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SENSORY IMAGINATION

by

Fernando Rodriguez Casas

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis Director's Signature:

[Signature]

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: SENSORY IMAGINATION AND IMAGINATION-IMAGES.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE CARTESIAN ACCOUNT OF SENSORY IMAGINATION</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Review of the Cartesian Account of Sensory Imagination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Sensory Imagination Involve Sense Perception?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlike sense perception, sensory imagination does not involve a sense organ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlike sense perception, 'environmental' conditions are not necessary for sensory imagination to take place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our imagination-images do not belong to the system of interrelated perceptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Hannay and the Object of Intentional Seeing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishiguro and Dilman: is seeing in the mind seeing as?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eidetic Imagery, a case for the Cartesian Account?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE BEHAVIORISTIC APPROACH.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Existence of Mental Images</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeming to Perceive, Imagining and Pretending that one Perceives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeming to perceive and imagining that one perceives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretending that one perceives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>SENSORY IMAGINATION AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THOUGHT. . . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Having a Mental Image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are Mental Images Objects in their own Right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Seeing' a Mental Image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sensuousness of Sensory Imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sensory Imagination: A Form of Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are Mental Images Pictures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are Mental Images Autonomous?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mental images 'in the back of our minds'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Wittgenstein case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infallibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary of the Chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>SENSORY IMAGINATION AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PERCEPTION . . . . . .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hume's Thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is Sensory Imagination Utilization of Knowledge?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is Sensory Imagination possible Without Knowledge of a Language?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is Sensory Imagination impossible Without Sense Perception?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sense perception and the basic sensory concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic sensory concepts and sensory imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Perception and Sensory Imagination Address Themselves to the Same Set of Objects?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX: ONEIRIC IMAGERY</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hypnagogic, hypnopompic and hallucination images.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dreams</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"...images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter."

--Aristotle,

_De Anima_, 432a
INTRODUCTION

SENSORY IMAGINATION AND IMAGINATION-IMAGES

The word "imagination" (and cognates) is used to designate a variety of phenomena. Consider the following cases. When we say of an author that he has imagination, we normally mean that he writes with originality or inventiveness, or innovatively, or unusually, or perhaps, that he is good at making things up or that he is good at inventing things and situations. In this sense 'imagination' seems to perform an aesthetic job designating something close to creativity. If we ask someone to imagine the consequences of a monetary devaluation, we are asking the person to assume and/or consider and/or suppose, and/or conjecture something. In this sense 'imagine' is close to thinking. On some occasion we may say that a certain person imagines that he is Napoleon, and what we mean by this is that the person falsely believes that he is Napoleon. We also say that we use our imagination when we picture or visualize something and, in cases of this sort, we say that we 'see' something with our mind's eye.

These are only four examples in which people are said to be exercising their imagination. It is often assumed that there is a common denominator that makes all
these cases cases of imagination. And because it has been traditionally accepted that the faculty of imagination is the faculty of producing mental images, one may think that what is common and essential to all these cases is the production of mental images. Wittgenstein and Ryle, perhaps more than anyone else, have made us realize how mistaken this conception is, for one needs to produce no mental image at all in order to imagine the consequences of a monetary devaluation, or, to write in an imaginative style (though it may be quite helpful), or, to falsely believe that one is Napoleon. Some contemporary authors have advanced similar, but less blunt, doctrines. Furlong, for instance, in his book, Imagination, does not claim that mental images are essential to all cases of imagining something, but he claims that all uses of 'imagination', and cognates, can be reduced to three basic kinds which

... have in fact a common root, which is given by the notion of imago, a copy. The imaginary is a copy of the real...

We shall have opportunity to see that this claim is not even true of mental images, let alone of imagination that does not imply the occurrence of mental images.

Of the four senses of imagination mentioned above, in this work I shall treat only the last one, that is of imagination as the faculty in virtue of which we produce mental images, or, for those people that have reservations
about talking of mental images, the faculty in virtue of which we 'see', 'hear', 'taste', 'feel', and 'smell' things in our minds. One main point I attempt to make in this work is precisely this: no accurate account of 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. in the mind is possible without the notion of a mental image. In order to distinguish this faculty of imagination from others when I refer to it, I decided to give it the name 'Sensory Imagination,' a name which the content of this work will, I hope, amply justify.

This notion of sensory imagination has been, historically speaking, by far the most important for philosophers. When Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume speak of imagination in general, in most cases what they have in mind is the faculty of producing mental images— or the faculty in virtue of which we 'see', 'hear', etc., things in the mind. It might be the case that this traditional notion of sensory imagination has nothing in common with the other senses of 'imagination' except sharing the same family of words for their expression. Therefore, to pursue an investigation designed to discover the common nature of all these notions may be a vain pursuit after chimerical essences misled by mere linguistic coincidences.

Laymen as well as writers on imagination tend to confuse and obscure the different senses in which 'imagination' is used. One common confusion is that between what is imaginary and what is sensorily imagined. Even a
distinguished writer on imagination such as Ryle, on occasion, seems to confuse these two as we shall see in due time. It is important from the start to keep in mind that something can be imaginary, that is, sheer fantasy, pure fiction, without having to be sensorily imagined. Nor is it true that everything that is sensorily imagined is fictional or imaginary. To put it paradoxically: not everything that is (sensorily) imagined is imaginary. Right now, for instance, I can 'see' the Eiffel Tower in my mind, but this fact does not transform the Eiffel Tower into an imaginary or fictional being, nor is my image of the Tower fictional either. On the other hand, we can create or make up all sorts of fictional, non-real or imaginary things in our writings and paintings and fables, etc., without framing a single mental image of them. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we very often use our sensory imagination in order to create or give an appearance to the imaginary beings that we conceive. But the fact that often the imaginary finds its first expression in sensory imagination indicates a close, yet only contingent, relationship between those two.

One should not expect to find in this work an elucidation of the concept of the imaginary. I shall speak of it only in regard to its relation to the concept of sensory imagination. This work, therefore, is not an attempt to treat the concept of imagination as a whole, for under
the general heading of 'imagination' we gather, as we have seen, the concepts of (or at least concepts closely related to) creativity, originality and inventiveness, supposal, assumption and conjecture, false belief, fiction, and non-real, and finally the concept of 'seeing', 'hearing', 'smelling', 'tasting', 'touching', and 'feeling' things in one's mind. Again, it is only this last concept that I shall try to elucidate in this work.

But we have not yet clarified sufficiently our subject of investigation. Sensory imagination, I said, is the faculty in virtue of which we either frame mental images or, are able to 'see', 'hear', etc., things in our minds. But the notions of a mental image, on the one hand, and 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. (in inverted commas) on the other, are used to cover a quite heterogeneous group of items which are not exclusive to sensory imagination.

Not everything we call 'a mental image' is a product of sensory imagination. After images, or more properly, after-effects and hallucinations, for instance, are often referred to as mental images, yet they are not framed by sensory imagination. After effects, whether they are visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile necessarily involve a sense organ. A blind man cannot have a visual after-image, a deaf man cannot have auditory after-effects. After-effects are the remains of earlier
perceptions, for this reason, they, unlike the images we frame in our imagination, can be—in a sense—spatially located. A visual after-image, for instance, is necessarily somewhere in our visual field and it can be located to the left or right or below, etc. of another contemporaneous visual after-effect, or to the left or right, etc. of some objects which are seen at the moment. Similarly, when we still feel the hat on our heads after it was removed, it is on our head that we feel the hat. On the other hand, a mental image such as the Eiffel Tower which I may 'see' in my mind's eye, does not belong to my visual field at all: it is not to the left or right, etc. of anything I may see with open eyes at the moment. I may frame in my imagination the feeling or sensation of having a hat on, but this 'feeling', or rather, this mental image of the feeling of having a hat on is not felt on my head, as I feel it when I actually have the hat on or when I have just taken it off and I have an after-sensation of it. In fact, I do not feel it anywhere. This tactile mental image that I frame in my imagination of the feeling of having a hat on, is a mental image of a feeling or sensation in the head, but it is not itself a feeling or sensation in the head as the after-effect is.

The occurrence and subsistence of an after-effect is, after all, not something which we are responsible for as we are responsible for our imagination-images. Surely enough
we can provoke the occurrence of an after-effect but we are powerless to make it disappear, to change it or sustain its appearance as we are normally capable of doing with our imagination-images.

After-effects are, thus, better described as after-sensations, for they truly belong to sensation rather than to imagination. The same considerations apply to the so-called negative after-effects as well as to all kinds of phosphenes. For this reason, all these 'mental images' should be carefully kept apart from imagination-mental images which are our sole concern here.

Some of the mental images that we call hallucinations are the result of a deranged perception sometimes induced by the temporary presence of a drug in the organism of the subject and other times the result of the general (more permanent) psycho-physiological condition of the subject. These hallucinations do not fall within the sphere of imagination either, for they not only involve a sense organ but they are actually abnormal perceptions. A widely accepted definition of hallucination in psychiatry is:

A false sensory perception in the absence of an actual external stimulus. May be induced by emotional and other factors such as drugs, alcohol, and stress. May occur in any of the senses.²

An exhausted driver may 'see' with his very eyes all kinds of things in the road that are not actually there; a person
under the influence of a hallucinogen might 'see' with intense coloration and with open eyes the heat coming out of a stove; the dipsomaniac with D.T.'s may 'see' with his eyes open insects crawling up his legs when there are only drops of dirty water, for example. All these cases are cases of sensory perception which are, for some reason, abnormal or deranged. These hallucinations fall, therefore, outside the sphere of sensory imagination. Rather, they belong to the sphere of sensation or perception. Yet, there seem to be hallucinations which are not so clearly different from our imagination images. Sometimes people report having visual hallucinations with the eyes closed. ³ This fact suggests that there is a kind of hallucination that does not necessarily involve a sense organ, at least in the manner that the other hallucinations do. How these hallucinations may be related to our imagination images is a matter that we shall mention in the Appendix to this work.

There are other senses in which a person may be said to 'see' or 'hear', etc. (in inverted commas) something that does not fall within the sphere of the imagination nor within the group of after-effects (and related phenomena) or hallucinations either. One may, for instance, 'see' an oasis when having a mirage. This is clearly not a case of having an hallucination for the experience is not dependent on the peculiar psycho-physiological condition of the
subject but dependent on the special environmental circumstances, so that any other subject in the same circumstances—other things being equal—would also be able to 'see' the oasis. Yet, 'seeing an oasis' when one has a mirage is not a case of sensorily imagining something for unlike what we 'see' in our minds, the oasis is something that we see only with the aid of our eyes and disappears as soon as we close them.

Other senses of 'see' (in inverted commas) such as those expressed in phrases like: "I can 'see' the point of his speech," are so remote from the imagination that it seems idle even to attempt to distinguish them from cases of 'seeing' things in the mind. In fact, expressions like "seeing a point" and "seeing the thrust of an argument" may be metaphorical figures of speech rather than distinct senses of 'seeing'.

In conclusion, the subject of this work is sensory imagination, the faculty by means of which we frame imagination—images, i.e., images in the production of which no sense organ is involved, or the faculty in virtue of which we can 'see', 'hear', 'feel', 'smell', and 'taste' things in our minds without involving any sense organ in doing so. It is also peculiar to these images that we normally can produce them, sustain them, and eliminate them at will. A fact that, as we shall see, does not entail that
all of them are deliberately produced, sustained, and eliminated. Unless otherwise specified, then, in this work when talking about mental images we shall be making reference only to imagination-mental images.

The philosophical problems that the concepts of sensory imagination and imagination-mental images give rise to are quite varied. They constitute, nevertheless, a network of closely interrelated problems which fall roughly into three categories:

(1) Ontological problems such as--Are there mental images? Does it make sense to talk about mental images? Where do mental images exist? Are there occurrences of 'seeing', 'hearing', etc., things in the mind? Are mental images objects in their own right?

(2) Epistemological problems such as--Is sensory imagination capable of giving rise to knowledge? Can we learn something new about a thing by sensorily imagining it? Are mental images a kind of knowledge? What can and what cannot be sensorily imagined?

(3) Problems in the Philosophy of Mind such as--What is it for a person to sensorily imagine something? Or, how should we describe the familiar occurrences that we report by saying that someone 'sees' or 'hears', etc., something in his mind? What is it in imagining that makes the image an image of X and not of anything else? How and
why having an image is like perceiving an object rather than just thinking about it? Yet, how are these occurrences different from perceiving something and from thinking about something? How are perception and thought related to sensory imagination, if at all? Can the man blind from birth visualize? Can we produce a mental image of anything perceivable in principle? Could we perceive, in principle, anything of which we can produce a mental image?

Sensory imagination gives rise also to a group of problems related to Aesthetics about which nothing is said in this work, nor do we need to say anything about these in order to treat the former problems. But more properly, these aesthetic problems involve the notion of imagination in general, and not only sensory imagination. Accordingly, they should and can be properly treated only in a wider context where imagination is understood in more senses than the one we have chosen for our investigation here, viz., sensory imagination.

There are also some epistemological problems related to the Kantian doctrine that gravitate around the notions of imagination and mental images. In this work I shall not address these problems directly for they require separate treatment within the context of Kantian scholarship, yet some of what will be discussed here might have import for those Kantian issues as well.
Most of the answers given through the years to the questions we are concerned with fall into two groups: Cartesian and Behavioristic. One should not expect these groups to be collections of answers which are nearly similar to those of the same group, and sharply different from those of the other group. This is simply not the case. Yet this broad distinction will not only be helpful in understanding the different accounts given of sensory imagination, but, by and large, it reflects one of two traditional directions that one may take when dealing with this (and others) problem in the Philosophy of Mind. One group of answers stresses the existence and importance of mental images, and accordingly tends to explain sensory imagination as an occurrence similar to perception in which the mental image plays the role of the object of perception, or imagination, at least to a certain extent. In its classical or traditional form, this account claims that to sensorily imagine X is to inwardly perceive in the privacy of the mind a mental image of X or a copy of X. This traditional view is, roughly, the view that prevailed through the years since Berkeley and Hume (in fact since Lucretius) to William James. We may refer to this group of answers as the Cartesian Account of Sensory Imagination.

The answers in the other group tend to eliminate mental images from their accounts of sensory imagination, and some of them either boldly deny the existence of mental
images or reduce them to something else. Most of these answers are part of behavioristic and/or materialistic theories of mind (i.e., Watson and Dennett), theories for which mental images are bothersome items because of their, at least apparent, intangible and/or private nature. Accordingly, the accounts given of sensory imagination in this second group dispense with the notion of a mental image (at least in its ordinary sense) and tend to explain it in terms of some sort of (overt) performance. Let us call this group of answers, not without some abuse of the term, The Behavioristic Account of Sensory Imagination.

Although Ryle may not be considered, strictly speaking, a behaviorist, still we may group him with the general behavioristic movement. For Ryle not only produced some of the most important criticisms of the Cartesian Account of Sensory Imagination, but also produced the most comprehensive alternative account of imagination that eliminated any reference to non-behavioral inner states and mental images. Roughly, Ryle's account of imagination tells us that to sensorily imagine something is to fancy or pretend that one perceives.

I shall try to show in this work that both doctrines --Cartesian and Behavioristic-- in their diverse forms, are unacceptable. The aim of this work is, then, that of overcoming the philosophical impasse between these two
positions. I believe I have produced an account of sensory imagination which is neither Cartesian nor Behavioristic and yet, it explains all the relevant psychological data. In addition, it does no violence whatsoever to our ordinary ways of speaking about the matter. The concept of a mental image is central to my account, yet sensory imagination is not explained under the model of perception. But to think of one's doctrine as situated in the golden mean between all other doctrines about the same matter, that go wrong either towards one extreme or the other, is presumptuous. The fact of the matter is that the account of sensory imagination I produce here is more Cartesian than Behavioristic in spirit, and it is so in spite of the fact that, unlike all other Cartesian accounts, it does not explain sensory imagination in perceptual terms, nor under the model of seeing things in a picture. Yet, I can imagine behaviorists accusing me of a form of Cartesianism, while I think it is quite unlikely that anyone would think that my position is behavioristic.

A final remark—not all the arguments brought forth in this work are original. Sometimes I make use of well-known arguments conceived, say, by behaviorists and use them in my criticism of the Cartesian Account and vice-versa.
CHAPTER I

THE CARTESIAN ACCOUNT OF SENSORY IMAGINATION

A Review of the Cartesian Account of Sensory Imagination

In this first chapter we shall review, expound, and criticize the Cartesian account of sensory imagination in general, and some of its specific versions in particular. This account can be found in the works of Berkeley, Hume, W. James, Lawrie, Ishiguro, Dilman, Danto, and Hannay, and (anachronistically) Lucretius. Although we shall briefly review the positions of all of these authors, we shall examine more closely the doctrine of Hume for, after all, due to its scope, vigor, penetration and subsequent influence, it has become the 'locus classicus' of the Cartesian account of imagination. Yet some detailed attention will be paid to the doctrines of Hannay, Dilman and Ishiguro, because, on the one hand, Hannay's work constitutes the only contemporary full length and explicit attempt to re-establish the Cartesian position in its traditional form. Dilman's and Ishiguro's works, on the other hand, constitute, perhaps, the most sophisticated contemporary attempts to untangle the problems of sensory imagination in
a Cartesian fashion, while trying to avoid the well-known howlers of the traditional doctrine.

When we picture the Parthenon in our minds, it is the Parthenon, and not anything else, that we see in our mind's eye. This is clearly true and it has not been seriously denied by anyone. Yet supporters of the Cartesian account, at least those holding the most traditional versions of it, have often been understood as denying this obvious point. This is due to the peculiar explanation they offer of the workings of the faculty of sensory imagination. What follows is a general reconstruction of the Cartesian Account of Sensory Imagination; as such, it roughly applies to all the authors mentioned above. It is followed, then, by a brief presentation of Hume's specific doctrine of sensory imagination.

In accordance with the Cartesian Account, we come to see the Parthenon in our minds by producing a mental picture of the Parthenon which we then contemplate in the privacy of our minds. This doctrine involves three basic claims: 1) Mental images are objects in their own right having, nevertheless, a special status as objects existing only in the mind. 2) Mental images are perceived in the privacy of the mind. 3) Mental images are copies, pictures, or some sort of representations, of objects. To see, hear, smell, etc. X in our minds, the explanation then goes, is
to perceive (see, hear, smell, etc.) a mental image of X in the mind. So, in this sense, it is a mental image of the Parthenon that we actually see when we visualize it, and not the Parthenon itself. And, therefore, to this extent, the traditional version of the Cartesian Account of sensory imagination can be said to replace the true object of sensory imagination (i.e., the Parthenon) with another (i.e., the mental image of the Parthenon).

Treating mental images as pictures or representations is essential to the doctrine, for it is in virtue of their being representations of things that by perceiving them we get to see, hear, etc. in our minds the things they represent, just as when we see in a painting what is being represented in it. In general, the Cartesian Account is an attempt to describe and explain the workings of sensory imagination in perceptual terms and under the model of seeing something in a picture. Sensory imagination is assimilated to perception or it is a special case of perceiving something. I hope to show in this work that those three basic claims of the Cartesian Account are untenable, that is to say, I intend to show (1) that mental images are not objects in their own right; (2) that there is no sense in which perception occurs in sensory imagination; and (3) that mental images, whatever they are, are not pictures, copies or representations in any ordinary sense of the word. In this chapter I shall concentrate on the second point.
Roughly, Hume's doctrine of sensory imagination is as follows. Embracing under the general notion of 'perceptions' all the contents of the mind, Hume distinguishes among them 'Impressions' from Ideas'. 'Impressions', he tells us, are those 'perceptions' which are present to the mind with more force and violence than 'Ideas' are. Among them we find "all our sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul."1 'Ideas', on the other hand, are copies or faint images of 'impressions'. 'Ideas', which are produced by the faculty of imagination, as well as by memory, are traces of earlier 'impressions' and consequently are necessarily less vivid and forceful, they are fainter and weaker. Therefore, an 'idea' of the imagination (what we call a sensory imagination image) differs from an 'impression' (what we would call, among other things, a perception) only in degree. The experience that a person has when looking at a tree in broad daylight with open eyes is the same kind of experience as the person has when visualizing the tree; both are qualitatively the same kind of occurrence varying only in degree. In both cases, the person is having a perception. To see X in the mind, in accordance with this doctrine, is after all, just like seeing X in broad daylight, the only difference being that when one sees X in the mind, one's experience is weaker.
Before Hume, Berkeley held a doctrine of imagination in many respects similar, and much before Hume or Berkeley, Lucretius, in Book IV of The Nature of the Universe, advanced a theory of sensory imagination of the same kind. There Lucretius claims that the "vision beheld by the mind closely resembles one beheld by the eyes," with the only difference being that the objects of the mind's vision are flimsier.

After Hume, the Cartesian Account of Imagination has been held and reformulated. William James, for instance, in his Principles of Psychology explicitly denounces Hume's 'atomistic psychological theory' but holds the following theory of imagination which is basically the same doctrine in that it describes imagination as the inner perception of private copies or pictures:

Sensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism, so that copies of them arise again in the mind after the original outward stimulus is gone. No mental copy, however, can arise in the mind, of any kind of sensation which has never been directly excited from without.

Fantasy, or Imagination, are the names given to the faculty of reproducing copies of originals once felt. The imagination is called 'reproductive' when the copies are literal; 'productive' when elements from different originals are recombined so as to make new wholes.

With the development of Behaviorism, Cartesian accounts of imagination fell in disrepute: mental images were suspected of being fictional entities invented by
speculative metaphysicians interested in over-populating the world. Often philosophers and psychologists alike declared that mental images did not exist.

Psychological investigation on the nature of sensory imagination which had started at the end of the last century with Francis Galton (1880), and perhaps even earlier with Fechner (1860), progressed and continued for about the first third of this century; but then it came to an almost complete standstill under the influence of Behaviorism. Today, Behaviorism is no longer widespread and the last ten years or so have seen a revival of interest in sensory imagination mainly on the part of psychologists who have been gathering a wealth of data from a variety of new forms of research and, to some extent, on the part of philosophers interested in the Philosophy of Mind.

As a result the Cartesian Account is by no means dead today. Danto, for instance, holds that sensory imagination "consists in the actual mental gazing at actual mental pictures." R. Lawrie, to mention another contemporary author, claims that "at least some of us sometimes imagine the object by contemplating a mental picture of it," and that "images do exist and thereby have features in their own right." It is, therefore, necessary to re-examine the Cartesian thesis in its traditional and modern versions.
Does Sensory Imagination Involve Sense Perception?

As we have seen, the Cartesian Account assimilates sensory imagination to sense perception; to sensorily imagine something is, in accordance with it, to perceive in some sense. So far as I know nobody has claimed that we see, hear, etc. or perceive our mental images with our sense organs: eyeballs, eardrums, etc. Yet, the Cartesian insists that the occurrence of seeing, hearing, etc. something in the mind is just like perceiving it with our sense organs with the difference being that we do not use our sense organs in doing so.² Of course, the Cartesian must add that the allegedly perceived object in the case of sensory imagination, i.e., the mental image, is not quite like ordinary objects of perception either, yet in spite of this he claims it is an object in its own right. We shall speak of this somewhere else.

I hope to make clear here, then, that there is no sense in which sense perception takes place in sensory imagination. That is to say, that what the Cartesian is inclined to characterize as occurrences of perceiving something in the cases of imagination are not actually cases of sense perception in any sense of the word. It should be clear in what follows that the conditions I stipulate for something to be called a case of sense perception do not, by any means, produce a particularly narrow
or special sense of 'sense perception'. On the contrary, these conditions, which no case of sensory imagination meets, are quite basic to sense perception.

Unlike sense perception, sensory imagination does not involve a sense organ. Let us contrast sense perception, or more concretely, plain seeing with seeing something in the mind. If someone who we know to have lost both eyes were to claim at some point that he is plainly seeing something, we would normally either take his remark as a joke or simply disbelieve his claim. "If he has no eyes, he could not possibly (plainly) see anything," we would rightly argue. For it is quite obvious that having visual sense organs and exercising them is a necessary condition for anyone to plainly see something. And, conversely, if we know that a certain person plainly saw something on one occasion, we can conclude that this person was in possession of his or her visual sense organs and used them on that occasion. If this person without eyes insisted that he was able to plainly see a T.V. program the night before, we would rightly conclude that, if he speaks in earnest, then he is imagining (falsely believing) having seen the program perhaps because he had hallucinations or vivid visualizations that made him believe he was actually plainly seeing. In sum, being able to plainly see something implies having eyesight and, I think it is obvious that no person can have eyesight without having eyes.
Similarly, we have reason to disbelieve anyone claiming to have plainly heard or smelled something when we know that his or her auditory and olfactory organs are non-existent or not in working condition. It is more difficult to imagine a person without gustatory organs and perhaps impossible to imagine a person without tactile organs, for in these cases, and especially in the last, large portions of the body operate as such. But in any case, having a body and exercising the sensitivity of some part of it is a necessary condition for anyone to have tactile, visual, auditory, gustatory, or olfactory perceptions. Moreover, having a sense perception consists, at least to some extent but not only, in the exercise of the sensitivity of some part of our organism. Any occurrence of sensory perception is, therefore, in some way connected to a certain portion of the organism, i.e., their corresponding sense organ.

In contrast, we can see something in our minds without exercising our visual sense organs in so doing. A person without eyes may very well have all sorts of visualisations, provided, of course, as we shall see in Chapter IV, that he was able to plainly see at some time. The situation is the same 'mutatis mutandis' with regard to hearing, smelling, etc. something in the mind.
Unlike sense perception, 'environmental' conditions are not necessary for sensory imagination to take place. As the possession and exercise of a bodily sense organ is a necessary condition for anyone to have a sense perception, some other 'environmental' conditions are also necessary. The surroundings must be illuminated if we are to perceive anything with our eyes; we must be within a medium such as air or water if we are to hear anything other than the vibrations that our own organism produces in our auditory apparatus, etc. These 'environmental' conditions clearly apply to vision, hearing and smelling. Tactile and gustatory perceptions seem to operate more on direct contact than through a medium. When, in the absence of these 'environmental' conditions a person claims to have plainly heard, smelled or seen something, then, again, we would rightly conclude that, if this person speaks in earnest, then he or she must have had hallucinations or dreams or something of the sort instead that made him, or her, believe to be actually perceiving. In contrast, our visualising ability does not get impaired at all by the absence of light, and we can conceivably hear and smell things in our minds when floating in outer space as well as when we are in our ordinary habitats.

Our imagination-images do not belong to the system of interrelated perceptions. Perhaps more important than the two points mentioned above, is the fact that what we
sensorily imagine, i.e., what we 'see', 'hear', etc. in our minds does not belong to the system to which all contemporary sense perceptions belong. Let me explain. When I picture to myself the Parthenon so as to see it vividly in my mind, while I keep absent-mindedly staring out of my window to the street, I cannot locate, or spatially relate in any sense the Parthenon I see in my mind to the automobiles and buildings I plainly see out of the window. Everything I see at the moment with open eyes constitutes a system of interrelated items: the yellow car is in front of the green one, both are parallel to the building on the left, a big truck passes by blocking the view of whatever happens to be behind it as it passes by. The sun suddenly shines and everything undergoes light and color changes, things cast their shadows on other things, etc. But the Parthenon I see in my mind is not part of this system. It is not at the left or right, or up or down, or behind or in front of any object I plainly see. It does not suffer any light or color modification when the sun suddenly shines, nor does it cast any shadows on the things on the street. What we see in our minds is nowhere in our perceptual visual field, and this fact alone shows that what we see in our minds does not belong to the visual system of perception at all, that is to say, the phenomenon of seeing the Parthenon in one's mind is not at all a phenomenon of visual perception.
Similarly, I may have a tune running in my head while the street noise reaches my ears. Is the tune running in my head simply one among the many auditory perceptions I have? Surely not. If all of a sudden a new and louder noise appeared in the environment, a loud siren, for instance, then it would have the effect of covering or over-powering all the previously perceptible street noise, but it has no similar effect on the tune I have running in my head. Again, this reveals that the sounds that we perceive constitute a system to which the 'sounds' that we hear in our minds do not belong. Parallel considerations apply to the differences between plainly tasting, touching and smelling something and tasting, touching, and smelling something in the mind.

Ryle pointed out\textsuperscript{11} that, as a matter of fact, ordinary people tend to express the difference between plain seeing and seeing in the mind by writing "'seeing','" in inverted commas, when they are referring to the imagination. Ryle himself does it, and since the publication of\textit{The Concept of Mind} most theorists adhere to this practice. So we may join them and reserve "'seeing','' 'hearing','' 'smelling','" etc. in inverted commas, for seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. in the mind. But the use of inverted commas is not ordinarily reserved for imagination uses only. We also say that a person 'saw' an oasis when the person experiences a mirage or that someone 'heard' an after
sensation. These uses, and many others, have nothing to do with imagination. In this work, though, the use of inverted commas with these perceptual terms will be reserved to indicate occurrences of sensorily imaginings unless otherwise specified. And for this reason too, whenever circumstances arise in which we would benefit from making explicit that a term is used not in the context of imagination but in the context of perception, I shall indicate this by writing a 'P' after the word; so:

"'seeing','" "'hearing','" etc. (in inverted commas) will be reserved for seeing, hearing, etc. in the mind, i.e., for cases of imagination--unless otherwise specified.
"seeing-P," "hearing-P," etc. will be reserved for cases of perceiving.

With the aid of this terminology, we can express our position clearly and succinctly: seeing-P and 'seeing' are two different things. One sees-P something when one perceives with the aid of one's eyes something; one 'sees' something when one frames a mental image of it in one's mind. To 'see' something in one's mind does not involve any seeing-P, and in general, to sensorily imagine something does not involve any perceiving. As Ryle puts it: "To 'smell' entails not smelling."¹²

In this section I have argued that certain conditions that we normally associate with perception, i.e., 1) the exercise of a sense organ, 2) the presence of certain 'environmental' conditions, and 3) belonging to an
interrelated system, are not present when we sensorily imagine something. These points make it sufficiently clear that sensory imagination is not a case of perception or, that there is no sense in which perception takes place in sensory imagination. This conclusion, nevertheless, will acquire full force only when, as we move along in our study of sensory imagination, we make increasingly clear how different it is, in fact, from perception, and especially, when we see that the alleged objects of internal perception, viz., mental images, not being objects in their own right, cannot possibly be objects of any kind of perception either.

A. Hannay and the Object of Intentional Seeing

There is a recent and quite blunt but elaborate attempt to resuscitate the Cartesian Account in its traditional form in A. Hannay's Mental Images: A Defense.

Hannay's book, which, he confesses, is a defense of mental images against a 'campaign' against them that he believes exists is, again, an explicit effort to describe sensory imagination in perceptual terms. It is surprising that Hannay begins his analysis wondering why the three philosophers he examines—Ryle, Sartre and Shorter—

...argue as if it were unnecessary, as if it were a foregone conclusion that none of the ways in which it is natural to talk about seeing could be
applied to imagining.13

The answer is not due to simple terminological reservations, as he believes, but clearly because these philosophers are well aware that sensory imagination is something quite different from perception and that an explanation of it in perceptual terms would, again, inevitably end up wrongly assimilating imagination to perception as Hume did. If there is one lesson we have learned in this century about sensory imagination it is that it does not involve any perceiving. Hannay seems to have failed to learn this lesson. On the contrary, he develops his thesis under the general and explicit assumption that "visual imagining is at least some kind of visual, incipiently visual, or quasi-visual experience,"14 meaning by "visual," as we shall see, "perceptually visual." This is literally deciding in advance what the nature of sensory imagination is.

Hannay's thesis is

...that imagining is simultaneously two kinds of seeing: seeing the imagined and seeing the image. There are two main points I shall try to establish in furtherance of this claim: (1) that seeing something in imagination, or 'in the mind's eye', is a way of really seeing it, and (2) that it is unintelligible to suppose that one could see something in imagination without also seeing something not in imagination.15

Hannay also claims that mental images are pictures of things.

Hannay's claims, which I find bolder than any Hume ever made on the subject, are developed and defended by
extending to cases of visual imagination a particular
analysis of the nature of visual perception advanced, at
one time, by E. Anscombe. In accordance with Hannay's in-
terpretation of Anscombe's doctrine, there are to kinds of
objects of sight: the material object of sight and the in-
tentional object of sight. We see something intentionally
when we think, or believe to be seeing, say, X, but in fact,
are facing something else, i.e., a trompe d'oeil cleverly
placed or, anything else, or, again, we intentionally see X
only when we seem to see X. By pointing out that X was not
present, we do not deny that we were seeing X in an inten-
tional sense, but only in a material sense. Hence, he
thinks, when we see X only intentionally and not materially
we still see X. Hannay believes that every case of visual
perception includes an intentional object and a material
object of sight as well. Unlike Anscombe, he claims

...that one cannot see something merely
intentionally without at the same time
seeing something else materially.17

Hannay's justification of the crucial point that when I see
X only intentionally and not materially, I still see X, is
that on the occasion X appeared, or, there was an appearance
of X, or, that what I saw (materially) appeared to me to be
X. He adds that

...it is wrong to regard an appearance of
something that it is not an appearance of it
'in person' as not being a genuine member of
the class of appearances of that thing.18
And a bit further, he adds:

... a pictorial appearance is as real as any. In order to be recognizable of Pierre, to depict him for us, a perceptibly present object must mediate a genuine member of the class of appearances of Pierre. This I take to be the real justification for Anscombe's intentional use of 'see'. We need intentional object-phrases for 'see' corresponding to our material ones because in giving accurate descriptions of things that are perceptibly present, hence seen materially, we may have to include in them descriptions of what is not perceptibly present. There is no multiplication of entities here. The only 'existences' guaranteed by the descriptions are the references of their material objects-phrases, and the object phrases in the enclosed descriptions are not guaranteed a reference simply by being mentioned in the enclosing descriptions.19

Harnessed with this analysis of seeing, Hannay then asks:

Given an intentional use of 'see' which does not require the existence, absolutely or in the situation, of an object corresponding to its object phrase, what now stands in the way of describing imagining as intentional seeing?20

Hannay's analysis of intentional seeing seems to beautifully fit sensory imagination, for here the object is not present 'in person' (or at least, it does not need to be present). Yet we claim we see it. So, Hannay maintains that seeing X in the mind is intentionally seeing X, that is, seeing an appearance of X. And, as we mentioned before, Hannay believes that there is no intentionally seeing something without materially seeing something as well, so it is not surprising that we find Hannay a couple of
paragraphs further claiming that the mental image is in every case the material object of sight that we see when we intentionally see an appearance of something in our mind's eye.

Thus, Hannay extends his analysis of visual perception to cases of sensory imagination. What justification does he give for this extension? One reason is that we use the verb "to see" (and cognates) for cases of visual perception and cases of visual imagination. That there is something visual in both kinds of occurrences I surely do not deny; in fact, this makes the use of the verb "to see" in both kinds of cases more than just a linguistic coincidence of course and, I shall make quite a bit of this fact myself in Chapter III. But the point in question here is not whether both occurrences are in some sense visual but whether both are perceptual occurrences. What justification, again, does Hannay offer to extend his (correct or incorrect) analysis of visual perception to visual sensory imagination? In fact, he gives no justification— in spite of his counter-claims. What he says, instead, is:

But since we do seem to see things even when our eyes are shut, we might just as well take this principle to show, not that imagining isn't seeing, but, anomalously, that even when our eyes are shut there must be something perceptibly present.21

The underlining is Hannay's!22
Of course, we see things even when our eyes are closed, or rather, we should say, we even 'see' things when our eyes are closed. Some of the things we 'see' when our eyes are closed are still 'seen' with our eyes, i.e., phosphenes and after-images. So, perhaps in an extended sense, we would be justified in saying that 'seeing' phosphenes and after-images are perceptual experiences. The phenomena of 'seeing' these things lack many features that typical cases of visual perception have and, have other features that these lack. However, they share others as well, i.e., both occurrences involve the visual sense organs and what is seen or 'seen' appears somewhere in one's visual field.

But, obviously, Hannay does not have these cases of 'seeing' phosphenes and after-images in mind when he makes his claim that we perceptibly see things even when our eyes are shut. After all he is talking about picturing, visualising or seeing something in the mind. So, when he says that we even see things when our eyes are shut, he means to say that we see, perceptibly see-P things when we visualise something or see something in our minds, and that due to this very reason, viz., because seeing something in the mind is a perceptual occurrence, he can extend his analysis of visual perception to cases of visualising.

If there is reason for us to doubt whether 'seeing' phosphenes and after-images are cases of perception, then,
we have much more reason to doubt whether cases of 'seeing' things in the mind are cases of perception, for, after all, seeing in the mind, as we noticed in the previous section, shares even fewer features with perception than 'seeing' phosphenes and after-images does.

The fact that Hannay never argues for this claim that seeing something in the mind is a visual perceptual phenomena, but only assumes it from the very beginning, makes his argument, and for that matter his whole book, a case of petitio principi.

Ishiguro and Dilman: Is Seeing
in the Mind Seeing As?

H. Ishiguro and I. Dilman attempt to elucidate the concept of sensory imagination by drawing a parallel between seeing something in the mind and seeing something in a picture. Unlike traditional Cartesian accounts, their doctrines do not include any claims about mental images being objects in their own right and consequently include no claims, at least explicit ones, to the point that mental images are perceived. I have decided, nevertheless, to examine these doctrines under the general heading of "Cartesian Accounts of Imagination" not only because they share with this doctrine the essential belief that sensory imagination is to be explained in terms of pictures, but also because their accounts imply some of the other features of the traditional account as we shall see.
Both Dilman and Ishiguro develop their theses inspired by some remarks on the subject made by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* and the *Blue Book*. Special attention is given to the following remark which comes from Wittgenstein's famous discussion of the concept of seeing as:

> The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In other words: the concept "I am now seeing it as . . ." is akin to "I am now having this image".\(^{24}\)

Dilman claims to develop his view based on "the logical affinity between the concept of seeing in a picture what is depicted and that of having a mental image."\(^{25}\) His view is expressed in the following passage:

> My friend is in the photograph in the sense in which he would be in my mind or thoughts if I were thinking of him or saw him in my mind's eye—if I had a mental image of him. He would be in my mind in the sense that I was thinking of him or had a mental image of him. In the latter case my thought of him takes the form of a mental image: I cannot have a mental image of him and not think of him. Both the image and the photograph have the same internal relation to my friend! If I see my friend in the photograph then I must have grasped this relation.\(^{26}\)

Nowhere does Dilman say that we see—P, or even 'see', mental images and, it is quite obvious that he is avoiding the use of the expression in spite of the fact that his view, if it is going to have any explanatory force at all, demands the further statement that one sees one's friend
in a mental image as one sees one's friend in a picture, for what other purpose would be served by making the mental image parallel to the picture? Both, he says, have the same relationship to the objects they represent. We see the sitter in the portrait, he adds, by seeing the picture itself. So, one supposes, the explanation should continue with the claim that similarly we see the object by seeing the mental image. But Dilman never says this, nor does he deny it, and I do not know exactly why he does this. One is inclined to suppose that this attitude springs up from the general distrust among contemporary professional philosophers for any view that presented mental images as real existing entities of any sort. In any case, as a result, his position on the matter is quite obscure and puzzling.27

It is H. Ishiguro who, with some modifications, carries this line of thought further by holding the startling view that, on the one hand, 'seeing' in the mind is like seeing-P pictures, and on the other, that there are no mental images. She believes that when we see something in our minds, we are actually seeing (something) as (something), or seeing an aspect (of something), in the same sense in which we say we see Olga in Picasso's painting or see the painting as a picture of Olga. The only difference between the case of the Picasso painting and seeing something in the mind is that, unlike the first case which can be described as a case of 'seeing X as Y' (viz., seeing the painting as
a portrait of Olga), in the case of seeing something in the mind there is nothing that is seen as this or that, there is only the seeing as. She puts it as follows:

The representations we have considered up to now were described by the expression: 'X's seen as Y's'. In the case of mental images the X's disappear, as it were, and we are just left with activities of 'seeing as Y's'. (This might seem like a verbal trick. But suppose one sees a person in a photograph and next imagine that half of it fades away. I can still see the remainder of the photograph as an image of the person. Suppose that more and more of the photograph vanishes, and I continue to see the person in the remaining traces. Finally I can find myself seeing the person in my mind's eye when I perceive nothing before me.) There is no representational medium on which I correctly or incorrectly apply 'rules of projection', or which I see as depicting something else.28

This is, no doubt, a baffling thesis. How could there be acts of just seeing as Y if there is nothing that is seen as Y? Seeing as is necessarily seeing something as this or that. But how can anything be an aspect without being an aspect of something? If there are no X's which can be seen as this or that, then there is no sense in talking about seeing as.

But apart from this matter, Ishiguro's explanation of seeing something in the mind as similar to seeing something in a picture, an explanation which is most clearly presented in the example of the vanishing photograph, is, I dare to say, quite wrong. With this example Ishiguro is
giving an illustration of a case in which the X's dis-
appear and yet we continue to see Y. The disappearing photo-
graph is, of course, the disappearing X. Even when the
photograph is half gone--let us imagine the photo is burning
--Ishiguro tells us, we still can see the person in it. She
is right in this: whether the photograph is half torn, or
half burnt or half faded, we may still be able to see in it
whatever the photograph represents. But, in any case, we
are still perceiving an object, seeing—P an object, i.e.,
the photographic print, half of which is gone. And it is
only in virtue of our being able to perceive this object
(the print with a multitude of little dots on it) that we
can also see what it represents. So far, so good, but then
Ishiguro's suggestion is that "finally," when the photograph
completely disappears, we are still able to see the person
represented in the photograph in exactly the same way as we
did seconds before when the photograph still existed. And
now that the photograph is gone, we are still seeing Y, the
person represented in the photograph, but unlike before we
can be said to be 'seeing' the person in our minds.

This description of the case assumes rather than
illustrates the belief that seeing in the mind is like see-
ing something in a picture. I shall try to show next that
seeing what is represented in a picture and seeing something
in one's mind are, in fact, quite different phenomena.
Surely seeing the little dots on the photographic paper (or
for that matter, seeing the piece of paper which is the photograph is something different from seeing those little dots as the representation of Y. The first is a clear case of seeing-P, while about the second case we say that we see Y in the photograph. But although these are two senses of "see," it is important to realize that the second sense necessarily involves the first, that is to say, it is impossible to see Y in the photograph without seeing-P the little dots, that is to say, impossible without visually perceiving the piece of photographic paper. When we see a person in a picture we are involved in seeing-P, we are perceiving something, namely, the picture, the material object. Seeing something in a picture or seeing a picture as the representation of Y, apart from its parasitic uses necessarily involves visual perception. Nothing can be seen as this or that if it is not first seen-P. I am not claiming that seeing-as is itself a phenomenon of perception. This might or might not be the case. Again, my claim is not that we see-P or perceive the person in the picture; I do not claim that seeing the little dots on the photographic paper as Y is merely a phenomenon of seeing-P something. Quite clearly, I think, it is not just this. I am only claiming that we cannot see the little dots as Y without at the same time seeing-P the little dots. That is to say, seeing as necessarily involves seeing-P. In other words, it is impossible to see, say, Bertrand Russell in a picture,
when we see a canvas as his representation, without visually perceiving the canvas as well.

This is why the person we see in the photograph, to return to Ishiguro's case, is somewhere in our perceptual visual field, as the photograph itself is. That is to say, the photograph we see—P and the person we see in it, both, are part of the spatially interrelated system of our perceptual visual field. Let us imagine that we hold the photograph in our hands in front of us so that the photograph, the piece of paper covered with tiny dots, appears in our visual field immediately above our hands and, say, left of the door, above the carpet, right of the telephone, and the lamp, etc. If we turn on the lamp everything in our perceptual visual field, including the photograph, undergoes a change in illumination. Those objects close to the lamp appear more clearly; in contrast those far from the lamp appear less clearly. The photograph casts shadows on other things and it can have shadows cast on it in turn, etc. If the photograph is close to the lamp we can see more clearly its rough edges, its worn corners, its yellowing tint, etc. In sum, the photograph, the piece of paper is one material object among others in the world and it is perceived with our eyes appearing, consequently, as part of our perceptual visual field. This much should be commonplace.

But the situation is, to a great extent, the same
for what we see represented in the photograph. It too is part of our perceptual visual field for it is seen with our eyes and it also appears above our hands, left of the door, right of the telephone and the lamp, etc. That is to say, what we see represented in the photograph has a place in our visual field as well. If we close our eyes we do not only stop seeing the photograph but also what is represented in it. Moreover, when we turn on the lamp and have the photograph close to it, we do not only see the piece of paper better but we can also see what is represented there better as well. That is to say, with better illumination we do not only see better the rough edge of the old photograph, but also the person that is represented in the photograph, i.e., the image.

In sum, seeing the image of a photograph (or seeing Y in the photograph) partakes of, and is subject to, the conditions of visual perception. To repeat: seeing Y in a picture involves visual perception; which is different from saying that it is nothing but visually perceiving something, just like seeing P a piece of paper is.

The parallel between seeing the photographic paper and seeing the image is by no means complete. While I said that the photograph can cast a shadow on some of the surrounding objects, it would be absurd to say that the person that appears in the photograph casts a shadow on the objects surrounding the photograph. This fact reveals that
the two objects of sight are of quite different sort. But this does not alter the truth that in order to see either object we must engage in some seeing-P and that both appear as part of our perceptual visual field. This can be re-confirmed when we realize that when another object cast a shadow on the photograph it obscures our perception not only of the photo but of the person we see in it as well. Or, to bring another re-confirming example, both objects of sight can leave an after-image in our vision. In conclusion, the idea of seeing something as, or seeing something in a picture, without at the same time seeing-P something is absurd.

Now, when we 'see' a person in our minds, even when we visualize this person in question as closely as possible as he or she appears in the photograph, what we see is nowhere in our perceptual visual field. When we see this person in our minds, we do not see him or her at, say, the left of the door and right of the telephone that we see-P with our eyes. It is simply impossible to locate this imagination-image (or this person that we 'see' in our minds), in our perceptual visual field. Nor does he or she suffer any modifications that the objects in the perceptual visual system undergo. If we put on a pair of yellow glasses, for instance, everything in our perceptual visual field will undergo a color modification. But the person we 'see' in our minds remains perfectly undisturbed by
occurrences of this sort. The reason is clear, the person 'seen' with our mind's eye belongs to another system, it is not a phenomenon of perception but of imagination.

It is, therefore, absurd to suggest, as Ishiguro does, that seeing that person in the photograph is identical with 'seeing' this person in our mind. Clearly then, seeing something in a picture, that is to say, seeing a picture as an appearance of something, is not like seeing something in the mind at all. And to claim that after the photograph has disappeared we keep seeing the person in the same way as we did before because now we are seeing it in our minds, is plainly false.

In conclusion, Ishiguro's thesis appears to be, after our analysis, once again an attempt to explain sensory imagination in terms that apply only to perception. Moreover, it is also an explicit attempt to explain sensory imagination under the model of seeing-P representations or pictures of things. Due to these features and in spite of her denial, or quasi denial, of the existence of mental images, her thesis can be properly considered to be a version of the Cartesian Account of Sensory Imagination.

I shall speak more about Ishiguro in Chapter III, for the account of sensory imagination that I shall develop there is in some interesting respects similar to Ishiguro's doctrine.
In a paper entitled "The existence of mental images," R. Lawrie argues "that at least some of us sometimes imagine the object by contemplating a mental picture of it." In passing, at this point, I want to remind us that whether this happens always or sometimes only, to all of us or only to a few, is a philosophically-irrelevant question, and thus, quite immaterial to the point at issue here, which is the possibility of explaining any occurrence of sensory imagination in those terms.] In support of his position, Lawrie brings up documented cases of 'eidetic' imagery. He claims that these cases are evidence that the subjects contemplate the imagined object by contemplating a mental picture of it. Unfortunately, Lawrie does not explain exactly why these cases constitute evidence for these philosophical claims. In fact, he simply says they are. We can, nevertheless, surmise why he thinks this. Lawrie considers a case in which an eidetic child, who is shown an oil painting only for "thirty seconds not nearly long enough for the child to commit the many details to memory" is able, after a while, to describe the picture with great accuracy and detail. The suggestion is, I suppose, that the recollection of the child is so prodigious that the only explanation we can give of the child's performance is that the child first produces a nearly perfect mental image of
the oil painting shown and then proceeds to examine it in the privacy of his mind, and thus, he is able to give all the details with exquisite accuracy because he is actually reading them off from his private mental picture. The child remembers the picture, then, by contemplating the mental image, just the way we remember how someone looks by looking at his or her photograph.

Against this suggested explanation several things must be said. First, if it is difficult to believe that a person, or a child, could commit to memory so great an amount of visual information, which if it occurs is, no doubt, extraordinary, it is no less extraordinary and hard to believe that the person or the child is able to produce such an incredibly detailed and accurate mental picture. Therefore, based on only this observation, I see no reason to choose contemplation of eidetic imagery as an explanation of the phenomenon and not prodigious memory when both are equally rare.

Second, there are many cases in which a subject is able to remember or recall something with exquisite detail and yet what is remembered is not tied to any one or any group of visual experiences that could be recreated eidetically. We are told that in ancient Greece some people, for instance, could recall the whole Iliad having learned this text not by reading it from any particular 'edition' of it, or several editions of it, but rather, from oral
communication occurring in a great many times with a great number of repetitions. There seemed to be then, cases where extraordinary recollection is displayed and yet it would be absurd even to attempt to explain it as the result of the contemplation of eidetic imagery. Moreover, cases like these prove that eidetic imagery is not necessary for prodigious recollection to occur and that the concept of eidetic imagery is not necessary to explain all cases of prodigious recollection.

Nevertheless, my inclination is to believe that mental imagery of an extraordinary vividness and accuracy enters in some cases of extraordinary retentive capacity where definite perceptual experiences are at issue, or are part of the material recollected. I am also inclined to believe that eidetic imagery, which is normally thought to be visual, is not a visual phenomenon only. The concept of eidetic imagery can and should be extended to cover auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory images as well. That is to say, some people have photographic memory, but it seems to be the case that some people have the same kind of retentive power but in relation to the other senses. Some anecdotes about Mozart, for instance, seem to indicate that the composer was gifted with a prodigious 'auditory eidetic imagery', that is, with a capacity to produce auditory images of a vividness and fidelity parallel to those that we attribute to people with photographic memory.
Third, even though I acknowledge the occurrence of cases of eidetic imagery and even more, I have just suggested myself that parallel phenomena might occur in the auditory, gustatory, etc. realms, and even though, again, I think that eidetic imagery may be involved in some cases of prodigious recollection, I do not think that these two points prove Lawrie's further claim that we see the imagined object by contemplating mental pictures.

The fact is that we can accurately describe any of these cases without having to say that we see the imagined object by contemplating its picture in the mind. All we must say, in the case of the eidetic child for instance, is that the child after having seen—P the oil painting visualises it, viz., 'sees' the oil painting in his or her mind, or if we prefer, he or she frames a mental image of the oil painting. This case, therefore, offers no support for the further philosophical claim that the child 'sees' the oil painting in his mind by means of contemplating or seeing another item, namely, a mental picture of the oil painting. In order to avoid confusion, at this point, let me advance boldly a view I shall defend in Chapter III. To say that a person frames a mental image, or that a person has a mental image, as we ordinarily express ourselves in everyday speech, does not imply or amount to saying that a person 'sees', 'hears', etc. something in imagination by means of seeing, hearing, or contemplating something else,
a mental image. Quite generally, it is not a mental image that we really 'see' when we sensorily imagine something, or frame a visual mental image of something, but rather the imagined object: the object of which the image is an image. In other words, the mental image itself is not the object of sensory imagination.

Four, Lawrie's accounts of these cases of eidetic imagery, or for that matter, of any case of sensory imagination, involve an absurd account of remembering and recalling. In accordance with his view, the subject is able to remember, say, how an oil painting looks, when, after having framed a mental image the subject can contemplate it in his mind, very much the way we remember how something looks by looking at a photograph of it.

But if it were true that in cases of this sort a person is able to remember how something looks only after he or she contemplates a mental image of it, again if it is true that the child gets his information about how the oil painting looks from his mental image, then, we should not say that he really remembers, on the contrary, in a sense we should say that he did not remember because he is getting the information from the mental image. Lawrie thinks that the child actually reads the information off the mental image because his conception of a mental image is of a real entity in the mind that has features of its own and is independent of our thoughts and our memory. Lawrie's
account does justice, nevertheless, to the undeniable experience of 'reading information off' a private image that people gifted with eidetic imagery report. We shall talk about this in a moment. On the other hand, it seems to me that when the eidetic child, or any normal person, frames a mental image of an object experienced in the past, he or she, is already recalling the experience. In other words, if the child is able to produce a mental image of the oil painting, it is because the child remembers. If the child could not remember the oil painting, then, he or she, could not frame a mental image of it, i.e., he or she could not visualise the oil painting. We do not ever recall how something looks, sounds, tastes, etc. by means of and after contemplating a mental image of it, rather, we produce more or less accurate, more or less faithful and more or less vivid mental images because (among other things) we remember. Framing a mental image of an object experienced in the past is one way of remembering it.

Lawrie thinks in this way, it seems to me, because he believes, as other authors do that the mental image functions as a photograph. Seeing a photograph of X, nevertheless, may help us remember how X looks, although quite often we learn how something looks by seeing a photograph. But when I produce a mental image of X, the mental image does not have the same function the photograph can have, viz., to remind me how X looks; on the contrary,
I am able to produce the mental image of X because I remember. Framing a mental image of X is already 'seeing' (or 'hearing', etc.) X in one's mind. To frame a mental image of X (on some occasions) is to recall X and not to produce an aid for recalling X subsequently.

But how can I, on this account, explain the definite feeling of 'reading information off the image' that people with eidetic imagery report and that we, also, sometimes experience? Together with this feeling, or rather because of it, we also get the impression that mental images are autonomous items, and objects in their own right, from the examination of which we can learn new things in the same way as we can learn from the objects we ordinarily perceive. For, if mental images were not, in some sense, autonomous objects having properties of their own, how, then, could we learn new things from them? How can they provide us with new facts if they do not have an independent status? If we learn new things from mental images, then, they must be some sort of autonomous objects in their own right. Or so, it seems, Lawrie and most psychologists interested in mental images think. It is a fact, then, that this feeling and this impression incline us to believe that mental images themselves are contemplated in the mind in a manner not at all different from ordinary perception.

But against this belief I shall argue that there is a sense in which we can properly say that we obtain new
information from our mental images, and that the sense in which this occurs not only explains the feeling of 'reading information off the image', but also explains why we fall prey to the illusion that mental images are objects in their own right which we contemplate as we contemplate objects of perception. In other words, the sense in which we can properly say that we can obtain new information from a mental image does not imply, guarantee or support the view that mental images are autonomous items having features in their own right, nor the further thesis that we perceive them.

There are people who are gifted with eidetic imagination. These people have an above normal retentive capacity probably based on their ability to produce extraordinarily faithful and detailed images. Some people can visually or auditorily, etc. recall an experience very poorly. Most of us do a fairly decent job of it, but some people, again, can 'see' things in their minds that they experienced before with great detail and accuracy. But these people, and in fact all of us, when we frame a mental image of something that we experienced before, are recollecting, how, this thing looks and/or sounds and/or smells, etc. What is recalled by framing the image is only the perceptual 'appearance' of the thing recollected, that is to say, the visual appearance of the thing and/or the auditory 'appearance' of, say, the melody, and/or the olfactory 'appearance' of, say, the fruit, etc. Now, for example, if
we ask the child with eidetic power who has just seen—P
an oil painting, what word was written above the shop window
represented in the oil painting, he might be unable to tell
us the word immediately, even though, let us assume, he
knows how to read and the word is not in a foreign language.
He simply might not remember what word was the word written
there, as he remembers immediately what his last name is,
or how old he is. However, after having produced his eidetic
image of the oil painting, then he can tell us what the word
over the store window is. Why is it that the child cannot
tell us what the word is before he frames an image of the
painting in his mind but he can tell us this after he frames
the image? When the child frames a mental image of the
painting, he can 'see' in his mind how the painting looks,
that is to say, he is also 'seeing' in his mind how the store
sign and the characters written on it look. So, being able
to 'see' the characters, he can 'read' them in his mind,
and thus, tell us what the word is. The child, in fact,
did not remember what the word was, perhaps he never learned
it. He literally got this information from his visualising
the appearance of the painting. The child remembered how
the painting looked but he did not remember what the word
written in the painting was. Recalling the first thing
allows him to remember or learn for the first time the
second. It is one thing to remember how something looks,
sounds, tastes, etc. and another to remember the meaning or
significance that the appearance, form or shape of something has in a culture.

One can recall a word, a name, a number, etc. without recalling any particular 'appearance' of them, that is, without necessarily recalling any particular paper, board, surface, print type or ink where and with which it might have been written. This is what the child cannot do when he is unable to tell us immediately what the word written in the stop sign is. But, again, the child is able to tell us what the word is after a while, and even spell it forwards and backwards, as Lawrie reports, because he first remembers the way the picture looked, which implies that he remembers the way the store sign looked with its characters drawn on it. And thus, secondly, by means of recalling these visual facts, the child can tell us what the word is, assuming, as we did, that he or she knows how to read. Consequently, in this sense, the child has derived new information from his mental image, for without framing the image and without 'reading' the word he 'sees' in his mind he could not have told us what the word was. Yet he has not learned anything new about the 'sensible' or visual appearance of the oil painting he was shown. All he has learned is a 'supervenient' feature of the painting, i.e., the meaning of those characters in a culture. ['Sensible features of a thing are those visual, auditory, olfactory, etc. features of it, i.e., its looks, and/or its smell, etc.; that is to say the color,
shape, size, form, texture, taste, smell, etc. of a thing. A sensible feature is readily perceptible to anyone. In contrast, a 'supervenient' feature, in this context, is one which is neither visual nor auditory nor olfactory, etc. and which can be apprehended only by a person who shares in the life of a culture, that is to say, a culturally-determined feature. Any normal human being can see the forms, color, size, etc. of the marks "YES," but only a person who knows at least some of the English language can get its meaning, which is a culturally determined feature of it.]

Of the eidetic child, we can say then that he or she always remembered how the characters looked (the sensible features), but the child did not remember what word (the supervenient feature), the characters spelled. But after he visualizes the characters, then the child can read the word that they make up.

There is no reason to say that the mental image he framed of the painting was contemplated or inwardly perceived. All we need to say to describe the case properly is that he 'saw the painting in his mind, that he 'saw' the store sign in his mind, that he 'saw' the characters written on the sign in his mind. This is all that he needs to 'see' in order to realize that those characters make a certain word. There is no need to 'see' or contemplate an extra item, namely a mental image.
But we do not need to dwell on cases of eidetic imagery in order to encounter this phenomenon of learning 'supervenient' features from mental images. If I am asked, for example, how many windows my parents' home has on the facade, I could not reply immediately because I do not remember this. Perhaps I never even learned this fact. Nevertheless, I can get this number by visualizing my parents' home facade and counting the windows in it. By means of my image, I am getting a new piece of information about my parents' home that I did not know before.\footnote{34} But I have not learned anything new about the way my parents' home looks, nothing about its 'sensible' character. These cases, then, show that we can and sometimes do learn things by virtue of our framing a mental image. This fact explains the feeling we sometimes have, and that people with eidetic imagination must have to a greater extent, of the images being independent sources of information. But I shall argue in Chapter IV that we cannot ever find anything sensibly new about an (imagined) object in the mental image we have of it in the mind. Whatever new information we gather about the imagined object from its mental image will necessarily be a 'supervenient' feature dependent on its 'sensible' features.

As it is impossible for a person with normal eyesight to look at a red-looking house and fail to have the visual experience of red (although it is possible that the fails to notice that the house is red), it is also impossible
to have a mental image of a house which we 'see' as being red in our minds and not know that it is a red house that we are 'seeing'. But it is possible to 'see' in our minds, and also to see-P, a house with eight windows in the facade and not know there are eight windows there. This is so because eight, or the fact that there are eight windows, unlike red, or the fact that the house is red, is something that one learns not only by seeing-P or 'seeing' something but also by counting, by knowing and applying some mathematics. We see-P and 'see' a red house in a different sense than we see that it has eight windows. Similarly, in the case of the word written on the store-sign. The child could see-P the sign and the characters on the sign in the painting when it was shown to him, and the child can also 'see' them in his mind afterwards. But on neither occasion need he have seen the word that was written on the sign. In order to see this he must, at least see the characters as making a word in a language (he must know what a language and a word are). And in order to see what word it is (in a strong sense) he must know how to read it and actually read it, that is to say, the child must be able to recognize the characters as a word in a language and recognize the meaning of the word in a particular language.

We have seen, then, that there is a sense in which we can say that we learn things from our mental images. However, the following reservations must be kept in mind.
There is nothing about the mental images themselves that we can learn, but rather, something about the object imagined. To say that one can learn something from a mental image does not mean that one can discover new facts, new 'sensible' features by contemplating a mental image. All it means is that when we see something in our minds that we experienced before, we can further 'see' some supervenient feature of this imagined object, a feature that either we failed to notice when we perceived it or that we forgot about.

Finally, we should mention that in the account we have just produced of the feeling we sometimes have of reading information off a mental image, we did not say or imply at any moment that we get to see something in our minds by means of contemplating a mental image. All we need in order to 'see' or discover a supervenient feature of an imagined object is to 'see' it (the object) in the mind. There is no need to 'see' an extra item as different from the object, viz., the mental image. The fact that we can learn supervenient features by sensorily imagining an object does not, therefore, prove that mental images are autonomous entities having features of their own and less that by means of our inward contemplation of them we get to see something else in our imagination.

A full discussion of the alleged autonomy of mental images and of whether they are objects in their own right
must wait until Chapter III, Sections Seven and Two, respectively. Here we have simply argued against one source of the inclination to believe that mental images are autonomous.
CHAPTER II

THE BEHAVIORISTIC APPROACH

The Existence of Mental Images

Behaviorism in its early years maintained that behavior alone exists and that mental states, which are usually thought to be publicly unobservable but authentic psychic episodes of which only the subject is aware, were non-existent and, that mental images, in particular, were philosophical inventions of imaginative metaphysicians.¹ Accordingly, most mental terms were given operational definitions.

Ryle, as I mentioned in the Introduction, should not be categorized as a behaviorist without reservations. His work on imagination, nevertheless, is the single most important, and to my knowledge the only attempt to produce a comprehensive logical elucidation of the concept of sensory imagination in a behavioristic fashion, at least in the sense that 1) he strongly attacks the Cartesian version, 2) he denies, or quasi-denies, the existence of mental images and 3) he not only offers in turn an account in which he deliberately dispenses with the concept of a mental image, but also his account is, again, a deliberate attempt to explain sensory imagination only in terms of overt
performances. Other philosophers\(^2\) have also defended a
behavioristic position on the imagination but most of them
are either re-statements of the Rylean thesis, or attempts
to develop and/or answer objections against it. For these
reasons, we shall concentrate in this chapter on the work of
Ryle, making reference to people such as Squires, Deitsch,
etc., only when what they say, while differing from Ryle,
is of importance for the general assessment of this
approach.

In the chapter on imagination of *The Concept of Mind*,
Ryle explicitly argues against the Cartesian account of
sensory imagination that he thinks is shared by "theorists
and laymen alike"\(^3\) who tend "to ascribe some sort of other-
worldly reality to the imaginary and to treat minds as the
clandestine habitats of such fleshless beings."\(^4\) Against
this view he argues that sensorily imagining X does not con-
sist in perceiving a mental picture of X in the mind. In
fact, it does not involve any perceiving, observing, or
sensing at all,\(^5\) and, moreover, that "there are no such
objects as mental pictures."\(^6\) This last claim of Ryle, by
itself, does not amount to a flat denial of the existence
of mental images. What he really and truly denies, it may
be thought, is the existence of mental images as conceived
by the Cartesians, i.e., real but private mental pictures,
a claim that does not amount to a rejection of the existence
of mental images _in general_.\(^7\) This interpretation would
seem correct had Ryle provided us also with an alternative definition of mental images. But, instead, in the second half of the chapter he attempts to explain sensory imagination, dispensing with the concept of mental images altogether. There he tells us that to sensorily imagine something is to imagine or pretend that one perceives something. Consequently, his explicit denial that there are mental pictures plus his apparent belief that there is no place whatsoever for mental images in any (correct) explanation of sensory imagination amounts to, I believe, a denial of the existence of mental images in general. We will examine in this section his negative views about the Cartesian account and mental images in general. In the next section we will examine his positive ideas about sensory imagination.

In the introduction to the chapter on imagination of The Concept of Mind, Ryle indicates his intention of proving that "seeing things in one's mind's eye does not involve either the existence of things seen or the occurrence of acts of seeing them." Ryle's thesis, thus simply stated, baffles the ordinary man when he encounters it and it has baffled many theorists, for it seems to be obviously, if not trivially and tautologically, true that when we see something in our minds we are seeing (in some sense) something and there is something that we see (in some sense). Ryle, in fact, is not denying that those occurrences which we
ordinarily report as "'seeing' something in the mind" or "'hearing' something in the head" takes place, but he thinks we are entitled to say these things only "façon de parler," for in those cases we really do not see anything nor is there anything seen in any real sense of 'seeing'. Imagining occurs, he acknowledges, but "the crucial problem is that of describing what is 'seen in the mind's eye' and what is 'heard in one's head'."⁹

In order to prove his claim, Ryle sharply distinguishes between plain seeing (or what we called seeing-P in Chapter I) and 'seeing', in inverted commas, and argues that seeing in the mind is 'seeing' and not plain seeing. 'Seeing' something in imagination is one thing and plain seeing another; 'seeing', 'hearing', 'smelling', etc. something in the mind is one thing and perceiving something another. In the light of this distinction, we can now interpret Ryle's original claim in the following two ways:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{'seeing' things in one's mind's eye} & \not\in 1 \quad \text{The existence of things seen-P} \\
& \not\in 2 \quad \text{The occurrence of seeing-P things} \\
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \not\in \) stands for "does not involve."
The first interpretation, which is true, contradicts the Cartesian Account of Imagination for, in accordance with this account, to see something in the mind involves the existence of things seen-P, viz., mental images, and also, involves the occurrence of acts of seeing-P things, viz., the internal perception of mental images. Harnessed with the sound distinction between seeing-P and 'seeing' and moving with his usual skill and wit, Ryle has no difficulty in exposing the absurdities and inconsistencies embedded in the Cartesian Account of Imagination in its traditional form. 'Seeing' X in the mind is not seeing-P X, and does not involve any seeing-P, because unlike perception 'seeing' X in the mind does not involve the visual sense organs, does not require the surroundings to be illuminated, it can occur in the absence of X and it can be qualified as 'vivid', 'life-like' and more or less 'faithful'. It is, therefore, true a) that 'seeing' things in the mind does not consist in seeing-P anything and in particular it does not consist in seeing-P something in the mind, and b) that 'seeing' things in the mind does not imply the existence of things in the mind which are seen-P, i.e., mental images.

Theorists who favor the Cartesian Account, we have seen, attempt to explain sensory imagination in perceptual terms, i.e., 'seeing' as a kind of seeing-P. It is not surprising then to find Ryle explicitly arguing against "the theory that 'seeing' is seeing after all,"10 and declaring
about Hume the following:

    His mistake was to suppose that 'seeing' is a species of seeing, or that 'perception' is the name of a genus of which there are two species, namely impressions and ghosts or echoes of impressions. 11

Obviously, then, Ryle's distinction between 'seeing' and plain seeing successfully supports the first interpretation of his original claim. The question now is whether there is also support for the second interpretation.

    The second interpretation is false. On the one hand, that 'seeing' something in the mind involves, or even consists in 'seeing' something in the mind, is tautologically true. This tells us nothing about 'seeing' mental images. All it says is that when we 'see' the Tower of London with our mind's eye, we 'see' the Tower of London with our mind's eye. It is, in part at least, the negation of this tautologically-true statement embedded in Ryle's original claim that baffled us first and gave it a paradoxical appearance.

    On the other hand, that 'seeing' something in the mind involves the existence of something 'seen' is also true in the sense that, if we 'see' something in our minds, there is necessarily something we 'see', whether it is a real object such as the Forum Romanum or a fictional thing such as the Golden Mountain does not matter. If we 'see' something in our minds, there must necessarily be an
'intentional' object which is seen. It is impossible to 'see', 'hear', 'smell', 'touch', etc. anything in our minds that does not exist at least in this intentional sense, as an intentional object of sensory imagination. But, if by the term "existence" we do not mean this, but rather we mean to specify the ontological status of the intentional object, declaring it to be real, then, of course, 'seeing' something in the mind does not necessarily involve the existence of a thing 'seen', for not all that we 'see' in our minds is a real, existent object such as the Golden Gate Bridge: we can also 'see' things like Aphrodite and Sherlock Holmes. Again, this interpretation tells us nothing about mental images.

Because Ryle, in spite of having distinguished plain seeing from 'seeing', did not also distinguish the different claims that the two interpretations of his original thesis make, but quite generally asserted, in several forms, that seeing in the mind does not involve seeing things and the existence of things seen, he ends up at the same time arguing validly against the Cartesian idea that seeing in the mind is some sort of seeing—P mental images and also arguing against common sense for the baffling position that we do not actually 'see' things in our minds but we speak so only as a _façon de parler._

From his valid conclusion that mental images are not seen—P and are not like ordinary perceptible objects, one can draw the conclusion that mental images conceived in
this manner do not exist but not the further conclusion, which I argued Ryle draws, that mental images without qualifications do not exist.

Mental images, we shall see in the next chapter, are not only not objects of perception and not like private, ghostly pictures, but they are not even objects in their own right for they have no determinations of their own: all the predicates they receive make oblique reference (at least) to that of which they are images. Now, this fact may be expressed on some occasions by saying that mental images do not exist, or more clearly, that mental images unlike objects of perception, do not have an existence of their own. But although mental images do not exist in the sense in which ordinary things, people, and events can be said to exist, it would be quite mistaken to deny them any kind of existence altogether, and especially it would be mistaken to deny their existence in such a manner that there is no point in talking about them at all when we speak of sensory imagination. In the next chapter I will try to make clear that the concept of mental images is necessary to explain sensory imagination, and, far from being nothing at all, mental images are sensuous but immaterial 'appearances' in the mind.

Besides the ambiguity noted in Ryle's original claim, there is (at least) another source from which Ryle's denial of the existence of mental pictures, and his subsequent
implicit denial of the existence of mental images in general, springs. This is Ryle's confusion of several senses of "imagination." Ryle first argues that sensorily imagining something is imagining that one perceives ('seeing' the Parthenon in one's mind is imagining that one sees-P the Parthenon). 12 we shall examine this thesis in detail in the next section. More relevant to our purpose here is Ryle's slide from the claim that 'seeing' X in the mind is imagining or fancying that one sees-P X to the further claim that X is imaginary and therefore non-existent, just like the symptoms of the hypochondriac who imagines he feels-P pains which are only imaginary and therefore not real. That this is actually Ryle's thinking can be seen clearly from the fact that he treats non-veridical or illusory experiences such as the experiences of the hypochondriac, the victim of Delirium Tremens and the sufferer of hallucinations together with cases of sensorily imagining something as if they were the same kind of phenomenon. 13 Moreover, he repeatedly compares 'seeing' in the mind and what is 'seen' in the mind to acting parts of fictional characters and the fictional characters themselves.

Mental images are the products of imagination. Santa Claus is the product of imagination, and the symptoms of the hypochondriac are the products of imagination. This is true but they are products of imagination in very different senses. A mental image is the product of our faculty of
sensory imagination, the faculty by means of which we 'see', 'hear', etc. things in our mind. Santa Claus, on the other hand, is a product of our imagination, not in the sense that Santa Claus is a mental image, because obviously he is not, but in the sense that he is an imaginary, i.e., fictional, being. As an imaginary being we can have Santa Claus in our thoughts or we may frame a mental image of him, and thus, 'see' him in our minds. But our mental image of him is one thing and Santa Claus the fictional old man is another. Mental images can be images of real or imaginary things, but they are not imaginary, fictional, things themselves.

The hypochondriac imagines his symptoms and illnesses. They are, we say, the product of his imagination, and they are imaginary. But the hypochondriac's symptoms are not imaginary in the same sense that Santa Claus is imaginary. The hypochondriac mistakenly believes that his symptoms and illnesses are real. But Santa Claus is imaginary without us (adults at least) mistakenly believing that he exists. Similarly, when we 'see' Santa Claus in our minds we are not normally under the illusion of seeing-P Santa Claus for we know well we are not seeing-P but only 'seeing'.

Thus, Ryle seems to arrive at the (implicit) conclusion that mental images are non-existent because they are imaginary beings, i.e., because they are the products of
imagination in the sense either that the symptoms of the hypochondriac are the products of his imagination and/or that Santa Claus is the product of our imagination. But the inference is unsound, rests on the ambiguity of the word "imagination." For although it is true that mental images are products of our imagination, that is, products of our faculty of sensory imagination, they are not imaginary beings as we can say that the symptoms of the hypochondriac and Santa Claus are. When Ryle claims:

There is no answer to the spurious question, 'Where do the objects reside that we fancy we see?' since there are no such objects. 14

and also

As mock-murders are not murders, so imagined sights and sounds are not sights or sounds. 15

he is mistakenly basing his argument for the conclusion that mental images are non-existent on the ambiguity of the expressions "imaged sight" and "fancied object." What I 'see' in my mind is, in a sense, an 'imagined sight' because I do not have the real sight of it in front of me; but the sight I 'see' is an 'imagined sight' necessary only in this sense of being a product of my sensory imagination. In this sense, whether I 'see' in my mind Santa Claus or the Island of Manhattan, I have an 'imagined sight' in my mind. But 'imagined sight' can also mean 'imaginary sight' in the sense in which we say that the symptoms of the hypochondriac are imagined or imaginary. Ryle, consequently, is justified
in concluding that those imagined (and imaginary) sights and sounds do not exist as sights-P and sounds-P. But Ryle cannot conclude, as he also does in the paragraphs just quoted, that mental images, those inner and ghostly sights and sounds the Cartesians speak of, do not exist because they are imaginary. Again, mental images, whatever they are, are products of our imagination but are not imaginary.

In conclusion, Ryle convincingly proves that sensory imagination does not consist in perceiving anything and, in particular, it does not consist in perceiving mental images, picture-like objects, in the privacy of the mind. As a consequence of this, he is also entitled to the claim that mental images conceived as perceptual picture-like objects in the mind, do not exist.

But the further implicit conclusion that there are no mental images in general finds no support in his arguments.

Seeming to Perceive, Imagining and Pretending that one Perceives

In the chapter on imagination of *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle describes sensory imagination first as seeming to perceive, then as imagining and fancying to perceive, and, finally, as pretending to perceive. This progressive assimilation of cases of sensorily imagining something to cases of pretending that one perceives something, accords
with the general behavioristic tendency of the book. The denial of the existence of the Cartesian mental pictures is, surely, not enough to completely discredit a Cartesian Account of Imagination in favor of observable, public episodes or dispositions. For even if mental images did not exist, Ryle still had in his hands the task of accounting for the occurrences of 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. things in the mind without using the concept of mental images.

Ryle attempts, then, to give an alternative account of these occurrences that would strip them of any appearance of being private occurrences. He tries to show that (sensorily) imagining is, after all, some kind of behavior. Of all the concepts available for such a role, I cannot think of a better candidate than Ryle's choice: the concept of pretending. The way Ryle proceeds to do this is the following: he substitutes for "'seeing' X in the mind" "seeming to see X" for this in turn "imagining one sees X" and for this "pretending one sees X." The substitutions are apparently innocuous, for in every case the concepts involved in the substitution overlap to a great extent, but not completely. But because they overlap only partially, the progressive substitution is quite unjustified and, not surprisingly, the further we move along the substitutions, the more distant we get from the concept of sensory imagination. What saves Ryle's text from being manifestly absurd at the end is the fact that his claims often profit
from the ambiguities of the term 'imagination', and also
because the examples he brings to illustrate his points are
often not cases of sensorily imagining something, but all
sorts of other cases that do not involve mental imagery.

Someone might think that this criticism of Ryle is
unfair to the extent that Ryle's aim was not that of
elucidating the specific concept of sensory imagination but
the general concept of imagination, and, consequently, he
brings up in the course of his investigation cases of
imagining that do not involve mental imagery as well as
cases that do. As a reply to this possible objection, I
quote Ryle

It is with this special brand of make-
believe that we are here concerned, namely
what we call 'imagining', 'visualizing',
'seeing in the mind's eye' and 'going
through in one's head'.

Let us follow now in more detail Ryle's steps.

Seeming to perceive and imagining that one perceives.

True, a person, picturing his nursery
is, in a certain way, like the person
seeing his nursery, but the similarity
does not consist in his really looking at
a real likeness of his nursery, but in
his really seeming to see his nursery it-
self, when he is not really seeing it.

The claim that when we 'see' X in our minds we seem to be
seeing-P X (in some sense yet to be specified) is perfectly
acceptable. But then Ryle moves to claim that our seeming
to perceive X when we sensorily imagine X is in fact
imagining that we perceive X.

How can he seem to hear a tune that he
does not really hear? And, in particular,
how can a person fail to be aware that
he is only seeming to hear or see, as
the dipsomaniac certainly fails? In what
precise respects is 'seeing' so like
seeing that the victim often cannot, with
the best will and the best wits, tell which
he is doing? Now, if we divest these
questions of associations with any 'wires
and pulleys' questions, we can see that
they are simply questions about the concept
of imagining or make-believe.18

This crucial step from seeming to see-P to imagining that
one sees-P is quite unjustified. It is so because:

(1) Ryle falsely assumes that the dipsomaniac's
visual hallucinations are the same sort of 'seeing' as that
of sensory imagination, and

(2) He holds the (probably false) belief that the
dipsomaniac invariably or necessarily is unaware that he is
only seeming to see and not really seeing-P.

Consequently, thinking that all seeming to see that takes
place in the mind alone19 is like the dipsomaniac's seeing,
Ryle concludes that all this seeming to see involves the
false belief that one is actually seeing-P the real thing.
And if it is the case that when we say we 'see' X in our
mind we are falsely believing that we are really seeing-P
X, then, of course, we have some reason to conclude, as Ryle
does, that when we 'see' X in the mind we are actually
imagining that we see-P X. For, as we mentioned in the
Introduction, there is at least one sense of "imagining"
that involves false belief.

I do not know whether the dipsomaniac with Delirium Tremens fails to be aware that he is only 'seeing'-d and not seeing-P, as Ryle believes. Those reports and descriptions that I have had the opportunity to read are not conclusive one way or another. So, it is not even clear that false belief is part of the dipsomaniac's experiences, let alone of ordinary visualization. Shorter, for instance, thinks that the man with 'Delirium Tremens' knows what is wrong with him, but still is tempted to believe that what he 'sees'-d is real.

The pressing question though is whether sensory imagination involves false belief, or, in the words of Ryle, whether "'having Helvellyn before the mind's eye' is actually a special case of imagining, namely imagining that we see Helvellyn in front of our noses." The answer is, of course, no. Sensory imagination does not involve false belief. When one visualizes the Taj Mahal recalling, perhaps, one's visit to the building, one is not mistakenly thinking or believing that one is still in India contemplating the monument. In fact, there is no sense at all in which one can be said to be mistaken in this case. As Shorter says when he brings this argument against Ryle: "One can imagine that one sees Helvellyn, and one can visualize Helvellyn. They are two quite different things."
Imagining that one sees-P X implies that one falsely believes that one is seeing-P X, but 'seeing' X in the mind does not imply such a thing. Yet I imagine it is possible for someone to be taken by his own visualizations and believe that he is actually perceiving when he is only sensorily imagining. But if this is at all possible, it would be reasonable to suppose that it occurs when the subject's consciousness is in some way altered or perhaps as part of self-deception. And naturally a mistake of this sort would count as being or coming close to being a pathological occurrence. In any case, a mistake of this nature is not typical of sensory imagination and seldom occurs.

**Pretending that one perceives.** Next, Ryle claims

There is not much difference between a child's playing at being a pirate, and one fancying that he is a pirate. He also notices that the child playing at being a pirate is, in fact, pretending to be a pirate. From this he concludes that 'seeing' something in the mind is pretending that one sees, 'hearing' a tune running in one's head is pretending that one hears the tune, etc.

Let us notice, first, that a child playing at being a pirate does not need to frame a mental image of himself as a pirate or, any other mental images in order to play; nor does he need any mental images in order to pretend he is a pirate, the tree is an island and the bench a boat.
Mental images might accompany the episode and, might even be helpful, but the production of mental imagery by itself does not ever amount to playing or pretending anything.

The person who imagines himself to be Napoleon, believes that he is Napoleon. But the person that pretends he is Napoleon does not believe, or at least does not have to believe, that he is Napoleon. The child pretending to be a pirate does not believe that he is a pirate, he is only pretending, he well knows the boat is only a bench and that supper time is only a few minutes ahead. So, Ryle's substitution of "imagining one perceives" for "pretending one perceives" is quite unjustified. And for this reason we cannot simply reject the view that sensory imagination is pretending to perceive on the same grounds that we rejected the view that it is imagining that one perceives, i.e., on the grounds that sensorily imagining does not involve false-belief. What, then, is wrong with saying that 'seeing' something in one's mind is pretending that one sees something?

As Ryle himself is well aware, pretending unlike imagining, involves the going through certain motions and operations: pretending is a form of behavior. One cannot pretend to be someone or something, or, pretend that something is the case without engaging oneself in some sort of behavior. Even pretending to be a corpse involves a certain
performance. Sensorily imagining something, on the other hand, does not involve any kind of behavior.

Let us consider what the concept of pretending to perceive actually is and, then, see how different it is from the concept of framing a mental image. What would we ordinarily be inclined to call a case of pretending to perceive something? We would, for instance, say this of an actor who, on stage, pretends to be seeing, say, a volcano erupting, or hearing the voice of his lover. In this case the person behaves as if he were perceiving something when, in fact, he is not. Ryle's intended parallel, although never explicitly stated, is the following: the man seeing X in his mind is also behaving as if he were seeing X when, in fact, he is not.

But the man who visualizes something, unlike the actor, does not have to do any acting, performing, or displaying of any sort, in fact he does not have to behave in any manner at all in order to frame a mental image in his mind. Consider the difference between the two following commands:

Pretend that you see a volcano erupting

Visualize a volcano erupting

We can find out whether the first order was obeyed or not by simply observing the behavior of the person who received the order. But no amount of observation will ever reveal whether the person obeyed the second order or not. It is
in this sense that Sensory Imagination is said to be private. Conversely, no amount of external behavior can ever count as visualizing or having the smell of strawberries in one's mind.

Pretending that one sees-P X and 'seeing' X in the mind are two different things and the occurrence of one never implies or involves the occurrence of the other.
CHAPTER III

SENSORY IMAGINATION AND THOUGHT

Having a Mental Image

If it is the case that when we sensorily imagine X, it is X that we 'hear', 'see', etc. in our minds and not a mental image of X. Then, why talk about mental images at all? If mental images are not, in any sense, perceived in the mind and they are not like ordinary objects, then why not follow Ryle's example and attempt to produce an account of sensory imagination dispensing with the concept of mental imagery? Why even bother to say that we have a mental image of the Eiffel Tower when we visualize it? What could the concept of 'having a mental image' add to the description of the phenomena of 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. something in the mind? And why, finally, do we ordinarily speak of mental images when we report cases of sensory imagination?

I hope I shall be able to show next that we cannot do without the concept of mental images, that no account of sensory imagination that lacks this concept can come close to being true. We shall consider next four typical cases of sensorily imagining something, and we shall see then that in each case we need to use the concept of a mental image if we are to give an adequate account of them. In fact, we shall see that without postulating the existence of mental
images an adequate account of these cases, or any other case of the kind, is impossible.

Case No. 1

I just visualized the face of my brother: I could 'see' him with certain detail and vividness. But if I were asked whether I 'saw' what color his eyes were, in honesty, I would have to answer that, although I know that my brother's eyes are green, I did not 'see' his eyes as any color when I visualized his face. I can tell how I 'saw' his hair in color, texture and style; I can also tell how his lips looked, for I visualized him with a peculiar smile of his, but not the color of his eyes.

When we perceive an object, it necessarily appears as having a full collection of 'sensible features,' but when we sensorily imagine an object it appears as having at least some of a disjunction of 'sensible features.' Any-thing we see—P must appear in some color and tone and visual texture and (perhaps) shape. Anything we hear—P must have some pitch, loudness and timbre (harmonics). Anything we touch—P must have certain warmth or coldness and must have certain texture, etc. But when we sensorily imagine the Eiffel Tower, for instance, we may succeed in 'seeing' quite vividly the shape, hugeness, even the structure may come to us quite clearly, but its color, texture, and tone may be left out. And nevertheless we rightly say that we 'see' the Tower in our minds. Similarly, we may
'hear' a familiar melody running in our heads and yet we have no answer to the questions of whether it was sung or played by an instrument or whether it was played loudly or softly. Surely this might happen in the case of hearing-P as well, but for a different reason. A heard-P melody must be either played on an instrument or sung or played by a full orchestra, etc., and on occasions we may fail to discern which is the case. But a melody we have running in our head does not need to be a melody 'heard' as played necessarily either by a piano or by a cello, etc. About a melody running in our heads the question of whether it is sung or performed on an instrument may simply not be applicable because how it was played did not enter the thought.

The way we 'see', 'hear', 'smell', etc. an object in our minds is, therefore, different from the way we see-P, hear-P or smell-P, etc. it. The difference resides in the fact that in perception the object appears with a fullness that is lacking in sensory imagination, where the imagined object often, or perhaps invariably, appears with unspecified features. This difference between perception and imagination is not simply a matter of degree. It would be a matter of degree if simply the object of perception presented itself to us with a fullness of determination greater than that with which it appears in sensory imagination. But the situation is, rather, that the object in perception has invariably and necessarily a total fullness of determination,
that is to say, it is impossible for an object that we perceive to have unspecified sensible features, as it is possible and perhaps inevitable in sensory imagination. Whether we attend or not to all these features when we perceive the object is another matter. In perception, we most often attend only to certain features of the object and in this sense we can say that the object of perception is not fully determined. But unlike the sensorily imagined object, the percept of perception, a shoe, for example, has necessarily some color, tone, texture, size, shape, shine or dullness—signs of having been worn or not, etc. And it is in this sense, the sense in which it must have an all-inclusive set of sensible features (of which we might be aware or not, or only to some extent) that I claim that the object of perception has a total fullness of determination. This sharp and important contrast between perceiving something and sensorily imagining something helps our argument in Chapter I, Section 2, where we defended the view that sensory imagination does not involve perception.

Coming back to the issue at hand, when I, in visualizing my brother's face, leave out the color of his eyes, I am leaving a detail unspecified. I may have left many other details unspecified. If I were to give a description of the face of my brother as he actually looks, my description would include the feature 'having green eyes'. But if I were to describe his face as I 'saw' it a moment
ago in my mind, then I could not include in the description the feature 'having green eyes'. The two descriptions, therefore, would not coincide, although they would not contradict one another.

Case No. 2

Let us imagine, now, that I mistakenly picture my brother's face as having a scar on the left side of the jaw instead of the right side as is actually the case. The full description of his face as I 'see' it in my mind and the full description of my brother's face as it actually looks, in fact, contradict one another. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to believe that because the face I 'see' in my mind has a scar on the left side of the face I am not actually 'seeing' my brother's face in my mind. It is still true that it is my brother's face that I was visualizing, it is his face I intended to 'see' in my mind and it is of him that I thought when I 'saw' the face, i.e., I thought of the face as being his. The fact that I pictured his face mistakenly as having the scar on the wrong side does not alter the fact that it was him that I was 'seeing' in my mind's eye. In other words, the fact that I mistakenly believe he has the scar on the left side cannot prevent me from visualizing his face. Moreover, it would be absurd to suggest that because of this mistaken belief of mine, I am also mistaken about whose face I am 'seeing' in my mind, that due to the fact the scar is on the left the face I
'see' in my mind is somebody else's or nobody's face.

Now we have a glimpse of what a mental image is and why there is the need to speak of it. We have two things: one is the actual look of my brother's face (as it appears to our eyes when we perceive it), another is the look of my brother's face as I 'see' it when I visualize it. That these are two different things is clear from the fact that their descriptions do not just fail to coincide but they can even contradict one another.

We can say then that the face of my brother as I 'saw' it in my mind, in contrast with his face as we see it when we perceive it, is the mental image of the face of my brother that I have on that occasion. The description "...face with a scar on the left side of the jaw..." is not simply the description of my brother's face as it 'appears' to me on the occasion, it is the description of his face as I 'see' it in my mind, it is the description of my mental image of my brother.

Surely enough, I can frame many other mental images of my brother's face, the descriptions of which may not coincide with the look of my brother's face as we see it in perception, nor with the images I frame of his face before when I left the color of the eyes out and placed the scar on the wrong side. It is possible, then, for someone to frame, in the course of his or her life, innumerable
mental images of X, the descriptions of which do not coincide with each other nor do they coincide with the description of the perceptual appearance of X. Some images are more detailed than others, some are more faithful than others, some are more vivid than others, some leave certain features unspecified, and some leave other features unspecified, etc. But to speak of images in this fashion might be misleading because it may give the impression that they are discrete, static, lifeless bits, while the truth of the matter is that mental images can change, evolve, develop, progressively disintegrate, etc. When we deliberately frame a mental image of the Eiffel Tower, for example, often as we hold the Tower in our mental 'gaze' we may suddenly decide to 'see' the color of it and the bolts of the structure that we did not 'see' before, but perhaps when we accomplish this the texture of the metal structure we could 'see' before drops out of the picture, and so on.

Case No. 3

Let us consider now a more extreme case. Professor Fulton related to me that at one time, knowing Royce's philosophical idealism, he used to picture Royce in his mind as a tall, bearded and elegant man, very much like William James looked. But as a matter of fact, and as Professor Fulton discovered some time later, Royce's looks were not the way he had pictured him: Royce was short, pudgy, not elegant-looking, and not like William James at
When Professor Fulton was picturing Royce in his mind in this manner, he was, of course, 'seeing' Royce in his mind's eye. Having no knowledge of Royce's physical appearance, but knowing who the man was and what his ideas were, Professor Fulton probably pictured Royce for himself as he thought the man who produced those ideas would look. That is to say, Professor Fulton gave Royce an appearance that he thought fitted the ideas of the philosopher. In any case, Professor Fulton 'saw' Royce in his mind as he imagined or fancied him to be, not as he knew or remembered he looked for he had no knowledge or recollection of this. Thus, we can say that Professor Fulton not only sensorily imagined Royce but also imagined (non-sensorily) how Royce looked.

Again, here, as in the cases we examined before, the full description of Royce's appearance and the full description of how Royce was 'seen' in Professor Fulton's mind do not coincide, in fact they are inconsistent. The description of the 'appearance' that Professor Fulton 'saw' in his mind, on the contrary, coincides with the (accurate) description we may give of the physical appearance of William James; but however remarkable this coincidence may be, it was not William James that Professor Fulton 'saw' in his mind, but Royce. This is because it was not James
that Professor Fulton was thinking of but Royce. Professor Fulton framed the image as an image of Royce, or, as phenomenologists would say, it was Royce to whom Professor Fulton was intentionally related. Professor Fulton, therefore, 'saw' Royce in his mind, but what he 'saw' was something that did not look at all like Royce.

Hence, when we sensorily imagine something we produce an 'appearance' of this thing in our minds, the full description of which may or may not coincide with the full description of the thing of which it is an appearance, and whether it coincides or not is irrelevant to its being an image of it. When I visualize my brother with a scar on the left side of the face or, when Professor Fulton pictures Royce as a William James look-alike, we are producing for ourselves an 'appearance' of my brother and an 'appearance' of Royce, which, due to my mistaken belief and to Professor Fulton's lack of knowledge and fertile fancy, do not coincide with the real appearances of my brother and Royce.

Case No. 4

Let us consider now a case of a person who knows well how Pope Paul looks and sounds but in the midst of a stretch of day-dreaming he 'sees' him as a gigantic Dracula robot which is coin-operated and has out-of-order angel-like wings. Surely enough, what he 'sees' hardly looks like Pope Paul, yet there is not the slightest doubt in his mind that it
was the Pope that he was 'seeing'.

Why the Pope was 'seen' in this manner on this occasion is a question for the psychoanalyst to answer. As Professor Fulton's image of Royce was probably framed in accordance with Professor Fulton's beliefs about the kind of appearance that would fit a man that produced those ideas, similarly, the image of the Pope is probably framed in accordance with the day-dreamer's beliefs and feelings about the Pope, the Papacy or the Catholic religion, or, about religion in general. Psychoanalysis tells us that some of these beliefs and feelings have an unconscious status in the mind and make themselves manifest in a camouflaged manner in the exuberant forms that our mental images sometimes take. Whether this is actually the case or not, again, is not for us to decide here. What is important about cases like this for our purposes is the fact that a certain 'appearance' is produced, the description of which has practically nothing in common with the description of the appearance of a particular object, a fact which the subject knows, and yet this 'appearance' is unmistakably an appearance of this object.

In all four cases we have considered, we found it necessary to distinguish the 'intentional object' (i.e., my brother, Royce, and Pope Paul, on the one side, and the manner in which the object was 'seen' in the mind on the
other. The distinction applied not only to cases of visual sensory imagination, but to all cases of sensory imagination. I might have a passage of Mozart's Jupiter Symphony running in my head, but the way I 'hear' it, perhaps because I remembered it wrongly, is not exactly the way it actually goes: I may be adding extra notes, or changing the tempo, or simply 'hearing' the main melody in the violins and not the base line, etc. Here, too, the description of what I 'hear' running in my head and the description of the Symphony's passage as it actually goes do not coincide. But to speak of an 'appearance' in this case of auditory imagery sounds awkward for "appearance" is a word we naturally associate only with vision.

Yet, the relationship between the Taj Mahal as I 'see' it right now in my mind and the Taj Mahal is the same kind of relation as that between the Jupiter Symphony as I 'hear' it running in my head right now and the Symphony itself. For in both cases we have a relation between some item towards which we are intentionally directed and a mental image of this object, which is the peculiar manner in which we are directed to the intentional object in cases of sensory imagination. The same is true of the relation between something as we 'smell' it, 'touch' it, or 'taste' it in our minds and the thing itself.

We speak of "'appearances" in cases of visual imagination because we want to indicate the fact that we are
conscious of the intentional object by means of having some of its sensible features present in the mind in such a manner that we are inclined to say that we 'see' the object. But if this is the case I see no reason not to extend the term "appearance" to cover cases of sensory imagination that are not purely or at all visual. For in these cases as well, as we have seen, we also need a term to indicate the manner in which the object in consideration is either 'heard' and/or 'smelled' and/or 'felt', etc. In all cases of sensory imagination we are sensorily aware of the sensible features of something, in other words, we are aware of an 'appearance' of sensible features. For the same reason we should also extend the term "mental image" which I take, in this context, to be equivalent to "mental 'appearance'."

A mental image is, then, the visual and/or tactile and/or olfactory and/or gustatory and or/auditory 'appearance' that an object\(^2\) has when we 'see' and/or 'hear' and/or 'smell' and/or 'taste' and/or 'feel' it in our minds. How is this kind of 'appearance' different from the kind of appearance an object has when we perceive it, has been, so far, only partially elucidated. We have said that unlike a perceptual appearance, a purely mental one does not have to have a full determination of sensible features. But above all, so far, we have established the necessity of speaking about these (mental) 'appearances'. To 'see', 'hear', etc. something in the mind can and should be
described, as we do in ordinary language, as having a visual or auditory, etc. mental image in the mind.

In almost all cases of sensory imagination the description of the perceptual appearance of the object and the description of its mental image will not coincide. This is for the simple reason that the mental images we normally produce are far from having the fullness of sensible determination that the perceived object presents. It seems that however complex, full and exuberant our mental images are, still they lack the fullness and inexhaustible quality of the object of perception.

There is, nevertheless, one exception to this rule. It occurs in those cases in which we produce a mental image of a thing which is totally the making of our fancy. For instance, right now I am picturing in my mind a three-headed monster covered in yellow and blue polka dots, etc. I never saw—P the monster in reality, nor have I ever heard of it in any tale, novel, or account of any kind. In this case, the description of the sensible features of the intentional object itself (the monster) and the description of its appearance in the mind coincide perfectly because the intentional object, the monster, exists only as an image in my mind. That is to say, it has no existence or appearance independent from my image. Not existing in any other way than as my image, the 'appearance' of the monster and the way it 'appears' to me in my mind necessarily coincide. But
in all other cases, i.e., cases where we sensorily imagine something which has some sensible determination of its own in reality or in fiction, the 'appearance' we produce of it in our minds might not match the actual or fictional appearance of the thing. In the case of objects of perception in particular, our images of them never equal the 'fullness' with which these objects present themselves in perception. Even the most exuberant of our mental images have only a limited number of determinations: we can never 'see', 'hear', etc. something in our minds in all the richness and detail with which we can perceive it. We shall examine this issue in more detail in the next chapter.

One might think that people gifted with photographic memory, or eidetic imagination are also exceptions to my claim that mental images can never have a full determination of mental features. This is not so. The image of the eidetic person is far richer than our mental images. Yet it can never have the character of (perhaps) inexhaustible and indefinite fullness that the material object of perception has. We can continue analyzing a material object with respect to its sensible qualities indefinitely: there are always new sides, new perspectives, new reactions to light, new subdivision, etc. to examine. On the other hand, the eidetic image, rich as it is, has a definite number of determinations, i.e., the determinations that the person who imagines has put in it and nothing else.³
To illustrate this point, let us think of a photograph of a person. The person in the photograph can be analyzed only so far. There is a point beyond which the image cannot give us information about the look of this person. For example, no matter how much we investigate and scrutinize the image, no matter how big an enlargement we made of it, we will not be able to tell whether the person had his pupils dilated or not. On the other hand, from the material object, the photographic print itself, we can learn all we want to know. Whether there are five or six tiny dots on the left corner, or whether the dots are perfectly circular, etc. is something we can find out simply by looking at it more carefully. In this respect, the mental image is like the photographic image. Both are images or representations of something, although of quite different sorts.

In sum, in order to account for the fact that the full description of the sensory features of an object we 'see' and/or 'hear', etc. in the mind typically does not coincide with the full description of the actual sensory features of the object, we must describe the occurrence as one in which we have a private 'appearance' of the object in the mind, i.e., as having a mental image.
Are Mental Images Objects in their own Right?

Objects that represent other objects, such as photographs, drawings, paintings, sculptures, models, etc., have determinations of their own, that is to say, they can receive predicates without making reference to the objects they represent. A canvas portraying Galileo, for instance, may be 100 by 50 centimeters in its dimensions, two kilograms in weight, very old and mildewed, etc. None of these features makes reference to Galileo, and they are, we may say, determinations of the canvas itself in regard to its being a material object. More precisely, the canvas must have a full score of sensible features: it must have some color, shape and texture, etc. This color and shape, the smell and taste and temperature and texture, are features of the old canvas and not of Galileo, of course. It is in virtue of its having matter that this canvas has sensible features of its own such as rough to the touch, multi-colored from the front, brownish from the back, etc. If the picture were not made of wood, cloth and pigment, nor of metal board, tint or material of any kind, viz., if the picture had no matter in any sense, then it would not have sensible features of its own either and we could not perceive it.

The Galileo we see in the canvas has sensible features of its own as well. He appears as having, say, a
strong face, with dark eyes, white hair, etc. These are features that belong to Galileo and not to the canvas. What the relation is between the sensible features of the canvas itself and the sensible features of its representation is a rather large and complicated question that we leave unanswered here. All we need to establish is that there are two distinct objects of reference, having two distinct sets of predicates and that the sensible features that the represented object has depend on the sensible features that the object in which the representation appears has. (Obviously, if say the pigment in the canvas is all blue, the represented object cannot look red, it must also have a blue appearance.)

Mental images, as we have seen, have been likened to pictures and sensory imagination to seeing something in a picture. Let us ask ourselves here, whether mental images have features of their own, as paintings, photographs, etc. do. Can we characterize mental images independently of the objects of which they are images as we can characterize the canvas without talking of Galileo? This question is particularly important because if mental images are not objects in their own right, if they have no appearance of their own, then they cannot function as pictures (in the mind) and sensory imagination cannot be explained under the model of seeing something in a picture by means of seeing-P the picture itself.
The answer to this question is 'no', mental images have no sensible features of their own, they are sheer 'appearances', in short they have no matter. Mental images can be said to be more or less vivid, detailed, realistic, life-like, sketchy, patchy, incomplete, and vague; but all these characteristics make oblique references to the objects of which they are mental images. These terms indicate, when applied to mental images or when applied to material pictures, that the object imagined or represented appears vividly, with detail, realistically, incompletely, vaguely or in a life-like or sketchy manner. When we say of a painting, drawing, or print that it is incomplete, vague or lacking detail, as J. E. R. Squires points out, it is not the brushstrokes, charcoal shapes and lines themselves that are incomplete, vague or lacking detail. Neither is the picture itself; rather, it is the appearance given to the object represented there that is incomplete, vague, or sketchy. Therefore, the use of these terms in the case of mental images does not prove that they have determinations of their own because these terms invariably make reference to the representational aspect of something. We would not literally and properly apply any of these terms to objects that have no representational dimension of any kind.  

J. M. Shorter, uncomfortable with Ryle's neglect of mental images, attempts to introduce the concept of a mental image arguing that although mental images are not
like ordinary objects, they still can receive predicates such as "blurry" independently of their representative aspect. The kind of case he has in mind is that in which we try to visualize a familiar thing but being able to go only so far we say, "All I got was a blur." I appreciate Shorter's concern about the necessity to re-introduce the concept of mental images, but the way he attempts to do this, viz., by re-establishing the thesis that mental images have sensible determinations of their own, is mistaken. 'Blurry', in the case mentioned by Shorter, is not a property that the mental image has on its own right. As Ishiguro and Dilman have pointed out, 'blurry' or the 'image being a blur', in this case should be understood adverbially for it makes reference to the person's failure to visualize the object. After all, what we express with "All I got was a blur", on this occasion, can be expressed equally well with "I only got to 'see' the object very vaguely (or 'blurrily'), or, again, "I 'saw' the object very indistinctly."

A mental image, then, has no sensible determinations of its own. This does not mean that a mental image has no sensible determinations in general. For, although a mental image has no sensible features of its own, still it is an 'appearance' of sensible features, but these features that we 'see', 'hear', etc., in our minds are not the sensible features of the image itself but of the imagined object.
The appearance is an 'appearance' of the intentional object only. The mental image has no appearance of its own. Evidence for this is the fact that there are no predicates that the image can receive in its own, i.e., without making oblique references either to the relative success of the person who imagines or to the object imagined.

A mental image is, then, an 'appearance', i.e., something that has sensible features, but it is necessarily and only the 'appearance' of the sensible features of something else.

Further proof that this is so can be found in the following test. If mental images had sensory features of their own, we could sensorily imagine a mental image in turn, as we can imagine anything that has sensible determinations (in reality or fiction). That is to say, if the image had a sensible 'appearance' of its own, then we could in turn frame a mental image of its 'appearance' as different from the 'appearance' of the object represented in it. We can do this with any material representation, for instance a photograph: we can frame a mental image of the object represented in the photograph or of the photograph itself having, say, rough edges and an object represented in it. But any attempt at visualizing in turn, say, a mental image of the Pyramids of Cheops that we just happen to frame, will end up in our visualizing again the Pyramids. Nothing new will appear in our second set of images because there is
nothing sensible that belongs to the mental image in its own that we could visualize the second time.

We can have two photographs with exactly the same appearance but one being the photograph of the other. What is different then, we may ask, about the mental image case? The difference is that while it is impossible to visualize any mental image in turn without simply visualizing the intentional object that 'appears' in it, it is possible to photograph any photographic frame or print in turn without producing an identical photograph, i.e., we may photograph the frame in a side view. In short (visual), mental images cannot be visualized in turn, and in general, we cannot sensorily imagine our imagination mental images in turn.

Any description of the 'appearance' of a mental image is a description of the object of which the image is an image. Besides this, the only other thing that can be described about a mental image is its relative vividness, clarity or blurriness. But these, as we have mentioned, should be understood adverbially because with these terms we assess the relative success with which images are framed. In other words, those terms do not stand for features that the image has on its own right, but rather, features that the image has as a result of the performance of the individual framing the image. The fact that mental images are not objects in their own right, explains why for a mental image to come to being, it must be framed, and,
why it disappears as soon as we stop sustaining its existence. Not being an object in its own right, a mental image, like a thought, exists only as part of a mental act, which in this case consists in the creation of a sensory, yet fleshless, 'appearance' of an object in one's mind.

It should become clear now that the Cartesian view that we 'see' something in the mind by means of seeing a mental image in the mind, just as we see something in a picture by looking at a picture, is untenable. It is untenable not only because the normal conditions of visual perception are lacking in sensory imagination, as we saw in Chapter I. It is also untenable because the analogy with seeing something in a picture collapses when we realize that the mental image has no appearance of its own.

When we see X in a picture, we must see-P the picture and it is by means of seeing-P the picture that we come to see X in it. Seeing X in the picture and seeing-P the picture are two different things (although intimately related). We may say that their objects are not the same, at least in the sense and to the extent that we can make this distinction between seeing the picture itself and seeing what is represented in the picture. Seeing X in a picture implies seeing something else and seeing in some other sense, viz., seeing-P a material object. But when we 'see' X in our minds, we are not also seeing something else
and in some other sense of 'seeing'—let alone seeing—P. It is not only that no perception, in any ordinary sense of the word, takes place in sensory imagination. The case is that in sensory imagination 'seeing' X does not involve any other kind of seeing and there are not two objects of sight. One could speak of two objects of sight in sensory imagination if the image itself had a sensible 'appearance' of its own.

Unlike seeing things in a picture, then, when we 'see' something in our minds we simply 'see' the 'appearance' of the imagined object and there is no other appearance (i.e., the alleged appearance of the mental image itself) by means of which (and our seeing of it) we get to 'see' the first. In other words, when we sensorily imagine something, we 'see' the sensory features of the intentional object as it 'appears' in our minds and there is nothing else that we 'see' besides this. 7

'Seeing' A Mental Image 8

As a matter of fact we ordinarily talk about 'seeing' mental images. This fact has often been overlooked by behaviorists and ordinary language philosophers. "'Seeing' mental images" is a quite justifiable way of speaking in the case of non-imagination images, such as after-images and some hallucinations because in these cases our visual sense organs are involved in such a manner that
it is with them that we 'see' these images. But our concern here is, of course, with 'seeing' images when imagination images are at issue.

The suggestion that we 'see' (imagination) images is thought in some philosophical circles to imply the Cartesian doctrine that we 'see' something in the mind by means of seeing a mental picture of it. But, on the other hand, the denial that we 'see' (imagination) mental images contradicts ordinary usage and appears to be, at least to many people, counter-intuitive. I shall next attempt to defend and explain the rationale for our ordinary way of speaking about 'seeing' mental images, and, at the same time, dispel the temptation to fall back into the Cartesian world.

When we visualize something we do not only 'see' the intentional object in our minds but we can also say that we 'see' the mental image of it as well. This seems to contradict what I just said in the former section, but actually it does not. The reason is that to say that one 'sees' a mental image of X means the same thing as to say that one 'sees' X in one's mind. Let me explain this with more detail.

The question "What did Professor Fulton 'see' in his mind?" is ambiguous. One possible answer is "Royce," that is, the intentional object. Another possible answer is "A tall, bearded, elegant man" which is the 'appearance'
Royce had in Professor Fulton's mind on that occasion, i.e., the image of Royce in Professor Fulton's mind. Consequently, Professor Fulton did not only 'see' the intentional object in his mind, but the mental image of it as well. But this fact does not imply that there are two occurrences of seeing something and two objects of sight. Specifically, this does not imply that there is some other thing that Professor Fulton 'sees' besides Royce, namely, the mental image. This is not implied because for Professor Fulton to 'see' that image of a tall, bearded, elegant man in his mind is one and the same thing with his 'seeing' Royce in his mind. The meaning of 'seeing' an (imagination) image of X in the mind" is the same as "'seeing' X in the mind."

"A mental image of..." is an ambiguous expression. "Of" may be followed by "Royce," and in this case it expresses a relationship between an object and its appearance given in the mind. "Of" may also be followed by "a tall, bearded, elegant man," which describes the content of the image. But, as we have seen this content of the image is identical to the image itself. There is nothing surprising here: not having any matter, lacking determinations of their own, mental images are nothing but content. Therefore, 'to see a mental image' is just to 'see' its content, and this is to see the intentional object as it 'appears' in the mind. When we 'see' a mental image, we completely see through it—so to speak—directly towards the intentional
object. When we say we 'see' an image in the mind, then, all we 'see' is the 'appearance' of another thing, i.e., the appearance of the imagined object. In other words, when we visualize something there is nothing for us to 'see' in our minds but the 'appearance' of the imagined object, and 'seeing' this 'appearance' can be justly described either as 'seeing' the (intentional or imagined) object or, as 'seeing' an image of that object in the mind.

I see, therefore, no objection to our normal way of speaking about mental images, viz., as 'seeing' them in the mind. The sense and rationale for this form of expression has been given. I have no objection to a philosopher's claiming that we 'see' mental images either provided that he or she does not mean to imply by this that 'seeing' a mental image of X is either a different occurrence from or is only part of the occurrence of 'seeing' X in the mind. So, although we can say that in visually imagining something we 'see' a mental image and also 'see' the intentional object, there is no sense in saying that we see the intentional object by means of seeing the image, for these are one and the same thing.

The Sensuousness of Sensory Imagination

Thirteen years after the publication of The Concept of Mind, Ryle wrote the following passage about his treatment of imagination in that work. It is worth quoting in
its entirety:

Through the lengthy stretch during which I floundered there did, however, run one idea which I still think is cardinal to the concept of imagining. It is this. A person at a concert may be listening to a piece of music that is strange to him, so that he is then and there trying to learn how it goes; but a person who goes over a tune in his head must already have learned and not yet forgotten how the tune goes; and more than this, not only must he already know how the tune goes, but he must be at the time using this knowledge; he must be actually thinking how it goes without the tune being actually played aloud to him or hummed aloud to him. He must be thinking how it goes in its absence.

Nor do these 'musts' represent a psychological law. An act would not be one of going over a tune in one's head unless these conditions were fulfilled. Of this I feel fairly sure. But what stumps me is what more to say of this notion of thinking how the tune goes. For the man may say, even with surprise, 'it is almost as if I actually heard the notes!' The kind of thinking that he was doing had a certain degree of vividness or lifeliness which makes him want to liken his merely thought-of notes to heard notes, save for the crucial difference that the thought-of notes were only thought of, and not heard at all. He heard no notes; but he 'heard' them vividly. He was non-sensuously so alive to how they would have sounded, that it was almost as if they had been sounding in his ears. It is for this 'concept of the quasi-sensuousness or vividness of, e.g., auditorily imagined notes that I feel sure that I failed to fix the bearings.\(^9\)

Ryle is mistaken in thinking that the man with the tune running in his head has "merely thought-of notes." His mistake seems to arise from the belief that we can either hear-P the notes or merely think of them and, if it is the case that the notes are not heard-P, then they are merely
thought of. Under this assumption, it is no wonder he is at odds trying to explain why we sometimes say things like "it was almost as if I actually heard the notes" when we were not hearing—\(P\) anything of the sort. Ryle is trapped in a dilemma of his own construction. The argument that if the notes are not actually heard—\(P\) then they are merely thought— of is unsound. There is a third possibility, namely, the notes are 'heard' in the mind and 'hearing' notes in the mind is not just thinking of them, it is also something else. This is what I shall try to show next.

We can think of an object of perception without sensorily imagining it at all. For instance, I can think of the perceptible features of something when I describe it as, say, large, cubical, metallic and red-colored, without 'seeing' it in my mind. I can also think of a melody, while lecturing about its virtues for instance, without having the melody running in my head. On the other hand, in order to sensorily imagine the metallic box or the melody, I must produce an 'appearance' of them in my mind. Producing an 'appearance' of some of the sensible features of a thing in one's mind, is not just thinking about the thing (or about its features), because when we have this 'appearance' we are sensorily aware of it. A claim such as this might encounter resistance at first because there seems to be a widespread tacit assumption that all sensory experiences are necessarily (or as a matter of fact) perceptual experiences
as well. Ryle seems to hold this belief and for this reason all he is willing to say is that the experience is quasi-sensuous, or almost but not quite sensuous, which amounts to saying that it really is not sensuous but only gives us the (false) impression that it is. But, as a matter of fact, in the case of sensory imagination we have very persuasive evidence that this assumption is unsound, for sensory imagination is quite characteristically a sensory occurrence that is not perceptual.

'Seeing', 'hearing', etc. something in the mind can be said to be a sensory experience for two reasons. One has already been mentioned: because when we 'see', 'hear', etc. something in the mind we are sensorily aware of the sensory features of something, that is to say, we have an 'appearance' in the mind. In contrast, when we merely think of the sensory features of something we are also conscious of them, but not sensorily conscious; the sensory features do not 'appear' for us in the mind.

The second reason has to do with the way in which the sensory features 'appear'. They 'appear', to a certain extent, in the way in which ordinary objects present themselves in perception. When we visualize, say, the Coliseum, we necessarily 'see' it in our minds from one point of view or another. We 'see' it either as it looks from the side of the Forum, or from the nearby hill, or from inside, etc. Of a given object, such as the Coliseum, we
can frame many images. It is impossible to frame an 'appearance' of the Coliseum in our minds that shows it from all these points of view at once. The situation is the same in perception. We cannot see-P the Coliseum from all these points of view at the same time. In perception, as well as in sensory imagination, the object appears only from one point of view. In this respect, then, sensory imagination is very much like perception and unlike thought. In thought we grasp the thing as a whole, so to speak, but in perception and sensory imagination the object appears, as phenomenologists say, in perspectives. And this fact alone is proof that when we sensorily imagine something we are not merely thinking about it but actually having an experience that we can rightly call sensory.

When we hear-P a melody, we hear-P it during a stretch of time in which the heard-P notes follow one another. This is exactly the same in sensory imagination: when we 'hear' a melody running in our heads we 'hear' it, again, in a stretch of time during which the notes 'heard' follow one another in the manner that the melody runs when it is played. In contrast, when we merely think of a melody, we can grasp it or conceive it all at once and as a whole. We can, of course, merely think of the notes one by one successively, but then we are thinking of each note at a time and not of the melody itself. So, too, when we 'smell', 'taste', etc. something in our minds: the
experience, unlike the mere thought of a taste or a smell, unfolds itself in a stretch of time in such a manner that it has a beginning and an end varying accordingly, perhaps, in vividness, intensity, lifeliness and clarity. In fact, the possibility of talking meaningfully of 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. something in the mind (as different from just thinking of it) is given by the fact that the experience of sensorily imagining is a sensory experience, that is to say, an experience in which some of the sensible features of an object present themselves from a certain perspective necessarily (as if they were seen-P and heard-P) and in a stretch of time during which the experience unfolds itself with a certain vividness and intensity. The fact, on the other hand, that we 'see', 'hear', etc. the imagined object in this manner justifies our calling it "an 'appearance'" or "an 'image'" terms which, of course, already imply a sensory context and not a context in which mere thought occurs.

The role that the 'mental appearance' plays in sensory imagination is, to an extent, similar to the role that the (ordinary) object plays in perception. The similarity at issue is that the object in perception and the mental image, both, make certain sensible features present, that is to say, in virtue of these elements certain sensory features are made visible, audible, etc., i.e., an appearance is given. The way in which this is accomplished in each
case is, of course and as we have already observed, quite different. In perception we can see-\textit{P}, hear-\textit{P}, etc. something because the (material) object is there presenting its appearance. In sensory imagination, a substitute 'appearance' of the object is created in the mind, an 'appearance' which is, unlike the perceptual one, totally immaterial. To hear a tune running in one's head is not merely to think how that tune goes, it is also to auditorily, but not perceptually, be aware of how the tune goes. The notes were not merely thought-of, they were auditorily present in the mind in the form of mental images.

\textbf{Sensory Imagination: A Form of Thought}

I shall try to show in this section that sensory imagination is essentially a form of thought. We shall see first that sensory imagination can, at least on occasions be a form of thought.

(A) When Professor Fulton framed that image of Royce as a tall, elegant, bearded man, he did not only 'see' this image in his mind. He was also, and by means of framing that image, fancying or imagining (non-sensorily) Royce to be that way. That is to say, framing that image on that occasion with those beliefs, intentions, etc. amounted not only to 'seeing' something but also to fancying something to be the case. Altogether we may say that Professor Fulton was, in framing that image, thinking about
Royce. Let us take another example. In framing a series of mental images of an object that does not exist, a person may be inventing or creating this thing. In adding this or that feature to the object as it 'appears' in his mind, he may be considering how it would look or perform having that feature. Visualizing it next to something else, he may be comparing it to this other thing, etc. So we see that the framing of images, on certain occasions at least, amounts to thinking in fashions such as fancying, considering, inventing, comparing, recollecting, anticipating, etc.

(B) The fact that sensory imagination is essentially a form of thought and exactly in what sense it is so, is something that we shall be able to see better by taking up the controversial issue of why is it that we cannot visualize what we are at the moment seeing—P.

In an article entitled "Visualizing," Squires holds the view that

\[\ldots\text{one cannot visualize what one is now seeing because it is one of the conditions for visualizing a scene that one should not be looking at.}^{12}\]

Squires thinks that this impossibility is a logical one because, following Ryle, he thinks that seeing in the mind is, in this respect, like pretending to see. As one cannot pretend to be what one actually is, or imitate what one is actually doing, so too, thinks Squires, one cannot visualize X when one is actually seeing X. I find this explanation
unacceptable on the grounds that 'seeing' in the mind is not pretending to see-P. Yet I agree with Squires, and about this there seems to be generalized agreement, that one cannot visualize what one is seeing-P at the moment.

But about this impossibility we must make two things clear. First, that the impossibility is not peculiar to vision but to all forms of sensory imagination. One cannot sensorily imagine X, visually and/or auditorily and/or olfactorily, etc., when one is, at the moment perceiving X. Second, it has not been made clear in the literature exactly what it is that it is impossible to do. For it is not impossible to visualize Z at the same moment that one is seeing-P X. It is not impossible either to visualize X at time $t_1$ when one is seeing-P X at time $t_1$, as Squires believes. I find no great difficulty in visualizing how X used to look some time ago, at the very moment that I have my eyes upon X. What exactly is it, then that we cannot do? I find it absolutely impossible to do the following: while seeing-P X at $t_1$, to frame a mental image of X as X appears in perception at that very moment $t_1$. So, the impossibility is not that of framing a mental image of what we are perceiving at the moment, but rather that of framing a mental image of what we are perceiving at the moment with the intention of giving it in the mind the same 'appearance' (to the extent this is possible) that it has in perception at that moment. That there is no point in framing this
mental image, that it would be useless to produce a substitute appearance of X when X is perceptually present, seems to me quite obvious. But this fact alone, i.e., that there is no need to do so, does not explain why it is impossible to do so. Then, again, why is this impossible? And is this a logical or psychological impossibility?

Let us go over the facts again in more detail. We said that while seeing-P X, it is possible for us to visualize Z either as X looked sometime ago, or as it will look in the future, or as it may look if the light conditions with which we perceive it now were different, etc. But we cannot visualize X as we see-P X at the moment. That is to say, we can visualize X in any manner other than the way in which we are perceiving it. We can visualize X to 'appear' in the mind in some way other than that in which it appears in perception at that very moment. Or more generally, we can sensorily imagine something at the time that we are attentively perceiving it only if we frame its mental image with the intention of presenting an 'appearance' of it other than the one it has in our perception at the moment. [Whether the full description of the mental 'appearance' coincides with a description of the present perceptual appearance or not is not important. What is important is the intention of producing a different appearance. The reasons are the same as those why Professor Fulton's image of Royce does not have to coincide with Royce's actual
appearance. We shall examine these in Section Seven.]

Now, why can we not sensorily imagine an object perceptually present to us except under these conditions? The answer, in brief, is the following: because to frame a mental image of the object as it presently appears in perception would amount to no thought whatsoever, and, a mental image can be produced only when its production amounts to a thought of some kind.

Let me show first that the production of a mental image of an object as it presently appears in perception would amount to no thought. The framing of a mental image of X with the intention of having it in some way different from the way it appears in perception at the moment, amounts to a thought. This is because in doing so we are considering X in some respect which is not given by perception. That is to say, we are either producing an 'appearance' of X as (we think) it did look before, or producing an 'appearance' of X as (we think) it will or may look when it, say, arrives, or we are producing an 'appearance' of X as (we think) it could or would look if X were real or if X were to be built or if X were shown next to Y, etc. In doing this, we are clearly either remembering or anticipating, or imagining or phantasizing, or inventing, or considering, etc. and doing these things is obviously thinking.
But no thought can be found in the production (if it were possible) of a mental image of X as X appears in perception at the moment. This is because by the very fact that it would be an image of X as X is perceived at the moment, it could not possibly be an image of X as it did, or will, or might, or could, or would, in some sense, appear if something other than the present perceptual circumstances were the case, which alone can constitute a thought about X. That is to say, if we pictured the object as it appears in perception at the moment we would not be considering it in any way whatsoever. For what thought could possibly be produced by the framing of a mental 'appearance' of the object we are presently perceiving in exactly the same manner as we are perceiving it? Any attempt to produce such an image would involve the absurd and impossible attempt either to remember what is perceptually present, or anticipate what is perceptually present, or image how what is perceptibly present would look or feel, etc., or invent what is in front of our eyes, etc. Clearly, then, we cannot frame a mental image of an object as it presently appears in perception because doing such a thing would involve us in the absurd and impossible task of trying to consider it in some other respect than the one presently given by perception by simply reproducing its present perceptual appearance. So, the production of such an image would be impossible because the idea of doing such a thing involves
a contradiction: to consider X in some other respect than in its present perceptual appearance by framing an image of it as it presently appears.

To be sure, we can and often do think about the object we are presently perceiving and about the way it appears in perception at that very same moment, but we do this in pure thought, not in mental images. On the other hand, the kind of thinking that we (at least on occasions) do when we exercise our sensory imagination must, of course, occur by means of mental images. And it is this kind of thought that we cannot have about the perceptibly present object.

We have seen, then, that the production of a mental image of an object as it presently appears in perception is logically impossible and that the reason why this is so is because framing such an image would amount to no thought. And now I appeal to this fact as evidence for the view that we cannot produce in sensory imagination a mental image of something the production of which would not amount to a thought. That is to say, the fact that we cannot frame a mental image of a perceptibly present object as it appears at the moment because its production would not constitute a thought of any kind, shows that mental images can be framed in sensory imagination only when their production amounts to a thought. That is to say, that sensory imagination is, in essence, a form of thought.
To frame mental images is, then, necessarily either to remember something, or anticipate something, or invent something, or speculate about something, or imagine (non-sensory) something, etc. Sensory imagination is, therefore, sensorial thinking, or thinking by means of images. It is as impossible for sensory imagination to produce a mental image the production of which does not amount to a thought, as it is for it to produce a thought not in an image.

It is important for us to realize by virtue of what it is that sensory imagination is a form of thought. It is of the essence of sensory imagination to have the possibility of bringing into mind a certain object by means of presenting an 'appearance' of it that does not coincide with its actual, present or past, appearance. That this is possible was clearly established by the examination of the examples in the first section of this chapter. This possibility gives sensory imagination its enormous richness and potential for thought. For, when we present to ourselves objects with a modified appearance, or in another set of circumstances from the present ones, or acting or reacting in particular ways, we are not simply idly reproducing something which is perceptually present. We are engaged in any of a variety of thoughts. So, it is in virtue of the fact that we sensorily imagine something by producing a mental image of it which does not correspond to the real and present appearance, behavior or habitat of the intentional object, that we can
think about it when we frame its mental image. If this were not the case, if everything we could 'see', 'hear', etc. had to, or as a matter of fact always did, strictly correspond to the intentional object in its present perceptual appearance, then the production of a mental image (if possible) would never amount to a thought. Moreover, if mental images always duplicate the appearances of earlier perceptions (as Hume thought) as a whole or in their parts, then sensory imagination would never amount to any thought other than recollecting and, perhaps, inventing. But as we have seen, on the one hand sensory imagination is a much more versatile form of thought than that, and, on the other hand, it is impossible to simply duplicate (intentionally) in an image the appearance of a perceptually present object.

In virtue of the fact that a mental image of X does not have to correspond to (and may even conflict with) the appearance, behavior, or habitat of X, we can express many of our emotions, hopes, intentions, ideals, frustrations, desires, etc. about X. The arsonist's desire and intention to burn the Postoffice Building, for example, may manifest itself simply in the framing of a mental image of the building in flames produced with great complacency. In our sexual fantasies, to take another example, we sometimes picture to ourselves people we know doing things we have never seen—P them doing and having an appearance we have never seen—P. On these occasions, clearly, we are remembering,
imaginings, conjecturing, supposing, etc. at the same time that we manifest (although privately) our desires, loves, inclinations, predilections, ideals, etc.

Let us turn now briefly to another sense in which we can say that sensory imagination is a form of thought. Having no matter, mental images cannot have sensory determinations of their own. The image that we see as red and round, is not red and round as a result of its own constitution. But if not the image itself, then what determines the 'appearance' that an image presents to the mind? We determine this with our thoughts and intentions. For example, in framing an image of Royce as a tall, bearded, elegant man, Professor Fulton was thinking of Royce as a tall, bearded and elegant man. What he 'saw' in his mind was determined by his thinking, which in this particular instance consists in his fancying or imagining (non-sensorily) that the philosopher was tall, bearded, and elegant looking. But we must remember that he fancied or imagined this simply by producing a mental image of a tall, bearded, elegant man in his mind and by taking this image to be an image of Royce. So, his fancying or imagining Royce in that manner is not a separate occurrence from, or something over and above, the framing of that image as an image of Royce on that occasion. Thus, whether a mental 'appearance' is red or blue, round or square, loud or soft, etc. is something totally determined by our thoughts, by us who produce the image. To 'see' a round
and red 'appearance' in the mind is to think about a round
and red thing; to 'hear' a soft and lovely melody running in
one's head is to think about a soft and lovely melody. The
thought takes, on each occasion, a specific form: on some
occasion it is inventing, on another occasion remembering,
etc.

In other words, the sensible appearance of a mental
image is determined on each occasion by our intention to
either compare the looks of this and that or imagine how
this would sound if played in that way or anticipate how
something will taste after seasoning with that, etc.

But our thoughts do not only determine the sensory
features that we 'see', 'hear', etc., but also what kind of
object and what particular object (when this is the case)
a mental image is an image of. Whether the 'appearance'
we 'see', 'hear', etc. is the appearance of a face, or a
house, or just a thing, or whether it is the face of Becky,
or the White House, is something that is also determined by
our thoughts. Again, whether the image is produced as an
image of this or that, and whether it is consequently taken
to be an image of this or that, makes the image an image of
this or of that. As it is impossible to 'see' a mental
'appearance' as red and round without the thought that it is
a red and round thing that one 'sees', it is also impossible
to have a mental image of X without the thought that the
image is an image of X. [This is only roughly true. We
shall refine and develop this thesis in the next sections and in particular we shall explain what is involved in taking an image as an image of something.]

Are Mental Images Pictures?

The answer to this question is a very definite no. Many of the reasons why mental images cannot be pictures or like pictures, or why they cannot function like pictures, have already been mentioned. But it seems to be convenient at this point for purposes of organization and clarity to state, at least in a summary fashion, some of the reasons why any account of sensory imagination that likens mental images to pictures and imagining to seeing things in a picture would be mistaken.

Seeing something in a representational picture involves two things: 1) seeing the picture itself, and 2) seeing the object represented in the picture. Pictures are objects in their own right, which means that they can be seen independently from seeing in them the objects they represent, i.e., we can see a canvas from its back without seeing the object the canvas represents. Mental images, on the contrary, are not objects in their own right and cannot be seen apart from seeing the 'appearance' of the object of which they are images. That is to say, mental images do not have an appearance of their own. Consequently, 'seeing' something in the mind, unlike seeing something in a picture,
does not involve two things: 1) seeing the image itself, and 2) seeing the object imagined. Not having an appearance of their own 'seeing' a mental image itself is not different from 'seeing' the imagined object. Consequently, while seeing something in a picture can be described as seeing the represented object by means of seeing another object, i.e., the picture itself, this description is totally inaccurate in the case of sensory imagination for here we do not see something by means of seeing something else. Again, unlike the case of pictures, where seeing the picture and seeing something in the picture are two different things, however closely connected they are, in sensory imagination, seeing the intentional object and seeing the mental image are exactly the same thing. In imagination the 'appearance' of the imagined object in the mind is the same as the (appearance of) mental image. 11

But perhaps more important is the fact that mental images cannot ever function as mere pictures in the mind. We have seen in the immediately preceding section that the production of a mental image simply as a picture or reproduction of what is being perceived at the moment is impossible. Unlike material pictures, portraits, replicas, representations, etc., mental images can never be produced as and function as mere reproductions of the appearance of their intentional objects. Their role in our mental life is never that of a simple copy. This conception of sensory
imagination as a faculty which can engage in the idle reproduction of internal copies of perceptions is inaccurate. Of course, we often reproduce the appearance of earlier perceptions, but when we do this we are necessarily thinking about them, i.e., we are at least remembering them.

In sum, insofar as sensorily imagining something is thinking about this something, the role of a mental image in our mental life can never be that of a mere copy or reproduction of something, like pictures can be.

One reason why we may try to explain the phenomenon of 'seeing' something in the mind in terms of seeing something in a picture (or seeing something as something\(^1\) is, that in both cases we are perfectly infallible about what we see—\(P\) or 'see'. There is, at least a sense in which the person who says, "I see that (ostensibly) as Y" is in an incorrigible position. And the situation with regard to mental images is partially, but only partially, similar. We are, I shall argue in section eight, infallible about the sensory features that an image presents to the mind. But we are neither infallible about the kind of thing that we 'see', nor about the reference of the mental image. Now, we may ask, "is this partial similarity, namely, infallibility about their objects between seeing-as and 'seeing' in the mind sufficient to conclude that mental images are (mental) pictures and that the phenomenon of 'seeing' \(X\) in the mind is like that of seeing something in a picture?" It seems to
me that their conclusion is unwarranted and mistaken. For we have seen that there are also important dissimilarities between sensory imagination and seeing something in a picture that prevents us from using one to explain the other. These dissimilarities are, to repeat: 1) the fact that sensory imagination, unlike seeing something in a picture, is not a perceptual phenomenon; 2) the fact that mental images, unlike pictures, have no appearance of their own; 3) the fact that in sensory imagination the object is not 'seen' by means of seeing something else, as it is the case in seeing-as; 4) the fact that mental images have a function in mental life which is irreducible to that of being mere copies or representations as pictures can be. If we are going to liken sensory imagination to something else, I would simply say that 'seeing' X in the mind is not like seeing a picture of X, it is more like actually seeing-X.

Are Mental Images Autonomous?

Our concern here is whether imagination mental images are autonomous or not. At least many, if not all, non-imagination images, such as after effects, phosphenes, and some hallucinations, are autonomous, in the sense that their nature and existence are not dependent on our thoughts. Imagination mental images in some of their occurrences give the impression of having an independence comparable to that of non-imagination images. But I hope I shall make clear
that this is only an impression. In doing so I shall explain in some detail what makes an image an image of X and how this is accomplished.

The answer to the question of whether imagination mental images are autonomous or not, is in the negative. The reason is, as we mentioned, that 1) mental images come into existence only as a result of a mental act and disappear as soon as we stop sustaining their existence, 2) we determine the sensory features they have, 3) we determine the kind of objects of which they are images, and 4) we determine the particular objects of which they are images (when this is the case). But, again, there are certain occurrences that involve mental images that seem to contradict these claims. Let us examine these.

Mental images 'in the back of our minds'. Sometimes we may suddenly realize that for, say, the last hour or so, we have been haunted by a certain mental image. Do occurrences of this sort prove that mental images can exist on their own? Do they prove that mental images can spring spontaneously in the mind in total independence from our thoughts? Do they prove perhaps even that mental images have a world and a nature of their own? We cannot answer these questions unless we first consider a feature of the mind on which any answer depends.

When we deliberately picture something in our minds, or when we make an effort to 'hear' someone's voice in our
heads, we turn our attention from whatever we are perceiving at the moment and focus it on the thing we are picturing or on the voice we are 'hearing'. We can 'see' something in our mind and attend to it at the expense of taking our attention away from something else, i.e., what we are doing or observing or pondering about, etc. As a result of our effort to visualize, say, the Taj Mahal while writing a letter, our full awareness of the paper and of the words we are spelling is gone. Our eyes might still be fixed on the half-written word, but although we are looking at it, we are not really (or fully) seeing it. This might be a very brief occurrence and we might soon be back into our writing or, we may go into longer stretches of sensorily imagining things, i.e., we might indulge in a bit of day-dreaming. In this last case our attention is drawn towards the mental images that we happen to frame, together with the thoughts and feelings, etc. that accompany them, in such a manner that we become fully conscious of these things while we become oblivious to what surrounds us, particularly of whatever we happen to be hearing-P, seeing-P, etc.; we are, thus, almost disconnected from the world of perception. Yet we do not completely shut ourselves off from the world of perception. We remain conscious of it, 'in the background', so to speak. Most of us, I guess, are familiar with the experience, while day-dreaming, of being aware of noises around us, voices calling our names, etc. which sound very remote and to which
we do not react as we do when we are fully aware of them.

We cannot, as a matter of psychological impossibility, go into a stretch of day-dreaming at the same time that we maintain ourselves explicitly or fully aware of the world that surrounds us. We cannot, as a matter of psychological impossibility, 'see' and/or 'hear' and/or 'smell', etc. something in our mind with full awareness of it and at the same time be also explicitly, or fully, aware of something else. As phenomenologists have emphasized, this impossibility is a consequence of the way our consciousness operates. We normally cannot be fully or explicitly conscious of two or more things. We are normally attending to, explicitly thinking in some form or another of, just one thing. But this does not mean that we are conscious of just this thing and of nothing else at all. We are also normally conscious of very many other things but in a 'marginal' sense: we are only implicitly or not fully aware of them. The voices we hear - P 'in the background' when we are day-dreaming are an instance of marginal attention. Another example is the following: when at the theater we concentrate on an actor on the stage, we are only half aware of the other actors also on the stage. We may be even less aware of things like the humming of the air conditioner or the pain of a full bladder. Again, if we are to notice explicitly any of these things, it would be at the expense of giving up our concentration on the actor.
It is, therefore, psychologically impossible to be fully aware of many things at a time, yet we are all the time implicitly aware, or marginally conscious, of a large number of things in very many different ways. I take this to be a fundamental and undeniable feature of the way our mind operates. 13

Let us return now to the case of suddenly realizing that for the last hour or so we had an image haunting us. Let us suppose that this is an image of an old church we once visited. The realization in this case is not of the presence of an image in the mind of which we were completely oblivious in the last hour. Rather, it is the realization that for the last hour or so we were 'seeing' an image of a church in the mind, but we really did not take explicit notice of it. To suppose that in this case we realize the presence in the mind of an image of which we were absolutely unaware before, is absurd and contrary to the facts of the case. For, if we are absolutely unaware of something, then there is no sense in which we can say that it was present in the mind before. So, if we say that an image was present in the mind before, and this is what we say and know when we suddenly take notice of an image that was haunting us for the last hour, then we must have been aware of this image in some manner and to some extent other than taking explicit notice of it. So, we must have been aware of the image of the church to some extent, for it is
precisely this that we come to realize, viz., that the image was present for the last hour or so. Therefore, cases like this do not prove that we can have images of which we are absolutely unaware; they do not prove that images are autonomous items which can exist in their own right without our being aware of them at all.

But at this point someone may argue that being only marginally aware of the image of the church before we took explicit notice of it, may not prove that the image exists of its own accord, but disproves the claim that the sensory features of the image and its reference are dependent on our thoughts. For, it may be argued, how could we determine the nature of the image if we are not fully aware of it? It has been established that an image cannot exist if we are completely unaware of it, but it has not been shown how we can determine the nature of a mental image with our thoughts, when ex hypothesis we are not thinking about the image, i.e., the image is only in the back of our minds. Not having a constitution of their own, mental images cannot have their sensory features and their reference on their own right, for these could result only from having a constitution of their own. But although I find the suggestion that there may be something else that accounts for the nature of mental images other than their (supposed) constitution or our thoughts quite bizarre, still, we can show that even in cases when we have images in the back of our minds, the nature of the image
is determined by our thoughts.

Let us take the determination of sensory features first. We determine the sensory feature of a red and round 'appearance' in the mind by producing in the mind a red and round appearance, which implies, as we said in Section Five, that we are thinking of something red and round as being red and round. Now, when we have an image of a red and round thing in the back of our minds, how can we be said to be thinking of a red and round thing if we have not even realized the presence of the image in the mind? As before, we must first remember that when we have a mental image in the back of our minds we are aware of the image but only marginally. Now, in order to frame a mental image we do not need to do it with full awareness of what we are doing. As we have seen, only a very small part of the things we do are done in this manner. So, in order to frame an image of something red and round we do not have to do it with the explicit awareness (which is usually accompanying deliberation) of framing an image of a thing the 'appearance' of which is red and round. We can do it having only a marginal awareness of it, and when we do so, we typically say that we had an image in the back of our minds. Having an image of a red and round thing in the back of our minds implies, then, that we are thinking of a red and round thing in the back of our minds. And this is exactly what we say when we realize that for the last hour or so we had an image of a red and round
thing in the back of our minds, i.e., that for the last hour or so we were thinking of a red and round thing in the back of our minds.

Let us turn now to the determination of the referent. When I claimed that, having an image of X in the mind implies that it must have been framed with the thought of being an 'appearance' of X and nothing else, I did not mean that in order to frame this image we must entertain (before or at the same time we frame the image) the propositional thought "this is an image of X" or "this shall be the image of X." Surely, we never or almost never do this, not even when we frame an image with deliberation. What I mean is that when the image is framed we *ipso facto* know that the image is an image of X because we take it to be so, we take the image to be an image of X.14 And it is our taking the image to be an image of this or that, that makes the image an image of this or that. A painter engaged in the production of a portrait may never entertain the thought "this picture is a portrait of X" and yet his picture is undeniably a portrait of X because he takes it to be so. Similarly, when we frame a mental image of X in the mind, it is that object we take the image to be an image of that determines its intentional object.

And how do we do this? How do we go about taking an image as an image of X in a way that does not involve entertaining a proposition? Well, we do this in very many
ways. For example, by having these feelings towards the image, by framing these other images before and after we frame the image of X, by modifying the image in these particular ways, by having these recollections whenever it appears, etc. Surely, doing all this amounts to our taking that image as an image of X. So, we take an image to be an image of X when our mental attitudes surrounding the image are appropriate to X, that is to say, when our emotions, and/or inclinations, and/or recollections, and/or beliefs, etc. surrounding the image are appropriate to X. Now we can see how it is possible for a person to have a mental image of X and not be aware of this. It is possible because this person may have the appropriate mental attitudes towards the image to make it an image of X, and yet fail to realize what these mental attitudes amount to. That is to say, the person fails to see or draw the implications of his or her mental attitudes. A person may fail to do this partly because he or she is framing the image in the back of the mind, so this person is not fully aware of how he or she is taking this image. In other words, when we are not aware that a mental image we have is an image of X, we are only marginally aware of our mental attitude towards it. But this may not be the only reason, for even when we frame a mental image with de-liberation and full awareness of it, we may fail to see that we are taking this image as an image of X. We may be involved, for instance, in a bit of self-deception or we may
simply be making a mistake about it. In any case, what makes a mental image a mental image of X is the existence of a preponderance of mental attitudes appropriate to X, which can exist even when the explicit belief that this image is an image of X is non-existent. So, in order to have an image of X, and not of anything else, all that is necessary is 1) to be marginally or explicitly aware of certain 'appearances' in the mind, and 2) take this appearance to be the 'appearance' of X either explicitly or affectively.

When we have an image of an old church in the back of our minds, we are marginally aware of the presence of some sensory features and we are also marginally aware that we take this 'appearance' to be the image of that old church. Then, at a certain moment, we may fully realize the presence of the image in the mind with or without realizing that it is an image of that old church. We shall see how this is possible in the next portion of this section.

In conclusion, failing to realize that one's image is an image of X does not disprove the claim that we determine the referents of the image with our thoughts. The determination of the referents of an image is not done by means of any explicit thought but rather by our general mental attitude towards the image. And this general mental attitude is present even when an image exists only in the back of our minds.
Before we close our discussion of images in the back of our minds, we should consider another source of the belief that mental images are autonomous. A mental image which is framed in the back of the mind has not only been framed with marginal awareness of it, but also, presumably, non-deliberately. And, as a matter of fact, we also speak of mental images "coming before the mind" when we refer to their non-deliberate appearance. Accordingly, one may think that this means, or implies, that these images are autonomous items because they can invade the mind and move away from it on their own accord, leaving us the only task of noticing their presence or absence. But this is taking matters too literally, for when we say that "an image suddenly came before my mind," we mean to say that we suddenly 'saw' and/or 'hear', etc. something in the mind which we did not deliberately try to 'see' and/or 'hear', etc. It is quite obvious that some of our images are not deliberately produced, i.e., they simply come to us, but this fact is no proof that these images are not dependent on our thoughts or that their coming to us does not constitute thinking. For, as a matter of fact, a great number of the ideas that we entertain are not deliberately produced either, they simply come to us. And it would be absurd to conclude that, for this reason, we did not produce them, that they are not our ideas, that we did not think of them and that consequently these ideas are autonomous. Similarly, there is no reason
either to suppose that, because an image comes to us without us calling for it, or deliberately framing it, we actually did not frame the image, and that the image exists on its own.

The Wittgenstein Case. At this point in our discussion of the alleged autonomy of mental images, a critic is likely to bring up a sort of case which, for lack of a better name, I call 'The Wittgenstein Case'. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein wrote:

(But it is also possible for a face to come before my mind, and even for me to be able to draw it, without my knowing whose it is or where I have seen it.)\(^{15}\)

This sort of case is interesting and relevant to our discussion only if we assume that the face is in fact somebody's face. What happens in this sort of case is then that we are, at least in appearance, ignorant of the fact that a certain image we have is an image of a particular thing, a fact that, in accordance with our view, we should know.

First of all, a case of this sort is not simply a case in which a face comes to us, we know whose face it is, e.g., an old teacher's face, but we do not remember his name. Rather, it is one in which the face that comes to us is the face of, say, a former teacher but we do not know this, which is different from not remembering his name.

When, after the image has come to us, we come to realize that it is an image of that teacher, we do not simply
realize that the face we 'see' in our minds looks like that teacher's face. What we realize is that the image is the image of that teacher's face and not merely that there is a remarkable similarity. If all our realization amounted to was that the image just looks like that teacher's face, then we cannot conclude that the image is an image of the teacher's face. We know only that this image looks like him. We do not conclude on the basis of remarkable similarity alone that it is the teacher's face. For the similarity may be as remarkable as we can possibly conceive yet this alone does not make it an image of the teacher, as we already saw in the case of Professor Fulton's Royce. The identity of the image is not changed by our realization either. It does not become the image of the friend because we recognize the similarity.

Let us imagine that Professor Fulton, at some point, is shown photographs of Royce and James, and that he, then, realizes that those mental images that he had framed of a tall, bearded and elegant man did not correspond to the actual appearance of Royce, but rather that they were remarkably like James. That is to say, Professor Fulton realizes that he was wrongly imagining (non-sensorily) Royce as a tall, bearded, elegant man. Now, it would be manifestly absurd to believe that because he realizes this now, those mental images he framed as images of Royce were not really images of Royce. It would be even more absurd to believe
that they were images of James. Of course, they were images of Royce because Professor Fulton took them to be images of Royce. He framed them as the images of a man having a physical appearance that (he thought) fitted the ideas of the philosopher. He was spontaneously framing images of a man capable of saying things that (he thought) fitted the philosopher, and acting, reacting, dressing, eating, etc. in the same manner. He would or actually had the emotions and feelings that he had for Royce, perhaps of admiration and respect, every time that he framed these images. In other words, the images were metaphors of the philosopher's attitude. Whenever he pictured in his mind that tall, bearded, elegant man, he probably was inclined to or actually repeated to himself some of the thoughts of the philosopher, while he was unwilling to associate the images with certain other things, for instance with the name "Henry James." All these things and all the very many others I could mention of the same sort amount to Professor Fulton's taking those images of a tall, bearded, elegant man as the images of Royce and not of James. It is all these things that determine the referent of the image, that determine of which particular object and of what kind of object an image is an image. I had explained this much about the issue of the referent of a mental image already. Let me elaborate some more on it now.

If none of this 'thought' or 'mental attitude'
surrounding the image of a tall, bearded, elegant man of Professor Fulton existed, then the image would not be an image of Royce. When we say that Professor Fulton framed a mental image of Royce, we say that he produced a sensory 'appearance' in his mind towards which he has a 'mental attitude' which is based on his beliefs, feelings, emotions, evaluations, etc. about Royce. A different 'mental attitude' with different connections would surround a mental image of James. The beliefs, emotions, evaluations, etc. about Royce may be either abundant, accurate, strong, definitive, etc., or few, dubious, mistaken, etc. But having some beliefs and/or emotions and/or value judgments, etc. about Royce is necessary for framing a mental image of Royce. Having a 'mental attitude' towards an image of Royce does not mean actually and explicitly making all the connections with the other items that we associate with Royce. This would be nearly impossible. When we frame an image of Royce some of these connections are actually made and must be made. It would be impossible to frame an image towards which we have no mental attitude whatsoever. In order to take an image as an image of this or that, we must establish the position of this image (or of its object) in our conceptual framework by actually making some of the connections that we think the object of the image has with other things. In order to do this, we must either explicitly think of this image as an image of X framing it with the intention of being an image
of X or, alternatively, relate it in some other manner to the place and time that one thinks are appropriate to X, and/or relate it in some manner to certain people, organizations, country, etc. that one thinks are appropriate to X and/or relate it to a certain kind of work, performance, activity, etc. that one thinks is appropriate to X, etc. Often we do not entertain an explicit thought to the effect that a certain image is an image of X, and we do not always frame an image of X with the explicit intention of doing so. At least in the cases that we are considering in this section explicit thought and deliberate intention are ruled out. So, we may ask, what is that other manner in which we may determine the referent of a mental image? How is it that we relate an image to places, times, activities, appropriate to X if not with an explicit thought to that effect or with the deliberate intention of doing so? We do this by framing the image at a certain moment and 'place' in the stream of our mental events or activities. By this I mean that we do it in one or all of the following ways:

(1) We determine the referent of an image by framing the image immediately after certain recollections, thoughts, feelings, mental images, etc. have occurred. Some of these antecedent mental events may be associated with the image of X in more ways than the mere temporal contiguity in the stream of mental events. Some recollections, thoughts, sensations, images, etc. may have led us to frame the image
of X. Some may have also been about X, some may have reminded us of X, etc.

(2) We determine the referent of an image by having certain feelings, emotions, thoughts, recollections, etc. at the same time that we frame and sustain the image in the mind. Some of these accompanying mental events may have a closer relationship to the image of X than that of being mere contemporary episodes in a stream of mental events. Some of these contemporary recollections, expectations, thoughts, etc. may also be about X. Some of the feelings, emotions, desires, etc. that we have at the time may be those that we normally have towards X. Some feelings may actually be reactions to the appearance of the image in the mind, and so on.

(3) We determine the referent of an image by having certain thoughts, inclinations, recollections, emotions, etc. immediately after the image of X has disappeared. Some of these, again, may have come to our minds as the result of our having that image of X a moment before, etc. Not any one of these possibilities must actually be the case for the image to be an image of X, but at least some, or rather, a preponderance of them must actually be the case. These are the surrounding thoughts, or surrounding mental attitudes towards the image that I mentioned before.

Among the mental attitudes mentioned above that I said surround an image, there is one that I think is particularly important because it seems to be always present
and because it is quite comprehensive. This is the inclinasion we have to associate or connect an image with certain things and not with others. This inclination may fluctuate from merely being inclined to do certain things with the image and to avoid others when and if the occasion arises, to actually feel inclined to do certain things and avoid others. Whatever is the case, what is important is that with these inclinations we have the capacity of making many actual connections. Because of this, on those occasions when we may not have made enough explicit connections between a certain mental image and other things to determine its referent unambiguously, we may have the referent quite determined anyway by being inclined to associate that image with a great number of things and not with a great number of others. Because inclinations are potentially many actual connections, they reveal the general or preponderant mental attitude of a person towards an image and its object. We should take notice then, that the referent of a mental image is not determined simply by some more or less contemporaneous mental event to the image, i.e., a couple of recollections about the same object and a couple of feelings similar to those one has about the object itself. Rather, the referent of a mental image is determined by the basic thoughts that the person has about that referent. By 'basic thoughts' about a certain thing, I mean those thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, etc. that we have about a
certain thing and by virtue of which we can distinguish it from everything else. A significant number of these thoughts comes to determine the referent of the image. This is done through and by virtue of our inclinations towards the image. For when we are, or feel, inclined to do these things with a mental image of X, but not these other things, we are using these basic thoughts. In other words, whether we are inclined to do this or that with an image is because we think of its referent as being this particular thing and not anything else. These basic thoughts, clearly enough do not come to the determination of the referent of an image always explicitly. They most often do their job only implicitly, in the sense that they are present only insofar as they are implied by the potential connections that our inclinations have for mental images. In sum, we use, effectively or only implicitly, our basic thoughts about X in order to frame an image of X.

The mental attitude that we have towards an image on one occasion may fail to pick out just one referent. In fact, this often may be the case. A commander, for instance, who has to choose an individual for a dangerous mission, may frame, among the candidates that pass his mind, an image that he takes to be either of X Smith or of his twin brother, Y Smith. In bringing to mind deliberately this ambiguous image, the commander considers, at once, X and Y as candidates for the mission. In doing so he was thinking of both of them.
He could do this easily because they look alike. The mental attitude that surrounds this image must, accordingly, be one that includes all the thoughts that the commander thinks apply to both brothers and exclude those thoughts that apply to one or the other exclusively. But when a person frames an image not as an ambiguous image, but as an image of a specific object, X, which he or she knows to be different from everything else, then the image will be surrounded by his or her general thought about X and consequently, the image will be unambiguously an image of X. In other words, if the mental attitude surrounding an image that a person has on an occasion is undetermined in such a manner that the image could be either an image of X or Y, then either it is because this person in general, and not only in imagination, fails to distinguish X from Y, or because this person intends the image to be ambiguous. This follows from the above discussion. For if it is the case that the referent of an image is determined by the general or basic mental attitude that a person has towards that referent, and not only by some attitudes, then a failure to distinguish X from Y in imagination (when the image of a particular thing is at issue) is necessarily the result of a failure to distinguish these in general. If a person is able to tell X apart from anything else, then this person can unambiguously frame an image of X. And whenever he frames an image that he or she takes as an image of X, the image
will be unambiguously an image of X. But this, as the following paragraphs shall explain, does not deny the possibility that when this person has an image of X, he or she may think or believe (mistakenly) that the image is the image of Y. One should not expect that the mental attitudes surrounding the image of X are identical in all of us. Each of us determines the reference of his or her images in accordance with his or her belief about, evaluation of, etc. X. And these vary from person to person. Consequently, the determination of the referent of a mental image is done on the grounds of each person's more or less idiosyncratic beliefs, feelings, etc. about the object.

Having explained in some detail how we determine the referent of a mental image, let us come back now to those cases we were trying to explain of an image coming to mind, say the face of an old teacher, without our knowing that it is the face of that old teacher. How can we not know this if, in accordance with our account, we determine it?

When the image 'comes before our minds', we frame non-deliberately an image of the face of that old teacher, but in so doing we become explicitly aware only of the sensory features it presents and of the fact that it is an image of a fact. But the fact that we framed that image as an image of that old teacher, does not become explicit to us. For some reason we do not become explicitly aware of what we, ex hypothesis, know, i.e., that the image is an image of
the old teacher. On the one hand, we say that the image is an image of that teacher in virtue of our thoughts; and on the other hand, we say that we do not know that the image is an image of that teacher. So, it seems that we are saddled either with a contradiction (and a counter-example to our view) or we have to postulate the existence of unconscious thoughts, a position which, at best, would need much explanation and support. But we do not need to take either horn of the dilemma.

When we say that we determine the fact that this image is an image of that old teacher, with our thoughts or mental attitudes, all we mean to say is that we take this image as an image of that teacher. We do this, perhaps, by having a certain violent reaction of fear and distrust towards it as we used to have towards the teacher himself when at school, by having before and after other images of objects associated with him, by recalling certain smells, sounds, subjects, books, etc. associated with him, by thinking (and even talking) about other teachers, or about schools, whenever this image comes to mind, etc. Thus we take this image to be the image of that old teacher without having to entertain any proposition to that effect. And taking the image in this way, which amounts to, in a sense, thinking about that teacher, is perfectly compatible with our failure to draw the implications of this 'mental attitude' of ours towards the image. We simply may not
realize what all this amounts to. On the other hand, this does not constitute any kind of unconscious thinking. Taking the image as the image of that old teacher in the ways we just mentioned constitutes and amounts to a particular form of thinking, but it is not unconscious thinking.

Why is it, we may now ask, that sometimes we do not realize that we are taking an image as an image of something? Sometimes, I imagine, it is due to sheer stupidity and other times because we are engaged in a bit of self-deception. But, generally speaking, the explanation will always be a psychological explanation, which is the task of the psychologist to determine. It is also possible to fail to realize of what kind of object a mental image is an image. For example, someone may frame a mental image of a flying saucer, yet for some psychological reason this person is aware that it is an image of a mechanical object, or even of a flying mechanical object, but fails to realize that it is an image of a flying saucer. His mental attitude towards it implies that it is an image of a flying saucer, but he fails to see what his mental attitude amounts to, perhaps due to the fear or embarrassment associated with this potential realization.

How can a person come to realize that the mental image that he or she has is actually a mental image of an old school teacher or a flying saucer? How do we come to be
fully aware of the referent of our mental image? This is a psychological question, but it is important to make clear here that if scrutiny and analysis (if at all possible) of the mental image are involved in the realization, it could not possibly be because by these means we can discover new sensory features in the image. This is impossible. There is nothing in the 'appearance' of the image that we have not put there ourselves and that it is not there as an 'appearance' for us to 'see' and/or 'hear', etc.

In conclusion, that mental images are dependent on our thoughts for their coming to being and subsistence, for having the sensory features that they have and for having the reference (to a particular object and/or to a kind of object) they have, has been shown. It has also been shown how this is done.

Infallibility

In perception, we can go wrong in the following three ways:

(1) We can make a mistake about a feature or about the appearance of a thing, i.e., think that what we see-P is straight when it is twisted;

(2) We can mistake the type of thing something is, i.e., think that what we see-P is a horse when it is a mule that we see-P;

(3) Misidentify an object of perception, i.e.,
take a person for another.

The first kind of mistake is impossible in sensory imagination. About the sensory features that we 'see' and/or 'hear', etc. in the mind we are infallible. When we 'see' something red and circular in our minds, it is impossible to find out subsequently that what we 'saw' was actually, say, square and blue. There are two, yet inter-connected, reasons why this is so.

(1) There is nothing in the sensory nature of the image that we have not put there ourselves. If something 'appears' as being red and round in our mind, it is because we gave it this appearance ourselves. So, although we have an 'appearance' in the mind that we 'see' and/or 'hear', etc., no recognition takes place. We do not recognize something as being red in the mind. We know it 'appears' red because we have determined it that way. So, the idea of concluding what sensory features a mental image presents after examining it, is absurd. An image is necessarily framed as having this or that sensory feature and this is something that we know.

(2) But apart from the fact that we determine the sensory features of our mental images, we are also infallible about them because they are nothing but appearances, that is to say, their appearance is completely given by what we 'see' and/or 'hear', etc. in our minds. To think that we may discover on one occasion that what we
'see' in the mind as red, may not be red but brown, is absurd. It is absurd because it implies that mental images can have color apart from our seeing them of one color or another. And this is impossible for they have no constitution of their own. Mental images are the color or form, etc. that we 'see' them having. Mental images are nothing but appearances, nothing beyond what we 'see', 'hear', etc.

But we not only determine the sensory features of our mental images, we also determine the kind of object our mental image is an image of and the particular objects of which they are images, when this is the case. So, we may reason that we are justified in concluding that we are infallible about these two things as well. But this conclusion would be incorrect, for although we are normally infallible about these two things, we are not always so.

In sensory imagination it is possible to think that an image is an image of X when in fact it is not. The same is true about the kind of image. "But how," one should rightly wonder, "can one think that his image is an image of X and not be an image of X, when we have made it clear, and insisted again and again, that we determine this with our thoughts? In accordance with our doctrine, if a person thinks that his image is an image of X, then it is an image of X." True, but the mind is a much more complicated thing. Let me explain how it is possible to go wrong about the
object.

We have seen that a person can have an image of X in his mind and not know this explicitly. We have shown how this is possible: by failing, for some psychological reason, to draw the consequences of his 'mental attitude'. Now, we can imagine a person that not only fails to be aware that he is taking a mental image as an image of X, but also on top of this, he thinks that it is an image of Y. So, while he has framed the image as an image of X and takes the image with his general mental attitude as an image of X, he also explicitly thinks that it is an image of Y. The reasons why we may falsely believe that our image of X is an image of Y, vary from person to person and range from simple mistake to self-deception. A woman, for instance, after a shocking experience with a brutal rapist, may have repressed the whole incident. Yet, she may be haunted by images of the rapist which she thinks are images of a certain school teacher--his look-alike perhaps--whenever she becomes fully aware of their presence. So, although the woman has framed those images as images of the rapist (for all the necessary connections are there), she refuses to acknowledge that fact and belief or thinks that they are images of the school teacher.

In conclusion, I hope to have amply shown that when a person's dominant mental attitudes towards a mental image are appropriate to X, then the image is an image of X,
even when the person fails to realize this or actually thinks that the image is an image of Y. This particular explanation of how the nature of a mental image is determined has allowed us to see that in spite of the apparent autonomy that some mental images present, imagination mental images, generally speaking, are totally dependent on our thoughts.

**Individuation**

The identity of a mental image depends on what it is an image of and, as we have just seen, this, in turn, depends on our thoughts. Two mental images, the full descriptions of which might be identical, are not necessarily the same image. One may be the image of John, and the other of James, his identical twin. What makes one image an image of John and not of James is the fact that we take one as the image of John and the other as the image of James.

We can frame many mental images of an object; the full descriptions of some of these images may coincide but the description of others may not. If I frame in my mind two mental images of an object, one at $t^1$ and the other at some time later $t^2$, assuming that the full descriptions of these images perfectly coincide one with the other, are they the same image? Well, in a sense they are: if we intend to call "the same image" two mental images that are of the same
object and present the same 'appearance' of it, then they are. But we must keep in mind that there is another sense in which they are not the same image, viz., they constitute two different mental occurrences at two different times.

In general, when we speak of mental images, the expression "the same thing" is quite ambiguous and there seems to be no definite criterion for deciding one way or another. This is not only because of the obvious reason that we are dealing here with occurrences that cannot be publicly assessed, but also because mental images are not objects in their own right. Consequently, expressions such as "same image," "different image," "other image," "similar image," etc. when used in this context have an ambiguity that arises from the ephemeral nature of these immaterial images. For this reason, I think it is convenient here to take Wittgenstein's advice to the point that it does not matter whether we call them one thing or several, provided we are clear, in each case, about what we mean. In fact, even the images of the twins, John and James, can, in a sense, be said to be the same image, for after all their descriptions are identical. But there is a third factor that makes any talk about 'sameness' of mental images, or any attempt to compare mental images one with the other, idle and inappropriate at least to a great extent. This is the fact, already mentioned, that mental images are not, or are not always, discrete, static items that appear and
disappear as photographic frames projected on a screen appear. When thinking about the *Venus de Milo*, for instance, we may frame an image of it in such a manner that we can 'see' the general appearance of the statue as if we were seeing—P it from a distance of several meters. But then our image may suffer a transformation: remembering that the statue is a two thousand year old marble we might suddenly see the whiteness of the stone and its deteriorated surface. Or, on the other hand, our image may suffer a transformation that we normally express (analogically) by saying that certain features 'came into focus' and then 'see' in our minds the serene face or the mutilated arms or the erect breasts, etc., things that we did not actually 'see' when we first framed the image, in a seminar sense in which we may say we are not seeing now the gracious arching of the neck. We can go through a long stretch of time in which we visualize the statue as seen—P from several points of view, having some features in mind at one time and other features later. In some cases, then, the modifications can be described as the sudden 'appearance' of a totally new 'view' of the statue, but in other cases, the changes in what we 'see' during this stretch of time should be described rather as modifications, alterations of an image, for there is a definite development or evolution that the image undergoes when only one or a few features of the image drop 'out of view' or come into view
at a time. The evolving image is, then, quite literally a 'visual' development of our thoughts about the object in question. If a feature drops 'out of view' it is because we stop thinking of it; if a new feature or a new perspective comes into appearance, it is, alternatively, because we are thinking of it.

Where does an image, then, begin and end in this visual evolution of our thoughts? Due to the three factors mentioned, I suspect that any general answer to this question would force under the heading of 'a mental image' awkwardly discrete units resulting from a totally artificial butcher's job.

Summary of the chapter

Any adequate doctrine of sensory imagination should:

1. Preserve and account for our ordinary use of the concept of a mental image when speaking about occurrences of sensorily imagining something and for ordinary expressions such as "I could see this bright mental image of a yellow tree."

2. It must preserve and explain the sensory characteristics of sensory imagination, i.e., the undeniable fact that when we sensorily imagine something, the experience is, to some extent, like actually perceiving something and having sensations. That is to say, it must accord with the experience of framing, having and 'seeing'
and/or 'hearing', etc. a mental image that at least most humans report.

(3) It must preserve the intentional object (the object of which the image is an image) as the subject of imagination, without either eliminating the concept of a mental image and without making the image itself the object of imagination. Accounts of sensory imagination that fail in any of these respects fall into the molds either of Cartesianism or of Behaviorism.

The account I have produced here, I believe, has the merit of preserving and explaining all these features.

I hope I have shown that the concept of a mental image, as a mental 'appearance' of something, is a concept indispensable in a true account of sensory imagination. For we must distinguish, on the one hand, the 'appearance' that something has in imagination—the mental image—from the appearance it actually has in perception, for these two are never the same. And on the other hand, the 'appearance' that something has in imagination—the mental image, again—from the appearance we merely think it has, for the former we actually 'see', 'hear', etc. while the second we only think about.

Yet, I insisted that mental images are not private mental pictures of their intentional objects. When we have a mental image of X, X is all we 'see' in the mind (by
these means); X is the object of sensory imagination. For we do not come to 'see' X in the mind by means of seeing something else, presumably, the mental image of X. Nevertheless, I argued that it is not inappropriate to speak of 'seeing mental images'. But mental images are not objects in their own right, they lack a constitution and thus an appearance of their own. So, they are nothing else but an 'appearance' of something else. Consequently, "seeing a mental image of X" means exactly the same thing as "'seeing' X in the mind," and this is unlike the case of pictures where "seeing X in a picture" is something different from "seeing the (material) picture itself."

I have also claimed that although the experience of having a (imagination) mental image is not a perceptual experience (as shown in Chapter I) it is nevertheless a sensory experience. That is to say, the experience of 'seeing' X in the mind is sensory because we are sensorily aware of an 'appearance' which presents its objects necessarily from a point of view, with a certain intensity and duration.

But although sensory imagination is a sensory faculty, it is also and essentially a thinking faculty for, I argued, it is impossible to frame a mental image the production of which would not amount to a thought. First, I showed that any case of sensory imagination that we consider is one in which the image is framed with
a point. Second, I showed that the production of a mental image of a perceptually-present object as it appears in perception at the moment, which would amount to no thought, is logically impossible for this very reason. Sensory imagination is, therefore, a form of thought that occurs in images. My view contrasts sharply with most other views that present imagination primarily as a faculty which is merely reproductive of perception and often idle.

I have also argued that mental images having no determinations of their own, cannot have this or that 'appearance', be this or that kind of object, or be an image of this or that particular being, on their own accord. We determine this for ourselves by framing an image as having this or that sensory features and by taking the image as an image of this or that particular object (when this is the case) and/or of this or that kind. I also explained how we go about taking an image as an image of this or that. I said that we do this with the thoughts or 'mental attitudes' that surround the image, that is, by actually connecting the image with the rest of our mental life and thus determining its place in our conceptual framework. For all these reasons, I argued mental images are not autonomous items but rather dependent on our thoughts.

I also claimed that we are infallible about the sensory features that a mental image presents to the mind. But although we are, normally, equally infallible about
their referent, we sometimes can be wrong about this. For it is possible to have an image of X in the mind and either not know that the image is an image of X, or think falsely that the image is an image of Y.

In the next chapter I intend to make clear the relation in which sensory imagination stands to perception. In it we shall also see the role that a certain kind of concept plays in sensory imagination.
CHAPTER IV

SENSORY IMAGINATION AND PERCEPTION

Hume's Thesis

Hume's psychological and causal account of mental images ('Ideas') as traces of earlier perceptions ('Impressions') and Hume's thesis that images differ from perceptions only in degree, have been often rejected especially by Twentieth Century authors. But many of these authors have retained, in one form or another the Humean belief—a basic empiricist tenant—that mental images are essentially connected with perception. Roughly, it is thought that having perceptions is a necessary condition for sensory imagination to occur.

I shall examine this thesis here. First, I will review it as it appears in Hume himself. Then I shall address myself to three contemporary versions of it: Dilman's, Ryle's and Annis Flew's. These contemporary versions, I hope to show, are either false, add little to Hume's thesis, or present it in a trivial fashion. In turn, I shall try to give an answer to the question of whether having perceptions is a necessary condition for having mental images, and if this is the case, why and in exactly what sense this occurs.
Hume thought that a mental image is a product of perception: to each image corresponds a perception from which it is derived. He noticed, nevertheless, that we, as a matter of fact, produce images of things that we never experienced. Such images, he acknowledged, do not have a corresponding perception. But although we have never experienced these things that we form in our fancy as a whole, we have, he asserts, experienced all the parts that compose them. The one to one correspondence between perceptions and images is strictly true only of what he calls 'Simple Impressions' and 'Simple Ideas'. As he says:

\[\ldots\text{all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.}\]

The one to one relationship between simple impressions and simple images holds generally but with one sort of exception, Hume tells us, that "is so singular, that is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim." The sort of exception Hume notices is that of a man who is able to produce a shade of color which he has never seen—\(P\) before in his imagination when he is presented a chart with all the different shades of that color except the one he has never seen and in the place of which there is a blank.

The most a human being can do with the freedom of his imagination, in accordance with this doctrine, is to re-assemble, re-shuffle, or reorganize the 'building blocks'--
so to speak--given by perception. It is important for our further discussion to notice here that the notion of simple or basic items--simple impressions and ideas--is essential to the doctrine for only at this irreducible level can be established the connection between perception and imagination.

This Humean doctrine is, at a general level, clearly false for there is much that we can imagine that has no such dependence and perception, i.e., imagining the consequences if the doctrines of Sociobiology were incorporated in the school curriculum. It is common knowledge that Hume assumed that all imagining was done with or through mental images. He failed to notice that there is much imagining we do that does not involve mental imagery. Hume may say though that by "Imagination" he meant most of the time what we call here Sensory Imagination. The relevant question now is whether Hume's doctrine is true about Sensory Imagination.

The reason Hume gives in defense of his thesis that a person cannot have a mental image of something that he or she has not experienced before as a whole or in all its parts, rest on his belief that images are traces of impressions. But this belief is open to the standard criticism of being more a causal and psychological doctrine than a logical one. For this reason, we would do well if, instead of examining this doctrine in its Humean formulation
we do it in its non-psychological reformulation produced by some contemporary writers. There are two versions:

1) Dilman and Ryle hold the view that a human being cannot sensorily imagine anything that he or she does not know as a whole in its visual and/or auditory, etc. appearance.

2) Annis Flew and Ryle (again) hold a view which is a version of the Humean thesis of the necessity of knowing at least 'the parts' of what is imagined.

Is Sensory Imagination Utilization of Knowledge?

Dilman and Ryle (as well as Sartre) hold the view that knowledge of the sensible features of a thing on the part of the subject is a necessary condition for him to sensorily imagine it. That is to say, a person must know how something looks and/or sounds, etc. prior to the framing of its image. Dilman says:

For if I did not already know what he looks like I could not have formed a mental image of him, nor drawn his portrait. 3

Pursuing this line of thought, we may say that in the case of real, perceptible things this knowledge can be obtained only, or ultimately only, by perceiving the things themselves (or perhaps by perceiving a mirror image of them), consequently in order to sensorily imagine a real thing, someone at least must have perceived the thing. In the
case of fictional beings, which are not perceptible, knowledge of their would be or imagined sensible features is also necessary, in accordance with Dilman and Ryle, but in this case, one must admit, we do not learn their perceptual features from experience but from myths, popular speculation, etc. The thesis is, therefore, not explicitly a thesis to the point that we cannot sensorily imagine something we have not experienced before but a thesis to the point that we cannot sensorily imagine an object the sensible features of which we do not know. How this knowledge is acquired, how dependent it is on perception, is another matter. But to the extent that this knowledge is knowledge of sensible features of real or fictional beings one may assume that this knowledge is ultimately dependent on perception.

In The Concept of Mind, Ryle says:

Going through a tune in one's head is like following a heard tune and is, indeed, a sort of rehearsal of it. But what makes the imaginative operation similar to the other is not, as is often supposed, that it incorporates the hearing of ghosts of notes similar in all but loudness to the heard notes of the real tune, but the fact that both are utilisations of knowledge of how the tune goes. This knowledge is exercised in recognising and following the tune, when actually heard; it is exercised in humming or playing it; in noticing the errors in its misperformance; it is also exercised in fancying oneself humming or playing it and in fancying oneself merely listening to it.
As we have seen in Chapter II, to sensorily imagine something for Ryle is a form of pretence: like an actor pretends to commit a murder and a child pretends to be a bear. So, the reason why knowledge of the sensible features of something is a necessary condition in order to sensorily imagine it is that this knowledge is necessary for the presence

A person who had not learned how bears growl, or how murderers commit murders, could not play bears, or act murders.5 Similarly, 'seeing' Helvellyn in one's mind "is one utilization among others of the knowledge of how Helvellyn should look, or in one sense of the verb, it is thinking how it should look."6

There are two sorts of counter-examples that prove this thesis to be untenable. The first sort of counter-example is that in which we sensorily imagine something the sensible features (real or imaginary) of which we are completely ignorant. The case of Professor Fulton picturing Royce in his mind that we examined in the former chapter is an example. Our ignorance about the sensible features of something is a matter of degree. In the case of Professor Fulton's visualizing Royce the ignorance of the sensible appearance of Royce was quite complete. When we speak over the telephone, to bring another sort of case, we may be talking with a person whose visual appearance we completely ignore, but we have a first-hand knowledge of how he sounds,
so our ignorance of his sensible features covers visual features but not auditory ones. In these circumstances we can visualize the person at the other end of the telephone furnishing a visual 'appearance' of the person to match his voice. Cases like these, then, are a clear indication that Ryle's and Dilman's theses are untenable.

But perhaps more significant is the fact that even when we are in possession of knowledge of the sensible features of something we may not utilize it when we sensorily imagine it. The day-dreamer that 'sees' Pope Paul as a coin-operated robot may know well how the Pope looks and yet he is not utilizing this knowledge on this occasion for he is 'seeing' the Pope in his mind not as the Pope actually looks but as having the appearance of a robot.

In the case of fictional beings, it is also possible to form mental images of them without knowing their sensible features at all or only partially. A person may learn, for instance, who Prometheus is, what his deeds and status in Greek mythology are, yet knowing nothing about the visual appearance he is supposed to have--if any--this person can frame in his mind a visual image of Prometheus.

I am not claiming that we may be absolutely ignorant about something and yet be able to sensorily imagine it. On the contrary, we must know who or what sort of thing something is at least vaguely in order to sensorily imagine it. I am only claiming that having knowledge of the sensible
features (real or fictional) of a thing is not a necessary condition for someone to sensorily imagine the thing and, consequently, that sensory imagination is not in essence, as Ryle claims, utilization of this knowledge.

Let us consider now the second sort of counter-example. These are constituted by mental images about which there is no question how accurate or faithful they are to the original. If sensory imagination were essentially utilization of knowledge of the perceptual features of a thing, then all our mental images would necessarily be more or less accurate and faithful to the thing imagined, varying in accordance with the accuracy of our knowledge of the thing itself. Ryle, who holds this view, consequently attempts to show that all our imaginings can be assessed as being not only more or less vivid but also more or less accurate and faithful. Cases of non-real things or not-yet-real things which are imagined are cases about which we can doubt whether it makes sense to speak of them as accurate and faithful. Ryle seems to be aware of this:

Certainly not all imagining is the picturing of real faces and mountains, or the 'hearing' of familiar tunes and known voices. We can fancy ourselves looking at fabulous mountains. Composers, presumably, can fancy themselves listening to tunes that have never yet been played. It may be supposed, accordingly, that in such cases there is no question of the imaginary scene being pictured right, or of the tune still under composition being 'heard' to go otherwise than as it really goes.
But in spite of this, Ryle insists that in these cases, as in all others, the required knowledge is present. As the man who 'hears' in his head a familiar tune is pretending or imagining to be hearing-P, Ryle tells us, the man who 'hears', 'sees', etc. a non-real thing in his mind, say Atlantis is "doing a piece of double imagining," for he is not only imagining or pretending that he sees something, he is also imagining and pretending "that this is how Atlantis would have looked." This, of course, shows that he, in fact, knows how anything that we would be inclined to call Atlantis should look, that is, he has an idea of what kind of arrangement of sensible features we would be inclined to call Atlantis. This might be correct for Atlantis as it was correct for the case of Prometheus, but it is not correct for all cases of imagining non-real things. Ryle's examples of non-real things are all cases of beings about which there is common knowledge of how they would or should look and/or sound, etc. if they were real. His account of sensory imagination as utilization of knowledge works well for these cases precisely because these are cases of non-real things of which there exists this body of knowledge commonly agreed upon about the sensible features of those things. This knowledge is obviously not obtained through perception, but exists in the form of myths, tales, fiction literature, popular speculation, etc. We have never perceived Aphrodite, Santa Claus, or a Martian,
yet, as Ryle rightly points out, we have a general idea of how a person who intends to impersonate them should look, we have, so to speak, knowledge of the original or model (whether ideal or real). The original Aphrodite, Santa Claus or visitor from Mars have an existence either in Greek mythology, in Christian popular fables, or in popular and/or scientific speculation (that occurred at some time).

But the situation is quite different when the object that is sensorily imagined has no other existence than in the mental image of a particular individual and necessarily in his thoughts or fancy. I may, for instance, frame in my mind a mental image of a three-headed monster covered in yellow and blue polka dots and which speaks poetically, etc. I have never seen—P such a being, nor have I ever read or heard a description of it. I have not conceived it in my mind before either, I just made it all up. In this case, surely there is no question of my image being accurate or faithful to anything; there is no model or original monster the sensible features of which I might have known before hand and in accordance with which I might have produced the image. There is no sense of talking about utilization of knowledge of an original here. Another example: a composer who 'hears' a melody in his head that he has never heard—P or written before, but that he simply runs it through his head in a creative moment. The musician is not ex hypothesis, utilizing knowledge of how the melody goes.
If Ryle's account were true occurrences of this kind would be impossible. Yet they occur.

It seems to me that Ryle, or for that matter any person who makes no place for, and use of, the concept of a mental image, is bound to end up with the view that sensorily imagining something is 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. something in the mind as we know the imagined thing looks, sounds, etc. For if we do not talk of mental images, if we do not distinguish the objects we sensorily imagine from the way they 'appear' in the mind, then we must adopt the view that we 'see' X in the mind only when what we 'see' in our minds looks, at least to a certain extent, like X, or, in more general terms, that we sensorily imagine X only when we 'see', and/or 'hear', etc. X as it actually looks and/or sounds, etc. But as we have already seen repeatedly, mental images do not need to be veridical, and knowledge of the sensible features of the imagined object—a condition for the image to be veridical—is not a necessary condition for sensorily imagining the object either.

On the other hand, I am, certainly, utilizing some knowledge in picturing that fantastic monster I just referred to, and the composer is utilizing some knowledge in the production of his melody in his head, but it is not knowledge of how the three-headed monster should look and sound nor knowledge of how the melody should go. What kind of knowledge is utilized in these cases shall be discussed
Is Sensory Imagination Possible Without Knowledge of a Language?

At the end of the chapter on imagination of The Concept of Mind, Ryle writes:

A person who had not learned how bears growl, or how murderers commit murders, could not play bears, or act murders. Nor could he criticize the acting. In the same way, a person who had not learned how blue things look, or how the postman's knock sounds, could not see blue things in his mind's eye, or 'hear' the postman's knock; nor could he recognize blue things, or postman's knocks. Now we learn how things look and sound chiefly and originally by seeing and hearing them. Imagining being one among many ways of utilizing knowledge, requires that the relevant knowledge has been got and not lost. We no more need a para-mechanical theory of traces to account for our limited ability to see things in our mind's eyes than we need it to account for our limited ability to translate French into English. All that is required is to see that learning perceptual lessons entails some perceiving, that applying those lessons entails having learned them, and that imagining is one way of applying those lessons. 11

Unfortunately, Ryle does not say any more about this issue. What exactly does he understand by a "perceptual lesson?"

The suggestion is twofold: that these perceptual lessons are and are not connected with the particular thing imagined. The example of the postman's knock suggests that we must learn through perceptual lessons the sensible features of the object in question itself. This suggestion we have examined already in the previous section and found
it untenable. But the passage in the above paragraph about learning how blue things look suggests that the perceptual lessons mentioned are not necessarily connected with any particular item to be imagined. But if these lessons do not yield knowledge about the perceptual features of any particular thing, what kind of knowledge do they yield that might be necessary to sensorily imagine anything?

A. Flew has a clear answer to this question. These perceptual lessons, she claims, yield knowledge about language viz., they teach us how to use a certain vocabulary of perception terms, they teach us the meaning of certain words. In her paper, "Images, Supposing and Imagining," she claims to be giving a new interpretation of the Humean thesis that human beings cannot sensorily imagine what they have not experienced before at least in all its parts. She states her position as follows:

So Hume's insistence that before we could have a particular image (idea) we must necessarily have had particular experiences (impressions) can be re-interpreted into a thesis that to describe any (private) image with understanding we must have learnt and not forgotten (public) lessons in the use of the words in which we are to describe that image.\(^\text{12}\)

Flew also believes that we can have "images which, with our present vocabulary, are indescribable,"\(^\text{13}\) and offers as an example of this, the difficulty that some subjects find in describing their experiences while under the influence of mescal.
This thesis has had considerable influence and acceptance. Its appeal probably arises from the fact that it seems to re-state the Humean thesis very neatly as a thesis not about our psychological consciousness but as a thesis "about logic and language,"\(^{14}\) as Flew herself tells us. I shall try to show next that Flew's thesis is, first, possibly true but, second, that it tells us nothing about images and imagination, and, third, that it is not really a version of the Humean doctrine.

(1) Instead of telling us what the necessary conditions for having a mental image, or, for sensorily imagining something are, Flew gives us in her thesis a necessary condition for describing a mental image. But the fact that her thesis speaks of mental images is irrelevant to its truth. The necessary condition for describing mental images mentioned in the thesis is a necessary condition for describing anything at all, not only mental images. Because in order to describe a mental image with understanding, and in order to describe anything at all as well, we must have learned and not forgotten how to use the words in which we are to describe that thing or image. This is true, of course, assuming that the learning of a language requires 'public lessons', i.e., that the ability to describe, in general, rests on prior experiences, an assumption that, I take, most people would be willing to concede. A parrot can repeat a description without any understanding; the
animal, we say, is not really using those words, not really describing anything, it is just imitating sounds. But if a human being is said to describe something, in the full sense of the word, he or she, of course, must know the meaning of the words used in the description. If a person ignores the meaning of certain words, he cannot produce a description of something that requires the use of these words.

(2) Although this thesis is, very likely, true, it is a thesis not about sensory imagination and not about mental images really. It is a thesis about describing or about the linguistic competence necessary for anyone to describe something perceptible in principle, for all it says is that knowledge of a perceptual language, acquired through public lessons, is a necessary condition for anyone to describe something perceptible (in principle) in words. Thus, whether the object of the description is a mental image or something else which is perceptible, is immaterial to the truth of the thesis. In other words, the necessary condition that Flew mentions in her thesis has no special connection with sensory imagination, it is not a condition peculiar to describing mental images only. It is, again, a condition for describing anything perceptible (in principle) in general.

(3) Hume's thesis is about the necessary conditions for having, not describing, mental images. As we pointed
out before, Flew believes that we can have mental images
that we cannot describe and that because we cannot describe
a mental image we should not conclude that we do not have
it. Consequently, her thesis about the impossibility of
describing mental images without having knowledge of cer-
tain words is not meant to imply that it is also impossible
to have mental images we cannot describe.

If it did imply this, the thesis would be in any
case false, because knowledge of the meaning of any words,
or for that matter, knowledge of a language is not a
necessary condition for having mental images. It would be
ridiculous to think that because Tarzan does not know a
language he cannot visualize anything, or have drummings
and rumbles running in his head. Flew's thesis, then,
which tells us nothing about the conditions for having or
producing mental images has little to do with Hume's and
our own concern here viz., to determine whether and in what
respect perception is a necessary condition for the pro-
duction of mental images.

In conclusion, Flew's thesis, which is very possibly
true and perhaps even trivially so, is not a thesis about
mental images in particular and it is not really a version
or re-interpretation of Hume's thesis.
Is Sensory Imagination Impossible

Without Sense Perception?

Let us consider now the question about the kind of knowledge, if any, we must be in possession of in order to frame any mental image and what relation does this knowledge have, if any, to perception. Or, again, what kind of knowledge yield those perceptual lessons of which Ryle spoke. We know, so far, that it is not knowledge of the sensible features of any particular thing nor knowledge of a language.

Following Ryle's lead, on the one hand, I shall argue that knowledge of the basic sensible (or sensory) concepts is a necessary condition for anyone to sensorily imagine anything. More concretely, knowledge of the basic visual concepts is a necessary condition for anyone to 'see' something in his or her mind; knowledge of the basic auditory concepts necessary for anyone to 'hear' something, etc. And even more concretely, knowledge of the concept of yellow, which is an example of a basic sensory concept, is a necessary condition for anyone to frame a mental image of something the 'appearance' in the mind of which is yellow. Knowledge of the concept of sour is a condition for anyone to 'taste' something sour in his or her mind, etc.

I shall also argue that perception is a necessary condition for anyone to have the basic sensory concepts. More concretely, that having visual perceptions is a
necessary condition for having the basic visual concepts, having auditory perceptions a condition for having the basic auditory concepts, etc. And even more concretely, that having seen-P yellow things is a necessary condition for having the visual concept of yellow,\(^{15}\) that having tasted sour things is a necessary condition for having the gustatory concept of sour, etc.

Consequently, I shall argue that having seen-P yellow things is a necessary condition for anyone to frame a mental image of a thing which 'appears' as yellow in the mind, and generally speaking, that having had perceptions is a necessary condition for anyone to sensorily imagine something. The link between the required perceptions and the resulting images are the basic sensory concepts.

**Sense Perception and the Basic Sensory Concepts.**

Basic sensory concepts are concepts such as 'yellow', 'red', 'dark', 'salty', 'cold', etc. But these examples alone do not make it quite clear what exactly we mean by "concept," "basic," and "sensory." So let us make clear what these terms mean and from this explanation I hope it will be clear that for a particular person to have these concepts it is a necessary condition to have perceived things falling under these concepts.

(a) **A Concept.**

Having the sensory concept of, say, yellow is or at least implies:
1. being able to pick out yellow things;

2. (if in command of a language) being able to talk knowledgeably about yellow and yellow things.

If a person is able to do these two things, then we can say that this person has the concept of yellow. Let this rough characterization of a concept suffice for our purposes.

There is, nevertheless, one possible source of trouble about this matter that we must attend to now. Psychologists\(^{16}\) report that some people who are blind can have tactile sensations of colors, they can accurately pick out each time things of some color by touching them. It is possible then that a person blind from birth and gifted with this capacity to discriminate colors by touch may have a tactile concept of, say, yellow. This tactile concept of yellow, though, is not identical with the concept of yellow that a man gifted with the normal sense of sight has. Both, this blind man and us, sighted people, can pick out yellow things from non-yellow things. For this reason, we may say that our concept of yellow and his concept of yellow _extensionally coincide_, a fact that gives some justification to calling both of them 'concepts of yellow'. But a man that has only the visual concept of yellow, i.e., a man who knows how yellow _looks_, can talk knowledgeably about yellow in a way that the man having only the tactile concept of yellow cannot, and vice versa. The knowledge of how yellow
things look must be different from the knowledge of how yellow things feel—whatever this means other than seeing—P yellow things. The man who has the visual concept of yellow is able (in principle) to say things like: "yellow is a more luminous color than brown," or "I can see all at once how the three shades of yellow dissipate," or, "this yellow next to this other yellow makes this second look richer," etc. The blind man who has only the tactile concept of yellow cannot say things of this sort for he does not know what yellow in its visual dimension is; he cannot make statements about the visual properties of yellow (such as that of being a bright color), nor about the visual relations that particular yellow things have to other visually perceived things.

On the other hand, the man who has only the tactile concept of yellow may be able to make discriminations on the 'felt' yellow things that people who lack this tactile capacity cannot do. Although this blind man with such an extraordinary capacity and the sighted man are, both, talking about the same things, i.e., yellow things, what they know about them is quite different and consequently their concepts are different. The blind man knows how yellow things 'feel', the sighted man how they look, and this allows each to say different, but not conflicting, things about yellow things. But when they speak about yellow as such, and not yellow things, as when we say that yellow is a
brighter, more luminous color than red, or that it can be more disturbing than green, etc. They are not speaking about the same thing. To know a color, or for that matter to know any sensory feature is not only to know how to pick out those objects that have that feature, it is also to know how any object that has that feature affects one or another of our sense organs. This is what I meant by the second condition for having a concept listed above, viz., to be able to speak knowledgeablely (provided one can speak, of course) about the sensory feature. One can do this only if one knows how any object that has that feature must affect one or another of our senses. But for this reason, too, we must conclude that to know how yellow 'feels' to the sense of touch must be a different thing than to know how yellow looks to the eye. The visual concept of yellow is not the same as the tactile concept of yellow (if there is such a thing) although they extensionally coincide.

(b) Sensory

These concepts are sensory because they can be obtained only through sensory perception. Even an extreme Rationalist would admit that having sensations and perceptions is necessary, at least as a reminder or as an occasion or evocation, for anyone to come to have the concept of yellow. I am not speaking of the concept (or knowledge) that we acquire through physics of what yellow is, but of the different sort of knowledge of how yellow
looks, of how salty things taste, of how loud noises sound, etc. Having visual sensations of yellow, then, is a necessary condition for anyone to have the concept of yellow, and similarly, for all the other sensory concepts.

(c) Basic

Basic sensory concepts are concepts that everyone must learn from his own experience. Basic sensory concepts cannot be learned from the experience of other people, as we may learn what a mushroom, a bridge and an oasis are from descriptions, accounts, pictures, etc. Although, in a sense, we can describe how, say, yellow looks, as when we say that it is a more luminous color than red, no description of this kind (which is usually done in other basic terms and mostly by analogies) will ever give a person, blind from birth, knowledge of how yellow looks. So, while basic sensory concepts cannot be really explained or described, everything else that is sensory or perceivable in principle can be described in terms of basic concepts. These basic sensory concepts are, therefore, learned only from one's own experience.

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Everything visual can ultimately be described in terms of the basic visual concepts, viz., 'blue', 'yellow', and all the other color concepts; 'rough', 'smooth', and the other visual texture concepts; 'light', 'dark', and the visual tone concepts; 'triangular', 'circular', 'irregular',
and the visual shape concepts. There is also a mixed bag of concepts such as 'opaque', 'transparent', etc. My claim does not imply that any object we perceive usually must have some color. A perfectly transparent thing, if such a thing exists, cannot have any color of its own, yet it must be seen by means of an arrangement or appearance of colors in our visual field, often by means of the color(s) of the opaque object(s) behind them. So, although any perceptual whole can be described in terms of colors (and other terms) not all the objects that appear in the whole need have color themselves, yet every perceptible whole must have not only color but also visual texture and visual tone.

Everything audible can ultimately be described in terms of the basic auditory concepts, such as 'loud', 'soft', and the other volume concepts; 'high-pitched', 'low-pitched', and the other pitch concepts, 'rich', 'pure', and the other timbre or harmonic concepts. Every sound which is perceived must have not only a pitch, but certain loudness and certain purity or richness. Similarly, for everything that can be touched, smelled and tasted.

**Basic Sensory Concepts and Sensory Imagination.** So far we have established the connection between perception and the basic sensory concepts. Here I shall try to make clear the connection between these concepts and sensory imagination. But before we do this, let us draw some
conclusions from our discussion of mental images in Chapter III which will be necessary to bear in mind.

If having a mental image of $X$ implies that the subject is, in some sense, thinking of $X$, then the subject must know $X$ or what kind of thing $X$ is, that is to say, the subject must have the concept of $X$. Also, if a person 'sees' in his mind, say, something red (when the 'appearance' of the thing in the mind is red), then he is thinking of red (or thinking of that thing as red) and he knows what red (or being red) is.

The objects that we 'hear', 'smell', etc. and the 'appearance' they present are not recognized for what they are, perhaps after examination, analysis or scrutiny as in perception. Normally, when we frame a mental image of $X$ we 'ipso facto' know that the image is an image of $X$ and how it 'appears' in the mind—albeit there are cases in which we know this only implicitly.

We 'encounter', as Sartre says, the objects of perception in a world of their own, where they exist independently of our perceiving them. In contrast, mental images are not 'encountered' in the mind, rather they are our own creations and their determinations wholly depend on our intentions and thoughts. So, the reason why the idea of analyzing, examining, observing or scrutinizing a mental image in the hope of finding what it is an image of and
what 'appearance' it really has, is an absurd idea is, precisely, because having the mental image implies that these things are already known. There is nothing in the image that we have not put in it.

The ordinarily few sensory determinations with which an object appears in sensory imagination seems to be the result of the fact that the image is a form of thought, i.e., the result of the fact that we ordinarily cannot explicitly think of many things at the same time. The mental image does not have any more sensory determinations than those we are thinking about. This is unlike the perceived object which will reveal a wealth of new sensory aspects as we perceive it further; this is so, of course, because the object of perception does not have its sensory properties in virtue of our thoughts, it has them in its own right.

In conclusion, we cannot learn anything sensorily new about the object we sensorily imagine from its image in the mind, as we cannot learn anything new about the object we think of from our thought of it. The claim that it is impossible to frame a mental image the concept of which we lack, should not be taken to mean that we cannot frame a mental image of something the concept of which we did not have prior to the framing of the image. For although this claim applies to the great majority of mental images we frame, it is not true for all. It is possible to frame a
mental image of something and in doing so, at the same time, conceive the object of which the image is image. This typically occurs when we use our sensory imagination creatively. For instance, when I visualized the three-headed monster that I mentioned before, the concept of the monster and the image came together because in this case in framing the image I am also conceiving the monster for the first time. But it is generally impossible to frame a mental image of X without having at that very moment the concept of X.

The above discussion establishes quite generally the dependence of our sensory imagination on our thoughts, knowledge or concepts, but it does not explain the special role that the basic sensory concepts play in the production of mental images. A human being may lack empirical concepts such as those of 'ashtray' 'stew', 'melody', 'tree', etc. If he does, he will not be able to frame any mental image of an ashtray or a stew or a melody or a tree. He may produce mental images the description of which coincides with the descriptions of these things; but in spite of this coincidence he would not be sensorily imagining these things. Therefore, ignorance of a non-basic sensory concept such as these, prevents a person from sensorily imagining only the kind of thing the concept represents, i.e., prevents the person from sensorily imagining any ashtray or any tree, etc. But the fact that this person may produce
an image the full description of which can coincide with a description of an ashtray or a tree or a melody, shows that ignorance of these non-basic concepts does not create any restrictions on the 'appearances' themselves that might be framed in the mind. Only ignorance of basic-sensory concepts does this. If a person lacks a basic sensory concept, then this person cannot produce any image in the mind the appearance of which falls under this concept. If a person does not know how red looks then this person cannot sensorily imagine anything having the 'appearance' of red in his or her mind. More generally, having the basic sensory concepts is a necessary condition for sensorily imagining anything. The reason should be, by now, obvious. A person who lacked, say, the basic visual concepts would be a person who would not know how anything looks (i.e., would not know how yellow, dark, rough, transparent, etc. look). Without knowing this, he or she could not possibly frame a visual mental image, because in order to frame one, the person must determine its sensory features. And how could this person determine a mental image to be yellow, if he or she, ex hypothesis, does not know how yellow looks? The lack of a basic sensory concept is a restriction then that applies to all objects, not only to ashtrays or trees or apples, because, given any object whatsoever, the person who lacks the concept of, say, red cannot 'see' this object as being red in his mind's eye. This is not to say that
the color-blind man may have a mental image of something which 'appears' red in his mind but that he, lacking the concept of red, cannot recognize it as being red, as the man who is ignorant of what an ashtray is may look at one and fail to recognize it as what it is, i.e., an ashtray. The case is rather, that the color-blind man cannot have any mental image of a thing 'appearing' as red in the mind, because if he had this image, if he could see something with a red 'appearance' in his mind, then he would have the concept of red, a thing that ex hypothesis he does not have.

As we have seen, we come to have basic sensory concepts from our own experience of particular instances of these concepts. In other words, we get the concepts of yellow, salty and loud only by looking at yellow things, by tasting salty things and by hearing loud things. But under each one of these concepts an infinite number of instances fall. Obviously, we do not need to experience an infinite number of instances of yellow to learn how yellow looks. The experience of a few instances of yellow normally suffices. But once a person has the concept of yellow, i.e., once he or she knows how yellow looks, he or she can, at least in principle, produce an infinite number of instances of yellow in his or her mind. That is to say, this person can 'see' in his or her mind many shades of yellow that he or she has not seen before. To what extent
we are able to do this is, first, something that seems to vary from person to person and, second, it is an empirical matter for the psychologist to determine. Without the basic sensory concepts playing such a relevant role in the production of mental images, this phenomenon of framing mental 'appearances' of things which 'appear' as having sensory features which we have not, strictly speaking, experienced before, would be a quite startling phenomenon. And, in particular, embarrassing for an empiricist such as Hume, who acknowledges the existence of the phenomenon but dismisses it as of such scarce importance that it "does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim." 19

Here, on the contrary, while holding fast to an empiricist principle that we shall make explicit next, we can account for this phenomenon without doing any violence to our empiricist claims. In other words, we can 'see' shades of yellow and green, we can 'hear' very high-pitched sounds and unusual timbres, etc. that we have never seen-P or heard-P before because we know how anything that is yellow or green or high-pitched or has a certain harmonics must look or sound, knowledge which we can obtain only from our own experience.

To sensorily image something is, among other things, to think how the object imagined would look and/or sound and/or smell, etc. if it were perceived. To visualize a red thing is, among other things, to think of it as looking red
to the eyes. And, it should be clear by now the only way we know of doing such a thing is by producing an 'appearance' of the thing in the mind in which it 'looks' red. We may say that in sensory imagination we think of the imagined object as if it were perceived (which is quite different from saying that we fancy ourselves actually perceiving it). But this type of thinking would be impossible if we did not know how anything that is perceivable in principle must look, sound, smell, etc., that is to say, impossible unless one has the basic sensory concepts which are the concepts under which anything that is perceivable in principle must fall. And these sensory concepts are also the concepts under which anything which is sensorily imagined must fall, that is to say, anything that is perceivable in principle or sensorily imagined can ultimately be described in basic sensory terms. Nothing can be sensorily imagined that does not have a real or hypothetical look or sound or taste or feel or smell.

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We are now in a position to bring together our findings of sections A and B. We have seen, on the one hand, that, roughly, having had perceptions is a necessary condition for anyone to have the basic sensory concepts, and, on the other hand, that having the basic sensory concepts is a necessary condition for anyone to sensorily imagine
anything. Consequently, roughly speaking, for any human being to sensorily imagine anything is impossible without having had perceptions. It is impossible to sensorily imagine something 'appearing' as being yellow in the mind, without having the basic concept of yellow, and it is impossible to have this concept without having had perceptions of yellow. The man blind from birth cannot 'see' anything in his mind because he does not know how anything looks because he has never seen—P anything.

We learn our basic sensory concepts from perception and never from sensory imagination. We could never 'see' in our minds a new color, or 'taste' a new taste or 'feel' the experiences of a sixth sense. But to say that we cannot ever 'see' in our minds a new color which we have not experienced before is not to say that we cannot 'see' in our minds new shades or kinds of a color which we know. But, admittedly, the distinction between a color (such as red, blue, yellow) and a kind of color (such as bluish-green, grass-green) is a fuzzy one. Yet, the distinction is ordinarily made in perception and in sensory imagination—it strictly parallels the way the distinction is made in perception. The limitations in his ability to distinguish colors that a color-blind man, for instance, is subject to are strictly paralleled in his sensory imagination.

Given the nature of color gradation, we cannot, of course, distinguish colors from kinds of colors in too sharp
a manner, but in cases of color blindness for instance
(as in many other cases), it makes sense to say that a man
cannot see—P the color green in any of its many kinds, and,
that he only has an inkling of this color when it comes
close to being another color, viz., blue or yellow. To say
that he cannot see—P only a kind of a color would be quite
misleading. The situation in his sensory imagination, then,
would be exactly the same. The man does not really know
how green looks\(^{20}\) and for this reason he cannot 'see' in
his mind's eye the infinite number of kinds of green that
the man with normal eyesight can. He can come as close to
visualizing green as he can come to perceiving green, that
is, he can visualize the bluish-green or the yellowish-
green but he cannot visualize any of the many shades that
we call simply 'green'.

In conclusion, sensory imagination can be said to be
parasitic on perception in the sense that all that 'appears'
in sensory imagination must 'appear' under the basic cate-
gories laid down by the manner in which objects of perception
appear. These categories are the basic sensory concepts.
But, although perception and sensory imagination are linked
in this manner, they remain two different faculties. The
one a faculty by means of which we apprehend an object as it
is encountered in the world by means of our sense organs;
the other a faculty by means of which we think about an
object by means of presenting to ourselves a sensory
'appearance' of it.

My experience has shown me that, as a matter of fact, most people and in particular laymen believe that we can discover new things, facts and properties by attending to our mental imagery as we can discover new things in perception. That is to say, the belief that there are no conceptual and perceptual restrictions on our sensory imagination, but rather that the appearances that we 'see', 'hear', etc. in our minds are autonomous and constitute a world of their own, is a widely-held belief. I hope I have already proved it to be false. For I have tried to show, on the contrary, that mental images are the products of our thoughts, i.e., that without the basic sensory concepts we cannot imagine anything, and because we cannot produce a mental image of anything of which we do not have a concept, we cannot ever find a property of a new kind or a new thing in sensory imagination.

Do Perception and Sensory Imagination Address Themselves to the Same Set of Objects?

From all the above, it follows that anything that can be perceived can also be sensorily imagined. But the converse is not true. Not everything that can be sensorily imagined is perceptible in principle. This seems to contradict almost all we said above, but actually it does not. Consider the case of a visual mental image of an equilateral
triangle. It is not the image of any particular thing, such as the drawing of a triangle on the blackboard, or a plastic model of a triangle, etc. Yet, we can 'see' in our minds just an equilateral triangle. The triangle we 'see' in our minds cannot possibly exist in the world, it is not the image of the kind of thing that can exist. If it cannot exist, it cannot be found in experience either, that is, it cannot be perceived.

Let us take another example. We can 'see' in our mind many red things, but we can also 'see' just red, or just yellow, that is to say, not any particular red or yellow thing but simply red or yellow. This is not even 'seeing' a patch of red or a red light for when we visualize just red we are not thinking about a patch of color or colored light, but simply about a certain shade of red. Red and yellow, again, are not things that can exist on their own and for this reason we cannot perceive just red or yellow, we necessarily perceive something having these colors. But in sensory imagination, perhaps, because mental images are mere 'appearances' having no matter of their own, we can simply 'see' yellow or a shade of yellow. These are not images of anything that could in principle exist on its own, but images of one or another manner in which perceivable things appear. This remarkable feature of sensory imagination seems to have passed unnoticed, a fact that is even more remarkable when we realize that it
is by virtue of this capacity that sensory imagination performs very important functions. Thus, although in a sense, sensory imagination can have objects that perception cannot have even in principle, this does not alter the fact that whatever is sensorily imagined must appear under the basic sensory concept learned from perception.

Human beings happen to have a perceptual make-up composed of basically five senses. If we had a sixth sense, most probably, or perhaps necessarily, we would be able to produce a new kind of mental image corresponding to the basic sensory features that this sense makes us experience. But although we can conceive, conjecture, imagine (not sensorily), suppose and think about this sixth sense, we cannot, as I said before, sensorily imagine it at all.

But--someone may object--why could we not produce a mental image of an object as it is perceived by this sixth sense given that we have the concept of such a sense? For, after all, the reason we can produce our mental images, it was argued, was because we have the necessary concepts to do so. The reason is that the concept of a sixth sense and a basic sensory concept are two very different sorts of concepts. While a basic sensory concept implies that a person who is in possession of it knows how something looks or smells, etc., having the concept of a sixth sense does not imply knowledge of how it would be experienced, does not include knowledge of the manner of appearance of the objects of this sense, i.e., no sensory knowledge is given by it. We can
think about a sixth sense, conceive its possibility, but
this does not imply that we also know how it would affect
our experience, i.e., how it would 'feel'. The concept of
a sixth sense is truly a limiting concept, a true noumenon.
Neither can we sensorily imagine, for the same reasons,
what a bat or a shark senses with its peculiar sense
organs.

Flew's claim that we have mental images which we can-
not describe is partially true. Partially, because she
uses 'mental images' to cover not only the products of
sensory imagination but the visions and experiences that a
person has under the influence of drugs, i.e., hallucinations.
Her claim is false with respect to imagination images, which,
we have seen, are to be distinguished from other mental
images, and true about other (but not necessarily all) kinds
of mental images. But the reason this is so, why these
mental images or hallucinations sometimes cannot be des-
cribed, is because they belong to perception and not to
imagination. They are not determined by our thoughts.
They are deranged perceptions often induced by a drug or
the lack of a drug. In cases like these in which the
physiology of the person is severely disarranged, it is
possible for the person to have such extraordinary perceptions,
not only in their content but in their manner of appearance,
that they are often explained or described by the subject
as experiences of a sixth sense. Now, if this is possible,
then I do not see why it is not also possible for people who have had these extraordinary experiences to frame mental images in their sensory imagination corresponding to them, for instance, when recollecting the experiences. But this, again, does not alter the general principle that an imagination mental image cannot occur without at least one perception which gave rise to the concept of it.

To sum up: we cannot produce a mental image of something which, if it existed, could not be perceived by our sense organs as they function normally or in an altered fashion. We cannot produce a mental image of anything which cannot be described in the basic sensory terms the concepts of which can only be learned in perception by each person on his or her own.

Summary of Chapters III and IV

Let me state now the overall view of sensory imagination that ensues from the piecemeal analysis of Chapters III and IV.

Sensory imagination has been presented as a faculty having a place between perception and thought in two senses.

(1) Sensory imagination depends on both, perception and thought, in order to be exercised. It depends on perception because having had perceptions is a necessary condition for anyone to sensorily imagine something. It
depends on thought because it is the thoughts, or mental attitudes, that accompany an image that determines its nature.

(2) Sensory imagination is essentially a thinking faculty in its own right. When we sensorily imagine something we are necessarily thinking about something or of something. But this is not pure thought; it is thought that occurs in images, which are private 'appearances' of (some of) the sensory features of something else. And the 'appearance' of sensory features of something in the mind occurs necessarily under certain basic categories and general conditions under which objects of perception appear.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX

ONEIRIC IMAGERY

In this Appendix, I attempt to extend the account of sensory imagination that I produced in this work to cover cases which are not clearly or typically cases of sensory imagination, yet I think they can be explained in roughly the same manner. I shall try to show that in spite of the obvious autonomous appearance that hypnagogic, hypnopompic, dream and some hallucination images present, they are still products of sensory imagination and dependent on our thoughts. But I cannot do this without, at the same time, assuming that a certain picture of the mind is correct, i.e., without assuming that there are unconscious thoughts and intentions. And since I shall not argue for the veracity of this view, I shall make it explicit here, that my claims in this appendix (except those of the last section) are held to be true only under the condition that the view that part of the life of the human mind takes place at a subconscious level is true. My suggestion, generally speaking, is that these mental images spring from the thoughts, intentions, impulses, etc. of the subconscious mind, that is to say, they constitute "oneiric" imagery. But one should not expect to find here a comprehensive account of these phenomena. In fact, what follows is no more than a rough sketch of the way in which we may be able to
explain these phenomena as occurrences of sensory imagination under the mentioned assumption.

Hypnagogic, hypnopompic, and hallucination images

The appearance of autonomy that some mental images present is particularly striking in the case of hypnagogic, hypnopompic and some sort of hallucination images. When we are about to fall asleep, but we are still conscious of the sounds around us, we may be invaded by visual and other sorts of imagery which seems to be quite foreign to our mental life. We have the impression of being spectators of something like a cinematographic sequence displaying a drama of which we have no control: the images follow one another and the objects they represent open, close, fall, speak, disappear, etc. without our being able to modify their progress. So it seems that we are facing perfectly autonomous mental imagery.

These images are, clearly enough, autonomous or we should rather say independent of the remaining waking thoughts that we have, but they are not absolutely independent from any thoughts. They are mental images that spring from perhaps the most radical form of unconscious thought that we have; these are the thoughts, motivations, impulses, etc. from which dream imagery springs. Hypnagogic images are incipient dream images which invade our consciousness before we completely fall asleep, that is to say, before
we disconnect ourselves from the world of perception. These images are, therefore, not dependent on the wakeful thoughts that we still have but they are dependent on the type of thought that dreams imply. This seems to include the expressions of impulses, desires, fears, etc. of the person dreaming.

The same kind of explanation applies to hypnopompic images which should be taken not as incipient dream imagery but as the remains of dream imagery when wakeful consciousness reappears. In the Introduction to this work, I mentioned that some hallucinations, namely those which involve a sense organ in their occurrence, are not 'seen', 'heard', etc. in the mind and consequently do not belong to the sphere of imagination. But I also mentioned that we also speak of some other kind of hallucination that is not a perceptual phenomenon, as is the former, but rather it belongs to imagination, for when we have these hallucinations we properly speak of 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. something in the mind. Some people report (apparently always due to some psycho-physiological disorder) 'seeing', 'hearing', etc. a sequence of images in their minds which, unlike ordinary mental images that we deliberately frame, seem to be completely out of their control. It is also reported that the colors 'seen', the sounds 'heard', etc. in these cases are particularly brilliant, strong, clear, etc. and in general the vividness of the sequence is greater than the
simple day-dream sequence.

But, again, the autonomy that these mental images exhibit is only apparent. For it is characteristic of cases of this sort that the subject, either due to the influence of a drug or simply as a result of his psycho-physiological condition, is, invariably, in some sort of dream-like state or stupor. That is to say, people experience these hallucinations only when they fall into a state of stupor that creates a condition of semi-wakefulness similar to that in which hypnagogic images take place. So, in this case too, the semi-wakeful mind witnesses a sequence of apparently autonomous mental imagery that actually springs from and is dependent on thoughts and motivations of which the subject is not fully conscious.

Dreams

A full account of the nature of dreams greatly exceeds the intentions and format of this work, of course, and the same holds for the nature of hallucinations, hypnagogic images, etc. Yet insofar as these may be considered as different varieties of what we call imagination images we can discuss them here under the general issue of their alleged autonomy and under the light of the general explanation of imagination images given in Chapter III.

When we fall asleep a large part (at least) of our wakeful awareness of the world is suspended; that is to say,
we are to a certain extent cut off from the world of perception. But this does not mean that the mind ceases to operate, comes to a perfect standstill or that no thought or mental activity of any kind occurs. Some sort of mental activity is clearly displayed in our dreams. In them we 'see', 'hear', etc. all sorts of things and when we do so we are 'thinking' of these things although we are not thinking of them in a wakeful manner. For this reason, "To 'see' X in a dream" does not mean exactly the same thing as "To 'see' X in the mind." Dreams, clearly enough, involve mental imagery: a necessary ingredient in any dream is the production of some sort of mental imagery. But when we dream we produce mental imagery in very special circumstances, i.e., we are asleep.

Due to the fact that when we dream our normal awareness of the real world (or the world of perception) has been suspended, in the case of dream images we are taken by the images. When we are dreaming we are not aware that we are only 'seeing', 'hearing', 'smelling', etc., but we believe that we are seeing-P, hearing-P, etc. So, probably because of the radical alteration of the state of mind that we suffer when we fall asleep, i.e., due to the fact that we shut ourselves off from the world of perception, the mental imagery that occurs then is not taken for what it is, i.e., for images only, but for reality itself. By the way, the fact that we, while dreaming, take the dream-occurrences
to be real may explain why we find emotional relief, gratification, fear, distress, etc. in the production of certain images. For if we were all the time conscious that they are just images, that they are not real, we would not get frightened, distressed, feel happy, sad, etc. as we normally do.

The difference between dream images and hypnagogic and hypnopompic images resides, then, in the fact that we are not taken, or at least completely taken, by hypnagogic and hypnopompic images as we are by dream images because these images appear when we are either still awake or have just begun to waken, so we retain some consciousness or are regaining consciousness of the real world against which the images can only be taken as images. 'Seeing' X in a dream is, then, 'seeing' X in the mind, but unlike the typical wakeful occurrences of 'seeing' X in the mind, 'seeing' X in a dream implies not only that a visual image was framed but also that one is taken by this image.

In sum, hypnagogic, hypnopompic, dream and (some) hallucination images seem to have the same basic nature, and to be subject to some of the same restrictions and conditions that typical imagination images are: (1) they are mere 'appearances', (2) they have a definite sensory character, (3) they allow for a certain infallible knowledge about them, (4) they are framed only when their production amounts to a thought, and (5) they are framed under the
basic sensory concepts. They, too, are determined by our thoughts, but the thoughts from which they spring seem to be of a radically unconscious kind. These thoughts get a chance to shape the nature of our mental images I suggested only when the ordinary wakeful consciousness is altered.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTES

Introduction


3 Ibid.

Chapter I


4 Ibid.

5 Some of the works of Holt, McKellar, Paivio, Marks, Gordon, Seagal, Horowitz and others on mental images has been compiled by Peter Sheehan in The Function and Nature of Imagery.


8 It is important at this point to make clear that Cartesians try to explain sensory imagination under the model of sense-perception, and not under the model of perception in some other sense such as extra-sensory perception, or simply non-sensory perception as it is expressed in phrases like "perceiving the point of an argument."
9 If this man with no eyes claimed that he sees spots in front of him, we may, perhaps, be able to give a sense to what he says; but clearly we would not say that his seeing the spots is a case of plain seeing. How could we when he lacks the eyeballs themselves!

10 I see no objection to speaking of a 'visual field' proper to visual imagination in which, we may say, everything that we 'see' in our minds appears, although, without having quite the spatial and other sorts of interrelatedness and continuity that the objects that appear in the perceptual field have. But in any case, this 'visual field' would not be the same as the perceptual visual field, for the things that we 'see' in our 'imagination visual field' are disconnected from those things that appear in our perceptual visual field, that is to say, the two visual fields do not constitute a system. If I see with my eyes the sun suddenly shining, all the objects I plainly see experience a change, but the objects I may have been seeing in my mind at that same moment experience no change at all.


12 Ibid., p. 253.


14 Ibid., p. 44.

15 Ibid., p. 149.

16 Hannay changes considerably Anscombe's doctrine; he modifies some logical features of it, adds important claims, etc. For this reason, the arguments I shall advance here should be taken as relevant to Hannay's position only, and not having any bearing on Anscombe's doctrine.

17 Alastair Hannay, Mental Images: A Defense, p. 149.

18 Ibid., p. 155.

19 Ibid., pp. 155-156.
Ibid., p. 159.

Ibid., p. 160.

Inverted commas in the remaining of this section do not indicate cases of sensory imagination.


Ibid.

On several other issues that Dilman touches in his paper, he has quite penetrating and clearly expressed insights that we shall have opportunity to comment on later.

Hide Ishiguro, "Imagination," 50.

Parasitic uses are found in expressions such as "I see my brother as the ideal president of the club," or "I see the economy as a gigantic jigsaw puzzle."


The case reported by Lawrie mentions only a "picture"; but I am using "oil painting" instead in order to avoid confusion and ambiguity for the term "picture" is also used by Lawrie to refer to the mental image that is contemplated in the mind: "mental picture."


I do not mean to imply that my framing the mental image is a necessary condition for me to get this information. It is only one way. For I could also go over all the rooms that face the front of the house and count their windows.
Chapter II


2 I.e., Squires, Deitsch, Odegard.


4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 253.

6 Ibid., p. 254.

7 The concept of mental images in general is a broader concept than the concept of mental images conceived as private mental pictures, for it is possible to conceive mental images in ways other than the way Cartesians conceive them, i.e., as mental pictures.


9 Ibid., p. 245.

10 Ibid., p. 247.

11 Ibid., p. 250.

12 Ibid., pp. 256-258.

13 Ibid., p. 256.

14 Ibid., p. 251.

15 Ibid., pp. 250-251.

16 Ibid., p. 264.

17 Ibid., p. 248.
18 Ibid., p. 256.

19 As different from seeming to see that takes place when we are in front of a real likeness of X, such as a picture of X.

20 I shall mark off the dipsomaniac's experiences from those of sensory imagination by writing a 'd' after them.


24 The hypochondriac's belief may be explained in this manner, i.e., taking the things 'felt' as things felt—P.


Chapter III

1 If we remember, in Chapter I, we roughly characterized the notion of 'sensible feature' as those visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile and gustatory features of something, i.e., the way something looks and/or smells and/or sounds, etc.

2 In view of the observations which will be given in Chapter IV, section 5, instead of "an object," we should perhaps, use here the more general term "something."

3 We shall see that this is the case in the following sections.


5 We may say of ordinary objects that they are 'incomplete', but this in the very different sense, i.e., of being under construction or not being finished.

7 It seems to me that when Ishiguro says that when the formula 'X seen as Y' is applied to mental images, "the X's disappear, as it were, and we are just left with activities of 'seeing as Y'." She was trying to say something along the same lines as my account. But her account, although moving in the right direction (thanks to her good philosophical nose, I guess) was at fault, because trying (wrongly) to explain sensory imagination under the model of sense perception, her account of the fleshlessness of mental images turns out to be, in fact, no more than a verbal trick. For as long as one says that sensory imagination is like seeing something in a picture, then, the X's cannot simply disappear for there must always be something in which something else is seen.

8 Inverted commas in this section are not necessarily indicative of sensory imagination.

9 Gilbert Ryle, "Phenomenology versus the Concept of Mind."

10 Perhaps the grammatically correct expression here is 'sensuously aware', but due to obvious unwanted connotations of the word "sensuous" (and cognates), I have decided to substitute it with the terms 'sensory' or 'sensible' (and other similar ones). I hope the reader will pardon me for this abuse of the English language and also for many others of which, I am afraid, I am not even aware.

11 A subsidiary argument is provided by Ryle in The Concept of Mind (p. 252). He argues that the language of originals and copies applies only to vision and to a certain extent to hearing, but not at all to the other senses. Yet we have olfactory, gustatory and tactile mental images as well and in the same sense in which we have visual images. So, if the former ones cannot be said to be copies, representations, replicas or pictures of the objects of which they are images, then we have no justification for calling visual images pictures either. In order to decide the validity of this argument, it seems to me, one must make clear the concepts of a copy, a picture, a representation, a replica, a duplicate, as well as those of copying something, portraying, imitating, etc. enterprise which exceeds the format of this work. For as it has been pointed out to us,
it makes sense to say that in creating a pine smelling
deodorant one is trying to copy the actual pine smell.
Yet it seems awkward to say that the smell of the
deodorant, or the deodorant itself, is a representation,
or even a copy of the actual pine smell.

12 I do not take these two, seeing in a picture and
seeing-as, to be equivalent. But I shall overlook this
point because, although it is important in its own right,
it has no special significance here.

13 This claim does not imply the view that we have
unconscious intentions, thoughts, motivations, inclinations,
etc. The notion of the unconscious as it is usually
understood, unlike this notion of marginal awareness, has
very many Freudian implications which are not part of this
notion of this analysis. This should be clear from the
fact that the examples we have used in order to sketch the
notion of marginal awareness are not instances of the
Freudian unconscious.

Chapter IV

1 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (London:

2 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination

3 I. D. Ilmian, "Imagination," Proceedings of the

4 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York:

5 Ibid., p. 272.

6 Ibid., p. 270.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 271.

9 Ibid.
To suppose that the concept of the three-headed monster is the model with which I frame my image is absurd, because, ex hypothesis, I have no concept of the monster prior to the framing of its image. In framing the image of the monster, I am also creating and conceiving the monster for the first time.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 246.

This claim does not, as we shall see later in detail, rule out the possibility of visualizing a shade of yellow one has never seen before. On the contrary, I shall explain, it is in virtue of having the visual concept of yellow that we can frame in our minds many shades of yellow that we have never seen-P.

The seriousness and accuracy of these reports are sometimes suspected. If they are not true, clearly, my argument would be considerably simplified. Examples of these reports can be found in B. Berlin and P. Kay's Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution, H. S. Odbert and C. E. Osgood's, "Studies in Synesthetic Thinking: II. The Role of Form in Visual Responses to Music," Journal of General Psychology, 26 (1942).

In spite of the former lengthy discussion on the implications of the possible existence of concepts such as the tactile concept of yellow, in what follows every time that I speak of the concept of yellow I mean the visual concept of it unless otherwise specified.

Surely this list is not complete and it might include miscategorizations. A complete analysis of the matter largely exceeds the intentions and format of this work.

20 In accordance with my definition of a concept, this color-blind man does not have the concept of green. Yet in some other sense even this man has the concept of green for he can speak about this color as the color that he cannot see but others can. He has this concept, of course, only because his fellow men can see—P green and he has learned what he knows about this color from them.

21 Perhaps we should include our so-called Kinaesthetic sense together with the traditional five. But apart from this issue, whenever I speak of a sixth sense in the following discussion, I do not mean this Kinaesthetic candidate (or any other of the sort) but a sixth sense that we can imagine (non-sensorily) but do not have.
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