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A MORBIDITY OF THE MIND: A STUDY OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL RHETORIC IN WILLIAM FAULKNER'S FICTION

Rice University

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A MORBIDITY OF THE MIND:
A STUDY OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL RHETORIC IN WILLIAM FAULKNER'S FICTION

by

DAWN TROUARD

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

A MORBIDITY OF THE MIND:
A STUDY OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL RHETORIC IN WILLIAM FAULKNER'S FICTION

Dawn Trouard

Faulkner's canon includes an overwhelming number of psychopathologically disturbed characters. Traditionally, such disturbed characters have been viewed somewhat indiscriminately as evidence of Faulkner's preoccupation with the doomed perversity of human nature. In fact, Faulkner conceived of these emotionally ill characters fictionally as occupying and defining three distinct rhetorical communities: neurotic; sociopathic; and psychotic. At the heart of each emotional illness is a psychologically demonstrable language disorder.

Faulkner's fragmented and tortured structures form the perfect containers for his characters who try to overcome their emotional exile. His frequent counterpointings between sick minds and healthy ones provide his fiction with the fullest range of imaginative possibilities. His characters challenge the border between sanity and insanity; with each incursion by a character into the realm of madness, the reader is provided with a new angle of vision regarding what it means to suffer and what it costs to discover truths.

Faulkner felt a kinship with those characters that suffer emotionally. And he was in basic sympathy with all the problems that human beings have in making themselves understood. The compound tragedy of psychopathologic character in need of fellowship and least able to express that need provides the perfect laboratory for a fiction writer
who hoped his writing "may improve man." Ultimately these designated abnormalities, psychologically rooted and fictionally documented, offer linguistic metaphors for the South as region (neurosis), for Faulkner as citizen-author (sociopathology), and for his literary philosophy as a study of the tragedy of human isolation (psychosis).

By revealing his abnormal characters through their distorted rhetorical patterns and their accompanying communication disability, Faulkner wrests fictional energy from the invigorating powers of pathology. Pathology as a fictional technique asserts itself as a positive activity; it represents the mind's ability in reading or writing to imagine life from a new angle—even a despairing or a deformed perspective. This centering on Faulkner's morbid personalities allows for a better understanding of the complexity of Faulkner's characterizations and fosters an appreciation of the stylistic gains Faulkner achieved by tapping the semantics of disfigured emotions.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract 1

Acknowledgements iii

I. Introduction: "Walking the Tightrope" 1

II. Neurosis: "Who else has been in Purgatory?" 27

III. Sociopathology: "Skunk Hour" 82

IV. Psychoses and other "mere" anarchies of the mind: "Nobody's here" 176

V. Afterward: "Cast a Shadow" 218

Bibliography 230
I. Introduction: "Walking the Tightrope"

"Misanthropes often practice psychiatry."

Saul Bellow

"He must have had no more aesthetic education after finishing secondary school than I did. He had to pick the whole thing up out of the air not even by reading though probably he did some—still in all he probably learned pictures from pictures and naturally got his sense of realities from acute observation and men. He was therefore as unlitrate a man as you can imagine in regard to formative influence."

F. Scott Fitzgerald on Monroe Stahr

"... there's not too fine a distinction between humor and tragedy, that even tragedy is in a way walking a tightrope between the ridiculous—between the bizarre and the terrible."

William Faulkner

In 1931, when Henry Canby's "The School of Cruelty"¹ began delineating the circles of hell in Faulkner's Mississippi, more than a passing critical position was established. For the next twenty years Faulkner's fiction would be characterized more often than not with catchphrases like "cruelty," "lust," "pain," "depravity," "sordidness," and "American sadism." Clifton Fadiman's blithe
dismissal of *Absalom, Absalom!* provides a far too typical example of Faulkner's early treatment: "One may sum up both substance and style by saying that every person in *Absalom, Absalom!* comes to no good end, and they all take a hell of a time coming even that far."  

Even when revisionism set in and corncobs gave way to Christ figures as favorite critical hobbyhorses for the fiction, there still remained at least a muted interest in the "dark" psychology permeating Faulkner's fiction. But by the fifties and after, the error of emphasis had shifted so radically that even Carvel Collins became trapped in a too dexterous symbological reading and so found Benjy, like Christ descended into Hell, in his Holy Saturday monologue, trapped "certainly with an agent of the devil"—Luster.² Likewise, Ike McCaslin, Sam Fathers, Dilsey, Joe Christmas, Schumann, and Lena Grove have all found critical canonization as Christs, proto-Christs, or Marys at the manger. Faulkner abetted these readings with his abstract orations about truths of the human heart; such soapboxing, combined with a work like *A Fable*, and the literary Easter egg hunt was on.

But now, with the renewed interest in Faulkner as misanthrope and sexually troubled puritan, the crucial role that the psychologically disturbed characters played in his little "keystone of the universe" is underscored. These characters are not merely foils for the drama depicting man enduring; they are at the very heart of the creative darkness which Faulkner himself in a letter to Cowley characterized with unrelieved despair: "Life is a phenomenon but not a novelty, the same frantic steeplechase toward nothing everywhere and man stinks the same stink no matter where in time." ⁴
A. C. Ward, 1932, was adamant about this "stink" in Faulkner's fiction: "pathology in literature has to be justified according to aesthetic standards, not medical ones; and the pathological factor in William Faulkner's books is not transmuted." But oddly one of the few people not taking up the humanistic cudgel was an M.D.; Lawrence Kubie in 1934 defended Faulkner's techniques, especially in Sanctuary. Where others found it "burning with evil and abnormality," Kubie praised the realistic literary creation of a culture scourged by neurosis. But Kubie's voice was drowned in a self-righteous critical din of disapproval. Most recently the onus of Faulkner's morbidity has been revived by Albert Guerard in The Triumph of the Novel. Guerard finds the canon testimony and vehicle for "the forbidden game" of misogyny. He coyly avoids the pitfalls of psychobiography by treating Faulkner's imaginative obsession in the compartment of "writer" not "citizen." But occasional lapses occur and Guerard announces that "Faulkner's misogyny like Conrad's, diminished noticeably with age." Guerard chooses interesting illustrations, and only occasionally does he force a psycho-sexual reading. There can be no quarrel with his assessment of Joe Christmas as a "clinical case"; nor is Popeye Vitelli ambiguous. However, Jenny biting her brother's ear in Mosquitoes does not quite merit Guerard's description of it as a "sisterly version of fellatio." The speeding car "sucking its dust" (emphasis mine) likewise fails Guerard as persuasive evidence of Christmas' repressed homosexual impulse.

I would like in the following pages to address the charges of Faulkner's real and rhetorical perversion by demonstrating the aesthetic function the pathological character serves in his fiction. I am
assuming a clinical outlook in my analysis because this mode of
analysis has never been thoroughly applied to Yoknapatawpha before, and
because this community, as Faulkner elaborated it, has more than its
fair share of pathologic characters. From Labove's obsession with Eula
of mammalian legend, to Popeye's sadism, I will examine the characters
first for their implied psychological pattern. While remaining con-
scious of the autonomy of the artist, I will examine clusters of
characters as they differentiate themselves emotionally. Though there
are no hard and fast lines of demarcation, by relying on standard
psychological studies, I have defined some traditional groupings of
abnormality: neurosis, sociopathology, and psychosis. 11

Each chapter will consist of three primary parts. After a tradi-
tional clinical placement and critical history, I will discuss how
the impaired mental processes of a given character affect his ability
to communicate. In the case of each respective disorder, communication
is progressively more impaired. Faulkner's method of illustrating the
failures in communication inevitably involves adaptations in his
rhetorical approach. Ultimately, characters with similar psychologi-
cal disorders tend to have similarities in their rhetoric. So, communi-
cation communities evolve. From these illustrations I hope to demon-
strate Faulkner's attitudes about rhetoric that fails and the impli-
cations failed communication have for a culture and its individuals--
sick or well. Together, Faulkner's handling of faulty communications
and rhetorical strategies result in new aesthetic effects. The third
and final subdivision of each chapter will discuss the pathologic
metaphor generated by each disorder. That is, the respective constel-
lations of illness function as linguistic metaphors for the South as region (neurosis), Faulkner as "citizen" (sociopathy), and for his philosophy of the tragedy of human isolation. In this introduction I preview the theory of psychopathology in Faulkner.

Clinical Backgrounds

Implicit in my approach is the assumption of Faulkner's own familiarity with abnormality. How does he create his fanatics, hysterics, paranoids with such accuracy? A great deal of speculation, faith leaping, and indulgent sleuthing is required here. Though Faulkner denied familiarity with Freud and promoted sheer imagination and poker playing as his sole sources of inspiration, Blotner reports that while Faulkner was in New Orleans he heard the talk of the local literati on Freud. And an additionally telling statement by Faulkner in his review of modern drama in The Mississippian provides proof positive for a developing attitude and reaction to Freud and his psychological system: "Writing people are all so pathetically torn between a desire to make a figure in the world and a morbid interest in their personal egos—the deadly fruit of the grafting of Sigmund Freud upon the dynamic chaos of a hodge-podge of nationalities."

In his recent study of Faulkner, Doubling & Incest/Repetition & Revenge, John Irwin uses a meta-Freudian treatment emphasizing triadic relationships as a persistent structural technique. Irwin addresses Faulkner's disclaimers and argues Freudian overtones in spite of Faulkner's own denials of influence. Irwin sensibly attributes
Faulkner's emphatic position on Freudian influence to the author's effort to avoid "the threat to his own creative energy and enterprise that might be posed by a sense of his own work having been anticipated by Freud's."\(^{16}\)

Faulkner's "non-relation" to Freud has been a matter of continuing interest to critics for some time.\(^{17}\) But in terms of hard data even the dense Blotner study produces only tenuous proof. There it is reported that Faulkner was seen reading a series in *Liberty* while he was working in the post office. Blotner believes this was *War Birds: The Diary of an Unknown Aviator*, a study which "emphasized the high casualty rate among combat airmen, the frenetic life they led on the ground, and the way the war had left the survivors maimed, psychologically if not physically."\(^{18}\) Blotner naturally connects this to Faulkner's "Ad Astra." But it likewise supports a case for Faulkner's continued interest in the effects of emotional trauma on its victims. Brooks also reports explicit evidence that Faulkner was exploring sexual pathologies in Theophile Gautier's *Mlle de Maupin*.\(^{19}\)

A more direct case can be made for Faulkner's familiarity with certain kinds of psychopathology by a book in his personal library. Phil Stone, in approximately April of 1922, had procured for Faulkner a copy of Louis Berman's *The Glands Regulating Personality*.\(^{20}\) This quasi-encyclopedic work bears a resemblance to *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Its literary slant, including references as current as F. Scott Fitzgerald, would enhance its appeal for an apprentice author. It ranges over a variety of topics from hysteria to Charles Darwin ("Neurasthenic Genius") to sadism.\(^{21}\) Though it is impossible to prove
that Faulkner read this book, it seems likely that he had some acquaintance with it. For one thing, Berman mentions Max Stirner’s *The Ego and His Own*: this book, obtained at about the same time as Berman’s work, suggests contiguous reading.22 Both Berman’s and Stirner’s work deal in part with Napoleonic complexes, and a limited edition of Emil Ludwig’s *Napoleon* was autographed "William Faulkner/7 January 1929" and added to the library at Rowan Oak. This Ludwig acquisition provides supplemental evidence for serious interest on Faulkner’s part in the "extra-ordinary," in every sense, as types of characters. Blotner notes that only 255 of the 1200 books in Faulkner’s library bore his inscription, a special mark of esteem.23 In addition to the autograph, Faulkner personally thanked Horace Liveright after he received *Napoleon*, commenting on the beauty of the book, and admitted to having read a 100 pages before he could set it down.24

I have pursued what might seem a rather long digression in order to set up an illustration of the type of cannibalizing of the skeletal descriptions to which Berman’s treatments lend themselves. If Faulkner read *The Glands Regulating Personality*, as I believe he did, he would have found Napoleon described in the following phrases:

a unique will and intelligence. . . . H. G. Wells has called his career the 'raid of an intolerable egotist across the disordered beginning of a new time.' . . . "This dark little archaic personage, hard, compact, capable, unscrupulous, imitative and neatly vulgar." . . . He was never in love, never possessed of permanent affection or tenderness for any woman. . . . That he never permitted feeling to interfere with the dictates of his judgment, a quality which rendered him the most unscrupulous careerist of history, must be put down to an insufficiency of the post-pituitary. . . . Napoleon lacked a chemical trace of the religious instinct, his sympathy was nil, and his conquests were made possible only because he
was blind to the suffering and misery his greed
for glory and dominion generated.\textsuperscript{25}

Faulkner created Thomas Sutpen, a man with a design, if not a complex,
indelibly associated with him. The language and attitudes Faulkner
uses to render Sutpen mythic bear a decidedly Napoleonic stamp (traits
recorded by Berman and others): "They did not think of love in connec-
tion with Sutpen. They thought of ruthlessness rather than justice
and of fear rather than respect, but not of pity or love. . . ."\textsuperscript{26}
"he had now come to town to find a wife exactly as he would have gone
to the Memphis market to buy livestock or slaves" (\textit{AA}, p. 42). The
town watches in "shocked amazement while he laid deliberate siege" to
Ellen Coldfield's father. And there is even an Elbaesque quality to
his "quitting of Jefferson" to prepare for his self-made destiny. Rosa
amply testifies to his crudity and vulgarity. But it is primarily in
the ruthless purposiveness of the design that the portraits stunningly
intersect: "I found that she was not and could never be, through no
fault of her own, adjunctive or incremental to the design which I had
in mind, so I provided for her and put her aside" (\textit{AA}, p. 240). With
comparable emotional dispatch he tells Quentin's grandfather the
history of the design he had: "To accomplish it I should require
money, a house, a plantation, slaves, a family--incidentally of course,
a wife. I set out to acquire these, asking no favor of any man" (\textit{AA},
p. 263).

None of this, of course, is to say that Faulkner modeled or
limited his characters based on descriptions available in Berman.
Mick Gidley takes care to point out numerous character parallels that
exist between Berman and Faulkner, types he believes correspond to Anse, Eula, Benjy. Though he scrupulously insists on the integrity of Faulkner's creation, he makes a too-exclusive case for the possibility that Faulkner was influenced by Berman's details.27

As a compendium for degeneracy, The Glands Regulating Personality is even more fertile. There is talk of "pop-eyed" appearances, masochism, Sartoris-like melancholia, and Hightowerish femininity and morbidity. Even Semiramis, an epithet Mrs. Charles Mallison feels Eula deserves for her effect on the woebegotten Gavin Stevins, is considered by Berman. Gidley has a field day with Faulkner's repudiation of the glands in his Nobel Prize Speech, and its implications for the Berman book. Gidley makes the argument that even though Faulkner is absorbed with "decaying breeds" (glands implied) and degenerate heredity (Snopesism), he finally believed man would triumph over even a bad genetic lot. But he stops mainly with the observation of related diction: glands. By making a leap of faith at this point, however, some significant connections can be found between Faulkner's Nobel Prize sentiments and Berman's final remarks. Berman claims that the dream of Utopia has been largely a "tragic aspiration for an impossibility" treasured by poets. Faulkner feels man's soul, with its capacity for compassion, pity, and sacrifice, will enable man to endure; Berman also sees a triumph over malignancy and pain. By controlling the internal secretions, Berman predicts that at least the human race will be rendered "less contemptible and more divine."28 Though Gidley rightly asserts that Berman is largely deterministic while Faulkner favors the triumph of the heart's choice to be better
than it is meant to be, both men finally predict humanistic victories. Berman's selectively manipulated glands correspond to Faulkner's stark optimism embodied in man's puny, inexhaustible voice.

In no way do I wish these possible influence connections to reduce the sheer force of Faulkner's creativity and capacity for insightful and suggestive characterization. Philip Rieff's defense of Freud's integrity, despite influence, is more than applicable to Faulkner: The work "is something to see through; it is presumably best explained by something other than--even contradicting--itself. Every work of art is to Freud a museum piece of the unconscious, an occasion to contemplate the unconscious frozen into one of its possible gestures." This study focuses on all those "possible gestures" that Faulkner generated to suggest a state of emotional deterioration.

The degree of influence Berman, Freud, or any psychological approach had on Faulkner's work cannot be gauged. But Faulkner repeatedly emphasized "character" as the heart of his work and he clearly did his best to round out and authenticate Yoknapatawpha by giving it its fair share of psychologically disturbed residents. And because even his deviants are usually fully drawn it is possible to use the early psychological studies to which Faulkner would have had access, combined with recent studies of mental disease, to discover with what symptoms his characters are endowed. But I do not intend merely to categorize and pin to the wall a panoply of symptoms and diagnoses. Rather, I shall argue that Faulkner, in the tradition of Shakespeare, creates characters that "live out their dramas in contexts which explain and even justify their behavior, as unconsciously determined behavior in
life is not explained." For Faulkner was able to combine his layman's understanding of psychology with an author's unrelenting eye for detail in his environment. By Lawrence S. Kubie's definition, the ingredients that designate mental disorder would be readily accessible to Faulkner, always obsessed by repetitions: "The essence of illness is the freezing of behavior into unalterable and insatiable patterns." Whenever psychological processes predetermine the tendency automatically to repeat, they are psychopathological. The observation of such phenomena is not new, nor is its existence, since as Crews pithily put it, "Freud did not alter human nature."

There are no classic cases--only Faulkner's intuitive approximations artistically rendered. As types reoccur, as communities develop, it becomes clear that Faulkner used psychopathological characters as devices to energize his fiction. They were tools and not his private compulsions as early critics implied; he was not in collusion with the diseases. My approach should provide an objective means to separate, name, and understand the groupings as literary devices. And in the process of resolving questions as crucial as why Faulkner had Rosa choose Quentin for an audience, this approach may also help to remove the twenty-year onus of sickness that colored his early reputation, debased the books, and occasionally rubbed off on the author. Faulkner repeatedly claimed he was only writing about what he knew. Arthur Kinney puts it more complexly when he states that "art originates in the human response to events rather than in the external world of discontinuous act."
In *The Lion in the Garden*, Faulkner diagnosed man's tragedy as "the impossibility—or at least the tremendous difficulty—of communication. But man keeps on trying endlessly to express himself and to make contact with other human beings." With language a difficult barrier under the best conditions, the plight of the psychopathologic characters is both thematically and rhetorically problematic. Kinney acutely argues that "Faulkner shapes his work to reveal the visions of his characters; their visions thus become his style." Often the visions that emerge reveal a sense of the universe wracked with pathology. Characters suffering from related mental disorders tend to speak alike in Faulkner—in both their diction and content. Michel Foucault in his development of an historical theory of madness insists that "*Language is the first and last structure of madness*." Consequently, Foucault values Freud not for the treatments he proposed but for returning madness to the "level of its language" where the only possibility of "a dialogue with unreason" can begin. So in examining an hysterical reaction in a character like Drusilla in *The Unvanquished*, Faulkner's language to describe her collapse, and her own responses, parallels in many details the hysterical symptoms of Nancy Mannigoe or Quentin Compson: eyes completely empty, laughter uncontrollably spilling out like vomit, exaggerated responses, rapid private associations, inattention to external appeals to order. In scenes where the stricken character is isolated by his disordered response, he, or she, inevitably wrests the attention from other characters or events. Percy
Grimm's cameo appearance in *Light in August* seems longer and fuller than an actual word count would reveal. Running the gamut of emotional disintegration, these characters seem able to fix the reader's attention with the rhetorical glittering eye—emblematic disproportion. In scenes where they are in competition for the center stage, responses are complex yet nearly predictable as in the case of Quentin's mental wanderings during Rosa's thirty-seven-page scene-stealing rampage.

And it is not uncommon for one pathologic character to seek out another, as with Rosa and Quentin. In fact, in *Requiem for a Nun*, Temple Drake Stevens makes this same point more than three different times. The Governor is trying to understand why Temple, mother of the child Nancy Mannigoe has murdered, is pleading for dispensation on Nancy's behalf. The Governor demands explanations for Temple's urgent defense of Nancy's murder. What he learns from Temple's coaxed soliloquy is not only a restatement of Faulkner's "tragedy of communication," but a revelation of a desperate rhetorical brotherhood among the emotionally ill:

1) Temple: I'll have to tell the rest of it in order to tell you why I had to have a dopefiend whore to talk to, why Temple Drake, the white woman, the all-Mississippi debutante . . . couldn't find anybody except a nigger dopefiend whore that could speak her language— *(RN, p. 244)*;

2) Temple: . . . I married another man and reformed, or thought I had, and bore two children and hired another reformed whore so that I would have somebody to talk to . . . . *(RN, p. 262)*: and

3) Temple: . . . all the other young country-club set applauded when they took an ex-dopefiend nigger whore out of the gutter to nurse their children, because the rest of the young country-club set didn't know that it wasn't the Gowan Stevenses but Temple Drake who had chosen the ex-dopefiend nigger whore for the
reason that an ex-dopefiend nigger whore was the animal that spoke Temple Drake's language... . .
A confidante. . . . the two sisters in sin swapping trade or anyway avocational secrets over Coca-
Colas in the quiet kitchen. Somebody to talk to, as well as to need, want, have to have, not to con-
verse with you nor even agree with you, but just keep quiet and listen. Which is all that people really want, really need; I mean, to behave themselves, keep out of one another's hair; the malad-
justments which they tell us breed the arsonists and rapists, and murderers and thieves and the rest of the anti-social enemies, are not really maladjustments but simply because the embryonic murderers and thieves didn't have anybody to listen to them... . . Which was what Temple had: somebody paid by the week just to listen... . . (RN, p. 266).

And so Temple craves an audience that understands; she finds this in Nancy. But she has already grown accustomed to this crucial service.

Her abductor, jailer, tutor in evil— Popeye—has kept her in Miss Reba's Memphis sporting house. Admittedly Temple is ripe for the performance she and Red give as Popeye, an "only slightly deformed cockroach: a hybrid sexually incapable," hovers over the bed whinnying in voyeuristic ecstasy. But as Temple recounts these sexploits from Sanctuary, Popeye's perverse sexuality is downplayed. Faulkner described Temple in a letter as a girl off of which evil flowed "like water off a duck's back." Now Temple reveals how being "impervious to evil" made her eligible to find happiness in grotesque communion and camaraderie with a "psychopath." In addition to the sleazy but expensive perfumes and negligees, beyond Red's stud service, Popeye provides her a guard, a Negro maid who would come in when the brothel was not under surveillance and she and Temple would "talk."
The ease of communication Temple achieves between herself and the underworld—including Popeye whom she calls Daddy—is sharply con-
trasted to the difficulty Temple has in retelling the story to the
Governor and Gavin, a very different community of listeners. Her
narrative falters and derails over and over as she chides herself:
"not even stalling now. Why cant you [herself] stop lying?" (RN, p.
244); "Where was I?" "Never mind. I said that before too, didn't I?"
(RN, pp. 246, 247, and 252). The laboring, made more difficult by
foreign morality and foreign sensibility, makes the communication
tenuous. Each of the psychologically ill is in search of someone who
speaks his language. Temple did not find the audience when her
courtroom lies sent Lee Goodwin to his death. For a complex range of
reasons, from mild anxiety to suicidal depression, language becomes
both definitionally and malfunctionally the heart of the emotionally
crippled character's fictional treatment. To this point, I would like
to introduce here Faulkner's wryly frustrated comment on the
world's obsession with detail about his own life, a community
personality-mongers craved and Faulkner fought:

Goddam it I've spent almost fifty years trying to
cure myself of the curse of human speech, all for
nothing. Last month two damned swedes, two days ago
a confounded Chicago reporter, and now this one that
can't even speak english. As if anything he or I
either know, or both of us together know, is worth
being said once, let alone twice through an inter-
preter. I swear to chrst being in hollywood was
better than this where nobody knew me or cared a
damn. I hate like hell to be in this state, I can
even put up with mankind when I have time to adjust.
But I do like to have the chance to invite people to
come to look at me and see where I keep my tail or my
other head or whatever the hell it is strangers want
to come for.

The fictional proposition of failed language and communication
inevitably leads to the issue of Faulkner's rhetorical style. To
engage in the artistic production of characters with inherent communication problems poses special problems of technical mastery for the artist. Faulkner was after a rhetoric that could reflect the character's mental condition without totally obscuring the meaning of that passage; i.e., how to give structure to thoughts which often resist patterning. This particular challenge of form for literature, as Norman Holland has noted, "displaces its psychological issues to the level of language qua language. There, our own muscular responses, the logic of the language itself, the gratification and violation of our formal expectations—these and perhaps other devices of language seem to master the original psychological issues." Up till now critics of Faulkner's style have tended to generalize about his innovative and often distressing rhetoric. The most frequent charge against his style is its "violation" of those formal expectations. But by focusing in this study on the disturbances in communication brought on by mental illness, I plan to demonstrate that "violations" are necessities dictated by the needs of these special characterizations. Thus, I will be focusing rhetorically on what Kazin dubbed Faulkner's "agonized rhetoric." Previously, critics like Aiken (1939), Beck (1941), Charles Glicksberg (1949), Jean-Jacques Mayoux (1952), and Walter Slatoff (1957) have not differentiated among the diverse tonal qualities of that agonized rhetoric. Relying on catch-all descriptive terms, they have discussed the hallucinogenic, hypnotic, neurotic, comatose, somnambulistic, nightmarish, and incoherent qualities of Faulkner's prose. But most
of these apologies on style attribute the convoluted, incoherent atmosphere associated with the aberrant characters to the stream-of-consciousness technique. By the same token, however, that sickness has been used as a blanket term to avoid discriminating the particular brands of pathology, the stream-of-consciousness technique only partially accounts for the turbulent and fevered rhapsody of the fiction. I hope to demonstrate a unique use of syntax, diction, and/or metaphor that communicates consistently the associated disorder, e.g., hysterics have their own private language just as religious fanatics have a pattern of speech peculiar to them. These rhetorical findings about language deviation will buttress the legitimacy of the clinical approach.

The risk in such a study, as Frederick Crews has warned in *Out of My System*, is that the fiction will dwindle "to an illustration of theory...[instead of becoming] richer and stronger than ever." I think the burden of clinical apparatus that my approach imposes can be justified by a brief illustration of its possibilities. I have chosen Darl from *As I Lay Dying* because there is very little controversy over the issue of his mental illness. Furthermore, this example demonstrates symptom characterization and structural strategy beyond its reification of a specific psychopathologic rhetoric. It occurs at the end of the novel, and Darl is on the train to the Jackson insane asylum. His chronic schizophrenia is in clear evidence. But even more significant than the subtle and consistent treatment of Darl's breakdown is the psychological counterpointing Faulkner achieves. Darl's final
appearance exhibits him at mental nadir. His progressively disordered thoughts and social withdrawal into enigmatic and incessant laughing has been preceded textually by Vardaman, whose language and emotional development seem both stunted and traumatized. He has only recently failed to make the leap from concrete thought to abstract ("My mother is a fish") in his efforts to understand his mother's death. Darl is functionally unable to explain his condition. And Vardaman is conditionally unequipped to do anything more than parrot information and fix egregiously apparent facts: "He went to Jackson" (Aldo, p. 239). Thus, Faulkner gives information galore but effectively thwarts intellectual penetration. The reader shares both Vardaman's confusion and Darl's feeble, but frenzied, attempts to connect with an external world that is receding mentally in symbolic unison with the depot.

D. W. Abse describes this syndrome known as schizophrenia:

in this condition, speech disturbance is prominent and takes the form of overwhelming compulsive talking, sometimes disjointedly and with interspersed composite words and clang associations, the content often being largely a running commentary on persons and objects in the currently surrounding environment. The excited schizophrenic patients who manifest this syndrome are attempting this way restitutorily to cling to the object-world, and at the same time to crowd out their own problems, conflicts, and feelings more concerned with people and things important to them—thus the syndrome also bears a resemblance to manic excitement, and may now be considered a schizo-affective disorder.45

Darl throughout the novel has been emotionally coy in his expression of emotional relationships. On the train the regression into a personal symbology is clear. Darl "understands" the seating arrangement of his guard attendants as a symbolic enactment of the two sides of the
state's nickels: "One of them sat beside him, the other sat on the seat facing him, riding backward. One of them had to ride backward because the state's money has a face to each backside and a backside to each face, and they are riding on the state's money which is incest" (AILD, p. 244). Mental mayhem and disjointed connections continue. From the seating arrangement, to the nickel, to a spy glass with a bestiality scene to a foamy and nihilistic repetition of "yes-yesyesyesyes," all these details function to distance Darl from the essence of his emotional problem. Following Darl's enforced departure chapter is Dewey Dell's. No mention of Darl's crack-up is made. Faulkner, by having Dewey Dell and Anse squabbling still and always about money, relieves the tension created by a climax in schizophrenia. It also reinforces the banality, normalcy and selfishness of those tragic survivors. Dewey Dell's first concern per usual is her pregnancy. Seemingly untouched by her mother's death, she is not far removed from Anse, who is reflected through Cash's psyche in the book's finale. Cash, practical and untormented, still can lament Darl's absence: "Darl I would think what a shame Darl couldn't be to enjoy it too. But it is better so for him. This world is not his world; this life his life" (AILD, p. 250).

Close readings that link illness and style in Faulkner are fairly rare. And there has not been a study developed in strict psychological terms before. I will be concentrating on documented psychological deviations rooted in pathological learning. I have omitted characters like Benjy and Ike on the grounds that they are primarily cases of organic dysfunction. My hope is that Faulkner's morbid characters will
reveal the uniquely invigorating powers pathological rhetoric and communication have for Faulkner's fiction.

The Metaphor of Psychopathology

Darl, like so many other of Faulkner's psychopathologic characters, is disinherited. And Faulkner seems to have special sympathy with those characters whose language betrays them. The last solace is the silence; and many of these characters betrayed by their own speech and their frail psyches achieve a damned privacy that mocks Faulkner's own desperate search for personal oblivion—"It is my ambition to be, as a private individual, abolished and voided from history, leaving it markless, no refuge save the printed books."46

Faulkner's own feeling for the pathology does not make him crazy, however, anymore than his craving for anonymity does. What he tapped in the artistic rendering of mental disease was the modern condition apotheosized. Mental illness also gave rise to what I think is both a personal, regional, and philosophic metaphor, i.e., the rough divisions of mental disturbance—neurotic, sociopathic, and psychotic—provide correlatives for Faulkner's cosmos of psychopathology. Neurosis functions as a fair description of the entire Southern regional problem that Faulkner found himself embroiled in. One side of Faulkner creates the Quentin who was hysterically chattering out his chant of "I don't hate the South"; the other side of him—the Mississippian—spokesman for the Southern condition, was championing the position of Negroes as children: "The Negroes would be better off [with slavery] because they'd have some one to look after them."47
His public rhetoric, still later in his life, clearly represented the neurosis engendered by the doublethink that the region found itself prone to in efforts to resolve the integration issue. Faulkner presented the true Southern position in his warning that "if it came to fighting I'd fight for Mississippi against the United States even if it meant going out into the street and shooting Negroes. . . . I will go on saying that the Southerners are wrong and that their position is untenable, but if I have to make the same choice Robert E. Lee made then I'll make it."48 The South with Faulkner as its most eloquent spokesman exhibited many of the symptoms of neurotic disorder: anxiety, insecurity, and "unsatisfactory interpersonal relationships."49

The sociopathic pathology provides a metaphor for the personal hell Faulkner created and craved in his alcoholism, grief, and assorted romantic problems in his private life. This felt misogyny at times consciously blossomed into misanthropy of the first order and Guerard has speculated on Faulkner's selection of female victims, predicaments, and tortures. His art involving sociopathic characters created an opportunity for indirection and disguise of these personal tendencies.

And finally, the extreme psychotics (manic-depressives, for instance) provide the best metaphor for what Faulkner meant by tragedy philosophically. Tragedy exists as a condition made possible by characters' emotional fragmentation and inability to establish connection with the human community. As Foucault explains it in the abstract, "Madness has become man's possibility of abolishing both man and the world—and even those images that challenge the world and deform man. . . . it is the ambiguity of chaos and apocalypse...escape
from the nothingness that imprisons." \(^{50}\)

The use of psychoses as a metaphor for tragedy in Faulkner's system is unique to this study. But it originated with Susan Sontag's essay on illness as a metaphor. Sontag has made this approach an unfashionable cause célèbre. But her point that clothes and illness "become tropes for new attitudes toward the self" \(^{51}\) is undeniably true.
The characterization of mental illness through consistent language is a vehicle Faulkner chose to express his vision; it was tapped for details, language, even landscape. Faulkner chose to explore this morbidity with a special sympathy as sufferer and witness, for in it he recognized a humanistic universal: a pathology of imagination manifest as moral, social, and personal vision. To write of alcoholics and neurotics was a form of personal therapy and discovery. But more importantly, they offered the quintessential vehicle for art as Faulkner believed it to be:

Art is simpler than people think because there is so little to write about. All the moving things are eternal in man's history and have been written before, and if a man writes hard enough, sincerely enough, humbly enough, and with all the unalterable determination never to be quite satisfied with it, he will repeat them, because art like poverty takes care of its own, shares its bread. \(^{52}\)

In effect, by taking what material was at hand, and by treating it with that special sympathy that triumphant creativity has for neurosis, \(^{53}\) Faulkner answers "The Oven Bird's" question of "what to make of a diminished thing."
ENDNOTES


6 Harlan Hatcher, "'Ultimate Extensions,'" WF:CH, p. 188


8 Guerard, p. 111.

9 Guerard, p. 112.

10 Guerard, p. 112.


13 Blotner, Biography, p. 396.


16 Irwin, p. 5.; Estella Schoenberg in Old Tales and Talking (Jackson: University of Mississippi, 1977) hovers about many of the same issues Irwin has dealt with. In what becomes a snotty footnote debate, Schoenberg accuses Irwin of arty self-indulgence in Doubling. She concludes, unfortunately for all her causes—stated and unstated—with a bit of crankiness, reminding Irwin and others that "not all problems are psychological or masculine or artistic," p. 14.


18 Blotner, Biography, p. 648.

19 Cleanth Brooks, William Faulkner: Towards Yoknapatawpha and Beyond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 120.


23 Blotner, Biography, p. 189.

24 Blotner, Biography, p. 539.

25 Berman, pp. 231-33.

26 William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! (New York: Vintage Books, 1956). All references to this book will be documented parenthetically as AA. Other primary source material will be designated parenthetically as follows:


27 Gidley, p. 83.
28 Berman, p. 291.
30 Meredith Anne Skura, The Critic and the Psychoanalyst: Some Approaches to Interpretation, unpublished manuscript.
35 Kinney, p. 6.

37. Foucault, p. 198.


44. J. L. Roberts, "The Individual and the Family: Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying*," *Arizona Quarterly*, 16 (Spring 1960), 26-38. Roberts is the only critic who denies Darl has become insane.


47. Meriwether and Millgate, p. 20.


50. Foucault, p. 281.


52. Cowley, p. 16.

II. Neurosis: "Who else has been in Purgatory?"

"There are clinical experts who think that such completeness of memory is a hysterical symptom."
Saul Bellow

"Symptoms of disease are nothing but a disguised manifestation of the power of love; and all disease is only love transformed."
Thomas Mann

"There are more nervous breakdowns today because there are more things for man to worry about. Also there are more people to breakdown. That would have something to do with it. But man in the long view doesn't change."
William Faulkner

Recently Paul Fussell nailed William B. Ober for his careening pathological analysis of famous writers. Dr Ober's book, Boswell's Clap and Other Essays: Medical Analysis of Literary Men's Afflictions, is charged with clumsiness, silliness, and pointlessness. Fussell winds up by saying that "Dr. Ober lacks sufficient literary instinct to realize that a person of imagination, let alone genius, is a latent everything."¹ Faulkner's canon has been particularly prone to psychological readings. In the bad old days the critics talked about degenerate obsessions that provoked wrath and disgust in the reader. More recently, Martha O'Nan offered a psychological reading of Benjy's hysteria.² She claimed that there existed no adequate study and definition of hysteria; using an abridged and outdated definition of hysteria, O'Nan argued Benjy is an hysteric. Some of her evidence has been traditionally employed to explain his idiocy.³

Saving psychological criticism from a dismal if not potentially degenerative critical situation is Cleanth Brooks. He legitimizes the
whole idea of scrupulous psychology in William Faulkner: Yoknapatawpha
and Beyond. He specifically talks about "Faulkner's interest in the
psychology of neurotic and psychotic women": Emily Grierson and the
mother and daughter in "Miss Zilphia Gant," for instance. Brooks tries
to go beyond the titillating surface of necrophilia and man-hatred to
reach Faulkner's literary motive: "The young Faulkner was at this
period not only very much interested in psychology, particularly femi-
nine psychology; he was also daringly experimental." Brooks offers an
ingenious psychological reading of the resolution of "Miss Zilphia
Gant," too. He links the onset of Zilphia's dreams about immaculate
conceptions to pending sexual consummation and cessation of the sexual
dreams to menopause. He proposes this solution very speculatively;
but a sustained reading of neurosis will accommodate all central
features of the story and eliminate the tentativeness of a psychologi-
cal argument. Brooks also gives a make-sense reading of "Dry Septem-
ber," discussing "Miss Minnie Cooper's neurotic fantasy" regarding
"mandingoes." Brooks sees the primary drama in this story as one of
community versus individual frustrations and distortions of humanity.
Because he views Faulkner as a good artist and a good psychologist,
Brooks disavows the popular reading that blames the weather for the
story's tragic conclusion: Faulkner was "too good a psychologist to
identify the climate of lynching with a meteorological condition. . .
too good an artist to use 'Nature' as a compelling cause of human
actions." Brooks notes in the same story Faulkner's effective use of
psychological gesture to explain the barber's retaliation. But Brooks
describes that reaction as "reflex action? hysterical compulsion?... quasi-hysterical." This tendency to generalize and approximate the meanings of words like "neurosis" and "obsession" in Faulkner criticism directs the purpose of this chapter. The aim of this chapter will be to define and organize what Brooks calls Faulkner's "interest" in neurosis, and to demonstrate neurotic disorder as an enabling principle for characterization, rhetoric, and regional metaphor.

Characters and Neurotic Symptoms

Faulkner generally sanctioned all critical approaches to literature—even Freudian ones—because such approaches proved literature/art was a "living quantity in our social condition. If it were not, then there'd be no reason for people to delve and find all sorts of symbolisms and psychological strains and currents in it."9 From his own point of view, though, what seemed most important was that the figure the author put down on paper be able to "stand up on its hind legs and cast a shadow."10 In discussing his characters' lives in Yoknapatawpha, Faulkner continually recurred to their/his/man's never-ending need for love, honor, and sacrifice. Pity also figured into that coda and it is in the nexus of love and pity that neurosis becomes a significant instrument by which to measure and understand his characters.

Foucault, in his delineation of the aspects of madness, talks about the diseases of the nerves. In nervous disorder, he claims the key theme rests in "the rapprochement of the body with itself."11
This idea of an omnisym pathetic response between flesh and soul corroborates an essential thesis formulated by Freud in Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria that:

sexuality does not simply intervene, like a deus ex machina, on one single occasion, at some point in the working processes which characterize hysteria, but that it provides the motive power for every single symptom, and for every single manifestation of a symptom. The symptoms of the disease are nothing else than the patient's sexual activity. . . . Sexuality is the key to the problem of the psychoneuroses and of the neuroses in general.12

In other words, in neurosis, the mind—emotions conspire with the body to send out a coded cry for help. The disorder of neurosis gives rise to symptoms like anxiety, obsession, compulsion, and hysteria. Though the severity of symptoms varies, the neurotic's critical ability to test reality is uninterrupted. The neurotic can function in society, but his intense anxieties impede a smooth existence. It is important to remember that the categories are not absolutely discrete and that there is traffic along the borders, e.g., anxiety neurosis can easily be accompanied by obsessions, or, due to aggravation, present occasional symptoms which may escalate into hysteria.

For the character disabled by anxiety neurosis—the first and "mildest" level of neurotic behavior as I will systematize it—the refrain is always: "Something is about to happen to me," a sentence most frequently associated with Faulkner because of Joe Christmas' use of it throughout Light in August. Clinically, anxiety can be the product of a specific, identifiable stimulus (phobia), or it may be an amorphous, free-floating sense of doom and foreboding (anxiety reaction).13 According to psychologists, the victim of anxiety neurosis
must avoid the fear-inducing stimulus in order to control his reaction; and usually, the anxiety neurotic finds it difficult to maintain the necessary avoidance distance. When contact with the object of fear is experienced—or even anticipated—the neurotic will experience a highly magnified level of anxiety.\textsuperscript{14} Frequently, the anxiety neurosis stems from an initial trauma, and as a consequence, a neurotic conflict is established. Once the conflict has been rooted, the manifestation of anxiety may attach itself to related or reminiscent embodiments of the feared situation. In Breuer and Freud's \textit{Studies on Hysteria}, the source for hysterical response is memory: "Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences."\textsuperscript{15} But the hysterics' memories are a very complicated cause of his disorder. The memories have been suppressed and consequently become "pathogenic."\textsuperscript{16} The pathogenic memories, according to Freud, are rooted in the "sexual traumas of childhood," and thus, sexual experiences, "unabreacted," constitute the aetiology of psycho-neuroses and the "corner-stones" of his theory.\textsuperscript{17} The hysterical symptom, characterized by its capacity to repeat itself, struggles for expression.\textsuperscript{18} Fenichel adds to an explanation of situations that trigger the anxiety responses by saying, "It is not sexual situations that are feared anymore but rather sexualized situations. . . ." In a more distorted way, they again symbolize either a temptation for a warded-off impulse or a punishment for an unconscious impulse or a combination of both.\textsuperscript{19} Naturally, the neurotic's mental set allows for frequent misapprehensions and the attendant symptoms of disturbed emotional response.
Fundamentally, "sexual inhibitions constitute the most frequent symptoms occurring in every type of neurosis."²⁰ A particular anxiety neurosis Faulkner explored in his fiction was androphobia: fear of men. The three specific cases of anxiety neurosis I will discuss, Zilphia Gant, her daughter, and Minnie Cooper, all suffer from varied shadings of this condition.

Brooks treats "Miss Zilphia Gant" rather extensively. After chronicling the nightmare of history in which mother Gant passes to daughter Gant—and we presume daughter will pass it to her hijacked daughter—her fear of men, Brooks rather inexplicably and cheerfully summarizes this story of "abnormal psychology" as a "kind of success story, in which the victim discovers for herself the proper mental hygiene."²¹ Although it is not his critical goal, Brooks accurately records the symptoms of the anxiety neurosis of daughter Zilphia. But he wants to identify the story too much with Anderson's school of grotesques. Consequently, he finds the story darkly humorous. Since the story is built on adultery, murder, child abuse, and a defensively embittered avoidance of life, "Miss Zilphia Gant" seems to me tonally more suited to despair. As for the Gants's achieving "proper mental hygiene," it is doubtful. At the story's close, Miss Zilphia has become her mother—and her mother is not a well woman.

According to Fenichel, "Freud's advice is still valid: if a person suddenly becomes irritable and moody and develops spells of anxiety or a general readiness for anxiety, one should first ask about his sexual life."²² To ask this of the Gant women is to guarantee a story full of grief and fury. As for the details of the story and
their pathological implications: Mother Gant's husband runs off with another woman; Mrs. Gant exacts justice by killing them both. In his desertion lie the seeds of her psychic trauma. The townfolk sum it up: "Mrs. Gant ain't got a whole lot of use for men-folks no more" (US, p. 371). Her worst fears and hostilities are exacerbated when she discovers her daughter napping under a common blanket with a boy from the school. From then on out, Mrs. Gant watches the girl incessantly. Potential playmates for Zilphia are screened to exclude male children. Over time, her brittle, vigilant defense against anything that could invoke trauma leaves Mrs. Gant mannish in appearance and ridden with "implacable paranoia." From young Zilphia's thirteenth year on she is inspected monthly for the inevitable signs of puberty. When Zilphia finally elopes, Mother Gant offers herself as a human barricade to the consummation of the marriage. She insists Zilphia stay in the house and as her final act, she stands guard with a shotgun in a three-day vigil, sweating slowly until the bridegroom has given up.

Before looking closely at the peculiar rhetoric of Mother Gant, I'd like to introduce one more pertinent feature of anxiety neurosis: aggression. A common phobia for the neurotic, according to Fenichel, is fear of infection. A particularly sadistic manifestation of this neurosis is related to venereal infection, and also to the more symbolic fear of infection, i.e., fear of impregnation. When Mrs. Gant returns from Memphis, fresh from murder, Faulkner describes her as possessing "a deadly female intuition, an undeviating conviction for sin...and the serene imperviousness of a vestal out of a violated temple" (US, p. 370). Mrs. Gant exhibits also the violent fear of
connection/contamination when she drives her patrons from the shop after they suggest Zilphia fraternize more. She screams after them, "'Bitches!' The regimen of inspection that young Zilphia endures can be explained no other way than as a neurotic indulgence of her mother's fears of sexuality—her daughter's or anyone's. The final significant rhetorical episode for Mother Gant occurs when she tells the story of her now—murdered husband to Zilphia. Faulkner renders graphically the experience of trauma relived, and its aftermath: "telling her about it in a cold, level voice in the language of a man. . . . Then her voice ceased. . . . her cold mad eyes gone blank as a statue's; and standing before her, her mouth open a little, Zilphia thought of a rock or a pile from which an abruptly undammed stream has roared away" (US, p. 374). This description of dams bursting parallels closely the imagery Freud selected to describe conversation with neurotic patients who cannot quite bring themselves to give an "ordered version of their life." The first account, according to Freud, "may be compared to an unnavigable river whose stream is at one moment choked by masses of rock and at another divided and lost among shallows and sandbanks." By this method, Faulkner suggests Mrs. Gant's excruciatingly repressed sexual memories and her overwhelming need, at considerable cost, to communicate. The connection to another, however minimal or twisted, is at least established temporarily. This same incident also verifies the "'compulsion to repeat,'" a neurotic symptom identified by Freud. Mrs. Gant must retell the story. And her desperate need to retell is indication of the intensity of her neurosis.
The second example of anxiety neurosis (pushed to near hysteria) is offered in the shape of Miss Zilphia, the daughter. Deficient herself in personal experience with trauma, she embodies the alternative to the somewhat calcified phobic response registered by her mother; that is, she exhibits anxiety reaction. For Miss Zilphia there is an escalating, but inchoate, anxiety associated with men. Faulkner has stacked the deck against Miss Zilphia's chances for living happily ever after. Neurosis can be environmentally nurtured, and Mrs. Gant is doing everything possible to insure that her daughter inherit the androphobia. Zilphia's eyes reflect her response to her mother's rage at their clients. They "go suddenly blank and then filling with terror. . . . she seemed to dissolve behind her wan, haunting face and terrified eyes. . . . She began to cry and vomit, her eyeballs back-rolling until only the whites showed, shrieking and retching. . . . In the spring she was ill again, from anemia and nervousness and loneliness and actual despair" (US, p. 372). At this time much of Zilphia's budding neurotic conflict is directed at her mother, whose near mute terrorism leaves the girl pale. She "walks rapidly and aimlessly" about the town; but once she is discovered by her mother in "the mesmeric throes of puberty" wrapped in a blanket with a young boy, the neurosis is rooted. Faulkner ends section II of this story with Zilphia sitting "beside the window for twelve years." Crippled by neurosis, she has begun to let life pass her by. Because Zilphia's neurotic conflict is linked more to her mother's raging disapproval of men and less to men in particular, it is not a violation in the
rendering of her condition when Faulkner permits her to fall in love
with a house painter. Miss Zilphia, during this period, experiences
an alternation in her neurotic progress; her sleep is interrupted by
dreams:

Zilphia's eyes began to pain her, and she could not
sleep well. She would wake from her dreams in which
the painter performed monstrously with his pot and
brush. In the dream his eyes were yellow instead of
gray, and he was always chewing, his chin fading away
into the blurred drool of the chewing; one night she
waked herself by saying aloud, "he's got a beard!"
Now and then she dreamed of the pot and brush alone.
They would be alive, performing of themselves actions
of monstrous and ritualized significance. (US, p. 375)

The possible sexual connotation that can be attached to that performing
pot and brush engaged in ritualized acts should be evident to even the
most amateur psychologist. More significant, though, than the easy
Freudian reading available, is an analysis of the same ideas treated
clinically by Fenichel:

In a state of being dammed up, this inability to master
the cathexes that resist sleep through dreams usually
first becomes apparent in the frequent occurrence of
dreams that fail, that is, in recurrent nightmares . . . ;
and eventually sleep may become almost completely im-
possible.

Furthermore, it is not only the cathexes of
repressed wishes that may make sleep impossible. Acute
worries or affect-laden expectations, whether agreeable
or disagreeable, particularly sexual excitement without
gratification, make for sleeplessness. In the case of
neurotic disturbances of sleep, the unconscious factors
of course outweigh the others.

Actually the impairment of the function of sleep
is one of the most common neurotic manifestations and
is encountered in almost every neurosis.26

In addition to explaining the neurotic basis for Zilphia's troubled
sleep, Fenichel reaffirms the accuracy of Faulkner's treatment of
neurotic disorder.

In Zilphia's final confrontation with her mother she is defeated by this embodiment of distortion and neurosis. Faulkner leaves her "shrunk into herself, collapsing from inside, to have lost height, become awkward" (US, p. 377). Foucault has also employed this image of conflation in his description of nervous disease as a "disorder of sympathy." In Foucault's description it is also useful to note how his conception parallels Faulkner's: "in nervous disease the body becomes too close to itself, too intimate in each of its parts. . . in a sense, strangely constructed . . . an aspect of a . . . too precise image: . . . the celebrated 'shriveling of the nervous system.'"27

From this point on, Miss Zilphia's condition is more defined. She develops a neurotic obsession about conceiving a child without benefit of intercourse: "I will conceive." And her sleep is further troubled:

She would have to be careful about getting into sleep. She was more careful about that than about getting into her clothes. But even then she sometimes slipped. Then she would lie in the dark . . . beginning to toss lightly from side to side like a surf getting up. She would think about Christ, whispering "Mary did it without a man . . ." or rousing, furious, her hands clenched at her sides, the covers flung back and her opened thighs tossing, she would violate her ineradicable virginity again and again. . . . (US, p. 379)

There is also a trend towards violent intensity in her desire. She develops a fantasy life about her husband and his new wife, and experiences vicarious sexual thrills, which effectively allow her to circumvent the traumatic fear of infection. The dreams stop temporarily, but she still suffers from sporadic fits of weeping and the "dying rumor of turpentine." Finally the obsession is realized and she gets the child
literally of her dreams. And on the surface things are much improved: Miss Zilphia and her daughter begin to cope.

The final example comes from "Dry September," and involves a less elaborately developed case of anxiety neurosis. I include it to reinforce my thesis that Faulkner was not just casually incorporating ill characters into his fiction; but, instead, they were used continuously in the fiction to achieve rhetorical effects. When Brooks analyzes "Dry September," his focus is on the lynching and the men involved. Though he pays tribute to Faulkner's delicate drawing of Miss Minnie, he clearly views her functionally as a plot motivator. I have previously stated that the disturbed character, however, is capable of upstaging the major players, and Miss Minnie is no exception to this precept.

"Dry September" opens with that free-floating indeterminacy that quintessentially characterizes anxiety neurosis: "the rumor, the story, whatever it was. Something about Miss Minnie Cooper and a Negro. Attacked, insulted, frightened" (CS, p. 168). As racial tensions begin to mount, Faulkner fosters the sense that Miss Minnie has a history of these reactions. One of the men queries, "Wasn't there something about a man on the kitchen roof, watching her undress about a year ago?"

When Faulkner finally brings Miss Minnie fully onstage, he clearly has taken what amounts to a regional cliché, and invested it with the energy of neurosis. Minnie Cooper is the archetypal Southern old maid—but in this case her fear of men has evolved into a specific fear of Negro men. Consequently, the situation is invested with added racial tension, exacerbated by frustrated sexuality and miscegenous paranoia.
Minnie is thirty-eight or thirty-nine, and lives at home with other "not the best in Jefferson" female relatives. Faulkner bases her adolescent popularity on a "slender, nervous body and a sort of hard vivacity" (CS, p. 174). As the result of malicious rivalries, Minnie is preempted in her role as belle of the ball. Her fall dawns on her very slowly, and finally she is reduced to merely watching the pageant of marriage and youth that surrounds her. She ruins herself socially (in Southern terminology this means she becomes "Poor Minnie," the same epithet used for Zilphia) by taking up with a widowed high-colored man. Deserted by him, she becomes, with her still bright face, a closet alcoholic. She adopts the mannerisms reserved for jilted Tennessee Williams heroines: she combats her loneliness with bright voile dresses and strolls downtown: "her idle and empty days, had a quality of furious unreality" (CS, p. 175). Miss Minnie's phobia, and we are narratively persuaded that it is a fantasy, that the black man attacked her, stems, it seems, from the trauma of being jilted. Her subsequent anxiety responses are generated by situations in which she is reminded of the sexual temptations embodied in her original response to the cashier. But there is also a complex dualism in her situation: there is the need for and suspicion of punishment wrapped up in her phobia. So that she responds not only to the promise-threat of sexuality represented by the black man, but also, she needs to reenact the circumstances that generate the town's initial disapproval and pity of her alliance with a high-colored man.
In Section IV, Miss Minnie's anxieties are sufficiently aggravated to produce a brief but genuinely hysterical fit. Represented in this fit is Miss Minnie's use of the non-discursive language of illness. Freud maintained that "hysterical symptoms are the expression of their [the patients'] most secret and repressed wishes." The manifestation of the symptoms involves the revelation of those [psycho-sexual] intimacies and the betrayal of those secrets. Freud insisted that these symptoms had "psychical significance, a meaning. The hysterical symptom does not carry this meaning with it, but the meaning is lent to it, soldered to it . . . the meaning can be a different one, according to the nature of the suppressed thoughts which are struggling for expression." Manifestation of neurotic hysteria allows her to convey the message that "I am sick"; and because the body complies with the victim's mental needs, the signs and gestures she exhibits indicate her conception of illness; i.e., since "the symptoms constitute the sexual activity of the patient," they reveal the essential nature of a neurosis.

Miss Minnie's presenting symptoms consist of fever, trembling, eyes, bright but glitteringly dark. She walks head up, "hands clenched at her sides"; her lips tingle; she tries to hold back the laughing, but is finally overcome and she is ultimately unable to suppress the "high sustained note" of hysterical laughter which recurs spasmodically as her friends try to soothe her. And what does her body language convey? In sheer physical terms, the fever is clearly linked to sexual excitement. The clenched hands seem metaphors, both for a need to repress urges (as do her efforts to quell her laughter) and a
conflicting need to take possession of her emotions or of a sex partner. The last is the thing she has obviously failed to do, and has led to her "Poor Minnie" status. And what of the laughter? It is in this touch that Faulkner stamps the story of Minnie as his and his alone. She has been a watcher of other's sexuality from the time she lost her social sovereignty. She became an object for pity—and scorn—in her last effort to make contact with a love object, the cashier.

But over time, and Faulkner takes pains to underscore this, Miss Minnie has lost her audience: "when she passed [or sojourns into town] . . . the sitting and lounging men did not even follow her with their eyes anymore" (CS, p. 175). Again, the dark heart of neurosis is sexual, and by translating her neurosis into promotive language (a component of neuralistic communication that will make listeners perform) she has recaptured the audience she lost in her adolescence. The hysterical behavior has such powerful affect that people want to respond. The drummers at the hotel gossip: "'That's the one: see? The one in pink in the middle.' 'Is that her?"' In the picture show as her laughter floods out, the trigger seems almost to be the miasma of sex around her: "darkness and the traffic of young girls and boys coming in two against two" (CS, p. 181). When the laughter starts, everyone turns to her and solicitous friends usher her out and minister to her devotedly. The anxiety neurosis has been fully embodied in Miss Minnie's experience.

I have maintained that there is scope and distinction in Faulkner's rendering of emotionally ill characters. The next neurotic subgrouping I would like to examine is the obsessive neurotic. Obsessions, as
defined by Cashdan, are "bothersome ideas that regularly interrupt one's train of thought." When these thoughts become so pervasive (repetitious) that they interrupt normal activity they are considered neurotic disorders. At this level the obsessive thought is usually linked to overwhelming anxiety. Usually obsessions are never acted on. When they go beyond urges and become "translated into action" they are compulsions. These acts are marked by an "intense, driven quality" and become pathological when they interfere with normal function. Cashdan further remarks that out-of-control compulsive behavior is "rigid, compelling and unavoidable."

The character who most uniquely represents Faulkner's use of obsessive-compulsive behavior is Labove. He appears in Frenchman's Bend and meets his _bête noire_ in one Eula Varner—inert, voluptuous, childlike. Labove is presented as primarily joyless, nearly an automaton, the last word in programmed behavior. He falls into football playing by sheer coincidence. He is a handy man to earn his keep and finally becomes Frenchman Bend's "professor." His own sanguine manner is humorously undercut by his precise ledger keeping. He outfits his family with touchdown spoils: a pair of cleated shoes for every game he wins for the university. His calm, rigid manner is incongruously yoked to a face that suggests "secret and ruthless ambition . . . fierce and unappeasable natural appetites . . . the hungry mouth" (II, pp. 105-10). His body seems "shrunken" as if a furnace were burning it away from the interior.

His tendency to compulsive/ritualized behavior shows up in the way he approaches his curriculum—steadfastly he does what he needs to
do to become a lawyer. When he takes over the chaotic school house he proceeds "with a kind of contemptuous detached physical pleasure in burning up excess energy." He studies his books, which he did not love so much as he believed that he must read, compass and absorb and wring dry with something of that same contemptuous intensity with which he chopped firewood, measuring the turned pages against the fleeting seconds of irrevocable time like the implacable inching of a leaf worm. . . . [in substance] he operated with grim sufficiency, not pride. (H, p. 111)

So far, Labove appears only as a very goal-task directed person. During his tenure as schoolmaster he believes he has simply travelled steadily in the direction he has set for himself. His organization of the classroom proceeds as methodically as his anticipated passing of the bar. Fenichel would see in Labove's excessive satisfaction in "teaching order and discipline" a displacement pattern in operation. The "character trait of orderliness," as displayed by obsessive compulsive neurotics is compensatory activities substituted to combat conflicts about defecation.34

But Labove's meticulousness aloeness is not sufficient cause to view him as pathological, even if it were enough to signify him as anally fixated. When he succeeds in passing the bar, however, and still fails to resign his post as schoolmaster, Labove reveals true signs of emotional disturbance--because something is "interfering" with progress in life. Faulkner describes Labove's obsession--why he cannot leave Frenchman's Bend and get on with life--in the following passages:

"And he could not do it [leave]. . . . He must return, drawn back into the radius and impact of an eleven-year-old girl who even while sitting . . . and eating a cold potato postulated that ungirdled quality of
the very goddess.

Then one day he discovered that he had been lying to himself for almost two years. . . . He knew now that it was not on the school steps but in his mind that she had constantly been for two years now, that it had not been rage at all but terror, and that the vision of that gate which he had held up to himself as a goal was not a goal but just a point to reach, as the man fleeing a holocaust runs not for a prize but to escape destruction. (H, pp. 115-17)

But Faulkner's sensitivity to the artistic development of the neurotic character is most impressive not in straight admissions, as seen above. Instead, it is in the stunning parallels and additional details of character and symptom that he is at pains to develop. For instance, because Labove is a self-conscious character, he gradually comes to realize that he is a slave to his obsession. He is haunted by associations and is unable to either avoid or exorcise this Eula of his mind. His landlady serves him a sweet potato (the only item Eula has ever demonstrated any interest in in the course of their acquaintance), and Labove vomits. He is enthralled, obsessed, and frightened. Faulkner plays with the reader in this episode by having the landlady remark, "'Why, Mr. Labove, you are sick!'" Eventually he becomes aware that the rage response Eula incites in him is not actually rage at all but terror, i.e., overwhelming anxiety: "I am afraid of what I might do, not because of her because there is nothing . . . that would hurt her. It's because of what it will do to me" (H, p. 120).

One of Labove's early efforts to displace his obsession conforms to classic compulsive neurotic behavior as Fenichel documents it: "Often the patient behaves as if he unconsciously sought castration,
but what he is actually searching for is something that will bring an end to the anxiety that prohibits his pleasure. As Labove's fear of what psychic damages Eula could accomplish grows, he contemplates self-castration. He finds an axe and in a projected fantasy of self-mutilation he hacks away at himself in an "orgasm of joy at the dangling nerves and tendons of the gangrened member" (H, p. 120). He "thirsts" after the axe-stroke which "will have paid even this price to be free of his obsession, only he knew that he could never be" (H, p. 118; emphasis mine). Now I don't believe that Faulkner went out and looked up symptoms of castration behavior in compulsive neurotics; but I do believe the overwhelming wealth of accurate, detailed parallels between clinical neurotics and Faulkner's artistic conception of neurosis are too great to be dismissed as fortune.

The psychodynamics of Labove's sexual frustration make possible even displaced fulfillment in the prospect of violent contact with Eula's brother, Jody. Labove assumes that Jody will attempt to defend Eula's honor after the failed "assault." And Labove suggests that he is willing to settle for this because even though "it would not be penetration . . . it would be the same flesh . . . which under impact at least [would yield]—a paroxysm, an orgasm of sorts, a katharsis anyway—something" (H, p. 122). The potential here for a bisexual reading is also confirmed in the psychological literature. Fenichel's theory of sexuality among compulsive neurotics states that bisexuality and ambivalence are necessary conditions for the neurosis so that more and more barriers seem to be removed from gratification in some form.
Fenichel also documents the compulsive neurotic's hyper-concern with polarized conflicts: cruelty and gentleness, disorder and order. Because his reactions reveal conflicting mixtures, the behavior of the neurotic may at times seem contradictory.\textsuperscript{37} For Labove this push-pull dialectic occurs in his expectations for physical contact with Eula:

He was mad. He knew it. There would be times now when he did not even want to make love to her but wanted to hurt her, see blood spring and run, watch that serene face warp to the indelible mark of terror and agony beneath his own; to leave some indelible mark of himself on it and then watch it even cease to be a face. Then he would exorcise that. He would drive it from him, whereupon their positions would reverse. It would now be himself importunate and prostrate before that face... He would be like a young girl... trapped not by the seducer's maturity and experience but by blind and ruthless forces inside herself which she now realised she had lived with for years without even knowing they were there. He would grovel in the dust before it panting... He was mad. He knew it. He knew that sooner or later something was going to happen. And he knew too that whatever it would be, he would be the vanquished."
(H, p. 119)

Fenichel further notes that sadistic impulses and tendencies toward cruelty are "constant findings in compulsive neuroses."\textsuperscript{38} So when Labove finally chooses to act on his obsession, transforming it into a compulsion, he blends all the incompatible conflicts of sadism and tender desire. Faulkner writes that as Eula faces Labove in the schoolroom she is "looking at the face of a potential homicide" (H, p. 120). He tries to soothe her with words: "'Don't be afraid!'"; but as he moves toward consummation his manner is ruthless and they "wrestle furiously." His chant becomes violent now: "'Fight it. Fight it. That's what it is: a man and a woman fighting each other.
The hating. To kill, only to do it in such a way that the other will have to know forever afterward he or she is dead" (H, p. 121). Ultimately, all Labove is certain of is that he wants someone to get hurt, and it doesn't even matter to him who the victim is.

A final clinical symptom which is singularly persistent in compulsive neurotic behavior is the sacrosanct-omnipotent power of words. According to Fenichel, words offer mastery over the rampant sexual urge and become shibboleths against danger, and often take the shape of a compulsive formula. Abstract thinking is akin to a bridge for the dramatically cleaved emotional life of the compulsive neurotic, and the neurotic's power to brood can help displace temporarily some sexual conflict.39 The first time Will Varner sees him, Labove is characterized by a "forensic face, the face of invincible conviction in the power of words as a principle worth dying for if necessary" (H, p. 105). But even more amazing is Faulkner's decision to let Labove chant in the throes of his passionate assault on Eula: "He held her loosely, still smiling, whispering his jumble of fragmentary Greek and Latin verse and American-Mississippi obscenity" (H, p. 121). Labove's behavior here exemplifies that jumble of uncontrolled sexuality yoked to the magical power of words.

I have previously suggested the desperation with which the emotionally ill seek communication; and Labove is no exception to this. Generally reclusive and uncommunicative, Labove is willing to be shot dead by Eula's brother as "proof. . . . Proof in the eyes and beliefs of living men that that happened which did not. Which will be better
than nothing, even though I am not here to know men believe it" (H, p. 123). Clearly, Labove craves the sign that will accord recognition and communicate the power of his obsession to the world. The sign is his only means to publish that obsession since the reclusive mental life the compulsive neurotic establishes makes normal rhetorical proofs impossible. When Labove is denied that "last vindication" of "I am because I have communicated my desire to the world," Labove is liberated from his neurosis and can leave Eula and Frenchman's Bend behind.

I would also like to stress that for twenty-four pages Labove is stage-center. His neurosis is far more compelling literarily than Eula's omnisexuality. And Faulkner is able to use the energy of psychopathology to make Labove cast a very real, very distorted shadow. In rechanneling the reader's attention for this narrative segment, Labove reinvests Eula with new stature simply by illuminating her in the glare of his neurosis.

The final aspect of neuroses that I will explore is anxiety hysteria. Historically, hysteria has always been a highly visible disease. Since ancient Greece, many of the disorder's symptoms have been medical commonplaces; Faulkner could have been appropriating such physical phenomena without realizing that the cumulative effect is an imaginative portrait of the hysteric. Most likely, his awareness of the disease was possible through his interest in the war where hysteria, especially in its convulsions, was commonplace. In fact, World War I gave impetus to the study of hysteria and related states of anxiety. Faulkner's fascination with the war and his aggrandizement of war
stories in circulation make this dimension of his personal life a probable point of contact with hysteria. These interests inevitably carried over into fictional creations.

I will attempt to make a synopsis of hysterical disorder by making reference to Faulkner's major hysterics and their connections among one another. I hope by examining Quentin in connection with Rosa Coldfield and Nancy, the Negro laundress of "That Evening Sun," I will not only demonstrate the importance of hysteria as a rhetorical principle, but I should be able to prove that Faulkner conceived of and rendered Quentin, in his key fictional appearance, as a consistent character wracked by neurosis.

Current theories define hysteria as a mental disorder which results from a "failure of adaptation as a result of conflict between individual needs and social opportunities." For instance, much of Miss Rosa's emotional turmoil stems from the denied opportunity to revenge herself on the man who insulted her. Revenge is necessary to exorcise the conflict, but Swope's death stymies her hopes. His death is an irreversible reality. For forty-three years she has endured a mental echo chamber of her own making in which "Why? Why? and Why?" resounds (AA, p. 167). The mental conflict of hysteria often results in physical symptoms which indicate a connection to the ongoing psychological conflict (vomiting, stammer, bent-back, paralysis, tics). Symptoms may be absent (amnesia, somnambulism), which points to conflict entirely on the psychic level.
There has been some agreement among researchers on the more familiar and defining traits of hysteria. The pioneer studies beginning in the 1880s by Josef Breuer, Sigmund Freud, and Pierre Janet began to receive professional public attention by April, 1893 when Freud's "Preliminary Communication" was discussed at the Society for Psychical Research and printed in their Proceedings. Janet, in 1894, used this same paper to conclude his *L'état mental des hysteriques*. This supportive and collaborative exchange continued for awhile and in *Studies on Hysteria* Janet is acknowledged as one "to whom the theory of hysteria owes so very much and with whom we are in agreement in most respects." The significant theoretical juncture for these psychologists rested in Janet's belief that hysterical dispositions derived from a "maladie par faiblesses," congenital mental weakness. Freud and Breuer maintained that hysteria was possible at any intellectual level. This corrective distinction insisted on by Breuer and Freud makes the historical hysterical reading of Quentin or Miss Rosa possible, since both exhibit marked intellectual gifts which would disqualify them based on Janet's thesis.

The components of the hysterical position, though varying in ranked significance, are basically the same for the Janet and the Breuer-Freud studies. There is a consistent consideration of the role of suggestion and hypnoid states (sommambulism and convulsive attacks). Janet comments on the hysteric's capacity for suggestion. He notes that the hysteric "falls into ideas." Ideas assume importance (often becoming fixated) and become indistinguishable from sense perceptions. Miss Rosa, to this way of thinking, is immersed in the idea of Sutpen's proposal. Consequently, for hysteric, it is quite easy to "acquire
illnesses—limps, or virtually anything conceivable, for actual diseases or accidents are unnecessary; all that is needed is for the idea to occur, that is, to be suggested to the hysteric. Any idea can assume central importance: a trip to the tropics, whiplash, or a dance; but while the normal individual may be momentarily transported to the locale, feel a twinge, or tap his foot, the hysteric is immersed in the idea. Somnambulism, a dream-like state in which he may be aware of nothing else, usually results. The same "dreams" invoke the same very clear language or gestures, and can occur time after time. These dissociated states are usually followed by a temporary amnesia and/or depression. The somnambulistic state may be triggered again by a term associated with the idea or it may require repetition of the whole idea; but, inevitably, the idea will eventually fill the hysteric's entire mind. Miss Rosa's reverie has been a forty-three year viewing and reviewing of her outrage. It is recounted for Quentin and the trip to Sutpen's Hundred takes on all the qualities of nightmare as Miss Rosa assumes the demeanor of a somnambulist: "she came and passed him how she stumbled a little and caught herself and looked full at him as if she had never seen him before—the eyes wide and unseeing like a sleep-walker's" (AA, p. 370). At the mansion she also strikes Clytie with "a full-armed blow like a man would have" and there appears to be no conscious intent in the act. Afterward, Quentin is amazed by her oblivion, for she forgets to thank him and even his name" (AA, p. 369). All somnambulistic reveries constitute types of hysterical fits.

Freud and Breuer saw suggestibility as a particular complication of the hysterical disposition. But though they deemphasized its
diagnostic significance, they did explain the hysteric's unique "facilitation of attention" to produce pathological phenomena where-in abnormally vivid ideas verge constantly on the brink of controlling all aspects of the hysteric's personality. 49

These fits in which the hysteric is in the dominion of an idea are just one aspect of the condition. A variant fit is the convulsive attack of the hysteric which manifests itself with a range of intensity: moaning, spasms, increased heart rate, violence, or a mere bewildered expression. 50 The hysteric has no control over these attacks and they are triggered in much the same way as fits of somnambulism are—an idea or emotion is aroused and seeks discharge. 51 Quentin attributes such symptoms to Miss Rosa in his imaginative enactment of the mansion-burning. She is in a fury, "clawing and scratching and biting," requiring two men to hold her down (AA, p. 375); she is "struggling and fighting like a doll in a nightmare, making no sound, foaming a little at the mouth" (AA, p. 376). These fits bear special significance in Faulkner since in the early research of hysteria they were seen to be "nothing but the exact repetition of disturbances by which vivid and painful moral impressions are manifested." 52 This view has since been diluted to embrace any emotional disturbance, but many readings of Faulkner's Quentin and other hysterical characters consider guilt, expiation, and shame concerning Southern "sins" responsible for the characters' aberrant behavior.

A predisposition for hysteria is established during childhood. Although there is no single, necessary environment which produces an hysterical personality, some conditions are more prevalent than others.
For instance, psychic health is dependent on a childhood that prepares a child to deal with stress and make satisfactory adjustments in a progressively independent fashion. For instance, forcing a child into independence too early often results in alienation from parents/siblings and interrupts the healthy emotional mutuality of family life.\textsuperscript{53} Obviously a family's hereditary history is a contributing factor. The tendency to nervous instability in a family will influence the patient's own development.\textsuperscript{54} Certain neurotic traits persist during childhood and adolescence in hysteria, but since fictional views of characters' psychic histories are limited, only one trait is particularly relevant: excessive day-dreaming. Miss Rosa's childhood serves as a casebook illustration of the latter type of development. She characterizes herself as being born "twenty-two years too late" (\textit{AA}, p. 22). Mr. Compson elaborates by revealing that her mother died giving her birth and that she "was never permitted to forget it" (\textit{AA}, p. 60). Consequently, she became a breathing "indictment" to "the father whom she hated without knowing it." By age ten she was in charge of housekeeping and she was soon given the adult mission of "saving" her niece and nephew, both of whom are older than Rosa herself. Her premature plunge into responsibility and independence is marked by day-dreaming. This is most clearly illustrated in the vicarious love she develops for Judith's Charles Bon, whom she knows only through "spying" and listening at closed doors. By such means she gathers the seeds to feed what she calls her "maiden revery" of a "child's vacant fairy-tale" (\textit{AA}, p. 146). The foundation of Rosa's hysteria is strengthened by her own father's instability. Unable to cope with the waste of the Civil War,
he nails himself in the attic (AA, p. 82-83).

Manifestations of hysteria are generally triggered by a traumatic change that contributes to latent mental conflicts or creates new ones. At such emotionally charged times, all the factors in the background are aroused. A series of traumatic events punctuates Rosa's life. She endures the death of her sister and father as well as the outrage of Sutpen's proposal. In addition she experiences acute turmoil when Henry Sutpen sho:-3s Bon. This announces the onset of her severe withdrawal into somnambulism. Her language and self-concept are entirely couched in dreamy, hypnotic language. The language becomes the metaphor for her emotional condition. She refers to herself as "self-mesmered . . . clinging" to the dream: "I found only that dream state in which you run without moving from a terror you cannot believe, toward a safety in which you have no faith, held so not by the shifting and foundationless quicksand of nightmare but by a face" (AA, p. 142). Conflict forces partial repression of fears in hysteria and some release is found in symptoms which may symbolically or associatively serve to communicate the root of the disturbance: the classic bent-back is a commonplace of soldiers suffering from fears that they will lack courage, that is, prove spineless.55

These bodily afflictions are called conversions.56 Rosa's exhibitions of physical metaphors are for the most part minor. Quentin notes that she holds her legs "straight and rigid as if she had iron shinbones and ankles" (AA, p. 7). This serves to convey the "impotence and static rage" of her "indomitable frustration." Mayoux, without mentioning hysteria, maintains that such conversions, "body language,"
operate to provide insight into characters in lieu of a "systematic classification of physical appearances" in Faulkner's fiction. So, according to Mayoux, "Rosa Coldfield is only what her body makes her. . . . Her body denotes lack, failure, defeat and even madness, but it also indicates the power of the will to live."\textsuperscript{57}

Before these conversions, the inaudible gesture for verbal communication, a whole range of communicative reversals may prevail: a preference for onomatopoeia and a frequent use of synaesthesia. The hysteric's low threshold of suggestibility leads him to appropriate sounds from the immediate "matrix of perception."\textsuperscript{58} Synaesthesia suits the hysterical personality, which commonly fails to discriminate between sense perceptions. Miss Rosa lavishly records the symptoms of this phenomenon in her lengthy soliloquy: "Do you mark how the wistaria, sun-impacted . . . distills and penetrates . . . by secret and attritive progress from mote to mote of obscurity's myriad components? That is the substance of remembering—sense, sight, smell: the muscles with which we see and hear and feel . . . that same figment-stuff warped out of all experiences" (\textit{AA}, p. 143).

Since \textit{Absalom, Absalom!} followed \textit{The Sound and the Fury}, there is great irony in Shreve's remark to Quentin that Southern folk "all out-live [themselves] by years and years" (\textit{AA}, p. 377). And Quentin's response rings no less true, for he is "older at twenty than a lot of people who have died." In Faulkner's self-created fictional cosmos, Quentin's fictional biography is ridden with problems. At his death in \textit{The Sound and the Fury} he was no more than 21. But in "That Evening Sun," written even before \textit{The Sound and the Fury}, Quentin narrates a
childhood experience from the perspective of his twenty-fourth year. And finally he is raised from this limbo for *Absalom, Absalom!*, ostensibly set just prior to the fatal freshman year at Harvard. In light of these facts, Cleanth Brooks' admonition to "exercise caution in using the Quentin of the later novel to throw light upon the Quentin of the earlier"\(^59\) seems prudent. But a clinical reading of his family history and childhood experiences supports an integrated view of Quentin; his fictional appearances present a progression along the continuum of hysteria.

The warmth and happiness that permeate the childhood memories of the Compson children seem to have grown in the face of a fairly unstable household. Out of Quentin's disordered consciousness of that June 2, 1910, morning emerges an unattractive picture of the parents. Caddy suggests that Mr. Compson is killing himself with drink; Mrs. Compson appears as a self-martyred, abusive complainer with an inferiority complex. She plays favorites with Quentin's younger brother, Jason, her "joy and salvation," the only one with "any practical sense" (SE, p. 116). Even if the picture is distorted, it is the hysterical's perception of the situation that is crucial. "If I'd just had a mother so I could say Mother Mother" (SE, p. 213) becomes a refrain in Quentin's thoughts. His affections are transferred to his sister Caddy and he longs to fix her in the purity of youth. Caddy's inevitable emotional and physical maturation will constitute a future trauma for Quentin.

Not only does this sibling dependence prime Quentin for hysteria, but his yearning for a "Mother, Mother" invokes the Oedipal roots of
hysteria. Quentin, although transferring his affection to his sister (also an unfit object for sexual desire), craves the mother; the taboo of incest (mother or sister) creates conflict. Essential to the hysterical character is the inability to cope with stress; in his longings and frustrations Quentin is inadequate and so his suicide becomes a quintessential hysterical statement of failure. Faulkner paves the way to this view of Quentin as a soul with tender emotional sensibilities in an authorial intrusion; he types Quentin as "the Southerner, the morose and delicate offspring of rain and steamy heat" (AA, p. 346). According to Abse, the hysterics's solution is to become impotent (avoidance) or seek outlet in homosexuality (conversion). Several critics have suggested that Quentin suffers from impotence and in The Sound and the Fury, Quentin recalls that Shreve is nicknamed "his husband." He is also disturbed by his own virgin state: "Why couldn't it have been me and not her who is unvirgin" (SF, p. 96). His latent longings emerge in his rehearsals of the confusion of incest that will damn and redeem Caddy's pregnancy. A crucial contrast in his relation with Caddy is her courage and strength—"always a king or a giant or a general" in pretend games (SF, p. 215)—as opposed to his pale efforts at heroics. Even his suicide pact with her is abortive. Implicit in this is a sense of role reversal—Caddy seems more the lusty son and Quentin the lady-like Southern virgin. Faulkner plants an hysterical suggestion for this in Miss Rosa's monologue when she tells Quentin of her "barren youth which (for that short time), . . . I lived not as a woman, a girl, but rather as the man which I perhaps should have been" (AA, p. 144).
Faulkner presents two bona-fide exposures to hysterical personalities, thus fictionally exploring the important role suggestibility can play in hysteria. The first is Nancy, a Negro laundress and whore, whom Quentin encounters when he is nine. Nancy parades many of the symptoms of classic hysteria. She has tried to hang herself with her dress in the jail cell, although local prejudice is convinced that she was on drugs since "no nigger would try to commit suicide unless he was full of cocaine" (CS, p. 291). No evidence for addiction is provided, but numerous symptoms of hysteria are. When one of her clients kicks her in the teeth, all she can do is spit blood and laugh (CS, p. 291). Quentin's important involvement with Nancy's condition occurs when out of fear of her husband she bribes the Compson children into going to her place. The idea she is fixated on is that Jesus, the husband, is stalking her, waiting to kill her. Her anxiety sends her into a somnambulistic state which Quentin recounts: "She talked like her eyes looked, like her eyes watching us and her voice talking to us did not belong to her. Like she was living somewhere else, waiting somewhere else" (CS, p. 302). Her conversion symptoms consist of a moaning like "not singing and not unsinging," a wringing of her wrists, uncontrol- lable tears, and an inability to swallow food.

Even though there is no evidence that Quentin was traumatized by the experience, it seems significant that he feels compelled to tell the story fifteen years after the fact. And an event in The Sound and the Fury which suggests some additional familiarity with hysteria also seems to be cast in the same mold as Nancy's hysteria. In his prelude to suicide, Quentin recalls some Negroes who are "just voices that
laugh when you see nothing to laugh at, tears when no reason for tears. They will bet on the odd or even number of mourners at a funeral. A brothel full of them in Memphis went into a religious trance ran naked into the street" (SF, p. 212, stress mine). Quentin characterizes Negroes as hysterics, as the underlined terms suggest; his childhood experience and Nancy may have provided the impetus for this mature view.

The next key encounter with hysteria occurs in Absalom, Absalom! when Quentin is called to attend the telling of Miss Rosa's story. In the psychology of hysteria, old-maids receive a special note as individuals prone to hysterical reactions. Clinically, the old-maid type often has "an infantile stunting of body growth" and an exaggerated prudishness that can lead to warped, bitter, or revengeful behavior that can culminate in collapse. Quentin notes several times the doll-like aspect of Rosa as well as her resemblance to a "crucified child." Most of the events in Absalom are catalyzed by her dogged refusal to reconcile herself to letting Sutpen "lie dead in peace" (AA, p. 362). And the proposition that generates Rosa's forty-three years of sleeping hatred does not seem to warrant the magnitude of her outrage. Faulkner even allows Rosa to address herself to "old-maidishness" when she tells Quentin that she knows a "thousand specious reasons good enough for women to" marry men: One of course is the "fear of dying manless which . . . old maids always have" (AA, p. 159).

Exposure to hysteria alone is not enough to induce a full-scale attack of hysteria, though. Quentin's encounters with hysteria are supplemented with a series of personal traumas in his life which separately account for the hysterical symptoms he manifests with increasing
force. The crisis is the discovery of the Dalton Ames affair in the summer of 1909. The impact is felt, but only in conjunction with other emotional crises does it achieve full pitch. During the second trauma, the September audience with Miss Rosa, some mild symptoms of hysteria appear. The most obvious are the somnambulistic reveries in which Quentin completely slips into the situation he is listening to or telling about. As Mr. Compson tells his portion of Sutpen's history, it frequently seems to Quentin "that he could actually see them" (AA, p. 132). In conversation with Rosa, Quentin is frequently characterized as hearing without listening. Quentin's own evaluation of the situation is telling, especially in the choice of diction which enhances the trancelike quality of the monologue:

It (the talking, the telling) seemed (to him, to Quentin) to partake of that logic- and reason-flouting quality of a dream which the sleeper knows must have occurred, stillborn and complete, in a second, yet the very quality upon which it must depend to move the dreamer (verisimilitude) to credulity—horror or pleasure or amazement—depends as completely upon a formal recognition of and acceptance of elapsed and yet-elapsing time as music or a printed tale. (AA, p. 22)

By the third trauma, the news of Rosa’s death and the telling of the tale to Shreve, Quentin appears well in the throes of hysterical delirium. The date of the letter (January 10) reveals much in that it corresponds to a personal trauma in Faulkner's own life. Blotner records that Estelle’s labor pains for the premature Alabama began on that January night. After this point in the novel, Quentin's dream-fantasies become so alive that it is but a small matter for him to become a walking participant in the "illusions that he begot" (AA, p. 348).
The somnambulism is continued (or preceded) and intensified in *The Sound and the Fury*. Quentin has weathered the fourth and final trauma—news of Caddy's illegitimate pregnancy and marriage. Quentin's elliptical thoughts point to the causes of his emotional turmoil, but his movements on the day of his suicide, a day in which he has missed his psychology class, have all the heightened calm of the sleep-walker. He is mesmerized by his own shadow; his watch, which seems to be "running through another month or another summer somewhere" (SF, p. 149), pulls at his attention. His delirium seems to be a composite of Nancy and Rosa's hysterical responses:

> I began to laugh again. I could feel it in my throat and I looked off into the trees where the afternoon slanted. . . . But still I could not stop it and then I knew that if I tried too hard to stop it I'd be crying and I thought about how I'd thought about not being a virgin, . . . "Quentin? Is he sick". . . and I quit trying to stop it. (SF, p. 183)

He suffers the memory lapses and fits of violence just as Rosa did. At one point he cannot remember why he has hit a friend; this resembles Rosa's striking of Clytie. Spoade characterizes Quentin's state as a drunken stupor, stating that, "I noticed you kept on looking at him, but you didn't seem to be paying any attention to what anybody was saying" (SF, p. 206).

Quentin's last moments constitute a whole series of ritualized hygiene acts, all of which he has forgotten and now remembers to perform. But in the haze of habit he completes each task. The behavior choices made in this somnambulistic state reflect the hysteric's use of metaphoric body language. Humphrey refers to these telling instances of
body language in his analysis of recurring motifs in Quentin's stream of consciousness. He points to his obsessive concern with appearance prior to the suicide: he washes his hands; he cleans his tie; he brushes his teeth and hat. Humphrey views this as Faulkner's effort to order symbolically Quentin's behavior around "the final and feeble act of cleaning Compson disgrace and dishonor; a purgative attempt on Quentin's part to erase the stain Candace has put on his psyche." The cleaning is a compulsive metaphoric conversion of repressed desires. And though Humphrey considers this a thematic atonement of a failed and tragic visionary, it is also clearly within the behavior patterns of hysteria.

Quentin also gives evidence of hysterical convulsions following two of the four traumatic events. The first convulsion occurs when he talks with Caddy about Dalton Ames. It is recalled during his somnambulistic reverie prior to his suicide: "her blood pounded against my hand I was leaning on my other arm it began to jerk and jump and I had to pant to get any air at all out of that thick grey honeysuckle" (SF, p. 188). The second convulsion comes in the wake of the letter about Rosa's death which triggers the telling of the Henry-Judith-Bon story to Shreve, replete with incest and miscegenation; the story reveals a crucial coalescence of Quentin's feelings about Caddy's nonvirgin state, and also precipitates his sentiments about incest. These will be his consuming desires come April, at which time he will know definitely of her illegitimate pregnancy. But in January, 1910, Quentin is simply racked by a variety of influences, cultural and personal, all embodied in the story of Thomas Sutpen. As Quentin lies in his icy room, even
though he is warm
he merely shook faintly and steadily, now he began
to jerk all over, violently and uncontrollably until
he could even hear the bed, until even Shreve felt it
and turned raising himself (by the sound) onto his
elbow to look at Quentin, though Quentin himself felt
perfectly all right. He felt fine even, lying there
and waiting in peaceful curiosity for the next violent
unharbingered jerk to come. "Jesus, are you that cold?"
Shreve said . . .
"No," Quentin said. "I'm not cold. I'm all right.
I feel fine.
"Then what are you doing that for?"
"I don't know. I can't help it. I feel fine.
(AA, pp. 361-2)

Both the physical symptoms and Quentin's reaction seem to indicate
clearly the hysterical convulsion triggered by a violent emotional ex-
perience.

In the final hours of Quentin's life he exhibits much of the per-
ceptive confusion common to hysterics. In the context of hysteria, his
chaotic apprehension of his environment approaches synaesthesia. Over
and over again the honeysuckle gets "all mixed up." The honeysuckle is
both aromatic and visual: "the honeysuckle it had got into my breathing
it was on her face and throat like paint" (SF, p. 188). As Quen-
tin's grip on reality fails, his ability to sift and order his percept-
ual matrix all but collapses: "I could feel water beyond the twilight,
smell . . . I could smell the curves of the river beyond the dusk"
(SF, p. 210-11). In addition, Quentin exhibits mental turmoil in his
occasional lapses into the pathetic fallacy. The honeysuckle exudes
the saddest aroma of all; he also responds to the flower's botanical
drizzle, which reinforces the flower's sympathetic sadness. In the
return from Sutpen's Hundred, Faulkner has "the fierce stars" seem to
pass judgment on the human tragedy Quentin has been participating in.

Evidence that Faulkner intended his readers to view the Quentin of
The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom! as the same can be found
not only in the consistent portrayal of Quentin as an hysterical but in
a significant planting of two richly associative trigger words, "wista-
ria" and "blackguard." For Quentin, the news of Rosa's death evokes a
series of related memories, especially about the omnipresence of the
wistaria. In September, prior to Quentin's receipt of his father's
letter, Miss Rosa's frenzied ravings have settled on "the vintage year
of wistaria" (AA, p. 144), her fourteenth year. Quentin's talk with
her is initiated by a reference to the wistaria that surrounds her
house and which was "blooming for the second time that dead September
afternoon." For Rosa, wistaria is part of the "miasmaldistant" of her
arrested youth. The wistaria is linked with "that inverted canker-
growth of solitude" (AA, p. 145) which characterized her bizarre and
pitiful childhood. These associations emerge from the trance-like
soliliby, in which, for the first time apparently, she tells of the
events leading to her death by outrage in that April after the war.
Significantly, April will operate as the month in which Quentin learns
of Caddy's pregnancy, and in which, for all intents and purposes, he
too dies of outrage, loss, shame. Quentin assimilates, because of his
suggestibility, her attitudes toward the wistaria, whose name alone
casts an evocative aura of dreamy hysteria. Her specific references
to the wistaria as "sun-impacted on this wall here" (AA, p. 144) find
an antecedent in the narrative setting where the "coffin-smelling
gloom sweet" of the twice-bloomed wistaria grows on the wall in "the
savage quiet September sun impacted distilled and hyperdistilled" (AA, p. 8). The wisteria smells become part of Quentin's memory of "female old flesh long embattled virginity" and he echoes the introductory language, as well as Miss Rosa's own extended references to herself as "hollow women . . . dead flesh" with a "virgin's itching discontent" (AA, p. 145). As Quentin recalls the trip to the mansion, his description of Miss Rosa reflects these influences, for he notes "smelling the heat-distilled old woman-flesh, the heat-distilled camphor in the old foldcreases of the shawl" (AA, p. 176).

All these associations have played on Quentin's consciousness in The Sound and the Fury. The meaning of the wisteria is more confused and complex at this stage in his hysteria. He fastens on to the fragrance of honeysuckle which has definite and admitted links to the wisteria. Together they "got all mixed up in [spring, twilight, sexuality] the whole thing came to symbolize night and unrest" (SF, p. 211). Quentin takes the malodorous associations of rank woman-flesh to the limits. Soon the honeysuckle, and integrally the wisteria, come to suggest the "delicate equilibrium of periodical filth" (SF, p. 159). The Sound and the Fury reaches the confused sensual-sexual crescendo keynoted in Absalom.

The other key phrase is "the blackguard." In Quentin's mental ellipses "blackguard" becomes a resounding epithet for Caddy's lover, lovers, and finally Caddy herself. Its connotation is concretized retrospectively through Rosa's application of it to Sutpen. Quentin appropriates it, assumes her connotations for the word, and then exhausts it during the June reverie. When Rosa applied it to Sutpen the
word embraced, superseded, and inspired a host of other epithets for atrocity: fiend, devil, brute. Crucially, Quentin describes Caddy's blackguard as a liar, scoundrel, and cheat—ultimately expelled from school. All these offenses can be aptly associated with Sutpen with only the slightest of modifications. And Rosa has instilled all of them in Quentin in her demonized version of Sutpen. In effect, Faulkner seems to have structured Absalom in such a way that it becomes a seedbed for much of Quentin's language and intense emotion in The Sound and the Fury.

Neurotic Rhetoric and Communication

A standard critical ploy is to account for Faulkner's style by saying, as Aiken does, that it is "frequently downright bad" writing that works. Aiken defends the "willful bad writing" as part of an elaborate, studied "process of immersion, of hypnotizing the reader." Kazin more exuberantly justifies the maddening style as a necessity for sustaining characters who live "copiously and brilliantly... by the sullen screaming intensity which Faulkner breathes into them." Backman makes a sweeping claim for Faulkner's work in his assertion that the work is "fraught with the leashed intensity," though he excludes Requiem for a Nun for carrying that intensity too far: "This work is curiously strained, manifesting an uneasy melodramatic quality that borders on hysteria. It seems best to leave this work out of the discussion on sickness in Faulkner's work." But by the theme of sickness which informs his essay, Requiem would deserve inclusion. These sample critical assertions underscore a push-pull dilemma in the
criticism. There is, on one hand, the desire to package the whole
canon as turbulent, frenetic, and ornate; on the other hand, there is
a desire to gloss over the truly frantic, measured, and hysterical
quality in certain pieces rather than established variations.

Faulkner provides both external and internal evidence by which to
distinguish his hysterics. The extensive, though specific, use of
phrases like "bemused" or "amazed" is illustrative of a conscious de-
sign on the author's part. Such phrases are used in connection with
Quentin, Rosa, Temple, and Nancy. Externally, Faulkner provides most
of these characters with some standard symptoms—amnesia, somnambu-
listic behavior, nervous repetitions. Quentin frequently wears a look
of "sullen bemusement" and his voice is generally tense, suffused,
flat, restrained and steady. Rosa is marked by a grim, quiet voice
with a musing tone. Phrases are repeated, recast, and chiseled with
curious intrusions punctuating an incessant flood of rhetoric about
demons, honeysuckle, twilight, and wistaria. Echoes of echoes
redouble.

But many of Faulkner's characters repeat themselves. For example,
when the opening of Rosa's italicized diatribe is compared with Var-
daman's account of Cash's efforts to get the mules across river (AILD, p.
144), both exhibit parallelism, repetition, frenzy, and desperation.
Rosa's may be distinguished by a baroque and elevated diction, but
structural similarities exist. There is even a quality of obsession in
how certain parts of Cash's efforts dominate Varadama's story. But Var-
daman is not hysterical, nor is most of Faulkner's unpunctuated, cha-
fing prose. The mark of the agonized rhetoric belonging to the hysterics
seems to be compulsive necessity. The hysterics are united by an insatiable need to tell. The charge Quentin levels at Miss Rosa regarding her decision to end her forty-three year silence has wide-ranging relevance and applicability: "Only she don't mean that [perhaps Quentin will become a literary gentleman], he thought. It's because she wants it told." (AA, p. 10). They tell their tales, but they find no release or relief in the telling. They bear a resemblance to Faulkner himself who, even after his talent had burned itself out, was driven to tell the stories again and again. Essentially his hysterics suffer from the fever which had cured the disease, waking from the fever without even knowing that it had been the fever itself which they had fought against and not the sickness, looking with stubborn recalcitrance backward beyond the fever and into the disease with actual regret, weak from the fever yet free of the disease and not even aware that the freedom was that of impotence. (AA, p. 12)

What becomes unique in this aspect of the analysis of neurosis, then, is the conscious "choice of neurosis." David Shapiro explains the notion of neurotic functioning as a correlative of style: "One cannot study neurotic styles of functioning without being impressed by the fact that what the neurotic person does and the special way in which he does it, his conscious attitudes and the way he sees things, are essential functional parts of the neurosis . . . [and in fact] continue the neurotic experience and are indispensable to it." The emphasis for Shapiro, and here in this study, is on the conscious choice of subtle and desperate manifestations of emotional disability as they affect style, and the consequent possibilities for electrifying characters with morbidity. Shapiro explains psychologically what Faulkner
achieves fictionally: "the neurotic's attitudes and interests will be of a sort that guarantees that the next neurotic attitude . . . will appear as the only plausible next thing to do."69

Such practical psychology reveals itself frequently in Faulkner's own comments about his motives as an author. His famous statement about his purpose for creating the chronicle of Yoknapatawpha serves as an ideal starting point to discuss the stylistic strategy of neurotic rhetoric:

All that I really desired was a touchstone simply; a simple word or gesture, but having been these 2 years previously under the curse of words, having known twice before the agony of ink, nothing served but that I try by main strength to recreate between the covers of a book the world as I was already preparing to lose and regret, feeling, with the morbidity of the young, that I was not only on the verge of decrepitude, but that growing old was to be an experience peculiar to myself alone out of all the teeming world, and desiring, if not the capture of that world and the feeling of it as you'd preserve a kernal or a leaf to indicate the lost forest, at least to keep the evocative skeleton of the desicated [sic] leaf.70

The phrases that I have underscored set the tone for the aspect of neurotic rhetoric that I would now like to explore. What he describes in this passage perversely seems to celebrate both the eternal artistic anxiety over impending and inevitable loss, and also the neurotic disorder of the creative will. In other words, the psychopathology implicit in neurosis demands repetition. And no author more than Faulkner felt so compelled to tell and retell the story, hoping all the while to achieve and preserve some fragment of a verité revealed in a world that has as its primary condition change and loss. By creating
characters afflicted with neurosis, Faulkner developed a rhetoric suited to the condition because he wanted to achieve personal and evocative recreations of a universal condition.

Joseph Rauling has defined neurosis as "a pathology of the imagination."71 Thus, its domain became the mind; Faulkner's own sense of the imaginative reality of his proprietorship of a mental landscape testifies to the rightness of this cartology. Furthermore, Faulkner believed that "The story, the truth he was telling, invents its own style, its own method."72 As a consequence, a story attempting to bring to life the emotional world of a neurotic demands that Faulkner "invent" a rhetoric that will enable him "tell that truth in a way that will seem as true, as moving, as beautiful, as passionate, as terrible to anyone else as it seemed to him. . . . he is simply trying to tell a truth . . . which troubled him so much he had to tell it in some way that it will seem troubling or true enough . . . to whoever reads it."73 So for the neurotic characters he must choose rhetorical structures that communicate the truths of the condition; because even in its aberrations, Faulkner sought always the "simple language of humanity."

There are some specific advantages to the inclusion of neurotic rhetoric in the sweep of his vision. First, all neuroses represent a disturbance or distortion in communication. This is a primary theme in Faulkner's fiction—from Quentin's recognition that Rosa just "wants it told" somehow to Shreve's simple "tell me about the South." Most of his characters reiterate their author's own sense of trying to tell and then failing, however gloriously.
Another dimension of neurosis makes it an especially useful rhetorical approach for an author experimenting with the limits of language. Neurosis makes use of two levels of communication: language, shared social symbols, and noises and body signs that are not symbols. Faulkner takes advantage of this duality to realize hysterical characters by using descriptive, shared language to talk about hysteries and their environment. And he also allows his neurotics to employ a special private language that is governed by personal, self-generating rules. The non-communal symbol in neurosis allows a victim to communicate about a significant subject which he ordinarily would be unable to approach—unable either as a matter of linguistic inability or as a matter of emotional incapacitation.

This means that the urge to communicate excitation, confusion, upset—even if only provoked by the memory of a traumatic experience—is a normal and appropriate reaction. As Breuer and Freud see it, "Telling things is a relief, it discharges tension even . . . when no absolution follows. [But] If the excitation is denied this outlet it is sometimes converted into a somatic phenomenon." Faulkner takes characters stricken with what Freud designated as the "hysterical phenomenon of retention" and finds a new thematic function for the role of memory: the mentally ill character's special bondage to memory reifies the whole problem of access. The disturbed character's relationship to memory will force him to invent new symbols to relieve his need to express his personal, social, even ethical confusions. The neurotic's special need to invent messages that are constitutionally unutterable challenges the author's ability to create both stage and
experimental scripts replete with private, and necessarily cryptic stage directions.

The fictional effect of this special psychological problem is that neurotic language, including its body language, results primarily in ideas translated into pictures. This makes for a series of tableaus that provides the imagistic hallmarks of Faulkner's style. And finally, the noises of the emotionally ill demand that the principal function of language be reexamined. According to Suzanne Langer, words are "not symbols for thought, but symptoms of the inner life, like tears and laughter, crooning and profanity."\(^7\)

Despite repeated paeans to the triumph of the human spirit, Faulkner never forgot that humanity in its heterogenity included some very base elements. Faulkner saw the necessity of showing man in his base attitudes, his base conditions, and still show that he goes on, he continues, he has outlived the dinosaur, he will outlive the atom bomb, and I'm convinced in time he will even outlive the wheel. He still has partaken of immortality, that the aberrations are part of his history, are part of himself, maybe.\(^7\) This holistic world view demands that even neurosis figure into the rhetorical vision.

**Neurosis as Regional Metaphor**

The final dimension of neurosis to be considered is neurosis conceived of as a regional metaphor. The idea I will be developing will be based primarily on Faulkner's own remarks about the South as an afflicted region—an affliction that bears striking similarities to neurosis.
Sontag chides that "The concept of disease is never innocent." My selection of neurosis as a metaphor for Southern disease as Faulkner diagnosed it is a deliberate one. Innocence finally has nothing to do with it. The South's racial prejudice reflects all the essential features of neurosis: it is emotionally centered, trauma-inducing, self-repeating and engendering, anxiety-ridden, fraught with contradictions and is most recognizable through its symptoms rather than its etiology. And from the KKK to the private practioners, aka "good Southerners," the regional neurosis possesses private languages and personal, often ugly signs. Examining the South as a region victimized by neurosis does not absolve it from responsibility, but it does allow for what Sontag calls the discovery of "tropes for new attitudes toward the self." In other words, neurosis as disease can, according to Sontag, represent "a will speaking through the body, [in this case the South, with] a language for dramatizing the mental: a form of self-expression." So neurosis becomes an individualized regional metaphor for the "sin of slavery" that shaped the Southern conscience, and which Faulkner says is genetically stamped and shared by generations of Southerners.

The source of the regional metaphor turns primarily from the idea of the South as a region torn apart by racial confusion. It is a confusion based on fear and pride, fear of the Negro socially and politically, and a pride that prohibits acknowledgement of that fear and insists self-righteously that palpable manifestations of indefensible prejudices and hostilities be denied anyway. Malcolm Cowley in examining this
dilemma of Southern nationalism explained it from a more abstract angle: "The tragedy of intelligent Southerners like Stevens (or like Faulkner) . . . is that their two fundamental beliefs, in equal justice and in Southern independence (or simple identity) are now in violent conflict."80 The key, here again, is the conflict in identity.

Faulkner frequently functioned as spokesman for the region and its condition. He likened the racial prejudice to an "internal sickness," cancerous awaiting the necessary removal.81 This conception of the South as sick would not in and of itself warrant a descriptive diagnosis of emotionally disturbed. What makes the "racial illness" an emotionally tense one is the contradictory responses Southerners, Faulkner included, have to it. The South is in chronic conflict, physically and emotionally. This is expressed by Faulkner when he speaks as Southerner, and it pervades his fiction as assorted characters come to grips with the discordant loyalties that a Southern identity definitionally contains.

Faulkner makes the neurotic conflict of the Southerner fictionally available in Absalom, Absalom!. Quentin, the definitive example of Southerner destroyed by his region's neurosis, is lured into relief through confession by his conversations with Shreve, his curious Canadian auditor and roommate. Shreve, in his detachment from the Southerner's crisis, expresses the extravagant and surreal qualities the South projects: "Jesus the South is fine, isn't it. It's better than the theatre, isn't it. It's better than Ben Hur isn't it. No wonder you have to come away now and then" (AA, p. 217). Later, Shreve pursues his wonderment at "this place": "I would sure hate to have come from
the South anyway even if I could stay there. . . . I'm not trying to be funny, smart. I just don't know how to say it better. Because it's something my people haven't got" (AA, p. 361). Quentin replies with the eternal Southern conundrum: "You can't understand it. You would have to be born there" (AA, p. 361). But as the novel closes, Shreve has posed the one question guaranteed to reinvoke the neurotic conflict that has motivated Quentin's entire psycho-dramatic rendition of Thomas Sutpen: "Why do you hate the South?"

Faulkner addressed similar issues in his role as regional spokesman. At Nagano, he was asked "Do you love the South?" His reply embodies the insoluble conflict that characterizes the informing neurosis for the region: "Well, I love it and hate it. Some of the things there I don't like at all, but I was born there, and that's my home, and I will still defend it even if I hate it." This love-hate relationship would lead Faulkner into a public championing of civil rights. It would make him generous and sympathetic in his fictional treatment of the historical atrocities inherent in slavery. He would also put him on the record and square in a contradiction: "The Southerners are wrong and . . . their position is untenable, but if I have to make the same choice Robert E. Lee made then I'll make it."

This balancing act performed daily by the region and its inhabitants creates the opportunity for a metaphor that links the South to the world. Implied in an existence founded on paradoxical needs is anxiety as condition. And Faulkner could use that pervasive anxiety afforded by Southern neuroses to explore the "modern human condition." The South in fact and fiction becomes a laboratory for the exploration of the
concerns that Faulkner raised in his Nobel Prize Speech: "Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even hear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up?" No clearer expression of the anxiety felt personally and universally seems possible. The fear that Faulkner said was universally felt, was even more acutely felt by Southerners because Faulkner felt that beyond atom bombs, the South was specifically afraid because the symbol of the fear was with him daily, the Negro. So wide sweeping disease is integral to the nature of the South and Southerners and Faulkner experienced personally the conflicts his fiction and public statements address. By establishing a psychological-literary metaphor for a social horror, a triumph of sorts seems possible. It allows for the rejection of all that is emotionally or fictionally inauthentic and untrue. Such a metaphor would be compatible with Faulkner's own quest: the "sanction of the moral and intellectual pain suffered on behalf of truth."
ENDNOTES


3 Even more recently, at the 1978 MLA specifically, a panelist named Patricia Tobin on the panel "Faulkner's words: Approaches to Fictional Language" spoke of Addie Bundren's coffin as Cubistic vagina. Although Tobin never made this point, her line of argument paves the way for a sequel on the subject of Addie's coffin as wandering vagina/uterus, and As I Lay Dying becomes a microcosmic metaphor that tends itself to the anachronistic historical reading of hysteria as wandering uterus.


5 Brooks, p. 444.

6 Brooks, p. 382.

7 Brooks, p. 382.

8 Brooks, p. 112.


10 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 118.


14 Cashdan, p. 27; Frazer and Carr, p. 8.


16 Freud, SE, VII, 15.

17 Freud, SE, VII, 273.

18 Freud, SE, VII, 41.


20 Fenichel, p. 169.


22 Fenichel, p. 187.

23 Fenichel, p. 209.

24 Freud, SE, VII, 17.

25 Breuer and Freud, p. 105n.

26 Fenichel, p. 189.

27 Foucault, pp. 153-54.

28 Full development of hysteria to follow on pp. 49-66.

29 Freud, SE, VII, 8-9.
31 Freud, SE, VII, p. 163.
32 Cashdan, pp. 28-29.
33 Cashdan, p. 30.
34 Fenichel, p. 280.
35 Fenichel, pp. 377-78.
36 Fenichel, p. 278.
37 Fenichel, p. 273.
38 Fenichel, p. 274.
39 Fenichel, p. 296.
40 D. W. Abse, Hysteira and Related Mental Disorders (John Wright and Sons, Ltd., 1966), p. 37. In 1966, Abse did an extensive study of the condition which resulted in the systematic documentation of the disease, its history, its causes, and symptoms.
41 Abse, p. 9.
42 Breuer and Freud, p. xv.
44 Breuer and Freud, p. 233.
46 Janet, p. 289.
47 Janet, p. 324.
48 Breuer and Freud, p. 247.
49 Breuer and Freud, p. 250.
50 Janet, p. 103.
51 Abse, p. 31.
52 Janet, p. 176.
53 Abse, p. 49.
54 Abse, p. 49.
58 Abse, pp. 156-58.
60 Abse, pp. 29 and 239.
62 Blotner, p. 681.
64 Conrad Aiken, "William Faulkner: The Novel as Form," *TDC*, p. 47.
65 Aiken, p. 48.
69 Shapiro, p. 19.
73 Meriwether and Millgate, p. 204.

74 Breuer and Freud, p. 211.


78 Sontag, p. 28.

79 Sontag, p. 44.


III. Sociopathology: "Skunk Hour"

"She drank; Mr. Thackeray didn't know it, but she drank."
G.K. Chesterton on one of Thackeray's women

"Illness is in part what the world has done to a victim, but in a larger part it is what the victim has done with his world, and with himself."
Karl Menninger

"Isn't anythin' Ah got whiskey won't cure."
"Well drinking, I consider drinking a normal instinct, not a hobby. A normal and a healthy instinct."
William Faulkner

This chapter will examine pathologies that riddle everyday life: alcoholism, delinquency, and sexual deviance. Though each is familiar to the reader in varying degrees of intimacy, in Faulkner's work these pathologies come to represent the most personal of all emotional disturbances. Although Blotner downplays it, Faulkner was an alcoholic; while Guerard speculates amply, Faulkner's sexuality was troubled—fictionally and privately; and finally, Faulkner's perverse social behavior is a matter of record—"I'm too old at my age to travel that far to eat with strangers—and his violently antisocial behavior is a matter of legend!"¹

My belief that "pathologizing" can serve positively to shape the artist's vision is shared by critics like Meredith Skura and James Hillman.² In Hillman's romantic-theoretical approach to psychology, Re-visioning Psychology, he affirms the authenticity, inherence, and validity of psychopathology; he views "The study of lives and the care of souls
as a prolonged encounter with what destroys and is destroyed, with what is broken and hurts—that is, with psychopathology. Between the lines of each biography and in the lines of each face we may read a struggle with alcohol, with suicidal despair, with dreadful anxiety, with lascivious sexual obsession, cruelties at close quarters, secret hallucinations, or paranoid spiritualisms. Significant in Hillman’s positive view of pathology is his redefinition of the creative impulse. While still finding the emotional disorder in "snarled communication," he sees it as more spiritually disabling than mentally catastrophic. This view is supported by unshakeable confidence in all generative urges—even though pathology means an oxymoronic view of entropy as growth: "the psyche's autonomous ability to create illness, morbidity, disorder, abnormality, and suffering in any aspect of its behavior and to experience and imagine life through this deformed and afflicted perspective."

Skura focuses on the creative process, too. Her assertion that "clearly, art and madness draw on the same aspects of personality" insists that true creativity results from a transformation of the "materials of madness" into a controlled aesthetic expression. She avoids the spiritualism of Hillman's analysis by demystifying the artist's eccentricities. Instead, Skura's orientation locates the touch of genius in a transcendent faith/talent that enables the artist to "strive for the impossible" finding harmonies in fantasy and reality, self-realization in art.

The two revisionists views of art and illness are useful to my thesis for two reasons: first, by locating artistic vision positively,
profitably, and necessarily in unique pathology, Skura and Hillman challenge traditional values. In other words, Sontag's condemnation of the cancer metaphor reflects predictable cultural norms. These norms seek not only to deny ill-health, but also to repress those urges that stimulate conflict between base human desires, social organization, and cultural development: translation: a little repression is a healthy thing. Secondly, these views of art serve, as Norman O. Brown puts it, "The function of making public the contents of the unconscious." 7

The artist who chooses to express the dark vision of "the disease called man" meets predictable hostility from his culture. Faulkner, aware of the double burden inherent in a celebration of social disability as a human potential, makes his assertion of psychopathology consistently, but subtly. So, though the sociopathological aspects of the fiction tend to be muted by indirection and disguise, Faulkner is still able to create a pathologically distinct characterization, style, and metaphor. Ultimately, the realm of sociopathology provides a new structure by which Faulkner can suggest that what Adrian Stokes calls "the aesthetic integration . . . [results] from tendencies often hostile to an integrative role." 8

In Foucault's historical view, sociopathic disorders shared much the same fate that all "madnesses" have endured—isolation and punishment. 9 When sociopathology ceased to be viewed organically and entered the realm of learned pathology, it was found that the condition, as Cashdan describes it, involved insufficient development of conscience. 10 He states further that sociopathic persons demonstrate "a peculiar insensitivity to society's rules, but appear to show little
guilt or remorse after committing misdeeds. The behavior of a sociopathic patient tends to be quite unpredictable and often incomprehensible. He may lie when it is easier to tell the truth and steal when there is no apparent profit motive. Sometimes his deviant acts are carried out in secret, as in certain types of sexual deviance; other times he will ostentatiously flaunt his arrogance and rebelliousness. No matter what form his behavior takes, it is marked by one unmistakable stamp—the blatant disregard for social convention. "It is the same sociopathic behavior occurs sub rosa; other times it may be flaunted. The common denominator is a repeated need to flout social convention.

The first division to be considered is the chronic delinquent. The magnitude of disability corresponds roughly to the condition of anxiety neurosis. It is certainly abnormal, but its victims tend to pass societally. Ironically enough, it is in this category of con men, sons of bitches, and pekingese eaters, that the comedy of pathology is presented. Clearly its aesthetics are founded in the grotesque. And I maintain that the humor of this division is possible only because Faulkner felt sufficient detachment. In terms of style (to be examined after character) there is sustained dynamic tension between "the relaxation of will" yielding the black comedy of delinquency and "will" producing tortured descriptions. In the metaphor generated by a sociopathologic approach, there is explanation for Faulkner's elusive personae. When he plays Peck's bad boy, he is indulging himself as "artiste." He is comedic and usually detached. But when the persona switches to bona-fide drunk or misogynist, the sense of choice is
shattered by sheer inevitability.

Chronic delinquency is probably the most neglected of all the areas of deviant sociology. The sensational aspects of "nuns, sluts, and preverts [sic]" has long overshadowed mundane delinquent criminality: JDs get rehabbed; sex murderers get front page. Technically, delinquency encompasses a wide range of legal and ethical violations. Political criminal behavior (conspiracy) belongs to this category, just as check forging or prostitution. In Cashdan's definition he captures the element of delinquency that makes it an ideal subject for Faulkner's rogues' gallery: "Poised on the fringes of society, they sustain themselves by exploiting the vulnerability and feelings of others." In all cases of sociopathic behavior there is a consistent defect of compassion for humanity and a consequent inability to form meaningful relationships. Crucial to most definitions of deviant behavior are two features: the deviant demonstrates an unwillingness or incapacity to follow minimal societal standards; this, of course, implies a normative group or set of observers who consider the deviant behavior deleterious to an understood or agreed-upon common good. The second feature is knowledgeability, i.e., the deviant must in some sense be responsible. He must be an agent who is aware that other courses of action are available. Peter McRugh in "A Common Sense Conception of Deviance" maintains that the deviant's act must not be "inevitable." So the decision to deviate occurs in a "context of other possibilities."

Though this definition is brief and simplified, there has been a surge in the study of criminal deviant behavior. I have abstracted what seems intrinsic to all the evaluations. Issues such as "How
widespread and intense must audience reaction be?" or "Deviance neutral-
ization by intimates" seem more the proper consideration of sociologists.
And so at this point I'd like to proceed to an examination of Faulkner's
criminal delinquents: Montgomery Ward Snopes, Jason Compson, Mink, and
Flem Snopes, and finally the notorious Jucarilla Indians. All but the
Indians portray present deviance that has been subjecturally realized by
Faulkner's own sense of deviance. The Indians, however, represent
stereotyped deviant behavior, and so it is with the Indians that I would
like to begin.

From the intractibility of the stereotype's behavior, the shadings
and permutations of other delinquencies can be measured. The stereo-
typed deviant has been definitionally captured by a six-part recipe es-
tablished by Erich Goode in *Deviant Behavior*:

1. exaggeration (extreme deviant behavior); 2. centrality (essential
to the lives of participants); 3. persistence ("once a deviant, always
. . . ."); 4. disjunctiveness ("their world is alien and mysterious")
5. homogeneity (basically alike); 6. clustering (possess typical
traits that bind). Faulkner's presentation of these Snopes children
satisfies all six criteria. As for homogeneity and clustering, the
children are described first as "things." They are dressed similarly
and except for sex and height differences they seem interchangeable.
Faulkner accents the "cohesiveness" by having each arrive in Jefferson
with a shipping tag giving origin and destination but no individualizing
information. Charles Mallison's account has them "always together and
anywhere in town or near it at any time of day." Faulkner's efforts to
describe them involve grotesque similes: "They looked like snakes"
(T, p. 360); or "they look like four shut pocket knives but they don't look lethal" (T, p. 363). Their inherent disjunctiveness is elaborately developed. Their train trip behavior results in abnormal station conduct for the conductor and porter. The Indians seize Mrs. Widrington's dog in a mysterious fashion that is never explained—even though an elaborate insurance investigation over three states is launched. They enter the locked Coca Cola plant at will without setting off the burglar alarm. Feats of stealth and quiet are used to achieve deviant goals. They dismantle the boarding house bed in favor of sleeping on a quilt on the floor: "you couldn't hear them; you didn't even know they were in the house or not, when they had entered it or left it; for all you knew, they might be right there in your bedroom in the dark, looking at you" (T, p. 365). Their origin and fate are strictly enigmatic. Why Byron has sent them to Mississippi is never established, but their departure fits Faulknerian justice: they are sent back into hellish exile—El Paso, Texas. No one is clear how they communicate or what motivates any of their behavior. But as they exit they provide a fine illustration of the sociology of deviance: "we represented Jefferson—watched them mount and vanish one by one into that iron impatient maw: the girl and the two boys in overalls and Ratliff's least un in its ankle-length single garment like a man's discarded shirt made out of flour—or meal-sacking or perhaps the remnant of an old tent. We never did know which it was" (T, p. 371). For Faulkner, as any devout Southerner knows, Texas becomes the asylum where deviance can best be isolated and ignored.

Regarding persistence and centrality, the Indians are clearly not rehabilitation material. In their foster home they slash Vernon DeWit's
cheeks from the ears down as he sneaks a peek at their sleeping quarters. They send him and his wife into a panic later, during which the DeWits barricade themselves into the bedroom. Doris Snopes's plans to train them to hunt as a pack results in a grotesque mockery of "play";

"Anyhow he was always with them, hollering at them and waving his arms to go this way when folks was watching, like dogs; they even had some kind of a play house or cave or something in another ditch about a mile up the road. That's right. What you think you are laughing at is the notion of a big almost grown man like Doris, playing, until all of a sudden you find out that what you're laughing at is calling anything playing that them four things would be interested in" (T, p. 369).

This culminates when the children decide to burn their trainer and benefactor at the stake. The extremity of their deviant behavior has already been illustrated. The smallest Snopes sports the abducted dog's name plate; they pow-wow in a ditch littered with chicken bones and trash. And the entire town of Jefferson, including the benighted Snopes relatives, is in a panic: "Fore God, men, run. It may already be too late" (T, p. 369). As the Indians wait to leave from the depot, their function as stereotypes is summed up by Ratliff: "So they're down at the de-po now. Would either of you gentlemen like to go down with me and watch what they call the end of an era [sic], if that's what they call what I'm trying to say? The last and final end of Snopes out-and-out unvarnished behavior in Jefferson, if that's what I'm trying to say" (T, p. 370). The Snopes' take-over of Jefferson has been steadily realized, but in the caricatures of uncivilized behavior, even the Snopes of Jefferson are unable to contend with their progeny. The Indians' most significant pattern of communication involves gestures of violence, especially with the switchblade. And their functions consistently
exhibit the key to sociopathic rhetoric—face games (to be dealt with later). In short, all efforts at communication are greeted as situational challenges in which a face-saving situation is created. The Indians must resort to violent response because "they didn't talk any language or anything else that [Dink] had even heard of..." (T, p. 360). The only documented noise comes as they are leaving town and the tall girl "said something, something quick and brittle that sounded quite strange in the treble of a child" (T, p. 371). It is, however, communication that ultimately separates the Indians from the normal Jefferson society; [and, it is this mark of deviance writ large that makes them unacceptable to that community.] So that the final note on the Indians has the community still in the dark even as to the nature of the garment one of the children wears.\textsuperscript{15}

Failing to fulfill the monolithic definition of deviance—but nonetheless criminal by design and execution—is Montgomery Ward Snopes. In designating "Types of Criminal Behaviour," Marshall B. Clinard and Richard Quinney\textsuperscript{16} have discerned areas by which this Snopes can be classified: he begins his career in a town as a "Public Order Criminal" and ends it in \textit{The Mansion} as a conventional criminal. Criminals in these categories are torn between general societal values and the deviant subculture's. (Their goal is economic success, but as Clinard and Quinney point out the method of pursuit is "inconsistent with the sanctity of private property."\textsuperscript{17})

Montgomery Ward's criminal career is more elaborately conceived by Faulkner. Even as a doughboy, he represents the Snopes' deviance potential abroad in a canteen cum USO-brothel. When he sets up his Atelier
Monty in Jefferson he conforms to the definition of criminality already mentioned. He attempts to make it acceptable to Jefferson society by presenting it as a photography studio.

Ratliff as the keener judge of humanity knows that everyone will show up once to check things out and then the advertised "tea" will be superfluous. The town's suspicions—and greatest fears—are allayed. It's clear that neither drinking nor gambling is the mainstay of the studio. Ergo, how bad can it be; or in moral blindness—what we don't check out can't hurt us. And if it weren't for actual property damage to the drugstore, the studio could have operated indefinitely. However, the night watchman was busy with lewd photos and consequently missed a robbery that anyone should've been able to stop. Indignation on the part of the drug addict whose store was robbed leads to a spiteful inevitability, and Ward's bawdy house is revealed.

Once confronted with the charges, Montgomery Ward's response demonstrates the critical aspects of sociopathologic rhetoric. This essential dimension of his personality wonderfully dramatizes Faulkner's bemused delineation of the spiteful penny-ante criminal. The defenses Montgomery Ward throws up sound nearly stock for any one familiar with the delinquent in drama (TV, etc...):

"Let him go ahead," Montgomery Ward said. "Suing his bondsman is easier than running a magic lantern. Safer too. Where was I? Oh yes. Even if they had been sent through the mail, which they haven't, that would just be a federal charge, and I don't see any federal dicks around here. And even if you tried to cook up a charge that I've been making money out of them, where are your witnesses? All you got is Grover Wimbush, and he don't dare testify, not because the God-fearing Christian holy citizens of Jefferson won't let him because they can't have it known that this is what
their police do when they're supposed to be at work. Let alone the rest of my customers, not to mention any names scattered around in banks and stores and gins and filling stations and farms too two counties wide in either direction—sure: I just thought of this too: come on, put a fine on me and see how quick it will be paid . . ." and stopped and said with a kind of hushed amazement: "Sweet Christ."

He was talking fast now: "Come on, lock me up, give me a thousand stamped envelopes and I'll make more money in three days than I made in the whole two years with that damned magic lantern." Now he was talking to Mr. Hampton: "Maybe that's what you wanted, to begin with: not the postcards but the list of customers; retire from sheriff and spend all your time on the collections. Or no: keep the star to bring pressure on the slow payers—" .... So Montgomery Ward didn't have anywhere to go then, he had run completely out; he just stood there now and Uncle Gavin watched Mr. Hampton take his hand off Montgomery Ward and pick up the album of pictures and the envelopes that held the rest of them and carry them to the sink where Montgomery Ward really would develop a film now and then, and tumble them in and then start hunting among the bottles and cans of developer stuff on the shelf above it. "Burn?"

Montgomery Ward said. "Hell, man, those things are valuable. Look, I'll make a deal: give them back to me and I'll get to hell out of your damned town and it'll never see me again. —All right," he said. "I've got close to a hundred bucks in my pocket. I'll lay it on the table here and you and Stevens turn your backs and give me ten minutes—". . . and they locked Montgomery Ward up in the county jail for operating an automobile contrary to law in the city of Jefferson, with Montgomery Ward cussing a while then threatening a while then trying again to bribe anybody connected with the jail or the town that would take the money (T, p. 163).

Having succeeded in establishing Montgomery Ward's early history of deviance, Faulkner, not surprisingly, recalls him for use in The Mansion as a part of Flem's scheme to keep the revenge-minded Mink in jail a lot longer. This time Montgomery Ward narrates his own section. He is shrewder, colder, and more calculating than he had previously appeared. As he barter...
each man seems living proof of the Snopes hereditary axiom that
Montgomery Ward claims to have discovered pretty young: "Every Snopes
will make it his private and personal aim to have the whole world
recognize him as the son of a bitch's son of a bitch" (M, p. 87). The
cash settlement for "getting twenty more years hung onto" Mink's sen-
tence is quickly parlayed into a ruthless game of poker blackmail.
Montgomery Ward's criminal instincts make him suspicious of Flem's
generous offer. And soon it is clear that Flem intends only to not use
a pornographic picture he had retained that would link Montgomery Ward to
his past, but to have him jump bond, and settle for $100 and train ticket
to wherever. Flem has stingily anticipated all Montgomery Ward's qualms
and counter-arguments to the plan to convince Mink to escape from jail;
Montgomery Ward expresses shame and relief and a twinge of conscience for
what he is about to do: "So now I had a set of steel bars between; now I
was safe from the free world, safe and secure from the free Snopes world"
(M, p. 83). But the remorse is short-lived and he cooperates with Flem
fully.

By using Montgomery Ward as a criminal constant in the trilogy,
Faulkner seems to express several traditionally held prejudices about
criminal behavior. For instance, there is a suggestion that heredity
is a factor (Snopesism). He also allows his always callous social
deviants to be very savvy about the society that they offend. Montgomery
Ward originally hopes his pay-off will be a "new life" couched only in
societal appearances. He hopes to pass his two years and allow Flem
time to enhance his own local prestige. Then after he's "live[d] down
that old bad past . . . aint blood thicker than just water even if some of
its just back from Parchman for bootlegging" (M, p. 68), then he can eventually fall back into the studio business. He feels that the two year sentence—if he were to be caught—is simply insufficient deterrent: "I can get plenty more stock in trade and the same old good will, will still be here just waiting for me to tell them where to go and maybe this time there wont be any developer fluid jugs sitting carelessly around. And suppose they are, what the hell? It's just two years and I'll be back again, already reaching to turn over that old new leaf ... (M, p. 68). Montgomery Ward's plan to turn everything to his own best advantage, combined with his patent disregard for community mores—or even his cousin Flem's risk—further reveal his status as criminal deviant. Not only does he recognize alternative behaviors and disregard them, he delights in the gullibility of a community that affords him an ever-new opportunity to indulge his solipsistic and perverted plans.

But in his brinksmanship games with Flem, it is difficult to decide who to pull for. Their combined immorality and self-serving attitudes make their exchanges darkly comic and their entrepreneurisms grotesque. As superintendent of the town power plant, Flem exploits the two black helpers as he niggardly embezzles bits and pieces of brass fixings. At this stage, Flem's capacity for conscienceless deviant behavior has not been detected by the town: "we had not yet to read the signs and portents which should have warned, alerted, spring us into frantic concord to defend our town from him [Flem]")(F, p. 15). This petty embezzlement will be followed by his betrayal
of Mink's need, his exploitation of his wife's adultery and his
daughter's sensibilities, his profiteering through the spotted ponies,
his flim-flam seizure of Henry Armastid's and Ratliff's diner and on
and on. Flem's violations of a standard code of decency are legion,
and Ratliff sums up the danger that Flem's sociopathologic abnormality
includes:

"That's good," Ratliff said. "Because he had purely
better be. All of us better be ["scaird"]. Because a
feller that jest wants money for the sake of money, or
even for power, there's a few things' right at the last
that he wont do, will stop at. But a feller that come--
came up from where he did, that soon as he got big enough
to count it he thought he discovered that money would
buy everything he could or would ever want, and shaped
all the rest of his life and without no--any hard feelings
because he knowed--knew that he wouldn't ask nor expect--
o--any quarter his--himself if it had been him--to do
all this and then find out at at the last, when he was
a man growed--grown and it was maybe already too late,
that one thing he would have to have if there was to be
any meaning to his life or even peace in it was not
only something that jest money couldn't buy, it was
something that not having money to begin with or even
getting a holt of all he could count or even hurt or harm
or grieve or change or alter to find out when it was
almost too late that what he had to have was something
that any child was born having for free until one day
he growed--grew up and found out when it was maybe too
c late that he day threwed—threw it away."
"What?" I said. "What is it he's got to have?"
"Respectability," Ratliff said.
"Respectability?"
"That's right," Ratliff said. "When it's jest money.
and power a man wants, there is usually some place where
he will stop; there's always one thing at least that
ever—every man wont do jest for money. But when it's
respectability he finds out he wants and has got to have,
there aint nothing he wont do to get it and then keep it.
And when it's almost too late when he finds out that's
what he's got to have, and that even after he gets it
he cant jest lock it up and set—sit down on top of it
and quit, but instead he has got to keep on working with
ever—every breath to keep it, there aint nothing he will
stop at, aint nobody or nothing within his scope and reach
that may not anguish and grieve and suffer." (T, p. 259).
In this passage, Ratliff focuses on a chronic tension that existed for Faulkner the author. There was a side of Faulkner's personality that seemed in open rebellion against respectability. As renowned author, he seemed compelled to tweak the noses of the establishment, money and power elite. He would stage public bouts of drunkenness; he would have to be trapped into attending his own Nobel award ceremony. He could be rude to fans like Mrs. John Steinbeck: "Madam, I write 'em, I don't read 'em." He would play "the farmer." At the same time, he exhibited a deep desire for acceptance, position, and status. His poor farmer persona found expression on the estate of Rowan Oak, and the Mississippi hick who shunned celebrity could sport English riding togs. He did much for money, but at the same time would refuse to write a book on the Mississippi River because "I am like an aging mare, who has say three more gestations in her before her time is over, and doesn't want to spend one of them breeding what she considers, wrongly perhaps, a mule." His primary impulse was to achieve that transcendent sort of "respectability" offered only by immortality, "to create something not there before and by so doing . . . [leave] his mark "on the wall of that final oblivion."20

But beyond the inherent conflicts in Faulkner's views on respectability, Flem's behavior proves rhetorically useful. It illustrates that key dimension of sociopathologic rhetoric—face games. Face games are a subdivision of accounts (to be dramatized through Jason Compson). Briefly, accounts are statements made to mitigate culpability for any potentially unacceptable act.21 They consist primarily of excuses and
justifications. An account, as explained by Marvin B. Scott and Stanford B. Lyman, is a "move in a social game." An encounter that creates a need for an account requires its participants, especially the deviant who is accused, to examine his aims in a situation, evaluate his fellow participants and/or adversaries, and assess how his account (language/gesture response) will be received. Face games become the most crucial game encounter in an account-demanding situation.

Normal audience reaction to the initiation of a face game involves minimizing damage to one's identity or asking for restoration of damaged honor. The game begins when the instigator damages the other participant (a single actor or a whole town). If the injured party chooses to participate (not avoid), his "move" will be to call attention to the offending act, designate responsibility, and demand a penalty. At this point, the game may escalate, if a counterattack is made; or, ideally, face salvage will occur. This means that the offending party makes apology or restitution that restores "the characterological status quo ante." The game is ultimately terminated when the instigator (in the cases to be considered here, the deviant) would acknowledge with thanks his readmission to the graces of the judging actor or community.

Now as already demonstrated with Montgomery Ward, he seeks only the appearance of penance for offense. He views the two-year stint in prison sufficient restitution to earn him a place back in the good graces of the town and its conventional respectability. The game is clearly viewed as just that—a game he plays with society. This is socially on par with the offending party in another face game claiming
the offense or slight had been a joke—"I meant no disrespect, basically," or if the offending actor excused himself by claiming to be drunk or temporarily out of control. So Montgomery Ward represents a traditional understanding and execution of a face game. His abuse of community conventions (trust, say, in his rehabilitation and penance) marks him as a social deviant holding the normal community in contempt. This contempt has been prefigured in his actual arrest, of course, during which his blithely escalates the stakes of his offense by challenging the town's morality and suggestibility to bribery and corruption.

Flem's use of face games is fittingly more deviant, more insidious, and more rhetorically intriguing. He is stared down by the accountant-investigators on the brass issue and he meekly turns over the $218.52 and resigns his post "'for the good of the service'" (T, p. 29). Though Flem is clearly guilty here, he is also in possession of some critical moral information. His wife, Eula, is having a rather publicly sanctioned affair with Mr. de Spain, the man who calls for Flem's resignation. Now in terms of face games, Flem is in the cat bird seat if he were to choose to use this information on his counternumber. At the very least, he could salvage a draw and retain his job. But he opts for a different strategy, one described by Scott and Lyman with the following: "face games may be undertaken as part of a larger strategy of exploitation. Thus persons may pose a threat of loss of face to themselves to achieve certain gains that may be attained thereby... [thus] face games may be undertaken for their own value or for the pay-offs they have for larger strategies in other games."24 Flem's
choice to hold the adultery marker for a more opportune occasion is central to Faulkner's plan for his character; and this delaying strategy is the critical basis upon which the entire plot/emotional structure of The Town rests, and will eventually fall. Again, Ratliff explains it in the humoresque idiom he cultivates as local sewing-machine sociologist: "Not catching his wife with Manfred de Spain yet is like that twenty-dollar gold piece pinned to your undershirt on your first maiden trip to what you hope is going to be a Memphis whorehouse. He don't need to unpin it yet" (T, p. 29).

Faulkner makes room for face games not laced with pathology. For instance, shortly after Flem's face game, the whole town gets involved in a romantic-juvenile encounter over the adulterous, but ever-chaste, Eula. The face game is kicked off by the town's leading citizens over ludicrous stakes. Lawyer Gavin "aint that he dont want to make trouble: he just dont know how." Stevens and Mayor "cut-out" de Spain engage in a pre-Cotillian face-off. Charles Mallison's father describes it as the town women's revenge: "You want trouble. You want something to happen. You like it. You want two red-combed roosters strutting at one another" (T, p. 57). On behalf of passive Gavin, his younger brother plants a spiked rake to blow-out the Mayor's tires on one of his ever-increasing trips past the house to sound the cut-off. Effective escalation and a change of turf are achieved when the corsage panic begins. Both Gavin and Mayor de Spain send corsages to all of the ladies attending the dance to justify sending one to Eula. Mayor de Spain adds playful insult to compensate for his car's rake injury by also sending Gavin a corsage made of the rake head,
two flowers, and a condom. Inevitably, this face game ends in a fist fight with de Spain fighting seemingly out of sheer perversity, and Gavin, dumbly and idealistically, "defending forever with his blood the principle that chastity and virtue in women shall be defended whether they exist or not" (T, p. 76).

These face games, absurd and elaborate, are, however, normal, emanating from intense small-town interactions. But even Flem's participation in a dance is shrouded in pending trouble and Faulkner never misses a chance to distinguish Flem's inherent sociopathy. Flem attending the same dance, amid the mayhem generated by a misguided Gavin Stevens, wears a rented dress suit that was "a 'red flag.' No: it was that sign at the railroad crossing that says Look Out for the Locomotive" (T, p. 73). As Flem gets closer to the time to unpin that goldpiece and make it pay, the town's tone shifts from breezy ruralism to tragic brinkmanship. And everywhere the tone reinforces the reader's sense that the wrong characters will lose. Because Flem is a man who "had even made sin pay by getting the start from it that wound him up vice president of a bank" (T, p. 297).

Flem makes his final push to wrest respectability and vengeance at the end of The Town. He has manipulated his daughter into making him her heir. He then shows the will to Uncle Billy, in hopes that this will eventually force the parents to acknowledge their daughter's eighteen-year adultery. Faulkner describes this decision by Flem as the "unpinning" of that gold piece. But he leaves it to Eula to provide definitive exegesis on how Flem's face game strategies have succeeded.
Her earthy vitality and transcendent glandular intelligence make her know how Flem's "turn" will affect Uncle Billy, whose "turn" will in turn affect Manfred de Spain. Her explanation explains the account systems wherein face games rapidly escalate to violence:

"If you are a man, you can lie unconscious in the gutter bleeding and with most of your teeth knocked out and somebody can take your pocketbook and you can wake up and wash the blood off and it's all right; you can always get some more teeth and even another pocketbook because even though you might face the friends who love you afterward you never can face the strangers that never heard of you before. No Manfred. If I don't go with him, he'll have to fight. He may go down fighting and wreck everything and everybody else, but he'll have to fight. I mean, he's a man first. He can swap Flem Snopes his bank for Flem Snopes's wife, but he can't just stand there and let Flem Snopes take the bank away from him." (T, p. 331)

Neither Manfred, Flem or Billy can bear to lose face. They have all appeared very male, very competitive, and very determined. But the pending emotional brawl that Flem has attempted to stir up as part of his strategy to take the bank is shortcircuited by Eula. By her suicide, she prevents Flem's threatened public humiliation of her from being a negotiable currency in the power grab. But Flem is an inevitable victor and survivor in this fallen world, and so he is able to use his next move to get final thrust in at Eula, de Spain and the town itself, which conspired in his cuckoldling. This face game concludes with Flem erecting a monument to Eula which bills her as "A Virtuous wife Is a Crown to her Husband/Her Children Rise and Call Her Blessed." Flem, who has appeared utterly without humor, now chooses as his mode of retaliation scathing irony and sarcasm. And the community and the bereaved lover must endure the exaggerated marble testament of Flem's contempt and triumph. The Town concludes with Flem effectively winning
the game by gaining the bank and getting the last bitter laugh.

Flem will lose the larger contest, but this is left to Mink, who has been fueling a revenge plan in prison—a place he's landed because of a traditional and violent face game he has played with Jack Houston. The contest between Mink and Houston is originally told in *The Hamlet*, and is developed again in *The Mansion*. Mink's need for face salvaging at any cost, even murder, clearly qualifies him as a sociopathic character. Faulkner's rhetoric sets the stage for intense conflict between Mink and Houston, which he endows with mythic significance and tragic poignance. The hostility leads to an inevitable contest which "began at the very instant Houston was born already shaped for arrogance and intolerance and pride . . . Mink [felt]. . . . the constant and unflagging necessity of defending his own simple rights" (M, p. 7). Houston's intense grief and arrogance "impinged on his, Mink's, own fate" when he decides to take advantage of local customs and let his milk cow winter "unofficially" on Houston's lush farm. Mink resents the $16 he'll have to pay Houston to make good the story he is peddling to explain why he has only chosen to reclaim the cow after the rough winter is over.

When Mink comes to reclaim his cow, he and Houston engage in a verbal face-off that conforms perfectly to the rhetorical standards of face games. Houston toys with Mink's vast emotional-financial vulnerability and after several strands of Houston's torment, webs are woven and a few "Hold its" are said. Faulkner fixes the face-off in what he calls "a tableau": Mink mounting the fence; Houston paused
with pistol ready. Mink backs off and experiences the frustration and dissatisfaction symptomatic of loss of face: "He walked away steadily enough but in such a thin furious rage that for a while he couldn't even see . . . it was simply them again, still testing, trying him to see just how much he could bear and would stand" (M, p. 10). The law intervenes and it is agreed that Mink must pay $18.75 to reclaim his cow; and since Mink is poor, he'll have to work it out at 50c a day fencing Houston's pasture. The back-breaking labor will be done at the expense of Mink's farm and health, but he rejects alternate plans like Houston buying out his share of cow: "And his pride still was that he would not be, would never be, reconciled to it. Not even if he were to lose the cow, the animal itself to vanish from the entire equation and leave him in what might be called peace" (M, p. 18). Mink's furious pride will not even allow him to postpone his debt: "I aint got time to make a living . . . I got to get my cow back home" (M, p. 19). Mink's attitude is icedly revealed and prefigures the ability he will have to wait in prison for his revenge on Flem: "a man can bear anything by simply and calmly refusing to accept it, he reconciled since by this means he could beat them, they might be stronger for a moment than he but nobody, no man, no nothing could wait longer than he could wait when nothing else but waiting would do" (M, p. 22). Clearly, Mink has a monomaniacal sense of justice and revenge, so when Mink has finally worked off his $18.75, Houston's decision to invoke his rights and exact another dollar as pound fee is also his death warrant. Houston's righteousness at this point seems viciously comic. And Mink's determination to kill Houston is exactly
and precisely choreographed. The final tableau for murder is silent, but Faulkner lets the reader know what the rhetoric for this "turn" of face-saving would have been: "I aint shooting you because of them thirty-seven and a half four-bit days. That's all right; I done long ago forgot and forgive that . . . That aint why I shot you. I killed you because of that-ere extry one-dollar pound fee" (M, p. 39).

Mink clearly qualifies as a criminal deviant because of his two considered acts of homicide. In both cases, prior meditation is possible; in both cases, alternative possibilities are available to him. At all times, Mink's private system of personal rights and justice takes ultimate preeminence over societal norms, while Flem's brutal rapacity is repugnant, he still stops short of murder. Ratliff described Mink as "the only out-and-out mean Snopes we ever experienced" (T, p. 79). But surely Flem had to be considered mean in the extreme! When viewing Mink in the context of his befuddled post-prison state in The Mansion, craving soda pop, it seemed an overly harsh assessment. But in the wake of his violence, Mink seems to be a "victim" of Faulkner's sense of justice; he is the murderer, and thus out-and-out mean. Flem seems contemptible and frightening, but though he stoops low, he still does not murder. Judith Wittenberg suspects Faulkner's own monetary problems made him more sympathetic to Flem than by rights he should have been. While this may have some validity, it is certainly not the case, as Wittenberg further claims, that Mink is "blind to the punitive nature of society's laws." And in his single-minded absorption with revenge, Wittenberg explains him as
"somehow 'innocent'--even principled" and classifies him as a
"paranoid monomaniac." 27  In fact, Mink can hardly be considered blind
to society's laws when he himself brings in the constable to arbitrate
the disputed cow:  "So I reckon I'll jist step over to the store and
have a word with Uncle Billy and the constable" (M, p. 26).  But as
the debt is decided, it is clear the Mink feels his fate is inevitably
to be a victim.  The law becomes part of "They" who keep testing him.
He is less paranoid, to use Wittenberg's term, than he is simply
reconciled to a Fate that constantly harasses and tests, and enrages
him for its own amusement (M, p. 27).  If he were more paranoid, he
could not have been so easily duped by Montgomery Ward's sabotage.
Even after the issue of the pound fee is introduced, Mink still defers to
the legal system:  "So the Law does say I got to pay another dollar be-
fore I get my cow . . . I just wanted to know the Law.  And if that's the
Law, I reckon there aint nothing for a law-abiding feller like me to do
but jist put up with it" (M, p. 29).  In fact, he makes the post hole pay-
ment like a good citizen.  The motive and description of Mink's murder of
Houston is in some ways stereotypical of "subculture violence." 27a  Though
most criminal murder is of intimates (Flem, for example), Houston's mur-
der, nonetheless, is precipitated like most murders--over the banal.
Goode cites many examples of the typical impetus to homicide:  being
short-changed a quarter; not getting enough white meat from the turkey;
being accused of staring; cutting into line.  The pound fee fits into
this category.  Furthermore, most of the Southern states, including
Mississippi, have a markedly high homicide rate. This suggests that this Southern subculture views violence as an assertion and indicator of manhood. That Faulkner himself was operating with a full-blown commitment to this ethos is documented by his family history (duelling grandfather, his own desire to experience combat, and his repeated social and fictional remarks that suggest "real men" are prepared for violence). Mink's shrunken male figure affirms ego and its maleness against Houston who is both virile and arrogant, but also wealthy. Goode further points out that economics frequently play a role in subculture violence: "Being at the bottom of the heap is already ego deflating. Even before anyone interacts with anyone else, one's manhood is called into question by being a socially and culturally disvalued human being. Being placed at the bottom of the heap, being poor, being materially insecure by themselves, will generate frustration and anger."²⁷b Mink expresses all these economic hostilities and social insecurities and resentments just prior to his initial confrontation with Houston: "What mattered was, he would have to give Houston, who didn't need it and wouldn't even miss the feed the cow had eaten, the eight dollars with which he, Mink, could have bought a gallon of whiskey for Christmas, plus a dollar or two of the gewgaw finery his wife and his two daughters were forever whining at him for" (M, p. 23). Mink's sense of resentment is deeply entrenched. So the murder over the extra dollar is symbolic. That Flem will also be destroyed for his failure to exert economic influence on Mink's behalf ties this murder also to the entire theme of greed and acquisition that permeates The Town.
His murder of Flem is the result of a deferred "turn" in a thirty-eight year old face game. When Mink was on trial—and even before he murdered Houston—Flem could have assisted Mink; but he did not. And so Mink waits patiently to take care of that "something private"—that outstanding account—an unresolved slight to his psyche that Flem committed in his failure to help, or even acknowledge Mink's need. Specifically, Mink believes that Flem effectively "sent [him] to the penitentiary without raising a finger, who had not even had the decency and courage to say No to his bloodcry for help from kin to kin" (M, p. 396). He will salvage face, exact retribution by saying "Look at me, Flem" and firing straight into his face: "Hit's got to hit his face; not I've got to but It's got to" (M, p. 415; emphasis Faulkner's). Probably, Mink figures a face hit is the best way to assure Flem's death. But metaphorically, it becomes the quintessential retaliation of a face game drama. Mink will verbally and figuratively redeem his own face by blowing Flem's face off. With Flem's murder, a sense of closure is finally achieved. Mink is freed to die, Eula Kohl Snopes has avenged her mother and contributed to the destruction of Flem by helping to free Mink to get his revenge.

Jason Compson is the final representative of sociopathologic deviance. He qualifies technically on the basis of family extortion: he misappropriates $1000 from his mother, blackmails his sister, and extorts nearly all of his niece's maintenance checks. Beyond these socially defined breaches of law, Jason is sadistic, racist, and self-righteous in the extreme. But because his deviant behavior is largely
sub rosa, he remains in the community's eyes a law abiding citizen. Jason's ability to maintain his mask of respectability is useful in explaining several aspects of sociopathologic rhetoric, and further helpful in demonstrating Faulkner's interest in the drama of sociopathy. The ability to evade a public lable of deviance depends on a language game called the "giving and receiving of 'accounts.'"28 Scott and Lyman maintain that a person's ability to talk enables him to explain, excuse, or justify misconduct. Society tends to use language descriptively, and often putatively. But language may also be used to defend oneself against a charge of misconduct or wrongdoing. So the deviant able to offer an "acceptable account" is no longer guilty of the particular deviant behavior; i.e., "his deviance has been neutralized."29 Jason's section of The Sound and the Fury is an extended effort to render an account. He employs both of the basic types: excuses and justifications. Excuses admit wrongfulness in an act, but deny full responsibility; a justification claims full responsibility for but denies wrongfulness of an act.30 Mink does not try to escape the label of deviant, but he does refuse to accept the label of crazy. As a consequence, he accepts his right to murder and the court's right (They) to punish. His unshakeable faith in the equity of his system—"Old Moster just punishes, he dont play jokes"—keeps him going. To be sent to the asylum in Jackson and be denied the right to even his score would be "a joke." Mink's interest is not in his label as criminal deviant, but in his sense of justice. Jason, however, is interested in avoiding the stigmatizing label of
criminality. Jason's primary mode of excuse-making is scapegoating; i.e., his behavior is always the fault of others. Most racial prejudice is accounted for in this category. Jason treats most women shabbily. Though on the surface he is the devoted son protecting his mother from the facts of the family's decline, his operative excuse for the maltreatment of women is given in the opening line of his section, "Once a bitch always a bitch" (SF, p. 223). "I never promise a woman anything, nor let her know what I'm going to give her. That's the only way to manage them. Always keep them guessing. If you can't think of any other way to surprise them, give them a bust in the jaw" (SF, p. 240). His long-term relationship is with a woman and is an affair that requires minimum financial and emotional expenditure on his part (SF, p. 422). Jason is anti-Semitic, but to avoid this label he scapegoats and rationalizes also: "I give every man his due, regardless of religion or anything else. I have nothing against Jews as an individual ... it's just the race. You'll admit that they produce nothing" (SF, p. 237). Jason hates blacks: "I never found a nigger yet that didn't have an air-tight alibi for whatever he did" (SF, p. 271); To torture Luster, he burns the circus tickets, burning them rather than letting the boy have one for free. Some of Jason's most bitter humor is racial: "I have to work ten hours a day to support a kitchen full of niggers in the style they're accustomed to" (SF, p. 298); "In 1865," he would say, "Abe Lincoln freed the niggers" (SF, p. 422). Jason's stream of vitriol and abuse would not, however, make him dramatically sociopathic in the way Faulkner prefers to use pathology. What cripples, and thus distinguishes, Jason's deviance is the petty
larceny he engages in and continually feels the need to justify. He is not a thief in his mind's eye. He is simply squaring accounts with his sister Candace. Rhetorically, justification in accounts attempts to render a deviant act "situationally appropriate."

31 Jason's efforts to neutralize his guilt for his societally unacceptable acts, and thus deny his criminality, includes denying the victimization of Quentin, condemnation of Candace, and the "sad tale," a technique which rewrites history to flatter and arrange facts for the deviant's benefit. 32 After tricking Caddy into a $50 look-see at Quentin, Jason insists he has honored the terms of the agreement. He greets Caddy's attack on him defensively and technically: "You already cost me one job; do you want me to lose this one too?" (SF, p. 255). His private psychological musings at this time are most telling of his account-justifying system: "And so I counted the money again that night and put it away, and I didn't feel so bad. I says I reckon that'll show you. I reckon you'll know now that you can't beat me out of a job and get away with it. . . . after she was gone I felt better. I says I reckon you'll think twice before you deprive me of a job that was promised me. I was a kid then. I believed folks when they said they'd do things. I've learned better since" (SF, p. 256). Jason holds Caddy responsible for the loss of the job at the bank that her husband had promised him. His withholding of Miss Quentin's support money allows him to feel repaid somewhat for this injury. It can't be criminal; it is simply his due. As for his family, Jason feels justified in treating them however best suits his purpose. He has been historically
wronged by them, and yet he has assumed the financial burden of their care. He never hesitates to remind the audience of the injustices he had been dealt. For Jason this keeping of accounts functions as a kind of stockpiling of injustices that somehow legitimizes any and all of his activities. Reeking with bitter sarcasm, Jason totes up the mental accounts: "Well, Jason likes work. I says no I never had university advantages because at Harvard they teach you how to go for a swim at night without knowing how to swim and at Sewanee they dont even teach you what water is . . . Then when she sent Quentin home for me to feed to I says I guess that's right too" (SF, p. 243).

Faulkner even gives Jason a chance to espouse his own moral system. When Earl, his boss at the store, mentions the money Jason has misappropriated from his mother, Jason pulls out all the disgruntled stops to salvage his position in the shop and his potentially vulnerable reputation with his mother:

"And when a man gets it in his head that he's got to tell something on you for your own good, good-night. I'm glad I haven't got the sort of conscience I've got to nurse like sick puppy all the time . . . If there's one thing gets under my skin, it's a damn hypocrite. [Referring to Earl's suspicions]. A man that thinks anything he dont understand all about must be crooked and that first chance he gets he's morally bound to tell the third party what's none of his business to tell . . . "Well, then, . . . "I reckon that conscience of yours is a more valuable clerk than I am, it dont have to go home at noon to eat. Only dont let it interfere with my appetite, "I says, because how the hell can I do anything right, with damn family" (SF, p. 286).

By using Jason as a sociopath, Faulkner takes the onus of criminality out of the Snopes clan and spreads the possibility of pathology about the community. Significantly, in the appendix to the novel, Jason is
described as not only sane, but able to hold his own with the cancerous growth of the Snopes. And so sociopathology comes to represent a contagion that is possible in any social stratum. Even though the Compson family is an aristocratic one, it is not immune to sociopathology, including its other manifestations. Jason represents bonafide criminality, while his father Jason Compson is invested with his own share of deviance—alcoholism, the second division of sociopathology.

Considering Faulkner's own sustained interest in the use of alcohol, his fiction demonstrates surprisingly little interest in drug abuse. In fact, of the six-plus characters who proffer even the possibility of drug dependence, only two are Yoknapatawpha residents: Uncle Willy Christian and Jason Compson III. The others, Cadet Lowe of Soldier's Pay, Ira Ewing of "Golden Land," "Mr. Acarius," and the Reporter and the flyers in Pylon are part of the "Beyond Yoknapatawpha" legacy. Though incidents of drinking are not uncommon in Faulkner, only these few characters illustrate levels of addiction that are genuinely sociopathic. Clinically, sociopathic drug abuse emerges from "dependent personalities" which exhibit little tolerance for frustration. Like all learned pathologies considered in this study, drug abuse develops from a reward system: alcohol and other drugs produce a reinforcing high, accompanied by the immediate avoidance of the problem(s) that have frustrated the drug seeker. The defining phenomena, according to psychologists, is the addiction or physical dependence accompanied by an escalating tolerance for the drug; and an "abstinence syndrome"—withdrawal, if drugs are terminated.
Since Faulkner's canon on this subject provides exceedingly brief appearances by his drug abusers, it is not possible to establish an entire system of illustrative symptoms. In fact, these characters are as interesting for their fictional tangentiality as they are for their pathology. I have previously stated that the psychopathologic characters command more attention than their actual fictional presence warrants. And the alcoholic characters emphatically achieve memorability. In every sense, the alcoholic's fictional function is both minor and ephemeral. Always they seem to exist more catalytically than substantively for their own purposes. Three of them are confined to very minor short stories (with Uncle Willy making brief cameo appearances in the trilogy); Lowe opens up the action of Soldier's Pay and then disappears after Chapter One except for his letters; Mr. Compson, who seems a critical presence in Absalom, Absalom! and The Sound and the Fury, actually appears only as a foil in both novels, and his own biography in the appendix, unlike the other Compsons', consists almost entirely of appropriated family history and real estate ventures; and the Reporter, though important, drifts namelessly through his novel, desiring substance and access, but is always confined to the fringes of the intenser lives around him. Each alcoholic somehow seems critical to the action of his story, but though each is arrestingly realized, yet none ever becomes the focal point of his story—even when it is his own story, as in "Uncle Willy" and "Mr. Acarius." But each character does expose somewhat a particular phenom-
traditional myths, problems, and realities of addiction as Faulkner experienced and expressed them.

It is a psychological paradox that alcohol functions, as Gregory Bateson explains it, to allow the alcoholic to achieve a more "correct" state of mind, a condition not possible for the alcoholic personality when he is sober. All of Faulkner's alcoholic characters find this release through different states of intoxication. But as the alcohol supplies escape from the painful realities, it almost contradictorily allows the alcoholic to feel "communion" with the group. This is a traditional view of alcoholism that Faulkner surely believed. When he himself needed to "cure" his isolation, he also sought what Bateson sums up as "secular Gemütlichkeit." Alcohol intoxication creates at least the illusion of fellowship. This is achievable, as Bateson explains it, because

His self-control is lessened, but his need to compare himself with others is reduced even further. He feels the physiological warmth of alcohol in his veins and, in many cases, a corresponding psychological warmth toward others. He may be either maudlin or angry, but he has at least become again a part of the human scene.

More often than not, alcohol/drugs enhance the sense of community for the character. Now, of course, the irony of this is that dependence on this method of union is viewed as sociopathologic by the "normal" community. So that the alcoholic exists in a chronic double bind—to sustain maximum familiarity of spirit, he must rely
on a drug that in excess makes him simultaneously at odds with community standards of acceptability. And it is along these lines of merger that Mr. Acarius speaks when he sums up his desire for a lost weekend; it also reflects, I think, the way Faulkner wants alcoholics to be understood: "'I want to experience man, the human race'" (US, p. 436).

The various aspects of drug addiction that emerge from Faulkner's fiction range in complexity. Faulkner's characters often make use of the anesthetic power of alcohol. This anodyne power is closely linked to the notion of escape. Being under the influence in almost every society has been organized socially as a "time-out." Erich Goode, in his study of alcoholism, explains that society has created a "zone of behavior" that society tolerates when a person is drunk. The sociopath abuser violates the temporariness of this reprieve. 37 Faulkner deals sometimes with the romance and relief of this hiatus; other times he deals with the bondage created by the myth of "controlled drinking."

The final dimension of drug abuse is the inherency of its despair. As a condition, alcoholism generates both external and internal conflict: the cliche' of "battling the bottle" is suggestive of its tragic potential. And it is this state in its extremity that turns hardcore alcoholics into "philosophers." 38 There are few consistent features of alcoholism, but one common denominator is the concept of "alcoholic pride." To an alcoholic, "failures" occur outside the concept of self; i.e., whatever happened(s), "it's not my fault." This attitude prevents cure, because responsibility or "bad luck"
always rests elsewhere. The true alcoholic has become wise and
cynical in the denial of fault that creates his despair. In his
fiction, Faulkner mixes these different elements to achieve a variety
of effects, from a love-sick drunken binge to the nihilism of dipsomania.

Faulkner's alcoholics fall nicely into two categories—those who
seem portraits of the artist engaged in a bit of bibliotherapy and
consequently tragic, and those who seem purely imaginative constructs
bent for philosophical purposes and consequently flawed in much the
same way Faulkner's "idea" fiction suffered. As I discuss their
alcoholic character development, I would also like to discuss their
literary significance.

Characters found along the personal axis are Lowe, Ewing, and
Compson, each exorcizing and victimized by Faulkner's private demons.
Cadet Lowe, not surprisingly, embodies many of Faulkner's militaristic
ambitions and disappointments: "they had stopped the war on him"
(SP, p. 7). He is drawn into a boozy camaraderie of fellow servicemen
all bound home. Not only does the alcohol serve as the bridge to
conversation and friendship, but it seems to initiate Lowe into an
alternative world of maleness—a world that measures virility by the
ability to hold a drink. It is also a world that exists regardless
of war. The easy familiarity that exists makes Lowe's greenness less
a burden than the object of a new project: "'You won't mind it [rotgut
whiskey], much after the first two drinks'" (SP, p. 9). When Lowe
resists the drink, he is egged and shamed onward:

"Hell, I can't!"

"Why, you got to, his new friend said to him
kindly" (SP, p. 10).
Lowe is rapidly absorbed by the feeling of good spirits and soon has ceased to be the outsider, eventually merging with the group to the extent that the train policeman describes him as one of the "'crazy ones ... Sure they're crazy. Do you think a sane man would get himself into this state?'" (SP, p. 21).

By the time Margaret Powers enters, Faulkner has endowed Lowe with his own pale and wan unrequited lovesickness. Lowe, "glassy-eyed and quite drunk," pines for the Beardsleyesque beauty. When he realizes his cause is lost, his petulant response is to locate the failure—not in his youth or foolishness—but outside. He has been beaten out by the more romantic war hero, Mahon. So his hangover and inebriate rhetoric consists of longing and resentment: "'Oh God,' he thought, feeling that no one had been so sick, imagining that she would say I love you, too. If I had wings, and a scar... ." (SP, p. 47).

Faulkner's descriptions of the drunken state and his recreation of the artificial festivity induced by too much drink, inspired by too much disappointment, are continually authentic: Gilligan, also drunk, attempts to guide Lowe "with the exaggerated caution of the inebriate"; Margaret couches her thoughts in the metaphors of alcohol: "Why can't a man be very happy or not very happy? It's only a sort of pale mixture of the two. Like beer when you want a shot—or drink of water" (SP, p. 39); and Faulkner describes the sensation of the excruciating oversensitivity of the posthangover shower: "Feeling the sweet bright needles of water burning his shoulders" (SP, pp. 48-49), an image that will turn up again. Even Lowe's emergence from drunken
sleep captures the disorientation of the morning after: "waked from a chaotic dream . . . lights burning above him. After a time, he re-called his body remembering where he was and by an effort he turned his head" (SP, p. 45). Rejected in love and teased by his companions, Lowe commences to reestablish his maleness with his new found barrier and retreat:

"'Made a conquest, hey, ace?'
'Go to hell,' replied Lowe. 'Where's the bottle?'" (SP, p. 55).

Wittenburg also identifies Faulkner's empathy with Lowe and she describes his novelistic presence as a "punishing and revealing self-caricature." Lowe's caricature, however, is sharply distinguishable from the next biographically delineated alcoholic in the canon. Lowe is treated jejunely. The jaundiced boozehound persona is a cultivated one, and Lowe has no "felt need" yet for the bottle.

"Golden Land" initially appears to be about a financially successful but personally dissipated and near-wrecked alcoholic. The story, which ran fourteen pages in a 1935 American Mercury, ends up diffused, fragmented, and ultimately about bankrupt dreams that never seem particularly clear even to their dreamers. The story is its dramatically strongest when it focuses on the addiction of Ira Ewing. Faulkner graphically creates the physical state of a coping alcoholic. Ewing's life is regimented and habitual—like his drinking: "If he had been thirty, he would not have needed the two aspirin tablets and the half glass of raw gin before he could bear the shower's needling on his body and steady his hands to shave" (AM, p. 1). His alcoholic profile
shows Ewing drinking good liquor among equally wealthy luscies. Faulkner establishes Ewing's "he-man" drinking credentials by stating that
Ewing "never wakened ill nor became ill from drinking, not only because
he had drunk too long and too steadily for that, but because he was
too tough. . . ." (AM, p. 1). But the symptoms of abuse are there.
His hands shake and tremble and he braces "his knuckles against the
wall in order to pour into the tumbler" (AM, p. 3). Ewing has fled
his tough heritage, retaining only the endurance of pioneer stock in
order "to move at all in the mornings [when it] required a terrific
drain on that character" (AM, p. 2). Ewing's nightly battle with
oblivion through liquor has replaced his legacy of incessant struggle
for survival against the Nebraska earth. And all his resources have
been dissipated by a cycle that ends each morning when Ewing's chauffeur
ritualistically carries him into the house, undresses him, and pours
him into bed. What can be ascertained from the story is that Ewing's
struggle against alcoholism is simply a question of continuance. He
has accepted his addiction and has even enlisted allies to function as
monitors of his intake. He drinks until he collapses and reawakens
each morning with the din of the previous night's party still in his
ear. His only clear desire seems to be oblivion granted by sleep;
but each reawakening renews a reality that finds him unable to "dis-
tinguish between reality an illusion" (AM, p. 3). His life is
distinguished by his willed, almost cultivated, alcoholism. There is
no passion—for his success, for his mistress, for his children. He
has fled his plain folk heritage and holds his mother a hostage.
Neither his struggle to keep her in California, nor her struggle to escape and presumably die, are clearly motivated. The only other possible basis for drama is the hostility of his home life—and this verges on cliché. The bitter, unsympathetic wife, the daughter gone bad, and the homosexual son comprise the "unhappy home life" of the alcoholic. But since the basis of Ewing's angst is indeterminate, the related domestic problems seem less an answer than an overkill.

But literally, though the story founders, it does illustrate an important aspect of alcoholic rhetoric. First, stylistically it is important to note that the entire tone of the story is wrought with rigidity and tension. Over and over, Ewing's "will" is cited as the source of his strength. The rigidity of description anticipates the thematic significance of control: Ewing will control his daughter's front-page scandal; Ewing will have his drink; Ewing will maintain appearances; Ewing's success in the edenic California will prove a triumph over destiny. And the story's denouement moves toward this asserted exuberance of will. His mother underscores the implied theme of the story, and the simplistic motive for his alcoholism:

"'This world has never been easy for Ewings. Maybe the Lord never intended it to be.'"
"'But it is from now on' he said; he spoke with a kind of triumph" (AM, p. 13).

His mother's surrender to his will concludes in ironic exultation: "'I will stay here and live forever'" (AM, p. 14). In essence, Ewing has created a world in which control is manifest everywhere. Yet the cost of this horrendous assertion is possible only by a contrived surrender to alcohol. The same Ewing who manages, merges, and manipulates, also
plays and loses power games within a structure of controlled drunkenness. His refrain of "My God, I want a drink" or "Get me a drink" is constantly negotiated. The servant that tucks him away at night will not respond to his drink request until he has finished his orange juice and coffee. His mistress will not pour from the flask until he has taken his swim exercise. Though he confides to his mother that he would like to flee from his life, he knows there is no escape and so he survives through the dynamics of personal conflict. When he greets his seething and hostile wife each morning, he is "outwardly calm and possessed." He descends along a "delicate iron balustrade." The children's names have been selected through a "mutual contemptuous armistice." He has never "failed" to go by his mother's on his way to town. His wife sits "still, rigid"; he speaks, "quiet and rigid." He confronts his mother "Unmoving, rigid." The tension at all levels is palpable; the implied question is always "When will the control collapse?"

The other addition this story makes regarding Faulkner's sense of alcoholism has to do with the rhetorical conflict generated by alcoholic pride. Alcoholics perpetuate their condition by believing that they can stay sober. So when the alcoholic is "blamed" for his alcoholism and wishes to prove [the pride] he is in fact, not an alcoholic, he stays sober. But as Bateson notes, when he succeeds, "the challenge" that motivates the sobriety is eliminated. The new test of ability for the temporarily sober alcoholic is "I can . . . risk a drink; I'm not hooked." The incurable alcoholic always measures
his worth by creating a system in which the challenge to his "pride" is outside "the self." In the context of the family situation, this means that an accusation of "drunk" from the wife will temporarily force the husband to prove he is not a drunk. But when sober, he must then prove he can handle a drink. Alcoholics Anonymous tries to restructure thinking to break the bind of this habit of opposition, because the alcoholic's tendency to prove and test his new found self-control invariably leads back to drink.

This is where Ewing's implacable control is most relevant. In his confrontations with his wife, she is the accuser: ""You were too drunk, too besotted with drink, to know or notice or care,"" ""You sot. . . . You drunken sot. And yet you wonder why your children--""

(AM, p. 5). His response is calm, icy, reasonable--"I can control this" is apparent in his manner. His response is defiant and searching: ""Ah. . . . So I am to blame for this too am I? I made my daughter a bitch, did I? Maybe you will tell me next that I made my son a f----"";

""That's not the question. That's not the question. That's all done. The question is, what to do about it. My father would have known"

(AM, pp. 5-6).

As soon as his wife exits, his controlled sobriety, the mark of coping, slips and he immediately orders a drink from the butler. He maintains the same veneer of strength in front of his mother, but as soon as he leaves her sight, he craves a drink. In front of the scandal-seeking cameramen, he is composure, out of their sight he immediately orders a drink. The most telling exchange revealing his alcoholic cycle occurs between Ewing and his mistress. They apparently have many
tacit agreements, and she handles his addiction with overweening authority. After she doles out a first drink and he demands another, she bargains, encouraging him to test his will power:

"All right," she said. "As soon as we get to the beach."
"No. Now."
"Let's go on to the beach first....Won't that be better?"
"Just so you are not trying to tell me I can't have another drink now."
"Of course not" (AM, p. 10).

Faulkner captures all the ugly details of alcohol abuse: the wheedling, the accusations, the phony tests of control and power. He was not consciously demonstrating the cybernetic system of alcoholism, but he did manage to create that situation dramatically. And so from his fictional characterization, genuine examples of the rhetorical tension inherent in alcoholic exchange emerge.

The final experience-rooted model of alcoholism is Mr. Compson. Mr. Compson's drinking has evolved to a level of extreme despair. He is a moving example of the fatalism that takes over the alcoholic who has essentially given up even the pretense of the battle. Drink is his anesthetic against the pain of failure; failure is guaranteed because all fault is external. Also, Mr. Compson, as Quentin presents him, is a compendium of accusations against humanity. Faulkner describes him in the appendix as sitting all day long "with a decanter of whiskey and a litter of dogeared Horaces and Livys and Catulluses, composing (it was said) caustic and satiric eulogies on both his dead and his living fellow townsmen" (SF, p. 220). For Mr. Compson, the final
despair is the realization that there is nothing in this life that is ultimately "quite worth despair." With this attitude, it is inevitable that "Father will be dead in a year they say if he doesn't stop drinking and he won't stop he can't stop" (SF, p. 154). Probably the essential Mr. Compson is found in his remarks on the meaninglessness of virginity, and everything else: "Nothing is even worth the changing of it" (SF, p. 96). This view makes Mr. Compson's fate unalterable. He has become the complacent alcoholic philosopher: man hasn't a chance; he is "the sum of his misfortunes" (SF, p. 120); "he is the sum of his climatic experiences . . . the sum of what have you. A problem in impure properties carried tediously to an unvarying nil: stalemate of dust and desire" (SF, p. 153); "men are just accumulations dolls stuffed with sawdust swept up from the trash heaps" (SF, p. 128). Having lost all hope, Mr. Compson only indulges a habit that makes the emotional discomfort of waiting to be dead slightly less acute: "liquor teaches you to confuse the means with the end. I am. Drink I was not" (SF, p. 216). As the alcoholic philosopher he sardonically inverts Kant and Descartes to justify his existence: "reductio absurdum of human experience" (SF, p. 105); he drinks; therefore, he is. To all his son's emotional anguish, he offers only courtly self-irony: "no Compson has ever disappointed a lady" (SF, p. 221).

With Mr. Compson, the axis of alcoholics, upon whom Faulkner drew most strongly on personal episodes for, concludes. All stages of alcoholic reality are presented—the amateur drinker who enjoys the persona of alcoholic more than anything, the functioning alcoholic,
trapped by addiction, but unable to beat it, and finally the beaten alcoholic whose existence is only bearably measured out in jiggers.

The final examples of drug abuse all seem more detached from Faulkner's intimate personal experience than the previous three had. In some ways, they seem efforts to imaginatively transcend personal reality. Mr. Acarius and the Reporter and others in *Pylon* are in search of "something more." Alcohol, for them, and Mr. Acarius in particular, represents a way to experience an intense connection. Uncle Willy's addiction, first to drugs and then to drink, is never adequately explained. But Faulkner uses the naive narrator to suggest that Uncle Willy's artificially induced harmony is the beau ideal. In this case, the commitment to the pathology of drug addiction becomes a sort of romantic integrity. "Mr. Acarius" represents a rather full exploration of many aspects of alcoholism, specifically "hitting bottom." The story is an exploration of skid row without any of the truly unsavory aspects of this particular tragedy. Mr. Acarius chooses "a sty in a penthouse," a Scotch lost weekend. Mr. Acarius' method of getting admitted demonstrates a desperate and twisted kind of will power: he willfully drinks himself into a finite oblivion. But whereas Faulkner did it to escape the unpleasant demands of reality, Mr. Acarius seeks it out in order to experience fully a "truer" more human reality than he thinks he has ever known before.

For Mr. Acarius, alcohol is primarily a means of creating the illusion of integration with community. Feeling that his life has missed achieving human resonance because it has been void of "debasement,"
Acarius is afraid that he will have lived his life without anything really having happened to him. His life has supplied him with nothing which he needs or even particularly wants to escape from. Without this humbling characteristic of humanity, he feels just "another cypher in the abacus of mankind." By going on a binge, he can at least witness and understand that need to escape:

"At least I can experience, participate in, the physical degradation of escaping--

.................................

—the surrender, the relinquishment to and into the opium of escaping, knowing in advance the inevitable tomorrow's inevitable physical agony; to have lost nothing of anguish but instead only to have merely compounded yesterday's spirit's and soul's laceration with tomorrow's hangover!" (Us, p. 437).

Mr. Acarius' over-romanticized and over-rhetorical rhapsody to alcoholism is scoffed at by his doctor friend. But Acarius insists this is the only way he can truly enter mankind. The doctor chides him that courting the DT's on good Scotch whiskey is hardly the same dedication of spirit as rotgut addiction; and Acarius defends his ambition by claiming "the anguish of my recovery from it will be at least a Scotch approximation of his who had nothing but canned heat with which to face the intolerable burden of soul." The doctor remains bemused with Acarius' plan to "surrender your amateur's virginity in debauchery," to play at the brotherhood of suffering," but finally agrees to supervise Acarius' project. Acarius begins his descent with heavy doses of Scotch and manages arrival by ambulance at a $50 per day dry-out clinic. He tries to savor all his "suffering." But instead of finding a new world of reality-confirming agony, he finds surrealistic mayhem. The spirit of debasement and anguish was not what he had intended it to be. After a
briefly optimistic start, where Acarius thinks he is being aided in
disrobing by a fellow inmate out of humanitarian purposes, he discovers
the chief occupation is neither anguish nor escape. Instead of philo-
sophically wizened conversation and mutually shared and understood
physical ills, he finds genuine chaos. Inmates steal clothes for
escape; they smuggle in fresh booze strapped to the bosoms and belly
of a cooperative alcoholic's girlfriend. There is no transcendent
wisdom to be wrenched from this unself-conscious circle of hell.
Only Acarius is there for the experience of "help" the clinic offers.
The other alcoholics see hospitalization as a new-found challenge—
how to keep drinking against incredible obstacles: nurses, locks,
security precautions. For Acarius, the experience becomes more night-
mare than reality, and he is haunted by an inmate's appropriately
surrealistic refrain: "Did you ever see a dream walking?" Acarius
feels himself an "isolate" from help and he longs for rescue to
"safety, sanity." When he makes a near-lunatic escape down a fire
escape and through the park, his first sober act is to dispose of all
the liquor in the house. When the doctor chides about his experiment
in humanity, Acarius has altered his foolish idealism: "'So you
entered mankind, and found the place already occupied,'" the doctor
said. "'Yes,' Mr. Acarius said, crying, 'You can't beat him. You

The story, though totally a lark, does make several interesting
points about alcoholism and suggests some deeper thematic attitudes
about "the wheel" of humanity. First, the story makes a mockery from
every angle about the notion of "controlled drinking." Though Mr.
Acarius attempts maintained alcoholism in order to become a weekend alcoholic—it is failure because alcoholism cannot be controlled by measure. The story also deflates the notion that alcohol can make the drinker part of the group. In fact, Acarius' very self-conscious efforts to simulate truly forbidden behavior make him more of a trespasser than he was as a mere witness to humanity. The story is tinged with a wicked fairy tale quality of the man who repents of his three wishes. For Acarius, the wish is to escape ordinary responsibility and get to the heart of suffering, temporarily. He wants to sightsee using the alcoholic time-out. Of course, the irony is that Acarius' escape marks him as most sociopathic, as he tries to flee from a controlled world into a free world that he has temporarily forfeited rights to.

Thematically, the story is about the alcoholic illusion of escape. Acarius waxes eloquent about humanity's collective need to escape and his realization that escapes always fail, for "in the last analysis there is no escape... You can never escape and, whether you will or not, you must re-enter the world and bear yourself in it and its lacerations and all its anguish of breathing, to support and comfort one another in that knowledge and that attempt." Acarius gives lip service to all of Faulkner's pet Nobel prize sentiments; but his whole response to humanity is inherently wrong. And so his failure to connect in alcoholic Bedlam is inevitably doomed for the same reason he has experienced no community in the "sane" world. He is a man without passion and feeling, with only infirm ideas about
community. Though it is primarily a funny story, it is no doubt intended by Faulkner to frighten the "healthy" as well as the sick.

"Uncle Willy" also employs the escapist theme inevitably bound up with drug abuse. Uncle Willy is physically realized with a shrunken frame and "eyes behind his glasses kind of all run together like broken eggs" (CS, p. 227). He had been a dope addict for forty years and is lionized by the small boys who eat free ice cream while Uncle Willy shoots up. After Uncle Willy is seized by concerned citizens and "cured," he eventually returns with an alcohol addiction, weight loss, a prostitute wife, and a "desperate despair" (CS, p. 229). The cured Uncle Willy's eyes are still "egg runny" but they look like "dead eggs" (CS, p. 223).

The story is most useful for its description of the indignant town's response to sociopathic behavior. Willy is benign, but nevertheless offensive to decent citizens. His behavior shifts from victimless criminality to socially dangerous behavior as they impinge further and further on his inalienable rights to be addicted. Faulkner's own position seems to rest somewhere between the boy narrator's blind adoration for Uncle Willy's deviant existence and the town's contentious meddling: "'You're crazy, Mr. Christian, crazy. I have tried to save you and make something out of you besides a beast but now my patience is exhausted. I am going to give you one more chance....'" (CS, p. 238). Faulkner endows the town the grating, self-righteous voice of every busybody everywhere. But the reader's decision is easy here, because Willy is clearly made a double victim when he really has never
harmed anyone.

When Willy dreams of flying the airplane to California and a new freedom, the final "vehicle" for escape is revealed. Just as alcohol followed drugs, the plane becomes the literal embodiment of the freedom escape always promises. It is easy to see why the youthful narrator adores Uncle Willy, and Faulkner's heavy-handed moralism at the end seems more a product of literary need than conscience. Willy dies in the crash because escape isn't possible, because he is betrayed, and because society demands recompense from its deviants. Because the psychogenesis of Willy's condition is never explained, the story remains a dark idyll of initiation with a touch of the comedy of pathos.

And finally, there are the several characters in Pylon. The pervasive drinking here is treated primarily as a situational response and serves mainly to displace and gratify urgent needs in the Reporter for connection with the wildly passionate fliers. He remains a ghostly, tangential figure. The flyers themselves drink and use the alcohol to stoke their courage. But by and large, Pylon offers up a hodge-podge of offhand attitudes and etiquette about drink. The atmosphere of the story is like an alcoholic haze, a twilight world peopled with ghostly and transient figures. The alcohol reinforces this mood and often provides descriptive language: "He swayed laxly... between the delusions of drunkenness and the delusion of sobriety" (p. 82).

Again the environment tends toward the surreal, and drinking, sex and flight create the sleazy Bohemia. The group of fliers has created their
own closely knit family and by their exclusivity their social alienation and social unsavoriness are understood. Not surprisingly, their forbiddenness makes them attractive. But Faulkner's own tentativeness of response to a public endorsement of deviance keeps the book from having much power. It remains a flirtation with excess and rebellion and escape, three key ingredients of drug abuse. And by clearly linking the escape of alcohol to sex and flight, it provides a nice bridge into the final dimension of sociopathology—sexual deviance.

Sexual perversion is probably the most amorphous category of sociopathology. Most psychologists have traditionally included homosexuality (inversion) as a basic sexual disorder. Now, the definition of abnormality is less iron-clad and homosexuality seems more societally acceptable. Faulkner, though billed as a pornographer in Sanctuary, for the most part confines his fictional renderings of sexual deviance to a pervasive atmosphere of sexual dysfunction. Usually Faulkner's treatment of sexual abnormality is in the service of his larger fictional themes. For instance, Caddy's or Miss Quentin's touted pre-marital promiscuity was considered by psychologists in Faulkner's time a form of perversion. But Faulkner himself is more interested in that promiscuity as it affects Quentin's incestual longings (equally perverse), and even more interested in the burden of dishonor on an aristocratic sensibility in critical decline.

Faulkner's fictional fiction choices regarding women is its own indictment: "victims of periodical filth" (LA, p. 173); "Delicate equilibrium of periodical filth between two moons blanched" (SF, p. 159);
and "'Women—-t!'" (WP, p. 339). Albert Guerard marshalls a staggering list of candidates for the hall of "abnormal" sexual relations: Doc Hines, Charles Bon, Eula Varner, Horace Benbow, Jenny, Charlotte Rittenmeyer, Joe Christmas, the Tall Convict, and Belle Mitchell. The list is not complete, but a tendency prevails. The sheer force of numbers overwhelms. Guerard has thoroughly diagnosed Faulkner's misogyny. Though he focuses on Temple Drake's aberrant rape, Guerard takes time to point out Faulkner's omnipresent preoccupation with incest and atypical sexual configurations, from homosexuality in *Absalom*, *Absalom!* to Labove's "paedophilic obsession" in *The Hamlet*. It would be a redundancy to summarize the exceedingly strong case Guerard establishes for Faulkner's misogyny and other critics', like Irwin's, equally persuasive demonstrations of Faulkner's concern with incest and miscegenation. What can be practically considered within the scope of this study is 1) the evolution and clinical impulses implied by Faulkner's interest in perversion and 2) a rhetorical analysis of his treatment of the less analyzed, but more stunningly perverse, characters: Januarius Jones, Emily Grierson, Joanna Burden and Popeye Vitelli. Jones represents an early attempt at the use of sexual aggression as menace; Emily Grierson demonstrates classical symptoms, and also invokes the role of community as the definer of pathology; Joanna brings sex, race, and fanaticism to rhetorical climax; and Popeye Vitelli's clinical biography at the end of *Sanctuary* puts Faulkner, for the only time, self-consciously in the role of psychologist-sociologist. Though Guerard exhausts the misogynic possibilities of that novel, his attention is rather
fixedly placed on Temple's insidiously brutal characterization. By reexamining the novel's heavy-handed employment of perversion as atmosphere, a full-range look at Faulkner's tonal facility is possible. By shifting perspectives to Popeye and allowing that character to control plot and emphasis, Faulkner affects the definitive legerdemain regarding psychopathology as a predominant fictional technique.

Freud's essays on The Theory of Sexuality were published in 1905. And by the time Faulkner was working on Soldier's Pay he was already employing psychological terminology. He has Jones flippantly discussing sex with Margaret Powers: "'In spite of me, my libido seems to be a complex regarding decency'" (SP, p. 248). Mr. Talliaferro opens Mosquitoes with talk of "the sex instinct," admitting that this instinct is "'perhaps my most dominating compulsion'" (M, p. 9). "Elmer" is ripe with phallic objects and the artist's problems with creativity and anality are also given vent. In Sartoris, Wittenberg suggests Faulkner was familiar with the Oedipal complex, either by Freud's own work or through disciple Ernest Jones's Hamlet and Oedipus. And the cumulative evidence of Freudian language and metaphor leads David Minter to see Elmer as a "psychosexual history" with "the terms being so distinctly Freudian as to make it inconceivable that Faulkner did not know exactly what he was doing."

Faulkner was clearly developing as an artist in a period when interest in human sexuality was high. Freud opens his first essay on "The Sexual Aberrations" by citing seven other researchers of sexuality, including Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis. The sensational aspects of
all these works were no doubt available to Faulkner by his New Orleans bohemian days. One passage from Ellis serves as an arty example of what appealed to Faulkner in the clinical potentials developing around the subjects of eroticism and perversion:

Yet, regarded as a whole, and notwithstanding the frequency with which they witness to congenital morbidity, the phenomena of erotic symbolism can scarcely fail to be profoundly impressive to the patient and impartial student of the human soul. They often seem absurd, sometimes disgusting, occasionally criminal; they are always, when carried to an extreme degree, abnormal. But of all the manifestations of sexual psychology, normal and abnormal, they are the most specifically human. More than any others they involve the potently plastic force of the imagination. They bring before us the individual man, not only apart from his fellows, but in opposition, himself creating his own paradise. They constitute the supreme triumph of human idealism. 47

This statement by Ellis underlines the sociopathic nature of perversion. It also identifies the social stigma inherent in sexual perversion as a sociopathic disorder. But most important is the literary impact implied by Ellis' faith in the availability and appeal of perversion in all degrees of manifestation to the artist, and further his celebration of the pervert as a kind of Everyman existential hero. While Faulkner's use of sexual perversion is ominous as often as it is humanely tolerant, he nevertheless clearly saw the possibility both for unique individualization through perversity and for rhetorical virtuosity by personalizing an aspect of humanity most artists and readers tend to deny or ignore. Ernest Kris explains this artistic impulse to make public what is private and sordid in pathological sexual fantasies. Kris is highly conscious of "the problem of the distance between the narrative account and
instinctual conflicts in the narrator.""48 (Is "womanfilth" really
Faulkner's private linguistic assessment of menstruation?) And he sees
the artist's message in successful art, not as "propaganda" or "spirit-
ual experience" or even pedagogic; instead he sees art's message as "an
invitation to common experience in the mind, to an experience of a
specific nature.""49 Norman Holland comments on Kris's position by ex-
plaining that the "magical" activity of art allows the artist an
"aesthetic illusion" as a defense in which "art grows from an illicit
solitary fantasy through the ego activities of delay, translating the
visual fantasy into words, and wooing the self esteem of others as a
way of warding off unconscious self-criticism (from the superego)."50
This analysis not only legitimates the reading of texts as artistic
biographies, but it corroborates many of Faulkner's own remarks about
the function of fiction, such as the notion of writing a novel when
disappointed in love.

Freud pronounced some basic tenets of sexual perversion in his
essay "The Sexual Aberrations." The key to explaining perversion is in
the faulty evolution of infantile sexuality. As Fenichel explains this
principle, perverts have the same sexual aims as children.51 This con-
stitutes a problem or abnormality when persons who experience sexual
frustrations regress to a form of infantile sexuality.52 Clearly, by
societal standards this response can be deemed abnormal. According to
Freud, "neuroses are, so to say, the negative of perversions."53 This,
of course, roots neuroses in sexual disturbance (Quentin, Miss Rosa, the
Gants, Minnie-Cooper); the primary difference, however, is that the
infantile desire represented can achieve no conscious gratification; i.e., terminal frustration of sexual desire. In perversion, as one interpreter explains it, the perverse desire is "capable of consciousness" and of being pleasurable. 54 Fenichel explains the difference by stressing the fact that in neurosis "the symptom is 'desexualized'" and consequent discharge is painful; thus repression is sought and the condition becomes self-perpetuating. But in perversion the symptom is not desexualized and genital orgasm is possible. 55 The resistances to fulfilling expression, Freud concludes, are shame and disgust. Fenichel goes on to explain that the pervert attempts to prove that "there is no castration. ... Insofar as this proof is believed, sexual pleasure and orgasm become possible again." 56 In Freud's amended position on perversion, A Child Is Being Beaten (1919), he stated the gratification element more plainly: "Neurotics, who have repressed perverse longings, may envy the perverts who express the perverse longings openly." 57

I think the fictional pattern of his perverts clearly bears out the satisfaction element for his perverts; and this sharply contrasts to the anguished failures of sexual expression recorded in his treatment of neurotics. Whether Faulkner knew this as an operative principle of psychoanalysis is unprovable; but the accurate fictional rendering of his perverse characterizations occurs too frequently for it to be written off as mere chance.

With Januarius Jones, Faulkner began his fictional study of specific perversions. As Faulkner's first attempt to recreate inchoate abnormality, Jones is understandably flawed. Jones suggests perversity
without ever quite realizing full-scale and debilitating abnormality. Jones functions in much the same way as Faulkner's works till Sartoria do: he anticipates major thematic concerns without fully succeeding in their intent. By this I mean that Jones seems sexually disturbed. He is portrayed distastefully. His very presence seems to threaten and disturb "normal" community members. In addition, he brazenly out his chances to be disgusting, almost relishing them. His obesity and jowliness make him seem a eunuch, yet Jones is described as the satyr and behaves as masquerade and voyeur.

The reader's view of Jones finds him presented almost statistically, "Jones, Januarius, Jones, born..." and he is caught in the "spire's illusion of slow ruin" (SP, p. 56). Faulkner harps on Jones' satyr-like appearance: "eyes were clear and yellow, obscene and old in sin as a goat's" (SP, p. 67); his eyes are also described as the color of urine. Jones' behavior, as well as his looks, are consistently inappropriate for the community. He fancies himself bold with women, and at the very least he is blunt: "'My dear woman [Cecily], if I had wanted to put my hands on you I would have done it'" (SP, p. 78). His dispassionate lust is comically played off against the lovely but simple-minded Cecily. So when he engages her in a conversation about the "unbearable ecstasy" of falcon sex (while she is afraid he is blackmailing her), it is little wonder she puts an end to his innuendo with a brusque, "'I think you're crazy.'" And his reply is consistently telling, "'I know I am!'" (SP, p. 228). His acknowledgement of his peculiar behavior satisfies earlier definitions of sociopathology
wherein the offending agent is aware of other courses of action but willfully prefers a self-serving, anti-social response.

Jones is described in two specific instances engaged in behavior that is definably sexually perverse. Though he is shrouded in an aura of jaundiced unpleasantness, he has been received critically as a buffoon rather than as a forerunner of corrupt sexuality. Most recently Wittenberg describes him as "self-centered, disruptive... sexual... a ludicrous figure, a fat, feline, and apparently androgynous Latin teacher... seeming to serve no purpose except as an embodiment of selfishness and pointless aggressiveness." Without making vast claims for Jones' centrality to the novel, I do think Wittenberg is too hastily dismissive. Jones's first act of deliberate sociopathy is not clearly sexual, but it does indicate a potential for deviance. At the rector's home he lustfully admires a black woman's "firm, free carriage, and—" (SP, p. 136). Faulkner cuts it off and allows Jones to witness the emotional reconciliation of Cecily and Mahon. When he is accused of intruding, he dismisses his eavesdropping as fortuitous manna from heaven: "'My dear ma'am who am I to refuse what the gods send?'" (SP, p. 137). When the couple adjourns to privacy, Jones, with knowledge that he is observed, willfully stoops to peer through the keyhole to continue his observation of the couple's reunion.

At this point, Jones is essentially pre-perversion; but since this peeping incident will be followed by his eavesdropping on Cecily in the drugstore later in the novel, Faulkner is obviously toying with the notion of casting Jones as a voyeur. Jones's behavior suggests a minimal
scoptophilia. As Fenichel explains it, the voyeur who seeks to observe
couples seeks to identify himself with one of the partners. The sensory
stimulation allows the voyeur to "incorporate" himself sexually and
vicariously into the observed scene. Though Jones is
clearly not about to witness any castration-allaying primal scene, he
would, if successful, see Cecily embrace a hideously scarred man. Since
Jones desires Cecily for himself, he seeks an assurance by voyeurism
that Cecily desires the ugly and abnormal.

Jones's final demonstration of sexual perversion takes the shape of
"obsession"; the target is Emmy. And it is easy to see Faulkner feeling
his way through Freud's technical terminology for aberration:

Emmy had become an obsession with Januarius Jones, such
an obsession that it had got completely out of the realm
of sex into that of mathematics, like a paranoia. He
manufactured chances to see her, only to be repulsed:
he lay in wait for her like a highwayman, he begged, he
threatened, he tried physical strength, and he was re-
pulsed. It had got to where, had she acceded suddenly,
his element impulse, of his motivating impulses, of his elemental impulse to live: he might
have died. Yet he knew that if he didn't get her soon he
would become crazy, an imbecile (SP, p. 283).

While Jones' eyes are "glued" to the house, he is comically stumbled
upon by the rector hiding in the shrubs. He "lurks." But even after he
succeeds with her, taking advantage of her grief, he continues to haunt
her. Gilligan catches Jones hanging on the window outside of Emmy's
room; a brief fight ensues, and Jones escapes into the night beset with
what Faulkner characterizes as "pure ennui" (SP, p. 315). This episode,
with its residual voyeurism and generally infantile sexuality, places
Jones roughly in a category of aberration known as "polymorphous perversion." Freud explains this behavior in *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*. Behavior in these cases is governed by an act's ability to supply instant gratification. All stimuli are potentially sexually exciting, but always only partially realized. This explains Jones's ennui, his aggressiveness, his willfulness. He is a sexually arrested adult, but he does derive satisfaction from voyeurism, shocking people, and obnoxiously, insistently sexual behavior. There is even a suggestion that his sexual obsession with Emmy is precipitated by her slamming his hand in the door. There seems to be no control, no recourse to manners or social mores in his behavior. His is chronically unsatisfied, but his desires tend to be chaotic and transient. He exhibits, I think for Faulkner, the stage of sexual perversion which borders constantly on being in violation of community acceptability. He is called "beast" and "worm" and incites a socially typical response from Gilligan: "'I'm going to beat hell out of him on principle, some day. I don't like him!'" (SP, p. 251). Jones represents the deviant who just passed.

*Light in August* is probably as sexualized a novel as *Sanctuary*. There is ample miscegenation, not only through Joe Christmas' violent razor murder of Joanna Burden, but through the religious fanaticism in Doc Hines's diatribes on female 'abomination.' Joe Christmas has been read accurately by most critics for the troubled sexuality, and it would belabor the point to redo extensive analysis of him here. Wittenberg does a tidy job of summarizing his pathology. She talks of his detailed development to adolescence, and
points that his "nursing years are in a way superfluous to the psychoanalyst, and that Faulkner uses means that are basically psychoanalytical to delineate Joe Christmas... and [his] sexually arrested development." She also notes Joe's early childhood trauma of viewing the Freudian primal scene, the sexual connotation of the toothpaste tube, and the consequent regurgitation which leads to "a permanent negative association of food, sex, and women" (LA, p. 122). He later develops intense hostilities towards all women and derives pleasure from their debasement through physical and emotional cruelties. He yearns for punishment. Essentially, Joe's sexual perversion are given to the reader by Faulkner and have been fully explored by the critics. But Joanna Burden's sexual problems are also clear, but less clearly digested. In fact, her own sexuality is primarily employed critically for its effect on Joe. Her masculinity also sets up a case for suspicions of Joe's sexual inversion, and Grimm's ironically exaggerated response of castration, the key Freudian psychosexual fear of infantile sexuality.

But Joanna's own sexual perversions are of rhetorical interest in their own rights. First, Joanna has a legacy of trauma that explains her "perverted" attraction to Joe for his Negro blood and his sadistic impulses. At four, she is forced to view the graves of her relatives who were killed in a duel over Negro voting rights. She also listens to a speech about an eternal course of doom on the white race. Thereafter, Joanna is plagued by a nightmarish vision of white children nailed to a cross. She is unable to confide this recurring fear to her father, and
she is even uncertain whether or not the vision is dreamed or hallucinated. She dreams of escape, but is told this is a cross that as a doomed white woman she must bear. Pain, race, religion become bound in her thinking. And her life becomes an abnegation of female sexuality; instead, she represses all sexual desire and becomes a devoted worker in the black cause. Why her response is sexual denial is not entirely clear. But in Joe Christmas, she sees the opportunity for sexual release realized and she is transformed into a "nymphomaniac" (LA, p. 245). Faulkner gives partial explanation for this choice of sexual expression: "the object fury of the New England glacier exposed suddenly to the fire of the New England biblical hell. . . . the imperious and fierce urgency that concealed an actual despair at frustrate and irrevocable years, which she appeared to attempt to compensate each night as if she believed that it would be the last night on earth by damning herself forever to the hell of her forefathers, by living not alone in sin but in filth" (LA, p. 274). Her nymphomania in response to the Negro Joe becomes a form of masochism. It allows her to debase herself for her whiteness; and it also allows her to sin, guaranteeing she be cursed in the way her father assured her she was destined to be. Her desire to bear a child from this perverse relationship may well harken back to the crucifixion fantasies of her childhood. All and all, her hypersexuality with Joe allows her to punish herself incessantly, since there seems no satiation for her sexual appetite or for her desire to be degraded. Bearing a mulatto child will seal her socially sought stigma as "nigger lover."
Joanna's masochistic nymphomania is further complicated by Faulkner's addition of a very appropriate extra perversion, coprolalia: "She had an avidity for the forbidden word symbols; an insatiable appetite for the sound of them on his tongue and on her own. She revealed the terrible and impersonal curiosity of a child about forbidden subjects and objects" (La, p. 244). Over a course of two years, Faulkner describes Joanna as becoming completely corrupted. The relationship with Joe becomes increasingly sado-masochistic: "he struck her in the face again and standing over her he spoke to her words she had once loved to hear on his tongue, which she used to say that she could taste there, murmurous, obscene, caressing" (La, p. 262). This practice, coprolalia, allows obscene language used during lovemaking to heighten sexual stimulation. Although it is a borderline perversion, in the case of Joanna and Joe it becomes a significant practice because it is used psychologically to degrade women and sexual intercourse. Fenichel explains coprolalia not only stresses sadistic tendencies but also keeps sex "dirty." 61

Faulkner insists on the subterranean and illicit aspects of Joanna and Joe's sex life: "The sewer ran only by night" (LA, p. 242); "like a man being sucked down into a bottomless morass" (LA, p. 246); "But beneath his hands the body might have been the body of dead woman not yet stiffened" (LA, p. 223); and "that rotten richness ready to flow into putrefaction at a touch, like something growing in a swamp" (LA, p. 248). He even employs Freudian vaginal imagery as he describes her "past life, the starved years, like a gray tunnel" aching towards an
end "as though in agony, virgin, and crucified" (LA, p. 250). Joe begins to consider her "inescapable, crazy" (LA, p. 254) and "cold, deadwhite, fanatical mad" (LA, p. 262). In depicting their relationship, Faulkner ascribes responsibility to Joanna for the pathological tone. Even though Joe is responsive to the pathology of her temptation, she is the instigator. Toward its end, she almost courts her own death in the shape of Joe's wrath for female and white. Particularly interesting in their coupling is its symbiosis. Their perversions are complementary: "It could not be said that he corrupted her. His own life, for all its anonymous promiscuity, had been conventional enough, as a healthy and normal sin usually is. The corruption came from a source even more inexplicable to him than to her. In fact, it was as though with the corruption which she seemed to gather from the air itself, she began to corrupt him" (LA, p. 246). Clearly the relationship is sexually pathological. Though it offers fine thematic contrast to Lena's insensate fecundity, it also reveals Faulkner's biases in terms of sympathy. From beginning to end, Joe is certifiably sick, sexually aggressive, and dangerous; yet Joanna is cast as the provocateur and effectively causes and craves her own death. Consequently, it seems another indictment of "hot wet primogenitive Female" (LA, p. 107). Also, it underscores the positive function of pathology for the fiction. The deviance embodied in Joe and Joanna completely overshadows the bovine Lena's questing. And Lena's role is further diminished by becoming merely catalytic when it is used more as a vehicle for liberating the grieved and reclusive Hightower.
Murderer, sodomite-rapist, and sexual pervert, Popeye Vitelli is probably the most infamous of Faulkner's aberrant characters. From Faulkner's own case history of Popeye, it is clear that many of Popeye's problems are congenital; for instance, "he will never be a man, properly speaking" (Sa, p. 244); and he is mentally retarded, with a pyromaniac for a grandmother. What qualifies him for admission to the cast to characters with "learned" pathologies is his particularly vicious responses to his own physical-intellectual inadequacies.

No doubt since Popeye cannot function sexually, his fear of castration is particularly high. Since Freud diagnosed this as the root of most sexual perversions, it is not surprising that Popeye shows marked sadistic tendencies as a small child. Responding to the prospect of fraternization at a children's party, he cuts up his "foster mother's" two lovebirds with scissors. Within three months of this incident he has "cut up a half-grown kitten the same way" (Sa, p. 244). It seems that since he has no normal outlet for his sexual impulses, he resorts to perversely sexual acts. Fenichel explains several aspects of sadistic behavior. First, relief from castration anxiety is sought by the sadist when he initiates aggressive sexual acts ("do unto others before"). This behavior tends to "increase the subject's power or prestige" and as a consequence it allays some anxiety. Naturally, his own sense of self is enhanced if he can create fear in others.62

Popeye utilizes fear with Temple and successfully turns her into a dependent (she calls him "Daddy"). She is terrified in the barn. And he physically brutalizes her with the corn cob—sufficient to send her
into a mild hemorrhage and shock. The corncob is a functional necessity
perversely chosen for Popeye. He effectively terrorized her in the
brothel, holding her prisoner, stalking her. These bursts of marked
physical cruelty, however, are punctuated by gift-giving. In her isola-
tion and fear, she comes to crave his visits and to cooperate in her
own degradation. He suppresses her attacks on his virility—"'You're
not even a man!'" (Sa, p. 184)—by gagging Temple with his hand: "his
nails going into her flesh," "his fingertips digging into her cheek."
He grabs her by the neck with such force that she "could hear the
vertebrae grating faintly together" (Sa, p. 186). This particular bout
of sadistic activity has been provoked by her burgeoning love for Popeye's
surrogate, Red. Her sexual taunts lead to feelings of murderous anxiety.
This relationship with Red also illuminates a second dimension of Popeye's
perversion, voyeurism. Because he cannot perform sexually, he invites
Red to have intercourse with Temple. While they engage in sex, Popeye
hangs "over the bed, moaning and slobbering," (Sa, p. 184) "without even
his hat off, making a kind of whining sound" (Sa, p. 205). The latter
description is made by the proprietress of the brothel. And in reply
Miss Lorraine suggests that "'Maybe he was cheering for them,'" (Sa, p.
205). The notion of his vicarious enthusiasm corresponds to the "inco-
poration" dimension of scopophilia. The pervert, according to Fenichel,
"wants to look at an object in order to 'feel along with him.'"63
That is, Popeye's perverse voyeurism allows him to satisfy sexual urges
in the only way he can. This manner of voyeurism complements Popeye's
sadism by its power to make him witness to and agent of Temple's degrada-
Popeye's perverse psychic presence tends to dominate the tone of the book. He physically dominates the beginning and finale of the book. In between, he is responsible for Temple's behavior, Red's death, and Godwin's lynching. Though he has little dialogue, he becomes a free-floating spectre of twisted sociopathic perversion. He penetrates into all segments of society from judge's household to brothel. And at all levels he is frightening and abhorrent. He is responsible for the tragedy in the novel, but he does create occasion for perverse irony when the self-righteous brothel keeper, Miss Reba, musters up real indignation over Popeye's bizarre sexual practices:

"I says 'I been running a house for thirty years, but this is the first time I ever had anything like this going on it. If you want to turn a stud in to your girl' I says 'go somewhere else to do it. I aint going to have my house turned into no French joint.'" (Sa, p. 205)

Finally among Faulkner's sexual perverts to be considered is Emily Grierson. She manifests one of the rarest of all conditions in psychopathology—necrophilia. Since her story is both posthumously told and limited by narrative choice, Emily's predisposition for this condition is only partially revealed. In fact, the reader receives only minimal clues about her perversion and is forced to surmise the most critical emotional aspects of her situation. Though not as extreme as necrophagia (eating the dead), Emily's necrophilia manages to isolate her in a conveniently prestigious fashion from the rest of the town. Though she is deemed eccentric, and justifiably so, she is not regarded
as sociopathic—and certainly not as dangerous. When the odor of decay first emanates from her house, the town supportively sprinkles lime for her and casts the blame on rats and a derelict gardener. Her first brush with necrophilism develops over the death of her father. She greets the would-be-mourners "dressed as usual with no trace of grief on her face. She told them that her father was not dead. She did that for three days with the ministers calling on her, and the doctors, trying to persuade her to let them dispose of the body" (CS, p. 124).

Freud discussed this refusal to accept death and he saw it as a method by which the bereaved could postpone the "work of mourning" (severing ties and memories). And Fenichel also elaborates this situation by noting that the victim will often fail to exhibit emotion because he is identifying with the dead person. Emily passes out of this phase, and though this condition is not necessarily sexual, it does contribute to an understanding of Emily's severe later sexual aberration. Specifically, Emily's father has essentially driven off her suitors and is immortalized in local memory as blocking their doorway, "clutching always at horsewhip, with daughter virginal in background." The town responds to the news of his death and her queer behavior with good lay-Freudian sensibleness and by viewing him as one who had "thwarted her woman's life so many times" (CS, p. 127).

We did not say she was crazy then. We believed she had to do that. We remembered all the young men her father had driven away, and we knew that with nothing left, she would have to cling to that which had robbed her, as people will. (CS, p. 124)
Once again there is a suggestion of hereditary causes for her ensuing illness: "her great-aunt, had gone completely crazy" (CS, p. 123). But no direct link is established. What seems more immediately the cause for her "reclusiveness" is her jilting. And from that time on she becomes for the town "dear, inescapable, impervious, tranquil," and perverse.

In her break-up with Homer Barron lies the explanation for her necrophilism. Necrophilism, according to perversion psychologists like Mathis, "represents the highest degree of sexual inferiority." By dealing with a corpse, the necrophile is free to fantasize that he controls the situation. This aspect of the condition accounts for much of Emily's motivation. Emily has been told over and over her family is too "high and mighty" for her suitors. The town, on the other hand, feels she has been too picky for someone with lunacy in the family. Finally, freed of her father, she takes up with a Yankee construction foreman, clearly "beneath" her breeding. Whatever ended her chances for this marriage motivates her frantic measure. Very methodically she buys arsenic to murder him. She then creates the illusion that the wedding is imminent by purchasing a monogrammed man's toilet set, a man's suit and nightshirt.

No further details about her private life are provided until the town invades her house after her death. Then the origin of the odor and the actual fate of Homer Barron are revealed. Emily's necrophilism is uncovered. It is not possible to tell how actively she lay with the corpse, but since the hair on the adjacent pillow is the iron gray of
the aged Emily, it does indicate an ongoing and chronic perversion. She has decorated the room to effect a bridal suite. His collar and tie are placed on the dressing table to seem as if just removed. Rotting Homer is positioned in an embrace, and the dusty pillow next to him is indented. Emily has achieved mastery over her own sex life. Her private world verges on the brink of psychosis (characteristic of necrophilia), where she pretends to live forever her honeymoon night. She has assumed the power in the relationship and cannot be thwarted by father or lover. Again Faulkner reveals his own obsession with the gallery of unravished brides of quietness. The intimation of pathology without the gory details succeeds in throwing the reader back on his own capacity for perverse imagination, for he inevitably must supply graphic scenarios for the sexuality implied by her behavior.

Emily's extreme sexual perversion concludes my discussion of Faulkner's characterizations of deviant behavior. There is sufficient range in his canon to conclude that he was fictionally interested in all manners of sociopathy, crime, addiction, and aberrant sexuality. Together his sociopathic characters all exhibit sufficient symptoms to assume that his creations were intentional and that they were the result of at least some research as well as active observation. Beyond their dramatic function, they imply a whole rhetorical attitude governing communication in a social system—their language system being the product of a conscious decision to resist communal norms.

More Rhetoric and a Pattern of Communication

The characters I have discussed so far all exhibit symptoms of
sociopathologic behavior. Occasionally, the condition described is as mild as cultivated morning-after hangovers. Other times, the situation is pre-meditated rape or murder. The common clinical denominator for almost all of the behavior manifested is an utter disregard for a community-established standard of acceptable behavior. This dimension of sociopathology will have significant impact on the thematic importance of these characters, and it will also suggest another aspect of failed communication, different from the neurotic's distorted communication—repetition, search for sympathetic audience and conversion behavior (body language). The heart of the distortion in sociopathic communication consists of a patent disregard for the general audience and a new kind of gamesmanship that allows the sociopath to indulge his behavior without guilt and, consequently, without prospect of change.

Blotner and many other critics have noted that "the individual's integration into communal life" was a primary theme for Faulkner.67 In sociopathology, this integration is impossible. What substitutes for communality is contact in the shape of games (accounts, face-saving, self-testing [alcoholism], Baudelairian style "cults of self" and secretive acts).

Faulkner's fiction reflects the fact that society functions with a social hierarchy and it is the responsibility of this collectivity to establish rules of behavior, even manners that 1) serve to reinforce membership within a community and 2) preserve "a common transcendent principle of social order."68 Hugh Dalziel Duncan further states, in Communication and Social Order, that a social system experiences
its greatest stress when it is unable (for whatever reason) to communicate in terms of this common transcendent principle." As a community we function on the assumption that loss of a sense of community is tragic and that a person who falls from the fold "will pay any price" to be restored to the circle. So authoritative rules function not only to discipline offenders but also to maintain "solidarity." When a person violates a community rule or norm, resentment stems from a sense of affront to that common body and until restitution is made "The common front of the group is endangered." At the moment of violation, there is a sense that the "transcendental community good" is not being understood or respected by the offender; in other words, he is acting as if the group communication is not being received. This is a Hobbesian principle, and Duncan explains it in the following:

all social organization is really a covenant in which the inferior surrenders his will to the superior because he believes that the superior can guarantee social order. From the view of the ruler, crimes, whether they are called crimes against nature, God, man, or the state, are not simply disobedience, but a breaking of a covenant that is the sole guarantee of order in a society.

So criminality, drug abuse, and sexual perversion force the violator to disregard a community prohibition, and in so doing threaten the principles on which the social order rests. Punishment is designed to "rehabilitate" or "reeducate" the guilty party so that he understands the need to expiate his guilt in the eyes of the community.

Faulkner frequently employs a narrative "we" that passes judgments and audits behavior on behalf of a "societal good." But since Faulkner
is not always entirely in sympathy with the collective good, the results are fictional irony, comedy, and tragedy. With his own position ambiguous, Faulkner has a hard time "punishing" his evil-doers. And it is interesting to note that in a majority of the deviant cases the fate of punishment a character endures is often not the appropriate one for his offense—Uncle Willy, Popeye, or Mink Snopes, for instance. I think this probably stems from Faulkner's empathy for rebellious and asocial behavior; but it also coincides with his interest in flawed communication. Mink is seduced by Montgomery Ward’s lies; Popeye hangs for the wrong murder because he won’t call for a lawyer; Uncle Willy is victimized by a public rhetoric of "do-goodism."

The basic communicative flaw that undoes society’s sense of hierarchy is the failure of persuasion. Duncan explains that "socialization is communication," and individuals cooperate with the community through a constant internal dialogue by which they persuade themselves "to be what society wants us to be." Thus, failure to act in such a way as society considers socialized—"normal"—constitutes an incomplete act of persuasion.

Faulkner’s sociopaths exhibit this breach in persuasion. Very seldom are any motives for their sociopathic behavior articulated. In other words, the reasoning pattern behind a given act is either denied the reader, as in the case of Emily, or it is revealed as flawed: Jason reveals his motives disjointedly in a ledger—accounts system whereby he attempts to persuade his audience that he is justified in violating communal standards of decent conduct. In other words, the mental
world of the sociopath is very often private. He does not make use of external auditors, but instead engages in private monologues by which he denies or even challenges the community (Uncle Willy and Montgomery Ward, respectively).

This maximizes the aura of isolation and disconnection that surrounds the sociopath's response to the community. Faulkner often has the sociopath response with rigid contempt and his consistent inability to feel that necessary communal solidarity ultimately affects his communication. Efforts at communication made by the sociopath, when he tries at all, function to rationalize and justify affronting behavior.

The face games and accounts systems are the primary methods of articulation. And they often are the vehicles by which the sociopath maintains a "passing" connection with external and confirming others.

But at the root of the games, or of the withdrawal, lies a basic despair. These characters, as they repel, function to remind the reader of personal loneliness and private sectors of isolation. They create a sense of desperate anguish, because even in the horror and aberration they might manifest, they are without hope of redemption. Their sociopathy insists they resist the socialization that could restore a holistic self. And so the constructed worlds they substitute for "normal" reality temporarily ease pain, but simultaneously guarantee impaired emotional health. Duncan speculates that "Perhaps in his self-abasement the masochist is only trying to communicate with others significant yet 'beyond' communication." In essence, "no self exists, or knows itself, save in the presence of another."73 The sociopath
effectively denies the reality of a meaningful other: no messages in; no messages out.

Beyond the despair these characters can engender by reminding readers of their humanity, they also tend to excite and energize the fiction through the nature of the negative/anti-social messages they communicate. The decision to violate a standard of behavior obviously ratifies a need in the sociopath; but it functions to excite the onlooker. Jason's pettiness, Popeye's cruelty, Mr. Compson's cynicism all have the potential to horrify the reader by the shock of recognition or arrest his attention by their dramatically existential indulgences. Each standard, Duncan explains, exists as a limit, a warning; beyond that warning there is "novelty, risk, and danger." The need to continually flout convention suggests a rigidity that warrants a pathology; but in the assertion of individual will there is an acknowledgement of triumph. Faulkner is kinder towards these characters than society might expect him to because he experienced his own extended isolation and had to regard himself as a victim of the creative self isolated by a society that did not, could not, and should not accept "deviance" among the artists. The rejection becomes a positive tension that stimulates.

This is the final phase of sociopathologic communication. It is reflected by the characters, but embodied in the artist and his work as a whole. In Dewey's theory of art as communication, the value of literature as a document that gives voice to the tantalizing aspects of asocial and antisocial behavior is explained. The juxtaposition of the "precarious, novel, irregular" and the "settled, assured, and
uniform" is possible. Art yokes the ordered and complete aspects of nature with the "uncertain, contingent, novel, particular." In this dual possibility man is allowed to witness in liberation the new and even dangerous, while being reminded always what the climax of this experience will be: "instrumentality" and "consummation." Besides providing a place for the acceptable expression and experimentation with the forbidden as privately realized and as socially experienced, art serves as the battlefield for the artist and his society. Specifically, I am talking about the function of art as a societally deemed sociopathic activity—or what Ronald J. Silvers calls "The modern artist's asociability." Silvers feels that the dynamic tension established through societal response to art and avant-garde artistic messages is a necessary impetus to creativity. Faulkner was victim and celebrant of this traditional problem of communication. He loathed and cherished the sobriquet of "Count No Count" and craved the life of the poet. He was on a small, private scale (family response) considered "a professional deviant," and in fact did much to contribute to his own mythology as asocial. In addition, he was a spokesman in his career for "aesthetic immorality": "Good art can come out of thieves, bootleggers, or horse swipes"; and "If a writer has to rob his mother, he will not hesitate; the 'Ode on a Grecian Urn' is worth any number of old ladies." In Silver's analysis many of his assessments seem particularly true of Faulkner as an artist. Faulkner endured the sociopathologic consequences of modern art's defining disregard for society's approval. First, Silvers maintains that "The artist's emphasis on his own ego as the source
of experience and his exclusive concern with his personal freedom stand in opposition to the expected forms of social responsibility." Though Faulkner is not as extreme in his position as the abstract expressionists were in isolating art from all concerns of society, he did champion the artist's right and duty to dare and to be free—to create his own tradition rather than to serve society's needs for tradition. The subtexts on Faulkner's most familiar statements on artistic freedom are all compatible with the notion that the artist must be estranged from society. Once he has determined his own "integrity" he no longer needs integration with the community and he is finally free to create. Though this sounds negative in its alienation, it is another case where pathology is reinterpreted as a positive force since it permits, as John Ferren wrote in Arts, "the possibility of unknown gestures."81

Another related modern malady of art as communication that occurs in Faulkner's writing is the "cynical response to public acceptance." Silvers claims that "the accusation of 'unintelligibility' and the other labels of aesthetic immorality are regarded by the artist as evidence of success in presenting new systems of morality, values, and social reality. . . . Baziotes remarks, 'I have a horror of being easily understood.'"82 Faulkner expressed similar views on the obligation of the artist to be understood: when asked if Joyce and Eliot were right to create their own languages Faulkner responded, "He has the right to do that provided he don't insist on anyone understanding it. . . . Well, the writer, actually, that's an obligation that he assumes with his
vocation, that he's going to write in a way that people can understand it. He doesn't have to write it the way that every idiot can understand it--every imbecile in the third grade can understand it."  

When the modern artist suspects he has compromised the integrity of his position and sees "the lines of complacency" in the mirror; Baziotes says he should "smash the mirror and whip himself into despair. A despair that only the madman in the cage can ever know."  

This "despair" previously connected with the condition of sociopathology is fastened to the true artist, too, since he must live with it in isolation and fear it if it indicates a pending connection through compromise. Silvers identifies it as the artist's need "to be cut off from others" at all costs.  

Faulkner addressed this issue when asked if the American artist is a part of society today. Faulkner replied that connection was possible if the artist had another occupation--farmer, lawyer. But for "the people who are literary and nothing else. . . . they have no place in the culture."  

And as for the despair, Faulkner saw it as a product of compromise, too, when the artist is second-rate because "he has already sold his soul for a swimming pool."  

And a final affinity Faulkner shares with the asocial personality of the twentieth-century, "modern," artist is the sense that his isolation allows him to generate an ever-evolving moral system. Silvers explains the creative process with the following:

The creative process is expected to include mistakes, accidents, and spontaneous, unplanned expressions. . . . Thus the modern artist admits his inability to determine the terminal state of an art work and indirectly the completeness of the moral statement. Some artists suggest
that the meaning is continuous through a number of art works. . . . For all modern artists, the most basic, dynamic creative elements of their substantial self prevent them from completing a moral system. 89

This same notion of evolution and change is basic to Faulkner's thinking about his work and even criticism of that work: "I think . . . it [criticism] is a symptom of change, of motion, which is life; and it's a proof that literature--art--is a living quantity in our social condition" 90; or when accounting for literary variations in subsequent appearances of his characters, he said: "The inconsistencies in the appendix prove that to me the book is still alive after 15 years, and being still alive is growing, changing; the appendix was done at the same hear as the book, even though 15 years later, and so it is the book itself which is inconsistent: not the appendix." 91

Finally, Faulkner, while believing in "decency" and the truths of the human heart, favored a sort of refined wickedness, an asociability and disregard for "society" that would save the art and the artist. He saw in the daring of deviance the possibility of resisting conformity and conventionality. He defended the right of individuality for his characters and for himself:

... the rapacious people--if they're not careful--they are seduced away and decide that what they've got to have is respectability, which destroys one, almost anybody. That is, nobody seems to be brave enough anymore to be an out-and-out blackguard or rascal, that sooner or later he's got to be respectable, and that finishes it. . . .

Respectability is an artificial standard which comes from up here. That is, respectability is not your concept or my concept. It's what we think is
Jones's concept of respectability.  

Sociopathology as Personal Metaphor

The three aspects of sociopathy—criminality, drug abuse, sexuality—all have some relevance to Faulkner's life, and so this personality disorder serves as a workable metaphor for the personal elements which contributed to his fiction. In the previous section of the chapter, I discussed how art and sociopathology co-mingle to define each other. In this section, I will look at the aspects of authorial personality that connects with the fiction on the subject. In The Dynamics of Literary Response, Norman N. Holland claims that "in theory a writer's biography ought to be able to read back from his subject's preferred formal devices to the defenses they represent to the circumstances in life that charged those defensive modes with pleasurable possibilities." This serves to explain the energy and exquisiteness of a rhetorical style essentially in the service of deviant behavior. Thus, the startling image of iron gray hair on a pillow manages to shock and mystify. It is exceedingly suggestive, but controlled, reserved despite its possibility for stampeding horror: aberrant fantasy defended by understated imagery and stark rhetoric. It would seem, then, that Faulkner could discharge his private "abnormal" tendencies into the development of characters that explore realms of taboo denied to family man and acclaimed genius. This allows for gratifying emotional release and pleasurable rhetorical production.

Skura points to the imaginative connections that the artist makes
consciously and unconsciously. The relevance of this to Faulkner can be seen in the transformations by the author of his life and his dreams. Wittenberg occasionally talks about specific parallels between Faulkner's fictional constructs and his personal dilemmas: "Popeye and Horace Benbow are each artistic reifications of serious psychological problems that Faulkner was facing even as he wrote the novel." Holland defines the connection as a matter of "coherent stylistics;" i.e., life and writings are stylistically related. And he claims that it is "possible to read back from literary style to lifestyle." He cautions, naturally, that there is not necessarily a perfect correspondence between literary event and life experience, but that it is possible to use the texts to discover "habitual patterns of fantasy and defense" that are generated from psyche and combine to produce a unique myth. Faulkner's recurrence to epicene women, incest triads, isolated women, all testifies to distinguishing preoccupations. Often the myth for Faulkner is sociopathic and the style reinforces the alienation and rigidity of the condition. This would also suggest that the more control Faulkner personally had over a forbidden subject, the easier it could be handled stylistically. I think Faulkner had no impulses toward necrophilia personally, however intrigued he might have been by the prospect of utter sexual dominance. The result of this distancing produced an almost explosive tour of aberrant etiology conjoined with a scathing look at community notions of "respectability." On the other hand, "Golden Land" flounders about in search of the distinctive moment that resolves all things fictionally. Instead of achieving the impact of
"A Rose for Emily," it draws its character, evokes a mood, suggests the imprisonment of alcohol and success and emotional isolation, and falters. The difference is that for Faulkner there were no easy solutions or epiphemic moments to be derived from alcoholism, only a need to keep exploring it personally and fictionally.

Delinquency is the first aspect of the sociopathologic metaphor; it is clearly an element in Faulkner's personality, but a very minor and controlled element. The effect of this on the fiction is that his delinquent characters are always redeemed by humor, though the laughter may be dark and painful. Jason's candor about the noble Compson lineage (Benjy as Jackson's star freshman) makes him human and frail and sympathetic at the same time that the reader recognizes that this is the same character that turns Benjy into the All-American gelding. So Faulkner's delinquents tend to occupy a twilight world between the comic and ironic visions that Roy Schafer delineates in *A New Language for Psychoanalysis.* 98 Jason inspires comedy because he is an antagonist "found to be rigid and ridiculous rather than evil and truly dangerous . . . [somehow] open to self-improvement." 99 The degree of his blackness is questionable. The other characters in the other categories are virtually void of humor relief and are nearly oppressive in their unrelieved despair.

Other occasions for Faulkner's delinquency seem Tom Sawyerish: his refusal to sort mail on schedule; his anecdotal scapegoating about the alcohol: "learned medicinal value of his [grandfather's] liquor. Grandfather thought the janitor did it. Hard on janitor" 100 and his
anti-temperance campaign; and even hiring a nurse to follow him around Hollywood on a drinking binge. In fact, much of his Hollywood behavior certified his image as incorrigible, irresponsible, and anti-social. And he added to this image by the assorted lies he told, maintained and regretted regarding his RAF career. Though he once accounted for his peculiar behavior by claiming he had a silver plate in his head that made him drink, Faulkner offered the best summation of this aspect of his personality in *Mosquitoes*. And in its self-deprecating humor, it illustrates perfectly the intersection of life and art in sociopathy:

"He was a white man, except he was awful sunburned and kind of shabby dressed—no necktie and hat. . . . He said he was a liar by profession, and he made good money at it, enough to own a Ford as soon as he got it paid out. I think he was crazy. Not dangerous: just crazy."/"What was his name? Did he tell you?"/"Yes. It was. . . . Wait. . . . Oh yes, I remember—Faulkner, that was it." (M, p. 145)

Faulkner's addiction to alcohol was marked by conspicuous consumption and, at times, flamboyant inebriation. Robert Coughlan did his share to perpetuate many of the alcohol anecdotes, and in the recent PBS production on his life a considerable portion of the film was devoted to clarification of alcohol apocrypha. Faulkner embellished some of his own tales, like falling drunk from a borrowed polo poney and awakening to "Darryl Zanuck's teeth bendin' over me." And many of his toast-master quips had to do with alcohol: "There is no such thing as bad whiskey. There's just some whiskies better than others." But there is more truth than sad irony in Sherwood Anderson's remark on the subject: "He drinks pretty hard. . . . I'm sure they don't all drink
like that all the time. They couldn't." Without question, Faulkner had an addiction to alcohol. Blotner calls it a "volitional alcoholism," and he, along with Wittenberg and Minter, document Faulkner's childhood frustrations which all corroborate the incipient personality structure of an alcoholic. From the drinking of heel taps to the timed binge-retreat he took before the Nobel Prize ceremonies, Faulkner depended on alcohol for escape—from marital discord, family responsibility and tragedy, the loss of his mistress Meta, and professional unhappiness. And most of his "collapses," his euphemism, were plotted with steely and frightening deliberation, and often they resulted in hospitalization. The drinking served, as Blotner notes, to link him with a tradition of Southern manhood. It also functioned as an analgesic, mitigating his social shyness. Further, it could sufficiently incapacitate him and allow him to avoid unpleasant responsibilities.

The final dimension of the sociopathic metaphor is sexual deviance. It would be a risky critical business to assert too much about the author's personal problems here since the only authenticating documents are Meta Carpenter's reminiscences. From her memoir only a few items can be stated with much assurance. First, Faulkner's sexuality was highly complex. His own assessment probably serves as the best diagnosis: "Do you know what the trouble is with me? I'm a puritan." This puritan side would take the shape of winsome romantic gestures like spreading Carpenter's bed with gardenia and jasmine petals. Fictionally, the puritan Faulkner would treasure the childlike innocence of the early
Caddy Compson, letting her fill the void for his lost daughter, Alabama. His fictionally notorious characters, Temple say, were more than adequately counterpointed by the virginal and epicene girls, particularly in the early poetry and fiction. The tension between that puritan self and the "raging sexuality" of the figure Carpenter projects makes the condition of sexual deviance plausible, but finally not explainable. Suffice it to say that by writing of his own mistress as "a sweet, tremulous girl" and also a mistress with "body sweet to fuck," Faulkner could tap richly diverse private resources for his fictional sexuality. The result for readers would be sexual types as distinct as Rosa Coldfield and Eula Varner Snopes.

The tripartite grouping of sociopathy works as personal metaphor because it successfully manages to explain Faulkner's often violent asociality, his addiction to alcohol, and his consistently disturbed romantic entanglements. Faulkner claimed that "By temperament I'm a vagabond and a tramp" and insisted that it wouldn't hurt a good writer "to be involved with alcohol, or with gambling or anything." He championed, instead, an integrity of the art work itself and the artist's responsibility first, last, and only to that work. This indifference to public favor extended to even influential places of publication like The American Mercury. When the editors asked him to give biographical notes to accompany his short story, Faulkner instructed his friend and agent, Ben Wasson, "Don't tell the bastards anything. It can't matter to them. Tell them I was born of an alligator and a nigger slave at the Geneva Conference two years ago.
Or whatever you want to tell them.\textsuperscript{114}

Artistically, he insisted on dissociation from his public, and even among his close friends he maintained a reserve, an inaccessibility. And in his social behavior—escaping parties by trellis, drinking to excess, pointed rudeness—it seems he preferred to reserve the energy needed for intimacy for his fictional world. In that realm, he could exorcise and explore his private demons, and by harnessing their energy cast a shadow. But even in the relief and release he found in writing there remains a sense of pain akin to an artistic masochism. His statement about the role of art for the Southerner does much to explain the conflict, plus the bibliotherapeutic function of the fiction, and it simultaneously reveals the Sisyphus quality inherent in art drawn from and about sociopathy:

\begin{verbatim}
We seem to try in the single
furious breathing (or writing)
span of the individual to draw
a savage indictment of the contemporary
scene or to escape from
it into a make-believe region . . .
each course is a matter of violent
partisanship, in which the writer
unconsciously writes into every
line and phrase his violent despairs
and rages and frustrations or his
violent prophecies [sic] of still more violent
hopes... I do not believe there lives
the Southern writer who can
say without lying that writing
is any fun to him. Perhaps
we do not want it to be.
\end{verbatim}
ENDNOTES


3. Hillman, p. 56.


11. Cashdan, p. 35.

12. Cashdan, p. 35.


15 An aside at this point seems useful. Though it is agreed clinically that genetics are not the dominant source for criminal behavior, it is telling that Faulkner makes the Indians the offspring of Byron Snopes. Byron is invested with a predictable criminal history. He has written the pornographic letters that tantalize Narcissa and aid in her blackmailing. His career climaxes in the embezzlement of bank funds and his fitting departure—he hightails it to Texas and points south. This escape makes it possible for him to serve Faulkner as a catalytic grotesque. Though Byron is a minor deviant, he is an ongoing link for the Snopes chronicles of maladjustment.


17 Clinard and Quinney, pp. 29-32.

18 Blotner, Biography, p. 1524.

19 Blotner, Biography, p. 1178.

20 Blotner, Biography, p. 1525.


22 Scott and Lyman, p. 97.


24 Scott and Lyman, p. 102.

26 Wittenberg, p. 184.

27 Wittenberg, p. 184.

27a Goode, p. 41.

27b Goode, p. 47.

28 Scott and Lyman, p. 90.

29 Scott and Lyman, p. 91.

30 Scott and Lyman, p. 93.

31 Scott and Lyman, p. 93.

32 Scott and Lyman, p. 94.

33 Cashdan, p. 42.

34 Cashdan, p. 38.


36 Bateson, p. 329.

37 Goode, p. 277.

38 Bateson, p. 320.
39 Bateson, p. 322.

40 Wittenberg, p. 45.

41 Bateson, p. 322.

42 Bateson, p. 326.

43 Guerard, p. 114.

44 Wittenberg, p. 166.

45 David Minter, Faulkner Manuscripts, p. 111.


49 Kris, p. 39.


52 Fenichel, p. 325.

53 Freud, SE, VII, 165.

55 Fenichel, p. 326.

56 Fenichel, p. 327.

57 Freud, SE, XVII.

58 Wittenberg, p. 47.

58a Fenichel, p. 71.

59 Freud, SE, VII.

59a Wittenberg, p. 122.


61 Fenichel, p. 351.

62 Fenichel, p. 356.

63 Fenichel, p. 71.

64 Freud, SE, XIV, 252-7.

65 Fenichel, p. 394.

66 Mathis, p. 201.
67 Blotner, p. 761.


69 Duncan, pp. 279-280.

70 Duncan, p. 272.

71 Duncan, p. 290.

72 Duncan, p. 279.

73 Duncan, p. 297.

74 Duncan, p. 267.


76 Kris, p. 37.


79 Stein, p. 124.

80 Silvers, p. 419.

82 Silvers, p. 423.

83 Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, pp. 52-53.


85 Silvers, p. 423.

86 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 104.

87 Stein, p. 125.

88 Silvers, p. 428.

89 Silvers, pp. 428-29.

90 Stein, p. 124.


92 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 32.


94 Skura, pp. 127-133.

95 Wittenberg, p. 90.


99 Schafer, p. 27.

100 Blotner and Meriwether, p. 7.

101 Blotner, p. 556.


103 Coughlan, p. 88.

104 Blotner, p. 714.

105 Blotner, p. 105.


107 Blotner, p. 493.


109 Blotner, p. 567.

110 Wilde and Borsten, p. 78.

111 Wilde and Borsten, p. 75.

112 Stein, p. 135.

113 Blotner and Gwynn, p. 24.
114 Blotner, p. 655.

115 Blotner, p. 811.
IV. Psychoses and other "mere" anarchies of the mind: "Nobody's here"

"Split lives never 'get well'"

Emily Dickinson

"imaginary evil is romantic and varied,
while real evil is gloomy, monotonous, barren,
boring" Simone Weil.

"I think that a writer is a perfect case of
split personality."

William Faulkner (May 7, 1958)

In *The Group*, Mary McCarthy outlines a status system in insanity by having a manic-depressive point out that "all neurotics are petty bourgeois. . . . We madmen are the aristocrats of mental illness."¹ Though the assessment is poetic and wry, this sentiment seems well-founded. Neuroses, because of their basis in infantile sexuality, seem relatively sordid, more ominous than frightening; sociopathology by definition embraces the riff-raff as well as criminals. But psychotics belong to a small exclusive club, and their lives are invested with a special kind of passion. They are, as a rule, not able to pass socially. They exist precariously, courting incarceration or even suicide. They live constantly on the brink of social destruction and self-annihilation.

Predictably, a low percentage of Faulkner's pathological characters exhibit genuine psychotic or pre-psychotic tendencies. *Light in August* seems overrun with religious fanatics, MacEachern, Hines, the Burdens. Yet, though MacEachern and the Burdens are rigid, even cruel, they are not fanatical in the way Hines is. Similarly, though Vardaman's behavior has been attributed to idiocy,² and he is certainly bereaved, he is
not a victim of mourning psychoses like Rider or Bayard Sartoris. And for the final area of psychoses, schizophrenia, only Darl Bundren is a candidate.

Faulkner's only comment on psychosis as a mental condition came during his interviews at Virginia. He assumed a liberal attitude and ended up arguing for the link between madness and a kind of genius:

"Who can say how much of the good poetry in the world has come out of madness, and who can say how much of super-perceptivity the—a mad person might not have? It may not be so, but it's nice to think there is some compensation for madness. That maybe the madman does see more than the sane man. That the world is more moving to him. That he is more perceptive. He has something of clairvoyance, maybe, a capacity for telepathy."  

It is in the same lecture that Faulkner further describes Darl as "completely off his rocker," "progressively madder" and "mad all the time." He then adds up these reasons to account for Darl as the most beautiful speaker in As I Lay Dying. Faulkner's unsatisfactory notion of compensatory madness in no way, however, negates the perceptivity of the characterizations. And part of this chapter will be aimed at restoring Darl's status as "aristocrat," a position that has been challenged by Leon F. Seltzer and generalized, abstracted, and underrated by William J. Handy and William Rossky. These characters are endowed with realistic emotional disabilities and thus become more than poet-madmen, or avatars of evil, or doomed romantic heroes; it is possible then to discover underlying connections in their emotional devastation and fictional impact. All represent extremely disordered
thinking, which in turn leads to fatally impaired communication. And as victims of mental disease, they suggest a metaphor for tragedy—an introversion of communication that traps each character within himself and results in an emotional/social death. The fictional effect of such a powerfully debilitating pathology is communal pathos. The reader witnesses the tragedy Faulkner describes for each. They are bifurcated souls, wracked by delusion, and imprisoned within a self that has severed its precarious connection with reality. The imaginative pathology inherent in psychoses serves best, as Foucault describes it, to create a rift in the modern world: "by the madness which interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a moment of silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where the world is forced to question itself." ⁵

Freud distinguished neurosis from psychosis by their respective fields of conflict. Neuroses present a conflict between ego and id that results in a repression of libido. The aspect of the libido that is repressed eventually reemerges in a reversed and symbolic form. This reshaped and masked desire constitutes a symptom and ultimately impairs the conscious personality. Perversion, an interregnum stage of pathologic disturbance, also stems from a need to repress, but the emergence of the impulse is less "deformed," and consequently more immediately satisfying, though less socially acceptable. In psychosis, the conflict shifts to ego versus external reality; i.e., some part of outer reality is denied, and thus lost. ⁶ Paul Schilder summarizes the differences between neurosis and psychosis by saying that in all cases of psychosis
the ego's relation to the external world is more severely impaired. 7

The first division of psychoses pertinent to an understanding of
Faulkner's characterization is manic-depressive psychosis, formerly
melancholia-mania. In his 1917 study of the subject Freud explained
the pathological nature of melancholia. He considered mourning over
the loss of a loved one a natural response; but melancholia, according
to Freud, is distinguished by "profoundly painful dejection, cessation
of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, in-
hibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings
to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings,
and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment." 8 In this
condition the victim experiences acute hostility which is directed both
at the self, and at the lost love object which has, as Schilder explains
it, been chosen narcissistically. 9 The masochistic exhibition of
hostility is central to melancholia, because Freud stresses that this
"impoverishment of the ego on a grand scale" centers the loss internally
rather than externally. This highly diminished self-regard accounts
for the near suicidal stress the melancholic will subject himself to—
no nourishment, sleeplessness. 10 And Freud remarks also on the de-
pressive psychotic's "insistent communicativeness" which makes him want
to expose himself to others in what he considers his utter unworthiness
to remain alive. Typically, the aspect of personality called in for
contempt is a feature possessed by the loved one; but it has been ap-
propriated for self-scorning purposes by the melancholic. In truly
pathologic cases the object of melancholy despair having been chosen
narcissistically allows the masochism to become a pleasurable way of expressing the psychotic’s hatred for his lost love. On this issue, Freud believed that “sadism alone . . . solves the riddle of the tendency to suicide which makes melancholia. . . . so dangerous.”

Occasionally, melancholia presents itself as part of a unified structure with mania. When melancholy transforms into mania, Freud speculated that the energy previously "bound" or allocated for painful suffering is liberated. But he stressed that this explanation was strictly "tentative.""

Faulkner’s two manic depressives manifest both the pathologic depression and the subsequent mania. Bayard Sartoris exhibits the fullest range of symptoms, particularly the masochistic need to punish himself in a fashion that parallels the death of his twin brother. And the narcissistic connection between the two, were it not for Faulkner’s pervasive interest in doubles, seems almost a Freudian plant to achieve perfectly clinical symptoms.

Not only is Sartoris replete with melancholy-mania, it also has Narcissa functioning semi-symbolically. As Bayard’s ignored wife, she serves as an ironic reminder of where Bayard’s real passion rests. Bayard suffers all the acute symptoms of melancholia: he is dejected, only tangentially, and temporarily linked to the outside world; he is without love for his surviving family; and he is self-destructive. Faulkner stresses his coldness, his face frequently like a deathmask; he craves death. His melancholy is accompanied by a mania—for speed and destruction. Though Aunt Jenny keeps claiming historical reckless-
ness as the basis for Bayard's behavior, the text offers too much

evidence of personality dissolution to think Faulkner was not aware of
Bayard's psychopathological state.

First, there is the obvious attachment to a brother, especially a
twin. The narcissistic obsession is clearly there and exacerbated by
the problematics surrounding John's death. John has died the glori-
ous, cavalier's death by being shot down in air-battle. He thumbs his
nose at his brother, kicks his plane out of the way, and leaps
impossibly feet first to his death. Bayard is helpless to defend Johnny
and equally helpless to save him. But he has a "need" to see him fall,
and in his account to Narcissa he recounts his frantic and futile search
to sight Johnny as he comes through the clouds. Implied in his sadistic-
masochistic rebelling is an enormous sense of guilt: why should one twin
die and the other live? He brutally forces Narcissa to listen to the
excruciating reenactment, and even bruises her wrists. He is resting
in a position injurious to his recently broken ribs, and Narcissa
scolds him. The torturing of his ribs at this point metaphorically
embodies the effect of the death tale on his psyche. Her analysis of
Bayard's need to rewound himself physically and spiritually closely
approximates Freud's explanations of the melancholic's need to "expose"
himself as both brute and unworthy survivor:

"You'll break your ribs again."
"Yes," he agreed . . .
"That's the trouble, right there," she said. "That's
the way you act: doing things that—that—you
do things to hurt yourself just to worry people. You
don't get any fun out of doing them."

.................................
"You're all twisted. You'll never get well
if you don't behave yourself. . . ." (S, p. 220).

All the natural affections in Bayard are stifled. His physical
presence is always "cold," "chill," corpse-like. He feels no love for
Narcissa, and Miss Jenny claims that "He doesn't love anybody. He
won't even love the baby. He doesn't seem to be glad, or sorry, or
anything" (S, p. 254). The only warmth or passion Bayard exhibits is
in connection with Johnny. Faulkner describes Johnny as the "ghost"
between Bayard and Narcissa, haunting them even in the marriage bed
(S, p. 253). When Bayard sorts through Johnny's things he experiences
the only "intimation of life and of warmth" that can stir him emotion-
ally. He fondles Johnny's canvas coat and calls Johnny's name, finally
laying his face against it, "defiantly and deliberately" (S, p. 190).

The appeals of the external world serve only to stiffen his re-
solve in isolation. When he seeks refuge from the guilt he feels for
his grandfather's death, Bayard half expects "a hand, no matter whose,
to touch him out of his black chaos" (S, p. 274). But at the same time,
his melancholy will force him to "spurn it." Such an incursion he feels
would "restore his cold sufficiency again" (S, p. 274).

Beyond Bayard's "bronze mask" demeanor (S, p. 213) and his total
lack of "affection for anything at all" (S, p. 217), his self-recrimina-
tion is severe. He relives and speculates on the crash and his throat
fills with vomit (S, p. 182). His sense of responsibility for his
grandfather's death forces him to admit the underlying cause for his
acute depression: "You did it! You caused it all; you killed Johnny"
(§, p. 264). This severe guilt fuels his utter apathy for life. He laments the "Three score and ten years" he must "drag a stubborn body about the world... And he was only twenty-six. Not much more than a third through it. Hell" (§, p. 148). This death instinct is linked by Bayard to Johnny's death. He even wondered if "Perhaps he was dead" (§, p. 272). For Bayard, as he constantly reviews Johnny's crash, "trying to remember, feel, a bullet going into his own body or head that might have slain him at the same instant" (§, p. 272), believes that his death would solve much. It would free him of guilt, responsibility, and the burdens of life. Then he could explain the horror of his current state: "that he too was dead and this was hell, through which he moved for ever and ever... seeking his brother who in turn was somewhere seeking him, never the two to meet" (§, p. 272).

Bayard is emotionally damaged and divided. The degree of his melancholy is underscored in his maniacal pursuit of destruction. Both the speeding car and the airplane are just means by which he hopes to expiate his guilt for being the one who lived. Faulkner invokes the plane again as the necessary vehicle for Bayard to fully punish himself as his infirm psyche demands. Freud stated that in the "clinical picture of melancholia, dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds is the most outstanding feature."13 Bayard seems intent on revealing himself to his family as guilty and unworthy. He courts the contempt of others.

Bayard's melancholy parallels clinical description even in his repeated bouts of insomnia. Although a mild form of revenge on self
when compared to the suicidal tendencies Bayard indulges, insomnia is
another self-tormenting device. Melvin Backman discusses Bayard's
"'instinct,'" his "dark suicidal force." Backman locates the novel's
"strange power" in a subterranean tension between Bayard's will to live
and his death instinct. Without calling it melancholy, Backman notes
the essential features of the emotional disorder, including the need
for self-violence. He sees the condition more as an "alienation from
humanity" and, even more traditionally, as "the inevitable enactment of
the Sartoris doom."14 While both of these elements are crucial to the
novel, to generalize about Bayard as "sick" diminishes the psychological
impact a walking doomed man invests the novel with. Backman prefers to
play up the constant motion reflected in Bayard's activity. But by
identifying his behavior with a specific psychosis, Faulkner makes the
character more believable. Because of the Sartoris legend, Bayard has a
tendency to become a walking abstraction. He could easily resemble the
ghostly heroes that people Miss Jenny's recollections. By investing his
character with psychosis, Faulkner makes Bayard painfully human. By
using the resources of psychopathological personality, Faulkner trans-
cends mere characterizations of ill-health. Though it is useful to see
Bayard as an emotionally disturbed individual, his psychosis affects
the thematics and aesthetics of the novel. In authenticating his
personality, psychosis reifies the particulars of Bayard's soul. To
understand Bayard's depression is to legitimate his melodramatic quest
for doom. The accounting is no longer histrionics but tragic patho-
logy. And to see the fullness of his characterization is to appreciate
Faulkner's own involvement with inner conflict. More importantly, by afflicting Bayard with psychosis, Faulkner reveals early an interest in psychopathology that frighteningly denies a man the possibility of any human intimacy. Bayard cannot be comforted or redeemed because his disorder denies him the possibility of explaining his guilt, his pain, and his need for more pain. The emotional show is essentially mime, and Bayard figuratively must wear a mask that makes his motives and his behavior forever enigmatic.

A fellow sufferer of melancholia is Rider in "Pantaloon in Black." Rider's experience of pathologic mourning is much more compact and intense and he moves from expected grief to hallucinatory melancholy to suicidal mania in a matter of days.

Rider presents a detailed portrait of the bereavement crisis. His marriage was predicated on an absolutist philosophy; i.e., having chosen Mannie he immediately and utterly devotes himself to the connubial life. His decision to read "the sign" as a call to posthumous reunion is implemented with the same absolute intensity. Having decided on a course of self-destruction, Rider's unreasonable behavior indicates that he has elected to end by any means the acute pain of loss.

The story proper has essentially two movements. The reader first experiences Rider attempting to cope with his loss. He does so through manic physical activity. He shovels dirt on her grave; he is the most active and flamboyant worker at the mill. These attempts fail and he rejects the comfort offered by his family. He indulges his emotional isolation and continues to experience the world as if Mannie were still
alive: as he walks the familiar route to their cabin, "his body breathing the air her body had vacated, his eyes touching the objects—post and tree and field and house and hill—her eyes had lost" (GDM, p. 137).

Once home where memories of Mannie are strongest, Rider experiences what is known as post-bereavement hallucination which is not particularly unusual for widowers who had been happily married. In a study of this grieving phenomenon, W. Dewi Rees discovered that there is a fairly high incidence of this experience, and it usually takes the form of "a sense of presence." For Faulkner, making use of Negro superstitions, Mannie is seen "wawkin." He longs to go with her, but "the will of that bone and flesh to remain alive" is very strong (GDM, p. 141). After this pivotal revelation—Rider wants to be with Mannie enough to die himself—the story takes on a different manic quality. He is no longer in search of a way to displace the grief. He opts for regression and for a primitive release that will defeat his physically sound body's will to live. His acute emotional anguish brings about a state of mind that prefers death to existence in the face of excruciating personal tragedy. With emotional reserves exhausted, he sets out on a manic course that will thwart his will to life indirectly: he provokes his own "suicide." His psychological disintegration after the hallucination is rapid. He "wolfs" unpalatable food and resembles his dog, which he claims Mannie loved on equal terms with himself. The comfort reextended by his kin again is rejected and he "wolfs" the pie they send. He finds himself "leading to invent to himself reasons for breathing" (GDM, p. 145).
After stoking himself with whiskey, he nearly foreordains his fate. He experiences the mania that occurs when the victim is detached from grief and realizes that "he would be gone in a moment" (GDM, p. 150). He becomes "without either grief or amazement" (GDM, p. 150). When he crashes the poker game he speaks metaphorically of being "snake bit and bound to die"; and shortly, he claims "Ah'm snake bit and the pizen can't hawm me" (GDM, p. 152). Clearly this sense of being beyond pain or suffering is a product of manic response. In some ways, his will to self-destruction makes him as a man already dead. By accusing the leader of the gambling circle he courts a showdown. After the murder, when he is being hauled off to jail, he repeats over and over, "Ah aint trying to get away" (GDM, p. 158). When the jail brawl breaks out he is hysterically bemused by his inability to surrender to the lynching, but he is finally overtaken and hung. His escape from psychotic grief is achieved by his own self-destructive design.

The story is more important than just an intimate look at someone who chooses "the nothing" over "the grief." Rider's pathological grieving is framed by the jailer's telling of the story to his cranky wife. The jailer is totally unsympathetic. He reads Mannie's feverish and turbulent behavior as an utter lack of grief. As he tells the story to his wife, he talks about Rider hurriedly shoveling dirt on the barely cold corpse, about his reporting to work early and working a full day without any sign of remorse. The jailer finally concludes that Rider is like all blacks:
"they aint human. They look like a man and they walk on their hind legs like a man, and they can talk and you can understand them and you think they are understanding you, at least now and then. But when it comes to the normal human feelings and sentiments of human beings, they might just as well be a damn herd of wild buffaloes" (GDM, p. 154).

The dramatic irony here is intense since Rider has literally died of grief. The jailer's complete misinterpretation of Rider's deranged mourning fulfills the prophecy in the first paragraph of the story: the chaotic graveyard decorated with "objects insignificant to sight but actually of a profound meaning and fatal to touch, which no white man could have read" (GDM, p. 135; emphasis mine). Here, both the pathology and the meaning are available only to the reader. The whites who profess propriety and humanity are cold and ignorant. The jailer and his wife are widely separated emotionally as he sanctimoniously passes judgment on the fatally grieving Rider. In this case, Rider's psychosis is again a source of energy and dignity because it is founded on a love so intense it challenges existence itself. And it is tragic, not only in its fatality, but in its complete failure to communicate itself to any significant audience.

The elevation of Rider to psychotic love-martyr is possible through Faulkner's manipulation of point-of-view. As a result, he is able to show the tragically anguished side of psychoses. But he was also interested in the malevolent aspects of this mental disorder—psychological victims who become victimizers, for instance, Doc Eupheus Hines. Almost every critic in Light in August speaks of this character as "fanatical," "crazed," "half-mad." His history, as Faulkner presents
it, is so abridged that he seems nearly one-dimensional. And there is so much competition among the psychopathologic characters in this novel for the center stage that Hines usually gets a critical light gloss. Cleanth Brooks presents the typical focus on Hines by referring to Hines's "definite distortion and perversion" of doctrinaire Calvinism. Brooks further comments on Hines's "bloodcurdling" confidence in his privileged relationship with the Almighty. However, it is this particular manifestation of mental illness that once again triggers plot and electrifies Hines's typically brief appearances in the novel. True to form, the energizing powers of psychopathology make Hines's demented speeches about "womanfilth" and "abomination" among the most often quoted rhetorical examples of Faulkner's intense misogyny.

Doc Hines appears to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. This psychosis, frequently developing later in life, is marked by a thought disorder that creates "misinterpretations of reality." In this condition, delusions and hallucinations are common. The paranoid schizophrenic also suffers from disordered thought and speech, as well as compulsions. Doc Hines reveals his delusional system and his agitated paranoid state in his conversations with God. Hines frequently manifests his assurance of divine selection. This sense of appointment is an alternative in psychotic disorder to the other feeling of being plotted against. Hines feels he is an agent for the Lord.

Hines's paranoid schizophrenia shapes itself into a psychotic fanaticism in which he is pitted against his bastard grandchild who
represents not only the sinful foulness of his daughter's lust, but
the heinous offense of interracial sexuality. Kurt Schneider's study
of Psychopathic Personalities locates extreme dogmatism at the heart
of fanatic psychopathy, and diagnoses the fanatic as being in basic
"conflict with life." 19 Hines's beliefs correspond to this description.
He has a rigid and obsessive delusional system regarding Joe Christmas
and women. And his energies are fixated on being a divine agent of
retribution.

A landmark in the study of paranoid schizophrenia was Freud's work
with Dr. Schreber. Basing his analysis on Schreber's own memoirs,
Memoirs of a Nerve Patient (1903), Freud extrapolated an analysis of
dementia paranoides. He also did work on the mechanism of paranoia
itself. 20 Some of Freud's conclusions and speculations have particu-
lar application for the case of Eupheus Hines.

Hines suffers a peculiar conflict of self-esteem. While his sense
of self seem extraordinarily strong in that God communicates with him
and has approved him as an agent in a higher plan, he also has a strong
sense of his own unworthiness. In preaching to the hysterical dietician,
he makes note of his period of persecution at the Lord's hand: "I have
lived under it for five years, watching and waiting for His own good
time, because my sin is greater than your sin" (LA, p. 120). Mrs.
Hines will corroborate Hines's sense of persecution and inadequacy as
she shares their history with Byron. She says that "he was always
fighting. . . . He said he had to fight because he is littler than most
men and so folks would try to put on him" (LA, p. 352). Her diagnosis--
"That was his vanity and his pride"—explains the paradox inherent in Freud's explanation of paranoia. It seems contradictory that out of a sense of persecution a man can develop a megalomania (delusions of grandeur). Freud, however, attempts to find the etiology in a kind of rationalization wherein the paranoid comes to think of himself as a "very exalted personage and worthy of such persecution."21 This explanation further allows for an understanding of the fanatic's chronic sense of conflict with the external world. As the paranoid's internal world is schisming, he still maintains a tangential, and occasionally intersecting, relation with the real world. Freud stresses this as unique to the paranoid disorder and critical to the delusional systems paranoids must generate. According to Freud, "The paranoid perceives the external world and takes into account any alterations that may happen in it, and the effect it makes upon him stimulates him to invent explanatory theories."22

These explanatory theories become available to an audience during the third stage of the paranoia process as Freud defined it—irruption.23 All of Hines's fanatical rhetoric is revealed in his articulation of his delusional systems. As his psychotic behavior manifests itself, Hines reveals a highly systematized, but bizarre scheme. Studies on paranoid schizophrenics have shown that the delusional systems often reveal much "internal consistency once the basic premise is granted."24 For Hines, the operation of God's plan seems quite clear requiring patience, expiation, and aggression, in due time, towards blacks, but the basic tenet is mysterious. Save his refrain of abomination, Hines
only claims authority to kill blacks; no further reason given. Mrs. Hines reports that during their daughter's pregnancy Hines has attended prayer meetings and on one occasion has gone to the pulpit "yelling against niggers, for the white folks to turn out and kill them all" (LA, p. 357).

Accompanying the revelations of Hines's grandiose delusions is his physical deterioration. Even before he speaks there are clues to his psychosis. Repeatedly, Faulkner describes his eyes as "fanatical" and "mad." By the time Byron Bunch is interviewing him, Hines's physiognomy reveals the internal psychological division: "He has been listening now, almost attentively, with that ability of his to flux instantaneously between complete attention that does not seem to hear, and that comalike bemusement in which the stare of his apparently inverted eye is as uncomfortable as though he held them with his hand" (LA, p. 361). This psychological fissuring has created a Hines who manages to pass undetected by the normal world. He is a janitor with wild eyes and wild religious-racial beliefs, and it seems that only his eyes threaten to betray the inner self that is being influenced by delusions of apocalypse. In fact, it is not until he becomes publicly physically aggressive that he becomes a menace sufficient to be weeded out. But by this time, the false self, the face that meets the world in R. D. Laing's description, is irrecoverable. As Hines gives his version of history, his voice reveals the psychosis which has overtaken his personality. Now it is not just his eyes that are mad: "He talks rapidly, his tone plausible, vague, fanatic, speaking of himself
again in the third person" (LA, p. 353). Faulkner reinforces the sense of disembodied self as Hines's story unfolds. With his "bright, mad glare" and a voice "calm and logical... just as jerkily," he discusses in rational tones how God has told him that "I have set you there to watch and guard My will. It will be yours to tend to it and oversee" (LA, p. 351). His voice halts "exactly like when the needle is lifted from a phonograph record by the hand of someone who is not listening to the record" (LA, p. 351). The heightened imagining of Hines's seeming mechanization, his resemblance to a puppet, his psychic immobility all contribute to the characterization of a psychotic development so complete that the original self is "lost".26

In the paranoid schizophrenic's personality structure, there are a few accessory symptoms that have bearing on the power of Hines's rhetorical presence. Clearly, his inverted and fanatical sense of Calvinistic mission have made him a potential danger throughout the novel. But he has managed to function, and he has enslaved his wife by the power of his delusions. This is possible because of what Josef Rudin describes as the difficulty of rooting out sadistic fanatical tendencies when they camouflage themselves in "religious-moral education."27 Normally, rigor, dedication, and austerity are approved of by society; but in fanatic psychosis, the vision that inspires these traits is inappropriate, and its realization becomes a fixated necessity. The result is monomania and it leads to a private alienation so acutely twisted that it ultimately comes to express itself in vitriol and sadistic physical aggression.
So, though Hines's behavior is inevitably suspect, it is either ignored, as with his employers, or it leads to a brainwashing, as with the disturbed dietician: "You hate him too... You knew before the other children started calling him Nigger" (LA, p. 118). Faulkner continually describes Hines's eyes as "fanatical" and "quite mad too." And in an interesting editorial speculation the narrative voice is called upon to note that the dietician fails to notice the demented look in the janitor's eyes, "or perhaps they did not look mad to her" (LA, p. 119). The suggestion of visible signs that pass unnoticed, or which may even be in part shared, make it possible for psychotics to pass socially, and for fanatics to draw followers. Essentially, at this point, the dietician is in an emotional union with Hines, linked by their irrational hatred of the child Joe Christmas. Hines responded to her accusations with all the confidence of ordination: "I knew he would be there to catch you when God's time came. I knew. I know who set him there, a sign and a damnation for bitchery" (LA, p. 119). Hines has an acute sense of mission and of God's handiwork. And as with a good paranoic, all events are incorporated into the design he erroneously sees as operating. So the children at the orphanage are early vehicles for the isolation and annihilation of Christmas. "They knew. I never told them. They knew. They was told, but it wasn't by me. I just waited, on His own good time, when He would see fitten to reveal it to His living world... This is the sign, wrote again in womansinning and bitchery" (LA, p. 120).

The interplay that follows between psychotic janitor and
hysterical dietician affirms the strategies of fanatic behavior. Hines must persuade the dietician of the significance of his mission. Rudin cites several examples of the use of compulsion to persuade in fanaticism. Since the mission is ordained by a higher authority it seems at once irresistible. To personalities susceptible to such appeal—hysterics—this strategy is impressive, but not only is the mission divinely legitimated, but the vessel-agent creates an aura of being "chosen or called."28

The dietician in her fear of Christmas' effect is seduced by Doc Hines's calm, confident, yet mad vision: "Her mad eyes were quite calm, her mad voice patient and calm" (LA, p. 120). His eyes still cold and unseeing will "envelop her"; and to underscore his tangential relation to reality, the eyes at one point are described as "almost human." Hines's early behavior is always measured and controlled. He is shrouded in an ominous sense of waiting and helps generate the novel's entire tone of "something is going to happen."

Hines's psychotic breakdown at the end of the novel provides fine counterpart to Hightower's developing vision of the wheel of humanity. Hines's delusions spring to life. He begins to cackle and he dramatizes his fantasized conversations with God. He characterizes the world as abounding in stink and filth, the product of the pollution of womenflesh. And he ascends to a right hand position with God since "the Lord did not keep His promise hid from His chosen instrument... . . and old Doc Hines kept in touch with God" (LA, p. 365).

Beyond Hines's unique dramatic potential as a paranoid schizophrenic, there are two aspects of this characterization that have
thematic importance for *Light in August*. First is his persecution of Joe Christmas. Hines's fanatical hatred of Joe Christmas has an explanation that once again corroborates the mechanism of paranoia as Freud documented it. Freud viewed the basic representation of paranoia as a contradiction of the statement "'I (a man) love him (a man).'"

This idea is repressed and transformed to "'I hate him'" which is likewise unacceptable to the conscious mind and so is projected, becoming "'He hates (persecutes) me, which will justify me in hating him.'"

When this thought finally reaches an acceptable conscious level, it is stated as follows: "'I do not love him—I hate him because he persecutes me.'" 29 Faulkner speculates on the possibility of understanding this symptom by saying "If the child had been older he would perhaps have thought 'He hates me and fears me. So much so that he cannot let me out of his sight' (LA, p. 129). Though Christmas fails to understand, Faulkner makes sure that the reader is made privy to the dynamics of this mechanism of psychosis. By viewing the basis of Hines's emotional illness as severely disordered thought, he sets the mood for an entire range of cruelties and tragedies that stem from people who are unable to communicate the messages of need and love.

Counterpointing the entire thread of lost identity and sick emotional attachments is the over-fecund Lena Grove, whose messages are comically simple and who amidst a real dilemma (unwed mother) remains emotionally unharrried. The affirmation she represents seems vital to offset the cruelty and persecution of the Christmas plot.

The second thematic tie-in to Freudian analysis is the idea of
homosexuality. The novel is laden with misogynic images and there has been some critical speculation regarding the possibility of Christmas' homosexuality. This is significant in light of the fact that the primary generalization deriving from Freud's study of paranoia was its connection to "passive homosexuality." Though there is no evidence that Hines is homosexually attached to Christmas, his continual diatribes on the abomination of women flesh make his own heterosexuality more than suspect. As a consequence, the incorporation of a paranoid schizophrenic into a novel about troubled sexuality, latent homosexuality, and vicious misogyny is a psychologically and fictionally shrewd decision.

While Doc Hines earns critical consensus as a deranged fanatic, Darl Bundren has attracted much controversy and confused critical response. In fact, Faulkner, in his conception of Darl, has led more than one critic down the primrose path near Jackson. But most critics agree Darl is crazy. There is debate, however, about when it happens, and why.

One critic, J. L. Roberts, uses his evidence to make claims for Darl's sanity despite an insane environment. Leon F. Seltzer made a thorough review of the literature on Darl's psychopathology for Literature and Psychology and stresses that most critics tend to discuss Darl's madness philosophically rather than psychologically. Seltzer builds his case for Darl as a highly flawed mixture of schizoid and hysterical by using Laing's The Divided Self as a sort of checklist. He denies Darl's credibility as a schizophrenic (the most frequent critical
description of him) on the basis "that nowhere in the novel does Faulkner intimate that Darl nourishes his impoverished sense of self on a fantasy life." This view of schizophrenia, though popular, is partially erroneous, certainly not exclusive, and I will advance a case for his psychosis with current definitions, using many of Seltzer's examples to justify Darl as a schizophrenic.

Much of Seltzer's motive in his essay is to deny the validity of Darl as a "coherent" psychopathologic character and to see the novel, in consequence, as severely flawed. Basically, he sees Darl's stream of consciousness as too intellectual to adequately communicate the necessary despair and isolation. Seltzer sees Darl as possessing sufficient control over his defenses, no dissociation of mind and body, and no fracturing of his self-image. Furthermore, Seltzer says Darl does not suffer from delusions or hallucinations. He is simply a highly self-conscious narrator—more psychic than psychotic. Seltzer considers the barn-burning episode an unjustifiable character aberration on Faulkner's part, occurring in a "fictional vacuum," the by-product of an hysterical response rather than the manifestation of psychotic potential.

In order to establish Darl as a schizophrenic, a title both warranted and critical to the overall effect of the novel, it is necessary to establish the context for this diagnosis. Faulkner was writing at a time when pioneer studies on this disorder by Bleuler, Freud, and Jung were readily available. It is not possible to determine how severely Faulkner intended to disable Darl, but there can be no doubt that he intended to chronicle his dissolution. The Darl of the opening chapter
who obsessively tries to place himself precisely in time and space is a radically altered character when he is being transported to the Jackson asylum.

The reader's second encounter with Darl points out his initial poetic lucidity. It also marks him as preternaturally detached from his situation. William T. Handy uses Darl's early description of drinking water from a bucket to make claims for Darl's "strange" sensibility, "the quality of Darl's living awareness." More critical, it seems to me, is the direction of consciousness the passage indicates. Primarily, Darl is already flirting with an overdiffuseness that will successfully threaten his integrity of self. By contrasting Darl's initial overzealous effort at location and description, Darl's second section shows his potential for psychic drift. When asked, "Where's Jewel?"—a difficult question for Darl, given their fraternal rivalry—Darl defers response for four paragraphs. He withdraws himself from the present moment and slips back to early childhood night reveries of mistaking the reflections of stars in the water bucket for the actuality of stars. Even at this stage, he seems a character in isolation, waiting until all the family was asleep to indulge this secret pleasure. None too subtly, this memory is immediately linked to the early stirrings of his masturbatory impulses.

All of these regressive and libidinal memories are evoked by no clear stimulus; and they are all meant to transpire in a brief period. Darl is recalled to the present, answers his question, and begins what will become a typical imaginative process: he projects himself into the
dramatic speculations of what other characters are doing in his absence. The passage imagining Jewel bears marked tonal contrast to his very satisfying reverie of water-drinking before the time he intuited the truth about Jewel's special bond with Addie.

But until Addie dies, Darl remains in control. He is peculiar, but he still retains a sense of boundary; i.e., where he stops and the rest of the world begins. Once Addie is placed in her coffin, Darl's problems of delineating self accelerate. Though he will struggle to find self, he becomes less and less capable of distinguishing his definitive "I am." Faulkner underscores the ominous disintegration of Darl's precarious control with Darl's "empty yourself for sleep" interior monologue. The tone again is borderline frenetic, as Darl with the overcompensatory exactitude of one who feels his control tottering attempts a lucid distinction between is and was. This passage is meant to explain consciousness and unconsciousness, but because Darl's downfall in his capacity for omni-inclusion the speech even devolves into the inevitability of was for Addie Bundren.

Darl's capacity for breakdown seems to have been present for some time. Faulkner allows several characters to voice their views on Darl's oddness. Anse claims he has warned Darl not to laugh at inappropriate times: "How many times I told him it's doing such things as that that makes folks talk about him" (AILD, p. 99). Tull locates the clue to Darl's galloping derangement in his eyes "that makes folks talk. I always say it aint never been what he done so much or said or anything so much as how he looks at you. It's like he had got into the inside of
you somehow" (AITD, p. 119). Of all the commentators on Darl's mental disintegration Cash seems most sympathetic and penetrating yet also conventional. He admits, in the monologue where he tries to make peace with himself before agreeing Darl's "better" off at Jackson, that it was inevitable that Darl's behavior would clue Gillespie into the arson: "he would a suspicioned it sooner or later. He could have done it that night just watching the way Darl acted" (AITD, p. 222). For those critics who see the barn-burning as justifiable, or an aberration, Cash's analysis of the act reveals a significant factor: he sees Darl's efforts here aimed at undoing Jewel's sacrifice: "it was the value of his horse Darl tried to burn up" (AITD, p. 223). So even though Cash disapproves Darl's motives, he endorses the would-be relief it offered—the end of the family's responsibility to Addie. But Cash is a creature of society and so consents because "it aint so much what a fellow does, but it's the way the majority of folks is looking at him when he does it. . . . And I reckon they aint nothing else to do--with him but what most folks says is right. . . . [Anyway] there just aint nothing justifies the deliberate destruction of what a man has built with his own sweat and stored the fruit of his sweat into" (AITD, p. 223-228). As Cash persuades himself of the rightness of Darl's incarceration, for Darl and the community, he also reveals, I think, why Darl seems less perfectly drawn as a representative of schizophrenia than Faulkner's other psychological aberrants. Cash believes that even in the maddest of the mad there is some kernel of self-conscious lucidity "that's done à past the sanity or the insanity, that watches the insane doings of
that man with the same horror and the same astonishment" (ATLD, p. 228). This is the best explanation of Darl's laughter. Rather than negating Darl's disintegration into schizophrenia, it explains how Faulkner understood the inner workings of the disorder. By making the schizophrenic absurdly aware of his abnormality, Faulkner makes the tragedy compound. One of the impediments to a consensus on Darl is his rational awareness of his fate: To Cash, "'Do you want me to go?'' he said. "It'll be better for you; I said. 'Down there it'll be quiet, with none of the bothering and such. It'll be better for you, Darl,' I said. 'Better,' he said. He began to laugh again. 'Better,' he said. He couldn't hardly say it for laughing" (ATLD, p. 228). Darl here is conscious of his predicament, but he is helpless. He can no more control his anguished laughter than he can arrest his descent into schizophrenia.

The greatest validation of Darl's break-up, however, is provided by Darl himself. It seems that Darl's powers of intuition have been inflated. Granting that he is sensitive, his ability to decide that Jewel is not Anse's son seems predictable. Addie comes for Jewel, pets him, makes special foods for him. Having distinguished him, any deviation from Bundrenism in Jewel's appearance would be sufficient to set Darl's poet soul imagining, and Jewel's physical distinctions—wooden with pale eyes—make him exceptional. By the same token, Darl as a revealed and admitted voyeur in the family, discovers Dewey Dell's condition, not by ESP, but by discovering the circumstantial evidence of the unsown seed (ATLD, p. 26). What is extraordinary is Darl's power of conveying his knowledge without speech, and it is Dewey Dells' apprehension under
Darl's penetrating gaze that no doubt establishes the veracity of his suspicion: "I sit naked on the seat above the unhurrying mules" as Darl seems to penetrate through her very clothes (A LD, p. 115).

But to focus on Darl's heightened perceptivity at the expense of his abnormal responses is to miss the dimension of his personality that makes "none of us pure crazy and aint none of us pure sane" (A LD, p. 223). Darl's reactions to ordinary stimuli are disproportionately bizarre—ropes feel alive in his hand (A LD, p. 151); and he views others in the postures and attitudes of the "dead gestures of dolls" (A LD, p. 197). Seltzer makes an adamant case for Darl's non-schizophrenia by claiming that at no time does he "become dissociated in mind and body . . . split between an unembodied, subjective, 'true' self, and an embodied, objective, 'false' self." But on the journey he describes his psychological violations from a highly objective perspective: "for an instant Cash and Darl crouch flagrant and unabashed . . . When we speak our voices are quiet and detached" (A LD, p. 135).

By the train trip, Darl's narrative is told entirely from a frenzied and self-conscious third person: "Darl is our brother, our brother Darl. Our brother Darl in a cage in Jackson where, his grimed hands lying light in the quiet interstices, looking out he foams" (A LD, p. 244). In addition to his pathologic self-consciousness and his free-floating, regressive memory, he is sufficiently withdrawn from the family to warrant a label of schizophrenic. The lack of fellowship experienced and expressed by Darl helps to explain clinically the nature of his psychosis. According to J.A. Kasanin, who was active in the second wave of schizophrenic
research (study languished after World War I despite solid foundations laid by Bleuler, Storch, and Kraeplin\textsuperscript{41}), "Such things as fellowship, unity, and a sense of harmony, which are all attributes of man's conception of the universe, are not integrated, and man begins to live in a state of isolation."\textsuperscript{42} This has significant impact on Darl and his language and communication sense. The schizophrenic's sense of community is impaired and his language is "individualistic, eccentric," and magical, with language serving to counter his crippling sense of insecurity. He experiences no "consensual validation": "my ideas" are shared and understood; others think as I do.\textsuperscript{43} Darl's pattern of deferred response points up this phenomenon. No one would understand or appreciate his private associations, and so his mind positively reels with images and distorted ideas, but he presents to the world passable responses that in no way reflect his actual thinking on the subject. His terse comments when Cash breaks his leg are punctuated by a running reportage on the clan's activity. But when the dialogues stop and the reader is alone with Darl, he exhibits idiosyncrasy of observation, interpretation, response, and language. His famous remark on Dewey Dell's "mammalian ludicrcsitities" illustrates the features of severe communication impairment:

Jewel and Vernon are in the river again. From here they do not appear to violate the surface at all; it is as though it had severed them both at a single blow, the two torsos moving with infinitesimal and ludicrous care upon the surface. It looks peaceful, like machinery does after you have watched it and listened to it for a long time. As though the clotting which is you had dissolved into the myriad original motion, and seeing and hearing in themselves
blind and deaf; fury in itself quiet with stagnation. Squatting, Dewey Dell's wet dress shapes for the dead eyes of three blind men those mammalian ludicrosities which are the horizons and the valleys of the earth (AIPP, p. 156).

The "three blind men" seem to come from nowhere and the sense of "seeing and hearing in themselves blind and deaf" is indeterminant. The subsequent linking of the river rescue to Dewey Dell's breasts seems tenuously attached to the previous reference to torsos. Clinical theory on this psychosis maintains that "The difficulty is that his [the schizophrenic's] speech lacks unity and synthesis... one is impressed by a diffusion of thought." This notion is perfectly compatible with Darl's entire impulse towards diffuseness—his ability to project and imagine. But it is also responsible for his peculiarity of expression and thought and helps to inhibit the social integration with others that might lead to a specific self-consciousness regarding existing borders in reality.

Darl's conversations with Wardaman prior to the barn-burning illustrate this phenomenon and demonstrate the precarious nature of Darl's connection to reality. This encounter develops over seven sections where Faulkner pointedly counterpoints Darl's section with Wardaman's. Wardaman has been described by critics as "perplexed" and otherwise as "idiotic." What Wardaman suggests, according to David Minter, is the primitive mind of a child as it copes with grief. He is working through the mourning by process by a substitution with the fish. Yet, his primitive mind is the ideal foil to Darl's exquisitely complex psyche. The result is the revelation that they share an illusion: Addie is talking
to them through the coffin. While Vardaman here is coming to grips with loss, Darl's highly accelerated emotional disintegration is underscored: the two brothers exchange places—Darl retreating; Vardaman retrieving his sense. Though he wants to participate in Darl's fantasy, reality intrudes: "'How can she see through the wood Darl? . . . She can't see out there, because the holes are in the top . . . How can she see, Darl?'" (AILD, p. 205). Darl sidesteps each illusion-deflating question. Darl prefers to preserve his fantasy. Minter defines the state Darl seeks as "premature senility."46 Such a state creates all the isolation inevitable in schizophrenia.

The decision to allow Darl to regress to madness poses interesting questions regarding his narrative function. Each section of the novel illuminates action and reflects the consciousness of the character involved in the action. If one of the consciousnesses is disintegrating, he will have a different apprehension of that experience. And since Faulkner had the intention of exploring the diverse possibilities for language, the language of the schizophrenic adds a new twist to the possibilities of establishing any truth. Though Darl possesses the sensitivity and imagination of "the writer," these same traits underpinned with psychosis make him ill-suited to survival in this world. Finally, As I Lay Dying reinvoles Faulkner's thematic interest in the telling of a story over and over through the eyes of its participants. Darl creates the enigmatic dilemma for the reader, however. The reader must sift through the various narrations and "overpass" to the truth of the novel. And by making the most compelling character finally a
madman, Faulkner invests his "tour de force" with another "greatest catastrophe which man can suffer"—insanity and its accompanying isolation. The reader again is fully engaged as he tries to judge the truths of the human heart, no less "true" if perceived through a discernibly distorted psyche.

Rhetoric and Communication in Psychoses

In psychosis, discourse fails totally. Characters may enter into private self-communion that is viewed as apathy, silence, and emotional deadness (Bayard); or they may be desperate for a connection, yet so emotionally devastated that verbal communication with significant others fails (Rider); then manic activity substitutes for articulation. In the schizophrenias, the cardinal problem, as Kasanin views it, is "The disturbances of language . . . [as] evidences the disturbance in the function of communication. . . . When a person suffers from interference in communication with his fellow men, he becomes isolated." Previous-ly, the mental disorders discussed have been marked by flawed messages, messages that break through despite defenses, or messages that communicate contempt for audience communality. In psychoses, the severity of the disturbance in the communication leads to a confusion in the audience. Bertram Cohen in his essay "Referant Communication Disturbances in Schizophrenia," explains this phenomenon: Schizophrenia "is a disturbance of communication rather than of language per se; its most dependable feature is that listeners find the patient's referents too elusive to grasp." For Faulkner's psychotics this is a critical distinction.
Bayard longs to admit his narcissistic yearning for his lost twin; incapable of the act that would liberate him, he sends messages that are grossly misinterpreted by the Sartoris-watchers like Miss Jenny. She reads the signals as evidence of a blood legacy that makes him crave flamboyant annihilation. Because his syndrome is never understood by his audience as a specific psychotic depression, he is allowed to fall victim to what Kasanin considers the "impulsive factor" in such severe mental disorders: suicides are unpredictable because the psychotic fears decisions and conclusion; he must react "impulsively and instantaneously." Likewise Rider cannot express the magnitude of his loss. He rejects close contact with his family, and he denies relief through religion. His manic activity is a message, but it is not understood in time or in terms to save him from a suicidal course. Hines's message employs mostly lucid language and standard grammar, but the message is founded on basic unreason. The illusion of clear articulation in no way negates the fact that the real message—destroy Joe Christmas—is understood only by a very elite few like the dietician who shares the same disordered premise. And finally there is Darl, whose messages become farther and farther removed from intelligibility till finally vocalization—"yes yes yes yes yes"—replaces all efforts at contact with external reality. Communication for these characters has assumed its final tragic form—their only relief is social tragedy, silence; their only escape is emotional tragedy—suicide or incarceration.

Beginning with Bayard and Rider, and concluding with Darl foaming
at the mouth, Faulkner uses his psychotics to introduce another level of despairing humanity. All four of these characters metamorphose imaginistically into animals. Because the psychotic menaces an emotional sense of communality (rather than a legal/contractual sense as does the sociopath), society, despite due process, maintains Middle Age vestigial urges to perceive madness as a reclamation of the human by his animal impulses. Darl projects himself into a cage. Rider is ferocious— not human. Foucault, as he points out the moral ramifications of bestial imagining, notes that "the madman, trac[es] the course of human degradation to the frenzied nadir of animality, disclos[ing] that underlying realm of unreason which threatens man envelops—at a tremendous distance—all the forms of his natural existence. It was not a question of tending toward a determination, but of being swallowed up by a darkness."50 Faulkner, by electing to invest his characters with the classical image of madness—burgeoning animality—creates his own rhetorical legerdemain: he takes characters reduced to emotional shards by depression, delusion, and diffusion and redeems even their aggression by linking it to excess of passion. Foucault sums up this concept: "The savage danger of madness is related to the danger of the passions and to their fatal concatenation."51

As all Faulkner's characters are swept up and corroded by a passion that either finds no voice or is the disarticulation of deranged thought processes, it is important to look at what function rhetoric has for them, and further, what rhetorical possibilities Faulkner arrested from the chronicle of psychoses. Primarily, language in psychoses
equals a kind of magic. In psychoses, particularly schizophrenia, the "peculiarities of language behavior" emanate from an excessive yet thwarted desire for personal security.\textsuperscript{52} Harry Stack Sullivan explains it by claiming that these victims use language to establish "a feeling of security in the presence of strangers."\textsuperscript{53} Thus, silence or terseness creates safe spaces for psychotics, just as ranting or developing private language and images might. "Speech," in these cases, is used, Sullivan claims, --"exclusively for counteracting his feeling of insecurity among other people."\textsuperscript{54} Consequently, the hyper-verbal activity in schizophrenic irruptions as created in Hines and Darl, function analogically as talking loudly in the dark would for a normal person made temporally anxious. Their noises and private images (womenfilth or mammalian ludicrosities) create for the psychotic a magical distance between his distorted and exclusive world-view, and reality's incursions into it.

By creating characters racked with psychoses Faulkner made it possible for his rhetoric to run the range from stymied communication to the development of absolutely individualized language and thought. Inherent in this conception of rhetoric as magical, private, and self-generative there is implied a model for the act of artistic creation. The psychotic characters are caught in emotional rip-tides. They send messages that are rarely understood and they explore the nethermost possibilities of language, communication, and both of these as the vehicles for survival in a sane world.
Psychoses as Philosophical Metaphor

Simply stated, psychoses in Faulkner equal tragedy. It is primarily a tragedy of isolation. Unlike the sociopaths who deny the significance and power of audience, the psychotics long for audience and connection, but are so emotionally disintegrated that the mode of connection—language that communicates—eternally escapes them. Faulkner diagnosed man's tragedy as "the impossibility—or at least the tremendous difficulty—of communication" and psychosis embodies this aspect of tragedy to the fullest. In psychoses, the metaphor of tragedy is shaped by passion, pain, isolation, and even a twisting violence that can lash outward in frustration or inward in search of release. Even Faulkner's later remarks on "the tragedy" turn on closely related issues. At Virginia he said, "the most tragic condition that an individual can have—[was] to not know who he was." In psychoses, because of the impassable charm existing between thought and expression, the self is lost. The loss of identity, either because it is denied or because it is fractured through the presence of living, is a concern in Faulkner's fiction. These lost selves, lost messages, and ultimately lost humans form the heart and purpose of his philosophic metaphor.

By daring to explore the most horrendous contours of madness, Faulkner demonstrates what Foucault considers art's power to "mediate" madness: "where there is a work of art, there is no madness." Faulkner invites readers to view the tragedy of contemporary existence. In viewing it, the reader is privileged in a sense to view the wounds the artist himself cherishes and suffers. In capturing the pain of utter
emotional isolation in his psychotic characterizations, Faulkner personally resists the urge to succumb to the void that has lured other artists too close to the abyss they chronicle. Faulkner's art, in recording and exploring the tragedy, prevents it. Foucault warns that madness is not the only language common to the work of art and the modern world. . . . [but] through the mediation of madness, it is the world that becomes culpable (for the first in the western world) in relation to the work of art; it is now arraigned by the work of art, obliged to order itself by its language, compelled by it to a task of recognition, of reparation, to the task of restoring reason from that unreason and to that unreason. The madness in which the work of art is engulfed is the space of our enterprise, it is the endless path to fulfillment, it is our mixed vocation of apostle and exegete.58

Having used psychosis as an expression of tragic isolation, Faulkner achieves maximum effect with it by using it metaphorically to echo the dilemma the writer faces. Faulkner has described the difficulty and the literature of psychosis confirmed it: the writer is faced with the problem of making a very private vision a publicly accessible one. Faulkner's favorite analogy for this was Kilroy: that the writer before passing through "the wall of oblivion . .. wants to leave a scratch on that wall—Kilroy was here—that somebody a hundred, a thousand years later will see."59 The issue again is message, message linked to identity linked to survival. For the artist, triumph is immortality; for the psychotic the victory would be a restoration of self. For both, the problem is the arrangement of language in such a way that one's meaning is understood regardless of how unique the expression may be. This specific
problem was addressed by Faulkner as an obligation for the writing man: "And so he's got to rewrite, to create a new pattern with a bulge that will take this bulge of the imagination which insists that it's true, it must be."60
ENDNOTES


6 Sigmund Freud, SE, XIX, 149-55.


8 Freud, SE, XIV, 244.

9 Schilder, p. 57.

10 Freud, SE, XIV, 246.

11 Freud, SE, XIV, 252.

12 Freud, SE, XIV, 257-58.

13 Freud, SE, XIV, 248.

14 Melvin Backman, "Faulkner’s Sick Heroes: Bayard Sartoris and Quentin Compson," Modern Fiction Studies, 2 (1956), 97.


22 Freud, *SE*, XII, 75.

23 Freud divides the steps of repression into 1) fixation (semi-passive phase); 2) repression proper (active process); and 3) eruption ("return of the repressed"), a period of pathological symptom formation. [Excerpted from "On the Mechanism of Paranoia"]


26 Laing, p. 149.

27 Rudin, p. 144.

28 Rudin, p. 171.

29 Freud, *SE*, XII, 63.


31 Freud, *SE*, XII, 4 and 59-62.

32 Seltzer, 48-63.

34 Seltzer, 59.

35 Supplementing the works by Freud that Faulkner could have conceivably used or heard about were the works of Jung already available in translation before 1920: The Psychology of Dementia Praecox (1909); The Theory of Psychoanalysis (1915); Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology (1916) including "A Criticism of Bleuler's 'Theory of Schizophrenic Negativism'" and "The Context of Psychoses." Bleuler's essay on this aspect of schizophrenia was available by 1912 as was his Affectivity, Suggestibility and Paranoia.

36 Handy, 439.

37 Seminar notes from Faulkner taught by David Minter, Rice, Fall, 1975.

38 Handy, 438.

39 Seltzer, 59.

40 Seltzer, 58.


45 Minter seminar notes.

46 Minter seminar notes.


50 Foucault, pp. 83-84.

51 Foucault, p. 81.

53 Sullivan, p. 8.
54 Sullivan, p. 54.
55 Blotner and Meriwether, pp. 70-71.
56 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 118.
57 Foucault, pp. 288-89.
58 Foucault, p. 288.
59 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 61.
60 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 52.
V. Afterword: "Cast a Shadow"

"The ideal of perfect health is only scientifically interesting; [what is really interesting is sickness] which belongs to individualizing."

Novalis

"The 'sickness' or 'health' of a work of art stands collateral to, does not depend on, the sickness or health of the artist."

Norman Holland, Shakespeare and Psychology

"But creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their knowledge of the mind they are far in advance of us everyday people, for they draw upon sources which we have not yet opened up for science."

Sigmund Freud, Jensen's "Gradiva"

"Personally I find it impossible to communicate with the outside world. Maybe I will end up in some kind of self-communion—a silence—faced with the certainty that I can no longer be understood."

William Faulkner

When John Bassett edited William Faulkner: The Critical Heritage in 1975, he summarized the primary trends in Faulkner scholarship. They were predictably Faulkner and the South, Faulkner and modernism, and Faulkner's stylistics. With Blotner's biography, there has been current critical interest in source studies, textual work, and biographical connections. I would like to place this study in connection to the more recent works on Faulkner that have presented a psychological bias.

Cleanth Brooks's William Faulkner: Toward Yoknapatawpha and Beyond
laces traditionally scrupulous close textual reading with occasional psychological analyses. The psychology of the characters is discussed only when it is necessary to explain how "brute facts" are invested with transcendent possibilities by Faulkner. Brooks also uses some psychological readings to account for changes in Faulkner's fictional concerns. For instance, Brooks sees Elmer as a kind of spiritual autobiography on Faulkner's part, his wrestling with the desire to be an artist as well as recording the young man's frustrated efforts to marry the girls of his heart's desire.

Judith Wittenberg's Faulkner: The Transfiguration of Biography emphasizes Faulkner's life, too, attempting to connect key psychological experiences with his fiction. Though this book reveals many interesting intersections and possibilities between Faulkner's life and his art, it suffers occasionally because it lacks Brooks's flexibility; i.e., Wittenberg holds hard and fast to her thesis (borrowed from Faulkner) that "art is the 'dark twin' of the life." So occasionally, the reader may be put off by a kind of critical overingenuity: Faulkner's wedding to Estelle took place on June 20, the date used for the trial in Sanctuary. Wittenberg concludes this parallel "served as the author's announcement of his impending marriage." One would hope Faulkner, if he intended it all, meant it as a bad joke rather than the prophetic disaster that Wittenberg implies. But both Brooks and Wittenberg are concerned in varying degrees with the psychological realities and investments in fiction. Such approaches discover aspects of the artist's self written into the constructed imagined world; constructs
illustrate Skura's tenet that art "is not an escape from, but an alternative version of, human relationships." The artist is exploring and expressing his interior, and in so doing he makes it possible for readers to have access to that imagined world.

John Irwin's *Doubling and Incest/Repetition & Revenge* takes adventurous critical opportunities. To Faulkner's fiction, Irwin brings Freudian psychology and Nietzschean philosophy, reminding readers that the living consciousness captured in great fictions is the result of a complex mix of forces. To read Irwin is to see Faulkner from new perspectives made possible only because, in discovering Faulkner's truths, Irwin discovers personal truths. His criticism functions reflexively, so that as Irwin renders the Faulkner texts through close reading, he simultaneously reveals equally important psychological lessons made available about authorship—Faulkner's and his own. Irwin manages to illustrate simply an important theory of William Gass's: "The purpose of a literary work is the capture of consciousness, and the consequent creation, in you, of an imagined sensibility, so that while you read you are that patient pool or cataract of concepts which the author has constructed." The importance of psychology as a critical tool is enhanced by Irwin's study since its usefulness is recircuited, running through the fictive world to be affirmed by readers who have only transient status in that world.

Another important book that employs psychological theory is Albert Guerard's *The Triumph of the Novel*. Guerard approaches Faulkner from the perspective of novelistic theory. By linking Faulkner to
Dickens and Dostoevsky, he offers not only an opportunity for continental reassessment, but Guerard refines and focuses a developing critical genre—novelistic psychology: how much do conscious and unconscious concerns, especially psycho-sexual obsessions, affect the problems of structure and style? In much the same way that Irwin offers new insights into Faulkner by collateral readings of the novels, Guerard's work presents new areas of intersection to be considered by authors engaged in changing the form of their genre.

I think that Faulkner might not mind too much these studies; despite his oft repeated slurs about critics, Faulkner might see in these studies proof that the work is still alive after all these years. But even more palatable to him would be the testimony these psychological studies offer that a Faulkner character does "stand up on its hind legs and cast a shadow."9 In this study, I have tried, despite the necessity of somewhat artificial groupings, to see the morbid psychology as the essence of much of Faulkner's characterization.

Though the general bias for psychological reading in Brooks, Wittenberg, Irwin, and Guerard is shared, each of these authors presents a different emphasis. I have attempted here to select from each of them those features of criticism that best serve a reading of fiction that is meant to reveal aspects of character that have been neglected. For instance, Brooks spends some time on the forces of neurosis as an influence in the fiction. By treating morbid psychology as a critical influence on stylistics, I have been able to delineate a host of subtle stylistic effects that neuroses can systematically account for. In
linking a variety of characters by emotional disease, the author's coherent design is reemphasized. Essentially, it seems the characters did lead the private and personal lives in his imagination that Faulkner claimed they did.10

Following Irwin, I too have employed Freud. He discovers a structure that informs Faulkner's canon; my application of Freud, more prosaic, has been intended to suggest historical and social possibilities that influenced Faulkner's creations. The Freud material has been heavily supplemented with current theories on psychopathology. These studies tend to corroborate the accuracy of Faulkner's perceptions. And in general, by not committing myself to a single psychological reading, I have been able to work on characters' language. My emphasis on the effect of language as a product of morbidity locates critical discoveries in the art work itself. Skura's explanation of creative regression allows that "the artist did have recourse to the primitive realms outside consciousness where neurosis (and psychosis) breed, but only to tame and bring back what he found there."11 This taming is essentially the harnessing of language to create and reveal mind.

In using Freud and other psychology studies to explore unique rhetorical patterns I have been able to employ a more current critical approach in which the aesthetic aim in fiction, as Gass explains it, is to create "a verbal world . . . alive through every order of Being. . . . The story must be told and its feeling is a record of the choices, inadvertent and deliberate, the author has made from all the
possibilities of language. . . . The novelist, if he is any good, will keep us kindly imprisoned in his language—there is literally nothing else." ¹² Faulkner's language for his characters reveal decisions about his psychological perceptions and about the authenticity of his fictional community.

My use of Wittenberg's psychobiographical approach was mainly important for the study of sociopathology as a function of art and as a metaphor for authorial psyche. Guerard's comprehensive study of artistic psychological obsession and its impact on stylistics and genre selectively anticipates my focus on the psychopathological character. He uses the epiphantic example of Sanctuary to erect his generic theory: I have assumed the theories of psychology already given and tried to arrange them in such a way as to explore exhaustively the pattern of language resulting from the influence of morbid psychology.

This effort at exposing roots and distinguishing differences prepares the way for what I think my focus accomplishes. In focusing on the psychologically sick characters and treating them as having a kind of integrity of type, I have outlined discernible patterns in Faulkner's descriptions of the groups; furthermore, among these types, I have found that there is a consistency in their respective psychological disfigurements. Combined with a search for descriptive pattern, I have tried to delineate an ongoing fictional concern with all kinds of failed communications that result from disorders, large and small, conscious and unconscious, in language and thought. Beyond the fictional energy of dark psychology and its aberrant language manifestations, I have tried
to view the psychopathology as metaphor for Faulkner's non-fictional concerns: region, self, and philosophy of art and artists. Though much narrower in range than other psychological studies of Faulkner, it presents a chance to view characters from disparate novels in close conjunctions—their emotional and linguistic unions in the realms of psychopathology.

My emphasis on psychopathology which is "defined in terms of disturbances of communication,"\textsuperscript{13} bifurcates the focus of this study to include rhetoric and language disturbance as a basis for understanding Faulkner's charged method of characterization and his characters. Faulkner's interest in the deviant possibilities of psychology gave him a chance to exercise what he considered the artist's right and duty: "The artist must create his own language."\textsuperscript{14} Faulkner was able to appropriate the language of emotional stress and deterioration and to essentially recreate it for his own purposes. It was as if by conjoining those words and images of decay and entropy, Faulkner was able to produce what Dawson Fairchild in Mosquitoes expressed as the potential for language: "I don't claim that words have life in themselves. But words brought into a happy conjunction produce something that lives." For Arthur Kinney it seems Faulkner, "instead of relying on words alone, \ldots depends on the configuration of language."\textsuperscript{15} And out of the configuration Faulkner creates minds perceiving. By focusing on the structure of disturbed psyches and their vital and variant powers for apprehending and expressing their realities, I have tried to establish fictional proof for what James Hillman believes is "the intimate
relation between pathologizing and imagination. Pathologizing processes are a source of imaginative work, and the work provides a container for the pathologizing processes.\textsuperscript{16} Faulkner's fragmented and tortured structures form the perfect containers for his characters who try to overcome their emotional exile. His frequent counterpointings between sick minds and healthy ones provide his fiction with the fullest range of imaginative possibilities. His characters challenge the border between sanity and insanity; with each incursion by a character into the realm of madness, the reader is provided with a new angle of vision regarding what it means to suffer and what it costs to discover truths. Hillman's belief that "Pathology produces an intensely focused consciousness of soul . . . undergoing a symptomatic pain—sobering, humbling, blinding"\textsuperscript{17} puts pathological character and communication at the heart of most of Faulkner's humanistic speeches, where he finds mankind "anguished" and in "desperate defensive confederation" trying and failing and enduring.\textsuperscript{18}

Faulkner felt a kinship with those characters that suffer emotionally. And he was in basic sympathy with all the problems that human beings have in making themselves understood. The compound tragedy of psychopathologic character in need of fellowship and least able to express that need provides the perfect laboratory for a fiction writer who hoped his writing "may improve man." Faulkner even saw himself as functioning as a psychiatrist exploring one "frail" mind at a time, trying to understand man, in general, better:
Maybe in that sense the writer has got to work for man's betterment, even if he's not deliberately trying to. I think that in a way the psychiatrist is doing that too. That I imagine a psychiatrist in—with one human being could learn about all he would need to know about what makes man do what he does... And since he will devote his life to it, he must have some thought that somehow he will improve in the end man's condition.19

With the writer acting as a psychiatrist and his fictional world populated by a full range of emotional types, there seems to be only one odd man out—the critical reader. As Faulkner shares his insights into the soul, what is the critic's relation to that experience? In as much as he benefits emotionally or spiritually from what he discovers from Faulkner, it seems he becomes a kind of out-patient at the fiction clinic. But in his desire to return to Faulkner he reveals a special and ingenious twist on the psychopathologic state. In the complexity of Faulkner's style, that requires frequent readings of a sentence to exhaust its meaning, there exists the built-in repetition of a neurosis. Next, it is the nature of fiction, because it shapes and forms experiences for the possibility of shared vision, to turn critical readers into voyeurs. Faulkner's highly imagistic fiction and dark concerns (castration, rape, incest), respectfully packaged, makes a particularly alluring invitation to the reader as "fiend." Holland explains this: "Form enables us to 'spy on' the characters better, at the same time that it protects us in this slightly illicit activity."20 Rounding out the mock-pathological portrait of critical reading is paranoia. This is, according to Hillman, "The squint that suspects interior intentions, that subjectivizes events and is always on the look-out for
hidden meanings." And looking back over this study and other critical examinations of Faulkner, I find the tendencies borne out. Confining it to just psychological approaches to Faulkner, it is inevitable to find the scene with Christmas and the toothpaste tube singled out repeatedly by critics, observed fondly from all angles, and then squeezed dry for a host of meanings that are inherent in the scene. If this example seems bemused or exaggerated, it is because again pathology asserts itself as a positive activity; it represents the mind's ability in reading or writing to imagine life from a new angle—even a despairing or a deformed perspective.

By recognizing psychopathology as a positive force, Clifton Fadiman's slur about Faulkner being "the only living writer who could retell 'Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs' using for characters Grumpy and the Witch" becomes a kind of high praise. Now it is possible to go to the morbid characters for a better understanding of the complexity of Faulkner's characterizations. And further, this approach fosters an appreciation of the stylistic gains Faulkner achieved by tapping the semantics of disfigured emotions. Irvin Malin has said it best: "In exploring the morbid and alien motives within American fiction, psycho-analytic criticism gives us courageous health."
ENDNOTES


10. Gwynn and Blotner, p. 117.

11. Skura, p. 130; emphasis mine.


17 Hillman, p. 106.


19 Gwynn and Blotner, p. 268.


21 Hillman, p. 136.


---------------. "Mississippi Frankenstein." New Yorker. 21 January 1939, pp. 60-61.


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