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THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RHEtorICAL IDEAL IN CLASSICAL GREECE

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The Philosophical and Political Foundations of the Rhetorical Ideal in Classical Greece

by

William Joseph Neidingen

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE

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May, 1980
ABSTRACT

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RHETORICAL IDEAL IN CLASSICAL GREECE

by

WILLIAM JOSEPH NEIDINGER

For four centuries (c. 900-500 B. C.) an aristocratic warrior culture and its concomitant ideals and educational processes reigned supreme in Greece. As the aristocracy declined, so, too, did the ideals. Gradually a new intellectual culture replaced the old warrior culture, and ideals then became ideals of the mind, not of the body. The particular form which this new intellectual culture assumed was to be found in rhetorical education.

Our approach to, and understanding of, ancient Greek rhetoric have been fashioned by the philological pursuits of the classicists of the nineteenth century. In the main, the interest has been with the mechanics of oratory--stylistics. If any opinions are even ventured concerning the substance of rhetoric, almost without exception they are opinions derived from information provided by Plato, who was, of course, hostile to the rhetorical profession.

A gradual reassessment is taking place in which sophism re-assumes its proper position in Greek politics. But its position in the Greek intellectual tradition is still regarded with evident embarrassment. This attitude is fostered by the failure to realize that the roots of rhetoric are just as fundamentally scientific as they are political.
Our task, then, is to re-integrate rhetoric back into its proper position in the Greek intellectual tradition. Once we comprehend this facet of oratory, we are then in a better position to understand Plato's criticisms and Isocrates' final articulation of the Greek rhetorical ideal.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The doxographers and biographers of the fourth century B.C. were the first to undertake a systematic study of the oratory of the "Golden Age."¹ Their works and those of the Hellenistic literary critics constitute our sole source of information about the formative years of Greek rhetoric, since no fifth century B.C. work is extant.² The established academic format of the treatises of the Hellenistic doxographers not only has determined what information has been preserved for us, but has also effectively shaped our approach to, and understanding of, Greek rhetoric.

The doxographers, according to John Burnet, were "those writers who related the opinions (δόξας) of the earlier Greek philosophers, and who derive their material, either directly or indirectly, from the great work of Theophrastos, Φυσικά δόξας η [Book 18 of On the Opinions of the Physicists],"³ which was mentioned by Diogenes Laertius.⁴ Of this entire treatise only one chapter has been preserved, that entitled περὶ αλληλουμνήσεως (On Perception). Theophrastus, using Aristotle's Metaphysics, book I, as his model and source of information, divided all philosophical speculation into topics, "perception," for example. He then recorded the divers opinions of the major pre-Socratic philosophers, no attention being paid to their chronological sequence. Affinity of belief was the only criterion for determining their order of arrangement. This approach to the study of philosophy succeeded in dividing, separating, and compartmentalizing the otherwise unified and
coherent theories of his predecessors. Theophrastus' work, in turn, was not only the source, but the model as well for later generations of doxographers.

One characteristic of the scholarship of the Hellenistic and Roman eras was the tendency to preserve rather than create. The academicians of Athens, Alexandria, Antioch, and Rhodes wrought no great innovations in literature, philosophy, or theology; they preferred to record, systematize, and edit the works of their ancestors which they had already come to regard as "classics." The Φυσικά δόξων of Theophrastus was essential to their editorial work in philosophy; it supplied them with data, and it provided them with an editorial format.

Hermann Diels effectively demonstrated that the Φυσικά δόξων was the distant ancestor of all the extant doxographical works. Aetius, Diels claimed, indirectly relied upon it when he composed the περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκοντῶν συναγωγή (Collection of Concordant Agreements); Diels then posited an intermediary work between Aetius and Theophrastus which he entitled the Vetusta Placita. From the so-called Vetusta Placita and the work of Aetius, the pseudo-Plutarch, John of Stobaius, and Sextus Empiricus drew the materials for their treatises, the Epitome, Eclogae, and Adversus Mathematicos. The Church fathers, notably Clement of Alexandria and Origen, also utilized this information derived from Theophrastus for their knowledge of classical Greek philosophy.

The debt of these later scholars to Theophrastus was threefold. On the most basic level, he was their main source
of information. In addition, they inherited from Theophrastus certain prejudices and perceptions regarding the pre-Socratics which he had inherited in turn from his teacher, Aristotle. Finally, and most essential to our thesis, they imitated Theophrastus' compositional technique of dividing, separating, and compartmentalizing the works of individual philosophers.

This method of arrangement gained popularity even among those outside the field of doxography proper. Literary critics, for example, also broke down their works into topics, under which they then listed the opinions of various of the great rhetoricians. In an indirect manner, Theophrastus' format also influenced the composition of biographical doxography, in which an attempt was made to present a unified account of a philosopher's thought and life. But since the biographical doxographers merely strung together the anecdotes and ideas of the subjects of their biographies as they were recorded in the pages of Theophrastus, their works read in an uneven and disjointed fashion. No serious attempt was made to unify the biography in a truly coherent manner. The biographers seldom recorded the events of a man's life in their proper chronological sequence, being content simply to list divers bits of information. Moreover, they rarely presented scientific and philosophical theories in a manner suggesting that there might have been a causal relationship or interdependence between one aspect of someone's thought and that of another.

This compartmentalization and isolation of the academic disciplines was characteristic only of the Hellenistic age.
To the Greeks of the seventh to fifth centuries B.C. scientific research was a more well-rounded affair normally encompassing a number of what we now consider to be unrelated subjects. In this sense we have more in common with Hellenistic scholars than they did with their ancestors of the previous centuries. This tendency to fragment the ideas of the pre-Socratics gave rise to certain misconceptions and misunderstandings which have persisted to the present and will continue so long as our approach to their academic endeavors remains unchanged.

Our understanding of early Greek rhetoric has been similarly misshaped by these factors. Rhetoric was born in a specific political and scientific context which determined its growth and an understanding of which is essential to its proper appreciation. The earliest orators, the sophists, were also engaged in scientific speculation upon which they constructed their rhetorical theories. But when Hellenistic scholars studied the sophists, they were concerned solely with the sophists' philosophical or rhetorical theories, depending upon whether the scholars themselves were philosophers or literary critics. Both approaches did violence to the sophists, for isolated treatment of either sophistic epistemology or stylistics gave, at best, only a partial picture of their endeavors.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars have followed in the footsteps of their Hellenistic predecessors. This is due partly to the manner of arrangement in which the latter has bequeathed evidence to the former, and partly due to the philological training and bent of modern scholars. Their first
task was that of collating and editing the extant works of the Greek orators. This was accomplished in the nineteenth century by Christianus Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, Leonardus Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, and again Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, which he modelled upon the doxographic reports of Aristotle's lost *Συναγωγή τεχνών*. Friedrich Blass edited and published the extant works of Isocrates in 1899. The fragments of the earlier rhetors, Gorgias and Protagoras, are, of course, contained in Hermann Diels' *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, and, in a more modern edition and looser translation, Mario Untersteiner's *Sofisti: Frammenti e Testimonianze*. The most convenient general translation and commentary of these works is R. C. Jebb's *Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus*. More complete and thorough translations are given in the Loeb Library under the individual authors and in the two-volume piece, *Minor Attic Orators*, various translators. Notable among more recent publications are: R. W. Connor's *Greek Orations*, and Kathleen Freeman's *The Murder of Herodes and Other Trials from the Athenian Law Courts*, but these are merely translations of select logographic speeches, with, however, extensive annotation.

When analyses of the works of the ancient Greek orators were written, they were generally confined to discussions of oratorical style. The parent work in this respect is Friedrich Blass' *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, from which all other works are derivative and dependent. He was followed by J. F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators*, and Josef Westermann, *Geschichte*
der griechen und römischen Beredsamkeit,\textsuperscript{21} neither of which are as complete and detailed as Blass. There are no significant differences among these authors, and what differences do exist are incredibly complex and not at all germane to the substance of this research. Moreover, their approach to the subject of Greek rhetoric was very much in line with that of the Hellenistic scholars, for, as Aristotle had remarked, his contemporaries dealt only with judicial rhetoric in their treatises, neglecting deliberative and epideictic oratory, and concentrating upon the rules of eloquence at the expense of logic and philosophy.\textsuperscript{22}

More general works on the history of ancient rhetoric include: Hans von Arnim's \textit{Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa},\textsuperscript{23} especially the introduction in which he traces the history of the conflict and interaction between rhetoric and philosophy in Hellenistic times; Nancy Streuver's \textit{The Language of History in the Renaissance},\textsuperscript{24} again the introduction in which she undertakes the same task as Arnim; Armando Plebe's \textit{Breve Storia della Retorica Antica},\textsuperscript{25} which contains a brief summary of the manner in which rhetoric was taught, is restricted mainly to the era after Aristotle; Donald Lemmen Clark's \textit{Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education},\textsuperscript{26} treats the same topic, but is primarily concerned with Roman judicial oratory. In general works on Greek philosophy, sophism was traditionally mentioned only in passing and even then as no more than a backdrop against which one could conveniently study Socrates and Plato; see, for example, Wilhelm Windelband,\textit{Geschichte der antiken Philo-
and Friedrich Ueberweg, Gründriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Mario Untersteiner goes into a more detailed analysis of the scientific aspects of sophism in Sofisti, but his work has two major shortcomings: 1) he makes no tight connection between the sophists' scientific speculations and their rhetorical practices, and 2) many of his interpretations are based upon his rather novel translations of certain key passages, translations which have not received any general acceptance.

The first significant attempt to reintegrate Greek rhetoric back into its proper political context was made by Werner Jaeger in his monumental Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. Since Jaeger it has become an historical commonplace to grant that the sophists fulfilled a certain need in Greek politics. Although Jaeger succeeded in explaining the political context in which sophism and rhetoric arose, he still saw no plausible excuse for the movement's weak moral fibre, a criticism which, as we shall see, originated with Socrates and Plato.

Not until it is realized that rhetoric was the product of scientific as well as political circumstances can it relieve itself of the perennial moral criticisms by which it was first condemned by Socrates. It is, then, our task to re-examine the early years of Greek scientific inquiry and to replace rhetoric squarely in that scientific and philosophical tradition. This and a knowledge of Hellenic politics and the role of oratory in it will render the art at least defensible in the face of Plato's attacks upon it. It will also put into
clear perspective Isocrates' sensitivity to certain of Plato's criticisms and suggest an explanation as to why he chose to reform some aspects of sophistry and rhetoric and not others. We shall, then, trace the progress of rhetoric in these formative years, from Corax and Gorgias to Isocrates, with an eye not to the internal evolution of rhetorical styles, but to the external, contextual forces of politics, science, and philosophy which fashioned oratory into antiquity's most favored educational program. It was, after all, Isocrates who triumphed over Plato. 32
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1 Although Plato and Aristotle both recorded the opinions of the pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato often did so in a careless manner, usually without naming the author of an idea, and Aristotle's interest went no further than demonstrating the validity of certain pre-Socratic theories only insofar as they were precursors of his own theories.

2 The possible exceptions are Gorgias' Ελένης ἠγκώμιον (Encomium on Helen) and Τήτερ Παλαμήδους ἡπόλογια (Palamedes' Defense of Himself), both of whose authorship is held suspect.


4 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 46.

5 Hermann Diels, Doxographi Graeci (reprinted, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter et Socii, 1958), pp. 499-527. The Vetusta Placita were composed, Burnet (op. cit., p. 35) believed, in the school of Poseidonius, a native of Apamea, Syria and a student of of the Stoic philosopher, Panaetius of Rhodes. Poseidonius succeeded his mentor as master of the school on Rhodes; he also continued the philosophical syncretism of Panaetius by blending Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian doctrines. See Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte der antiken Philosophie (Munich, Beck, 1923), p. 305.

6 The most thorough account of Aristotle's reliability in his treatment of his pre-Socratic forerunners is found in Harold Cherness, Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935).

7 See, for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Criticism.

8 See, for example, the works of Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, and Philocratus, Lives of the Sophists.

9 Christianus Walz, Rhetores Graeci (London, private publication, 1832-1836).

10 Leornardus Spengel, Rhetores Graeci (Leipzig, B. G.)
Teubner, 1854-1855).

11 Leonardus Spengel, Artium Scriptores (Leipzig, 1858-1861).

12 Friedrich Blass, Isokrates (Leipzig, Druckerei Lokay, 1899).


14 Mario Untersteiner, Sofisti: Frammenti e Testimonianze (Florence, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1949).


21 Josef Westermann, Geschichte der griechen und römischen Beredsamkeit (Leipzig, Versohnungsbund, 1921).

22 Aristotle, Rhetoric i.1,3-4.


26 Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Morningside Heights, Columbia University Press, 1957).

27 Wilhelm Windelband, op. cit.

28 Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (Munich, Beck, 1923).

29 Untersteiner, op. cit., pp. 101-123.

30 A more detailed discussion of his translations and the problems which they pose will appear on pages 40 ff.


CHAPTER II

PRE-SOCRATIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Rhetoric occupied an ambiguous position among the Greeks. Despite its status as the most fashionable academic pursuit of the aristocracy and the most proficient trainer of contestants for the legal and political arenas, it was the target of relentless criticism. For though men may praise excellence in the other arts, as Philostratus observed,

\[ \text{ῥητορικὴν δὲ ἔπαινοσι μὲν, ἄποτεσσαροὶ δὲ λι πανοῦργυν καὶ φιλοχρήματω καὶ κατὰ τὸν δίκαλον ξυγκειμένην.} \]

in the case of rhetoric, even while they are praising it, they suspect it of being underhanded and mercenary and constituted in defiance of justice.¹

The rhetoricians' most vehement and persistent critics were also their chief educational rivals, the philosophers. But many men found it difficult to distinguish between these two species of intellectuals,² because often there was no discernible difference. Frequently the roles of the philosopher and the orator were combined in the person of the sophist. Philostratus, in fact, defined sophistry as "ῥητορικὴν φιλοσοφοῦσαν" (philosophical rhetoric).³ And the sophist, that master of facile persuasion, was also suspect. Since earliest times, Protagoras claimed, his art had simultaneously incurred the populace's esteem, envy, and hatred.⁴ So although rhetoric was born, perfected, and thrived in Greece, it was never regarded without great suspicion.

A mild anti-rhetorical bias had always existed among the Greeks. In the Homeric world, where the solution to every
problem lay in war prowess, not eloquence, the rhetor was an anomaly. Achilles berated Hector at one point for resorting to "babbling" in an effort to settle their differences.\textsuperscript{5} Hector himself had chastised his fellow countryman, Polydamas, when the latter proposed a sound, rational alternative to heroic valor.\textsuperscript{6} Nor can we fail to detect a gentle irony in Homer's description of the loquacious Nestor.\textsuperscript{7} This same aristocratic antipathy towards the orator appeared again sporadically in later classical literature. Pindar praised Ajax as a valiant man "of few words."\textsuperscript{8} Aeschylus' Antigone bade a herald put an end to his verbiage, "μὴ μακρηγήρει" (to speak succinctly).\textsuperscript{9} Likewise, a chorus leader in the Supplicants introduced his speech with the promise to be "βραχός τορός θ' ὅ μῦθος" (short and simple).\textsuperscript{10} But this attitude was not so much a reasoned critique of the art of rhetoric as an innocent impatience with verbosity.

In Hellenistic and Roman times, however, the criticisms were different. Petronius typically lambasted the rhetoricians of his day for their propensity to employ far-fetched situations as their students' practice models. The result was such that after their training, the students were no more suited for the realities of the bar and forum than before their commencement.

Et ideo ego adolescentulos existimo in scholis stultissimos fieri, quia nihil ex his, quae in usu habe- mus, aut audiunt aut vident, sed piratas cum catenis in litore stantes, sed tyrannos edicta scribentes, quibus imperent filiis ut patrum suorum capita praecidant, sed responsa in pestilentiam data, ut vir- gines tres aut plures immolentur, sed mellitos ver-
And I believe that youths are made utter fools in schools; because nothing of those things which we hold customary do they see or hear, only pirates standing in chains on the sea shore, tyrants writing edicts by which fathers are ordered beheaded by their children, or a response in time of plague ordering that three or so virgins be sacrificed; nothing but honeyballs of words, as if everything said or done was sprinkled with poppy and sesame. Those nourished on such fare can know no more than those working in a kitchen can smell good. By your leave, I would say that more than anyone else you (rhetors) have destroyed eloquence.

Petronius' invective against the bombastic Asíanic style of the day was merely a question of stylistics. Cicero, too, had been confronted with the choice between the grandiloquent Asíanic and simple Attic styles; he chose, typically, a middle course. But stylistic considerations aside, there were far more serious charges laid against the rhetoricians. The sophists, the first ones to construct coherent oratorical systems, were labeled by Xenophon "πόρνους" (prostitutes) of wisdom. His accusation was a common one. Aristotle spoke of them with derision, ridiculing the tricks they used to make their opponents look foolish and thereby win the debate. Polybius, when discussing Zeno of Elea, came to the crucial point of the criticisms.
reason that, generally, he did not greatly concern himself with inquiry into facts nor management of his subject, but with the preparation of the speech. And it is clear that he frequently prides himself on this very thing, like other notable authors.  

With a marked viciousness Aristophanes unmasked this rhetorical concern for style at the expense of truth in his famous debate between Just Discourse and Unjust Discourse. Aristotle, in his no longer extant ode, Grillos, was believed to have levelled against rhetoric the complaint that it was nothing but style without purpose, and in doing so laid bare the fundamental issue: rhetoric stood accused of concerning itself with appearance, not truth.

Socrates initially made this charge against rhetoric. It was a means of argumentation, he claimed, which sought to convince, not by exposing the truth of a matter, but by the discovery and employment of some novel persuasive device.

Ωθέω ό ρητορικός έκ περί τὸ δῆλεν δὲ καὶ περί τὰ ἄλλα ἰδομένοι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οἰκ εἰδῶς, τι λογάδον ή τι κακὸν έστιν ή τι καλὸν ή τι αληρθόν ή δίκαιον ή δικίον, πειθώ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμεραγμένος, έστε δοκείν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς εν εἰδῶς μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος;

Does it not hold the same, therefore, for rhetoric as it does for health and the other arts; that it is not at all necessary to know these things—that something be good or bad or that it be noble or shameful or just or unjust—but to discover some persuasive trick, so that one appears more learned than they who are actually knowledgeable to those who are ignorant?

The rhetorical art was a deceit, a feigning of truth foisted by the clever upon the credulous. Or so it seemed to Socrates.

But the concern of the rhetoricians and sophists for appearances was, in fact, a specific philosophical stance on
their part. The central issue underlying the famed debate between Gorgias and Socrates was the difference between two types of belief—ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) and δόξα (opinion). Episteme, as was generally agreed, referred to an absolute truth, and doxa to appearances. Socrates maintained that rhetoric confined itself only to the realm of opinion and appearances. The sophists themselves admitted that their art operated on this level only, because they believed that an absolute truth was an impossibility. "Truth" was for each individual as things appeared to him. For this very reason the task of the orator was to change such opinions, not from an opinion to the truth, but from one opinion to another.

The precise formulation of these two concepts, episteme and doxa, was an unintentional byproduct of over a century of scientific and philosophical speculation. When examining the theories of the early rhetoricians, we must bear in mind that their rhetoric was firmly based in this scientific and philosophical tradition. Only through an examination of a particular facet of that tradition, that is epistemology, can we truly comprehend the position of the orator in the fifth century B.C. and properly appreciate his endeavors, freed from the onus of the charges with which Socrates and Plato stigmatized him.

Students of philosophy have traditionally organized their studies of pre-Socratic philosophers around the theme of the search for the one hidden element of growth in nature, the φύσις. From this starting point they have recited the litany of elements that came to be regarded as the physis, from water
to atoms, until one comes to Socrates and Plato, who are regarded as having solved this problem, somehow. But the lasting contribution of the early Greek philosophers was not any one particular theory of the physis, if this ever was the sole aim of their speculations, but the formulation of a scientific method in their research, or, more properly speaking, two scientific methods—logic and empiricism. For successive generations of philosophers and rhetoricians constructed their theories upon, and with the aid of, these two techniques. It was squarely in the mainstream of this development of a theory of scientific inquiry that we find the first orators securely placed. We will, then, organize our study of pre-Socratic philosophy around this theme of the evolution of a scientific method.

The pre-Socratic method of inquiry was at first simple observation. Hippolytus recorded the tradition that Xenophanes had cited observations of shells in highland districts, fish fossils in the quarries of Syracuse, and flat impressions of marine creatures in the stones of Malta as evidence for the theory that "all things are of earth and water." Anaximander was reputed to have constructed his theory of evolution upon a series of observations of the comparative nursing periods of fish, mammals, and humans. John Burnet postulated that Thales and Anaximenes arrived at their respective ascriptions of the physis as water and air through the simplest observations derived from direct sensory data about these two elements. He came to the conclusion that the charge that the pre-Socrat-
ics built their theories not upon observation and experimenta-
tion, but lucky guesswork, is "ludicrously wrong."\(^{23}\)

The observational nature of scientific inquiry and the
concept of the \textit{physis} exerted a mutually restraining and de-
termining influence. So long as men adhered to a method of
inquiry based upon results derived from simple observation
and sense perception, the \textit{physis} would remain some substance
perceptible to the senses. And, likewise, if the \textit{physis} con-
tinued to be regarded as a tangible entity, then there would
be no need to rely upon or develop any method of inquiry other
than observation. Thales and Anaximenes, as a consequence,
found their \textit{physeis} in very concrete and observable elements,
water and air.\(^{24}\) Even Anaximenes' theory of change, the rari-
fication and condensation of air, was nothing more than the
result of the simplest observations on the behaviour of the
various meteorological phenomena. Xenophanes was likewise
confined in his claim that "all things that come into being
and grow are of earth and water."\(^{25}\) And Anaximander's \textit{\pi\epsilon\rho\omicron} (the infinite) appears to have been merely an indeterminate
mixture of the four traditional elements.\(^{26}\) Both the manner
and the object of the quest tended to confine one another to
the immediate, tangible realities.

Even when the \textit{physis} came to be considered as a substance
which was imperceptible to the sensory detection, there re-
mained the tendency to regard it, nonetheless, as a material
entity. The numbers which Pythagoras claimed to be the source
of all things had very definite geometrical constructions,\(^{27}\)
due, in part, to the fact that Greek mathematics was fundamentally geometry, not arithmetic. The Νοῦς (Intelligence) which Anaxagoras enthroned as the guiding force of creation, was meant to be taken as corporeal matter. 28 Empedocles, too, conceived his two causal elements, Φιλότης (Love) and Νείκος (Strife), to be as physically substantial as the στοιχεῖα (the common elements). 29 But if the physis was a corporeal entity, though imperceptible to the senses, then sense perception and observation were not completely reliable methods of inquiry.

Only gradually was it realized that the concept of an imperceptible physis would undermine the efficacy of the observational method of investigation. When Heracleitus first postulated a law, the Λόγος, 30 which patterned the changes in our world, he placed the comprehension of it beyond the capability of ordinary men.

\[ \text{And,} \]

\[ \dot{\varepsilon} \kappa\pi\acute{\alpha}τη\nu\tau\alphaι, \phi\nu\acute{\alpha}ν, \text{οι} \ \acute{\alpha}ν\vartheta\rho\omega\kappa\iota \ \pi\acute{\rho}δς \ \tau\etaν \ \gamma\nu\omega\acute{\alpha}ν \ των \ \phi\acute{a}νερων \ \pi\acute{a}ραπλησιων \ \text{O}\omicron\eta\rho\iota, \ \deltaο \ \dot{\varepsilon} \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}το \ των \ \text{E}\lambda\acute{\eta}νων \ \sigma\phi\acute{\omega}κερος \ \pi\acute{a}ντων, \ \dot{\varepsilon} \kappa\acute{e}ιν\nu\nu \ \tau\epsilon \ \gamma\acute{a}ρ \ \pi\acute{a}i\deltaες \ \phi\theta\acute{e}\iota\rhoας \ \kα\acute{a}τακτει\nu\nu\tau\acute{e}ς \ \dot{\varepsilon} \kappa\pi\acute{a}τη\nu\tau\iota \ \dot{\epsilon}\iota\acute{\pi}\acute{a}ντες \ \dot{d}ο\acute{a} \ \dot{e}l\deltaο\mu\epsilon\nu \ \kα\acute{i} \ \dot{e}l\lambda\dot{b}ο\mu\epsilon\nu, \ \tau\acute{a}τα \ \dot{a}πο\lambda\acute{e}\iota\iota\pi\epsilon\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu, \ \dot{d}ο\acute{a} \ \delta\epsilon \ \o\acute{s}\delta \ \dot{e}l\deltaο\mu\epsilon\nu \ \o\acute{b}τη \ \dot{e}l\lambda\dot{b}ο\mu\epsilon\nu, \ \tau\acute{a}τα \ \phi\acute{e}ρο\mu\epsilon\nu. \ 32 \]

They say that men are deceived by the knowledge of
visible things, just as was Homer, the wisest of all Greeks. Some children with lice deceived him saying, "That which we saw and took is that which we leave behind, and that which we neither saw nor took, that we bring along."

The reason for this inability to perceive reality clearly lies in man's dependence upon the senses for information. "The eyes and ears are bad witnesses," admonished Heracleitus, because "physis likes to conceal itself." Heracleitus did not, however, discount the senses altogether, for he admitted that "the eyes are more reliable witnesses than the ears." He had, nonetheless, called the senses into disrepute and declared them inadequate tools in the search for the Logos. With the credibility of the senses called into question, it was necessary to formulate a new method of scientific inquiry.

Parmenides was the first to work out all the implications which an imperceptible physis would have for science, philosophy, and, eventually, rhetoric. He argued that the fundamental reality, the physis, was an element which he designated as the "Ev (One) or, more frequently, the "Eσι (It Is). This substance was ἀγένητον (uncreated), ἀνέκδηπτον (indestructible), ἀπρέμες (motionless), and ἀτέλεστον (without end or issue). To postulate such an immobile and unchanging reality obviously contradicts every bit of evidence which we receive from our senses. Now Parmenides did not deny the existence of change, nor the fact that our senses perceive change, but he did deny the attribute of a "reality" to this order of things. The realm of change and plurality was that
of appearance and deception. He reasoned that his It Is was a plenum, thereby making motion impossible, even that type of motion which the Greeks referred to as "coming into being" and "passing away," that is, change. True reality is one, motionless, changeless, and beyond the reach of the senses.

Parmenides created a dichotomy. He posits, on the one hand, a reality that is one and motionless and, on the other hand, a world of appearances that is many and changing. One's information about the latter comes from the senses. It is called δόξα (opinion), and it is false. The information about reality comes from contemplation. It is called επιστήμη (knowledge), and it is true. By constructing a matrix of appearances, the senses, opinions, and deception against reality, contemplation, knowledge, and truth, Parmenides destroyed the fundamental cohesion of human perceptual experience and the essential unity of the pre-Socratic scientific method.

Having thus discounted the senses, Parmenides' task was to explain the manner in which man acquired his knowledge.

From the extant fragments of Parmenides' works, it is surmised that he had constructed a coherent epistemology. The most pertinent fragment reads,

\[
\text{s ŷs ŷs x̂ês x̂ês k̄âs în m̄êł̄êw p̄ο̂l̄ûp̄l̄ά̂ḡκ̄τ̄ων t̄l̄h̄ν̄âs ân̄θ̄ρ̄p̄ôîn p̄âr̄îσ̄τα̂τ̄î. t̄d̄ ŷs ŷs âb̄t̄ p̄ôîn h̄p̄êr̄ f̄ρ̄ôn̄êî m̄êł̄êw f̄̄h̄ôs̄îs ân̄θ̄r̄p̄ôîn k̄âî p̄âs̄în k̄âî p̄ân̄t̄l̄. t̄d̄ ŷs ŷs p̄λ̄ên̄êw p̄ôîn h̄p̄êr̄ p̄h̄m̄a.}
\]

For as each has the mixture of deceitful parts, so stand the thoughts to men; for it is the same, that which is thought, and the nature of the parts in men, each and every one; for what is more is the thought.
His theory of knowledge is basically what becomes known later in Greek philosophy as ἡ γνώσις τοῦ δεινοῦ τῶ δυνατῶ (the knowledge of like to like).41 The theory states that as the mixture of Light and Dark, Parmenides' metaphor for truth and opinion, 42 is in a person, so will that person come to an awareness of either reality or appearances. He also ventures to say that thought and existence are synonymous.43 For if one thinks, one has to think of something; one cannot think of nothing. Only that which exists can be thought; for the thought exists because of that which exists. To attempt any further elaboration or clarification of these statements would not be warranted by the extant evidence. A major philosophical advance was made when men undertook the defense of Parmenides' theses.

The task of defending Parmenides' rather extreme position fell to his disciple and countryman, Zeno of Elea. Zeno sought not so much to prove the existence of a motionless and unchanging One, as to disprove the existence of the world of plurality and change. His technique was to start with an opponent's proposition regarding some aspect of this realm of plurality and change, and to draw from this proposition two contradictory conclusions, thereby proving the fallaciousness of the original proposition and, at the same time, the absurdity of the postulate of plurality and change. Plato described Zeno's technique in the following manner:

The book [of Zeno's] is in fact a sort of defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by showing that his supposition,
that there is a one, leads to many absurdities and contradictions. This book, then, is a retort against those who assert a plurality. It pays them back in the same coin with something to spare, and aims at showing that, on a thorough examination, their own supposition that there is a plurality leads to even more absurd consequences than the hypothesis of the one.\textsuperscript{44}

Zeno tried to prove the impossibility of motion by demonstrating the impossibility of: 1) moving through a fixed space. (the infinite divisibility of any space to be moved through will, logically, preclude any beginning of motion), and 2) there being even an infinitely small amount of motion at any given time (an object in motion must occupy a given space at a given moment, and, if this is true, then the object is at rest and not in motion).\textsuperscript{45} The essence of Zeno's defense was to draw two contradictory conclusions from the same postulate and to deny utterly any understanding or defense of the proposition. His proofs, though based upon observable phenomena, contradict them. But this was his very achievement--to develop a logical process independent of the contradictory evidence of the senses. The process came to be known as the dialectic; and, indeed, Aristotle calls Zeno the founder of the technique.\textsuperscript{46}

For the next century Parmenides' theories exercised a profound influence over Greek philosophers, particularly over the atomists Empedocles and Democritus.\textsuperscript{47} They took Parmenides' idea of an uncreated, unchangeable, indestructible physis and broke it down into an infinite number of ultimately indivisible particles called \textit{hĩξωματα} (roots) or \textit{ἄτομοι} (atoms). The atoms themselves were structurally changeless, though they do mix
with one another to produce numerous secondary substances. This combination and separation of atoms produces an illusion of creation, change, and destruction.

\[ \phi\nu\sigma\iota\varsigma \omicron\delta\epsilon\nu\sigma\varsigma \varepsilon\varsigma\tau\iota\nu \alpha\pi\acute{\alpha}t\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \theta\nu\eta\tau\acute{o}\varsigma, \omicron\delta\epsilon\, \tau\iota\varsigma \omicron\lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu \omicron \mu\acute{e}n\nu \theta\nu\acute{a}t\acute{o}t\omicron\iota \tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\acute{\eta}; \omicron\lambda\upsilon\upsilon\delta \mu\acute{a}n\nu \mu\acute{e}z\iota \varsigma \tau\e\delta\acute{i}\acute{a}l\lambda\acute{a}z\acute{e}z \tau\e\mu\iota\gamma\epsilon\nu\tau\acute{o}\varsigma \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota. \] 48

There is no growth of anything mortal, neither is there any end in destructive death, but only a mixture and reconciliation of things mingling.

This rehabilitation of the world of change and appearances entailed a corresponding rehabilitation of the efficacy of the senses.

The atomists did not reject the senses outright, as did Parmenides and Zeno, but awarded to them a limited sphere in which they were competent. Empedocles' advice was to heed the information which comes from our several senses; but, he further warned, sensory data are of a restricted usefulness. For the competency of the senses was confined to the realm of appearances; they are incapable of delivering information about the fundamental reality, the atomic world. Democritus, likewise, relegated sensory data to the order of appearances; that knowledge which comes from sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch he called "bastard" or "obscure." Sensory information is, then, only of a limited usefulness.

The atomists found it desirable to elaborate upon the theories of sense perception expounded by Parmenides. Empedocles was the first to formulate a coherent theory of sensation. He built upon Parmenides' premise that sensation derives from a reciprocal activity between the sense organ and the
object perceived. But rather than claiming an equal interaction of like substances in the organ and the object, Empedocles divided the process into passive and active actions. Every object emanates certain particles called ἀπορρατα (effluvia) which enter various passages in the sense organs.53 There is, of course, a particular sensibility of each organ according to the respective sizes of the particle and the passage. The entrance of the particle produces a stimulus which is then converted into sensation and finally recognition. This arises from the interaction of like particles in the sense organs and in the effluvia.

γαῖῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὑπέμας, ἔθατι δ' ὁδῷ, αἰθέρι δ' ἀιθέρα δίον, ἄτρο πυρί πῦρ δίδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νείκος δὲ τε νείκει λυγῳ.54

For we see earth by means of earth, water by water, divine aether by aether, and destroying fire by fire, and love by love, and hate by woeful hate.

This clarifies Theophrastus' statement that Empedocles believed that thought and pleasure arose from the interplay of similar atoms and ignorance and pain from opposite ones.55 Democritus, too, made the action of particles upon the sense organs the basis of his epistemology.56 But, according to the atomists, sense perception was still valid only for the realm of appearances, that is, the world of the combination of atoms in the mixture and separation.

Inquiry into the ἄτομοι themselves must be made via another faculty. As Democritus urged, "a more precise investigation is necessary."57 Since this particular fragment came from a work entitled "On Logic" or "The Canon," we are fairly
secure in maintaining that "a more precise investigation" was a reference to the use of logic or dialectics. Empedocles, in any case, makes it clear that contemplation accompanied by good intentions and faultless care is a much surer path to positive knowledge than reliance upon sense perception and observation.\textsuperscript{58} It is, then, either logic or contemplation that will give one access to the ultimate realities of the atomic world.

We have with the atomists a more precise formulation of Parmenides' dichotomy. Though the senses are not to be discarded outright, they are considered incapable of detecting the \textit{physis}, the atoms; they are, however, quite capable of producing reliable information about the apparent world. This information is the foundation of one's \textit{δόξα} (opinion) on the qualities of substances, like light or dark, sweet or bitter, or light or heavy. But these qualities are only secondary and exist by convention; the atoms and the void are the true reality.

\textit{διπότε τὰ φαινόμενα διέβαλε, "νόμῳ χροιῆ; νόμῳ γλυκῷ; νόμῳ πικρόν," εἰπὼν, "ἐπεξῆ ὁ άτομοι καὶ κένος"}\textsuperscript{59}

[Democritus said] with regards to phenomena, "color [exists] by convention, sweetness by convention, bitterness by convention," saying, "really only atoms and the void [exist]."

There is, then, in \textit{δόξα} a certain cultural relativity. With \textit{επιστήθη}, that is, the knowledge of the atoms and void, there are no shades of distinction, no differences of convention, but only the cognition of these two entities and the forces that control them, none of which are intelligible to the
senses. Recognition comes through either contemplation, revelation, or dialectics.

It was precisely in this ongoing clarification of the concepts of doxa and episteme that Gorgias, Protagoras, and the early rhetors were active. For the atomists' epistemologies, with their corollary theories of opinion, perception, truth, and dialectics, were the foundation of the oratorical theories of the sophists.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II


2. Plato, Gorgias 465 D.


4. Plato, Protagoras 317 A-C.

5. Homer, Iliad xxii.261.

6. Ibid., xii. 231-150.

7. There seems to be a discrepancy between the heroes' propensity for action and contempt for "babbling" and Phoenix's advice to the young Achilles "to become a doer of deeds and a speaker of words," (Iliad xxii. 261). The phrase "μύθος τε ἡτηρὶ ἐμεκαι" deserves a more accurate translation than the traditional "speaker of words." Homer employs "μύθος" to denote the utterance of anything of gravity or importance. An exhortation, a vow, curse, or command is termed a "μύθος" as, for example, when Agamemnon lays "a powerful command upon" the priest Brysis, "κρατερῶν δ' επὶ μύθον ἐτελλον" (Iliad i.25). It is perhaps more in the spirit of a commander or exhorter that we should interpret Phoenix's admonition. Significantly enough, Homer does not use "λόγος" as the object of "rhetor," but the more volatile "μύθος."


9. Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes 1052.

10. Aeschylus, Suppliant 274.

11. Petronius, Satyricon 1-2. All translations from Greek and Latin are my own unless otherwise indicated. When my own translations are used, the original text will precede the translation.
12
Cicero De Officiis xxxvii. 132-135.

13
Xenophon Memorabilia i.6.13.

14
Aristotle Sophistic Argumentations iii. 6.

15
Polybius Histories xvi.7.9-10.

16
Aristophanes Clouds 890 ff.

17
Plebe, op. cit., p. 70.

18
Plato Gorgias 495 C.

19
This particular point demands a further clarification. By the very fact that it was found necessary to inquire into the nature of things, meant that the underlying reality, the physis, was not immediately apparent to the senses. The method of inquiry would, then, necessitate the use of "logic" in conjunction with observation. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that originally these men made an indiscriminate use of reason and the senses, and that there was, as yet, no true distinction or division of this technique of inquiry into the components of logic or empiricism.

20
Diels, Fragmenta, 21A fr. 33. The standard abbreviation for Diels’ work, Fragmenta der Vorsokratiker, is "DK." It will be used hereafter in such a manner: DK 21A fr. 33; DK referring to the work itself, the first Arabic numeral is a reference to a particular pre-Socratic philosopher as indexed by Diels, A or B refers to ancient fragments related to either events of the philosopher's life (A) or his teachings (B), and fr. followed by an Arabic numeral refers to a particular fragment.

21
DK 12A fr. 10.

22
Burnet, op. cit., pp. 49, 75.

23

DK 21B fr. 29.

Burnet, op. cit., p. 74.


Windelband, op. cit., p. 83.

DK 31B fr. 17.

DK 22B fr. 114.

DK 22B fr. 72.

DK 22B fr. 56. The verb Heracleitus used for "to take," "\(\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\alpha\nu\omega\)," also has the meaning, applicable in this particular case, of "to understand." Note the frequent use of "\(\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\alpha\nu\omega\)" by Heracleitus' younger contemporary, Pindar, who also used the verb in this sense.


DK 22B fr. 123.

DK 22B fr. 101a.

DK 28B fr. 8.5.

DK 28B fr. 8.3-4.

DK 28B fr. 8.45. Parmenides believed that the common assumption and fallacy of his predecessors was the admission of the existence of the "it is not," or nothingness. This would, of course, allow the motion of the "It Is" into the "it is not," thereby producing change. But Parmenides said,
"ἐστι καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν αὐτῷ ὅπερ ἔχουν ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινεῖται," that is, "that all things are One and it stands within itself; it does not have a place in which to move," Plato Theaetetus 180 E.

39
DK 28B fr. 4. Parmenides used the phrase "λεύσας...νοῦ" that is, "look with the mind." So one may reasonably deduce that this refers to some manner of contemplation. He does, however, attribute his personal knowledge of the "It Is" to a revelation from Δ'Κη, the goddess of justice. But whether "λεύσας...νοῦ" refers to a rational or a revelatory activity, it certainly excludes observation and sense perception.

40
DK 28B fr. 16.

41

42
Theodor Ballau, Die Idee der Paideia (Meisenheim, Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1952), is a detailed investigation into Parmenides' impact upon Plato.

43
DK 31B fr. 8.

44

45

46
Aristotle Physics ix.239b.9 ff. Aristotle further clarifies himself by stating that dialectics was the art of argumentation, not from true premises, but from premises admitted by one's opponent.

47
See above, p. 31 n.42.

48
DK 31B fr. 8.

49
DK 31B fr. 4.
50  
   DK 31B fr. 2.

51  
   DK 31B fr. 17.

52  
   DK 68B fr. 11.

53  
   DK 31B frs. 89, 2, and 101.

54  

55  
   Burnet, op. cit., p. 246.

56  
   DK 68B fr. 7.

57  
   DK 68B fr. 11.

58  
   DK 31B fr. 110.

59  
   DK 68 B fr. 125.
CHAPTER III

PROTAGORAS

Very little is known about Protagoras' youth. Most of the ancient doxographers agreed that he was born in the coastal town of Abdera,\textsuperscript{1} though an alternate tradition placed his birth in Teos, Ionia.\textsuperscript{2} A probably spurious legend related his academic apprenticeship under the Magi tutors of Thrace.\textsuperscript{3} The only other information concerning his early days is that he invented a type of shoulder pad with which porters could more easily carry their loads.\textsuperscript{4} The ingenuity of the invention attracted the notice of Democritus who received Protagoras as his student and disciple.\textsuperscript{5} Under the tutelage of Democritus Protagoras began his philosophical and rhetorical training,\textsuperscript{6} but any more detailed information concerning his career as a student is lacking. His teaching career, however, is very well documented.

Protagoras' professional activities centered upon his oratorical abilities. He gave public lectures, for a fee,\textsuperscript{7} and used these public performances as an advertisement, an \textit{ἐπὶθείξις}, of his rhetorical prowess which, he claimed, he could impart to his students for a fee.

My claim is that I am one of these, rather better than anyone else at helping a man to acquire a good and noble character, worthy indeed of the fee which I charge and even more, as my pupils themselves agree. On this account I have adopted the following method of assessing payment. Anyone who comes to learn from me may either pay the fee I ask for or, if he prefers, go to a temple, state on oath what
he believes to be the worth of my instruction, and deposit that amount.\textsuperscript{8} Protagoras cautiously admitted to being a sophist,\textsuperscript{9} and boasted of being able to make anyone "a better man"\textsuperscript{10} by teaching him "prudence...order...and speech."\textsuperscript{11} Socrates correctly interpreted this feat as the \textit{τεχνη πολιτικη} (the art of politics), the art of making men good citizens.\textsuperscript{12} Protagoras founded no permanent educational institution, but passed his life wandering from city to city gathering about himself coteries of local aristocratic youths eager for instruction.\textsuperscript{13} He was both renowned and ridiculed for a contingent of permanent students which travelled with him.\textsuperscript{14} He taught in this manner for forty years.\textsuperscript{15}

His rhetorical instruction was the first organized approach to linguistics.\textsuperscript{16} He conducted a systematic study of grammar and vocabulary, and developed the question-and-answer method of debate, a technique which later became known as the Socratic dialogue.\textsuperscript{17}

whether they exist or not. For many are the obstructions to knowledge, both in the obscurity (of the question) and in the shortness of a man's life."\textsuperscript{19} The statement gained him the reputation of an atheist,\textsuperscript{20} a charge which resulted in his expulsion from Athens\textsuperscript{21} and a burning of his books in that same city.\textsuperscript{22} He was, nonetheless, a close friend of Pericles,\textsuperscript{23} and prior to his expulsion Pericles had entrusted Protagoras with the drafting of a constitution for the new pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii.\textsuperscript{24} At Thurii, founded in 443 B.C., he must surely have come in contact with his fellow colonists, Hippodamus of Miletus and Herodotus of Halicarnassus. Protagoras was reputed to have lived until the age of ninety.\textsuperscript{25} He died in good health on a voyage to Sicily.\textsuperscript{26}

The epistemological speculations of Protagoras, and the sophists in general, have been largely either ignored, relegated to a position of secondary importance, or, even when given cursory consideration, studied in complete isolation from any rhetorical theories.\textsuperscript{27} But this separate treatment is not in any way peculiar to modern scholarship; the ancients also divided the sophists' works in a similar fashion. Both Sextus Empiricus and Aristotle analyzed and discussed sophistic philosophy and rhetoric in separate and distinct treatises. Such division and isolation would have appeared strange to the sophists themselves, for they did not regard their philosophical and rhetorical pursuits as distinct and unrelated endeavors. The inclination to divorce rhetoric from philosophy unfortunately obscures the fundamental cohesion and interdependence
which epistemology and rhetoric held for the sophists—their epistemology was the indispensable foundation for their oratorical ideal.

In so far as one is able to reconstruct Protagoras' epistemology from the extant fragments, it appears certain that he relied heavily upon the theories of Heracleitus and his mentor, Democritus. One particular fragment which indicates this dependence was recorded by Sextus Empiricus and reads as follows:

\[\text{φησιν οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὴν ἢκλην ἰενσθῇν εἶναι, ἤρωθεσις δὲ αὐτὴς ἵναις προσθέτεις ἄντί τί τῶν ὑποφόρησεσιν θάνατοι καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετακοιμίσθαι τε καὶ ἁλλοιοθετοῦσιν παρά τε τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ παρά τὰς ἄλλας κατασκευάς τῶν σωμάτων. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοὺς λόγους πάντως τῶν φαινομένων ὑποκεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ ἢκλῃ, ἵνα δύνασθιν ἢκλῃ ὑκον ἐπ' ἑαυτῇ πάντα εἰναι διὰ πᾶσι φαίνεται.}^{28}

Then the man [Protagoras] says that matter is in flux, and that at the same time as it is in flux there are produced mixtures from the particles disintegrating; and that sensations are modified and transformed according to the age and other contingencies of the body. And he also says that the intelligibility of all phenomena is in matter; in so far as matter is dependent upon itself, it is everything such as appears to everyone. Men sometimes perceive conditions other than those [that are]. For they who are in a conformity with nature perceive those things which are in matter and can [only] reveal themselves to those in conformity with nature. They [who are in a state] contrary to nature [perceive] those things [which can reveal themselves] to those [not in conformity with nature].

This fragment contains several important points deserving of a closer analysis.

Heracleitus' ideas were the starting point for Protagoras' epistemology. As Heracleitus had claimed that \( \text{πάντα ἤεῖ} \) (all things flow),^{29} so too did Protagoras believe that \( \text{ἥκλην ἰενσθῇν} \) \( \text{εἶναι} \) (matter was in flux). If we assume that Protagoras ad-
hered to all of the ramifications of Heracleitus' postulate, then we must conclude that, like Heracleitus, he believed that the "flux" pertained not only to external matter, but also to man himself.\textsuperscript{30} This belief in a Hercleitan state of flux was the foundation of atomistic and sophistic epistemology, that is, the theory of the interaction between the object perceived and man's sense organs.

Protagoras' belief in such a theory of epistemology is betrayed by one particular statement, namely, that "\textit{προσθέσεις ἁμαρτήματα ἰσιδωράω γίνεσθαι} (there are produced mixtures from the particles disintegrating)."\textsuperscript{31} The production of mixtures, or change, must take place both in the objects perceived and in man, since both are said to be in a state of flux. The change in the objects perceived is the conglomeruation and the disintegration of atoms from which all of the secondary, phenomenological qualities arise. The change in man corresponds to what Protagoras labelled "the age and other contingencies of the body." Furthermore, since both the objects perceived and man are in a state of flux, so, too, must perception or sensation, which is the contact between the objects perceived and the sense organs, be attributed to flux. And so it was with Protagoras; perception was the product of the action of the former upon the latter.\textsuperscript{32} He claimed, in effect, that perception, sensation, and thought were contingent upon an individual's physiognomy.

This concept of perception explains the next statement
in the Sextus Empiricus fragment, "the intelligibility (τοῦ λόγου) of all phenomena (φαινόμενα) is in matter." Our understanding or perception of phenomena arises from the action of matter (ὁ λόγος) upon the sense organs. Then, to follow this line of reasoning, the object perceived is the sum total of all of the perceptions of all those perceiving it, because a perception cannot arise independently of the effect that the matter of the object perceived has upon the sense organs of any individual. Even two divergent perceptions have their origins in some stimulus received from the same matter perceived by both. So, to use Socrates' example, a wind which feels cold to one man and hot to another is just that, both cold and hot. Protagoras resorts to the epistemological theory of Parmenides, the knowledge of like to like, to explain the co-existence of divergent perceptions, or how "men sometimes perceive conditions other than those [that are]." To Parmenides it was the mixture of Light and Dark in a person that colored their perception. Protagoras was less allegorical and more specific. He believed that certain "contingencies of the body," like senescence, disease, etc., determined whether our bodies were "in conformity with nature," that is, normal. If one were normal, then one's perceptions would be normal. But if one were in a state "contrary to nature," that is, abnormal, then one's perceptions would be abnormal, abnormal but still valid. The classic example was that of a sick man tasting wine. What a healthy man, one in conformity with nature, would perceive as sweet wine, an ill man, one in a state contrary to
nature, would perceive as bitter. In a similar fashion this concept would apply to all sensations and all contingencies of the body. Protagoras' epistemology was thus a pastiche constructed of elements taken from the theories of Parmenides, Heracleitus, and Democritus.

A more concise statement of Protagoras' epistemological theory is contained in the famous and often misunderstood "Homo Mensura Fragment."

\[ \pi\alpha\nu\tau\omega \chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\omega \mu\epsilon\tau\rho\omicron\omicron \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu \delta\nu\theta\rho\omicron\pi\omicron\varsigma, \tau\epsilon\omicron \mu\epsilon\nu \delta\nu\tau\omicron \lambda\varsigma \varepsilon\sigma\iota\nu, \tau\epsilon\omicron \delta\epsilon \omicron \omicron \delta\nu\tau\omicron \lambda\varsigma \omicron \omicron \varepsilon\sigma\iota\nu. \]

Man is the measure of all things, of those things that are, such as they are, and of those things that are not, such as they are not.

The abuses of this fragment vary. Often it is removed from its context and used as a motto for the entire classical period. Sometimes it is given a narrowly aesthetic interpretation, particularly with regard to Greek sculpture. And frequently it is examined through the lenses of a nineteenth-century philosophical system and interpreted in such a fashion as would have made sense in the nineteenth century A. D., but not in the fifth century B. C. Protagoras intended it as a statement of epistemology.

Nearly every word of the "Homo Mensura Fragment" has been subjected to analysis by philosophers both ancient and modern. Questions revolve around the precise meaning of \( \chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\omega \) (of all things), \( \mu\epsilon\tau\rho\omicron \) (measure), \( \delta\nu\theta\rho\omicron\pi\omicron\varsigma \) (man), as well as \( \delta\nu\tau\omicron \lambda\varsigma \varepsilon\sigma\iota\nu \) (of things that are, such as they are), and so forth. But with a basic understanding of Protagoras'
epistemology and only an elementary linguistic background, we can extricate ourselves from the semantic labyrinth created by his interpreters.

Χρημάτω (of all things), as its root, χρη-, implies, and as Laszlo Versenyi so assiduously points out, signifies something "used, experienced, or needed by man."\(^{42}\) ἄνθρωπος (man), he then declares, is tautological since it is already implied in the word χρημάτω. It is, in fact, the word χρημάτω that is tautological, because the deletion of ἄνθρωπος would render the passage completely meaningless, whereas πάντω (of everything) can, and in Greek often does, stand independently of χρημάτω, and still make perfect sense; for χρημα "is often expressed where it may be omitted."\(^{43}\)

Mario Untersteiner attempts to translate μέτρον as "master" rather than the traditional "measure,"\(^{44}\) but his reinterpretation necessitates a complete reworking of the meaning of Protagoras' other statements. His reasons for doing so, moreover, remain obscure, especially since we have it on the quite reliable evidence of Plato and Sextus Empiricus that Protagoras intended μέτρον to be understood in the sense of κριτήριον (criterion).\(^{45}\) Untersteiner comes to the use of μέτρον as "master" only by a very dubious reworking of the idioms "ἡβης μέτρον (the fullness of youth)" and "μέτρον ἐχειν (to exercise moderation)" into a sense of fulfilment and then mastery.\(^{46}\) Μέτρον in both cases is part of an idiom from which it cannot be separated and be expected to retain its idiomatic meaning.

The argument which revolves around the word ἄνθρωπος is
essentially whether it should be understood in the sense of "mankind" or "an individual man." The former interpretation was soundly rejected in antiquity and, indeed, does not accord well with the relativistic bent of Protagoras' epistemology.

If we read μέτρον as "criterion" and ἄνθρωπος as "an individual man," then we are in a better position to approach the second half of Protagoras' postulate, τῶν μὲν δυντῶν ηκὶ εστίν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ δυντῶν ηκὶ οὐκ εστίν (of those things that are, such as they are, and of those things that are not, such as they are not). It is this phrase that has generated the most heated debate.

Some scholars have twisted this statement to read, "man is the measure of all things, of that which is, that it is, and of that which is not, that it is not." The text would then mean that man's perceptions determine what exists and what does not exist. Untersteiner interprets Protagoras as having believed that matter must manifest itself to man in order to exist.47

Several objections can be raised against this interpretation of the fragment. First, as J. Mewaldt noted,48 the latter half of the "Homo Mensura Fragment" is constructed according to formal rhetorical rules, displaying both Protagoras' penchant for antithetical statements and the structural balance for which his speeches were noted.49 With some justification, then, one could question the motive behind Protagoras' inclusion of the second half of the phrase, τῶν δὲ οὐκ δυντῶν ἦκι οὐκ εστίν (of those things that are not, such as they are not).
Did it somehow clarify the meaning of the preceding phrase? Or was it merely an artistic nicety? Second, to posit an individual man as the absolute criterion of existence and non-existence violates the general spirit of atomistic physics and Protagorean epistemology. Third, this particular misunderstanding arises from a misinterpretation of Sextus Empiricus' commentary on the "Homo Mensura Fragment" which reads,

\[ \text{πάντα γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐστὶν, τὰ δὲ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαινόμενα οὐδὲ ἐστὶν.}^{50} \]

All phenomena [which appear] to men exist, and the phenomena [which appear] to no men do not exist.

When Sextus Empiricus spoke of τὰ φαινόμενα (phenomena), he was referring to that order of existence known as the "apparent" or "phenomenological," the world of secondary qualities and characteristic that arises from the conglomeration and disintegration of atoms. This is the order perceived by the senses; single atoms are imperceptible to the senses. The proper rendition of Sextus Empiricus' explication should be, "all the secondary qualities (τὰ φαινόμενα) [which appear] to men exist, those secondary qualities [which appear] to no men do not exist." Fourth, we have the evidence of Plato that Protagoras intended man to be the criterion and measure of secondary qualities, not absolute existence or non-existence. In the Theaetetus\(^{51}\) Socrates explains Protagoras' maxim to the young Theaetetus through that example of the wind which feels hot to one man and cold to another. In this case each man is the criterion of whether the wind is hot or cold, but not whether the wind exists or does not exist. Fifth, it is quite true,
as Untersteiner maintains, that Protagoras believed that sensation arose from the interaction of an external object and man's sense organs and that without the sense organs no sensation could arise. This means, however, that only the secondary qualities perceptible to the senses cannot exist apart from man; but the atoms of the object perceived can and do so exist. Protagoras did not state that an object could not exist unless its secondary qualities were perceived by some man. We must agree with the conclusion of Heinrich Gomperz,

das Wichtige war ihm [Protagoras], dass jeder menschlichen Empfindung und jedem menschlichen Gedanken eine adäquate Realität entspricht, nicht dass jeder Realität auch menschliche Empfindung und Gedanken entsprechen.52

Protagoras claimed that each man was the judge of how things appeared to him, an epistemological belief which is normally classified as "subjectivism" or "relativism."

Relativism was a concept that permeated every facet of the intellectual and cultural activities of fifth-century B.C. Greece. For example, Euripides' characters' speeches are simply opportunities to express their personal ideas and attitudes on the world order.53 Xenophanes subjected the divine realm to his inspection and concluded that even the concept and depiction of deity was relative and varied from nation to nation.

αλλ' εί χειρας έχον βόσες ἵπποι τ' ἥ λέοντες ἢ.
γράψαι χειρεσιοι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἀπερ ἄνδρες, ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποιοι βόσες δέ τε βουσίν ὁμοίας καὶ κε θεών
λεῖας ἑραφον καὶ σώματ' ἑπιλογὸν τοιαύθ' οἶδον περ
καθοι' δέμας εἶχον ἕκαστοι.54

But if oxen and horses or lions had hands and could paint with their hands and produce works of art just
like men, the horses would paint the images of their gods like horses and oxen like oxen and make their bodies just as each animal has them.

And,

Αθηναίοις τε θεοῖς φατέρους σιμοῦς μέλανας τε Θρηκές τε γλαυκοῦς καὶ πυρροῦς ψαμ τελεσθαί. 55

And they say that the Aethiopians are wont to depict their gods as black and snub-nosed and the Thracians theirs as bright-eyed and red-haired.

Herodotus' work abounds with comparisons between the customs of the Greeks and various barbarians. 56 Lyric poetry had steadily turned its focus inward upon the passions and sentiments of the individual since the days of Sappho and Archilochus. 57 And the sophists, in addition to their stance of relativism in the field of epistemology, initiated the famous nomos-physis debate which attained such a great popularity in the fourth century B. C. In sum, subjectivism was all-pervasive.

The problem lies in the relationship of these various manifestations of relativism to one another. Is one the source of the others? Are they unrelated? Or do they have a common origin? Untersteiner believes that the Greeks "had arrived at this idea [the relativity of values] by the force of natural historical development," by which he means "the broadening of outlook." 58 The phrase is too vague to be very useful. If one assumes that he is referring to an increasing contact between Greeks and barbarians in the fifth century B. C., then one is forced to defend the historicity of the tenuous position that the Greeks lived in virtual isolation since the fall of the Mycenaean kingdoms. The most serious objection to Un-
stersteiner's theory, however, is that it completely ignores the very definite line of epistemological evolution which led to sophistic relativism. The subjectivism of the lyric poets certainly preceded the advent of the sophists, but it was the sophists who gave a precise articulation to an otherwise amorphous, undefined trait of the lyricists. It was only after the sophists had worked relativism into a well-defined, articulate concept that it had such an impact upon Herodotus and Euripides.\(^{59}\)

Protagoras' relativistic epistemology was the foundation for his rhetorical theories. If, as he maintained, each man was the sole criterion of how things appeared to him, then it was quite obvious that two variant perceptions could co-exist with regard to the same condition or situation. Both perceptions would be valid but neither would be an absolute or objective truth. An objective perception, Protagoras would have claimed, is rendered impossible by the very nature of perception, that is, the result of the interaction of an external object upon an individual's sensory organ. Objectivity and truth and absolute knowledge (\(\epsilon πιστήμη\)) were philosophical fantasies for the sophists. Man could be sure only of his own perception and \(δόξα\) (opinion). If, to use a Platonic distinction, one meditated upon one's opinion, one was \(διανοούμενος\) (ruminating). But when one expressed one's opinion, a \(λόγος\) (account) was produced.\(^{60}\) In every situation, then, there were potentially at least two antithetical \(λόγοι\).

\[\text{Καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δόσ λόγους εἶναι περὶ πάντως πράγματος}\]
And he said first that concerning every situation there were two accounts which conflict with one another.

It is precisely at this point that Protagoras began his rhetorical theory.

Protagoras' major concern was with the various aspects of antithesis. He is believed to have organized his treatises into two general works, the titles of which reflect this concern, ἀντιλογίαι (Antilogies) and Ἀλήθεια καταβάλλοντες (Truth or Destructive Arguments). He also claimed a facility in being able to argue both sides of any given question. As Seneca related concerning the sophist's ability,

`de omni re in utramque partem disputari posse ex aequo et de hac ipsa, an omnis res in utramque partem disputabilis sit.'

[that he was] able to argue equally well either side of all questions, and, from this fact, that all questions are debatable from either side.

This art of defending or arguing opposite opinions was known as the τέχνη ἀντιλέγω (the art of antilogy), that is, eristics.

The penchant for antilogy manifested itself in Protagoras' oratorical style as well as his rhetorical theories. Just as he avowed the validity of contradictory opinions with regards to the same situation, so, too, did he balance his speeches at every opportunity with pro and contra statements. Though the style was forced, it gained popularity in the fifth century and its influence can be detected in the speeches which Euripides and Thucydides wrote for their characters. An eristic ability became the hallmark of an educated gentleman.
Protagoras was compelled to make grand claims for his rhetoric, for if any opinion was valid, why should one pay Protagoras for oratorical instruction to be able to defend or argue one or the other side? This accusation stemmed from, and the defense lay in his epistemology. Though Protagoras maintained the validity of all opinions, he acknowledged the fact that "men sometimes perceive conditions other than those [that are]," if they are in a state "contrary to nature." This would lead them to have a ἡπτῶ λόγον (weaker account). A man "in conformity with nature" would give a κρείττω λόγον (stronger account). The task of the orator was to persuade the man in a state contrary to nature that he held the weaker opinion and, having thus convinced him, bring him to an understanding of and agreement with the stronger account. This was Protagoras' claim, "ἡπτῶ λόγον κρείττω λόγον ποιεῖν (to make the weaker account stronger)."67

This boast of Protagoras has been subjected to misinterpretation on two accounts. The first is the unfortunate translation of λόγος as "argument," rendering the phrase, "to make the weaker argument stronger." When set in its proper context,68 however, we see that Protagoras was not referring to forensic duplicity. To the contrary, he was making an epistemological statement. It was in this latter sense that Plato, too, understood the phrase.69 The second error is to regard this as a statement of morality, not epistemology. In such a light Protagoras is cast as a man devoid of ethics, selling his talents to the wealthier side to secure the defeat of
just and moral proposals. Protagoras clearly had no such intent in his declaration. Not even Plato could bring such an unwarranted charge against the sophist, and he spoke of Protagoras only in the most complimentary of terms.
EXCURSUS TO CHAPTER III

THE DISSOI LOGOI

None of Protagoras' works are extant; only isolated sentences and the reports of the doxographers about his works remain. There is, however, one surviving work from the last decades of the fifth century B.C. which H. Diels and H. Gomperz believe to show a definite Protagorean influence in both its style and content.\(^1\) The untitled work has come down to us without authorship and attached to the manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus.\(^2\) It was written in the Doric dialect, and has customarily been entitled the Νυσαοὶ λόγοι (The Two Accounts or alternately, The Two Arguments). This designation was chosen from the opening lines of each chapter which contain the phrase, "διασοι λόγοι λέγονται περί... (there are said to be two accounts concerning...)." There then follows examinations of the concepts of: 1) good and evil, 2) honor and shame, 3) justice and injustice, 4) truth and falsehood, 5) madmen and wisemen, 6) the teachability of wisdom and excellence, 7) political affairs and methods of candidate selection, 8) the power of the art of rhetoric and the rhetorician, and 9) memory. The tract is neither sophisticated, original, or very profound, but appears to be a student's exercise in the mastery of antilogy.\(^3\)

The anonymous author attempted to illustrate with various examples the maxim of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things." Our student-author apparently did not comprehend the original epistemological context of the "Homo Mensura Fragment," but raised Protagorean relativism to an ethical plane.
He also took advantage of and modified another of Protagoras' rhetorical concepts, that of καιρός (proper occasion). Καιρός began as a strictly oratorical idea; a rhetorical style, phrase, or gesture could be employed only on the proper occasion, for example, a solemn demeanor during a dirge, heroic gestures in a eulogy, or an adaptation of vocabulary to suit the mental capacity of one's audience. It was, in short, the ability to pick λόγους ἀρμοδίους (well-fitting words). The composer of the Dissoi Logoi combined this concept of oratorical suitability with the idea of epistemological relativism to produce an entirely new thesis, or misunderstanding. His argument is that given the proper occasion or set of circumstances, an act may be judged good which at any other time would be judged evil, or that the same act may be judged one way by a given group of people and the opposite way by another group. He propounded what may be termed "ethical or ethnic relativism."

The only digressions from this format are chapters six, seven, and eight in which he delivers the normal sophist opinions on virtue, politics, and rhetoric. But even in these sections one can easily detect the Protagorean penchant for antithetical balance.

**DISSOI LOGOI**

I Concerning Good and Evil

1. There are said to be two arguments among those in Greece who philosophize about good and evil. For, on the one hand, there are those who say that the good is one thing and evil another; and those who say that they are the same, and to some it might be
good and to others evil, and to the same man, at
one time good, at another evil.
2. And I place myself with the latter; and I shall
examine from such a view human life, in which care
is taken for eating and drinking and intercourse;
for these things to one who is feeble are an evil,
and to one in health and lacking them, good.
3. And, to be sure, the intemperate use of these to
those who are misusing them is evil, and to those
selling them and receiving pay, a good. To be sure,
disease to those who are ill is an evil, and to
doctors, a good. To be sure, death to those who
are dying is an evil, and to undertakers and grave-
diggers, a good.
4. And agriculture, bring forth beautiful fruit, to
farmers is a good, and to retailers, an evil. To
be sure, for ships to be crushed and smashed is an
evil to the shipowner, and to the shipbuilders, a
good.
5. Still, that iron corrode and become blunt and
be crushed for the others is an evil, and to the
smith, a good. And, doubtless, that a piece of cer-
amic be smashed for the others is an evil, and to
those making ceramics, a good. And that the sole
be worn down and broken through for the others is
an evil, to the cobbler, a good.
6. To be sure, among those in gymnastic, musical,
and military contests: for example, in the gymnastic
contest in the stadium, victory to he who wins is a
good, and for those who are defeated, an evil.
7. And this is the case also for the wrestlers and
the boxers, and all the other (?) musicians: for
example, victory in the cithera contest to the vic-
tor is a good, and for those defeated, an evil.
8. And in case of war (and I shall speak first of
the most recent events), the victory of the Lacede-
monians, in which they defeated the Athenians and
the allies, to the Lacedemonians it was a good, and
to the Athenians and the allies, an evil; and the
victory, in which the Greeks defeated the Persians,
to the Greeks it was a good, and to the barbarians,
an evil.
9. To be sure, the capture of Troy, to the Achaeans
was a good, and to the Trojans, an evil. And the
same of the misfortune of both the Thebans and the
Argives.
10. And the battle of the Centaurs and the Lapiths,
to the Lapiths it was a good, and to the Centaurs,
an evil. And, to be sure, also the legendary battle
of the gods and the Giants, and victory, to the gods
was a good, and to the Giants, an evil.
11. And there is said to be another argument, that,
on the one hand, the good might be one thing, and
evil another; just as in name they differ, so too
in deed. And I myself interpret this in such a way;
for I believe there would be no distinction in the
quality of good and the quality of evil, if each
were the same and not another; for that would be
strange.

12. And I know that neither can one respond if some-
one would ask, saying these things, "Do tell me,
now did you do anything good for your ancestors?"
And he would say,"Both many and great things."
"You, therefore, are indebted to them on account of
a great and many evils, if good is the same as evil."
13. "And what, now did you do anything good for your
ancestors?" ("Both many and great things.") "Then
you did great evil to your ancestors. And what,
now to enemies you did evil?" "Both many and great."
"Then you did the greatest good."
14. "Come, then, and answer me this. Is it other-
wise, or do you pity beggars, that they have many
evils, and, to the contrary, you are happy: that
they have many goods, if evil and good are the same?"
15. And nothing prohibits that the King be found
in a state similar to the beggars. For the many
and great things, to him, are many and great evil
things, if good and evil are the same. And these
things ought to be said about all things.
16. And I am treating each one, beginning with eat-
ing and drinking and intercourse. For these things
to those who are ill, it is evil, and, to the con-
trary, it would be good to the same ones; if good
and evil are the same; and to those who are ill,
to be ill is an evil and a good, if good is the
same as evil.
17. And like this also is everything else, which
was said in the preceding argument. And I do not
say what good is, but I am attempting to demonstrate
not that evil and good are the same, but that each
is a separate thing.

II Concerning Honor and Shame

1. And there are said to be two arguments concern-
ing honor and shame. For, on the one hand, some
say honor to be one thing, and shame to be another;
they differ just as both do in name, so, too, and
in body; and some say honor and shame are the same.
2. And I shall attempt to prove the latter, be-
ginning in this manner. For, to begin, it is honor-
able for a wholesome boy in the bloom of youth to
gratify a lover, and shameful for a beautiful boy
to gratify one who does not love him.
3. And it is honorable that women bathe inside,
and shameful in the palaestra, but for the men, in the palaestra and gymnasion it is honorable.  
4. And it is honorable for a man to copulate in solitude, so that it be concealed indoors; and shameful outdoors, so that anyone sees it.  
5. And it is honorable that women copulate with their man, and shameful with another. And, surely, for a man it is honorable to copulate with his own wife, and shameful with another.  
6. And to adorn oneself and to anoint oneself with white lead and to deck oneself with gold, is shameful for a man, but for a woman, honorable.  
7. And it is honorable to do good to friends, and shameful to enemies. And it shameful to flee from enemies, and honorable, in the stadium, to flee from competitors.  
8. And it shameful to murder friends and citizens, and honorable to murder enemies. And this same argument holds regarding all things.  
9. And, I said, I am about to treat those things which cities and peoples believe to be shameful. For example, for the Spartans it is honorable for the girls to do gymnastics and appear without sleeves and chitons; and for the Ionians, shameful.  
10. And for those Spartans it is honorable not to teach the children music and letters, and for the Ionians shameful not to know these things.  
11. And among the Thessalonians it is an honor for one who takes the horses and mules from the herds to domesticate them; and in Sicily it is a shameful thing and a deceitful deed for one who takes a cow to "make like a wasp" and skin and chop it up.  
12. And among the Macedonians it seems to be honorable that girls, before they marry a man, be loved by and keep company with a man, and shameful after she has married; and amongst the Greeks both are shameful.  
13. And for the Thracians it is ornamentation to tattoo the girls; and for the others the tattoo is a punishment for those committing injustice. And the Scythians believe it an honor that he who kills a man, having severed the head, should bear it as an ornament on the front of his horse, and later, having covered the skull with gold or silver, should drink from it and pour libations to the gods; and amongst the Greeks one would not even wish to enter the house of such a person who has done such things.  
14. And the Massagetai, having butchered their elders, eat them, and the most honorable funeral seems to be performed by the children; and in Greece, if someone did these things, having been banished
from Greece he would die in infamy as one who does shameful and evil deeds.
15. And the Persians believe it to be honorable for men to adorn themselves just like their women, and to copulate with their daughters and mothers and sisters; and the Greeks believe it to be shameful and unnatural.
16. To be sure, amongst the Lydians it seems to be honorable that girls, having been prostituted and having earned money in such a way, in such a condition, to be married; and amongst the Greeks no one would want to marry such a girl.
17. And the Egyptians do not believe these things to be honorable amongst other peoples: for here in Greece, on the one hand, it is honorable that women weave and work with wool, but there in Egypt, the men do so, and women carry on the affairs which the men do here in Greece. To mix mud with the hands and bread with the feet, to them is fitting, but to us, the opposite.
18. And I know, if someone would order all men to gather into one place the dishonorable things, as each so believes, and to take back from this heap the things which are good, as each believes, not even one thing would remain, but everyone would divide up everything. For not everyone believes these to be the same.
19. And I shall cite a certain poem:
   For you should see, in such a way, amongst mortals,
custom divided so, in all cases there is neither honor or dishonor, but the situation,
taking these, makes it shameful and having changed, makes it honorable.
20. And as might be said in general, at the appropriate time all things are fitting, and at the inappropriate time, shameful. What have I accomplished in this? I claimed to prove the shameful and honorable are the same and I did prove it in all these cases.
21. And it is argued what is shameful and honorable, that each is a different thing. If ever someone should ask those so reasoning how the action is shameful and honorable, if, at any time, anything honorable is done for them, and they will admit it to be shameful, if both the shameful and the honorable are the same.
22. And if they know a certain honorable man, he, then, is also dishonorable; and if they know a certain white-haired one, he is also black-haired. And, truly, it is honorable to honor the gods; and,
again, shameful to honor the gods, if, indeed, both shame and honor are the same.
23. And this must be asked of me regarding all things; and I shall turn to their argument of what they say.
24. For if it is honorable that a woman adorn herself, and shameful that a woman adorn herself; if shame and honor are the same; and the same goes for the other cases.
25. In Lacedemonia it is honorable that children perform gymnastics, in Lacedemonia it is shameful that children perform gymnastics; and likewise with all the other cases. (?)
26. And they argue, that if some were to gather together the shameful things from all peoples everywhere, then, having called them together, would command them to take those things which each thought to be honorable, everything would be carried away as good. I am surprised, if the shameful things having been collected, will become honorable, and not as that which they were.
27. If, certainly, one led away a horse or a cow or a sheep or a man, no other thing would he have led away; neither if when he carried away gold, would he carry off bronze, neither if he carried away silver, would he carry off lead.
28. And, then, instead of shameful things, honorable things are carried off? Speak, then, if someone carried off an ugly man, he would, in turn, have carried off a beautiful one? And they bring forth the poets as witnesses, who for pleasure, not for truth, write poetry.

III Concerning Justice and Injustice

1. There are two arguments argued concerning the just and the unjust. And some, on the one hand, argue that justice is one thing and injustice another; and others argue that justice and injustice are the same. And I shall attempt to refute this second argument.
2. And first, I shall say that it is just to lie and deceive. To do these things to enemies is good and just, and to friends, shameful and wicked, I might declare. And how to enemies, and to loved ones, not? For example, to parents; for if it were necessary that a father or a mother drink or eat poison, and if it were not desired, is it not just to give the poison in a gruel or a drink and not to say it is in it?
3. To be sure, would it not be just to lie and deceive the parents? And to steal friends' things and to do violence to loved ones is just.
4. For example, if someone in the household, being in pain or heavy in grief, was about to kill himself with either a sword or a rope or something, it would be just to steal these, if one were able, and if, arriving late one should have to overpower him already having these things, to hinder him with force?
5. And how is it not just to reduce one's enemies to slavery? And if one were able, taking the whole town, to deliver them over as slaves? And it seems just to burglarize the common houses of the citizens. For if your father, being captured by the enemy were condemned to death, it would have been necessary, and, then, not also just, to steal into the place and save the father?
6. And to swear falsely; if someone, having been seized by enemies, should surrender himself swearing truly to hand over his city, having been released, then, having sworn so, would it be just to do this?
7. I do not think so; but, rather, having sworn falsely, to save the city and loved ones and temples and the patrimony. Then, surely, it is just even to swear falsely. And to rob a temple.
8. I omit particular goods of the cities, but the common wealth of Greece, that which is in the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia; when the barbarian was about to take Greece and salvation was found to lie in money, was it not just to take and use the money in the war?
9. And to kill loved ones is just; such is the case of both Orestes and Alcmion; and the god deemed it just for them to do this.
10. And I shall turn to the crafts and poetic things. For in tragic composition and painting, whoever should deceive the most and at the same time making it similar to the truth, he is the best.
11. And I wish to produce as a witness one of the older poems, of Cleoboulines:

I saw a man stealing and deceiving with violence,
   And to do this in violence is something most just.

12. This was a very old idea; and Aeschylus on this subject:
   God is not far removed from deceitful justice.

And,
   God, at times, honors the deceitful moment.
13. And there is argued an argument contrary to this: that the just and the unjust are different things, just as they differ in name, so, too, in deed. If, when someone were to ask those arguing that the
unjust and the just are same, if, then, it were just to do these things to their ancestors, they would agree. And, then, unjust also. For they argue that the unjust and the just are the same. 14. Pay attention to another thing; if you know a certain just man, then the same one would be unjust too; and, to be sure, either to a great or a small degree according to the same. And if one should say, "Having done many unjust things, let him die," then let him die for having done many just things.

15. And enough about these. And I am about to demonstrate those things they are saying, believing that the just and the unjust are the same thing.

16. For to steal the goods of enemies is just and unjust, to demonstrate the same thing if their argument were true; and all the other cases are in the same way.

17. And they bring forth the crafts, in which there exists neither justice nor injustice. And the poets, then, do not tell the truth, but for the sake of man's pleasure they write poetry.

IV Concerning Truth and Falsehood

1. There are argued two arguments about the false and the true, of which, on the one hand, one says false discourse to be one thing and true discourse another; and, again, some declare them to be the same.

2. And I argue the latter; first, because these are spoken with the same words; and, then, whenever a discourse has been delivered in such a way, it develops that that the discourse is true, and if it does not so develop, the same discourse is false.

3. For example, accuse someone of sacrilege; if he committed the deed, then the accusation is true; and if he did not commit it, false. And the same is true of a speech of defense. And surely the courts judge the same speech to be either true or false.

4. Then, if we, seated across from one another, were to say, "I am an initiate," we all would say the same thing. But only I would be truthful, for I am.

5. It is clear that the same statement, whenever falsehood is present, is false, and whenever the truth, true. (Just as a man is the same, as a child and a youth and a man and an old one).

6. And it is argued that false discourse is one thing and true discourse another, differing in name as in deed; for if someone would question those so arguing, how the same statement is both false and true, they would tell him: if false, it is clear
that there are two; and if true, he would answer, the same statement is also false. And, then, he who spoke truly or gave witness, also spoke falsely with regards to these same things. And if one knows a certain man to be honest, the same one is also false.

7. And they say these things from the reason that, if the deed came about, the statement is true, and if it did not come about, false. Is it not different not only in name, but deed?

8. And, again, if one were to question the judges who judge the deed (for they are not present at the events),

9. they themselves would agree, that in which falsehood is mixed is false, that in which truth is mixed is true. In this there is a complete difference.

V untitled

1. The madman and the wiseman and the intelligent and the ignorant both say and do the same thing.
2. And they use and name the same things: earth and man and horse and fire and all the other things. And they make the same things: they sit and they eat and they drink and they sleep and other things in the same manner.
3. And, to be sure, the same thing is both great and small and more and less and heavier and lighter. For, in such a way, all things are the same.
4. The talent is heavier than the mina, and lighter than two talents; therefore, the same thing is lighter and heavier.
5. And the same man lives and does not live, and the same things exist and do not exist; for those things which are here are not in Libya, neither, surely, those things that are in Libya are in Cyprus. And the other things according to the same logic. Then things both exist and do not exist.
6. Those saying these things, that wisemen and madmen and the intelligent and the ignorant do and say the same things, and the other things following in the same argument, do not reason correctly.
7. For if someone should question them, if the madman differed from the wiseman and the intelligent from the ignorant, they would say, "Yes."
8. For it should be very plain from the nature of things, each and every one, how they agree. Surely, if they do these things, both the wise are foolish and the foolish wise, everything is thrown into confusion.
9. And logic must be applied, whether being in a particular situation, the wisemen or the madmen
speak. For they claim, whenever someone asks them, that they say the same things; but the wise say them at the proper moment, and the ignorant do not. 10. And saying this, they believe it a small thing to add, "if it is the right moment or if not," so that they are no longer the same. 11. And I do not believe that this thing having been added, changes the fact, but by the accent having been changed; just as Glaucus and γλαυκός (white) and Xanthus and ἕαυθος (blonde) and Xanthus and ξυνθος (yellow).

12. These things, on the one hand, differ by the change of accents, others differ in the longness or shortness of pronunciation: Tyrus and τυρός (cheese) and ἁκός (shield) and σκός (sack); and others by a change of letter: κρός (power) and κρατός (of the chief) and δος (stupid) and νός (intelligence).

13. When, nothing having been taken away, there is such a difference between things, what, then, if one added or subtracted something? And this I shall prove such as it is.

14. If anyone were to subtract one from ten (or were to add one to ten), neither would it still be ten or one, and this applies to other things in such a manner.

15. I ask, if the same man both exists and does not exist; exists, then, in particular or in general? Would not, then, if someone were to say, "he does not exist," lie; saying these same things in regards to the particular and the general? Everything is in such a fashion.

VI Concerning Wisdom and Excellence: If They Are Teachable

1. There is argued a certain argument, neither true nor novel, that wisdom and excellence are neither teachable nor learnable. And those saying these things use these proofs:

2. That it is not possible, if you should give something to another, that you still have that thing. This, then, is the first demonstration.

3. And another, that if teachable, teachers would teach it, just like musicians.

4. And third, that those wisemen born in Greece taught their own arts to their loved ones.

5. And fourth, that certain ones, having gone to the sophists, have become worthy of the word.

6. And fifth, that many not going to the sophists have become worthy of the word.

7. And, very simply, I believe this for this reason:
for I know teachers to teach letters, happening to know these things, and cithar players to teach the cithar. And regarding the second proof, that, then, teachers are accepted as teachers in a particular thing. What, surely, do the sophists teach but either wisdom or excellence?

8. And what were the Anaxagoreans or Pythagoreans? And the third, Polycleitus taught his son to make statues.

9. And if someone did not teach, it is not a proof; and if just one person taught, it would be a sign that it is possible to teach.

10. And fourth, that the wise do not become so by the sophists; for many knowing the alphabet did not study it.

11. And physis has something of the same, in which someone, without studying under the sophists, became proficient, becoming naturally clever, could easily grasp most things, learning little from them from whom we learn nomenclature, and from them, in either a greater or lesser degree, from our father and mother.

12. And if to someone it is not believeable that we learn names, but know them as we are born, let him consider this; if someone were to send off a newly born child from Persia and were to rear him here, deaf to Greek speech, he would speak Persian. If someone were to escort a child from here to there, he would speak Greek. In such a way do we learn nomenclature and without knowing our teachers.

13. In such a way my argument has developed, and you have the beginning, the end, and the middle. And I do not claim that is possible to teach, but the arguments are not sufficient for me on this matter.

VII untitled

1. And some of the demagogues argue that it is necessary that the archons come into their office by lottery, but these things they believe are not the best.

2. For if someone were to ask someone arguing this, why, then, do you not assign your slaves their tasks by lottery, so that the muleteer, if he drew a lot to cook, he would cook, and the cook would drive mules, and the same with the others?

3. And why not let us, bringing together the smiths and the cobblers and the artisans and the gold-workers, put them in a lottery and compel them to work at that craft which each drew but not at that which he knew?
4. And in the same way, in contests that the contenders draw by lot the type of competition and that which each drew, perform. The flute player, if it happened, play the cithera and the cithera player play the flute. And in war the archers and the hoplites ride horses, and the cavalrymen shoot the bow; in such a way everyone would do those things of which they had no knowledge and at which they were inept.

5. And they argue this to be good and democratic; I believe it not at all democratic. For in cities there are men hating the people, to whom it happened that they drew the bean, who would destroy the people.

6. But it is necessary that the populace itself, by observing, choose all those well-disposed to it; and to be general, those so qualified; and others to guard the laws and other things.

VIII untitled

1. I believe it possible to discuss succinctly the same man and his crafts, and to know the truth of a situation, and to know how to judge correctly, and to be able to lead the people, and to know the rhetorical crafts, and to teach about the nature of everything as it is and as it becomes.
2. And first, he who knows about the nature of everything, how will he not be able to do things correctly and teach the city?
3. And furthermore, he who knows the arts of speech will also know how to speak correctly about everything.

4. For it is necessary that he who is going to speak correctly, speak about that which he knows. For he will know everything.

5. For he knows the art of all discourses, and all discourses are about all things which exist.

6. And it is necessary that he who is going to speak correctly know the facts about that which he is going to speak, and to teach correctly the city to do good things, and to hinder them from doing evil.

7. And knowing these things, he will also know about other different things; for he will know everything. For these things are common to everyone, and, if necessary, he, then, will do what he should in any case.

8. And he knows how to play the flute, and he will be able to play the flute, if it should be necessary to do this.

9. And it is necessary that he who knows how to judge, teach judgment correctly; for, concerning this, there are laws. Knowing this, he will also
know its opposite and things different from it.
10. And it is necessary that he know all the laws; if, surely, he does not know the facts, neither will he know the laws.
11. For the same one who knows the rules in music, also knows music; he who does not know music, neither knows the rules.
12. He who knows the truth of matters, it is logical, knows everything.
13. And concerning all things, he is able to speak succinctly, and, should it be necessary, to answer one questioning him. It is necessary that he know everything.

IX untitled

1. Memory discovers the biggest and the best inventions, useful for everyone in wisdom and in life.
2. There is this fact: if you should concentrate, on account of this, your mind would perceive things passing by more clearly.
3. And secondly, to meditate upon that which you hear; for many times, in this case, to hear and to say the same things impresses upon the memory the whole of what you have learned.
4. Third, if you should hear something affirmed similar to that which you know, such as this: it is necessary to remember Chrysippus, remember chrysos (gold) and hippos (horse).
5. Another case: Pyrilampe, remember pyr (fire) and lampein (to shine).
6. And in this way for deeds: about courage, Ares and Achilles; for smiths, Hephestus; for cowardice, Epeus...
1 US 2A frs. 2, 2a, and 3. The standard abbreviation for Mario Untersteiner's *Sofisti: Testimonianze e Frammenti* is "US." His referencesystem and arrangement is similar to Diel's in *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* and the same designation (see above, p. 29 n. 20) will be used for *Sofisti* hereafter.

2 Diogenes Laertius *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* viii.50.


4 Diogenes Laertius *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* viii.53.

5 Ibid., viii.54.

6 Ibid., viii.50.

7 Ibid.

8 Plato *Protagoras* 328 B-C.

9 Ibid., 317 B-C.

10 Ibid., 318 A.

11 Ibid., 318 E.

12 Ibid., 319 A.
13
US 2A fr. 2.

14
Plato Protagoras 315 A.

15
Plato Meno 91 E.

16
Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers viii.54.

17
US 3A fr. 7.

18
Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers viii.55.

19
Ibid.

20
US 2B frs. 2, 3.

21
US 2A fr. 3.

22
Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers viii.52.

23
US 2A fr. 10.

24
Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers ix.5.

25
US 2A fr. 3.

26
Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers viii.56.

27

28

29
John Burnet believed that this phrase was not a genuine statement by Heracleitus, but an appropriate enough summation
of his ideas. Burnet, op. cit., p. 146.

30

DK 22B fr. 78. Also note the Heracleitan statement from the pseudo-Hippocratic Περὶ διαίτης (On Regimen) i.25, "χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεία καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἀνώ καὶ κάτω ἀμείβοντα μενα (all things are passing, both human and divine, upwards and downwards exchanging)." As recorded by Burnet, op. cit., p. 151.

31


32

Plato outlined this argument in his Theaetetus 156 A-B.

33

Plato Theaetetus 152 B-C.

34

See above, p. 22.

35

Plato Theaetetus 159 D-E.

36

Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos vii.60.

37

Specifically Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus.

38

Most notably Untersteiner, Sofisti and Gomperz, Sophistik.

39


40

Untersteiner, Sofisti, p. 78.

41

Gomperz, op. cit., p. 218

42

Versenyi, op. cit., p. 291.

43

44 Untersteiner, *Sofisti*, p. 78.

45 DK 74A fr. 14 and Plato *Theaetetus* 160 B.

46 Untersteiner, *loc. cit.*

47 Untersteiner, *Sofisti*, p. 47.


50 Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* vii.

51 Plato *Theaetetus* 151 E–152 B.

52 Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 216.


54 DK 21B fr. 15.

55 DK 21B fr. 16.

56 For example, Herodotus *History* i. 131, 140.


Scribner's Sons, 1970), chapter ii.

60

61

62
Untersteiner, Sofisti, pp. 11, 15.

63
DK 80A fr. 20.

64
Plebe, op. cit., p. 25.

65
Gomperz, op. cit., p. 132.

66
Euripides Antippe 189.

67

68
Ibid.

69
Plato Theaetetus 167 A-B.

70
See, for example, Aristophanes Clouds 889-1105.

71
Plato Protagoras 309 D.
FOOTNOTES
EXCURSUS TO CHAPTER III

1  Gomperz, op. cit., p. 187.


3  Cf. Plato Protagoras 312 A-E.

4  Plebe, op. cit., p. 20.

5  The following is my own translation of the Dissoi Logoi, a work which, as of December, 1977, has not been translated into English. The text used is that of Diels, DK 90. An attempt has been made to render into English the same forced style as appears in the Greek: the order of phrases is kept the same; the punctuation, used more for an aid in the delivery of the speech than according to the rules of grammar, remains the same; and the sequence of tenses, though often incorrect, is faithful to the original of our student-author.
CHAPTER IV

GORGIAS

The Hellenistic doxographers placed Gorgias' birth in Leontini, Sicily, \(^1\) shortly before 460 B.C. \(^2\) Although they claim that his father had decided that Gorgias should receive his oratorical apprenticeship under the sophists, \(^3\) the extant accounts agree that he studied only under Empedocles. \(^4\) Whether Empedocles taught Gorgias any of the rhetorical arts or not is uncertain, but Gorgias definitely chose rhetoric as his profession rather than the scientific and philosophical pursuits of his master.

Gorgias achieved a pan-Hellenic acclaim for his oratory in both its theoretical and practical applications. He was credited with being both its reviver \(^5\) and organizer \(^6\) in the Greek world, and was said to have taught, practiced, and advocated the employment of several novel oratorical devices: hypallages, metaphors, allegories, tropes, reduplications, apostrophes, and brevity. \(^7\) His most renowned work, On Nature or Non-Being, was not, strictly speaking, a rhetorical treatise, but an epistemology upon which Gorgias based his oratorical theories.

Gorgias delivered speeches at special events \(^8\) which served the dual purpose of earning a living and advertising his trade. He was a virtuoso in the matter of advertisement; on many occasions he challenged audiences to propose any topic upon which, he boasted, he would then extemporaneously compose
an eloquent, entertaining, and informative speech. Although this bravado surely lent credence to the popular accusation that the sophists were showmen interested only in style and not truth, Gorgias himself seemed to have escaped this particular charge, and even Socrates commented upon the quality of Gorgias' teaching. He had some of the more illustrious political and educational figures of classical Greece as his students: Polus, Isocrates, Pericles, Antisthenes, Licymnus, and Proxenus. A typical sophist, he wandered from city to city, though at one point he opened a school in Thessaly. And typically he charged for his instruction. He grew wealthy from his tuitions, lived comfortably, and died poor.

His initial reputation stemmed from his involvement in Sicilian politics. His fame spread rapidly after an alliance of Sicilian cities dispatched him to Athens to plead before the Popular Assembly in order to obtain Athenian military aid against Syracuse. He impressed the Athenians, and Athens charmed him. He returned there on many occasions for professional and personal reasons. He stressed the theme of Greek unity vis-a-vis the barbarians at the pan-Hellenic assemblies at Olympia and Delphi, an effort for which the Hellenes erected a gold statue in his honor at Delphi. He lived for more than a century; accounts vary from 105 to 109 years, a longevity which he attributed to "never having done anything for anyone else."

Gorgias, like Protagoras, grounded his rhetorical theories in contemporary philosophy. On the advances made by his pre-
decessors in the field of epistemology, he constructed a coherent theory of communication which served as the basis for his oratory. With Gorgias we are in the same position as we were with Protagoras; unless we acquire a thorough understanding of his epistemology, we are liable to be misled into an erroneous assessment of his rhetorical claims and practices.

Gorgias' fundamental point of view was that of epistemological relativism. This, at least, was the understanding of Sextus Empiricus.

Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος ἱπήρχε τοῖς ἀνηρίκησι τὸ κριτήριον.20

And Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same category as those who had annulled [the concept] of criterion.

The treatise in which Gorgias outlined his ideas on epistemology was entitled Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δυντός ἢ περὶ φάσεως (On Not-Being or Nature). Though the work itself is no longer extant, there does survive Sextus Empiricus' paraphrase of Gorgias' argument in the former's Adversus Mathematicos.21 Although the pertinent section is too lengthy for full quotation, a brief summary of it is necessary. Conveniently, Aristotle had encapsulated Gorgias' belief in a simple, tripartite proposition,

οὐκ ἐἶναι φήσιν οὐδέν· ἐλ· δ' ἔστιν δὴνωστὸν εἶναι· ἐλ· δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνώστων, ἀλλ' οὐ δηλωτῶν ἀκλοῖς.22

He said that nothing exists. And even if it were to exist, it would be unknowable. And even if it were knowable, it would not be communicable to others.

Let us analyze this proposition in detail.23 Gorgias declared first that nothing exists. For if anything (τι) were
to exist, it must be either Being ($\tau \delta \delta \nu$) or Not-Being ($\tau \delta \mu \delta \nu$). It follows logically that it ($\tau \iota$) cannot be Not-Being; for if Not-Being existed, then it would be synonymous with Being, which is not possible. But neither, Gorgias claimed, can it ($\tau \iota$) be Being which exists. Against this part of the proposition he began his attack by attaching certain qualifications to the concept of Being: Being must be either eternal or created or both of these, and One or many or both. These were the usual attributes by which the various pre-Socratic philosophers had described their diverse notions of the physis or Being, and Gorgias attacked each of these possible attributes of Being in order to argue the non-existence of Being. Obviously Being cannot be both eternal or created or One and many, for both of these pairs are opposites, and something cannot maintain diametrically opposed and exclusive qualities simultaneously. Since this is so, he proposed to eliminate each quality individually. Being is not eternal, for if it were eternal it would be boundless, with neither beginning or end and without position. But whatever exists must have position; that is, it must be contained either in or with relation to something else. If it is contained in or by something else, then it is not boundless and eternal because it would be bounded or contained by something which would infringe upon that particular quality of boundlessness. But neither can Being be contained in or limited by itself because there must be some distinction between the object contained and the container. If this were not so,
then Being would be double, container and contained. Then both must necessarily limit and bind the other. Therefore, neither would be limitless, boundless, or eternal. But, Gorgias stated, neither can Being be created, that is, "come into being" or "become," because for Being to exist it must not be "becoming." Gorgias' proof seems to us to be inappropriately short with regards to this particular point, but his brevity makes perfect sense in light of its context in the pre-Socratic philosophical tradition. The pre-Socratic philosophers had regarded Being and "becoming" as antithetical and exclusive qualities which, of course, cannot exist simultaneously in the same object. "Becoming" negates the possibility of Being in a particular object, since Being was regarded as an absolute quality, that is, without creation or termination. Neither can it (τι) be One; for if it were One, then it must be either a quantity, a continuum, a body, or a volume. If it were a quantity, then it would be separable; if a continuum, then divisible; if a body, then threedimensionally distinguishable; and if a volume, then not indistinguishable. In each case, then, it would not be a unity or One. It also cannot be many, for the many are composed of Ones. Since the One does not exist, neither can the many. Therefore, nothing exists.

In spite of his elaborate proofs against the possibility of existence, Gorgias conceded for the sake of the argument that even if it were to exist, it would be unknowable and inconceivable to men, "διὰ δὲ κἂν ἢ τι, τούτο ἡγεσιστῶν τε
καὶ ἀνεπινόητὸν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ." 24 To explain this tenet he postulated a sharp dichotomy between thought and reality. He proposed that if it were true that whatever exists can be thought, so too must the thought itself exist. But if any thought exists, then all thoughts exist. If all thoughts exist, then the objects thought about must exist too. This is plainly false, he declared, for we imagine all sorts of objects that do not exist: the Chimera, a winged man, a chariot riding across the waves, or Not-Being. Reality or that which exists is, therefore, not the object of thought; it is inconceivable.

Again Gorgias made a concession; even if it were conceivable, it would be incommunicable to another, "καὶ ἐλ. καταλαμβάνοιτο δὲ; ἀνέξοιστον ἐτέρω." 25 If we perceive something which exists, we come to know it through our several senses. Objects of sight are perceived through vision, sounds are perceived through hearing, and there is no interchange. 26 We cannot see or taste a sound or hear a taste or feel a vision. Our means of communication is speech which is perceived by our sense of hearing; the medium of our communication is sound. Objects perceived by sight, taste, touch, or smell are incommunicable through the sense of hearing, that is by speech. Only that which is heard can properly be communicated through speech, in so far as one is able to reproduce exactly the original sound. This concept makes particularly good sense when examined in light of fifth-century B. C. epistemology, for it was believed that all perception
is an interaction between the object perceived and the sense organs. The perception itself is momentary; it lasts only as long as the physical interaction between the object and the organ persists. The sensation is absolutely dependent upon such a contact. When the contact ceases, so does the sensation. Although a name is given to the appropriate quality of the sensation, the name of the sensation is not the sensation itself; it cannot adequately relay the significance of the sensation to another. Neither can the name give definition to the sensation; rather the sensation gives significance to the name. Thus a man who tastes bitter wine, for example, cannot relay this sensation to another through the medium of speech, since the word "bitterness" cannot give the hearer an appreciation of that particular sensation. The hearer would lack the experience of that particular bitterness which would have given meaning to the word. Gorgias claimed essentially that a word and the object designated by that word are distinct and exclusive; the former is incapable of relaying exact information about the latter. So even if it did exist and were comprehensible, it would still be incommunicable.

Gorgias' attack on Being was an assault against the archenemies of epistemological relativism in the ancient world, the Eleatics. J. H. M. M. Loenen believes that it was the Eleatic, Melissus, who was the specific target of Gorgias' invective. Melissus, as a disciple of Parmenides,
maintained the usual Eleatic beliefs regarding Being: it is One, eternal, immobile, unchanging, and all-alike. His only divergence from orthodox Eleaticism was his proposition that Being was spatially as well as temporally infinite. He reasoned that unless Being was a spatially infinite entity, it would have to be bounded by either something or nothing. The admission of either contingency would have led him into Eleatic heresy. For if Being were bounded by something, then something must exist besides Being, and Being would, therefore, be multiple, not One. Neither could Being be bounded by nothing, for the Eleatics did not recognize the existence of the void.

Melissus also adhered to the normal epistemological credo of the Eleatics.

It is clear, then, that we do not see correctly after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just as we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what was has passed away, and what was not is come into being. So then, if there were many things, they would have to be just of the same nature as the One.

He claimed that the senses were deceptive since they tell us that Being is a plurality and that it changes; true Being is One and does not change. If plurality were true reality, he stated, "each thing would be just as we believed it to be."
Consequently, Melissus argued for an exact correspondence not between the senses and reality, but between thought and reality.

Melissus started from the simple fact that one can (think and) say that something is, and from this he immediately concluded that something that is actually exists.  

It was against Melissus' concepts of ontology and epistemology that Gorgias composed his treatise.

In his attack against Melissus' brand of Eleaticism, Gorgias employed the very methods of another of Parmenides' students, Zeno of Elea. Zeno's technique was to draw from an opponent's postulate two contradictory conclusions, thereby proving the untenability of the original proposition. In a similar fashion, Gorgias, by disproving opposite, intermediary, and, therefore, all possible conclusions, discredited the original postulate. In such a manner he disposed of the Eleatic concepts of Being, knowledge, and communication. He did not, however, argue against these ideas in an absolute sense, but only against a specific, Eleatic interpretation of them.

Although both Gorgias and the Eleatics agreed that the senses can give information only about the world of appearances, they differed in that Gorgias considered this order of existence to be a "reality." The Eleatics did not. For Gorgias believed that there was a valid correspondence between sensation and appearance; for the Eleatics the only valid correspondence was between rational thought and Being; hence Melis-
sus' belief in the homogeneity of thought and existence. And since speech was the medium of thought's expression, Melissus believed that there was an equally valid correspondence between a word and the object which the word designated. Gorgias argued to the contrary, that the impressions received through the sense organs were the only valid criteria for the existence of an object; the mind is a valid criterion only for the existence of thoughts. Thought and the expression of thought, speech, are in no way determinants of an object's existence. Moreover, since speech does not maintain an unequivocal correspondence with sensation, one cannot accurately communicate to another the information gained through the senses. It is sensation that gives meaning to speech, not vice versa. Loenen summarized Gorgias' position thus: what is perceived by one, A, gives significance to his words, B, but B has no significance to one, C, who has not perceived what A has perceived. Gorgias did not deny the possibility of communication, but communication only as the Eleatics understood it.

Gorgias' intention in denying the absolute efficacy of the spoken word, a strange stance for a rhetor, was to eliminate from his epistemology notions of absolute truth and absolute knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). With their elimination, there would remain only relativism and opinion (δόξα). But Gorgias, unlike Protagoras who confined his relativism to stylistic and epistemological planes, expanded this concept to include the ethical sphere as well.
We are in a good position to examine Gorgias' application of relativism to the fields of philosophy, oratory, and ethics, because there are extant two of his most renowned speeches, Ἐγκλήμιον εἰς Ἡλένους (The Encomium on Helen) and Τοῦ αὐτοῦ βπέρ Παλαμήδου άπολογία (Palamedes' Defense of Himself), both of which Aristotle recorded in full.32 The Encomium on Helen is believed to have been written about 430 B. C. and Palamedes' Defense of Himself between 425-400 B. C.33 Though modern scholars have attempted to complicate Gorgias' motives in composing these orations,34 it is certain that there was nothing more than an epideitic purpose behind their creation, a display of Gorgias' beliefs and style. They were an advertisement of his art.35

Gorgias used his treatise On Not-Being or Nature to destroy the Eleatic theories of ontology, epistemology, and communication and The Encomium on Helen and Palamedes' Defense of Himself to lay the foundations of his own theories. His basic postulate was that absolute certainty or knowledge and perfect communication were impossible. Instead one could hope only for opinion and persuasion. From this premise he built a convincing theory of the persuasive power of the spoken word, a power best described as ψυχαγορία (soul-leading).36 There were, he believed, two aspects to this rhetorical psychagogy, emotional and rational, and in The Encomium on Helen and Palamedes' Defense of Himself he elaborated upon each of these concepts.

The Encomium on Helen deals with the emotional aspect of rhetorical persuasion. In it Gorgias presented his theory
of emotional psychagy and used the speech itself as an example of the practical application of the idea. The occasion for the oration was his attempt to free Helen from the undeserved reputation which she received at the hands of certain poets, such as Homer, Steisichorus, and Aeschylus. After a cursory treatment of the less spiritual explanations of the causes which may have occasioned Helen's abduction, for example, the decree of the gods, rape, and violence, then Gorgias admitted the possibility of her having been persuaded verbally to flee with Alexander (Encomium 8). He compared this verbal persuasion to the powers of violence and deception (Encomium 12).

Gorgias began his discourse upon the "enchanting" and "magical" powers of speech by associating oratory with the art of poetry (Encomium 9). Poetry he described as "λόγος ἐξω μέτρων (speech having measure)" (Encomium 9). Prose and rhetoric, by analogy, would be λόγος ἄνευ μέτρου (speech without measure). Their common operative element is ἅπατη (deception). Though they both aim to deceive the audience, their manners of execution differ, a distinction underscored by Armando Plebe. The ability of poetry, he declared, is "fa credere all' esistenza di oggetti che non esistono," while that of prose or rhetoric is "fa credere che le cose siano diverse da quelle che sono." The deceptive nature of poetry was recognized by Hesiod.

And this first word the goddesses said to me, the Muses, the daughters of aegisbearing Zeus, "Shepherds of the wilderness, wretched things of shame, Mere bellies, we know how to say many false things
as though they were true;
But we know, when we will, how to utter the truth." 40

It was this same principle of deception that Gorgias claimed
also operated in classical drama.

ηνθηση δ' η τραγῳδία και διεβοήθη θαυμαστῶν λικράμα
και θέαμα τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων γεγομένη και παρασκόδοσα
τοῖς μύθοις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀνάπην, ἐκ Γοργίας
φησίν, ἢν δ' τε ἀπαθήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπαθήσαν-
tος καὶ δ' ἀπαθεῖτες σοφότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπαθηθέντος.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ δικαιότερος διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδείκτων πεποιή-
κεν, ὁ δὲ ἀπαθεῖτες σοφότερος ἐμβάλλοικν γὰρ ὕφ'
ηδονῆς λόγω τὸ μὴ ἀναλοθητον. 41

Tragedy flourished and was lauded, being for the
man of that time both a fantastic recitation and
spectacle. By providing stories and deeds, it be-
came a deceit in which, as Gorgias claimed, the
one who deceives is more just than the one who
does not deceive and the one deceived is wiser
than the one who is not deceived. For the deceiver
is more just in that having promised this, he then
accomplished it. And, likewise, the one deceived
is wiser; for the one who is easily ensnared by
the pleasures of speech is not insensate.

It was imperative, then, for the successful poet, playwright,
and orator to convince his audience that that which is spoken
is real.

ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις
καὶ δυσπαγίαις ἵδιαν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων
ἐπαθεν ὡς ψυχής: φέρε δὴ πρὸς ἄκλον ἢπ' ἄκλον μετ-
αστῶ λόγω. 42

Through the medium of speech the mind experiences
its own feeling in regards to the fortunes and
misdentities of other events and people.

The actual mechanics and process of persuasion are quite
simple. The mind or soul (ψυχή) is in possession of some
particular opinion or belief. The task of the poet or rhetor
is to alter that belief; it is the inherent power of speech
that will bring about this alteration (Encomium 8). Gorgias
compared this power to the effects that certain medicines
have upon the body (Encomium 14). Just as certain medicines are able to either alleviate pain or cause death, so too does the enchanting power of speech "beguile and persuade and transform" the soul by instilling joy, easing pain, and increasing compassion (Encomium 8, 10). Once the logos has stimulated the soul, an emotion which is similar to that being expressed in the logos is produced in the soul. The listener is, then, in a state in which he can υπερξειν (sympathize). (This theory bears a remarkable resemblance to contemporary epistemology which claimed that sensation was an interaction of similar particles from an external object upon those of the sense organs.) Once the hearer is in a state of sympathy, the soul can be stirred to either: 1) action or 2) προτελείς (persuasion). In either case, the deception is accomplished. The soul has been duped into the belief that that which was spoken is reality; the old opinion is banished, and the soul, now in possession of a different belief, is moved to action or a new state of conviction. If speech does, in fact, possess such a coercive and deceptive power, how can Helen justly be blamed for having been beguiled by Alexander's overtures (Encomium 20)?

Palamedes' Defense of Himself deals with the rational aspect of oratorical persuasion. This speech, like The Encomium on Helen, served both as Gorgias' platform for his theory and as an example of the practical application of that theory. The particular incident which he chose as the dramatic background was a popular Greek legend, the trial of Palamedes, which, in later times, was recorded by Apollo-
To avoid service in the expedition to rescue Helen, Odysseus had feigned insanity. His ruse was uncovered by Palamedes who was every bit as crafty and clever as the king of Ithaca. Odysseus never forgave Palamedes and resolved upon revenge. With the aid of a forged letter, a disloyal servant, and a bogus payoff for an alleged act of treason, Odysseus convinced the Achaean host that Palamedes had betrayed them to the Trojans. As a result Palamedes was stoned to death. Gorgias felt that in spite of Palamedes' reputation for cleverness, the man obviously did not do an adequate job in defending himself against Odysseus' spurious charges, and so he composed a defense which, he felt, Palamedes should have used.

The script of the defense against the accusations of Odysseus hinges upon the argument that positive knowledge is impossible. Since the alleged betrayal passed unwitnessed, no one would have had an immediate, sensory perception of the occasion. No one actually knew of the event. Palamedes contends, then, that Odysseus really does not know (ἐπιστήμη μενος), but only believes (δόξα) that treason had been committed (Palamedes 3). Odysseus' allegations are based upon δόξα not ἐπιστήμη. Gorgias' use of episteme should not be understood in the Eleatic sense of an absolute truth, but in the sense of information derived from sensory contact. Following the statement that Odysseus accuses without knowing (Palamedes 5), Palamedes enumerates every conceivable contingency, motive, and possibility for the alleged treason (Palamedes 6-21), and then proceeds to demolish them by de-
monstrating how each would have been a logical impossibility. By this systematic elimination of all possibilities, Palamedes proves the untenability of Odysseus' δῆξα. At one point Palamedes even resorts to a dialectical ruse of Zeno, that is, drawing two contradictory conclusions from the same postulate. He states that the accusation of treason implies both cleverness and foolishness on the part of the traitor (Palamedes 25). And, as Zeno would have agreed, two opposite qualities cannot coexist in the same person (Palamedes 25). Gorgias has Palamedes end his defense with an abbreviated version of the theory of communication found in the Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δυνατοῦ ἡ Περὶ φύσεως, that is, the incommunicability of knowledge. Palamedes exhorts his judges not to heed words but to trust in deeds (Palamedes 34), because it is utterly impossible to convey truth through the medium of speech (Palamedes 35). Without the sensory experience of the witness to the treachery (or even from the testimony of such a witness), Odysseus' verbal accusations are idle, fallacious chatter.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

1
US 4A fr. 1.

2
US 4A fr. 2.

3
US 4A fr. 1.1.

4
US 4A frs. 2, 3, 9.

5
US 4A fr. 7.

6
US 4A fr. 1.1.

7

8
US 4A fr. 1.4, 1.5.

9
US 4A fr. 1a and Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 482.

10
US 4A fr. 8a.

11
US 4A frs. 2, 4.5, 6.1.

12
US 4A fr. 18.

13
US 4A frs. 2, 4.2.

14
US 4A fr. 18.

15
US 4A fr. 4.1.

16
US 4A fr. 1.4.
17
US 4A fr. 7.

18

19
US 4A fr. 11.

20
Sextus Empiricus *Adversus Mathematicos* vii.65.

21

22
US 4B fr. 3bis.

23
The following is a summarization and clarification of the account contained in Sextus Empiricus, *supra*, as recorded in DK 82B fr. 3.

24

25

26
Cf. Plato *Greater Hippias* 299 C- 300 A.

27

28
DK 20B fr. 3.

29
DK 20B fr. 8.

30

31

32
DK 82B frs. 11, 11a.

33
Charles P. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the

34
See Jan Sicking, "Gorgias und die Philosophen," Sophistik, pp. 384-386, for a brief summary of these points of view.

35
See appendices for the translations of these works.

36
Here we must understand ψυχή (soul) in a wider sense, as the word was used by the Greeks. ψυχή encompasses our ideas of life-giving breath, spirit, consciousness, and mind. Note, Werner Jaeger, Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1947), pp. 74-78.

37
For example, Homer Iliad iii.154-160. Aeschylus in his Agamemnon 689 ff. coined from Helen's name the following derogatory words: ἐλένας (ship's hell), ἐλάνδρος (man's hell), ἐλέπτολις (city's hell).

38
In antiquity Gorgias was credited with having a poetic flair to his rhetoric, US 4A fr. 29. Philostratus, in fact, used the word "γραμματικὴ (to speak like Gorgias)," to indicate a florid, poetic literary style. Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 493.

39
Plebe, op. cit., p. 33.

40

41
US 4B fr. 23.

42
Gorgias Encomium on Helen 9.

43
Plato, too, described rhetoric's power in terms of enchantment, Plato Phaedrus 271 C.

44
Apollodorus Epitome iii.8.
CHAPTER V
RHETORIC AND POLITICS

Before the developments of professionalism and specialization in the Hellenistic Age, the purpose of aristocratic Greek education was to produce the man of varied interests and multiple skills and capabilities. An obvious example is Pericles, who showed considerable acumen in matters of politics, warfare, rhetoric, finance, dialectics, and artistic judgment. Even those men whom we have traditionally regarded as solely philosophers or solely scientists had a wider field of activity than that which we usually credit them. For example, besides an intense devotion to astronomical and meteorological problems, Herodotus assigns to Thales an active participation in Ionian politics.\(^1\) Anaximander was acclaimed not only for his scientific efforts but also for his leading role in the foundation of a colony on the Pontus, Apollonia.\(^2\) In addition to his doomed struggle to reform Hellenic religion, Xenophanes undertook the composition of elegies and satires; particularly notable in antiquity was his two-thousand-verse masterpiece on the colonization of Elea.\(^3\) Amongst the extant fragments of Heracleitus' wisdom is one aphorism often quoted by the ancients, that law is just as crucial to a community as are the walls of the city.\(^4\) Empedocles was active in the establishment of democracy in Akragas,\(^5\) and Aristotle went so far as to credit him with the creation of the foremost of the political arts, rhetoric.\(^6\) Indeed, Gorgias was said to have been one of his students.\(^7\) Democritus encouraged men
in the study of statesmanship and was credited with authorship of a treatise on politics. One common factor in the lives of the pre-Socratic philosophers was their involvement in the life of the polis. Even such a contemplative as Pythagoras, who staunchly advocated a vita theoretica, was famous, or infamous, for his political activities in Croton and Metapontion. To find a Greek such as Anaxagoras, who actually did lead a "theoretic life," is exceptional. The polis was, after all, the institution which molded and guided Greek cultural endeavors, distinguished Greek from barbarian, and by which the Greeks defined themselves as "political animals."

To free the sophists from the charges of moral laxity and duplicity, we have, until now, concentrated upon establishing a valid, philosophical foundation for their oratory, that of epistemological relativism. This was rhetoric's intellectual base; the polis was its active one. For rhetoric, more so than the other intellectual accomplishments of the Greeks, owes its very creation and formation to plothetical exigencies.

Although Greek rhetoric came to fruition in Athens, its birthplace was in the west, on the island of Sicily.

Ait Aristoteles cum sublatis in Sicilia tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis repeterentur, tum primum, quod esset acuta illa gens et controversiae nata, artem et praecpta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripisse: nam neminem solitum via nec arte, sed accurate tamen et descripte plerosque dicere. Aristotle said in Sicily, after the tyrants had been expelled, when, after a considerable length
of time, the return of private property was sought through legal channels, Corax and Tisias, the Sicilians, a clever people born for controversy, collected some rules and precepts: for, before them, no one adhered to any method or art, although they did try to speak with order and care.

Although the exact identity of the tyrants to whom Cicero (and Aristotle) referred is uncertain, it is generally agreed that the tyrants mentioned are of the "dynasty" founded by Gelon, son of Deinomenes. The last members of this line were Hieron of Syracuse, who died in 467/6 B.C., and Thrasybulus, whose government was expelled from that same city shortly thereafter.

Most of the information about Corax concerns his relationship with Tisias, about whom a great deal more is known. Tisias was born around 480 B.C. and his said to have been a student of Corax and his "successor." Tisias established a school for the teaching of rhetoric in Syracuse. He also employed his oratorical talents as a λογογράφος (logographer) to accommodate the increased legal activities after the restoration of democracy, "res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis repeterentur." For some reason now forgotten, he incurred the wrath of the new government and was exiled from Syracuse; thereafter, he led the Wanderleben typical of the later sophists, visiting such cities as Leontini, Thurii, and Athens. He was reputed to have written a manual of rhetorical devices, but even in Cicero's day this handbook was no longer extant. There is some dispute as to Tisias' originality and his dependence upon his mentor, Corax, a dispute which the ancient sources do little to settle. Many attribute the foundation of the rhetorical τέχνη (art) to both Corax and
Tisias. Others give the credit only to Tisias or only to Corax. Willy Stegemann offers a plausible solution to the dilemma by maintaining that "Tiseas habe...Korax' mündlich erteilte Lehren schriftlich aufgezeichnet."\(^{18}\)

The core of Corax and Tisias' teachings was the concept of εἰκός (probability), a term which Plebe defines as "il verosimile...è da stimarsi molto più del vero,"\(^{19}\) and Blass as "das Wahrscheinliche und Glaubliche."\(^{20}\) To argue on the grounds of probability is, very simply, to argue what most plausibly may have happened, given the absence of any witness to an event. The example used in antiquity to illustrate this concept was that of a mutual accusation by two men as to who was the aggressor in a quarrel.\(^{21}\) If a jury were to pass judgment without the benefit of any witnesses, it must consider which man would have been more likely to have started the argument, the stronger more likely than the weaker, the courageous more likely than the cowardly. Εἰκός bears a superficial affinity to the pre-Socratic ideas of epistemological relativism. But it is only a superficial one. From the extant fragments we can discern no philosophical foundation for this idea; rather than a general philosophical principle, it should be considered as a frequently used forensic device. Relativism and εἰκός were kindred developments, but certainly not derivative, the latter from the former. There is no evidence which would justify Stegemann's conclusion that for the Sicilian orators "kommt es vor allem auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit, nicht auf die Wahrheit an."\(^{22}\)
The infant art of rhetoric would have remained unique to Sicily had not the diplomatic, political, military, and cultural exchanges between that island and the Athenians been so extensive in the late fifth century B.C. In 427 B.C., at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the city of Leontini sent a special embassy to Athens to request military assistance to protect the town from the aggression of the Syracusans. To insure the success of the mission, the Assembly of Leontini sent their most eloquent statement. Heading the delegation was Gorgias; there is some uncertainty as to whether or not Tisias was included. It was Gorgias, at any rate, who made an outstanding impression upon the Athenians with his oratorical eloquence. It was in his speeches before the Assembly that the Athenians had their first encounter with the new art of rhetoric.

The introduction of rhetoric into Athens was fortuitous; it suited perfectly the current political needs of the Athenians. The war with Sparta had just begun, and the planning of military strategies had split the Athenian populace into two hostile camps, the conservative democrats and the radical democrats. The spokesmen for the factions were obliged to present or defend their cases before the Popular Assembly; clearly the polished orator or the persuasive politician had the certain advantage, as Cleon realized.

The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability of a project by the wits of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to past events not to the facts
which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard; the easy victims of new-fangled arguments, unwilling to follow received conclusions; slaves to every new paradox, despisers of the commonplace; the first wish of every man being that he could speak himself the next to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost before it was made, and by being as quick in catching an argument as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences; asking, if I may say so, for something different from the conditions under which we live, and yet comprehending inadequately those very conditions; very slaves to the pleasures of the ear, and more like the audience of a rhetorician than the council of a city. 26

Thucydides, influenced as he was by the sophists, was well aware of the importance which the new art played in Greek politics. He believed that rhetoric and politics exerted a reciprocal influence upon one another. Words obviously incite men to action, "anyone who denies that words can be a guide to action must either be an idiot or have some personal interest at stake." 27 But he also noted that the tumultuous political conditions of the war had the effect of altering men's vocabulary; "to fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings." 28 For better or worse, rhetoric had become an integral part of Athenian political life.

The claims of rhetoric upon Hellenic politics were not confined merely to Athenian democracy. Had rhetoric no more of a stake in politics than its usefulness in democratic debate, it would not have survived the emasculation of the polis in the fourth and third centuries B. C. when Philip, Alexander, and the Diadochoi deprived the Greek city-states of their political freedoms. But rhetoric had wider claims
which enabled it to survive the destruction of the independent polis. Its hold upon classical culture was threefold: 1) rhetoric had become inextricably involved in the sphere of litigation, 2) rhetors had become the principal advocates of the cause of pan-Hellenism, and 3) rhetoric had become an integral part of the educational curriculum and the rhetor himself, an ideal. These three factors assured the art's continued existence and popularity in Hellenistic and Roman times.

The most important branch of oratory in antiquity was what Aristotle termed "δικαστική (forensic oratory)," and it was primarily for such judicial purposes that rhetoric was born in Sicily and thrived in Athens. Indeed, both the Sicilians and the Athenians were infamous in antiquity for their fondness for legal combat; Cicero labelled the Sicilians a people controversiae nata, and Aristophanes claimed the Athenians did "nothing but try cases." In Athens, especially, a citizen of any prominence stood a very good chance of appearing in court sooner or later.

The private litigation which the Athenian courts handled, known as δικαίωμα, involved such crimes as assault, theft, and slander, but the most common of legal proceedings was over contested wills. This was due to the facts that wills were easy to forge and that there was no regular, public legal means by which wills could have been recorded and validated. Consequently, matters of inheritance, legal descent, and guardianship were plagued by fraudulent claims and counter-claims. Demosthenes, for example, began his career as a
rhetor and logographer by persecuting his guardians for having squandered his inheritance while he was under their stewardship. His successful speech is still extant. Lysias and Isaeus, as did most of the famous "Ten Orators," composed numerous speeches used in inheritance suits. R. J. Bonner understated the case when he noted that "wills were a fruitful source of litigation."

Even the course of performing his normal civic duties, the average citizen was very likely to be confronted with a public suit, known as a "γραφή." The occasions for issuing such graphai were innumerable. Citizens nominated for certain public magistracies had to pass through an examination, δοκίμαι, of his private and public affairs. The uncovering of any irregular activities would result in the cancellation of the nomination and a legal suit. Then at the end of their annual term of office, the magistrates' actions were again subjected to close scrutiny; the discovery of any inconsistent or suspicious transaction would again end with a public suit. A citizen might also be brought to public trial if he merely proposed unconstitutional legislation or had acted according to a law which was later declared illegal. Disputes concerning one's ability to perform civic liturgies were quite common. Athenian law permitted a citizen to pass on his liturgical duties to another citizen if he could prove that this other citizen was more capable of financing the project than he. Procedural negligence in the proposal or administration of legislation could also be
the occasion of a \( γραφή \).\(^{40}\)

In addition to correcting public and private ills, there was a more nefarious aspect of Athenian litigation—the vendetta. It was a tenuous line that separated the diligent citizen who, in the course of fulfilling his civic obligations, dragged into court someone who happened to be a personal enemy, from the man consumed with vengeance who, in his efforts to destroy a personal enemy, happened to utilize the courts. Furthermore, not only was the use of the courts to settle private vendettas common, but, in the eyes of the Athenians, apparently without stigma.\(^{41}\) When one found oneself called before the jury by a quarrelsome neighbor, the normal course of action was to delay one's opponent's suit by summoning him with a countersuit of your own.\(^{42}\) Such tactics were employed by Crito, for example, to harass those who were trying to destroy him politically through legal suits.\(^{43}\) Personal legal attacks were a potent political weapon which often preceded major public political moves. Pericles and Ephialtes, for instance, began their democratic reforms, which strengthened the Popular Assembly at the expense of the Areopagus, by charging individual Areopagites with corruption and abuse of power.\(^{44}\) By so discrediting individuals of that ancient body, the way was cleared for the debilitation of the group as a whole. Such was the efficacy and efficiency with which the Athenians used public courts to satisfy private grievances.

The worst abuse of the legal system of Athens was at the hands of a type of litigant known as the \( συκόφαντης \) (sycophant or informer). The informer was a professional accuser who
earned his livelihood by confiscating the wealth of those whom he managed to convict in court. His existence was made possible by a peculiar feature of Athenian law which allowed a man a portion of the fine levied against anyone he convicted as a public enemy. The informers, Aristophanes complained, were ubiquitous and greatly-feared individuals and as such they were the targets of his repeated criticisms. Andocides, too, felt scant sympathy for the sycophant and used the word as a term of contempt.

You informer, you base jackal!...And you are permitted to live and haunt this city. Little do you deserve to do so, who, under the democracy, lived as an informer; under the oligarchy, lest you be forced to hand over the wealth you amassed by informing, you became a toady of the Thirty.

Charmides, in Xenophon's Symposium, gladly embraces his new state of poverty, since this would free him from the constant attacks of the informers. Any person conspicuous for either his wealth or success faced the likelihood of becoming a victim of the sycophants.

The perpetual use and abuse of the legal institutions confirms the ancient appraisals of the Athenians as an extraordinarily litigious people. In such an environment the polished rhetor would possess a marked advantage over the inarticulate, untrained citizen.

Eloquence, then, became a prerequisite of the successful lawsuit. Because as the Athenians' fondness for litigation
increased, so too did their requirements for oratorical perfection in the courtroom grow more demanding. Demosthenes' labors at perfecting his diction and delivery are legendary. Other, less well-known anecdotes reinforce this characterization of the Athenians' penchant for rhetorical niceties. Suidas, the lexicographer, related an event in which a foreign banker offered the financially destitute Athenians funds at extremely favorable terms. The banker unfortunately used an incorrect future tense in the course of his proposal and was howled off the podium by the assemblymen who refused to permit him to continue until he had corrected his Greek. The introductions to many of the extant speeches contain a prefatory apology entreat ing the jurors to excuse any grammatical or verbal mistakes which the litigant may commit while pleading his case. Socrates, reputedly having declined the offer of a defense speech composed for him by Lysias, sought permission in his suit to disregard the expected oratorical style and to use ordinary speech.

I am not a great speaker at all...I assure you that you will not, men of Athens, get fine arguments...decked out in splendid phrases, but only plain speech set forth in those words which come to mind...In fact, men, it would be unbecoming for me at my age to come before you like a youngster with a prefabricated speech. So I ask of you just one thing, and I ask for it very sincerely, if you discover that I speak in my defense just as I have been accustomed to speak...in the marketplace...do not be surprised at it and do not interrupt me...I am really a complete stranger to the language of this place...So I believe I have the right to ask you to permit my manner of speech pass.

Thus, on a most basic level, rhetorical training proved its advantage insofar as eloquence was persuasive.
The persuasiveness of the litigants' speeches was all the more crucial in light of several features of the Athenian legal system which necessitated a quick initial victory. First, with the exception of certain homicide cases and instances of proved perjury, there was no system of appeals in Athens.\(^2\) Every court decision was final; unless a man could win at his initial hearing, his cause was irrevocably lost. Second, juries were not bound by precedent.\(^3\) Though the decisions of previous tribunals were often cited, they were in no manner considered binding, and consequently a litigant could not rely upon legal precedent to ensure the victory of his case. Third, since the concept of precedents was absent from the Athenian legal system, there was no ongoing clarification of the law. Every case had to be argued anew; there was no possibility of reliance upon a previous court's elucidation of a particular legal point. Fourth, even the plaintiff in public and private suits had to be persuasive enough to obtain at least one-fifth of the jury's votes, for unless he received this amount, he stood to be fined one thousand drachmas or one-sixth of the damages he sought in the suit.\(^4\) These restrictions limited a man's dependence upon the law itself to aid him in winning his case and forced a greater reliance upon his own persuasive abilities.

Paradoxically, however, in spite of their litigiousness and their pressing demands for oratorical eloquence, the Athenians strove to prevent the birth and growth of a legal profession. The idea of a professional lawyer was repugnant to the democratically-minded Athenians of the fifth century
B. C. Every man was required by law to plead his own case, a stricture which forced the professional rhetors into several subsidiary, paralegal fields. There were, of course, those who still had the pugnacity to hawk their services publically, in direct defiance of the law, but the majority of rhetoricians found outlets for their abilities in logography and education. Often the two occupations were combined.

Logography or speech writing was contemporaneous with the birth of rhetoric in Sicily and was, without exception, practiced by all of the great Greek orators. Of the extant 130 out of the original c. 1700 speeches of the Ten Orators, only a very few were intended to be used by the authors themselves. The overwhelming majority was composed for third parties who had hired the rhetors for exactly this purpose. Plutarch even claimed that Demosthenes wrote speeches for both sides in the same suit. Certainly it was not a concern for the justice of a particular cause that determined the logographers' choice of clientele in a case; it was strictly a financial arrangement. The task of the speech writer was twofold; he was required to explain to the jury, to his client's advantage, the legal implications and ramifications of the case, and he had to present his client as affable, eloquent, and worthy of the jury's confidence. The latter task called into play all of the logographer's oratorical abilities. The former relied upon his knowledge of legal technicalities. He had to learn the facts of a case and anticipate any and all legal objections and arguments. Most of the speech writers acquired out of sheer necessity an intimate familiarity with
the law. Their knowledge of legal matters was oftentimes so thorough that they were called upon by interested parties to draft legislation. 58

The logographers' speeches were composed for a number of reasons. The most immediate, of course, was financial gain. But had the speeches served no other purpose, they would not have survived past the day of the trial. Since the authorship of a speech was generally common knowledge, the logographer used the speech as an advertisement of his abilities and services. In this way it served the same epideictic function as had the speeches of the sophists. But this, too, had a sense of immediacy about it, and would not warrant the continued preservation of a given speech. Rather, since the speech writer was often also a teacher of rhetoric, he or his students would save and collect the speeches, thus producing a compilation which would then serve as a sourcebook of practical models which the students could study and imitate. 59

The orations were studied not only for their style but also for their moral content. Since the proems normally contained brief eulogies on such topics as the nature of justice or civic responsibilities, their high moral overtones were thought to provide excellent educational material for the ephebes. Hellenistic Greek and Roman orators, then, preserved the speeches of the rhetors because of their stylistic and ethical sublimity.

The survival of rhetoric beyond the collapse of the independent polis was not due solely to the fact that its association with law had resulted in a corpus of classical legal
orations. As such, rhetoric would have provided no more than standards for epideitic or literary excellence, better suited for the staleness and gloom of the library than the "dust and light of the market." Rather, rhetoric's association with law was a living one, to such a degree that in Hellenistic and Roman times "lawyer" was synonymous with "rhetor."

Another reason for the survival of rhetoric beyond the abolition of democracy in Greece was that the early rhetors were the principal and most eloquent champions of the ideal of pan-Hellenism. Although the Greeks had always felt themselves superior to the barbarians by virtue of their common culture, this vague sentiment was never potent enough to transform itself into practical action. Unity was achieved only when Greece stood in the shadows of Xerxes' massive invasion force. Only then did envoys from the Greek city-states meet at Sparta, at a place later renamed "Hellenium," settle the differences among themselves, plan their strategy against the Persian Empire, and form a defensive alliance called "The Greek League." But even then unity was limited and ephemeral. Since the oracle of Apollo at Delphi had advised submission to the King of Kings, many of the city-states stood aloof from the contest. And after the battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale, what unity had existed rapidly disintegrated. The smaller Greek cities found themselves arrayed in one of two hostile camps—the Delian League or the Spartan Alliance. The polarization of the Hellenes led finally to the Peloponnesian Wars. It was during this period immediately
prior to the Peloponnesian Wars that the pan-Hellenic ideal was first articulated.

It was not that the rhetoricians were blind to the growing factionalism in Greece, it was because of it that they espoused this ideal. The spectre of permanent discord made men long for the not too distant past when all Greece (so they convinced themselves) was united against a common foe. Such were the motives which prompted Herodotus to compose his history. He idealized the harmony of the Greeks during the Persian invasion as a Golden Age, and, as such, it had a formative and everlasting influence upon the concept of pan-Hellenism. For thereafter Greek unity, as a cause, was never expounded for its own sake, but always in relation to the barbarians. Unification was not an eternal, utopian ideal; it was regarded rather as an urgent preliminary preparation for a greater mission—war against the barbarians.

It may have been accidental that Greek unity became a celebrated cause amongst the rhetoricians or, more likely, it may have resulted from an exigency of their occupation. Unlike the philosophers and orators of a later day, the first rhetors rarely established permanent educational institutions. They led what was first termed by Hans von Arnim as a "Wanderleben."\(^{62}\) They had no fixed classrooms, no official enrollment, no rigid curriculum, and usually no stipulated duration for their courses. The only sure thing was their fee. Having completed a course of instruction in one city, the sophists felt no compunction in migrating to another city which offered fairer students and fatter fees. The necessity of the rhetors'
travelling about Greek lands in order to advertise their services and win new clientele thus led to a certain pan-Hellenic feeling on their part.

The sophists and rhetors, then, were in the vanguard of this pan-Hellenic movement. In 392 B.C. Gorgias delivered an oration before the Greeks gathered for the games at Olympia in which he was said to have spoken to them about the need for concord. Unfortunately, most ancient authors referred to this speech, known as the 'Ολυμπικός (Olympicus), only in order to make comments about Gorgias' poetic rhetorical style. Only two major references were made regarding the content of the oration. One, a satirical comment by Melanthius,

Γοργίου τοῦ ἑτορος ἀναγνώστος ἐν 'Ολυμπικῷ λόγῳ περὶ δυνομάς τοῖς Ἐλλησιον ὁ Μελάνθιος ὁ ὁδότος ἡμῖν, ἐφ᾽, ουμβουλευετε περὶ δυνομας, διὰ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν γυναίκα καὶ τὴν θεραπαίναν ἱδεῖαι τρεῖς δυτικα δυνομείν οὐ πέπεικεν. ἦν γὰρ ἤς τοι ἔρικε τὶς ἔρικε τὸν Γοργίου καὶ ἐπιτυπία τῆς γυναικός πρὸς τὸ θεραπαίνωδιον.

Melanthius said of Gorgias, the rhetorician, who had read a speech to the Greeks at Olympia about unity, "He counselled us about harmony, while he could not effect concord [in his own household] being just three, himself, his wife, and his hand-maiden; for there was, it seems, a certain love on the part of Gorgias towards the maid and a jealousy on the part of the wife towards her.

The other comment, by Philostratus, is more helpful.

ὁ δὲ ὁλυμπικὸς λόγος ὑπὲρ τοῦ μεγίστου αὐτῶν ἐποιητεῦθη. συμείωσαν γὰρ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὅρον δύνομας ἐξευθείᾳ αὑτοῖς ἀπεξεροτερίκην τρέποντας ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πέλθων ἀθανατοῦ στὸν βουλεύεται τῶν ὄλων μὴ τὰς ἄλλης πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων χάραν.

The speech, Olympicus, was a foray into politics on an issue of the greatest importance to Gorgias. For seeing Greece at odds with itself, he counselled them about harmony, turning them against the barbarians and persuading them to make a prize by their arms, not of their own cities, but of the land of the barbarians.
On another occasion the Athenians elected Gorgias to compose
the annual eulogy in honor of their fallen soldiers. A large
portion of his speech, the Epitaphos (Epitaph), can be recon-
structed from the extant fragments. From that which remains
we can surmise only that it was an ordinary eulogy. But Philo-
straus informs us that Gorgias had other motives for writing
this speech.

παροξύνων τε γάρ τούς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ Μήδους τε καὶ
Πέρσας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοῦν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγωνιζόμενος
ὑπὲρ δυνομῆς μὲν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλληνας οὐδὲν δι-
ῆλθεν, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἦν ἀρχής ἐρώτας, ἦν
οὗτ ἄν κτῆσαι μὴ τὸ δραστηριον αἰρουμένους, εὖ-
διέτριψε δὲ τοῖς τῶν Ἀθηνικῶν ἑορτασίων ἐπιλή
dεικνύμενος αὐτοῖς, διὸ τὰ μὲν...θρήνους.

Though inciting the Athenians against the Medes and
Persians and expounding upon the same notion as in
the Olympicus, he did not fully develop this idea
of unity with regards the the Greeks, since the
Athenians were desirous of empire, which was not to
be had without some audacity. He introduced in his
panegyrics something about the trophies of the Medes,
explaining that while the trophies taken from the
barbarians demanded praise, those taken from the
Greeks, lamentations.

The common factor in Gorgias' calls for unity was the crusade
against the Persians. Antisthenes, too, used this same theme
in an oration which he composed for the Isthmian Festival,
and Lysias' Ὀλυμπικός was also concerned with promoting pan-
Hellenic unity against the barbarian. This idea became the
central theme of Gorgias' most famous student, Isocrates.

The final reason for rhetoric's survival and popularity
under the Diadochoi and the Roman emperors was that it had be-
come the principal educational curriculum of the urban elite.
During the political and moral chaos of the fifth and fourth
centuries B. C., rhetoric replaced the traditional aristocratic
training of the ephebe. Political and military developments had rendered the noble cavalryman obsolete; in Hellenistic times his functions were usurped by the bureaucrat and the mercenary. His ideas and his values, he himself, had become anachronistic, surviving to a limited extent only in the protected atmosphere of the gymnasium. The new governmental conditions demanded a new "hero" with new skills; the need was for men with rhetorical and legal training. But even among those aristocrats who did not enter the services of the government or the bar, fluency and eloquence became socially fashionable. Rhetorical training met the demands of government, the agora, and aristocratic fashion.

Even while democracy still flourished in the late fifth century B.C., the sophists began to lay the first claims for rhetoric as the new ἀρετή: Hippias claimed that the height of excellence was "to produce a beautiful and eloquent speech." But rhetorical training did more than just make a man eloquent, they claimed, it made him superior to other men, superior by virtue of his wisdom. By "wisdom" Protagoras meant the ability to change men's opinions, and it was this same power of persuasion that Gorgias called "the greatest good for mankind."

Socrates. Tell us what it is that you claim to be the greatest good for mankind and of which you say you are the producer.

Gorgias. That, Socrates, which truly is the greatest good and the source, not only of personal freedom for individuals, but also of mastery over others in one's own country.

Socrates. Now just what do you mean by that?

Gorgias. I mean the ability to persuade with words judges in the law courts, senators in the Senate,
assemblymen in the Assembly, and men in any other meeting which convenes for the public interest. Since it is perfectly true that by virtue of this power you will have at your beck and call the physician and the trainer, that businessman of yours will turn out to be making money for somebody else! Not for himself will he make it, but for you who have the power to speak and persuade the vast majority.76

Rhetoric meant more to the sophists than mere verbal adroitness; it embraced other arts and skills as well. As Gorgias exclaimed, "Oh, Socrates, if you only realized the whole of the matter; how it [rhetoric] encompasses, in a manner of speaking, all of the other crafts."77 For practical purposes, however, Gorgias and Protagoras narrowed their exorbitant claims to the field of politics.78

"Αρ', ἔφην Εγώ, ἐπομαυ· σοῦ τῷ λόγῳ δοκείς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑποχυνθοῦσαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθὰς πολίτας. Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἢ Σάκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα δ' ἐπαγγέλλομαι.79

[Socrates] Do I understand you, I said; is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?

[Protagoras] That is, Socrates, precisely what I profess to do.

Protagoras' political speculations are contained in his "Great Speech," a portion of the debate named after the sophist.80 Presenting his ideas in mythological form, Protagoras proceeded to explain that Prometheus and his brother, Epimetheus,81 were charged with distributing to all animate creatures the faculties necessary for their survival; Epimetheus was to allocate and Prometheus was to inspect the finished product. By the time Epimetheus got to mankind, he had exhausted his supply of talents and protective devices. It was left, then, to Pro-
complish this he stole the arts of Athena and Hephaistus, including fire, and gave them to man. With the aid of these crafts, man set about inventing such things as speech, agriculture, shelter, and clothing. He was still prey to the wild beasts, however, for he lacked the political art, that is, the ability to live together harmoniously in cities. Zeus, realizing the problem, entrusted Hermes with two gifts which were to be distributed to men--αλ δέκτη and δική (reverence and justice). These two qualities, Protagoras claimed, were to be given to all men. By virtue of their possession, everyone is allowed a voice in democratic government, λεγορία; it did not, however, insure that every man would be a leader. The quality of leadership, the sophists emphasized, had to be learned, and they were able to teach it.

The foremost ability of the leader was, in the minds of the rhetoricians, that of εὐλογεῖν (speaking well). Only the sophists had the knowledge of this art "which makes men eloquent."

The art of speaking well naturally demanded precision and precision, in turn, required a thorough knowledge of the language itself. To acquire this knowledge the sophists began the first systematic analysis and study of grammar and vocabulary.

In this respect Protagoras was renowned for his efforts in systematizing the Greek language. He was the first to classify nouns carefully into the three genders: ἀρρενα (masculine), θηλεα (feminine), and νερέη (neuter). He distinguished the tenses of verbs, and established the four moods: request, question, answer, and command. And as a practical
application of linguistic precision, he instructed his students in the technique of poetic criticism.

Poetry was for the Greeks no mere aesthetic indulgence; it served a more exalted purpose in their culture. Since the time of Homer, poetry was the genre par excellence of Greek literature, the medium of education, and the vehicle of social ideals. So when the sophists included poetics as an integral part of their educational curriculum, they were very much in the mainstream of Greek education, more so than Plato, who had a deep-seated distrust of poetry and poets. Protagoras, in fact, regarded poetic criticism as the principal part of his oratorical instruction.

'Ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη, ὡς Ἐκκρατεῖς, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέρος μέγιστον εἶναι περὶ ἐπών δεινὸν εἶναι· ἔστι δὲ τάσος τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα διόν τ' εἶναι ξυνιέναι ἂν τε ὅρθῳ πεποίηται καὶ ἂ μὴ... 86

[Protagoras] I am of the opinion, Socrates, that for a man the greatest part of education is skill in poetry, that is, to understand that which has been spoken by the poets, both that which has been composed correctly and that which has not.

Despite such high esteem for poetic criticism, there is no evidence that Protagoras engaged in any systematic development of the technique but only in incidental critiques. 87

There are only a few extant examples of Protagoras' application of poetic criticism. He is said to have taken Homer to task for the misuse of moods and genders. Homer had erred, Protagoras claimed, when he stated, "Μὴν ἔρῃ διδασκαλίαν", (Sing, goddess, of the wrath), 88 for "though he had wished to ask the Muse to sing, in fact, he had commanded her to do so." 89 Likewise, he stated, Homer committed a solecism in regards to gender.
Protagoras said that if "wrath" and "helmet" are masculine, he who says "οβλομένην" commits a solecism according to that man, though it does not appear so to others, while [he who says] "οβλόμενον" appears [to have erred], but, in fact, has not committed a solecism.

A lengthier, more detailed example of Protagoras' poetic criticism is to be found in Plato's Protagoras. In this particular passage Socrates and Protagoras undertake an analysis of a poem by the lyricist and elegist, Simonides of Ceos. Their explication includes an epistemological distinction between "being" and "becoming," clarification by reference to other poems, an analysis of sentence structure, definition of terms, and an explanation of grammatical rules. But despite its prominent place in Protagoras' scheme of instruction, poetic analysis was not the final goal of education.

This entire complex of ideas about verbal precision and poetic criticism constitutes the basis of Protagoras' concept of ὑποθετεια, that is, "the art of the correct use of language."
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1 Herodotus History of the Persian Wars i.170.

2 Burnet, op. cit., p. 52.


4 DK 22B fr. 44.


6 Ibid.

7 Burnet, op. cit., p. 201.

8 DK 68B frs. 157, 253.


10 Cicero Brutus xii.46 seq.

11 Willy Stegemann, "Teisias," Pauly's Real Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900), V, pp. 139-140.


13 One tradition relates how Tisias refused to pay Corax the fee for rhetorical instruction. When the case came to court, Tisias argued that if he were to win the case, he would not be obliged to pay his mentor; and if he were to lose, then Corax's instruction was obviously worth nothing, in which case neither should he be obliged to pay. As his defense Corax reversed the two arguments. The court dismissed the case claiming, "ἐκ κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ἦν (a bad
egg from a bad crow ("corax" in Greek)." George Kennedy, The
Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1963), p. 59. The same story is told of Protagoras and
Euathlos in Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers ix.
56.

14
Pausanias Travels Through Greece vii. 17.8.

15
Stegemann, op. cit., p. 140.

16
Cicero loc. cit.

17
Stegemann, loc. cit.

18
Ibid.

19

20

21
Plato Phaedrus 273 A-C.

22
Stegemann, op. cit., p. 144.

23
US 4A fr. 4.1.

24
Stegemann, op. cit., p. 140.

25
US 4A fr. 4.7.

26
Thucydides The Peloponessian Wars iii.39. John H. Fin-ley (trans.) The Peloponessian Wars (Cambridge, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1942).

27
Ibid., iii.42.

28
Ibid., iii.82.

29
Aristotle Rhetoric I.i.11.
30  Cicero loc. cit.

31  Aristophanes Peace 826.

32  There is mention made in various places of parties leaving a deposit with a magistrate with regards to someone's will, but this does not appear to be a regular procedure, however, and the exact process remains obscure.

33  See, for example, Lysias Orations XLI ff.

34  Demosthenes Demosthenes vs. Aphobus et al.


36  See, for example, Lysias Orations XVI.

37  Aristotle The Constitution of Athens xlv.2 and xlvi.4.

38  This particular type of suit was known as a γραφὴ παρανομία; see, for example, Lysias Orations XVIII.

39  See, for example, Isocrates Antidosis 145.

40  Aristotle The Constitution of Athens xl.2.

41  Bonner, op. cit., p. 62.

42  See, for example, Antiphon Choreutes xxi.

43  Bonner, op. cit., p. 148.


45  Note Aristophanes comments, in passim, in Plutus, Birds, and Acharnians.
Andocides On the Mysteries 99.

Xenophon Symposium iv.8.

Plutarch Parallel Lives xi.1.

Bonner, op. cit., p. 164.

Cicero de Oratore i.231.

Plato Apology 17 C-18 A. Although Plato has Socrates deny having expertise in courtroom rhetoric, the apology conforms perfectly to the oratorical rules then in vogue; his denial, then, like all the others, was merely pro forma.


Ibid., p. 181.

Ibid., pp. 41, 69.

This prohibition was frequently circumvented by hiring a professional advocate to act as a character witness or a material witness for the litigant. Plato remarked, "We are told that by clever bargaining and with the aid of a lawyer, the law enables a man to win a case, whether just or unjust; and that both the power and the art of speech, which is able to be taught, are at the disposal of him who can pay." Plato Laws 937 A- 940 A. Plato recommended either exile or death as the penalty for what he considered to be unscrupulous advocacy, Plato Laws 940 A.

The list, according to Caecilius, περὶ χαρακτηρὸς τῶν δέκα ἡγετῶν (On the Personalities of the Ten Rhetoricians), includes: Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isaeus, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Dinarchus.

Plutarch Parallel Lives lxi.5.

Bonner, op. cit., p. 218.
59
It should be mentioned that later Greek and Roman scholars used these speeches also as models of classical Attic Greek, Bonner, op. cit., p. 2.

60
Hammond, op. cit., p. 224.

61
Herodotus History of the Persian Wars vii.173 and Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War i.132.

62
Von Arnim, Dio von Prusa, p. 15.

63
US 4A fr. 35.

64
US 4A fr. 1.

65
US 4B fr. 8a.

66
The source of Philostartus' statement is assumed to be Melanthius, since no other ancient author before Philostratus mentions the contents of the oration. It is doubtful, however, if he actually knew that Gorgias espoused pan-Hellenism in the context of a crusade against Persia or merely assumed so because all the later rhetors did so. Philostratus Lives of Eminent Philosophers 493.

67
The Athenians conducted an election each year in which a famous orator or politician was chosen to compose a speech praising those Athenians who had died during the year while fighting for the state, see Plato Menexenus 234 B. It is uncertain whether only native Athenians were elected to this honor. If it is the case, then we must interpret the evidence as Gorgias having written a eulogy on behalf of some Athenian.

68

69
US 4B fr. 5b.

70
Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers vi.2.

71
Lysias Orations XXIX.

73. 'Αρετή (excellence), a quality which befits a free man is synonymous with virtus, in the Ciceronian sense of the word.

74. Plato Greater Hippias 304 C.

75. Plato Theaetetus 166 D.

76. Plato Gorgias 452 C-D.

77. Ibid., 456 A.

78. Plato, Protagoras 318 A and Gorgias 452 D.

79. Plato Protagoras 319 A.

80. Ibid., 320 C-328 D.

81. Prometheus (Forethought) and Epimetheus (Afterthought).

82. Plato Protagoras 312 D.

83. Aristotle Rhetoric iii.5.1407.


85. Ibid., ix.53.

86. Plato Protagoras 338 E-339 A.


88. Homer Iliad i.1.
89
US 2A fr. 29.

90
Aristotle Sophistic Refutations xiv.173b.17. Mario Untersteiner, Sofisti, vol. I, pp. 69-69, clarifies this con-
fusion, "Il cambiamento del genere dei sostantivi era, dunque, determinato dalla logica: 'filosoficamente importa l'esigenza
di adeguare il linguaggio alla logica: errore che tornerà spes-
so a comparire nella storia della linguistica' (Momigliano
maschilizzazione di μηνις, ricordando che deriva da *Manis...
e *Manis è maschile. Cfr. anche...--πηκηθης: è propriamente
parola non greca...I sostantivi, formati da un suffisso in
-ακ (-ηκ ion. att.) sono di solito maschili."

91
Plato Protagoras 339 A-348 A.

92
R. Peiffer, "Die Sophisten, Ihre Zeitgenossen und
198.

93
Fehling, op. cit., p. 345, βροντεπεια, "die Kunst des
richtigen Gebrauchs der Sprache."
CHAPTER VI
SOPHISTS OF THE SECOND GENERATION

The sophists' most significant contribution to Hellenic civilization was not any one particular epistemological or linguistic theory, but the belief that education should have an intellectual foundation. This concept, a radical departure from earlier ideas of heroic pedagogy and ἀρετή (excellence), has continued to exert its influence upon educators almost to the present day. Though advocating the apparently egalitarian notion that knowledge and virtue can be taught to anyone, the sophists tended to confine their instruction to young aristocrats, and as a consequence, they succeeded in alienating both the commoners and the conservative aristocracy. Despite such widespread opposition, their classes remained full, their ideas gained adherents, and rhetoric assumed a prominent position as the foremost discipline in the educational curriculum of the sophists. It was this rhetorical ideal that crowned the idea of intellectual culture in antiquity.

Before rhetorical education received its final articulation by Isocrates in the fourth century B.C., sophism, particularly oratory, became the target of some devastating criticisms levelled by Socrates, Plato, and even Isocrates himself. These criticisms were of such a radical nature that they demanded a complete rethinking of the means and aims of oratorical education, which Isocrates did so thoroughly rethink and revise that it amounted to what he considered to be an absolute break with sophism.
Before we can understand the nature of Isocrates' re-
vision, we must examine the reasons for the attacks by So-
crates and especially Plato. Had not Socrates held Protagoras
in the highest esteem? And had he not remarked on the quality
of Gorgias' instruction? Though sincere and fundamental dif-
ferences had existed between Socrates and the first genera-
tion of sophists, the opponents in these debates always treated
one another with the utmost civility and courtesy. Gorgias,
Protagoras, and Socrates all respected one another's intel-
lectual integrity. There came a noticeable change in the
Platonic dialogues, however, when Socrates confronted the
younger, second-generation sophists; there is a marked dif-
fERENCE in his handling of Polus and Hippias. Socrates
treated Polus with a disdain only slightly disguised and
quite regularly subjected him to merciless ridicule, some-
thing which he never did to Polus' mentor, Gorgias.1 Hippias,
too, is referred to with scant respect.2

Though continuing many of the academic endeavors and re-
searches of men like Gorgias and Protagoras, the younger
generation of rhetors decidedly lacked the integrity of their
elders. One senses a certain spiritual cheapening of the
profession amongst the seconde generation of sophists, and
it was precisely on this point that Socrates and Plato took
them to account.

In this chapter we will examine the disciplines in which
the younger rhetoricians continued the work of their mentors.
We will then pinpoint the grounds for the popular criticisms
of the rhetors, sophists, and logographers, and finally
analyze the nature of the Platonic reaction.

The clarification and refinement of the concepts of δόξα and ἐπιστήμη never ceased to occupy the attention of the later sophists and orators. Epistemology was still a fertile field for speculation. Galen stated that Prodicus composed a work entitled Περὶ φύσεως (On Nature) which he likened to similar treatises by Parmenides, Melissus, Empedocles, and Gorgias. We may assume from the wording of Galen's statement that Prodicus dealt with the same problems of physics and epistemology which had occupied the others, though the extant fragments are too few to permit any reliable reconstruction of his thoughts. Antisthenes, a student of Gorgias, was the first to apply, in an allegorical manner, the distinctions of "appearance" and "truth" to certain passages from Homer.

Antiphon, too, sought to clarify the distinction between doxa and episteme, and enough of his treatise, Truth, remains to attempt a tentative interpretation of his theory. The most informative of the extant fragments was preserved by Hippocrates.

It seems to me that, in general, there is no such thing as a non-existent discipline; for it is illogical to regard those things which exist as not existing. If some of those things which do not exist [do not exist], how could anyone look at them as existing and then say that they do exist? For if it is possible to see that which does not exist, just as if it does exist, I do not know in what
fashion one could believe that they do not exist, those things which one can see with the eyes and know with the mind as existing. But this certainly cannot be so.

Antiphon disagreed with the Eleatic tenet that the realm of appearance is a realm of false knowledge; he trusted the senses to give reliable information about an object's existence. This declaration served as the prelude to a larger investigation concerning the relationship between objects and the names men have assigned to them. Antiphon maintained that the process of naming is not a haphazard affair; rather, it is an ordered, scientific procedure involving sensory and intellectual cognition and classification. While the objects themselves are "the offsprings of nature," the names are but conventional labels which derive their definition from the perception of the object. This faithfully echoes Gorgias' theories of linguistics and epistemology as outlined in his On Not-Being or Nature, and fits into the larger context of the sophistic distinction between νομός and φύσις, convention and nature. Antisthenes proceeded to apply this distinction to concepts such as justice and injustice, Greek and barbarian, and good and evil. So, although the younger sophists continued in the philosophical footsteps of their mentors, it cannot be claimed in their behalf that there was any noticeable originality to their epistemological research.

Like the older sophists, the second-generation rhetors based their oratorical theories and instruction upon their epistemological investigations. Their epistemological refinements served as the foundation for their fundamental concern for verbal precision, for what Protagoras had termed ὅθολπεία.
All the rhetoricians were recorded as having issued fine and
noble statements about the desireability of linguistic pre-
cision. Antisthenes proclaimed, "Δροχή πανευθεωκ η τῶν δυνα-
μάτων επισκεψις (the beginning of education is linguistic in-
vestionation)." Hippias' linguistic acumen was legendary
even amongst his contemporaries, and Prodicus was renowned
for the minute distinctions which he drew between words of
similar meanings, a process known as διαιρέσις (division).
Indeed, Socrates beseeched Prodicus in one dialogue not to
clutter the debate with his time-worn, obscure distinctions
between synonyms. Prodicus' intention was to teach men to
discriminate between words which express slight modifications
of the same idea. Lysias' main contribution to Attic oratory
was the development of a concise legal vocabulary which care-
fully distinguished the ever-so-slight variations in meaning
of similar words. He insisted that every object and action
was to be precisely defined by the exact and proper words.
Such linguistic precision was the aesthetic and educational
objective of the philosophical and rhetorical research of the
younger sophists.

This accumulated research was often compiled into rhetori-
cal handbooks called τεχναι. When he opened a school of
rhetoric in Athens, Antiphon wrote αι ἡττορικαί τεχναι (The
Rhetorical Skills) for the benefit of his students. Unfortunately, only one fragment remains from this work, so we
are unable to examine any specific advice he gave to his
pupils. Thrasymachus, too, wrote a handbook which Suidas re-
ferred to by the title of Ἀφορμαὶ ἡττορικαὶ (Rhetorical
Resources). Aristotle mentioned that Thrasy machus had also composed a treatise entitled \( \text{περὶ τῶν θεών} \) (Convincing Arguments), which may have been a type of stylistic handbook. \(^{14}\) And I saeus, a student of Isocrates and a teacher of Demosthenes, wrote his own Art of Rhetoric. \(^{15}\) The paucity of the remains from these handbooks prevents us from assessing the originality of the second-generation rhetors' contributions to their profession, but, according to the comments of the Hellenistic doxographers and lexicographers, we are safe in assuming little originality on their part. They merely continued, by and large, to refine the concepts of their predecessors.

One such concept to be perfected in the fourth century B. C. in both its theoretical and practical aspects was that of \( \text{ἐλκός} \) (probability). Once used by Corax and Tisias only as a forensic maneuver in a legal contest, it was now sophisticated and refined by men such as Antiphon and Lysias who used it with frequent and deadly accuracy.

The treatise in which Antiphon explicated and developed the use of \textit{eikos} was entitled \textit{Tetralogy}, a collection of three groups of four short model speeches. Each group deals with a particular type of homicide with two possible speeches for the prosecution and two for the defense. The three types of murder are: 1) wilful, 2) accidental, and 3) in self-defense. Antiphon attempted to push the use of probability to the limits in each speech, to argue solely with what the Greeks called \( \text{πλάστεις ἐντεχνοὶ} \), that is, "artificial proofs" or reasoning.

The first tetralogy\(^{16}\) presents the situation of a freeman
found dead with his mortally wounded slave at his side. Before the slave dies, he implicates a long-time enemy of his master as the murderer. The family of the deceased therefore brings suit against the accused. But since the slave has died by this time, both the prosecution and the defense must resort to "probable," "possible," and "likely" reasons as to why the accused would have or could have committed the crime. The second tetralogy\(^{17}\) presents a legal and moral dilemma about which, it was said, one generation earlier Protagoras and Pericles had passed an entire day arguing.\(^{18}\) A man is practicing the javelin throw when a young boy, a spectator, runs in front of the target, is struck, and dies. The boy's parents sue the javelin thrower for their son's death. It must be remembered that in ancient Athens any type of homicide, whether voluntary or accidental, involved blood-guilt on someone's or something's part. In this case Antiphon presented various arguments which try to place the blame either on the thrower, the slain youth, or the javelin itself. In the third tetralogy\(^{19}\) the case of a young man drinking amiably with one of his elders is presented. After a while they begin to argue, come to blows, and the youth seriously injures the old man so that medical attention is required. The old man dies, nevertheless, and his relatives bring the young man to court on charges of murder. The prosecution argues the probability of wilful murder, and the defense that of murder in self-defense. At one point even the possibility of incompetent medical treatment is proposed, but then dismissed. The cases and speeches in the Tetralogy are not rescripts of actual
lawsuits but examples of lines of theoretical argumentation based upon the idea of εἰκός.

This refinement of eikos on a theoretical plane is paralleled by a more sophisticated use of it in the courts. Antiphon admirably employed this device in the most famous of his extant speeches, On the Murder of Herodes. Herodes, an Athenian citizen, disappeared while on a voyage with a young Mytilenian, Helos, who was accused by Herodes' relatives of having murdered Herodes and then casting his body into the sea. Helos came to Athens to be tried; the relatives had arranged the suit against him in a slightly unorthodox manner which had the effect of severely hampering Helos' attempts to gather the information necessary for his defense. The major line of defense which Antiphon had outlined for Helos rested upon the application of eikos, attempting to prove that it was extremely improbable, under the given circumstances, that Helos could have killed Herodes. The argument was persuasive enough to clear Helos of the charges against him.

Lysias, too, was noted for his efficacious use of probability in his speechwriting, for example, in his speech written for the defense, The Matter of the Olive Stump. A wealthy man is accused by a sycophant of removing from his own land the decayed stump of one of the sacred olive trees, an offspring of the tree originally planted by the goddess Athena on the acropolis. A committee of the Areopagus regularly inspected such trees and stumps throughout Attica; their removal or mutilation was considered impiety punishable by death. The man for whom Lysias wrote the defense not only brings witnesses
who testify that no such stump had ever existed on the man's property, but also resorts to the argument that it would have been highly unlikely or improbable that he would have done such a deed.

If I did set about such an act as this...consider what profit I stood to get by clearing away the stump, and what loss by preserving it, what I should have achieved if I went undetected, and what I should suffer at your hands if I were exposed...Yet this man is quite unable to show either that I was compelled by poverty to venture on such an act, or that the plot was declining in value while the stump existed, or that it was obstructing vines close to a building, or that I was unappraised of the dangers awaiting me in your court.23

Eikos clearly had become a regular oratorical device of the logographers, used not only in the absence of direct proof or witnesses, but also to strengthen such testimony.

Another facet of the rhetorical heritage which the second-generation orators received from their predecessors was the ideal of pan-Hellenism. Particularly active in the promotion of Greek unity was Lysias. In 392 B. C. he, like Gorgias, was elected by the Athenian Assembly to deliver the annual funeral oration over the city's slain. This eulogy, known as the Epitaphios, honored those soldiers who had fallen fighting against Corinth. Although he paid due respect and homage to those who, "prizing courage above all, deprived themselves of life, made their wives widows, and left their children orphans,"24 he did not let the opportunity escape to advance the cause of pan-Hellenic harmony. He repeatedly drew attention to the by-this-time legendary unity of the Greeks during the Persian Wars,25 and purposefully referred to Greece as if she were a political whole.26 The framework
in which he constructed and presented his pan-Hellenic ideal was that of the crusade against Persia. Another speech in which Lysias belabored the theme of Greek unity was his Olympiicus, delivered in 388 B.C. to the Greeks assembled at Olympia for the games. In fact, the games themselves, Lysias declared, were established by Hercules as a means of bringing the Hellenes together in "mutual amity." Again a call for a united Greek crusade went forth, this time directed against Artaxerxes II and Dionysus I of Syracuse. Dionysus had recently begun to extend his hegemony over the island of Sicily and Lysias regarded him as just as serious a threat to Greek liberty as Greece's traditional enemy, the Persian King of Kings. In vain he tried to convince the Greeks that their disunity was the cause of their weakness and that any disaster which befell one polis affected them all. This utopian dream of Greek unity Lysias had inherited from his mentor, Gorgias, and passed on to his own student, Isocrates.

These various academic pursuits of the rhetoricians, epistemology, pan-Hellenism, and the compilation of rhetorical handbooks, proved to be fairly innocuous to their status amongst the general population. This was for no other reason, perhaps, than that such matters were beyond the intellectual interest or comprehension of the masses. The common man had no intellectual quarrel with sophism. The cause for offense lay elsewhere. There were three main sources of popular resentment against rhetoric and the rhetors: 1) political bias, 2) personal emnities, and 3) a widespread disgust with the shoddy courtroom tactics of the logographers. Public outrage did not,
however, diminish the size of the crowds which flocked to
the rhetoricians' schools and the logographers' offices.

To appreciate the nature of the political bias against
the rhetors, it is necessary to have an understanding of the
pervasive factionalism in Athens during and after the Pelopon-
nesian War. The traditional enmity between the conservative
aristocrats and the radical democrats was temporarily sub-
merged under the sensible guidance of Pericles. But with his
death in 429 B. C., the leadership of Athens fell to either
the incompetent or the irresponsible. An incompetent con-
servative like Nicias proved as detrimental to the welfare
of the city as an irresponsible radical such as Cleon. No
mention need be made of Alcibiades. As conservative generals
lost more and more battles and the radicals won more, the
reins of government fell into the hands of the latter, who
eventually brought the state to ruin and defeat. The assess-
ment of Isocrates, admittedly a conservative sympathetic to-
wards the aristocracy, is an accurate one.

[Ἀθήναι] ἐπαλύενε τοὺς πολίτας Ὄθοι ἤγείσθαι τὴν
μὲν δικολασίαν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανομίαν ἀλευ-
θερίαν, τὴν δὲ παραρηγαίαν ἱσονομίαν, τὴν δὲ ἔξουσίαν
τοῦ πάντα ποιεῖν εὐθαμολογίαν. 30

[Athens] taught her citizens in such a fashion to
regard insolence as democracy, lawlessness as liber-
ty, surliness as equality, and to do whatever one
pleases as happiness.

The imposition of a conservative regime upon Athens by the
Spartans brought no relief from irresponsible government.
The excesses, cupidity, injustices, and purges of the Thirty
Tyrants only hastened their downfall and increased the sever-
ity of the radical reaction. A general amnesty of sorts was
was eventually declared when democracy was restored, but the memory of the Thirty was so vivid and so bitter that the conservatives would never again regain control of the government of Athens. The activities of the rhetoricians and logographers must be viewed against this background of the continual advancement and final entrenchment of the radical democratic faction.

Almost without exception, the younger orators were members of or sympathizers with the conservative aristocracy, a stance which immediately set them at odds with the majority of Athenians. Critias, of all the sophists and logographers, was held in the greatest contempt in antiquity; he had been one of the Thirty Tyrants.

Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ διλημματικῇ πάντων κλεπτεστάτος τε καὶ βιαιότατος καὶ φονικῶς κάτατος ἐγένετο.\textsuperscript{31}

Critias and Alcibiades inflicted the worst evils upon the city. For Critias, of all those in the oligarchy, had been the most villainous, the most violent, and the most murderous.

Such was the opinion of the staunchly conservative Xenophon. But even six centuries later, when Philostratus wrote his Lives of the Sophists, this assessment of Critias had not changed.

κάκιστος ἐνθρόπων ἐμοιγε [Κριτίας] φαίνεται ἐν τῶν πάντων ἐν ἐπὶ κακίᾳ δρομα.\textsuperscript{32}

It certainly seems to me that [Critias] was the most evil of all those men who have reputations in crime.

Though none of the other rhetors had as infamous a reputation as Critias, their conservative, aristocratic sympathies
were well-known. Andocides, for example, was from a wealthy aristocratic family and belonged to one of Athens' secretive, conservative organizations known as ἐταῖρεῖα. He was implicated in Alcibiades' defamation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries and, therefore, suspected of being part of the phantom, oligarchic "Plot of the Three Hundred." As punishment he was sent into exile in 415 B.C. He returned under the general amnesty declared after the war with his conservative sympathies and radical enemies still intact. The radical Callias charged Andocides with profanation of the mysteries, a crime he supposedly had committed more than sixteen years earlier. He managed to defend himself successfully, but political troubles still lay ahead. In 395 B.C. Athens allied herself with Thebes and Corinth in a war against Sparta who managed to defeat them at Nemea the following year. Andocides, who had called for the end of the war, formed part of the Athenian peace mission to Sparta. He favored the terms laid down by the Spartans, but they were rejected by the Athenians, who then awarded Andocides a second sentence of exile for his "laconism." Antiphon, too, was renowned and died for his aristocratic beliefs. Descended from a family which had supported the Peisistratids, he himself was a member of a conservative ἐταῖρεῖα. He was a fanatic opponent of the democracy to the point of helping subject cities in their lawsuits against Athens. Two of his extant speeches were written for client states seeking a readjustment of their tribute. One suspects that his defense of Helos against the charges of murdering an Athenian citizen was also grounded
in similar anti-democratic motives. Antiphon's chance to impose his conservative views upon the Athenians came in 411 B.C., when the oligarchic government of the Four Hundred came to power. Thucydides called him the mastermind behind the regime. When the Four Hundred itself split into moderate and ultra-conservative factions, Antiphon, finding himself amongst the latter, was forced to go to Sparta to seek aid in bolstering his position. This understandably outraged the Athenians who were then at war with Sparta. When Antiphon returned to Athens, he was tried for treason and executed. A curse was laid upon his property, progeny, and tomb.

Little is known of Prodicus' beliefs other than that he despised the masses and was basically conservative. It is clear that such conservative and aristocratic beliefs and actions did little to endear the rhetoricians to the populace.

But it was not always for such exalted political reasons that the orators fell into disfavor with the common people. Often no more than personal hostilities were at stake. Just as the public could muster a certain amount of antipathy towards the rhetors for their aristocratic bearing, so too could they bring their hatred to bear against an orator if he were a metic. A metic, μέτοικος, was a resident alien of Athens who paid taxes but enjoyed no civic rights. Metics were first encouraged to settle in Athens by Solon who had hoped to entice skilled craftsmen to the city. As so often happens, these aliens frequently proved to be more resourceful than the natives, thus incurring the jealousy of the latter. A number of aliens, legally barred from actual participation in the government,
turned to successful careers in logography. Lysias, for example, was a native of Thurii and a staunch supporter of Athens. He emigrated there in 412 B.C. only to be exiled by the Thirty in 404 B.C. during one of their xenophobic purges. He eventually returned and resumed his profession of logography. Isaeus, too, was a metic forced into a career of speechwriting, as was Thrasymachus. Here operated a prejudice against certain rhetoricians not specifically directed against them personally or professionally, but against their class.

Often it was the offensive personality of the rhetor which grated upon the sensitivities of the common man. Prodicus' mercenary attitude towards education was infamous in antiquity; all of the doxographers commented upon it. Philostratus once claimed that Prodicus came to be dominated by money and pleasure and that he dispatched agents to various cities to hunt up wealthy clients for instruction. Athenaeus and Xenophon also noted his avariciousness, nor did Plato, of course, let the opportunity pass to mention the vast sums of money which Prodicus received for his teaching. Hippias was the target of similar attacks. Plato sarcastically made the point that Hippias had earned more for dispensing his "wisdom" than any man alive. Hippias' boasts were hardly enraging: he declared that the multitude was too ignorant to distinguish between good and evil and true and false, that he was the wisest of men, and that no one was his superior in anything. The basis for his boasts was his program of *abtāρκεία* (autarky), which Momigliano defines as "alles kennen und alles tun
zu können." It was a program of self-sufficiency. He once proclaimed at the Olympic Games that everything on his person he had made himself, his ring, shoes, cloak, tunic, and girdle. He also claimed expertise in poetry, prose, tragedy, orthography, mnemonics, and a host of other disciplines, claims which were met variously with amusement, contempt, and disbelief.

The sophists and orators also managed to offend people by ridiculing and disparaging traditional beliefs and values. We have seen that Andocides was involved in the sacrileges committed on the eve of the Sicilian expedition. The others did not express their scorn for popular religion in such a drastic manner, but resorted to an academic approach to present their arguments. A type of euhemerism was popular among the younger rhetoricians. Prodicus, in his no-longer extant Ωραι (Horai), was believed to have had proposed the theory that those men who had been most beneficial to their fellow men were deified. Critias explained the gods as merely the fabrications of wily politicians, designed to scare the weaker into submission and obedience. Antiphon simply ridiculed those who concerned themselves with the afterlife.

There are certain people who do not live the present life, but prepare themselves assiduously as if they were going to live some other life--not the present one; and time, slipping by in this way, is lost.

The traditional religious beliefs of the Greeks received scant respect from the sophists.
The sophists' formulation of the concepts of νδομος and φοσις (convention and nature) aided in undermining most of the traditional beliefs and values of the Greeks. The customary pride with which the Greek held himself apart and above the barbarian was viewed as groundless arrogance by the rhetors, who saw the difference not as inherent and preordained, but merely as a matter of upbringing. Ancient institutions and the ideals which upheld them, once subjected to sophistic eristics, came to be considered no more than mere conventions determined by circumstances of time and place. There were no perfect institutions or absolute values; there were no eternal standards or sacred ideals: the sophists ridiculed the sacrosanct and contemptuously dismissed that which was held most holy.

One of the greatest affronts to the decencies of his fellow citizens was the shoddy legal practices of the logographers. Thrasymachus, it was rumored, went to great lengths to trump up causes for persecution. The logographers' antics inside the court were no more reputable than those outside, for they frequently resorted to character assassination to win their cases. Andocides, Lysias, and Isaeus were masters of the ad hominem attack. Insults directed by the prosecution against the defense, and vice versa, were plentiful enough, but frequently a man's entire lineage was the butt of his opponent's sarcasm and slander. Neither were theatrics beneath the logographers, as we can judge from the critical comments of Socrates and Aristophanes. The logographers' reputations suffered severely from such pettifoggery. Philostratus judged Antiphon as
as one who "wrote speeches in defiance of justice."\textsuperscript{65} Isaeus gained the infamy of employing his cleverness in the worst possible causes.\textsuperscript{66} Their reputation was so poor that in the fourth century B.C. "logographer" became a term of abuse.\textsuperscript{67}

Such complaints against the rhetoricians played only an insignificant part in forming Plato's opinion of rhetoric. His passing references to Prodicus' avarice or Hippias' megalomania were never central points or key issues in the debates; they merely served as literary props to enhance the development of the dialogue. Plato's concern with the personalities of the orators was ephemeral, his fundamental disagreement being with the very concept or possibility of a rhetorical education.

As much as he depreciated contemporary rhetoric, Plato nevertheless could not ignore it, since the rhetors were his most formidable pedagogic rivals. He presented his critique of rhetoric and its practitioners in a number of dialogues: the Gorgias, Protagoras, Menexenus, Theaetetus, The Sophist, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias, and most importantly, the Phaedrus.

Werner Jaeger nominated the Phaedrus as the most variously interpreted and most widely misunderstood of the Platonic dialogues.\textsuperscript{68} It has, at different times, been proclaimed as the earliest and the latest of Plato's writings, the programme of the Academy, an explanation of his ideas on writing, his first (or final) presentation of the theory of Ideas, and an essay on Eros.\textsuperscript{69} Its Erotic content has led scholars to group the Phaedrus with the Symposium as the two great Platonic
dialogues on Love, thereby ignoring the basic theme of the debate. The *Phaedrus* is a dialogue about rhetoric, and, as such, is more akin to the *Gorgias*. Eros was the chosen subject of the orations used to illustrate examples of good and bad rhetoric; it was a favorite theme for oratorical practice in the fourth century B.C., as Aristotle's lost collection of Eros speeches attests. The Erotic speeches of the *Phaedrus* are held together by the speakers' common concern with the art of constructing a good oration.

In the *Phaedrus* the youth, after whom the dialogue was named, recites for Socrates' benefit one of Lysias' speeches on the subject of Love, in which the famous orator had proposed that it would be more advantageous to accept as one's lover a person who does not reciprocate the love rather than one who does (231 A-234 C). Not very impressed with Lysias' oration, Socrates boasts to Phaedrus that he is equally capable of producing as beautiful a eulogy as Lysias (235 A-C). After some token coaxing by Phaedrus, Socrates then delivers an oration along the same lines as those of Lysias, namely the desireability of the non-lover (237 A-241 D). Phaedrus is enthralled, but Socrates abruptly ends the speech because his daimon forbade him to continue (242 A-B). Both his and Lysias' speeches were, Socrates declares, blasphemies against Eros, the god of Love, who demands a recantation (242 D-243 A). Socrates then begins his second oration which is a discourse on the nature of true Love as opposed to the shallow and false love of which he and Lysias had just spoken (244 A-257 D). The remainder of the dialogue is dedicated to an analysis of
the three speeches which are examined and criticized from literary and philosophical standpoints. The second of Socrates' discourses was, it is agreed, the best of the three in both its style and content, and, therefore, is an example of true rhetoric. Plato contrasts this with the false and worthless rhetoric of his contemporaries.

Hippias had once remarked that "the height of excellence is the ability to produce an eloquent and beautiful speech." 71 Plato disagreed not so much with the aim as with the accepted sophistic definitions of "eloquence" and "beauty." He believed that the rhetoricians neglected one essential element which would perpetually frustrate their efforts at achieving true eloquence and true beauty; that is, they ignored knowledge. The rhetors' basic stance was that they did not have to know or understand a topic thoroughly in order to speak eloquently and convincingly upon it. Plato believed this to be impossible. From this one fundamental flaw, the absence of knowledge, stem all of Plato's other criticisms.

Since rhetoric had no solid basis in knowledge, as the rhetoricians themselves admitted, Plato denied to the discipline the status of a τεχνη. Τεχνη (techne), a word which in the Homeric epics had carried a connotation of "wiles" or "a crafty way of securing or effecting something," had acquired a more scientific definition in Plato's time; it had come to signify an art or method of doing something based upon a systematic set of rules founded upon a scientific knowledge of the truth. Rhetoric, Plato believed, did not fit this definition.
[Socrates]...it [rhetoric] is no art, but a knack that has nothing to do with art, inasmuch as there is, as the Spartans put it, no "soothfast" art of speech, nor assuredly will there ever be one without a grasp of truth.\(^72\)

Any discipline that could not proffer specific reasons for its procedures and activities was no art at all, but merely a "knack" acquired through experience (ἐπιστήμη).\(^73\) Rhetoric was the knack of producing pleasure and gratification in an audience\(^74\) by flattery and deception,\(^75\) whose use was bad enough in Plato's mind, but, he claimed, the orators did not even understand the very mechanisms of the flattery and deception which they employed. Their skill was not based upon knowledge.

This leads us back to the fundamental philosophical stance of the early sophists, that of epistemological relativism. Of course, they would have admitted, rhetoric is not based upon knowledge, episteme; knowledge is an impossibility. There exists only the sensory perception of the realm of appearances which gives rise to doxa, opinion. That Plato should have defined rhetoric as a discipline unconcerned with truth and knowledge was no news to the rhetors. Even when he taunted the sophists with the accusation of merely giving the appearance of knowledge among the ignorant,\(^76\) he did no more than sarcastically reiterate their own position.

[Rhetoric is] an art of creating contradictions belonging to the consciously insincere type of mimicry based on mere opinions deriving from that branch of illusionism which is concerned with the making of images, by taking for its peculiar province the undivine and merely human productivity concerned with the production of the verbally portentous.\(^77\)

The sophists believed, as Protagoras had once stated, that their opinion was better than that of the masses. Plato's argument
with the sophists concerning the identity of knowledge and sense perception was pointless, therefore; for the rhetors had long since assumed that the two were different, they had even rejected the possibility of knowledge.

Rhetoric operated solely in the realm of opinion, as the young Phaedrus was led to surmise.

Οὕτωι περὶ τοῦτων ἀκήκοα, διὸ φίλε Σωκράτες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ἁτομῷ ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ διντὶ δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντα δὲν πλήθει οὐ περὶ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ δυτικὸν ἀγαθὰ ἡ-καλά; ἀλλ' δέσα δοξεῖ· εἰκ γὰρ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πείθειν, ἀλλ' οὖν εἰκ τῇς ἀληθείας.78

I have heard such things, my dear Socrates, that he who wishes to become a rhetorician does not have to learn anything about true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by those who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honorable, but only with the opinions about them, and from those opinions comes persuasion, and not from the truth.

Since rhetoric did not concern itself with knowledge of the truth but only with opinion, Plato believed that it could never teach, but only persuade. He drew a distinction between "believing" and "learning."

Socrates. Then, does it seem to you that "having learned" and "having believed" and are learning and belief the same thing?

Gorgias. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Socrates. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:—If a person were to say to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?" you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gorgias. Yes.

Socrates. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gorgias. No.

Socrates. No, indeed; and this again proves that
knowledge and belief differ.

Gorgias. That is true.

Socrates. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

Gorgias. That is so.

Socrates. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion, one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

Gorgias. By all means...

Socrates. Then rhetoric as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief... but gives no instruction?79

Plato criticized rhetoric, then, as a knack of speaking which persuades but does not teach80 and explains how to argue but not the contents of the argument, because the oratorical tricks of persuasion exist without regard to the content or context of a speech.

Although Plato would not allow for a formal educational system not based upon a knowledge of the truth, he conceded this point and tried to meet the rhetors on their own ground. He proved to them that knowledge was necessary even in the realms of persuasion, opinion, and probability. To employ effectively that favorite device of the logographers, ἐλκός (probability), it was necessary, Plato argued, to have a knowledge of the truth. Note, Plato did not claim that for the orator to persuade on the grounds of probability he must express the truth, but that he must, nonetheless, have knowledge of the truth, for the probable must surely resemble the true.
Probability is engendered in the minds of the many by its similarity to the truth, and we had just agreed that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover resemblances of the truth.

Plato basically maintained that probability, from the less to the more probable, had to have an absolute standard against which it could be judged; that standard was the truth.

Plato demonstrated that knowledge and truth were essential to the very concept and operation of rhetoric. Recall that in his *Encomium on Helen*, Gorgias extolled the beguiling and enchanting powers of oratory which could "persuade and transform" the soul (*Encomium* 10). Plato concurred with this assessment, declaring that rhetoric possessed the ability to "steal the soul with embellished words" and was, therefore, akin to magic. It was, in brief, the art of psychagogy. But, Plato objected, how could the rhetorician claim to lead, persuade, or transform the soul, if he had no knowledge of the soul itself?

It is clear then that Thrasymachus and anyone else who wishes to teach the art of rhetoric in earnest first will describe exactly the soul and make it known...since the power of speech is that of psychagogy, and, therefore, he who would persuade rhetoric must learn about the differences in souls.

The rhetoricians, of course, did not even pretend to explore the intricacies of the soul, all the while claiming that this was the special province of their discipline.

Another aspect of rhetoric to which Plato took exception
was that of the role of dialectics. Socrates' two speeches in the *Phaedrus* served as a demonstration of the fundamental dependence of rhetoric upon dialectics, a point upon which both Plato and the sophists were in agreement. The second of Socrates' orations on Eros, in which he enumerated the species and recognized the essential unity of Love, was a perfect example of the synoptic and diairetic functions of dialectics. Plato contrasted this use of dialectics with the shallow and meaningless sense of synthesis and division which the rhetors had. Certainly a knowledge of classification was necessary for the proper presentation of arguments and construction of a speech, but Plato believed that this was far from dialectic's only role. Its correct use was as the only legitimate method in the pursuit of knowledge; its use by the rhetors bordered on abuse in Plato's eyes. Not only did the rhetors not use dialectics to obtain knowledge, they debased it into a cheap variety of eristics, employed to enhance the cause of the apparent or even the false.

Plato's final objection to contemporary rhetoric was well in line with his theocentric reasoning; rhetoric, as it was generally practiced, was not pleasing to God.

\[ \text{Τάδε δὲ οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτῆσονται ἄνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας.} \]
\[ \text{Ποὺ οἷς ἔνεκα τὸν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους} \]
\[ \text{δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεοῦς κεχαρίο} \]
\[ \text{μένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι.} \]

And this [rhetorical skill] one will not attain without a great deal of trouble; something which a wise man will undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order to be able to speak acceptably about things before the gods.

True rhetoric gained its power of eloquence from the expression
of the truth.

Far from discarding oratory, Plato used the Phaedrus to demonstrate what a new rhetoric could be, if based upon the proper philosophical foundation. The new rhetorical curriculum he outlined was more arduous and more extensive than that of the sophists, which he likened to the fleeting Gardens of Adonis.

Would a farmer, who is a man of sense, take seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them during the heat of summer, in some Garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty?...But when he is in earnest he sows in good soil, and practices husbandry, and is satisfied in eight months if the seed which he has sown yields in perfection.

In the Phaedrus Socrates returned to the same tenet he had maintained in the Gorgias, that is, that an orator must know the truth of a subject before he can speak upon it. An orator, Plato believed, must be thoroughly trained in philosophy, especially dialectics, before he can hope to speak truthfully and effectively.

It is against the background of these popular and learned criticisms that we must evaluate the rhetorical programme of Plato's chief educational rival, Isocrates.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI

1 Plato Gorgias 461 A ff.

2 Plato Lesser Hippias 368 B-E.

3 US 6B fr. 3.


5 US 13 B fr. 1.

6 See above pp. 71 ff.

7 Peiffer, op. cit., p. 185.

8 Plato Greater Hippias 285 C-D.

9 Plato Protagoras 385 A.

10 Jebb, Attic Orators, p. 155.

11 Plato Menexenus 236 A.


13 Dobson, op. cit., p. 50.

14 Aristotle Rhetoric iii.1.7.

15 Dobson, op. cit., p. 123, quoting the pseudo-Plutarch.

16 Maidment, op. cit., pp. 52-83.
17
Ibid., pp. 89-115.

18
Plutarch Parallel Lives "Pericles" 36.

19
Maidment, op. cit., pp. 121-145.

20
Freeman, Herodes, pp. 63-85.

21

22

23
Ibid., 13 ff.

24
Lysias Epitaphios 71.

25
Ibid., 20 ff.

26
Ibid.

27
Lysias Olympiacus 5.

28
Ibid.

29
Ibid. 8.

30
Isocrates Areopagiticus 20.

31
Xenophon Memorabilia i.2.12 ff.

32
Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 501.

33
34  Maidment, op. cit., p. 320.

35  Andocides On His Return and Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War vi.27, 61.

36  Andocides On the Mysteries. In 415 B. C. Andocides had been tried only for the defamation of the herms.

37  Andocides On the Peace 13-16, 28.

38  Antiphon On the Revolution 1.


40  Antiphon On the Tribute of Lindos and On the Tribute of Samothrace.

41  Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War viii.68.

42  Ibid., viii.90-91.

43  Ibid.

44  Antiphon On the Revolution 1-4.


46  Jebb, op. cit., p. 140.

47  Ibid., p. 265.

48  Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 498.

49  US 6A fr. 4b.

50  Xenophon Symposium iv.62.
51 Plato Greater Hippias 282 C and Cratylus 384 B.

52 Plato Greater Hippias 300 D and 282 E.

53 Ibid., 284 E.

54 Ibid., 368 B.

55 Ibid., 364 A.

56 Momigliano, op. cit., p. 468.

57 Plato Lesser Hippias 368 B-E.


59 US 14A fr. 25.

60 US 13B fr. 53a.

61 Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 497.

62 For example: Lysias Agoratus 18, Nichomachus 21, Alcibiades 23-40, and Soldier 1.

63 For example, Antiphon Herodes 74-80.

64 Freeman, Herodes, p. 18.

65 Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 499.

66 Jebb, op. cit., p. 271.

67 Plato Phaedrus 257 C.

69  Ibid., pp. 182-183.

70  Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 71.

71  Plato Greater Hippias 304 C.

72  Plato Phaedrus 260 F.

73  Plebe, op. cit., p. 47.

74  Plato Gorgias 462 C, E.

75  Ibid., 465 C and 503 A-B.

76  Plato Gorgias 459 B-C.


78  Plato Phaedrus 260 A.

79  Plato Gorgias 454 D.

80  Plato Theaetetus 186 A.

81  Plato Phaedrus 273 C.

82  Plato Menexenus 235 A.

83  Plato Euthydemus 345 C.

84  Plato Phaedrus 271 A, D.

85  Ibid., 265 E-266 A.
86
*Ibid.*, 266 D-267 A.

87
*Ibid.*, 273 E-274 A.

88

89
Plato *Phaedrus* 276 B.

90
*Ibid.*, 277 E and *Gorgias* 460 A.
CHAPTER VII
ISOCRATES

The gradual debilitation of the polis during and after the Peloponnesian War brought in its wake a fragmentation of Greek civic ideals. Those talents and virtues which were ideally embodied within a single citizen were now dispersed and distributed singly among many persons. The citizen-soldier, for example, gave way in the fourth century B. C. to the politician and the mercenary. The aristocratic ideal of possessing a plausible proficiency in poetry, athletics, and music was abandoned in favor of the professional poet, sportsman, and musician. The archaic \( \phi \lambda \delta \sigma \phi \alpha \) (lover of wisdom), diligently inquiring into the realms of man, nature, and the gods, evolved into academicians, scientists, and philosophers. It was the age of the specialist; a man generally acquired an expertise in one and only one field. Rhetoric, too, was in danger of being similarly limited and confined. It might have become the exclusive domain of lawyers and logographers had it not been for the efforts of one man to fashion it into a comprehensive educational curriculum. That man was Isocrates.

Isocrates was born in 436 B. C. in Attica in the deme of Erchia.\(^1\) His father, Theodorus, was by profession a flute manufacturer, a fact which afforded Isocrates' numerous opponents a source for constant ridicule. Theodorus was both wealthy and wise enough to obtain for his son an education befitting an aristocrat; the young Isocrates reputedly studied under such famed sophists as Prodicus, Protagoras, Theramenes,
and Gorgias. Yet another of his mentors, Socrates, saw particular promise in Isocrates.

Socrates. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to risk a prophecy concerning him.

Phaedrus. What do you prophesy?

Socrates. I think that he has a genius which rises above the orations of a Lysias, and that he has a nobler personality. My impression is that he will improve himself admirably as he grows older. All earlier rhetoricians will be like children if compared to him. And further I believe that he will not be wholly satisfied with rhetoric, because there is some divine spark that will lead him to things still greater, for there is an element of philosophy in him.

Isocrates himself informs us that during the Peloponnesian War he lost his entire patrimony. Some probably spurious story transmitted by Plutarch relates how Isocrates alone dared to defend Theramenes against the accusations of Critias and to wear mourning clothes publicly for Socrates. In 404 B.C. he left Athens for Chios where he opened a school of rhetoric that achieved some success. With the restoration of democracy in Athens in the following year, he returned and began his career as a logographer, a profession at which Isocrates expressly denied ever having worked, although Aristotle claimed that the bookstores of his day were still well-stocked with the courtroom speeches of Isocrates. Several of these speeches are, in fact, extant: the Trapeziticus, Against Callimachus, On the Team of Horses, Aegineticus, Against Lochites, and Against Euthynus. A weak voice and a frail stamina kept Isocrates from ever appearing personally before an audience or assembly. He worked as a logographer for about a decade before opening his school in 392 B.C.
Isocrates' school gained fame throughout the Greek-speaking world. In his speech, *Against the Sophists* (c. 391 B. C.), which served as a manifesto and credo for the institution, Isocrates let it be known that his was to be no ordinary school of sophistic rhetoric and eristics. The emphasis would be, rather, upon sound and thorough "philosophical" training. He charged native Athenians no tuition, but claimed a fee of 1,000 drachmas from foreigners. His students came from all parts of the Mediterranean, and among them were some of the most renowned statesmen and scholars of the fourth century B. C.: the politicians Eunomus, Philomelus, and charmantides; the historians Ephorus and Theopompus; the philosopher Speusippus; the orators Isaeus, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, and Hypereides; and the general Timotheus. Hermippus of Smyrna dedicated an entire treatise to the subject of the pupils of Isocrates, and Cicero made the following comparison to the noble products of his school.

Ecce tibi est exhortus, Isocrates, [magister istorum omnium] cuius e ludo ex equo Troiano méri principes exierunt.

Then behold you arose, Isocrates, the master of all these, from whose school, as if from the Trojan horse, none but the finest leaders emerged.

In 351 B. C. when the widow Artemisia of Caria sponsored an oratorical contest to eulogize her deceased husband, Mausolus, it was said that all those who entered the competition had once been students of Isocrates. When not teaching Isocrates was engaged in writing various pamphlets, either calling for the reform of Athenian democracy, urging monarchs to show restraint in their government, or begging one or another of the
princes or kings of Hellas to lead a holy war against the barbarians.

In vain Isocrates attempted to reconcile the Greek poleis to one another and, in particular, Athens to Philip II of Macedonia. He saw in Philip the messiah for his holy war. When Philip crushed the Athenian army at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., however, Isocrates, bent upon suicide, secluded himself in a temple precinct where he quickly starved to death at the age of 98. The reason for the suicide is unclear and many scholars regard the story as apocryphal. Buried outside Athens' walls, his grave was marked by a column surmounted by a simn—the ancient symbol of irresistible and eloquent persuasion.

Isocrates has always been something of an enigmatic figure. He obviously commanded great respect and even affection amongst his students. Timotheus went so far as to dedicate a statue of his master to Demeter at the sanctuary of Eleusis, and Philostratus claimed that a similar cenotaph existed at Olympia. But among those of his contemporaries not immediately acquainted with him, he was regarded with great suspicion. At one point in his secluded career, Isocrates professed to be shocked when he learned of the low esteem in which the populace of Athens held him.

Μέχρι μὲν οὖν πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἐμην καὶ διὰ τὴν προαιρέσειν ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκλήν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἐπιείκείας ἔχειν πρὸς ἄπαντας τοὺς ἱδιώτας· ἦδη δὴ ὑπογιζον μοι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτής οδοσ, ἀντιδόσεως γενομένης περὶ τριήμερης καὶ περὶ ταῦτας ἵγων ἔγνω καὶ τούτων τινὰς οὐχ οἴνω τρὸς ἴδεικεν τοὺς ἐκείμενος ὕπερ ἦλπιζον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν πολὺ διεσφασθέντος τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιηθεμανάω καὶ ἰδέαντας ἐπὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι τοὺς
Until well on in years I thought that owing to this choice [to speak on great issues] and on account of my retired life, in general, I was held in some regard by everyone; then as my life was about to draw to a close, having been challenged to an exchange of property regarding a triarchy, I came and realized that even those outside my profession were not as well disposed towards me as I had thought. In fact, some were so completely misled concerning my activities that they readily listened to my distractors.

Isocrates has fared no better among modern scholars. Werner Jaeger drew attention to what he diplomatically described as Isocrates' flexible system of ethics; George Kennedy, in a harsher manner, categorized Isocrates as "an intellectual of no very certain convictions whom rhetorical ability reduced to straw-snatching opportunism." Similarly B. G. Niebuhr called Isocrates

\[ \text{ein so armeseliger Kopf, als man sich nur denken kann...ein durchaus schlechter, kümmerlicher Schriftsteller, einer der gedankenlosesten, armeseligen Geister.} \]

Although Norman Baynes came to his defense, after a fashion, he, too, takes Isocrates to task for his glaring inconsistencies. Klaus Bringmann, on the other hand, believes that Isocrates still maintains today the exalted position which he held in antiquity.

These inconsistencies of Isocrates, to which scholars are fond of drawing their attention and fire, are of two types. First, there is the awkwardness with which Isocrates attempted to reconcile his narrow Athenian patriotism with his broader pan-Hellenic idealism, and, second, the apparent shallowness of his grandiose claims to teaching "philosophy."
To vindicate Isocrates of these inconsistencies would be futile, though he himself attempted this, with no great success, in his speech, the *Antidosis* (354 B.C.). Our task shall be to examine Isocrates' speeches with the intention of trying to discover the existence of that all-encompassing principle to which he remained faithful and which would somehow forgive or at least explain his fluctuating political stances. The principle was, of course, pan-Hellenism. It served not only as the content of many of his speeches, but also as the backbone of his "philosophy," and the rationale behind his politics. Isocrates used pan-Hellenism to infuse a new life and a new morality into his program of rhetorical education, which he referred to as his "philosophy."

Before beginning a detailed examination of the extant orations, a necessary clarification must be made concerning the terms "σοφιστής (sophist)" and "φιλόσοφος (philosopher)." This clarification is essential because our lack of appreciation of Isocrates' claims to "philosophy" stems fundamentally from our usage of these words and our misunderstanding of the way in which they were employed in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The issue is also colored by the sympathy we entertain for the Socratic and Platonic tradition which, of course, was hostile towards rhetoric and rhetoricians. We have come to regard a sophist as a teacher of rhetoric, with the usual insinuations of glibness, artifice, and lack of principles. For this prejudice we are indebted to Socrates
and Plato. "Sophist," however, originally meant nothing more than one adept at his skill or art. Pindar so used it in reference to poets,\textsuperscript{26} Herodotus to diviners,\textsuperscript{27} Aeschylus to musicians,\textsuperscript{28} and Plato to the Demiurge.\textsuperscript{29} Wise men, in general, came to be known as "sophists," as Herodotus called the Seven Sages\textsuperscript{30} and as Dionysius of Halicarnassus labelled both Isocrates and Plato.\textsuperscript{31} Isocrates boasted that Athens' achievements were due to her sophists,\textsuperscript{32} here obviously not signifying the practitioners of sham rhetoric, whom he detested, but the city's wise statesmen and thinkers. "Philosopher" similarly originally possessed a much less technical definition than it does presently. It meant nothing more than "a lover of wisdom." Pythagoras was reputed to have humbly considered himself not a φοινικός (wiseman), but only a φιλόσοφος (lover of wisdom).\textsuperscript{33} And Heracleitus referred to Hesiod and Isocrates to Alexander the Great as "a lover of wisdom."\textsuperscript{34} The definition of the two terms had not solidified before the end of the fourth century B.C.\textsuperscript{35}

Only gradually did these words assume those definition to which we are accustomed. Plato was partially responsible for their new usages. Those thinkers whom he admired he called "philosophers"; those he despised he referred to as "sophists," and our judgment of sophists and philosophers is based upon this altered verbal definition and usage. But it must be remembered that Plato and Isocrates were contemporaries, both handling and fashioning the Greek language each to his own purposes. Isocrates was equally correct and had as much right to call his type of education "philosophy" as did Plato his.
Our perception of this semantic problem then has been shaped by the general esteem in which Plato is held and the connotations which he attached to these terms.

Isocrates' philosophy consisted of instruction in what he regarded as the noblest of academic disciplines, rhetoric. The excellence of rhetoric was, by Isocrates' time, a very hackneyed theme among Greek orators, and Isocrates' pronouncements upon the subject marked no new advances or insights. He merely reiterated, perhaps in more splendid periods, the time-worn honors once bestowed upon the art by Gorgias, Protagoras, and others before him. It was the power of the logos, he was fond of declaring, that raised men above the beasts, and Greeks above barbarians. And as Protagoras once had explained, rhetoric was the source of men's blessings and the foundation of all human institutions and of civilization itself. Isocrates went so far as to proclaim the superiority of rhetoric to poetry and to elevate Peitho, the force of persuasion, to the status of a deity. For Isocrates to praise the art was one thing, on the other hand, as he looked about at the practitioners of that art, he certainly could not help but notice that they fell far short of that ideal. The profession needed to be purged.

Isocrates began his reform by criticizing the most obvious abuses of rhetoric. In his treatise, Against the Sophists, he added his voice to the popular criticisms against unscrupulous rhetoricians by ridiculing the outlandish promises the sophists made to their students.
Εἰ πάντες ἦθελον οἱ παιδευόμενοι ἐπιχειροῦντες ὑληθῆ λέγειν, καὶ μὴ μελεῖσον πολεῖσθαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ὑπάκουσθαν εἰμέλλον ἐπιτελεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα κακῶς ἦκουσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἱδίω τῶν, νῦν δὲ οἱ τολμῶντες λίαν ἀπερισκέπτως ἠλάζον εὐθεῖα πεποιήκασιν ἵπτε δοκεῖν ἡμείνας βουλεύοντας τοὺς ἐρωμένους τῶν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατριβὸντως. 44

If all those who teach were willing to speak the truth, and not make promises greater than those they can fulfill, they would not be so poorly thought of by the public; now, however, teachers dare to boast of powers, disregarding the truth, and have created the impression that it is better advice to lead a life of indolence than to dedicate oneself to philosophy.

Such teachers, he accused, had no interest in education or justice; they were preoccupied only with their tuitions and courtroom triumphs. 45 He found it odd that the sophists should charge a fee for teaching the truth, not that they charged a fee, which he himself did, but that their tuitions were such "a small fraction of truth's value." 46 This vein of criticism was neither original nor very profound, but merely served to give notice that Isocrates regarded his rhetorical instruction to be superior to traditional sophistry. 47

The students who graduated from Isocrates' school were not the usual products of sophistic training, suited only for pettifoggery and hair-splitting eristics. Isocrates regarded eristics and dialectics as being of only a limited usefulness; even then, they were fraught with many temptations and dangers. Too easily could they ensnare one in the delights of absurd argumentation, 49 which too often was mistaken for a search for the truth, when, in fact, it was nothing more than verbal legerdemain. 50 At worst, dialectics gave one a certain facility in contriving falsehoods. 51 Not quite as dangerous
as dialectics, but every bit as useless, in Isocrates' mind, was the study of mathematics and science. He considered these disciplines to be adequate mental gymnastics but certainly of no practical or permanent value. The fruitlessness of such speculation was proved to Isocrates by the grand diversity of learned opinion regarding such matters. It must have given him great delight to witness the strife among the post-Socratic schools of philosophy.

Although Isocrates was amused by such philosophical feuding, he was not drawn into the fray with yet another system of truth and knowledge of his own. He eschewed any educational program which smacked of dogmatic rigidity and certainty.

Isocrates' rejection of dogmatism was both an artistic as well as an ethical decision. On an epistemological level he naturally denied the possibility of ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), while claiming that his δόξα (opinion) was better than others' "exact knowledge." Neither on an ethical level could he espouse an orthodoxy of behaviour and customs. In a passage reminiscent of the Dissoi Logoi, he underscored the wide disparity among nations in their assessments of principles of good and evil. This did not, however, prohibit him from expounding the traditional Greek aphorisms on a number of occasions. He similarly decried such a doctrinaire attitude on an artistic level. He chastised those teachers who professed to make men eloquent by inculcating them with a predetermined set of rules and procedures. It is impossible, he claimed, to apply strict rules to the creative process. For this reason he condemned those who wrote τεχναί (rhetorical
handbooks) and those who taught rhetoric, τοῦτος πολιτικὸς λόγος, as an art, that is, as if it were a skill to be learned by rote. Isocrates went to great lengths to explain what his "philosophy" was not, but he was not at all clear as to what exactly it was.

When he spoke of his educational curriculum and the type of student he hoped to produce, he spoke only in the vaguest of terms. He never made the outlandish promises his colleagues did, to be able to teach men virtue, for he believed that it was impossible to make wicked men virtuous. But he believed that it was quite possible to make good men better through rhetorical training. His rationale was that true conviction comes from being persuaded by the actions of a man's life; the good orator, therefore, will strive to live honorably in order to appear more persuasive before his audiences. In the same vague vein Isocrates spoke of rhetoric making men wiser. The mind is finely atuned, Isocrates claimed, when one delivers an oration, for the same rational faculties are employed in the composition of an oration as when one deliberates over a certain situation. This constant mental exercise will fortify men's minds with sound opinion which would enable them to make the wisest decision in any given circumstance. Here again Isocrates shied away from the flamboyant promises of his colleagues. He did not profess to make any man wiser or even more eloquent; he believed that only those students with some natural endowment could be turned into good and wise rhetoricians, given a certain amount of experience and training. The graduate of Isocrates' school, his "educated" man, would
be: eloquent, able to manage well his own and his city's daily affairs, accurate in his judgments, decent, honorable, moderate in all things, and modest. 65

It would be unfair, however, to regard these vague descriptions and comparatively moderate claims as the sum-total of Isocrates' concept of his "new rhetoric." His reform of sophism entailed much more than a truth-in-advertising campaign, though even this would have relieved the profession of some of the more common and nastier criticisms concerning unscrupulous orators and logographers. Isocrates had in mind a grander scheme—a complete moral reformation of the art of rhetoric.

The superiority of philosophy (as we presently define and understand it) as an educational ideal over rhetoric was due to its elevated moral tone and principles. 66 Isocrates realized this. Logography simply could not compete with Socrates' search for truth, nor well-rounded, sonorous periods with Socratic dialectics. Within the space of two generations, the art of rhetoric had, as Plato claimed, ensnared itself in the world of form, an art which existed for its own sake. Although such an attitude is tolerable in some of the other arts, painting and sculpture, for example, it proves to be particularly sterile in literature. Isocrates sought, therefore, to raise rhetoric out of this mire of artistic self-indulgence.

Isocrates gave rhetoric substance, a new moral fibre—politics. But rhetoric's new involvement in the political arena was not to be understood in the same sense in which Protagoras and Gorgias had once spoken. To them the task of rhetoric was
to train eloquent and verbally agile politicians whose consummate virtue was their persuasiveness, a quality which resided in the beauty of their speech more often than in the truth of their statements. Isocrates withdrew from this type of politics in order to engage in civic affairs on a higher plane; he made rhetoric rise above politics in order to control it. In the seclusion of his school he could educate and send back into the world statesmen capable of reforming and redirecting the course of Greek politics. Essentially, Isocrates wanted to create a new pan-Hellenic elite, whose authority rested upon superior culture and education, to replace the old and now impotent aristocracy as the political leaders of Hellas.

From the cloister of his school of rhetoric Isocrates took an active though removed part in this political reform. He continually composed pamphlets, merciless in their criticisms and unequivocal in their condemnations, which called for a complete re-examination of the operation and realignment of the aims of Greek politics. He was unsparing, and indeed his harshest criticisms were directed towards his native city, Athens.

Isocrates deplored the contemporary state of Athenian politics; there was not a segment of the population that escaped his attacks. But these attacks were meant to be constructive criticisms, for Isocrates viewed himself, in his capacity as a rhetorician, as an advisor to the city of Athens. He deplored the condition of Athens' courts and legal system. The citizens themselves were litigious, the sycophants were audacious and, for this very reason, admired, and, in
general, the Athenians were plainly infatuated with cheap oratory.⁷⁴ This same political sickness could also be seen in the Assembly. Here, too, the Athenians displayed their fondness for eloquence at the expense of truth,⁷⁵ a trait that gained them a reputation of fickleness.⁷⁶ More than having lost their ability to lead, the Athenians were now even incapable of being led.

You distrust and dislike men of that character [honest] and cultivate, instead, the most depraved of the orators who come before you on this platform; and you prefer as being better friends of the people those who are drunk to those who are sober, those who are witless to those who are wise, and those who dole out the public money to those who perform public services at their own expense. So that we may well marvel that anyone can expect a state which employs such counsellors to advance to better things.⁷⁷

The honor of holding civic office had degenerated by this time into a permanent occupation for many;⁷⁸ the day of the professional politician had arrived.

Isocrates was more than a siren calling attention to a bad situation; he ventured proposals to remedy the situation. His reform is presented in his speech, the Areopagiticus (355/354 B.C.), which Werner Jaeger characterized as the manifesto of the conservative faction.⁷⁹ Briefly, Isocrates' idea was to return to an earlier form of democracy, that which existed under Solon and Cleisthenes.⁸⁰ The special feature of Solonic government in which Isocrates was particularly interested was the Areopagus. That august body which once held the reigns of power and served as the repository of sacred tradition had fallen, during the radicalization of the democracy in the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., to the position of a barely
tolerated, anachronistic body of elders empowered to try only obscure cases of sacrilege and an occasional homicide. Isocrates' plan was to restore the Areopagus to its former pinnacle of power and prestige as the guardian of hallowed ancestral custom and public decency. In effect, he wanted to rebuild the character of Athens on the moral authority of the Areopagus.

Isocrates' call for political reform and his efforts at reforming the rhetorical profession were not isolated phenomena in his career. On a very elementary level they were related in that Isocrates felt that political reform and leadership were the tasks for which orators should be trained. But there also existed a much more crucial and fundamental connection between these two activities; both were subordinated to and existed to serve a higher ideal—pan-Hellenism.

Service to the goal of Greek unification would give rhetoric sufficient moral content to enable it to meet the Socratic and Platonic criticisms of it being an art concerned with form and not substance. Isocrates believed that the loftiness and the sacredness of this ideal would raise rhetoric to that same sacrosanct plateau, for as he was so fond of repeating, the nobility of the theme ensures the nobility of an oration. It was precisely for this reason that Isocrates condemned logography, because it dealt with petty, ephemeral issues and not great ideas. Pan-Hellenism was such a noble idea which would give rhetoric a moral purpose.

Isocrates' pan-Hellenic crusade cannot be properly understood apart from his concept of rhetoric and the political
reforms which he tried to effect on a local level. But before examining pan-Hellenism's relationship to Isocrates' call for civic reform in Athens, we must understand the nature of the ideal and the political circumstances of the Greek city-states during the time in which Isocrates preached this crusade.

Isocrates did not originate the concept of pan-Hellenism; it was a time-honored ideal amongst the Greeks, who saw in the heroic expedition against Priam's Troy an antecedent of the same ideal they were trying now to effect. The Greeks also believed that the various pan-Hellenic games and contests at Olympia, Delphi, and Corinth were established by their founders to promote the cause of Greek harmony. But the series of events which had given the greatest demonstration of Hellas' ability to unite was the fifth-century wars waged against the Persians. Thereafter, pan-Hellenism became a favorite theme of Greek oratory; Gorgias, Lysias, Isaeus, and Isocrates all spoke on the topic.

The era in which Isocrates preached this cause was not particularly conducive towards pan-Hellenic harmony. The Greeks were becoming increasingly bellicose towards one another, alliances and enmities were constantly shifting, Philip was threatening from the north, and Persia was taking advantage of this internecine strife to make significant inroads into Hellas. Isocrates believed that these ills of the Greeks began after the Persian Wars when Athens and Sparta began to compete for hegemony. Now, far from uniting with each other to defeat the barbarians, the Greeks had grown accustomed to allying and
collaborating with the Persians against one another. But in these strange circumstances Isocrates managed to find some hope.

Persia, he firmly believed, was not so powerful as she appeared; she ruled not by virtue of her own strength but only by the folly of the Greeks. To underscore this weakness he pointed to Persia's recent reversals at the hands of the Greeks: the Greek-supported revolt in Egypt (361 B.C.), the rebellion in Cyprus (385 B.C.), the independence of Rhodes (395 B.C.), and the march of the Ten Thousand (401 B.C.). The time was ripe, he argued, for a united Greek crusade against the King of Kings.

The first problem to be considered was the exact political arrangement by which the city-states would live in this united "Greece." Although Isocrates never really clarified himself by much more than stating that it would be necessary to stage a reconciliation amongst, especially, Argos, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Macedonia, Josef Kessler believes that he had in mind a loose confederation "unter einer starken Vormacht." Norman Baynes, on the other hand, finds no evidence in the speeches that Isocrates ever even suggested such a league or confederation. Kessler is quite correct, however, in stating that Isocrates was perennially concerned with the problem of hegemony, of which city should rule this Greek "union," whatever form it may take. One thing was certain, whichever polis exercised hegemony, it had to respect the autonomy of its allies. It was the failure to do so that cost Athens her two Alliances.
Although Isocrates' ideas about pan-Hellenism are scattered throughout his speeches, Kessler has done an admirable job in bringing together these strands in a more organized manner than Isocrates himself had done. What appeared in Isocrates' writings only as persistent themes, Kessler has welded together into a coherent pan-Hellenic proposal containing four goals: 1) the unification of Hellas, 2) the liberation of Ionia, 3) the colonization of Anatolia by the Greeks, and 4) the relief of the mercenary and exile population problem. The one venture which would achieve all these goals simultaneously was a war against Persia. Recall that since the time of Gorgias, pan-Hellenism had always been conceived within the framework of a holy war against the barbarians. Now Isocrates elaborated upon this theme. By breaking Persian power the war would, of course, free the Ionians, open up the hinterland of Asia Minor to Greek colonization, and provide land and employment for Hellas' numerous exiles and mercenaries. But more importantly, the war would cement pan-Hellenic brotherhood.

Wenn dies alles geschehen ist, wird es die erste und Hauptaufgabe des Vororts sein, die Hellenen gegen die Perser zu führen. Dieser Zug soll die Einheit stärken und befestigen, gewissermassen durch Blut und Eisen die Griechen zusammenschieden zu einem untrennbaren Ganzen.

The concept of pan-Hellenism was admirable, Isocrates' plan feasible, the results beneficial, but there existed one insurmountable obstacle--leadership. Who was fit to rule the συμμαχία (offensive alliance)? Throughout his career Isocrates made appeals to various cities, kings, and despots to undertake the leadership of this crusade; hence the charges of
opportunism, duplicity, and hypocrisy.\textsuperscript{98}

Dearest to Isocrates' heart was the hope that his beloved Athens would lead the Greeks. She had the right, he believed, to exercise this hegemony. In the \textit{Panathenaicus} (342-339 B.C.) and the \textit{Panegyricus} (380 B. C.) he explained in great detail the cultural and political benefits which the Athenians had bestowed upon her fellow Greeks, benefits which gave Athens priority for hegemony.\textsuperscript{99} In fact, he claimed, since the most ancient times the Greeks had conferred this right upon the Athenians.\textsuperscript{100} Cultural and political achievements notwithstanding, Athens' best claims to hegemony rested upon her past military actions against the barbarians.\textsuperscript{101} But the Athenians had forfeited this honor in recent memory by turning her Alliances into empires.\textsuperscript{102} Although Isocrates often tried to excuse Athens' behaviour,\textsuperscript{103} he realized finally that the other city-states would not tolerate her insolence again.

It is against this pan-Hellenic background that Isocrates' platform of political reform becomes intelligible. Before he had actually abandoned the dream of Athenian leadership, Isocrates was trying to render Athens acceptable to the other Hellenes. He knew that her imperialistic longings and abrasive behaviour towards her allies were the by-products of the radical democracy. For this very reason in the \textit{Areopagiticus} (355-354 B. C.) he proposed a conservative counterplan for Athenian politics. His local political reforms, like his rhetoric, were subservient to the higher principle of pan-Hellenism.
Only when Isocrates became completely disillusioned with Athens did he make overtures to other Greeks to lead the pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia. He called then upon Jason of Pherai, Dionysius of Syracuse, Archidamus of Sparta, Nicocles of Cyprus, and finally Philip of Macedonia. Baynes believes that Isocrates' disillusionment was total, that he appealed to these monarchs not just to lead a pan-Hellenic crusade against Persia, but to wage war against Persia on behalf of the other Greeks—to do the job for Greece. Kessler disagrees, saying that Isocrates proposed identical plans to these leaders as he had to Athens.

Historians have argued about the practical effects of Isocrates' pan-Hellenism on Greek politics. Kessler, for example, maintains that the Congress of Corinth faithfully fulfilled Isocrates' program. But he stands alone in this assessment; usually Isocrates is judged as having had no appreciable effect on the course of Hellenic politics. Certainly, as events turned out, the Congress of Corinth proved to be a sham, and Greece lost her autonomy under Philip, Alexander, and the Diadochoi. Even Alexander's Asian campaign and conquest did not proceed along the lines mapped out by Isocrates. The pan-Hellenism of the Hellenistic Age was a far cry from Isocrates' concept of it. In the arena of practical politics, Isocrates' pan-Hellenism had little noticeable effect.

Isocrates' contribution to the progress of Hellenic culture lay elsewhere, in education, for it was he who shaped rhetoric into a viable educational curriculum. Rhetoric, like
philosophy, was a product of the polis and, as such, had its fortunes attached to those of the polis, particularly Athens. So long as the courtrooms and the popular assemblies remained open, rhetoric flourished. But as Greek political culture in general and Athenian democracy in particular began to sour, rhetoric, like philosophy, beat a hasty retreat into the seclusion of schools and academies. The survival of these two disciplines was due to the fact that both had claims wider than the city-state or any particular form of government which enabled them to survive the degeneration of democracy and eventually even the collapse of the polis itself. If Isocrates had not intervened in the course of rhetoric's evolution, the art would probably have died a lingering death in the stultifying air of Hellenistic specialization, just as, for instance, aristocratic military education gradually degenerated into ephiebic physical training and finally professional sportsmanship. Isocrates rescued rhetoric from the fate of becoming vocational training.

For rhetoric to have been considered "education" and not just "training," it had to have been able to compete with Hellas' other great educational system, philosophy. Isocrates raised rhetoric to the status of an educational program; he infused the art with a system of values, a set of ideals, and a moral purpose—that of pan-Hellenism. It is ironic that that principle which Isocrates used to give new life to rhetoric died shortly after he did. Similarly, the style of oratorical eloquence and the format of teaching rhetoric had changed by the end of the fourth century B.C. So, if both the form and
content of Isocratean rhetoric vanished within decades of his death, what was his lasting contribution to the art? It was, simply, that he demonstrated that rhetoric was capable of embodying and defending the highest of social values; it was unimportant whether these values changed from age to age. It was important that rhetoric support, defend, and teach them. This was the debt antiquity owed to Isocrates.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VII

1 Other than those items of autobiographical information gleaned from Isocrates' own speeches, most of the data on the events of his life are from later sources and, therefore, must be handled with caution. The earliest such author is Dionysius of Halicarnassus; of much later dates are: Plutarch, the pseudo-Plutarch, Cicero, Philostratus, Zosimus, Suidas, and Photius.

2 Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 506. George Norlin (ed. & trans.), Isocrates (London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1928-1945), p.xii, believes that the accounts relating to the teachers of Isocrates are late and spurious. Only Gorgias, he claims, was his mentor and only Gorgias' stylistic influences can be detected in his writings. Prodicus, in fact, is named by Plutarch, Protagoras by Suidas, and Theramenes by Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

3 Plato Phaedrus 279 A. Though written at a later date, the dramatic setting of this dialogue is 410/409 B.C.

4 Isocrates Antidosis 161.

5 Plutarch Parallel Lives "Isocrates" 15.

6 Cicero Brutus xii.48.

7 Isocrates Antidosis 2 and 37.

8 Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Literary Composition "Isocrates" 19.

9 Isocrates made frequent reference to these disabilities: To Dionysius 9, Panathenaicus 9-10, To Philip 81, To the Rulers of the Mytelenaeans 7.

10 Isocrates Against the Sophists 1, 10, and 19.

12 Isocrates *Antidosis* 93 seq. and Philostratus *Lives of the Sophists* 506.

13 Athenaeus *Deipnosophistae* xiii, it was entitled "The Disciples of Isocrates."

14 Cicero *de Oratore* 94.

15 Dobson, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

16 For example: Norlin, Isocrates, p. xliii; Jebb, *Attic Orators*, vol. II, p. 31; and Dobson, Greek Orators, p. 129.

17 Norlin, *op. cit.*, p. xxix; the inscription read, "Timotheus dedicates this statue of Isocrates to the goddess of the temple, in token of his affection for the man and of his respect for his wisdom."

18 Philostratus *Lives of the Sophists* 506.

19 Isocrates *Antidosis* 4.

20 Jaeger, *Paideia*, vol. III, p. 128. This is essentially Blass' assessment of Isocrates.


25 Theodor Mommsens as quoted by Bringmann, loc. cit.

26 Pindar Isthmaean Odes v.28.

27 Herodotus History of the Persian Wars ii.49.

28 Aeschylus frag. 314.

29 Plato Republic 569 D.

30 Herodotus History of the Persian Wars i.29.

31 Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Literary Composition "isocrates" 25.

32 Isocrates Antidosis 250.

33 Cicero Tusculan Disputations v.3.9.

34 DK 22B fr. 35 and Isocrates To Alexander 2.


36 Isocrates Panathenaicus 48, Nicocles 5-6, and Antidosis 273.

37 Isocrates Antidosis 294.

38 Plato Protagoras 320 C seq.

39 Isocrates Antidosis 253 and Nicocles 5.

40 Isocrates Antidosis 254 and Nicocles 7.

41 Isocrates Evagoras 10.
42
Isocrates Antidosis 249.

43
Jebb, op. cit., p. 36 states that Isocrates' thoughts on rhetoric could be gleaned from two of his speeches: Antidosis and Against the Sophists. The former was written as a reply to an imaginary accusation brought against Isocrates of corrupting the youth of the city, which gave him a chance to answer his critics. The inspiration obviously comes from Plato's Apology. Against the Sophists, Jebb claims, contains what Isocrates' rhetoric is not, and the Antidosis what it is. Jaeger regarded Against the Sophists as a direct reply to Plato's Gorgias, see Jaeger, Paideia, vol. III, p. 58.

44
Isocrates Against the Sophists 1.

45
Ibid., 9.

46
Ibid., 3.

47
Isocrates Antidosis 84.

48
Isocrates Helen 7.

49
Ibid., 1.

50
Isocrates Against the Sophists 1.

51
Isocrates Helen 4.

52
Isocrates Antidosis 266. Mathematics and the sciences Isocrates regarded, as did Plato, as propaideutics to the study of philosophy.

53
Ibid., 268.

54
Ibid., 203.

55
Isocrates Panathenaicus 9.
56 Isocrates To Demonicus 1.

57 Isocrates To Demonicus, To Nicocles, and The Cyprians, for example.

58 Isocrates Against the Sophists 12.

59 Ibid., 9.

60 Isocrates Antidosis 274.

61 Ibid., 279 seq.

62 Ibid., 183.

63 Ibid., 271 and To Alexander 4.

64 Isocrates Against the Sophists 15.

65 Isocrates Panathenaicus 30-32.


67 Ibid., p. 51.

68 This was exactly Plato's intention in forming his school, hence the reason for the competition in ancient times between philosophy and rhetoric. See above, p. 8.

69 His most famous works in this respect are: Antidosis, Panathenaicus, Panegyricus, and Areopagiticus.

70 Isocrates Panathenaicus 2.

71 Isocrates Antidosis 18-19.

72 Ibid., 23.
Ibid., 313.

Isocrates To Philip 129.

Isocrates On the Peace 5 and 10.

Ibid., 52 seq.

Ibid., 13, translation by George Norlin, op. cit.

Kessler, Isokrates, p. 31.


Isocrates Areopagiticus 16.

Ibid., 37.

Jaeger, Paideia, vol. III, p. 119. As Isocrates expected, this plan raised cries of treason from the radical demagogues, accusations which Isocrates sought to ward off by denying charges of a conservative plot (Areopagiticus 59) and by proclaiming his democratic sympathies (Areopagiticus 70).

Isocrates Archidamus 15, Antidosis 3 and 17, Panathenaicus 15, Panegyricus 4, Nicocles 39, and Cyprians 10.

Isocrates' pan-Hellenism has traditionally been treated, unfortunately, in exactly this manner; see, for example, Kessler, Brinmann, and Dobesch. While this approach is not thoroughly incorrect, it does not give a complete picture and does not allow for the true significance of Isocrates' activities.

Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 505 mentioned that it was a common accusation against Isocrates that he had plagiarized Gorgias' speeches on this particular topic.
On this last point see Isocrates Panegyricus 116.

Isocrates Panathenaicus 158 and 160 seq.

Ibid., 160 and Panegyricus 124, with particular reference to Sparta, Panegyricus 122, with particular reference to Thebes, Archidamus 27.

Isocrates Panegyricus 137 and To Philip 101 and 124.

Isocrates Panathenaicus 140 seq.

Isocrates To Philip 30.

Kessler, Isokrates, p. 8.

Baynes, op. cit., p. 145.

Isocrates On the Peace 21.

Kessler, Isokrates, p. 18.

See above, p. 70.

Kessler, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

See above, p. 154.

Isocrates Panathenaicus 35 seq. and Panegyricus 20-48.

Isocrates Panathenaicus 52.

Isocrates Panegyricus 66 and 103, Panathenaicus 45 and 152, and Archidamus 42.

See above, p. 162.
103 Isocrates Panathenaicus 70 seq. and Panegyricus 100 seq.

104 Kessler, op. cit., p. 46.

105 Ibid., p. 47 and Isocrates Nicolaes and To Philip.

106 Baynes, op. cit., p. 156.

107 Kessler, op. cit., p. 54.

108 Ibid., p. 74 seq.

109 Dobson, op. cit., p. 145.

1. The adornment for the city is bravery, for the body, beauty, and for the soul, wisdom, and for action, excellence, and for speech, truth. And those things opposed to these are offensive. It is necessary to honor with praise a man and a woman and a speech and a deed and a city and an action which are worthy of praise, and on the unworthy to place blame. For it is both a fault and a mistake to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.

2. And it rests upon the same man to speak rightly and to refute those blaming Helen, a woman, on account of whom it is unanimously and in one spirit agreed, has come both the belief of the poets telling (about her) and the fame of her name, which has become a symbol of those events. I, however, wish to give a logical account (opposed to that which) maligns her, to end her blame, and to expose those falsely accusing her, and to show the truth, to put an end to ignorance.

3. Now then, first, by nature and by birth (the account) of those eminent men and women (from whom is descended) the woman about whom this speech is concerned, is unknown but to a few. Known because her mother was Leda, and her father a god, though said to be a mortal: Tyndareus and Zeus, the former because he believed himself to be (the father), and the latter
because he proclaimed himself so. And the one was the most powerful amongst men and the other the lord of all things.

4. And having been born from such as these, she had a beauty equal to a god's which she displayed and did not hide; she instilled in many (persons) many passions of love. And with one body she gathered together many bodies of proud men, of whom some had an immensity of wealth, and others the prestige of hallowed good-birth, others the fitness of personal strength, and still others had the force of learned wisdom. And everyone came (to her) out of love and the desire for invincible fame.

5. Whoever, then, because of this (love) and in such a manner, taking Helen, sailed away, I do not speak. For to recount to those who already know what happened those same events, brings belief, but does not bring enjoyment. In this speech, omitting the (events of) the time back then, I will proceed to the beginning of the argument, and I will go to the causes on which account the departure of Helen for Troy came about.

6. For either by the wish of Fortune or by the command of the gods or by the decision of Necessity, happened those things which came to pass; either she was seduced by violence or persuaded by words. If now, on the one hand, for the first reason, she (Fortune) is to be blamed, who is (always) being blamed, for it is impossible to forestall the wish of a god by human
forethought. For it is natural that the stronger not be for-
estalled by the weaker, but that the weaker be ruled and led
by the stronger, and that the stronger lead and the weaker fol-
low. And the gods are stronger than mortals both in force and
in wisdom and in other things. If now one must ascribe blame
to Fortune and the gods, one must then absolve Helen of the
infamy.

7. And if she had been carried off by force and illegally
constrained and unjustly outraged, it is clear that, on the
one hand, he who raped her, in so far as he maltreated her,
committed an injustice, whereas she who was raped, insofar as
she was maltreated, fell into misfortune. The barbarian who
attempted barbaric actions is culpable by law in speech and in
action—by law for having committed dishonor, in speech for
having been the instigation, in action for having brought about
the damage. Whereas she, having been constrained and having
been taken from her fatherland and having been bereaved of
her loved ones, how can she not be reasonably pitied rather
than maligned? For he has perpetrated evil things, she but
submitted; it is just, then, to pity her and to hate him.

8. And if speech persuaded and deceived her soul, neither on
this account is it difficult to speak in her defense and to
free her from blame—indeed, in this manner: speech is a great sover-
eign who, with the smallest and invisible body, accomplishes
godlike deeds; for it can put an end to fear and ease pain and
instill joy and increase compassion. And how it can do these things, I will demonstrate.

9. And it is necessary to demonstrate this to the belief of the listeners. I believe and call all poetry "speech having measure." Into those having heard it there enters dreadful fear and tearful compassion and mournful desire. And through the medium of speech the mind experiences its own condition in regards to the misfortunes and fortunes of other events and people. To be sure, I must proceed from one argument to the next.

10. For those possessed (and) enchanted by speech, there comes a bringing on of pleasure and an aversion to pain, for the power of enchantment, by associating with the opinion of the soul, beguiles and persuades and transforms her (the soul) by craftiness. Two techniques are found in craftiness and magic; they are: corruptions of the soul and deceptions of belief.

11. So many have persuaded so many regarding these things, and (they) have been persuaded by the fabrication of false arguments. For if everyone had memory in regards to all these things—of things gone by and knew of those things in the present and foresaw those things about to happen—speech would not, as now, deceive with the same devices. Presently there is nothing with which to record easily the past or to
observe the present or to divine the future. So that concerning most things, most people today give opinion as an advisor to the soul. And opinion, being precarious and unreliable, snares those using it in precarious and unreliable misfortunes.

12. What fault, then, does not allow that in a similar manner praise influenced Helen, when (she was) no longer young, just as if she were seduced by violence? For the force of persuasion, from which comes this (way of) thought about her, and, to be sure by necessity, is not reproachful and does have the power to persuade her. For the speech which persuades the soul persuaded her; it forced her to be persuaded by what was being said and to consent to what was being done. And so then, he who was persuading, in so far as he was forcing, deals an injustice, whereas she who was persuaded, insofar as she was compelled by words, gains a bad reputation.

13. And so that persuasion, to move forward logically, warps the soul just as it pleases; it is necessary, first, to learn the ways of the meteorologists who, changing one opinion for another and producing another opinion, make the faithless and untrustworthy appear (true) to the eyes of belief; secondly, the ways of those engaged in a debate, among whom one word, having been composed in an artful manner, changes and persuades an entire crowd, not having been spoken in truth; and third, the contentions of the philosophers, in which are displayed speedy wits insofar as they can bring about a change of belief
for opinion.

14. Both the power of words towards the disposition of the soul and the prescription of medicine towards the nature of the body have the same (type of) force. For just as some medicines drive some humors from the body and some put an end to disease and some to life, so too, words; (there are those) which cause pain, some which produce pleasure, others which strike fear, and still others which place the listeners in a (state of) courageousness, and, finally, those persuasive ones which poison and corrupt the soul with evil.

15. And so that if, on the one hand, she had been persuaded by speech, she did not violate justice, but fell into misfortune—as was shown; I will counter the fourth cause with a fourth argument. For if Love⁶ was doing these things, there is no difficulty in her escaping the blame of the accusation of bringing about these disasters. For we see things not to have the nature which we desire, but that which happens to be peculiar to each, and through vision the soul is warped even in its character.

16. For immediately, whenever the eyes see the visage of an enemy and an unfriendly armament of bronze or iron, the one of defense, the other of offense, the soul is disturbed and upset; just as often, though there are no dangers in what will pass, some people flee panic-stricken. For strong is
the truth of the argument dwelling in us through which fear, which comes from the eyes, so desiring, causes the neglect of the custom through which comes a judgment (about what is) good and the good things which come from victory.

17. And, to be sure, certain ones, seeing fear, succumb to the moment in which they are thinking. In such a manner, fear extinguishes and annihilates intelligence. And many are involved in useless pursuits, dreadful diseases, incurable insanities; in such a way does vision impress upon the mind images of those things seen. And many frightening things are felt aside, and those things which are left aside are the same things which are spoken.

18. But, to be sure, whenever those drawing create, finally, one body and one figure from many colors and shapes, they give pleasure to the eyes; and the fashioning of human things and the activity of statue-making present a divine delight to the eyes. Likewise, somethings which cause pain and some which cause desire flee from the eyes. And many other things produce in many the loves and desires of many things and many persons.

19. If, then, Helen's eyes were delighted by the body of Alexander and produced desire and conflict in her soul, what is to be wondered at? Who, if Love is a god, being less powerful, is able to repel or ward off such a divine power of the
gods? And if it is a human failing and ignorance of the soul, it must not be blamed as a fault, but be thought of as a misfortune; for it happened as it happened by the snares of Fortune, not by the wishes of thought and by the necessities of Love, not by the machinations of art.

20. How, then, is it possible to believe the reproach of Helen (to be) justified, who was either seduced or persuaded by words or taken by force or was compelled by divine constraint, did what she did, in all cases, escapes reproach?

21. In this speech I have done away with the infamy of the woman and fulfilled the stipulation which I set forth in the beginning of the speech; I have attempted to free (her) of the injustice of the charges and of the ignorance of opinion. I had wished to write a speech about Helen as, on the one hand, an encomium and, on the other hand, as a personal diversion.
1 The text used for this translation is DK 82B fr. 11. Again, as in the translation of the Dissoi Logoi, the punctuation is more faithful to the Greek than to the English rules of grammar, serving more as an aid to the delivery of the speech.

2 Π'στις, meaning precisely a state of conviction brought about in the listener by the force of the persuasion of speech.

3 Δικτα, opinion.

4 Ψυχή, see footnote 36 page 87.

5 The mention of the meteorologists is a reference to the pre-Socratic philosophers whom their fellow Greeks regarded as idle observers of the natural phenomena.

6 Eros, the god of love.
APPENDIX B

GORGIAS' PALAMEDES' DEFENSE OF HIMSELF

1. Neither the accusation nor the defense is a decision concerned with death, for Nature has voted death, with an open cast of the pebble, for all mortals on the very day on which one is born. But about honor and dishonor there is a problem: whether it is necessary for me to die justly or to die violently with the greatest disgrace and reproach.

2. There, then, being two such cases, under one you have all power, under the other I, of the one I have justice, of the other you have force. You are able to kill me easily, if you wish; you have that such power of which I have none.

3. "If now the accuser, Odysseus, either clearly knows that I have betrayed Hellas to the barbarians or opines that somehow these things are so and made the accusation through goodwill towards the Greeks, he would be the best of men. And why not? he who saves the fatherland, the ancestors, all Hellas, still punishing on their behalf the unjust man. And if in jealousy or intrigue or in knavery he concocted this accusation, he is the worst of men on this account.

4. Where do I begin regarding these things? What do I say first? To which of the defenses should I turn? For an accusation unable to be proved creates visible consternation, on
which account, one is necessarily at a loss in one's speech, unless I learn something of the truth and contingencies of the present situation by finding teachers who are more venturesome and resourceful.

5. So that now, not clearly knowing, the accuser accuses me, (this) I know. I know quite clearly that I had not done these things; neither do I know in what manner anyone could know about that which did not happen. And if by thinking these things to be so he made the accusation, I will show you in two ways that he does not speak the truth. For neither having wished was I able nor being able have I wished to attempt such things.

6. To this I bring the first argument: how I am unable to do this. For it was necessary, first, that there be a beginning of treason, and the beginning has to be by speech. For it is necessary for the event to come about for there to be a communication first. And how can communication come about without there being a meeting. But in what manner could a meeting have taken place, without either they having sent someone to me or I having gone to them? For a message by letter does not go without someone carrying it.

7. But, surely, this became possible by speech. And, surely, therefore, I was with him and he with me—in what manner? Who being with whom? A Greek with a barbarian? How listening and
speaking? One to one? But we do not know thw language of the other. But with an interpreter? Then there becomes a third witness of the things that had to be done in secret.

8. But (concede) that this came about, although it did not. It was necessary with them to give an assurance and be given (one). Now what would the assurance be? An oath? Who, then, would be likely to trust me, a traitor? Perhaps hostages (as an assurance)? Who? I could have given my brother—for I have no other—and the barbarian certain of his sons, for such would be the greatest assurance to me from him and for him from me. And had these things transpired, it would be obvious to you all.

9. One might say that we secured the compact with money, he giving and I taking. (Was this done) then, with a little money? But it is not reasonable to receive a little money for a great service. But with alot of money? What then was the conveyance? How could one man convey it? Or many? If many were conveying it, many would have been witness to the scheme, and if only one had conveyed it, there would not have been much which he carried.

10. And was it transported by day or by night? But at night there (would have been) many and frequent guards, on account of whom, it would not have been possible to escape detection. But by day? But, then, daylight militates against such doings.
But concede this. And I leaving (here) received (it) or he, carrying it, entered (here)? Both are impossible. And how, then, taking it would I hide it from those within and from those without? And where would I put it? And how would I guard it? And by using it I would have become obvious, and by not using it, what would I have gained from it?

11. And, to be sure, therefore, let be those things which did not happen. We met, we spoke, we listened, I took the money from him, taking it I escaped detection, I hid it. Surely, it would have been necessary to do this, on account of which these things came to pass. Therefore, this would be even more impossible than the things said already. For in doing this, I did it myself or with others? But it is not the deed of a single man. Then, with others? With whom? Clearly with conspirators. But are they freemen or slaves? But, on the one hand, I deal with you freemen. Who, then, of you shares the knowledge of the treason? Speak. On the other hand, with slaves, how (can one deal with them) in faith?—these, aroused by (thoughts of) freedom or under pressure, willingly accused me.

12. And how did this venture come about? Clearly it was necessary that enemies, more powerful than you, be brought into the camp; the very thing is impossible. How would I have brought them in? Through the gates? But I (am not able) to shut or open them, for the commanders are lords over these.
But over the walls by means of a ladder? Would I, then, not have been seen? All (the walls) are full of guards. But by breaking through the wall? This would have been visible to everyone. For camp life is open to full view amongst the soldiers, among whom everyone sees everything and everyone is seen by everyone. And, therefore, in every way all these things were completely impossible for me to do.

13. Consider, together, also this. On what account was I led to wish to do these things, if I was the most able to do so? For no one wishes, at one's own cost, to risk the greatest dangers nor to be the worst in the greatest evils. But on account of what? (And again I return to this,) to rule? (Rule) over you or the barbarians? But over you, so great and so illustrious, it is impossible, amongst whom everything is the greatest: the virtues of the ancestors, abundance of wealth, prowess, courage of spirit, rule of the cities.

14. But over the barbarians? And who will hand it over? And with what sort of power will I take charge of these, a Greek over barbarians, being one over many? Having persuaded or forced them? For neither would they have been willing to be persuaded nor I have been able to force them. But each willingly exchanging with each equally, exchanging the pay for base treachery? But, certainly, it is of the greatest folly to both trust and to receive trust, for who would prefer slavery to kingship, the worst to the most powerful?
15. One might say that, having been enamoured with riches and wealth, I attempted this venture. But, for one, I now possess wealth in measure, and neither do I need much; for requiring much money are those who spend much money, but not those who are more powerful than the pleasures of Nature, but those who are always slaves to pleasure and who seek to gain prestige from riches and magnificence. And of these things none pertain to me. And as I speak the truth, I have beside me my past life as a faithful witness, and you were witnesses to the witness, for you lived with me; therefore, you knew all these things.

16. And, really, on account of honor a man would not attempt such actions, even one of a mediocre intelligence. For respect comes from virtue and not from evil. How can respect come to a man who betrays the Greeks? And, in addition to all these things, I was not wanting in respect, for I was respected by those most respected in the matters of greatest respect, (i.e.,) by you for wisdom.

17. And neither for safety would one have done these things. For the traitor is an enemy to all: to law, to justice, to the gods, to the crowds of men; for he oversteps the law and breaks down justice and he destroys the people and he dishonors the gods. And for him such a life, on account of the greatest risks, has no security.
18. But, then, wishing to help friends or to harm enemies? And on this account some might commit an injustice. But for me, everything has happened the opposite; I have harmed my friends and helped my enemies. The deed, to be sure, produced no good advantage. Neither does one act villainously in order to suffer badly.

19. And this is what remains, whether I did this to escape some fear or evil or danger. But, in regard to this, no one would be able to say what (fear, etc.) pertains to me. For on account of these two things everyone does everything: either to pursue advantage or to escape penalty; whatever of these things are done villainously, beyond these motives, is sheer madness. By doing these things, I have done myself ill, is no secret. For by betraying Greece, I betrayed myself, my parents, loved ones, the dignity of my ancestors, ancestral tombs, temples, the fatherland, the greatest of Greece. And the things which are of the greatest value, I would have delivered to the unjust.

20. And consider this also. How would life be bearable for me, having done these things? For where would I be able to turn? To Greece? To suffer punishment from those who were wronged? Who of those who had suffered wrong would keep from (harming) me? But to remain among the barbarians? After having abandoned all the greatest men, having been deprived of the most beautiful honor, living in shameful dishonor,
having cast aside the efforts by which I strove for excellence in the past? And these (lost) on my own account, which is the worst thing for a man: to fall into misfortune on his own account.

21. Neither would I have been in a trustworthy position with regards to the barbarians. How indeed? They having associated in this faithless act with me, having delivered friends over to enemies. And life is not bearable to one deprived of trust. For one could make good a loss of money or deprivation of his power or expulsion from the homeland, but he who loses trust would never be able to regain it. So that, then, neither being able could I have wished nor wished have been able to betray Greece, by reason of the arguments laid out.

22. And I wish, after having (said) these things, to debate with my accusor. What then, persuaded you, being such as you are, to accuse such a one (as myself)?\(^5\) For it is worthwhile to learn of what nature you are that you say such things, as if an unworthy were speaking to another unworthy. For do you accuse me either knowing for sure\(^6\) or by conjecture.\(^7\) For, if with knowledge, you know by seeing or by taking part or learning from one who took part. If you did see, reveal to these men the method, the place, the time, when where, how you saw it; if you took part, you are liable to the same accusations; and if you heard from an accomplice, whoever he is, let him come forth himself, appear, give witness. For in this
manner, the attested charge will be more trustworthy. Since now, in fact, no one of us produces a witness.

23. You will say, perhaps, it to be the same for you not to produce witnesses for what happened and for me (to produce witnesses) for what did not happen. But it is not the same. For those things which did not happen it is not possible, in any way, for there to be witnesses; but for those things which did happen, it is possible, in any way, for there to be witnesses; but for those things which did happen, not only is it not impossible, but even easy, not only easy, but even necessary (to produce witnesses), but you were not only not able to produce witnesses, but even to find false witnesses; and for me it is possible to find neither type.

24. And so you do not know of what you accuse me, it seems; for the rest, though not knowing, you conjectured. Therefore, oh, most shameless of men, having trusted in your reputation, the most unreliable of things, not knowing the truth, you dare to prosecute a man with the death penalty? What do you know about such a man committing such a deed? But, surely, to conjecture about everything is common to everyone, and, in such a case, you are no wiser than anyone else. But neither is it necessary to trust those with opinions, but only those with knowledge, nor to believe opinion to be more trustworthy than truth, but, to the contrary, truth more so than opinion. 8

25. And you accused me on two accounts which are opposed,
cleverness and madness, which are not able to exist in the same person. For, on the one hand, when you say I am crafty and capable and resourceful, you accuse me of cleverness. But when you say that I betrayed Greece, (you accuse me) of madness, for madness is to attempt things that are impossible, prejudicial, evil, by which one harms his friends and aids his enemies and makes his own life disgraceful and perilous. And yet, how is it possible to trust such a man who, saying the same things to the same people about the same subjects, means the opposite?

26. And I would have liked to learn from you whether you regard the wise man as foolish or intelligent. For if foolish, the argument is quite novel, but not the truth; and if intelligent, it is not, clearly, like the wise to commit impieties and prefer the worst when better is at hand. If, then, I am wise, I did not err, and if I erred, I am not wise. On either account, then, you are wrong.

27. Though I am able to counteraccuse you, having committed many and great and old and new crimes, I do not want to; for I do wish to be acquitted of this charge not by your evils but by my merits. These things, then, are for you.

28. As for you, oh men (sitting in) judgment, I wish to speak concerning myself, (which might be) looked upon with jealousy, but it is the truth, things not fitting to one accusing but to one accused. For now, amongst you I attempt to give an examina-
tion and an account of my past life. Therefore, I beg of you, if I remind you of the good actions of mine, that no one begrudge the things I say, but consider it necessary that one accused of serious false charges say also something of the good things among you who know. Such is most pleasant for me.

29. First, then, and second and most of all, continually, from the beginning to the end, has my past life been free from censure, free from all taints; for no one could lay any true charge of evil before you against me. And, in fact, the accusor himself has not mentioned any proof of the things which he has mentioned. Thus, his discourse is an abuse without proof.

30. And, I could say, having said so I would not have lied nor have been refuted; I was not only blameless but also a great benefit to you and to the Greeks, and to all men, not only those now living, but also those to be. For who could make human life resourceful out of a lack of resources? Ordered from disorder? (I have made human life resourceful) by discovering: military tactics, greatest in their advantage; written laws, as guardians of justice; letters, the mnemonic device; measures and weights, the easy interchangers of transactions; beacons, the most powerful and quickest of signals; draughts, a painless pasttime of leisure. On whose account, then, do I recall these things to you?

31. On the one hand, I am making it evident that I give my
attention to these things and, thereby, giving an indication that I shun ignoble and evil deeds. For it is impossible that one turning his mind to such salutary matters should attend to evil things. I am worthy, then, if in no way I harmed you that I myself should not be harmed by you.

32. And in no way am I worthy to suffer badly on account of other actions, neither at the hands of the young nor the old. For, on the one hand, I am harmless to the elders, and, on the other, not without benefice to the young. Of those of good fortune I am not envious; I am compassionate towards those of misfortune, neither despising poverty nor honoring wealth more than virtue, but virtue more than wealth; neither (am I) useless in council nor lazy in battle, doing what is commanded, obeying the leaders. But not for me to praise myself, but the present situation demands that these accusations be completely refuted.

33. And, last, my speech is about you to you, and after saying this, I will end my defense. For compassion and supplications and entreaties of friends are helpful, when the judgment is with the mob; among you, seeming and being the best among the Greeks, not with cries of friends nor supplications nor compassionate pleas is it necessary to convince you, but with the clearest justice, by showing the truth--it is not necessary for me to deceive in order to escape these charges.

34. And it is necessary that you turn your minds not to the
words but to the deeds, neither to prefer the charges to the evidence, nor to believe that a short time rather than a long time to be a wiser judge (of the situation), nor think that slander is more trustworthy than a trial. For, in regards to all things, it is of the good man to guard against error in those things which are irreparable more than in those things which can be mended; for these things, by forethought, are able to be (prevented), by afterthought they are incurable. It is one of these things when men condemn a man to death. Now it is the same for you.

35. If, then, it was possible through words the truth of deeds to become to the hearers clear and apparent, surely a decision would be easy from the things said; but since it is not so, (I ask of you) to safeguard my person, wait a longer period of time, and with the truth to make the decision. For the danger is great for you of being judged as unjust men, to strike down a good reputation and gain an evil one. And to good men death is preferable to dishonorable reputation; for the one is the end of life, the other a disease of life.

36. And if you should unjustly put me to death, it will be apparent to many, for I am not unknown; your evil deed will become known to all the Greeks. And you, and not the accusor, will bear the blame for the injustice, for in your hands is the goal of justice. There would not be a crime greater then this. For not only against me and my parents will you have erred,
dispensing justice unjustly, but against yourselves for having become part to a terrible, godless, unjust, lawless act, killing an ally, useful to you, a benefactor to Greece; Greeks killing a Greek, having shown no evidence of crime and no sure cause.

37. My reasons are stated and I stop. For to recall at length things said briefly has some logic with regards to those jurors of small ability, but to the foremost of the foremost, Greeks of Greeks, it is not fitting to ask of you to pay attention or to remember what was said.
The text used for this translation is DK 82b fr. 11a. As in the translations of the Dissoi Logoi and the Encomium on Helen, the punctuation is more faithful to the Greek rather than the English rules of grammar, serving more as an aid in the delivery of the speech.

2. ἐπιστάμενος.

3. δοξάζων.

4. The text is corrupt and the meaning of the passage is, therefore, uncertain.

5. The meaning of the sentence is uncertain.

6. εἰ δὲ ἢκριβῶς.

7. δοξάζων.

8. "Truth" is meant to be understood in the sense of information gained from direct sensory perception; Gorgias is not speaking of an absolute truth.
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