements together would be almost pure speculation. Suffice it to say that the combination of these factors, however tentative, is strongly related to the decline of party strength in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The first and most obvious effect of the decline of party in the House on American public policy is that party leaders are forced into a "ceaseless manuevering to find majorities" (Key, 1964; Mayhew, 1966). When the "majority" party cannot provide a majority for programs -- either the president's or the party leaders' -- the result is at best incrementalism (Anderson, 1979) and at worst stalemate (Burns, 1963; Sundquist, 1968). The one characteristic com-
mon to all periods of major policy change (e.g., Jacksonian reforms, the civil liberties and economic legislation of the 1860s and early 1870s, the New Deal) was the existence of a cohesive majority party and a cohesive minority (Brady, 1978, 1980, 1982; Sinclair, 1977). In none of these periods have the President and his congressional allies been forced to build and continually rebuild an interparty coalition to enact their programs. When party strength is high, policy tends to have direction and consistency. Under conditions of party weakness or flux, leaders are forced to seek votes and compromise policy in order to form ephemeral majorities (Brady and Ettling, 1984; p.31).

The committee system is separate from the party system in the modern House, and, except in 1975 seniority has determined committee leadership. Throughout most of the post 1910-1911 period, the committee leaders' perspective differed from that of the party leadership. This problem was particularly acute in the post 1938 period. Since 1938 the Democrats have controlled the House for all but four years (1947-1949; 1953-1955), and conservative southern Democrats often chaired important committees. The party and committee leadership were from separate and often ideologically opposed power bases, even though they were nominally of the same party. Regular House members could take their cues from either set of leaders, and the result was often stalemate.
In contrast, the party and committee system in the 1890-1910 period were blended. The Speaker of the House was chairman of the Rules Committee; the majority leader was chairman of the Appropriations Committee; the majority whip was chairman of either Judiciary or Ways and Means (Brady, 1973; McConachie, 1898). The Rules Committee, which did not have a formal meeting room, and consisted of only five members, was subject to the Speaker's call to meet wherever and whenever he chose. The Speaker's unilateral right to appoint committees permitted him to staff the Rules Committee with loyal party men. This, in essence, gave him absolute control over the management and timing of all bills.

Superior party strength in the 19th Century stemmed internally from the availability of sanctions to leaders. Kenneth Shepsle (1982) makes this point nicely when he argues that legislatures are cooperative games. That is, the stronger the parties' sanctions over members, the higher the level of intraparty cooperation. One reason that European legislatures have high levels of party voting is that their party systems, from local constituencies to party-as-government, have greater sanctions than do American parties. While levels of party voting in the U.S. House have probably never been as high as they are in European systems, over time analysis shows that the greater the sanctions, the higher the level of party voting. The greatest sanction available to the congressional leadership has been the power
to appoint committees. Party voting in the 19th century is higher than any period in the post 1915 period with the exception of Roosevelt's first three New Deal Houses (Brady and Ettling, 1984; p.30). The highest levels of party voting in the history of the House came in the 1890-1910 period when the Speaker had his full complement of floor powers to go with his appointive powers. The Speaker's control of the Rules Committee, his right to recognition on the floor, and his power to count a quorum during the 1890-1911 period increased his ability to discipline dissident members. And the results show the highest levels of party strength occur in precisely this period (see for example, Brady and Althoff, 1974; Jones, 1968).

In the heyday of the Speaker dominated House, the majority congressional party could pass legislation with strong partisan majorities. The Speaker's powers plus the belief in party government (Jones, 1968), were enough to ensure majorities. This did not hold true for most of the Houses since 1910-1911. Party leaders in the post 1910-1911 period have had to rely on bargaining and compromise to achieve limited policy goals. Their predecessors could rely on authority to carry the day. The contrast in leadership styles between Czar Cannon and Sam Rayburn is the difference between authority and bargaining (Cooper and Brady, 1981).

One result of a decrease in party strength is clear: public policy formulations in the 20th century has been more
incremental. A congressional policy process dominated by bargaining and compromise virtually assures this. Party leaders who could count on their party's support were freer to examine policy alternatives and innovative solutions. Less of their time was necessarily consumed in attempts to build majorities (Brady and Ettling, 1984; pp.32-33).

Another major effect on policy brought about by the decline of party strength was the increasing inability on the part of voters to determine responsibility for policy outcomes. When political parties stood for concrete positions across a range of activities, and their partisans, within limits, voted those positions in the House, responsibility for the results could be affixed. It is obvious that elections do not generate changes in the basic structure of federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances and single member plurality elections. These structural characteristics have survived many elections. The answer to the question of how elections produce major policy shifts is that certain critical elections reflect partisan realignments which radically alter the standard policy-making process. It has been argued that "normal" elections are decided by local factors but in each American realignment, elections are dominated by national issues (Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale, 1980).

The effect of these elections in the House is that they reduce the major drawbacks to party voting in the House.
Elections which are decided on national issues, like realignments, can be seen as a public demonstration of changes in policy preferences. In this section I will examine the importance of political realignments on the appropriations process. Realignments have been chosen to serve as a surrogate measure for a variety of factors external to the actual operation of the House.

**The Impact of Political Realignments.**

To measure changes in demands of the public is outside the bounds of this research. Opinion polling in a systematic way is a rather recent development in American political life. The measurement of how public demands have shifted can be obtained in a manner which, although less elegant in form, is certainly more dramatic in function. Public swings in political demands are mercurial and frequently short lived. The true shifts in political allegiances are much fewer and farther apart. The existence of major policy swings frequently coincides with political realignments. During the period under consideration there were only two realignments, 1895 - 1899, and 1933-1939. The effects of these realignments can be seen in the Figures in Chapter One which show the rapid increases in government spending during those periods. If one accepts the arguments of the scholars who contend that realignments leads to greater partisanship among members (see for example Brady, 1985, 1982, 1978; Sin-
clair, 1982 and 1977, and Penno, 1966) then one may expect to see "non-traditional" (meaning non-incremental) behavior in appropriations during those realignment periods. The belief is that these rapid changes in membership lead to a deterioration of norms, resulting in (1) less observance of the consensual modes of decision making which lead to incrementalism and (2) greater emphasis on partisanship which is more tolerant of non-incremental change. The findings presented by Brady (1985; p.32) give us reason to accept this notion. Given these previous findings, and believing that the voter is expressing a verdict on current economic, international, and domestic policy when voting, I will now examine the importance of realigning elections on the appropriations process.

The two realignment periods were examined in terms of the action of the appropriating committee(s), the final action of Congress, and the action of the estimating department or agencies, be it the individual departments as was the case in the first realignment (1895-1899), or the Executive as in the second, recentralized period (1932-1939). I chose to examine the impact on the appropriations for Agriculture as well as the total budget, as a way of observing the dynamic at a lower level. Changes are reported by budget period, which in most instances means each session of each Congress. Since there is some deviation from standard analysis, a brief explanation of the dates and how the means were calculated is required.
The periods of "stability" or non-realignment against which the realignments are measured are (1) 1888-1895, (2) 1900-1910, (3) 1911-1915, (4) 1920-1931, and (5) 1940-1974. The years were divided in this way because (1) given the ratchet effect discussed in the previous chapter one would expect any increase created by realignments to have a lasting effect; (2) simply pulling out the realignment years and calculating the remainder based on total years minus the number of years in the realigning period would bias the results by creating an artificially large increase between the years which border the realignment; and (3) if one calculates the mean with the realignment years included, the means benefit from the inclusion of the suspected "outliers". These periods were also altered in a similar manner to reflect the war years. There was also a division made to account for the recentralization of the process in 1920-1921 to determine if there existed a change in the way the process functioned after the "Speaker as Czar" period.

First let us examine the results of the analysis using the total budget. The figures in Table 9 represent the percent of absolute change in (1) the amount being reported to the floor from the committee, (2) the amount appropriated and passed into law; this is a measure of the absolute change in appropriations between t and t-1, and (3) the percent absolute increase in the amount requested from what-
# TABLE 9

REALIGNMENTS AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS  
TOTAL BUDGET AND AGRICULTURAL BUDGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Committee Action</th>
<th>Congressional Action</th>
<th>Requestor Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1888-1894</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1899*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1910</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1915</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1931</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1939*</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1974</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Agriculture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Committee Action</th>
<th>Congressional Action</th>
<th>Requestor Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1888-1894</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895-1899*</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1910</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1915</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1931</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1939*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1974</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Realignments*
ever source between year t and t-1. The reason for the use of absolute change is that it is the departure from incrementalism that is of interest here, and not the direction of the changes.

In both of the realignment periods we notice a change from the periods on either side. In the 1895-1899 realignment all three measures showed slight increases. The committees were more active, the Congress was changing appropriations at a slightly increased rate and the requesting agency was showing a willingness to make larger changes in the amount estimated. The size of the increases are not very impressive, but should not be taken as rejection of the proposition that realignments matter. In the case of the 1895-1899 reforms realignment took place at the height of the Speaker's powers. This was a period in which "[T]he committee and party systems were molded together..." (Brady, 1985; p.32). Leaders of the major committees were party leaders, while the president and the majority in congress were of the same party. In a period of decentralized appropriations, a strong speaker, high partisan voting, and chairmanship of the major committees belonging to party leaders, one would expect the period to be ripe for non-incremental change. Indeed, Brady has shown the only changes in the overall budget that exceeded twenty percent in the post-Civil War, non-war era occurred during realignments (1985; p.34). He attributed those large jumps to a combination of
the high partisan voting in the period, and the high member turnover on the Appropriations Committee. Over the entire period, however, the results are collectively unimpressive. The reason for the slightness of the changes are attributable, I believe, to the very things that allowed for the singular nonincremental increases Brady noted. In periods of high partisanship one naturally expects members to follow the lead of the party chieftains. In this period of concentration of power and hierarchical structure in which Agencies were presented with the envious task of appropriating for themselves, one would expect little movement from the amount requested. Any movement at all should be expected to take the form of increases as members rally 'round the pork barrel and attempt to add their constituents to the numbers being aided by government. This, as we shall see when addressing Agriculture, appears to be exactly the situation.

The total budget during the period of 1895-1899 showed, however, only a slight deviation from previous behavior and is certainly in line with what would follow.

The New Deal realignment of 1932-1939 showed remarkable change, not because of committee action, but rather because of administration led policy shifts which were translated into greatly altered requests patterns and a committee willing to accept those proposals. Party strength increased during the period 1932-1939, as did partisan voting (Brady and Ettling, 1984). During this period the estimates were
changing by large amounts and the committee was responding with small changes to those estimates. The result was annual changes in the law of twelve percent. One reason the committee changes appear to be so small is that they follow the 1920-1931 period in which the committee was quite active, effecting an average change of eleven percent. This flurry of activity was in response to the recentralization of the process in 1920 and the perceived need to reduce the budget deficit caused by World War I. The realignment resulted in impressive budget changes which become lost against the spectacular increases during World War II. In the post WWII period (1940-1974) we see again that the committee adopts what can best be described as incremental changes while the Bureau of the Budget asked for average changes of thirteen percent; and Congress responded with a budget that grew an average of twelve percent.

The effects of the realignments are much more profound when seen on a smaller scale. The 1895-1899 realignment resulted in considerable committee action. The twenty-two percent average change was by far the largest of the series. The realignment was at the end of the period in which the government had run budget surpluses since 1867. Given the recent stripping of Appropriations Committee powers and the long string of prosperous years it is not surprising that when the Republicans gained control in the 54th Congress, the McKinley ascendency was accompanied by appropriating
committees willing to act. We again see that the 1900-1910 period showed considerable change in the annual budget, primarily the result of near equal increases in the requests from the various agencies. Committees acted in a much less partisan fashion (Brady, 1985; p.35) and the result was less committee effect. In the recentralization period of 1921-1931 we see even less committee action. We know from previous studies that the post-1920 period showed marked decreases as the Committee and the agencies took heed of the House's call for Appropriations to guard the purse (Brady and Morgan, 1983). It appears from this that changes did occur, and that the committee / estimator relationship was well enough defined that overt committee action was not necessary to effect change.

The New Deal's effects on Agriculture began with cuts and ended with massive increases. The expansion of the role of government in Agriculture is evident by the annual forty-two percent change in the amount requested and is echoed by the average change of nearly forty percent in the amount actually appropriated.

Committee action was very high and demonstrated a willingness to move in non-incremental fashion. In the post New Deal period the committee reverted to nonpartisanship and the growth of agricultural appropriations was again largely due to increases in the amount Congress was presented with.
Again, the relatively small levels of committee action should not be taken as indicating committee impotence. If the Committee is as powerful as we suspect, the small changes they produce are evidence of their capabilities rather than signs of weaknesses. Thus, one can conclude that political realignments have had an effect on the appropriations process, but that that effect does not necessarily take the form of greater Committee involvement.

**Party Voting and Appropriations**

It is foolish to relegate the role of party to periods of realignment. The role of party in the Congress has been well studied and well prescribed (see, for example, Cooper, 1970, 1975, 1977; McConachie, 1898; and Polsby, 1968). That party as government as measured by party voting have been in decline since the beginning of the twentieth century is equally evident (Brady and Ettling, 1984). Even if the trend has been to reduce party strength, there is firm evidence that party voting experiences swings of greater and lesser magnitude, and thus, one would assume, so does the relative influence of party. Party strength has been considered the catalyst for policy change (Sinclair, 1977; Brady, 1978, 1982; Ginsberg, 1972, 1976). Such shift in policy should be, one would assume, accompanied by a corresponding shift in appropriations since many policy changes relate to
the way government is allocating its resources. While I examined the role of party membership on the Appropriations Committee in Chapter One, what I wish to examine here is the influence of party in the House as it pertains to appropriations.

By dividing the series into periods of differing levels of party strength we can test whether certain the appropriations process in those periods experienced any changes.

To deal with the problem of measuring party strength I have chosen to accept previous findings (Brady, 1985) and divide the post-Civil War Congresses into periods of party strength. Using an Index of Likeness measure Brady found that several periods from 1867 to 1974 emerged as groupings. Using this rough measure I have divided the series into five periods; 1874 - 1890, 1919 - 1916, 1921 - 1932, and 1933 - 1939. I have chosen to omit the post-New Deal period since it has been the subject of the preeminent work on Appropriations (Fenno, 1966) and there have been no realignments since the New Deal.

The periods I have chosen may be divided in the two distinct periods or contexts: (1). Periods of decentralized appropriations -- 1867 - 1920; (2) Periods of centralized appropriations 1921 - 1974. They may divided within the respective periods by the level of party voting. I have simply chose to divide them into Low (1867 - 1890) and High (1895 - 1916) in the decentralized period and Low (1946 -
1974), Medium (1921 - 1933), and High (1933 - 1939) in the centralized years. What is expected is that, given the argument that increased partisanship leads to a greater propensity for nonincremental behavior then those periods of higher partisanship will reflect that with larger increases of spending.

To estimate the effect of these periods on the appropriations process I used a regression technique known as Piecewise Regression with Known Joint Points. Judge et al. (1985; p. 735) recommend this variation of dummy regression for estimation of models with varying but nonstochastic parameters.

Thus, the regression has dummies in the form of 1 during the duration of a period and 0 when not within a period. The regression is appropriately estimated using OLS and the associated tests of significance are correct. The dependent variables tested in this regression were (1) the change in final appropriations (current law) from one year to the next; and (2) the change in the estimate received from one year to the next. The results of the regression are seen in Table 10.

As is evident in the Table the coefficients in the first model exceed the 1.96 necessary with the number of observations to be significant at the .05 probability level for those periods we expect; the period which began with the McKinley realignment, 1899-1915 and the New Deal realignment of 1933 - 1939.
### TABLE 10

**THE EFFECT OF PARTY STRENGTH ON APPROPRIATIONS**

**Dependent Variable: Change in Law From One Year to the Next**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1874 - 1890</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>(-1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891 - 1915</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>(2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 - 1933</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(-0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933 - 1939</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>(4.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>(4.18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .42 \quad \text{D.W.} = 1.95 \]

**Dependent Variable: Change in Estimate From One Year to the Next**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1874 - 1890</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891 - 1915</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>(-0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 - 1933</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933 - 1939</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>(2.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>(5.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .15 \quad \text{D.W.} = 2.00 \]
The results tend to confirm the hypothesized relationship. The rationale I find convincing is that the 1899-1915 period was one of decentralized appropriations and strong party leadership vested in the hands of committee chairmen, and there should be shifts to reflect increased party loyalty. Power was centralized, leadership was focused, and the decentralized nature of the appropriations process was favorable for higher spending. The New Deal period reflected the presence of Roosevelt and the willingness of the Committee to follow the Presidential initiative to lead the country out of depression. These results are not surprising, serving to reconfirm findings cited earlier. The impact of realignments is unmistakable, in the process of appropriating money as elsewhere in the government.

The second regression was designed to test the proposition that the periods of party partisanship was reflected in nonincremental behavior on the part of the requesting agencies. The results, predictably, mirror those of the previous regression. With the high correlation between changes in estimates and changes in laws this is not surprising. Again, we find insignificant differences between the Congresses of the decentralized period, nearly identical behavior in the similar periods within the post reform era, and that the New Deal coefficients are statistically insignificant. One major difference in the findings of the two regressions is in the confirmation that the 1920 reforms led
to changes in the way the estimates were presented. The 1921-1933 period showed significant coefficients which indicates that the estimates changed in response to the reforms. The estimators, aware of the renewed mandate to cut the budget responded by making larger changes themselves. Thus, in Chapters One and Two I have presented theoretical arguments supportive of the ideas put forward by the incrementalist notion of decision making. I proposed that incrementalistism is a rational manner of avoiding conflict in the decision making arena and is consistent with the cognitive processes used in decision making. I then examined how the Committee norms of subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization, and apprenticeship are fostered by recruitment and career service patterns. The effect of norms on committee behavior was tested by examining the committee action, (the dependent variable) in the form of percentage change from department / agency estimate to committee report to the floor. In doing so I used a number of surrogate measures for norms as the independent variables. Changes in norm supporting context (i.e., periods of membership stability with few freshmen and continuous control of the congress by the same party) proved to have little effect on committee action. I then chose to examine if the Committee followed a pattern of alternating increases and decreases in its reports and how the reforms of 1946 affected those decisions. In all cases the effects were minimal. It appears that the
behavior of the committee was relatively immune to all external and internal changes.

I then changed the unit of analysis somewhat to determine if committee has any influence on the appropriations process before it acts on the estimates. By examining the way in which the estimates changed from one year to the next, I was able to conclude that the requesting agency or department acted in a manner consistent with the rational behavior we might expect from a decision making body that was working in concert with the Committee.

The conclusions drawn from the results of this chapter when taken in conjunction with those of Chapter One are two-fold: first, that periods of realignment are accompanied by nonincremental appropriations due in large part to the absence of adherence to established norms; and second, that party strength, while having an effect on appropriations, probably does so through increased demands on the requesting agency or department to alter its pattern of increasing its estimates in an incremental manner. This should not be taken to imply that the only time the decision process is changed in the House is in response to external forces. Political Science is based on the proposition that politics matters. We reject the notion that government is a captive of forces external to itself and incapable of changing. In the following chapters I will examine how the House has altered the way in which it appropriates money. Political Scientists
believe that institutions are structured so as to facilitate the business of government. I will show that the U.S. House has shaped its structure to fit the wishes of the membership, and that by doing so, influenced the behavior of the membership.
CHAPTER THREE

The previous chapters demonstrated that the appropriations process, while incremental by nature, may be shaken from its normal behavior by extraordinary external events. In the following chapters I will explain how the process may also be altered by variations in "internal" events. The House of Representatives does not operate in an immutable arena; members determine the rules under which the House and its various committees work. In this chapter I will provide a brief history showing how the context within which appropriations are made has changed since 1865 and how those contextual variations have led to changes in the actual structure of the appropriations process.

In 1865, due to the great cost of financing the Civil War, appropriations reached 822.1 million dollars. By 1867, these had dropped to 155.9 million, yet from this point on, government began inexorably to expand. Fueled by World War I, the budget in 1916 topped one billion dollars for the first time. Never again would ledgers with only nine columns be sufficient to record government spending!

In response to the large increases in governmental spending that the House, in 1865, created a separate committee on appropriations. Prior to 1865 all money decisions
(the raising of revenues as well as the appropriation of funds) were concentrated, in the House, in the Committee on Ways and Means. This was as formidable a task as it may now appear, since a single appropriations bill was all that had been required to fund the entire government until 1823. Governmental growth in response to national expansion led to a total of eight appropriations bills by 1860. The jurisdiction of Ways and Means expanded to include management of the war debt, supervision of banking and currency, direction of courage, weights and measures as well as revenue and appropriations (Alexander, 1916; p.234).

Still, the work was being done by a committee of seven to nine men who bore such a massive workload that revenue and appropriations bills seemed to continuously occupy the floor. The chairman of Ways and Means became the de facto floor leader, arranging the order of business, setting hours for adjournment and fixing the closing time for long sessions (Alexander, pp.234-235).

The desire to have a single committee control expenditures and revenues persisted even after the Civil War had increased expenditures by a factor of ten and plans to increase revenues to relieve the national debt taxed the most astute financiers.

The catalyst needed to overcome the institutional inertia which insisted that both parts of monies and bills remain in the hands of a single committee was provided by the
Civil War. The deficits required to wage this conflict dominated the economy as no others have, before or since. In the period from 1861 to 1865, the deficit constituted an average of 70.9 percent of the budget. In comparison, during the World War One years of 1917-1919 the debt made up 62.1% and the War with Mexico in 1847-1848 debt averaged 37% of the total (Wander, 1981; p.37).

Finally, in 1865, the burden on Ways and Means was too great and its workload had to be lessened. To accomplish this, jurisdiction of Ways and Means over appropriations, banking and currency, and Pacific Railroads was transferred to separate committees with corresponding names (Alexander; p.235).

The creation of a separate committee on Appropriations did not generate much controversy, nor did it occupy much of the House's time. The Chairman of Ways and Means, Thaddeus Stevens, R-PA, spoke in favor of the creation of such a committee. Stevens favored separation, even though it meant a loss of power for his own Committee. The only argument raised against the creation of a new committee was that the same end could be achieved by enlargement of Ways and Means. With only one member speaking against it, the resolution passed easily.

Thus, formation of a separate committee on Appropriation marked the first major reform in the Budgetary process in the House. It was not, as we shall see, the last.
In the ensuing decade the Appropriations Committee took its role as watchdog of the Treasury seriously. In 1876 the Committee enhanced its power by leading the fight to pass the Holman Rule. The Holman Rule gave the Committee the right to reduce expenditures in general appropriations bills. Prior to the passage of this Rule when such bills were under consideration the Committee could only recommend salary increases. The effect of the Holman Rule was to give the Committee greater power to reduce Presidential-Executive Branch budget estimates. A second consequence was that the Appropriations Committee would be permitted to add amendments to bills which effectively allowed them to legislate as well as appropriate. Reference to the floor debate on the Holman Rule and its effects is instructive.

Mr. Cox (D-NY), Chairman of the Rules Committee reported out the following rule on January 17, 1876:

"That Rule 120 be so amended that all after the word "progress" be stricken out and there shall be added the following: Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment thereto, changing existing law, be in order except such as, being germane to the subject-matter of the bill, shall RETRENCH EXPENDITURE " (C.R., 44th Cong.; p.445).

At issue here was the Appropriations Committee members' right to cut expenditures even more deeply. Mr. Randall (D-PA) argued:

"We propose to modify this rule because, as the Committee on Rules believes, a forced construction was put upon a portion of the rule, under which any salary was allowed to be increased, though the opportunity was never given to decrease a salary. Now the Committee proposes to go "right about face..." (C.R., 44th Cong.; p.445).
Mr. Hurbret (R-IL) expressed the minority view when he said, "The proposed rule will practically abolish all committees except the Committee on Appropriations" (C.R., 44th Cong.; p.445). Those favoring the Holman Rule countered by arguing that the Committee "will be subject to the will of the majority of the House." Representative Garfield (R-OH) protested that the Rule gave the Appropriations Committee the power to legislate as well as appropriate.

"It will allow the Committee on Appropriations to re-organize the Army, to re-organize the Navy, to re-organize the Treasury Department, in short to recast all the legislation concerning the public service, not merely as to the amount of money to be appropriated, but as to the size and condition of that service" (C.R., 44th Cong.; p.446).

Former Speaker Banks (R-MA), Representative Hale (R-ME), and Representative Rasson (R-IA) all clearly objected to the increased power the Rule gave to Appropriations. Representatives Holman (D-IN), Randall, and Cox led the fight for the Rule. They argued that without the Rule "...the vast increase in expenditures during the past twelve years has been effected by means of appropriations bills under the operation of the the rules of the House" (C.R., 44th Cong.; p.447). The passage of the Holman Rule they believed, would allow the Appropriations Committee to retrench expenditures and put the government on solid economic footing.

Those in favor of the Holman Rule won the roll call vote, with 156 voting yes, 102 no, and 32 not voting. The
vote was highly structured by party identification -- slightly over 90 percent of the Democrats voted yes while over 90 percent of the Republicans voted no. The partisan nature of the vote was not surprising given that the Democrats had not controlled the House since 1858. In the 16 year period of Republican dominance the Democrats had been in a continual minority on questions of federal intervention in expanding industrial interests, land grants to railroads, the creation of Land Grant Colleges, and homestead policy. All of these policies had cost money, and been opposed by the Congressional Democratic Party (Brady, 1982). The passage of the Holman Rule was, however, a Pyrrhic victory.

In the 46th Congress (1879-81) the House enacted a major revision of the Rules. Among the changes none generated more debate than the special rules giving the Agriculture Committee and the Commerce Committee (on river and harbor legislation) the right to appropriate money. Other committees -- Post Office and Roads, the military committees and Indian Affairs also sought the right to appropriate, but only agriculture and rivers and harbors legislation were favored. The debate centered on Rule XI, clause seven, and in each case it was proposed to give the relevant committee "the same privileges in reporting bills and making appropriations ... as is accorded to the Committee on Appropriations" (C.R.,46th Cong.; p.684).
Those in favor of giving the Agriculture and Commerce Committees the right to appropriate characterized the debate as a struggle for power:

"The fact is, this is simply a fight for power...The ground of complaint among members is the immense power the the Committee now wields in this House." "Two hundred and seventy men in this House are under the guardianship of fifteen" (Mr.Calkins, R-IN: C.R., 46th Cong.; p.690).

"It is important that we have economy. But the gentlemen assume that there are only fifteen economists in the House" (Mr.Browne, R-IN: C.R., 46th Cong.; p.729).

"I do not believe that the Representatives of the people should come here with gags in their mouths and be utterly unable to represent their constituencies upon the question of appropriations" (Mr.Harris, R-MA: C.R., 46th Cong.; p.730).

As part of their attack on the Appropriations Committee's power, those favoring reform argued that the Committee used various rules and techniques to bottleneck bills. Appropriations, they claimed, held up substantive legislation by acting as a legislative bottleneck and thus enhancing Committee power. Among the techniques used by the Committee were not allowing amendments to bills:

"I asked for an appropriation that would not exceed $70 a year. The gentlemen in charge of appropriations said it was perfectly right. "Then put it on," said I. "I cannot," he said; "the Committee has not authorized it." "Then," said I, "let me submit it to the House." "Oh, no" was the reply, "we must stand by the report to the Committee." (Mr.Calkin: C.R., 46th Cong.; p.696).

Members for the special rules argued that the Appropriations Committee waited until late in the session to introduce their bills, thus discouraging serious consideration.
Further, some argued that Appropriations failed to heed the authorizing committees' bills and as a result, needed services and projects went unfunded.

"This service, (Post Office) sir, is continually growing. We have not got a finished country. We are developing all the time... In this last year we have increased out post-offices by 1597... It is impossible for any man, I do not care what his ability is can keep pace with the growing demands of this service (A reference to the one Appropriations member responsible for the Post-Office appropriations). I submit that the Committee on Post Office and Post Roads is the appropriate committee to report this bill" (Mr. Money, D-MS: C.R., 46th Cong.; p.711).

"during the last year there have been added to the inhabitants of the State of Nebraska from one hundred to one hundred twenty thousand people by immigration... If the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads is allowed to report appropriations for the postal service I believe service throughout the country will be improved" (Mr. Valentine, R-NE: C.R., 46th Cong.; p.710).

Ultimately, the only committees to receive the right to appropriate on their own were Agriculture and Commerce for the rivers and harbors bills. Each of the other committees was denied the right to appropriate on their own. However, the losers in the 46th House (1880) would try again in the 49th House (1885-1889).

Opponents of the rules to allow committees other than Appropriations the right to fund argued, among other things, that decentralizing the process would open the doors to the Treasury. Those who opposed decentralization were some of the most famous and powerful House members. Speaker-to-be Keifer (R-OH) argued:

"I believe, Mr.Chairman, that if you transfer to the various committees of the House the duties
of preparing the several appropriations bills there will be strife between those committees... each striving to obtain the most appropriations for the Department of Government directly under its charge, and in that way we will necessarily augment the annual appropriations beyond the ordinary revenues of the Government" (C.R., 46th Cong.; p.712).

Mr. Cox, a former chairman of the Rules Committee said:

"I could refer my friend to the messages of democratic Presidents, to the old rules of interpretation, to the days of honesty in the administration of these affairs, before LOG ROLLING became common and before men could combine for this common purpose, for all the little rivers inside of the States " (C.R., 46th Cong.; p.728).

Mr. Chittendon (R-NY):

"It does seem to me in the last degree a waste of time for this House to go on day after day, week after week, and month after month discussing practically the question whether we shall open the Treasury for an eager scramble by all the committees " (C.R., 46th Cong.; p.710).

Speaker Randall: "The House to-day has acted in reference to the appropriations for the Agriculture Department in a manner which, upon reflection, they will regret" (C.R., 46th Cong.; p.711). Others defended the role and past behavior of the Appropriations Committee as the guardians of the Treasury, and on all votes other than those concerning agriculture and rivers and harbors these people won the day.

In the 47th and 48th Houses the move to decentralize the appropriations power grew in strength, as clear from the creation in 1883 of a Rivers and Harbors Committee. On December 14,1885 the 49th House began to debate a rule change which would give four other committees the right to appro-
priate funds. The arguments on both sides were much the same as those offered in 1880. The main differences were that this time a majority of the House favored decentralizing the appropriations power and J. Carlisle of Kentucky had replaced Randall as the Democratic Speaker. The rules changes allowing other committees to appropriate were all passed, leaving the system decentralized until 1920 when the rule (H.R. 324) changed again. A small sample of this debate demonstrates its similarity to that of 1880.

Mr. Randall presented the minority report from Rules which, among other things, argued:

"A particular Department or bureau may prefer to have its special committee with which it has intimate and cordial relations, to make the appropriations for its use rather than to undergo the scrutiny of an appropriations committee having control of the appropriations for all the Departments and having attachment no more to one than the other" (C.R., 49th Cong.; p.171).

Further, the minority report states:

"It is a fact within the experience of every member who has been here long that the Committee on Appropriations always finds itself confronted with a demand from each of the committees having a special subject in charge for larger appropriations than the Committee think should be made" (C.R., 49th Cong.; p.171).

Mr. Randall and others argued that when the rivers and harbors bill had gone to special committees the effect had been to raise appropriations, and to fund trivial projects. Opponents claimed that in 1884 the pork barrel for rivers and harbors had appropriated millions more than President Arthur requested and then passed the increase over his veto.
Moreover, they claimed bills were passed before estimates had been received. This time, unlike 1880, the forces seeking to limit Appropriations' power were in the majority.

The majority on the Rules Committee proposed extensive rules revisions which eliminated much of the legislative effect of the Holman Rule and gave the power to appropriate the following bills to the relevant committees: consular and diplomatic to Foreign Affairs; army and military academy to Military Affairs, naval to Naval Affairs, post office bills to Post-Office and Post Roads, and the Indian bill to Indian Affairs.

The majority report charged that since the revision of the bills in the 44th House (1876) the Appropriations Committee had failed to report within 30 days of the first Monday of December, rather since then bills had been submitted within a week or claimed, both showed how Appropriations was overworked and too powerful. Once again, however, the argument centered on the Appropriations Committee's power to reduce expenditures.

Mr. Hiscock (R-NY) argued:

"The Committee on Appropriations prepare their bills as other committees prepare their reports, and then the Committee on Appropriations and the reports of the other committees all come in here at the same time, and the result is that the Committee on Appropriations takes the right of way, while, as a consequence, all other legislation is crowded out."

Further he argued that in conference the Appropriations Committee members would bargain:
"not with reference to items in the particular bill, but with reference to items in different bills, trading off provisions in another" (C.R., 49th Cong.; p.230).

Mr. Welborn (D-TX) sounded the power theme when he said:

"I submit that the autocracy ( Appropriations keeping power over money bills) here championed is not only antagonistic to, but utterly subversive of, the representative principle on which not only this House, but all our free institutions are constructed, and I submit further that this situation of things ought not to be perpetuated any longer" (C.R., 49th Cong.; p.236).

In rebuttal to the argument that decentralization would open the Treasury to log rolling, proponents of the changes countered with claims that Appropriations had not funded programs sufficiently. Mr. Morrison (D-IL), Chairman of the Rules Committee said:

"I call attention to the fact that appropriations in some Departments and for the productions of some of the public interests will grow, and may rightly grow, whether they are reported by the Committee on Appropriations or on Agriculture" (C.R., 49th Cong.; p.196).

And Mr. Herbert (D-AL) argued:

"Take any of these Departments or bureaus, take the Fish Commission. What were its demands upon the purse of this country ten years ago? Nothing. What are they now? Hundreds of thousands... I know and I recognize the fact, which some of the members of that committee seem unwilling to recognize, that this is a great and growing country;... the money which sufficed to carry on this government twenty years ago will not approximate such a result now" (C.R., 49th Cong.; p.205).

The debate over these rule changes, recorded well over 100 pages and divided party members. For example, while Mr. Reed favored the changes, Joseph Cannon opposed them, and
former Speaker Randall opposed them while most Democrats favored the change. The new appropriations system had eight committees which could fund programs. Appropriations was responsible for about one-half while the other seven committees handled the remainder. This system was to remain in place for over 30 years until the recentralization of power in Appropriations in 1920.

The thirty five years spanning these two major reforms were years of impressive economic growth in both the private and the public sectors. Woodrow Wilson's progressivism and America's entry into World War I resulted in great increases in federal expenditures. After the War the Republicans won control of the House in 1918 for the first time in eight years, and under the leadership of Representative Good (R-IA), chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the 66th House, the Republicans attempted major reforms in the budget process. They first passed the Budget Act of 1919 which created the Bureau of the Budget and gave the executive branch greater control over estimates and expenditures. A crucial part of the budget reform was the recentralization of appropriations decisions in the Appropriations Committee. However, the Republicans under Good's leadership separated the committee changes (H.R.324) from the Budget Act of 1919. Their rationale was that there was greater bipartisan support for the Budget Act of 1919 and more heated opposition to recentralizing power in Appropriations. Debate on the
Budget Act was characterized by support for the Act but opposition to H.R.324 which was not yet under consideration. Thus the formal debate on H.R.324 did not occur until June of 1920 well after the 1919 Budget Act had passed.

One section of the Budget Act which encountered little opposition was the establishment of an executive budget developed with the assistance of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB). This process would serve Congress by establishing a filter through which requests and claims by the various agencies and departments must pass prior to coming to Congress. It would also place the responsibility on the President for any shortcomings or inequity in the requests. Good expressed the committee view:

"If duplication, waste, extravagance, and inefficiency shall exist in the service in the future, the President will be responsible for them if he includes in his budget an estimate for their continuation" (C.R., 66th Cong.; p.7084).

The debate on H.R. 324 was limited to two hours by a special rule from the Rules Committee; thus those speaking for and against the resolution were limited to major figures in the House. Mr. Madden (R-IL) led off the debate by arguing that "... the time has come when there should be some centralization of power in the legislative branch of the government to regulate expenditures." He went on to argue that with eight committees appropriating in different ways it was impossible "to visualize the financial situation of the Nation and ... to keep the expenses of the Government within the revenues" (C.R., 66th Cong.; p.8109).
The second major speaker for the change was Mr. Good of Iowa. He began by arguing that since the Budget Act had been passed to reform expenditure patterns and that "... vain is a budget law, all in vain the legislation demanded by the American people for budgetary reform, if we only clean the executive departments and do not correct the evils existing in this House." He then offered his resignation as chairman of Appropriations if that would help pass the resolution (C.R., 66th Cong.; p.8116). Good went on to argue that the present system was responsible for extravagance and waste. Citing an example of a deficiency appropriation (from the Appropriations Committee) and an appropriation from Military Affairs which overlapped he said: "Stop and plan is." He ended with a plea to conduct the government's business "along business lines, unmindful of the ambitions of men" (C.R., 66th Cong.; p.8117). Mr. Byrns (D-TN) also spoke in favor of the resolution urging his Democratic colleagues to remember the Democratic platform of 1916 which promised fiscal responsibility. In short a powerful bi-partisan coalition had been formed to recentralize power in Appropriations based on the assumption that members of the Appropriations Committee would not be closely connected to individual Departments thus reducing governmental expenditures.

Those opposing the resolution were led by Representatives Haugen (R-IA) and Padgett (D-TN). They argued that
the resolution would give far too much power to one commit-
tee. "To my surprise, notwithstanding the fact that autocr-
acy is generally looked upon with scorn and contempt, it
appears here in a more malignant form than ever" (Pad-
gett, C.R., 66th Cong.; p. 8109). Haugen, who was also chair-
man of Agriculture argued that the Appropriations Committee
was not sensitive to the needs of agriculture. This meant,
of course, that they did not adequately fund his programs.
He cited the overfunding of railroads compared to underfund-
ing of agriculture as an example:

"... the $700,000,000 (to railroads) was not
only cheerfully granted ... but rushed through
with the greatest of ease. On the other hand, we
asked for the meager sum of $76,493.98 out of the
$3,620,765.48 asked for in the interest of
6,000,000 farmers and 6,000,000 laborers tilling
6,000,000 farms, producing 3,000,000,000 bushels
of corn and 5,600,000,000 bushels of cereals feed
not only our people but the people of the world.
That was swept aside." (C.R., 66th Cong.; p. 8111).

Further arguments were the old refrain that the members
of Appropriations were already overworked and that the ex-
pansion to 35 would leave only 3 members per subcommittee
for each of the 12 bills to do the work now performed by 189
men (Appropriations members plus those on the other seven
appropriating committees). Unlike 1885 these arguments were
not compelling. The final vote was 200 in favor of H.R.324
and 117 voting no. The vote was not entirely a party vote
though Republicans voted strongly for it.

The internal reforms, as has been shown, were initiated
in order to bring the process back "under control". The ex-
tent to which there was true centralization, however, was limited to the fact that all appropriations were formally united under the auspices of one committee. The contentions of those favoring recentralization focused on the increased coordination and theoretically the increased capacity of those supporting greater economy when the entire budget could be viewed as a single unit. It was believed that the budget would be considered by the Appropriations Committee which would continue the practice of close examination and report its findings and suggestions to the floor where extensive debate would ensue (Cooper, 1961; p.174). Thus, the goal of consolidated appropriations fell victim to the needs of the committee to divide itself into relatively autonomous subcommittees.

"I imagine these subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations are now, in practice, separate and independent committees, that have very little to do with each other in making up the various bills reported from the Committee on Appropriations, and therefore, do not coordinate appropriations as claimed." (Mr. Hicks: C.R., 66th Cong.; p.8114).

The post reform - pre-World War II years also marked an unprecedented increase in peacetime expenditures as well as peacetime deficits. From 1933 to 1936 deficits grew to consume an average of over 50% of the total budget (Wander, 1981; p.24). While the structure of the Appropriations process was not held directly responsible for growth of spending, the end of World War II allowed the manner of Congressional spending to be placed, once again under the microscope of internal and external scrutiny.
Congress responded as it had in previous post-war periods; by further attempts to centralize. To that end, a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was appointed with the goal of increasing the efficiency and influence of the Congress. Congress had been allowing (if not actually encouraging) increased Executive power. If Congress was to recapture its power, it would have to initiate such changes. While the Joint Committee was not in existence to consider particular changes in the budget process, one recommendation pertinent to the topic at hand was for the formation of a Joint Committee on the Budget with the responsibility of reporting out a legislative budget sixty days after Congress convened. The proposal was to serve as a guide for total spending and revenue for the coming Congress with the stipulation that spending in excess of revenues must be accompanied by Congressional authorization of increased public debt for that year. (Wander, 1981; p.21)

As might be expected, some members of the Appropriations Committee offered some strong objections to such reforms.

"Does the gentleman (in reference to Monroey's introduction of the aforementioned reforms) think that a reactionary provision which requires a legislative budget . . . and would not allow the Appropriations Committee to function is a forward-moving step or is it one that really should be thrown out? (Mr. Taber, C.R., 79th Cong.; p.10041)

" . . . (this system) ... sets up what really might be properly termed a caste system in the Congress. It leaves to two committees in the House and two committees in the Senate the power to control all important legislation involving appropriations for 435 Members in the House and 96
Members in the United States Senate. (Mr. Patman, C.R., 79th Cong., p.10076

While these arguments, in addition to those claiming that the proposed Joint Committee was too large, too prone to logrolling, and was afforded too little time for serious consideration of its charge were persuasive, the part was included when the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was passed. The reform met with a less than successful tenure, however, and was abandoned after two unsuccessful attempts at implementation.

These three efforts constituted the major reform efforts prior to the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The effort in each case was attempt to curb government spending and decrease existing deficits. The Congress never showed any reluctance to spend when it was deemed necessary to avert or abate crises such as war or depression. It also appears obvious that the Congress recognizes its inability to refrain from those spending habits acquired during periods of stress even when the stress had been relieved.

How do changes in the structure of the process effect the manner in which monies are appropriated? Figures 9 and 10 show the relationship between the amount requested from the agencies in the 1885 - 1921 pre-BOB era and the executive requests in the 1921-1974 period and the amount appropriated by the Congress. The simple correlation between the request and the final appropriations was .936 for the
1885-1921 period and .998 for the era of executive requests. Graphically and statistically it is obvious that the final appropriations look a great deal like the amounts requested. Perhaps this is due to a symbiotic relationship between the Senate and the Executive which manifests itself in conference committees. If we examine just the House action displayed in Figures 11 and 12 we again see the requests meeting with, in aggregate, general approval in the pre-BOB and post-BOB eras.

Does this apparent ready acceptance of requestor's wishes indicate a legislative branch doing a fine imitation of a rubber stamp? Perhaps if we look a level lower, to the committee level such wholesale agreement would disappear. Figures 13 and 14 tells the same story ad nauseum. The two lines indicate the amount requested and the amount reported to the floor. The amount reported testifies to the work actually done by the appropriating committees. Keep in mind that since 1921 all appropriations have gone to the Committee on Appropriations. Again, what Figures 8-14 and the correlations confirm is that changes made to requests are usually quite small.

The lack of apparent legislative action on appropriations requests is an illusion. The observer who feels betrayed by an inattentive Congress has fallen victim to a budget and budgetary process in which large dollar changes are lost in the enormity of the aggregate. When millions of
FIGURE 14

BUDGET ESTIMATES AND COMMITTEE ACTION (LOGGED) 1921-1974

ESTIMATE

YEAR


12 11 10 9 8 7
dollars are cut or added they lose their relative importance when compared to the billions requested.

In order to highlight this point one need only reexamine Figures 3-7. These graphically display the percent change between the amounts requested and amounts reported to the floor of the House by the appropriating committee(s) for the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, and Treasury.

The most striking aspect of these figures is the size of the changes; changes of fifteen to thirty percent are not at all uncommon. Keep in mind that what this indicates is that the appropriating committee is altering Department/Agency requests frequently by as much as one-third. The changes, especially in the earlier parts of the sequences, are frequently dramatic and vary from large decreases in the estimates to large increases in the amount requested. From a point marked roughly by the mid-1940's the patterns, while maintaining their volatile nature, are decidedly in the direction of steady cuts in requests.

I have shown in this chapter that Congress has occasionally deemed it necessary to alter the way in which it conducts its business. It has done so in an effort to curb its own spending, as well as in an attempt to respond to "excessive" budget cutting zeal demonstrated by the Committee. In Chapter Four I will examine in greater detail the shape which the rules changes took and what affect they had on the process.
CHAPTER FOUR

Political scientists interested in the United States Congress have long been concerned with how congressional structure affects decisions. From at least the time of Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* (1885) an implicit assumption regarding structure and decision making has been widely held by congressional scholars. In the last decade or so this idea has been made more explicit and formalized in the work of Ferejohn (1974); Shepsle (1978); Shepsle and Weingast (1981) and others (Ostrom, 1980). Other scholars, not in the public choice school, have also pointed to the importance of congressional structure on policy decisions (Orfield, 1975; Cooper, 1975, 1978). Given this concern, it is not surprising that the recent reforms in the United States House of Representatives have generated a good deal of scholarly output (see Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1981; and Mann and Ornstein, 1981 for a review), and controversy over the consequences of these structural changes in the House. One of the more important and well studied of these reforms is the change in the congressional appropriations process.

The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 made important changes in the structure of the appropriations process in the House of Representatives. Since the last reform period
scholars and practitioners alike have praised and decried the decisional consequences of the Act (Schick, 1979; pp.565-573). According to Schick (1979) the reforms affected the House and Senate appropriations process in the following ways: "a diminution of the role of the appropriations process as a check on government spending" (Schick, 1979; p.415); "separated the budget and appropriations processes" (Schick, 1979; p.441); changed the role of the House and Senate appropriations committees such that they are no longer "regarded solely as the protectors of the purse; they are now seen as claimants whose spending inclinations must be policed by the budget process" (Schick, 1979; p.441), centered new controls in the congressional budget process, and shifted the overview of the budget process to the Budget Committee. "The role of the Budget Committees is to speak for the budget process, not to represent the many other interests pressing upon Congress and most of the authorizing committees (are) actual participants in the congressional budget process" (Schick, 1979; p.577). Surely this partial list of changes testifies to the structural changes wrought by the 1974 Act. The decisional consequences of these changes is still an open question (Schick, 1979, pp.565-581).

The combination of Fenno's work on the appropriations process with Schick's (1979) analysis of the 1974 Act and its aftermath gives us an excellent description of the appropriations process both before and after 1974.
In this section I am especially interested in the effects of structural change on both the appropriations process and money decisions. This concern for structural effects comes from both the empirical work of Fenno and Schick and the formal work of Shepsle, Ferejohn and others. The question of the importance of structural changes in determining outputs has generated varied answers. The strongest statement for the importance of structural variables is found in Shepsle and Weingast's (1981) work on the universal pork barrel politics in Congress. Their model argues or assumes that the endogenous structural variables have effects independent of exogenous variables such as the state of the economy and partisan electoral control. Ferejohn's (1974) work on rivers and harbors legislation clearly points to the independent effect of structural variables on congressional decisions. Studies by Fenno (1966, 1973) and Schick on the appropriations process also point to the effect of structural variables and change in structure on money decisions.

Given the apparent importance of structural factors on congressional outputs it is surprising that there are no explicit studies of the effects of such changes over time.

The budget process in the United States House of Representatives has undergone a number of major structural changes since the Civil War. Each of these changes in the budget process was enacted by a majority of the members of the House and one assumes each was enacted for a purpose. From
its creation in 1865 the House Appropriations Committee has in various ways been at the center of the controversies over structural changes. While it is true that we have a good idea about the effects of the 1974 reforms on budgetary matters, it is somewhat puzzling that we know very little about the effects of the other great changes in the structure of the appropriations process. This is especially peculiar since there are strong similarities in both the exogenous circumstances of the reforms and in the proposed structural changes. For example, those opposed to recentralizing the appropriations power in the Appropriations Committee in 1920 offered an alternative plan which had many of the features of the 1974 reforms. The 1920 alternative plan would have had the Appropriations Committee set spending limits in twelve categories and then allow other committees to appropriate within those categories and limits. Another example of similarity is that in each reform the question of centralizing or decentralizing the appropriations process to "get a handle" on spending was central. Clearly, if we are to both understand why structural reforms occur and their effects on appropriations decisions it is necessary to examine the full range of budgetary and appropriations reforms. The major reforms to be investigated are the 1880-85 move to decentralize and the 1919-1920 decision to recentralize the appropriations process. This will, of course, entail an analysis of the 1865 to 1880 period as a baseline for analyzing the effects of the 1880-1885 reforms.
This section will examine the causes and effects of these two reforms in light of the relationship between: (1) reforms and the state of government finances, (2) structural changes and appropriations decisions, and (3) the House and the Appropriations Committee. I shall approach the problem from a perspective based loosely on rational choice. Specifically, I assume that the reforms were designed and voted in by members to achieve results which they perceived as beneficial to themselves. The strategy adopted is to begin by providing an historical review of the appropriations process from 1865 to the post 1919 Budget Act period. Special attention will be paid to what House members perceived the issues and solutions to be (Ostrom, 1980). Based on this record I will formulate hypotheses to test the relationships posited above.

**Design and Data Analysis**

My basic assumption is that the structure of the House and its committees makes a difference in terms of both the decisions made and who benefits from the decisions. The tenor and tone of the debates surrounding the reforms of 1876, 1880, and 1920 show that the representatives themselves saw structural changes as affecting decisions. Based on both the work cited earlier (Shepsle; Shepsle and Weingast; and Ostrom) and the members' comments during the debate one can generate a number of testable hypotheses.
The first area of concern is the relationship between exogenous economic variables and the endogenous structuring of the appropriations process. The major economic variables used in this study are governmental finances and the public debt. Specifically I have collected data on whether the government was running surpluses or deficits and per capita national debt over the 1867 to 1930 time period. The argument is that the status of governmental finances will affect the House's structural decisions. When the government is running deficits and the public debt is high one would expect the pressures on the House to favor retrenchment of expenditures. On the other hand, when the government has a surplus and the public debt is low the pressures on the House should be to expand expenditures. It is clear that I can not show a clear causal relationship between these external variables and specific structural changes, rather the intention is to show that the forces for structural changes vary with the state of the federal governments finances. When said finances are in good shape pressure to change structures to accommodate increased expenditures will be ascendant whereas, when governmental finances are in poor shape pressure to change structures in order to decrease expenditures will be ascendant. Thus, while I can not show cause I can indicate the conditions under which structural change is likely to occur.
The second area of concern is the relationship between structural changes and appropriations decisions. In the 1867 to 1880-85 period when Appropriations had control over expenditures I expect that the Committee will have attempted to maximize their power. Fenno (1966) showed how the Appropriations Committee, by cutting executive requests, retained power over the purse in the 1946-64 time period. My expectation is that during the 1867 to 1880-85 period the Appropriations Committee will have cut Department requests and have funded programs at a rate lower than the House wished. In addition, as the debates revealed, the Appropriations Committee's use of the Holman rule for legislative purposes would further increase the Committee's power. In short, during the pre 1880-85 reform period the Appropriations Committee should have acted as a bottleneck to legislation thus enhancing the Committee's power.

In the 1880-85 to 1920 period when there were from three to eight separate committees appropriating I expect to find that the special interest committees will fund programs more generously than did Appropriations in the preceding period. Such increased funding will, I expect, result in higher yearly increases in the total budget as well as higher increases in special interest appropriations. Testing these hypotheses entails examining both the total appropriations pattern and agricultural and rivers and harbors appropriations over the entire period to determine the effects of
structural changes on decisions. The case of rivers and harbors appropriations is especially interesting because these expenditures have been regarded as a classic case of pork barrel politics (Ferejohn, 1974; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). The costs for such programs are diffuse, especially before individual taxes formed any portion of governmental revenues, and the benefits are district specific. Under rules where such expenditures are made by committees clearly and specifically attached to the involved interests there should be an increase in expenditures and/or the number of funded projects. In short, I expect to find changes in decisions occurring concomitantly with changes in the structure of committees, and if the comments of the representatives voting to recentralize appropriations in 1919-20 were correct, a decrease in the rate of expenditures following 1920.

A third area of concern is the relationship between the House and the appropriating committees. Fenno (1966) and Schick (1979) have shown that the main constituency of the Appropriations Committee is the House membership, and one of Congress' goals is to "spend on its preferred programs, even if it must weaken the appropriations process in order to get its way" (Schick, 1979; p.417). The desire of members to fund their programs was present in earlier eras as the debates over the reforms of the late 19th and early 20th century clearly show. The House's continuing concern over the
power of the Appropriations Committee allows us to test for relationships between appropriating committees' reports and House action under different structural conditions.

The final area of concern is an attempt to portray the overall relationship between the exogenous economic variables, structural change and appropriations decisions. I do not propose to put forward a model of these relationships given the preliminary nature of the work and the difficulty in making the data district specific. For example, to show that when the Rivers and Harbors Committee had appropriations power expenditures were greater than when the Appropriations Committee had funding power does not prove that individual members were maximizing. In order to show maximization the data would have to be compiled on a district level basis. My purpose here differs in that I seek to portray in broad strokes the effects of structural changes on money decisions, and to indicate that the political actors making the structural changes were cognizant of their likely effects.

Government Finances and the Reforms of 1880-1885 and 1919-1920

The decision to create a separate Appropriations Committee in 1865 came at a time when budget deficits and national debt had reached a peak. The costs of conducting the Civil War had been high and the Congress and the country
were anxious to reduce expenditures. In the twenty years after the Civil War the American economy was transformed. Comparing the decade from 1850 to 1860 with the decade, 1865-1875, it becomes clear that the Civil War contributed to the industrialization of the United States. The three major indicators of industrial production used by economic historians are tons of pig-iron, bituminous coal and railroad construction. Between 1850 and 1860 pig-iron production increased 50 percent, bituminous coal production increased about 95 percent, and 20,000 miles of railroad track were laid. In contrast, from 1865 to 1875 pig-iron production increased over 100 percent, bituminous coal increased more than 150 percent and over 40,000 miles of railroad tracks were built. This expansion of the American economy generated budget surpluses and lowered per capita national debt. In fact, from 1867 until 1894 the federal government ran budget surpluses each year, and in the process the per capita national debt fell from $70.91 in 1867 to $17.80 by 1890. Thus at precisely the time (1880-85) when House majorities were objecting to Appropriations' tight control over expenditures the government was running surpluses and dramatically reducing the national debt.

In contrast to these favorable economic figures the reforms of 1919 and 1920 occurred during unfavorable economic conditions. The cost of fighting World War I had by 1919 generated a $13,370,638,000 deficit and a per capita nation-
al debt of $242.54. Under these conditions it is reasonable to assume that there were pressures to retrench governmental expenditures. In addition, for the first time in the history of the United States both an individual and a corporate income tax had been collected to fund the war effort. Figure 15 shows the budget deficit or surplus from 1867 to 1920, while Figure 16 shows the per capita national debt for the same time period.

The Figures clearly show that both the reforms of 1880-85 and 1919-20 occur at times when government finances were appropriate for the decisions rendered. That is, the reforms to decentralize the appropriations power which were viewed by both proponents and opponents as mechanisms to increase expenditures occurred at a time when there was money available. The reforms of 1919-1920, which were viewed as a mechanism to reduce government expenditures, occurred at a time when governmental finances were in poor shape, characterized by large deficits and high debt. While these results do not establish a cause and effect relationship they clearly show a correspondence between governmental finances and the direction of structural reforms. Moreover, during the period from 1867 (the first non war budget) until 1879 (the last budget prior to the 1880 reforms) the House Appropriations Committee decreased the expenditures from 155.9 million dollars to 145.3 million dollars, and the average percentage increase from year to year was .16. In short,
during a period of governmental surpluses, high economic growth, low national debt, and large population increases, the House Appropriations Committee kept federal expenditures extremely low. Given these conditions plus the legislative implications of the Holman Rule it is not surprising that forces favoring increased expenditures were in the ascendency in the House of Representatives.

**Structural Changes and Committee Decisions**

Budget estimates from Departments during the 1866 to 1888 period are neither readily available nor, when discovered, systematic enough to generate a valid time series. However, as the final appropriations bills show there was no real increase in federal expenditures during the era of Appropriations Committee control. The Committee utilized parliamentary timing and techniques as well as bargaining in the conference committees to bottleneck money decisions. The result of these tactics was to increase the power of the Committee over legislation. After 1872 the Committee began to report its bills late in the legislative session — within two weeks of adjournment —, and after the passage of the Holman Rule on four occasions the Committee added amendments to bills which prohibited final House-Senate passage. In the four years from Holman to the 1880 rules changes the Committee was thrice able to keep yearly omnibus Rivers and Harbors bills from passing. The members of the Committee
also were able to keep amendments from being offered. In part they achieved this by timing the bills for late introduction and in part by special rules and privileges given to Appropriations legislation. Membership on the Committee was restricted to representatives with relatively long tenure in the House, and apparently to those with fiscally conservative views. The available hearings on the appropriations bills and the debates show Committee members always speaking for the need to economize or "retrench governmental expenditures." Debates on rivers and harbors and levy construction on the Mississippi River over the 1867-1879 period invariably show Committee members to be opposed to excessive spending on "creeks and miniature, trivial rivers." Their success in keeping the "Treasury from being opened to a committee scramble" is attested to by the minimal increases in governmental expenditures over the period.

The opening of the appropriations process first to rivers and harbors and agriculture legislation in 1880, and then in 1885 to five other committees tightly tied the appropriations powers to special interests. If the literature on structure affecting decisions and the remarks of the House members opposing decentralization are correct we should find:

(1) a higher average annual percentage increase in appropriations during the 1880 to 1916 period;

(2) an immediate increase in expenditures for those Departments and agencies directly under the control of an appropriating committee;
(3) the increases in appropriations which were the result of the structural changes will be independent of the state of the government finances;

(4) in the case of rivers and harbors bills the reforms of 1880 and the House's general acceptance of the practice in 1885 should yield an increase in both the number of projects and the amounts expended.

I now turn to an analysis of these hypotheses.

**Expenditures in the Pre and Post 1880-85 Reforms**

When in 1880 the House passed a major revision of its rules, the most hotly contested were the special rules to allow committees other than Appropriations to pass money bills. The granting of these rights to the committees responsible for rivers and harbors and agriculture bills was a major change, demonstrating the majority discontent with Appropriations decisions. The 1885 rules changes were the logical culmination of those made in 1880. Thus I expect to find that in the 1880 to 1915 time period the average increases in the federal budget were larger than they were in the 1867-1879 period. The analysis uses 1915 as the end point because the 1916 to 1920 budgets reflect the costs of preparing for and entering World War I. The 1919 and 1920 rules changes which recentralized power in the Appropriations Committee should have resulted in a decrease in the average annual increment in the federal budget. Table 11
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<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<td>3.9</td>
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shows the mean annual percent change and the standard deviation of the change for each of the three periods of structural change. The first period measures change from 1867 to 1879 and is the period of Appropriations Committee dominance. The second period measures annual percent change from the 1879 budget through the 1916 budget. The third period measures budgetary change from 1920 through 1933. Including budgetary change after 1933 would have shown even greater decreases but would measure the initial extraordinary budget decrease due to the effects of the Depression. Finally, since I am dealing only with the percentage change in the budget, I report results based on total dollars appropriated. Normalizing dollars by converting to 1900 dollar values showed no real change in the results, only slightly lower increases in each period.

The results support the interpretation. The structure of appropriations committee / committees and shared control of appropriations with the executive clearly affect the amounts appropriated. In the period of Appropriations Committee dominance the average increase is only .16, while during the period of decentralized congressional dominance the average rise is over 6 percent. Moreover the federal budget actually declines over the period of Appropriations Committee control. The greatest decreases in the budget, and the sharpest cut (23%) occurred after passage of the Holman Rule. From the change of rules in 1880 to 1884 the
total increase was 22 percent and after a majority of the House approved the decentralized appropriations process the average increment in the budget increases even more. This result is all the more impressive given that the total budget during the 1885 to 1915 period is divided approximately 50-50. That is, the total of the Sundry and Civil, Deficiency and Departmental Salary bills which were handled by the Appropriations Committee constituted about one-half of the total budget.

The passage of the 1919 Budget Act and House Resolution 324 resulted in a budget system which gave the President greater control over the budget process and shifted the congressional role to reaction and oversight. The result was a lowering of the average annual increment to 3.1 percent and a decreased standard deviation of 6.1. It seems clear that changing the structure of the process changed the results, and more importantly changed the results in the direction foreseen by members.

While corroborative, the results for the total appropriations do not prove the point because total appropriations reflect both the decisions of special interest committees and the Appropriations Committee. If structure affects decisions then one should see immediate effects from the rules changes in 1880 on the appropriations for both agriculture and rivers and harbors legislation. The argument is that in the 1867 to 1879 period the Appropriations Committee
preserved, and especially after 1875 (Holman Rule), enhanced its power by monopolizing the appropriations agenda (Shepsle, 1978, elaborates on this argument pp.129-30). Such monopoly rents were earned and used by Committee members who converted them into institutional influence (Shepsle, 1978; p.129). During the heyday of Appropriations the Committee membership was small and came from a relatively limited number of senior members. Membership on Appropriations was not easy to obtain and thus in Shepsle's terms influence was not dissipated. The reforms of 1880, while not increasing the membership of Appropriations, dissipated their influence by allowing over 30 other members (membership of Commerce and Agriculture) to influence money decisions. The move in 1885 to allow five other committees to appropriate greatly dissipated the Appropriations Committee powers by both decreasing (by about half) the scope of their influence and increasing the number of members with influence over appropriations. In addition, the members of the new committees were self selected which increased the likelihood that they would favor changing expenditure patterns.

Shepsle (1978; pp.129-130) argues that when a committee is permeable - easy to gain membership on - the power of the committee is diminished. In the 1867-1879 period there were seventy-five appointments to the Appropriations Committee, and of these available positions, fifty-eight men filled them. Thus, of approximately one thousand three hundred
members of the House during this period, less than 5 percent of the membership had a seat on Appropriations. In any given House less than 4 percent of the members could have a seat on Appropriations. In the contemporary House about 13 percent of the House membership has a seat on Appropriations (55 of 435). It is clear that appointment to the Appropriations Committee did not come easily in the period in which Appropriations had sole control over money bills. When the House voted in 1880 and in 1885 to divide the appropriations power it increased the permeability of the monopoly greatly. The one hundred and fifty odd members of the 49th House constituted OVER 45 PERCENT of the total House membership. Such changes in the number of individuals with a share of the appropriations process could only result in changed expenditure patterns. Fenno suggests this result when he comments on the difficulties in the Appropriations Committee in the 80th House (1947-49) due to the influx of new members (Fenno, 1968; p.52). Under conditions of decentralized monopoly control, extreme permeability and self selected membership, the members of the new monopoly committees could be expected to enhance their influence by increasing appropriations in their domains.
Agriculture and Rivers and Harbors

The House Agriculture Committee made the first agricultural appropriation in 1880 thus there is not pre and post structural change test possible. Therefore, the expectation is that agriculture appropriations will rise faster than the overall appropriations during the 1880 to 1920 period. Rivers and harbors bills had a legislative history dating back to the 1820's, and as a result a pre and post 1880 reform analysis is possible. The expectation is that the committees responsible for the appropriation will, beginning in 1880, increase the number of individual projects funded and also increase the number of dollars spent. The rationale is straightforward. The committee had a monopoly on rivers and harbors legislation which had been created so that funding would be increased. In short, the House majority voted special powers to the committee in order to avoid the Appropriations Committee's fiscal conservatism, and the "new" committee could enhance its influence and House support for its influence by expanding the number of recipients.

Testing the hypothesis for agricultural appropriations was relatively simple given that each year from its inception (1880) there was both an agricultural and a total appropriations bill passed. If my thesis is correct the annual increase in monies for agriculture should be high that the increase in total appropriations for the years 1880 to 1915. This is, in fact, a conservative test because about
one-half of the total appropriations came from committees which had the same interest in increasing appropriations as did Agriculture. Figure 17 shows the average annual increases in appropriations for both agriculture and total budget outlays over the 1867 to 1920 period.

The results corroborate the hypothesis. The average increase for agriculture exceeds the same figure for total appropriations eight of nine times from 1881 to 1889, and on six occasions the increase is greater than 10 percent with three of these being greater than 50 percent. The agricultural appropriations increases are consistently higher than their total expenditure counterparts, and when cuts are made with the few exceptions agricultural cuts are less than the overall cuts. Figure 18 shows that over the 1880 to 1915 period agricultural appropriations rise as a percentage of the total budget. In terms of cumulative increases in budgets over the period agriculture rose 9188 percent compared to a 452 percent increase in total expenditures. Thus, regardless of how calculated, the agricultural appropriations rose more dramatically than did total appropriations in the 1880-1915 period.

The test for the hypothesis concerning rivers and harbors legislation is twofold: (1) I present two graphic plots of the number of projects funded in omnibus rivers and harbors bills from 1867 to 1887 and the amounts of money expended in the same period; (2) a tabular analysis of rivers
and harbors expenditures from 1867 to 1915. The expectation is that in 1880 both the number of projects and the amounts expended will dramatically increase, and that the same figures for 1886 and 1887 will rise again after the House's majority made decentralized appropriations a general principle. Figures 19 and 20 show the number of projects funded by bill from 1867 to 1887, and the amount of money expended for the same period. Table 12 shows the average appropriation for rivers and harbors omnibus bills from 1867 to 1879, 1880 to 1886, and 1887-1915. In addition the table shows the ratio of growth for each of the three periods.

The number of projects funded increases from slightly over 200 in 1879 to over 350 in 1880 and from approximately 330 in 1886 to over 400 in 1887. The increase in amounts appropriated moves from less than seven million dollars in 1882 to about eleven million dollars in 1882 and over fifteen million in 1887. It is clear that the change in structure generated immediate increases in numbers of projects funded and lagging slightly behind an increase in amounts appropriated.

Table 12 shows a large percentage increase (84.3 percent) in the 1880 to 1886 period when the appropriations power was limited to three committees. The average appropriation in this period was 14.65 million dollars compared to 7.18 million dollars in the period of Appropriations' control. During the 1887 to 1915 period the average appro-
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Years</th>
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<th>Average Appropri.</th>
<th>Total Appropri.</th>
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<th>Diff. in % Increase to R&amp;H</th>
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<td>1887-1915</td>
<td>50th-63rd</td>
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<td>30.12</td>
<td>309.3</td>
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priation was 30.12 million dollars. Comparable figures for
the total budget increases in the same three periods reveal
that during the heyday of Appropriations rivers and harbors
expenditures went up less than the total budget (actually
were cut more) whereas; during the second period rivers and
harbors expenditures went up 70 percent more than total out-
lays. In the period of full decentralization the rivers and
harbors expenditures went up only 36 percent more than total
outlays. The results show that in the period of several ap-
propriating monopolies expenditures in special areas rose
more quickly than did total expenditures, with the largest
differences coming in the period of limited monopolies.

It is of course possible that the rise in expenditures
shown here simply reflect the rise in governmental surpluses
over the period. There are theoretical reasons to believe
that such is not the case. Shepsle and Weingast (1981) ar-
genue that structure has effects which can be independent of
exogenous effects. If they are correct then the rise in ag-
gricultural and rivers and harbors outlays need not move with
the status of government finances. In order to test this
hypothesis I collected the annual figures on governmental
surpluses and/or deficits and normalized both the state of
government finances and rivers and harbors expenditures by
creating Z scores for both. The surplus measure is an ex-
tremely useful measure because from 1867 to 1893 the federal
government ran surpluses and the increased appropriations
over the 1880 to 1915 period may be the result of member spending to reflect the available surplus. If this is wrong, as I suspect it to be, plotting the Z scores for both surpluses and rivers and harbors expenditures should show expenditures increasing at a faster rate than a simple reflection of available revenue would predict. Figure 21 shows the result.

Until 1872 the standardized scores for rivers and harbors funding are lower than the scores for budgetary surplus meaning that the Appropriations Committee was not funding rivers and harbors bills with an eye to budgetary surpluses. In the 1874 to 1879 period rivers and harbors funding runs slightly higher than the standardized budget scores, however the two move together reasonably well in this period. The 1880 to 1885 period also shows rivers and harbors scores generally moving with the budget scores although slightly higher. After the House's approval in 1885 of the decentralized appropriations process the two figures diverge sharply. That is, at precisely the point where budget revenues drop the appropriations for rivers and harbors increases indicating that the structural changes act independently of the government's financial situation.

Given the importance of asserting that structure acts independently of exogenous variables a second test was conducted. The data on governmental surpluses/deficits used in Figure 21 are for all revenues combined minus expenditures.
FIGURE 21

NORMALIZED SCORES FOR RIVERS & HARBORS APPROPRIATIONS
RELATIVE TO GOVERNMENT SURPLUS/DEFICIT 1867-1892

- RIVERS & HARBORS
-- SURPLUSES
The Congress had control over only about half of these revenues -- the tariffs; and the question of protective versus non-protective tariff had long been a divisive one (Brady, 1982). Thus one might well hypothesize that special appropriations moved with tariff revenues rather than general revenues. The argument is that since Congress controlled tariff revenues through tariff bills they could fund special interests like agriculture and rivers and harbors by adjusting tariff bills as conditions dictated. If structure is independent of revenue generated by tariffs, then appropriations for agriculture and rivers and harbors should increase under the decentralized appropriations structure. In order to test this argument I converted the total value of tariff revenues received by year into their natural logarithms, then converted the total dollars appropriated for agriculture and rivers and harbors in a similar manner. The results were then plotted from 1867 through 1916 (Figure 22).

The results clearly show that appropriations move independently of tariff revenues. The values for tariff move from 5.10 to about 5.60 and with the exception of the 1896 to 1898 period (the Dingley Tariff) the line does not vary greatly. The line for rivers and harbors and agriculture show far greater change. The log value for rivers and harbors is 3.27 in 1867 and rises to 4.62 in 1910 and is 4.45 in 1915. Moreover, there is a major jump from under 3 to over 4 at the inception of the special powers to appropriate
FIGURE 22

RIVERS & HARBORS AND AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATIONS
COMPOSED TO TARIFF REVENUES 1867-1916

--- TARIFF
--- AGRICULTURE
..... RIVERS & HARBORS
(1880). The line for agricultural appropriations moves from 2.37 in 1880 to 4.23 in 1915. The major increase in the slope of the line occurs in the 1886 to 1888 time period immediately after a House majority approves the fully decentralized appropriations system. The rise in both appropriations lines relative to the steady state line for tariff revenues shows that the structural changes of the 1880-85 period resulted in increased expenditures which were independent of tariff revenues.

I have argued that the reasons underlying this result are that the 1880 and 1885 reforms created new monopolies and that the members of the specialized committees self selected their committee assignments specifically to appropriate more money. It was only by appropriating more money that members could satisfy the House which created their monopolies and build personal influence. Since both rivers and harbors and agricultural legislation affected directly almost all congressional districts, I expected and found (for rivers and harbors) an increase in the number of projects funded. Rivers and harbors legislation is of special interest because it is classic cases of specific benefits (projects in districts) coming from diffuse unspecified sources (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). This argument suggests that prior to the 1880 rule changes the Appropriations Committee would have decided rivers and harbors expenditures in a non pork barrel fashion. Given the relatively
high levels of party voting prevalent in this era and the strong "bloody shirt" politics of the 1867-1876 period, I expect rivers and harbors legislation to have a strong regional flavor prior to the late 1870's-1880 period. Table 13 shows the number of projects and the total dollars value by region for the 1867 to 1886 period.

The data show that until 1878 the Eastern and Midwestern sections received more projects and money than did Southern and Border state regions. It is not until 1878 that the South receives a million dollars or more in projects whereas the Midwest received more than a million each year and the East did 75 percent of the time. In the first post reform appropriations (1880) both the Southern and Border state regions received substantial boosts while the East and Midwest received less funds while increasing the number of projects.

The sectional bias of the post Civil War pre-compromise of 1876 period (Woodward) is a function of committee assignments. From 1867 (39th House) until 1873 (42nd House) no Southerner has a seat on Appropriations and seven of the nine members come from Midwestern (4) and Eastern (3) states. It is not until the 1878-1880 period that the South receives substantial representation on the Appropriations Committee. When in the 46th House the decision was made to allow Commerce to appropriate for rivers and harbors the South had 20 percent of the Committee seats and Border state
<table>
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<td>1882</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Millions of dollars*
representatives had 25 percent of the seats. The immediate
effect on appropriations is evident in the Table. While I
can not show decisively that after 1880 rivers and harbors
decisions were based on members maximizing I can conclude
that at the aggregate level many of the signs of a universal
pork barrel (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981) are present.

The evidence for the effects of structural change on
money decisions is impressive. Decentralizing the appropria-
tions power by creating seven committees with monopoly con-
trol over special interests resulted in: higher increases
in the total budget outlays, higher increases in appropria-
tions for rivers and harbors and agriculture independent of
government's financial position and clear indications that
rivers and harbors bills became pork barrel politics at the
time of structural change. But what of the Appropriations
Committee's behavior during the period in which power was
decentralized. If the Committee behaved differently from
the specialized committees the case for structural change
would stand in great relief. The only money bill which was
controlled by Appropriations throughout the 1867-1915 period
is the Legislative Appropriations Act. The Committee re-
tained control over Deficiency and Sundry Civil Appropria-
tions but these bills can not be compared over time. The
only comparable data is then, the House Appropriations Com-
mittee's funding of the Legislative Budget.
Over the 1860 to 1915 period the House grew from 243 members to 435 members, an increase of about 89 percent. One would therefore expect pressures from House members to increase the legislative budget. Moreover, during this period the work load of the Congress increased greatly (Brady, 1973; Cooper 1975) which should have generated additional demand for resources. Table 14 shows the average annual increase in legislative appropriations over the years 1867-1915, and Figure 23 shows the graph of legislative increases for the 1880-1915 period.

The Table and Figure show that the Appropriations Committee's behavior did not vary greatly over the entire time period. In the first period the average increase was -.21 while in the second period the average increase was only 2.62 with a lowered standard deviation. These figures are all the more impressive when compared to the average increases in total appropriations (over 6 percent) and in agriculture and rivers and harbors (over 10 percent) over the 1880-1915 period. In short, the behavior of the Committee did not change markedly during an era when specialized committees increased appropriations greatly. The Committee by their behavior during their period justified the conclusions of Good and other reformers (1919-1920) that Appropriations would be a "watchdog of the Treasury."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Mean Change</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867-1879</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sole Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1915</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shares Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 23

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
Appropriating Committees and the House

The extended quotes in the introductory section of this chapter made it perfectly clear that the reforms of 1880 and 1885 were in large part a question of the power of the Appropriations Committee. A majority of the House in 1880 and again in 1885 wished to strip power from the Committee and to distribute it across a wider spectrum of the membership. Thirty odd years later another majority voted decisively to return the appropriating power to the Committee in an attempt to retrench expenditures and manage the War debt. In one sense the questions about the power of the Appropriations Committee are fundamentally questions about levels of funding for programs of concern to House members. There appears to be a constant pressure on the Committee to increase appropriations in order to satisfy House members. When asked why the Appropriations Committee had approved such large increases in the federal budget during the 1960's chairman George Mahon (D-TX) replied:

"We do need to impose greater discipline on ourselves ... but when we deal with all of the 435 members of this body, then we have to do the best we can under the circumstances. The Congress and the country must come to the position of supporting a greater degree of restraint than we now have" (Schick, 1979; p.439).

Fenno in The Power of the Purse (1966) also documents the pressure on the Committee to fund programs, and in his later work Congressman in Committees (1973) makes the House membership the Committee's primary constituency. It seems
to be the case that since its inception in 1865 the Appropriations Committee's relationship with the House is of primary importance. "The Committee is subject to two sets of expectations--one holding that the Committee should supply money for programs authorized by the Congress and holding that the Committee should fund these programs in as economical a manner as possible" (Fenno, 1966; p.410).

The Committee's dilemma is that, while the House insists on havings its programs funded, the power of Appropriations is enhanced when it can act as a bottleneck to legislation and can successfully reduce expenditures. The House majority which reduced the Committee's powers in 1880 and 1885 obviously felt that the Committee had not appropriated enough to satisfy members' demands for funding. I have seen that the effect of the structural changes of 1880-1885 was to increase expenditures particularly in areas where special interest committees were formed. I have not however, examined the relationships between appropriating committees, executive Departments requests and House action.

The underlying cause of the reforms of 1880 and 1885 was Appropriation's failure to adequately fund projects. The debates of 1880 and 1885 demonstrated the strength of members objections to Appropriation's policies. When the House created a new set of monopoly committees based on special interests they expected a rise in expenditures and, as we have seen, they got it. When, in turn, they recentral-
ized authority in the President and in the Appropriations Committee they expected a lower rate of growth in expenditures and that was obtained. If the creation of special interest committees with monopoly appropriating powers yielded these results in the aggregate the effects should also show in the relationships between executive Department requests and committee action, and House reaction to committee reports. The expectations are: (1) during the period of special interest monopoly appropriating committees executive budgets will often be increased; (2) in the post reform era (1921) executive requests will be cut far more often than raised; (3) in the period of monopoly committees the House will be more inclined to cut committee requests or alternatively to raise them less and (4) in the post 1921 reform period the House will be more inclined to raise committee reports.

In order to test these hypotheses I collected Executive Department requests from 1888 to 1948, appropriating committee reports of funding, and the House's floor action on committee report for the same years. It would have been preferable to have the same data from 1867 onward but both budget requests and committee reports are spotty and thus comparisons to the post 1888 period are inappropriate. The data for committee action on executive requests were collected for all Rivers and Harbors and Agriculture bills and the Legislative Budget bill. The data sets are complete
(1888-1948) for the Agriculture and Legislative appropriations. Unfortunately, the Rivers and Harbors bills are not comparable after 1921, thus I only use rivers and harbors expenditure data up to 1916. Utilizing both the Legislative and Agriculture histories over the entire period gives us the actions of the Appropriations Committee over the entire period.

There are thirty separate agricultural appropriations in the 1888-1916 period, and of these seventeen times the Agriculture Committee cut the Department request and thirteen times they raised it. Of the nine times the committee changed the request by greater than 10 percent six times they raised the request and three times they cut by more than 10 percent. In contrast, during the 1920 to 1948 period there were 29 committee actions on estimates, and of these 25 were cuts and 4 were raises. There were eight cuts of ten percent or greater and two raises of over ten percent. In terms of a simple count of cuts and raises the Agriculture Committee raised estimates far more often than did the Appropriations Committee, and when they made non-incremental decisions raises outnumbered cuts two to one. In contrast, when the Appropriations Committee acted in a non-incremental fashion they cut requests at a four to one ratio to raises.

The same analysis of the Legislative appropriations reveals a different result. In 30 decisions during the
1888-1916 period Appropriations cut requests twenty-eight of thirty times and in the 1920 to 1948 period they cut twenty-five of twenty-nine requests. In both periods the Committee cut requests by over 10 percent on a number of occasions, and in neither period did they raise requests by over 10 percent. Data by committee and period on average change of requests are presented in Table 15.

The results show that the Appropriations Committee actions in regard to requests are consistent over the entire period. They cut requests in both periods regardless of the interest involved. The cuts ranged from 3.3 percent in agriculture during the 1920-1948 period and from 3.5 to 5.2 in the legislative requests. In contrast, when agricultural requests were handled by the Agriculture Committee they raised requests by an average of 3.5 percent. The Rivers and Harbors Committee was more extreme in that they raised presidential requests by an average of 24.5 percent, although the variance of 60.8 shows that great swings in action on requests was prevalent. In sum, the results show that different structures resulted in different treatment of budget requests, and that the difference is in the expected direction.

The question of House floor action on committee reports is complicated by the fact that in most cases throughout its history the House has accepted with little modification the Committee report. The reasons for this behavior are reason-
<table>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1888-1916</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.38 1.70</td>
<td>.41 1.96</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1948</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.43 6.04</td>
<td>na na</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ably straightforward. First, the floor is not a very good place to take on a detailed appropriations bill because the Committee members have expertise and generally the non-committee members do not have the time or expertise to fight. Second, the structuring of the House's rules both on the floor and in the Committee of the Whole favored the appropriating committee. Third, and most important for our purposes, the structure of the committees making the expenditure had been approved by a majority of members. Thus, in the era of decentralized monopoly committees the majority of the House favored such an arrangement and the same case can be made for the post 1921 arrangement. Under these conditions it is not surprising that the House's actions on committee reports does not greatly alter committee decisions. Nevertheless, I expect that whatever variance is left to be explained will be in the hypothesized direction. That is, in the 1888-1916 period the House will increase committee appropriations less than they do in the post 1921 period.

In this analysis I include the House's reactions to the total budget as a baseline for the analysis of specific appropriations. Table 16 shows the average annual change in committee reports by area and by committee over the two separate structures.

House floor action on committee bills does not alter committees' decisions much in either period, as attested to by the low average change figures. However, what limited
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Legislative (mean) (s.d.) (change)</th>
<th>Agriculture (mean) (s.d.) (change)</th>
<th>Rivers &amp; Harbors (mean) (s.d.) (change)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886-1915</td>
<td>-3.5 2.6</td>
<td>3.5 14.3</td>
<td>24.5 60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1948</td>
<td>-5.2 7.8</td>
<td>-3.3 13.7</td>
<td>na na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
changes there are move in the predicted direction. The House added an average of .325 to agriculture appropriations coming from the Agriculture Committee; whereas when the Appropriations Committee handled the agriculture bill the House added an average of .425 to the Committee report. The figures for the total budget follow the same pattern. Specifically, when appropriations bills were mixed the House cut reports .01 on the average while in the post 1921 period they added an average .58 to reports. On the legislative budget Appropriations Committee's decisions were cut an average .08 in both periods. Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast to these results, is the fact that in spite of the large increases in rivers and harbors appropriations over 1888-1916 the House increased the appropriations by .428. While this amount is not much the direction of the House's action suggests that the demand for additional funding was not totally satisfied even during the heyday of pork barrel politics.

The Special Case of the 1919-1920 Reforms

The reasons for the House's changes to a decentralized appropriations structure and the behavior of the special interest committee during this era seem evident. A majority of members favored decreasing the Appropriations Committee's power because they had not funded programs at a high enough
level in a period where government finances were solidly in the black. What is slightly puzzling is the House's action in 1920 to recentralize power in Appropriations. The majority (or at least those who argued for the reform) foresaw the fiscal consequences -- a reduced level of government growth. However, why would a system which clearly spread decisional power over a larger number of members be eliminated. The 1919-1920 budget reforms were led by Representative Good and supported by the Republican leadership thus, one might expect the reform to have been passed on a straight party vote. Such was not the case. The final vote, 200 for / 117 against, was not entirely a party vote although over 80 percent of the Republicans voted for the reform. There was also solid Democratic support for the reform. Most interesting is the extent to which members of the committees about to lose power voted for the resolution. One might have expected Republican members of these committees to at least be cross pressured to support the reform because the party leadership supported the charge. However, Democratic members of said committees might be thought to have clear reasons to vote against the reform. Interestingly, a majority of BOTH Republicans and Democrats on the appropriating committees voted FOR the reform. The pattern was not, of course, unmixed. The three senior Republicans on Agriculture led by Gilbert Haugen voted against the resolution as did the two ranking Democrats on Agriculture. On
the other appropriating committees a majority of the senior members including chairmen and ranking members voted to strip their own committees of appropriations power. How can these results be explained in light of our views of reforms?

Under the decentralized appropriations process each of the special interest committees had a monopoly over appropriations related to their interest. Members of those committees self selected themselves based largely on interests in their districts. There were, for example, no representatives from urban districts on Agriculture, and in three Houses we have examined carefully each member of Rivers and Harbors had at least one Corps of Engineers project. Given these conditions, there is little or no constraint on committee members to reduce expenditures. In fact, since the members of Agriculture know that Rivers and Harbors and Naval fortifications will rise they are induced to vote greater expenditures in agriculture. Only under a condition where all such committees are constrained would there have been a possibility of a solution.

The huge national debt incurred in World War I and the large deficit budgets of 1917, 1918 and 1919 (over 40 billion dollars total) created a fiscal situation wherein some resolution was in order. The behavior of the special interest committees during the 1917-1919 period probably contributed to the sense of crisis. The agricultural budget increased 36 percent while rivers and harbors appropriations increased
20 percent at a time when the per capita national debt rose from $28.77 to $242.54. Concern over increased expenditures had been shown as early as 1912 when the House debated and then created a Select Committee on the Budget. The formal resolution (H.R.324) in the 66th House which recentralized power in Appropriations came from the Select Committee on the Budget. In short, under the decentralized monopoly structure it was not likely that expenditures would be checked; realizing that and given the status of the governments' finances something had to change. A majority voted to restructure appropriations. The result was, as has been shown, a decrease in the rate of growth of government expenditures over a decade in which the economy grew rapidly.

Recentralizing power in Appropriations meant a reduction in the number of members with a portion of the appropriations power and more importantly the thirty-five members of Appropriations could increase their influence by reducing Department requests, thus decreasing the rate of growth of expenditures.

Another factor which possibly affected the House's decision to change the appropriations process was the changed nature of revenue sources. Shepsle and Weingast (1981) in their discussion of universal pork barrel use a term in their system of equations which implicitly represents a member's ability to calculate the benefits to his or her district based on what contributions the district makes to the
federal budget through income taxes. Given this, a member can rationally decide pork barrel issues. Prior to the introduction of income taxes the revenues of the government were untargeted. That is, funds were generated from sources not directly attributable to members' districts. Under this condition members would be more likely to vote for increases in funds benefitting their districts. The costs of World War I made income taxes, both corporate and individual, an important source of government revenue, and while we can not prove that members saw and foresaw the greater costs to their districts it is apparent from the debate of 1920 that some members recognized the argument. Representative Madden (R-IL), a prime mover of the reforms, argued:

"Only a few years ago we had but 300,000 taxpayers ... Today we have 3,400,000 and it will not be long before we have 5,000,000 and these taxpayers are all alert to the need for economy. Extravagance such as has never been known before has existed throughout the Nation for a long period, and today we are confronted with a deficit ... of more than $3,500,000,000. It is only by the most rigid system of economy that we can hope to pay this deficit with the revenues at our command ... unless we register our votes in favor of this resolution we will have said by our actions that we are not in favor of economical reform in Government. (Applause)" (C.R., 66th Cong.; 8109).

As a further test of the proposal that the shifting of appropriating power led to a significant increase in actual appropriations I turned to regression analysis. More specifically I sought to determine if the rivers and harbors appropriations and the total governmental appropriations displayed a marked increase in the amount appropriated.
I believe convincing evidence and arguments supportive of those hypotheses offered earlier has been presented, but in an attempt to discern statistical variations in the appropriations patterns I adopted the MITS procedure used by Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980: 745–756). Use of this rather straightforward process was a search for evidence that the decentralization of the appropriations process led to true increases in the level of appropriations.

In order to examine this the following regression models on rivers and harbors appropriations laws was tested:

\[ Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \epsilon_t \]

where:

- \( Y_t \) = current law appropriations,
- \( X_0 \) = appropriations level prior to 1876,
- \( X_1 \) = a counter for years from 1 to N,
- \( X_2 \) = a dichotomous variable, 0 for observations prior to 1876, 1 for 1876 and after,
- \( X_3 \) = a counter for years, 0 prior to 1876, 1, 2, 3, . . . for 1876 and after;
- \( \beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3 \) parameters to be estimated, \( \epsilon_t \) = error term.

The parameters \( \beta_0 \) and \( \beta_1 \) indicate, respectively, the level and slope of the period prior to the decentralization of appropriations. To determine whether these parameters were effected by the changes in the appropriating authority, the estimates for \( \beta_2 \) and \( \beta_3 \) must be examined to determine
whether they are significantly different than zero. If the estimate for $b_2$ is not significantly different from zero, then one may infer that the decentralization had no effect on the level of the time series.

Likewise, if the estimate for $b_3$ does not differ significantly from zero then one may infer that the new rules had no effect on the slope of the time series.

In estimating the model using ordinary least squares yields the results in Table 17.

The results for the model indicate that there was a definite shift in the intercept in the post 1885 period. In fact, the only variable which proved to be significant at an acceptable level was $b_2$ which was the dummy variable serving to test the pre-post 1885 shift. The Durbin - Watson statistic indicates that there is no serious autocorrelation of the error terms. The $R^2$ of .73 is quite good but should not be considered as particularly important given the time series nature of these appropriations measures.

The second test performed was on the total appropriations. Here, rather than predict of levels of appropriations I chose to predict to actual committee action. A brief explanation of this dependent variable is in order at this point. What is analyzed here is the change in the appropriations request as presented to the Committee and the appropriations proposal that goes to the floor for consideration. Changes in requests were measured as the percent
TABLE 17

MITS ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS DECISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimate Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$B_0$</td>
<td>-195.28</td>
<td>-.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_1$</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_2$</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_3$</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .73$  D.W. = 1.90  n = 22
change between the amount requested and the amount reported to the floor. We are looking for an indication that the manner in which the budgetary requests were handled changed when the substantive committees were stripped of their Appropriating authority. Thus, what is being examined is not the levels of expenditures, but rather the action taken on budgetary requests. The use of percent change prevents the data from becoming distorted simply due to the presence or absence of war or depression. Rather, changes attributable to such crises must manifest themselves as a change in the behavior of the committee, not merely in increases in the amount appropriated.

The resulting model resembles the previous one with additional variables $X_4$ and $X_5$ which stand, respectively, for a dichotomous variable with 0 for observations prior to 1921, 1 for 1921 and all years beyond; and a counter for years, 0 prior to 1921, 1, 2, 3, ..., for 1921 and after. The time series was stopped at 1947. Model estimation led to the results found in Table 18.

Since initial examination showed some autocorrelation the Cochrane - Orcutt correction was used and the model reestimated. The results tend to confirm the hypothesized relationships. The variable $X_4$ proves to be the only significant variable. Again, this variable stands for the change in the intercept in the post-1921 period.
TABLE 18

MITS ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE DECISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimate Coefficient</th>
<th>T-Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$B_0$</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_1$</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_2$</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_3$</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_4$</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-2.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_5$</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2 = .34$  D.W. = 1.99  n = 53
It indicates that Committee behavior was to increase the amount budget requests were cut following recentralization. While it cannot be proved that this explanation contributed to the final vote it is a plausible explanation, and one which some important members of the House accepted.

The 1880-85 and 1919-1920 reforms were clear and formal restructuring of the House rules to achieve definitive results. The opening of the appropriations process to seven other committees was intended to increase funding in client departments. The 1919-1920 reforms clearly limited the role of the Congress in the budget process, and created a non-permeable Appropriations Committee which restricted access to the budget process to thirty-five men who were to limit expenditures. In order to achieve this result power had to be taken from the many and given to the few, and that is what the House did. In contrast, the 1974 reformers limited the President but actually made the budget process accessible to a larger number of members. Cooper (1975) argued that the 1974 reforms were not likely to succeed precisely because the reforms had tried to please all the participants thus diffusing authority when more centralization was necessary. The judgement of scholars seems to be that the 1974 reforms both centralized and decentralized power in the House with predictably ambiguous results.
CHAPTER FIVE

Summary

This study set out to examine the manner in which the House of Representatives has dealt with the appropriations of money. To that end I focused this research on two major areas: (1) the importance of factors external to the Congress, and (2) internal factors, primarily membership and career patterns and the reasons for, and the results of changes by the House to the rules under which appropriations were made.

To summarize, in Chapter One I presented theoretical arguments supportive of the ideas put forward by the incrementalist notion of decision making. I proposed that incrementalism is a rational manner of avoiding conflict in the decision making arena and is consistent with the cognitive processes used in decision making. I then examined how the Committee norms of subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization, and apprenticeship are fostered by recruitment and career service patterns. These norms are conducive to incrementalism as a behavioral pattern because they stress the need for consensual decisions making.
Most studies of the budgeting of monies have dealt with the changes in absolute amounts and presented these as evidence of incremental behavior at the decision making level. While I have no argument with the notion of incrementalism as a decision rule, the existing measures are inadequate for tapping actual Appropriations Committee behavior. To remedy this I proposed use of percentage change as a dependent variable, maintaining that decision rules should manifest themselves in the form of behavior which is invariant over time.

The effect of norms on committee behavior was tested by examining the committee action, (the dependent variable) in the form of percentage change from department / agency estimate to committee report to the floor. In doing so I used a number of surrogate measures of norms as the independent variables. Changes in the electoral or congressional context which fostered adoption of existing Committee norms (i.e., periods of membership stability with few freshmen and continuous control of the Congress by the same party) proved to have little effect on Committee action. This adds further evidence to the argument that the actual Committee behavior is not affected by external or internal events.

I then chose to examine if the Committee followed a pattern of alternating increases and decreases in its reports. Since the Committee seeks to report bills which present Committee decisions as consensual, one way to facil-
iterate agreement among the members on the Committee (which, of course, represent diverse constituencies) is to adopt a practice which precludes any one sector or department from continual cuts. I examined the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, and the Treasury for signs of such behavior. The results of the regression analysis showed some minimal tendency to follow this pattern of give and take.

I then changed the unit of analysis somewhat to determine if committee has any influence on the appropriations process before it acts on the estimates. By examining the way in which the estimates changed from one year to the next, I sought to determine whether the estimates made by the agencies / departments were affected by the structural reforms of 1920 which recentralized the appropriations process into one committee. It has been shown in Chapter Four and elsewhere (Brady and Morgan, 1983) that appropriations responded to such structural changes in a dramatic and predictable manner. If the requests followed the same pattern of reacting to structural changes as the House did, since the estimates are the responsibility of the Executive branch, and the structural changes were the result of internal Legislative branch maneuvering, then one must conclude that the estimating body was behaving in anticipation of Committee behavior, and is, therefore, affected by internal structural change. From this I was able to conclude that
the requesting agency or department acted in a manner consistent with the rational behavior we might expect from a decision making body that was working in concert with the Committee.

In Chapter Two I examined the linkage between party voting and non-incremental policy change. Drawing on the work of Brady (1973, 19787, 1980, 1982, and 1985), Sinclair (1977), and others, I decided to test the effect of the modern realignments on the appropriations process. I changed the analysis to look at the difference in the amount appropriated from one year to the next. We know that the realignments of the 1890s and the New Deal period of 1933-1938 resulted in dramatic policy shifts (Brady and Ettling, 1984; and others). I used regression analyses to test the relationship between realignments and non-incremental behavior in the appropriations process.

The results tend to confirm the hypothesized relationship. The rationale I find convincing is that the 1899-1915 period was one of decentralized appropriations and strong party leadership vested in the hands of committee chairmen, and there should be shifts to reflect increased party loyalty. Power was centralized, leadership was focused, and the decentralized nature of the appropriations process was favorable for higher spending. The New Deal period reflected the presence of Roosevelt and the willingness of the Committee to follow the Presidential initiative to lead the coun-
try out of depression. These results are not surprising, serving to reconfirm findings cited earlier. The impact of realignments is unmistakable, in the process of appropriating money as elsewhere in the government.

A second regression was designed to test the proposition that the periods of party partisanship was reflected in nonincremental behavior on the part of the requesting agencies. The results, predictably, mirror those of the previous regression. With the high correlation between changes in estimates and changes in laws this is not surprising. Again, we find insignificant differences between the Congresses of the decentralized period, nearly identical behavior in the similar periods within the post reform era, and that the New Deal coefficients are statistically significant. One major difference in the findings of the two regressions is in the confirmation that the 1920 reforms led to changes in the way the estimates were presented. The 1921-1933 period showed significant coefficients which indicates that the estimates changed in response to the reforms. The estimators, aware of the renewed mandate to cut the budget responded by making larger changes themselves.

The results of Chapter Two, when taken in conjunction with those of Chapter One are: first, that periods of realignment are accompanied by nonincremental appropriations due in large part to the absence of adherence to established norms; and second, that party strength, while having an ef-
fect on appropriations, probably does so through increased demands on the requesting agency or department to alter its pattern of increasing its estimates in an incremental manner. The findings indicate that (1) in the absence of external factors such as major political realignments, or internal changes such as the move to decentralize in the 1885-1889 or recentralize in 1920, the Committee, and the entire process operates in a fairly predictable manner; (2) committee actions generally conform to what one would expect to see if the norms of subcommittee autonomy, reciprocity, specialization and apprenticeship offered by Fenno (1966) are followed; (3) a change in party control is accompanied by non-incremental changes in the budget, especially during periods of political realignments; and (4) even when major political events occur (e.g., "external" events such as realignments or "internal" events such as the rules changes), the resulting change is short-lived.

Chapters Three and Four dealt with changes internal to the appropriations process. I first traced some of the history of the Appropriations Committee, from its beginning in 1865 through the decisions in 1885 to strip the Committee of its authority for several of the Department and agencies formerly under its jurisdiction and the subsequent 1920 recentralization of power to appropriate.

The 1880-85 and 1919-1920 reforms were clear and formal restructuring of the House rules to achieve definitive re-
sults. The opening of the appropriations process to seven other committees was intended to increase funding in client departments. The 1919-1920 reforms clearly limited the role of the Congress in the budget process, and created a non-permeable Appropriations Committee which restricted access to the budget process to thirty-five men who were to limit expenditures. In order to achieve this result power had to be taken from the many and given to the few, and that is what the House did.

The findings of Chapters Three and Four provide convincing evidence that the decentralization of the process -- the increased accessibility to appropriations decisions for the membership -- led to nonincremental change in the budget. The recentralization of the process in 1920 was intended to negate the action of the 1885 reforms and was largely successful in doing so.

Given the findings of this research we can summarize: the decisions which effect appropriations are (1) the action of the Committee, (2) the reaction of the House to the Committee reports, (3) the action of the executive agency or department that makes the actual estimate that is considered by the Committee. The first two areas are best examined through use of the percent change dependent variable. This allowed us to determine the behavior of the bodies without being concerned with the actual amounts being requested by the Executive which may be distorted due to war or depres-
sion. If one believes that decision rules are actually in use, then it seems reasonable to expect the rules to operate regardless of the context. The third area to be studied, the action of the estimating authority, was also examined using percentage change, but in regard to the difference between the current and the previous year's estimate. This enables us to "partition" responsibility for increased expenditures between the House and the Executive. If, for example, we find estimates which increase twenty percent and approval of a budget which increases fifteen percent, then one must ask is the Committee being the guardian of the purse when it cuts twenty-five percent of the estimate, or is it being too lax by allowing a fifteen percent increase? The answer to such a question is largely based on one's perceptions of the role of the Committee. Confusion over the proper role of the Appropriating Committee has been in evidence in the House itself as demonstrated by the rules changes initiated when the Committee was first performing its role as guardian too diligently, and again when the committees responsible for appropriations were too generous. In both cases there was some confusion as to the role of the committee, but there was no confusion over what was meant by the changes in the rules. In both cases the rules changes were intended to insure that the wishes of the House were carried out, regardless of the wishes of the committee(s).
A Unified Perspective.

The appropriations process offers an excellent opportunity to view the workings of government through a positive theory perspective. As identified throughout this research, the actions of all of the actors in the process are consistent with those of utility maximization. The Committee, when presented with a reduction of the cross pressures of Committee vs. Member norms, has been shown to adopt non-incremental decision patterns. When one party is swept into power through a realigning election, or to a lesser degree, when control is wrested from a long-dominant party through a deviating election, that party is placed in a newly-found position of power. Minority leaders become majority leaders and ranking committee members become the chairs of those same committees. It is natural and rational for the new controlling party to exhibit behavior which is at variance with the status quo.

In a similar vein, we saw that when the process was decentralized through the 1885-1889 reforms, the substantive committees assumed primarily the role of advocate of their interest groups rather than proponents of economy. This was explained as a response to the external demands of constituents who were paying taxes while the government was running surpluses and members of the Appropriations Committee were following their perceived purpose of cutting expenditures. When the membership of the House saw program support being
slighted in favor of budget cutting in a period of prosperity, it responded in a rational -- albeit perhaps shortsighted -- manner by stripping the Committee of much of its power. The substantive committees used their new-found appropriating powers just as one would expect them to, they dramatically increased spending in their areas.

At this point it becomes important to view the entire process rather than focus solely on Committee action or House action on Committee reports. Examining just Committee action shows a continuation of the pre-interruption behavior. If we examine changes in amounts appropriated from one year to the next, however, we see results that are definitely non-incremental in nature. The explanation for the puzzle of incremental Committee behavior and incremental House action resulting in non-incremental budgetary behavior is found in the first part of the process, the estimation stage.

If we accept the notion of rationality that is less than comprehensive; be it the "muddling" rationality of Lindblom (1956), the satisficing behavior suggested by Simon (1969), or the bounded rationality of Padgett (1978), we can explain much of the process in terms of rational behavior on the parts of all of the actors in the process. While it is true that the budget is formally presented by the Executive, the final estimate manifests considerable Congressional input.
This is recognized by the House, as evidenced by its unwillingness to alter Committee reports. There are strong House norms to respect Committee autonomy in the area of Appropriations (Fenno, 1966). Figures 11 and 12, which show House floor action on Committee reports, provide graphic proof of the sanctity of the Committee work. Given the frequently non-incremental nature of estimates one must infer either (1) an unwillingness to alter administration budget proposals; (2) an unwillingness to alter Committee reports or threaten Committee autonomy, or (3) a general agreement with Committee decisions. I believe the evidence demands rejection of the first two interpretations. First, the House is well aware of its Constitutional mandate to initiate all money bills and has jealously guarded this right. As for a lack of will to change the process itself -- the House has radically altered the process in response to changing member preferences in 1880-1885 and again in 1920. We also know that overt changes in Appropriations behavior are now less evident as there has been increased emphasis placed on supplemental, deficit, and "backdoor" spending (Schick, 1980).

It is the third alternative which I believe offers a better explanation for the continuing increases. The belief that members trust the Appropriations Committee Membership is one which has been argued by Fenno (1966). It follows that if a symbiotic relationship exists at all levels; be-
tween Congress and the House; the House and the Committee; the Committee and the Subcommittee; and the Subcommittee and the bureau or agency presenting the estimate; one should not expect to find non-incremental behavior in the changes from one level to the next. The estimates have met with considerable scrutiny before they are considered by the Subcommittee. Estimates which are destined to meet with general disapproval are simply not presented for Committee action.

Working in concert, the authorizing committees, the appropriation subcommittees and the executive have most of the problems worked out before the estimates are presented. Thus, changes at each step of the process reflect the fine tuning of the product.

**Conclusion**

While this dissertation has focused on the Appropriations Committee it has dealt with more than a historical view of the operations of one committee. What I have attempted to show is that the process which produces appropriations is, when one removes the rhetoric so necessary to political action, quite rational, and quite simple. Simon argued that members are "made to adapt their decisions to the organization's objectives" (1947; p.79). But Congressional goals are neither as concrete nor as malleable as those in the private sector. As Cooper (1975) has pointed out, Congress faces numerous constraints in any attempt to
alter its direction or its mode of operation. When faced with such institutional and normative barriers to rapid change, the development of decision rules which are elastic enough to accommodate temporary departure from their use, is both rational and desirable.

Among the questions remaining to be answered are those which examine the role of subcommittee in greater detail. Appropriations subcommittees are afforded great latitude in making the decisions which are then followed by the entire Committee (Fenno, 1973). Knowing the extent to which these subcommittees remain autonomous and outside the "iron triangles" which promote development of "subcommittee as advocate" is crucial to our understanding of whether the institutionalization of decision making processes is beneficial in the lessening of conflict, or hazardous to the careful deliberation of crucial issues.
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