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THE STATUS OF EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

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THE STATUS OF EPISTEMOLOGY
IN THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

by

WILLIAM JAMES BARTELS

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE:

Dr. Niels C. Nielsen, Jr., Chair, Department of Religious Studies
Director

Dr. James Sellers, Professor, Department of Religious Studies

Dr. Konstatin Kolenda, Professor, Department of Philosophy

HOUSTON, TEXAS

APRIL, 1985
ABSTRACT

THE STATUS OF EPistemology
IN THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

by

WILLIAM JAMES BARTELS

In Martin Heidegger's single minded pursuit of the meaning of Being, he repeatedly dismissed epistemology as short-sighted, inept, and useless. In turn, much of the criticism of Heidegger has centered on the alleged lack of a sufficient epistemological justification for his own claims. Thus, the only possible relationship between Heidegger and epistemology seems to be one of mutual condemnation. This thesis challenges this notion.

In Heidegger's view, epistemology is the expression of a reductionistic ontology that infuses the whole Western tradition. Thus, epistemology reduces all Being to mere presence, and forces all knowledge to conform to a single standard. Heidegger condemns epistemology because he can tolerate neither its inadequate ontological premises nor its arrogant epistemological conclusions.

To avoid these limitations, the early Heidegger (H I) wanted to found ontology through a phenomenological exhibition of the transcendental structures that make it possible for man to understand Being. The understanding of Being is itself the possibility
condition of all forms of knowledge. Therefore, H I was also attempting to found epistemology. Phenomenological "sight" was to provide the knowledge necessary for this founding.

However, the later Heidegger (H II) made an epistemological leap away from knowledge as phenomenological sight and into knowledge as artistic insight. Unconcerned to found either ontology or epistemology, he wished only to reflect poetically on Being. Such reflective knowledge of Being, like artistic insight, needs no justification because it makes no truth claims. It merely expresses personal faith-like insights that are intended to be illuminating and thought provoking.

In my opinion, H I's attempted transcendental grounding of knowledge failed, and H II's thought creates an unnecessary dichotomy between artistic insight and all other forms of knowledge. But one may still gain insights from Heidegger that are relevant to epistemology. H I shows the necessity of placing any discussion of knowing within the full context of human existence as a whole. H II shows the unavoidability of holding certain faith-like basic convictions that comprise the frame within which we experience and know our world. These insights provide a promising starting point for the development of an epistemology broad enough to cover religious, aesthetic, and ethical knowledge as well as scientific knowledge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Introduction

"It is not just that Heidegger avoids developing an epistemology because he doesn't think it important: he cannot give an adequate account of knowledge because he has no basis upon which to do so -- he therefore has to write it off completely." -- Roger Waterhouse

"...here we remain completely 'natural' and disregard all the...extravagant and useless theories about knowledge." -- Martin Heidegger

The status of epistemology in the thought of Martin Heidegger? The title contains an intentional ambiguity. It can refer either to the status of "traditional epistemology" according to Heidegger or to the epistemological status of Heidegger's own work. I intend both meanings and will investigate both topics in this work. But Heidegger and epistemology? It is generally known that Heidegger's one and only driving question, the single animus of his entire philosophical endeavor, was the Seinsfragen, the question of Being.\(^1\) With equal generality it is assumed, therefore, that Heidegger has no use for epistemological concerns and conversely that anyone concerned with epistemology should

\[\text{\footnotesize---------}\]

1. This is true even if one accepts a gradual shift in Heidegger's questioning away from the meaning of Being to the truth of Being, and finally to the place of Being. Though the terminology changes, Being is still the Erfragte.
have no use for him. As the quotations that begin this introduction suggest, it seems the only possible relation between Heidegger and epistemology is one of mutual distrust and condemnation. This thesis intends to challenge this notion.

But indeed, Heidegger does frequently criticize epistemology as superficial and totally inadequate to the task he pursues. Moreover, it is certainly true that he never develops an epistemology of his own, nor does he think it necessary or even desirable to do so. Even his own methodological remarks are sparse and judged inadequate by many interpreters. Finally, when one considers the dearth of secondary material on this subject, the assumption that Heidegger has nothing to do with epistemology seems justified, and the fate of this study seems sealed.

Am I thus finished before I have begun? Not really. For one thing, the already mentioned criticism that Heidegger directs toward traditional knowledge theory can certainly be explored. This will at least clarify why Heidegger seems so hostile to epistemology and point out what is at stake in his dispute with it. But more importantly, it is my contention that just as "all epistemological statements are inherently ontological" (Paul Tillich), so all ontological statements are inherently epistemological. This means that just as any statement about how we know implies some view of what is known, so any statement
about what is implies something about the possibility and mode of its knowledge. One cannot talk of Being without some indication, even if unconscious and implicit, of how such knowledge is possible. Ontology and epistemology each imply the other suggesting that some form of reciprocal relation obtains between the two. If this is indeed the case then Heidegger's concern for the meaning of Being must somehow contain epistemic implications. It must include some indication of how one can know the meaning of Being.

Moreover, the goal of the original project of Being and Time was "fundamental ontology," and fundamental ontology is tantamount to asking how ontological knowledge is possible. In addition, all our knowledge of particular beings (ontic knowledge) is, according to Heidegger, dependent upon and made possible by ontological knowledge. Thus, it would certainly seem possible to characterize fundamental ontology as somehow being fundamental epistemology as well.

Even in the writings of the later Heidegger where truth and Being predominate and fundamental ontology is left by the wayside, it is still some kind of knowledge of the nature of truth and

2. Cf. for example, SZ, p.13 and pp.37-38; and KPM, pp.1-2.
3. The case for this will be elaborated in the course of the thesis.
Being that is sought. Granted, it is no longer conceptual knowledge, nor is it obtained through representational thinking, but it is knowledge nonetheless. Furthermore, since the later Heidegger becomes more and more concerned with what he calls the truth of Being, and since he claims more than once that the essence of knowledge is tied up with the essence of truth, it is credible to assume that even in these later works there are epistemic implications to be discovered however different and removed they may seem from those of the early works. A clarification of this difference between the implicit epistemological underpinnings of Heidegger I and Heidegger II, in addition to its intrinsic merits, could also throw light on the much discussed question of the Kehre or "turn" that takes place in Heidegger's philosophy and which necessitates the terminology of an "H I" and "H II."

One can conclude, therefore, that although it must be very carefully worked out, at times inferred, at other times built upon suggestion, an implicit epistemological conviction does lie

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4. Cf. N I, p.498, In der Frage, was Erkenntnis sei, ist im Grunde nach der Wahrheit und ihrem Wesen gefragt. See also pp.550-551, and 647-648 for other examples.

5. I use the terms Heidegger I and Heidegger II (hereafter simply H I and H II) as synonymous with the terms "early" and "late" Heidegger. No fangement as to the continuity or discontinuity between H I and H II is intended.
imbedded in Heidegger's philosophy. Thus, its investigation is a philosophically legitimate undertaking.

But the justification of my topic is not yet complete. Epistemology per se finds its proper place in the ranks of philosophy, not in theology nor even in philosophy of religion. In addition, Heidegger was neither a theologian nor was he particularly interested in religion. Why then should a thesis on epistemology and Heidegger be proffered within a department of religious studies? To answer this question requires a brief detour through some of the classic criticisms of religion.

Criticism of religion may be divided roughly into three very broad categories: 1) ontological, 2) ethical, and 3) epistemological. The first simply denies the reality of that to which religion and theology refer. Examples of this form of criticism may be found in Feuerbach (religion as projection), Marx (religion is but an empty reflection of the material world), Nietzsche (God is dead), and Freud (religion as illusion and wish-fulfillment).

The ethical criticism on the other hand does not necessarily even raise the ontological or epistemological questions. It objects rather to the pragmatic or moral effects of religion, or to some particular theologically formulated ethical system. Marx as well as Nietzsche may again be cited as representatives. Marx
believed that religion diverted potential revolutionary energy into an unrealistic hope for a better spiritual world. Religion taught people to accept their situation rather than fight to change it. Nietzsche thought Christian love was nothing but a rationalization for weakness and that Christian ethics was a "slave" ethics. Other examples of the ethical objection are Voltaire and Moliere, who constantly attacked the ecclesial hypocrisy that was rampant in their day.

The third kind of criticism, the epistemological, does not deny the reality of what supposedly lies behind religious and theological claims, rather it denies, or at least questions, the knowability of such matters. The quintessential representative of this type of criticism is the Immanuel Kant of the Critique of Pure Reason. This work suggests that the object of religious knowledge simply lies beyond the reach of the categories of human understanding. Certain theories of language or science also raise this objection -- if assertions or hypotheses must be empirically verifiable (or falsifiable), and if the divine is not empirical, then the subject matter of religion and theology is ab initio beyond the purview of human knowledge.

Any theology or philosophy of religion that wishes to speak meaningfully to the modern world must, in some way or another, take up the challenge and answer these criticisms. Any effort to
do so belongs, at least as prolegomena, to the theological endeavor. In this study I am interested only in epistemology. This proclivity is due not just to personal preference, but also to historical circumstance. If the modern age is one of worldwide domination of science and technology,⁶ and if knowledge comes to preeminence as the means of this domination, then a certain epistemological chauvinism belongs to this age as one of its determining characteristics. Thus, the epistemological criticism takes a certain precedence over the others historically, if not logically. It should be noted that neither Heidegger nor I agree with this chauvinism. Nonetheless, its pervasiveness requires a reconsideration of epistemology with a view not only to "improving" it, but also toward its critique -- in the Kantian sense of a setting within limits.

Furthermore, I believe this epistemological chauvinism has played an important role in creating a fundamental dilemma that plagues us today in the age of science and technology. On the one hand, we uphold the post-enlightenment ideal of "complete rationality," while on the other hand we realize that many of our most cherished beliefs can never measure up to this ideal. By "complete rationality" I mean the view that ideally all our beliefs

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6. As indicated, for example, by such epithets as the "atomic age," the "space age," and the "information age."
should be logically sound, empirically demonstrable, and, preferably, indubitable. According to this view, any belief or doctrine that is not scientifically sound, or cannot be supported by rational argument and certain proof, should be discarded as untenable or held in abeyance awaiting further evidence. Thus, one powerful myth of modernity is that as individuals in the age of scientific enlightenment we must free ourselves from all superstition and irrational belief, and we must look to Reason as the only key to our liberation.

Yet, in spite of this rational ideal, this myth of modernity, we discover that, in fact, we do hold certain fundamental beliefs that seem necessary to make life meaningful, but that are incapable of the kind of rational validation just described. Religious beliefs in God and the immortality of the soul, and cultural beliefs in such classical values as truth, beauty, and the good, for example, bestow meaning on our lives and imbue our actions with significance. But these ideals are neither logically necessary, nor scientifically demonstrable. They fall far short of our rational ideal.

Hence, there is a tension between our commitment to the ideal of complete rationality and our commitment to beliefs that cannot be rationally proven. This tension between our "ideal" selves and our "actual" selves produces a kind of schizophrenia within the
scientific-technological individual in modern Western societies. We are faced with equally unacceptable yet presumably inescapable alternatives -- either to retain our ideal of complete rationality and reject our most fundamental beliefs as irrational, or to maintain our cherished beliefs and acknowledge our own irrationality. The one seems to sacrifice meaning and depth for the sake of intellectual rigor whereas the other seems to sacrifice intellectual integrity and consistency for the sake of a meaningful existence.

I believe this "schizophrenia" is especially acute for modern religious people because religious knowledge is ostensibly a prototypical and glaring example of insupportable and irrational beliefs. How, then, can a successful modern scientist, engineer, or doctor, for example, whose very disciplines seem necessarily to presuppose the validity of the ideal of complete rationality, maintain religious beliefs without feeling guilty of intellectual sloppiness, irrationality, and emotionalism? Some have tried to solve the problem by finding rigorous proofs and empirical evidence for religious doctrines, thereby making religion itself into a science. I call this approach religious rationalism. Others have tried to seek refuge in a simple confession of a faith that is completely different from all other forms of knowledge, thereby divorcing religion from the rest of life. I call this the approach of mere fideism.
It is my conviction that neither religious rationalism nor mere fideism can succeed, and that there is another, potentially more fruitful way to resolve the problem. Rather than divorcing faith from reason or forcing religious knowledge to meet the epistemic standards imposed by the doctrine of complete rationality, one might instead question the notion of complete rationality itself. What if this notion turns out to be a false ideal, unattainable, perhaps even undesirable, not only in matters of religion, but even within science itself? What if an effort were made to broaden our conception of rationality in such a way that our most fundamental beliefs need not be rejected out of hand as irrational? Such a reconstruction and broadening of epistemology could go a long way toward resolving, for religious man in particular and modern man in general, the schizophrenia mentioned above, or, expressed in more traditional terms, toward reconciling faith and reason. This is the ultimate goal toward which I am moving in the present work.

Nevertheless, it is well beyond the bounds of this study to develop a full-blown theory of knowledge. My aspirations are more modest. By examining Heidegger's critique of traditional knowledge theory, inquiring into any alternative his thought might suggest, then reflecting critically on the results, I hope to take a few first steps toward such a fundamental revision of epistemology.
We see then that the working out of an epistemology amenable to its problematic is part of the prolegomena to philosophy of religion or theology. This work only anticipates and prepares for such a theory of knowledge. Its relation to religious studies is, therefore, tenuous; its ramifications for theology, oblique. Yet as participating in the constant task of responding to the arguments of theology's fault-finders and religion's gain-sayers, this study is not alien to religious studies and therefore suspect; on the contrary, it is comfortably at home there.

In summary, this study is both philosophically and "theologically" legitimate. The examination of the status of epistemology in the thought of Heidegger will make a contribution not only to Heidegger studies, but will also offer a potential contribution to epistemology, and an indirect contribution to religious studies as well. Much is required if this work is to succeed. After sharpening the focus of the problem through a review of the relevant secondary literature, I will discuss Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology. Next, I will discuss the epistemological status of Heidegger's own thought in both its early and its late stages. Finally, I will evaluate the results, clarify the relation that should exist between Heidegger and epistemology, and conclude with some remarks about this work's implications for religious studies by sketching out in very rough strokes what a revised epistemology might entail.
Chapter 1

History of Research

The immense body of literature on Heidegger grows ever greater. The most recent and complete bibliographic tool\(^1\) now lists well over five thousand works on Heidegger and his philosophy. Any attempt to trace the development or summarize the content of this research flirts unavoidably with the dangers of over-generalization and distortion. Nonetheless, even the roughest such overview will provide some sense of those themes from Heidegger’s philosophy considered most important by his interpreters and critics. In so doing it will also point out the need for this study and clarify its contribution to the research. My treatment of the general secondary literature will thus be limited to the elucidation of several broad yet readily perceptible areas of focus in the history of Heidegger scholarship. That part of the research more directly relevant to my subject matter will be discussed in greater detail.

In addition to the many attempts simply to interpret this difficult philosopher, the early works took up three main aspects of Heidegger's thought: 1) his hermeneutic phenomenology and its relation to Husserl's "pure" phenomenology, 2) his existential analyses and descriptions, and 3) his phenomenological ontology. Of these three, the second was initially the most important. For although Being and Time, the work that secured Heidegger's renown, was originally published in a journal begun by Husserl to promote phenomenology, and although the goal of the original project of this magnum opus was to reawaken an interest in ontology, it was the existential side of his thought that captured the Zeitgeist of post-World War I Europe. Even today Heidegger is often erroneously categorized as an existentialist.

In the late 1940s and early fifties two factors combined to challenge this notion and to change the focus of research. The first was the beginning of the publication of the works clearly belonging to the so-called later Heidegger. In the first of these was the 1947 "Letter on Humanism" in which Heidegger explicitly

2. There were also numerous works on Heidegger and theology. However, since these focused almost exclusively on his analysis of existence they are subsumed under that category.


rejected "existentialism" as an inappropriate categorization of his thought\(^5\) and discussed the *Kehre* or turn in his thinking from "Being and Time" to "Time and Being.\(^6\) The second factor was the appearance in the early fifties of three studies by Karl Löwith in which he not only called attention to the "turn" in Heidegger's thinking, but also argued strongly that this was a complete "turn around" or reversal of Heidegger's earlier positions.\(^7\) The combination of these two factors meant that, along with the continuing interest of scholars in the three areas already mentioned, a new theme was introduced -- that of the nature of Heidegger's "turn" and the relationship of his earlier philosophy to his post-*Kehre* thought. Although differing greatly in the details, the consensus of scholarship came to grant a marked difference in style between the early and the late Heidegger while denying any fundamental difference in subject matter. According to this now dominant view, the later Heidegger shows a change of emphasis only, not a change of position.

The continuing publication of new works by Heidegger in the

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5. For the text I used cf. WM:BH, p.326.

6. WM:BH, p.325.

next two decades again focused research upon interpretation. Discussion of how these later, often cryptic, writings were consistent with or contrary to the earlier works also continued apace. Furthermore, new topics introduced by the later Heidegger, as well as old ones now given greater emphasis, were taken up by commentators and critics. These included studies on the nature of truth, language, art (especially poetry), science and technology, and the "history of Being" (Seinsgeschichte) -- to name some of the most prominent.

Current research has been grouped by one scholar under five categories: 8 1) Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe, i.e., the publication and interpretation of his complete works; 2) the relation of the Heideggerian and Husserlian phenomenologies; 3) the problem of the temporality of Dasein and the time of Being; 9 4) Heidegger's "political philosophy" (including the controversy over Heidegger's relationship to the NSDAP); and 5) other issues. Among these other research issues Zimmerman lists Heidegger and psychology, psychoanalysis, literature, theology, Wittgenstein, and Marxism. 10 The present study would appear at first glance to be just one

9. Or, one could say, the problem of the early and the late Heidegger revisited.
10. ibid., p.280.
more incidental topic to be thrown into the somewhat nebulous last category -- other issues. This appearance is nonetheless illusory. For as I pointed out in the introduction, a clarification of the relationship between Heidegger and epistemology will aid in the understanding of Heidegger's own philosophy, especially his critique of the Western tradition, his rationale behind the project begun in *Being and Time*, and the nature of the change from *H I* to *H II*. It will also enable us better to evaluate those criticisms of Heidegger that focus on epistemology.

Relevant Research

The Separationists

What research then, has already been done on Heidegger and epistemology? As I have already said, amazingly little. And within this area there is no reassuring consensus of opinion, rather a confusion of inconsistent interpretations reigns. To begin with, there are those who suggest that Heidegger is entirely critical of epistemology, and that no positive contribution to it may be made from Heidegger's thought. This may be called the
strict separationist view of the relation between Heidegger and epistemology. The most ardent advocate of this position is Roger Waterhouse in his book, *A Heidegger Critique*. His view is aptly summarized by the quotation with which I began this work. It comes from a critical chapter devoted to "Ontology versus Epistemology." Waterhouse says, "It is not just that Heidegger avoids developing an epistemology because he doesn't think it important: he cannot give any adequate account of knowledge because he has no basis upon which to do so -- he therefore has to write it off completely." This is, of course, what is wrong with Heidegger's philosophy according to Waterhouse. Without a sufficient epistemological basis to justify his position, Heidegger's claims are more akin to personal opinion than to philosophical truth.

Paul Ricoeur is another, equally explicit proponent of this strict separationist perspective. According to Ricoeur,


13. Cf. "The Task of Hermeneutics," *Philosophy Today*, 17, Summer 1973, pp.112-128 for the basis of the following discussion. Though in agreement with Waterhouse on this point, Ricoeur is both more sympathetic to Heidegger's thought in general, and more familiar with it. Waterhouse's scathing critique is based on a misunderstanding of one part of one work -- Being and Time -- which was itself only a part of Heidegger's original project.
Heidegger took issue with Dilthey’s presupposition that hermeneutics was the theory of knowledge germane to the human sciences as opposed to the empirical methodology of the natural sciences. Heidegger changes the question from "How do we know?" to "What is the mode of Being of that being who exists as understanding?" This represents an attempt to go beyond epistemology and to disclose its ontological conditions of possibility. Hence, Ricoeur states, "the theory of knowledge is inverted from the beginning by a questioning which precedes it." 14 There is now an opposition between epistemology as an attempt to ground by derivation and fundamental ontology which tries to disengage fundamental structures through exhibition. Ricoeur concludes that, "all return to the theory of knowledge is thus forbidden." 15

As a result the Diltheyean aporia within epistemology, i.e., the impasse between two competing modes of knowing, is not resolved by Heidegger. It is transformed into an opposition between epistemology and ontology. For Heidegger, "...any return from ontology to the epistemological question...is impossible." 16 This means that the main question Heidegger leaves unanswered is, in

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14. ibid., p.121.
15. ibid., p.123.
16. ibid., p.125.
Ricoeur's opinion, how one may account for any critical evaluation within this philosophy. Ontology and epistemology remain separated by an unbridgeable chasm. The former asserts that epistemological method cannot grasp the nature of Being; the latter asserts that ontological claims cannot be justified.

D. Janicaud, in "Heidegger and Method," 17 also agrees at least implicitly with the strict separationists. This article describes two radically different styles of philosophizing and states that they seem incompatible. The first is the rigorous, rule-following method of science or metaphysics; the second is Heidegger's way, the Wandel des Fragens -- the "wandering transformation of the way of questioning." 18 Janicaud then asks if this second way has its own kind of coherence. Certainly Heidegger thinks it does, but just how is not clear. Heidegger's presupposition is that, "the relationship of man to the world does make sense, but neither exclusively nor primarily in a logical way. It makes sense insofar as language enables us to appropriate the enigma of existence and its 'given-ness' through time." 19 Nevertheless, Heidegger rejects any ultimate methodological synthesis.

18. p.144.
19. p.146.
criticizing reason and method as obstinate adversaries of thought. Is it still possible, Janicaud asks, that these two styles of philosophizing might both be justified? He implies that each has its own merits and sphere of applicability. But he gives no explicit answer to this question and his article offers no basis for believing there is any common ground between the way of rigor and the way of reflection. Heidegger's thinking, though perhaps not without a certain value, is incompatible with a methodic approach like that of epistemology.

A fourth supporter of the strict separationist position is Hans-Georg Gadamer. In his book Truth and Method\textsuperscript{20}, Gadamer also implies that Heidegger has transcended the epistemological problematic by inquiring about Dasein's kind of being, i.e., about understanding. In his hermeneutic phenomenology Heidegger has gone beyond all empirical differences and given a "transcendental interpretation of the understanding."\textsuperscript{21} This obviates the traditional pre-occupation with epistemology. Additional corroboration that Gadamer subscribes to this interpretation of Heidegger's work as a displacement of knowledge theory may be discovered merely by glancing at the table of contents. Gadamer's discussion of Heidegger's project of a hermeneutic phenomenology

\textsuperscript{20} New York, Seabury Press, 1975.

\textsuperscript{21} p.234.
occurs as a sub-division of a more general section bearing the title "the overcoming (überwindung) of the epistemological problem through phenomenological research."²² Like the other strict separationists, Gadamer believes that Heidegger does not and cannot make any positive contribution to the theory of knowledge. Epistemology is not to be redeemed by Heideggerian insights; it is to be replaced by a general theory of hermeneutics.

A final representative of the separationist position is J. P. Richardson.²³ Although this work is limited to the anthropological part of Being and Time, Richardson does attempt to show how Heidegger uses his notion of "everydayness" as an argument against traditional epistemological reasoning.²⁴ Heidegger criticizes epistemology because it is based on a limited ontology (that of the present-at-hand) yet presumes to be universally applicable. When it oversteps its limits by conceiving of man as an entity present-at-hand, i.e., merely extant, it distorts man's being.²⁵ Thus, Heidegger only attacks

²² Cf. table of contents and p.124.
²³ John Pratt Richardson, Heidegger and Ordinary Language Approaches to Epistemology, Ph.D. diss., UC-Berkeley, 1981.
²⁴ p.2.
²⁵ p.88.
epistemology. Rather than resolve its problem, he attempts to restructure it. And regardless of whether or not this attempt succeeds, epistemology is to be left behind. One must presume therefore, that Heidegger's thought offers no positive contribution to the theory of knowledge.

The Foundationalists

At the other extreme are those who believe that Heidegger's thought is directly related to epistemology as ground to tree, i.e., the former makes possible and supports the latter. Heidegger could have developed a revised and revitalized epistemology, but eschewed this in favor of more pressing tasks. He tilled the ground, but he did not plant the tree. It is thus a rather straightforward task for his interpreters to develop the theory of knowledge for which Heidegger laid the groundwork. H. Llera, in "Possibilidades Epistemológicas de la Filosofía Existencial," 26 is representative of this view. He presents four topics which he believes to be of fundamental importance for any theory of knowledge. These are: 1) the subject-object correlation, 2) the act of knowing, 3) the function of the intellect as the possibility of

knowing, and 4) the categories of the understanding. After discussing these and their epistemological importance, Llera concludes that Heidegger's philosophy effects substantial modifications in these four areas and thus offers the possibility of developing a new epistemology based on these insights.²⁷ Llera does not carry out this development however, nor does he even discuss Heidegger's views on these four concepts. But his article does affirm that Heidegger's philosophy offers the basis for a reworking of epistemology.

In "Les Structures Fondamentales de la Vie Cognitive,"²⁸ J. V. Weile goes somewhat further than Llera in asserting Heidegger's relevance to epistemology. Believing that the anthropological part of Being and Time remains valid even after the Kehre, Weile begins with the nature of the Dasein as disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) and asks what this means when considered from the viewpoint of human knowledge. The legitimacy of this question lies in that "the concept of disclosedness must be considered as a reconsideration of the concept of ratio, of reason. It represents an effort to think, in a more inclusive and original fashion, the

²⁷. Llera, p.413.

essence of man as a knowing being." 29  Whereas the traditional concept of ratio as lumen naturale is an ontic force providing the primordial and necessary concepts for knowledge, disclosedness is an ontological structure which is phenomenologically discernible and not limited to concepts. It is rather the horizon for our encounter with entities. 30  Since one must encounter an entity before it can be known, disclosedness, as this horizon of encounter, is the primordial basis of knowledge. Thus, Weile also points to the possibility of developing the epistemic repercussions of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. And he goes further than Llera by presenting Heidegger's description of disclosedness and highlighting its importance as the ultimate fundament of all human dealings with the world -- including knowing.

A third proponent of the view that Heidegger lays the ground for epistemology is K. O. Apel. His work Dasein und Erkennen is directly concerned with epistemology and how Heidegger's work bears upon it. Apel's main purpose is "...to work out the laying of the foundation of epistemology which is bound up with

29. p.98, Or le concept d'ouverture doit être considéré comme une reprise de celui de ratio, de raison. Il représente un effort pour penser l'essence de l'homme comme être connaissant d'une façon plus enveloppante et plus originaire.

30. p.102.
[Heidegger's] new way of posing the question of Being."³¹ For, Apel believes, in Heidegger's laying of the foundation of the doctrine of Being, a completely new concept of the essence of human knowledge is accomplished (p.5). Whereas traditional knowledge theorists have dealt only with the "known world" and ignored the "lived world," Heidegger realizes that the former is only a part of the latter. Thus, the Kantian question about the possibility conditions of the objectivity of the object is radicalized and deepened by Heidegger into the question about the possibility conditions of the understanding of Being. In other words, the logical a priori of consciousness becomes the existential a priori of the finite Dasein's understanding of Being (p.36). Hence, in Heidegger's claim that the Dasein's mode of being is to understand Being "...is expressed the epistemological beginning of Heidegger's fundamental ontology."³²

What Heidegger accomplishes is a transcendental phenomenology of the whole of existence, not just of objective knowing. But such a transcendental-hermeneutic phenomenology cannot describe

³¹ Dasein und Erkennen. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Interpretation der Philosophie Martin Heideggers, Phil. diss., Bonn, 1950, p.5, ...sie die mit der Neustellung [Heideggers] der Frage nach dem Sein verbundene erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegung Herauszuarbeiten sucht.

³² p.39, ...ist der erkenntnistheoretische Ansatz der Heideggerschen Fundamentalontologie ausgesprochen.
presuppositionless "essences." Rather, it needs a horizon of possibility from which the understanding can guide the description. This horizon is the understanding of Being as projection upon one's own ability to be. In sum, Heidegger has gone beyond Kant's logical a priori of the "known world" by uncovering the existential a priori of the "lived world", i.e., to-be-understanding (zu-sein-verstehen). And, as Apel puts it, "this to-be-understanding is the original knowledge in the sense of an existential theory of knowledge. In it is rooted the pre-scientific and scientific forms of knowledge with all of their particular methodic starting points." Like Llera and Weile, Apel sees Heidegger's philosophy as the foundation of knowledge theory. Ontology is the infrastructure upon which the epistemological super-structure is built.

The Reciprocalists

Yet a third interpretation of Heidegger's relation to epistemology lies somewhere between the two opposing views

33. p.46.
34. p.231. Diese zu-sein-verstehen ist die Urerkenntnis im Sinne einer existenzialen Erkenntnistheorie. In ihm wurzeln die vorwissenschaftlichen und wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisarten mit all ihren methodischen Sonderansätzen.
already discussed. The separationists hold that there is no conceivable positive relation between Heidegger's thought and knowledge theory; the foundationalists hold that there is a direct, one-way relation -- Heidegger's thought lays the ground for epistemology. The third position however, asserts that a reciprocal relation between the two obtains. I will call it the reciprocalist position. According to this view, Heidegger does offer insights valuable to epistemology and his criticism of it is often legitimate. Nonetheless, Heidegger's wholesale dismissal of knowledge theory is simply wrong-headed for his own claims must be justifiable by some sufficient epistemology or else they carry no weight and are not compelling. Epistemology needs ontological depth, but ontology needs epistemological validation.

This third opinion is clearly held by P. L. Bourgeois. After granting that Heidegger has successfully overcome the epistemological separation of subject from object, and undercut the methodological controversies of the 19th century between the natural and human sciences, Bourgeois states that "the present paper is intended to show that Heidegger's fundamental ontology does not necessarily exclude a reciprocity between ontology and

epistemology at a foundational level."\(^{36}\)

Acknowledging the validity of one of Heidegger's criticisms, Bourgeois points out that the problem with traditional epistemology is that "...it has failed to get below the derived mode of being of the present-at-hand."\(^{37}\) Therefore, a revamped epistemology which overcomes this limitation is necessary. On the other hand, Bourgeois tells us, Heidegger himself "...has failed epistemologically on two counts."\(^{38}\) First of all, he has not seen that the implicit epistemic dimensions of hermeneutic phenomenology can be developed into an epistemology. Secondly, he has not seen that this epistemic dimension must be made explicit since existence is foundational for both ontology and epistemology.

Thus, Bourgeois concludes that Heidegger is certainly relevant to knowledge theory, for fundamental ontology "...both grounds epistemology and is epistemology."\(^{39}\) It grounds epistemology because knowing is a derivative mode of Dasein's being as comprehension (and fundamental ontology discloses this mode of

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37. p.374-375.
38. p.376.
being). And it is epistemology since this comprehension is the fundamental epistemic strata of Dasein when looked at from an epistemological viewpoint. But Heidegger failed to develop this dimension and he was wrong to consider it unnecessary or impossible to do so. Ontology and epistemology are mutually interdependent.

C. F. Gethmann also takes this third position. Heidegger's question about the meaning of Being is a transcendental question "about the a priori synthesis as the ground of the knowledge of the objects of knowledge." By disclosing the understanding of Being which forms the a priori synthesis as the horizon within which entities may be encountered, Heidegger intended to show that this horizon must also determine the meaning of Being. And this meaning of Being is not to be thought of as a thesis about Being, but as the transcendental ground from which any possible thesis about Being could be understood. According to Gethmann, Heidegger never intended to ask "What can we know about Being?", but "How could we possibly know about Being?". Thus, like the foundationalists, Gethmann holds that Heidegger's work is not

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41. p. 39. ...nach der Syntheses a priori als Grund der Erkenntnis der Gegenstände der Erkenntnis...
critical epistemology; rather it is meta-critical in that it questions one step further, going back to ask "...about the possibility conditions for any epistemology whatsoever."\textsuperscript{42}

Unlike the simple foundationalists however, Gethmann criticizes Heidegger for failing to stick to this positive beginning. It is his conviction that there must be a methodological continuity embracing the whole of Heidegger's philosophy and that therefore, "...the method of Heidegger's whole philosophy is to be understood only from the [perspective of] the fundamental transcendental philosophical beginning."\textsuperscript{43} Even the post-Kehre material, though radically different in style and vocabulary, should still be concerned with the transcendental problem of the a priori synthesis posed by the early Heidegger. However, Gethmann thinks that the later Heidegger's wholesale critique of methodic thinking is inconsistent with the earlier transcendental view, and a corruption of it. For H II, all methodic thinking is powerless when it comes to Being, and his own reflections on Being are ostensibly outside of, and immune to, any critical evaluation. This Gethmann can not accept. Heidegger's later disavowal of

\textsuperscript{42} p.160, ...fragt nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit für Erkenntnistheorie überhaupt.

\textsuperscript{43} pp.12-13, ...die Methode der gesamten Philosophie heideggers nur von dem tranzendentalphilosophischen Grundansatz her zu verstehen ist.
method is a betrayal of his earlier transcendental approach; nonetheless, the early work remains relevant to epistemology in spite of Heidegger's own opinion to the contrary.

A third ally of the reciprocity of ontology and epistemology is M. Brelage. In his collection of essays, *Studien zur Transzendentalphilosophie*, Brelage argues for the necessity of coupling transcendental philosophy to the positive sciences. He proposes that the notion of concrete subjectivity is the means to this end. Heidegger represents, for Brelage, this change from transcendental philosophy to concrete subjectivity. Thus, Heidegger's philosophy would point toward the founding of a theory of knowledge on an analysis of the knowing subject and for this reason is relevant to epistemologists. Yet Heidegger himself did not aim at a concretization of the problem of the epistemological subject for he rejected both the theory of the subject and the discipline of epistemology as based on an unsuitable ontological starting point. Like the strict separationists then, Brelage realizes that Heidegger no longer raises an objection within epistemology, but objects to knowledge theory in general. Heidegger would replace epistemology with the disclosure of the ontological possibility conditions for


45. p.31.
knowledge. His position is therefore a pure "a priorism" for "all knowledge of entities is grounded on knowledge of Being." And Being is never thought of as the ground of reality (Seiendheit), but only as the ground of reality's unconcealment. Being is a transcendental possibility condition for the knowledge of entities. But Brelage goes on to ask whether this ontological groundlaying of knowledge is really sufficient in itself or whether it must not eventually give way to a new, though modified, theory of knowledge. He believes that it must. Ontological claims must themselves be capable of epistemic validation.

Although Heidegger certainly thought his critique destroyed all epistemology, it only applies, according to Brelage, to theories of knowledge based on the presupposition of the bifurcation of reality into subject and object. And it is exactly here, in Heidegger's radical rethinking of the "subjectivity of the subject" that his thought offers a positive contribution to knowledge theory. Again we see here the view that epistemology needs ontological clarification, but ontology needs epistemological justification. The two are reciprocally related.

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46. p.32, ...alle Erkenntnis von Seiendem [gründet] in Erkenntnis des Seins.
47. p.44.
A final advocate of the reciprocalist group is Charles B. Guignon. Guignon is concerned with showing how Heidegger's work bears upon the traditional problem of skepticism regarding the existence of objects in the external world. This skepticism results from the post-Cartesian dichotomy of the world into subject and object. Hence, Heidegger's contribution to epistemology lies in the way he deflates its basic assumptions about the subject-object relation and its concomitant idea of justification while offering a new understanding of the epistemic structure of our lives. Heidegger's thought does contribute to epistemology then, even though Being and Time was explicitly designed to bypass the presuppositions of epistemology. But Guignon thinks that ultimately Heidegger cannot bypass epistemology for one must ask how the results of fundamental ontology can be justified. Although authenticity is supposed to provide the criterion for such justification, just how it is to do so remains unclear. Moreover, even if the needed clarity were


49. Cf. the preface, p. vii.

50. p.5.

51. p.38.

52. p.330.
obtainable, what would become of competing claims to authenticity? Heidegger has no way to resolve this problem. Hence, he succeeds in the "negative" side of his task -- the critique of the subject-object split; but he fails in the "positive" side -- his own fundamental ontology is left without a satisfying justification. Guignon concludes that since one can never exit from the historical/linguistic structure that makes all understanding possible, one can never claim that epistemology "precedes" ontology or that ontology "grounds" epistemology. The two always remain reciprocally related and necessarily so.

Summary

This synopsis of the research displays a bewildering variety of different, often inconsistent, opinions on Heidegger's possible relation to epistemology. The strict separationists say there is no possible point of intersection between Heidegger's interests on the one hand, and an epistemologist's on the other. To recapitulate the metaphor of ground and tree, this view holds that whatever the status of Heidegger's ontological ground, it is

53. p.334.
separated by a vast ocean from the epistemological "tree" which grows on an altogether different continent. At the other end of the spectrum, the foundationalists hold that there is a relation, and that it is positive, direct, and unilateral: Heidegger's philosophy grounds epistemology. Between these two extremes are the reciprocalists. They hold that there is a possible positive relation, but it is neither as direct nor as one-sided as the foundationalists believe. Some Heideggerian insights are valuable for knowledge theory, but Heidegger himself would have benefited had he recognized the need for a more satisfying epistemological basis.

What are we to make of such a broad range of opinion held by competent scholars? For one thing, it is a testimony to the ambiguity of Heidegger's writings and the difficulty of interpreting him. But is this degree of difficulty so great that we are simply condemned to wander about in this relativity of opinion with no basis to choose between competing alternatives other than personal bias or whim? No. There is yet another, more significant, reason for the diversity of view. It is quite simply that no one has yet investigated the relation of Heidegger and epistemology in both a thorough and systematic way. Of the works treated here, seven were relatively short articles or essays necessarily limited either to sweeping generalities or to an extremely narrow focus. And most of these showed a remarkable
bias in favor of *Being and Time* and a neglect of the later works. Two of the remaining works were occupied primarily with other themes and only discussed Heidegger and epistemology in an incidental way. Only the three dissertations dealt explicitly with Heidegger and epistemology in some depth, but these too concentrate almost exclusively on *Being and Time*, and two of them offered no critical evaluation of Heidegger whatsoever. No one has carefully and thoroughly examined the nature of Heidegger's early critique and later complete rejection of epistemology. No one has examined independently both the early and the late Heidegger's views on knowledge, knowing, and how he believes his own thought to be justified without recourse to epistemology. How then can one decide upon the exact nature of Heidegger's relation to knowledge theory with any significant degree of probability? As we have seen, one cannot. It is exactly this lacuna that the present study intends to fill. Only after Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology has been presented, and the epistemological bases of *H I* and *H II* elucidated, will I attempt to describe the exact relation between Heidegger and epistemology.
Chapter 2

The Status of Traditional Epistemology According to Heidegger

Introduction

Our task in this chapter is two-fold. First we must clarify what is meant by "traditional" epistemology. Secondly, we must present Heidegger's critique of it. The importance of this task should not be underestimated. For we cannot hope to understand fully, nor evaluate fairly, Heidegger's epistemological position until we are secure in our knowledge of what Heidegger understands to be at stake in traditional epistemology and exactly why he is at odds with it. In fact, one of the greatest weaknesses in the already limited research on Heidegger and epistemology is the almost total neglect of just such a preliminary endeavor. Some of the works cited in the previous
chapter are simply silent on the matter.\textsuperscript{1} Others merely hint that Heidegger criticizes epistemology as derivative and limited in scope.\textsuperscript{2} Brelage presupposes that Heidegger's critique of epistemology is already well-known.\textsuperscript{3} Each of two other studies exhausts the subject in a sentence, citing only the most general aspect with no elaboration -- Heidegger criticizes knowledge theory because it is based on an unexamined and inadequate ontology.\textsuperscript{4} Richardson makes this point as well and adds that even Dasein's own kind of Being is distorted when viewed through the prism of this inadequate ontology.\textsuperscript{5} In Guignon's work section 13 is entitled "The Critique of Traditional Epistemology." Here Guignon states that Heidegger criticizes the finitude of traditional epistemology, but he is more concerned with whether this criticism must not fall back against Heidegger's own project and undermine it, than with the nature of the limitations of traditional knowledge theory.\textsuperscript{6} Waterhouse dedicates a chapter to the problem of ontology versus epistemology, but in it he is

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1. Cf. the articles by Llera, Weile, and Janicaud.
2. Cf. the works by Gethmann, Ricoeur, and Gadamer.
3. p.31
4. Cf. the studies by Apel and Bourgeois.
5. Richardson, pp.73-74 and p.88.
preoccupied more with his own critique of Heidegger than with Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology. In short, there is simply no work that discusses the nature of Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology in any detail. The present chapter intends to fill this gap in the research.

Before attempting to define traditional epistemology a preliminary word on method is in order. I have already mentioned certain differences between the early and the late works which necessitate the terms H I and H II, and I have hinted that some of these differences may be quite significant for this study. Nevertheless, I will make no fundamental distinction at this point between the early and the late Heidegger. This is because Heidegger's conception of traditional epistemology and his critique of it were in the main already established in the early works. Although there is a change of vocabulary in the later works, Heidegger's position regarding traditional epistemology remains essentially the same. It is true that his critique becomes less cautiously stated and his attacks more globally formulated. Yet this can readily be seen more as a natural expansion of his earlier position than as a change in it. Therefore, in this chapter while discussing the characteristics of traditional epistemology and its limitations in Heidegger's eyes, I will draw

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7. Waterhouse, pp.149-163.
from Heidegger's entire corpus with little regard to the chronological position of individual works. Heidegger's position regarding traditional knowledge theory remains, for the most part, constant throughout his writings.

Definition of Traditional Epistemology

I am using the words "traditional epistemology" as a technical term with a precise meaning that I will subsequently develop. Let it be noted immediately however, that while Heidegger does use the term "traditional epistemology," its occurrence in his writings is, nonetheless, rare. More frequently he refers simply to epistemology in general with no further qualification, or to some "particular," "favorite," or "current" theory of knowledge. "Traditional epistemology" is therefore by no means a key word or technical term in the Heideggerian vocabulary and my use of it as such is admittedly somewhat artificial. Nonetheless, though it is used here at my discretion, I maintain that it is an adequate and legitimate expression of Heidegger's intent. For whether Heidegger speaks of epistemology generally, in an all-encompassing manner, or specifically of a particular epistemological interpretation, one comes quickly to the
conclusion that he means ultimately the same thing. The term has a unity of meaning and function for Heidegger that will undoubtedly seem strange and unacceptable to modern epistemologists familiar with the multiplicity of competing theories of knowledge. Yet Heidegger himself explicitly says that "...in spite of the numerous epistemological standpoints...there has been and is yet but one single interpretation of the essence of knowledge..."8 It is this belief in the essential unity of epistemological interpretation that allows Heidegger to mean the same thing whether he refers to epistemology in general, traditional epistemology, or some particular theory of knowledge. What is this unifying meaning of knowledge? What justifies this apparently indiscriminate lumping together of all theories of knowledge, no matter how diverse, into a single category? How does the adjective "traditional" apply? These questions must be answered before we can understand Heidegger’s critique of traditional epistemology.

To begin with we will dismiss some things that Heidegger does not mean in asserting the essential unity of all epistemology. He does not mean that there are no significant differences in the details of the various theories of knowledge. Even for Heidegger

8. N I, p.561, ...es trotz der zahllosen erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunkte...bisher doch nur eine einzige Auslegung des Wesens der Erkenntnis gibt...
it is patently obvious that the empiricist school, on the one hand, with its assertion that all knowledge is a posteriori, and the idealist tradition, on the other hand, which espouses both the possibility and the necessity of a priori knowledge, are not in agreement. Likewise, Heidegger is not so foolish as to think that Descartes and Kant, Plato and Nietzsche are all "really" saying the same thing although employing different vocabularies. The unity of which Heidegger speaks is not an identity of theoretical content.

Nor does he mean to assert a unity in the conclusions drawn by these different theories or in the results they obtain, e.g., that knowledge is possible, that it can be justified somehow, that it can be communicated, etc. Certainly a radical skeptic's conclusions are different from those of his less skeptical colleagues. And even among those who agree that knowledge is possible there are those who are uncertain as to how explicitly and formally it can be justified. Heidegger is not unaware of these differences nor does he deny them.

If, then, Heidegger proposes neither a unity of theoretical content nor a unity of practical conclusions, what kind of unity does he claim? If he would in fact agree that these differences are both real and significant, how can he still posit a fundamental unity underlying them all? Don't the conclusions of the previous
paragraphs actually contradict Heidegger's claim quoted above that in all epistemologies there is but a single interpretation of the essence of knowledge? The key to the problem of the fundamental unity of epistemological interpretation lies in the adjective "fundamental." Heidegger asserts that in spite of the plethora of epistemological theories and the widely divergent opinions regarding both their content and their conclusions, there is none-theless one fundamental attitude or presupposition -- better still, "pre-position" -- underlying them all. There is no single interpretation on the theoretical level, rather there is a shared philosophical/metaphysical pre-position which is the common basis upon which the different theories are constructed. It is to this universally shared pre-position that Heidegger points when asserting that there is but a single interpretation of the essence of knowledge. The assertion of the fundamental unity of epistemological interpretation points to the common fundament which unifies all interpretations of knowledge. This common ground, which Heidegger calls the "metaphysical fundamental position,"9 is

9. Cf. N I, p.455, ...die metaphysische Grundstellung... The concept is not entirely clear. Heidegger uses it in this "once and for all" sense, but also speaks of Nietzsche's own metaphysical fundamental position. I take this to mean that there is only one ultimate metaphysical fundamental position -- Being as abiding presence. But there have been many ways of conceptualizing this position in the course of history. Nietzsche's own way would be Nietzsche's own metaphysical fundamental position, but this would still be a version of the original fundamental position.
the ontology of the present-at-hand,\textsuperscript{10} that is, of the merely extant.

A brief excursus on Heidegger's understanding of the beginning of Western philosophy will help us to understand this better. According to Heidegger, the original impetus to true philosophizing, be it at the beginning of Greek philosophy or in the present, is to be found in \textit{astonishment}, in a sense of wonder that anything \textit{is} at all. This astonishment leads to the question -- What then, is being? To ask and answer this question is the "first and authentic task of philosophy."\textsuperscript{11} When the pre-socratic philosophers circumscribed this question by asking it for the first time, the beginning of Western philosophy attained its "essential conclusion."\textsuperscript{12} But this original question was not unfolded \textit{as} a question. Rather answers were quickly seized upon without previously reflecting on the question itself. The answer thus seized upon by the Greeks and retained until the present is what Heidegger calls the metaphysical fundamental position.\textsuperscript{13} The question is what is Being in general. The answer, all too quickly

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\textsuperscript{10} Cf. SZ, for a discussion of the meaning of present-at-hand.

\textsuperscript{11} N I, p.452, ...ist die erste und eigentliche Aufgabe der Philosophie...

\textsuperscript{12} N I, p.452, ...wesentlichen Abschluß.

\textsuperscript{13} cf. N I, pp.455-456.
given, was that Being is presence, which came to mean present-at-hand, i.e., simply being extant. Because this ontology of the present-at-hand became the dominant position of the entire Western tradition every theory or statement about anything in this tradition, including knowledge, is shot through with the implications of this inadequate and unexamined ontological starting point.

To return to the issue of the essential unity of all epistemological points of view, we see that, according to Heidegger, the Western tradition too hurriedly seized upon a notion about Being (Being = being extant), which has unified and singularly influenced every field of human inquiry since then. This metaphysical fundamental position, what I have called a pre-position, is the belief, universally transmitted by the tradition, unquestioningly appropriated from it, that Being is nothing but the quality of being "on hand," available for human perception, amenable to human purposes, malleable by human action. It is this ontological tunnel vision -- not theoretical or practical agreement -- which Heidegger implicates in his claim of a single interpretation of the essence of knowledge. It is this common myopic starting point for the entire Western philosophical tradition, including epistemology, that enables Heidegger to mean always the same thing whether he speaks of epistemology generally or particularly. Hence, Heidegger's claim is both
profound in intent and sweeping in scope. He is making a claim about nothing less than the fundamental attitude and presupposition of the whole of Western history. Heidegger's views on epistemology, therefore, involve not just a philosophical counterclaim to a particular theory of knowledge, but a distinctive reading of the entire history of Western philosophy.

The term "traditional epistemology" as I employ it then, includes every theory of knowledge in the Occidental tradition. It includes them all because according to Heidegger they all share the same metaphysical fundamental position. It does not refer to a particular theory of knowledge that has gained currency and maintained popularity in recent history, as would be suggested, for example, in music by the term "traditional folk song." Rather it signifies the common predisposition and approach of the entire Western tradition to matters epistemological. "Traditional epistemology" does not refer to an epistemological theory within the tradition, but to the fundamental epistemological attitude of the whole tradition.

If there is, as Heidegger thinks, such a common starting point lying at the base of every reflection on knowledge, then one would expect to find certain similarities or points of agreement between the various theories of knowledge regardless of their many differences. These common tendencies or trends would constitute
the essential characteristics of what is to be included in our technical term "traditional epistemology." It is just these essential characteristics of traditional epistemology that we must be sure of before we can present or understand Heidegger's critique of it. One way of doing this would be to sift through Heidegger's writings for relevant passages then list these characteristics as we discover them. But such a procedure would risk being disconnected, redundant, and perhaps sterile, bereft of any clear cut unifying framework. For these reasons I will eschew this approach. A more productive approach -- and the one I will follow -- would be to present Heidegger's view of the historical development of our ideas about knowledge noting common elements as we go. After all, Heidegger's position is more an interpretation of the whole history of philosophy than a discussion of particular themes within it. Moreover, the historical framework will provide a unity to the exposition that would likely be lacking in the "search and list" approach.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that nowhere does Heidegger explicitly undertake such a presentation of the history of epistemological interpretation in its entirety. Rather, he gives us bits and pieces which must be gathered where found then synthesized into a picture of the whole historical development. Thus, the structure and development of what follows are my own, though the particular interpretations are, of course, Heidegger's.
After presenting this Heideggerian interpretation of the history of epistemology, I will summarize what has been learned about the nature and meaning of traditional epistemology. This summarizing description will accomplish what I mean by a "definition" of traditional epistemology as Heidegger understands it.

A Heideggerian History of Epistemological Interpretation

At the beginning of Greek thought there was a primordial disclosure of Being. This disclosure, together with the question about Being that it spawned, constitute the beginning of Western history.\(^{14}\) What was this disclosure? What was revealed therein? Simply astonishment that beings \textit{were} at all. "Entities in Being -- that became the most astonishing thing for the Greeks."\(^ {15}\) Hence, Greek philosophy (and all true philosophy) begins with astonishment that anything should be at all. "Astonishment...is

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\(^{14}\) WM:VWW, p.187.

\(^{15}\) WP, p.48, Seiendes im Sein: dies wurde für die Griechen das Erstaunlichste.
the arche, the beginning, of philosophy," it "carries and pervades philosophy."\(^{16}\) Even later, with Plato and Aristotle, astonishment that beings are in Being is recognized as the proper impetus to philosophizing.\(^{17}\) But at the very beginning, before the Sophists, philosophy meant something quite different than it does now. "Philo-sophia" meant being in harmony with the "sophon," corresponding to its self-manifestation. The "sophon" means "all beings are in Being."\(^{18}\) To be in harmony with this "sophon" is apparently equivalent to preserving this most astonishing thing -- that beings are in Being. And one preserves this by maintaining a sense of inquisitive wonder regarding Being. Later however, in reaction to the skepticism and arguments of the Sophists, those who loved the "sophon" had to protect it and preserve this astonishing thing from its detractors. This led to a striving after the "sophon," a desire to grasp it definitively and in this way pass it on. This yearning search for the "sophon" became the question "What is being in so far as it is?" Only at this time, and only with the asking of this question, does thinking become "philosophy" -- that is, the sphere of inquiry that we customarily mean by this term.

\(^{16}\) WP, p.80, Das Erstaunen ist...die \(\ddot{a}rche\) der Philosophie. Das Erstaunen trägt und durchherrscht die Philosophie.

\(^{17}\) WP, pp.79-85.

\(^{18}\) WP, p.49, Alles Seiende ist im Sein.
Thus, the earliest Greek thinkers, Heraclitus and Parmenides, were not "philosophers," but "greater thinkers" who were in harmony with the "sophon." It would be left for Socrates and Plato to take the first step into "philosophy." And two centuries after Heraclitus, it would fall to Aristotle to take the last step by characterizing philosophy's goal as the question "What is a being?" (to ὄν). This question was and remains the "leading question of metaphysics."  

Henceforth, the history of the West has been the continuing search for the right word to describe being as a whole. But every word proposed fails to measure up. They fail because this leading question, "What is a being?" was never unfolded as a question, that is, it was never reflected upon to determine just what was being asked about. Instead, because of the yearning for a secure grasp of the "sophon," answers to the question, "What is a being?" were all too quickly seized upon. Thereby the original Greek experience of Being as "emerging presence" was distorted into the concept of "permanent presence." The leading question of metaphysics "What is a being?" was answered as

19. WP, pp.52-59, Was ist das Seiende?
20. NI, pp.455-456, die Leitfrage der Metaphysik.
21. NI, p.492.
22. NI, p.455.
"abiding presence" and this answer has remained in effect throughout the entire history of Western metaphysics.\textsuperscript{23}

This answer is what Heidegger elsewhere calls the ontology of the present-at-hand.\textsuperscript{24} It is this answer, given before the leading question was properly unfolded, that Heidegger calls the metaphysical fundamental position. As the fundament for Occidental metaphysics it has left its indelible mark upon everything in Western philosophy.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the concept of knowledge too is affected by the metaphysical fundamental position. It too undergoes a progressive conceptual distortion in the same way that the understanding of Being did. How was knowledge originally understood by the Greeks? We look to Heraclitus and Parmenides for the answer.

\textbf{Heraclitus and Parmenides}

For Heraclitus Being includes in an original unity much that was separated by later philosophers. Being is \textit{logos} (gathering), \textit{harmonia}, \textit{aletheia} (unconcealment), \textit{physis} (emerging power), and

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phainesthai (self-manifestation). Since, for Heraclitus, the nature of knowledge is determined by the nature of truth, to know must be to see what is unconcealed in aletheia, to apprehend what is manifested in phainesthai. Heidegger says,

for Heraclitus knowing means the apprehending of that which shows itself, the guarding of the appearance as the "view" that something offers, of the "image" in the specific sense of phantasia. In knowing, the true is held fast; the self-showing, the image is taken up and taken into possession; the true is the imaged-in image. Truth is image-in-ation, but the latter understood in the Greek sense, not "psychologically," not epistemologically.

While the precise sense of this apprehending or taking into possession (imaging-in) of the true that, for Heraclitus, constitutes knowledge remains ambiguous, it is to be understood according to Heidegger as fundamentally different from any later notion of subject-perceiving-object. It is somehow a simple reception and preservation of what shows itself, the apprehending of the true.

Turning now to Parmenides, Heidegger tells us that he "...stood

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27. N I, p.506, Für Heraklit heißt Erkennen: das Festnehmen dessen, was sich zeigt, das Bewachen des Anblicks als der >>Ansicht<<, die etwas bietet, des >>Bildes<< im bezeichneten Sinne der phantasia. Im Erkennen wird das Wahre festgehalten; das Sichzeigende, das Bild, wird in den Besitz auf- und ein-genommen; das Wahre ist das ein-gebildete Bild. Wahrheit ist Ein-bildung; das Wort aber jetzt griechisch gedacht, nicht >>psychologisch<<, nicht erkenntnis-theoretisch-neuzeitlich. (Cf. pp.504-507 for a fuller discussion).
on the same ground as Heraclitus." Thus, for Parmenides too Being is a unifying whole wherein \textit{logos} and \textit{physis} belong together for the sake of \textit{aletheia} (unconcealment). Parmenides famous dictum, \textit{to ga\=r noe\=in estin te kai einai}, normally rendered as "thinking and being are the same," actually means something quite different. According to Heidegger, \textit{noe\=in} means to apprehend, to let something come to one by taking a receptive attitude toward what shows itself. \textit{Being, einai}, means entering into unconcealment and is thus that which shows itself to apprehension. And \textit{to auto}, "the same," does not mean simple identity, but an essential belonging togetherness. Hence, the quotation from Parmenides means "apprehension occurs for the sake of Being. Being occurs essentially only as appearing..." For Parmenides too, then, knowing is apprehension of what shows itself. Being and knowing (apprehension) co-determine each other in an original unity.

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29. EM, p.105.

30. EM, p.106.

31. EM, p.106.


33. In Parmenides \textit{noe\=in} and \textit{einai} function analogously to Heraclitus' terms \textit{logos} and \textit{physis} respectively.
In both of these thinkers truth is recognized as the essential in knowledge. Truth as aletheia is the uncovering or revelation of Being. Thus, to know is to have seen that which uncovers itself. This was called technē by the early Greeks, for technē is a bringing-forth out of concealment.\(^34\) Hence, it is Heidegger's view that the nature of truth as unconcealment flashed momentarily in Greek thought,\(^35\) and that knowledge, as determined by the nature of truth, was the apprehension of the unconcealed.\(^36\) But even at the beginning, truth as unconcealment was not fully thought out, nor has it ever been subsequently in Western philosophy. And knowledge was but for a moment determined by the nature of truth. To know was to see what showed itself and to remain in harmony with this revelation. There is thus in Heidegger's understanding of the original disclosure of Being something akin to King Arthur's view of the accomplishments of Camelot, a sense of "one brief shining moment" that was magnificent but ephemeral.

\(^{34}\) HW:UK, p.47, and N I, pp.97 and 494.

\(^{35}\) HW:UK, pp.39-40.

\(^{36}\) N I, p.551.
Plato and Aristotle

With Plato several important changes in the understanding of Being, truth, and knowing take place that have immense consequences and shape the history of Occidental metaphysics from then on. Being becomes idea, truth becomes correspondence, and knowing becomes approximation to what is to be known.37 The Greek word idea means that which is seen in the aspect it offers. What is offered is the appearance, and "the appearance of a thing is that...wherein it is present as what it is, i.e., in the Greek sense, is."38 Being as idea, as coming to appearance, includes both the fact that something is, and what it is (i.e., what is subsequently referred to as existentia and essentia respectively). "Thus the idea constitutes the Being of an entity."39 Here idea means everything that can be perceived, not just the visibly perceptible.

But if idea means appearance, does this not grow out of the

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37. For the following discussion see WM:PLW, pp.201-236, and EM, pp.137-140.

38. EM, p.138, Das Aussehen eines Ding ist das...worin und als was es an-west, d.h. im griechischen Sinne ist.

39. EM, p.138, So macht die ı́sı́2 das Sein des Seienden aus.
same experience of physis that Heraclitus and Parmenides shared? Yes, answers Heidegger, idea is a "necessary consequence of the essence of Being as emerging appearance." But the important thing "is not that physis should have been characterized as idea but that idea should have become the sole and decisive interpretation of Being." This is due to the consequence being exalted to the level of the essence itself, which amounts to a distortion of the essence. Furthermore, idea came to be synonymous with what an entity is while the fact that an entity is became secondary. True being is whatness (ontos on); thatness is a deformation of true being (me on).

The idea now becomes a paradeigma, a model. At the same time, the idea necessarily becomes an ideal. The copy actually "is" not; it merely partakes of Being, methexis. The chorismos, the cleft, has been opened between the idea as what really is, the prototype and archetype, and what actually is not, the copy and image.

As a result that which appears as an entity is only a copy of the

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40. EM, p.139, ...eine notwendige Folge aus dem Wesen des Seins als des aufgehenden Scheinens.

41. EM, p.139, Nicht daß überhaupt die φύσις als ἰδέα gekennzeichnet würde, sondern das die ἰδέα als die einzige und maßgebende Auslegung des Seins auskommt...

real and is thus mere appearance.\textsuperscript{43} The only true Being is that which abides as the eternal and unchanging, the idea. Hence, there is a division of "reality" into worldly things perceived by the senses and the supersensible ideas or "forms" that constitute true being. "Now the on becomes distinct from the phainomenon."\textsuperscript{44}

This entails the second change mentioned above -- the change in the nature of truth. Because true Being is the paradigm or archetype which is above and superior to all copies, i.e., all existent things, "all disclosure of beings must aim at assimilation to the model, accommodation to the idea."\textsuperscript{45} Truth is now under the domination of the idea. It retains some of the original insight into unconcealment but for the most part it becomes correspondence to the idea, correctness of vision, of apprehension as representation.\textsuperscript{46} "Truth as unconcealedness is no longer the fundamental feature of Being itself, rather, having become correctness as a result of its subjugation to the idea, it is from

\textsuperscript{43} EM, p.141.

\textsuperscript{44} EM, p.141, Jetzt treten ὑ ὑ und ὁλοκληρωμένος auseinander.

\textsuperscript{45} EM, p.141, ...muß all Eröffnung des Seienden darauf gehen, dem Urbild gleichzukommen, dem Vorbild sich anzugleichen, nach der Idee sich zurichten.

\textsuperscript{46} EM, p.141 and WM:PLW, pp.228-236.
thenceforth the characterization of the knowledge of beings."\(^{47}\)

Since truth and knowledge are essentially related, this change in the former entails a change in the latter as well. Knowing in Platonism then, is approximation to what is to be known. What is to be known is Being itself. And Being itself is the ideal. When we look at things within the world, it is not their physical characteristics that we perceive, but their supersensible form or idea that we apprehend. Knowledge must measure itself against this supersensible idea. It must re-present what is not visibly present. For this reason knowledge is now a representative self-measuring upon the supersensible.\(^{48}\) Now man's relation to the world is interpreted as noein or intuitus, i.e., as reason, for it is only reason that is capable of apprehending these supersensible ideas.\(^{49}\) Henceforth it is reason, or intuition, that guarantees the knowledge of Being. Thus Heidegger can say that from antiquity to Kant and Hegel both the ideal of knowledge and the concept of true knowledge are oriented to intuition.\(^{50}\) We see

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\(^{48}\) N I, pp.177-179.

\(^{49}\) WM:VWG, p.159.

\(^{50}\) GP, p.167.
then that with Plato Being became the eternal presence of the
supersensible idea, truth became correspondence to the idea and a
property of our knowledge of entities, and knowledge became a
representation that measures itself upon the supersensible -- it
became an approximation to the idea.

Aristotle continues this progressive deterioration in the
understanding of Being, truth, and knowing. The philosophical
question is now "What are beings?" Heidegger tells us that for
Aristotle, "philosophy is a kind of aptness which makes it
possible to see being in respect to what it is in so far as it is
an extant being."\(^{51}\) This "what it is," i.e., the Being of beings, is
constituted by first principles and causes, and it is summarized
for Aristotle in the word \textit{energeia}.\(^{52}\)

But if the most important event in Plato (from the standpoint of
Being history) is the understanding of Being (\textit{physis}) as \textit{idea}, the
most important aspect of Aristotle's thought is his conception of
\textit{logos}. Logos meant originally and primarily "gathering into
unconcealment," but it had the secondary meaning of "language" as

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\(^{51}\) WP, p.58, Die Philosophie ist eine Art von Zuständigkeit, die
dazu befähigt, das Seiende in dem Blick zu nehmen, nämlich im
Hinblick darauf, \textit{was es ist}, insofern es Seiendes ist.

\(^{52}\) WP, p.59 and N I, pp.451-453.
one particular way of this gathering into disclosedness.\textsuperscript{53} However, in Aristotle logos comes to mean purely and simply statement.

Now logos as statement becomes the abode of truth in the sense of correctness. And this process culminates in Aristotle's proposition to the effect that logos as statement is that which can be true or false. Truth...now becomes an attribute of the logos.\textsuperscript{54}

This change in the abode of truth also effects a change in its essence. "Truth becomes the correctness of the logos.... Logos is now \textit{legein ti kata tinos}, to say something about something."\textsuperscript{55} What is spoken of is the thing lying on hand in front of us prior to all statement, and "Being becomes this just-lying-on-hand-before us."\textsuperscript{56} Thus, the essence of truth is to make sure that what we say about something is correct, i.e., adequately corresponds to the thing being spoken about.

Now in the statement an entity can be represented in many ways (e.g., as having properties, magnitude, spacial relations, causal

\textsuperscript{53} EM, p.141.

\textsuperscript{54} EM, p.142, Jetzt wird der Logos als Aussage umgekehrt der Ort der Wahrheit im Sinne der Richtigkeit. Es kommt zu dem Satz des Aristoteles, wonach der Logos als aussage das ist, was wahr oder falsch sein kann. Wahrheit...wird jetzt Eigenschaft des Logos.

\textsuperscript{55} EM, p.142, Die Wahrheit wird zur Richtigkeit des Logos.... Logos ist jetzt \textit{\lambda\iota\gamma\iota\varsigma\omega\nu e\iota \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\varsigma\nuos}, etwas über etwas sagen.

\textsuperscript{56} EM, p.142, ...ergibt sich das Sein als \textit{dieses} Vor-liegen.
relations, etc.), and these are all determinations of its being. These determinations are called categories (kategoriai). Thus, "from here on the doctrine of Being...becomes a discipline which searches for the categories and their proper arrangement. The goal of all ontology is a system of categories." 57 In this process language, as propositional statements, becomes the arbiter over Being. For whenever one statement stands over against another (contradiction), the contradictory cannot be. 58 In Aristotle, logos has become the assertion, assertion has become the locus of truth, and only that which is described by true assertions can be.

What then, becomes of knowing in Aristotle's thought? As with Plato, Aristotle thinks of knowing as a kind of "having-seen" that is oriented to the things that lie present before us. "Episteme, as a mode of being situated among things that are constantly present, is itself a form of human presence in face of what is unconcealedly present." 59 But knowledge must be true, and truth (or falsity) resides in assertions. Thus, knowledge is tantamount to a correct judgment about the truth of an assertion. Indeed,

57. EM, p.142, Von hier aus wird die Lehre vom Sein...zur Lehre, die nach den kategorien und ihrer Ordnung forscht. Das Zeit aller Ontologie ist die Kategorienlehre.


judgment is the vehicle of truth and the basic form of knowledge. This is the Aristotelian basis for Hobbes' thesis that knowledge is judgment, and this dictum became "...the creed of modern logic and epistemology." For Aristotle then, Being is that which lies present before us and about which we make assertions. Truth is the correspondence of the assertion to this thing lying there in front of us. And knowledge is judgment, ascertaining whether the assertion indeed corresponds to what it represents.

What may be said to summarize the changes in the understanding of knowledge wrought by Plato and Aristotle?

Physis becomes idea (paradigma), truth becomes correctness. Logos becomes assertion, the locus of truth as correctness, the source of the categories, the fundamental principle governing the possibilities of Being.

Knowledge has become either a representing approximation to a supersensible realm, or the correspondence and correctness of an assertion to that about which the assertion is made. And either way, knowledge is conceived of as a present-at-hand relation of a

60. GP, p.285, ...die Überzeugung der modernen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie.
61. EM, p.144, Die Qūos wird zur ἴδεα (παράδειγμα), Wahrheit wird Richtigkeit. Der Logos wird zur Aussage, zum Ort der Wahrheit als Richtigkeit, zum Ursprung der Kategorien, zum Grundsatz über die Möglichkeiten des Seins.
present-at-hand being to an entity that is also present-at-hand. According to Heidegger, with the change of physis to idea and logos to kategoria, "...the original disclosure of the Being of entities ceased and henceforth the true, now interpreted as the correct...became steadily broader and flatter." To facilitate this change language (logos) had to become a mere tool for representing, communicating, housing, and guaranteeing truth as correctness. And so it was that "the moment had come for the birth of logic." From early on with the Greeks, thinking about the proposition and about knowledge had been oriented to the logos. So with Aristotle's change in the meaning of logos it was almost natural that thinking about knowledge became logic. Logic began, therefore, with the platonic-aristotelian school.

As a result the question of the essence of truth is no longer asked. This amounts to a tremendous philosophical oversight, and as Heidegger tells us, "ever since Plato and Aristotle this

63. EM, p.143. ...die ursprüngliche Eröffnung des Seins des Seienden ausgesetzt hat und das Wahre als das Richtige...verbreitert und so immer ebener wird.
64. EM, p.143, Die Geburtsstunde der Logik ist gekommen.
65. GP, p.260.
66. EM, pp.92, 130, and 137.
'oversight' pervades the entire history of Occidental philosophy. Moreover, knowledge and thought are now separated from Being, enabling ratio to dominate Being from now on. This differentiation, this separation of thinking and Being, of knowing and known, according to which Being is determined from the standpoint of reason, is what Heidegger calls "the fundamental attitude of the Western spirit." Whereas knowledge was originally an attentive looking at, and an active preservation of, Being's self-manifestation, it has now become a measuring and judging of the assertion's applicability to a given entity. No longer the humble beneficiary of Being's self-revelation, knowledge has become instead the omnipotent ruler over Being.

The Middle Ages

The thought of the middle ages is more aptly characterized as a solidification of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition than as a radical departure from it. Nevertheless, some important novelties

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67. N I, p.175, Dieses >>Versaumnis<< geht seit Platon und Aristotles überall durch die ganze Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie.

68. EM, p.136 and N I, pp.530-535.

69. EM, p.111 and pp.156-157, die Grundhaltung des abendländischen Geistes.
do arise here which prepare the way for the more sweeping and significant changes that occur in the transition to modernity. These novelties are due to the rise of Christianity.

Plato's conception of *to agathon*, the good, and Aristotle's conviction that the Being of entities was constituted by first principles and causes were tailor made for the Judeo-Christian notion of God the creator. For this reason Heidegger says that, since Aristotle, philosophy as metaphysics has thought beings as such "onto-theo-logically."\(^{70}\) Moreover, Plato's equation of true Being with a supersensible realm of eternal ideas was also quite amenable to the Christian understanding of God as transcendent, eternal, and unchanging. Hence, during the middle ages Being becomes God the Creator while things in the world become the created.\(^{71}\) Among the totality of creatures, man has a special place because it is his spiritual welfare and eternal salvation that are at the center of Christianity.\(^{72}\) There is thus established a threefold division of being. "God as creator, the world as the created, man and his eternal salvation -- these are

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\(^{70}\) SD: EPA, p.76.

\(^{71}\) N II, pp.414-416 and HW:UK, pp.63-64.

\(^{72}\) KPM, p.7.
the three domains defined by Christian thought within what is as a whole. The studies devoted to these three areas were theology, cosmology, and psychology respectively, and together they constituted the discipline of *metaphysica specialis*.

Within this discipline, truth remains a correspondence (*adequatio*) that is located in the understanding, but now it can be located in either human or divine understanding. Of course divine truth takes precedence, providing the archetype to which human truth is to conform. The divine truth is mediated in God's revelation which is thus the ultimate source for all truth. And since revelation is interpreted by the Church, the ecclesiastical tradition becomes "the authoritative mediator of knowledge." Because so-called natural knowledge had no grounds of intelligibility apart from revelation, it conformed almost automatically to the tradition and teachings of the Church. "Basically therefore," Heidegger tells us, "there was no worldly knowledge," i.e., no knowledge outside the bounds of

73. FD, p.85, Gott als Schöpfer, die Welt des Geschaffenen, der Mensch und sein ewiges Heil, sind die drei aus dem christlichen Denken her bestimmten Bereiche innerhalb des Seienden im Ganzen.


75. FD, p.75, ...maßgebender Wissensvermittlung...

76. FD, p.74, Denn es gab im Grunde kein weltliche Wissen.
revelation.

The most important occurrence in all of this, however, is that the first step was taken toward the notion of truth as certainty. It is the creator God who is in sole possession of the one eternal truth and who is the sole source of man's salvation. Man now faces a dilemma. By himself he cannot be absolutely certain of his salvation, yet because it concerns his eternal destiny, he must be certain of it. "Thus a necessity rules...that man in some way make sure of his salvation..."77 This certainty comes through faith whereby man obtains assurance of himself and his salvation. But what is important is that,

Herein lies embedded the possibility of man's determining the essence of certainty by himself in accordance with the essence of certainty in general (self-assurance), and thus of bringing mankind to sovereign authority within what is real.78

And when truth becomes the certainty of human knowledge whereby humanity finds its security, "...that history begins which...is called modernity."79

77. N II, p.423, So waltet eine...Notwendigkeit, daß sich der Mensch so oder so seines Heils...versichert.

78. N II, p.423, Hierin liegt die Möglichkeit beschlossen, daß der Mensch gemäß dem Wesen der Gewißheit überhaupt (Selbstsicherung) von sich aus das Wesen der Gewißheit bestimmt und so das Menschentum innerhalb des Wirklichen zur Herrschaft bringt.

79. N II, p.424, ...beginnt jene Geschichte, die...die Neuzeit heißt.
Descartes

It is with Descartes that the modern period begins. The role that the understanding of truth as certainty played in the transition to modernity cannot be overstressed. The desire for certainty, which is recognized as necessarily self-assurance, "demands the development of the assurance of man's unconditional domination," in the sense of humanity's domination and control over the earth. When truth becomes certainty, the relation of man to the things in the world changes. No longer is astonishment the primal impetus to philosophy as it was with the Greeks. Once certainty has become the determining form of truth, it is the human desire for confidence in the absolute certainty of knowledge that is "the arche, the beginning of modern philosophy."

Here the "mathematical" becomes dominant. Heidegger uses this term mostly in a very special broad sense to mean more than simply mathematics. The mathematical in this broad sense amounts

80. N II, p.424, ...den Ausbau der Sicherung einer unbedingten Herrschaft des Menschen fordert...

81. WP, p.88, ...die ἀρχή der neuzeitlichen Philosophie.
to man's determining for himself the parameters according to which anything may appear as a thing. "It is a taking cognizance of something, what it takes being something it gives to itself from itself, thereby giving to itself what it already has."\textsuperscript{82} What this apparently incomprehensible jargon means is that the mathematical is the establishing of what constitutes certainty on its own terms alone, i.e., not in relation to, or dependence upon, any external standard. It is a kind of self-grounding knowledge. As such Heidegger says of the mathematical that it is the "fundamental position we take toward things..."\textsuperscript{83} It is the new relation of man to the world.

Since the mathematical constitutes ultimate certainty by being grounded solely on itself, the only genuine access to entities now must lie in knowing in the sense of mathematical knowledge. This is the only kind of knowledge that gives \textit{assurance} that entities are grasped in their Being.\textsuperscript{84} "Because it is free from contingent experiences, mathematical knowledge is in the highest sense

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\textsuperscript{82} FD, p.71, ...es sei ein Zur-Kenntnis-nnehmen, das, was es nimmt, aus sich selbst sich gibt, dabei sich solches gibt, was es schon hat.

\textsuperscript{83} FD, p.58, ...jene Grundstellung zu den Dingen.

\textsuperscript{84} SZ, pp.95 and 100.
rational and a priori...". Therefore it is also perfectly rigorous and absolutely binding.

Being now becomes the object -- that which man sets before himself in such a way that he can be certain of it. This "setting-before" that accomplishes objectivity is what occurs in representation (German: Vorstellen, literally "to set or place before"). As Heidegger tells us, "being as the objectiveness of representation, and truth as the certainty of representation, are so defined for the first time in the metaphysics of Descartes." And according to Heidegger, the whole of modern metaphysics, including Nietzsche, "maintains itself within the interpretation of being and of truth that was prepared for by Descartes." This does not mean that human representation creates or effects reality; rather, it means that the constancy and persistence that constitute being as abiding presence "is narrowed down to the

85. KPM, p.8, Sie ist im höchsten Sinne rationale und apriorische, weil von zufälligen Erfahrungen unabhängige...

86. HW:ZW, p.80, Erstmals wird das Seiende als Gegenständlichkeit des Vorstellens und die Wahrheit als Gewißheit des Vorstellens in der Metaphysik des Descartes bestimmt. (Cf. also N II, pp.431-432.)

sphere of presence in the sense of the presence of the
re-praesentatio."\textsuperscript{88}

Because certainty is the self-given assurance of the validity of
every representation, it requires an underlying support for itself
that is continually present as the foundation for all
representing. "The demand for certainty goes after a fundamentum
absolutum et inconcussum..."\textsuperscript{89} This absolute and indubitable
foundation is "that which already lies present in and for all
re-presentation, and is constant and fixed in the sphere of
indubitable re-presentation."\textsuperscript{90} The only thing that is always
already present in this way is the representer himself (ego
cogitans). The indubitable "I" of Descartes' ego cogito thus
becomes the very ground of truth as certainty and of reality as
being-represented. Hence, the indubitable ego is also the ground
of all certain knowledge.

It is important that we recognize a significant reversal that,
according to Heidegger, takes place here. Whereas previously

\textsuperscript{88. N II, p.433, ...auf den Umkreis des Anwesens in der Praesenz
der re-praesentatio eingegrenzt.}

\textsuperscript{89. N II, p.429, Die Forderung der Gewiβheit geht auf ein
fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum...}

\textsuperscript{90. N II, p.432, ...das in allem Vor-stellen und für alles
Vor-stellen jeweils schon vorliegt und im Umkreis des Zweifellosen
Vor-stellens das Standige und Stehende ist.}
everything that endures of itself and lies present before us was hypokeimenon, subjectum, subject, now "the ego, the res cogitans, is the distinctive subjectum...") Man has become the only proper subject, "that with regard to which all remaining things are first determined as what they are." And whereas previously anything thrown up opposite even one's mere imagination was objectum, object (an imaginary mountain for example), now only that which is over against and other than the subject is the objectum. "The things themselves become 'objects'." In other words, with Descartes a reversal of the meanings of subjectum and objectum takes place which is much more than simply a matter of usage. "It is a radical change of Dasein, i.e., a change in man's understanding of the Being of what is, that takes place because of the domination of the mathematical."  

Now human reason is the ultimate foundation of certainty, truth, knowledge, even Being itself. "With the 'cogito sum,' reason, in keeping with its own demand, now becomes explicitly posited as the

91. N II, p.432, Das ego, die res cogitans, ist das ausgezeichnete subjectum...

92. FD, p.81, ...zu demjenigen, mit bezug auf welches die übrigen Dinge erst als solche sich bestimmen.

93. FD, p.82, Die Dinge selbst werden zu >>Objekten<<.

94. FD, p.82, ...es ist ein grundstürzender Wandel des Daseins, d.h. der Lichtung des Seins des Seienden, auf Grund der Herrschaft des Mathematischen.
first ground of all knowledge and the guide for any characterization of things whatsoever."\textsuperscript{95} The "I" principle, \textit{cogito-sum}, is the "fundamental axiom of all knowledge."\textsuperscript{96} Included in this "I" principle are two other such fundamental axioms: the principle of non-contradiction and Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason. These principles "...become the principles of authentic knowledge..." and are "the axioms of pure reason."\textsuperscript{97} Because they constitute philosophy's fundamental axioms, "the whole of metaphysics is to be based on them..."\textsuperscript{98} Hence, the mathematical has come to be the paradigm for all knowledge, metaphysical as well as physical.

Let us summarize these crucial developments that occur explicitly in the philosophy of Descartes and initiate the modern age. First of all, truth has changed from the correctness of the propositions of thinking into the certainty of representations.

A true thing is what man of his own accord brings clearly and distinctly before himself and consigns to himself as something thus brought-before-him

\textsuperscript{95} FD, p.82, Diese, die Vernunft, wird jetzt mit dem \textit{cogito-sum} ausdrücklich und gemäß ihrer eigenen Forderung als erster Grund alles Wissens und als Leitfaden aller Bestimmung der Dinge überhaupt gesetzt.

\textsuperscript{96} FD, p.83, ...das Grundsatz allen Wissen...

\textsuperscript{97} FD, p.83, ...werden die Grundsätze des eigentlichen Wissens...die Axiome der reinen Vernunft...

\textsuperscript{98} FD, p.84, Auf sie soll die ganze Metaphysik gegründet werden...
(re-presented) in order, by way of such a self-consignment, to guarantee what is represented.

Secondly, Being itself has become that which is present in a guaranteed representation. "The essence of the reality of the real lies in the permanence and persistence of that which is represented in the certain representation." Being has become being-represented. Furthermore, since the act of representing demands a sure and constant basis, the ego becomes the subject par excellence, that which underlies and determines all else. Because of this "I" principle, man is now the subject who represents. And when man becomes the subject who represents, the things in the world become the objects of man's representation. What is represented (placed before, Vor-stellen) stands over against man as the object (German: Gegenstand, literally to stand against). Finally, since the "I" principle also contains the principles of non-contradiction and of sufficient reason which form the fundamental axioms of human knowledge, human reason becomes the basis for all knowledge. And all true knowledge must conform to the mathematical paradigm.

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99. N II, p.427, Ein Wahres ist das, was der Mensch je von sich aus klar und deutlich vor sich bringt und als ein so vor-sich-Gebrachtes (Vor-gestellte) sich zu-stellt, um in solcher Zustellung das Vorgestellte sicherzustellen. (Unfortunately the translation cannot preserve the word play on the root stellen.)

What is important here is that in the new fundamental position of modernity, the mathematical, in the sense of a self-grounding ground, came to dominate. With the Greeks, Being revealed itself and human knowledge received and preserved this manifestation. In the middle ages when the Christian view predominated, the source of truth was divine. Thus, human knowledge and worldly truth were grounded on this divine truth. But with the coming to the fore of the mathematical in the modern period, human reason elbowed its way to center stage. Now man is truly the measure of all things. Man determines and controls beings for the sake of human certainty and security. The importance of this must not be lost. According to Heidegger, the very relationship of man to the world and to Being has changed. No longer astonished by the wonder of Being as were the Greeks, no longer dependent upon God's saving grace as were the Christians of the middle ages, man now stands in domination over all things. Confirmed by the assurance of certainty in his calculating, controlling knowledge of everything on the earth, man has become the ruler of Being.

The Being of everything that is gets determined by its relation to man. He determines himself as the subject who represents on the indubitable basis of his own "I think." Earthly things are categorized as objects, as that which is "over against" man's representational thinking. Even Being itself is established in relation to man as this very "being-represented." All of this is
due ultimately to man's quest for certainty, the desire for a self-grounding ground. And this desire for certainty is itself the expression of a changed relationship to Being. The primary symbol of this changed relationship is man as the subject nonpareil. "Subject-ism" reigns in modernity.

The Present

Rather than concern ourselves now with other individual thinkers -- Leibniz, Kant, Hegel -- who were important in the historical developments that have determined our age, we turn instead to the characteristics of the present age itself. This abbreviation is necessary because of limitations of space; it is possible because, in Heidegger's opinion, we today are still determined by the fundamental position that was accomplished by Descartes in the transition to modernity. Natural science, mathematics, and modern metaphysics all sprang from the same root according to Heidegger -- the mathematical in the wider sense. 101 These three domains intertwine in such a way that the essential character of the present age is expressed in science and technology. I cannot here go into a detailed description of

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101. FD, p.75.
Heidegger's views on these dual determinants of the present epoch in the history of Being. I discuss them only to show how Heidegger views the present and to point out the essential role that knowledge and epistemology play in this scenario.

It is Heidegger's conviction that "...our present-day world is completely dominated by modern science's desire to know,"\(^\text{102}\) and by the technological domination of the entire planet which accompanies this desire.\(^\text{103}\) Why is this the case? Because "the uprising of man into subjectivity transforms that which is into an object."\(^\text{104}\) As we have already seen, the object is what is brought to a stand in and for representational thinking. And man represents objects in this way "for the sake of his own security which wants dominion over everything that is as the potentially objective..."\(^\text{105}\) This amounts to an assault upon the earth because the things of the world are only allowed to reveal themselves within the framework of man's calculating and objectifying representational thinking. The name for this assault

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102. VA:WB, p.47, ...unsere heutige Welt vom Wissenwollen der modernen Wissenschaft durchherrscht wird.

103. HW:NWG, pp.235-236.

104. HW:NWG, p.242, Der menschliche Aufstand in die Subjektivität macht das Seiende zum Gegenstand.

105. HW:NWG, p.242, ...dies aber um seiner eigenen Sicherheit willen, die die Herrschaft über das Seiende als das mögliche Gegenständliche will...
is technology.

The earth itself can show itself only as the object of an assault, an assault that establishes itself in human volition as unconditional objectification. Nature appears everywhere...as the object of technology.\footnote{106}

Technology reveals by way of challenging nature; it brings nature to bay.\footnote{107} Hence, modern technology is an expression of man's will to power and, as such, is an assault upon the earth.

Science plays an analogous role and for the same reason -- the uprising of man into subjectivity. In one writing Heidegger offers the following definition: "Science is the theory of the real."\footnote{108} To understand this definition we must understand what Heidegger means by the descriptive words within it. The word "theory," as Heidegger uses it, means a kind of observation that is a "molding and fashioning of the real that ensnares and imprisons."\footnote{109} The word "real" on the other hand means the same as "the certain" and is that which is imprisoned or secured in its

\footnotetext{106}{HW:NWG, p.236, Die Erde selbst kann sich nur noch als der Gegenstand des Angriffes zeigen, der sich als die unbedingte Vergegenständlichung im Wollen des Menschen einrichtet. Die Natur erscheint überall...als der Gegenstand der Technik.}

\footnotetext{107}{TK:FT, p.15.}

\footnotetext{108}{VA:WB, p.46, Die Wissenschaft ist die Theorie des Wirklichen. (Heidegger's emphasis)}

\footnotetext{109}{VA:WB, pp.55-56, ...das nachstellende und sicherstellende Bearbeiten des Wirklichen.}
objectness, i.e., is the object of a guaranteed representation. Therefore, the dictum "science is the theory of the real" means that "the ensnaring representation which imprisons everything real in its pursuable objectiveness is the basic character of that representation whereby contemporary science corresponds to the real." Like technology, then, "science brings the real to bay." To be certain of this ensnaring/imprisoning of the real, a careful method must be employed. Therefore, in modern science method has "decisive priority."

Why then are knowledge and epistemology so important? Because the essential determinants of the present -- science and technology -- are forshadowed in the historical origin of the modern understanding of knowledge. The question of what constitutes valid knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular now has preeminence "...because knowledge and cognition have succeeded in attaining an essential power in the

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110. VA:WB, p.56.


112. VA:WB, p.56, Die Wissenschaft stellt das Wirkliche.

113. VA:WB, p.58, ...den entscheidenden Vorrang.

history of the West." And why have they attained this power? Because in the urge toward self-grounding that is the mathematical in the broad sense, and in the "uprising into subjectivity" that is the outcome of this urge, secure knowledge, guided by the fundamental axioms of reason, is the sole guarantor of the reality of the real, of what can be objectively represented with certainty. Elsewhere Heidegger refers to the preeminence of this calculating, securing, certain knowledge as the "domination of the principle of sufficient reason" which "determines the essence of the modern technical age." Methodically guaranteed knowledge is both the expression and the means of man's attempt to dominate being in the present scientific and technological age. The contemporary preoccupation with method and the priority given epistemology are the final outgrowth and current manifestation of the separation of Being and thinking that Heidegger has called the "fundamental attitude of the Western spirit." As a result of this separation Being is determined from the standpoint of thinking and reason -- only that which is


116. SG, p.198, So bestimmt dann die gekennzeichnete Herrschaft des Satz vom Grund das Wesen des modernen, technischen Zeitalters.

117. EM, p.111, ...die Grundhaltung des abendländischen Geistes.
rationally known with certainty can be. Secure knowledge is the means of the subject's domination of beings, the source of man's self-assurance. It is will to power.

Traditional Epistemology — A Summary

So far I have shown that, according to Heidegger, all epistemological interpretations are unified by the single understanding of the essence of Being as abiding presence. Heidegger calls this the metaphysical fundamental position. I have also traced very briefly a Heideggerian view of the historical development of the Western tradition's conception of knowledge. I will now summarize the characteristics or trends common to this whole development. This will provide us with the understanding of traditional epistemology that we need in order to comprehend fully Heidegger's critique of it.

The interpretation of Being as extantness (abiding presence) has been current ever since antiquity.\textsuperscript{118} Although the precise conception of the nature of this presence has changed from "emergent appearing" to "createdness" to "being-represented," etc.,

\textsuperscript{118} EM, p.155.
Being as presence still reigns as the metaphysical fundamental position of the West. Also since antiquity there has been a trend toward an ever increasing differentiation between Being and thinking whereby thinking and reason have become the determinants and judges of Being. As we have seen, Heidegger calls this the fundamental attitude of the Western spirit. Furthermore, the notion of truth has been progressively modified from unconcealment to correctness and finally to certainty. One could call this the fundamental Western principle of truth. Finally, the desire for valid understanding has been transformed into the desire for indubitability which demands a self-grounding certainty. This desire for self-grounding certainty is the mathematical in the broad sense, which Heidegger calls the fundamental presupposition of our knowledge of things.

These "four fundamentals" -- the fundamental metaphysical position, the fundamental attitude of spirit, the fundamental principle of truth, and the fundamental presupposition of knowledge -- have worked together to form the interpretation of knowledge that is dominant in the Occidental tradition. Accordingly Heidegger tells us that,

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120. FD, p.58.
In spite of the countless epistemological standpoints...there has been, and is yet, but a single interpretation of the essence of knowledge, an interpretation for which the first Greek thinkers laid the ground in that they definitively characterized the Being of all extant beings. It is among such beings that all knowing plays its role as an extant comportment of one extant being toward other extant beings.\textsuperscript{121}

The nature of this comportment is further spelled out when Heidegger refers to the "traditional conception of knowledge defined in terms of cognition as representation..."\textsuperscript{122} Knowledge is the quest for truth as the certainty of these representations.\textsuperscript{123} Since that which is secured in a certain representation is ultimately that which can be (beingness as objectivity), Heidegger says that,

\begin{quote}
Epistemology...is at bottom a metaphysics and ontology that is based on truth as the certainty of the guaranteed representation.... In fact, it is a matter of the metaphysics of the object...\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{121} N I, p.561, ...es trotz der zahllosen erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunkte...bisher doch nur eine einzige Auslegung des Wesens der Erkenntnis gibt, diejenige, zu der die ersten griechischen Denker den Grund gelegt haben, indem sie das Sein des Seienden maßgebend bestimmten, des Seienden, inmitten dessen alles Erkennen als ein seielendes Verhalten eines Seienden zu Seiendem spielt.

\textsuperscript{122} US:WzurS, p.266, ...nach dem überlieferten, aus dem Erkennen als Vorstellen bestimmten Begriff des Wissens.

\textsuperscript{123} N I, pp.500-501.

\textsuperscript{124} VA:UM, p.75, Die >>Erkenntnistheorie<<...ist im Grunde die auf die Wahrheit als der Gewißheit des sicherenden Vorstellens gegrundet Metaphysik und Ontologie.... In Wahrheit handelt es sich um die Metaphysik des Gegenstandes...
Now it is man the subject who determines the possible ways that Being can manifest itself. Now it is reason and reason's sure knowledge that decide what can or cannot be. Now logic and mathematics reign as the sovereign guides of reason's judgments. Now the nature of truth is determined by the nature of knowledge rather than vice versa, and language has become a mere tool for signification. Epistemology, as the arbiter of what constitutes true knowledge, has set itself up as the final judge over all possible forms of Being and every aspect of human thought. Thus, epistemology is a name for the modern desire to control and dominate Being. It is the most powerful expression of the will to power that infuses our age. Traditional epistemology, for Heidegger, does not mean simply one theory about knowledge, nor is it limited to a some general explanation of "knowledge" or "science." For Heidegger traditional epistemology embodies the basic attitude of the Western tradition toward Being itself. It is itself an expression of the metaphysical position that underlies the entire history of Western philosophy. Epistemology, when used by Heidegger, refers less to a particular knowledge theory than to the whole history of Being.
Heidegger's Critique of Traditional Epistemology

At last we have reached a point from which we may answer the problem posed by the title of this chapter, namely, what is the status of traditional epistemology according to Heidegger? Heidegger criticizes epistemology on several different levels ranging from the very broad to the more specific. I will begin with the broadest and move through progressively narrowing levels to the more precise and specific.

The most all-encompassing limitation of epistemology is that it is part and parcel of the general oblivion of Being that characterizes the whole history of Western philosophy. From the very beginning of this discussion however, it must be noted that the forgetfulness of Being of which Heidegger speaks is not merely, nor even primarily, a lack, fault, or oversight of individual philosophers. Rather, to Being itself belongs concealment just as essentially as unconcealment. Indeed, the self-withdrawing of Being is the mode of Being's self-giving. "Self-withdrawal is the manner in which Being comes to presence,
that is, consigns itself to us as approaching presence." The meaning of this apparently absurd paradox is that when Being illuminates beings, it is the latter that come to the fore while the lighting action of Being itself is overlooked. This lighting action is the manifestation of Being, yet it is just this event of illumination itself that is not seen. Thus, in a sense, Being withdraws in its very moment of shining forth. This is why the preeminence that beings have had over Being in metaphysics -- and it is this preeminence that constitutes the oblivion of Being -- is due ultimately to Being itself. "The overshadowing of Being by extant beings comes from Being itself..." This process or event of simultaneously giving/withdrawing, concealing/revealing, is the meaning of "Being history" (Seinsgeschichte). This history is not the history of man nor even of man's relation to Being. "The history of Being is Being itself and only Being. However, since Being claims human being for grounding its truth in beings, man is drawn into the history of Being..." When man is

125. SG, p.122, ...das Sichentziehen ist die Weise, wie Sein west, d.h. als An-wesen sich zuschickt.

126. N I, p.657, Die Überschattung des Seins durch das Seiende kommt aus dem Sein selbst...

127. SG, p.114 and p.120.

128. N II, p.489, Die Seinsgeschichte ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses. Weil jedoch das Sein zur Grundung seiner Wahrheit im Seienden das Menschenwesen in der Anspruch nimmt, bleibt der Mensch in die Geschichte des Seins einbezogen...
drawn into Being's history, and when, because of Being's withdrawal, he occupies himself with beings while remaining oblivious to Being, then metaphysics is born with its resulting distortions. "The tradition of truth regarding Being which evolves as 'metaphysics' develops into an unrecognizable pile of distortions that cover up the primordial essence of Being." 129

Traditional epistemology is criticized first of all then because it is a part of this "pile of distortions." Epistemology is at bottom metaphysics, and "metaphysics leaves...the essence of Being undecided, and must leave it undecided, in that it remains indifferent from the beginning to an appreciation of what is worthy of questioning..." 130 Our lack of knowledge of the essence of truth, which constitutes the forgetfulness of Being, "rules in the form of the omni-calculation of certainty." 131 And epistemology is the epitome of this omni-calculation of certainty. The broadest criticism that Heidegger levels against epistemology then, is that it is always concerned only with beings and never

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130. N II, p.459, ...die Metaphysik das Wesen des Seins unentschieden läßt und lassen muß, sofern ihr eine Würdigung das Fragwürdigen...von Begin an gleichgültig bleibt...

thinks Being itself -- it is a manifestation of the oblivion of Being.

Narrowing down the scope of his critique somewhat, Heidegger tells us further that the main expression of the forgetfulness of Being, and the root cause for all subsequent inability to think Being, lies in the unexamined ontology of the extant, of the present-at-hand. When "abiding presence" was immediately seized upon as the answer to the original metaphysical question (what is a being?), the ground was laid for understanding the Being of everything that is as present-at-hand, mere extantness. Thus, knowledge too has been understood in terms of the ontology of the extant.\textsuperscript{132} Since Descartes, knowing has been thought of as "...the commerçium that is present-at-hand between a present-at-hand subject and a present-at-hand object."\textsuperscript{133} And this subject-object relation "becomes the 'evident' point of departure for problems of epistemology or the 'metaphysics of knowledge'."\textsuperscript{134} The criticism then is that since epistemology is based solely on an ontology of extantness, it is really only

\textsuperscript{132} N I, p.561.

\textsuperscript{133} SZ, p.132, ...das vorhandene commerçium zwischen einem vorhandenen Subjekt und einem vorhandenen Objekt.

\textsuperscript{134} SZ, p.59, ...wird sie dann zum >>evidenten<< Ausgangspunkt für die Problem der Erkenntnistheorie oder der >>Metaphysik der Erkenntnis<<.
applicable to things for which mere extantness exhausts their possibilities of Being. Traditional epistemology has "not gone so very far off epistemologically..." when one is discussing our knowledge of things. But it is quite incapable of doing justice to anything whose Being is not characterized merely by extantness, i.e., human beings and Being itself.

Even traditional epistemology's knowledge of extant objects is not completely secure because there has been no clarification of the kind of Being belonging to the knowing subject. Traditional epistemology's "...neglect of any existential analytic of Dasein whatsoever has kept [it] from obtaining even the basis for a well secured phenomenal problematic." Epistemology is limited then because it cannot gain access to Being, nor even to the Being of the one who knows (human being), and even within its meager purview, the knowledge it has of extant objects is itself inadequately secured. This leads us to the next criticism.

Epistemology is derivative, thus superficial. What derivative means here is that the kind of knowing described above, i.e., the logical, rational, mathematical representation of objects, is itself

135. SZ, p.207, ...nicht so sehr als erkenntnistheoretische fehlgehen...

136. SZ, p.207, ...auf Grund des Versaumnisses der existenzialen Analytik des Daseins überhaupt gar nicht erst den Boden für eine phänomenale gesicherte Problematik gewinnen.
only one part and possibility of the knower's manner of Being. In fact, Heidegger claims that the ability for such rational cognition is itself based upon the full existential constitution of Dasein -- disclosedness (Erschlossenheit). This means then that "knowing is a founded mode of access to the real,"\(^{137}\) it a "founded mode of Being-in-the-world."\(^{138}\) That knowing is a founded mode, that it is therefore derivative, ultimately these are expressions of the fact that Being is more primordial and inclusive than knowing.\(^{139}\) Thus, what Heidegger says of one mode of being, "Being guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it,"\(^{140}\) may be generalized into "Being is more primordial than knowing." Because knowledge is thus derivative and describes only a small part of the possibilities of Being, it is very limited in its range of access. One example of this limitation is found in Heidegger's comparison of knowing to having moods. Through the latter,

*Being has become manifest as a burden. Why that should be, one does not know.* And Dasein cannot know anything of the sort because the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure.

\footnotesize{
137. SZ, p.202, Erkennen ist dannach ein fundierter Modus des Zugangs zum Realen.
138. SZ, p.71, ...fundierten Modus der In-der-Welt-seins.
139. Or as Apel puts it, the "lived world" is broader than the "known world."
140. SZ, p.286, Ursprünglicher als jeder Wissens darum ist das Schuldig sein.
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belonging to moods...\textsuperscript{141}

Thus, ontologically, mood is a mode of disclosure "\textit{prior} to all cognition and volition and beyond their range of disclosure."\textsuperscript{142}

How can this limitation of representational knowledge be more precisely characterized? First we must realize that, according to Heidegger, it is only at the level of the \textit{Being} of beings that one plumbs the true depths of a phenomenon and comes upon its essence. Now, as we have seen, it is also Heidegger's view that the \textit{Being} of beings is other than and more than simple presence-at-hand, i.e., mere extantness. Yet it is only at the level of beings that are merely extant, just present-at-hand, that representational knowledge is operative. Thus, representational cognition can never reach the essential level of \textit{Being}. Hence, representational cognition is always limited to the \textit{surface} only, it can never penetrate to the \textit{depths} of a phenomenon. In a word, it is \textit{superficial}.

Heidegger begins a sentence in his first volume on Nietzsche as follows: "If all this is seen not from the inside, but rather from

\textsuperscript{141} SZ, p.134, Das Sein ist als Last offenbar geworden. Warum, weiß man nicht. Und das Dasein kann dergleichen nicht wissen, weil die Erschließungsmöglichkeiten des Erkennens viel zu kurz tragen gegenüber dem ursprünglichen Erschließen der Stimmungen...

\textsuperscript{142} SZ, p.136, ...\textit{vor} allem Erkennen und Wollen und über deren Erschließungs tragweite hinaus...
the outside with the criterion of the usual theories of knowledge..." 143 The important thing here is not what Heidegger means by "all this," nor even what he says in the unquoted assertion that follows the conditional. What is important is that, according to Heidegger, to employ the standard of epistemology is to see from the outside, to remain on the surface of a phenomenon. Later on in the same work Heidegger says that the usual approach to the metaphysical question assumes that one must begin by working out an appropriate epistemology.

Before the question is posed explicitly, philosophy must...always secure itself on the path of an epistemology...yet in doing this it always remains on a path that leads only to the anteroom of philosophy, as it were, and does not penetrate to the very center itself." 144 Again we see that epistemology cannot penetrate to the depths of Being; it remains forever restricted to the surface. It is because epistemology is necessarily superficial (as are all the sciences for that matter), that Heidegger occasionally throws out such

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143. N I, p.65, Sieht man all dieses nicht von innen, sondern von aussen mit dem Maßstab der üblichen Erkenntnis- und Bewußtseins-theorie...

144. N I, p.80, Bevor diese Frage eigens gestellt wird, muß sich die Philosophie...immer auf dem Wege einer Erkenntnis- oder Bewußtseinslehre sicherstellen, immer auf einem Weg bleiben, der sich gleichsam im Vorraum der Philosophie bewegt und nicht in der Mitte selbst breist.
pejoratives as "...a pale and empty biology and psychology or epistemology." By this Heidegger does not mean that biology, psychology, and epistemology say nothing at all or convey no valid information. Rather he is simply pointing to the fact that they cannot reach to the depths of the Being of the phenomena they study. Thus, they are indeed valid sciences of certain realms of objects, but they are "pale and empty" when it comes to the deeper level of the Being of these objects. Epistemology is derivative, therefore it is limited to the superficial; it knows nothing of the profound.

But epistemology has not been content to restrain itself in this way. In fact, it has done quite the opposite and claimed that it and it alone can guarantee secure knowledge in any realm of inquiry. Any so-called "knowledge" that does not conform to its strict principles is mere sham and pretense. It does not deserve to be called knowledge at all. This self-proclaimed priority is the next target of Heidegger's criticism. This usurpation by epistemology of a priority it does not rightfully possess is not simply condemned as false confidence or arrogance. Far beyond this and more importantly, this undue priority of epistemology actually distorts its own understanding of itself. "Because

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145. EM, p.107, ...einer leeren und blasen Biologie und Psychologie oder Erkenntnistheorie...
knowing has been given this priority, our understanding of its own kind of Being gets led astray..."146 In other words, because knowledge is only considered valid as logical, certain, representational cognition, epistemologists overlook the fact that this kind of knowledge is only one kind of comportment of the human being. The personal dimension is excluded from the beginning by epistemology since only objectively certain judgments, i.e., those that are not "tainted" by human passions, are considered to be "real" knowledge.

Furthermore, this false priority of epistemology distorts not only its self-understanding, but also distorts everything that it attempts to grasp at the essential level. We have already seen that because epistemology is built on the ontology of extantness it cannot reach to the depths of Being and essence. Yet in its arrogant self-elevation it attempts to do just that, thereby thoroughly distorting what it tries to know. "As a way of philosophizing, that is, as a basically finite enterprise, the effort to illuminate any essence necessarily reflects the havoc that human knowledge wreaks on every essence."147 Epistemology, 

146. SZ, p.59, ...weil durch diesen Vorrang des Erkennens das Verständnis seiner eigensten Seinsart mißleitet wird...

147. WM:VWG, p.125, Alle Wesenserhellung muß als philosophierende, d.h. als eine zu innerst endlich Anstrengung immer auch notwendig für das Unwesen zeigen, das menschliche Erkenntnis mit allem Wesen treibt.
with its kind of calculative thinking and knowing, wreaks havoc on every essence, including its own essence. It is for this reason that Heidegger mentions "the confusion of the erudite epistemology,"\textsuperscript{148} or speaks of trying to see with eyes that have not been "dazzled and fogged over by some current theory of knowledge,"\textsuperscript{149} or talks of the "violence" caused by "preconceived notions...drawn from the theory of knowledge,"\textsuperscript{150} or mentions certain "essential and dynamic relations which have long been misinterpreted by...epistemology."\textsuperscript{151} In short, epistemology has ascribed to itself a priority and preeminence that it does not deserve, along with a breadth and depth of scope it cannot attain. In so doing epistemology wreaks havoc on every essence, including its own understanding of the essence of knowledge.

Finally, Heidegger criticizes epistemology because it is the present manifestation of the will to power and, as such, expresses

\textsuperscript{148} N I, p.497, ...des Unwesens der gelehrten >>Erkenntnis-theorie<<... (It is also interesting to note that the word I have translated here as 'confusion' is the same word that I translated above as 'havoc').

\textsuperscript{149} GP, pp.160-161, ...die durch keine umlaufende Erkenntnis-theorie verblendet und schliend geworden sind.

\textsuperscript{150} GP, p.226, ...vorgefaßten...Begriffen der Erkenntnistheorie vorgewaltigt.

\textsuperscript{151} EM, p.83, ...in bestimmten Wesens- und Geschehensverhältnissen, die uns durch...Erkenntnislehre seit längein mißdeutet sind.
man's desire for self-salvation through certainty and control. Operating under the premise that when one's knowledge of the things in the world is certain, one's control over beings is complete, man tries to set himself up as the ruler of all things. Epistemology is thus no less than man's attempt to dictate under what conditions and in what guise Being can manifest itself to man. Therefore, at its best knowledge theory may provide us with reliable access to a limited kind of Being (extant objects), but at its worst it closes off or distorts all inquiry into what is essential and most worthy of questioning.

Summary

Heidegger's understanding of the traditional view of knowledge has been presented as the quest for the certainty of the objects of representations guaranteed by logical reasoning and mathematical calculation. Epistemology, as the "science" of what constitutes such knowledge, is criticized by Heidegger on several levels. It is an inherent part of the oblivion of Being that constitutes the history of Being in the West as metaphysics. Thus, it can never attain a thinking of Being. It is based on an unexamined and inadequate ontology of the extant
(present-at-hand). Hence, it cannot apply to entities whose Being is not exhausted by extantness. Its knowledge is a derivative and limited mode of human being. For this reason it is condemned to see only the surface of things and remain blind to depth phenomena. Nevertheless, it has claimed a false priority for itself as the sole judge of all true knowledge. Thereby it distorts itself and wrecks havoc on every essence that it tries to take within its grasp. It is an expression of the metaphysics of modernity, a manifestation of man's desire to dominate Being, and an attempt to control how Being can reveal itself. It is will to power. While allowing a positive role to epistemology within its own limited domain (extant objects), the status of traditional epistemology is considered by Heidegger as, on the whole, negative. For all the reasons mentioned above, Heidegger severely criticizes epistemology. But he criticizes it in the Kantian sense, that is, he circumscribes its limits.
Chapter 3

The Epistemological Status of Heidegger I

Introduction

We have seen how Heidegger understands traditional epistemology and should thus begin to see why his own philosophical endeavor can neither follow its tenets nor submit to its decrees. The realm of his investigations simply lies beyond the pale of human knowledge as commonly understood. Heidegger's inquiry must therefore have its own mode of access (its own way of knowing), and must follow its own method. And these in their turn will necessarily seem strange, inadequate, or inappropriate when viewed through the lens of the traditional ideas about truth in knowledge and rigor in method. However, simply to assert the inadequacy of one approach is not to demonstrate the feasibility of another. Consequently, it is our task in this chapter to examine the early Heidegger's alternative to the traditional ideas of knowledge, knowing, and method, and to determine how and why
he considers this appropriate to his task. Furthermore, since Heidegger claims to be investigating the most fundamental level of Being, that upon which all else is grounded, I will also show how the traditional concept of knowledge is supposed to be founded upon Heidegger's more primordial analysis of what it means to know. This then is what I mean by the epistemological status of Heidegger I.¹

Several topics must be discussed if we are to attain the goal set out for us in this chapter. To show that Heidegger was hardly indifferent to the question of knowledge, we must point out his call for reflection on its essence. Next, his own reflections on knowledge must be presented. Third, a more detailed exhibition of Heidegger's understanding of the conditions that render this knowledge possible will be given. Finally, I will discuss the nature of the early Heidegger's philosophy -- What did it intend to accomplish, and how was this to be possible? I will conclude the chapter with a summary of what has been learned about the epistemological status of Heidegger I.

¹ It should be evident that I am now using the word "epistemological" in a different sense than Heidegger, a sense more in keeping with its usual meaning. For Heidegger, the term designates a particular, fundamental approach to beings that he believes universally underlies Western history. For me, the term as used here means quite simply Heidegger's own understanding of knowledge (of both beings and Being) and whether this can be justified.
Before taking up the first of these matters, a word must be said about which writings to include in the period of the early Heidegger. Without entering into any prolonged debate on this issue, which would take us much too far afield, I will simply state that I believe the works of the later Heidegger to have begun with *On The Essence of Truth*. Although first published in 1943, the essay was written in 1930. Thus, I will include in the period of the early Heidegger all published works from *Being and Time* up to, but not including, *On The Essence of Truth*. These include *Being and Time*, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, *The Essence of Reasons*, *What is Metaphysics?*, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, *From the Last Marburg Lecture*, and *Phenomenology and Theology*. The information in the present chapter is based solely upon material in these works.

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2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1943. cf. WM:VWW p.175 for the text I used. The beginning of the later Heidegger at this point seems to be a consensus among scholars.

Heidegger's Call For Reflection On The Essence of Knowledge

I have already discussed Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology and I have said that he neither developed his own epistemology nor desired to do so. Yet it would be completely mistaken to assume that he was never interested in questions pertaining to knowledge. Indeed, in his pre-Being and Time writings he was very much interested in logic and how beliefs could be justified. In fact it was in the course of these very early writings that Heidegger came to see that such questions lead inexorably to metaphysics and ontology. As one scholar has put it, "...Heidegger's study of logic...leads him to metaphysics."  

Even after the Seinsfrage became the dominating goal of his life's work, Heidegger realized the need for achieving clarity in the understanding of knowing and knowledge. Already in Being and Time Heidegger points out the lack of clarity regarding the

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essence of knowledge by referring to "...any of the most various interpretations which that distinctive predicate 'knowledge' will support." And in Basic Problems in Phenomenology he refers to a "defect" in current discussions about different ways of knowing. "The defect is that there is lacking an adequate interpretation of what we understand in general by the term knowing..."7

Such an adequate interpretation is not only desirable, it is also necessary. For Heidegger goes on to say "...the clarification of the kind of Being that belongs to knowledge itself becomes indispensable."8 To this end, we learn that "what is required is to find a sufficiently original concept of understanding from which alone all modes of knowing...can be fundamentally conceptualized."9 Yet the clarification of knowledge that he seeks will not be epistemology nor will it be in any way epistemological in Heidegger's sense. For Heidegger has reversed the usual procedure. Rather than circumscribe the limits of

6. SZ, p.215, ...der verschiedenartigsten Interpretationen der Erkenntnis, die doch dieses auszeichnende Pradikat trägt...

7. GP, p.389, Der Mangel besteht darin, daß es an der hinreichenden Interpretation dessen fehlt, was wir überhaupt unter Erkennen verstehen...

8. SZ, p.217, ...daß die Aufklärung der Seinsart des Erkennens selbst unumgänglich wird.

9. GP, p.390, Damit ist gefordert, einen hinreichend ursprünglichen Begriff des Verstehens zu finden, aus dem heraus erst alle Weisen des Erkennens...grundsätzlich begriffen werden kann.
ontology by way of an antecedently developed epistemology, he intends to clarify the essence of knowledge and knowing on the basis of a previously worked out ontology.

From the very beginning then we see that Heidegger is interested in the nature of knowledge and knowing and that he intends to reflect on their essence. But this reflection will never result in an "epistemology." It will be an ontological clarification of the kind of Being that belongs to knowing. Most simply put, Heidegger's position is as follows: since knowing is simply one mode of Being of that distinctive entity, man, any clarification of the essence of knowing demands a prior understanding of the kind of Being that humans possess. Viewed from this perspective, the goal of all the early works, i.e., the analytic of Dasein and the development of fundamental ontology, includes, at least as a subsidiary motive, a clarification and more profound understanding of the essence of knowledge and knowing. What does Heidegger I explicitly tell us about his understanding of knowledge?
H I's Reflection on Knowledge

We have seen that, according to Heidegger, our understanding of the nature of knowledge remains murky and lacks clarity. A profound reflection that ultimately will render a unifying concept for all modes of knowing is therefore necessary. Now Heidegger tells us that "if knowing 'is' at all, it belongs solely to those entities that know."\(^{10}\) The point of this apparently trivial statement is that reflections on the nature of knowing cannot take place in a vacuum, they cannot be abstracted from a reflection on the nature, i.e., the Being, of the entity that knows. Therefore, first and foremost one must realize that whatever else it might be, knowing is a comportment of \textit{man}, of the \textit{Dasein}, toward entities.\(^{11}\) It is a mode of Being of the \textit{Dasein} that uncovers entities in the world.\(^{12}\) To clarify the nature of knowing, then, demands a prior clarification of the Being of the \textit{Dasein}, of \textit{man} as the being who

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11. GP,p.389.

12. SZ, p.218.
knows. It demands an analytic of existence.\textsuperscript{13}

We cannot enter here into a detailed discussion of Heidegger's analytic of existence. Instead we limit ourselves to those aspects of it that most concern knowing, and even then we must be satisfied with the broad strokes rather than point by point interpretation. Heidegger describes the Dasein as "Being-in-the-world." This is already significant for theory of knowledge because it denies the post-Cartesian subject/object dichotomy of reality. According to Heidegger, the notion of a worldless subject that must struggle to relate itself to external objects which are foreign to it is an error of the first order.

The idea of a knowing subject separated by an epistemological gulf from the object to be known has its limited validity as an abstraction from, and analysis of, reality. But when this analysis is reified, taken to be the way things "really are," confusion results. In Heidegger's view one does not first discover oneself as an isolated subject that must strive to reach some objects to experience and "know." Rather, one discovers oneself as already in a world of things that are understood and dealt with knowledgeably.

It is this phenomenon of understanding oneself as being within

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{SZ}, p.207.
a world that is already familiar that Heidegger has in mind in the term "Being-in-the-world." Thus, the twin epistemological problems of radical skepticism and of how the subject can relate to the object are immediately unmasked as sham problems based on a derivative and ultimately incorrect analysis. In fact, Heidegger tells us, we always discover ourselves first of all as living in a world with which we are familiar, working with things that are already known. But how then should knowledge be characterized?

Heidegger's most general and pervasive description of knowing is that it is a type of "vision" or "sight." The use of visual imagery as a description of knowing is quite in keeping with the philosophical tradition, and means more than simply perceiving with the eyes. Heidegger formalizes the terms "sight" and "seeing", "...enough to obtain therewith a universal term for characterizing any access to entities or to Being, as access in general."\(^{14}\)

Now it is Heidegger's conviction that different kinds of beings require different modes of access. Consequently, this formal definition of sight as access in general must encompass all of those modes of Being whereby the Dasein gains access to its

\[^{14}\text{SZ, p.147, ...das damit ein universaller Terminus gewonnen wird, der jeden Zugang zu Seiendem und zu Sein als Zugang überhaupt charakterisiert.}\]
world. There is the circumspection (Umsicht) of concern that discloses equipment (the ready-to-hand); there is the respect (Rücksicht) of solicitude that discovers other human beings; there is the sight (Sicht) that is directed toward Being as such; and there is the transpicuity (Durchsichtigkeit) whereby one's own Being becomes transpicuous or transparent to oneself.  

Furthermore, there is our theoretical observation of extant entities (the present-at-hand) which Heidegger calls a "just looking at without circumspection," and there is phenomenological interpretation, a kind of knowing which "looks primarily toward Being." Thus we realize that indeed all our modes of access, all our ways of knowing, are subsumed under the formally defined term "sight" or "seeing." For Heidegger, knowing is a comportment of man toward entities (or toward Being) that uncovers these entities according to their specific mode of access. The formal term for this access is "sight."

15. cf. SZ, p.146. I have chosen these sometimes awkward English terms in an attempt to preserve their connection with the German root, Sicht (sight), through variations on the Latin root specere. The important thing to remember is that each of these modes of Being is a type of sight or vision in the formal sense of "access to."

16. SZ, p.69, ...unumsichtiges Nur-hinsehen. (My emphasis)

17. SZ, p.67, ...auf das Sein sieht... (my emphasis)
Now, "all sight," Heidegger tells us, "is grounded primarily in understanding..." With this notion of understanding, and more particularly with the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis), we have arrived at what I consider to be the core concept in the thought of the early Heidegger. The success or failure of the project of Being and Time hinges upon whether this understanding of Being can be developed and made explicit as Heidegger thinks it can. Unfortunately, this is also one of his slipperiest concepts. There are ambiguities, inconsistencies, even apparent contradictions in Heidegger's use of this term which make our task extremely difficult. I will deal with this in more depth later. For now we must simply note that understanding, as a fundamental structure of the Dasein's existence, is what makes all "sight," therefore all knowledge, possible. Furthermore we learn that it is ultimately temporality that provides the full meaning as well as the possibility condition of Dasein's Being as understanding. Thus, Heidegger's "logic" is somewhat as follows: knowing is one

18. SZ, p.147, ...alle Sicht primär im Verstehen gründet... (my emphasis)

19. The structure of Dasein as disclosedness is also constituted by state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), and discourse (Rede) as well as by understanding (Verstehen). Nonetheless, these are not three separate "parts", but three aspects of a unified whole. Thus, while there is a disclosedness that belongs to state-of-mind and discourse, to the extent that this provides a certain access to what is disclosed therein, they are "grounded" in understanding. Of course, it is also true that a state-of-mind and a type of discourse always belong to every understanding as well.
mode of Dasein's Being; Dasein's Being is characterized by
disclosedness within which understanding functions as the ground
of our access to both entities and to Being; understanding is
ultimately structured and rendered possible by temporality;
therefore, Being must be understood temporally. Hence the title,
Being and Time.
The Possibility of Knowledge: Understanding

The Centrality of the Understanding

We now turn to a more in-depth treatment of just how understanding is to provide the Dasein with access to entities and even with access to Being itself. Because understanding plays such a decisive role in the early Heidegger's thought, my delineation of it will also illuminate the "inner logic" or rationale of the original project of Being and Time. Our first task then is to answer these questions: Why is this notion of understanding, especially the understanding of Being, so important? How does it come to play such a significant role in Heidegger's inquiry? The clearest explanation for the centrality of the understanding of Being is given in the latter part of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, to which we now turn.

The metaphysical question ever since Aristotle is, what is a being? Why did Aristotle pose this question? Why has this

20. cf. KPM, pp.209-236 for the following discussion.
question been continually re-asked ever since? Do those who ask it merely engage in an intellectual game, a verbal wrestling match that has nothing to do with the "real" world? Is not such a question the proof of the pretension of an idle aristocracy that has nothing better to do with its time than invent pseudo-problems only to brag and prance about after then finding their "solutions"? Hardly. According to Heidegger, metaphysics is not something simply created by man and foolishly erected into elaborate systems and doctrines. It is, "the fundamental event which occurs with the irruption of the concrete existence of man into the totality of beings."\textsuperscript{21} It is an event within man himself; a fact of his existence.

What does this mean, and why should it be so? It means that in man's existence there lies both the possibility and, rightly understood, even the necessity of asking this question -- what is a being? Such a question is possible because man already understands something like Being, though only in the vaguest and most ill-defined way; it is necessary because man is concerned about his own Being, it is at issue with him. Thus he needs to know what it means to be. "Man's fundamental need, as a being

\textsuperscript{21} KFM, p.232, ...ist das Grundgeschehen beim Einbruch in das Seiende, der mit der facktischen Existenz von so etwas wie Mensch überhaupt geschieht.
thrown in the midst of beings, [is] to understand Being."\textsuperscript{22}

Historically, as we have pointed out in the previous chapter, philosophers have proposed answers to the Being question without first reflecting on the question itself, i.e., without any consideration of what is really sought in this question. It is Heidegger's intention to re-ask this question by first carrying out such a preliminary reflection on the question itself. When one asks the question, what is a being (Seiende)? one is really asking, what is a being \textit{qua} being?, i.e., what is a being \textit{as such} (Seiende \textit{als ein solches})? This question is equivalent to asking, what is the \textit{Being} of a being (das \textit{Sein des Seiendes})? The \textit{Being} of a being is what constitutes a particular being in its essential character and manner, its "what" and its "how."

Yet even this question is not the most fundamental one. For one cannot distinguish between the multiple meanings of the word "is", nor can one comprehend how they belong together, unified in this one word, without a clear, unifying concept of Being in general. Reflection on the question itself then has led us to see that what is truly sought when we ask what is a being (\textit{Was ist das Seiende?}) is, what is the meaning of Being in general (\textit{Was ist das

\textsuperscript{22} KPM, p.236, ...die Grundbedürftigkeit des Menschen \textit{[ist]}, als ein in das Seiende geworfenes Seiendes, dergleichen wie Sein verstehen zu müssen.
Sinn des Seins überhaupt?). And this is the question for which the whole of Being and Time seeks the answer.

However, though with the question about the meaning of Being we have arrived at what we are truly seeking, we cannot simply stop here and attempt to answer it. For we do not as yet even know where to look for a possible determination of Being as such. Thus we are led on to ask, "Whence is the like of Being, along with the full wealth of structures and relations included in it, to be conceived?"\textsuperscript{23} In other words, one must ask how a conceptualization of Being is possible. According to Heidegger, this is no speculative undertaking because we already understand, and have always already understood, something like Being. Every time we say the word "is" we understand something about what this means, though we cannot at first explicitly express it.

When we ask about the possibility of a conceptualization of Being, then, we are asking about something we already understand, though only vaguely, inexplicitly, and non-conceptually. In fact the question about the possibility of the concept of Being first arises from this preconceptual understanding of Being. "Thus, the question about the possibility of the concept of Being is once

\textsuperscript{23} KPM, p.215, \textit{von wo aus ist dergleichen wie Sein, und zwar mit dem ganzen Reichtum der in ihm beschlossenen Gliederungen und Bezüge, überhaupt zu begreifen?} (Heidegger's own emphasis)
again forced back a step to the question about the essence of the understanding of Being in general. The task has become, "the elucidation of the intrinsic possibility of the understanding of Being." This is a question about the essence of man. For it is man who understands something like Being.

We see then, that when rightly understood, the metaphysical question -- what is a being? -- leads necessarily to an analysis of the Being of man. Such an analysis, having man's Being as its theme, is itself an ontology. And to the extent that this analysis is to exhibit the possibility of any ontology whatsoever by disclosing the inner possibility of the understanding of Being, it is an ontology that founds ontology in general. It is fundamental ontology. "Embodied in this term [fundamental ontology] is the problem of the finitude in man as the decisive element that makes the understanding of Being possible." Therefore, the central problem of Being and Time is to show how the understanding of Being is possible and thereby to move closer to a conceptual


25. KPM, p.216, ...die Aufhebung der inneren Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses.

26. KPM, p.222, Im Gehalt dieses Titels ist das Problem der Endlichkeit im Menschen in Absicht auf die Ermöglichung des Seinsverständnisses als das Entscheidende eingeschlossen.
determination of the meaning of Being in general.

The understanding of Being is the core of H I's philosophy. From the preconceptual understanding of Being the metaphysical question arises. It is to this same understanding that one must return for the answer. And to obtain this answer one must work out the unifying concept of Being by accomplishing an explicit understanding of Being. The understanding of Being is therefore, in a way yet to be clarified, both the source and the goal, as well as the possibility condition, of Heidegger's inquiry. It is for this reason that the inquiry is necessarily circular. What is the nature of the understanding of Being that it can bear the heavy weight of this threefold task?

The Nature of the Understanding of Being

We must now clarify more precisely in what way the understanding of Being can be at the same time source, goal, and possibility condition of Heidegger's inquiry. Is he really describing a single unified phenomenon with a three-fold function? Or are the three functions Heidegger ascribes to the understanding of Being simply incompatible equivocations indicating a lack of clear thinking on Heidegger's part? What is the relationship between the understanding of Being on the one
hand, and understanding in general as an existential structure on
the other? Which is more fundamental? Let us be clear about what
Heidegger says before we decide.

The first sense in which Heidegger uses the term "understanding
of Being" is the easiest to grasp because it most resembles our
common, everyday use of the word "understanding." Heidegger
says,

For despite the impenetrable darkness that
envelopes Being and its meaning, it remains
nonetheless certain that at all times and in every
place where beings are disclosed we understand the
like of Being.... Every time we assert a proposition,
e.g., 'today is a holiday,' we understand the 'is' and
thereby we understand the like of Being.

Here understanding functions analogously to its common usage and
means a kind of knowing, or "knowledge of..." though certainly
this is not to be thought of as an objectively certain knowledge
nor even as an explicit knowledge. It is more along the lines of
a "familiarity with..." that has not yet been worked out into a
clear concept. Heidegger calls this a "pre-ontological"

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27. KPM, p.217. Denn so undurchdringlich das Dünkel ist, das über
dem "Sein" und seiner Bedeutung lagert, so gewiß bleibt, daß wir
jederzeit und im ganzen Feld der Offenbarkeit des Selgenden
dergleichen wie Sein verstehen.... In jedem Aussprechen eines
Satzes, z.B. "heute ist Feiertag", verstehen wir das "ist" und
damit dergleichen wie Sein.
What is it then, that the Dasein understands in this inexplicit, pre-conceptual way? First of all it understands its own Being. "It is peculiar to this entity Dasein that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it."\textsuperscript{29} In other words, man always understands himself somehow, he has some inkling of what it means for him to be. This understanding of one's own Being is what Heidegger terms an "existentiell" understanding, which means that it pertains to Dasein's own kind of actual Being, i.e., existence. But man understands more than just his own Being in this pre-conceptual comprehension. "The understanding of Being that belongs to Dasein refers equi-primordially to the understanding of something like a 'world' and to the understanding of the Being of those entities that become accessible in the world."\textsuperscript{30} Thus, in some way, we are vaguely familiar with not only our own Being, but with entities in the world, and even with Being itself. For, "in the existentiell understanding one's own Dasein is first

\textsuperscript{28} SZ, p.12, inter alia.

\textsuperscript{29} SZ, p.12, Diesem Seienden eignet, daß mit und durch sein Sein dieses ihm selbst erschlossen ist. (Cf. also GP, pp.277-280)

\textsuperscript{30} SZ, p.13, Das dem Dasein zugehörige Seinsverständnis betrifft daher gleichursprünglich das Verstehen von so etwas wie >>Welt<< und Verstehen des Sein des Seienden, das innerhalb der Welt zugänglich wird. (Cf. also GP, p.280)
experienced as something that is, as a being, and thereby Being is understood."  

It is the understanding of Being in this vague cognitive sense, in this sense of an ill-defined, pre-conceptual familiarity with Being, that functions as the source of every inquiry into Being. It is in the understanding of Being, Heidegger says, that the question "why?" originates. "The question (my emphasis) of the meaning of Being becomes possible at all only if there is something like an understanding of Being." Whenever Heidegger speaks of the understanding of Being as a fact of our existence from which the question about Being springs, he intends "understanding" in this sense of a vague cognitive awareness. He is saying that we always do in fact "know" something about Being, even though this "knowledge" is at first quite indeterminate and inarticulate. Indeed, it is the very indeterminateness of this understanding that prods us to ask more specifically about the meaning of Being.

31. GP, p.396, Zunächst ist im existentiell Verstehen das eigene Dasein als Seiendes erfahren und dabei das Sein verstanden.


33. SZ, p.200, Die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein wird überhaupt nur möglich, wenn so etwas wie Seinsverständnis ist.

34. Cf. SZ, p.5; GP, p.14; WM:VWG, p.130-131 inter alia
The second sense in which Heidegger refers to the understanding of Being is closely related to the first. We always already have an indeterminate knowledge of Being. Because it is indeterminate, we want it clarified, so we ask about its meaning. But because it is nonetheless knowledge, however vague, we also already possess, in a certain sense, the answer to that question as well. The understanding of Being "...contains the ultimate and primordial answer to every question." 35 This, of course, includes the answer to the question of the meaning of Being. Thus, the understanding of Being is not only the source of our inquiry, but also its goal. It contains what we are seeking -- the meaning of Being.

What is required is to make this vague, non-conceptual answer into a clear and explicit knowledge of the meaning of Being. Yet this will not add any new content to the pre-ontological understanding. Rather it is the explicit interpretive working out of what is already implicitly contained in this pre-ontological understanding of Being. Most simply put, Heidegger seeks to know clearly the meaning of Being by means of its unifying concept. He can achieve this because we already possess, in the pre-ontological understanding of Being, the goal we are seeking --

35. WM:VWG, p.167, ...es enthält schon die erst-letzte Urantwort für alles Fragen.
the meaning of Being. It is not a matter of finding an answer that we do not yet have, but of making clear and explicit the vague answer that we already possess. Whenever H I speaks of the goal of his undertaking, of the need to "...come to an understanding of 'what we really mean by this expression "Being'",

it is this second sense of the understanding of Being that he has in mind, i.e., an explicit, precise, and conceptually clear knowledge of the meaning of Being.

The third way in which the understanding of Being functions in Heidegger's thought is as possibility condition. And it is here that we first arrive at some of the difficulties surrounding this term. For Heidegger speaks of the understanding of Being as possibility condition in what we might call both a weak sense and a strong sense. The weaker sense is closely tied to, indeed, results from, the two previously discussed uses of the understanding of Being. Since the pre-conceptual understanding of Being is both indeterminate and cognitive, it is both the source and goal of the inquiry. Therefore, since it makes possible the asking of the question about Being and also contains, in incipient form at least, the answer to this question, it is certainly the condition of possibility for the entire investigation. Hence, the

36. SZ, p.11, ...>>was wir denn eigentlich mit diesem Ausdruck ,Sein' meinen<<.
understanding of Being is the necessary possibility condition for there to be fundamental ontology at all. But this is a fairly weak notion of "possibility condition," bordering on the almost trivial, "unless we know enough about a matter to pose an intelligent question about it and care enough to pursue the question, there can be no successful inquiry." 37

The understanding of Being, however, also seems to function in a much stronger sense of possibility condition in H I. And it is not at first clear if this strong sense is at all compatible with the previously cited uses of the understanding of Being. The strong sense implies that the understanding of Being is a transcendental structure and therefore is the transcendental possibility condition of all experience and all knowledge, whether of Being or of beings.

We have already shown that, in Heidegger's view, whatever else knowledge might be, it is a comportment of the Dasein toward entities (or toward Being). Now in the final paragraph of the

37. One must acknowledge nonetheless that in the context of H I's inquiry, the demonstration of even this kind of possibility condition is nowhere near as trivial as this "paraphrase" suggests. For, as the introduction to SZ shows, Heidegger faced a philosophical climate in which any inquiry into the meaning of Being was considered either impossible, insignificant, or meaningless. Therefore, to show that indeed one could meaningfully ask about Being with hopes of obtaining a significant answer was no minor task.
published portion of *Being and Time* Heidegger says that it is the preliminary, nonconceptual understanding of Being, "...that makes it possible (my emphasis) for Dasein as existent Being-in-the-world to comport itself towards entities..."\(^{38}\) In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* Heidegger goes so far as to equate the understanding of Being with the transcendental "horizon of objectivity,"\(^ {39}\) i.e., that which makes it possible to encounter objects at all. Furthermore, the understanding of Being is said to be the possibility condition of the Dasein's own kind of Being, of existence itself.\(^ {40}\) The understanding of Being is "thus manifest as the innermost ground of human finitude."\(^ {41}\) This point is further reinforced if we remember that Heidegger's term for human being is "Dasein," which means literally "to be the there." For Heidegger goes on to say that "It is on the basis of his understanding of Being that man is the "there" (Da) with whose Being (Sein)occurs the revelatory irruption into that which is."\(^ {42}\)

\(^{38}\) SZ, p.437, ...ermöglicht, daß sich das Dasein als existierendes In-der-Welt-sein zu Seiendem...verhalten kann.

\(^{39}\) KPM, p.130, Horizont der Gegenständigkeit.

\(^{40}\) KPM, p.218-219.

\(^{41}\) KPM, p.219, So offenbart sich das Seinsverständnis...als der innerste Grund seiner Endlichkeit. (My emphasis)

\(^{42}\) KPM, p.219, Auf dem Grunde des Seinsverständnisses ist der Mensch das Da, mit dessen Sein der eröffnende Einbruch in das Seiende geschieht...
Hence, the understanding of Being in this sense seems to be an a priori transcendental possibility condition for the very Being of the Dasein and therefore for the encounter this kind of Being makes possible with entities. As such, it is the transcendental structure that renders all knowledge possible.

The understanding of Being as possibility condition in this strong sense, however, seems incompatible with the first two ways Heidegger uses the term. The first usage was as a vague knowledge of Being; the second was as the result of making this vague understanding clear and explicit. And it is only if the understanding of Being does indeed possess this cognitive aspect that Heidegger's inquiry into the meaning of Being may hope to succeed. But if the understanding of Being is really a transcendental structure that somehow precedes experience and makes it possible, then it is not itself knowledge in any way, but rather the possibility condition of all knowledge.

Here arises the question that plagues all transcendental philosophy -- How can that which makes all knowledge possible itself be known? How can the transcendental horizon of objectivity itself become the "object" of experience? It seems that one may either assert that the understanding of Being is somehow cognitive or that it is somehow the possibility condition of cognition, but not both at the same time. Before attempting to
overcome this impasse, we must broaden the discussion to consider the nature of understanding in general and its relation to the understanding of Being.

Existentiell Understanding and the Understanding of Being

So far our discussion has been of only a particular, though privileged, understanding -- the understanding of Being. But what is the nature of understanding in general? How does it "mesh" with the understanding of Being? Are Heidegger's discussions of these all important concepts themselves compatible? We must now try to shed some light on these matters. 43

43. Although sections 31 and 32 of SZ are devoted to the nature of understanding, the following discussion will depend almost exclusively on section 20, parts A and B of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. This is due to several factors: 1. The tortuous prose and opaque terminology for which Being and Time is so justly famous would demand lengthy explanations of even those terms that are not of primary interest to this discussion; 2. Whereas the discussion of understanding in SZ is only a subdivision of the whole analytic of existence, which is the primary theme, the focus in the cited section of GP is much more specifically on the crucial role of the understanding itself; 3. There is a more explicit consideration of the relation between existentiell understanding and the understanding of Being in GP than in SZ. Besides, the view of the nature and role of understanding is virtually identical in the two works.
What we seek is a "sufficiently original concept of understanding." Now Heidegger tells us that

If in the accomplished understanding of Being there lies an act of understanding, and if the accomplished understanding of Being is constitutive for Dasein's structure of Being, then it follows that the act of understanding is [also] an original determination of the Dasein's existence.... Moreover, ultimately understanding in general is not primarily a cognition, but...a fundamental determination of existence itself.

Clearly then, understanding in general is a basic structure of existence. As Heidegger says, "To exist is essentially, if not exclusively, to understand."

What is the structure of this understanding that constitutes existence? Heidegger tells us, "means more exactly, to project oneself upon a possibility, in the projection to maintain oneself continually in a possibility." What is the meaning of "projection" here and why should it have anything to

44. GP, p.390, ...einen hinreichend ursprünglichen Begriff des Verstehens.

45. GP, p.390-391, Wenn ein Verstehen im Seinsverständnis liegt und das Seinsverständnis konstitutiv ist für die Seinsverfassung des Daseins, dann ergibt sich: Verstehen ist eine ursprüngliche Bestimtheit der Existenz des Daseins.... Noch mehr, am Ende ist das Verstehen überhaupt nicht primär ein Erkennen, sondern...eine Grundbestimmung der Existenz selbst.

46. GP, p.391, Existieren ist wesenhaft, wenn auch nicht nur, Verstehen.

47. GP, p.392, Verstehen besagt genauer: sich entwerfen auf eine Möglichkeit, im Entwurf sich je in einer Möglichkeit halten.
do with understanding? To answer this it will be helpful first to consider Heidegger's notion of meaning. The reason for this should soon become apparent.

According to Heidegger, something has meaning when it has come to be understood. 48 Now, "meaning is that wherein the understandability of something maintains itself.... Meaning is the... 'upon which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes understandable as something." 49 Without the jargon, this simply means that meaning is that in light of which something is understood. For example, if I say "a hammer is a tool for driving nails," then I have understood the hammer in light of its nature as a tool (though undoubtedly I am not expressly conscious of this fact). The meaning of the hammer then, i.e., that in light of which I understand it as a tool, is "toolness," so to speak, or "instrumentality," to put it less awkwardly. This act of projecting the hammer upon its horizon of understandability (e.g., instrumentality) to discover its meaning is, according to Heidegger, the basic act of understanding. It is for this reason that understanding is projection. From this it should be clear that projection includes two things: that upon which something is

48. SZ, p.151

49. SZ, p.151, Sinn ist das worin sich Verstaedlichkeit von etwas halt.... Sinn ist das... Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verstandlich wird.
projected, i.e., its meaning; and that which is projected, i.e., that which is to be understood. Every projection is both a "projection of..." and a "projection upon..."

Returning to the understanding that is characteristic of existence then, we may ask what is projected, and what it is projected upon. What is projected is the Dasein itself; that upon which the Dasein projects itself is a possibility of itself. To understand is to "to project oneself upon a possibility."50 This means that the Dasein has always already understood itself in light of its possibilities, it has chosen certain possibilities or ignored some and lapsed into others. To understand oneself in light of possibilities as possibilities is to understand oneself as free.

To the extent that the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and understands itself in this possibility...the projection is the way in which I am the possibility, that is, it is the way I exist freely."

What is essential in understanding as projection is that by means of this projection the Dasein understands itself as existing freely. It is thus an existentiell understanding, i.e., it pertains to the way man actually exists. In fact, this "understanding as

50. GP, p.392, sich entwerfen auf eine Möglichkeit... (My emphasis)

51. GP, p.392-393, Sofern sich das Dasein auf eine Möglichkeit entwirft und in ihr sich versteht...der Entwurf ist die Art, in der ich die Möglichkeit bin, d.h. die Art, in der ich frei existiere.
self-projection is the Dasein's fundamental mode of happening."\textsuperscript{52}

Furthermore, Heidegger tells us, understanding in general, as this basic determination of existence, "is the condition of possibility for all kinds of comportment, not only practical, but also cognitive."\textsuperscript{53}

We are now faced with the problem of the relation between understanding in general as a basic structure of Dasein's existence (existentiell understanding) and the understanding of Being in particular. And the astute reader should now see just how sticky this problem is. For both understanding in general and the understanding of Being are said to be the possibility condition for our comportment with (and therefore, our knowledge of) entities.

Moreover, upon closer examination it seems that somehow each is supposed to be the possibility condition of the other! For if understanding as projection is the most general and inclusive concept of understanding, then it would seem that the understanding of Being, as one particular projection, is a sub-division of projection in general, and, as such, is only

\textsuperscript{52} GP, p.393, Das Verstehen als Sichentwerfen ist die Grundart des Geschehens des Daseins.

\textsuperscript{53} GP, p.392, ...ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für alle Arten nicht nur des praktischen Verhaltens, sondern auch des Erkennens.
possible on the basis of the understanding in general. On the other hand, Heidegger tells us that the understanding of Being "coincides so little with the ontic experience of beings that ontic experience necessarily presupposes a preontological understanding of Being as its essential condition."\textsuperscript{54} In other words, ontological understanding is the possibility condition of ontic understanding, therefore the understanding of Being is the possibility condition of understanding in general as projection. Now if one objects that understanding in general is not an ontic understanding, Heidegger himself offers the refutation. He says that understanding as projection "relates to the Dasein itself, that is, to a being, and is therefore an ontic understanding."\textsuperscript{55} What then are we to make of this curious state of affairs? On the one hand understanding as projection is the possibility condition of the understanding of Being; on the other hand the understanding of Being is the possibility condition of understanding as projection. Surely they cannot each be the possibility condition of the other -- or can they?

In fact this apparent impasse is resolvable, and each is indeed

\textsuperscript{54} GP, p.398, ...es deckt sich so wenig mit dem ontischen Erfahren von Seiendem, daß ontisches Erfahren notwendig ein vorontologisches Seinsverständnis als wesenhafte Bedingung voraussetzt.

\textsuperscript{55} GP, p.395, Es bezieht sich auf das Dasein selbst, d.h. auf ein Seiendes, und ist daher ein ontisches Verstehen. (My emphasis)
the possibility condition of the other, yet each is such in a
different way. The key is the difference between understanding
as act (Verstehen) and understanding as accomplishment
(Verständnis) -- a difference which is usually completely lost in
translation. I will now attempt to explain this more fully.\textsuperscript{56} The
complete phenomenon of understanding includes not only that
which is to be understood (let us call it X) and that in light of
which it is to be understood (let us call it Y), but also the act of
projecting X upon Y, and the result of this projection (i.e., "X is
a function of Y"), which is the accomplished understanding that
was originally sought. Now when Heidegger says that
understanding as projection constitutes Dasein's existence and is
the possibility condition of all comportment, he is referring to
understanding as act.\textsuperscript{57} This is understanding as Verstehen. On

\textsuperscript{56} It should be kept in mind however, that what follows is my
interpretation of what I think Heidegger is saying rather than a
simple recitation of what he explicitly says. Nowhere does he
himself elaborate upon this difference between Verstehen and
Verständnis, nor does he even draw much attention to it. However,
I believe my interpretation to be the only way to avoid the
apparent impasse mentioned above.

\textsuperscript{57} The term "act" is potentially misleading. It does not mean
"act" in the sense of one action initiated by a subject who could
have acted otherwise or refused to act at all. It is more a mode
of the Dasein's Being, the way Dasein exists and must exist. As
long as the Dasein exists, projection occurs. Nonetheless, the
term has a certain utility here serving to distinguish the agency
that accomplishes an understanding (understanding as a verb) from
the result obtained by means of this agency (understanding as a
noun).
the other hand, when Heidegger speaks of an entity having been understood, he is speaking of understanding as something already accomplished, as knowledge or insight already gained. This is understanding as Verstândnis. The understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) is just such an already accomplished knowledge of Being. Now any Verstândnis, any accomplished understanding, as the result of a projection is necessarily made possible by Verstehen, by the act of understanding as this very act of projecting. Thus we see how understanding in general as act (Verstehen) is the possibility condition of the understanding of Being as achievement (Seinsverständnis).

Well and good so far, but how then can the understanding of Being be the possibility condition of any ontic understanding, i.e., of any understanding of particular beings? As we have already seen, something is understood only when it has been projected upon its horizon of understandability, upon that in light of which it is intelligible. Hence, to understand an entity as the particular entity it is, this entity must be projected upon its Being. And if this projection is to result in a specific understanding of this entity as something in particular (which is what it means to understand this entity in light of its Being), then the Being of this entity must itself have been already understood. Therefore, one must already have gained some knowledge of Being, one must already have an accomplished
understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) before any entity can be understood as the particular being that it is.

For example, we have seen that according to Heidegger the Being of the hammer, as equipment, is characterized by "instrumentality." Heidegger is saying that before I can understand the hammer as the particular being it is (i.e., as an instrument for driving nails), I must already have understood the Being of this kind of entity, that is, I must already have understood "instrumentality" itself. In this sense, the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) is the possibility condition, not of the act of ontic understanding (projection), but of the accomplished ontic understanding (the "upon which" of the projection). To summarize, existentiell understanding as the act of projecting makes possible the understanding of Being as a projection of Being. But the understanding of Being as accomplishment makes possible any existentiell understanding as an accomplished understanding, that is, understanding a being as the being that it is.

It must be stressed here that even understanding as achieved (Verständnis) is not yet a clear, conceptually precise and explicit knowledge. It is a tacit knowledge that cannot easily be clearly verbalized. The process of working this vague knowledge out into a conceptually clear understanding is what Heidegger calls
interpretation (Auslegung, literally, a "laying out"). It is making explicit the "as" in the understanding of an entity as such and such. This is where knowledge of the kind that usually interests epistemologists occurs. The important thing here is to see that the explicit knowledge that preoccupies epistemologists is, in Heidegger's view, already a derivative or secondary phenomenon of knowledge, and that it finds its proper place within the context of existence as a whole. The explicit knowledge that concerns knowledge theorists is itself, according to Heidegger, based on a more original and broader (though less explicit) kind of knowing, a kind of knowing that is constitutive of the whole of man's Being.

Returning now to the way the understanding of Being is source, goal, and possibility condition of Heidegger's inquiry, we see that it is the already accomplished though still vague knowledge we have of Being (vorontologisches Seinsverständnis) that is the source of our inquiry. We see further that it is this same understanding rendered explicit through interpretation that is the goal (ontologisches Seinsverständnis). And it is both the fact that we do always have at our disposal a vague understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) and the fact that we exist as projecting (Verstehen) (and therefore are capable of accomplishing an explicit projection of Being), that make it possible for the whole inquiry to succeed, for us to gain a clear knowledge of Being. Furthermore, since knowledge of entities is only possible if these
entities are projected upon their Being (which must itself be understood), we see how Seinsverständnis and Verstehen are also the possibility conditions of the knowledge of particular beings as well. But these are not yet ultimate possibility conditions. For Heidegger goes on to ask how this very understanding of Being is itself possible. The answer, of course, will be temporality.

The Possibility of the Understanding: Temporality

We have already seen that a being is only understood when it is projected upon its Being, and therefore, Being itself must already be understood. In existentiell understanding, for example, the Dasein understands itself as the particular being it is and in this process Being is understood. Now,

If we say that Being is understood in the Dasein's existentiell understanding, and if we observe that understanding is a projecting, then in the understanding of Being there lies yet a further projection: Being is only understood to the extent that it, on its part, is projected upon something.

58. GP, p.396, Wenn wir sagen: Im existenziellen Verstehen des Daseins ist Sein verstanden, und wenn wir beachten, daß das Verstehen ein Entwerfen ist, so liegt in dem Verständnis von Sein wiederum ein Entwurf: Das Sein ist nur verstanden, insofern es seinerseits auf etwas hin entworfen ist.
In other words, just as beings have to be understood in light of something, i.e., their Being, so Being itself must be understood in light of something, i.e., there must be that upon which Being itself is projected.\textsuperscript{59} If we keep in mind that H I constantly seeks the meaning of Being, and if we remember that meaning, for Heidegger, is the "upon which" of a projection, then it becomes obvious that it is exactly this "something" that Being itself is projected upon that is the goal of fundamental ontology.

If the understanding of Being is to be possible as a science in the sense of ontology...then that upon which the understanding of Being, as understanding, has already preconceptually projected Being must be brought to light in an explicit projection.\textsuperscript{60}

Heidegger recognizes that since he is inquiring into the possibility of the understanding of Being as such, his task involves the curious enterprise "...of inquiring even beyond Being about that upon which Being itself, as Being, is projected."\textsuperscript{61} It is

\textsuperscript{59} Heidegger realizes that this seems to raise the specter of an infinite regress, but he postpones his discussion of how the problem is to be avoided. Consequently, I too will consider this matter later.

\textsuperscript{60} GP, p.399, Wenn Verstehen von Sein als Wissenschaft im Sinne der Ontologie möglich sein soll...dann muß dasjenige im ausdrücklichen Entwurf enthüllt werden, woraufhin das Seinsverständnis als Verstehen das Sein vorbegrifflich schon entworfen hat.

\textsuperscript{61} GP, p.399, ...noch über das Sein hinaus nach dem zu fragen, woraufhin es selbst als Sein entworfen ist. (Heidegger's emphasis)
this "beyond Being," this something upon which Being is projected, that provides the ultimate illumination necessary for all unveiling -- of either beings or Being. Thus it is "the basic condition for the knowledge of beings as well as for the understanding of Being..." It is the ultimate possibility condition for all knowledge. What is this "beyond Being" that functions as this ultimate possibility condition for all knowing?

If Dasein harbors within itself the understanding of Being, and if temporality makes possible the Dasein in its Being-structure, then temporality must also be the condition of possibility of the understanding of Being and thus of the projection of Being upon time.

Time is the meaning of Being and the possibility condition of all knowledge.

But how is temporality the possibility condition of understanding in general (Verstehen)? And how is temporality the condition of possibility for the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) in particular? The answer to the first question would require a complete description of how the Dasein's Being is constituted ultimately by temporality, and would take us

62. GP, p.402, Die Grundbedingung für die Erkenntnis von Seiendem sowohl wie für das Verstehen von Sein...

63. GP, p.397, Wenn Dasein in sich selbst Seinsverständnis birgt, die Zeitlichkeit aber das Dasein in seiner Seinsverfassung möglich macht, so muß auch die Zeitlichkeit die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses und damit des Entwurfs des Seins auf die Zeit sein.
much too far afield. Indeed, the entire published portion of Being and Time is Heidegger's answer to this first question. I must therefore limit myself here to only the briefest sketch.

The Dasein is described by Heidegger as Being-in-the-world, and its particular mode of Being is called existence. This is a technical term for Heidegger and goes well beyond its usual meaning (actuality) to include what has traditionally been referred to as transcendence. Heidegger draws upon the etymology of the word "existence" (from Latin, ex-, "out of" + sistere, "to stand") to emphasize that peculiar ability of man to "step outside of himself," i.e., what the tradition has called his self-transcendence. As a transcendental inquiry, Heidegger is seeking the possibility condition of this self-transcendence. He is asking "How is transcendence possible"?

Now the primary moment of this transcendence, this existent mode of Being of the Dasein, is understanding as projection. In this existentiell understanding the Dasein projects itself upon a particular possibility of itself. It transcends (i.e., passes over, oversteps) what it currently is toward what it is not now, but can become. In this description certain temporal nuances begin to be felt. The Dasein is always constituted by what Heidegger calls an
ecstatic-horizontal unity of past, present, and future. Dasein, as existant, always projects itself upon a particular future possibility from out of the range of possibilities that have been bestowed upon it by its past, thereby determining a particular constellation of the present.

But here "future", "past", and "present" do not refer to what we usually mean by these terms. They are all particular ways of Being of the Dasein. They are called "ecstases" by Heidegger, emphasizing that they constitute Dasein's transcendence. As such, each has both an authentic and an inauthentic mode. The authentic future is a kind of active anticipation (Vorlauf en); the inauthentic future is a mere expecting (Erwarten). The authentic past is a recollection (Wiedeholen); the inauthentic past a forgetting (Vergessenheit). The authentic present is a moment-of-vision (Augenblick); the inauthentic, a just lingering-in-the-present (Gegenwärtigen). What Heidegger is saying here is that to exist as the transcendent being (better, as the transcending being) is to be a unity of the ecstases of future, past, and present, in either their authentic or inauthentic modes. This ecstatic-horizontal unity of authentic or inauthentic past, present, and future is what Heidegger calls temporality.

64. "Ecstatic" emphasizes the going beyond of projection; "horizontal" emphasizes the ultimate upon which of this projection, beyond which one cannot go.
(Zeitlichkeit). It is temporality that is the most original and primordial characterization of the Dasein's Being. Thus, what Heidegger has accomplished here is a temporal interpretation of transcendence.

Understanding as projection is dependent upon such a unity of the ecstases of future, past, and present. If Dasein could not be toward a future from out of a past and for a present, there could be no "projection upon", no "projection of", and no act of projecting. Therefore, it is temporality that makes understanding in general possible. Temporality, as the unity of the ecstases of future, past, and present, is the transcendental possibility condition of understanding in general as projection.

But how is temporality the possibility condition for the understanding of Being? The answer was to have been given in the third division of part one of Being and Time which was never published. The only answer available to us is that found in the later portion of Basic Problems in Phenomenology. We have just seen how temporality makes possible transcendence which, in its turn, makes possible the projection that characterizes understanding as act (Verstehen). Now we seek how temporality also makes possible the understanding of Being as an accomplished

understanding (Seinsverständnis), that is, as already projected upon its horizon of intelligibility. In other words, we wish to know how temporality provides the horizon upon which Being is projected. Unfortunately, we must again limit ourselves here to the briefest possible summary -- what Heidegger works out in some sixty pages we must sketch out in but a few paragraphs.

Transcendence is made possible by the ecstatic character of temporality. And it is the "going beyond" of transcendence, its "overstepping to...", that makes possible the projection that characterizes understanding in general. Thus it is transcendence, and ultimately temporality, that make possible that specific projection of Being that occurs in the understanding of Being.

If transcendence makes possible the understanding of Being, and if transcendence is grounded in the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality, then the latter [i.e., temporality] is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being. 66.

But "where" is the "upon which" of this projection of Being? How does temporality offer the horizon for this projection? According to Heidegger, the "overstepping to..." of the ecstases of temporality which characterizes transcendence is not simply a stepping out into nothing.

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66. GP, p.429, Wenn Transzendenz das Seinsverständnis ermöglicht, Transzendenz aber in der ekstaticisch-horizontalen Verfassung der Zeitlichkeit gründet, dann ist dieses die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses
Rather, as overstepping toward..., and on the basis of their respective ecstatic characters, they each have a horizon which is prescribed by the mode of the overstepping, that is, by the mode of the future, past, and present and which belongs to the ecstasis itself. Each ecstasis, as an overstepping toward... has at the same time in itself and belonging to it an adumbration of the formal structure of the whereto of the overstepping. We designate this whereunto of the ecstasis as the horizon or, more exactly, the horizontal schema of the ecstasis.

The importance of these few sentences cannot be overstressed. This notion of the horizontal schemata of the ecstases of temporality provides the key to understanding how time is the meaning of Being.

Our "stratification" of projections is now as follows: understanding of particular beings requires a projection of this entity upon its Being; understanding of Being requires a projection of Being upon its own horizon of intelligibility, which

67. GP, pp.428-429, ...sondern sie haben als Entrückungen zu... aufgrund ihres jeweiligen ekstatischen Charakters einen aus dem Modus der Entrückung, d.h. aus dem Modus der Zukunft, der Gewesenheit und der Gegenwart vorgezeichneten und zur Ekstase selbst gehörigen Horizont. Jede Ekstase als Entrückung zu... hat in sich zugleich und ihr zugehörig eine Vorzeichnung der formalen Struktur des Wozu der Entrückung. Wir bezeichnen dieses Wohin der Ekstase als den Horizont oder genauer das horizontale Schema der Ekstase. (I have translated Entrückung rather freely as "overstepping" rather than more literally as "removal" for two reasons. First, "overstepping" provides a more explicit allusion to transcendence; second, the term "removal" lends itself too easily to the misperception that somehow the ecstases are being removed or carried away by some agent other than themselves. The Dasein "oversteps", i.e., transcends, in the ecstases; the Dasein is not "carried away" or "removed" by any agency outside of itself).
is temporality; temporality can provide this horizon because each 
eccasisis of temporality intrinsically includes its own particular 
schema, that is, its own unique "upon which." Therefore, in that 
specific projection that constitutes the understanding of Being, 
Being is projected upon the horizontal schema of an ecstaticis of 
temporality and it is this horizontal schema which illuminates 
Being, which provides the light in which Being is understood.

As an example of this abstruse and involved process Heidegger 
delineates how the horizontal schema of one ecstaticis of 
temporality illuminates the Being of a particular kind of entity, 
that of the ready-to-hand, or the handy. Now the Being of any 
entity is comprised of both its specific content, i.e., what it is, 
and its mode of Being, i.e., how it is. With regard to the handy, 
Heidegger tells us that "the whatness of the beings that confront 
us daily is defined by their equipmental character." Now 
Heidegger had already shown that the whatness of equipment is 
constituted by its "in-order-to", that is, by its instrumentality,

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68. "Ready-to-hand" is the way Macquarrie and Robinson translate 
Heidegger's "zuhanden"; in Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
Hofstadter uses the alternative "the handy". I will use the latter 
term for the most part because it is less awkward. What is 
important is to remember that Heidegger means by this term the 
Being of those items that one uses as tools in order to accomplish 
some end. Such objects are therefore handy, ready to be taken up 
and used at any time.

69. GP, p.432, Die Washeit des Seienden, das uns alltäglich 
begegnet, ist durch den Zeugcharakter umgrenzt.
and that instrumentality can only be understood temporally. The hammer is an instrument used in order to accomplish a task yet to be done for a purpose yet to be realized. It can only be understood as an instrument in light of this looking forward to what it is intended to accomplish, i.e., in terms of the future. Thus, in the discussion to follow here Heidegger is interested only in "the mode of Being of equipment, its handiness, with respect to its temporal possibility, that is, with respect to the way we understand handiness as such temporally."\textsuperscript{70} In other words, he wants to show how it is only possible to understand handiness by means of temporality.

Now previously Heidegger had shown that the Being of the handy could undergo a modification by becoming unavailable. A hammer, for example, could break and thus become useless, become unavailable for the task at hand, become "not handy." From this Heidegger infers that both handiness and unavailability are "\textit{variations of a single basic phenomenon} which we characterize formally by \textit{presence} and \textit{absence}, and generally as \textit{preasens}."\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{70} GP, p.433, \textit{...die Seinsart des Zeugs, die Zuhandenheit desselben, mit Rücksicht auf seine temporale Möglichkeit, d.h. mit Rücksicht darauf, wie wir Zuhandenheit als solche zeitlich verstehen.}

\textsuperscript{71} GP, p.433, \textit{...Abwandlungen eines Grundphänomens sind, das wir formal mit \textit{anwesenheit} und \textit{Abwesenheit} und allgemein als \textit{Preasenz} kennzeichnen.}
Heidegger purposely uses this Latinate expression to keep this term distinct from the time-determinations he has already discussed. Thus we see that handiness has a preasensial meaning, which signifies for Heidegger that it is understood temporally. But what is the meaning of this term preasens then? How does it relate to temporality?

The term is defined only negatively by Heidegger. He assures us that it is not the same as the present moment or the "now" of the common conception of time. Moreover, he assures us that preasens is not the same as the ecstasis of the present that he had previously described in the existential analytic. But if preasens is "more original" than the now, and if it does not indicate an ecstatic phenomenon, then what does it mean? Heidegger's answer (if one can call it that) is worth quoting at some length.

We have already pointed out that the ecstases of temporality are not simply overstepping toward..., such that the direction of the overstepping proceeds as if into nothing or is still indeterminate. On the contrary, to each ecstasis as such there belongs a horizon that is determined by it and that first of all completes that ecstasis' own structure.... The present projects itself in itself ecstatically upon preasens. Preasens is not identical with present, rather, as the basic designation of the horizontal schema of this ecstasis, it co-constitutes the complete time-structure
of the present. \(^{72}\)

In other words, preasens is the horizontal schema of the ecstatics of the present, and the two together -- the ecstatic and its horizontal schema -- make up the full time-structure of the present. \(^{73}\) What exactly this term preasens means, however, is not further spelled out by Heidegger. It is simply said to be the horizontal schema of the ecstatics of the present.

How does this horizontal schema guide the understanding of Being? Again, I quote at length.

As overstepping toward... the present is a being-open for entities encountering us, which thus are understood antecedently upon preasens. Everything which encounters us in the en-presenting is understood as coming-to-presence, i.e., understood by way of presence because of the horizon, preasens, which was already overstepped [toward] in the ecstatic... Accordingly, we understand Being from the

\[^{72}\] GP, p.435, Wir haben darauf hingewiesen, daß die Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit nicht einfach Entrückungen zu... sind, so daß die Entrückungsrichtung gleichsam ins Nichts geht oder noch unbestimmt ist. Vielmehr gehört zu jeder Ekstase als solcher ein durch sie bestimmter und ihre eigene Struktur allererst vollendender Horizont.... Gegenwart entwirft sich in sich selbst ekstatic auf Preasenz. Preasenz ist nicht identisch mit Gegenwart, sondern als Grundbestimmung des horizontalen Schemas dieser Ekstase macht sie die volle Zeitstruktur der Gegenwart mit aus.

\[^{73}\] Presumably there is a specific horizontal schema for the ecstatics of the future and past as well, but Heidegger does not discuss these.
original horizontal schema of the ecstases of temporality.

To return to the example of understanding handiness, Heidegger tells us that whenever we encounter a thing (e.g., the hammer), as either available or unavailable, we have already projected it upon the horizontal schema of praesens (or absens). We discover the hammer as either present for its intended use or as absent from this intentional context. Thereby we "understand" that the meaning of the Being of handiness is to be present within and for an instrumental context.

At last we can see how temporality makes possible the understanding of Being. As we pointed out earlier, the Being of any entity is constituted by its whatness and howness. We have learned that the whatness of the handy is defined by its equipmental or instrumental character, which can only be understood temporally as an "in-order-to". The howness, as we have just seen, can only be understood temporally in light of the horizontal schema of praesens as presence for this "in-order-to". Thus, both the specific whatness and howness that comprise the

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74. GP, p.436. Als Entrückung zu... ist die Gegenwart ein Offensein für Begegnendes, das somit im vorhinein auf Praesenz hin verstanden ist. Alles, was im Gegenwärtigen begegnet, ist aufgrund des in der Ekstase schon entrückten Horizontes, Praesenz, als Anwesendes, d.h. auf Anwesenheit hin verstanden.... Sein verstehen wir demnach aus dem ursprünglichen horizontalen Schema der Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit.
Being of the handy are temporally determined. The Being of the handy is determined by time.

Here we see the first glimmering of the completion of the task toward which the published portion of Being and Time only pointed. Time is shown to be the horizon for all understanding of Being because temporality makes possible the projection that constitutes the act of understanding and also provides the horizontal schema, or the "upon which", of that projection which makes possible the accomplished understanding of Being. The meaning of Being is time. Temporality is thus the ultimate possibility condition for all understanding, whether of Being or of beings.

    In its ecstatic-horizontal unity temporality is the fundamental condition of the possibility of the epekeina (the "beyond"), that is, of the transcendence constitutive of the Dasein itself. Temporality is itself the fundamental condition of possibility of all understanding which is grounded in transcendence and whose essential structure lies in projection.

Thus, temporality is also the ultimate possibility condition for all our knowledge, for as Heidegger has told us repeatedly, knowledge itself depends upon the understanding of Being. Temporality is,

75. GP, p.436, Die Zeitlichkeit ist in ihrer ekstatisch-horizontalen Einheit die Grundbedingung der Möglichkeit des ἐπέκεινα, d.h. der das Dasein selbst konstituierenden Transzendenz. Die Zeitlichkeit ist selbst die Grundbedingung der Möglichkeit alles in der Transzendenz gründenden Verstehens, dessen Wesensstruktur im Entwerfen liegt.
therefore, the ultimate epistemological foundation of H I. It makes possible our knowledge of Being which, in its turn, makes possible our knowledge of particular beings. If the whole of H I is fundamental ontology, it is no less, and with equal right fundamental epistemology as well. Heidegger claims to have demonstrated not only how one can know Being, but in so doing, also to have uncovered the transcendental possibility condition for our knowledge of anything at all. I will consider whether or not this claim is justified in Chapter Five. For now we turn our attention away from the content of H I's philosophy to consider its character. We now ask, What kind of philosophy is H I doing? And what import does this have for our own task?

The Nature of H I's Thought:
Transcendental-Phenomenological Science of Being

Our discussion of H I has proceeded up to now "from the inside," so to speak, from the perspective of its own inner aim and direction. Now we must change our standpoint and view H I "from the outside." We must ask what kind of philosophy this is. How should its inquiry be characterized? What did H I set out to do and how did he expect to accomplish it? These questions are
important because the answers will cast light in their own way on the epistemological presuppositions or assumptions that undergird H I's thought. Armed with the answers to these questions and the results of the previous discussion, we will finally be able to draw some conclusions about the epistemological status of H I.

How does H I understand the nature and goal of philosophy? Heidegger tells us that in antiquity *philosophia* meant the same as science in general. Later, particular disciplines within this general science -- medicine, mathematics, natural science -- became detached from philosophy and were called sciences in their own right. Accordingly, "the designation *philosophia*." Heidegger tells us, "refers to a science which underlies and encompasses all the other particular sciences. Philosophy becomes science pure and simple." It is "absolute science." What then is the theme of this absolute science which includes, indeed, grounds all others? "We assert now that *Being* is the proper and sole theme of philosophy.... Negatively, this means that philosophy is not a science of particular beings, but of *Being*, or, as the Greek

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76. GP, p.4, Die Bezeichnung Φιλοσοφία verbleibt jetzt einer Wissenschaft, die allen anderen besonderen Wissenschaften zugrundeliegt und sie umgreift. Die Philosophie wird die Wissenschaft schlechthin.

77. Ibid. ...absolute Wissenschaft.
expression goes, ontology."^78 In other words, whereas the positive sciences study particular beings, or realms of beings, philosophy is concerned with no particular entity, but with Being itself. Therefore, "philosophy is the theoretical-conceptual interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and possibilities. Philosophy is ontological."^79 Philosophy is quite simply the science of Being.

Since philosophy distinguishes itself from those disciplines that study particular beings by investigating Being itself, philosophy is transcendental.

With this distinction between Being and beings and the singling out of Being as [our] theme, we depart in principle from the realm of beings. We surmount it, transcend it. [Therefore], we can also call the science of Being, as critical science, transcendental science.

Thus, philosophy is "critical, transcendental science of Being, that

^78. GP, p.15, Wir behaupten nun: Das Sein ist das echte und einzige Thema der Philosophie.... Das besagt negativ: Philosophie ist nicht Wissenschaft vom Seienden, sondern vom Sein oder, wie der griechische Ausdruck lautet, Ontologie.

^79. GP, p.15, Philosophie ist die theoretisch-begriffliche Interpretation des Seins, seiner Struktur und seiner Möglichkeiten. Sie ist ontologisch.

is, ontology."^81 It seeks that which makes all understanding of Being possible -- the meaning of Being. Indeed, philosophy's sole problem is that of the meaning of Being. Philosophy asks, "Whence can the like of Being in general be understood? How is any understanding of Being whatsoever possible?"^82

Now if philosophy is the science of Being, then it must have a scientific method. Nevertheless, because it is a transcendental science,

the method of ontology, that is, of philosophy in general, is appropriate only to the extent that it is has nothing in common with any method of any of the other sciences, all of which as positive sciences deal [only] with beings.

Since philosophy deals with Being, not particular beings, its method must necessarily be different from those sciences that study particular beings. But since Being can only be discovered in the understanding of Being, which belongs to a particular being

^81. GP, ibid. ...kritisch transzendentele Wissenschaft vom Sein, d.h. Ontologie.

^82. GP, p.19, Von wo aus ist dergleichen wie Sein überhaupt zu verstehen? Wie ist Seinsverständnis überhaupt möglich?

^83. GP, p.26, Die Methode der Ontologie, d.h. der Philosophie überhaupt, ist insofern ausgezeichnet, als sie mit keiner Methode irgendeiner anderen Wissenschaft, die alle als positive Wissenschaften vom Seienden handeln, etwas gemein hat.
(the Dasein) "ontology has an ontic foundation." For this reason, the science of Being in general is founded in its possibility on a particular being, the Dasein. "Consequently, in clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the first task is the demonstration of its ontic foundation and of the characteristics of this founding." That is, the first task is the analytic of existence as constituted by temporality.

"The second task," Heidegger tells us, "is the characterization of the kind of knowledge that takes place in ontology as the science of Being... Since antiquity it has been recognized that Being somehow precedes beings; Being is somehow prior to beings. Thus, "the a priori character of Being...demands a corresponding, specific mode of access and manner of apprehending Being -- a priori knowledge." Furthermore, Heidegger tells us that, the basic components of a priori knowledge constitute phenomenology. And "phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology, that

84. GP, p.26, Ontologie hat ein ontisches Fundament...

85. GP, p.27, So ist die erste Aufgabe innerhalb der Aufklärung des Wissenscharakter der Ontologie der Nachweis ihres ontischen Fundaments und die Charakteristik dieser Fundierung.

86. GP, p.27, Das Zweite ist die Kennzeichnung der in der Ontologie als der Wissenschaft vom Sein sich vollziehenden Erkenntnisweise...

87. GP, p.27, Der apriorische Charakter des Seins...fordert demgemäß eine bestimmte Zugangsart und Erfassungsweise des Seins: die apriorische Erkenntnis.
is, of scientific philosophy."\(^{88}\)

What are these components that constitute phenomenology as a priori knowledge? There are three: phenomenological reduction, construction, and destruction. The first of these components is required because of the previously mentioned ontic foundation of ontology. It is Being that is sought, yet Being is always the Being of a particular being. Therefore, phenomenological vision cannot immediately grasp Being, rather it must begin with a particular being. But then phenomenological vision must be "...led away from that particular being and led back to its Being."\(^{89}\) It is this "leading back" of our vision away from particular beings that constitutes what Heidegger calls phenomenological reduction.

But this is neither the only component of phenomenological method, nor is it the most important one. We must not only turn away from beings as individual beings, we must also turn our gaze toward Being as such. This demands a projection of the particular being upon its Being. It is this projection that Heidegger

\(^{88}\) GP, p.27, Phänomenologie ist der Titel für die Methode der Ontologie, d.h. der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie.

\(^{89}\) GP, pp.28, ...von dem Seienden...weg- und zurückgeführt auf dessen Sein.
designates as phenomenological construction. This is the interpretive working out in an explicit projection of what has always already been implicitly understood in the pre-ontological understanding of Being.

But there is a third component of the phenomenological method. Since we must begin with beings, and since our experience of beings is always conditioned by our particular historical circumstances and our place within a philosophical tradition, some step must be taken to assure us that the philosophical tradition, with its store of basic concepts, does not mislead the inquiry.

Accordingly, there necessarily belongs to the conceptual interpretation of Being and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of Being a destruction. This means a critical deconstruction of the traditional concepts which at first must necessarily be employed — a dismantling down to the sources from which they were drawn.

Rather than uncritically accepting the concepts of a particular tradition, Heidegger is saying we must de-construct this tradition to discover the underlying experience that the concepts were originally intended to express. This is the only way to


91. GP, p.31. Daher gehört notwendig zur begrifflichen Interpretation des Seins und seiner Strukturen, d.h. zur reduktiven Konstruktion des Seins eine Destruktion, d.h. ein kritischer Abbau der überkommen und zunächst notwendig zu verwendenden Begriffe auf die Quellen, aus denen sie geschöpft sind.
appropriate a tradition positively.

Thus, phenomenology includes three moments -- reduction, construction, and destruction -- which belong together essentially. "The method of ontology thus characterized enables us to designate the idea of phenomenology as the conception of the scientific procedure of philosophy." The philosophy of H I, therefore, is a critical, transcendental science of Being (ontology), whose scientific method is constituted by the three basic components of phenomenology. It is a transcendental-phenomenological science of Being whose goal is the elucidation of temporality as the transcendental possibility condition of any understanding of Being whatsoever. Once this had been accomplished the ground would have been laid for the thematic, conceptual interpretation of Being by way of time.

The Epistemological Status of H I

What now may be said by way of summary about the epistemological status of H I? Heidegger was not indifferent to

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92. GP, p.32, Die so charakterisierte Methode der Ontologie ermöglicht eine Kennzeichnung der Idee der Phänomenologie als des wissenschaftlichen Verfahrens der Philosophie.
the problem of knowledge. He recognized the need for a fundamental clarification of the essence of knowledge and knowing. Yet this very task required an ontological clarification of the Being of the particular being that knows; it required an analysis of the Being of man, of the Dasein. For Heidegger was convinced that, whatever else it might be, knowing is a comportment of man toward entities or toward Being. Knowing is a mode of human Being.

In the course of this existential analytic we learned that different kinds of beings required different kinds of comportment toward them if they were to be known. Nevertheless, all of these modes of comportment provide access to entities. Knowledge, as such access to, is defined formally by Heidegger as "sight" or "vision", and all such vision is grounded in understanding.

Furthermore, it is Heidegger's firm belief that any knowledge of particular beings demands as its possibility condition a prior knowledge of Being itself. Therefore, The basic question not only of ontology, but also of epistemology becomes: How is it possible to understand Being? This is a transcendental inquiry seeking transcendental possibility conditions and, as such, it must employ a transcendental method. This method is to be found in phenomenology which is comprised of a reduction, construction, and destruction, and which is itself one particular mode of access, one
particular kind of sight. Phenomenological seeing is the type of comportment necessary to render Being accessible and understandable.

Such understanding is made possible ultimately by temporality as the ecstatic basis of all projection and as the horizontal schemata upon which Being is projected. Therefore, Temporality is the ultimate transcendental possibility condition of all understanding and all knowledge. It provides, one might say, both the capability of relating to entities (transcendence) and the "categories" in light of which entities are understood (the horizontal schemata).

Heidegger's inquiry is a science of Being, which aims at a clear and explicit conceptual interpretation of Being. To insure its results, Heidegger must work out a very careful and detailed account of how such knowledge is possible. The phenomenological method, while never degenerating into a mechanical technique, must nonetheless be carefully employed and rigorously followed if the goal is to be obtained. The path will be arduous and progress slow, yet it promises a gradual, step by step, progressive, and ultimately sure knowledge of the meaning of Being. If I is engaged in transcendental philosophy in the tradition of Kant yet going beyond the Kantian problematic by inquiring about the possibility conditions not just of theoretical knowledge, but of existence as a
whole, of which knowing is only a part. One may dispute the appropriateness of certain steps along his way; one may debate the success or failure of his ultimate outcome, but one cannot deny that he attempted no less than a transcendental grounding of all of our ways of Being, including our ways of knowing. Regarding H I, it is the foundationalists who are right. H I attempted to provide the transcendental foundation for every human inquiry, including epistemology. If he was successful, then every theory of knowledge must go back to an analysis of existence to find its point of departure. What it means to exist must determine what it means to know, and not vice versa.

93. And such I will do in Chapter Five.
Chapter 4

The Epistemological Status of H II

Introduction

In this chapter we must do with H II what we did in chapter three with H I -- we must determine what the later Heidegger's views on knowledge and knowing are, and we must decide something about the epistemological status of his post-Kehre thinking. For in spite of the tremendous differences in style between the early and the late Heidegger, he was constantly seeking to know more about Being and its truth. Nevertheless, the difference in the approach of H II vis à vis H I demands a corresponding difference in our presentation of the material in this chapter.

H I was attempting to develop a consistent and unified "scientific" approach to the question of the meaning of Being. There is therefore a systematic character to the writings of the early Heidegger, and this demanded a careful attempt to interpret
his early thinking systematically. I tried to delineate what I considered to be the core concept of his thought, then to show what this implied about his understanding of knowledge, while taking pains at all times to illuminate the systematic interrelations of the concepts treated.

There is simply no system in the writings of the later Heidegger. Although the unceasing attempt to illuminate Being and its truth unifies all of H II's work, the individual writings are topical and diverse, not systematic. They demonstrate little, if any, concern to relate the discussions of one work to those of another. Furthermore, even a cursory inspection of these later writings reveals a dramatic and striking change of language from that of the early Heidegger. Whereas the early Heidegger dealt with philosophical concepts and strove for clarity of ontological conception, the later Heidegger eschews any quest for conceptual clarity in favor of a kind of metaphorical deluge. To borrow from art, the early Heidegger is like realism in painting, trying to capture every detail as precisely as possible. The later Heidegger is like impressionism, seeking to communicate more through suggestive richness than precise detail.

Because of this difference in character and style my own presentation of the thought of H II will also be topical rather than systematic. I will elucidate several of the most important
topics in the work of H II and show what they express or imply about his understanding of knowledge and knowing. Next I will discuss the nature and method of H II's investigations -- what is he trying to do and how does he hope to accomplish it? Finally, I will summarize what all of this tells us about the epistemological status of the later Heidegger.

Some Important Topics in H II

Being

Although our main interest in this study lies in Heidegger's ideas concerning knowing and knowledge, we begin this section with a discussion of H II's notion of Being. For Being remains in H II as in H I the matter most worthy of investigation. Moreover, the conviction that the subject matter determines the mode of approach underlies the later Heidegger just as it did the early Heidegger. Therefore, since for H II Being is the matter to be known, an understanding of H II's idea of Being should give us a clue as to his notion of knowledge as well. For in H II it is always knowledge of Being that is sought.
What then may be said regarding Being as viewed by H II? First of all, the "ontological difference" between Being and beings that we first came upon in H I becomes even more pronounced in H II. Whether this is to be conceived as an increase in the degree of difference between Being and beings, or whether it should be thought of as an increased awareness on Heidegger's part of the ramifications of this difference, which remains equally absolute in H II as in H I, is to some degree irrelevant. The important point for us is that in H I Being was always the Being of a particular being, therefore, one could never jump immediately to a consideration of Being itself. One had always to begin with a being and only approach Being itself gradually and progressively based on the results of the preliminary investigations of the particular being chosen as the starting point. And even when an understanding of Being itself was finally attained, it could only be conceived as the Being of an entity, never as Being in and for itself. This is why there was to have been, according to Being and Time, a reinvestigation and further precision of the structure of the Dasein after the meaning of Being had been made explicit.

Furthermore, in H I the full range of Being seemed to be exhausted in its role as transcendental possibility condition. For although Heidegger realized that entities were discovered and not created by the Dasein, the Being of an entity was described predominantly as its "how" and its "what," which ultimately were
determined by the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality, i.e., the transcendental possibility condition par excellence. As Heidegger said explicitly in Being and Time, "Being is the transcendens pure and simple."¹

But in H II we find that Heidegger often seems to jump right into a discussion about Being without the arduous, careful, and lengthy preparation that we had come to expect from the procedure of H I. There appears to be some more direct mode of access to Being than was available to the early Heidegger. Moreover, in H II one quickly gets the impression that Being is no longer merely a transcendental possibility condition. It may frequently remain unclear just how Being is conceived by H II, but it is always clear that Being now seems to possess an alterity and priority, even an agency, that are incompatible with, and superior to, any notion of transcendental possibility conditions.

Indeed, Being now seems to be that which controls all else, giving itself to man or withdrawing itself from him, presiding over thinking, summoning man to reflection, originating and ruling history. In fact, the later works so stress the priority of Being that they have prompted some critics to charge Heidegger with reversion to a pre-critical realism. I will discuss the aptness of

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¹ SZ, p.38, Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin. (Heidegger's emphasis.)
this criticism later. For now we must look to what Heidegger does say in his later works regarding Being.

I will begin with just those characteristics that emphasize Being's dominance. First of all, the absolute "otherness" of Being is emphasized. It cannot be described or explained in terms of anything else because it is unique. "Yet Being -- what is Being? It is It itself." Elsewhere Heidegger emphasizes the uniqueness of Being by writing it as \( \text{Sein} \), or by spelling it archaically as Seyn. The difference between Being and beings is also accentuated when Heidegger says that Being is more in being than any being. And in spite of the apparent contradiction, it is this same difference to which Heidegger refers when he says in another work "Being is not. It gives Being." The opposite ways of expressing this difference arise from the perspective governing the statement. When viewed from the perspective of beings, Being is not at all. When viewed from the perspective of Being, Being is more significant than any being. The important point in both

2. WM: BH, p.328, Doch das Sein -- was ist das Sein? Es ist Es selbst.


5. SD: ZS, p.6, Sein ist nicht. Sein gibt Es... This literal translation of the idiom "es gibt," normally rendered as "there is," is demanded by the capitalized "Es" and by the context of later comments by Heidegger on the "It" that "gives" Being.
expressions is that there is an absolute difference between Being and beings, and Being takes precedence. It is also this absolute alterity of Being that Heidegger has in mind when he says elsewhere that Being is the ground of all else, yet remains itself without a ground.⁶

Yet, as we have already seen, H I also advocated the ontological difference between Being and beings. Why then are we making so much of it here? Because in H II Being is not only different, it also seems to dominate all else. Being "...presides over thinking and hence over the essence of humanity..."⁷ Being not only concerns man, it also claims him.⁸ Man is called by Being to name Being, to preserve Being's truth, and to transform his relationship to Being.⁹ At times it even seems that man is almost the plaything of Being, to be used in accordance with Being's own destiny. "Man," Heidegger tells us,

"...thrown' by Being itself into the truth of Being, so that, ex-sisting in this way, he watches over the truth of Being in order that whatever is should

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6. SG, pp.185 and 188.

7. WM:BH, p.314, ...das Sein selbst, das mögend über das Denken und so über das Wesen des Menschen...vermag.


appear in the light of Being as the entity which it is.

Furthermore, Being rules in history, and the various epochs of Western history are determined by Being's destining itself to man. Whether or not man can overcome the modern technological domination of the world and enter into a new relationship to Being is less a question of the will of man than of the destiny of Being.

In addition, even thinking itself seems to be elicited, guided, and controlled by Being. Heidegger tells us that thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. Yet thinking is not the initiator, it does not cause or bring about this relation. Rather, "thinking brings this relation to Being solely as something handed over to it from Being." Being is the active agent here. As Heidegger says elsewhere, "Being comes, lighting itself, to language." The rigor of this thought is said

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10. WM: BH, pp. 327-328, Der Mensch ist vielmehr vom Sein selbst in die Wahrheit des Seins >>geworfen<<, daß er, dergestalt ek-sistierend, die Wahrheit des Seins hütet, damit in Lichte des Seins das Seiende als das Seiende, das es ist, erscheine.


12. WM: BH, p. 311, Das Denken bringt ihn [diesen Bezug] nur als das, was ihm selbst vom Sein übergeben ist, dem Sein dar.

13. ibid., p. 358, Das Sein kommt, sich lichtend, zur Sprache.
to be found in remaining in the element of Being and letting Being rule.\textsuperscript{14} We are not really the creators of this thought, for we do not come upon thoughts, rather they come upon us.\textsuperscript{15} And even the fact that we are still not thinking (in Heidegger's sense) is not a fault or oversight of our own, rather it stems from Being's turning away from us.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, even the relation between Being and the ultimate transcendental possibility condition seems to have been reversed. In H I the ecstatic-horizontal unity of temporality seemed to be what determined an entity's Being, i.e., its "how" and "what". But in H II it seems that the opposite is now the case. "Openness" is now the term Heidegger uses to refer to the ecstatic-horizontal structure of the Dasein. And it is Being that lets openness happen.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus we see that for H II Being is not only totally different from beings, it also totally dominates them. It is Being that determines the essence of man; it is Being that presides over history; it is Being that calls forth and guides authentic thought.

\textsuperscript{14} WM:BH, p.313.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. GD, pp.33-41.
\textsuperscript{16} VA:WHD, p.132.
\textsuperscript{17} HW:UK, p.49.
it is Being that lets the transcendence of Dasein (openness) happen.

However, in spite of all this emphasis on the priority and apparent dominance of Being, there are indications that in fact the relationship between Being and man is not as one sided as it might at first appear. It is the essence of Being to "come to appearance" and Being needs man as the site of this appearance.\(^{18}\) Also, although Being is in many respects overpowering, man must still wrestle with Being in order to bring it to a stand in some particular embodiment.\(^{19}\) But even though man and Being are still somehow interdependent, the balance of power, so to speak, has tilted toward Being.

Yet, if Being is so wholly other, so totally different from beings, then how can Being appear to man, how can man ever hope to know anything of Being? Let us first examine the ways that Being cannot be known by man. H II never tires of telling us that Being is totally incapable of being grasped by means of the normal or traditional modes of knowledge and thought. These means of knowledge are all geared towards knowing particular beings, and Being is absolutely different than beings. Therefore, although

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18. EM, pp.75 ff, and TK, p.39.

19. Cf. HW:UK and N I and N II for example.
Being can be understood, it cannot be articulated.\textsuperscript{20} It cannot be articulated because the like of Being cannot be expressed in propositional statements,\textsuperscript{21} nor will it fit into the schema of the subject-predicate relation.\textsuperscript{22} Being cannot be grasped by way of traditional representational thinking,\textsuperscript{23} nor can it be defined through the formation of concepts.\textsuperscript{24} And in H II we find that Being cannot even be conceived as a transcendental possibility condition,\textsuperscript{25} nor can it be reached by way of transcendental method, for this method corresponds to the claim of the principle of sufficient reason which tries to determine the Being of entities only within the realm of the subjectivity of reason itself.\textsuperscript{26}

Traditional modes of knowing are therefore helpless to reach Being. And even transcendental philosophy with its own peculiar transcendental method is inadequate for the task. How then shall Being be experienced? How shall it ever be known? Because it is completely different than beings it must be accessible only to a

\textsuperscript{20} SG, pp.154-155.
\textsuperscript{21} SD, pp.24-27.
\textsuperscript{22} ibid., pp.19-20.
\textsuperscript{23} ibid, pp.24-25 and 27-58.
\textsuperscript{24} SG, p.153.
\textsuperscript{25} G, p.56.
\textsuperscript{26} SG, p.137.
completely different kind of knowing. What might this knowing be, of what does it consist? We must turn now to a consideration of what H II tells us about knowing and knowledge.

Knowing and Knowledge

Just as Being is totally different from beings, so there is a knowing which is totally different than the kind of knowledge we have of beings. Heidegger tells us that the kind of knowing of which he speaks is more than merely amassing information about something, and that it is completely different from the knowledge of science. Yet this other kind of knowing determines and limits science. Moreover, this kind of knowing is not to be equated with perception or with the formation of an image or the representation of objects. This knowledge is also more basic and fundamental than ethics, or aesthetics, or even logic. And although we certainly need this knowledge, all

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27. HW:UK, p.55.
epistemology is useless here.\textsuperscript{31}

What is this knowledge then? The question about knowledge, Heidegger tells us, is in reality the question about truth and its essence,\textsuperscript{32} and truth is unconcealedness. Therefore, knowing is bringing-forth-out-of-concealment, it is bringing into the light what was previously concealed in darkness.\textsuperscript{33} Knowledge is described as "carefully safeguarding into its truth",\textsuperscript{34} and as "standing within the truth".\textsuperscript{35} This knowledge is not some indifferent awareness of a thing, but a "being-at-home-in", a "knowing how" or aptitude, which provides for an opening up, a revealing of something.\textsuperscript{36} Thus knowing is being in the midst of an "open" vis à vis entities, it is the accomplishment and preservation of this "openness."\textsuperscript{37}

Such knowing has little to do with seeking or finding answers. Rather, it is most purely expressed in the act of creative

\textsuperscript{31} FD, pp.25-26.
\textsuperscript{32} N I, p.498.
\textsuperscript{33} HW:UK, p.48 and H, pp.195-196.
\textsuperscript{34} HW:ZW, p.88, Wissen, d.h. in seine Wahrheit verwahren...
\textsuperscript{35} HW:UK, p.55 and EM, p.16, Wissen aber heißt: unter Wahrheit stehen können.
\textsuperscript{36} TK, pp.12-13 and WP, pp.56-57.
\textsuperscript{37} HW:UK, pp.53-55 and FD, p.188 and EM, p.122.
questioning itself. Heidegger frequently says that knowing is an ability to learn, and this ability to learn means an ability to inquire. 38 Heidegger also says that knowing is willing to know, 39 and willing to know is questioning. 40 Indeed, the kind of knowledge Heidegger seeks is only possible through "creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection." 41

Another term Heidegger applies to knowing as this bringing forth out of concealment is techne. 42 This techne is called "that knowledge which supports and guides every human irruption into the midst of beings." 43 Its nature is further spelled out by Heidegger when he says that techne is a looking out beyond the merely given; it is the ability to put into work the Being of any particular entity. 44 Techne seems to be a kind of insight that one has into Being itself, an insight which one can bring to

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38. EM, p.17 inter alia.
40. EM, pp.16-17.
41. HW:ZW, p.88, ...nur um schöpferischen Fragen und Gestalten aus der Kraft echter Besinnung.
42. TK, p.12; N I, p.97; HW:UK, p.48; EM, p.122.
43. N I p.97, ...dasjenige Wissen, das allen menschlichen Aufbruch inmitten des Seienden trägt und führt.
44. EM, p.122.
expression in some concrete work. In other words, by remaining open to new possibilities, by constantly questioning anew even that which seems most beyond question, in striving to give shape and form to any insights thus gained by embodying them in a creative work -- through all of this one has experienced the kind of knowledge of which Heidegger speaks.

If all this strikes the reader as similar to the creation of a work of art, the analogy is not accidental. For art and knowledge belong together in reciprocal relation.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, art is knowledge and therefore techne.\textsuperscript{46} Art is knowledge because knowledge is standing in the truth and art is the essence of truth.\textsuperscript{47} Here we reach the core of H II's idea of knowledge and knowing. Knowing is no longer the formation of a correct image based on a valid perception of objects. Knowing is not even phenomenological "seeing" as the scientific method of transcendental philosophy. The kind of knowledge that Heidegger seeks, and that he prizes more than all else is amazingly similar to artistic insight. This knowledge is grounded in an insight into the nature of Being that arises from a deep respect for, and reflection on, the wonder of Being -- an insight which is expressed and made concrete through

\textsuperscript{45} N I, pp.635-636.
\textsuperscript{46} EM, pp.122-123.
\textsuperscript{47} N I, p.637, HW:UK, p.59 ff.
the work of art.

This interpretation is reinforced when we consider Heidegger's analysis of Nietzsche's concept of knowledge. Heidegger's respect for Nietzsche in this regard is readily apparent. He tells us that Nietzsche strove harder for knowledge and against the lack of knowledge than any other modern.\textsuperscript{48} For Nietzsche, knowledge was the schematizing of the chaos that constantly overwhelms us. As such it belongs to man's never-ceasing attempt to establish a secure constancy in the midst of this chaos. This knowledge has the character of both a command to oneself (\textit{Befehl}) and of a free and imaginative composition or creation (\textit{Dichten}). The latter is in fact very similar to the creativity of the artist. Indeed, for Nietzsche, art is higher than truth.\textsuperscript{49}

The later Heidegger seems to have recast much of this in his own image (or perhaps it could be said with equal right that his interpretation of Nietzsche was itself cast in the image of Heidegger's own thought). In \textit{H II} it is \textit{Being} that overpowers man rather than chaos, and knowledge is the struggle to achieve and express one's insight into \textit{Being} and to bring this insight to stand in a work of art. If for Nietzsche art is higher than truth, 

\textsuperscript{48} N I, p.582.

for Heidegger art is the highest expression of truth.

Thus, for H II knowledge is still "sight", but it is now artistic insight. As such, knowledge is not like a bridge linking the knower and known who stand separated from each other like opposite banks of a stream. Rather, knowledge is the stream itself which first creates the two banks and turns them toward each other.\(^{50}\)

We now turn our attention to H II's understanding of truth, for as we have seen, the question about knowledge is ultimately the question about the essence of truth. Although there will unavoidably be some repetition of material already presented, we will also discover new aspects of Heidegger's position, and even the repetition will serve to corroborate what has already been said.

Truth

As with Being and knowledge, the question "how does it stand with the truth of all thoughtful projections?" cannot be

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50. N I, pp.569-570. (The metaphor is Heidegger's)
sufficiently asked, much less answered, in metaphysics.\textsuperscript{51} Nor does the logic that rules in this metaphysics apply here. In fact, contradiction may be proof for, not against the truth of such statements.\textsuperscript{52} It is also insufficient to appeal to the truth of everyday experience, for this truth must itself be founded.\textsuperscript{53} Likewise, every standpoint from which one begins eventually requires that its own truth be founded in some way.\textsuperscript{54} In fact, truth is not at all to be conceived in the usual way as the answer to some philosophical mystery. It is itself the mystery; it is itself the matter to be thought.\textsuperscript{55}

What does Heidegger think of truth then? As we have already seen, truth is the unconcealment of Being. Because truth is the unconcealment of Being, and because Being is absolutely different than beings, the truth of any immediate experience of the world's Being disappears with the scientific interpretation of the world.\textsuperscript{56} The latter deals with beings only and thus necessarily

\textsuperscript{51} N I, p.653.
\textsuperscript{52} N I, pp.30-31.
\textsuperscript{53} FD, p.9.
\textsuperscript{54} FD, p.11.
\textsuperscript{55} WM:HG, pp.434 and 438.
\textsuperscript{56} H, p.143, Auf Grund der sciuntifischen Welt-Interpretation verschwindet die Wahrheit der unmittelbaren Welterfahrung.
obscribes Being. But this is not the only reason that Being is obscure. For just as self-withdrawing belongs to Being as much as self-giving, so concealment belongs to truth as much as unconcealment. This enigmatic statement does not mean that truth is at bottom falsehood. Rather it means that truth is not to be thought of as a static state of complete illumination, as if time were to stop at the full light of the noonday sun. On the contrary, truth is an unsure and unending process of struggle. It is a struggle against concealment and for revelation that must be constantly repeated. Thus, concealment belongs to truth as that against which the process of unconcealment must constantly strive. Truth as unconcealment is this struggle against the darkness, a struggle that unceasingly attempts to bring Being into a revealing light.

Now art, Heidegger says, is "a becoming and happening of truth." This is so because art opens up in its own way the Being of beings. Art is the bringing-into-the-work of truth.

58. HW:UK, p.59, Dann ist die Kunst ein Werden und Geschehen der Wahrheit.
59. ibid., p.28.
or the setting-into-work of truth. Indeed, art is truth to such a degree that Heidegger says in one place that truth must happen as art. Again we see that it is now artistic insight, not phenomenological sight, that reveals the truth of Being.

But if art is truth, what is art? "All art...is essentially poetry." For poetry lets happen the "open" in which the lighting projection of truth takes place, and this lighting projection of truth is itself poetic composition. This is not to be taken as saying that all art forms -- painting, sculpture, music, etc. -- are really varieties of the art of language. Nor does it mean that only the written compositions of poetry are "truly" art. Heidegger uses the term "poetry" here in a very broad sense to mean "the lighting projection of truth." Poetry in the narrower sense of written composition is only one form of poetry in this broad sense of an illuminating setting-into-work of truth. In sum, "the essence of art is poetry. The essence of

62. HW:UK, p.46.
63. HW:UK, p.59, Alle Kunst ist...im Wesen Dichtung. (Cf. also p.62.)
64. ibid. p.60.
65. ibid. p.61.
66. ibid. p.60, ...des lichtenden Entwerfens der Wahrheit, d.h. des Dichtens in diesem weiteren Sinne.
poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth."\textsuperscript{67}

Now if truth is art, and art is poetry, poetry, in the essential sense, is language.\textsuperscript{68} For language alone brings what is into the open for the first time. By naming beings for the first time, language brings beings to word and to appearance.\textsuperscript{69} This bringing to appearance of the Being of beings is the unconcealment that constitutes truth. Thus, man is related to truth not as the "subject," but as the "sayer," that is, as the one who brings Being to language.\textsuperscript{70}

Truth as unconcealment is art. Art is poetry. Poetry, in the essential sense, is language. Our quest for H II's understanding of knowledge has led us to seek the nature of truth, which in turn has led us through art and poetry to language itself. Therefore, we now must look more specifically at what H II has to say about language.

\textsuperscript{67} ibid. p.62, Das Wesen der Kunst ist die Dichtung. Das Wesen der Dichtung aber ist die Stiftung der Wahrheit.

\textsuperscript{68} HW:UK, p.61.

\textsuperscript{69} ibid. p.60 ff.

\textsuperscript{70} WM:HG, pp.436-437.
Language

Language comes to play an all important role in the later Heidegger's thought. This is because it is now Heidegger's conviction that language is "the house of Being" -- to cite his best known and frequently used metaphor relating to language.\(^{71}\) This means that language is "the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself."\(^{72}\) Language is assigned the task of revealing and preserving the Being of the entity in a concrete work.\(^{73}\) This, in Heidegger's view, is in keeping with the original meaning of the Greek word logos. For, Heidegger tells us, logos meant originally "a gathering into unconcealment."\(^{74}\) The words of language do not represent anything, rather they reveal a thing in the range of its expressibility.\(^{75}\) Indeed the word is an act of violence that


\(^{72}\) WM: BH, p.324, Sprache ist lichtend-verborgende Ankunft des Seins selbst.

\(^{73}\) EHD: HWD, p.34.

\(^{74}\) EM, p.130, ...die offenbarmachende Sammlung. (Cf. also VA: L)

\(^{75}\) G, p.46.
discloses Being.  

We see here with regard to language the same ambivalence that we observed in relation to Being. On the one hand it seems as if language itself is the active, dominating, and controlling agent without equal. It is often said by Heidegger that it is not man that speaks, but language itself "speaks". It seems to address us, to claim us before we can participate in it. Furthermore, it is language that is the ground and essence of human being. The ground of the human Dasein, Heidegger says, is conversation or dialogue, which is the authentic event of language. He says again in the same document that in poetry (i.e., in original language) man is gathered into the ground of his Dasein. Language is not a tool, but the event that has at its disposal the highest possibilities of human being. In this "free play" of language, Heidegger says, our own nature is at stake. Being human is logos, is language. Moreover, language is said to be

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76. EM, p.131.
78. EHD:HWD, p.36-40.
79. ibid p.42.
80. ibid p.35.
81. WHD, p.87, ...das Spiel der Sprache...
what makes history possible. Poetry, which constitutes primordial language, is called the ground that supports and sustains history. Heidegger says that Being-historical and being-a-dialogue are equally old, they belong together and are the same.

Yet, on the other hand, in spite of this domination by language, man is still called upon to respond to the speaking of language, and this response often has the character of violence. Man must again struggle with things to bring them to expression in a word that is fitting for them. Therefore, to answer means to correspond to the matter at stake, to listen to language and to be able to respond to it. Man still has a role to play, though language itself seems primary.

In any case, to know of Being, we must interrogate language. And in his later writings this is exactly what Heidegger both does and exhorts us to do. In one place he speaks of an "emergency path" that is available to us when we "listen to language."

82. EHD:HWD, p.34.
83. ibid p.39.
84. ibid p.37.
85. SD, p.20; WP, pp.92-93; US:S, pp.32-33; G, p.49.
Elsewhere he says that language is to be taken as our starting point. He goes on to say that the question of Being is intimately tied up with the question of language, and it is for this reason that we must interrogate language. We must remember, however, that authentic and original language is poetry. Language arises, according to Heidegger, through man's departure into Being, and "in this departure language was Being becoming word, i.e., poetry. Language is the primordial poetry in which a people speaks Being."

Thus, the language that is the house of Being, the language which we are to interrogate to learn of Being, is not everyday language. This language is not declaratory, nor is it representational thinking expressed in statements or assertions. This language does not traffic in concepts, rather

87. EM, p.66.

88. ibid. p.67.

89. EHD:HWD, p.40.

90. EM, p.131, In diesem Aufbruch war die Sprache als Wortwerden des Seins: Dichtung. Die Sprache ist die Urdichtung, in der ein Volk das Sein dichtet.

91. SD, p.20.

92. ibid p.22 and US:WzurS, p.266.
it lets Being speak through it.\textsuperscript{93} The language Heidegger describes must even be liberated from logic and grammar in order to place it in a more essential framework through thinking and poetic creation.\textsuperscript{94} The essence of this language is not to be found in the symbolic nor in signification.\textsuperscript{95} Nor is the essence of this language even described by the term "metaphor". Metaphor is limited to metaphysics.\textsuperscript{96} Therefore, the language of thinking is not metaphorical!

What can a language which is neither declaratory nor representational, is comprised of neither statements nor assertions, is neither logical, grammatical, nor conceptual, is neither symbol, signification, nor metaphor -- what remains for such a language to be? We know only that it is creatively poetic and respectfully interrogative, that Heidegger calls it the "relation of all relations"\textsuperscript{97} and the "mode of appropriation."\textsuperscript{98}

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\textsuperscript{93} H, p.92, and WM:ZSF, p.399.

\textsuperscript{94} WM:BH, pp.311-312 and 315-316; WM:ZSF, p.403.

\textsuperscript{95} WM:BH, p.324.

\textsuperscript{96} SG, p.89.

\textsuperscript{97} US:WS, p.215, Die Sprache ist...das Verhältnis aller Verhältnisse.

\textsuperscript{98} US:WzurS, "Appropriation" has become the way most translators translate Ereignis, a term that for Heidegger unveils the mutual belonging together of Being and man.
Ultimately, we know only that it is what he calls the house of Being.

If this all seems unclear, be not dismayed. Heidegger is well aware of the lack of clarity, but does not necessarily see this as a fault. "Here nothing is clear", he admits, "but everything is significant." Heidegger concludes, "What remains to be said? Only this: appropriation appropriates." Heidegger seems to be saying that there is a realm of thinking where conceptual clarity is at its lowest, yet existential significance is at its highest. And in spite of the uncertainties and dangers that lurk here, it is just this realm that most deserves thoughtful reflection.

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99. US:WS, p.167, ...nichts ist klar; aber alles bedeutend.

100. SD, p.24, Was bleibt zu sagen? Nur dies: Das Ereignis ereignet.
Thinking and Thought

We turn now to consider the nature of the thinking and thought that H II espouses at the expense of more traditional ways of philosophizing. We treat this last in our list of topics for it is actually the most inclusive term H II uses -- most of the topics already discussed are in fact subsumed under or a part of what Heidegger calls thought. Because of this, there will once again be considerable repetition of themes previously presented. And once again this should serve to corroborate the accuracy of our presentation.

First of all, as we have come to expect by now, there is a long list of what this thinking is not. This thinking is not scientific -- science cannot reach into the depths of the "darkness" that is at play in thinking.\textsuperscript{101} Philosophical thinking stands in a totally different realm and order than science,\textsuperscript{102} and for philosophy to attempt to style itself as a science is for it to abandon true thinking.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} Cf. GD, pp.33-41.
\textsuperscript{102} EM, p.20.
\textsuperscript{103} WM:BH, p.312.
Moreover, thinking is non-representational. According to Heidegger, thinking is not exhausted by representation, therefore the un-representable is not ipso facto the un-thinkable.\textsuperscript{104} Furthermore, true thinking must go beyond representational thinking because representational ideas block access to the fundamental character of Western thought.\textsuperscript{105} And it is just this fundamental character of Western thought that Heidegger seeks.

Heidegger's kind of thinking is also non-conceptual. Just as all great Greek thinking thinks non-conceptually, so must any thinking that aspires to be great today renounce the concept.\textsuperscript{106} Unlike the sciences, the rigor of thought is not to be found in any technical-theoretical exactness of concepts.\textsuperscript{107}

This thinking does not even move forward in a linear and progressive manner,\textsuperscript{108} nor can it be attained at the end of a long series of investigations of facts in the realm of cause and effect.\textsuperscript{109} Rather, thought must simply jump into its matter in a

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{104} SG, p.39.
\textsuperscript{105} VA:WHD, p.143.
\textsuperscript{106} WHD, p.128 and H, p.48.
\textsuperscript{107} WM:BH, p.313.
\textsuperscript{108} N I, p.484.
\textsuperscript{109} N I, p.392.
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more immediate way. There is no need to carefully follow a step by step procedure before one can reach the matter being investigated.\textsuperscript{110}

Logic and its law of non-contradiction have no jurisdiction over the thinking Heidegger espouses.\textsuperscript{111} Logic cannot have any such governing role because logic applies to objects and Heidegger's thought is non-objectifying.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, the attempt to measure thinking by the standard of logic is like "a scheme that tries to evaluate the nature and powers of a fish by seeing how long it is capable of living on dry land."\textsuperscript{113}

This thinking is neither theoretical nor practical, but prior to both.\textsuperscript{114} It does not try to explain or describe anything;\textsuperscript{115} it does not even bring any knowledge of anything (in the sense of

\textsuperscript{110} N I, p.392.

\textsuperscript{111} EM, p.20; WM:ZSF, p.394; WM:BH, pp.313 and 344-345.

\textsuperscript{112} N I p.640-643.

\textsuperscript{113} WM:BH, p.313, Diese Beurteilung gleicht dem Verfahren, das versucht, das Wesen und Vermögen des Fisches danach abzuschätzen, wieweit er imstande ist, auf dem Trocknen des Landes zu leben.

\textsuperscript{114} ibid. p.354.

\textsuperscript{115} N II, p.11 and EM, p.20.
precise information about).\footnote{116} This thought eschews all polemics because every polemic "fails to assume the attitude of thinking."\footnote{117} Ultimately, and perhaps most surprisingly, the thought of which Heidegger speaks will no longer even be philosophy, for philosophy is identical with metaphysics, and thinking is more original than metaphysics.\footnote{118}

The true task of authentic thinking is to go back to the roots of Western thought. The purpose of this regression is not to recapitulate old ideas or to glorify the primitive, but to re-experience the original and fundamental event of Being's unconcealment which still underlies the history of the West.\footnote{119} Thinking must be a dialogue with the beginning of Western thought;\footnote{120} thinking is the "re-collection of Being, and nothing else."\footnote{121} In fact, the underlying intention of all H II's thought is to conduct a more original reflection on the whole history of Western metaphysics from the perspective of the question about

the truth of Being rather than from the traditional question "what
is a being". 122

Such an ambitious endeavor is accomplished through a
questioning that does not seek information about entities or
attempt to find permanent answers to philosophy's questions, but
seeks to accentuate the wonder, the mystery, and the
question-worthiness of the experience of Being. 123 It is an
attempt to gently entreat Being from concealment into the
openness of understanding. 124 But this is to be an understanding
that accentuates the riddle rather than solves it, and remains
always a further questioning rather than the final answer. 125

The "result" then, to which this thoughtful questioning is to
lead is not information, not knowledge in the usual sense, and not
answers to philosophical conundrums. Its twin purpose is to find
creative and original ways of expressing Being in language, 126
i.e., ways that open new possibilities of thought 127 and to

124. WM:WW, pp.196-197.
126. WM:BH, p.311.
stimulate others to go this same way, i.e., to draw others into the same intoxicating experience of Being.

This thinking then, is totally unlike our usual ways of thought. The reason for this difference is, once again, that the "what" that is thought and the "how" of thinking are co-determinative, and Being (the matter to be thought) is absolutely other than beings. What this thinking most resembles is poetry, in the broad sense that has already been discussed.

Because thought is so wholly different from normal modes of thinking, it cannot be judged by normal standards. Does that mean that it is completely arbitrary, determined by nothing but the whim and fancy of the individual thinker? Not according to Heidegger. Authentic thought has its own standards, its own kind of rigor. Of what does this rigor consist? Of a stern and resolute openness to the truth of Being; of a "thinking that belongs to Being"; of a speaking that remains purely in the element of Being and lets it rule. Heidegger's most explicit, though still murky, account of the standard that measures authentic thought is

128. N I, p.381.
129. WM:WW, p.196.
130. EM, p.93, ...dem Sein zugehöriges Denkens.
131. WM:BH, p.313.
given in the letter on humanism. There he says,

The fittingness of the saying of Being...is the first
law of thinking.... The law of the fittingness of that
thought which thinks the history of Being [is] rigor of
reflection, carefulness of saying, frugality with
words. 132

If this still seems disconcerting to traditional philosophers,
there is little more Heidegger can say. He admits that this
thinking may seem to be like a fool driven in a magic circle, but
he offers the consolation that the circle may ultimately turn out
to be a hidden spiral. 133

The Nature of H II's Thought: A Leap Into the Art of Creative
Thinking

What then can we say about the nature of this strange kind of
thinking that is so completely different from all traditional
philosophy? By way of contrast with what has been said about the
nature of H I's thought, it is obvious that H II's thinking cannot

132. ibid. pp.359-360, Die Schicklichkeit des Sagens vom Sein...ist
das erste Gesetz des Denkens.... [Das] Gesetz der Schicklichkeit
des seinsgeschichtlichen Denkens [ist] die Strenge der Besinnung,
die Sorgfalt des Sagens, die Sparsamkeit des Wortes.

133. WM:ZSF, p.404.
be the kind of "scientific philosophy" sought by the early Heidegger. Nor is H II's thinking transcendental philosophy, for Being is not adequately described as a transcendental possibility condition. And in spite of Heidegger's occasional comments to the contrary, authentic thinking no longer follows the phenomenological method in any way analogous to the procedure of the early Heidegger. H II's thinking most closely resembles poetry and hence, is not a science, but an art.

What then can be said of method in this strange kind of thinking that is neither scientific, nor transcendental, but most akin to art? Heidegger's most general methodological principle has been, and continues to be, that the mode of access to something is to be determined by the nature of the matter under investigation. In H I we saw that whereas science was the proper mode of access to particular beings, transcendental method was the only genuine mode of access to Being itself. For Being itself was conceived of as a transcendental possibility condition. But for H II neither science nor transcendental method are appropriate to Being. Being is still completely different than particular beings, but now it is also more than transcendental possibility conditions. Indeed, Being is now thought of as revealing itself more through the moods and insights of artistic inspiration than through any carefully employed rational method either scientific or transcendental. It is for this reason that H II denigrates
reason as a stubborn adversary of thought, and disparages method as appropriate only to science and metaphysics.\textsuperscript{134} Indeed, in genuine thinking there is no method.\textsuperscript{135}

How then should we conceive of this transition between the transcendental method of H I and the authentic thinking of H II? Put differently, by what means does H II gain access to Being, what "procedure" does he employ? In spite of his pejorations of method in the usual sense, Heidegger does think the word "method" has a genuine sense that is still valid. He points to its origin from the Greek words \textit{meta}, which means "after" in the sense of to go or follow after, and \textit{odos}, which means a path or way. Thus, the proper meaning of method is "to follow a way."\textsuperscript{136} Furthermore, the way to Being will receive its proper character from the manner in which the Being of the entity manifests itself to the knowing man.\textsuperscript{137} Now Being manifests itself to man through language, which is "the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself" and therefore "the house of Being."\textsuperscript{138} But original language is

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134. VA:WB, p.58.


137. ibid.

poetry, which, as the setting-into-work of truth, is the nature of art. If, then, the path to Being receives its character from the way Being is manifest, and if Being is manifest in art, then the way to Being, i.e., "method" in H II's sense, must have something of the character of art. What then is the character of art?

"The nature of art is poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn, is the founding of truth." Moreover, Heidegger continues, this founding has the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and originating. All of these share the unmediated character of a beginning, which is "the peculiarity of a leap out of the unmediable." The character of art then, as the founding of truth, is best expressed as this unmediated, creative leap.

Art is the founding-preserving spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work [of art]. To originate something by a creative leap, to bring something into Being from its essential provenance in a founding leap -- this is what the word origin means.

139. HW:UK, pp.61-62.

140. ibid. p.62, Das Wesen der Kunst ist die Dichtung. Das Wesen der Dichtung aber ist die Stiftung der Wahrheit.

141. ibid. p.63, ...das Eigentumliche des Sprunges aus dem Unvermittelbaren her... (my emphasis)

142. HW:UK, p.64, Die Kunst erspringt als stiftende Bewährung die Wahrheit des Seienden im Werk. Etwas erspringen, im stiftenden Sprung aus der Wesensherkunft ins Sein bringen, das meint das Wort Ursprung. Keep in mind that the title is "The Origin of the work of art."
If the way to Being for H II is to have the character of art, of this founding leap, then we should expect that the "method" (the path) Heidegger follows in his later work will also have the nature of an unmediated leap -- of a bridgeless leap into the realm of Being. This is indeed the case. Because this idea of an unmediated leap into the realm of Being is, in my opinion, of crucial importance not only in establishing the epistemic character of H II, but also in determining the relationship of H II to H I, I will discuss it at some length. Furthermore, it has been given much too little attention in the secondary literature, an omission this section attempts to redress.

I have already alluded to the fact that H II frequently seems simply to jump in and start speaking of his topic with little or no introductory remarks or methodological discussions. For example, in the essay "Hölderlin and the essence of poetry" Heidegger simply starts off with an attempt to reveal the essence of poetry through samplings of Hölderlin's poems. And Hölderlin himself is chosen apparently because he is "the poet's poet."143 an accolade given without further comment as though this were a self-evident truth. Heidegger does admit that one will eventually have to decide whether this poetry is merely empty self-reflection or

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143. EHD:HWD, p.32, der Dichter des Dichters. (Heidegger's emphasis)
whether such poetry does indeed accomplish what Heidegger suggests. But the basis for this decision will not lie in any arguments or reasons given by Heidegger to support his claims. Rather, the decision must rest on the sole basis of the illuminating power of the claims themselves. Heidegger concludes by asking,

Will we now persist in maintaining the opinion that Hölderlin is tangled up in an empty and excessive self-reflection for lack of a sufficiently rich experience of the world? Or do we recognize instead that this poet thinks forth poetically into the ground and center of Being...? 144

Heidegger has simply leapt into the matter and come to this conclusion: Hölderlin thinks the ground and center of Being. We too must decide whether he is right by a leap away from the realm of rational argument, and a leap into the simple enlightening power of what has been said.

In another writing Heidegger again chooses a poem to convey his point. 145 Yet there is no explanation of why this particular poem should offer enlightenment. He simply jumps right in with it, so to speak. All he does say is that "in a way not further

144. ibid., p.44, Werden wir jetzt noch meinen, Hölderlin sei verstrickt in eine leere und unübersteigerte Selbstbespiegelung aus dem Mangel an Weltfülle? Oder erkennen wir, daß dieser Dichter in der Grund und in die Mitte des Seins dichterisch hinausdenkt...?

145. US:S.
explicable" this poem shows a fitness to the matter under discussion. In other words, the "reason" for the choice of this poem cannot be explained, it can only be experienced. A leap away from the sphere of explanation has occurred.

This same leap is seen in yet another work where Heidegger is concerned with interpreting poetry. Again no reasons are given for the selection of the poems dealt with, and Heidegger admits that his selection of these poems will seem arbitrary. But he counters that he has chosen them because they will bring our attention to the matter under investigation "abruptly, as if by a leap of insight." We see then that the only "reason" for using these particular poems is that they have a strange power to transport us almost immediately, i.e., as if by a leap, into the essential depths of the subject matter.

This turn to poetry in the thought of the later Heidegger has its own "reason" and its own necessity. In The Principle of Sufficient Reason, Heidegger says that traditional thinking lacks the key to understand the matters that concern him. Just to search for this missing key would be an arduous and lengthy

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146. ibid. p.20, ...auf eine nicht weiter erklärbare Weise...
147. US:SG.
148. ibid. p.39, ...fast wie durch einen Blicksprung...
task. So, rather than struggling along that long and difficult path, Heidegger elects to go "another way" (einen anderen Weg). The other way is, of course, poetry. 149 Heidegger turns to poetry then, because it takes us beyond where traditional ways of thinking can go. There is no cautious methodological consideration here. Traditional thinking has failed, so Heidegger leaps to poetry.

Our claim that the "method" of H II consists in an unmediated leap finds more explicit support as well. In his creative commentary on Nietzsche, Heidegger often speaks of the attempt to think the totality of particular beings in a specific projection of Being. 150 How may one arrive at such thinking? Never through a careful preoccupation with the orderly facts of a cause-effect relationship. Rather, "We come to the totality of beings," Heidegger tells us, "always and only through a leap which happens as, along with, and as a result of, the accomplishment of this projection [of Being]." 151 Later in the same work Heidegger once again contrasts the linear and progressive method of science with that of "genuinely thoughtful thinking" which "before taking any

149. SG, pp.206 ff.
151. N I, p.392, Zum Seienden im Ganzen kommen wir immer nur durch einen Sprung als Vollzug und Mitvollzug und Nachvollzug jenes Entwurfes... (My emphasis)
step must have already accomplished the leap into the whole, must have already gathered itself in the center of a circle." 152 It seems clear then that one enters into H II's kind of thinking only by way of a leap.

Both the leap of thinking and an explicit reflection on its character as a leap are seen most clearly however in The Principle of Sufficient Reason. 153 Here Heidegger sets out to discuss the famous Leibnizean principle which forms the title of the book. He begins by presenting its usual meaning -- everything has a reason; nothing is without reason. But before long Heidegger tells us that the principle can undergo a change of tone from a principle of sufficient reason regarding entities to a "saying of Being." In the remainder of this work Heidegger seeks to experience and to understand the principle in this altered form as a saying of Being, which now means "Being and Ground (or reason): the same." 154 To succeed in this task "demands nothing less than that the manner of our thinking be transformed, transformed so that it corresponds to the matter under investigation, which means to the principle of sufficient

152. N I, p.484, ...muß das denkerische Denken für jeden Schritt jedesmal zuvor den Sprung in das Ganze vollziehen und sich in die Mitte eines Kreises sammeln.

153. SG.

154. SG, p.93, Sein und Grund: das Selbe.
reason as a principle of Being."\textsuperscript{155} 

But this transformation of thinking does not come about as an extension or elaboration of the former way of thinking. The second form of the principle is in no way derivable from the first. It stands on its own -- it has no basis or foothold in the first form of the principle. Thus, the change from the first form to the second is an abrupt one.\textsuperscript{156} For "behind the change of form is hidden a leap of thinking. The leap brings thinking without a bridge (my emphasis)...into another realm and another manner of saying."\textsuperscript{157} The round about way Heidegger began this work brought us nearer to the leap, but it could neither replace it nor accomplish it. We can only properly ponder the matter in question "when we think the principle of sufficient reason as a leap into Being as such, i.e., when we accomplish this 'leap'."\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155} SG, p.94, Dies verlangt nichts Geringeres, als daß sich die Weise unseres Denkens verwandelt, so verwandelt, daß es dem Sachverhalt, den der Satz vom Grund als Satz vom Sein sagt, entspricht.

156. SG, p.95.

157. SG, p.95, Hinter em Wechsel der Tonart verbirgt sich ein Sprung des Denkens. Der Sprung bringt das Denken ohne Brücke...in einen anderen Bereich und in eine andere Weise des Sagens.

158. SG, p.103, ...wenn wir den Satz vom Grund als Satz in das Sein als solches denken, d.h. diesen >>Satz<< vollziehen. Throughout this work, Heidegger plays on the many meanings of the word "Satz" which can mean both "principle" and "leap."
Even H II's most basic thesis, i.e., that of Being history, of Being destining itself to man within and through history, is only attained through this leap.

What is called the destiny of Being characterizes the former history of Western thought in so far as we look back upon it and into it from out of the leap. We cannot conceive of what the destiny of Being means as long as we do not accomplish the leap. 159

Heidegger further emphasizes this point later on when he says "Nevertheless, the history of Western thought shows itself as the destiny of Being only when we look back on the whole of Western thought from out of the leap..." 160

Is this leap of thinking merely arbitrary? Does it depend on nothing at all for guidance? Heidegger recognizes the problem when he says, "the leap hangs in the air. In what air, in what ether? This we can only experience through the leap." 161 Does this mean then that the results of such a leap are left to the

159. SG, p.108, Was Geschick des Seins gennant wird, kennzeichnet die bisherige Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens, sofern wir auf sie und in sie aus dem Sprung her zurückblicken. An das, was Geschick des Seins heißt, können wir nicht denken, solange wir nicht den Sprung vollziehen.

160. SG, p.150, Indes zeigt sich die Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens erst dann und nur dann als Geschick des Seins, wenn wir aus dem Sprung her auf das Ganze des abendländischen Denkens zurückblicken...

caprice of each individual thinker? Near the end of this work Heidegger seems to pose the question himself when he asks, "But with this leap do we not fall into a bottomless unfathomability?" Far from it he replies:

So little does the leap let thinking fall into a bottomless unfathomability in the sense of the completely vacuous, that it is the leap that first allows thinking to succeed in attaining the correspondence to Being as Being, that is, to the truth of Being.

Here we see it clearly expressed -- it is the leap itself that first enables thinking to achieve the correspondence to Being that for H II is the hallmark of authentic reflection. The truth of Being is attained only by way of this leap.

In the work Identity and Difference Heidegger uses almost identical language: the principle (Satz) of Identity becomes a leap (Sprung), in this leap thought is transformed, and through

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162. SG, p.185, Aber fallen wir mit diesem Sprung nicht ins Bodenlose?

163. SG, p.185, Der Sprung läßt jedoch das Denken so wenig ins Bodenlose im Sinne des völlig Leeren fallen, daß er erst das Denken in die Entsprechung zum Sein als Sein, d.h. zur Wahrheit des Sein gelangen läßt.

164. ID, p.20.

165. ID, p.20.
this liberative leap one enters into belongingness with Being.\textsuperscript{166} "Thus, in order to experience properly the belonging-together of man and Being a leap becomes necessary. This leap is the abruptness of a bridgeless entry into that belonging..."\textsuperscript{167} The leap brings one suddenly and without mediation into the Er-eignis\textsuperscript{168} -- a technical term which is H II's preferred way of designating the event of the reciprocal appropriation of Being and man.

The idea of such a leap is also mentioned explicitly by Heidegger in \textit{The Heraclitus Seminar},\textsuperscript{169} in \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics},\textsuperscript{170} and in \textit{Was Heißt Denken?}\textsuperscript{171} Moreover, something very like it is implied in the change from a consideration of the "essence of language" to the "language of essence" in \textit{On the Way to Language},\textsuperscript{172} and in the change from a consideration of the

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
  \item 166. ID, p.20.
  \item 167. ID, p.20, So wird denn, um das Zusammengehören von Mensch und Sein eigens zu erfahren, ein Sprung notig. Dieser Sprung ist das Jähe der brückenlosen Einkehr in jenes Gehören...
  \item 168. ID, p.28.
  \item 169. Cf. H, p.82.
  \item 170. Cf. EM, pp.4–5 and 10, inter alia.
  \item 171. VA:WHD, pp.133–134, 139, and 141; also cf. WHD, throughout.
  \item 172. US:WS, p.176 ff.
\end{itemize}
}
"essence of truth" to the "truth of essence" in *On the Essence of Truth*. In *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* Heidegger speaks of the answer that is sought as a transformation of thinking, a transformation that, as we have seen, is equated with the leap. Furthermore, in *On the Way to Language* Heidegger says that in thinking there is no method or theme, only the region that gives free reign to what is to be thought. He adds, "We are even now walking in that region, in that realm which concerns us." In other words, this is an indication that the leap has already occurred.

It seems to me, therefore, absolutely clear that the nature and "method" of H II's thought is most fully and appropriately summed up in this notion of an abrupt and bridgeless leap of thinking. The later Heidegger has leapt away from the way of rigorous and careful, linear and progressive method, be it scientific or transcendental. He has come to the conviction that the best, indeed, the only appropriate entry into the region of Being stems from the unmediated suddenness of an original insight into Being; an insight that comes from respectfully interrogating language in


174. SD:EPA, pp.61 and 80.

new ways and "listening" to its poetic response; an insight that is in every respect analogous to the creative leap of artistic inspiration.

The kind of radically different thinking espoused by H II, which seeks no answers and can only be entered into through an unmediated leap, can only be compared with artistic insight. A great painting like Picasso's Guernica does not seek to convey precise and accurate information about a particular historical event. Nor does it attempt to "answer" the problems posed by evil, war, or suffering. And surely even the most rigorous epistemologist would not dare demand of Picasso "how do you know this painting is true?" or "how can you justify what you have painted?" For the painting "merely" expresses a profound insight into the suffering and horrible tragedy that result from man's inhumanity to his fellow man, while at the same time provoking those who view the art work to ponder these things as well. It does not answer the enigma of such pain and suffering. Rather, it elicits a response from us by emphasizing this mystery. Is it really so far fetched or reckless to suggest that the Guernica expresses the very Being of war's agonies, and does so much more eloquently and forcefully than any historical or journalistic account of a particular battle could ever do?

If it is this kind of artistic insight into the enigma of Being,
this kind of thoughtful and thought provoking expression of ones personal revelation, that Heidegger calls authentic thinking, then obviously it cannot resemble normal thought processes, and it cannot be judged by the usual standards of rational thought. But it could still be meaningful. Perhaps Heidegger's statement quoted above, "here nothing is clear, but everything is significant," becomes more illuminating and less offensive when viewed in this light. H II is not necessarily trying to replace philosophy with a magical and mystical flight of fancy. But he is claiming that there can be valid and valuable insights into the nature of those murky and mysterious things that lie at the very basis of our culture and history, insights that are more akin to art than to knowledge. And he is claiming that it is still important for at least some of us to question anew these insights, to plumb their depths in search of new possibilities of interpretation and expression. Any culture that refuses such an endeavor not only sacrifices its basis for a creative future, it also abandons the roots of its historic past. For creative transformation is the only genuine appropriation of ones heritage.
The Epistemological Status of H II

We must now clarify by way of summary what we have learned about the epistemological status of H II. We find various discussions of knowledge and knowing in the works of the later Heidegger just as we did in the earlier works. And certainly H II always remained motivated by a desire for knowledge of Being and its truth. Yet just as certainly the kind of knowledge sought by H II is radically different from both the usual knowledge of beings, and even from the kind of knowledge of Being sought by H I. The early Heidegger recognized the need for a clarification of all kinds of knowing -- of both beings and of Being -- and he thought his own transcendental investigation of the Being of man could provide the necessary basis for such a clarification, although he himself never carried out this task. On the other hand, H II no longer shows any interest at all in the usual kinds of knowing, preferring to concentrate entirely on his attempt to know something of Being through his "genuine thought." Furthermore, there is no indication that the work of the later Heidegger could possibly be conceived as an attempt to found or clarify the more traditional kinds of knowing.
Instead, H II presents us with the picture of a philosopher who has recognized that neither natural science, nor transcendental science are appropriate avenues to an understanding of Being. Natural science fails because it deals with beings, not Being. Transcendental science fails because it is still tangled up in the language of metaphysics and because Being is more than transcendental conditions of possibility.

For H II Being is now the originator of Western history, the source of creativity, and the bestower of the gift of language. Heidegger was thus forced to uncover another way to gain access to Being, for he never gave up the belief that we do indeed understand the like of Being. How then was this understanding possible? Only by way of a totally different kind of knowledge, a completely different mode of access. This "other way" Heidegger found in language as poetry, which means ultimately, as art.

It is art, Heidegger believes, that is the setting-into-work of truth, the bringing-forth into unconcealment of that which was formerly hidden. Knowledge of Being, for H II, is knowledge as art. The latter is not the disinterested objectivity of the scientist, but a passionate being-at-home in the matter to be known. Knowledge as art does not explain or describe, it gives no precise information about anything. Instead, it expresses an original insight into the mystery of Being by way of a creative
work of art -- a creative work that can take the form of poetry, painting, music, or any other art form, including Heidegger's art of creative thinking.

This kind of knowledge is only possible as a creative questioning and shaping out of genuine reflection. Knowledge as art does not seek the answer to some philosophical mystery; rather, it presents new possibilities of thought that will accentuate the mystery and prompt still further questioning. Such original questioning and thought is no longer even philosophy. It is simply the attempt to find creative ways of expressing in language one's own personal insight into Being while simultaneously stimulating others to do the same by enticing them to experience the riddle of Being for themselves.

This kind of knowledge is no longer phenomenological sight. It is artistic insight. It is no longer achieved as the long awaited result of a carefully employed, step by step method. Rather it is attained abruptly, through a leap of insight. It is a leap that can only be experienced, not explained. It is a leap that brings one immediately, without bridges, away from the spheres of representational thinking or transcendental philosophy and into the realm of Being. This leap has no standard or guide outside of itself. It is what might be called self-authenticating -- anyone who has experienced it is assured of its validity; anyone who has
not experienced it cannot comprehend it.

What is the epistemological status of this unique knowledge that comes by means of a sudden leap of artistic insight? From the perspective of traditional concerns about epistemic validity, one can only say that the thought of H II lies in an epistemological no man's land where nothing is clear and literally anything goes. Yet it is precisely Heidegger's point that such traditional epistemological preoccupations apply only to beings, not to Being. For this very reason they are disqualified from having any jurisdiction over a reflection on Being itself.

According to Heidegger, the thinking of Being moves in its own realm and follows its own "rules." Thus, regarding H II it is the separationists who are correct. The knowledge aspired to by H II is totally different than traditional knowledge and is separated from it by an infinite and unbridgeable chasm. The only way to cross from one side of this chasm to the other is by way of an unmediated leer. If traditional epistemology can have no jurisdiction over H II's genuine thought, it seems equally certain that this genuine thought can have no relevance to traditional theories of knowledge. Traditional modes of knowledge and H II's kind of knowledge can neither conform to, nor conflict with each other, for nowhere do they coincide. It would seem that one is East, the other West, "and never the twain shall meet."
Chapter 5

Heidegger and Epistemology

I said at the beginning of this study that no decisions regarding the relationship between Heidegger and epistemology would be made until an examination of his critique of traditional epistemology had been discussed and the epistemological status of both H I and H II had been presented. These conditions have now been met. Thus, the time has come to evaluate our findings and to draw some conclusions. I will begin each section with a very brief summary of Heidegger's position, then proceed with the evaluation.

The Status of Traditional Epistemology According to Heidegger

Heidegger has claimed that epistemology is at bottom ontology and metaphysics. It is an ontology that has separated thinking from Being, and in the process made reason the highest judge and
final arbiter over Being. Within this framework, knowledge operates as the struggle for the certainty of the subject's representation of objects -- a certainty to be insured by logical reasoning and mathematical calculation.

Epistemology, so defined, is criticized by Heidegger for many reasons. Since it deals with beings, it neglects and "forgets" Being. It is therefore forbidden from the outset from attaining any knowledge of Being. Moreover, even within the realm of beings, traditional epistemology is severely limited for it is based on an inadequate ontology that takes Being simply as being extant. For this reason it is also incapable of doing justice to human concerns, for what it means to be human is not exhausted by extantness. Furthermore, this scientific/theoretical knowledge is a derivative and limited mode of human being, capable only of seeing the surface of things. It cannot penetrate to the depths. Yet in spite of these limitations it has elevated itself to the first rank, claiming to be the only valid judge of "true knowledge." This epistemological hegemony distorts the nature of knowledge itself and wreaks havoc on every essence. According to Heidegger, traditional epistemology is a manifestation of man's desire to control Being, and in the process to confirm himself as the master of all things. This attempted domination is will to power.
Inadequate to grasp human being, incapable of even the most rudimentary understanding of Being itself, and unwilling to accept any challenge to its false priority and total domination, traditional epistemology must be rejected by Heidegger. If Being is to be understood, some other mode of access must be found than that offered by knowledge as traditionally conceived.

What are we to make of this critique? Is it unquestionably valid? Is it merely the expression of Heidegger's personal bias? Or is it perhaps something in between these extremes? To determine the proper response we will evaluate his criticisms one by one. But first I must emphasize a point already made about what Heidegger means by "traditional epistemology." We must remember that Heidegger is not referring to an individual theory of knowledge, nor even to a particular school of epistemological interpretation. All of his criticisms are directed against what he sees to be the underlying assumptions of the entire Western philosophical tradition -- assumptions which necessarily influence all theories of knowledge no matter how diverse. Heidegger calls the sum total of these presuppositions and assumptions the "metaphysical fundamental position"; it is what I have called a pre-position. This pre-position is the common ground upon which we stand, the fundamental beliefs we share, simply by virtue of sharing the same cultural heritage and philosophical tradition.
Because of this trans-historical focus, one cannot refute or challenge Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology by citing some particular theory of knowledge that reputedly avoids the pitfalls Heidegger has pointed out. All counter-argument must also operate on the level of the tradition as a whole. In other words, one must examine the entire breadth of our philosophical tradition, then come to some conclusion about whether Heidegger's interpretations do justice to the nature of its epistemological positions. Admittedly this entails what some would call a "subjective" judgement. But matters of such trans-historical scope can never be decided without recourse to such personal evaluations. With this proviso kept firmly in mind, let us proceed with our evaluation of Heidegger's critique.

First of all, it is said that epistemology "forgets" Being itself and deals only with particular beings or groups of beings. This is, I think, true. Yet it is not immediately self-evident that this constitutes a defect. Indeed, most epistemologists would claim that this is exactly how matters should be. Epistemology is not ontology, nor should it be -- it is, after all, theory of knowledge, not a theory of Being. But it is precisely Heidegger's point that this distinction is neither as clear nor as absolute as many knowledge theorists would have us believe. Heidegger claims that it is impossible to construct an epistemology that is not thoroughly imbued with ontological assumptions and presuppos-
itions, however hidden or unconscious they may be. To express Heidegger's point in Paul Tillich's terms, "every epistemological statement is inherently ontological." If this is true, and I believe it is, then to the extent that this implicit ontology is inadequate, the resulting theory of knowledge may also be limited or skewed in some way.

On the other hand, I think the converse of Tillich's statement is equally true -- every ontological statement is inherently epistemological. It is impossible to make any assertions about Being without implying something about how this knowledge is possible and justifiable. Thus, epistemology and ontology seem necessarily to be reciprocally related to one another -- to do either properly, one must do both. Whether or not various ontologies (including Heidegger's) recognize this, it seems clear that, in general, epistemologists have not accepted this reciprocity. The usual view has been that before one can engage in any other branch of philosophy -- be it ontology, ethics, or aesthetics -- the way must first be secured by an adequate epistemology which alone can guarantee the validity of the proposed endeavor. ¹ Far from being its equal then, epistemology has been considered as

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¹ One might also note in this context that this same view has frequently been held with regard to theology as well; unless its knowledge of God could be verified by some theory of knowledge, its assertions were considered either meaningless or of only emotional interest.
prior to and more fundamental than ontology. Therefore, to the extent that our epistemological tradition has tended to ignore or deny any fundamental interdependence with ontology, I take this aspect of Heidegger's criticism to be valid.

Epistemology is next criticized as being based on the presupposed and limited ontology of the extant, of mere presence. Hence, the kind of knowledge that results can never reach Being itself, nor even human being, for neither of these can be described essentially by simple extantness. Moreover, since it is precisely the human being that knows, and since, as we have just seen, human being cannot be adequately grasped by an epistemology of the extant, even traditional epistemology's knowledge of objects is not fully secured because the mode of being of the knower has not been sufficiently clarified.

Once again, I think this criticism is valid. If knowledge can be described as a relationship whereby the knower gains access to the known, then the mode of being of the knower and the nature of what is known must both determine the character of this access. For example, in the Cartesian philosophy the world is divided into "thinking things" (res cogitans) and "material things" (res extensa). Though the former differs from the latter as subject differs from object, both kinds of being are considered "things," i.e., extant entities. Thus, since Descartes, the main problem of
epistemology has been to figure out how to get an extant subject and an extant object together in such a way that knowledge can take place. And this knowledge must be governed by the standard proper to all extant entities -- mathematical calculation. But neither "extant substance" nor even "thinking extant substance" suffices as a description of the mode of being of the subject. Thus, if the dominant theory of knowledge holds that the essence of being is exhausted by extantness, only distortion can result. For it is the human being who knows, and a human being is more than merely an extant thing that thinks. Moreover, this distortion in the idea of knowledge is even greater when what is to be known is another human being. For in this case neither the "knower" nor the "known" are adequately characterized as extant entities.

Therefore, to the extent that traditional epistemology has tried to make a theory of knowledge based on extant objects the standard of all knowledge, even when it is human being or Being itself that is sought, this criticism is valid. On the other hand, as we have seen, Heidegger also says that even the knowledge of objects is not secured as long as its foundation within the being of the knower is not fully grasped. This raises the question of whether knowledge can ever be founded in this sort of ultimate and absolute sense. For now this question must remain open. Thus, for the moment I neither endorse nor deny this facet of
Heidegger's criticism.

Next it is said that the knowledge of traditional epistemology is derivative and thus, superficial. Since the theoretical knowledge of science is but one mode of human being, and since the more existentially significant and profound aspects of our lives -- e.g., religion, moral values, aesthetics, etc. -- seem beyond the purview of science, it seems inevitable that any attempt to penetrate these dimensions of human culture by means of scientific method is doomed to failure from the outset. Such an attempt might garner some superficial insights into these areas, but will remain inevitably blind to their deeper levels of significance. And if this is true of human being, it is even more so when applied to Being itself.

Again, I concur with Heidegger on this point. If our only mode of access to any sphere of experience were limited to the disinterested observations, mathematical calculations, and theoretical models of science, our understanding of the world and of our place within it would be greatly impoverished. I submit, along with Heidegger, that in such a scenario our knowledge, though perhaps vast and precise, would be at best superficial, and at worst an almost meaningless distortion. The methods of natural science are fine for an examination of objects, but grossly inadequate for an understanding of persons. This opinion is
admittedly dependent on Heidegger's "anthropocentric" view of significance and meaning. According to this view, what an object means to an individual, i.e., its human significance, is more expressive of its Being than the scientist's theoretical description of it. Therefore, the farmer's "springhead in the dale" expresses a more profound understanding of this entity's Being than the scientist's "effluence of subterranean H₂O."

One could counter that in such matters the meaning of "more profound" and "more significant," and certainly such questions as what constitutes the "true" Being of an entity are open to considerable debate. I do not argue with this. But the very fact that what constitutes the "profound" and the "superficial" is determined by human judgments points to the total human context within which all epistemology must operate. Thus, quite regardless of all disagreements over which particulars are thought significant and which trivial, it seems clear that any theory of knowledge that does not take account of the full personal context of knowledge is too limited. In my judgment, traditional epistemology has failed to do this. Indeed, it has tried to banish from the realm of "true" knowledge every vestige of the "personal." Anything personal must be "subjective," and ipso facto the enemy of knowledge.

Heidegger next criticizes epistemology for ignoring these
limitations and claiming for itself universal and absolute power in determining what constitutes "valid knowledge." Keeping in mind our proviso that Heidegger is directing his comments toward an entire tradition rather than toward some particular theory within it, once again I agree with the criticism. It is not so much a question here of an explicit and conscious claim of epistemo-
logical omnipotence as it is a matter of implicit sentiments and prejudices that are deeply and firmly rooted in the collective subconscious of our culture. Yet one catches glimpses of this implicit epistemological chauvinism in many ways. For example, who has not heard pejorations of certain ethical values or aesthetic judgments because they are "merely subjective"? Who has never seen psychology, history, sociology, and other social sciences condemned as "unscientific"? Who has never seen the humanities dismissed cavalierly as a mass of "personal opinions," or heard religion excoriated as sheer "ignorance and superstition"?

There is also a more subtle way in which this epistemological domination is manifest. For we find within the humanities and social sciences themselves an almost constant attempt to restructure procedures and redefine goals in an attempt to become more "scientific," i.e., more like the natural sciences. Obviously the feeling is strong that unless the data in each of these disciplines can stand some scientific test of what constitutes
secure knowledge, then not only its results, but its very raison d'être is called into question. What is all this if not a demonstration of both the priority and the power of epistemology in its role as supreme judge of valid knowledge? In spite of those who have for some time now been challenging this view of science and knowledge,² I believe that this "scientific and epistemological chauvinism" is still tightly woven into the cultural fabric of our everyday attitudes and social institutions. Hence, I believe this part of Heidegger's criticism is still valid.

Finally Heidegger criticizes traditional epistemology as will to power and as an attempt by humanity to secure its own "salvation." Such an opinion is admittedly more a personal judgment than a demonstrable fact. But when we compare our own culture's almost obsessive desire to possess and control nature with certain Eastern cultures that have maintained a reverence for all beings along with a sense that man belongs to nature rather than vice versa; when we observe that so much of our national identity in the United States revolves around our self-proclaimed scientific superiority and technical mastery; when we note how easily and naturally technological prowess in the form of sophisticated atomic missiles and "killer" satellites has

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2. I am thinking especially of people like Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Michael Polanyi.
become synonymous with worldwide political power -- when we consider all this, it is hard to deny that Heidegger's harsh judgment here harbors more truth than most of us would like to admit. Knowledge means control, and control means power.

In summary, although Heidegger's attacks on traditional epistemology are often incautiously stated, sometimes exaggerated, and occasionally extreme, it is my belief that his critique is, in the main, valid. Does his own thought, then, provide us with a viable alternative? It is to this question that we must now turn.

The Epistemological Status of H I

We have seen that the early Heidegger recognized the need for a clarification of what it means to know. But since knowledge is a comportment of man, the clarification of knowing requires a prior elucidation of the nature of human being. Thus, the analysis of existence, what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology, is at the same time fundamental epistemology as well.

Within the existential analytic we saw that, to be known properly, different kinds of entities required different modes of comportment, but that all such comportment grants us access to
what we seek to know. Knowledge as such "access to..." is defined formally by Heidegger as "sight." Furthermore we are told that all such "sight" is grounded in understanding, which forms part of the basic structure of human being. In addition Heidegger tells us that before one can know any particular beings one must have a prior knowledge of Being itself. As a result, the fundamental question of both ontology and epistemology becomes, "How is the understanding of Being possible?"

This quest for possibility conditions is a transcendental inquiry, and, as such, it must employ a transcendental method. Heidegger finds this method in phenomenology -- itself a unique kind of "sight," in the formal sense described above. Phenomenological seeing is the kind of comportment required to render Being accessible. The ultimate possibility condition for this understanding of Being is temporality, which provides both the ecstatic basis for the projection that constitutes understanding as act (Verstehen), and the horizonal schemata upon which Being is projected in understanding as accomplishment (Verständnis). Therefore, temporality is the ultimate transcendental possibility condition of all understanding and hence, of all knowledge.

He I has undertaken the formidable task of developing a transcendental phenomenological science of Being. The goal of
this science is to bring our vague and dark premonitions about Being into the light of day by means of a clear, unifying concept of the meaning of Being. To this end, and by way of a carefully followed method, he tried to exhibit the ultimate transcendental foundation undergirding and integrating all the possible meanings of Being. He attempted no less than a transcendental founding of all our ways of Being, including knowing.

How must we assess this bold attempt? Does Heidegger succeed or fail in exhibiting the transcendental foundation of all understanding? It is my opinion that H I's transcendental philosophy shares the same weaknesses that plague all transcendental philosophy, and for this reason it cannot possibly succeed. There are at least three such weaknesses.

The first such weakness is what I call the "bootstrap" problem. This means that the task transcendental philosophy sets itself seems impossible from the outset. Such philosophy seeks to know that which makes all knowledge possible, to discover the basis of all discovery, to understand what empowers all understanding. This kind of recursive enterprise may not be intractable in certain branches of mathematics, but is it really philosophically possible? Is such an attempt not analogous to the effort to lift oneself by one's own boot straps? Even Kant himself, the great originator of transcendental philosophy, was constantly haunted
by the question of how the *Critique of Pure Reason*, i.e., his own quest for ultimate possibility conditions, was *itself* possible.

To put it differently, though remaining within the terms of Heidegger's own philosophy, we could say that to understand something is to place it within a broader, clarifying context, to put it in a larger framework where new symmetries and illuminating relationships become visible that were previously hidden or overlooked. That is the meaning of Heidegger's statement that to understand something is to project it upon its horizon of intelligibility. What transcendental philosophy seeks to understand is the *ultimate* framework, the most universal clarifying context beyond which one *cannot* go. But if understanding means to place in a broader context, and if by definition one *cannot* go beyond the ultimate transcendental context, then it would seem impossible ever to attain an understanding of this final possibility condition. All recourse to any "larger framework" is automatically and unavoidably cut off. One cannot lift oneself by one's own philosophical bootstraps.

Even if we grant for a moment that an attempt to discover ultimate possibility conditions *might* somehow be possible, there are still insurmountable difficulties with such an endeavor. One of these is the problem of an infinite regress. It is the second of the three weaknesses mentioned above. Heidegger says that to
understand an entity one must project this entity upon its Being, which for its part must also be already understood. But to understand Being means that it too must be projected upon its own horizon of intelligibility, i.e., the horizontal schemata of temporality. But must not these horizontal schemata themselves be understood? How can they provide the ultimate conceptual clarification of the meaning of Being if they themselves have no clear meaning? Surely they cannot. Thus, they would have to be projected upon some further horizon of intelligibility to discover their meaning. And this further horizon would likewise need to be projected upon a still further horizon. This process would have to be repeated ad infinitum -- there could be no "final horizon" that would not itself need projecting to be understood.

Heidegger claims this problem is avoided because we can be sure that temporality is the final horizon. Why? Because we are seeking the ultimate a priori possibility conditions. This necessarily revolves around the question of what is the prior horizon of intelligibility, and "prior" is a temporal determination. Thus, once we have reached temporality itself, the question of what is prior falls away, it simply dissolves into meaninglessness. Beyond time itself any mention of temporal priority is absurd. However, this is a singularly unconvincing argument. If it is true that there is nothing beyond the horizontal schemata of temporality, then by Heidegger's own logic
there is no context, no horizon, wherein these schemata themselves can be bestowed with any meaning -- we are back at our "bootstrap" objection to transcendental philosophy. On the other hand, if Heidegger's statement about the finality of temporality is false, then the problem of infinite regress remains unsolved. Either temporality is indeed final, therefore incapable of being understood, or it is not ultimate, and we are left with an infinite regress. Either way, the search for ultimate and intelligible transcendental possibility conditions fails.

Finally, there is a third problem that prevents transcendental philosophy, Heidegger's included, from succeeding. I call this the "one to one mapping" problem. No "one to one mapping" obtains between the phenomena to be explained and the possibility conditions proffered as the explanation. Most simply put, this merely means that there is no single solution that would adequately explain the phenomenon in question. There is no unique way to map the phenomenon to its possibility condition. Quite to the contrary, an almost infinite set of potential explanations exists that would offer a seemingly "reasonable" account of what makes something possible. Let us examine this in more detail.

The procedure of any transcendental inquiry runs pretty much as follows. Some phenomenon is considered to be in need of
clarification, explanation, or verification — for Kant it was our knowledge of objects; for Heidegger it was the understanding of Being. Thus, one poses the question, "what must be the case in order for this phenomenon to occur"? In other words, what makes this phenomenon possible? The balance of such an investigation is given to exhibiting said possibility conditions and to demonstrating just how they are supposed to render the phenomenon in question possible. Again, for Kant this was the unification of the a priori categories of reason with the raw data of sense experience through the mediation of the forms of intuition — space and time. For Heidegger, as we have seen, it is temporality that makes possible the understanding of Being which in its turn makes possible all other knowledge.

The problem is that one could just as easily have come up with a completely different conception of what renders these phenomena possible, a conception that would also seem to provide an adequate explanation. There is no "one and only one" solution, no single state of affairs that alone could adequately explain the matter in question. This is what I mean when I say there is no one to one mapping between the matter to be explained and its possibility condition.

For example, one would be hard put to deny that Berkeleyan idealism also offers an interpretation of what makes our
knowledge of objects possible -- all objects of nature are but ideas in the mind of God, and it is the grace and constancy of Divine providence that insures that our perceptions of things in the world are orderly and regular. Apart from post-enlightenment prejudices against all such supernatural interpretations, is it really clear that Kant's solution is more likely than Berkeley's? Are innate "categories of the understanding", the "transcendental imagination", and the "transcendental unity of apperception" really inherently easier to believe in or more demonstrable than Berkeley's God?

I conclude therefore, that transcendental philosophy's attempt to discover ultimate possibility conditions cannot succeed. As transcendental philosophy, H I's thought suffers from trying to know what either cannot be known because it is ultimate, or cannot be known because the attempt to do so leads inexorably to an infinite regress. Moreover, any proposed final possibility condition is only one of many conceivable solutions. The "bootstrap" problem, the problem of an infinite regress, and the "one to one mapping" problem combine to form the ineluctable nemesis of any such endeavor.

If we turn our attention now away from this "external" evaluation and consider instead H I's thought from an "internal" perspective, we find that here too there are difficulties. I have
already pointed out that his proposed solution to the problem of an infinity of projections is untenable. Beyond this there are problems with his account of the horizontal schemata of temporality. As I pointed out in chapter three, Heidegger never really informs us of the positive meaning of these schemata. He defines them negatively by saying that they are neither like the usual concept of time with its notion of a sequence of now points, nor are the schemata to be confused with the existential structures of temporality that he had delineated in the course of the existential analytic. What meaning can they have then? Ultimately, it is just these horizontal schemata that are to provide the key to our understanding of the meaning of Being, yet Heidegger leaves these all important structures virtually devoid of any possible meaning.

Furthermore, when he does discuss them, a curious thing takes place. The horizontal schemata of temporality are supposed to be the ultimate and most essential time determinations. Yet, as discussed by Heidegger, these schemata seem to have suddenly become bereft of all temporal significance. The horizontal schema of the present, which figures in Heidegger's demonstration of how the mode of Being of the handy is temporally determined, is called praesens. At first glance this certainly seems capable of having a temporal meaning. But when we remember that Heidegger himself has told us that it cannot mean either the present in the sense of
an existential structure nor the present in the sense of the "now," it suddenly becomes questionable what temporal meaning this schema can have. Moreover, when we recall that the schema of prae
sens can undergo a modification that is referred to as absens, we begin to suspect that some sleight of hand is taking place here. Heidegger has spent all of Being and Time convincing us that indeed time is the key to the meaning of Being. But now, when he is discussing the most fundamental determinant of temporality, he speaks of prae
sens and absens -- terms that seem to have more of a spatial than a temporal meaning. The former means to be present, available for an instrumental purpose; the latter means the opposite, to be absent from such an instrumental context. Is this simple "being present" or "being absent" not suspiciously similar to the ontology of the extant that Heidegger had previously said was inadequate and limited? When it comes to Heidegger's limited discussion of the schemata of temporality, I can no longer find any possible temporal meaning in the terms he uses. Indeed, they have little meaning of any kind.

Another problem within the thought of H I revolves around the question of whether his transcendental approach, even if in itself successful, would be sufficient to the problematic that Heidegger originally set for himself. He began by pointing out the many different meanings that this word "Being" could possess. Among these he lists "What-being" (the essential nature of a thing),
"That-being" (the mere fact that a thing is), "How-being" (an entities mode of being), and "Being-true" (to stress the "is" in an assertion, e.g., "Today is Tuesday," stresses the truth of the assertion). Now Heidegger took on the task of finding the meaning of Being that would provide the one fundamental concept capable of unifying all of these disparate senses of Being. He claims to have found this in temporality as the transcendental horizon that renders any understanding of Being whatsoever possible.

Nonetheless, when it comes to exhibiting how the horizontal schemata of temporality determine the Being of the handy, Heidegger mentions explicitly only its "What-being" and "How-being." Even if we grant that implicitly "Being-true" is also dealt with since for H I truth means revealing an entity's what-being and how-being, the fact remains that Heidegger has provided us at best with only an explanation of "whatness" and "howness," not of "thatness." What an entity is and how it is may be determined, to a greater or lesser extent, by the transcendental structures that govern understanding, but the fact that it is, seems totally unrelated to the operations of the understanding.

For example, if I look at the world through the proverbial rose colored glasses, the glasses would determine what I perceive, i.e., everything as pink, but they would have no effect on the fact that
there is something there to be perceived in the first place. Likewise, that a being is, necessarily goes beyond any transcendental grounding of how we come to understand what and how a being is. Indeed, it raises the question of why it is. This brings us face to face with the mystery of Being, the strange fact that beings should be in Being at all. Although Heidegger himself is aware of this mystery of "thatness," I see no way that his temporal interpretation of transcendence can encompass this particular meaning of Being. To this extent then, he has not found the one meaning of Being that can unify all its other meanings. He has failed to obtain the goal he set for himself at the beginning.

To summarize, it is my opinion that the philosophy of H I cannot succeed in its attempt to find the ultimate transcendental conditions of possibility for all ways of Being. Such a task seems impossible, and even if it could succeed, it would leave unanswered the question of "that-being," of the "facticity" of being. The latter is beyond the purview of transcendental philosophy -- Being is more than transcendental possibility conditions.

Nevertheless, to say that H I failed to reach his goal is not to say that he got nowhere at all, or that this thought holds no insights for those interested in theory of knowledge. Although I
think his attempt to display the transcendental foundation of all modes of Being, including knowing, failed, I also believe one can find much in his thinking that is relevant to epistemological matters. His criticism of traditional epistemology can perhaps serve to awaken knowledge theorists from their "dogmatic slumbers," so to speak, thereby initiating a re-evaluation of the nature of knowledge and knowing. In addition, his insistence that one cannot do epistemology without bringing along ontological assumptions implies that ontology and epistemology are necessarily reciprocally related, i.e., that each involves the other. This is, I think, valid and should provide much food for thought to those interested in either area.

Finally, and most importantly, Heidegger's steadfast claim that knowledge should be interpreted within the context of human existence as a whole and not vice versa should be considered as an enduring positive contribution to the theory of knowledge. Until we understand the full ramifications of the fact that the one who knows is the living human being of flesh and blood, of passions and prejudices, of feelings and failings; until we recognize that it is not, on the contrary, an abstract, disinterested, and coldly rational process that is merely incidentally embodied in human form, we will continue to misunderstand and distort the nature of knowledge and knowing. Even the most mathematically precise and rigidly logical knowledge
of the scientist is still personal knowledge. And this is most significant epistemologically. The thought of H I should serve as a constant reminder of the importance of this personal context within which all knowing occurs.

The Epistemological Status of H II

We have seen that while Heidegger's criticism of traditional epistemology is in most respects valid, and while his early thought does indeed offer insights relevant to theory of knowledge, his attempt to discover and delineate the ultimate transcendental foundation of both Being and knowing does not, and cannot succeed. What then can we say about the thought of H II? Does he succeed where H I failed? To this question we now turn. Once again we begin this section with a brief summary of what we have learned about H II's ideas on knowledge and knowing.

H II never gave up either the desire to know more of Being and its truth, or the conviction that we do indeed always have some understanding of Being, no matter how vague or imprecise. And like H I, the later Heidegger remained convinced that traditional modes of knowing were totally inappropriate to the matter under investigation. But unlike the early Heidegger, H II has also given
up the belief that transcendental science with its phenomenological method can offer the access needed to obtain a genuine knowledge of Being. Traditional knowledge fails because it looks to beings and forgets Being. Transcendental science fails because it is itself tainted by traditional metaphysic's oblivion of Being, and because H II realizes that Being is more than transcendental possibility conditions.

Yet, Heidegger believed, there must still be some way to know Being, some other mode of access to the truth of Being. This "other way" is what I have called the art of creative thinking. According to H II, it is art that reveals Being, that accomplishes the "setting-into-work" of the truth of Being. For H II genuine knowledge is knowledge as art. This knowledge is completely different from both traditional knowledge and from transcendental knowledge. It occurs only through a creative questioning and respectful reflection on the very roots of our Western tradition, especially its roots in language. For language, in Heidegger's view, is the house of Being.

Knowledge as art explains nothing, describes nothing, objectifies nothing, conceptualizes nothing, answers nothing. Rather, it expresses one's personal insight into the mystery of Being. Whether this expression takes place as poetry, painting, some other art form, or H II's authentic thinking, it manifests
nonetheless an original understanding of Being. Such an understanding opens new possibilities of thought that lead to further questioning and reflection.

This knowledge is no longer phenomenological sight; it is artistic insight. It no longer traffics in traditional philosophical concepts; its medium is a creative and poetic dialogue with language. It is no longer attained by means of a carefully developed and closely followed method; it comes suddenly, by a leap of insight. There is no longer any external standard to guide this leap or to serve as its judge; it is a law unto itself, authenticating itself solely by the power of its own ability to illuminate. Finally, this knowledge does not provide answers to philosophical mysteries; it accentuates the mystery and invites us to experience a sense of wonder and astonishment regarding it. Knowledge as art would seem to have nothing to do with traditional knowledge. The two seem separated by a gulf that cannot be bridged, only leapt across.

What are we to make of this extraordinary claim of H II? Does artistic insight reach new depths that phenomenological sight cannot penetrate? Or does it sweep us away to a philosophical never-never land populated by a host of arbitrary phantasms and whimsical chimeras? Is the contention of some critics that H II represents a return to a "pre-critical realism" valid? And
however this is decided, can this knowledge as artistic insight have any conceivable bearing on epistemology? These are the issues we must now decide.

First of all, I think the idea that H II exemplifies a reversion to a pre-critical realism is quite wrong. Heidegger has read and understood Kant. Indeed, in his early writings he even tried to go beyond Kant by working out an even more inclusive critical philosophy. But he came to realize finally that no such critical transcendental philosophy could succeed. The thought of H II comes only after this realization. Hence, whatever else it might be, it is "post-critical," not "pre-critical."

Nor does the label "realism" apply. Yes, for H II Being has an amazing alterity, priority, and dominance that go beyond transcendental possibility conditions, but Heidegger is always very careful not to simply take up and reapply old categories and concepts. Being is more than possibility conditions, but it is usually described negatively by H II. Hence, one always comes away with the feeling that it is unclear exactly what H II means by "Being." Therefore, one might say that he certainly flirts with realism, but he never marries the girl. If labels are to be applied at all, something besides "realism" must be found. Toward this end, and in keeping with the H II's view that Being can never be definitively known, but only glimpsed through artistic insight,
perhaps we should look for such a term in the domain of art instead of philosophy. I would replace the philosophical term, "realism" with the artistic term, "impressionism." Thus, H II does not represent a "pre-critical realism," but a "post-critical impressionism." The later Heidegger has given up on critical philosophy, giving us instead his own insightful impressions of the mystery of Being.

But what of H II's notion that art is an alternative kind of knowledge superior to other modes of knowing? First, I think it is undeniable that the creative insight of great artists does indeed offer a more profound understanding of our life-world than would be possible if we were limited only to a scientific knowledge of objects, or to the often abstract and lifeless ruminations of much traditional philosophy. Let us recapitulate the example of chapter four -- Picasso's Guernica.

This great painting does not simply convey, with greater emotional force, the same information that could have been transmitted through a journalistic or historical account of the battle. It does not merely tell us, in a more striking manner, what could have been expressed in a medical report on the effects of bombs and bullets. Nor does it just give us a less abstract and theoretical message than a philosophical treatise on the problem of evil could accomplish. Of course, this painting does
all of this, but I submit that it also gives us more insight into what "really" took place in the Spanish village that is its namesake than could these other disciplines. The painting gives us something that none of these other fields can possibly give. It expresses a truth that is beyond the scope of science and philosophy, and that is incapable of being fully "translated" without loss into either of these disciplines. The painting, as any great work of art, has granted access to the most profound and significant dimensions of human being, dimensions that seem inaccessible to scientific investigation and philosophical speculation.

If other examples are still needed here, compare any of Sartre's plays or Camus' novels with Sartre's more abstract treatise, Being and Nothingness. Consider Michaelangelo's painting on the ceiling of the Sistine chapel, then any theological discourse on the imago dei or on original sin. Compare the novels of Dostoyevski with the laborious analytic of existence in Heidegger's Being and Time. In all of these cases (which could be multiplied endlessly), the work of art reveals more than its philosophical or theological analogue. Artistic insight, expressed in a great work of art, does indeed offer a different, and privileged, kind of access to a deep and meaningful level of human experience.

If one responds, "that is all well and good, but this is no
longer philosophy," Heidegger would be the first to agree. He himself has said that the kind of thinking he espouses will no longer be philosophy. It is instead the art of creative thinking. What are we left with then? H II has not claimed to provide final answers to long standing philosophical dilemmas. He has erected no elaborate and absolute philosophical systems, and he has founded no philosophical schools. Indeed, he would cringe at the thought of anyone calling himself a Heideggerian. He suggests rather that what is most significant and potentially meaningful in the cultural and linguistic substrate of our tradition may also be that which is most mysterious because it is beyond the ken of traditional modes of knowledge, either scientific or philosophical. He also suggests that the only way to find meaning at this level is to question this tradition constantly, to experience the mystery within it, and to struggle creatively to bring one's insights to fruition in some work of art. One cannot meticulously follow some carefully laid out method to reach such an understanding. It comes, if at all, only through a sudden leap of insight.

Regarding the epistemological status of the often vague, highly metaphorical, and frequently bizarre writings of the later Heidegger, one can only say that there is no epistemological underpinning here. Rather than reasoned argument and rigorous method, we have what seem to be bald and arrogant claims put
forth as if they were self-evident truths. But if we understand the train of H II's thought, these are never meant to be declarations of fact or philosophical assertions that claim universal truth. Supposedly, even the later Heidegger's most basic positions -- like the notion of the history of Being or the idea of language as the house of Being -- are not a declaration of fact, meant to give definitive answers, but a creative and insightful interrogation of the roots of our tradition, intended to be eye opening and thought provoking.

Thus, the lack of any epistemological validation of these views cannot be taken as a weakness or fault, for H II is making no truth claims in the usual sense. What appear to be put forth as answers actually always remain only questions. We conclude therefore, that to the extent that H II's statements are the expression of creative personal insights, and are proffered only as thought provoking possibilities which serve as a seedbed for further questioning, the criticism that there is no way to justify these statements epistemologically is unfair and invalid.

Nevertheless, having said that, I must hasten to add that while it is true that on one level H II claims to do no more than question constantly, it seems to me that on another level he has gone beyond mere questioning and in fact made something very similar to universal truth claims. His thesis of Being history
seems to be just that, a thesis. He shows no signs that this thesis is merely a possibility that might not "actually" express the truth of the matter. His claim concerning the ontological priority of language does not seem open to debate. And certainly his criticisms of traditional philosophy and epistemology, as well as of science and technology, seem as unwavering as if written in stone. H II may style himself a latter day Socrates who knows nothing and only asks questions, but if the comparison applies at all he is in fact a Socrates who knows too much. He seems to make claims and assertions that are not allowed by the "logic" of his own thought.

Finally, even if we accept the notion that H II really has abstained from all truth claims and offers only thought provoking questions and creative possibilities, there is still a problem. Although his claim makes sense that artistic insight affords us a greater understanding than usual ways of knowing, and although his belief that this kind of knowledge is completely different from other kinds of knowledge may be valid, it seems to me fundamentally wrong to perpetuate the idea that there is no point of intersection between the two kinds of knowledge, that each operates in completely separate and mutually exclusive spheres.

H II both accepts and accentuates the split between knowledge as personal, artistic insight into the mystery of Being on the one
hand, and the knowledge of traditional epistemology on the other. Moreover, he expends no small energy condemning the latter. This can only reinforce the enmity between epistemology and ontology, and strengthen the suspicion that H II has fallen into some mystical flight of fancy that is as irrelevant as it is incredible. Even if one believes that the early Heidegger overcame Descartes' subject-object dichotomy and undercut Dilthey's split between the natural and human sciences, H II has not been so successful. He has merely replaced their dichotomies with one of his own.

H II has suggested that at the very core of the socio-linguistic nexus that forms the basis of our cultural tradition there lies the mystery of Being. Through interrogating this tradition and wrestling with this mystery we may come to some creative insight about Being itself. Such an artistic insight is unmediated and has the character of a leap. It is therefore, very similar to a free decision or a leap of faith. Such a decision about the foundation of our historical existence will determine the manner in which we experience and conceive of "reality," it will shape our basic conception of the world and of our situation within it.

But is it not also true that even one who has refused such reflection and disavowed any mystery has also come to some such decision? And that this decision, whether made consciously or by default, still plays a determining role in one's way of relating to
the world? In other words, I think one can make the case that some such faith-like decision about the "mystery of Being" is made, for the most part unconsciously, by everyone, and that it colors heavily one's approach to, and attitudes about, the world. A view of "Being" lies at the bottom of the scientist's approach to the world just as much as it does at the bottom of Heidegger's. Scientific research would be ridiculous unless the scientist believes that this is a rational universe, that it follows discoverable rules, and that its processes can be accurately described and reliably predicted on the basis of mathematical models. These beliefs, and others like them, constitute what amounts to a decision about the nature of Being.

H I has explicitly claimed as much by insisting that an ontology of some kind is always presupposed in the tradition. One can make the case that the thought of H II demonstrates the unavoidability of such a fundamental decision about Being. Yet in his desire to stress the difference between knowledge as insight into Being and traditional knowledge of particular beings, Heidegger himself failed to recognize or make clear that such a decision-like insight provides the basis for all kinds of knowledge.3 If he had realized this, his later thought could have

3. He does say in at least one place that this other kind of knowledge "grounds and limits science," but he never develops this claim.
made a significant contribution to the theory of knowledge instead of remaining completely separated from it and predominantly hostile toward it.

Furthermore, it seems to me that Heidegger has traded in an epistemological chauvinism for an "art chauvinism." For H II it is always artistic insight that illuminates Being. Heidegger seems to canonize art as the only means of such knowledge and to glorify the artist at the expense of all else. But are there not other kinds of such fundamental insights that also open up to us an understanding of "Being"? I am thinking here particularly of what could be called a basic ethical insight, a sense that certain intrinsic values hold sway in our world and govern, or should govern, our behavior within it. Granted, our knowledge of what particular action is right or wrong may be learned, but our knowledge that there is such a thing as right and wrong, however these are defined, seems to constitute a more basic intuition or belief. It is my contention that such an ethical insight forms just as much a part of our fundamental decision regarding "Being" as artistic insight. Heidegger's unwillingness to consider anything beyond art and artistic insight as the proper mode of access to Being is a serious limitation of his thought.
Heidegger and Epistemology

What then can be said finally about the relationship between Heidegger and epistemology? Heidegger has clearly seen and ably articulated the limitations and shortcomings of traditional epistemology. He tried to overcome these problems not once, but twice, in two quite different ways. His first approach was that of transcendental philosophy with its attempted transcendental founding of all ways of Being, including knowing. As the scientific method of this transcendental inquiry, phenomenological sight was to provide the access required. This phenomenological vision, like all sight, is grounded in understanding, which is part of the structure of human being. Temporality was revealed as the ultimate transcendental condition of possibility for understanding in general, and hence, for all knowledge.

But Heidegger came to realize that this transcendental approach could not work. Whether he understood this impasse as a fundamental problem inherent in transcendental philosophy itself (which is doubtful), or whether he simply came to see that Being was more than transcendental possibility conditions and thus beyond the scope of transcendental method (which is more likely),
the fact remains that he abandoned the transcendental approach as inadequate to the truth of Being.

This required Heidegger to find yet another mode of access to Being. He found this in art. For through the creative insight of the artist as expressed in an original work, Being itself was revealed in a way quite beyond the possibilities of disclosure belonging to either traditional or transcendental knowledge. Within the domain of art as revealer of Being, poetry has preeminence. This is because it is Heidegger's conviction that while language is the house of Being, the door to this house remains closed to everyday objectifying language. Only the non-objectifying language of poetry can enter the domain where Being dwells and becomes manifest. The only way to participate in this respectful dialogue with language that is the art of creative thinking is by a leap -- a creative, bridgeless leap into "the matter to be thought." And the only way to judge whether or not the results of this leap are valid is to experience the leap first hand, to go this same way and hold fast to Being's truth. This kind of knowledge neither has, nor needs, any epistemological justification for it makes no truth claims. It does not provide answers; it only poses questions.

As to the relationship of H I to epistemology, it is the foundationalists who are right. Heidegger attempted, and thought
he had attained, a transcendental founding that would ground all forms of knowledge. Yet this attempt failed; no such foundation can be discovered, and even if it could, it would be inadequate to unify all the various meanings of Being. Regarding H II, it is the separationists who are right. Heidegger thinks he has found another kind of knowledge that is totally different from traditional modes of knowing. Yet this is completely divorced from the usual kinds of knowledge by an infinite and unbridgeable chasm. One crosses this epistemological gulf only by way of a faith-like leap. Once the leap has been made there is no possible return to the other side of the chasm. Thus, H II's knowledge as artistic insight would seem to have no bearing on traditional epistemological concerns.

However, if we take Heidegger's thought as a whole, considering both H I and H II together, it is the reciprocalists who are right. One can draw insights relevant to theory of knowledge from both H I and H II, but Heidegger himself should have devoted more time to a broadening of epistemology and less time to a castigation of it. Heidegger's critique of epistemology can function positively as both the impetus to a re-examination and re-evaluation of our traditional ideas of knowledge and knowing, and as a rich source of thought-provoking "raw material" for this process. Another enduring contribution of H I is his insistence that ontology and epistemology are not mutually exclusive, but
interdependent. Moreover, his early thought shows, negatively, the impossibility of finding an absolute transcendental foundation of knowledge, and, positively, the necessity of placing epistemological reflection within the personal context of human existence as a whole.

Even his later thought offers us an example of the kind of faith-like decision that is required when considering the most fundamental and significant levels of our historical being. Furthermore, one could expand upon this by showing the necessity of such decision, faith, or insight to serve as the foundation for our experience of the world. As a result, one would see that faith, or something very like it, is not the negation of knowledge, but its possibility condition. For it is ultimately such a decision about the nature of Being that forms the horizon within which we experience and know our world.

Heidegger's relation to epistemology is not as simple and unidirectional as the relation of ground to tree. Nor need it be a relation of mutual contempt and hostility, nor even one of complete indifference. One can indeed appropriate many insights from Heidegger that are relevant to the theory of knowledge, but his own thought could only have been strengthened had he recognized the need for dialogue with epistemology instead of mere diatribe against it. Heidegger's thought will gain its widest
hearing, and epistemology its needed depth, only when each is willing to listen to and learn from the other.

**Implications for Religious Studies**

What is the import of all this for religious studies? First of all, as I suggested in the introduction, this study implies that the usual procedure theologians and philosophers of religion have followed in responding to the epistemological criticism is inappropriate and should be reversed. Historically, when theological statements or religious claims have been challenged by some theory of knowledge, the theologians responded in one of two ways. They either tried to justify religious claims within the confines of the new epistemology (what I have called religious rationalism), or they claimed that religious knowledge was immune to epistemological criticism because it was based on faith, which was completely different from usual ways of knowing (what I have called mere fideism). But both approaches accepted the new theory of knowledge at face value, then re-evaluated how to justify religion in light of it.

This study suggests that the proper response to the epistemological criticism is neither to force religion into an
epistemological Procrustean bed, nor to drive a wedge between religious knowledge and mundane knowledge. On the contrary, any theory of knowledge that does not have room for such humanly significant matters as religion, art, and ethics should itself be re-evaluated and broadened. How might this broadening be done and what might it entail? My response here must be tentative for as I have said from the outset, it is far beyond the scope of the present work to create a full-blown epistemological theory. I must limit myself to suggesting some points that such a theory of knowledge might try to make. What follows therefore, is more like a preliminary, rough sketch for a painting that is yet to be attempted than like a precise description of a detailed work already achieved.

The first tenet of the revised epistemology that I envision would be that it is no longer realistic or meaningful to seek any absolute, apodictic foundation for human knowledge. Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology has pointed out that all theories of knowledge ultimately rest on historically conditioned presuppositions that often remain unconscious and uninvestigated. Such presuppositions are not absolute and cannot provide an indubitable starting point for our reflections. Moreover, if my assertion that ontology and epistemology are reciprocally related is correct, then one can neither found epistemology on a previously secured ontology, nor ground
ontological knowledge in any ultimate sense on an already worked out epistemological foundation. Neither the one nor the other provides an absolute foundation because we always already find ourselves "within" both. Finally, we have learned from the example of H I the impossibility of attaining any final transcendental grounding of knowledge and knowing. Thus, the epistemology that I envision begins with the simple admission that there is no indubitable starting point that can secure human knowledge absolutely. Does this mean that all "knowledge" is really sham and pretense? Does it mean the skeptics are correct in asserting that, finally, nothing can be known with any certainty? Not at all. It simply means that no knowledge is apodictically certain.

The second tenet of the epistemology I envision would be that knowledge and knowing are properly situated only in the context of human existence taken as a whole, and that while this existential foundation by no means offers absolute certainty, it does provide a sufficient basis for human knowledge. I believe this is H I's most epistemologically significant insight. To put it differently, all knowledge is personal knowledge -- a term borrowed from Michael Polanyi (cf. his book Personal Knowledge), who also saw the importance of placing knowing in its broader human context.
What I anticipate as a path toward a revised and broadened theory of knowledge that would also have room for religious knowledge is a combination and expansion of some of both Heidegger's and Polanyi's insights. Chief among these, and one on which both men agree, is the point just mentioned -- the necessity of placing all discussion of knowing within the whole personal context in which it is operative. But whereas Heidegger eventually gave up any concern to relate his special "knowing as artistic insight" to other forms of knowledge, Polanyi tried to develop an approach that would include all kinds of knowing in a unified view. Following Polanyi here, the epistemology I envision would also seek a unified view of all kinds of knowledge. However, Polanyi seems to ignore some of the more profound existential concerns of man, e.g., the anxiety of finitude, the problem of moral evil, and the whole tragic aspect of human existence. Following the early Heidegger here, my revised epistemology would include such concerns as a significant part of the whole personal context in which knowing occurs.

To sketch out further my vision of a broadened epistemology, I would use the term "personal knowledge" as the most general and inclusive classification of knowing. Unlike H II who divorces knowledge as artistic insight from other kinds of knowledge, "personal knowledge," as I am using it, would include all forms of knowing, religious as well as scientific, ethical as well as
aesthetic. This term is especially significant when one considers the basic convictions upon which all such knowledge is grounded and without which it is impossible. These basic convictions, which are highly personal, mostly inexplicit, and usually accepted uncritically from our cultural tradition, form the fundamental and defining framework or paradigm within which we experience and interpret our world.

Since these convictions form the most inclusive framework within which science, rationality, and logic operate, it follows that they cannot themselves be scientifically validated, rationally demonstrated, or logically proven. Thus, they are accepted less on factual evidence than on faith. But they are not accepted merely on faith. There is always also some measure of fact involved as well. For example, the paradigm is strengthened somewhat if it can adequately explain large domains of experience, whereas it is weakened somewhat when facts arise that seem incapable of explanation within the paradigm, or that reveal inconsistencies within it. But no individual fact of experience can ever verify or falsify such a paradigm, and even a whole group of such facts, though influential and relevant, will always be incomplete and insufficient as a justification for accepting or rejecting the whole paradigm. This means that all of our knowledge, because it is conditioned to some extent by such paradigms, always includes both a component of fact and a
component of faith.

However, the next point that the epistemology I envision would make is that the relative strength the these two components can vary. Therefore, I see within human knowledge what could be called a "continuum of existential significance" such that the more humanly significant is the matter to be known, the less factually rooted and rationally secure is this knowledge, and the larger is the amount of faith involved in its acceptance. On the other hand, the more factually rooted and certain is the matter in question, the less likely it is to be existentially meaningful, and the smaller is the element of faith required for its acceptance.

As I said in the introduction, such ideals as truth, beauty, and the good, along with beliefs in God and the immortality of the soul, for example, are generally more important in giving meaning to our lives than are such isolated facts as the structure of DNA, the chemical composition of moon rocks, or the exact number of sub-atomic particles. But the ideals just mentioned, while very meaningful, are vague, imprecise, and incapable of empirical validation, while the facts of science just cited, though they can be much more securely known and rigorously demonstrated, are not very existentially meaningful in themselves. Nonetheless, even such "objective" knowledge would not be possible without the scientist's belief in a rational world, his commitment to the
discovery of truth, and the conviction that it is good to strive for such knowledge. Thus, even scientific knowledge always has an element, though relatively slight, of faith. And on the other hand, even such uncertain and unprovable notions as belief in truth, beauty, and the good must have some factual basis in our experience for us to maintain them. Therefore, there is always an element of both "fact" and "faith" involved in all our kinds of knowing, though the relative strength of each component will vary according to where the matter in question lies on the continuum of existential significance.

The import of all this for religion and religious knowledge would not be that because there is an element of faith involved in all knowledge, all items of religious faith are ipso facto above reproach. Rather, the point would be that our religious convictions, like our other convictions, are maintained, modified, or rejected as a result of the interaction of a large number of factors that always include both a measure of factual evidence and personal faith. Neither faith alone nor reason alone ever provides the sum total of our "reasons" for claiming to know or believe something. This is true regardless of whether the matter in question is, at one extreme, knowledge of the natural world, or, at the other extreme, something like knowledge of God.

This means that instead of Dilthey's dichotomy between the
human and the natural sciences, or Heidegger's dichotomy between precise knowledge of beings and artistic insight into Being, we would have a unified view of knowledge based on the recognition that, although in varying amounts, elements of both faith and factual experience are always operative in all knowledge. Instead of trying to force theology to fit a false ideal of rationalism, or trying to divorce it from rationality altogether by reversion to an extreme fideism, theologians could make the case that it is as "reasonable" for them to hold their beliefs as it is for a scientist to hold his, because the same dynamics, though in different measures, are operative in both.

This does not mean that the probability of these two beliefs being true is equal. The probability of truth is greater for scientific knowledge than for religious knowledge because its blend of fact and faith includes relatively more fact and relatively less faith. But the process whereby one comes to believe something in the two domains is the same, that is, both fact and faith are involved. Therefore, it is not intrinsically less reasonable for a religious devotee to believe in God than it is for a scientist to believe in something like electrons.

Hence, the schizophrenia of Western technological man that I referred to in the introduction would also be undermined and so lose its force. The split between the ideal image we have of
ourselves as completely rational scientific skeptics who accept no belief without rigorous proof or experimental evidence, and the fact that each of us nonetheless harbors beliefs that are fundamental and meaningful, but incapable of such proof, would be unmasked as a false and misleading dichotomy. The proper way to overcome this schizophrenia is not by the attempt to demonstrate with complete rational, logical, and empirical indubitability the legitimacy of our fundamental beliefs. All such attempts must fail. Nor can one succeed by simply giving up all beliefs, however fundamental, that cannot be so proven. Neither can the problem be solved through a retreat into mere fideism. This schizophrenia may only be overcome by the realization that complete rationality is a false and unattainable ideal, and that complete fideism cuts off all possibility of dialogue with other realms of human knowing thereby offering an open invitation to arbitrariness. Ultimately, there is no incompatibility, mutual exclusion, or hostility between faith and reason, for both are always involved in knowing when one considers the whole existential context of personal knowledge. Faith is never completely without its reasons, and reason is never completely devoid of faith.
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