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THE BALKAN POLICY OF COUNT GYULA ANDRASSY

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THE BALKAN POLICY OF
COUNT GYULA ANDRÁSSY

by

CHARLES K. BURNS, JR.

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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May, 1980
ABSTRACT

THE BALKAN POLICY OF COUNT GYULA ANDRÁSSY

by

Charles Burns

The thirty years from 1848 to 1878 witnessed several events which significantly affected the history of the Habsburg empire. This period saw the Habsburgs deprived of their hegemony in Germany and dispossessed of their Italian provinces. The demonstrable weakness of the Austrian state resulted in a major change in its form of government in 1867, with the result that the Hungarian half of the realm achieved a large voice in determining the country's foreign policy.

One result of the Magyars' enhanced influence on foreign policy was the appointment of Count Gyula Andrásy as foreign minister in late 1871. Andrásy brought to office a distinctly Magyar point of view about the Dual Monarchy's proper foreign policy: he was anti-Russian and pro-Turkish, favored the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, and was resolved to protect the Dual Monarchy's prestige as a Great Power in order to maintain the Magyars' privileged position within Austria-Hungary. He regarded Russia as the greatest danger to his countrymen's favorable
status.

Initially Andrássy sought to combat the Russian menace by forming an alliance with Germany or Great Britain against Russia; however, when he was unable to do that, he chose to cooperate with Russia in an effort to moderate any ambitious schemes which St. Petersburg might envision. Andrássy's tactics succeeded admirably until the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 when the Russians' sympathies for their fellow Slavs put increasing pressure on St. Petersburg to take action in the Balkans.

Andrássy was able to retain the initiative in Balkan diplomacy until late 1876. Then, when it became apparent that Russia was on the verge of war against Turkey and that Austria-Hungary would not resort to military actions to prevent that conflict. He negotiated the Budapest Conventions, which safeguarded Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests by limiting Russia's gains in southeastern Europe and by ensuring that the Dual Monarchy acquired Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, at the end of the Russo-Turkish War, St. Petersburg did not honor its pledges to Vienna. The Treaty of San Stefano, imposed by Russia on Turkey, posed a real threat to Austria-Hungary's continued existence as a Great Power since it deprived the Dual Monarchy of Bosnia-Hercegovina and established a large Bulgarian state which would have dominated the Balkans.

Andrássy recognized the danger which the Treaty of San Stefano posed to the Dual Monarchy and strove to negate that
treaty. Ultimately it was set aside by the Congress of Berlin, and the territorial changes resulting from the Russo-Turkish War were adjusted in a manner favorable to Austria-Hungary. While the Dual Monarchy did make gains as a result of the Congress of Berlin, those advantages cannot be attributed primarily to Andrássy's policy. They were due far more to the facts that British and Austro-Hungarian Balkan interests largely coincided and that Russia retreated before the threat of British military action than to anything done by Andrássy who, because of his country's weakness and irresolution, saw himself forced to play a passive and impotent role by the end of the Balkan crisis.
PREFACE

"We have the East to thank for opium smoking, hashish use, and the Eastern Question. All these have the common property of rendering extraordinarily stupid those individuals who are involved with them for a long time."

--Daniel Spitzer, Vienna journalist, June 4, 1876.

It is the belief of many historians that the First World War was both one of the most cataclysmic events of the past few centuries and the direct antecedent of many of the problems, issues, and attitudes of our contemporary society. While historians will probably never reach a consensus on an order of priority for the underlying causes of World War I, they do generally agree that the direct cause of the war was the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914. That act was the result of the bitter rivalry between Serbia and Austria-Hungary and a reflection of the mortal threat which Serbia posed to the Dual Monarchy. In a larger sense, the enmity between Austria-Hungary and Serbia can be ascribed

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to Serbia's aggressive policy towards Austria-Hungary—a course of action which was fueled by visions of a "greater Serbia" and by Serbian nationalism. Serbian nationalism, in turn, exerted a powerful attraction on the Serbs of Austria-Hungary, thereby creating a force which threatened the very existence of the Dual Monarchy and forced it to adopt an attitude hostile to Serbia.

While it is difficult to select a definitive starting point for the problems which Austria-Hungary faced in the Balkans and which ultimately led to World War I, to this writer it appears that many of the conflicting interests which precipitated World War I stemmed from the Near Eastern crisis of 1875-1878. Twice during that period the Serbs' nationalistic aspirations and traditional hatred of the Turks led the principality to wage war against the Ottoman empire. In the second instance the Serbs were successful in conquering a substantial area formerly under Turkish rule. However, the Serbian conquest, and eventual territorial enlargement, lay to the southeast of the principality. At no time during the crisis did Belgrade feel able to expand towards the west into Bosnia-Hercegovina, despite the facts that those provinces were populated by oppressed fellow Slavs, were the starting point of the disturbances, and were subject to tenuous control by Constantinople. Austria-Hungary prevented Serbia from occupying Bosnia-Hercegovina because the Dual
Monarchy felt it was essential to maintain control over Bosnia-Hercegovina and the sanjak of Novi Pazar in order to protect Dalmatia, to prevent the establishment of a common border between Serbia and Montenegro, to hold open a route towards Salonika, and to forestall the establishment of a large Slavic state on the Dual Monarchy's borders. As a result of the Congress of Berlin, which ended the 1875-1878 crisis, Serbia was excluded from an area which it coveted and was forced to look towards the south—towards Macedonia which was not predominantly Serbian in population and which was not likely to respond positively to Belgrade's overtures—if it hoped to enlarge its territory.

When, in 1908, Vienna ended the charade of Turkish sovereignty over Bosnia-Hercegovina by annexing the provinces outright, it also suppressed completely any hope of obtaining the area which Serbia might have entertained, however unrealistically. The Dual Monarchy's action was viewed in Belgrade as a blow both to Serbia's nationalistic hopes and to its pride. Both the Serbs and their Russian protectors were enraged by Vienna's annexation, and there was a serious and prolonged threat of war between Serbia and Russia and the Dual Monarchy. In the end hostilities were avoided because the two Slavic nations backed down from a military confrontation with Austria-Hungary and its ally Germany; however, with their pride
stung and their prestige tarnished by the outcome of the annexation crisis, Serbia and Russia resolved not to give way similarly in the future.

In their attempt to prevent Austro-Hungarian diplomatic triumphs after 1908, Russia and Serbia sponsored a league of Balkan states which they hoped would be strong enough to blunt the Dual Monarchy's efforts to control affairs in southeastern Europe. Although St. Peters burg intended the Balkan League to be primarily anti-Austro-Hungarian in outlook, the Balkan states themselves quickly utilized their alliance to rid the peninsula of Turkish control in the First Balkan War of 1912.

As a result of Serbia's victories in the First and Second Balkan Wars, Serbian patriotism was inflamed to a fever pitch. The accession to power of the ambitious, aggressive, anti-Habsburg Karageorgevich dynasty in 1903, coupled with the increase in Serbian chauvinism, territory, and strength as a result of the Balkan Wars posed a mortal threat to the Dual Monarchy. For many years Serbian nationalism had exerted a powerful attraction on the Serbs of Austria-Hungary and had, thereby, threatened the very existence of the Dual Monarchy. Now, after Belgrade's triumphs in 1912 and 1913, the force of attraction was even stronger, and Vienna was compelled to adopt an attitude more hostile towards Serbia than had previously been the case.
The enmity between Austria-Hungary and Serbia reached the point of no return with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in June, 1914. Once again the Bosnian issue was at the heart of the affair. The assassins were a group of anti-Habsburg Bosnian patriots who had been trained and armed in Serbia and who had received the assistance of influential Serbian citizens in planning their attempt on the archduke's life. While the Austro-Hungarian government had no evidence of the Serbian government's complicity in the assassination, Vienna did recognize quite clearly that the murder in Sarajevo offered it the possibility of ridding itself of the threat which Serbia posed to the continued existence of the Dual Monarchy. From there it was a short step to World War I.

If, then, the world war which led to the demise of the Habsburg empire, the collapse of Europe's dominating position in the world, and the rise of many forces which influence our own lives today resulted primarily from Balkan problems and rivalries, particularly those involving Austria-Hungary and Bosnia-Hercegovina, it should be of interest to examine the Balkan policy of Count Gyula Andrássy, the foreign minister responsible for bringing Bosnia-Hercegovina under Austro-Hungarian control in 1878. The primary purpose of this work is to determine what Andrássy and his government wanted to
accomplish in the Balkans, to see how they went about trying to achieve these goals, and to see how events modified the Dual Monarchy's aspirations. The particular focus of the research was the question constantly in the back of the researcher's mind: Could Andrásy or Austria-Hungary have pursued an alternative policy or taken actions different from those which were taken and thereby forestalled or postponed World War I?

In view of the course of events from 1878 to 1914, one might infer that Austria-Hungary would have been better off to have followed a different course of action in the Balkans during the period when Andrásy was in office. Two alternative possibilities come to mind immediately in regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina: either Austria-Hungary could have made concessions to Serbia in that area in an effort to placate Belgrade; or, the Dual Monarchy could have settled the provinces' status by annexing them outright in 1878, thereby avoiding some of the problems which arose thirty years later.

Although Andrásy did oversee the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878, his preferred Balkan policy certainly did not include that action—either de facto or de jure. We shall see during the course of this work what he did regard as Austria-Hungary's proper policy vis-a-vis the Balkans, and how he tried to implement that
policy. We shall also witness how Andrássy's ability to put his policy into practice was steadily diminished by events over which he had only modest control at best until ultimately he became scarcely more than a lowly pawn in the diplomatic chess game. Andrássy's inability to take actions which both he and the emperor were utterly convinced were vital to the Dual Monarchy's continued existence as a Great Power and as a nation is a serious indictment of Austria-Hungary's leaders and system of government and an indication of the level of decline to which the Habsburg monarchy had sunk by the late 1870's.

No one can complete an undertaking of this kind without the encouragement and assistance of many people. My greatest debt of gratitude goes to Dr. R. John Rath who was unfailingly patient and considerate in providing the guidance and suggestions needed to bring this work to completion. I would also like to thank the members of the History Department of Rice University for their assistance and support; I am particularly grateful to Dr. Gale Stokes for the example and encouragement which he provided. I am indebted to the staffs of the Fondren Library of Rice University and the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and the Kriegsarchiv of Vienna for their courteous assistance. Special thanks go to Dr. Horst Brettler-Messer and Frau Erika Wollmann of Vienna for helping to make my stay there
both rewarding and pleasant. Finally, I must express my deepest gratitude to my family, without whose patience, support, and understanding this work could not have been completed.
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CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN GREAT POWERS
ABOUT 1870

"Does Austria-Hungary, today a constitutional monarchy, wish to remain a Great Power as its predecessor the absolutist Austria was—will it take up that inheritance? Yes or no?"

--Andrássy, March 21, 1878

"It has been suggested often enough that the Monarchy does nothing in its own interests and only lurks waiting for a crumb to fall."

--Andrássy, April 28, 1878

Andrássy's Balkan policy did not exist in a vacuum and cannot be separated from the broader context of European Great Power diplomacy. Indeed, Andrássy became foreign minister precisely because of momentous changes in the continental diplomatic configuration, and throughout his ministry he saw his attempts to implement his Balkan policy impinged on by the Powers' broader, European-wide interests. Therefore, before we begin an examination

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1From a speech by Andrássy as found in Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) (hereafter cited as "Staatsarchiv [Vienna]"), Politisches Archiv, Section XI, Carton CCCXVI, Fo. 51.

2Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of April 28, 1878, ibid., Carton CCXC, Fo. 1,228.
of Andrássy's Balkan policy it is necessary to place that policy in its European context by means of a brief review of the diplomatic situation about the time Andrássy took office.  

The year 1871 witnessed two related events which had a tremendous effect on European diplomacy. The creation of a unified German state in January and the smashing defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War meant that for the first time in modern history Europe found its usual geopolitical situation reversed. No longer was there a weak and divided center surrounded by strong peripheral states; the new nation in the heart of Europe was undeniably the strongest. The successes of Prussian arms against Austria-Hungary and France and the realization of Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck's policy of unification demonstrated unquestionably that the new German state was the foremost power on the continent.

An important question for the other states of Europe was what Bismarck and Emperor William I intended to do

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3The best brief survey of the diplomatic situation at this time is found in William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp. 3-55. Particularly pertinent to this study is the analysis of the attitudes of the Great Powers towards the Ottoman empire and the Eastern Question about 1870 found in Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, The Great Powers, and the Straits Question 1870-1887 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 3-12.
with Germany’s new supremacy. Bismarck’s goal may be summed up in one word: peace. According to the chancellor, Germany had no further territorial aspirations and sought only a period of European calm during which the empire could achieve cohesion.

The greatest problem Bismarck faced in his attempt to create and to maintain for Germany an era of peace was the threat posed by France. Bismarck was convinced that France would avail itself of any opportunity to regain Alsace-Lorraine, which had been lost to Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War. Consequently Bismarck began to follow a foreign policy which had as its goal the maintenance of France’s diplomatic isolation.

Several factors aided Bismarck in his attempt to deprive France of allies. Italy was somewhat put off from close association and cooperation with France because of the increasing likelihood of competition between the two countries for north African colonial acquisitions. Austria-Hungary was ostensibly a likely ally for France.

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4 Brief relevant discussions of Bismarckian Germany’s foreign policy immediately after the Franco-Prussian War can be found in Count Alois Károlyi, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Berlin, to Andrassy, Berlin, January 13, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CIV (Prussia, Reports 1872), Fos. 9-13; Károlyi to Andrassy, Berlin, December 4, 1876, ibid., Carton CX, Fos. 545-553; and Hans Rothfels, Bismarck und der Osten (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’che Buchhandlung, 1934), pp. 18-22 and 28-41.
but there existed powerful individuals and factions within the Dual Monarchy who distrusted France's military capabilities and who sought closer association with Germany rather than opposition to the new empire. Bismarck had little to fear in regard to an immediate Franco-Russian alliance. Emperor Alexander II was devoted to his imperial uncle William I and would hardly have acted against him. At the same time, Alexander II was distrustful of republican France and averse to having intimate dealings with a state which had such a form of government. In addition, Germany and Russia had cooperated on several occasions during the previous decade. In 1863, Prussia had supported Russia's subjugation of the Polish revolt by agreeing that tsarist forces could pursue Polish insurgents into Prussian territory if that were necessary. In return, Alexander II had remained neutral during Prussia's wars with Denmark, Austria, and France and had acted to help discourage possible Austro-Hungarian intervention on the side of France during the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck further strengthened the German connection with Russia in 1870-1871 by giving tacit support to Russia's abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris of 1856—an action which ended the neutralization

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of the Black Sea.

Despite the fact that a close association with Russia offered unquestionable advantages to Germany, Bismarck did not wish to have to rely solely on the tsarist empire. A second ally would ensure that Germany did not become too dependent on Russia and would increase the difficulties of France in ending its isolation. Of the two countries available, Italy and Austria-Hungary, Bismarck preferred the latter since it was the stronger of the two and since it was, to some extent at least, a German state. Of course, Bismarck would hardly rebuff or estrange the Italians, since in the period immediately after the Franco-Prussian War he could be certain only of the friendship of Russia and the hostility of France.

Bismarck's policy in the 1870's would revolve around the two certainties just mentioned; he would seek to maintain the existing rapprochement with Russia and to prevent France from gaining allies among the other powers, all the while working diligently to preserve the peace.

Bismarck's bete noire, France, posed more of a potential than an actual problem for Germany during the 1870's. 6 France had the desire but not the means to

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6For the French position, see Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 15; Baron Friedrich Langenau, Austro-Hungarian representative at St. Petersburg, to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, January 27/15, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXVII (Russia, Reports from Petersburg, 1875), Fos. 78-79.
regain Alsace-Lorraine and to revenge itself on Germany. Even a revitalized France strongly motivated by dreams of revanche was by itself no match for Germany. The obvious solution was an alliance, but France had little to offer as a potential ally. The French armies had been decisively defeated by the Prussians; the Paris Commune, in addition to its debilitating effect on France itself, scarcely created confidence on the part of the monarchs and the conservative ruling classes in other European countries; and the French did not seem to be able to choose between a republican or a monarchical form of government. Thus in the early 1870's the only course of action which appeared to be open to the French government was that of working slowly and carefully to cultivate friendships among the Powers while revitalizing the country and the military forces in order to be able to take advantage of any opportunity which might arise to end France's isolation or to strike a blow at Germany.

Italy faced problems similar to those of France, but in the Italian case the difficulties arose primarily from Italy's recent and precarious attainment of Great Power status. 7 No Italian state had been able to emulate Prussia

and unify the Apennine peninsula; rather, unification came only with the assistance of France and Prussia and in spite of Austrian victories over Italian forces. Nor could the creation of an Italian state be said to be really complete since northern and southern Italy were unified in name only and since significant numbers of Italians resided in Istria and in southern Tirol in Austria-Hungary.

The primary goals of the Italian government in the 1870's were to create a cohesive state and to guard zealously Italy's status as a Great Power. The Italians encountered a severe difficulty in regard to the latter goal because by itself Italy was too weak to command the respect of the other Powers or to be able to carry out its territorial ambitions—for example in north Africa or in the Balkans. In order to effectuate its goals, Italy required either a partner or a crisis in European diplomacy which could be turned to its advantage. France was not a likely ally in view of the increasing possibility of north African colonial rivalries and because a Franco-Italian grouping would arouse the enmity of Bismarck and Germany. Any understanding with Austria-Hungary was out of the question because of the Italian remembrance of long

years of Habsburg intervention and rule in the Apennine peninsula, the constant anti-Habsburg agitation of the Italian irredentists, and the fact that Italian and Austro-Hungarian interests clashed in the Balkans. From the Italian point of view, Germany was a possible ally, but, as previously stated, Germany would be likely to prefer an alliance with Austria-Hungary to one with Italy. The Italian government could view Russia as a possible ally, especially in the Balkans, but in the 1870's Russia and Great Britain were scarcely on the best of terms, and as an ally of Russia, Italy would be subject to attack by the British navy. With these considerations in view, Italy, again like France, was forced to adopt a cautious yet opportunistic foreign policy in the 1870's.

In a general sense, the problems and aspirations of the Habsburg monarchy were similar to those of France and Italy. As in France, the leaders of the Dual Monarchy

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felt that a revitalization and a unification of the disparate parts of Austria-Hungary were among their most pressing tasks. In the dozen years preceding 1871, Austria-Hungary had been defeated in two wars, lost its territorial possessions in Italy, and been expelled from its position of leadership within the Germanic Confederation. An additional sign of the Dual Monarchy's weakness was the discontent and unrest among the Magyar element—a feeling on which both Napoleon III and Bismarck had sought to capitalize during their wars with the Austrian empire.

In view of the Dual Monarchy's tarnished reputation, one of the primary concerns of the leaders of Austria-Hungary in the 1870's was to demonstrate that, despite its recent setbacks, Austria-Hungary was not a doddering and decrepit state waiting to take the place of the Ottoman empire as the sick man of Europe, but on the contrary that the compromise of 1867\(^{10}\) had provided the basis for a resilient and viable state.\(^{11}\) However, in order to

\(^{10}\) For a brief discussion of the compromise of 1867, see May, The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914, pp. 31-45.

\(^{11}\) This concern is particularly emphasized by Andrássy in the protocol of the ministerial council for common

revitalize itself internally and militarily, Austria-Hungary required a period of external peace, the attainment of which would be hampered by its diplomatic isolation. For the reasons mentioned previously, Italy was hardly on good terms with the Habsburg realm; nor did the Habsburg ruling circles have any great respect for Italy's power and capabilities. Likewise, France was regarded as too weak to be a suitable ally. Bismarck probably sought nothing more from Austria-Hungary than peace and friendship, but a fear that Germany might try to add the German areas of the Dual Monarchy to the German empire was current within Austria-Hungary, and there existed as well an influential faction which distrusted and hated Bismarck, Prussia, and the new German empire. Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations were quite cool because of Austria-Hungary's "treachery" during the Crimean War and because of the Dual Monarchy's relatively liberal treatment of its Polish territory and population, which from the Russian point of view

affairs of December 28, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCLXXXVIII, Fos. 805-807; by Archduke Albert in "The military situation of the Monarchy (December, 1876)," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, No. 78-4/1 (1876), Fos. 1-8; and in Archduke Albert to General Friedrich Beck, Vienna, March 20, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 77, Fos. 30-32; by Beck in "Memorandum on the Solution of the Eastern Question, 1, December 1876," ibid., 70/59, Fos. [1-20]. See also Josef Jakob Holzer, "Erzherzog Albrecht 1867-1895: politisch-militärische Konzeptionen und Tätigkeit als Generalinspektor des Heeres," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1974), passim.
contrasted unfavorably with the tsarist empire's own Polish policies.\textsuperscript{12} There existed as well the likelihood of friction between Habsburg and Romanov interests in the Balkans. Nevertheless, if Austria-Hungary sincerely sought peace and an effective refurbishment of its Great Power position and prestige, it would have to seek a rapprochement with Germany or with Russia. Austro-Hungarian leaders would have to overcome substantial internal opposition to close cooperation with Germany, or they would have to assuage the personal antipathy of the tsar toward Austria-Hungary and its ruler and arrive at a Balkan policy acceptable to both Russia and the Dual Monarchy. It would be a difficult but perhaps not impossible task.

The sole continental power that stood in a good position vis-à-vis the German empire was Russia.\textsuperscript{13} Russia and Prussia had not opposed each other militarily since the conclusion of the Seven Years' War a century earlier, and

\textsuperscript{12} For Russian forebodings about the Dual Monarchy's Polish policies, see Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, December 3/November 21, 1871, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1871), Fos. 147-148; Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, December 9/November 27, 1871, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 156; Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 6/February 23, 1872, \textit{ibid.} (Russia, Reports 1872), Fos. 40-41 and 47-48.

\textsuperscript{13} For a succinct discussion of Russian foreign policy, see Jelavich, \textit{A Century of Russian Foreign Policy}, pp. 125-188.
in the 1860's cooperation between the two states had been close and cordial. The maintenance of that good relationship would be necessary if Russia were to accomplish its primary immediate foreign policy goal in the 1870's: the revision of the verdict of the Crimean War. Specifically, Alexander II sought the abrogation of the section of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 which called for the neutralization of the Black Sea and the retrocession of that part of Bessarabia which had been lost to Romania. Russia succeeded in attaining the first of these goals in March of 1871 under the cover of the Franco-Prussian War, but the second was more difficult to accomplish. In part, the reacquisition of Bessarabia would be a delicate task because it could be regarded as nothing more than one manifestation of the tsarist empire's drive toward Constantinople, a goal of Russian foreign policy since the time of Peter the Great. Because that was precisely the view which Great Britain and Austria-Hungary were likely to take, their opposition could be expected.

Although the Dual Monarchy was not overly concerned about the fate of Constantinople, its leaders loathed and feared Russian Pan-Slavism. As Benedict H. Sumner has stated, "there is no doubt that during the late 'seventies

14 The subject is covered in Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question 1870-1887, pp. 3-84.
panslavism bulked in the eyes of Buda-Pesth and Vienna, of Constantinople and London as the most dangerous force in Russia." The movement was particularly dangerous because at this time it was in a process of transition, exchanging its earlier Slavophile ties for a Pan-Russian outlook. By the 1870's the Pan-Slavs advocated the extension of Russian hegemony to the Balkans as a part of their political program. This idea, propounded by the firebrands of Pan-Slavism, posed a serious danger to Austria-Hungary in that it cried out for the destruction of the Dual Monarchy and the inclusion of Austria-Hungary's Slavic population among the Slavs who were to be under the


16 Ibid., p. 39. See also Benedict H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1962), pp. 56-80, for a good succinct discussion of the impact of Pan-Slavism on Russia and its role in the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878.

17 The two foremost proponents of Pan-Slavism in the early 1870's were Rostislav A. Fadyeev and Nicholas P. Ignatiev. Fadyeev's Opinion on the Eastern Question, published in 1869, advocated a military settlement of the Slavic-Eastern Question, that is, a war by Russia against the Austro-Hungarian and/or Ottoman empires. Ignatiev, the tsar's ambassador at Constantinople, was viewed as the man who was attempting to transform Fadyeev's theory into practice. See Sumner, "Russia and Pan-Slavism in the Eighteen-Seventies," pp. 40-47.
rule or the tutelage of Russia.  

As is well known, the British opposition to a Russian advance toward Constantinople stemmed from the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the Ottoman empire as a means of protecting communications with India. India was also at the heart of friction between Great Britain and Russia in the 1860's and 1870's when Russia advanced into Central Asia and serious disputes arose over conflicting claims and indefinite borders in that area.

In the light of British and Austro-Hungarian fears about Russia's intentions in the Balkans, the tsarist empire's basic task in implementing the retrocession of Bessarabia and/or expansion of some kind into the Balkans was to avoid an aggressive or incautious course of action which might force the Dual Monarchy and Great Britain into an alliance against Russia. As alternatives to such a

18 For a contemporary Austro-Hungarian view of the Pan-Slavic movement, see Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 19/7, 1873, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXV (Russia, Reports 1873), Fos. 148-151.

19 This Russo-British conflict in Central Asia forms the single most prominent theme in Langenau's reports from St. Petersburg in 1873 and 1874. The reports are found in ibid., Cartons LXV and LXVI. See also Robert W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: A Survey of Foreign Policy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1937), pp. 506-507.

20 For British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's awareness that such a situation could arise, see Count Friedrich Ferdinand Beust, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at
cautious policy, Alexander II could seek an alliance with Germany in order to overawe Austria-Hungary or an arrangement with the Dual Monarchy to partition the Ottoman empire.

Little has been said thus far about Great Britain because while it was certainly a Great Power it was not interested in being a European Great Power. From December, 1868, to February, 1874, William E. Gladstone and the Liberals ruled England. Her Majesty's Government was distracted from continental affairs by its attempt to pacify Ireland. English statesmen did feel some uneasiness over the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War, since by its victory Germany totally destroyed the continental balance of power. Although in the past Great Britain had exerted itself militarily to maintain a continental balance of power, no overt hostility was manifested toward Germany at this time. British leaders were, however, worried and suspicious about Bismarck's future intentions and policies. The only other significant foreign policy concern which Great Britain faced was the friction with Russia in

London, to Andrassy, London, February 9, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VII, Carton LXXXV (Great Britain, Reports 1876 I-VII), Fos. 141-142.

Central Asia. As the decade of the 1870's opened, Great Britain found itself in an enviable position as one of the strongest of the powers with little need to consider what happened on the European continent and apparently content to pursue its interests in continued isolation.\footnote{Obviously it is difficult to compare the naval strength of Great Britain to the land forces of the continental powers. While the British fleet served its purpose in protecting the home islands, the British leaders were acutely aware of the weakness of their land forces vis-à-vis the other powers. In this regard the Russian threat to India was of particular concern. Until the late 1880's British statesmen considered employing Ottoman forces against Russia if Great Britain and the tsarist state became involved in a war in the East. See Lowe, \textit{The Reluctant Imperialists}, pp. 7-8.}

In summary, in the era immediately after the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarckian Germany was content with the existing situation but also had to be constantly vigilant about France; Great Britain held itself smugly aloof from continental affairs; and Russia desired to reassert its power and prestige, one of the manifestations of which might well be an aggressive policy in the Balkans. The other three powers, France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, because of reasons such as recent military defeats or lack of internal unity, were more likely to play a secondary role in European diplomacy, since they all required a period of tranquillity to refurbish their Great Power status.

Having briefly examined the problems and aspirations
of the Great Powers as the decade of the 1870's opened, let us now look more closely at the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary. The basic choice which faced the leaders and peoples of the Dual Monarchy in regard to foreign policy was the option between a defense of the territorial status quo or an attempt at expansion. The former had been Austro-Hungarian policy since 1815, and it had much to recommend it. Internal conditions, particularly the multiplicity of ethnic groups residing within the empire, made the maintenance of the existing territorial arrangements almost a necessity for the Dual Monarchy. The forces of attraction which would arise from the creation of new national states or the increase of territory and prestige of existing national states could seriously endanger the existence of the Habsburg empire.

A second factor which favored a non-aggressive foreign policy was the problem of the form of government within Austria-Hungary. The period from 1848 to 1871 was one of constant experimentation with the governmental structure. The basic issues involved were the choices between an autocratic or constitutional ruler, a decentralized or a centralized government, and effective participation by a select few or by all of the Dual Monarchy's peoples. The Compromise of 1867 created a situation which was somewhat more stable than that which had existed in the preceding two decades, but neither a feeling of unity nor
agreement by the different races on the form of government was in prospect.

The settlement of 1867 was itself an important element which encouraged a foreign policy designed to preserve the status quo. The Compromise gave the eastern half of the empire, more specifically the Magyars, an approximate parity with the western half in regard to power and influence in the Habsburg government. Since the two halves of the empire would not necessarily agree on foreign policy goals, it would probably prove easier to maintain the policy already in effect than to initiate a dynamic, aggressive course of action. An additional consideration in regard to the Compromise was the fact that its economic clauses had to be renegotiated every ten years. This process could lead to serious or prolonged disagreements between the halves of the Dual Monarchy which could have a severely debilitating effect on the conduct of foreign policy.

A final factor which made for a relatively inactive foreign policy was the fact that Austria-Hungary was diplomatically isolated and that it was exceedingly doubtful that it could carry out an aggressive, expansionist policy on its own. The key element in any such course of action might well turn out to be the Austro-Hungarian army, and that army and its leadership were undergoing a severe crisis of confidence as a result of the defeats of
1859 and 1866.  

While some could argue that this crisis of confidence, based upon an actual diminution of the power and prestige of the Habsburg empire and dynasty, was the most insistent reason in favor of an aggressive foreign policy, the fact that only a very limited area remained available for Austria-Hungary's enlargement discouraged others from advocating such a policy. Only the Balkans remained open to the Dual Monarchy, and an expansionist policy there would be certain to bring Russian complications in its wake. A crucial consideration was the role of Pan-Slavism. While it was not an attitude espoused officially by Russian ruling circles, reports from St. Petersburg indicated close connections between the tsar's family and the Pan-Slav and raised the possibility of Pan-Slavic influence on official policy, especially on Alexander II.  

Austro-Hungarian observers could move from the realm of

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23 For evidence of that feeling, see the writings of Archduke Albert cited in ante p. 10, no. 11. Albert's attitude was extremely important because he was the de facto head of the Austro-Hungarian military forces and a close and trusted adviser of Francis Joseph in regard to military matters. See also Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1976), pp. 88-89.

24 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 19/7, 1973, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXV (Russia, Reports 1873), Fos. 148-151.
speculation about the possible influence of Pan-Slavism on Russian policy to its actual effect when they considered the activities of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, Nicholas P. Ignatiev. He was an ardent Pan-Slav and a man with numerous connections among the highest level of Russian society and officialdom. He had served as ambassador to the Ottoman empire since 1864 and had great influence at the Porte. Ignatiev was also reputed to have an extensive network of agents—allegedly Pan-Slavs—throughout the Balkans. He was known to favor Russian hegemony over the Straits and Constantinople as well as over the Slavic peoples of the Balkans. Thus Ignatiev's preferred solution of the Eastern Question would include the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. While such personal views might be unwelcome, they would not necessarily be damaging to Austria-Hungary.


26 The Russian agents at Ragusa and at Belgrade were thought to be particularly outspoken in their Pan-Slavic sympathies. See Prince Nicholas Wrede, Austro-Hungarian representative at Belgrade, to Andrásy, Belgrade, August 26/14, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCV (Serbia, Various 1875), Fos. 19-20; Baron Gabriel Rodich, governor of Dalmatia, to Andrásy, Zara, April 28, 1873, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXII (Dalmatian governor's office 1873), Fos. 20-21.
if Ignatiev were kept in line by the Russian foreign office. However, the officials at the Ballhausplatz regarded the ambassador as a totally untrustworthy individual who often acted in a manner contrary to his instructions.  

Successful Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans, if implemented with speed and efficiency, might blunt the significant threat which Russia and Pan-Slavism posed to the Dual Monarchy in that area. But such an attempt made unilaterally would also be a gamble. That is, on the one hand, Russia might be overawed or too slow to respond to a quickly-executed Austro-Hungarian fait accompli, but, on the other, St. Petersburg might demand compensation in the event Austria-Hungary achieved an enlargement of its territory in the Balkans, or the tsarist empire might attempt a more dangerous and extensive kind of intervention if the Dual Monarchy made a fiasco of its intrusion into southeastern Europe. The possibility of an amicable agreement with Russia about Balkan expansion existed, but here again Pan-Slavism posed a stumbling block. It could very well happen that Pan-Slavic pressure and agitation might

27 In the 1870's Ignatiev was the single most maligned individual in the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic reports and in the marginal comments on those reports by Andrásy and Francis Joseph. A representative Austro-Hungarian view of the Russian ambassador may be found in Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, June 1, 1876, ibid., Section X, Carton LXIX, Fo. 213.
render Russia either disinclined or unable to limit itself 
to the gains to which it might have agreed to with the 
Dual Monarchy.

In addition to the problem of a possible confrontation 
with Russia, there were several other factors which 
weighed against an aggressive Balkan policy. Such a 
course of action would quite likely arouse the hostility 
of Serbia and Montenegro, since it would almost surely 
have as its goal the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina-- 
areas highly prized by those two principalities. 28 It would 
also stimulate the nationalist feelings of the Balkan 
peoples, creating an attitude which could, in turn, be 
transmitted to their Austro-Hungarian kinsmen and lead to 
unrest within the Dual Monarchy. Indeed, almost any ex-
pansion was bound to produce serious opposition within 
Austria-Hungary; there were simply too many nationalities, 
political parties, and special interest groups with con-
flicting aspirations involved.

Finally, one more factor militating against an active

28 According to Seton-Watson, Benjamin Kállay, the 
Austro-Hungarian representative at Belgrade from 1868 to 
1875, was one of the few of the Dual Monarchy's diplomats 
who realized and advised the Ballhausplatz of the fact 
that the Serbs "'see in Bosnia the natural complement of 
their territory', and 'count one day upon possessing it'." 
See Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, p. 512; and the same 
author's comments in reference to Kállay in his "Russian 
Commitments in the Bosnian Question and an early Project 
of Annexation," The Slavonic and East European Review, 
policy should be mentioned: money. Particularly after 1873, the Habsburgs were chronically short of funds. The situation was not one of a complete lack of resources but rather of an insufficiency which robbed Austria-Hungary of full freedom of action. Money was available for half-measures, but an all-out effort could be made only once, if then, and therefore had to be both absolutely necessary and resoundingly successful. 29

In contrast to those considerations which encouraged the leaders of Austria-Hungary to refrain from an active foreign policy, equally significant reasons for just such a course of action could be found. Possibly the most pressing factor was the obvious bankruptcy of the policy the Dual Monarchy had followed since 1815. The attempt at maintaining the territorial status quo had resulted only in military defeat and loss of territory and in serious damage to the empire's faith in itself, its role in the European state system, and its capacity to play that role. Besides the fact that a continuation of the

29 These generalizations about the Habsburg monarchy's financial position and the manner in which foreign policy was affected by a lack of financial resources are drawn from the protocols of the ministerial councils for common affairs of late 1877 and early 1878. See post, pp. 387-391 and 400-401 for a more detailed elaboration of the subject. For the pernicious and lingering effects of the depression of 1873 on Austria-Hungary, see Heinrich Benedikt, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Franz-Joseph Zeit. Vol. IV of Wiener Historische Studien (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1958), p. 92.
previous policy appeared to offer increasingly diminishing chances of success, the Dual Monarchy needed to adopt a positive course of action in order to show itself a resilient and still vigorous state.  

While the necessity of enhancing the reputation of the dynasty and the state could be accomplished through an easy conquest in the Balkans, there were also a number of other factors which encouraged an aggressive Habsburg policy there. One of the most important of these was the military advantage to be gained by the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That military advantage played a part in the motivation of several influential senior army officers who favored expansion into the Balkans. The group included Baron Gabriel Rodich, the governor of Dalmatia from 1870 to 1881; Baron Stephen Jovanović, the commanding general of the Eighteenth Infantry Division, which was

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stationed in Dalmatia; Baron Anton Mollinary, the commanding general at Zagreb and the head of the Croatian-Slavonian border district from 1870 to September of 1877; Baron Friedrich Mondel, the emperor's principal aide-de-camp; and General Friedrich Ferdinand Beck, the director of the Imperial Military Chancery during the 1870's.

Although Rodich and Jovanović were somewhat removed from the center of action at Vienna, they were not without influence. As we shall see, Rodich was on good terms with


both Prince Nicholas of Montenegro and the Christian leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and his reports were extensively used by the foreign ministry to gauge the state of affairs in those areas.\textsuperscript{36} Rodich's motivation in regard to the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina stemmed primarily from ethnic/political considerations. He was the most prominent representative of those Croat nationalists who wanted to unite all Croats under Habsburg rule and who therefore wished to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{37} Jovanovic had less influence than his brother-in-law Rodich and acted mainly to reinforce the proposals and views of Rodich.

Mollinary seemed to have a variety of considerations in mind when he spoke in favor of annexing Bosnia-Hercegovina. As the head of the Croatian border district, he was knowledgeable about the extent of the brigandage and border violations which occurred and asserted that the latter were "the order of the day" in both directions.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36}For an indication of the importance of Rodich's role in the Crisis of 1875-1878, see post, pp. 115-118 and 148-151.

\textsuperscript{37}See post, pp. 43-44, for the Balkan aspirations of the Croats.

He once stated his belief that "peace will first come [to Bosnia] when the double eagle has spread its wings over the land."\(^{39}\) If that did not happen, Mollinary feared that Dalmatia would become a "dangerous possession."\(^{40}\) However, in addition to the immediate goal of establishing security in the border areas of the Dual Monarchy by acquiring Bosnia-Hercegovina, Mollinary also wished to obtain the sanjak of Novi Pazar and the territory along the Vardar river in order to pave the way for a thrust by the Dual Monarchy toward Salonika and/or the Aegean Sea.\(^{41}\)

By virtue of the positions they held, Mondel and Beck were well situated to influence Francis Joseph's thinking significantly. Indeed, Mollinary implied that it was a triumvirate of Mondel, Beck, and Rodich who persuaded Francis Joseph to undertake a lengthy visit to Dalmatia in May, 1875, which may well have helped to instigate the Hercegovinian revolt of July.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{42}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282. However, see also Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/187/No.1 (*Nachlaß Pott*), p. 64 in which Pott indicates that Rodich was the instigator of Francis Joseph's Dalmatian visit.
Certainly Beck was in a position to influence Francis Joseph if he chose to try to do so. Along with Archduke Albert and Count Andrásy, Beck was one of the emperor's few trusted advisers. In the words of his biographer, "more than any other personality in the empire, Beck was in a position to speak daily with the emperor—at least once and often also more frequently and at length. Beck was in a position to influence the emperor with premeditation and skill in the direction of his own views." 43

The head of the imperial military chancery had not been a member of the anti-Prussian "revenge party" which flourished in the period between 1866 and 1871; nor did he favor rapprochement with Russia. Beck recognized that only the Balkans remained open for Austro-Hungarian expansion and that the Dual Monarchy would face Russian competition there. 44 Beck felt that "Russia itself is waiting only for the first cannon shot from below the Danube so that, in union with all the Slavic nations, it can attack Austria and begin the great war for the


44 Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, pp. 138-139.
solution of the Eastern Question." Because of his fear of such action by Russia, Beck advised Francis Joseph to protect Austro-Hungarian interests at the first sign of trouble in the Balkans. In 1869 he submitted a memorandum to the emperor to the effect that aggressive action by Serbia and Montenegro should be reckoned with and that in such a case the monarchy would have to take possession of much of Bosnia if Dalmatia were to be protected.

Like Mollinary, Beck also was interested in furthering Austro-Hungarian expansion toward Salonika. In a memorandum dated August, 1875, entitled "Study on the Occupation of Bosnia," Beck pointed out that the most direct route between the Suez Canal and Great Britain and northern Germany would be a railroad via Vienna-Noví-Salonika. According to Beck, part of that line was already built and open to traffic and, if Austria-Hungary possessed northern Bosnia, the construction of a necessary link through that region would be facilitated.

Irrespective of the individual concerns which they had

46 Ibid., p. 179.
47 Beck, "Study on the Occupation of Bosnia. (August 1, 1875)," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B 2 Fo. VI/No. 171 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), Fos. [1-17], especially Fo. [8].
in regard to the issue of Austro-Hungarian expansion into the Balkans, the military men also shared certain common views. They all regarded Austro-Hungarian possession of Bosnia-Hercegovina as essential for the protection of Dalmatia, since otherwise that province could be defended only by sea power because the railroads were inadequate for the transportation of troops. In time of war even the assistance of the Ottoman empire would not make possible a rapid enough passage of Austro-Hungarian troops to Dalmatia, and in the event the Turks were hostile the position of Dalmatia would be almost hopeless. For his part, Beck feared that if Serbia were allowed to acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina "not only Dalmatia but also Croatia-Slavonia and more would be lost to the monarchy." In addition to such "defensive" considerations, i.e., to protect Dalmatia primarily in order to forestall separatist tendencies within the Dual Monarchy, there were also "positive" military reasons to ensure Austro-Hungarian possession of Dalmatia. After the loss of Venetia in 1866, the harbors of Dalmatia and Istria formed the only available anchorage for the Austro-Hungarian fleet. As the briefing paper for the emperor's


visit to Dalmatia in 1875 stated,

Dalmatia is very rich in excellent and protected harbors, in several of which all the fleets of the world could be anchored. Especially good are those of Gravosa, Cattaro, and Lissa. This abundance of excellent harbors places the command of the Adriatic Sea in the hands of the power which controls Dalmatia. 50

In addition to military considerations, economic factors also played a significant role in the aspirations of some groups within Austria-Hungary to expand into the Balkans. The Balkan countries were important markets for Austria-Hungary, and it was essential that the empire maintain de facto control over at least a large segment of the area since the Dual Monarchy had no secure foreign markets. This was especially true after 1873, when the economic crisis which began that year pushed more Austro-Hungarian capitalists into the Slavic markets of the Balkans. 51

The projected railroad between Salonika and the Dual

50 [Beck], "Dalmatia," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna) B/2/Fo. VI/No. 170/10 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), p. [5]. The italics are in the original text.

Monarchy was an important element in the desire for commercial expansion in the Balkans. In 1869 the Ottoman empire had granted an Austro-Hungarian company a concession for the construction of this railroad as a part of an extensive network of Balkan railroads. By 1875 the stretches between Salonika and Mitrovitza and between Banja Luka and Doberlin had been constructed. In reference to this railroad, Beck echoed the common feeling when he stated that "the desire for it is international and without doubt it is coming." The economic advantages promised to Austria-Hungary by such a trans-Balkan railroad and the impetus to utilize Balkan markets provided by the 1873 depression produced a rather strong urge toward developing economic/political hegemony over the lower Danube and in the direction of Salonika.

From this brief discussion one can see that there were a number of authoritative arguments which could be used in

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53 Beck, "Study on the Occupation of Bosnia (August 1, 1875)," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/2/Fol. VI/No. 171 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), p. [8].

favor of pursuing either an active or a passive Austro-Hungarian foreign policy; certainly the formulation of policy was not entered into lightly because the foreign policy decisions made at this time were likely to be fraught with momentous and lasting consequences for the Dual Monarchy. One might wonder what individual or group was responsible for those decisions. In view of the disparity of opinion surrounding the subject, one might question whether Austro-Hungarian foreign policy—that is, foreign policy goals and aspirations generally accepted by the whole monarchy—actually existed. Or must one perhaps think in terms of Austrian, Hungarian, or dynastic foreign policy—or possibly some combination of all these factors? In order to answer these questions we must examine very briefly the governmental structure of Austria-Hungary during the period under discussion.

The compromise of 1867 created an Austro-Hungarian state composed of two halves theoretically equal in power and influence. Each half—Hungary, or Transleithania, and "Austria," or Cisleithania 55—in theory had a large measure of autonomy in regard to internal affairs. During the period of Andrássy's foreign ministry both parts of the

55 The "Austrian" half of the Dual Monarchy had no official title other than "the kingdoms and countries represented in the Reichsrat." It often went by the name of Cisleithania since the Leitha was the small river which divided the western and eastern halves of the monarchy.
empire were governed by ministries which were selected from the largest political groups within the respective parliaments and which were responsible to those parliaments.

In addition to the Cisleithanian and Transleithanian governments, there was a third governmental system which handled common or joint affairs and served to unify the two halves of the Dual Monarchy. This government was composed of the dynasty, three ministries for common affairs, and a unique representative body known as the delegations. Francis Joseph retained absolute control over the three joint ministries—those charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, military affairs, and financial affairs of a common nature. The common ministers were appointed by the ruler and served at his pleasure; thus they were immune from the whims of the Cisleithanian and Transleithanian parliamentary bodies. In actual practice, the common ministers dealt with the Austrian or Hungarian parliaments when it was to their advantage to do so. For example, Andrásy met with parliamentary leaders and committees to explain his foreign policy and justify budgetary requests, but he dodged interpellations in the parliaments by citing


57 An interpellation was a question which a member or members of parliament could direct to a minister or to the
the law which stated that such questions were to be directed to the minister-president rather than to a common minister.

The delegations were composed of an equal number of representatives from the Cisleithanian and Transleithanian parliaments. These two groups met, discussed, and voted separately, although the tabulation of the votes was made for the body as a whole. The delegations met in a brief annual session, the main purpose of which was to approve the budgets for the joint ministries. It should be noted that the delegations did not determine the sources of the revenue required or how the funds were to be raised; that was supposedly done by the Cisleithanian and Transleithanian parliaments immediately after the budgets had been approved by the delegations. Members of the delegations had the legal right to interpellate the common ministers, but the delegations could effectively oppose the ministers or their programs only by utilizing the delegations' budgetary powers.

Even from such a cursory look at the dualistic system of government, one can easily discern that the conduct of foreign policy was designed in theory to remain in the hands of the emperor, acting through his foreign minister. But despite Francis Joseph's apparent control of foreign Cisleithanian or Transleithanian government as a whole. All interpellations had to be answered by the appropriate minister.
policy, the system also made serious opposition to the emperor's wishes possible. In the 1870's it was relatively easy to gain the delegations' approval for budgetary and financial requests. This was due in large measure to the fact that the Transleithanian delegation was united in its outlook and disciplined to vote as a unit, while the Cisleithanian delegation was much more fractious in its parliamentary activities. Since Gyula Andrássy was Francis Joseph's foreign minister and one of his closest advisers in the 1870's, the government almost invariably had the support of the Transleithanian delegation, which, with the assistance of just a few votes from the Cisleithanian delegation, could successfully influence any issue in the government's favor. In essence, then, financial measures could be approved in the delegations by the Hungarians, with the assistance of only a few Cisleithanian members, but those same measures might meet with obstinate opposition in the Cisleithanian parliament. While in theory such opposition was not to be carried to the point of rejection of a measure approved by the delegations, there existed some doubt over this point, both on the part of Francis Joseph and of his potential opposition within the Cisleithanian parliament. Regardless of whether or not a parliament could reject an act approved by the delegations, it could delay and obstruct the funding required to implement the program, give vent to hostile opinions, or raise
embarrassing questions for the government. In addition to the complications which such opposition could cause the Dual Monarchy in its conduct of foreign affairs, a delay by the Cisleithanian parliament in raising the money approved by the delegations would be especially serious because under the terms of the Compromise Cisleithania was charged with raising seventy per cent of the total amount needed.

The possibility of opposition to imperial policy just outlined did exist in fact in the Cisleithanian parliament. The ruling group in that body was the German liberals. They were for the most part upper middle class business and professional men who interested themselves in the commercial and financial affairs of the monarchy and who sought to limit the emperor's financial powers and to ensure that any expenditures were well spent. They were also "the heirs of the men who had carried through the bourgeois revolution of 1848 in Vienna" and their remembrance of '48 colored their thinking and determined their actions in several areas. The liberals viewed their defeat in 1848 as the work of a coalition of Russians, Croats, and the imperial army and regarded each of those groups with abhorrence. While the Russians and the


59 Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/187/No. 1 (Nachlaß Pott), p. 54.
Croats were outside their sphere of activity, the imperial army was not. The German liberals regarded the army as the keystone of an absolutist system and were "almost fanatically violent"\textsuperscript{60} in their opposition to requests for funds for the army. Their granting of support for the army in a most grudging and parsimonious manner did not endear the liberals to Francis Joseph and his generals.\textsuperscript{61}

After the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the German liberals may be said almost to have become disinterested in foreign policy. Prior to 1866 they had sought German unification under Habsburg auspices so that liberalism might have a chance to flourish within Germany.\textsuperscript{62} They had not, however, been particularly distraught over the outcome of the Seven Weeks' War; had abstained from a policy of revenge; and from an imperial point of view had behaved in a most insulting manner in their demonstrative celebrations of Prussia's victories in the Franco-Prussian War.\textsuperscript{63} German unification destroyed any hope of an

\textsuperscript{60}Macartney, \textit{The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918}, p. 520.

\textsuperscript{61}Tschuppik, \textit{The Reign of the Emperor Francis Joseph}, p. 230.


\textsuperscript{63}Tschuppik, \textit{The Reign of the Emperor Franz Joseph}, p. 211.
Austro-Hungarian policy of expansion in the west, that is, in northern Italy or Germany, and at the same time temporarily ended the liberals' interest in foreign policy. They did aspire to see the hopes and plans of the hated Russians and Croats thwarted in the Balkans, but in the early 1870's they regarded activity there as rather "superfluous." However, after the depression of 1873 began, Austro-Hungarian business interests turned increasingly to the markets of the Balkans and the liberals began to consider seriously the need to counter Russian influence there. While the liberals did seek economic penetration and dominance in the Balkans, they did not seek political control there. The acquisition of more Slavs by the Dual Monarchy was anathema to them, since the long term effect would probably be a diminution of their own political power within Cisleithania and/or the monarchy as a whole. In summary one may correctly say that when the German liberals returned to power in Cisleithania in late 1871 they appeared unlikely to oppose the course of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy unless that

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65 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 14-17. For an explanation of the position of the Germans within Cisleithania, see Andrew G. Whiteside, "The Germans As An Integrative Force in Imperial Austria:
policy encompassed the addition of Slavic territory.

The Compromise of 1867 put the Magyars, the ruling ethnic/political group in Hungary, in an even stronger position than the German liberals to influence foreign policy.\textsuperscript{66} The Compromise had culminated a long and bitter struggle by the Magyars for an effective voice in governing the Habsburg realm. Although the empire's isolated diplomatic position and internal disunity had virtually forced the unpalatable compromise on Francis Joseph in 1867, it was a settlement and it offered the prospect of increasing the Dual Monarchy's strength and prestige. Therefore, Francis Joseph would be most reluctant either to alienate the Magyar ruling class or to risk disrupting the compromise settlement. The Magyars did not have to demonstrate their influence through direct approbation of or hostility to Francis Joseph's policies. Rather, since the emperor was well acquainted with the Magyars' views and would be very loathe to treat them

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cavalierly, Magyar influence made itself felt as a circumscribing of Francis Joseph's policy choices, that is, the emperor probably viewed some actions as simply not to be taken because of the certainty of vehement Magyar opposition.

In regard to foreign policy, the Magyars, like the German liberals, feared that an influx of Slavs into either half of the empire would ultimately destroy the preeminent position of the Magyars in Hungary, either by diluting the strength of the Magyars there or by forcing political concessions in Cisleithania which would eventually have to be duplicated in Hungary. In part because of the proximity of the Balkan Slavic threat, the Magyars had traditionally shunned a foreign policy oriented toward the west; however, after the expulsion of the Habsburgs from the German lands in 1866 and the Compromise of 1867 the Magyar leaders began to take an interest in developing good relations with Bismarckian Germany. The Magyar ruling class required a strong Germany since otherwise the Habsburgs might be able to reassert themselves in Germany and then possibly abrogate the Compromise. But friendship could not be offered unequivocally to Germany; it had to be divorced from Austro-Hungarian participation in the existing German-Russian rapprochement, since Russia, especially a "Mother Russia" nourishing and prodding her Balkan children to a dangerous
maturity, was the Magyars' bête noire. The Magyars regarded the Ottoman empire as a source of welcome assistance in their struggle against the Slavs; however, their Turkophile sentiments would not prevent them from furthering the aspirations of the small Balkan states if that course of action seemed to offer the promise of success in reducing Russian influence in the Balkans. 67

In addition to the Magyars and the German liberals, several of the nationalities of the Dual Monarchy had certain definite ideas about its foreign policy. For example, in general the Czechs were antipathetic toward Germany, friendly toward Russia, and hoped for cooperation between Austria-Hungary and the tsarist state in the Balkans. 68

The Serbs 69 and the Romanians 70 of the monarchy advocated


the same cooperation, but had no aversion to Germany and also sympathized with the nationalist aspirations of Serbia and Romania respectively. For their part, the Poles were implacably hostile to Germany and to Russia and were the one Slavic group which was unaffected by the appeal of Pan-Slavism. 71 By the 1870's the Croats were less interested in the proper Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy than they were in the proper Croatian Balkan policy. 72 The subordination of the Croats to the Magyars as represented in the Nagodba 73 of 1868 led many Croats to think in terms of asserting their nationality outside the framework of the Habsburg empire. The basic hopes for the Croatian future were either that a greater Croatia with Serbs and Slovenes subordinated to Croats could be established or that a Yugoslav state with equal rights for the three South Slav peoples might come into being. A third movement, less widespread than the other two but very


73 The Nagodba was an agreement between the Hungarian and Croatian governments which was superficially similar to the Ausgleich. However, it was regarded unfavorably by many Croats because it signified their subordination to the Magyars. In the period from 1848 to 1867 Croatia was
influential because its leaders were high-ranking Habsburgtreu Croat generals, sought to elevate the status of Croatia within the Austro-Hungarian state structure. Adherents of all three ideas opposed allowing Bosnia-Hercegovina to fall to Serbia and/or Montenegro, and the faction which wished Croatia to remain within the Dual Monarchy actively sought to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina to Austria-Hungary and Croatia.

In view of this divergence of opinion on the part of the nationalities and ruling political groups about what constituted the proper goals of foreign policy, one might look to the views of Francis Joseph in order to find a foreign policy which had as its goal the protection of the interests of the monarchy as a whole. Such a conception would be accurate only if one bears in mind that Francis Joseph tended to regard dynastic and state interests as identical. In addition, one should remember a crown land ruled from Vienna; as a result of the Ausgleich and the Nagodba Croatia was subjected to close and onerous Magyar supervision. For the Nagodba's details and effect, see May, The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914, pp. 74-76.

74 To be sure there were points such as antipathy to an increase in the Slavic population of the monarchy, friendship for Germany, and hostility toward Russia on which the ruling Magyars and German liberals were agreed; however, there were also serious differences of opinion in regard to the latter two points. The Magyars wished for intimate ties with a Germany disassociated from Russia, while such a condition was not necessary for the Cisleithanians. Further, the Magyars felt that Austria-
that while Francis Joseph undoubtedly had the interests of the monarchy as a whole at heart and while he believed that he himself made foreign policy, the fact that his outlook was not always shared by the ruling groups in Cisleithania and Transleithania sometimes made it difficult for him to implement his own policy. 75

In the early 1870's the emperor and his policy were somewhat confused and indecisive. The wars of 1859 and 1866 had expelled Austria-Hungary from central European affairs and had at the same time tarnished the reputation and the authority of the Dual Monarchy and its ruler. Austria-Hungary's humiliation at the hands of Italy and Prussia made Francis Joseph "more long-suffering and reluctant to go to war," and he probably felt a greater need to preserve intact the remainder of his lands after 1866.

Hungary had to act decisively to counter the rivalry and threat from Russia, while the German liberals saw little cause for such action.

than he had before that date. But, if on the one hand, Francis Joseph became more cautious in his policy and somewhat resigned to the problems and limitations which would be faced by any ruler of Austria-Hungary, he certainly did not become apathetic. Those same defeats which forced Austria-Hungary out of a preponderant role in central Europe focused the attention of the Dual Monarchy on the Balkans, the only area left in which Austria-Hungary could exert and expand its influence as a Great Power. There the chronically misgoverned and rebellious Turkish provinces of Bosnia-Hercegovina offered the prospect of an easy aggrandizement which would refurbish the reputations of the house of Habsburg, the Dual Monarchy, and the Austro-Hungarian army.

Militating against the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina was the poor and backward nature of those provinces; Francis Joseph did not desire to add that kind of territory to his already fractious empire. And, while Francis Joseph may have felt the need to demonstrate the vigor of his empire by means of an aggressive Balkan policy, his capability to act was significantly limited. The opposition of the ruling German liberals and Magyars to the addition of more Slavs to the empire, for example by the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, was a brake upon

\footnote{76 Bridge, \textit{From Sadowa to Sarajevo}, pp. 11-12.}
the emperor's freedom of action. Equally serious as a deterrent to an active policy was the fact that the delegations and the parliaments controlled the funds which would be required for such a course of action. While parliamentary control could possibly be circumvented if the monarch were absolutely determined to follow his own inclinations, that would be a prolonged and difficult process and would undoubtedly create internal problems which would make it impossible to conduct an effective foreign policy. And, along the same line of reasoning, one of Francis Joseph's fundamental considerations had to be to prevent, in so far as possible, any sign of weakness or disunity within the Habsburg realm. Such discord would only fuel the desires of Russian Pan-Slavists—as well as official Russia—to act against the Dual Monarchy, and it also might encourage the German empire to think seriously of seizing the German parts of Austria-Hungary. Conversely, however, the passive policy of defending the status quo which the Habsburgs had practiced since 1815 had hardly been successful and a continuation of that policy might be viewed by opposing Powers as evidence that Austria-Hungary was inactive because it was too weak and opinion too divided to be able to act. That, in turn, would be an open invitation to the partition and the destruction of the Dual Monarchy. In such a difficult situation just what was Francis Joseph to do to protect his empire and to restore the prestige of his house?
CHAPTER II

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY FROM THE AUTUMN
OF 1871 TO THE SUMMER OF 1875

"Count Andrassy, in
spite of his great ability,
was basically only an
Hungarian, like all his
countrymen, and he regarded
the common monarchy from
the Hungarian point of
view only as a means to
raise Hungary to the status
of a great power, in spite
of the Romanians, South
Slavs, and Slovaks."

--Lieutenant General
Emil Pott.¹

"'Of all the races in
Austria-Hungary' . . . the
Magyar 'has the strongest
interest in the preservation
of the monarchy'."

--Count Gustav Kalnoky,
sometime in the 1880's.²

An obvious starting point for Francis Joseph in his
attempt to reorient Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was to
make a definite break with past policy. The removal of
Baron Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust as foreign minister
indicated that the Habsburg ruler had accepted the loss of
Austro-Hungarian primacy in the Germanies and that he was
seeking a better relationship with the Bismarckian state.

¹Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/187/No. 1 (Nachlaß Pott),
p. 49.

²As quoted in Wank, "Foreign Policy and the Nationality
At about the same time when the Prussophobe Beust exchanged his duties at the Ballhausplatz for those of ambassador to the Court of St. James in London, Count Richard Metternich was replaced as the Dual Monarchy’s ambassador in Paris. He, too, had been hostile toward Prussia and Bismarck, and had been one of the most vigorous advocates of a Franco-Austro-Hungarian alliance.  

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The choice of the new foreign minister served as a further indication of the reorientation of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. The experiences of Count Gyula Andrássy prior to assuming his duties at the Ballhausplatz in November, 1871, had in some measure fitted him for the vicissitudes of imperial and public service in the Habsburg monarchy. His very place of birth, in Kassa on the border of an area inhabited by Magyars and Slovaks, made him well aware of the nationality problems of the Dual Monarchy; so, too, did his outlook as a Magyar. Andrássy had experience as a politician, having served in the lower house of the Hungarian parliament in 1847-1848 and later as minister-president of Hungary from 1867 to 1871. Along with Francis Deák, he had been one of the prime movers in the negotiation of the Compromise of 1867. He was not a trained or experienced diplomat; his only contact with the world of diplomacy prior to 1871 had been during the brief

period in 1849 when he had been commissioned by the Hungarian government of Louis Kossuth to try to secure the support of the Ottoman empire for the Hungarian war for independence. Following that unsuccessful revolt, Andrásy had fled to Great Britain and then France. He was condemned to death in absentia for his part in the revolutionary movement but was able to secure a full pardon and return to Hungary in 1858. At that time he renewed his interest in Austro-Hungarian politics and worked with Deák to effectuate the compromise with the monarch.  

Andrássy became foreign minister in late 1871 because of the conjunction of a number of factors acting in his behalf. The most important of these was the general diplomatic situation. The defeat of France in 1870 left Austria-Hungary in a very dangerously isolated position. A rapprochement with Germany was an obvious solution, particularly in view of Bismarck's recently expressed

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5For the circumstances surrounding Andrásy's appointment as foreign minister, see Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, Vol. I, pp. 612-639; and Tschuppik, The Reign of
desire for European peace and cooperation with the Habsburg state and because of ominous signs of Russian activity in the Balkans. However, as the Dual Monarchy's foreign minister, Beust could not inspire Bismarck with the confidence and trust which would be necessary for an Austro-Hungarian-German agreement; therefore, Beust had to be replaced.

If Francis Joseph really aimed at improved relations with the German empire, Andrásy was his logical choice as foreign minister. The Magyars as a group recognized the importance of and worked toward establishing better relations with Germany, and the emperor was well aware this was understood and appreciated by Bismarck. Andrásy had already demonstrated leadership and political ability in the Compromise negotiations and as minister-president of Hungary, and with the exception of the aged Désk, he was the single most capable and influential pro-Compromise leader in Hungary.

Andrássy's preeminent position in the Magyar ruling class was an important consideration from the emperor's point of view because of the manner in which the agreement of 1867 had come into being. Having once sacrificed imperial power and prestige to the Magyars in order to gain

the Emperor Francis Joseph, pp. 225-228.
a settlement with them, Francis Joseph was loathe to disturb that accommodation. As Bismarck's confidant, Bernhard von Bülow, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, stated in comments on the post-Compromise situation in Austria-Hungary, "he who judges correctly will not overlook how difficult it must have been for him [Francis Joseph] to put himself in opposition to Hungarian public opinion, to Hungarian passions and Hungarian prejudices, to the wishes of Hungarian ministers." In terms of foreign policy, such an attitude on Francis Joseph's part meant that he would be more inclined than previously to take Hungarian wishes into consideration and that the Magyars would have a real and effective voice in the conduct of foreign affairs. Andrásy's appointment as foreign minister was both a symbol and a result of the Magyars' enhanced status within the Dual Monarchy and an exemplification of the emperor's new outlook—he would be more attentive to Magyar desires and orient his foreign policy toward the southeast.

Since the monarch's primary foreign policy considerations have already been touched on, let us now examine Andrásy's motivations and inclinations.

Undoubtedly Andrássy perceived quite clearly that the same combination of circumstances which had brought him to office would also ensure his influence in the counsels of state and the determination of policy. In the words of his son, Andrássy entered the service of the Habsburg state "because he believed he could be useful to the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy under the conditions then prevailing. His chief motive in all his actions was a specific Hungarian patriotism." A fundamental tenet of that patriotism was the maintenance of the privileged position and power of both the Magyar ruling class and also of the Magyars as a nation. The failure of the revolution of 1848 had demonstrated that an Hungarian state separate and independent from the Habsburg realm was not a realistic expectation. What the Magyars required was a state in which they, a relatively small group numerically, could play a dominant political role and which would at the same time be a Great Power capable of protecting them against the threat of Slavic nationalism(s). The Compromise seemed to afford just the solution required by the Magyars.


Thus, Andrásy's foremost task was the preservation and enhancement of the Habsburg state as a means of protecting the Magyar nation.

In his attempts to improve Austria-Hungary's perilous diplomatic situation, Andrásy looked first to Germany. From a Magyar point of view, close cooperation with Bismarck's empire offered only advantages. Such a relationship would provide the Hungarian half of the empire with two real benefits. In the first place, Hungarian friendship for Germany would help to stifle both Cisleithanian opposition to the German empire and agitation by diehard revanchists for an alliance and/or action against Germany. Forestalling an anti-Prussian course of action had been a necessary Hungarian concern in the period between 1866 and 1871, since a recovery of the pre-1866 Habsburg position in Germany would have endangered the dualistic system and the Magyars' political power.9 A prime example of the Magyars' pro-German orientation was their behavior at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War when, mainly due to efforts of Andrásy, who was then minister-president of Hungary, the Habsburg empire adopted a very cautious policy of neutrality.10 Nor were the

9 See Bismarck's analysis to this effect in Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, April 17, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CVIII, Pos 228-229.

10 For a general account of the Austro-Hungarian
efforts to facilitate a good relationship with Germany which Andrássy and his countrymen advocated unrecognized by Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor saw only too clearly the dangers which a reinstitution of centralistic government within the Habsburg realm would pose for both Hungary and Germany. As ambassador Károlyi reported,

Prince Bismarck regards the dualistic form of the state, that is, the securing of Hungarian influence on the foreign policy of the Monarchy, as the best guarantee for a good understanding with Germany. Prince Bismarck always places a special value on Hungarian influence, for he proceeds from the conviction that the permanent interests of Hungary indicate an alliance with Germany, and that as long as Hungary's influence is undiminished, a weakening of the relationship with Germany is not to be feared. 11

The second advantage which close cooperation with the Hohenzollern empire offered to the Magyars—and to the Dual Monarchy as well—was the enhancement of the prestige and power of the Habsburg state by means of an alliance with one of the strongest powers on the Continent. Such an agreement would go a long way toward achieving Andrássy's goal of refurbishing the strength of the monarchy, and it


11 Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, April 17, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CVIII, Pos. 228-229. See also Károlyi to Andrássy,
would also allow Austria-Hungary to counter the threat
Russia posed to it in the Balkans. As could be expected,
however, Bismarck was most reluctant to enter into an
agreement directed against Russia. Throughout the crisis
of 1875-1878 he consistently stated that he would
acquiesce in any resolution of the Balkan problems at
which the Dual Monarchy and Russia could amically arrive. 12
Still, despite Bismarck's reluctance to support Austria-
Hungary, if the Dual Monarchy were to block Russia's Pan-
Slavic Balkan intrigues, it was essential that Germany not
act against the interests of the Habsburg monarchy. Im-
proved Austro-Hungarian relations with Germany might ob-
viate the possibility of Hohenzollern support for the
tsarist empire and could lead to an Austro-Hungarian-
German alliance as well.

In Andrassy's view, Russia was easily the greatest
threat to the Habsburg state. The problem which he regard-
ed as pressing and immediate, and the solution of which
was absolutely essential if the Great Power status of
Austria-Hungary was to be maintained, was to confront and

Berlin, June 4, 1875, ibid., Carton CIX, Fos. 30-33 for a
similar statement by Bismarck.

12 For Bismarck's Balkan views, see Károlyi to Andrassy,
Berlin, January 22, 1876, ibid., Carton CX, Fo. 17;
Károlyi to Andrassy, Berlin, December 4, 1876, ibid., Fos.
545-549; and Károlyi to Andrassy, Berlin, December 28,
1877, ibid., Carton CXI, Fo. 515.
to counteract the Russian danger. In his effort to frustrate tsarist machinations, the foreign minister faced several difficulties. First of all, he would have to overcome the pro-Russian orientation of the circle led by Archduke Albert who favored Austro-Hungarian expansion into the Balkans in cooperation with Russia. If Andrássy could convince Francis Joseph that such an expansionist program was both unwise and dangerous for the Dual Monarchy and that the Habsburg state had to confront Russia rather than cooperate with the tsarist empire, the foreign minister would still face the issue of how to oppose Russia. Andrássy himself possibly regarded a war with the Romanov state as inevitable and perhaps even favored a preventive war against the Russians, but the status of the Austro-Hungarian army and the Dual Monarchy's


14 See Beck, "Study on the Occupation of Bosnia (August 1, 1875)," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/2/Fol. VI/No. 171 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), Fos. 13-14, for a statement of the advantages of Austro-Hungarian-Russian cooperation in the Balkans; as well as Archduke Albert, "Aphoristic Observations on the current Situation. November 1876," ibid., Separate Fascicle 70/59, Fos. 1-5 for a statement of the futility and disadvantages of Austro-Hungarian military opposition to Russia.

paucity of financial resources were likely to be stumbling blocks which would retard or prevent an aggressive policy vis-à-vis Russia. When Andrásy took office the army was not prepared for war against Russia, either in terms of logistics and organization, or of confidence and esprit de corps. An even more serious question faced by the Dual Monarchy's leaders was whether the Habsburg realm possessed the resources and the will to back even a first-rate army to victory against the tsarist state.

An important part of Andrásy's efforts to counter the Russians' Pan-Slavic threat to the Dual Monarchy was his program for the Balkans. From a personal point of view, Andrásy opposed a policy which would actively involve Austria-Hungary there and which might lead to the addition of more Slavs to the population of the monarchy. In the late 1860's he had favored using part of Bosnia-Hercegovina to buy the friendship of Serbia, or as he expressed it, "to use the Turkish provinces as an explosive to dynamite the connection between Russia and Serbia."16

By the time he became foreign minister, however, Andrásy's

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views about the Balkans were in a state of flux. The Franco-Prussian War caused the Dual Monarchy to attach much greater importance to the area. The prevailing "court" view called for Austro-Hungarian expansion into the Balkans, preferably in peaceful agreement and cooperation with the other interested parties. This was also the view of the German liberals—to the extent they were interested in the matter—since they believed that such a course of action would be the most profitable and least dangerous method of expansion.17 While Andrásy did not want anything to do with a policy of territorial expansion in the Balkans, he did seek to squelch Russian and Pan-Slavic influence in the area and to replace it with Austro-Hungarian. He did not aspire to territorial aggrandizement since that would have to come at the expense of the Ottoman empire, a state which the Magyars regarded with friendship and with which the Dual Monarchy shared a community of interest in combatting Russian aggression in the Balkans. In addition to those considerations, a weakening of Turkish control over the Balkans would inevitably strengthen the Slavs and thereby pose an increased danger to Austria-Hungary and/or the Magyars.18 For Andrásy,


the maintenance of the territorial status quo in the Balkans was probably the most desirable expectation which he could realistically envision when he became foreign minister; however, he probably had not given up completely the idea of using part of Bosnia-Hercegovina to attach Serbia and Montenegro to the Dual Monarchy.¹⁹

In view of the differences of opinion concerning the proper course of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and the weaknesses manifested by the Dual Monarchy, the tenor of Andrassy's first important policy statement was hardly surprising. In a dispatch dated November 23, 1871, the foreign minister made his views known to all the imperial and royal foreign missions. For public consumption abroad, he stated that his confidence in his ability to direct the affairs of the monarchy was founded on two elements: firstly, that the "vitality and force" of the Dual Monarchy met a need in Europe in that it was necessary to guarantee European equilibrium and general peace, and, secondly, that his course of action would be guided by the "vital interests of the empire itself." The most important

¹⁹ In Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre, Vol. II, p. 287, Mollinary quoted Andrassy as stating in November of 1871 that "we should make conquests there [that is in the Balkans] not by means of war but rather by peaceful means and these should be limited to the northwestern part of Bosnia as well as Hercegovina; the eastern part of Bosnia--'scraps on the Drina' he called it, would be left to Serbia and the southernmost part of Hercegovina left to Montenegro."
aspect of the communication was the manner in which Andrássy interpreted those "vital interests." He believed that the proper policy for Austria-Hungary was one of "frank, open, and absolute peace." In addition, he stated that Austria-Hungary had no need for an increase in territory and that it would be difficult to point out an act of territorial aggrandizement which would not turn out to be an embarrassment to both halves of the monarchy. Austria-Hungary's best policy would be the maintenance of peace and the continued growth of its prosperity.  

As one would expect, the statement of such peaceful intentions made an excellent impression and elicited favorable responses. 21 Of particular importance to Andrássy were the attitudes which the governments of Berlin and St. Petersburg would take toward his ministry and his policies. The Russian foreign minister and chancellor, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, revealed himself quite pleased with

20 Andrássy to the imperial and royal missions, Vienna, November 23, 1871, Auswärtige Angelegenheiten. Corresponden-
denzen des Kais. und Kon. Gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern. No. 6. vom November 1871 Bis September 1872. (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der k. k. Hof und Staats-

21 Beust to Andrássy, London, December 13, 1871, ibid., p. 3; Count Carl Zaluski, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome, to Andrássy, Rome, December 15, 1871, ibid., p. 4; Count Anton Prokesch-Osten, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Constantinople, to Andrássy, Constantinople, December 15, 1871, ibid., p. 4.
the attitude and ideas which Andrásy presented in his dispatch. In reference to the Magyar's stated program, Gorchakov said to the Austro-Hungarian minister, "'but that is my program; it is entirely my program. For eighteen years I have preached the same policy here; I advise the avoidance of external complications and the consolidation of the internal position'." Likewise, expressions of approval came from Berlin. The German foreign office felt that Andrásy's statement would make a "splendid impression" upon Bismarck and William I, and in addition Bismarck gave indications of his personal trust and confidence in Andrásy and of his "sincere wish to make a good relationship between the two cabinets [Berlin and Vienna] an actuality."  

While Andrásy was penning platitudes on the necessity of peace and the blessings of prosperity he was also seeking a method of counteracting the Russian threat. In

22 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, November 27/15, 1871, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1871), Fo. 136.


24 Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, December 23, 1871, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CIII, Fo. 272. See also Münch to Andrásy, Berlin, December 16, 1871, ibid., Fo. 246.
November and December of 1871 he cautiously sounded out Germany and Great Britain about the possibility of an alliance against Russia. He also attempted to win over Francis Joseph to such a plan and to convince the emperor that Russia posed a real danger to the Dual Monarchy. Andrássy's greatest effort in this direction came during an extraordinary council of the monarchy's leaders which met from February 17 to February 19, 1872. Apparently the group, consisting of the emperor, Andrássy, Archduke Albert, the Imperial War Minister Major General Baron Franz Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, and Colonel Beck as protocolist, met at Andrássy's instigation.

The foreign minister must have had several thoughts in mind when he arranged the meeting. In a general sense, he wished to emphasize to the emperor and to the military leaders his conception of the intimate relationship between

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25 Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, pp. 61-63.


27 Ibid., p. 25.
the conduct of foreign policy and military strength and preparedness. As he stated during the conference, "the only policy [that is, foreign policy] which is correct is that which is also strategically correct." He emphasized further that a nation's "rights" no longer afforded the certainty that its interests and position would be respected; power, he maintained, was the only sure guarantee of success.  

To ensure the military strength of the Dual Monarchy, Andrásy made four specific recommendations: (1) the complete implementation of compulsory military service; (2) the thorough preparation for battle of the common army, the Cisleithanian Landwehr, and the Transleithanian Honvéd within two years; (3) the detailed planning of mobilization so that the time required could be known with certainty; and (4) the preparation of the probable theater of war.  

After making these specific proposals, Andrásy spent some time detailing his view of the existing political-military situation. Not surprisingly, he emphasized the threat Russia posed to Austria-Hungary. In order to nullify that danger, the Dual Monarchy had to ensure the neutrality of Germany in the event of an Austro-Hungarian-
Russian war. In regard to the Balkans, Andrásy stated that Vienna's proper policy was to prevent cooperation among the Romanians, Serbians, and Montenegrins, and to support the Ottoman empire. Such a course of action would rule out an aggressive Austro-Hungarian policy designed to obtain Bosnia-Hercegovina because that action could produce a coalition of Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey, and possibly even Russia, against the Dual Monarchy. Consequently, Andrásy believed that the assistance of Germany was essential to Austria-Hungary, and he requested permission from the emperor to take steps toward arranging an alliance with Bismarck. 30

In their reactions to the minister's proposals, the other three participants in the conference manifested varying degrees of hesitation or hostility. Baron Kuhn voiced the greatest opposition to the Magyar's suggestions. Kuhn's basic point was simply "that the greatest danger threatening the monarchy came from Prussia and not from the East." 31 The minister of war also emphasized the difficulties of preparing for a war--both in a general sense and specifically against Russia. According to Kuhn, the ministry of war would have to have 40,000,000 gulden at its disposal before war was declared to be able to

30 Ibid., pp. 31-37.

31 Ibid., p. 36.
purchase the food and the other supplies which would be needed. Furthermore, Kuhn stated, the army high command counted on diplomatic maneuvering to secure for them the seven or eight weeks necessary for full mobilization and deployment. Finally, in regard to mobilization against Russia alone, Kuhn stated that the 44 days' time called for in the existing plans could scarcely be lessened because of the poor transportation facilities in Galicia. 32

Overtly Archduke Albert was less decided in his opposition to the foreign minister's views, despite his notorious hatred of Prussia. He agreed with Andrásy that the army should be made strong and combat ready and that the greatest danger to the Dual Monarchy came from Russia; however, he did not view an alliance with Germany as any solution to that threat. Albert argued that Prussia was motivated solely by its own interests. If Austria-Hungary defeated Russia in a war, the Dual Monarchy would then be a threat to Bismarck's state and war between Habsburg and Hohenzollern would be the likely result. The proper Austro-Hungarian policy was for the monarchy to maintain its freedom of action, not to ally itself with Prussia. 33

The emperor's reaction to Andrásy's ideas was somewhat

32 Ibid., p. 38.

33 Ibid., pp. 38-40.
ambiguous. Francis Joseph responded to the foreign minister's request for permission to initiate negotiations aimed at an alliance with Germany by saying that such action would be "premature." Conversely, the ruler stated in his remarks which concluded the political part of the conference "that a war with Russia was probably to be accepted as the next impending war," and that while the Dual Monarchy needed a period of time as much in excess of Andrásy's two year limit as possible so that the state could be consolidated internally, nevertheless, preparations for a war with Russia had to be completed within two years.

In addition to providing insight into Andrásy's foreign policy views at the time he took office, the conferences of February, 1872 are also important because the problems and concerns discussed then foreshadowed many of those dealt with in late 1877 and early 1878 during the height of the Balkan crisis. One example which can be cited is the problem of gaining parliamentary approval of funds. Andrásy hoped to raise Kuhn's 40,000,000 gulden

34 See Lutz's introductory remarks in _ibid._, pp. 24-28.

35 _ibid._, p. 37.

36 _ibid._, p. 41.
in advance of any crisis so that provisions could be stock-
piled; Albert countered that idea with complaints about
the delegations' parsimony in provisioning the army in
time of peace. 37

A second issue which continued to be debated until 1878
was the choice of an area from which to attack Russia. For
his part, Archduke Albert saw no positive advantage in
attacking Russia since "nowhere could that war be carried
into the heart of Russia." 38 One obvious point of de-
parture for an attack was Galicia, but Kuhn mentioned the
transportation problems which deployment there would in-
volve, 39 and the Archduke stated that terrain difficulties
would limit an Austro-Hungarian advance from its Polish
territory into Russia to approximately a Dunaberg-Kiev
line. 40 Andrássy proposed embroiling the Russians in a war
with the Ottoman empire and then intervening. He described
the process as "a case of leading the Russians into a mouse
trap by way of the occupation of Moldavia and Walachia."
Austria-Hungary could then attack the Russian flank from

38 Ibid., p. 36.
39 Ibid., p. 38.
40 Ibid., p. 36.
Transylvania. Both Archduke Albert and Kuhn opposed that plan because of the poor communications in Transylvania and the "impossibility" of deploying a large army there.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 34.}

A third problem which continued unabated was the divergence of opinion about what constituted the proper Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and how that policy could best be implemented. This disparity of outlook militated against the formulation and execution of a vigorous foreign policy and tended to retard to an agonizing slowness the speed with which major policy decisions were made. All too often decisions tended to be reached by default, that is, when a positive, vigorous course of action could not be agreed upon, the leaders fell back to a passive policy which rendered the Dual Monarchy a spectator to events which had tremendous bearing on its future—happenings in which it should have been an active participant.

Francis Joseph's refusal to enter into negotiations aimed at securing an Austro-Hungarian-German alliance temporarily ended Andrásy's hopes of a coalition directed against Russia. But, if the foreign minister could not seek an alliance with Germany, he could still work to improve relations between the two states. In view of the

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}.}
existing friendship between Germany and Russia, rapprochement with the Hohenzollern state might well necessitate improved relations with tsarist Russia. Personally, Andrásy certainly had no desire for a rapprochement with Russia, but in view of the minimum of two years required to make the Austro-Hungarian military forces battle ready and in the absence of an anti-Russian league, that might be the best, or even the only, realistic policy for Austria-Hungary to pursue. In addition to gaining time for the necessary military preparations, an understanding with Russia could perhaps provide the Dual Monarchy with a means of forestalling the tsarist empire's more extreme Balkan plans and might even obviate the need for active opposition to the Romanov state.

It was largely out of circumstances such as these that the Three Emperors' League of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia came into being. There were also, however, a number of other conditions which encouraged the formation of such a conservative grouping. Of no small import were the personal relations between the leading ministers of the three states. Beust and Gorchakov had been personally antipathetic and any Austro-Hungarian-Russian rapprochement was unlikely as long as they were both in office.  

There was, however, no ill will between Andrásy and Gorchakov, and the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister also got along very well with Bismarck.

While good personal relations would aid in smoothing the way to an understanding, there were also more serious considerations which favored a German-Austro-Hungarian-Russian entente. For Germany such an understanding would remove the Dual Monarchy as a potential ally for France and also render Germany less dependent on Russia. The Three Emperors' League would serve the interests of the Habsburg state by ending its diplomatic isolation, and of course Andrásy always hoped to use it as a starting point from which to draw Germany into an alliance with Austria-Hungary against Russia. Possibly Gorchakov had less definite goals in mind, but both he and Alexander II sincerely believed in monarchical cooperation to ensure the peace of Europe, and if one thought in terms of an active Balkan policy, Austro-Hungarian cooperation or acquiescence would be necessary if Russia were to be successful. There was also a community of interest in regard to Poland, especially in view of German and Russian fears about

"My Activity as Ambassador in St. Petersburg," Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCCXXXII (Nachlaß Langenau), Fo. 2.
Austro-Hungarian concessions in Galicia.44 A final motivating factor was the threat, real or imagined, which the socialist movement posed to conservative rulers and powers.45

With these considerations in mind, the leading statesmen and members of the ruling dynasties of the three Eastern Powers undertook a series of personal visits and meetings during the years from 1871 to 1875. The result was the formation of the Three Emperors' League, with an attendant improvement in the relations of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia with each other. Since Germany and Russia were already on good terms, the creation of the entente essentially improved Austro-Hungarian relations with those two states. This was accomplished rather easily in the case of the Dual Monarchy and the Hohenzollern realm. In August and September of 1871 a series of meetings took place at Gastein, Ischl, and Salzburg between Bismarck and

44 Baron Carl von Franckenstein, Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, November 24/12, 1871, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1871), Fo. 124; Andrásy to Langenau, Buda, April 4, 1872, ibid. (Russia, Dispatches to Petersburg, 1872), Fos. 7-8; Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, March 9, 1872, ibid., Section III, Carton CV (Russia, Various, 1872), Fos. 1-2.

William I and Beust and Francis Joseph. 46 These meetings were important not for the decisions which were made but rather because of the sense of cordiality and cooperation which was reestablished, particularly between William I and Francis Joseph. 47

When this monarchical reconciliation was followed quickly by Andrásy's appointment as foreign minister, the stage was set for closer Austro-Hungarian-German relations. Andrásy promptly revealed to Bismarck the value he placed on good relations between the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns and received an encouraging response from the chancellor. 48 Bismarck assured Andrásy that he could count on "full reciprocity" 49 in his efforts to establish cordial relations

46 Contemporary accounts of the meeting may be found in Baron de Gabriac, French chargé d'affaires at Berlin, to Count Charles de Rémusat, French minister of foreign affairs, Berlin, August 11, 1871, Documents diplomatiques français (1871-1914), Vol. I: May 10, 1871-June 30, 1875 (1st ser., 41 vols., Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1929), Vol. I, pp. 57-60; Marquis Gaston-Robert de Banneville, French ambassador at Vienna, to de Rémusat, Vienna, August 24, 1871, ibid., p. 70; de Banneville to de Rémusat, Vienna, September 7, 1871, ibid., pp. 75-76.


48 Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, January 13, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CIV (Prussia, Reports, 1872 (I-V)), Fos. 9-13.

49 Ibid., Fo. 10.
between their two countries. The German chancellor emphasized his conviction that Russia would not attempt hostile action toward Austria-Hungary as long as Alexander II lived, and he assured Andrássy that Germany would not "lend a hand" to any such endeavor. The chancellor also held out the prospect of an understanding among the three Eastern Powers by revealing that Alexander II was apparently considering attempting a revival of the Russian-German-Austro-Hungarian entente which had existed in the first half of the nineteenth century.

While Austro-Hungarian-German relations could be smoothed out rather easily, the Austro-Hungarian-Russian situation appeared to offer more problems. The tsarist press had voiced suspicion of Andrássy when he was appointed foreign minister because of fear that the Magyar's anti-Russian outlook would manifest itself in concessions to the Poles of Galicia. A second hindrance to Austro-Hungarian-Russian cooperation was the task of reconciling the Balkan aspirations and interests of the Dual Monarchy and the tsarist empire. Still another significant stumbling block

50 *Ibid.*, Fo. 11.


52 Franckenstein to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, November 24/12, 1871, *ibid.*, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1871), Fo. 124.
was the attitude of Alexander II. He was known to harbor a grudge against Francis Joseph and Austria-Hungary because he regarded Russia's defeat in the Crimean War as a contributing cause to the death of his father—and the Dual Monarchy had been the blackest of villains in that defeat.  

Despite the problems just noted, soon after Andrásy became foreign minister Russia appeared to be ready for a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary. Gorchakov professed himself pleased with Andrásy's appointment and, except for possible differences over the Polish question, he foresaw no difficulties which would be likely to arise between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Immediately after his arrival in St. Petersburg in late 1871 Langenau became convinced that the time was ripe for a Habsburg-Romanov rapprochement, and he promptly reported that that seemed to be the Russians' feeling as well.  


54 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, November 27/15, 1871, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1871), Fos. 136-137.  

55 Langenau, "My Activity as Ambassador in St. Petersburg," ibid., Section XL, Carton CCCXXXII (Nachla Langenau), Fo. 3; Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, December 3/November 21, 1871, ibid., Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1871), Fos. 147-148. It should be noted that Langenau's Russophile views were freely admitted by him and were well known to the Ballhausplatz; so also was his notorious Prussophobia. His dispatches throughout the
In the summer of 1872, Vienna took an active step toward improving relations with the Muscovite state when Archduke William was sent as an observer to the Russian military maneuvers. Alexander regarded Archduke William with particular esteem and viewed his selection as Austria-Hungary's representative as a personal favor. He responded by bestowing upon the Archduke Russia's highest decoration—an honor heretofore granted to only one person in Russia. 56

1870's reveal a great confidence in Alexander II and in the tsar's sincere desire for peace and a good understanding with the Dual Monarchy. That view was hardly uncommon, but the ambassador appears to have accepted it as an article of faith without applying the canons of reason to the Russian situation. His reports strike one as somewhat superficial and not always based on the best sources; however, one must also recognize that Langenau was hampered in his attempts to establish rapport with the Romanov court by the curious position of the Austro-Hungarian military attaché, Colonel Baron Anton von Bechtolsheim. As Langenau himself stated, Bechtolsheim was much closer to the tsar than was the ambassador and saw Alexander much more frequently and in more intimate circumstances. Indeed, on several occasions Francis Joseph and Alexander sought to use the attaché as a messenger for their personal communications. Like Langenau, Bechtolsheim was an outspoken Prussophobe. See Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, December 11/November 29, 1872, ibid. (Russia, Various 1872, Private Letters from Petersburg, 1872), Fos. 56-59; Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, December 17/5, 1874, ibid., Carton LXVI, Private Letters from Petersburg (Langenau) 1874, Fos. 43-46; Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, January 8, 1878, ibid., Carton LXXII, Fos. 29; and Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, pp. 159 and 199.

56 Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, Vol. II, pp. 59-61; Langenau to Andrásy St. Petersburg, July 27/15, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXXIV (Russia, Reports 1872), Fos. 137-139.
At the same time when Austria-Hungary and Russia were establishing friendlier relations, plans were being made for Francis Joseph to visit Berlin. As soon as the tsar heard the reports of a possible meeting between William I and Francis Joseph, he expressed a desire to attend it, with the result that all three emperors met in Berlin in September, 1872.57 While the meeting accomplished very little of a concrete nature, it did serve to lay the foundation for the conclusion of the Three Emperors' League the following year. It demonstrated monarchical solidarity, which Langenau reported was Alexander's primary goal,58 and it served as Austria-Hungary's induction into the German-Russian fellowship. It was also important because Andrassy was able to establish good rapport with Gorchakov and to gain the tsar's confidence with his "refined candor."59


58 Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, July 30/18, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1872), Fo. 141.

59 Bechtolsheim to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, September 26/14, 1872, ibid. (Russia, Various, Diverse 1872), Fo. 15.
In terms of future developments the most significant aspect of the Berlin meeting was the discussions between Andrásy and Gorchakov. In their talks the two statesmen frankly set forth their views about Galicia and the Balkans—the primary areas of friction between their two countries. Andrásy was able to reassure Gorchakov that Austro-Hungarian concessions to the Poles would be very moderate and certainly would not pose the danger of inciting Russia’s Polish subjects. A more serious topic was the outlook of the two empires vis-à-vis the Balkans. The Habsburg minister stated that Austria-Hungary could not realistically have territorial aspirations there because dualism made the empire’s outlook "defensive." The Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy neither wanted nor could assimilate any additional territory; likewise, Cisleithania had no use for an increase in size, but if, nevertheless, an addition became imminent, Hungary would act to prevent it. Andrásy sounded out the Russian chancellor about the tsar’s support of Serbia, mentioning

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61 Ibid., pp. 404-405.
Austro-Hungarian opposition to the notion of a "greater Serbia" which would include Bosnia-Hercegovina, disapproval of a possible marriage between Prince Milan and a member of the Romanov family, and hostility towards possible Russian support of the agitational activities of Svetozar Miletić in favor of Serbia. Andrassy then passed on to the subject of the Ottoman empire, in connection with which he emphasized the Dual Monarchy's desire to maintain Turkey in its existing state.

Gorchakov's replies to his Habsburg counterpart were quite satisfactory. The Russian stated that his government had advised Milan to honor his obligations to Constantinople and not to indulge in an adventurous course of action. Russia gave no support to Miletić; nor would the tsar countenance the idea of a Romanov marrying a vassal of the sultan, according to Gorchakov.

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62 Copy of a report addressed to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia by the Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, Berlin, September 9/August 28, 1872 in ibid., pp. 402-403. For Miletić's views, see Djordjević, "The Serbs as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor," pp. 66-68.


64 Copy of a report addressed to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia by the Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, Berlin, September 9/August 28, 1872 in ibid., pp. 402-403.
to the Balkans, the chancellor stated that Russia, too, was satisfied with the status quo. 65

Although the discussions in Berlin in 1872 did not produce any written agreements, they did satisfy the participants. Bismarck saw substantial progress toward the establishment of improved relations between the two nations he hoped to have as allies; Gorchakov came to know Andrássy as "an honest, straightforward, sensible and earnest patriot, with whom he could establish a perfect understanding"; and Andrássy could not help but be encouraged by the Russian chancellor's reassurances to him about the tsarist empire's Balkan policies.

In the summer of 1873 the Eastern powers established the Three Emperors' League on the foundation of the good faith created in Berlin. The opening move came during a visit by William I to St. Petersburg in May, 1873. He and

65 Copy of a report addressed to the Emperor of Russia by the Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, Berlin, September 9/ August 28, 1872 in ibid., pp. 406-407. See also Langenau to Andrássy, St. Peters burg, April 17/5, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1872), Fo. 81, for a statement of Russia's pacific intentions in the east.

Alexander signed a military agreement which called for each country to aid its ally with a 200,000 man army in the event that country were attacked by a single European power. 67

The tsar attempted to draw Austria-Hungary into that same military alliance when he visited Vienna in June, but Francis Joseph and Andrásy retreated behind constitutional arguments in order to avoid such an action. They proposed instead that an understanding be entered into by the sovereigns. Alexander II accepted that proposal, and the agreement was signed on June 6, 1873. 68 It called for consultation in order to forestall serious problems between Austria-Hungary and Russia and in order to formulate a common policy if the European peace should be threatened by a third power. In the event that concerted military action should be required, it would be arranged in a separate convention. In October, 1873, William I added his signature to those of Alexander and Francis Joseph, thus creating the Three Emperors' League. 69

satisfaction with the Berlin meeting, and his conviction that he could work successfully with Andrásy.


68 See Emperor Alexander II of Russia to Emperor William I, Stuttgart, June 10/May 29, 1873 in ibid., pp. 204-206.

69 The Three Emperors' Agreement, Schönbrunn [Vienna],
Although Alexander II was quite pleased with the conclusion of an entente with Austria-Hungary, the Three Emperors' League, like the September, 1872 meeting in Berlin, was only the herald of even better relations between Habsburg and Romanov. The capstone of rapprochement was the visit of Francis Joseph to St. Petersburg in February, 1874. Although the two rulers had made some progress toward better personal relations at the previous meetings in Berlin and Vienna, their behavior had remained more correct than cordial. At this meeting, however, Francis Joseph won over Alexander from the onset. One of the emperor's first actions upon arriving in St. Petersburg was to lay a wreath and say a prayer at the grave of Nicholas I. Alexander II regarded that as an "'act of atonement'," and all the hostility which he had hitherto borne against Francis Joseph vanished. The emperor followed up on the good impression he had created initially by manifesting a sincere appreciation of Russian accomplishments and by distributing decorations and

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June 6/May 25, October 22, 1873 in *ibid.*, pp. 206-207. The ostensible purpose of Alexander II's visit to Vienna was to attend the world's fair being held there. The German emperor was also scheduled to visit in June, but his illness forced a last-minute cancellation. His wife, Empress Augusta, took his place and appeared in Vienna during the last week in June. Not until October was William I well enough to make the trip and add his signature to those of his brother monarchs.

monetary gifts on a most generous scale. 71 The Russians responded with a heartfelt outpouring of hospitality which demonstrated emphatically the improved state of Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations.

Although the visit was taken up as much with ostentatious display as it was with serious discussions, a frank exchange of ideas did take place. Andrássy was gladdened to hear from the tsar himself that Alexander did not condone any sort of "Pan-Slavic, nationalistic, or religious" propaganda in eastern Europe. 72 For his part, Gorchakov made sure that Andrássy understood the Russian position vis-à-vis Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was quite simple: Russia would regard Austro-Hungarian acquisition of the two provinces as a casus belli. 73

The final high-level meeting which sealed the Austro-Hungarian-German-Russian entente took place between Archduke Albert and Emperor William I in the summer of 1875. It was similar in importance to Francis Joseph's visit to St. Petersburg in that while Austro-Hungarian-German relations had actually improved in the first half

71 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 13/1, 1874, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXVI (Russia, Reports 1874), Fos. 74-75 and 78-82.


73 Ibid., p. 118.
of the 1870's, Bismarck and William I must have regarded that rapprochement with some reserve because of the rampant Prussophobia ascribed to the Archduke. In an interview at Ems, Archduke Albert, the general who was alleged to have said that he would die peacefully if he had beaten one Prussian army in the open field,\textsuperscript{74} convinced William I that he harbored neither resentment against Germany nor a desire for the Dual Monarchy to revenge itself on that state. In fact, the Archduke and the Emperor found themselves "in complete agreement on all military and political issues" which they had discussed.\textsuperscript{75}

The interview between Archduke Albert and Emperor William concluded the era of personal, imperial diplomacy which stretched back to the fall of 1871. Francis Joseph appeared to have become reconciled to the expulsion of his dynasty from Germany, and Austria-Hungary succeeded in establishing a good relationship with the German empire, an important part of which was the sincere friendship between Andrásy and Bismarck. Austro-Hungarian-Russian

\textsuperscript{74} As stated by Bismarck to Károlyi in Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, June 4, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CIX (Prussia, Various 1875), Fo. 31.

\textsuperscript{75} Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, June 28, 1875, ibid., Carton CVIII (Prussia, Reports from Berlin 1875), Fos. 409-411.
relations had also improved dramatically; this was in no small measure due to the quiescent situation in the Balkans. Balkan concerns had been the one recurring theme in all the Austro-Hungarian-Russian discussions, and the peace that prevailed in southeastern Europe in the early 1870's had been a major factor in facilitating the continuing improvement of Habsburg-Romanov relations.

As mentioned previously, Andrásy became foreign minister in part because of Austria-Hungary's new foreign policy orientation toward the southeast; however, orientation did not necessarily imply action, certainly not at least in Andrásy's view. Initially the foreign minister himself apparently maintained his earlier belief in the wisdom of partitioning Bosnia-Hercegovina among Serbia, Montenegro, and the Dual Monarchy if the Balkan situation should demand such action, but his thinking in regard to the proper Austro-Hungarian course of action soon began to change.

Andrássy's response to a proposal to purchase an area around the bay of Cattaro demonstrates clearly the stage his thinking had reached by early 1873. Baron Rodich had suggested that the Dual Monarchy buy a small area known as the Klek enclave from the sultan. This area was a wedge

77 Rodich's proposal is discussed in Francis Joseph to
of land which fronted on the bay of Cattaro and provided direct access to Hercegovina. It formed the quickest means of communication from Constantinople to Hercegovina and was therefore of vital importance to the Turks. It was precisely because the enclave was of such significance to the Porte that Andrassy opposed an attempt to acquire it. He felt that the area could be obtained only by war, and that would hardly be a suitable undertaking in his view, since, as he stated, "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has on its border an amiable neighbor whose political interests, in large measure, go hand in hand with our own and with whom we have every reason to cherish the best relationship." A more specific reason mitigating against

Beust, Schonbrunn, May 20, 1870, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton LIV (Statements and Autograph Letters of the All-Highest, 1873), Fo. 10. Rodich had evidently made his suggestion in 1870.

For an understanding of the importance which the Turks placed on the Klek enclave and its value to them as a communications route, see the dispatches from Count Franz Zichy in Constantinople during August, 1875. The messages can be found in ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXXIII.

Report of the Minister of the Imperial House and of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, February 6, 1873, ibid., Section XL, Carton LIV (Statements and Autograph Letters of the All-Highest, 1873), Fo. 65.
Austro-Hungarian acquisition of the Klek enclave was that Turkish possession of it would allow the Porte to speed troops to areas of unrest on the borders of the Dual Monarchy without Austria-Hungary having to exceed the bounds of neutrality by allowing the Turks to cross Habsburg territory. In this manner Austria-Hungary could avoid criticism from the Slavs—including Russia—for aiding the Turks against Balkan insurgents.80

Andrássy's statements about the Klek enclave illustrated his changed thinking about Bosnia-Hercegovina. In his comments on Rodich's proposal, the foreign minister no longer mentioned allowing a part of those provinces to fall to Serbia and Montenegro. Instead, he merely stated that in the event the weakness of Turkish control made it necessary for the Dual Monarchy to take possession of the Klek area, then that weakness would also have to serve "as justification for the occupation of the hinterland [that is, the hinterland of Dalmatia]." It must be emphasized, however, that in Andrássy's opinion it would be necessary for the Dual Monarchy to acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina only if a slackening of Turkish control created a danger that those provinces might come under the rule of some other

80 Ibid., Fos. 4-8, 64-65, and 67.
state. 81

Andrássy was also guided by his desire to maintain the status quo in his dealings with Austria-Hungary's small Balkan neighbors. Relations with Romania hinged mainly on the issue of the degree of Romania's autonomy and the possibility of its gaining complete independence from the Porte. 82 In early 1872, Austria-Hungary seconded Russia's successful request at Constantinople that Prince Charles be allowed to substitute "Romania" for "Moldavia-Walachia" in his title 83; however, that action was taken by Andrássy not out of any wish to enhance Charles' status but wholly because of his desire to prevent Russia from receiving all the credit for the change in the prince's title. 84

81 Ibid., Fos. 65-66. For a similar statement of Andrássy's views on the Ottoman empire and Bosnia-Hercegovina--also in reference to the proposed purchase of the Klek enclave--see the protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of May 17, 1872, ibid., Carton CCLXXXVII, Fos. 760-761


83 Andrássy to Károlyi, Ofen [Buda], April 16, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CV (Prussia, Dispatches to Berlin 1872), Fos. 18-19.

84 Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 68.
Typical of Andrásy's sentiments was his refusal to accept and support the Romanian request to have its agents in Vienna and Berlin given official diplomatic recognition. According to Andrásy, such recognition was so closely associated with the concept of independence that it would probably raise the issue of Romania's precise relationship to the Porte if it were granted. Although Andrásy was obviously most reluctant to deal with the topic of Romanian independence, the Romanians continued to bruit the matter about. In late 1873 the Austro-Hungarian mission in St. Petersburg relayed a report which claimed that Prince Charles had stated that under "'favorable circumstances'" Romania would seek "'an extension of its political rights'." The danger posed was not that of Romanian independence per se but rather of Serbian and Montenegrin reaction to Turkish military action against Romania. The situation could very easily lead to a reopening of the Eastern Question. Because unilateral Romanian action could create general Balkan unrest, which would in turn necessitate Great Power intervention, Andrásy

85 Andrásy to Károlyi, Vienna, July 7, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CV (Prussia, Dispatches to Berlin 1872), Fos. 51 and 54.

86 Ernest Ritter von Mayr to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, October 11/September 29, 1873, ibid., Section X, Carton LXV (Russia, Reports 1873), Fos. 412-413; Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, February 3/January 22, 1875,
advised the Romanians to adopt a very cautious and unhurried course of action. 87

In reference to Serbia, Vaso Trivanovitch has stated that "from 1872 until 1876, the foreign policy of Serbia was practically dictated by the League [the Three Emperors' League]." 88 While that statement may be correct, the orchestration of that Austro-Hungarian-Russian "dictation" was not without its problems. From Andrássy's point of view, his difficulty vis-à-vis Serbia stemmed not so much from the principality itself as from the possibility of Russian intrigues there. This concern was not allayed by improved relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg because the scheming Ignatiev remained at Constantinople and continued to spin a web of intrigue throughout the Balkans. 89 One of his principal agents was the Russian

87 Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, March 6, 1875, ibid., (Russia, Instructions 1875), Fos. 41-42.

88 Trivanovitch, "Serbia, Russia, and Austria during the Rule of Milan Obrenovich," p. 424.

89 For a reference to Ignatiev's potential for disrupting harmonious Austro-Hungarian-Russian relations, see the statement of Baron Alexander H. Jomini to Langenau as reported in Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, September 26/14, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna) Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Private Letters from Petersburg 1872), Fo. 53.
representative in Belgrade, who was accused of advising Prince Milan's government more in accordance with Pan-Slavic aspirations than with his official instructions. Andrássy's fear was that this situation would escalate and that the Serbian government would increasingly subordinate itself to the Pan-Slavic plans of Ignatiev and his cohorts.

From the Austro-Hungarian viewpoint, almost equally as dangerous as Pan-Slavic machinations was the possibility of closer Russian-Serbian ties resulting from marriage or a change of the Serbian dynasty. Rumors that Prince Milan had in mind marriage to a Romanov princess were current about the time Andrássy took office, and the foreign minister was worried enough about them to sound out Gorchakov about the possibility of a Romanov-Obrenovich marriage alliance in Berlin in September, 1872.

90 For Austro-Hungarian criticism of the actions of Andrew N. Kartzov, the Russian consul at Belgrade, see Prince Nikolaus Wrede to Andrássy, Belgrade, August 26/14, 1875, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CCV (Serbia, Various 1875), Fos. 19-20.

91 Andrássy to Langenau, Pest, April 10, 1872, ibid., Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Dispatches to Petersburg 1872), Fo. 11; Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, April 17/5, 1872, ibid. (Russia, Various 1872, Private Letters from Petersburg [Baron Langenau] 1872), Fo. 15.

92 Copy of a report addressed to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia by the Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, Berlin, September 9/August 28, 1872, in Meyendorff, "Conversations of Gorchakov with Andrássy and Bismarck in 1872," p. 403.
No sooner were the Austro-Hungarian fears concerning Milan's marriage laid to rest when the Russians became suspicious of the Dual Monarchy's role in Serbian affairs. In the spring of 1873 Milan and his prime minister Jovan Ristić had visited the tsar at Livadia. At that time Russia had advised Milan "to abandon all ideas of making Serbia a great power or independent and to concern himself with the internal affairs of his land." Such advice from the alleged protectors of the South Slavs enraged Ristić, who informed the Russians that he "would have to look around for another protector." With that incident in mind, the tsar and his ministers could hardly view Ristic's subsequent visit to Vienna with unconcern. While Ristić was in the Habsburg capital, he and Andrássy agreed that the Serbian agent in Vienna should have an "official" but not a "diplomatic" character, a formula which had previously been unsuccessfully proposed by the Serbs to the Russians. Andrássy's attempts to mollify Russian annoyance over Vienna's upgrading of the Serbian representative could not have been too well received, since in his explanation of the Austro-Hungarian action the foreign minister emphasized that his limited recognition of the Serbian representative

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93 An account of the Serbs' visit to Livadia is found in Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, May 14/2, 1873, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXV (Russia, Various, Letters), Fos. 49-53.
merely reflected accurately the dependence of Serbia on the Dual Monarchy. 94

In the spring of 1875 it was Andrássy's turn to be alarmed, this time over reports of an impending change of dynasty in Serbia. The prevailing version of the rumor was that Milan would be deposed and replaced by the Duke of Leuchtenberg, a Romanov kinsman. 95 Langenau, however, dispelled the Leuchtenberg rumor; Alexander II, he assured Andrássy, simply would not allow a member of the Romanov family to become a vassal of the Porte. Furthermore, the ambassador was convinced that Russia desired the maintenance of the existing situation in Serbia in order to avoid the confusion and disturbances a change of dynasty would occasion. 96

Like his fellow monarchs Charles of Romania and Milan of Serbia, Nicholas of Montenegro also endeavored throughout the 1870's to increase his country's prestige and to rid it of any taint of Turkish domination. 97 Although he

94 Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, May 21, 1873, ibid. (Russia, Dispatches, 1873), Fos. 49-54.

95 Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, April 1, 1875, ibid., Carton LXVII (Russia, Instructions 1875), Fos. 51-52.

96 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, April 13/1, 1875, ibid. (Russia, Various 1875-1876; Letters from Petersburg 1875), Fos. 57-58.

97 Although Montenegro had never been effectively controlled by the Porte, the sultan maintained a titular
was only slightly more successful than Charles and Milan, Nicholas showed himself to be a more astute diplomat in his dealings with the Great Powers; indeed, he managed to retain the support and sympathy of both Austria-Hungary and Russia throughout most of the 1870's. In his diplomatic maneuvering Nicholas benefitted from a very special relationship with Russia. This tie between Russia and Montenegro had been fostered by custom and tradition and stemmed from ethnic and religious ties, compounded by Montenegro's successful resistance to the Turkish onslaught. In the case of Austria-Hungary, Nicholas had an advantage in that those representatives of the Dual Monarchy who were in closest contact with Montenegro were quite sympathetic to its problems and aspirations.

claim to sovereignty.

98 Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, p. 61. Jelavich also quotes Nicholas as saying, "We and the Russians are 100,000,000 strong." This statement dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century and may not be indicative of the Russian-Montenegrin relationship in the 1870's; it was, however, precisely what Andrásy and Austria-Hungary feared.

99 The role which Baron Gabriel Rodich played in Balkan affairs in the 1870's is difficult to determine with precision. His sympathies for the South Slavs were well known; so, too, were his hope that the Dual Monarchy would advance into the Balkans and his loyalty to the monarch. Rodich maintained a good relationship with Nicholas of Montenegro and with the rebels of Bosnia-Hercegovina after 1875. He was accused in the Cisleithanian parliament of abetting the Hercegovinan revolt by allowing free passage of men and arms across the Austro-Hungarian border and by
The initial Montenegrin issue that confronted Andrásy as foreign minister was a request from Nicholas for an Austro-Hungarian military mission. According to the report of Baron Rodich, Nicholas desired the mission not for military purposes but rather as a demonstration of Montenegro's independent status. While an answer to this request was being formulated, Nicholas raised the ante by revealing to Rodich his hope for Austro-Hungarian diplomatic recognition. Although Andrásy viewed the issue of Montenegrin independence as "a moot point," he would not antagonize the Porte by officially recognizing Montenegro's de facto condition. Andrásy's solution to providing a sanctuary for the rebels. Andrásy's instructions to Rodich were to seal the Dual Monarchy's borders with Turkey and to prevent popular demonstrations in favor of the revolt. Both Andrásy and Francis Joseph seem to have been satisfied with his performance in this respect.

Major Gustav Ritter von Thoemel, who was sent to Cetinje in the early 1870's under the pretext of negotiations concerning communications between Dalmatia and Montenegro, was also well liked by Nicholas and quite sympathetic to the prince's views and aspirations.

100 Andrásy to Rodich, Vienna, February 19, 1872, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Car- ton CXXXI (Dalmatian governor's office 1872), Fo. 4.

101 Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, April 10, 1872, ibid., Fo. 26.

102 The phrase appears in Andrásy to Wrede, Vienna, May 5, 1875, ibid., Section X, Carton LXVII (Russia, Re- ports 1875), Fo. 65; but it is equally valid for the earlier period.
the problem was to send a trusted agent to Montenegro under the pretext of conducting discussions about communications between Dalmatia and Montenegro. 103

At about this same time (the spring of 1872) Rodich reported on a series of meetings between Nicholas and Serbian and Russian representatives to discuss the possibility of forming a Montenegrin-Serbian alliance to be financed by Russia and directed against the Porte. The proposals quickly came to naught, however, because of disagreement over whether Serbia or Montenegro had the better claim to leadership of the South Slavs. Rodich himself did not believe that Prince Nicholas was firmly committed to any such bellicose project. Even if Nicholas did favor an aggressive course of action, Rodich did not think that Serbian-Montenegrin relations were cordial enough to bear the weight of an alliance. 104

Another incident indicative of Russia's interest in Montenegrin affairs occurred at the same time the alliance negotiations were being held. This time the issue was Nicholas' invitation to the Vienna world's fair in 1873. Apparently there was a misunderstanding, and Nicholas

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103 Andrásy to Rodich, Vienna, February 19, 1872, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXI (Dalmatian governor's office 1872), Fos. 4-5.

104 Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, February 29, 1872, ibid., Fos. 13-16; Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, April 10, 1872, ibid., Fos. 17-18.
reported himself "very hurt" because his invitation was to come through Turkish diplomatic channels rather than directly from Vienna to Cetinje. He tried to get Russian assistance in righting this grievous wrong. 105 Although the tsar did not take especially vigorous action in behalf of Nicholas, Alexander did regard it as a mark of personal esteem when the invitation was sent directly to the prince. According to Langenau, the matter ended well for the Dual Monarchy since the Austro-Hungarian action greatly raised Alexander's opinion of Francis Joseph and Andrássy. 106

In 1873 Rodich reported more signs of Montenegrin-Serbian discord. After a visit to Montenegro the governor of Dalmatia stated that Nicholas feared that Serbia was cautiously trying to take over the administration of Bosnia—something which would constitute a de facto annexation. The prince was unhappy over what he regarded as Serbia's exaggerated territorial pretensions as well as over Serbia's claim to be the South Slav Piedmont. Nicholas warned Rodich that Serbian conduct could force him

105 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 20/8, 1872, ibid., Section X, Carton LXIV (Russia, Reports 1872), Fo. 51.

106 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, April 1/March 20, 1872, ibid., Fos. 56-60. Francis Joseph commented in the margin of this report that the direct invitation was intended to humor Montenegro and not to demonstrate favor for Russia. See also Langenau, "My Activity as Ambassador in St. Petersburg," ibid., Section XL, Carton CCCXXXII (Nachlaß Langenau), Fo. 6.
to adopt an aggressive course of action, even though he did not currently favor that.\textsuperscript{107}

Rodich also reported to Vienna on Montenegro's connection with Russia. He felt that it would remain unbroken simply because of the material advantages and prestige which accrued to Montenegro.\textsuperscript{108} Rodich did mention that Nicholas did not approve of the conduct of the Russian consul at Ragusa, who sometimes exceeded his instructions, but, conversely, Nicholas' kinsman and confidant Bojidar Petrovich was "especially sympathetic to Russia."\textsuperscript{109}

Much more ominous for the peace of the Balkans than Russian intrigues in Montenegro or a projected alliance between the Slavic princedoms was the hostility which erupted between Montenegro and the Porte in the autumn of 1874. The problem stemmed from the "massacre" of about twenty Montenegrin subjects in the vicinity of Podgoritza, in a border area claimed by Montenegro. Nicholas feared

\textsuperscript{107} Rodich to András, Zara, April 28, 1873, \textit{ibid.}, Section XL, Carton CXXXII (Governor of Dalmatia, 1873), Fos. 20-21.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}, Fos. 24-25. See also the correspondence between Andrásy and Langenau during March, 1873 in \textit{ibid.}, Section X, Carton LXV in reference to Russian cash subsidies paid to Nicholas of Montenegro.

\textsuperscript{109} Rodich to András, Zara, April 28, 1873, \textit{ibid.}, Section XL, Carton CXXXII (Governor of Dalmatia 1873), Fos. 24-25.
that the enraged state of public opinion would force him into war against the sultan; consequently, he called on Russia and Austria-Hungary for assistance in ensuring that Montenegro would receive proper redress of its grievances.\textsuperscript{110} Despite representations by the members of the Three Emperors' League in Montenegro's behalf, the Turks could not be persuaded either to investigate the affair promptly or to punish the guilty parties summarily. The Porte chose instead to delay matters and to attempt to evade responsibility for the affair. Turkish inaction created great pressure within Montenegro for Nicholas to act against Constantinople; only the strong control which he exercised over his country enabled the prince to maintain peace.\textsuperscript{111}

By early 1875 the Turks had finally undertaken a dilatory investigation of the Podgoritza affair, and the possibility of war between Montenegro and the Ottoman empire began to diminish. However, although the danger of a Turkish-Montenegrin clash diminished, Balkan unrest did not.

\textsuperscript{110}Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, November 9, 1874, \textit{ibid.} (Dalmatian governor's office 1874), Fos. 7-10.

\textsuperscript{111}Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, November 14/2, 1874, \textit{ibid.}, Section X, Carton LXVI (Russia, Reports 1874), Fo. 337; Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, November 29, 1874, \textit{ibid.} (Russia, Dispatches to St. Petersburg, 1874), Fos. 112-113.
The focus of conflict shifted northward to the area around Nevesinje in Hercegovina. There clashes erupted which resulted in the flight of Slavs to Montenegro. Nicholas again appealed to the Powers, this time for aid in repatriating the Hercegovinans, but both Turkey and Austria-Hungary refused to assist Montenegro since those countries felt that Montenegro itself was behind the troubles in Hercegovina.

As a result of the Montenegrin and Hercegovinan disturbances and the prospect of serious trouble in the Balkans, the leaders of Austria-Hungary met on January 29, 1875, to discuss the Dual Monarchy's proper course of action. The participants at that extraordinary conference were Francis Joseph; Archduke Albert; Andrásy; Beck; Field Marshal Baron Franz von John, the chief of the

112 Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, December 25, 1874, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXII (Dalmatian governor's office 1874), Fo. 15.

113 Some idea of the state of affairs in Hercegovina may be gained from the documents in Actenstücke aus den Korrespondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministers des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877) (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der k. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1878), pp. 92-95.

114 The proceedings of this conference can be found in the protocol of the conference held on January 29, 1875 under the chairmanship of the emperor, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, No. 69-2/2 (1875), Fos. 1-26. A French translation of material extracted from the first ten pages of this protocol appears in M. V. Groub, "Austro-Hungarian Policy in the Balkans on
general staff; Baron Alexander von Koller, the imperial minister of war; and Vice-Admiral Friedrich von Pöck, chief of the marine section of the ministry of war.

The first phase of the discussion dealt with the political aspects of Balkan intervention. Andrásy began by accepting the notion that circumstances could force Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to protect Dalmatia; however, in Andrásy's opinion that action would be dependent on a number of factors. The foreign minister ruled out a military campaign against Turkey because that could possibly unite the Ottoman empire, Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro against the Habsburg state. Indeed Turkey—or Turkish possession of Bosnia-Hercegovina—posed no threat to Dalmatia; rather the Ottoman presence in the Balkans was "almost providential" from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, he maintained. As the situation currently existed, the Porte was "vegetating" on Austria-Hungary's frontier—not strong enough to be a threat to the Dual Monarchy, yet still sufficiently powerful to restrain the Christian principedoms from their expansionist pretensions. The difficulty which the foreign minister foresaw was the possibility that Turkish rule

would become so weak that Serbia and/or Montenegro would try to acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina or that the Hercegovinans would attempt to create an entirely new state. In Andrásy's opinion, either eventuality would pose a direct and immediate threat to Dalmatia. 115

In dealing with the immediate results which might arise from a Montenegrin-Turkish conflict, Andrásy detailed two possibilities for Austria-Hungary. If it came to war between the Porte and its "vassal" and the Turks were victorious, the end result would probably be some sort of Great Power intervention which would restore the status quo ante bellum. If, however, Montenegro defeated the Porte, Andrásy felt that Austria-Hungary would have a good chance to take Bosnia-Hercegovina under the guise of border rectification. 116

Archduke Albert accepted Andrásy's outline of events but carried it farther by asserting that Novi Pazar should be occupied at least up to the crest of the Balkan mountains in order to safeguard a possible railroad line via Novi-Sarajevo-Prisrend. 117

115 Protocol of the conference held of January 29, 1875 under the chairmanship of the emperor, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, No. 69-2/2 (1875), Fos. 3-6.

116 Ibid., Fos. 7-9.

117 Ibid., Fos. 10-11.
Andrássy immediately opposed the acquisition of Novi Pazar. He felt that the area should be left to Serbia and Montenegro since it would form a "bone of contention" between them and keep them too embroiled with each other to threaten Austria-Hungary. Andrássy added that he could not envision Serbian-Montenegrin cooperation under the existing circumstances. 118

After this political discussion the conferees turned to the military problems involved in implementing an occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Baron von John opened the discussion by pointing out that the Bosna river valley was the only suitable line of advance and that the primary objectives would be Banja Luka, Travnik, Sarajevo, and Mostar. The occupation of Bosnia should originate from Croatia-Slavonia; that of Hercegovina from Dalmatia. John also advised the attaching of military officers to the Balkan consulate staffs so that they might reconnoiter the area. 119

Andrássy agreed with John's conception of the situation but cautioned against sudden, unprecipitated action because of diplomatic considerations. He felt that any Austro-Hungarian move would have to be arranged so that the

118 Ibid., Fos. 11 and 14-16.
119 Ibid., Fos. 17-18, and 20-21.
world would view it as a response to a threatening situation rather than an attempt at a fait accompli. 120

At this point the discussion turned to the number of troops required for the operation. John and Albert agreed that a contingent of 450,000 men would be needed to occupy Bosnia and to hold Serbia and Montenegro in check. 121 Andrassy responded that such a figure was far too high, since it was not based on a proper understanding of how the occupation would be effectuated. According to the foreign minister, Bosnia would be occupied only if the Porte were unable to maintain its rule there and then only on the condition that Serbia and Montenegro be compensated. Thus the danger of conflict with the princedoms would be avoided and the number of troops and the expenses involved would be greatly reduced. 122

Francis Joseph ended the conference by ordering the assignment of military officers to the Balkan consulates and the preparation of two mobilization studies, the first involving a strengthening of the border to maintain internal

120 Ibid., Fo. 20-21.

121 Ibid., Fo. 22.

122 Ibid., Fo. 22-23.
security and the second envisioning intervention in the Balkans.\footnote{Ibid., Po. 25. Francis Joseph's orders resulted in several mobilization studies in 1875. The first of these was completed in March. It called for a force of five divisions to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina up to the line of the Drina and Lim rivers. According to the study, this force would be strong enough to extend operations into Serbia if that became necessary. The cost of the mobilization was estimated at about 21,000,000 gulden for a six month period. See Proposal of the imperial war ministry concerning the basic characteristics of a possible disposition of an army of observation against Bosnia and the adjoining lands, \textit{ibid.}, No. 69-2/3 (1875), Fos. 1-11. A minor revision of this plan appeared in June of 1875. The occupying force was reduced to four divisions, but the cost estimate was increased to 23,400,000 gulden. This plan is significant in the light of later events because at this early date--even before the outbreak of the Balkan crisis--the minister of war reported that the funds necessary for the mobilization of this force were not on hand. In an attempt to speed up the acquisition of the money he requested prior authorization to request it from the Delegations upon the receipt of a mobilization order. See Proposal of the imperial war minister. Mobilization}{123} Andrássy's views as expressed in the conference of January, 1875, taken in conjunction with earlier statements and with his conduct of policy since 1871, allow one to form a clear picture of his foreign policy aspirations on the eve of the most serious of the nineteenth century Balkan crises. The Magyar minister had undergone a gradual transformation in his thinking about the Balkans. In contrast to his outlook before he became foreign minister, he was no longer willing to countenance a course of action which might be harmful to the Porte, such as, for example, the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina between
the Dual Monarchy, Serbia and Montenegro. In contradic-
tion to the view he expressed to Mollinary in November,
1871, in 1875 Andrássy was unwilling for Milan or Nicholas
to acquire any of Bosnia-Hercegovina; instead, the prince-
doms were to receive Novi Pazar, a prize which Andrássy
fervently hoped would contain the seeds of everlasting
conflict.

The foreign minister increasingly regarded the main-
tenance of Ottoman control in the Balkans—and concomitant-
ly the preservation of the territorial status quo—as the
Balkan situation most advantageous to the Dual Monarchy.
Although Andrássy eventually acknowledged that the Habsburg
empire might have to seize Bosnia-Hercegovina, such a move
would be "defensive"; it would occur if, and only if, a
slackening of Turkish control created the danger that those
provinces might come under the rule of some other state.
One must remember that in the period from 1871 to mid-1875
there was no indication of a diminution of the Porte's con-
trol over its Balkan possessions; therefore, Andrássy could
pay lip service in relative safety to a policy which he
would be exceedingly reluctant to implement. The foreign
minister believed that the rivalry between Milan and
Nicholas for leadership of the South Slavs precluded an

plan for the disposition of an observation corps against
Bosnia and the adjoining lands, ibid., No. 69-2/4 (1875),
Fos. 1-11 and 54-61.
effective alliance between their two countries. If that proved to be the case, and if the Great Powers refrained from intervention in the Balkans, then Andrássy regarded a general conflagration in southeastern Europe—one which might force the Dual Monarchy to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina—as highly unlikely. Andrássy could logically hope that the Great Power restraint vis-à-vis the Balkans which he desired would be an outgrowth of the Three Emperors' League. After his early failure to set the Dual Monarchy on a course of active opposition to tsarist Russia, the foreign minister had been forced to change his tack to one of cooperation with Russia in an attempt to circumscribe St. Petersburg's Balkan aspirations and to protect Austro-Hungarian interests. Although there was still a great deal of mutual suspicion on the part of the Dual Monarchy and Russia about their Balkan plans, the League seemed to offer Andrássy an effective means of thwarting the tsarist empire's more extreme Balkan schemes.

In the first part of 1875 it appeared as though Andrássy would be able to continue his own low key Balkan policy. The small states of the area were not united and therefore were too weak to disturb the status quo, while the soaring schemes of Russian Pan-Slavists were bound by the shackles of the Three Emperors' League. There was, however, one condition which was absolutely essential if Andrássy was to be able to maintain his policy. Peace had
to be preserved. Any disturbance of the Balkan status quo would invite Russian intrigue and intervention, and an armed conflict between Turks and Slavs would spur Serbia and Montenegro to unite in opposition to the Porte. In early 1873 Andrásy had stated that "during the next three years a disturbance of the Monarchy's peace was not to be feared."124 As July, 1875 approached, his time was rapidly running out.

124 Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of January 8, 1873, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCLXXXVII, Fo. 1, 136.
CHAPTER III

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ATTEMPTS TO QUELL BALKAN UNREST,
JULY, 1875 TO JULY, 1876

"I do not think that Serbia has the courage to enter the lists contrary to the serious remonstrances of Austria-Hungary and Russia."
--Andrássy, April 8, 1876.

"The most serious danger to us comes from Serbia, whose warlike attitude becomes more menacing each day."
--Andrássy, May 27, 1876.

Although the Three Emperors' League provided Andrássy with a means to suppress the intrigues of Russia and the Slavic principalities, the Habsburg foreign minister had absolutely no leverage over the Ottoman empire's Christian, Slavic subjects--the group most likely to create a serious Balkan disturbance. The situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina was exceptionally dangerous. The Moslem nobles of that area fanatically defended their conception of Islam and their proprietary rights over the

1Andrássy to Count Franz Zichy, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Constantinople [n.p.], April 8, 1876, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 576.

non-Moslem peasants which their religion gave them. Their tendency to revolt against the sultan in defense of religion had made reform impossible. Nor had the Moslem lords been the only group to revolt; peasant uprisings had been fierce and frequent in the nineteenth century since the rayah had nothing more to lose than precarious lives of abject misery.  

The Hercegovinan revolt of 1875 began early in July. It was rooted in centuries of oppression exemplified by the harsh feudal regime under which the Christian peasants suffered. While Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Slavic agitation probably all played a role in inciting the revolt, it appears to have been primarily an indigenous movement which sprang from local causes, the most important of which were a poor harvest coupled with an extremely onerous system of taxation. From Hercegovina the revolt quickly

3 For information about conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina prior to the time when Andrassy became foreign minister, see Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns, Vol. I, pp. 106-119.


5 Ibid., p. 16. See also Svetozar Theodorović, "Sketch of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1875," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 70-59 (1), pp. 1-37. Theodorović was the Austro-Hungarian consul at Sarajevo. His study is particularly useful for its description of the system of
spread to Bosnia. The intensity and extent of the movement raised a question which Andrássy dreaded: could the Ottoman empire maintain effective control over its Balkan possessions?

In an attempt both to assist the Porte in quelling the revolt and to minimize the effects of the uprising, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister acted quickly in several areas. Initially, he sought to discourage other states from intervening. The government of Francis Joseph stated publicly that it regarded the revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina as a Turkish internal problem. Andrássy revealed his fervent desire for the restoration of peace in the Balkans; however, in his view the choice of the method to use in bringing about that peace should be left exclusively to the Turks.  

Another depiction of conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina by the same author is found in his "Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry in Bosnia; Observations about the general economic situation. Report of imperial and royal consul general Theodorovich," in Correspondenzen des Ministeriums des Aeussern und Berichte der k. und k. Missionen und Consulate in handelspolitischen Angelegenheiten. No. 1 (Den beiden Delegationen vorgelegt im October 1875) (Vienna: Aus der kaiserlich-königlichen Hof- und Staats- druckerei, 1875), pp. 107-110. It is interesting to note that Theodorović stressed that Bosnia-Hercegovina offered only a "doubtful advantage" to Austro-Hungarian commerce.

Andrássy to Baron Gabriel Herbert-Rathkeal, acting Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Constantinople, Vienna, July 10, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXV (Turkey, Correspondence with Constantinople 1875-76), Fo. 19. See also the foreign
Andrássy also took prompt action to ensure that his statements of principle and his desired course of action were not contravened by Austria-Hungary itself. In fact, it was probably this consideration as much as any other which stimulated a flurry of activity by the foreign minister soon after the outbreak of the revolt. Without doubt, he felt that he had to seize the initiative in determining Austria-Hungary's response to the Balkan unrest in order to preclude the possibility of being forced into an aggressive, expansionist policy which was anathema to him. Nor were his fears in this regard unjustified. The revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina aroused all the Slavs of southeastern Europe, especially the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. During the Podgoritza affair, Andrássy had shown himself seriously concerned about whether or not the Dual Monarchy could enforce a policy of neutrality among its subjects in southern Dalmatia in the event of a

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minister's view as stated in Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, July 25, 1875, ibid., Section VIII, Carton LXXXIV (Great Britain, Dispatches 1875), Fo. 102.

For example, see the statement that "the uprising in Hercegovina and Bosnia in 1875 mobilized all the energies of the entire Serbian population from the Vojvodina to Dalmatia and from Serbia to the lands under Ottoman rule" in Djordjević, "The Serbs as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor," p. 70.
Turkish-Montenegrin war. Now a crisis more serious and more geographically immediate had arisen.

The foremost threat to Andrássy's plan to let the Turks solve their Balkan difficulties without outside interference was the favorable attitude which Francis Joseph and some of his military leaders held towards Austro-Hungarian aggrandizement in southeastern Europe. From Andrássy's viewpoint, it was of no little importance that both Rodich and Jovanović commanded in Dalmatia, a province exceedingly sensitive to the prevailing Balkan unrest. The two men favored Austro-Hungarian expansion into the Balkans and could easily cooperate in furthering that goal. Their sentiments were known to the local populace, and Rodich, in particular, exercised a significant personal influence over the Slavs of the area.

Even more ominous from Andrássy's point of view than the attitudes of the pro-expansionist generals, and

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8 Andrássy to Rodich, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, No. 69-2/1 (1875), Fos. 2-3.

9 A part of Rodich's prestige and influence in Dalmatia and surrounding areas stemmed from his handling of a revolt against the imposition of conscription there in 1869-1870. Rodich's compromise solution to the conflict was very favorable to the Slavs of southern Dalmatia. See Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 86. See also references to Rodich's influence over the local populace in the documents found in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Cartons CCXXVII and CCXXVIII.
decisive for Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, was the outlook of the emperor in the summer of 1875. In April and May of that year Francis Joseph had made a thirty-three day visit to Dalmatia. He had been welcomed enthusiastically, particularly by delegations from Bosnia-Hercegovina, and had received assurances from Nicholas of Montenegro that the principality would make every effort to accommodate itself to Austria-Hungary's Balkan policies. According to Beck, at this time the Montenegrin government proposed a joint Austro-Hungarian-Montenegrin seizure of Hercegovina. Regardless of whether or not this proposal had any effect on the emperor's thinking, by some accounts Francis Joseph returned to Vienna convinced that an Austro-Hungarian annexation of Hercegovina and/or Bosnia was in the immediate future.

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10 For a brief account of this visit, see Mollinary, Sachsundvierzig Jahre, Vol. II, pp. 283-284. A contrasting view of the visit is found in Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 92.

11 According to Beck, the father-in-law of Prince Nicholas, proposed to him that Austria-Hungary "send Jovanović into Hercegovina" while the Montenegrins covered the Austro-Hungarian right flank. A division of territory was not discussed, although the Montenegrin voiced his countrymen's desire "to free our co-religionists from the Turkish yoke" and "to have enough land to be able to nourish our cattle." See Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, pp. 182-183.

An aggressive Austro-Hungarian course of action certainly was not envisioned by Andrásy, and apparently the foreign minister was able to convince the emperor that the disturbances in Bosnia-Hercegovina offered neither cause nor excuse for intervention. Francis Joseph probably was not totally convinced of the correctness of Andrásy's policy, but he was willing to allow the foreign minister to attempt to implement his ideas. In July and August, 1875, Andrásy's guiding principle was to keep the insurgents isolated from outside assistance so that the Porte could crush the revolt. Rodich was ordered to seal the borders against aid from Austria-Hungary to the rebellious provinces and to allow insurgents to enter the Dual Monarchy only if they interned themselves. In addition, Rodich was ordered by Andrásy to inform the rebels "that we do not regard the present moment as suitable for such a movement and that because of that they cannot count on any support from us." The governor of Dalmatia was also


14 Andrásy to Rodich, Vienna, August 10, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXIV (Turkey, Correspondence with Rodich 1875-76), Fo. 181.

15 Andrásy to Emperor Francis Joseph, Terebes, July 20, 1875, ibid., Fo. 47. See also Andrásy to Rodich,
instructed not to deny the Turks landing privileges at Klek on the bay of Cattaro.\textsuperscript{16}

On August 12, Andrásy evaluated the current situation for the governor so that Rodich could better understand and fulfill his instructions.\textsuperscript{17} According to Andrásy, a

\begin{quote}
Terebes, July 21, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 46; and Andrásy to Rodich, Terebes, August 1, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 177.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16}Andrásy to Rodich, Vienna, August 9, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXVI, Fo. 264. The status of the bay of Cattaro and Klek was rather complicated. Andrásy upheld the Turks' right to land troops there, not apparently in recognition of the justice of the Porte's claim but rather simply to assist the Porte in quelling the revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In actual practice if the Turks wished to disembark troops or supplies at Klek, the Ottoman ambassador at Vienna requested permission to do so from the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry. The Ballhausplatz would then instruct Rodich to allow the Turks to land. Thus, in effect the Dual Monarchy maintained control of the bay of Cattaro and was able to use that control as a powerful bargaining tool in attempting to get the Turks to follow Vienna's wishes. Details of the situation are found in \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXVII.

\textsuperscript{17}In addition to assisting Rodich in following the foreign minister's instructions, Andrásy had at least two other thoughts in mind when he wrote these letters. Firstly, he wanted to reveal to Rodich his views on Russia in order to counteract the ideas of Jovanović, who was blaming the trouble in Bosnia-Hercegovina on Russia and propagandizing in favor of an aggressive Austro-Hungarian course of action. See Andrásy to Rodich, Vienna, August 12, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the imperial-royal governor of Dalmatia, Lieutenant-General Rodich in Zara, 1875-1876), Fo. 3. Secondly, the foreign minister had not been satisfied with the first draft of Rodich's instructions. That document had been prepared by Francis Joseph's military chancery and "was decidedly friedly toward the insurgents in its tone." The tone of that document forced Andrásy to revise the instructions. See [Doczy], "On the Occupation of Bosnia," \textit{ibid.}, Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fo. 51. Andrásy
definitive solution of the Eastern Question would not be in the interests of Austria-Hungary. The foreign minister acknowledged that the Dual Monarchy could not suffer Serbia and Montenegro to acquire Bosnia-Herzegovina; however, consideration for Russia's reaction forced Austria-Hungary to be circumspect in dealing with the principalities. Rodich was instructed to work to prevent a final solution of the Eastern Question, to adhere to a policy of strict neutrality vis-à-vis Turkey, to attempt to give substance to the Dual Monarchy's preeminent interest in the affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to ensure that the Christian population of the Balkans realized "that they have to expect a final resolution of their fate only from us."  

In a second, private, letter which accompanied his latest instructions to Rodich, the foreign minister provided the governor with additional insight into the bases of his policy. Andrássy stated his conviction that Russia was not currently interested in a definitive Balkan

emphasized to Rodich that he was to receive his instructions through the foreign ministry since that ministry bore the brunt of the responsibility for Austria-Hungary's conduct in the resolution of the Balkan problems. See Andrássy to Rodich, Vienna, August 12, 1875, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the imperial-royal governor of Dalmatia, Lieutenant-General Rodich in Zara, 1875-1876), Fo. 2.

18 Andrássy to Rodich, Vienna, August 12, 1875, ibid., Fos. 1-2.
settlement, that Serbia was unprepared to attempt to effectuate such action, and that alone Montenegro was too weak. Thus, since a "radical solution" of the Balkan problems was not likely to be forced on Austria-Hungary, Andrásy saw no reason to deviate from a policy of strict neutrality. ¹⁹

Initially the foreign minister's assessment of the responses of Serbia and Montenegro to the Hercegovinan revolt appeared to be correct. Early reports from Belgrade indicated that the Serbian government definitely preferred peace in Bosnia-Hercegovina in order to be able to devote all its strength to the impending elections to the national assembly. The Serbian opposition party, led by Jovan Ristić, was, however, clamoring for action and criticizing Milan's passive policy. ²⁰ Nicholas of Montenegro, shrewdly biding his time, facilely assured Vienna that he would not depart from the path of peace which his friendship with Austria-Hungary enabled him to follow. ²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., Fo. 3.

²⁰ Johann Čingria, Austro-Hungarian consul at Belgrade, to Andrásy, Belgrade, July 22, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXXIV (Turkey, Correspondence with the agent in Belgrade and with the Serbian agent Zukitch, 1875 and 1876), Fo. 8-9; and Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, July 28, 1875, ibid., (Turkey, Correspondence with Belgrade 1875), Fo. 12.

²¹ Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, August 15, 1875, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXIII (Governor in Dalmatia [Lieutenant-General Baron Rodich in Zara] 1875), Fo. 164 and 169.
Although the governments of the Slavic principalities followed a course of action which coincided with Andrássy's wishes during the early part of the revolt, St. Petersburg immediately began to create problems for the foreign minister. As soon as the seriousness of the revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina became fully evident, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Eugene P. Novikov, informed the Ballhausplatz that it was the view of his government that "only a combined action by the three Great Powers [i.e., Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany] can prevent a general conflagration." St. Petersburg feared that the Porte would find itself unable to suppress the revolt and that such a demonstration of impotence would rouse Montenegro to overt participation in the hostilities. The Russians proposed that Andrássy, Novikov, and General Count Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, the German ambassador at Vienna, coordinate joint action aimed at pacifying the rebellious areas of the

Novikov himself was quite pro-Austro-Hungarian and anti-Pan-Slavic; in particular, his experiences as a member of the diplomatic staff at Constantinople had turned him most decidedly against the Bulgars and their aspirations. His staff at Vienna was, however, somewhat inclined toward Pan-Slavic ideas. For a succinct account of Novikov and his views, see Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 27-28. For evidence of the esteem in which Andrássy held Novikov, see Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, January 9, 1873, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXV (Russia, Dispatches to Petersburg 1873), Fos. 3-4.
Ottoman empire. 23

Andrássy's reply to the Russian proposal was immediate and unequivocal. "I can agree to any action which has as its purpose to make clear to the insurgents that they can expect no help from the three powers," 24 he stated. If, however, St. Petersburg envisioned "collective intercession for the purpose of reconciling the Christians," Austria-Hungary could not participate in such combined action.

The response which the foreign minister's conditions received from the Russian government was generally acceptable. Langenau reported that what St. Petersburg had in mind was "not intervention but conciliatory action." 26 Novikov stated that his government also wanted to make sure that the insurgents knew that no help would be forthcoming from the Great Powers. The Russian

23 Baron Bela Örczy, section chief in the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, to Andrássy, Vienna, July 25, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXX (Turkey, Correspondence with the embassy in Petersburg and with the Russian embassy in Vienna, Russian Communiques, 1875-1876), Fos. 5 and 8.

24 Andrássy to Örczy, Terebes, July 26, 1875, ibid. (Turkey, Correspondence with Peters burg 1875-76), Fo. 9.

25 Ibid., Fo. 18.

26 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, July 27, 1875, Ibid., Fo. 26.
ambassador did say, however, that the Porte should be sounded out about the possibility of instituting reforms in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 27

The basic agreement of the Habsburg and Romanov governments on Balkan policy allowed Andrásy to step forward in early August with the first of three major initiatives to solve the Balkan crisis which he undertook between July, 1875, and June, 1876. As matters stood in late July, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister personally felt no need to intervene in what he still wished to regard as a Turkish internal affair; however, the Russian official view seemed inclined towards intervention, and certainly the Pan-Slavs favored that idea. From Andrásy's point of view it might be advisable for Austria-Hungary to join with Russia in a common program in order to circumscribe the actions of the tsar's government. 28 The plan revealed by Novikov lent itself to such a course of action by the Habsburg statesman because it offered him the leadership and made Vienna the focal point of the joint effort. Accordingly, Andrásy proposed, and St. Petersburg accepted, a program of unofficial mediation. The members of the Three Emperors' League were to

27 Örczy to Andrásy, Vienna, July 27, 1875, ibid., Fo. 22.

28 The germ of such an Austro-Hungarian course of action is found in Andrásy to Emperor Francis Joseph,
coordinate their efforts to bring peace to the Balkans by means of identical instructions to their ambassadors and consuls within the Ottoman empire.\(^29\) Specifically, the consuls in the rebellious areas were to meet with the insurgents and to assure them that their movement would not receive any assistance from the Eastern Powers. At the same time, the Powers would recommend to the Turkish government that it satisfy those demands of the rebels which the Three Emperors' League regarded as legitimate; however, the Powers would provide the rebels with no more than a "moral guarantee" that the Porte would institute reform.\(^30\) Such a program, lacking Great Power assurances of reform and without provision for coercion of the Porte, was naive in the extreme and reflected a lack of touch with Balkan realities. It did, however, correspond to

Terebes, July 28, 1875, *ibid.*, Fos. 33-34.

\(^{29}\) See Andrásy to Langenau, Toke-Terebes, July 29, 1875, *ibid.*, Fo. 45; Copy of a dispatch from Baron Alexander M. Jomini, senior counselor in the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, to Novikov, St. Petersburg, August 4, 1875, *ibid.*, Fo. 93; and Andrásy to Zichy, Vienna, August 7, 1875, *ibid.*, Carton CCXXXIII (Turkey, Correspondence with Constantinople, August-December, 1875), Fo. 10.

Andrássy's goal of intervening as little as possible in the hope that the Turks themselves would be able to put down the revolt.

After a brief delay, during which activities were coordinated and the remaining European powers instructed their agents to join the Three Emperors' League's project, the consular commission undertook its work in early September, 1875. The members were disabused immediately of any hope of success under their existing instructions. The Austro-Hungarian representative, Conrad Wassitsch, reported appalling conditions of anarchy and chaos in the rebellious areas. The insurgents distrusted all Turkish officials and promises and refused to meet with representatives of the Porte unless the European consuls were also present. Furthermore, the rebels demanded that the

31 For the details of the adherence of Great Britain, France, and Italy to the consular project of the Three Emperors' League, see Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 78-88.

32 Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, September 6, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Austro-Hungarian delegate to the Pacification Commission in Mostar, Wassitsch, 1875-1876), Nos. 28-29. See also Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, September 13, 1875, ibid., Fo. 67.

33 Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, September 13, 1875, ibid., Fo. 67.
Great Powers guarantee the implementation of reforms.\textsuperscript{34} Such a demand was hardly acceptable to Andrássy; nor was he encouraged by Wassitsch's accurate but unpalatable assessment of the situation. The foreign minister had proposed the consular mission in order to demonstrate to the insurgents that they could expect no aid from the Great Powers. Now, Wassitsch implied that the rebels might not need help since "the Porte did not appear to be in a position to subdue the revolt."\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, in late September, 1875, Wassitsch relayed his conviction, shared, he added, by the other five members of the consular commission, that Great Power diplomatic intervention was the only possible solution to the crisis.\textsuperscript{36}

It is probably not coincidental that a steady decline in the importance with which Andrássy regarded the consular commission also dates from about the time Wassitsch began to importune in favor of European intervention. Andrássy simply did not agree with Wassitsch's outlook or proposals.\textsuperscript{37} The foreign minister had not yet

\textsuperscript{34}Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, September 24, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 72.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, Fo. 72.

\textsuperscript{36}Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, September 27, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 98.

\textsuperscript{37}Andrássy to Wassitsch, Vienna, September 28, 1875, \textit{Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön.}
been brought to the point of acquiescing in European intervention. He did not want any more Austro-Hungarian involvement in the Balkan crisis than was absolutely necessary. In addition, he may have received word of the impending proclamation of reforms by the Porte—reforms which might obviate the need for intervention. In any event, the consular commission began to languish in limbo. It continued to maintain contact with the rebels and to submit valuable reports on the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but Andrassy no longer regarded it as a

38 Turkish reform proposals were promulgated on October 2, 1875. As it turned out, Andrassy had a very low opinion of the efficacy of the reforms. See Andrassy to Mayr, Vienna, October 16, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXX (Turkey, Correspondence with the Austro-Hungarian delegate to the Pacification Commission in Mostar, Wassitsch, 1875-1876), Fo. 299. See also Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 88-98, especially p. 95.
possible means of ending the revolt.

Andrássy quickly realized that the consular mission could not serve as an effective means of quelling the uprising; however, the need for pacification was increasingly emphasized by the unrest in Serbia.\(^39\) Although initially the official Serbian response to the rebellion was pacific, it became rapidly obvious that the majority of the population did not share the government's view. Under the best of circumstances it would have been difficult for Milan to control his bellicose subjects, but during the period from July 30 to August 12 Milan was not in Belgrade but rather visiting in Vienna. In his absence war fever inflamed the Serbs. Numerous committees to provide financial and material support for the rebels were formed; and, in preparation for military action, troops, horses, and supplies were assembled.\(^40\) The country was ready for war and demanded it of Milan upon his return to

\(^{39}\)A good account of the situation in Serbia at this time is found in Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878*, pp. 98-121.

\(^{40}\)Cingria to Andrásy, Belgrade, August 6, 1975, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), *Politisches Archiv*, Section XII, Carton CCXXXIV (Turkey, Correspondence with Belgrade 1875), Fos. 36-44. On August 10, Rodich reported to Vienna that a contingent of armed and nationally-costumed Serbians was on the way via Trieste to Dalmatia in order to participate in the revolt. See Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, August 10, 1875, *ibid.* (Turkey, Correspondence with Rodich 1875-76), Fo. 183. Needless to say, the Serbs were not allowed to enter Hercegovina from Austro-Hungarian territory. See Andrásy to Rodich, Vienna, August 12, 1875, *ibid.*, Fo.
Belgrade.  

Despite the fact that his countrymen wanted war, Milan knew that Andrásy, and presumably the Great Powers, wanted peace. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister had strongly advised the prince of Serbia to refrain from hostilities against the Porte. According to Andrásy, if Serbia violated the peace, then it would bear the responsibility for the consequences. The implication was that no Great Power would aid the principedom or restrain the Porte if the Turks responded victoriously to a Serbian attack.  

Faced with the dilemma of choosing between the conflicting wishes of the Serbian people and the Great Powers, Milan first tested the strength of Andrásy's position. The prince sounded out St. Petersburg about the possibility of Russian support for Serbia. Milan stated that he might be "overwhelmed" by events and forced into war against Turkey. If that happened, he wished to

197. See also Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 105-106 for an account of Serbian military preparations.

41 Ibid., p. 106.

42 Andrásy to Wrede, Terebes, August 14, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCV (Serbia, Dispatches 1875), Fos. 54-55.
know whether or not Russia would countenance an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia. The tsar, pacifically inclined and loyal to the Three Emperors' League, rebuffed the Serbs by stating that if Milan made war he would incur his "displeasure" and would not be able to count on any Russian assistance.

43 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, August 16, 1875, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXXV (Turkey, Correspondence with Petersburg 1875-76), Fo. 4. Andrásy was in fact considering the possibility of an occupation of Serbia under certain conditions. He advised the emperor that the best course of action for the Dual Monarchy seemed to be to allow Serbia to wage war, but also to inform the Serbs that if the war took on an anti-Habsburg character or endangered Austro-Hungarian interests, the monarchy would intervene. Andrásy mentioned an occupation of Belgrade as one aspect of such an intervention. See Andrásy to Emperor Francis Joseph, Terebes, August 17, 1875, ibid., Fos. 30-31.

44 Baron Leopold Friedrich von Hofmann, section chief in the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry, to Andrásy, Vienna, August 20, 1875, ibid., Fos. 26-27. See also Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, August 18, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXX (Turkey, Correspondence with Petersburg 1875-76), Fo. 126. Andrásy attempted to prejudice Alexander II against Serbia by means of a dispatch which blamed Serbia's bellicosity on the "revolutionary party" of Ristić. See Andrásy to Langenau, Terebes, August 17, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXV (Turkey, Correspondence with Petersburg 1875-76), Fo. 6. That party had just won a substantial victory in the elections for the national assembly which were held on August 16. See Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, p. 107. While the group led by Ristić, basically the Serbian Liberal party, was not "revolutionary" in the sense which Andrásy wished to imply to the tsar, it certainly was much more bellicose than the ruling conservatives and would undoubtedly prove difficult for Milan to control. See Andrásy to Koloman Tisza, minister-president of Hungary, Terebes, August 17, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna)
Nothing could have been more in accordance with Andrásy's wishes than the attitude manifested by the tsar's government. Not only had Alexander II restrained Belgrade, but, in addition, Baron Alexander Jomini, a senior official in the foreign ministry, revealed that the tsar's government accepted the Dual Monarchy's view that Austria-Hungary could not suffer an obstreperous Serbia on its borders. 45 Jomini also stated in reference to the tsar that "he repudiates any solution [of the Balkan crisis] that is radical or unacceptable to Austria-Hungary and desires to maintain the status quo." 46

Despite Russia's energetic action to stifle Serbia's war plans, the principality quickly displayed a renewed desire for a conflict with the Turks. Ristić, who had advocated war during the electoral campaign for the national assembly, became the Serbian foreign minister in

Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CXXXIII (Hungarian minister-presidency, Hungarian ministeries, and the Ban of Croatia, 1875), Fo. 10.

45 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, p. 116.

46 Mayr to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, September 10/ August 29, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXVII (Russia, Reports 1875), Fo. 430. According to Jomini, a part of Alexander's reluctance to aid Serbia stemmed from his belief that "the cosmopolitan revolutionary element had gained access there." Ibid.
a change of ministries which occurred on August 31.\textsuperscript{47}

The next day the national assembly met. Initially
Milan was able to moderate its bellicose temper,\textsuperscript{48} but by
late September the situation appeared to be out of his
control. Despite the fact that Milan openly favored peace,
the national assembly voted a large war credit and the
government sounded out Montenegro about a possible
alliance.\textsuperscript{49} Furthermore, a Serbian general was instructed
to organize and forward Serbian volunteers to Bosnia, and
Ristić was in contact with Bulgarian revolutionary
leaders.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47}Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis

\textsuperscript{48}For the text of Milan's pacific address at the
opening session of the national assembly, see Sir
Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty; showing
the various Political and Territorial Changes which have
taken place Since the General Peace of 1814 (4 vols.,
London: Harrison and Sons, 1891), Vol. IV, pp. 2,401-
2,403. The assembly's reply to Milan's speech from the
throne contained definite bellicose undertones. See
ibid., pp. 2,404-2,406.

\textsuperscript{49}Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis
of 1875-1878, pp. 110-113. See also Wrede to Andrassy,
Belgrade, September 25, 1875, Actenstücke aus den Corres-
pondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums
des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16.

\textsuperscript{50}Mihailo D. Stojanović, The Great Powers and the
Balkans, 1875-1878 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
Since the prince of Serbia seemed unable to check his country's headlong rush to war, the Great Powers took it upon themselves to do so. In a dispatch dated September 29, 1875, Mayr relayed to Andrásy a Russian proposal for a joint demarche at Belgrade in order to restrain Serbia. Jomini had stated the Russian view that the national assembly was completely out of hand and that Milan could oppose it only "'at the risk of his life'." Therefore, the Powers would have to act. Andrásy readily agreed, as did the governments of the rest of the Great Powers, with the result that on October 6 Belgrade was presented a note which stated that the guaranteeing powers of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 would find it impossible to prevent a Turkish occupation of Serbia if that nation acted aggressively against the Porte. The presentation of this collective note,

51 Mayr to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, September 29, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXVII (Russia, Reports 1875), Fo. 450.

52 See the foreign minister's statement in Andrásy to Seiller, Vienna, September 30, 1875, ibid., Section III, Carton CIX (Prussia, Instructions 1875), Fo. 168.

53 The text of the note can be found as an appendix in Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, October 7, 1875, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), p. 132. Great Britain did not join in the actual presentation but did support the action of the other five powers. See ibid.; and Baron Anton Wolkenstein-Trostburg,
coupled with a surprising burst of activity by Milan during which he ejected Ristić and his cohorts from the government and overawed and regained control of the national assembly, greatly reduced the threat of war between Serbia and the Ottoman empire. In addition to the activities of the Powers and of the prince, the approach of winter played a significant role in temporarily calming the situation in Serbia.

To be sure, Andrássy was delighted to see a less bellicose attitude on the part of the Serbs, but he did not place unwarranted value on the state of affairs. What had been created was a lull in the activity, and not a cessation of tension. Still, the foreign minister no doubt hoped to use the period of calm to arrive at a viable solution to the Balkan problems. However, before Andrássy could act the Porte, on October 2, proclaimed a series of reforms designed to end the worst oppression and abuses of power within the Ottoman empire and to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The tsarist government,

Austro-Hungarian ambassadorial counselor at London, to Andrássy, London, October 3, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton LXXXIV (Great Britain, Reports 1875), Fo. 236.

54 A good account of Milan's activities is found in Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 118-120.

55 The Turkish reform dealt mainly with a modest degree of tax reform and the establishment of machinery
pressed by Ignatiev, accepted the Turkish proclamation.\footnote{Mayr to Andrássy, St. Petersbourg, October 8/ September 26, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXX (Turkey, Correspondence with Petersbourg 1875-76), Fo. 228; and Andrew F. Hamburger, official of the Russian foreign ministry, to Novikov, Livadia, October 24/12, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXI (Turkey, Reports and Instructions, St. Petersbourg, July 1875-1876), Fo. 6.} Andrássy did not. He was, in fact, enraged by the Porte's action. His hostility toward the Turkish initiative was based on two criticisms of it. In the first place, he regarded the sultan's decree as largely the work of Ignatiev rather than of the Turks. To Andrássy it signified an attempt by Ignatiev, always regarded by the Ballhausplatz as the ultimate Pan-Slavic intriguer, to wrest the initiative from him and to transfer the focus of diplomatic maneuvering to Constantinople.\footnote{See the scathing marginal criticism of Ignatiev by Emperor Francis Joseph and by Andrássy in Hamburger to Novikov, Livadia, October 24/12, 1875, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXI (Turkey, Reports and Instructions, St. Petersbourg, July 1875-1876), Fos. 6 and 3.} The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister was also critical of the Turkish decree because he doubted that it would ever be implemented. He regarded it as merely an attempt by the Porte to "elude the influence" of the Great whereby Turkish subjects could petition the sultan for redress of grievances. For the text, see Hertslet, \textit{The Map of Europe by Treaty}, Vol. IV, pp. 2,407-2,408.
Powers. 58

Since Andrásy was convinced that the Turkish reform plan was nothing more than a charade—and dangerous as well because it gave Ignatiev such an opportunity for meddling—he believed that it was imperative to propose a substitute plan of real substance. Andrásy presented the basis for such a plan to St. Petersburg on October 16. He first attempted to nullify the Turkish proclamation by criticizing it as a project which dealt only with material problems and neglected social and moral reforms which were also vital. According to Andrásy, the Powers had to obtain three reforms from the Porte if the Balkan revolt was to be ended. The sultan would have to grant the institution of religious freedom, the abolition of tax farming, and the complete elimination of the feudal agricultural/societal system which prevailed in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 59 The Russians initially raised numerous questions concerning the details and implementation of

58 Andrásy to Mayr, No. 1, Vienna, October 16, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXX (Turkey, Correspondence with St. Petersburg 1875-76), Fo. 243.

59 The foreign minister set forth his proposals in Andrásy to Mayr, No. 2, Vienna, October 16, 1875, ibid., Fos. 263-276 and 293-307. This document is important for the future development of Andrásy's thinking in reference to Bosnia-Hercegovina because it contains one of his first elaborations of opposition to any sort of autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina. His most significant objection was that the religious hatreds were too intense and deeply-rooted to allow peace even if Bosnia-Hercegovina were
these reforms, but at the same time signaled general acceptance of them. 60

While the cabinets in Vienna and St. Petersburg were corresponding about the reforms which they might demand from Constantinople, two events occurred which warned Andrásy that a firm new initiative from him was imperative if he were to hold Russia's Balkan aspirations in check. The first of these took the form of a Russian sounding out of Vienna about Bosnia-Hercegovina. Jomini revealed to Mayr his personal feeling that he was "inclined toward a collective intervention by Europe, first by a conference and then if necessary by a military occupation of the insurgent provinces conferred upon Austria-Hungary and Russia." If such a proposal were rejected by the Powers, then a policy of non-intervention would be the only possible course of action remaining:

removed from Constantinople's control or given home rule. A second objection to autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina was that it would lead to similar demands from Bulgaria and demands for complete independence from Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. See ibid., Fos. 267-270.

60 For example, see Jomini to Novikov, St. Petersburg, October 19, 1875, ibid., Fos. 345-347 for Russian questions concerning the reform proposal; and Hofmann to Andrásy, Vienna, October 21, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXVII (Turkey, Correspondence of the ministry with His Excellency Count Andrásy, 1875 and 1876), Fo. 22 for Russian acceptance.
however, according to Jomini, that would result in "a certain European crisis." 61

Andrássy's response to Jomini's feeler made evident the Magyar's antipathy toward increased or extensive Great Power involvement in the Balkan crisis. In regard to a possible conference, Andrássy would not oppose it, but he would not propose it either, and he did not think it would settle anything. The foreign minister flatly rejected a Habsburg-Romanov occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In Andrássy's view, that might easily lead to friction between Austria-Hungary and Russia and could serve as a further impetus to Pan-Slavism, creating a force which the Tsar's government might find difficult to control. And if the occupation were successful in pacifying Bosnia-Hercegovina, it would make the return of the provinces to Turkey morally impossible. 62

Andrássy received further notice of Russia's growing impatience with following the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic lead as a result of Archduke Albert's visit to St. Petersburg in the first half of December, 1875. 63 During his

61 Mayr to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, October 27/15, 1875, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fd. 288. The italics are in the original.

62 Andrássy to Mayr, Budapest, November 18, 1875, ibid., Fos. 284-286.

63 See Holzer, "Erzherzog Albrecht 1867-1895," pp. 75-
stay the archduke held numerous discussions with the tsar and his advisers. All of the Russian officials expressed trust in Francis Joseph and Andrásy; however, that did not prevent them from voicing proposals which were at odds with those of the Habsburg foreign minister. Gorchakov, for example, stated to the archduke that there were two ways to settle the current Balkan troubles: either "'to patch up the Eastern Question or to undertake frankly its resolution'." Russia had opted for the former approach but of course it would "'not be stable'." 64 Tsar Alexander also mentioned the temporary nature of the solutions which had been proposed; he hoped that a resolution of the problem would last "'a couple of years." More important in terms of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was Alexander's statement that Bosnia and Hercegovina should become independent principalities and that under no circumstances could Russia allow the Dual Monarchy to annex them. 65

78, for an account of the archduke's visit to Russia.

64 Ibid., p. 76.

65 Ibid., p. 78. Archduke Albert also revealed the growing desire on the part of the Russian people for a "'quick and definitive solution of the Eastern Question'" as well as the tsarina's increasing role in serving as a focal point of pro-Christian, anti-Turkish sentiment. Ibid., p. 76.
In the light of these statements by the tsar and his ministers it seemed quite possible that Russia might officially propose either independence or autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina. At this stage of the crisis any significant change in the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina—for example, independence, autonomy, or occupation by a European Power—was unacceptable to Andrássy; therefore, he had to act in order to prevent any such proposal. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister was also motivated to activity by a Turkish reform decree of December 16, 1875, and by ominous reports of increasing tension between the Slavic principalities and the Porte. It appeared as though there were simply going to be too many parties trying to solve Andrássy's Balkan problem for him if he did not act promptly.

66 In general terms, the Turkish reform of December 16, 1875, would have instituted equality before the law for all Ottoman subjects. See Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, December 21, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXIII, Fo. 675. For the official version of the reform in French translation, see Rachid Pasha to Zichy, Constantinople, December 13, 1875, ibid., Fos. 630–632. On December 17, Zichy reported to Andrássy, "Firman has not made the slightest impression; it is not worthy of any attention, no one believes in the promises, which moreover are not new." See Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, December 17, 1875, ibid., Fo. 654.

67 See Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, December 18, 1875, ibid., Fo. 660; and Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, December 18, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXVII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Austro-Hungarian delegate to the Pacification Commission in Mostar, Wassitsch, 1875–1876),
Andrássy's second major initiative to end the troubles in southeastern Europe was his note of December, 1875. This document evolved from the proposals Andrássy had made to St. Petersburg in his dispatch of October 16. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister intended to use the note to reassert his dominant position among those statesmen who were attempting to find a solution to the Balkan crisis and to prevent both European intervention and any real change in the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The greatest threat to Andrássy's position and goals came from Russia. Most concerned with gaining Russian acceptance of his reforms, he originally proposed that the terms of the note be agreed on and presented to the Porte only by the members of the Three Emperors' League. Russia, however, induced Andrássy to enlarge the scope of his proposed action so that when he made the formal presentation of his reform program on December 30, Andrássy addressed it to all the Powers and not just to the other members of the Three Emperors' League. The Habsburg minister proposed the implementation of full religious liberty, the abolition of tax farming, the amelioration of the lot of the peasant farmers, and the use of the

Fos. 317-318.

68 For a discussion of the origins of the Andrássy Note, see Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 140-169.
resources of Bosnia-Hercegovina for the benefit of that area. The reforms were to be implemented by a committee composed of equal numbers of indigenous Moslems and Christians. 69

Andrássy's note did enable him to regain the diplomatic initiative among those statesmen who were trying to solve the crisis. With the exception of Great Britain, the Powers all accepted the Andrássy Note by January 3, 1876. 70 Her Majesty's government, however, dragged its feet for another two weeks. The primary problem stemmed from Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's distrust of Andrássy and the Three Emperors' League. Disraeli personally opposed what he regarded as the Eastern Powers' anti-Turkish machinations in the Balkans. 71 The British


70 The acceptances are found in documents 204-207 in ibid., p. 163. For a discussion of the acceptance of the note by the parties involved, see Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 170-230.

government emphasized to Vienna its concern over the possibility that the Andrássy Note might be used either as a weapon against the Porte or as a pretext for intervention rather than as a method of calming the troubles.\textsuperscript{72}

The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister attempted to win British acceptance of his note by stressing that his only goal was to end the crisis. At the same time he publicized rumors of Ignatiev's attempts to induce Serbia and Montenegro to wage war against the Porte in the coming spring as a means of pressuring Great Britain to take a united stand with the rest of the Great Powers.\textsuperscript{73}

Eventually, on January 18, 1876, the British government gave "general support" to the Andrássy Note\textsuperscript{74}; however, that position was conditioned on the ability of the Great Powers to persuade the insurgents to lay down their arms.

\textsuperscript{72} Beust to Andrássy, London, January 4, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXIX, Fо. 174; and Beust to Andrássy, London, January 9, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fо. 238.

\textsuperscript{73} Andrássy to Beust, Budapest, January 7, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fо. 208.

\textsuperscript{74} Beust to Andrássy, London, January 18, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fо. 318.
and/or to prevent outside aid to the rebels. 75

With the Great Powers' acceptance of his project finally in hand, Andrassy was able to authorize the deliverance of his reform proposals to the Porte in late January, 1876. 76 During the period before the Andrassy Note was officially presented to the Turks, the Habsburg minister had worked diligently to ensure Turkish acceptance at the proper moment. 77 For their part the Turks had worked equally assiduously to prevent intervention by the Powers, as witnessed for example by their reform attempts of October 2 and December 16. As a part of their struggle to avoid, or if that proved impossible, to make a real gain from European intervention, the Turks proposed as a quid pro quo for their acceptance of the Andrassy Note that Austria-Hungary actively assist in appeasing the insurgents, effectively seal the Dalmatian frontier, and allow the Porte to occupy Montenegro in the

75 Derby to Beust, Foreign Office, January 25, 1876, ibid., Fo. 403.


77 Andrassy to Langenau, Budapest, January 7, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXI, Fo. 30.
event that principality did not observe strict neutrality. 78 What Andrásy wanted, however, was not haggling but acceptance. He responded that if the Porte did not agree to the Powers' demands, he would close Klek to the Turks, leave Serbia and Montenegro a free hand, and in general let events take their own course. 79

In the face of Andrásy's threat, supported by demands from Russia that Constantinople acquiesce in the reform program, the Porte had no choice but to comply with the Powers' conditions. 80 On February 13 Andrásy was informed that the Ottoman empire would implement the requested reforms, 81 and on the next day orders to that effect went out from Constantinople to Bosnia-Hercegovina. 82 At the same time, the Porte indicated its desire to placate

78 Andrásy to Zichy, Vienna, January 26, 1876, ibid., Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 103.

79 Ibid., Fos. 106-108 and 112.

80 See Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, p. 216 for Russian support of the Austro-Hungarian position.

81 Rachid Pasha to Aarifi Pasha, Turkish ambassador in Vienna, Constantinople, February 13, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fos. 242-243.

82 Zichy to Andrásy, Constantinople, February 14, 1876, ibid., Fo. 260.
the refugees from the rebellious areas, and on February 15 the sultan granted the insurgents a "complete amnesty." In addition, the Porte provided its commissioners, who were to oversee the pacification of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with a set of instructions which appeared generous and conciliatory. Among other benefits, the refugees were to be provided with food until crops could be harvested on a regular basis, to be furnished with the materials necessary for the reconstruction of their homes and churches, and to be exempted from taxation for two years.

Having thus succeeded in getting the Turks to undertake reform, Andrássy was determined that Austria-Hungary would render the Porte all possible assistance in

83 Wassitsch to Andrássy, Mostar, February 25, 1876, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 181-182. This report contains an appendixed decree by the sultan granting amnesty to the rebels of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Andrássy had proposed that the Porte grant such a general amnesty in late January. See Andrássy to Zichy, Vienna, January 26, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fos. 116-118.

84 The Porte's instructions to its commissioners to Bosnia-Hercegovina can be found in "Special instructions to be executed by the commission on Bosnia-Hercegovina," Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 624-626.

85 Zichy, for one, believed that the Turks were making
that work. It soon became obvious that Constantinople would need that assistance. On the same day the reform decree was sent off to Bosnia-Hercegovina, the rebels reported that they had absolutely no faith in Turkish promises. Nevertheless, Andrassy was undaunted. On February 21 he issued a new set of instructions to Rodich. In view of the Porte's acceptance of the reform note, Rodich was now charged with publicizing the Turks' new promises and with using his "great personal influence" to induce the insurgents to give up their struggle and to persuade the refugees to return to Bosnia-Hercegovina.  

an unprecedentedly sincere effort at reform. See Zichy to Andrassy, Constantinople, March 3, 1876, ibid., p. 182. See also Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 234-236.

86 Jovanović to Rodich, Ragusa, February 14, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Imperial-Royal Governor of Dalmatia, Lieutenant-General Rodich in Zara, 1875-1876), Fo. 53. See also copy of a telegram from the imperial-royal head of the Cattaro district, [n.p.], February 17, 1876, ibid., Fo. 12; and copy of a telegram from the imperial-royal head of the Cattaro district [n.p.], February 19, 1876, ibid., Fo. 14.

87 Instructions for the governor of Dalmatia Lieutenant-General Baron Rodich, Vienna, February 21, 1876, ibid., Fo. 27.

88 Ibid., Fos. 25-29. The support of the refugees by the Dual Monarchy did pose something of a financial problem. According to the governor of Dalmatia, the first 22,000 refugees brought 30,000 head of livestock with them. Most of this exodus was to the not overly productive province of Dalmatia. By 1878, the number of refugees had risen to at least 100,000; the cost of
Three days later Andrássy issued the same instructions to Mollinary. In addition, he stressed to both Mollinary and Rodich that any physical, material, moral, political, or agitational support for the rebels or against the pacification effort was not to be tolerated. The foreign minister also utilized his Balkan consular force to aid the Turks, and even Emperor Francis Joseph spurred the Dual Monarchy's efforts to facilitate pacification by ordering supporting them had come to over ten million gulden. See Mollinary, Sechszundvierzig Jahre, Vol. II, pp. 291-292.

The Dual Monarchy also gave Nicholas of Montenegro financial assistance which aided Montenegro to care for the refugees it received from Hercegovina. As one might expect, Andrássy sought to make political capital out of Austria-Hungary's humanitarian gesture. Rodich was instructed to publicize the Dual Monarchy's action among the refugees and insurgents. See the correspondence between Andrássy, Rodich, and Prince Nicholas in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVII (Turkey, Austrian gift of food to Montenegro for the Turkish refugees, 1875).

89 Andrássy to Mollinary, Vienna, February 24, 1876, ibid., Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with Lieutenant-General Baron Mollinary in Agram, 1876), Fos. 1-3. Emperor Francis Joseph also made his influence felt about this time. According to Beck, it had come to the emperor's attention that one of the well-known insurgent leaders, Miroslav Hubmaier, was being supported from Zagreb. Mollinary was ordered to prevent support for him and to interdict rumored attacks on Turkish territory from bases within the Dual Monarchy. See Beck to Mollinary, Budapest, January 27, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, No. 69-1/1 (1876), Fo. 1

90 Andrássy to Wassitsch, Vienna, February 6, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Austro-Hungarian delegate to the Pacification Commission in Mostar, Wassitsch, 1875-1876), Fo. 363.
the ban of Croatia to give Mollinary his "strongest support." Finally, Andrásy sought to prevent foreign volunteers from aiding the insurrection. He requested that Italy prevent any such effort by "Garibaldians" and advised the Montenegrin government to expel any foreign volunteers who might be within that country. He also warned Serbia to "draw back" from any preparations for war against the Porte.

Although the Dual Monarchy was exceedingly active in trying to bring about pacification, its efforts were not

91 Emperor Francis Joseph to Ban Ivan Mažuranić, Vienna, February 25, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, No. 69-1/4-4 (1876), Fos. 2-3.

92 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, p. 243. See also Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 18, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXI, Fo. 129 for an account of the activities of a group of "Garibaldians"; and Count Felix Wimpffen, Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome, to Andrásy, Rome, March 1, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XI, Carton LXXXVII (Italy, Various 1876), Fos. 1-2 for Italian compliance with Andrásy's request.

93 Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 18, 1876, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXXI, Fo. 129.

94 Instructions for the imperial and royal diplomatic agent and consul-general in Belgrade, Prince Wrede, Vienna, February 17, 1876, ibid., Carton CCXXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with Belgrade 1875 and 1876), Fos. 8-10.
rewarded with success. On the one hand, the Porte's representatives in Bosnia-Hercegovina were divided in outlook and lacking in the financial resources necessary to implement reform. On the other, regardless of what the Turks did, the insurgents distrusted them. The fighting continued, scarcely abated.

Such was the general situation when Rodich undertook a visit to Cetinje in the first week of March, 1876, to discuss affairs with Prince Nicholas. To the Montenegrin ruler, the continuation of the revolt was easily explained; the Turks simply had not done anything to appease the rebels. Nicholas proposed that Rodich speak personally with the rebel leaders in an effort to effecuate some sort of progress toward pacification. Andrássy wholeheartedly agreed to the plan. Perhaps the Slavophile Rodich could

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95 The Turkish commissioners were also reluctant to recognize the necessity of treating with the insurgents. For details of their attitudes and actions, see The Times (London), March 25, 1876, p. 10; and ibid., April 6, 1876, p. 8. See also Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 237-238.


97 Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, March 7, 1876, ibid., p. 184.

98 Andrássy to Rodich, Vienna, March 8, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Imperial-Royal
both gain sufficient trust from the rebel leaders so that they would agree to negotiations and also command enough respect from the Turks so that they would treat and negotiate honestly with the insurgents.

At about the same time that Rodich and Andrassy were discussing the possibility of Austro-Hungarian mediation between the opposing sides, the rebels themselves proposed a twelve-day truce to the Turks.\textsuperscript{99} The Turkish commander in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Mukhtar Pasha, agreed to an informal truce on condition that his forces be given access to the towns of Nikšić, Zubči, and Piva in southern Hercegovina. No sooner had the rebels accepted these conditions when the Turks attacked, with Mukhtar himself leading an attempt to relieve and reprovision the besieged fortress of Nikšić.\textsuperscript{100}

As a result of the failure of the "truce," Andrassy adopted a sterner attitude toward forcing the Turks and the

\textsuperscript{99}Zichy to Andrassy, Constantinople, March 17, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 490. For more information on the truce proposals and negotiations, see the correspondence between Andrassy and Zichy in mid-March found in \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXII, and that between Andrassy and Rodich in \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXVIII.

\textsuperscript{100}Harris, \textit{A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878}, pp. 248-249.
insurgents to reach an agreement. In accordance with Andrássy's instructions, on March 27, 1876, Rodich met with the Turkish leaders and eventually succeeded in overawing them to the extent that Mukhtar Pasha agreed to an armistice for the first twelve days of April. There was to be no troop movement, and Nikšić was to be resupplied via Montenegro. Nicholas was to cooperate in the effort. 101

In addition to browbeating the Turks to promise an armistice, Rodich was also instructed by Andrássy to coerce the insurgents to undertake serious negotiations. The governor of Dalmatia was to inform the rebels that

if the insurgents do not want to follow our advice and if pacification does not occur, they will be left on their own. We will not act hostilely against them, but we will leave them to their chosen fate and concern ourselves with insuring that our tranquillity is not disturbed by the course of events beyond our borders.

Furthermore, Andrássy instructed Rodich to emphasize to the rebels that the Powers had agreed to prevent Serbian or Montenegrin assistance to the revolt. 102

101 Ibid., pp. 249-250. See Rodich to Andrássy, Ragusa, March 28, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Imperial-Royal Governor of Dalmatia, Lieutanant-General Baron Rodich in Zara, 1875-1876), Fo. 220 for Rodich's proposal of these terms to the insurgents.

102 Andrássy to Rodich, Vienna, March 23, 1876, ibid., Fos. 171-173.
In early April Rodich met with the assembled insurgent leaders of southern Hercegovina, and they presented him with a written list of their demands. As their conditions for pacification the insurgents required that at least one-third of Hercegovina be owned by native Christians; that Turkish troops occupy only six designated towns; that the Porte rebuild houses and churches, provide food for one year, and exempt the residents from taxation for three years; and that the Christians retain their arms until the Moslems laid down theirs. Furthermore, the rebels' leaders would arrange the implementation of reforms in cooperation with the Turks and those reforms would apply to all inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The money given by the Porte to finance the reforms was to be distributed by a European commission. Finally, Austria-Hungary and Russia would maintain representatives in the six places garrisoned by the Turks in order to supervise the implementation of the reforms. 103

Andrássy was not pleased with these terms. He felt that the provisions contained in his note of December 30, 1875, offered a suitable basis for peace. Moreover, those terms left Austria-Hungary free of responsibility for their implementation. The foreign minister also disapproved of the rebels' proposals because he did not believe that the

103 Rodich to Andrássy, Ragusa, April 7, 1876, ibid., Fo. 291.
Porte could reasonably be expected to accept the rebels' demands. He quickly attempted to convince the rebels of the impossibility of their terms, but just as promptly received word that the insurgents were not overly concerned about Andrássy's reservations. If Austria-Hungary and Russia would not or could not help them, they would rely upon "the courage of victory and confidence in their own strength."105

In response to the rebels' statements, Andrássy sought Russian assistance. In commenting on the terms of April 7 to St. Petersburg, he stated that he believed the reforms already promised by the Turks would be accepted by the insurgents if Austria-Hungary and Russia made it clear that they favored such a program.106

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104 Andrássy to [?], Lazzich-Lazarovich, Austro-Hungarian vice-consul in [?], Vienna, April 8, 1876, ibid., Carton CCXXXI (Turkey, Trebinje 1876), Fo. 49; and Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, April 12, 1876, Aktenstücke aus den Corresp. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministers des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 202-203.

105 Lazzich-Lazarovich to Andrássy, Ragusa, April 9, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXI (Turkey, Trebinje 1876), Fo. 52. See also Lazzich-Lazarovich to Andrássy, Castelnuovo, April 7, 1876, ibid., Fo. 44; and Lucas Vercevich, Austro-Hungarian vice-consul in Trebinje, to Andrássy, Trebinje, March 30, 1876, ibid., Fo. 29.

106 Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, April 8, 1876, ibid., Fo. 187.
initially agreed with Andrásy that the rebels' conditions were inadmissible as a basis of discussion. However, he soon decided that the insurgents would require some kind of guarantee that the Turks would implement reform, i.e., that their proposals were worthy of consideration. The Habsburg minister responded that he had already informed the Porte that Austria-Hungary would not countenance reforms a "hair-breadth" beyond those already promised by the sultan's government and further stated that he regarded the most important of the insurgents' demands as impossible to fulfill.

As the truce of early April drew to a close it appeared that any decisions made in regard to the insurgent's demands would be irrelevant. The problem was Nikšić. Despite the terms of the armistice, the Turks

107 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, April 10, 1876, *ibid.*, Fo. 191.

108 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, April 11/March 30, 1876, *ibid.*, Fos. 202-203.

109 Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, April 12, 1876, *Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussehern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877)*, pp. 202-203. The term "hair-breadth" is found in Andrásy to Zichy, Vienna, April 9, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), *Politisches Archiv*, Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 578. See also Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878*, pp. 257-265 for more details about the Austro-Hungarian-Russian disagreement.

110 For the strategic importance of Nikšić in regard to
had been unable to reprovision their garrison there. The Porte blamed Montenegro for this failure, and talk of war between the two countries was in the air.\footnote{In view of the increasingly serious situation at Nikšić, Mukhtar Pasha began an advance to relieve the town on April 13. He did not get far. By April 19 the Turks had been decisively defeated. According to Mukhtar, the insurgents had been assisted by 7,000 Montenegrins.} Montenegrin complicity in the defeat of Mukhtar enraged the Turks, and for several days the Porte wavered on the brink of war with Montenegro.\footnote{Finally, Cetinje was the maintenance or the reinstatement of effective Turkish control over Hercegovina, see Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, April 25, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 710.}  

\footnote{See Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, April 13, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 616; Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, April 13, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Imperial-Royal Governor of Dalmatia, Lieutenant-General Rodich in Zara, 1875-1876), Fo. 318; and Ottoman minister of foreign affairs to the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, Constantinople, April 15, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 622.}  

\footnote{Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, April 19, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 650; Anton Strautz, Austro-Hungarian consul at Mostar, to Andrássy, Mostar, April 20, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXX (Turkey, Mostar, 1876), Fo. 16.}  

\footnote{For example, see the correspondence between Andrássy and Zichy during the third week in April in \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXII.}
presented with a demand that Montenegro guarantee the resupply of Nikšić. If Nicholas did not comply, Mukhtar was authorized to advance to the city's relief with a large force.\footnote{Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, April 22, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 673.} Andrássy, hoping to reinstitute a truce and endeavoring to prevent openly declared hostilities between Cetinje and Constantinople, advised Nicholas to accept the Turkish demand, which the prince did.\footnote{See Andrássy to the prince of Montenegro, Vienna, April 25, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXVII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Prince of Montenegro 1876), Fos. 39-42; Prince of Montenegro to Andrássy, Cetinje, April 25, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 45 and 48; and Andrássy to Zichy, Vienna, April 25, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 734.} Nevertheless, the Porte authorized Mukhtar to attempt to relieve Nikšić once again on April 26.\footnote{Andrássy to Zichy, Vienna, April 23, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 682.} This time the
Turks were successful; by the twenty-eighth Mukhtar had fought his way into the town. 118

The relief of Nikšić did not result in a Turkish-Montenegrin war; indeed, the tension between those two states was now eased 119 since the situation at Nikšić no longer required the Porte to attempt to coerce Montenegro to cooperate. Conversely, any hope of a renewed truce or of serious discussions between the Turks and the insurgents had been temporarily destroyed, and along with it Andrassy's hope of implementing reforms which would pacify Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Hard upon the failure of the Andrassy Note came the foreign minister's third and final attempt to pacify the Balkans without extensive European involvement. Actually, the initiative in the matter stemmed from Gorchakov, but the program was ultimately elaborated by Andrassy. During the early months of 1876 the Russian chancellor's views had begun to diverge somewhat from those of his Austro-Hungarian counterpart. Specifically, Gorchakov was willing

118 Zichy to Andrassy, Constantinople, April 30, 1876, ibid., Carton CXXXII, Fo. 803.

119 Perhaps the tension decreased because this time instead of stating that his opposition included 7,000 Montenegroins, Mukhtar, in a more circumspect manner, said that "as the forest was very thick, we could not determine how many Montenegroins were among the insurgents." As quoted in Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, p. 286.
to accept the seven conditions proposed by the insurgents in April as a basis of discussion, and he appeared ready to grant Nicholas an increase in territory as a reward for Montenegro's conduct during the crisis.\textsuperscript{120} Andrássy, of course, opposed both of these two possible courses of action. Because of the Habsburg's minister's failure to resolve the Eastern Crisis and because of their diverging opinions as to the next step to be taken, Gorchakov proposed a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Three Emperors' League in Berlin in May, 1876.

The reports from St. Petersburg quickly made it evident that Gorchakov would probably arrive in Berlin with a definite program in mind and primed to assume diplomatic leadership of the Three Emperors' League. According to Langenau, the issues which the tsar's government regarded as most important were the fashioning of guarantees which would allow the refugees to return home, the granting of territorial additions to Montenegro, and the elaborating of a plan of autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{120} For examples of Gorchakov's views, see Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, April 11/March 30, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CXXXI, Fos. 202-203; and Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, April 22, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 237.

\textsuperscript{121} Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, April 18/6, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 228-229.
If these proposals were to be the gist of the Berlin meeting, then both Andrásy and Bismarck would have to regard the discussions with distaste. The German chancellor knew that such terms would be unacceptable to Andrásy and might well lead to a serious weakening of the Three Emperors' League.\textsuperscript{122} For his part, the Austro-Hungarian minister could not accept the Russian proposals because he was not willing to go beyond the terms of the Note of December 30, 1875. Unfortunately, however, those reforms had not been sufficient to quell the Balkan unrest and that attempt at reform had failed. Something new was required, and Andrásy had nothing to offer. Still, if he did not wish to relinquish the initiative to an increasingly restive Gorchakov, it appeared that he would have to come up with new proposals.

In view of the possibility that Gorchakov would make unacceptable proposals, both Andrásy and Bismarck desired to sound out each other before the Russian arrived.\textsuperscript{123} In a private discussion between them Bismarck restated Germany's basic position, that is, that the German government would agree to any solution of the problems which

\textsuperscript{122} For the German view, see Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, April 29, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Section III, Carton CX, Fos. 168-169 and 171.

\textsuperscript{123} Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, April 29, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Section XII, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with Berlin 1875-76), Fos. 189-190.
Austria-Hungary and Russia could amicably reach. He also sought Andrássy's opinion about European intervention in the Balkans, either by Austria-Hungary, by Austria-Hungary and Russia, or by Italy. While Andrássy ruled out all three of those possibilities, he did indicate that the Dual Monarchy would probably acquiesce in a retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia. Nothing was mentioned about an Austro-Hungarian quid pro quo.\footnote{Andrássy to Emperor Francis Joseph, Berlin, May 12, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Section III, Carton CIX (Prussia, Various 1876), Fos. 16-17.}

On the next day, May 11, the tsar and his suite arrived. Alexander II showed himself quite agreeable and very desirous of cooperating with the other two Powers. Nevertheless, in spite of the tsar's spirit of cooperation, the memorandum which Gorchakov presented was "absolutely unacceptable" to Andrássy. It included such proposals as an occupation of Turkish territory by Russia and Austria-Hungary and a Great Power congress to prepare measures with which to coerce the Porte to make reforms. Andrássy immediately declared that he could not accept the memorandum in its existing form, whereupon Gorchakov agreed to discuss counterproposals.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, Fos. 18-20.}
In order to free himself from a very unpleasant situation, Andrásy raged at the Germans and cajoled the tsar. To Bismarck, Andrásy posed the problem of having to choose between Russia and Austria-Hungary by threatening to quit the Three Emperors' League. Convinced that Andrásy was not bluffing, Bismarck assured him that Germany would not pressure Austria-Hungary to accept any unpalatable measure.  

The Habsburg minister then explained to the tsar the difficulties which he was having with Gorchakov, whereupon Alexander II promised "he will modify his project. You will eliminate all that you oppose."  

In view of the tsar's support of the Austro-Hungarian position, it is hardly surprising that at the next meeting of the ministers Andrásy found Gorchakov "soft as butter." The Habsburg foreign minister was able to discard Gorchakov's program in its entirety and substitute his own. In addition, Andrásy persuaded the Russian  

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126 Rowland Hegedüs, "The Foreign Policy of Count Julius Andrásy: In the Light of the Great War," Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 3 (1937), pp. 632-634. According to this account, Andrásy informed Bülow that "'this unnatural thing that calls itself the Three Emperor League comes from Germany. It was you who made the Russians so great, and it is no business of ours to take the consequences. When it begins to rain into this miserable shed of a League, we shall take our umbrellas and walk out'." Ibid., p. 632.  

127 Ibid., pp. 633-634.
chancellor to postpone any agreement on territorial enlargement for Montenegro and to agree that he would have no objection to the annexation of Turkish Croatia by Austria-Hungary. 128

Andrássy was very pleased with the program proposed in the Berlin Memorandum, as well he should have been. It contained nothing new or unpleasant from his point of view; it was essentially a restatement of the Andrássy Note of December 30, 1875. This time the three Eastern Powers resolved to insist on an armistice of two months' duration during which the Porte and the rebels would conduct direct negotiations. Those negotiations were to be based on five points: the Turkish government would provide material for rebuilding houses and churches and food for sustenance, a mixed Moslem-Christian committee would supervise the distribution of relief materials, Turkish troops would be temporarily concentrated in specific locations, Christians would maintain their weapons, and representatives of the Powers would oversee the implementation of reforms. The document ended with a brief statement that if the armistice expired without peace having been achieved, then the Powers would have to take unspecified "effective measures" to end

128 Andrássy to Emperor Francis Joseph, Berlin, May 12, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CIX (Prussia, Various 1876), Fo. 24. See also the account in Hagedös, "The Foreign Policy of Count Julius Andrassy," pp. 634-635.
the Balkan disturbances. 129

On May 13 the Three Emperors' League presented the above memorandum to the representatives of the other European Powers. Italy and France quickly agreed to follow the lead of the Eastern Powers; Great Britain just as swiftly and very decidedly refused. The most implacable British opponent of the Berlin document was Prime Minister Disraeli. His opposition was motivated primarily by his suspicion of the Eastern Powers' intentions and by his desire to safeguard British interests. Disraeli was also quite vexed by the manner in which the document had been presented to Her Majesty's Government; England had been treated "as if we were Montenegro or Bosnia." 131

Turkish Croatia corresponds approximately to the westernmost third of Bosnia.

129 For the text of the Berlin Memorandum, see Berlin Memorandum, May 12, 1876, Aktenstücke aus den Corresponderzen des Kais. und Kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. 1877), pp. 221-222.

130 For the positions of Italy and France, see Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 299-303. See also Wimpffen to Andrássy, Rome, May 27, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXI (Correspondence with the imperial and royal embassy in Rome/Italy and the Italian embassy in Vienna 1875-1876, Italian Communiqué), Fo. 173, for a fuller statement of the Italian view.

131 The quotation is found in Count Peter Shuvalov, Russian ambassador in London, to Gorchakov, Ems, May 19/7, 1876, Robert W. Seton-Watson (comp.), "Russo-British Relations During the Eastern Crisis. II. From the Andrássy
could he view the memorandum as signifying a common European program when three of the Powers had played no role in its formulation. Most importantly, Disraeli suspected that the Three Emperors' League, especially Austria-Hungary and Russia, intended to use the final statement of the note as a pretext for intervention in case peace negotiations failed. 132

On May 15, Beust forwarded to Vienna a statement from Derby which detailed the opposition of Her Majesty's Government to the Berlin Memorandum. The British doubted that Serbia and Montenegro would abide by an armistice, felt that the Porte's financial condition rendered the Turks unable to rebuild Bosnia-Hercegovina, and viewed the concentration of Turkish troops in specified areas of the provinces as serving only as a prelude to renewed religious warfare. Like Disraeli, Derby, too, was most critical of the possibility of intervention which the Berlin Memorandum allowed. 133

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Note to the Serbo-Turkish War," The Slavonic Review, Vol. III, No. 9 (March, 1925), p. 664. See also Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Vol. IV, pp. 24-26, for a memorandum which Disraeli presented to his cabinet on May 16, 1876.


Andrássy responded to British opposition by attempting to mobilize the governments of Germany, France, and Italy to put pressure on Great Britain to join the other Powers.\textsuperscript{134} He also immediately began to sound out London as to whether non-acceptance of the Berlin Memorandum also signified active opposition to it. Andrássy pleaded with Her Majesty's Government at least to acquiesce in the document if Great Britain could not actively support it and to join the Powers in working at Constantinople for a two months' truce.\textsuperscript{135}

In response to Andrássy's flurry of activity, Her Majesty's Government merely reiterated British objections. In regard to whether the British government would actively work against the Berlin Memorandum, Derby stated that Great Britain would adopt an essentially passive position, working neither for nor against it. Derby also responded to Andrássy's request for British assistance in persuading

\textsuperscript{134} Andrássy to Károlyi, Wimpffen, and Count Carl Kuefstein, Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, Vienna, May 17, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, p. 236.

\textsuperscript{135} Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, May 17, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section XII, Carton CCXXIX, Fo. 535; Andrássy to Beust, Budapest, May 18, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 538; Andrássy to Seiller, Budapest, May 18, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with Berlin 1875-76), Fo. 211; and Andrássy to Károlyi, Budapest, May 19, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with Berlin 1875-76), Fo. 215.
the Porte to accept an armistice by declaring that Great Britain would not advise the Porte against accepting an armistice if the Turks felt that such a course of action was in their best interests. 136

Despite the fact that Great Britain refused to participate in presenting the Berlin Memorandum to the Porte, the Three Emperors' League decided to impose it anyway. Events, however, conspired to frustrate their intention. One factor which the Powers had to bear in mind in regard to the presentation of a note to the Porte was the probable Turkish response; that is, would the sultan, his ministers, and the Turkish people accept such blatant European intervention. Conditions in May, 1876, did not augur well for a favorable reaction on the Porte's part. 137 The Turkish populace was extremely aroused and manifested a belligerent, anti-European attitude. During the first week of May the Balkan revolt spread to Bulgaria, and the


137 See Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 325-335 for the state of affairs in Turkey during May, 1876.
hard-pressed Turks had to rely on the murderous attacks of irregular troops to quell the rebellion there.\textsuperscript{138} At the same time, the Powers were provoked by the murder of the French and German consuls in Salonika on May 6 by a mob of Turkish citizens--an affair which brought requests for European troops.\textsuperscript{139} Unrest was also widespread in Constantinople, where Zichy reported that the Ottoman government appeared to be "helpless."\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{138} Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, May 5, 1876, Aktenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussen über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), p. 204; Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, May 6, 1876, ibid., pp. 204-205; Zichy to Andrássy, May 7, 1876, ibid., p. 205; Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, May 7, ibid., pp. 208-209; Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, May 9, 1876, Appendix 3. Copy of a report from consul [Rudolph?] Filek [von Wittinghausen?] to the imperial and royal embassy in Constantinople, Adrianople, May 6, 1976, ibid., pp. 214-215; Oscar Montlong, Austro-Hungarian consul-general at Rustschuk, to Andrássy, Rustschuk, May 24, 1876, ibid., p. 246. See also David Harris, Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1939), for a detailed account of the Bulgarian Horrors.

\textsuperscript{139} See Gerhard Ritter von Chiari, Austro-Hungarian consul at Salonika, to Andrássy, Salonika, May 6, 1876, Aktenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussen über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 206-207; Andrássy to Zichy and Chiari, Vienna, May 9, 1876, ibid., p. 211; Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, May 9, 1876, ibid., pp. 212-213; Chiari to Andrássy, Salonika, May 9, 1876, ibid., p. 216; and Chiari to Andrássy, Salonika, May 25, 1876, ibid., pp. 248-252.

\textsuperscript{140} Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, May 12, 1876, ibid., p. 220.
as a backdrop to these events, the revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina continued unabated.\textsuperscript{141}

In the face of such evidence of the explosive state of Turkish public opinion and of the impotence of the Turkish government, the Powers, nevertheless, carefully prepared their note and coordinated their efforts. But, on the eve of the presentation, the sultan was deposed, and it was thought wise to delay the note until the new government gave some indication of its policies. In the interim, the six Powers attempted to find a compromise formula which would enable Great Britain to participate in the presentation of a reform program to the Porte. When this effort did not succeed, the other Powers resolved again, in late June, to proceed without Great Britain. Once more they were frustrated by a change in the Turkish government. This time the Porte's ministers of war and foreign affairs, along with several other officials, were assassinated just as the Powers were about to present the note.\textsuperscript{142} Their second failure even to present the memorandum, coupled with the deteriorating diplomatic situation in the Balkans, caused the Powers to forego any

\textsuperscript{141} Wassitsch to Andrásy, Metkovich, May 6, 1976, \textit{ibid.}, p. 229.

\textsuperscript{142} Harris, \textit{A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878}, pp. 335-347.
further attempt to implement the note.

As well he should have been, Andrassy was disheartened by the failure of the Berlin Memorandum. While its success in serving as a basis for pacification would have been problematical at best, the fact that no armistice was put into effect and that no discussions between Turks and rebels were instituted allowed the hostilities to continue—and the continuation of fighting brought Serbia and Montenegro ever nearer to openly declared participation in the hostilities. To be sure, the Powers' hold on the Slavic principalities was always tenuous; the restraint exercised on Serbia by the Powers' note of October 6, 1875, was exceedingly short-lived. By December, 1875, the Porte was alarmed by reports of a Serbian-Montenegrin alliance—a possibility which seemed to be indicated by Wassitsch's reports. He stated that "the Montenegrins have already . . . done too much for this revolution not to believe themselves de facto at war with Turkey." He reported

143 Zichy to Andrassy, Constantinople, December 18, 1875, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXIII, Fo. 660.

144 Wassitsch to Andrassy, Mostar, December 18, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXVII (Correspondence with the Austro-Hungarian delegate to the Pacification Commission in Mostar, Wassitsch, 1875-1876), Fo. 318. See also Lucas Vercevich, Austro-Hungarian vice consul in Trebigne, to Andrassy, Trebigne, November 26, 1875, ibid., Carton CCXXXIV (Turkey, Vice-consulate in Trebigne, 1875 and 1876), Fo. 71.
further that war between the Porte and the principality was expected to come officially in March. 145

With the approach of better weather and the possibility of active campaigning, rumors, schemes, and preparations for hostilities abounded. Serbia had continued preparations for a war against the Porte during the winter and by spring was ready for action. In January and February of 1876 the national assembly had approved extraordinary military expenditures and a forced loan of two million dinars. In addition, military supplies had been gathered, and mobilization procedures readied. Milan also sounded out Greece and Montenegro about an alliance against the Turks. 146

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145 Rodich to Andrassy, Zara, January 13, 1876, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXXIV (Turkey, Correspondance with Rodich 1875-76), Fo. 349. See also Wassitsch to Andrassy, Mostar, January 8, 1876, ibid., Fo. 327. The wily Nicholas of Montenegro was also creating problems for Andrassy by whiling away the winter months in negotiations with the Porte. The Turks had concluded that they could pacify Bosnia-Hercegovina only with the aid of Montenegro; as his payment Nicholas wanted part of northern Albania, a portion of Hercegovina, and the port of Spizza and its surrounding district. See Rodich to Andrassy, Zara, December 30, 1875, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXIII (Governor in Dalmatia Lieutenan-General Baron Rodich in Zara 1875), Fo. 404. Apparently the possibility of an agreement was nullified by Andrassy's opposition, the pressure Nicholas felt to aid the insurgents, and the steadily worsening state of Montenegrin-Turkish diplomatic relations. See Andrassy to Langenau, Vienna, February 9, 1876, ibid., Section X, Carton LXVIII (Russia, Instructions 1876), Fos. 24-29 for Andrassy's opposition; and Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersbourg, February 16/4, 1876, ibid., Carton LXIX, Fos. 47 and 49 for the pressures Nicholas faced.

146 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis
Although Austria-Hungary and Russia tried to halt Serbia's rush to war, they were unsuccessful. In part the Powers failed simply because the revolt continued and the Serbs increasingly desired to help their brethren, but a change in the attitude of Prince Milan also played a significant role in the matter. Throughout 1875 and well into 1876 Milan himself had opposed the war and had attempted to control his people; however, that effort had isolated him from his countrymen and had created the threat of assassination or deposition. Moreover, by the spring of 1876 Milan no longer fully trusted Habsburg and Romanov statements and motives. Peter, the Karageorgevich pretender to the Serbian throne, was fighting as a volunteer with the Bosnians, and Milan was convinced that Peter's journey through Austro-Hungarian territory to join the insurrection could have been prevented. In regard to Russia, Milan simply could not believe that the tsarist empire would leave fellow Slavs in the lurch—either in regard to aid to the rebels or to Serbia and Montenegro if they became involved in a war with Turkey. Nor could the prince give credence to Russia's official warnings and efforts to force Serbia to maintain peace when the tsar's consul in Belgrade privately and personally counseled

war. 147

By early March, 1876, the Serbian situation was rapidly reaching a crisis stage. Andrásy received word from Rodich that Prince Nicholas felt that Serbia had to make use of the current Balkan disorders or be discredited in the Slavic world. 148 This warning, coupled with the facts that Montenegro would have to follow any Serbian lead and that military preparations were continuing in Serbia, caused Andrásy to exert great pressure on Milan. On March 12, Andrásy pointed out to Belgrade that Montenegro was adhering to the Powers' pacific course of action and that in view of the Porte's acceptance of the Andrásy Note and the sultan's proclamation of an amnesty for the rebels, Serbia could no longer justify either its military preparations or its equivocal position. If Serbia did not cease its military preparations, the country would face the collective intervention of Europe. Andrásy demanded

147 Trivanovitch, "Serbia, Russia, and Austria during the Rule of Milan Obrenovich, 1868-1878," pp. 427-430. See also Stojanović, The Great Powers and the Balkans 1875-1878, pp. 86-87, for Ristić's view of the situation, especially in regard to Russia's probable course of action.

148 Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, March 7, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXVIII (Turkey, Correspondence with the Imperial-Royal Governor of Dalmatia, Lieutenant-General Baron Rodich in Zara, 1875-1876), Fos. 95 and 98.
that Milan state categorically what his course of action would be. 149

Milan's response to Andrásy's communication was to test Habsburg-Romanov solidarity. He found it temporarily lacking. Gorchakov was miffed over Andrásy's presumption in speaking of "collective intervention" without having consulted Russia. The Russian chancellor refused to pressure Serbia until March 24, by which time he had received more evidence of Serbia's continuing preparation for war. 150 Finally on March 25 Belgrade stated to Vienna that Serbia had no intention of attacking Turkey and that its military activities were merely complementary to the reorganization of its military forces. 151

Serbia's statement of pacific intentions held good for about six weeks 152; however, in early May Ristić and a

149 Andrásy to Wrede, Vienna, March 12, 1876, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CCIX, Fos. 21-26.

150 See Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, March 17, 1876, ibid., Section X, Carton LXVIII (Russia, Instructions 1876), Fos. 51 and 54; Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, March 19, 1876, ibid., Carton LXIX, Fo. 115; and Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, pp. 384-388.


152 For example, see Andrásy to Zichy, [n.p.], April 8, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna) Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fo. 576.
cabinet which favored action came to power. Although Ristic stated to Wrede that Serbia would maintain a pacific policy, preparations for war continued throughout the country. By the end of May the level of Serbian preparation had escalated seriously. Wrede reported that a three months' moratorium on private debts had been instituted, the law which provided freedom of the press had been suspended, and a loan in the amount of twelve million francs was under subscription. Equally ominous was the news of the enrollment of Michael Chernyaev, a retired Russian general, as the head of the Serbian armed forces. According to Wrede, Milan himself was now belligerently inclined. The Austro-Hungarian consul believed that Serbia had decided on war and that the timing


154 Wrede to Andrassy, Belgrade, May 10, 1876, ibid., p. 217.

155 Wrede to Andrassy, Belgrade, May 6, 1876, ibid., p. 211. Wrede specifically mentioned the stockpiling of supplies in Belgrade, the secret erection of munitions depots in the interior of the country, the purchase of horses, and the recruitment of volunteers.

156 Wrede to Andrassy, Belgrade, May 23, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCIX, Fo. 261.
of it would be determined by the course of the armistice negotiations, the progress of the insurrection in Bulgaria, and the subscription of the national loan.  

Although the Serbian situation was rapidly becoming critical, Andrásy was limited in his possible responses. He had already in March confronted Milan with the very serious threat of intervention if Serbia persisted in a bellicose course of action; however, that threat had not deterred the Serbs. Since Andrásy did not view Austro-Hungarian intervention in Serbia as a realistic program, he turned to the other interested states for aid in thwarting Serbia. Andrásy's first move was to seek Russian pressure on Belgrade in an attempt to retard the Serbs' recklessly belligerent course of action.  

Gorchakov and Alexander II tried to restrain Nicholas and Milan but with mixed results. As usual, the astute Montenegrin responded in a moderate and conciliatory

157 Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, May 25, 1876, ibid., Fos. 251-255.

158 Andrásy to Károlyi, Budapest, May 27, 1876, Actenstücke aus den Corresponderenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), p. 254. Károlyi was at this time with Alexander II and Gorchakov who were taking a cure at Ems.

159 Károlyi to Andrásy, Ems, May 31, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CX, Fo. 198.
manner, but the prince of Serbia did not. 160

In addition to seeking Russia's assistance in calming
the Slavs, Andrásy also advised the Porte as to the
course of action most likely to ease the tension. The
foreign minister felt that Constantinople should do its
best to effect a truce with the insurgents in order to rob
Serbia of a pretext for war and to free more troops to use
against Serbia if war came anyway. Secondly, Andrásy
c counseled the Porte to begin to negotiate border rectifi-
cations with Nicholas of Montenegro in the hope of
dividing Serbia and Montenegro and perhaps keeping
Montenegro out of a possible war. 161

In spite of Andrásy's efforts to preserve the peace,
signs of an imminent war became ever clearer. From
Rodich there came word that Montenegro appeared to be com-
pletely ready for hostilities, 162 while Ristić stated
privately that the only way for the Porte to avoid war
would be to turn over the administration of Bosnia-

160 Károlyi to Andrásy, Ems, June 2, 1876, ibid., Fos. 218 and 222.

161 Andrásy to Zichy, Budapest, May 29, 1876, ibid.,
Section XII, Carton CCXXXII, Fos. 908-909.

162 Rodich to Andrásy, Zara, June 3, 1876, A c t e n-
stücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön.
gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussen über Orientalische
Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877),
p. 269.
Hercegovina to Serbia. 163 Milan's government also gave an indication that Russian pressure would not suffice to prevent war. In the face of the tsar's threat that he would abandon Serbia completely if that country broke the peace, Belgrade replied merely that it would refrain from hostilities for as long as possible. 164

Two weeks turned out to be as long as Serbia could uphold the peace. On June 21 the first class of the militia was called to the colors, 165 and the next day Milan wrote to the Forte that his troops would be entering Bosnia to restore peace to that province. The delivery of this letter to Constantinople on June 29 was followed on June 30 by a Serbian declaration of war. 166 On July 2, 

163 Wrede to Andrassy, Belgrade, May 30, 1876, ibid., p. 257.

164 Wrede to Andrassy, Belgrade, June 8, 1876, Staats-archiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCIX, Fo. 288.


1876, the Serbs advanced across their border; the same day Nicholas of Montenegro declared war on the Porte.

War between the Slavic principalities and the Porte was a completely logical and foreseeable outgrowth of the revolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. That it had been postponed for a year was due largely to Andrassy's efforts. However, while Andrassy's work had been vigorous at times, his reform proposals had not been particularly innovative or efficacious. True, they could have succeeded in halting the armed revolt and in establishing the basis of a society built on justice and equality in Bosnia-Hercegovina—but someone had to enforce those reforms. Andrassy was not willing to allow Austria-Hungary to do it, nor to join with Russia in guaranteeing reforms, nor to agree to Italian supervision of the rebellious provinces. Likewise he sidestepped all suggestions of effective coercion of the Porte. In reality, Andrassy cannot actually have hoped to solve the

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168 For the text of the Montenegrin declaration, see Prince of Montenegro to the Grand Vizir, Cetinje, July 2, 1876, *Documents Diplomatiques. Affaires d'Orient. 1875-1876-1877,* pp. 164-166.
Balkan crisis by means of reform. He was too astute to fail to perceive that the plans he proposed were inadequate. Indeed, in the first year Andrássy sought not so much to solve the crisis as to allow it to be solved. He was opposed to an aggressive Austro-Hungarian policy—that is, a program whereby the Dual Monarchy would intervene to impose or guarantee reform in Bosnia-Hercegovina—because such action would invite imitation by Russia and call forth the possibility of a definitive settlement of the Eastern Question. Andrássy sought to avoid such a categorical solution because it would bring with it the likelihood of an addition of Slavic territory to the Dual Monarchy and the probability of significant and threatening increases of territory and/or influence in the Balkans by Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia. To Andrássy the pre-1875 situation, if it could be reestablished, was a condition much more preferable than anything which he could envision as succeeding it. Viewed in this light, Andrássy's reform plans appear to be no more than sham. He was not willing to allow a substantive change in the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina, particularly one which would weaken or abolish Turkish suzerainty over the provinces and create the possibility of a new, de facto independent Slavic principality, or which would leave open the possibility of absorption of the area by Serbia and Montenegro. Andrássy used his reform plans as a means of forestalling
intervention by the Powers or by the Slavic principalities and as a method by which he could retain the
initiative and preclude the proposal of measures, such as autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina, which might have brought
a solution, albeit radical and probably short-lived, to the Balkan crisis. In essence, the Habsburg minister was
stalling off vigorous and effective measures in order to afford the Turks time to achieve a military solution of
their problems. That was the only means by which he could assure the preservation of the status quo ante 1875.
However, in such a situation—that is, with no hope of improving their lot save by their own efforts—it is not
surprising that the insurgents continued their fight until finally Serbia and Montenegro were pulled into the
hostilities.

With the outbreak of war between the Porte and the principalities, Andrásy's policy suffered a severe blow.
It would be an arduous, if not impossible, task to bring about a return to pre-1875 conditions; it would be equally
difficult to prevent Russian intervention and the possibility of throwing open the Eastern Question which that
action would entail. A change in Austro-Hungarian policy seemed to be imperative. But what course of action was
Andrásy to choose?
CHAPTER IV

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY
FROM JULY, 1876, TO DECEMBER, 1876

"The question is this: if we will not go with, will we step forward against Russia?"
--Andrassy, September 28, 1876.¹

"Nothing is to be won by a war with Russia."
--Archduke Albert, November, 1876.

The attack of Serbia and Montenegro on the Ottoman empire signified the start of a new phase of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878. From Andrassy's point of view, war between the principalities and the Porte intensified certain dangers which had been inherent in the situation from the beginning of the Hercegovinian revolt. Open and declared hostilities between Slavs and Turks brought in their wake the possibility that the war could become a Slavic crusade against the Ottoman empire. Regardless of whether the fighting remained merely a war or became a kind of Christian jihad, Russia would inevitably be much

¹Notes on the oral utterances of His Excellency [Andrassy] in the council of September 28 [1876], Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fo. 158.

²Archduke Albert, "Aphoristic Observations on the Current Situation, November 1876," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 70/59, 2, [Fo. 4].
more interested in Balkan affairs than it had been prior to the outbreak of war. As a Slavic Great Power with its reputation to protect, Russia could hardly allow its Balkan brothers to suffer any irreparable harm at the hands of the Turks; conversely, if the Turks were routed, the tsar's government would be unlikely to refrain from adding to its own territory. If these larger issues did not provide him with enough cause for concern, Andrásy was also confronted with the duty of safeguarding Austria-Hungary's interest in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Regardless of the nature of the war and the course of action Russia chose to follow, the rebellious provinces, long coveted by Serbia and Montenegro, would be the prime objectives of any conquests which Milan and Nicholas might achieve.

Faced with a situation vastly altered by the outbreak of a "declared war," Andrásy was forced to reevaluate Austria-Hungary's course of action. During the period before the beginning of hostilities between Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, the foreign minister had sought to limit the extent of the crisis by tacitly siding with the Porte in the hope that the Ottoman empire could maintain the territorial and political status quo in the Balkans. This goal, coupled with the hope of keeping Austria-Hungary out of active involvement in the Balkan disturbances, greatly influenced Andrásy's reform proposals. At no time did the Habsburg minister publicly propose
reforms which would be clearly and completely backed by the Great Powers. Nor did he ever consent to exert significant, visible pressure on the Porte to implement reforms or to satisfy the grievances of the insurgents. And yet from the very beginning Andrásy was advised by his own agents that grudging, half-hearted promises of reforms from the Turks would not suffice to pacify Bosnia-Hercegovina. One can surmise only that the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister had no real desire to satisfy the rebels; rather, his method of bringing about peace was to allow the Turks as free a hand as possible. This solution, fostered by Andrásy during the first year of the Balkan crisis, had not proven successful. Was it necessary, however, for the Habsburg minister to seek another answer to his problem? In part, the Porte's failure to suppress the revolt in Bosnia-Hercegovina stemmed from the fact that it had no way to halt the support which came from Serbia and Montenegro. Now, with war declared, the Turks could openly confront all their Balkan antagonists. Perhaps if Andrásy could continue to forestall Russian intervention a bit longer the Turks could reassert their hegemony throughout the Balkans and reestablish a reasonable approximation of the status quo ante bellum.

A second possible course of action was closer cooperation with Great Britain. To be sure, in the summer of
1876 this was a somewhat remote likelihood since to that point Her Majesty's Government had held itself rather aloof from Balkan affairs and had not shown itself particularly well-disposed toward Andrásy and Austria-Hungary. Still, if the Slavic principalities were inordinately successful against the Porte, or if Russia intervened against the Turks, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary might well find themselves sharing a community of interests in the Balkans.

A third option, although one not at all appealing to Andrásy, was the arrangement of a definitive settlement of the Eastern Question with Russia. Obviously this would necessitate an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy such as Andrásy loathed, but it would also prevent friction with Russia, preserve the Three Emperors' League, and guarantee Austro-Hungarian control over those areas of the Balkans which the Dual Monarchy regarded as vital to its interests.

The actions taken by the Austro-Hungarian government during the very early days of the war between Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey indicate that Andrásy chose to continue his pro-Turkish policy in the hope that the Porte would triumph over its antagonists. In regard to internal affairs, Andrásy sought to prevent volunteers from
assisting the Slavic principalities and to stifle agitation and propaganda by the Slavs of the monarchy in favor of Serbia and Montenegro.

While, on the one hand, Andrássy sought to master the internal reactions of the Dual Monarchy to the outbreak of war, on the other, he attempted to give some direction to the actions of Serbia and Montenegro. In pursuit of that goal he promptly warned the Serbs and their allies in Bosnia-Hercegovina that Austria-Hungary would not countenance Serbian acquisition of the rebellious provinces. With

3 Andrássy to Kuefstein, Vienna, July 7, 1876, Aktenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877). Andrássy, influenced by Tisza, expressed concern to Mollinary about whether the population of Croatia-Slavonia would maintain a "loyal position" in the event of war between the principalities and the Porte and inquired as to the wisdom of declaring a "state of emergency" on the Dual Monarchy's southern border. See Andrássy to Mollinary, Vienna, June 27, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, 69-1/3-108 (1876), Fo. 2. Mollinary replied that such a measure would be quite likely to inflame the situation more than to calm it. See Mollinary to Andrássy, [n.p.], June 28, 1876, ibid., Fo. 3.

4 For example, see the correspondence in regard to the suppression of pro-Slavic newspapers published in the Vojvodina in Beck to Tisza, Vienna, June 6, 1876, ibid., 69-1/3-88 (1876), Fo. 1; and the exchange of letters between Beck, Mollinary, Andrássy, and Emperor Francis Joseph in ibid., 15-1/2 (1876).

5 Andrássy to Rodich, Vienna, July 7, 1876, ibid., Separate Fascicle 73/20, Fo. [1]. Consuls Theodorović and Wassitsch in Sarajevo and Mostar, respectively, were also instructed quietly to spread the word that Austria-Hungary
regard to Montenegro, the situation was perhaps more serious, since that country posed a more direct threat to the Dalmatian hinterland. Rodich was extremely concerned that Prince Nicholas might quickly succeed in establishing de facto control over large parts of Hercegovina. The governor of Dalmatia felt that in such an eventuality it would be very difficult to persuade Nicholas to relinquish that control. Rodich was also quite fearful that Cetinje would occupy the Klek enclave and the port of Cattaro. If that happened, the sympathy of the Slavs of southern Dalmatia for the Montenegrins could create a dangerous situation in the event that Austria-Hungary had to oust Nicholas' troops from the area.

would not allow Bosnia-Hercegovina to fall to Serbia.
According to Pott, Mollinary was given a small sum with which to finance agitation against Serbia's acquisition of Bosnia; however, Mollinary failed to utilize the money because he believed that he had not been given enough to do any good. See ibid., B/187/No. 1/ Chapter V (Pott Nachlaß), p. 67.

6 For example, see Rodich's statement that "early today the Prince of Montenegro at the head of his troops burst out of Cetinje toward Hercegovina." Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, July 2, 1876, Staatsarchive (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CXXXIV (Imperial-royal governor's office in Dalmatia, 1876), Fo. 242.

7 See Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, July 6, 1876, ibid., Section XII, Carton CXXXVII (Turkey, landing authorization for Turkish ships; transportation of rations and wounded), Fo. 237; and Rodich to Beck, Zara, July 7, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, 69-1/4-5 (1876), Fos. 2-10 and 13-15.
Andrássy did not agree with the governor's pessimistic view. In his opinion, Montenegro hardly posed a dire threat to the Dual Monarchy. He was convinced that Nicholas would require Austro-Hungarian assistance regardless of the outcome of the war. If Serbia and Montenegro won, Nicholas would have to obtain the Dual Monarchy's approval of any territorial changes. If the principalities were defeated, Cetinje would look to Vienna for protection against the Porte. 8 Andrássy stated that he would not intervene to prevent a Montenegrin occupation of the Klek area; however, he also advised Nicholas to avoid action which would damage the Dual Monarchy's interests and informed the prince that Austria-Hungary would not accept any fait accompli which was inimical to its interests. 9

In regard to the Porte's prosecution of the war, Andrássy indicated a willingness to allow the Turks to proceed in a relatively unhindered manner. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, the British government had sounded out Vienna about Austria-Hungary's response to the


9 Andrássy to Rodich, July 7, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CXXXIV (Imperial-royal governor's office in Dalmatia, 1876), Fo. 265.
proposition that if Serbia attacked the Porte, "no power had the right to oppose the Turkish entry into Serbia."\textsuperscript{10} Andrássy promptly agreed with the British position\textsuperscript{11} and undoubtedly hoped to witness a quick and successful Turkish campaign.

In addition to such measures as forestalling the possibility of internal agitation and informing other interested parties of its point of view, the Dual Monarchy also undertook some modest military preparations to ensure that the war did not take a course which would endanger its interests. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities two gunboats were dispatched down the Danube to Belgrade and placed at Wrede's disposal.\textsuperscript{12} At the same time an observation corps was ordered to the vicinity of Šabac to give additional weight to Austria-Hungary's views about the proper conduct of the war.\textsuperscript{13} And if,

\textsuperscript{10} Beust to Andrássy, London, June 26, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Section VIII, Carton LXXXV, Fo. 434.

\textsuperscript{11} Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, June 27, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton LXXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fo. 113.

\textsuperscript{12} Beck to the marine section of the imperial war ministry, Laxenburg, July 3, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers. 69-1/11 (1876), Fo. 1

contrary to Andrásy's fervent hopes and earnest efforts, an occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by imperial-royal troops became necessary, a mobilization plan had been revised specifically for that task. ¹⁴

Once these preparations were completed, Andrásy would probably have been quite content simply to watch the unfolding of events passively; however, he was not allowed such a luxury. His calm was disturbed by Russia. The escalation of the revolt to open war presented the tsarist state with both a liability and an opportunity. As the vociferously avowed champion of the Slavs, Russia's prestige was at stake. Alexander II could not allow Serbia and Montenegro to suffer any real humiliation at the hands of the Turks. That was the danger inherent in the situation. However, if the Slavic principalities routed the Turks, the resulting chaos might lead to a definitive settlement of the Eastern Question and the possibility that St. Petersburg could regain Bessarabia and perhaps acquire additional territory. The crux of the matter was that, regardless of the outcome of the war, Russia might be forced to intervene; but, effective military intervention could be hampered or prevented by Austria-Hungary. Therefore, St. Petersburg viewed with increasing favor an

¹⁴ Proposal of the imperial war minister, July 10, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers. 69-1/18 (1876), Fos. 1-64.
understanding with the Dual Monarchy about the possible actions which the two states might take as a result of the war.

Andrássy and the Austro-Hungarian government also felt the need for a clearer delineation—and hopefully, accommodation—of Romanov and Habsburg Balkan policies. For his part, Andrássy foresaw the probability of increased pressure on Russia to intervene. While he himself would oppose any such action by St. Petersburg, he also knew that influential leaders such as Archduke Albert and General Beck would not. They were, in fact, desirous of close cooperation with Russia in the Balkans. They favored such a course of action because on the one hand, it would facilitate mutual gain for the two countries, and because, on the other hand, they feared a military confrontation with Russia. In view of the facts that Russia would probably be pressured into taking some kind of vigorous action and that he would not be able to marshal enough support within Austria-Hungary to oppose the tsarist empire, the foreign minister was forced to regard a policy of

cooperation with St. Petersburg with increasing favor. It was from such conditions as these that the first firm agreement between St. Petersburg and Vienna to cooperate in the Balkans stemmed. Basically the Russians desired the freedom to act unhindered by Austria-Hungary, while Andrássy wanted a written agreement in order to define and limit Russian gains and to protect the Dual Monarchy's interests.

As early as May, 1876, Alexander II indicated a desire to meet with Francis Joseph during the tsar's summer visit to the spas of central Europe. 16 Something of a carrot and stick atmosphere surrounded the Russians' request for a meeting. According to reports from St. Petersburg, the tsar frequently reiterated his loyalty to the Three Emperors' League and his monarchical affection for Francis Joseph 17; however, the Russian government also continued to bandy about the idea of autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina 18—a proposal which was hardly acceptable to

16 Colonel Baron Anton von Bechtolsheim, Austro-Hungarian military attaché at St. Petersburg, to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, May 6, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXVIII (Russia, Various 1875-76, Correspondence with Bechtolsheim), Fos. 80-81.

17 Ibid. See also Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, May 8/April 26, 1876, ibid., Carton LXIX, Fo. 185.

18 Emperor Francis Joseph to Andrássy, Ischl, June 24, 1876, ibid., Section XL, Carton LIV (Autograph letters of the All Highest and reports, 1876), Fo. 1.
Andrássy but which, at the same time, would be certain to draw him into discussions with St. Petersburg.

The mutual desire of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian governments for some kind of agreement about their Balkan policies led to discussions among the two rulers and their chief ministers on July 8, 1876, at Reichstadt in Bohemia. The talks were apparently harmonious, and Gorchakov and Andrássy were able quickly to resolve potential points of conflict. In large measure agreement was easily reached because what was decided was not delineated precisely. (The participants did not agree on an authoritative text of the "Reichstadt agreement." ) The most important provisions of the understanding provided that if Turkey defeated Serbia and Montenegro, peace would be reestablished on the basis of the status quo ante bellum in the principalities and that Bosnia-Hercegovina would be governed in accordance with the stipulations of the Andrássy Note and the Berlin Memorandum. If the Slavic principalities triumphed, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Montenegro would divide Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the Austro-Hungarian version of the agreement, the Dual Monarchy was to receive most of

\[19\] For a good discussion of the Reichstadt agreement, see Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 134-151. See also the dramatic account in Hegedus, "The Foreign Policy of Count Julius Andrássy," pp. 635-637, and that in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, pp. 172-176.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, while according to the Russian text the Habsburg state was to acquire only a relatively small part of Bosnia. The Russian text also contained the condition that the two Powers would not favor the establishment of a large Slavic state in the Balkans. As its share of the spoils, Russia was to get the part of Bessarabia which it had lost to Romania in 1856 and Turkish territory in Asia.²⁰

As a result of their misunderstanding about the disposition of Bosnia and Herzegovina,²¹ the leaders of both Austria-Hungary and Russia were pleased with the Reichstadt agreement. Gorchakov and Alexander II believed that they had prepared the way for the recovery of Bessarabia and for the aggrandizement of their Balkan proteges at the nominal cost of the concession of part of Bosnia to the Dual Monarchy. For his part, Andrassy viewed the understanding with satisfaction, but not, however, because he thought that Austria-Hungary was to acquire most of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He had agreed to take the Turkish territory only because he felt that if the Slavic

²⁰ A comparison of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian texts of the agreement can be found in ibid., pp. 583-586.

principalities defeated the Porte, they would pose a certain threat to Austro-Hungarian interests in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Reichstadt accord was also valuable in Andrássy's opinion because it bound the Russians to a definite, limited program in the Balkans.

Despite the advantages which the Reichstadt agreement brought to Austria-Hungary, Andrássy could not be satisfied with the Dual Monarchy's diplomatic position. As matters stood in the summer of 1876, the Habsburg state was in part dependent on Russian honor and good-will for the safeguarding of its Balkan interests. Andrássy had little reason to doubt that Russia would act in accordance with the Reichstadt understanding, but at the same time, he could not overlook the possibility, or the suspicion, of Russian perfidy. In such a situation it was only politic that he keep open the lines of communication with Great Britain. Andrássy neither proposed nor desired any concrete alliance or agreement with Her Majesty's Government in regard to the Balkans; he did want to make certain that negotiations between Vienna and London could be implemented easily in the event St. Petersburg posed a serious threat to Austro-Hungarian interests. It was a narrow tightrope which Andrássy sought to walk in regard to the British: close friendship but not alliance, recognition of a community of interests but not implementation of a common program to safeguard those interests.
An initial problem which arose to hinder close Austro-Hungarian-British relations was the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In June of 1876 the British government had once again raised the issue of autonomy for the two provinces and at the same time revealed an equivocal attitude toward a possible annexation of the area by Austria-Hungary. Derby stated that such an action by the Dual Monarchy could precipitate a general partition of the Ottoman empire. The British foreign secretary implied that such an event would not be in the interests of Great Britain; however, he also said that the British would not fight to save the Turks. 22 Andrássy's reply to Derby's statements about autonomy was a reiteration of his usual position that such a condition would prove unworkable in Bosnia-Hercegovina because of the ethnically and religiously mixed population. 23

With the outbreak of war between Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, Derby dropped the issue of autonomy and began to worry the Ballhausplatz with soundings about the possibility that the war might force the Dual Monarchy to occupy

22 Beust to Andrássy, London, June 7, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton LXXXV, Fos. 388-389. See also Beust to Andrássy, London, June 23, 1876, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXIX, Fo. 690.

23 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, June 25, 1876, ibid., Section XII, Carton CCXXIX, Fo. 693; and Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, June 27, 1876, ibid., Fos. 700-702.
or annex Bosnia-Hercegovina. In regard to this issue, Beust promptly provided Derby with a reply designed to calm Her Majesty's Government. According to the ambassador, if the Dual Monarchy had to occupy or annex Bosnia-Hercegovina, it would encounter no opposition there and, therefore, such action by the Habsburg state would not necessarily lead to future complications or to a widening of the crisis. However, Beust lacked the knowledge to be able to give Derby an inkling of Austria-Hungary's future policy. He stated to Andrásy that if he had the requisite information about Austria-Hungary's policy and could explain the Dual Monarchy's intentions to Her Majesty's Government, he could ensure good rapport with Great Britain. 24

At precisely the same time that Beust was importuning in favor of a closer relationship with Great Britain, Andrásy was negotiating with Gorchakov at Reichstadt. In view of the accord which Austria-Hungary and Russia reached there, the Habsburg foreign minister was unwilling for the time being to enter into far-reaching negotiations or a binding agreement with the British. Since, however, it would have been unwise to reject out of hand the friendship and the overtures of Her Majesty's Government,

Andrássy responded to the feelers of Derby and Beust\textsuperscript{25} in a positive, but also very general, manner. According to the Habsburg minister, the essential goal of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary was the same: the reestablishment of the status quo ante 1875 in the Balkans. A secondary aim was the protection of their respective interests if that condition could not be effectuated. Andrássy would not go beyond these general statements of fact; there was no hint of willingness to act with Great Britain to reinstitute the pre-1875 situation or to cooperate in safeguarding their special interests.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25}It should be mentioned here that throughout the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 Beust worked assiduously to effect an Austro-Hungarian-British agreement or alliance. Such a course of action had a certain amount of logic and wisdom to commend it to the Ballhausplatz; no doubt Beust also favored it because it would have given the exceedingly vain ambassador an exaggeratedly important role in Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. Andrássy did not inform Beust of the terms of the Reichstadt agreement and, therefore, the ambassador did not realize the extent to which he was opposing the foreign minister's policy. One can say that Beust knew Andrássy preferred an agreement with Russia to one with Great Britain, but he did not know that the foreign minister had actually committed himself at Reichstadt. For the views of Beust, see the voluminous correspondence between the ambassador and the Ballhausplatz in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Cartons LXXXIII through XCIV.

\textsuperscript{26}Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, July 8, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Carton LXXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fos. 136-137.
The communiqué which the Ballhausplatz issued as a result of the Reichstadt meeting did much to allay British curiosity about the Dual Monarchy's future course of action. According to that innocuous document, which made no mention of any agreement between Vienna and St. Petersburg, Austria-Hungary intended to maintain a policy of non-intervention. If it became necessary to alter that policy, the Dual Monarchy would invite an agreement among the Great Powers as to what should be done. 27 Beust reported that Derby was quite satisfied by Austria-Hungary's action; heretofore the English statesman had feared that a widening of the conflict or even a general war was an immediate prospect. 28

From the British point of view the Reichstadt communiqué lessened the interest of Her Majesty's Government in Austria-Hungary's future policy. For his part, any slight interest in better rapport with Great Britain which Andrásy may have had was diminished by several events which occurred in July and August of 1876. The first incident to which Andrásy took exception was a speech by Derby in mid-July in which the foreign secretary

27 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, July 9, 1876, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIIL, Fos. 19-21.

28 Beust to Andrásy, London, July 10, 1876, ibid., Fo. 27.
made uncomplimentary references to Austria-Hungary, stating that the Dual Monarchy was pursuing a pacific course of action because such was forced upon it by the country's nationality problems. The obvious inference was that the Habsburg state could not act decisively in the Balkans. 29 Derby's speech was followed on August 2 by a conversation in which the foreign secretary stated to Beust that Her Majesty's Government "could not encourage" an Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, even though drastic political changes in the Balkans might seem to necessitate that. 30 On the same day the British—by means of an article in The Times—once again raised the spector of independence for Bosnia-Hercegovina. 31 While taken separately, each of these occurrences was of little importance, their cumulative effect made Andrássy leery of British intentions in regard to both the Balkans and Austria-Hungary.

While the British and Austro-Hungarian statesmen were feeling out each other's Balkan policies and intentions,

29 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, July 19, 1876, ibid., Section VIII, Carton LXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fos. 168-169.

30 Beust to Andrássy, London, August 2, 1876, ibid., Carton LXXXVI, Fos. 774-775.

31 Beust to Andrássy, London, August 2, 1876, ibid., Fo. 781.
the events of the war in southeastern Europe took an unexpected turn: the Turks were winning. As early as July 5, 1876, less than one week after the declaration of war, the Serbs sounded a less than bellicose note when government leaders admitted to Wrede that Serbia could not win a long war and would welcome intervention by the Powers to facilitate negotiations with the Porte.\textsuperscript{32} Mediation soon began to be discussed even more seriously when the Turks quickly seized the initiative in the fighting and enjoyed general and decisive success against the Serbs.\textsuperscript{33} By August 12 the situation had become so serious for the Serbs that Beck predicted European intervention in their behalf.\textsuperscript{34}

The Serbian military fiasco had very serious consequences for St. Petersburg. Russia was materially and emotionally involved in the struggle between the Orthodox "little brothers" and the Turkish infidels. Immediately after the declaration of war, Langenau predicted that in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, July 5, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Section XXXVII, Carton CCIX, Fo. 393.
  \item Rupp, \textit{A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria} 1876-1878, pp. 155-156; Trivanovitch, "Serbia, Russia, and Austria during the Rule of Milan Obrenovich, 1868-1878," p. 433.
  \item Beck to Rodich, Vienna, August 12, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/2/Fo. VI/No. 179/14 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), [p. 2].
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the event of an all-out Turkish war effort Alexander II probably would not be able to keep Russia out of the conflict. The matter would become too much one of "honor and self-respect."\(^{35}\) By August, 1876, the complete inability of the Serbs to contest effectively the Turks' victorious advance had created a critical situation in Russia. On the thirteenth of that month Langenau reported to Vienna that, precisely because of the Serbs' misfortunes, sympathy and enthusiasm for their cause was continuing to increase. According to the ambassador, the tsar could not isolate himself from the pro-Slavic agitation because of the advantage which such separation would give to the anarchists and socialists. Nevertheless, Langenau believed that for the time being Alexander and his government would be able to maintain a pacific, non-interventionist policy.\(^{36}\) Such a belief in the tsar's ability to control his people turned out to be very short-lived. The Serbian situation remained perilous, and the Russian people and press became increasingly agitated. On August 16 Langenau wrote that Alexander's position was becoming

\(^{35}\) Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, July 5/June 23, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIX, Fo. 300.

\(^{36}\) Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, August 13/1, 1876, ibid., Fos. 362-364.
difficult and that action had been taken against several newspapers because of attacks on the government's Balkan policy. The ambassador felt that the agitation would soon induce St. Petersburg to make "a pacification attempt in Turkey." At this same time (mid-August, 1876) Andrássy began anew to try to bring peace to the Balkans. He was motivated by his fear that Russia's "pacification attempt" might take the form of military intervention as well as by the fact that Turkish success offered him the possibility of reestablishing peace on the general basis of the status quo ante 1875. The crux of Andrássy's pacification effort was pressure on Belgrade to request the mediation of the Great Powers. In order to make the offer attractive to the Serbs, he held out the prospect of preserving intact all of the principality's territory.

37 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, August 16/4, 1876, ibid., Carton LXVIII (Russia, Various 1875-76; Letters from Langenau), Fo. 60.

38 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, August 16/4, 1876, ibid., Carton LXIX, Fos. 385-388.

39 Ibid., Fo. 388.

40 Andrássy to Wrede, Bayreuth, August 17, 1876, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CCIX, Fo. 93.

41 Andrássy to Wrede, Vienna, August 23, 1876, ibid., Fo. 99.
On August 25 Prince Milan formally requested the mediation of the Powers to reestablish peace.\textsuperscript{42} His appeal initiated an extended period of squabbling between Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Great Britain about the precise basis upon which peace was to be reintroduced. Meanwhile desultory fighting continued. Apparently the first concrete proposal of terms of an armistice came from Gorchakov, who proposed a truce of two or three months' duration and mentioned the possibility of a Great Power conference to work out the conditions under which peace would be reestablished.\textsuperscript{43}

Andrássy's response was not favorable to the chancellor's suggestions. He objected to such a long armistice because he felt it would allow the Turks to temporize in their usual manner. The Habsburg minister shared Gorchakov's view that the Powers should agree on the peace terms, but he did not favor a conference for that purpose. He argued that a conference implied a lasting solution. That, in turn, implied radical change in the political organization of the Balkans, but little had changed; the Turks were in the process of demonstrating

\textsuperscript{42} Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, August 25, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 465-469.

\textsuperscript{43} Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, August 29, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Section X, Carton LXIX, Fo. 418.
that they were still able to rule their Balkan possessions. As a counterproposal Andrásy argued for a one month truce to be followed by a peace based on the status quo ante bellum for Serbia, frontier rectifications in favor of Montenegro, and reforms such as those embodied in the Berlin Memorandum for Bosnia-Hercegovina.  

From this point on attempts at pacification became rapidly and increasingly complicated. Of initial concern to Vienna was the general situation in Russia and the response of St. Petersburg to Andrásy's proposal. Langenau reported a growing fear among the foreign diplomatic corps that Russia would enter the war against Turkey if a truce was not implemented or if the Turks scored a truly decisive military victory. At the same time the Austro-Hungarian ambassador informed the Ballhausplatz that Gorchakov now seemed to believe that only a Great Power conference could offer a solution to the chaos in southeastern Europe. According to Langenau, the Russian peace

44 For a detailed elaboration of Andrásy's program and ideas, see "Notes of an Interview of His Excellency Count Andrásy with His Excellency Mr. Novikov, delivered as an aide-mémoire to the ambassador from Russia on September 6, 1876," ibid., Carton LXVIII (Russia, Various 1875-76; Correspondence with Bechtolsheim 1876), Fos. 160-172.

45 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, September 9, 1876, ibid., Carton LXXIX, Fo. 448.
program included "autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina, and perhaps even for Bulgaria." The ambassador also thought that St. Petersburg might propose Italy as the Great Power which would guarantee the implementation of Balkan reforms. 46

If the course of action of the tsar's government was not precisely to Andrássy's liking, that followed by Her Majesty's Government was frankly objectionable. On September 10 Ambassador Zichy reported that Great Britain was exerting strong pressure on the Turks to compel them to implement a truce. 47 While Andrássy could hardly object to the institution of a cease-fire, he was quite hostile to the British proposal of "'administrative reforms in the nature of local autonomy for Bosnia and the Hercegoviné'" as one of the bases for the reestablishment of peace. 48

46 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, September 9/ August 28, 1876, ibid., Nos. 451-452. Langenau also stated that the crucial factor in regard to any Russian proposals was the degree to which Alexander II would back them. Langenau implied that at this time the tsar would readily modify those which might be unacceptable to Austria-Hungary and Germany in order to preserve unity and harmony within the Three Emperors' League, ibid., Fo. 452.


48 Zichy to Andrássy, Constantinople, September 10,
When, in mid-September, St. Petersburg accepted London's program as a basis for pacification, Andrássy was moved to make a strong counterattack on the British proposals. On the one hand, he informed Novikov that Austria-Hungary could not agree to the British terms because the idea of autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina and Bulgaria was incompatible with the goal of preserving the Ottoman empire, and, on the other, he directed at London a barrage of arguments designed to emphasize that the Dual Monarchy would not allow its interests in the area to be disregarded and to demonstrate the folly of autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina. Andrássy argued that autonomy was

1876, ibid., p. 400. In their entirety the British proposals were as follows:

"The status quo ante, speaking roughly, both as regard Serbia and Montenegro.

'Administrative reforms in the nature of local autonomy for Bosnia and the Hercegovine.

'Guarantees of some similar kind (the exact details of which might be reserved for later discussion) against the future maladministration of Bulgaria'." Ibid.

49 Substance of a telegram from Prince Gorchakov, communicated by Mr. Novikov, September 15, 1876, ibid., p. 410.

50 Response to the communication made by Mr. Novikov of a telegram from Prince Gorchakov, ibid.

51 For example, see Andrássy to Wolkenstein, Vienna, September 17, 1876, ibid., p. 418. In this communication the foreign minister stated that "one must not forget that we occupy the box closest to the stage of Eastern disorders, a fact which is scarcely comforting, and that we have the most vital of interests—at least in Bosnia and Hercegovina. We will neither ignore those interests ourselves nor allow them to be ignored; rather we have resolved to have them recognized."
"an indefinite thing, vague and impossible to control in its application," that it would excite the aspirations of the insurgents to no purpose, and that it would be rejected by the Turks out of hand. He proposed to substitute "autonomous rights" for autonomy per se. According to the Habsburg minister, these rights would be modeled after those included in the Andrásy Note of December 30, 1875.  

As it turned out, the Austro-Hungarian-British dispute was one of definition and not of substance. When London reported that by local autonomy it meant giving the populace some control over local institutions and officers in order to prevent abuses of power, Vienna readily accepted the British proposals. By September 22,  

52 Andrásy to Wolkenstein, Vienna, September 17, 1876, ibid., p. 416.  
53 Ibid., pp. 415-418.  
54 Andrásy to Wolkenstein, Vienna, September 17, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton LXXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fo. 255.  
56 Andrásy to Wolkenstein, Vienna, September 20, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton LXXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fos. 233-234 and 241.
1876, a common program had been agreed on by the Great Powers and was presented to the Porte shortly thereafter. 57

At the same time when the Great Powers were striving to arrive at a common policy in regard to Turkey, Russia and Austria-Hungary were working independently to safeguard their own interests. Both countries attempted to secure Bismarck's support for their own particular policies in the event a general accord could not be attained. The negotiations between St. Petersburg and Berlin took place first. 58 In early September, Bismarck dispatched Field Marshal Edwin von Manteuffel to the Russian military maneuvers in Russian Poland. 59 Manteuffel delivered an autographed letter from William I to Alexander II and assured the tsar of the German empire's friend-

57 For the terms of this joint demarche, see Derby to Sir Henry Elliot, British ambassador to Constantinople, [n.p.], September 22, 1876, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 423-424. In general the terms called for the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro, that is, no loss of territory, and limited local self-government for Bosnia-Hercegovina and Bulgaria. The note stressed that the creation of a "tributary state" on the order of Serbia and Romania was not to be considered in regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina.

58 See Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria-Hungary 1876-1878, pp. 190-194 for the details.

59 For Bismarck's reasoning in this matter, see dictation of the imperial chancellor Prince von Bismarck,
Although William I's letter to the tsar stated that "the memory of Your attitude toward me and my country from 1864 to 1870-71 will guide my policy towards Russia, whatever happens," Bismarck was rudely disconcerted by the response of the Russian government to Manteuffel's mission. On September 14 the Russians presented the German foreign office with two questions: what would Germany's position be if Russia had to act unilaterally [i.e., in regard to the Balkans] and what diplomatic procedures or action would Germany propose if it considered backing Russia? Bismarck did not deign to answer either query; rather, Berlin responded that William I would discuss the issue with Grand Duke Nicholas during the latter's upcoming visit to Berlin.


60. For the text of the letter, see Emperor William I to Emperor Alexander II, Berlin, September 2, 1876, ibid., p. 38. For Manteuffel's report to the emperor, see Field Marshal Baron von Manteuffel to Emperor William I, Warsaw, September 6, 1876, ibid., pp. 38-44.


63. See dictation of the Imperial Chancellor Prince von Bismarck, Varzin, September 16, 1876, ibid., pp. 48-51; and notes of State Secretary von Bülow, Berlin, September 18, 1876, ibid., p. 352.
Because of Bismarck's cool response to St. Petersburg's questions and because the situation in Serbia increasingly demanded Russia's intervention, the tsar's government made a direct appeal to Vienna. It was, after all, the attitude of the Dual Monarchy which would be of decisive consequence to Russian intervention. On September 26, 1876, the tsar's personal emissary, General Felix Sumarokov-Elston, arrived in Vienna with autograph letters from Alexander to Francis Joseph and from Gorchakov to Andrássy. The tsar stated in his letter that he would continue to work toward the establishment of a concert of Europe and toward "a real and immediate armistice." Alexander assured Francis Joseph that he disavowed completely any thought of creating a large Slavic or Serbian state. According to the tsar, the Porte could be forced to accept the Powers' demands if Austria-Hungary and Russia would simultaneously occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina and Bulgaria, respectively, while the Powers staged a combined naval demonstration at Constantinople. In the event that the Ottoman empire disintegrated, Russia and Austria-Hungary could use the Reichstadt agreement as the basis for a

64 For the details of the Sumarokov-Elston mission, see Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria-Hungary 1876-1878, pp. 172-182.

65 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph, Livadia, September 23/11, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv. Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 301.
Francis Joseph's reply to the tsar was a tactful rejection of Alexander's proposals. The Habsburg monarch did not believe that an Austro-Hungarian-Russian occupation of the Porte's rebellious provinces would suffice to bring about reform there; rather the occupation would probably result in independence movements in the areas affected. This in turn would mean either that the Habsburgs and Romanovs would replace the sultans as the oppressors of the Balkans or that the occupations would become permanent—something which the Dual Monarchy's public opinion would not stand for in regard to Russia and Bulgaria. The emperor did assent to Great Power military action at Constantinople but also believed that the Turks would resist. If that happened, Russia might be forced to act unilaterally. Francis Joseph stated that he would not act against Russia, despite the certainty of strong public pressure to do so. However, if Austria-Hungary was to maintain its prestige and position as a Great Power, it would have to have decisive influence in regulating the events which occurred on its borders; therefore, it might be necessary to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina. 67 Regardless

66 Ibid., Fos. 302 and 307-308.

67 Copy of an autograph letter from His Majesty the Emperor and King to Emperor Alexander II, Vienna, October 3, 1876, Ibid., Fos. 322 and 342-348.
of what might occur, Francis Joseph called for an exchange
of opinion which "would at least guarantee that we will
not march in opposite directions." 68

In view of the possibility that Russia might embark
on a course of action which was more adventurous than the
Dual Monarchy could agree to and which might actually be
detrimental to the Habsburg state's interests, Andrásy
sounded out Bismarck as to Germany's position in the event
of a serious disagreement between Russia and Austria-
Hungary. 69 In early October, 1876, Baron Carl von Münch-
Bellinghausen was sent to see Bismarck at his country
estate. As usual, the German chancellor opted for an im-
partial position in the incipient Habsburg-Romanov dispute.
He stated to Münch that he did not view a Russian occu-
pation of Bulgaria as a serious threat to Austria-Hungary
because it would not and could not signify a permanent
conquest. 70 The Dual Monarchy could profit substantially

68 Ibid., Fo. 348.

69 The details of Münch's mission can be found in
Rupp, A Waivering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878,
pp. 194-198. For Münch's report, see report of Baron
Münch about his conversation with Prince Bismarck, Vienna,
October 8, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv,
Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 209-241.

70 Report of Baron Münch about his conversation with
Prince Bismarck, October 8, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna),
Politisches Archiv. Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 211-
213.
from any such action by Russia if Austria-Hungary would take possession of Bosnia-Hercegovina. 71 Indeed, Bismarck viewed the Austro-Hungarian position as being rather favorable; the Dual Monarchy would be the decisive factor in any Russo-British conflict which might arise and could benefit inordinately from that situation. 72 Bismarck reiterated to Münch his policy of balancing and mediating between his two allies. As examples of this policy he declared that he could not ally Germany with Austria-Hungary against Italy because that would be regarded as detrimental to Russia's interests; likewise, he would not give Russia even the slightest sign of encouragement or of acquiescence in regard to a break with the Dual Monarchy. 73

Not only was Bismarck's refusal to take Austria-Hungary's part discouraging to Vienna, but his revelations about Russia's intentions were also downright alarming. The chancellor stated to Münch that he had just been sound ed out by Russia about Germany's course of action if war between the tsarist state and Austria-Hungary should occur. Bismarck claimed to have responded to the Russian query by refusing to consider it since he was certain Austria-

71 Ibid., Fos. 222-223.

72 Ibid., Fo. 214.

73 Ibid., Fos. 216-221.
Hungary did not pose a threat to Russia. 74

If Bismarck's statement was not sufficient to alarm the Ballhausplatz, there were two other more or less contemporaneous events which could not help but cause concern in Vienna. The first of these was the Manteuffel mission of early September. The reports from Berlin about the purpose of that undertaking were contradictory. Baron Alois Seiller, the acting ambassador, was informed by the German foreign office that Manteuffel's visit to the tsar had no political purpose. 75 Seiller did not believe this and was convinced that there had been a political motive for the journey when Manteuffel reported both to William I and to Bismarck immediately upon his return; however, initially he could learn little about the subject of the discussions in Poland. 76 On September 18 Seiller reported to Vienna that he had learned "from the best sources" that "Baron Manteuffel was charged with declaring to Emperor Alexander that Russia could count upon the support of Germany in the

74 Ibid., Fos. 217-218. See also Bismarck's response to the Russian feeler and the reasoning upon which he based his response in documents number 239-241 in Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, Vol. II, pp. 53-57.

75 Seiller to Andrássy, Berlin, September 2, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CX, Fo. 371.

76 Seiller to Andrássy, Berlin, September 16, 1876, ibid., Fos. 388-389.
Eastern Question under all circumstances." Two days later Seiller changed his story. The new version was that Russia had been assured of Germany's support but within the context of the Three Emperors' League, that is, Germany would not aid Russia to the disadvantage of Austria-Hungary. The Ballhausplatz, however, could not be certain of the extent or the conditions of the support Germany had offered Russia.

A second cause of anxiety in Vienna was a Russian partial mobilization which was reported on September 22. According to reports from Austro-Hungarian military representatives in St. Petersburg, troops were being mobilized in the Odessa, Kiev, and Kharkov military regions. In addition, the garrison in St. Petersburg was being placed on a war footing, horses were being evaluated for military service, and various other preparatory measures were being undertaken. The tsarist state appeared to be ready to

77 Seiller to Andrassy, Berlin, September 18, 1876, ibid., Fo. 403.

78 Seiller to Andrassy, Berlin, September 20, 1876, ibid., Fos. 410-411.

79 For example, on October 14, Seiller reported a conversation with Lord Odo Russell, the British ambassador in Berlin, during which Russell stated that according to his knowledge William I had agreed to support Russia "under all conditions" but that Bismarck had not accepted his ruler's view. Seiller to Andrássy, Berlin, October 14, 1876, ibid., Fos. 449-450.

80 See the report of Captain Eduard Klepsch, military
back its diplomatic maneuvering with military force.

The tsar's intentions were clarified for Vienna in mid-October, when Francis Joseph received another letter from Alexander. This time the tsar insisted on "self-government" for the rebellious provinces and forcefully declared that Russia was prepared to see that such a condition was implemented.\(^{81}\) From the Austro-Hungarian point of view a much more serious concern was the manner in which Alexander seized on Francis Joseph's earlier reference to the Reichstadt agreement as a basis for cooperation\(^{82}\) and interpreted that reference as an indication of Francis Joseph's belief in the impending disintegration of Turkey "as a consequence of a war by Austria-Hungary and Russia against the Porte." Alexander was quite agreeable to war against the Turks; he regarded the coming spring as the most propitious time for an attack on the Ottoman empire and proposed an alliance between Russia and

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81 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, Livadia, October 10/September 28, 1876, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 368-369.

82 Francis Joseph's reference to Reichstadt is found in Copy of an autograph letter from His Majesty the Emperor and King to Emperor Alexander II, Vienna, October 3, 1876, ibid., Fo. 348.
Austria-Hungary for that purpose.  

The tsar's offer posed a dilemma for the Austro-Hungarian government. A war against Turkey in cooperation with Russia, especially a war which would leave Bulgaria occupied by the tsar's troops, was totally unacceptable to both Francis Joseph and Andrásy. The foreign minister summed up the situation when he stated that "the problem of Austria and of its dynasty is to maintain Turkey until Austria knows what is to take the place of Turkey, and until Austria is certain that what replaces Turkey is not hostile to Austria's existence." However, in view of Russia's increasingly bellicose attitude, the Ottoman state's ability to maintain itself, much less its Balkan provinces, appeared questionable. Therefore, Andrásy was "inclined to reach an agreement [i.e., with Russia] as to what should definitively take the place of Turkey."  

In regard to the concrete terms of an agreement, Andrásy did not regard an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and a Russian occupation of Bulgaria as equal in importance or long-term effects. The Austro-Hungarian move would be a solution to the Balkan chaos, but

83 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, Livadia, October 10/September 28, 1876, ibid., Fo. 369.  

84 Notes on the oral utterances of His Excellency in the council of September 28 [1876], ibid., Carton CDLIX, Fo. 158.
the Russian entry into Bulgaria would confront Europe with "the superior force of the Slavs." That, in turn, would upset the balance of power and inevitably result in war. Still, regardless of the dangers inherent in a Russian attack on the Ottoman empire, the foreign minister was convinced that Austria-Hungary would not act to thwart such a move. If that were true, then, according to Andrássy, the Dual Monarchy would have to protect its interests by seizing Bosnia-Hercegovina "immediately" upon the outbreak of hostilities. 85

Francis Joseph's reply to the tsar's letter was dated October 23. In general the views he expressed were in harmony with the thinking of his foreign minister. The emperor informed the tsar that he had absolutely no desire to hasten the dissolution of the Ottoman empire; nor did he believe that Europe would acquiesce in joint action by Austria-Hungary and Russia against the Porte; however, Francis Joseph did acknowledge that it might become necessary for Russia to act unilaterally. If that happened, the emperor implied that the Dual Monarchy would probably have to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Habsburg assured his brother monarch that Austria-Hungary wished to cooperate with the tsarist state. In order to further that cooperation, he accepted the tsar's proposal of a

secret Austro-Hungarian-Russian Balkan treaty. 86

Francis Joseph's willingness to come to terms with the Russians resulted from a conjunction of the fact that Austria-Hungary was not willing to contest the tsarist empire militarily and the probability that the pressure on Russia to intervene in the Balkan fighting would become unbearable. Perhaps the tsar's government would agree to gains which, while limited and strictly defined, would still allow it to save face and to escape the clamorous demands of the populace for action. If St. Petersburg could act temperately, then Vienna could remain neutral without damage to its prestige as a Great Power and would require only moderate territorial compensation.

By late October, 1876, it behooved Vienna to reach an agreement with St. Petersburg because the pressure on Russia to intervene was rapidly becoming intolerable. In mid-September, the Porte had instituted a de facto armistice by ordering its troops to refrain from offensive action against Serbia and Montenegro 87; however, a definitive

86 Copy of an autograph letter from His Majesty the Emperor-King to His Majesty Emperor Alexander, Budapest, October 3 [sic, 23], 1876, *ibid.*, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 375-378 and 389.

truce had not been established and fighting resumed in October. Once again the Turks were victorious, this time so decisively that Belgrade lay easily within their grasp. 88

This latest and definitive Serbian military debacle, combined with the fact that for some time past the Porte had stubbornly resisted St. Petersburg's armistice proposals, 89 put tremendous pressure on Alexander's government to intervene. When the tsar received Francis Joseph's letter of October 23, which gave him a relatively free hand, the way was clear for Russia to act. 90 On October 31 Ambassador Ignatiev presented an ultimatum to the Porte. If the Turks did not accept an immediate armistice of at least six weeks' duration, Russia vowed to sever


89 In general the dispute between St. Petersburg and Constantinople centered around the duration of the armistice. The Russians demanded a truce of six weeks or two months, while the Turks held out for six months. Details of the disagreement can be found in the correspondence between Andrásy and Wrede in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCIX, and in documents number 743-830 in Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äußern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 435-479 passim.

90 For the background of the Russian ultimatum of October 31, 1876, see Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 237-241.
diplomatic relations between the two empires. The Porte promptly accepted an armistice. 91

While Andrassy undoubtedly hoped that the Porte's acceptance of an armistice would dampen what had been an increasingly dangerous situation, St. Petersburg soon revealed that the tsarist government would not be satisfied just with the institution of a truce. On November 3 Alexander II once again explained his intention to Francis Joseph. He revealed his resolution to act alone if necessary to ensure both reform in Turkey and an improvement in the lot of the Balkan Christians and declared that he proposed to act soon. 92 On November 11 the tsar gave force to his statements. While passing through Moscow, Alexander made a public speech in which he commented on Balkan affairs. He linked together the Slavic cause, Russian interests, and the affinity of race and religion which Russians and Balkan Slavs shared, and invoked God's aid to "help us to fulfill our sacred trust." 93

91 Ibid., p. 241.

92 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, Livadia, November 3/October 22, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 400-401.

93 See Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 227 for a portion of the text of the speech. See also ibid., pp. 226-228 for details of its origin and significance.
Immediately following this speech the tsar ordered the mobilization of four more army corps, and on November 20 he placed the railroads in western Russia under military control. 94

The seriousness of the dispute between Russia and Turkey and the increasingly bellicose attitude of St. Petersburg stimulated a mutual sounding out of each other by Vienna and London during the fall of 1876. As early as the time of the Sumarokov-Elston mission both Great Britain and Austria-Hungary had acknowledged a certain community of Balkan interests and both countries had opposed the tsar's Balkan proposals. At that time Beust had emphasized the unity of the two countries' interests 95 and had "almost immediately suggested that England and Austria should come to an understanding." 96 The Dual Monarchy's ambassador was particularly concerned to learn what Great Britain's response to a war between Russia and Turkey would be. To Derby he posed the question of whether

94 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 246-247.

95 Beust to Andrásy, London, October 10, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton LXXXVI, Fo. 232.

96 Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, p. 31, n. 73.
or not Her Majesty's Government would remain passive if confronted by such an event. Beust reported to Vienna that he foresaw several possible reactions by Great Britain: war when Russian troops entered Romania, an occupation of Constantinople by the British, or an occupation of Crete or Egypt. In any event, Beust was firmly convinced that the British government could count on the backing of both parliament and the country and that it could act very energetically should it decide to do so.

Regardless of Great Britain's capabilities and inclinations, Andrássy was not in favor of close cooperation or a treaty with that state. He already had Russia bound to Austria-Hungary by the Reichstadt agreement, and he considered the arrangement both necessary and preferable to an entente with the British. However, he did not

97 Beust to Andrássy, London, October 18, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VII, Carton LXXXVI, Fo. 297.

98 Beust to Andrássy, London, October 27, 1876, ibid., Fos. 340-341.

99 It should be mentioned here that Beust was not aware of the terms of the Reichstadt agreement and did not know that Austria-Hungary and Russia had ostensibly reached an agreement in regard to their future Balkan policies. One should also recall that Beust had served as Andrássy's immediate predecessor as foreign minister. From the correspondence between the embassy in London and the Ballhausplatz it sometimes must have appeared to Andrássy as though Beust regarded himself as the foreign minister in London rather than as the ambassador. Correspondence
trust the tsarist state completely and certainly did not wish to alienate Her Majesty's Government. Accordingly, Andrásy's instructions to Beust were for the ambassador to "neither provoke nor rebuff possible suggestions" about cooperation between London and Vienna.¹⁰⁰

Caught between the likelihood of increasing pressure from London for close cooperation and the probability of unilateral military action by St. Petersburg, Andrásy still had one small hope of preventing the chaotic Balkan situation from deteriorating to Vienna's disadvantage. On November 5 Great Britain formally proposed a conference of the Great Powers to be held at Constantinople. The purpose of the conference would be the reestablishment of peace; the basis of discussion for the peace terms would

between the two men was normally correct, sometimes acrimonious, and never cordial. Beust was not privy to all of Andrásy's policy goals and agreements; occasionally the foreign minister preferred to work around rather than through his ambassador. Throughout the crisis of 1875-1878 Beust was inclined to favor an agreement with Great Britain against Russia, a course of action of which Andrásy did not approve because of his doubts about the ability and the resolution of Her Majesty's Government to act. Beust, however, was not fully informed of the degree of Andrásy's opposition to cooperation with Great Britain, with the result that the ambassador and the foreign minister continued to pursue separate and often conflicting goals.

¹⁰⁰ Andrásy to Beust, Budapest, November 1, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton LXXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fo. 304.
be the same conditions which had been presented by the Powers to the Porte in late September, 1876.  

While the terms of September had remained generally unacceptable to the Powers, the situation had changed significantly from September to November and had forced Russia to favor a more ambitious program. Tsar Alexander himself had stated that Russia would not be content with more Turkish promises of change; the tsarist government would require material guarantees of reform. According to Langenau, the official Russian view was that an "occupation of Bulgaria as a guarantee for reform is generally held to be unavoidable." The ambassador believed that this would be the key point for which Russia would seek to win acceptance at the Constantinople conference.

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101 Sir Andrew Buchanan, British ambassador at Vienna, to Andrásy, Vienna, November 5, 1876, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), pp. 480-481. For the terms which had been presented to the Porte, see ante, p. 204-205, n. 43.

102 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, November 20, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIX, Fo. 604.

103 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, November 19, 1876, ibid., Fo. 601.

104 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, November 22/10, 1876, ibid., Carton LXVIII (Russia, Various 1876, Letters from Langenau), Fo. 63.
Andrássy's initial reaction to the British proposal was one of apprehension. He was well aware that Russia would probably demand the right to occupy Bulgaria, particularly in the event that the Porte resisted or rejected the conditions which the Powers' might seek to impose. Andrássy opposed such an occupation, but the British would not take a definite stand one way or the other, and the Russians seemed determined. If he did not believe that he could prevent a Russian occupation of Bulgaria, then Andrássy had to ensure the Powers' approval of a possible Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Russia had already agreed to such a move, indeed, Alexander had proposed it in his correspondence with Francis Joseph, but in this issue, too, Great Britain wavered irresolutely neither approving of nor flatly rejecting the possibility. Thus, while Andrássy did agree

105 For example, see Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, October 8, 1876, ibid., Section VIII, Carton LXXVII (Great Britain, Instructions 1876), Fo. 252; and Andrássy to Beust, Tisza-Dob, November 6, 1876, ibid., Fo. 324.

106 As for example, the tsar had already proposed in September. See Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph, Livadia, September 23/11, 1876, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 307-308.

107 For evidence of conflicting British statements in reference both to a Russian occupation of Bulgaria and an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, see Beust to Andrássy, London, October 9, 1876, ibid., Section VIII, Carton LXXXVI, Fo. 216; Beust to Andrássy, London, November 7, 1876, ibid., Fos. 41 and 47; and Beust to Andrássy, London, November 27, 1876, ibid., Fos. 229-230.
to a conference, he was not pleased by the results which appeared most likely to arise from it; nor was he at all sanguine about the probability that it would bring peace and an end to the chaos in the Balkans.

While Andrásy did not really expect the Constantinople conference to succeed, he must have hoped it might, for by late 1876 he had been slowly, but apparently inevitably, forced to cooperate with Russia in an aggressive Balkan policy. Both partner and policy were anathema to him. Andrásy had begun his ministry to disavowing an aggressive, expansionist Balkan policy. Early in 1872 he had advocated an alliance with Germany against Russia. However, by the end of 1876, Andrásy had agreed first at Berlin to take about one-third of Bosnia, then at Reichstadt to take all of Bosnia and part of Hercegovina, and had finally come to speak simply of acquiring Bosnia and Hercegovina. All of these different acquisitions were to be made in cooperation with Andrásy's bete noir Russia and at the expense of his friend Turkey. How had such a situation come to pass?

Andrásy's increasing cooperation with Russia stemmed primarily from Austria-Hungary's diplomatic isolation.

108 See ante, pp. 60-61.

Simply stated, the Habsburg foreign minister had been unable to secure a strong ally for an anti-Russian program. If the Dual Monarchy has no allies, and, if Austria-Hungary was not prepared to confront Russia by itself, there was nothing for Andrásy to do except to cooperate with Russia in order to restrain St. Petersburg's more grandiose Balkan plans.

In regard to the Dual Monarchy's position vis-à-vis Russia, the attitude of Bismarck was of paramount importance. Throughout 1875 and 1876 the German chancellor steadfastly refused to side with either of his allies against the other and always sought to facilitate a compromise agreement between the two. While Bismarck had come to regard a Russo-Turkish war as inevitable by late 1876, he did not view it as necessarily dangerous for Austria-Hungary. The chancellor believed that it would be difficult for Russia to wage war successfully against the Porte. Bismarck's advice to the Dual Monarchy was to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina "as soon as the Russian army crossed the Pruth." If Austria-Hungary took Bosnia-Hercegovina, Russia marched into Bulgaria, and Great Britain occupied Constantinople, then the basis for a compromise among those three most interested powers would be at hand and a European war could be averted.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, November 25, 1876,
event, Bismarck advised Vienna to reach an understanding with London so that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain could act in concert if necessary. As for relations between the states of the Three Emperors' League, Bismarck repeatedly assured Ambassador Károlyi that there was no agreement between Berlin and St. Petersburg which Vienna did not know about and that an "endangering" of the Dual Monarchy by Russia would "run counter to Germany's interests." Still, no promise of German support for Austria-Hungary was forthcoming, and Langenau kept submitting distressing reports in which he stated that St. Petersburg "is completely certain of the moral support of Germany in the East and is counting on Berlin to prevent the possibility of an active course of action against Russia." Károlyi undoubtedly assessed Bismarck's

Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIV (Confidential communications to the German government concerning the secret negotiations with Russia), Fos. 7-8.

111 Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, November 28, 1876, ibid., Section III, Carton CX, Fos. 538-539.

112 Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, November 25, 1876, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIV (Confidential communications to the German government concerning the secret negotiations with Russia), Fo. 7.

113 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, November 19, 1876, ibid., Section X, Carton LXIX, Fo. 602. See also, Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, November 22/10, 1876, ibid., Carton LXVIII (Russia, Various 1876, letters from Langenau), Fos. 66 and 64.
position correctly when he wrote that only the most pressing circumstances could force Bismarck to oppose Russia actively since such a policy would throw the tsarist state into the arms of France. 114

From Vienna's point of view, Germany was not the only Power which was pursuing an ambiguous course of action; Great Britain's foreign policy was even more perplexing. In its attempts to sound out London, the Ballhausplatz encountered difficulties in several areas. One major problem was the British response to Austria-Hungary's need to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina if Russia attacked Turkey. The British government refused to recognize this necessity; rather than give approval conditional on Russia's action, London preferred to oppose occupation under any circumstances. 115 No doubt Andrássy himself would gladly have abandoned any designs on Bosnia-Hercegovina if he had been categorically assured that Her Majesty's Government would not tolerate any increase in Russian influence or territory.

114 Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, November 28, 1876, ibid., Section III, Carton CX, Fo. 542. For two excellent summaries of Bismarck's views in early December, 1876, see Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, December 4, 1876, ibid., Fos. 545-553; and Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, December 12, 1876, ibid., Fos. 576-580.

115 For example, see Beust to Andrássy, London, October 9, 1876, ibid., Section VII, Carton LXXXVI, Fo. 216; and Beust to Andrássy, London, November 17, 1876, ibid., Fos. 229-230.
in the Balkans; however, such a guarantee was not forthcoming.

Determining what Great Britain's response to a Russian attack on Turkey would be was a second area of concern for Vienna. Her Majesty's Government sounded out the Ballhausplatz about the possibility of an agreement between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman empire to oppose Russia; however, London was interested primarily in Constantinople and the Straits and was not willing to accept a Russian invasion of Bulgaria as a casus belli. When Beust requested "formal and positive proposals" from Derby, the British foreign secretary failed to provide any; instead, he retreated to the position that a Russian occupation of Bulgaria would not necessarily trigger a hostile British response. To Andrassy the position of Her Majesty's Government appeared most

116 Beust to Andrassy, London, November 7, 1876, ibid., Fo. 47.
117 Beust to Andrassy, London, October 25, 1876, ibid., Fo. 320.
118 Beust to Andrassy, London, October 25, 1876, ibid., Fo. 330.
119 Beust to Andrassy, London, November 17, 1876, ibid., Fos. 223-225.
unsatisfactory. British leadership and policy seemed confused and irresolute and certainly offered no prospect of firm support against Russian machinations.

The last quarter of 1876 also witnessed serious friction between Vienna and Rome. The crux of the matter was the lack of suitable compensation for Italy in the event that Austria-Hungary had to take Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Ballhausplatz tried to fob off the hope of north African acquisitions on the Quirinal, but the Italian government wanted nothing to do with such a plan. Instead, the Italians emphasized their desire for Italia irredenta. If Italy had serious designs on parts of the Dual Monarchy's territory, then Austria-Hungary would have to be very circumspect in opposing Russia in the Balkans, for, as Archduke Albert summed up the situation: "if we make mischief with Russia, the Italians will let fly instantly, you can bet your life on that!"

Andrássy tried to mobilize the support of Bismarck and the German empire in his attempt to disabuse the Quirinal.


121 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 199. See also ibid., pp. 195-200.

122 Archduke Albert to Beck, Arco, October 22, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 77 (Archduke Albert 1871-1882), Fo. 21.
of its dreams of acquiring Habsburg territory. In early October, Münch had approached Bismarck about an Austro-Hungarian-German alliance against Italy; however, Bismarck had minimized Italy's ability to act against the Dual Monarchy and had declined Münch's proposition. Thus Andrássy was left with the problem of countering the Russian threat from the east while Italian agitation and hostility continued unchecked in the west.

Thus it was that in late 1876, although Austria-Hungary remained a member of the Three Emperors' League, in terms of safeguarding its Balkan interests the country also found itself diplomatically isolated. From Andrássy's point of view, Germany's course of action was disinterested and inclined toward neutrality; Russia's was aggressive with undertones of antipathy toward the Dual Monarchy; Great Britain's seemed weak and ambiguous; and Italy's

123 Report of Baron Münch about his conversation with Prince Bismarck, Vienna, October 8, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 219-221 and 240-241. Münch felt that although Bismarck would not agree to an alliance at that moment, he might at a later date if he were offered an abrogation of Article V of the Treaty of Prague of 1866 as a quid pro quo. Article V stated that under certain conditions Germany would hold a plebiscite in northern Schleswig to determine whether that area remained within the German empire or was returned to Denmark. Ibid., Fo. 241. See also Andrássy to Seiller, Vienna, October 9, 1876, ibid., Section III, Carton CIX (Prussia, Instructions 1876), Fo. 182; and Andrássy to Baron Otto Gravenegg, Acting Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome, October 17, 1876, ibid., Section XI, Carton LXXXVII (Dispatches to Rome 1876), Fo. 94. for Andrássy's response to Italian machinations.
appeared frankly hostile to the Habsburg state. If Andrásy hoped to check Russian expansion in the Balkans, to avoid Austro-Hungarian territorial gains there, and in general to reestablish and preserve the situation which had existed prior to 1875, he would have to rely solely on the power and prestige of the Habsburg state and his skill as a diplomat.

If Andrásy had been able to count on the unequivocal support of the political and military leaders of Austria-Hungary, his goal of preventing radical political and territorial changes in the Balkans would have been difficult, but not impossible, to achieve. However, Andrásy could not at this time depend on the wholehearted acceptance of or backing for his program by the military-political hierarchy, especially not from Beck and Archduke Albert, who, in late 1876, subjected the emperor to a

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124 The author does not mean to imply that Andrásy championed his policy in complete isolation. His views were supported by the Magyars, particularly by Minister-President Tisza. However, approximately 70% of the expenses incurred in implementing foreign policy or waging war were to be born by the western half of the empire, an area whose leaders did not agree with Andrásy's views. And, as evidenced by the statements of the Hungarian finance minister in 1877 and 1878, the eastern part of the empire might well have encountered serious difficulties in raising 30% of a large sum—for example, 30% of the cost of mobilizing the common army. See the statements of Koloman Szell, Hungarian minister of finance, in the protocols of the common ministerial conferences of 1877 and 1878 in ibid., Section XL, Cartons CCLXXXIX and CCXC.
barrage of proposals and memoranda which outlined their points of view. The opening salvo from the two imperial advisers took the form of a joint memorandum dated November, 1876. In that document Beck and the archduke attempted to demonstrate to the emperor that the Romanov empire was superior to all other states in terms of military staying power. Therefore, Austria-Hungary's proper course of action was to acquiesce initially in Russian aggression in order to be able to muster the Dual Monarchy's full strength for a final, definitive settlement of the Eastern Question. 125

In addition to his joint memorandum with Beck, Archduke Albert presented Francis Joseph with a second statement of his views in November. Albert was rather pessimistic. As he put it, "nothing is to be won by a war with Russia." 126 At best—even if victorious—the Dual Monarchy could expect a severe strain on its finances, a substantial loss of manpower, and no territorial gains. Albert believed that Italian intervention in a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia would be quite likely and

125 Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, pp. 190-191.

126 Archduke Albert, "Aphoristic Observations and the Current Situation, November 1876," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 70/59/2, Fo. [4].
regarded the hope of British support for Austria-Hungary as chimerical for, even if Her Majesty's Government had the will to aid the Dual Monarchy, it lacked the troops to do so. The archduke offered no solution to the problem of safeguarding the realm's Balkan interests, only endless arguments against a war with Russia.\textsuperscript{127}

As if their previous efforts were not sufficient, on December 1, 1876, both Beck and Archduke Albert presented the emperor additional arguments in favor of their opinions. The two documents reached similar conclusions. Both harped on the view that the course of developments in the Balkans—the likelihood of Russian and perhaps Italian intervention there and the possibility of future territorial gains by Serbia and Montenegro—necessitated an aggressive Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy. Both writers argued in favor of expansion to include Bosnia-Hercegovina, Albania, Macedonia, and Salonika, that is that the Dual Monarchy should devour the western half of the Balkan peninsula. They urged that course of action because they believed that it would be the best means to secure the Dual Monarchy's vital interests in the face of Russian expansion into the eastern part of the peninsula; however, both of them implied very strongly that the territorial gains they proposed should be made in cooperation with

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Ibid.}, Fos. [1-10].
Russia. Beck and Archduke Albert recognized the danger which significant Russian gains in the Balkans could pose to Austria-Hungary, but they wanted to reduce that danger by joining with Russia in order to circumscribe the tsarist empire's action.  

Under no circumstances did they wish to oppose Russia militarily.

The military leaders were not the only important persons within Austria-Hungary who opposed a confrontation with Russia. The German Liberal Party, which controlled the Cisleithanian parliament and the ministry in that half of the Habsburg state, demonstrated strong antipathy toward any policy which appeared likely to lead to war. The German Liberals, however, complicated Andrassy's problems by going one step farther. Not only did they oppose war against Russia, but they also opposed adamantly any Balkan expansion in cooperation with Russia.

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128 Beck's views are contained in Beck, "Memorandum on the Solution of the Eastern Question, December 1, 1876," ibid., 70/59/2, Fos. [1-20]. The archduke's memorandum is summarized in Holzer, "Erzherzog Albrecht 1867-1895," pp. 80-82.

129 On this particular point, see Beck to Rodich, Vienna, November 23, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/2/Fol. VI/No. 179/18 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), Fos. 1-2; [Archduke Albert], "Aphoristic Observations on the Current Situation, November 1876," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 70/59/2, Fos. 1-5 and 9-10; Galais-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, pp. 191-192; and Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 95.

130 For a succinct account of the Cisleithanian parliament's interest in Balkan affairs in 1876, see
To Andrássy the views of the Liberals must have appeared both quixotic and dangerous, but in the autumn of 1876 the party demonstrated both the sincerity with which it held its foreign policy views and the possibility of parliamentary opposition to an aggressive course of action pursued by Austria-Hungary—either against Russia or for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement. On October 21 the German Liberals interpellated the Cisleithanian government of Prince Adolf Auersperg about the monarchy's Balkan policy. Their questions made it quite clear that the majority party opposed any policy which might lead either to war or to the acquisition of Balkan territory. Such a view by the German Liberals was hardly new or unexpected; however, their determination to implement their policy goals was hardened by Prince Auersperg's response to their interpellation on October 27. In general his outline of the Dual Monarch's Balkan policy corresponded with the wishes of his party; however,


a problem arose when Auersperg made an ill-chosen statement to the effect that Andrásy would not tolerate any interference in his conduct of foreign policy. 132

The result of Auersperg's blunder was a lengthy debate on foreign policy and on parliament's right to influence that policy. In the Liberals' view parliament influenced foreign policy through the minister-president who, according to article XII of the Compromise of 1867, had a voice in the determination of foreign policy. The Liberals also emphasized parliament's right to approve budgetary and tax measures as a means of controlling foreign policy. 133

From Andrásy's point of view the position taken by the Liberal party portended a serious conflict. Auersperg had stated in parliament that Francis Joseph favored the maintenance of peace and that such a policy would exclude the incorporation of new territory into the Dual Monarchy. 134

132 Auersperg's reply is found in ibid., pp. 6,857-6,858. See also Snyder, "Bosnia and Herzegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879," pp. 70-71.


That was precisely what the Liberals wanted to hear. Andrássy, however, had already entered into the Reichstadt agreement, a pact which under certain circumstances could bring Bosnia-Hercegovina into the monarchy, and he was negotiating seriously with St. Petersburg about a more extensive joint Balkan policy. The Liberals were opposed to an adventurous or expansionist policy and believed that they had firm enough control over the Cisleithanian parliament to prevent any such course of action.\footnote{For example, see Herbst's statement in \textit{ibid.}, p. 6,966.} It appeared as though the stage was rapidly being set for a confrontation between Andrássy and the Liberal party.\footnote{Evidence of Andrássy's awareness of an impending conflict can be found in [Andrássy], Aide-memoire, [n.p.], December 26, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section I, Carton CDLII, Fos. 509 and 526.}

The foreign minister certainly did not welcome the prospect of a clash with the Liberals over an expansionist Balkan policy, but that appeared to be the lesser of two evils. Andrássy himself had not wavered in his determination to oppose Russia; he simply did not have the means to do so. No European Power held out the promise of military and financial support against St. Petersburg, and the Dual Monarchy's own political and military leaders doubted the wisdom of such a course of action. Thus,
unable to protect Austria-Hungary's interests militarily, Andrássy was forced increasingly into cooperating with Russia to define and limit Russia's Balkan gains. By the end of 1876, Andrássy's hope of opposing St. Petersburg had plummeted to such depths that he was on the verge of signing an agreement with Russia which would signify Austria-Hungary's acquiescence in a Russo-Turkish war, guarantee Russia the monarchy's benevolent neutrality, and clear the way for Russia to attack the Turks. Only if the Constantinople conference could mediate an end to the Balkan disturbances could Andrássy avoid such a pact with Russia. The foreign minister was not optimistic about his chances.
CHAPTER V

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY FROM DECEMBER, 1876, TO APRIL, 1877

"With two independent nations pulling different ways, with an army which could not be trusted to fight against the Slavs, with finances in such a state that I understand she has considerable difficulty in raising the five or six millions required for the first mobilization of her troops—with all these elements of weakness, Austria, it seems to me, is a country on whose efficient aid we cannot fairly count."—Derby, April 17, 1878.¹

"It cannot be doubted that it would be in England's interest to seek an alliance with us in view of the possibility of a conflict with Russia, something which is not out of the question, because England needs an army which it does not have. I do not fail to recognize the duplicity of which the Russian statesmen have shown themselves guilty. But I ask: Are the British statesmen better?"—Langenau, November 22, 1876.²

The conference which convened at Constantinople in mid-December, 1876, was brought about by Great Britain. As stated in the formal invitation by Her Majesty's Government, the meeting had as its purpose the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman

¹As quoted in Beust to Andrássy, London, April 17, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton XCI,

²Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, November 22/10, 1876, ibid., Section X, Carton LXIX, Fos. 613-614.
empire and the reestablishment of peace on the bases of the status quo ante bellum for Serbia and Montenegro, local autonomy for Bosnia-Hercegovina, and guarantees of reformed administration for Bulgaria. While this statement undoubtedly gibe with the interests of Her Majesty's Government, it did not necessarily correspond with the Balkan goals of Russia or Austria-Hungary.

By December of 1876 the foreign policy of the imperial Russian government had become exceedingly complex. Alexander II continued to protest his pacific intentions; however, he also made it clear that he would no longer tolerate empty Turkish promises and that he was prepared to act unilaterally to implement reform. As a minimum he would require "material guarantees"—most notably the occupation of Bulgaria—to ensure genuine reform by the Porte.


4 For evidence of Alexander's resolve to act, see Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, Livadia, November 3/October 22, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 400-401; and Emperor Alexander II of Russia to Emperor William I, Livadia, November 2/October 21, Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, Vol. II, pp. 85-86.

5 Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, November 20, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIX, Fo. 604.
As a precaution against the Turks' refusal to implement reforms, the Russian government was in the process of negotiating an agreement with Austria-Hungary which would clear the way for war on the Ottoman empire. However, while the tsar, clamorously seconded by the Pan-Slavs, appeared ready to act, there were several factors which militated against such a course of action. A cause of immediate concern was the fact that the imperial army was not prepared for hostilities; mobilization was not proceeding rapidly or efficiently and confusion appeared rampant. In addition, Russia's finances—the vital underpinning of an aggressive policy—did not seem sound enough to support a lengthy war. There was, in fact, a significant ministerial faction that opposed war for precisely that reason. In regard to Russia's specific goal at the Constantinople conference, about all that can be said is that St. Petersburg hoped to secure the support of the other Powers for its reform objective. Such support would offer Russia a distinct advantage regardless of Turkey's

6 Post, pp. 272-290.

7 For Russian anti-war sentiment in late 1876, see Langenau's December dispatches in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXIX. See also Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 260-261; and Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 258-259 and 261-262.
response to European demands. Unanimity on the part of
the Powers might be sufficient to force the Porte to agree
to substantive changes in policy and administration, with
the possible result that the tsar's honor would be
assuaged enough so that he would not feel compelled to
defend it on the field of battle. If, however, the Turks
rejected the conference's proposals and Alexander felt that
war was the only method left to solve the problems of
southeastern Europe, then the Powers' approval of Russia's
ostensible war aims would probably ensure European non-
intervention in a conflict between St. Petersburg and the
Porte.

Although it was as interested in the resolution of
the Balkan disturbances as any other Power, Austria-
Hungary did not play an important role in the Constantinople
conference. There were a number of reasons for Andrássy's
hesitation to do so. Of foremost importance was the fact
that in the Reichstadt agreement Austria-Hungary and Russia
had already hammered out the prototype of an amiable
division of Balkan spoils. By December, 1876, their con-
tinued negotiations had brought Vienna and St. Petersburg
to the verge of an agreement even more far-reaching than
the Reichstadt accord. It seems probable that by this time
Andrássy was resigned to striking a Balkan bargain with
Russia and was not inclined to oppose Russia overtly at
the conference. He did, however, sound out Great Britain
about the response of Her Majesty's Government to a Russian occupation of Bulgaria. When the British replied that they would do no more than oppose an occupation diplomatically and when they would not state unequivocally that they would occupy or defend Constantinople militarily, Andrásy could not have been encouraged to oppose Russia.  

While Andrásy was not willing to oppose Russia openly, he by no means wanted to facilitate an unqualified Russian success in the Balkans. The issue was simply one of finding a circuitous method to thwart St. Petersburg. Lord Salisbury, who spoke at some length with Andrásy about the Balkan situation, felt that the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister believed that a Russo-Turkish war might solve his problems, since in fighting such a war Russia would waste away its strength pursuing a futile, unprofitable military venture. According to the marquis, Andrásy believed that the present was the best time for a Russo-Turkish war since with each succeeding year Russia would grow relatively stronger and more likely to defeat the Turks decisively. In regard to Andrásy's hopes for the conference and its aftermath, Salisbury summed up the

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9 Ibid., pp. 102 and 100.
situation thusly:

(1) England takes the odium of breaking off the Conference. (2) Russia occupies Bulgaria. (3) Austria is consequently 'forced' after a time, to occupy Bosnia, (4) She is also 'forced' to insist on an ultimate evacuation by both powers; but not until Russia has been weakened by an obstinate struggle with the Turk. (5) Consequently an estrangement (but in consequence of Russia's weakness, not a war) between Austria and Russia.

The British statesman believed that such a chain of events was one of the few ways by which Andrásy would compel Francis Joseph and the Austro-Hungarian military leaders to adopt a position hostile to Russia. 10

Despite the possibility of serious disagreements between Russia and Great Britain, the preliminary conference, which met from December 11 to December 22, 1876, progressed remarkably smoothly. 11 The deliberations of the conference, which was attended only by representatives of the six Great Powers, turned primarily around the recommendations to be

10 Salisbury to Derby [Constantinople], December 7, 1876, ibid., pp. 108-109. Salisbury drew his conclusions about Andrásy's wishes for the conference from a conversation with Baron Heinrich Calice, one of Andrásy's intimates in the foreign ministry. For information on the relationship between Andrásy and Calice, see Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 61 and 48.

11 For a good, succinct discussion of the preliminary conference, see Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 239-243.
made to the Porte about Bulgaria. On the whole, Ignatiev succeeded in gaining unanimous support for the Russian point of view. The Russian plan, as elaborated in the preliminary conference, called for the establishment of a large Bulgarian province. Its northern border was to run along the Danube from the river's mouth to the vicinity of Novi Pazar, thence southward along the Drina river to include much of Macedonia, and then east along the Rhodope mountains to the Black Sea. Bulgaria was to have a large measure of autonomy exemplified by an elected provincial assembly. The chief executive was to be a governor-general appointed by Constantinople, with the consent of the Powers. Peace and order were to be ensured by an interim gendarmerie composed of Belgians, and later by an indigenous body composed of equal numbers of Christians and Moslems. At the insistence of Great Britain, the large Bulgarian province was to be divided administratively into eastern and western halves; however, the two parts were to be governed identically and there was no prohibition against their eventual union to form one state.  

Ibid., pp. 240-242. For more details concerning Bulgaria, see the imperial and royal conference plenipotentiaries to Andrassy, Constantinople, December 10, 1876, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Ausvern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1875 bis 31. Mai 1877), p. 504; and appendix to document 868, plan of organization of Bulgaria proposed by Mr. Schuyler and Prince Tzertelew,
An autonomous, possibly united, Bulgaria of the magnitude envisioned by the preliminary conference would have posed a very serious threat to Austro-Hungarian plans for expansion down the Vardar river valley to Salonika; nevertheless, Andrássy raised no serious opposition to Ignatiev's plan. It is difficult to discern the reasons for his failure to do so. Possibly Andrássy felt that he would be alone in his opposition to Ignatiev's plan. In addition, he was probably unwilling to arouse Russian hostility or to risk destroying the conference. Andrássy's own explanation for not objecting to the establishment of a large Bulgaria was that he felt no need to oppose the actions of the conference since he was quite convinced that the Turks would reject the proposals out of hand.

ibid., pp. 635-636. While the area to be included in the Bulgarian state was extensive, the ethnographic maps used at the conference generally supported the proposed boundaries. According to Sumner, the principal map used by the conference, the one drawn up by H. Kiepert, of the University of Berlin, "had been prepared to Russian order and at Russian cost" and was not regarded as reliable by Vienna. See Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 241, n. 1. For a discussion of the Kiepert map and the reasons for its popularity during the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, see Henry R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia, Liverpool Studies in Geography (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1951), pp. 65-68.

13 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 250, n. 1. Sumner's view is corroborated by Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, May 29, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fos. 65-68.

14 Andrássy to the imperial and royal conference
Regardless of the reasons for his passivity, Andrásy's failure to speak out against Ignatiev's Bulgarian plans later proved to be a source of embarrassment to him when he was forced to contest the nearly identical Bulgaria provided for by the Treaty of San Stefano.

The preliminary conference had relatively little difficulty in reaching agreement on Serbian, Montenegrin, and Bosnian issues. Serbia was granted the status quo ante bellum, while Bosnia-Hercegovina was awarded a status and an administrative arrangement very similar to that recommended for Bulgaria. Only in the case of Montenegro was there any disagreement. Ignatiev's original proposal to grant the country an Adriatic coastline which would include Spiza, Antivari, and Dulcigno was rejected by Austria-Hungary and Italy, with the result that Montenegro was excluded from territory along the coast. Prince Nicholas was awarded modest gains of Hercegovinian territory. 15


15Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 242-243. For the details of the settlement in regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina, see imperial and royal conference plenipotentiaries to Andrásy, Constantinople, December 10, 1876, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön.
Once the representatives of the Powers had decided among themselves what was to be demanded of the Turks, the preliminary conference dissolved, and the plenary session, with Turkish delegates in attendance, took up its work. In the very first meeting of the plenary session on December 23, the Powers' representatives received an omen of things to come. They were greeted by the booming of cannons saluting the promulgation of a new constitution for the Ottoman empire. According to the Turkish representatives, this document made the continuation of the conference superfluous since the popular control of administration which the constitution granted would serve as the surest guarantee of the implementation of reforms. 16 Quite simply, the Turks refused to negotiate on the basis of the proposals made by the preliminary conference. 17

As a result of the Turks' adamant refusal to discuss the Powers' proposals, the European delegates were forced

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16 Imperial and royal conference plenipotentiaries to Andrassy, Constantinople, December 23, 1876, ibid., pp. 519-520.

17 Imperial and royal conference plenipotentiaries to Andrassy, Constantinople, January 1, 1877, ibid., p. 522.
to reduce their demands. In the first week of January, 1877, revised, and rather innocuous, demands were presented to the Turks.\textsuperscript{18} Once again the Porte balked. The Ottoman government offered to negotiate if two of the proposals—those calling for an international commission to oversee reform and for European approval of the governors-general of Bulgaria—were dropped.\textsuperscript{19} When the Powers declined to alter their demands again, the Turkish government refused further negotiations. In the face of such resolute resistance the Powers had no choice but to end the conference. This they did on January 20. Immediately thereafter their ambassadors all left Constantinople in accordance with plans which had been agreed upon prior to the conference.\textsuperscript{20}

One of the immediate results of the failure of the Constantinople conference was the initiation of direct peace negotiations between the Turks and the Slavic

\textsuperscript{18} The revised demands are stated in imperial and royal conference plenipotentiaries to Andrásy, Constantinople, January 3, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 524-525.

\textsuperscript{19} Sumner, \textit{Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880}, p. 246.

principalities. On January 27, 1877, the Porte invited both Serbia and Montenegro to discuss the reestablishment of peace.\(^{21}\) During the interval between the end of the Constantinople conference and the Turkish call for negotiations Belgrade had sounded out St. Petersburg about the desirability of Serbian military cooperation in the event of a Russo-Turkish war.\(^{22}\) In view of the fact that the Russian response was somewhat dilatory and equivocal and that the Serbs were neither eager nor able to resume hostilities, Belgrade chose to negotiate with the Porte.\(^{23}\)

Initially Andrásy played a minor role in fostering the talks between Belgrade and Constantinople because he believed that the outcome of those negotiations depended primarily on the attitude of the Russian government. Andrásy knew that Serbia would not negotiate in earnest until Russia had approved of that course of action.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{21}\) Herbert to Andrásy, Constantinople, January 27, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, p. 539.

\(^{22}\) Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, January 24, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fo. 21.

\(^{23}\) For the vagaries of Serbian policy at this time, see Rupp, \textit{A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878}, pp. 318-319.

\(^{24}\) Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 1, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1877), Fo. 66; Andrásy to Beust, n.p. [late January, 1877], \textit{ibid.}, Section VIII, Carton XC, Fo. 40.
moreover, he felt that the outcome of any such talks would be superfluous since in the event of a Russo-Turkish war Serbia would want to aid Russia regardless of whether or not the principality was at peace with Turkey.  

Once Russia made known to Belgrade its approval of separate, direct peace negotiations between Serbia and the Ottoman empire, the talks proceeded to a quick denouement. In part because of Andrásy's urgings, the Turkish demands on Serbia were quite modest, and peace was promptly re-established on March 1. The terms included the status quo ante bellum for Serbia, full amnesty for Serbian participants in the hostilities, and complete withdrawal from Serbian territory by the Ottoman forces.

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25 Andrásy to Károlyi, Vienna, January 28, 1877, ibid., Section III, Carton CXI (Prussia, Instructions 1877), Fos. 26-27.

26 Russian approval was given in early February, 1877. See Andrásy to Wrede, Vienna, February 5, 1877, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fo. 20.

27 For a detailed list of Turkish demands, see Herbert to Andrásy, Constantinople, February 5, 1877, Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Aussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), p. 546. See also Andrásy to Wrede, Vienna, February 5, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fo. 20.

In contrast to his relative passivity toward negotiations between Belgrade and Constantinople, Andrásy was hardly a disinterested spectator to the talks between Montenegro and Turkey. In general, the foreign minister's actions reflected the greater danger which Montenegro posed to Austro-Hungarian interests at that time. Unlike Serbia, Montenegro had fared well in the war against the Ottoman empire. Cetinje was in a position to bargain with Constantinople and to exert pressure on the Turks if its demands were not met.

While Andrásy did favor "a certain territorial enlargement" of Montenegro, he was very particular about what areas might be included. Prince Nicholas assured Vienna that he would direct his efforts toward acquiring territory in northern Albania—a plan perfectly acceptable to Andrásy; however, reports from Constantinople indicated that the Porte appeared likely to offer Montenegro the Sutorina district. Montenegrin possession of that area

29 Andrásy to Zichy, Vienna, January 24, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CXXII, Fo. 5.

30 Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, January 12, 1877, ibid., Carton CXXIV, Fos. 6-9.

would enable the principality to dominate the Austro-Hungarian port of Cattaro and to gain access to the bay of Cattaro and the Adriatic Sea. 32

In view of the threat which Montenegrin possession of the Sutorina area posed to the Dual Monarchy's interests, Andrássy acted swiftly to block the cession of that territory. On the one hand, he declared to the Porte that a cession of the Sutorina-Zubči area "would be viewed not as a pacification of Montenegro but as a provocation of Austria-Hungary," 33 while on the other hand, he informed Prince Nicholas that if he persisted in his efforts to acquire the area in question, Emperor Francis Joseph would immediately cease all subsidies and preferential treatment which Montenegro was receiving from Vienna and the principality would be left to the mercy of the Turks. 34

In his reply to Andrássy's warning the prince of Montenegro acknowledged that it was very difficult for him to give up the thought of acquiring the Sutorina district,

32 Andrássy to Herbert, Vienna, February 4, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CXXII, Fo. 84. See also Thoemel to Andrássy, Catinje, February 22, 1877, ibid., Carton CXXIV, Fos. 82 and 90.

33 Andrássy to Thoemel, Vienna, February 23, 1877, ibid., Fo. 92.

34 Ibid., Fo. 93.
but since he also recognized the validity of the Austro-Hungarian position, Nicholas promised that he would refuse the cession of Sutorina, even if it were voluntarily offered to him by the Porte.\(^{35}\)

Once the Ballhausplatz had received Nicholas' assurances that Montenegro would not accept the Zubčić-Sutorina area, Andrásy dropped his opposition to Turkish cessions to the principality,\(^{36}\) and promised Nicholas that the Dual Monarchy would act in Montenegro's behalf at Constantinople.\(^{37}\) Peace negotiations soon hit a snag, however, when the Porte demanded compensation for any territorial losses to Montenegro.\(^{38}\) Still another problem quickly developed when Cetinje demanded that it be given the town of Nikšić, a concession which Turkey adamantly refused to make.\(^{39}\) Throughout March and into April

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\(^{35}\) Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, February 25, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 102-103. See also Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, February 25, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 100.

\(^{36}\) Andrásy to Herbert, Vienna, March 6, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CXXII, Fo. 115.

\(^{37}\) Andrásy to Thoemel, Vienna, March 6, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Carton CXXIV, Fo. 137.

\(^{38}\) Herbert to Andrásy, Constantinople, March 9, 1877, \textit{Achtenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom. 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877)}, p. 567.

\(^{39}\) See the correspondence between Andrásy and Thoemel in March and the first half of April, 1877, in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section XII, Carton CXXIV.
Montenegrins and Turks bargained and blustered; their only real achievement was an extension of the existing truce to April 13, 1877.  

While the failure of the Constantinople conference had a positive effect in giving impetus to direct peace negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, it had quite the opposite effect on relations between St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Ever since the Berlin Memorandum of May, 1876 had failed to bring peace to the Balkans, Russia had increasingly taken the lead in attempting to settle the crisis in southeastern Europe. The Constantinople conference, which ended with the presentation to the Porte of a rather innocuous list of requested reforms, was the latest in a long series of attempts by the Powers to effectuate reform. Russia, as one of the Powers most interested in the resolution of the crisis, was particularly sensitive to the Turks' rejection of the Powers' demands. For their part, the Pan-Slavs could not tolerate the effrontery evidenced in the Porte's response to St. Petersburg's initiatives, while the mass of Russians perhaps felt some degree of sympathy for and kinship with the oppressed Balkan Slavs, and Tsar Alexander II regarded the matter as an affair of honor: he had to ameliorate the lot of the Christian subjects of

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40 Thoemel to Andrássy, Cetinje, March 22, 1877, ibid., Fo. 204.
the sultan or suffer intolerable shame and disgrace. With the failure of yet another diplomatic effort, Russia looked with increasing favor on a military settlement of its conflict with the Ottoman empire. After all, Ignatiev had secured the adherence of the Powers to a reform program; Russia, as a representative of the European community, could conceivably wage war to implement that program. Indeed, by presenting an ultimatum to the Porte on October 31, 1876, and mobilizing a significant part of its army, Russia had already demonstrated its willingness to undertake a military solution. However, military action for whatever purpose—to force the implementation of reform, to salve the tsar's honor, to placate the Pan-Slavs, or to establish Russian hegemony in the Balkans—could be taken only with the agreement, or at least the acquiescence, of Austria-Hungary. Securing Vienna's approval for war against the Turks posed a large problem for St. Petersburg.

By late 1876 the facts that he had lost the initiative which he had enjoyed earlier in efforts at pacifying the Balkans and that Russia appeared increasingly ready to attempt a military resolution of its quarrel with the Turks were hardly lost on Andrásy. The ever increasing likelihood of a Russo-Turkish war forced him to make another reappraisal of Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy. As always, Andrásy loathed any unnecessary
alteration of the existing Balkan territorial and political arrangements. As a Magyar patriot and as a statesman aware of the vital interests of the Dual Monarchy, Andrásy was understandably unhappy over the prospect of a war which would enhance Russia's political or moral influence in the Balkans. However, in view of the extreme reluctance of the Habsburg army's high command to confront Russia militarily, the financial difficulties which the monarchy would suffer if Austria-Hungary engaged in a major war, and the conflicting Balkan goals of various Austro-Hungarian leaders, it appeared that it would be extremely difficult for the Dual Monarchy to fight a war against Russia. Given these circumstances, Andrásy had to secure strong foreign support before the monarchy could offer effective military opposition to Russia.

The most likely, indeed, the only, source of assistance against Russia appeared to be Great Britain. London and Vienna were apparently stimulated to sound out each other when Russia presented its ultimatum to Turkey on October 31. On November 3, 1876, Mr. Montagu Corry, prime minister Disraeli's private secretary, discussed the Eastern Crisis at length with Count Rudolph Montgelas, the secretary of the Austro-Hungarian embassy in London. The talks were private and unofficial, but because of the special relationship with existed between
Corry and Disraeli and Montgelas and Andrásy,\textsuperscript{41} they could not help but be of great significance. Corry began the exchange of opinion by stating that since vigorous action by Germany would be prevented by France and since Russia was too weak financially to sustain an aggressive

\textsuperscript{41}That the "special relationship" mentioned between Andrásy and Montgelas actually existed is perhaps open to question, but the probability of such a relationship can be deduced from several sources. Possibly the most conclusive evidence of the existence of an intimate relationship between the foreign minister and the embassy secretary is the fact that while in London Montgelas acted as his own master. With neither Beust's knowledge or approval, Montgelas negotiated repeatedly with members of Her Majesty's Government. When Beust found out about the secretary's activities, he was justifiably angry and requested that Andrásy discipline Montgelas. The foreign minister did nothing. See the documents in \textit{ibid.}, Section I, Carton CDLIX (Part X: Montgelas Affair 1868-1887. Conduct of imperial and royal legation secretary Count Montgelas in London. Unauthorized negotiations with Lord Beaconsfield, 1876-1878. [Negotiations with England concerning a common course of action in the Eastern Question, a possible alliance, subsidy, etc.--which were entered into without authorization on the part of Count Montgelas. November 1876-April 1878]), Fos. 3-40.

In February, 1878, Montgelas fabricated and reported to the foreign ministry details of a meeting with Disraeli which had not taken place. As a result of Montgelas' spurious report, for a while Vienna felt itself under heavy pressure to mobilize against Russia. When Beust learned the truth about this matter, he was furious and urged disciplinary action against Montgelas; however, once again Andrásy failed to act sternly. See Beust to Andrásy, London, February 15, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 172-173; Beust to Andrásy, London, February 20, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 178-184; and Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, March 19, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 196.

It should be noted that Montgelas' view of Austria-Hungary's proper response to a definite, overt Russian threat to the monarchy's vital interests in the Balkans corresponded closely to Andrásy's. On one occasion Montgelas stated that his views had been inspired by Andrásy, and he implied that he had been privy to Andrásy's
Balkan policy, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary could settle the Eastern Question "if not for ever [sic] at least for a long time—perhaps for generations—exactly as they liked." Great Britain and the Dual Monarchy, he added, should act on the basis of a joint program at the impending Constantinople conference. He hinted that Her Majesty's Government was about to make a concrete proposal to that end in Vienna. 42

Montgelas responded to Corry's revelations by casting doubt on England's will to act decisively against Russia even if such action appeared necessary. He went on to state that in dealing with a country such as Great Britain, with

thoughts on the subject. See Montgelas to Hübner, London, June 18, 1877, ibid., Fos. 105-106 and 115-118. Additional information on Montgelas' activities can be found in Montgelas to Beust, London, May 1, 1877, ibid., Fos. 70-75; [Montgelas] Memorandum, London, June 7, 1877, ibid., Fos. 107-113; Montgelas to Andrassy, London, June 20, 1877, ibid., Fos. 119-122; Montgelas to Beust, Vienna, July 18, 1877, ibid., Fos. 133-148; and Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, p. 411.

42 Montgelas to Corry, Belgrave Square, November 4, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIX (Part X: Montgelas Affair 1868-1887. Conduct of imperial and royal legation secretary Count Montgelas in London. Unauthorized negotiations with Lord Beaconsfield, 1878-1878 [Negotiations with England concerning a common course of action in the Eastern Question, a possible alliance, subsidy, etc.—which were entered into without authorization on the part of Count Montgelas. November 1876—April 1878]), Fo. 28.
its frequent changes of government, Austria-Hungary would have to have a firm and lasting agreement which would obligate the British to assist Austria-Hungary against Russia. Corry then proposed that Montgelas prepare a draft agreement representing the wishes of the Dual Monarchy for Disraeli's consideration. 43

Montgelas promptly presented Corry with an agreement which called for a Balkan peace providing for local self-government for the rebellious areas. Austria-Hungary and Great Britain would regard aggression by any Great Power against European Turkey or by Russia against the Porte's Asiatic possessions as a casus belli. In case of war, Austria-Hungary and Turkey would take joint military action in Europe and Great Britain and Turkey would do the same in Asia. Great Britain would fight alone in the Caucasus region. The draft treaty envisioned the possibility of an Austro-Hungarian occupation of the sultan's Balkan provinces and specified a very broad set of conditions under which Bosnia-Hercegovina could be ceded to the Dual Monarchy. In the agreement Her Majesty's Government promised to pay a subsidy to Austria-Hungary for the duration of any war against Russia. Moreover, Great Britain agreed to bear three-fourths of the expenses of any occupation of Turkish territory by imperial-royal

43 Ibid., Fos. 29-33.
troops.\footnote{Montgelas to Corry, Belgrave Square, November 5, 1876, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 38–40. Of course Montgelas' proposals were unofficial, non-binding, and, ostensibly at least, represented nothing more than his own personal views. There was, however, one aspect of Montgelas' correspondence with Corry which had significance for the future: the fact that Austria-Hungary would require a subsidy to be able to contest Russia militarily. As Montgelas said, the amount of the subsidy I am quite unable to propose. But there must be no mistake about the necessity of a subsidy as distinct from the guaranteeing of a loan. Unaided our finances would hardly stand the test of war, and as there would for obvious reasons even at the end of a successful war not be a question of a war indemnity—a subsidy is necessary. See \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 34. Prior to the actual outbreak of a Russo-Turkish war a subsidy was perhaps not a crucial issue. However, Disraeli was informed that Austria-Hungary would require one if the Dual Monarchy was to undertake hostilities against Russia. Later, in early 1878, at the height of the crisis, Disraeli obstructed negotiations between London and Vienna over precisely this issue of a subsidy—an act which called Disraeli's motives into question and undermined Andrassy's willingness to cooperate with Great Britain. See post, pp. 391–395.}{44}  

Of course one cannot know precisely what Disraeli had hoped to receive from Vienna in the way of recommendations for a joint program, but what Montgelas offered was too far-reaching for Her Majesty's Government to accept at that time. It was for this reason that Corry rejected the draft treaty. In regard to specific parts of the agreement, he objected mildly to Austria-Hungary's acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and contended that the proposed subsidy would
encounter difficulties in Parliament.45

Despite the British rejection of his treaty, Montgelas remained undaunted in his efforts to foster cooperation between London and Vienna. He was convinced that Disraeli did not oppose his proposals in principle. Indeed, after speaking with the prime minister, he wrote Beust that "the prime minister regards the moment as favorable in regard to weakening Russia, and is resolved to use it."46

Disraeli's apparently bellicose attitude and Montgelas' high hopes notwithstanding, nothing concrete was produced by the exchange of ideas between Corry and the Austro-Hungarian embassy secretary. The most likely explanation for this lack of results is that neither Austria-Hungary nor Great Britain was at that time really serious about making an agreement with each other. Montgelas himself had informed Corry that both he and Andrássy had misgivings

45 Montgelas to Beust, London, November 15, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton ODLIX (Part X: Montgelas Affair 1868-1887. Conduct of imperial and royal legation secretary Count Montgelas in London. Unauthorized negotiations with Lord Beaconsfield, 1876-1878 [Negotiations with England concerning a common course of action in the Eastern Question, a possible alliance, subsidy, etc.—which were entered into without authorization on the part of Count Montgelas. November, 1876—April, 1878]), Fos. 25-27 and 42.

46 Ibid., Fos. 44-45. The italics are in the original text.
about an alliance with Great Britain. For one thing the Austro-Hungarian government doubted whether England was really resolved to oppose Russia in the Balkans. Montgelas feared that Great Britain would make an agreement with Austria-Hungary merely to destroy the Three Emperors' League, after which the Dual Monarchy would have to rely wholly on its own resources in facing whatever diplomatic, or even military, problems that might arise. 47 Furthermore the Austro-Hungarian political leaders knew full well that while Disraeli enjoyed preeminence among the members of the Conservative government, his views were by no means shared by all the members of his cabinet. Lord Derby, the foreign secretary, was particularly inclined to take a pacific course of action. His views contrasted so greatly with those of the prime minister that Corry asked Montgelas to make sure that Derby would receive no information about their negotiations. 48 Such a split within the British cabinet could hardly have been encouraging to an Andrassy

47 Montgelas to Corry, Belgrave Square, November 4, 1876, ibid., Fos. 28-33. See also Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, October 10, 1877, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 484.

48 Montgelas to Beust, London, November 15, 1876, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIX (Part X: Montgelas Affair 1868-1887. Conduct of imperial and royal legation secretary Count Montgelas in London. Unauthorized negotiations with Lord Beaconsfield, 1876-1878 [Negotiations with England concerning a common course of action in the Eastern Question, a possible alliance, subsidy, etc.—which were entered into without authorization on the part of Count Montgelas. November 1876—April 1878]), Fo. 50.
already worried about whether Great Britain would honor any commitments which it might make.

Andrássy was not alone in his misgivings about the wisdom of an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain; the British cabinet also had reasons to doubt the effectiveness of such an accord. From the beginning Disraeli had feared that the members of the Three Emperors' League would endeavor to use the Balkan crisis to settle the Eastern Question to their own advantage. Even now, in late 1876, he did not entirely trust Andrássy's motivations; nor was the prime minister convinced that Andrássy had complete freedom of action in dealing with Russia.

In addition to Disraeli's doubts about his Habsburg counterpart's intentions, there was also reason to question whether the Dual Monarchy could take military action against Russia. Major M. S. Gonne, who made an evaluation of Austria-Hungary's potential as an ally, had serious misgivings about the willingness of the Slavs in Austria-Hungary either to fight in or to support a war against Russia. Major Gonne also reported a shortage of money and equipment, as well as a reluctance among Austro-Hungarian officers to fight against Russia. He advised his government against placing too much faith in Austria-Hungary

49 See ante, p. 140-141.
In view of the fears and doubts about an alliance in both Vienna and London, it is not surprising that nothing resulted from their talks in the autumn of 1876. For his part, Andrásy was afraid that Great Britain would leave Austria-Hungary in the lurch in opposing Russia. Moreover, the Habsburg foreign minister was on the verge of reaching a Balkan agreement with Russia that would provide the Dual Monarchy with more immediate and more concrete advantages than it could gain from an entente with Great Britain. Andrásy's British counterpart, Disraeli, feared that Austria-Hungary did not possess that full freedom of action which would allow it to oppose Russia actively. The prime minister also distrusted the Dual Monarchy's military capability and foresaw that because of its weakness Vienna might regard an agreement with St. Petersburg as the best way out of its predicament.

While Great Britain was very interested in Andrásy's Balkan policy, there was another country which was much more directly affected by the Dual Monarchy's actions and foreign policy: Romania. The Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 both posed a serious danger and offered an opportunity to Romania. Initially the government of Prince Charles had

50 For the details of Major Gonne's report, see Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 233-235.
taken a neutral position toward the conflict between Turks and Christians; however, as the diplomatic situation deteriorated in the autumn of 1876 and the prospect of a Russo-Turkish war increased, the Romanian position became more and more untenable. Specifically, the Romanians' problem was that of determining the proper response to such a conflict. Bucharest could assist Russia's attack on the Ottoman empire, but a decisive Russian triumph would not be in Romania's interest in view of Russia's well-known intention to regain Bessarabia. Conversely, however, a Romania allied with a victorious Russia might be able to gain its full independence from Constantinople, as well as to acquire territory such as the Dobrudja, or the delta of the Danube.\footnote{For the Romanian position, see Barbara Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878," Südost-Forschungen, Internationale Zeitschrift für Geschichte, Kultur und Landeskunde Südosteuropas, Vol. XXX (1971), pp. 114-120; Barbara Jelavich, "Russia and the Reacquisition of Southern Bessarabia, 1875-1878," \textit{ibid.}, Vol. XXVIII (1969), pp. 199-207; Radu Rosetti, "Roumania's Share in the War of 1877," \textit{Slavonic Review}, Vol. VIII, No. 24 (March, 1930), p. 550; and Richard V. Burks, "Romania and the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878," \textit{Journal of Central European Affairs}, Vol. II, No. 2 (July, 1942), pp. 119-127.} Active opposition to Russia in an attempt to preserve the territorial integrity of Romania was a viable possibility only if Bucharest could secure the assistance of a Great Power ally.

While Romanian parties and politicians were divided...
in their views on the most advantageous course of action, they were united in the opinion that their overriding concern was the defense and maintenance of Romania's territorial integrity. 52 In their efforts to save Bessarabia the Romanians sounded out all the possible sources of assistance. Initially they turned to Russia, the party most directly involved. In October, 1876, a Romanian delegation met with the tsar and his advisers at Livadia. The Romanians offered to act as an "'advance guard'" for the tsar's army in return for the elevation of their country to an independent kingdom, the annexation of a part of Dobrudja, and the guarantee of continued possession of Bessarabia. Russia, however, neither needed nor desired an "'advance guard'," particularly not under such conditions. All that St. Petersburg wanted was the right of free passage through Romania. Although the Romanian delegation persistently tried to learn Russia's intention in regard to Bessarabia, the Russian response to Romanian queries was equivocal and dissembling. 53

Immediately after its failure to reach an agreement

52 Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878," p. 117.

with St. Petersburg, Bucharest turned to Vienna in an attempt to secure the assistance of a Great Power against the threat of overwhelming Russian force. The Romanians offered to oppose the passage of Russian troops if they could be sure of military and financial support from Austria-Hungary. If such support was not forthcoming, the Romanian army would simply stand aside and allow the tsar's troops free passage.  

The Romanian sounding posed a problem for Andrásy. He realized the value which Romania's strategic position gave the country as an ally and knew full well the ease with which the Romanian concern for Bessarabia and fear of a Slav-dominated Balkan peninsula could be fanned into overt opposition to Russia. From Andrásy's point of view, however, a choice between Romania and Russia was not a choice at all. The foreign minister had already concluded that his best hope of limiting Russia's Balkan gains was concerted action with the tsarist state rather than outright opposition. Romania, with its small, poorly equipped, and untested army, hardly possessed the military

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54 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria, 1876-1878, pp. 243-244.

55 For details of the condition of the Romanian army, see Rosetti, "Roumania's Share in the War of 1877," pp. 552-553. For the contemporary Austro-Hungarian military evaluation of the Romanian army, see Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert Baron von Löheysen to Beck, Ploesti, June 13, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät
potential to effect a change in Austro-Hungarian policy.

Although Andrásy was not willing to assist Romania in opposing Russia, he was at the same time also unwilling to countenance any serious weakening of Prince Charles' realm. Dismemberment or a prolonged Russian occupation of Romania would pose a direct threat to the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, Andrásy recognized Romania's value to Austria-Hungary since it would almost inevitably remain anti-Russian and would serve as a physical barrier between "Mother Russia" and her unruly Slavic children in the Balkans. His reply to Bucharest's sounding reflected this line of thinking. Andrásy advised the Romanian government not to oppose Russia but instead to declare that in acquiescing to the passage of Russian troops it was yielding to superior force. The foreign minister assured Romania that as long as that country maintained the proper

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des Kaisers 69-1/9-6, Fos. 3-4; and Löhneysen to Beck, Foragin, September 24, 1877, 69-1/9-22, Fos. 6-7. Lt-Col. Löhneysen and Captain Koloman von Bolla were Austro-Hungarian observers attached to Russian headquarters. They submitted a series of forty detailed reports on the Russian campaign of 1877. These reports were addressed to Beck as the head of the emperor's military chancery but also were circulated to Andrásy as a matter of course.

Andrássy's views may be found in Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 21, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna) Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton XC, Fo. 221. The gist of this letter, slightly elaborated on, is contained in Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, Vol. III, pp. 33-34. See also Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878," p. 116.
relationship with Austria-Hungary, the Dual Monarchy would see that neither its "political position nor its territorial interests" suffered any damage. When one recalls that at Reichstadt Andrassy had agreed that under certain conditions Russia would be allowed to regain Bessarabia, it is obvious that the Habsburg minister was playing a double game. It is equally apparent that, despite his entente with Russia, Andrassy was determined not to see Austria-Hungary standing alone in the event of Russian treachery.

As the year 1876 drew to a close it became ever more apparent to Andrassy that it would be necessary to reach a comprehensive modus vivendi with Russia. In reality the foreign minister had no other choice since he remained skeptical about the value of a military agreement with Great Britain. It was obvious to Vienna that the brunt of any fighting would be borne by the imperial-royal army, that no significant territorial or monetary gains could be made by the Dual Monarchy, even in the event of decisive victory, and that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain had

57 Andrassy's reply to Bucharest is quoted in full in ibid., p. 118.

58 For example, see Andrassy to Beust, n. p., n. d. [in reply to a report from Beust dated June 11, 1877], Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIX, Pos. 93-99.

59 Archduke Albert and General Beck were particularly
differing strategic interests in the Balkans. In addition, it was difficult for the Ballhausplatz to determine exactly who was in control of British foreign policy, the dawdling and pacific Derby or the mercurial and aggressive Disraeli. And, even if the British cabinet resolved its differences of opinion over foreign policy, there was always the possibility that one cabinet would be replaced by another with a conflicting foreign policy. Undoubtedly Andrásy could not long escape the fear that if he bound himself too closely to London, he might ultimately end up as an abandoned British cat's-paw. Thus, there appeared to be nothing left to Andrásy save to reach an agreement with St. Petersburg, especially when Russian rhetoric was viewed against the background of the Sumarokov-Elston mission, the partial mobilization of the Russian army, and the ultimatum presented to the Porte on

adament in their contentions that a war with Russia could not bring Austria-Hungary any permanent advantages. See Archduke Albert, "The Military Situation of the Monarchy," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers 78-4/1, Fos. 1-7; and Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, p. 200.

60 For Andrásy's appreciation of the differences in Austro-Hungarian and British Balkan interests, see Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 29, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fos. 87-93.

61 For a general statement detailing many of the reasons for Andrásy's distrust of the British, see Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 29, 1877, ibid., Fos. 65-72.
October 31, 1876. 62

From the Russian point of view, by late 1876 an agreement with Austria-Hungary was no longer merely desirable; it had become a necessity. St. Petersburg had failed in its attempt to persuade Bismarck and Germany to coerce Austria-Hungary into acquiescing in Russia's wishes, and the Constantinople conference had not resulted in a European mandate for Russia to end the Balkan chaos. If, nevertheless, Russia was determined to intervene in the Balkans, a military fiasco could be prevented only if Austria-Hungary was appeased in advance.

With both Russia and Austria-Hungary having no other nation to which they could turn, it is not surprising that the two countries made the sacrifices necessary to reach a compromise agreement. However, the understanding was neither easily achieved nor quick in coming. Its origins dated back to the Sumarokov-Elston mission and the subsequent correspondence between Francis Joseph and Alexander II. 63 In late October, 1876, the Habsburg monarch had written the tsar to the effect that Austria-Hungary would accept Bosnia-Hercegovina as a quid pro quo for acquiescence in a Russian attack on the Ottoman empire, 64 and St.

62 See ante, pp. 209-221.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., p. 217.
Petersburg had promptly responded with the basis of a concrete understanding.

The Russian proposals aimed at achieving two goals: firstly, to ensure Austria-Hungary's benevolent neutrality during a Russo-Turkish war, and secondly, to arrange certain specific benefits for Russian arms as a result of the Dual Monarchy's neutrality. The accomplishment of Russia's first objective was an absolute necessity if the tsarist government was determined to wage war against the Turks. Moreover, an Austria-Hungary observing benevolent neutrality would "paralyze" any attempts at collective mediation which might be proposed by the other Powers. In regard to military assistance St. Petersburg requested that Vienna expedite the passage of Russian medical supplies and wounded through the Dual Monarchy's territory, that it facilitate the Russian army's contracting of provisioning and transportation from Habsburg subjects, and that it adopt a compliant attitude toward Russia's temporary disruption of Danubian commerce. Russia also asked Austria-Hungary neither to extend its military influence to Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, or Hercegovina nor to oppose the military cooperation of those areas with the tsar's armies. In return, Russia agreed to an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia; however, that action had to be "divested of all
appearance of hostility toward Russia."

Despite the fact that by the time the Ballhausplatz received the Russian proposals Andrásy had more or less resolved to cooperate with St. Petersburg, several of the Russian conditions were quite unacceptable and aroused the immediate opposition of Andrásy, as well as that of Francis Joseph and the emperor's military advisers. Andrásy was in a strong bargaining position and was not inclined to compromise with or to accommodate St. Peters-
burg. It was after all the Russians who wished to take action, and Andrásy was determined that it was they who would pay the price.

The Habsburg minister's initial objection to an agree-
ment with Russia was directed against the Russian claim that Austria-Hungary and Russia shared a community of Balkan interests and should work in concert there. Accord-
ing to Andrásy, such a conception was totally erroneous. In contrast to Russia, the Dual Monarchy had no desire whatsoever to intervene militarily in Turkish affairs unless and until it became patently obvious that the Ottoman empire had entered a state of irrevocable disintegration.

These initial Russian proposals can be found in Gorchakov to Novikov, Livadia, November 2/October 21, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 393-398. See also Gorchakov to Novikov, St. Petersburk, December 5/November 23, 1876, ibid., Fos. 451-453.
Any Austro-Hungarian efforts to act against the Turks before that time, especially if undertaken in union with Russia, would be frustrated immediately by the resulting storm of hostile public and parliamentary opinion. Therefore, Andrássy claimed, it was neither in the interest of Austria-Hungary, nor in fact possible, for the Dual Monarchy to cooperate openly with the tsarist state in the Balkans. The Magyar minister did, however, recognize that St. Petersburg was under tremendous pressure to act against the Turks and that Alexander II was determined to do just that. This condition did create one "negative" common goal: the prevention of a collision between Habsburg and Romanov interests and aims. It was for this reason, and this reason alone, that Andrássy said he was ready to cooperate covertly with Russia. 66

Vienna's willingness to reach an understanding with St. Petersburg was contingent on several major modifications of the Russian proposals. Andrássy was particularly concerned about the possibility of cooperation between the Balkan peoples and the tsar's armies and was determined to prevent such a development. He argued that if Russian troops were allowed to operate in Serbia and Montenegro,

66 Andrássy, Aide-memoire, December, 1976, ibid., Fos. 507-513. This document was sent to Langenau on December 26, 1876; it is an excellent summary of Andrássy's views about an agreement with Russia.
they would be in close proximity to imperial-royal forces and an accidental clash could occur. And, as Andrásy emphasized, it was his desire to prevent just such an unfortunate incident which motivated him to cooperate with Russia in the first place. Andrásy proposed that Vienna and St. Petersburg agree on the establishment of a neutral zone consisting of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Novi Pazar, Serbia, and Montenegro. 67

In addition to his objective of keeping Russian troops out of Serbia and Montenegro, Andrásy also wished to prevent the principalities from participating in any way in a Russo-Turkish war. He argued that the demoralized and exhausted condition of the two small countries nullified any possible military value which they might otherwise have had for Russia. Furthermore, the foreign minister attempted to demonstrate to St. Petersburg that the assistance of Serbia and Montenegro would be diplomatically disadvantageous. Heretofore, he argued, the prospect of Russian action against the Ottoman empire had been regarded as the action of a single Great Power to rectify an intolerable situation. As such Europe was prepared to acquiesce in that action. Europe did not, however, have "the intention of placing Russia at the head of a revolution against

67 Ibid., Fos. 517-518.
Turkey for the benefit of orthodox Slavdom." Andrássy foresaw that a war waged by Russia, assisted by Serbia, Montenegro, and the Turks' own rebellious subjects, could easily assume the character of a racial and religious conflict. If such a struggle did develop, Andrássy did not believe that Russia would be able to control its outcome. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister also predicted that any significant aggrandizement of Serbia or Montenegro as a result of a Slavic crusade against the Turks would be a very serious hindrance to further cooperation between Vienna and St. Petersburg. According to Andrássy, Austria-Hungary's German and Magyar population "would regard Russia's course of action as threatening the existence of the Monarchy and would allow no government to be a spectator to that." Andrássy's reply to the Russian proposals was quite unacceptable to the tsarist government. St. Petersburg particularly objected to the foreign minister's demand that Serbia and Montenegro constitute part of an extensive buffer zone between Habsburg and Romanov areas of military

68 Ibid., Fo. 518.
69 Ibid., Fos. 519-523.
70 Ibid., Fo. 527.
operations. According to Langenau, the Russians had regarded Serbia as a theater of war from the very beginning of their military planning, and they certainly did not want to relinquish the advantages of Serbian cooperation. 71 Gorchakov himself informed the Ballhausplatz that it would be impossible for Russia to deprive itself of Serbia and Montenegro "as bases of operations and as effective diversions." He also indicated that the tsar's military planners envisioned utilization of the Serbian army outside of the principality. 72

Although St. Petersburg desired the military cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro, Vienna adamantly opposed that possibility. In his effort to thwart an alliance between Russia and the Slavic principalities Andrassy was strongly supported by both Archduke Albert and General Beck. 73 As the chief of the emperor's military chancery emphasized, the logical Russian line of advance would pass through the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula. The Russian presence in Serbia could only have an ulterior

71Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, January 3, 1877/December 22, 1876, ibid., Fo. 96.

72Gorchakov to Novikov, St. Petersburg, December 5/November 23, 1876, ibid., Fos. 451-452. See also Gorchakov to Novikov, St. Petersburg, December 15, 1876, ibid., Fos. 461-462.

73Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, p. 192.
motive and would definitely pose an immediate threat to Austro-Hungarian interests.74 For his part, the foreign minister continued to stress to Russia the pernicious effect which official cooperation between St. Petersburg and Belgrade could have on the attitudes of the Dual Monarchy's Slavic subjects,75 and to emphasize the desirability of Serbia and Montenegro as a completely neutralized buffer zone between Russian and Austro-Hungarian troops.76

In addition to their quarrel over the delimitation of a neutral zone, Russia and Austria-Hungary also encountered difficulty in resolving the fate of Hercegovina. The problem stemmed from an escalation of Austro-Hungarian demands. St. Petersburg contended that at the Berlin discussions in May, 1876 and at Reichstadt in July of the same year Andrássy had renounced an Austro-Hungarian occupation

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74 Beck, Observations of His Excellency Herr von Beck against the Establishment of Russian Strength in Serbia, December 12, 1876, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 70/59 (2) [Fos. 1-3].

75 Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, December 26, 1876, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 504.

76 Andrássy to Langenau, Budapest, January 24, 1877, ibid., Fos. 541-542.
of Hercegovina. Now, when Vienna demanded the right to occupy both Bosnia and Hercegovina, it appeared to the Russian government that the Ballhausplatz had raised the price of Austro-Hungarian neutrality. For his part, Andrássy maintained that at Reichstadt he had "designated expressly to His Majesty [Alexander II] on the map the two Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina" as the area to be occupied by Austria-Hungary in the event of a Turkish defeat at the hands of Serbia and Montenegro. 77 In actuality both the Russian protest and Andrássy's explanation were superfluous since the Dual Monarchy now demanded the occupation of Hercegovina as well as Bosnia as the price of its neutrality. If Russia was determined to attack the Turks, it would have to meet Vienna's requirement. 78

The agreement which was ultimately signed at Budapest on January 15, 1877, was not completely satisfactory to either Austria-Hungary or Russia; however, it did provide

77 Andrássy to Novikov, Budapest, December 19, 1876, ibid., Fos. 473-474.

78 For a comparison of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian versions of the Reichstadt agreement, see Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 583-586. See also George H. Rupp, "The Reichstadt Agreement," The American Historical Review, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (April, 1925), pp. 503-510, for a discussion of the reasons for the variation in the two texts.
an effective temporary settlement of the two countries' conflicting Balkan interests. This agreement dealt primarily with military issues which might arise as a consequence of a Russo-Turkish war. In the event of such a conflict Austria-Hungary agreed to observe benevolent neutrality toward Russia, to decline participation in any Great Power collective mediation, to acquiesce in the temporary interruption of Danubian commerce, and to make available railroad facilities for the transport of sick and wounded Russian soldiers. In addition to the military aspects of the convention, Austria-Hungary and Russia agreed that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Bulgaria were to be re-organized politically so as to ensure local autonomy to the populace. In the event that Vienna regarded it as necessary, the Dual Monarchy was granted the right to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina at a time and in a manner of its choosing. Thus Austria-Hungary was free to act irrespective of whatever actions Russia might take in dealing with Bulgaria. However, an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was not to appear coordinated with a Russian occupation of Bulgaria; nor was it to be executed in a manner which could be interpreted as hostile to

79 For the text of the treaty, see Austrian-Russian Treaty of Budapest, January 15, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 631-638. See also Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 596-599.
Russia.  

The interconnected issues of Serbian and Montenegrin participation in a Russo-Turkish war and the establishment of a buffer zone between imperial-royal and tsarist troops were settled by compromise. It was agreed that Serbia, Montenegro, and Novi Pazar would constitute a neutral zone; however, Austria-Hungary was not to oppose "combined action of the forces of Serbia and Montenegro with Russian troops outside those countries."  

While the treaty of January 15, 1877, went a long way towards forestalling a possible conflict between Habsburg and Romanov interests, from Vienna's point of view an even more important agreement was reached on March 15, 1877. Stated succinctly, where the January 15 treaty made a Russian attack on Turkey possible, the second agreement attempted to regulate the political and territorial changes which might result from a Russo-Turkish conflict. 

While Andrásy certainly did not approve of a Russian attack on Turkey, he could acquiesce in such a move if Austro-Hungarian Balkan interests were protected. In the March 15 treaty Andrásy was primarily concerned about the postwar status of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Bulgaria. He was

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80 Austrian-Russian Treaty of Budapest, January 15, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 636.

81 Ibid., Fo. 637.
determined to ensure that the Dual Monarchy had not only the right to "occupy" the provinces, as stated in the January agreement, but also that Austria-Hungary could annex the area if it felt such action necessary. The foreign minister was also resolved to prevent long-term Russian control over Bulgaria. \(^8^2\)

Andrássy easily persuaded St. Petersburg to agree to Austria-Hungary's right to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina. After all, in the January treaty Russia had already agreed that Austria-Hungary could "occupy" the provinces; it was a simple step for the tsar's government to acquiesce in an Austro-Hungarian annexation as a quid pro quo for Russia's reacquisition of southern Bessarabia.

Although Russia and Austria-Hungary quickly settled the Bosnian annexation issue, Andrássy was not completely satisfied with their understanding. He feared that Russia might try to equate an occupation of Bulgaria with the Dual Monarchy's move into Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such a viewpoint was unacceptable to the foreign minister, and he spent much time arguing against it. He claimed that after Russia had freed Bulgaria from the Porte's rule, the tsar could easily withdraw Russian influence from the area without disadvantage to St. Petersburg since Bulgaria

\(^8^2\) Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878*, pp. 294-296.
possessed all the prerequisites for an independent existence. According to Andrásy, the situation was entirely different in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Those two provinces were so divided ethnically and religiously that it was extremely improbable that they could be united to form a viable state. If Bosnia and Hercegovina could not exist as an independent state, Andrásy foresaw their union with other Slavic areas to form "a great South Slavic empire." That possibility was intolerable to Vienna and, as Andrásy emphasized to St. Petersburg, could be prevented only by a prolonged occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by imperial-royal troops.\(^83\)

Besides the Bosnian and Bulgarian issues, there were at least two other significant points of discussion in the negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. The first dealt with the possibility of territorial aggrandizement by Serbia and Montenegro. The Russians believed that the principalities should be allowed to partition Novi Pazar.\(^84\) Andrásy's position was ambiguous. During the early stages of the negotiations he did not oppose the Russian

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\(^83\) Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 28, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 560-576. See also Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, Vol. II, p. 392.

\(^84\) [Gorchakov], Aide-memoire, n. p., n. d. [presented to Andrásy by Novikov on February 28, 1877], Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 596-598.
proposal; however, later he declared that the road to Salonika through Novi Pazar could not be permanently closed to the Dual Monarchy, as would be the case if the sanjak were divided between Serbia and Montenegro.

A second issue, which was of even greater importance to Andrásy, was the definition of when the territorial changes were to be brought about. For his part, Andrásy still preferred no changes whatsoever in the status quo; however, he feared that Russia would begin pressing for the implementation of the agreed on territorial arrangements as soon as war was declared. The Habsburg minister vigorously maintained that any agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not to be implemented merely as a result of the declaration or the outbreak of war, but rather only as a result of territorial changes which might follow a war or as a result of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire.

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85 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 294.

86 Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 28, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 574; Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 28, 1877, ibid., Fo. 601. Undoubtedly Andrásy recognized the advantages of keeping Serbia and Montenegro separated on grounds other than the protection of the Dual Monarchy's commercial interests—for example, in order to hinder military and political cooperation between the two principalities.

87 Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 28, 1877, ibid., Fos. 569-576.
The agreement which was ultimately signed in mid-March, 1877, and which formed the second of the Budapest Conventions, was a brief document which contained four articles. In the first Austria-Hungary and Russia agreed to limit their possible annexations to Bosnia-Hercegovina and southern Bessarabia, respectively, and to decide the fate of Novi Pazar at a later date. Secondly, the two empires stated that they would act in concord if the territorial changes in the Balkans necessitated a conference of the Great Powers. In the third article Vienna and St. Petersburg confirmed that both would remain loyal to the territorial changes which had been envisioned at Reichstadt, that is, that a large Balkan state, either of Slavic composition or otherwise, would not be established. Bulgaria, Albania, and the remainder of the Turkish province of Rumelia would become independent states; Thessaly, Crete, and part of Epirus would go to Greece; and Constantinople and its immediate environs would become a free city. Finally, the document concluded with an agreement between the two countries to keep their understanding strictly secret. 88

From the Russian point of view the Budapest Conventions were not so much advantageous agreements as harsh

88 The text of the territorial section of the Budapest Conventions may be found in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 599-601.
necessities. The plain and simple fact was that no war could be fought between Russia and Turkey in Europe without Austro-Hungarian acquiescence. The cost of that acquiescence was a Russian promise to limit drastically its possible territorial gains in the Balkans.

As he had throughout his foreign ministry, Andrássy continued to abhor the possibility of an alteration of the Balkan territorial status quo. Even as late as the end of February, 1877, he was still attempting, albeit halfheartedly, to dissuade Russia from war. He declared to St. Petersburg that

As long as the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Turkey is possible, we would have neither any interest in nor any desire to make annexations. On the contrary, any alteration of the status quo would strike a blow against the equilibrium and security of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.\(^{89}\)

If, however, a Russo-Turkish war could not be prevented, the Budapest Conventions seemed to place Austria-Hungary in an advantageous position. Those agreements limited Russian gains to southern Bessarabia and a small part of Asiatic Turkey under the best of circumstances, and they ruled out the possibility of a tsarist vassal state in Bulgaria. Conversely, if Russia found the Budapest

\(^{89}\) Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, February 28, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 571.
Conventions too restrictive and attempted a unilateral fait accompli, the imperial-royal army could move into Romania and isolate the Russian forces deep in the Balkans while the British fleet protected Constantinople. Thus, in one way or another, any Russian gains in the Balkans were to be strictly limited—either voluntarily by means of adherence to the Budapest Conventions or forcibly by Austro-Hungarian and British military action. As Andrásy remarked, "history certainly cannot reproach me for not having created a favorable enough situation for Austria-Hungary." 90

During the period between the conclusion of the first of the Budapest Conventions and the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War Andrásy was relatively inactive on the diplomatic scene. He knew full well that the Budapest Conventions virtually assured a Russo-Turkish war and as soon as it became apparent that St. Petersburg would agree to respect Vienna's vital Balkan interests, Andrásy could await the war's coming with complacence. True, there were some fleeting and halfhearted attempts to foster peace, especially between Turkey and Montenegro, but Andrásy, better than any non-Russian statesman, knew the seriousness and extent of Russia's preparations for war.

Russia's determination to intervene militarily in the Balkans caused St. Petersburg to seize the diplomatic initiative during the second half of January, 1877. This action by the Russian government stemmed in part from the outcome of the Constantinople Conference. Although that meeting had ended in failure on January 20, the Great Powers had both demonstrated a sense of unity and supported Russia's proposed territorial revisions during the meeting. Gorchakov wished to preserve that unity and to convert it to European sanction of a Russian attack on the Ottoman empire. By January 31, when St. Petersburg called on the other Powers for support against Turkey, the first of the Budapest Conventions had already been signed and presaged Austro-Hungarian cooperation. Gorchakov, however, still desired an unequivocal European mandate to act against Turkey, that is, an obvious show of Great Power backing for the Russian position which could be used to counter Austro-Hungarian demands during the negotiations concerning the Balkan territorial settlement. 91

As a result of the disappointing response to Gorchakov's circular dispatch of January 31, the tsar's government undertook a more vigorous attempt to gain the Powers' support. During the first half of March, 1877, Ignatiev

91 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 308-311.
was sent on a tour of Berlin, London, Paris, and Vienna to mobilize collective pressure on the Porte and to secure support for Russia. Ignatiev's journey occasioned a month of complicated negotiations which centered on the sequence of Russian and Turkish demobilization. Ignatiev's original proposal envisioned Russian demobilization subsequent to and conditioned by three factors: Turkish demobilization, peace between Montenegro and Turkey, and reform within the Ottoman empire. He could not, however, persuade the other Powers to accept the Russian point of view. Ultimately, a confusing and rather meaningless agreement was signed by the Powers. Basically the London Protocol, dated March 31, 1877, called on the Porte to make peace with Montenegro, to demobilize, and to institute reforms. Her Majesty's Government, however, added a caveat to the document which stated that Great Britain would regard the protocol as "null and void" in the event that "reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, and peace between them" was not attained. The Russian

92 For the background of Ignatiev's mission, see ibid., pp. 324-327. See also Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, March 4, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXX, Po. 94.

93 Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 349.
government also added a condition which stipulated that the tsar would discuss mutual disarmament with the Porte's representative as soon as peace with Montenegro was concluded and the Porte guaranteed the implementation of reforms.\footnote{For the text of the London Protocol, see "The London Protocol of March 31, 1877," in \textit{Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914}, Vol. II, pp. 141-143.}

The stipulation which Russia added to the London Protocol portended the ineffectiveness of that document as an instrument of peace. By the end of March, 1877, there was, for example, almost no hope for an agreement between Montenegro and Turkey. Prince Nicholas favored a renewal of hostilities because he felt that war offered a better prospect of territorial gain than did negotiations with the perfidious Turks.\footnote{Beust to Andrásy, London, March 24, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section VIII, Carton LXXXVIII, Fo. 538.}

As had been the case once before, during the arrangement of a truce between Montenegro and the Ottoman empire, the fate of the Niksic area became a crucial issue in the search for a chimerical Balkan peace. Constantinople regarded retention of the region as a "point of honor,"\footnote{Andrássy to Thoemel, Vienna, March 28, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section XII, Carton CXXIV, Fo. 222.}
while Cetinje demanded possession of it since it was the only available area containing the vital agricultural resources which Montenegro so badly needed. 97

For his part, Andrásy repeatedly urged the Porte to accommodate Prince Nicholas, since, as the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister put it, "peace lies in the hands of Montenegro." 98 In addition to advising Constantinople to placate the Montenegrins, Andrásy also counseled the Porte to accept the London Protocol. He urged the Turkish government to accept the Protocol even if it could not see its way clear to grant territorial concessions to Montenegro. In this way the Porte could at least demonstrate its peaceful intentions. 99

At the same time when Andrásy was pressuring Constantinople to make concessions to Montenegro, he was also urging Prince Nicholas to adopt a pacific policy. Andrásy emphasized that, even if it did not acquire Nikšić, 97 Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, March 29, 1877, ibid., Fo. 225.

98 Andrásy to Herbert, Vienna, March 31, 1877, ibid., Carton CXXII, Fo. 168. See also Andrásy to Herbert, Vienna, April 3, 1877, ibid., Fo. 179; and Andrásy to Herbert, Vienna, April 9, 1877, ibid., Fos. 205-214.

99 Andrásy to Herbert, Vienna, April 6, 1877, ibid., Fos. 184-186.
Montenegro would still be the only state to realize a tangible gain from the Balkan troubles and that the country would earn the gratitude of Europe in return for bringing about peace. Andrásy also slyly pointed out to Nicholas that whatever settlement was reached would hardly be definitive and that Montenegro would face the next round of the Eastern Question from an enhanced territorial and moral position. 100

The prince of Montenegro, however, would accept none of Andrásy's arguments. Nicholas read the Russian position far too well and was firmly convinced that the tsar would not abandon Montenegro before the principality had achieved all its goals. 101 Thus, when the Porte refused to make the territorial concessions which Cetinje demanded, Nicholas broke off negotiations. In response, the Turks informed Montenegro that they would not renew or extend the existing armistice beyond April 12. 102

While the dispute between Montenegro and the Ottoman empire was serious enough in itself, it was certainly

100 Andrásy to Thoemel, Vienna, April 9, 1877, ibid., Carton CXXIV, Fo. 285.

101 Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, April 11, 1877, ibid., Fo. 314.

102 Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, April 13, 1877, ibid., Fo. 337.
not Andrássy's only concern in the spring of 1877. Langenau's reports from St. Petersburg were even more ominous for the future of peace in the Balkans. Throughout February and March Langenau emphasized the Russian government's pacific inclination; however, he also increasingly stressed St. Petersburg's demand that the Porte meet certain conditions, such as a Turkish-Montenegrin peace and the implementation of reforms. Such concessions were the sole means by which Tsar Alexander's "honor" could be satisfied. With the signing of the London Protocol and Europe's acquiescence—however tenuous—in Russia's demands on the Porte, those stipulations assumed an increasing importance in the eyes of the tsar and his government. Now, more than ever, Alexander felt himself involved in an affair of honor, and he could admit of neither delay nor equivocation in the Turks' acceptance and implementation of Russia's demands.\(^{103}\)

The almost non-existent possibility of peace was further diminished by the Porte's reaction to the London Protocol. The Turkish government was extremely vexed by the demands that it conclude a peace treaty with Montenegro

\(^{103}\) Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 2/February 18, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section X, Carton LXX, Fos. 81-84; Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, March 28/16, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 147 and 151. See also Rupp, \textit{A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878}, pp. 252-258.
and demobilize prior to Russia's disarmament. The Turks feared that such a course of action would constitute an invitation to the insurgents to renew their activities—a condition which would in turn provide Russia with a pretext for suspending its return to a peacetime military footing. 104

Despite the earnest efforts of London and Vienna to persuade Constantinople to accept the Protocol, the Turks denied the right of the Powers to interfere in their internal affairs and demanded reciprocal Russian disarmament, thus, in effect, disavowing the Powers' attempt at collective intervention. 105

At this crucial juncture Andrassy stepped forward and approached St. Petersburg with an offer of mediation. Andrassy's motives were twofold: firstly, he undoubtedly still preferred the maintenance of peace to the prospect of a Russo-Turkish war; and, secondly, if peace could not be maintained, he hoped to assist Russia in appearing to enter the war reluctantly and as a last recourse. Such an appearance would lessen the impact of Russia's action on


105 Circular, Constantinople, April 10, 1877, ibid., p. 603.
Austro-Hungarian public opinion and thereby make the implementation of Austro-Hungarian neutrality easier. 106 St. Petersburg, however, was determined to chastise the Turks and would hear nothing of Andrásy's proposal. On April 20 the Russian government rejected the Dual Monarchy's offer of mediation. 107 Four days later it declared war on the Ottoman empire.

106 Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, April 18, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1877), Fos. 125-126; Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, April 18, 1877, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 654-658.

107 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, April 20, 1877, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Various 1877), Fo. 9.
CHAPTER VI

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY FROM APRIL, 1877, TO AUGUST, 1877

"'Russia can accomplish nothing in Turkey against Austria's will; therefore one must endeavor above all to avoid any opportunity which could place Russia in collision with Austrian interests'." 1

--Shuvalov, October, 1877.

"'Austria's task remains as before, to form a bulwark against Russia, and only as long as it fulfills this task will its existence be a European necessity'." 2

--Andrassy

Relatively speaking, Andrássy could view the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war with a sense of equanimity. From what has already been said, it is clear that at the same time he had worked to preserve peace and the territorial status quo in the Balkans he had also striven to safeguard Austria-Hungary's vital interests in that region in the event hostilities could not be prevented. He had secured a clear and binding agreement with Russia which delimited the

1 As quoted in Deym to Andrássy, Brighton, October 4, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 477.

2 As quoted in Dioszegi, "Einige Bemerkungen zur Frage der österreichisch-ungarischen Ostpolitik," p. 231.
tsarist government's possible gains and which set forth some of the conditions under which a Russo-Turkish war was to be fought. Andrásy had also gained some support for Austria-Hungary's interests from Bismarck. While it was true that the German chancellor had promised his unequivocal support to neither Russia nor Austria-Hungary, he had stated to the Ballhausplatz that he would not allow the Dual Monarchy to suffer any irreparable harm to its vital interests or to its prestige as a Great Power.

When hostilities actually began, both Alexander II and Bismarck reaffirmed to Vienna their previously stated positions. From St. Petersburg Langenau wrote that he was "profoundly convinced" that Alexander would adhere to the Budapest Conventions since "His Majesty considers his word once given as sacred and will never depart from it."3 From Berlin too, there came reassurance. Bismarck informed Károlyi that Germany stood ready to help prevent discord between Austria-Hungary and Russia and that the Dual Monarchy could be sure that Germany "would never allow you to have to suffer anything really harmful."4

3Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, April 24/12, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna) Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 112. See also Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, May 30/18, 1877, ibid., Section X, Carton LXX, Fo. 400.

4Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, May 26, 1877, ibid., Section III, Carton CXI, Fos. 317-318. See also Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 29, 1877, ibid., Section VII, Carton XC, Fo. 236.
Once war between Russia and Turkey had begun, one of Andrásy's primary objectives was to limit the participation of the Balkan states in that conflict. During the spring and summer of 1877, he had little cause to be concerned about Serbian participation. The Serbian debacle in 1876 had both exhausted the country's ability to wage war in the near future and had cost the Serbs Russian support. Wrede reported from Belgrade that Serbia would not join in the Russo-Turkish war anytime soon and that participation at a later date would require a Russian subsidy.\(^5\)

In contrast to Andrásy's expectations, in May, 1877, Milan offered to place his country and his army at Russia's disposal. The tsar's government instructed the Serbian ruler to "refrain quietly from all preparations and to count on no money from Russia."\(^6\) In June the prince of Serbia paid a personal visit to Alexander, who was in the field with his army at Ploegst, and repeated his offer of cooperation. Once again he was rebuffed.\(^7\)

\(^5\)Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, April 27, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fos. 176-177. See also Langenau to Andrásy, St. Peters burg, May 13/1, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 118 and 115.

\(^6\)Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, May 13/1, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 115.

\(^7\)Rupp, \textit{A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878}, p. 387. See also Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, June 20/8, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section X, Carton LXX, Fo. 357; Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, May 23, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Vienna, May 25, 1877,
Despite the encouraging conduct of the tsar in rejecting Serbia's offers of military assistance, Andrássy did not regard Serbia's neutrality as likely to be permanent. He knew quite well that at that moment Russia did not believe Serbian assistance was necessary or advantageous. However, military reverses could quickly change such an attitude. Andrássy was also aware that Milan was not well entrenched in power and that opposition by the prince to prolonged, serious agitation for war could threaten his throne. And, finally, Andrássy realized that during the early stages of a Russo-Turkish conflict (for example before the Russian troops crossed the Danube or won a resounding success) Serbian participation would primarily benefit Russia instead of the principality and would offer Serbia no real advantage or opportunity for military victory. If the war went in Russia's favor, Milan would ultimately be forced to fight to assure Serbian gains. Thus, Andrássy did not believe that Serbian participation could be permanently avoided; however, Russia's attitude

_ibid._, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fos. 55.

8Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, June 3/ May 22, 1877, _ibid._, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 135-137; and Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, May 13/1, 1877, _ibid._, Fos. 119-120.

9Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, August 11, 1877, _ibid._, Section VIII, Carton XC, Fos. 367-368.
during the early months of the war gave him reason to hope that Vienna could oversee Belgrade’s actions at least enough to ensure the protection of the Dual Monarchy’s interests in the Balkans.

In addition to moderating Serbia’s response to a Russo-Turkish war, Andrásy also hoped to limit Montenegrin’s participation in that conflict. The situation in Montenegro, however, was markedly different from that in Serbia. In contrast to its neighboring principality, Montenegro had neither suffered serious reverses at the hands of the Turks nor signed a peace treaty with Constantinople. Moreover, Montenegro possessed better resources for war than Serbia. Likewise, morale was higher in Montenegro where both prince and people seemed eager to renew the struggle against their hereditary enemy. In view of this situation, when the truce between Montenegro and Turkey expired on April 13, 1877, a resumption of hostilities was regarded by Andrásy as a foregone conclusion.

Although Andrásy could not prevent hostilities between the Ottoman empire and its rebellious vassal, he did take several steps to try to maintain Austro-Hungarian influence over Montenegro’s policy and actions. Initially, he counseled a cautious and passive military policy, ostensibly so that Montenegro would not expose itself to the danger of decisive defeat while the Russians were still concentrating
north of the Danube. Later, when the Turks threatened to overrun Montenegro, Andrassy promised that Austria-Hungary would protect the independence and integrity of the principality and that the Dual Monarchy would prevent the Turks from waging a barbarous war of revenge against Montenegro. In early July, 1877, Andrassy gave the Porte a clear warning to ease the pressure on Montenegro and respect Austria-Hungary’s wishes in regard to that country.

Andrassy’s actions during the early weeks of the Russo-Turkish war indicate that he gave no thought to preventing Montenegrin participation in the conflict but rather strove to persuade Catinje to respect the Dual Monarchy’s interests. In contrast to his feelings about Prince Milan, Andrassy seemed to trust Nicholas’ ability to control his country, to arrive at an astute estimate of what gains Montenegro could realistically hope to make, and to gear his foreign and military policy accordingly. In regard to both Serbia and Montenegro, Andrassy’s policy was

10 Andrassy to Thoemel, Vienna, April 24, 1877, ibid., Section XII, Carton CXXIV, Fо. 381.

11 Andrassy to Thoemel, n. p., [June, 1877], ibid., Fос. 431-432.

12 Andrassy to Zichy, Vienna, July 4, 1877, ibid., Carton CXXII, Fо. 300.
essentially the same: to adopt an attitude of utmost vigilance, without excluding the possibility of military intervention in order to ensure that the Dual Monarchy exercised the final, decisive authority in the western half of the Balkans.

Romania was the third Balkan state whose participation in a Russo-Turkish war was of concern to the Dual Monarchy. Vienna had less influence in Bucharest than in Belgrade or Cetinje, but Andrásy did not regard that fact as particularly unfavorable since Romania's military weakness and diplomatic isolation could easily be turned to Austria-Hungary's advantage.

During the fall of 1876 and the early months of 1877, the Romanian government had evaluated its possible responses to a Russo-Turkish war and, in the absence either of a Great Power guarantee of Romania's neutrality or of Great Power support against Russia, had opted for a policy of active cooperation with the tsarist regime. On April 16, 1877, the Romanian and Russian governments signed an agreement in which St. Petersburg agreed "to respect the

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13 For example, see Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, August 11, 1877, ibid., Section VIII, Carton XC, Fos. 367-368.

14 For details of the Romanians' dilemma, see Burks, "Romania and the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78," pp. 123-127; and Rossetti, "Roumania's Share in the War of 1877," pp. 550-554.
political rights of the Romanian state'" and "'to maintain and defend the existing integrity of Roumania'."\textsuperscript{15} The signing of this convention was followed in short order by the outbreak of war between Romania and the Ottoman empire during the second week in May and by a Romanian declaration of independence on May 21, 1877.\textsuperscript{16}

While at first glance it might have appeared that the government of Prince Charles had allied itself wholeheartedly with Russia, Andràssy was certain that such was not the case. He could hardly fail to recall that in February, 1877, he had been sounded out by the Romanian representative in Vienna about Austro-Hungarian support of Romania in a policy of active opposition to Russia. Andràssy was also aware of the fact that Bucharest feared and distrusted its stronger ally. He knew that the Romanians were afraid of losing Bessarabia to Russia, of suffering a long and onerous Russian occupation, and of having their interests sacrificed to those of Russia's Slavic proteges.\textsuperscript{17} In short, Andràssy knew that Bucharest

\textsuperscript{15} Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 299.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 300-301.

\textsuperscript{17} Jelavich, "Austria-Hungary, Rumania and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878," pp. 115-117.
had allied itself with St. Petersburg solely because no other realistic course of action was available.

The Romanians' precarious situation left Andrássy in an ideal position. In the Budapest Conventions he had agreed to Russia's reacquisition of Bessarabia, and he recognized that objective as one of the tsar's paramount foreign policy goals. No doubt Andrássy would abide by his promise in the Budapest Conventions if the sacrifice of Bessarabia proved sufficient to control and satisfy Russia's political and territorial aspirations in southeastern Europe. If, however, Russia presented Austria-Hungary with an unacceptable fait accompli in the Balkans, then Andrássy could always attempt to incite the Romanians to active opposition to Russia—something which could probably be achieved if the integrity of Romania was threatened and if Austria-Hungary provided military support to Bucharest. Andrássy did in fact lay the groundwork for the future support of Romania if that should become advantageous to Vienna. ¹⁸ when he assured the Romanian government that

¹⁸ One of the most important objectives of the Austro-Hungarian observers accompanying the Russian army was to ferret out the true attitude of the Romanian political and military leadership towards the Russo-Turkish war and to determine the combat efficiency of the Romanian army. While admittedly such activity could have taken place without any thought of future alliance with Romania, it is also equally true that the gathering of such information would have been a necessary prerequisite to the formation of that alliance. See Beck to Bechtolsheim, Vienna, May 27, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militarkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, 69-1/4 (1877), Fos. 3-5; and
Austria-Hungary would not allow Romania to suffer any injury to "its political position or its territorial interests." 19

Thus, in his dealings with Russia and Romania Andrásy left himself room for a very opportunistic course of action. He had an agreement with St. Petersburg in which he consented to the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia; however, he had assured Romania that he would not stand by idly and witness damage to that country's political and territorial interests. It is apparent that Andrásy was quite prepared to support either St. Petersburg or Bucharest. The factor determining his choice would be the extent to which Russia honored its commitments to safeguard Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans.

When war actually broke out in April, 1877, the Austro-Hungarian government gave every indication that it would cooperate closely with Russia, as prescribed by the Budapest Conventions. Alexander and Francis Joseph immediately exchanged letters overflowing with praise of their respective qualities of character, and the emperor went so far as to promise "to conform scrupulously not only to the letter but also to the spirit of our conventions." 20

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20 Emperor Francis Joseph I to Tsar Alexander II,
his part, Andrassy announced publicly that the goal of the Austro-Hungarian government was to prevent European complications from arising as a result of the Russo-Turkish conflict.21

In actuality Andrassy took a number of steps aimed both at facilitating Russia's attack on Turkey and at controlling Austria-Hungary's reaction to that struggle. He refused a Romanian request that Austro-Hungarian warships be stationed at Brăila and Galati to protect those two Romanian cities from the Turks,22 and, in accordance with the Budapest Conventions, the Dual Monarchy did not protest the disruption of Danubian commerce by the Russians, despite numerous foreign inquiries about that problem.23

In his attempt to control the Dual Monarchy's response

Vienna, April 29, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 677-678; and Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, Moscow, May 5, 1877, ibid., Fo. 680.


22 Andrassy to Herbert, Vienna, April 25, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CXXII, Fo. 237.

23 Andrassy to Langenau, Vienna, May 6, 1877, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 682 and 686.
to the Russo-Turkish war Andrassy faced a potentially serious problem in the form of the Magyars' reaction to that conflict. The foreign minister found himself confronted with the delicate task of squelching Hungarian opposition to Russia sufficiently to satisfy the Russians while at the same time acting circumspectly in doing this so as not to arouse the wrath of the Magyars. Even before the outbreak of war St. Petersburg had protested pro-Turkish demonstrations in Hungary,24 and, with the initiation of hostilities, Andrassy's effort to control Magyar public opinion became even more difficult.

Constantinople immediately seized the opportunity offered it by the Magyars' pro-Turkish sentiments to declare its intention to return to the University of Budapest some thirty-five volumes which had been plundered earlier from the library of King Matthias Corvinus. The initial Turkish proposal was to return the books directly to Budapest. Foreseeing the probability of extensive, vociferous Turkophile demonstrations in consequence, Andrassy balked at the Porte's proposal. Instead, he demanded that the books be returned to the foreign ministry in Vienna, which would in turn present them to the university.25

24 Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, February 6, 1877, Ibid., Fo. 103.

As soon as the Turks saw their plans to deliver the books to Hungary thwarted, they tried another gambit. The Turkish government proposed that a delegation of Turkish students visit Budapest. Andrassy did not overtly oppose this idea, but he did inform the Porte that political demonstrations by the students would not be tolerated and that, if they did occur, the Turkish students would be expelled from the monarchy.26

Thus, on the one hand, Andrassy scrupulously observed the terms of the Budapest Conventions and sought to accommodate Russia as much as possible in the hope that Austria-Hungary's show of good faith would foster a similar attitude in St. Petersburg. On the other hand, however, Andrassy, himself a master of opportunism and equivocation, knew full well that a display of good faith would hardly serve as a guarantee that Russia would respect the Dual Monarchy's interests. The foreign minister believed Alexander's sincerity in assuring Vienna that Russia would honor its commitments to Austria-Hungary. But who could foresee what influence the Pan-Slavs might obtain in Russia

from Tisza to Andrassy dated April 21, 1877], Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CXXXV, Fo. 22; and Notes dated April 25, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCLVIII, Fo. 1.

or what pressure events in the Balkans might place on
the tsar's government to create faits accompli unilaterally?
In short, it appeared to Andrásy quite politic to hedge
his Russian bet.

If Andrásy wanted to be certain that Austria-
Hungary could not be left in the lurch by Russia, his only
choice was to turn to London and to establish a common
program to be pursued by Great Britain and the Dual
Monarchy in the Balkans. Such an arrangement would ensure
that Andrásy could protect his country's vital interests
under all circumstances. As it turned out, Her Majesty's
Government also recognized the value of an understanding
with Vienna.

Less than a week after the opening of the Russo-
Turkish war, Corry, Disraeli's private secretary, once
again approached Montgelas about the possibility of a con-
certed course of action. Corry proposed that Austria-
Hungary and Great Britain work toward a Russo-Turkish
peace based on the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by
the Dual Monarchy, the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia,
and the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian state
north of the Balkan mountains. Montgelas replied cautious-
ly that because of its geographical location Austria-
Hungary could afford to await patiently the development of
the situation secure in the knowledge that the imperial-
royal army could force the Russians to evacuate European
Turkey at any time. To Vienna Montgelas reported that Great Britain appeared determined to safeguard its interests in southeastern Europe; however, he feared that without an ally Her Majesty's Government might be just irresolute enough to let the proper moment for action slip by.  

At precisely the same time Corry sounded out Montgelas about the possibility of cooperation between London and Vienna, Disraeli approached Beust on the same subject. The prime minister asked bluntly "What would you request of us?" Lacking precise instructions on the topic of cooperation with Great Britain, Beust turned Disraeli's inquiry aside. The ambassador replied noncommittally that if Her Majesty's Government was serious about arriving at an agreement with Austria-Hungary, then Disraeli should propose terms to Vienna.  

As reported by Montgelas and Beust, the British soundings were too precipitous and hinted at agreements too far-ranging to be acceptable to Andrásy. The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister feared that any negotiations

27 Montgelas to Beust, London, May 1, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fos. 70-75.

28 Beust to Andrásy, London, May 1, 1877, ibid., Fos. 63-65.

29 See Andrásy's marginal comments in ibid., Fo. 63.
with Great Britain, however innocuous, could not be kept secret, and he did not regard British and Austro-Hungarian interests in southeastern Europe as being as closely related as the British overtures had implied. Accordingly, Beust was instructed to "neither provoke nor rebuff confidences" from the British. 30

Regardless of Andrásy's wishes and his instructions to Beust, Derby approached the ambassador on May 9, 1877 about the possibility of presenting a joint Anglo-Austro-Hungarian note to St. Petersburg. According to Derby, the note would spell out precisely what Near Eastern interests London and Vienna regarded as inviolable. For Andrásy's information, Derby revealed that Great Britain's vital interests included the prevention of any disturbance of Suez Canal traffic and the preservation of Turkish control over Constantinople and the Straits. The foreign secretary wanted to know what Austria-Hungary's Balkan concerns were so that London and Vienna could agree on their common

30 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 6, 1877, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 4. Andrásy was particularly concerned over the secrecy issue since a series of British blue books published in early 1877 had revealed that Austria-Hungary had been quite lukewarm in supporting Russia at the time of the Constantinople conference. For more on this problem, see Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, February 8, 1877, ibid., Carton XC, Fo. 62; and Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 22, 1877, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1877), Fos. 75-77.
interests. Derby pressed for a quick response from Andrassy so that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary could present their note to the tsar's government and forestall any unacceptable Russian faits accompli in the Balkans.  

Andrassy regarded Derby's proposal as little more than an inconsequential British stratagem. The foreign minister believed that it would be impossible for Russia to contravene the vital interests which Derby had set forth. He suspected that Her Majesty's Government wanted a general understanding with Vienna in order to be able to put more pressure on Russia and to justify itself before parliament. Andrassy wanted nothing to do with an agreement aimed at such purposes. Nevertheless, in spite of his dissatisfaction with Derby's suggestion, he did not feel that it would be wise to end all discussion with London. Once again Beust was cautioned against taking any initiative in regard to negotiations with Her Majesty's Government but was at the same time instructed not to discourage British overtures overtly.

31 Beust to Andrassy, London, May 9, 1877, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 10; and Beust to Andrassy, London, May 9, 1877, ibid, Carton XCI, Fo. 906.


33 Andrassy to Beust, Tisza Dob, May 11, 1877, ibid., Fos. 33-34. This time Beust was told "to do nothing which would give the impression that we would like to evade an understanding with England."
Beust's passivity was not sufficient to prevent further soundings by Derby. On May 17 the Austro-Hungarian ambassador reported that the foreign secretary had asked him if the Dual Monarchy would be willing to cooperate with Great Britain to prevent the Russians from taking Constantinople. 34

Andrássy did not favor such cooperation but, because of his desire to keep the lines of communication with London open, he could not rebuff the British. He replied equivocally that his government would be willing to consider a British plan for the protection of Constantinople. 35

Despite Andrássy's lukewarm response to Derby's verbal proposal, Her Majesty's Government quickly followed up on May 20 with a written plan which called for the use of British sea power in conjunction with Austro-Hungarian land forces to protect Constantinople and the Straits. 36

On May 29 Andrássy expressed his disgust over and annoyance with Great Britain's soundings in a response to London's proposal for the joint protection of Constantinople.


35 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, May 19, 1877, ibid., Fo. 49.

36 Beust to Andrássy, London, May 20, 1877, ibid., Fos. 52-54.
Simply stated, Andrásy was quite angry because Her Majesty's Government continued to try to take him farther down the road to active and overt cooperation against Russia than he wished to go at that time. Obviously Andrásy could not merely inform the British that he did not desire to cooperate with them, but he could try to gain the initiative in the negotiations so that he could guide and limit them according to his own views.

Andrásy began his attempt to gain the upper hand in negotiations with London by criticizing the British view that a community of Balkan interests existed which could bring about a quick agreement between London and Vienna. In Andrásy's opinion, such an idea was invalid. According to the foreign minister, the British concerns were "specifically English" interests in which Austria-Hungary had far less at stake than did Great Britain. The Dual Monarchy, said Andrásy, was not about to risk incurring Russia's wrath solely to protect British interests. 37

The Habsburg statesman also argued against any active opposition to Russia at that time. From Austria-Hungary's viewpoint, such a course of action was unnecessary. The Dual Monarchy had already revealed its vital Balkan interests to St. Petersburg, and Russia had promised to

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37Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 29, 1877, ibid., Fos. 65-69.
respect those interests. If Russia did not respect the Dual Monarchy's wishes, Andrássy was certain that his country's strategic military position would enable it to protect its interests. Therefore, he informed London, he had no reason to side openly with Great Britain against Russia.

Andrássy did, however, acknowledge to Her Majesty's Government that the tsar might not honor his pledge to respect Austria-Hungary's interests and that some of the results of the Russo-Turkish war might not be acceptable to London and Vienna. He proposed that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain draw up and communicate to St. Peters burg a list of such unacceptable results. For the information of Her Majesty's Government he submitted seven conditions which Austria-Hungary could not accept as consequences of a Russo-Turkish war. They included the establishment of a protectorate by a single Great Power over the Balkan Christians; the failure of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 to participate in the Russo-Turkish peace negotiations; the acquisition of territory by Russia up to the right bank of the Danube; the annexation of Romania by Russia or the establishment of Russian hegemony over that country; the implementation of a Russian secundogeniture in the Balkans; the occupation of

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38 Ibid., Fos. 69-72.
Constantinople by Russia; and the creation of a "great Slavic state at the expense of the non-Slavic elements of the Balkan peninsula." In addition to those conditions, Andrásy told London that Austria-Hungary had also informed St. Petersburg that it could not acquiesce in a continuing Russian presence in Bulgaria or south of the Danube or to the entry of Russian troops into Serbia. These were Vienna's inviolable interests. If Derby was interested in working out a comprehensive statement of British and Austro-Hungarian interests, then Andrásy would be willing to negotiate further. 39

Andrássy's letters of May 29, viewed in conjunction with the Budapest Conventions, reveal the dilemma in which the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister found himself. The Budapest documents promised Austria-Hungary Bosnia-Hercegovina and Russian respect for specified Austro-Hungarian Balkan interests in return for the Dual Monarchy's benevolent neutrality during a Russo-Turkish war. In large measure Andrássy trusted the tsar to keep those promises. In addition to his faith in Alexander, he felt that he could bide his time because he believed that Austria-Hungary's geographic position would enable the Dual Monarchy to arbitrate the outcome of a Russo-Turkish war at

39 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 29, 1877, ibid., Fos. 84-94.
any time it so desired. Furthermore, Andrásy did not feel at all certain that Her Majesty's Government was determined to act as resolutely as it spoke. Thus, Andrásy felt no overriding pressure to cooperate with Great Britain.

There was, however, a reverse side to Andrásy's ostensibly pro-Russian policy. In the first place, he had never really favored cooperation with Russia; he had been forced to acquiesce in that course of action because there had been no alternative. He had always opposed any expansion of Russian power or prestige, and an alliance with Great Britain—assuming that country would act vigorously—would ensure beyond any doubt that the Russian gains remained quite modest. Andrásy knew full well that, inspired by victory and goaded by Pan-Slavic pressure, Alexander II could be moved to repudiate the promise he had given to Vienna. In his opinion, such an event would cause an Austro-Hungarian-Russian confrontation. The foreign minister was well aware of both the apprehension with which the monarchy's military leaders viewed such a possibility and the value of a Great Power ally in such a situation. He could ill afford to estrange the British by rebuffing London's overtures.

In May, 1877, Andrásy undoubtedly preferred to continue his cooperation with the Russians. Conversely, however, he did not wish to anger the British or to create
doubt about Austria-Hungary's freedom of action by breaking off negotiations with London. Therefore, he had to continue his discussions with Her Majesty's Government.

Andrássy quickly encountered a problem in dealing with the British when Disraeli responded to his proposal of May 29. On June 7 the British prime minister told Montgelas that "it was England's intention to conclude with us an offensive and defensive alliance limited to the East." As part of that entente, Disraeli said that "England was ready to regard the endangering of any one of the 7 points [i.e., Andrássy's list of Austria-Hungary's vital interests dated May 29] a casus belli." The prime minister went on to ask Montgelas if Austria-Hungary would concentrate its troops in Transylvania if the British occupied Gallipoli and massed their fleet at Constantinople.

Although Montgelas stalled Disraeli by observing that Austria-Hungary's geographical advantages would allow the Dual Monarchy to wait until the last moment before coercing Russia, and, therefore, that military action was not yet

40 [Montgelas], London, June 7, 1877, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fos. 107-112. The italics are found in the original.

41 Ibid., Fo. 112.
necessary, the prime minister refused to let the matter drop. On June 11 he approached Beust on the subject of military cooperation between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. Disraeli began his conversation with Beust by implying that Austria-Hungary might be unable to act in unison with Great Britain because of a previous commitment to Russia. After that unpleasant beginning the prime minister quickly progressed to an equally unpalatable topic. In his opinion, he informed Beust,

we [Great Britain and Austria-Hungary] must be united in that Russia not be allowed to cross the Balkans. When it has crossed the Danube and... has had a military success to save its honor, then we must press for the conclusion of peace, which naturally could not be concluded without our cooperation. If Russia rejects the two of us and crosses the Balkans, then we ourselves must take material guarantees for the maintenance of the treaty [the Treaty of Paris of 1856]; by that I understand that we send our fleet and occupy a point such as Gallipoli in order to command the Straits, while you would march into the principalities.

Disraeli also stated that in addition to the incursion into Romania, Her Majesty's Government would acquiesce in an occupation of Serbia by imperial-royal forces if Vienna deemed that necessary. Beust, undoubtedly shocked by the magnitude of Disraeli's proposals, could only counter that halting Russia north of the Balkan mountains was not a point of particular concern to the Dual Monarchy.42

42 Beust to Andrassy, London, June 11, 1877, ibid., Section VII, Carton CLXX, Fos. 144-147. The italics are found in the original.
In Andrassy's reply to Beust's report of his conversation with Disraeli, the foreign minister explained his view of Austria-Hungary's position more clearly than he had at any point prior to that time. For him the crucial issue in the Russo-Turkish war was not halting the Russians north of the Balkan mountains or preventing an occupation of Constantinople but rather forestalling the establishment of a large, powerful Slavic state on the Dual Monarchy's borders. The foreign minister did not regard an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Romania or Serbia as appropriate to the accomplishment of that goal. Nor did he view with equanimity the prospect of a conflict with Russia. Andrassy likened a war between Great Britain and Russia to a fight between "a wolf and a shark," while maintaining that hostilities between the Dual Monarchy and the tsarist empire would be an infinitely more serious undertaking. He felt it quite likely that war between the Habsburg and Romanov realms would result in the destruction of the defeated state. For these reasons Andrassy did not believe that it was time to unite Austria-Hungary with Great Britain in open military opposition to Russia.  

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43 Andrassy to Beust, n. p., n. d. [from internal evidence one can conclude that this writing is in response to Beust's dispatch of June 11, 1877], ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fos. 94-99.
Andrássy's response to British overtures for an alliance was not totally negative. He did inform London that he agreed that the results of the Russo-Turkish war "would have to be submitted to European sanction." He also consented to support Great Britain in its defense of those interests which Derby had revealed to Beust in early May, 1877.  

On June 13, the British made yet another alliance proposal. This time Derby asked Beust whether Austria-Hungary would agree to a joint demarche aimed at preventing a Russian occupation of Constantinople and proposed an understanding between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary as the best means of safeguarding their respective Balkan interests.  

Andrássy's response to the latest British proposal was essentially the same as his reply to Disraeli's plan of June 11. He reiterated his by now familiar arguments that thus far Russia had given Austria-Hungary no reason to take action against the tsarist state and that if military measures were required to protect the Dual Monarchy's interests, they could be postponed until the last instant.

44 Ibid., Fos. 102-103.

because of the strategic advantages of Austria-Hungary's geographic position. According to the Habsburg minister, for the time being it simply was not in Vienna's interest to do anything other than trust Russia's promises.\(^{46}\)

Despite Andrásy's generally negative attitude towards unified action with Great Britain, he did not rule out future cooperation entirely. Instead, he invited Her Majesty's Government to submit to the Ballhausplatz a statement of principles which could be used as the basis of an agreement between London and Vienna. Of course, Andrásy had no view towards any sort of concrete or immediate plan of action.\(^{47}\)

During the remainder of June and throughout July Her Majesty's Government continued its attempts to secure a firm commitment from the Dual Monarchy. On the one hand, the British pressured Andrásy to come to terms with them by voicing their doubts that Austria-Hungary really had a free hand vis-à-vis Russia and by stating that without a binding agreement parliament probably would not provide funds for an ally.\(^{48}\) On the other hand, Her Majesty's

\(^{46}\) Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, June 22, 1877, ibid., Fos. 193-196. See also Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, June 22, 1877, ibid., Fo. 179; and Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, June 22, 1877, ibid., Fo. 184.

\(^{47}\) Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, June 22, 1877, ibid., Fos. 193-196.

\(^{48}\) Beust to Andrásy, London, June 30, 1877, ibid.,
Government tried to make it easy for Andrásy to reach an agreement with Great Britain by offering him a very innocuous protocol which stated merely that the two countries had reached "a perfect accord...on their recognized common interests" and that they would act in unison to safeguard those interests if necessary.\(^{49}\)

No matter what the British did, throughout July Andrásy refused to make any formal agreement with them. He focused most of his opposition to cooperation with London on the differences in the British and Austro-Hungarian positions on Bulgaria. The British wished to limit any Bulgarian state to an area north of the Balkan mountains, but Andrásy had never regarded that as a crucial objective. What was important to the Habsburg state was "that at the end of the war Bulgaria will be evacuated as soon as possible by the Russian armies, that a large Slavic state will not be created, and that Romania and Bulgaria will remain completely independent of Russia." Andrásy acknowledged that his position was in marked contrast to that of Her Majesty's Government, but

\(^{49}\)Beust to Andrásy, London, June 30, 1877, ibid., Fo. 236.
he refused to compromise.  

Finally, on July 26, Andrásy proposed a common program to London. He suggested that the two countries adopt Vienna's seven points of May 29 and London's aim of keeping the Straits closed to ships of war as the basis of a common program. He advocated that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary defend their combined interests by "parallel but independent action without reference to each other." If close or overt cooperation became necessary, then the two countries would coordinate their actions "at a given moment" for the purpose of safeguarding their mutual interests. Thus, after some three months of negotiating, Andrásy still refused to enter into anything more than a very general agreement with Great Britain, and he would accept no plan which was overtly directed against Russia. Nor would he agree to an openly avowed course of action undertaken in common with Great Britain.

Derby agreed to Andrásy's plan on August 14, 1877. The British foreign secretary did not think highly of the

50 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, July 26, 1877, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 336. Andrásy argued that if a Russian occupation of Bulgaria was to be permanent, then the borders of Bulgaria would be immaterial in terms of the threat posed to Constantinople. Conversely, if the occupation was only temporary, the danger to Constantinople would be minimal regardless of the size of Bulgaria. Ibid.

51 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, July 26, 1877, ibid., Fos. 344-349.
Habsburg minister's proposal since he still preferred a policy of open cooperation between London and Vienna, but it was apparent that Andrásy would not agree to such a course of action. In order to get any agreement at all, Her Majesty's Government had to accept Andrásy's terms.  

When Andrásy learned that London had accepted his proposal, he indicated that he was quite satisfied with the "complete understanding" which had been established. While one can question what kind of agreement had been reached, one cannot doubt that Andrásy was relieved to see the affair ended. After all, it had not been his desire to negotiate with the British in the first place but rather merely to keep the lines of communication open. Her Majesty's Government had tried to take Andrásy faster and farther down the road to overt cooperation against Russia than he was willing to go, and it had required considerable skill to avoid becoming involved in the more grandiose plans devised in London without at the same time rebuffing and estranging the British. It had

52 Derby to Sir Andrew Buchanan, British ambassador at Vienna, London, August 14, 1877, ibid., Fos. 407 and 414-417.

53 Andrásy to Deym, Vienna, August 29, 1877, ibid., Fo. 463. See also Andrásy to Deym, Vienna, August 27, 1877, ibid., Fo. 459.
been a trying and delicate situation from which Andrásy appeared to have escaped relatively unscathed. Indeed, after almost four months of negotiating Andrásy ended up by agreeing that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary had certain common interests in the Balkans and that if those interests required the attention and protection of the two powers, they would work out a plan of joint action at the appropriate time. It was, in effect, an agreement to agree at a later date—but only if that became absolutely necessary.

It is apparent that in the spring and summer of 1877 one of Andrásy's guiding principles was to maintain as many options as possible. At the same time he scrupulously observed the terms of the agreement he had made with Russia, he also fostered a closer relationship with Great Britain in the hope of having a counterweight to Russia at his disposal. He was, however, also quite aware that Austria-Hungary might be left in the lurch by both Russia and Great Britain if it did not appear determined to defend its own interests. Consequently, he tried to give some direction to the military planning which went on in Vienna during the early stages of the Russo-Turkish war.

As previously mentioned, the Austro-Hungarian supreme command had drawn up a contingency plan for

54 See ante, p. 105, n. 123.
intervention in the Balkans in early 1875. The increasing threat of a Russo-Turkish war gave impetus to the consideration of new plans at a conference of military leaders held on November 13, 1876, in which the emperor, Archduke Albert, Minister of War Major General Baron Arthur Bylandt-Rheidt, Chief of the General Staff Major General Baron Anton Schonfeld, War Ministry Section Chief Major General Baron Franz Vlasits, and Brigadier General Beck participated. The discussion at this conference, which dealt mainly with the prospect of war with Russia, sheds light on the ideas of the emperor and his highest military advisers about the Dual Monarchy's foreign and military policies. The emperor explained that Austria-Hungary and Russia had not become allies as a consequence of the Reichstadt agreement. That understanding merely provided a temporary modus vivendi. In view of the radical forces abroad both in Russia and in the Balkans, the emperor believed the Russian government might be forced to go beyond its agreements with Austria-Hungary, thereby forcing the Dual Monarchy to resort to military opposition against Russia. For this reason Francis Joseph believed

55 For the full details of the conference, see Protocol of a conference held on November 13, 1876, under the chairmanship of the emperor, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, 69-1/25 (1876), Fos. 1-25.

56 Ibid., Fos. 1-5.
that it was advisable to keep the possibility "of war with Russia in mind" and to make the necessary preparations for such an eventuality. 57

The emperor's views were not well received by the other conferees. Under a pretense of discussing the preparations for war with Russia, some conference participants, most notably Archduke Albert, voiced their opposition to such a course of action. The archduke emphasized that in his opinion, it would be difficult for Austria-Hungary to win a war against the already mobilized Russian troops. Moreover, even if the Dual Monarchy should win such a conflict, the empire would not gain any permanent advantages and would incur Russia's lasting hostility. 58

57 Ibid., Fo. 5.

58 Ibid., Fos. 7-14. It should be emphasized that Archduke Albert consistently favored cooperation with Russia and displayed a hostile attitude towards Germany. In addition to his pro-Russian personal feelings, Albert also preferred to cooperate with the tsarist regime because he was exceedingly leery of a military confrontation with that state. Conversely, however, the archduke was convinced that the Dual Monarchy had to demonstrate that it was a vigorous, determined, and powerful country. He sought to achieve that impression through participating in a peaceful partition of the Balkans in agreement with Russia and/or an Austro-Hungarian attack on Italy. Albert regarded war with Italy as "an easy war" which would yield material gains for the Dual Monarchy and ease the pressure of centrifugal nationalistic forces in Austria-Hungary. For representative statements of the archduke's views, see Archduke Albert to Beck, Vienna, March 20, 1877, ibid., Separate Fascicle 77, Fos. 30-32; [Archduke Albert], Aphoristic Observations on the current situation, November, 1876, ibid., 70/59 (2), [Fos. 1-10]; and [Archduke Albert], The Military Position of the Monarchy,
While the divergence of opinion about the efficacy of war against Russia undoubtedly hindered the conferees in their efforts to formulate concrete plans for that possibility, there was no divergent thinking about the Dual Monarchy's proper policy in regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina. The leaders agreed that Austria-Hungary would probably have to protect its interests by occupying the provinces. One immediate result of the conference of November 13, 1876, was the drafting of the "ad hoc plan." It called for the use of the XIII Corps, headquartered at Zagreb and composed of the Sixth, Seventh, and Thirty-Sixth Divisions, and the Eighteenth Division, based at Zara, for the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In March, 1877, the emperor was

[December, 1876], ibid., Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, 78-4/1 (1876), Fos. 1-8.

General Beck also agreed with the archduke in regard to the advantages offered by a war against Italy. According to the general, by late 1877 the time had arrived to attack Italy, a country which posed a direct and serious threat to Austria-Hungary. Beck seems to have had very strong reservations about the Dual Monarchy's ability to wage a successful war against an Italy allied to another Great Power; therefore, he advocated an attack then, at a time when the Italians were diplomatically and militarily isolated and could be defeated relatively easily. See [Beck], Study concerning an Attack against Italy. Winter 1877-78, ibid., B/2/Fol. VI/No. 176 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky), [Fos. 1-34].

informed by Baron Leopold von Hofmann, the common minister of finance, that the estimated cost of putting the "ad hoc plan" into effect, slightly more than 21,000,000 gulden, could be met without recourse to parliament. Thus it appeared that if a Russo-Turkish war actually did occur, Austria-Hungary would be able to defend its claim to Bosnia-Hercegovina.

As April arrived and war became increasingly imminent, the "ad hoc plan" was revised and refined and certain preliminary steps were undertaken to implement it. Molinary and Rodich were summoned to Vienna for a final discussion of the plan with the emperor, Archduke Albert, Schönfeld, Bylandt-Rheidt, and Beck. Molinary, who was slated to lead the XIII Corps southeast from Croatia, and Rodich, who was to strike northeast from Dalmatia with the Eighteenth Division, both had an opportunity to voice any fears which they had about the plan. Apparently the only real problem which was acknowledged at this time was deciding the proper moment to implement the "ad hoc plan".

60. Most submissive report of the presentation of the imperial finance minister on February 27, 1877, concerning the procurement of the funds required for a mobilization as per the reduced ad hoc case, Vienna, March 1, 1877, ibid., 69-1/7 (1877) [Fos. 1-6].

61. For example, see Beck to Rodich, Vienna, April 1, 1877, ibid., B/2/Fo. VI/No. 179/19 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky) [Fos. 2-3].
plan." For his part, Andrásy let it be known that his primary concern was to ensure that Austro-Hungarian troops occupied the sanjak of Novi Pazar as quickly as possible to prevent it from being invaded by Serbia or Montenegro. Although it had been stated in the Budapest Conventions that the fate of Novi Pazar would be settled at a later date by mutual agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the foreign minister did not appear concerned about how he would justify the Dual Monarchy's unilateral action to Russia or about what St. Petersburg's reaction to such a high-handed action might be.

With the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war the Dual Monarchy's military and diplomatic problems rapidly multiplied. Scoring immediate and impressive victories over the Turks in the Caucasus theater, Russian troops managed to cross the Danube in strength by late June and advanced rapidly into northern Bulgaria. Well into July, 1877, it

62 Protocol of a conference held under the chairmanship of His Majesty the Emperor on April 20, 1877, Vienna, April 20, 1877, ibid., Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers 69-1/11 (1877), Fos. 1-18.

63 Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre, Vol. II, pp. 305-306. See also Pott's remarks about Andrásy's response to the implementation of the "ad hoc plan" in Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), B/187/No. 1 (Nachla. Pott, p. 67. It should perhaps be mentioned that both Mollinary and Pott refer to Andrásy as a participant in the conference of April 20, 1877; however, the protocol of that conference makes no mention of his presence.
appeared as though the tsar's armies would sweep victoriously forward, perhaps even all the way to Constantinople. Andrássy could not have welcomed such a prospect since a resounding triumph would not serve to restrain the Pan-Slavs or to strengthen the tsar's sense of moderation.

While the success of Russian arms was serious enough in its own right, it also attracted hangers-on to the Russian cause. Both Italy and Serbia began to coquet with the tsarist government. The Serbian threat appeared

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64 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 307.

65 In early June, 1877, Prince Humbert, the heir to the Italian throne, revealed to ambassador Haymerle "a great partiality for Russia." The prince added that he did not believe that a Russo-Turkish war would remain localized but that he also did not know what course of action Italy should follow. See Haymerle to Andrássy, Roma, June 9, 1877, Staatarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XI, Carton LXXXVII (Italy, Letters 1877), Fo. 31. It should be noted that Haymerle attempted to play down the importance of Humbert's remarks. The ambassador believed that the prince's views were not in harmony with those of his father the king. Ibid., Fo. 33. A few weeks later the Quirinal made a proposal which Andrássy could not help but find quite vexing. The Italian government advocated a joint Austro-Hungarian-Italian intervention in behalf of Montenegro which was sorely pressed by the Turks at that time. Andrássy countered that Montenegro had not requested such assistance, and that if it did, Austria-Hungary as the power most affected by the matter, should deal with it unilaterally. Privately Andrássy voiced his suspicion that the Italian proposal was nothing more than a pretext for Italy to meddle in Albania. See Andrássy to Haymerle, Vienna, July 2, 1877, ibid. (Italy, Instructions 1877), Fos. 74-75. See also Andrássy to Thoemel, Vienna, July 3, 1877, ibid., Section XII, Carton CXXIV, Fos. 459-462. Andrássy felt that Vienna should be on guard against Italian
to be the more serious of the two. In early July, Lt. Col. Löhneysen reported the belief at Russian headquarters that "the entry of Serbia into the war in the near future is certain." Similar information came repeatedly from Thoemel in Cetinje. Thoemel also mentioned talk of a Serbian declaration of independence and an alliance between Serbia and Montenegro. Personally, Andrásy did not feel that Serbia was capable of waging war effectively in the summer of 1877; nevertheless, the situation certainly required his untiring vigilance.

The successes of the tsar's troops during the early weeks of the Russo-Turkish war and the possibility that that conflict might spread to the disadvantage of Austria-Hungary necessitated more than mere diplomatic watchfulness

machinations and in particular look out for any hint of cooperation between Rome and St. Petersburg. Andrásy to Haymerle, n. p., July 23, 1877, ibid., Section XI, Carton LXXXVII (Italy, Instructions 1877), Fo. 83.

Löhneysen to Beck, Zimnitza, July 5, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers, 69-1/9-10 (1877), Fo. 3.

Thoemel to Andrásy, Cetinje, July 11, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CXXIV, Fo. 475; and Thoemel to Andrásy, Danilovgrad, July 16, 1877, ibid., Fo. 490.

Andrássy to Thoemel, Vienna, July 16, 1877, ibid., Fo. 492.
by the Dual Monarchy. It was imperative that the Habsburg realm prepare itself to defend militarily its vital interests. Since potentially Russia posed the gravest danger to Austria-Hungary, Francis Joseph promptly ordered his military advisers to develop a mobilization plan based on the possibility of war with the tsarist empire. The resulting comprehensive order of battle, dated May 22, 1877, called for the Dual Monarchy's main thrust to come from Galicia, where about 400,000 men were to be concentrated. The southern border was to be defended against the Italians by about 100,000 troops. An additional 50,000 men were to be concentrated in Transylvania, and a Balkan incursion aimed at securing Bosnia-Hercegovina was to be undertaken by a force of 50,000 men. According to this plan, war with Russia was to be set in motion by the initiation of the "ad hoc plan" in the Balkans.  

This proposal, formulated by the general staff under the guidance of Schönfeld, was based on an even earlier plan, also prepared by Schönfeld.  

69 Proposal of the general staff dated May 22, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers 69-1/21 (1877), Fos. 1-3. Although the proposal was dated May 22, it was not actually presented to the emperor until June 23, 1877.

70 For an interesting and detailed discussion of Schönfeld's November, 1876 plan, see Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, pp. 94-95.
1877, however, was markedly different from that of November, 1876, the date of Schönfeld's original plan. The chief of the general staff was quite aware of the altered diplomatic and military circumstances and submitted a personal memorandum which took into account the altered situation along with the general staff's contingency plan. In his memorandum Schönfeld raised the basic question of "whether it would not be proper, through a sudden thrust against the southernmost Russian forces which were engaged in European Turkey, to isolate those forces or at least to create serious concern about their lines of retreat."

In support of his reasoning the chief of staff cited the example of the Austrian concentration in Transylvania in 1854 and referred to the difficulty which Russian armies would encounter in crossing the Danube and Pruth in the face of hostile forces. Furthermore, Schönfeld emphasized, an Austro-Hungarian thrust into the Balkans would benefit from Turkish, and possibly Romanian, assistance. 71

After touting the advantages of an attack against the Russian forces in the Balkans, Schönfeld went on to acknowledge that Russian troop concentrations near Galicia

ostensibly posed a threat to that province if Austria-Hungary did not concentrate its forces there. What the chief of staff proposed, however, was not a prolonged campaign in the Balkans but rather a quick thrust against the Russian forces south of the Danube. In short, he proposed to beat the separated enemy in detail. Schönfeld felt that if Austria-Hungary did not concentrate in Galicia, it would not alert the Russians to an impending attack and would be able to create insurmountable problems for Russia in the Balkans before Russia would have time to menace Galicia seriously. In addition, if Vienna did not mass troops in Galicia, the Dual Monarchy's diplomatic endeavors would be facilitated and the Ballhausplatz would be able to maintain "a dubious policy to the last instant." 72

The proposals of May 22, 1877 (both the contingency plan and Schönfeld's memorandum), are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, they prove beyond any doubt that, well before the Treaty of San Stefano and the overt threat to Austro-Hungarian vital interests which that treaty represented, the Dual Monarchy foresaw and prepared for the possibility of a military struggle with Russia. Therefore, St. Petersburg's actions in early 1878 should not

72 Ibid., Fos. 40-41.
have caught Vienna unprepared. Secondly, the fact that
two markedly different plans were presented to the emperor
is indicative of the lack of unity in regard to the
leadership, direction, and thinking of the upper echelon
of the Austro-Hungarian military establishment. Lastly,
it should be noted that Schönfeld's memorandum was quite
in line with Andrásy's preferences. The plan set forth
by the chief of staff would allow the foreign minister to
pursue its policy of cautious cooperation with Russia and,
at the same time, to ensure that the Dual Monarchy could
actively protect its interests if that became necessary.

The debate over the most advantageous Austro-
Hungarian military response to a Russian threat was not
settled in 1877; indeed, it was to return with a
vengeance in early 1878. As the summer of 1877 wore on,
however, it became increasingly imperative that the Dual
Monarchy prepare itself to act, especially in regard to
the specific matter of securing control over Bosnia-
Hercegovina. In late June Beck alerted Rodich to the
likelihood that the Eighteenth Division, stationed in
Dalmatia, would have to be mobilized soon. 73 In July, the
situation became more serious since, according to reliable

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73 Beck to Rodich, Vienna, June 21, 1877, ibid.,
B/2/Fol. VI/No. 179/21 (Nachlaß Beck-Rzikowsky) [Fos.
1-2].
sources, Serbia was on the brink of declaring war. In view of the imminence of Austro-Hungarian action, the "ad hoc plan" was reviewed and elaborated once again. The plan remained basically the same as the one detailed in January, 1877, although the possibility of adding a cavalry brigade and a naval contingent to the invasion force was considered. The cost of implementing the most expensive variation of the plan for a three month period was now estimated at 26,400,000 gulden.

74 For example, see Captain Koloman Bolla to Beck, Tarnova, July 30, 1877, ibid., Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers 69-1/9-16 (1877), Fo. 3. Bolla stated that at Russian headquarters "a Serbian action is generally accepted as certain." See also Andréssy to Wrede, Vienna, July 25, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fo. 82.

75 For the complete plan see the ad hoc case prepared in July, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät des Kaisers 69-1/2 (1877), Fos. 2-116.

76 Ibid., Fo. 18.

77 Ibid., Fo. 3.

78 Ibid., Fo. 21. In view of subsequent events it should be noted that the "ad hoc plan" of July, 1877, contained political instructions for the commander of the operation. These instructions stated that "in taking possession of these lands one must be guided by the thought that it is a matter of lasting acquisition." The Austro-Hungarian troops were to expect a peaceful welcome and were not to act as conquerors. Their first task was to occupy Sarajevo to gain control of the administrative machinery of the provinces and then to resettle the inhabitants who had fled to the Dual Monarchy and to Montenegro. Ibid., Fos. 11-14.
Once the "ad hoc plan" was refined and approved, the next step in its implementation was the determination of how to pay for the cost of mobilization. In view of the precarious military and diplomatic situation in the Balkans, the appropriate ministers were hastily summoned to Vienna to discuss the financial aspect of the operation. On July 31, 1877, the emperor, Andrásy, Minister-President Tisza and Auersperg, and Finance Ministers Sisinio Pretis and Koloman Szell met to resolve the problem. 79

Andrássy dominated the meeting and spoke vigorously in favor of raising the money to finance the "ad hoc plan." According to him, it was time to take the steps which would give Francis Joseph the capability "to order the necessary military measures immediately" if that became necessary. Andrássy was afraid that it would take a month or longer to complete the process of raising the money and then mobilizing the troops. Such a delay between the start and the completion of mobilization would be disadvantageous to the Dual Monarchy since it could rob

79 See Andrássy to Koloman Szell, Hungarian minister of finance [Vienna] [July 27, 1877], Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CXXXV (Royal Hungarian Minister-President), Fo. 43; and Andrássy to Tisza, Vienna, July 27, 1877, ibid., Fos. 45-47. For the details of the conference, see Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of July 31, 1877, ibid., Carton CCLXXXIX, Fos. 849-867.
Austria-Hungary of the opportunity to act at the most favorable moment. If the period of time required to complete mobilization could be reduced by gathering up the money well in advance of the order to mobilize, Andrassy thought that should be done. According to him, the key issue for the Dual Monarchy was its ability to act immediately in its own behalf at any moment such action became necessary; consequently, he pressed for an immediate beginning of the financial operation. Some of the other conferees raised mild objections to that proposal but ultimately agreed to start trying to raise the money.

The line of reasoning which Andrassy displayed during the conference of July 31, 1877 had been well thought out and was adhered to firmly by the foreign minister. Indeed, his ideas on the Dual Monarchy's proper course of action reappeared in essentially the same form in the spring of 1878 during the height of the Balkan crisis. Contrary to General Beck's subsequent contentions, Andrassy did not wish to mobilize the army in July, 1877. He did not wish to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina. He did not wish to

\(^{80}\text{Ibid.},\text{ Fos. 849-855.}\)

\(^{81}\text{Ibid.},\text{ Fos. 856-862.}\)
attack Russia, then in the process of being stalemate
by the Turks at Pleven.  

In the summer of 1877 Andrássy did wish to have the Dual Monarchy in a position to meet

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There are a number of scholars, for example, Rupp in A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 402-404; Rothenberg in The Army of Francis Joseph, p. 96; and Langer in European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, p. 128, who impute to Andrássy a marked degree of bellicosity towards Russia during the latter days of July, 1877. Almost invariably these scholars cite Glaise-Horstenau's biography of Beck as the source for their allegations. See Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, pp. 186-189, 193-194, and 215-216. This writer does not feel that Glaise-Horstenau or Beck's recollections are particularly reliable sources. In the first place, this writer was unable to locate in the Kriegsarchiv any protocols or notes about a conference of military leaders held on July 31, 1877. Nor, apparently, were other scholars able to locate this material, since the Glaise-Horstenau book is the only source normally cited for the events of a conference of military leaders allegedly held on that day. Franz Josephs Weggefährte itself is virtually undocumented, and the reader is left to guess what documentary evidence Glaise-Horstenau may have utilized.

Certainly something more than Beck's memory would be necessary to prove that Andrássy favored war with Russia in July, 1877, because in at least two very important instances Beck's memory can be shown to have been notably deficient. According to Beck's account, as cited in Franz Josephs Weggefährte, p. 167, he played a significant role in the decisive council of July 18, 1870, which kept Austria-Hungary out of the Franco-Prussian war. However, Glaise-Horstenau's research in the protocols of that meeting did not even indicate Beck's presence, much less participation, decisive or otherwise. Glaise-Horstenau stated that his comparison of the protocols of the conference of July 18, 1870, and Beck's recollection "hardly allows one to doubt that when Beck dictated his notes many years later, he fell victim to an error of memory." See Glaise-Horstenau, Franz Josephs Weggefährte, p. 170.

A second instance in which the actual documents prove Beck's memory at fault concerns the council of January 15, 1878. Beck's statements to Wertheimer portrayed Andrássy in a very bellicose frame of mind while the protocol itself leads one to the interpretation that the foreign minister's mood was much more ambiguous. Wertheimer
whatever challenges and dangers it might encounter. The foreign minister wanted to have both money and a mobilization plan in hand so that he, and the empire he represented, could respond vigorously and effectively to a rapidly changing and inherently dangerous situation. His desire to initiate the process of obtaining funds for mobilization, and even to obtain those funds, was certainly a far cry from any intention to make immediate use of the money to mobilize. In addition, it is obvious from the amount of money mentioned in the conference of July 31, 1877, that the subject under discussion was not a
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charitably concluded that Beck's interpretation of Andrásy's position must have been the result of a "misunderstanding." For the pertinent evidence, see Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrásy, Vol. III, pp. 60-65; and brief resume of the conference which took place under the chairmanship of His Majesty on January 15, 1878, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicles 70/59, pp. 1-5. These were not insignificant lapses of memory and leave open the possibility of other, equally serious, errors. Certainly one cannot conclude, as several authors do on the basis of Beck's statements, that Andrásy favored a war against Russia in July, 1877.
To be sure, there is positive evidence of Andrásy's pacific intentions toward Russia in 1877. Firstly, war with the tsarist state would have been an objective at odds with the diplomatic policy which Andrásy had followed since the inception of the Three Emperors' League. Secondly, if he envisioned war with Russia, it would have been politic of Andrásy to seek a firm alliance with Great Britain—something which he had not done. Thirdly, the protocol of the ministerial council held on July 31, 1877, does not reveal that Andrásy was notably hostile toward any country; indeed, the object of the mobilization under consideration is not even mentioned. One has to deduce from the amount of money required for its implementation that what was being discussed was the "ad hoc plan."
general mobilization but rather the implementation of the "ad hoc plan"—a plan the aim of which was to secure Bosnia-Hercegovina for the Dual Monarchy, not to attack Russia. 82

Although the Austro-Hungarian government did make arrangements to raise the money required for the implementation of the "ad hoc plan," the funds were never utilized. 83 As most of the conferees of July 31 hoped, the military situation in the Balkans did change drastically in favor of the Turks. As the main body of the imperial Russian army moved southward through western Bulgaria, it encountered determined and successful Turkish resistance led by Osman Pasha. Defeats at Plevna on July 20 and July 30 slowed the impetus of the Russian advance and forced a concentration at Plevna. The Turkish successes emphasized the precarious situation of the Russian forces and signified a stalemate in the Balkan campaign. 84

82 Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of July 31, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCLXXXIX, Fo. 855.


84 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 319.
Shortly after the July battles Captain Klepsch reported that large numbers of additional Russian troops, including the Guard Corps, were being mobilized and transported to the combat zone.\textsuperscript{85} For his part, Colonel Lohneysen stated that Plevna had "completely altered things in the theater of war," that the Russian offensive was at a standstill, and that the Russian strategic right flank was seriously threatened. Lohneysen was of the opinion that the Russians could not defeat the Turks in Bulgaria until they received the reinforcements necessary for a general offensive. It appeared to the colonel that the Russian army would be stalled in Bulgaria indefinitely.\textsuperscript{86}

From St. Petersburg Ambassador Langenau wrote that the Russian defeat at Plevna had created a situation which was "especially favorable" to Austria-Hungary. He felt

\textsuperscript{85}Klepsch to Beck, contained in Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, August 3, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXX, Fo. 501. See also Klepsch to Beck, contained in Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, August 5, 1877, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Militarkanzlei Seiner Majestat des Kaisers 69-1/17-3 (1877) [Fo. 1]. It should be noted that the correspondence between the military observers at Russian headquarters and their superiors in Vienna was circulated to Andrassy as a matter of course.

\textsuperscript{86}Lohneysen to Beck, Selvi, August 7, 1877, ibid., 69-1/9-17 (1877), Fo. 2; and Lohneysen to Beck, Gorni Studen, August 15, 1877, ibid., 69-1/9-18 (1877), Fo. 7.
that Russia's setback would reemphasize the value of the Dual Monarchy's neutrality and friendship. Langenau also believed that Russia's difficulties would make the country less inclined to seek a definitive solution to the Eastern Question than would have been the case if the tsar's army had promenaded to Constantinople.

From Andrásy's point of view the stalemate at Plevna was beneficial since it allowed him to resume a cautious and equivocating policy. Russia's military problems eased the fear of Her Majesty's Government for Constantinople and helped Andrásy to conclude his negotiations with the British without reaching any kind of concrete agreement. In regard to implementation of the "ad hoc plan," the Russian defeat meant that Belgrade would slow, if not halt, its progress toward war so that Austria-Hungary could cancel or delay military action. Andrásy could not help but favor such a step by Vienna. After all, at no time did Andrásy wish to alter the existing territorial situation in the Balkans; he wanted

87 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, August 15/3, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 152-153.

88 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, August 9/ July 28, 1877, ibid., Section X, Carton LXX, Fo. 504. See also Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, October 10/September 28, 1877, ibid., Fo. 537.
only to ensure that Vienna was not discomfited by whatever changes might occur there. In Andrássy's opinion, the stalemate at Plevna was most fortunate. It gave him a respite, allowed him to extricate himself from the negotiations with Great Britain, and came just in time to prevent the money required for the implementation of the "ad hoc plan" from being wasted. \[89\] And, Plevna held out the possibility of much more—of Russian forces stalled in the Balkans, perhaps even through the winter, and of unbearable strains on that army's logistical network and on the Russian government's financial resources. While Plevna was not regarded as an augury of Russia's ultimate defeat, it did allow Andrássy a chance to postpone a definitive choice between St. Petersburg and London and to prolong his balancing act between those two loci of power. It was an opportunity which he gladly accepted.

\[89\] The fact that the "ad hoc plan" was not implemented prior to the stalemate at Plevna was important from the Austro-Hungarian government's point of view because it could realize the funds for that plan only once without recourse to parliament. Any subsequent financial requirements for a mobilization would have to be approved and effectuated by the parliamentary representatives.
CHAPTER VII

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY FROM
AUGUST, 1877, TO APRIL, 1878

"The history of the Monarchy teaches that wars have also been conducted under unfavorable financial conditions."
--Baron Leopold Hofmann, imperial and royal finance minister, 1 February 7, 1878.

"If it comes to war, there is no credit operation which can create money for us."
--Koloman Szell, Hungarian finance minister, March 12, 1878.

To the dismay of Andrassy and the Dual Monarchy, the respite provided by the Turks' gallant defense of Plevna lasted only a few short weeks. As the summer of 1877 changed to fall the Russian army held up before Plevna turned from assault to siege tactics. Count Totleben, the mastermind of the defense of Sevastopol during the Crimean War, took effective control of the tactical operations and slowly the Russians began to acquire the upper hand. 3 As an ultimate Russian victory at Plevna

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1 Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of February 7, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCXC, Fo. 1,044.

2 Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of March 12, 1878, ibid., Fo. 1,176.

3 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 335.
appeared increasingly certain, the Balkan caldron began to bubble ominously for the Ballhausplatz. Not only was the prospect of Russian triumph in sight, but the activities of Serbia and Montenegro also caused renewed concern in Vienna.

By the end of September, 1877, Montenegrin flags were flying over captured blockhouses in the Sutorina area and Thoemel was strongly predicting a Montenegrin offensive into Hercegovina. Andrássy immediately warned Prince Nicholas that Austria-Hungary would not accept a Montenegrin fait accompli in Hercegovina and advised that Montenegro direct its military efforts in some other direction. Nicholas paid lip service to Andrássy's demand, but at the same time attempted to consolidate Montenegro's hold over the Sutorina district. By mid-November virtually all of the Sutorina region was under

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4See Andrássy to Thoemel, Vienna, September 27, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XII, Carton CXXIV, Fos. 598-599; Thoemel to Andrássy, Ostrog, September 29, 1877, ibid., Fo. 600; and Thoemel to Andrássy, Ostrog, October 4, 1877, ibid., Fo. 611.

5Andrássy to Thoemel, Vienna, October 4, 1877, ibid., Fo. 615; and Thoemel to Andrássy, Danilovgrad, October 9, 1877, ibid., Fo. 623.

6Thoemel to Andrássy, Cattaro, October 17, 1877, ibid., Fos. 639-641.
Montenegrin control. Rodich reported that in addition to the Sutorina, with the exception of Antivari and Dulcigno, Montenegrin forces ruled the coast of northern Albania all the way to the Boyana river. Since such an expansion of Montenegrin authority was completely unacceptable to Vienna, Andrássy was forced to issue a second, stern warning informing Montenegro that it would not be allowed to retain its conquests in northern Albania.

In response to both the likelihood of Russian gains and to Montenegrin aggrandizement, Serbia's entry into the conflict appeared more probable as autumn progressed. By mid-November both the Serbian representative in Vienna and Wrede in Belgrade were predicting Serbia's imminent declaration of war. For Andrássy the primary concern was

7 Thoemel to Andrássy, Virbazar, November 13, 1877, ibid., Fo. 679.

8 Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, November 17, 1877, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXV (Dalmatian governor's office, 1877), Fo. 106; Rodich to Andrássy, Zara, November 25, 1877, ibid., Fo. 109.

9 Andrássy to Thoemel, Budapest, November 24, 1877, ibid., Section XII, Carton CXXIV, Fo. 692; and Thoemel to Andrássy, Castellastua, December 4, 1877, ibid., Fo. 722.

10 Memorandum, November 14, 1877, ibid., Section XL, Carton CCLVIII, Fo. 3.
the direction of Serbia's advances. Wrede believed that Serbia would attempt to acquire territory to the south of the principality, but he also thought that Serbian forces might well move into Novi Pazar or Bulgaria in an effort to link up with Montenegrin or Russian troops. 11

As the situation at Plevna became increasingly critical London was moved to launch a fresh diplomatic initiative. Once again Her Majesty's Government began to importune Vienna about the advantages of close cooperation and a definite plan of action vis-à-vis Russia. Disraeli stressed to the Ballhausplatz that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary together could resolve the Eastern Question in whatever manner they chose. 12 For his part Disraeli claimed that he was quite determined to act; he merely wanted to know "when, where, and how" he could count on the Dual Monarchy's cooperation. 13 In an attempt to spur Andrassy to make a definite commitment, Disraeli repeated

11 Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, November 15, 1877, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXVI, Fos. 464-467; Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, November 22, 1877, ibid., Fo. 472; and Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, November 29, 1877, ibid., Fo. 474.

12 Montgelas to Beust, London, October 29, 1877, in Beust to Andrásy, London, October 31, 1877, ibid., Section VIII, Carton LXXXIX, Fo. 399.

13 Montgelas to Beust, London, October 29, 1877, in Beust to Andrásy, London, October 31, 1877, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fo. 160.
the suspicion of Her Majesty's Government that Austria-Hungary's freedom of action was limited by an agreement with Russia.\footnote{Montgelas to Beust, London, October 29, 1877, enclosed in Beust to Andrássy, London, October 31, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section VIII, Carton LXXXIX, Fo. 400.}

When Andrássy did not respond to Disraeli's challenge, the British began to emphasize other issues such as the possible fate of Bulgaria and of Constantinople if Austria-Hungary and Great Britain failed to cooperate. The primary concern of Her Majesty's Government now appeared to be the preservation of the Turks' control of Constantinople. Derby acknowledged that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain had already agreed that Russia could not be allowed to establish long-term control over the Ottoman capital; however, he feared that if the tsar's troops entered the city, even temporarily, it would prove almost impossible to get them out again. The foreign secretary urgently asked Andrássy's opinion about the need to prevent such a fait accompli.\footnote{Beust to Andrássy, London, November 28, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 501. See also Beust to Andrássy, London, November 28, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 512.}

Andrássy's reply to the overtures of Her Majesty's Government during October and November, 1877, was predicated on his suspicion of British motives. He feared that
Her Majesty's Government wanted to use an alliance with Austria-Hungary to coerce Russia—a maneuver which would be advantageous to the British government since it would both preclude the necessity of actually taking any belligerent action and, at the same time, provide it with "a cheap success in Parliament." And, even if the intentions of the British leaders were devoid of any ulterior motives, Andrásy did not yet believe that it was time for action. As he explained to Beust, the British were "like troops who fire at the enemy before he comes in range. That brings on the enemy instead of discouraging him, because, with the shot, he knows he is not facing seasoned troops." 16

In his response to Derby, Andrásy referred to the position which he had elaborated to Her Majesty's Government on June 22, 1877. He reminded London that at that time he had stated that Austria-Hungary would not acquiesce in a lengthy Russian occupation of Constantinople and that the Dual Monarchy would view Russian seizure of the city as a casus belli. According to Andrásy, St. Petersburg had been informed of the Austro-Hungarian position on this matter and appeared to appreciate the military threat which Austria-Hungary would pose if its wishes were disregarded.

16 Andrásy to Beust, Budapest, December 1, 1877, ibid., Carton XC, Fo. 441.
Andrássy regarded any further action by Austria-Hungary at this time as probably unnecessary and as certainly premature. 17

On December 10, 1877, Andrássy's wait-and-see policy suffered a serious blow when the Turkish forces at Plevna surrendered. While the Russians were not yet at the gates of Constantinople, it was widely believed that they soon would be. The Turks had recently suffered crucial defeats in Asia, 18 and the Russian victory at Plevna seemed to re-invigorate that nation. Langenau predicted that if the Porte did not sue for an immediate peace, Russia was determined "as a minimum to dictate the peace in Adrianople." 19 It appeared as though the long festering Eastern Question might be moving rapidly to a conclusion.

While the fall of Plevna was an obvious source of concern for Andrássy, unknown to the general public, the foreign minister had still another reason to worry about the tsarist government's course of action. At the same time Vienna acquired news of the Russian victory, it also

17 Ibid. See also Beust to Andrássy, London, December 3, 1877, ibid., Fo. 536.

18 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, p. 339.

19 Langenau to Andrássy, St. Petersburg, December 14/2, 1877, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXX, Fos. 637-639.
received a statement from the tsar in which he outlined his provisional ideas for a political and territorial Balkan settlement. Among them Alexander listed the creation of an autonomous, tributary Bulgarian state with borders approximating those agreed to at the Constantinople conference. The tsar felt that Bulgaria should be occupied by Russian troops for two years. In regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina, Alexander envisioned that its political organization would conform to the proposals of the Constantinople conference, with Austria-Hungary having rights there analogous to those of Russia in Bulgaria. He also proposed that Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro be granted independence and territorial enlargement and that the Porte's Christian provinces be granted reforms. The tsar demanded that southern Bessarabia be retroceded to Russia, with Romania receiving the Dobrudja as compensation. The principles of freedom of the Danube and closure of the Straits to ships of war were to be maintained. Russia would require an indemnity from Turkey as well as a treaty regularizing relations between Russian and Turkish citizens. Finally, Alexander agreed that the Powers would have a say in peace provisions "having the character of general interest."

20 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, Varadin, December 9/November 27, 1877; ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 710-713.
Although Alexander stated that he believed that his settlement was "in the spirit if not in the letter of our arrangements," Andrásy held an entirely different opinion of the Russian terms. While Alexander's conditions were not in themselves excessively alarming, in the context of renewed Russian enthusiasm for the war and the indication that Russia was on the verge of decisive victory, the tsar's proposed settlement could be viewed as an ominous portent of an unpleasant and unacceptable Russian fait accompli. With just such a possibility in mind, Andrásy felt constrained to oppose the tsar's position. Most of the foreign minister's criticism of Alexander's ideas centered around the proposals pertaining to Bulgaria and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Andrásy objected to the Bulgaria envisioned by the tsar because it would constitute a large Slavic state—something which had been ruled out from the very beginning of the negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Andrásy also opposed a lengthy Russian occupation of Bulgaria. In regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Habsburg minister stressed the fact that Austro-Hungarian

21 Ibid., Fo. 710.

22 For information about Russian official attitudes and public opinion at this time, see Langenau’s dispatches to Andrásy during November and December, 1877. They are found in Ibid., Section X, Carton LXX.
annexation of those provinces was the necessary quid pro quo for Russia's repossessio
of Bessarabia. A third major point which Andrásy emphasized was that Russia and Turkey could settle bilaterally only those items which were of exclusively mutual interest; all other terms would have to be mediated or approved by the other Great Powers.²³

In addition to fostering pretentious goals in St. Petersburg, the fall of Plevna also conjured up visions of conquest and aggrandizement in Belgrade. Consequently, on December 14 the Serbs declared war on the Ottoman empire. From Andrásy's point of view the Serbian action raised the possibility of an immediate threat to Bosnia-Hercegovina. Andrásy moved quickly and decisively to quash that possibility. He promptly informed Belgrade that Austria-Hungary would not allow Serbian troops to operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Novi Pazar²⁴ and that the Austro-Hungarian army would intervene if necessary to

²³[Andrássy], "Observations on the proposals," enclosed in Emperor Francis Joseph I to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, Vienna, January 8, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLI, Fos. 783-790.

²⁴Andrássy to Wrede, Vienna, December 22, 1877, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CXXVI, Fo. 132; Wrede to Andrássy, Belgrade, December 25, 1877, ibid., Fo. 535; and Wrede to Andrássy, Belgrade, December 25, 1877, ibid., Fos. 538-539.
see that the Dual Monarchy's wishes were respected.  

Likewise, Vienna advised the Turks that the Serbs would not conduct military operations west of the Drina river and requested that the sultan's forces also refrain from campaigning in Bosnia-Hercegovina.  

While the Russian victory at Plevna had a tremendous impact on the conduct of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy, its importance was not limited to the diplomatic sphere. In particular the Russian triumph also had a significant effect on the Dual Monarchy's parliamentary affairs. Immediately after the fall of Plevna the Cisleithanian delegation undertook a debate on Austria-Hungary's foreign policy. On December 12, 1877, Andrássy's policy was attacked by a combination of Polish and German Liberal representatives who feared that the foreign minister had not thus far acted to forestall a Russian fait accompli in the Balkans and that he would not be able to do so in the future.  

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25 Andrássy, Address to the budget committee of the House of Representatives of the Austrian parliament, December 18, 1877, ibid., Section XL, Carton CCCXVI (Declarations and speeches of His Excellency the Minister of the Imperial House and Foreign Minister Count Andrássy in the public and committee sittings of the Delegations. Period 1877-1878.), Fo. 14.  

26 Andrássy to Zichy, n. p., December 22, 1877, ibid., Section XII, Carton CXXII, Fo. 460.  

27 Snyder, "Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879," pp. 83-84. See also Ernst Freiherr
Andrássy himself was present for the debate and personally replied to his critics. His response was not effective. The foreign minister excused himself by stating that he was unprepared at that time to defend his policy. He refused to clarify or specify either what his Balkan policy was or what his position was in regard to the possibility of an Austro-Hungarian annexation of Turkish territory. Andrássy berated his critics, reminding them that during past wars the usual question had been "which province will Austria lose this war" but that now, when that would not be the case, "I have heard only fear and anxiety expressed that Austria for once, in an extraordinary manner, would win a province." 28

Ultimately the debate on foreign policy ended without result, primarily because there was no concrete budgetary or legislative action against which Andrássy's foes could focus their opposition. 29 The issues raised in the debate,

von Plener, Erinnerungen von Ernst Plener, Vol. II: Parla-
mentarische Tätigkeit. 1873-1891 (3 vols., Stuttgart: 

28 See Andrássy's speech in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Poli-
tisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCCXVI (Declarations and 
speeches of His Excellency the Minister of the Imperial 
House and Foreign Minister Count Andrássy in the public and 
committee sittings of the Delegations. Period 1877-1878), 
IV/2, Sitting of the Austrian Delegation on December 12, 
1877, pp. 7-8.

29 Snyder, "Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian 
Politics, 1878-1879," pp. 84-85.
and in fact the very act of questioning his foreign policy, did, however, portend serious difficulties for Andrassy and for Austria-Hungary. In December of 1877 the foreign minister simply was not in a position to speak frankly about his foreign policy options and the precautions he had taken to protect Austro-Hungarian interests if he wanted to keep all those options open. Consequently, his public statements tended to appear either dissembling or confused and contradictory and certainly did not satisfy his parliamentary critics.³⁰

Still another result of the fall of Plevna was a renewal of the previous discussions between London and Vienna about a common course of action vis-a-vis Russia. The initial reaction of Her Majesty's Government to the

³⁰For examples of Andrassy's vague and confusing statements about his Balkan policy, see his speeches in Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCCXVI (Declarations and speeches of His Excellency the Minister of the Imperial House and Foreign Minister Count Andrassy in the public and committee sittings of the Delegations. Period 1877-1878), I, Delegation of the Austrian parliament, budget committee, December 6, 1877, p. 1; and III, Delegation of the Hungarian parliament, sitting of the committee for foreign affairs on December 9, 1877, pp. 4-6. In the first instance Andrassy stated both that his policy "was acknowledged throughout Europe as clear and purposeful" and that "it seems to me meritorious if the image of my policy still appears to be nebulous; better that than if our interests had been injured through premature utterances." In the second case Andrassy refused to reveal what material guarantees he had secured for the protection of Austria-Hungary's interests.
Russian victory at Plevna was quite belligerent—at least as conveyed to the Ballhausplatz. The normally pacific Derby admonished Beust that war between Great Britain and Russia would be unavoidable if the tsar's troops occupied Constantinople, even if only temporarily.\(^{31}\) The foreign secretary also declared that British naval and land forces would "appear in Constantinople" if the sultan so desired.\(^{32}\) For his part, Andrásy believed that in the end Russia would respect Great Britain's interests and conciliate Her Majesty's Government.\(^{33}\) Andrásy did, however, warn the British against the danger inherent in a peace concluded without the approval of the Powers and stated that London and Vienna should coordinate their actions to prevent Russian preponderance in the Balkans.\(^{34}\)

At the same time Andrásy was setting the stage for possible cooperation with London, he was also sounding out

\(^{31}\) Beust to Andrásy, London, December 12, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Section VIII, Carton XC, Fo. 578.

\(^{32}\) Beust to Andrásy, London, December 17, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 633.

\(^{33}\) Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, December 9, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 454.

\(^{34}\) Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, December 22, 1877, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 497-499.
Berlin about support for Austria-Hungary in its effort to have the tsar's tentative peace terms revised. The answer which Andrásy received from Germany was generally favorable. According to State Secretary Bülow, Emperor William would inform Tsar Alexander that, as in the past, Germany would continue to acquiesce in whatever arrangements Russia and Austria-Hungary found mutually acceptable. Bülow implied that Bismarck realized that the terms which Alexander had proposed in his letter of December 9 were unsatisfactory to Vienna and that Bismarck "would be guided by a frank feeling of friendship for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and our difficulties and interests would be taken into consideration." Thus, while the imperial German government did not promise unqualified support for Austria-Hungary, its response to Andrásy's queries did seem to imply that Berlin would not stand by and witness injury to the Dual Monarchy's interests.

In addition to sounding out London and Berlin, Vienna also negotiated directly with St. Petersburg. On January 8, 1878 Francis Joseph provided Alexander II with a personal

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35 Andrásy to Károlyi, Vienna, December 26, 1877, ibid., Section III, Carton CXI (Prussia, Instructions 1877), Fos. 158-160.

36 Károlyi to Andrásy, Berlin, December 28, 1877, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 736-740.
response to the tsar's tentative peace proposals. The emperor opposed the far-reaching terms suggested by the tsar. Francis Joseph stated that the Austro-Hungarians had always believed that a definitive settlement of the Balkan situation could be made only after the dissolution of the Ottoman empire. According to Francis Joseph, such a reorganization of the Balkans could take place only if Turkey died a "natural death from a lack of vitality." The Habsburg monarch did not believe that Europe would acquiesce in major territorial and political changes as a result of Russia's destruction of the Ottoman empire. Therefore, Francis Joseph maintained that the "definitive organization of the Balkan peninsula, which had been anticipated at Reichstadt, cannot be effectuated."  

Despite Francis Joseph's warning to the tsar, St. Petersburg did not seem inclined to placate Vienna. Russian military pressure on the Turks continued, and by mid-January the situation had worsened appreciably. Zichy informed Andrássy that the Turks could defend neither Adrianople nor Constantinople and that they urgently needed

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37 Andrássy's detailed and specific objections to the tsar's proposals, as mentioned previously in ante, pp. 358-359, were included as an appendix to the emperor's letter. See [Andrássy], "Observations on the proposals," enclosed in Emperor Francis Joseph I to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Vienna, January 8, 1878, ibid., Pos. 782-794.

38 Emperor Francis Joseph I to His Majesty the Emperor
a truce. The ambassador continued, however, that the Russians had stated that they would not grant an armistice until the two sides had agreed to tentative terms. 39

In view of the increasing prospect of an unacceptable Russian fait accompli, Andrásy once again turned to Great Britain. He informed Her Majesty's Government that Austria-Hungary was opposed to any linking of the armistice and peace negotiations and that Vienna was taking steps at St. Petersburg to prevent that possibility. 40 Andrásy asked how Great Britain would react to a treaty between Russia and Turkey which was concluded without the participation of the other Great Powers. 41

The response of Her Majesty's Government to Andrásy's query was quite satisfactory in that London stated that it would regard as invalid any treaty which affected either the Treaty of Paris of 1856 or the Treaty of London of 1871.

39 Zichy's report is summarized in Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, January 12, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton XCII, Fo. 19.

40 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, January 14, 1878, ibid., Fo. 29.

41 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, January 14, 1878, ibid., Carton CLXX, Fos. 2-3.
and which did not at the same time have the assent of the Powers guaranteeing those treaties. Moreover, the British appeared ready to move beyond mere diplomatic measures. On January 15 Disraeli dramatically explained his position to Beust, "I have the crown behind me as no minister has had before me, a secure majority of 100," he asserted. "I hope none of my colleagues will resign. If they want to I will replace them, but I myself must be able to count on an ally." Great Britain, he said, intended to dispatch its fleet to Constantinople in response to a British-inspired request by the Porte. The fleet's subsequent action would depend on to what action Austria-Hungary would be willing to commit its ground forces. Beust reported that Her Majesty's Government appeared willing to uphold Austro-Hungarian interests which had been spelled out to the British in the summer of 1877, and the ambassador declared that he believed Austro-Hungarian-British cooperation could be achieved easily if only

\[42\] Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, January 15, 1878, ibid., Carton XCII, Fo. 38.

\[43\] Beust to Andrassy, London, January 15, 1878, ibid., Carton CLXX, Fos. 6-7.

\[44\] Beust to Andrassy, London, January 16, 1878, ibid., Fo. 16.
Vienna would clearly and unequivocally state how it intended to counter the Russian threat. 45

Andrássy's response to Disraeli's sounding was nothing more than a reiteration of his earlier position. The foreign minister passed along to London the assurances which St. Petersburg had given him that the Russian peace negotiations would deal only in generalities and would not prevent Austria-Hungary from having a voice in the final peace treaty. Consequently, according to Andrássy, the Dual Monarchy was calmly awaiting the Russo-Turkish peace agreement. 46 Andrássy also revealed to Beust his belief that Great Britain was pressing for military measures in order to match the advantages which Russia was rapidly acquiring. Andrássy was of the opinion that the strength of Austria-Hungary's "geographic military position" obviated the need for any military action by the Dual Monarchy at that time. 47

On January 18, Disraeli once again jarred Andrássy's facade of serenity. The prime minister stated to Beust:

45 Beust to Andrássy, London, January 17, 1878, ibid., Fo. 21.

46 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 17, 1878, ibid., Carton XCII, Fo. 49.

47 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 18, 1878, ibid., Carton CLXX, Fos. 25 and 28.
We want to act in common with Austria, not separated from her. If Count Andrassy wants to make the 'grand coup' [sic], that is, mobilize, then I would immediately suggest that my colleagues offer recompense.48

Disraeli's vigorous call for action was promptly followed up by Derby, who emphasized to Beust on January 19 that "'what can be done must be done in the next 48 hours if the situation is to be saved'."49

Andrássy's response to this latest British prodding was less ambiguous than usual but still lacked substantive proposals. The foreign minister criticized British policy because recent bellicose statements by Queen Victoria, as well as those made by members of her government, could not be reconciled with the absence of parliamentary grants of funds for military measures. Andrassy declared that Austria-Hungary would continue to doubt Great Britain's "capacity to act" until that nation took a decisive step to protect its interests. The Habsburg minister again emphasized the importance of the Dual Monarchy's geographical position, obviously implying that Austria-Hungary could afford to indulge in a wait and see attitude while Great Britain could not do so if Her Majesty's Government wished its assertions about protecting its interests to be taken

48 Beust to Andrassy, London, January 18, 1878, ibid., Fo. 31.

49 Beust to Andrassy, London, January 19, 1878, ibid., Fo. 34.
seriously. 50

At this point Disraeli, spurred by Great Britain's need to act and perhaps encouraged by Andrássy's firmer tone, proposed an alliance to Beust. He explained to the ambassador that he understood that Austria-Hungary could not enter into a rapprochement with Great Britain without at the same time endangering the existence of the Three Emperors' League. Nevertheless, he continued:

In this situation there is only one thing to do: conclude a definitive treaty. Then England's sea power and treasure stand at your command. If I have the treaty, then I can go before Parliament with it and request ten million, which I would certainly obtain. 51

In commenting on his conversation with Disraeli, Beust pinpointed the crux of the problem involved in effectuating an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain. He was convinced that the Dual Monarchy would not conclude an alliance without prior evidence of British action as proof of good faith, while Great Britain would not act prior to the signing of an alliance. 52

50 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 20, 1878, ibid., Fo. 42.

51 Beust to Andrássy, London, January 21, 1878, ibid., Fos. 45-46.

Despite the increasing urgency of the calls of Her Majesty's Government for an understanding between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, Andrásy's responses followed the same earlier reserved pattern and he continued to refuse any definitive alliance. 53

In large part Andrásy's reluctance to deal more decisively with the British stemmed from his own and his government's uncertainty about what military measures could or should be undertaken against the Russians. In an attempt to clarify the Dual Monarchy's position a conference of the empire's highest military and political leaders discussed possible military action against Russia once again on January 15, 1878. The meeting was presided over by Francis Joseph and attended by Andrásy, Archduke Albert, Minister of War Bylandt-Rheidt, Chief of the General Staff Schönfeld, and Beck, the head of the military chancery. Francis Joseph opened the meeting by calling for a review of existing Austro-Hungarian mobilization plans against Russia. 54

53 For example, see Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, January 22, 1878, ibid., Fo. 52; and Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, January 23, 1878, ibid., Fo. 75.

54 For a summary of the discussion at the conference of January 15, 1878, see "Brief resume of the conference which took place under the chairmanship of His Majesty on January 15, 1878," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 70/59, Fos. 1-5. While most accounts of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy at this time include an account of the conference of January 15, 1878, most of them, for example,
Andrassy responded to the emperor stating that since the majority of the Russian army was situated south of the Danube and, since the bulk of this force was south of the Balkan mountains, Austria-Hungary's plans were outdated. In Andrassy's view, the Russian forces in the Balkans were sustained by tenuous lines of communication, were separated into two parts by a rugged mountain chain, and were opposed by Turkish troops that still held strong defensive positions in Bulgaria. It appeared obvious to Andrassy that Austria-Hungary could force a Russian withdrawal from the Balkans simply by moving against the Russians' lines of communication and by threatening their divided forces. 55

After expounding his preferred military strategy, Andrassy explained the Dual Monarchy's position with reference to Germany and Italy. The picture he painted, which was quite favorable to the Habsburg position, was no doubt in part colored by his desire to overcome the likelihood of the military command's reluctance to engage in

those of Rupp, Rothenberg, and Wertheimer, are based primarily on information provided by Beck and not on the resume of the conference itself. This writer has already stated his opinions about Beck's reliability in ante, pp. 273-275.

55"Brief resume of the conference which took place under the chairmanship of His Majesty on January 15, 1878," Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle, 70/59, Fos. 1-2.
aggressive action against Russia. The foreign minister claimed that he could state with "absolute conviction" that Germany would pose no danger to Austria-Hungary in the event of a war with the tsarist empire. As for Italy, Andrassy felt that the recent change of monarchs there would serve to reduce the bellicosity of the Italians and that in any event Italy could be held in check by British seapower. Andrassy believed that the diplomatic situation would allow Austria-Hungary to leave only reserve formations arrayed against Germany, while troop strength on the Italian border could be reduced to that sufficient to hold defensive positions. 56

While one could reasonably infer from Andrassy's statements that he believed that Austria-Hungary would not find itself in a disadvantageous position if war broke out with Russia, the Dual Monarchy's military leaders did not share that view. As a group they were much less sanguine about the monarchy's chances in a war against Russia than Andrassy and found considerable fault with his proposed strategy. For his part, Schonfeld advised that the major Austro-Hungarian thrust should be made from Bucovina instead of from Transylvania, since such a maneuver would allow the utilization of the greatest number of troops according to existing mobilization plans. Alluding to the

56 Ibid., Fos. 2-3.
scarcity of provisions there, the poor condition of the railroads, and the difficulty of deploying from the Transylvanian mountain passes, Archduke Albert also opposed Transylvania as a jumping off point. He criticized Andrassy's prediction that Italy would remain passive during an Austro-Hungarian-Russian war and claimed that the Dual Monarchy should maintain strong forces along the Italian border. Beck emphasized that the Dual Monarchy's lines of communication would be almost as tenuous as those of the Russians if the two countries became engaged in the southern part of the Balkans. He even postulated a situation in which the Russian forces in the Balkans might move through Serbia against southern Hungary in cooperation with the Italians. 57

The results of the conference were thus indecisive. Since the military men were unable to agree on the strategy and tactics to be employed against Russia, Francis Joseph ordered Schonfeld and Archduke Albert to continue discussions of the proper strategy in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable strategic concept and to begin the planning necessary to implement that idea. 58

From Andrassy's point of view, the result of the

57 Ibid., Fos. 3-5.

58 Ibid., Fo. 5.
conference was unsatisfactory. Although none of the military leaders present had spoken openly against war with Russia, Andrássy knew that their opposition to such a conflict had not diminished. He was right, for on the very day the above conference took place, Archduke Albert presented the emperor a memorandum in which he called his attention to the large number of problems involved in fighting a war against Russia. The archduke feared German and Italian intervention on behalf of Russia, the possibility of a Pan-Slavic crusade against Austria-Hungary, increased nationality problems within the Dual Monarchy, and the exhaustion of his country's finances. Although he agreed with Andrássy that a separate peace between Russia and the Ottoman empire had to be prevented, he felt that this could be achieved by opening "the eyes of Emperor Alexander to the dangers of the situation." 59

While Andrássy was probably unaware of the archduke's memorandum, he was cognizant of the opposition of the military to a war against Russia. In the January 15 conference Andrássy had hoped to attain a definitive answer in regard to precisely what policies Austria-Hungary would pursue in confronting Russia so that he would be able to

adjust his policy to the military actions which he knew Austria-Hungary was prepared to undertake. Without such knowledge he was unable to know how far he could go in opposing Russia, either with or without the assistance of Great Britain.

Because of his uncertainty over precisely what military actions the empire was prepared to take, Andrásy had to pursue a rather circumspect policy vis-à-vis Russia and its unilateral peace negotiations with the Turks. For this reason, he limited himself to informing St. Petersburg that a separate agreement between Russia and Turkey would not be regarded by Vienna as inevitably inimical to Austro-Hungarian interests. At the same time he admonished the Russians that any such agreement could deal with peace terms only in a general sense and warned the tsarist government that if it acted in a unilateral manner it would antagonize not only Austria-Hungary but also the rest of the Powers and create difficulties for itself. Conversely, if Russia continued to respect Austro-Hungarian wishes and to cooperate with the Dual Monarchy, the terms embodied in the Budapest Conventions could be implemented. 60

60 Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, January 15, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 821-824. See also Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, January 24, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1878), Fos. 31-32.
In response to Vienna's opposition to a separate Russo-Turkish peace, the Russian government initiated a two-pronged diplomatic campaign. Langenau found himself constantly reassured by Gorchakov that Russia had no intention of lessening Austria-Hungary's influence on the definitive peace terms to be made at the conclusion of hostilities and that in any event the current negotiations with the Turks only involved terms of a general nature. 61 Langenau also reported his belief that both Gorchakov and Alexander II were aware of the value of the Russian agreement with Austria-Hungary and realized that the tentative peace terms which the tsar had sent to Francis Joseph would have to be modified in accordance with Vienna's wishes. 62

The second part of the Russian campaign to obtain Austro-Hungarian approval of the tsarist government's course of action was initiated by the tsar himself. On January 19, 1878, Francis Joseph received a personal communication from Alexander which was intended to persuade

61 Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, January 15/3, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLI, Fos. 174-175; Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, January 16/4, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXII, Fo. 66.

62 Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, January 15/3, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLI, Fo. 168.
him of the justness of the tsar's proposals. In his letter the tsar defended Russia's aggressive policy on the basis of the sacrifices which his empire had made in the war against the Turks. According to Alexander, it would be impossible for him to allow the Balkan Christians to be subjected to direct Turkish rule. The tsar demanded complete autonomy for Bulgaria, since, as he put it, "any other transaction would be a bastard, lying, illusory course." 63 He also declared his firm intention to take back Bessarabia. 64 Alexander threw a sop to Austria-Hungary by acknowledging the Dual Monarchy's right to occupy and/or to annex Bosnia-Hercegovina; however, he intended to proceed with his plans for the Balkans irrespective of Vienna's course of action. As for Austria-Hungary's objections to a separate Russo-Turkish peace agreement, Alexander insisted that he had no intention of depriving the Great Powers of their rightful voices in the matter, but he asserted that there would obviously be nothing to consider until the belligerents reached some

63 Alexander II to Francis Joseph I, n. p., January 16/4, 1878, ibid. See also the summary of this letter as found in Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 440-441.

64 Alexander II to Francis Joseph I, n. p., January 16/4, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 806.
kind of preliminary agreement. 65

On January 26 Francis Joseph replied to the tsar's
communication in a rather brief and quite moderate letter.
The emperor informed Alexander that "it would be absolutely
impossible to consent to an occupation of Bulgaria after
the conclusion of peace," but he tempered his disapproval
of the tsar's proposals by inviting continued cooperation
between Austria-Hungary and Russia. 66

On the same day the emperor wrote the tsar any possi-
bility of further cooperation between Austria-Hungary and
Russia was nullified by Novikov's disclosure to Andrassy
about Russia's conditions for a preliminary peace.
Bulgaria, at least as large as envisioned by the
Constantinople conference, he insisted, was to become an
autonomous, tributary province. Serbia, Montenegro, and
Romania were to become independent and to be accorded
border adjustments. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be
granted autonomy. Russia itself was to obtain both terri-
torial and financial indemnities from the Turks. 67

65 Ibid., Fo. 798.

66 Francis Joseph I to Alexander II, Vienna,
January 26, 1878, Ibid., Fo. 809-811. In regard to
Bessarabia, Francis Joseph stated that he "would do what
is in my power in order to render that realizable." Ibid.,
Fo. 811.

67 Memorandum, n. p., January 26, 1878, Ibid., Section
X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Various 1878, Diverse 1878), Fo. 1-2.
Andrássy's reaction to the Russian communication was one of anger and frustration. Throughout the Balkan crisis he had cooperated with Russia; he had, in fact, on numerous occasions dodged British overtures for an anti-Russian alliance. Although he felt certain that he had presented Russia with a clear understanding of Austria-Hungary's position and interests, it now appeared as though St. Petersburg was disregarding Austro-Hungarian interests in a most callous and cynical manner.

While the foreign minister was undoubtedly embittered by the failure of his policy to restrain Russia, he was equally concerned about his country's weak diplomatic position. Austria-Hungary could count on no allies for active assistance against Russia and seemed incapable of acting in its own behalf.

In his attempt to improve Austria-Hungary's position vis-à-vis Russia, Andrássy turned first to Germany for help. He complained to Berlin that instead of limiting its negotiations with the Turks to general peace terms, St. Petersburg was attempting to settle the Eastern Question once and for all in its own favor. Andrássy claimed that the Russian peace terms were totally unacceptable to Vienna and left him no choice but to regard them as invalid since they violated Austria-Hungary's rights as a signatory Power of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. He warned Berlin that in view of the fact that Russia did
not appear inclined to respect Austria-Hungary's vital interests in the Balkans, he foresaw either "a conflict with Russia or a conference" as the only means of settling the dispute. 68

Andrássy's attempt to pressure Berlin into stepping forward in support of Austria-Hungary against Russia was not successful. Bismarck realized full well that the rift between his two allies threatened the existence of the Three Emperors' League, but he also knew that if Germany sided openly with Austria-Hungary against Russia, it would be an equally serious threat to the alliance. The chancellor did acknowledge the validity of Andrássy's complaints about the Russo-Turkish peace terms, but he remained quite vague about what actions Germany might undertake on Vienna's behalf and no concrete assistance for the Dual Monarchy was forthcoming. 69

In addition to informing Berlin about his dismay over Russia's course of action, Andrássy also revealed his anger to London. On January 26, he instructed Beust to inform Derby that

68 Andrássy to Károlyi, Vienna, January 29, 1878, ibid., Section III, Carton CXIII (Prussia, Dispatches 1878), Fos. 20-23.

69 Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, January 29, 1878, ibid., Carton CXIII, Fo. 47.
Russia has given us many far-ranging promises and repeats them daily. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the Russians are playing falsely and we are determined to frustrate them in a suitable manner. Neither time nor will is lacking.\footnote{Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 26, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 86.}

Encouraged by the resolute tone of Andrássy's statement, the British government once again sought cooperation with Austria-Hungary against Russia. Disraeli proposed that London and Vienna present an identical note to St. Petersburg warning the tsar's government not to prolong the occupation of Bulgaria or any other Turkish province and not to take any unilateral action to change the status of the Straits.\footnote{Beust to Andrássy, London, January 27, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 92; Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 22, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Fos. 52-53.}

As had happened before, when confronted with a concrete British proposal to act, Andrássy began to quibble. He agreed to send an identical note, but he thought that all the Powers should be included in such an action.\footnote{Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 28, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Fo. 102.}
its support of Austria-Hungary's seven points of May 29, 1877, informed Vienna that it would not agree to the formation of a Bulgarian state as set forth in the tentative Russian peace terms, and queried the Ballhausplatz about "what measures Austria would be prepared to take" in the event that St. Petersburg ignored the wishes of London and Vienna. 74

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister was seeking support for Vienna in Berlin and London, he also dealt directly with St. Petersburg. In view of the fact that an Austro-Hungarian military response to the increasing danger posed by Russia seemed problematic at best, he tried to persuade Russia to respect Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests. On January 28, 1878, he wrote Gorchakov to inform him about his fears over the proposed Russian peace terms. He portrayed himself as a wronged innocent who had played the diplomatic game honorably in cooperation with Russia only to see his trust abused and his advice spurned. According to Andrássy, Russia's course of action now presented him with a dilemma: either he had to resign from office or else he had to state

73 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, January 31, 1878, ibid., Fo. 126.

74 Sir Henry Elliot, British ambassador at Vienna, to Andrássy, n. p., January 31, 1878, ibid., Fo. 114.
publicly that any Russian peace terms which touched on European interests would be viewed by Vienna as invalid unless they were approved by all the Great Powers. To avoid the hard necessity of taking an open stand against Russia, Andrassy proposed a conference to discuss and determine the conditions of peace. He closed his message by instructing Langenau "not to allow any doubt to remain in the mind of Prince Gorchakov that it [a conference] is the only means which can be utilized to legitimize in the eyes of the Austro-Hungarian public the attitude maintained during the war by the Imperial and Royal Government--the only means which will allow me to bear any longer the responsibility for a line of conduct concerted with Russia."\(^7^5\)

Gorchakov's response was prompt and generally acceptable. He acknowledged that all peace terms which were of European-wide interest required the sanction of the Powers,\(^7^6\) but he evaded Andrassy's objection that the tentative peace terms had been unilaterally imposed by maintaining that an armistice without preliminary terms would have created a situation advantageous to the Ottoman

\(^7^5\) Andrassy to Langenau, Vienna, January 28, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1878), Fos. 39 and 45.

\(^7^6\) Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, January 29, 1878, ibid., Carton LXXII, Fo. 91.
empire. 77 However, he assured the Habsburg foreign minister that Russia had "no objections" to the calling of a conference to discuss the peace terms. 78

On February 3, 1878, Andrásy issued a formal invitation to the Great Powers to attend a conference in Vienna to deliberate over and modify the preliminary Russo-Turkish peace terms. 79 The Powers readily accepted Andrásy's proposal of a conference, but serious disputes quickly developed over the choice of Vienna as the site of the meeting, who was to attend, and who was to preside. 80 While Andrásy's idea was readily accepted in principle, it appeared as though it might be some time before the conference could actually be held.

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77 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, January 30/18, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 182.

78 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, January 29, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXII, Fo. 91.


80 The most important disputes centered around Russia's objection to Vienna as the site of the conference and Gorchakov's desire to preside at the meeting. Succinct statements about the Russian position can be found in Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, February 5/January 24, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXXII, Fos. 123-125; and in Andrásy to Langenau, Vienna, February 13, 1878, ibid., Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1878), Fos. 80-84.
Despite the facts that Russia and Turkey had signed the bases of a preliminary peace on January 31, and that Russia had subsequently agreed to allow the European powers to modify those terms, the tsar's army continued to advance towards Constantinople. By the end of the first week in February there were excited rumors of Russian troops in the outer defenses of Constantinople as well as confirmed reports of tremendous agitation in the Turkish capital.

In Great Britain public and official opinion took a more bellicose turn. A part of Her Majesty's fleet was dispatched to Constantinople because, as Derby stated,

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81 Zichy reported the signing of a preliminary agreement at Adrianople on January 31, 1878. See Zichy to Andrassy, Constantinople, February 1, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 130. The conditions the Turks agreed to included the establishment of an autonomous, tributary Bulgarian state at least as large as that proposed by the Constantinople conference; independence and territorial gains for Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia; the implementation of an autonomous, reformed administration for Bosnia-Hercegovina; the payment of indemnity to Russia; and an arrangement to safeguard Russia's rights in regard to the Straits. For the text of the agreement, see Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880, pp. 625-626.

82 Beust to Andrassy, London, February 7, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton XCI, Fo. 218.

83 Beust to Andrassy, London, February 6, 1878, ibid., Carton CLXX, Fos. 140-142. For a brief period telegraphic communication from Constantinople to Europe was cut except for a link through Bombay and Andrassy received reports from Zichy via Bombay and London. Ibid.
"'the Porte can no longer be viewed as the master of its own affairs'." The other Powers were invited to participate in the naval action, and Great Britain once again turned specifically to Austria-Hungary for assistance. On February 11, Disraeli informed Beust that "if we [i.e., Austria-Hungary] went ahead [i.e., with military measures], one would not remain behind here." With the British fleet bound for Constantinople and with the Russians threatening to create unacceptable faits accomplis by their continued advance on the Turkish capital, it did, indeed, seem time for Austria-Hungary to take more serious measures to safeguard its interest. On February 7 a crown council met to consider mobilization of the

84 Beust to Andrássy, London, February 14, 1878, ibid., Carton XCI, Fo. 251.

85 Beust to Andrássy, London, February 8, 1878, ibid., Fo. 225. Austria-Hungary considered joining in the British naval demonstration. Apparently Vienna wanted to expand the demonstration to include Italy and France, and when an agreement with those countries could not be reached, Austria-Hungary dropped its plans to participate. See Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, February 10, 1878, ibid., Carton XCII, Fo. 87; Andrássy to Haymerle, Vienna, February 10, 1878, ibid., Section XI, Carton LXXXVII (Italy, Instructions 1878), Fo. 39; and Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, February 12, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXI, Fo. 86.

86 Beust to Andrássy, London, February 11, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 151.
Austro-Hungarian army. 87

War Minister Bylandt-Rheidt opened the meeting by emphasizing the need to mobilize the entire army rather than just part of it. He stated that the cost of mobilization would total 310,000,000 gulden for the first three month period and that 83,449,000 gulden would be required on the first day of mobilization. 88

Advancing a number of reasons why he believed that a smaller sum would suffice, Andrássy promptly took issue with Bylandt-Rheidt's figures. In the first place, he felt that full-scale military precautions would not be necessary on the Italian border because Great Britain would keep the Italians in check. Secondly, he thought that the very fact that Austria-Hungary was mobilizing would be sufficient to prevent war. Finally, and most importantly, he did not want to risk weakening Austria-Hungary's diplomatic and military position by presenting to parliament a request for funds which would be unacceptable to it. Conversely, however, he strongly felt that Austria-Hungary had to demonstrate its determination to use its own resources to defend its interests. He counseled asking for

87 For the complete protocol, see protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of February 7, 1878, ibid., Section XL, Carton CCXC, Fos. 1,018-1,062.

88 Ibid., Fos. 1,018-1,019.
a small sum and for specifying that it was to be used for purely defensive purposes. According to Andrásy, quick parliamentary approval of even a modest request would emphasize Austria-Hungary's resolve to see its wishes respected and would probably give Russia pause for thought. And, if the Dual Monarchy was forced to act, part of the first day's expenses would be in hand and mobilization could begin. The representatives would then undoubtedly make sufficient funds available.  

At this point Finance Minister Hofmann took up the problem of raising a total sum of 310,000,000 gulden. He declared that he could produce 103,000,000 gulden without taking recourse to parliament; however, as for obtaining the remaining two-thirds of the sum needed, the prospects did not look promising. In Hofmann's opinion, a funded debt or a general loan appeared to be necessary, and either of those required parliamentary approval. That consent would be difficult to obtain since the two halves of the monarchy were already in debt to the amount of 235,000,000 gulden. Furthermore, the debt ceiling currently stood at 412,000,000 gulden. If the Dual Monarchy assumed an additional debt of 207,000,000 gulden, that limitation would have to be changed. All in all, it appeared to the finance minister that by far the easiest way to raise the

89 Ibid., Fos. 1,037-1,038 and 1,040.
money was to ask for British assistance. Pursuing the thesis that "we have the troops, England the money," he proposed obtaining a £30,000,000 subsidy from Great Britain. He believed that if the cost of the initial three months could be met from abroad, then Austria-Hungary could manage to meet subsequent expenses.\footnote{Ibid., Fos. 1,042-1,045.}

If, as Hofmann stated, "the internal resources for a mobilization absolutely were not at hand," then the obvious source of assistance was Great Britain. In response to the emperor's question about the likelihood of a British subsidy, Andrásy responded that "he had just now come from the English ambassador and believes that England will let herself be found ready for that." Andrásy, however, continued to emphasize the fact that for him the important thing was that Austria-Hungary be ready to take action on its own. He, therefore, reiterated his proposal that a small grant be obtained from the Dual Monarchy's parliaments.\footnote{Ibid., Fo. 1,046.}

Despite Andrásy's call for Austria-Hungary to take at least a token action, the conferees quickly returned to

\footnote{Ibid., Fos. 1,046-1,049. On this point see also Miklos Komjathy (ed.) Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie (1914-1918) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiado, 1966), p. 44.}
the subject of a British subsidy. Hofmann, Beck, and Francis Joseph all spoke out in favor of a sum of £30,000,000, with £10,000,000 to be available on the first day of mobilization. Andrásy replied that he was "convinced" that Great Britain could provide £10,000,000 on the first day and that the British ambassador had already intimated that he expected a loan to be made to Austria-Hungary. It was agreed that Andrásy should pursue the matter with Her Majesty's Government.

The foreign minister was not slow in requesting funds from Great Britain. On February 10 he instructed Beust to go to Disraeli immediately and to inform him that the Ballhausplatz believed that a Russian occupation of Constantinople was imminent. Beust was then to ask the prime minister if Great Britain still regarded such an event as a casus belli and if Austria-Hungary could count on British financial support if the Dual Monarchy had to mobilize its army.

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93 Protocol of the ministerial conference for common affairs of February 7, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCXC, Fos. 1,050-1,052.

94 Ibid., Fo. 1,052.

95 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, February 10, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fos. 146 and 150.
The British government replied quickly to Andrássy's questions, but its response was not satisfactory to the foreign minister. On February 11 Beust relayed word that Disraeli "is certain that the matter would be practicable in the form of a loan with moderate interest guaranteed by England." Disraeli added that Great Britain was ready to act and expected to be joined by Austria-Hungary. Beust also reported that he had spoken with Derby, who had talked about influencing Italy to act in a manner desired by the Dual Monarchy. The next day Beust reported about a second interview with Disraeli during which the prime minister had stated:

I have spoken confidentially about my colleagues and they have placed everything in my hands, under the condition that Count Andrássy is serious and acts without further delay, that is, to proceed to mobilize. We are certain to obtain the guaranteed loan, but the moment must be utilized. We are the masters of the situation internally and we are resolved to act. If Austria does not act with us, then we will limit our action to two points: the Dardanelles and Egypt. If Austria acts with us, then we will strive for its interests and for the seven points. But for once we must finally come out into the open.

96 Beust to Andrássy, London, February 11, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fos. 146 and 150.

On February 13, the pressure on Andrásy to reach an understanding with Great Britain intensified, for word came from London that Her Majesty's Government was ready "to incur a great financial sacrifice" to achieve an alliance with Austria-Hungary. Disraeli needed to know Austria-Hungary's intentions the very next day; otherwise he would act strictly in Great Britain's own financial interests. 98 Disraeli's pressure on Austria-Hungary to cooperate with Great Britain was reinforced by the British ambassador in Vienna, Sir Henry Elliot, who asked Andrásy for assurance that units of the imperial-royal navy would immediately join the British fleet at Constantinople. 99

On February 14, Andrásy replied to the recent British overtures by asking the British whether they would provide

98 Baron Nopcsa, Austro-Hungarian embassy official at London, to Andrásy, London, February 13, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fo. 171. Italics in the original.

99 Elliot to Andrásy, Vienna, February 13, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton XCIII (Great Britain, Various 1878: Correspondence with the English embassy), Fo. 15. No doubt Andrásy felt the British pressure all the more keenly since on February 13 a revised Austro-Hungarian mobilization plan stated emphatically that it would be "absolutely impossible" to mobilize the Dual Monarchy's armed forces if the required 310,000,000 gulden was not obtained first. See Proposal of the Chief of the General Staff: Case of war against Russia, 2nd Variation. Jumpoff from East Galicia, Vienna, February 13, 1878, Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 75/8, Fo. 20.
as a subsidy half or as a minimum one-third of 300,000,000
 gulden required to mobilize the Habsburg army and whether
 this sum would "be ready on the first day of mobilization."
 Andrássy explained that if Her Majesty's Government could
 not provide the money, the Habsburg government would have
 to try to get it from the Austrian and Hungarian parlia-
 ments. Such a procedure would likely be a slow and diffi-
cult process and even if it were successful the current
 favorable moment for action would probably be lost. If
 Great Britain could provide a subsidy, Andrássy would be
 "in a position to propose mobilization." The subsidy,
 however, would have to be kept secret. 100

 Immediately after the receipt of Andrássy's telegram,
 Beust approached Disraeli about a subsidy only to be
 rudely rebuffed. When Beust referred to Disraeli's
 earlier conversation with Baron Nopcsa during the course
 of which Disraeli had mentioned the "great financial
 sacrifice" which Great Britain was prepared to make for
 Austria-Hungary, the British prime minister denied ever
 having made such a statement. It became obvious that the
 information which Nopcsa had relayed to Vienna was at
 best grossly erroneous and at worst a deliberate

 100 Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, February 14, 1878,
 Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I,
 Carton CDLIX, Fos. 165-168.
falsehood. 101 Disraeli was markedly less favorable to subsidizing the Dual Monarchy than Nopcsa had indicated to Andrásy. Beust now learned that the prime minister regarded a subsidy as "absolutely impossible." Disraeli even felt that a guaranteed loan in the amount of £10,000,000 would be rather difficult to obtain and would require parliamentary approval. As if this were not enough, Disraeli also uttered serious doubts about the need for Austria-Hungary to mobilize its entire army. All that London envisioned was for the Dual Monarchy's forces to occupy Romania and Serbia and to render the Danube impassable. 102

Andrássy was very reluctant to accept a British loan because it would require the approval of the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments and, consequently, could be delayed or possibly even rejected. 103 Any delay in approving the

101 Beust subsequently learned that Nopcsa had not even spoken with Disraeli but rather had been persuaded by Montgelas to report to Vienna a conversation which Montgelas claimed to have had with Disraeli. Apparently that conversation was fabricated by Montgelas. See Beust to Andrássy, London, February 20, 1878, ibid., Fos. 178-184.


103 Substance of a secret telegram from Lord Derby to Sir H. Elliot, n. p., February 16, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 165; Elliot to Andrassy, Vienna, February 17, 1878, ibid., Carton XCIII (Great Britain, Various 1878; Correspondence with the English embassy), Fo. 19.
loan would provide Russia with significant advantage in a war with the Dual Monarchy while the rejection of such a loan would be an extremely serious blow to Austria-Hungary's prestige and position as a Great Power. For this reason, Andrássy could not accept a British loan.\footnote{Andrássy's position is set forth in Andrássy to Beust, n. p., n. d. [February, 1878], \textit{ibid.}, Section I, Carton CDLIX, Fos. 211-213.}

As a consequence, by late February, 1878, the possibility of a strong Austro-Hungarian-British military alliance had disappeared. Disraeli told Beust "rather peevishly," on February 25, that he "would have nothing further to do with the matter."\footnote{Beust to Andrássy, London, February 25, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Section VIII, Carton CLXX, Fo. 172.}

With the failure of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary to reach a firm agreement to cooperate against Russia, the Dual Monarchy was thrown back on its own resources--a prospect that was scarcely pleasing to Andrássy. He knew that the money required for military action was not at hand, and more importantly, he feared that the will to oppose Russia was also lacking. Andrássy's greatest worry about the lack of resolution on the part of the Dual Monarchy's leaders concerned the military men. They remained divided in their opinions as to how best to meet the
Russian danger and appeared reluctant to grapple with the challenge Russia posed.

Of all the military leaders, Beck was perhaps the most vigorous opponent of an aggressive course of action. Even though he had not raised any serious objections to a military confrontation with Russia in the February 7, 1878 conference, during the latter part of the same month he waged a vigorous campaign against any Austro-Hungarian military action. When the emperor informed him on February 13 that Andrassy was urging immediate mobilization so that Austria-Hungary could give the impression of being armed and resolute when the Great Power conference would finally meet, Beck warned such a course of action should be embarked on "only if war was unavoidable and finally decided upon." The next day he revealed his reservations about any kind of military struggle with Russia to the emperor, for if it came to war with Austria, Russia could count on assistance from Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro. Curbing Russia's ambitions in the Balkans was not enough reason for Austria-Hungary to resort to war. Moreover, any efforts to go to war would lead to parliamentary crises in both Austria and Hungary and result in the overthrow of the government. 106

In addition to the opposition of army leaders such as Beck and Archduke Albert to war against Russia, there were also problems of a technical nature which made Austro-Hungarian military action very difficult. A major difficulty stemmed from the fact that Andrassy wished to utilize an Austro-Hungarian mobilization for purposes different from those conceived of by the military high command. He wanted to mobilize the army to demonstrate the Dual Monarchy's determination to see its interests respected and to give weight to Vienna's position at a Great Power conference. The military leaders, especially Chief of the General Staff Schönfeld, on the other hand, criticized Andrassy's plan as both impractical and dangerous. From their point of view, one could not simply "mobilize"; one had to focus the mobilization against another state. Moreover, they insisted that mobilization was the last step before a declaration of war—an action "not much less threatening than an ultimatum." A mobilization to coerce Russia was doubly dangerous since the tsar's military forces were already on a war footing and could disrupt any potential threat from Austria-Hungary before the Dual Monarchy could get its armies fully mobilized. 107

107 Schönfeld, "Why does a Mobilization without an Immediate Deployment appear neither possible nor worthwhile?" Kriegsarchiv (Vienna), Separate Fascicle 42, Fos. [1-3].
Still another hindrance to Austro-Hungarian military action was the fact that except for Great Britain, the Dual Monarchy could not expect much real military assistance from abroad, as it soon became obvious that the British were in no position to send a large contingent to the Balkans. On February 15, 1878, Andrassy instructed the Austro-Hungarian military attache in London, Captain Baron Hermann Spaun, to ascertain the strength of British land forces which could be utilized outside of Great Britain.  

Spaun's response was not encouraging. According to him, Great Britain could make 37,000 men available within two weeks and an equal number in an additional three to four weeks' time. However, after mustering these initial 75,000 men, "'further mobilization would require a long time'."  

Despite the Dual Monarchy's difficult military position—the lack of assistance from Great Britain, the divided and opposing counsel of influential Austro-Hungarian army leaders, and the danger posed by the already

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108 Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, February 15, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton XCII, Fo. 103.

109 See Spaun's report enclosed in Beust to Andrassy, London, February 17, 1878, ibid., Carton XCI, Fo. 258. A detailed breakdown of British strength can be found in another report by Spaun enclosed in Beust to Andrassy, London, February 18, 1878, ibid., Fo. 261.
mobilized Russian army—and Andrassy continued to press for a show of action. On February 24, 1878, with the Dual Monarchy thrown back on its own resources, another crown council was held to evaluate the situation. Once again, Andrassy demanded some form of tangible action to demonstrate to the world that Austria-Hungary was determined to protect its interests and that, despite the setbacks of the past thirty years and its unique and cumbersome system of government, the Dual Monarchy was a fully viable state. He feared that if Austria-Hungary did not act vigorously in its own behalf, the Dual Monarchy would succeed Turkey as the focal point of Russian agitation and intrigue. The best way to exhibit Vienna’s resolve, Andrassy contended, would be to secure a credit authorization from the Delegations. 110 He advised requesting a small sum such as 60 to 80,000,000 gulden, in order to facilitate quick parliamentary approval. Once granted, the money could be applied to the expenses of the first day of mobilization

110 According to the author’s understanding of the situation, the Austro-Hungarian government was unsure of the precise mechanics for handling such a special request under the dualistic system. As the government envisioned the situation, if the delegations voted favorably on the need for such an extraordinary credit, then the respective Cisleithanian and Transleithanian parliaments had no other recourse than to find the means to raise their share of the total sum. However, the government was not absolutely certain that this procedure would be accepted without opposition; nor could it rule out the prospect of parliamentary opposition to the credit request itself, particularly in Cisleithania.
if it became necessary to deploy the army. 111

The other members of the conference, particularly Bylandt-Rheidt, were unenthusiastic about Andrassy's proposal. The minister of war emphasized that a credit of 60,000,000 gulden would be of absolutely no benefit to the army. Contrary to what some people might believe, that amount would not allow the mobilization of half of the army. The only sum which would facilitate that process was a minimum of 103,000,000 gulden. 112

Despite both Bylandt-Rheidt's criticism of his proposal and the hesitancy of his fellow ministers to submit a credit request to parliament, Andrassy argued in favor of his plan until the conference participants reluctantly agreed to acquiesce in a request to the delegations for a credit of 60,000,000 gulden. Francis Joseph ended the conference by approving that request. 113

Thus, at the council of February 24, 1878, Andrassy won approval from his ministerial colleagues and the

111 Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of February 24, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisch Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCXC, Fos. 1,108-1,113, 1,121, and 1,134.

112 Ibid., Fos. 1,126-1,127 and 1,131.

113 Ibid., Fos. 1,137-1,138.
emperor to request the granting of a credit from parliament. Even if granted by the delegations (which was by no means certain) the credit would hardly constitute a major victory for the foreign minister. The very request might in fact raise more questions than it answered. At first glance the granting of such a credit could be viewed as a sign of Austria-Hungary's determination to protect its interests; however, it was known in the delegations that such a sum was not sufficient to mobilize the army. For what purpose then was the money to be used? Just what Andrásy intended to do with the money is not certain. Undoubtedly he viewed the raising of it as a demonstration of the Dual Monarchy's resolve to protect its interests, but he also seemed to think that it would be possible in some way to use the money to facilitate mobilization if the situation demanded it, despite the repeated statements by military leaders that 103,000,000 gulden would have to be on hand before mobilization could begin. Therefore, it is difficult to determine what specific course of action Andrásy had in mind. Probably he simply wanted the money at his disposal in order more effectively to meet whatever contingency might arise from the extremely complex diplomatic conditions. 114

114 For what exactly Andrásy intended to use the 60,000,000 gulden remains open to question. The minutes of the crown council of February 24, 1878, reveal that Andrásy made a number of apparently contradictory
Since Austria-Hungary was unsupported by Great Britain and unable or unwilling to mobilize its army to defend its interests, Andrassy again turned to Berlin for assistance in holding Russia in check, only to be met with equivocation. Bismarck's priority continued to be the preservation of the Three Emperors' League. He informed the Dual Monarchy that

statements. For example, the foreign minister began the meeting by stating that he did not intend to use the money for war and ended it by calling for an immediate mobilization in order to decide the Eastern Question. One can speculate that despite the military's repeated statements to the contrary Andrassy still intended to use the sum to help meet the expenses of the first day of mobilization if that became necessary. It also appears that Andrassy may have become quite vexed over the reluctance of the other conferees to act and may have overstated his case at the end of the meeting.

It is also possible that Andrassy was considering using the 60,000,000 to help meet the expenses of occupying Bosnia-Hercegovina. While the occupation would not be to Andrassy's liking, it was an obvious and accepted counterweight to Russian presence in Bulgaria. In addition, there exists the possibility that Andrassy had to agree to Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans as the price of retaining his office. This idea is advanced by Rupp, who states that when, in early March, 1878, Andrassy submitted his resignation to clarify his position vis-a-vis the emperor, Francis Joseph retained him "with the understanding that he would support the plans for an Austrian drive toward Salonika." Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 474. This writer does not agree with Rupp's thesis, but does believe that by the end of February, 1878, Andrassy may well have come nearly to the point of regarding the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as inevitable. In such a situation it could only be to Andrassy's advantage to have the money necessary for an occupation on hand.
he could see no real danger that the extent of Bulgaria or the presence of Russian troops there posed to Austria-Hungary. Bismarck advised Andrássy to allow the Eastern Question to "stagnate." In other words Austria-Hungary should allow Great Britain to take the lead in opposing Russia's Balkan policy. Such opposition from Great Britain would force St. Petersburg to moderate its policy because it would demonstrate the lack of Great Power sanction for the policy which Russia was pursuing. By following such a plan Austria-Hungary could ensure the frustration of Russia's plans without incurring the tsar's animosity. In order to guarantee the protection of its own interests, Bismarck advised Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia without further delay. As for the possibility of war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, it was "obvious" to Bismarck that any Austro-Hungarian action against Russia would have to be taken in alliance with Great Britain; however, the chancellor was leery both of Great Britain's will to fight and of its

115 Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, February 23, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CXII, Fos. 173a–173d.

reliability as an ally.  

His conversations with Bismarck led Ambassador Károlyi to believe that Germany would continue to maintain a "strictly neutral position" in the dispute between its two allies from which it would depart only if its interests were endangered. One of those interests, as acknowledged by Bismarck, was the preservation of the Dual Monarchy's position as a Great Power. Therefore, Germany would not acquiesce in a decisive defeat of Austria-Hungary by Russia in a war between those nations. Thus, a military conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg could not turn out to the serious disadvantage of the Dual Monarchy.  

Thus it was that Andrássy's efforts to strengthen Austria-Hungary's position vis-à-vis Russia remained without results. He had not been able to persuade the Dual Monarchy's leaders to take vigorous independent action against Russia nor had he succeeded in obtaining an alliance to protect his country's interests.  

It was at this point, with its own leaders divided over the proper course of action to pursue, with no military commitment from Great Britain and with lukewarm

117 Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, February 23, 1878, ibid., Fos. 173d-173e.

118 Ibid., Fos. 173f-173g.
support at best from Germany, that Austria-Hungary found itself when the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano was signed on March 3, 1878. The treaty provided for Serbian, Montenegrin, and Romanian independence with territorial gains for the two Slavic states. Bosnia and Hercegovina were immediately to be reformed in accordance with the guidelines formulated by the Powers at the Constantinople conference in 1876-1877. Bulgaria was to become an autonomous, tributary principality. It was to be evacuated by Turkish forces and occupied by 50,000 Russian troops for approximately two years. The size of Bulgaria was to be not less than that agreed to at the Constantinople conference. Russia also demanded an indemnity from the Porte, part of which was to be met by the cession of southern Bessaria, Ardahan, Kars, Batum, and Bayezid to Russia. 119

Andrássy had known for some time prior to the Treaty of San Stefano what terms Russia would probably impose on the Turks, and he had tried to ensure that Russia's peace conditions would not harm Austria-Hungary's interests in the Balkans. The Treaty of San Stefano, however, signified a fait accompli that was totally unacceptable to Andrássy. Because of Austria-Hungary's diplomatic

119 For a discussion of the Treaty of San Stefano, see Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 399-420. The text of the treaty can be found in ibid., pp. 625-636.
isolation the only course of action open to him was to renew his proposal of a Great Power conference to discuss the peace terms. On March 6, 1878, the Habsburg foreign minister issued a second invitation for a conference to the Great Powers, this time calling for a meeting of the leading ministers at Berlin. His proposal was promptly accepted by them; however, a delay soon developed. Her Majesty's Government refused to attend the conference until Russia agreed to submit the entire treaty of San Stefano to the Powers for their consideration and possible revision.

Andrássy, no doubt motivated by his desire for a full-scale revision of the San Stefano treaty, supported the

120 For a succinct account of the background of the Congress of Berlin, see Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, pp. 475-476.

121 Andrássy to Langenau, Vienna, March 8, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Instructions 1878), Fos. 110-111.

122 For statements about the British point of view, see Beust to Andrássy, London, March 8, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, Fo. 183; and Beust to Andrássy, London, March 9, 1878, Aktenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 7. April 1877 bis. 3 November 1878), pp. 77-78.
British position on the conference's authority; nevertheless, relations between the two potential allies were not as harmonious as they could have been. For its part, Her Majesty's Government appeared to be somewhat suspicious of Andrassy's motives in calling for a congress and wary that a fait accompli might be presented to Great Britain at the meeting by the Three Emperors' League. The British government was particularly concerned about the possibility of an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia which would give Bosnia-Hercegovina to Vienna in return for a free hand in Bulgaria for St. Petersburg. Such a possibility was an issue of paramount importance to Her Majesty's Government since it was concerned with the threat which the Bulgaria established by the treaty of San Stefano posed to continued Turkish control of Constantinople and the Straits. Andrassy admitted to Beust that the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina might "become an unavoidable necessity"; however, to Her Majesty's

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123 For example, see Andrassy to Langenau, Vienna, March 16, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section X, Carton LXXI, Fos. 119-120.

124 Beust to Andrassy, London, March 6, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton XCI, Fo. 307.

125 Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, March 26, 1878, ibid., Carton XCII, Fo. 159.

126 Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, March 8, 1878, ibid., Fo. 125.
Government the foreign minister proclaimed that Austria-Hungary "was not thinking of compromising the unity of interests [i.e., between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain] by seizing special objects of compensation."

He called for continued discussions between London and Vienna but proposed nothing in the way of a definitive program for the congress. 127

Andrassy's failure to formulate a common program to be followed by Great Britain and Austria-Hungary was due, in part, to the demands which parliamentary consideration of the credit bill made on his energies during March of 1878. 128 On the ninth of that month he had presented his request for 60,000,000 gulden to the delegations, and he spent most of the next twelve days defending his request against the adamant opposition of the German Liberal party and the influential Neue Freie Presse. On the evening of March 9 he met with the budget committee of the Cisleithanian delegation to justify his credit proposal on the basis of ensuring an improvement of the lot of the Balkan Christians and of limiting Russian aggression in

127 Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, March 16, 1878, ibid., Fos. 145–147.

128 For a statement by the foreign minister in regard to the weight of parliamentary affairs at this time, see Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, March 16, 1878, ibid., Fo. 145.
the Balkans. He assured the delegation that the purpose of the credit was not to be able to mobilize but rather to be able to respond to any need which might arise. It was in essence merely a case of Austria-Hungary's being able to protect its interests with its own strength and resources. 129

It was precisely on this point—that is, for what concrete purpose the 60,000,000 gulden was to be utilized—that the opposition to Andrásy's request focused. To be sure the foreign minister acknowledged the representatives' right to have exact information about Austria-Hungary's interests; nevertheless, he argued that such a revelation to parliament could be construed in other countries as a kind of ultimatum and might damage the monarchy's ability to guard its interests at the congress. 130 In response to direct questions, he stated to both the Cisleithanian and the Hungarian delegations that the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina had never been and was not then the

129 Delegation of the Austrian parliament. Sitting of the Budget Committee on the evening of March 9, 1878, ibid., Section XL, Carton CCCXVI, Fos. 15–20. See also Snyder, "Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878–1879," pp. 89–93, for a succinct discussion of the progress of Andrásy's credit request through the Delegations.

130 Delegation of the Austrian parliament. Budget committee. March 11, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCCXVI, Fos. 23–24.
goal of his foreign policy. He regarded such a possibility as "absolutely excluded" from his policy as long as conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina "do not immediately threaten our own security."

On March 20 the credit bill was debated by the full delegation. The next day the measure passed by an almost two to one majority. Thus, even if Andrássy had to wait for the respective parliaments to raise the money, he and his policy--whatever it might turn out to be--had secured a vote of confidence and the wherewithal to defend the Dual Monarchy's interests after a fashion.

Andrássy's victory in the delegations could not have come at a more opportune moment, because on March 23, Francis Joseph received word from the tsar that Ignatiev was about to leave for Vienna to try to resolve the conflict of interests between their two countries. Apparently Alexander was motivated by the continuing dispute with Great Britain over the congress' competency and

131 Ibid., Fo. 22; and Delegation of the Hungarian parliament. Sitting of March 11, 1878, ibid., Fo. 29.

132 Delegation of the Hungarian parliament. Sitting of March 11, 1878, ibid., Fo. 29.

133 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, St. Petersburg, March 23/11, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 843.
authority and by the tension between London and St. Petersburg which resulted from the close proximity of British and Russian forces near Constantinople. The Ballhausplatz believed that Russia probably could not win a war against Great Britain and certainly could not triumph over Great Britain and Austria-Hungary together. Therefore, it appeared to Andrassy that if Russia hoped to preserve a significant measure of the power and prestige it had gained in the Balkans, it was absolutely necessary for the tsarist government to arrive at an understanding with either Austria-Hungary or Great Britain.

Despite the tsar's bland assertion that Ignatiev was especially qualified for the mission to Vienna by virtue of his participation in the Constantinople conference and his negotiation of the Treaty of San Stefano, no other choice could have been as disastrous. The Russian count, who had always been regarded by the Ballhausplatz as the epitome of the detested Pan-Slavs, would now arrive with the added guilt of having created the abhorrent fait 134

134 For example, see Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, March 19/7, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXI (Russia, Various 1878, Langenau's letters), Fos. 29-31; and Zichy to Andrassy, Constantinople, March 28, 1878, ibid., Section XII, Carton CXXVII, Fo. 234.

135 Tsar Alexander II to Emperor Francis Joseph I, St. Petersburg, March 23/11, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 843.
accompli at San Stefano.

When Ignatiev arrived in Vienna he was immediately confronted by a hostile Andrassy. Although Andrassy assured the Russian representative that the Dual Monarchy would adhere to the Three Emperors' League and maintain benevolent neutrality towards St. Petersburg in the event of a Russo-British war, he demanded that Russia accept the following conditions in any future Balkan settlement: that the Dual Monarchy would occupy, and possibly annex, both Bosnia-Hercegovina and the sanjak of Novi Pazar at its convenience; that Montenegro would not be given any part of the sanjak of Novi Pazar; that Austria-Hungary would acquire the Adriatic coastline all the way to the mouth of the Boyana river; that territory presently allotted to Serbia in the western Balkans would be reduced; that Austria-Hungary would assume control of the Danubian island of Ada Kale; that Belgrade would acquiesce in the construction of a railroad through Serbia; that Russia would retain the previously agreed on right to reacquire southern Bessarabia; that the borders of Bulgaria as set in the Treaty of San Stefano would be reduced so as to decrease Bulgaria's Black Sea coastline and to exclude Adrianople from Bulgarian control; and that the Russian occupation of Bulgaria would be limited to 20,000 troops for a period of six months. If St. Petersburg accepted the Dual Monarchy's proposals, Andrassy assured Ignatiev
that Austria-Hungary would support the rest of Russia's program at a congress and would take actions to restrain British interference in a Balkan settlement.\textsuperscript{136}

The Austro-Hungarian demands raised several areas of conflict between Andrassy and Ignatiev. One involved Vienna's claim to increased territorial gains, specifically the sanjak of Novi Pazar and the Adriatic coast down to the Boyana river. Neither had been allotted to Austria-Hungary in previous Austro-Hungarian-Russian agreements, and Andrassy was hard pressed to justify these claims to Ignatiev. In the case of Novi Pazar, the Habsburg minister defended his demand on the basis of the fact that after the establishment of a Greater Bulgaria through the Treaty of San Stefano, Novi Pazar could no longer be defended by the Turks. Austria-Hungary, Andrassy insisted, could not allow the sanjak to fall to Serbia or Montenegro. Andrassy cited the probability of Pan-Slavic agitation along the coast of northern Albania and the danger which such unrest could pose to the Dual Monarchy as justification for his desire to obtain that area. Andrassy's demand was particularly galling both to

\textsuperscript{136} For a statement of the Austro-Hungarian terms, see Memoir, March, 1878, ibid., Fos. 847-852. An excellent discussion of the Ignatiev mission is found in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 444-455. See also Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, Vol. III, pp. 90-99.
Ignatiev and to Montenegro, because it involved robbing the Montenegrins of their foremost goal in fighting the Turks: access to the sea. Moreover, the Montenegrins had captured and were in possession of the ports of Spizza, Antivari, and Dulcigno. Throughout the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 Russia had supported Montenegro's territorial demands. If Cetinje had to give up areas it had actually conquered, it would be a severe blow to Russian prestige.  

Although Austria-Hungary's territorial claims were quite unpalatable to Ignatiev, it might have been possible to accept them with good grace had Russia felt that the rest of its program could be implemented, but Andrassy made it clear that he could not accept it. He objected in particular to the Greater Bulgaria which Russia had succeeded in establishing through the Treaty of San Stefano. During his meetings with the Russian, he strove to limit the western border of Bulgaria to the Struma river to protect Austria-Hungary's access to Salonika via the Vardar river valley. To Andrassy the formation of the Bulgaria envisioned by the San Stefano treaty was a clear violation of the Budapest Conventions, article three of which prohibited the formation of a large, compact Slavic

137 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 448-449.
state.  

For his part, Ignatiev maintained that the borders of the Bulgaria created at San Stefano were essentially the same as those to which Austria-Hungary had agreed at the Constantinople Conference of 1876-1877. Furthermore, he argued that during the negotiation of the Budapest Conventions, St. Petersburg had presented a map to the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry which outlined Russia's ideas on what constituted a proper western border for Bulgaria. Ignatiev claimed that Vienna had accepted this frontier and that he had conducted his subsequent peace negotiations with Constantinople on that basis.  

Andrassy insisted that while the borders of Bulgaria stipulated at San Stefano and at the Constantinople Conference may have been similar, the resemblance ended there. The Bulgaria proposed in 1877 was a divided Bulgaria far less autonomous than the one envisioned by Russia in 1878. Andrassy made short shrift of Ignatiev's claims in regard

138 Andrassy to Langenau, Vienna, April 2, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fo. 862. See also Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 450-451; Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, Vol. III, pp. 91-94; and Count Otto Stolberg, German ambassador at Vienna, to Bulow, Vienna, April 1, 1878, Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, Vol. II, pp. 233-254.

139 Andrassy to Langenau, Vienna, April 2, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 862-863.
to the map which allegedly delimited Bulgaria's western borders. Although he did not deny having seen such a map, he insisted that no borders for Bulgaria were indicated on that map. Moreover, he pointed out that no reference had been made to this map during the fifteen month period since the map had been presented to Vienna.  

In view of Andrásy's overt hostility towards him and the treaty he had authored, Ignatiev had no prospect of success in Vienna. When he presented Andrásy a memorandum in which he incorporated the Austro-Hungarian objections to the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, the Habsburg minister refused to approve the details of the Russian's version of his own objections and merely indicated that he would accept Ignatiev's statement of the Austro-Hungarian position in very general terms. Since he was not authorized to negotiate a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano, Ignatiev had no choice but to take Vienna's demands to St. Petersburg. He left the Austro-Hungarian capital on March 31, 1878, after securing from Francis Joseph a pledge that Austria-Hungary would refrain from initiating military preparations against Russia.  

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140Ibid.

141Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 493.
By the end of March events had somewhat clarified the course of action open to Andrásy. He had secured a 60,000,000 gulden contingency fund, which, if one did not look too closely, could be viewed as an indication that the Dual Monarchy was resolved to defend its interests vigorously. Andrásy knew, however, that no further funds (certainly not enough to permit a full-scale mobilization) could be raised without risking a long and perhaps embarrassing parliamentary battle. The foreign minister was also well aware that the Austro-Hungarian military command was not likely to agree to any course of action which would involve the serious prospect of armed conflict with Russia.

Diplomatically the first quarter of 1878 witnessed no improvement in the Dual Monarchy's isolated position vis-à-vis Russia. In the final analysis, the British were too uncertain of Austria-Hungary's will and ability to fight Russia to finance Austria-Hungary's mobilization. This, plus the Habsburg government's schizophrenic inability to decide on a proper course of action, made a formal military alliance between London and Vienna very unlikely for the time being. However, the situation was not necessarily unfavorable for the Dual Monarchy, since Great Britain and Austria-Hungary continued to share a community of interest in limiting Russian gains in the Balkans. The post-Plevna diplomatic crisis did clarify
the attitude of Germany toward its two allies somewhat. In practical terms Berlin promised Andrássy only limited support and refused to assist Austria-Hungary in an armed conflict with Russia. At the same time Germany declared that it would not countenance a decisive Russian triumph over the Dual Monarchy. Thus Austria-Hungary was free to undertake whatever course of action it might wish vis-a-vis Russia, secure in the knowledge that Berlin would protect it against irremediable disaster.

The events of February and March, 1878, demonstrated to Andrássy that Austria-Hungary would not take strong action in its own behalf and that no other Great Power would actively assist the Dual Monarchy against Russia. Consequently, Andrássy was forced to rely on guile and diplomacy in his attempt to defend his country's interests in the Balkans and to protect its Great Power position.
CHAPTER VIII

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLICY
FROM APRIL TO AUGUST, 1878

"What are we supposed to do with the area [Bosnia-Hercegovina]? These provinces form a part of the hinterland of Dalmatia for us—actually they are uneconomical stretches of mountains which will swallow up our money just like Dalmatia"
--Carl Giskra, January 2, 1878. 1

"We have not only fulfilled our program at the congress but we achieved more than was contained in our program. We have every reason not only to be content with the results of our policy, but also to be proud"
--Andrassy, July 15, 1878. 2

The failure of the Ignatiev mission at the end of March, 1878, coincided with the appointment of Lord Salisbury to replace Derby as foreign minister and heralded the beginning of a period of intense and complex bargaining between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. 3 Immediately upon assuming office Salisbury

1 As quoted in Baron Carl Wolfarth to Andrassy, Vienna, January 2, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section I, Carton DCLXXXII, Fo. 5.

2 Andrassy to Tisza, Vienna, July 15, 1878, ibid., Section XL, Carton CXXXVI, Fo. 101.

issued a circular dispatch in which he vigorously stated the British position on the Balkan crisis and implied that he would act energetically to implement the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. The foreign secretary criticized the Treaty of San Stefano because it established a Greater Bulgarian state and because the net result of the treaty was "'to suppress, almost to the point of entire subjection, the political independence of the Government of Constantinople'." 4

Salisbury's reasoned critique of the San Stefano agreement, not to mention his advocacy of both the right of the Great Powers to amend treaty provisions of a general nature and the necessity of submitting the treaty in its entirety to the congress, found a welcome reception in Vienna. 5 Andrásy described Salisbury's missive as a "'brilliant dispatch'" and hinted that he would be amenable to close cooperation with a vigorous and resolute British foreign secretary. 6

Salisbury certainly was not slow in transforming his energetic impression into action. Motivated both by the

4 Ibid., p. 380.
5 Beust to Andrásy, London, April 2, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, Fo. 189.
6 Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question, p. 382.
Ignatiev mission and by uncertainty about Austria-
Hungary's true position and freedom of action, he re-
peatedly pressured Vienna, during the first ten days of
April, to enter into a formal, written agreement which
would include a guarantee of the seven vital Austro-
Hungarian interests that Andrassy had elaborated in May
of 1877. In addition, the foreign secretary also stated
that the primary concern of Her Majesty's Government was
to limit Bulgaria to an area north of the Balkan mountains,
and he pressed for a precise statement of Andrassy's
attitude in regard to this issue.

On April 18, Andrassy finally revealed to London his
ideas about specific alterations needed in the Treaty of
San Stefano. According to him, Austria-Hungary envisioned
several changes in the Russo-Turkish treaty. In the first
place, any Russian occupation of Bulgaria or Romania was

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7 Karolyi to Andrassy, Berlin, April 14, 1878, Staats-
archiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton
CXV (Prussia, Letters 1878), Fo. 4.

8 Salisbury to Elliot, Foreign Office, April 3, 1878,
ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, Fos. 329-331;
Beust to Andrassy, London, April 3, 1878, ibid., Fo.
193; Beust to Andrassy, London, April 10, 1878, ibid.,
Fo. 199.

9 Beust to Andrassy, London, April 12, 1878, ibid.,
Fo. 202; and Beust to Andrassy, London, April 15, 1878,
ibid., Fos. 259-260.
to be limited to 20,000 troops and was to terminate soon after the end of the fighting. Secondly, Bulgaria's borders were to be reduced in accord with "the principle of not establishing a large Slavic state at the cost of the non-Slavic population." Andrassy's third point concerned the prohibition of an exclusively Russian civil organization of Bulgaria. His final two proposals were of a more general nature: the protection of Greek interests against Slavic predominance and the safe-guarding of Turkey's territorial integrity so that Constantinople could defend itself against Bulgaria. Andrassy also prepared Her Majesty's Government for future developments by stating that he would have subsequent demands in regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro.

While in his letter of April 18, Andrassy did explain to the British the changes he envisioned in the Treaty of San Stefano, he did not reveal his attitude toward Salisbury's effort to limit Bulgaria to an area north of the Balkan mountains. He claimed that he could not explain his views to London until he knew exactly what Her Majesty's Government meant when it called for the "line of the Balkans" as Bulgaria's southern border.

10 Andrassy's five points can be found in Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, April 14, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, Fos. 213-214.

11 Andrassy to Beust, Vienna, April 18, 1878, ibid., Fos. 263-264.
The British responded to Andrássy's letter on April 20. Salisbury immediately accepted three of Andrássy's five points; however, he did not give a specific reply to Andrássy's proposals for the occupation and organization of Bulgaria. He merely stated that Great Britain's "greatest interests lie in Asia" and that, because of the effort that would have to be exerted there, Her Majesty's Government could work to secure only those interests in the Balkans which it felt were of absolutely paramount importance. As Salisbury viewed the situation, those paramount interests were "the reduction of Bulgaria and the removal of Bulgaria from proximity to Constantinople and the sea."\(^1\) Since Andrássy claimed to be unclear about what Great Britain desired in regard to Bulgaria's borders, Salisbury proposed that Andrássy himself elaborate those boundaries. Assuming that Vienna and London could agree on Bulgaria's borders, Salisbury then envisioned a formal convention embodying their common point of view.\(^2\)

Salisbury's position could not have been pleasing to Andrássy. The reference to the preeminence of Great Britain's Asian interests did not augur well for a resolute defense of Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests by Her

\(^{12}\)Beust to Andrássy, London, April 20, 1878, ibid., Fos. 271-273.

\(^{13}\)Beust to Andrássy, London, April 20, 1878, ibid., Fo. 267.
Majesty's Government. Moreover, Salisbury's suggestion that Andrássy draw up Bulgaria's borders was definitely not acceptable. From Andrássy's point of view the one positive result of the exchange of ideas with Salisbury was the foreign secretary's apparent acquiescence in Austria-Hungary's acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Andrássy promptly followed up on the issue of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in part because of the favorable climate for such action and in part because it was becoming increasingly obvious that the Dual Monarchy would be compelled to seize those provinces.

On April 21, Andrássy sent Beust a long memorandum in which he explained and justified the necessity for Austria-Hungary to acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the event that the provinces fell to Serbia and Montenegro instead of to the Dual Monarchy, Andrássy foresaw only two possibilities: either Austria-Hungary would have to annex the "entire South Slavic complex" or else leave itself exposed to the continued attraction which a powerful Slavic state would exert on the Serbo-Croatian population of the Dual Monarchy. Obviously the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the Habsburg state was preferable to either of those alternatives.  

14 Andrássy, Memorandum, enclosed in Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, April 21, 1878, ibid., Fos. 318-320.
As Andrásy explained to Her Majesty's Government, he regarded Constantinople's loss of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the least disadvantageous prospect for the Ottoman empire. If the Turks could not control Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1875, they certainly could not do so now that Ottoman access to the area depended on Bulgarian acquiescence. If the provinces remained under titular Turkish rule under conditions making it impossible for the Porte to govern the region, the situation would invite a Balkan coalition against Turkey to solve the Bosnian question. Such a combination might very well mean the end of Turkish rule in Europe. 15

In terms of European Great Power interests, Andrásy felt that there were two valid reasons why Bosnia-Hercegovina should go to Austria-Hungary. First of all, he simply could not foresee the possibility of a lasting peace if any other solution were found. Secondly, he strongly believed that it was necessary to have a counterweight to Russian/Slavic predominance in the Balkans and that only Austria-Hungary could effectively play this role. 16

At the same time that he instructed Beust to secure a

15 Ibid., Fos. 320-322.
16 Ibid., Fos. 322-323.
definitive British response to his memorandum, Andrásy also sought clarification of several other points from the British government. Of primary concern to him was the British attitude toward Austria-Hungary's demand that Montenegro be denied access to the Adriatic. He also wanted to know whether or not Great Britain was prepared to make the issue of Bulgaria's borders a casus belli. Andrásy feigned ignorance on the latter point to fend off Salisbury's request that he personally propose boundaries for Bulgaria.17

Although Salisbury readily promised Beust that "for the moment England would regard the annexation [of Bosnia-Hercegovina] without jealousy and as a matter between us and the Porte,"18 he displayed an annoying single-mindedness about Bulgaria19 that made the Habsburg minister feel that the setting of the borders of Bulgaria was the only issue in which Great Britain had any real interest. Since Great Britain's seemingly exclusive interest in Bulgaria would create an intolerable situation for the Ballhausplatz,

17 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, April 23, 1878, ibid., Fo. 254.

18 Beust to Andrásy, London, April 24, 1878, ibid., Carton XCI, Fo. 16.

19 For example, see Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, April 23, 1878, ibid., Carton CLXXI, Fo. 254.
Andrássy informed the British that any further cooperation between London and Vienna would depend on the former's acceptance of all the Dual Monarchy's vital Balkan interests. Among these vital interests were the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary, the prohibition of Serbian or Montenegrin acquisition of Novi Pazar, and the denial to Montenegro of both access to the Adriatic and a border on the Boyana river. Only if those conditions were met, in addition to those concerning Bulgaria of course, could Andrássy feel that he had adequately protected Austria-Hungary's interests.20

In addition to stimulating the continuation of Austro-Hungarian-British negotiations, the Ignatiev mission—or more precisely the failure of that mission—also affected Vienna's relations with Berlin. In the face of St. Petersburg's continued defense of the San Stefano treaty provisions, Andrássy once again felt himself in need of all the assistance that he could wheedle out of Germany. In an effort to buy Berlin's support against the Russians in mid-April Austria-Hungary abrogated Article V of the Treaty of Prague of 1866.21 Although Bismarck was quite pleased

20 Andrássy to Beust, [n. p.], April 29, 1878, ibid., Fo. 346.

21 Andrássy to Károlyi, Vienna, April 13, 1878, ibid., Section III, Carton CXIII (Prussia, Dispatches 1878), Fo. 125; Andrássy to Károlyi, Vienna, April 13, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII (Abrogation of Article V of the
to be freed from that treaty's requirement to hold a plebiscite on the fate of northern Schleswig, he still was unwilling to do more for Vienna than he had done in the past. Although he refused to accede to the tsar's request to put pressure on Austria-Hungary to reach an agreement with Russia and also counseled the tsarist government to moderate its demands, the German government undertook no vigorous or effective action to force it to do so.22 And Bismarck took no really decisive actions to support Austria-Hungary against Russia.23

St. Petersburg's reaction to the failure of the Ignatiev mission was one of anger and disappointment. During the first week of April Langenau repeatedly reported the Russian government's frustration over Andrássy's proposed revisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. Ignatiev informed the Austro-Hungarian ambassador that their differences over the borders of Bulgaria and Montenegro

Peace of Prague), Fos. 3 and 6. According to Rupp, Bismarck had been trying to persuade Austria-Hungary to abrogate Article V since 1874; however, Andrássy did not agree to do so until February 15, 1878. See Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 451, n. 52.

22Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, April 14, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VII, Carton CLXXI, Fos. 204-209. See also Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, April 27, 1878, ibid., Section III, Carton CXII, Fos. 318-319.

23Károlyi to Andrássy, Berlin, April 14, 1878, ibid., Section III, Carton CXII, Fo. 290.
would make a satisfactory agreement quite difficult to achieve, while the tsar asked the Austro-Hungarian military attaché in Russia, Baron Bechtolsheim, to make it clear to Francis Joseph that he was displeased with Andrásy's terms. For his part Chancellor Gorchakov focused his attention on the Bulgarian issue and reiterated what Ignatiev had already said in Vienna about Bulgaria's borders and the extent of Russia's involvement there. The Ballhausplatz did not find Gorchakov's views convincing.

On April 17 the Russian foreign ministry finally responded to Andrásy's program with a five-part counter-proposal. In regard to Serbia, Russia would acquiesce in a commercial agreement between Vienna and Belgrade as long as it did not prejudice Serbia's independence. The tsar's government agreed to accept the changes which Vienna had proposed for Bulgaria's western border as well as to reduce the number of troops stationed in Bulgaria and the length of the British occupation there, but it did not specify how many troops were to be used or how long they were to

24 Langenau to Andrásy, [n. p.], April 4, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXII, Fo. 349.

25 Bechtolsheim to Beck enclosed in Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, April 7, 1878, ibid., Fo. 363.

26 Langenau to Andrásy, St. Petersburg, April 9/ March 28, 1878, ibid., Fos. 366-369.
remain in Bulgaria. As predicted by Langenau, Russia held out for an Adriatic coastline and a Boyana river boundary for Montenegro but agreed to unspecified guarantees to protect the Dual Monarchy's interests in the area along the Adriatic coast. 27

Despite the appearance of some compromise on Russia's part, the Ballhausplatz felt that the offer from St. Petersburg was excessively vague and did not promise Russian acceptance of the Dual Monarchy's de facto acquisition of Novi Pazar. In Andrassy's opinion, the Russians had made "no essential concessions" in their counterproposals. He regarded the Russian position as totally unacceptable and, suspecting that the tsar's government was not negotiating in good faith, he temporarily broke off the exchange of views with Russia. 28

At the same time Andrassy was attempting to reach some kind of arrangement with Great Britain and/or Russia, he was also monitoring the attitudes and actions of the

27 See the Pro-memoria enclosed in Novikov to Andrassy, Vienna, April 17/5, 1878, ibid., Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 868-869. For slightly different version of the Russian proposals, see the Verbal pro-memoria delivered by Mr. Novikov, April 17, 1878, ibid., Fos. 18-19.

28 Andrassy to Károlyi, Vienna, April 18, 1878, ibid., Section III, Carton CXIII (Prussia, Dispatches 1878), Fo. 138.
Balkan states. The decisive Russian triumph and the proposed Treaty of San Stefano had created a state of flux in the Balkans. Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania were all in the process of evaluating their options and attempting to maximize their political and territorial gains.

Montenegro was undoubtedly Andrassy's foremost area of concern in the Balkans. As a result of its successful campaign against the Turks, Montenegro controlled a significant stretch of Adriatic coastline, including several good ports, as well as extensive territory extending toward the Boyana river and northern Albania. In short, Montenegro was in possession of areas which Austria-Hungary had no intention of allowing Montenegro to retain.

Antivari, where the Dual Monarchy's consular representative continually provoked Montenegrin suspicion with his resolute and outspoken defense of Austria-Hungary's claims in the area, was a particularly sore spot. Although Prince Nicholas acknowledged Austria-Hungary's right to Antivari, his troops continued to occupy the town.29 The situation in Antivari remained quite fluid throughout April. While Bozo Petrovic, Prince Nicholas's kinsman

29 For details of the situation in Antivari, see Memorandum, Vienna, April 5, 1878, ibid., Section XL, Carton CCLVIII, Fos. 1-2; and Memorandum [n. p.], April 10, 1878, ibid., Fos. 1-2.
and emissary, stated to the Ballhausplatz, on the one hand, that Montenegro would "stand by" Austria-Hungary and adhere to the decisions made by its more powerful neighbor, on the other, he maintained that "if Montenegro has to submit to a reduction of its territorial gains and a loss of the sea coast, the war cannot be regarded as finished." In the light of the Montenegrins' well known bravery and obstreperousness and St. Petersburg's open support of Cetinje's position, precisely what arrangements would be made in regard to Montenegro appeared uncertain at best.

In Serbia conditions were equally unsettled but not as threatening to Austro-Hungarian interests as in Montenegro. In the aftermath of a San Stefano treaty which sacrificed Serbian interests to those of Bulgaria, Belgrade was faced with a difficult choice. The Serbs could either resign themselves to maintaining nominal Russian support by subordinating their ambitions to those of Bulgaria, or else they could attempt to maximize their territorial gains by striking a bargain with Austria-Hungary. The difficulty in coming to terms with the Dual Monarchy was that any such agreement involved a sine qua non renunciation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar. Such a sacrifice would be

30 For Petrovich's statement, see Count Béla Orczy, Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry section chief, Memorandum [n. p.], April 2, 1878, ibid., Fos. 1-2.
highly unpleasant but it might well be necessary if Serbia were to achieve any major gains. Consequently, when queries at St. Petersburg about the Serbian territorial gains which Russia might support brought a reply which was not to Belgrade's liking the Serbian government promptly sounded out Vienna. By the end of April, 1878, Wrede reported that Serbia was resigned to the loss of Novi Pazar, and it appeared that an agreement could be worked out between Vienna and Belgrade.

Although Andrásy's diplomatic efforts remained without concrete results in the early spring of 1878, they cleared the way for the Dual Monarchy to obtain the right to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina. But the sending of occupying troops into the two Turkish provinces required money which the government still not have in hand. On April 24, 1878, a crown council met to consider the problem of raising the 30,740,000 gulden needed for this purpose.

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31 Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, April 10, 1878, *ibid.*, Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXXII, Fos. 142-144.

32 Wrede to Andrásy, Belgrade, April 25, 1878, *ibid.*, Fos. 157-158.

33 Although the delegations had approved the request for 60,000,000 gulden on March 21, 1878, the Cisleithanian and Hungarian parliaments had to determine from what sources the money was to come.

34 Included in the expenses of the occupation were the costs of mobilizing a modest body of troops; increasing the troop strength and fortifications in Dalmatia,
The obvious solution that was easily agreed on was to utilize the 60,000,000 gulden which had already been approved.\(^ {35}\)

Almost as soon as a solution to the problem of financing the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina was determined, complications arose. On April 28 when the crown council met again to reconsider the subject, the Cisleithanian and Hungarian finance ministers advised that only 31,000,000 gulden instead of the entire 60,000,000 should actually be allocated\(^ {36}\)—a proposal which Andrásy strongly opposed arguing that doubts had already been raised about Austria-Hungary's resolution to administer the two provinces when the Dual Monarchy had not immediately tried to allocate the 60,000,000 gulden the government was authorized to raise. An effort to raise only 31,000,000 gulden would be a further blow to the country's

Transylvania, and Galicia; and outfitting a small number of ships to control the Bay of Cattaro. See protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of April 24, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section XL, Carton CCXC, Fos. 1,208-1,209.

\(^ {35}\) _Ibid._, Fos. 1,213-1,214.

\(^ {36}\) Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of April 28, 1878, _ibid._, Fos. 1,252-1,253.
prestige. Eventually the emperor decided in favor of the larger amount and charged the finance ministers with quickly drawing up a plan to obtain the whole sum.38

On May 3 the finance ministers presented their proposals to still another crown council, which discussed various means to procure the money, such as making use of a funded debt or issuing bonds payable in gold.39 Ultimately, however, Francis Joseph decided to postpone sending any specific proposals to the parliaments in the hope of keeping parliamentary opposition at a minimum. The representatives of the two halves of the monarchy were just at that time completing the decennial negotiations of the financial clauses of the compromise agreement, and it was felt that the presentation of the government's financial measure at this inopportune moment might endanger that agreement.40

On the very next day, May 4, Francis Joseph reconvened the crown council. Since the compromise negotiations had

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been successfully completed by then the emperor ordered that the request to raise the full 60,000,000 gulden be presented to both parliaments on May 9. Thus the government did not ask the parliaments to raise the funds necessary to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina until seven weeks had passed after the delegations had granted the money.

If the month of May did not begin auspiciously insofar as the Dual Monarchy's financial prospects were concerned, it did witness some improvement in the diplomatic field. Although the Montenegrins remained as intractable as ever, the Serbs appeared increasingly ready to reach an understanding with Austria-Hungary in the hope of thereby preserving at least a modicum of territorial expansion. From St. Petersburg Langenau reported that a Serbian diplomat had informed the Russian foreign ministry of Belgrade's extreme displeasure over the large Bulgaria that was being established. In the ambassador's opinion, a propitious moment had arrived for Austria-Hungary to make an agreement with Serbia since the country did not seem to want "anything more than to exchange a Russian for an Austro-Hungarian protectorate." Shortly after

41 Protocol of the ministerial council for common affairs of May 4, 1878, ibid., Fos. 1,301-1,306.

42 Langenau to Andrassy, St. Petersburg, May 8/April 26, 1878, ibid., Section X, Carton LXXII, Fo. 23.
Langenau's message reached Vienna, Wrede informed Andrássy that Prince Milan, who appeared to be visibly angered at St. Petersburg, had renounced any Serbian interest in gaining Novi Pazar and had agreed to make a commercial agreement with Austria-Hungary. After receiving this information the Ballhausplatz regarded the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar as secure, since Serbia was no longer opposed to it.

During the early part of May Austria-Hungary and Great Britain continued their efforts to work out a common Balkan program. As in the recent past, their negotiations again revolved around the Bulgarian issue. Great Britain informed Austria-Hungary that it would support the Dual Monarchy in restricting the length of the Russian occupation of Bulgaria if the Dual Monarchy would assist Great Britain in pushing the borders of that country back to the Balkan mountains. Although the British government promised "that if Count Andrássy will come to terms about the southern limit of Bulgaria, Her Majesty's Government will make no difficulties respecting the points upon which

43 Wrede to Andrássy, Belgrade, May 27, 1878, ibid., Section XXXVIII, Carton CCXXII, Fos. 175-177.

44 Salisbury to Elliot, Foreign Office, April 29, 1878, in Andrássy to Beust, Vienna, May 2, 1878, ibid., Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, F. 366.
he insists, it evaded the issue of whether it regarded Bulgaria's borders as a potential casus belli. Salisbury merely informed Andrásy that Great Britain could not accept a treaty which did not limit Bulgaria to an area less than that proposed by the Treaty of San Stefano. The foreign secretary implied that his government would regard Bulgaria's borders as a casus belli only in the event that Austria-Hungary and Great Britain could agree on a common course of action in the Balkans.

Although the British government stated its satisfaction with Andrásy's recent negotiations with it and expressed the feeling that an understanding between London and Vienna was imminent, the Habsburg minister still refused to conclude a binding agreement with Her Majesty's Government to defend British and Austro-Hungarian interests against Russian aggression. One cannot be certain about the reasons why Andrásy failed to establish an entente with Great Britain. Probably his hesitation was the result of a combination of skepticism about Great Britain's ability

45 Salisbury to Elliot, Foreign Office, April 25, 1878, in Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 2, 1878, ibid., Fos. 375-378.

46 Salisbury to Elliot, Foreign Office, May 4, 1878, in Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 18, 1878, ibid., Fos. 403-405.

47 Andrásy to Beust, Vienna, May 10, 1878, ibid., Fo. 425.
and/or willingness to aid Austria-Hungary in a military conflict with Russia and his knowledge that the Habsburg government might find itself unable to meet the demands which Great Britain could make on the Dual Monarchy in a formal treaty.

While at least the potential was at hand for reaching an agreement with the British government, such was not the case in the negotiations with the Romanov government. Following Andrásy's rejection of the terms Russia had proposed in mid-April, there was a three-week lull in communications. Then, on May 8, St. Petersburg submitted a new list of proposals. Although the Russians still insisted on retaining the borders of Bulgaria stipulated in the Treaty of San Stefano, they expressed a willingness to divide the country into separate eastern and western parts, both of which were to be autonomous and occupied by Russia until local self-government was established. St. Petersburg agreed to the occupation or annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary; however, the tsar's government proposed that Novi Pazar be divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Russia also insisted on the retention of the San Stefano borders for Montenegro—i.e., that Montenegro be granted access to the Adriatic. The only "concession" made to Austria-Hungary was that the Dual Monarchy could conclude agreements with Serbia, Montenegro,
and Bulgaria to safeguard its commercial interests.\textsuperscript{48} Andrassy found the Russian proposals "totally unacceptable." In fact, he regarded them as in some ways more injurious to Vienna's interests than the Treaty of San Stefano itself.\textsuperscript{49} If this was the best that St. Petersburg could offer, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister believed the prospects of a compromise were bleak indeed.

Russia's failure to negotiate with Austria-Hungary in good faith can be attributed to several causes, such as, for example, St. Petersburg's distrust of Andrassy and the fact that the Russians feared Great Britain's military potential more than they did Austria-Hungary's.\textsuperscript{50} For this reason, an agreement with London seemed indispensable if St. Petersburg was to preserve any significant gains in the

\textsuperscript{48}Pro-memoria, [n. p.], [received by Andrassy on May 8, 1878], \textit{ibid.}, Section I, Carton CDLIII, Fos. 875-880.

\textsuperscript{49}Andrassy to Karolyi, Vienna, May 9, 1878, \textit{ibid.}, Section III, Carton CXIII (Prussia, Dispatches 1878), Fos. 155-156.

\textsuperscript{50}Rupp, \textit{A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878}, pp. 501-502. The appointment of Salisbury as foreign secretary and his strong circular dispatch of April 1, 1878, also impressed on the Russian government the necessity of achieving a modus vivendi with Great Britain. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 502. See also Karolyi to Andrassy, Berlin, May 7, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), \textit{Politisches Archiv}, Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, Fo. 417.
Balkans, and as soon as the tsarist government became convinced of the uncompromising nature of Andrássy's position, it immediately began to negotiate for a satisfactory détente with London. Throughout April Foreign Secretary Salisbury and Ambassador Shuvalov discussed the Balkan situation in London. In mid-May, Shuvalov journeyed to St. Petersburg and worked out concrete proposals for an agreement with Great Britain with the tsar and Gorchakov. The British found these proposals satisfactory and an Anglo-Russian agreement was signed in London on May 30, 1878. The most important points of the understanding reached between Russia and Great Britain concerned Bulgaria. Russia agreed to a modification of Bulgaria's borders which would exclude Bulgaria from access to the Aegean Sea and which would make the Balkan mountains the southern boundary of independent Bulgaria. In return, Great Britain agreed to the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia and to Russia's acquisition of Kars and Batum.

Although Andrássy did not possess information about the specific compromise proposals that London and St. Petersburg were examining, he was quite aware of the

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51 For details about the Russo-British negotiations, see Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 471-500.

52 For the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement, see the Anglo-Russian Agreement, ibid., pp. 646-651.
negotiations between the British and Russian governments. He was also fully cognizant of the danger which an Anglo-Russian agreement would pose to Vienna: the Dual Monarchy might easily find itself isolated diplomatically and unable to secure Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar. Throughout the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878, Andrássy had preferred to work with the tsarist government to limit Russia's gains and to safeguard Austria-Hungary's interests. But, when cooperation with Russia became impossible and when St. Petersburg stood on the verge of achieving an entente with London, he moved quickly to strike a bargain with the British government.\(^{53}\)

On May 18 Andrássy informed London that although his government agreed with the British position in regard to the southern boundary of Bulgaria, his government could not reach an understanding with the British unless they agreed to insist that any Russian occupation force in Bulgaria and/or Romania would have to be limited to 20,000 men (in the case of Bulgaria) and that it would remain there only "a few months after the conclusion of the peace." Moreover, the British had to support Austro-Hungarian acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar.

\(^{53}\) According to Rupp, on May 11, Andrássy informed Novikov that Russia's May 8 proposals were unsatisfactory and stated that he would have to forge an agreement with Great Britain. See Rupp, A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, p. 518.
and stipulate that the Dobrudja could not be acquired by Russia and that Montenegro could not acquire a port on the Adriatic.  

Lord Salisbury responded favorably to all of Andrassy's conditions with the exception of the Montenegrin issue. He regarded that matter as an exclusive interest of the Dual Monarchy and preferred not to incorporate any stipulation concerning a Montenegrin harbor in a formal agreement. He eventually agreed not to oppose Vienna's stand vis-à-vis a Montenegrin coastline and hinted that he might even support the Austro-Hungarian position but under no circumstances would he make the issue a casus belli.

On May 28 Sir Henry Elliot finally sent Andrassy a definitive British proposal. The key element, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, was that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary would strive at the impending congress

54 Andrassy to Beust, [n. p.], May 18, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section VIII, Carton CLXXI, Fos. 429-430.


57 Beust to Andrassy, London, May 22, 1878, ibid., Fo. 432.
to confine autonomous Bulgaria to an area north of the Balkan mountains and east of the Morava river. The Russian occupation was to be limited to 20,000 troops for six months after the signing of a definitive treaty. In return, Great Britain agreed to "support any proposition with respect to Bosnia which Austria shall make at the Congress." 58

Despite the fact that Vienna's isolation appeared increasingly imminent as the result of an Anglo-Russian agreement, Great Britain's latest proposal still was not completely acceptable to Andrásy, who immediately raised the issue of the Dobrudja. According to the Treaty of San Stefano that area was to go to Russia, which would, in turn, exchange it with Romania for southern Bessarabia. Andrásy insisted that if Romania refused to part with Bessarabia, Russia could not be allowed to retain the Dobrudja. A second point of concern for Andrásy was the status of Hercegovina. In order to be absolutely certain that British support extended to the Dual Monarchy's acquisition of Hercegovina, Andrásy wanted Her Majesty's Government to add the phrase "and Hercegovina" to its

statement of support of Vienna's position on Bosnia.\textsuperscript{59}

Her Majesty's Government regarded the inclusion or exclusion of Hercegovina from any Anglo-Austrian understanding as unimportant. Ambassador Elliot unofficially indicated that London might well regard Hercegovina as a part of Bosnia. Salisbury, however, countered Andrassy's proposals with a requested change of his own: a reservation to the effect that while Her Majesty's Government would support Austria-Hungary at the Berlin congress, Great Britain would not make the Bosnian borders a casus belli.\textsuperscript{60}

In view of the facts that an Anglo-Russian agreement had already been signed, that Salisbury showed signs of becoming difficult to deal with, and that the congress was scheduled to begin in one week, Andrassy decided to take whatever support he could readily obtain from Great Britain. On June 6, 1878, he and Elliot signed an accord which embodied Salisbury's original proposals, plus a statement prohibiting Russia's acquisition of the Dobrudja.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., pp. 111-112.

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., p. 112. See also William N. Medlicot, The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880 (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1938), pp. 25-26. For the text of the agreement, see Convention between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain concerning the attitude to be followed at the
While the agreement with Great Britain guaranteed that the Dual Monarchy's most important Balkan interests would be safeguarded at Berlin, Austria-Hungary still lacked the money necessary to implement any decision the congress might make for Austria-Hungary to occupy or annex Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar. In May the government's efforts to raise the 60,000,000 gulden authorized by the Delegations met with mixed results. For a variety of reasons the government's request for these funds encountered opposition in both halves of the empire, particularly because neither parliament had received reliable information about precisely how the government intended to use the money. True, Andrassy had previously given assurances that Austria-Hungary never intended to expand into the Balkans; however, since the 60,000,000 gulden was insufficient to finance the full-scale mobilization necessary to oppose Russian aggression effectively, there were strong suspicions that the foreign ministry wanted to use the money to occupy or annex Bosnia-Hercegovina, even though the government did not specify the purpose for which the money was intended when it presented its report on May 9.  

62 The request for funds may be found in Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Oesterreichischen Reichsrathes, 8th session, Vol. XI, p. 1,023. For information about Cisleithanian parliament's
When the government presented its request for funds it was interpelled by the Cisleithanian parliament about its conduct of foreign policy. Referring to the government's "repeated and categorical declarations" that Austria-Hungary had no intention of making territorial acquisitions in the Balkans, opponents of Andrássy's foreign policy expressed their apprehension over the frequent newspaper reports that the Dual Monarchy had such action in view. To set their own minds at rest and to reassure the public, they asked the government, (1) whether it intended to move troops into Bosnia-Hercegovina; (2) what the purpose of any such movement would be and (3) whether any such movement would take place as a result of an agreement among the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 or as a result of a bilateral agreement with Russia. 63

On May 14, Minister-President Adolph Auersperg gave the government's reply to the above questions in a speech that was brief and to the point. According to Auersperg, interest in foreign affairs at this time, see also Snyder, "Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879," pp. 93-97.

63 The interpellation speech and the query itself are printed in the Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Österreichischen Reichsrathes, 8th session, Vol. XI, pp. 12,296-12,297.
the government's view had not changed since the beginning of the crisis: its goal continued to be to find a solution which would render future disturbances on the Dual Monarchy's borders impossible. In pursuit of that objective it had never been the government's intention either to circumvent the collective authority of the Great Powers or to work in secret with a single Great Power. Therefore, the reports of Austria-Hungary's territorial ambitions which had been referred to in the interpellation were "without any basis in fact," "unfounded," and "unworthy of belief." 64

Auersperg's speech, while containing nothing new, was, ostensibly at least, an unequivocal declaration of the Habsburg government's Balkan policy. It did not serve to quieten the suspicions of Neue Freie Presse, 65 but it did suffice, no doubt in conjunction with Andrássy's earlier statements, to reassure the members of the Cisleithanian parliament. The combination of Auersperg's statement and the press of work involved in completing the renegotiation of the economic phase of the Compromise served to prevent

64 See Auersperg's speech in ibid., p. 12,349.

65 For example, on May 15, 1878, the newspaper commented that Auersperg's statement had not ruled out a unilateral occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. See Snyder, "Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879," p. 95.
any further consideration of foreign affairs in the Cisleithanian parliament during May. 66

It was not until June 7 that the bill authorizing the raising of Cisleithania's share of the 60,000,000 gulden came up for consideration by parliament. Due to the immediacy of the congress' opening and the feeling that a bill passed by the delegations really could not be rejected by the two parliaments, there was little debate on the proposal, and it passed that same day. 67 Some members of parliament continued to express doubts about the purpose for which the money was intended, 68 but they could not expect more in the way of reassurances about the Dual Monarchy's peaceful intentions than Auersperg had given in his speech on the fourteenth and Andrassy in his past statements of Austria-Hungary's reluctance to acquire new territory.

Armed with his 60,000,000 gulden grant and with the

66 On May 16, 1878, an effort was made to open debate on the Dual Monarchy's foreign policy but failed for lack of parliamentary support. See Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Österreichischen Reichsrathes, 8th session, Vol. XI, p. 12,407.

67 Snyder, "Bosnia and Herzegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879," p. 96; Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Österreichischen Reichsrathes, 8th session, Vol. XI, pp. 12,798-12,812.

68 For example, see the speech of representative Hausner in ibid., pp. 12,804-12,806.
agreement he had made with Her Majesty's Government, Andrássy was in a strong position when the Congress of Berlin convened on June 13, 1878. The Dual Monarchy's understanding with the British could serve to decrease Russian influence in the Balkans by reducing its control over Bulgaria and by reducing the size and power of Bulgaria itself. The agreement would also aid Austria-Hungary in securing Bosnia-Hercegovina.

While the agreement with Great Britain ensured that the Dual Monarchy's most important interests in the Balkans would be protected, there remained several Austro-Hungarian objectives, the achievement of which had not been ensured prior to the congress. They included the acquisition of de facto control over Novi Pazar, the exertion of greater Austro-Hungarian influence in the western part of the Balkans, and the denial of an Adriatic coast to Montenegro.

Under Bismarck's leadership the congress first took up the question of Bulgaria. The negotiations on this subject were lengthy and difficult, but Great Britain and Austria-Hungary succeeded in implementing most of their program. Russia agreed to the Balkan mountains as Bulgaria's southern boundary and gave up Bulgaria's Aegean coastline and its Macedonian territory. The Russian occupation was to be for only nine months with a maximum of
50,000 troops.\textsuperscript{69}

Any Austro-Hungarian success in reaching its goal of acquiring more influence in the western part of the Balkan peninsula hinged largely on the power which Serbia and Montenegro could exert. The end of the Russo-Turkish War found Serbia in a difficult diplomatic position. The Serbs had entered that war as Russia's ally early enough to be of material aid to the tsar but not soon enough to win his gratitude or to erase the Russian memory of Serbia's poor performance against the Turks in 1876. Serbia's military showing throughout the Balkan warfare of 1875-1878, coupled with the critical importance of Bulgaria to Russian plans to expand towards the Straits, caused Russia to disregard the Serbs' wishes in 1878. By the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano, Serbia was allowed some territorial gains in Novi Pazar but most of the land on its southeastern frontier, which Serbian troops had actually conquered militarily, was assigned to Bulgaria. The Serbian government was quite angered over Russia's subordination of its interests to those of Bulgaria, but it was unable to persuade Russia to revise the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano in Serbia's favor.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{69} For the Congress of Berlin, see Medlicot, The Congress of Berlin and After, pp. 1-146. For the negotiations involving Bulgaria, see ibid., pp. 45-71; and Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, pp. 501-553 passim.

\textsuperscript{70} Stojanović, The Great Powers and the Balkans, pp.
If Russia would not aid the principality, Serbia had no choice but to try to arrange an understanding with Austria-Hungary despite Belgrade's antipathy toward the Dual Monarchy. Just prior to the Congress of Berlin Serbia agreed to build a railroad through Serbian territory linking Vienna and Constantinople and to conclude a commercial treaty with the Dual Monarchy. In return for Serbia's renunciation of territorial claims in Novi Pazar, Austria-Hungary agreed to use its influence at Berlin to attain an extension of Serbia's southeastern frontiers. 71

Montenegro's position vis-à-vis Austria-Hungary was stronger than that of Serbia, although it, too, suffered a diminution of the gains allotted it by the Treaty of San Stefano. Montenegro's military prowess and the traditional ties with St. Petersburg enabled Cetinje to retain strong Russian diplomatic support at Berlin. The result was that although Prince Nicholas lost his territorial gains in Novi Pazar, he retained Antivari and a small strip of the


71 Ibid. See also Trivanovitch, "Serbia, Russia, and Austria during the Reign of Milan Obrenovich," pp. 438-439. According to Medlicott, Vienna envisioned Nish as the junction of Constantinople-Sofia and Mitrovica-Salonika rail lines. Thus it was to Austria-Hungary's advantage to assist Serbia in retaining that area. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, pp. 32-33.
Adriatic coast. However, Montenegro was prohibited possession of ships of war, a condition which rendered the Montenegrin success in retaining Antivari much more palatable to Vienna.

In regard to the acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Andrassy encountered most of his difficulties from the Turks and from his Austro-Hungarian opponents rather than from the other Powers. He succeeded in persuading both Bismarck and Salisbury to agree to his proposal that Austria-Hungary occupy and administer Bosnia-Hercegovina instead of annexing the provinces outright. Such a formula

72 Stojanović, The Great Powers and the Balkans, pp. 278-279; Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, p. 97. Basically, Andrassy acquiesced in Montenegro's acquisition of Antivari and an adjacent strip of coast-line as a quid pro quo for Russia's acquiescence in Austria-Hungary's occupation of Novi Pazar. It should be noted that the area of the sanjak occupied by the Dual Monarch was expanded at Montenegro's expense. See Francis Joseph to Andrassy, Vienna, June 15, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CXVII (All Highest's handwritten letters and telegrams to Minister Count Andrassy during the minister's stay in Berlin, 1878), Fos. 1-2; Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, p. 77. In addition to conditions concerning Novi Pazar, Andrassy originally demanded Austro-Hungarian acquisition of Spizza, Turkish control of the mouth of the Boyana river, a Montenegrin promise not to fortify Antivari or to allow foreign warships to anchor there, and Montenegrin agreement to provide road and rail communication between Dalmatia and Scutari, in northern Albania, as his price for yielding Antivari to Cetinje. See Andrassy to Francis Joseph, Berlin, June 13, 1878, Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Politisches Archiv, Section III, Carton CXVII (Proposals and telegrams to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty during the stay of His Excellency Minister Andrassy in Berlin, 1878), Fo. 6.
was designed to avoid the difficult question of which part of the Dual Monarchy was to acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina and to circumvent assumption of the provinces' debts. Administration instead of annexation would also allay the Austro-Hungarian criticism that would arise from outright annexation and make it easier for Turkey to part with the provinces. 73

Despite the fact that Andrásy pressed for administration rather than annexation, he did not envision a temporary occupation but felt that annexation would eventually come about as a matter of course. 74 The Turkish government, however, had no intention of yielding Bosnia and Hercegovina permanently, with the result that Andrásy was forced to agree to formal limitations on Austro-Hungarian control there. On the last day of the Congress, he signed a note stating that Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina was intended neither to be permanent, nor to diminish the rights of the sultan there. In addition, the details of the Austro-Hungarian occupation were to be arranged by Turkey and the Dual Monarchy in an

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73 Andrásy's rationale for "occupation" rather than "annexation" is contained in Andrásy to Francis Joseph, Berlin, June 25, 1878, ibid., Fos. 93-96.

74 Ibid., Fos. 93-99. See also the comments of the director of the commercial section of the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry to his wife in Baron Joseph Schwegel to Baroness Schwegel, Berlin, July 3, 1878, ibid., Carton CXV, Fos. 42.
agreement made following the Congress. Andrássy was also forced to make similar concessions in regard to Novi Pazar, although Austria-Hungary was not to administer that area but only to station troops there and to have the right of passage through the sanjak.\(^7\)

With the settlements arranged at the Congress of Berlin the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 came to a close, and Andrássy's Balkan policy assumed less immediate importance for the Dual Monarchy. The three years had witnessed a grueling battle by the foreign minister against formidable odds as he attempted to contain Russia's Balkan aspirations. It was not without pride that he could view the work of the Congress of Berlin. Vienna's gains were significant and, if measured by the program Andrássy set forth to Ignatiev in March, 1878, the congress was a distinct success for Austria-Hungary. With the exception of Montenegro's acquisition of Antivari, and the details of Russia's occupation of Bulgaria, Andrássy won acceptance of all his objectives; the result was the reassertion of Austro-Hungarian hegemony in the

\(^7\) For details of the nature of the dispute between Vienna and Constantinople, see the correspondence between Andrássy and Zichy during June and July of 1878. It is found in \textit{ibid.}, Carton CCLVII. For the text of the agreement between Austria-Hungary and Turkey which was signed on July 13, 1878, see Medlicott, \textit{The Congress of Berlin and After}, pp. 404–405.
western part of the Balkans and the curtailment of Russia's
grandiose plans for the eastern half of the peninsula.
While Andrásy could justifiably be proud of his achieve-
ment in thwarting Russia's plans in the face of sometimes
long odds, one can, nevertheless, ask whether or not
Austria-Hungary's conduct during the crisis of 1875-1878
and the gains the Dual Monarchy realized from the Congress
of Berlin signified a genuine success for the foreign
minister's policy. That question has remained open to
debate from Andrásy's time to the present.
CHAPTER IX

A SUMMARY OF ANDRESSY'S BALKAN POLICY

"His chief motive in all his action was a specific Hungarian patriotism."
-- Gyula Andressy the younger about his father.¹

Viewed in the light of his experiences before becoming foreign minister, Andressy's primary objective as foreign minister is rather easily discerned. It is difficult to believe that a man who risked his life and his fortune in behalf of his Magyar compatriots and who, subsequent to his pardon and return to Hungary in 1858, devoted himself to establishing a secure and powerful place for his countrymen within the Habsburg state, could have any goal other than the preservation, protection, and enhancement of the position the Magyars had won for themselves within the Austro-Hungarian empire as a result of the compromise of 1867. In view of the Magyars' inability to establish a viable state in 1848, and the threat posed to them by Slavic nationalism in general and the Pan-Slavic movement in particular, it seemed apparent

¹Andressy the younger, Bismarck, Andressy and their Successors, p. 42.
to Andrásy that the Magyars' position and independence could be maintained only within the Austro-Hungarian empire. Therefore, although his foreign policy was dominated by his feelings and attitudes as a Magyar, it was in no way at variance with Habsburg interests. Indeed, Andrásy, better than almost any other Austro-Hungarian leader of his day, recognized the direct relationship between the protection of the Dual Monarchy's status as a Great Power and the preservation of the privileged place of the Magyars in southeastern Europe. Andrásy could, therefore, serve both Magyar and Habsburg interests at the same time and through one policy.

Specifically in terms of a Balkan policy, Andrásy's objective of protecting the Magyars' privileged status translated into an attempt to preserve the territorial and political status quo in southeastern Europe. Once again, his goal was conditioned by his outlook as a Magyar. The Compromise of 1867 had given the Magyars a dominant position in the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy; however, in order to maintain that position, it was necessary to hold the other nationalities in check until such time as they were thoroughly Magyarized. Any change in the existing territorial and political arrangement in the Balkans could jeopardize that process by providing an alternative example to Magyarization and a real and powerful source of attraction for Austria-Hungary's minorities.
This was particularly true in regard to the South Slavs. A strong and dynamic Slavic state in the Balkans could prove so attractive to the Slavs of Austria-Hungary that it would pose a serious threat to the dualistic system of government, to the Magyars' primacy within that system, and even to the continued existence of the Habsburg empire. To Andrássy the best method of preventing any danger like that seemed to be to forestall further development by Serbia and Montenegro as focal points of South Slavic nationalism.

Both in terms of a European and a Balkan context, Andrássy recognized Russia as the gravest threat to the Habsburgs and to the Magyars. In the 1870's, Andrássy's belief was imminently reasonable. The tsarist state had demonstrated its tenacious strength repeatedly during the nineteenth century, for instance by marching armies far into western Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, by contributing signally to the reconquest of Hungary in 1848-1849, and by fighting its opponents to a standstill during the Crimean War. In Andrássy's view, Russia was the only Power with both the inclination and the capability to alter the existing Balkan situation. In order to maintain the prestige of the Dual Monarchy and, concomitantly, the position of the Magyars within Austria-Hungary, Andrássy had to protect the Habsburg empire against Russia's attempts at aggrandizement in southeastern Europe.
Andrássy's preferred method of combating the Russian challenge was to ally Austria-Hungary with Germany against the tsarist state. This element of his thinking was demonstrated by his attempt in 1872 to persuade Francis Joseph to allow him to sound out Berlin about an alliance. Andrássy's plan foundered on the emperor's reluctance to act that boldly, combined with a lingering Prussophobia and a fear of Russia's military might on the part of some of the emperor's closest advisers. Without the monarch's permission to do so, Andrássy could not openly pursue an agreement with Germany; however, he did not give up the idea entirely. He established an excellent relationship with Bismarck, and worked quietly and steadily to make Austria-Hungary the preferred of Germany's two allies within the Three Emperors' League.

Since Andrássy was unable to adopt a policy of overt opposition to Russia, he was forced to follow a more subtle course of action. He chose to use the Three Emperors' League in an attempt to give direction to Russia's Balkan policy and actions. Andrássy was successful in persuading St. Petersburg to honor his wishes during the first year of the Balkan crisis. He took the diplomatic initiative and made several proposals designed to end that crisis while the Russians docilely followed his lead.
With the outbreak of war between the Porte and its nominal vassals in the summer of 1876, the situation became much more complex and difficult for Andrássy to control. The failure of his previously made compromise proposals, coupled with Russia's enthusiasm for the Slavic cause, cost Andrássy his position of diplomatic leadership. Permanent and far-ranging alterations of the pre-1875 Balkan territorial arrangements and/or Russian intervention in the area, appeared increasingly likely.

If Russian intervention in the Balkans was imminent, then the Dual Monarchy was faced with the choice of confronting the tsarist empire militarily or cooperating with Russia in an effort to protect its own vital interests. Although one may suspect that Andrássy would not have shrunk from a confrontation with Russia, his policy of cooperating with Russia to control St. Petersburg's activities in the Balkans had worked well to that time, and his government chose to continue that course of action. The Reichstadt and Budapest agreements were the consequence. As a result of those understandings Austria-Hungary secured the right to acquire Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar, limited Russian gains in the Balkans, and forestalled the establishment of a large Slavic state on the Dual Monarchy's border. All things considered, Vienna was about as well prepared for the probable consequences of Russia's attack on Turkey as it could be—short of
taking military action—when the Russo-Turkish war began.

As demonstrated by his actions during the Russo-
Turkish war, the foreign minister continued to base his
hope of controlling Russia's Balkan schemes on cooperation
with the tsarist empire. While he did coquet with Her
Majesty's Government, Andrassy seems neither to have
trusted the British fully nor to have believed that they
could provide Austria-Hungary with much real military
assistance against Russia. He did keep the lines of
communication to London open and was quite careful not to
estrange the British irrevocably; nevertheless, he in-
variably balked at any British suggestion of concrete and
concerted action by London and Vienna against St. Peters-
burg. And, at the same time he was flirting with Great
Britain, Andrassy made sure that Austria-Hungary scrupulous-
ly observed the terms of its agreements with Russia.

The events of late 1877 and early 1878 brought an end
to cooperation with Russia. The magnitude of Russia's
victory over the Turks and its cynical disregard of Austro-
Hungarian interests, exemplified by the Treaty of San
Stefano, forced Andrassy and the Habsburg government to
reevaluate Vienna's policy options. It appeared to
Andrassy that the time had come for Austria-Hungary to
step forward decisively to safeguard its own interests.

Initially the emperor and his advisers examined the
Dual Monarchy's military options once again. Personally
angered by Russia's duplicity and believing adamantly that Austria-Hungary had to demonstrate its vitality, Andrásy favored at least the appearance of military action. He argued for an Austro-Hungarian mobilization and would not have stepped back from war with Russia if it had resulted from the Dual Monarchy's action. While Andrásy would not have backed down if Russia threatened Austria-Hungary militarily, it appears that he could have seriously considered attacking Russia only during the period from mid-December, 1877, to the British refusal to subsidize Austro-Hungarian mobilization in mid-February, 1878. He knew that most of the money required for a full mobilization would have to come either from a British subsidy or a grant by the Dual Monarchy's parliaments. After the conference of February 7, 1878, he knew specifically that 207,000,000 of the 310,000,000 gulden required for mobilization would have to be obtained from one of these two sources. Except in the event of a Russian attack on Austria-Hungary, Andrásy did not believe that the money could be gotten from the parliaments. When, on February 15, 1878, the British refused to grant a subsidy to Austria-Hungary, the last possibility of an Austro-Hungarian attack on Russia—if, indeed, there had ever been any such possibility—was ended. Andrásy was, however, convinced that it was absolutely necessary that Austria-Hungary take some kind of action in its own
behalf, and he worked until he succeeded in obtaining a grant of 60,000,000 gulden.

Armed with the 60,000,000 gulden grant and the agreement with Great Britain which he later arranged, Andrásy was able to appear at Berlin as the representative of an ostensibly powerful and dynamic member of the European state system and did in fact secure marked advantages for Austria-Hungary.

In summary then, one can say that Andrásy's preferred policy was always to maintain the political and territorial status quo in the Balkans and, when Russia's actions made such a policy unworkable, to limit the changes resulting from the Russo-Turkish war as strictly as possible. In evaluating the success of his policy, it would be well to keep in mind what he desired to attain, what was attained, and what it was possible to attain.

As stated earlier, Andrásy's primary concern was to preserve the Magyars' favored position within the Dual Monarchy. In order to do that he had to safeguard the interests of the empire as a whole and to facilitate Austria-Hungary's demonstration of its viability. In large measure the success or failure of his program hinged on his ability to protect Austria-Hungary from Russian aggression and to forestall radical changes in the Balkan territorial arrangements.
In general Andrássy succeeded in fending off the Russian threat. The Great Powers refused to allow Russia a Bulgarian satrapy and forced the tsarist empire to evacuate the Balkans promptly upon the conclusion of peace, so that lasting harm to Austria-Hungary's interests was avoided.

In addition to negating the danger Russia posed to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, Andrássy also protected the Dual Monarchy from the grandiose schemes of Serbia and Montenegro. Although he was unable to preserve the status quo ante 1875 in the Balkans, Andrássy did succeed in influencing political and territorial changes there to the advantage of the Dual Monarchy. He was able to limit the Slavic principalities' power and aggrandizement and to reestablish Austro-Hungarian hegemony over the western half of the peninsula. If the pre-1875 situation could not be maintained, Andrássy secured changes which were about as favorable to the Dual Monarchy as one could reasonably expect.

Andrássy's success, exemplified by the Treaty of Berlin, was not, however, unequivocal. As he himself stated repeatedly, the crux of his problem was to demonstrate beyond any doubt that Austria-Hungary, despite the shocks the realm had suffered since 1848, was in fact still a state fully deserving of the respect and prerogatives accorded to a Great Power. If Andrássy could
convince the rest of Europe that the Dual Monarchy was a healthy nation, then perhaps other states and neighboring peoples would be less inclined to try to take advantage of Vienna's difficulties, particularly its nationality problems.

Andrássy's case for the dynamism of Austria-Hungary based on the country's actions during the 1875-1878 crisis could not, however, stand close inspection. The Dual Monarchy's success vis-à-vis Russia was primarily a by-product of the fact that Russia bowed to Great Britain's demands and that the British and Austro-Hungarian interests happened, in large measure, to coincide. Even the Dual Monarchy's acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar was a tainted triumph since Andrássy had had to settle for "occupation and administration" instead of annexation in order to sugar coat the pill for the Dual Monarchy's public opinion. Vienna had even had to agree to respect the Sultans' rights within the provinces--hardly actions to be identified with the policy of a vigorously aggressive Great Power.

It would be difficult to say then that Andrássy's policy was anything more than a short-term success and a success only in a limited sense of the word. The actions of the foreign minister helped to prevent immediately disastrous events for the Dual Monarchy, for example, the establishment of a large Slavic state on Austria-Hungary's
borders, but they did nothing to improve the empire's prospects in the long run. One can, of course, ask if the achievement of anything more was reasonably possible. In this writer's opinion, probably not. At the time Andrásy began his ministry nationalism was already a potent and growing force within Europe. It was a force which was rapidly rendering the multi-national Dual Monarchy an anachronism. The survival of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power—or even as a nation—and by implication the continuation of the Magyars' favored status within the empire, depended on the ability of the Habsburg state to demonstrate that despite the revolutions of 1848, the embarrassing role it played in the Crimean War, the defeat at the hands of France and Sardinia and the loss of its rich Italian provinces, the defeat by Prussia and the loss of its hegemony in Germany, the concessions made to the Magyars, and the creation of an unique governmental structure, it was, nevertheless, still a viable state. Both Andrásy and Francis Joseph recognized that Austria-Hungary could not manifest its viability by remaining a spectator to events on its borders which threatened its very existence. And yet, not once during the crisis of 1875-1878 did the Dual Monarchy act decisively to protect its interests against damage at the hands of another Great Power. Not even in regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina can the Dual Monarchy be said to have acted vigorously. Vienna's
acquisition of those provinces was not the freely chosen action of a confident Great Power but rather a desperate measure which Austria-Hungary was forced to take in self-defense against Russia and the Slavs.

It appears to this writer that by the time Andrassy became foreign minister, what he believed needed to be done—to revitalize Austria-Hungary and to demonstrate that renewed vigor—could be done only with great difficulty. Militating against such action was a potent combination of factors. Both Andrassy and the emperor recognized the need for action but the nationality problems, the wretched state of the nation's finances, the divergent interests of the two halves of the realm, and the crisis of confidence in the nation's future, particularly on the part of the military leaders, worked against a long-lasting revitalization of the Austro-Hungarian state. Given those conditions, about the most which could be expected of Andrassy as foreign minister was a competent, albeit primarily passive, defense of the Dual Monarchy's indisputably vital interests and an occasional, opportunistic foreign policy foray designed to persuade the rest of Europe that Austria-Hungary was indeed still a Great Power. In the short run perhaps Andrassy did convince Europe that Austria-Hungary remained a Great Power. He was, after all, a master of improvisation and opportunism. If anyone could present the
Dual Monarchy's increasingly desperate situation in a favorable light, it was Andrásy. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine who could have served more effectively as Austria-Hungary's foreign minister during the 1870's. He was able to protect the Dual Monarchy's Balkan interests, to acquire some territory, and to minimize to the other Powers his country's weakness and vacillation. But, as mentioned earlier, Andrásy's "success" was largely the result of Great Britain's triumphant defense of the Balkans against the danger of Russian hegemony there. And, even if Andrásy and Austria-Hungary had achieved the gains they did make entirely on their own, it would not have signified very much since those gains were short term, and, particularly in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a mixed blessing at best. It would appear then, that one has to answer the question asked in the beginning of this work—whether Andrásy could have pursued a different course of action and thereby helped Austria-Hungary to avoid World War I—in the negative. It should be readily apparent by now that Andrásy and Austria-Hungary had less and less freedom of action as the Balkan crisis progressed. It seems as though the more serious the Russian threat to the Dual Monarchy became, the less able or inclined was Austria-Hungary to act. One can surmise, probably with a good deal of justification, that the Habsburg government hesitated to confront Russia because
of a lack of confidence in the nation's ability to defeat the Russians. Moreover, if the Dual Monarchy was as weak as some leaders were beginning to fear it was, a decisive military defeat could destroy the Habsburg state.

Andrássy's "failure," as he himself undoubtedly recognized, turned precisely around this issue of confidence in the nation's future. He was completely convinced of the need to revitalize the country and to restore its faith in itself. Although he worked unceasingly towards achieving that goal, he was hard pressed even to effectuate the pretense of vigorous action on the Dual Monarchy's part, much less to bring about real action or to enhance the nation's power or confidence. The "success" of Andrássy's policy may be compared to the success of a well-conducted rear guard action which buys time and brings definite short-term advantages to the defenders but which is indicative of defeat and does not alter the ultimate outcome of a conflict.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

As the reader undoubtedly knows by now, the bulk of the information in this writing was gleaned directly from archival research. The material in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv provides a good grounding in Andrásy's day-by-day conduct of affairs and, if one is sufficiently patient and diligent, allows one to reach an understanding of Andrásy's long-range objectives. The documents in the Kriegsarchiv, while somewhat more difficult to use than those in the Staatsarchiv, often provide flashes of insight into Andrásy's motivation in adopting a particular approach to foreign policy problems. Moreover, the Kriegsarchiv material also provides information about the relationship between the Dual Monarchy's military capabilities and its conduct of foreign policy, as well as illustrating how the decision-making process worked at the highest level of the Habsburg government.

In discussing the published works consulted in connection with this writing, one must begin with Eduard Wertheimer's biography of Andrásy. Its value lies primarily in the author's intimate understanding of the events which he describes and in his utilization of irreplaceable source materials which have subsequently been destroyed. Wertheimer's book is marred by its extremely
pro-Andrássy outlook and by the tensions of the time in which it was published—for instance it is markedly anti-Russian and almost totally silent about Andrássy's negotiations with the British.

A number of books touch on some phase of the diplomacy of the 1875-1878 crisis, but no single volume covers the whole period from Vienna's perspective. Between David Harris', A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, which covers the first year, and George Rupp's, A Waver ing Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878, which details the events of the second two years, one can get a good picture of the general diplomatic situation. Benedict Sumner's Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880 gives a good explanation of Russia's course of action during the crisis and provides insight into Austria-Hungary's policy as well. In her works on Habsburg and Romanov foreign policy, Barbara Jelavich provides a succinct and outstanding account of the Balkan policies of those two states during the time in question. The numerous works by R. W. Seton-Watson also contribute to a better understanding of the diplomatic situation during the 1875-1878 crisis.

In regard specifically to Andrássy's foreign policy, the books by Edmund Glaise-Horstenau and Anton Mollinary are important, as is the article by Heinrich Lutz about the extraordinary council of February, 1872. The articles
by Istvan Diószegi are of special value in highlighting the specifically Magyar nature of many of Andrássy's goals and much of his policy. Péter Hanák's article in volume III of the *Austrian History Yearbook* deals in a more general but equally valuable manner with the influence of the Magyars in the governing of the Austro-Hungarian state and is suggestive about the power relationships and the decision-making process within the Dual Monarchy. The short work by Eduard Heller, *Ein Beitrag zur Charakterbilde Kaiser Franz Josephs*, is also important for its explanation of the way in which Francis Joseph's government functioned during the period under consideration here. Gunther Rothenberg's *The Army of Francis Joseph* succinctly provides a great deal of information about the army, particularly about the views and morale of its high command, during this period and aids one in determining Andrássy's true policy preferences.
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