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PARTY VOTING AND POLICY CONTENT PERSPECTIVES OF ALIGNMENTS
IN THE POST - NEW DEAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Rice University

Ph.D. 1984

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PARTY VOTING AND POLICY CONTENT PERSPECTIVES OF
ALIGNMENTS IN THE POST-NEW DEAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

by

MELISSA P. COLLIE

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Joseph Cooper
Dean of Social Sciences, Director

David W. Brady
Professor of Political Science

Peter Mieszkowski
Professor of Economics

Houston, Texas

April, 1984
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Melissa P. Collie

1984
ABSTRACT

PARTY VOTING AND POLICY CONTENT PERSPECTIVES OF
ALIGNMENTS IN THE POST-NEW DEAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MELISSA P. COLLIE

The primary purpose of this analysis is to examine voting alignments in the U. S. House of Representatives during the post-New Deal era. The analysis focuses on House alignments during three periods: the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 94th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

Two approaches that have shaped the last decade's study of congressional voting alignments are considered. One is termed the party voting approach. It is designed to monitor change in the collective voting behavior of the legislative parties. The other is termed the policy content approach. It is designed to monitor change in the voting patterns associated with broadly defined policy areas. An examination in Chapter 1 of prior research reveals that the two approaches attend to different research problems and to different aspects of change in voting patterns.

Despite the influence of both approaches in recent longitudinal analyses of congressional voting, the two have
yet to be compared systematically. Chapter 2 considers the theoretical and conceptual tenets of the two approaches. The discussion leads to the development of a conceptual framework that depicts four scenarios of congressional voting alignments. It is then argued that longitudinal change and stability may be conceptualized as the movement (or lack of movement) between the four scenarios.

The third chapter evaluates the conventional methodologies associated with the two approaches. Several problems are identified in both methodologies. Modifications are introduced to address the problems and the research design employed in the analysis is presented. The fourth chapter presents the results of the modified party voting approach and the modified policy content approach for the three periods. In general, the results indicate a decline of the partisan cleavage and an increase in both consensus and alignment fragmentation. The final chapter summarizes the major findings of the analysis, reconsiders the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, and draws comparisons with other research. In conclusion, possible causes and consequences of the changes observed are considered.
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Last, I wish to thank my parents. They have inspired a tenacity and curiosity that has sustained me at all times. I am and will be centrally indebted to them for my professional progress. This project is dedicated to the memory of my father, Emil Henry Pratka, Jr.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Any student of congressional voting alignments who is mindful of the character of recent research faces a dilemma of sorts. However cursory, a perusal of the recent literature shortly indicates that analysis has been conducted increasingly under the auspices of two quite different approaches to the study of congressional voting alignments. With one approach, analysis focuses on the legislative parties, which are treated as aggregates or blocs comprised of party members. The character of voting alignments is then examined in terms of attributes that characterize the collective voting behavior of the parties. Insofar as the focus of analysis is the voting behavior exhibited by the legislative parties, this approach may be referred to as the party voting approach. With the other approach, analysis focuses on broadly defined areas of public policy. The character of voting alignments is then examined in terms of the voting behavior that corresponds to alternative policy areas. Insofar as the focus of analysis is the voting behavior associated with different policy areas, this approach may be referred to as the policy content approach.
Analysts have tended to adopt one approach or the other rather than both. Consequently, the implicit if not explicit message is that each approach is the more appropriate or useful framework through which a valid representation of congressional voting alignments can be obtained. The dilemma, in short, is which approach to choose.

The choice between the two fundamentally concerns whether analysis is to proceed within a party framework or within a policy framework. Inherent in the choice is a decision about whether a behavioral structure is more validly revealed by monitoring political parties or public policies. Since analysis under the two approaches begins from different starting points, so to speak, it is not surprising that markedly different perspectives on the character of congressional voting alignments follow. To underscore the divergence between the two approaches, the following section considers the development and usage of both approaches with attention to the research problems and findings associated with each.

**Development and Usage**

The following presentation illustrates the influence of both the party voting approach and the policy content approach to the last decade's analysis of congressional voting alignments. The discussion indicates that the two approaches, despite their common focus, reflect analysis of
different aspects of congressional voting alignments and are tied to different sets of particular research problems and questions. These differences are partially explained by the context in which each approach has been introduced. To address this consideration directly, the discussion below reflects a chronological orientation. Organized in this manner, the character of recent research is cast in the light of its theoretical and analytic antecedents.

**Political Parties and Voting Alignments**

As with most areas of legislative research, the bulk of analysis dealing with the collective voting behavior of legislative parties has concerned the American Congress. However, the earliest example of this type of research reflected a comparative orientation. In Abbot Lawrence Lowell's (1902) comparison of party voting behavior in the American Congress and western European parliaments, he showed that the incidence of interparty conflict in the American system was markedly lower than in parliamentary systems. In this study, we have for the first time the voting behavior of the legislative parties used as a criterion on which cross-national comparisons were generated. As exemplified in Lowell's work, then, analysis attentive to the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties is rooted in the comparative tradition.

Lowell's emphasis on levels of party conflict and his development of the party vote score, which measured the
percentage of votes on which 90 percent of the majority
party or coalition opposed 90 percent of the minority party
or coalition, reflected implicitly one of the basic
differences between party behavior in the American
presidential system and party behavior in the western
European parliaments. Specifically, in the western European
legislative scenario, members of the legislative parties
characteristically voted as blocs of individuals. Thus, the
relevant question regarding party behavior became how often
party blocs opposed each other. It was with the American
referent particularly in mind that Stuart Rice (1928)
suggested an additional criterion for the measurement of the
collective voting habits of legislative parties, that of the
level of intraparty cohesion. With Rice's index of
intraparty cohesion, the conceptual parameters of party
behavior included attention to intraparty behavior as well
as interparty behavior.

Despite the contributions of Lowell and Rice, analysis
of the congressional parties remained relatively limited for
some twenty years (Schattschneider, 1942; Berdahl, 1949; Key
1949; Holcombe, 1933; 1940; 1950). However, a comparative
orientation, coupled with the behavioral revolution,
generated extensive analysis of party voting behavior during
the 1950s and 1960s. In this period, analysis was conducted
against the backdrop of the normatively oriented discussion
concerning the role of "responsible parties" in the American
political system (Schattschneider, 1942; American Political
Science Association, 1950; Ranney, 1954). The comparativist orientation was evident in that the role of responsible parties was defined primarily in terms of the British model of two-party politics. According to this referent or model, the legislative parties were to assume the role of either governing majority or loyal opposition. The applicability of this role to the American Congress inevitably was complicated given the presidential system of government in which there was no guarantee, as in parliamentary systems, that the party in control of the administrative apparatus would also control the legislature. Tailored to the American system, however, the model to which the congressional parties were compared presumed at a minimum that parties should act as cohesive and opposed blocs.

Within this context, a number of studies began to document the levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict in American legislatures. Given the more relaxed character of party behavior in the American system, analysts explored the importance or strength of party as a basis of cleavage vis a vis sectional and demographic cleavages. At the national level, Julius Turner's (1951) work appears as the earliest comprehensive exploration into the variations in party behavior across time and across policy areas. In his and other studies, party emerged as the predominant basis of cleavage in the Congress (Truman, 1959; Matthews, 1960; Marwell, 1967; Shannon, 1968; Shapiro, 1968; Turner and Schneier, 1970). Complementing the analysis of the
congressional parties, several studies presented results for particular state legislatures at particular points in time (Keefe, 1954; Derge, 1958; Flinn, 1960; Buchanan, 1963; Sorauf, 1963; Friedman and Stokes, 1965; Wiggins, 1967; Bryan, 1968; Le Blanc, 1969). As a collection, they indicated the considerable variation in the character of partisan cleavages across legislatures. Comparative state analyses further demonstrated that the degree of party cohesion and conflict tended to be higher in the more urban states; however, the variation in the collective voting behavior of the parties, even among urban states, was the single most important finding that emerged from these studies (Zeller, 1954; Jewell, 1955; Keefe, 1956; Lockard, 1959; Dye, 1965).

That a focus on the collective voting behavior of legislative parties dominated research conducted during the 1950s and 1960s on voting alignments in the American setting is relatively clear. That it rested in a comparativist orientation is referenced further by the frequent observation that levels of party cohesion and conflict in the American setting seldom rivaled those in most non-American legislatures (Turner, 1951; Zeller, 1954). Cross-national comparisons of party behavior, primarily focusing on party cohesion, have continued to evoke interest, as illustrated by Epstein's (1980) extensive consideration of a number of single-nation studies. Still, in many analyses conducted during this period, the purpose or motivation
behind this focus lay in the prediction of individual voting behavior. In Turner's (1951) analysis, for example, he not only concluded that partisan cleavages occurred more frequently in the Congress than did sectional or demographic cleavages but that party served as the "single best predictor" of individual voting behavior. The linkage Turner drew between the character of cleavages and alignments and the determinants of individual voting behavior was explicitly evident in the logic regarding the determinants of individual voting behavior in non-American parliaments. Specifically, it was reasoned that in scenarios where the legislative parties acted as cohesive and opposed blocs, party was the overriding determinant of individual voting behavior. In any case, relatively little attention was devoted to explaining longitudinal variations in the aggregate parameters of party behavior. This was a function of both research orientation, i.e., the explanation of individual voting behavior, and the relatively limited longitudinal profile of congressional party behavior available at the time.

Recent research has expressed an interest in both the longitudinal character of party alignments as well as their explanation. In the last decade, the shifting nature of partisan cleavages in the House has been more fully documented (Clubb and Traugott, 1977; Cooper, Brady, and Hurley, 1977). The results indicate an erratic but overall decline in the levels of both intraparty cohesion and
interparty conflict since the turn-of-the-century. Although similar results on the U. S. Senate await presentation, a number of studies have examined partisan cleavages in more specific historical periods (Dauer, 1953; Young, 1956; Cunningham, 1963; Alexander, 1967; Holt, 1967; Patterson, 1967; Silbey, 1967; Russo, 1972; Bell, 1973; Bogue, 1973; Bogue and Marlaire, 1975; Brady, 1972; 1973; Hoadley, 1980). Other research has highlighted the fluctuation in particular aspects of congressional party behavior that have occurred within the last few decades. Patterson (1978) has shown that interparty conflict increased during the 1950s, declined during the 1960s, and increased during the 1970s. Similarly, Deckard and Stanley (1974) have documented the decline in party cohesion on interparty conflict votes over the period 1945-1970.

As suggested above, in addition to providing a more thorough longitudinal profile of the variability of the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties, recent research has begun to focus directly on the explanation of this variability. For example, Norpoth (1974) has argued that party cohesion in the House is a function of shared policy attitudes among party members. In a similar vein, Deckard and Stanley (1974) have attributed the decline in party cohesion over the last few decades to the increasing importance of ideologically charged regional groups within each party. Rather than individual attitudes, other research has emphasized the importance of electoral
factors and institutional variables. Research has shown that in certain historical periods, party cohesion and conflict in the House have increased as the homogeneity of the parties' constituent bases, the strength of the party leadership, and the amount of turnover increased (Brady, 1972; 1978; Brady and Althoff, 1974). Two studies have argued that the importance of electoral factors outweighs that of internal variables (Cooper, Brady, and Hurley, 1977; Brady, Cooper, and Hurley, 1979). One has argued that the institutional character of the legislature itself is highly circumscribed by the character of party cleavages rather than the reverse (Cooper and Brady, 1981). Controlling for trend, Sinclair (1977b) has tested for the impact of several variables -- including presidential popular vote, party size, legislative and administrative status, and change in party control -- on party cohesion in the House over the period 1901-1956. The more important of her many findings is that the impact of electoral and non-electoral factors differed by party.

The disparate character of these studies attests to the complexity of explaining the changing contours of party behavior in the Congress. At base it indicates that no consensus has emerged concerning either proximate or intermediary determinants. Recent analysis, in short, admits to far more progress in documentation than in explanation. Indeed, given the extensive documentation now available, the variations in the collective voting behavior
of the legislative parties have elicited relatively few attempts to explain why they have taken place (Shannon, 1970; Collie, 1984).

The general tendency among the last decade's analyses of party behavior has been to treat party cleavages and alignments as the dependent variable. Supplementing analyses focused on the explanation of party behavior, several studies have begun to assess the effects of party behavior on public policy (Cooper and Bombardier, 1968; Sinclair, 1977a; Hurley, 1979; Hurley, Brady and Cooper, 1978). Others have focused specifically on the relationship between electoral turnover, party cleavages, and policy change (Fishel, 1973; Orfield, 1975; Brady and Lynn, 1973; Brady, 1978; 1980; Brady and Stewart, 1982). While the impact of weakened party cleavages on policy remains unclear, the literature generally has demonstrated that measurable changes in the substance of public policy appear contingent on high levels of both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict.

Voting Alignments and Public Policy

As interest developed during the 1950s and 1960s in the variation of party behavior in the American Congress and state legislatures, scholars began to examine the relationship between voting alignments and public policy. Using a number of different methodologies, several studies focused on single areas of public policy such as civil rights (Andrain, 1964), agricultural policy (Pennock, 1956),
tariff questions (Watson, 1956), and foreign policy (Grassmuck, 1951; Westerfield, 1955; Jewell, 1959; Rieselbach, 1964; Carroll, 1966). Others sought to compare the voting behavior associated with different policy areas (Gage and Shimberg, 1949; Turner, 1951; Belknap, 1958; Farris, 1958; MacRae, 1958; 1965; Marwell, 1967; Shannon, 1968). As with analyses conducted during this period that focused on the collective voting behavior of the legislative parties, most of these studies were cross-sectional in nature. However, it was from this genre of research that the policy framework so evident in the recent longitudinal research on congressional voting alignments emerged.

As introduced by Clausen (1967), a skeletal version of the policy framework was represented initially as a methodological response to the measurement identity problem encountered in longitudinal analysis of the voting alignments associated with particular policy areas. In this study, Clausen addressed prior work that had relied on scaling and clustering techniques for identifying dimensions of voting in one or more policy areas (Belknap, 1958; MacRae, 1958). The measurement identity problem arose when these techniques were applied in longitudinal analysis. Specifically, Clausen sought to discern criteria that would establish whether a scale derived at one point in time was equivalent, i.e., captured the same policy concern, to a scale derived at another point in time. His purpose, then, was to construct a methodology that could be used to
establish the content equivalence of policy dimensions derived at different points in time. Arguing for a more rigorous standard of content equivalence than a reliance on the subjective evaluation of policy content and the specification of correlational cut-off criteria provided, he proposed that equivalence be based on a specific pattern of substantive and statistical relationships. The statistical component of the pattern involved the demonstration that individual scale scores were correlated more highly within policy dimensions across time than between policy dimensions at the same or alternative points in time. The substantive component of the pattern involved the demonstration that the impact of predictor variables on legislators' scale scores varied across policy dimensions. Adopting this methodology, he and Cheney (1970) demonstrated that voting patterns on economic and welfare policy dimensions were distinguishable, stable, and similar in the House and Senate over the period 1953-1964.

In a subsequent and more comprehensive analysis of House and Senate voting patterns during the same period, Clausen (1973: 1-37) presented the theory of congressional decision-making on which the policy framework is based. The theory rested on the assumption that individual legislators regularly operate under conditions of low information and decisional overload, an assumption which has been incorporated in several models of congressional decision-making (Cherryholmes and Shapiro, 1969; Kingdon, 1973; 1977;
Matthews and Stimson, 1970; 1975; Asher and Weisberg, 1978; Kozack, 1982). Given these conditions, Clausen argued that legislators develop decisional rules in order to routinize the decision-making process. The policy dimensional theory presumed that legislators relate specific motions to broad policy areas and depending on the policy area, consider the positions taken by a variety of actors. Legislators refer to the same actors over time in each policy area; however, different actors remain influential to different degrees in different policy areas. In his application of the theory to House and Senate voting patterns 1953-64, Clausen defined five broad policy "domains" -- government management, social welfare, agricultural assistance, civil liberties, and international involvement -- within which votes were classified and policy dimensions generated. His results indicated that each policy domain yielded a dominant dimension on which voting patterns remained stable across time and differentiable across policy domains despite the infusion of new members. Insofar as voting patterns proved longitudinally stable within policy domains and differentiable across policy domains, his analysis provided support for the policy dimensional theory of congressional decision-making.

As Clausen recognized, the policy dimensional theory bore several interrelated implications for the analysis and understanding of both individual decision-making and the structure of voting alignments. First, it implied that
members of Congress shared a relatively limited set of policy concepts (p. 16). In this regard, a small number of broadly defined policy areas could serve as an exhaustive system of classification in longitudinal analysis. Second, it implied that congressional decision-making across policy areas could not be explained in terms of the member's position on a single, ideological continuum (pp. 7, 31-32). Rather, multiple factors impinged on member decision-making and the relative importance of these factors varied across policy areas. From these two implications followed the third and fourth. The third implication was that the ordering of individual legislators on policy dimensions would differ across policy areas (p. 10) and the fourth that different voting alignments would form as policy content shifted from one policy area to another (p. 31).

With reference, then, to both individual voting patterns and the structure of voting alignments, Clausen assigned policy content a crucial role. At the individual level, it hypothetically mediated the influence of other explanatory variables. At the aggregate level, it hypothetically served as the key indicator to discerning the variation in voting alignments. In short, the policy dimensional theory provided a theoretical justification for an integrated approach to the analysis of voting patterns based on policy content.

It is not the case that the policy dimensional theory of congressional decision-making itself has since met with
universal approval and substantiation. It is viewed as one of several competing models of legislative decision-making (Kingdon, 1977; Weisberg, 1978; Kuklinski, 1979; Collie, 1984). Moreover, it is not the case that the relation posited between the variation in policy content and the variation in voting alignments is singular to the policy dimensional framework. Several studies have developed around the perspective that particular policy types, variously conceptualized, evoke particular voting alignments (Froman, 1967; Salisbury and Heinz, 1970; Lowi, 1972; Hayes, 1978). Finally, it is not the case that the substantive and statistical pattern that Clausen (1967) outlined for determining policy content equivalence has been widely adopted. Current usage reflects little concern for the measurement identity problem addressed by Clausen (1967) and a great deal of concern with the voting patterns on dimensions that appear in broadly defined policy areas. Therein lies the importance of the policy content approach to the recent literature on legislative voting alignments. It is its role as a conceptual and organizational framework for the analysis of longitudinal change in voting patterns that has elevated the policy content approach to the status of necessary supplement if not preferred alternative to the more conventional reliance on statistics that reflect the collective voting behavior of the legislative parties.

The five policy domains defined by Clausen (1973) have come to constitute the primary classificatory framework
within which voting alignments in the contemporary Congress are assessed. However, the results of several studies that have relied on the policy content approach indicate that the policy dimensions in each domain have been less distinctive, durable, and dominant than was suggested in Clausen's (1973) initial research. The first three New Deal Congresses (1933-38) found House voting patterns on the government management, social welfare, and agricultural assistance policy dimensions all highly partisan (Sinclair, 1977c). Moreover, the civil liberties and international involvement dimensions characterized in Clausen's (1973) research failed to appear in the House until the 75th (1937-48) and the 76th (1939-40) Congresses, respectively (Sinclair, 1978a). In the more recent 91st (1969-70) and 92nd (1971-72) Congresses, two new dimensions -- the "agricultural subsidy limitation" dimension and the "national security recommitment" dimension -- have emerged in the House (Clausen and Van Horn, 1977). In an extensive series of studies, Sinclair (1978a; 1978b; 1981a; 1981b) has emphasized the differences that have developed over the last few decades in the support of partisan and regional groups for the legislation contained in government management and social welfare dimensions. Her (1982) analysis of House voting patterns 1925-78 represents the most thorough longitudinal examination of the variation in the voting patterns associated with the five policy domains. Particularly notable is the decline during the 1970s in
Northern Democratic support on the government management dimension (Sinclair, 1981b; 1982).

One aspect of the research adopting a policy content approach, then, has involved the documentation of the appearance and disappearance of policy-oriented "dimensions of voting." An equally important aspect of this type of research has involved the explanation of members' voting behavior in the substantively different areas of public policy. Typically, analysts have tested for the impact of a variety of factors including party, region, constituency, ideology, and presidential influence. The most important and consistent conclusion emerging in these studies has been that the impact of these factors has varied across the five policy domains or, alternatively, no single structure explains the voting patterns across policy domains. From a theoretical standpoint, then, policy dimensions of voting derive from differentially weighted combinations of determinants of individual voting behavior. Relatedly, one of the more prominent conclusions emerging in this literature has been that the impact of party on individual legislators' positions is highly circumscribed (See esp. Clausen, 1978).

In the last few years, a controversy has developed concerning several aspects of the results yielded by the policy dimensional framework. One study has argued that the primary factor behind congressional decision-making in the 1970s is ideology and that three ideologically oriented
blocs have been operative across policy dimensions in the House (Schneider, 1979). A second study on Senate voting patterns has shown that the correlation between members' scale scores on different policy dimensions has increased across the period 1957-76 (Smith, 1980). Finally, a third study has concluded that voting in the House and Senate 1965-76 reflects a dramatic ideological division between Democrats and Republicans regardless of policy area (Shaffer, 1980). To varying degrees, each of these studies has challenged directly the conclusions that voting patterns have remained stable across time and differentiable across policy areas. However, the results of the three are not strictly comparable to those derived under the Clausen framework due to alternative measurement techniques and methodologies.

Although the policy dimensional framework has been relegated primarily to the analysis of voting alignments in the post-New Deal Congress, a small subset of studies has applied the policy content approach in historical analyses of the Congress (Brady, 1978; 1980; Brady and Stewart, 1982) as well as at the sub-national level (LeLoup, 1976). While these studies have relayed primarily on the policy framework for the analysis of voting patterns, the legislative context on which they have focused has necessitated modification of the classification system employed in analysis of voting patterns in the contemporary Congresses. In LeLoup's (1976) examination of voting in state legislatures, the
international involvement domain was, of course, dropped. In the several historical analyses, votes have been classified in policy areas that were significant to the period.

The Two Faces of Analysis

The prior discussion has traced the development of research associated with the party voting approach and the policy content approach. A consideration of the antecedents of recent research reveals that the party voting approach has developed in response to a comparativist orientation on political parties whereas the policy content approach has developed in response to questions concerning the relation between policy concerns and individual voting behavior in the American Congress. The character of recent research indicates that the party voting approach has been used generally to examine the causes and consequences of variation in levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. Recent analyses adopting the policy content approach, in contrast, have been occupied generally with the documentation and explanation of the voting patterns associated with different policy areas.

The overall results of both approaches have indicated longitudinal variation in the character of congressional voting alignments. Yet each approach directs attention to different aspects of longitudinal change. With the party voting approach, change is measured in terms of the
variations in the collective voting behavior of the legislative parties. With the policy content approach, change is measured in terms of the fluctuations of the policy agenda and in terms of the variations in the voting patterns associated with each policy area.

In sum, the two approaches attend to different research problems and questions and to different aspects of longitudinal change in voting patterns. One result of these differences is a fragmented longitudinal profile of congressional voting alignments. We are left, in other words, with a party voting profile on the one hand and a policy content profile on the other.

The two approaches, in addition, appear to have generated contradictory conclusions concerning the longitudinal character of congressional voting alignments over the last few decades. Consider, for example, the remarks of Samuel Patterson (1978: p. 169) concerning the character of recent congressional voting alignments:

Analyses of congressional voting over a period of time indicate great continuity in voting patterns, which persists irrespective of changes in the composition of membership. Nevertheless, some aggregate patterns exhibit interesting fluctuations. One is the pattern of party voting. . . .

The "continuity" to which Patterson refers is based on the results of longitudinal analyses focused on policy, the "fluctuations" based on longitudinal analyses focused on parties. Undoubtedly, in any period there will be elements
of both continuity and change in the character of voting alignments. However, Patterson's observations suggest that an evaluation of the parameters of continuity and change is not the issue when the results yielded by these two approaches are juxtaposed. Rather, the results of the policy content approach suggest that stability has been more characteristic of recent voting alignments whereas the results of the party voting approach suggest that instability has been more characteristic.

In general, then, the character of recent analysis on congressional voting alignments has two faces. As is evident from the discussion in the last section, both the party voting approach and the policy content approach have enjoyed wide usage in recent research. However, their empirical yield has remained largely self-contained. Analysts adopting a party voting approach have responded to prior results corresponding to the party voting approach. Likewise, analysts adopting a policy content approach have responded to prior results corresponding to the policy content approach. There has been, in short, little cross-fertilization between the two.

The lack of cross-fertilization is unfortunate, from an empirical standpoint, since each approach provides an alternative perspective on the character of congressional voting alignments. Our knowledge of the contours of congressional voting alignments would likely be enriched were the two approaches used together. There is, however,
no precedent in recent research that would provide an analytic or methodological guideline for the comingling of the two. Indeed, despite the degree to which both approaches currently define and influence the study of legislative voting alignments, the conceptual and methodological foundations of the two have yet to be compared and evaluated systematically. Given that each seeks to represent the character of congressional voting alignments, such a discussion would appear important in and of itself. It appears even more important in light of the divergence of conclusions, as suggested in Patterson's remarks above, concerning the longitudinal character of congressional voting alignments.

Scope and Purpose

The primary purpose of this inquiry is to examine changes in the character of congressional voting alignments. The specific focus is on the United States House of Representatives during the post-New Deal era. In light of the previous discussion in this chapter, the primary purpose of this research leads directly to a secondary purpose, which is to examine and compare critically the party voting and the policy content approaches to mapping the character of congressional voting alignments. It is an analysis of these two approaches that instructs the organization of this research.

In the next chapter, the conceptual and theoretical
tenets of the two approaches are examined. When the broader
tenets of the approaches are considered, it becomes evident
that each approach presumes different expectations
concerning the parameters of congressional voting
alignments. The discussion leads to the development of a
conceptual framework that depicts four scenarios of
congressional voting alignments. It is then argued that
longitudinal change and stability may be conceptualized as
the movement (or lack or movement) between the four
scenarios. A reevaluation of the two approaches in light of
the framework reveals that each approach reflects only a
partial profile of the character of congressional voting
alignments and, as a result, only a partial profile of the
character of change and stability.

The third chapter presents the research design employed
in this analysis. Due to the shortcomings of both
approaches identified in the previous chapter, an exclusive
reliance on either is rejected in favor of a combined
reliance on both. The chapter begins with an examination of
the conventional methodologies associated with the two
approaches. Several problems are identified in both
approaches. Modifications in the two methodologies are
introduced to address the problems and the details of the
research design employed here are presented. The utility of
the design is then discussed in terms of the patterns of
longitudinal change described in the prior chapter.

The fourth chapter examines House voting alignments
during three periods: the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 94th-96th (1975-80) Congresses. Results are presented employing the party voting approach and the policy content approach, both as modified per the discussion in the previous chapter. In general, the results indicate a decline of the partisan cleavage and an increase in both consensus and alignment fragmentation.

The final chapter presents a summary of the major findings of the analysis. The limitations and strengths of the two approaches are then evaluated in light of the results obtained. In addition, the findings are considered as they relate to the four scenarios of congressional voting alignments described in the third chapter and to other research. In conclusion, several factors are considered as explanations of the changes observed across the three periods. Finally, the implications of the current character of congressional voting alignments for politics and policy-making in the House is discussed.
CHAPTER 2

Toward a Framework for Analysis

Perspectives and Strategies

Overall, the foregoing discussion of the literature implies that analysts adopting either of the two approaches would acknowledge that the general character of voting cleavages and alignments in the American Congress may be viewed as emergent and flexible (Polsby, 1975; 1978). Yet, as highlighted in the previous chapter, each approach has become associated with different types of research questions and problems. Moreover, each approach has generated methodologies designed to capture different aspects of longitudinal change in voting patterns. Given these considerations, an exclusive reliance on either approach would appear contingent merely on the degree to which each approach is suited to the research problem at hand.

Such a conclusion would be premature. In the broadest sense, the party voting approach and the policy content approach are linked to perspectives that differ in their identification of the political phenomena that are of primary analytic concern. It is this linkage that lends the research problems and questions that are considered in each
approach their theoretical relevance and importance. As well, it is this linkage that induces and justifies the development of basically different strategies for the analysis of longitudinal change in the character of voting alignments.

The party voting approach is linked to the perspective that identifies the emergence and endurance of the political party as the most salient aspect of political life in modern, democratic systems of government (Schattschneider, 1942; Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1964; Sorauf, 1976; Almond and Powell, 1978). By virtue of this perspective, attention is concentrated on the interplay within, between, and among political parties. To paraphrase Sorauf's (1976) distinctions, this perspective has spawned extensive and discrete literatures on the electoral, organizational, and governmental aspects of party behavior. It is on the basis of this perspective that analyses focusing on the voting behavior of the congressional parties relate to literatures on the determinants and implications of interparty coalition formation and dissolution (MacRae, 1967; Axelrod, 1970; DeSwan, 1973; Brass, 1977) and the character of party competition and electoral strategy (Downs, 1957; Stokes, 1963; Converse, 1966; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Budge and Fairlie, 1978).

Establishing the importance of political parties is to shape the parameters of the research agenda: How do parties behave? What factors lie behind their behavior? What
consequence does their behavior entail? As illustrated in the last chapter, these are precisely the questions that the literature adopting the party voting approach has addressed with regard to legislative voting behavior. However, these questions derive their importance only when the general importance of political parties to the system and to the legislature is acknowledged. Once it is acknowledged and the focus of analysis is on legislative voting alignments, the most salient aspect of change in the overall character of voting alignments becomes the manner in which the voting behavior of the legislative parties varies over time. Establishing the importance of political parties is also then to shape a strategy for the analysis of change in the character of voting alignments.

It would be wrong to argue that analysts adopting the policy content approach attribute no central significance to the political party. However, the approach itself and the perspective to which it is linked generate that conclusion. The policy content approach is linked to the perspective that identifies the manifestation and interposition of interests and preferences as the most salient aspect of political life in modern democratic systems of government. By virtue of this perspective, attention is concentrated on the reconciliation and adjustment of interests and preferences. This perspective has two variants. The more conventional variant is associated with the study of groups and recognizes politics in the legislative arena as the
struggle of groups to realize or legitimate discrete interests and preferences. In this variant, the disquisitions of historical figures such as Madison (1787), de Toqueville, a (1945)nd Calhoun re (1851)late to the writings of of of group theorists and contemporary pluralists (Bentley, 1908; Riesman, 1950; Truman, 1951; Latham, 1952; Hagan, 1958; Dahl, 1961; 1967; 1971; Dahl and Lindblom, 1976; Lane, 1965; Polsby, 1980). The axiomatic variant is associated with the study of individuals and recognizes politics in the legislative arena as the struggle of individuals to maximize their preferences. In this variant, the study of political behavior relates to the study of economic behavior.

In both variants, it is the character of interests and preferences rather than the character of groups and individuals that is the primary focus of attention. This is less explicit in the conventional, pluralistic variant than in the axiomatic variant. In the vocabulary of pluralism, "the group(s)" finds frequent mention, as in, for example, Latham's (1952) "the group basis of politics." This would imply that it is the group that is of primary concern. However, the group is only noticeable much less important insofar as it articulates an interest. This is especially evident in studies focusing on the legislative arena and has likewise been the basis on which pluralism's tenets have been criticized on both normative and empirical grounds (e.g., Mills, 1959; Bachrach and Baratz, 1969; McConnell,
1967; Manley, 1983). While pluralists and group theorists would recognize civil rights advocates as a group, they would fail to recognize the set of blond-haired legislators as a group. The latter would gain identity, however, if they were to express an interest, for example, in regulating colors of dye. Despite the silliness of the example, the point remains that groups are inseparable and indeed derive definition from the interest(s) they articulate. Similarly, the individual finds definition in the axiomatic variant only insofar as he or she has a set of preferences. As noted earlier, axiomatic theory assumes from the outset that all individuals have a set of preferences. Based on the assumptions that all individuals have preferences and act rationally (i.e., act to maximize their preferences), axiomatic theory seeks to understand the relations among the character of preferences, institutional arrangements, individual strategies, and legislative outcomes. Axiomatic theory is, in general, the study of preferences, not the study of individuals. Both the pluralistic and the axiomatic variants then reflect a concern for the group and the individual only to the degree that the group and the individual reflect a concern.

This perspective beckons as well a research agenda but it is one that differs markedly from the other. To establish the importance of interests and preferences is to ask which interests and preferences manifest themselves. What is their configuration? How are alternative interests
and preferences reconciled? Again, as illustrated in the last chapter, these are to large degree the questions to which analysis reflecting the policy content approach addresses itself and, again, these questions derive their importance only when the general importance of interests and preferences is established as primary. Indeed, the thrust of the policy content framework concerns the identification of an interest (read shared policy concept and/or policy domain) and the identification of the manner in which alternative preferences are reconciled (read the specification of the voting pattern associated with each policy area). Once the analytical salience of interests and preferences is established and the focus of analysis is on legislative voting alignments, the most significant aspect of change in the overall character of voting alignments becomes the manner in which interests and preferences vary over time. As with the party voting approach then, establishing the importance of interests and preferences is to shape a strategy for the analysis of change in the character of voting alignments.

The party voting approach and the policy content approach, therefore, are linked to perspectives that concentrate attention on alternative political phenomena. The perspective to which the party voting approach is tied recognizes at the outset the salience of political parties. The perspective to which the policy content approach is tied recognizes the salience of competing interests, generally
defined. To be sure, there has been overlap and convergence, as in, for example, analyses that have examined the relations between parties and interest groups (Schattschneider, 1942; Eldersveld, 1964; Dahl, 1971) and the relations between preference distributions and party behavior (Downs, 1957). It is not, then, that either perspective dismisses altogether the interconnectedness of parties and interests. Still, the two define quite different starting points for the analysis of political behavior in general and political behavior in the legislature in particular.

The purpose of this discussion is not to elevate the comparison of the two approaches to a philosophical debate whose resolution would establish which political phenomena are of primary and secondary importance. Nonetheless, the discussion suggests the unsettling conclusion that we must continue to talk past each other, so to speak, or engage in precisely such a debate. Neither need be the case. A more detailed examination of the conceptual and theoretical tenets of the two perspectives reveals a clearer understanding of the parameters of congressional voting alignments. Equally important, it provides conceptual clues for an understanding of the patterns of change.

Preference Aggregation and Reconciliation

The perspective to which each approach is linked recognizes that the extra-legislative world encompasses
discrete interests and preferences. Moreover, each perspective recognizes that in democratic systems the manifestation of interests and preferences in the legislative arena is (more or less) a function of the interests and preferences outside the legislature. However, the perspectives reflect different assumptions concerning the profile of interests and preferences in the extra-legislative arena and, as a result, bear different conclusions for the manner in which discrete interests and preferences are aggregated and reconciled within the legislative arena. In addition and especially relevant to the research here, they bear different conclusions concerning the shape or character of congressional voting alignments.

The perspective to which the party voting approach is linked differentiates the role or function of parties in two-party systems from the role or function of parties in multi-party systems (Almond and Coleman, 1960; Dahl, 1971; Sartori, 1976; Epstein, 1980). Specifically, the two-party system compels the parties to aggregate and to articulate myriad groups and interests. This role or function follows from the incentive in a two-party system for each party to secure a coalition large enough to win control of the government. Multi-party systems likewise compel the parties to articulate their interests; however, interest aggregation occurs between rather than within parties. Two interrelated assumptions, then, underlie the perspective on parties in
two-party political systems. The first assumption is that discrete interests and preferences may be subsumed under or accommodated within the respective umbrellas of the political parties. The second is that the subsumption or accommodation of discrete interests and preferences is peculiar to the province of party politics. The first assumption acknowledges the possibility of preference aggregation while the second assumption acknowledges the singular role of party in the process of aggregation. Together, these two assumptions lay the foundation for the perspective that the political party is the sole mechanism through which interests are aggregated in the legislature.

This perspective, then, allows for the possibility that discrete interests and preferences may relate to one another in a reinforcing pattern. Accordingly, discrete interests and preferences may converge within parties and diverge between parties. When this occurs, each party may be viewed as an aggregate of discrete but consonant interests; however, the interest aggregates in each party are dissonant to one another. In its extreme variant, this perspective presumes that such a state of affairs is inherent or "natural" to the two-party system. The more conservative or modified posture, however, recognizes that the concomitant occurrence of intraparty interest convergence and interparty interest divergence is contingent in part on the overall distribution of preferences and in part on the degree to which institutional and structural features of the political
system limit and constrain preference aggregation. The modified variant, though, remains true to the two primary assumptions underlying this perspective. It acknowledges that discrete interests and preferences may be subsumed or accommodated within the rubric of party. As well, it recognizes the political party as the only political organization within which interest aggregation occurs. The modified variant, however, regards the relation between preference aggregation and political parties as conditional.

When interests converge within the parties and diverge between the parties, the reconciliation of divergent interests in the legislative arena is determined by which party wins control of the government. In this respect, conflict resolution inside the legislature is a result of electoral competition and strategy outside the legislature. Given the occurrence of intraparty interest convergence and interparty interest divergence, election outcomes decide which party shall have an opportunity within the legislature to realize or legitimate its interests. This perspective suggests that under these conditions the winning party is positioned to legitimate a set of discrete interests. In other words, the winning party is positioned to deliver a set of policy alternatives that are consonant to the discrete interests aggregated within it and dissonant to the discrete interests subsumed in the losing party. Provided that there is a relation between interests and preferences in and outside the legislative arena, the legislative
parties act as cohesive and opposed blocs across policy areas. The implication of this rationale for the character of congressional voting alignments is simple but compelling. Assuming that the distribution of preferences is such that interests converge within parties and diverge between parties, the character of voting alignments will be invariant, partisan, and electoral in origin.

The character of legislative voting alignments is similarly well-defined in the perspective to which the policy content approach is linked. Likewise, the result of this perspective is heavily intertwined with the profile of interests and preferences outside the legislature. Due in fact to the assumed character of interests and preferences outside the legislature, this perspective projects a different method of both interest aggregation and reconciliation.

As noted earlier, this perspective recognizes that the extra-legislative world encompasses discrete interests and preferences and that the manifestation of interests and preferences in the legislature is (more or less) a function of preferences outside the legislature. For the moment, I shall restrict attention to the assumptions associated with the pluralist variant, two of which are relevant. The primary assumption is that in large, complex societies discrete interests are manifold and relate to one another in a cross-cutting rather than a reinforcing pattern. As Miller (1983: p. 735) has observed, the distribution of
preferences is accordingly conceptualized as a large set of relatively small "preference clusters." The subsidiary assumption is that different interests have different salience to different groups. To rely on Miller (1983: p. 735) again, "... different issues are differentially salient to different preference clusters." In short, this perspective assumes that different individuals and groups are likely to agree on some issues, disagree on others, and disagree as well on which issues are important.

At the outset, then, the pluralist variant does not acknowledge the possibility that discrete interests in the extra-legislative arena aggregate and diverge in a reinforcing or dualistic fashion. This follows from the first assumption concerning the profile of preferences in large, complex societies. To the degree that the character of interests and preferences inside the legislature mirrors the character of interests and preferences outside the legislature, this perspective assumes that discrete interests do not aggregate but diverge within the legislative arena. The first assumption, then, establishes the impossibility of invariant majority and minority preference clusters in the legislature. Rather, majorities and minorities shift across issue areas.

A similar relation between preference profile and majority cycles in the legislature finds expression in the axiomatic variant in the now well-known "paradox of voting" first discovered by the Marquis de Condorcet some 200 years
ago (Arrow, 1951; Black, 1958; Riker, 1958; 1961). In the axiomatic literature, the preference profile corresponding to pluralism's profile of cross-cutting interests has been characterized as "discordant" (Fishburn, 1973), "anarchic" (MacKay, 1980; MacKay and Wong, 1979), and "lacking in inner harmony" (Riker, 1961; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). Quite simply, the "paradox of voting" is the "problem of cyclical majorities" where majority preferences are unstable and outcomes intrinsically indeterminate (McKelvey, 1976; Cohen, 1979; Cohen and Matthews, 1980). In other words, it is unlikely that any set of outcomes is associated with a fixed majority of legislators. In both the pluralistic and the axiomatic variants, then, the preference profile results in shifting majority and minority preference clusters.

When discrete interests relate in a cross-cutting rather than a reinforcing pattern, the reconciliation of divergent interests and preferences in the legislature is not determined by electoral outcomes (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973: chaps. 11-12; Ordeshook, 1976). This follows from the absence of a majority preference cluster that is positioned to legitimate or institute a set of discrete interests. Rather, the reconciliation of divergent interests and preferences in the legislature is determined within the legislature by political maneuver. In both the pluralistic and the axiomatic variants, political maneuver takes a variety of forms such as logrolling, vote trading, agenda manipulation, and strategic voting. In this context,
the subsidiary assumption of the pluralistic variant results in the logroll, whereby the reconciliation of conflict is determined by the rule of alternative "articulate" or "intense" majority preference clusters. Axiomatic theory has shown, however, that the process of logrolling does not result in equilibrium because logrolling coalitions form and re-form in an endless cycle (But see Weingast, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981).

In both variants of this perspective, the aggregation of discrete interests and preferences is the result of the process of or manner in which divergent interests and preferences are reconciled in the legislature. Interest aggregation is, in other words, a product of legislative outcomes and occurs only to the degree that alternative majority preference clusters maximize their objectives. Interest aggregation becomes, in short, merely the sum of alternative majority preference cluster victories.

The implication of this rationale for the character of congressional voting alignments is similarly simple but compelling. Assuming that the distribution of preferences is cross-cutting rather than reinforcing, the character of voting alignments will be variant, discrete, and legislative in origin.

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the aggregation and reconciliation of discrete and divergent interests and preferences takes a different form in the two perspectives. In the perspective to which the party voting approach is
linked, discrete interests and preferences may converge within the parties and diverge between the parties. When this occurs, the legislative parties become aggregates of consonant but opposed interests. With interests and preferences aggregated in this manner, the reconciliation of divergent interests and preferences in the legislature results from an electoral determination of majority and minority party aggregates, after which the majority or winning party is positioned to realize or legitimate the discrete interests within it. In this respect, the reconciliation of discrete interests and preferences results from the aggregation of discrete interests and preferences. In the perspective to which the policy content approach is linked, discrete interests and preferences relate to one another in a cross-cutting rather than a dualistic fashion. When this occurs, different majorities form around different alternatives. Since no single group is powerful enough to realize any set of discrete interests, the reconciliation of divergent interests in the legislature is determined by each majority maneuvering to maximize its objectives. The aggregation of interests hence becomes the result of legislative outcomes. In this respect, the aggregation of discrete interests and preferences results from the reconciliation of discrete interests and preferences.

As the discussion additionally illustrates, the character of congressional voting alignments varies markedly between the two perspectives. In the perspective to which
the party voting approach is tied, the character of voting alignments may be invariant and partisan. In the perspective to which the policy content approach is tied, the character of voting alignments is variant and discrete. However, these results have followed from the profile of interests and preferences in the extra-legislative world. In the former, discrete interests and preferences may relate in a reinforcing or dualistic fashion. In the latter, they may not.

The implication for the parameters of congressional voting alignments is immediate and direct. It is not the case that the character of congressional voting alignments is inherently invariant and partisan. Nor is it the case that the character of congressional voting alignments is inherently variant and discrete. Rather, the character of congressional voting alignments varies with the profile of interests and preferences in the extra-legislative world. This is not to say that the extra-legislative profile of interests and preferences is fully determinative and thus to dismiss the impact of structural and institutional factors of the political system and the Congress itself (On the latter, see Shepsle, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Cooper and Brady, 1981). Rather, it is to assert that in the American political system the character of interests and preferences inside the Congress bears some relation to the character of interests and preferences outside the Congress. It is, in general, to acknowledge or assume the basic tenet
of representative democracy, an assumption, as already noted, evident in both perspectives.

We may adopt, in other words, a static view of the character of congressional voting alignments (as either invariant and partisan or variant and discrete) only to the degree that we are willing to adopt a static view of the profile of discrete interests and preferences outside the Congress (as either dualistic or cross-cutting). Without question, the prevailing wisdom would have it that the character of interests and preferences in the United States is pluralism incarnate. However, historical research has shown that at certain times the general character of American interests and preferences has become highly polarized, resulting on one occasion in civil war. The study of polarization in the electorate lies, of course, at the heart of the realignment literature (Burnham, 1970; Campbell and Trilling, 1980; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, 1980; Brady, 1984). Of special relevance given the discussion here, polarization in the electorate has corresponded to, and according to this literature induced, a parallel polarization in congressional voting alignments, with polarity in both locations captured in the relations within and between the two parties (Sinclair, 1977c; and especially Brady, 1978; 1980; Brady and Stewart, 1982). All told, to infer that congressional voting alignments are intrinsically "emergent" is not to infer that congressional voting alignments are intrinsically "flexible."
The Parameters of Congressional Voting Alignments

We are now in a position to establish more fully the parameters of congressional voting alignments. Consider the diagrams shown in Figure 1. Each circle represents the total membership of a legislature in which every member belongs to one of two political parties. It is assumed that the total membership is an odd number; therefore, it is possible to define a majority and minority party. The space to the left of the dotted line down the center of each circle represents the membership of one party while the space to the right of the dotted line represents the membership of the other party. The solid lines within each circle represent issues or discrete interests. In the upper two diagrams, discrete interests relate to one another in a more or less reinforcing pattern. In the lower two diagrams, discrete interests relate to one another in a more or less cross-cutting pattern.

In Figure 1a, three issues divide the legislature into highly similar majority and minority preference clusters. For each issue, the majority preference cluster is composed mainly of individuals in the majority party and the minority preference cluster is composed mainly of individuals in the minority party. Figure 1a, then, depicts a scenario in which the basis of division in the legislature is more or less the same across issues and represented by more or less cohesive and opposed party blocs. In Figure 1b, three issues divide the legislature again into highly similar
Figure 1. Four Scenarios of Legislative Voting Alignments.
majority and minority preference clusters. For each issue in this case, however, the majority preference cluster is composed of members of both parties as is the minority preference cluster. Figure 1b, then, depicts a scenario in which the basis of division in the legislature is again more or less the same across issues and represented by more or less cohesive and opposed blocs that each comprise segments of both parties' membership. In Figure 1c, the three issues divide the legislature into relatively dissimilar majority and minority preference clusters. On one of the three issues, the majority preference cluster is composed mainly of individuals in the majority party and the minority preference cluster is composed mainly of individuals in the minority party. On the other two issues, this is not the case. Figure 1c, then, depicts a scenario in which the basis of division in the legislature varies across the three issues. In Figure 1d, eight issues divide the legislature into eight pairs of majority and minority preference clusters. The most obvious difference, then, between the last diagram and the other three is the number of issues that divide the legislature. In this regard, each of the three previously discussed is a special case of the last diagram.

The scenario depicted in Figure 1d is of special importance. To this point, the discussion in the chapter has emphasized the connection between the character of congressional voting alignments and the manner in which
interests and preferences relate to one another. As the three diagrams and the discussion in the last section have shown, majority and minority preference clusters are relatively similar when interests and preferences relate to one another in a reinforcing pattern but relatively dissimilar when interests and preferences relate to one another in a cross-cutting pattern. Figure 1d implies that the number of issues and preferences is as significant to an understanding of the parameters of congressional voting alignments as the manner in which interests and preferences relate to one another. As already noted, Figures 1c and 1d are alike to the extent that in both scenarios interests and preferences relate to one another in a cross-cutting fashion. However, the latter illustrates a scenario in which issues are more numerous and majority and minority preference clusters more numerous. In short, the general character of congressional voting alignments is more differentiated.

This is not to dismiss the importance of considering the relation or pattern among interests and preferences. The character of congressional voting alignments is more highly differentiated in Figure 1d because a greater number of discrete interests divide the legislature and because the relation among them is cross-cutting. Were, in other words, the eight issues to relate to one another in a reinforcing pattern, the character of congressional voting alignments would resemble the scenario depicted in either of the two
upper diagrams. Therefore, neither the number of discrete interests (many or few) nor the relation of discrete interests (cross-cutting or reinforcing) alone is likely to generate a fully defined portrait of the parameters of congressional voting alignments. Rather, it is their interrelationship that is revealing.

Now consider Figure 2. Each of the four diagrams shown previously in Figure 1 are represented in Figure 2. Both the solid and the broken lines between the circles represent longitudinal change in the character of congressional voting alignments. The solid lines represent the most likely avenues of change. The broken lines represent the least likely avenues of change. The placement of the solid and broken lines is intended merely to acknowledge that the character of congressional voting alignments is likely to become more, or less, differentiated gradually rather than abruptly. It is to acknowledge, in short, that "realignments" are rare events.

The thrust of Figure 2 is that longitudinal change (and stability) in the character of congressional voting alignments can be conceptualized as the movement (or lack of movement) toward or away from any one of the four diagrams. For example, assume at time-1 the character of congressional voting alignments takes the form exhibited in Figure 2a where discrete interests and preferences are relatively reinforcing, majority and minority preference clusters relatively similar, and the legislative parties relatively
Figure 2. Patterns of Longitudinal Change in Voting Alignments.
cohesive and opposed. Analysis at time-2 may reveal, on the one hand, that the character of congressional voting alignments approximates the form exhibited in Figure 2b where discrete interests and preferences are relatively crosscutting and majority and minority preferences clusters relatively dissimilar. On the other hand, it may reveal that the character of congressional voting is still of the form exhibited in Figure 2a. The former would imply change, the latter stability.

It is, of course, unlikely that at any single point in time the match between the actual character of congressional voting alignments and the diagrams in Figure 2 will be exact. Nor is it the case that gradual movement along the broken lines is unlikely. A 20-degree shift in the cluster of lines represented in Figure 2a would establish that the direction of longitudinal change is toward Figure 2b. Thus, the diagrams themselves and the (broken or solid) lines between them are intended as exemplary rather than exhaustive specifications of change and stability in the parameters of congressional voting alignments.

The Two Approaches Reconsidered

The discussion in the last section is instructive for it reveals deficiencies in both the party voting approach and the policy content approach to the analysis of longitudinal change. Each approach is suited conceptually to the description of one of the four scenarios; however,
each is deficient in capturing the other three scenarios and deficient in capturing the movement toward or away from them. To illustrate these deficiencies, I shall refer again to Figure 2.

The party voting approach, with its sensitivity to levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict, is designed to discriminate the scenario represented in Figure 2a, in which interests and preferences are reinforcing, majority and minority preference clusters relatively similar, and the legislative parties relatively cohesive and opposed. If intraparty cohesion and/or interparty conflict are not high, the party voting approach fails to discriminate between the other three scenarios. Given such results, it is possible to conclude only that majority preference clusters are not composed mainly of individuals in the majority party and minority preference clusters are not composed mainly of individuals in the minority party. If over a series of time points intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict increased, then the party voting approach would indicate movement toward Figure 2a. The source of the movement, however, would remain unclear. Similarly, if over a series of time points intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict decreased, then the party voting approach would indicate movement away from Figure 2a. The direction of the movement, in this case, would remain unclear.

That the party voting approach reflects (general)
movement toward or away from Figure 2a is not unexpected given the motivation behind the approach itself. The intent of the approach, as was described in the first chapter, is to measure the importance of party as a basis of cleavage in the legislature. The analysis of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict levels, as should be clear from the Figure 2a, is intrinsic to the study of party's importance as a basis of cleavage. In this sense, movement toward or away from the other diagrams is unimportant to the party voting approach since all attest to the insignificance of party cleavages. If, as argued here, movement toward or away from the other three scenarios is significant to the analysis of change in the character of congressional voting alignments, then the party voting approach may be viewed as deficient.

The policy content approach, with its sensitivity to a relatively few number of cross-cutting, discrete interests (i.e., policy domains), is designed to discriminate the scenario represented in Figure 2c, in which interests and preferences are limited and cross-cutting, majority and minority preference clusters relatively dissimilar. However, the approach by definition is geared toward a segmental orientation to longitudinal change. Herein lies its central deficiency. Specifically, the policy content approach is designed to monitor longitudinal shifts in the character of voting alignments associated with discrete interests rather than longitudinal shifts in the general
character of congressional voting alignments. It is concerned, in other words, with the longitudinal movement of each line inside Figure 2c rather than the longitudinal movement of Figure 2c toward, for example, Figure 2a or 2b. In addition, because it assumes a relatively limited number of discrete interests, it is unlikely to acknowledge the movement of Figure 2c toward Figure 2d. To be sure, analysts adopting the policy content approach have been attentive to the appearance of "minor policy dimensions" within policy domains (e.g., Clausen, 1973; Clausen and Van Horn, 1977; Sinclair, 1977b). Still, their discussion in this regard has focused, not surprisingly, on the voting patterns associated with the minor dimensions rather than what the appearance or disappearance of minor policy dimensions implies even for the character of voting within the broad policy domain, much less the overall character of congressional voting alignments. Therefore, the policy content approach is likely at best to overlook and at worst to disregard a general trend toward either greater dualism or greater differentiation.

That the policy content approach is wedded to a segmental, discrete orientation toward the analysis of longitudinal change is not unexpected given that its development and usage has coincided with a period in American history (i.e., the 1960s and 1970s) whose signature feature has been the issue cross-cutting traditional party lines. The bipartisan foreign policy of the fifties and
sixties and the activities of the Conservative Coalition on black civil rights legislation throughout the last decades are the two most outstanding examples. Nonetheless, to adopt de facto a segmented, issue-oriented approach to the analysis of longitudinal change in congressional voting alignments is conceptually to deny possibly basic changes in the general character of congressional voting alignments. If, as argued here, the movement between the four diagrams in Figure 2 represents salient change in the character of congressional voting alignments, then the policy content approach may be viewed as deficient.

Both the party voting approach and the policy content approach are likely, then, to reflect only a partial view of change (or stability) in the overall character of voting alignments. The immediate issue is how the two approaches can be integrated to reflect the parameters of change discussed here. This issue is the subject of the following chapter.
Notes

1 The linkage between the policy content approach and the tenets of pluralism has been discussed by Schneider (1979: pp. 11-41). However, Schneider's discussion revolves around the juxtaposition of ideological and pluralist "theories" of American politics. Thus it bears a complementary relation to the purpose of discussion here. Further, while Schneider's treatment of pluralism's central tenets is quite thorough, his discussion of the relation between the policy content framework and pluralism is underdeveloped.

2 For a recent discussion of the conceptual relationship between pluralist theory and axiomatic theory, see Miller (1983).

3 Of continuing interest to axiomatic analysis has been the investigation of preference profiles that result in equilibrium outcomes and thus arrest the cyclicity of majorities (Black, 1958; Vickrey, 1960; Ward, 1965; Sen, 1966; 1970; Plott, 1967; Kramer, 1973). The primary result emerging from this literature is that certain conditions, i.e., certain preference profiles, preclude the possibility of cyclical majority preferences. In general, these conditions specify that alternative preferences are mutually reinforcing and dualistic (Miller, 1983: pp. 739-740). The literature on probabilistic distributions of preference profiles has drawn generally parallel conclusions (e.g., Jamison and Luce, 1972; Kuqa and Nagatami, 1974; Fishburn and Gehrlein, 1980). Still, the general thrust of this body of research is that such conditions are rare.

4 The center placement of the dotted line within each circle is arbitrary and immaterial to the discussion.
CHAPTER 3

A Research Strategy Defined

From the outset, it has been clear that the party voting approach and the policy content approach attend to different aspects of longitudinal change and stability in the character of congressional voting alignments. What should be clear from the discussion in the last chapter is that each approach is additionally relatively insensitive to more broadly defined parameters of congressional voting alignments. As a result, each approach is likely to generate an incomplete if not distorted profile of longitudinal change and stability. On this basis alone, an exclusive reliance on either approach can be rejected in favor of an integrated or combined approach.

The research strategy adopted in this analysis may now be generally described. The discussion in the previous chapter has identified four scenarios of congressional voting alignments. It has been argued that the broader character of longitudinal change and stability can be conceptualized as the movement or lack of movement between these scenarios. Analysis here shall rely on both the party voting approach and the policy content approach to analyze longitudinal change and stability within the context of this
framework.

To rely on both the party voting approach and the policy content approach is not to say that the methodology associated with each approach is beyond improvement and modification. Nor by any means is it clear at this point how the two may be used integratively to detect the patterns of longitudinal change and stability that are of interest here. To these ends, the following section considers critically the conventional methodologies associated with each approach. This critique serves as a preface to the modifications introduced into the two methodologies in this analysis. In the next section, the details of the research design and methodology are presented. The chapter concludes with a description of the manner in which the research design permits the detection of the general patterns of longitudinal change and stability suggested in the discussion of the four scenarios of congressional voting alignments.

Methodological Issues

There is, not surprisingly, little overlap or commonality in the methodologies associated with the party voting approach and the policy content approach. Each methodology, when evaluated on its own merit, admits to problems and deficiencies. In some cases, these problems and deficiencies preclude the detection of the patterns of change this analysis seeks to uncover. In other cases, they
merely reflect the need for "fine-tuning." For the most part, they have all remained unaddressed in the literature.

**The Party Voting Approach**

In studies adopting the party voting approach, analysts typically have selected among four statistics: the Rice of cohesion, the party unity score, the index of likeness, and the party vote score. The Rice index of cohesion reflects the level of intraparty cohesion on a 100-point index.¹ The party unity score reflects the level of intraparty cohesion (usually expressed as a raw percentage rather than an indexed value) when party majorities oppose each other. The index of likeness, which is seen least frequently, is employed as a measure of interparty conflict and is obtained by calculating the percentages of members from the two parties that vote in the same direction and subtracting the difference from 100. With all three statistics, analysis usually proceeds on the basis of each statistic's average value across votes for a given Congress. Finally, the party vote score, expressed as a percentage, represents the proportion of votes on which party majorities conflict. Sometimes analysts have chosen to use a 90 percent cutoff value in which case the party vote score reflects the percentage of votes on which 90 percent of one party opposes 90 percent of the other. More frequently, analysts have chosen to use a 50 percent cutoff in which case the statistic reflects the percentage of votes on which 50 percent of one party opposes 50 percent of the other.
As noted at several points, the purpose of the party voting approach is to address the salience of the partisan cleavage. Worth reiterating is that the salience of the partisan cleavage is a function of both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict (Cooper, Brady, and Hurley, 1977; Collie, 1984). In its ideal form, the partisan cleavage finds both parties highly cohesive and consistently conflictual. Therefore, highly cohesive parties that are unopposed no more attest to the salience of the partisan cleavage than do highly conflictual parties that are fragmented. Nor, for that matter, does one highly cohesive party that opposes another highly fragmented party. Unfortunately, when the importance of the interrelationship between intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict is considered, deficiencies in the above four statistics become apparent.

In measuring only intraparty cohesion, the Rice index fails to capture the salience of the partisan cleavage. If it is low for either party, we may infer that the partisan cleavage is weak. If it is high for both parties, we still can question the importance of the partisan cleavage because we have no sense of the level of interparty conflict. While a scenario of total consensus would yield the highest values on the Rice index for both parties, it would hardly testify to the salience of party in voting alignments.

The party unity score has a similar problem. With this statistic, it is possible to monitor changes in intraparty
cohesion on interparty conflict votes. As with the Rice index of cohesion though, the party unity score neglects to capture differences in the level of interparty conflict. Therefore, the party unity score fails to differentiate a scenario where interparty conflict occurs on 100 percent of votes from a scenario where interparty conflict occurs on 10 percent of votes.

The index of likeness is sensitive to both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict though its use reflects an emphasis on the latter. As the statistic approaches 0, it indicates a high level of intraparty cohesion in both parties and a high level of interparty conflict between the two. However, the upper values of the statistic can be misleading. The index of likeness takes on a value of 100 (its upper limit), for example, when 50 percent of each party votes in the same direction and when 100 percent of each party votes in the same direction. As a result, it is likely to obscure the nature of intraparty relations as well as interparty relations.

With a 90 percent cutoff, the party vote score captures both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. When the statistic is high, it provides indisputable evidence of a strong partisan cleavage. When the statistic is not high, we may infer little concerning the strength or weakness of the partisan cleavage. For example, the 90 percent cutoff value precludes the differentiation of a scenario where moderately strong majorities of the parties oppose each
other consistently from the scenario in which there is total consensus. With a 50 percent cutoff value, the problem occurs in reverse. We are unable to distinguish a scenario where cohesive party majorities oppose each other from a scenario where fragmented party majorities oppose each other.

The above discussion indicates that exclusive reliance on any one of the above statistics is likely to generate a limited if not distorted profile of the degree to which division in the legislature is structured along party lines. Thus the central problem with each of the statistics is that each fails to capture the very phenomenon that is of primary interest. This problem is mitigated somewhat if the statistics are used in conjunction with one another. To illustrate the profile of voting alignments they yield as a group and its limitations, results based on these statistics are presented for the nine Houses in Tables 1 and 2.

The results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict has been far from absolute in all three periods. In Table 1, the Rice index of cohesion shows that cohesion in the Democratic Party remained highly stable across the three periods but fluctuated considerably within the 1930s and the 1950s periods. In the Republican Party, within-period fluctuations are less noticeable than between-period changes. Republican cohesion dropped after the 1930s and rose during the 1970s. The average party unity scores
Table 1. Intraparty Cohesion in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 94th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Mean Index of Cohesion</th>
<th>Mean Party Unity Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Results on the 74th through the 86th Houses were obtained from Cooper, Brady and Hurley (1977). Results on the 94th-96th House were compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.
Table 2. Interparty Conflict in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 94th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Mean Index of Likeness</th>
<th>Party Vote Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90 v. 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Results on the 74th through the 86th Houses were obtained from Cooper, Brady and Hurley (1977). Results on the 94th-96th House were compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.
indicate that Democratic cohesion on interparty conflict votes declined across the three periods whereas Republican cohesion declined only with the 1950s. Thus, the two statistics yield somewhat different profiles of change and stability concerning intraparty relations. In Table 2, the indices of likeness show that with each period the degree of similarity between the parties increased. The party vote scores at both the 90 percent and the 50 percent cutoff values indicate that the level of interparty conflict decreased across periods.

As a group, then, the statistics indicate a general decline in both intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict across the three periods. In this respect, they indicate a weakening of the partisan cleavage. Unfortunately, analysts adopting the party voting approach seldom report results based on all four statistics. Rather, the statistics are used selectively. As has been argued above, selective use of the statistics is unlikely to capture the strength or weakness of the partisan cleavage. As a result, the profile of the partisan cleavage in most analyses examining the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties is limited and suspect.

This is not to say that a reliance on the four statistics is fully adequate. Indeed, as a collection, the four provide but a crude indication of the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties, especially in the absence of a strong partisan cleavage. Consider the
possibilities. Perhaps many votes divide both parties. Perhaps few votes divide both parties. Perhaps some votes divide Democrats and not Republicans. Perhaps other votes divide Republicans and not Democrats. Perhaps some votes divide some Democrats from some Republicans. Perhaps few votes are divisive.

In general, these possibilities imply that the contours of intraparty relations and interparty relations may take a variety of forms more subtle than can be reflected by a reliance on the four conventional statistics. More important, they imply that the contours of intraparty relations and interparty relations may take a variety of forms in the absence of high intraparty cohesion and high interparty conflict. To date, the character of these relations has not been addressed in the literature adopting the party voting approach. As a result, there is evidence that indicates how the congressional parties are not voting. How they are voting remains unclear. There is, in other words, a positive relationship between the strength of the partisan cleavage and our knowledge of the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties. In view of the results presented in Tables 1 and 2, we have a far better understanding of the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties during the 1930s than during the 1970s. If, in sum, one problem is that selective use of the statistics fails to capture the strength of the partisan cleavage, then a second problem is that collective use of
the statistics captures only the strength of the partisan cleavage.

**The Policy Content Approach**

As a methodology, policy dimensional analysis may be viewed as a variant within the larger family of scaling and clustering techniques that have long been familiar tools for the analysis of individual voting behavior and voting alignments (Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, 1966; MacRae, 1970; Weisberg, 1972; 1974b). The technical foundation of policy dimensional analysis rests first on the classification of votes, excepting those that are unanimous or near-unanimous, into one of the five substantively defined policy domains. Next, inter-correlations, usually based on the Yule's Q statistic, are obtained for the votes within each policy domain. A cutoff value, usually .6, is then employed to discern "policy dimensions," or unidimensional clusters of votes, within each policy domain. Once policy dimensions are identified, members' scale positions on each dimension are assigned and the analysis of voting proceeds usually from a correlation or regression analysis of individual scale scores and various individual-level predictor variables such as party, region, constituency, and ideology. Analysis usually focuses on the voting patterns associated with the largest policy dimension, i.e., the largest cluster of votes, within each policy domain.

In general, policy dimensional analysis provides a methodological framework that is more sensitive to the
contours of voting alignments that emerge in the absence of a strong partisan cleavage than, as has been shown above, the conventional methodology associated with the party voting approach. Nonetheless, the policy dimensional framework is not without analytical problems. As will shortly become evident, the problems involved in policy dimensional analysis are far less straightforward than those associated with the party voting approach.\(^5\)

The first problem involves the classification of votes into the five policy domains. Quite simply, some votes are easier to classify than others. The classification problem is not due to any lack of examples in past research. Analysts adopting the dimensional method have fairly consistently reported which of the five policy domains include specific pieces of legislation.\(^6\) Given the acceptance of previous standards and choices, a classificatory problem emerges concerning votes on legislation that explicitly includes aspects of more than one policy domain. An example is an amendment to adjust the budget (which suggests the vote belongs in the government management domain) by reducing social welfare expenditures (which suggests it belongs in the social welfare domain) and augmenting defense expenditures (which suggests it belongs in the international involvement domain). One aspect of the problem, then, is when the legislation itself interrelates policy domains. Another aspect of the problem is when the interrelationship is implicit. One example is the
establishment of grain quotas for the Soviet Union. Does this vote belong in the international involvement domain since it involves trade policy and U. S.-Soviet relations? Or does it belong in the agricultural assistance domain since it effectually is a form of aid to the agricultural community? For another example, do votes on the elimination of Medicaid dollars for abortions belong in the civil liberties domain or the social welfare domain? These sorts of classificatory dilemmas become all the more pressing as policy concerns become more interconnected or as legislators become more apt to express them that way.

The second problem concerns the observational base that is used in the scaling or clustering process. In longitudinal analysis, the policy dimensional approach requires independent cluster analyses of the votes classified within each policy domain at each point in time. While votes of similar policy content are classified in the same policy domain across time, the set of observations over which the cluster analyses are undertaken varies across time. That is, the set of observations from which the clusters are derived in each policy domain at a given point in time includes all individuals that held office at that point. Thus the observational base is cross-sectionally stable but longitudinally variable.

The longitudinal instability of the observational base diminishes the rigor of the statistical component used to establish the content equivalence in the policy dimensional
framework. In past analyses, this problem has been addressed indirectly by means of a cohort analysis in which the policy positions of those members who held office during successive legislatures are considered (Clausen, 1973; Sinclair, 1978a). As frequently, however, the strategy has been to report mean support scores for the total membership -- usually subdivided into partisan and regional groups -- per policy dimension for each point in time (e.g., Sinclair, 1981a). With either strategy, the general point remains that the instability of the observational base reduces confidence in the content equivalence of specific measures with similar policy content drawn at different points in time.

The final problem concerns the lack of a conceptual perspective on policy dimensions. Policy dimensional analysis is conceived on the assumption that the larger character of congressional voting alignments is represented by a limited number of different voting alignments or, in the dimensional language, a limited number of major "dimensions of voting," each of which corresponds to one of the five broadly defined policy domains. Even on the assumption that the legislative agenda includes items whose substantive content corresponds to one (or more) of the five policy domains, the identification of "policy" dimensions of voting remains problematic. Specifically, it may be possible to identify substantively and statistically a major dimension of voting, i.e., a cluster of votes larger than
any other, within each policy domain. However, if the major dimensions of voting do not vary across policy domains, do not, in other words, reflect different voting alignments, then, "policy" dimensions of voting, as such, do not exist. Indeed, a plurality of voting dimensions does not exist. Rather, a single major voting alignment predominates, multiple dimensions of voting being one in the same.

The above example suggests that policy dimensions do not retain a conceptual validity when the alignments associated with the major dimensions of voting do not vary across policy domains. The conceptual validity of policy dimensions is equally difficult to justify when "major" dimensions of voting are not discernible in policy domains. As it is possible that voting alignments may become more similar across policy domains, so it is possible that voting alignments may become more dissimilar within policy domains. Should the latter occur, voting across policy domains would no longer be represented primarily by a limited number of major dimensions of voting. Rather, voting across policy domains would be more validly characterized as amorphous or fluid and highly issue-specific.

There are two faces, then, to the problem regarding the conceptual validity of "policy dimensions of voting." One concerns whether major dimensions of voting are different and the other concerns whether major dimensions of voting are major. As a rule, dimensional studies do not report either the number of dimensions defined within policy
domains or their relative size. Consequently, we have little information on the degree to which voting patterns across policy domains are represented by the "major" dimensions of voting discussed in the dimensional analyses. Nor is the degree to which voting alignments vary across policy domains altogether clear. As already noted, dimensional analysts have relied on individual-level statistics to analyze the voting that occurs on policy dimensions. One strategy has been to report correlation or regression coefficients between individual scale scores on policy dimensions and individual-level predictor variables (e.g., Clausen, 1973; Clausen and Van Horn, 1977). Another strategy has been to report mean support scores on policy dimensions for partisan and regional groups (e.g., Sinclair, 1981b). The implicit message, for example, in variations in the correlation coefficients associated with different policy dimensions is that voting alignments vary across policy dimensions. Either strategy provides only a rough profile of the character of the voting alignments associated with the policy dimensions. The direct measurement of the degree to which voting alignments vary across policy dimensions has yet to be presented.

Research Design and Methodology

The analysis examines voting alignments in the U. S. House of Representatives during three periods: the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 94th-96th
(1975-80) Congresses. These nine Houses have been selected for several reasons. First, there is a Democratic majority in each of the nine. Therefore, the analysis controls for the potential impact of legislative status on voting alignments. Second, each period includes one House following a midterm election and two Houses following a presidential election. Therefore, the analysis is not restricted only to mid-term or presidential election years nor to any set of presidential administrations. Third, the United States was not at war during any of the three periods. Thus the analysis controls for the independent impact that wartime may have on voting in the Congress. Fourth, there has been no major realignment between the three periods. Thus, the patterns concerning change and stability can be framed legitimately within the context of a single "era." Finally, the three periods are sufficiently spaced to allow for the detection of the general movement (or lack of) described in the last chapter rather than fluctuations. However, in examining three Houses for each period, it is possible to address fluctuations as well. As a whole, the set of nine provides enough scope to detect overall change and stability and enough focus to detect fluctuations.

To assess the character of House voting alignments during these three periods, the research design incorporates elements of both the party voting approach and the policy content approach. In the previous section, several problems
and deficiencies regarding the conventional methodologies associated with the two approaches have been identified. In view of these problems and deficiencies, modifications are introduced into the party voting and the policy content components of the research design. To maintain clarity of presentation, the party voting component and the policy content component are discussed separately.

The Party Voting Component

Two problems with the conventional methodology employed in the party voting approach have been identified. The first problem is that selective use of the four previously discussed statistics fails to capture the salience of the partisan cleavage. The second is that collective use of the four statistics fails to provide a well-defined profile of the character of intraparty relations and interparty relations when the partisan cleavage has weakened. In adapting the party voting approach to address these problems, the point is to retain the ability to discern the partisan cleavage but to gain in addition a more refined perspective of the character of party relations in its absence or weakness. To address these problems, the following modifications have been introduced.

For each of the nine Houses, votes are classified as conflictual or consensual. Conflictual votes are defined as those on which party majorities oppose each other and consensual votes are defined as those on which they do not. The average level of intraparty cohesion for both parties on
both consensual and conflictual votes is then presented. In part, this is equivalent to using the party vote score with a 50 percent cutoff value in conjunction with the party unity score. In presenting the average level of cohesion for consensual votes, we have additionally a measure of cohesion for each party under conditions of interparty consensus. In sum, the results will allow the determination of intraparty relations from the standpoint of interparty relations.

To this point, the methodology shall afford a rough indication of the salience of the partisan cleavage. To refine the perspective on the character of intraparty and interparty relations, conflictual and consensual votes are subdivided further among four categories. The first category includes votes on which both parties demonstrate high cohesion. Conflictual votes falling into this category are those on which both parties are cohesive and opposed. Consensual votes falling into this category are those on which there is little conflict at all. The second category includes votes on which only the Democratic Party demonstrates high cohesion. Conflictual votes falling into this category are those on which a cohesive majority party opposed a fragmented minority party. Consensual votes falling into this category are those on which a fragmented minority party joins a cohesive majority party. The third category includes votes on which only the Republican Party demonstrates high cohesion. Conflictual votes falling into
this category are those on which a fragmented majority party votes against a cohesive minority party. Consensual votes falling into this category are those on which a fragmented majority party joins a cohesive minority party. The fourth category includes votes on which neither party demonstrates high cohesion. Conflictual votes falling into this category are those on which fragmented party majorities oppose each other. Consensual votes falling into this category are those on which fragmented party majorities join each other.

Once conflictual and consensual votes are classified in this manner, it is possible to specify further the manner in which votes divide (or fail to divide) each party under conditions of interparty consensus and interparty conflict. Thus we shall have a clearer perspective of intraparty relations as well as interparty relations.

The Policy Content Component

Three problems regarding policy dimensional analysis have been identified. The first problem concerns the classification of votes that appear to belong in more than one policy domain. The second problem involves the instability of the observational base and its consequences for the determination of policy content equivalence. The last problem involves attention to the conceptual validity of policy dimensions. In modifying the conventional methodology, the central point is to retain the ability to discern the patterns of voting associated with the five policy domains but to gain in addition a more refined
perspective on "policy" dimensions of voting. Accordingly, I now shall present the dimensional design employed in this analysis.

In each House, votes on which a majority of the total membership is equal to or greater than 90 percent are excluded from the analysis. Thus, as is standard procedure in dimensional analyses, unanimous and near-unanimous votes are not considered. In addition, private bills as well as votes involving internal House matters (such as the allocation of committee funds and legislative branch appropriations) are not included.

The policy classification system adopted for each period is the five-fold system defined by Clausen (1973). In order to enhance the comparability to prior work, I have relied heavily on the guidelines of previous studies in the classification of specific votes (Clausen, 1967; 1973; 1978; Clausen and Cheney, 1970; Clausen and Van Horn, 1977; Sinclair, 1977; 1978a; 1978b; 1981a; 1981b; 1982). Based on these studies, the content profiles of the five policy domains appear as follows.

The government management policy domain is to include legislation that deals with the economy and the nation's resources. Examples are fiscal and monetary policy, business regulation, public works, energy policy, and conservation and environmental legislation. The social welfare domain is to include legislation that deals more directly with the general welfare of the individual.
Examples are legislation concerning relief programs, public housing standards, food stamps, medical programs, education, urban renewal, minimum wage and labor regulation, and consumer protection. The agricultural assistance domain is to include legislation designed to aid the farming community. Examples are farmer credit programs and farm mortgage moratoriums, commodity subsidies, anti-erosion incentives, and pestilence control legislation. The civil liberties domain is to include legislation that deals with the legal rights and immunities of the citizenry. Examples are black civil rights legislation, busing, subversive activities regulation, federal criminal justice procedures, abortion, and ERA ratification. Last, the international involvement domain is to include legislation dealing with non-domestic policy questions. Examples are foreign military and economic aid, trade policy, national defense spending and armaments, and U. S. participation in international conferences and organizations.

The classification problem has been addressed by cross-classification of votes into more than one policy domain. Their policy category identification is then determined statistically. Cross-classification has been necessary on but a small percentage of the votes in each House. With statistical determination of vote categorization, votes are retained in the policy domain only when they meet the statistical cutoff criterion applied generally to the votes within all domains. This means that votes that have been
cross-classified may or may not appear eventually in the policy dimensions corresponding to different policy domains.

For each of the three periods, a cohort has been identified that comprises only those members who held office during the entire period. Table 3 presents a partisan/regional profile of the three cohorts. The identification of the three cohorts stabilizes the observational base for each period. The purpose of cohort identification, therefore, is to address the second problem. By stabilizing the observational base for each period, greater rigor is introduced into the statistical foundation for policy content equivalence, especially in light of the longitudinal stability of individuals' policy positions (Clausen, 1973).

Once votes have been classified and cohorts identified, a matrix of the absolute values of Yule's Q coefficients has been generated for the votes within each policy domain in each House. A complete linkage hierarchical clustering procedure has then been performed on each of the Q-coefficient matrices. A similarity value of .6 is established as the cutoff criterion, which is equivalent to setting the minimum Q-coefficient to .6 as has been done in prior work (e.g., Clausen, 1967; Sinclair, 1978a).

The hierarchical clustering procedure used in conjunction with the .6 cutoff criterion yields one or more clusters of votes, or "dimensions of voting", for each policy domain. A dimensional profile of the voting within
Table 3. Partisan/Regional Profile of Cohorts in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 94th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.∗

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>% Democratic South</th>
<th>Non-South</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Republican South</th>
<th>Non-South</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<td>64.5</td>
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<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th</td>
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<td>64.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: 1 The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 2 The 1930s cohort includes three members of a third party. Percentages are deflated to reflect their inclusion. 3 Percentages reflect that a Republican switched to the Democratic Party during the 76th House. 4 Percentages reflect that a Northern Republican switched to the Democratic Party during the 85th House. 5 Percentages reflect that a Northern and a Southern Democrat switched to the Republican Party during the 95th and the 96th House.
each policy domain is presented. The first part of the profile illustrates the number of major clusters that appear in each policy domain. Major clusters are defined statistically as those that account for at least 10 percent of all the votes hierarchically clustered at .6 or above within each policy domain. The second part of the profile identifies (if possible) the largest cluster of votes within each policy domain and its size relative to the other major clusters in the policy domain.

The dimensional profiles provide information on the degree to which voting patterns are structured within each policy domain. In this respect, it addresses partially the third problem, which concerned the conceptual validity of policy dimensions. The fewer the number of major clusters and the greater the proportion of the total number of votes hierarchically clustered accounted for by these major clusters, the more indication there is that voting patterns are relatively structured within a policy domain. A single cluster composed of all votes hierarchically clustered in a policy domain provides the strongest evidence that voting is highly structured in the domain and thus the strongest (preliminary) evidence that voting alignments may be validly conceptualized as "policy" dimensions of voting. In general, the greater the dominance of a single cluster within a policy domain, the more plausible the argument that voting is relatively structured within the domain and thus the more plausible the validity of policy dimensions.
Last, the character of voting alignments is examined for the membership-at-large across votes in the largest cluster or policy dimension in each policy domain. Due to the problem identified earlier with using individual-level results to assess the character of voting alignments, analysis here relies on measures of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. This additionally increases the comparability of the dimensional results to those derived using the party voting approach. With these results, it is possible to examine whether and to what degree voting alignments vary across policy domains. As with the dimensional profiles, these results provide insight into the conceptual validity of policy dimensions. Specifically, if voting alignments fail to vary across policy domains, then there is evidence that "policy" dimensions are not conceptually distinguishable. Conversely, the greater the variation in voting alignments across policy domains, the stronger the evidence that policy dimensions of voting represent the character of congressional voting alignments.

Detecting Change and Stability

The research design and methodology may now be considered in terms of the patterns of longitudinal change described in the last chapter. The patterns have been conceptualized as the movement between four scenarios of congressional voting alignments. Therefore, an identification of these patterns is contingent on the degree
to which criteria that differentiate the four scenarios can be established within the context of the research design. In the discussion below, I shall first describe briefly each scenario and then discuss how the scenario finds expression in this research design.

The first scenario depicts discrete interests and preferences relating to one another in a relatively reinforcing pattern that corresponds to cohesive and opposed party blocs. This scenario suggests that congressional voting alignments are relatively invariant across policy areas and associated with the relative strength of the partisan cleavage. In that the party voting component of the design is sensitive to overall levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict, it is sensitive to the first scenario. The higher the level of intraparty cohesion in both parties and the higher the level of interparty conflict, the more plausible the inference that congressional voting alignments may be characterized in terms of the first scenario. The scenario derives expression in the policy content component on two conditions. The first condition is the identification of a relatively primary cluster of votes in each policy domain. The second condition is that the voting alignment associated with each of the primary clusters is characterized by relatively high intraparty cohesion in both parties and relatively high interparty conflict.

The second scenario also finds discrete interests and
preferences relating to one another in a relatively reinforcing pattern; however, the dualism or polarization in this scenario does not correspond to party division. This scenario also suggests that congressional voting alignments are relatively invariant across policy areas but are not associated with the partisan cleavage. With regard to the party voting component of the design, low levels of intraparty cohesion in either or both parties provide preliminary evidence of this scenario. The stronger evidence of this scenario in the party voting component is the clustering of conflictual and consensual votes within the category in which cohesion is high in neither party. This scenario is depicted in the policy content component on two conditions. The first condition is the identification of a relatively primary cluster of votes within each policy domain. The second condition is that the voting alignment associated with each of the five primary clusters is not characterized by relatively high intraparty cohesion in both parties.\textsuperscript{11}

The third scenario reflects a relatively limited number of discrete interests and preferences relating to one another in a relatively cross-cutting pattern. Accordingly, majorities and minorities are differentiated. This scenario implies that congressional voting alignments vary across a relatively limited set of policy areas. The party voting component of the design indicates this scenario by a lack of high intraparty cohesion in either or both parties and a
relatively weak level of interparty conflict. This scenario is depicted in the policy content component of the design again on two conditions. The first condition is the identification of a relatively primary cluster of votes within each policy domain. The second is that the voting alignments associated with the five primary clusters vary across policy domains.

The fourth scenario depicts discrete interests and preferences relating to one another in a cross-cutting pattern. In this scenario, a greater number of discrete interests and preferences divide the membership. Accordingly, majorities and minorities are relatively more differentiated. This scenario suggests that congressional voting alignments vary within as well as across policy areas. The party voting component of the design again indicates this scenario with a lack of high intraparty cohesion in both parties and a lack of high interparty conflict. The scenario is depicted in the policy content component on either of the two following conditions. One condition is the proliferation of major dimensions (which have been defined statistically as clusters of votes that account for at least 10 percent of all votes hierarchically clustered at .6 or above) within one or more policy domains. The corollary to this condition is the disappearance of a relatively primary cluster of votes within one or more policy domains. A second condition is the failure of the major cluster(s) of votes within one or more policy domains
to account for a high proportion of the votes hierarchically clustered.

To note once again, the four scenarios are intended as conceptual representations of the character of congressional voting alignments and consequently conceptual representations of longitudinal change and stability. Thus, the general expectation is not to find empirical definition per se of the four scenarios. In point, the results in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the relation between the actual character of voting alignments in the three periods and the first scenario, in which the legislative parties are cohesive and opposed, is only approximate. However, insofar as they indicate a weakening of the partisan cleavage, they indicate movement away from the first scenario. What can be shown, then, are general tendencies that have not been explored in prior research from the perspective developed in this analysis.
Notes

1 Based only on those legislators who cast positive or negative votes, Rice's index is $100\left\{2p-1\right\}$ where $p$ = the percentage of legislators in the group under consideration voting yea. Thus if 70 percent of Democrats vote yea, the index of cohesion for the Democratic Party on that vote is $70 - 30 = 40$ (Rice, 1928).

2 See Cooper, Brady, and Hurley (1977) for an exception.

3 Based only on those legislators who cast positive or negative votes, Yule's $Q$ is $ad - bc/ad + bc$ for the $2 \times 2$ table, or $P - Q/ P + Q$ where $P$ is the number of concordant pairs and $Q$ is the number of discordant pairs. Thus Yule's $Q$, whose range is from $-1$ to $+1$, takes on a positive value if the number of concordant pairs predominates, a negative value if the number of discordant pairs predominates, and a zero value if they are equal. Yule's $Q$ is a special case of the Goodman-Kruskal gamma coefficient, the latter defined for contingency tables of any size (Yule, 1911; Goodman and Kruskal, 1954).

4 The positive cutoff value is established after the Yule's $Q$ correlations have been converted to their absolute values. Conversion controls for the direction of voting.

5 As noted in the first chapter, the policy content framework devised by Clausen (1973) is but one of several classification systems that have been devised in recent years. In light of the alternative frameworks proposed, perhaps the most important issue confronting those who wish to adopt a policy content approach concerns the selection of a policy classification system (Collie, 1984). The widespread use of the Clausen framework in the analysis of congressional voting alignments more than likely springs from its substantive as opposed to abstract orientation. Indeed, Clausen (1973: chap. 1) initially defended his selection of the five policy domains on the basis of their substantive clarity and its correspondence to legislators' perceptions. That no major realignment since the New Deal has disrupted legislators' five-fold perception of public policy has, of course, contributed to the relevance of the policy domains themselves to analysis of contemporary congressional voting alignments. Given the Clausen framework's widespread application to the analysis of contemporary congressional voting alignments and given that
it is the character of contemporary congressional voting alignments that is of primary interest here, I have confined discussion in the text to the technical and methodological problems that relate exclusively to the "policy dimensional" method of analysis.

6 To be sure, we may quarrel with particular choices. For example, public works projects conventionally have been classified in the government management domain, which generically includes legislation dealing with the government's management of the nation's economy and its resources. The implementation of public works projects, however, involves quite direct benefits to individuals: namely, jobs. From this perspective, public works legislation belongs in the social welfare domain, which generically includes legislation that is of direct benefit to the individual. This rationale is clearest when the 1930s are considered. Then, public works projects were explicitly presented as an aid to the individual rather than as a means of managing and utilizing the nation's resources. From another standpoint, though, all of the important pieces of legislation considered during the 1930s belong in the government management domain since all were merely pieces of the New Deal package that sought centrally to arrest the economic crisis that had engulfed the nation.

Similar objections to the placement of particular pieces of legislation merely reiterate the salience of the measurement identity problem initially addressed by Clausen (1967). At a minimum, they suggest that vote classification cannot be treated cavalierly. To quarrel such choices, however, is to quarrel with the policy content foundation of the framework itself. An interest in replication and comparability justifies the acceptance of prior classificatory decisions.

7 Inter-coder reliability coefficients have been obtained for vote classification. They are based on the inter-coding of approximately 10 percent of the number of votes classified in each House and range from .92 to 1.

8 This solution is implied in Clausen's (1967) treatment of the measurement identity problem.

9 A complete linkage hierarchical clustering procedure is equivalent to the Johnson (1967) "Maximum Method," which Sinclair has employed in her studies. One of the strengths of the complete linkage clustering procedure is that the clustering algorithm utilizes only the ordering of proximity measures. Therefore, measures of association that are monotonically invariant yield equivalent hierarchical
clusters. Thus the interaction between the clustering process and measures of association is at a minimum. See Weisberg (1974a) on the relationships between measures of association. See especially Anderberg (1973) and Hartigan (1975) for a discussion of complete linkage clustering.

10 The impact of setting the cutoff similarity value is to establish the statistical basis for defining the number of hierarchical clusters. Each hierarchical cluster is then viewed as a separate policy dimension within a particular policy domain. For example, it is possible for two sets of votes to form two hierarchical clusters at the .99 level. The two sets of votes may then form a single hierarchical cluster at the .05 level. Were this the case, it would indicate that the votes within each of the two sets clustered at the .99 level were highly related but that the two sets themselves were highly unrelated. With .6 adopted as the cutoff value, two hierarchical clusters or policy dimensions would be defined within that policy domain.

11 It is not possible within this research design to distinguish the nature of the cleavage associated with this scenario. In the design, though, the task is to distinguish this scenario from the other three. Thus, the nature of such a cleavage is less relevant to the general purpose of the design than the specification of such a cleavage.
CHAPTER 4

Voting Alignments in the Post-New Deal House

The central purpose of this chapter is to examine change and stability in House voting alignments during the post-New Deal era. During the span of these decades, the political agenda has undergone substantial flux. Propelled by Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1932, the Democratic Party established itself as the party whose national program represented a federal response to the severe economic crisis that had engulfed the nation. By the 1950s, the country had undergone the Second World War and with the resolution of the Korean conflict witnessed both peace and growing affluence. In the 1960s, black civil rights issues assumed a mounting intensity as did increasing American involvement in Vietnam. The 1970s has brought, by most accounts, a new complex of issues -- concerning the environment, energy resources, consumer protection, women's rights, and national commitment abroad -- that has challenged traditional loyalties both inside and outside the Congress.

Given these considerations, it would appear somewhat remarkable had not the general character of congressional voting alignments undergone some degree of change across the three periods examined here. As discussed in the first
chapter, previous research provides some perspective on the changes that may be anticipated. Analysis has shown the erratic but long-term decay of interparty conflict and intraparty cohesion through the late 1960s (Cooper, Brady, and Hurley, 1977). The results in the last chapter indicate that this trend has progressed into the 1970s. Dimensional research has indicated the splintering of long-standing coalitions during the 1970s, notably the Northern Democratic coalition (Sinclair, 1981b; 1982), as well as the emergence of new policy concerns in old issue areas (Clausen and Van Horn, 1977). Still other research suggests the development of ideological coalitions (Schneider, 1979) and regionally based blocs (Sinclair, 1977c). In sum, there have emerged several different and not necessarily competing versions of change and stability in House voting alignments during the post-New Deal era. With this analysis, another enters the fray.

Results

As described in the last chapter, the analysis examines change and stability in House voting alignments from the standpoint of both the party voting approach and the policy content approach. The conventional methodology associated with the party voting approach has been modified and extended in order to capture more fully the interrelationship between intraparty relations and interparty relations. The conventional methodology
associated with the policy content approach has been modified and extended to address both the technical problems regarding the classification of votes and the instability of the observational base and the conceptual problem regarding the analysis and evaluation of policy dimensions. The results obtained in this analysis of House voting alignments are organized below in three parts.

The first part contains the results obtained using the modified party voting methodology. The results are depicted in terms of central tendencies indicating general patterns of intraparty and interparty relations as well as the more detailed distributional profile of intraparty relations and interparty relations relating to the eight categories of votes described in the last chapter. These results capture both the strength of the partisan cleavage and the character of intraparty and interparty relations that have developed in its demise.

In the second part, the dimensional profiles of voting in the five policy domains are presented. As described in the last chapter, these profiles are depicted in terms of two components. One concerns the number of major policy dimensions (defined here as clusters of votes that account for at least 10 percent of the total number of votes clustered at .6 or above) that appear in each policy domain per House. The other concerns the relative size of the largest policy dimension, i.e., the largest cluster of votes, within each policy domain. Both aspects of the
dimensional profiles provide information on the degree to which voting is structured within policy domains.

Finally, the character of the voting alignments associated with the largest cluster of votes within each policy domain for the nine Houses is examined in terms of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. These results improve the comparability of the dimensional component of the analysis to the party voting component of the analysis. As well, they provide direct measurement of the degree to which voting alignments vary across policy domains.

**Party Alignments**

Table 4 presents preliminary information on intraparty relations and interparty relations during the three periods. In general, the results imply the variable contours of House voting alignments in the post-New Deal decades. As indicated by the high standard deviations, which show little change either within or across the three periods, cohesion in both parties fluctuated considerably on both interparty consensus and interparty conflict votes.

This is not to say that aspects of change in both intraparty relations and interparty relations are not evident. Three are most prominent. First, mirroring the results obtained in the last chapter, the results in Table 4 indicate that interparty conflict declined across the three periods. During the 1930s, party majorities voted against each other almost two-thirds of the time. By the 1950s, they opposed each other less than half the time with a
Table 4. Intraparty and Interparty Relations in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Consensus Votes</th>
<th>Conflict Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote Mean(S.D.)</td>
<td>Vote Mean(S.D.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>78.4(15.5)</td>
<td>81.1(14.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>73.4(16.6)</td>
<td>80.4(14.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>81.3(16.9)</td>
<td>86.1(14.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>77.7(16.3)</td>
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<td>84th</td>
<td>87.5(14.9)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>85th</td>
<td>82.3(16.6)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>86th</td>
<td>82.7(16.1)</td>
<td>82.3(16.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>84.2(15.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>88.0(14.5)</td>
<td>86.6(14.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: Consensus votes were defined when more than 50 percent of both parties voted in the same direction. Conflict votes were defined when more than 50 percent of both parties voted in the opposite direction. The mean is the average percentage of party members that voted together. "S.D." is the standard deviation.
further decrease evident for the 1970s. Second and also paralleling the results obtained in the last chapter, the average level of intraparty cohesion on interparty conflict votes declined. The erosion of intraparty cohesion in the Democratic Party was steady, that of the Republican Party only evident between the 1930s and 1950s. Third, the results indicate that intraparty cohesion on interparty consensus votes increased across the three periods. On these votes, cohesion increased in the Democratic Party with each period. In the Republican Party, an increase was evident only with the 1970s.

The combination of these three patterns effects a clear contrast between party alignments in the 1930s and the 1970s. In the 1930s, party majorities conflicted more often than they concurred and when they conflicted party majorities were larger than when they concurred. By the 1970s, party majorities concurred more often than they conflicted and when they concurred party majorities were larger than when they conflicted. From a partisan standpoint, the results indicate that cohesion decreased on votes that count and increased on votes that don't. Still, party blocs comprised on the average almost three-quarters of each party's membership during the 1970s. Therefore, it is not so much the case that particularly slim party majorities opposed each other during the 1970s. Rather, it is that party majorities opposed each other far less frequently and that when they did not party majorities were
more substantial.

These results imply rather explicit changes in the interrelationship between intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. Nonetheless, they provide but a general indication of the changes. I shall turn, therefore, to a more detailed presentation of intraparty relations and interparty relations by examining the distribution of interparty consensus and interparty conflict votes in the four categories defined in the previous chapter.

Table 5 presents the distribution of interparty consensus votes in the four categories. These results indicate that the character of interparty consensus changed substantially across the three periods. Two trends are most dramatic. First, the percentage of votes on which majorities in both parties were highly cohesive increased across the three periods. During the 1930s, interparty consensus votes of this type accounted on the average for less than a quarter of the number of votes where party majorities concurred. The percentage rose to an average of 35.2 during the 1950s and rose again to an average of 44.9 during the 1970s. Relative to the 1930s, then, the percentage of votes on which highly cohesive party majorities concurred more than doubled by the end of the 1970s. Second, the percentage of votes on which neither party demonstrated high cohesion decreased across the three periods. During the 1930s, the average percentage of votes classified into this category was 45.9. In the 1950s, it
Table 5. The Percentage Distribution of Interparty Consensus Votes in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Both Parties</th>
<th>Democratic Party Only</th>
<th>Republican Party Only</th>
<th>Neither Party</th>
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<td>19.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>46.4</td>
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<td>75th</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mean</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: High intraparty cohesion was defined when at least 90 percent of the members in a party vote together.
dropped to 37.2 percent and dropped again in the 1970s to 24 percent.

On the whole, when party majorities concurred during the 1930s period, they were more likely than in the later two periods to be fragmented party majorities. During the 1970s period, concurrent party majorities were more likely to be cohesive concurrent majorities. The pattern is further confirmed by comparing the modal tendency during the 1930s with that of the 1970s. In each of the three Houses during the 1930s, more consensus votes fell into the last category than any other. By contrast, in each of the three Houses during the 1970s, more consensus votes fell into the first category than any other.

The results also indicate that votes which found only the Democratic Party highly cohesive steadily increased across the three periods by small percentages. This is in contrast to the Republican Party where cohesion dropped after the 1930s. Addition of the first two categories reveals that the Democratic Party was highly cohesive on 34.1 percent of interparty consensus votes during the 1930s. By the 1970s, the percentage increased to 63.5. Therefore, when party majorities concurred during the 1970s, Democrats were highly cohesive almost two-thirds of the time. In general, then, interparty consensus votes increasingly became associated with highly cohesive Democratic majorities.

Still, the more striking aspect of change in the
character of interparty consensus was the movement from fragmented consensus to unified consensus. When coupled with the results presented in Table 4, these results indicate that party majorities not only became more likely to agree, they both became more unified in their agreement.

Table 6 presents the distribution of interparty conflict votes among the four categories. These results indicate that in each period, the greatest proportion of interparty conflict votes was characterized by a lack of high cohesion in both parties. Among the nine Houses, only the 76th showed a higher percentage of votes in another category. In that case, 30.2 percent of interparty conflict votes were characterized by a highly cohesive Republican Party only whereas 25.9 percent were characterized by a lack of high cohesion in both parties.

Two clear trends are nonetheless evident. First and suggestive of the results presented in the last chapter, the percentage of interparty conflict votes on which both parties were highly cohesive decreased across the three periods. During the 1930s, 24.5 percent of the time party majorities conflicted they were both highly cohesive. Interparty conflict votes of this type decreased to an average of 12.8 percent during the 1950s and again to an average of 3.7 percent during the 1970s. Second, the percentage of interparty conflict votes on which neither party was highly cohesive increased across the three periods. Representing less than a third of the total number
Table 6. The Percentage Distribution of Interparty Conflict Votes in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>High Intraparty Cohesion</th>
<th>Both</th>
<th>Democratic Only</th>
<th>Republican Only</th>
<th>Neither Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Party Only</td>
<td>Party Only</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
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<td>24.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>64.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>51.5</td>
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<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: High intraparty cohesion was defined when at least 90 percent of the members in party vote together.
of interparty conflict votes during the 1930s period, the percentage of interparty conflict votes characterized by fragmented party majorities rose to 55 percent during the 1950s and to 66.8 percent during the 1970s. By the 1970s, then, two-thirds of the time party majorities opposed each other, both were fragmented.

Disparities between the parties were sharpest during the 1930s and the 1970s. In both periods, a higher percentage of interparty conflict votes found Republicans highly cohesive more frequently than Democrats. During the 1970s period, this relation obtained in all three of the Houses examined. Indeed, addition of the last two categories reveals that during the 1970s the Democratic Party was fragmented 90 percent of the time it opposed a majority of the Republican Party. The 1950s contrasted the other two periods. In the 84th and 85th House, a highly unified Democratic Party opposed a fragmented Republican Party more frequently than a highly unified Republican Party faced a fragmented Democratic Party. In the 86th House, there was no substantial difference between the two.

Again though, the more striking aspect of change in the character of interparty conflict was the movement from polarization to fragmentation. To be sure, during the 1930s the proportion of interparty conflict votes that found both parties highly unified in their opposition was limited. Nonetheless, votes of this type had all but disappeared during the 1970s. Paralleling this trend, the modal
tendency toward fragmentation in both parties grew more exaggerated. When coupled with the results presented in Table 4, these results indicate that party majorities not only became less apt to oppose each other, they both became fragmented in their opposition.

Collectively, the results indicate several specific trends in the voting patterns of the congressional parties. First, the proportion of votes on which party majorities opposed each other declined. Second, on votes where there was interparty consensus, the proportion of votes on which both parties were relatively unified increased and the proportion of votes on which both parties were relatively fragmented decreased. Third, on votes where there was interparty conflict, the proportion of votes on which both parties were relatively unified decreased and the proportion of votes on which both parties were relatively fragmented increased.

Together, these trends signify that by the end of the 1970s, substantially fewer votes induced division between the parties. Those that did frequently induced division within both parties as well. As the parties grew more fragmented in their division, they grew more unified in their consensus. There was no single trend, then, toward either interparty consensus or intraparty fragmentation. Rather, changes in the character of intraparty relations were differentiable within the context of changes in the character of interparty relations.
**Dimensional Profiles of Voting**

Tables 7 and 8 present summary statistics on the Q-correlation of votes within the five policy domains for each of the Houses considered in this analysis. The results in Table 7 indicate that a relatively high proportion of votes classified within each policy domain in the nine Houses correlated at or above .6. In most cases, the percentage was well above 80 percent. The one exception was the civil liberties policy domain in the 74th House within which only 40 percent of the votes were correlated at or above .6. This finding provides a statistical basis, which is consistent with prior research (Sinclair, 1978a; 1982), for excluding the civil liberties policy domain in the 74th House from consideration.

The results also suggest several preliminary comments on the policy dimensional method of analysis. As shown in Table 7, the number of votes whose substantive content pertained to the five policy domains varied considerably across domains. In each of the nine Houses, more votes pertained the policy content profile of to the government management domain than any other. A single domain did not consistently include the least number of votes; rather, there was variation generally with each House. The results do not reveal whether the variation in the number of votes pertaining to different policy domains was a function of shifts in the political agenda or shifts in voting behavior. The latter is a possible explanation due to the standard
Table 7. Percentage of Votes Correlated in the Five Policy Domains in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
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<th>Assistance</th>
<th>Liberties</th>
<th>Involvement</th>
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<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>88.7(53)</td>
<td>93.5(31)</td>
<td>94.4(18)</td>
<td>66.7(9)</td>
<td>100.(9)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>92.8(69)</td>
<td>93.8(32)</td>
<td>94.1(17)</td>
<td>100.(12)</td>
<td>100.(30)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
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<td>96.6(29)</td>
<td>90.0(10)</td>
<td>100.(14)</td>
<td>94.1(34)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
<td>94.8(58)</td>
<td>100.(35)</td>
<td>93.8(16)</td>
<td>94.4(18)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>94.7(375)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>92.3(39)</td>
<td>95.8(95)</td>
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<td>91.5(94)</td>
<td>94.3(230)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The percentages reflect the proportion of votes classified in each policy domain that clustered at a similarity value of equal to or greater than .6. N is the total number of votes classified in each policy domain.
Table 8. Mean Yule's Q Coefficients For Votes Classified in the Five Policy Domains in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Civil</th>
<th>International</th>
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<td>.81</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.84</td>
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</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The statistic reported is the mean Yule's Q coefficient among votes per domain that clustered at a similarity value of equal to or greater than .6.
exclusion in dimensional analyses of votes that approach unity. The results do, however, reiterate the policy content foundation of the policy dimensional method of analysis. Specifically, given the results in Table 7, it is clear that the "major" dimensions discussed in policy dimensional analyses are major relative to other dimensions that appear within domains rather than major in some absolute sense.

The results in Table 8 indicate that among votes with a minimum Q-value of .6, the mean Q-coefficient ranged from a low of .75 in the agricultural assistance policy domain in the 95th House to a high of .98 in the civil liberties policy domain in the 84th House. As a rule, the mean Q-coefficient in each policy domain was relatively high. In most cases, votes within policy domains correlated at .8 and above.

Together, Tables 7 and 8 indicate that a relatively high proportion of the votes within each domain correlated at a relatively high level. They do not reveal, however, the structure of the correlations and thus the structure of voting within policy domains. To this end, I turn to the dimensional profiles.

Figures 3-5 present for each period respectively the number of major hierarchical clusters or policy dimensions that emerged in each policy domain as well as the percentage of votes clustered at .6 or above accounted for by these dimensions. The results suggest both similarities and
Figure 3. The Number of Major Policy Dimensions Formed in Policy Domains in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40) Congresses.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The vertical lines are the number of major policy dimensions in each policy domain for the 74th (1935-36), the 75th (1937-38), and the 76th (1939-40) Congresses, respectively. Major policy dimensions account for at least 10 percent of the total number votes clustered at .6 or above. The number above each line is the percentage of votes clustered at .6 or above in each policy domain accounted for by the major policy dimensions.
Figure 4. The Number of Major Policy Dimensions Formed in Policy Domains in the House of Representatives during the 84th-86th (1955-60) Congresses.

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The vertical lines are the number of major policy dimensions in each policy domain for the 84th (1955-56), the 85th (1957-58), and the 86th (1959-60) Congresses, respectively. Major policy dimensions account for at least 10 percent of the total number votes clustered at .6 or above. The number above each line is the percentage of votes clustered at .6 or above in each policy domain accounted for by the major policy dimensions.
Figure 5. The Number of Major Policy Dimensions Formed in Policy Domains in the House of Representatives during the 94th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Government Management</th>
<th>Social Welfare</th>
<th>Agricultural Assistance</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Internatl Involvement</th>
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<td>56.3</td>
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</tr>
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<td>83.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The vertical lines are the number of major policy dimensions in each policy domain for the 94th (1975-76), the 95th (1977-78), and the 96th (1979-80) Congresses, respectively. Major policy dimensions account for at least 10 percent of the total number votes clustered at .6 or above. The number above each line is the percentage of votes clustered at .6 or above in each policy domain accounted for by the major policy dimensions.
differences among the three periods.

The results in Figure 3 indicate that during the 1930s period, a relatively limited number of major policy dimensions formed in each policy domain. No domain in the any of the three Houses, however, was represented by a single major dimension. With one exception, the voting in each policy domain was defined by two or three major dimensions of voting. The exception was the international involvement domain of the 74th House within which four major dimensions of voting emerged.⁴

The results in Figure 3 also indicate that the major dimensions of voting within each policy domain in each House during the 1930s captured a relatively high percentage of the votes hierarchically clustered. The lowest percentage of votes accounted for by the major policy dimensions was 69.6 percent in the government management domain of the 76th House. In all other cases, major dimensions accounted for more than 70 percent of the votes clustered in each policy domain. In three domains at different time points -- agricultural assistance in the 74th and 76th House, civil liberties in the 75th and 76th House, and international involvement in the 75th House -- the major dimensions accounted for 100 percent of the votes clustered.

During the 1930s period, then, a relatively limited number of major policy dimensions captured a relatively high proportion of the votes clustered in each domain. This pattern was even more evident in the 1950s period, as
indicated by the results presented in Figure 4.

The results in Figure 4 show that, as with the earlier period, a relatively limited number of major policy dimensions formed in each policy domain. During the 1950s, voting within policy domains was represented by a single major dimension in the government management domain of the 85th House, the agricultural assistance domain of the 84th House and the civil liberties domain of the 84th and the 85th House. With three exceptions, each policy domain in each House was defined by three or fewer major policy dimensions. The exceptions were the social welfare domain of the 84th House and the international involvement domain of the 84th and the 86th House, all of which were defined by four major dimensions of voting.

The results in Figure 4 also indicate that with one exception the major dimensions of voting in each domain in each House during the 1950s accounted for a relatively high proportion of the votes hierarchically clustered. The exception was the government management domain of the 85th House in which a single dimension captured only 37.5 percent of the votes clustered. In the agricultural assistance and the civil liberties domains, the major policy dimensions accounted for 100 percent of the votes clustered in each of the three Houses. Indeed, a single major dimension captured 100 percent of clustered votes in the agricultural assistance domain of the 84th House and the civil liberties domain of both the 84th and 85th House. The major policy
dimensions in the social welfare domain of the 84th House and the international involvement domain of both the 84th and the 85th House likewise accounted for 100 percent of the votes clustered.

The results in Figures 3 and 4 indicate, then, that the 1930s and the 1950s were similar in two respects. First, each policy domain included a relatively small number of major clusters or policy dimensions. In both periods, four was the maximum number of major policy dimensions per domain, four being the exception rather than the rule. Second, the group of major policy dimensions within each policy domain accounted for a relatively high proportion of the votes hierarchically clustered, the one exception being government management in the 85th House. In three policy domains at different time points in both periods, the major policy dimensions accounted for the total number of votes hierarchically clustered.

In both respects, the 1950s proved an exaggeration of the 1930s. During the 1950s, voting patterns in the agricultural assistance domain of the 84th House and the civil liberties domain of the 84th and the 85th House were represented by a single major dimension that accounted for 100 percent of the votes clustered. During the 1930s, a single major dimension of voting did not appear in any of the five domains. Further, during the 1950s, the major policy dimensions in four of the five domains accounted for 100 percent of the votes clustered. In two of the domains
-- agricultural assistance and civil liberties -- the relation obtained in all three Houses. During the 1930s, the major policy dimensions in but three of the policy domains accounted at one time or another for 100 percent of the votes clustered. As well, in only the civil liberties domain was the relation consistent across the Houses examined.

While the patterns for the 1930s appeared more pronounced during the 1950s, the similarities between the two periods are more prominent than the dissimilarities. In both periods, a relatively limited number of major policy dimensions accounted for a relatively high proportion of the votes hierarchically clustered. In other words, the structure of voting patterns within policy domains in both periods was fairly well defined by the major policy dimensions. In this respect, the 1970s proved a marked contrast, as indicated by the results presented in Figure 5.

The results in Figure 5 indicate that only the government management domain of the 94th House and the civil liberties domain of the 95th House were represented by a single major policy dimension. As evident in the agricultural assistance domain of the 95th House, the maximum number of policy dimensions formed in a single domain increased during the period. More striking, vis a vis the earlier two periods, major policy dimensions in each domain accounted for a generally lower percentage of the clustered votes. The difference was especially substantial
in three of the five policy domains: government management, social welfare, and international involvement. In the government management domain, major policy dimensions accounted for at most 41.3 percent of the clustered votes. The low was 28.5 percent. In the social welfare domain, major policy dimensions accounted for at most 63.9 percent, the low being 31.6 percent. Last, major policy dimensions in the international involvement domain accounted for at most 59.9 percent, the least being 34.4 percent. The decrease was most severe, then, in the government management domain.

While voting in the agricultural assistance and civil liberties domains was fairly well represented by the major policy dimensions, the number of major policy dimensions in both domains increased vis-à-vis the earlier two periods. The exception to the rule was the agricultural assistance domain of the 94th House, which was defined by two major dimensions. In this case, however, the two major dimensions accounted for but 56.3 percent of the votes clustered. The dissimilarity between the 1970s and the earlier two periods is shown in Table 9, which presents results on the average percentage of clustered votes accounted for by the major policy dimensions in each period.

The results in Table 9 show that a smaller percentage of clustered votes was captured by major policy dimensions during the 1970s in all of the five policy domains. The decrease was most dramatic in the social welfare and
Table 9. Average Percentage of Votes in Major Policy Dimensions in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
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<th>Civil</th>
<th>International</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th-76th</td>
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<td>96.6</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>92.8</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: Major policy dimensions are defined as hierarchical clusters of votes that account for at least 10 percent of the total number of votes clustered at or above .6.
international involvement domains. During the 1950s, major policy dimensions in the social welfare domain accounted on the average for 92.8 percent of clustered votes. During the 1970s, they accounted on the average for but 50.2 percent. Similarly, during the 1950s, major policy dimensions in the international involvement domain accounted on the average for 91.7 percent of hierarchically clustered votes. During the 1970s, they accounted on the average for less than half the votes clustered. The results indicate as well that even in the policy domains where major dimensions accounted for a relatively high proportion of clustered votes during the 1970s, i.e., agricultural assistance and civil liberties, the percentages were lower vis a vis the 1950s.

To some degree the averages obscure the exaggeration of the 1930s pattern in the 1950s. Relative to the earlier period, virtually no change appeared during the 1950s in three of the domains: agricultural assistance, civil liberties, and international involvement. The only clear increase occurred in the social welfare domain where the percentage rose from an average of 84.1 during the 1930s to an average of 92.8 during the 1950s. The only within-domain trend occurred in government management. In that case, major dimensions of voting accounted for a lesser percentage of clustered votes across the three periods. The trend obtains even when the 85th House, in which one major dimension accounted for but 37.5 percent of clustered votes, is excluded from the average. Based on the percentages of the
84th and 86th House, the average is 66.6 percent.

In sum, while the dissimilarities between the 1930s and the 1950s were less remarkable than the similarities, the dissimilarities between the 1970s and the earlier two periods were stark. During the 1970s, major policy dimensions accounted for a substantially lower proportion of clustered votes in three domains: government management, social welfare, and international involvement. In the other two domains, the number of major policy dimensions increased vis-à-vis the earlier two periods and, despite the proliferation, the major dimensions accounted on the average for a lesser percentage of clustered votes. On the whole, then, voting within policy domains during the 1970s was far less well-defined by major policy dimensions.

The results presented in Table 10 complete the dimensional profiles of voting patterns in the three periods. The percentages indicate the proportion of votes in major policy dimensions included in the largest cluster of votes in each domain. Therefore, they provide information on the relative size of the largest cluster of votes.

Given the emphasis in prior dimensional analyses on the limited number of "major" dimensions of voting, perhaps the most striking aspect of the results presented in Table 10 concerns the varying proportion of votes represented by the largest cluster of votes within each policy domain. This variation obtained both within and across periods. The
Table 10. The Relative Size of the Largest Policy Dimension in the Five Policy Domains in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Civil</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
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<td>86.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>82.3</td>
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<td>75.6</td>
<td>92.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th</td>
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<td>55.0</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17.2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>62.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The size reported for each dimension is the percentage of votes in major policy dimensions (per domain) accounted for by the largest policy dimension.
proportion of votes in major policy dimensions included in the largest cluster of votes reached a low of 17.2 percent in the agricultural assistance policy domain of the 95th House. During the 1930s period, the largest cluster of votes in three policy domains -- government management, social welfare, and civil liberties -- accounted for less than half the votes clustered in major policy dimensions. The same occurred during the 1950s in the social welfare domain of the 84th House and in the international involvement domain in all three Houses as did it during the 1970s in three domains: social welfare, agricultural assistance, and civil liberties.

In this context, these results suggest that congressional voting alignments during the post-New Deal decades have been more variegated than even the dimensional analysts would contend. As well, they imply that analyses of "major" dimensions of voting discuss in many cases a highly limited proportion of votes. In short, "major" dimensions of voting do not appear quite as major as the dimensional analysts would lead us to believe.

Despite the overall variation, the results in Table 10 confirm and magnify the patterns observed earlier. Indeed, they cannot be interpreted properly without consideration of the results pertaining to the prior component of the dimensional profiles. The importance of considering the interrelationship between the two components of the dimensional profile is most relevant in the case of single
policy dimensions. The results above suggest a major difference between the single dimensions evident in policy domains of the 1950s and those of the 1970s. Namely, the former accounted for a high and sometimes the total number of hierarchically clustered votes. The latter did not. Not only is there concern, then, with the relative size of the largest cluster of votes, there is concern with the relationship of that cluster to voting in the larger domain, that is, unless we wish to say that voting in the civil liberties domain of the 1950s was comparable to voting in the social welfare domain of the 95th House, which clearly it was not. The discussion below takes this consideration into account.

During the 1930s, the largest policy dimension in four of the five policy domains accounted on the average for at least 50 percent of the votes in major policy dimensions. The one exception was the social welfare domain which accounted for 49.7 percent. Given that each domain in the 1930s was defined by at least two and more frequently three major policy dimensions, these results indicate that the largest cluster of votes within each policy domain was on the average quite prominent in or representative of the voting patterns within the particular policy domains. Since the major dimensions accounted for a relatively high percentage of clustered votes within policy domains during the 1930s period and the largest cluster of votes within the policy domains accounted for a relatively high proportion of
the votes in major dimensions, it follows that a relatively primary cluster of votes defined voting patterns in policy domains of the 1930s. Therefore, voting during the 1930s was relatively structured within policy domains by a single dimension of voting.

During the 1950s, the largest cluster of votes in four of the five policy domains (the exception being international involvement) included on the average a higher proportion of votes in the major policy dimensions. The average for government management is skewed by the single major dimension in the 85th House that accounted for only 37.5 percent of the clustered votes. When the 85th House is excluded, the percentage drops to 73.5. Thus the relation obtains even when the deviation is accounted for.

The increases in the four policy domains during the 1950s indicate that the largest cluster of votes became more representative of the voting behavior within policy domains. Since the major policy dimensions during the 1950s accounted in most cases for an even greater percentage of clustered votes within policy domains and the largest cluster of votes accounted for an even greater percentage of votes in the major policy dimensions, it follows that an even more primary (vis a vis the 1930s) cluster of votes defined voting patterns in policy domains of the 1950s. In general, then, the results indicate that the pattern observed for the 1930s strengthened in the 1950s.

During the 1970s, the largest cluster of votes in two
policy domains -- agricultural assistance and civil liberties -- included on the average a substantially lower percentage of the votes in major policy dimensions. The decrease was especially dramatic for the civil liberties domain. There, the average dropped from 92.2 percent during the 1950s to 43.8 percent during the 1970s. In the latter period, the average for the government management domain and the social welfare domain are skewed, again due to the single major dimensions of voting in the two domains that represented, respectively, but 28.5 and 31.6 percent of the clustered votes. When these two dimensions are excluded from the averages, the average for government management reduces to 53.2 percent and the average for social welfare reduces to 44.2 percent. Accounting for the skewness, then, reveals that the largest cluster of votes in an additional two domains included a markedly less substantial number of the votes in the major policy dimensions.

The results of the second component of the dimensional profile magnify the differences between the 1970s and the earlier two periods. The first component showed that major policy dimensions in three policy domains during the 1970s accounted for a substantially fewer number of hierarchically clustered votes. As well, it showed that in the other two domains the number of major policy dimensions increased but that the greater number of dimensions still failed to account for a proportion of clustered votes comparable to the earlier two periods. This component indicates that the
relative size of the largest cluster of votes within four of the domains decreased relative to the earlier two periods. Therefore, since the major policy dimensions during the 1970s accounted in most cases for a smaller percentage of clustered votes within policy domains and the largest cluster of votes accounted for a lesser percentage of votes in the major policy dimensions, it follows that voting patterns within policy domains during the 1970s were not defined by a primary cluster of votes.

Within the larger context of variation discussed earlier, then, the completed dimensional profiles imply basic transitions between the three periods. During the 1930s, voting patterns within policy domains were relatively well defined by the major policy dimensions. Among the major policy dimensions, a single dimension of voting was relatively primary. Therefore, voting patterns with policy domains during the 1930s were relatively well represented by a single major dimension of voting. During the 1950s, voting patterns within policy domains were relatively more defined by the major policy dimensions. Among the major policy dimensions, a single dimension of voting was relatively more primary. Therefore, voting patterns within policy domains during the 1950s were relatively better represented by a single major dimension of voting. Finally, during the 1970s, voting patterns within policy domains were relatively undefined by major policy dimensions. Among the major policy dimensions, the primacy of a single dimension
of voting was markedly less evident. Therefore, voting patterns within policy domains during the 1970s were relatively amorphous and fluid.

**Voting Alignments and Public Policy**

The analysis concludes with an examination of the voting alignments associated with the largest cluster of votes within each domain. As already noted, alignments are examined in terms of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. Table 11 presents party vote scores that have been tabulated across the votes in the largest policy dimension in each policy domain for the nine Houses. The results indicate rather explicit differences in the three periods.

During the 1930s period, voting on four of the five policy dimensions was characterized by high interparty conflict, the exception being the civil liberties policy dimension. On the social welfare and agricultural assistance dimensions, 100 percent of the votes found party majorities opposed to each other in all three Houses. The level of interparty conflict on the government management and the international involvement dimensions was hardly less substantial. As a rule, more than 90 percent of votes in the four dimensions during all three Houses were characterized by interparty conflict.

During the 1950s period, the average percentage of interparty conflict votes declined in all four dimensions. The decrease was especially dramatic in the international
Table 11. Party Vote Scores on Policy Dimensions in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Civil</th>
<th>International</th>
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<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
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<td>100.</td>
<td>100.</td>
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<td>95.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th</td>
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<td>100.</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>91.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>100.</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th</td>
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<td>89.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>90.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th</td>
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</tr>
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<td>95th</td>
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<td>42.9</td>
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<td>84.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: The percentages reflect the number of votes in the largest policy dimension (per domain) on which a majority of the Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans.
involvement dimension. There, interparty conflict declined from an average of 91.0 percent during the 1930s to an average of 10.8 percent during the 1950s. While a decline vis a vis the 1930s was evident in voting on the other three dimensions -- government management, social welfare, and agricultural assistance -- interparty conflict remained relatively high. On all three dimensions the average percentage of interparty conflict votes was above 90 percent. As well, there was somewhat of an increase in interparty conflict in the civil liberties dimension. The increase vis a vis the 1930s was less notable, though, than the general lack of interparty conflict on the dimension in all three Houses. Voting on both the civil liberties and the international involvement dimensions was characterized consistently by relatively low levels of interparty conflict, the lack of interparty conflict being more dramatic in the latter. Thus, during the 1950s, voting on the government management, social welfare, and agricultural assistance was distinguished from voting on the civil liberties and the international involvement dimensions. The former were consistently characterized by a high level of interparty conflict and the latter were consistently characterized by a low level of interparty conflict.

During the 1970s, there was little change in the level of interparty conflict on the government management dimension. On the social welfare dimension, the average percentage of interparty conflict dropped from 92.3 during
the 1950s to 81.9 during the 1970s. The decrease in the percentage of interparty conflict votes on the agricultural assistance dimension was even sharper. There, the average percentage dropped from 90.2 during the 1950s to 59.9 during the 1970s. In contrast, interparty conflict increased in both the civil liberties and the international involvement dimensions. Over the period, roughly two-thirds of the votes on both dimensions were characterized by party conflict. On the international involvement dimension, the level of interparty conflict increased with each House. By the 96th House, it approached 90 percent.

In sum, the voting alignments during the 1930s associated with different policy dimensions were with one exception characterized by high interparty conflict. Based on these results, then, the voting alignments associated with four of the five policy dimensions were not distinguishable from one another. This was not the case in either the 1950s and 1970s. In both the latter periods, levels of interparty conflict were lower and began to vary with policy dimensions. During the 1950s, the level of interparty conflict dropped in the four dimensions. As well, the voting alignments on three of the dimensions became distinguishable from the voting alignments on the other two. During the 1970s, the level of interparty conflict remained relatively unchanged on one dimension, decreased on two, and increased on another two. The increases in interparty conflict notwithstanding, the
profile of voting alignments across policy dimensions during the 1970s resembled the 1950s far more than the 1930s. The general result of the changes between the 1950s and the 1970s was that voting alignments on three dimensions again were distinguished from voting alignments on the other two, the former being associated with relatively moderate levels of interparty conflict and the latter being associated with relatively high levels of interparty conflict.

Table 12 presents the average level of cohesion in the two parties across votes in the largest policy dimension in each policy domain. These results sharpen the contrast between the three periods.

The results indicate that during the 1930s period, intraparty cohesion was relatively high in both parties across policy dimensions, with the exception of the Democratic Party on the civil liberties dimension. These results, when coupled with the results on interparty conflict, indicate that during the 1930s the congressional parties were relatively cohesive and opposed across four of the five policy dimensions.

As a rule, the parties were less cohesive on votes in the 1950s than in the 1930s across all policy dimensions, with the exception of Democrats on the government management dimension. Voting on the government management and social welfare dimensions became distinguishable during the 1950s by the lower level of cohesion in both parties on the social welfare dimension. No substantial difference in cohesion
Table 12. Party Cohesion on Policy Dimensions in the House of Representatives during the 74th-76th (1935-40), the 84th-86th (1955-60), and the 95th-96th (1975-80) Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Government Management</th>
<th>Social Welfare</th>
<th>Agricultural Assistance</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Involvement Internatl.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>91.9</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>94.8</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>87.8</td>
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<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>84th</td>
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<td>76.6</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>67.0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
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<td>79.9</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>74.2</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>86.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>81.0</td>
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<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
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<td>76.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th</td>
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<td>85.0</td>
<td>84.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>85.4</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author based on data made available by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies.

Notes: Cohesion scores reported are the mean percentage of Democratic and Republican membership, respectively, that voted together on votes in the largest policy dimension in each domain.
levels distinguished voting on the government management dimension from voting on the agricultural assistance dimension. The civil liberties dimension found the Democratic Party fragmented and the Republican Party relatively cohesive. In contrast, both parties were relatively fragmented on the international involvement dimension. These results, when considered in conjunction with the party vote scores, indicate that on the civil liberties dimension a fragmented Democratic party majority tended to vote with a relatively cohesive Republican party majority. This was in contrast to voting on the international involvement dimension, which found relatively fragmented majorities of both parties voting together. During the 1950s, then, voting alignments were indistinguishable only for the government management and agricultural assistance policy dimensions. Both dimensions were characterized by a relatively high level of interparty conflict and a relatively high level of intraparty cohesion in both parties.

In the 1970s, party cohesion declined on the government management dimension in both parties, though more so in the Democratic Party. In contrast, cohesion rose in both parties on the social welfare dimension. The high intraparty cohesion in both parties associated with voting on the agricultural assistance dimension during the earlier two periods disappeared during the 1970s. Coupled with the party vote scores, these results indicate that during the
1970s the agricultural assistance dimension was no longer characterized by cohesive and opposed party blocs. The results also indicate that while interparty conflict rose during the 1970s on the civil liberties and international involvement dimensions, both parties were on the average relatively fragmented on both dimensions. Though party majorities conflicted more often during the 1970s on these dimensions, they were fragmented rather than cohesive in their opposition. In general, an increase in interparty conflict on one dimension during the 1970s was compensated by a decrease in intraparty cohesion on another.

In sum, the results indicate substantial differences in the character of voting alignments in the three periods. The 1930s found the parties cohesive and opposed on four of the five policy dimensions. In contrast, four types of voting alignments were distinguishable during the 1950s. On both the government management and the agricultural assistance dimensions, the parties remained relatively cohesive and opposed. On the social welfare dimension, the level of interparty conflict remained high; however, cohesion in both parties dropped vis a vis the 1930s. Thus the social welfare dimension saw relatively fragmented party majorities opposing each other. On the civil liberties dimension, a relatively fragmented Democratic party majority tended to concur with a relatively cohesive Republican party majority. In contrast, the international involvement dimension was characterized by fragmented party majorities.
that were consensual. By the 1970s, voting on three policy dimensions -- agricultural assistance, civil liberties, and international involvement -- were characterized by moderate levels of interparty conflict. This resulted from a decrease vis a vis the 1950s in interparty conflict on agricultural assistance and increases in interparty conflict on the civil liberties and international involvement dimensions. On the agricultural assistance and civil liberties dimensions, both parties were relatively fragmented. On the international involvement dimension, only the Democratic Party was relatively fragmented. On both the government management and social welfare dimensions, the parties were more cohesive and conflictual relative to the other three dimensions. Relative to the 1950s, however, intraparty cohesion in the two parties decreased on the government management dimension and interparty conflict decreased on the social welfare dimension.

In general, voting alignments associated with different policy dimensions were least distinguishable during the 1930s, most distinguishable during the 1950s, and moderately distinguishable during the 1970s. On the whole, the shifts that occurred across periods in the character of voting alignments on the policy dimensions proved a direct parallel to the changes that occurred in the aggregate levels of intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. In this respect, the longitudinal relation between voting alignments
and policy dimensions reflected but the decay of the partisan cleavage in microcosm.

Summary

The combined reliance on the party voting approach and the policy content approach has provided a most interesting perspective on the longitudinal character of House voting alignments in the post-New Deal era. The results of both approaches have indicated that House voting alignments have been generally variegated throughout the period. However, within the context of this variation, there is substantial evidence of change.

The single most important finding of the analysis concerns the relation between the weakening of the partisan cleavage and the increasing fragmentation of House voting alignments. The decay of the partisan cleavage is evident in both the results on the collective voting behavior of the congressional parties and the results on the voting alignments associated with different policy dimensions. Indeed, the decreases in the strength of the partisan cleavage on particular policy dimensions were but pieces of the more general trend. The increasing fragmentation of House voting alignments is evident when the dimensional profiles are juxtaposed with the dimensional analysis of voting alignments.

The juxtaposition reveals that during the 1930s voting within policy domains was relatively well represented by a
primary dimension of voting within each domain. In four of the five domains, the voting alignment associated with this dimension was characterized by cohesive and opposed party blocs. Thus a single highly partisan voting alignment characterized voting patterns across four of the five policy domains. During the 1950s, voting within policy domains was even better represented by a single dimension of voting. However, four distinguishable alignments corresponding to different policy domains emerged. Only in two policy domains was the partisan cleavage still strong. Thus the general character of House voting alignments was more differentiated in the 1950s than the 1930s. During the 1970s, voting within policy domains was markedly undefined by a single major dimension of voting, as evidenced by the proliferation of major policy dimensions, their relative failure to capture a high proportion of clustered votes, and the reduction in the relative size of the largest clusters of votes. Rather, voting within policy domains during the 1970s was highly amorphous and fluid. Therefore, the general character of House voting alignments was even more differentiated and fragmented during the 1970s than during the 1950s.
Notes

1 The term, "post-New Deal," is used in the analysis to indicate the years following the initial implementation of the New Deal package after Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1932. Some scholars view the New Deal realignment as continuing into the late 1930s and thus encompassing the 74th and the 75th Congresses. On the New Deal realignment period, see Key (1955), Burnham (1970), Sinclair (1977c), and Sundquist (1973).

2 The rise evident with the 1970s in the number of votes is partially the result of teller votes, which began to be recorded for the first time in the 1970s. The impact of teller voting on the results of this analysis is discussed in the next chapter.

3 In the remainder of the text, references to "clustered votes" mean votes clustered at or above .6.

4 This analysis defined major policy dimensions for the international involvement domain during the 74th and the 75th House, which differs from previous research (e.g., Sinclair, 1978; 1981a; 1982). The votes on these dimensions dealt mainly with U. S. participation in international conferences and national defense. Therefore, there appeared to be no statistical or substantive reason to exclude these dimensions from consideration.

5 In the social welfare domain of the 85th House, the two major policy dimensions were the same size. The policy dimension used in the analysis of alignments dealt with HEW appropriations.

6 Dimensional analysts have tended to emphasize the importance of constituency and regional factors rather than party in their discussion of voting on the agricultural assistance dimension (e.g., Clausen, 1973; Sinclair, 1981; 1982). In this respect, the results presented here contrast the standard conclusions drawn in dimensional analyses. For a perspective on the interrelationship between party, region, and constituency during the 1950s, see Mayhew (1966).
CHAPTER 5

Change and Stability After the New Deal

Summary and Discussion

Combined, the results of the party voting approach and the policy content approach provide an integrated profile of the character of House voting alignments during the three periods. As well, they verify the limitations of an exclusive reliance on either approach to an evaluation of longitudinal change in the character of legislative voting alignments.

An Integrated Profile of House Voting Alignments

The party voting approach and the policy content approach have yielded both common and complementary results on the character of House voting alignments during the three periods. First, I shall consider the commonalities.

The results of both approaches imply that the specific contours of House voting alignments have been highly variegated in each of the three periods. This is reflected in the results of the party voting approach by the consistently high standard deviations around the mean level of intraparty cohesion in both parties on both interparty consensus and interparty conflict votes. It is reflected in the results of the policy content approach by the number of
major dimensions defined in policy domains and the proportional sizes of the largest policy dimensions.

The results of both approaches likewise imply basic differences in the character of House voting during the three periods. This is reflected in the results of the party voting approach by the differences in the character of intraparty and interparty relations during the three periods. It is reflected in the results of the policy content approach by the differences in the degree to which major policy dimensions accounted for the voting patterns that occurred within policy domains and by the differences in the voting alignments associated with the largest policy dimension within policy domains.

The results of both approaches also imply that the differences among the three periods have been progressive or trend-like. This is reflected in the results of the party voting approach by the consistent decreases in the level of interparty conflict across the three periods; 2) the consistent decreases in the level of intraparty cohesion in both parties on interparty conflict votes across the three periods, and 3) the consistent increases in the level of intraparty cohesion in both parties on interparty consensus votes. It is reflected in the results of the policy content approach by the increasing differentiation of the voting patterns associated with policy domains.

Finally, the results of both approaches imply the decay of the partisan cleavage. This is reflected in the results
of the party voting approach by the progressive decline across the three periods of cohesive and opposed party behavior in the aggregate. It is reflected in the results of the policy content approach by the progressive disappearance across the three periods of cohesive and opposed party behavior on specific policy dimensions.

The commonalities in the results of the two approaches suggest that the character of House voting alignments in the post-New Deal era has included elements of both stability and change. Voting alignments have been stable in the sense that throughout the era they have been highly variegated. One characteristic, in other words, has been that voting alignments in all three periods have tended to vary with each vote. Specifically, the results imply that sometimes individuals vote with the majority of their party. Other times, they do not. Similarly, individual alliances form on one aspect of legislation and reform on another, even within the same broadly defined policy area. Without results on individual voting behavior, it is impossible to determine whether this variegation is patterned or random. Given the shifts in the character of alignments during the three periods, it would be interesting to examine whether and to what degree individual voting patterns shifted or dispersed during the three periods. In general, though, continuity in the character of House voting alignments in the three periods gains definition from the variegation of House voting alignments in each of the three.
If the results of both approaches imply that House voting alignments have remained consistently variegated, and this variegation may be interpreted as evidence of stability or continuity, they likewise imply that change has been at least equally characteristic. In this respect, the complementary aspects of the results of the two approaches are revealing.

The results of the party voting approach have implied that the salience of the partisan cleavage has weakened with each period. This is evident in the results on the character of intraparty and interparty relations. During the 1930s, party majorities conflicted more often than they concurred. They not only conflicted more often than they concurred, they conflicted more often than they concurred in the other two periods. As well, party cohesion in both parties was higher in the 1930s when party majorities conflicted than when they concurred. Party cohesion was not only higher when party majorities conflicted, it was higher than when party majorities conflicted in the other two periods. The 1950s were characterized by a decrease in interparty conflict and a decrease in party cohesion in both parties on interparty conflict votes. The 1970s were characterized by a further decrease in interparty conflict and a further decrease in party cohesion in both parties on interparty conflict votes. The changes in both intraparty relations and interparty relations resulted in a substantially different profile of the collective voting
behavior of the congressional parties in the last period. During the 1970s, party majorities concurred more often than they conflicted and party cohesion was higher when they concurred than when they conflicted. On votes where there was interparty conflict, the conflict occurred most often between fragmented party majorities.

It would be difficult to construct more straightforward evidence of the decay of the partisan cleavage. The strength of the inference is based not only on change in the character of interparty relations. Nor is it based only on change in the character of intraparty relations. It is important, in this regard, to recall that either alone would provide some evidence of the weakening of the partisan cleavage. The salience of the partisan cleavage is contingent on the degree to which both parties are cohesive and opposed voting blocs. Therefore, if interparty conflict alone had decreased across the three periods, a case could be made that the salience of the partisan cleavage had weakened. Similarly, if intraparty cohesion in either party had decreased across the three periods, a case could be made that the salience of the partisan cleavage had weakened.

The results of the party voting approach have indicated, however, that interparty conflict declined and that intraparty cohesion in both parties declined on interparty conflict votes. Therefore, the strength of the inference is grounded in the evidence that the interrelationship between intraparty relations and interparty relations indicative of
the salience of the partisan cleavage has unraveled, has unraveled, moreover, progressively.

The results of the policy content approach imply that the relation between voting alignments and public policy has become more differentiated with each period. This is evident in the results on the dimensional profiles of voting patterns within policy domains and the character of voting alignments associated with specific policy dimensions.

During the 1930s, voting within policy domains was relatively well-defined by major policy dimensions. As well, the largest of the dimensions in each policy domain was relatively dominant or primary. In four of the five policy domains, the alignment associated with the largest policy dimension in each domain was characterized by a high level of interparty conflict and intraparty cohesion in both parties. During the 1930s, then, dimensions of voting, as they are conventionally known in this literature, were not for the most part discernible. Rather, the same voting alignment obtained across at least four of the five policy areas. In a policy content sense, there was no relation between policy and voting alignments. There was variation in policy, to be sure, but the only variation in voting alignments occurred on the civil liberties dimension. On this rationale, the relation between voting alignments and public policy was largely undifferentiated or undefined.

During the 1950s, voting within policy domains was even better defined by major policy dimension. Moreover, the
largest policy dimension within each domain was relatively more dominant or primary. In the 1950s, though, the alignment associated with the largest policy dimension in each domain varied across policy domains. In policy content terms, there amounted to four major dimensions of voting, each of which corresponded to a different policy area. There was in the 1950s, then, covariation between policy and voting alignments. On this rationale, the relation between voting alignments and policy became differentiable.

In the 1970s, voting within policy domains was relatively undefined by the major policy dimensions. Further, the largest policy dimension within each domain was relatively less dominant and hardly primary. Finally, the clarity of the difference in the voting alignments associated with different policy dimensions diminished. All were to varying degrees characterized by conflict between fragmented party majorities.

With regard to the voting patterns exhibited within policy domains during the 1970s, recall for the moment that the results on the Yule's Q coefficients revealed that there was no substantial difference between the 1970s and the earlier two periods in either the mean inter-correlation of votes within each policy domain or the proportion of votes within each policy domain that correlated above the cutoff criterion. It is not that the level of correlation shifted, it is that the structure of the inter-correlations shifted. Smaller sets of votes were highly correlated, resulting in a
high number of small clusters. This is the corollary to the failure of major policy dimensions during the 1970s to capture a comparable proportion of hierarchically clustered votes. As well, it is the corollary to the proportionally smaller size of the largest policy dimensions. Voting with policy domains, in other words, was to large degree characterized by a multitude of small policy dimensions, the direct implication being that coalitions and thus alignments shifted across votes a great deal more than in the 1950s, the difference between the 1970s and the 1930s being as night and day.

The implication is that voting within policy domains became more fluid and amorphous, alignments became more issue-specific and ad hoc. On this rationale, the relation between voting alignments public policy became more differentiated. In that the pattern of increasing differentiation occurred in each policy domain, it follows that the general character of congressional voting alignments in the 1970s became more differentiated.

Together, the results of the policy content approach and the party voting approach suggest the co-occurrence of the weakening partisan cleavage and the increasing differentiation of legislative voting alignments.¹ Thus the character of change in House voting alignments across the three periods would appear represented by two parallel or dual trends. However, the results of the party voting aproach suggest an additional perspective on the character
of longitudinal change. Specifically, they point to an increase in the overall level of consensus within the House. This is reflected in the results concerning the consistent increases across the three periods in the proportion of interparty consensus votes on which both parties were highly cohesive. With these results considered, change in post-New Deal alignments has three faces: greater unity, party decline, and increasing fragmentation.

The Two Approaches Reevaluated

The relation between the decline of the partisan cleavage, the increase in unity or consensus, and the movement toward greater differentiation shown in the results of this analysis reiterates the limitations of an exclusive reliance on either the party voting approach or the policy content approach, even as modified here. While the party voting approach yielded evidence on the general decline in the salience of the partisan cleavage and the increase in consensus, it did not capture the movement toward greater differentiation. Although the policy content approach yielded evidence indicating the decay of the partisan cleavage on specific policy dimensions and evidence on the movement toward greater differentiation, it did not reflect the general decay of the partisan cleavage nor the movement toward greater unity. Indeed, since unanimous and near-unanimous votes are routinely excluded from policy dimensional analyses, the policy content approach dismisses any changes in unity from the outset.
Though both approaches, when modified, fall short of capturing the fuller profile of the differences in the character of voting alignments during the three periods, an unmodified policy content approach would have fallen shorter than an unmodified party voting approach. Specifically, the combined use of the party vote score at the 50 percent level and the party unity score revealed that the level of interparty conflict had declined across the three periods and that the level of intraparty cohesion in both parties declined erratically on interparty conflict votes across the three periods. Based on these results alone, there was evidence of a general decline in the salience of the partisan cleavage. Therefore, an unmodified party voting approach would have captured at least a crude indication of one important aspect of longitudinal change. As the results of the unmodified policy content approach are conventionally discussed, there would have been only remarks on the shifting levels of support on the largest policy dimension in each of the five policy domains. Therefore, an unmodified policy content approach would not have discerned the decay of the partisan cleavage across policy domains. Nor would it have discerned the increasing differentiation of voting patterns within policy domains. Most certainly, it would have not have discerned in the last period the greater differentiation in the general character of congressional voting alignments.

In general, the results confirm the conceptual
limitations of the policy content approach. Based on the results of the modified policy dimensional method alone, it is clear that "policy dimensions of voting," as they are conventionally presented in the literature, more validly represent the structure of congressional voting alignments sometimes than others. As the results indicated, the only period in which a limited number of "major" dimensions of voting corresponding to broad policy areas appeared was the 1950s. In the 1930s, major dimensions of voting were largely one and the same and in the 1970s major dimensions of voting were no longer major.

This is not to dismiss the deficiencies of the conventional methodology associated with the party voting approach. Quite clearly, the unmodified party voting approach would not have captured the movement toward unity or consensus. As well, the unmodified party voting approach obscured changes in the relation between intraparty cohesion and interparty conflict. As the results of the modified party voting approach showed, changes across the three periods in the character of intraparty cohesion varied with the character of interparty relations. The proportion of interparty consensus votes that found both parties highly cohesive increased consistently with each period. In contrast, the proportion of interparty conflict votes that found both parties lacking high cohesion decreased consistently across the three periods. In the sense that it obscured the nexus of intraparty and interparty relations,
the unmodified party voting approach failed to capture a more subtle pattern revealed by the modified party voting approach. That is, the salient changes in intraparty cohesion that occurred across periods on interparty conflict votes and interparty consensus votes occurred in both parties. At a minimum, this suggests that the changes in the relation between voting behavior within the parties and voting behavior between the parties is far more complex that has been previously assumed.

**The General Contours of Change**

The results of the party voting approach and the policy content approach suggest a broad correspondence between the general contours of congressional voting alignments in the three periods and three of the four scenarios described in the second chapter. In addition, they provide a perspective on the deficiency of the four scenarios as representations of longitudinal change.

**The Four Scenarios**

The relation of House voting alignments during the 1930s is to the first scenario, in which a relatively limited number of discrete interests and preferences related to one another in a relatively reinforcing pattern that was captured by cohesive and opposed party blocs. The relation of voting alignments in the 1930s to this scenario is suggested by the 1) relative salience of the partisan cleavage in the aggregate; 2) the degree to which a
relatively primary dimension of voting was discernible in each policy domain, and 3) the invariance of the voting alignments associated with the primary dimensions of voting across policy domains, each of which proved highly partisan.

The relation of House voting alignments during the 1950s is to the third scenario, in which a relatively limited number of discrete interests and preferences related to one another in a relatively cross-cutting pattern such that majority and minority preference clusters shifted across policy areas. The relation of House voting alignments in the 1950s to this scenario is suggested by 1) the relative decline of the salience of the partisan cleavage in the aggregate; 2) the degree to which a relatively primary dimension of voting was discernible in each policy domain, and 3) the variance of the voting alignments associated with the primary dimensions of voting across policy domains.

The relation of voting alignments in the 1970s is to the fourth scenario, in which a relatively manifold number of discrete interests and preferences related to one another in a relatively cross-cutting pattern such that majority and minority preference clusters became more differentiated and variable. The relation of voting alignments in the 1970s to this scenario is suggested by 1) the further weakening of the partisan cleavage and 2) the degree to which primary dimensions of voting were less discernible in policy domains.
On the whole, the results suggest that the longitudinal course of change in House voting alignments during the post-New Deal era has been toward greater differentiation. This is explicit in the movement from the first scenario, in which majority and minority preference clusters are largely undifferentiated, to the third scenario, in which majority and minority preference clusters are differentiable but limited, and from the third scenario to the fourth scenario, in which majority and minority preference clusters are differentiated and manifold. Equally important, as I shall argue shortly, the results suggest that the movement toward greater differentiation has varied directly with the general decline in the salience of the partisan cleavage.

The results also suggest a deficiency in the four scenarios of longitudinal change. As a group, the four scenarios account for changes in the basis of division in the legislature and not changes in the level of division in the legislature. As the results of the party voting approach indicated, there has also been change in the level of division in the House, as reflected by the increasing proportion of votes on which highly cohesive party majorities concurred. From one standpoint, the increase in unity is but additional evidence of movement away from the first scenario, in other words, but additional evidence of the weakening of the partisan cleavage. Still, the results suggest the need to account conceptually for an additional parameter of change and stability in the evolution of voting
alignments.

In sampling the longitudinal movement of House voting alignments from the first to the third to the fourth scenario, the results of this analysis have shown that the partisan cleavage has weakened and the differentiation of voting alignments has increased. In this respect, the results indicate an inverse relationship between the strength of the partisan cleavage and the fragmentation of voting alignments. As implied in the four scenarios, the relationship between the increasing decay of the partisan cleavage and the increasing fragmentation of voting alignments was far from a forgone conclusion. When the partisan cleavage is strongest, fragmentation, to be sure, is by definition reduced. This is to say, when the two parties act as a largely cohesive bloc and oppose each other consistently, fragmentation is only definable from the standpoint of the absence of total consensus or unity. Still, it was by no means clear that the weakening of the partisan cleavage would correspond to the increasing fragmentation of legislative voting alignments.

The primary implication of this relationship is that no coalition other than the party coalition is capable of aggregating interests across policy areas. As discussed in the second chapter, the relation between interest aggregation and parties is fundamental to the perspective on the role of political parties in two-party systems. This is not to say that alternative coalitions are not active at
various points in time and in various policy areas. The activities of the Conservative Coalition come most readily to mind. The Conservative Coalition formed initially in order to obstruct the passage of labor legislation during the later 1930s and became highly active and successful on black civil rights legislation (Brady and Bullock, 1980; 1981). Still, the Conservative Coalition is not a coalition whose presence has been sustained across policy areas.\footnote{1}

In the broadest sense, this implication denies the possibility of the second scenario, in which interests and preferences relate to one another in a relatively reinforcing pattern that transcends or crosses party lines. Indeed, there is no documentation of the sustained appearance of such a coalition in the history of the House. That is, until the 1970s. Given the results obtained here, I shall presently consider a conflicting interpretation of the character of voting alignments in the recent House.

An Alternative Interpretation

The relationship between party decay and increasing fragmentation directly contradicts the conclusions drawn by Schneider (1979) on the House of the 1970s. On the basis of interview data and roll call analysis in the Senate and the House 1971-76, he has concluded that alignments in the 1970s are characterized in terms of a single left-right continuum. He has found a high degree of ideological consistency across economic, race, civil liberties, and foreign policy. The continuum -- composed of "liberals," "progressives" or
moderates, and "conservatives" --has taken rise from the "fundamental ideological conflict of our era," which in Schneider's (p. 203) words, has occurred

... between those who primarily believe in the efficacy of the private sector and market forces, versus those who believe that the latter generates too much deprivation and injustice, and worse, deep systemic instability... In a nutshell, the conflict is between a market orientation and a social justice-democratic government orientation.

Schneider's conclusions are contradicted by the analysis here in two regards. First, his analysis contradicts the findings in this analysis concerning the highly fragmented character of recent House voting alignments. His analysis implies, rather, that voting alignments in the 1970s have been highly invariant within and across policy areas and, in this sense, denies that coalitions have been highly unstable or fluid across votes, which is the hallmark of acute fragmentation. Second, in suggesting that the ideological continuum transcends party lines, his analysis contradicts the primary implication of the relationship shown here between party decay and fragmentation, that implication again being that the legislative parties provide the only basis on which salient interests can be organized or aggregated across policy areas. Rather, his analysis suggests that a commonality among individuals' ideological positions on the value of the market economy induces alliances that cross discrete policy
areas and party lines. Although Schneider does not dismiss the potential for future ideological conflict between the parties, his emphasis is on the general ideological patterning and the ideological factions within the parties (p. 199; Also see Sorauf, 1976: p. 305). In sum, his analysis suggests that the character of recent House voting alignments approximates the second of the four scenarios, in which discrete interests and preferences relate to one another in a relatively reinforcing pattern that is not reflected in the partisan cleavage.

In explicit recognition of the second scenario, the design of this analysis allowed for the possibility of the emergence of a polarization that crossed party lines. As described in the third chapter, support was to be contingent on 1) low levels of intraparty cohesion in either or both parties; 2) the identification of a relatively primary cluster of votes, and 3) a lack of high intraparty cohesion in both parties on the five primary clusters. The results of this analysis have provided some support for the first and third conditions. While high party unity in both parties on interparty consensus votes reached a peak in the 1970s, it was lacking on more than half of interparty consensus votes and generally absent on interparty conflict votes. Similarly, on the largest policy dimensions identified for three of the five policy domains, either one or both the parties was relatively fragmented. In general, the results of the party voting approach and the analysis of
the voting alignments associated with the largest policy dimensions indicated that if there was a dominant coalition operative across policy areas in the House it was not a partisan one. The further assumption, though, given the pervasiveness of an ideological conflict of the sort described by Schneider, is that this conflict would be captured in a primary cluster of votes within each policy domain, as per the second condition. In this regard, the telling indicators are the dimensional profiles of voting within policy domains during the 1970s. As a group, they indicated that vis a vis the earlier two periods and especially the 1950s, major policy dimensions accounted for a substantially lesser proportion of clustered votes and that the largest policy dimension in each policy domain accounted for a substantially lesser proportion of the votes in major policy dimensions. The implication of the dimensional profiles, then, is that if an ideologically oriented set of alliances has been operative in the 1970s, it has been operative on a highly limited number of votes.

Party Decline and Fragmentation

A relation between the longitudinal decay of the partisan cleavage and the increasing fragmentation of legislative voting alignments has not been explicitly documented in prior research. Given the novelty of the empirical relation in the literature, I shall consider several linkages to other analyses that bear on the
Two dimensional studies on the House are relevant to the conclusions drawn here. As noted in the first chapter, Sinclair (1981b: p. 183) has shown the diminished support of Northern Democrats on government management policy dimensions. In 1953-1968, the average percentage of support among Northern Democrats was above 90 percent. In 1969-78, the average percentage of support dropped to 83.5. Her analysis relates to the extent that it shows the break-up of a long-standing support group in the Democratic Party. Even more indicative of fragmentation is an aspect of Clausen and Van Horn's (1977: p. 633) analysis of House voting patterns in the 88th, 91st, and 92nd Congresses. The authors present results on within-party variance of member support on the five policy dimensions viewed here as well as two "new ones," the "agricultural subsidy limitation" dimension and the "national security commitment reorientation" dimension. Though the authors do not discuss this aspect of their results, their results indicate that on all five of the conventional policy dimensions within-party variance in both parties was greater in the latter two Houses. On the two new dimensions, within-party variance more closely resembled within-party variance of the latter Houses than that in the 88th. The direct implication is that party members' support varied more in the latter two Congresses across the votes included in the particular policy dimensions. Thus, this analysis provides evidence at the individual level of
Stronger support for the relation between a weakened party cleavage and the fragmentation of voting alignments lies in several studies of voting coalitions in state legislatures (Key, 1956; Patterson, 1962; Broach, 1972; Welch and Carlson, 1973). All of these studies have examined voting alignments in "one-party" or "non-partisan" state legislatures. The comparability of these legislative settings and the House of the 1970s is based on the absence of a strong partisan cleavage. To a one, the results of these studies have indicated that in the absence of cohesive and opposed legislative parties coalitions have been fluid, factional, and issue-specific. In the words of V. O. Key (1956), politics in the absence of strong parties becomes the "ceaseless maneuvering for majorities."

The ceaseless maneuvering for majorities characterizes House politics in recent Congresses as well, at least from the perspective of the individual who is primarily engaged in majority construction. As quoted in Maass (1983: p. 61), consider the reflection of Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., on the current character of the Democratic Party in the House:

We're five parties in one. We've got about 25 really strong liberals. A hundred and ten progressive liberals, maybe 60 moderates, about 45 people just to the right of the moderates, and 35 conservatives. We have 10 fellows who haven't voted with us 10 percent of the time. We have 13 who haven't voted with us 20 percent
of the time.

O'Neill's perspective corresponds to the conclusions drawn in this analysis concerning the highly fragmented character of House voting alignments in the 1970s. However, the relation posited here between the declining salience of the partisan cleavage and the increasing differentiation of voting alignments gains its fullest defense when electoral and institutional characteristics of the House in the 1970s are considered. In both cases, it is possible to combine and juxtapose other bodies of literature that suggest the relation between party decline and fragmentation. Indeed, it is in consideration of these other literatures that the results found here imply broad linkages between the character of electoral politics, institutional structure, and voting alignments in the House.

An Electoral Perspective

The recent research on party in the electorate suggests two criteria by which the salience of party may be gauged. The first criterion is compositional and concerns the proportion of individuals in the electorate who identify with one of the two major political parties. The second criterion is behavioral and concerns the degree to which partisan identification determines individuals voting decisions.

With regard to the compositional profile of the electorate, numerous analyses have shown that the proportion of partisans in the electorate has declined and the
proportion of Independents has risen over the last few decades (See esp. Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). The shift in the compositional profile of the electorate has paralleled a shift in patterns of voting behavior. Split-ticket voting has increased and partisan defection in congressional elections has become relatively commonplace (DeVries and Tarrance, 1972; Cover, 1977; Cover and Mayhew, 1981). Recent analysis on congressional voting has emphasized additionally the importance of candidate evaluations in voter decision-making (Abramowitz, 1975; 1980; 1981a; 1981b; Mann, 1978; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Conway and Wycoff, 1980; Hinckley, 1980a; 1980b; 1981; Jacobson, 1981a; 1981b; Parker, 1980a; 1981b; Ragsdale, 1981). The central conclusion of this research is that individuals vote for the congressional candidate they evaluate more positively. The aspect of their findings that is most relevant here is that candidate evaluations appear to be formulated independently of partisan identification, particularly in House races. Rather, voters tend to evaluate House candidates largely on the basis of job performance and personal qualities. Therefore, in terms of both compositional and behavioral criteria, the salience of party appears to have weakened in the 1970s.

Also relatively clear is that the impact of local party organizations in congressional elections has declined. This is most evident in the literature that concerns the basis and character of electoral support in congressional races.
More specifically, recent research has concluded that individuals seeking congressional office have come to rely increasingly on their personal organization as primary rather than supplementary to local party organizations (Mann, 1981). A growing number of analyses have emphasized the importance of members' "home styles," i.e., the manner in which members communicate and interact with their constituents, as the most important determinant of electoral support (Fenno, 1979). Most of this research has been conducted within the context of the ongoing investigation into the increased electoral advantage of incumbents in House races (Mayhew, 1974; Cover and Mayhew, 1977). Perhaps most telling is that remarkably few of these studies mention local party organizations and their activities at all. Instead, the emphasis has been on the advantage incumbents retain in generating positive impressions to the district through information management and control (Cover, 1980; Hinckley, 1980b; Jacobson, 1981b; Parker, 1980b; 1981a). The mitigating factor to incumbents' advantage appears, moreover, to be the well-financed and accordingly well-publicized challenger (Jacobson, 1978; 1980).

Overall, the character of recent research suggests that congressional races are viewed by voters and scholars as contests between incumbents and challengers rather than contests between Democrats and Republicans. This contrasts markedly the perspective emerging from the early study of congressional voting, which interpreted congressional races
as primarily contests between party candidates (Stokes and Miller, 1962). Rather than party products, candidates for office nowadays have become primarily "self-starters" and, in view of recent research, "self-maintainers."

In the broadest sense, the above research suggest that congressional election outcomes of late result from the enterprise of individual office-seekers in a less partisan world. The relation between the two in itself suggests an idiosyncratic shading to the behavior of both candidates and voters and, in this sense, is ample testimony to the decay of party and the fragmentation of electoral politics. This is but half the story though. The two trends have coincided additionally with the mobilization of an unprecedented number of discrete interests with a stake in the legislative agenda (Miller and Levitan, 1976; Anderson, Brady, and Bullock, 1978; Heclo, 1978; 1983). Though there has been speculation that the public's issue concerns have collapsed into a "single-issue mentality", there appears to be widespread disagreement on what the single issue is or should be (Pierce and Sullivan, 1980). The result, as Heclo (1983: p. 37) has put it, is that "Political parties . . . have now been largely eclipsed by the financial, analytic, and organizing power of newly mobilized groups." According to the most recent research, this mobilization has not been prefaced by the increasing "nationalization of politics" (Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale, 1984). Rather, local or district-specific effects appear more important than
national effects (Ragsdale, 1980; Mann and Wolfinger, 1981; Weatherford, 1983; Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983).

On the whole, research on the recent character of electoral politics attests to both party weakness and fragmentation. There are fewer partisans in the electorate and there is less partisan voting behavior among those that remain. Party organizations appear to play a role in electoral politics that is secondary to candidates' personal electoral "machines." Finally, new and numerous groups have defined for themselves a piece of the legislative agenda yet their appearance and activity lacks a unifying theme. There appears, in short, to be a myriad of single-issue groups but the absence of a single issue.

An Institutional Perspective

The institutional character of the House has undergone major changes since Thomas Reed held the Speakership at the turn-of-the-century. To provide a perspective on the institutional weakness of party in the recent House as well as the structural fragmentation that is also characteristic, I shall preface the discussion of the institutional character of the House in the 1970s with some of the broader aspects of change during the twentieth century (Galloway, 1961; Dodd and Schott, 1979: pp. 65-105; Cooper and Brady, 1981).

From an institutional perspective, the apex of party strength in the House occurred during the years in which Republican Joseph Cannon served as Speaker. During this
era, the Speaker enjoyed substantial latitude in shaping the congressional program and imposing party discipline on the rank-and-file membership. As well, the party and committee structures were meshed resulting in close cooperation between party and committee leaders on the development and direction of majority party policy (Brown, 1922; Chiu, 1928; Jones, 1968; Cooper, 1970; Brady, 1973).

Since that time, the institutional strength of party in the House has changed substantially. As a result of the 1910-11 revolt against "Boss" Cannon, the Speaker lost considerable powers. The direction of party policy rested for some years in the caucus; however, factions that soon developed within the caucus prevented any approximation of the ironclad rule by the Speaker witnessed in the Cannon years. By the 1950s, caucus activity had all but disappeared and was in fact discouraged by Democratic Speaker Sam Rayburn, who fostered alternatively conflict reduction between the parties and brokerage politics among the relatively autonomous set of committee chairmen. (Young, 1943; Gross, 1953; MacNeil, 1963). In a 50-year span, then, the House had moved from "party government" to "committee government".

The 1970s was characterized by a wave of reform efforts that affected rules within the Democratic Party and the rules and structure of the House as a whole (Davidson and Oleszek, 1977; Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1977). One face of the reforms was party oriented and included the augmentation of
the Speaker's referral powers and basis of influence within the Democratic Party and in relation to House committees. As well, there was a revitalization of the party caucus and other party mechanisms such as the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. Accordingly, the party-oriented face of reform appeared to mark the renewed institutional strength of party.

In the literature on the institutional character of the recent House, however, few scholars have discussed the importance of party. Rather, attention has focused on the dispersal of power and authority among an increasingly influential but disjointed network of subcommittees (Ornstein, 1975; 1981; Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1977; Dodd and Schott, 1979; Davidson, 1981; Davidson and Oleszek, 1977). Indeed, the more important face of reform, by most accounts, was the augmentation of subcommittee autonomy, visibility, and resources vis à vis full committees. On the whole, consensus maintains that the renewed institutional strength of party has been more than counterbalanced by the trend toward fragmentation and dispersal of power.

Compounding the fragmentation of authority introduced by the strengthening of the subcommittee system, the House during the 1970s saw a proliferation of issue-oriented caucuses and informal groups (Hammond, Mollohan, and Stevens, 1981; Loomis, 1981). Their formation and number by definition challenged any consolidative trend activated by the revitalization of the party caucuses. Perhaps, though,
the ultimate testimony to the duality of party weakness and fragmentation was the passage of procedures and the formation of structural units that integrated process and policy independently of party. The prime examples are the new Budget Committees and the formalization of the new budgetary process (Schick, 1980; Maass, 1983). While their formation and adoption was partially a response to presidential pressure and challenge, it at base indicated the need for integrative mechanisms that party, as basis of coalition formation and policy-making, no longer provided. Further evidence of the lack of party strength and the fragmented character of the House is the Speaker's increasing reliance on ad hoc task forces to enjoin support among party members on specific pieces of legislation deemed critical to the "core" elements in the party (Sinclair, 1981c; 1983) and his creative use of alternative referral procedures with special committees to shape the parameters of party policy (Cooper and Collie, 1981). While the use of such mechanisms may ultimately encourage harmony within the party and increase the Speaker's influence among party members, their use suggests the institutional weakness of party as well as the tenuous and circumscribed influence of the party leadership in the House of the 1970s.

Summary

The above discussion has highlighted aspects of party decline and fragmentation in both electoral politics and the institutional character of the recent House. In suggesting
a broad correspondence between the general character of voting alignments and the general character of electoral politics and and institutional structure, the implicit position is that the three are interrelated. The interrelationship has been suggested in other research. Mann (1978; 1981) has argued that the individualistic orientation to congressional voting and campaigns translates into individualistic behavior in the legislature. In an historical analysis of the House from Cannon to Rayburn, Cooper and Brady (1981) have argued that the character of cleavages and alignments in the House, while generated by the character of cleavages and alignments in the electorate, shapes and constrains the institutional context of the House, which, in turn, shapes and constrains party leadership interaction with the rank-and-file membership.

To be sure, the causal relationship among the three is highly interactive and complex. The currently decentralized character of the House, for example, reinforces the tendency for individuals to rely on personal enterprise in their electoral quests, which in turn increases the potential for individualistic behavior in the House. The important point, though, is that recent research appears to be moving in the direction of considering the dynamic aspects of the interrelationship. In this respect, the analysis here fits another piece to the puzzle.

Conclusion
The single most important finding of this analysis has been the longitudinal relation between the decay of the partisan cleavage and the increasing fragmentation of voting alignments. The analysis implies that as party weakens in its capacity to serve as a broadly based coalition of interests, coalitions develop around specific policy areas and ultimately specific policies. Thus, the analysis suggests to future research a two-sided question: Why has the partisan cleavage degenerated and why has the degeneration coincided with increased fragmentation?

Scholarship has but begun to address the first aspect of the question. As noted in the first chapter, the variations in the longitudinal strength of the partisan cleavage have been subject to remarkably little systematic analysis. What evidence is available, moreover, by and large concerns the historical House rather than the contemporary one. To date, analysts have not examined systematically the reasons behind the declining strength of the partisan cleavage in the contemporary House.

There can be little doubt that the explanation of the longitudinal relation between party decay and fragmentation is rooted in a complex nexus of both environmental and institutional factors. This was implicit in the discussion of the last section concerning the parallel developments of party decay and fragmentation in the electoral arena and the institutional character of the House. The discussion implied additionally that the decay of the partisan cleavage
and the increase in fragmentation have been to an extent mutually reinforcing, especially in light of their interactive relationship to the environment and the internal character of the House. Thus one explanatory aspect of the longitudinal relation between party decay and fragmentation is a dynamic one. In their mutually reinforcing relation, party decay and fragmentation feed upon one another. Hence, the relation gathers a momentum of its own.

Several other factors possibly contribute. One concerns the impact of prolonged majority status and its corollary, prolonged minority status. The rationale is that stable majority parties grow complacent and forgetful of the importance of the party's collective performance while stable minority parties become demoralized and passive when confronting their seemingly permanent status. If fragmentation, or individual deviation from the party, does not stand to interrupt the status of either, members of the two parties have little incentive not to go their own way.

Another explanation is that the critical set of issues on which the current two-party system took stride has faded. Political conflict no longer concerns whether to institutionalize the welfare state. Rather, it concerns the distribution of benefits or the "fine-tuning" of the welfare machine. A separate explanation is that new issues have arisen that challenge or cut across the established boundaries of the coalitions generated by the New Deal. From this perspective, the character of the political agenda
has both shifted and expanded. The fine-tuning of old issues has been accompanied by the introduction of new and separable ones. Both of these explanations imply that the constituent bases of the parties no longer provide a foundation for party unification and opposition. This would appear more relevant to the Democratic Party, the rationale being that the heterogeneous constituent base of the Democratic Party was doomed to fragmentation as soon as the economic crisis that brought it to power subsided (Leuchtenberg, 1963; Patterson, 1967). No longer unified by a common and intense economic concern, the diverse elements under the Democratic umbrella realized their separate and sometimes conflicting interests.

A final explanation is that the complexities of the modern welfare state have themselves introduced a complexity or interrelatedness into the policy-making process that cannot be accommodated by party politics. Rather, the "administrative state", to use Dodd and Schott's (1979) term, itself an impetus to the mobilization of discrete and diverse interests, inherently induces the fragmentation of politics as myriad groups, each with a stake in policy outcomes, vie to maintain if not increase their share of the pie.

It is with regard to the last explanation that an assessment of the reasons behind the relation between the decay of the partisan cleavage and the increase in fragmentation during the post-New Deal era poses a special
challenge. Specifically, analysis of the relation must confront the degree to which the relation is a function of the larger environmental context, a function, in other words, of the modern state itself. This consideration unfortunately inhibits the comparability of historical analysis of the partisan cleavage to analysis of the character of voting alignments in the contemporary era. The question becomes whether the weakness of parties and the fragmentation of interests is endemic to the American administrative state. On the one hand, it would appear that continued party decay and fragmentation are inevitable only to the extent that we are willing to agree that the American system has seen the last of polarization. On the other hand, the intricacies and complexities of the modern administrative state, and the intricacies and complexities it has introduced into the character of electoral and legislative politics, would appear to reduce severely the probability of such a circumstance.

The consequences or implications of party decay and fragmentation are as complex and multiple as its causes. A scenario in which voting alignments are highly fragmented is a scenario in which the composition of majority coalitions (and consequently minority coalitions) is highly uncertain and unpredictable. This bears several ramifications for the character of legislative politics.

When coalitions are unpredictable, party leaders' ability to determine the contours of both support and
opposition is highly limited. As already noted, this appears to have led to new leadership strategies for the construction of majorities (Sinclair, 1981c; 1983). Prior research has also determined that when faced with a fragmented party, the leadership tends to adopt a more diffuse, personal, and ad hoc basis of appeal to the membership (Cooper and Brady, 1981). If this was the case in the Rayburn House of the 1950s, it has only grown more exaggerated, given that fragmentation has become more acute.

The same rationale may be applied to presidential relations with the Congress. When majority coalitions become less predictable, the President too is less certain of support and opposition. As party leaders are compelled to adopt a more intimate and ad hoc style of communication with the House, so the President is compelled to adopt a more intimate and ad hoc style of communication with the House. Carter's reluctance in this regard was one of the sources of his trouble with the Congress (Jones, 1981; 1983). It is, in contrast, Reagan's forte (Ornstein, 1983). If both the party leadership and the President rely on personalized appeals to the membership, it would appear relatively clear that the President retains the advantage. In the most general sense, then, the fragmentation of legislative alignments increases presidential power vis a vis the Congress and concomitantly increases the likelihood that individuals' decisions become more subject to presidential influence and pressure.
The fluidity of alignments also increases the impact of legislative rules on policy outcomes. When alignments are relative fixed and coalitions intact, the impact of legislative procedure is to grease the wheels of the majority preference. When alignments are relatively fluid and coalitions unpredictable, legislative rules are likely to determine which of alternative majorities prevail. Indicative of the applicability of this rationale to the recent House is Oppenheimer's (1981) conception of the "new obstructionism," the travels of the Carter energy package in the House giving rise to the expression. The result, broadly speaking, is that the impact of the policy process on policy outcomes is greater when voting alignments are fragmented. Relatedly, the ultimate substantive contours of policy become less uncertain at the onset of the legislative process.

A final implication concerns the impact of the fragmented alignments on individual voting behavior. In a scenario where voting alignments are fragmented and fluid, member voting behavior is likely to become more strategically oriented. It should be noted that in the axiomatic literature, the distinction between "sophisticated" or "strategic" and "sincere" voting behavior was derived within the context of cyclical majorities (Farquharson, 1969). When majority and minority coalitions are stable, there is no incentive for members of either party to behave strategically. Members in the majority
party win and members in the minority party, outnumbered, lose. When voting alignments are fluid, however, individuals become less certain of the ultimate policy outcome. Consequently, political maneuver becomes epidemic. Given the fragmentation of voting alignments in the recent House, it is likely that strategic voting behavior has reached an all time high.
Notes

1 The evidence on the further decline of the partisan cleavage and the increased differentiation of voting alignments during the 1970s is complicated by the introduction of recorded teller votes. The degree to which recorded teller voting contaminates the results remains unclear in this analysis and other analyses of voting in the 1970s (e.g., Sinclair, 1981a; 1981b; 1982; Clausen and Van Horn, 1977). An alternative perspective, therefore, on the character of voting alignments in the 1970s is that the pattern shown in this analysis is artifactual. Such a perspective is tempered by the results here that indicate the weakness of the partisan cleavage and fragmentation across policy areas regardless of the proportion of votes classified in each policy domain. It is tempered additionally by the evidence, which is discussed later in the chapter, of party decay and fragmentation evident in electoral politics and in the institutional character of the House.

2 The correspondence between the three periods examined here and the four scenarios is relative rather than absolute. A closer approximation to the first scenario, in which alignments are characterized by high intraparty cohesion and high interparty conflict, arguably occurred during the years following the realignment of 1896 and the years in which Joseph Cannon served as Speaker (Brady, 1973; Brady and Althoff, 1974).

3 The character of interests and preferences has, of course, not been empirically examined in this analysis. References to interests and preferences in connection with the four scenarios thus are inferential.

4 As Brady and Bullock (1981: p. 194) show, the Conservative Coalition has at one time or another during the period 1937-75 been active on labor, agricultural, civil liberties, social welfare, and foreign policy. However, their results indicate that in no single House was the Conservative Coalition active in all of the above policy areas. Thus the activity of the Conservative Coalition in different policy areas has varied longitudinally.
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