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JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS
SOCIAL BACKGROUND, GENERAL VALUES, AND ROLE PERCEPTION

by

Kyoji Wakata

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis Director's Signature:

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Although this work owes much to others, statements expressed in this dissertation and possible errors are solely mine.
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PART 1

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Subject of Study: Japan's Diet Members

The legislature, or a representative assembly which is to make rules for its society,\(^1\) can be found in almost every polity in today's world including those in developing areas. Although many studies regarding the American system of legislature have accumulated, studies with comparative perspective seem to have just begun.\(^2\) The basic aim of this study is to contribute, to whatever extent, to a comparative and comprehensive understanding of the legislature by adding the case of the Japanese Diet.

The legislature is generally a highly institutionalized entity, whose role, structure, and internal procedure are stipulated by various formalities. In the contemporary trend of behavioral and functional approaches to politics, however, studies on the legislature have focused their

\(^1\)Representativeness and rule-making capacity are two primary attributes of the concept of the legislature, in my definition. Both of them sometimes are nominal, but all legislatures seem to share these two propensities at least in formal terms.

attention more on the individuals who are involved in legislative processes rather than formal and institutional aspects of the legislature. A presumption here is that aggregates of performances of these individuals will determine the functions of the legislature, which are seemingly the most important topic for students in the field of legislative studies.³

We cannot ignore, nevertheless, the fact that these individual behaviors are constrained by various formalities of the legislature. Institutional and formal setups can never be disregarded in legislative studies. As John Wahlke correctly pointed out, "a major methodological theme" of studies on legislature is that "institutional and behavioral approaches are, in fact, interdependent."⁴

The present study primarily concerns Japanese legislators. The focus is on characteristics of this group of individuals, not on institutional compositions of the parliament of Japan. However, the premise is that attitudes and behavior of legislators are partly a reflection, in a sense, of institutional setups of the legislature. Legislators' attitudes and behavior are conditioned and delimited by prescribed formalities of the institution insofar as the legislators are in their offices. Therefore, by examining the characteristics of this group of

⁴John C. Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, p.4.
people we should know what kind of institutional prescriptions are actually and effectively operating within the legislature.

I must note that what is under scrutiny in this dissertation is specifically the legislators. The so-called "relevant others," such as constituents, interest groups, parties, and administrators, are not included in our subject. Although these "relevant others" also take part in legislative processes, it is legislators who are ordained to represent the public and are assigned power to make rules in formal terms. Even if their roles are nominal, the legislators occupy a place of focal point in rule-making processes, at least in prescription. However effective influences some outside forces may have on legislation, their impact to be effective should be reflected in the legislators' performance.

By the same token, legislative staff members are not included in our analysis. It is true that legislative staffs also formally compose a part of the legislative

5 The "legislative system" conceptualized by some scholars as a tool for analysis is composed of legislators and "relevant others." Ibid., p. 19; Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 2nd ed. pp. 4-6.


7 Some scholars conceptualize the legislative system as composed of legislators and legislative staffs. Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Politics, pp. 8-24.
institution and have certain capacities in rule making in many nations. The legislative staffs lack, however, representativeness, one of the characteristics attributed to the legislature. Hence, even though the staff may have influence on legislation, this influence would be effective only after being reflected in legislators' activities. In a practical sense too, the political role of legislative staffs in the Diet of Japan is considered to be minor and marginal. 8

After all, by observing and examining legislators, we can detect what impact the "relevant others" or legislative staff members cast upon rule making through legislators. Thus, the paper focuses upon the characteristics of Japanese Diet members.

Social Background

One way to describe and characterize a group of people, a political élite group in particular, is to examine their social background. This examination will tell us a great deal about individuals in the group, or about the group as a whole, especially when placed in cross-national comparative perspective. Therefore, biographical characteristics of Japanese Diet members should be explored first to understand who Japanese legislators are.

As Richard Merritt has suggested, however, "Alone, they (biographical characteristics) are not likely to answer most of the politically relevant questions that we might want to ask."\(^9\) The main theme of this paper is attitudinal characteristics of Japanese Diet members with the social background secondary. Social background characteristics are relevant because they are thought to explain, to a large extent, attitudinal characteristics.

One's attitudinal characteristics might generally be formed and transformed through various experiences which the individual undergoes. A process through which one acquires social values, that is the "socialization" in a broadest sense, includes not only learning from institutions like the family or school, but also the learning process through diverse kinds of contacts a person has vis-à-vis the society. It may encompass not only childhood but continue in adolescence and even to adulthood during which one's values are still susceptible to change.

Among legislator's personal life experiences, our interest includes those factors which are considered relevant to the formulation of their political attitude and behavior. Such factors as family origin and childhood environment, which seem to be fundamental for every

person in forming his later career, as well as later attitudes and behavior, will be examined. Also, such factors as educational background and career pattern, which seem to pertain more to the recruitment of people into the legislative offices, are required.

Attitudinal Characteristics: General Values and Role Perception

The examination of legislators' observable political performances might be an important way to characterize and understand legislators. The most frequently used method, particularly in American legislative studies, is observing and analyzing legislators' voting behavior ("roll-call" votes in American legislators). This method would be, however, much less fruitful in Japan, because legislators' voting records can be predicated, almost perfectly, by their party identification in the Japanese Diet. The analysis of voting behavior will only reveal the characteristics of each party as a unit, but it will not reveal the characteristics of individual legislators. In Japan's political world, activities of individual Diet members tend to be more behind the scene, avoiding observations by the public.

Aside from manifest performances, the implicit attitude, the values, and the orientations are underlying potentials of legislators. Analysis of these should be another way to understand legislators. Since underlying
attitudes and expressed activities are interrelated within each person, examinations of implicit perspectives of legislators should explain, to a great extent, their behavioral patterns.

The present study will focus on psychological and attitudinal aspects of Japanese Diet members rather than an overt conduct of the legislators. It should lead to an understanding of the political behavior of Japanese Diet members, and thence to an understanding of the overall functions of the legislature in Japanese polity.

With regard to the attitude of legislators, we have two distinguishable concepts. Each legislator has dual statuses in a society: a status as a member of the society and a status as a member of the legislature which is a part of the society. As a member of the legislative institution, he must have certain values with respect to the institution and to the legislators who compose it. These are what some scholars called legislators' "role concept," "role orientation," "role expectation," or "role perception." The legislators' perception of their "role" has been considered a key for analysis in many American legislative studies.\textsuperscript{10}

"Role" might be defined, in short, as norms and values commonly accepted by people concerning behavior of holders of specific positions,\(^{11}\) and this concept of "role" is well acknowledged as a useful tool for various social studies, including studies on legislature. Although the concept has been developed for studying social behavior in the Western societies, this paper presumes its cross-cultural applicability.\(^{12}\) Since we have no adequate scheme, yet, to analyze the Japanese legislators' attitudes pertinent to their political activities, I will try to use in this study the framework of American legislative studies based on the idea of "role."

The legislator, as a member of the whole society at the same time, has values concerning the entire aspects of the society. These are legislators' general, basic value orientations. The legislator's political attitude or perception of his role is regarded as a part of his general, basic values, which are a coherent set of values about overall aspects of life and society. In other words, what a legislator thinks he should do as a legislator has

\(^{11}\)For various definitions of the concept of "role," see Neil Gross et al., *Explorations in Role Analysis*, pp. 13ff.

\(^{12}\)For example, Malcolm Jewell says, "Role analysis should be a useful technique for studying legislative system in other countries and for making cross-national comparisons of legislative systems." Jewell, "Attitudinal Determinants of Legislative Behavior," p. 494.
to be related to what he thinks and values in his daily life. I consider these basic attitudes of legislators worth exploration to account for their political performances in the legislature.

The general values of legislators seem to have been given insufficient attention in legislative studies thus far. This study will attempt to examine them insofar as they are thought to be pertinent to legislators' political conduct.

General Values: Three Dimensions. A whole set of values within each person's mind is considered to have a multi-dimension structure. In an attempt to inquire into the organization of social attitudes of people, especially social attitudes relevant to political behavior, Hans J. Eysenck proposed two dimensions: a radicalism-conservatism dimension and a tough-tender-mindedness dimension.

Although the Eysenck's scheme has not been adopted as a whole in this study, his suggestion helped my conceptualization.

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13 Among few studies which focus on the basic beliefs and values of political élites, the most intensive and systematic works include Robert D. Putnam's The Beliefs of Politicians. Although what Putnam studied as "élite culture" is not identical to what we analyze as "general values" of politicians in this study, the basic concept behind his research seems the same as ours. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, pp. 1-7.

The general values of legislators will be measured on three dimensions in this study. Three dimensions are: (1) conservatism-radicalism dimension, (2) open-closed-mindedness dimension, and (3) machiavellianism-idealism dimension. All these dimensions are considered to have certain implications on legislators' political perspectives and behavior.

The first dimension is the conservatism-radicalism dimension. One of the most frequently studied concepts of people's attitudinal characteristics is "authoritarianism" defined by Theodore Adorno and his associates in *The Authoritarian Personality*. Their concept of "authoritarianism" is composed of such temperament and inclination as: conformity to traditional norms and values, support of hierarchical order, uncritical obedience to the authority, and anti-introspectiveness.\(^{15}\) This concept of "authoritarianism" was attacked as measuring only "right authoritarianism," not general authoritarian orientations.\(^{16}\)

The concept of "right authoritarianism" can be considered, however, what we call "conservatism" in this study.


\(^{16}\) Edward A. Shils, "Authoritariansm: 'Right' and 'Left,'" pp. 24-49.
The measurement scale of the "right authoritarianism" will serve to measure our first dimension. The scale used in this research is one which a Japanese social psychologist, Kotaro Kido, has developed on the basis of the definition of "authoritarianism" by Maslow and Adorno et al., with certain modifications for the employment in the cultural context of Japan.\(^{17}\)

It should be noted here that the conservatism to be measured in this study is orientations concerning general matters of life and society, not those concerning policy outputs, such as economic policies or foreign politics. Although conservatism on the level of policy outputs might also be an important topic, it is considered strongly associated with party membership among Japanese Diet members. Their attitude toward policy matters will be predicated by looking at their party's stated stands.

The second dimension of legislators' general values is the open-closed-mindedness dimension. Originated from the concept of Adorno's "authoritarianism," but departing from it, some scholars came to conceptualize "general authoritarianism," which might be called dogmatism or open-closed-mindedness.\(^{18}\) Based on the conceptualization of


\(^{18}\)Brief history of the studies on the "right authoritarianism" to the "general authoritarianism" is in Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, pp. 11-15.
Milton Rokeach and his associates, dogmatism in this paper is defined to refer to such characteristics as: uncritical acceptance of a belief-system; great discrepancy between belief- and disbeliefsystem; perception of the surrounding situation as a threatening one; absolute reliance upon the authority of belief-system; and relatively narrow and future-oriented time perspective. On the basis of Rokeach's definition, it is logically assumed that this dimension of dogmatism is different from the first dimension of conservatism-radicalism.

The third dimension of legislators' basic values to be examined is the machiavellianism-idealism dimension. It is often thought that politicians, among whom are legislators, are tough-minded, machiavellian type of people in their inter-personal relations. Japanese politicians may

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19 Ibid., pp. 55-56.

20 Rokeach defines his concept of dogmatism as the extent to which irrelevant factors arising from within the person or from the outside world encumber the reception of information. Outside factors include reward and punishment from external authorities. Internal factors are irrelevant ego motives, power needs, need for self-aggrandizement, need to allay anxiety. Ibid., p. 57. I regard people's tendency to be encumbered by internal factors as dogmatism, and the tendency to be encumbered by external factors as conservatism. The dogmatism in this paper is so defined, and is considered not to overlap with conservatism. Rokeach too points out that dogmatism is negligibly related to conservatism. Ibid., p. 396.

21 Machiavellianism-idealism in this paper is slightly different from what Eysenck called "tough-tender-mindedness," which seems to be a broader concept. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics, pp. 130-131.
not be an exception, and the machiavellian tendency of Japanese legislators seems worth exploration.

Richard Christie and Florence Geis, in their Studies in Machiavellianism, defined the concept of machiavellianism and developed a scale for measuring it. According to them, machiavellianism is defined by the following tendencies: relative lack of affect in inter-personal relationships; a lack of concern with conventional morality; an instrumentalist view of others; and low ideological commitments. Their definition and measuring scale are borrowed for this research. Machiavellianism is likely to be a completely different dimension from the previous two dimensions. These are three dimensions of legislators' general values which are thought to have some relevance to their political attitude and behavior.

Role Perception: Seven Facets. Regarding the American legislators' role, John Wahlke et al. have proposed a model which comprise several role sectors and their various components. Their scheme and concepts may not be necessarily appropriate for the study of legislators in

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22 Richard Christie and Florence L. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism, pp. 10-34.
23 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
24 Wahlke, et al., The Legislative System, pp. 7-17.
other countries, but application of the scheme to the Japanese cases appears to have considerable relevance and meaning. This is because Japan's present institutional framework of the Diet was constructed by American officials of Japan Occupation, who tried to transplant the American legislative system into Japanese polity. Therefore, the study of Wahlke and his associates, as well as the study of Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, are drawn upon for the analysis of Japanese Diet members' role orientation in this paper.²⁵

The legislator's role in this study is conceptualized as composed of seven facets, with the following theoretical reasoning: As an occupant of the legislative office, each legislator interacts with various groups. Conceivable groups with whom a Japanese Diet member interacts are constituents, interest groups, political parties, factions, administrative agencies, and the society as a whole. In relation to each of these groups, a legislator cherishes certain normative orientations as a guide for his behavior. Our goals is to investigate what kind of attitude the legislator has toward each of these groups.

Seven facets of the Japanese Diet member's role include the following:

---
(1) Areal focus: Diet member's perception about his relations with constituents in terms of geographic areas.

(2) Style of representation: Diet member's perception of his relations with constituents in terms of the mode of representation rather than the geographic area he represents.

(3) Orientation toward interest groups: attitude as regards the relationship with organized interests.

(4) Party loyalty: the strength of commitments and loyalty to party and the degree of acceptance of party discipline and control.

(5) Factional loyalty: loyalty to factional groups which is called "habatsu" in Japan's political scene.

(6) Orientation to the committee: evaluation of the functions of standing committees in the parliament, as well as the orientation toward administrative agencies with which the legislator has to interact as a committee member.

(7) Evaluation of the parliament: evaluation of the role that the Diet, and the Diet member as well, plays within the entire political system.

These are seven sectors of the role which each of Japanese Diet members is supposed to bear.
Chapter 2

RESEARCH METHODS

Universe of Research

The individuals under observation and analysis in this study are total members in Japan's Diet. In August, 1974, when the main part of data collection was carried out, there were altogether 739 Diet members. Among them, 487 members were in the House of Representatives (with 4 vacant seats), and 252 members were in the House of Councillors (with no vacant seats).

Sources of Information

The primary sources of information for the analysis of the universe are of three kinds. First is some published materials which contain brief biographical descriptions of all members in the Diet.¹ They are used mainly for the examination of social background and recruitment of legislators.

The second type of sources, which should be considered the main source of information in this study, is

¹Published materials used for this dissertation include: Nihon Minsei Kenkyukai, ed., Kokkai Giin Soran, 1974; Takayoshi Miyagawa, ed., Seiji Handobukku 4; Shugiin Jimukyoku, ed., Shugiin Yoran, Otsu (February 1973).
a questionnaire survey administered to a limited number of Diet members. The samples, i.e., legislators to whom the questionnaire survey was conducted, are comprised of 92 Diet members (64 Representatives and 28 Councillors). Some information of the social background and recruitment, and most data on general values and role perception of Diet members are obtained by these questionnaires.

Problems involved in selecting and deciding the sample will be discussed later in this chapter. It may suffice to say here that it was noted that the sample would properly represent the universe regarding two seemingly important points, the chamber and the party, although the sample might not be a strictly proportional projection of the universe in these terms. Care was also taken that samples of minority parties would not be too small so that the analysis of those minority parties based on the questionnaire data could be generalized with a certain credibility. Therefore, members of the Komeito and Democratic Socialist Party are inflated in our sample in order to allow generalized comments about these minority parties. The representativeness of the sample as regards the chamber and party is presented in Table 1.

I have to note here that no questionnaire data was obtained on members of the Communist Party. This is due to a practical problem I faced in administering the questionnaire survey, of which I will explain later in
this chapter. Admitting that the Communists are considered one of the significant forces in Japan's parliamentary politics today, we have to dispense with them in the analysis of the attitudinal characteristics which primarily depends on the questionnaire data.

The third type of sources of information in this study is several depth interviews with Diet members. I personally had conversational interviews (about one to three hours) with six incumbent Diet members (three Representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party, one Socialist Representative, one Democratic Socialist Representative, and one Komeito Councillor) and one former Diet member (Liberal Democrat). Those interviews are thought to support the data obtained by questionnaires. Diet members' statements in these conversations had insight and helped me in interpreting the questionnaire data.²

Finally, I must add that some short and casual conversations I had with Diet members' secretaries and office staffers in the course of administering the survey were also as helpful as depth interviews with Diet members.

²There may exist an argument that an open-ended interview, rather than a closed-ended questionnaire, is more capable in providing larger amounts of information with more accuracy about beliefs and values of élites. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, pp. 18-19. Acknowledging the argument, we depended more heavily on a questionnaire survey because I thought we could get information from more Diet members through a questionnaire survey than by interviews when we have a limited resource for research.
Comments of these inside observers often suggested certain important clues to understand Diet members.

Measurement of Social Background and Recruitment

In the category of social background of Japanese Diet members, the following factors are examined in this research: family origin in the form of parents' economic status and father's occupation, place of upbringing, age and sex. Such items as ethnic traits, family religion, and family's social status (aristocrat or commoner), all of which are often considered important indicators of the social background of élite, are not examined in this study because these factors do not seem to have much relevant meaning in characterizing individual Japanese.

Information on parents' economic standing, father's

---

3Cf. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics, p. 119.

4There is almost no ethnic subgrouping within Japanese society. Regarding religion, Buddhism is the prevailing religion among Japanese with few exceptions of Christians, Shintoites, and believers of various lay-religious sects. In Japan where people's religious commitments are fairly weak in comparison with Western societies, it can be assumed that religious background has not much impact upon social and political behavior of people. The exception is Sokagakkai, in which case religious belief in Sokagakkai and political membership of the Komeito are associated almost perfectly beyond any exploration. The status of aristocrat was abolished after World War II, and is seldom mentioned these days.
occupation, and the place of upbringing are gathered only from the sample legislators through questionnaires. Information on age and sex of all Diet members are available in certain published materials.

In the category of recruitment patterns, educational background, previous career, main recruiters, and length of service in the Diet will be explored. Legislators' previous career includes the occupational as well as political career that legislators had experienced before they came to the parliament. In connection with the previous career pattern, we will also inquire who had mainly influenced the legislator and made him decide to seek an office in the Diet. The presumption is that other than long-term psychological factors which cherished legislators' aspiration for legislative career, there should be certain external forces which finally triggered the internal ambition and made legislators run for the parliament. These outside forces, which might be called the main recruiters of legislators, will be identified by the sample legislators in the questionnaire, and the identification is based on legislators' own perception. The main recruiters of legislators may include family members, local leaders, party leaders, and interest groups.

The length of service in the Diet tells about the legislator's experience in the legislative office and must have certain implications on the legislator's political
perception and behavior. Data about the length of service are available regarding all Diet members in some published materials.

Measurement of General Values

Data on legislators' general values should be obtained through the questionnaire survey. In the questionnaire, I asked the sample legislators 30 questions to measure their general values, considering the time that most Diet members would spare for the survey. Ten questions to measure the conservatism, 10 questions for dogmatism, and 10 questions for machiavellianism were placed in the questionnaire.

A scale developed by Kotaro Kido is used for the measurement of conservatism-radicalism in this study, as previously noted. Kido's scale had 12 questioning items. I selected 10 items out of his scale, dropping two items which are regarded as too politically sensitive for Japanese legislators to answer frankly.\(^5\)

The dogmatism scale in this study is based on a scale presented by Milton Rokeach and his associates in *The Open and Closed Mind*. There are 66 items in their dogmatism scale.\(^6\)

\(^5\)Twelve questions in Kido's authoritarianism scale and 10 items in my questionnaire are in Appendix 2.

\(^6\)Sixty-six questions in Rokeach's dogmatism scale are given in Appendix 3. See Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, pp. 71-80, 89-91.
A Japanese student in social psychology translated them into Japanese, applied the scale to a sample of Japanese, and selected 25 questions which were considered to have relatively strong discriminatory power. I tested this 25-item scale of dogmatism upon Japanese college students. Having analyzed the results of this pre-test, I selected the final 10 items which have relatively strong discriminatory power.

The machiavellianism-idealism scale in this study is based on Richard Christie and Florence Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism. Their scale included 71 questioning items. I did a pre-test, addressing these 71 questions translated into Japanese to a sample of 98 Japanese college students. Having analyzed data obtained by this pilot test, I constructed a scale with 10 items which were considered to have relatively strong discriminatory power as well as internal consistency.

Ten questions for the conservatism, 10 for the dogmatism, and 10 for the machiavellianism were inter-

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7 Hideko Oguchi, "Jido no Jinkaku Keisei to Oyako Kankei ni Tsuite," pp. 39, 43. Oguchi's 25-item scale of dogmatism is shown in Appendix 4.

8 About this pre-test, see Appendix 4.

9 Christie and Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism, pp. 11-13. Seventy-one items are presented in Appendix 5.

10 About this pre-test, see Appendix 5.
spersed with each other in the questionnaire in order that respondents would not guess the researcher's intention. All 30 items were placed in a Likert format, in which responses vary across five degrees, from strong agreement to strong disagreement.

It should be noted here that in 29 of 30 questions, the affirmative answer indicates a positive inclination on the scale. It is possible that yea-sayers tend to score high points on all three scales. Therefore, caution should be taken in interpreting legislators' scores on the scales because of this scales' susceptibility to an acquiescence response set. Conceding this problem in the questioning items, however, should not destroy the reliability of the scales as a whole.

The general values of the sample legislators were examined on these three scales. With respect to these general values, it seemed necessary to characterize legislators in comparison with ordinary citizens of Japan. Questionnaires which contain the same three scales were administered to a group of citizens.

The questionnaires addressed to a group of citizens included, in addition to 30 questions on conversatism, dogmatism, and machiavellianism, questions about age, sex, 

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\[\text{11} \] See the Note on the Questionnaire in Appendix 1.
level of education and occupational career. These questionnaires were distributed to about 300 people who were mostly male and relatively old (in their 40s, 50s, and 60s) as are most Japanese Diet members. Those citizens were selected from among this writer's relatives, neighbors, acquaintances, and parents of students in a college where this writer teaches. One hundred and ten persons returned the questionnaires. The respondents' age, sex, education, and occupation are described in Appendix 6. They are not representative of the "average citizen" in strict terms, but we can assume that they can be used as an indicator of the Japanese masses in comparison with the legislators.

Measurement of Role Perception

Role perception of Diet members were also investigated with the help of the questionnaire survey. As previously explained, we thought that the role of a Diet member in Japan had seven facets. The sample legislators were asked in the questionnaire to express their opinions with respect to each of these seven facets.

The first facet of legislators' role perception is the areal focus. We can conceive two types of the legislator's geographic focus: district- and nation-orientation. As intermediary category of "district-nation-orientation" was omitted in this study for fear
most Diet members would choose such an alternative.\textsuperscript{12} Actually in the course of collecting data, I heard many Diet members expressing difficulty in selecting either district- or nation-orientation. By forcing them to choose between two alternatives, we can detect their inclination on the areal role.

The style of representation is also categorized into two types: trustee and delegate. Wahlke et al. have conceived an intermediary category of "poli
ci,"\textsuperscript{13} but it is omitted again in this study with the same reason as noted above.

American legislators are usually categorized, in terms of their orientation toward interest groups, into three types: facilitator, neutral, and resister.\textsuperscript{14} In this study, the same three types are applied to Japanese Diet members, but the definition of three types is slightly different. Here three categories simply indicate three different degrees of the strength of the legislator's favorable attitude to group interest, i.e., favorable, indifferent, and unfavorable attitude.

\textsuperscript{12}Wahlke et al. conceptualized three types: district-focus, nation-focus, and district-nation-focus. Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, p. 291.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 277-280.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 325; Jewell and Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, pp. 350-351, 413.
Regarding the orientation toward party, American legislators are often divided into three types: party man, the indifferent, and the maverick. The strong party control and strict discipline within Japanese parties are, however, quite different from the American situation, and the three types are hard to apply to Japanese Diet members. In this study, Japanese Diet members are categorized into four types, according to their obedience and loyalty toward party authority. The four types are: loyalist, conformist, independent-inclined, and the independent.

Loyalty to the factional group called "habatsu" might be a role perception unique to Japanese legislators. Three types are conceptualized according to their orientation to "habatsu." They are: faction-favorable, faction-admissive, and faction-resented. The legislator's perception of his role as a committee member includes two types: committee-oriented and committee-disoriented.

The final facet of legislators' role perception is the evaluation of the legislature, or the legislator in general, in relation with the whole polity or the whole society. With this respect, American legislators are often divided into five types: ritualist, tribune,

inventor, broker, and opportunist. These typologies seem rather unique to American legislators. In this study, I conceive three levels of evaluation of the role of legislature. Three levels are: high-evaluation, medium-evaluation, and low-evaluation.

Procedure of Questionnaire Survey

Finally, it seems necessary to explain actual procedures in which the questionnaire survey was administered and some practical problems I faced in the course of conducting the survey. In the first stage of this project, it was aimed that the size of the sample should be at least 10 percent of the total universe, which means about 74 Diet members. Estimating the return rate as about 50 percent, I decided to distribute questionnaires to 20 percent of all Diet members, i.e., 148 members. Selecting these 148 Diet members was done by random sampling method. From a list of all members of the House of Representatives, which is in Japanese alphabetical order, one out of every five Representatives (1st, 6th, 11th, 16th, 21st, et cetera) was selected. In the same manner, samples of Councillors were selected from the same kind of list of Councillors.

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17 From a list of all members of the House of Representatives, which is in Japanese alphabetical order, one out of every five Representatives (1st, 6th, 11th, 16th, 21st, et cetera) was selected. In the same manner, samples of Councillors were selected from the same kind of list of Councillors.
offices of these 148 Diet members at the Legislative Office Buildings in downtown Tokyo, and explained the project as well as the procedure to fill in the questionnaire mostly to office staff members, but in some cases (eight cases precisely) to Diet members themselves. During this process, six offices refused to cooperate,¹⁸ and these six samples were replaced by other six members selected by the same random sampling.¹⁹ I left the questionnaire at these Diet members' offices to be returned to me by mail without identification in prepared envelopes. When staff members could not decide whether they would cooperate or not upon my first visit, second or even third visits were paid until cooperative replies were obtained. Filled-in questionnaires were returned from 78 Diet members by mail in August and September, 1974.

Among 78 responses obtained at this stage, there were only seven Komeito members and five Democratic Socialist Party members. Having found that samples of small parties were too small to make generalized comments

¹⁸One Liberal Democrat refused to cooperate in any kind of social science research aiming at analyzing legislators. Three other Liberal Democrats refused saying that they were too busy to cooperate. One Socialist refused claiming the possibility of partisan bias involved in this kind of research, although I explained that any such bias would be eliminated.

¹⁹One who is next to the refusing member on the list was selected.
about these particular parties or to say about party differences, an additional questionnaire survey was conducted for members of these two minority parties. In July and August of 1975, the same questionnaires were distributed to all the remaining members of the two parties whom I could contact. Five Komeito members and nine Democratic Socialists were added to the sample in this manner.

I should note, however, that no member of the Communist Party responded to this survey. Questionnaires were distributed to 12 Diet members of the Communist Party. All of their offices reserved their decisions on cooperation with this project upon my first visit, but at last they all accepted my explanation and questionnaire as well after two or three times visits. Nonetheless, no Communist member was found among those who responded. It seems that they all decided not to cooperate.

In the end, 92 responses were obtained. Although some questionnaires returned had unanswered parts, all of them were usable in some respects, and they compose the primary source of information about the attitudinal characteristics of Japanese Diet members. I must admit here, however, the inevitable bias in mail survey. Very likely, those who refused to answer or who did not return the questionnaire are, as a group, suspicious of people in general than those who did. An American university affiliation might have frightened some
respondents, for example perhaps Communist Party members. Table 2 of the return rates suggests attitudes of Japanese parties toward this kind of research project.

Another technical problem in the survey is the possibility that some questionnaires were completed by secretaries or staffs of Diet members. These problems are inherent in mail survey on élites, and could not be solved in the present research. These problems are not, however, so serious as to destroy the usefulness of this study as a whole.
Chapter 3

JAPANESE LEGISLATORS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Before proceeding to the examination of characteristics of contemporary legislators, it would be appropriate to present in this chapter a summary sketch of politicians who had appeared into the national political scene since the birth of the parliament in Japan. The sketch will show a historical context in which Diet members today have emerged and a milieu in which contemporary legislators think and act.

We can identify four important political forces in the history of the parliament of Japan. They are: (1) "kanryo seijika" (literally "bureaucrat-politician"), politicians who made their career through higher civil service of government; (2) "tojin" (literally "party man"), politicians who made their career through elective political offices, i.e., local assemblies and the parliament; (3) representatives of workers; (4) a recently-emerged lay-religious group called Sokagakkai. These four forces appeared into the political arena of the Diet in different phases of the history of Japanese parliament, and the influences they have had in Japanese politics may differ considerably. Yet all of them are considered major forces in the Diet today.
"Kanryo Seijika": Bureaucrat-Politician

In the past as well as today, legislators who had previously served in the high-ranking bureaucracy composed a formidable, or even critical, force in Japanese parliament. The vital role of these "kanryo Seijika," politicians who came from higher civil service, in Japanese politics is illustrated by the fact that five out of 11 Diet members who served as Prime Minister in postwar period had bureaucratic background.

In the political tradition since Meiji Restoration, bureaucrats have been politically-minded, exceeding their role as mere administrators. Meiji oligarchs themselves, who dominated politics of the Imperial regime in Meiji era, were considered bureaucrats in the sense that they occupied the top ranks of various Emperor's bureaus. In addition to these oligarch, other career bureaucrats below them, who occupied the higher echelon of civil service and were called "kokyu Kanryo" (high-ranking bureaucrats), had fairly easy and close access to policy-making. As all ultimate governmental power was in the hands of the Emperor, it seems that there was not strict demarcation in actuality between policy-making and administration. As a political force, higher civil servants exercised their influence not only in the administrative sphere
but also political sphere of government.\textsuperscript{1} Thus, the
tradition of "political bureaucrats" was firmly
established in Imperial Japan.

High-ranking bureaucrats in the early Meiji were
recruited from particular "han" (fiefs instituted in
Edo era), such as Satsuma-han or Choshu-han, from where
most oligarchs also came. They were often called
"hanbatsu kanryo" (fief-clique bureaucrat). Personal
connections were generally the base for their recruit-
ment.\textsuperscript{2} These "hanbatsu kanryo" are considered the original
model of political bureaucrats in Japan.

From about the 1920s, however, career personnel
who were recruited through élitist education in
national (imperial) universities and the civil service
examination took over offices in the higher bureaucracy
in Japan.\textsuperscript{3} They were often called "gakubatsu kanryo"
(school-clique bureaucrat). The term implies the fact
that although they were recruited by education and merits,
personal bonds based on schools from which they had
graduated were a significant factor for promotion within
bureaucratic structures. Those "gakubatsu kanryo" set

\textsuperscript{1}Robert M. Spaulding, Jr., "The Bureaucracy as a

\textsuperscript{2}Frank Langdon, \textit{Politics in Japan}, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{3}Junnosuke Masumi, \textit{Nihon Seitoshi Ron} 4, pp. 165-
168.
the pattern of career process for high-ranking bureaucrats today.

Even after the substantial structure of Japanese polity was reformed and politics and administration were more clearly separated under the Occupation, it appears that high-ranking civil servants in postwar period have been oriented toward a political role in government. "Political bureaucrats" have, thus, taken roots in Japanese politics. It is natural that some higher civil servants, who are politically-oriented and are sometimes actually involved in policy-making processes, would turn their career into legislative offices. Those "bureaucratic politicians," legislators with previous careers in higher bureaucracy, have composed a formidable force in the postwar parliament.

The significant role that "kanryo seijika" (bureaucrat-politician) have played in postwar Japan is partly attributed to the governing policy of the Allied Forces during the Occupation. While many prewar politicians were purged and kept behind the scene, occupying Allied Forces had to depend on the existing administrative organization and personnel to implement their policy of reorienting Japan. The removal program did not cut too deeply into the ranks of professional bureaucracy as compared with elective office-holders.4 Thus, the emergence of

4Hans H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation, pp. 82-90.
"bureaucratic politicians" were more solicited. The "kanryo seijika" may compose the most significant and powerful force in the contemporary parliament of Japan.

"Tojin": Politicians from Local Politics

Many Japanese Diet members in the past as well as today are politicians who worked their way up through local legislatures and came finally to the Diet. The name of "tojin" has been used to identify those politicians as distinct from "kanryo seijika," politicians with bureaucratic career. "Kanryo seijika" and "tojin" were two dominant forces in politics of the prewar Diet, and have been so within the conservative camp of the postwar era.

The pattern that politicians start their career from local assembly and go up to the national Diet can be traced back to the beginning of the national parliament in Japan in 1890. In fact, prior to the establishment of the parliament, prefectural assemblies, which were institutionalized in 1880, were the main arena for political activists who demanded the expansion of political participation against oligarchs. When the national assembly was first established, those who had been trained in local assemblies came to the national scene. Thus, the pattern "from local to national politics" was set at
the very beginning of parliamentary politics of Japan.

Although the pattern "from local to national politics" might be found in many other nations, the label of "tojin," which is to identify those who came from local politics, has specific implication in the political world of Japan. The term "tojin" has traditionally indicated an antithesis to "kanryo seijika." Those who have been called by the name of "tojin" are politicians as distinguished from and opposed to "bureaucrat-politicians," that vital élite group in Japanese government.

The group of activists who came from local politics to the national parliament in the early phase of Imperial Japan was composed of politically aspiring local gentries, i.e., ex-samurai, landlords, and local entrepreneurs.\(^5\) They were an opposition force, in a sense, against oligarchs and élitist bureaucrats in the Imperial regime. They were excluded from the core of power in Imperial Japan, which were occupied by oligarchs and bureaucratic élites. Even in the eyes of public, Emperor's bureaucrats were generally more esteemed than parliamentarians in prewar days.\(^6\)

In other words, "tojin" have been considered to have closer

\(^5\) Masumi, *Nihon Seitoshi Ron* 1, 2.

\(^6\) As an illustrating episode, Masumi reports that some local gentries who were not politically-minded hated to get elected to local assemblies in early Meiji. Masumi, *Nihon Seitoshi Ron* 2, pp. 59-62.
contacts with grass roots populace in contrast to "kanryo seijika."

Although "tojin" started as an opposition force in early Meiji, they gradually gained access to the center of power in the Imperial regime. The economic basis for people who aspire for the Diet through local politics has also changed as social and economic structures of Japan have undergone a drastic transformation after World War II. Along with these transitions, the identity of "tojin" and their character as "outsider" might have been weakened. Yet, some contemporary Diet members are still called by the name of "tojin." In the conservative camp of parliamentary politics today, "tojin" seem to have their own identity, being distinguished from "kanryo seijika" as were their predecessors in prewar period.

"Kanryo seijika" and "tojin" are the two main forces among the majorirty conservatives, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Today, the two forces do not form any solid group within the party, but they often represent two different types of conservative politicians in Japan, in terms of career and perspectives.

Representatives of Workers

After the political reform during the Occupation, a large number of representatives from the working class came into the parliament. Their appearance as a powerful
force is one of the conspicuous factors in the Japanese postwar parliament.

Nevertheless, legislators with socialist ideologies and backings of organized workers are not entirely a postwar phenomenon. After the franchise was expanded to all male citizens in 1925, a few representatives supported by leftist intelligentsia groups and organized labor unions came into the House of Representatives in Imperial parliament. They never became, however, a formidable force in the prewar Diet, partly because leftist groups were fragmented organizationally and ideologically from Bolshevists to Fabian-style labor unionists, and partly because their political activities were under strict control by Imperial police.  

Representatives of workers in the postwar period can be broadly divided into two groups. One is socialists and social democrats and another is the communists. Alignments and realignments took place time and again among socialists and social democrats after the war, but they have maintained substantial seats in both houses of the parliament as main opposition forces against the majority Liberal Democrats.  

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7Prewar history of socialist and communist movements is in George O. Totten, III, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan, pp. 16-88.

8For historical survey of socialists and social democrats in postwar period, see: Allan B. Cole et al., Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan, pp. 3-82.
Socialists and social democrats are divided today into two parties, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Ideologically, Socialists are more inclined toward Marxist orientation in general, although there are several different shades of ideological approaches among the Socialists. Compared with Socialists, Democratic Socialists, who severed themselves from Socialists in 1960, believe in rather moderate labor unionism and social reformism. Democratic Socialists bitterly refute the Marxist's interpretation of the society. In terms of strength in the parliament, the Socialists party has been a much larger power than the DSP, keeping almost one-third and over seats in the Diet. The DSP has not attained more than ten percent of Diet seats in the past, and their strength seems on the wane at the present.

The communists, another group in the leftist camp, first came into the parliament during the Occupation as the Japan Communist Party (JCP). They once almost disappeared from the national political scene of the parliament when their leaders adopted the strategy of violent revolution in Japan during the early 1950s. The failure of violent revolution brought about a strategic change of Communists to a "peaceful revolution," meaning a revolution through parliamentary measures. The Communists have gradually grown in popularity among Japanese voters, and today they retain about ten percent
of all seats in the parliament.

New Religious Group: Sokagakkai

A completely new phenomenon in parliamentary politics in postwar Japan is the emergence of a religious group, Komeito (Clean Government Party, sometimes abbreviated to CGP). The Komeito is a political affiliate of the Sokagakkai (Value Creation Society), which is a lay-religious organization attached to a Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shoshu. The Sokagakkai claims that their members comprise a considerable proportion of Japanese populace.\(^9\)

Komeitoites first came into the Diet in 1967, and have retained since then about 5-7 percent of total seats in the parliament. Records of parliamentary performance of the party members can be described as "one of cooperation with the right drifting toward limited, unstable coalitions with various elements of the left."\(^10\) The political stand of the Komeito is best represented in their slogan "chudo seiji" ("middle-of-the road politics"). They often join the Socialists in opposing the majority Liberal Democrats,

\(^{9}\)The number of the Sokagakkai members was estimated somewhere between 4-10 percent of the total population of Japan in the late 1960s. James W. White, The Sokagakkai and Mass Society, pp. 57-58.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., pp. 152-153.
but they are, as are the Democratic Socialists, opposed to
the Marxist theory of society.

Members of Sokagakkai, who compose the primary
constituents of the Komeito, are said to have been
recruited from the lower classes in a "mass society,"
which could be interpreted as uprooted working people
in urban areas.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 57-106; Yukio Hori, \textit{Komeito Ron}, pp.
182-194.}
Chapter 4

INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF JAPANESE LEGISLATORS

As pointed out earlier in Chapter 1, legislative studies require understanding of both institutional and behavioral aspects of the legislature. Although the present study concerns attitudes and behavior of legislators, institutional framework of the parliament should not be disregarded because they compose the settings in which contemporary legislators operate. Before examining the characteristics of individual Japanese Diet members, we need to understand formal organization of Japan's parliament. After discussing the formal structures of the Diet, we will proceed to the exploration of social background and attitude of Diet members, the main substance of this paper.

Selection of Diet Members

First, let us look at procedural formats concerning the selection of legislators. Japanese Diet members are elected by constituents of different sizes. In elections for the House of Representatives, which has 491 seats as of August, 1974, each prefecture is usually divided into several electoral districts according to its popula-
tion. In case of some thinly populated rural prefectures, each prefecture stands for one electoral district. The number of Representatives elected from each district ranges from one to several depending on the population of that district. The proportion between the number of Representatives and the number of eligible voters within a district differs considerably across districts, giving more advantages to rural candidates than urban candidates. The drive of migration from rural to urban area which has occurred along with industrialization in postwar Japan has made this disproportion more conspicuous. The number of votes the urban candidate must receive to get elected is almost 3.5 times, in extreme case, that of the rural candidates.

The House of Councillors is composed of two types of members in terms of their constituencies: Councillors who represent prefectual constituencies and Councillors who represent a national constituency. In prefectural constituencies for Councillors, each prefecture stands for one electoral district. Some prefectures elect several Councillors and some elect only one Councillor, depending on the prefecture's population size. Here again handicaps

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1Japan is today administratively divided into 47 prefectures.

of urban candidates exist in comparison with rural candidates. For 100 members out of a total of 252 Councillors, the entire nation composes a constituency.

There are two different types of tenure for Japanese Diet members. The term for the Councillors is six years, half of them going through an election every three years. The Representatives have four-year tenure and all of them are tested in each election for the House. The Chief Executive has power to dissolve the House of Representatives and call an election for the House whenever he chooses. Actually, during 28 years of postwar parliament, the average tenure for the Representatives has been only two and a half years.³

Role of the Diet

Formal prescription on the role of the parliament in Japan specified by the Constitution is considered one of the most significant institutional settings in which Japanese Diet members operate. It may give an condition to the legislators' perception of their own functions in the Japanese polity.

The present Constitution of Japan dictates that the parliament alone holds the final deciding power in legislation, and therefore, Diet members are the only lawmakers

³Ibid., p. 18
In Japan.\textsuperscript{4} In spite of this formal prescription of the contemporary Diet, it is thought that residual effects of the past prescription and past practices concerning the role of the parliament may also set a condition for attitudes of Diet members today.

In Imperial Japan, the Meiji Constitution stated that the Emperor held prerogative over every field of government including law-making. The role of the parliament was defined as providing the Emperor with agreement in legislation.\textsuperscript{5} In practice, oligarchic élites, who were close aids to the Emperor, exercised the actual authority of governing through the Emperor's ultra-parliamentary bureaus, such as the Cabinet, Privy Council, Military Boards, elder statesmen, Imperial Household Ministry, and the Imperial Conference. The Diet was generally regarded as a discussion club, deprived of any decision-making power, and was assigned merely an instrumental role for mobilizing support or objection in oligarchic politics.\textsuperscript{6}

The old prescriptions and practices in Imperial Japan were changed into the present system by American officials during the Occupation. Despite the drastic

\textsuperscript{4}Constitution of Japan, Article 41.
\textsuperscript{5}Imperial Constitution of Japan, Article 4.
\textsuperscript{6}Baerwald, Japan's Parliament, p. 2.
reform carried out by SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), however, it is suspected that the old norms and practices related to the role of the parliament have had persisting effects upon legislators after the war. American framers in the Japan Occupation did not totally disregard what was left from the preceding structures of the Imperial regime, and the postwar Constitution was put into effect strictly following the procedure stipulated by the old rule.\(^7\) For this reason the old system, especially concerning the role of parliament in practice, has actually appeared unchanged in the minds of many legislators. In fact, many conservative politicians tried to preserve the substance of old system in practice even after the formal structure was changed under the Occupation.\(^8\)

The extent to which the norms and customs of the prewar regime have persisting effect upon the perception of contemporary legislators is open to speculation. Should we assume that the traditional heritage is important in any system, we must not disregard the old practice of the Imperial parliament in understanding the contemporary Diet.

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\(^7\) Justin Williams, "The Japanese Diet under the New Constitution," pp. 928-932.

\(^8\) Takeshi Ishida, Kindai Nihon Seijikozo no Kenkyu, pp. 305-306.
Differences Between the Two Chambers

In the postwar system, the Diet has bicameral structure: the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Both chambers consist of popularly elected representatives. In the Imperial Diet only the House of Representatives had elected members. The House of Peers in the Imperial parliament was replaced by the House of Councillors after World War II.

The House of Representatives and the House of Councillors share equal power in certain respects, such as in amendments of the Constitution. In many respects of policy-making, however, the House of Representatives is purported to play the main and driving role within the Diet, while the House of Councillors is expected to check and prevent the other chamber from excessive decision-making. For example, in ordinary legislation the House of Representatives has the upper hand over the other House. In ratifying treaties and making the national budget the House of Representatives exercises a still greater power.\(^9\)

The House of Councillors is geared to continuity, whereas the House of Representatives is geared to be flexibly responsive to changes in the society. The

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\(^9\) About details of functions of two chambers, see Constitution of Japan, Articles 59, 60, and 61.
difference between the two chambers in this respect is illustrated by the difference of tenure between the Representatives and the Councillors. This tenure system of the Councillors, which is consistent with that of American Senators, was adopted by American framers in the Occupation.  

10 This fact indicates that when American framers instituted the House of Councillors in the Japanese parliament, they had in their minds the United States Senate as a guiding model.

In practice, the Representatives tend to have closer access to decision-making power than the Councillors. To illustrate this tendency, note the fact that all the Prime Ministers, as well as more than 80 percent of cabinet ministers, in the postwar period were chosen from among the Representatives.  

11 Another point which has been often alleged by public opinion leaders and politicians themselves is that the House of Representatives should be the main arena for partisan politics, while the House of Councillors is prescribed to moderate the partisan confrontation in the other chamber. This prescription seems not to have been well realized in the parliament today, but the existence of such expectation should be noted.


11 Ibid., p. 18.
Internal Structure of the Diet

One of the significant intra-institutional set-ups of the Diet includes standing committees in both Houses. Standing committees are so arranged that each of them covers each major field of government affairs. This standing committee system is also a product of postwar parliamentary reform by American framers. Although there were standing committees also in the Imperial parliament, they were not arranged to cover all fields of government, nor to play an essential role in legislative processes as the present system is so constructed. Unlike the present procedures, most legislative deliberations in the prewar system started on the floor. For the creation of the present system, the standing committees in the American Congress provided a model. American framers intended, undoubtedly, for those standing committees to become places where much of the sub-

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12 Today there are 16 standing committees in each house. They are: Cabinet, Local Administration, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Labor and Social Welfare, Agriculture and Forestry, Commerce, Transportation, Postal, Construction, Budgets, Audits, Steering, and Disciplinary.

13 There were only four standing committees in the Imperial Diet. They were: Budgets, Audits, Disciplinary, and Petitions.

14 The standing committee system in today's Diet has parallels in several important aspects to the U.S. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Baerwald, Japan's Parliament, p. 88.
stantial legislative deliberations could take place before final decisions on the floor and that they would play a vital role in law-making processes as in the United States Congress.

Although the legislative standing committee system has been prescribed to bear an essential part in Japan's parliament, the prescription has not worked in practice as well as the American framers anticipated. Standing committees, among others the Budgets Committee which is considered the most important committee in each house, look more like an arena where verbal battles are fought between majorities and opposing minorities for the sake of public display rather than places where legislators discuss and bargain. ¹⁵ This phenomenon might be attributed to the tight control and strict discipline within Japanese political parties. Unlike the American Congress where legislators' behavior in committees, as well as on the floor, is relatively independent of party control, Japanese party authorities control their members' activities in the Diet. This pattern diminishes the individual legislator's capacity for effective bargaining and maneuvering.

Within the internal structure of the Diet, another significant stipulation is the extensive power given to

¹⁵Ibid., p. 90-91.
speakers of both chambers and chairmen of standing committees. Those officers of the Diet are provided with rather impressive power in arranging orders of proposed legislation, setting dates for debate and voting. Those prerogatives are also a product of postwar reform by occupying American officials. They feared, as one account goes, that minority archconservatives in the Japanese parliament might bar some progressive legislation by filibusters as among minority Congressmen in the United States Congress.¹⁶ The prescribed strong power of the presiding officers in the parliament has been intended to prevent delay and obstruction from minorities opposing the majority's programs.

In practice, because of the absence of a seniority system in the Japanese parliament and strict discipline within Japanese parties, the post of house speakers and legislative committee chairmen have been subjected to party authorities, particularly the authority of the majority party. The power of officers of the Diet, both in prescription and practice, has worked to bring about confrontation rather than compromise between the majority party and minority parties. Deprived of any effective means to prevent proposals by the majority, who controls the powerful post of the presiding officers, minorities have often resorted to tactics of

¹⁶Ibid., p. 15-16.
physical obstruction of legislative proceedings in committees or in the floor session.¹⁷

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 103-104.
PART 2

SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND RECRUITMENT
Chapter 5

SOCIAL BACKGROUND

What kind of people gather at the national assembly of Japan? In this chapter social background characteristics of Japanese legislators are examined. The findings are descriptive. Social background characteristics will be examined later as an explanatory exploration related to legislators' values and perceptions. The descriptive data are, nevertheless, interesting as a method of discovering who Japanese legislators are, especially in comparison to legislators of other nations and ordinary citizens of Japan.

Family Background

What kind of families have Japanese legislators come from? In a society like Japan, where people are fairly homogeneous in ethnicity and religion, where rigid hierarchical social classes cannot be found and social mobility is considered to have been high, the best indicators for characterizing people's family background might be income and occupation. In particular, the occupation of a person would suggest not only his

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1Ronald P. Dore, "Mobility, Equality, and Individualization in Modern Japan," pp. 113-150.
economic standing, but also the social status attached to that occupation in the society. Thus, parents' economic standing and the father's occupation are explored to describe Japanese legislators' family background.

Published materials which describe parents' economic statuses and occupations in regard to all legislators are not available. Therefore, my information came only through questions I asked legislators in my sample. Respondents rated the economic standing of their parents in such ways as shown in Table 4.

Judging from our data most Japanese lawmakers, in terms of parents' income, seem to have come from middle class families. Only about 8 percent came from upper class families and about 12 percent came from lower class families. We have to note, regarding these figures, that the ratings were made by legislators' subjective perceptions and judgments without any concrete cutting-off points provided for classification of the three classes. Although the data are the only information available on the economic status of legislators' parents, I must concede they are somewhat subjective and arbitrary. Probably the category of "middle class" is larger than the actual situation, considering that "middle class" ratings are noncommittal responses to this kind of question in Japanese culture. Nevertheless, as a roughly sketched picture, our data suggest that middle class backgrounds are attributed
to a large proportion of Japanese Diet members.

In comparison with economic status, occupational classification is assumed to be less subjective and arbitrary. Occupations of the sample legislators are classified, based on the legislators' own perception, as presented in Table 5.

In conventional standards within Japanese society, politicians, higher civil servants, landlords, business entrepreneurs, and such professional people as lawyers, doctors, teachers, and journalists are thought to be in either upper or upper-middle class in socio-economic status. Especially in the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, during which period most legislators were raised, those managerial and professional occupations are thought to account for a fairly small proportion of jobs in Japan, and to have had accordingly even higher socio-economic status than today. With this presumption, it is concluded that the majority of the sample Diet members (61 percent) are from upper or upper-middle classes. If we include white collar workers in the middle class, 71 percent have either middle, upper-middle, or upper class family backgrounds. It is apparent that these better family backgrounds are over-represented in the parliament in comparison with the social and economic structures of the Japanese society as a whole.

Among those upper or upper-middle class family origins, what attracts particular attention is the
politicians' and higher civil servants' families. Politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats are regarded as having composed a political élite in Japan ever since prewar periods. In our sample, a little more than ten percent have been recruited from families of this political élite group. It should be said that the reproduction of political élites in successive generations is practiced on a considerable scale within Japan's political circles.

When Diet members have been recruited from politicians' families, the practice comes to possess the nature of inheritance of elective offices. Concerning this problem, we have data with respect to the entire population of Diet members. Among 739 Diet members in Japan's parliament today, 61 are sons, 10 are sons-in-law, 2 are wives, and 5 are close relatives of late or former Diet members. Other 8 Diet members are identified as sons of distinguished local politicians. Altogether 86 of the total legislators (about 12 percent) are considered as heirs of representative offices. This practice of inheriting legislators' posts seems to be an increasing trend in contemporary Japan.

On this issue we also have to notice that partisan

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3 Asahi Shimbun (Osaka), January 30, 1976, p. 2; Asahi Shimbun (Osaka), January 5, 1976, p. 2.
crossover almost never occurs from generation to generation on the political élite level in Japan, and inheritance of legislative offices has been practiced mostly among Liberals Democrats. Among 85 Diet members who are considered as heirs of representative posts, 80 are Liberal Democrats and 5 are Socialists. Thus, families of higher civil servants and politicians of the LDP camp have been a significant seedbed for another generation of LDP representatives.

These findings may suggest that the Liberal Democrats are real élites in the sense that they have access to actual policy-making power, and only their offices have such attractiveness as to cause self-breeding among themselves. But we must take note also of the fact that all other minority parties are mostly of postwar existence in the Diet. In the Socialist Party, which appeared in the Diet relatively early after the war, we can find some cases of hereditary customs (five cases), though still few. There is the possibility that such instances will increase among minority party members in the future.

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4 With regard to 86 Diet members who inherited their legislative offices, only 1 case of partisan crossover is found. A Socialist Diet member is found to be a son of a late Minseito (a predecessor of today's LDP) Diet member. Nihon Minsei Kenkyukai, ed., Kokkai Giin Soran; Asahi Shimbun (Osaka), January 5, 1976, p. 2.
Except for these hereditary instances among certain members, our data indicate that Japanese legislators have been recruited from fairly varied sectors of the society. Although the majority of the sample legislators have been recruited from relatively well-off families in Japanese society, the social base of Japanese legislators cannot be considered too narrow or homogeneous as the social base of an élite group.

According to our data, 29 percent came from families of manual labor occupations, such as farmers, fishermen, or blue collar workers. About 20 percent of the sample legislators are from farmers' families, although this category is not sufficiently represented considering that the majority of the Japanese labor force was engaged in agriculture in prewar days.

The characteristics of family background seem to vary across party lines, as suggested by data in Table 5. According to our data, Liberal Democrats seem to have been recruited from fairly diverse sectors of the Japanese society. An exception is, of course, those Liberal Democrats who came from families of politicians or higher civil servants and who conform among themselves to the reproduction pattern of political élites. Other than these, however, the social origins of Liberal Democrats are still broad enough, including families of business entrepreneurs, farmers, various professionals,
landlords, white collar workers, and even a few blue collar workers. Although their social base is apparently inclined toward middle to upper classes, manual labor families still account for 22 percent of the total LDP respondents.

Among the Democratic Socialists, families in professional occupations such as teachers, doctors, lawyers, and journalists, appear prominent. Members of the Komeito seem to have been recruited considerably from business entrepreneurs. One account of the family background of Komeito leaders suggests that many are from small or even petty business families, which have rather middle to lower socio-economic characteristics. The Socialists are the only group which seems to be frequently recruited from manual labor workers' families. Ten of 21 Socialists respondents have either farmers' or blue collar workers' family origins. Nevertheless, a considerable number of Socialists are from professional families.

As a whole, our data suggest that many Japanese Diet members have come from upper or middle class families, but their social origins have considerable diversity and broadness for the social base of a political élite group. The study of Akira Kubota revealed

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5Hori, Komeito Ron, pp. 186-188.
also the fairly heterogeneous and broad nature of social origins of Japanese higher civil servants, another significant political élite group in Japan. I am inclined to agree with Kubota's view that upward social mobility in Japan has been attained to a great extent through the modern educational system established by the Meiji government, which has brought about a rather broad base of Japanese political élites.

Childhood Environments

The place of residence in childhood, like family background, might have certain impacts upon one's later career and later attitudes. It is often said that the political élites tend to be recruited from larger towns and cities. Perhaps the urban environments in which political information is abundant and access to political power is easy to find is generally assumed to be suitable for socialization and recruitment of political élites. The proposition is yet to be tested by empirical data. The environment is measured according to the degree of urbanization, and respondents in our survey rated their place of upbringing as shown in Table 6.

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6 Akira Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan, pp. 27-57.

7 Ibid., p. 161.

8 Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics, p. 121.
It is not easy to find a proper cutting-off point for distinguishing rural and urban areas in Japan, where most geographic communities are not distinctly separated from each other by space, and the urbanization is to be scaled on a continuum. But my assumption, though still arbitrary, is that the rough distinction is made at somewhere around the population size of 100,000. Smaller communities than that are often different from larger communities in regard to the volume of cultural and education facilities, the volume of communication and information, and the level of existing political institutions.

In this rural-urban distinction, about a half of the sample legislators (56 percent) are from a rural environment and another half (44 percent) are from urban areas. Considering the fact that Japanese society was not so industrialized and urbanized during the period when most Diet members were children (mostly 1920s, 30s, and 40s), the proportion of urban background appears more salient among legislators, in comparison with the Japanese populace as a whole.

Yet the concentration of Japanese Diet members in the urban areas is not too remarkable. The majority are still from rural areas. Although Tokyo area produced more Diet members than its share in the entire population, the disproportion is not so drastic as some might
expect when we consider the general proposition that élites tend to be drawn from urban areas and the fact that Japan is a highly centralized society, administratively and culturally. From our data, it may be concluded that the childhood environment of Japanese Diet members is about evenly varied from rural to urban areas.

Let us examine differences in legislators' childhood environment across party lines, also shown in Table 6. Liberal Democrats and Socialists seem to have come fairly evenly from all sizes of communities. Members of the Komeito and Democratic Socialist Party, however, show some noticeable patterns. Komeitoites are mainly from rural towns and local cities, and few are from small village. This finding, together with the fact that small or petty business entrepreneurs are often found among their family backgrounds, fits the argument that the Sokagakkai movement is not based on rural society but on uprooted working people in rather urban societies. On the other hand, Democratic Socialists seem to have been recruited from more rural areas.

Educational Background

Information on educational background of all Diet

members is in several published materials. Educational levels of all legislators are shown in Table 7. (For reference, education of the sample legislators is also included in the table). Almost 70 percent of Japanese legislators have college degrees. Among ordinary citizens (let us say among male citizens of the legislators' age) in general, college graduates probably account for less than 10 percent.

The general proposition that political élites are better educated than the masses is clearly asserted in this case of Japanese legislators. Jean Blondel explained the better educational background of legislators by saying that it is a result of "natural" forces at play in selection of legislators because legislative works require education, especially in developed societies where legislators must understand highly complex and technical problems of administration.

Although data on legislators in other nations are

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11 In 1960, people who entered the college accounted for 8.2 percent of the total number of people who reached the age of 18. Monbusho (Ministry of Education), ed., Wagakuni no Kyoiku Suijun, 1975, p. 30.

12 Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics, p. 121; Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, p. 79.

13 Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, p. 81.
not available to this writer, the proportion of university educated people in the legislature in many developed nations might be high as in Japan. Nevertheless, the figure in Japan is still impressive by any comparative standard.

Two factors may explain high educational level among Japanese Diet members. One is the easily available educational system, especially of higher learning, in Japan; another is the significant role that education has played in the mechanisms of social mobility in Japanese society.\footnote{Dore, "Mobility, Equality, and Individuation in Modern Japan," pp. 117-124.} In Japan where rigid social strata cannot be found, people are recruited into the higher echelon of the social ladder mostly through education. Among professional people like lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, or engineers, university degrees are almost requisite. The situation is the same as well for higher civil servants.\footnote{According to one report, 99.2 percent of higher civil servants in Japan have university degrees. The figure is higher than American civil servants (87.7 percent) or British civil servants (86.2 percent). Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan, p. 58.} Among business leaders, university graduates comprise the great majority, almost 80 to 90 percent.\footnote{The figure varies depending on how one defines the "élites" or "leaders" of business community in Japan. Dore, "Mobility, Equality, and Individuation in Modern Japan," pp. 118-119; Hiroshi Mannari, The Japanese Business Leaders, pp. 78-81.} Compared with those professional people,
high-ranking bureaucrats, and business leaders, the figure of 70 percent among Diet members is not particularly high. Perhaps it can be said that opportunities are more available for the less educated within the politicians' world than in other elitist careers in Japanese society.

In any case, the fact points to the significance of higher learning (and the entrance examination system for universities) in the process of selection and recruitment of elites in Japan, including political elites. In the case of politicians in particular, college degrees are counted as significant assets in election as something which testifies to the personal quality of the politician, or what one aptly called "kanban" (literally "label" or "title").\textsuperscript{17}

What seems, however, to have more important implication with respect to educational characteristics of Japan's political elites is the concentration of graduates upon one particular university. One hundred and sixty-one Diet members are graduates of Tokyo University.\textsuperscript{18} (They account for 22 percent of the total Diet members, and 32 percent of those with university

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with a former Liberal Democratic Representative, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.

\textsuperscript{18} Nihon Minsei Kenkyukai, ed., \textit{Kokkai Giin Soran}. 
degrees).

In Japan where social élites are often selected by educational background, Tokyo University has played an essentially significant role in sending out large numbers of élites on top levels in almost every field of society, in the legal field, medical field, academic field, civil service, and the politicians' world. The significant role of Tokyo University in selecting élites in Japan may stand out uniquely in cross-cultural comparison. For example, within the high echelon of bureaucracy, which is one of the establishment where educational background is most crucial in recruitment and promotion, Tokyo University graduates account for almost 80 percent.19 Perhaps the bureaucracy is, among Japanese establishment, a place where Tokyo University graduates are exceptionally concentrated. Probably next to the higher civil service, the politicians' world is the place where the background of Tokyo University dominates.

Graduates of Tokyo University have a strong partisan bias. Of 161 legislators from Tokyo University, 131 (81 percent) are Liberal Democrats. Considering the fact that the LD Party has been in power during most of the 30 year postwar era, it has been Liberal Democrats who are actual political élites in the sense that they are

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19Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan, p. 69.
the only legislators with access to real decision-making power. If Tokyo University functions to recruit élites in an actual sense, it is rather natural that people go from Tokyo University to the majority party. The most typical career pattern for political élites in Japan is often summarized as that of people who have graduated from Tokyo University, gone up the ladder in higher civil service, and come into the Diet as Liberal Democrats.

It should be noticed that 119 of 161 Tokyo University graduates in the Diet (74 percent) studied law at the University. The Law School of Tokyo University has been traditionally regarded as, and has actually been, the core of the establishment of élite recruitment. Political élites of Japan are most heavily concentrated among the graduates of this school. We must note also that most Diet members who graduated from Tokyo University Law School have not practiced law as their occupation. The institution has functioned as a recruiter of political élites, rather than as an agent where lawyers are trained. (We will discuss about Diet members who have the lawyer's career in the following Chapter 6).

Party differences exist regarding educational background, as shown in Table 7. Among Japanese parties Liberal Democrats are the best educated group of people. The percentage of the college-educated among them reaches 80 percent. It might be another indication of well-to-do
family backgrounds among many Liberal Democrats.

Another interesting point is that the Japan Communist Party includes a considerable number of college graduates (68 percent), second to the LD Party. In comparison with Socialists, among whom many are from working class families and are less educated, the Communist Party is a party largely composed of intelligentsia with a high level of education. In the parliaments of Communist states, people classified as intelligentsia are regarded as one of the significant forces, together with those from workers' or peasant backgrounds.\(^{20}\) It seems that the Communists in Japan's Diet tend to have rather strong characteristics as a group of middle class intelligentsia.

Age and Sex

In a general proposition, political élites tend to be older than the masses and to be male rather than female.\(^{21}\) Is it true in the case of the Japanese Diet members, and how much are the old people and males over-represented in Japan's parliament?

Data are available on the age of all Diet members in some published materials.\(^{22}\) Table 8 in brackets shows

\(^{20}\) Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures*, p. 81.

\(^{21}\) Merritt, *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics*, p. 121; Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures*, pp. 77-78.

\(^{22}\) Miyagawa, ed., *Seiji Handobukku*. 
the age of all Japanese Diet members. (For reference, the table includes the age of the sample legislators.) The mean age of all Diet members is 57.23 and the median is also 57. The figures suggest that a large proportion of Japanese Diet members are fairly old, i.e., in their fifties and sixties. When compared with legislators of other nations, whose average age often drops into the forties, elderliness of Japanese politicians as a whole is remarkable.

This elderly tendency of Japanese Diet members is not considered as a phenomenon indigenous to Japan's political soil. We must remind ourselves that Japan's parliament was composed of much younger people (the average age being in the forties) during the early phase of the Imperial Diet. Perhaps the newness of the political system, or the legislative institution, may be related to the age of legislators, as Jean Blondel suggests.

In addition to Blondel's general proposition, however, I would like to cite a factor which is rather particular to the political world of Japan. The elderliness of Japanese Diet members can be regarded partly


\[24\] See Table 3.

\[25\] Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures*, p. 78.
as a result of election campaign practices in contemporary Japan. To get elected to national representative offices in Japan, one must have a large financial base (often called "kaban" meaning "purse") to construct a personal election machine called "koenkai" (backing society), or must obtain organizational support from labor unions, political parties, or other professional or religious organizations. Financial basis or organizational backings are generally hard to get for young people in any society. It may be contended that, in Japan, funds and organizations that candidates are required to command for conducting their election campaigns and for winning elections are extremely large.

At the same time, building up a "koenkai" machine is slow work and not easy for a young candidate. The "koenkai" means an organization of supporters based on a ramifying network of personal bonds. It is often called by another name, "jiban" (literally "areal foundation"). Japan's traditional personal ties on which "jiban" is based emphasize face-to-face contacts and emotional commitments between a leader and followers. (This type of personal relationship is often called the "oyabun-kobun" relation. Confer Chapter 14 for more detail.) Accumulating these personal bonds on a considerable scale large enough to wage winning support requires long and steadfast efforts, and as such is often difficult for
young candidates.

The fact that many young Diet members are identified as sons or grandsons of powerful politicians, mostly late or former Diet members, indicates that among young politicians only those who have inherited sufficient "kaban" and well-organized "jiban" have good chances to win elections. Also, the fact that these "nisei giin" (second generation legislators) are mostly found among Liberal Democrats suggests that Liberal Democrats depend more heavily upon such personal property as "kaban" and "jiban" which can be inherited from father to son than do other party members, for whom organizational support from parties and labor unions is more essential in election campaigns.

There are differences of age across party lines as shown in Table 8. The LDP is a party of rather old politicians and the Komeito and the Communist Party are composed of relatively young representatives. In this respect the Socialists and Democratic Socialists fall in between. As the Komeito and the Communist Party appear to have firm and centralized party structure, and party

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26 Among 41 young legislators under 40 years of age, 22 are found to be either sons or grandsons of distinguished politicians. Nihon Minsei Kenkyukai, ed., Kokkai Giin Soran.

27 Of 22 young "second generation legislators," 19 are Liberal Democrats and three are Socialists. Ibid.
organizations play a crucial role in vote-getting in these parties, it is natural that legislative offices are more easily available to younger generation in these parties.

I also examined the differences in age between Representatives and Councillors. There is not much age difference between the two chambers. (The average age of Representatives is 57.13 and that of Councillors is 57.43).

In conclusion, it is very likely that the characteristics of age of Japanese Diet members are related to election campaign practices in contemporary Japan. The elderliness of Japanese legislators as a whole and differences of average age among parties can be considered a result of the situation in today's election.

However, we must point out the fact that Japanese business élites also represent relatively older generation in comparison with their counterparts in the United States and Britain. One may speculate that elderly tendency is

28A considerable number of Komeito candidates recently have also personal "koenkai" organizations of their own, which do not overlap with the party organization. However, vote-getting by "koenkai" is still marginal and party machines bear the main burden in election for most Komeito candidates. Interview with a Komeito Diet member in the House of Councillors, May 15, 1976, Osaka.

the characteristic of élites of contemporary Japan in general. Broad social structure and culture of Japan may dictate that those who attain the élite status must be fairly old. Election practices in Japan, particularly those in the conservative camp, which give old politicians more advantages, are considered a part of Japan's general social mechanisms of élite recruitment which favor old people to younger generation.

With regard to sex, there are only 23 female legislators in the Diet of Japan today, accounting for about three percent of the total legislators. The figure is small, but in many other nations females occupy a rather similar proportion in the parliament, except in some Eastern European countries where women are considerably represented. 30

30 Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, pp. 160-161.
Chapter 6

RECRUITMENT PATTERN

Through what kind of process have Japanese legislators been recruited into the Diet? In this chapter, the patterns of the recruitment of Japanese legislators are described. Previous occupational and political career, forces which motivated legislators to run for the Diet, and the length of service in the Diet will be examined.

Career Pattern

In the case of Japanese politicians, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish their occupational career from political activities. For some Diet members political activities themselves have been their occupation. Some legislators have made their career as full-time workers in a political party or in labor unions, or as secretaries of other distinguished politicians. Some have no occupational experience other than their posts as local assembly members on various levels. Thus, in the category of "career pattern," previous occupations and political careers of legislators are examined at the same time.

Regarding occupation and political career, information is available on almost all legislators in
several published documents. Previous careers of Japanese legislators, categorized by party, are shown in Table 9.

There are clear differences of career pattern across parties. As previously noted in Chapter 3, higher civil servants and local politicians have traditionally been the two main career courses for prospective Liberal Democratic Diet members. People who experienced either one of these careers account for more than 60 percent of today's LDP Diet members. The rest of Liberal Democrats are recruited from among business entrepreneurs, who include top executives of large corporations and owners of middle- or small-sized companies, professional people, i.e., lawyers, teachers, et cetera, and white collar workers (various types of office workers).  

The bureaucrat-politicians have a fairly simple career pattern. Having graduated from distinguished national (or Imperial) universities, Tokyo University in many cases, they serve in politically significant national administrative ministries (Finance Ministry, Ministry for Commerce and Industry, among others), and go up the bureaucratic ladder. While in higher service, they accumulate personal connections with LD Party leaders and

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1 Data in this study are collected mainly from Nihon Minsei Kenkyukai, ed., Kokkai Giin Soran.

2 Business men without executive posts and lower level civil servants are included in the category of "white collar workers."
will be recruited into the Diet as Liberal Democrats. Most of them experience no other type of occupation or political career. This career pattern is a phenomenon apparently unique for the LDP camp.

On the other hand, among Liberal Democratic Diet members who worked their way up through local-level elective offices, many have other occupational experiences such as business entrepreneurs, teachers, white collar workers, et cetera, along with experiences in local political posts. Often they have started their commitments to local politics through their occupation.

Some of the Liberal Democrats, however, who came from local politics have had no occupational experience other than political activities. It may be these people who can be called "pure politicians" or "professional politicians" in the true sense of the word. For them politics itself is their occupation. Among these "professional politicians" in the LD Party, three types of careers are identified: local politician; worker in party organization; personal aid to certain powerful politician.

A noticeable career pattern among "professional politicians" in the LDP is the career as a politician's secretary. One starts his career as a personal aid to a politician (often in a post called "shosei," meaning "student houseboy"). Serving an individual politician on
a daily life basis, he will establish strong personal, even affectionate ties with his boss. Under the benevolence of his boss, he can cultivate connection with significant political figures and party leaders. Under the boss's benevolence, he can increase his own influence among supporters of the boss. Sometimes he can inherit the "jiban" of his boss when the boss retires.

This career pattern of politicians' secretary is a phenomenon seen mostly among Liberal Democrats, although a few such cases are also found among the Socialists. When I visited Diet members' offices for the questionnaire survey, I found that office staffers for LDP members were employed personally by individual Diet members, while staffers for members of Komeito and the Communist Party are employed by the party as party officials. This finding illustrates the differences between political career patterns across these party lines. In any case, the significance of a secretary's career among Liberal Democratic politicians seems to suggest that the personal bonds between the boss and the follower, which involve broad aspects of their lives, are significant factors in the circles of LDP politicians. (This kind of relation between a LDP Diet member and his secretary might be called "oyabun-kobun." Compare Chapter 14 for more detail of "oyabun-kobun" relationships.)

Entertainers account for only a tiny proportion of Liberal Democrats, but this career type should be examined
as a lately emerging phenomenon within the LD Party or within Japan's parliament in general. As the development of mass communication media, especially television, has progressed and prevailed, entertainers whose names and faces are known throughout the nation by broadcasting networks and various publications have found themselves provided with strong vote-getting power without any fund or "jiban" which had been considered essential for traditional election campaigns. Some entertainer-politicians, often called "talento seijika" (meaning "talent" politician), have remained non-partisan, but some are recruited into the LD Party. They represent a new trend in election campaigning style in Japan.

As a whole, it is apparent that most Liberal Democrats are recruited from professional and managerial type of work. Very few LDP Diet members have had experiences in manual labor, as farmer, fisherman, or blue collar worker.

The career pattern for Socialists is distinctly different from that of Liberal Democrats. Higher civil service career is almost negligible for Socialist Diet members; also very few Socialists have had occupational experiences such as business entrepreneurs. Instead, the typical pattern for Socialist Diet members is a career of labor union official. More than 60 percent of JSP legislators had experience as labor unions officials.
Some of them served as full-time workers in unions after school days, having no other career experience but labor unionists. Yet in many cases, Socialists start their career as blue collar workers, white collar workers, or teachers, become involved in union activities, go up the organizational ladder in unions to become leading officials, and finally come into the Diet with unions' organizational backings. Among various labor unions in Japan, the most conspicuous as Socialists Diet members' backgrounds are National Railroad Workers' Union ("Kokuro" and "Doro,") Postal Workers' Union ("Zentei"), and the Japan Teachers' Union ("Nikkyoso"). Thus, many started their career as railroad workers, post-office workers, or teachers, became full-time workers in union activities, took leaderships in unions, and were recruited into the Diet.

Labor union activists often go into local assemblies or Socialist party organization as party officials before they come into the Diet. Some Socialists become local assembly members or party officials without any labor union background. In any case, almost all Socialist Diet members have experience of political activity in either a labor union, local assembly, or party organization.

Democratic Socialist Party Diet members, who ideologically drop in between the "big two," the LDP and JSP, appear closer to the Socialists in regard to their
previous career. Many have experiences in labor union activities, although the proportion of union activists is smaller (43 percent) in comparison with that among Socialists (62 percent). Along with a labor union, local assembly and party organization are the place where most Democratic Socialists receive training in political activities before they come into the Diet, which is more or less similar to the career pattern of many Socialists. Often DSP members start their career as white collar workers or blue collar workers, as many Socialists Diet members also did. Yet the proportion of white collar workers is larger than that of blue collar workers in the case of Democratic Socialists, while among Socialists blue collar workers account for a larger proportion than white collar workers. This fact seems to partly explain the ideological difference between the two parties.

With respect to Komeitoites, who are also considered to be ideologically in between the "big two" in Japan's politics, the situation is fairly different. The career as labor unionist is scarcely found among Komeito Diet members (only one member); instead, a great majority (76 percent) are recruited into the Diet through the party organization. The "party organization men," often full-time party officials, constitute the main reservoir of Komeito Diet members. This may be the cause as well as effect of the strength of control exercised by
the party authority over its members. Komeito's party officials sometimes experience careers as local politicians at the same time. Almost all Komeito legislators have had experiences in either party institution or local legislatures.

Some Komeito members have career experience only in their party organization, or some have a career as "party organization man" and local politician at the same time. The rest of Komeito members, however, start their career as white collar workers or business entrepreneurs prior to the career in the party organization or in local politics. Blue collar worker's experience is found among very few Komeitoites. The most typical career pattern for Komeito Diet members seems to be that of those who have white collar or small business occupational experiences, get involved in the Sokagakkai or Komeito activities, and work their way up through local politics or party organization, or both.\(^3\) White collar worker's or business backgrounds found among many Komeito members may explain their middle class ideological orientation.

The career of entrepreneur can be found only among Liberal Democrats and Komeitoites, yet it should be noticed that the category of "entrepreneur" includes a

\(^3\)For instance, of six Komeito members of a city assembly, three are identified as white collar workers and three are owners of retail stores. They are party officials at the same time. Interview with a Komeito member of Kawanishi City Assembly, May 15, 1976, Kawanishi, Hyogo.
wide variety of people from top executives in large corporations to owners of petty businesses. Among Komeito members "entrepreneurs" are found to be mostly owners of small stores or small factories.⁴ In contrast, "businessman" found among Liberal Democratic Diet members tend to be executives and owners of large business enterprises, if not national big businesses.

The Japan Communist Party members, who may be placed at the extreme left on the ideological continuum, have considerably different career patterns from the Socialists who are closer to Communists in ideologies than others. Among Communists, the most conspicuous background is professional career such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, and journalists. Although some Communists are from blue collar workers (12 percent) and have experiences in labor union activities (25 percent), professional career accounts for the majority (almost 50 percent) of the Japanese Communists. The JCP shows the characteristic as a group of middle class intellelghtsia, having many members with high educational background and professional career. In this respect, the Communist Party differs considerably from the Socialist Party, which is predominantly a party of organized workers.

Among professional careers of the Japanese Communists, the lawyer's career particularly attracts our

⁴Hori, Komeito Ron, pp. 185-186.
attention. Here we have to ponder over the role of lawyers in Japanese politics in comparison with lawyers' role in American politics. In the United States legislators with legal background have been prominent or even dominant in national as well as local political worlds. It is reported that "lawyers make up a large proportion of American politicians at all levels."\(^5\) With respect to lawyer-legislators, it has been pointed out that there is the "convergence" or "affinity" between the two professions due to three properties inherent in these two professions: professional independence, a code of ethics, and a norm of public serve.\(^6\) This theory of professional convergence, however, cannot necessarily be applied outside the United States.

As a whole, lawyers account for only a small proportion (five percent) of total Japanese legislators. Lawyers in Japan occupy only a marginal part of the reservoir of Japan's national politicians, far from the status of the "high priest of politics" in the United States.\(^7\)

\(^5\)Heinz Eulau, John D. Sprague, *Lawyers in Politics*, p. 11. They say, "Of 175 members serving in the Senate of the United States between 1947 and 1957, 54 percent were lawyers. In the seventy-first through seventy-fifth Congresses, from 61 to 76 percent of the members of the Senate and from 56 to 65 percent of the members of the House of Representatives belonged to the legal profession." *Ibid.*, p. 12.

\(^6\)Ibid., pp. 143-145.

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 11ff.
It is not easy to summarize factors which explain the differences between the role of Japanese lawyers in politics and the role of American lawyers in politics. Perhaps we may say that the role of lawyers, as well as the role of legal intercourse in the society at large, is basically different in the two countries. Legal suits and legal intercourse are not the primary way to settle social conflicts in various aspects of the life of Japanese people, for whom more personal relations and influence seem to take precedence. This explanation may be indicated by the fact that the total number of people practicing law in Japan is smaller in comparison with the American counterpart.8

We also say that the legal profession is not a particularly good background for people who aspire to enter into elective political offices in Japan. We may speculate that although legal knowledge is considered appropriate for people in government, those who studied law at school and who aspire for political "power élites" in Japan seek their career through government bureaucracy, rather than through the profession of independent attorneys. In Japan the world of independent lawyers seems to be rather far removed from the world of

politicians, who are primarily concerned about struggle for power. In other words, the general image of lawyers in Japan seems to be that of people who are rather detached and disengaged from political authority and governing power. Japanese lawyers in general are not only detached from the governing authority, but they sometimes tend to be dissenting against the governmental authority. The role expected of lawyers in Japan does not fit people who aspire for political power.

Although a certain number of lawyers are in the Liberal Democratic camp (16 legislators), there are more lawyers in the "leftist" camp (6 Socialists and 15 Communists), and the lawyer's career is most conspicuous in the Communist Party (25 percent of the total JCP Diet members). It can be said that the lawyer's career in Japan has produced more "counter elites" than elites in the government.

We also have to notice that a legal career is more prominent among Communists than among Socialists. As previously noted, it may suggest that middle class, 

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9 Declarations and public statements by Associations of Attorneys in Japan often include criticism and dissent against governmental policies and conduct of political leaders. Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai, ed., Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai Sengan Ketsugi Kaku Chiho Bengoshikai Rengokai Sengan Ketsugi Shu; Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai Jinkenyogo Tinkai, ed., Jinkenyogo Kankei Sengan Ketsugi Shu.
intelligentsia tendency of the Japanese Communists in contrast to the predominance of organized workers among the Socialists.

Another point to be noticed among the Communists is that there are many "party organization men" who have no other career except party activities. They start their career as professional political organizers after graduation or sometimes during their school days as leaders of student organizations, and maintain their career as full-time party workers in the party. The majority (56 percent) of Communist Party Diet members are recruited from those "party organization men." The "party organization men" are in the majority within the Communist Party and Komeito. This fact perhaps indicates that those two parties have strong party organizational structure and party authorities have strong control over their members.

Finally, I must touch upon the career pattern of non-party members. Among non-party members, all of whom are in the House of Councillors, one important career pattern is the entertainer's career. As previously noted, entertainers, whose names and faces are well known nationally through mass media, have considerable vote-getting power even if they do not have much financial or organizational backing. Therefore, some entertainers who can conduct election campaigns without endorsements
from any major party remain non-partisan. As they are more advantaged in national constituency than in district constituencies, most entertainers choose to run for offices in the House of Councillors. Only one out of 12 legislators who have an entertainers' career is in the House of Representatives.

About the career pattern of legislators, we may conclude that in the case of Japanese politicians there is no single occupation dominating the background of national politicians as contrasted with the dominance of lawyers in the United States. It seems that the distribution of occupational backgrounds found among Japanese legislators is more similar to that found in European parliaments, where the percentage of manual occupations depends largely upon strength of socialist and communist parties. In the case of Japanese legislators, blue collar workers dominate manual occupations. The career of farming is found among very few Japanese legislators (only one percent). In short, the LDP is dominated by people from higher civil service and local assemblies, and the JSP is dominated by people from labor unions. Komeito is generally dominated by "party organization men." The dominant forces in the JCP are also "party organization men" and professional people such as lawyers and teachers.

One characteristic which seems to be commonly shared
by many Japanese Diet members is their rather long experience in political activities before they came to the Diet, even though the type and field of those activities vary widely. The main institutions in which many Diet members have accumulated their experience in politics and through which they have been recruited into the Diet are: high-level bureaucracy, local legislatures, political party organizations, and labor unions. Very few legislators have come to the Diet with no background of activity in those institutions. In other words, these four institutions are major training grounds for prospective Diet members. Only those who might have attained leading positions after a long period of service in such institutions would become eligible to contend for the Diet posts. In that sense, most Japanese legislators should be regarded as professionals in politics and well experienced in political activities in their own field.

One fact should be noticed here. Except for local assemblies, all three training grounds for Japanese Diet members, i.e., higher civil service, parties, and labor unions, are well structured organizations. Therefore, we can adequately characterize many Diet members as successful "organization men" in the sense that they climbed up the organizational ladder in
either bureaucracy, parties, or labor unions. Their career as "organizational men" might have some effect upon their behavior in the parliament.

Main Recruiters

In addition to the career pattern, the people, whom we may call the main recruiters, who influenced legislators most seriously in making their decisions to run for the Diet will be considered. Respondents in our survey cited their main motivating forces as shown in Table 10.

Among Liberal Democrats, local leaders, i.e., leaders of local commerce and industry or other distinguished local politicians, seem to play a significant role in recruiting legislators. Second to local leaders, interest group leaders and party leaders are important recruiters of LDP Diet members. In the case of Socialists, interest group leaders, in their case labor unions, are the main recruiters (62 percent), although party leaders also recruit some Socialists. Among Democratic Socialists, the pattern of recruitment is similar to that found in the Socialists' case. In the case of Komeito members, many were influenced by party leaders in their decisions.10 Those patterns of recruiters

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10 In addition to our questionnaire data, one Komeito Diet member said that for most Komeito candidates the party authority is the primary and crucial motivator and recruiter, without whose advice and consent most Komeitoites would
found within each party fit fairly well with the career pattern of legislators in each party.

Legislators who cited their parents or close relatives as a motivating force are not too numerous in our sample (about five percent). However, as we have already discussed previously in "family background," the hereditary pattern is practiced among a considerable portion of Japanese legislators (about 12 percent of total Diet members).

As a conclusion concerning the recruiters of Japanese legislators, it can be said that the great majority of Japanese legislators have received some kind of outside influence as the final motivating factor in their decision to run for the Diet office. Most of them receive support and advice from local community, interest groups, or party. This seems to imply that these three groups, or three institutions we may say, might have the significant role in producing Japanese lawmakers. Legislators' independent decisions without influences seem fairly rare among Japanese legislators, and perhaps the situation would be similar in many other nations. (Legislators' independent decisions without any outside influences are included in the category of "others" in Table 10). These outside influences in the final process

not reach such ambitious decisions. Interview with a Komeito Diet member in the House of Councillors, May 15, 1976, Kawanishi, Hyogo.
of recruitment are thought to have some effect upon how legislators perceive things and how they act in their later days in the parliament.

The Length of Service in the Diet

After recruitment into the Diet, how long do the legislators in Japan generally continue to service in office? The length of legislators' service, which indicates the accumulation of experience, will also have some implications on their legislative performances.

In a cross-national perspective, the turnover of legislators varies markedly from 100 percent to around 20 percent. In countries where the length of tenure is limited by institutional regulations the turnover is 100 percent or very high, as in some Latin American nations or Communist states. When those restrictions do not exist, Jean Blondel contends, the rate of turnover gradually decreases from about 50 percent to somewhere between 20 to 30 percent as the institutionalization of the legislature proceeds, as seen in many Western parliaments. However, Blondel also argues, "this does not mean that the career of the legislator becomes very long: most members, everywhere, stay in the legislature for only ten to fifteen years, not more."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}Blondel, \textit{Comparative Legislatures}, pp. 160-161.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., pp. 86-87.
The length of service of all Japanese legislators is shown in Table 11. In the House of Representatives the newcomers occupy 19 percent of the total seats. This figure closely parallels the legislatures in the United States, Britain, and Canada, which have the lowest turnover rate in the world.\textsuperscript{13} Observing the number of newcomers in the early Imperial Diet, which was around 50 percent,\textsuperscript{14} we see the trend of decrease in legislative turnover along with the institutionalization of the legislature, as Blondel argues. This low rate of turnover may indicate, together with the older age of members, the stability, or stagnation in a sense, of the lower house today as an institution.

Among the Representatives today, the median of the term is 3.06, and the mean is 4.67. On the basis that the average length of one term for the Representatives in postwar Japan is 2.5 years, the median of the length of service is about 7.5 years, and the mean is about 11.75 years. About 33 percent of the Representatives have legislative experiences of more than six terms, i.e., 15 years, which is considered by Blondel as a natural limitation of the tenure for most legislators. Some 18 percent have more than ten terms (25 years) of experience.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 160-161.
\textsuperscript{14} See Table 3.
in the office. Thus, in the present situation in the Japanese House of Representatives, the turnover is very low and the length of service is generally quite long.

In partisan terms, the Liberal Democrats have, in general, the longest experience in their office, followed by the Socialists and Democratic Socialists. The Komeito members have a rather short experience, and the Communists have a very short one. These party differences are simply explained by the fact that while the Liberal Democrats (more precisely, predecessors of the present LD Party) have included the majority of the Diet since the early postwar Diet, the Socialist Party has gradually increased its force in the parliament, and the emergence of the Komeito and the Communist Party is a fairly recent phenomenon.

In contrast to the House of Representatives, in the House of Councillors the newcomers account for 48 percent. The median term for the Councillors is 1.08, and the mean term is 1.87. As the length of one term for the Councillors is six years, the median is 6.46 years, and the mean is 11.22 years. About 80 percent are in either their first or second term. Although the mean length of service of the Councillors is fairly long, since the tenure for them is long, the turnover in the chamber is considered much higher than in the other house. Perhaps the Councillors do not stand for re-
election so often as the Representatives do partly because they have long tenure and partly because their offices are not so attractive as those of the Representatives.

It is rather ironic that the House of Councillors, which has been prescribed as continuous in its functional role in the Diet, has a higher turnover rate than the House of Representatives, which has been expected to be flexibly responsive to the change in the society.
PART 3

GENERAL VALUES
Chapter 7

CONSERVATISM

The first dimension of legislators' general values to be investigated in connection with their political behavior is the conservatism-radicalism dimension. Let us first characterize Japanese Diet members in general on this dimension. An image of the average and typical politician harbored by many Japanese may be a politician who is old and conservative.\(^1\) How valid is this image? Are Diet members actually different, as a group, from Japanese masses in this respect?

We can compare scores of surveyed Diet members on the conservatism-radicalism scale and scores of the samples of Japanese citizens on the same scale. Scores of both groups are presented in Table 12. The Diet members generally had lower points (less conservative) on the scale in contrast with the ordinary citizens. The mean score for the sample of legislators is 31.84, while that of the sample citizens is 36.57. The \(t\) score of the difference-of-means test between the two groups is 5.611, and therefore the difference seems significant.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) In a discussion with eight college students, most of them described their image of the politician in general as an old person who is more conservative than ordinary Japanese. January 11, 1976.

\(^2\) With our data, the degree of freedom is 187. Pro-
It allows us to state that the Diet members are generally less conservative than the ordinary citizens. The finding here appears to contradict the conventional image of politicians in Japan. Our finding rather suggests that in their basic values, related to a Japanese standard, Japanese legislators are fairly non-conservative in general.

We proceed then to explain why the Diet members are less conservative in contrast to the common people in Japan. One explanation might be the high level of education acquired by legislators. The differences in educational background between the samples of Diet members and the sample group of citizens are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>legislators</th>
<th>ordinary citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>elementary</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>graduate</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kotaro Kido, the constructor of Japanese version of the conservatism scale used in this study, showed, with empirical data, that the better educated were inclined toward less conservative values and the less educated

vided with this degree of freedom, and selecting the significance level of 0.01 for a two-tailed test, the critical region is $t > 2.576$. Statistical computation is based on Hubert A. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed., pp. 220-226.
tended to be more conservative in Japan. Should this be accepted, the less conservative tendency found among Diet members might be explained by, among other factors, their better educational background.

We must now inspect party differences. Variations across party lines in regard to the members' basic disposition on conservatism-radicalism seem to deserve particular interest because they may explain antagonisms that Japanese parties often express in their overt conduct toward each other.

Legislative proceedings in the Japanese Diet are prone to be deadlockcd by uncompromising party rivalries. One may suspect that "right-left" ideological cleavages across parties are the main cause of the difficulties in compromise and bargaining among parties in the parliament. It is rather ostensible that there exist serious discrepancies across Japanese party lines on the level of "right-left" political ideologies, judging from observed statements and actions of parties. The question here is whether the cleavages across party lines exist not only the level of political ideology but also on the more basic level of personality.

According to our data presented in Table 12, it

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3Kido, Shakai Ishiki no Kozo, pp. 120-121.
seems that partisan differences exist. Among others, the Liberal Democrats as a group revealed the most conservative inclination. In our survey, they made the average score of 34.41 on the scale. The Socialists tended to be the least conservative. The mean score of the sample Socialists was 26.42. Members of the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, generally speaking, fell in between. Komeito members had the mean score of 32.75. The average of Democratic Socialists was 31.15.

The divergence between the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists seems clear and distinct. The t score of the difference-of-means test between the two groups is 4.245. This figure indicates that the difference is statistically significant. It is expected that considering "right" stands taken by the LD Party and "left" stands of the Socialist Party on policy matters and ideological issues, the Liberal Democrats are more conservative than the Socialists in their perspectives on various daily-life problems. A discrepancy found in our data supports the contention that the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists clearly differ from each other not only concerning ideological and policy considerations but also in their basic and general value orientations. A label

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4 In this case the degree of freedom is 61. Provided with this degree of freedom and the significance level of 0.01 for a two-tailed test, the critical region is \( t > 2.66 \).
of "conservative" for the Liberal Democrats and that of "radical" for the Socialists seems not too inappropriate even when we look at their basic outlook.

The Liberal Democrats in general are conservative in comparison with other Diet members. They are not so, however, measured by standards of the Japanese population at large. The average score of Liberal Democrats in our sample on the conservatism-radicalism scale is 34.41. That of the group of citizens is 36.57. The Liberal Democrats may represent a conservative force in the parliament, but they are closer than other parties to the average citizens on this particular dimension of basic values.

Members of the Komeito, as a group, are considered less conservative than Liberal Democrats but not so radical as the Socialists, judging from the average scores these parties made on the conservatism-radicalism scale in our survey. The t-test score of the significance of difference between Komeito members and Liberal Democrats is 1.03, and that between Komeitoites and the Socialists is 3.40. The difference between the Komeito and the LD Party is not statistically significant, but the difference between

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5 Given the degree of freedom of 44, and selecting the significance level at 0.05 and a two-tailed test, the critical region is $t > 2.02$. 
the Komeito and the Socialists is critical. The latter score indicates that the Komeito members are generally closer to Liberal Democrats than to Socialists on the conservative-radical continuum.

In legislative performances, the Komeito, as one of opposition forces, has been regarded more intimate with the Socialists than with the LD Party, the party in power. The Komeito has actually often allied with the Socialists in various legislations as well as in many elections on local and national scenes. Our survey data suggest, however, that there is a certain gap between official stands of the party in policies and ideologies and the members' fundamental perspectives. The Komeito members turned out to be more similar to the Liberal Democrats than to the Socialists in their propensities on conservatism-radicalism. Thus, the patterns of party alignments sometimes do not correspond to the general outlook of members of each party.

Our finding concerning the tendency of Komeito Diet members on conservatism-radicalism seems to support certain appraisals on the organizational disposition of the Sokagakkai as well as on attitudes of Gakkai members in general. For example, James White considers,

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6Provided with the degree of freedom of 29, the significance level of 0.05, and a two-tailed test, the critical region is t>2.09. When the significance level is selected at 0.01 for a two-tailed test, the critical region is t>2.86.
having examined the Sokagakkai's posture expressed in the teachings of Gakkai leaders in the criteria of "authoritarianism" suggested by Adorno (such as authoritarian submission, aggressiveness, and preoccupation with sexual behavior), that the association is not so "authoritarian" as often expected, though moderately conservative. 7 James Dator also gives a picture of Sokagakkai members as people with slight, not strong, "authoritarian" and "tradition-directed" orientations in comparison with other Japanese. 8

Data in our survey indicate that Komeito Diet members are moderate in their daily-life perspectives. They are slightly on the conservative side among legislators, but less conservative by the standard of ordinary citizens of Japan.

Members of the Democratic Socialist Party in our sample generally scored similar points to Komeito members on the conservative-radical scale. The $t$-test score of the significance of difference between the Liberal Democrats and Democratic Socialists is 2.004. That between the Democratic Socialists and Socialists is 2.543. Both differences can be considered significant, but not too dis-

distinct. The t-test score between the Democratic Socialists and Komeitoites is 0.764, meaning the difference is negligible. Based on these figures, we assume that Democratic Socialists are generally less conservative than Liberal Democrats but not so radical as the Socialists, and they are relatively closer to Liberal Democrats than to Socialists on the conservatism-radicalism scale as are Komeitoites.

This finding on the Democratic Socialists seems to correspond to official conduct of the party which we observe in the Diet. On various policy issues, the Democratic Socialist Party has taken a center ground between the Liberal Democrats on the right and the Socialists on the left. It is hard to decide whether the DSP has more serious differences with the LD Party or with the Socialists in its official stands. In any case, the implicit tendency of the Democratic Socialists on conservatism-radicalism revealed in our data is not far from what we expect of them on the basis of their explicit legislative performances.

What kind of factors would explain the character-

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In the case of the difference between the DSP and the LDP, the critical region at the significance level of 0.05 for a two-tailed test is \( t > 2.02 \). The critical region at the significance level of 0.01 for a two-tailed test is \( t > 2.70 \). In the case of the difference between the DSP and JSP, the critical region at the significance level of 0.05 for a two-tailed test is \( t > 2.75 \). Therefore, both figures are significant at the level of 0.05, but not significant at the level of 0.01.
istics of Japanese legislators on the conservatism-radicalism continuum found above? One possible causal factor is age. Age of a person indicates the general atmosphere of the period in which he has matured, or represents the volume of accumulated experiences that he has had in all aspects of his life. Hence, we often hear about "generation gap" among different age groups. People's conservative-radical inclination may also vary across different age brackets. Kotaro Kido has shown, with empirical data in a research survey, that older people tend to be conservative and younger generations are inclined to be radical among ordinary citizens of Japan.\(^{10}\)

Is there any "generation gap" among Diet members with respect to their conservative-radical tendency?

In our data I failed to identify a systematic association between legislators' age and their conservative orientation. Unlike ordinary citizens, the pattern of "old conservatives" and "young radicals" does not seem to be the case with the Diet members. Diet members are considered an exceptional group within which the "generation gap" on the conservatism-radicalism is overwhelmed by some other, more effective variables, perhaps the party identification.

\(^{10}\) Kido, Shakai Ishiki no Kozo, pp. 121-122. He conducted his survey in 1953 upon randomly selected 700 male citizens in Tokyo, aged between 20 and 69. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 96.
Education is often considered as another factor which influences one's orientation on the conservative-radical dimension. As noted earlier, Kido has asserted that people tend to become less conservative as they acquire better education, at least in the case of Japanese. Based on this assumption, I have already explained that Japanese legislators are generally less conservative than ordinary citizens because they have better educational backgrounds. Can we account for varying conservatism among Diet members by education?

It is found in our survey, that legislators' conservative-radical orientation cannot be predicted by education. It is thought that Japanese Diet members are a fairly homogeneous group in terms of educational background. The great majority of them are well educated. (As noted above, about 70 percent have college degrees, and those who have secondary or college education reaches 90 percent). Moreover, Diet members are considered homogeneous in terms of their intellectual ability, if we assume that a certain level of such ability is required for the legislator's office. In this situation, education would account for little of the legislators' attitudinal orientations.

Another factor which may predict the legislators' conservative-radical tendency is their career pattern. One's career should generally affect his basic perspective
in a later period of his socialization. Each group of Diet members in our sample, categorized by their previous career, is scored on the conservatism-radicalism scale as presented in Table 13. (The mean score and standard deviations of each career group are given in the table). It appears that Diet members with certain career backgrounds tend to be conservative while some other careers are associated with less conservative orientation.

In our survey, Diet members with a business background have shown the most conservative tendency among others. However, the category of "business entrepreneurs" in this study includes a large variety from big business executives to owners of small factories and stores. In addition to the heterogeneity of the group, it is only a tiny proportion of businessmen in Japan who came to the Diet. Therefore, it seems rather hazardous to draw a conclusion about the conservative characteristics of Japanese business entrepreneurs in general.

Nonetheless, our data seem to suggest that at least those businessmen who are politically minded and who have chosen the course to become a Diet member are rather more conservative than other legislators. It is surmised that the subculture of business circles in Japan do not basically conflict with conservative values. Conservatism of Japanese businessmen in general should be an important
subject for further investigation. 11

Another career which seems to be linked with the conservative inclinations is the bureaucratic career. Bureaucracy in general is considered as a conservative entity. Fritz M. Marx summed up the occupational and institutional disposition of the bureaucracy as follows:

..., it (administration) bears a distinctly conservative streak. It responds to the present in the light of the past, ... Not unnaturally, the higher civil service usually favors a firm structure of political power as something to lean against. ..., administrative systems normally have a professional predilection for the status quo. Higher civil servants often emerge as emotional defenders of the given order of things. 12

Bureaucrats are generally believed to possess such propensities as conformity to traditional norms and values operating within their organization, great respect for hierarchical order, and obedience to authority, 13 all of which are components of the concept of conservatism in this study.

No study has examined attitudinal characteristics

11 No work is found which studies the values and perspectives of Japanese business people. One sociological study about Japanese business leader is: Mannari, The Japanese Business Leaders. It does not deal with, however, the attitudinal characteristics.


13 Ibid., pp. 86-90.
of higher civil servants in Japan as a whole. Our data seem to indicate that the conservative tendency is characteristic among high-ranking bureaucrats of Japan, at least among those who turned their career from bureaucracy to the Diet. When we reflect upon the significant, or even critical, role that "kanryo seijika" (bureaucrat-politician) have played in the politics of Japan throughout the prewar and postwar era, their conservatism might have serious implications for various policy-making in Japan.

In contrast to business or bureaucratic careers, some other careers have revealed less conservative, even radical, inclinations. Diet members who have professional career backgrounds such as doctors, teachers, or journalist, are relatively non-conservative. Those who have had experience as white collar workers or blue collar workers are also inclined to be less conservative.

One group which marked the least conservative, i.e., the most radical, tendency is that with experience in labor union activities. This is understandable, considering

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15 The t score of the difference-of-means test between those with labor union backgrounds and those with business career is 2.482. The t-test score between labor unionists and former bureaucrats is 2.139.
that labor union movements in general, and those in Japan in particular, are associated with the ideological "left."

The group of Diet members with a legal career also turned out to have rather distinct radical inclinations. Although the number of ex-lawyers surveyed is small (three legislators), low standard deviation among scores of these former lawyers may allow us to make inferences about their tendency.

A liberal or even radical orientation of lawyers is not far from an image that we have of lawyers in Japan. Lawyers in Japan as a whole seem to have perceived their primary role in the society as defending civil rights of people against oppressing authorities. In their perception, authorities which oppress people's civil rights might include certain traditional norms and customs as well as the government authority. The lawyers as a social group have assigned such a role to themselves. Perhaps the public at large has also such an image of lawyers in Japan. Thus, the lawyers as a social force often acted to dissent

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16 The role Japanese lawyers have assigned themselves in the society is ostensible in public statements and appeals that Associations of Attorneys have issued on various social and political problems, particularly on civil rights problems. See Nihon Bengoshi Rengokai, ed., Sengen Ketsugi Shu; idem, Jinkenyogo Kankei Sengen Ketsugi Shu. These statements are often characterized by the tone of dissentors, protesting against government administration and criticizing big businesses.
and protest against the government authority. At least they have taken a position detached and dissociated from it. This kind of social role of Japanese lawyers makes a clear contrast to that of higher civil servants, who have been undoubtably supporting and aspiring for governmental power.

Considering such a social role of lawyers in general within Japanese society, it is understandable that many lawyers tend to resent authoritarian submission, conformity to traditional norms and values, support of hierarchical order, and anti-introspectiveness. Thus, the lawyers in Japan are generally considered to have a liberal or sometimes leftist tendency.

In the parliament, legislators with legal background are often found in the leftist camp, as previously noted. (See Chapter 6, Table 9). Though a considerable number of Liberal Democrats have also had a legal career, it is suspected that they have a somewhat different outlook from fellow members of the party, particularly former bureaucrats.

Reviewing the variance of conservative-radical orientation among Japanese legislators, it is thought that the party identification is the most significant variable to predict legislators' inclination on this

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
Certain careers can also predict conservative or radical orientation of legislators. It should be noted here, however, that those careers are closely related to certain parties. A business career is mostly found among Liberal Democrats. A bureaucratic career is exclusively found within the LD Party. The career of labor union is mainly for legislators in the leftist camp, not for Liberal Democrats. Only the legal career is found across party lines. It is possible to argue that the association found between some careers and the conservative-radical orientation is deduced from the association between the party identification and the conservatism-radicalism. To clarify this problem, we may need further exploration with more data. In any case, we can say here that the career pattern, party identification, and conservative-radical perspectives are closely related with each other among Japanese legislators.

The Liberal Democrats are the most conservative among Japanese parties. Among various career groups, legislators who came from business or higher civil service are found most conservative. Nonetheless, these groups are still the same or slightly more liberal when compared with the conservatism of the average citizens. Thus, the man in the street in Japan would fear that some Diet members, such as Socialists, labor unionists,
or lawyers, have markedly radical orientations.
Chapter 8

DOGMATISM

The open-mindedness or the tolerance of varying viewpoints is one of the significant qualities for the smooth functioning of parliamentarism. Antagonisms among Japanese legislative parties which sometimes bring about even physical disorder within the parliament are often explained by ideological discrepancies across party lines and tight discipline within each party. Antagonisms might also be explained by the members' commitments to certain ideologies and their ideological intolerance and dogmatism. What are the actual characteristics of Japanese legislators regarding their open-closed-mindedness?

Let us first inquire whether the Diet members as a whole are different from ordinary citizens on this problem. Conventionally, two seemingly conflicting arguments may exist. First, since the Diet members are generally considered to have more articulated values, stronger convictions in their beliefs, and deeper commitments to their ideology than ordinary citizens, they should be more dogmatic than others. Second, as Diet members have to appeal to a broad basis of electorates, they may invariably tolerate other values and be open-minded.

Dogmatism scored by Diet members and ordinary
citizens in the survey is given in Table 14. According to our survey, it seems that legislators are more open-minded than the ordinary citizens. The mean score of dogmatism for the Diet members is 25.135, and that of the citizens is 30.452. The t score of the difference-of-means test between the legislators and citizens is 5.68, indicating that the difference is obviously significant. It appears that the Diet members as a group are relatively open-minded measured by the standard of Japanese society.

It is not easy to speculate about factors which account for our finding. Milton Rokeach and his associates have not presented any clear-cut causal variable which determines the open or closed mind, but they seem to suspect that dogmatism is a characteristic of depth psychology formed during early childhood, which is rather immune to the social circumstances and experiences after childhood. Their proposition is that the openness-closedness of one's mind should be traceable to his childhood experience, particularly to his relations with parents within the family.¹

If we assume that the dogmatism is formed during the early phase of personality formulation, how can we explain the relative open-mindedness of Diet members in general? I hypothesize that rigidly closed personalities

¹Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, pp. 347-365.
are not consistent with the job of the legislator, and only those with a certain tolerance have survived various stages of selection process of legislators. A dogmatist, who has a closed belief-system, who relies totally and uncritically upon the authority which he believes in, and who does not tolerate any other values, will find it difficult to appeal for broad electoral supports. It is true that political parties in Japan are ideologically oriented, and their coherence appears to be based upon the members' ideological commitments. However, one would to some extent need tolerance and compromise for varying views and ideologies to obtain and keep the post of legislator. People who have psychological characteristics of anxiety and dogmatism will hardly win popular support.

In addition to this theory of "social Darwinism" about the selection of legislators, educational background is also a possible factor to explain open-mindedness of Japanese Diet members. Rokeach and his associates did not mention the relationship of education and dogmatism. It is possible, however, that education is related to open-mindedness. Intelligence, amassed knowledge, exposure to and cognizance of varying views and values would help to moderate closed personalities. In that case, more tolerance of the Diet members than citizens can be attributed partly to their better educational background.

We must pause here in order not to overlook in this survey a methodological problem which might have certain
effects upon the finding of relative open-mindedness of Diet members. One might suspect that the legislators in responding to our questions may have tried to project a self-image as open-minded concealing their true inclinations. In general, according to most social standards the dogmatic attitude is not considered desirable. Several question items of the dogmatism scale, in particular, may imply certain attitudes which many Japanese considered as socially undesirable.² (All the questions measuring the conservative-radical scale are not considered to be biased by those standards which most Japanese people would agree as socially desirable or undesirable). Even if secrecy and anonymity are guaranteed, respondents may tend to conform to what is socially desired. (Norms which the society as a whole desires should be distinguished from traditional or conventional norms. Conformity to traditional norms makes for conservatism, while susceptibility to the socially desired norms makes for hypocrisy). Although this kind of bias will work upon the respondents of both the Diet members and ordinary citizens as well, susceptibility to such influence may be greater among the Diet members who are public figures than among ordinary citizens. Therefore, it is considered possible that many Diet members have projected their

²Item No. 3, 18, 21, 24, 27 in Part 3 of the Questionnaire. See Appendix 1.
image as desired by the public, whereas most citizens have revealed more of their actual tendencies, caring little about public expectations. We do not know how serious is this bias, but it should be noted.

Our finding about the Komeitoites is a rather unexpected one. Many religious movements claim that their righteousness should be universal, and in that sense they have the character of exclusiveness. The Sokagakkai is no exception. Moreover, principles of the Nichiren Sho sect, on which the teachings of Sokagakkai are based, are known to have had particularly strong intolerance when compared with other Japanese religions. The principal doctrine of the Sokagakkai has claimed exclusive righteousness of their religion and has taught intolerance. Based on the view that social calamity as well as personal grief were the result of heretical beliefs, the Sokagakkai adopted a rather aggressive measure for propagation, recruitment, and indoctrination, which was called "shakubuku" (literally, "to break and flatten").

Many public opinion leaders consider that militancy and intolerance, represented in "shakubuku," are the basic character of the Sokagakkai and the Gakkai mem-

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3 White, The Sokagakkai and Mass Society, p. 35.

4 For "shakubuku" tactics of the Sokagakkai, see Ibid., pp. 81-88.
bers. They think that the members of Sokagakkai believe in, absolutely and uncritically, the teachings and leaderships of the Gakkai authority, in short that they are a group of closed-minded people. Many colleagues in the Diet also share the opinion that the Komeito Diet members are generally dogmatic.

In spite of this image of Sokagakkai members as the closed-minded personality, the Komeitoites in our survey have turned out to be relatively open-minded people. They revealed more tolerance than other party members. How should we account for this result?

We may think that the fundamental nature of the Sokagakkai and its members has undergone a change from militant intolerance to moderate openness. James White suggested as follows:

...Since 1962 a tolerance and a willingness to work with other groups on nonreligious matters have developed.

This thaw is perhaps one facet of maturization and moderation through which it has been suggested all religious movements must pass . . . .

..., in all, .... The Gakkai does not seem to be sufficiently uncooperative, exclusivist, and mistrustful of other actors...

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7 Interview with a Democratic Socialist Party member of the House of Representatives, July 30, 1975, Tokyo.

Komeito members in the Diet may represent a new element of the Sokagakkai which emerged after the Gakkai had attained to a certain extent mature tolerance as a religious movement.

It is also possible that Komeito members in the Diet are more flexible and open-minded in their way of thinking than rank-and-file members of the Sokagakkai. It can be thought that even if many ordinary members of the Sokagakkai are rigid and closed in their views and dependent on the religious authority of Gakkai, those members who have been recruited into the Diet have more secular, pluralistic values, because such personal quality is needed for electoral politicians. This is only a hypothesis, and this hypothesis seems to be worth further investigation.\(^9\)

The above arguments may explain why Komeito Diet members are not particularly dogmatic in comparison with other party members. They do not explain, however, why Komeitoites are more open-minded, if slightly, than others. On this question, we must consider again the influence of public expectation upon legislators' responses. It has been often suspected that the Komeitoites have a generally strong tendency to conform with what is largely,

\(^9\)Robert D. Putnam also points out that adherents to ideologies at the mass level may often engage in the dogmatic thinking and intolerance, but that is not generally the case at the élite level. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, p. 62.
or universally, desired by the society as a whole.¹⁰ One may call this inclination hypocrisy. If that is the characteristic of the Komeitoites in general, the open-mindedness of Komeito Diet members may be considered a result of their pretense. Perhaps they responded to our questions to project a universally desired image of open-minded personality, and their make-believe is greater than other Diet members. To document this hypothesis, further examination will be required. In any case, we can say at least that Komeito members in the Diet are generally not so dogmatic as often feared by outside observers.

There is not much variance across other parties (Liberal Democrats, Socialists, Democratic Socialists) in terms of the members' tolerance. Some scholars would agree that the Socialist Party has shown strong ideological commitments in some aspects of its conduct.¹¹ Statements and performances of many Socialist Diet members are often colored with an ideological and dogmatic tone. Nevertheless, our survey seems to imply that their beliefs are as flexible as those of the Liberal Democrats and Democratic Socialists. Perhaps as J.A.A. Stockwin says, personal relations of leader-followers, rather than ideologies, become increasingly the basis of the behavior

of Socialists.  

It is regrettable that we do not have data about dogmatism of the Communist Diet members in Japan. Communists are usually thought as dogmatic, and this image was documented by a study on British Communists.  

It is commonly thought that the Japanese Communists are also dogmatic, having strong convictions in their value-system and refusing pluralistic approaches. As the Socialists who are seemingly committed to their ideologies turned out rather tolerant, however, the ideological dogmatism of Japanese Communists is not necessarily the case. Only an empirical examinations will clarify this question.

In general, Japanese legislators, regardless of their party identification, are found to have considerable capacity for accepting diverse views. Given that premise, antagonistic conduct that political parties express toward each other in the contemporary parliament of Japan cannot be attributed to the personality of Japanese Diet members. Even though many Japanese legislators act intolerantly toward other parties in legislative per-

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12 Ibid., pp. 158-159.
14 Having examined the beliefs of politicians in Britain and Italy, Robert D. Putnam also reports that the ideological style of politicians has not much to do with their partisan hostility. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians, p. 62.
formance, the overt expression of such enmity should be considered the result of certain outside factors rather than of inner, psychological characteristics of legislators.

On this problem, one Democratic Socialist in the House of Representatives asserted as follows:

Antagonistic behavior is often seen in public, such as in floor sessions, committee meetings covered by mass media, public speeches, press conferences, and other occasions open to public. But I have seldom seen intense animosity among members of different parties when legislators are on more private bases, such as in committee meetings which drew little media coverage or other private meetings.  

This testimony implies that the strong and strict control exercised by the authority of Japanese parties is a factor which makes Diet members take party-line behavior and be antagonistic to other parties in their overt and public performances. In that sense, Japanese legislators have two faces, public and private, even when they are in their offices.

15 Interview with a Democratic Socialist in the House of Representatives, July 30, 1975, Tokyo.
Chapter 9

MACHIAVELLIANISM

The image of a typical politician may often be one who is tough-minded, cold-heartedly calculating, skilled in maneuvers with little respect for morality, and talented in manipulating others, in short, a machiavellian. In Japan, where public assessment of the quality of government in general is more of pessimism and cynicism than of optimism and support and where "reports of political corruption and violations of laws and parliamentary norms by persons in public life receive considerable attention in the mass media,"\(^1\) many citizens may expect that only the machiavellians would survive the intrigues of the political world.

Let us look at the scores of the samples of Diet members on the machiavellianism scale shown in Table 15, and compare them with those of the samples of citizens which are also given in the same table. Unexpectedly, the data suggest that Japanese Diet members are less machiavellian than the masses. The mean score of the sample of Diet members is 24.91, and that of the surveyed citizens is 31.34. The t-test of significance of dif-

\(^{1}\)Bradley M. Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan*, p. 78.
ference between the two groups is 5.946. It is inferred with a considerable probability that Diet members, among Japanese, are a group with relatively tender-minded orientation.

Two factors possibly explain the tender-mindedness of Japanese legislators. One is the traditional and unique ethic of Japan, which is best summarized in such terms as "giri" and "ninjo." Another is the pure idealism, which is a more universal characteristic of people's outlook, and which is thought to be shared by certain Japanese legislators.

First, we consider that the norm of "giri-ninjo" is one of the significant characteristics of the sub-culture within the Japanese political world. It is conventionally thought that the norm of "giri-ninjo" is expected and respected as proper behavior and virtue for inter-personal relations among many Japanese politicians on local and national scenes.

Here we must explain these concepts of "giri" and "ninjo" in more detail.² According to the definition by Takeo Doi, a Japanese social psychologist, "ninjo," which etymologically means "human feelings," refers to those inter-personal feelings and attitudes which are primarily based on spontaneous affect and emotion, such

as those often seen among family members. "Giri," by contrast, refers to a bond of moral obligation which is often seen in relations between in-laws, among neighbors, among colleagues and associates, between superiors and subordinates. However, Doi maintains, "family relations also have an aspect to which the term 'giri' can be applied, and at the same time 'ninja' can be extended to 'giri' relations. In other words, 'giri' relations are pseudo-'ninja' relations in which one may experience 'ninja.'" Although "ninja" emphasizes more spontaneous human emotion in personal relations whereas "giri" focuses upon obligatory aspects of inter-personal relations, both concepts are based on personal inter-dependency of people upon each other.

Concepts of "giri" and "ninja" both assume that people live depending on each others' benevolence and favor, not independently. The most important factor in inter-personal relations is considered as the recognition of interdependency of people. Normative expectation derived from this assumption would conflict with pragmatic self-interests. Rather than self-interests, one's benevolence at his own expense will be expected and valued. Emotional and affective content of personal relations is emphasized. This kind of norm is actually an antithesis to the machiavellianism we defined earlier.

The machiavellian who lacks affect in inter-per-
sonal relations and who has an instrumentalist view of others would be regarded to be wanting in "ninjo." The machiavellian who cares less about conventional morality would be considered to lack "giri." The machiavellian who calculates, maneuvers, and manipulates to achieve pragmatic self-interests would be certainly looked down upon by those who value "giri" and "ninjo." Thus, in the culture where "giri" and "ninjo" are appreciated and expected, attitudes indicated by the machiavellianism have only negative values.

The normative expectations which are represented by the concepts of "giri" and "ninjo" have been traditionally prevalent in the Japanese society at large. Though more individualistic and pragmatic values are emerging, this cultural norm persists in various sectors of contemporary Japan with varying degrees of intensiveness. The politicians' world is considered one of the places where such traditional values are particularly effective, as it is often called "giri to ninja no sekai" (the world of "giri" and "ninjo.") In personal relations among political associates, between political leaders and

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3 One former Diet member expressed his opinion that the norms of "giri" and "ninjo" are very important elements in the conduct of legislators. Interview with a former LD Party member of the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo. Also two secretaries of the Liberal Democratic Diet members mentioned "giri to ninja no sekai" to describe the political circles of Japan. July and August, 1974, Tokyo.
followers, and representatives and supporters, this traditional ethic seems to operate more effectively than in other circles of Japanese society.

It is difficult to answer the question of why the politicians' world is particularly susceptible to these traditional values. One may suspect that among politicians, especially among conservative politicians, there is a tendency to regard themselves as élites who are concerned with government and politics and a tendency to identify themselves consciously or unconsciously with the traditional samurai who were also governing élites. The principal values which the samurai in feudal Japan were indoctrinated with were the Confucian ethical philosophy, which emphasized the virtue of superiors' benevolence and subordinates' loyalty. It is plausible that these traditional norms for the conduct of élites who govern persist, though weakened, among contemporary Japanese politicians.

In the traditional personal relations of Japanese, among whom consciousness of, or almost obsession with, psychological vertical relations between superiors and subordinates has always been notable, the superior's benevolence and subordinate's loyalty are to be respected.

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4 About political implications of Neo-Confucian philosophy in Tokugawa Japan, see: Masao Maruyama, Nihon Seiji Shisoshi Kenkyu, pp. 20-70; Ryusaku Tsunoda et al., eds. Sources of Japanese Tradition, pp. 344-442.
In this culture, the ideal type of leader (or élite) has been conceived as "child like" person who is sensitive to affection and emotion, who does not or cannot calculate, who trust others, and who depend totally upon others.  

This kind of anti-machiavellian moral standard has been regarded as a qualification for the leadership personality. It represented the moral virtue for the traditional ruling élites, samurai, as leaders who were to lead the subordinates and the ruled. This ethical standard for the ruling élites seems to have maintained its influence even after the political modernization under Meiji Restoration.  

We consider that within the world of politicians, particularly among traditionally oriented conservative politicians, who regard themselves as descendants of the samurai governing élites, these traditional values still have significance.

The fact that the norms exist in the politicians' world is one thing, and whether legislators have internalized the values or not is another. It is possible that the subculture represented by the terms of "giri" and "ninjo" is a value pattern inherited from the past and established by tradition, and legislators comply with this

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5 Takeo Doi, Amae no Kozo, p. 62.

subculture on the surface even if they have more individualistic and pragmatic orientation in their minds. In any case, our data which show that Japanese Diet members are less machiavellian than ordinary citizens can be interpreted as an indication that the "giri-ninjo" ethics have influence among politicians today. Possibly, even though calculation, maneuver, and pragmatic self-interests may be the actuality with legislators in today's Japan as many people may imagine, legislators have tried to present their image as a person who live in "the world of giri and ninja," a person who lives depending on others' favor and who gives others benevolence.

The influence of the traditional "giri-ninjo" culture found among Japanese Diet members appears to contradict the relatively liberal orientations found earlier among them, since conformity to traditional norms and values is one of the characteristics of conservatism. Yet, conformity to traditional values is only one property of the concept of conservatism, and "giri-ninjo" is only one facet, though a significant one, of traditional values of Japan. Therefore, we can interpret our findings as follows: Diet members are generally liberal people by Japanese standards, but concerning personal relations in particular they tend to be bound by traditional expectation of "giri" and "ninjo," and express stronger tender-mindedness than ordinary citizens. It can be said that Japanese legislators have
a certain ambivalence in their values in the sense that they are fairly liberal in various aspects of daily-life, but for personal relations they are still under considerable influence of traditional "giri-ninjo" culture.

To see if Japanese legislators' preference for non-machiavellian orientation is a result of the influence of the norm of "giri-ninjo" which is unique to Japan, it may be interesting to compare Japanese Diet members with American politicians. Perhaps in the United States, where people are generally considered to place more value upon a detached, businesslike, pragmatic, and calculating attitude in inter-personal relations, politicians would not show such strong anti-machiavellian orientation as Japanese legislators have revealed. The influence of the different cultures of the two societies should be proved by future empirical studies.

Looking at party differences, we see almost no significant difference across party lines in regard to the machiavellianism. One might expect that Liberal Democrats, who are conventionally thought to be the typical people living in the "world of giri and ninja" and who actually proved themselves most conservative among Japanese Diet members in our survey, will show the strongest anti-machiavellian inclination. Nevertheless, other party members turned out to be almost the same as Liberal Democrats in their non-machiavellian
orientation. Regardless of their orientation on the conservative-radical dimension, members of all parties, including the Socialists, seem to value emotional and affectional inter-personal relations rather than pragmatic and individualistic calculation.

In spite of these findings, it is still suspected that maneuvers, calculation, and manipulation for pragmatic interests are often the actuality in the political world of Japan. In fact it is highly likely that "giri" and "ninjo" would be manipulated by calculation for pragmatic self-interests among Japanese politicians. In the relations between party leaders and the rank-and-file, between a factional boss and his followers, between a representative and his electoral supporters, and between legislators and interest groups, people may utilize "giri" and "ninjo" to seek their interests.7

Because of the existence of the "giri-ninjo" ethics among politicians, the pursuit of interests will avoid the straightforward expression. Instead of blunt negotiation and bargaining, the pretence or disguise of benevolence and loyalty should be always performed on the surface. Personal bonds will mean more than institutions, and private, personal settings will often be more significant

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7 Frank Langdon suggests that, for example, "pressure groups very effectively utilize such a set of social attitudes." Langdon, Politics in Japan, p. 78.
than formal, institutional settings. Dealings are often behind-the-scene, and often by "haragei" (meaning "silent power" or "silent influence.") (It is rather difficult to translate "haragei" into English, but it generally indicates a person's ability to influence others without any observable statement or action but simply by his personality and his mere presence.) The "giri-ninjo" norm seems to be particularly significant for understanding the formation of factional groups of politicians called "habatsu," which is also unique to Japanese politics.

The traditional Japanese culture of "giri-ninjo" may not be the only force which drive Japanese legislators toward a non-machiavellian orientation. More universalistic idealism and general trust in human beings, rather than such a particularistic norm as "giri" or "ninjo," might have influenced legislators to express antimachiavellianism.

Idealism, which pays little attention to pragmatic benefit, is also an antithesis to machiavellianism. Idealists who concern themselves more with ideals and ideologies than reality and pragmatism will score low on the machiavellianism scale. Optimists who believe in the good nature of the human beings will also score low on it. The Diet members may not be particularly idealistic in comparison with other citizens, but perhaps legislators
who care about their public image will apt to describe themselves as more idealistic than their actual selves because idealism is preferred to pragmatism in Japan's cultural context.

It is difficult to tell which of the two factors, traditional Japanese culture of "giri-ninjo" or more universalistic idealism, is responsible for Japanese Diet members' low machiavellianism. I suspect that the combined effects of the two factors have caused their anti-machiavellian attitudes. After all, one thing is clear, and that is that the machiavellian is not the desired type among Japanese politicians.

It can be argued that the Liberal Democrats in general, who scored high on the conservatism and low on the machiavellianism, are more under the influence of the traditional "giri-ninjo" philosophy. On the other hand, the Socialists, who scored low on conservatism and also low on machiavellianism, are thought to have rather universalistic, ideological idealism and ultimate trust in the human being. In any case, both of them seem to share in common the valuing of emotional content and affectivity rather than pragmatic and individualistic calculation.

Although Japanese legislators as a whole are found less machiavellian than the masses, there are still some variations of machiavellianism among legislators.
Provided that legislators' machiavellianism does not vary along with party line, what kind of factors will predict legislators' machiavellianism? The career background is a possible one. Let us look at variations of legislators' machiavellian orientation along with career patterns shown in Table 16.

Legislators with a bureaucratic career scored relatively high on the machiavellianism-idealism scale among Japanese Diet members. This suggests that pragmatism and individualism are more or less accepted within Japan's bureaucracy. Gradualism, realism, and pragmatism, rather than idealistic way of thinking, are common practices of bureaucrats across cultures. Our data indicates that Japanese civil servants are not the exception. In well-institutionalized bureaucracy, emotional "giri-ninjo" may not be so effective as is the norm of practical merits, even though "giri-ninjo" should not be totally neglected. In any case, the bureaucrat-politicians in general are relatively tough-minded realists compared with other legislators.

In contrast to bureaucratic-legislators, "tojin," the politicians who came from local politics, turned out to be tender-minded. Those "tojin" are the people who spent much of their life in the political world, "the world of giri and ninja." They are considered to have been most seriously influenced by the traditional culture
of "giri-ninjo." It is not surprising that these "giri-
injo" people turned out to be clearly negative toward
the machiavellian way of thinking.
PART 4

ROLE PERCEPTION

In Part 4, each of seven facets of the role perception held by Japanese Diet members will be examined. To characterize Japanese legislators, examples of American legislators will be frequently referred to, because comparison of legislators in the two countries has specific relevance as previously mentioned. At the same time, causal factors which may contribute to the formulation of the Japanese legislators' perception of their political role will be sought in their social background, recruitment process, and general values.
Chapter 10

AREAL FOCUS

One of the main topics inherent in the discussion of the representative democracy concerns whose interests the delegate in the parliament represents. The question is often asked in terms of geographic focus. There have been traditionally two opinions on this issue. One is that the legislator should be the spokesman of the interests of the constituent district which elected him. Another is that the legislator, once elected to the legislature, should act to achieve the best interests of the whole area for which the legislature is instituted, and should be independent of parochial interests. We should inquire into legislators' attitudes on this matter. This is the first facet of Japanese Diet members' role perception to be investigated.

Let us first glance at the American situation. The expectation that the legislator should represent the interest of his district seems to be widely shared among citizens and politicians alike in the United States. It may be true that there are a certain number of legis-

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1 Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, p. 287; Jewell and Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, p. 410.
lators in every state legislature who have a broader focus and contend that the interests of the state as a whole must dominate. It is said that this view of state orientation has been established as a norm in several state legislatures.\(^2\) Nevertheless, it is reported that the number of district-oriented legislators exceeds that of state-oriented ones in most states, and the United States House of Representatives also has the higher proportion of those with district orientation.\(^3\)

What is the general feeling of the Japanese public concerning this areal role of the legislator? The Japanese public seems to have a rather negative attitude toward local concerns of legislators, in comparison to a generally positive attitude among Americans. Although there is no quantitative data about the sentiment of ordinary citizens of Japan on this issue, one former Diet member said that there certainly exists a normative expectation among the general public of Japan, especially in journalistic circles, that the legislator should consider national interests ahead of local ones.\(^4\) In fact, we can find, in some of the national press, bitter

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\(^3\)Ibid., p. 411.  
\(^4\)Interview with a former member of the Liberal Democratic Party in the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.
criticisms by opinion leaders of parochial considerations by legislators.  

The different shades of public sentiment between Japan and the United States about local interests may be attributed to the different geography and demography of the two countries. On the one hand, in the United States where land is vast and local communities are separated from each other by considerable space, people easily conceive rather distinct and separate interests for each community. On the other hand, in Japan which has a rather small area and where population density is very high, there are few local communities separated from each other by distance, and it is often difficult to perceive the local community with its own distinct interests. Rather, it may be easier to see the whole nation as one homogeneous and monolithic community. As geographic mobility increases, local community as an object of affection and concern will diminish, if not disappear.

In this situation in Japan, how do Diet members view their areal role? The sample legislators were asked to choose between two alternatives: district-

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5 One of the cases which illustrate the bitter feelings of Japanese journalism against the legislator's local service can be seen in the following event in 1966. A Representative, who had been appointed as the Minister of Transportation, placed some pressure on the Japan National Railway and made express trains stop at a city in his constituent district. Public opinion leaders
or nation-orientation. As anticipated, many respondents said they found difficulties in expressing their preferences between the two choices which are, they claimed, an oversimplification of their mixed feelings toward the areal focus. Most Diet members whom I met alleged that their choices depend on each particular issue. Some legislators even argued that local interests of their district had never conflicted with national interests. Being urged to state a preference, one way or the other, however, they expressed their geographic focus as either district or nation. The results are presented in Table 17.

In spite of the general tendency of public opinion leaders in Japan to be critical about local perspectives of legislators, the majority of Diet members seem to be oriented toward their districts. The situation here is not much different from what we found among American legislators. This finding makes us suspect that most Diet members are not particularly susceptible to the

unanimously and severely attacked the legislator's act in the news media. As a result of the press campaign and attack from opposition parties, the legislator resigned from his post as Minister. Mainichi Shimbun, September 4, 1966; September 6, 1966; September 10, 1966 (editorial); Asahi Shimbun, September 4, 1966; September 7, 1966; September 13, 1966; Shyukan Gendai (weekly), September 29, 1966; Sankei Mainichi (weekly), October 2, 1966. This is one example, and more or less similar stories may not be hard to find.

Of 92 sample legislators, 15 Councillors with national constituency were excluded from examination on this issue.
general and diffused "national public opinion" concerning the problem of areal focus of the legislator. It seems that more immediate concerns than "public opinion" dominate the minds of Japanese Diet members. The immediate and primary concern of most Diet members may perhaps be their re-election.

Let us hear from district-oriented legislators elaborating upon their views. One Diet member presented a simple explanation of his attitude as follows:

People in my district made a Diet member out of me. So, I work for them. 7

Another Diet member summed up more complicated feelings of legislators who are inclined toward the district in the following way:

Every Diet member always wants to achieve policies which benefit the local interests of his electoral district even if they may hurt the interests of the nation as a whole, because such achievements would certainly promote his standing in the next election. This must be an implicit feeling held by almost all legislators.

Whether each Diet member would actually carry out district-oriented legislation disregarding opinions of national public, especially national news media, or not depends on each legislator's way of thinking about practical self-interest.8

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7 Interview with a Liberal Democrat in the House of Representatives, July 28, 1975, Tokyo.

8 Interview with a former member of the LD Party in the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.
In his opinion, most Diet members are in a dilemma between an idealistic impulse which does not allow legislators to neglect national interests and pragmatic considerations which make legislators conscious of parochial interests of the constituents. According to him, idealistic legislators tend to be nation-oriented and pragmatic people tend to be district-oriented. The main thrust of his opinion, however, is that the legislator's anxiety about his re-election often prevails.

Most Diet members, as well as most scholars who observe politicians, would agree that the overwhelming concern among Japanese legislators is always their re-election. This concern generally makes legislators unable to treat the interests of the district lightly. This concern also frequently dominates idealistic thinking about the welfare of the society at large, and dominates national public opinion as well. This is a rather natural phenomenon occurring within a system where electoral competition exists. There may not be much difference between Japanese and American legislators in this regard. The findings that district-oriented legislators are in the majority in both countries may illustrate this point.

There are still a certain number of Diet members, however, who think and behave primarily in terms of the interests of Japanese society at large. How shall we
explain the variance of areal focus among Diet members? As possible explanatory variable, we will examine the competitiveness in election, the demographic characteristics of constituent district, and psychological character, particularly the pragmatic way of thinking, of the legislator.

Local interests might be particularly keenly felt in certain areas, while they may not be so in some other areas. One proposition is that in the districts where electoral competition is intense, local interests tend to become political issues, and tend to be strongly felt by electorates and candidates. Some studies of American legislators have contended, based on empirical data, that the intensity of electoral contests within the district is a factor which is strongly related to the legislator's awareness of his district's interests, and therefore related to his areal focus of attention. ⁹

The legislator's seniority in the Diet indicates his repeated victories in election. As the length of service in the Diet increases, the legislator will feel secure in his seat. The hypothesis is that one who feels that his seat is secure will tend to care less about opinions in his district, whereas one who feels his seat to be threatened will tend to be anxious about what the

district desires. Therefore, we will examine the manner in which parliamentary seniority of Diet members is related to their geographic focus.

Table 18 shows the relationship we found in our survey. The data suggest that those who have experienced few winning elections are inclined to be oriented toward their districts. However, a considerable number of those who have won repeatedly in elections still focus their attention on their districts. It seems that the competitiveness in election or the feeling of security in election is not sufficient to explain the areal role orientation of the legislator in Japan. Although the degree of competitiveness also varies from one district to another in Japan, there seem to be very few "safe" seats, if any, in which the legislator can afford to pay little attention to what the constituents wish and desire. As the previous quotation of a former Diet member implies, almost all Diet members are anxiously concerned over the voices of their constituents. In that sense, the intensity of competition in an election will count for little district- or nation-orientation of legislators in the Japanese situation.

Our hypothesis is that geographic and demographic characteristics of the constituency, rather than electoral competitiveness in the district, are more responsible for the areal orientation of legislators in Japan. To say it in more specific terms, Diet members tend to be district-
oriented in rural areas and nation-oriented in urban areas.

This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the legislator's perception is a reflection of the general sentiment of constituents as a whole. According to an argument of Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, legislators represent their constituencies' attitude either because "the district choose a Representative who so shares its view" or because "the Congressman follows his (at least tolerably accurate) perceptions of district attitude in order to win re-election."\(^{10}\) Thus, where local interests are articulated, distinct, and visible, Diet members tend to focus on the district. Where local interests are ambiguous and people's attention to broader and more universal interests prevails, legislators would be so oriented. We have to inquire as to how constituents in the district generally feel about their local interests in order to understand how the legislator thinks about his areal role.

It can be usually assumed that in socially underdeveloped environments, i.e., rural areas, where social communication is slight, people are generally inclined to be less aware and concerned about the larger political

\(^{10}\)Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," p. 50.
system, and therefore be parochial in their outlook.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, in more developed and urbanized areas, people will be exposed to larger societies, and tend to have universalistic perspectives.

In Japan, moreover, the local community in rural areas can be separated from other communities more easily, though not very distinctly, than in urban areas. In the urban areas, population density is high and there is no space at all which separates cities from one another. In addition to that, geographic mobility is stable in rural areas while mobility is high in urban areas. Thus, people in rural Japan are considered to be more separated from other parts of Japan. They will tend to pay more attention to and have more affection for their parochial locality than urban people do.

On the basis of these assumptions, we consider that Diet members from rural areas tend to be oriented toward their districts while those from urban areas tend to be nation-oriented. Let us examine the relationships between rural-urban characteristics of constituent districts and Diet members' areal focus. The relations we observe in our survey are shown in Table 19.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics, pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{12} Regarding almost all Japanese legislators, electoral district are identified as their home town areas where they grew up during childhood. Nihon Minsei
The survey data given in the table support our hypothesis. Although some other factors may also influence Diet members' perceptions about the areal role, the social and demographic characteristics of the constituency is considered as one of the main things to account for legislators' areal focus.

It may be necessary to note here that almost all Diet members in Japan have been elected from their hometowns, i.e., the place where they were raised. Possibly, rural-urban characteristics of the place of upbringing might have a rather long-reaching influence upon the areal orientation of Diet members. It is difficult to tell whether the childhood environment or the later circumstances of constituent district is more significant in determining the areal focus of legislators. In any case, however, we must examine the demography of the district to understand areal focus of the Diet member. Each district has chosen its "boy" to represent the district, and the Diet member shares the view of the district.

Other than external characteristics of the constituent district, what might determine the areal orientation is the inner character of the legislator.

Kenkyukai, ed., Kokkai Giin Soran. Therefore place of upbringing and constituent district are used interchangeably in this study.
According to a suggestion previously noted by a former Diet member, the idealistic legislator tends to be nation-oriented, and the pragmatic and machiavellian legislator is inclined towards district orientation. For a machiavellian, the pragmatic consideration of getting elected often prevails and makes him to choose the interests of his district over those of nation, because promotion of local interests may be more tangible and immediate for most electorates, and it will help vote-getting in an election. On the other hand, the idealist will not totally disregard the interests of the larger public, which is in the norms advocated by national opinion leaders, even though pragmatic concern also makes him aware of the voices from the district.

The association between the machiavellian inclination of legislators and their areal focus, seen in our survey, is presented in Table 20. District-oriented legislators as a group scored slightly more machiavellian tendency than those who are nation-oriented. The \( t \) score of the difference-of-means test between the two groups is 1.726, indicating the difference is significant, though not very distinctly.\(^{13}\) Although the association is not

\[^{13}\text{In this case, the degree of freedom is 72. Provided with this degree of freedom, and selecting the significance level at 0.05 for a two-tailed test, the critical region is } t>2.00. \text{ If we select the significance level of 0.05 for a one-tailed test, the critical region is } t>1.671.\]
too clear, the data seem to support our proposition.

In conclusion, it may be said that the areal focus of the legislator is determined by his own personality and the characteristics of his constituent district. Even if some Diet members are machiavellian, they would hold a nation-oriented focus where their constituent districts are urban areas and voters there have a generally broader outlook and concern about national issues. On the other hand, some idealists may be district-oriented, if their districts are rural, and provincialism is particularly strong in their district.
CHAPTER 11

STYLE OF REPRESENTATION

How does the legislator perceive his relations with the electorate? In other words, how does he view the mandate of the represented? This question about the style of representation should be another principal issue, along with the areal focus, for those concerned with parliamentary democracy.

In this respect, two types of the mode of representation have been conceptualized: "trustee" and "delegate." Both types seem to have rather long-standing support and advocacy among political philosophers, opinion leaders, and politicians themselves in Europe and the United States. For example, the delegate-type orientation or the idea of mandatory representation is said to have had a considerable popularity even back in eighteenth century Britain.¹ On the other hand, the trustee-type representational style, in which the legislator is not bound by instructions from whatever source but is guided by his unbiased, mature judgment and conscience, has also been advocated by many, amongst whom was Edmund Burke.²

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¹Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, p. 271.
²Ibid., pp. 269-270.
In the state legislatures of contemporary America, trustee orientation seems to be in the majority, although there may be certain variations among states.\(^3\) John Wahlke and his associates explain this situation in the United States as follows.\(^4\) The nature of tasks which face the contemporary government, be it state or national, is so exceedingly complex that most ordinary citizens are unable to grasp its problems and are likely to entrust the affairs of government to the elected representatives. The representatives who are presumably better informed have to depend upon their independent judgment. The role orientation of "trustee" is, therefore, a functional necessity for contemporary legislatures. Thus, "trustees" are more frequently found than "delegates" in American legislatures today.

What is the situation in Japan on this question? It seems that this problem of style of representation of

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 281.

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\(^4\)Ibid., p. 281.
the legislator has not been discussed in articulated form among Japanese. Politicians and opinion leaders might have favored one or the other mode of representation in their statements or conduct, but they did so without much consciousness of the problem. The question of whether the legislator should be a trustee or delegate has not been raised as an issue for controversy among opinion leaders nor been consciously recognized by politicians as a theme for philosophical consideration related to parliamentary democracy. We must caution ourselves here that the concept of representational style, as well as the concept of representation itself, has been developed mainly in Western culture, and is somewhat alien to Japanese. (As a result, the terms "trustee" and "delegate" are difficult to translate into Japanese.)

I suspect, notwithstanding, that the general feeling of the Japanese public, particularly that of opinion leaders, is inclined to favor the trustee-type of representation. This is because Japanese people are generally considered to be susceptible to a norm which is typically represented in the argument of Edmund Burke, although many Japanese may not be aware of his philosophy.

Burke maintained that the representative should be an agent for the general good of the whole nation, not for a particular party of a certain locality. At the same

\[5\text{Rbid.}, \text{ pp. 269-270.}\]
time, he contended that the representative ought to be free from the mandate of constituency or any other external force, and be guided by his own independent judgment. In short, nation-orientation and trustee role are advocated as the proper attitude of the legislator, and local-orientation and delegate role are rejected as improper in Burke's formula on the "democratic" parliament.

As Japan is geographically small and socially homogeneous, conformity to the nation as a whole rather than pluralism may appeal to the sentiment of Japanese in general. I have already suggested that the public opinion of Japan, insofar as expressed in the national press, is inclined to be critical about parochial considerations of the legislator. Such a tendency may illustrate the fact that the Burkean norm has been accepted prevailingly among Japanese, among opinion leaders in particular, whether they have consciously recognized this Burkean philosophy or not. Although we have no empirical documentation, it is expected that the norm which advocates the nation-orientation and trustee role of the legislator has claimed considerable agreements among scholars, politicians, and other opinion leaders in Japan.

Let us look at how Japanese Diet members in our survey have perceived the style of representation. Table
21 shows our findings. A little more than half of the respondents identified themselves as trustees, while a little less than half expressed themselves as delegates. It seems that the trustee role has slightly more popularity than the delegate orientation among Japanese Diet members. The two types, however, are in a closer competition when compared to the situation in American legislatures.

In spite of the inclination of the general public of Japan, which we assumed to be rather favorable to trustee-style of representation the proportion of trustees seems not large enough in the Diet of Japan in comparison with American Legislatures. Why is the role of delegates found relatively frequently among Diet members in Japan? Again, we must think about the strong and prevalent anxiety of Japanese Diet members over their own re-election. If re-election is the primary concern for legislators, legislators cannot afford to neglect what the constituents have to say, and they will be alert to the voices, cues, and instructions from their districts. Therefore, it is presumed that anxiety about re-election makes Diet members not only "district-oriented" but also "delegate-oriented."

It seems necessary, at this point, to think about the relationships between areal focus and style of representation of legislators. The areal focus and style of representation are generally thought to be associated with each other. In Burke's formulation about the
"democratic" representation, as previously mentioned, the combination of nation-oriented focus and trustee-type role was recommended as an appropriate orientation of the legislator, and district focus and delegate role were criticized as inappropriate for the parliamentarian. The legislator who agrees with the Burkean norm, whether consciously or unconsciously, will tend to see himself as an advocate of the national interests free from the mandate of his constituents. On the other hand, those who are primarily concerned about re-election will be oriented toward their districts and see themselves as delegates who follow what the constituents wish and demand.

The relationships between the areal focus and style of representation, which was found in our survey, is given in Table 22. We can see certain association between district orientation and delegate perception and between nation-orientation and trustee role. It seems that the hypothesis explained above is supported by these data, though to a limited extent. We must note here, however, that the association is far from perfect among Diet members in Japan. A considerable number of Diet members are nation-oriented, and still regard themselves not as free and independent "trustees" but as "delegates" following instructions of the constituents. Conversely, a considerable number of Diet members whose attention is primarily on their districts seem to feel that
they can attain their districts' interests not by following a mandate but by depending on their own judgment.

The "trustees" are in a majority with a slight margin among Japanese legislators, but their proportion is not very large when compared with American legislatures. We have already cited the anxious considerations about re-election which often make Diet members regard themselves as "delegates." It is also possible to think that Japanese Diet members in general have less confidence in themselves as specialists of government affairs. Those without much self-confidence will rely on others.

John Wahlke and associates argued, as explained earlier, the legislator's trustee role is a "functional necessity," because legislative works in the United States are of such complex and specialized nature that legislators cannot expect adequate judgment or instructions from ordinary citizens, including their constituents. Legislators, who presumably have expert knowledges in the field, are required to depend on their own judgment. Many Japanese Diet members seem not to find that such specialized knowledges are needed in their work. (The problem of specialization and expertise of Diet members will be discussed later in Chapter 15.) When legislators consider that legislative work they deal with does not demand any particular expertise, or when they do not see themselves as the specialists of government affairs who are more
informed and able than ordinary citizens, they will naturally tend to listen to outside group. Thus, many Japanese Diet members who are concerned about re-election define themselves as "delegates," seeking cues and instructions in their constituencies.

Let us now examine party differences as regards the representation style of members. According to our data, presented in Table 21, Liberal Democrats are markedly inclined toward the "trustee" role (68 percent), while Komeito members generally showed a tendency toward "delegate" perception (67 percent). Socialists and Democratic Socialists are almost even split between the two types.

One factor which might account for the differences among parties is the majority-minority status of each party. As the LD Party is the ruling party, the Liberal Democrats in general are the most deeply involved in policy-making in Japan when contrasted with other party members. They are the people who deal with the main substance of government affairs in Japan, actually taking part in the core process of policy-formulation. They will acquire expert knowledge of administration, and accordingly become confident of themselves as government professionals. It is rather natural that these Liberal Democrats tend to be self-dependent and feel not bound by outside suggestions and instructions.

On the other hand, members of small and new parties,
such as Komeitoites, are rather removed from the core of government affairs. They have little experience in the main and substantial process of policy-formation. They may perceive themselves as laymen, not as specialists of government. It is understandable that they are inclined to regard themselves as the "delegates" of the people. By picking up and strictly reflecting the grassroots opinion, they will try to expand their power and popularity among electorates.

The legislator's style of representation is also considered to be related to his seniority in the Diet. As his or her length of service in the Diet increases, the legislators accumulates experience as an office-holder in the parliament. He will become confident of himself as a mature lawmaker with better judgment. The legislator's seniority also indicates his repeated victories in election. Therefore, as the length of service in the Diet increases, the legislator will feel more secure in his seat, as noted earlier. In either case, Diet members with long experience in the parliament are considered to have a tendency toward freedom and independence from mandate of the constituency.

Table 23 presents the relationships between length of service and the style of representation of legislators. Those who have short legislative experience are inclined, though slightly, to be "delegate"
while those who have long experience are mostly "trustees." The data seem to support our argument.

We have explained that Liberal Democrats often turned out to be "trustees" because their party has a majority status in the parliament and is the party in power. Yet, it is also probably that many Liberal Democrats have had long experience in the Diet, and, hence, tend to rely on their own judgment not on instructions of others. Most Komeito members have served only one or two terms in the Diet. Perhaps many Komeitoites lack confidence in themselves to exercise their own independent judgment, not only because of their status as members of a minority party, but also because they have had limited experience in legislative work.

Finally, we think that the pragmatic and machiavellian tendency of the legislator is also related to his style of representation. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that the machiavellian who is primarily concerned about his pragmatic purpose of re-election will often focus his attention on his electoral district. By the same token, the machiavellian will be anxious to discern what people in his district wish and desire, and speak and act as a substitute for his constituents. As one former Dietman has told, that will "certainly promote his standing in the next election."

On the other hand, the idealist is considered to be easily influenced by expected norms in the society. A
normative expectation about the "democratic" parliament which prevails in the general public of Japan, among opinion leaders in particular, is thought to be the Burkean philosophy, which advocates the trustee-type representation.

The relationship between the machiavellian tendency and the style of representation of legislators is given in Table 24. The table indicates as a general tendency that those who identified themselves as "delegates" are rather machiavellian, and those who expressed themselves as "trustees" are relatively tender-minded. However, the machiavellian or idealistic personality of the legislator can predict his style of representation only within a limited extent. When we examine the combined effects of the majority-minority status of the party to which the legislator belongs, the length of his service in the legislature and his tough-tender-minded personality, we will better understand his perception on the style of representation.
Chapter 12

ORIENTATION TOWARD INTEREST GROUPS

It is true that the legislator is elected to the parliament on the principle of territorial representation. However, from a more informal point of view, the legislative process, or the legislature itself, is thought of as an arena where group interests, not geographic interests, compete and bargain. Some legislators may perceive specific interest groups, aside from the constituency, as a focus of attention and reference for their legislative performance. Some may even define themselves as "spokesman" of certain organized interests. Some may oppose, however, pressure upon the legislature exerted by organized interests.

Let us first make a brief survey of this problem in the United States. Traditionally, public opinion in the United States and, for that matter, in most Western democratic nations has been characterized by an antipathy toward group interests.¹ A popular sentiment among the American masses at large might have been summarized as a distrust of interest groups, which were considered to be hostile toward general public interest. In that

traditional political culture, the contention that particular interests should not intervene in the legislative process, and the legislator must act independently of any group and impartially to protect the general public would have elicited much agreement.

In practice, however, "interest groups flourish within a nation (the United States) that distrusts them."² Formation of and participation in voluntary associations are a widespread phenomenon in American society. Based on this actuality, a recent intellectual trend in the United States is towards the recognition that concerted group activity of those who share a common interest is a legitimate and essential part of the political process in a modern mass society. This view of "pluralism," which is considered to have been initially presented by Arthur Bentley's The Process of Government around the turn of the century, has become one of the main streams in the academic world of political science and political philosophy in the United States.³ It might certainly have influenced public assessment of organized interests.

It is reported that "as a general proposition,

²Ibid., p. 39.

American legislators tend to view lobbyists and lobbying as significant contributions to the effective operation of the legislative process."\(^4\) In spite of the negative tradition against group pressure among Americans, interest groups are now thought to be firmly rooted in the political system of the United States, and most legislators seem to accept and appreciate their activities in the legislative process.

We now turn our attention to the areas outside of the United States. It seems to be generally recognized, by this day, that "interest groups wield a significant amount of power in the most varied political systems."\(^5\) This is a recognition of reality. In the evaluation by people, however, it is doubtful that the legitimacy of interest group activities is universally admitted, even in Western countries.\(^6\) Even though group pressure might be an increasing practice in the political process of many nations, the antipathy of people for it seems to persist.

There is no empirical evidence about general attitudes of the Japanese public toward group pressure in the political process. As far as we can judge from the

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\(^6\) Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 312.
press, the general public of Japan seems to be, as the traditional culture of most nations has been, rather distrustful of political conduct of special interests. In a society like Japan, which is easily perceived as a homogeneous unit geographically and socially, the public interest, as opposed to the interests of specific groups, may have greater appeal. Moreover, it is not a prevalent practice for Japanese to organize and participate in the voluntary associations. Therefore, it may be thought that those who can organize their interests into group activity are only a part of the society, and the majority masses are left without any organization to represent their interests. In addition to that, in Japan pressure of special interests is often exercised behind the scene, not in a publicly institutionalized manner. Some of these group activities have drawn public attention in the news media as shady political intercourse which borders on political corruption.\(^7\) They certainly increase people's distrust of interest group activity in general. In any case, it seems that the "pluralist" view of the society and politics has not been well accepted among scholars, journalists, and politicians in Japan.

We must now examine the attitude of Japanese legislators toward organized interests. Let us look at our

\(^7\)Robert E. Ward, *Japan's Political System*, pp. 78-79.
data as regards this issue. Respondents have been categorized into three types:

1. "facilitator," who favors interest group activities,

2. "neutral," who regards the organized interests as not desirable, but admissible and inevitable,

3. "resister," who thinks that group pressure is evil and should not be allowed.

Table 25 shows orientation of the sample legislators.

When we compare our findings with some data about American state legislators, the first thing we notice is the fact that "facilitators" among Diet members in Japan are very few. The "facilitators" comprise a formidable portion (about 20-45 percent) in state legislatures in the United States. In contrast to that, only two percent of our respondents turned out to be "facilitator." The fact clearly indicates that interest group activity has not yet obtained legitimacy in the perception of many Japanese Diet members. Our finding seems to illustrate that most Japanese legislators have not internalized the "pluralists" approach to politics, and the classical view which takes group pressure as a threat to "democracy" is

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still dominant among Diet members in Japan.

Although "facilitators" are few, we found, at the same time, that the proportion of "resisters" is not large either among the sample Diet members. "Resisters" account for about 17 percent of the respondents. The number of "resisters" in the Japanese Diet does not seem large when compared to their American counterparts. It is reported that "resisters" make up about 20-40 percent of legislators in some state assemblies in the United States.\(^9\) Considering the fact that public sentiment in Japan is rather negative toward group pressure and very few "facilitators" are found in the Diet, we must assume that outright hostility toward interest groups is unexpectedly weak.

The great majority of our sample (71 percent) expressed themselves as "neutrals." Their attitude indicates that organized interests have taken root for operation in practice in the legislative process in Japan, yet their legitimacy has not been well acknowledged in the normative expectation of Diet members.\(^10\)

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 326-327.

\(^10\)As an illustration of the normative perception of Japanese legislators on this issue, the following story may deserve citing. When I was discussing with a Diet member about outside groups with which the legislator interacts, he carefully corrected my word "interest groups" into "a group of citizens" and "a group of businessmen." Interview with a Liberal Democrat of the House of Representatives, April 10, 1974, Tokyo. This kind of euphemism is also pointed out with Americans. Zeigler and Peak,
respondents seem to have expressed the dilemma between their ethical norm and the reality as a "neutral" attitude. It is likely that some respondents who harbor a rather favorable opinion of group pressure might have resorted to the "neutral" answer, a non-committal response avoiding frank exposure of their true feeling on this issue, taking into consideration the critical posture of public opinion leaders. In any case, we feel there is ambivalence of Japanese legislators with regard to interest group activities in the legislative process.

Are there partisan differences related to this problem? Looking at our data presented in Table 25, we notice several points. The only party which includes "facilitators" is the Liberal Democratic Party, although we have only two "facilitators" in our sample. It is assumed that most interest groups in various fields would try to establish influence mainly through legislators who have close access to power in the policy-making process. When we reflect upon the fact that the LD Party has been a party in power during most of the postwar period, it is naturally expected that those who are most deeply involved in pressure group politics are among Liberal Democrats. Understandably, "facilitators" will be found most often among Liberal Democrats.

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Interest Groups in American Society, p. 38.
However, Liberal Democrats in our sample also include several "resisters." The indication may be not all Liberal Democrats have commitments to special interests. It is conventionally thought that organized interests of business, agriculture, or those of a professional nature, among other interests, have had intimate relations with the ruling LD Party, and many Liberal Democrats have been involved in and committed to political activities of these special interests. Yet, not all Liberal Democrats are involved in pressure group politics in Japan. There seems to be a certain number of Liberal Democrats who are dissociated from, and critical of, the pressure group politics which takes place in policy formulation in the LD Party and in the Diet.

The Komeito is found to be the most distrustful of and unfavorable to interest groups. Among Komeito respondents, about 40 percent are "the neutrals" and 60 percent are "resisters." Although the Sokagakkai itself can be considered, in a way, as an association which represents the interests of its members, the Sokagakkai

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12 Junnosuke Masumi, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Taisei, pp. 63-65.
members themselves seem to perceive their organization as desirous of pursuing not only their own interests but also the general welfare of the entire public.\textsuperscript{13} Doctrines of many religious movements have a universalistic, rather than pluralistic, perspective, and teachings of the Sokagakkai seem to be no exception in this sense. The religio-political ideology of "ningensei shakaishugi" ("humanistic socialism"), advocated by the Komeito, typically tells that their basic approach is monistic, not pluralistic.\textsuperscript{14}

Aside from their ideology, the status of Komeito as a recently-emerged minority party will also account for the Komeitoites' disengagement from pressure group politics. They have little relation with business associations, agricultural organizations, or labor unions, which are the significant organized interests in Japanese politics. Instead, the electoral basis of Komeitoites is mainly unorganized workers and unorganized petty entrepreneurs in the "mass society."\textsuperscript{15} It is not surprising that many Komeitoites are apt to be skeptical about the legitimacy of group pressure.

\textsuperscript{13}White, The Sokagakkai and Mass Society, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{14}For the ideology of "Humanistic Socialism," see Hori, Komeito Ron, pp. 101-107.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 215-216.
By contrast, Socialists and Democratic Socialists in our sample include very few "resisters." Of 14 Democratic Socialists, 13 are "the neutrals" and only one is a "resister." Of 21 Socialists, 20 are "the neutrals" and only one turned out to be a "resister." Most members of both parties seem to accept inevitable functions of organized interests, even if they are not enthusiastic about pressure politics.

As the career patterns of Socialists and Democratic Socialists have revealed, many members of these two parties have been deeply involved in labor union activities and have commitments to the causes of organized workers. Not only do many individual Socialists have commitments to labor unions, but the Socialists as a party are linked with and depend on Sohyo (Nihon Rodokumiai Sohyogikai--General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), the largest worker's organization in Japan. In the same way, the Democratic Socialist Party is linked with Domei (Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei--Japanese Confederation of Labor), the second largest labor association. Many members of both parties rely upon these organizations in terms of funds, campaign workers, and voters at election time.\(^{16}\) They

\(^{16}\) Particularly Sohyo has adopted a policy of all-out support of the Socialists, in which all members are assumed to support Socialists.
inevitably receive demands and pressures as well.

Thus, Socialists and Democratic Socialists are actually involved in pressure group politics. They regard themselves, however, not as "facilitators" but as "neutralists." It seems that they do not want to justify the "pluralist" philosophy of politics, nor to admit group pressure in general as legitimate, even though they act to represent the interest of organized workers in practice.

They are probably under the influence of the traditional norm which upholds public interests as having the utmost significance. Socialists and Democratic Socialists may also be sensitive to negative opinions for pressure and lobbying in the Japanese press. Public distrust of organized interests has been provoked especially when business interests have applied pressure in a suspicious manner. Socialists and Democratic Socialists have tried to distinguish their own activities from lobbying of business interests, and have attacked the conduct of business groups as hostile toward "public interest," but defended their own activity on behalf of organized workers as "in the public interest." In any case, they are not inclined in their normative expectation to approve group pressure in general.

Socialists must be specifically negative towards the "pluralist" approach to politics. Their ideology is
basically founded on Marxism, and Marxism will not accept compromise among plural interests. Socialists' adherence to the interests of labor unions is excused as follows:

The interests of working people represent universal interests, the interests of all the populace. Serving as a spokesman of labor unions is not for the sake of a particular part of the society but for the whole people.17

Here again, Socialists defend the interest of labor unions in the name of "public interest," rather than admitting it as one of several interests to be compromised.

After all, Socialists and Democratic Socialists tend to be advocates of "public interest," not "pluralism." At the same time, they must recognize the actuality of Japanese pressure politics in which they themselves are involved. It is assumed that their ambivalence has been expressed in the response of "neutrals."

We have above discussed Diet members' orientation toward interest groups along party lines. Other than party, the career pattern seems to be another factor to account for the legislator's attitude toward group interests. Through a certain career, legislators may become committed to particular interests. Experiencing another career, the

17A conversation with a secretary working for a Socialist Diet member. She was a Socialist Party member herself. August 1974, Tokyo.
legislator may become hostile toward any kind of such group pressure. The relationship between legislator's career and their interest group orientation is given in Table 26.

We find that legislators who came from higher civil service are inclined to be rather favorable to interest group activities. Generally speaking the job of an administrative agency includes discovering organized interests (clientele groups) in the field which the agency deals with, sometimes to help people form interest groups, and to serve the interests of these clientele groups. Organized interests, as clienteles, approach bureaucrats as well as legislators to make their causes heard and reflected in policy-making. Thus, it is assumed that bureaucrats in general have intimate relations with certain interest groups.

In the case of Japan, involvements of higher civil servants in specific interests (Mostly business interests) seem particularly deep and committing. Robert Ward explains as follows:

> The political targets of most Japanese interest groups have traditionally been the government administration rather than the legislature. The reason is simple. Executives and bureaucrats, rather than legislators, have

made most of the important decisions in Japanese politics and administration, or if they have not made them, they have at least interpreted and applied them, ... Since the war, the political role of the House of Representatives had gradually increased in importance, interest groups are perhaps paying greater attention to the legislature and its committees, but their stress remains heavily on the higher bureaucracy. 19

Approximately three-tenths of retiring higher civil servants usually go into business corporations, 20 and it is thought that those corporations are clienteles with which the bureaucrats have worked. This practice is called by the conventional term "amakudari" (literally "descending from heaven," implying that bureaucrats have the upper hand in their relations with clienteles). This practice indicates close and cooperative relations between higher civil servants and certain interest groups. Thus, Diet members who have previously served in bureaucracy (mostly Liberal Democrats) are likely to keep personal connections with certain special interests even after they came to the legislature.

We have already pointed out that workers' unions are another significant force, along with business associations, among organized interests in Japanese politics.

19 Ward, Japan's Political System, p. 78.
20 Kubota, Higher Civil Servants in Postwar Japan, p. 155.
We can see, in Table 26, that legislators who previously worked in labor unions (mostly Socialists and Democratic Socialists) are generally not negative, though not outspokenly positive, toward pressure group politics. Among 23 Diet members with a labor union career, 22 are "the neutrals" and only one is a "resister." Most of them apparently keep personal ties with certain labor unions as well as commitments to the interests of these organizations after they have been elected to the Diet. Their serious involvements in pressure politics of workers' organizations are unavoidable because they have to ask for these unions' backings as their primary election base. Indeed, some of them operate in the political arena as ostensible spokesmen of particular unions, when the interests of these unions are at stake.

Admitting that the most powerful pressure on political process of Japan is from business interests, we must notice the fact that legislators who have career experience in business are not particularly favorable to interest group activities, at least in our survey. Almost 45 percent of these Diet members are found to be "résisters."

The interpretation of this finding is as follows: Diet members with business backgrounds are mostly rather independent entrepreneurs, not representing any specific sector of Japanese businesses, such as oil industries, auto industries, textile industries, and so forth. The pattern that specific interests of economic circles send
their representatives into the parliament is seldom, if at all, practiced in Japanese politics. Business interests would approach higher civil servants in respective ministries or legislators who are not their representatives but who have influential power in relevant policy-making to place pressure for their cause, rather than sending their own "spokesman" into the Diet.

Finally, we must mention another significant pressure groups which has a powerful body of delegates in the parliament, i.e., agricultural interests. The largest organization which represents the interests of Japanese farmers is Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai (Agricultural Cooperative Society), abbreviated as Nokyo. Their lobbying on agricultural policies is one of the most conspicuous of pressure politics in Japan. Although there are few Diet members who have had actual experience in farming as their

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21 There are some occasions in which legislators represent a certain sector of business. For example, a Diet member who has a background as an owner of middle-size textile company and who serves as an official in an association of small- and middle-sized textile corporations, told me that he works in the Diet to promote the interest of the industry. But he also contended that his electoral base is not these business interests. Interview with a Liberal Democrat of the House of Representatives, July 25, 1975, Tokyo.

22 Nokyo is composed of several national organizations, differentiated by their functions, as well as thousands of local and prefectural units. Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodokumiai Chuokai (National Central Association of Agricultural Cooperative Societies) coordinates all these organizations, especially in a political field.
main occupation, a considerable number of Diet members have been engaged in the Nokyo organization. Today about 15 Diet members are firmly committed to Nokyo activities and work in the legislature as representatives of Nokyo. They are often called "Nokyo giin" (Nokyo legislator) or "kome giin" (rice legislator). Although our survey did not clearly reveal the point, the agricultural interest is a group which has the most strongly committed representatives in the parliament.
Chapter 13

PARTY LOYALTY

One of the conspicuous points about legislative politics in Japan is the strength of party control exercised by the party leaderships over the members' legislative behavior, especially over their voting performance. The situation in some European parliaments might be similar to that of Japan, although detailed data are not available to this writer. The case of Japan stands out uniquely, however, when contrasted to the conditions in American legislatures, where individual legislators act more independently of party authority. In any case, tight party discipline seems to be one of the most significant factors in understanding legislative performance in Japan.

American legislators are often divided into three types according to their voting behavior. These three types are:

(1) "the party man," who votes with his party,
(2) "the independent" (or "the indifferent"), who votes independently of his party,
(3) "the maverick," who regularly and persistently deviates from his party.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, pp. 364-369; Jewell and Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, pp. 415-417. The distinction between "the independent"
This typology seems inadequate, however, in Japan.

It is impossible to assess the loyalty to party of Japanese Diet members by looking at their voting behavior. Except for a few rare incidents in which Diet members cast votes against the will of their party (usually decided through intraparty mechanisms), voting records of Japanese legislators have corresponded strictly to party lines. By tradition, the custom of political parties in Japan dictates that members should vote unanimously in the parliament. "The mavericks" or "the independents" may make up a considerable portion of American legislators, but they would not survive in Japanese parties. Diet members who voted against the party had to expect, in most cases, the severest sanction, expulsion from the party. The maximum way permitted for Japanese legislators to express dissatisfaction is to be absent from voting session. Even this abstention has been regarded as a revolt against the party authority. Thus, all Diet members in Japan are considered "the party men," as far as we look at their voting records.

Overt performance is one thing and implicit attitude

and "the maverick" is not clear as Heinz Eulau admits. Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 368.

It is reported that about 20 percent of United States Representatives were classified as mavericks. Jewell and Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States*, p. 416.
should be another. We should detect, in this study, how Japanese legislators feel about loyalty and conformity to party, rather than examining their voting records. Do they think strict discipline appropriate or do they want more individual independence and initiative? Diet members are categorized into four types and their definitions are as follows:

(1) "Loyalist": Legislators should always obey what party authority tells them.

(2) "Conformist": Legislator can act against the party authority within intraparty procedure, but in the public he should always abide by and support the authority's leadership which is regarded as the outcome of intraparty decision-making.

(3) "The independent-inclined": Legislators can criticize the party leadership even in public, such as in public speeches, press conferences, interviews, et cetera, but in voting in the Diet he should always follow the party's decision.

(4) "The independent": The legislator should always act according to his own belief and judgment regardless of what the party leaders tell him.

Table 27 shows party orientation of the sample legislators, categorized as to the above four types. About 13 percent of respondents turned out to be "loyalists." About 39 percent are "conformists." About 36 percent are found to be "independent-inclined." Altogether 88 percent of our sample legislators have agreed that the legislator should obey the party's decision at least when he cast votes in the Diet. It can be said that the strict control of voting behavior by the party leaders is not only practiced but
accepted as proper discipline by the vast majority of contemporary Diet members.

Nevertheless, we should not overlook the fact that a little more than 10 percent of respondents expect that the legislator must act on his own belief and judgment, not bound by party decision, even in voting. Although they have exercised little independence when they actually voted in the Diet, their conformity is considered a rather forced one. They seem not to be satisfied with the present situation of party politics in Japan.

How should we explain this tight control within Japanese parties? As a basic factor, one may cite a group consciousness of Japanese in general. Chie Nakane, for example, argues that "(for Japanese) the commitment to a group is more important than the concept of individualism."³ Many students on Japanese culture would agree that an inclination to be situation-oriented and to behave in the framework of "group" is a significant general character of Japanese people. In contrast to the independent and individualistic performance of American legislators, Japanese legislators' dependence on the party might be largely attributed to this basic cultural difference.

In addition to this general characteristic of

Japanese, we may cite the ideology-oriented character of Japanese political parties in order to account for strong party control in Japanese politics. Japanese society is heterogeneous, in terms of political ideology, being fragmented from communists and socialists on the left to the archconservative nationalists on the right. It is assumed that each political party in Japan is made up of a group of people who adhere to a certain ideology. Ideological discrepancies among Japanese parties are grave in the sense that the differences concern not only specific policies but also political structures, and even the basic socio-economic structures. In these situations, it is party leaders who define the basic outline of the ideology which members must embrace. It may be hard for individual members to oppose this kind of authority by party leaders.

Strong party control may also be due to the cohesive and centralized national structure of Japanese parties. American parties are characterized by their fragmentation and localism. In the United States each district has its autonomous unit, and the legislative party is a quite

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4 Robert Dahl graded the degree of political opposition into the following four types: (1) change of the personnel of government, (2) change of the specific policies of government, (3) change of the structure of the political system, (4) change of the socio-economic structure. Robert A. Dahl, "Patterns of Opposition," pp. 341-344.
different entity from those local autonomous units. In contrast to American parties, local branches and chapters of Japanese parties are constantly under control of the headquarters in Tokyo. The organizational structure of Japanese parties seems to have more parallels with political parties in Western Europe than with American parties.

Central control is particularly effective at election time. The formal endorsement ("konin") by the party at elections is vital for Diet candidates to win. Other than financial or organizational support from the party, sheer identification label given by the party would be a great asset for candidates. "Konin" is a must for candidates of the Komeito and Communist Party, who largely depend on the party organization in terms of funds, campaign activity, as well as votes of party members. The situation is almost the same for Socialist or Democratic Socialist candidates, who must seek support of labor unions affiliated with their party in terms of funds, campaign workers, and votes of union members. "Konin" is also critical, if not a must, for candidates of the LD Party, who usually possess their own personal election machine of "koenkai." In the latter case, the party's nomination itself

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still counts seriously in vote-getting. Leading officials decide who can get "konin" in the next election in all parties of Japan. Thus, the party authority puts their members on the line not only during the election period but constantly, because the next election is always coming up in the minds of Diet members. Even "the independent" is compelled to follow the party leadership to get elected to the Diet.

Although Diet members are bound and restricted to whatever party they may belong when they officially perform in the parliament, their implicit loyalty seems to vary across party lines. Let us look at our data presented in Table 27. Komeitoites have shown, as a group, the strongest conformity to the party. Eight of 12 Komeito respondents (67 percent) turned out to be "the loyalists," who think that any kind of objection to party leaders should not be permitted within or outside of the party. Eleven of 12 (91 percent) are either "the loyalists" or "the conformists," believing that no dissention should be allowed in public.

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6 For the significance of party endorsement for candidates of the LD Party, see Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style, Chapter 1, "The Politics of Party Endorsement."

7 About the pattern of candidate selection process in Western political parties, see Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Chapter 8, "Candidate Selection."
This strong party conformity among Komeito Diet members may be attributed to the members' firm attachment to the religio-political ideology of the Sokagakkai and Komeito. I think that party loyalty must be related to ideological homogeneity within the party. Heinz Eulau has also made the same assumption. Eulau has reported, however, that "there is no association" between ideological homogeneity and party-line thinking. This finding may suggest that ideological considerations have little meaning in American legislators' concept of their own party. Differing from this American situation, I assume that the party loyalty of Diet members is based on their ideological commitments in the ideology-oriented political atmosphere of Japan.

We have no quantitative data concerning ideological homogeneity of each party of Japan. It is conventionally assumed that Komeitoites, as a group, are ideologically homogeneous and coherent among themselves. Only the Communist Party may match the Komeito in ideological coherence within the party. This characteristic of Komeitoites may perhaps stem from the fact that Komeito has been, and still is, based on a religious movement. Many

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8 Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 374.
religions teach only one truth, rejecting heterodoxies. We have already found in Chapter 8 that Komeito Diet members are not dogmatic at all in comparison with other legislators, but this does not mean that the Sokagakkai, as a religious organization, allows different meanings and interpretations of their religio-political ideology to exist in their own organization. Although the Komeito has severed itself from the Sokagakkai in 1970 to become an independent, securalized political party,\textsuperscript{10} that was only a change of appearance, and Komeito has remained an affiliate of the Sokagakkai. Thus, ideological regimentation of Komeito members, as well as of Gakkai members, is effectively conducted through teachings of the religious authority.

Beside the high degree of consensus among members, the Komeito has a well-centralized national organization, although it overlaps in large part with the organization of the Sokagakkai.\textsuperscript{11} It will also help the party and Gakkai leaders not only to control members' behavior but also to educate members and make them more party- or Gakkai-oriented.

It is difficult to tell whether the ideological coherence among members and centralized structure of the

\textsuperscript{10} About the "seikyo bunri" (separation between religion and politics) of the Komeito in 1970, see Hori, Komeito Ron, pp. 58-62.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 142-170.
party have brought about the loyal character of Komeitoites, or the cause and effect go reversely. In any case, these three variables (ideological homogeneity of members, organizational structure of the party, and members' loyalty to the party) are considered to be highly correlated with each other.

It is regrettable that we do not have data to analyze the loyalty of Communist Party members. Unquestionably, the Japan Communist Party shares with Komeito the characteristics of ideological regimentation and organizational centralization. Therefore, one assumes that Communist Party members have strong loyalty to their party.

In contrast to the Komeito members, Liberal Democrats, as a group, have shown the weakest party loyalty when compared with other party members. The LDP is the only party which contains a considerable number of "the independents" who want to dissent from the party even in Diet vote. About 14 percent of LDP respondents are "the independents." About 60 percent of LDP respondents are either "the independents" or "the independent-inclined," who think that the legislator can criticize and object to the party authority in public.

In ideological terms, there is a broad consensus among Liberal Democrats insofar as they agree with the capitalist view of free enterprise related to the basic socio-economic structure of Japan. Within that scope, how-
ever, the LD Party embraces members with a wide variety of political ideologies from the extreme right to the center or even moderate left.\textsuperscript{12}

In structural terms, most observers would agree that the LD Party is a loose federation of factional groups called "habatsu."\textsuperscript{13} One may suspect that loyalty and emotional attachment to the factional leader weight more heavily than loyalty and attachment to the party in the minds of many Liberal Democrats. Therefore, it is rather naturally expected that the party leaders command less loyalty of members within the LD Party. (We will discuss these factional groups called "habatsu" and legislators' loyalty to them in the following Chapter.)

Factional fragmentation of the Liberal Democrats might be explained by its majority status in the parliament and its status as a ruling party in Japan. Heinz Eulau has suggested that in competitive American state legislatures the majority party is generally more cohesive than the minority party, because the members of the majority party can be more effective in legislation by taking a partisan role.\textsuperscript{14} One the other hand, Malcolm Jewell and


\textsuperscript{13}Tsuneo Watanabe, \textit{Habatsu}, pp. 8-9; Haruhiro Fukui, \textit{Party in Power}, pp. 142-143.

\textsuperscript{14}Wahlke et al., \textit{The Legislative System}, pp. 344-351.
Samuel Patterson have contended that a legislative party with a large majority may tolerate more deviation of its members from the party line than do parties which are under circumstances where the margins between parties are close.\textsuperscript{15} Perhaps the proposition by Jewell and Patterson might be more applicable to the situation of Liberal Democrats. Although the LD Party's majority status seems to be gradually declining, the party has enjoyed, for most of the last three decades, fairly secure status as a ruling party with a considerable margin. Moreover, the fact that the minorities are divided into several parties might have given the Liberal Democrats a feeling that immediate threats of another force to take over their secure status is not imminent. The feeling of security based on past experiences as a stable majority party is thought to have prevailed among Liberal Democrats. Thus, the party tolerates the members' dissensions.

In addition to that, American scholars are discussing legislators' deviation in legislative vote, while we are concerned about legislators' psychological conformity to the party. The LD Party has control over its members' behavior at least in Diet vote. The party can tolerate its members' dissention if the members are not in a session to

\textsuperscript{15} Jewell and Patterson, \textit{The Legislative Process in the United States}, p. 415.
vote in the Diet.

The size of the party also seems to be related to the party orientation of its members. When the size of a party is too large, it tends to be fragmented into several factions, as we will discuss in the following chapter. In this situation of factional fragmentation, it is difficult for the party leaders to exercise as effective control over all its members.

The Socialists and the Democratic Socialists are, as groups, more inclined toward party conformity than the Liberal Democrats but not so loyal as the Komeitoites. Both parties have considerable number of "conformists" and very few "loyalists." Among the Socialists respondents, the "loyalists" and "conformists" make up 62 percent. Among Democratic Socialist respondents, "loyalists" and "conformists" account for 57 percent. By contrast, the same types of legislators account for only 38 percent of LDP respondents.

The Socialist Party is assumed to have more consensus among its members in ideology than the LD Party has. They, the Socialists, have rather clearly stated Marxian goals and means for the society, although there are some differing and conflicting interpretations about Marxist theory among them. In this sense, the ideological homogeneity among the Socialists is considered lower than among the Komeitoites.

In organizational terms, the Socialist Party is regarded as commanding more control over its members than the
LDP leaders, but not as much as Komeito exhibits. The factional groups called "habatsu" exist also within the Socialist Party, although "habatsu" in the Socialist Party are not as conspicuous and prevalent as those groups within the LD Party. The situation in the Democratic Socialist Party seems to be fairly similar to that of the Socialist Party, ideologically as well as organizationally.

The legislators' party loyalty varies not only across party lines but across chambers. In prescription, the two chambers bear different expectations for their members regarding the "party role." As noted in Chapter 4, American framers in the Japan Occupation had intended to make the House of Councillors more independent and free from party politics to check and control the other house, which was to be the main arena for party politics. This expectation has been expressed ever since by Japanese scholars, opinion leaders, and politicians as well. Is this prescription realized in the parliament today? Table 28 shows us party loyalty of the sample legislators categorized by the chamber.

The figures indicate that the Councillors tend to be more independent and free from party control in their perception than the Representatives as prescribed and expected. However, the difference between the two chambers in this regard is not striking. Compare the number of "the independents" and we see not much difference. Only in the category of "the loyalists" can we see some differences
between the two chambers. We can say that party orientation held by Councillors reflect the chamber's actual situation of party politics. It seems that most Councillors are deeply involved in party politics and firmly committed to their party, although the norm of individual independence still lingers. Party politics has prevailed in the House of Councillors despite the will of framers of the institution.

Finally, as a factor which may predict legislators' party loyalty within each party, one can hypothetically think of the legislators' conservative temperament. Since the concept of conservatism in this study includes such a propensity as authoritarian submission, the legislator's conservatism is assumed to a certain extent to predict loyalty to the party authority. Having examined relationships between legislators' conservatism and their party loyalty, however, I found that the conservatism is not associated with party loyalty.

An explanation for this finding might be the existence and importance of other leadership than party authority within the Japanese political world, i.e., factional leadership. It is suspected that although party appears to command when legislators act overtly and publicly, the factional leadership may possibly exert more authority over legislators on the psychological level. Submissive legislators would give their loyalty and express affection toward factional leadership of the party.
Chapter 14

FACTIONAL LOYALTY

The factional group called "habatsu" is one of the most important factors in understanding political behavior of Japanese legislators. Tsuneo Watanabe even stated that "the history of party politics (in Japan) since the Meiji Restoration has been the history of struggle among 'habatsu.'"\(^1\) Within American legislatures, we can also find some informal groups, which are called social groups, friendship groups, or cliques,\(^2\) but "habatsu" in Japanese politics is different from them in terms of intra-factional structures, the strength of bonds between the leader and followers, its functions, and pervasiveness. Perhaps "habatsu" can be regarded as an uniquely Japanese phenomenon.

As "habatsu" is unique to Japan, its description in more detail may be needed before proceeding to the analysis of the Japanese Diet members' orientation toward it. "Habatsu" is generally understood as an informal group formed on the basis of personal relations of members.\(^3\) "Habatsu"

\(^1\)Watanabe, Habatsu, p. i.


\(^3\)Cf. Kiyoaki Tsuji, ed., Iwanami Shojiten, Seiji, 3rd ed. p. 211.
phenomena are not limited within the political world, but are seen in every circle of Japanese society. Yet, "habatsu" in politics, which we are concerned with in this study, has a particular form and character of its own. It seems that "habatsu" in the politicians' world is the most conspicuous and distinct one among various other "habatsu" in Japan.

The conformation of "habatsu" is primarily based on personal relations between a leader ("ryoshu" or "oyabun") and his followers ("kobun"). "Habatsu" is conceived as an aggregation of these vertical personal relations between "oyabun" and "kobun." The vertical nature of the group formation and weakness of horizontal ties among members are illustrated by the fact that the group will mostly disintegrate when the leader dies or retires. The central role of one particular boss in "habatsu" is also apparent when we consider the fact that "habatsu" is usually called by the name of the boss.

The "oyabun-kobun" relationship is primarily personal, not institutional. The relation is perceived by both "oyabun" and "kobun" not to stem from their formal positions but from more personal commitments between them. Thus, the "oyabun-kobun" relation is strongly flavored with the peculiarly Japanese expectation of inter-personal relations

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which emphasizes emotion and affection, in short, the "giri-ninjo" culture. The "kobun" (follower) would seek the personal favor of his "oyabun" (boss), and devote personal loyalty to the "oyabun," a loyalty which is often uncritical and total. "Oyabun" provides his "kobun" with personal benevolence and demands loyalty in return. The benevolence of "oyabun" and the loyalty of "kobun" are always colored with emotion and affection.

The "oyabun-kobun" relationship is not only personal and emotional but diffused. It does not function for the sake of specific political objectives, but it functions in broad aspects of life. In other words, the personal relation between "oyabun" and "kobun" demands that both individuals are totally dependent upon and committed to each other. For instance, the "oyabun-kobun" relationship would intervene in such private areas as marriage, education, or employment of themselves or their family members. Based on this diffuseness and total involvement, the tie between "oyabun" and "kobun" is expected to become stronger.

One would expect, considering the characteristics of "habatsu" described above, that ideological considerations count little in "habatsu" formation. Within the Liberal Democratic Party, in which the "giri-ninjo" concept is thought to be particularly influential, personal "giri-ninjo" commitments, rather than a common opinion on policies and
political issues, are the primary foundation of "habatsu." Rank and file politicians (often called "jingasa" meaning soldier) adhere to a boss figure mainly because they feel personal obligation and indebtedness to the boss, not because they share a common political goal.\(^5\)

It is generally believed, on the other hand, that ideological considerations work, to a certain extent, in "habatsu" groupings among the Socialists. It seems apparent that different shades of ideology exist among "habatsu" in the Socialist Party. This does not mean, however, that personal "oyabun-kobun" relations are completely absent in "habatsu" formation among Socialists. The fact that the "habatsu" among Socialists, in most cases, is formed around one leading figure,\(^6\) as "habatsu" in the LD Party, makes us speculate that the personal "oyabun-kobun" bonds are significant among the Socialists. After all, the Socialists are also a part of the general culture of Japanese society which prefers emotion and affection where thought appropriate. Even if we should admit that

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\(^5\) It is true that there exist, in the LD Party, some groups which are formed on the basis of political opinions of members. They cut across "habatsu" lines. They do not have primary importance, however, when legislators have to make critical political decisions and actions.

\(^6\) A few small "habatsu" in the JSP, all of which have only two or three members, do not have boss figures in them.
Socialists may not be so deeply immersed in the traditional "giri-ninjo" expectation as are Liberal Democrats, the difference must be a matter of degree. The fundamental pattern of inter-personal relations and group formation of the Japanese people should be common among both Liberal Democrats and Socialists. Perhaps the Socialist Party is not different from the LDP in the sense that the pseudo-family type of "habatsu" is a dominant pattern of group formation within the party, and that the personality of certain individuals has no less significance than the ideology or policy considerations.  

Let us now look at Diet members' orientation toward "habatsu" expressed in our survey. Respondents have been categorized into three types according to their "habatsu" orientation. The three types and their definitions are as follows:

(1) "Faction-favorable": The existence of "habatsu" is preferable.

(2) "Faction-admissive": The existence of "habatsu" is inevitable and admissible, though not preferable.

(3) "Faction-resented": The "habatsu" is bad, and should not be allowed within the party.

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The sample legislators expressed themselves as one of those types, and the result is shown in Table 29.

The "faction-favorable" account for 18 percent of total respondents. It means that the vast majority (more than 80 percent) are not enthusiastic about "habatsu" politics. In spite of the pervasive practice of politics of "habatsu," by "habatsu," and for "habatsu," most Diet members seemingly do not want to concede, in their normative evaluation, that the "habatsu" has certain merits for Japanese politics.

This seems to be a reflection of public opinion, especially of journalism, in Japan. Although there is no systematic examination of Japanese opinion in general on the problem of political "habatsu," it is not a difficult task to find critical comments and articles toward "habatsu" in various publications. "Habatsu no heigai" (vice of "habatsu") has almost become a cliche in Japanese journalism. "Habatsu" has been treated negatively in most articulated opinions in the press. In this negative climate, the appeal of "habatsu kaisho" (dissolution of "habatsu") has been frequently issued by leading politicians, particularly by those in the LDP camp.8

The "faction-admissive," who admit the inevitability of the existence of "habatsu," make up 34 percent of total

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8 About movements to dissolve "habatsu" in the LDP, see: Masumi, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Taisei, pp. 351-369.
respondents. We can see in them a dilemma between normative perception and the recognition of reality. They seem to resent factionalism in principle, but they accept, or perhaps are actually involved in, "habatsu" politics in Japan in a passive way. When we add together "faction-favorable" and "faction-admissible," those who acknowledge the existing "habatsu" phenomena, whether positively or passively, amount to almost half of the respondents. The remaining half think that the "habatsu" should not be allowed.

We must note here that the respondents include members of the Komeito and Democratic Party, in which "habatsu" divisions are weak or non-existent. The Komeito has a monolithic structure, and its members are under the effective control of centralized leadership, as we have seen in the previous chapter. No factional fragmentation has been observed within the Komeito.\(^9\) The Democratic Socialist Party does not have such strong party coherence as that of the Komeito. "Habatsu"-like groups are not totally non-existent within the Democratic Socialist Party. Factional divisions, however, seem not distinct nor serious in the DSP when compared with the LD Party or the Socialist Party.

Responses of Komeitoites and Democratic Socialists

\(^9\) Interview with a Komeito Diet member in the House of Councillors, May 15, 1976, Osaka.
in our survey seem to reflect the actual condition in these parties. The Komeito respondents, as a whole, showed a stern rejection of "habatsu" politics. Eleven of 12 Komeito respondents believe that "habatsu" is an evil practice and should not be accepted. Only one Komeito member answered that "habatsu" was admissible, though not preferable. Democratic Socialists are generally more moderate in their objection to "habatsu." Out of 14 DSP respondents, 10 think that factionalism should not be allowed, but four acknowledge factional groups as inevitable and permissible.

It is the Liberal Democratic Party which is most seriously fragmented into "habatsu." As noted earlier, many observers of Japanese politics have alleged that the LD Party should be considered as a federation of "habatsu." Almost all Liberal Democrats in the Diet, except for a very few senior members ("choro giin" meaning "elder legislators"), belong to one or another "habatsu."¹⁰ Pervasiveness of "habatsu" within the LD Party is notable.

"Habatsu" is not only prevailing but it bears significant practical functions among Liberal Democrats.

¹⁰According to one account, there are nine "habatsu" among Liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives. There are eight "habatsu" among Liberal Democrats in the House of Councillors. Eight "habatsu" among Representatives and eight "habatsu" among Councillors correspond to each other. There are 15 senior Liberal Democrats who do not belong to "habatsu" in the House of Representatives. Ten Liberal Democratic Councillors are non-faction people. Miyagawa, ed., Seiji Handobukku, 191-199.
First of all, "habatsu" performs a critical role in the process of nominating party-endorsed candidates for election. Official endorsement by the party is vital for candidates to get elected to the Diet, as explained earlier. The final deciding power of selecting party candidates is in the hands of the Election Policy Committee ("Senkyo Taisaku Iinkai") of the LD Party. One mostly needs the support of a boss of "habatsu" in order to get nominated as a party candidate in this selection process at Election Policy Committee.\footnote{11} Gerald Curtis suggests that "the first commitment to join a faction is often related to the endorsement problem."\footnote{12} Thus, "habatsu" plays a significant function even in the preliminary stage of the making of Liberal Democratic legislators in Japan.

Second, "habatsu" functions as a collector as well as a distributor of political funds for Liberal Democrats.\footnote{13}


\footnote{12} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 23. One former Diet member said that in an interview, "In most cases, candidates commit themselves to one or another 'habatsu' in the early stage of informal election campaign, well before they became Diet members." Interview with a former Liberal Democrat in the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo. See also Hajime Ishii, \textit{Jiminto yo Dokoe Iku}, pp. 222-235.

A large part of financial contributions, which are mostly from businesses in the case of the Liberal Democratic Party, is given to the leader of "habatsu." Most Liberal Democratic Diet members must secure a considerable amount of money to maintain their own "koenkai" organizations, which should be kept active even during a non-election period, and to conduct a campaign during an election. The purse of the rank and file Liberal Democrat should be supplied with money by his "habatsu" boss, although he himself to a certain extent must make up his funds. Thus, "habatsu" means a vital funnel of funds for most Liberal Democrats, on which they depend to survive.

Third, the "habatsu" functions as an agent through which significant political posts in the executives, party and parliament, such as offices of cabinet minister ("daijin"), parliamentary undersecretary ("seimujikan"), Party General Secretary ("Kanjicho"), Policy Research Council Chairman ("Seimuthosakai kaicho"), Executive Council Chairman ("Somukai kaicho"), other party committee chairman, House Speakers, chairman of the Diet standing committee, et cetera, are allocated among members of the LD Party. The Prime Minister, who is also the president of the LD Party, is formally responsible for the appointment of these posts. He must consult and negotiate with

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"habatsu" leaders in forming his cabinet and in other appointments, because it is obvious that he cannot smoothly exercise his leadership as a Prime Minister and as LDP president without cooperation of other "habatsu" leaders. Thus, rank and file Liberal Democrats can hardly obtain important positions without recommendation of the boss of "habatsu." We have to bear in mind that those posts, especially cabinet offices, represent the highest stake among Japanese politicians, because these titles (not only as a present holder but also as a holder of these posts in the past) will certainly help the Diet member in election. Considering these three functions of "habatsu" in the LDP, we understand that "habatsu" is an essential frame of reference for Liberal Democrats, perhaps practically more immediate and vital than the party organization itself.

Let us see how Liberal Democrats responded in our survey. Thirty-three percent of Liberal Democratic respondents are "faction-favorable." Forty-nine percent are "faction-admissible." Eighteen percent are "faction-resented." A great majority (a little over 80 percent) of Liberal Democrats seem to acknowledge the actual existence of "habatsu" politics within their party, whether

15 Interview with a former Liberal Democrat in the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.
positively or passively. They actually belong to and are dependent on "habatsu," and feel that these conditions are inevitable.

Although a great majority of Liberal Democrats approve the reality of "habatsu" politics in their party, many of them seem to be rather ambivalent toward "habatsu." They refrained from outright support of "habatsu," finding certain normative demerits in factional politics. Nonetheless, they acknowledge the inevitability and permissibility of "habatsu" phenomena. When we reflect upon the critical role of "habatsu" in the LD Party and negative public opinions toward factionalism, the ambivalence and dilemma of Liberal Democrats are understandable.

We should not overlook the fact that Liberal Democrats include a considerable number of "faction-resented" (18 percent of LDP respondents). It should be noticed that resentment of "habatsu" politics is particularly strongly felt on the part of young Liberal Democrats. Some young Turks among the Liberal Democrats seem to demand a remedy for factionalism of their party, although they are involved in factional politics and are compelled to operate within the framework of "habatsu" in reality.

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16 Yomiuri Shimbun, ed., Jiminto Kaizoan, pp. 23-26, 47-48, 87, 301-308, 352. This Book is a compilation of articles written by 11 young Liberal Democratic Diet members.
There also exist several "habatsu" in the Socialist Party. "Habatsu" is not so pervasive among Socialists as among Liberal Democrats. About 25 percent of the total Socialists Diet members do not belong to any faction.17

The Socialists' "habatsu" is slightly different in character from "habatsu" in the LD Party. Functions of "habatsu" as fund-raiser and post-allocator are much less conspicuous among Socialists than among Liberal Democrats. Indeed, there is almost no governmental post to be allocated by the leaders of the Socialist Party. Only when the party elect their own party officials, such as Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-General, et cetera, "habatsu" politics among Socialists become active and salient in the eyes of the public. "Habatsu" among Socialists, without many practical functions to perform, seem to be less autonomous in comparison with that of Liberal Democrats. The Socialists' "habatsu" has the appearance of an ideological group. It is assumed, however, that "habatsu" among Socialists share the basic characteristics of "habatsu" as a group knit by personal "oyabun-kobun" relations, as we have stated earlier. Very likely, "oyabun-kobun" relations among Socialists are established on the basis of both the traditional personal

commitments of "giri-ninjo" and ideological agreement.

Among Socialist respondents in our survey, 14 percent are "faction-favorable," 29 percent are "faction-permissive," and 57 percent are "faction-resented." Socialists in general appear to have more antipathy toward "habatsu" politics than do the Liberal Democrats, but are not so negative as are Komeitoites or Democratic Socialists. Many Socialists will not find practical merits in "habatsu" existence, as certain Liberal Democrats might have done. In principle, Socialists will not regard the ideological differences as a reasonable excuse to legitimize "habatsu."18

Reviewing our findings about differences across party lines as regards the members' factional loyalty and party loyalty, we notice the fact that Diet members in the larger party tend to be more loyal to faction rather than party whereas those in the smaller party tend to be loyal to party and resentful of faction. In other words, it seems that the larger the party is, the more fragmented it is into factions and the more autonomous the faction would be. The smaller the party is, the more effective control it has over its entire membership. A Liberal Democratic Diet member stated as follows:

The size of a group which adequately functions among Diet members is limited, because the leader-

18 Hatakeyama, Habatsu no Kaibo, pp. 133-134.
ship cannot command too large a group of legislators and sufficient personal contacts would fail within too large a group of legislators. When the party is over-sized, the smaller group within the party will take over the place of the party organization. 19

Chie Nakane also comments, regarding the size of group formation in Japanese society, as follows:

The ideal type of effective group is (one) which is organized on two levels (the leader and his followers), with all members linked directly to the leader. When a group becomes larger, with an increased number of levels, effectiveness of the entire system tends to decrease, and a functional core develops at each level. 20

The face-to-face contacts seem essential in order to keep the bonds of group formation in the Japanese subculture of "giri-ninjo," in which affective, personal ties count more than institutionalized relations. A group in which a leader can constantly keep direct, personal contacts with group members must be limited in size.

The Liberal Democratic Party, the largest party which has 280 Representatives and 130 Councillors, is most seriously fragmented into factions. The size of "habatsu" in the LD Party ranges from around 80 to about 15 persons. 21

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19 Interview with a Liberal Democrat in the House of Representatives, July 28, 1975, Tokyo.

20 Nakane, Japanese Society, p. 51.

The average size of Liberal Democrats' "habatsu" might be around 60-70 members. The Socialists, the second largest party which has 118 Representatives and 62 Councillors, followed the LD Party also in terms of the factional fragmentation. "Habatsu" among Socialists ranges in size from about 50 down to two or three members.²² The average size of "habatsu" among Socialists is somewhere around 30-40 members. The existence of small "habatsu" with only two or three members in the Socialists Party suggests that these are primarily based on ideological considerations, since it is hardly expected that they would function effectively in a practical sense.

"Habatsu" fragmentation is not serious within the Democratic Socialist Party, which is composed of 20 Representatives and 10 Councillors. Assuming that the party should grow larger, it is very probable that factional divisions would also become serious in the party. The Komeito is also small in size, being composed of 20 Representatives and 24 Councillors. In the case of the Komeito, it seems that in addition to its small size the strong ideological regimentation among members is effective in preventing fragmentation and factionalism in the party.

²²Ibid., pp. 197-199.
We have been investigating Diet members' orientation toward "habatsu" along party lines. When the party identification is controlled, what is significant in explaining the Diet members' "habatsu" loyalty? One possible factor is conservatism of the member. The conservatism, defined in this study, must indicate a person's submissive inclination toward authority. The authority can be either the party or "habatsu." Our data have suggested, as we have seen in the previous chapter, that conservative legislators are not particularly loyal to their party authority. A hypothesis would be that the conservative orientation is related to factional loyalty.

The relationships between legislators' conservatism and their factional loyalty are given in Table 30. Our data indicate that the "faction-favorable" generally tend to be more conservative while the "faction-rejected" in general are relatively less conservative.

Given that the Japanese culture emphasizes personal ties more than institutionalized relations, the authority to which one is obedient and loyal would be embodied in a person rather than an institution. The party authority is a well-institutionalized, rather impersonal one. On the other hand, the authority of "oyabun" is based on traditional "giri-ninjo" relations. Thus, it is understandable that the conservative Japanese, who conform to
traditional values and seek some sort of group authority
to depend upon, will turn to the "habatsu," or more
specifically to the boss of "habatsu," rather than to
the party.

Our finding in this chapter as a whole seems to
suggest that "habatsu" is a significant frame of
reference for Japanese Diet members, particularly for
Liberal Democrats. As "habatsu" are non-institutional-
ized group, they often operate behind the scene and
escape public attention. However, it is likely that the
political behavior of Japanese legislators, especially
of Liberal Democrats, is often influenced by their
commitments to "habatsu," rather than to the party or
constituents.
Chapter 15

COMMITTEE ROLE AND LEGISLATORS' SPECIALIZATION

Specialized standing committees which cover each of the main fields of government activities have been gradually developed in the legislative institutions of Western European nations and the United States.¹ As the complicated society of modern times demands legislations in which expert knowledges are required, the committee system has now become an essential existence for the working of the legislatures in those as well as many other countries. Specialization of legislative works and legislators themselves seems to be a natural trend in modernized politics.

On the other hand, there has been a long-standing, traditional view that the specialization, expertise, and concern for technical problems are not for lawmakers but for administrators, and proper works for legislators are compromise, adjustment, and integration of conflicting goals and values on broader policy issues.² This view might have certainly checked the increasing division and

¹Blondel, Comparative Legislatures, pp. 66-67.
²Wahlke et al., The Legislative System, pp. 193-194.
specialization of legislative works.

Counteracting this traditional argument for the general nature of legislators, the standing committee system has been gradually institutionalized and utilized as a device to respond the needs of lawmakers in the complex mass society. In the United States, among other countries, the legislative committees have been firmly institutionalized to a degree of almost autonomous entities in the legislature, and been given central and critical roles in legislation. At the same time, specialization and expertise of legislators are thought to be popularly accepted in norms as well as in practice. One account says that the vast majority of American state legislators are perceived as specialists by themselves or their colleagues, and it concludes that specialization appears to be a characteristic of the functioning of contemporary America's legislatures, even if it were not for the tradition.³

What is the situation of standing committees in the Japanese Diet? Formal structures of contemporary parliament in Japan imitated the model of the United States Congress in many respects, and the standing committee system, as noted in Chapter 2, is one of the most

³Ibid., pp. 201-214. The study shows that the percentage of specialists ranges from 71 to 95 percent across legislatures.
significant institutional formats transplanted from the American legislature. In 55 years of the Imperial parliament, no counterpart of the American committee system has been developed, no practice or expectation of legislative specialization has been cherished. How has the transplantation worked in the Japanese Diet after World War II? Aside from the alien influence, we can also imagine that increasing complexity of public activities in contemporary Japan has solicited the development of specialized committees and specialized Diet members. Inquiry has to be made as regards Diet members' perception of the role of standing committees in the Diet. Their perception will tell something of the actual functions of the legislative committees in Japan.

Let us look at Diet members' evaluation of the role of standing committees and specialization of legislators. In our survey, respondents are categorized on this issue into two types: "the committee-oriented" who place the primary importance on their role as committee members; "the committee-disoriented" who regard the committee work as secondary. What we found in our survey is presented in Table 31.

Almost three-quarters of respondents (76 percent) have turned out to be "the committee-oriented." The situation in Japan seems not much different from that in the United States. The transplanted system of specialized
standing committees appears to have taken roots in Japanese parliament, at least in the values of legislators. Adequacy and importance of the system seem to be appreciated by many Japanese Diet members.

The classic view that the generalization rather than specialized expertise should be the nature of legislative performance still persists among a part of Diet members today, according to an inside observer of the parliament.4 Judging from our data, however, the expectation of legislative specialization seems to have prevailed. The predominance of committee-oriented perception appears to be a shared pattern of all parties, although Komeitoites and Democratic Socialists demonstrated their high regard for the committee system more definitely than others.

Is the legislator who has expert knowledge and is publicly recognized as a specialist in a particular field of government a common type among Japanese Diet members? Those who observe Japan's parliament would doubt that such specialists are frequently found among Japanese legislators, although no systematic examination of this question has been conducted. Let us think about the stability of committee membership in the Diet. Most Diet members move from one committee to another fairly often, having experience in several committees which do

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4 Interview with a former Liberal Democratic member of the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.
not necessarily suit their previous background or interest. In these situations, it is hard to expect Diet members to accumulate expertise in a specific field. This is in contrast to the committee system in the American Congress, where the stability of tenure in the committee is remarkable.

One of the major causes of the instability of committee membership might be the lack of seniority system in the parliamentary committee of Japan. Memberships of each committee are allocated to parties according to each party's share of seats in the House. Each party appoints its members to various committees in its own intra-party procedures. Basically, all Japanese parties have a principle that juniors have priority over seniors in committee assignment. This policy has been most effectively practiced in the Liberal Democratic Party. Among Liberal Democrats, freshmen are appointed to the committee they desire, while seniors have almost no choice but the committees which the party leaders assign

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\[5\] Ibid. Exception for this certainly exists. There are some Diet members who stay in a particular committee, in which they have appropriate background, interests, and better knowledges. Ibid.

\[6\] Alan Rosenthal, Legislative Performance in the States, pp. 170-171. He points out, however, that there is high turnover and little stability of committee membership in state legislatures in the United States. Ibid. pp. 170-175.
to them. It is reported that a wider scope of choice is permitted to all members within the Komeito. This difference in policy of committee assignments between the LD Party and Komeito should be related to the difference of committee role perception between Liberal Democrats and Komeitoites, as noticed in our survey.

Officers of the committees are chosen on the principle of seniority in the United States Congress. The independent power of the committee chairman thus elected is considered as the source of autonomy of the committee in legislative politics in the United States. The posts of committee officers in the Japanese Diet, such as committee chairman and directors of committees ("riji"), are allocated among parties on the basis of power balance among parties in the House. Each party appoints its share of committee officers based on its own internal consideration, not on appointees' seniority. In the case of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party,

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7 Interview with a former Liberal Democratic Party member of the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.

8 Interview with a Komeito member of the House of Councillors, May 15, 1976, Osaka.

9 All of the 16 chairmen of the standing committees in the House of Representatives are Liberal Democrats. Among 16 chairmen in the House of Councillors, 9 are Liberal Democrats, 4 are Socialists, 2 are Komeitoites, 1 is a Communist. Miyagawa, ed., Seiji Handobukku, p. 142.
which has most of the significant offices in the legislative committees, bargaining among "habatsu" decides who gets which committee chairmanship or other posts. In these circumstances, the growth of autonomous legislative committees has been blocked. The committee chairman has been usually subjected to the authority of his party, or sometimes even to the interest of particular "habatsu."

Observing the reality of the standing committee system in Japan's parliament, we feel that the committees are not only subject to the party politics but ineffectual in policy-making. Japanese Diet members strictly follow what the party leaders instruct them to do in committees as well as on the floor. The ultimate outcome of committee deliberation is well predictable when one counts the number of members of each party in the committee. The majority's proposal will carry through the committee, if the majority really wants the program. Because of tight party control, the committee hardly functions as a place where substantive negotiation and bargaining are attained among committee members. The committee session is apt to

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10 Bunsei Sato, a Liberal Democrat in the House of Representatives, tells us how things go on in the committee as follows: "An expert legislator in committee operation instructs us, 'You should stand up for vote this time,' or 'You should keep sitting this time.' Many members stand up and sit down like nursery school children under these instructions, not knowing what are the contents of the proposed bill." Yomiuri Shimbun, ed., Jiminto Kaizoan, pp. 202-203.
be brought to a deadlock between the majority who push a bill and the minority who try to stop it.

The Liberal Democrats are in the majority in all standing committees in the House of Representatives. They have either the majority or an even half of the seats in most standing committees in the House of Councillors. They have been in a position to force their will in the committees in almost all areas of government affairs. Therefore, the policy-formulation which takes place within the LD Party is an essential and decisive stage in the entire policy-making processes of Japanese polity.

The Policy Research Council (Seimu Chosa Kai) plays the main role in intra-party policy formulation within the LD Party. The Policy Research Council is divided into 15 committees ("bukai"), each of which has a special subject-matter field corresponding to the legislative standing committee as well as to the administrative ministry. As the number of legislative issues increases, specialization within the Policy Research Council has proceeded, and some of its committees are further divided into sub-committees ("shoiinkai"). These committees and sub-committees in the Policy Research Council of the LD Party appear to have the critical role in substantial policy-making in Japan.

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In the usual pattern of the legislative process in Japan, bureaucrats in the administrative ministry, cooperating with and under the pressure of outside clientele groups, draft a policy program. Members of the committee or sub-committee of the Policy Research Council in the LD Party, which covers the respective field, participate in this stage of program drafting as a contact, intermediary, and coordinator between the interest groups and administrative agency or as advisors to clienteles and bureaucrats. Liberal Democrats Diet members themselves sometimes exercise initiative in drafting a bill, with the help of relevant interest groups and an administrative agency. In any case, members of the committee or sub-committee of the Policy Research Council perform a vital role in making the substance of a specific policy in Japan. What is decided in these committees or sub-committees often becomes the will of the ruling party, and hence, the will of the government.

In order to participate or to exercise initiative in this primary stage of substantial program making, Liberal Democrats are usually required to grasp and understand the specifics of the problem and to obtain sufficient knowledge of the problem. We must note here that all memberships of the committees and sub-committees in the Policy Research Council are assigned on the basis of Diet members' voluntary will without any party dicta-
tion. All Liberal Democrats can choose the committee or sub-committee whose field interests them and suits their background, and they can stay there as long as they want to be there. In this situation, members of these committees and sub-committees will cultivate and accumulate specialized expertise as well as close relations with relevant clienteles and bureaucrats.

It is suspected that the Liberal Democrat tends to attach a considerable significance to his work as a member of the policy research committee of his party. It is highly unlikely, however, that they attach the same importance to their role as a member of the standing committee in the Diet. It is said that Liberal Democrats often perceive deliberation in the standing committee in the parliament as "a nuisance and waste of time since substantive decisions have been made already."\(^\text{13}\) Although some Liberal Democrats may be specialized and have close ties with interest groups and bureaucrats in a particular field, it does not necessarily mean that they are positively oriented toward the legislative committee system.

Let us now look at the actual condition for members

\(^{12}\) Interview with a former Liberal Democratic Party member of the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo. Also see Fukui, *Party in Power*, p. 87.

of the opposition parties. They are usually excluded from the primary policy formulation process in which special interests, the administrative agency, and Liberal Democrats participate to spell out the substance of the program. Members of opposition parties have no formal way to take part in this stage of the policy-making process, which takes place before the program is brought into the parliamentary procedures. Opposition party members are often considered as a negative and antagonistic force by those who participate in this informal policy-making mechanism. A former LDP Diet member stated as follows:

Socialists may ask administrative officials to submit some data concerning proposed legislative programs and ask explanation of the proposal. Administrators will do their best in explanation. In this respect, there exists interaction between Socialists and administrators. But Socialists' amendments or counter proposals are usually unacceptable for either clientele groups, administrators, or us Liberal Democrats. Their aim is always to kill proposals made by the LDP and government agencies. In this sense, relations between Socialists and administrators are not cooperative.14

The Socialists, as one of the opposition forces, seem to have rather bleak relations with administrative agencies. When the policy proposal is brought up in the standing committee in the parliament, there is little

14 Interview with a former Liberal Democrat of the House of Representatives, September 27, 1974, Tokyo.
room left for members of opposition parties to negotiate and bargain. The main substance has already been made, and opposition party members have no way to make an impact on the outcome of the committee deliberation insofar as the Liberal Democrats stand together. The standing committee generally functions as a place where each party shows off its official stands on issues and policies. The actual situation of the standing committee for opposition party members may be summed up in the following comments of Hans Baerwald:

Members of the opposition parties are frustrated by the knowledge that even though committee hearings permit them to delay the LDP from exercising its will, the deliberations themselves have little impact--if any--on the shape of the proposed bill or government policy.15

It is difficult to expect members of the opposition parties to approach the standing committee system in a positive and constructive way.

It is thought that the frustration is most serious among Socialists, who disagree with Liberal Democrats in basic ideology and on most policy issues. Democratic Socialists are also among the minorities, but the ideological discrepancy they have with the Liberal Democrats

is moderate. It is easier for them, than for the Socialists, to find a compromise in the process of standing committee deliberations with the ruling party on various legislative programs. They perceive that there are possibilities for them to bargain with the Liberal Democrats and influence the proposed policy at this stage of the standing committee, even though in a very limited manner.\textsuperscript{16} They seem to have a more optimistic evaluation as to the operation of the standing committee system in the parliament today.

Blunt opposition and frustration on the part of minority party members are not always the case. There are few exceptions. Constructive deliberations on substance and specifics of the policy proposal in the standing committees are possible in the field where "right-left" ideological antagonism is less strong and clientele groups can obtain basic agreements among parties. For example, such constructive discussion is common in the Agricultural-Forestry committee (Norin Suisan Inkai"), according to a member of the committee.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, this seems to be rather exceptional. Judging from the actual performance of the standing committees in contemporary

\textsuperscript{16}Interview with a Democratic Socialist Party member of the House of Representatives, July 30, 1975, Tokyo.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
parliament in Japan, many members of opposition parties, particularly the Socialists, are thought to be dissatisfied with the functions of the institution.

In spite of the ineffectiveness of the standing committee system in reality, the vast majority in our survey expressed high regard and positive orientation toward the committee system. How should we explain the gap between the actual inefficiency of the committee system and legislators' high evaluation of the system? Hans Baerwald thinks that many Japanese Diet members are afraid that expressing little respect for the standing committee system might indicate that they have not learned "all there is to be known about the workings of a parliamentary institutions." 18 I am inclined to agree with his argument. It is thought that Diet members have expressed, in our survey, their expectation and hope, not the recognition of the reality.

Interestingly, Komeitoites and Democratic Socialists seem to place more expectation and hope, than the Liberal Democrats or Socialists do, in effective functioning of the standing committees in the parliament. Liberal Democrats are satisfied with the present performance of the committees as far as they dominate the committees and

utilize them in order to formally legitimize the passage of their own legislative programs. The Socialists also seem to be satisfied, in a sense, with the utility of committee hearings as a place to disseminate information to the public, attacking government proposals and propagating their cases in public, and thus cultivating support among citizens. Perhaps those are the Komeitoites and Democratic Socialists who really wish that their voices will be heard in more effective and autonomous standing committees in the parliament.

We have discussed the variation of legislators' committee orientation across party lines. Aside from party differences, what variable is related to the committee orientation of Diet members? The legislator's perception of the legislative committee system is thought to have something to do with his basic values. The hypothesis is that idealistic legislators tend to be committee-oriented, whereas the pragmatic machiavellian tends to be committee-disoriented. Because the significance of the parliamentary committee system is only in the prescription, and substantive policies are made elsewhere in actuality, machiavellians will recognize little utility in this system and will concentrate their efforts on more pragmatic and efficient policy-making mechanisms available. On the other hand, idealists will attach more significance to the prescribed performance
of the committee system and the fulfillment of the
prescription.

The relationship between machiavellianism-idealism
and committee orientation of legislators is given in
Table 32. Those who clearly marked idealistic inclination
are mostly committee-oriented. Those who are disoriented
toward the committee system turned out to be relatively
machiavellian. The data seem to support our hypothesis.
Chapter 16

EVALUATION OF THE PARLIAMENT

We have so far examined legislators' perception of their role in relationship with each segment of the political system: constituents, interest groups, political party, faction, and administrative agency. We now turn to the legislators' perception of their role in relation to the polity or society as a whole. How do the legislators perceive the role they play in the entire political processes? In other words, how do Diet members evaluate the functions of the parliament in the political system of Japan?

The postwar Constitution of Japan declares:

The Diet is the supreme organ of national power, and the sole institution of law-making in the state.\(^1\)

The prescription by the constitution is one thing, and the actual functions which the Diet performs in political reality is quite another. The role of the legislature is, as Heinz Eulau has suggested, "subject to numerous constitutional requirements and limitations, but within the parameters of the formal institutional context they are forever subject to changing conditions."\(^2\) What are the

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\(^1\) Constitution of Japan, Article 41.

\(^2\) Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System*, p. 245.
real conditions surrounding the parliament in Japan today? How do Japanese legislators perceive these conditions? Analysis of the legislator's evaluation of the legislature is "one way of studying the power position and the functions of the legislature."\(^3\)

American legislators have been often categorized into five types according to their perception in this regard: "ritualist," "tribune," "inventor," "broker," and "opportunist." But this typology seems to have derived from the historical development of an American government which is rather unique.\(^4\) It does not seem to be appropriate for the analysis of Japanese Diet members. In this study, the legislator's evaluation of the parliament is ranked into the following three levels: (1) "high evaluation," in which the Diet is perceived as an institution where most of significant national policies are actually made; (2) "medium evaluation," in which the Diet is regarded as only a checking body for primary policy-making forces who are outside the parliament; (3) "low evaluation," in which the Diet is considered to perform only a ritual of legitimation without any substantial function.

Table 33 shows the distribution of the surveyed

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 246.

\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 246-249
legislators in these three evaluative attitudes. The majority of the respondents (57 percent) expressed "high evaluation" towards the parliament. They agree that the Diet functions as a supreme and ultimate rule-making body in Japan and they themselves are the members of this highest organ of state power, as the Constitution prescribes.

The "high evaluation" seems to be somewhat of an over-estimation of the functions of the Diet, considering the incompetence and ineffectiveness which the Diet has revealed in dealing with the making of national policies of Japan. Why have the majority of respondents expressed such "high evaluation?" This finding seems to indicate that many Japanese Diet members have an inclination to conform with a prescribed norm, especially when the norm is a clearly dictated and publicly accepted one. The supremacy of the Diet in the Japanese polity is a civic course taught most widely among Japanese citizens. It is suspected that many Diet members have tried to make things appear just as prescribed and desired by the public, paying little attention to the reality. If they did not do so intentionally, they might have expressed "high evaluation" of the parliament by wishful thinking. It may often happen that the recognition of the reality is influenced by the normative expectation or hope. Diet members might have taken what the parliament should be
as what it is. In any case, it may probably be safer to count the possibility of these biases which might have inflated the response of "high evaluation" of the functions of the Diet.

Thirty-three percent of respondents expressed "medium evaluation." They think that the role of the Diet is to check and control the excess of power held by true decision-makers. Though they admit that the main substance of policies are made outside the formal framework of the Diet, they believe to a limited extent in the competence and effectiveness of the parliamentarism in the power situations of Japan. Many external observers of Japanese politics seem to have a more or less similar evaluation of the Diet. Hans Baerwald, for one, has said that the Diet exercises its judgments in sorting out policies though in a limited and indirect fashion.\(^5\)

Those who have "low evaluation" account for eight percent of the total respondents. They think that the functions of Japanese Diet are severely limited to a mere ritualistic and procedural role. They are pessimistic or a pathetic regarding the effective functions of the Japanese parliament as a policy-making body. Some of them may be satisfied with their role in this bleak picture of Japanese parliamentarism. It is possible that some

of them prefer a less institutionalized, extra-parliamentary form of policy-making, such as the behind-the-scenes politicking or organized popular movements outside the Diet.

In general, our data tell us that a little over 50 percent believe in the supreme power of the parliament in Japan. Even if we take the bias of wishful thinking into our consideration, it seems that a considerable number of Diet members are optimistic about the role and status of the parliament in Japan. The vast majority (more than 90 percent, when we add up "high evaluation" and "medium evaluation") seem to agree that the Diet performs an effective role, at least as a checking body if not a supreme organ.

Let us look at the differences across party lines found in our survey. Socialists and Democratic Socialists seem more pessimistic than others about the effectiveness of the Diet. Their evaluation is not surprising considering their minority status and the frustrating situations they often face in the parliament. Socialists are more pessimistic than Democratic Socialists. This difference may indicate that the Socialists have more serious ideological cleavages with Liberal Democrats, the people in power, than the Democratic Socialists have.

We find, in our survey, the Liberal Democrats and Komeitoites are fairly optimistic about the competence
of the parliament in Japan. It is understandable that the Liberal Democrats, who have held the executive office and the majority in the Diet for most of the postwar period are satisfied with the status quo and tend to emphasize the effectiveness of the present system.

We must look for some other explanation, however, to account for the optimism of the Komeitoites. It seems worth recalling that Komeitoites in general have placed great significance in the standing committee system in spite of the system's incompetence in reality. One may suspect that the Komeito members generally have a tendency to emphasize the prescribed ideals, caring less about the reality. The Komeitoites might be considered a group of idealistic optimists. This characteristic, though hypothetical, is more or less what this writer has been impressed by judging from conversations with members of the Komeito (not only Diet members but also staff members, local assembly members, et cetera).

When the legislator's majority-minority status is controlled, it seems that the legislator's idealism makes him optimistic in evaluating the role of the parliament. Examination of the relations between the machiavellian-idealistic orientation and evaluation of the parliament is presented in Table 34. The data suggest that those who have high respect for the parliament are rather idealistic people. We have already pointed out, in the previous chapter, that idealists tend to pay high regard to the parlia-
mentary committee system. We can contend that the idealistic legislator tends to perceive the prescribed ideals to be realized in the actual situation, and that they often over-evaluate the effective functions of the parliament and standing committee system, paying less attention to the real performance of the institutions.
Chapter 17

CONCLUSIONS

This study primarily attempted to investigate Japanese Diet members' political role perception as a dependent variable. Inquiry was also made into social background characteristics and general values of Japanese Diet members as independent variables, which were assumed to explain role perceptions of these Diet members.

General Values

One of the methodological problems which I had to cope with was the measurement of the general values of legislators. Three scales, i.e., (1) conservatism-radicalism scale, (2) open-closed-mindedness scale, and (3) machiavellianism-idealism scale, were used in this study. All these three scales have been developed for the measurement of people's attitudes mainly in the disciplines of sociology and social psychology. An attempt was made to apply these three scales to the political élites for the understanding of the legislators' political behavior.

A tentative conclusion as regards the application of these scales to Japanese legislators is as follows:
(1) Legislators' conservatism-radicalism in their basic perspective is closely related to their political "right-left" ideologies. Legislators' inclination on this basic conservatism-radicalism explains, to a certain extent, differences and discrepancies across party lines in Japan.

(2) Machiavellian-idealistic (or pragmatic-idealistic) tendency of legislators in their basic values is considerably related to the manner in which legislators perceive their political role and in which legislators act in a political arena.

The utility of these scales in studies of political élites, in legislative studies in particular, seems to be a future possibility, although the measuring techniques may need further refinements.

Legislative Role in Japan

The main theme of this study has been the investigation of legislators' role perception. This study attempted to investigate the Japanese Diet members' political perception using the theoretical scheme of "role analysis" which has been mainly developed for the analysis of American legislators. This study also attempted to contrast our findings on Japanese legislators with the characteristics of American legislators. Using a
common analytical scheme for studying different countries has obvious merits. It renders the comparison easier, and gives studies a cross-cultural perspective. Testing the utility of "role analysis" across nations seemed an important topic for legislative studies, especially when the legislative studies have become of cross-cultural interest.

Having been applied to the Japanese legislators, however, the "role analysis" seems to have revealed certain limitations for a full understanding of attitudes and behavior of Japanese Diet members. This limitation is considered due to an ambiguous perception of "role" among Japanese, particularly "legislative role" among Japanese politicians. It seems necessary to discuss this problem of "ambiguous role perception among Japanese legislators" in greater detail.

One thing which I have felt throughout the survey and in my analysis is an impression that the basic ideas of the representative assembly, as well as its institutional setups, are somewhat extraneous to Japanese politicians. Parliamentarism was imported into Japan in early Meiji for the first time, and various structures and procedures of Japan's Diet have been formed and reformed imitating models in Europe and the United States. Japanese politicians learned the concepts and workings of a legislative body. It seems important to recognize that they have learned formats of the legislature as something
like foreign textbooks, and that they have not institutionalized the parliament through their own practices. This fact looms large when we consider the crucial role of American framers in establishing the contemporary Diet during the Occupation.

As a result it seems likely that Japanese politicians tend to perceive the functions of various legislative setups as only formalities in textbooks. One may suspect that many Japanese Diet members do not believe that legislative structures and procedures really work as prescribed. Probably they feel that more informal, non-institutionalized practices take precedence.

Provided that these situations exist, some doubts may be expressed about the reliability of the "role" perception of Japanese Diet members. The concept of "role" presumes agreed expectations that prescriptions be substantiated with regard to a certain position. However, when prescriptions have little hope of being carried out in actual practice, as among Japanese Diet members, the "role" has only a superficial meaning. People will perceive their "role" merely as a matter of formality, and will not pay much attention to it when they act. In these cases, people will not be keenly conscious of or concerned about their "roles." Even if they are aware of their "role," their perceptions of it will remain
diffuse and obscure.¹

After having reviewed what we found in questionnaires and interviews, I am inclined to say that many Japanese Diet members do not have clear ideas or serious concern about their own "roles." It seems that investigations into their role perceptions sometimes fail to answer the questions about some significant aspects of Japanese legislators' attitudes in connection with their political performances. "Role analysis" may, therefore, leave certain characteristics which lie deep in Japanese politicians' orientation untouched.

Culture of Japan

For better comprehension of Japanese politicians, certain basic cultural patterns of Japanese society, such as "giri-ninjo" and "oyabun-kobun," have been considered to be significant in this study. The assumption is that the basic cultural pattern of each society, which

¹The lack of "role" concept, or the undifferentiated and ambiguous nature of it, in the thinking of Japanese people is also pointed out by Chie Nakane. "The distinguishing characteristic of the operation of the group is seen to be the absence of clearly differentiated roles for each according to his position. The formal organization of the group assigns to each member a certain prescribed role which he is to perform. However, in practice the informal organization of the group takes precedence, and such formally prescribed roles are not always performed according to expectation. The actual role of an individual does not always or necessarily correspond to his rank or status." Nakane, Japanese Society, p. 31
are often the subject of studies in the fields of sociology and anthropology, are also significant for the study of political élites, including the study of legislators. When the legislative studies have come to possess a cross-cultural perspective, the cultural context of each society seems important because the legislators are a part of the society and legislators' attitudes and behavior are a part of the general culture of the society.

Through an overall observation of Japanese Diet members, it may be suggested that traditional Japanese norms and practices, which are neither well institutionalized nor clearly defined, often have more important implications for Japanese Diet members' political behavior. The formally ascribed "roles" of the legislative offices may be somewhat extraneous to the Japanese political soil, but certain informal norms, practices, and organizations have a long-standing tradition among political élites of Japan or in Japanese society in general, long before a formula for the parliament was imported into Japan. It is likely that today's Diet members are more susceptible to these inherited, indigenous social patterns of Japan rather than to transplanted prescriptions.

One of the norms which has been traditionally expected and valued for inter-personal relations in Japanese society, or within Japan's political world in particular, can be expressed in concepts of "giri" and "ninjo." The norm is neither defined in detail, nor
consciously felt, to say nothing of being formally ascribed as a code of ethics, among contemporary Japanese. "Giri-ninjo" values are thought, however, to have become internalized among Japanese as almost subconscious psychological mechanisms. In contrast to the rather alien values of parliamentarism, this traditional ethic may be a more familiar, well-rooted expectation as practiced among Japanese politicians. Because of its diffuse and omnipotent nature, this attitudinal value seems to have significance in accounting for extensive aspects of Japanese politicians' performance in the Diet.

As one form of inter-personal relations which has been traditionally significant and prevalent in Japanese society, we can observe "oyabun-kobun" relationships. These relations are not based on the "roles" or formal capacities of leaders and followers. Instead, "oyabun-kobun" relations emphasize more informal, personal qualities of leaders and followers and emotional commitments among them, i.e., the leaders' benevolence and followers' loyalty. In short, "oyabun-kobun" relations are based on the "giri-ninjo" ethics. For Japanese politicians, obligations and advantages which stem from informal, personal "oyabun-kobun" relations, rather than rights and responsibilities derived from official "roles," will often guide their conduct in the
Diet.

When "oyabun-kobun" relations take a group formation, it becomes a "habatsu." Although "habatsu" have never been accepted as a formal institution, nobody denies their significance in Japanese politics. My impression after this research is that these informal "habatsu" organizations set a crucial frame of reference, more serious than officially defined "roles," for many Japanese politicians.

We must be careful, however, not to overstate the importance of the traditional and uniquely Japanese factors for describing and explaining the behavior of Japanese legislators. We cannot forget the fact that Diet members work in the formal setting of the parliament, which originated in the West. Even if "giri-ninjo" norms, "oyabun-kobun" practices, or "habatsu" groupings have undeniable impact in Japan's political world, Japanese legislators cannot function totally outside the formal framework of the parliament. It may be said that Japanese politicians in the Diet follow the traditional norms and practices of Japanese society, but try to avoid conflict with the imported prescriptions. In that sense, Japanese Diet members seem to represent an example of a blend of indigenous, traditional elements of Japan and extraneous, transplanted elements of the West.

Thus, this study examined certain cultural patterns of Japanese society, in addition to rather
extraneous "legislative roles," for understanding of Japanese politicians. I must concede, however, that this study has fallen short leaving much ahead for the construction of a satisfactory theoretical scheme which renders exhaustive description and explanation of various unique and universal characteristics of Japanese Diet members. The present paper should consequently be regarded as one minor and tentative step toward a systematic, comprehensive understanding of the Japanese legislature in comparative perspective. Despite all the limitations and shortcomings, I hope it will be a stimulant for further exploration in the study of Japanese politics as well as in the field of comparative theory construction of the legislature.
TABLES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>487 (66%)</td>
<td>64 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillors</td>
<td>252 (34%)</td>
<td>28 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>739 (100%)</td>
<td>92 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats (LDP)</td>
<td>406 (55%)</td>
<td>42 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists (JSP)</td>
<td>180 (24%)</td>
<td>21 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists (JCP)</td>
<td>59 (8%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komeito (CGP)</td>
<td>54 (7%)</td>
<td>12 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists (DSP)</td>
<td>30 (4%)</td>
<td>14 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10 (1%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>739 (100%)</td>
<td>92 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Questionnaire Distributed</td>
<td>Questionnaire Returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komeito</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialists</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>Total Number of Representatives</td>
<td>Number of Newcomers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st (1890)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (1892)</td>
<td>300 166 (55%)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (1894)</td>
<td>300 147 (49%)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (1894)</td>
<td>300 103 (34%)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th (1898)</td>
<td>300 173 (58%)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th (1898)</td>
<td>300 77 (26%)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th (1902)</td>
<td>376 233 (62%)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th (1903)</td>
<td>376 97 (26%)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1904)</td>
<td>379 109 (29%)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1904)</td>
<td>379 187 (49%)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1912)</td>
<td>381 185 (49%)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (1915)</td>
<td>381 156 (41%)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (1917)</td>
<td>381 136 (35%)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (1920)</td>
<td>464 248 (53%)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Status</th>
<th>Number of Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>7 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>70 (80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>10 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = number of respondents; NA = Number of no answer)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>CGP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician, Bureaucrat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Entrepreneur</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer, Doctor, Teacher,</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Worker</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer, Fisherman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar Worker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>37*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(No ID: no party identification; N: number of respondents; NA: number of no answers. *One LDP member and a JSP member answered that their fathers had been engaged in two types of occupation.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Upbringing</th>
<th>Number of Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Village (population under 1,000)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Town (population 1,000-100,000)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City (population above 100,000)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Area</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N: number of respondents; NA: number of no answers)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Background*</th>
<th>Number of Legislators in Universe</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>DSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>20 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>55 (14%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>320 (79%)</td>
<td>15 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate</td>
<td>6 (1%)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ID</td>
<td>5 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>406 (100%)</td>
<td>30 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Primary level education means elementary school (6 years) and junior high school (3 years). Secondary level education means high school (3 years). Chuto-gakko in prewar days, which was 6 years education following 6 years elementary school, was counted as secondary level education. College level includes more than 2 years higher learning after secondary level education. In all levels, only those who completed the level are counted.
### TABLE 8 AGE OF LEGISLATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Legislators in Universe</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>DSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Career</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>DSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Civil Servant</td>
<td>128 (31)</td>
<td>2 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Politician</td>
<td>130 (32)</td>
<td>9 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician's Secretary</td>
<td>32 (8)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Entrepreneur</td>
<td>68 (17)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>16 (4)</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>10 (2)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>19 (5)</td>
<td>3 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>29 (7)</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Worker</td>
<td>34 (8)</td>
<td>10 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar Worker</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
<td>5 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainer</td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union Official</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>14 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Organization Leader</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Organization Leader</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Official</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Identification</td>
<td>24 (6)</td>
<td>2 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Most legislators experienced more than two types of careers, many of them two or three types, and even four types. The number in parenthesis indicates the percentage of legislators.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivating Force</th>
<th>Number of Legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents or relatives</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Leaders</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Leaders</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leaders</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Thirteen persons cited two kinds of motivating force, two persons cited three kinds, 64 persons cited one, and the remaining one person did not answer this question.*)
TABLE 11 LENGTH OF SERVICE IN THE DIET BY PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term (Year)*</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>CGP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>JCP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (2.5)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>94 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (5.0)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>75 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (7.5)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4(10.0)</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>13</td>
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(*The length of period for which the Representative has served is calculated on the basis that the average length of one term for the Representatives is 2.5 years in postwar Japan.)
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<th>JCP</th>
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<td>19 (8%)</td>
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<td>6 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (36)</td>
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| N                      | 34  | 13  | 12  | 19  | 1   | 1  | 80 | 109   |
| NA                     | 8   | 1   | 0   | 2   | 1   | 0  | 12 | 1     |

| Total                  | 42  | 14  | 12  | 21  | 2   | 1  | 92 | 110   |
| Mean                   | 34.41 | 31.15 | 32.75 | 26.42 | 31.84 | 36.57 | |
| SD                     | 4.64 | 5.18 | 4.84 | 4.90 | 5.70 | 5.75 | |

(N: number of answers; NA: number of no answers; SD: standard deviation.)
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>5.95</td>
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## TABLE 14  DOGMATISM OF LEGISLATORS AND ORDINARY CITIZENS

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</tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>26-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
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<td>5.15</td>
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</table>

(N: number of answers; NA: number of no answers; SD: standard deviation)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores of Mach.</th>
<th>Legislators</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>4</td>
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| N             | 31  | 14  | 11  | 17  | 2     | 1     | 76    | 107   |
| NA            | 11  | 0   | 1   | 4   | 0     | 0     | 16    | 3     |

| Total         | 42  | 14  | 12  | 21  | 2     | 1     | 92    | 110   |
| Mean          | 25.03 | 23.00 | 24.46 | 25.47 | 34.50 | 24.00 | 24.91 | 31.34 |
| SD            | 7.44 | 4.48 | 4.50 | 5.67 | 9.50  | 0.00  | 6.48  | 7.62  |

(N: number of answers; NA: number of no answers; SD: standard deviation)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Career</th>
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<th>SD</th>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>JSP</td>
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<td>5</td>
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(*All 77 legislators analyzed here have district constituencies. Legislators with national constituency, who accounted for 15 samples in this survey, were excluded.*)
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
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(chi-square: 9.22; degree of freedom: 3)

*Among 92 Diet members in our survey, 15 Councilors who have national constituency were not included in this analysis.*
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(The t-test score of significance of the difference between district-oriented legislators and nation-oriented legislators is 1.726.)
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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(Chi-square: 3.698; degree of freedom: 1. Chi-square of 3.841 is required to reject the null hypothesis of "no association" at the 0.05 level of probability. At the 0.10 level, chi-square of 2.706 is required.)
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(Chi-square test is avoided here since the expected frequencies in each cell are small. H.M. Blalock, Jr., op. cit., p. 285.)
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<td>23.36</td>
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<td>6.43</td>
<td>6.23</td>
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(The t score of the difference-of-means test between delegates and trustees is 2.175. With the degree of freedom of 73, the critical region at the significance level of 0.05 for a two-tailed test is t>2.000.)
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<th>Number of Legislators</th>
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<td>Facilitator</td>
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<tr>
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<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</table>

(N: number of answers; NA: number of no answers)
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<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Resister</th>
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(*Professional career includes lawyers, doctors, teachers, and journalists.  
**Among 92 respondents, 7 legislators cited three types of occupation as their main previous career, 21 cited two types, and 59 cited one type of job. Five legislators did not answer the question.*)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>JSP</th>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>35 (39%)</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>--</td>
<td>12 (13%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12 (43%)</td>
<td>35 (39%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21 (34%)</td>
<td>11 (39%)</td>
<td>32 (36%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>6 (10%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>11 (12%)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>28 (100%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faction-admissive</td>
<td>19    4   1   6    --  1   31 35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faction-resented</td>
<td>7     10  11  12   2  --  42 47%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42    14  12  21   2  1   92</td>
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TABLE 30 RELATIONS BETWEEN CONSERVATISM AND FACTIONAL LOYALTY

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<th>Faction-admissive</th>
<th>Faction-resented</th>
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<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
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<td>1</td>
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Number of answers

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<td>12</td>
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Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>42</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>92</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Mean

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Standard deviation

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<td>31   12   10   15   2  --      70 (82%)</td>
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<td>8    2    1    4   --  --      15 (18%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Score of Each.</td>
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<td>Committee-disoriented</td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of Answers | 59 | 13 | 4 | 76 |
| No Answer         | 11 | 2  | 3 | 16 |
| Total             | 70 | 15 | 7 | 92 |
| Mean              | 24.46 | 28.69 | 24.91 |
| Standard Deviation| 6.44 | 6.85 | 6.48 |

(The t-test score of significance of the difference between "committee-oriented" and "committee-disoriented" is 2.255. With the degree of freedom of 83, the critical region at the significance level of 0.05 for two-tailed test is t > 2.000.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>CGP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>No ID</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answers</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>89 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>--</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 34 RELATIONS BETWEEN MACHIAVELLIANISM AND EVALUATION OF PARLIAMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scores on Mach.</th>
<th>Evaluation of Parliament</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>21-25</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | Answers | 44 | 27 | 5 | -- | 76 |
|                | No Answer | 8 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 16 |

|                | Total | 52 | 30 | 7 | 3 | 92 |
| Mean           | 23.46 | 26.22 | 30.60 | 24.91 |
| Standard deviation | 6.86 | 4.65 | 7.01 | 6.48 |

(The t score of significance between "high evaluation" and "medium evaluation" is 1.824. The t score between "high evaluation" and "low evaluation" is 2.222).
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1  RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
(Translated from original in Japanese)

Questionnaire

Dear Sir:

This questionnaire is addressed to you with the purpose of obtaining data for research which will attempt to analyze the Japanese legislators as a political group consisting of individuals. The research is strictly academic without any political, partisan, or journalistic interests. The resulting analysis will be used for a doctoral dissertation which is to be submitted to the Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, Texas, United States of America.

Answers to this questionnaire are confidential. To guarantee anonymity and secrecy, the completed forms would be mailed to me without any identification in the envelopes provided. I would like to request that you be frank in filling out this questionnaire.

Questions here concern your personal background, your personal opinions about the role of a legislator, and your opinions on various aspects of life. There are no questions concerning matters of policy or political issues. We are interested in legislators as individual human beings.

Legislators to whom questionnaires are addressed were selected from the entire memberships of both the upper and lower houses by random sampling method. I understand that completing this questionnaire will require time and that your duties already place you on a tight schedule. However, I believe that this project may well contribute to the better understanding of the Japanese legislative system as well as Japanese polity itself. I would like to ask you kind cooperation in this project.

Since you may be interested in the results, a summary of this study will be made available to you, in some way, when the study is completed.

Kyoji Wakata
Department of Political Science
Rice University
General Instructions

Please try to answer every question. Even if you cannot find an item which applies to your answer perfectly, please try to find the most adequate one. When you think all the items are unapplicable to your case or are inadequate to your opinion, please skip the question.

Please put X mark on ___ line following adequate items. If you want to check the category of "other," please specify your case. Check one item or as many items as apply according to instructions in parentheses for each question.

Please do not inscribe your name on this questionnaire.

Part 1: Personal Background

1. Age. (Check one.)
   Below 30
   31-40
   41-50
   51-60
   61-70
   71-80
   Above 81

2. Sex. (Check one.)
   Male
   Female

3. Your father's main occupation. (Check as many as apply.)
   Politician, higher civil servant
   Farmer, fisherman
   Blue collar worker
   White collar worker
   Business entrepreneur
   Lawyer, doctor, teacher, journalist
3. Continued
   Landlord
   Other (Specify.)

4. Your parents' economic status. (Check one.)
   Upper class
   Middle class
   Lower class

5. Place where you spent most of your life until you were about fifteen years old. (Check one.)
   Small village (population below 1,000)
   Rural town (population 1,000-100,000)
   City (population above 100,000)
   Tokyo area

6. Level of education you received. (Check one.)
   Elementary school
   Secondary school
   College or university
   Graduate school

7. Your main career, professional as well as political, before becoming a Diet member. (Check as many as apply.)
   Politician on local level
   Higher civil servant
   Farmer
   Fisherman
   Blue collar worker
   White collar worker
   Business entrepreneur
   Lawyer
   Doctor
   Journalist, teacher
   Leader of students' political organization
7. Continued
   Official of labor union
   Official of political party
   Secretary of politician
   Other (Specify.)

8. Forces which made you finally decide to
   run for the Diet. (Check as many as apply.)
   Your parents or close relatives
   Local leaders
   Party leaders
   Leaders of interest groups
   Other (Specify.)

9. Party membership (Check one.)
   Liberal Democratic Party
   Socialist Party
   Communist Party
   Komeito
   Democratic Socialist Party
   Other

10. Chamber of the Diet (Check one.)
    House of Representatives
    House of Councillors

11. Type of constituency. (Only members of the
    House of Councillors are asked to check.)
    National constituency
    District constituency

12. Years of holding office in the Diet (Check one.)
    Less than 5 years
    6-10 years
    11-15 years
12. Continued
   16-20 years
   21-25 years
   26-30 years
   more than 31 years

Part 2: Opinions on the Role of a Legislator

1. Which is more agreeable with your opinion about the interest of the constituent district? (Check one.)
   a. The legislator should always respect his constituent district's interest. ___
   b. The legislator should place the national interest ahead of his district's interest. ___

2. Which is most agreeable with your opinion about interest groups? (Check one.)
   a. The legislator should represent the interest of certain interest groups. ___
   b. The legislator can represent the interest of certain groups on some issues ___
   c. The legislator should be indifferent to any particular interest groups. ___

3. Which is most agreeable with your opinion about party discipline? (Check one.)
   a. The legislator should always abide by his party's leadership. ___
   b. The legislator can criticize his party's leadership only within intra-party procedure. ___
   c. The legislator can criticize his party's leadership publicly, but should always follow party's decision in voting in the Diet. ___
   d. The legislator should always behave according to his own beliefs and judgments. ___
4. Which is most agreeable with your opinion about factions?
   a. Factional groups are preferable. ___
   b. Factions are inevitable, if not preferable. ___
   c. Factions within the party should not be allowed. ___

5. Which is more agreeable with your opinion about the role of the legislator as a standing committee member? (Check one.)
   a. The legislator should regard committee works as the primary duty of his office, and should cooperate with respective administrative agencies. ___
   b. For a legislator, being a member of standing committees is a secondary role. ___

6. Which is most agreeable with your opinion about the role of the Diet in Japanese politics? (Check one.)
   a. In Japanese politics, the Diet is an institution where most of significant national policies are actually made. ___
   b. In Japanese politics, the Diet checks the excess of power of primary decision-makers, who are leaders of the party in power. ___
   c. In Japanese politics, the Diet is an institution which performs only a ritualistic function. ___

7. Which is more agreeable with your opinion in regard to your relationship with constituents? (Check one.)
   a. The legislator should always respect the opinions of his constituents and follows their demands. ___
   b. The legislator should follow his own judgment and belief after constituents once trusted him to serve as their representative. ___
Part 3: Opinions about General Subjects

The following are opinions on various topics about life. Do you agree with them or not? Please put an x mark on the adequate place. Check one for each opinion.

1. However the science has developed, we can not totally disregard superstitious things such as fortune-telling.

2. There is no point in keeping a promise if it is to your advantage to break it.

3. In a heated discussion, I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

4. It is righteous and manly to have chivalrous attitude of always helping the weak and opposing the powerful.

5. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.

6. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

7. It is not proper behavior for a man who is the head of a family to do kitchen work or baby sitting.
8. It is safe to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when it is given a chance.

9. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes

10. We must revive and preserve traditional customs and values, such as respecting seniors within the family as well as in the society in large, which have declined since World War II.

11. It is foolish to take a big risk unless you are willing to go the limit.

12. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place, because most people just don't give a damn for others.

13. To correct the messy state of modern society, powerful leadership is needed.

14. Never trust anyone who has a grudge against you.

15. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
16. We can not totally eliminate the possibility of war because the inclination to fight is deeply rooted in human nature.

17. Fundamentally, it is human nature never to do anything without an eye on one's own advantage.

18. There are a number of people I had come to hate because of the thing they stand for.

19. Young people today are competent only in their debates, not in their actions. They should be quieter and work harder.

20. It is better to compromise with existing evils than to go out on a limb in attacking them.

21. In a discussion I sometime interrupt others too much in my eagerness to put across my own point of view.

22. If your honor becomes marred, you should exert all your efforts to vindicate yourself.

23. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.

24. In times like these, a person must be very selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>The smoking and drinking of liquor by women, which began in Japan after World War II, is a desirable trend.</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>Friends should be chosen with an eye toward what they might be able to do for you.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Because everybody was born with different levels of ability and talents, it is natural that those who have greater competence take statuses superior to those of others with less ability and talent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Never tell anyone the real reason why you have done something unless it is useful to do so.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems do not really understand what is going on.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Notes for Questionnaire

Part 1 concerns legislators' social background. Part 2 concerns "role perception," and Part 3 concerns "general values."

Items 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25, and 28 in Part 3 measure "conservatism." Only item 25 is a negative question, which means that the answer of "disagree" scores the highest points of conservatism. Other questions of this group, being positive, are rated reversely from item 25.

Items 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, and 29 in Part 3 measure "machiavellianism." All questions in this group are positive.

Items 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, and 30 in Part 3 measure "dogmatism." All questions in this group are also positive.
APPENDIX 2 TWELVE ITEMS IN KIDO'S AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE

(Items with * mark indicate those which are put in the questionnaire in this study. The remaining two items are dropped ones.)

*1. However the science has developed, we can not totally disregard superstitious things such as fortune-telling.

*2. It is righteous and manly to have chivalrous attitude of always helping the weak and opposing the powerful.

*3. We have to revive and preserve traditional customs and values, such as respecting seniors within the family as well as in the society at large, which have declined since World War II.

*4. It is not proper behavior for a man who is the head of a family to do kitchen work or baby sitting.

*5. The smoking and drinking liquor by women, which began in Japan after World War II, is a desirable trend.

6. Koreans are, in general, a race who often tend to be violent and not industrious.

*7. To correct the messy state of modern society, powerful leadership is needed.

*8. We can not totally eliminate the possibility of war because the inclination to fight is deeply rooted in human nature.

9. Although Japan was defeated in the Pacific War, the ideal of "Greater Asia Community" which was a philosophical base of the war was not wrong as an ideal.

*10. Young people today are competent only in their debates, not in their actions. They should be quieter and work harder.

*11. If your honor becomes marred, you should exert all your efforts to vindicate yourself.

*12. Because everybody was born with different levels of ability and talents, it is natural that those who have greater competence take statuses superior to those of others with less ability and talent.
APPENDIX 3 SIXTY-SIX ITEMS OF THE DOGMATISM SCALE
BY ROKEACH AND HIS ASSOCIATES

*1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

*2. Communism and Catholicism have nothing in common.

3. The principles I have come to believe in are quite different from those believed in by most people.

4. In a heated discussion people have a way of bringing up irrelevant issues rather than sticking to the main issue.

5. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

6. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

7. While the use of force is wrong by and large, it is sometimes the only way possible to advance a noble ideal.

8. Even though I have a lot of faith in the intelligence and wisdom of the common man I must say that the masses behave stupidly at times.

*9. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

10. There are certain "isms" which are really the same even though those who believe in these "isms" try to tell you they are different.

11. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

*12. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

*13. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

*14. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

*15. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.
*16. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

17. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

*18. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

*19. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

*20. In a discussion I sometimes interrupt others too much in my eagerness to put across my own point of view.

*21. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

*22. My hardest battles are with my self.

*23. At times I think I am not good at all.

*24. I am afraid of people who want to find out what I'm really like for fear they'll be disappointed in me.

25. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakspeare.

26. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

27. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

28. If I had to choose between happiness and greatness, I'd choose greatness.

29. It's all too true that people just won't practice what they preach.

30. Most people are failures and it is the system which is responsible for this.

*31. I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically.

32. It is only natural for a person to have a guilty conscience.

*33. People say insulting and vulgar things about me.
*34. I am sure I am being talked about.

35. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

*36. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

*37. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

38. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life become meaningful.

*39. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

*40. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

41. To compromise with your political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

42. When it becomes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

*43. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

44. To compromise with our political opponents is to be guilt of appeasement.

45. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

46. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than those in the opposing camp.

47. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

48. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

*49. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

*50. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
51. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

*52. I sometimes have a tendency to be too critical of the ideas of others.

53. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

54. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respect.

55. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

56. There's no use wasting your money on newspapers which you know in advance are just plain propaganda.

57. Young people should not have too easy access to books which are likely to confuse them.

*58. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

59. It is by returning to our glorious and forgotten past that the real social progress can be achieved.

60. To achieve the happiness of mankind in the future it is sometimes necessary to put up with injustices in the present.

61. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

*62. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

63. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

64. There is nothing new under the sun.

65. To one who really takes the trouble to understand the world he lives in, it's an easy matter to predict future events.
66. It is sometimes necessary to resort to force to advance an ideal one strongly believes in.

(Items with * mark are 27 items selected by Ogushi for her Japanese sample. She replaced Rokeach's items 1 and 2 by her own item, "Male and female have nothing in common." Also she combined items 12 and 13 into 1 item.)
APPENDIX 4  PRE-TEST FOR THE DOGMATISM SCALE

Oguchi's 25 items scale for dogmatism was addressed to a sample composed of 31 Japanese college students (12 males and 19 females).

For each item, the sample students are divided into 3 groups: a quarter of the sample (8 students) who scored the higher points of dogmatism in that particular item, a half of the sample (15 students) who scored the middle points, and another quarter of the sample (8 students) who scored the lower points. The t-test score of significance of the difference between the upper quarter and lower quarter for each item is calculated, and the t-test score indicates the discriminatory power of the item.

The followings are Oguchi's 25 scales items, and scores in parentheses designate discriminatory power (t-test score) of the item. Those items with * mark are finally selected for the dogmatism scale in this study.

1. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems. (-1.000)

2. My hardest battles are with myself. (-1.764)

*3. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying. (-3.528)

*4. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived. (-3.771)

5. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts. (-2.118)

*6. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than ideas he opposes. (-3.372)

7. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong. (-1.930)

8. I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically. (-1.564)
9. At times I think I am no good at all  

*10. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place, because most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

11. I am sure I am being talked about.

*12. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

13. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

14. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

15. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

16. Male and female have nothing in common.

*17. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

*18. In a discussion I sometimes interrupt others too much in my eagerness to put across my own point of view.

*19. In times like these it is often necessary to be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

20. People say insulting and vulgar things about me.

21. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

*22. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.
23. I sometimes have a tendency to be too critical of the ideas of others. (0.327)

24. I am afraid of people who want to find out what I'm really like for fear they'll be disappointed in me. (-1.610)

*25. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on. (-5.000)
APPENDIX 5  PRE-TEST FOR MACHIAVELLIANISM SCALE

The scale by Christie and Geis, which has 71 items, was administered to 98 Japanese college students (67 males and 31 females). The discriminatory power of each questioning item has been calculated in the same manner as in the pre-test for dogmatism scale, which is explained in Appendix 4.

The following are Christie and Geis's 71 items, and scores in parentheses indicate discriminatory power of items. Those items with * mark are finally selected for the machiavellianism scale in this study.

1. A white lie is often a good thing. (-2.137)
2. General speaking, most people do not truly believe in anything new until they have experienced it. (-1.075)
3. If one is morally right, compromise is out of the question. (-0.181)
*4. There is no point in keeping a promise if it is to your advantage to break it. (-3.828)
5. Any normal person will stand up for what he thinks is right even if it costs him his job. (-3.226)
6. No one has a right to take his own life. (-3.163)
7. Every time one problem is avoided another arises. (-0.680)
8. Nature has so created men that they desire everything but are unable to attain it. (-3.362)
9. Once a way of handling problems has been worked out it is best to stick with it. (-0.005)
10. Most men like to tackle new and difficult problems. (-1.362)
11. Anyone who completely trust anyone else is asking for trouble.  (-3.745)

12. There is too much of an emphasis upon practical subjects in our schools and not enough attention is paid to the moral teachings of great historical figures.  (-0.848)

13. If people could understand one another's position, there would be no good reason for human problems.  (-1.505)

14. It is best not to let people think that you like them when you really can't stand them.  (-1.870)

15. It is easy to persuade people but it is hard to keep them persuaded.  (0.604)

16. If there is any chance that a recommendation might backfire, be very cautious in recommending anyone.  (-2.278)

17. You really can't tell much about a man by the company he keeps.  (-1.660)

18. It is a good policy to act as if you are doing the things you do because you have no other choices.  (-3.407)

19. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean moral life.  (-2.844)

20. Some of the best people have some of the worst vices.  (-2.736)

21. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.  (-5.535)

22. It is foolish to take a big risk unless you are willing to go the limit.  (-3.853)

23. The power of one man over another is rarely the result of trickery or force.  (-0.827)
24. The world would be in much better shape than it is if people acted upon basic ethical principles. (-1.640)

25. One should take action only when sure it is morally right. (-0.688)

26. The best way to settle an argument is for people to forget their differences of opinion as to what is right or wrong and to compromise on the basis of facts. (-1.007)

27. Humanity not only is of no service but is actually harmful. (-0.286)

28. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless they are forced to do so. (-3.149)

29. It is wise to flatter important people. (-3.044)

30. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. (-2.384)

31. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death. (-3.280)

32. Even the most hardened and vicious criminal has a spark of decency somewhere within him. (-3.442)

33. Once a decision has been made, it is best to keep changing it as new circumstances arise. (1.087)

34. Most people don't know what is best for them. (-0.770)

*35. Never trust anyone who has a grudge against you. (=5.817)

36. One who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived. (-0.795)

37. It is best to give others the impression that you can change your mind easily. (1.296)
38. History teaches no moral lessons; evil and good have always been present. (-3.618)
39. Most men will fight back when insulted. (3.290)
40. Generally speaking, it is best to say what you think even if it bothers others. (-3.034)
41. When you come right down to it, it's human nature never to do anything without an eye on one's own advantage. (-3.926)
42. It is better to compromise with existing evils than to go out on a limb in attacking them. (-4.137)
43. A good government should keep the people peaceful and obedient. (-2.582)
44. Most men are brave. (-0.780)
45. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. (-4.723)
46. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught. (-2.103)
47. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. (-1.278)
48. Men are quicker to praise than they are to blame. (1.029)
49. It is better that a hundred criminals go free than one innocent man should be unjustly punished. (-0.489)
50. It is easier to take advantage of someone you love than someone you fear. (-1.585)
51. Barnum was very wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every minute.)
52. It is safer to be feared than to be loved. (-2.212)
53. Most people are basically good and kind. (-3.272)

*54. Friends should be chosen with an eye toward what they might be able to do for you. (-5.622)

55. Deceit in the carrying on of war is praiseworthy and honorable. (-2.662)

56. The great majority of men are more satisfied with what seems true than with the truth. (-3.533)

57. If a friend asks for advice it is smart to think about what will happen if you advice backfires. (-2.504)

58. Men resent an injury at the hands of others more than one that is self-inflicted. (-1.771)

59. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reason for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. (-3.271)

60. It is possible to be good in all respects. (-2.606)

61. It is not a good idea to bring pressure upon people if you want them to do something. (0.178)

62. The most important thing in life is winning. (-2.634)

63. Most men forget more easily the death of their father than the lost of their property. (-1.704)

64. One should upset as few people as possible while making decisions. (1.921)

65. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with everyone. (0.849)

66. Just about anything one does can be justified after it is done. (-1.698)

*67. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. (-3.849)
68. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. (-2.285)

69. The most important thing in history is who won and how the winning came about. (-1.700)

70. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest. (-3.313)

71. Most people are more concerned with making a good living than with satisfying their conscience. (-2.875)

(Item no. 51 is omitted from the questionnaire used for the pre-test, because the content is not understandable for Japanese.)
## APPENDIX 6 DATA CONCERNING SEX, AGE, EDUCATION, AND OCCUPATION OF SAMPLES OF ORDINARY CITIZENS

### (Sex)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Number of Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>97 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>110 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (Age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 40</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>50 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>31 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>6 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>7 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 81</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>110 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (Education)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Number of Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Level</td>
<td>19 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Level</td>
<td>37 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Level</td>
<td>23 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Level</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>31 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>110 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 6  Continued

(occupation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number of Samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Civil Servants</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar Worker</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar Worker</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisherman</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total  113*

(*Three persons cited two kinds of occupation.*)
BIBLIOGRAPHY


