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SUBJUNCTIVITY: ITS FORMS AND EFFECTS IN FOUR
SHAKESPEAREAN COMEDIES.

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SUBJUNCTIVITY: ITS FORMS AND EFFECTS
IN FOUR SHAKESPEAREAN COMEDIES

by

DALE GENE PRIEST

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

SUBJUNCTIVITY: ITS FORMS AND EFFECTS
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DALE GENE PRIEST

In an effort to focus more precisely on the pragmatic aspects of Shakespeare's art, I have employed the term "subjunctivity" to designate certain dramatic properties indicative of the playwright's manipulation of his audience. I have found the term especially useful in defining the uniqueness of the romantic comedies--plays I perceive as both literary artifacts and social documents. Subjunctivity, in relation to these plays, thus denotes at once an artistic strategy and a vision of life. The strategy, furthermore, promotes Shakespeare's recommendation of the vision. As dramatic method, subjunctivity refers to the playwright's persistent balancing of opposing forces in the comedies. We note, on the one hand, those aspects of the drama designed to involve or psychologically engage an audience in the life of the play--such things as authentic, prose discourse, convincing character development, suspense, realism, the impression of genuine, human emotion, and the like. These things constitute the "assertion" of a play.
On the other hand, we mark the qualifications of that assertion--the hypotheticalities, or chiefly "metadramatic" factors which serve to offset the engaging appeal of the dramatic illusion. These aspects of the plays function to disengage us by calling attention to the artifice of the dramatic worlds--such things as poetry, song, and stylized rhetoric, disguise and conventional posturing, plays-within-plays, and other instances of "theatricality."

Unbalanced in the tragedies to encourage affective (purgative) involvement of audience, these dual forces are equally and simultaneously counterpoised in the comedies to elicit from an audience a cognitive and critical scrutiny of the drama and its meaning, vis-a-vis "real life." In this way Shakespeare encourages us to discover an implicit recommendation in the plays, an implication about the value of the theatrum mundi metaphor as a model for life. We recognize that human experience is best perceived subjunctively; it is best perceived as tentative--real and theatrical at the same time. Man can, ironically, best achieve what is most genuine and enduring by discovering and self-consciously exploiting hypothetical or theatrical modes. To illustrate this in the plays themselves, Shakespeare gives us examples of the efficacy of the subjunctive perspective in his leading roles. Julia, Petruchio, Viola, Rosalind--all
demonstrate the usefulness of subjunctive vision, the "rightness" of using hypotheticality as entrance into life, as the proper means to confront and shape human experience. I investigate the forms and effects of subjunctivity in four of Shakespeare's comedies: Two Gentlemen of Verona, The Taming of the Shrew, As You Like It, and Twelfth Night.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION

About the time I first began seriously formulating my thesis topic, a friend and I attended a major league baseball game at Houston's Astrodome. I enjoy baseball, and for reasons not unrelated to those pertinent to my love for theater. Both, of course, are contrived or "artificial" activities in which an audience seeks the joys and sorrows of recreative, vicarious experience. And though baseball has been widely and often rather mindlessly described as "dramatic," that popular notion still points with validity to a common denominator, in theatricality, shared by sport and dramatic performance. In any case, I was prompted to consider such things by an incident in that ball game in Houston. A Houston player hit a towering pop-up to the Atlanta catcher. He dropped it, embarrassing testimony to the Braves' woeful ineptitude at the time. My friend Tim, from seats closer to the field than usual, bellowed out "Hey, Murphy, what's the matter, too high for you?" At that point the beleaguered Atlanta rookie, in response, turned and stared directly at us with a decided look of chagrin on his face. Tim, shocked and mortified, ducked down in a fit of confused, embarrassed laughter. We spent the rest of the game trying to figure out what had happened.

What had happened, we decided, amounts to a violation of convention (on the playing field) and a concomitant shattering of expectations (in the audience). Major League ball players are not supposed to acknowledge
jeers from the crowd so overtly, and Tim certainly did not expect it. Murphy's response punctured the barrier of theatricality separating the game from the fans and deprived Tim of his assumed right to simultaneous involvement in and detachment from the events on the diamond. Murphy was reacting as Murphy, not as a baseball player, and he took us off guard. It was, in principle, as if Richard Burton, after delivering a soliloquy as Hamlet, suddenly turned and waved to a friend in the audience. The effect is devastating to the illusory integrity of the play/game as self-contained, artificial "world." Murphy's reply to Tim would not, of course, have been so shocking in a "poor play"; i.e., a Sunday afternoon softball game in the park where, like Bottom in "Pyramus and Thisbe," the players banter incessantly with the sideline patrons in an effort to "explain" performance and error. But in the Astrodome— with its indoor, "theater" environment of lights, comfortable seats and neatly-drawn foul lines— the effect of such a response is shattering. There the theatrical ambience, as well as the professional, major-league level of the staged activity, encourage us to perceive the game as dramatic spectacle, as a quasi-art form operating at a level of reality different from our own.

We wish and expect to perceive it thus. For a moment in the third inning, however, Murphy radically altered that perception with a turn of the head.

This is all tangential, and yet relevant to the thesis of this dissertation. The incident described does point vividly to the complex and rather delicate relationship that exists between dramatic art and its audience. That baseball is not a dramatic art per se is not at issue here. We all understand there is no script in baseball, that outcomes are uncertain from moment to moment. We know the essence of the game is spontaneous effort, with the players "really" trying to hit home runs and
turn double plays. And yet the game is still a game. Its spontaneous activities are framed in convention and governed by rigorous, artificial rules. It generates its own internal tensions not immediately related to the particular, "real" experience of either participants or audience. Sport is, therefore, a close relative of bona fide dramatic art and certainly a valid analog thereof. And our response to such forms of dramatic activity, our relationship to them as audience, is clearly far from simple. It bears investigation.

This relationship has, of course, been investigated in regard to Shakespeare. The body of Shakespearean criticism is enormous, and the commentators on the comedy itself are legion. Of those who have worked within the general sphere of my interest in the plays, however, the number of significant contributors is somewhat more limited. Names such as Burns, Styan, Righter, Evans, Calderwood, Hawkins, Mack, Rossiter come immediately to mind. And there are others, as a glance at my notes will attest. I have found the relevant criticism abundant enough to keep me busy, stimulated, and moving ever closer to my own, final position. Still, it is sufficiently scanty and inconclusive to point up the need for such a study as mine. Many of the available studies are interesting, most are helpful in some way, some are brilliant. Calderwood's thesis of Shakespearean "metadrama," Evans' analysis of the various levels of awareness between/among characters and audience, and Righter's observations on the self-contained Renaissance play are all invaluable contributions. Yet even these critics seem unable or unwilling to go beyond observation and analysis. The final step has yet to be taken, the final conclusive inference about Shakespeare's art that will shed light on its ultimate value for audience and reader.
Consider, for example, the conclusive sentence of A. P. Rossiter's chapter on "comic relief" in Shakespeare: "Shakespeare's view is the double-eyed, the ambivalent; it faces both ways."¹ The statement rather leaves one hanging. Its accuracy is unquestioned and demonstrated convincingly in his preceding argument, but its insufficiency makes me uncomfortable. The question of why or to what purposes and effects Shakespeare works in such a way is left unaddressed. Even Maynard Mack, who comes right to the edge of the problem in his essay on engagement and detachment in Shakespeare, must admit, "All that I can hope to do here is to touch on some of the signs of what I take to be Shakespeare's interest and sophistication in these matters."² It is true that Mack is correct in his analysis of how Shakespeare's audience is affected by theatrical devices and conventions. He calls our attention, quite rightly, to various Shakespearean effects that encourage reflection on the meaning of the dramatic activity, rather than mere assimilation into it. But in his attention to how the plays work, he neglects their final value. The question of how Shakespeare's craft impinges on human experience outside the theater walls—experience with which he is so universally in touch—remains unresolved.

In his "optative conclusion," Mack points to the need for further study of Shakespeare's style vis-a-vis his topic. To prompt that study, he suggests the playwright's dominant modes in this regard are "emblematic" (detaching) and "psychological" (engaging).³ I hope my thesis is, in part, an adequate response to that challenge. I posit in my notion of Shakespearean "subjunctivity" a pervasive, comic mode—not only stylistic but more inclusively dramaturgical—that encompasses Mack's dialectic in a single critical criterion. My term denotes at once an artistic strategy
and a vision of life, and the strategy promotes Shakespeare's recommendation of the vision. As dramatic method, subjunctivity refers to the playwright's persistent balancing of opposing forces in the comedies. I will examine, on the one hand, those aspects of the drama designed to involve or psychologically engage an audience in the life of the play—such things as authentic, prose discourse, convincing character development, suspense, realism, the impression of genuine, human emotion, and the like. These things constitute the "assertion" of a play. On the other hand, I explore the qualifications of that assertion—the hypotheticalities, or chiefly "meta-dramatic" factors which serve to offset the engaging appeal of the dramatic illusion. These aspects of the plays function to disengage us by calling attention to the artifice of the dramatic worlds—such things as poetry, song, and stylized rhetoric, disguise and conventional posturing, plays-within-plays, and other instances of "theatricality."

Unbalanced in the tragedies to encourage affective (purgative) involvement of audience, these dual forces are equally and simultaneously counterpoised in the comedies to elicit from an audience a cognitive and critical scrutiny of the drama and its meaning, vis-a-vis "real life." In this way Shakespeare encourages us to discover an implicit recommendation in the plays, an implication about the value of the theatrum mundi metaphor as a model for life. We recognize that human experience is best perceived subjunctively; it is best perceived as tentative—real and theatrical at the same time. Man can, ironically, best achieve what is most genuine and enduring by discovering and self-consciously exploiting hypothetical or theatrical modes. To illustrate this in the plays themselves, Shakespeare gives us examples of the efficacy of the subjunctive perspective in his leading roles. Julia, Petruchio, Viola, Rosalind—all demonstrate the
usefulness of subjunctive vision, the "rightness" of using hypotheti-
cality as entrance into life, as the proper means to confront and shape
human experience.

I will investigate the forms and effects of subjunctivity in four of
Shakespeare's comedies: Two Gentlemen of Verona, The Taming of the Shrew,
As You Like It, and Twelfth Night. The choices, of course, are far from
random, and in so admitting I surrender all pretense that my approach to
the comedies is universally effectual. Some plays would no doubt resist
explication by my method; most, I feel, would yield nicely. Armed with
my thesis, I would be willing to take on Love's Labor Lost, Merchant of
Venice, Much Ado, The Tempest, and, especially, Midsummer Night's Dream.
The latter play, calling such overt attention to the various interfaces
between life and fiction, illustrates most vividly the workings and
effects of dramatic subjunctivity. I have avoided it, however, partly
out of personal preference for my target plays (five plays would swell
this study to book length). I also defer to Calderwood's fine analysis
of Dream, using a method similar at times to mine. I have chosen two
early and two "mature" comedies and thus feel obliged to demonstrate how,
in the later plays, the principles and devices of subjunctivity are inte-
grated more organically into the fabric of the drama. I show, for instance,
how these principles are variously embodied in the clowns Feste and
Touchstone, and how— as well as to what extents and effects— these
characters function to subjunctify their worlds. But overriding all my
observations on the plays is a steady consciousness of my obligation to
make conclusion. I examine not only the means Shakespeare uses to achieve
a pervasive balance between the forces of engagement and detachment, in
relation to his audience, but also how this balance promotes the plays'
unique value as representational art.

Subjunctivity, as a characteristic of theater, refers to dramatic activity and language represented not as "fact," but as contingent or possible. It refers to a drama that encourages an audience to confront it, in one sense, as if it were "real" experience, while remaining continually aware that it is not, that it is theatrical representation. If Shakespeare's comedies are subjunctive in nature, then, his stagecraft has more in common with that of, say, Bertolt Brecht than that of Ibsen and Arthur Miller. The "illusionist," abetted by carefully realistic stage design, would tease us into a total, psychological participation in the drama as if it were, for the duration of the performance, an actual or unstaged event. Shakespeare's stage, on the other hand, is—like Brecht's—open and unconfined by the uncompromising trappings of concrete realism. It does not demand of us; it invites us, especially in the comedies, to relax a bit. And beyond stagecraft, the plays themselves contribute throughout to this effect.

In "subjunctivity" I propose a critical term more uniquely suitable to an examination of the comedies than Calderwood's "duplexity," for instance. The latter term otherwise functions nicely to elucidate various self-conscious ambiguities built into any art form that alternately, or simultaneously, conceals itself in illusion and reveals itself as artifice. But for Shakespeare's comedy that notion needs finishing to a more precise term. It is safe to say that all of Shakespeare's plays are interwoven with duplexities designed variously to engage and detach their audiences vis-a-vis the several "worlds" of the plays. Thus Hamlet's "Mousetrap," as intrigue, contributes to plot complexity and so heightens dramatic tension, while it simultaneously reminds the audience that it, like Hamlet,
is only watching a play. Richard II likewise engages our sympathies as, in despair, he woefully tells Aumerle "sad stories of the death of kings."
At the same time we are urged to remember that a king is but an actor:

... For within the hollow crown
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his Court, and there the antic sits.
Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp,
Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
To monarchize ... (Richard II, III.ii. 160-65).

The technique is central to Shakespeare's art. But with the comedies this technique is so pervasive and its effects so pronounced as to demand for these plays a separate and exclusive critical criterion.

Subjunctivity clearly implies an intentional analogy between the dramatic and the verbal. Indeed the connection here is firmer than analogy. For activity, action, and interaction— the grammatical province of the verb— are at the etymological core of the word "drama" itself. Thus drama is verbal in the double sense that it is concerned with/about words (dialog and dialectic), and is contrived to represent verb-like activity. It does this, of course, in different ways, for different reasons, and to different effects. Dramatic genre— certainly for Renaissance art— can dictate the "mood" of a play. If comedy is subjunctive, tragedy is imperative. Marlowe's Tamburlaine, an heroic but tragic figure, insists the world conform to his ambitious designs. The engaging tensions of Tamburlaine II emerge from the irresolvable conflict between two obstinate fixities: a man's will and an unalterably ordered cosmos. The mood of Macbeth is likewise imperative; the play slams into our consciousness as an irrepressible moral emblem. Its duplexities notwithstanding (e.g., the "Poor player" speech, the porter scene), Macbeth insists upon the cosmic, symbolic significance of the actions represented and demands the intense involvement of its audience, a psycho-emotional commitment to Macbeth's
story. Its value as high mimetic art, its cathartic efficacy, emerges at the interface between stage and life, where fulfillment is dependent on, and the result of, the engaged "participation" of the audience. This clearly differs from comedy.

We must be wary of the temptation to extend the grammatical analogy to the history plays. Shakespeare's histories are not merely "indicative" if we so imply they are concerned only with dramatic statement, with the artful representation of historical event, or with conventional Tudor theories about kingship, historical retribution, divine order and the like. Rossiter warns us rightly that Shakespeare was less than comfortable with the traditional "statement" about history, order, degree, etc.: "It falsified his fuller experience of men. Consequently, while employing it as FRAME, he had to undermine it, to qualify it with equivocations: to vex its applications with sly or subtle ambiguities: to cast doubts on its ultimate human validity ..." We might say the playwright could not resist "subjunctifying" the statement. Thus, in the histories, Shakespeare would invite his audience to more than a detached rehearsal of common knowledge.

In any case, comedy suggests while tragedy insists. When it begins to assert, comedy habitually qualifies. And its single-minded "advocators" (one thinks immediately of Jaques and Malvolio), unless they soften, are usually left out in the end. We shall see, in this regard, how Petruchio, in Shrew, is but a "quasi-asserter." Self-conscious in his role as pedagogue to Kate, he enjoys a healthy sense of detachment qualitatively different from the self-consciousness of the intensely committed and/or genuinely assertive tragic hero. Comedy, then, exemplifies and recommends a tentativeness, a skeptical tolerance of which Touchstone is perhaps the arch-
exponent ("Your 'If' is the only peacemaker, much virtue in 'If'"). Heavy-handed "warreants" will not do, and one thinks of Overdo and Busy, who in Jonson's Bartholomew Fair, must learn this lesson of comedy before they may have dinner with the rest. Likewise, Ferdinand's rigid "edict" is a foredoomed fixity in Love's Labor Lost. It cannot hold, for it violates the comic spirit. And Berowne, the comic hero, recognizes this immediately. He will play the game, but with a detached involvement worthy of Touchstone himself. Courting no illusions, he forecasts the vow's impotence against healthy, human nature:

Necessity will make us all foresworn
Three thousand times within this three years' space;
For every man with his affects is born,
Not by might mastered, but by special grace.
(I.i. 151-154).

Comedy does indeed assert, but it is not dogmatic. The assertions of comedy, negative and positive, usually embrace the familiar human attitudes and emotions— pride, anger, jealousy, kindness, and love, both brotherly and romantic. But superimposed on the assertions, on the thematic matrices of Shakespearean comedy, are various "subjunctive" conditions "contrary to fact." These conditions serve to qualify, even negate the assertions, to undermine the otherwise engaging appeal of theme and plot, and to remind the audience not to take them too seriously. Sometimes the contrary-to-fact condition is dialectical, taking the form of a direct protest or contradiction from one of the characters in the play. Thus Rosalind abruptly deflates Orlando's romantic notion that people die for love: "Men have died from time to time and worms have eaten them, but not for love." (AYLI, IV.i. 108). The audience gets the message, even if Orlando does not: "I would not have my right Rosalind of this mind, for I protest her frown might kill me." More often, however, the qualifications are woven more
subtly into the fabric of the play itself. The conditions take many forms—conventional plot complexities, disguise and misunderstanding, interior drama and plays-within-plays, song, and other forms of artifice and contrivance. All serve to "subjunctify" the surface reality of the play (and by "surface reality" I mean the dramatic illusion of "overriding reality," to use Elizabeth Burns' helpful term, by which she refers to the spontaneous patterns of mundane experience. Such reality would include "actual," disaffected behavior—rare enough in "real" life—and such genuine, human emotions as love and hate). In the case of Shakespeare the subjunctivity is surely intentional on the part of the artist. He does it with his audience in mind. He wants to distance us from his play's "overriding reality" that might otherwise involve us too much in its life. This is, as we shall see, exactly to his purposes as comic playwright.

The theory of dramatic subjunctivity is highly conceptual and resists formalization. A few more observations need to be made, however, before we note its workings in my four target plays. The Comedies can be considered dramatic "heterocosms" (to use M. H. Abrams' term), sustained in the tension generated by two opposing forces—the one engaging, the other disengaging the audience. On the one hand the "mirror" of the play reflects an overriding reality representative of "nature," or actual human experience. (Again, this reality is an illusion. It is, however, a bona fide baseline ontology for the world of the play; the patrons of representational art agree to accept it as such.) This reality takes many forms, usually related to character and plot. In Much Ado About Nothing, for instance, the Claudio-Hero plot seems, perceived at one level, to steer perilously close to the brink of tragedy. Claudio, duped by Don John into believing Hero unfaithful, violently and openly dishonors her, scorning her as a
"rotten orange ... (who) knows the heat of a luxurious bed," (IV,i. 32ff.). In light of Claudio's hard-hearted impetuousness and Hero's innocent, unwarranted suffering, many have considered him unworthy to win her later as his true bride. Patrick Swinden has even opined that "a hard deposit of unpleasantness crystallises around Claudio and sinks the centre of the play." I consider this view an overstatement, for the play is rescued successfully. In any case, there is nothing affected, at this point, about the characters' responses to the plot. Claudio's rage and Hero's shock are "real"; in the world of the play their emotions are sincere and authentic. The audience, identifying with them through the bond of representative, human experience, thus participates in the drama to the extent that it feels and responds to the engaging force generated by the surface reality of the play.

On the other hand, the playwright makes certain the audience does not forget the mirror itself. He reminds them they are watching a play. In Shakespeare's day, of course, this task was made easier by the logistics of Renaissance theater. The relatively bare stage, the bright sunlight, the boisterous spectators milling about and perhaps even sitting on the stage—all called attention to the "unnaturalness" of the dramatic situation. Even today, in a modern theater that promotes the illusion of reality with sophisticated settings, costumes, and lighting, there is still the stage withal, and the curtained frame of the mirror. Much more important and to our point, however, are the conventions, devices, motifs, and language of the play itself. These frequently, especially in Shakespearean comedy, call attention to the play's own fictive artificiality; they advertise the play as art. These aspects of the drama, serving to subjunctify or "unrealize" the reality of the play, then
promote an effective disengagement of audience from dramatic world.

In *Much Ado* such a disengagement is largely effected by the artifice, the "practice," of eavesdropping and deception. Shakespeare establishes this motif early on, in the masquerade scene, and weaves both main and subplots out of a tissue of misunderstanding arising from highly-contrived circumstance. Evans has observed that "no crowd of characters in a Shakespearean world exhibits more universal predilection for the game, such readiness to exchange and then exchange again the roles of deceiver and deceived." This, of course, has its effect on the audience, which is aware of the practices and deceptions in the play as no single character is. From its superior position as a kind of ultimate eavesdropper, the audience watches as Claudio tricks Benedick into believing Beatrice loves him, and then is himself duped by Don John concerning Hero's "treachery." We are privy to the intrigue as Beatrice is "set up" to admit Benedick's alleged passion for her; we watch as Don Pedro, too, is deluded by Don John's machinations. Finally, we overhear, with Dogberry's watch, Borachio's boasting of his part in the scheme against Claudio.

All of this "meta-eavesdropping" works to disengage an audience in at least two ways. First, the audience's acute awareness of the fact and the nature of the misunderstandings ensuing from the witnessed intrigues provides virtual assurance that the misunderstandings will be cleared up. This is a common paradox in comedy. If we, as audience, see clearly through the complexities caused by intrigue, we also rest comfortable in the expectation that the victims in the play will also come to see eventually. Disguise, of course, works the same way, when we know who is behind the mask and why. It gives us a detached assurance that the difficulties causing or caused by the disguise will be cleared up with
the eventual revelation of identity. Deception and other forms of artifice or "practice" intimate resolution or normalcy, just as wrong connotes right and sickness implies health. The "opposites" depend on each other for their meaning and impact, and an audience will find paradoxical comfort in its understanding of comic intrigue.

Secondly, the audience of Much Ado will be distanced by the theatricality of the eavesdropping scenes. Evans, we saw, refers to the intrigue as a "game," and to the deceivers as role-players. The characters, in their contrived "practices," cease to be "themselves" and become actors in the plays-within-plays that are the eavesdropping scenes. Shakespeare is, in effect, advertising his own art and reminding us that we are watching a play. This, in turn, serves to loosen the grip that plot and character might otherwise hold on our sensibilities. It weakens the arch of realism and sympathy that otherwise connects us to the drama. And I might add that, corollary to the above, these interior scenarios sharply reinforce the audience's awareness of itself as audience. Watching Beatrice as she functions as concealed audience to the staged conversation between Hero and her attendants, we are acutely reminded of our own status as audience. Aware of Hero's knowledge of Beatrice's "hidden" presence, we remember that all the actors on the stage are aware of us; they are engaging in a larger "practice" for our benefit. Ultimately, of course, the "practice" is all Shakespeare's. He will keep us distanced from his art to the extent that we might reckon with it correctly.

In Much Ado, the playwright accomplishes this effect not only by means of the game of deceit, but also through the benign bunglings of Dogberry on the one hand, and the witty repartee of Beatrice and Benedick on the
other. We are spared an excessive involvement with Hero's near-tragic debasement at the altar partly because we are fresh from the preceding scene. There Dogberry, having ironically fathomed Don John's plot, determines to "excommunicate" the villians. Thus we are assured that though Hero's mortification is "real" (since she does not know Claudio has been duped), her restoration is contingent only upon the truth's being made public. Larry Champion has dealt rightly with the way in which Beatrice and Benedick, in their wit-combat, help keep the play in comic perspective. Until the altar scene, when their true affection for each other and for Hero converge, they are able for the most part to hide their true identities (their "real" feelings and emotions) behind the subterfuge of wit. Language itself becomes a "mask," a "practice."

Bea: I wonder that you will still be talking, Signior Benedick. Nobody marks you.
Ben: What, my dear Lady Disdain! Are you yet living?
Bea: Is it possible Disdain should die while she hath such meet food to feed it as Signior Benedick? Courtesy itself must convert to disdain if you come in her presence. (I.i. 117-24)

And on and on they go. We might note, in this regard, that their use of language is the inverse of Dogberry's. Self-consciously trying to avoid an encounter with "truth," Beatrice and Benedick hide behind a dazzling display of wit. Dogberry, genuinely trying to arrive at truth, asserts himself in a muddled display of malpropism. Thus he charges the second watch:

... You are thought here to be the most senseless and fit man for the constable of the watch, therefore bear you the lantern. This is your charge. You shall comprehend all vagrom men. You are to bid any man stand, in the Prince's name. (III.III. 22-26)

Beatrice and Benedick will discourage "comprehension," at least until late in the play, with shimmering translucent language. Dogberry will
strive for comprehension despite a woefully opaque approach to language. All three, however, call attention to language as artifice—Beatrice and Benedick, through sparkling, contrived wit; Dogberry, through practiced misuse. In both cases the practice is, again, the playwright's. He reminds us of the manipulative limits language will allow; he makes us aware that language is an aspect of play, a contrived thing. Just as "practice" can be contrived for good (the strategem to unite Beatrice and Benedick) or ill (the plot against Claudio), so language can be contrived in ambivalent and polarized ways. The effect of all this practice and contrivance is one. The audience, reminded of the theatrical aspects of Much Ado, is allowed a measure of detachment to balance the allure of the play's more serious movement.

Shakespeare, then, has built into his comedies a variety of devices and motifs calling attention to the contrived nature of the dramatic heterocosms of which they are themselves integral parts. The resultant subjunctifying effect—undermining, qualifying, and balancing the otherwise engaging appeal exerted by the illusion of an assertive, overriding reality—is necessary for the establishment of the proper comic condition. As is true of other kinds of drama, and indeed of all representational art, Shakespearean comedy does not exist totally self-contained as fictive, "second world" of pure illusion. To be of value, the second world must somehow flex back to reality, re-impinge upon the world, the society which gave it life. Harry Berger, Jr., notes that the Renaissance painter often accomplishes this "invasion of life" by the use of an interior "presenter," pointing into the "world" of the painting itself. The dramatist similarly builds into his artifacts certain "gestures of self-limitation" contrived to prevent the reader or observer from losing himself in the art. Shakespeare knew, with his age, that the playwright was responsible
for more than simply the creation of absorbing illusion. He was a consummate master, in the tragedies as well, of the theatrical techniques consciously designed to prevent an audience from tumbling headlong into a play, as it were, on a wave of intense ekstasis. Other dramatists and critics, of course, have also been aware of the dangers of excessive audience involvement. Sartre, in our day, has observed that if drama does no more for us than encourage unmitigated involvement and identification, it becomes an exercise in narcissism—a means not to self-knowledge, but to self-indulgence. And Brecht, with his "epic theater," purposefully frustrates a modern audience's hunger for illusion; he intentionally "alienates" an audience from the world of the play ("Verfremdungseffekt").

Brecht's method relates to his epic theory itself, the fundamental quality of which Brecht himself described with the verb zeigen: to show, point to, or demonstrate. Thus his dramatic episodes are not presented but represented; they are "shown," not "lived." (We recall the effect of the interior "pointer" in Renaissance painting.) In The Caucasian Chalk Circle (1944), for instance, we are presented a demonstration of an ancient Chinese fable, narrated by Arkadi, a professional singer from Tiflis. The dramatic framework is the familiar one of the play-within-a-play, similar to that of Beaumont's Knight of the Burning Pestle and Shakespeare's own Shrew. Arkadi calls on his musicians and his actors to "demonstrate" his legend to the interior audience composed of war-ravaged, Caucasian peasants. This kind of "epic" staging, emphasizing the remoteness and "pastness" of the events staged, has a decidedly disengaging effect on an exterior audience watching the whole spectacle. Such epic acting, as Peter Demetz has noted, as well as the use of songs, music, choreography, and scenic design all serve to conteract the fable, commenting on
rather than supporting it; these elements alienate the events of the play from the realm of the ordinary, natural, and expected.14

Brecht's stagecraft encourages his audience to step back, as it were, and take stock of his play. If his audience finds the legendary stories of Grusha and Azdak engaging and appealing, that is fine and to his purposes. As Otto Reinert has observed, Brecht uses emotional appeal as a strategy of persuasion—as a means to a rational end, not as an end in itself.15 Aware of the play as artifice, the audience is detached sufficiently to consider the value, the implications of the art. That these implications may be Marxist is not of our concern here. Nor is the final value of the play reducible to any kind of simple didactic formula (and this is certainly true of Shakespeare). The value of the play resides in the fact that it is an aesthetic experience rewarding for its own sake and because it promotes cognitive consideration on the part of its audience. And this kind of cognition requires the degree of detachment insured by the theatrical and stylistic logistics of this kind of drama. Brecht himself spoke of an epic "Smoking Theater," where people could watch plays as if they were bicycle races or boxing matches (we might say baseball games)—spectators on their toes, critically aware of the various technical and thematic implications of the play.16 This suggests that Brecht's notion of dramatic subjunctivity was perhaps more extreme than Shakespeare's in its emphasis on the realism or "contrary-to-factness" of the play. The temptation to call Shakespeare's the more "balanced" view is irresistible. In any case, Brecht's dramatic theory and practice point vividly to our central point about Shakespeare's art, vis-a-vis his audience. Simultaneously engaged and detached, the spectator is able to truly experience the play, to include the exercise of a cognitive control vital to the assimilation of
the play's final value.

This important process of cognitive interpretation—different from the affective response of first sight and any deeper understanding subsequent to later reflection—requires, for the observer, the proper "psychic distance." This, again, is the important function of the subjunctifying forms and effects embedded in Shakespeare's comedies. They are also partly responsible for those incongruous situations that are at the heart of most humor— the conditions of laughter (comic misunderstanding resulting from disguise, for instance). But more significantly, in announcing the artifice of the play and thus undermining its "reality," such tactics serve to disengage the audience to the extent necessary to balance the forces working to draw the audience into the world of the play. This "balancing act," furthermore, is ongoing and simultaneous, just as a subjunctive sentence is simultaneously engaging statement of fact and distancing qualification. Such a balance in the comedies produces the proper perspective for optimum assimilation of value on the part of the audience. From his vantage point the spectator is able, on the one hand, to "rub shoulders" with the experience represented on the stage, to enjoy or otherwise feel his "participation" in it. And he is free, simultaneously, to exercise his fullest critical faculties in interpreting the play, to draw from it something which impinges on his own experience outside the theater walls. Taken together, these things constitute the play's value as representational art.

The impact of the dramatic experience, for anyone watching or even just reading a Shakespearean comedy, is a spongy and various thing. It resists formalization or general rendering, and is best considered in the context of the specific aspects of each play. That is the burden of the next chapters— to show how subjunctivity works, and to what final effects,
in the four plays. But we can perhaps make a profitable start here. That the value of Shakespeare cannot be reduced to formula points, first of all, to what it is not. It should be obvious that value in Shakespeare is rarely to be found in obtrusive dianoia, and never in the kind of overt didacticism practiced by his Medieval predecessors. We have noted Rossiter's observation that in the history plays Shakespeare, far from merely illustrating or endorsing prevalent Tudor doctrine about kingship and divine order, actually vexes and qualifies it. Rather than uncritical "message" plays about moral matters, the histories often emerge as historical assessments that stress a political rather than a providential interpretation.

Thus, as Moody Prior asserts, the question of Henry's right to rule, in *Henry VI*, repeatedly turns on the question of whether he can rule.17 Likewise in the tragedies, though he has behind him the "Fall of Princes" tradition with its didactic overtones, Shakespeare does not preach to his audience. What befalls his heroes and their worlds is largely the result of their fated conflict with the divinity that shapes their ends. Indeed, what can be said of how man is to act or what he is to believe in a universe where we are to the gods as flies to wanton boys? The value of these plays has much to do with catharsis, little with instruction. We are invited not so much to learn, but to feel deeply. And, of course, the comedies too are free of overt moral or theological messages that would spur us to activity or belief. Thoroughly secular, they insist on nothing and advocate no formulaic maxims. They are, again, subjunctive by nature.

Nor is the value of Shakespearean comedy to be found in satire. This is not to say that the plays do not relate to human society. I have already asserted that they do. But as a reformer of social values, Shakespeare's comedy works in ways more subtle than the satirist's method,
ways I will approach shortly and enlarge on later. Indeed there is social commentary and some incidental satire in Shakespeare, but the exposition of folly and vice is not his primary comic purpose. It is not Shakespeare's main business to be concerned with knaves and fools and their disruptive or malignant relationship to society, with their exploiting and being exploited. That is more in line with Ben Jonson's approach to comedy, in which vice and its rather lurid social context are exposed for what they are or pretend to be. We might say that Shakespeare's comedies are less "audience-bound" than Jonson's and the other forms of satiric comedy that followed in the next two centuries. Shakespearean value is, of course, a direct function of the play-audience relationship, but less dependent on the character of an audience culled from a particular social context. Hence Shakespeare's famed "universality."

This is not the place to argue whether the bard's plays were written for public stage or private occasion. Nor do we choose merely to overlook the "schools of night" and "new maps with the augmentation of the Indies" and other topical allusions in Shakespeare. I say simply that one virtue of festive, non-satiric comedy of Shakespeare's kind is its more general appeal and effectiveness. The settings and social worlds of Romantic comedy are more fluid, less important than they are in satire. Sherman Hawkins,\(^\text{18}\) Northrop Frye\(^\text{19}\) and others have called attention to the sometimes dual nature of the comic worlds in the plays. But Shakespeare's societies, whether "normal" or "green," are designed neither to engage nor enchant an audience. Rather, they serve the playwright as expansive, and thus nicely functional arenas wherein his characters may move and interact freely and at their own pace in response to the universal forces of sexual attraction and antagonism. Any audience can share in the liveliness and energy of
Romantic comedy.

Satire reaches out to a more particularized audience. What it seeks to expose or correct may be rather timeless human foibles, but its denser, more focused structure still reflects an appeal to a society that presumably "needs" the satiric message. Thus Wycherley lashes out at the sexual hypocrisy of the Restoration, Pope demolishes the "dunces" of Augustan literary coteries, and Swift takes on the human animal himself against a backdrop of Eighteenth-century political folly. And Jonson's Bartholomew Fair is "as dirty as Smithfield, and as stinking every whit." This is not Shakespeare's method; we do not seek his value in satire. And the difference between his and the satiric approach to comedy is seen in other important ways besides audience-orientation. Jonson's Volpone may provide us with some interesting points of comparison in this regard. There, not only social setting but plot and character as well are all more consequential than is generally the case in Shakespearean comedy. I have mentioned that Shakespeare's settings tend to be loose and expansive, like Brecht's, with much room for diverse "horizontal" interaction among the characters. And his social worlds are representational, even in the interior "green" realms (with some qualifications in the case of Dream). But if Shakespeare's comic worlds are representational, Jonson's are sordidly so.

Volpone's Venice is a grotesquely enlarged photograph of a "real" society where gold is God and greed is the moral norm. Its populace is composed almost exclusively of knaves and fools (Celia and Bonario excepted), with the fools themselves trying hard to be knaves. Here the interaction between the characters is more "vertical," with the knaves reaching down to exploit the fools, and the fools reaching up to grab the knaves' money. To unravel the schemes and expose the vice, Jonson must depend on a dense,
tightly-woven plot. All the causal links must be carefully illuminated, so that it is clear who is acting as knave and who as fool. The final satiric message is dependent on the audience's recognition of the enormity of the vice and its location; i.e., who is responsible and to what extent. Shakespeare's plots, on the other hand, tend—with the notable exception of *The Comedy of Errors*—to be much more loose and casual, rather incidental impediments to the inevitable movement toward marriage and social integration. Granted, the plots are sometimes significant enough. Shylock's demand for a "pound of flesh" as security on Antonio's loan, Don John's practice on Claudio, the meanness of Frederick and Oliver in *As You Like It*, the intransigence of Egeus in blocking Hermia's happiness, and even the plot to bring Caesario and Sir Andrew together in a duel—all these pose problems, with potentially serious effects, that must be worked out before the resolution and integration of Romantic comedy can be reached. But there is no integration at the end of *Volpone*, only resolution—and that of a grim nature.

At the conclusion of Jonson's play, Volpone is locked up in irons, Mosca sentenced to the galleys, Corbaccio humiliated in the stocks, and Voltore disbarred and exiled. The intricate, densely "realistic" plot of the play has put great demands on the outcome of the satire. The "plot movers" have been the main characters themselves, and it is they who must meet its final demands. They are responsible, they must pay, and the satire has its way. No one is left to redeem the society in the spirit of forgiveness and regeneration. The case is different with Shakespeare. His intrigues are usually instigated by minor characters, as if to mitigate the metaphysical "reality" of malevolence in the comedies. His plot-movers tend to be people like Don John, Fredrick, Egeus, Sir Toby, and
Maria. Their efforts are interesting, and even work to draw us into the world of the play. But their efforts are not as motivated or as "sincere" as those of Jonson's knaves. They lack the heavy-handed realism supplied by the duplicity of Corvino, the greed of Volpone and Mosca, the parasitic rapacity of Corbaccio and the rest. Those rascals truly over-reach themselves. In the end, Volpone must step out from the stage and remind us we have been watching a comedy.

Volpone is clearly a comedy less subjunctive than Shakespeare's. Its value is much more clearly defined in its satiric outcome. And though Shakespeare's remains elusive, we can make a final approach to it by looking more closely at the treatment of character by the two playwrights. It may seem backwards at first to refer to the "realistic" aspects of character in Volpone, when few Renaissance plays are so dominated by theatrical self-consciousness as this one. Indeed the metaphysical framework of the play is neither "man being" nor "man thinking" but "man acting" (homo ludens). Alvin Kernan has demonstrated how the theatrical metaphor is so very densely interwoven into the fabric of the play.21 Posing as a man sick and dying, as Scoto the mountebank, even as a dead man—Volpone serves as a paradigm for the ubiquitous theatrical activity in the play. No one is who he seems. Each major character hides behind a theatrical mask, "practicing" on others to satisfy his self-aggrandizing appetites. Volpone, rich but without children, pretends he is dying in order to extract gifts from his would-be heirs. These birds of prey, in turn, feign friendship for Volpone in order to draw the biggest share of his estate. And Mosca, Volpone's slavish parasite, plays the flatterer only to try to blackmail his master when Volpone wills him his whole estate and pretends to be dead. This bizarre trick, a gaudly parody of Renaissance "over-
reaching," is motivated by Volpone's perverse desire to enjoy the dis-
comfiture of the vultures awaiting his death.

The "reality" of all the self-conscious role-playing in Volpone lies,
then, in the disguised ugliness actually motivating the players, and in
the fact that their various roles come to be their essences. They become
locked in or imprisoned in their theatrical parts, as they "fail to real-
ize that their make-believe becomes in time their reality."22 As long as
the players follow their greedy appetites instead of their reason, there
is no way to get out of their chosen parts. Theatricality, which began
as an attempt on the part of the players to control their fortunes,
becomes the agent of disorder and uncontrol. Only when the masks are
finally removed can order be restored. Then the performance is over, but
the players are therefore destroyed. The passing of the parts nullifies
the players' transformed existence. They are doomed for having forfeited
a reality outside their roles. In the prologue to the play, Jonson had
promised us "profit with (our) pleasure." In the end, the profit lies in
the exposure and correction of folly through the blood-letting of justice:

... Away with them!
Let all that see these vices thus rewarded,
Take heart, and love to study 'em. Mischiefs feed
Like beasts, till they be fat, and then they bleed.
(Volpone, V.xii. 148-51)

The value of Shakespeare's comic art is an ongoing thing, persistently
interwoven into the subjunctive patterns of the plays. For an example,
we can return, before moving on to Two Gentlemen, to our discussion of
Beatrice and Benedick in Much Ado. We have seen that early in the play
they practice the artifice of wit to avoid any "real" encounter with each
other. Certainly until the outbreak of genuine emotion following the
altar scene, the character of each is tentative in ways that Volpone's,
in spite of his masks, is not. When Jonson's play opens we see Volpone bathing in his gold coins. This gives us an immediate sense of certainty about the real ugliness of his character, an impression to be increasingly solidified as the fox plays out his increasingly degenerate, imprisoning roles. When Much Ado opens, however, we merely hear about Benedick. And even that second-hand information is obscured by Beatrice's elaborate, metaphysical jest about him as cupid's archer, challenged by her uncle's fool (I.i. 39-45). Such evasive language contributes to the "false start" she gives us concerning his character. She would have us picture him as that stock alazon figure, the miles gloriosus, "a stuffed man ... (who) wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat, it ever changes with the next block." She speaks of him as a convention rather than as a man. Such hypotheticality has a decidedly distancing effect on audience sensibilities. It is a subjunctive device warning the audience not to be hasty in forming notions about Benedick's "real" character. Likewise Beatrice's character itself is from the start shrouded in subjunctivity. If Benedick is "Signior Mountanto," Beatrice is "Lady Disdain." Each refers to the other with false or abstract names to widen further the distance between the nominal and the real, between character and audience. Beatrice, furthermore, conceals herself behind a mask of masculine aggressiveness. Unlike the literal disguises of Julia, Viola, and Rosalind, however, Beatrice's is one of witty and aggressive language. Like Messina itself (with the obvious exception of the reticent and brooding Don John), she is, in the beginning, largely a stylistic entity. Her feelings are concealed behind a surface of wit, and her "assertions" are those of rhetorical bombast. Her style, in other words, is a subjunctifying artifice, calling attention to her powers of theatrical contrivance and thus dis-
couraging a psychological identification of audience with character.

On the other hand, there are forces at work, even early in the play, to engage us with Beatrice and Benedick. Their sheer energy alone is enough to persuade us that there is surely vital integrity hidden behind their theatrical surfaces—something that will out sooner or later. It is clear, furthermore, that they have known each other for some time, evidence of a viable human bond between them which no amount of protest and wit-skirmishing can quite deny. "I know you of old," she chides Benedick, "You always end with a jade's trick." The jest both disguises and reinforces the affection. We are further attracted to them by their loyalties and the loyalties of others to them. This is specifically true in regard to their relationships with Claudio and Hero. Neither alazons nor eirons, Claudio and Hero are immediately recognized as characters whose judgments we can trust. Like Olivia in Twelfth Night, they are "base-line" figures who represent a kind of moral norm for the world of the play. Though they can and will be deluded, we can count on their fundamental common sense and the basic sincerity of their feelings and responses. If Olivia is fond of Sir Toby and his gang of revellers, we are prone to like them too, and we can trust that her affection for Feste is well grounded. Likewise the human bond between Hero and Beatrice encourages us to look beyond mere kinship for something fundamentally worthy in the latter, as the affection of Claudio for his friend woos us to seek real human substance in Benedick. Indeed we know already from the messenger that he is "as pleasant as ever he was ... (a man who) hath done good service in the wars." Thus during the first two acts of Much Ado our perspective on Beatrice and Benedick is a balanced and tentative one. Distanced by the artifice of their postures and engaged by their
promise as human beings, we bring a cognitive scrutiny to bear upon them
which best equips us to interpret what is about to happen to them.

What is about to happen to them is, of course, a voluntary metamor-
phosis. They will cease playing Cupid's enemy and willingly submit to the
power of love. We are prepared for the change, and for reasons other than
the human potential we noticed above. From the outset we have been able
to perceive chinks in their armor of obstinance. For two acts the defining
feature in the ostensible character of both Beatrice and Benedick has been
a sworn devotion to the single life. Both appear to be committed to a
rational, self-sufficient existence that precludes the frivolous complex-
ities of romantic love. We are urged to believe in the sincerity of these
sentiments because they entrust them to their bosom friends, not just to
each other. (With each other, their wit combat disengages us from most
everything they say.) In Benedick's remarks to Claudio we hear the tones
of conviction, even if they are orchestrated with those of dangerous self-
righteousness:

    ... all women shall pardon me. Because
    I will not do them the wrong to mistrust any,
    I will do myself the right to trust none, and
    the fine is ... I will live a bachelor."
(II.i. 244-29)

Likewise Beatrice will remain a "bachelor" (we recall her masculine
"disguise"):

    ... Just, if (God) send me no husband,
    for the which blessing I am at him upon
    my knees every moring and evening ...
    No uncle, I'll none. Adam's sons are
    my brethren, and truly, I hold it a
    sin to match in my kindred ...
(II.i. 29ff)

spoken to her uncle and her cousin.
Yet balancing the engaging sincerity of these stances is their obvious conventionality. Hearing them, we immediately think of Troilus and the other self-styled enemies of Cupid. "Pride cometh before a fall" and other platitudes come crowding in to undermine the force and appeal of their philosophies. And they are further subjunctified by the qualifications inherent in their various oaths. Note the subjunctive tones of Benedick's protest:

... The savage bull may (bear the yoke of marriage), but if ever the sensible Benedick bear it, pluck off the bull's horns and set them in my forehead."
(I.ii. 264-66).

And just before his "fall" there is almost an optative quality about his musings:

... May I be so converted, and see with these eyes? I cannot tell, I think not. I will not be sworn but love may transform me to an oyster, but I'll take my oath on it till he have made an oyster of me he shall never make me such a fool ... till all graces be in one woman, one woman shall not come in my grace."
(II.iii. 21ff).

Several lines later he is an oyster, but very much alive. Beatrice, too, displays the same kind of unconscious tentativeness in her protesting:

... With a good leg and a good foot, Uncle, and money enough in his purse, such a man would win any woman in the world, if a' could get her good-will ... (but) not till God make men of some other metal than earth."
(II.i. 15ff).

In these subtle qualifications, in the fact that they "protest too much" in each other's presence, and in the conventionality of their philosophy, Beatrice and Benedick both subjunctify their own positions. This is the playwright's doing, of course. It serves to reinforce the audience's balanced perception of their character established in the tension between their wit and their human potential, examined above. Our
sensibilities, as regards our perception of them, are simultaneously engaged and detached. We perceive them with the cognitive control necessary for optimum assimilation of what is about to happen. Until the very moment of their transformations their respective characters are tentative, and we likewise perceive them tentatively. Form and meaning are about to converge. The character, the identity of Beatrice and of Benedick have been heretofore suspended in a solution of conditionality, waiting to be precipitated. They are subjunctive creatures, bound neither to the fixed identity of a Don John nor the excessively self-conscious theatricality of a Volpone. They have walked, intelligently, the middle ground between excessive involvement in their world and detachment from it. Neither terribly sad nor terribly happy, they are tentative about themselves and each other. They are thus in a position to change, to find new selves as they yield to each other and the integrating power of love.

Here is the value of this aspect of Much Ado. In using the principle of subjunctivity to create Beatrice and Benedick, Shakespeare has thereby molded our perceptions to the balanced perspective of critical cognition. Like them, we are tentative, ready to draw inferences. And from their willingness to change, to find eventual felicity in an institution they seem to despise, we can draw a great Shakespearean inference that values this aspect of the play. In the characters of Beatrice and Benedick, Shakespeare is subtly but persistently recommending a subjunctive approach to experience. To participate in life and yet remain aloof from excessive commitment and single-minded involvement is to insure the flexible control that maximizes one's opportunities for success and joy. The playwright is, in effect, recommending a variant of that dominant Renaissance metaphor relating life to the stage. If theater is a mirror for life, so in life
is found an image of the theater. Life is best perceived as drama, but not as Jaques' arena of futility or Macbeth's pageant of emptiness. Human experience is best perceived as comedy. Such is the essential vision of Beatrice and Benedick, as it is that of other heroes and heroines of Shakespearean comedy. It is an intelligent world-view, bound on the one side by genuine, human feeling and on the other by self-conscious theatricality. Subjunctive vision is a healthy version, then, of the homo ludens metaphysic. Here is a metaphysic that keeps man "acting" in both senses of the word, ever-conscious of his tentative role and his ability to control his world by changing to meet the demands of experience. Shakespeare does not insist on this lesson, but his comic art recommends it. Form and meaning thus converge at the interface between stage and audience. In Much Ado, Shakespeare uses the forms and techniques of subjunctivity to give us the perspective necessary to interpret Beatrice and Benedick's own subjunctivity. His method is their model, and their model becomes the playwright's implicit recommendation to his audience. It is the "profit" we can take home with us.
NOTES


3. Ibid., p. 294.


5. Ibid., p. 12.


14. Ibid.


16. See Demetz, p. 15.


Shylock is a rather problematic exception to this generalization. In speaking of Twelfth Night and Malvolio, David Zesmer notes that "Shakespeare did not repeat the mistake made in The Merchant of Venice of creating a villain too big to be absorbed into the sunny atmosphere of comedy."


Ibid., p. 21.

Dramatic energy is a fundamentally engaging force in a play; i.e., it works to involve an audience in the life of the drama. In tragedy, obviously enough, such energy promotes cathartic involvement. To the extent that the knaves and villains of comedy assert themselves, furthermore, their energies function to focus our attention on the resulting, situational problems which somehow must be resolved. Volpone, Don John and certainly Shylock thus contribute to this form of audience involvement.

The high spirits of Shakespeare's "funny" characters also promote engagement, insofar as they are representative of the vitality of real life. Humor requires some disengagement, however—a simultaneous detachment often provided in the case of such characters by our awareness of their various lack of awareness. Sly, Dogberry, and Bottom come to mind in this regard.

Shakespeare's more intelligent funny people, while releasing us with (for instance) their manipulative use of language, can further engage us in the plot-affecting intrigues which are the spontaneous outgrowth of their energetic sense of fun. Feste, Sir Toby, and Maria are good examples here. In the cases of Beatrice and Benedick, however, dramatic energy reinforces the empathic bond otherwise established by the playwright between character and audience. Here we think also of Katherine, Petruchio, and Rosalind.
CHAPTER TWO:
THE TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA

One is almost obliged, at the beginning of any discussion of The Two Gentlemen of Verona, to concede the play's fundamental weakness. Faced with the body of existing criticism on the play, one feels out of line to do otherwise. Those commentators who dare to do more than demonstrate new ways in which the play does not work have tried to save it by bringing variously colored lights to bear upon its difficulties. One camp would have us consider Valentine's outrageous behavior in Act V, for instance, as reflecting the influence of John Lyly, whose treatment (in the Euphues and Endimion) of the conflicting claims of romantic love and male friendship was familiar and sensible to Shakespeare's audience. Others struggle to make a case for the "education" motif in the play; these critics generally maintain that the process of self-discovery for the naive heroes requires drastic measures and results. Some see the play as an early experiment with the great themes of forgiveness and reconciliation that would be handled more adroitly in the later comedies and in King Lear as well. And of course there are those who maintain Shakespeare has given us a parody about love and friendship, or that the ending of the play represents a critical refutation of the men's (especially Valentine's) conventional and self-indulgent posturing throughout. Finally there are the more genial approaches, notably that of Inga Ewbank, who argues convincingly that Shakespeare, as in the sonnets, both uses and criticizes
romantic convention in an attempt to beget a dramatic assessment of the real experience that is love and friendship.⁶ All this notwithstanding, I seek neither to condemn nor save The Two Gentlemen. I choose rather to re-examine it in terms of the principles of dramatic subjunctivity. This does not, of course, deprive me of an argument. I will, however, accept the play on its own terms in the hope of showing how the playwright's techniques and words as we have them work to produce the kind of effects examined in Chapter One.

Let us begin at the ending. I approach the play's final scene by issuing a challenge, at the outset, to its universal interpretation. Every critic of Two Gentlemen must later or soon come round to dealing with its abrupt and shocking conclusion. And since how one feels about this notorious ending invariably affects what one has to say about the rest of the play, I am persuaded to encounter it early. The situation is familiar. Proteus has "rescued" Valentine's beloved Silvia from the outlaws and is about to rape her, since she will not submit to the "gentle spirit of moving words." Valentine, witnessing the scene from the thicket, leaps forth to stay his erstwhile friend and verbally upbraids him for his treachery. Proteus repents. Valentine forgives and relinquishes Silvia to his reformed chum. The cold abruptness and lifeless artificality of this twenty-four-line exchange have embarrassed, even horrified, thousands of Shakespeare lovers over the years. George Eliot's response typifies that of audience and reader alike:

(It) disgusted me more than ever in the final scene where Valentine, on Proteus's mere begging pardon when he has no longer any hope of gaining his ends, says: "All that was mine in Silvia I give thee"!— Silvia standing by. ⁷

What Eliot found so offensive, of course, is Valentine's total lack of
real feeling for Silvia. She seems, as Ralph Berry points out, "a stage prop in the drama of Valentine," a silent, rhetorical object to be disposed of verbally. Valentine's detachment from the potentially vital and enriching "stuff" of his experience seems so extreme at this point that it becomes, like Jaques' in As You Like It, fatuous self-involvement. And Julia's subsequent swoon-assuming even it is not a mere posture—hardly counters the alienating force such wooden, unnatural behavior exerts on an audience.

Nor is this the only problem posed by the ending of our play. The overall difficulty here relates to the audience's awareness more of the genre than the life of the play. Convention prevails over plausibility as comedy comes rushing to a neat and rather artificial conclusion. We are made too aware of the "endingness" of the play as Shakespeare wraps everything up for us in the last one hundred eighty-eight lines. I have argued that causal linkages are not as vital to Shakespeare's art as they are to the satirist's, but here coincidence joins with convention in overtly calling our attention to the play as artifact. Silvia conveniently encounters Valentine's outlaws; Proteus, Julia, Valentine, and the Duke (also in tow with the outlaws) all make their appearances at just the right moments. The final integration, furthermore, is largely rhetorical maneuvering. Once Sebastian is revealed as Julia and she is quickly joined to Proteus, the women thereafter have no more lines. Thurio is dismissed, Valentine united with Silvia, the outlaws granted amnesty, and all "jars included" in a thirty-seven line verbal exchange between Valentine and the Duke. The problems are artfully resolved indeed, but excessive artfulness contributes to an unbalanced disengagement of audience sensibilities. Thus the play's final scene emerges as a rather hypothetical affair, too
subjunctive in its abandonment of life for the niceties of art and convention.

So goes the traditional criticism of the ending of Two Gentlemen. I have, I confess, overstated the argument to bring into sharper focus an alternative response to the final scene. We have seen that the most jolting artificiality here is in the remorse and forgiveness exchange between Proteus and Valentine, following as it does the engaging reality of an attempted rape. The brief duolog, concluding with Valentine's disposal of Silvia, seems so outrageously arbitrary as to predispose an audience to perceive the rest of the play's ending as mere contrivance as well. We have seen that there are indeed strong subjunctifying forces at work in these final moments, but they are exaggerated by our response to those key lines and its carry-over effects. What if our response is other than what Shakespeare thought it would be? I don't believe I am merely boxing at shadows, although everyone does indeed seem to hear the lines the way Julia does, in shocked amazement. But let us look at them again. Valentine has just chastised Proteus for his treachery:

Pro: My shame and guilt confounds me.
For as I tender'm not as true suffer
As e'er I did commit.
Val: Then I am paid,
And once again I do receive thee honest.
Who by repentance is not satisfied
Is nor of Heaven nor earth, for these are pleased.
By penitence the Eternal's wrath's appeased.
And, that my love may appear plain and free,
All that was mine in Silvia I give thee.
(V.i.v. 73-83).

I believe there is more going on in this exchange than two silly lads perfunctorily acknowledging that Renaissance maxim about the superiority of male friendship over courtly love. If not, then this is parody indeed.
First of all, Proteus' anagnorisis need not, on the stage, be as abrupt and empty as it appears in print. I don't know how Shakespeare's company performed this scene, but a good actor, playing Proteus, could certainly exploit the spatial and temporal parameters of the theater to make his utterance of remorse believable and engaging. A long pause might ensue, for instance, between Valentine's poignant "'Mongst all foes that a friend should be the worst!" and Proteus' reply, during which time he might turn, stunned, to walk downstage as the enormity of his actions begins to sink in. Another pause, perhaps punctuated with gestures of confusion and indecision, could intervene between "My shame and guilt confounds me" and "Forgive me, Valentine." As for his language itself, the brevity and declarative straightforwardness of his prose, except for the third sentence, reveal troubled sincerity as easily as flippant unfeeling (The subjunctive sentence suggests his deeply-ingrained habit of posturing, but his "hearty sorrow" would not have connoted, to a Renaissance audience, the frivolity we hear from our association of "hearty" with conviviality and canned soup.).

Proteus, for all the mischief his self-seeking causes in the play, is not committed to evil in the same sense that Don John and Shylock are. He does not represent a thematic fixity. He is, rather, a self-conscious manipulator, a kind of artist-figure who, no less than Julia in her disguise, creates illusion as a means toward securing his own ends (That his gaining or pursuing these ends must result in the unhappiness of others makes him, of course, a "villain," or "bad" artist-figure.). Nor is he locked or imprisoned in his own role-playing as Valentine is much of the time. Proteus is much more self-conscious than his friend, who tends to be the creature of convention Berry observes. 9 This is all to say that Proteus is more subjunctive in his attitude about himself, more able and
willing to change. Such a person, ever-eschewing a final identity, is, like Benedick in Much Ado, also ever-ripe for acquiring one. Perhaps this is what happens to Proteus in our scene. His manipulations have been thwarted, but the subjunctive psychology that has prompted those manipulations has also left him free to metamorphose one last time, into a genuine self who can joyfully integrate with society. The complaint, of course, is not so much with the change as with its apparent abruptness, which makes his new identity seem but another magic trick, another case of insincere posturing. I hope my comments have weakened the inevitability of that impression.

But there is other evidence that the exchange between Proteus and Valentine was intended to be much less artificial than it has been perceived. First of all, the last two lines of Valentine's reply suggest, to my view, a startling alternative to their usual interpretation:

> And, that my love may appear plain and free,
> All that was mine in Silvia I give thee.

What if the noun referent for "All" is not Silvia herself, but the "love" of the preceding line? In that case, Valentine is not saying "I give you Silvia," but rather something to the effect of "I freely extend to you, Proteus, a love equal in intensity to that I felt for Silvia when we were courting back in Milan." (R.W. Bond endorses a similar interpretation in his Arden edition of the play.) Such a rendering makes a great deal of difference in our view of Valentine. Even so, he is still indulging in theatrical histrionics, as his rhymed platitude about the "Eternal's wrath" makes plain. We see him even now, his arms outspread and his eyes to the heavens. But he is spared the heartless "nincompoop" moniker levelled at him by Berry. Julia, of course, interprets Valentine's words in the traditional manner. Thinking he has given Silvia away to Proteus, her own lover, Julia faints. And I submit that this response goes far toward
explaining why the usual interpretation is so universal. Audiences and readers have always followed Julia's lead in their response to the couplet. Over three hundred years of tradition dissuades me from insisting on anything here; nor am I desperately trying to "save" the play. I am simply suggesting that there is a subjunctive quality about Valentine's language here that looks two ways: in one direction, toward ultra-detached theatricality; in the other, toward generous human affection. The couplet is, in effect, a pun— an early example of the playwright's love for loaded and ambivalent language. The pun, unfortunately, is overly subtle, and Julia's response discourages us from hearing the side that would help balance the distancing effect resulting from Valentine's rhetoric and his apparent behavior. Recognition of the pun would, that is, give us a firm, cognitive grip on the proceedings here. Misusing it, we are alienated by the artifici-uality of both language and action.

Another example of ambivalence in Valentine occurs a few lines farther on. The Duke and Thurio having appeared on the scene, the latter spies Silvia and claims her as his own. He must then endure this barrage from Valentine:

Thurio, give back, or else embrace thy death.
Come not within the measure of my wrath.
Do not name Silvia thine; if once again,
Verona (sic) shall not hold thee. Here she stands,
Take but possession of her with a touch.
I dare thee but to breathe upon my love.
(V.iV. 126-131).

Here is an interesting admixture of elements. Those content merely to attack the play or defend it as parody might point to the speech as yet another instance of Valentine's ludicrous posturing as Romantic lover. (Curiously, I have found few critics willing to address themselves to these lines. Berry avoids them.) Valentine, in this view, is once again seen acting out an illusion— this time, that he is a wrathful knight
protecting the lady to the point of "arms" against a villainous and unworthy suitor. He seems all convention. And his rhetoric—his "or else's," "if's," "but's," and "dares"—is his weaponry. It suggests a desire to keep any actual conflict safely suppressed behind a screen of bombast and verbal qualification. And yet, again, Valentine need not be taken without exception as a product of convention. The speech seems in several ways to jar the notion that Valentine is a thoroughgoing poser who has just disposed of Silvia with the turn of a couplet. First we notice the language itself. If the rhetoric seems artificial, the words can also be perceived as intensely energetic. We notice he speaks in prose this time, and the platitudes are gone. The language reflects real passion as readily as fatuous pretense. And this is not the first time in the play that genuine human feeling has been perceived straining to find outlet through otherwise conventional language. Let us look back at Valentine's banishment speech, uttered as soliloquy when he learns he must be separated from Silvia:

And why not death rather than living torment?  
To die is to be banished from myself.  
And Silvia is myself. Banished from her  
Is self from self—a deadly banishment!  
What light is light, if Silvia be not seen?  
What joy is joy, if Silvia be not by?  
Unless it be to think that she is by,  
And feed upon the shadow of perfection.  
Except I be by Silvia in the night,  
There is no music in the nightingale.  
Unless I look on Silvia in the day,  
There is no day for me to look upon.  
She is my essence ...  
(III.i. 170-182).

I call this subjunctive language—stylized verbal patterning serving the needs of real feeling. And here I have the support of Ewbank, who proposes that here, as in Proteus' "foreswearing" soliloquy (II.vi. 1-43) and as in the sonnets, Shakespeare is working through the convention to reveal actual,
psychological distress. He criticizes the conventional rhetoric by using it, testing its limitations; he calls attention to the poignancy of the feeling by illustrating the convention's inability to order and contain it completely. As Ewbank puts it, "Under the pressure of the serious complications in the plot, those involving tension of mind and suffering and heartbreak, verbal ingenuity itself becomes a vehicle for a sense of life." We might add that the audience is simultaneously engaged and detached by the playwright's use of the vehicle both to release and contain that sense of life. Once again we have been afforded the best prospect from which to mind the play. Thus, in the speech quoted above, we feel the subjunctifying effect of Valentine's language. His conceits, his hypothetical "if's," "except's," "unless's," and other qualifiers, the symmetrical argument and the carefully poised antitheses—all call our attention to the language as artifice. Yet the verbal patterning is functional to the playwright's purposes in revealing an engaging core of feeling. The style itself suggests the staccato movements and counter-movements of a divided, troubled mind. The patterned speech reflects both indecision and the urge to impose order on unresolved paradoxes. The speech is both cause and result of the energy embedded in it. And, to quote Ewbank again, "There is a genuine ring of agony as the metaphors in Valentine's speech stop being conceits and become live reality." The effect of this subjunctive language is to pose an authentic human problem that cannot be tossed off as merely hypothetical. The audience is persuaded to share in Valentine's dilemma and, at the same time, to rest in the assurance that the power of art will be sufficient to resolve it. The insight suggested by this speech is of course lost on Valentine himself. Unlike Proteus, and especially Julia, Valentine lacks a consciousness of himself as an
artist-figure, in theatrical control of his experience. In fact he seems rather paralyzed here; he will get out of town simply because he feels he has no other choice. Still, his language sometimes has subjunctifying qualities that prompt an audience to consider the relationship between life and art.

But I was discussing Valentine's response to Thurio, in Act V, and had suggested that the speech represents both scene and sincerity. Where the accent lies depends, as is true of many of Valentine's lines, on how the exchange is acted. Two Gentlemen is one of the most purely verbal of Shakespeare's plays, and a producer often finds himself with a great deal of interpretive leeway in deciding which effects he wants to emphasize in a given speech. Valentine is especially vulnerable to a weighted or one-sided portrayal since, as we have seen, his language reflects both/either a mindless devotion to artifice and/or a human sensitivity often denied him. Perhaps more often it is obvious that he should be presented as the rather silly puppet of convention. Certainly at the beginning of Act II he is a mere object of amusement for a detached and condescending audience. There Speed, an audience surrogate to Valentine's dullness, quickly perceives on our behalf what is as plain "as a nose on a man's face" but invisible to Valentine; i.e., Silvia's ploy of having him write for her a love letter to her "suitor." And when Speed explains to him (to no avail) what is going on, in rhymed "fourteeners," the parody is obviously at Valentine's expense. Speed is spoofing the Petrarchan idiom which we assume informed Valentine's letter and certainly will characterize his later poem to Silvia:

My thoughts do harbor with my Silvia nightly,  
And slaves they are to me that send them flying,  
Oh could their master come and go as lightly,  
(III.i. 140, ff.).
And so on with the conceit.

In the last scene of the play, however, the option is clearly open to portray Valentine as possessed of human qualities as well. Certainly the bombast and flourish could be emphasized to make him seem ridiculous. Strutting and cutting giant circles in the air with his sword, thundering his lines, he could easily call attention to his proclivities toward conventional posturing. But would this not be absurdly gratuitous behavior for one who, forty lines earlier, had casually given away the girl whom he is now defending with such vigorous bombast? Many would reply that absurdly gratuitous behavior is not out of line with Valentine's character. I would resist, however, such a thoroughly wooden interpretation. His language, as I have noted, suggests real energy and passion, and that without bending, twisting, or reading between the lines. If Valentine is committed to Silvia here, his speech reinforces, furthermore, the alternative reading of his earlier reply to Proteus' repentance. If he has indeed not given Silvia away, but merely has extended profuse love to Proteus, then here he may be seen as seriously defending a personal and particular manifestation (that for Silvia) of the more abstract love he had freely and generously enlarged to include Proteus in the earlier speech. Viewed from this perspective, the reply to Thurio is not only richer in the stuff of real life, but it is dramatically functional as well. It is redemptive. The speech, so taken, justifies Valentine as worthy of Silvia's hand, as does his subsequent petition of mercy on behalf of the outlaws. I doubt, even so, that Valentine has arrived at the "perfection of self—knowledge" claimed for him by Peter Lindenbaum. He remains noticeably obsequious to the Duke right up to the end. But he is not merely Shakespeare's version of Jonson's Bartholomew Cokes, naively oblivious to all
reality, including the loss of his girlfriend. Valentine, after all, will marry the Duke's daughter, and with the Duke's blessing.

This observation leads to my final point of evidence in defense of a more balanced view of Valentine. When the latter's heated words force Thurio to back off and renounce his claim to Silvia, the Duke turns to Thurio and says,

The more degenerate and base art thou,
To make such means for her as thou hast done,
And leave her on such slight conditions.

And then, to Valentine:

Now, by the honor of my ancestry,
I do applaud thy Spirit, Valentine,
And think thee worthy of an empress' love.
(V.iv. 136-141).

The defenders of satire in Two Gentlemen will shout "irony" in one voice. The Duke, ostensibly praising Valentine for his noble actions, humiliates poor Thurio for behavior identical to Valentine's a scant fifty lines earlier. Both, that is, have renounced Silvia "on slight conditions." Both, as the Duke's ironic "praise" of Valentine insinuates, are equally foolish and contemptible imposters, cardboard parodies of true lovers. I disagree. It seems to me the Duke's final speech is hardly the place to look for irony, as I will explain presently. It is true, of course, that the Duke is capable of subjunctive vision. His detached, self-conscious use of convention to achieve "serious" results, for instance, is evident at the beginning of Act III. Having learned from Proteus of Valentine's plan to elope with Silvia, the Duke contrives an elaborate, artificial ruse by which he will "discover" the rope ladder under Valentine's cloak. The device is essentially an exercise in subjunctivity, as he posits a condition contrary to fact (his feigned "identity" as a suitor to a
reluctant lady) in order to camouflage genuine purpose (the determination to expose Valentine). Seeking Valentine's advice on how to proceed with his hypothetical suit, the Duke manipulates him programmatically by taking advantage of his dullness and his obvious inclination towards conventional response and behavior. Thus the Duke hypothesizes that his lady is inaccessible by day, knowing full well what Valentine's response will be: "Why, then I would resort to her by night." But her doors are kept locked and her chamber is on the second floor, which calls forth the stock solution of the courtly lover: "Why, then, a ladder, quaintly made of cords ... would serve to scale another Hero's tower." Carrying the ladder in secret, as we might expect, requires a cloak such as Valentine has on, and with a "dry run" the game is over and the discovery made.

The Duke's practice on Valentine is a clear instance of convention mocking itself so as to bring dramatic focus to bear on the real intensity of feeling underlying it or contingent on it. There is nothing affected about the Duke's anger: "Go, base intruder. Overweening slave! ... Be gone! I will not hear thy vain excuse! But, as thou lovest thy life, make speed from hence." And we have spoken above of Valentine's subsequent pain upon being thus banished. An audience is released by all the toying with overt convention, only to be quickly re-engaged by the explosions of feeling and the attendant turning of the plot. Interestingly, when the Duke's discovery is made, Valentine's cloak is opened to reveal yet another convention. In addition to the rope ladder, the Duke finds the Petrarchan poem to Silvia, the sheer artifice of which I have mentioned in contrast to Valentine's banishment speech. Convention is thus being exposed, quite literally, to redouble the self-mocking effect of the Duke's artful procedure with Valentine. Convention is exposed for what it is—man's compulsive
and variously effective attempt, through the use of art and artifice, to impose order and direction upon the overriding impulses of human experience. And in the exposure Valentine and his little poem are found lacking in this regard. Julia's disguise, as we shall see, is a much better way to apply the subjunctive principle to the demands of real life. Valentine's authenticity as a lover of Silvia is witnessed by the impending marriage, by Silvia's reciprocal affection and fidelity, and by the intensity of the Duke's irate response here. But his method of dealing with that reality, at this point, is exposed as too hypothetical.

Embedded in this exchange illustrating highly subjunctified feeling is another of those pervasive and implicit Shakespearean comments about drama and its relationship to life. The scene itself (III.i.) is a variation of the play-within-a-play motif, with interesting similarities to Hamlet's "mousetrap." Here the Duke is like Hamlet— the detached yet very interested manipulator who will use the dramatic mode as a means to discovery. Claudius, although he is aware of himself as both detached from and represented in the play, parallels Valentine in that both are puppets manipulated by the playwright-figures on the basis of expected and predictable (i.e., conventional) response and behavior. Acutely aware of the contrivance, an audience is distanced by the play's thus calling attention to itself as artifice. It is involved, on the other hand, by the very human forces motivating the scenario, and by its interest in the expected results and what they will mean for the world of the "greater" play enveloping the scene. The audience, in short, is once again poised and ripe for Shakespearean value. In our scene from Two Gentlemen convention is mocked because it points up and is closely allied with Valentine's dullness and unreflecting absorption in the convention at this point, and because it is segregated
from and diminished by the ensuing intensities. And yet the scene forces us to consider artifice, theatricality especially, as a means by which experience may be "framed" and thus perhaps correctly encountered. The implication, from the overt nakedness of the artifice here, is that it may be fine and right if handled in a more temperate way. Julia will give us an example of that presently.

Thus, though the Duke is quite capable of theatrical maneuverings, I have suggested that his final speech is the wrong place to seek irony. At the end of the play the independence of his character or personality is tempered by and subordinated to his function in the drama. There he is the "prince" figure who, as Leo Salingar notes, figures in the final scene of no less than thirteen of Shakespeare's sixteen comedies and romances. And I submit that this fact reflects more than the playwright's habit of bringing together "a crowd of characters from various social ranks for a grand ensemble scene at the end" for the purpose of illustrating the democratic inclusiveness of the comic spirit. The prince also functions as the Lord of Rule, a presiding authority who appoints, sanctifies, or approves the proper marriages and who thus imposes order and decorum on the tangled web of experience represented in the play. Like Hymen in As You Like It, it is he who must "bar confusion" and "make conclusion" of all jars; the comparison purposefully points to the rather god-like finality of the prince's concluding decrees. Considered, therefore, in the context of its function, the Duke's final speech leaves scant room for meaning other than that communicated in the straightforward sense of his utterance. Nor can the Duke be mistaken or beguiled. Final order based on confusion is an irony we might seek in the theater of the absurd, but not in Shakespeare's genre. Thus, though the Duke has not witnessed Valentine's much-
debated "Then I am paid" speech, we are in error to read into the Duke's chastisement of Thurio a concomitant condemnation of Valentine. To do so is to reduce the Duke, vis-a-vis Shakespeare's purposes, from a spokesman for order to an instrument of irony. I suggest, on the other hand, that the playwright intended for us to accept the fundamental rightness of his final estimation of Valentine:

... Sir Valentine,
Thou art a gentleman, and well derived,
Take thou thy Silvia, for thou hast deserved her.

I do not maintain that the Duke is a god, that he is omniscient and so able to proclaim the objective "truth" about Valentine. Again, he does not know of the recent exchange with Proteus, just as he is ignorant of Proteus' treachery and Sebastian's identity. I am saying simply that his function in the drama, at this point of conclusion, transcends his role; that function itself recommends the truthful accuracy of his final insights and judgments. Seen in this light, those judgments about Valentine undermine the notion that he is a thoroughgoing "nincompoop." They recommend, indeed, the hypothesis that perhaps Valentine has not thrown Silvia away at all.

I have argued at such length for alternative implications in the language and action of the final scene in order to point up subjunctive qualities usually overlooked in the reading and performing of the play. The language and activity of the accepted text do in fact allow for a perception of the scene more conducive to the assimilation of value, by reader and audience, than has been generally supposed. This is not to argue for the play's hidden perfection. The pervasive and consistent balancing of feeling and artifice which characterizes As You Like It is not to be found in Two Gentlemen. Nevertheless, the play— even its final scene— reveals the playwright's early concern with the subjunctive mode as a means for
relating his art to the human experience. It is a commonplace of Shake-
spearean criticism that Dr. Johnson found the bard defective in just this
regard, that he neglected his duty as a poet to instruct as well as to please.
Thus Johnson finds fault with the endings of all four of our plays on the
basis of his general criticisms as outlined in the Preface:

... He sacrifices virtue to convenience, and is so much more
careful to please than to instruct, that he seems to write
without any moral purpose ... He makes no just distribution
of good or evil, nor is always careful to show in the virtuous
a disapprobation of the wicked; he carries his persons indif-
ferently though right and wrong, and at the close dismisses
them without further care ... When he found himself near the
end of his work, and, in view of his reward, he shortened the
labor, to snatch the profit. 18

Shakespeare neglected, that is, the play's profit for his own. Thus, on
the ending of Twelfth Night, Johnson complains that

... the marriage of Olivia, and the succeeding perplexity,
though well enough contrived to divert on the stage, wants
credibility, and fails to produce the proper instruction
required in the drama, as it exhibits no just picture of
life. 19

To make such claims is to leave scant room for dramatic value other than
that found in overt moralizing, rigid poetic justice, or realistic, Ibsen-
like unfolding and discussion of character and complication.

Johnson's fundamental bias, it seems to me, is a too-rigid distinction
between and separation of pleasure and profit. For him, artifice is the
source of pleasure, whereas profit can be found only in satisfying, care-
fully chronicled conclusions. Such an assessment takes no account of the
subjunctive principle. It ignores the interpenetrating and interdependent
workings of artifice and reality in Shakespeare's comedies and thus over-
looks the role of the "mirror" itself in the projection of dramatic value.
Most of my discussions of Shakespeare's use of the subjunctive mode to
impart ongoing value in his comedy necessarily stress the benign effects
of convention and artifice when employed as a balancing control on human feeling. This is certainly true of my observations about Julia. In the final scene of *Two Gentlemen*, however, the convention and artifice are highly visible; so visible, in fact, as to arouse the ire of Dr. Johnson and almost everyone since. Thus, in my argument suggesting that Shakespeare is even here experimenting with the subjunctive principle, I have approached the subject from the other direction. I have suggested that embedded in the artifice is the stuff of human experience, a measure of feeling allowed by the language and action as we have them but almost universally overlooked. Shakespeare had not yet mastered the balanced control over the forces of engagement and detachment which would make the later comedy such rich experience for his audience. Here the balance is upset by the apparent hypotheticality of the proceedings, the seemingly artificial dramatization of the love-friendship theme. The concluding encounter, that is, seems overly portrayed, in the Brechtian sense; such an effect can adversely alter, for an audience, the total experience of the scene.

The conflict between love and friendship had long been a favorite topic for Medieval and Renaissance writers, but the subject lends itself more to academic discussion than to convincing dramatic representation. It is best handled with detachment. Perhaps this fact helps explain why audiences have so long been alienated by the encounter between Proteus and Valentine. Perhaps the difficulty of staging this theme explains why Shakespeare, as Peter Phialas points out, never again made it the central concern of his plays. It is true, in *Much Ado*, that there is real conflict in Benedick's mind when Beatrice forces him to choose between his love for her and his friendship for Claudio. But he is reluctant to commit himself to his choice, and the whole affair is made rather hypothetical, from the audience's point
of view, by the fact that the truth is already out concerning Claudio's fundamental blamelessness. We note that earlier in our play, in the first explicit dramatization of the theme, the conflict is confined within the mind of Proteus. In a forty-three line scene all to himself (II.vi), Proteus reviews the conflicting claims of love and friendship with the detached scrutiny of a scholastic, rationalizing his "threelfold perjury" with artful convolutions of logic and rhetoric. The "conflict" is that of debate, or syllogism. Even later, when Silvia throws Proteus' treachery back in his face, the treatment of the theme is verbal, much like a sermon or lecture:

    ... My will is even this:
    That presently you hie you home to bed.
    Thou subtle, perjured, false, disloyal man! ...
    Return, return, and make thy love amends.
    ... Valentine thy friend
    Survives, to whom, thyself art witness,
    I am betrothed. And art thou not ashamed
    To wrong him with thy importunacy?
    (IV.ii.93,ff.).

Again the "debate" is as one-sided as it was in Proteus' earlier soliloquy, only here the other side has the floor. The only rebuttal Proteus can offer is the ridiculous lie that Julia and Valenitne are dead. There is a measure of engaging energy at work here, of course, thanks to Silvia's good sense and very human sympathies. It is ironic that her empathetic response to the love-friendship problem is stronger, more energetic, than Proteus' direct involvement in it. It is but an early example of Shakespeare's life-long habit, in the comedies, of locating the most balanced perspective in his women. Silvia is detached enough to see through Proteus' "importunacy," yet involved enough, on behalf of her lover and a woman she has never even met, to upbraid him passionately for it. Thus, to the extent that she invests this encounter with subjunctive balance, Silvia informs
it, for an audience, with value less immediately accessible in the play's final scene.

Returning to the ending, I nevertheless submit once more that there are subjunctive possibilities in the play's conclusion sufficient to recommend it as a criticism of life, and not merely as a criticism of the play. The ending is weak only insofar as those possibilities remain un-exploited. The language itself, as I have indicated, will support a sense of life and energy that could be underscored by proper production. What we lack, however, is a more obvious check on the distancing, apparent artificiality of the play's conclusion. We want (in both senses of the word) a more overtly engaging appeal to our sensibilities, a tug at our sympathies to bring the ending into proper subjunctive balance and thus provide us with a prospect from which to consider the play as a criticism of life. We feel keenly, in this regard, the absence of the "clownish servants," Launce and Speed. The ways they and Crab function in the play as a realistic or parodic check on the distancing effects of romantic convention have been sufficiently explored as to obviate their rehearsal here.21 Suffice it to say that in their detached involvement, in their insights and commentary, can be seen the pith of the subjunctive vision that will so functionally characterize those high Renaissance clowns, Feste and Touchstone. But they, Speed and Launce, are strangely not around at the end of Two Gentlemen to help precipitate a more balanced conclusion. Perhaps their disappearance from the play signals the kind of ending we have; it suggests the sense of incompleteness so often felt in the Proteus-Valentine exchange and in the hurried ordering of the final events.

As the play is most often perceived, it is almost entirely up to Julia to provide the engaging humanity necessary to save the final scene from
totally alienating artifice. It is entirely possible, as I have suggested, that she "stages" the swoon and the "confusion" over the rings to put herself in a position where Proteus will recognize her. When Proteus asks her (she is still disguised as his page) to produce the ring intended for Silvia, we sense a controlled contrivance about her responses:

Jul: Here 'tis. This is it.
Pro: How! Let me see.
Why this is the ring I gave to Julia.
Jul: Oh, cry you mercy, sir, I have mistook.
This is the ring you sent to Silvia.
Pro: But how camest thou by this ring?
At my depart I gave this unto Julia.
Jul: And Julia herself did give it me;
And Julia herself hath brought it hither.
Pro: How! Julia!
(V. iv. 92-99).

Even so, she is playing the playwright to get things done, using theatricality as an entrance into life. There is nothing feigned about her next utterance:

Behold her that gave aim to all thy oaths,
And entertained 'em deeply in her heart.
How oft hast thou with perjury cleft the root!
O Proteus, Let this habit make thee blush!
Be thou ashamed that I have took upon me
Such an immodest raiment, if shame lives
In a disguise of love.
It is the lesser blot, modesty finds,
Women to change their shape,
    than men their minds.
(V. iv. 101-109).

Her passion is much more obvious here than is the potential feeling embedded in the earlier remorse-forgiveness exchange between Proteus and Valentine. Thus her pain, as an engaging pull on an audience, functions to balance to a great extent the otherwise stylized "demonstration" of foregoing events. She serves to subjunctify the scene, not by imposing contrary-to-fact conditions on the real, but by the "back door" of bringing real feeling out from under the scene's existing artifice. She therefore
does her part to establish, for the audience, the conditions necessary for
the assimilation of value from the play. Now the play can be perceived
not only as play but, to some degree at least, as a criticism of life.
That criticism is objectified in Proteus' response. He seems at last to
have achieved the same and clear-eyed vision Julia has had all along:

    Than men their minds! "Tis true. Oh,
       Heaven, were man
       But constant, he were perfect! That one error
       Fills him with faults, makes him run
       through all the sins.
       Inconstancy falls off err it begins.
       What is it in Silvia's face, but I may spy
       More fresh in Julia's with a constant eye?
        (V.iv. 110-115).

I say "seems" because once again it would appear that remorse is a bit
easy for Proteus. His revelation, furthermore, after an initial ejaculation,
is couched in conventional rhymed couplets that rather undermine the sincere
spontaneity of his confession. Nor is it clear, finally, that he truly
comprehends, as Julia does, the real heart of subjunctive vision— the
healthy relationship, that is, between constancy on the one hand, and per-
ceptive relativism on the other. The reason for doubt is that in his last
couplet he posits as an argument for constancy a line of reasoning he
earlier employed as a rationale for switching his allegiance from Julia to
Silvia:

    And even that power which gave me first my oath
       Provokes me to this threefold perjury ...
       At first I did adore a twinkling star,
       But now I worship a celestial sun.
       Unheedful vows may heedfully be broken ...
        (II.vi. 4,ff.).

Thus, it may be that Proteus does not fully understand the rightness of
Julia's perspective, her ability to be constant and tentative at the same
time. Nevertheless he does articulate an otherwise bona fide critique of
himself and of life in general, a critique grounded directly in the implications of Julia's speech. And to the extent that Julia thus precipitates the play's final, regenerative order—to include Valentine's spirited defense of Silvia and the ensuing marriages—she is a redemptive agent in the final scene. She not only helps to save the world of the play from a possible death in excessive artificiality, she also, and concomitantly, restores for the audience a measure of the perspective needed for it to consider the criticism of life implicit in her subjunctive response to the dramatic world. That response bears closer investigation, for Julia represents the subjunctive heart of Two Gentlemen of Verona.

In Act IV of the play, Julia delivers a poignant, self-revealing soliloquy (IV.iv. 95-112) that suggests the nature and function of her compound identity in the play. Having travelled incognito (as Sebastian) to Milan in order to claim Proteus' sworn affection, Julia discovers instead his blatant disregard of former vows and his treacherous defection to Silvia. In light of this discovery, and of the purpose of her long journey from Verona, her decision in this scene to remain in disguise (indeed, to play a self-defeating role as Proteus' servant) seems at first a rather arbitrary concession to the playwright's dramatic purposes. It is seen, in other words, as a contrivance designed to promote comic misunderstanding through conventional plot complexities, and thus to elevate the audience to a level of awareness comfortably higher than that shared by the other characters in the play. Still, the rationale for her decision ("I am my master's true-confirmed love,... Yet will I woo for him, but yet so coldly") points to a complex and convincingly human response to her plight. The response is that of self-effacing devotion coupled with a jealous desire for the unfaithful lover's undoing. This dual answer to the play's exi-
gencies manifests itself in Julia's compound identity— the disguised reveal of a genuine self— and thereby contributes to the play's artistic framework while simultaneously emphasizing an engaging core of genuine human love.

Julia's initial decision to subsume her true identity under the guise of Sebastian the page represents the first instance of her dual function in the play. As an instrument utilized by the playwright for the exercise of his artful, plot-impelling magic, she "conjures" Lucetta to outfit her with a pseudo-identity contrived to deceive all but the audience. The concession to convention is extended, furthermore, in her wish not only to seem masculine, but beyond that to appear "fantastic"— wearing her hair, after convention, in "twenty odd-conceited true-love knots." Beneath the disguise, however, is human motivation and a genuine young lady in love, a person who reveals herself to Lucetta and, of course, to the audience. Despite the Petrarchan imagery, we catch the tones of convincing authenticity: "I'll be as patient as a gentle stream,/ And make a pasttime of each weary step,/ Till the last step have brought me to my love." (II.vii. 34-36). Reinforcing both the artistic importance of disguise and the thematic significance of revealed human motivation here is the adroit juxtaposition of this scene and the preceding one, wherein Proteus has just revealed, in a key soliloquy, his treacherous determination to pursue Silvia and thus betray Julia and Valentine. He too will don a disguise, but his, rather than of habit, will be one of two-faced, self-aggrandizing deceit. His decision to dissemble in "threelfold perjury" provides, then a strikingly effective contrast not only to the outwardness of Julia's disguise but also to the faithful love that informs her motives. The contrast is patently secured, finally, in the irony of her estimation
of Proteus' fidelity: "His words are bonds, his oaths are oracles,/ His love sincere, his thoughts immaculate." (II.vii. 75-76).

The doubling of Julia's identity is most vividly seen in Act IV, when she arrives in Milan and finds herself enrolled, by virtue of her disguise, in the service of him to whom she would most fervently wish to reveal herself. Remaining in disguise, however, and thus serving the plot demands of the playwright's comic art, Julia nevertheless reveals herself continually to the audience from beneath the trappings of her superficial masculine identity. In separate conversations with the host, Proteus, and Silvia, "Sebastian" speaks in a voice recognized by the audience as Julia's own. Her language represents a simultaneous dual response to both plot demands and the urgings of her own heart. Shocked to discover Proteus serenading Silvia, Julia speaks of his "false, jarring music." The host hears Sebastian; the audience hears, in addition, the pathetic undertones of disguised self-revelation. Likewise her response to Proteus' commissioning her to act as a go-between in his suit of Silvia carries with it a touching sub-surface significance. Sebastian, at plot-level, displays an admirable sympathy for Proteus' jilted lover; Julia, simultaneously, bares a wounded heart to the audience:

    Jul: I cannot choose but pity her,
    Pro: Wherefore shouldst thou pity her?
    Jul: Because methinks that she loved you as well
        As you do love your lady Silvia.
    She dreams on him that has forgot her love.
    You dote on her that cares not for your love.
    'Tis pity love should be so contrary,
        And thinking on it makes me cry, "alas!"
    (IV. iv. 82-89.).

In her remarkable conversation with Silvia, Julia (disguised as Proteus' envoy) fully exploits the complex dramatic potential inherent in her dual identity. Here (IV.iv. 137-182.) her self-conscious manipulation of
language contributes strikingly to the subjunctifying intricacies of the play as artifact, while it simultaneously reveals to the audience the confessional tones of authentic human misery. "Sebastian" tells Silvia, to set up the ensuing complexities, that "he" knows Julia almost as well as he knows himself (148). He goes on to relate that Julia "is become as black as I" (Julia is here presumably suntanned from her journey); after Proteus' departure from Verona she had, Sebastian continues, thrown her "sun-expelling mask" away (apparently referring to a cosmetic mask). This statement embodies an artful triple irony founded in the audience's awareness of Sebastian's true identity, in their knowledge of Julia's having put on a "mask" (the disguise), and in their memory of Proteus' reference to Julia as, compared to Silvia, "but a swarthy Ethiope" (II.vi. 26). The self-conscious manipulation of overlapping roles and identities, furthermore, reaches its apex in the play-within-a-play motif of lines 163-177. At this point Sebastian describes the history of Julia's having wept over his portrayal, in Julia's own gowns, of Ariadne's "passioning for Theseus' perjury." I will return to this remarkable narrative presently. Clearly such a complex, layered structure of parallel meanings and identities represents an acute concession to the playwright's own powers of artistic contrivance. He is "showing off" his play through his wit. Yet again the audience remains in touch with Julia's disguised "selfness." Here, as in her ten asides and three soliloquies, she speaks to the audience in a voice unheard by the other characters. Sebastian's sad little story is also Julia's painful autobiography. In speaking this way, Julia affirms per primary identity (an authentic, engaging, human counterpoint to the play's contrived artistry) and reinforces conversely the audience's sense of detachment, as she shares with them the perspective of super-awareness
she alone enjoys the play. Sensing her control, the audience may sym-
pathize with her without pity.

We have here a dramatic heterocosm sustained, then, in the tension
generated by two opposing forces— the one engaging, the other disengaging
the audience. On the one hand the "mirror" of the play reflects an over-
riding reality representative of universal, unfeigned human experience.
This reality in our scene takes the form of Julia's "passioning." There
is nothing affected about her feelings. Her pain, disappointment, jeal-
ousy, anger, and her love for Proteus are all real; in the world of the
play these emotions are sincere and authentic. The audience, attached to
Julia in the sympathetic bond of shared, human experience, thus partici-
pates in the drama to the extent that its members feel and respond to the
engaging force generated by the overriding reality of the play. On the
other hand, the playwright makes certain the audience does not forget the
mirror itself. He reminds them they are watching a play. The conventions,
actions, and language of the play itself call attention to its own fic-
tive artificiality as it advertises itself as art. These aspects of the
drama, serving to subjunctify or "unrealize" the reality of the play, then
promote the desired disengagement of audience from dramatic world.

Julia, in the interview with Silvia and in her following soliloquy,
uses the work "if" eight times and the actual (grammatical) subjunctive
mood twelve times. Thus even her grammar contributes to the qualifying,
the distancing, the unrealizing of her situation. As Sebastian, for
instance, she tells Silvia of his/her having played Ariadne's part in
the pageant:

Our youth got me to play the woman's part,
And I was trimmed in Madam Julia's gowns,
Which served me as fit, by all men's judgements,
As if the garment had been made for me.
(IV.iv. 165-168.).

"As if" indeed! She continues:

Madam 'twas Ariadne passioning
For Theseus' perjury and unjust flight,
Which I so lively acted with my tears
That my poor mistress, moved therewithal,
Wept bitterly; and would I might be dead.
If I in thought felt not her very sorrow.
(172-177.).

Note how the potential pathos is mollified by her subjunctive conclusion. Julia's "real" passion is indeed buried somewhere inside a series of "Chinese boxes" composed of myth, plays-within-plays, overlapping and reflected identities. These distancing qualifiers are "contrary to fact" conditions emerging out of the subjunctive mood of Julia's discourse. They call acute attention here to the contrived artfulness of the dramatic situation and thus serve to counter-balance the audience's otherwise intense identification with Julia's plight.

Indeed we are overtly reminded that Julia is actually posing by her reference to having "acted" in the Pentecost pageant. The detachment of the spectator at this point is assured in his sudden recognition that here is a young man (a player in the company) acting the part of a young woman (Julia) who is posing as a young man (Sebastian) who is pretending to woo for Proteus and who "lies" that "he" once acted the part of a woman (Ariadne) in a pageant about a myth. The action is suddenly perceived as through the large end of a telescope. The audience perhaps remains confident that the voice they hear is Julia's, but all the psychological switch-backs here suddenly render her "reality" (her passion and identity) a very spongy thing indeed. And the effect is reinforced by the fact that Julia, in her subjunctive discourse about role-playing, is superimposing an interior "pretend" reality upon the overriding surface-reality of the play. She
goes on, furthermore, to advertise the "mirror" in her soliloquy, when she addresses herself and Julia's picture as mutual "shadows":

Come, shadow, come, and take this shadow up,
For 'tis thy rival. O thou senseless form,
Thou shalt be worshiped, kissed, loved, and adored!
And, were there sense in his idolatry,
My substance should be statue in thy stead.
(202-206).

More conditions contrary to fact. The ambiguity between substance and shadow is underscored, again, by the grammatical subjunctivity of her conclusion.

What is Shakespeare about here? And in posing such a question I am again seeking conclusion, the final effect of the playwright's words as we have them. We recall that art must flex back into life to be of value. It does this partly by announcing its own limitations as art, and thus its accessibility to living society. It is thereby functional, simultaneously, as a conserver and a reformer of the society's values. In our sample scene we have noticed various subjunctifying devices— the disguise itself and the contrivances of Julia's "loaded" language— all of which are concessions or gestures of the play's limitations as art. Thus they release the spectator from the play's reality to the extent that he is able to exercise his critical and interpretive powers. He is free, that is, to confront Julia's experience with a cognitive control much less often his privilege while watching, say, a tragedy. The play, in other words, strikes its own simultaneous balance between the forces of detachment and involvement and thus establishes the unique conditions of Shakespearean comedy.

But I am still not quite there. The final value of the comedy has yet to be firmly established. What is the spectator's or reader's interpretation of our scene to be? I believe, in brief, he takes with him from the play two things: 1) the delight, the refreshment of having been trans-
lated for a time into the "second world" realm of marvel and laughter; and
2) a philosophical, attitudinal, and behavioral model that can be utilized
for richer personal experience and the gradual reformation of the values
of his society. I hasten to add, again, that I do not claim Shakespeare
wrote didactic plays after the order of his Medieval predecessors. The
comedies, certainly, are thoroughly secular and uncluttered by obtrusive
dianoia. I feel, however, that the critic should not obstinately overlook
the "profit" of great art, especially when he is dealing with mimetic,
Renaissance literature. From Shakespearean comedy I believe the auditor
takes with him that recurring reminder mentioned earlier: if the stage is
a metaphor for life, so may life be perceived subjunctively as play. I
submit this is indeed the playwright's subtle but persistent recommendation
in the comedies. The world is best perceived as a play, but not as Jaques'
arena of futility or Macbeth's pageant of emptiness. It is best perceived
as comedy.

In Julia's sense of herself and her relationship to her experience,
and in her chosen mode of behavior there is a sanity and a sure hope of
success unavailable to single-minded "advocators," cynics, and such would-
be forgers of destiny as Hamlet and Macbeth. The "play" (comedy) metaphor,
as a model for life, is (to give it currency) a "coping" mechanism, founded
in the principle of subjunctivity. Julia is not determined to forcibly
assert her "essence" (her selfness, her will, her personal emotions) upon
her social environment. Thrust into strange surroundings and confronted
with intense personal difficulties, she decides, instead of raging against
her world, to employ the play metaphor as a means to adaptation and adjust-
ment. She is content to remain partially detached, patient until things
work out. Julia does act, of course, but in both senses of that word. She
moves carefully toward her goals in the guise of a player. She is thus willing to forego even a sense of personal identity; she will sacrifice it, at least temporarily, to the slow unravelling of the script she herself has written. In this there is a paradoxical security. As long as Julia continues her "moratorium" Proteus, unaware of her, cannot love her. But neither can he hurt her. She has the advantage. In her detachment, of course, she is also willing to change her superficial identity (in a play, and in life thus perceived, all identity is rather superficial), if that is what it takes to get along and to move on toward her goals:

Here is her picture. Let me see. I think, If I had such a tire, this face of mine Were full as lovely as is this of hers. And yet the painter flattered her a little, Unless I flatter with myself too much. Her hair is auburn, mine is perfect yellow. If that be all the difference in his love, I'll get me such a colored periwig. Her eyes are gray as glass, and so are mine. Aye, but her forehead's low, and mine's as high. What should it be that he respects in her, But I can make respective in myself? (IV.iv. 189-200.).

We note the empirical tentativeness of Julia's argument, the subjunctivity of her language and her vision. Her eyes are open and clear, in spite of her adversity, because she has the detachment of a player. She is firmly in her world while not exactly of it. She sees herself as homo ludens, man using play as entrance into life. She will not scratch out the "unseeing eyes" of Proteus' picture, for she knows that would be a futile act of passion, an intrusion of "real" emotion into her play. Forbearance, even forgiveness, are more to her purposes here. In acting out her will (self-involvement) from behind disguise (detachment), she simultaneously reveals and conceals her truest feelings. Thus we as audience are both involved in and detached from the events of the play. We know that the
disguise both thwarts her purposes while it simultaneously gives us virtual assurance that she will eventually reach her goal. We sense her control. She is Julia while at the same time she is other than Julia. She is subjunctive—fact and qualification simultaneously. Shakespeare, then, uses the forms and techniques of subjunctivity to give us the perspective necessary to interpret Julia's subjunctivity. His method becomes her model, and her model becomes the playwright's implicit recommendation to his audience.
NOTES


2 See Peter Lindenbaum, "Education in The Two Gentlemen of Verona," Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 15 (1975), 229-244.


6 Inga-Stina Ewbank, "'Were man but constant, he were perfect': Constancy and Consistency in the Two Gentlemen of Verona," in Shakespearian Comedy, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies 14 (New York, 1972) pp. 31-57.


8 Berry, p. 49.

9 Ibid., pp. 42, ff.


11 Berry, p. 53.

12 Ewbank, pp. 44-46.

13 Ibid., p. 44.

14 Ibid., p. 46.

15 Lindenbaum, p. 230.


17 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 81.

20 Phialas, p. 52.

21 See, for example, Harold F. Brooks, "Two Clowns in a Comedy, ...," in *Essays and Studies* (London, 1963), pp. 91-100; and Phialas, pp. 62-63.
CHAPTER THREE: THE TAMING OF THE SHREW

One indicator of Shakespeare's apprenticeship in the handling of subjunctive modes is the erratic visibility of the principle at work in the early comedies. Thus, though Julia's balanced vision solidly approximates that of the later Viola, we had to re-examine heretofore unexploited possibilities in Shakespeare's art to appreciate more fully the subjunctive impact of Two Gentlemen. In The Taming of the Shrew, on the other hand, the subjunctive scheme is worked out in gigantic proportions. This is not to say that the play does not "work" because the mode is recklessly overwrought. Subjunctive success in Shrew depends, rather, on the controlled, artistic balancing of immense and obvious forces at work in the comedy. From the very beginning we feel the magnitude of these forces. Sly's clamorous earthiness dominates an induction otherwise announcing loudly the fictiveness of what is to follow. Petruchio's preposterous and relentless game of "supposing" is balanced throughout by his own massive energies and Katharine's unfeigned misery. There is nothing quiet about this play in the sense of the classical serenity Anne Barton notices in As You Like It. And yet the play is a good one, an important one for this study. The large and various forces working to engage and detach us are finally poised against each other to produce those subjunctive effects characteristic of Shakespeare's comedy in general.
It is therefore wrong to consider Shrew, as some critics do, a thorough-going farce. Pure farce offers nothing to counter the distancing effects of unmitigated merriment. Farce lacks dramatic value of the Shakespearean kind. Shrew is, rather, a synthesis of kinds, establishing its own subjunctive conditions in the juxtaposition of diverse dramatic elements. In this play we can observe a main plot based on folklore (the "tamed shrew" motif) and the conventions of Old Comedy, with its emphasis on the agon, or pitched battle between highly assertive characters and/or social forces. And there is the Bianca sub-plot drawn from Ariosto, as adapted in Gascoigne's Supposes (1566) and evincing a New Comedy bias in its familiar, telic movement from romantic attraction to sexual union by way of complication and misunderstanding. Corollary to this mixing of kinds is the hybrid quality observed by Sherman Hawkins in the play. Shrew, that is, features both the "journey" or "double setting" motif (as in As You Like It) and that of siege or "arrival" (as in Twelfth Night), and develops out of the conflict generated by both sexual antagonism and romantic attraction. And as for the farcical elements in Shrew, they are certainly there—especially in the rather mechanical, automatic persistence of the taming process itself. But infusing the farce are the ingredients of New Comedy of the familiar romantic, Shakespearean stripe. This fact is obvious enough in the sub-plot, but is also true of the main— if one is willing to admit that there, for the most part, love is suspended or postponed in Petruchio and displaced, in Katharine, by an authentic unhappiness. The crowding together of all these diverse elements produces a rather airy dramatic heterocosm of large proportions and high contrasts. It is as if the dramatic landscape were somewhat lunar, as opposed, say, to the sylvan mellowness of
As You Like It. Yet, again, the large forces at work in Shrew balance effectively to produce the conditions designed to bring an audience/reader into subjunctive harmony with the playwright's art. Our examination of how this process works, and to what effects, will begin with the "induction" scene.

Dealing with the induction to Shrew and the problems it allegedly imposes is a familiar and recurring scholarly task. That task most commonly involves speculation about 1) the nature of Shakespeare's source, 2) the relationship between his play and the anonymous The Taming of a Shrew, published in 1594, 4 and 3) the question of why Shakespeare did not return to or complete the "frame" of his play at the conclusion of the comedy. The third of these problems alone is of concern to me here, as it bears upon our understanding of the play as we have it. That understanding would be radically different if there were a conclusion to the induction scenes. Even here, however, I do not presume to explain the disappearance of a once-extant conclusion, as some critics have attempted to do. 5 My comments on the conclusion of Shakespeare's play as we have it are based, rather, upon the assumption that the strategy of omitting a final return to the induction-frame was founded in conscious, artistic judgment on Shakespeare's part. He understood that a return to the initial framework, such as occurs at the end of A Shrew, would undermine the subjunctive balances he had worked out in the play as we have it. (I will return to this point in more detail later.) Thus, though much has been written about the induction to Shrew, most scholars have concerned themselves primarily with the problem areas outlined above. 6 Their contributions are valuable but only tangential to my purposes here. My concern is with the play as we have it, to include the induction as
an integral part of that play. We often forget, as Thomas Bergin has pointed out, that the First Folio edition of *Shrew* bears no mention at all of an "induction"; only later did editors so label the opening scenes. One can thus fairly infer that, to Shakespeare, the material about Christopher Sly was of an intimate, organic piece with the subsequent drama. That is how I wish to perceive it. Perhaps Shakespeare would have smiled at our scholarly attempts to account for that peculiar, two-scene adjunct we call the "induction."

If Shakespeare wrote *Shrew* in the early 1590's, as is commonly supposed, then he would have had precedent for the use of a spoken induction—to include the device of setting up interior spectators to observe the main play. He was probably familiar with the work of George Peele, whose *Old Wives Tale* (1595) featured the spoken induction. He had before him, furthermore, the popular example of Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy* (c. 1592), where Revenge and Andrea's ghost appear on stage as audience and chorus to the main play. The device was to gain in popularity for the duration of the Renaissance, to re-emerge (in an altered and less "dramatic" form) in the prologues to numerous Restoration plays. Beaumont and Fletcher used a rather elaborate induction scene in *Knight of the Burning Pestle* (1613), where Ralph, a grocer's apprentice, emerges from the interior audience on stage actually to participate in the main play as a "Grocer Errant."

The technique, furthermore, was to be a favorite one for Jonson's satiric purposes. The induction's growing popularity notwithstanding, Shakespeare was here, as usual, an experimenter— and in ways beyond the mere treatment of novelty.

Thelma Greenfield points out that early dramatic inductions were of two types. Most characteristically, they "tended to direct the audience's
reaction to the play by concerning themselves in an explanatory way with its argument, theme, genre, structure, staging, or merit. The extreme example of this kind of induction would appear in Jonson's Bartholomew Fair (1614), where a scrivener presents the theater audience with a contract from the author, the terms of which establish exactly what the audience may and may not expect in the play. And though Shakespeare's induction is not of this kind, a germ of like purpose can be heard in the servant's admonitions to Sly.

Mess: Your Honor's players, hearing your amendment,
Are come to play a pleasant comedy;...
Sly: ...let them play it. Is not a comonty
a Christmas gambold or a tumbling trick?
Page: No my good lord. It is more pleasing stuff.
Sly: What, household stuff?
Page: It is a kind of history.
(Ind. ii. 131,ff.).

(Like some critics, Sly will have a boisterous farce; he will get something better, even if he cannot appreciate it.) The other kind of induction, to include Shakespeare's, creates "a distinct imaginative realm, sustained to provide a dramatically pointed contrast with the main play ... (these) perhaps are more properly called frame plays." Thus the first two scenes of Shrew establish an interior "reality" organically related to, but qualitatively different from, the "pretense" to follow in the "main" play. Of course this reality is also different from that represented by the theater audience. Shakespeare's induction therefore conforms in kind to those introduced in The Knight of the Burning Pestle and The Old Wives Tale, but, I would submit, with a difference in purpose and function.

Beaumont's play, and Peele's illustrate the appropriateness and adaptability of the induction to the authors' satiric purposes. The very use of an induction seems implicitly to cast doubt on what is to follow; thus it can be used to help establish the ideal satiric conditions. An
induction, that is, can itself point with glee to the mere artifice of
the play to follow, undermining the value of that "world" for the theater
audience. Again we recall the interior "presenter" of various Renaissance
paintings, literally pointing to the figure construed as the focus for
the work of art. An audience is disengaged, released to consider the arti-
fact from a perspective of detached scrutiny or even amusement. Of course
this condition can be countered— as it is in great art such as Bronzino's
painting Venus and Eros Discovered by Time, and in comedy of the
Shakespearean kind— by the engaging forces exerted by realism, theme,
sympathetic character portrayal, and the like. The real value of great
art depends, as we have seen, on the establishment of such a more balanced
perspective. Good satire can be "great art," of course, but its value
resides in the effective undermining of inferior values, rather than the
establishment and implicit recommendation of finer. In any case,
Beaumont uses his induction as a doorway to burlesque. It releases his
audience to enjoy a parody at the expense of the literature of knight-err-
rantry and the boorish middle class of London. Likewise, Peele's play
emerges as a satire on the romantic, literary theme of magic and enchant-
ment (similar to that theme which would later be Platonized by Milton in
his masque of "Comus"). Ben Jonson, furthermore, would later use the
induction to establish the conditions, vis-a-vis his audience, appropriate
to his satire of human foibles. Shakespeare's purposes, however, are
not primarily satiric in the comedies. And his induction to Shrew,
rather than merely mocking and devaluing the play world and what it
represents, actually serves to suggest a pervasive Shakespearean "lesson."
Suggested in the interplay between artifice and reality is the illusory
nature of all reality. The suggestion thus brings the play world back
into close contact with the "real" world of the audience. Let us look at how this technique works.

The Taming of the Shrew opens with a great general alarm, much like the noisy beginning of Jonson's Alchemist. Christopher Sly, wonderfully drunk and obstreperous, is being kicked bodily out of the alehouse to the accompaniment of breaking glass and much verbal abuse from the host. No poetry here—Sly returns the abuse with clamorous protestations about his royal ancestry, and camps stubbornly on the cold, hard ground for the night. A play could hardly have a more realistic beginning. The brief episode holds a mirror up to nature, reflecting the hard and timeless human experience acknowledged by Feste at the end of Twelfth Night.

But when I came unto my beds,...
With tosspots still had drunken heads,
For the rain it raineth every day.

The induction, unfortunately, is often cut in stage productions of the play. But when it is acted (and in the reading) this opening, with its engaging magnetism, sweeps an audience immediately into the world of the play. There are no signs of an "induction" here; there are indeed no indications that this is anything but a self-contained play. The image of nature here, immensely more prominent than the reflecting mirror, acts firmly to engage audience sensibilities from the outset. If the scene is funny, it provokes the laughter of sympathy, the comic equivalent of cathartic involvement in tragedy. Thus the playwright forthwith establishes an engaging, imaginative heterocosm sustained in the illusion of reality. Sly himself is a perfectly focused image of reality. His motto, "Let the world slide," even embodies an outrageous pun on his name which nonetheless suggests his close relationship to the world of "actual" human experience.
The convincing illusion begun with Sly is continued with the arrival upon the scene of the Lord and his hunting train. Though the Lord speaks in pentameters (suggesting his social superiority to the snoring "swine"), his language is rich with the energy of a huntsman and the proper names of his dogs. Thirty-five lines deep into the play, the world of Shrew is almost filmic in its colorful and earthy realism. But when the Lord spots the unconscious drunkard, his response initiates a sudden shift, felt by the audience, in the direction of theatricality:

Grim Death, how foul and loathsome is thine image! 
Sirs, I will practice on this drunken man. 
What think you, if he were conveyed to bed, 
Wrapped in sweet clothes, rings put upon his fingers, 
A most delicious banquet by his bed, 
And brave attendants near him when he wakes, 
Would not the beggar then forget himself? 
(Ind. i. 35-41.).

The lord slips into the almost Marlovian idiom that will increasingly characterize his language as playwright, director, and actor. Not that he is an actual overreacher like Tamburlaine, but he is a "supposer," a "practicer," a creator of conditions contrary to fact. In this regard he shares the subjunctive powers and prerogatives of Petruchio and Shakespeare himself. The Lord will metamorphose Sly by "supposing" him to be someone else and by acting or practicing as if that supposition were "real." Cecil Seronsy has argued convincingly that "supposes" indeed comprise the unifying theme of the play as a whole. Certainly it is accurate to perceive a parallel between the Lord's practice on Sly and Petruchio's on Kate. Petruchio's stratagem in "wooing" her, that is, is to postulate her a mild and modest gentlewoman. And obviously the playwright is the ultimate supposer, as illusion is his very livelihood. Back to our scene, however, there is an unmistakable sense of exhilarating power in the Lord's language as his scheme takes shape in his mind. It
is the rather god-like power of creation itself. "What's here? One
dead...?," he asks. "See, doth he breathe?" He breathes, of course,
but only on the level of "tosspot" reality established by the opening
action. Through the power of the imagination, the Lord is about to
create a new, theatrical ontology. To the Lord, the unconscious Sly
is an inanimate lump, an image of Death. It is as if, at this point,
Sly is not a "role" at all, but an "actual" dead body on the stage—
the grim culmination of the opening realism. No actor animates, no lines
enliven his inert form. The Lord, however, will create a role for him,
"inspire" him, breathe into him new life on a theatrical level. (Note
the theological implications of the Lord's title. He is simply "The
Lord," and like the God of Genesis, he will create a man "in his own image;"
Sly awakes also a "Lord," but obviously a little lower than his creator.)
The means by which this creative act is accomplished is not the shaping
of Adamic clay, but something equally "magical." It is the shaping power
of the imagination, expressed in the "practice" itself.

At this point in the play, the audience is suddenly jolted out of its
involved "participation" in the early activity on stage. The break comes
with "Sirs, I will practice...," immediately following "Grim Death, how
foul and loathsome is thine image!" The word "image" triggers a new meta-
perspective, kindling in the Lord (and then, in the audience) a sudden
recognition of the inter-relationship between reality and illusion. This
important point in the play can and should be rendered carefully and
deliberately on the stage. Up to the word "image" the Lord must remain
firmly in the tosspot world of Sly. His banter about his hunting dogs
should have the authentic ring of actual, lively "shop-talk." His lines
in response to the drunken, sleeping Sly, furthermore, should bristle
with the genuine, self-righteous scorn of an offended superior. Now comes the break— the moment of inspiration, of subjunctive vision. A noticeable pause should ensue as the Lord's eyes light up with insight. Then, as the Lord unfolds the script for his scenario, the creative energy now animating him must be obviously intense but also (and I feel this is important) clearly under control. Too much tumult here and the audience will miss the subjunctive tones of the speech in the din of slapstick hilarity. The audience must be allowed the impact of the "practice," and not be denied the significance of the "what if/ would not?" construction of the plan. The Lord is, after all, proposing a play, not a mere sideshow stunt.

I do not deny that there is drollery in the Sly episode, but the overt mirth and merriment of the jest for the theater audience resides not so much in the Lord's practice as in our perspective on Sly himself. When he emerges from his stupor, surrounded by the finery attendant on his new "identity," it is all too clear that he will not be able to play his part. We perceive the tremendous gap between Sly and the new, dramatic expectations thrust upon him, and we laugh at the absurd incongruity. Now, however, it is the laughter of ridicule (detachment) rather than of sympathy (engagement). Here I agree with Richard Henze (at least at this point in his argument about role-playing in Shrew. He is wrong-headed about Kate, but more of that later.) when he says that "However quickly the beggar forgets himself,... we do not forget that the beggar is only a beggar. However real Sly is to himself as lord, he is not a real lord to us." He is not "aptly fitted" for his part. Sly is, in effect, an extra-dramatic entity thrust into a play. Even after the subjunctive break of line thirty-five, when conditions "contrary to fact" are estab-
lished and the "practice" begins, we still perceive Sly as a member of the tosspot world. He is not on the same ontological plane as the practicing Lord and his entourage of actors. He is still as "real" as he was before the break. (To the extent that we realize that the Lord's practice is a play-within-a-play, we must also acknowledge that the engaging, "real" Sly of the opening was only a good actor playing the role of Sly. But there we "believed" in him, and we continue to believe in him in a way unlike our response to the artifice of the Lord's practice. Thus the confusion between illusion and reality is heightened— or, perhaps better, their inter-relatedness emphasized— in the minds of the audience.)

Sly's presence in the meta-dramatic world of the Lord's house, while he maintains his original dramatic identity, is incongruous in the same way that actual animals (flesh-and-blood donkeys, pigs, etc.) are oddly out of place on stage or in any clearly dramatic environment. This kind of situation can easily produce mirth of the drollest variety. Perhaps I can illustrate. Sly, apparently convinced that he is indeed a lord, is re-united with his "lady" after his fifteen-year lunacy. His response, uttered against the backdrop of his new finery and the self-conscious sophistication of all those around him, will provoke the belly-laugh:

    Servants, leave me and her alone.
    Madam, undress you, and come now to bed.
    (Ind. ii. 118-119.).

The ironic gap between the "lady's" artful posturing and Sly's fine, animal instincts can only be bridged by explosive laughter. Mirth of this kind would have been possible before the break if the Lord had led in a pack of actual dogs and one of them had promptly relieved himself against the leg of one of the actors. Sly thus clings to his original
dramatic identity in spite of the "fact," verified by his own senses, that he has been theatrically transformed:

I do not sleep. I see, I hear, I speak.  
I smell sweet savors, and I feel soft things. 
Upon my life, I am a lord indeed.  
And not a tinker or Christopher Sly. 
Well, bring our lady hither to our sight;  
And once again, a pot o' the smallest ale.  
(Ind. ii. 62-77.).

At this point Sly seems to want to capitulate to his new role, but that only out of allegiance to his empirical sense. We note the pentametrical speech and the magisterial pronouns, but he still wants ale rather than sack. He goes on, furthermore, to contend that he knows Cicely Hacket, the alehouse maid, and he muses about whether he should call his lady "Al'ce madam" or "Joan madam." He lacks imagination and any sense of theatricality. He does not know, of course, that he is in the middle of a play (actually a play-within-a-play); nor does he have any accurate notion of what a play is. To him a "comonty" is a "Christmas gambold" or a "tumbling trick." It is unlikely, however, that his "performance" would be less outrageous if he knew all around him were play-acting and that he was expected to participate. We can be sure his original identity would continue to peek through the role, like Snout's through the Wall in "Pyramus and Thisbe," or Holofernes' through Judas Maccabeaus in the "Nine Worthies" pageant. Even as it is, the incongruity between Sly's dogged realism and his theatrical ambience is analogous to the disregard of dramatic convention in those lamentable playlets from Dream and Love's Labor's Lost. Sly's persistence in his original identity— together with his hopeless attempt to conform to dramatic expectations— prevents the Lord's scenario from being a self-contained play. From the point of view of the theater and audience, Sly is an inadvertent demolisher of illusion.
The result is jest of the merriest kind.

I maintain, however, that an audience is encouraged to bring a different set of sensibilities to bear upon the Lord's practice itself. His is a subjunctive exercise, the highly self-conscious juxtaposing of conditions contrary to fact and existing realities. His is not, of course, a telic exercise in the sense of Julia's purposeful and protracted disguise. The Lord contrives his "play" merely as a "pastime passing excellent," a jest designed to amuse. Yet the very purposelessness of the exercise underscores its value as an object lesson in subjunctivity. We have seen that Sly scarcely benefits from the practice; if he seems at first rather amazed (or confused), he will end up bored with the whole thing. He merely provides an unwitting baseline of realism for the contrivance. The Lord and his entourage, furthermore, expect only entertainment. The theater audience, however, is in a position to draw significant inferences from the proceedings of the induction. Between our engagement with Sly's tosspot realism and the detachment attendant on our awareness of the ludicrous incongruity of his situation is a perspective that permits a cognitive focus on the Lord's subjunctive activities. The hallmark of this activity, we quickly come to realize, is control. The notion of control is indeed at the heart of the entire subjunctive enterprise as it relates to dramatic comedy of Shakespeare's kind. The playwright, the actor, the audience—all exercise some form of control in creating, enacting, and responding to conditions that serve to balance or counteract otherwise dominant and disruptive forces in the plays. Such containment rescues Much Ado, as we have seen, from its brush with tragedy, on the extreme one hand. Lack of containment, at the opposite extreme, results in the slapstick anarchy of the "Nine Worthies" pageant.
And in the induction to Shrew, the Lord's sense of restraint keeps the practice under control in a way that more or less admonishes an audience to consider the relationship between reality and illusion or artifice. Instructing his huntsman on how to deal with Sly when he awakes, the Lord says,

Persuade him that he hath been lunatic,  
And when he says he is, say that he dreams,  
For he is nothing but a mighty lord.  
This do, and do it kindly, gentle sirs.  
It will be pastime passing excellent 
If it be husbanded with modesty.  
I. Hun: My Lord, I warrant you we will play our part 
As he shall think, by our true diligence, 
He is no less than what we say he is.  
(Ind. i. 63-71.).

There is a distinct sense of power in this exchange, especially in the declarative finality of lines sixty-five and seventy-one. It is the power of the magician, the artist, the playwright to transform and to create. But we also note the restraint. The Lord knows that in order for the illusion to balance with reality, control must be exercised. Thus the subjunctive qualifications of "If it be husbanded with modesty." Artistic success is dependent on judicious and economical use of theatrics. The practice must be carried out "kindly" and with modesty—connoting not compassion and shyness, but naturalness and moderation. The admonition then echoes in the huntsmen's resolve to play their parts with "diligence." The Lord, then, is here functioning as playwright surrogate. Like Hamlet, later, and like Shakespeare himself, the Lord is keenly aware of the dangers of "immodest" or unbalanced art. The restraints of convention must be strictly observed—by artist and by actor—or the self-contained play will collapse into a ritual of mirth and other "real" emotions. The Lord thus feels obliged to counsel his actors about con-
tainment:

... how my men will stay themselves from laughter
When they do homage to this simple peasant.
I'll in to counsel them. Haply my presence
May well abate the overmerry spleen
Which otherwise would grow into extremes.
(Ind. i. 134-138.).

And he warns the travelling players about the same danger.

There is a lord will hear you play tonight.
But I am doubtful of your modesties,
Lest overeyeing of his odd behavior—
For yet his Honor never heard a play—
You break into some merry passion
And so offend him; for I tell you, sirs,
If you should smile, he grows impatient.
A Player: Fear not my lord. We can contain ourselves,
Were he the veriest antic in the world.
(Ind.i. 93-101.).

It is noteworthy that at this point, with the arrival of the players,
the theater audience is beginning to feel the exhilarating advantage of
super-awareness. Bertrand Evans does not address this scene, but his
method is appropriate to our analysis here.¹² Put simply, we not only
know more than Sly, but we also now have an advantage over the players
as well. We know that the Lord is "practicing" on them in his request
that they play before a "Lord" who does not exist except as a figure in
his primary practice. A "Chinese box" effect is beginning to develop, an
effect which will culminate in our perspective on the players as they
mount the "interior" stage as Kate, Petruchio and the rest. The Lord's
advice to the players, then, is a practice-within-a-practice, one we are
keenly aware of. But our super-awareness here does not result in total
and unchecked detachment. Shakespeare "controls" us through our interest
in what the Lord has to say. Not only is he expounding about control,
but he is doing so in all, engaging sincerity. He "means" it when he
advises the players to observe the conventions of the self-contained play.
There is nothing feigned about his remarks. Thus he is both practicing and not practicing on them. Our response is that of scrutiny. And our controlled perspective here finds a focus, and a neat correlative in the Lord's advice itself.

One important inference to be drawn from this advice about cunning and self-control relates to the "real life" application of the subjunctive principle. One infers that the best way to deal with obtrusive, disruptive reality (here represented by the anticipated behavior of Sly) is to erect an insulating barrier of theatricality between oneself and the provocation. The Lord is recommending a "contrary-to-fact" mentality as a means to the preservation of control. Thus we perceive the advantage of behaving as if the unsettling reality did not exist or did not threaten. Perhaps we recall Julia's subjunctive strategy, employed to cope with Proteus' treachery in Two Gentlemen. In any case, there is instructive implication in the Lord's advice, instruction which transcends the needs of the immediate, dramatic situation. Our inference is, in a sense, indeed at odds with that situation. The Lord recommends subjunctive control less as a means for managing reality than as a way to perpetuate illusion for its own sake, or for the sake of jest, sport, and "worthless" fancy. The coming play must be handled with "modesty" to preserve its value as mere entertainment, just as the rules and traditions of the hunt insulate that activity from the tosspot reality of food-getting. From the players' perspective, furthermore, Sly's behavior (the Lord maintains) is apt to be odd, antic, lunatic— in a word, unnatural. In contrast to Sly's lunacy, the approaching play-world is being set up as the more "real." We of course anticipate the opposite, that Sly's responses will be genuine and authentic— a merry commentary on art.
Countering our relationship to Sly the realist, however, is a growing awareness—discouraged at the beginning—that Sly himself is but an actor playing the role of a drunken tinker, who is acted upon to emerge in a new role, that of the antic Lord. The growing emphasis on play-acting serves to undermine the notion of Sly's reality. Yet our inference about the relationship between reality and controlled subjunctivity persists; indeed it is made possible by the controlled, cognitive perspective that is the result of our partial release from Sly's initial magnetism. That inference, furthermore, finds value in the confusion at this point between what is real and what is illusory or purely theatrical. As the Lord's accelerated "practice" more and more blurs the distinction between the real and the illusory, we more and more feel encouraged to perceive all mundane experience in terms of theatrum mundi. Thus our increasing detachment actually serves, ironically, to bring the play-world back into closer contact with the world outside the theater wall. The Lord's lecture on theatricality emerges, rather in spite of itself, as an object lesson and implicit recommendation about the proper perspective on human experience. The ground and result of this subjunctive perspective is control.

This important point in the induction passed, we return to the merriment of the denouement in scene ii, where the Lord's control gets rather out of control through excess. Or so it would seem. Actually the Lord's hyperbolic tactics and language in the scene are strictly directed and bridled by a single-minded determination to convince Sly that he is lord indeed. Perceived from a critical perspective, the Lord's staged assertions are, as we shall see, a balanced construct. But the great gap of incongruity between the paltry insignificance of his purpose and the magnitude of his theatrical exertions results again in detached amusement for
an audience. This is true for the interior audience as well, conscious of the practice as they are. We can see the Lord's attendants snickering in the background. But they are also involved in the practice, bearing the responsibility of "managing well the jest." The theater audience, on the other hand, is largely relieved of responsibility once it has absorbed the subjunctive "lesson" discussed above. It is free doubly to enjoy the mirth from a nearly "vertical" angle of vision. We have, that is, a more "objective" view of the gap between the Lord's motive and his practice.

Even such extreme detachment will not go unchecked, however. The appearance of the players will once again invite us, as we shall see, to consider the shifting nexus between appearances and reality.

To return to the Lord's actual practice on the awakened Sly, it is immediately clear that his theatrics, if yet under control, will be "assertive" to the extreme. His remarkable speech, orchestrated with the reinforcing comments of his servants (i., 25-69), is verbally analogous to Marlovian overreaching. His language here merits extended quotation. He asks of Sly,

Wilt thou have music? Hark! Apollo plays,
And twenty caged nightingales do sing.
Or wilt thou sleep? We'll have thee to a couch
Softer and sweeter than the lustful bed
On purpose trimmed up for Semiramis.
Say thou wilt walk; we will bestrew the ground.
Or wilt thou ride? Thy horses shall be trapped,
Their harness studded all with gold and pearl.
Dost thou love hawking? Thou hast hawks will soar
Above the morning lark. Or wilt thou hunt?
Thy hounds shall make the welkin answer them
And fetch shrill echoes from the hollow earth.
(Ind. ii. 37-48.).

Here is an obvious instance of pearls before swine. The tactic is continued in the language of the servants, taking their cues from the Lord:
2. Serv: Dost thou love pictures: We will fetch thee straight
Adonis painted by a running brook,
And Cytherea all in sedges hid,
Which seem to move and wanton with her breath,
Even as the waving sedges play with wind....
3. Serv: Or Daphne roaming through a thorny wood,
Scratching her legs that one shall swear she bleeds,
And at that sight shall sad Apollo weep,
So workmanly the blood and tears are drawn.
(Ind. ii. 51-62.).

Such voluptuous language forecasts that of Jonson's Epicure Mammon, himself a kind of late-Renaissance overreacher. Armed with the philosopher's stone, he too will exercise a lord's powers and luxurious prerogatives:

I will have all my beds blown up, not stuffed:
Down is too hard. And then mine oval room
Filled with such pictures as Tiberius took
From Elephantis... Then my glasses
Cut in more subtle angles, to disperse
And multiply the figures as I walk
Naked between my succubae....
(Alchemist, II.i. 41-48.).

And the images in the servant's pictures recall the imagination of Marlowe's own Piers Gaveston and his outrageous plans for the pleasure of King Edward:13

Sometime a lovely boy in Dian's shape,
With hair that gilds the water as it glides,
Crownets of pearl about his naked arms,
And in his sportful hands on olive tree,
To hide those parts which men delight to see,
Shall bathe him in a spring; and there hard by,
One like Actaeon peeping through the grove
Shall by the angry goddess be transformed,
And running in the likeness of an hart
By yelping hounds pulled down, and seem to die;—
Such things as these best please his Majesty.
(Edward II, I.1. 61-71.).

Language like this, to include that of the Lord and his servants (who are adjuncts of the Lord, since they are following his "script"), illustrates the immense power and control of the playwright, and/or his surrogate in the play. The Lord, Mammon, even Gaveston (whose political
ambition and homosexual passion for Edward comprise a more creditable motive for extravagance)—all overreach the immediate demands of the dramatic situation and call overt attention to their own powers to create and transform. The Lord's speech thus reminds us that a playwright is behind all this—another nudge in the direction of detachment. Still we note the "if-then" structure of the discourse, for here the subjunctive principle is writ large and overt. Fact and fancy, illusion and reality are interchangeable to the Lord. Great hypotheticalities are immediately countered by firm promises of fact. The "facts" themselves all cater, furthermore, to Sly's own sublunary sensibilities, with the initial exception of the nightingales' warbling to Apollonian accompaniment. It is hard to imagine nightingales singing drinking songs. Otherwise the pleasures would seem to conform to Sly's notions of earthly delights—sleeping, riding, hawking, hunting, coursing. All these things are quite manly and firmly rooted in English soil. Even the Ovidian pictures are selected for their realism. They are so "workmanly" done that one can fairly see the sedges moving, and will swear that Daphne actually bleeds. The graphics, in effect, will be for Sly more "lively" than the mythical deeds they depict. Such an appeal to Sly's capacities for appreciation, furthermore, is purposeful. It reinforces the persuasive thrust of the Lord's discourse—a telic element lacking in Epicure Mammon's naked projections. The effect of the speech on Sly is indeed to make him waver in his commitment to his identity as the tinker of Burton Heath. Together with his empirical verification of the surrounding finery, the speech tempts him to capitulate to his new role as Lord. And yet for all this directed balancing, the most noticeable quality of the Lord's speech remains that of hyperbole.
Although the Lord keeps the practice under theatrical control (if with less "modesty" than we might have expected from his earlier statements), his speech has a decidedly distancing effect on audience sensibilities. In a sense this effect is inevitable. A theater audience at this point expects the speech to enlarge the practice, to contribute to the ever-widening gap of incongruity between Sly and his theatrical environment. We expect to perceive it as a reinforcer of the sense of mirth located, again, in the basic incompatibility of the elaborate practice and its paltry motive. The Lord's language itself offers little to dissuade us from this perception. If his concessions to Sly's realistic sensibilities are pragmatic and persuasive, his rhetoric itself is hyperbolically inappropriate. The highly-wrought blank verse, the poetic diction, the imagery drawn from mythology—all lend to the Lord's speech an ornamental quality that announces its artificiality, its "overdoneness." The catalog of lordly delights, to include the Ovidian pictures, gives the speech a flavor of rather emblematic pageantry, perceived in stark contrast to Sly's psychological realism. The effect, of course, is comic and detaching. This is all to Shakespeare's purpose here, as I will explain, but the reference to the "lustful bed (of) Semiramis" recalls an earlier Shakespearean instance where comic detachment is at odds with dramatic ends. In the early tragedy Titus Andronicus, Aaron the Moor compares Tamora to the same Semiramis in an overreaching speech of Marlovian proportions:

Now climbeth Tamora Olympus' top,  
Safe out of Fortune's shot, and sits aloft,  
Secure of thunder's crack or lightning flash,  
Advanced above pale envy's threatening reach,  
As when the golden sun salutes the morn,...  
Then, Aaron, arm thy heart, and fit thy thoughts,  
To mount aloft with thy imperial mistress,...
Away with slavish weeds and servile thoughts!
I will be bright and shine in pearl and gold,
To wait upon this new-made Empress.
To wait, said I? To wanton with this Queen,
This goddess, this Semiramis, this nymph,
This siren that will charm Rome's Saturnine,...
(Titus Andronicus, II.1. 1-23.)

Hyperbole is here unsuited to the action, keeping an audience aloof from
an otherwise engaging response to the drama. Even so, the hyperbole is
modest compared to Aaron's later speech when, exulting in the history of
his own villainy, he catalogs evils the excesses of which reduce them to
ludicrous pranks:

Even now I curse the day...
Wherein I did not some notorious ill:
As kill a man, or else devise his death;
Ravish a maid, or plot the way to do it;...
Make poor men's cattle break their necks;
Set fire on barns and haystacks in the night,
And bid the owners quench them with their tears,
Oft have I digged up dead men from their graves
And set them upright at their dear friends' doors,...
And on their skins, as on the bark of trees,
Have with my knife carved in Roman letters,
"Let not your sorrows die, though I am dead."
(V.1. 125-140.).

How can a haystack pyromaniac be taken seriously as a tragic villain?
The Moor's language renders his own evil stature as finally ludicrous.
Even buried breast-deep and left to starve he will rave that he is "no
baby," and that he would perform "ten thousand worse" evils (if he could
only get unstuck).

Now Titus is supposed to be a tragedy, and Aaron's inappropriate
rhetoric contributes to the play's generally unsatisfactory reputation.
Such language is a detaching force in a dramatic world largely dependent
on genuine emotional appeal for its artistic success. The Lord's speech
on the other hand, is not so destructive to the emerging world of Shrew—
this in spite of the fact there are interesting similarities between the
latter and Aaron's "Semiramis" soliloquy. Beyond the poetry and rhetoric, the two speeches share a common persuasive focus, overstated to be sure. The Lord will have Sly, like the Moor, "fit (his) thoughts to mount aloft" to a higher station. Sly is admonished, in Aaron's language, to shed the "slavish weeds and servile thoughts" of a tinker, and so arise in the "pearl and gold" of a lord. To the extent that he accepts such a lofty new identity, Sly also will "wanton" with his "Queen" at the Lord's encouragement (though Sly himself will "wanton" more forthrightly: "Madam, undress you, and come now to bed."). Yet the Lord's speech, unlike Aaron's, does not undermine the integrity of the dramatic heterocosm. Obviously we are dealing here with different literary modes; similarly inappropriate, disengaging language could seriously damage a tragic context while actually serving to heighten the effects of comedy. The point to be made, however, is that the Lord's speech threatens even to upset the balances of Shakespearean comedy, but that this does not happen.

In spite of the hyperbole and the highly-visible theatrics here and elsewhere in the induction, Shakespeare manages to keep his audience focused, in a cognitive way, squarely upon the dramatic proceedings. The unchecked detachment otherwise attendant on practical joke or slapstick farce is not allowed to upset the subjunctive balance. We have examined some of the reasons why this is so— the countering concessions to tosspot realism, Sly's own psychological profile, the emphasis on control, and the like. But in a larger sense the speech contributes to an overall pattern of delay and disordering experience designed to frustrate audience expectations and so effect, in an audience, a wondering desire for conclusive upshot. We have seen, for instance, how an audience is ripe for implication in the Lord's instructions to the players. This ripeness is
enhanced by the fact that the arrival of the players is itself an unexpected interruption of the Lord's scenario. The jolt of surprise invariably invites critical attention; a break in the orderly procession of things itself invites renewed scrutiny of underlying patterns of meaning, patterns suddenly rendered more conspicuous by the apparent hiatus in their development. The pattern of meaning illuminated at that point includes, but goes beyond, the notion of subjunctive control examined earlier. If the implications of the Lord's practice on Syl are illuminated by his practice, at another level, on the players themselves, it is also suddenly clear to an audience that the Lord himself is being practiced upon, manipulated by a playwright. His power and control notwithstanding, he is no more a real lord than Sinklo is Soto, the "aptly fitted part" once performed by the player to whom the Lord speaks. The fact that Sinklo (the player's name in the stage directions to the Folio) was an actual actor in the Chamberlain's Company is of course lost on a theater audience. There is no reference to his name in the text, since the Lord has forgotten it. Nevertheless, the interruptive intrusion of an outside "reality" into the Lord's scenario focuses our attention upon the vexing relationship between appearance and actuality. We suddenly perceive the Lord as "part" as well as person. This is a cognitive response, and is typical of the effects of Shakespearean comedy.

Interestingly, and in contrast, the arrival of the players in Hamlet precipitates an intense affective response, a reinforced empathy with Hamlet's genuine misery. There the actor's elaborate, theatrical passion—generated in the poetic narrative of Hecuba's agony—functions as a foil for the prince's very real motive and cue for passion. In contrast to the artfulness of the player's passion, Hamlet's is felt as all the more
genuine and engaging. The emotive focus is on the great disparity between appearances and reality, a painful perception articulated by Hamlet himself in the ensuing "rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy, and in his earlier rejoinder when Gertrude will know why death "seems" so particular with him:

"Seems, Madam?... These (shapes of grief) indeed seem, For they are actions that a man might play; But I have that within which passeth show— These but the trappings and the suits of woe. (I.ii. 76,ff.)."

Elsewhere in the tragedies, Shakespeare will use theatrical analogues in different ways, as when Macbeth compares the emptiness of his seared life to a poor player's struttings. With the arrival of the players at Elsinore, however, he uses the interruption, the theatrical interlude, to bring an audience into closer communion with Hamlet's grief.

With the arrival of the actors in *The Shrew*, on the other hand, the playwright uses the interruption to focus his audience's cognitive attention on the interpenetrating and closely balanced relationship between role and reality. Such is one pervasive difference between Shakespeare's tragic and comic effects— imperative feeling on the one hand, subjunctive consideration on the other. With the Lord's speech to the wakened Sly, though we are prepared for a widening of the comic gap between Sly and the theatrical ambience, we are not ready for such a disconcerting delay in the expected main events of the practice— the presentation of the "Lady" and the commencement of the entertainment. The interruption of the scenario again calls critical attention to hear upon the "theme" of the induction; i.e., the flexibility of the shifting nexus between illusion and actuality. The speech itself is paradigmatic in this regard. Although gratuitously ancillary to the unfolding of the scenario, it addresses itself to the
metaphysics of the induction as a whole. The speech establishes, that is, an interpenetrating dialectic of fact and fancy. On the one hand are aligned the deities of Ovidian myth, and such proposed niceties as fine paintings and golden artifacts. On the other side are the more quotidian components of horses, hounds, rape and blood. The relationship between/among these elements is fundamentally the same as that between the "tosspot" Sly and the "lordly" Sly, between Sinklo and the traveling player, between the Lord and his practiced posture, between John Heminges or whatever actor and the role of the Lord itself, between the page and the "lady," and so on. All proclaim that illusion and reality are closely and organically related. The drama itself is now perceived as the subjunctive solution wherein these contending elements are suspended and allowed to inter-react. Thus, the Lord's speech—like his instructions to the players—itself serves as object lesson to direct the audience's scrutiny that is attendant on the interruption of the action.

The subjunctive nature of the drama, implied throughout the induction, is underscored by the recurring emphasis on dreams and dreaming. In the interplay between dream and the Lord's practice, an audience is encouraged to perceive an organic relationship that transcends mere analogy. We are reminded of our own experience with dreams—"rudimentary private dramas," as Elizabeth Burns calls them—wherein we function variously as both actor and spectator. In a dream we are simultaneously involved and detached, as we seem to move voluntarily through an involuntary world where illusion is its own reality. Dream as overt theatrical metaphor was no doubt more accessible to Shakespeare's immediate audience than it is to us, closer as they were to the literature of the Middle Ages. Conventional as "framing device" in that literature, dream provided a "stage" for ex-
perience otherwise inaccessible to the author-dreamer. On that stage
the writer could subsume his "real" identity and function as creative
artist in his role as protagonist, and could seem to experience a wider
world where "seem" was as "real" as could be wished. Examples of this
kind of dream literature come readily enough to mind: The Roman de la
Rose, Pearl, and Piers Plowman, as well as Chaucer's Book of the Duchess
and Parliament of Fowles. All these works deal with serious or "actual"
realities within a context contrary to fact, thus creating a subjunctive
condition conducive to the assimilation of meaning on the part of pro-
tagonist and reader alike. Shakespeare himself was certainly aware of
the kinship between dream and drama, and of the usefulness to his artistic
purposes of dream as theatrical metaphor. A Midsummer Night's Dream is
of course the consummate monument to that awareness. There dream and
drama come together to make a clear statement about the subjunctive
relationship between illusion and reality, role and identity. Using a
slightly different language, Mr. Calderwood develops this notion with
convincing insight in his essay on Dream as metadrama. The association
of dream illusions with those of drama is of course found throughout
Shakespeare, from Hamlet to the Tempest. But the association is an es-
specially happy one for the comedy, as it encourages, in an audience, a
cognitive perspective exactly suited to Shakespeare's purpose.

When dream associations are first introduced in Shrew, however, they
function more as adversary than as friend of subjunctive drama. When
the hunter agrees that the Lord's plans for Sly will make the drunkard
quite forget himself, the Lord says:

Even as a flattering dream or worthless fancy.
Then take him up and manage well the jest.
(Ind. i. 44-45.).
The Lord's comment, to include his analogy, calls attention to the fatuous frivolity of the plan by focusing on the great difference between illusion and reality. The patent unreality of dreams is used to point up the gap of incongruity between the Lord's highly artful scenario and Sly's quotidian naturalism. Thus the remark joins with heightened audience-awareness to encourage disengagement of audience from play. We are released, that is, to enjoy the mirth of the practical joke. Later, however, dream associations are employed more subtly, vis-a-vis dramatic illusion, to vex an audience into a consideration of the closer and not-so-clear-cut relationship between role and reality. At the outset of the provocative speech we have examined, the Lord addresses Sly's persistent clinging to his "old" identity:

O noble lord, bethink thee of thy birth,
Call home thy ancient thoughts from banishment,
And banish hence these abject lowly dreams.
(Ind. ii. 32-34.).

And Sly, having heard the full argument, questions in dream-like confusion,

Am I a Lord? And have I such a lady?  
Or do I dream? Or have I dreamed till now? 
(70-71.).

Sly's confusion is a benign one for the playwright's purposes, for it lends focus to the complexities of the theatrical illusions at work here. The audience knows full well what is going on, but it feels a keen urge to help Sly figure it all out. Sly thinks he knows who he really is, but he is faced with a disconcerting theatrical ambience that seems for all the world as real as his own skin. There exists in the tension between the real and the unreal a contradiction unresolvable for poor Sly, his attempted acquiescence to his new identity notwithstanding. Dream seems to supply the only answer, but even that is confusing. Was his other life as the Burton tinker all a dream, as the Lord would have him believe?
Or is he dreaming now, soon to awake in front of the alehouse? Sly's dilemma reminds the audience of the power of illusion, and thus of its close kinship to reality. Sly lacks the vision to recognize and deal with this commonality, so it is no wonder that he knows nothing of drama. But his very failure in this regard promotes heightened audience anticipation of the coming play. His unsuccessful struggle with dramatic illusion makes us the more eager to bring our keener understanding to bear upon the new drama about to begin. It is a foregone conclusion that Sly will not be able to cope with it, much less appreciate it or benefit from it. When he is informed that the "comonty" will actually be "a kind of history," we may be sure that he expects a factual account of something that has "really" happened in the past. But we are critically ready for something else—if we have profitted from the induction, where Shakespeare has used drama to prepare us properly for drama. Our awareness that what we have witnessed (a preliminary drama about drama, designed to introduce us to drama) is itself theatrical has left us apprized of the illusory nature of all reality, including that beyond the theater. Perhaps we even hear in the Page's "history" a telling pun on histrionicus, from that telling Elizabethan motto, Totus mundus agit histrionem. The play, like human experience itself, will be "real" and theatrical at the same time.

We shall soon see that Sly projects himself into the main play in two ways. There are two functional manifestations in the play proper of what he represented in the induction. His relationship to Petruichio is perhaps the clearer of the two, and helps explain why the induction does not leave an audience inordinately detached from the proceedings. Sly's other relationship, more oblique, is to Kate, whom I will discuss presently. Now let us look at the beginning of the "main" play. When Lucentio and
Tranio mount the interior stage before Sly and the rest, we are acutely aware of the "presentation" of drama. The multifarious implications we have discovered in the induction have indeed focused our interest on what is to come. At the outset of the main play, however, the theatrical "mirror" must inevitably loom more visible than the "history" or life it reflects. Such is the inescapable effect of inductions. Nor does Lucentio's opening rhetoric offer any check on our sense of detachment. His language quickly reveals the cardboard idealist, the lisper of Petrarchan niceties who pines and burns at first sight of fair maid. Perhaps we recall Valentine. Certainly we think of Ferdinand, Longaville, and Dumain—stoic advocates of "sweet philosophy" whose rhetorical high aims perish in the face of "sweet beauty." Thus Lucentio reminds us of posing and artifice. Theatricality calls further attention to itself in the eavesdropping of scene one. Standing aside to view the "good pastime" attendant on Baptista's entrance with his daughters and Bianca's suitors, Lucentio and Tranio comprise another interior audience to remind us of the play-within-a-play structure of the overall proceedings. The "Chinese box" effect is redoubled in our awareness of this scene as a playlet within a play within the play of the Lord's practice within a play. Add to all this the stirrings, from above, of Sly and the others at the end of the scene and we have the ingredients of a detached perspective indeed.

Yet, as we might expect, Shakespeare does not allow naked artifice to go unchecked. The voice of Tranio is our first indicator that Shrew will not be an unbalanced dramatic world. Countering his master's overly-zealous superfluities, Tranio says

I am in all affected as yourself,  
Glad that you thus continue your resolve  
To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy.
Only, good master, while we do admire
This virtue and this moral discipline,
Let's be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray,
Or so devote to Aristotle's checks
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjured....
No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en.
In brief, sir, study what you most affect.
(I.1. 26-40.)

Here is the good sense of a Berowne, couched in a language that itself undermines the excesses of posturing (note the bristling pun on "affected" in his first utterance). Tranio's role as servant, furthermore, makes him brother to Launce and Speed, cousin to Feste and Touchstone. All embody that Renaissance commonplace about the "wise fool" which, from Erasmus to Milton, located enlightenment in the lowly and simple. In Shakespearean comedy, we may look to such "fools" for the balanced, subjunctive vision (Though many lack it, of course. Sly, Bottom and his kin come to mind.). Couple Tranio's fundamental good sense with his remarkable face-making ability and we have a subjunctive "hero," a leveller of fatuous and a creator of purposeful illusion. It is this quality in Tranio that inspires Lucentio to sensible action and hatches the plan whereby they will exchange identities, thus allowing Lucentio to insinuate himself into Bianca's household as Cambio, the schoolmaster-servant. Tranio's counsel saves Lucentio from total self-parody (at this point, at least), and rescues their exchange of vestments from arbitrary theatrics. The servant's vision infuses illusion with engaging purposefulness.

Still the scene ends with a return to the frame, the mirror for the "history." Sly is seen nodding above, not minding the play. His conclusion that the play must be over reminds us that it has just begun—indeed, that we must begin again. His intrusion interrupts our budding engagement with the young plot and forces us to acknowledge the artifice of the proceedings. Sly is an unwitting "presenter," pointing to the
play world as created thing. Perhaps the jolt reminds us that he too, for all his realism, is a created thing. Once more we are mindful of the slippery interface between illusion and reality. Accenting this awareness is a return here to the "sleep-dream" motif of the induction. Sly's drowsiness is a sign not only of his boredom with art, but also of the ephemeral, unreal nature of his immediate experience (i.e., the play). One critic has even suggested that Sly is dreaming the "main" play into being.\[18\] Even so, we do well if we remember, from the induction, the ambivalent effect of dream illusions and their integral relationship to dramatic illusion. If a sleepy Sly reminds us of the practical joke played on him and the fanciful unreality of what is being played before us, his nodding also recalls for us the creative power of dream to animate illusion with convincing reality.

In calling attention to his art, Shakespeare is thus again remarking on its relationship to life. If this be play, dream, magic trick, it is illusion of the kind life offers. No sooner does Sly nod than Petruchio bounds upon the stage, roaring that he will knock Grumio's head off. Art becomes alive as we immediately respond to the enormous and engaging energies of the hero. And here is the connection between Sly and Petruchio. Both represent types from the Old Comedy of Aristophanes—crude, vulgar, energetic, misfits within their social orders, though Sly lacks the wit and cunning to transform his world as Petruchio will do. Petruchio fulfills, for an audience, the desire somehow to get Sly's engaging realism into the main play, to feel his energy projected into the interior orama. This expectation has from the beginning served as a constant check on our otherwise excessively detached musings about art and illusion, musings encountered by the very fact of an induction and the play-within-a-play
framework. This expectation serves as a bridge, as it were, between
induction and play proper. After all the interruptions and extended ex-
pectations caused both by those punctuations and the implications of the
Lord's practice, at last we have reached Shakespeare's center of gravity. With
the arrival of Petruchio the greater drama is an organic whole. It is
no accident that Sly and his crowd interrupt no more from above, or that
Petruchio— with gamesmanship to match his vitality— will represent the
subjunctive heart of the play. More about that presently.

If Petruchio receives Sly's vitality, Katharine inherits his dilemma. Like Sly, she is "victimized," manipulated by a playwright surrogate who
will transform her by having her believe she is something other than what
she "really" is. What she really is equates, as an audience-engaging
force in the play, to Sly's authentic personality. Not that she shares
his tosspot crudeness, but Kate does present to an audience a firm and
unaffected psychological profile. Her "identity" is a dramatic illusion
to be sure. Yet relative to the theatrics of the Lord, Petruchio, and
the "posers" of the sub-plot, she represents a level of reality perceived
by an audience as "life." Her emotions are genuine, her responses un-
feigned, at least until her conversion to subjunctivity on the road to
Padua late in the play (IV.v.). Until then the audience usually feels
in and with her the anger and misery of an authentically unhappy young
woman.

The energy of Kate's discontent often seeks outlet in contempt and
scorn, as in her first utterance. Responding to Baptista's announcement
to Bianca's suitors that she, Kate, must be married off first, she bris-
tles, "I pray you sir, is it your will to make a stale of me amongst
these mates?" We sense the affronted pride, as later when she reacts to
Baptista's solicitous fawning over her younger sister:

What, will you not suffer me? Nay, now I see
She is your treasure, she must have a husband.
I must dance barefoot on her wedding day
And for your love to her lead apes in Hell.
Talk not to me. I will go sit and weep
Till I can find occasion for revenge.
(II.i. 31-36.).

Interestingly, she employs the same proverbial allusion to the fate of old maids as does Beatrice in Much Ado (II.i. 43.), but without the latter's ironic detachment. Kate feels the pain more acutely. Other instances of her straightforward unhappiness could be cited, such as her shame and consternation at that mockery of a wedding ceremony (III.ii.), and her pitiful, enraged disappointment when she, famished, is taunted by Grumio with only the "name" of meat (IV.iii. 1-35.). But her nadir of abjection comes when Petruchio even denies her the hat she likes. All her human emotions come together in a declaration of memorable poignancy:

Why, sir, I trust I may have leave to speak,
And speak I will. I am no child, no babe.
Your betters have endured me say my mind.
And if you cannot, best you stop your ears.
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart,
Or else my heart concealing it will break;...
(IV.iii. 73-78.).

Thus I must resist Mr. Henze's notion that Kate is role-playing throughout the play.19 Certainly his observation that Petruchio teaches her the art of acting, to be consummately demonstrated in the play's last scene, is a sound one. But until then it is simply misleading to speak of her role and Petruchio's in the same breath. Her shrewishness itself is a role only insofar as her behavior perpetuates itself as a result of other's expectations of her. She may appear such a thoroughgoing shrew, in other words, largely because she is known to be a shrew and she knows it. Trapped in this situation, she is powerless to emerge as a free and
healthy woman until she is taught to act (in both senses of the word) toward a new "being." Until that time, however, her behavior is spontaneous, untheatrical. Though intelligent enough, she does not yet understand, with Petruchio, the power and ends of acting or "supposing." She remains through most of the play seriously assertive, unself-conscious, devoid of Petruchio's subjunctive vision. Interestingly, her response to Petruchio's imaginative practice on her is again like Sly's to the Lord's theatrics. Both conclude that the explanation for their puzzling experience must somehow relate to madness. The seat of madness is of course reversed in Kate's case. Whereas Sly has empirical evidence which seems to support the Lord's claim that he, Sly, has been fifteen years a lunatic, Kate has no reason to doubt her own sanity. Thus Petruchio must be mad if she is to account for the upside-down world he confronts her with. Note her assessments of Petruchio and his behavior: "fool" (II.i. 213, 259.), "witless" (II.i. 266.), "half-lunatic" (II.i. 289.), "madbrain rudesby" (III.i. 10.), "frantic fool" (III.i. 12.), "mad Petruchio" (III.i. 19.), "disquit" (IV.i. 171.), and so on.

Kate's resistance to theatricality, as well as her final conversion to it, are much more intense than Sly's brief defiance of and "sliding" acquiescence to the Lord's scenario. If he establishes the pattern, she fleshes it out to convincing fullness. She resists passionately and converts spectacularly. Thus she is doubly functional to the playwright's purposes. She firmly grounds the drama in engaging realism to balance the play's artistic framework, and then provides a striking object lesson (germane to the play's final value) in the rightness of subjunctive vision. Her intensity gives her life and credibility. Even Robert Heilman—who argues that Shakespeare's chosen genre (farce)
dictated that he create characters without depth who cannot really be hurt and thus cannot involve us in their troubles—comes round at last to admit Kate's strong emotional makeup and appeal. In effect (and to his credit), he loosens his grip on his own argument in order to account for the play as we indeed have it. From the moment Kate steps on stage, the play-within-a-play begins to assert its own intrinsic integrity. That assertion will be interrupted, it is true, by Sly's intrusion at the end of scene one, to be restored in Petruchio's energetic appearance. Yet Kate beckons for us to "believe" in the interior play from the start. If one important effect of the "frame" is to call our attention to the wires on the playwright's puppets, Kate will encourage us to notice them less as the play goes along. The actor's relationship to real life, that is, will become more clear and compelling as the play world moves away from the practical joke and toward the "history" the page has promised us.

The wires on the Paduan puppets must not entirely disappear, of course. Shakespearean comedy, once more, is not the theater of total illusion. Nor is there ever much danger, actually, of our being overly-absorbed in the action of The Taming of the Shrew. There is, for one thing, enough emphasis on reversal and transformation in the play to keep us reminded that a playwright is behind all this. Shakespeare even transforms the convention itself—by giving us the "false start" of the induction scenes and by putting a marriage in the middle—thereby calling added attention to his art. Mark Scheid, in an unpublished essay, has remarked on this persistent characteristic of the play by pointing to a curious statement by Grumio at the marriage ceremony. When Petruchio asks if his nag is fed and ready to bear them away, his man replies, "Aye, sir... the oats have eaten the horses." (III.ii. 208.). Rather than look for meaning here
where there probably is none, we might, Scheid suggests, perceive the remark as a kind of paradigm for the pervasive inversions of the play. The induction aside, Lucentio and Tranio thus exchange identities in Act One. Hortensio then becomes Licio the musician, Lucentio changes further into Cambio the tutor, and the Pedant becomes Vincentio. Nothing is as it seems. Kate, the supposed shrew, emerges as loving wife. Bianca, the demure little sister, is revealed in her true colors, headstrong and willful. Shakespeare, I would suggest, is continuing his lesson, begun in the induction, on the interplay between illusion and reality.

Scheid maintains that even narrative details in the play offer instructive substance located in the "reversal" theme. Grumio's memorable description of the trip to Petruchio's country house, for instance, has it that the hero left Kate in the mud, her horse on top of her. This inversion of horse and rider recalls the familiar pedagogical analogy relating virtue's regulation of the passions to a man's control over his steed. If Kate is thus undone and "bemoiled" in the mire of carnality, it is ironic that she actually will not indulge in any physicality (indeed she will fast, quite literally) until after her "conversion" at the end of the play. And Curtis' assessment of Grumio's story is itself a pronouncement of relativity: "By this reckoning he is more shrew than she." All of these interesting inversions add animation to a credible dramatic world, and at the same time draw attention to the playwright's magic. They provide commentary, through illustration, on theatricality and the workings of dramatic illusion. And all this commentary points to a central subject in Petruchio—his vision, his message, and his method.

Petruchio is the heart of Shrew, the heart of its meaning. He embodies both the detached power of the artist and the most genuine, life-loving
energies of humankind. He is both Lord and Sly, with the intelligence and vision to integrate both into a plan of action that bodes "peace, love, and quiet life." This final serenity is, of course, the conventional goal of comedy—of Shakespearean comedy in general, and of the subjunctive enterprise in particular. Such tranquility is the result of purposeful activity contrived to resolve differences and integrate disparate elements of the dramatic world. This process occurs at three levels. Theoretically, "medially," it happens on the stage. More precisely, it is represented in an illusory dramatic world where serenity reigns at the final curtain. "Causally," the process lives in the mind of the playwright, where the integration co-exists with or even precedes the conflicts contrived to require resolution. "Effectively" the process evolves in the minds of us, the audience, without whom the whole notion of drama is absurd. For us, the final serenity takes the form of understanding (the tragic equivalents would be disintegration and catharsis). The assimilation of the play's implications—such as those relating to subjunctivity and the nexus between illusion and reality—occurs all along, to be sure, as we experience Shakespearean comedy. The value of the plays is by no means confined in their endings. But it is there that our inferences receive validation in an understanding correlative to the harmony on stage. This understanding goes with us, furthermore, back into the street, where it can interact with and alter our mundane experience. Thus, I must disagree with Mrs. Bradbrook, who maintains that Shrew has a therapeutic function of an "abreactive" kind. The play, she says, offers the spectator "an opportunity to harmonize the conflicts of his 'inner society' by projection upon the persons imaged" in the dramatic roles. To my way of thinking, that is the business of tragedy. The
The "therapeutic" value of Shakespeare's comedy is infusive, not effusive—nourishing, not purgative. The plays are, in effect, instructive without being didactic. And in Shrew Shakespeare has chosen Petruchio, through the education of Kate, to be our primary mentor.

If Petruchio's aim is "peace, love, and quiet life," he must postpone "real" love until his plan has worked, and his methods are anything but peaceful and quiet. The fact that they do work, however, renders as mere parody the wife-getting efforts of Lucentio and Hortensio in the sub-plot. I cannot help but think that Tranio in either of their steads would have done just fine. Perhaps Shakespeare wanted a double parody to set off Petruchio's "rightness" the more vividly. Perhaps he knew that two subjunctive heroes in the same play would dilute the lessons they embody. In any case, Luciento and Hortensio fail— in spite of their nominal marriages— because their "compliant wives" turn out to be headstrong and surly. Lacking Petruchio's consistent control over the game of wife-getting, they themselves have been gulled, victimized. The parodic contrast between their educational programs and Petruchio's is obvious from the outset. Whereas Petruchio is both thoroughly committed and confidently detached, his poor counterparts are either weak-kneed or overly-zealous. They lack the balance and control that is the hallmark of subjunctive vision. Hortensio is especially feeble. Disguised as Licio, "quaint musician" to Bianca, he quickly protests his "passion" through the device of the cryptic "gamut." When the blatant ruse ends with Bianca's "Tut, I like it not," Hortensio suspects Cambio's (Lucentio's) attentions to her and virtually gives up: "If once I find thee ranging, Hortensio will be quit with thee by changing." He moves on to a wealthy widow whose "kindness," he avers, will win his "love" in
about three days (after he has tamed her). And even at Petruchio's "taming school" the would-be suitor apparently learns little, for his lusty widow turns on him in the end.

Likewise Lucentio's is a hollow parody of Petruchio's strategy, if somewhat less ludicrous than that of Hortensio. Lucentio errs— in spite of his superficial success in winning Bianca— on the side of excess. We noted his tendencies, in this regard, in his opening expostulations about "sweet philosophy." Nor is his love, in spite of his effusive "passion," convincingly genuine. It is wooden, stylized, pedantic— learned from the Ovidian school books he reads to Bianca. He "burns, pines, perishes" in proper Petrarchan style— in love, in short, with the idea of love. Thus his assumed role as Cambio the schoolmaster emerges as self-parody as well; the teacher mocks his own efforts in trying to "construe" his "affection" for his pupil. Nor does Lucentio properly heed Tranio's counsel to "bend thoughts and wits to achieve her." The disguise— though well conceived and ostensibly put to purposeful use— is quickly nullified by Lucentio's impetuous abuse of the device. No sooner does his instructional program with Bianca begin than he reveals himself and his intentions from behind the subterfuge of the Latin lessons. Though he gets a somewhat less devastating response than does Hortensio to the latter's similar confession, Lucentio essentially sacrifices control to impulse. In more skilled hands the device could have been used as an ally of time to protect the "practicer" while he carefully constructed a foundation of mutual understanding and affection. As it is, the disguise serves only the plot in "blearing" old Baptista's eyes long enough for the pair to run off and get married. The device is a "counterfeit suppose," but a rather perfunctory one. Its significance
is that of foil to the masterful use of "supposes" by Petruchio. "Love wrought these miracles," Lucentio declares when the truth is out. That love, however, is questionable at best, and the "miracle" is merely that of mistaken identity. The true miracle is reserved for Petruchio, who, with a playwright's vision, will create "peace, love, and quiet life" out of noise and contempt.

Petruchio would seem at first an odd subject for subjunctive heroism. We normally find it in the almost serene composure of a Julia, a Viola, a Rosalind—women whose steady and healthy detachment enables them to control and direct deep, human feelings. The fact that Petruchio is masculine, furthermore, is an immediate and obvious indication of further reversals, in Shrew, of the normal nature of things in Shakespearean comedy. His nature is hyperbole, not serenity; his activity is initiated by money, not love or complex human emotion. Whereas the heroines are generally eirons—disguising themselves below the status of their "real" identities—Petruchio comes on as an alazon, the intruder of Old Comedy who will assert himself where he does not seem to fit. Thus Petruchio will "wive and thrive it wealthily in Padua," freed by his father's death to make his mark in the world. He projects, indeed, the familiar miles gloriosus figure, undaunted by impediments:

Think you a little din can daunt mine ears?
Have I not in my time heard lions roar?
Have I not heard the sea, puffed up with winds,...?
Have I not heard great ordnance in the field,
And Heaven's artillery thunder in the skies?...
(1.i. 200-205.).

Yet here, even at the outset, the apparently Marlovian rhetoric points subtly to an important difference between Petruchio and the conventional alazon. He is already "quasi-asserting"; he is asking questions, not
proclaiming. The questions insinuate contrary-to-fact conditions, indicating a gap of detachment between the speaker and his rhetoric. This self-conscious detachment will insulate Petruchio from his experience, enabling him not only to avoid but reverse the fate of most alazons. He is no Faustus, who will actually risk his soul to reach his ambitious ends. He will win, because his detachment gives him the control of the true artist.

The compelling, human feeling at the motivational core of the subjunctive heroines is rather intricately postponed and displaced in Petruchio's case. Genuine love of the kind that animates Rosalind is, in Shrew, found only at the very end of the play, when Kate at last is in step with her mentor. There "Kiss me, Kate" becomes not a ruse, but a manifestation of the marriage of two minds. Until then such genuine feeling is motivational for Petruchio only in the sense that it is his goal, rather than his employ. "Affection's edge" is sharpened in him before he even meets Kate, because he can anticipate the future happiness attendant on his having a wealthy wife. Otherwise, the human core of the heroines finds correspondence, in Petruchio, in a two-fold equivalent. On the one hand is his engaging, life-loving energy, discussed above as a link to Christopher Sly. More important, however, is the function of Kate's own unhappiness in this regard. Unself-conscious herself, she is indeed the alazon Petruchio only plays at being. Linked inseparably with Petruchio's machinations, her misery provides the compelling human component essential to the subjunctive enterprise. The transformation of her pain into joy and contentment will signal both the defeat of the alazon and the triumph of subjunctive vision. This conversion will signal final integration within the play world and, for an
audience, the meaning of the drama.

Aside from these inversions of Shakespeare's usual mode, however, Petruchio represents the familiar subjunctive vision recommended by the playwright. He controls his own experience by imposing hypothetical conditions upon existing realities. He "supposes" a great deal, and acts as if these contrary-to-fact conditions were true. Mr. Seronsy's essay happily obviates a painstaking examination of the details of Petruchio's dealings with Kate. Suffice it to say, his approach represents subjunctivity writ large—loud and daring hypotheticalities imposed on Kate's loud and aggressive reality. Nor is his strategy a matter for the audience to infer. He clearly outlines his modus operandi in a key soliloquy delivered just before he encounters the notorious shrew:

... I will attend her here
And woo her with some spirit when she comes.
Say that she rail; why, then I'll tell her plain
She sings as sweetly as a nightingale.
Say that she frown; I'll say she looks as clear
As morning roses newly washed with dew.
Say she be mute and will not speak a word;
Then I'll commend her volubility
And say she uttereth piercing eloquence.
If she do bid me pack, I'll give her thanks
As though she bid me stay by her a week.
If she deny to wed, I'll crave the day
When I shall ask the banns and when be married.
(II.i. 170-181.).

The speech reveals a keen intelligence, not the backwoods vulgarity often associated with Petruchio. The hero must be portrayed with "some spirit," to be sure, but I object to productions which render Petruchio a mere animal. His plan requires a great deal of alert, controlled self-consciousness, and a full measure of wit (made abundantly clear in the ensuing interview with Kate). A rarity in Shakespearean comedy, Petruchio, as male lead, is every whit as clever as his feminine counterparts in the
other plays. I like to see him portrayed as rather enjoying his own, benign shrewdness.

Petruchio's kinship with the playwright and the Lord of the induction is obvious in the subjunctive nature of his plan. All have the power to create alternative realities simply by supposing them so. Petruchio's soliloquy in particular bears striking similarity to the Lord's speech to Sly, examined earlier. Both depend on an "if-then" structure to establish a new reality based on supposition. Even the "nightingale" image recurs here. As a symbol of ethereal nicety it suggests—by way of contrast with the crude Sly and the coarse shrew—the wide range of the playwright-figure's powers. Both the Lord and Petruchio have the artist's control and confidence to nominate new identities. The Lord, of course, is only an unfleshed model of the magician, designed to alert an audience to the notion of theatricality as it relates to real life. His paltry success in "transforming" Sly notwithstanding, the Lord's powers are finally thwarted by Sly's dull intransigence. The Lord does, however, establish the proper dramatic ambience for Petruchio, the successful playwright surrogate. The latter likewise has rather unyielding raw material to work with, and for most of the play it appears Kate is even less likely than Sly to metamorphose into a new identity. She does at last change, of course, and that rather dramatically—pun intended. Much more intelligent than Sly, she finally learns how to "act."

The Taming of the Shrew is such a striking and full-blown object lesson in subjunctivity largely because of its extension of the ways in which the principle normally is utilized and recommended. We have seen that Shrew, like the other plays, establishes the balanced conditions
that encourage an audience to perceive the drama in a cognitive way. The forces designed to establish that balance are larger in _Shrew_, but the balance is there. Again like our other plays, _Shrew_ presents a leading figure who self-consciously plays a game or role in order to confront, control, and alter an existing "reality" in the play. In _Shrew_, however, this pattern is extended in an overt "lesson"; Petruchio literally teaches Kate to share in his vision. Thus the playwright's recommendation of the subjunctive principle is rendered all the more striking. Kate "converts" to subjunctivity on the road to Padua, having served her miserable time in "purgatory" at Petruchio's country house. Though lack of solid evidence prevents me from insisting on anything here, I cannot help but perceive Kate's transformation as a quasi-religious experience—a yielding unto God, as it were. I have spoken before of the God-like powers of the playwright-surrogate, and nowhere are those powers more in evidence than in this scene. Let us examine it in full:

_Pet:_ Come on, i' God's name. Once more toward our father's.  
_Good Lord, how bright and goodly shines the moon!_  
_Kath:_ The moon! The sun. It is not moonlight now.  
_Pet:_ I say it is the moon that shines so bright.  
_Kath:_ I know it is the sun that shines so bright.  
_Pet:_ Now, by my mother's son, and that's myself, it shall be moon, or star, or what I list,...  
_Hor:_ Say as he says, or we shall never go.  
_Kath:_ Forward, I pray since we have come so far, and be it moon, or sun, or what you please. And if you please to call it a rush candle, Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me. (7)  
_Pet:_ ... It is the blessed sun.  
_Kath:_ Then, God be blessed, it is the blessed sun.... What you will have it named, even that it is, And so it shall be for Katharine. (15)  

(IV.v. 1-22.)

Such language seems to carry theological overtones. We note the frequency of the words "God" and "blessed," and the reference to "our father's." Petruchio's "now by my mother's son, and that's myself,"
recalls Christ's announcement of his divine origin and powers. Kate's statement of submission (line 15), furthermore, seems to have the ring of a religious confession. With this confession she is converted to her lord's subjunctive "doctrine," released from the prison of her old, fixed identity to enjoy the freedom and spontaneity that animate Petruchio himself. She has learned (recalling Biblical paradox) that to find herself she must lose herself. She has foresworn her oath rigidly to resist Petruchio's efforts to convert her, and thus can say with Berowne,

Let us once lose our oaths to find ourselves,
Or else we lose ourselves to keep our oaths.
It is religion to be thus foresworn.
(Love's Labor's Lost, IV.iii. 361-363.)

Katherine is now a new creature.

Whether or not Kate's transformation is a kind of religious experience, it is quickly obvious that she has found zest and joy for the first time. When the travelers meet Vincentio on the road, she playfully participates with Petruchio in the game of pretending the old man is a "young budding virgin, fair and fresh." Then, when Petruchio "returns" him to his old identity, Kate responds, tongue-in-cheek: "Now I perceive thou art a reverend father. Pardon, I pray thee, for my mad mistaking." She has learned the healthy fun of Petruchio's "lunacy." She is now as "mad" as he, and they are thus on the road to "peace, love, and quiet life." An important aspect of Kate's new vision is the detachment that allows her to see herself from without, as it were. This new capability will enable her to deal with human experience by playing self-conscious roles. This is immediately evident in the banquet scene, where she plays the role of the dutiful wife to the hilt, thus securing the healthy sum wagered against her. In her famous speech on the duty of wives to their husbands, Kate is enacting a convention based on the Pauline argument
from the Bible (Ephesians 5: 21-33). How "serious" she is about the particulars of her argument is uncertain, and a moot point. What we can be sure of is that her assertions are at odds with her own experience, thus making it plain that she is engaging in theatricality. George Bernard Shaw and those who feel the speech is "altogether disgusting to modern sensibility"²³ surely miss the point. Kate here is "quasi-asserting," no more concerned with the "truth" of her argument than Petruchio protesting earlier that Kate was "pleasant, gamesome, passing courteous." The speech is a posture, a theatrical tactic that enables her to confront her experience and triumph over her critics. Kate is masterfully playing the "as if" game she has learned from Petruchio. He has indeed created a miracle.

The Taming of the Shrew, in Kate's final happiness and the integration of the play world, recommends subjunctivity as the means whereby man can control his own destiny and live at peace with his experience. This lesson would be curiously undermined had Shakespeare returned, at the end of the play, to his initial framework. In the non-Shakespearean A Shrew, Sly is awakened after the performance by a tapster, to whom he remarks in amazement,

Who's this? Tapster, oh Lord sirra, I have had
The bravest dream tonight, that ever thou
Hearest in all thy life.
Tap: Ay marry, but you had best get you home,
For your wife will curse you for dreaming here tonight.
Sly: Will she? I know now how to tame a shrew.
I dreamt upon it all this night till now,
And thou has waked me out of the best dream
That ever I had in my life, but I'll to my Wife presently and tame her, too,
And if she anger me.

Here is dianoia of the most overt order, the kind of thing we do not associate with Shakespeare. To discuss the ending of Shakespeare's play
as we have it, we do not really need to know which came first, The or A Shrew. If, however, A Shrew is the older, source play, then Shakespeare's decision not to follow his model and return to the frame is rendered the more significant. Aside from his preference for nondidactic drama, Shakespeare probably felt reluctant to risk leaving his audience with the final impression that his play was only about shrew-taming. A Shrew is, as we have seen, "about" much more. Beyond this, a return to Sly would upset the theatrical balances so adroitly developed by the play as a whole.

The great subjunctive lesson of the play is that theatricality is a very positive way of life—that the hypothetical mode can and does serve the ends of real humanity. After the theatrical ambience is established in the induction, the interior play quickly begins to assert itself as a viable and integrated world, animated by recognizable, human energies and emotions. Thus, while theatricality remains a dominant mode (Shakespeare will not let us forget), the impression emerges that acting is the universal human activity. Illustrating this fact, the Paduan puppets grow and develop into people like ourselves. Those characters who understand this best (Petruchio, and then Kate) develop into better and happier people. The effect on an audience of this dual process is of crucial importance to the play's success. At the end of the play we are alert to the play's value, poised between our involvement with the play's life and our awareness of its hypotheticality. As Kate and Petruchio go off together, we truly understand that illusion and reality, convention and humanity, meet most benignly in subjunctivity—even if we do not have a name for it.

A return to Sly would destroy this effect. If Sly wakes up, Kate
and Petruchio are reduced to mere dream, the dramatic world trivialized. We are suddenly released—indeed, pushed—from our cognitive vantage point by this obtrusive reminder that this whole affair is just a practical joke after all. Excessive detachment reduces the dramatic experience to the level of whimsy. Our "education" is thus seriously undermined. James Calderwood, perceptive student of metadrama that he is, does not seem to understand this effect of a resurrected Sly. Comparing the ending of Shrew to that of A Midsummer Night's Dream he comments,

Shakespeare leaves his Sly in the dramatic dream, absorbed by illusions, forever unable to reemerge into the real world. But Dream would seem to represent an advance on this aspect of Shrew in that the dramatist now assumes responsibility not only for involving his audience but also for releasing it again. In Shrew the audience is sacrificed to the play; in Dream the play is sacrificed to the audience, yet does its work in the very process of being sacrificed. 25

Perhaps Calderwood is confused by the fact that there are two audiences in Shrew— the interior audience of Sly, et al., and, of course, ourselves. It is Sly who is sacrificed to the play, not us. My point is that Sly must be sacrificed to the play or it remains, for us, "only" a play, with little value beyond a few pointers on how a man can torment his wife. Calderwood forgets that Sly is outside the play in a way qualitatively different from the lovers' "green world" removal from Athens in Dream. The relationship between Sly's world and the various dramatic levels of Shrew is important, of course. We saw this earlier. But the equivalent, in Shrew, to the dreamers' return to the city is the implied commencement of Kate's and Petruchio's successful married life together, not the return to Sly's quotidian reality. Sly has served the dramatist's purposes early and is best left sleeping so as
not to disrupt Shakespeare's magic. We are best released if we return to the street with Petruchio, not Sly, as our model.
NOTES


4 The Stationers' Register records on May 2, 1594, the entry to Peter Short of " a booke intituled A pleasant Conceyted historie called The Tayminge of a Shrowe."


8 Greenfield, p. 37.

9 Ibid.

10 Seronsy, pp. 15-30.


13 I will not argue for influence here, though Edward II first appeared in 1593, probably early enough to have preceded Shrew. See also note 14.
14 For possible Marlovian influences see Nicholas Brooke, "Marlowe as Provocative Agent in Shakespeare's Early Plays," Shakespeare Survey, 14 (1961), 34-44.

15 This theme is examined in Maynard Mack, "The World of Hamlet," Yale Review, 41 (1952), 502-523.


17 James Calderwood, Shakespearean Metadrama (Minneapolis, 1971), pp. 120-148.


20 Heilman, pp. 158-159.


22 Seronsy, op. cit.


24 Unless J. Dover Wilson be proved right. He maintains, in the New Cambridge Edition of 1928 (p. 142), that A Shrew is a memorial reconstruction of The Shrew, and that the conclusion to A Shrew is based on a now-lost conclusion to Shakespeare's play. That being the case, we would have to suspend judgment on Shakespeare's ending until the lost pages were found.

25 Calderwood, p.146, n.
CHAPTER FOUR:
AS YOU LIKE IT AND TWELFTH NIGHT

As You Like It and Twelfth Night, dating contemporaneously to about 1600, signal the high-water mark of Shakespeare's festive, romantic comedy. Thereafter, the bard was to focus his energies in the tragic mode, and of course the world is richer for the masterpieces that followed. But the shift marked an abrupt turning, for whatever reasons,1 from the kind of drama we have been investigating. No more would Shakespeare employ the artfully balanced play to endorse the steady and healthy (essentially comic) world-view. Even when Shakespeare did return to "comedy" after 1600, the results were curious, often unsettling amalgams we have learned to call "dark comedies," "problem plays," or "romances." F.S. Boas, who taught us to speak this way, observed that such plays as All's Well and Measure for Measure raise complex issues that "preclude a completely satisfactory outcome."2 Such plays resist, furthermore, the standard generic classifications. Thus, with As You Like It and Twelfth Night, we reach the end of Shakespeare's subjunctive phase, and we reach it on a high note indeed. Though it is critically unproductive to speak of their shared excellence as a common feature, the two plays are alike in their enduring popularity and their countless successes on the stage. And of course, they share, as we shall see, Shakespeare's concern for the subjunctive principle. Together, they
provide the playwright's consummate expression of that principle as it informs and valuates the comedies written before 1600.

There are, however, noticeable differences between the plays. Nearly everyone agrees, for instance, that Twelfth Night is darker in tone than As You Like It. Most playgoers hear unsettling reverberations in the former, especially at its conclusion, to remind us of the harshness of the real world beyond art and comedy. Indeed, a companion of mine actually cried at a recent performance, moved to tears by the disturbing effects of Malvolio's humiliation, Antonio's uncertain (but possibly dismal) fate, and Feste's final commentary on the wind and rain. My friend, bringing to bear upon the play a sensibility much like that of Charles Lamb, responded in sympathy to those left out of the comic resolution. The final message of the play, for her, was the appalling arbitrariness of the final justice, to include its "positive" manifestation in the abrupt and contrived pairing of Viola-Orsino and Olivia-Sebastian. My friend's response was perhaps an extreme and atypical reaction to Shakespearean comedy, but it vividly illustrates one contrast between Twelfth Night and the happy serenity of As You Like It. Anne Barton attributes this contrast primarily to Shakespeare's handling of the plays' endings. The conclusion of As You Like It preserves, in spite of Jaques' voluntary defection to the hermitage, that "classical equilibrium" which sanctifies the "heightened world" of the play and allows for the untroubled inclusiveness of the final "crowded dance." The ending of Twelfth Night, on the other hand, is exclusive and rather capricious. The absence and/or rejection from the heightened world of all but the two romantic couples, together with the fairy-tale logistics of the conclusion, calls our attention to the "line dividing fiction from something
we recognize as our own reality." The holiday spirit of the play is damaged as we wake to the cold light of day and "return to normality along with Sir Toby and Maria, Sir Andrew and Malvolio."

Thus, for Barton, Twelfth Night anticipates the "problem plays" and the difficulty of endings that do not "transfigure the events in which they were inmanent." At the conclusions of All's Well and Measure for Measure few are left out, to be sure, but the resolutions are accomplished at the cost of (we might say) the plays' subjunctive balance. The final incorporations depend on an overt concession to the artificialities of comic form; they neither grow out of nor revitalize all that has gone before. Such endings are nakedly arbitrary. They disturb violently the conditions necessary for our assimilation of the kind of meaning we absorb from, say, Shrew or As You Like It. And by the time Shakespeare got to Pericles, Cymbeline, and The Winter's Tale, he would make it clear from the outset that he was now writing fairy stories. If this tendency toward capriccio begins with Twelfth Night, however, it is only foreshadowed there. Subsequent changes in Shakespeare's art by no means negate the value of the play for our purposes. Those changes may serve rather to illuminate, by means of extension, an interesting difference between Twelfth Night and As You Like It.

Other broad differences between the two plays may be perceived by incorporating them into a comparison with the comedies we have already examined. We may start with Hawkins' scheme, mentioned earlier, wherein the early comedies line up as plays of "exodus" (AYLI, Dream, Merchant of Venice, and Two Gentlemen) or "arrival" (Comedy of Errors, Love's Labor's Lost, Much Ado, and Twelfth Night). This division according to "double setting" and "unity of place" works well for As You Like It
and Twelfth Night, and opens the door to a clearer understanding of what happens in the plays. Interestingly, however, the scheme is least precise in regard to Shrew and Two Gentlemen. Hawkins admits that Shrew shows mixed features of both patterns and thus resists categorization. In the case of Two Gentlemen, however, I must take exception to his firm placement of the play in the "exodus" group. It is true, of course, that there are multiple settings in the play; the two gentlemen do embark on fortune-seeking holidays from Verona to Milan. Yet the Mantuan frontier hardly qualifies as a "green world," to be mentioned in the same breath with Arden, Belmont, and the enchanted woods outside Athens. It is no more a heightened world than the park in Love's Labor's Lost, an arena of confrontation where tensions and misunderstandings may be ultimately resolved. The real tension in Two Gentlemen, furthermore, is generated in the intrusion of Julia into the dramatic setting at Milan, with its already established complexities of love and intrigue. Thus I wish to dissociate Two Gentlemen from Hawkin's categories in order to re-align both it and Shrew with the plays under consideration in this chapter.

Scholars have long quibbled about the source or sources of Twelfth Night. John Manningham, in 1602, noticed similarities to an Italian comedy called Gl' Inganni. In the eighteenth century, consensus seemed to light on Bandello's Novelle. In the nineteenth century, Joseph Hunter identified another Italian play, Gl' Ingannati (or The Mistaken), as the "true origin" of Shakespeare's. Nor can we overlook Barnabe Riche's tale of Apoionius and Silla as an "obvious" source for the sentimental main plot of Twelfth Night. Perhaps we can assume Shakespeare was familiar with all these stories involving a young woman disguised as a page who courts another woman on her master's behalf. This
is exactly what happens in The Two Gentlemen, a play based largely on the episode of Felix and Felismena in Montemayor's Diana Enamorada (1542). All of this rather hazy attribution aside, I tend to agree with Harrold Jenkins in his practical conclusion that "the most important source for Twelfth Night is The Two Gentlemen." In the later play, Shakespeare would enlarge upon and polish what he had begun in the earlier. Beyond the shared concerns observed by Jenkins (intrigue, disguised wooing, etc.), the two plays interlock in other ways as well. Julia and Viola (for me, the central figures of the plays) both arrive, as outsiders, upon pre-established "worlds"— communities already taut with their own internal tensions. The tensions are generated by "love" (the gentlemen's passion for Silvia and Orsino's for Olivia) and sustained in sexual antagonism (Proteus' illicit love is spurned; Orsino's fatuous love is unrequited). The "blocking figures" who often provide the tension in the "exodus" plays are here the lovers themselves. Within these autistic, confined worlds, furthermore, there is no apparent place for our intruding heroines.

This central problem is underscored by the heroines' disguises, donned beforehand for their own protection. They lack even an identity to offer the new community. At the other extreme, the women must face the danger of becoming entrapped, by the new societies, within their ersatz or quasi-identities. This danger is especially real for Viola, who enters a more populous and volatile world than does Julia. As Cesario, she will finally be vulnerable, for instance, to the unrestrained jealousy of Orsino. At last perceiving Olivia's fondness for his own "boy," the Duke rages at him,
I'll sacrifice the lamb that I do love,
To spite a raven's heart within a dove.
(Twelfth Night, V.i. 133-134.).

Such focused attention on Cesario designates not a place in the dramatic world for Viola, but an entrapment stemming from her masculine identity. Similar danger lurks likewise in the background community of the play. If the "sword fight" with Sir Andrew is a comic phallic symbol for the man-like assertion of Viola's personality in her "usurped attire," it is also a threatening and potentially dangerous trap. Real fear peeks through her rather slapstick response to Sir Andrew's "challenge":

Pray God defend me! A little thing would make me tell them how much I lack of a man.
(III.iv. 331-332.).

The disguises of both Viola and Julia threaten to entrap them both in apparently self-defeating activity—advancing for others those causes which should be their own. It is, finally, tribute to their vision and powers as subjunctive heroines that those causes are their own—that each does act on her own behalf in spite of the restrictive pressures of her community. Each acts (as we have already seen in the case of Julia) not as one might "really" act in the face of adversity, but as one would "act" in a play. They secure their own ends by projecting a public role, a hypothetical social image, by means of which each can negotiate with reality. The dramatic worlds inherited by Julia and Viola, furthermore, are denser, more "plot-bound" than those of Shrew and As You Like It. Theirs is the more complex task of untying knots and gaining entrance to closed houses. Thus their activity will of necessity be more defensive, more passive. Each will employ subjunctive vision more as a coping device than as an aggressive tactic of self-assured control. Julia and Viola remain in control of their situations, to be sure, but their compli-
cated environments call for resigned patience on the part of each.

Julia announces early her readiness for this kind of slow persistence. Facing the difficult journey to Milan, she reassures Lucetta,

I'll be as patient as a gentle stream,
And make a pastime of each weary step,
Till the last step have brought me to my love.
(II.vii. 34-36.).

She will prove that her perseverance runs deeper than the conventional language here might suggest. In Milan, she is greeted by the "false-music" of her lover, serenading another woman. Her responses to the host reveal an implicit ability and willingness to endure:

... I would I were deaf. It makes me have a slow heart.
... it hath been the longest night
That e'ver I watched, and the most heaviest.
(IV.ii. 64 ff.).

Likewise, Viola, when she realizes she (as Cesario) has been entangled in the web of Illyrian society, reveals both a firm commitment to human feeling and a resigned willingness to stand and wait:

... As I am man,
My state is desperate for my master's love;
As I am woman— now alas the day!—
What thriftless sighs shall poor Olivia breathe!
O Time, thou must untangle this, not I!
It is too hard a knot for me to untie!
(II.ii. 37-42.).

Here I cannot resist untangling the complexities of the word-play in the couplet. The "not-knot" pun suggests that not only her dilemma but Viola herself is a "knot" to be untied by time ("... thou must untangle this knot, I"). She sees herself, furthermore, as both "I" and "not I," a subjunctive creature whose "reality" (at this point a tangled hypothesis) will emerge only when the play has worked itself out. This resolution requires time and controlled patience. Viola will be up to the task.

How different are the worlds of Shrew and As You Like It, where the dramatic communities are porous and fluid— waiting to be solidified
by the magic of Petruchio and Rosalind. If we discount the rather parodic sub-plot of Shrew, these plays feature fewer knots to untie than loose ends to be tied together. Katharine stands aloof from her community, and Petruchio's machinations on her are less a response to the intrigues of Paduan society than the voluntary acceptance of a personal challenge. In As You Like It, we can hardly speak of a plot at all, once Orlando's passionate intrusion into the Duke's company in Arden has been resolved in peace (II. vii.). In the "green world" of the forest, far removed from the "briers of this working-day world," Rosalind is not resigned to cope with dilemmas. She is free to assert herself and make things happen. Time is thus her ally not as defense, as it was for Julia and Viola, but as opportunity for selfpaced assertiveness.

It may seem curious, in the rather timeless world of the forest, that Rosalind is so conscious of time. Yet she shares with Petruchio an ambivalent attitude founded in their mutual sense of power and control as "playwrights" or magicians. On the one hand, their freedom and displacement from the temporal norms of "working-day" society result in a cavalier attitude about time—a sense of its relativity and expansive open-endedness. This view comes out in Petruchio's swell-chested explanation for his being in Padua:

Such wind (blows me) as scatters young men through the world to seek their fortunes... I have thrust myself... haply to wive and thrive as best I may. Crowns in my purse I have, and goods at home, And so am come abroad to see the world. (I.ii. 49 ff.).

No plans yet, but world and time enough for anything. Rosalind, though her first question of Orlando in the forest is "what is 't o'clock?", is likewise unconcerned about the time of day. Orlando says more than he
knows with his reply: "There's no clock in the forest." Though Rosalind taunts him with her satiric rejoinder about the lover-as-time-piece, she concludes that "time travels in divers paces with divers persons." Time is relative and thus, in a sense, "timeless."

On the other hand, Rosalind's exhilarating sense of control over her own destiny makes her the more anxious to achieve it. Her power makes her eager, even impatient, to experience that for which she is negotiating. This sense of energetic urgency shimmers through her pretense of impatience when Orlando comes to her, late for his "lesson" at the feet of his tutor, Ganymede:

Where have you been all this while? You a lover!... Break an hour's promise in love! He that will divide a minute into a thousand parts and break but a part of the thousandth part of a minute in the affairs of love, it may be said of him that Cupid hath clapped him o' the shoulder,... Nay, an you be so tardy, come no more in my sight. I had as lief be wooed of a snail.

(IV.i. 40 ff.).

Superficially, this impatience is subterfuge—a pedagogical device, but we know it accurately reflects a zeal founded in genuine affection. We know Rosalind is "practicing" and revealing herself at the same time, for we remember that engaging, breathless effusion when Celia finally tells her that Orlando is indeed in the forest:

Alas, the day! What shall I do with my doublet and hose? What did he when thou sawst him? What said he? How looked he?
Wherein went he? What makes he here? Did he ask for me? Where remains he? How parted he with thee? And when shalt thou see him again? Answer me in one word.

"You must borrow me Gargantua's mouth first" is Celia's reply, and we have arrived at one of the funniest and most poignant moments in the play. The tumultuous laughter this scene always evokes is of the warmest kind, a near-perfect example of the laughter of sympathy. Impatience for
happiness is a universally engaging sentiment; if the incongruity of satisfying the desire by a single word is funny, the humanity behind the impatience is deeply touching. Here we sense a foundation of genuine feeling upon which Rosalind, as we watch from the ideal comic perspective, will erect her artful contrivances to claim her joy.

Petruchio, too, betrays in his "supposing" an engaging restlessness about passing time— an implicit desire to reach the point of his subjunctive mission. As we might expect, this impatience is especially noticeable toward the end of the play. Having dismissed the poor, confused tailor for not sewing the right gown, Petruchio drops his madcap pose for a moment and turns to his wife:

Well, come, my Kate. We will unto your father's
Even in these honest mean habiliments.
Our purses shall be proud, our garments poor,
For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich,
... Neither art thou the worse
For this poor furniture and mean array.
If thou account'st it shame, lay it on me.
And therefore frolic. We will hence forthwith
To feast and sport us at thy father's house.
Go, call my men, and let us straight to him;...
Let's see. I think 'tis now some seven o'clock,
And well we may come there by dinnertime.
(IV. iii. 170 ff.).

Time is still his to command, however. When Kate crosses Petruchio about the hour of the day, he stifles his actual impatience and moves quickly into a final subjunctive "lesson".

Kath: I dare assure you, sir, 'tis almost two,
And 'twill be suppertime ere you come there.
Pet: It shall be seven ere I go to horse.
Look, what I speak, or do, or think to do,
You are still crossing it. Sirs, let 't alone.
I will not go today; and ere I do,
It shall be what o'clock I say it is.
(IV.iii. 191-197.).

Until Kate gives up her rigid notions about actualities and learns to
think freely, relativistically, Petruchio will continue his instruction. We have caught in his words, however, some of the feeling that motivates and vitalizes his game.

Time, for Petruchio and Rosalind, is more servant than merely not because they are more intelligent or aware than Julia and Viola. All four are blessed with the power and insight to enact the subjunctive vision as a means to goal-gaining. The difference lies in the nature of the dramatic worlds Shakespeare has fashioned for Petruchio and Rosalind. Though Shrew has mixed features, as we have seen, both it and As You Like It feature the exodus motif, whereby the protagonist is set free to explore and transform new dramatic territory. That territory is more figurative in Petruchio's case—though, to a great extent, his exploration and transformation of Kate do take place in the country outside Padua. Both Julia and Viola become variously entrapped in the societies they intrude upon, whereas Petruchio and Rosalind leave the entanglements of their societies behind. The death of Petruchio's father has set him free to go where and be what he will, just as the "death" of Rosalind's relationship with her uncle Frederick has resulted in her liberating banishment into Arden. With such freedom goes world enough and time to fashion happiness through the artful manipulation of "reality." Self-conscious play-acting as a response to sexual attraction, furthermore, focuses our attention, in these two plays, on the assertive aspects of subjunctive vision. Neither Petruchio nor Rosalind has to divert his or her powers into untying the knots of faithlessness or misdirected affection. They are able to concentrate their substantial energies on seeing to it that the knots of marriage will be securely tied. With less need to cope, they are more aggressive than Julia and Viola. Thus the
healthy use of the subjunctive principle stands out in higher relief in 
*Shrew* and *As You Like It*. The principle is employed more "actively" or 
voluntarily, and the subjunctive negotiations are more obviously directed 
towards joy. As a subjunctive "tool," Rosalind's disguise is a clear ex-
ample of what I mean.

Comparing Rosalind's "mask" to Viola's, G. K. Hunter makes the point 
that "Rosalind is able to use her disguise as a genuine and joyous ex-
tension of her personality. Viola suffers constriction and discomfiture 
in her role."\textsuperscript{12} The difference is not only situational. Shakespeare has 
given us two different personalities in these plays. Viola is doubly 
vulnerable to "discomfiture" in her disguise because she is rather unsure 
of herself to start with. Washed up on the shores of Illyria, her twin 
brother perhaps dead, she is disoriented and without a firm sense of 
identity:

\begin{verbatim}
Vio: What country, friends, is this?
Cap: This is Illyria, lady.
Vio: And what should I do in Illyria?
    My brother he is in Elysium.
    ... Oh, my poor brother!
    (Twelfth Night, I.ii. 1-7.).
\end{verbatim}

Viola feels incapacitated without her brother; without him, she lacks 
a sense of wholeness. Thus, she feels unready to claim a place in this 
new world, ill-prepared for society.

\begin{verbatim}
Oh, that I... might not be delivered to the world
Till I had made mine own occasion mellow,
What my estate is!
I.ii. 42-44.).
\end{verbatim}

Thus, leaning on her Captain for aid and support, she resolves to go 
into disguise:

\begin{verbatim}
Conceal me what I am, and be my aid
For such disguise as haply shall become
The form of my intent.
(I.ii. 53-55.).
\end{verbatim}
"Haply" connotes uncertainty not only about her disguise (Viola will change it from eunuch to page) but about the "form of my intent" as well. Although she does resolve to serve the Duke, she commits "what else may hap to time." Patience is Viola's forte, of course. With time as her ally, she will play her role until, with the reappearance of Sebastian, she can emerge to untie the knots and claim her joy. In the meantime, her tentativeness is her protection, a reflection of her good sense. It has been observed that her posturing represents, along with protection, an attempt to try out different identities "in order to discover what her mature identity is to be in the future." Liberated from her past, experiencing the freedom of her "psychological moratorium," she copes with her adolescent "identity crisis" by assuming quasi-identities (especially the hermaphroditic youth and the "phallic-ambulatory male"). Whatever the problems of identity in the play, it is clear that Viola's role as Cesario—conceived in necessity—remains under her firm control and buys her the time she needs to find joy. It is equally clear, however, that her psychological "starting point" is the most fragile of our four subjunctive leads.

We usually think of Rosalind as somewhat older than Viola, and even larger in stature ("I am more than common tall."). Certainly she is more mature, and more prepared for love of the lasting kind. No sooner is she "overthrown" by Orlando's grace and courage than her thoughts run not just to marriage, but to the bearing of his child as well. When Celia asks her cousin if her distracted state is "all for your father," Rosalind replies, "No, some of it is for my child's father... Would I could cry hem and have him." Here is an early indication of the highly focused, human need that animates Rosalind. Soon she will be "fathoms
deep" in love with Orlando, and there is no reason for us to doubt the sincerity of her affection. In a play virtually devoid of soliloquy (which otherwise provides us with unassailable "truths" about motivation and intent), it is noteworthy that Rosalind's most direct statements about her feelings for Orlando are uttered in the presence of Celia alone, with whom Rosalind is "one." (See I.iii. 1-40; III.ii. 230-260; IV.i. 203-222.) Her professions to Celia are unfeigned; we can trust them. One must simply ignore such evidence in order to perceive Rosalind's relationship to Orlando as a political power struggle founded in domination and one-upmanship.15 One can more readily forgive such an interpretation of Petruchio, whose tactics are so much more visible than his motives. Even in his case, however, it is explicit that the animating impulse includes a desire for "peace, love and quiet life... (all) that's sweet and happy," (Shrew, V.ii. 108-110.). To deny or overlook Rosalind's compelling humanity, however, is to strip her of half her well-balanced personality, and thus to negate half her important function in the play as well.

Without authentic feeling, Rosalind is severely flawed as an embodiment or illustration of subjunctive vision. Posturing for its own sake, or for mean reasons, is not Shakespeare's recommendation in these plays. Without Rosalind's love, furthermore, the play itself would lack that persistent, engaging pull on our sensibilities to balance the self-proclaimed theatrical elements of the drama (Petruchio's suppressed affection, in this regard, is augmented, as we saw, by Kate's unfeigned unhappiness.). Without the intensity of Rosalind's "real" feelings (or Julia's or Viola's, for that matter), we would lack the perspective necessary for the full impact of Shakespeare's subjunctive comedy. As it is,
however, we do have her large affections to motivate her and animate her machinations. Rosalind's tactics, reflecting her motives, are as aggressive as they are goal-oriented. Returning to her disguise, we note the energy that animates her plans for dissembling:

Were it not better,  
Because that I am more than common tall  
That I did suit me all points like a man?  
A gallant curtal ax upon my thigh,  
A boar spear in my hand, and— in my heart  
Lie there what hidden woman's fear there will—  
We'll have a swashing and a martial outside,  
As many other mannish cowards have  
That do outface it with their semblances.  
(I.iii. 117-124.).

This is not merely the disguise of an "umber smirched face," suggested by Celia. Rosalind's is an aggressive disguise— recalling, but going beyond, the "fantastic" hairstyle worn by Julia. We note the gratuitous accoutrements— purposefully phallic, to compensate for admitted anxiety in her heart. As protection from "lascivious men" and as compensation for fear, Rosalind's disguise is of the same order as Julia's and Viola's— theatricality employed defensively, as a coping device. Viola's sword is worn rather reluctantly, an impression borne out vividly when the plot of Twelfth Night forces her, as Cesario, to draw it. There is, on the other hand, an exuberant voluntarism about Rosalind's choice of disguise— an exhilarating pride in her power to transform:

I'll have no worse a name than Jove's own page,  
And therefore look you call me Ganymede.  
(AYLI, I.iii. 126-127.).

Beyond merely adjusting to situational exigencies, she is arranging the freedom of play. Like Petruchio, with his scheme of "supposing" (See Shrew, II.i. 170-182.), Rosalind decides here to act "as if." For both, this is a liberating decision. With Celia, Rosalind can thus say, "Now go we in content/To liberty and not to banishment."
In Arden the fun begins, as plot gives way to detached debate and the self-conscious playing of games. D. J. Palmer has observed how "play" emerges in Arden as a reflection of and compensation for the virtual plotlessness of the dramatic activity after Orlando is received into the forest community. Almost everyone in Arden variously engages in some sort of game, though with different degrees of awareness and detachment. Celia forecasts the dominant characteristic of this rather artificial world when she looks around and proclaims, "I like this place, and willingly could waste my time in it." Arden is a place where people "fleat the time carelessly, as they did in the golden world." Indeed, it is a golden world—a quasi-realm not only dominated but actually defined by artifice and play. Our first glimpse of its inhabitants finds Duke Senior, that inveterate fantasist, "playing" with reality by transforming the cold wind into an artful sermon on the uses of adversity. Amiens recognizes his talent:

Happy is your Grace,
That can translate the stubbornness of fortune
Into so quiet and sweet a style.
(II.i. 18-20.)

Odd that this should remind the Duke it is time to go kill deer, but then he slips immediately back into a "debate" posture by reflecting on the morality of hunting.

At this point comes word of the melancholy Jaques, whose scornful aloofness from the "real" world will prove so practiced and extreme as to become, ironically, an "actuality" or fixity in the play. His posture is so iron-clad that it finally defines and confines him—separates him from his playmates at pastime. Jaques' "play" is indeed so "serious" as to threaten the healthy tentativeness which is the upshot of subjunctive
comedy. Thus, in the effect of his withdrawal from the artful, comic res-
olution, he shares with Malvolio a kinship of extremes. Malvolio, with
his petty vindictiveness, is almost totally without detachment. Jaques
is irreversibly detached. Both flee from the otherwise-resolved society
and "see no pastime." If both are pharmakos figures, cast out so that
the comic spirit may "make conclusion," they also cast doubt over that
conclusion by suggesting its fictive "playlikeness." As Jaques leaves
for his "abandoned cave" he qualifies, but does not destroy, the comic
vision. He does, after all, bestow his blessings on the "magical"
pairings. He departs, furthermore, to look into religion—yet another
form of "magic."

After the engrossing interlude wherein we learn of Orlando's danger
at home, and of Adam's touching loyalty (II.iii.), we arrive in the
forest to stay (except for one brief moment at the beginning of Act III).
Now we are in the company of Rosalind, Celia, and Touchstone, and the city
folk's first encounter with the foresters finds them face to face with
cardboard people. With the appearance of Corin and Silvius, we are
clearly in the world of artifice, in general, and of conventional pasto-
ralism in particular. If the shepherd Silvius believes himself sincere
in his lamentation on Phebe's obduracy (II.iv. 22-43.), an audience will
recognize at once that he is playing a game. The "play," of course, is
the literary game of the pastoral complaint, infused with the sentiments
of courtly love and rendered in the accents of Petrarchanism. Note how
the distancing hypotheticality of Silvius' argument for the "reality" of
his love undermines assertion and advertises artifice:

If thou remember'st not the slightest folly
That ever love did make thee run into,
Thou hast not loved.
Or if thou hast not sat as I do now,
Wearing thy hearer in thy mistress' praise,
Thou hast not loved.
Or if thou hast not broke from company
Abruptly, as my passion now makes me
Thou has not loved.
Oh, Phebe, Phebe, Phebe!
(II.iv. 34-43.)

Shakespeare's audience would have recognized, in Silvius' stylized posture, the sonnet-scribbling Montanus of Lodge's Rosalynde, Shakespeare's popular source. Silvius also recalls the lovelorn Colin Clout of the Shepherd's Calendar (1579); Spenser's swain holds forth in four of the eclogues (1, 3, 6, 12) on the hopelessness of unrequited love. Interestingly, Colin's stubborn girlfriend was named Rosalind, and Phebe recalls (besides Lodge's shepherdess) the deity nominated at the end of the January eclogue. Colin's name, furthermore, is suggested in "Corin," Shakespeare's equivalent of Corydon in the source. The point is that even the names of the playwright's people here call attention to literary convention and widen the distance between play and audience.

Orlando himself has a "romantic" name (we remember Ariosto), changed from "Rosader" in Lodge, and his behavior certainly contributes to the emphasis on convention and artifice in the sylvan world of Arden. We are persuaded to believe that his affection for Rosalind has more substance to it than Silvius' for Phebe, but its expression is no less fatuous. His plan is to carve sonnets on every tree in Arden. Note the rhetorical apostrophizing:

Hang there, my verse, in witness of my love.
And thou, thrice-crowned queen of night, survey
With thy chaste eye, from thy pale sphere above,
Thy huntress' name that my full life doth sway.
O Rosalind! These trees shall be my books...
Run, run Orlando, carve on every tree
The fair, the chaste, and unexpressive she.
(III.ii. 1-10.).
The Duke's trees were tongues, and brooks served him for books, but the fantasizing impulse is the same. Both Orlando and the Duke Senior are engagingly kind souls, but their clouded perception of the relationship between art and nature (a persistent pastoral theme) is remarkable. Thinking he is being a realist, the Duke responds to the destitution of Orlando and old Adam by emblematizing it:

Thou seest we are not all alone unhappy. 
This wide and universal theater
Presents more woeful pageants than the scene
Wherein we play in. 
(II.vii. 136-139.).

The metaphor belies the perception. The vision is not subjunctive because the Duke does not actually know what unhappiness is. Misfortune to him is academic, a starting point for rhetoric. Woe is a pageant, an art form. One possessed of subjunctive vision in Shakespeare's comedy is, like Viola or Rosalind, keenly aware of the distinction between art and nature. Such awareness is necessary to the properly-balanced reintegration of illusion and reality in a vision, a mode of activity, that utilizes art to promote life.

The Duke clearly lacks the power of discrimination. If his kindness is admirable, it is also spontaneous and programmed. Only Jaques darkens the scene perceived through the Duke's rosy lenses. Critics have often noted that the two don't get along very well. Perhaps this is because Jaques' performance is a discomforting, inverted parody of the Duke's world-view. Jaques' persistent brooding on the actualities of "the infected world" clashes with the Duke's optimism, to be sure; beyond that, the Duke is threatened by Jaques' posturing. The Duke wants people to be "sincere," as he believes himself to be. Thus he is most pleased at the report of Jaques' crying over the wounded deer (II.i. 26-70.). He
will seek Jaques out and "cope" him when he is "full of matter." But
when Jaques, admiring Touchstone, will become a satirist and heal the
world through detached foolery, the Duke erupts in paranoid anger:

Fie on thee! I can tell what thou wouldst do...
For thou thyself hast been a libertine
As sensual as the brutish sting itself...
(II.vii. 63-66.).

Not wanting to think on his own benevolent fantasizing, the Duke insists
on Jaques' grim "reality." We may be sure that the Duke is equally upset
when Jaques, taking his cue from the Duke's own "universal theater" re-
mark, extends the metaphor in the "All the world's a stage" speech to
adumbrate a "woeful pageant" more real than the Duke would care to think
about.

The Duke's own, personal "game-reality" is writ large in Orlando's
poetry. He, too, has trouble distinguishing art from nature, as his
"tedious homilies of love" indicate. For Orlando, natural affection is
stylized, conventionalized, though he lacks the vision properly to employ
art in the service of life. The similarity between his and the Duke's
spontaneous modes of thought is noteworthy in the second of his poems
found in the trees:

Why should this a desert be?
For it is unpeopled? No,
Tongues I'll hang on every tree,
That shall civil sayings show
... how brief the life of man
Runs his erring pilgrimage,...
But upon the fairest boughs,
Or at every sentence end,
Will I Rosalinda write...
(III.ii. 131 ff.).

"Tongues in trees" again, and bad poetry to boot. Once more the meta-
phorical language belies the perception. Orlando's relativistic profun-
dities about populated deserts and life's brevity reflect not subjunctive
vision, but a spontaneous and rather mindless "gaming" with reality. Reality (love and nature) is perceived as a form of art (poor art, at that). Once again the "stubbornness of fortune" is translated into "sweet style," without a genuine and discriminate encounter with misfortune at all. Orlando is serious about this conventional drivel, for he thinks it reflects, as a natural extension, the "reality" of his love for Rosalind. Touchstone's barbs keep this business in perspective, of course, but it is Rosalind who brings into clearest focus the contrast between Orlando's perception and true, subjunctive vision.

After Touchstone has composed his parody of Orlando's "no jewel like Rosalind" poem (III.ii. 93-118.) and has left the scene, Rosalind reveals to Celia a remarkable dissociation of sensibilities. On the one hand, Rosalind recognizes bad poetry when she hears it:

... I heard them all, and more too, for some of them had in them more feet than the verses would bear... the feet were lame and could not bear themselves without the verse and therefore stood lamely in the verse. (III.ii. 173 ff.).

Here is the detachment of the true critic. On the other hand she is ecstatic when she discovers the identity of the author, as we noticed in the breathless barrage of questions she fires at Celia (III.ii. 231-237.). Again, it is significant that she is alone with Celia; her effusions have the impact of soliloquy. There is obviously nothing feigned about her affection for Orlando here. Thought and feeling are thus separate, discriminate in Rosalind. Viola, of course, has this same analytical gift in Twelfth Night. When Malvolio delivers to "Cesario" the ring supposedly left by mistake with Olivia, Viola remains alone on stage to ponder the strange events:
I left no ring with her. What means this lady?...  
She loves me, sure, the cunning of her passion  
Invites me in this churlish messenger.  
None of my lord's ring!...  
Poor lady, she were better love a dream.  
Disguise, I see thou art a wickedness,  
... My master loves her dearly;  
And I, poor monster, fond as much on him,  
And she, mistaken, seems to dote on me.  
(II.ii. 17 ff.).

Viola is able to discriminate clearly between the artificial trappings  
of the situation (the ruse, the cunning, and her own disguise) and the  
human affection which gives that situation a complex reality. This per-  
ception allows her to re-integrate self-consciously illusion (e.g., her  
disguise) and reality (her love and her generous sympathies for Orsino  
and Olivia) in a true understanding and a modus operandi designed to see  
the problem through to a successful conclusion. Her tack will be more  
cautious than Rosalind's, for reasons examined earlier. Viola is more  
defensive, resigned to enlist slow time as her ally. Rosalind's re-inte-  
gration of thought and feeling is more joyous and active. Her procedure  
as actor and playwright will be more aggressive. Her dramatic ambience,  
as we have seen, allows her that freedom.

How Rosalind deals with Arden and its "play-like" particulars will  
be explored further, but our scene (III.ii.) affords another interesting  
comparison. When Celia tells her cousin that she had found Orlando  
under a tree,"like a dropped acorn," Rosalind sighs, "It may well be  
called Jove's tree when it drops forth such fruit." Only a few lines  
earlier Touchstone, when told that Orlando's poem had been found on a  
tree, quips, "Truly, the tree yields bad fruit." The "fruit" in both  
cases is Orlando, or his poetry (in regard to romantic love, the two are  
indistinguishable). The uses of the metaphor, however, are radically
different. The contrast is not to be found in any radical difference between Touchstone and Rosalind. They are very much alike in their discriminating powers of perception. Touchstone's remark, however, is pure wit; it is founded in thought only. Rosalind then takes the figure and infuses it with life. Her remark is spoken after thought and feeling have been reunited. She has made it clear that Orlando's verse is truly "bad fruit," but she can use an artful metaphor to express emotion—the fruit of genuine affection. Certainly Touchstone is not without feeling. There is, for instance, an obviously authentic loyalty between him and the girls ("He'll go o'er the wide world with me"), and he will, in spite of some detached reservations, marry Audrey, the country wench ("an ill-favored thing, sir, but mine own"). Yet Touchstone's profession is that of fool; his livelihood resides in the detachment of his wit. His job is that of the leveller, the satirist. Thus the fool emerges as a distorted image of Rosalind. He shares her powers of discrimination, but not her balanced personality. Touchstone, in short, is heavy on thought and light on feeling. If he provides but little in the way of engaging reality (love, sympathy, and the like), his barbs nevertheless help prevent the play from foundering on the rocks of sentimentality and pretense. In Twelfth Night, Orsino's benign (and mindless) posturing and Malvolio's malignant (and equally mindless) pretense need just this kind of check. Feste will be there to provide it, and other things as well. More on that presently.

There are "naked realities" in As You Like It to balance somewhat the distancing effects of games, conventional pastoralism, stylized behavior, art songs, and other forms of artifice in the play. These engaging realities are germane to the plot, and thus occur mostly before
we are in Arden to stay. Before he falls in love and slips into rather unthinking posturing, Orlando figures forth as a sensitive and blameless youth who beckons to our sympathies. Abused and "kept rustically at home" by Oliver, Orlando is dependent on his brother for breeding and inheritance, according to the will of Sir Rowland. Thus Orlando's "learning" and nobility of character are the gifts of nature, since the "nurture" he receives of Oliver amounts only to neglect, deprivation, and servitude. In the face of such gross mistreatment, furthermore, Orlando meets the stubbornness of fortune with courage. "I will no longer endure it," he resolves, and the plot of *As You Like It* is activated. Then the wrestling match with Charles transpires to mark Orlando's initiation into independence. Here is an objective instance of the courage and self-assertion that prompted his "mutiny" against Oliver's treachery. The victory over the Duke's wrestler is indeed a very real conquest over Oliver himself, in that the latter had conspired to have Charles break the neck of his younger brother. We are glad for Orlando's survival of the ordeal, and our sympathies find validation in the admiration of Rosalind and Celia, whom we have already met through good report (I.i. 110-118.) and their own engaging conversation. (I.i. 1-152.).

The wrestling match has been serious business, and Orlando's endurance has significant consequences in regard to Rosalind, the plot, and audience sensibilities. Orlando's successful self-assertion lifts him from anonymity to identity, but he is the son of Rowland de Boys—old enemy to Frederick and friend of the Duke's banished brother. If the young hero's sensational debut at court is deserving of "high commendation," as LeBeau indicates, it also reminds the Duke of old enmities—makes him "humorous" and disposed to "misconstrue" Orlando's nobility.
Orlando is advised to flee because, in effect, he is Sir Rowland's son. This vindictive humor resulting from the opening of old wounds extends to Rosalind as well. The people pity her "for her good father's sake," so she will be banished as well. When she protests, the Duke responds angrily,

Let it suffice thee that I trust thee not.
Thou art thy father's daughter, there's enough.

This plot-activating animosity represents genuine hostility, a force functional (as is Oliver's meanness) to engage an audience in the troubled life of the play. The same can be said— at the other extreme of human feeling— for Orlando's love and compassion for old Adam, and for Adam's touching loyalty to his master. Having been banished from court, Orlando learns from his servant that Oliver again is planning his brother's death; he will burn Orlando's house down around him. Adam advises immediate flight, and unselfishly offers his master the little fortune he had saved through long years of service to Sir Rowland. Orlando, moved with affection and compassion, resolves again to "mutiny" against unendurable conditions. Adam, in whom appears "the constant service of the antique world," will go with him. Together they will seek "some settled low content" in a free world outside. Their relationship is grounded in touching, human feeling. Even after Arden has been reached an audience is yet compelled by the weariness of the old man and by Orlando's determination to bring comfort to Adam, be it at the risk of his own life. (II.vi. 1-15.).

Just as we notice these engaging "realities," however, we must make qualification. Even at the outset of the play— where human passion forges intrigue and action— Shakespeare does not abandon artifice for the
sake of total dramatic illusion. Rather, he qualifies the engaging effects of compressed, condensed, intense dramatic situation (which Elmer Edgar Stoll taught us to look for in good dramatic art\textsuperscript{19}) by casting his story in a "fairy-tale" framework. If Orlando's situation is compelling as a representation of human dilemma, it is also "contrary-to-fact" as art, by virtue of its fictive or mythic envelope. Orlando is the noble innocent whose father has died, leaving the family in disorder and him the victim of arbitrary evil. The hero's opening speech begins "As I remember it, Adam, it was upon this fashion"—distracting the proceedings at once with the familiar "once upon a time" motif. Oliver's malevolence, furthermore, is motiveless, announced in one of the play's few soliloquies (I.i. 169-179.). This device works two ways. As soliloquy, the confession represents a fixed "truth" about Oliver; it is something an audience can believe in, unfortunate though it may be. Nor is the arbitrariness of the announcement—its improbability—alone sufficient to render it disengaging. Stoll, again, has reminded us that some of Shakespeare's most intense effects arise out of the most unlikely psychological and situational occasions.\textsuperscript{20} It is, rather, the predictability of Oliver's evil, its conformity to the mythic mode, which lends to the scene an aura of artifice.

Oliver's feeble rationale for hatred, furthermore, artfully parallels LeBeau's assessment of why the Duke has come to hate Rosalind. Oliver says that Orlando is so "beloved in the heart of my own people that I am altogether misprized." LeBeau notes that Frederick has turned on Rosalind "upon no other argument/But that the people praise her for her virtues/And pity her for her good father's sake," (I.ii. 291-293). Arbitrary service to the plot is also found in Oliver's early conversa-
tion with Charles the wrestler, where Oliver introduces Rosalind (indirectly) into the play by asking— for no apparent reason— whether she has been banished along with her father (I.i.iii.). Orlando's rite de passage, furthermore, calls attention to the folk-hero motif, and Rosalind herself is presented in predictable parallel to the hero. Both have lost their fathers, or at least their inheritances. Both are trapped by arbitrary evil and are about to escape. Both have loving and loyal companions to whom they may confess. If Orlando, as hero, is more wooden and stereotypical (as his long, purely dramatic exposition at the outset would indicate), Rosalind, as heroine, is witty and realistic. And yet they interact. Rosalind infuses the hero with love, and Orlando imparts his courage to Rosalind. His wrestling with misfortune sparks her into activity and self-assertiveness. These parallels in plot and character and the concessions to convention all call attention to the framework of the play. It is thus apparent that an artist is at work, creating a subjunctive milieu with contrivances designed to balance the pull of plot and dianoia.

Twelfth Night begins in much the same way, with Orsino's opening line again announcing the nature of the dramatic experience as contrary-to-fact. "If music be the food of love, play on," sighs the Duke, wallowing in the theatrical posture of the ardent, spurned lover. Opening conventionality is more focused in the case of Orsino, more immediately obvious. He lacks the "real" cause for agitation which Orlando feels. In both plays, nevertheless, the playwright opens with a scene calling attention, in different ways, to artifice and juxtaposes it with an ensuing scene where we meet the more "realistic" heroines. This tactic in itself lends an immediate, subjunctive balance to the plays.
Reality is introduced by artificiality. In *Twelfth Night* the playwright's early concern is with his heroine's dilemma, and she begins at once to illustrate the particulars of subjunctive vision and activity. In *As You Like It*, on the other hand, we have no striking "lesson" in the subjunctive enterprise until Rosalind begins her manipulative tactics in the forest. The beginning of that play, as I see it, is more designed to establish subjunctive conditions within the play itself—conditions that encourage a perspective of scrutiny on the part of an audience. Simultaneously engaged by the "realities" we have examined, and detached by the subjunctifying artifice of the play's structure, an audience is poised to assimilate the meaning of the ensuing dramatic activity.

Rosalind's negotiations in Arden constitute a subjunctive encounter with an open, stylized world dominated by convention, play, and debate. Arden is a mythic, "golden" place, an "unreal" environment recognizably fictive in character. It is, in short, the literary world of pastoral romance. Shakespeare was working closely from his source when he gave us such a world, and when he did depart from Lodge, the changes tended to heighten rather than diminish the benign and mellifluous atmosphere of the story. People die in *Rosalynde*. The Norman wrestler brutally disposes of two challengers before himself yielding "Nature her due and Rosader the victory" in death. Gerismond (Duke Senior) finally slays the usurping Torismond (Frederick) in Lodge's work. Shakespeare not only spares them but actually exonerates a suddenly penitent Frederick. In the source story, Alinda/Aliena (Celia) is given a more credible reason for falling love with Saladyne (Oliver) when the latter rescues her from a gang of "rascals" very seriously bent on rape. In making
the two dukes brother, furthermore, and then in reconciling them, Shakespeare sets up a nice parallel with Oliver and Orlando, and thus extends the concessions to structural artistry we noted earlier.

All this is not a back-handed argument for Lodge's realism as against Shakespeare's softly primitive pastoral. *Rosalynnde* is as nicely mannered a piece of euphuistic romance as one could wish. Shakespeare, furthermore, does preserve the incident of Rosader's bloody encounter with the lion. Though somewhat distanced by the "report" motif, and by the rather picturesque description of the setting, the account of Orland's ordeal is "real" enough to cause Rosalind to faint. (Rosalind's protestations about "counterfeiting" the swoon notwithstanding, we can be sure that her reaction is genuine—another indicator of the humanity beneath the fiction of disguise.) Shakespeare, too, gives us Jaques—and especially Touchstone—to keep us mindful of the limits, uses, and misuses of convention. The comparison with Lodge serves, rather, to point up the fact that Shakespeare, in *As You Like It*, was not interested in overthrowing the pastoral convention. Nor, on the other hand, was he concerned with the pastoral for its own sake, much less for the sake of the moral edification insisted upon by Lodge. Shakespeare approached his source from the outside, with the detachment that always accompanies good sense. He perceived the medium in general (and Lodge's story in particular) as an occasion for subjunctive comedy, as a stylized medium which could be made to live and reflect the proper use and value of art.

David Young's excellent essay on *As You Like It* is a detailed and convincing study of how Shakespeare incorporates the tradition of the pastoral sojourn into a vision of life that teaches us to see wide
and deep. He concludes that

Our discoveries about the complicated relations of Nature and Art, our growing sense of the relativity of experience, our abandonment of doctrines and categories in favor of a recognition of the equivocal and paradoxical elements of life and love, all lead to a remarkable widening of judgment, a new tolerance. 22

Young is decidedly right. One specific value of his essay, for our purposes, is found in his observation that the equivocal vision of the play resides largely in its self-consciousness about artifice, and that this, in turn, can be traced to Shakespeare's use of the subjunctive mood:

... the atmosphere of artifice and hypothesis is also engendered by the remarkably extensive use of "if" in As You Like It, as though the grammar that most suited a world like this one was the conditional. 23

Young then goes on to document the extent of the conditional in the play, culminating in Touchstone's defense of hypothesis: "Your 'If' is the only peacemaker; much virtue in 'If'." (V.iv. 107). Touchstone is of course blessed with subjunctive vision; only he is not, as we have seen, in a position to exercise it as fully or illustrate its value as clearly as does Rosalind.

Rosalind is the core of the play, and Young could have rendered superfluous some of what I have to say in this chapter had he emphasized her centrality to the vision endorsed by As You Like It. I have called Rosalind a negotiator. What I mean by that is more specific than and goes beyond the familiar definition of dealing so as to get things done. Rosalind does that, of course. She, like any effective negotiator, has a goal, an awareness of conflicting claims on her attention, and a gift for tentativeness in policy and action en route to resolution. But I have chosen the term especially for Rosalind because of its etymology.
The root of "negotiate" is *otium*, a word from classical times that variously denotes the pastoral ideal: leisure, contentment, the good life, and so on. 24 (It also embraces—especially for the Renaissance—the ideal of fulfilled, romantic love.) *Otium* is advertised in the Duke's translation of Arden into a "golden world"; it is explicit in Amien's music—especially the famous song about life under the greenwood tree (II.v. 1-47.). Now the true opposite of *otium*, for me, is not *neg-otium*. The negotiator is equivocal, ambivalent about *otium*, but not totally at odds with the idea. The true enemies of *otium* are ambition (shunned by the pastoral poet) and the aspiring mind. The overreaching of Tamburlaine, his meteoric ambition, is rendered the more strikingly dramatic because he was once a shepherd. The enemies of the pastoral ideal in *As You Like It* are Oliver and Duke Frederick, "overreachers" of sorts whose will to power and lordship over others provides the tension, the opposition, that gets the plot moving. Their attitudes and activities are "actual" and assertive; their "imperativeness" recalls the metaphysics of the tragic mode. If *otium* is the opposite of willful ambition in its benignity, it is, however, no less "real." *Otium*, if not an imperative metaphysic, is still engaging. As the goal that directs and impels dramatic activity, or as an actual state variously realized in the play, *otium* provides a core of reality, an ideal in relation to which the negotiator may act or proceed in various ways contrary to fact.

To illustrate we may recall Petruchio's "peace, love, and quiet life"—an ideal to lend meaning and direction to the arch-negotiator's supposings. The engaging metaphysic I am calling *otium* obviously animates Rosalind as well; we see it in her "fathoms-deep" love for
Orlando. In *As You Like It*, the most specific representative of *otium*, in the classical sense, is Corin. Corin is a shepherd in a pastoral play, and to that extent is a prop in a conventional mode. Still, he is older and wiser than the stylized Silvius, and there is authentici ty in his perception of himself and his place in the world:

Sir, I am a true laborer. I earn that I eat, get that I wear, owe no man hate, envy no man's happiness, glad of other men's good, content with my hap, and the greatest of my pride is to see my ewes graze and my lambs suck. (III.ii. 77-81.).

This is an engaging statement—the simple profession of a man in whom the pastoral ideal is alive and well. Corin is more realist than poser. Thus, Touchstone has no real quarrel with him; he acknowledges that the old shepherd is a "natural philospher." Yet precisely because Touchstone recognizes in Corin an unpretentious exemplar of *otium*, he cannot resist exercising on the rustic his highly-developed skills as negotiator. Indeed, Touchstone's professionalism at this sort of thing is a key, again, to the difference between him and Rosalind. The fool's negotiations (at least until he meets Audrey) are pure skill; they lack the motive and cue that animate his mistress. Thus, his negotiation with Corin amounts only to a witty proof that the shepherd is damned for never having been at court, that antithesis of the pastoral world. Jaques also 'has the tools of the negotiator, as he shows in his "ducdame" version of Amiens' song about pastoral idealism (II.v. 52-59.). The equivocal vision is wasted, however, because of Jaques' excessive commitment to his own performance.

The balanced, subjunctive vision of Rosalind recommends her as the true negotiator of *As You Like It*. She acts "as if" to conceal purpose
and feeling for tactical reasons; she also acts "as if" in order to infuse humanity into a green world otherwise stifled by convention and therefore rather devoid of real life. Her relationship to Arden and its twin poles of otium and artifice is equivocal. Her tactics as negotiator are obvious enough, it seems to me, but perhaps they merit some attention in the rather controversial case of her intervention in the Silvius-Phebe affair (III.v. 1-80.). Having overheard Phebe's disdainful rejection of Silvius' protestations of love, Rosalind jumps in to act her part (as Ganymede) in the scenario. Pressing his "touche" thesis too far in this case, Ralph Berry sees Rosalind's outburst as an example of her will to master or dominate disturbing, "certain others" in the play. Seeing herself in Phebe's anti-romantic attitude, Rosalind is subtly threatened, the interpretation goes, and she is compelled to browbeat the shepherdess with one-upmanship. To view Rosalind in this way is not only to misconstrue what she says, but also to ignore some important evidence in support of her subjunctive posture. When Corin, at the end of the preceding scene, invites her and Celia to come witness the encounter between the "lovers," Rosalind makes a telling remark:

Oh, come, let us remove.
The sight of lovers feedeth those in love.
Bring us to this sight and you shall say
I'll prove a busy actor in their play.
(III.iv. 59-62).

The lines are a fine instance of Shakespeare's simultaneous effects. Rosalind's confession of her own love is engaging, while her allusion to theatricality reminds us that this is dramatic art. Our balanced perspective again encourages us to seek meaning. We are signalled that Rosalind will use the contrary-to-fact artifice of her role both to conceal and assert her own reality in a negotiation with another aspect
of Arden. We are poised to know how she will do it, and to what effects. Beyond that, the lines make it clear that her response to Phebe will not be "real" in the sense of the unfeigned, overbearing rudeness of Berry. Rosalind's detached involvement in the affair is another departure from his source made by Shakespeare, in keeping with his heroine's subjunctive vision. In Lodge, Rosalynde is "incensed," unable "to brook the cruelty of Phebe." 26 In the play, however, Rosalind is a player, incorporating both posturing and feeling in her negotiative art. The object of her negotiations is to infuse both sense and sensibility into the affair of Silvius and Phebe. Rosalind seeks to impose a sense of balance upon the extremes of pretense and hard reality represented in this scene by reminding both parties of the relativity of time and beauty:

You foolish shepherd, wherefore do you follow her  
Like foggy south, puffing with wind and rain?  
You are a thousand times a properer man  
Than she a woman....  
'Tis not her glass, but you, that flatters her,  
And out of you she sees herself...  
But, mistress, know yourself. Down on your knees  
And thank Heaven, fasting, for a good man's love.  
For I must tell you friendly in your ear,  
Sell when you can. You are not for all markets.  
Cry the man mercy, love him, take his offer.  
(III.v. 49-61.).

Silvius is a cardboard parody of pastoral idealism who fancies that the "good life" lies somewhere behind Phebe's scornful eyes. Still, he reminds Rosalind of her own affection for Orlando (See II.iv. 43-45.); thus she can "feed" her own love by helping Silvius see things more clearly. To do this she will educate him, negate his lifeless sense of otium by pointing out his own mindless posturing and the equivocal nature of Phebe's attractiveness. Phebe represents the other extreme, but
her single-minded antiromanticism is equally vain in its lifelessness. Rosalynde's rebuke of Phoebe in Lodge's work is interesting in this regard:

\begin{quote}
Take heed, fair nymph, that in despising love you be not overreach'd with love, and in shaking off all, shape yourself to your own shadow, and so with Narcissus prove passionate yet unpitied. 27
\end{quote}

For Shakespeare, too, Phebe is a negative "overreacher," an enemy of otium in her willful, ultra-realism. Her response to Silvius' complaint that she kills him with her eyes forecasts, by way of contrast, Rosalind's own rejoinder, as Ganymede, to Orlando's protestation that he will die if Rosalind rejects him:

\begin{quote}
Phe: Lie not, to say mine eyes are murderers! Now show the wound mine eye hath made in thee. Scratch thee but with a pin and there remains Some scar of it.... But now mine eyes, Which I have darted at thee, hurt thee not, Nor, I am sure, there is no force in eyes That can do hurt.
(III.v. 19-27.).
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Ros: Men have died from time to time and worms have eaten them, but not for love.
(IV. 1. 106.).
\end{quote}

The harshness of Phebe's rebuff of Silvius sets her apart from the conventional coy mistress. She is not "leading him on" by pretending to be disinterested; she is trying to get rid of him. Rosalind's remark, on the other hand, is a tactic—part of her subjunctive enterprise to "cure" Orlando by "counsel." The "truth" of her argument, spoken by "Ganymede" in a pedagogical posture, does not reflect her real concerns. The ostensibly cold fact about death for love belies her actual interest in keeping Orlando's love for "her" (Rosalind as Ganymede as Rosalind) very much alive. Phebe, however, is serious in a very straightforward
way. She is engrossed in a lifeless anti-romanticism that leaves room for no love but narcissism. Phebe also needs "curing"; the affliction is the opposite of Orlando's, but the medicine is fundamentally the same—a good dose of relativism. Single-mindedness is the enemy of contentment. Here, as elsewhere in Shakespearean comedy, the subjunctive "message" is reinforced by the audience's awareness of the relativism of role.

Rosalind's "real" feelings are not the issue in our scene, since she is negotiating from behind the Ganymede mask. Thus, her conclusion ("Down on your knees/ And thank Heaven, fasting, for a good man's love") is neither angry assertion nor sincere advice. Certainly, abject submission would be foreign to Rosalind's own experience. The statement, rather, is an "optative" conclusion, an upshot of her relativistic argument. It is a tactic designed to jolt Phebe into alternate modes of perception, and thus to allow for the possibility of human affection. I am reminded, in Ganymede's "advice," of Kate's lecture to the women at the end of Shrew. I have compared Rosalind to Petruchio; Kate, after her conversion to subjunctivity, becomes (like them) an aggressive negotiator. Rosalind's motives are not Kate's; the former is "feeding her love," while the latter is winning a bet. Nevertheless, the subjunctive postures are similar, and Rosalind can no more be held precisely accountable for her advice than can Katharine. Both speak "as if" they mean what they say. The result of the subjunctive negotiations, in Rosalind's case, is an instance of comic irony. Phebe both misses the point and takes Ganymede's advice too literally. She "falls" in love, but with Ganymede, not Silvius. Here is another of those Shakespearean reversals which underscore the relativity of the subjunctive
enterprise by calling overt attention to the fluidity of the dramatic experience.

Phebe, suddenly in love with Ganymede, is not "really" an enemy of love after all. Nor, an audience feels sure, will she "really" be in love with Ganymede for long, for it is clear that Rosalind is in firm, aggressive control of this play world. Her own steadfast affection, together with her magical powers as playwright-negotiator, will result, finally, in all "earthly things made even." The magic word in this transformation— as, indeed, in the play as a whole— is "if," the great peacemaker. The ending of As You Like It is both contrary-to-fact and alive with real joy, by virtue of Shakespeare's subjunctive art. Rosalind, the playwright's surrogate, masterfully uses the conditional to crystallize genuine joy out of a solution of hypotheticality. "Ganymede's" promises will come true:

(To Phebe): I will marry you if ever I marry woman, and
I'll be married tomorrow.
(To Orlando): I will satisfy you if ever I satisfied man,
and you shall be married tomorrow.
(To Silvius): I will content you if what pleases you
contents you, and you shall be married tomorrow.
(V.ii. 122-127.).

The play itself thus fulfills the promise of its title, as we go home believing in the subjunctive mode as the proper approach to human experience.

If the recommendations of Twelfth Night are more understated and less obvious than those of As You Like It, it is largely because Viola, the subjunctive center of the play, is much less in control of the drama than Rosalind is in hers. Rosalind is a free agent, and her energetic, self-activated negotiations in Arden (especially the theatrics staged for Orlando) clearly illustrate the value of "supposing" as entrance
into genuine life and love. Viola, as I have indicated, is restricted by circumstance. The role of eiron, liberating for Rosalind, becomes a somewhat confining self-definition for Viola. It is true that "Cesario" is free to move at large as a gentleman. Beneath the mask, however, Viola is restless in the knowledge that her contrary-to-fact identity is that of a servant. The word itself is prominent in her vocabulary, revealing her self-consciousness. She is, indeed, a "compound" servant, as she indicates when Olivia asks her name:

\textbf{Vio:} Cesario is your servant's name, fair Princess.
\textbf{Oli:} My servant, Sir! 'Twas never merry world
Since lowly feigning was called compliment.
You're servant to the Count Orsino, youth.
\textbf{Vio:} And he is yours, and his must needs be yours.
Your servant's servant is your servant, madam.
(III.i. 108-113.).

Olivia doesn't know, of course, the full extent of Viola's "lowly feigning" at this point, but an audience is alerted to the connection, in Viola, between theatrics and servitude.

The "feigned compliment" represents both truth and illusion. Viola herself is no servant, and her salutation to Olivia simply reflects a polite nature. Cesario, however, is a surrogate, and his words register Orsino's greetings. If the words are "feigned," so much the more in keeping with the Duke's transparent posturing. In any case, Viola (as Cesario) is obliged primarily to negotiate on behalf of others. For herself she is patience personified, and her negotiations will be at once oblique and direct. Interestingly, the relationship between Viola's "meta-negotiations' and illusory identities is adumbrated when Cesario first visits Olivia as Orsino's embassy. Having pled the Duke's suit through her "divinity" metaphor, Viola responds to Olivia's query as to whether "he" has more to say:
Vio: Good madam, let me see your face.
OTI: Have you any commission from your lord to negotiate with my face? You are now out of your text. But we will draw the curtain and show you the picture. Look you, sir, (unveiling).
(I.v. 248-252.)

Clearly, Olivia realizes that Cesario's request represents a sudden departure from the "text" of Cesario's negotiation-scenario. Here is Cesario speaking personally, on his own behalf. Simultaneously, an audience hears the voice of a Viola anxious, from behind her mask as servant, to establish contact with a "real" person—a kind of "primary" negotiation. Before the request we hear Viola meta-negotiating with a veiled identity, our detached awareness enhanced by our memory of the Duke's conventionality and by the metaphorical nature of the suit itself. In the request, on the other hand, we feel the engagement of actual sentiment speaking through the role. Viola is curious about this woman who has so inflamed Orsino's passion. If her request represents genuine interest, however, Viola's use of the word "face" has a curiously ambivalent effect. In contrast to her veil, Olivia's face represents her "actual" identity, the person with whom Viola will establish contact from behind her mask. But as the object of "out-of-text" negotiations, the face seems just another veil beneath the veil.

This subtle commentary on the slippery nature of dramatic identity continues, furthermore, with Olivia's reference to her face as "picture." What follows has been much emended, but the first folio reads "such a one I was this present—is 't not well done?" Cesario's witty reply is "Excellently done, if God did all." The exchange is a tissue of the hypothetical and the real, with opposing (and simultaneous) effects for an audience. The face as picture calls attention to the artificiality
of the countenance Olivia presents to the world— a mask of grief as excessive as Orsino's sentimentality. She will mourn her brother seven years, and perform her daily ritual of watering the ground with tears. This "picture" is "well done" in the sense that it is artfully contrived, but it forces on Olivia an unnatural, restrictive servitude greater even than that attendant on Viola's pseudo-identity. Surely, as Sir Toby points out, such "care" is an "enemy of life." In such a context, Olivia's curious remark can be paraphrased, "Behold this artifact that has replaced what I once was." On the other hand, the unveiling represents a relinquishing of pretense, a yielding unto the impulse (engendered by "Cesario") to return to life. (The fact that Cesario is a mask correlates that central irony of subjunctivity, founded in the promotion of life through artifice.) Olivia's unveiling can thus be perceived as an engaging presentation of self. In this context, we may paraphrase her ambivalent statement as follows: "Behold the image of what I was before I donned my mask of mourning"— which amounts, in effect, to "behold what I really am." Viola is not free to reciprocate, but the grammatical subjunctivity of her reply reveals, at least, a "primary" negotiation which opts, through the artifice of wit, for the true and natural beauty of a real woman. Here is another rich instance of the simultaneity of Shakespearean effects residing in the masterful use of subjunctive modes. The intersection of feeling and artifice prompts us to see a proper relationship between the two.

Olivia does not wear her mask well, or for very long, because it is against her nature. A genuine, life-loving personality will shine out from behind such forms of repression as the mourning veil. If her sense of decorum is reflected in her steward (Malvolio is a grotesque
of that decorum), her love of fun finds lively symbols in her uncle
and her clown. Olivia's perfunctory chiding of Sir Toby for his "leth-
argy" and fruitless pranks" is clearly overshadowed by an affectionate
tolerance for his energetic high spirits (See I.v. 124-144; IV.i. 51-63.).
Her defense of Feste against the stifling Puritanism of Malvolio (I.v.
43-106.) likewise illustrates her delight in the wit and festival im-
pulses of her old household entertainer. (Significantly, Feste will
eventually imprison Malvolio, quite literally). Thus it is no wonder
that Olivia, stricken by Cesario's charm and beauty, will quickly "catch
the plague" and drop her mask to pursue what she truly perceives as
life and love. Her next interview with Cesario culminates in another
of those subjunctive exchanges that call attention to both fact and
fiction. We note this time, however, that it is Olivia who interrupts
the negotiation-scenario with a straight-forward request:

\[\text{Vio:} \quad \text{Madam, I come to whet your gentle thoughts}
\]
\[\text{On his behalf....}
\]
\[\text{You'll nothing, madam, to my lord by me?}
\]
\[\text{Oli:} \quad \text{Stay.}
\]
\[\text{I prithee tell me what those think'\st of me.}
\]
\[\text{Vio:} \quad \text{That you do think you are not what you are.}
\]
\[\text{Oli:} \quad \text{If I think so, I think the same of you.}
\]
\[\text{Vio:} \quad \text{Then think you right. I am not what I am.}
\]
\[\text{Oli:} \quad \text{I would you were as I would have you be!}
\]
\[\text{Vio:} \quad \text{Would it be better, madam, than I am?}
\]
\[\text{I wish it might, for now I am your fool.}
\]
\[\text{(III.i. 147-56.)}
\]

The contrary-to-fact texture of the interchange here reminds us
of the hypotheticality of the dramatic situation, founded in the sup-
position that Cesario is a man. Yet Olivia's impulses are clearly un-
feigned at this point; she, at least, is not pretending. Even the mask
of reason is dropped as she professes her feelings:

\[\text{A murderous guilt shows not itself more soon}
\]
\[\text{Than love that would seem hid....}
\]
By maidehood, honor, truth, and everything,  
I love thee so, that mauger all thy pride,  
Nor wit nor reason can my passion hide.  
(III.i. 158-164.).

Here is "real" passion to balance our awareness that the object of that  
passion is hypothetical, the relationship unreal. Interestingly, when  
Olivia does find real happiness in a husband, it is with a man (Sebastian-  
"Cesario") who is no more Cesario than is Viola (though Sebastian is  
indeed a man, of course). At that point, however, the hypothetical be-  
comes the actual not through any self-conscious practice on the part of  
Olivia. Her devotion to "Cesario" remains single-minded and open. The  
subjunctive transformation occurs, rather, because of Sebastian's will-  
ingness to accept the unreal as reality. Such a tactic, founded in a  
benign and pragmatic opportunism, is what we might call an "inverse  
negotiation"— the opposite, say, of Petruchio's forging of happiness  
through aggressive "supposing." The scene is a pivotal one for the plot  
and resolution of Twelfth Night.

Sebastian has re-appeared on the scene to open Act IV. We have  
seen him briefly before, at the beginnings of Acts II and III, perhaps  
to remind us that all will be well when he finally enters the dramatic  
society and helps untie its tangled knots. When he does penetrate  
Illyria, however, he will at first inadvertently complicate that tangle.  
He arrives as a stranger but immediately inherits a false identity.  
Mistaken for Cesario, Sebastian finds himself embroiled in Sir Toby's  
staged "feud" between Sir Andrew and Cesario (IV.i.). Then he is "res-  
cued" by Olivia, who also takes him for her fond youth. Resuming her  
pursuit of love, Olivia exclaims, "Would thou'dst be ruled by me!"  
Sebastian, thoroughly confused but rather delighted by the strange
happenings, innocently replies, "Madam I will." And that is that. Olivia's happy summary indicates how easily, in subjunctive comedy, contrary-to-fact situations can become "realities": "Oh, say so, and so be!" Sebastian's amazement at all this reminds us of Sly's response to the Lord's scenario in _Shrew_; like Sly, Sebastian questions the reality of his experience:

... Or I am mad, or else this is a dream.
Let Fancy still my sense in Lethe steep.
If it be thus to dream, still let me sleep!

-------------

This is the air, that is the glorious sun,...
And though 'tis wonder that enwraps me thus,
Yet 'tis not madness....
For though my soul disputes well with my sense,
That this may be some error, but no madness,
Yet doth this accident and flood of fortune
So far exceed all instance, all discourse,
That I am ready to distrust mine eyes
And wrangle with my reason, that persuades me
To any other trust but that I am mad,
Or else the lady's mad—...
(IV.i. 65-67: IV.iii. 1-16.).

This discourse on madness can be read as an objective outsider's commentary on the world of the play in general. The very name "Illyria" suggests madness in its connotations (delirium, illusion, even illness). The plot hangs on illusion. As I have noted, furthermore, there is something rather dark, if not unhealthy, about Feste's conjuring of Malvolio's "madness" in the sub-plot (IV.ii.). Such emphasis on madness accounts for (and/or reflects) the intricacy of the plot and colors the somewhat unsettling resolution of _Twelfth Night_ (see p. 121, above). Yet it is madness that is also transformed into Olivia's happiness, and Viola's. The lunacy perceived by Sebastian is the unreality of "error," as in the _Comedy of Errors_. It is situational— caused by
Viola's disguise and the fact that she and Sebastian are twins—heightened, perpetuated, by Olivia's affection for "Cesario." Such madness is thus very different from Sly's and that perceived by Kate in Petruchio's antic behavior. The madness of _Shrew_ is the result of self-conscious contrivance; Sebastian's comes from "accident and flood of fortune." In both plays, however, the contrary-to-fact unreality of "madness" is transformed into the reality of "peace, love, and quiet life." Petruchio accomplishes this miracle through his aggressive, active game of "supposing." Sebastian turns the trick not by causing magic, but by yielding unto it. He merely allows the "bias of nature" to draw in all mistakes (V.i. 267). Though the tactics are inverse, the results are the same. Within the tentative, equivocal, and finely-balanced dialectics of Shakespeare's subjunctive comedy, things not real become alive at the end to counterpoise and vindicate such inverse subjunctive processes as life represented through play and love obscured behind masks.

What Viola should see in Orsino frequently eludes an audience. The Duke is a rather flimsy, self-indulgent posturer with a streak of "savage jealousy" which comes out in the end. It is possible that his thoughts of killing Olivia, when he is finally convinced he will not win her, is a posture itself—learned from stories about the "Egyptian thief" (V.i. 120 ff.). There is real ugliness, however, in his resolve to kill the "lamb" that he "loves" (Cesario) so that Olivia cannot have "him," thus "to spite a raven's heart within a dove" (V.i. 134.). Nevertheless, Viola does love the Duke; that much is clear from the outset:
... I'll do my best
To woo your lady. (Aside) Yet, a barful strife!
Whoe'er I woo, myself would be his wife.
(I.iv. 40-42.).

Viola's affection for Orsino is thus a "given" in the play—no more to be questioned or explained than Rosalind's love for Orlando, or Julia's for Proteus. Again, we have the aside to assure us of the fixity of this aspect of the play. But when she meets Orsino she is already committed (tentatively, of course) to her pseudo-identity as Cesario, against the time when it will be known what her "estate" is. Viola will not be "delivered to the world" until she is reborn as a "real" person. Rebirth will occur, of course, in the play's resolution, when Sebastian frees her to take her place at the Duke's side. In the meantime, she is faced with a dual dilemma: how to cope with both her true feelings for Orsino and Olivia's mistaken affection for her as Cesario.

We have seen that in spite of the lady's openness with her, Viola handles the problem Olivia poses by means of a consistent "meta-negotiation" on behalf of the Duke. A persistent detachment (in the actual presence of Olivia) keeps her, ironically, faithful to the Duke's purposes and worthy of his confidence in her (as Cesario) as his surrogate suitor. It is true that we hear Viola speaking personally to Olivia at one point in the interesting exchange, discussed above, about Olivia's face as "picture." Even there, however, she quickly returns to her negotiations in the well-known appeal to marriage (to Orsino) as a means for leaving the world a "copy" of the Lady's graces. The "meta-suit" is continued, furthermore, for the remainder of the scene (I.v. 251-307.). Her tactic, vis-a-vis Olivia, is predominantly that of detached play-acting. Viola's role as servant is most restrictive, then, in her
quasi-relationship with Olivia— at least as far as the main plot is concerned. We have seen how overtly suffocating the disguise can be when Cesario is trapped in the duel-scenario staged by Sir Toby. The negotiations with Olivia, however, represent a more genuine or significant "barful strife" for Viola. Moved by pity for the lady and love for the Duke (see her soliloquy at II.ii. 17-42.), she is nonetheless obliged to maintain a rather rigid and somewhat self-defeating posture when in Olivia's house. In the presence of Orsino himself, however, Viola seems more free to reveal herself from behind her mask in an effort to promote— through skillfully contrived language— the welfare of all three parties in the triangle. I will examine this generalization in detail, but first we might note briefly, and parenthetically, how the clown parallels Viola in this regard.

Feste is no mere trapping in Twelfth Night. Indeed, he "belongs" more to the world of the play than does Touchstone in his. Feste gets very much involved, for instance, in the machinations against Malvolio. When the clown (disguised as Sir Topas the curate) tortures the steward in his dark "madhouse," we feel Feste's involvement in the scenario much more intensely than we feel Touchstone's ire, for instance, as he bullies William (AVLI, V.i. 18-63.). This is a rather curious fact, since Feste's role is contrived as part of a playlet, whereas Touchstone's outburst against the rustic would seem totally spontaneous. And yet Feste, below the mask, is genuinely involved in the reprisals against the stuffy Puritan who would deprive the clown's merry company of their cakes and ale. Touchstone, on the other hand, merely browbeats William with wit and rhetoric, rising masterfully to the challenge of the bumpkin's ill-advised boast, "Aye, sir, I have a pretty wit." It is true
that William is a rival for Audrey's hand, and that Touchstone speaks of "translating his life into death." Nevertheless, the clown's method is to "overrun with policy," and his tactic thus correlates Rosalind's earlier, self-conscious lecturing to Phebe, discussed above.

Feste, then, is noticeably more integrated into his dramatic world—though, for the most part, he shares with Touchstone the detached perspective which is the sine qua non in the make-up of the professional fool. Like Viola, Feste functions as a liaison between Olivia's merry household and Orsino's den of sighs. Like Viola in her master's palace, Feste is more free in the house of his own mistress. Thus the clown bears a symbolic relationship to Viola as well as to Olivia— the two women together comprising the "heroine" of Twelfth Night (we note the interchangeability of the letters in their names). At home, Feste sings gay songs such as "O mistress mine," with its carpe diem vitality. For the Duke he sings the beautiful but melancholy "Come away, death," with its conventional theme of death-for-love. There the clown's behavior is more stylized, reflecting Orsino's own transparent mind—"a very opal," as Feste wryly calls it. "Brought on" as a professional entertainer, he feels, at the palace, the restrictiveness of his role— the pressure to "observe their mood on whom he jests," as Viola points out. Even his overtures for pay there lack the witty spontaneity he delightfully employs elsewhere (e.g., III.i. 50-65.). If "foolery shines everywhere," as Feste himself maintains, it would seem to shine more brightly at home than abroad.²⁸

Likewise, Viola seems less restrained at "home." This freedom within the bondage imposed by disguise is best seen in II.iv., both before and after the interlude of Feste's song. Here Viola is not obliged
to act out Orsino's commission; she does not have to meta-negotiate. Thus the restrictions of her role as servant are loosened. She may speak more freely as the Duke's "boy," and thus may "negotiate" in a more purely subjunctive manner for the balancing of the play itself and for the promotion of love's cause. Let us examine this important scene. With music playing in the background, Orsino sighs a little speech allowing as how he is the very model of the lover. When he asks Cesario, "how dost thou like this tune?", a telling dialogue ensues:

\begin{verbatim}
Vio: It gives a very echo to the seat
  Where love is throned.
Duke: Thou dost speak masterly.
My life upon't, young though thou art, thine eye
  Hath stayed upon some favor that it loves.
Hath it not, boy?
Vio: A little, by your favor.
Duke: What kind of woman is 't?
Vio: Of your complexion.
Duke: She is not worth thee, then. What years, i' faith?
Vio: About your years, my lord.
Duke: Too old, by Heaven....
  For women are as roses, whose fair flower
  Being once displayed, doth fall that very hour.
Vio: And so they are. Alas, that they are so—
  To die, even when they to perfection grow!
(II.iv. 20-42.).
\end{verbatim}

The exchange operates at two levels simultaneously— the one fictive, contrived, and contrary-to-fact, the other "real" and revelatory. The music establishes an ambience of artifice, calling attention to the spectacle that is the play itself. Our attendant detachment is then reinforced by the Duke's conventional lines on the "sweet pangs" of the (Petrarchan) lover—a verbal correlative to the music itself. "This tune," we realize, embraces Orsino, too. Whether or not Viola intends to parody him in her pretty line about love's "echo," we may be sure Shakespeare is calling our attention to the connection between music, Orsino, and artifice in general. This disengaging nudge meets no
resistance, furthermore, in the charming little fiction about Cesario's lady-friend. The story is an obvious contrivance, artfully built upon Orsino's predictable reaction to Cesario's "masterly" utterance about love and music. Our disengagement from the patent falsity of Cesario's fabrication is widened, of course, by our knowledge that Cesario is actually a girl. To be more precise, we know that "Cesario" is really a boy actor playing a girl playing a boy pretending to have been in love with a fictitious girl. If this were all the scene affords, our heroine would seem frozen in a pointless illusion. But there is more, certainly. Orsino hypothesizes that Cesario's eye has "stayed upon some favor (favorite) that it loves." Viola replies, "A little, by your favor," and thus uses the artifice of pun to reveal genuine feeling to an audience. Orsino hears "A little, by your leave," but we hear Viola reaching out to the real favorite of her eyes; i.e., the Duke himself. She opts for love through the artifice of wit, and continues to do so as she relates the various qualities of the alleged mistress to Orsino's own characteristics. The human feeling revealed through disguise and fiction is engaging indeed. The subjunctive tactic thus lends balance and purpose to the theatrics here. Our proper perspective is maintained as we watch Viola "act" in response to the heart's promptings.

Viola's negotiations achieve an even sharper focus after Feste leaves the scene. Indeed, the stylized sentiment that is his song provides an effective foil for the moving exchange to follow. When Orsino is roused by the conventional lyric to re-commission Cesario in even more hyperbolic terms, we have the following:

Vio: But if she cannot love you, sir?  
Duke: I cannot be so answered.  
Vio: Sooth, but you must.
Say that some lady, as perhaps there is,
Hath for your love as great a pang of heart
As you have for Olivia. You cannot love her,
You tell her so. Must she not then be answered?
Duke: There is no woman's sides
Can bide the beating of so strong a passion
As love doth give my heart,... Make no compare
Between that love a woman can bear me
And that I owe Olivia.
Vio: Aye, but I know—
Duke: What dost thou know?
Vio: Too well what love women to men may owe.
In faith, they are as true of heart as we.
My father had a daughter loved a man,
As it might be, perhaps, were I a woman,
I should your lordship.
Duke: And what's her history?
Vio: A blank, my lord. She never told her love,
But let concealment, like the worm i' the bud,
Feed on her damask cheek. She pined in thought,
And with a green and yellow melancholy
She sat like Patience on a monument,
Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed?
We men may say more, swear more, but indeed
Our shows are more than wills, for still we prove
Much in our vows, but little in our love.
Duke: But died thy sister of her love, my boy?
Vio: I am all the daughters of my father's house,
And all the brothers too. And yet I know not.
Sir, shall I to this lady?

Here is the subjunctive heart of **Twelfth Night**. This exchange, in its structure and effect upon an audience, is very similar to that important scene noted earlier in **Two Gentlemen** (IV.iv.), where Julia, as Sebastian, negotiates on her own behalf with Proteus (78-94) and then with Silvia (113-182). If the scene in the latter play is the more complex (because of the dual interviews and the fact of Proteus' faithlessness), its equivalent here in **Twelfth Night** is no less remarkable in its delicate interplay of subjunctive forces. Again, the exchange operates between the poles of fiction and feeling; the dialectic tension resides in the opposition of free supposition against firmly fixed opinion. Orsino "cannot be answered" by Viola's hypothesizing on behalf
of Olivia (and, of course, herself), but the negotiations do, in fact, soften him somewhat. He seems interested in the story of Cesario's "sister." (We note the ingenious device by which she holds Orsino's attention during this lesson in relativity: she includes the Duke himself in her subjunctive analogies.) Yet in his most empathic moment, Orsino once more attitudinizes in conventional terms: "But died thy sister of her love, my boy?" Such a stereotyped formulation of feeling echoes precisely the sentiment of Feste's recent song ("I am slain by a fair cruel maid"); it recalls Orlando's feeble response to "Ganymede's" hypothesis that were "he" Rosalind, the gentleman would be rejected: "Then in mine own person I die." (AYLI, IV.i. 93.). Rosalind counters, we have seen, with a delightful shock-treatment ("Men have died... and worms have eaten them, but not for love."), whereas Viola, typically, maintains a more defensive posture. She decides to bide her time and changes the subject: "And yet I know not. Sir, shall I to this lady?" Both Orlando and Orsino are hard cases, and full enlightenment, for both, must await the magic of concluding events.

The extent to which Viola's negotiations here succeed in reorienting the Duke's misconceived and misplaced affection (Viola's ultimate goal) amounts to only a small portion of our scene's dramatic value. Shakespearean comedy is a double-edged instrument. Each of our four plays is at once an artistic and a social document. As a social document, each illustrates variously how subjunctive vision and purposeful, theatrical activity can be employed to promote life and bring communities together. As art, each establishes its own internal balances between distancing, self-conscious artifice and engaging "realities" such as the representational illusion of genuine, human feeling. This is the
artistic manifestation of the subjunctive enterprise. Responding to the equipoise, an audience enjoys and benefits from a perspective on the dramatic activity ideally suited to scrutiny and the assimilation of the play's value; i.e., how it relates to life outside the theater. In our scene from *Twelfth Night*, such subjunctive balance is established in the effect of Viola's humanity as revealed through the artifice of disguise and hypothetical commentary. We feel Viola's own "pang of heart" keenly as a reality behind the hypothetical grief of "some lady" and that of Cesario's sister. We feel that passion, too, as a living contrast to the Duke's self-indulgent, stylized moans. It has been noted in other contexts that Viola represents a genuineness of feeling against which the illusory can be measured. This is surely true, and our ability to make such measurements is dependent on Shakespeare's consummate skill in the use of illusion itself. If Viola is a monument to Patience, *Twelfth Night* and the other plays we have examined are enduring monuments to the master's craft.
NOTES

1. The problem of why the later plays should be so different in tone and implication has received diverse scholarly and critical attention. Dover Wilson holds that after 1600 Shakespeare entered a period of "gloom and dejection"; see John Dover Wilson, The Essential Shakespeare (Cambridge, 1932), p. 115. R.A. Foakes opines that the later Shakespeare was experimenting with "discontinuities and contradictions in character and action, withdrawing from the basic commitment to romantic love and to common ethical attitudes shown in the earlier comedies"; See R.A. Foakes, Shakespeare: The Dark Comedies to the Last Plays (London, 1971), p. 94.

   It is H.B. Charlton's unorthodox view that the "problem" plays actually were written before the romantic comedies, and that they were steps to Shakespeare's discovery of the "true sources of nobility in man and of joy in life"; see H.B. Charlton, Shakespearian Comedy (London, 1938), pp. 208-265.


3. Lamb perceived in Malvolio a proud but Quixotic visionary possessed of heroic, if not tragic dignity. The essayist, in "On Some of the Old Actors," states, "I confess that I never saw the catastrophe of this character... without a kind of tragic interest." Of the steward in his dark prison, Lamb remarks, "a sort of greatness seems never to desert him." For these quotes and some interesting commentary, see Joan Coldwell, "The Playgoer as Critic: Charles Lamb on Shakespeare's Characters," Shakespeare Quarterly 26 (1975), 188-192.

   Coldwell argues that Lamb uses his recollection of Malvolio as played by William Bensley, in 1791, as "an excuse for developing a theory nurtured by his own studies over many years."


5. Ibid. p. 178.
6 The fate of Lucio, in Measure for Measure, is an ironic illustration of this fact. A slanderer and a cynical embodiment of social morality in the play, Lucio remains unreformed at the end. Yet his rejection itself is contrived in an "inclusive" mode: he is married to a prostitute at the Duke's command.


10 On the "entrapment" motif in the play, see J. Dennis Huston, "'When I Came to Man's Estate': Twelfth Night and Problems of Identity," Modern Language Quarterly 33 (1972), 287 ff.

11 Frederick's banishment of Rosalind is, of course, a malign act—no more benign, intrinsically, than the exiling of Kent in King Lear. Nor do I choose simply to ignore the "dark" side of As You Like It; I explore below the engrossing effects attendant on the plot-impelling machinations of Frederick and Oliver. Rosalind's banishment is, however, a gateway to freedom. At the end of Act I, as Rosalind and Celia leave the court for the forest, Celia makes an important observation: "Now go we in content/To liberty and not to banishment."


13 Huston, p. 283.

14 Ibid., pp. 283-286.

15 Berry interprets the play as a whole in terms of the "touche." See Ralph Berry, Shakespeare's Comedies: Explorations in Form (Princeton, 1972), pp. 175-195.


17 Thomas Lodge's pastoral romance, Rosalynde. Euphues golden legacie, appeared in 1590 and went through eleven editions by 1634.

20 Ibid., p. 2.
23 Ibid., p. 46.
25 Berry, pp. 183-185.
26 Rosalynde, p. 781.
27 Ibid.
28 For Touchstone's comment on this same idea, see *As You Like It*, II.iv. 16-18. Though Touchstone claims to be more of a fool in the forest, his remark is intentionally ambiguous. I think it is clear, furthermore, that he is more "even" as a character than Feste. Touchstone is equally at home in court or forest. If he is less energetic than his counterpart in *Twelfth Night*, Touchstone is the more consistently balanced of the two great fools.
29 Jenkins, p. 79.