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GULLIVER AND DR. SWIFT: THE ISSUE OF THE SATIRIST'S IDENTITY

Rice University

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GULLIVER AND DR. SWIFT:

THE ISSUE OF THE SATIRIST'S IDENTITY

by

ROBERT A. KOCH

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Theories of identity help illuminate satire. In identity formation, an individual introjects cultural values towards which he feels ambivalent. Like other tragic satirists, Juvenal, unable to accept his ambivalence, projects his selfishness onto his enemies. Condemning society, he precludes his social accommodation. Like other comic satirists, Horace accepts his ambivalence and turns it to comedy. By charming his audience, he ensures a place for himself in society.

Swift, like Horace, tries to compromise his conflicts, but their severity gives his satire Juvenalian intensity. Unlike Juvenal, Swift sees the absurdity of the continuing battle. In the first section of the verses on his death, Swift laughs at pursuing reputation when one cannot control others' opinions. Nevertheless, he declares pride a universal human feature. In the panegyric section, Swift rebels against the futility of pride by taking credit for supporting the public interest. Despite the arranged compromises, conflict is everywhere apparent in the poem.

Pride is a useful concept for defining Gulliver's identity confusion. In Book I Gulliver obtains high position, but, not realizing it depends upon his supporting the ministers, he falls from power. In depicting Gulliver, Swift attempts to justify his public activities and to renounce his tormenting pride. Swift represents dilemmas of impotence in Book II. Although some Brobdingnagians protect Gulliver, others exploit him, and he suffers many accidents. Compensating for his humiliation, Gulliver claims heroic identity. Rejecting this claim, Swift recommends, through the king of Brobdingnag, support for the public interest. In Book III Swift mocks using intellect to deny man's subjection to circumstance.
A person should accept his limited control over events. Book IV presents a model for the proper use of reason in the Houyhnhnms, who live in social harmony. Through the disruptive, passionate, and dirty Yahoos, Swift condemns the evil nature of man. However, man is neither Houyhnhnm nor Yahoo, but both. Swift ridicules Gulliver's in comprehension of this fact but does not reconcile the conflicting forces. Man ought to be good but inherently is partly evil. Thus, Swift expresses his need both to conform to cultural values and to rebel against them.
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CONTENTS

Abstract 11
Acknowledgments iv

I. Satire and Identity Theory 1

II. Tragic and Comic Satire: Juvenal and Horace 28

III. Swift's Identity: "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift" 68

IV. Omnipotence: Book I of Gulliver's Travels 110

V. Dependency: Book II of Gulliver's Travels 136

VI. Totalism: Book IV of Gulliver's Travels 156

VII. Book III and the Unity of Gulliver's Travels; Conclusion 187

Bibliography 205
CHAPTER I. SATIRE AND IDENTITY THEORY

Previous approaches to the satirist's identity have fallen into three categories: the biographical, the psychological and the rhetorical. Some proponents of the biographical and psychological approaches, such as William Makepeace Thackeray\(^1\) and J. Middleton Murry,\(^2\) have regarded satiric works simply as emanations of the author's personality and failed to discuss the author's tactics for influencing and persuading his audience. Correcting this deficiency, rhetorical critics have averted their gaze from the psychological dimension of satire and concentrated instead on its techniques. However, this approach also is unable to provide a full understanding, for it fails to account for the satirist's motivations. To reveal the relationship between the psychological and rhetorical aspects of satire, an integrative approach is needed. I propose to use psychological theories of identity, such as Erik Erikson's, to integrate the two critical modes.

There are two advantages to the rhetorical approach. The first is that it releases the satirist from blame for what are considered his unpleasant emotions. The satirist often seems angry, spiteful, revengeful, and cruel. He may also seem self-centered and unconcerned for the welfare of others. Indeed, many critics who regard satire as the expression of the satirist's personality have condemned the satirist's attitudes. Witness Thackeray's condemnation of Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, Book IV:

> It is a Yahoo language; a monster gibbering shrieks and gnashing imprecations against mankind—tearing down all shreds of modesty, past all sense of manliness and shame; filthy in word, filthy in thought, furious, raging, obscene.\(^3\)
Reacting against such views, Maynard Mack writes,

Criticism of satiric literature has barely begun to budge from the position of Macaulay, Elwin, Leslie Stephen—all of whom seem, at one time or another, to have regarded it as a kind of dark night of the soul (dank with poisonous dew) across which squibs of envy, malice, hate, and spite luridly explode. . . . In this essay, I should like to ventilate this fetid atmosphere a little by opening a window on one or two rhetorical observations. . . . My illustrations will be drawn from Pope, especially from his formal satires, such as the "Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot"; and my thesis will be that even in these apparently very personal poems, we overlook what is most essential if we overlook the distinction between the historical Alexander Pope and the dramatic Alexander Pope who speaks them.⁴

Agreeing with Mack that an author should be distinguished from his satiric persona, Alvin B. Kerman asserts,

The satirist must be regarded as but one poetic device used by the author to express his satiric vision, a device which can be dispensed with or varied to suit his purpose. We can expect, however, that if satire is a true genre then whenever the satirist does appear, whether he remains anonymous, is identified as "I," or is given a name, he will share certain basic characteristics with all other satirists. This basic character will be dictated by his function in the satiric work and established by tradition. The biographical critics of satire have insisted that each satirist is either an exact image of his creator or at least his spokesman, but ironically enough, their writings tend to confirm the idea of a basic satiric character, for whether they are describing Juvenal, Pope, Byron, Swift or Philip Wylie they seem always to be talking about the same proud, fiery, intolerant, irascible man whom no one would want for a neighbor.⁵

These two critics are rightly attacking the naive biographical method of literary criticism, not the approach I am introducing which is, on the whole, compatible with their rhetorical method. Nevertheless, they have turned away from evaluating the satirist's personal involvement in his writing, a subject I wish to reconsider. Thackeray and others have reacted against satire out of offended gentility, which Mack and Kerman have chosen to circumvent rather than to confront directly. Attempting to exculpate the satirist from the charge of malice and vindictiveness,
these critics have neglected to rescue satire itself from similar charges.
If satire inevitably stimulates resentment and outrage against its
author, how wise was the satirist in choosing his rhetorical methods?
Apparently, not all audiences have possessed Victorian sensibilities.
For example, in the "Discourse concerning Satire" John Dryden expresses a
taste very different from Thackeray's:

... the Delight which Horace gives me, is but languishing,
... His Urbanity, that is, his Good Manners, are to be
commended, but his Wit is faint, and his Salt, if I may dare
to say so, almost insipid. Juvenal is of a more vigorous and
Masculine Wit, he gives me as much Pleasure as I can bear;
He fully satisfies my Expectation, he Treats his Subject home;
His Spleen is rais'd, and he raises mine: I have the Pleasure
of Concernment in all he says; He drives his Reader along with
him, and when he is at the end of his way, I willingly stop
with him."

I hope we need no longer fear what psychology reveals about satire.

Obviously, if "the satirist" is a convention and satire is a form
of imitation, there must exist real people with satiric frames of mind,
or there could be no imitation. Satiric conventions have endured because
they do make psychological sense. If they did not, satire itself would
have no appeal to the human imagination. True, a satirist does not
necessarily rail incessantly in his private life, as some biographical
critics seem to have assumed. The ability to speak satirically can
coexist with other habits of social interaction. Nevertheless, for an
author to hope for success in this genre, he must possess at least the
capacity to think satirically.

If satiric personas were simply a group of conventions, all such
persons would be nearly identical to type; but, in fact, the satirists
who have lasted are those who have been unique. We admire Juvenal for
his fierce indignation, Horace for his subtlety and urbanity, Swift for
his vividness, irony, and imagination. As I think Kerman would admit, none of these authors accomplished what they did merely through imitation. Although Mack, Kerman, and others have convincingly demonstrated that writers adopt conventions and play roles, these satirists must have been intellectually and emotionally committed to the forms of social interaction they selected, or they would not have troubled to write satire at all. By inventively adapting convention to serve their personal and social needs, they achieved their own unique satiric styles.

While I agree that the author should not be too readily identified with his voice, to assert a complete disjuncture would also be an oversimplification. The author's own personality is not likely to be a perfectly coherent whole, but comprises characteristic conflicts, compromises between conflicting desires, and roles adopted for rhetorical or otherwise manipulative purposes. In addition, authors, like other people, can choose among a variety of responses to events in their lives. In writing satire, they choose from their whole repertory the reactions appropriate to that genre. They also choose to write satire, and that choice is psychologically revealing. Thus, a psychological approach does not force a critic to identify the writer with his voice fully, and enables him to see beyond the simplistic distinction between them.

Respect for truth requires us to face even unpleasant realities, such as a satirist's anger and bitterness. But I hope also to illuminate the personal and cultural predicaments which make such reactions understandable. In light of modern advances in psychology, Thackeray had a naive view of human personality; perhaps recent developments in the study of identity will provide us a more tolerant view of the satirist.
The other advantage of the rhetorical approach is that it redeems satire for art. If satire is shown to be art, we no longer must stare petrified with horror at satiric hostility; satire becomes transformed into a worthy object of admiration and study in university English departments. In *The Art of Satire* David Worcester writes,

> The spectrum-analysis of satire runs from the red of invective at one end to the violet of the most delicate irony at the other. Beyond either end of the scale, literature runs off into forms that are not perceptible as satire. The ultraviolet is pure criticism; the infra-red is direct reproof or abuse, untransformed by art.

Rhetoric determines what is art:

Rhetorical devices . . . serve to win the reader and to soften the impact of the writer’s destructive or vengeful sentiments. Such devices are all-important for the study of satire. The skill with which they are employed serves as a criterion between good satire and bad . . . the presence or absence of such devices determines what is satire and what is not.

To achieve the desired rhetorical effects, the satirist must seem detached:

> Satire is the engine of anger, rather than the direct expression of anger. Before our sympathy is won, we must be freed from the distress of witnessing naked rage and bluster. Like Mark Antony, the artist must simulate coolness and detachment. . . . A satire may be inspired by rage; it may produce rage in its readers; but ninety-nine times out of a hundred, rhetorical analysis of its language will reveal the widest differences between its style of attack and the style of a rattling good set-to between man and wife, or between a Communist lecturer and a member of the American Legion.

Although Worcester admits the importance of anger, disguising the anger is what turns denunciation into satiric art. The satirist’s rhetorical manipulations form the subject of Worcester’s book. After calling satire "a department of rhetoric," James Sutherland makes a point similar to Worcester’s by comparing quotations from Jonathan Swift and Robert South: the essential difference between the two passages is that whereas Swift’s mind is entirely concentrated upon his argument, South is sufficiently detached from his to enjoy the
wit and the ironical statement of it. Without such detachment, we are not likely to get satire at all. \textsuperscript{11}

As Kerman has pointed out, Worcester's approach has

focused somewhat narrowly on the satirist's use of linguistic devices and his ability to contrive incidental effects.
... we are still left with a satirist who is only an artist manqué, a contriver of farragoes rather than articulated wholes. \textsuperscript{12}

Therefore, Kerman describes characteristic satiric fictions which involve a typical "satirist," scene, and plot. His new-critical conception of art is observable in the following passage:

Every major writer of satire has been praised by some critics for his fearless determination to tell the truth about his world and damned by others for a twisted, unstable, prurient liar whose works no careful father should allow his children to open.

This dilemma has been created by the biographical and historical methods of critician, and to solve it we need to approach satire in the way we do other poetry—as an art; that is, not a direct report of the poet's feelings and the literal incidents which aroused those feelings, but a construct of symbols—situations, scenes, characters, language—put together to express some particular vision of the world. The individual parts must be seen in terms of their function in the total poem and not judged by reference to things outside the poem such as the medical history of the author or the social scene in which he wrote. \textsuperscript{13}

Mack, too, emphasizes that satire is an art:

the Muse ought always to be our reminder that it is not the author as man who casts these shadows on our printed page, but the author as poet: an instrument possessed by and possessing—Plato would have said a god, we must at any rate say an art. \textsuperscript{14}

Like Kerman, Mack believes fiction to be an indispensable feature of satire and discusses its rhetorical function, as Ronald Paulson does brilliantly in \textit{The Fictions of Satire}. \textsuperscript{15} Unfortunately, in his essay Mack discusses only Pope's "Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot," and Kerman, in his attempt to find fictive coherence in satire, grossly overgeneralizes
about satire's generic features. Can Horace, for instance, be fairly
called a "proud, fiery, intolerant, irascible man"? In contrast to
Kerman, Paulson admits, "Being a rhetorical form, satire invariably
engages in casuistry and inconsistency--often at the expense of the
coherence of its fiction." Since none of these critics have been able
to find the internal coherence of satire, I hypothesize that its coher-
ence does not depend upon art--not, at least, upon the sort that merely
papers over or beautifies unpleasant emotions. If it did, we would have
to condemn many famous satirists as bad artists. Actually, satire feeds
upon unresolved and perhaps unresolvable social and psychological con-
licts that interfere with what we commonly conceive to be artistic form.
At its best, satire is powerful, rugged, vivid, witty, clever, or imagina-
tive--but rarely beautiful. Theories of identity can help provide
conceptual coherence by describing the central conflicts that fuel the
satirist's accomplishments. Although satire's status as art may be a
worthwhile topic for discussion, no desire to prove that satire conforms
to a particular standard of art will restrict, I hope, my investigation
into these matters.

In The Power of Satire Robert C. Elliott has already introduced a
psychological approach to satire. According to him, satire historically
begins as a form of magic. The primitive satirist believes in the power
of curses to kill his opponents. As culture matures, magic becomes sub-
limited into art:

satire as an art cannot develop so long as belief in its
magical efficacy retains its hold over men's minds. While it
is thought of as curse or spell, its primary mode of existence
will be governed by the non-rational and non-literary formal
relations of magic. But, when belief in its magical power has
been brought under control of the ego (does the belief ever
really die?), then, through the creative act of a poet, satire may break out of the forms which have restrained it and be free to develop in the ways appropriate to art.?

Once again a critic calls upon the redemptive power of art. Unfortunately, Elliott's argument is weakened by his failure to define "art" or to show how the sublimation takes place. In addition, Elliott reveals considerable uncertainty—with some reason—about the degree to which magical elements are still present in "artistic" satire. Believing that the theoretical difficulties may be insurmountable, I have chosen not to follow Elliott's example but to interpret satire in light of identity theory, a subject he does not treat.

One objection to any psychological approach to literature is that a real psychological study requires much more information than a critic has available. A psychoanalyst would require many hours in session with his patient before venturing a diagnosis. This objection is valid, however, only if the critic is trying to understand the satirist's whole personality. Such an understanding need not be the goal of a psychological study. It is also possible to describe the psychological mechanisms operating within the limited context of a particular work. The assumption has been that we must choose between discussing the writer, in which case we are not really functioning as literary critics, and discussing the work as a literary artifact, jealously guarding against non-literary concepts. However, the work itself is intended as an interaction with the satirist's world; that is, the satirist is affected by what he sees around him, selects elements from it, and describes and arranges them to influence his audience. The traditions of the genre serve as a repertory of options developed for satiric purposes, which the writer may select,
modify, and supplement as suits his purpose. To discuss the satirist's personality in isolation or to pretend that satire exists somehow independently of human motivations as a collection of generic features is to rob satire of its vitality.

Another objection to the use of psychology in describing literary works is that this approach is excessively narrow because it can describe only the psychological factors influencing the author's writing and ignores literary principles, conventions, and techniques. This objection derives from the fact that many psychoanalytic critics have tried to use literary texts solely to psychoanalyze their authors. Although to understand a writer a psychological critic must sometimes use evidence gathered from outside the work, an interest in the author does not preclude attention to literary tradition and technique. My intention is not to analyze the authors but to describe literary structures with the aid of psychological principles. The features of literature must make psychological sense, for poems, dramas, and novels are products of the human mind. But we must also remember that composition is a specialized activity that presents conditions and opportunities not necessarily available in other kinds of behavior. In the tacit assumption of critics who object to this approach, psychological critics analyze more or less permanent psychic structures that can be divorced from a writer's work. Such a bifurcation is actually quite artificial, for psychology really describes mental functions, which take place in time and do not take place in a vacuum. A satirist cannot be separated from the situation in which he finds himself and to which he is reacting. A more rewarding approach is to study the psychology of satire, to describe the kind of interaction
the satirist is having with his environment and audience. If such an approach is followed, the objection I have been discussing does not apply because we are no longer viewing the satirist’s psyche as wholly separable from his work.

Identity is a very useful concept for discussing satire precisely because it allows us to overcome the artificial separation of the work from its creator. Satire is a field upon which conflicts of identity, usually based upon a satirist's conflict with his society or a portion of it, are played out. An individual's identity is a conceptual link between his society and him. As such, identity has two aspects—the individual and the social—and its genesis can be discussed from both psychological and sociological perspectives. Psychology tends to find an individual’s identity in his psychological structure, though it does admit social influences and determinants. From this point of view, the id, ego, and superego, the various stages of sexual development, Oedipus complexes, and so forth, are of the utmost importance. Sociology, on the other hand, stresses the socially defined roles the individual may choose or find imposed upon him. John Spiegel has categorized roles into four groups:

1. 'Ascribed' roles, e.g. those of sex or age. One acquires these roles whether one wants to or not. 2. 'Achieved' roles, e.g. those of profession. These can be assumed only after one has achieved something. If one assumes the role without having done this, then one encounters resistance from the community. 3. 'Adopted' roles. Here it is always a question of pairs of roles in which the adoption of a role is coupled with an assignment of its complement to another person, e.g. baiter and victim... 4. 'Assumed' roles. These are roles such as those mentioned under 3, but of a temporary nature and resulting from 'playfulness.' Assumed roles are not serious.
Role playing implies patterned behavior, and has both the advantages and disadvantages of predictability. The individual is confined by the role, yet making himself predictable to others helps him to establish social interdependencies with them. Most people need to establish their individuality, as distinct from their identity, by deviating from or elaborating upon their roles. According to David J. DeLevita, identity is a way in which a person "chooses the constancies and predictabilities under the protection of which he dares to accept changes and unpredictabilities and even to change unpredictably."19 Indeed, the roles themselves are usually defined flexibly enough to allow for variations. Otherwise, they could not persist in a society. In fact, allowing for variations is one of the ways in which groups of people maintain group identity, which is "what a group continues to show as constant features in spite of the fact that the members of the groups vary."20 According to P. A. Sorokin, the other ways are "2. by selectivity in the acceptance of new members, those who do not 'fit' being excluded; 3. by transferring its own ideology to the new members, e.g. by training, education and the like; 4. by means of symbols and rites."21 Since society must make room for individual differences, social roles alone do not constitute identity, and sociology must make room for psychological concepts to arrive at a more nearly complete understanding. Identity is an accommodation between the individual and his society.

Erik Erikson has been the main proponent of this view, which he expresses as follows:

... the growing child must derive a vitalizing sense of reality from the awareness that his individual way of mastering experience, his ego synthesis, is a successful variant of a group identity and is in accord with its space-time and
life plan.22

Erikson further expands upon the relation between the individual and society when he distinguishes between personal and ego identity:

The conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous observations: the perception of the self-sameness and continuity of one's existence in time and space and the perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity. What I have called ego identity, however, concerns more than the mere fact of existence; it is, as it were, the ego quality of this existence. Ego identity then, in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of the fact that there is a selfsameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods, the style of one's individuality, and that this style coincides with the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for significant others in the immediate community.23

If a person is to feel secure in his identity, at least some other people must recognize the identity he has claimed and interact with him on that basis. Erikson has elaborated in some detail upon the stages through which an individual achieves identity in his community. But, since I do not intend to use these stages in my argument, I will not repeat them here.24

If an individual's identity is to be a "successful variation of a group identity," he must internalize its values by forming a superego. According to Freud, a child begins to do this when his parents deny him what he wants.

A considerable amount of aggressiveness must be developed in the child against the authority which prevents him from having his first, but none the less his most important, satisfactions, whatever the kind of instinctual deprivation that is demanded of him may be; but he is obliged to renounce the satisfactions of the revengeful aggressiveness. He finds his way out of this economically difficult situation with the help of familiar mechanisms. By means of identification he takes the unattackable authority into himself. The authority now turns into his super-ego and enters into possession of all the aggressiveness which a child would have liked to exercise against it.25
In this manner the child adopts the values of his group, for as Freud says,

... what is operating in the superego is not only the personal qualities of these parents but also everything that produced a determining effect upon them themselves, the tastes and standards of the social class in which they live and the characteristics and traditions of the race from which they spring.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus the superego begins to internalize a rudimentary social ideology. Erikson believes that during adolescence people adopt a more fully formed ideology, which he regards as "the social institution which is the guardian of identity."\textsuperscript{27} Since "it is through their ideology that social systems enter into the fiber of the next generation,"\textsuperscript{28} ideology provides the theoretical basis on which an individual relates to his society. As the agent of ideology, the superego assumes an important role in identity formation and maintenance.

The superego can be harshly critical, but it can also grant self-esteem. Part of the superego is the ego ideal, or ideal self, which consists of the individual's identifications with his parents, and which is a product of his love for them.\textsuperscript{29} The ego ideal strongly influences the formation of identity, for each person wants an identity that will approach it and will not feel satisfied with social roles that are incompatible with it.\textsuperscript{30}

One of the main functions of the superego is conscience. "This function consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship."\textsuperscript{31} The superego demands that certain desires and ideas it finds unacceptable be repressed. Thus, a sense of identity depends in part upon repression. K. R. Eissler argues that, if all of an individual's memories were available to him,
he could not maintain a sense of continuity, which is a part of a sense
of identity, because many of his memories would disturb that continuity.32
In any case, DeLevita says, "The return of the deeply repressed contents
during analysis is often coupled with a feeling of depersonalisation . .
. .,"33 because the repressed material is unacceptable to the superego.

Incompletely repressed desires may be projected onto another social
group. According to Erikson, these desires combine to form an unconscious
evil identity:

. . . the unconscious evil identity, that which the ego is most
afraid to resemble, is often composed of the images of the
violated (castrated) body, the ethnic out-group, and the
exploited minority. Although it manifests itself in a great
variety of syndromes, this association is all-pervasive, in
men and women, in majorities and minorities, and in all classes
of a given national or cultural unit. For the ego, in the
course of its synthesizing efforts, attempts to subsume the
most powerful ideal and evil prototypes (the final contestants,
as it were) and with them the whole existing imagery of
superior and inferior, good and bad, masculine and feminine,
free and slave, potent and impotent, beautiful and ugly,
black and white, tall and small, in one simple alternative in
order to make one battle and one strategy out of a bewildering
number of skirmishes. . . . The unconscious associations of
ethnic prototypes of good and evil with moral and sexual ones
are, we may add, a necessary part of any group formation.34

When the identity of an individual or group is endangered, it is likely
to revert to this process of social adolescence and to embrace totalism.
"Totalism," a term which I shall use repeatedly in this paper, was coined
by Erikson to describe an alternative to "wholeness." The whole person
is flexible, able to accept many of his human functions and possibilities
and alternate among them. A person who becomes totalistic, however,
draws an absolute boundary between what is acceptable and what is not.
He becomes extremely intolerant of any ideas or behavior which does not
conform to the concept of his identity. Totalism is responsible for the
oppression of many minority groups. When such a group attempts to change its social status, it threatens to undo the projections and repressions of other groups, consequently endangering their identities. Delevita argues, for example, that the Nazi oppression of the Jews was stimulated by just such a threat.

At this point it seems appropriate to consider the possible applications of these ideas about identity to satire. First of all, a satirist’s enemies represent something that he does not want to become. His understanding them shows that they represent a mode of behavior that something within him could lead him to adopt, but he tries to depict it in such a way that it becomes unacceptable both to himself and to others. That he recognizes the enemies’ behavior as a real alternative indicates that to some extent they tempt him, but it does not indicate pure envy, as some have charged, because although he may desire some of the things the enemies seek, such as praise, money, or pleasure, there may also be certain conditions for the attainment of these rewards that the satirist feels ought to be met. By rejecting the rival behavior pattern, he reinforces his identity and the identity of the group to which he belongs. When the enemies pose no serious threat to the satirist’s or his group’s identity, his satire is likely to be humorous and light. In more extreme cases, when rival groups and social change threaten to make his ideology and his roles obsolete, satire may be filled with rage and indignation. This is particularly the case when the satirist’s cause is already lost, for he then has little or nothing to lose by offending his audience. On the other hand, the writing of satire allows some satirists the opportunity to detach themselves from the immediate, impinging circumstances.
and to adopt a wider perspective, under the protection of which they can unleash the hostility upon which much comedy depends.

Second, the fact that identity depends upon ideology helps to clarify the dual focus of satire upon the social and the personal. The satire needs an ideological focus if it is to be meaningful as satire. The personal involvement of the author, conveyed by the emotional tone of the work, makes the human significance apparent and gives the satire its rhetorical and emotional force. Identity provides a conceptual link between the two.

The satirist may be either more or less conscious of his own ideology as he attacks that of others. Even when he is highly aware of the nature of his ideology, he often does not make it explicit. The reader can, however, infer much of it from the kinds of criticism the satirist makes. Ideology does not emerge clearly because the satirist commits most of his energy to attacking what threatens his identity. He does not attempt to defend his position on its own merits because he does not trust the good will and honesty of his adversaries. Feeling his identity attacked, the satirist counterattacks by interpreting the enemies' behavior according to his own ideology.

On the other hand, a satirist may attack an ideology and the social institutions it supports, without offering an alternative ideology. In such cases, the satirist sees the ideology as a violation of human nature or common sense, and social order as legalized nonsense. These satirists reject any identity acceptable to their societies and choose instead the role of radical. In the chaos of their world, they see a reflection of the identity confusion they believe society has forced upon
them. Of course, there are many satirists who fall between these two cases by having an incompletely formed ideology, meant, upon further refinements, to replace the outmoded one.

These perceptions lead us to my third point: the satirist's main focus of attack is the identities of his opponents. This is the case whether or not the satirist has felt his own identity seriously endangered by them. The usual division of satiric targets is into knaves and fools. In our terms, knaves seek to defraud others by presenting a false identity, which the satirist tries to expose and thereby destroy. Or they may adhere to a false ideology, which he attempts to discredit. Insofar as fools are victims of knaves, they are deceived as to the kinds of roles they play in respect to knaves. More broadly defined, fools are deceived as to their identity, either by themselves or by others. Very commonly, the satirist tries to deprive both targets of any ideological support by revealing their motives to be childish, animalistic, or immoral. Or he may attack their behavior as purely mechanical and automatic. In either case, their actions do not make sense in terms of any viable social philosophy. If universally adopted, their behavior would lead to destruction and chaos rather than to stability, order, and utility. To protect this view, the satirist often fails to describe rival ideologies, and when he does, he interprets them entirely on the assumption that his views are correct; the rival ideology is a corruption of them. The satirist rarely tries to achieve a perspective that would allow him to reconcile his conflict with other members of his society, for his purpose is to make his audience's choices as stark and vivid as possible.
Fourth, the satirist defines his own identity in respect to both his enemies and his audience. To his opponents he is a destroyer of identity; he plays out his role in his depiction of them. To his audience, his role is more complex. Some already are his friends by virtue of being in the same social class and circumstances and of holding to the same ideology. Others are his enemies. But he addresses himself mainly to those who are somewhere in between, those who are not entirely on his side, but whom he can woo to it. The satirist counts on his audience to feel in some degree the conflict he does with his opponents. He seeks a basis for agreement in, perhaps, a moral code all have been taught but that has fallen into disuse or has never been well adhered to, or he may appeal to basic human nature or good sense. He draws out the latent conflict between beliefs and behavior and exacerbates it. The audience, he believes, can resolve the tension by adopting his views. To draw out the conflicts, the satirist needs the audience to identify with him, and to this end, he uses rhetorical tactics of a more personal nature. In tragic satire he induces them to feel his pain and anguish; and in comic satire he offers them, in addition, his laughter and triumph over his enemies. He also tries to make it as unpleasant as possible for them not to identify with him, largely through intimidation and guilt. This is the predominant tactic in tragic satire, although it also exists in the comic variety. The audience's potential to be either friend or enemy often leads the satirist to offer reward and punishment simultaneously by showing impossible ways to resolve the conflicts. For example, irony shows that the satirist wants to be in agreement with others, but that he cannot. The message of ironic agreement often is "What are my choices?"
I can agree with my enemies, but in doing so, I violate my integrity and my intelligence." An enemy or potential enemy is expected to feel guilty. Fleeing from guilt, he will embrace some other method (preferably that offered by the satirist) for resolving the differences.

Part of the role the satirist plays towards his enemies and his audience is embedded in the depiction of his opponents. But the satirist may disguise himself to varying degrees. He may alter his attitude by pretending to be more intolerant of his enemies than he really is. In this way, he can make the audience's choices simpler and more emotionally loaded. Or he may pretend to be more tolerant than he is. In this case, he influences the audience to regard him favorably as a kind or moderate man, while the depictions themselves sway the audience towards taking a more extreme position than he. A more extreme case of disguise than a modification of attitude is the adoption of an assumed identity—a full-fledged persona or satiric mask—which commonly takes the form of a naif, an impartial man, or an enemy. The naif and the impartial man function much like the mild version of the satirist in that the depictions encourage a more extreme view than the voice's, but here there is a more nearly complete break between the satiric voice and the depictions of the enemies. That is, the persona is not responsible for the depiction. Since the depiction seems to be independent of the voice, the audience may be drawn into regarding the depiction as objectively true, for the persona apparently has no motivation for distorting the facts; indeed, his motivation may tend in the opposite direction. It is perhaps likely that few readers are actually taken in by this ruse, and that they often identify with the satirist in enjoying the trick. Part of their pleasure comes
from feeling superior to hypothetical others who do not see the trick, and more comes from a certain freedom the satirist has given them and himself. For these types of personae are usually caricatures who draw as much ridicule as the enemies, though for different reasons. Since the satirist never directly states his own ideas, he avoids being pinned down and provides room for his own ambivalence. Thus, he does not force a very specific doctrine upon his audience; its members can enjoy the ridicule without feeling required to adopt any beliefs they might find oppressive. An enemy persona does take responsibility for the depictions, but since he is an enemy, the satirist escapes responsibility and the enemy seems to damn himself. The enemy persona is a caricature as much as the impartial or naive persona is. The viewer's perception of the attack upon the caricatured person occurs as part of the recognition of him. The need to identify the figure short-circuits any defenses, such as guilt feelings, etc., that the viewer might have against enjoying the attack. Thus, he experiences a saving in psychic energy, which is afterwards expended as laughter. The escape provided the satirist and his audience by the caricature-persona allows the satirist to avoid a very specifically ideologically defined identity. The audience is most aware of what he is against and has only a vague idea of what he is for. To a degree, this type of satire provides the writer an escape from an identity he finds uncomfortable for either social or personal reasons.

Mock-form functions in much the same way as a persona. Here a style or the requirements of a genre rather than a human voice seem to provide the commentary on the enemy. The satirist deprives his enemies of their identities by placing them in an uncongenial stylistic environment where
they are deprived of supportive class assumptions, ideology, and values. Modifications in the basic style are necessary to accommodate this new content. Through these modifications the audience senses the incongruity towards which the satirist points. Since the genre is dislocated as much as the satirist's adversaries, some have suggested that the satirist makes fun of the genre as well. But in mock-forms (as opposed to travesties) the fun, if it exists at all, is not tendentious but is an escape from seriousness. Paradoxically, the more seriously the writer takes the genre, the more pleasure he can take in escaping from that seriousness and returning to a childish liberty. Mock-form is sometimes a compromise, an expression of the poet's ambivalent attitude toward the strenuous demands of civilization. He genuinely enjoys having enemies he can attack in this manner, for they take all the responsibility and blame for a desired obliviousness to cultural demands. His serious, responsible criticism of their childish behavior gives him the freedom to play like a child himself with generic formulae. But his playfulness does not obviate the implicit values of the basic genre. Indeed, his provision for childish rebellion makes the burden of ideology more acceptable to his audience and him. At the same time, his official adherence to the implied values affords him surrogate parental protection, which makes his playfulness relatively safe.

The accommodation for ambivalence is the main feature distinguishing comic from tragic satire. Whereas the comic satirist turns his own and his audience's ambivalence into a weapon used against his enemies, the tragic satirist's ambivalence helps to defeat him. An overwhelming social situation threatens to undo all his work of maturation and social
adaptation and to release from repression all the childishness and selfishness that had been more or less subordinated to social goals. The threat from within reinforces one from without. To deal with this new danger, the satirist projects these threatening inner forces onto his enemies whether or not this action is justified by their actual behavior. Because he compounds the qualities they possess independently with the projected ones, the distinction between them and the rejected part of him becomes blurred. This fact helps explain why he attacks their identities. He does it because they represent parts of himself he is no longer able to assimilate into his own positive identity. He does not consider that they may have sensible concepts of their own identities, which are different from his. Because of his projections, they represent what is not part of his positive identity; therefore, they have only negative identity.

Since the tragic satirist does not accept his own ambivalence, he is, in effect, locked into a continually escalating battle with himself. The more he rejects the unacceptable impulses, the more they clamor for attention, and the more strenuously they must be denied. This dynamic progression makes increasingly impossible any achievement of internal balance or accommodation to society, which he really desires (though on his own terms). While he attacks childish, selfish, and animalistic behavior, his own impulses of the same character subversively gain expression in his attacks upon his opponents, for, as we have seen from Freud's discussion of the superego, his rage against them is basically the rage of the rejected impulses against their renunciation. Thus, he becomes locked into a self-perpetuating cycle that produces much
righteous rage and denies him the secure sense of identity he desires. Nevertheless, such a satirist often convinces us that he is right. Given his ideological and social assumptions and the corruptions of society, what other alternatives are left him? Do we really want him to abandon his principles, which often seem enlightened and humane? He can frequently convince us that his enemies really are to blame for his painful state of mind, and perhaps they often are.

The concepts I have been discussing lead us to some insights into the psychological genesis of that common satiric technique, irony. When the satirist voices the opinions of his opponents, he has, to use a colloquialism, put the shoe on the right foot, though he expresses these opinions in a manner which leads to their rejection. The internal incongruities that tip off the audience to the ironic intention parallel precisely the dynamic conflict the satirist experiences internally. Thus, irony is a direct expression of the satirist's psychic organization and not merely a rhetorical tactic. Of course, it is a rhetorical tactic as well, which is effective because of the psychological sense it makes to an audience.

The power of the satirist stems from his ability to make his audience sympathize with his attitudes. The conflict within the superego, the fact that its energy comes from what opposes it, is universal, as is the hope—and the doubt—that through civilization man can gain the satisfactions he tried to achieve more directly in childhood. The contradiction within the superego makes it inherently unstable, and thus the parties to the conflict are susceptible to reorganization. Were they not, the satirist would be unable to restructure, even temporarily, the
minds of his audience. Comic and tragic satire are two different ways
of organizing the conflicting elements. Comic satire, through its
implicit provision for ambivalence, is the more successful and independ-
ent structure, while the totalism of tragic satire, whatever compassion
we may feel because of its social genesis, is an ostentatious defeat
that demands the complete conversion of an audience to reinforce an
ideology towards which the satirist himself feels some unadmitted
hostility.

That wit makes the satirist's hostility socially acceptable is a
commonplace of satire criticism. David Worcester, for instance, advances
this idea and refers to Freud's theory of wit\textsuperscript{37} without fully endorsing
it.\textsuperscript{38} I have drawn more heavily upon Freud's ideas in developing my own
theory about the difference between comic and tragic satire. Similarly,
Robert C. Elliott uses Freud to show how wit tricks the superego into
permitting expression to the satirist's and his audience's unacceptable
impulses.\textsuperscript{39} However, Elliott does not put Freud's views into the context
of identity theory, as I have done. In discussing the difference between
comic and tragic satire during the Renaissance, Alvin B. Kerman refers
to Northrop Frye's definitions of comedy and tragedy.\textsuperscript{40} According to
Frye, an important difference between the two genres is that a tragic
action isolates the protagonist\textsuperscript{41} whereas a comic action produces an
inclusive, harmonious and healthy society.\textsuperscript{42} Although Kerman carefully
distinguishes the two types of satire from comedy and tragedy, he main-
tains that the differences between the two types parallels that between
comedy and tragedy. While Kerman's theory accords with mine, he does not
relate the distinction he makes to identity theory. Doing so is valuable
for three reasons. Identity theory helps explain the connection between wit and the social inclusiveness of comic satire. In addition, identity theory goes beyond merely describing the tragic satirist’s isolation and helps to explain it. Finally, identity theory defines the psychic and social structures that comic and tragic satire share.
FOOTNOTES


3. Thackeray, p. 36.


23. Erikson, p. 50.

24. For full development see Erikson, pp. 91-141.


27. Erikson, p. 133.


32. K. R. Eissler, unpublished manuscript, paraphrased by DeLevita, p. 182.

33. DeLevita, p. 182.

34. Erikson, p. 58.

35. DeLevita, p. 188.

36. DeLevita, p. 188.


39. Elliott, pp. 263-64.

40. Kernan, pp. 150-246.


42. Frye, p. 163ff.
CHAPTER II. TRAGIC AND COMIC SATIRE: JUVENAL AND HORACE

In the early eighteenth century, John Dennis distinguished between
Horace and Juvenal in a manner still generally judged to be valid today:

Horace, who wrote as Lucilius had done before him, in
imitation of the old Comedy, endeavours to correct the Follies
and Errors, and the epidemick Vices of his Readers, which is
the Business of Comedy. Juvenal attacks the pernicious outra-

gious Passions and the abominable monstrous Crimes of several
of his Contemporaries, or of those who liv'd in the Age before
him, which is the Business of Tragedy, at least of imperfect

Tragedy. Horace argues, insinuates, engages, rallies, smiles;
Juvenal exclaims, apostrophizes, exaggerates, lashes, stabbs.

There is in Horace almost every where an agreeable Mixture of
good Sense, and of true Pleasantry, so that he has every where
the principal Qualities of an excellent Comick Poet. And

there is almost every where in Juvenal, Anger, Indignation,
Rage, Disdain, and the violent Emotions and vehement Style of
Tragedy.¹

To demonstrate the relevance of identity theory to satire generally, I
shall now interpret works by these two archetypal tragic and comic
satirists. The ideas developed here will be useful later in discussing
Swift, who combines tragic and comic features.

Previous critics have not used theories of identity to define the
differences between Horace and Juvenal. Before the existence of any such
theories, John Dryden, trying to determine who is the better satirist,
concludes in his "Discourse concerning Satire" that Juvenal is more
delightful; Horace, more instructive.² Horace's instruction surpasses
Juvenal's in being more general and various.³ Although Dryden concedes
that Horace's circumstances tend to justify his relative civility, the
critic more thoroughly enjoys Juvenal's bluntness:

... a Noble Soul is better pleas'd with a Zealous Vindicator
of Roman Liberty; than with a Temporizing Poet, a well Manner'd
Court Slave, and a Man who is often afraid of Laughing in the
right place: Who is ever decent, because he is naturally servile. Somewhat inconsistently, Dryden later asserts that Horace's rallying manner is superior to Juvenal's denunciation, but concludes,

This Manner of Horace is indeed the best; but Horace has not executed it, altogether so happily, at least not often. The Manner of Juvenal is confess'd to be Inferior to the former; but Juvenal, has excell'd him in his Performance. Juvenal has rail'd more wittily than Horace has rally'd. In addition to these evaluative remarks, Dryden presents a descriptive comparison that has become traditional: "Folly was the proper Quarry of Horace and not Vice. . . . Juvenal . . . was wholly employ'd in lashing vices . . . ." Like Dennis, Dryden identifies Juvenal's weapon as denunciation; Horace's, as laughter—and Robert C. Elliott and Alvin Kerman endorse this traditional distinction. Kerman, however, also finds a tone of despair and dejection in Juvenal's work.

In The Fictions of Satire, Ronald Paulson asserts that "the fictions used by satire are essentially relationships between people." The relationship between fool and knave is the basic one. Following Dryden, he distinguishes between Juvenal and Horace as follows:

The distinction between Horatian and Juvenalian satire is largely one of focus on fool or knave: Horace focuses on the fathers who are hated, while Juvenal focuses on the sons who kill their fathers.

In emphasizing social relationships, Paulson approaches my topic but never discusses the relationships in terms of identity theory. Paulson also notes: "Moderation is not ordinarily a Juvenalian ideal. He opposes black to white instead of settling for Horace's intermediate shade." Here one can see a description of Juvenal's totalism, though Paulson does not place his observation within my theoretical context.
Paulson further notes that Horace often admits his own folly while "Juvenal keeps himself rigorously separate from the folly and knavery he portrays." Identity theory should help illuminate the connections among these various aspects of Juvenal's and Horace's satiric styles.

As is the case with comparisons of Horace to Juvenal, separate treatments of Juvenal have not utilized identity theory. Most critics have discussed such topics as Juvenal's style, tone, and themes. Sigmund G. Fredericks praises Juvenal for his tragic tone and grand style, and Gilbert Higel has credited his style as well. Higel, together with Ludwig Friedlaender and J. Wight Duff, particularly commends Juvenal's vividly detailed descriptions. However, both Friedlaender and Higel criticize Juvenal for his loose form, his failure to fashion artistic unities. Friedlaender, Duff, and Fredericks state the usual truisms about Juvenal's vituperative tone, but observation of his rhetorical skills leads Fredericks and Kerman to consider the issue of Juvenal's truthfulness. Elaborate rhetoric ill accords with Juvenal's pose as a simple, plain-spoken man. Kerman concludes that since satire is art, the satirist's truthfulness or lack thereof is irrelevant. Friedlaender, who like a few others enumerates Juvenal's rhetorical techniques, suspects the anger is sometimes artificial. Duff, too, has noted the rhetorical aspect of Juvenal's satire. Like Fredericks, Kerman identifies the satirist's theme as follows: "money, wealth, luxury, and success have debased Rome and destroyed the ancient virtues which made her ruler of the world." Discussing Satire III, W. S. Anderson identifies its theme:

Rome is no longer Rome. This paradox provides Juvenal with his approach and fully supports the emotion with which
Umbricius condemns his native city. He takes the Rome of traditional associations—its majesty, justice, wealth, beauty, and honesty—and exposes its self-contradiction. Thus he comments on various conditions, the lack of opportunity, the aliens, the fires, the thieves, etc., all of which signify the loss of the traditional Roman qualities and cumulate in a totally negative picture of an uninhabitable city. When he leaves, then, Umbricius symbolizes in his act what he has been saying, that Roman characteristics no longer fit the city, for he is the last Roman. 33

Anyone interested in theories of identity will find these remarks highly suggestive although Anderson himself does not derive them from identity theory.

Let us now discuss Juvenal’s third satire as an example of tragic satire. Juvenal’s persona, Umbricius, feels his identity and his livelihood threatened by social changes that have occurred in Rome. He generalizes his condition by claiming, in effect, that Rome is no longer Rome (ll. 60–61). 34 It has abandoned its ideals and its sense of reality and has been taken over by Greeks. Here we see the satiric dual focus upon the personal and the social, which we remarked in Chapter I. The traditions and values that had made Rome Rome formed the context within which Umbricius defined his identity. Against his will, Umbricius is involved in the collapse of Rome. The connection exists on the symbolic level as well, for Umbricius is old and will soon have to carry a staff (l. 28), while the buildings of Rome are in danger of collapse and have to be supported by props (ll. 193–94).

Umbricius himself is in a double bind. If he stays in Rome, he must choose between actions enabling him to survive at the expense of violating his values, and virtuous starvation—that is, between psychological suicide and actual, physical death. He decides to leave Rome "Since there is no room . . . for honest callings in this city, no reward for labour;
since my means are less to-day than they were yesterday, and to-morrow
will rub off something from the little that is left . . . "(ll. 41-50).
To further justify his departure, he asks,

What can I do at Rome? I cannot lie; if a book is bad, I
cannot praise it, and beg for a copy; I am ignorant of the
movements of the stars; I cannot, and will not, promise to a
man his father's death; I have never examined the entrails of
a frog; I must leave it to others to carry to a bride the
presents and messages of a paramour. No man will get my help
in robbery, and therefore no governor will take me on his staff;
I am treated as a maimed and useless trunk that has lost the
power of its hands. What man wins favour nowadays unless he
be an accomplice—one whose soul seethes and burns with secrets
that must never be disclosed? (ll. 41-50)

Besides these reasons of an alternatively moral or practical nature, there
are others strictly practical. Umbricius claims that it is dangerous
for a Roman to stay inside his dwelling, for the building may at any
time collapse or catch fire. If he ventures into the street by day, he
risks being crushed by precarious loads transported through the city.
By night, he may be attacked by bullies and robbers. The food is so bad,
and the streets so noisy, that one cannot sleep at night. By the end of
the satire, Umbricius has eliminated virtually every possibility of
functioning in Rome.

Although these complaints are weighty in themselves, they also bear
a symbolic significance, for the objects of complaint often demonstrate
the Romans' abandonment of social responsibility in favor of selfishness
and greed. For instance, late in the satire, Umbricius asks,

For if that axle with its load of Ligurian marble breaks down,
and pours an overturned mountain on to the crowd, what is left
of their bodies? Who can identify the limbs, who the bones?
The poor man's crushed corpse wholly disappears, just like his
soul. (ll. 257-61)

The context of this remark makes clear that the marble is being transported
carelessly with no concern for the safety of pedestrians. Yet the marble itself is probably going to construct a rich man's extravagant house or a pretentious public edifice. The combination of self-glorification and negligence of the common welfare by the nobles produces for ordinary people the most complete loss of identity imaginable in the disappearance of their bodies. The envisioned scene serves as a metaphor for Rome's, and Umbricius's own, loss of identity, which has been produced by the nobles' abandonment of social responsibility and of any viable social ideology.

Besides making moral and practical complaints, Umbricius charges that poor people are accorded little respect:

And what of this, that the poor man gives food and occasion for jest if his cloak be torn and dirty; if his toga be a little soiled; if one of his shoes gapes where the leather is split, or if some fresh stitches of coarse thread reveal where not one, but many a rent has been patched? Of all the woes of lukeless poverty none is harder to endure than this, that it exposes men to ridicule. (11. 147-53)

Here the basic complaint is that people are evaluated entirely according to their wealth rather than their moral merit. The poor man who adheres to ancient Roman values finds, to use Erikson's phrase, that the style of his individuality does not coincide with his meaning for significant others in the immediate community. He does not possess a viable identity. Juvenal makes this idea more explicit in the following passage:

At Rome you may produce a witness as unimpeachable as the host of the Idaean Goddess--Numa himself might present himself, or he who rescued the trembling Minerva from the blazing shrine--the first question asked will be as to his wealth, the last about his character: 'how many slaves does he keep?' 'how many acres does he own?' 'how big and how many are his dessert dishes?' A man's word is believed in exact proportion to the amount of cash which he keeps in his strong-box. Though he swear by all the altars of Samothrace or of Rome, the poor man
is believed to care naught for Gods and thunderbolts, the Gods themselves forgiving him. (ll. 137-46)

A cynical rationalization, this belief disguises social prejudice or an attempt on the part of the judges to gain the favor of the rich by maintaining their power. The judges are the real violators of the oath as an institution symbolizing responsibility to the truth. As a result, the poor man's fidelity to social ideology is not recognized, and his identity is thereby impaired.

As we shall soon see, Umbricius's reaction is to attack his enemies in a way similar to the way he has been attacked. But, in addition, what he says is often designed to convey his emotional state rather than to convince by argument. Sometimes, for instance, he contradicts himself, as when he claims that poor people cannot sleep at night for the street noises (ll. 234-38) but that the rich sleep in their litters while being conveyed through the streets (ll. 239-42). At other times he makes trivial complaints that distract from the seriousness of his argument. For example, he protests against soldiers stepping on his toes as he walks on the crowded streets. By making both kinds of statements, Umbricius shows that he is willing to seize any weapon, make any argument, no matter how trivial or absurd, to urge his point. The statements create an impression of helplessness, desperation, and rage, and are, therefore, themselves evidence of his impaired social status. Although the contradictory and trivial complaints do not convince by way of evidence, they do create a strong impression of his desperate fury, with which we may sympathize. He uses self-abasement as a ploy to gain sympathy. Unfortunately for any satirist who uses this tactic, it is self-destructive, for in his attempt to demonstrate his emotional state,
he makes conditions seem worse than they really are. Burning bridges, he makes reconciliation with his society increasingly difficult. We must seek elsewhere for the conceptual bases of his argument.

In response to social rejection, Umbricius attacks the Roman nobles and, more especially, the Greeks who have gained their favor. The Greeks, by scurrilous means, have taken control of much of Roman life, and this fact symbolizes Rome's loss of identity. Umbricius reacts by attacking the Greeks' identity: "Say, what do you think that fellow there to be? He has brought with him any character you please; grammarian, orator, geometrician; painter, trainer, or rope-dancer; augur, doctor or astrologer . . . ." (ll. 74-76). Since the Greek is ready to adopt any number of roles in spite of his lack of qualifications, he claims a false identity, which it is Umbricius's intention to expose. In another section, Umbricius attacks the Greeks further:

. . . they are a nation of play-actors. If you smile, your Greek will split his sides with laughter; if he sees his friend drop a tear, he weeps, though without grieving; if you call for a bit of fire in winter-time, he puts on his cloak; if you say 'I am hot,' he breaks into a sweat. Thus we are not upon a level, he and I; he has always the best of it, being ready at any moment, by night or by day, to take his expression from another man's face, to throw up his hands and applaud if his friend gives a good belch or piddles straight, or if his golden basin make a gurgle when turned upside down. (ll. 100-108)

Umbricius demonstrates that the identity the Greeks claim is in fact no identity at all. Superficially, their overt behavior reveals no pattern of its own since they are always agreeing with others. This infinite flexibility deprives them of temporal continuity. And their style of individuality does not agree with their meaning for their employers, for underneath the feigned sympathy and praise lies a selfish and subversive instinct for manipulation: "all [are] ready to worm their way into the
houses of the great and become their masters," (l. 72) In addition, by stressing their nearly miraculous virtuosity at acting, Umbricius accentuates the distance between their overt behavior and their true motives and turns them into inhuman monsters who function beyond his understanding or sympathy. He says that he cannot do as they do, not just to show his morals will not permit it, but to deprive them of their identity as comprehensible human beings and thereby alienate them further from his audience and himself.

Nevertheless, the Greeks succeed in fooling the nobles by reducing them to a childish state. Through praise such as an infant might deserve for the exercise of basic functions, the Greeks relieve their masters of the obligation to meet higher social responsibilities. By satisfying every desire and performing any service, no matter how outrageous, the Greeks obviate the nobles' need to deal with practical situations within a moral order. Conveyed back to infancy, the nobles care about nothing but personal gratification and glorification. As most adults might have expected, the Greeks do not accept the nobles' dependence as selflessly as parents are expected to. The Greeks exploit this dependence to dominate and blackmail them (ll. 53-54, 109-13). In thus depicting the nobles, Umbricius reveals them as fools and denies them a fully formed, adult identity.

The nobles and Greeks obtain by ignoble means a superfluity of goods, services, and praise that the poor people and Umbricius himself completely lack. They represent methods Umbricius himself might select to achieve the same ends. His denial of identity to them is a necessary part of his personal rejection of their methods. Umbricius may be
jealous, but he does not demand the superfluity for which he admonishes
them. He believes that everyone should possess a modest sufficiency and
that, while virtuous men should be respected, no one should by falsely
exalted above the common station.

The countryside provides an attractive alternative to Rome:

There are many parts of Italy, to tell the truth, in which no
man puts on a toga until he is dead. Even on days of festival,
when a brave show is made in a theatre of turf, and when the
well-known afterpiece steps once more upon the boards; when
the rustic babe on its mother's breast shrinks back affrighted
at the gaping of the pallid masks, you will see stalls and
populace all dressed alike, and the worshipful aediles content
with white tunics as vesture for their high office. (ll. 171-79)

Outside Rome, one need not fear the collapse of houses (ll. 190-02); one
may live cheaply and grow an abundance of vegetables (ll. 223-31). When
a person lives simply, he finds himself able to supply all the needs of
life. In the passages describing country life, one may glimpse the stoic
doctrine of life according to nature, which Juvenal advocates in other
satires, particularly numbers 10 and 11. In the former, which Johnson
imitated in his "The Vanity of Human Wishes," Juvenal writes, "Thus it
is that the things for which we pray, and for which it is right and
proper to load the knees of the Gods with wax, are either profitless or
pernicious!" (ll. 54-55) They are pernicious because they produce
unhappiness and pain. As an alternative, Juvenal recommends a modest
life of virtuous labor and claims that "the woes and hard labours of
Hercules are better than the loves and the banquets and the downy
cushions of Sardanapalus" (ll. 360-62). With luxury he associates cor-
ruption, futility, and pain; with simplicity, virtue and as much happiness
as it is the human lot to obtain. Umbricius does the same, for he is
Juvenal's mouthpiece. Although Umbricius is not Juvenal, Juvenal
explicitly endorses his persona's views at the beginning of Satire III, and Umbricius's other opinions are consistent with Juvenal's views as expressed in the other satires. The right perception of human and physical nature produces virtue, modesty, and sufficiency. The corruption of the nobles and the Greeks is a measure of their deviation from natural humanity, of their distorted identities as human beings. But, ironically and outrageously, in Rome it is the honest, virtuous, hardworking man who is denied a social role.

The connection between nature and virtue is also apparent in lines 10-20, where Juvenal provides the setting for Umbricius's complaint:

But while all his goods and chattels were being packed upon a single wagon, my friend halted at the dripping archway of the old Porta Capena. Here Numa held his nightly assignations with his mistress; but now the holy fount and grove and shrine are let out to Jews, who possess a basket and a truss of hay for all their furnishings. For as every tree nowadays has to pay toll to the people, the Muses have been ejected, and the wood has to go a-begging. We go down to the Valley of Egeria, and into the caves so unlike to nature: how much more near to us would be the spirit of the fountain if its waters were fringed by a green border of grass, and there were no marble to outrage the native tufa!

Numa was a legendary king of Rome who founded many religious institutions upon the advice given by his mistress, the goddess Egeria, at the very spot where Umbricius speaks. Notice here that Juvenal finds the natural preferable to the artificial, which he regards as corrupt and pretentious. The marble symbolizes Rome's alienation from its true spirit and original identity. The Romans have meretriciously defiled a sacred place by renting it out to practitioners of another faith, thereby showing that they value money more than their traditions. The presence of the Jews in itself symbolizes the place's loss of its Roman identity. Thus, in describing the setting for Umbricius's complaint, Juvenal adumbrates the
major themes of his satire and the reasons for Umbricius's departure from Rome.

If, as I have already stated, Umbricius's stands conform to Juvenal's, one may wonder why Juvenal chose to use a persona at all. Since Juvenal announces his approval of Umbricius in establishing the frame for the satire, Juvenal is clearly not hiding behind his persona to escape the censure of the authorities. Rather, by leaving Rome, Umbricius enables Juvenal to argue with increased rhetorical effect, for Juvenal himself was not prepared to abandon the city. Leaving Rome is an action that demonstrates the strength of Umbricius's conviction. His departure convinces us that there is nothing left for him in the city, that his life there has been a disaster. Since the formation of his character was intimately bound up with Rome and its traditional values, his departure shows that Rome has been a disaster for itself as well. He abandons Rome because by its departure from its true nature, it has abandoned him. For Umbricius the satire is a parting shot at the city that raised and betrayed him, but for Juvenal the satire has another significance. The energy and venom of the attack, the violence and pathos of his protest, show the depth of his commitment to Rome and its ancient ethic. He has not yet given up the hope for reform, and he remains in Rome. Thus, in this work Juvenal's assumed identity as Umbricius has an important, but limited, function; essentially, we hear Juvenal's true voice, as any examination of his other satires will show. Umbricius's identity conflicts and his attempts to deal with them are Juvenal's conflicts and attempts, and make such clear psychological sense because they are genuine, not feigned.
In conclusion, Juvenal's third satire is neither pure individual spite and envy nor pure social criticism. Rather, the personal protest and social critique reinforce each other: the critique lends dimension and legitimacy to the protest, and personal involvement gives fire and immediacy to the critique. It is Umbricius's identity conflict that makes this mutual reinforcement possible. Social conformity to Umbricius's now subverted ideology should have given him and other Romans the necessities of life and the respect they needed. Denied these social supports to his identity, Umbricius's unsatisfied needs have grown into a subconscious infantile fantasy of luxury and aggrandizement. Since such aspirations ill accord with his ideology and are therefore a threat to his identity, Umbricius has projected this fantasy upon the nobles, whose unfavorable portrayal constitutes a renunciation of the desires. In their place, Umbricius consciously and sanely chooses the more modest goal of sufficiency and respect.

This theory in no way suggests that Umbricius's depiction of the nobles is inaccurate, for psychologists claim that projection is necessary to understand other people. To the extent that the depiction is accurate, it provides support for the projection. One may, however, doubt that his portrayal of the Greeks is valid, for it is unlikely that an entire nation could be composed of such inhuman monsters as Umbricius has described. Once again, the mechanism of projection is at work. When Umbricius claims that he cannot act as the Greeks do, he reveals that he has at least considered doing so, since ideologically correct behavior has not led to success. But because such a temptation is a threat to his identity, he has projected the tempting behavior onto the
Greeks, and depicted them as lacking identities. By this means, he renounces the temptation. Thus, his depictions of the nobles and the Greeks are ways of protecting his previously established identity, which has been under attack externally and internally. However, these defensive maneuvers deny more expedient perceptions of his situation and prohibit adaptation. It is this fact that makes Juvenal's third a tragic satire. Its purpose is to refuse accommodation to society and to insist upon a kind of social failure. Yet, lest all this seem to discredit Juvenal, the ideal he holds up seems a model of sanity in comparison to his depictions of Rome, the truth of which is now impossible to determine. How fully committed Juvenal was to the state of mind he reveals in this satire is open to question. We are not required to believe that he was unable to see beyond this way of thinking, to see it as useful for rhetorical purposes. Yet the psychological truth of this satire shows that he did experience it. The truth of the experience and the ability of others to empathize with it are the sources of his rhetorical force, and that is considerable. He may or may not have consciously planned it that way.

When Samuel Johnson imitated Juvenal's third satire in his "London," he altered the poem considerably to adapt it to contemporary circumstances and to elevate its moral tone. One way in which he accomplished the latter purpose can be seen by comparing the concluding verse paragraphs.

The original Juvenal, as translated by G. G. Ramsay, reads,

To these I might add more and different reasons; but my cattle call, the sun is sloping and I must away; my muleteer has long been signalling to me with his whip. And so farewell; forget me not. And if ever you run over from Rome to your own Aquinum to recruit, summon me too from Cumes to your Helvive Ceres and Diana; I will come over to your cold country in my
thick boots to hear your Satires, if they think me worthy of that honour. (ll. 315-22)

Johnson, however, writes,

Much could I add,—but see the Boat at hand,
The Tide retiring, calls me from the Land;
Farewell!—When Youth, and Health, and Fortune spent,
Thou fly'st for Refuge to the Wilds of Kent;
And tir'd like me with Follies and with Crimes,
In angry Numbers warn'st succeeding Times;
Then shall thy Friend, nor thou refuse his Aid,
Still Foe to Vice, forsake his Cambrian Shade;
In Virtue's Cause once more exert his Rage,
Thy Satire point, and animate thy Page. (ll. 255-63) 35

The words "Follies," "Crimes," "Vice," and "Virtue's Cause" find no counterpart in Juvenal. In addition to introducing such expressions wherever appropriate, Johnson deletes many passages in which Umbricius complains of his personal humiliation and degradation without referring to moral values. For instance, Umbricius's complaint,

... hurry as we may, we are blocked by a surging crowd in front, and by a dense mass of people pressing in on us from behind; one man digs an elbow into me, another a hard sedan-pole; one bangs a beam, another a wine-cask, against my head. My legs are beplastered with mud, soon huge feet trample on me from every side, and a soldier plants his hobnails firmly on my toe. (ll. 253-46)

remains unimitated in "London." In many other passages, Johnson abstracts or generalizes so that the "low" details in Umbricius' complaints disappear. Also significantly absent are Umbricius' proclamations of his sexual frustration, a grievance not particularly honored within a Christian value system. Besides referring to such values, Johnson appeals to patriotic ones. Juvenal's

Must I not make my escape from purple-clad gentry like these? Is a man to sign his name before me, and recline upon a couch better than mine, who has been wafted to Rome by the wind which brings us our damsons and our figs? Is it to go so utterly for nothing that as a babe I drank in the air of the Aventine, and was nurtured on the Sabine berry? (ll. 81-85)
becomes Johnson's

Ah! what avails it, that, from Slav'ry far,
I drew the Breath of Life in English Air;
Was early taught a Briton's Right to prize,
And lisp the Tale of HENRY's Victories;
If the gull'd Conqueror receives the Chain,
And Flattery subdues when Arms are vain?
(ll. 117-22)

Where Juvenal's Umbricius only claims preferential treatment as a native Roman, Johnson's persona Thales appeals to the British subject's pride in his freedom, rights, and national power. In lines 50-66, Johnson also appeals to national pride, whereas in lines 29-40 Juvenal appeals to less admirable social and class prejudice.

Juvenal uses the past primarily as a standard of comparison by which the present must be condemned; Johnson sorrowfully contemplates a past both cherished and lost. For example, in the passage quoted on page 38, Juvenal mentions Numa and his assignations only briefly before rushing off to describe the meretricious present. But in "London" Johnson imitates the passage as follows:

While THALES waits the Wherry that contains
Of dissipated Wealth the small Remains,
On Thames's Banks, in silent Thought we stood,
Where GREENWICH smiles upon the silver Flood;
Struck with the Seat that gave ELIZA Birth,
We kneel, and kiss the consecrated Earth;
In pleasing Dreams the blissful Age renew,
And call BRITANNIA's Glories back to view;
Behold her Cross triumphant on the Main,
The Guard of Commerce, and the Dread of Spain,
Ere Masquerades debauch'd, Excise oppress'd,
Or English Honour grew a standing Jest.
(ll. 19-30)

Although Thales' personal deprivation receives as much emphasis as Umbricius', Johnson's greater reverence for the past and regret for its demise is strikingly apparent. A comparison of Johnson's lines 99-106
to Juvenal's lines 67-68 would produce the same conclusion. In addition
to describing Thales' personal deprivation and the national decline,
Johnson indicates that the evil Londoners lose something too. Where
Juvenal writes,

Ah! Let not all the sands of the shaded Tagus, and the gold
which it rolls into the sea, be so precious in your eyes that
you should lose your sleep, and accept gifts, to your sorrow,
which you must one day lay down, and be for ever a terror to
your mighty friend! (ll. 54-57)

Johnson imitates,

But thou, should tempting Villainy present
All Marlb'rough hoarded, or all Villiers spent;
Turn from the glitt'ring Bribes thy scornful Eye,
Nor sell for Gold, what Gold could never buy,
The peacefull Slumber, self-approving Day,
Unsullied Fame, and Conscience ever gay.
(ll. 85-90)

Through repetition and climax the British poet more strongly emphasizes
the benefits of virtue that may be lost by pursuing evil. Johnson's lines
suggest a compassionate, Christian concern for the welfare of potential
sinners, a concern Juvenal does not prominently express in his third
satire. In still another passage, Johnson adapts Juvenal's verses to
express a greater sense of loss. Juvenal writes,

I must leave it to others to carry to a bride the presents and
messages of a paramour. No man will get my help in robbery,
and therefore no governor will take me on his staff: I am
acted as a maimed and useless trunk that has lost the power
of its hands. (ll. 45-48)

In Johnson's imitation this becomes

Others with softer Smiles, and subtler Art,
Can sap the Principles, or taint the Heart;
With more Address a Lover's Note convey,
Or bribe a Virgin's Innocence away,
Well may they rise, while I, whose Rustic Tongue
Ne'er knew to puzzle Right, or varnish Wrong,
Spurn'd as a Beggar, dreaded as a Spy,
Live unregarded, un lamented die.
(ll. 75-82)
Where Juvenal indignantly protests against evil, Johnson stresses the pathos of the situation; previously existing honorable and even lovable qualities—principles, purity of heart, and innocence—become, sadly, corrupted. This as well as other passages reveals Johnson's or Thales' greater self-consciousness, a greater awareness of inner states, whereas Umbricius almost exclusively concentrates upon attacking outward show. The concluding line in Johnson's version expresses sorrow, whereas Juvenal's bursts with resentment.

How may we explain this alteration in tone? Obviously, the modification cannot be attributed entirely to the change of setting. The tonal difference stems from the differing temperaments of the authors. W. B. C. Watkins has remarked that Johnson's understanding of man derived from introspection, an idea which might partly explain the greater inwardness of "London." James Boswell has noted that melancholy was a predominant feature of Johnson's own character, and, indeed, Johnson does imbue "London" with a greater sense of pathos and loss than exudes from Juvenal's poem. This is not the place to investigate carefully the causes of Johnson's melancholy, but it does seem likely that Johnson embraced it for two conflicting reasons. First, by being miserable, he could punish himself for desires conflicting with his conscious values. Second, he could use his melancholy to rebel covertly against the demands he placed upon himself. Such a character structure is quite different from Juvenal's, and Johnson's imitation reflects the difference. Thus, even when a poet chooses to follow tradition so closely that he imitates a particular poem, he is likely to reconstruct it in a way that reflects his own personality structure.
Like critics of Juvenal, those of Horace have overlooked identity theory in their analyses of his satires. Having at the beginning of this chapter discussed comparisons of Juvenal to Horace, I now turn to criticism focusing upon Horace individually. As with Juvenal, criticism of this satirist largely deals with such traditional topics as tone, style, and theme. Nearly everyone comments upon Horace's good-humored manner, as do J. Wight Duff and Niall Rudd, and refers to Horace's stated purpose to "tell the truth with a smile." David L. Sigsbee and Duff also remark Horace's tolerance, clemency, and forgiveness. In addition, Sigsbee notes the personal, autobiographical element and the informal, conversational quality of this satirist's verse. Horace's tone well suits his purpose, identified by Rudd and M. J. McCann as being to reform individual behavior, not institutions. Writing about Horace's style, Rudd and Eduard Fraenkel discuss the effects Horace achieves by juxtaposing elements of high and low style. Duff and Fraenkel praise Horace for his efficient use of spare, but telling detail. Discussing Horace's management of form, both Fraenkel and Rudd show how he uses allusions to previous lines in a satire to define sections within it. Like Fraenkel and McCann, Jacques Perret considers Horace's relation to his literary predecessor, Lucilius. In addition, Perret discusses Horace's position in the literary quarrels of his day and concludes, contrary to the usual opinion, that Horace sided with the nectori, the new poets who followed Catullus in cultivating a spare style contrasting with the more elaborate style of Cicero and the traditional Roman poets. Perret also asserts that Horace was not a believer in any particular philosophical system, and Sigsbee and Rudd agree
with him. In "The Three Worlds of Horace's Satires," M. J. McGann discusses the relation between the public world and the private one in the Sermones but does not handle the subject in terms of identity theory or see the full complexity of the relationship. 58

If the failed identity of Juvenal's Umbricius leads him into totalism and the destruction of his enemies' identities, in Horace we find a tolerant satirist whose identity comprises a successful and unique combination of social roles: son of a freedman; friend of Maecenas; modest, moderate, relatively virtuous man; poet and satirist. In several satires he defends these roles against attacks made upon them, so that he can continue to lead the kind of life he chooses. As the critics mentioned above have noted, his attacks do not constitute a general condemnation of society but are aimed at individuals who are acting unwisely. These attacks serve to protect his identity by demonstrating the superior wisdom of his own course. In addition, the attacks constitute another claim to identity: that of a chiding, but benevolent, guide to good living.

In Horace we do not see a raging superego denouncing unconscious impulses that he has projected onto others. Rather, he bases his attacks upon attempted solutions to his own internal conflicts, which often imply conflict between various roles he wants to play. His attacks are partly a way of consolidating and seeking social recognition for his solutions. Resembling negotiated agreements, the solutions are characterized by compromise and by terms carefully selected to allow agreement on a limited basis while ignoring other bases upon which disagreement would be inevitable. Thus, each role maintains a degree of independence from the
others so that Horace can use it to escape a momentarily uncomfortable role. By achieving detachment, he becomes able to manipulate these roles to serve his social purpose and accommodates his ambivalence to social demands placed upon him. He defines his identity only in those limited terms that will prove it viable, and he fights those definitions that would do him harm. As a consequence, one might expect his identity to be similarly limited. But the elaborate and clever maneuvering necessary to achieve the internal and external compromises reveals Horace in considerable complexity. Horace, though different in his social position from most other men, rarely sacrifices his individuality for the sake of a socially acceptable identity. His flexible use of roles allows him to achieve both, and he lets us know it.

One consequence of his maneuvering is that he cannot afford to be ideological in a highly particularized way. His ethical precepts are usually very general—even vague—and designed to accommodate his maneuvers. Predominant in his moral code, for example, are the values of tolerance and moderation. Naturally, he attacks other people for their intolerance and immoderation, thereby protecting himself from any possible similar extremes of his own. But these people do not threaten his identity seriously because he has already succeeded in establishing an internal balance of forces. To his moderating faculty satire provides a social function and opportunity for display. Defeating enemies is for him no struggle for survival; it is a proclamation of success.

Horace preaches moderation even in attempts to be virtuous. Thus indulging his own ambivalence toward morality, he humanely accepts the ambivalence of others. In Epistle I,vi\textsuperscript{59} he disapproves of intolerance
by pronouncing, "Let the wise man bear the name of madman, the just of unjust, should he pursue Virtue herself beyond due bounds." (ll. 15-16)

In Satire I.iii.63 he attacks the stoics for their intolerance and ridicules their claim to be kings. Though Horace does not say so, this claim rests on the argument that the stoic can choose his own reactions to the world and thereby decide the quality and importance of every event he observes. Possessed of such wisdom and self-sufficiency, stoics are capable of exercising any profession, including kingship (ll. 129-33).

But Horace also associates the claim with stoic intolerance and a desire to dictate the morals of others. In particular, he attacks the stoic assertion that all crimes are equal and demand equally harsh punishment. By implication, the stoics' intolerance is an attack upon Horace, who admits to having minor faults; and Horace's response is to attack the stoics' identity. In lines 124-26, he does so by pointing to the contradiction between the stoic's claim to self-sufficiency and his desire for power. He continues the attack in the following passage:

Mischievous boys pluck at your [the stoic's] beard, and unless you keep them off with your staff, you are jostled by the crowd that surrounds you, while you, poor wretch, snarl and burst with rage, O mightiest of mighty kings! In short, while you, a king, go to your penny bath, and no escort attends you except crazy Crispinus, my kindly friends will pardon me if I, your foolish man, commit some offence, and in turn I shall gladly put up with their shortcomings, and in my private station shall live more happily than Your Majesty. (ll. 133-42)

Here Horace shows that the stoic's claim to be king of himself is false, since he becomes angry, and that his attempt to control the behavior of others is doomed. Thus, Horace robs him of the identity he has claimed. As an alternative, Horace offers tolerance. He admits that he himself has failings and, without demanding that they be approved, requests that
they be forgiven. One may infer that he is also tolerant of himself. Tolerance allows him, unlike the stoic he attacks, to accommodate his ambivalence toward his superego, which he thereby keeps under control. Reciprocating his friends' forbearance, he is willing to tolerate their faults and renounce any attempt to dictate their behavior. As Horace sees it, tolerance is a great social virtue: by practicing it, a social group grants to its members the independence and freedom that allow them to associate with one another comfortably. No demand is made that ideological commitments control completely the identities of the various members. In contrast, the intolerant stoic is unsocial, as the taunts of the boys demonstrate. By his very pretensions to power, he excludes himself from much of society. For Horace, paradoxically, tolerance itself has become an ideological commitment that helps to define the identity of his group though he seeks to make it as large as possible. The exclusion of the stoic from it, here projected onto the mocking boys, is one way in which the group maintains its identity and Horace maintains his. Even tolerance has its limits.

Significantly, in the passage quoted above, Horace's criterion for judging the stoic's behavior is the amount of pleasure it produces. Since Horace thinks the pleasure should be the aim of life, he is against giving the superego free rein. However, neither does he advocate the opposite extreme: a purely instinctive life. Both civilization and nature are parts of life, and as much pain may be suffered through violating moral law as through denying the instincts granted by nature. The task of the thinking man is to harmonize, to the extent he can, the sometimes conflicting demands of nature and civilization. To promote
this harmony, Horace points out that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the bases for social and moral law:

... Expedience herself [is] the mother, we may say, of justice and right. When living creatures crawled forth upon primeval earth, dumb, shapeless beasts, they fought for their acorns and lairs with nails and fists, then with clubs, and so on step by step with the weapons which need had later forged, until they found words and names wherewith to give meaning to their cries and feelings. Thenceforth they began to cease from war, to build towns, and to frame laws that none should thieve or rob or commit adultery. ... If you will but turn over the annals and records of the world, you must needs confess that justice was born of the fear of injustice. Between right and wrong Nature can draw no such distinction as between things gainful and harmful, what is to be sought and what is to be shunned ... (ll. 97-106, 111-14)

Though law can be justified by reference to pleasure and pain, it is not the product solely of sensual experience. Morality is not natural, but is the instrument by which people, reacting to painful experience, form a harmonious society. First, language facilitates mutual understanding and opens the possibility of social accommodation. Then, language becomes the medium in which people formulate and publish their laws. But, according to Freud, language is important in another respect: it is a necessary stage in the development of consciousness, which enables men to choose their actions rather than simply respond to instinctive drives. This possibility of conscious choice is an assumption underlying all of Horace's satire.

Horace chooses as his targets not those who are his polar opposite but those who threaten his conscious attempts to moderate the sometimes conflicting forces within him. One example we have already examined is the totalistic stoics, to whom he recommends tolerance, not lawlessness. Usually Horace tries to diminish the conflict between morality and instinct. For instance, in Satire I.11, where he advocates whoring
in preference to adultery, he argues that our instinctive drives are not so demanding as they seem; unfortunately, we often give them a false intensity by placing them in competition with the demands of morality. Man's real sensual needs, he claims, are easily satisfied and soon cloyed. Not accepting this fact of nature, the foolish adulterers seek to increase their desire by initiating a game in which desire and prohibition are the contestants (ll. 96-110). The adulterer risks punishment, which is, in effect, the price he has agreed to pay if he is caught. In psychological terms, the risk legitimizes his desire while simultaneously sharpening it to rebellion. But rather than increasing sexual tension by playing id and superego off against each other, Horace chooses a healthy ego that ministers only to the id's real demands. In attacking the adulterers, he rejects their combination of extremes for a middle course, which he regards as both natural and not disruptive of social harmony. The use of prostitutes, though not commendable (l. 30), involves less danger than adultery, produces no social conflict, and leads to greater psychic equanimity.

In Satire I.vi we see Horace producing a compromise between two conflicting mental forces: his belief in modesty and his desire to feel superior to others. He reconciles the conflict by claiming that his modesty makes him superior. Though he makes his modesty serve his ambition, on other levels, his belief in modesty is genuine. Like tolerance, it is a social virtue that helps to limit conflict among individuals. On a more personal level, it is a way of redeeming and maintaining a connection with his humble beginnings as the son of a manumitted slave. Horace had become the friend of Maecenas, the second most powerful man
in the Roman Empire at the time, and Horace wrote the satire to defend that friendship, which had been attacked on grounds of the great contrast in their family backgrounds. He responds that personal merit is more important than noble ancestors. Attacking ambition in order to show his lack of it, Horace takes the attitude of a man who is simply superior, and whose superiority has been justly recognized. Relating an earlier occurrence in his career, he describes himself greeting Maecenas with faltering words and speechless shame (I.vi.56-57)—a sign of modesty, he claims, but perhaps really a sign of suppressed ambition. He carefully gives the responsibility for cultivating the friendship to Maecenas and—to a lesser degree—Virgil. Thus, attacks upon the friendship come to seem attacks upon Maecenas's judgment—a more dangerous target than Horace himself. In addition, he distracts attention from the efforts he must have made to improve himself and from the ambition needed to motivate those efforts.

The attack upon the friendship and the basis for the attack threaten the coherence of Horace's identity. His enemies want separation between at least two classes of society: the nobles and the freedmen. If such a separation is legitimate, Horace's position is untenable. He is to be more closely identified with the lower of the two classes. However, by claiming that personal merit is a more appropriate criterion for Maecenas's friendship, Horace finds a way to reconcile his former and present group memberships: the merits he developed as a freedman's son justify his friendship with Maecenas. Referring to values that transcend those of a mere class, Horace redefines the nature of Maecenas's group to allow his membership in it. After rejecting the idea that it should
be composed of nobles, Horace presents the real criteria in the following passage:

... you [Maecenas] are cautious to choose as friends only the worthy, who stand aloof from base self-seeking. ... I count it a great honour that I pleased you, who discern between fair and foul, not by a father's fame, but by blamelessness of life and heart. (ll. 50-52, 62-64)

To Maecenas Horace gives responsibility for choosing the members of the group and for determining the ideological basis for the choice, though Horace clearly believes himself worthy of being chosen. One of the criteria is that friends should not use the friendship to serve their own ambitions. Basically, Horace argues that he is not ambitious because Maecenas does not believe him to be. Of course, this argument is logically flawed, but it is effective here because it is a compliment to his patron's judgment. No one who wants to avoid offending Maecenas is likely to disagree.

Though Horace rejects the snobbery of ancestry, he does not reject that of educated understanding. Horace prefers the distinction between educated, perceptive individuals and uneducated, usually stupid ones, to the distinction based on birth. However, it serves Horace's purpose to leave the two distinctions incompletely disentangled. Towards the beginning of the satire, he concedes that even the stupid common people have sometimes accurately recognized that ancestry does not assure true merit. But, appealing to educated prejudice, he proceeds to ask rhetorically, "What, then, should we do, we who are set far, far above the vulgar?" (ll. 17-18). Although he admits that the vulgar are sometimes right, he credits his own merits partly to having received a noble's education (ll. 65-78). Though he attacks the poor, uneducated, "vulgar"
masses, they are not the people Horace wishes to convince. The real target is other nobles of Maecenas's and his acquaintance. For rhetorical purposes, Horace draws upon the nobles' belief that their superior education and understanding justify their position in society. If they do not want to be associated with the ignorant crowd, they should recognize his true merit and accept his friendship with Maecenas. Thus, Horace uses the equation of nobility with wisdom to undermine that equation itself sufficiently to allow his entry into noble circles. Using an element of their ideology, he redefines the group so he can establish his identity within it.

As a way to deny his own ambition, Horace argues against ambition and a related quality, vanity, which turns men into slaves. "The truth is, Vanity drags all, bound to her glittering car, the unknown no less than the well known" (ll. 23-24). The examples which follow this remark suggest that the unknown are included because they are filled with envy for the more successful, whom they therefore inspect closely and destructively. While Horace does not directly accuse his opponents, he implies that they are motivated by envy and are themselves guilty of ambition. He turns their attack back upon them. These remarks are also meant to suggest Horace has no motivation to seek fame, though he may be attaining it inadvertently. The man who wisely renounces ambition finds himself in harmony with others, since envy will not enslave him and no one will want to attack him. But in so arguing, he rather openly admits the motivation for his own pose. One may legitimately wonder how simple and unambitious Maecenas and his circle really were, but they probably found Horace less threatening if the poet appeared modest, and it
certainly was not in their best interests to appear ambitious for higher posts. The fact that all were bound to endorse modesty makes Horace's defense a strong one. Thus, his supposed lack of ambition qualifies him for a place of honor.

Though Horace uses his modesty to serve his ambition, he has other motives for being modest. Self-effacement enables him to retain his ties with his humble past and to escape from the complicated ideological manipulation and self-defense his new role entails. Later his Sabine farm, which connected him to his former life on his father's farm, would provide him refuge from the backbiting of Rome:

I was not cheated by Fate,
who gave me a little farm and a spirit
sensitive to Grecian poetry, above
the crowd and its spite.
(ode II.16) 64

Poetry provided another refuge. Though unambitious in a worldly sense, Horace was poetically very ambitious. To retain a patron, an appreciative audience, and stimulating contacts within Maecenas's circle is the real motive for defending his friendship. He reveals his poetic ambition in the following ode:

No paltry or commonplace wings will loft me
through the fluent air in my doubled form as
a poet, and I will not linger
longer on earth: high above envy I
will leave the cities. Not for me, the child of
impoverished parents, not for me, your guest,
my dearest Maecenas, the dying
and the confinement by the river Styx.

Now, now, the skin on my legs is becoming
wrinkled, and above I am metamorphosed
to a white bird, soft feathers are
forming upon my fingers and shoulders.
Now more famous than Daedalus' Icarus
as a singing bird I will see the shores of
the roaring Bosphorus, the gulfs of
Syrtes, and the Hyperborean fields.

I will be known by Colchians and Dacians
(who hide their fear of Marsian troops) and far-off
Geloni, I will be studied by
Spanish scholars and the tribes on the Rhone.

Please omit dirges and lamentations and
disgusting grief at my foolish funeral;
keep down the clamor and never mind
the superfluous tribute of a tomb.

(Ode II.20)

His ambition to achieve so much that he will become unassailable involves
him in a strange paradox. Though in fact he needs the recognition of
others, his desire to escape criticism causes him to interpret the status
which he seeks and eventually achieves as an autonomous one. He dreams
of possessing a significant identity for the widest possible audience
while gaining freedom from the difficult manipulation of roles so evident
in Satire I.vi. This dream expresses desires apparent elsewhere in his
work. During his lifetime, it was only a dream, and he had to use his
conflicting roles both to maintain membership in two different classes
and to maintain independence from each, so that he could establish his
own unique identity as a moralist and a poet. The modesty of the freed-
man's son both cloaks his ambition and provides an escape from its
consequences. Thus two antithetical character traits complement each
other and serve him; he does not totalistically choose one, deny the other
and project it onto his enemies.

In the last third of Satire I.vi, Horace praises the benefits of
living the life of a freedman's son. By revealing how much he enjoys the
simple life, he issues a disclaimer of any ambition to wealth or high
position and thus advances his central purpose in the satire. But this section also shows him satisfying a deeper need: to carry into the present, in modified form, an earlier identity. In this way, he maintains something which is an important element in any person's identity: a sense of continuity with the past. Preserving the past also protects him from feeling too dependent on his patron and his group for a sense of identity; it provides a way to independence. Consequently, he stresses the ease and freedom from obligations which characterize his life-style. Claiming that he would not choose wealthier parents, he tells Maecenas, "And though the world would deem me mad, you, I hope, would think me sane for declining to shoulder a burden of trouble to which I have never been accustomed" (ll. 97-99). After this sentence, Horace gradually drops his modest tone and ends the satire proclaiming the actual superiority of his simple life. Thus, his humble roots become a potent counter to any sense of inferiority he may have felt in the presence of the wealthy and powerful. His past, of which he had stood accused, is redeemed and made useful.

In lines 65-95 Horace praises a transitional figure between his lowly beginnings and his current success. This figure is his father, who took him to Rome so he could obtain the kind of education normally given to sons of knights and senators. By attributing all of his virtue and understanding to the influence of his father, Horace accomplishes an important rhetorical purpose. He forces anyone who attacks his friendship with Maecenas on the basis of Horace's background to attack his father's motivations as well. And Horace depicts him as such a loving, wise and self-sacrificing man, that any attack would seem mean-spirited.
In addition, Horace apparently regards his success as a demonstration of love for, and loyalty to, his father. Upon any sympathetic reader, Horace's intense gratitude makes a more favorable impression than the "carping" of Horace's enemies. But the attitudes of his audience and enemies are not simply a social problem; they also bear psychic significance because they contribute to his present identity. It is essential for Horace to love his father and for others to honor his love because that love justifies the rise that links his past and present identities.

It seems likely that Horace would have earlier met opposition to his upward mobility when he attended school in Rome. This opposition would have made him unusually dependent upon his parent for moral support. Years later, in this satire, we see Horace depending upon a mental image of his father in similarly uncongenial circumstances. Fortunately, Horace was spared any strong need to rebel against his father's aspirations for him because his father did not make those aspirations oppressive: "He had no fear that some day, if I should follow a small trade as crier or like himself as tax-collector, somebody would count this to his discredit" (11. 85-87). His father's advice made provision for Horace's ambivalence, and as the passage continues, we see that Horace accepted the guidance: "Nor should I have made complaint, but, as it is, for this I owe him praise and thanks the more" (11. 87-89). We can see in Horace's moderate ambivalence the basis for the independence he later claims.

Though fathers may press ambitions upon their offspring, they often present themselves as blocking figures, whose sons experience guilt over their desire to overcome them. But Horace's father, instead of trying
to prove his superiority, wanted to be surpassed, as his sacrifices for Horace's education show. Whatever guilt Horace may have felt at surpassing him and leaving behind his social station is transformed to gratitude by the father's active connivance in the son's success. Gratitude serves to keep his father above him with enough authority to endorse his behavior. Without love for his father, he would probably have been left with a heavy burden of guilt for rising above his original social position and assuming a new identity. So love ratifies both the past and the present despite the differences between them. Love for his father becomes the emotional basis for reconciling his roles as Maecenas's friend and a freedman's son. Important though this basis for reconciliation is, it is limited enough to permit Horace to play the roles off against each other when it suits his purpose, as we have already seen him do. Since his father has allowed for Horace's ambivalence, loving him does not necessitate rejecting either role.

Imitation, it is said, is the sincerest form of flattery. In Satire I.iv Horace claims to have modeled his role as a satirist upon the role his father played toward him:

If in my words I am too free, perchance too light, this bit of liberty you will indulgently grant me. 'Tis a habit the best of fathers taught me, for, to enable me to steer clear of follies, he would brand them, one by one, by his examples. Whenever he would encourage me to live thriftily, frugally, and content with what he had saved for me, "Do you not see," he would say, "how badly fares young Albius, and how poor is Baius? A striking lesson not to waste one's patrimony!"

(ll. 103-111)

And Horace goes on to give several other examples. Affirming the theories of Erikson and Delevita, this passage shows his father's use of negative role models in forming Horace's positive identity. One may infer that
Horace intends in his satires to have a similar effect upon his audience and to reassert his own identity. The passage also implies that his role is as benevolent a one as his father's. As in Satire I.vi, Horace uses his gratitude towards his father as a justification for his present role. By reminding his audience that he once played the role he now asks them to play, he undercuts any attempt to polarize their roles into those of oppressive father and recalcitrant child. By presenting himself as a formerly helpless child who needed instruction in the ways of the world, he reveals his own vulnerability and disarms his audience of the defenses they have worn against his attacks. And since he is grateful to his father, he suggests, should not the audience be similarly grateful to Horace? This ploy may seem disingenuous, and it is, in that it distracts attention from the destructiveness of satiric attacks. Nevertheless, Horace speaks the truth, though perhaps not the whole truth. He shows us the real genesis of his identity as a satirist and his motivation for continuing in the role.

In the final paragraph of this satire, one may see how Horace's self-deprecation undermines his adversaries' defenses. Here he tells how, while reflecting on other people's behavior, he looks for ways to improve his own conduct. He continues:

Thus, with lips shut tight, I debate with myself; and when I find a bit of leisure, I trifle with my papers. This is one of those lesser frailties I spoke of, and if you should make no allowance for it, then would a big band of poets come to my aid—for we are the big majority—and we, like the Jews, will compel you to make one of our throng. (11. 137-43)

In the earlier part of this passage, Horace trivializes his own satiric efforts and suggests they are not important enough to cause offense.

Once again he avoids the role of an oppressive father-figure and claims
innocence to disarm his critics. However, what he says here belies what he said earlier: that writing satire improves morality, which is an important and valuable object. Horace's self-deprecation is obviously ironic. But it is funny also, because it involves a typically comic trick. His self-deprecation appears as a defensive rather than an offensive maneuver; it is an attempt to escape from criticism. By making this maneuver, Horace places himself in the same role as his critics, who attacked him because they feared his criticism. He makes a conciliatory bid for sympathy. His critics disarmed, their anger can escape as laughter. The idea of compulsion expressed in the last sentence seems more frank and potentially offensive. But here the frankness is winning—for two reasons. First, it confirms the audience's perception of what he has just said as a comic trick. Granting them freedom to reject it, he acknowledges their ambivalence and ability to choose. And second, since Horace's desire is to include them in a group rather than exclude them, his threat of compulsion merely shows how intensely he wants them to join. He thereby implies that writing satire is a friendly act, not the hostile one they had assumed it was.

Juvenal and Horace have traditionally been regarded as the archetypical tragic and comic satirists. In this chapter I have tried to explain their characteristics in terms of the identity theories propagated by Erikson and others. Juvenal, the tragic satirist, responds totalistically to an identity confusion brought on by incongruities between his ideology and observable Roman behavior. Horace becomes a comic satirist by eschewing totalism and accommodating his ambivalence to social forms. By these means, he makes allowances for his audience's
ambivalence and seeks to charm his readers into accepting his views. On a more personal level, by manipulating roles, he achieves a socially acceptable identity substantially of his own devising. In contrast, Juvenal uses his own defeated identity as a rhetorical tactic to encourage a return to traditional Roman values. In the following chapters, the ideas developed here will prove useful in interpreting Swift, who combines characteristics of both Juvenal and Horace.
FOOTNOTES


5. Dryden, p. 656.


15. Paulson, p. 28.


23. Friedlaender, p. 37.


25. Fredericks, p. 143.


27. Kernan, pp. 76-78.


29. Friedlaender, p. 38.


32. Kernan, p. 69.


38. Duff, p. 64.


41. Duff, p. 83.

42. Sigsbee, p. 85.

43. Rudd, p. 15.


45. Rudd, pp. 266-67.


47. Duff, p. 64.


50. Rudd, p. 40.

51. Fraenkel, p. 103.

52. McGann, pp. 84-92.


56. Sigsbee, p. 86.

57. Rudd, p. 19.

58. McGann, pp. 61-72.


60. Horace, pp. 30-45.


63. Horace, pp. 75-87.


CHAPTER III. SWIFT'S IDENTITY:
"VERSE ON THE DEATH OF DR. SWIFT"

Swift is the most enigmatic of the three satirists under
discussion, for he combines Juvenal’s indignant vituperation with
Horace's detachment and humor. Swift attacks his opponents totalistically,
but is wary of totalism. He projects his worst traits onto others, yet
at times recognizes his own reflection in their countenances. What are
we to make of him? To begin to answer this question, we will turn to
the "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift," which contains in its closing
panegyric a self-portrait of the dean. An analysis of the identity he
presents here will prepare us for the discussion of Gulliver's Travels
in the following chapters and will, in particular, enable us better to
understand the degree of Swift's distance from his narrator in that work.

The "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift"\textsuperscript{1} has been a subject of much
controversy in recent years. The disagreement revolves around an apparent
contradiction between Swift's portrait of himself as a self-sacrificing
public servant, who "Without regarding private Ends,/ Spent all his
Credit for his Friends" (ll. 3\textsuperscript{3}1-32), and the main premise of the poem,
taken from La Rochefoucauld. In Swift’s translation, the maxim reads,

\begin{verbatim}
In all Distresses of our Friends
We first consult our private Ends,
While Nature kindly bent to ease us,
Points out some Circumstance to please us,
\end{verbatim}
(II. 7-10)

Did Swift not see that the example of his own selflessness contradicts
Rochefoucauld's generalization on the selfishness of man? J. Middleton
Murray answers negatively and finds the discrepancy a fault.\textsuperscript{2} A graver
fault is that the earlier part of the poem seems to attack pride, whereas Swift himself seems vain in the panegyric. Barry Slepian has attempted to resolve the conflict by claiming that the panegyric is ironic; the satirist is satirizing himself as someone guilty of pride. For evidence, Slepian points to several obvious untruths in the panegyric, to contradictions within the poem itself, and to Swift’s footnotes, which Slepian interprets as ironic overstatement. Yet, as Scouven and Hume have pointed out, not everything in the panegyric can be taken as ironic; much expresses Swift’s strong and persistent convictions. Explaining what they consider the real function of the irony in the panegyric, these critics write, “he burlesques his praise just enough that the reader should be too delighted by the multiple ironies to resist the apologia.”

Other critics, such as Uphaus and Fischer, have replied to Slepian’s argument by asserting that Swift does not satirize pride at all, but accepts it as a universal feature of human nature. In Fischer’s view, Swift’s purpose is to show that man’s moral task is “to draw from his potentially dark and selfish nature a truly generous conduct.” as Swift does when he praises Pope and others by expressing envy of them. However, though these views have a proper bearing upon the interpretation of the poem, it is surely an overstatement to assert that Swift’s purpose in the “Verses” is to urge them, for he more obviously aims at self-vindication; these views merely support his purpose. In addition, Fischer’s interpretation becomes excessively theological, most notably when he concludes that “the whole lesson of Swift’s panegyric is that the only true good of man is trust in God.” Although Fischer supports his argument with several examples of Biblical allusions found in Swift’s
poem his conclusion conflicts with the more obvious meaning of the
"Verses." To be considered plausible, an interpretation must not violate
common sense, must find some coherent pattern within the poem, and must
be consistent with what else we know of Swift.

I have already quoted lines 7 through 10 of the "Verses," where the
author introduces Rochefoucauld's maxim. Following these lines, Swift
produces many illustrations, all of which fall into one of two categories—
envy of others' success or fame, and pleasure at their decline in health.
The two categories are appropriate to this poem, for the supposed impetus
for its composition is Swift's death, the ultimate decline in health and
the occasion for friends and public alike to evaluate his life. In addi-
tion, Freud's concept of omnipotence can be used to show a connection
between the categories. During the oral stage, according to Otto
Fenichel, "since the psychological separation of the ego from the external
world is still incomplete, through comprehending the outside world or
parts of it within itself, the ego comes to feel itself omnipotent."¹⁰
Later, "When the child is forced through experiences to renounce his
belief in his omnipotence, he considers the adults who have now become
independent objects to be omnipotent, and tries by introjection to share
their omnipotence again."¹¹ What he introjects includes certain rules
of behavior, the enforcement of which taught him his powerlessness. By
obeying the rules, he hopes to recover his lost power and self-esteem.
Fenichel defines "self-esteem"—called "pride" by Swift—as "the aware-
ness of how close the individual is to the original omnipotence."¹²
Obviously, death is nature's final denial of man's omnipotence, so
Swift's two categories are more deeply related than at first appears.
In preparing for death, Swift plays at renouncing both residues of his childish belief in omnipotence—his pride along with his mortality.

The anal stage can provide the archetypal pattern for a person’s relation to a society and its ideology and represent an important turning point in the development of self-esteem. If toilet training is pursued too harshly, the child may feel that he must introject forces which are basically hostile to him. As previously pointed out, a sadistic superego consists partly of energies rebelling against parental authority and turned back against the self.\textsuperscript{13} Thereafter, the child is faced with a dilemma: his self-esteem depends partly upon his acceptance of the introjected authority, yet the self-accusations instigated by the authority deprive him of self-esteem. Searching for a way out of this dilemma, such an individual may attempt to turn the self-accusations against others, but in doing so he violates the social code requiring kindness and benevolence. When, to prove his merit, he renounces this aggression, it only turns back upon him, damaging anew his self-esteem. If for this reason the conflict between obedience and defiance is never resolved, the individual may attempt basically unsatisfactory compromises or endlessly alternate between kinds of behavior symbolizing obedience and defiance. He may try to escape the conflict in a variety of ways: he may regress either actually or symbolically to a stage before toilet training, he may deny his own rebellion and either seek the good opinion of others to reinforce the denial or seek association with others—especially those with power or prestige—for the same purpose, or he may become so distrustful of authority that, mistakenly believing in his superior good will towards himself, he attempts to set himself up as the sole judge of
his own merit. The last of these attempted solutions fails, for, to be convinced of his worth, he must apply criteria that are social in origin; therefore, he merely internalizes the conflict rather than resolving it. The other attempted solutions are unstable because they seek to deny forces that exercise real power within the psyche.

Though we, of course, know nothing of Swift's toilet training, the scatological character of much of his writing is well known and strongly suggests he experienced and never really resolved these anal conflicts. By fits and starts, he tries, abandons, and tries again all of the solutions mentioned above. For this reason, Swift's personality has always seemed contradictory and difficult to interpret. Swift's exclamation, "HOW inconsistent is Man with himself!" suggests he was aware of his contradictions; and the statement of his intentions in writing—to vex rather than divert mankind—implies knowledge of the contradictory implications of his work. He presents the reader with the discrepancy between what man is and what he ought to be and admits no possibility of a thorough resolution. The conflict between obedience and defiance is exploited, compromised, and sometimes mocked, but it never really ends. Therefore, the dilemmas Swift poses cannot be resolved by interpretation; the wary critic dares no further than to describe.

To describe Swift as an anal character, however, is not to suggest that his problem was only resistance to a jordan. Rather, the anal conflicts set a pattern for his interpretation of social relations and ideological commitments, a pattern reinforced by further experience. Swift's anal interpretations of human aspirations and ambitions in such works as A Tale of a Tub and The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit
depend for their effect upon their reductiveness. He interprets all
dreams of glory as attempts to deny the reality of human nature which
anity symbolizes. This real nature involves man in filth and depravity
and in all the anal passions—anger, rebellion, selfishness, and greed.
Man's very attempts to deny these aspects of his nature point most
emphatically at their existence: there would be no need for denial were
there nothing to deny. Denied, the objectionable aspects often gain
expression surreptitiously in the activities and ideas used to deny them.
Swift's insistence that man cannot be what he dreams of is a stubborn
though sometimes guilty resistance to ideological demands for renunciation
of his anality. This resistance, however, is sometimes balanced by the
accusatory character of his writing and by his belief in the limited
good man is capable of once he accepts his true nature.

In "The Excremental Vision" Norman O. Brown has argued that Swift
explores his anal version of the "universal neurosis of mankind" and
presents his discovery of sublimation in his scatological works. Unfort-
unately, Brown overemphasizes the expository nature of Swift's composi-
tions and tends to ignore Swift's involvement in the anal conflicts
animating his work. Brown also does not link anality to identity and
self-esteem.

The Swift so far described is the one with whom we are all familiar.
Yet Swift does not use scatology only for purposes of attack; at times
he dreams of excremental pleasures. Seeing this side of his work does
much to dispel the mists of horror which obscure some of his work for
even post-Victorian readers: Swift did not intend his excremental
attacks in so vitriolic a spirit as is often supposed. Swift was more
accepting of feces and anal conflicts than some of his readers. Part of his fun came from alarming others with descriptions which he liked to believe did not alarm him so much. The basic conflict and the substances involved seemed much more innocent and easier to face than the deeper anxieties of anally interpreted experience. The bowels provided a route to simplification, though Swift characteristically compromised it by elaboration of idea, image, and syntax, as anxiety crept in. In alarming others, he could express his own rebelliousness and try to project his fear and revulsion onto them, triumphing over readers and anxiety at once. He could also be proud of facing the truth, though we know that Swift’s truth is not everyone’s.

"A Panegyrick on the Dean" is one poem that demonstrates Swift's enjoyment of excremental ideas. In the person of Lady Acheson, Swift praises himself as the builder of two privies, which he denominates temples to the goddess Cloacine. In a rhapsodic style, he asks,

THEE bounteous Goddess Cloacine,
To Temples why do we confine?
Forbid in open Air to breath;
Why are thine Altars fix’t beneath?

WHEN Saturn rul’d the Skies alone,
That golden Age, to Gold unknown;
This earthly Globe to thee assign’d,
Receiv’d the Gifts of all Mankind,
Ten Thousand Altars smoaking round
Were built to thee, with Off’rings crown’d;
And here they daily Vot’ries plac’t
Their Sacrifice with Zeal and Haste;
The Margin of a purling Stream,
Sent up to thee a grateful Steam.

(11, 229-42)

Far from expressing revulsion, this poem expresses a desire to overcome it. Swift attributes our revulsion to gluttony: feces did not smell bad until man turned to a superabundant and luxurious diet. The stench
and the necessity of bowel control are punishment for oral pleasures. As a result, Cloacine,

None seek thee now in open Air;
To thee no verdant Altars rear;
But, in their Cells and Vaults obscene
Present a Sacrifice unclean;
From whence unsavory Vapours rose,
Offensive to thy nicer Nose.
Ah! who in our degen’rate Days
As Nature prompts, his Off’ring pays?

(11. 281-88)

Gluttony is Swift's version of the Fall: before that event no conflict existed between man and his maker's law. A world without privies and chamber pots he presents as his version of paradise. And, indeed, the period in a child's life before toilet training is relatively free of conflict between a child's and his parents' wills. Controlling his bowels is a price the dependent child must pay for his continued nourishment. The author decries gluttony because hunger necessitated compliance to his mother's or his nurse's wishes. Swift's anal fantasy provides an imaginary escape from the demands of civilization. Of course, the poem is jocular in tone; the reader is meant easily to reject as a trivial and childish fantasy the idea that he might regain his anal innocence. Yet the poem could provide no enjoyment did not the fantasy possess a certain appeal. Therefore, the poem constitutes evidence that Swift's conflicts between obedience and defiance did originate in the anal period. The poem presents a prospect of escape to an earlier stage of development, before his self-esteem was subject to the observance of rules.

The "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift" is not scatological, but Swift's anal character does help to explain the ironies and contradic-
tions of the poem. Basically, in the two sections preceding the panegyric, Swift creates a humorous compromise between his desire for immortality and fame and the need to renounce them. The panegyric represents a restructuring of the same elements: he demands immortal fame and claims to have paid a price. Central to the poem are the issues of self-esteem and omnipotence. By continuing the conflict between obedience and defiance, he maintains the belief that one or the other should grant him something closer to his original omnipotence. Since neither one actually does, he keeps looking back to the other to provide it.

Overlying this structure are the recognition that he cannot obtain omnipotence and the belief that he should not seek it. Since this belief is sanctioned by Christianity, pursuit of omnipotence is attended by a loss of esteem and by alienation from an omnipotent God. The value system that seems to offer participation in omnipotence demands that he renounce it. Swift's reaction against seeking omnipotence is unsuccessful because the reaction itself is partly motivated by desire for omnipotence and self-esteem. He can brazenly assert his desire, he can qualify it by irony, and he can condemn or ridicule it, but he cannot abandon it.

The social relationships described in the "Verses" are highly competitive. People gain self-esteem by comparing themselves favorably to others, often by projecting their own weaknesses and vices onto them. Since omnipotence is impossible, one can measure one's approach to it only by comparison to others who are one's rivals to power and prestige. Behind the competition is the common human experience of sibling rivalry, where children compete for the support of an omnipotent parent. Though Swift had a sister, his rivalry may have been more with other students
at boarding school, the teachers filling the role of parents. In such a rivalry, a child may blame a sibling for unfairly robbing him of his omnipotence. Such a child may point to the sibling’s failures to follow parental rules as evidence that he has been unfairly alienated from the parental omnipotence. Another possible reaction is to dispute the parental omnipotence by refusing to obey the parent’s wishes or by finding fault with the rules or with their application. In other words, if the child cannot win the rivalry by adhering to the rules, he can refuse to play or try to grant his omnipotence to another referee. If the desire for omnipotence is not abandoned, these modi operandi can become permanent character structures. The "Verses" provide evidence that Swift himself was unable to choose among the tactics because none could provide the desired result. The fact that he therefore switched among them helps to explain the inconsistencies in the poem.

Although not entirely compatible with the concepts of Freud and Erikson, some ideas presented by Karen Horney in *Neurosis and Human Growth* are useful in understanding Swift’s personality. According to Ms. Horney, a neurotic is someone who, because of extreme social pressures, has found it impossible to develop as himself. Since only a very large reward can compensate him for abandoning his true self, the neurotic conceives an image of an ideal self who he would like to become and who, he believes, would be entitled to treatment as someone special, not required to conform to all social norms and entitled to having all his needs and desires satisfied. However, the neurotic can never really achieve this goal; in comparison to his ideal, his undeveloped true self seems contemptible. A conflict between two senses of identity ensues,
as he wonders, "Who am I? Am I the proud superhuman being—or am I the subdued, guilty, rather despicable creature?" Needless to say, this is exactly the conflict faced by Gulliver in Book IV of the *Travels*. Swift himself ridiculed the conflict not because he had resolved it; rather, ridicule served as a reaction formation against the conflict. He distanced the conflict by projecting it onto Gulliver.

Horney's view that there is such a thing as a "real self" seems highly questionable. In the course of development, any personality must adopt a social ideology which is not part of its basic nature. Ms. Horney herself fails to define "real self," saying only that the individual must decide for himself what his real self is. Unfortunately, this seemingly reasonable statement leaves a theoretical vacuum. I regard "real self" largely as a rhetorical term designed to encourage patients to take responsibility for their lives and to accept parts of themselves which they have denied. For the purpose of this study, I accept Freud's view that there is a basically irresolvable conflict between instinctual man and his social self. The formation of an ideal self or ego ideal is a necessary part of social adaptation. The conflict between it and limitations and desires incompatible with it can be ameliorated but not eliminated. The acceptance of a "real self" does not resolve the conflict or obliterate the forms that it takes. Nevertheless, however overoptimistic Ms. Horney may be about the resolution, her description of the conflict can provide insights into Swift's character.

Living in an environment which does not allow him to develop his real self, a child develops a sense of basic anxiety. "It is his feeling of being isolated and helpless in a world conceived as potentially
hostile." In reaction, he may try to cling to the most powerful person around him; he may try to rebel and fight; he may try to shut others out of his inner life and withdraw emotionally from them. In principle, this means that he can move toward, against, or away from others.  

Since in his unfavorable circumstances

the child is driven not only in one of these directions, but in all of them, he develops fundamentally contradictory attitudes toward others. The three moves toward, against, and away from others therefore constitute a conflict, his basic conflict with others. In time, he tries to solve it by making one of these moves consistently predominant—tries to make his prevailing attitude one of compliance, or aggressiveness, or aloofness.

Ms. Horney divides neurotics into three groups according to their methods of resolving the conflict. These are the expansive, the self-effacing, and the resigned types. The expansive neurotic "prevailing identifies himself with his glorified self" and attempts to deny his compliant self. The self-effacing neurotic identifies with his compliant self and tries to gain love by conforming to the wishes of others; the resigned neurotic has given up his internal struggles and cultivates detachment. In the case of Swift, the choice among the three alternatives seems not to have been made in so stark a manner as Horney describes. The conflicting attitude towards others remains, and Swift forms compromises among the trends. Nevertheless, Horney's description of the first group especially applies to Swift and therefore requires further discussion. Members of this group desire to master life. "The reverse side of the necessity for mastery is his dread of anything connoting helplessness; this is the most poignant dread he has." The expansive group is divided into three subdivisions—the narcissistic, the perfectionistic, and the arrogant-vindicitive types. The narcissistic person believes that
he "is his idealized self and seems to adore it." The perfectionist identifies himself with his standards; he equates "in his mind standards and actualities—knowing about moral values and being a good person." The aim of the third type is to gain a vindictive triumph. Repeated humiliations have convinced him that affection is rarely genuine and generally hypocritical, so he forces himself not to desire it but to scorn it. Renouncing all self-effacing trends, he regards any human need as "a sign of despicable weakness." Maintaining a myth of god-like self-sufficiency, "he becomes too proud to ask for anything, and cannot receive anything graciously." He must find himself superior to others and "cannot tolerate anybody who knows or achieves more than he does, wields more power, or in any way questions his superiority." Since like other neurotics he cannot ever realize the image he has created for himself, he comes to hate himself and his self-effacing trends intensely. Unable to accept his self-hate, he projects his negative identity onto others and adopts a punitive attitude towards them. Such an attitude fills two other functions, as well: it is a way of expressing his vindictiveness, and "it serves as a means of intimidating others for the purpose of asserting his claims" to special treatment. He also expresses his self-hate by an "utter disregard for his personal welfare," in his pursuit of triumph.

Ms. Horney's neurotic types resemble Erikson's totalistic personality, but there are some differences between the two theories. First, Horney explains demands for special treatment as a demand for compensation for abandoning the real self, whereas Erikson appears to accept Freud's explanation that they are an attempt to regain infantile omnipotence.
Second, Horney describes a more limited set of possible negative and positive identities. Third, Horney presents more details about the motivations and development of the personalities she describes, especially of the arrogant-vindictive type, to which Swift seems partly to belong. Fourth, Erikson regards the development of positive and negative identities as a necessary part of identity formation, whereas Horney does not. According to him, these opposed senses of identity form a substratum even in the healthy, "whole" personality, who has gained enough self-assurance to relax the demands of his positive identity without giving them up and to become more tolerant of himself and others. Fifth, although Horney's "real self" corresponds to Erikson's "whole personality," in that both concepts imply the individual's acceptance of all his real desires and supposed weaknesses, the concepts differ in that they fit into two different sets of alternatives. The "whole personality" includes both positive and negative identities, and is contrasted to the totalistic identification with the positive one. The "real self," though it includes trends to move against, towards, and away from other people, does not attempt to exaggerate one of these and deny the others, as do the expansive, self-effacing, and resigned types. The "real self" is contrasted to all these types and to both positive and negative identities. The "real self" does not include these contrary senses of identity, but only trends which, if further developed, could lead to such distortions of the true self. Despite these theoretical differences, Horney and Erikson discuss some of the same phenomena; only their explanations differ, and only in part. Horney's views on the social development of the child can be used to show how social experience as interpreted by an
analyly oriented individual reinforces that orientation. In particular, she can help us to understand the development and modification of Swift's ideal identity or ego ideal.

Swift seems to have developed an ideal identity in reaction to humbling experiences, which include his status as a poor relation educated at the expense of his uncles, and his position as secretary to Sir William Temple, who treated him with what Swift considered insufficient respect and consideration. In the Journal to Stella, Swift recounts a conversation with Harley: "one thing I warned him of, Never to appear cold to me, for I would not be treated like a school-boy; that I had felt too much of that in my life already (meaning from Sir William Temple). In reaction to such experiences, Swift formed the ambition to regain his self-esteem by becoming a bishop, an influential political figure, and a famous wit.

Though Swift bases his claim to identity partly on personal abilities, there is an ideological basis as well. This ideology represents a compromise in the conflict between an earlier set of positive and negative identities. This conflict never really ends but is subsumed into the new ideology, which serves as the basis for a new ideal self. Basically, Swift sees this conflict as one between reason, which is taught by society, and passion, which is inherent in the individual from birth. Occasionally, we can see this earlier conflict clearly coming forth again, as when in the "Letter to a Young Gentleman Lately Entered into Holy Orders," Swift totalistically asserts that to argue with the profligate "is almost in a literal sense, to fight with Beasts." Here Swift suggests that indulgence in passion excludes one from identity as a
human being. However, despite a continual pull back to a Christian totalism, Swift's saner self rejects totalism. Swift regards reason as highly corruptible by the passions, and the famous example of Gulliver's Travels, Book IV, shows how far he was from demanding that men be totally reasonable. Characteristically, Swift insists upon man's bestial nature while asking something more of him. Only be recognizing his corrupt nature can man hope to achieve the limited good he is capable of. This ideological commitment represents a compromise between obedience to the demand that he be reasonable and rebellion against it.

In politics, too, Swift was against totalism and against political parties because they nurtured it. In Examiner Number 31 he writes,

I HAD last Week sent me by an unknown Hand a Passage out of Plato, with some Hints how to apply it. That Author puts a Fable into the Mouth of Aristophanes, with an Account of the Original of Love. That, Mankind was at first created with four Arms and Legs, and all other Parts double to what they are now; 'till Jupiter, as a Punishment for his Sins, cleft him in two with a Thunderbolt; since which Time we are always looking for our other Half; and this is the Cause of Love. But Jupiter threatened, that if they did not mend their Manners, he would give them t'other Silt, and leave them to hop about in the Shape of Figures in Baso Relievo. The Effect of this last Threatening, my Correspondent imagines is now come to pass; and, that as the first splitting was the Original of Love, by inclining us to search out for our t'other Half, so the second was the Cause of Hatred, by prompting us to fly from our other Side, and dividing the same Body into two, give each Slice the Name of a Party.

I APPROVE of the Fable and Application, with this Refinement upon it. For, Parties do not only split a Nation, but every Individual among them, leaving each but half their Strength, and Wit, and Honesty, and good Nature; but one Eye and Ear, for their Sight and Hearing, and equally lopping the rest of the Senses: Where Parties are pretty equal in a State, no Man can perceive one bad Quality in his own, or good one in his Adversaries. 37

To refute Whig charges against the Tories, he says in Examiner Number 33,

"A Whig forms an Image of a Tory, just after the Thing he most abhors;
and that Image serveth to represent the whole Body."38 Swift’s alternative to this sort of political totalism is support of the national interest. In Examiner Number 35, where Swift is discussing whether the monarch should support a political party, he writes,

when the visible Interest of his Crown and Kingdom lies on one Side; and when the other is but a Faction, raised and strengthened by Incidents and Intrigues, and by deceiving the People with false Representations of Things; he ought, in Prudence, to take the first Opportunity of opening his Subjects Eyes, and declaring himself in favour of those, who are for preserving the Civil and Religious Rights of the Nation, wherewith his own are so interwoven.

THIS was certainly our Case; For I do not take the Heads, Advocates, and Followers of the Whigs, to make up, strictly speaking, a National Party; being patched up of heterogeneous, inconsistent Parts, whom nothing served to unite but the common Interest of sharing in the Spoil and Plunder of the People; the present Dread of their Adversaries, by whom they apprehended to be called to an Account, and that general Conspiracy of endeavouring to overturn the Church and State

... .39

Thus, Swift’s rejection of one sort of totalism leads to formation of a new sort that supports his own claim to identity and damns the Whigs.

Support of the national interest is very much a part of Swift’s ideal self and continues to be so even in the "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift," written many years later. Here Swift describes his role in the controversy over Wood’s half-pence:

The Dean did by his Pen defeat
An infamous destructive Cheat.
Taught Fools their Int’rest how to know;
And gave them Arms to ward the Blow.
Envy hath own’d it was his doing,
To save that helpless Land from Ruin,
While they who at the Steerage stood,
And reapt the Profit, sought his Blood.

(11, 407-14)

Note that Swift bases his claim to identity and esteem upon his support for the public interest. To establish his claim, he attacks the fools
for not recognizing their interest and suggests that those "who at the
steerage stood" and who should have protected the national interest did
not do so but used their positions for personal benefit. In lines 443-54
he attacks the rural squires more explicitly for so misusing their public
trust. Swift also dumes the identity of one enemy, Chief Justice
Whitshed, by claiming that he "all Justice had discarded" (l. 421).
Betraying his true and ideologically correct social function, the judge
ceases to be a human being and metamorphoses into "A wicked Monster on
the Bench" (l. 417). By such maneuvers, Swift projects whatever selfish
motivations he possessed onto the governmental authorities. In contrast
to them, he identifies with the superegoic demand that one should support
the public interest and turns his superego's energies against them. Thus
he avoids being the victim of these energies himself and hopes to partici-
cipate in the superego's omnipotence. The self-importance his superego
grants him can be seen in the following lines:

   By Innocence and Resolution,
   He bore continual Persecution;
   While Numbers to Preferment rose;
   Whose Merits were, to be his Foes,
   (ll. 399-402)

Here the identity of his enemies is defined almost entirely in terms of
their opposition to Swift. In their intense antagonism towards him he
could see his own repressed desire to gain omnipotence for his rebellious
and selfish self. At the same time, the governmental officials' active
hostility towards him reinforces his basic anxiety and justifies his
need for triumph.

The idea of "interest" provides Swift with a useful alternative
within the political realm to the conflict between reason and passion,
for reason distinguishes man's true interest, serves his self-love, yet provides a bulwark against being overwhelmed by demands for immediate gratification. Thus, Swift's ideological commitment to interest and the claim to identity which it supports function as a limited accommodation of reason and passion, obedience and defiance, and the earlier set of positive and negative identities. The same principle extends to religious belief. Ultimately, man's highest interest is to go to Heaven:

The motives of the best actions will not bear too strict an enquiry. It is allowed, that the cause of most actions, good or bad, may be resolved into the love of ourselves; but the self-love of some men, inclines them to please others; and the self-love of others is wholly employed in pleasing themselves. This makes the great distinction between virtue and vice. Religion is the best motive of all actions, yet religion is allowed to be the highest instance of self-love. 40

In this way Swift attempts to reconcile man's selfish nature with God's plan, so that he need not deny human nature in order to act morally.

However, the idea of "interest" does not eliminate the conflict between reason and passion, for unchecked passion leads one to act in ways inconsistent with one's higher interest. Swift consistently opposes attempts to achieve a complete merger of passion and religion, as A Tale of a Tub, The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, and "A Letter to a Young Gentleman Lately Entered into Holy Orders" show. For Swift, a real conflict remains between man's immediate desires and God's will. One consequence of Swift's view is that the suppressed desires still seem rebellious against the higher self. In Swift's writings, this rebelliousness continues to gain expression in excremental imagery even after he has formed a second ideal self in hopes of resolving the original identity conflict. Sometimes he uses excremental imagery with admitted pleasure in it for its own sake, as in "A Panegyric on the Dean," which
I have already examined, and sometimes he uses it to condemn his opponents, as in A Tale of a Tub and Gulliver's Travels, Book III. In the latter case, Swift is not so much indulging in denial and projection of anal pleasures onto his enemies to maintain his sense of identity as he is using his own rebellious energies to support morality, religion, and common sense. Thus, he simultaneously accomplishes two seemingly opposed reconciliations. On the one hand, rebellion comes to the aid of orthodoxy. On the other, religion and morality serve as a means of revenge against the society which has forced him to conform to its norms. These two conflicting reconciliations can themselves be reconciled by Freud's insight that the energy of the superego is originally rage against cultural demands. Thus, Swift's style of wit operates by returning consciousness to that stage of psychic development where the change in direction of the anger takes place. Part of the difficulty in interpreting Swift's intentions stems from the fact that the direction of the anger is not clearly differentiated. But what causes difficulty here in interpretation is also the source of Swift's energy and wit, for in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, Freud has shown how wit depends upon creating a seeming reconciliation between opposite wishes.

Swift, then, formed two ideal identities. The first is the orthodox, clean, rational self at odds with the rebellious, anal self. The first becomes submerged in the second ideal, which is an attempt alternatively to reconcile or to mock these conflicts, to use them for satiric attacks upon various opponents, and otherwise to keep the competing forces in unresolved suspension. Like the first ideal self, the second is not a real self in Horney's sense, for the original conflict
between obedience and defiance continues. Nevertheless, the second ideal self does allow Swift to restore to his personality a balance of which the first ideal self would have deprived him. Though the second ideal self does qualify the first one, it does not eliminate it. Indeed, the second cannot exist without the first because it feeds off the conflict between the first set of positive and negative identities. However, Swift's claim to be the second ideal self sometimes leads him to project the first ideal onto others whom he represents as unrealistic idealists, as the example of "Strephon and Chloe" shows.

Swift uses both the first and second ideal selves to achieve a vindictive triumph. The original positive and negative identities are used to prove that Swift is either more moral or less squeamish than others. Swift uses the second ideal self to prove that he is more realistic than others about the mixed good and evil in human nature. Although Swift insists that this mixture exists, he does not view it with equanimity but with vindictive anger. Only a concern for his welfare keeps him from expressing it more openly:

Drown the World, I am not content with despising it, but I would anger it if I could with safety. I wish there were an Hospital built for it's despisers, where one might act with safety and it need not be a large Building, only I would have it well endowed . . . 43

His vindictiveness also expresses itself in his distrust of romantic love, which he interprets as a denial of the ugly side of human nature. For instance, in "A Letter to a Young Lady, on her Marriage," he writes,

. . . I hope, you do not still dream of Charms and Raptures; which Marriage ever did, and ever will put a sudden End to. Besides, yours was a Match of Prudence, and common Good-liking, without any Mixture of that ridiculous Passion which hath no Being, but in Play-Books and Romances. 44
Although denial of reality is not for all people a precondition for love, Swift thought it was because he had still not resolved the battle between his demand for perfection and his rebellion against that demand. He rejects love because to love he would have to reject the whole battle between obedience and defiance and the vindictive energies it generates. His "realism" becomes expression of vindictiveness against women, probably for the excessive demands they placed upon him during his toilet training. To such a person, being loved represents a great increase in his self-esteem Swift could not afford to make his self-esteem contingent upon his own perfection or upon meeting someone else's standards. Instead, he chooses to base his self-esteem upon his own standards, which include a "realistic" continuation of the conflict between obedience and defiance.

As I have already indicated, central to all these conflicts is the issue of self-esteem. Should Swift depend upon others for a sense of personal worth? Swift's answer is generally an emphatic no, for his experience showed him that he could not depend upon them for it. Another source of antagonism to such dependency is recognition that a desire for praise robs one of autonomy: to be praised, one must do what other people want. So Swift declares his independence, his own ability to decide his worth, in two contradictory ways: by defiance, and by adopting the social rules as his own. Asking for praise becomes evidence of low self-esteem:

To be vain, is rather a mark of humility than pride. Vain men delight in telling what honours have been done them, what great company they have kept, and the like, by which they plainly confess that these honours were more than their due, and such as their friends would not believe, if they had not been told: whereas a man truly proud, thinks the greatest honours below his merit, and consequently scorns to boast. I therefore deliver it as a maxim, that whoever desires the character of a proud man, ought to conceal his vanity.
Swift had to feel that any rewards came to him because others recognized his merit as he defined it, not because he had blindly done the bidding of others. Still, he did need others to affirm his self-image, for the second ideal self incorporates social standards resented by his lower self and has not successfully resolved the conflict. He ordinarily could not admit that he needed his association with Harley and St. John or their approbation to bolster his self-esteem. Swift himself was aware of the conflict, as he admits in a letter to Oxford: "I would desire to stand in your Memory; As one who was truly sensible of the honor you did him, though he was too proud to be vain upon it."46

The merit for which Swift expected to be recognized consisted of his natural abilities and especially of his ability to perceive and support the national interest. Thus, he rejects that sort of selfishness which achieves its aims at the expense of others. But Swift believed that if he supported the public interest, the nation should support him. Since he did not want to suggest he needed others to bolster his self-esteem, he refused to appear solicitous of others' good opinion; therefore, he decided the nation should support his claims for prestige and influence out of gratitude. After the fall of the Oxford-Bolingbroke ministry and his return to Ireland, Swift continually blames his inability to triumph upon the ingratitude of some he served, the folly of the general public in not perceiving its true interests, and the unenlightened selfishness of his opponents. These three grievances provide fuel for a moral triumph, if not an actual one. The fact that he failed to achieve the position he desired becomes proof of his superior morality and truthfulness. It proves that his self-esteem depends entirely on
his ability to meet his own criteria. As further proof, Swift continually risked his personal safety for the causes he supported. His "Of Mean and Great Figures" shows that most of his heroes were men who were capable of great self-sacrifice for the sake of their beliefs. Swift desired to be one of them. But, characteristically, this desire is another form of his wish to be admired by others. The fact that he acknowledged the baseness of mankind and the importance of self-interest and thereby avoided the charge of being excessively idealistic does not alter the fact that the supporter of the public interest is as much an ideal self as the first one was. By failing, Swift could allow others to take over his own rebellion against the demands of his ideal self.

If Swift did not achieve his aim of becoming a bishop and retaining acceptance as an equal by the politically powerful, he was successful as a wit and satirist, for in these roles he could put his own identity conflicts to productive use. His position as an outsider and the government's rejection of his views allowed him to turn his destructive energies—both those of rebellion and those of orthodoxy—against his opponents. In this he shows the punitive trend Horney finds in the arrogant-vindictive type. In addition, his ambition for literary reputation, like his ambition to become a bishop, served his need for triumph, as he admitted in a letter to Bolingbroke and Pope. The following passage is meant for Pope:

I am ashamed to tell you, that when I was very young I had more desire to be famous than ever since; and fame, like all things else in this life, grows with me every day more a trifle. But you who are so much younger, although you want that health you deserve, yet your spirits are as vigorous as if your body were sounder. I hate a crowd where I have not an easy place to see and be seen. A great Library always maketh me melancholy, where the best Author is as much
squeezed, and as obscure, as a Porter at a Coronation. In my own little library, I value the compliments of Graevius and Gronovius, which make thirty-one volumes in folio (and were given me by my Lord Bolingbroke) more than all my books besides; because whoever comes into my closet, casts his eyes immediately upon them, and will not vouchsafe to look upon Plato or Xenophon. I tell you it is almost incredible how Opinions change by the decline or decay of spirits, and I will further tell you, that all my endeavours from a boy to distinguish myself, were only for want of a great Title and Fortune, that I might be used like a Lord by those who have an opinion of my parts; whether right or wrong, it is no great matter; and so the reputation of wit or great learning does the office of a blue riband, or of a coach and six horses.48

Here Swift shows some characteristic ambivalence. Towards the beginning of the passage, he seems ashamed that his ambition has declined in intensity; but as he continues, his remarks about the library mock his desire for fame. At the end, the phrase "whether right or wrong" reveals his conflict between ambition and guilt surrounding it, while "it is no great matter" reflects his weariness with the conflict. The weariness explains his declining ambition, for it is one side of the conflict between positive and negative identities. As he gives up on resolving the conflict, the contestants fight with less fury, and Swift feels diminished motivation and vitality. The conflict itself provided the fuel for his literary accomplishments.

In the passage just examined, Swift reveals his need for triumph and his desire to be treated as someone special, a desire Karen Horney believes characteristic of the expansive type. Swift enlarges upon his views of fame in a subsequent letter. Although the passage we have read was addressed to Pope, Bolingbroke read it and seized the opportunity to express his own views, which have little to do with what Swift had said except that their subject is fame. Basically, Bolingbroke argues that fame is not an aim in itself but a means to gain increased influence and
power; therefore, it is sensible to seek fame during one's lifetime, but
not sensible to seek immortality. Swift replies,

My Lord what I would have said of Fame is meant of Fame which
a Man enjoys in his Life, because I cannot be a great Lord, I
would acquire what is a kind of Subsidium, I would endeavour
that my betters shall seek me by the merit of something dis-
tinguishable instead of my seeking them. But the desire of
enjoying it after times is owing to the Spirit and folly of
Youth; but with age we learn to know the house is so full
that there is no room for above one or two at most, in an age
through the whole world.49

Swift's statement that he prefers to be sought demonstrates his fear of
dependency upon others for self-esteem and shows the dread of helplessness
characteristic of the expansive type. Thus, not only the methods and
objects of Swift's satiric writing, but also his motives, stem from this
fear, which derives from the conflict between rebellion and obedience,
between positive and negative identities.

The panegyric section of the "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift"
demonstrates very well this author's pride in his independence; for
example, examine the following passage:

He never thought an Honour done him,
Because a Duke was proud to own him;
Would rather slip aside, and chuse
To talk with Wits in dirty Shoes;
Despis'd the Fools with Stars and Carters,
So often seen caressing Chartres;
He never courted Men in Station,
Nor Persons had in Admiration;
Of no Man's Greatness was afraid,
Because he sought for no Man's Aid.
Though trusted long in great Affairs,
He gave himself no haughty Airs;
Without regarding private Ends,
Spent all his Credit for his Friends;
And only chose the Wise and Good;
No Flatt'rs; no Allies in Blood;
But succour'd Virtue in Distress,
And seldom fail'd of good Success;
As Numbers in their Hearts must own,
Who, but for him, had been unknown.

(ll. 319-38)
In the first two lines, Swift declares his reluctance to base his self-esteem upon his association with the powerful. Although the letter to Oxford already quoted reveals that such an association was valuable to Swift, both that letter and this passage show Swift's strong reaction against basing his self-esteem upon it. Therefore, the fact that the passage does not tell the whole truth does not indicate that these lines are ironic. His desire not to lose his independence becomes very clear in the lines, "Of no Man's Greatness was afraid,/ Because he sought for no Man's Aid" (ll. 327-28). He prefers to talk to the "Wits in dirty Shoes" who will be more likely to depend upon him. Ehrenpreis's biography shows that Swift did pursue the preferment of his friends with more vigor than his own, for by doing so, he could make them dependent on him. Since he feared dependency upon the powerful himself, he resisted asking favors for himself and expected they be granted him almost unasked in recognition of his contributions. Swift's assertion that he chose no flatterers as friends shows again his unwillingness to depend upon others for his self-esteem. The passage ends with a declaration of how dependent others, in contrast, have been upon him.

The high valuation Swift places on independence is apparent also in his attacks. For instance, he calls Ireland, "the Land of Slaves and Fens; / A servile Race in Folly nurs'd, / Who truckle most, when treated worst" (ll. 396-98). Attacked for servility are not only the poor Irish, but powerful ones as well:

And, would you make him truly sower;
Provoke him with a slave in Power;
The Irish Senate, if you nam'd,
With what Impatience he declaim'd!
(ll. 343-46)
One of the "Thoughts on Various Subjects" shows that Swift thought ambition frequently reduced one to servility: "AMBITION often puts Men upon doing the meanest Offices; so climbing is performed in the same Posture with Creeping."51 In contrast to the ambitious, Swift claims to have kept his honor and independence:

HAD he but spar'd his Tongue and Pen,
He might have rose like other Men;
But, Power was never in his Thought;
And, Wealth he valu'd not a Groat;

(11. 355-58)

Not caring for his personal welfare, Swift has steadfastly supported the public interest in spite of the injury doing so has caused him. Failure to achieve power has become proof of his superior virtue. Unfortunately, his argument is not entirely true. He has sought power and influence and he has been dependent upon others. But the partial falseness of his claims in these passages does not make them ironic. Rather, to reinforce his positive identity as an independent and righteous man, he projects his negative identity as a dependent and ambitious man onto his enemies. The whole purpose of his revulsion against servility is to grant him participation in the mythical omnipotence of his superego. The opposition of others towards him, though real, is allowed to function as a projection of his own resistance to his superego's demands.

When I have asserted that these lines of the panegyric are not ironic, I have meant that Swift did not intend the reader to disbelieve them. Yet they represent only one of Swift's ways to organize the conflicting forces of obedience and defiance. There are other organizations present in the poem, particularly in the two sections preceding the panegyric. These other organizations, together with some apparently
ironic passages in the panegyric, do reveal Swift's doubt that the claims he makes in the panegyric are true. Swift probably did look askance at his own self-praise--but not to the point of retracting it. I believe that the other writings I have examined support this contention by demonstrating Swift's ambivalence towards pride and by explaining the reasons for it.

When Barry Slepian asserts that Swift is satirizing his own pride in the panegyric, he is partly right and partly wrong. As we shall soon see, the earlier sections present an ambivalent attitude towards pride, not an outright condemnation of it. The discrepancy between the panegyric and the rest of the poem is largely a difference in how the ambivalence is organized and a difference of emphasis. The panegyric is also a reaction against Swift's earlier attempt to relinquish his claims to fame and superiority. It is more productive to understand the inconsistencies in the poem than to resolve them. Only then can we see how the parts relate to each other and what their relationship means.

As evidence for his claim that the panegyric is ironic, Slepian points to Swift's footnotes, which Slepian describes as replete with ironic exaggeration. Swift repeatedly uses such words as "never," "every," and "all" to create a very one-sided and unrealistic account of the events in which he was involved. Yet the use of extreme language does not necessarily indicate irony in Swift. For example, in his marginalia to Clarendon's History of the Rebellion, 1707 where, lacking an audience, he would have no reason to be ironic, he writes next to the Marquis of Mountrose's name, "He was the only Man in Scotland who had ever one Grain of Virtue; and was therefore abhorred and murdered
publicly by his hellish countrymen." The margins of this book seem to be filled with such exclamations as, "Abominable, damnable Scotch Hellish Dogs for ever, Let them wait for Cromwell to plague them, and enslave their Scabby Nation." Swift was not so habitually moderate in his expression to raise the suspicion of irony in his footnotes to the "Verses."

In addition, Slepian points to certain contradictions in the poem. For instance, after attacking thirteen people by name in this very poem, Swift asserts, "He lash'd the Vice but spared the name" (l. 460). Perhaps Swift is so desperate to create a good image of himself that he overlooks the contradictory evidence to concentrate upon evidence which would support his claim, such as Gulliver's Travels. But assuming that Swift is ironic, we still have to determine the meaning of the irony. There are more plausible explanations than that Swift is moralisticaly satirizing his own pride. For instance, he may be satirizing the traditional satiric apologia and declaring his independence of Horace's model. Or he may be satirizing the distortions which memory imposes upon the past. I believe that, in addition, the falsehoods exist to create just enough doubt about the sincerity of the panegyric generally that the reader who detects other distortions will not be able to blame Swift for them. The reader--and Swift, too--can believe as much as they want--or as much as Swift can get away with. On the other hand, by telling obvious lies, Swift declares his disrespect for public opinion and his refusal to meet its standards. Thus, the irony in the panegyric reflects his ambivalence toward ambition for fame and his desire to remain independent.
To understand the relationship between the panegyric and the rest of the poem, we must examine the earlier sections in detail. In seeking the coherence of the "Verses," critics have usually mistaken the tone of the earlier part by regarding it either as a serious condemnation of pride or as an acceptance of pride as a morally neutral fact of human nature. Actually, in this section Swift adopts a comic, bantering tone which keeps the issue of condemnation or acceptance continually up in the air. The opening lines read:

As Rochefoucauld his Maxims drew
From Nature, I believe 'em true;
They argue no corrupted Mind
In him; the Fault is in Mankind.
(l. 1-4)

Since Swift states that the facts of human nature which Rochefoucauld describes are indeed faults, one might decide he is taking a condemnatory view. However, since Rochefoucauld drew his maxims from nature, one could conclude that the faults are inescapable and should be accepted. At least, one cannot escape them by ignoring them. Rochefoucauld's opponents have assumed that since seeing one's faults brings guilt feelings, seeing causes the guilt. Rejecting their own perception, these people have projected the self-blame which the perception entails onto Rochefoucauld. Characteristically fighting such attempts at projection and denial, Swift asserts the faults exist whether observed or not. But, one may ask, if the faults are inescapable, how can one bear to look upon them? If one observes them long enough, will not one eventually come to accept them?

In the next verse paragraph, Swift notes again the common confusion between guilt and the perception of it:
THIS Maxim more than all the rest
Is thought too base for human Breast;
"In all Distresses of our Friends
"We first consult our private Ends;
"While Nature kindly bent to ease us,
"Points out some Circumstance to please us,
(ll. 5-10)

By using the expression "too base," Swift implies that it is man's pride which refuses to admit the truth. Paradoxically, one must abandon one's pride to concede that one has it, for admitting it puts one at the mercy of public opinion. Swift quickly does so by admitting his own desire to feel better off than his friends and by admitting his envy of their success. Adopting a tone at once jovial and confidential, the poet tries to cajole the reader into admitting like faults. If Swift succeeds in establishing such a conspiracy, the reader presumably will not be so ready to condemn him, and Swift will make his own desire for vindication acceptable.

How does Swift make these materials charming? One method is trivialization, as in the following lines:

WE all behold with envious Eyes,
Our Equal rais'd above our Size;
Who wou'd not at a crowded Show,
Stand high himself, keep others low?
I love my Friend as well as you,
But would not have him stop my View;
Then let him have the higher Post;
I ask but for an Inch at most.
(ll. 13-20)

The desire to have the better view is so lacking in importance that no one could be seriously offended by it. Yet this passage also suggests a darker meaning—that Swift desires general supremacy and himself wishes to be viewed and admired. Hiding this meaning behind a trivial and relatively inoffensive example, Swift provides the reader too with an
excuse for admitting the more objectionable significance. On the other hand, trivialization of the second meaning suggests that Swift’s ambition is petty, foolish, and unworthy. In thus accomplishing two contrary purposes at once, Swift follows the tactic described by Freud in *Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, and does so to comic effect.

Among the other methods for making this material charming and acceptable, four can be seen in the following passage:

> VAIN human Kind! Fantastick Race!  
> Thy various Follies, who can trace?  
> Self-love, Ambition, Envy, Pride,  
> Their Empire in our Hearts divide;  
> Give others Riches, Power, and Station,  
> 'Tis all on me an Usurpation.  
> I have no Title to aspire;  
> Yet, when you sink, I seem the higher.  
> In POPES, I cannot read a Line,  
> But with a Sigh, I wish it mine;  
> When he can in one Couplet fix  
> More Sense than I can do in Six;  
> It gives me such a jealous Fit,  
> I cry, Fox take him, and his Wit.  

(11. 39-52)

The first of these methods is to condemn self-love, ambition, envy and pride. In doing so, Swift makes a concession to appease that force in his own and his audience’s minds which objects to these vices. But his condemnation is qualified by the second method, which is to regard these faults not as horrible vices, but merely as follies. Whether one regards an act as an example of evil or folly depends upon whether one emphasizes the harm done to others or to the doer himself. Of course, one may contemplate the latter with more equanimity and even pleasure than the former. In the lines where Swift names these follies, the reader may sense the author’s joy in gaining the freedom to admit, contemplate, and discuss faults which society would rather not perceive.
The expression "Fantastick Race!" suggests a marvellous dream about his own follies and those of others, though the joy in experiencing it is qualified by the implied criticism that man ought to be more realistic--he has no title to aspire. Third, Swift's expressions of envy are highly exaggerated, creating doubt about how much of what he says he means literally. The exaggeration gives the reader freedom to enjoy Swift's anger, for the doubt about its sincerity decreases Swift's--and, by extension, the reader's--responsibility for it. The fourth method for making his materials charming is to turn his envy into praise of others. Doing so demonstrates further the folly of envy: though a desire to surpass others produces envy, envy actually confirms the superiority of others. Thus, one is tormented by one's own ambition. Because Swift's jealous fit and his curse upon Pope cannot damage Pope or lower the quality of his poetry, Swift foolishly hurts only himself. So on one level, by praising Pope, he suggests that his envy is just a folly which not only harms no one, but exalts his friend, while on another level exists the implication that such self-destructive folly should be eschewed. Thus, in a whirl of contradictory implications, Swift keeps the decision for condemnation or acceptance of ambition and envy in doubt.

The next section of the poem (ll. 73-142) concerns the reaction of Swift's friends to his declining health and eventual death. The following passage is typical of this section:

"He hardly drinks a Pint of Wine;"
"And that, I doubt, is no good Sign."
"His Stomach too begins to fail;"
"Last Year we thought him strong and hale;"
"But now, he's quite another Thing;"
"I wish he may hold out till Spring."
THEN hug themselves, and reason thus;
"It is not yet so bad with us."
(ll. 109-16)

As Fischer has pointed out, the friends are trying to deny their own
mortality. Seeing Swift as a *memento mori*, they discuss his health as a
circumstance bearing only upon him in order to reject its implications
for themselves. Rather than sympathizing with Swift's misfortune or
genuinely hoping for his recovery, they are glad to use him as a screen
for their own projections. Even the one neighbor who sympathizes
(ll. 135-42) does so only out of self-interest. Swift regards these
reactions as foolish:

THE Time is not remote, when I
Must by the Course of Nature dye;
When I foresee my special Friends,
Will try to find their private Ends;
Tho' it is hardly understood,
Which way my Death can do them good;
(ll. 73-78)

Projection of their mortality onto Swift creates only an illusion of
good. By portraying their reactions as foolish, Swift laughs at, rather
than denounces, them and seems not to take their insensitivity personally.
Although in doing so, Swift finds a way to accept his lack of control over
the opinions and sympathies of others and thus prepares for death, a
desire for revenge lurks behind the laughter. Ridicule is the price
others must pay for his helplessness.

In the next section (ll. 143-298), Swift imagines people's
reactions to his death. Some, such as the doctor (ll. 169-76) and the
queen (ll. 177-88), seek to justify themselves rather than to mourn
Swift. His enemies would prefer him to be alive only if they could
replace his death with that of a greater enemy (ll. 189-96). His best
friends mourn for only a short time (ll. 205-208). And the ladies are at least as concerned about their game of whist as Swift's demise (ll. 225-42). In describing these scenes, Swift acknowledges that he is not the center of anyone else's world and that he will be unable to control the intensity or nature of anyone's reaction to his death. He cannot control their evaluation of his life, because other people's self-interest will determine it. Their reactions constitute a mortification of his pride, a mortification which he seems partly to accept. Though Swift really desires another reaction, the desire itself is identical to the self-interest which in others will produce the actual evaluation, so how can he object? Swift himself is the butt of this joke, which is a way of coping with his ambivalent attitude towards pride.

The mortification extends not only to Swift but to his writings:

Now Curl his Shop from Rubbish drains;
Three genuine Tomes of Swift's Remains.
And then to make them pass the glibber,
Revis'd by Tibbalds, Moore, and Gibber.
He'll treat me as he does my Betters.
Publish my Will, my Life, my Letters.
Revive the Libels born to dye;
Which POPE must bear, as well as I.
(ll. 197-204)

In these works Swift had striven for public acceptance of his opinions. In their revision, he loses control over his means of influence. But, more important, the selection of these editors demonstrates the inadequacy of Swift's persuasion. If this scurrilous publisher, who presumably would read the works, really understood and valued Swift's ideas, he could never choose three men of whom Swift vehemently disapproved. As if this mortification were not enough, in lines 249-98 Swift portrays the bookseller Lintot slighting the dean's works as old-fashioned and
recommending new compositions by men Swift hated. As anyone acquainted with Swift, the supporter of the ancients against the moderns, realizes, the dean was very unlikely to accept Lintot's standard of recommendation as valid. A general truth that could stand the test of time was worth far more than the fripperies of fashion or popular opinions of the moment. Nevertheless, Swift finds his works classed among the ephemeral. Though mortified, the dean hints that the blame rests not with himself but with the taste of the age. The anger and indignation that lie under the surface of this poem begin to show themselves more clearly towards the end of this section, where Lintot is describing Wolston:

He doth an Honour to his Gown,
By bravely running Priest-craft down;
He shews, as sure as GOD'S in Gloc'ster;
That Jesus was a Grand Impostor;
That all his Miracles were Cheats,
Perform'd as Juglers do their Feats;
The Church had never such a Writer;
A Shame, he hath not got a Mitre!
(ll. 291-98)

Swift feels freer to indulge his anger here because it is not merely personal but has an ideological justification.

This passage provides a transition into the panegyric, which is in some ways a continuation of the earlier sections; in other ways, a reaction to them. In it, Swift's acceptance of his inability to control others' evaluations turns into angry rebellion against that failure. Swift has prepared for the change in a number of ways. In the earlier sections, he has asserted the universality of pride, thus excusing its operation in himself. On the other hand, some passages have suggested that Swift objected to pride, thus supporting his assertion in the panegyric that he is not proud. The contradiction can be described as the
paradox of moral pride: in the end, like the people at the beginning of the poem, Swift is too proud to be proud. There are other preparations. In the first two sections, he has put himself in a self-effacing role, denying his own anger and vindictiveness while at the same time admitting them, and he has accepted his inability to control the judgments of others. By accusing himself of pride and envy and by showing their operation in himself to be benign, he has appeased the objections of others to Rochefoucauld's maxim and to the pride he reveals in the panegyric. By envisioning the negative and indifferent reactions to his death, he has elicited from his audience objections or solicitude which he can satisfy in the panegyric. His suggestion that his friends' and enemies' reactions are foolishly motivated opens the way to his assertion that his self-esteem is based on sounder ground—his active support for the public interest. In all these ways, the early sections have created a vacuum of self-assertion which needs to be filled. Despite Swift's humor and seeming willingness to accept his lack of power and influence, the negative and careless evaluations are meant to justify his demands for honor and prestige as a self-sacrificing supporter of the public interest.

Though the first two sections do justify and prepare for the panegyric, they also qualify it. The good-humored tone of these sections does not disappear with the appearance of Swift's indignation. When he calls the speaker of the panegyric "impartial" (l. 306), he is clearly being ironic. Since Swift expects every reader to know that he has written his own panegyric and vanity is one theme of the poem, "impartial" should be taken as a signal that it will be quite biased.

Continuing the acceptance of helplessness in the earlier parts, Swift's
irony is an admission that his self-portrait will not and should not be universally accepted. On the other hand, the first sections hint at the folly of moralistic self-assertion in a society dominated by the immoral or amoral folly which is the basis for others' judgments of him. Though the imagined reactions of others to his death justify his self-assertion, such a justification does not ensure his even-handedness. To the contrary, Swift must create a particularly favorable self-image to stand up to the attacks and indifference of other people. A portrait so motivated can hardly be regarded as impartial, and Swift expects the reader to recognize that fact even though it vitiates his vindication. Thus, Swift's ambivalence towards pride is carried over into the final section.

In conclusion, the panegyric and the earlier parts of the poem represent two different ways of organizing Swift's ambivalence toward his need for self-esteem and power. In the first sections, Swift turns his ambivalence to humor as he prepares to face the complete loss of power and control that comes with death. A rebellion against this loss, the panegyric constitutes a totalistic reorganization of the ambivalence. Swift uses ideology to support his totalism, but continuing ambivalence and doubt about the legitimacy of his position cause him to qualify ironically his self-assertion by telling obvious falsehoods. Of the sections, the panegyric is the most Juvenalian; the first two are Horatian in their use of humor and of pride mixed with self-depreciation. But the Horatian solution to internal conflicts cannot last long for Swift, for underneath the humor the battle between obedience and rebellion rages with an intensity of self-accusation and defiance which Horace never knew.
FOOTNOTES


5. Scoetn and Hume, p. 231.


13. See pages 6-7.


24. Horney, p. 192.

25. Horney, p. 194.


27. Horney, p. 196.


29. Horney, p. 204.

30. Horney, p. 204.

31. Horney, p. 198.

32. Horney, p. 208.

33. Horney, p. 211.


44. Swift, Prose Works, IX, 89.

45. Swift, Prose Works, IV, 245.


47. Swift, Prose Works, V, 83-86.


51. Swift, Prose Works, I, 245.

52. Slepian, p. 254.


56. Fischer, pp. 432-33.
CHAPTER IV. OMNIPOTENCE: BOOK I OF GULLIVER'S TRAVELS

The discussion of Swift's identity conflicts in the last chapter provides an understanding of the psychological resources he had available for creating the narrator of Gulliver's Travels and develops concepts which help us to describe the attitudes which Swift discloses towards him. In discussing these matters, I shall make psychological observations about Gulliver and discuss similarities and differences between Swift and him. Since there exists considerable critical disagreement over whether Gulliver is a character, this method may seem controversial. If Gulliver is not a character, how can one analyze him psychologically? A brief exploration of this difficult issue is appropriate and should help clarify my approach.

Viewing Gulliver as a character originated as a reaction against identifying him with Swift. For instance, in "The Pride of Lemuel Gulliver" Samuel Holt Monk argues,

[Gulliver] is NOT Jonathan Swift. The meaning of the book is wholly distorted if we identify the Gulliver of the last voyage with his creator, and lay Gulliver's misanthropy at Swift's door. He is a fully rendered, objective, dramatic character, no more to be identified with Swift than Shylock is to be identified with Shakespeare. This character acts and is acted upon; he changes, he grows in the course of his adventures. Like King Lear, he begins in simplicity, grows into sophistication, and ends in madness. Unlike King Lear he is never cured.

But other critics have noted that regarding Gulliver as a character is not the only alternative to identifying him with his creator. It has become more fashionable to regard Gulliver as a voice manipulated by Swift for satiric purposes. The fact that Swift's commentary was more
important to him than Gulliver's consistency explains the narrator's
inconsistency and provides a new way of finding unity within the work.
Some critics—such as Denis Donoghue—flatly deny that Gulliver is a
character. Such critics, however, have overstated a partial truth.
Though Swift uses Gulliver for a variety of satiric purposes and though
Gulliver is not completely consistent, he does exist as some sort of
representation of a human being: Swift gave him a name and a brief
history; the events of the Travels occur in a single temporal sequence
defined by his presence and point of view; and Swift makes us aware that
Gulliver interprets and reacts to what happens. In a letter to Mrs.
Howard, Swift himself playfully speaks of Gulliver as though he were a
real person and declares his distance from him:

I am not such a prostitute Flatterer as Gulliver; whose chief
Study is to extenuate the Vices, and magnify the Praises of
his Country, in the midst of Corruptions . . . .

Because there is reason to regard Gulliver as a character as well
as reason not to, a number of critics have taken a more moderate position
than either Monk or Donoghue. For instance, C. J. Rawson in Gulliver and
the Gentle Reader writes,

It is wrong, I think, to take Gulliver as a novel-character who
suffers a tragic alienation, and for whom therefore we feel
pity or some kind of contempt, largely because we do not, as I
suggested, think of him as a 'character' at all in more than a
very attenuated sense: the emphasis is so preponderantly on
what can be shown through him (including what he says and thinks)
than on his person in its own right, that we are never allowed
to accustom ourselves to him as a real personality despite all
the rudimentary local colour about his early career, family
life and professional doings. An aspect of this are Swift's
ironic exploitations of the Gulliver-figure, which to the very
end flout our most elementary expectations of character consist-
tency: the praise of English colonialism in the last chapter,
which startlingly returns to Gulliver's earlier boneheaded
manner, is an example. The treatment of Gulliver is essentially
external, as, according to Wyndham Lewis, satire ought to be.
Nor is Gulliver sufficiently independent from Swift; he is not identical with Swift, nor even similar to him, but Swift's presence behind him is always too close to ignore. This is not because Swift approves or disapproves of what Gulliver says at any given time, but because Swift is always saying something through it.4

Though Rawson emphasizes Gulliver's rhetorical function, he does admit that Gulliver is a character in at least an attenuated sense. With some exceptions, Rawson's commentary seems highly perceptive, but he fails to explore the implications of what he says and to resolve them into a consistent pattern, such as a psychological interpretation can provide. His assertion that the treatment of Gulliver is external, for example, is left undeveloped and undigested. What is an attenuated character, anyway? Why would Swift choose to use such a device? Rawson tells us what Swift did not do in constructing Gulliver—he did not create a novelistic character—but he does not tell us what Swift did do. Similarly, in Jonathan Swift and the Age of Compromise Kathleen Williams writes,

Indeed Gulliver, though he seems more solid than the rest of Swift's mouthpieces (partly because he is actor as well as narrator) is conceived in the same way, but in his case as in that of the authors of A Tale of a Tub and A Modest Proposal it is convenient, even necessary, to speak of the author or narrator or mouthpiece as a person, while recognizing that even as we read we know him to be a satiric fabrication. As with all Swift's mouthpieces, his purpose is purely satiric, and he is given as many characteristics, consistent or not, as his inventor requires for that purpose, or he may from time to time disappear altogether. The brilliance of the handling of Gulliver lies in the precision with which the inconsistency of the satiric mouthpiece is used progressively for a further satiric effect, and contributes to: the rich meanings of the work as a whole.5

Here Ms. Williams draws a balanced evaluation, accurately describing Gulliver and his function, but as with Rawson, she does not really explain how the discrepancies fit into a satisfactory whole. If Gulliver is not quite a character, what is he?
One reason critics have had trouble deciding whether Gulliver is a character is the difficulty in defining "character." Rawson and Williams attempt to define Gulliver by reference to a term that does not quite fit the Travele, as they would admit. In the absence of a more appropriate term, what other option do they have? As the quotation from Rawson suggests, our expectations of fictional characters come from familiarity with the novel. Robert C. Elliott makes this point too in The Power of Satire: "The technique is not that of the novelist, however. Swift pays little regard to psychological consistency; Gulliver's character can hardly be said to develop; it simply changes." However, though we may define Gulliver and his function by comparing him to novelistic characters, Swift himself did not define him this way, for the novel was still being born. Swift constructed Gulliver not out of novelistic conventions, but out of his own assumptions about identity and its formation, human personality, and social relations. For this reason, though Gulliver cannot be thoroughly psychoanalyzed, his behavior can legitimately be interpreted using the concepts developed in my last chapter. These concepts can sharpen our perception of Gulliver and help us to understand Swift's treatment of him and the reaction Swift expected of his audience.

Swift's interest in his narrator is thematic rather than personal. He does not, like many novelists, intend to set Gulliver before us as a friend about whom we know every intimate detail. Rather, he conceives Gulliver in terms of his own identity conflicts over self-esteem. As a result, this narrator is rather one-dimensional, but his single dimension can be interpreted in psychological terms. Gulliver's self-revelations have an external quality because they do not constitute a confidential
autobiography but public claims to identity. Swift uses descriptions of the lands Gulliver visits to comment upon those claims. Since Swift's commentary is largely negative or a mixture of positive and negative, it serves his purpose to have Gulliver overwhelmed by his social contexts rather than to have Gulliver dominantly functioning as the medium for evaluation of these societies. Therefore, Gulliver's reactions must seem to exist on the same plane as the rest of his report, and Swift's imaginative representation rather than Gulliver's perceiving mind has to bear much of the commentary. Though Swift playfully pretends to claim verisimilitude, there is no real attempt to describe life as his readers would have known it; instead, in response to the dynamics of his own identity conflicts, Swift blatantly and fantastically reorders reality to express certain ideas about it. Thus, the psychic content Swift had available for use in the Travels is not confined to Gulliver's mind but spills over into the creation of the lands he visits. As a result, Swift gains considerable freedom in his treatment of Gulliver. Merely sketched in thematic terms, Gulliver can be used for a variety of purposes, though I believe that, interpreted correctly, his behavior is more consistent than others do. Nevertheless, a true enjoyment of Gulliver's Travels requires that we appreciate diversity and narrative freedom as much as consistency and unity. Like Rawson and Williams, I cannot provide a single term to describe what Gulliver is, but the ideas I have already developed allow me to describe—in a more diffuse way—how Swift conceived of him.

Let us now consider Swift's method of representation in Book I of Gulliver's Travels. Much criticism of this book has focused upon
political allegory. Arthur E. Case in his Four Essays on Gulliver's Travels has identified Gulliver largely with Bolingbroke. For instance, Gulliver's support of the Blefuscuarians represents Bolingbroke's correspondence with the French during his negotiation of the Treaty of Utrecht. However, the allegory is not consistent, for the emperor of Lilliput and his son are taken to represent George I and the future George II, who were not king and prince of Wales while Bolingbroke was in power. In addition, some of the incidents are open to more than one interpretation. For instance, Case takes Gulliver's urinating on the palace fire to represent Bolingbroke's negotiation of the Treaty of Utrecht, whereas Landa takes it to represent Swift's writing of A Tale of a Tub. Such inconsistencies and conflicting interpretations might lead one to discount the allegorical interpretation. In a letter to L'Abbé des Fontaines, Swift himself claimed that his satire was general rather than particular and was as applicable to any country in the world as to England. However, the generality of the satire does not rule out the possibility that Swift drew upon his experiences and those of his friends and allies to create his fiction. The fact that Swift published the Travels anonymously suggests he was aware that parallels could be drawn, as do some of the letters exchanged between Swift and his friends after the publication. I believe that Swift's "official" purpose was to write a general satire, but that behind that intention lurked a desire to justify himself and his friends and damn his enemies. The motive for the general satire is generalized anger deriving from his own experience. Swift's fiction serves to disguise his intention to attack specific targets and to condense a variety of experiences from various periods of his life and
involving various personages into a single narrative. The fact that the events of this book can be given various allegorical significances merely shows how successful Swift was at reshaping his experience into a general satire. The fiction is not a direct representation of his experience but an imaginative altering and reordering of it to satisfy certain motives. One of these motives is self-justification, but another, paradoxically, is to discredit the pride which was so disappointed at Bolingbroke and Oxford's fall from power and at his own departure for a deanship in Ireland. Both motives are attempts to recover from the disappointment he felt on that occasion.

The most obvious imaginative alteration is in the size of all the characters but Gulliver. Swift uses the Lilliputians' low stature to satirize pretensions to grandeur and omnipotence. For instance, the beginning of the emperor's "Articles and Conditions" for Gulliver's freedom reads:

GOLBAsto MOnAReN EVLAME GURDILO SHEFIN MULLY ULLY GUE, most Mighty Emperor of Lilliput, Delight and Terror of the Universe, whose Dominions extend five Thousand Eulustra, (about twelve Miles in Circumference) to the Extremities of the Globe; Monarch of all Monarchs; Taller than the Sons of Men; whose Head strikes against the Sun; At whose Nod the Princes of the Earth shake their Knees; pleasant as the Spring, comfortable as the Summer, fruitful as Autumn, dreadful as Winter.\textsuperscript{11}

The emperor's stature suggests that his pretensions are childish—a suggestion reinforced by his name, the end of which sounds like baby talk, and (for us) by the fact that belief in omnipotence does in fact begin in infancy. The reader's greater knowledge of geography and consciousness of his own and Gulliver's size make the emperor's claims ludicrous. By implication, other monarchs' claims to grandeur are equally pretentious and childish when seen within the larger context of the world or the
universe. By diminishing monarchs, Swift attacks their identities and bolsters his own, making his relative power and wisdom seem greater than they would otherwise appear. He need not feel diminished by his absence from court.

The childishness of Lilliputian ambition is especially apparent in the games of Chapter III. Here Swift depicts candidates for great employments competing with each other at jumping on a rope, and aspirants to honorary ribbons leaping over a stick or creeping under it. Swift is clearly implying that the talents necessary to gain high position or honor are not those needed to govern wisely. Rather, one must do whatever is required by the people who have the employments and honors at their disposal, no matter how degrading or childish the requirements may be. In these descriptions Swift shows once again his resistance to basing his self-esteem upon meeting the approval of others. To do so is childish; ideally, an adult has chosen his own values to act upon. Thus, to support his own claim to identity, Swift attacks that of Walpole and other ministers by showing them to be irresponsible, selfish, and childish.

Though Swift uses diminution for satiric purposes, he also uses it to create the pleasure which is supposed to make his medicine palatable. The pleasure that the reader feels in identifying with Gulliver's stature draws him partly into the narrator's experience and makes him vulnerable to Swift's critique. For example, Chapter II opens with this paragraph:

When I found myself on my Feet, I looked about me, and must confess I never beheld a more entertaining Prospect. The Country round appeared like a continued Garden; and the inclosed Fields, which were generally Forty Foot square, resembled so many Beds of Flowers. These Fields were intermingled with Woods of half a Stang, and the tallest Trees, as I could judge,
appeared to be seven Foot high. I viewed the Town on my left Hand, which looked like the painted Scene of a City in a Theatre. 12

Such passages are entertaining because Swift makes cities, houses, and people seem less threatening than in ordinary life; offering the reader a taste of invulnerability and omnipotence, Swift begins to implicate the reader in Gulliver's pretensions to grandeur. The general effect of the Lilliputians' small size is to turn them into dolls or toys which do not at first require us to take them seriously. In this little world, Gulliver almost resembles a child at play, and Swift himself plays with his materials, inviting the reader to join him. One of the functions of play is to prepare the player for dealing seriously with events, ideas, or whole cultural systems which are symbolized in the game. 13 Playing with the Lilliputians serves a similar function for Swift and the reader. The Lilliputians' size makes them so obviously fantastic that no one can object to Swift's depiction of them. Whatever parallels the reader spots to historical events can only be suspected and are partly the reader's responsibility. Thus, by allowing the reader to feel above the Lilliputians and by creating suspicions, the author gradually prepares the reader's mind for seeing the European countenance in the mirror Swift holds up, after he shifts its direction in Book II.

Gulliver's comparatively large size leads him to believe that Lilliput is a land in which he could be omnipotent. But, in fact, he never possesses such power, as is most vividly illustrated by the opening chapter, where he is tied down on the beach. In spite of their resemblance to toys or dolls, the Lilliputians play the role of parents or authority figures who require Gulliver's compliance to their rules and
demands. Away from his native land, Gulliver must develop a new identity that makes sense in the society where he finds himself. In many respects, the way he does this corresponds to my description of Swift’s identity formation in my last chapter. Though Swift does not wholly represent himself through Gulliver, he does draw upon his own experience to depict Gulliver’s adaptation to Lilliputian society. The final events of this book form a commentary on the identity he claims.

When Gulliver awakes tied to the ground, ridiculously resembling an omnipotent child bound by social restrictions, he at first tries to escape, but the Lilliputians shoot a volley of arrows at him.

When this Shower of Arrows was over, I fell a groaning with Grief and Pain; and then striving again to get loose, they discharged another Volly larger than the first; and some of them attempted with Spears to stick me in the Sides; but, by good Luck, I had on me a Buff Jerkin, which they could not pierce. I thought it the most prudent Method to lie still; and my Design was to continue so till Night, when my left Hand being already loose, I could easily free myself; And as for the Inhabitants, I had Reason to believe I might be a Match for the greatest Armies they could bring against me, if they were all of the same Size, with him that I saw. But Fortune disposed otherwise of me.  

In this passage, one may see the conflict between obedience and defiance which is characteristic of the anal stage and of Swift’s own character.

Note that in spite of his bonds and humiliation Gulliver still tries to believe in his own omnipotence, which will produce a triumph of defiance. He also expresses this belief in another passage:

... supposing these People had endeavoured to kill me with their Spears and Arrows while I was asleep; I should certainly have awaked with the first Sense of Smart, which might so far have rouzed my Rage and Strength, as to enable me to break the Strings wherewith I was tyed; after which, as they were not able to make Resistance, so they could expect no Mercy.

Gulliver here reveals the vindictive rage he would experience in response
to the injuries and limitations inflicted upon him.

To determine the amount of wisdom Gulliver demonstrates on these occasions, we should assess the real extent of his potential power, but doing so is very speculative. Though he exceeds them greatly in size, they exceed him greatly in numbers. In addition, they possess arms which can be used effectively against him. It is sufficient to say that Gulliver feels enough doubt about the extent of his power to submit. Though he clings to the myth of omnipotence, he makes most of his decisions with a recognition of his limited power. The contrast between Gulliver's self-image and his real identity is one of Swift's most important satirical tools in this book.

Gulliver's vindictive rage and the conflict between obedience and defiance can be observed in another passage, which occurs after the description of Gulliver's first meal:

I confess I was often tempted, while they were passing backwards and forwards on my body, to seize forty or fifty of the first that came in my reach, and dash them against the ground. But the remembrance of what I had felt, which probably might be the worst they could do, and the promise of honour I made them, for so I interpreted my submissive behaviour, soon drove out those imaginations. Besides, I now considered my self as bound by the laws of hospitality to a people who had treated me with so much expense and magnificence. However, in my thoughts I could not sufficiently wonder at the intrepidity of these diminutive mortals, who durst venture to mount and walk on my body, while one of my hands was at liberty, without trembling at the very sight of so prodigious a creature as I must appear to them.

Gulliver's submissive behavior constitutes a promise because he intends to nurture the Lilliputians' expectation that he will not harm them. He has claimed a role, part of his new identity. He does so out of fear, creating an idealized self-image to compensate for his loss of self-esteem and to suppress his rebelliousness. If Gulliver were a real
person, we would say that he had turned his anger back upon his desire to exercise power and achieve his immediate instinctive aims. As I have pointed out, this retroflection of anger is the way people commonly adopt social rules and form superegos. The expression "Promise of Honour" shows how Gulliver has converted his fear into a form of pride. He tries to accept submissiveness by giving it the sanction of his ego-ideal. Another reason for his docility is that he is becoming dependent upon the Lilliputians for food. As I have explained in the last chapter, the "Panegyric on the Dean" shows that Swift regarded hunger as a motive for conforming to social law. Just as Gulliver idealizes his fear, he idealizes his growing dependency by giving it the sanction of his super-ego: he considers himself honorably "bound by the Laws of Hospitality." By such means, Gulliver gives up his mythical omnipotence and replaces it with an idealized self-image.

The last sentence in this passage reveals another of Gulliver's motivations. By sympathizing with the Lilliputians, he has begun the process of becoming part of their society and of taking on a role within it. He has begun to view himself through Lilliputian eyes, and he likes what he sees. Gulliver loves considering himself a prodigy and must cultivate the Lilliputians and accept their perspective to remain in that role. However, he interprets their view of him almost entirely to serve his need for self-esteem, rather than properly assessing their self-interest. Continually reporting that they were filled with astonishment at him and his deeds, Gulliver relates enjoying their admiration so much that he tries to induce it, as in this description of an imperial dinner:

Filemap the Lord High Treasurer attended there likewise, with his white Staff; and I observed he often looked on me with a
sour Countenance, which I would not seem to regard, but eat
more than usual, in Honour to my dear Country, as well as to
fill the Court with Admiration.\textsuperscript{17}

Here Gulliver, rather than contemplating some action to counter the
hostile designs which Flimnap's expression should lead him to anticipate,
merely compensates for the insult by eating more to create astonishment
and increase his self-esteem. In the plan for starving Gulliver, Swift
points to the hollowness of such pride:

\textldots for want of sufficient Food, you would grow weak and
faint, and lose your Appetite, and consequently decay and con-
sume in a few Months; neither would the Stench of your Carcass
be then so dangerous, when it should become more than half
diminished; and immediately upon your Death, five or six Thou-
sand of his Majesty's Subjects might, in two or three Days,
cut your Flesh from your Bones, take it away by Cart-loads,
and bury it in distant Parts to prevent Infection; leaving the
Skeleton as a Monument of Admiration to Posterity.\textsuperscript{19}

In the first quotation, pride in his size has made Gulliver a fool by
blinding him to his true interests and the actions necessary to serve
them. Since his idealized self-image has replaced his mythical omnipo-
tence, Gulliver tends to believe that self-esteem gives him omnipotence
and that he no longer needs to weigh his actions carefully. Pride cuts
him off from an accurate assessment of his position in Lilliput. Thus,
Swift asserts the folly of depending upon others' favorable reactions
for self-esteem. Gulliver fails to see that those reactions are motivated
by self-interest and that the self-interest of others does not necessarily
correspond to his. He can equally well satisfy the Lilliputians' appe-
tite for marvels whether he has been starved to death or is alive and
eating.

Though Gulliver is most aware of the boost to his self-esteem which
the Lilliputians give him, their reaction to him is actually ambivalent.
They do enjoy marveling at him, but their astonishment is mixed with fear. In Chapter I, the binding of Gulliver and the assignment of a thousand soldiers to guard him demonstrate their fright. Though Gulliver behaves submissively to diminish their fear, he does not seem to appreciate fully how dangerous their fear is to him. Submit though he might, his size and strength always pose the danger that he might wreak havoc in their kingdom. In addition, the costs of feeding such a monster are exorbitant, and the Lilliputians are occasionally tempted to economize. Thus, what gives him his self-esteem could also endanger him. In Chapter II, a friend of Gulliver's relates to him the deliberations at court:

... the Court was under many Difficulties concerning me. They apprehended my breaking loose; that my Diet would be very expensive, and might cause a Famine. Sometimes they determined to starve me, or at least shoot me in the Face and Hands with poisoned Arrows, which could soon dispatch me... 19

However, the emperor is persuaded against this course by Gulliver's demonstration of clemency toward six men who had instigated a crowd to shoot arrows at Gulliver. Thus, in this instance he effectively uses kindness to diminish the Lilliputians' fear. Nevertheless, he cannot eliminate it and, in fact, does not want to because it forms the basis of his self-esteem. Gulliver's way to resolve the conflicting implications of his strength and their fear is to decide that his strength makes his submission especially valuable. In the following passage, he encourages the Lilliputians to accept this view:

[The emperor] then desired me to draw my Scymiter, which, although it had got some Rust by the Sea-Water, was in most Parts exceeding bright. I did so, and immediately all the Troops gave a Shout between Terror and Surprize; for the Sun shone clear, and the Reflexion dazzled their Eyes, as I waved the Scymiter to and fro in my Hand. His Majesty, who is a most magnanimous Prince, was less daunted than I could expect; he ordered me to return it into the Scabbard, and cast it on
the Ground as gently as I could, about six Foot from the End of my Chain. The next Thing he demanded was one of the hollow Iron Pillars, by which he meant my Pocket-Pistols. I drew it out, and at his Desire, as well as I could, expressed to him the Use of it, and charging it only with Powder, which by the Closeness of my Pouch, happened to escape wetting in the Sea, (an Inconvenience that all prudent Mariners take special Care to provide against) I first cautioned the Emperor not to be afraid; and then I let it off in the Air. The Astonishment here was much greater than at the Sight of my Scymiter. Hundreds fell down as if they had been struck dead; and even the Emperor, although he stood his Ground, could not recover himself in some time. I delivered up both my Pistols in the same Manner as I had done my Scymiter, and then my Pouch of Powder and Bullets; begging him that the former might be kept from Fire; for it would kindle with the smallest Spark, and blow up his Imperial Palace into the Air.  

Gulliver clearly enjoys frightening the Lilliputians because doing so feeds his self-esteem. However, the demonstration of the weapons comes in conjunction with giving them up and losing the power they gave him. So Gulliver uses the panic he creates to compensate for his loss of power and to stimulate a sense of obligation among the Lilliputians. However, though Gulliver accepts this resolution of conflicting implications and implicitly recommends it to the Lilliputians, they do not accept it without suspicion. Their fear of Gulliver remains, for he has reminded them of his potential hostility and power. This power creates some of the enemies who eventually destroy him at the end of the book. In addition, the Lilliputians do not feel a sense of obligation simply because Gulliver has lessened their fear of him. Rather, he has made them feel that they can with some assurance of safety use him for their own purposes. Gulliver's pride has blinded him to his true position in Lilliput. Because of his own fear and desire for freedom, he has abandoned some of his real power for the sake of the increased self-esteem he obtains by creating astonishment and becoming a valuable servant to the emperor.
But self-esteem will not protect him from the jealousy of the ministers.

In the conditions which the emperor proposes for Gulliver's freedom, one can see both the Lilliputians' fear of Gulliver and some of the uses to which he can be put. The earlier articles in this document require Gulliver to comport himself so as not to harm the Lilliputian citizens. For instance, the second article reads, "Secondly, He shall not presume to come into our Metropolis, without our express Order; at which time, the Inhabitants shall have two Hours Warning, to keep within their Doors."21 Perhaps the most important article, however, is the following: "Sixthly, He shall be our Ally against our Enemies in the Island of Blefescu, and do his utmost to destroy their Fleet, which is now preparing to invade Us."22 The Lilliputians—and particularly the emperor—are able to put aside their fear of Gulliver only if they can use his great strength for their own benefit. In gaining his freedom, Gulliver allows his power to become subservient to the will of another. By making Gulliver comment, "I was at full Liberty,"23 Swift ironically points at the limitations upon Gulliver's freedom. Like a child in European culture, Gulliver is not permitted to achieve independence until he has accepted the conditions laid down by society. The agreement Gulliver accepts resembles the child's internalization of cultural values as he takes on roles in his society and partially subordinates himself to cultural goals. Gulliver reveals some resentment at the conditions in the following passage: "I swore and subscribed to these Articles with great Cheerfulness and Content, although some of them were not so honourable as I could have wished."24 However, the emperor's praises complete Gulliver's submission:

The Emperor himself, in Person, did me the Honour to be by at the whole Ceremony. I made my Acknowledgments, by prostrating
myself at his Majesty's Feet: But he commanded me to rise; and after many gracious Expressions, which, to avoid the Censure of Vanity, I shall not repeat; he added, that he hoped I should prove a useful Servant, and well deserve all the Favours he had already conferred upon me, or might do for the future. 25

So, after some conflict between obedience and defiance, Gulliver allows his pride to replace his lost omnipotence.

The development of Gulliver's new identity resembles Swift's formation of his first ideal self. His depiction of Gulliver's folly is partly the second ideal self's negative commentary on the first ideal. But since the second ideal is an attempted resolution of the conflicts between obedience and defiance and between the self-images embodying those trends, Swift's attitude toward Gulliver's obedience is ambivalent. Gulliver's great size represents the strength of Swift's anger against social constraints, and Gulliver, from one point of view, foolishly conforms to society, fatuously using his idealized self-image to repress his anger and turn its energies to the use of others. However, Swift partially approves of this development. The reader is made to feel that in the end the Lilliputians unconscionably betray Gulliver. His defeat is their fault rather than his because the Lilliputian ministers oppose him out of jealousy, selfishness, and pride, qualities towards which Swift turns an unfriendly eye. In a better world, Gulliver would have been more successful. By showing that it is not a better world, Swift justifies his own rebelliousness against cultural demands, against excessive idealism, against basing his own self-esteem upon the opinions of others, and against Gulliver's and his own initial identity formation.

The development of Gulliver's identity is analogous to Swift's formation of his first ideal self, and Swift expresses the same
ambivalence towards Gulliver's development as to his own. But the events in which Gulliver is involved more nearly correspond to the experience of Swift and those with whom he identified during the Oxford-Bolingbroke administration. Presumably, the Swift involved in these experiences would have been the second ideal self rather than the first. But, as I have already asserted, the second ideal only submerges and does not eliminate the first. The second feeds off the conflict between the first set of positive and negative identities. In addition, Swift attempts to use the second ideal to achieve honor and prestige as a wit, bishop, and influential political figure. Basically, these aims are heirs to Swift's desire to regain omnipotence. Therefore, Swift's attacks upon Gulliver's identity might seem to constitute an attack upon Swift's second ideal self, as well as the first. But actually, Swift attacks his motives for participating in these events as though the motives belonged to the first ideal, the resemblance between the aims of the first and second ideals justifying the distortion. By attacking the first ideal as represented by Gulliver, Swift reinforces the second ideal's dominance. He keeps the second ideal intact while still discrediting the motives for his participation and such motives generally. By discrediting them, Swift attempts to recover from his disappointment at his loss of influence within governmental circles. If he should never have pursued his aims, he should not feel disappointed that he did not achieve them. His "realistic" assessment of human motivations supports his disavowal and grants general significance to his criticisms of both the Lilliputians and Gulliver.

In the material quoted earlier from Gulliver and the Gentle Reader, Rawson claims that Gulliver is insufficiently independent of Swift to be
considered a character. Leaving aside the issue of whether Gulliver is a character, one can see that Gulliver and Swift are entangled for the reasons given above, but for another reason as well. Gulliver's size, which is the major component of his pride, also provides the perspective from which Swift views the Lilliputians and the European courtiers they represent. Thus, Gulliver, in his function as narrator rather than actor, becomes unconsciously identified in Swift's and the reader's minds with pride in their perspicuity. Gulliver as an observer tends to merge with Swift's own omnipotence of thought, an heir to the first ideal self's omnipotence and a component of Swift's second ideal self. Swift expresses his own ambivalence in his depiction of Lilliput and Gulliver and gains symbolic control over his conflicts; seeing and describing the conflicts becomes a substitute for resolving them and grants him temporary and illusory immunity as an observer. As I have already observed, Book II operates to deflate these claims to omnipotence, but here they serve Swift's satiric purpose in the depiction of the Lilliputians. A partial identification of Swift the observer with Gulliver the actor becomes apparent when Gulliver opposes the emperor, for here Gulliver demonstrates the same independence of judgment that is characteristic of Swift.

Significantly, Gulliver's fall comes immediately after his first real assertion of independent will and judgment. In his refusal to subjugate Blefuscu, he acts to conform to a value—justice—which he had presumably internalized before his arrival in Lilliput, rather than to conform to the emperor's wishes. Of such independent judgment Swift would have heartily approved, especially since Gulliver's belief in justice supports the general public interest of both nations. Yet in
his refusal Gulliver fails to realize that his power has come to be contingent upon serving the self-interest of the emperor. His pride has gone to his head, and he does not see his limits. His gestures towards the Blefuscudians are full of the same proud posturing as we have seen before. Relating his refusal, Gulliver says, "But I endeavoured to divert him from this Design, by many Arguments drawn from the Topicks of Policy as well as Justice: And I plainly protested, that I would never be an Instrument of bringing a free and brave People into Slavery." By refusing, Gulliver gains additional self-esteem in two ways. First, he acts upon the values embodied in his ego ideal and participates in its mythical omnipotence. Second, he plays an ideological trump card against the emperor who had forced his submission. Similarly, Swift himself had used ideological justifications to assert his independence and oppose ruling governments. However, the articles of impeachment prove that Gulliver's ego-ideal is not omnipotent, and playing his trump card, though winning the hand, loses the game. Swift's attitude towards this situation is rather complex. On the one hand, he approves of Gulliver's resolve and of his independence, and he blames the Lilliputians for using Gulliver's good intentions to discredit him. On the other hand, he suggests that Gulliver is foolish for not recognizing the real limits of his power and for not taking into account the self-interest of powerful people.

In the later chapters of Book I particularly, Swift's treatment of Gulliver shows a tendency to justify him and discredit the Lilliputians. The first article of impeachment accuses Gulliver of illegally urinating within the palace grounds to put out a fire. Louis Landa takes this
action to represent Swift's writing of *A Tale of a Tub*, the resentment of which possibly caused Queen Anne to oppose Swift's preferment to a bishopric. This work scandalized many people with its scatology and sexual innuendo, here represented by Gulliver's urinating. However, Swift insisted his intention was to support the Anglican church against its nonconformist and Catholic enemies. The end justified the means. Actually, Swift used satire to accommodate his rebelliousness to his orthodoxy. When applied to Swift, there is some truth to the Lilliputian assertion that he

under Colour of extinguishing the Fire kindled in the Apartment of his Majesty's most dear Imperial Consort, did maliciously, traitorously, and devishly, by discharge of his Urine, put out the said Fire kindled in the said Apartment . . . .

However, this charge embodies only a partial truth; Swift's conscious intention was to support the church. Nevertheless, if this episode does represent Swift's writing *A Tale of a Tub* and the queen's reaction to it, Swift certainly has distorted the facts considerably to justify himself. Gulliver's motives are much more innocent than Swift's. In this case, Swift's attribution of his second ideal's motives to the first ideal self serves his need for self-justification. Gulliver's action can be excused on the grounds that there are no other means available to extinguish the fire. But writing *A Tale of a Tub* was not the only way of fighting the non-conformists, Catholics, and other targets of Swift's. In addition, Gulliver really does put out the fire, whereas Swift did not end all religious controversy. Swift's distortions are self-serving and designed to justify his behavior. Swift's self-justification largely takes the form of attacks upon the behavior and motives of Gulliver's enemies. In the passage quoted above, the reader is meant to regard the accusations
as corruptions of language and reason, for Gulliver's primary intention was surely to extinguish the fire and not to make water illegally within the palace grounds. Thus, Swift fights the suspicion that he primarily intended to write scatological works and only disguised this intention by writing in support of the church. Rebuffing his enemies' attacks, he turns their accusations back upon them; they are the ones with ulterior motives. The accusation against Gulliver makes no sense, demonstrates the ingratitude of his accusers, and shows their willingness to create the appearance of reason to serve their self-interest and cover their true motivations. These motivations include the empress's offended prudishness, the admiral's jealousy of Gulliver's naval success, and Flimnap's suspicion of an affair between Gulliver and his wife. They give the motivations an ideological sanction by cloaking them in reason and respect for the letter of the law. His enemies are guilty of the deceit of which they accuse him. Thus, he projects his own deceitfulness, of which he himself is partly a victim, onto his enemies and claims innocence. At the same time, in showing that Gulliver confers a greater benefit by breaking the law than he would have by obeying it, Swift justifies his own defiance. Not only A Tale of a Tub but also his defense of it serve to resolve his conflict between obedience and defiance.

The other articles of impeachment concern Gulliver's correspondence with the Elefusudians and his refusal to subjugate their kingdom. According to Case, Gulliver represents Bolingbroke negotiating the Treaty of Utrecht. Ending the War of the Spanish Succession, this treaty was highly controversial, for Bolingbroke had made secret agreements with the French enemy without consulting England's allies. These agreements
resulted in Marlborough, the English general, withdrawing his army from a position from which, in all probability, he could have launched a successful move upon Paris. England's Austrian, German, and Dutch allies, as well as the English Whigs, were enraged by Bolingbroke's treachery. After Queen Anne's death and the fall of the Tory ministry, the Whigs, who also suspected him of correspondence with the Pretender, threatened to initiate an investigation into Bolingbroke's activities. Bolingbroke fled the country for France, where he became the Pretender's secretary of state. According to Irvin Ehrenpreis, Swift apparently believed Bolingbroke's version of the events, that it was necessary to end the prolonged and expensive war, that he was primarily interested in peace, and that the charges against him were motivated by the ambitions of his enemies. Though Bolingbroke may have deceived him Swift also had his own reasons for believing Bolingbroke's story. Our author had identified himself with the Tory ministry; his own preferment had depended upon Bolingbroke and Oxford's good will and influence, and he had written in their defense. To accept the charges against Bolingbroke would mean discrediting his own activities in support of the Tories. Thus, his own interests and self-esteem were tied to Bolingbroke's vindication. For this reason, Swift could conflate Bolingbroke's and his own experience in the figure of Gulliver.

The allegorical representation of these events in *Gulliver's Travels* is designed to vindicate Bolingbroke. Swift depicts Gulliver as a man who desires peace, who is willing to defend Lilliput against invasion but unwilling to subjugate another nation. The ministers have manufactured the charges against him because they see him as a rival to power.
Outrageously, they accuse him of deceit and of having ulterior motives, faults of which Swift shows them to be guilty themselves. By charging him with treason, they claim an ideological sanction for their own acts and try to deprive Gulliver of his. Therefore, the articles of impeachment constitute an attack upon Gulliver's identity and those of Bolingbroke and Swift. But Swift constructs his fiction in such a way as to deprive the Lilliputian ministers of the identities they have claimed as supporters of the nation's and the emperor's interests.

Despite the fact that these parallels can be drawn, one must admit that Swift does succeed in constructing a general satire. **Gulliver's Travels** would make sense even if we knew nothing about Bolingbroke or the Treaty of Utrecht. Materials for constructing other parallels are ready at hand in any reader's experience. Within the fiction Swift's personal motivations, too, do not become apparent. Swift's perceptions become objectified in Gulliver and the Lilliputians so that we can only infer Swift's intentions. What we infer without the aid of psychology is an abstract commentary on certain dilemmas of power. But psychology clarifies Swift's motives and explains what led him to order his materials as he did. We can see that Swift's portrayal of Gulliver is ambivalent and that his ambivalence arises from his own identity conflicts over self-esteem and over obedience and defiance. In so far as Swift ridicules Gulliver, he rejects his first ideal identity; in so far as Swift justifies Gulliver, he embraces it. Such is the ambivalence of Swift's second ideal self, represented here in the whole fictive reordering of his experience.
FOOTNOTES


8. Case, p. 73.


10. See Swift, Correspondence, pp. 178ff.


21. Swift, Travels, p. 27.
22. Swift, Travels, p. 28.


29. Case, pp. 74ff.

CHAPTER V. DEPENDENCY: BOOK II OF GULLIVER'S TRAVELS

If in Book I Swift explores the dilemmas of power, in Book II he explores those of impotence. Instead of being the victim of plots, Gulliver is subject to random accidents and to the caprices of the Brobdingnagians. Attacked by wasps and dwarves, fetched in a dog's mouth, sexually molested by maids of honor, and bruised by a hailstorm, Gulliver becomes highly dependent upon others for protection. Unfortunately, the Brobdingnagians sometimes exploit his dependency. The farmer who finds him wears him out at expositions, and even the beloved Glumdalclitch reduces him to functioning as her doll. Thus, Gulliver's dependency has two aspects, one more desirable than the other: protection and exploitation. In Book II Swift expresses his own resistance to dependency and reveals unawares his own suppressed dependency needs. Swift's use of perspective, his shifts of point of view from that of a tiny person among big people, to Gulliver's recollections of the reverse perspective in Lilliput, to seeing and being seen as a man of equal stature to others in England, call attention to the fact that what we see depends largely upon how we look at it. Our author attributes these various points of view to differences in size, but Gulliver's relative sizes also cause and come to symbolize particular frames of mind. In Book II, Gulliver becomes dependent and both pettily and vindictively resistant to dependence. Swift uses him to express similar trends of his own, but he refers to other perspectives to control and limit the applications. He suggests, somewhat ambivalently and evasively, that Gulliver's perspective is not absolute, and he distances his own conflicts over
dependency enough that he can play with them.

Life in Brobdingnag mortifies Gulliver's pride, of which we have seen a good deal in Book I. Among enormous people, Gulliver must adopt a new identity appropriate to his circumstances, and this new identity is much less flattering than the first one. Two of the identities the Brobdingnagians impose upon him are those of an animal and a doll. Both of these derive from Gulliver's resemblance to a child, for, according to Lawrence Stone in *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800*, "Before the age of two infants were regarded with some distaste as smelly and unformed little animals lacking the capacity to reason,"¹ and there was "a general tendency to treat children from about two to seven as amusing pets to entertain the grownups."² Through Gulliver Swift explores childhood and his own motivations for outgrowing it. Through the king of Brobdingnag and the use of perspective, he expresses a more mature and moral counterreaction against the sort of self-assertion Gulliver makes to resist the childish identity he possesses in Brobdingnag. Thus, Swift repeats his victory over his childishness.

The first stage of his identity formation occurs in Chapter I, where the Brobdingnagians have difficulty determining what kind of animal he is. In the following passage, Gulliver describes the reaction of the farmer's servant who finds him:

He considered a while with the Caution of one who endeavours to lay hold on a small dangerous Animal in such a Manner that it shall not be able either to scratch or to bite him; as I myself have sometimes done with a Weasel in England.³

Here we find a different view of rebellion from that presented in Book I. There Gulliver's large size expresses a belief in omnipotence and in the power of anger against social restraints. Here Gulliver projects onto
the farmer contempt for an anger that has become futile because it has been overwhelmed by fear. Unable to express his anger, Gulliver turns it back upon himself as self-hatred and becomes abject:

All I ventured was to raise mine Eyes towards the Sun, and place my Hands together in a supplicating Posture, and to speak some Words in an humble melancholy Tone, suitable to the Condition I then was in. For, I apprehended every Moment that he would dash me against the Ground, as we usually do any little hateful Animal which we have a Mind to destroy. ¹

Although it should be sufficiently apparent that Gulliver is a very small human being, the servant’s master, a farmer, is disconcerted enough by Gulliver’s size to fail to identify him as one:

The Farmer having (as I supposed by their Talk) received such an Account of me as his Servant could give him, took a piece of a small Straw, about the Size of a walking Staff, and therewith lifted up the Lappets of my Coat; which it seems he thought to be some kind of Covering that Nature had given me. He blew my Hairs aside to take a better View of my Face. He called his Hinds about him, and asked them (as I afterwards learned) whether they had ever seen in the Fields any little Creature that resembled me. ²

The fact that the farmer as well as Gulliver sees him as subhuman suggests that Swift has designed the fiction to express contempt for powerlessness and for anger against it. According to Karen Homey, this attitude is a consequence of pride. ³ Since Gulliver cannot fulfill his positive identity as a powerful man in control of his fate, he hates himself for fulfilling his negative identity as an impotent creature subject to all sorts of random mishances. Through Gulliver Swift expresses his own self-hate for not mastering his fate, but he qualifies this hatred in important ways. Gulliver obviously is a human being, and the farmer appears ridiculous in not recognizing him as one. Swift’s satire here on the ways in which habit controls perception tends to neutralize his self-contempt. Gulliver does not really deserve being characterized as
an animal, as the Brobdingnagians themselves intermittently realize. Swift's commentary on habits of perception functions to qualify the deeper meaning of the fiction. The satire on perception provides no alternative to viewing Gulliver with contempt; but it does suggest a more maturely conceived and broader frame of reference which limits the self-hate.

If Gulliver at first resembles a small dangerous animal, he soon becomes a tame one. This transformation in his identity begins to take place in Chapter I, where the farmer tells his son to pet Gulliver to show good will. In Chapter II we find this description of Gulliver:

It now began to be known and talked of in the Neighbourhood, that my Master had found a strange Animal in the Field, about the Bigness of a Splacknuck, but exactly shaped in every Part like a human Creature; which it likewise imitated in all its actions; seemed to speak in a little Language of its own, had already learned several Words of theirs, went erect upon two Legs, was tame and gentle, would come when it was called, do whatever it was bid, had the finest Limbs in the World, and a Complexion fairer than a Nobleman's Daughter of three Years old.

Here Gulliver is still depicted as an animal although, indeed, he imitates human beings. There is a grain of truth in this view, for if children are animals who learn to be adults largely by being forced to imitate them, then human culture and any individual’s identity within it are largely a matter of mimicry and artificiality. Parts of the description are such as would be used to describe a domesticated animal; he is tame, and, like a dog, he comes when called. Similarly, Glumdalclitch regards him as a pet, comparable to her pet lamb. Gulliver has encouraged this view by being submissive and dependent. Swift uses the domesticated animal imagery to express his contempt for such modes of behavior.

Another identity which the Brobdingnagians assign to Gulliver is
that of a doll. Here is the opening of Chapter II:

My Mistress had a Daughter of nine Years old, a Child of
towardly Parts for her Age, very dextrous at her Needle, and
skilful in dressing her Baby. Her Mother and she contrived to
fit up the Baby’s Cradle for me against Night: The Cradle was
put into a small Drawer of a Cabinet, and the Drawer placed
upon a hanging Shelf for fear of the Rats. . . . This young
Girl was so handy, that after I had once or twice pulled off
my Cloaths before her, she was able to dress and undress me,
although I never gave her that Trouble when she would let me
do either my self.10

Gulliver, to gain the protection he needs, must accept more dependency
than he requires. His dependence upon Glumdalclitch demands that he give
up kinds of control he really could exert. Gulliver’s identity as a toy
or doll is forced upon him by the often trivial interests of others; he
does not claim these identities for himself. Thus, he becomes the crea-
ture of other people. Swift especially points to this dimension of
dependency when the queen buys Gulliver at the beginning of Chapter III.
Gulliver is forced to come to terms with a world which overwhelms him,
which was not created for his own benefit, and he must struggle to main-
tain his ego-centricty.

If Glumdalclitch mildly exploits Gulliver’s dependency, her father
does so more egregiously. In Chapter II this man displays him like a
freak in a side-show, requiring Gulliver to perform frequently and
exhaustingly for the farmer’s financial benefit. Since Gulliver is
powerless, this man feels free to pay so little heed to Gulliver’s
interests that he allows Gulliver’s health to deteriorate badly. By the
time he sells Gulliver, the farmer fears that Gulliver may soon die. In
relating such incidents, Swift reveals a reason of his own for desiring
independence: dependency often makes one act in others’ self-interest
rather than in one’s own.
Gulliver reacts to all of these indignities by claiming identity as a hero. In Chapter I he displays his intrepidity to a cat and bravely slays a rat. In Chapter II he demonstrates his military skills to the peasants. To prove his courage to a skeptical queen, he cuts flies to pieces with his knife and kills four wasps in the same manner. Most important, in Chapter VII, to compensate for his impotence and prove his value to the king, Gulliver offers to teach him the manufacture and use of gunpowder. This passage has often been used to demonstrate the inconsistency of Gulliver's character, for in Lilliput he had shown more peaceful intentions. But before we jump to this conclusion, we ought to remember Swift's own exclamation, "HOW inconsistent is man with himself!"

The inconsistency is not in Swift's depiction, but in the identity Gulliver claims, and what identity he does claim depends largely on the circumstances in which he finds himself. Gulliver is driven to a belief in force by his sense of his own powerlessness and consequent loss of self-esteem, for which he wishes to compensate. He can no longer afford to be magnanimous. Karen Horney has pointed out that the individual desperate for self-esteem has a "perfectly amazing . . . capacity for unconscious reversal of values." He will at any moment choose those values which are most likely to boost his pride. Since Gulliver is guilty of pride, we should not be surprised by his inconsistency; it is in character.

The circumstances in which Swift has placed Gulliver generally make his heroics appear ludicrous. The amount of control his actions grant him is so small that the reader feels Gulliver has become pathetic, because his struggle to maintain his ego-centricity is doomed to failure.
Swift is not commenting on Gulliver alone, but upon self-conscious heroism in general. He has constructed Book II to put heroic pride in a context which will render it contemptible. Swift would not object to slaying flies, but he does object to taking pride in such actions, and particularly to being heroic simply to increase one's self-esteem. Swift rejects force as a means to retain an ego-centric world in favor of adopting moral values which serve the interests of whole societies. The king expresses Swift's views when he denounces Gulliver's offer to instruct him in the use of gunpowder. The king sees that the little creature who is so dependent upon the sympathy of others has killed his own sympathetic nature in order to increase his pride. Therefore, rather than honoring Gulliver, the king regards him as an "impotent and groveling" insect who entertains "inhuman ideas." The king and Swift thus reject Gulliver's claim to a more exalted identity and deny him even his humanity.

While Swift disdains Gulliver's pride, he also rejects his character's dependency. In doing so, Swift not only shows contempt for the dependent person, but uses Gulliver to express distaste for people who are depended upon. Most of these are women. Behind Swift's expressions of disgust for the female body, there lies a massive disillusionment with oral dependency. During the oral period an infant leads a completely ego-centric life, believing that its mother exists solely to satisfy its needs. But Swift discovered that this view is an illusion, that the mother or nurse has needs and requirements, too, which must be satisfied. Gulliver's revulsion at women's bodies expresses Swift's early resentment of this fact. For example, in Chapter I Gulliver tells how a baby wants
him for a plaything. At the beginning of the following passage, the nurse tries to divert the child's attention:

The Nurse to quiet her Babe made use of a Rattle, which was a Kind of hollow Vessel filled with great Stones, and fastned by a Cable to the Child's Waist: But all in vain, so that she was forced to apply the last Remedy by giving it suck. I must confess no Object ever disgusted me so much as the Sight of her monstrous Breast, which I cannot tell what to compare with, so as to give the curious Reader an Idea of its Bulk, Shape and Colour. It stood prominent six Foot, and could not be less than sixteen in Circumference. The Nipple was about half the Bigness of my Head, and the Hue both of that and the Dug so varified with Spots, Pimples and Freckles, that nothing could appear more nauseous: For I had a near Sight of her, she sitting down the more conveniently to give Suck, and I standing on the Table. This made me reflect upon the fair Skins of our English ladies, who appear so beautiful to us, only because they are of our own Size, and their Defects not to be seen but through a magnifying Glass, where we find by Experiment that the smoothest and whitest Skins look rough and coarse, and ill coloured. 19

Swift's depiction of the breast expresses his disillusionment with dependency. In giving suck, the nurse ignores the infant's true wishes and forces it to accept a substitute, an action which fits the pattern I have noted earlier of the dependent person's having to accept kinds of dependency he does not desire. The description of the breast comes immediately afterwards, suggesting that the description is a vindictive reaction designed to deny any desire for breasts because desiring them forces one to accede to unacceptable conditions and threatens one's ability to act on one's own. Possibly, Swift vengefully turned the anal period's lessons of self-control and disgust against the woman who taught him, rejecting her continuing affection and dependence upon him. Such a trend might have been strengthened by resentment at being kidnapped by his nurse. The nurse—who did so, Swift says, 20 out of pure affection for him—may have tried to compensate for any guilt by demonstrating
unwanted fondness and demanding that Jonathan return it. During the oral phase an infant has an inadequate sense of separation from his mother or, in this case, nurse. Thus, once an infant has begun to feel its identity as a being separate from the nurturer, sucking upon a breast can seem to pose the threat of incorporation. Responding to this threat with destructive analysis, Gulliver gradually breaks the threatening body down into small enough pieces that they cannot encompass him, and since the threat of incorporation depends upon his desire for them, he renders them disgusting. In addition, the sharpness of focus which Gulliver can maintain because of his small size expresses resistance to the softening of outline which normally occurs in close proximity to another's body. Perhaps Swift interprets this loss of perceptual ability as an ego loss and associates it with merging into another's being. By maintaining Gulliver's sharpness of focus, Swift uses him vicariously to assert control and to deny his own need to surrender to a nurturing, all-protective woman.

Much of Gulliver's revulsion elsewhere expresses resistance to incorporation. In Chapter I he fears being eaten by the Brobdingnagians. In Chapter III Gulliver finds the queen's eating nauseous when he is frightened by the size and power of her teeth and by her massive eating utensils. A woman who can crunch with her teeth the wing of a bird nine times as large as a turkey can clearly consume Gulliver as well. In Chapter IV Gulliver's description of a cancerous breast also expresses resistance to incorporation: "There was a Woman with a Cancer in her Breast, swelled to a monstrous Size, full of Holes, in two or three of which I could have easily crept, and covered my whole Body."
In Chapter V Gulliver relates how maids of honor play with him:

They would often strip me naked from Top to Toe, and lay me at full Length in their Bosoms; wherewith I was much disgusted; because, to say the Truth, a very offensive Smell came from their Skins; which I do not mention or intend to the Disadvantage of those excellent Ladies, for whom I have all Manner of Respect: But, I conceive, that my Sense was more acute in Proportion to my Littleness; and that those illustrious Persons were no more disagreeable to their Lovers, or to each other, than People of the same Quality are with us in England. 24

As in the passage describing the farmer's difficulty in identifying Gulliver, Swift here uses his play with perspective to limit the force of his criticism. Nevertheless, we find Gulliver expressing revulsion to a woman's breasts. This passage combines images of breast feeding with ones of a more prurient nature. Swift continues this theme in the following paragraph:

The handsomest among these Maids of Honour, a pleasant frolicksome Child of sixteen, would sometimes set me astride upon one of her Nipples; with many other Tricks, wherein the Reader will excuse me for not being over particular. 25

These events seem curious until one becomes aware that genital fondling was regularly used during this period to express approval of children. 26 This fact may also explain Swift's vision of a Utopian educational system in Book I, where he recommends severely limiting the demonstration of affection by parents towards their children and attributes that affection to sexual desire. 27 Genital fondling can produce alienation because the child cannot fully understand or participate in the adults' titillation. He feels victimized. The fact that there exists as yet no clear distinction between sexual and excretory functions causes further confusion, for toilet training often produces shame about the same organs which the adults sexually stimulate. One possible reaction is that the child regards the adult's fondling as a betrayal of the lessons taught him.
Here, although Gulliver has no choice but to participate, he has no opportunity to achieve satisfaction and he feels alienated because his wishes are not considered. The implication of the proximity of the breasts is that this unwanted sexual activity poses the same threat of incorporation and loss of self-control as does sucking on a breast. Awareness that certain smells are unsavory begins in the anal stage, and the reader will remember that Swift's opposition to love seems to have begun in this period. Therefore, to protect the self-control and independence which he gained in the anal stage, Gulliver calls attention to the women's offensive odors, thereby denying his dependency needs. In the sentence following the first of these two passages, Gulliver admits that the Lilliputians sometimes found his own odor offensive. By this means, Swift avoids the charge of unfairness in his depiction of women and legitimizes his critique. It is acceptable to attack others if he implicates himself. At the same time, his reference to the usual European perspective reestablishes the dominance of a normative view and limits the intensity of horror which Gulliver experiences. The ideal of "decency" which Swift advocates in "Strephon and Chloe" allows him to recognize feminine anality while still retaining his belief in cleanliness. In this passage from Gulliver's Travels, Swift forms a similar compromise by balancing his olfactory accusations with distancing through perspective, showing that this unfavorable view of women is not unavoidable. The mask of science allows him to explore his unconscious associations of sex with orality and anality, but he does not want to close off the possibility of mutual understanding and acceptance.

Gulliver calls the incident with the monkey the most dangerous event
in which he was involved in Brobdingnag. In this travesty of nurturance, Gulliver is kidnapped, as Swift was by his nurse, and forced into a state of dependence. Though the monkey is male, it fills what is among humans a feminine role, and Swift makes the parallel between the monkey and a nurse explicit: "He took me up in his right Fore-foot, and held me as a Nurse doth a Child she is going to suckle . . . ."29 Shortly thereafter, Gulliver recounts his revulsion at being forced to consume food that the monkey has prechewed. Swift has also compared women to monkeys in "A Letter to a Young Lady, on her Marriage":

As Divines say, that some People take more Pains to be damned, than it would cost them to be saved; so your Sex employs more Thought, Memory, and Application to be Fools, than would serve to make them wise and useful. When I reflect on this, I cannot conceive you to be human Creatures, but a Sort of Species hardly a Degree above a Monkey, who hath more diverting Tricks than any of you; is an Animal less mischievous and expensive; might, in Time, be a tolerable Critick in Velvet and Brocade; and, for aught I know, would equally become them."30

This passage suggests that Swift may also be travestyng women in this quotation from Gulliver's Travels. However, the two passages differ in import. In the letter Swift compares women to monkeys to distance himself from them, to declare his difference from them. He compares them to monkeys because monkeys are famous for imitating the behavior of humans. Feminine fashions also involve women in imitation, as well as in artificiality. Swift suggests that underneath the civilized veneer, women are as bestial as monkeys. In addition, by portraying them as another species, Swift calls attention to the inexplicable nature of their behavior. When one describes the actions of another kind of animal, one may seem to obviate the need for explanation, because explanation cannot proceed without some degree of identification. If identification seems
inappropriate because of the difference in species, the other animal's behavior becomes merely curious. In the comparison to monkeys, Swift regards women in the same way and denies his own inclination to behave similarly. Yet, towards the end of the passage, I sense that Swift genuinely enjoys his depiction of women, that he gains a vicarious pleasure from viewing their antics. The momentarily grave and serious Swift could here enjoy the more frivolous side of his nature through observing women while still maintaining priestly decorum. In this context, Swift can view at least some cultural forms as a kind of play which does not impinge on his true animal nature. Though the monkey incident in *Gulliver* contains some of the same elements, it is much less jovial, and Swift demonstrates a greater repugnance towards the animality of human beings. By travestying women as nurturers, Swift declares his distance from them and his revulsion at being forced into a dependent role. The animality of the monkey calls attention to the instinctuality of maternal behavior; it is a given and has not been chosen by either Gulliver's or the monkey's ego. Significantly, the first question which the rallying king asks Gulliver at the conclusion of this episode is "what my Thoughts and Speculations were while I lay in the Monkey's Paw."31 The king's and Swift's point is that philosophy or intellectual control does not give one control over circumstances, in spite of the fact that philosophers may cultivate the illusion that it could. Thus, Swift demonstrates the limits of the mind's control and emphasizes the power of the monkey's blind instinct. In the familiar world, one's illusions are more or less adjusted to reality; one develops habitual and relatively successful ways of defending them. *Gulliver's* altered circumstances, his life in a
greatly enlarged world, strip him or, in Swift's view, should strip him of the illusion of his ego's control. Gulliver's horror is an emergency defense against the recognition of his own powerlessness before a larger being and before his own animality and instinctuality. For the implication of the kidnapping is that he too is a monkey who instinctively or irrationally needs nurturing. Through Gulliver Swift expresses his own horror of, and resistance to, dependency. By depicting women as monkeys, he distances himself from them and expresses revulsion. Behind the revulsion there probably lies his resentment against his nurse for taking him away from his mother and for imitating her. In addition, the monkey has a need to be nurturing, and, to fulfill its role, requires another individual to take the complementary, dependent role. Perhaps Swift here represents his own nurse, who may have required the infant Jonathan's affection and dependence to overcome her guilt at the kidnapping. If such was the case, Jonathan could have opportunistically projected his own dependency needs onto her to settle the conflict between his own need for nurture and his resentment against its only source. This solution may have been an important motive for developing his own ego as a means to gain independence. Thus, the emphasis here on the irrational and instinctive in depicting Gulliver's forced return to dependency. In this fictive representation, Swift distances himself from the conflict in order to explore it again and triumph over it with humor. Nevertheless, the incident shows that the conflict persists.

Although I have concentrated upon the unfavorable portrayal of dependency in this book, Swift's treatment of it is predominantly favorable. Even though Glumdalclitch regards Gulliver as a doll and
plaything, she genuinely is emotionally attached to him and protects him from many dangers. In return Gulliver feels affection for her and worries about her fate after his departure. But the price he pays for her protection in diminished self-esteem and independence is ultimately one he cannot afford to pay. In creating Gulliver, Swift imagines himself filling his negative identity as a helpless, dependent self. One advantage of possessing a negative identity is that one can still maintain a belief in the efficacy of the positive identity, could it be achieved. And if one looks at oneself from a higher perch, one can to some extent exist at the higher level. Laughter at the expense of the negative self serves to intimidate an individual to become his ideal self. But if one did not at least plausibly resemble and feel drawn towards the negative self, there would be no need for laughter.

Although Gulliver expresses revulsion towards women's bodies and towards dependency, he also experiences it in relation to other objects, such as lice and flies, which make him aware of his helplessness and of the world that exists and lives independent of his own habits of thought and the modes of behavior which ordinarily grant a semblance of control over one's life and environment. The inadequacy of his habitual frames of reference make Brobdingnag an overwhelmingly physical world, where he is subject to all sorts of humiliating accidents that catch him off guard. It is not a place where he can anticipate events or convincingly pretend to be master of his fate. This land eludes his will, and he cannot plan or control his life. Much of his revulsion is a reaction to perceiving reality as a truly alien place which was not created for him. I have already indicated that another of Gulliver's reactions against
his impotence is to claim identity as a hero, but Swift ridicules this role as vociferously as that of child, animal, and doll. As we shall soon see, Gulliver's helplessness and dependency are really designed to increase the king of Brobdingnag's moral authority.

Yet, despite all the dark implications I have just explored, Book II may be the most comic of the four voyages. The comedy stems partly from Swift's and the reader's imaginative triumph over their own impotence and subjection to circumstance as depicted and exaggerated in Gulliver. By laughing at him, we as observers rise above him and seem possessed of greater actual and conceptual control over our lives. The fantastic nature of his adventures obviates his pull upon our sympathies and releases us from feeling the full impact of his experience. But paradoxically these controls upon the intensity of the experience allow Swift to explore Gulliver's experience and his own peripheral perceptions more closely. The Swift who can identify with his character to explore this ground is protected by the Swift who transcends Gulliver, who conceives the plan of the entire book, and who can shift the perspective when the insights become too dangerous. Under this protection, his negative self becomes dependent upon his positive self, and Swift can indulge his dependency needs while refusing to depend on anyone else. Since identifying with this negative self and ridiculing it are parts of the same imaginative process, Swift combines energies normally opposed to each other and experiences a joyous release which he expresses in the great inventive playfulness of this book.

Gulliver's helplessness and our limited or ambivalent identification with him prepare us to accept the views of the king of Brobdingnag, who
does possess power and advocates what Swift would consider the correct political positions. I have already discussed the king's indignant rejection of Gulliver's offer to teach the manufacture and use of gunpowder. In Chapter VI Gulliver, at the king's request, describes the political and cultural institutions of England as favorably as possible. The king then poses many questions and doubts which reflect Swift's own views, and eventually decides upon an extremely unfavorable view of Englishmen. He expresses it in the following passage:

As for yourself (continued the King) who have spent the greatest Part of your Life in travelling; I am well disposed to hope you may hitherto have escaped many Vices of your Country. But, by what I have gathered from your own Relation, and the Answers I have with much Pains wrung and extorted from you; I cannot but conclude the Bulk of your Natives, to be the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth.\(^{32}\)

The final image in this passage implicates all Englishmen in the identity attributed to Gulliver earlier in the book, and it adds a moral dimension to the animal imagery used to describe him. For the first time, the reader gets an indication of what this imagery means and is not left to draw upon his own associations. Most of the actions that the king condemns are corruptions of social systems designed to benefit general society. Selfishness causes certain corruptions, such as bribery of the voters;\(^{33}\) and carelessness, others such as the failure to educate lawyers adequately.\(^{34}\) Throughout his criticism, the king judges English social institutions according to their efficacy in serving the commonweal. Basically, he shares with Swift a practical moral concern that recognizes and counters the evils of human nature, so that good can prevail. Here, as in the "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift," our author seeks to retain an ego-centric world-view by identifying with values which he believes
will serve the public interest. The king and he reject and belittle those who oppose them because these enemies pose the major block to regaining omnipotence. Therefore, Swift recommends a broad social orientation as a basis for identity and self-esteem as an alternative to Gulliver's futile dependency and physical heroism.
FOOTNOTES


5. Swift, p. 72.


7. Swift, p. 74.


10. Swift, p. 79.


12. Swift, p. 82.


14. Swift, p. 94.

15. Swift, p. 118.

16. Horney, p. 94.

17. Swift, p. 118.


19. Swift, pp. 75-76.


27. Swift, *Travels*, p. 44.
CHAPTER VI. TOTALISM: BOOK IV OF GULLIVER'S TRAVELS

In Book IV Gulliver visits the only non-human society in the Travels. The Houyhnhnms in their rationality and benevolence represent an ideal of Western culture, an ideal which, as George Sherburn has pointed out,¹ should not be too closely identified with any particular group, such as the Shaftesburian benevolists, deists, or neo-stoics, but which is a generalized amalgam of various idealistic aspirations for mankind.² As such, they constitute an ideal identity for Western man. On the other hand, the Yahoos, with their filth, greed, and quarrelsome-ness, represent the complementary negative identity. In attempting to find a place in this society, Gulliver falls into a severe identity confusion as he tries to identify with the Houyhnhnms and shuns his own humanity because it too closely resembles Yahoo nature. In the process, he comes to face the dilemmas of pride and self-hate described by Karen Horney in Neurosis and Human Growth. Although Swift exploits the correspondences between humans and Yahoos to isolate and criticize the bad side of human nature and partly accepts the Houyhnhnms as an ideal, he ultimately insists that man's nature is a mixture of good and evil. To pretend that man can achieve perfection is nonsense, pride, and insanity. In this, Swift agrees with Horney's conclusions. However, unlike her, he never presents a concept of a real human self at harmony with its own nature. Man's capacities for good and evil remain in conflict. Differing from modern psychological theorists, Swift does not regard Yahoo mischievousness and perverseness as reactions against cultural demands but as basic, though not all-encompassing, elements of

156
human nature. As Louis I. Bredvold has argued, Swift believed a
capacity for evil to be inherent in mankind. Identifying the conflict
between good and evil as the essential feature of his own identity and
of humanity's, Swift rejects the notion that man could be perfectly
reasonable because accepting it would remove him from the battle which
gave his life meaning and motive.

The present consensus of critical opinion holds that Swift does not
wholly approve of Gulliver's misanthropy at the end of the voyage. Reject-
ing the views of William Makepeace Thackeray, John B. Moore, and others,
such critics as John F. Ross, Samuel Holt Monk, and Robert C. Elliott have pointed to Swift's character Pedro de Mendez to show that Gulliver's
condemnation of all men as Yahoos is unjustified. With this position I
am, on the whole, in agreement. However, I believe that Monk has under-
estimated the intensity of Swift's conflicts and overestimated Swift's
optimism when he remarks, "[Swift's] satire is seldom merely invective.
It is not paradoxical to say that it arises from philanthropy, not mis-
thropy, from idealism as to what man might be, not from despair at what
he is." Ross is very much on target when he writes about the end of the
voyage,

severe satire remains the main theme, but the new theme of
Gulliver's absurdity complicates the issue... So far as I
can see, Swift offers no answer of his own, no solution. But
he does transcend the misanthropic solution... This seems
to me the final comedy of Lemuel Gulliver—that Swift could
make an elaborate and subtle joke at the expense of a very
important part of himself.

However, Ross does not account for what happens here in the psychological
terms I shall bring to bear, and neither does Monk. Saying nothing about
identity conflicts, the battle between obedience and defiance, totalism,
or the paradox that pride and self-hate are inseparable, they describe but fail to explain Swift's contradictions. Elliott has discussed the Travels in psychological terms, but his approach is very different from mine. According to him, primitive men believe that invective has the power to kill. Invective becomes art when belief in magic dies out and becomes sublimated into satire. Thus, Swift's distancing himself from Gulliver is a function of Swift's artistry. He patterns and objectifies emotion in the work, thereby transcending his disillusionment and hatred. Although Elliott's remarks about esthetic distance are accurate and helpful, his discussion of the magical element in satire fails to isolate the patterns I hope to reveal.

Ross and Ricardo Quintana have distinguished between the two species inhabiting Houyhnhnmland by claiming that the Houyhnhnms are rational whereas the Yahoos are passionate. The Yahoos, however, do not represent all the passions, but only those that cause dissension or that Swift found disgusting. On the whole, they embody human tendencies to rebel against social restraints. The Houyhnhnms are not entirely rational; they too have feelings though "their Wants and Passions are fewer than among us." As a result they lead lives of relative equanimity and content, devoid of the painful internal conflicts which beset man. The passions that they do feel are ones, such as benevolence, which conduce towards social harmony. Thus, whereas the Yahoos represent the rebellious part of man, the Houyhnhnms represent virtues which man cultivates by conforming to socially transmitted values. Unlike man, however, the Houyhnhnms are naturally inclined to adopt these values and feel no desire to rebel against them.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "reason" as "That intellectual power or faculty (usu. regarded as characteristic of mankind, but sometimes also attributed in a certain degree to the lower animals) which is ordinarily employed in adapting thought or action to some end; the guiding principle of the human mind in the process of thinking."\textsuperscript{15} Reason, then, involves the perception of cause-and-effect relationships and implies recognition of the fact that man can use such perceptions to order his behavior in ways enabling him to control his environment. He must discipline himself to reason, however, before he can gain this control. Whether reason can be used to choose goals is a more difficult question. Certainly, reason alone cannot select them, as Pope asserts in An Essay on Man: "Two Principles in human nature reign;/ Self-love, to urge, and Reason, to restrain."\textsuperscript{16} Yet reason can help one perceive unworthy or self-destructive aims. The Houyhnhnms' reason shows itself partly in adapting thought and action to ends; for example, in describing their discourse, Gulliver says, "I was infinitely delighted with the Station of an humble Auditor in such Conversations, were nothing passed but what was useful, expressed in the fewest and most significant Words."\textsuperscript{17} They also use reason to evaluate goals. For instance, after Gulliver has described his crew members' propensities towards murder, robbery, forgery, and other crimes, the Houyhnhnm Master "was wholly at a Loss to know what could be the Use or Necessity of practising those Vices."\textsuperscript{18} He means the social use or necessity, for he has no conception of fiercely selfish passions. Gulliver quickly enlightens him by providing "some Ideas of the Desire of Power and Riches; of the terrible Effects of Lust, Intemperance, Malice, and Envy."\textsuperscript{19} By making the Houyhnhnm Master appear
naive, Swift criticizes the benevolists and optimists for their supposed blindness to half of human nature. Yet he also makes the valid point that much human behavior is aimed at achieving evil and destructive ends. Reason should teach that the individual is best served by actions which preserve social harmony; in a society where selfish passions produce continual conflict, most people are condemned to misery. Here, as in the "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift," one can recognize this author's commitment to serving the public interest and his opposition to purely selfish behavior. Though people unfortunately do behave antisocially, reason and observation should teach them the futility of their actions and restrain them from socially destructive behavior. As a product of civilization, reason should serve cultural as well as personal ends. Among the Houyhnhnms the proper use of reason develops in harmony with nature, but it is folly to believe it can do so among men. For mankind reason can prevail only by winning the conflict with disruptive passions. To be rational, a human being must be obedient to reason's dictates.

In another passage Swift uses the Houyhnhnms to illustrate the idea that reason unencumbered by passion produces social harmony:

As these Noble Houyhnhnms are endowed by Nature with a general Disposition to all Virtues, and have no Conceptions or Ideas of what is evil in a rational Creature; so their grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason, and to be wholly governed by it. Neither is Reason among them a Point problematical as with us, where Men can argue with Plausibility on both Sides of a Question; but strikes you with immediate Conviction; as it must need do where it is not mingled, obscured, or discoloured by Passion and Interest. I remember it was with extreme Difficulty that I could bring my Master to understand the Meaning of the Word Opinion, or how a Point could be disputable; because Reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain; and beyond our Knowledge we cannot do either. So that Controversies, Wranglings, Disputes, and Positiveness in false or dubious Propositions, are Evils unknown among the Houyhnhnms.
The idea that reason would lead people to the same conclusions, were that faculty not corrupted by the passions, is very much Swift's, as the following quotation from his sermon "On the Trinity" demonstrates:

_Reason itself is true and just, but the Reason of every particular Man is weak and wavering, perpetually sway'd and turn'd by his Interests, his Passions, and his Vices. Let any Man but consider, when he hath a Controversy with another, though his Cause be ever so unjust, though the whole World be against him, how blinded he is by the Love of himself, to believe that Right is Wrong, and Wrong is Right, when it makes for his own Advantage._  

Although uncorrupted reason leads to a single conclusion, human passions often interfere with its operation and make disputation necessary. Since the Houyhnhnm's reason allows them to judge and act sensibly and to live in social harmony, they do represent an ideal which Swift embraces. Nevertheless, passion often prevails in man, who is therefore incapable of fully achieving the Houyhnhnm ideal.

The Houyhnhnm's endorse cultivating a number of other qualities associated with reason: learning ability, the use of language, order, cleanliness, civility, gentleness, and benevolence. They take the first two of these as signs of reason in Gulliver. Chapter III begins:

_MY principal Endeavour was to learn the Language, which my Master (for so I shall henceforth call him) and his Children, and every Servant of his House were desirous to teach me. For they looked upon it as a Prodigy, that a brute Animal should discover such Marks of a rational Creature._

Order and cleanliness mark the Houyhnhnm's in contrast to the Yahoos, but Swift makes the connection of these qualities to reason less clear. Presumably, when one directs one's behavior to achieve reasonable aims, one's actions will be orderly and deliberate. Norman O. Brown has rightly looked to Freud's theory of anality to explicate Swift's works, but unlike me he concentrates upon the erotic element rather than upon the
anal conflict between the individual will and social norms. Training in self-control begins during the anal stage when one learns cleanliness; and bowel control becomes the prototype for later forms of discipline. For this reason, cleanliness, too, is a sign of rationality. Since human culture promotes cleanliness, being clean shows respect for social values and social order. Therefore, here too, rationality is connected to social harmony—in this case, through the idea of cleanliness. Even though—or actually, because—these associations are human, they contribute to Swift's imagination of the ideal Houyhnhnms. Fulfilling the understandable human desire for internal peace, the Houyhnhnms experience no conflict between the societal demand for cleanliness and the human urge to rebel against it. Therefore, when Gulliver requests the Houyhnhnm Master's indulgence not to make him "expose the Parts [of his body] that Nature taught us to conceal," the Master replies, "my Discourse was all very strange, but especially the last Part; for he could not understand why Nature should teach us to conceal what Nature had given." Of course, civilization, not nature, has required Gulliver to remain covered. The Master, ignorant of any conflict between nature and civilization, misses what for us is an obvious response. Feeling no antagonism between obedience and defiance, he remains unashamed of any parts of his body. Though such an attitude is appropriate to him, it is not to humans; and Gulliver, even after he has tried to identify with the Houyhnhnms, continues to wear and actually make his own clothing.

Not only does reason teach the Houyhnhnms to cultivate social harmony, but the manner in which their affections are constituted naturally works towards that end:
FRIENDSHIP and Benevolence are the two principal Virtues among the Houyhnhnms; and these not confined to particular Objects, but universal to the whole Race. For, a Stranger from the remotest Part, is equally treated with the nearest Neighbour, and where-ever he goes, looks upon himself as at home. They preserve Decency and Civility in the highest Degrees, but are altogether ignorant of Ceremony. They have no Fondness for their Colts or Foals; but the Care they take in educating them proceedeth entirely from the Dictates of Reason. And, I observed my Master to shew the same Affection to his Neighbour's Issue that he had for his own. They will have it that Nature teaches them to love the whole Species, and it is Reason only that maketh a distinction of Persons, where there is a superior Degree of Virtue.  

Similarly, the absence of love frees their marital relations from jealousy, quarreling, and discontent.  

Assuredly, if humans were like the Houyhnhnms in these respects, we would lead more peaceful lives. But Gulliver's description and his continual comparisons of humans to the Yahoos make apparent that, although we can conceive of the Houyhnhnm ideal, our own natures prevent us from achieving it. And our passionate nature, perhaps, keeps us from wholly wanting it. The Houyhnhnms' relative unemotionality also frees them from the fear of death and from the need to mourn profoundly for departed family members and friends. Thus, they live in greater psychic equanimity than people do. Though stoics may find such detachment admirable, Swift indicates that this aspiration distorts human nature, just as the Houyhnhnms present a distorted image of man.  

Although Swift uses the Houyhnhnms to recommend virtues of which he heartily approves—the employment of philosophy only towards useful ends, the avoidance of romantic love, the preferences for reason over passion and for efforts in the public interest over those supporting purely selfish aims—he also shows through the Houyhnhnms the inadequacy of reason alone to produce true understanding. In the following passage,
for instance, the Houyhnhnm Master evaluates Gulliver's body:

He said, I differed indeed from other Yahoos, being much more cleanly, and not altogether so deformed; but in point of real Advantage, he thought I differed for the worse. That my Nails were of no Use either to my fore or hinder Feet: As to my fore Feet, he could not properly call them by that Name, for he never observed me to walk upon them; that they were too soft to bear the Ground; that I generally went with them uncovered, neither was the Governing I sometimes wore on them, of the same Shape, or so strong as that on my Feet behind. That I could not walk with any Security; for if either of my hinder Feet slipped, I must inevitably fall. He then began to find fault with other Parts of my Body; the Flatness of my Face, the Prominence of my Nose, mine Eyes placed directly in Front, so that I could not look on either Side without turning my Head; That I was not able to feed my self, without lifting one of my fore Feet to my Mouth; And therefore Nature had placed those Joints to answer that Necessity. He knew not what could be the Use of those several Clefts and Divisions in my Feet behind; that these were too soft to bear the Hardness and Sharpness of Stones without a Covering made from the Skin of some other brute; that my whole Body wanted a Fence against Heat and Cold, which I was forred to put on and off every Day with Tediumness and Trouble.28

In these comparisons, the Master's prejudices become dramatically apparent. Obviously, the deficiencies he finds give us humans little trouble; we have developed and take for granted habitual forms of behavior that compensate for the disadvantages of our particular form. Not having developed these habits, the Master is more struck by our deficiencies than we are; but perhaps we would encounter many inconveniences were we suddenly to find ourselves inhabiting the bodies of horses. In addition, the human need of clothing could actually be considered an advantage since, unlike horses, we can put on as much or little of it as the weather requires. Swift's point is that reason alone cannot reveal truth, for reason requires evidence upon which to act, and the evidence at hand may or may not be adequate or pertinent. In "On the Trinity" Swift writes,
If an ignorant Person were told that a Load-stone would draw Iron at a Distance, he might say it was a Thing contrary to his Reason, and could not believe before he saw it with his Eyes. 29

The amount of evidence available to the reason depends upon one's experience. Not having the experience of being human, the Houyhnhnms Master selects the evidence that his own habits, his adaptations to his own body, would lead him to observe, and thus falls into error. Though reasoned, his critique is distorted by prejudice. Therefore, Swift's portrayal of the Houyhnhnms cannot be considered an unqualified endorsement of reason.

If the Houyhnhnms are symbols of social harmony, the Yahoos symbolize discord and all the passions which produce it. Dominated by rebelliousness and hostility, they refuse to learn the behavior patterns, skills, and values which would make their activities socially productive.

BY what I could discover, the Yahoos appear to be the most unteachable of all Animals, their Capacities never reaching higher than to draw or carry Burthens. Yet I am of Opinion, this Defect ariseth chiefly from a perverse, restive Disposition. For they are cunning, malicious, treacherous and revengeful. They are strong and hardy, but of a cowardly Spirit, and by Consequence insolent, abject, and cruel. It is observed, that the Red-haired of both Sexes are more libidinous and mischievous than the rest, whom yet they much exceed in Strength and Activity. 30

This passage, together with others comparing Yahoos to people, makes clear that the Yahoos represent the human propensity to rebel against civilized values. Similarly, during the Grand Assembly the Houyhnhnms advance the following charge: "as the Yahoos were the most filthy, noisome, and deformed Animal which Nature ever produced, so they were the most restive and indocible, mischievous and malicious." 31 In this quotation, Swift suggests that there is some connection between Yahoo
rebelliousness and their filth, a quality which Gulliver emphasizes more than any other. Though Swift, of course, does not say so, the connection is that the anal stage provides the prototype for later rebellions against social rules. Since excrement can be used as a weapon to defy parental demands, Swift associates feces more generally with hostility. So, when he imagines a Yahoo attack upon Gulliver, he writes, "Several of this cursed Brood getting hold of the Branches behind, leaped up into the Tree, from whence they began to discharge their Excrements on my Head."\(^{32}\)

In addition to being offended by the Yahoos' dirtiness, Gulliver is revolted by their bodies. The following is Gulliver's initial description of them:

Their Heads and Breasts were covered with a thick Hair, some frizzled and others lank; they had Beards like Goats, and a Long Ridge of Hair down their Backs, and the fore Parts of their Legs and Feet; but the rest of their Bodies were bare, so that I might see their Skins, which were of a brown Buff Colour. They had no Tails, nor any Hair at all on their Buttocks, except about the Anus; which, I presume Nature had placed there to defend them as they sat on the Ground; for this Posture they used, as well as lying down, and often stood on their hind Feet. They climbed high Trees, as nimbly as a Squirrel, for they had strong extended Claws before and behind, terminating on sharp Points, hooked. They would often spring, and bound, and leap with prodigious Agility. The Females were not so large as the Males; they had long lank Hair on their Heads, and only a Sort of Down on the rest of their Bodies, except about the Anus, and Pudenda. Their Dugs hung between their fore Feet, and often reached almost to the Ground as they walked. The Hair of both Sexes was of several Colours, brown, red, black and yellow. Upon the whole, I never beheld in all my Travels so disagreeable an Animal, or one against which I naturally conceived so strong an Antipathy. So that thinking I had seen enough, full of Contempt and Aversion, I got up and pursued the beaten Road, hoping it might direct me to the Cabbin of some Indian.\(^{33}\)

When Gulliver later remarks "My Horror and Astonishment are not to be described, when I observed, in this abominable Animal, a perfect human Figure,"\(^{34}\) it becomes apparent that Swift has imagined Yahoos partly to
satirize what is evil and disgusting in human nature. The description of Yahoos contains some elements which obviously do not correlate with human features or behavior, so Swift has prepared the fiction for later distinctions between Yahoos and us. Nevertheless, Gulliver's emphasis is upon the similarities, and Swift exploits these to criticize us. Significantly, the elements of the description which do not pertain to us, such as the Yahoos' climbing of trees, are not the elements producing Gulliver's disgust. It is the similarities that are revolting, and most of these relate to features which we alter or hide. For instance, Western men have beards, but they usually shave them. We trim our nails, though, admittedly, even if we let them grow, they would never be strong enough to use as the Yahoos do theirs. With clothing we usually cover our breasts, anuses, and pudenda. But it is these features which most strikingly catch Gulliver's attention and receive a disproportionate emphasis. Physically the Yahoos are largely human figures without the modifications imposed by civilization. Gulliver's conformity to convention causes his revulsion at the exposed, unmodified body—a revulsion which is a consequence of his and Swift's conflict between obedience and defiance.

The Yahoos represent Swift's and mankind's suppressed anti-social, hostile, and rebellious energies. In this fictive ordering, the author also associates these energies with the body as a way of dissociating them from the ego or, in Swift's terminology, the reason; for the ego finds suppressing these desires and gaining absolute control of the self difficult if it must recognize the wishes as part of itself. The division of human nature into Yahoos and Houyhnhmens is a totalistic distortion of the truth, designed to produce an impossible victory for the ego. Swift
himself rejects such totalism by the end of the book. Nevertheless, as I have already argued in my third chapter, Swift's second ideal self, which produces the conclusion, does not fully resolve his basic identity conflict, which determines the fictional bifurcation of human nature in Book IV.

The most important factor causing dissension among the Yahoos is their greed, which he represents as irrational and degrading. The Houyhnhnm Master describes them as follows:

> if . . . you throw among five Yahoos as much Food as would be sufficient for fifty, they will, instead of eating peaceably, fall together by the Ears, each single one impatient to have all to it self.\(^{35}\)

The Master continues at some length to describe the Yahoos' love of possessions, especially of shining stones which are of no use, and which obviously are identical to the jewels humans love to acquire. In ascribing this behavior to the Yahoos, who are mere brutes, Swift dissociates greed from the ego. Reason should tell them, and tell people, that such behavior is destructive and that they desire things which are useless and more food than they really require. Since people continue to act this way nonetheless, their greed should be attributed to corrupt human nature, here symbolized by the Yahoos. Dissociating this behavior from the ego is designed to increase the probability of the ego's triumph. However, psychology shows that greed has everything to do with the ego, though perhaps not at the conscious level. According to Fenichel, greed is a sign of oral frustrations.\(^{36}\) During the oral period an infant has no sense of separation from his world, and thus feels himself omnipotent. As he becomes aware of the separateness of objects, he attempts to maintain his earlier status by incorporating them, that is, by placing them
in his mouth. Greed reveals a fixation at this level, for the avaricious individual tries to grant ego-quality to objects by possessing them. Conferring ego-quality is a sublimation of the urge to incorporate—the earlier desire modified to conform to the nature of the actual world, which really cannot be incorporated. Fenichel also states that the fixation can be exacerbated during the anal stage, in which the infant develops doubts about whether he owns his own feces. I would suggest that the infant also doubts whether he wants to own them. He originally possesses them within his body, but must renounce them in defecation. Later the individual tries to overcome his doubts by acquiring large numbers of goods. Whether or not one accepts these particular explanations, psychoanalytic theory does support Swift's view that greed is irrational, but claims that it is so not because it is instinctive—for our drives really do not demand more than our bodies require—but because greed is caused by fixations at primitive levels of ego development. I have already suggested that Swift had a strong need to recover the oral omnipotence which he lost during the anal stage. The portrayal of the Yahoos indicates that Swift himself felt some desire to behave as they do but has rejected it because it is socially disruptive and irrational. He, as I have already asserted, attempted to regain his omnipotence and self-esteem in other, more acceptable ways. His ego had developed to the point where he could see the irrationality of greed, but not in a manner enabling him to overcome the basic conflicts underlying such a compulsion. His depiction of the Yahoos as filthy and degraded shows that he made renouncing his greed a point of pride, and that he turned his own revulsion at anality and excrement against this derivative of
the anal stage. Nevertheless, the Yahoos do represent, in a disguised way, his own desire to regain omnipotence. By rejecting their behavior, he attempts to reacquire some of his own omnipotence while renouncing his desire for it.

As I have stated, the division of human nature between Yahoos and Houyhnhnms is totalistic, and in his new circumstances Gulliver adopts the frame of mind which could have promulgated such a division. Certainly drawn to totalistic thought as a way to resolve his own conflict between obedience and defiance, Swift uses the Yahoos to satirize human folly and evil. Some of his letters demonstrate that he partly identified people with Yahoos to express contempt for mankind. In an apparent reference to Gulliver's Travels, Swift writes to Pope, "I have got Materials Towards a Treatis proving the falsity of that Definition animal rationale; and to show it should be only rationis capax." He draws this distinction to make the point that reason is not the predominant human faculty but only one among others which sometimes prove more powerful. This statement in itself could be considered compassionate rather than disparaging; however, in another letter to Pope, Swift says,

I tell you after all that I do not hate Mankind, it is yours autres who hate them because you would have them reasonable Animals, and are Angry for being disappointed. I have always rejected that Definition and made another of my own. I am no more angry with ---- Then I was with the Kite that last week flew away with one of my Chickins and yet I was pleas'd when one of my Servants Shot him two days after. Angry he may not be; contemptuous he certainly is. Here he has vindictively withdrawn his hope for mankind to punish them for failing to meet his expectations. In another letter Swift recommends that Thomas Sheridan "expect no more from Man than such an Animal is capable of, and
you will every day find my Description of Yahoes more resembling. On the other hand, he writes to Charles Ford, "I have finished my Travels, and I am now transcribing them; they are admirable Things, and will wonderfully mend the World." Here Swift expresses high expectations for man, but he mocks them because they have caused him so much frustration. He also mocks Gulliver for experiencing the conflict between high expectations and the vengeful renunciation of them in the letter to Symson prefaced to the Travels:

I DO in the next Place complain of my own great Want of Judgment, in being prevailed upon by the Intreaties and false Reasonings of you and some others, very much against mine own Opinion, to suffer my Travels to be published. Pray bring to your Mind how often I desired you to consider, when you insisted on the Motive of publick Good; that the Yahoos were a Species of Animals utterly Incapable of Amendment by Precepts or Examples; And so it hath proved; for instead of seeing a full Stop put to all Abuses and Corruptions, at least in this little Island, as I had Reason to expect: Behold, after above six Months Warning, I cannot learn that my Book hath produced one single Effect according to mine Intentions.

This passage contains a contradiction, for Gulliver first states that he published his book "against mine own Opinion," but later he says he "had Reason to expect" reform. Here, as is often the case in the Travels, Swift has tried to escape his own conflicts by projecting them onto Gulliver, exaggerating them till they become ridiculous, and laughing at them. However, he never really presents a solution to the conflict; he only convinces himself that it is not so horrible as Gulliver indicates. Swift's own attitude remains ambivalent, as he struggles between rage and acceptance, idealism and realism, obedience and rebellion. In the end, he is unable to choose; he wants to maintain all attitudes at once. He laughs at Gulliver for thinking that human beings are Yahoos, but the satire on human nature in the portrayal of them retains its place and
its powerful impact in the book. Swift's own ambivalence has caused most of the critical difficulties in interpreting this work. However, what has caused confusion also vexes the reader, as was Swift's intent, and shatters his complacency. Drawing him into Swift's own conflicts, the author entangles the reader in bewildered self-criticism.

Swift not only disparages mankind in his portrayal of the Yahoos, but to a certain degree he holds up the Houyhnhnms as models for human behavior. For instance, he assuredly approves of their use of philosophy only for practical ends, as his criticism of the projectors in Book III shows, and he endorses the supremacy of reason over passion. Yet Swift qualifies his totalism. Neither the Yahoos nor the Houyhnhnms are comprehensive representations of mankind, and Swift also suggests that the Houyhnhnms' reason is insufficient to produce a perfect human society. Man cannot become virtuous merely by denying that his evil nature exists. But the main way in which Swift withdraws from his totalistic position is by showing the folly, inconsistency, and self-hatred Gulliver falls into when he identifies with the Houyhnhnms.

Let us now consider Gulliver's identity conflict, which symbolizes the identity confusion of Western man. In my third chapter I introduced Karen Horney's view of neurotic pride. According to her, an individual who is not allowed to develop his real self may desire to become an ideal self.

The glorified self becomes not only a phantom to be pursued; it also becomes a measuring rod with which to measure his actual being. And this actual being is such an embarrassing sight when viewed from the perspective of a godlike perfection that he cannot but despise it. The neurotic develops a conflict between two different senses of identity;
he doubts whether he fulfills his positive or negative self-image. Swift himself expresses a similar idea in his "Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting":

To be vain, is rather a mark of humility than pride. Vain men delight in telling what honours have been done them, what great company they have kept, and the like, by which they plainly confess that these honours were more than their due, and such as their friends would not believe, if they had not been told; whereas a man truly proud, thinks the greatest honours below his merit, and consequently scorns to boast. I therefore deliver it as a maxim, that whoever desires the character of a proud man, ought to conceal his vanity. 44

To counter self-revealing vanity, Swift recommends a reaction formation against it which Horney would not recommend. Wishing merely to replace publicly supported pride with self-sufficient pride, he fails to resolve the basic dilemma. However, the quotation does show that Swift was close to understanding that a hunger for an ideal self-image stems from low self-esteem. Book IV provides more evidence.

In Houyhnhnmeland Gulliver is not recognized as his real self, that is, as a human being, because the Houyhnhnms have never seen one before. for them the question is whether Gulliver is a Yahoo. They are puzzled because they can spot differences as well as similarities. Realizing that the Houyhnhnms are comparing him to Yahoos, Gulliver is quick to spot the dangerous correspondences:

The Beast and I were brought close together; and our Countenances diligently compared, both by Master and Servant, who thereupon repeated several Times the Word Yahoo. My Horror and Astonishment are not to be described, when I observed, in this abominable Animal, a perfect human Figure; the Face of it indeed was flat and broad, the Nose depressed, the Lips large, and the Mouth wide: But these Differences are common to all savage Nations, where the Lineaments of the Countenance are distorted by the Natives suffering their Infants to lie grotelling on the Earth, or by carrying them on their Backs, nuzzling with their Face against the Mother's Shoulders. The Fore-feet of the Yahoo differed from my Hands in nothing else,
but the Length of the Nails, the Coarseness and Brownness of the Palms, and the Hairiness on the Backs. There was the same Resemblance between our Feet, with the same Differences, which I knew very well, although the Horses did not, because of my Shoes and Stockings; the same in every Part of our Bodies, except as to Hairiness and Colour, which I have already described.45

The description plainly indicates that the Yahooos do not have a "perfect human Figure," but Gulliver emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences, thus revealing that he has a predisposition to contemptuous self-regard. The Yahooos stand for something in his nature which he would like to overcome, just as they do for Swift and, presumably, for all products of Western civilization. Hence Gulliver is glad to have his clothing, which disguises his full similitude to the Yahoo body. Eventually, however, the Sorrel Nag sees Gulliver sleeping nearly naked. Gulliver relates, "I had hitherto concealed the Secret of my Dress, in order to distinguish myself as much as possible, from the cursed Race of Yahooos; but now I found it in vain to do so any longer."46 Shortly afterwards comes the passage where Gulliver and the Houyhnhnm Master disagree over whether nature taught us to conceal any parts of our bodies. Clearly, the clothes symbolize civilization, by which mankind often seeks to suppress what he considers the evil part of his nature. Gulliver fears the discovery of his body will identify him with the Yahooos. However, the fear is not perfectly reasonable because the Yahooos do not wear clothes or cultivate the civilization they symbolize. Culture really does raise man above the Yahoo condition. Nevertheless, civilization often seems to demand suppression of the natural or irrational desire to be rebellious, dirty, greedy, and degraded. Gulliver fears acknowledging these desires because he assumes that if he did so they would completely
take over his personality, overwhelming his rational faculty. Therefore, he tries to hide his body. Although not like the Yahoos, Gulliver differs from the Houyhnhnms as well, for, not feeling any conflict between nature and civilization, they are unashamed of their bodies. Though Gulliver tries to identify with the Houyhnhnms, he never does so by walking around naked; he always recognizes that his resemblance to them depends upon the suppression of the Yahoo part of his nature. He so dissociates himself from the Yahoos that he makes his clothing out of their skins.

To identify with the Houyhnhnms, Gulliver totalistically attempts to dissociate himself from human beings because of their resemblance to Yahoos. In Chapters V and VI, Gulliver describes English and European culture, exaggerating every fault and ignoring every virtue in an attempt to prove that he is better and more Houyhnhnm-like than they. He admits his motivation at the beginning of Chapter VII:

"The Reader may be disposed to wonder how I could prevail on myself to give so free a representation of my own Species, among a Race of Mortals who were already too apt to conceive the vilest Opinion of Human Kind, from that entire Congruity betwixt me and their Yahoos. But I must freely confess, that the many Virtues of those excellent Quadrupeds placed in opposite View to human Corruptions, had so far opened mine Eyes, and enlarged my Understanding, that I began to view the Actions and Passions of Man in a very different Light; and to think the Honour of my own Kind not worth managing; which, besides, it was impossible for me to do before a Person of so acute a Judgment as my Master, who daily convinced me of a thousand Faults in my self, whereof I had not the least Perception before, and which with us would never be numbered even among human Infirmities. I had likewise learned from his Example an utter Detestation of all Falseness or Disguise; and Truth appeared so amiable to me, that I determined upon sacrificing every thing to it."

"Let me deal so candidly with the Reader, as to confess, that there was yet a much stronger Motive for the Freedom I took in my Representation of Things. I had not been a Year in this Country, before I contracted such a Love and Veneration"
for the Inhabitants, that I entered on a firm Resolution never
to return to human Kind, but to pass the rest of my Life among
these admirable Houyhnhnms in the Contemplation and Practice of
every Virtue; where I could have no Example or Incitement to
Vice. 47

In this passage Gulliver declares his intention to define his identity
within the context of Houyhnhnm society rather than within the human one
in which his nature would incline him to fit better. The fact that he
blames his own viciousness not upon his basically corrupt human nature
but upon the influence of other humans shows that he is attempting to
project upon others his own vicious desires in order to renounce them.
He proves his virtue by denouncing others' vices. However, by planting
contradictions of attitude in Gulliver's narrative, Swift indicates that
Gulliver's attempt cannot be successful. For instance, Gulliver bases
his detestation of humanity partly upon remarks the Houyhnhnms have made
about him. Gulliver cannot renounce humanity without renouncing himself,
and doing that is an impossibility; at best, he will hate himself. The
Houyhnhnms accidentally encourage him to do so by pointing out "a
thousand faults, whereof I had not the least perception before." Surely,
Swift does not want us to see Gulliver's enlightenment as an advantage.
By thus depicting Gulliver, Swift tries to renounce his own totalism;
just as Gulliver projects his vicious nature upon the Europeans, Swift
projects his totalism upon Gulliver, thus: revealing that his reaction-
formation against totalism embodies the original process in a new form.

The Houyhnhnm Master responds to Gulliver's unfavorable description
of England as follows:

He said, he had been very seriously considering my whole Story,
as far as it related both to myself and my Country: That, he
looked upon us as a Sort of Animals to whose share, by what
Accident he could not conjecture, some small Pittance of Rea-
son had fallen, whereof we made no other Use than by its
Assistance to aggravate our natural Corruptions, and to acquire
new ones which Nature had not given us. That, we disarmed our selves of the few Abilities she had bestowed; had been very successful in multiplying our original Wants, and seemed to spend our whole Lives in vain Endeavours to supply them by our own Invention. 48

Through the Houyhnhnms Master, Swift expresses his own objections to subordinating reason to the passions, for this relationship ought to be the reverse. However, the Master's condemnation is surely too harsh, for sometimes people do act reasonably. The Master's one-sided view has two causes. First, Gulliver himself has exaggerated the evils of English society. Second, this Houyhnhnms can understand humanity only by comparing us to Yahoos. For this reason, he doubts Gulliver's account: "he manifestly perceived, that in order to favour them, I had concealed many Particulars, and often said the Thing which was not." 49 Gulliver must have lied, because his description of humans distinguishes them from Yahoos:

He was the more confirm'd in this Opinion, because he observed, that as I agreed in every Feature of my Body with other Yahoos . . . ; so, from the Representation I had given him of our Lives, our Manners, and our Actions, he found as near a Resemblance in the Disposition of our Minds. 50

The rhetorical effect of the Master's response is to increase the reader's awareness of human corruption and irrationality and to intensify his abhorrence of them. Yet Gulliver's later relation of his return to European society reveals the Houyhnhnms judgment to be too extreme.

The event which conclusively identifies Gulliver as a Yahoo occurs in Chapter VIII:

BEING one Day abroad with my Protector the Sorrel Nag, and the Weather exceeding hot, I entreated him to let me bathe in a River that was near. He consented, and I immediately stripped myself stark naked, and went down softly into the Stream. It happened that a young Female Yahoo standing behind a Bank, saw the whole Proceeding; and inflamed by Desire, as the Nag and I
conjectured, came running with all Speed, and leaped into the Water within five Yards of the Place where I bathed, I was never in my Life so terribly frighted; the Nag was grazing at some Distance, not suspecting any Harm; She embraced me after a most fulsome Manner; I roared as loud as I could, and the Nag came galloping towards me, whereupon she quitted her Grasp, with the utmost Reluctancy, and leaped upon the opposite Bank, where she stood gazing and howling all the time I was putting on my Cicaths.

THIS was Matter of Diversion to my Master and his Family, as well as of Mortification to my self. For now I could no longer deny, that I was a real Yahoo, in every Limb and Feature, since the Females had a natural Propensity to me as one of their own Species.\textsuperscript{51}

Since Swift has imagined the Yahoos to criticize the irrationality and evil in human nature, it can be assumed that Gulliver is expressing Swift's own revulsion towards human sexuality. Swift has—tentatively and with qualifications—projected his sexuality onto the Yahoos and renounced it by depicting them as degraded creatures. The contrast between the Houyhnhnms and the Yahoos suggests that he objects to the irrationality of sexual passion, for among the Houyhnhnms, "The young Couple meet and are joined, merely because it is the Determination of their Parents and Friends: It is what they see done every Day; and they look upon it as one of the necessary Actions in a reasonable Being."\textsuperscript{52} The genetic considerations determining mating patterns meet no objection from irrational passions for particular individuals.\textsuperscript{53} Among humans, however, sexuality operates somewhat independently of the ego and its concepts of reality and practicality. Freud expresses this idea as follows:

"The sexual instincts are less easily moulded [than the self-preservation instincts]; for in the beginning they do not know any lack of objects. Since they are connected parasitically, as it were, with the other physical functions and at the same time can be auto-erotically gratified on their own body, they are at first isolated from the educative influence of real necessity; and in most people they retain throughout life, in
some respect or other, this character of obstinacy and inaccessibility to influence which we call "unreasonableness."54

Trying to identify with the reasonable Houyhnhnms, Gulliver cannot bear viewing his own unreasonable sexuality as represented in the Yahoos. By experiencing horror, he attempts to dissociate himself from them and from his own sexuality. Nevertheless, the Houyhnhnms do not allow him to escape implication and take the Yahoo’s attack as proof that he belongs to that species. Here one can observe a typical Swiftian pattern: some aspect of human nature is renounced, projected and vilified, only to reimplicate the individual in what he has renounced, now exaggerated and made horrible by his method of renunciation. Swift himself had experienced this pattern, which can be seen in the final Examiner paper, where he uses it for rhetorical purposes. Defending himself against his detractors, he writes,

nothing can well be more mortifying, than to reflect, that I am of the same Species with Creatures capable of uttering so much Scurrility, Dulness, Falshood and Impertinence, to the Scandal and Disgrace of Human Nature.55

The structure of Book IV, however, demonstrates that by the time Swift wrote Gulliver’s Travels, he could see the folly in this pattern of thought.

The most compact example of Gulliver’s foolish totalism comes in Chapter X:

WHEN I thought of my Family, my Friends, my Countrymen, or human Race in general, I considered them as they really were, Yahoos in Shape and Disposition, perhaps a little more civilized, and qualified with the Gift of Speech; but making no other Use of Reason, than to improve and multiply those Vices, whereof their Brethren in this Country had only the Share that Nature allotted them. When I happened to behold the Reflection of my own Form in a Lake or Fountain, I turned away my Face in Horror and detestation of myself; and could better endure the Sight of a common Yahoo, than of my own
Person. By conversing with the Houyhnhnms, and looking upon
them with Delight, I fell to imitate their Gait and Gesture,
which is now grown into a Habit; and my Friends often tell me
in a blunt Way, that I trot like a Horse; which, however, I
take for a great Compliment; Neither shall I disown, that in
speaking I am apt to fall into the Voice and manner of the
Houyhnhnms, and hear myself ridiculed on that Account without
the least Mortification. 56

Here Gulliver's attempt to identify with the Houyhnhnms is vividly
apparent, as is his attempt to renounce the Yahoo part of his nature by
vilifying humans. Nevertheless, Gulliver's totalism backfires and he
becomes implicated in his own attack, illustrating Karen Horney's assertion
that "Pride and self-hate belong inseparably together; they are two
expressions of one process." 57 In addition to pointing towards the
destructiveness of self-hate, Swift calls attention to the illogicality
of Gulliver's reasoning. Gulliver cannot raise himself above human
nature by condemning it because he himself is human. Thus, his desire
to be perfectly rational makes him think irrationally. Properly regarded,
reason should help one to understand and manipulate reality, not to deny
it. Denying the evidence of his real human nature, Gulliver is left
with as little reason as a common English horse, or perhaps less.

In Chapter IX the Houyhnhnms hold a general assembly where they
debate the question "Whether the Yahooos should be exterminated from the
Face of the Earth." 58 In this episode the Houyhnhnms cease to be merely
elements of rationality and become instead symbols for the totalistic
demand that man become perfectly rational and obliterate all opposing
tendencies. Ultimately, the question is whether man deserves utter con-
demnation for his partial viciousness. These issues rather than the
true nature of the Houyhnhnms, obviously, are Swift's main concern and
explain the inconsistency of the Houyhnhnms' characterization. The
Houyhnhnms themselves could not exist as real creatures independent of
the mind that created them. The associated qualities of cleanliness,
order, learning ability, language ability, benevolence, etc. that the
Houyhnhnms embody are human associations derived from the way people are
trained to become useful members of society. Swift created them to
evaluate in a fictional work the demand that man become perfect or be
dammed as totally depraved. So here they symbolize this totalistic
demand, although they themselves are not totalistic since they do not
have the proclivities they denounce in the Yahoos. At the same assembly
the Houyhnhnms show their intolerance of human imperfection by exhorting
the Master to force Gulliver's departure.

Besides leading Gulliver into irrationality, his imitation of the
Houyhnhnms produces in him another fault inconsistent with the Houyhnhnms'
values. He comes to feel "Hatred and Contempt"59 rather than benevolence
towards his own kind. The inappropriateness of his attitude becomes
apparent as he returns to European society. Pedro de Mendez shows by his
benevolent behavior towards Gulliver that he is far from being a quarrel-
some, dirty, and malicious Yahoo. He provides Gulliver free passage to
Lisbon; gives him food, wine, a clean cabin aboard ship, and almost three
weeks' free lodging in Lisbon; lends him clothing and, at his departure
for England, twenty pounds. He also patiently endures Gulliver's expres-
sions of antipathy to humankind, 60 and encourages him to readjust to
human society and to return to his wife and family in England. He cares
enough about Gulliver's welfare that he does these things despite
Gulliver's resistance, his attempt to escape, and his ridiculous loathing
of humanity. To be benevolent, one must accept human failings. Through
his depiction of Pedro de Mendez, Swift indicates that the Yahoos do not constitute a realistic, well-balanced image of mankind.

Gulliver's desire to imitate the Houyhnhnms makes him less benevolent than Don Pedro and most other human beings. Gulliver provides the following description of his return home:

As soon as I entered the House, my Wife took me in her Arms, and kissed me; at which, having not been used to the Touch of that odious Animal for so many Years, I fell in a Swoon for almost an Hour. At the Time I am writing, it is five Years since my last Return to England: During the first Year I could not endure my Wife or Children in my Presence, the very Smell of them was intolerable; much less could I suffer them to eat in the same Room. To this Hour they dare not presume to touch my Bread, or drink out of the same Cup; neither was I ever able to let one of them take me by the Hand.61

Here and in similar passages Swift draws upon the reader's desire to be appreciated and his commitment to kindness in order to gain allies in his rejection and ridicule of Gulliver's attitude. Insisting upon perfect virtue, Gulliver paradoxically becomes more evil than many other people. And, in addition to frustrating others, his intolerance makes him miserable in the company of his own family.

The final paradox of Gulliver's thought is that he has a contradictory attitude towards pride; as Samuel Holt Monk has pointed out,62 Gulliver says that he is against it, but his words reveal that he himself is proud:

when I behold a Lump of Deformity, and Diseases both in Body and Mind, smitten with Pride, it immediately breaks all the Measures of my Patience; neither shall I be ever able to comprehend how such an Animal and such a Vice could tally together. ... I dwell the longer upon this Subject from the Desire I have to make the Society of an English Yahoo by any Means not insupportable; and therefore I here intreat those who have any Tincture of this absurd Vice, that they will not presume to appear in my Sight.63

Thus, Swift demonstrates that modesty, as well as rationality and
benevolence, depends upon full recognition of human nature—with its faults and virtues—in oneself and other people. One cannot become perfect merely by abhorring vice in others and refusing to esteem their virtues. The attempt to find a solution to the conflict between good and evil by totalitarianism denouncing human nature produces nonsense, self-contradiction, and unhappiness.

Although Swift ridicules Gulliver’s attempt to settle the conflict between good and evil, our author presents no alternative method for doing so. Swift means us to see that the conflict is forever inescapable; the good of which man is capable is limited. In so arguing, Swift protects his own tendencies towards rebellion and defiance, but his equally strong demand for obedience produces an angry denunciation of such propensities as depicted in the Yahoos. Therefore, his mockery of Gulliver does not erase his earlier condemnation of mankind. Swift sought to continue the opposition between obedience, represented by the Houyhnhnms, and defiance, represented by the Yahoos, because he defined his own identity in terms of the conflict. To resolve it would be to deny his own humanity. The conclusion of Gulliver’s Travels provides some relaxation in the conflict by ridiculing extreme positions, but it does not and can not end it.

2. For the argument in favor of identifying the Houyhnhnms with the deists, see Calhoun Winton, "Conversion on the Road to Houyhnhnmland," Sewanee Review, 68 (1960), pp. 20-33.


11. Elliott, p. 221.


31. Swift, Travels, p. 255.
32. Swift, Travels, p. 208.
33. Swift, Travels, pp. 207-208.
34. Swift, Travels, pp. 213-14.
35. Swift, Travels, p. 244.


37. Fenichel, p. 281.


42. Swift, Travels, p. xxxiv.


62. Monk, p. 70.

CHAPTER VII. BOOK III AND THE UNITY OF GULLIVER’S TRAVELS; CONCLUSION

At least since Aristotle unity has been considered an important criterion for literary excellence, and Swift scholars, who naturally want to maintain their author’s position in the literary firmament, have often sought through Gulliver’s Travels for a unifying principle to justify their admiration. Merritt Lawlis, who suggests that unity is a false critical standard to bring to Gulliver’s Travels, is atypical. Most others have argued for the work’s unity, though many have cut their losses by conceding Book III, if not to the dust-bin, then to Swift’s second drawer. John W. Tilton has found the character of Gulliver to be the chief unifying factor of the work. Another view is represented by Samuel Kliger, who argues, "Relationship and order in Swift’s allegory are achieved . . . through balance and contrast." The balance (or contrast) between the little Lilliputians and the big Brobdingnagians is an obvious example. John M. Munro provides an inclusive pattern when he suggests that Books I and II present inferior and superior human beings; Books III and IV, inferior and superior reasonable beings. Clearly, however, we cannot fit the book into any such scheme unless we can find unity in Book III, described by Ricardo Quintana as a "catch-all for satiric fragments for which no place had been found in the other three parts."

Some critics find unity in the third book thematically. Munro, mentioned above, defines Swift’s theme as the wrong-headed use of intellect. Ilia Dawson Traldi finds a double theme: "man, because of his inordinate pride, refuses to recognize the limits of nature, particularly of human nature; and at the same time, man ignores the possibilities
inherent in, and unique to, his nature." And W. O. S. Sutherland, Jr., claims, "The whole [of Book III] is unified by the constant reiteration that lack of a moral conception of man’s place in the world leads to a universe in anarchy." Though all these definitions are plausible and informative, the fact remains that in form and technique, the third voyage is less unified than the other three and differs from them in structure. Book III contains a wide variety of satiric targets, ranging from abstract mathematicians, to projectors, historians and critics, tyrants, people who desire immortality, and Dutch traders. In addition, Swift uses Gulliver inconsistently to achieve satiric effects. The most glaring example occurs at the beginning of Chapter VI. In Chapter V Gulliver has sometimes wonderingly, sometimes impartially observed the ridiculous physical experiments at the Academy of Projectors. For example, he writes,

THERE was a most ingenious Architect who had contrived a new Method for building Houses, by beginning at the Roof, and working downwards to the Foundation; which he justified to me by the like Practice of those two prudent Insects the Bee and the Spider.

But the succeeding chapter begins with Gulliver disparaging the academicians' political proposals, some of which Swift would approve:

IN the School of political Projectors I was but ill entertained; the Professors appearing in my Judgment wholly out of their Senses; which is a Scene that never fails to make me melancholy. These unhappy People were proposing Schemes for persuading Monarchs to chuse Favourites upon the Score of their Wisdom, Capacity and Virtue; of teaching Ministers to consult the publick Good; of rewarding Merit, great Abilities, and eminent Services; of instructing Princes to know their true Interest, by placing it on the same Foundation with that of their People: Of chusing for Employments Persons qualified to exercise them; with many other wild impossible Chimaeras, that never entered before into the Heart of Man to concieve; and confirmed in me the old Observation, that there is nothing so extravagant and irrational which some Philosophers have not maintained for Truth."
The relationship between satiric voice and target has radically shifted, and the author does not persistently reinforce his attack. More fully dissipating the cumulative power of Swift’s satire is the fact that Gulliver visits four lands rather than one or two, and a smaller proportion of the book can be devoted to each one than was possible in the other books. In Book III Gulliver can only visit; he remains an observer and never has to adapt to the societies as he tries to find a place in them. Representing Swift retreating from his own ambivalence, Gulliver’s lack of personal involvement in all but the Struldbrug episode alleviates the sense of dilemma that brings excitement and interest to the rest of the Travels. Gone from this book are Swift’s relatively brave and honest confusion and the reader’s implication in the predicaments the author elsewhere creates. Confusions of identity have been laughed back into the shadows at the end of Book IV, which was written earlier. As a result, Book III is more totalistic than the other books. From my point of view, exploring these matters is more interesting than vindicating Swift or censuring him for failing to unify Book III.

Gulliver’s Travels as a whole is rather informally organized. Unifying factors include Swift’s use of the voyage motive and of Gulliver as, at least nominally, narrator and protagonist. In each land, Gulliver must become acquainted with a new society, learn a new language or find a translator, and meet the necessities of life. He repeatedly displays concern for his social status and defends his veracity. In addition, there are certain recurrent themes: politics, education, pride, ambition, greed, treachery, prejudice and habit, and a preoccupation with the body’s natural functions. Aside from the symmetrical arrangement of
Books I and II, Swift's attempts at more formal bindings are largely ineffective. For instance, the events throwing Gulliver onto the lands increasingly exemplify man's evil nature, and this movement corresponds to Gulliver's increasing alienation. Yet Swift does not integrate these events well into the fabric of his book. Gulliver's forced landings apparently do not cause his alienation; they are merely appliqué. The real organization of Gulliver's Travels is less conscious and more chaotic.

Besides recurrent themes and techniques unifying the Travels, there also exist complicated connections among the various books. The simplest of these is the contrast between Books I and II. In the first book Gulliver is a giant among the tiny; in the second, tiny among the giants. The first book explores the dilemmas of power; the second, those of impotence and dependency. In both books the possibility of exploitation is continually present. In addition to providing these symmetries, Swift opens in Book I a trap which he springs in Book II. In reading the first book, the reader laughs at the pride of the diminutive Lilliputians; in the second, he discovers that he is a foolish and contemptible Lilliputian himself. Despite the symmetrical relationship, the dilemmas of power and those of impotence are dissimilar in important ways, and Book II introduces themes and issues having no equally emphasized counterpart in Book I. Most prominent among these are the randomness of human experiences and disgust with the human body and its instincts. These two themes are connected by the fact that instincts and desires, like the world's events, have a certain independence of the ego and its power to make decisions.

Revolusion at the body again becomes an issue in Book IV, and there
are many other parallels between Books II and IV. Both Brobdingnag and Houyhnhnmland have benevolent rulers. In both books war is condemned—in Book II, by the Brobdingnagian king; in Book IV, by Gulliver. In both lands Gulliver is sexually attacked by females. In both places Gulliver is regarded as an animal and even so regarded by other animals—by the monkey in Brobdingnag, by the female Yahoo in Houyhnhnmland. At some point both the Brobdingnagians and Houyhnhnms decide Gulliver must be a rational creature, although they also have difficulty identifying his species because of his clothing. Most important from both a technical and a thematic standpoint, Gulliver reacts similarly to the negative identity ascribed to him in both lands. He tries to recover his self-esteem by identifying with the Brobdingnagians and the Houyhnhnms. After his return from the second voyage, Gulliver finds Englishmen just as tiny as a Brobdingnagian would, and after the fourth he considers them Yahoos. Both visits bring him to the point where he cannot bear to view himself in a mirror. All of these parallels suggest to me not a formal pattern but Swift's preoccupation with certain ideas which did not reach satisfactory clarity in Book II. Of the two books, the second provides more evidence, enigmatic though it is, about Swift's psychological development. The episode with the maids of honor is, as I have already indicated, particularly suggestive. But, living in the 17th and 18th centuries, Swift did not have available adequate concepts to define the psychic experiences which preoccupied him. In Book IV he gains greater clarity by adapting these experiences to the intellectual context of his own time. In the process something is lost, and something gained.

Book IV is the more powerful and profound satire because in it
Swift presents starker contrasts and a more sharply drawn set of alternatives. Here we find two diametrically opposed species: the predominantly rational, harmonious Houyhnhnms and the passionate, socially disruptive Yahoos. Through them Swift produces a stronger condemnation of Europeans than in Book II and at the same time qualifies his criticism more forcibly by bringing out more dramatically the absurd contradictions in Gulliver's attitude. In Book II, the moral implications of the animal imagery do not become apparent until the king pronounces judgment; in Book IV these implications are present from the beginning. In Book IV Yahoos—not enormous women—possess the disgusting bodies. As a result, Swift can express his disgust more strongly through exaggeration. Even though Gulliver belongs to a different species from the Yahoos, he is implicated fully in their guilt and repulsiveness by being identified with them by the Houyhnhnms and sometimes by himself. In Book II Gulliver admits that the Lilliputians had found his body revolting, but his admission is a concession rather than self-accusation. In addition, Gulliver is more inferior to the Houyhnhnms than to the Brobdingnagians or their king. As a result of the sharper contrasts, Book IV presents a world in which everything is black and white—though Swift takes pains to show the limitations of such a view—whereas in Book II the reader finds shades of grey. An additional benefit of these contrasts is that Gulliver's identity confusion is more extreme than in Brobdingnag, and, consequently, the personal significance of Gulliver's dilemma is brought home to the reader more truly than in Book II. Since Gulliver is relatively passive and dependent in the earlier book, his being protected or exploited is less a matter of choice than whether he sees himself as
a Yahoo, a Houyhnhnm, or a human being. What choices of identity Gulliver does make in Brobdingnag Swift shows to be futile and inconsequential. But such is definitely not the case in Book IV. Gulliver's need to choose an identity increases the dramatic interest of the fourth voyage and encourages the reader's emotional and intellectual involvement. In Book IV all elements—plot, character, the conception of the Yahoos and Houyhnhnms, the political and moral themes—converge to define—and over-define—Gulliver's alternatives. As a result, this voyage is the strongest in the Travels, and, for this reason, Swift placed it last.

Book IV is partly a highly successful reworking of materials present in Book II. But in the reworking something is left out. In the second voyage Swift faces the subjection of mankind to random circumstance and rather tentatively peaks out from behind a heavy satiric shield at the instincts' horrific independence from the ego. In Book IV wild and untamed instinct becomes subsumed in the Yahoos' rebelliousness. In the process, these instincts come to serve the ego as a form of rebellion, though at the cost of exacerbating the conflict within the ego between obedience and defiance. But, in fact, many events in the world and in ourselves occur not in rebellion against order but in mere obliviousness to it. The freedom of world, body, and desire from the ego's complete domination is the issue unfaced in Book IV and the one to which Swift returns in Book III.

However, even in Book III Swift does not fully face the ego's failure to control self and world but instead mocks those who refuse to accept the limits of their control. In doing so, Swift implies that he accepts his limits, while his concentration upon those he ridicules
distracts him from facing the emotional consequences of such an acceptance. In Chapter IV our author uses the character Munodi to recommend reliable, traditional methods of agriculture and architecture in preference to the more imaginative programs of the new science. Unlike us, Swift considers science less realistic than tradition. The new programs, Swift strongly implies, defy reality and involve the projectors in dangerous and destructive solipsisms. heelless of all evidence and reason, the projectors believe that whatever they can imagine will be practicable, and Swift constructs his fiction to show that they are wrong. For Swift traditional knowledge and methods are especially important because they have already been accommodated to the nature of reality. To rely upon imagination would be to open the door to neurotic obsessions which he projects onto the projectors and other enemies and which he wishes to suppress in himself. Swift uses tried-and-true ways of interacting with the world together with the conceptions of reality derived from those interactions to control his own neurotic need for a triumph by his ego and to protect himself from traumatic defeat.

Swift's initial description of the academies clearly indicates the projectors' desire for omnipotence:

In these Colleges, the Professors contrive new Rules and Methods of Agriculture and Building, and new Instruments and Tools for all Trades and Manufactures, whereby, as they undertake, one Man shall do the Work of Ten; a Palace may be built in a Week, of Materials so durable as to last for ever without repairing. All the Fruits of the Earth shall come to Maturity at whatever Season we think fit to choose, and increase an Hundred Fold more than they do at present; with innumerable other happy Proposals. The only Inconvenience is, that none of these Projects are yet brought to Perfection; and in the mean time, the whole Country lies miserably waste, the Houses in Ruins, and the People without Food or Cloaths.

Because of their overweening ambition, these professors deny reality and
neglect to exert the more limited and arduous forms of control which would insure a better life. In the Academy of Lagado Gulliver meets a number of projectors, one of whom seeks
to reduce human Excrement to its original Food, by separating the several Parts, removing the Tincture which it receives from the Gall, making the Odour exhale, and scumming off the Saliva. He had a weekly Allowance from the Society, of a Vessel filled with human Ordure, about the Bigness of a Bristol Barrel. Swift gives no explanation for this professor's activities, but our author's own excremental preoccupations suggest what significance these activities had for him. For Swift anality is associated with shame and rebellion. Revulsion at stench and filth necessitates obedience. His defiance is justified by the fact that defecating is a natural function; no one can help it. Insofar as he proposes a resolution to the conflict between obedience and defiance, he recommends decency, a civilized acceptance of excremental functions behind closed doors. This amount of control man can achieve. Unable to accept the fact that there may be something which he is unable to help, the projector repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempts to undo the work of the bowels. As punishment for both his pride and his shame, he lives in continual contact with the filth he intends to refine. In seeking too much control over the physical world for his ego, he loses what limited control he would otherwise have. Swift uses his ridicule of this professor to suppress his own desire for omnipotence and to express resentment at his own exacting pride. In a sense, this attitude is a product of his experience writing Book IV, where he rejects Gulliver's idealistic expectations.

Although Swift indicates the projectors have been inspired by the Laputians, he also indicates the former possess only a "Smattering of
Mathematics" in comparison to the inhabitants of the flying island. The more accomplished Laputians live in a highly abstracted state, disdaining concern for practical matters as "vulgar and mechanick." Unlike the members of the academy, the Laputian philosophers seek to deny their subjection to circumstance by living in a world of ideas. Their cutting food into geometric forms and into the shapes of musical instruments demonstrates their desire to make the physical world conform to concepts, as does their peculiar method of tailoring. This may be intellect, Swift implies, but it is not reason, which demands attention to the practical problems of common life. As a result of their intellectual pride, the Laputians wear ill-fitting clothes and bear considerable responsibility for the ramshackle condition of Lagado and the rest of the kingdom they govern so negligently and unwise. As we have seen elsewhere, Swift here condemns those who do not act in the public interest. In addition, as punishment for failing to confront problems which they really might solve, the Laputians are tormented by imaginary, apocalyptic fears. Obsessive-compulsive personalities frequently experience such fears, which disguise a wish for a cataclysm to destroy their self-afflicting pride and end their tormenting internal conflicts. Perhaps Swift himself had felt such anxieties during his most intellectually ambitious moments and thereby gained the experience necessary to portray their operation upon the Laputians. At least, he sometimes evokes the fear of social, intellectual, or moral disaster in his works. Maintaining sanity, Swift renounces purely intellectual ambitions and the concomitant anxiety in the unfavorable portrayal of the obsessive Laputians.
In Chapter X Swift reintroduces a theme from Book II: man's subjection to his own body. When first told of the Struldbrugs, Gulliver is filled with delight and begins to fantasize how wise and rich he would become if he were one. He entertains himself with the imaginary prospect of overcoming one consequence of possessing a body: death. However, he soon discovers that the Struldbrugs' freedom from mortality does not free them from other consequences of their physicality. Forever aging, the Struldbrugs become increasingly subject to bodily and mental deterioration. Since immortality--far from granting greater freedom--increasingly limits and dulls their lives, Gulliver concludes, "my keen Appetite for Perpetuity of Life was much abated." As in the other episodes I have discussed, the desire to exceed human bounds or the actual fulfillment of the desire produces worse effects than does the acceptance of normal human limitations. Swift's lesson, of course, is that one should accept his limits, for although they cause pain and frustration, opposing them will only make matters worse. In deciding to accept his limits, he reconciles his freedom to choose with necessity. If man can not take pride in his ego's omnipotence, he may take pride in achieving, through acceptance, as much control as it is the human lot to obtain. This, in effect, is Swift's answer to the disturbing issue, introduced in Book II, of man's subjection to physical circumstance. Nevertheless, this answer is basically ameliorative--not conclusive--for, in Swift's view, unreasonable desires are part of human nature, and the Houyhnhnms, who live according to nature and who accept death with equanimity, are an impossible model for humans to emulate.

Although in the examples just discussed Swift ridicules those who
rebeld against human limitations, this ridicule is really a way to avoid facing the psychological consequences of powerlessness, consequences which were closer to the surface in Book II. Doing so in life is not necessarily a bad idea, but it weakens Book III and the entire Travels as a work of literature. A sign of Swift's retreat is the fact that Gulliver experiences no identity conflict in this book and becomes emotionally involved only in the Struldbrug episode. When Swift laughed at Gulliver at the end of Book IV, he essentially pulled out of him and his experience. He was in no frame of mind to face additional disturbing conflicts when he returned to Book III. For this reason, the satire in Book III is more totalistic than in the other books and depends more upon projecting one party to an internal struggle onto Swift's enemies. Here one finds little exploration of both sides of an issue, little sense of dilemma or predicament. Swift's lack of personal implication and involvement is also reflected in the book's lack of structural cohesion. Gone with Swift's and Gulliver's involvement is the reader's, as well. Also, since Gulliver experiences no identity crisis here, Book III does not parallel the other voyages in a very important thematic and structural way.

As a result of its incohesiveness, Book III does not fit into the Travels as a block to the extent the other voyages do. Its relationships to the other voyages are, therefore, relatively complicated. I have already suggested that Swift is dealing here with issues raised in Book II and not satisfactorily handled in Book IV. In addition, the Laputians and the academicians of Lagado exemplify the foolish use of the intellect, in contrast to the true reason of the Houyhnhnms. The
satire on despotism in Chapter IX, however, relates most closely to the political satire of Book I. The Dutch practice, mentioned in Chapter XI, of trampling on the crucifix seems unrelated, except in the most general way, to anything else in Book III or the rest of the Travels. Although the satire on modern historians and critics in Chapters VII and VIII could be considered under the category of the false use of reason, these chapters find a stronger topical parallel in the Battle of the Books. While the third book is bound to the others in important ways, then, the miscellaneous nature of the connections interferes with the symmetrical relationships elsewhere present in Gulliver’s Travels. Thus, Book III does not compensate in consciously crafted form for its failure to achieve the deep significance of the other voyages.

In this discussion of satire and identity theory, two issues have emerged as especially important: ambivalence and self-esteem. To adopt an identity, an individual must develop or accept an ideological model of how society functions or ought to function. This ideology provides the conceptual framework for the individual’s relationship to his society. Unfortunately, a person often has desires—sometimes primitive in nature—which do not accord with his ideology. Ideology is partly superegoic and therefore suffers from some of the contradictions within the structure of the superego. The anger of the superego, according to Freud, is fundamentally the anger of renounced drives against authority figures who have forced the renunciation. For this reason, the superego is basically unstable, and people have ambivalent attitudes towards it. A person’s formation of a superego has two stages: first, he abandons his mythical omnipotence; and second, he attempts to regain it in the
form of self-esteem by conforming to the dictates of his superego. But since self-esteem is not omnipotence and the individual feels some antagonism towards his superego, he needs social relationships to support his character development. If he does not get this support, he may retreat into totalism. He insists that his ideology is totally correct, that he meets its demands perfectly, and he attacks destructively the identities of his opponents. He projects his own antagonism to his superego upon them and makes a social contest replace the inner one in an attempt to bolster his self-esteem. Even if a person does receive the required social support, the conflict does not end, but it is more easily tolerated. In this case, ambivalence is more likely to be accepted and made a less central issue in a person's life.

In Juvenal we have seen an example of a totalistic satirist. Juvenal's persona, Umbricius, has found himself unable to function in Rome. He claims that he is despised for conforming to traditional Roman values. He attacks the identities of the successful Greeks by calling them virtuosic actors devoid of integrity. The nobles he accuses of being infantile and of being easily manipulated by the Greeks. Unfortunately, Umbricius' behavior only increases his difficulty in establishing a viable identity in Rome. For this reason, Juvenal's third satire is a tragic one.

In the example of the comic Horace, we find a more creative approach to problems of identity. Fortunately for him, he had a father who made allowances for Horace's inevitable ambivalence. As a result, his conflict between obedience and defiance is not very severe. Consequently, he is not firmly committed to a highly particularized ideology. He can
play roles off against each other to escape the unpleasant consequences of a particular role; he can manipulate the ruling class's ideology to justify his friendships with Augustus and Maecenas; and he can use his lowly ancestry to escape the jealousy of rivals. His satire provides many examples of these ways to establish identity. In addition, unlike Juvenal, who condemns everyone and thereby alienates them, Horace's ideological commitment to tolerance and moderation predominantly works to form an inclusive social group. At least, such is his claim. For this reason, Horace's creative manipulation of roles is socially more successful than Juvenal's destructive method. Horace also converts his ambivalence towards the roles he claims into self-deprecating humor, thereby disarming and amusing his potential adversaries. In these various ways Horace makes his ambivalence useful to him.

Swift presents a much more complicated case than either Juvenal or Horace. Like Horace, he sometimes tries to compromise the conflicts within him, but the parties to the conflict are so vehemently opposed that his satire often takes on a Juvenalian intensity. Unlike Juvenal, however, Swift often shows considerable awareness of his conflicts and the absurdity of the continuing battle. In the "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift" one may observe his ambivalent attitude towards pride. In the first section Swift laughs at the folly of pursuing reputation in a world where one cannot control the opinions of others. Nevertheless, he declares pride a universal feature of human nature. In the panegyric section, Swift rebels against the futility of pride by asserting his own values and accomplishments. He bases his self-esteem upon his support for the public interest. In doing so, he arranges a compromise between
his desire to regain omnipotence and the guilt that accompanies it. Despite the compromise, conflict is everywhere apparent in the poem and has, therefore, caused critics much difficulty in interpretation.

Pride is also a central theme in *Gulliver's Travels*. In Book I Gulliver obtains position and prestige, but, failing to realize that they are contingent upon his support for the interests of prominent Lilliputians, he falls from power. Through his depiction of Gulliver, Swift attempts to justify his own activities in support of the public interest and to renounce his pride, which was humbled at the fall of Oxford and Bolingbroke. After describing the dilemmas of power in Book I, Swift turns to those of impotence in the following book. Although Glumdalclitch and other Brobdingnagians often care for and protect Gulliver, others exploit him, and he suffers many accidents. To compensate for his humiliation, Gulliver claims identity as a hero, a claim which Swift mocks. As an alternative, Swift again recommends, through the king of Brobdingnag, support for the public interest. Although written last, Book III picks up a theme from Book II: man's subjection to circumstance. Here Swift mocks the unwise use of intellect to deny man's subjection. If a person accepts his limited control over events, he will achieve more control than if he denies it. Book IV presents a model for the proper use of reason in the figure of the Houyhnhmns. In contrast to these creatures who live in social harmony, the Yahoos are disruptive, passionate, and dirty. Through them Swift condemns the evil nature of man. However, the resolution of the book demonstrates that man is neither Houyhnhnm nor Yahoo, but a mixture of both. In mocking Gulliver's failure to comprehend this fact, Swift renounces totalism, but he does
not reconcile the conflict between the two parts of human nature. Man ought to be good, but inherently he is partly evil. In this stand-off, Swift expresses his own need to conform to cultural values as well as his own rebellion against them.


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