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THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

R. Neal Tannahill

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

R. Neal Tannahill

VOLUME II
To those whom I love: Bill, Fred, Rick and Nancy, Doug, Pat, Nancy, David, and, of course, my parents. Without them, this would be meaningless.
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PART ONE

Diversity in Western European Communism
The communist movement in Western Europe has never been monolithic if by that we mean massive uniformity. In the beginning, although Western European communist parties may have been designed from the same pattern, they were not cut from the same cloth. The fledgling parties born in the wake of the Great War may have shared a similar revolutionary élan and a vague image of the coming socialist order, but they differed in strength, origin, leadership, ideological heritage, organization, and position vis-à-vis the social, political, and constitutional order in their respective countries. Their unity, which in the decade following the founding of the Third International in 1919 became monotonous if not perfect, was based largely on the prestige, leadership, and support, both financial and psychological, of the Soviet Union.

In the half century since the early days of the Comintern, the unity if not uniformity of the communist movement in Western Europe has passed into diversity and even division. Centrifugal forces have triumphed over centripetal ones, and one can no more speak of a single Western European communist movement than one can speak of a single world movement. Today, in both their domestic and international positions, the communist parties of the Western European democracies are characterized by an accelerating diversity.

The development and dimensions of this diversity are
the subject of Part One. In Chapter I, we focus on the historical place of each of the parties in their domestic environments, specifically, their strength, alliance strategies, domestic positions, and organizational patterns. Then, we turn in Chapter II to a comparison of each party's historic posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and international communism.
CHAPTER I

DIVERSITY IN THE DOMESTIC ARENA

Despite a similar Marxist-Leninist heritage, the communist parties of Western Europe's democracies differ significantly in their domestic positions and postures. First, they vary in size and strength. Some are major parties; others are little more than impotent sects. Second, different parties have adopted different political strategies. Some seek a united front with forces of the noncommunist left; others pursue a broad alliance with centrist as well as leftist elements; still others opt to go it alone and refuse all possible alliances. Third, the communist parties of Western Europe present different conceptions of the "Road to Socialism." Some have come to see it in revisionist or even reformist terms, while for others, the road is still paved with Stalinist verities. Finally, the parties diverge organizationally. Some cling to the norms of democratic centralism; but others have introduced subtle and not-so-subtle innovations.

Size and Strength of the Parties

The communist parties of Western Europe vary in size and strength from great mass parties to minuscule sects with virtually no political influence. The largest and most advantageously placed communist party in Western Europe today is the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Although
the PCI was comparatively weak at its founding in 1921 and suffered a long period of illegality under the Fascists, since World War II it has grown into the most powerful party of the Italian left. Its membership is estimated at more than one and a half million and, unlike other communist parties in Western Europe, it has increased its percentage of the vote at each legislative election since 1945, winning 27.2 percent of the votes and 179 of 630 seats in the last Chamber of Deputies election in May, 1972. (For figures on membership and election statistics, see the tables in the appendix.) Moreover, in the regional elections held in June, 1975, the PCI won 32.4 percent of the vote, placing a close second behind the perennial party of government, the Christian Democrats, who gathered 35.6 percent of the ballots.\(^1\)

The PCI has transformed its electoral success into a considerable measure of political power at the local and regional levels. Alone or in alliance with the Socialists and other parties of the left, the PCI has for decades controlled about 20 percent of the nation's smaller cities and towns, and about 30 percent of the larger cities and provinces, primarily in Northern and Central Italy,\(^2\) including Bologna since 1945,\(^3\) Genoa since April, 1975,\(^4\) and Naples since September, 1975.\(^5\) What is more, the recent regional balloting left the communists alone or with their allies in control of the majority of major
Italian cities. Consequently, the Italian Communist Party is the greatest single political employer in the country for all those posts below the level of the national government.\textsuperscript{6}

Not only does the PCI exert strong electoral and political influence, but it also makes its presence felt in other areas of Italian life. The party maintains or dominates a large number of mass organizations, including a peasant group, women's organizations, peace associations, friendship associations (the Italian-USSR Friendship Association, for example), and Italy's largest trade union federation, the CGIL.\textsuperscript{7} Finally, the PCI operates a number of industrial, commercial, and cooperative enterprises including a large garment concern which maintains retail stores in most Italian towns.\textsuperscript{8}

Although it has not enjoyed the steady increase in electoral support that the PCI has, the French Communist Party (PCF) since World War II has regularly won one-fifth to one-fourth of the French electorate and succeeded in winning for itself a major place in the French political milieu. In the beginning, the PCF was staked with a large portion of the old Socialist Party's electorate and organization, a base that steadily declined throughout the 1920s. With the Popular Front in the mid-1930s, however, the party came into its own electorally and in membership terms and has been one of the major parties of France ever
since. In the most recent National Assembly elections in March, 1973, the PCF took 21.3 percent of the vote on the first ballot and claimed 73 of the 490 assembly seats at stake. (See tables in the appendix.) Also, in the presidential election of May, 1974, Francois Mitterand, the candidate of the united left (the Communists, Socialists, and Left Radicals) came within two percentage points of defeating Valery Giscard d'Estaing and capturing the presidency.\(^9\)

In local elections, too, the PCF has registered some significant successes. The Communists in 1971 governed alone or in coalition about 1100 municipalities (of 38,000) with 787 PCF mayors and more than 20,000 city and town councillors. Of the cities with greater than 30,000 population, the Communists controlled 45 compared to the Gaullists' 30 and the Socialists' 40.\(^10\)

Like the Italian Communist Party, the PCF maintains an extensive network of closely-knit auxiliary organizations--part of what Annie Kriegel calls a "countersociety."\(^{10}\) It maintains or dominates numerous student, youth, women's, and peasant groups as well as the CGT, France's largest trade union federation. Like the PCI, the French Communist Party owns a number of businesses and industries, and controls some producer and consumer cooperatives.\(^{12}\)

The third major communist party of Western Europe and the only Western communist party currently holding a place
in the national government is the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). Founded in Moscow in 1918 after the Finnish Civil War, the SKP was an illegal party in Finland, but, nevertheless, succeeded in laying a base for itself among Finland's working class and in the labor movement. Since its legalization following the signing of the armistice ending the Continuation War with the Soviet Union in 1944, the SKDL, the electoral front dominated by the SKP, has consistently won about one-fifth of the popular vote and one-fifth of the seats in legislative elections. In Finland's most recent election in September, 1975, the SKDL won 19 percent of the popular vote and 40 (of 200) parliamentary seats.

In 1966, the SKP parlayed its parliamentary strength into a place in the Finnish government by entering a coalition with the Social Democrats and Agrarians. Although the SKP left the government in 1971, in late 1975 negotiations were begun in Finland directed at the formation of a multiparty government including the Communists to deal with the nation's worsening economic situation. On November, 30, 1975, the negotiations culminated in the formation of a national emergency government including the Communists, Social Democrats, Centrists, Liberals, and the Swedish People's Party. 13

Like its French and Italian counterparts, the Finnish Communist Party has a firmly established place in the
economic, social, and political life of its country. It runs a number of commercial enterprises and maintains an accompaniment of auxiliary organizations. Also, the SKP exercises considerable influence in the trade union movement although it must take a back seat to the Social Democrats in Finland's major trade union federation, the SAK.

The Icelandic Communist Party has also achieved significant electoral successes since World War II.\textsuperscript{14} Established as an independent party in 1930, the People's Alliance (PA), once the communists' electoral front, now the party itself, began rather slowly, but since 1940 has won between 13.9 and 19.5 percent of the votes in every parliamentary election. On two occasions since 1950, the PA has participated in a government, from 1956 to 1958, and from 1971 through August, 1974.

The Icelandic Communists have also made their mark below the national level. The party wins its share of the vote in local elections, holding seats in several municipal councils including Reykjavík council and along with the Progressives, the PA controls the Icelandic Federation of Labor. Despite its impressive domestic posture, the PA remains a small party in absolute terms (about 2200 members) in a small country.

The only other Western European communist party with a reasonable claim to major party status is the Communist
Party of tiny Luxembourg (PCL). After its founding in January, 1921, the Luxembourg Party struggled to gain an electoral footing and did not win its first parliamentary seat until 1937. Presently, however, the PCL enjoys a firm if modest electoral position. In the most recent parliamentary election in May, 1974, the PCL won 10.4 percent of the popular vote and elected 5 of the Legislative Assembly's 59 deputies. Although since World War II the PCL's strength has varied considerably from a low of 2.5 percent in a partial legislative election in 1948 to a high of 16.9 percent in another partial election in 1951, it has averaged about 10 or 11 percent of the vote and about 10 percent of the seats in the legislature.

The PCL has also won a place below the national level of government. In local politics, the party has registered some successes, particularly in urban areas. Together with the Socialists, the PCL controls the municipal government of the country's second largest city, Esch-zur-Alzette, whose mayor is a party member. The PCL also enjoys a measure of influence in Luxembourg's largest trade union federation, the United Federation of Free Trade Unions. Nevertheless, as with the Icelandic Communist Party, the small absolute size of the PCL (about 500 members) and the relative insignificance of Luxembourg as a nation relegate the party to the role of being little more than a medium size fish in a quite small pond.
Although no other communist party in Western Europe can seriously pretend to major party status, a number have on occasion exercised a modicum of political influence as minor parties in multiparty systems by finding themselves in the position of holding the swing votes in an evenly balanced parliament. The Swedish Communist Party (VPK) illustrates both the prospects and problems of such a position.

Following both the 1970 and 1973 elections in Sweden, the VPK held the balance of power between the Social Democratic forces of Prime Minister Olof Palme and the bourgeois opposition and although it was able to exercise some indirect influence, the VPK found itself on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the Social Democratic government refused to consult or negotiate with the Communists while on the other if the VPK chose to vote against the government on a crucial issue, the party would be opting, in effect, to throw out a socialist government and replace it with a conservative one. This the Communists did not want to do. Consequently, the Social Democrats controlled the situation. As one Western diplomat put it, "It's a case of the dog wagging the tail, to uncoin a phrase." Unfortunately for the VPK, its leverage, such as it was, came to an end in 1974 when the Social Democrats reached an alliance of sorts with the Liberal Party thus freeing themselves from reliance on the Communists.
Despite recent fortuitous circumstances, the VPK has never found itself well-placed electorally. Only in the highly favorable atmosphere of the last months of World War II did the Swedish Communist Party receive as much as 10 percent of the vote. In no other election before or since has it registered more than 7 percent with its usual total more often approaching 3 or 4 percent. In Sweden's last parliamentary election in September, 1973, the VPK gathered 5.3 percent of the popular vote winning only 19 of the Riksdag's 350 seats.

The VPK's national role has generally been minimal. Organized labor is the stronghold of the rival Social Democrats with the Communists controlling no national unions and only a tiny minority of local unions (about 80 of 9000 with many of these concentrated in the remote North). Ironically, the party has even had trouble maintaining control of its own youth affiliate which has been shaken by defections to ultra-leftist groups.

Another party which despite its small size has recently enjoyed political influence because of opportune circumstances is the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP). Prior to 1973, the NKP had not held a seat in the Storting since 1961 and not won more than 6 percent of the popular vote since 1945. Indeed, since its emergence as an independent party in 1923, the NKP has won more than 3 parliamentary seats only twice, in 1945 (11) and in 1924 (6). In the
September, 1973 elections, however, the NKP together with two other left-wing groups won 16 seats, one of which is held by the NKP's chairman, Axel Larsen. With the bourgeois parties holding 77 seats and the other parties of the socialist left (including the powerful Social Democrats) controlling 77 seats, the NKP thus finds itself in the propitious position of holding the balance of power. Recent setbacks in municipal and regional elections in September, 1975, however, may indicate the electoral surge of the far left is ebbing. 19

Despite its recent good fortune, the small (estimated 2800 members) Norwegian Communist Party is far from mighty. 20 Not only has the party failed to record many electoral successes, but it has been unable to stake out a place for itself in the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions or, like the Swedish Party, to be sure of the allegiance of its youth affiliate.

Like the NKP, the Danish Communist Party (DKP) has experienced an electoral revival. In December, 1973, the DKP won 3.6 percent of the vote and elected 6 deputies to the Folketing in an election marked by heavy protest voting against the established parties. 21 In the most recent election in January, 1975, the party continued its resurgence increasing its representation to 7 seats. 22 Except for the 1973 and 1975 elections, however, the DKP's electoral record has been far from glorious. Until
1932, the DKP had never won representation in parliament. Then, after a high point in 1945 when the communists won 12.5 percent of the vote, the party went into a steady decline and from November, 1960 until the end of 1973, the party was unable to elect a single deputy or to win more than 1.4 percent of the vote. In spite of the DKP's recent electoral gains, the party has failed to establish a strong position in the trade union movement.

Although it is relatively small (5000 members) and is unrepresented on the 44-member Council of States (the upper house), the Swiss Communist Party (the Partei der Arbeit, or PdA) has consistently won representation in the larger house of the Swiss legislature. Since 1922, the party has won between 2 and 7 seats in the legislature except for the 1943 election when the party was illegal. In the last election of October, 1975, the PdA won 4 seats, approximately maintaining the relative position it has held in the 200-member legislature for the last 25 years. Also, in local politics, the party holds a smattering of municipal and cantonal offices. Despite its modest but steady electoral performance, the PdA has little influence in Switzerland.

Like the PdA, the Dutch Communist Party (CPN) has consistently won representation in the legislature while failing to make a significant impact on national politics. From 1918 to 1937, the CPN won from 1.2 to 3.4 percent of
the vote. Since the end of World War II, the party has won from 2.4 to 10.6 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections and presently holds 7 of the 150 seats in the lower chamber of the legislature. Despite its electoral foothold, the CPN's efforts at achieving political influence have been disappointed. Its front organizations are declining in significance and it has made few inroads into organized labor.\textsuperscript{25}

The Belgian Communist Party (PCB), like its Dutch and Swiss counterparts, has maintained a small but steady electoral base. Since 1925, the PCB has won at least one seat in parliament every election with a high of 23 in 1946. More typically, however, the party's parliamentary delegation has been between 2 and 9 members. At the last parliamentary election in March, 1974, the PCB elected 4 representatives and won 3.2 percent of the vote. Also, like the Swiss and Dutch parties, the PCB's influence on national affairs is peripheral at best. In municipal and provincial politics, the party has won only a fraction of the seats and in the major trade unions, the PCB's influence is slight.

The other communist parties of Western Europe's democracies are minuscule with little present hope of winning national parliamentary representation. With a declining membership of barely 300, the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI) is hardly worthy of the name. Initially created
in 1921, the party vanished and had to be reformed in 1933. Throughout its history, the CPI has been a political failure. Its electoral organization is practically non-existent and except for some residual influence in the "official" IRA and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, it is politically sterile.

The German Communist Party (KPD) was once the pride of Western European communism, but under the Bonn Republic it is only a shadow of its former self. During the Weimar Republic, the KPD held as many as 100 seats (in 1932) and was regarded as Western Europe's strongest communist party. In 1933, however, Hitler outlawed the KPD and proceeded to dismantle its organization and liquidate its leaders and militants. After the war, the party demonstrated a residue of strength in the first election under the Bonn Republic in 1949, but then declined losing Reichstag representation entirely in 1953. Another blow fell on the party in 1956 when it was declared unconstitutional. Since refounded in 1968 as the legal DKP, the West German Communist Party has participated in Reichstag, land, and municipal elections but with a notable lack of success, electing only a smattering of representatives in local legislatures. Not everything, however, is dark for the DKP. It has rapidly increased its membership and is currently gaining in influence among the young, among trade unionists, and among left-wing members of the Social
Democratic Party.

Another party with negligible electoral strength but some influence in other areas is the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). The party has never been a success electorally. Not since 1950 has the CPGB even held a seat in parliament and never has it won more than .5 percent of the popular vote.\(^{27}\) Nevertheless, the party has gained influence disproportionate to its size in the trade unions, particularly in the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers and the Transport and General Workers Union.\(^{28}\)

In the last twenty years, the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) has declined from minor party status to that of a dwarf party. Although before 1945, the party failed to win representation, from 1945 to 1959, the KPÖ held from 3 to 5 seats in the Nationalrat. Not since 1959, however, has it held a seat in the Austrian parliament and at the last election in October, 1971, the party was able to amass only 1.4 percent of the popular vote. What is more, the party has proved its weakness in recent local elections and is isolated from the Austrian working class.

Alliance Strategies

The communist parties of Western European democracies also differ in the alliance strategies they employ vis-à-vis other political parties. One of the broadest and most innovative of these strategies is that of the Italian
Communist Party. In early 1921, the PCI was born out of a split in the Socialist Party at Livorno and despite a growing Fascist threat, the Communists and Socialists struggled for position rather than uniting against the Fascists. Subsequently, the Fascists won power and began to move against opposition parties finally outlawing the Communists and other opposition parties in the late 1920s. While underground, the Communists and the Socialists found cooperation to be a necessity if they were to survive. 29

After the war, the PCI continued emphasizing cooperation with anti-fascist forces, entering the government with the Socialists, Christian Democrats, and other parties of the anti-fascist resistance. In May, 1947, however, the PCI was excluded from De Gasperi's government and the long era of Christian Democratic rule began. Despite this and the shadow of the Cold War, the PCI was never isolated and never sought isolation. In the 1948 election, the Communists and Socialists fought the election on a popular front basis and although Christian Democrats and Social Democrats left the CGIL, the major Italian labor federation, the Socialists and Communists continued their union cooperation. Additionally, although Socialists and Communists refrained from future electoral alliances, the two parties continued to collaborate in local and regional governments, together running several Italian cities including Bologna. 30
In 1956, the Hungarian crisis and the events of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) placed a severe strain on the relations between the PCI and its electoral allies. Thereafter, Pietro Nenni, the Socialist Party chief, began to disengage his party from the Communist sphere and the threat of a Christian Democrat-Socialist government that could perhaps isolate the PCI became more and more plausible. In 1959, the Socialist Party Congress abrogated the Unity of Action Pact with the PCI and by 1963, the threatened "opening to the left" became a reality as the Socialists opted to join Aldo Moro's Christian Democratic government (a move that split the Socialist Party). At the local level and in the CGIL, however, Socialist-Communist cooperation was still too beneficial to both parties for either to break it off.\textsuperscript{31} Then, in 1966, the unification of the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties again threatened to isolate the PCI.\textsuperscript{32}

By 1969, however, it was apparent that the PCI would not be isolated. The Socialist Party split again into its original components and the "opening to the left" had not harmed the Communists as much as some had anticipated. Since then, cooperation between the Italian Communists and other left-wing parties in the CGIL has continued and negotiations for a united "non-political" labor federation including Communists, Socialists, and
Catholics are taking place. In local and regional politics, recent electoral gains by the left, particularly the PCI, have increased the number of cities and regions in which left-wing administrations are in power. 33

In recent years, the Italian Communist Party has offered a proposal for a broad alliance of "democratic forces" in Italy that goes beyond standard left-wing political alliances. Following the September, 1973 military coup against Chile's socialist president Salvador Allende, Enrico Berlinguer, the secretary-general of the PCI, proposed a "compromesso storico" (historic compromise). The lesson to be drawn from Chile, Berlinguer argued, was that even if the left were to win 51 percent of the electorate, effective government would be impossible without the support of substantial segments of the middle class--in Italy, Catholics and Christian Democrats. Therefore, it would be necessary for the PCI and Socialist Party to reach an understanding, a "compromesso storico," with those forces in support of a common "democratic" program. 34

Although there have been few indications of an early formation of a Grand Coalition among Communists, Socialists, and moderate Catholics at the national level in Italy, there have been signs of movement at the local level. One indication of this movement has been the continued and lively dialogue between the PCI and the Church in Italy. 35 A second sign is the continued progress toward
trade union unity and cooperation. 36 Most significant, however, are the phenomena of open cooperation between Communists and Christian Democrats in certain local governments. In Venice, PCI, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Christian Democratic city council members for a time worked together on an urban renewal project and openly and formally agreed to regular consultations. Although the national organization of the Social Democratic Party and then the Secretary of the Christian Democrats, Fanfani, torpedoed the short-lived association in February, 1975, similar cooperation is continuing in a number of smaller towns including Avellino, a city northeast of Naples, and in Agrigento in Sicily. 37 What is more, in late 1975 the Christian Democratic Party in a vaguely worded statement announced its intentions of engaging in a "dialogue" with the Communist Party offering the possibility of informal consultations between the two parties on issues of major national importance. 38

In France, the PCF has had a more ambivalent relationship with the Socialists. While the Italian Communist Party after the 1920s pursued a collaborative policy with other leftist parties, the French party, like many other parties in Western Europe, closely followed the fluctuations of the Comintern line.

By the end of 1921, it was apparent that the Bolshevik Revolution was not going beyond the borders of Russia and
to consolidate their position and end their isolation, the Soviet leaders adopted a united front policy. Consequently, after its birth in 1924, the PCF followed, somewhat reluctantly (and unsuccessfully), a united front policy with the Socialist rump. At the Fifth Comintern Congress in June-July, 1924, the line on alliances was unchanged. United front from above, that is, alliances with socialist parties, was condemned and a policy of united front from below, alliances with individual socialists and groups of socialists over the heads of their leaders, was endorsed.39

By 1928, Comintern policy was modified again to include a "class against class" program.40 Socialists became "social-fascists" for the communists and in the 1928 election the PCF refused to withdraw any of its candidates on the second ballot in order to help better placed parties on the left against right-wing opponents. In short order, then, the PCF became isolated in both the political and labor union arenas.41

With the rise of fascism in Europe and an apparently growing fascist threat in France itself in the early 1930s, there was considerable pressure on the left for a united front and in the PCF from the base for an end to class against class tactics, a pressure which the party leadership rejected.42 Instructions from Moscow, however, did bring a reversal in policy and in 1934, the Central
Committee of the PCF mad a direct offer to the Socialists to organize a common action against fascism.\textsuperscript{43} After a number of rhetorical exchanges and more Comintern intervention, the PCF agreed to all of the major Socialist demands and the two signed a Unity of Action Pact in July, 1934,\textsuperscript{44} and agreed on electoral cooperation in the 1934 election.\textsuperscript{45}

Proclaiming the slogan of la main tendue (the extended hand), the Communists expressed a willingness to cooperate with Radicals as well as Socialists\textsuperscript{46} and following the 1936 election, a popular front government was formed by the Socialists and Radicals and supported by the PCF. In the early days of the Popular Front, the PCF fully cooperated with the Blum government in parliament and moved on the industrial front to calm labor unrest.\textsuperscript{47}

Despite occasional disagreements and sporadic labor unrest, the French Communists continued in their support of the Front through the first half of 1937 and pledged loyal support for the Chautemps government after the Blum cabinet fell on June 21, 1937.\textsuperscript{48} Later, however, the PCF opposed Chautemps' program of economic and political stability and in 1938, Communist-supported strikes led to the fall of a second Blum government.\textsuperscript{49} For a time, the PCF supported the new Daladier government, but conservative economic policies and then the Munich Agreement\textsuperscript{50} saw the Popular Front formally dissolved on November 10, 1938.
Although no longer supporting the government, the Communists in 1938 were not isolated. Communists and Socialists were still cooperating on the union front and the continuance of an electoral agreement was likely.

Again, however, events outside of France set the tone for Communist alliance strategies. In August, 1939, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, to the consternation of the West, signed a nonaggression pact. The Communists' support for the agreement was seen as a treasonous action and a campaign of repression was begun against the PCF including the banning of L'Humanité, the party's national newspaper.51 After the Soviet attack on Poland on September 17, 1939, the PCF took a defeatist approach to the war and subsequently it was declared illegal and its elected officials were suspended.52

In June, 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union and the French Communists were again able to pursue a united front policy which they did with great success during the Resistance and into the post-liberation period. After the war, the Communists entered the government for the first time in a broad popular front including the Socialists and the MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire).53

In May, 1947, the PCF broke with the government ostensibly over the issue of wage increases, but, in reality, because of the international situation. Then, following the founding of the Cominform in October, 1947, the party
rejected the idea of collaboration with the Socialists.\textsuperscript{54} With a new trades union split in late 1947 and an undisguised Socialist hostility toward the PCF, the Communists were once again beginning a long winter of political and union isolation.\textsuperscript{55}

With the ending of the Cold War and the birth of the Fifth Republic, the isolation of the Communists began to come to an end and the PCF again made overtures to the Socialists for cooperation. In 1962, the PCF unilaterally ordered a number of its candidates to stand down on the second ballot in favor of better placed Socialists. The Socialists responded in kind and in 1966 the Socialists and Left Radicals (F.G.D.S.), and the Communists reached a formal agreement for second ballot withdrawals in the 1967 elections. After the election, cooperation was extended to the National Assembly where the F.G.D.S. and PCF voted together on all major issues\textsuperscript{56} and negotiations were begun on a possible common program.\textsuperscript{57} In June, 1972, these negotiations were climaxed with the signing by the PCF, the Socialists, and a group of Left Radicals of a 60,000-word common program.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, in both 1966 and 1974, the Communists agreed to support the Socialists' candidate for president, Francois Mitterrand, on the first ballot.\textsuperscript{59}

Although relations between the Communists and Socialists in France have traditionally waxed and waned,\textsuperscript{60} since
the 1974 presidential election, the alliance has appeared increasingly shaky.\textsuperscript{61} Sporadically, a polemical battle is being waged with the Communists accusing the Socialists of undermining left unity by failing enthusiastically to support Communist candidates on second ballot elections\textsuperscript{62} and by disloyally yearning to join a coalition under Giscard. On their part, the Socialists have had to defend themselves from charges that they are inviting problems similar to those experienced by Portugal.\textsuperscript{63}

In Norway, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the NKP mirrored the Comintern shifts in alliance strategies. With the beginning of World War II, however, the NKP supported the democracies against Germany, but corrected the policy by September 15, 1939.\textsuperscript{64} Although the party was initially confused over the line to take on the German invasion of Norway, the party soon called for an end to resistance,\textsuperscript{65} a move which general opinion regarded as treasonous.

As in France, after June, 1941, the Communists turned again to a popular front strategy in the resistance and after the liberation entered the first postwar coalition government. The Labor Party (DNA) and the NKP even initiated talks toward unification, but the Communists soon retreated.\textsuperscript{66}

Again, as in France, the coming of the Cold War led to the political isolation of the Norwegian Communists.
They were excluded from the government and the strong Labor Party rebuffed the NKP at every turn. 67

In the 1950s, the alliance policy of the NKP took a zigzag course first moving in a united front direction and then taking an anti-DNA posture. 68 By the 1960s, the party was trying to break out of its isolation by making popular front bids both to the DNA and the Socialist People's Party (SF), but all offers were rejected. Communist suggestions for an electoral alliance in the 1965 elections were ignored, but the NKP opted unilaterally to field candidate lists only in certain areas. 69 Within the NKP, however, there was deep division over these popular front tactics 70 and the leadership, in essence, allowed each provincial organization to make up its own mind. 71 Nevertheless, both the SF and the DNA refused cooperation and the NKP remained isolated.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the party fluctuated between calls for left-wing unity and allegations against the other leftist parties, particularly the DNA. 72 Talks were begun in 1971 with the SF toward cooperation on an electoral basis, but the SF rejected any alliance. 73

In 1973, however, the NKP ended its long political isolation by forming the Socialist Electoral Alliance along with the SF and a splinter faction of the DNA. 74 Although still only an electoral alliance, the SF has proposed turning the front into a united political party
and the NKP has agreed to try this course.\textsuperscript{75}

In Iceland, although a communist faction was formed in the Social Democratic Party in 1921, it did not secede until 1930. Then, in 1937, when Communists pushed for a popular front, the Social Democrats refused, but their left-wing split to join the Communists in an electoral front.\textsuperscript{76} After Iceland won its independence in 1944, the Communists participated in a coalition government. Although an election defeat in 1947 and Cold War tensions sent the Communists into opposition, they were not isolated. They gained influence in the labor unions and after the 1956 election again entered the government\textsuperscript{77} where they stayed until December, 1958.

In the 1960s, the Icelandic Party continued its alliance policies. In 1963, it entered the elections allied with the small National Defense Party who later merged with the Communists as the party converted its electoral front into the party organization. The ending of the front in 1968 split the Marxist left into 3 segments: the PA, a pro-Moscow party, and a socialist people's party. Following the 1971 election, however, the Communists along with the larger Progressive Party and the small socialist people's party, the Organization of Liberals and Leftists (OLL), joined to form a left-wing government.\textsuperscript{78} Since July, 1974, however, the Progressives have formed a government with the Independence Party, the OLL has shrunk to
a miniature, and the PA is back in opposition.

In Ireland, the CPI, re-founded in 1933 after an abortive start in 1921, followed an early united front policy, but with no success. After a more hard line posture during the Cold War period, the party has attempted futilely to organize a broad popular front.

Communist alliance strategies in Switzerland closely followed Comintern policies before World War II, but the PdA was unable to win united front cooperation with the Socialists. After the war, the communists again campaigned unsuccessfully for unity of action, but became more standoffish during the Cold War. Since the late 1950s, the Swiss Communists have endorsed an alliance policy, but with only marginal success at the cantonal and local levels.

In Luxembourg, the PCL's alliance strategies have been quite similar to those of the French Communist Party. Like the PCF, before World War II, the position of the PCL fluctuated with that of the Comintern. Then, after the war, the party entered the government only to leave in March, 1947 with the beginning of the Cold War. Also, like the PCF, in recent years, the PCL has campaigned hard for collaboration with the Socialists, but with much less success. Although the two parties are in coalition in Esch-sur-Alzette, the Socialists have rejected offers for national cooperation.
Similarly, in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Great Britain, recent offers of cooperation have been rejected by larger social democratic parties. In Belgium, the early PCB followed the Comintern line and after the liberation became part of a Socialist-Liberal-Communist coalition government until March, 1947, when the party began a long period of isolation. Although the party adopted a unity of action policy in late 1954, the PCB has had little success outside of local specific issues and some occasional union cooperation.

The history of the alliance tactics of the Communist Party of the Netherlands is much the same with the exception that the latter 1950s' move toward collaboration was met with resistance on the part of a large number of the party's union militants who refused to merge their organization with that of the Socialists. Recently, the CPN has broadened its alliance appeals calling in 1972 for collaboration with "all democrats and progressives," but, in any case, the CPN's repeated pleas for cooperation have fallen on deaf ears.

In Sweden, the early history of the Communist Party was marked by deviation as a series of leaders sought a rapprochement with the Social Democratic Party (SAP) rather than following the Comintern's class against class line. After intervention by Moscow, the Swedish Party eventually became more conformist and in 1947-1948 adopted
the new Cominform hard line against the Social Democrats. In the 1950s, the party again returned to united front tactics even withdrawing some candidates in favor of the SAP in some districts in 1958.\textsuperscript{89} Nevertheless, the Social Democrats have adamantly and persistently rejected all offers for collaboration.

The British Communist Party has also failed in its many attempts at trades union and electoral collaboration with a larger socialist party. In the 1920s, the CPGB's appeals for cooperation were rebuked unmercifully. Although the British Communists hesitated to adopt the class against class line, a Comintern-directed purge reduced the party to subservience and conformity to the International's instructions. After World War II, the CPGB again followed alliance strategies parallel to those of Moscow. In recent decades (at least since 1956), the British Party has campaigned for cooperation with the Labour Party, especially in the union arena (except for periods following particularly stinging Labour rebukes), but with virtually no success.\textsuperscript{90} Although as individuals, communists have won positions in a number of unions, neither the Trades Union Council nor the Labour Party recognize the CPGB in any official role.\textsuperscript{91}

In Finland, the SKP's position toward the Social Democratic Party (SDP) has been ambivalent. After its founding in exile in 1918, the SKP initially took a hard
line toward the "collaborationist" SDP. Unable to field its own candidates legally and unable to compel its supporters to abstain, the SKP found itself having to support Social Democrats electorally in a number of elections while at the same time working to capture the SDP's youth organization and to win a position in the unions. Also, from 1925 on, although the communists controlled the major union federation, the SAJ, they compromised with the SDP on numerous occasions to maintain leftist unity.\textsuperscript{92}

In 1928, the SKP turned to the Comintern's hard line posture and ranted against the SDP. Subsequently, the SDP established its own union movement and, more significantly, the SKP was ill-placed to withstand growing fascist influence in Finland. After the adoption of the popular front program by the International, the SKP followed suit and slowly began reestablishing its position.\textsuperscript{93}

After the war, the SKP, now legal, hoped the SDP would join it in a common electoral front, the SKDL. Only individual branches of the Social Democrats did, however, and the SKDL became an electoral and parliamentary organization for the Communists rather than a connecting link between the two left-wing parties. In national politics, the SKP entered a broad coalition government of Communists, Social Democrats, and Agrarians, and before the 1945 election, the SDP narrowly rejected an offer for electoral cooperation.\textsuperscript{94} Then, in April, 1945, the
SKP joined in the "Big Three Agreement" with its coalition partners. Finally, in local elections in late 1945, the SDP and SKP agreed to an electoral committee.95

In local elections in late 1947, however, the Social Democrats refused alliance. Then, after heavy losses in the 1948 election, the SKP left the government. Although the Finnish Communists were now isolated politically and opposed the minority SDP government, they still supported the principle of a broad coalition of democratic forces. Throughout the Cold War period, the SKP endorsed the idea of a broad coalition government including Communists, Social Democrats, and Agrarians while at the same time struggling rather bitterly with the SDP in the union arena. On their part, the Social Democrats proved to be the party most adamantly opposed to SKP participation in government.96

In 1966, the Communists finally succeeded in having the Big Three Coalition restored as they entered the government along with Agrarians and Social Democrats.97 In the next year, the communist-dominated union federation and the SDP union organization united under a single governing board.98

Although this was what the SKP had been campaigning for, in March, 1971, the Communists withdrew from the cabinet in large part because of an internal opposition to the united front policy. Within the SKP, there developed a large, organized "Stalinist" faction who oppose cooper-
ation with the Social Democrats. Consequently, the party's efforts toward rapprochement with the Social Democrats and left have been on-again, off-again, and the recent decision to enter a national emergency coalition was reached only with some hesitation.

There is no ambiguity, however, in the positions of the Austrian, Danish, and West German parties who have all come to oppose the united front. In Austria, the early KPÖ closely adhered to the International line and enjoyed participation in a postwar provisional government until 1949. As with other parties in Western Europe, in the late 1950s and 1960s, the KPÖ adopted a united front program even opting in 1966 to support Socialist candidates in 24 of the country's 25 electoral districts. In response, the Socialists took a vigorously anticommunist line. Since the disaster of the 1966 policy and the post-Czechoslovakia 1968 factional division in the party, the KPÖ has renounced the popular front choosing instead a policy of unrelenting opposition to the Socialist Party.

In Denmark, the fledgling DKP pursued the Comintern's united front policy (unsuccessfully), but balked at adopting the class against class tactic and only reluctantly did the party accept the International's line on the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the early days of World War II. After the war, three communists were in Denmark's coalition government and the party followed a policy of collabor-
ation with the Social Democrats. Following an electoral setback in 1947, however, the DKP left the government and the party was divided over the path it should take.
Into the 1960s, the party strove for a united political front and a united labor front,\textsuperscript{104} but since its return to parliament in 1973, the DKP has used its position to attack the Socialists.\textsuperscript{105}

Before it was crushed by the Nazis in 1933, the German Communist Party closely adhered to Comintern guidelines.\textsuperscript{106} After the war, the reborn KPD called for collaboration with the Social Democrats (SPD),\textsuperscript{107} but was taking a harder line in the years preceding its renewed illegality in 1956. In its clandestine period, the party tried to promote unity of action with the SPD\textsuperscript{108} and after being reconstituted as the legal DKP, the West German Communist Party in 1969 achieved an electoral union with several socialist splinter groups although the Social Democrats refused cooperation.\textsuperscript{109} Subsequently, the DKP fluctuated in its approach to the SDP, but since 1973, in particular, the West German Communists have concentrated on trying to elicit cooperation from individual Social Democrats while taking a position highly critical of the Social Democratic Party and government.\textsuperscript{110}
Domestic Programs

Despite a similar Marxist-Leninist backdrop, the communist parties of Western Europe present domestic programs that range in tone and substance from the reformist, almost social democratic, to the neo-Stalinist. The domestic programs, like the Western parties' alliance strategies, have tended to vary with the International line being dogmatic during class against class periods and more conciliatory in popular front periods. As with alliance strategies, however, the domestic programs of the Western parties have been characterized by diversity.

In Iceland, the "Road to Socialism" for the PA has been far from revolutionary. During the economic crisis of the 1930s, the party conducted some agitation, but, particularly since World War II, the Icelandic Party has made its mark through the skillful exploitation of peculiarly Icelandic issues such as opposition to the U.S. defense base at Keflavik and support for Icelandic fishing rights. The party explicitly accepts the peaceful road and in its manifestos and actions, both in government and in opposition, has demonstrated a commitment to nonrevolutionary reformist policies.

Similarly, the British Communist Party has come to accept the peaceful and democratic road to socialism. Never genuinely revolutionary, the CPGB in its early days concentrated on union organization and industrial mili-
tancy. Although Lenin himself had to persuade the early party to accept a parliamentary approach, the party has long since rejected violent revolution as unnecessary and unlikely. According to Newton, the party's cadres tend to be pragmatic and, as Ross and Hartman argue, expect a bread and butter approach in union affairs. In general, the party employs constitutional means to achieve its ends—writing letters, lobbying, petitioning, etc.—and most industrial unrest is not the direct responsibility of the Communist Party, but rather ultra-left groups. Currently, the CPGB emphasizes economic issues, offering suggestions for curing Britain's economic ills including price controls, increased public ownership, frozen rents, and wealth tax.

Another party which has self-consciously proclaimed a nonrevolutionary line is the Italian Communist Party. In its earliest days, the PCI was divided between a group led by Amadeo Bordiga who saw the revolutionary conquest of the state as the party's first objective and another group headed by Antonio Gramsci who advocated the transformation of the state from within. Although the Comintern supported Gramsci and Bordiga was ousted from leadership, the debate continued in the PCI in the early and mid-1920s. Eventually, the position of Palmiro Togliatti—Ruggero Grieco—Angelo Tasca, that the gradualist advocacy of democratic objectives designed to win mass support
be pursued, carried the day. Then, with the rise of fascism, the leadership's policy decision was reinforced as the party found that the advocacy of democratic, transitional slogans was necessary to maintain a united front effort against Mussolini. Although heavy Comintern pressure forced the PCI to recant its more rightest statements, the exigencies of conditions in Italy prevented the party from embarking on a dogmatic left-wing course.

Then, when the Comintern adopted a popular front policy in 1935, the Italian Communists were quick to promote it by playing down revolutionary rhetoric and stressing anti-fascist unity.

After the liberation, the PCI emphasized moderation and cooperation rather than revolutionary action. "The goal that we will propose to the Italian people when the war is over," Togliatti declared, "will be that of the creation in Italy of a democratic and progressive regime..."

Upon his return to Italy in 1944, Togliatti accepted the King and Marshall Bordiga as commanders of the anti-fascist forces, thus being more accommodating even than the Liberals. Opting to follow the constitutional road to power, the PCI decided that democracy must be parliamentary and announced for an Italian rather than a Russian road to socialism.

In response to the Cold War, Togliatti redoubled his efforts to establish the party's credentials as a demo-
critic, reformist party even going so far as to accept the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the new republican constitution.\footnote{129}

The failure of the party to win power and the atmosphere of the Cold War led to its taking temporarily a harsher line. The PCI supported a number of strikes and demonstrations, but, in general, the party adopted a policy of loud demands for reform with little action.\footnote{130}

After the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956, the question of the Italian Road once again was moved to the front burner in the PCI\footnote{131} with some (not the top leadership) going so far as to make openly revisionist statements.\footnote{132} For his part, Togliatti wholeheartedly accepted the peace and détente theme of the Twentieth Congress and emphasized the several roads to communism line.\footnote{133} Crises in Poland and Hungary, however, compelled Togliatti to take a more conservative position, at least temporarily.\footnote{134} At the Eighth PCI Congress in December, 1956, the leadership staked out a moderate policy that, on the one hand, saw the purge of many conservatives\footnote{135} and the exodus of a sizable number of revisionists.\footnote{136}

In no sense, however, were the Italian Communists retreating from their own reformist themes. In 1957, Togliatti quarreled with the French Communists over the Italian Road theme\footnote{137} and Marxist dogma.\footnote{138} Later, at a Moscow conference, Togliatti declared sectarianism to
be a greater danger than reformism.  

After the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, a new burst of reformism boiled up in the PCI as the party reemphasized the peaceful road and launched appeals to broad groups in Italian society. In a document published posthumously in late 1964, Togliatti detailed his party's *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. The PCI seeks, he said, "a form of socialist society based upon...our traditions of a multiparty system, on full respect for constitutional guarantees, and for religious and cultural liberties."  

Since 1964, the PCI has continued to elaborate and broaden its reformist approach to socialism in Italy. As Tarrow sees it, the party's *Via Italiana* is marked by four main themes: (1) constructive participation in parliament and in elections and local government; (2) a strategy of alliances; (3) an ideology of "reform of structure" as the preferred means of constructing socialism in Italy; and (4) activity in local government. Speaking for the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, the present head of the party, has stated that a communist Italy would be a democratic Italy with all but fascist opposition parties allowed to function. Also, the new government would neither withdraw precipitously from NATO and the EEC nor abolish all private enterprise. In recent electoral campaigns, the PCI has also strongly stressed honest and
efficient administration.

In the Netherlands, the CPN has moved from a position or orthodox Marxism to an acceptance of the peaceful road theme. The early party was marked by a division between revolutionary-minded leaders and parliamentarians, but, as in Britain, the parliamentarians gained ascendancy.\textsuperscript{144} Despite its attachment to parliamentarism, the party remained wedded to orthodox Marxist verities through the 1950s, responding only half-heartedly to the détente theme of the Twentieth CPSU Congress.\textsuperscript{145} In 1964, however, despite internal dissensions, the Dutch Party adopted a more nationalistic program including an acceptance of the peaceful road,\textsuperscript{146} a position that has been embellished in recent years as the CPN has gone so far as to back down from demands for Dutch withdrawal from NATO and the EEC.\textsuperscript{147}

In Norway, too, the early communist party took a radical albeit parliamentary approach and after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, the NKP was unwilling to come to terms with destalinization.\textsuperscript{148} In 1963, the NKP adopted a new program emphasizing the peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism.\textsuperscript{149} In the 1970s, the NKP has tried to imitate the Swedish Communists by presenting itself as a national party committed to striving for change within the existing parliamentary system.\textsuperscript{150} The issue upon which the NKP has campaigned the hardest in recent
years has been opposition to Norwegian entry into the Common Market. 151

Similarly, the Belgian Communist Party has long followed an orthodox, but, in practice, parliamentary, road to socialism. 152 In recent decades, the PCB has increasingly cultivated an image of respectability anchored in parliamentary legality. 153

In Switzerland, the Communist Party began activity after 1922 designed to disrupt Swiss society, including an anti-religious movement and a united front from below campaign. In the 1930s, the party continued its hard line posture, but generally deemphasized revolutionary actions. 154 In 1966, the PdA revised its program in favor of a less rigid, more flexible approach, including acceptance of the peaceful road thesis and a multiparty system. 155 Into the latter half of the 1970s, the PdA has increasingly withdrawn into staunch parliamentarism, rejecting extremism and violence. 156 In recent election campaigns, the PdA has emphasized economic issues, calling for rent and price freezes coupled with salary increases. 157

The first program of the Swedish Communist Party in 1917 was hardly revolutionary, but after Comintern affiliation in 1919, the party's program was a revolutionary one, both in means and aims. In actions, however, the Swedish Party was not. Even by 1943, the party was hinting that socialism could be achieved by peaceful means and in 1946,
party leader Linderot spoke of majority approval of socialism. With the Cold War and electoral decline, however, the party adapted its propaganda to the Cominform line. In 1956, the Swedish Communists accepted with pleasure the peaceful road thesis. More recently, the Swedish Party has gone quite far in modernizing its program. Since 1967 when it symbolically changed its name from the Swedish Communist Party (SKP) to the Left Party--Communist (VPK), the Swedish Party has offered a unique brand of communism in its domestic program. The program proposed by the VPK in 1967 called for a decentralized model of socialism combined with broad guarantees for civil liberties. At the party's congress in October, 1972, however, the VPK retreated from its "new left" brand of communism by adopting a revised, somewhat more militant program. It remains to be seen, however, how much of a rejection of the modernist line (if any) this implies.

While some Western European communist parties have adopted the peaceful path to socialism smoothly and even eagerly, the French Communist Party has moved only cautiously and unevenly. It is not that the PCF has acted in a revolutionary manner. Time and again, in the turbulent days following the liberation, during the Algerian crisis, and in May-June, 1968, the French Communists refused to capitalize on potentially revolutionary situations, rather, acting as a stabilizing force. Georges Lavau even
argues that the PCF fulfills a stabilizing and legitimizing function in the French political system. The PCF, however, has been reluctant to let go of the old verities of Marxist-Leninism, at least on a permanent basis.

Adding to a typology of Touchard, we can identify seven phases in the evolution of the PCF. In the beginning, from 1920-1923, the PCF was little more than a detached branch of the Socialist Party. In its ideology and organization, the PCF was not what is usually considered a communist party.

In the second period from about 1923 to 1934, the PCF underwent a bolshevization whereby the party adopted the organization and tenets of Russian Bolshevism. It was a time of dogmatism as well as isolation.

The Popular Front period from 1934 to 1939 was one of reintegration. As Brower argues, it was in this period that the French Communist Party became a national party by clothing itself in the patriotic symbolism of the French Revolution and adopting an ideology of defense--defense of fonctionnaires, the franc, the French culture, workers, peasants, the middle class.

In the fourth period, 1939 to 1941, the French Communists suffered a time of isolation because of their identification with the Soviets' war policy and their consequently "anti-patriotic" defense posture.

From June, 1941, to 1947, the fifth period, the PCF
came back into the patriotic fold. During this period of war communism and subsequent government communism, the party pursued generally quite pragmatic, "national" policies.

During the Cold War period, from 1947 to the late 1950s, the party went through a period of hyperdogmatism and intellectual sterility. At different occasions, the PCF sponsored strikes, riots, demonstrations, and parliamentary obstructionism. 166

In the final period, since the late 1950s, the PCF while campaigning for and eventually constructing an alliance with the Socialists, has cautiously, hesitantly, embarked on the path of revising some of its ideological positions that are the most offensive to possible allies. For years, the party agonized over the question of whether or not there could be a multiparty system during and after the construction of socialism, whether there could be an alternation of power, and whether a socialist government would accept a negative electoral verdict. 167

Although the French Communists have moved only slowly to modernist positions, there are signs of a new openness as well as continued intransigence in the party. The former is illustrated by the Socialist-Communist Common Program, a relatively pragmatic document that compromises some of the differences between the two parties. 168 In it, the PCF explicitly accepts such concepts as the multi-
party system under socialism and alternation in power. For their part, the Socialist agree to accept more nationalizations than they had previously countenanced and implicitly agree to refrain from seeking alliance with the right.\textsuperscript{169} That the party may be retreating from its unaccustomed moderation is indicated by the harder line expressed at the Twenty-First Congress of the PCF held in October, 1974 and by the party's recent turn toward greater industrial militance.\textsuperscript{170} At the PCF's Twenty-Second Congress in February, 1976, however, moderation was again the watchword as Marchais explicitly abandoned the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.\textsuperscript{171}

In West Germany, the Communist Party has a long history of militancy. During the last years of Weimar, the KPD was uncompromisingly hostile in its attitudes toward the government and revolutionary actions were not out of the question. After the party's rebirth in the wake of World War II, its position was one of relative moderation but with the coming of the Cold War, the KPD preached a revolutionary line.\textsuperscript{172} During its clandestine period, however, the German Communists turned to a more moderate approach and after their party was reestablished as the legal DKP, they carefully ruled out violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat stressing the peaceful road.\textsuperscript{173} Since the West German rapprochement with the USSR and Bonn's assurances of the continued legality of
the DKP, the party has taken a more hard line approach emphasizing euphemisms for revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.\textsuperscript{174}

The Danish Communist Party, too, has taken a harder line approach in recent years. Much like other Western European communist parties, the DKP moved from its socialist heritage to a position of orthodoxy in the late 1920s, returned to moderation during the popular front era and the resistance and early postwar periods, and then returned to a harder line position during the Cold War years.\textsuperscript{175} Then, in 1965, the DKP spelled out a new domestic program fully accepting the parliamentary road to socialism. "Socialism," party leader Jespersen wrote, "is the continuation of the best traditions of the democratic struggle of our people. Socialist democracy will be inviolable, and \[under it\] the existence of the multiparty system \[will be\] guaranteed by the constitution."\textsuperscript{176} In recent years, particularly since the party's return to parliament, the DKP through its spokesmen in parliament have taken a harder line calling for a revolutionary transition to socialism through parliamentary means, mass actions, and strikes.\textsuperscript{177} In recent years' election campaigns, the party has stressed tax reform and the withdrawal of Denmark from NATO and the EEC.

In Ireland, the Communist Party's programmatic development has been similar to that in Denmark. Following a
period of Cold War rigidity, in 1962 the CPI adopted a program accepting the peaceful road to socialism as well as Irish unification and independence from Britain's "imperialistic" control. Recently, however, the Irish Party has taken a harsher line calling for the formation of a "National Liberation Front" in Ireland. Although the CPI favors a peaceful, political solution to the question of socialism in Ireland, it does not eschew violence. Currently, the CPI concentrates on such issues as the reunification of Ireland, the end of British influence in Ireland, and withdrawal from the EEC.

The early Austrian Communist Party had a relatively radical program even launching an unsuccessful revolt in 1919. From then until it was outlawed by the Nazis in 1933, the KPÖ continued its hard line program, but stopped short of violence. After the war, the party hoped to duplicate the coup de Prague, but its efforts were thwarted. During the 1960s, the KPÖ modulated its domestic program to one of more moderation including an acceptance of the peaceful road to socialism thesis. After 1968, however, with the liberal-conservative division in the party, the KPÖ's domestic policy became a point of controversy. Subsequently, although the KPÖ has not retreated to Stalinist rigidity, its domestic position is far from reformist. As party chairman Franz Muhri has written, the KPÖ "is working for socialism with-
out civil war, but the possibility of this will depend on how far the front of class struggle expands in Austria and the world." In current issues, the KPD concentrates much of its effort in attacking the Socialist government and calling for a move to a transitional stage between capitalism and socialism.  

Finally, the Luxembourg Communist Party has moved from a hard line to a more moderate posture domestically. After its founding in January, 1921, the PCL launched a strike movement designed at disrupting Luxembourg society. As with a number of other Western parties, the PCL took a moderate approach during the popular front period and during the period immediately after the war. During the Cold War, however, the PCL returned to a position of rigid orthodoxy.  

At the party's Eighteenth Congress in 1965, the PCL adopted a program accepting the peaceful transition to socialism, the multiparty system, and the feasibility of reform before the abolition of capitalism. Currently, the issues that the PCL more frequently stresses are opposition to Luxembourg's participation in the Common Market and the alleged exploitation of Luxembourg's workers by large companies and banks.  

Organization  

Organizationally, the Leninist model calls for a small, disciplined, highly centralized cadre party based on the cell in which decision-making is conducted by the
norms of democratic centralism. Both in general and in specific instances, however, the nonruling parties of Western Europe have deviated from this model.

First, in theory and in practice, most of Western Europe's communist parties have abandoned the ideal of a cadre party in favor of a mass party, a goal which the Italians, French, and Finnish parties have achieved and, at least since the Second World War, most of the parties of Western Europe have at least tried to build a mass membership party.

Secondly, despite a norm of party discipline and centralization, most Western parties have long histories of factionalism. As an extreme case of the effects of factionalism, in Finland, the SKP has experienced a significant structural transformation in the wake of the emergence of a deep schism within the party between "modernists" and Stalinists. In 1969, the division came to a head with the virtual establishment of an oppositionist organization within the party itself as on both the Central Committee and the Politburo, a balance between the two groups was established at the February, 1969, Party Congress.\(^{187}\) Although in May, 1975, at the Seventeenth Party Congress, the two factions moved to patch the rift, the result was more cosmetic than real\(^{188}\) and the party continues to be characterized by an internal debate and a dual structure.
Listing all the major and minor divisions undergone by Western European communist parties would be a major task, but in the last twenty years major schisms in the Western parties include the following: a split between progressives and conservatives in the Austrian Party following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968; in the Belgian Party, the exodus of the de Brug group in the late 1950s and later desertion of Jacques Grippa and a group of followers to form a pro-Chinese party in the 1960s; the purge of Axel Larsen and subsequent departure of a large retinue of his supporters in the Danish Party; in France, the Servin-Casanova Affaire; in Iceland, the desertion of Stalinists from the PA in 1968 and the departure of Valdimarsson's group in 1969 each to form an opposition leftist party; in the Italian Communist Party, the challenge from the Il Manifesto group in the late 1960s and early 1970s; in the Netherlands, factions supporting both the Chinese and the Soviets in the international movement; in Norway, the defection of the youth affiliate in 1967 to support a Muscovite minority and a purge of Maoists in 1970; and in Sweden's VPK, a factional division over the party's progressive policies.

Thirdly, in Belgium, Ireland, and Switzerland, communist parties have introduced organizational variations corresponding to national conditions. In Belgium, the communist party is divided into Flemish and Walloon branches
each of which applies the party line in its own region
and each of which has the right of veto over party policies.
The organization of the miniature Irish Communist Party
also reflects national divisions with the Executive Com-
mittee divided into Northern and Southern branches.
Finally, in Switzerland, the structure of the PdA follows
the federal structure of the Swiss confederation with
cantonal sections and representation of the nation's
three major linguistic groups on the Central Committee.\(^{189}\)

Fourthly, a number of communist parties have departed
from the Leninist norm of democratic centralism. The
Western European communist party that has strayed the furth-
est is the Swedish Communist Party which Kevin Devlin
characterizes as a "paradigm of revisionist development."\(^{190}\)
Since 1964, the VPK has undergone an unprecedented internal
democratization marked by freedom of debate and the tol-
eration of a wide range of opinions.\(^{191}\) Along with the
new program approved in 1967, the VPK, under C. H. Her-
mansson's leadership, also adopted new rules which vir-
tually abrogated democratic centralism. Stressing indi-
vidual members' freedoms and rights, the new rules guaran-
teed that delegate elections be by secret ballot and
declared that the party cannot order trades union or
Diet representatives to vote in a prescribed way. Finally,
all party congresses were to be public.\(^{192}\)

While no other party has gone so far as the VPK in
abandoning democratic centralism, others have gone through periods of debate and openness. In France, the French Communist Party has long exemplified the orthodox model of democratic centralism. Following the 1974 presidential election, however, the party leadership opened the party press to grass-roots criticism and opinion. Ironically, much of the criticism was directed against what many militants see as "revisionism;" so, it remains to be seen whether the PCF is about to relax its organizational form.

Similarly, the Italian Communist Party has experienced lively internal debate. Although sometimes the debate has been bitter (such as much of that surrounding the Il Manifesto controversy), most of it has been calm and even constructive. As Urban puts it, the hallmark of the PCI's internal organizational posture is conciliation.

Other notable exceptions to democratic centralism have included the early 1969 debate in Austria over the KPÖ's reaction to the Czechoslovakian crisis, a similar, long-running debate in Finland's SKP, and controversies in the Norwegian Party over Furubotn's purge and the ouster of the Vogt group from leadership positions in 1967.

Fifthly, a number of parties have seen a decline in the importance of the cell. In Italy, since World War II, the cell has declined in importance in the struc-
ture of the Italian Communist Party and is being replaced by the section. As Tarrow reports, from 1950 to 1963, cells decreased from 54,000 to 33,000 while sections increased from 10,200 in 1951 to 11,000 in 1961. In Sweden, the VPK went so far as to openly devalue the cell in the 1960s in favor of the district.

Finally, in Italy there are marked differences between the form the PCI takes in the North and the form it takes in the South. In the North, the party is a mass party largely based on industrial workers and the factory cell. In the South, however, the Communist Party lacks a strong membership base and is composed mainly of poor peasants and agricultural workers. In Tarrow's description:

The party at its best in the South is in fine a subtle set of ties among diverse and ill-defined social groups, working in various ways to promote unity and modernization. At its worst, unity appears in the shape of alliances with backward groups and modernization takes the form of appeals for mass patronage.
Notes


17. Tarschys, op. cit.


23. From January, 1970, until the September, 1971, election, the party did hold one seat in parliament because of the defection of Hanne Reintoft from the Socialist People's Party.


munism, VI (Winter, 1973), 362-396.

30 Blackmer, op. cit., 14-15; Evans, op. cit. See Togliatti's call for continued collaboration of "democratic forces:" Rinascita, Jan.-Feb., 1947.

31 Blackmer, op. cit., 82 ff.


38 Ibid., 26 Sept. 1975.


41 Tiersky, op. cit., 36-50.

42 Maurice Thorez, Cahiers du Bolshevisme, 1 April 1934, 387-398.

43 L'Humanité, 31 May 1934.

44 Daniel R. Brower, The New Jacobins: The French

45 There were only a few rumblings in the PCF against the alliance. See, Gaston Momnousseau, "Pour l'alliance avec les couches moyennes," Cahiers du Bolshevisme, 1 Sept. 1934, 102.

46 See, L'Humanité, 18 April 1936.

47 Marcel Gitton, "Tout n'est possible," ibid., 29 May 1936.

48 Brower, op. cit., 192-197.

49 Ibid., 208-215.

50 Which the communists vilified, L'Humanité, 2 Oct. 1936.

51 Tiersky, op. cit., 100-101.

52 Ibid., 101.

53 Ibid., 112-158.


55 Tiersky, op. cit., 151-171.

56 Ibid., 242-250.


60 Programmatic agreement does not guarantee tactical unity. In 1972, Francois Mitterrand was quoted as saying the following: "As much common program as possible, and as little common action as possible." Le Monde, 12 Oct. 1972.


Wright and Machin, op. cit.


*Arbeideren*, 22 April 1940.


Gilberg, op. cit., 135.

Ibid., 163-167.


YICA, 1971.

YICA, 1972.


YICA, 1975.


Olmstead, op. cit.


Sworakowski, op. cit.

YICA, various years.
Sworakowski, op. cit.

YICA, various years.

Sworakowski, op. cit.

Ibid.

YICA, 1969.

Sworakowski, op. cit.

"Manifest van de CPN," De Waarheid, 1 Sept. 1972.

Sworakowski, op. cit.


Kendall, op. cit., 126-127.


Ibid., 184-214.

Ibid., 244-248.

Ibid., 258-260.

Ibid., 261-341.

Ibid., 351-352.

YICA, 1971.


For present position, see Aarne Saarinen, "The Strategic Aim of the Finnish Communists," World Marxist Review, XVIII (Sept., 1975), 93-95.

Sworakowski, op. cit.

YICA, 1966.

YICA, 1975.

YICA, 1975.

Sworakowski, op. cit.


YICA, 1966.

YICA, 1969.

YICA, 1975.

Olmstead, op. cit.

YICA, 1975.

Pelling, op. cit.


Newton, op. cit., 154.


Newton, op. cit., 102.

Crozier, op. cit.

YICA, 1975.

Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 103.

Urban, op. cit., 367-368.

Ibid., 371.

Ibid., 376 ff. Togliatti resented Moscow's heavy-handed tactics; Togliatti's letter of March 17, 1928, in Humbert-Droz, Il contrasto tra l'internazionale e il PCI 1922-1928, 251.


127 Trent'anni di vita e lotta del PCI (Rome: Rinascita, 1952), 203.


130 Blackmer, Unity in Diversity, op. cit., 17.

131 L'Unità, 15 Mar, 1956.


137 "La via italiana al socialismo," in Togliatti, op. cit.


140 Mario Gozzini, Il dialogo alla prova: Cattolici

141 Togliatti, Promemoria in Rinascita (Sept., 1964), 1.


144 Sworakowski, op. cit.

145 Kool, op. cit.

146 YICA, 1966.


149 YICA, 1966.


151 YICA, 1975.

152 Sworakowski, op. cit.


154 Sworakowski, op. cit.

155 YICA, 1966.

156 YICA, 1975.

157 YICA, 1975.

158 M. Donald Hancock, Sweden: The Politics of Post-Industrial Change (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1972), 128-130.

159 Tarschys, op. cit., 39-40.

Georges Lavau, "Le parti communiste dans le système politique français," 7-55 in Bon, ibid., 39.


Jean Touchard, "Introduction a l'ideologie du Parti communiste francaise," 83-106 in Bon, op. cit. He uses six phases which we bring up to date by adding a seventh.


Brower, op. cit.

Tiersky, op. cit., 157-235.


Programme commun, op. cit.

For an elaboration of the party's new reformist positions, see, Georges Marchais, Le défi démocratique (Paris: Grasset, 1973).


Sworakowski, op. cit.; Loss, op. cit.

174 YICA, 1974.
178 YICA, 1975.
179 YICA, 1975.
181 Sworakowski, op. cit.
183 Ibid.
184 Sworakowski, op. cit.
185 YICA, 1966.
186 YICA, 1975.
189 YICA, 1975.
191 Ibid., 29-31.
192 Sparring, in Upton, op. cit.
193 Guy Rossi-Landi, "Le parti communiste francais

194 P. A. Allum, The Italian Communist Party Since 1945, Occasional Publication no. 2 (Reading: University of Reading Graduate School, 1970), 23.


196 Urban, op. cit.


199 Johansen, op. cit.; YICA, 1968.

200 Tarrow, "Political Dualism," op. cit., 41.

201 YICA, 1975.

202 Tarrow, Peasant Communism, op. cit., 267.
CHAPTER II

DIVERSITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

In March, 1919, Lenin founded the Third International as an agency to bring about world revolution. With the failure of the revolution to spread beyond the borders of Russia, however, the Comintern was transformed into a vehicle for legitimizing communist rule in Russia and a tool through which the world's communist parties could be transformed into instruments of Soviet foreign policy.¹ After the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924, the Comintern ceased having any semblance to the relatively open discussion body that Lenin had envisaged. Rather, it became an agency of Soviet control and Stalin instructed all of the world's communist parties to adopt the Russian Bolshevik model.² Throughout most of the interwar period, Moscow insisted on complete control over member sections of the Comintern, down to minor details of policy.

In the early days, Moscow won this control in many cases through direct intervention backed up by the enormous prestige of the Soviet Union as the world's first socialist state.³ With the dismantling of the Comintern in 1943 and the emergence of mass communist parties in a number of Western European countries in the wake of World War II, Moscow's potential for direct interference was limited. Its capacity for indirect control based on
the USSR's prestige as the Socialist Fatherland remained
great and, augmented by the Cominform after 1947, Moscow
continued to exercise considerable direction during the
early postwar and Cold War eras.

Since 1956, however, the international communist
movement has been shaken to its very foundations by a
series of crises and its unity has been shattered. First
came Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth Congress
of the CPSU revealing and condemning the crimes of Stalin.
Then, in rapid succession, came Hungary, the shifts in the
Soviet line toward Yugoslavia, the excommunication of
Albania, the Sino-Soviet split, the ouster of Khrushchev,
the Sinyavsky-Daniel trials, and, in 1968, the Soviet-led
invasion of Czechoslovakia. 4

Before 1956, communists (save for the Yugoslavians)
and anticommunists alike agreed on one point: Soviet
Russia incarnated the cause of communism. For many, this
ceased to be true after 1960. For others, Czechoslovakia
1968 shattered the last illusions. 5 No longer was there
a single world movement with a center in Moscow, but
several movements with centers in Peking, Belgrade, Havana,
and, perhaps, Rome. 6

In the face of the crises of international communism,
the communist parties of Western Europe have responded
differently, ranging from traditional adherence to the
Soviet Union to remarkably independent action.
Luxembourg

Although events of the last twenty years have gravely jarred international communism, the faith of the Communist Party of Luxembourg has remained unshaken—by destalinization, by Hungary, the Sino-Soviet rift, or even by the events in Czechoslovakia. Historically, the PCL has been an uncritical supporter of the Soviet Union and the party has never wavered from that pattern. In 1968, the PCL was the only legal Western European communist party to approve the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Concerning the international communist movement, the Luxembourg Party has unstintingly supported the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) against all possible rivals, even attacking C. H. Hermansson, the leader of the Swedish Communist Party, for his independent attitude. On the Chinese issue, the PCL has been a persistent and harsh critic of Peking loyally backing the efforts of the CPSU to isolate China within the movement. Currently, the PCL endorses Moscow's call for a new world conference to excommunicate the Chinese.

West Germany

Another strong supporter of the Soviet Union in Western Europe is the West German Communist Party. After its birth in December, 1918, the KPD was the object of Moscow's careful attention and the German Party became the model for Comintern policy in Western Europe.
Since World War II, the German Party has remained faithful to Moscow. During the early years of the Bonn Republic, during its fugitive period from 1956 to 1968 (after being declared illegal by the Federal Constitutional Court), and since its reconstitution as the legal DKP in September, 1968, the Communist Party of West Germany has had very close ties with both the East German Communist Party and the CPSU.\textsuperscript{13} Unequivocally, the DKP has supported the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and all other Soviet and East German positions concerning international affairs. In regard to the Sino-Soviet split, the West German party has steadfastly adhered to the Soviet position condemning the Chinese heresy in no uncertain terms and it strongly supports the Soviet initiative for a world conference to condemn Peking.\textsuperscript{14}

Ireland

Founded at the behest of Moscow in 1933, the Irish Communist Party has generally supported the Soviet Union's international positions. The CPI has endorsed Soviet initiatives toward détente and has stood behind Moscow in its dispute with the Chinese. At the world conference which finally took place in Moscow in June, 1969, the CPI solidly endorsed CPSU positions. In 1974, Michael O'Riordan, the party's chairman, saluted the record of the 1969 conference and implied support for a new conference.\textsuperscript{15}

The Irish Party's record of support for the USSR has
not, however, been unblemished. In 1968, the CPI stood among most other Western European communist parties in deploiring the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Subsequent actions, however, indicate that the CPI's break with Moscow in 1968 was an exception rather than the rule.

France

The French Communist Party has long been one of Moscow's most loyal and staunchest defenders in Western Europe, so loyal and so staunch as to prompt Guy Mollet to declare "le Parti communiste n'est pas a gauche, il est à l'Est." [The Communist Party is not so much to the left as it is to the East.] Although before 1924, the PCF evinced considerable independence from Moscow, after the party's bolshevization, it was not totally independent, but rather a section of the International with French leaders making frequent pilgrimages to Moscow where administrative problems and electoral tactics were discussed and often decided. Time and again, the French Party changed its position to conform with somersaults in Soviet policy toward class against class in 1928, the popular front in 1934, the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, the outbreak of war in 1939, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. But, as Annie Kriegel argues, it was not a process of the Comintern simply issuing orders (although
orders sometimes were issued). On many questions, Moscow gave no directions or the meaning of their instructions was unclear. The Comintern's authority was thus somewhat akin to the "law and the prophets," absolute, but hermetic.\textsuperscript{17}

After the Second World War, the French Communist Party was less directly under tutelage to the Soviet Communist Party.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, during the Cold War years, the PCF's support of Moscow and opposition to the Western alliance was inflexible.\textsuperscript{19} In this setting, the PCF greeted the events of 1956 with uneasiness. The first reaction of the PCF to Khrushchev's "secret speech" was careful, even apologetic toward Stalin.\textsuperscript{20} Cautiously, the PCF called for a "thorough Marxist analysis to determine all the circumstances under which Stalin was able to exercise his personal power...."\textsuperscript{21} Later, the party took a position critical of Stalin, but made a distinction between the USSR, which should head the movement, and its leaders who were fallible.\textsuperscript{22} As for the rehabilitation of Tito, the PCF accepted it only grudgingly. In sum, the French Party was very uncomfortable with the new course of destalinization outlined at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Although the PCF accepted the new Soviet line, its immediate effects on the operation of the party were few.\textsuperscript{23}

The Hungarian invasion was an international crisis with which the PCF could more comfortably deal. While
the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956 visibly shook the communist movement in many Western European democracies, in France, there was relatively little dissension within the party. One deputy, Aimé Césaire from Martinique, resigned; and one critical intellectual, Jacques-Francis Rolland, was expelled, but the bulk of the PCF remained loyal to the party. 214 Confident of the loyalty of the majority of its cadres and apparat, the PCF was in the forefront of those who encouraged the Soviets to handle the events in Hungary with firmness. 25

For the next decade, the PCF continued its loyal support of the Soviet Union. 26 No Western party was more critical of the Chinese and no party more firmly backed the Soviets' call for an international conference of communist parties to read the Chinese out of the international movement. 27 On all principal questions, in the early 1960s, the PCF displayed a striking display of solidarity with the CPSU.

Czechoslovakia was another matter. Initially, the reaction of the French Communist Party to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was one of "surprise and reprobation." 29 The reaction of party intellectual Roger Garaudy was more harsh. A "return to Stalinism both in theory and in practice," he declared. 30 Although Garaudy had supporters, particularly among intellectuals, a large group in the PCF remained loyal to the Soviet Union.
Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch, widow of Maurice Thorez, the long-time leader of the PCF, even resigned from the Politburo in protest over the party's opposition to the Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. 31

Although the PCF has never retracted its criticisms of the invasion, it quickly moved to soften their impact and shore up its ties with the Soviet Union. After the initial shock lessened, the "reprobation" originally expressed by the party became "regret." Finally, the PCF saluted "l'accord" between Moscow and the Czech government. 32 Garaudy was censured by the Politburo for his remarks and, in 1970, expelled from the party along with several other dissident intellectuals. 33 Subsequently, the party supported the Soviets' efforts to reunite the international movement and has endorsed the current Czech regime.

After 1968, the PCF maintained its traditional loyalty to the Soviet Union, 34 but, at the same time, it affirmed a strong French nationalist orientation. While the French Party endorsed Moscow's handling of the Solzhenitsyn affair, 35 it also objected to Soviet indications of support for Giscard in the 1974 French presidential election campaign. 36

In late 1975 and early 1976, however, the French Communists took a series of steps that have moved them closer to the Italian Communists' position of international
independence. In November, 1975, the PCF and PCI joined in a common declaration insisting on the independence of each national party. At the same time, they have insisted that the world conference proposed by Moscow be limited to questions of peace and détente in Europe rather than the expulsion of the Chinese—an action that could reunite world communism under Soviet authority. Then, at the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU in February, 1976, Enrico Berlinguer and Gaston Plissonnier, speaking for the Italian and French Communists respectively, defended their parties' these of communist pluralism directly to the faces of their Soviet comrades.

Denmark

Although its loyalty has not been unswerving, the Danish Communist Party is presently a stout defender of the Soviet Union. Before World War II, the DKP was pro-Soviet in its policies, but with some notable exceptions. In 1937, Axel Larsen, the party leader, urged a strong defense posture for Denmark. Subsequently, he was called to Moscow in order to change his mind. The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the outbreak of war in 1939 also wrought confusion within the party.

After World War II, the DKP continued a pro-Soviet posture, loyally defending Moscow's Cold War position. In 1956, however, the party was shaken by the twin shocks
of destalinization and Hungary followed by the gyrations of Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. For Axel Larsen, the leader of the DKP, the inconsistencies of the Moscow line were too much. After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU with its revelations about Stalin, initiation of destalinization, and thaw toward Yugoslavia; Larsen, once a vocal admirer of Stalin, switched his position and adapted to the new line. When called upon to change positions again, however, Larsen, in effect, said that once was indeed enough. He declared that the DKP should emancipate itself from Moscow and become a genuinely Danish party. Subsequently, in October, 1958, Larsen was deposed as party leader and the less independently-minded Knud Jespersen became his successor. In leaving the party, however, Larsen took with him a considerable retinue of followers who soon founded a left-wing noncommunist party (the Socialist People's Party) that subsequently outpolled the DKP.  

The elimination of Larsen and his supporters did not lead to unquestioned support for the policies of the Soviet Union. The DKP criticized the Sinyavsky-Daniel trials and expressed misgivings over charges of Soviet anti-semitism. Then, in 1968, the party stood in opposition to Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia.

Since the Czech invasion, however, the DKP has clung to the Kremlin line. Although it has not formally retracted
its early criticisms of the invasion, the Danish Party has apparently approved the current Husák regime in Czechoslovakia and supported the Moscow-directed "normalization" there. Also, the DKP has backed the Soviet Union firmly in its dispute with the Chinese adhering since 1963 to a clear stand against the Peking line. Currently, the party endorses Soviet efforts to isolate the Chinese within the world communist movement.

Austria

Like the DKP, the Austrian Communist Party is now a strong supporter of the Soviet Union's positions. From its earliest days, the Austrian Party faithfully defended Moscow. Although its pro-Soviet orientation was somewhat marred by its criticisms of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trials, the KPÖ was among Moscow's earliest and firmest backers in the Sino-Soviet conflict. 43

With Czechoslovakia, however, the Austrian Communist Party's generally consistent support for the Soviets wavered. Prior to August, 1968, the KPÖ had expressed its approval of the Dubcek reforms and, when the Soviet invasion came, the Austrian Party quickly condemned it. Then, at the 1969 Moscow conference of communist parties, the Austrians along with the Italians took the lead in asserting the independence and autonomy of each party only signing the final document of the conference with reservations. 45
The KPÖ, however, was not united in its condemnation of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. Leading the criticism of the USSR was a minority largely of intellectuals led by Franz Marek and Ernst Fischer. Opposing them was a more conservative group of veteran militants who strongly supported the Soviet Union. Between these two groups stood the party's centrist leadership headed by party chairman Franz Muhri.\textsuperscript{46} In late 1968 and early 1969, a polemical debate between the main protagonists in the KPÖ raged in the party press. At the party's congress in January, the conservative group began to assert their strength\textsuperscript{47} and the party began to modify its criticisms of the Soviets' actions in Czechoslovakia. By 1970, the conservatives won a complete victory. The Marek-Fischer group was expelled from the KPÖ and the party became a supporter of normalization in Czechoslovakia, praising the Husák regime. Currently, the international positions of the Austrian Communist Party closely reflect those of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{48}

Finland

The Finnish Communist Party has remained loyal to Moscow despite misgivings over Czechoslovakia and the complications of an intraparty split. Since the SKP was founded in August, 1918, in exile near Moscow, the Finnish Communists have been closely tied to the Soviet Union, even supporting the Soviets during Finland's wars with the USSR. Following the armistice between Finland and
the Soviet Union in 1944, the Finnish Communists continued to adhere to the Soviet line internationally. 49 There was no real debate in the SKP over Khrushchev's "secret speech"50 and the party survived the Hungarian crisis well, endorsing Moscow's thesis. 51 Nevertheless, the Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968 led to a public dispute between the SKP and CPSU and to an intensification of divisions within the Finnish Party itself.

Even before the division over Czechoslovakia, there were three identifiable factions in the SKP: a group of anti-Stalinist progressives, a hard line dogmatist faction, and, finally, a group of centrists. 52 The Czech crisis and the SKP's reaction to it intensified and deepened the division within the party. 53

Originally, the SKP endorsed the reforms initiated by the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia, but when it learned of the invasion, the party cautiously withheld judgment. As events became clearer, however, the Finnish Party announced its disapproval of Soviet actions. A large section of the party, nevertheless, remained intensely loyal to the Soviet Union and the issue became another, major bone of contention between the rival factions in the SKP. 54

Since 1968, the Finnish Party has not retracted its criticism of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia, but it has minimized the original differences and returned to a
generally pro-Soviet posture. The SKP has been a strong ally of the USSR in its disputes with China and an equally loyal proponent of Moscow's policy of international détente. Also, the party has strongly endorsed Moscow's call for a new world conference.

Switzerland

In Switzerland, the PdA's traditional loyalty to the Soviet Union has been tempered by dissent over the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. In its early history and later development, the PdA was strongly pro-Soviet. Although destalinization became an object of internal contention, the Swiss Communist Party remained closely allied to Soviet policies. In 1968, however, the PdA blamed the USSR for the invasion of Czechoslovakia and began a series of uninhibited criticisms that extended into 1969. At the June, 1969 conference of communist parties, the PdA was among those who would sign the final conference document only with reservations.

Since 1969, the Swiss Party has avoided references to the Czech invasion and has returned to alignment with general Soviet policies, including support of the USSR in its dispute with the Chinese. Finally, the PdA has developed strong bilateral ties with the Italian Communist Party.
Belgium

In its earliest days, the Communist Party of Belgium was split between Trotskyist and Stalinist factions, but after the demise of the former in the late 1920s, the PCB closely followed the Soviet line. The party zigzagged with the Soviet line from 1939 to 1941 and dutifully supported Moscow's Cold War positions.

Since the Czechoslovakian crisis, however, the Belgian Communist Party has moved from a position of loyal defense of the Soviet Union to one of cautious, even critical support of the views and policies of Moscow. Although the Hungarian invasion provoked defections from the PCB and the Sinyavsky-Daniel trials led to some criticisms from the Belgian Party, the PCB was closely tied to the Soviets, particularly supporting Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence and the Soviets' attacks on the Chinese. In August, 1968, however, the PCB came down on the side of the Czech leaders and against the Soviets.

Following the height of the controversy over Czechoslovakia, the Belgian Communists moved both to reaffirm their ties with the Soviets and to assert their independence vis-à-vis Moscow. In 1971, party president Marc Drumaux praised the CPSU, but, at the same time, was careful verbally to maintain his own party's autonomy. Currently, the PCB generally supports Soviet positions, but is not hesitant to offer criticisms. While the Belgian Communists
opposed the views of dissident Russian novelist Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, they also opposed his expulsion from the
Soviet Union.62 Additionally, the PCB is more conciliatory toward the Chinese than the Soviets are.63

Italy

From its founding in 1921, the Italian Communist
Party was closely tied to the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (despite a healthy measure of independent
thinking on the part of the PCI).64 Indeed, were it not
for Soviet assistance the PCI would likely not have sur-
vived the long period of fascist-imposed illegality.
Since 1956, however, the PCI has moved sometimes cautiously,
sometimes resolutely toward a position of autonomy and
independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The shock of Khrushchev's rude destruction of the
Stalin myth provided the political and psychological basis
for a gradual restructuring of the Italian Communists' relations with the Soviet Union. In an interview in
Nuovi Argomenti, party leader Togliatti discussed the
problems raised by the revelations of the Twentieth CPSU
Congress, declaring that the sins of Stalin should not
be regarded as the results of one man's weakness, but that
the Soviet system itself must share the guilt.65 Boldly
continuing, Togliatti asserted the following:

The Soviet model should no longer be obligatory.
...The complex of the system is becoming polycentric, and in the communist movement itself one can no longer speak of a single guide.\footnote{66}

Later, in June at the PCI Central Committee meeting, Togliatti re-emphasized polycentrism.\footnote{67} Although in the West, Togliatti's position on polycentrism was seen as something akin to a declaration of independence from the USSR, more realistically, it was less a call for change than an assessment by Togliatti of what he saw an objective reality.\footnote{68}

In any case, Moscow was not amused. On June 30, 1956, Pravda carried an editorial critical of Togliatti.\footnote{69} In response, Togliatti took a hard line against the riots in Poland and moved to quiet criticism of the USSR within his own party.\footnote{70}

Hungary, too, was a shock for the PCI. In response, the party adopted a pro-Soviet position, but not inflexibly so. Unlike the Soviets (and the French Communists), the PCI refrained from emphasizing the role of a counter-revolutionary underground\footnote{71} and within the ranks of the party itself, there was considerable support for the insurgents.\footnote{72} Despite these misgivings and the Nuovi Argomenti article, the PCI in the fall of 1956 remained a supporter of the USSR.

After a period of relative calm, the renewed destalinization push begun at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in October, 1961, unleashed all of the forces of
division within the PCI.\textsuperscript{73} The debate in the party was harsh and bitter with criticisms of the institutions and practices of the Soviet Union being constantly reiterated. Reformers and moderates easily won the upper hand in the PCI and the concept of polycentrism was revived.\textsuperscript{74}

In the last years of his life, Togliatti led the PCI in open and active resistance to some aspects of Soviet policy. In September, 1964, the party attacked Soviet cultural policy.\textsuperscript{75} The Italian Communists strongly defended cultural liberty in respect to the arts, literature and religion,\textsuperscript{76} and attacked the Soviets for their censorship of \textbf{Dr. Zhivago}\textsuperscript{77} and repression of intellectuals.\textsuperscript{78} In the Sino-Soviet dispute, although the PCI condemned the hard line positions of the Chinese,\textsuperscript{79} the party, rather than unreservedly backing the Soviets, called for a compromise and a toning down of rhetoric. In October, 1963, the PCI explicitly opposed the CPSU's call for a world conference to deal with the Chinese,\textsuperscript{80} and reaffirmed that position in 1964.\textsuperscript{81} Although the Italians opposed the ideological position of the Chinese,\textsuperscript{82} they also opposed any effort by the Soviets to reestablish hegemony in the international movement—a hegemony that would reduce their own freedom of action.\textsuperscript{83}

Thus, the PCI clung stubbornly (and successfully) to its position of "unity in diversity." The success of the world movement, the Italians asserted, depended
upon the development of qualitatively different relationships among component parts. Autonomy, the Italians argued, "means, and ought to mean, full respect for the principle of non-interference by any party in the internal affairs of other parties, but allowing for necessary debate and confrontation of opinion." 84

One of the boldest efforts of Togliatti to establish the autonomy of his party appeared posthumously when, in the face of Soviet opposition, the PCI published a document prepared by Togliatti before his death in the fall of 1964. Togliatti's "Testament," as it was called, was a manifesto of reformist Italian communism. In it, Togliatti, speaking for the PCI, refused to accept collective mobilization in regards to the Sino-Soviet dispute, rejected excommunication of the Chinese, and criticized the slowness of destalinization in the USSR. 85

Togliatti's successors were no less independently-minded than he, criticizing both the manner in which the ouster of Khrushchev was handled and the harsh verdicts handed down against Daniel and Sinaysky. 86 Firmly, the party continued to stress each party's autonomy.

In 1968, the PCI deplored the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia as unjustified. 87 Long sympathetic to liberalization in Eastern Europe, the Italian Communists held firm to their condemnation despite official adverse Soviet reaction. The PCI unequivocally rejected
the Brezhnev Doctrine which the Soviets used to defend their intervention in Czechoslovakia:

We do not admit that the sovereignty of a socialist country can be in conflict with its 'class and internationalist' character. Sovereignty is an unalienable right. For us, this is not an abstract interpretation, but a value which we cannot renounce.88

Then, at the June, 1969 world conference of communist parties, which the Italians agreed to attend only on the stipulation that no party (i.e., the Chinese) would be excommunicated from the movement, the PCI publicly criticized the Soviets for their handling of the Czech affair and refused to sign all but one non-controversial section of the final document.89 Berlinguer, speaking for the PCI, denied that there "can be a single model for socialist society." Unity, he asserted, "can only be based on an appreciation of the original and creative capability of every national community and party."90

Since 1968, the PCI has maintained its autonomous position. Although on most international issues, the CPSU and PCI agree, on certain important questions, the Italians have continued to express opinions at variance with the Soviets. On Czechoslovakia, the PCI has reaffirmed its original dissent and augmented it with criticisms of normalization there. On the Sino-Soviet split, the PCI has refused to agree to an expulsion or isolation of the Chinese. On Soviet domestic policies, the Italians have criticized the treatment of Solzhenitsyn and Soviet Jews.91
To the visible irritation of Moscow, the PCI has rapidly moved to dissociate itself from the activities of the Portuguese Communist Party. Finally, Berlinguer boldly outlined his party's *Via italiana* at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU in early 1976 and strongly argued his party's position of independence.

Norway

The Norwegian Communist Party has a long tradition as something of a maverick, a tradition which still flourishes. In 1919, the Norwegian Labor Party joined the Third International virtually intact, but after four years of deviation, the Executive of the Comintern (ECCI) forced a split and only a minority remained to constitute the Norwegian Communist Party. The result of the massive purge was not, however, the totally compliant party that Moscow desired. Lacking ideological sophistication, the new NKP leaders frequently stumbled into error. At other times, the NKP's deviations were willful.

Although Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin precipitated something of a debate within the Norwegian Party, destalinization had little immediate effect on the NKP. There was little sympathy for change among the leadership and no purges of domestic Stalinists followed.

Hungary was a greater shock for the Norwegian Communist Party causing numerous defections. In general, the NKP assessment of the situation kept with the Soviet version
of "counterrevolution," but not uncritically so.98

Following the tumultuous Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, the Norwegians moved boldly to stake out an autonomous position for themselves in the international movement. Uncomfortable with the new emphasis on destalinization, the NKP again refused to take any actions along those lines. More significantly, the party refused to take any position on the Sino-Soviet split, but rather took a position of neutrality.99 Then, in December, 1962, the party published an editorial declaring that each party is autonomous and independent.100

Although on most major international issues (such as peaceful coexistence and the peaceful transition to socialism) the Norwegians agreed with the Soviet Union rather than China, the NKP refused to support Moscow's tactics. The Norwegian Party called for a reconciliation, but not one that would subordinate one party to another,101 and sent no representative to the 1967 Karlovy Vary meeting preparatory to the world conference.102

With the replacement of Khrushchev, the NKP again took the opportunity to dissociate itself from Moscow even accusing the Soviet leadership of lying.103 Despite a good measure of internal dissension from Moscow loyalists within the party, the NKP continued to stress "unity in diversity."104

In 1968, the NKP vigorously attacked the Soviet-led
intervention in Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{105} Then, at the 1969 World Conference of Communist Parties, the Norwegian delegate, like his British counterpart, declared he had no authority to sign the final document.\textsuperscript{106}

Since 1968, the NKP has stuck to its position of international autonomy and independence. Consequently, it has adhered to its criticisms of the Czechoslovakian invasion and remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute.\textsuperscript{107}

Great Britain

The international posture of the Communist Party of Great Britain has been marked by sharp contrasts. Although the British Communist Party is now notably independent of Moscow, its early years were marked by almost slavish submission to the Comintern which had played a dominant role in its founding and organization.\textsuperscript{108} Moscow's supervision of the CPGB extended even to matters of detail\textsuperscript{109} and in 1923, the whole of the Executive Committee was called to Moscow for instructions. When, in 1929, part of the leadership of the British Party was reluctant to follow the Comintern line, they were replaced.\textsuperscript{110}

The ultraloyalty of the British Communist Party extended well beyond World War II, but in 1956, the twin shocks of the Twentieth Congress and Hungary gravely shook the CPGB and severely strained its relations with Moscow. In the mid-fifties, there was a rising tide of discontent within the British Party as the realization
of the tyranny of the Stalinist system sank in. Against this background of rising unhappiness came the shattering events of 1956: the revelations of Stalin's "errors," the Poznan riots in Poland, and Hungary. Scores of militants in the CPGB voted with their feet and among those who remained, many unleashed severe criticisms against the Soviet Union.

The events of 1956 triggered the crystallization of an opposition within the British Communist Party against blinded loyalty to the USSR. Although the British Party remained pro-Soviet in orientation, it was no longer uncritically so. The CPGB was the first West European party to criticize the Daniel-Sinyavsky trials and it also censured the Soviets for anti-semitism. While the British were severely critical of the Chinese cultural revolution, they were also reserved toward the USSR.

If Hungary had shaken the ties between the CPGB and the CPSU, Czechoslovakia shattered them. Immediately, the party press called the Soviet-led invasion a "mistake" and despite the presence of a sizable minority of Moscow supporters in the party ranks, the British Communist Party extended and expanded its criticisms of the invasion. First, it opposed Moscow's call for a world conference of communist parties to reunite the movement in the wake of the brouhaha over Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet rift. Then, when the conference was held in June, 1969,
the British Party refused to sign the final document and explicitly criticized the Soviet handling of Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{119} Finally, since the conference, the CPGB has not hesitated to condemn normalization in Czechoslovakia and has engaged in polemics with the Soviets over the issue.\textsuperscript{120}

The Netherlands

Although once closely tied to the CPSU, the Dutch Communist Party has moved first to a position of autonomy, and then to a position of isolation in the international communist movement. After an early factional period (into which the Comintern intervened),\textsuperscript{121} the CPN became a loyal follower of the Soviet Union and from its bolshevization around 1925 until after World War II, the Dutch Party was little more than a noisy mimic of Moscow.\textsuperscript{122}

Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, however, proved to be a bombshell for the Dutch Communists. Although the party leadership only halfheartedly accepted destalinization\textsuperscript{123} and enthusiastically acclaimed the Hungarian intervention, the events of 1956 kindled a brush fire of dissension within the party ranks. Part of this dissension took the form of an oppositionist party which contested the 1959 elections against the CPN, but most of the opposition—Stalinist, revisionist, Maoist—stayed within the ranks of the party.\textsuperscript{124}

In the face of the division within the CPN, the party
walked a tightrope on the Sino-Soviet dispute criticizing first one side and then the other and resisting Soviet pressures for a showdown conference to deal with the Chinese heresy. 125

At the Twenty-First Congress of the Dutch Communist Party in 1964, the CPN adopted a more autonomous position for the party. 126 Under the leadership of Paul de Groot and his successors, this policy of autonomy increasingly became one of international isolation. In 1967, de Groot denounced Soviet interference into the internal affairs of the Dutch Party 127 and the CPN refused to send representatives to the preparatory meeting to the proposed world conference held at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. 128 The Dutch sent no one to the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution held in Moscow and even discouraged rank and file members from travelling in communist countries. By the time of its own congress in December, 1967, the CPN was virtually isolated as delegates from abroad were conspicuously absent. 129

Despite its near isolation and vigilance against outside interference, the CPN has not been reticent about criticizing other communist parties and communist states. In 1968, the Dutch Party roundly condemned the Czechoslovakian invasion and, keeping with its policy, refused to attend the 1969 World Conference to reunite the movement. De Groot himself has taken the Soviets to task for the
German-Soviet Pact of 1939 (which, of course, he supported at the time) and the treatment of Soviet Jews.\textsuperscript{130} In 1972, the Soviet and Dutch parties indulged in a bitter polemic over de Groot's positions which, despite a long attack in Pravda, the CPN reaffirmed as their own.\textsuperscript{131} In 1974, the CPN vigorously condemned Moscow's handling of the Solzhenitsyn affair\textsuperscript{132} and remains adamantly opposed to the call for a new world conference.

Sweden

Although the Swedish Communist Party has historically seldom been an uncritical imitator of the Kremlin line, since the early 1960s, it has attempted to break out of its domestic isolation by following a policy of independence from Moscow. From the time it joined the Third International in 1919 until 1929, the Swedish Party was characterized by splits, purges, and defiance of Comintern wishes.\textsuperscript{133} Even after 1930 when the party became more submissive to Moscow, the Swedish Communists were not blind copycats of Soviet policy. Nevertheless, after World War II, the party was essentially conformist to Soviet views.\textsuperscript{134}

As it was for other Western European communist parties, 1956 proved to be a significant year for the Swedish Communist Party. Although it easily accepted the concept of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin was a blow for the Swedish Party whose whole leadership and bureaucracy were compromised. Hungary added to
the party's woes and the two events, destalinization and Hungary, spurred an internal discussion within the party.\textsuperscript{135}

By 1962, the long-simmering discussion of the party's national role and its international ties became a debate, much of which was aired in the party newspaper, \textit{Ny Dag}. One faction called for a "nationalist" approach with concentration on Swedish issues and independence from Moscow, while another group in the party held to Stalinist positions. At the party's Twentieth Congress in early 1963, the dispute reached something of a climax. Although the old guard dominated the congress and elected a majority to the Central Committee, the "nationalist" elements won a major concession with the appointment of C. H. Hermansson, the moderate editor of \textit{Ny Dag}, as party chairman.\textsuperscript{136}

Despite his rather tenuous position, Hermansson moved quickly to give his party a new image. Missing no opportunity to demonstrate his party's independence, the new party chairman lost no time in criticizing the foreign and internal policies of the USSR attacking the manner of Khrushchev's removal and softening the Swedish Party's support for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet split.\textsuperscript{137}

Buoyed by electoral gains and a bright personal image, Hermansson solidified his reformist position at the party's Twenty-First Congress in 1967 which adopted a new program outlining a reformist domestic policy and an independent international posture. In spite of a hard core of old-
time Stalinists, the renamed Left Party--Communist moved to implement its autonomous international position by assuming a neutral position on the Sino-Soviet conflict\textsuperscript{138} and by dispatching only an observer to the Karlovy Vary preparatory meeting of West and East European communist parties.

Since 1967, despite a growing Stalinist bloc, the VPK has barely hesitated to criticize the socialist world. The Sinyavsky-Daniel trials, the Berlin Wall,\textsuperscript{139} the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia,\textsuperscript{140} the Soviet-directed normalization there, and the treatment accorded Alexander Solzhenitsyn have all come in for harsh criticism by Hermansson and the VPK.

Iceland

The Communist Party of Iceland has, throughout most of its history, maintained a position aloof from international affairs that do not directly affect Iceland. Organized from the left opposition of the Social Democratic Party, the Icelandic Communists remained within that party (on the advice of the Comintern) until 1930 when they broke off and became an independent party.\textsuperscript{141} Always only loosely tied to the Soviet Union and never fully bolshevized, the party broke away from the Comintern in 1938 in order to reconstitute itself to include more left-wing social democrats. By 1949, however, the Icelandic
Communist Party came under the control of a pro-Soviet group who directed the party along somewhat more orthodox lines. More "nationalist" elements once again assumed leadership in the party in 1962, a leadership that was solidified when the bulk of the pro-Soviet militants seceded from the party in 1968 following its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Icelandic Communist Party's present international position is one of critical aloofness from the international communist movement. Rarely taking positions on issues not directly affecting Iceland, the party has been generally isolationist in international communist affairs and has adopted a neutral position on the Sino-Soviet split. The Icelandic Communists consider the rift as "idiotic and chaotic" and irrelevant to Icelandic concerns. On Czechoslovakia, however, the Icelandic Party abandoned its usual reserve, condemning the invasion by the Soviet-led forces in the strongest possible terms. (The offended Soviets even refused to invite their Icelandic comrades to the 1969 World Conference of Communist Parties!) Since 1968, rather than softening its criticism, the PA has reiterated it and added new attacks on the Soviet-directed normalization in Czechoslovakia.
Notes


5 Ibid., 20-22.


7 For example, the initial response of the PCL to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was to stress U.S. propaganda, Zeitung, 6 June 1956, cited in The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism, Russian Institute, ed. (New York: Colombia University Press, 1956), 96.

8 Sworakowski, op. cit.


11 YICA, 1975.

12 Sworakowski, op. cit.


18. Ibid., 292; although, according to Shulman, on occasion the Soviets were not above giving instructions to the French Party, nor the PCF beyond accepting them. Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), 215-220.

19. For illustrations of this support for Moscow, see, Cahiers du Communiste, May, 1952; Jan., 1950; May, 1950; and for opposition to European defense, ibid., Dec., 1953.


28 L'Humanité, 21 May 1964.

29 Ibid., 22 Aug. 1968.


32 Fejtő, *Dictionnaire, op. cit.*, 94.

33 For reasons broader than just the disagreement over Czechoslovakia.


36 Ibid., 9 May 1974.

37 Le Monde, 19 Nov. 1975.


40 Ibid.

41 YICA, various years.

42 YICA, 1969.


46 Kevin Devlin, "Czechoslovakia and the Crisis of Austrian Communism," *Studies in Comparative Communism*,


51 Upton, op. cit., 111-116, 328.


57 Sworakowski, op. cit.

58 Trager and Bordonaro, op. cit., 742.


60 Sworakowski, op. cit.

61 YICA, 1970.


63 YICA, 1975.

64 Sworakowski, op. cit.


69 Galli, op. cit., 127

70 Togliatti, op. cit., 172-173; L'Unità, 3 July 1956; Rinascita, July, 1956, 369-372; Blackmer, op. cit., 70-79.

71 Ibid., 83-85.


75 Rinascita, 5 Sept. 1964.

76 Ibid., 4 July 1963.

77 L'Unità, 12 Apr. 1962.


81 Ibid., 23 Apr. 1964.


85 Togliatti, Prememoria, in Rinascita, Sept., 1964; William E. Griffith, "European Communism, 1965," 1-38 in

89 Trager and Bordonaro, op. cit., 742.
90 L'Unità, 12 June 1969.
94 Gilberg, op. cit., 1-59.
95 Ibid., 60-156.
96 Friheten, 9 June 1956.
98 Gilberg, op. cit.
100 Johansen, op. cit.
101 Ibid., 348.
104 Gilberg, _op. cit._, 197.
105 _Ibid._, 199-200.
106 Trager and Bordonaro, _op. cit._, 742.
108 Srorakowski, _op. cit._
112 Pelling, _op. cit._, 164-175.
115 _Morning Star_, 24 May 1965.
119 Trager and Bordonaro, _op. cit._, 742.
121 Srorakowski, _op. cit._
123 _De Waarheid_, 11 July 1956.
124 Kool, op. cit. 21-24.
126 YICA, 1966.
127 Fejtö, Dictionnaire, op. cit., 110.
129 YICA, 1968.
131 Popov, op. cit., 39-40.
135 Sparring in Griffith, op. cit., 300-303; Sworakowski, op. cit.
136 Ibid., Sparring in Upton, op. cit., 93-97; Sparring in Griffith, op. cit., 316-319.
137 Ibid., 318-319.
138 Sparring in Upton, op. cit., 98-100.
139 Willenz and Uliassi, op. cit., 53-54.
140 Trager and Bordonaro, op. cit., 742.
142 YICA, 1968.
143 Popov, op. cit., 39.
144 YICA, 1975.
145 Fejtő, "L'évolution des partis communistes," op. cit., 86.

146 Fejtő, Dictionnaire, op. cit., 103.
PART TWO

The Causes of the Diversity
As we have seen in Part One, the communist parties of Western Europe are neither replicas of the CPSU nor carbon copies of each other. Rather, each party has its own distinct character, both domestically and internationally, as the parties differ in size, organization, alliance strategies, domestic programs, and international postures.

What, then, are the causes of this diversity in the positions and postures of the communist parties of Western European democracies? By its very complexity, the diversity points to no easy explanation. Both the Icelandic Communist Party and the Communist Party of Luxembourg are moderate-sized parties in small countries. Yet, the PA is internationally independent and domestically reformist while the PCL is strongly pro-Soviet internationally and relatively conservative in domestic policies. The Danish and Swedish Communist Parties are both small parties in Scandinavia, but the former is firmly aligned with Moscow and domestically conservative, while the latter is independent in its foreign policy and quite revisionist on domestic issues. A third contrast between parties in somewhat similar positions is that between France's PCF and Italy's PCI. Each is a major party in a large predominantly Catholic country of Southern Europe. On the one hand, however, the Italian Communists have long been characterized as conciliatory, opportunistic, independent-minded, and even pragmatic (or as pragmatic as
a communist party can be). In France, on the other hand, the PCF has been described as Stalinist, dogmatic, sometimes sclerotic. What accounts for this difference in parties ostensibly cut from the same political mold, in apparently similar positions, in somewhat similar political systems?

The explanation for the diversity in Western European communism lies in a number of highly interrelated factors whose importance weighs differently for different parties. Ceterus paribus, perhaps one factor, such as leadership or the political system, would be preeminent, but the ceterus are never paribus. Everywhere there is complexity and an interrelation of factors with different ones of these having prime importance in different systems and no single factor standing as determining in all cases.

Although everything may interact dynamically, human language and thought force us to delineate phenomena along spatial and temporal lines if we are to describe and explain the interaction. Having defined the object of inquiry, the role of science is to cut through the rich complexity of reality to focus on those discrete factors accounting for the variations in that object and then to define the nature of the causal relationships. So, we construct a model, a simplification of reality, to explain the diversity in policies and postures of the communist parties of Western Europe. That is the task of Part Two
as in each of the chapters we examine a discrete set of factors, considering their effects on the Western parties.

Considering the Western communist parties from a systems theory perspective, each is located in a dynamic environment that shapes (and in turn is shaped by) the party's behavior. In Chapter III, we will explore the effects of the international environment on the communist parties of Western Europe. Then, in Chapters IV through VI, we will focus on various aspects of the domestic environment, considering the domestic social structure in Chapter IV, the domestic political system in Chapter V, and the constitutional system in Chapter VI.

The postures and positions of the communist parties of Western Europe's democracies are not determined by the parameters of their environments alone. Internal as well as external factors shape the parties' behavior. In Chapter VII, we will explore the importance of leadership; in Chapter VIII, the focus will be on the size and sociology of the party membership and electorate. Finally, in Chapter IX, we will examine the role of history.
CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Rather than being uniquely national political institutions, communist parties by their doctrine and their heritage are members of an international movement. Consequently, developments in the international arena potentially can affect the fortunes and behavior of Western European communist parties. First, the domestic political fortunes of the Western parties are profoundly influenced by international developments concerning the world communist movement and the Soviet Union in particular. Secondly, many of the domestic and international policies of Western European communist parties are in large part shaped, directly and indirectly, by developments abroad.

The International Environment and Domestic Political Fortunes

The electoral fortunes of Western European communist parties are strongly and directly tied to the status of the international communist movement which, for Western Europe, in large part still means the Soviet Union. When the prestige of Moscow and international communism is high, the Western parties share in the glory. When it is low, they reap the misfortune.

At no time has the general prestige of the USSR been greater than at the conclusion of the Second World War
during which the Soviets were widely perceived in the West as fighting bravely and sacrificing heavily for the common goal of defeating the Axis powers. Consequently, every communist party in Western Europe enjoyed relatively great electoral successes in the immediate postwar elections. In Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Iceland, France, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, and Austria, the communists won a larger percentage of the vote in late World War II and early postwar parliamentary elections than they had ever won before or have won since. In two other cases, Luxembourg and Italy, the PCL and PCI each won larger shares of the vote than they had ever won before, shares which have subsequently been surpassed. Only in the highly unusual case of West Germany—a divided, defeated, and occupied country—was this not the case.

Conversely, in times of international tension, the Western European parties fare less well electorally, particularly those parties operating in nations tied formally or informally to the Western political and military alliance. In Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Britain, countries all firmly linked to the Western alliance, the electoral performance of each country's communist party declined during the Cold War years (from about 1947 to about 1960). In Sweden and Switzerland, nations with a Western orientation, but no formal military ties to the Western alliance, there was a less definite
decline in the electoral fortunes of the Swedish and Swiss Communist Parties. On the other hand, in Finland and Austria, neutral countries with some ties to both East and West, the communist parties experienced no electoral decline. The exceptions to this pattern are in two small countries, Luxembourg and Iceland, and in Italy. In Iceland, the PA declined from its 1946 electoral zenith of 19.5 percent, but the decline was not steady, and in Luxembourg, the pattern was unclear because of the presence of both partial and nation-wide elections. Just considering the latter, there does appear to have been a downturn in the PCL's electoral fortunes between 1945 and 1954 and then something of a leveling off. In Italy, however, the PCI successfully bucked the trend by increasing its parliamentary vote percentages despite Cold War tensions.

Similarly, when the international prestige of the Soviet Union is low, the Western parties often pay an electoral price. Throughout much of Western Europe, communist parties absorbed heavy losses in elections following on the heels of the Hungarian crisis of 1956. In parliamentary elections in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Holland, Norway, and Sweden in 1957, 1958, or 1959, communist parties all lost ground. The only exceptions to the pattern occurred in Great Britain where the CPGB held its own in the 1959 election, Luxembourg and Italy where communist parties made very slight gains.
(up .2 percent and .1 percent respectively), and in two neutral nations, Finland (up 1.6 percent in 1958) and Switzerland (up .1 percent in 1959).

The Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 also proved to be the electoral undoing of many of the Western parties. At the time of the invasion, many of the Western parties were engaged in popular front activities and dialogues with Christians and Socialists and welcomed the reforms of the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia as an illustration of socialism "with a human face." The Soviet invasion made a mockery of the electoral tactics of the Western parties. Not to have condemned it would have undermined the Western parties' program of appeals to the noncommunist left in their own countries. Even so, many of the parties who did denounce the invasion suffered electoral setbacks. In Austria, the KPÖ lost 50 percent of its vote in the April, 1969 municipal elections in Vienna. In Sweden, despite the VPK's vociferous dissociation from Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia, the party fell to its lowest postwar share of the vote in the September, 1968 parliamentary balloting. Similarly, in Belgium, Finland, Iceland, and Norway in late 1968, 1969, or early 1970, in parliamentary or municipal elections (in the case of Iceland), the communist party experienced an electoral decline. Only in Luxembourg, where the PCL endorsed the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, did a Western
European communist party record an electoral gain in a major election closely following the invasion.

International developments also profoundly affect Western parties' non-electoral political fortunes. Whether or not noncommunist parties see communist parties as potential alliance partners is largely determined by international factors. In the period of international good feelings following World War II, communist parties were admitted into postwar coalition governments in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, and Norway. With the onset of the Cold War, however, the communists were no longer considered as acceptable partners and in every case either left or were expelled from the government.

In 1956, the Hungarian invasion served to strain relations between communist parties and other parties of the left. In Italy, for example, the events of 1956 led to an increase in tension between the PCI and the Socialists particularly in the CGIL, the Italian labor federation.\(^4\) In Iceland, following the June, 1956 election, the communists entered into a coalition government. The spectre of Hungary, however, served to isolate the communists within the government and to compromise their effectiveness.\(^5\)

Currently, East-West détente has improved Western communist parties' chances of forming electoral and governing alliances with noncommunist parties. As East and
West find ground for rapprochement internationally, so have communist and noncommunist parties reached understandings domestically. It has been no accident that Catholics and Socialists have been more receptive to communist initiatives for "dialogue" and "understandings" in this age of détente than they were in the Cold War era.

The crises of international communism can also become internal crises for nonruling parties. As we have seen, Khrushchev's secret speech, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other international events wreaked no small amount of havoc in a number of the Western parties. Illusions were broken; allegiances were shattered; and divisions were deepened. As Fejtő argues, the cumulative crises of international communism have produced a "God is dead" crisis within many of the Western parties. 6

One result of this has been a decline in revolutionary fervor and dedication. In many of the Western European parties, the organization is withering and the recruitment of new members, especially young people, is alarmingly unsuccessful. 7 In Norway, the NKP's youth organization is insignificantly small 8 and the majority of the declining Austrian Communist Party's membership is over 60 years of age. 9 In Britain, the CPGB organization suffers from high turnover, luke-warm dedication, 10 and major problems in enlisting young people. 11 In 1973, only about 16,000 of the nearly 30,000 members of the party
even paid their dues. Seemingly, the best organized parties are the French, Italian, West German, and Finnish parties which have the funds to hire squadrons of functionaries to supplement party volunteers.

Another result of the crises of international communism has been the proliferation of rival leftist movements--Maoist, Stalinist, Trotskyist, and Anarchist—that have sprung up to challenge the established communist party in virtually every country of Western Europe. In France, the PCF has had to contend with innumerable revolutionary splinter parties and the Italian Communist Party has been faced with opposition from various left-wing terrorist organizations as well as the now relatively tame Il Manifesto group, but the party facing the greatest challenge is the British Communist Party. Among student and union circles, the CPGB has clearly been outflanked on the left, particularly by the Trotskyist Workers Revolutionary Movement.

Developments in world communism other than those directly dealing with the prestige of the Soviet Union and East-West relations also affect Western parties' political fortunes. Events in Portugal, for example, have posed threats to the alliance strategies of Western parties, particularly in Italy and France. For its part, the Italian Communist Party has acted swiftly to dissociate itself from the Portuguese Communists trying to maintain
its credibility as a "democratic" potential party of government. In France, where the PCF has pledged its support for the Portuguese Communist Party, the issue has been one factor underlying the strained relations between the Communist Party and the Socialists.

The International Environment and Party Policy

Historically, the domestic and international policies of the communist parties of Western Europe have been influenced both directly and indirectly by Soviet policy. The various tactics of united front from below, united front, and class against class, were in large part conceived and instituted from Moscow, often for reasons of Soviet foreign policy rather than in the domestic interests of the nonruling parties.

In the beginning, the communist parties of Western Europe exercised considerable sovereignty over their own internal affairs and participated in Comintern activities as near equals with the CPSU. For most of the parties, however, this ceased to be the case after the mid-1920s as Moscow, under the framework of the Comintern Executive, moved to convert the Western parties into tools of Soviet policy. Thereafter, on major questions of policy, at least, instructions came from Moscow.

For example, the popular front policy of the French Communist Party was dictated by the USSR. On its surface,
the popular front in France was the result of fear by French leftists, particularly the Communists, of the possibility of the establishment in France of a regime similar to the Fascist regimes in Germany and Italy—a fear evidently engendered by the nationalist revolt of February 6, 1934, in Paris. According to Célie and Albert Vassart, two well-placed participants in the events of the time, however, this was not the case. Rather, the popular front was a result of the Soviet Union's desire to safeguard its European front by a system of international guarantees\textsuperscript{19} and instructions for the new line came directly from Moscow.\textsuperscript{20}

Perhaps the best illustration of the Western communist parties' historical mimickry of Soviet policies was the gyrations in position revolving around the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the beginning of World War II. Before the agreement was made public, the posture of the Western parties was one of support for anti-fascist popular fronts against the German and Italian fascist menace. After the German-Soviet agreement, the popular front theme was unchanged, but the Western parties unanimously heralded the pact as a move toward peace. Then, when war broke out, the first reaction of the communist parties in the West was one of "patriotic" and "national" support for anti-fascist unity. After the Soviet invasion of Poland (and, in at least a few cases, instructions from Moscow)\textsuperscript{21} their
positions switched. In Britain, the Daily Worker headlined the Soviet military action with "Red Army Takes Bread to Starving Peasants." Meanwhile, in Norway, the NKP daily, Arbeideren, labeled the war "imperialist" and called for an end to resistance. The Danish Party resorted to blaming Churchill and the Social Democrats for their country's occupation.

Throughout Western Europe, the communist line changed from anti-fascist patriotism to "revolutionary defeatism" and even sporadic cooperation with the Nazis. In occupied Denmark, for example, the DKP chose to pursue a policy of strict neutrality towards the Germans, while in France, the PCF sought a modus vivendi with the Germans, apparently receiving tacit approval for the publication of L'Humanité.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June, 1941, communist policy toward the war somersaulted again. In all of Western Europe, communist parties became ardent patriots, organizing active resistance against the Nazis. In occupied Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy, and France, communists were in the forefront of the armed resistance effort. Elsewhere, they took their place among the war's loyalist supporters.

After the war, the Western parties continued their policy of cooperation with bourgeois anti-fascist forces and, as we have seen, participated in governing coalitions.
in several countries. As relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers cooled, however, so did relations between the Western communist parties and their coalition partners. Furthermore, in every case, to a greater or lesser extent, the Western parties adopted the role of defenders of Soviet domestic and foreign policies.

Since destalinization, since Hungary, since the Sino-Soviet rift, since East-West détente, and certainly since the Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968, the Western communist parties have frequently been at odds with the Soviet Union. Invariably, the differences, when they come, come on issues on which there is a conflict of interests between the Western parties and the CPSU, issues that affect the political fortunes of the Western parties in their own political spheres such as the Czech invasion and Soviet cultural policy.

On other issues, however, although most of the Western communist parties are far from Soviet puppets, the positions of the CPSU and Western parties are closely parallel. Unanimously, the Western parties deplored United States' policy in Viet Nam and all other manifestations of "American imperialism." All look on NATO with some degree of hostility and all have at least some residual affinity for the Soviet Union. All support the Soviet viewpoint (if not Soviet tactics) in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute.
In sum, Moscow has historically served as the head of the communist movement in Western Europe, not only symbolically, but in a decision-making capacity as well. In the last two decades, however, Moscow's reins of leadership have fallen slack as more and more the Western parties have taken their heads. What, then, were the now loosened ties that once so firmly bound communists in Western Europe, and how have these ties relaxed?

The first factor that must be considered is that of direct intervention. To what extent are the communist parties of Western Europe instructed agents of the Soviet Union? Because of a scarcity of reliable information, there is no easy answer to this question. The best estimate is that until 1943 extensive direction came from the Third International (read Moscow) and that after the Comintern's dissolution, instructions continued to come from the Soviet Union although not with so much frequency or detail as before. After the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956, however, the Western parties for the most part were free from direct outside control. 27

After the cresting of the revolutionary wave, the Third International became Moscow's tool for controlling the Western parties and during the period of the Comintern, the Kremlin insisted on complete control over member sections. The evidence of massive and direct Soviet interference into the internal affairs of the nonruling parties
is abundant. In 1923 in Norway, the Comintern Executive forced a split in the Norwegian Labor Party to secure control. Even small details of operation of the British Communist Party were dictated by Moscow and in the Netherlands, the Comintern intervened time and again to force purges and leadership shuffles to secure its will. The examples could be multiplied endlessly. What laxity did exist in the Comintern's control over member sections was due to Moscow's indifference, problems of communication, political naivété on the part of Western European communist leaders, and some willful disobedience from Western communists.

The demise of the Comintern did not mean the end of control from Moscow. In 1947, Stalin created the Cominform as an agency for adjusting the policies of the Western communist parties, particularly the French and Italian, to the needs of his diplomacy. Although the Cominform was instrumental in spreading the USSR's Cold War line among the Western parties, it is unclear how much direct intervention actually occurred. Again, the evidence is very sketchy and it is difficult to determine which actions on the part of the Western communist parties were self-motivated and which were the result of direct pressure from Moscow.

Since 1956, it seems that Moscow can no longer exercise direct control of the Western European communist
movement in most countries. Illustrative of this loss of dictatorial control was the World Conference of Communist Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969. Almost certainly, the Soviets' goal for the conference was to revive a formal institutional structure for the movement that would include the bulk of the world's communist parties (omitting, of course, such recalcitrants as the Chinese and Albanians). What Moscow got, however, was only a conference whose decisions were not binding on its participants and which, the Soviets had to guarantee, would not be used to purge the movement of deviant parties. Even to achieve this, the Soviets had to spend several years intensely proselytizing among communist parties.\textsuperscript{32}

Soviet policy itself helps determine the relative freedom of the Western parties to act on their own. In times of international tensions during which Soviet leaders feel threatened--the rise of fascism in Germany, the Cold War period--Moscow exerts its strongest efforts to harness the policies of the Western parties for the defense of the Soviet Union. At other times, however, there is less need for tight control. Currently, even if the Soviet Union had the potential to dictate policy to the Western parties, the present atmosphere of détente reduces Moscow's need for lockstep conformity in Western Europe. As Tiersky argues, "The fundamental implication of Soviet-American détente...is that [the communists] are today more than
ever on their own, without even the old and meaningless
dithyrambics about Soviet support in the 'world revolution'
to justify acting for the Socialist Motherland above all
else."33

Perhaps the strongest tie still binding Western com-
munist parties to Moscow is a psychological one. As the
first socialist state, the Soviet Union embodied the hopes
and dreams of Western European communists and in its role
as ideological, political, and military vanguard of the
coming socialist utopia, the USSR could and did parlay
its prestige into control of the nonruling communist parties.
In the 1920s, the prestige of the Bolshevik Revolution
coupled with the wartime bankruptcy of parliamentary
socialism enabled the CPSU not only to dominate the world
movement, but also to have a powerful voice in each of the
Western parties. While collaboration with Nazi Germany
from August, 1939, to June, 1941, tarnished Moscow's
image, the sacrifices of the Russian people and the suc-
cesses of the Red Army considerably enhanced Soviet pres-
tige throughout Western Europe, particularly among the
ranks of Western European communists. Currently, although
still powerful in some Western parties and in all parties
among many veteran cadres who were socialized into party
activity during an age in which the USSR was seen as an
anti-fascist bastion, the prestige of the Soviet Union
has been shaken--by the purge trials, the Nazi-Soviet
Pact, the revelations about Stalin's crimes, Hungary, the Sino-Soviet split, détente, the Czechoslovakian invasion. No longer is the moral, political, and ideological leadership of the Soviet Union unchallenged in the international movement. Consequently, the psychological ties between the Western European communist parties and the Soviet Union are, in most cases, far weaker in 1976 than they were in 1946 or in 1956.

Another tie between the Soviet Union and West European communist parties is financial. During the Comintern period, most Western parties received international aid with the possible exception of the Swedish Communist Party. Since the dismantling of the Comintern, however, international aid has become much less.

Although proof is hard to come by, a number of Western parties are apparently still at least partially supported from abroad. The Communist Party of Luxembourg is apparently financially dependent on the Soviet Union. It has more money to spend than it can raise domestically and its leading members travel frequently in the USSR and spend their vacations there. Its strong support of Moscow is at least partially the result of these financial ties.

The West German Communist Party has a special relationship with Moscow and the East German Communist Party. During its period of illegality, the KPD was almost totally dependent on East Germany for survival. The bulk of its
funds apparently came from the German Democratic Republic and its leaders lived there in exile. Since being reconstituted as the legal DKP, the West German Communist Party has remained financially dependent on outside sources, particularly East Germany. Finally, Moscow has made the continued legality of the DKP a condition of its rapprochement with the West German government. Not surprisingly, the DKP's foreign and domestic policies are virtually identical with those of the Soviet Union and East Germany.

A number of parties also receive indirect financial support from abroad. In Italy, France, and Finland, communist parties operate commercial enterprises, including export-import concerns and travel agencies that make transactions with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on often rather favorable terms. A portion of their profits are thus a form of indirect subsidy. Realistically, however, the profits directly resulting from trade with communist nations are probably small compared to the parties' total revenues.

Again, evidence is scarce, but it is apparent that Soviet financial support is lacking for at least some of Western Europe's communist parties. In recent years, the British Communist Party, for example, has fallen on hard times. It is perennially short of cash and its daily paper, Morning Star, has been running a deficit.
For most Western European communist parties, however, there is no clear evidence one way or another about whether they are receiving international financial aid and, if so, how much. What is clear, is that the larger mass membership parties with entrenched national positions and reliable domestic sources for funds (members' dues and contributions, state subsidies, salaries of office holders, profits from party enterprises—"Red Capitalism") are potentially less dependent on international aid than the weaker dwarf parties.

Even for parties not financially dependent on outside assistance, Soviet funds can still act as a policy restraint. Apparently, Moscow is not above supporting "Stalinist" oppositions to Western parties whose policies take on too much of an anti-Soviet air. According to McInnes, Russian and East German money supported Austrian hard liners in the KPÖ's factional struggle following the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968.42

Another factor binding Western communist parties to the Soviet Union involves the concept of proximity. Geographical distance is part of this, but more importantly, it also pertains to perceptions of historical and political ties between a Western European nation and the Soviet Union. Finland lies in the shadow of the USSR and much of its history turns around the state of its relations with Russia.43 Consequently, the Soviet Union is relatively salient for the average Finn and particularly salient
for Finnish Communists. Thus, Moscow's potential for indirect influence is relatively great. Secondly, the very fact of geographical closeness makes communication and consultation between the CPSU and the SKP relatively easy. The Kremlin has taken advantage of these circumstances to attempt (unsuccessfully) to mediate the current schism within the SKP.

In contrast to Finland, Iceland is geographically relatively distant to the population centers of the Soviet Union and, historically and politically, quite distant. Consequently, there is little to reinforce pre-existing psychological attachments of Icelandic Communists to Moscow and the potential for direct intervention by the Soviets in PA affairs is relatively limited.

During the Comintern days, proximity, ease of communications, and Soviet perceptions of party salience helped to determine the amount of attention and instruction a Western party received from the Comintern Executive. The French, German, and British parties were very much under the scrutiny of Moscow, while parties off the beaten path in Norway, Sweden, and Iceland enjoyed a measure of benign neglect. In the cases of the Italian and Finnish parties, domestic illegality hampered communications between Moscow and the base of the party, thus allowing each of these parties more freedom than it would otherwise expect.
In this age of "polycentrism," communist parties other than the CPSU can also influence the nonruling parties of Western Europe. The Chinese Communist Party has presented a challenge to the CPSU for political and ideological leadership of the world movement and, in turn, virtually every Western European communist party has been challenged by internal factions or by splinter parties espousing the Chinese positions.

While none of the main line Western European communist parties support Peking's ideological position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the fact of that division has provided the Western parties with a wedge to extract greater autonomy for themselves in the international movement. For one thing, the Chinese rebellion against Soviet dominance in the world movement has given the Western European communists psychological encouragement for their own independent designs. More concretely, the fact of the schism has provided the Western parties with a currency for which they can bargain their own freedom of action. In exchange for general support of Soviet positions and condemnation of the Chinese, Moscow has been willing to accept a greater independence from the Western parties. At the same time, the Western European parties (the more independent ones, at least) are careful not to go too far in their support for Moscow's position. The last thing they want is a complete victory for the Soviets that would restore Russian
hegemony in the international movement and thus threaten their independence.

Relatively successful nonruling parties have served as models for neighboring parties. In Scandinavia, the Norwegian Communist Party has gone part way in imitating its innovative Swedish neighbors. The Italian Communist Party has recently served as a model for the Swiss Communists with the two having close ties.\textsuperscript{45} Also, the Luxembourg Communist Party has strong links with the French Party.

Finally, a major development in the international relations of Western European communist parties is increased regional contact and cooperation among like-minded communist parties in Western Europe. As McInnes argues, regional cooperation among communist parties offers a "proletarian internationalist" justification for the Western parties to escape Soviet tutelage.\textsuperscript{46} In January, 1974, for example, at the rally of Western communist parties in Brussels, the Western parties successfully resisted Moscow's efforts to call an international meeting to read China and her allies out of the world movement.\textsuperscript{47} In late 1975, another indication of a growing regional autonomy among communist parties in Western Europe appeared as the Italian and French Parties published a common declaration that insisted on the independence of each party.\textsuperscript{48}
Notes

1See the appendix.


9Devlin, op. cit., 16.


11YICA, 1975.

12YICA, 1974.


22 Daily Worker, 20 Sept. 1939.

23 Johansen, op. cit., 326.


25 Ibid., 13-14.


30 Sworakowski, op. cit.


32 John P. Sontag, "International Communism and Soviet Foreign Policy," Review of Politics, XXXII (Jan., 1970),


YICA, 1974.


YICA, 1974.


McInnes, *op. cit.*, 148.


YICA, 1974.

McInnes, *op. cit.*, 154.


CHAPTER IV

DOMESTIC SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Although the international environments of the Western European communist parties are similar, each party must function in a unique domestic environment. A primary aspect of that domestic environment is the social structure, including, in particular, the nature and intensity of the ethnic, religious, class, and geographic cleavages in each nation in which a communist party must function.

Because of its complexity and the complexity of the interrelationships of several variables, it is difficult to make precise statements about the relationship between a country's social structure and the policies and position of its communist party. Three broad generalizations can be drawn, however. First, contrary to simplistic Marxist analysis, there is no universal direct relationship between social structure and the electoral success of Western communist parties. Secondly, the programs and policies of the parties are, in part, shaped by the necessity of conforming to or coping with the domestic social structure as it acts as a backdrop for political activity. Finally, the social structure, particularly social cleavages, tends to be reflected in the organization of the Western parties.
Social Structure and Electoral Success

Although Einaudi, et. al., argue that communist strength in Italy and France is in part the result of social, economic, and religious issues,¹ the most commonly hypothesized relationship between social structure and communist party strength is one focusing on social class. Among the various forms this hypothesis has taken are the crude Marxist proposition that the communist party is the party of the proletariat,² Lipset’s argument that those on the lower end of an economic stratification system in poorer countries tend toward political radicalism,³ and Greene’s hypothesis that communism is strong where there are substantial unmediated cleavages along socioeconomic lines.³ The evidence, however, indicates that social cleavages alone, be they religious, ethnic, geographical, or economic, do not necessarily lead to a strong communist movement.

Considering each type of structural cleavage in turn, there is no clear universal relationship between polarization on religious issues and the strength of communist parties. In Italy and France, the PCI and PCF have benefitted from a traditional anticlericalism with each winning large chunks of the anticlerical vote.⁴ In Italy, Poggi has created an index of clericalism based on answers to several questions concerning the right and duty of the Church and its agents to intervene in public life.
The index demonstrates that high scores on clericalism are associated with voting for the Christian Democratic Party and low scores with support for the PCI. As we can see in Table 1, however, not all of those scoring low on the clericalism index voted communist. Some voted Christian Democrat, others opted for other parties. What is more, a minority of those scoring high on the index voted for the PCI. While there is evidence for a strong relationship between the clericalism-anticlericalism cleavage and communist strength in Italy, the two are not perfectly congruent by any means.⁵

Similarly, on the basis of a survey taken in late 1963 and early 1964 in Italy, Hazelrigg⁶ discovers a strong relationship between the strength of individuals' religious devotion and political tendency. As we can see from Table 2, leftist parties do better among those individuals with weaker ties to the Church than they do with moderate or strict Catholics, but by no means are the religious and political cleavages congruent. Nearly a third of the group least strongly tied to the Church vote for center or right-wing parties while more than a third of the strict Catholics vote for the left.

Barnes reports that communist voters in Italy are far less likely to be regular church attenders than are supporters of the Christian Democrat Party.⁷ As we can see from Tables 3 and 4, the PCI draws the large majority
TABLE 1. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AND COMMUNIST VOTE IN ITALY IN 1958, BY CLERICALISM INDEX AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, IN PERCENTAGES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score on Clericalism Index</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Status</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Lower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% voting DC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% voting PCI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Tendency</th>
<th>Marginal Catholic</th>
<th>Moderate Catholic</th>
<th>Strict Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leftist</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leftist = PCI, Socialists, and Social Democrats  
Centrist = Republicans, Christian Democrats  
Rightist = Liberal, Monarchists, neofascists

TABLE 3. ATTENDED CHURCH IN PREVIOUS SEVEN DAYS, 1956, BY PARTY, IN PERCENTAGES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>PSI</th>
<th>PSDI</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>MON</th>
<th>MSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSI = Socialist Party  
PSDI = Social Democratic Party  
DC = Christian Democrat Party  
PLI = Liberal Party  
MON = Monarchist Party  
MSI = Neofascist Party

TABLE 4. FREQUENCY OF CHURCH ATTENDANCE IN 1968, BY PARTY, IN PERCENTAGES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>PSIUP</th>
<th>PSI-PSDI</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>MON</th>
<th>MSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least once a week</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often during the year</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PSIUP = Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity

of its support from individuals with only loose ties to the Church. Again, however, the PCI falls well short of monopolizing the unchurched vote and a considerable minority of communist supporters are regular church goers.

The PCI's continued ability to attract at least a portion of the votes of regular church attenders and inability to monopolize the votes of the unchurched is illustrated by Sani's 1972 data. (Table 5.) Of those who attend church "once a week" or "often," nearly 17 percent vote communist. On the other hand, only about a third of those who rarely if ever attend church support the communists.8

In France, Stoetzel finds that in 1952, 77 percent of the French Communist Party's voters practiced no religious observances.9 In a more recent survey in 1973, the I.F.O.P. (Institute Francaise de l'Opinion Publique) reports that French Communist voters are less likely to claim to be Christians than the electorate as a whole (61 percent to 82 percent) and that PCF voters tend to be less involved in Church sponsored organizations than the electorate in general (11 percent to 25 percent).10

Although the communists in Italy and France have apparently benefitted from traditional anticlericalism, it is not true that anticlericalism is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a strong communist party. In other climes, particularly in much of Latin America,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Rarely or Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

anticlericalism has not produced strong communist parties. Conversely, in other countries, communism has gained a footing without the presence of a clerical-anticlerical cleavage. In Iceland and Finland, Latin anticlericalism is largely unknown, but communist parties nevertheless flourish.

Throughout Western Europe, while communist party members and supporters tend to be areligious (if not antireligious), it is not true that all or most areligious individuals are communist supporters. In Table 6, we can see, for example, that the number of people responding that they seldom if ever attend church is proportionately greater in Sweden than in France. Yet, we know that the Swedish Communist Party is far smaller than France's PCF.

What is more, strong communist parties have not emerged from relatively severe religious cleavages in Ireland and Austria, nor from less intense divisions in the Netherlands, Sweden, or Norway. If anything, religious conflict has hampered the development of the Irish Communist Party. In the North, CPI members tend to be from Protestant backgrounds, while in the South, Catholic. Consequently, the CPI has had difficulty defining a "Marxist" solution to the problems of Northern Ireland that does not alienate a major sector of its membership.

Although the communist parties of Western Europe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Last week</th>
<th>Last year</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

have not ignored ethnic and linguistic divisions, they have been unable to build much of a power base on such cleavages. In Belgium, a nation with a relatively intense ethnic division, the PCB has courted the minority Walloons by endorsing constitutional revisions that would give them more autonomy. Consequently, the party's strength is largely concentrated in Wallonia\textsuperscript{12} and all its deputies are elected from there. Nevertheless, while the PCB may be a regional party, in no sense is Wallonia a communist region. As Hill reports, in 1968 only 3 percent of the Walloon voters claimed to prefer the PCB.\textsuperscript{13}

Similarly, the Communist Party of Switzerland also has a regional flavor to it. Although the French-speaking cantons have only about 20 percent of the population, the PdA in 1971 gathered 71 percent of its vote and all 5 of its deputies from them.\textsuperscript{14} As with the Belgian case, however, communist party strength remains modest in the French-speaking regions.

Finally, ethnic cleavages in the rest of Western Europe have provided little grist for the communist mills. In Finland and Italy, ethnic minorities tend to support peculiarly ethnic parties. In Britain, the CPGB has historically drawn much of its support from the Celtic fringe regions, but the recent emergence of sectionalist parties in Britain has diminished this base.

Although communist strength often tends toward regional
concentrations, it would be incorrect to say that communist strength to any great extent is based on regional cleavages. In much of Scandinavia, the major cleavage has been an urban-rural one. Although communist parties have strongholds in backwoods sectors of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (in addition to concentrations in industrial areas), communist support is more the result of economic insecurity and traditional radicalism than an urban-rural cleavage. ¹⁵

In Italy, the major regional cleavage is between the South, the Mezzogiorno, and the more prosperous North. Although the PCI has addressed a number of appeals to the problems of the South, one can hardly say that the Communist Party is built on that cleavage. ¹⁶

Finally, throughout the continent, communist strength tends toward concentrations in urban areas such as Paris, Copenhagen, and Oslo. The reason for this, however, is less an urban-rural cleavage than the concentration of industrial workers in urban areas.

The relationship between class divisions and communist party strength is complex. First, there is no simple one-to-one relationship between the size of the working class or the poorer classes and communist party strength. If there were, of course, there would be a strong communist party in virtually every country of Western Europe, which is not the case. Turning to more
specific evidence, even in countries with mass communist parties, large proportions of the working class are neither party members nor voters. Ecological studies in France and Italy between communist voting and the percentage population employed in industry show little correlation. Mattei Dogan reports that in Italy in the late 1960s, while about 49 percent of the PCI's vote came from the industrial working class, only about 38 percent of that class were communist supporters. Of 9,760,000 votes cast by industrial workers in 1958, he estimates that only 3,700,000 went to the PCI. Similarly, on the basis of a 1968 survey, Barnes finds that only 35 percent of the working class support the PCI. (See Table 7.)

Ehrmann reports that in France in 1962, 70 percent of the PCF's vote came from workers and their families, but less than one-half of the working class voted communist. In the 1956 election, Dogan estimates that of 9,050,000 votes cast by industrial or agricultural workers, only about 4,200,000 of these went to the PCF.

In Finland, Pesonen finds that in 1966, 79 percent of the supporters of the communists' electoral front, the SKDL, were working class, but only 34 percent of the working class voted for the SKDL. In Pesonen's earlier study of the 1958 parliamentary election in Tampere, Finland, he reports that although 94 percent of the communist voters were workers, two-thirds of the workers in
TABLE 7. PARTY ID IN ITALY IN 1968, BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AND SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS, IN PERCENTAGES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Class</th>
<th>Subjective Class</th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>PSIUP</th>
<th>PSDI</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>PLI</th>
<th>MON</th>
<th>MSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the city voted noncommunist and Allardt's nationwide data indicate that only 40 percent of Finnish workers prefer the SKP.

Neither is communist support predominantly drawn from the poorer classes. According to Allardt, communist voters in Finland are of somewhat lower socioeconomic status than those who vote for the Social Democrats, but the difference is very slight. On the basis of his 1947 to 1954 research in Sweden, Rydenfelt concludes that the trades and occupations showing the highest percentage communist vote are among the best paid rather than the worst paid. Also, there is no relationship in Sweden, he argues, between unemployment and the communist vote.

In Italy, one ecological study even finds a positive correlation between PCI vote at the commune level and per capita income, while Barnes' survey evidence shows that of the lowest income group, those earning less than 50,000 lire a month, 15 percent voted communist, but 48 percent supported the Christian Democrats in 1968.

In France, a 1965 survey indicates that of the 7 largest electoral organizations, the PCF's electorate had the lowest percentage of voters with monthly incomes below 500 francs.

Secondly, communist party strength has a more diverse base than just the industrial working class. Dogan estimates that more than half of the votes of the Italian
Communist Party come from groups other than the industrial working class with agricultural workers contributing 36 percent of the party's poll. He estimates that of the PCI's 6,700,000 votes in the 1958 election, 3,700,000 came from industrial workers, 1,300,000 from agricultural workers, 800,000 from tenant farmers, 830,000 from the petty bourgeoisie or small farmers, and 70,000 from the urban middle class.\textsuperscript{33}

In France, too, communist voters come from a broader spectrum than just the working class. Survey data (Table 8) indicate that only about half of the PCF's electorate are workers and although many of those classified as "inactive" are retired workers, significant portions of the party's vote comes from other sectors of the population.

A similar pattern holds for other countries where data is available. Newton indicates that almost 25 percent of the British Communist Party are middle class.\textsuperscript{34} According to Hill's 1968 figures, more than a quarter of the Belgian Communist Party's voters are middle class.\textsuperscript{35}

Third, in countries where the communist party is strong, one of its soundest bases of support is the industrial proletariat. In France, even in years when the communist vote has been in decline, such as 1958 and 1968, the PCF has been able to count on certain bastions of strength. Foremost among these are the working class
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>Adult Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

suburbs of Paris—the "Red Belt." Although the support for the Italian Communist Party is more diffuse, the PCI can also rely on a hard core of working class support, particularly in the "Red Belt" section of central Italy. Like its French and Italian counterparts, the Finnish Communist Party has powerful bastions of support in varying economic and social regions, one of which is among industrial workers. In Iceland and Luxembourg, too, the communist party enjoys a base among workers. Finally, even in countries where communism is weak, a large portion of what strength it does have is among workers.

Fourth, in spite of the fact that every Western European communist party has a core of strength composed of workers, not every national proletariat has even a large minority allied to the communists. In Norway, Austria, and Ireland, the communists have made almost no inroads among workers. In Britain, although the CPGB has some strength in certain unions, its success in converting even a minority of rank and file workers has been minimal. In Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, the communists have only been able to establish a foothold among workers.

Finally, the relationship between communist strength and the intensity of class cleavage is not a simple, direct relationship. In France, Italy, and Finland, nations which have historically witnessed severe class
cleavages, 39 communism has flourished among the workers while countries such as Britain and Switzerland, which have experienced relatively few class conflicts, have no substantial communist movement. 40 But, while the working class movements of Austria and Norway, to name two examples, have historically been quite radical with each country experiencing a good measure of class division, neither country has a strong communist movement. 41 Even more difficult to explain on the basis of class cleavages is the case of Iceland. It is a small country with neither political rigidity nor class division, but, nevertheless, has one of the stronger communist parties of Western Europe. 42

What can be concluded about the relationship between communist strength and social structure is that the most successful Western European parties have been able to establish bases of support in more than one large socio-economic group. In France, the PCF has strongholds of support not only among industrial workers in and around Paris, but also in certain traditionally leftist provinces in central and southern France. 43 That the PCF is not exclusively working class is indicated by party statistics on the social composition of its membership. In 1966, 60 percent of the PCF were workers (43 percent from the private sector, 13.5 percent public, and 3 percent agricultural), 18.6 percent were white collar employees,
6.7 percent farm owners, 9 percent intellectuals, and nearly 6 percent tradesmen and artisans. 44 Geographically, the PCF vote is well-distributed across the map of France (with, or course, some concentrations). 45

The Finnish Communist Party, too, has more than one foundation of support. One of the SKP's bases is among traditionally leftist workers in the South and West. In the North and East, however, the SKP is strongest in the most backward parts of the country in rural areas where unemployment is often high—what Allardt calls "backwoods communism." 46

Similarly, the Icelandic Communist Party has several bases of support. Its main support comes from urban areas from workers, students, and intellectuals, but it also finds support in small fishing and processing towns along the eastern and northern coasts. 47

The Western European communist party with the most diverse base of support is the Italian Communist Party. In addition to urban working class support, the PCI has attracted large shares of votes in rural districts from share tenants (Mezzadri), farm workers, and poorer peasants. 48 According to a 1963 survey, 37 percent of Italian agriculture workers, 29 percent of the manual workers, 18 percent of the small farmers, 19 percent of the salaried office workers, 19 percent of the artisans, 19 percent of those employed in trade and commerce, 17 percent of the
white collar workers, and 13 percent of the professionals, managers, and owners say that they prefer the PCI.\textsuperscript{49}

Although the foundation of the Communist Party of Luxembourg is essentially working class, the party is not totally concentrated in one group. Its bases of support include not only urban workers, but also miners from the industrial south.\textsuperscript{50} In general, however, the bases of the support of the PCL are far less diverse than those of the other relatively successful communist parties of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{51}

The importance of social cleavages for Western European communist parties is that they provide fertile soil from which a party may seek nourishment. Although the absence of major social cleavages does not preclude communist strength (witness Iceland) nor their presence insure communist success (witness Austria), cleavages, be they clerical-anticlerical,\textsuperscript{52} ethnic, regional, or class, provide bases for communist parties to build support. A clerical-anticlerical cleavage as in France and Italy; a large, isolated industrial proletariat as in much of Europe; or sharp ethnic divisions as in Belgium, can all be fertile ground for the development and sustenance of a communist party that can skillfully exploit the divisions for its own ends.

On the other hand, an overwhelmingly Catholic country such as Ireland (where as much as 90 percent of the pop-
ulation are practicing Catholics\textsuperscript{53}) or a wealthy, predominantly bourgeois nation such as Switzerland provide little natural support for the communists.

Social Structure and Party Policies

Whether a communist party is able to take advantage of the opportune conditions provided by social cleavages or to flourish despite relatively consensual surroundings (as in Iceland) depends on a number of factors, one of which is how well it adapts its programs and policies to its domestic environment. Although the size and strength of nonruling communist parties is not determined by the social structure, their political success depends at least in part on how well they adapt their programs to different socioeconomic groups. The more intense the cleavages, the better the opportunity for the communists to find a receptive audience.

The case of the Icelandic Communist Party demonstrates, however, that the absence of major social cleavages does not condemn a communist party to political sterility. In Iceland, communist success has depended in part on the well-directed exploitation of certain characteristics of the economic and social development of the nation.\textsuperscript{54} As well as workers' issues and the issue of international neutrality, the PA has successfully appealed to fishermen and fishing interests by strongly championing the rights of Icelandic fishermen in the "cod war" with Britain.\textsuperscript{55}
In Finland, too, the communists have achieved success in appealing to diverse groups. In the developed industrial areas of the South and West, the SKP has taken advantage of the traditional radicalism of Finnish workers to establish a stronghold of support. In the North and East, however, the party has found success by pitching its appeals to displaced, "alienated" workers in economically backward regions experiencing rapid social change.56

No other Western European communist party has sought to appeal to a broader range of social and economic groups than the Italian Communist Party. Once called a "vast Tammany Hall" by Gunnar Myrdal, the PCI has tailored its brand of Marxism to attract industrial workers in the North, peasant farmers in the South, city dwellers, Catholics, and even members of the middle class. Rather than just a working class organization, Togliatti saw the PCI as encompassing all but the ruling class.57 "It is necessary," he declared, "to attract into the party all the active elements that are in the working and intellectual classes and to make of our party a party with a mass character."58

In the Italian South, the PCI has courted support through establishing mass organizations and agricultural cooperatives, supporting agrarian reform, and emphasizing local issues and personalities59 and its success is reflected in election results for the Chamber of Deputies.
In 1946, the PCI won only 10.2 percent of the vote in the South, but in 1963, that figure was 23.7 percent.\textsuperscript{60}

The PCI has also exerted strong efforts to reach a \textit{modus vivendi} with the Church and to attract Catholic laymen to the party. To gain the neutrality if not the support of the Vatican, the Italian Communists agreed to the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the new republican constitution,\textsuperscript{61} endorsed religious freedom in Italy,\textsuperscript{62} and attacked the Soviets for their anti-religious campaign of 1963.\textsuperscript{63} Since Pope John's \textit{Pacem in Terris} in 1963, the Catholic Church itself has been more receptive to communist advances and the two great social forces of modern Italy have engaged in a dialogue to reach understanding on common interests.\textsuperscript{64} For the PCI, the fruits of its approaches toward the Church have been an increased acceptance among Catholic laymen and, significantly, in the June, 1975 regional elections, for the first time, the Church hierarchy refrained from specifically endorsing the Christian Democrats.\textsuperscript{65}

In France, too, the Communist Party presents a platform designed to appeal to peasants,\textsuperscript{66} small businessmen, and workers. Like the Italians, the French Communists have pursued a policy of \textit{la main tendue} ("the extended hand") toward Catholics, but the French version has not been so far-reaching. It has been between individual communists and Catholics, rather than formal spokesmen
(as in Italy) and has been more sporadic. Since the purging of Roger Garaudy, the PCF's chief advocate of rapprochement with the Church, relations between the party and the Church have cooled considerably.

The group most receptive to the courtship of the French Communists is the workers. By defending their immediate interests, the PCF has won the allegiance of a large portion of the French working class. According to a 1966 national survey, more Frenchmen consider the PCF the "party of the workers," (41 percent) than any other single description (such as "grand force of the left," (17 percent), "the party that wants revolution," (7 percent)).

Elsewhere, too, communist parties have attempted to capitalize on domestic social divisions by gearing their programs to appeal to the interests of various social groups. In Belgium, the PCB has built most of its modest success on appeals to the minority Walloons and to miners and industrial workers in Wallonia and Brussels. The communist parties of West Germany and Great Britain direct many of their efforts toward workers and trade unionists.

The relationship between social structure and communist party programs and policy is not that the former determine the latter. The presence of Catholics or peasants or urbanites within a political system does not dictate policy. Rather, the influence of social structure lies
in the fact that as a major part of the communist parties' domestic environment, those parties must in some way deal with it. They may harness the political energy created by social cleavages to their own advantage as in France and Italy or, failing in this, be torn apart themselves by those very cleavages, as in Ireland. Social structure affects communist parties' programs in that the parties mold their particular brand of communism to appeal to the interests of the different social groups in their domestic environments. Since the domestic social environments of the Western parties differ, each is faced with somewhat different exigencies and, in part, their different policies and programs are the result of these differences. Consequently, while the Western parties' international environment, because of its similarity for each of the parties, makes for similarities in the parties' behavior, their domestic social environment, because of its diversity, makes for differences.

Social Structure and Organization

In a number of Western European communist parties, the organizational structure of the party mirrors salient social cleavages. Although since 1970 the communist parties of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have been unified, the CPI reflects the political and religious cleavages in that divided land. The Executive Committee
of the party is divided into North and South branches with the party general-secretary, Michael O'Riordan, being from the South, and the party chairman, Andrew Barr, from the North. With each branch holding a veto, the CPI has found it difficult to make policy decisions on matters involving Northern Ireland and Irish unification.\(^{74}\)

Like the Irish Party, the Belgium Communist Party is divided along lines reflecting the nation's major social cleavage. Since 1966, the PCB has been divided into Walloon and Flemish branches with each having the right of veto.\(^{75}\)

Similarly, the Swiss Communist Party's structure reflects the nation's multilingual character with each of the three major linguistic groups formally represented on the Central Committee. Of its 50 members, 32 are French-speaking, 15 German, and 3 Italian. Also, both German- and French-speaking members are represented on the five man secretariat.\(^{76}\)

Finally, the organizational variations in the Italian Communist Party are in large part the result of variations in the nation's social structure. In the North, the PCI is built on the standard factory cell structure while in the South no strong cell network has been created and the section is essentially the primary unit. There, the party reflects the traditional character of the largely
agricultural economy where kinship and personality dominate. Keeping with the traditional pattern of party organization in the South, the PCI has evolved a structure there that is clientelistic.
Notes

1 As well as the stagnation of capitalism after and before World Wars I and II and the failure of either state to develop a political class conscious of its responsibilities and an administrative machinery fully able to perform the tasks of a modern state. Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach, Aldo Garosci, *Communism in Western Europe* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1951), 10-12.

2 In terms of voters if not necessarily in terms of members. The party, of course, is the vanguard of the proletariat and thus may be more heterogeneous in its composition.


5 Gianfranco Poggi, *Le preferenze politiche degli italiani: analisi di alcuni sondaggi pre-electorali* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968), quoted in Samuel H. Barnes, "Italy: Religion and Class in Electoral Behavior," 171-226 in Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1974), 208-210. A problem with this and other surveys taken in Western Europe is the refusal of many respondents to state a partisan preference. These respondents are usually concentrated on the left; so, the communist proportion of the sample is invariably underrepresented. Since there is no reason to believe that those communists who refuse to identify themselves are similar to those who do, we must accept survey findings with at least some reservations.


7 Barnes, *op. cit.*, 195.


78 percent in 1968, Hill, op. cit., 48.

Ibid., 49.


Dogan, "Parties and Strata in France and Italy," op. cit., 158.

Barnes, op. cit., 206.


27 Allardt, op. cit., 56.


30 Barnes, op. cit., 204.

31 Sondages, 1965.

32 Dogan, "La stratificazione," op. cit., 454.

33 Dogan, "Parties and Strata," op. cit., 158.


37 Tarrow, op. cit., 131-133.


43 Ehrmann, op. cit., 214.


45 Ranger, op. cit.


47 YICA, 1974.


49 Quoted in Tarrow, op. cit., 134.

50 YICA, 1974.

51 This, as we shall see in Chapter VIII, is one of the causes of the PCL's rigid domestic and foreign policies.

52 But not, apparently, between opposing religious persuasions. In the competition between two dogmas, there is no place for a third.

Olmstead, op. cit.; Gilberg, "Patterns," op. cit.

YICA, 1974.

Allardt, "Patterns of Class Conflict," op. cit.

Rinascita, 29 Aug. 1964.

Quoted in Tarrow, op. cit., 123.

Ibid.

Ibid., 175.


New York Times, 16 June 1975; nevertheless, the Vatican has been careful not to support the Communists. Ibid., 10 Nov. 1975.

Angelo Macchi, "Il 'Compromesso Storico,'" Aggiornamenti sociali, XXV (April, 1974), 233-246.


Heinz Timmerman, "National Strategy and International Autonomy: The Italian and French Communist Parties,"
Studies in Comparative Communism, V (Summer/Autumn, 1972), 250-276, 262.


72 Sondages, 1966.


74 YICA, 1975.

75 YICA, 1975.

76 YICA, 1975.

77 Tarrow, op. cit., 267-270; see, also, Alan Stern, "Political Legitimacy in Local Politics: The Communist Party in Northeastern Italy," 221-258 in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Communism in Italy and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL SYSTEM

Perhaps the most important aspect of a communist party's domestic environment is the political system. First, other left-wing parties compete with the communists for political resources thus directly affecting the communists' political success. At the same time, it is usually these same leftist competitors who are the primary possible alliance partners for the communists. What is more, because of the ambivalent position of leftist parties as both potential rivals and partners of the communists, they can indirectly influence the shape of the communists' policy postures both domestically and internationally.

Secondly, communist parties in Western European democracies are affected by the nature of the party systems in which they operate. Party systems differ both in number of parties and in degree of polarity. Depending upon the size of a communist party, its political prospects are affected by these two aspects of the party system and may modify its policies accordingly. Indirectly, then, the party system can influence communist policy positions.

Thirdly, the policies and positions of the Western communist parties are influenced by the nature and strength of actual and potential party auxiliaries such as unions
and youth organizations. On the one hand, communist parties use auxiliaries to shield themselves from environmental uncertainties, but, on the other, these organizations act as ties between the parties and the political system.

Finally, the political culture in which each communist party is embedded shapes both the communists' strength and political position. Political cultures differ in their receptivity to communism; so, different political cultures offer different prospects for communist party establishment and growth. As with social structure, the political culture indirectly influences party policies in that to be successful, communist parties find it necessary to appeal to salient characteristics of their domestic political culture.

Left-Wing Political Parties

Social Democratic Parties.

Throughout Western Europe, nonruling communist parties are faced with a variety of other leftist parties with whom they sometimes compete and sometimes cooperate. Historically, the most important of these, both as competitors and as allies, have been social democratic parties.

Major communist parties in Western Europe are found only where antedated by strong socialist movements which split into social democratic and communist segments. In Italy, the PCI was formed when a group of radical Socialists
seceded from the Socialist Party at its Seventeenth Congress in Livorno and joined the Third International. ¹

Similarly, the French Communist Party began as the result of a split in the Socialist Party at Tours in October, 1921.² Although its founding came in Moscow in 1918, the Finnish Communist Party was composed of the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party whose leaders fled following a bloody civil war.³ Finally, the communist parties of Luxembourg and Iceland were formed following divisions in social democratic ranks, in 1930 in Iceland, 1921 in Luxembourg.⁴

In countries where communist parties were born as a result of a fusion of small left-wing groups as in Britain and Austria, or were virtually implanted from Moscow as in Ireland,⁵ communism has been weak. But in other countries—Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, although communist parties emerged from splits in social democratic ranks, they have failed to develop. How are these parties differentiated from the parties of France, Italy, Finland, Luxembourg, and Iceland, all of which grew into relatively successful parties?

Thomas Greene argues the importance of elites' initiative, the manner of party formation, and the timing of that formation.

Where socialism is strong, but communism weak the explanation lies in the political choice of left-wing elites at a critical juncture in modern history.
Modern CPs are strong only where their early leadership, clientele, and organizational network came directly from strong socialist parties already in existence, and only at the time when the Bolshevik Revolution and the organization of the Comintern gave impetus to a splintering of the political left. 6

Thus, Greene argues, communist parties are weak where based on a fusion of left-wing groups as in Britain and Austria or where the socialist party avoided the splintering caused by the Bolshevik Revolution and founding of the Comintern, as in Sweden, Belgium, Holland, and Norway.7

Although Greene's point about the role of elites is insightful and his statement about the manner of formation of communist parties is empirically accurate, his thesis on timing is not totally correct. He neglects the cases of the Danish and Swiss Communist Parties, both of which split from socialist parties after the Russian Revolution (1917 for the DKP, 1921 in Switzerland), and both of which have failed to develop into significant communist parties.8

In addition to Greene's point about the role of elites, the key underlying factors in the early development of communist strength in Western Europe were the political strength of the parent social democratic party and the communists' early position vis-à-vis the social democrats. Communist parties in Western Europe became strong: (1) only where they had a loyal base of indigenous support; (2) only where there were strong leftist traditions; and (3) only where the social democratic party initially was not so strong as to overwhelm the communists, parti-
cularly in the labor movement. First, in France, Italy, Finland, Luxembourg, and Iceland, communism began with a firm foundation of leftist support. In France, after the split at Tours, 89 of the 96 old Socialist federations and 110,000 of the 179,800 members elected to follow the PCF and although its strength declined until the 1930s, the party maintained a firm core of support.9 The Italian Communist Party did not succeed in rallying even half of the old Socialist Party to its banner, but, nevertheless, enjoyed a solid core of organizational and mass support following the split at Livorno, particularly among workers.10 Additionally, the party was blessed with a core of very capable leaders including Gramsci, Togliatti, Terracini, and Tasca.11 Although born in exile, the Finnish Communist Party held a solid base among emigré working class leaders in Russia and rank and file workers back in Finland.12 When the communists finally seceded from the Social Democratic Party in Iceland in 1930, they constituted a small, but dedicated base. Subsequent infusions of dissident left-wing Social Democrats swelled the party's ranks into a major force in Icelandic politics. Finally, the Communist Party of Luxembourg began as a small core of radical leftists. Despite its early political weakness, the PCL soon established a base for itself, particularly among left-wing workers.13
Secondly, in all of these countries, there was a firm Marxist tradition. Both France and Italy possessed long socialist histories with syndicalist and anarchist undercurrents. In both countries, socialism had been a powerful political force during and before the First World War. In Finland, class divisions intensified into civil war in 1918. Also, Luxembourg and Iceland were heirs to traditions of leftist strength.

Finally, in each of the countries where communism developed into a powerful national force, the social democrats lacked the strength in both the political and union arenas to prevent the communists from gaining a foothold. In each instance, the social democrats did not enjoy an early left-wing political dominance or the national power that comes from the cabinet and, in each instance, the social democrats were not firmly entrenched in the labor movement. Consequently, the newly emergent communist party was able to lay a foundation for itself both politically and in the labor movement.

In France, the new French Communist Party overshadowed the Socialist rump in both membership and organization. Although by 1924, the Socialists had reversed the relationship, they lacked the strength decisively to undercut the PCF's position, particularly that strength that comes from holding the reins of government.

In Italy, the split at Livorno had seen only a minor-
ity of the Socialist Party opt for communism, but, ironi
cally, fascism saved the PCI from possible isolation on the
left. In late 1926, Mussolini outlawed both the PCI and
the Socialist Party driving them underground. Since
organizationally the PCI was better equipped to deal with
illegality than the Socialists (as well as because of the
advantageous circumstances of the Resistance), the Com-
munists emerged from World War II firmly entrenched at
near equal status with the Socialists. 17

Illegality and exile made times rough in the early
days of the Finnish Communist Party, but bourgeois parties
controlled the government and the civil war had weakened
the Social Democrats' organization. Consequently, the
SKP was able to secure and broaden its base among leftist
elements in Finland. 18 After World War II, the legalized
SKP was aided in its emergence as a major political force
by the fact that the Social Democrats had been compromised
by wartime association with the bourgeois parties. As
Sparring argues, in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, the pol-
itical labor movement became practically identical with
social democracy, but defeat in World War II ended a similar
development in Finland. 19 Subsequently, the Communist and
Social Democratic Parties in Finland have been at near
equal strength.

In Iceland, the left-wing of the Social Democratic
Party did not secede to form the Communist Party of Ice-
land until 1930. At that time, although formidable, the Social Democrats lacked the political leverage to crush the communist upstarts either in the unions or politically. Then, in 1936, another faction of the Social Democrats broke away to join the Communists, further weakening the parent party. Similarly, despite the early electoral weakness of the Communist Party of Luxembourg, it survived and built a base from which to grow in the 1930s largely because the Luxembourg Socialist Party lacked the strength to dominate the left. 20

Communism failed to develop beyond an isolated sect in countries where one or more of the three conditions was not met or where, as Greene argues, no significant group of socialist elites opted for communism. 21 The Communist Parties of Austria and Britain were born of fusions of leftist groups rather than a fission of the Socialists and both failed to carve out large chunks of support from the working class. Additionally, in both countries, the social democratic parties operated large and successful organizations which succeeded in thoroughly isolating their communist competitors. 22 Similarly, in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and elsewhere, communist parties were never able successfully to compete with powerful social democratic parties who controlled the unions and, at least potentially, the government. Communism failed to grow in these countries because, as Gilberg says of the
Norwegian case, the social democrats presented an alternative on the left superior to anything the communists could offer.\(^{23}\)

In the decades since most Western European communist parties were founded in the 1920s, communist strength has been very much related to the strength of the social democratic parties. First, in general, where socialism is weak, communism is weak. Second, where communism is moderately strong, socialism is moderately strong. Finally, where socialism is very strong, communism is weak.

In countries without strong socialist traditions (Ireland and the United States, for example), neither socialism nor communism prosper. Only in countries with socialist heritages and consequent historically significant socialist parties have communist parties flourished.

Electorally, communist strength is strongly correlated with prior leftist voting patterns.\(^{24}\) Ranger, Ehrmann, and Wright all point out that in France, much of the communist party's vote comes from areas with strong leftist traditions. Ehrmann finds that "almost all the constituencies of the Center and the Southwest which are now casting a heavy ballot for the CP went montagnard in the election of May, 1849, creating the first legislative assembly of the Second Republic."\(^{26}\) Later, these same areas voted Radical, then Socialist, and now Communist.

In Italy, Communist and Socialist strength in the
1970s geographically coincides to a large extent with the map of Socialist support in 1919 and for central Italy, they match almost perfectly. The "Red Belt" region of central Italy historically has been a bastion of anticlericalism. In 1831, representatives of this region gathered in Bologna to protest the temporal power of the Pope. Today, they elect town councils and regional governments with left-wing majorities and Bologna has a Communist mayor. 27

In Finland, communist strength in the South and West is concentrated in regions with traditional leftist voting patterns. 28 According to Allardt, communist strength is to a large extent explained by traditions of radicalism and class conflict. 29

In countries with large social democratic parties, however—Britain, West Germany, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, and Belgium—communism is chronically weak. In their competition for leftist voters, social democratic parties in these countries have swept the field. Through their control of the unions and, at times, local and national governments, the social democrats have established themselves as the only viable left-wing alternative to the bourgeois parties. Consequently, they win all but a few die-hard or protest left-wing votes.

The closest case of an exception to this occurs in Luxembourg where the Socialist Party is, along with the
Christian Socialist Party, one of the nation's largest parties. Despite its size, the Luxembourg Socialist Party has failed to dominate the left because of its inability to win national power. For 55 years, until the May, 1974 elections, the conservative Christian Socialists controlled the government. The present position of the Socialists at the head of a center-left governing coalition may, however, give them the political leverage to expand their support thus spelling the possibility of hard times for the Communists.

In those countries where both communist and socialist parties have been historically strong, the respective strength of communist and socialist parties varies positively, at times, and, at times, negatively. When there is a general swing to the left among the electorate, both socialist and communist parties will benefit and gain correlatively. During the popular front period, for example, the tendency was for both socialist and communist parties to prosper. Conversely, both parties will decline if there is a national shift away from the left.

The strength of communist and socialist parties varies inversely, however, in the case of a secular shift among left-wing voters. In such an instance, the relative strength of the left and right parties remains the same, but the socialists gain at the expense of the communists or vice versa. For example, from 1920 to 1934 was a long
periods of decline for the French Communist Party, but
years of moderate growth for the Socialist Party. In
the Cold War period, in several countries, the Socialists
gained at the communists' expense. Similarly, postwar
gains by the Italian Communist Party have been largely
at the expense of the Socialists and other leftist parties.

Ironically, then, the communists are often in the
fiercest competition with the party with whom they are
not in fundamental opposition on many issues and with
whom they appeal to similar social strata and interests--
the socialists. The two parties often find themselves
competing for the same relatively fixed number of left-
wing voters and the success of one is the failure of the
other. In alliance, communists and socialists presumably
work together to achieve common electoral and programmatic
goals against bourgeois opponents. In opposition, they
battle for preeminence among leftist voters. The rub is
that there is no clear demarcation between times of alliance
and times of opposition. In different locales and at
different times, communists and socialists both compete
and cooperate. During periods of alliance, the two often
find themselves competing both for labor union and elec-
toral dominance. In times of opposition, the two parties
often cooperate on the local and regional levels. To
quote Kurt Schumacher, communists and socialists are
brothers, like Cain and Abel.
As competitors, communist parties have been faced with the problem of differentiating their program on popular grounds from that of the socialists. In countries such as Sweden and Norway where the communists have adopted programs pointing to the peaceful road to socialism and the social democrats are themselves relatively radical on many issues, the communists have been hard pressed to find ground on the left that has not been preempted by the dominant socialists—ground other than loyalty to the Soviet Union, usually not a popular position.

As allies or would-be allies, communist parties have been faced with the problem of modifying their positions to secure socialist backing while, at the same time, not alienating their own base of support. In France, for example, the PCF has been forced to accept such concepts as multipartism, alternation of power, and the abandonment of the concept of a dictatorship of the proletariat. By doing so, however, the PCF has apparently paid a price among its own militants who have evinced increased displeasure with the party's moderate stance.

Also as allies, the communists have faced the problem of being exploited by their partners. As participants in the 1946 coalition of Communists, Social Democrats, and Agrarians, the politically naive Finnish Communist Party was thoroughly outmaneuvered by its experienced partners. During its tenure in government, the SKP won
only the single concession of airline nationalization. In exchange, it was shackled with part of the blame for a wage freeze and price increases and, when major strikes broke out in the fall of 1946, the SKP could no longer play its usual role as unconditional champion of the workers' demands. Similarly, the SKP's participation in center-left governing coalitions from 1966 through March, 1971, brought it few tangible benefits. In coalition, the party was forced to make concessions accepting "nonsocialist" measures, particularly in the economic field. Consequently, the SKP shared the blame for unpopular economic policies and its own internal divisions were exacerbated.

The communists' dilemma in alliance with socialist parties is that without the socialists, they cannot hope to win national political power in most of Western Europe, but, in alliance with the socialists, they face the danger of losing their separate identity and seeing their support dwindle. In France, the PCF has taken major steps to secure an electoral and programmatic alliance with the Socialist Party with the two reaching agreement on a Common Program in 1972 that was a major compromise of orthodox communist philosophy. Mitterrand's very strong showing in the 1974 presidential election illustrates the potency of the electoral combination. Alarmingly for the Communists, however, the major electoral shift since the forming of the common front has not been so
much toward the left, but within the left in favor of the Socialists and away from the PCF. In 1969, the Socialist Party appeared a spent and humiliated force. It was declining, divided, and dispirited, but since then, under Mitterrand's leadership, it has perhaps become the dominant party of the left. In the fall bi-election after the presidential vote in 1974, the Socialists increased their vote while the Communist vote declined sharply. The latest polls show the Socialists far ahead of the Communists and an October, 1975 partial legislative election in Vienne again followed the trend of an increased first ballot Socialist vote apparently gained at the expense of the Communists. In local elections in the spring of 1976, again the big gainers were the Socialists rather than the Communists. The dilemma for the Communists is that if they wish to maintain an electoral alliance that has a real chance of winning, they must appear moderate enough to reassure the voters and Socialists alike of their democratic intentions. If they appear too moderate, however, they risk alienating their own cadres and perhaps declining vis-à-vis the Socialists.

The response of the PCF's leaders to this has been to walk a tight rope between maintaining the alliance for electoral purposes and boldly reasserting their party's separate identity. Although the Communists have continued to insist on their own fidelity to the alliance, they
have increasingly risen to assail their Socialist allies for disloyalty and trying to enlarge their own influence at the Communists' expense. Also, the Communists have increased their industrial militancy. Whether this tactic of trying to have things both ways is successful, however, remains to be seen.

Another danger facing the Communists in France and elsewhere is that socialist allies may bridge over the left-right political cleavage to form a majority government with the bourgeoisie thus condemning the communists to what could be permanent minority status on the left as well as political isolation. In France, the PCF has accused the Socialists of disloyal yearnings to join a coalition under Giscard.

In Italy, however, the threat has taken concrete form in the famed "Opening to the Left." In the early 1960s, the Italian Socialist Party elected to join the Christian Democratic government of Aldo Moro. The PCI was spared isolation, however, for two reasons. First, the Socialists valued their local and regional ties with the Communists too much to give them up. Secondly, the Center-Left government foundered on its inability in the long run to solve Italy's more pressing economic problems.

** Socialist People's Parties. **

In 1959, Axel Larsen, who had been deposed as leader
of the Danish Communist Party, along with a large group of former communists and other leftists, formed the Danish Socialist People's Party (SF) which proceeded in 1960 to outpoll the DKP 6.1 percent to only 1.1 percent and to win 11 seats to the communists' none. Since then, socialist peoples' parties have complicated life for communist parties in much of Scandinavia.

The prototype of the socialist peoples' parties, the Danish SF, was something of a halfway house between the Social Democrats and the Communists. Anti-capitalist, the SF criticized the Social Democrats for having stopped being a truly socialist party and for becoming too dependent on the union movement. At the same time, while pledging its own adherence to Danish democratic-parliamentary tradition, the SF excoriated the DKP for clinging to the Kremlin.

Electorally, the SF continued to do well winning 5.8 percent of the vote and 10 seats in 1964, 10.8 percent and 20 seats in 1966. In 1968, however, the SF itself split with the parent party winning 6.1 percent of the vote and 6 seats and the splinter party, the VS, registering 2 percent and 4 seats. In the 1971 election, the VS fell below 2 percent and thus by Danish electoral laws lost its seats in the Folketing. The SF, however, improved its representation to 17 seats and 9.1 percent and, with the Social Democrats, entered the government. In 1973.
however, the SF lost heavily falling to 6 percent and 11 seats with the communists reaping the benefits and the 1975 election saw the SF's decline continue as it dropped to 4.9 percent and 9 seats.

Like their Danish comrades, communists in Norway have had to contend with a challenge from a socialist people's party. Contrary to Danish experience, the Norwegian SF was formed in 1961 by a group of unaffiliated leftists and former Social Democrats. Like the Danish SF, however, the new Norwegian party rejected both Peking and Moscow as models, pledged its allegiance to parliamentarism, and attacked the Social Democrats for lacking socialist vigor. Although the long range goal of the SF was quite similar to that of the NKP—a democratic transition to socialism based on Marxism, parliamentarism, and the multiparty system, the SF attacked the Communists as "dogmatic" and "old Marxists," while the NKP accused the SF of splitting the labor movement.

Electorally, the Norwegian SF has recorded more modest successes than its Danish model. In 1961, the SF won only 2.4 percent of the vote and 2 seats in the Storting, but did hold the balance of power between bourgeois parties and the Social Democrats. In 1965, the SF upped its total to 6 percent of the votes and 2 seats; then, in 1969, after the defection of its youth wing, the SF declined to 3.4 percent and no seats. In 1973, the
SF, the NKP, and a group of dissident Social Democrats formed the Socialist Electoral Alliance winning 16 seats, 11.2 percent of the vote, and substantial leverage in a closely balanced Storting. Since 1974, negotiation have been held among the three members of the Socialist Electoral Alliance with the ultimate aim of merger into a single leftist party.

In Iceland, after the 1967 election, Hannibal Valdimarsson, the chairman of the communist-dominated People's Alliance and head of the Icelandic Federation of Labor, together with a group of his followers, broke away from the PA and began the Union of Liberals and Leftists (ULL), Iceland's equivalent to a socialist people's party. Valdimarsson's quarrel with the PA involved the issue of internal democracy as well as personality conflicts. Meanwhile, he criticized the Social Democrats for lacking socialist purity. The explicit goal of the ULL was the establishment of an umbrella social democratic party, including the PA, the ULL, and the Social Democrats with Valdimarsson, of course, at its head.

Following the 1971 election, Valdimarsson achieved part of his goal. In the balloting, the PA won 17.1 percent and 10 seats, and the ULL 8.9 percent and 5 seats. Together with the Progressives, the three formed a left-wing government. In the 1974 election, however, shaken by factionalism, the ULL fell to only 2 seats and the
coalition was broken with each of the parties going its separate way.\textsuperscript{55}

For the communist parties of Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, the socialist people's parties have been an unwelcome threat. As halfway houses between the social democrats and the communists, the SF parties provide a convenient home both for the dissenting communists who might not bring themselves to move all the way over to the social democrats, and for renegade left-wing social democrats and unaffiliated leftists who might otherwise join the ranks of the communists.

By dividing the extreme left-wing vote, socialist people's parties have further weakened the relatively impotent communist parties in Denmark and Norway. In Denmark, the DKP's electoral strength dropped alarmingly in face of the SF challenge only rallying in the 1973 and 1975 elections. Similarly, the NKP vote fell in competition with the SF in Norway. Not until the formation of the Socialist Electoral Alliance did the fortunes of the Norwegian Communists improve. Only in Iceland, buoyed by a general leftist swing, did the communists hold their own against an SF challenge.

Socialist people's parties have also challenged communists in the union arena and among young people. In Iceland, the ULL siphoned off some of the PA's strength in the Icelandic Federation of Labor.\textsuperscript{56} Similarly, the
SF in Norway has attracted agricultural, forestry, and industrial workers away from the NKP.\textsuperscript{57} Also, in both Denmark and Norway, in particular, SF parties have attracted youths from the communist parties.\textsuperscript{58}

Because of their ideological proximity, communist parties have been hard pressed to differentiate themselves from the SF parties. Communists have expended their resources villifying the SF parties as "splitters" dividing the left and defending themselves against charges of heavy-handed orthodoxy and mimicry of Moscow. Consequently, SF parties provide an impetus to the communists to liberalize their domestic policies and liberate themselves from ties to Moscow. Ironically, however, because they have tended to siphon off the most progressive elements in the communist party, particularly in Denmark, the presence of a strong SF party makes the communists less likely to liberalize.

Socialist people's parties complicate the alliance strategies of communist parties because the SF parties are more acceptable as possible coalition partners for the social democrats, thus threatening the communists with a narrow isolation on the left such as occurred in Denmark in 1971. At the same time, if the communists wish to come to terms with social democratic parties for purposes of alliance, they must also decide on a policy for dealing with the SF parties. Logically, an alliance between com-
munists and social democrats would include the SF who fall between the two ideologically and often hold an important share of parliamentary power. Consequently, negotiations must be among at least three partners and an alliance, if reached, would usually find the communists subordinate not only to the social democrats but to the SF as well. In Norway, where an electoral alliance has been reached among the NKP, the SF, and a group of Social Democrat dissidents, the communists are clearly the minor partners.

Finally, the SF parties, particularly the Danish SF, have provided a model for the renovation of the Swedish Communist Party. The new left domestic policy, independent international posture, and internal democratization of the VPK are very much akin to that of the SF parties in neighboring countries.

Ultra-Left Parties.

In the last decade, virtually every communist party of Western Europe has been challenged by a proliferation of Maoist, Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist, New Left, and anarchist left-wing splinter parties. One of the first of these was the Communist Party of Belgium—Marxist-Leninist (PCB-ML) begun in 1963 by veteran communist Jacques Grippa as a pro-Peking rival to the established PCB. Apparently, the PCB-ML in its early years took 15 percent of the PCB's members and 10 percent of its vote. Since
then, the PCB-ML has split and then split again. Presently, however, the main line PCB faces challenges from another Maoist party and a growing Trotskyist movement. In France, the PCF has been challenged by dozens of small leftist movements whose appeals have failed to win mass support, but have attracted numbers of students and intellectuals. Indeed, in May-June, 1968, much to the chagrin of the PCF, it was the Maoists, Trotskyists, and anarchists who manned the barricades in an attempt to put their own revolutionary strategies into operation. Today, however, the influence of most of the ultra-left parties is diminishing.

The British Communist Party is being severely challenged on the left, particularly by the Trotskyist Workers Revolutionary Party. Complicating the picture for the CPGB is the revival of Scotch and Welsh nationalist groups who, while not leftist in the traditional sense, pose a major threat to communist recruitment.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the chief leftist threat to the Italian Communist Party came from the Il Manifesto group, an anti-Soviet new left oriented coterie of intellectuals expelled from the PCI in 1969 and 1970. Today, the PCI is also being challenged from the extreme left by a number of terrorist organizations, including Lotta continua, Bandiera Rossa, Servire il Popolo, and a new left-wing party, Partito di Unità per il Comunismo.
that includes *Manifesto* and other groups. 65

In other countries, the Swiss Communist Party is faced with opposition from numerous left-wing organizations. A number of Maoist and other far left groups compete with Sweden's VPK. In the Netherlands, dissident pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties challenge the CPN, although most pro-Peking and pro-Moscow cadres have remained in the party. A Marxist-Leninist party formed in 1973 competes with the Norwegian Communist Party. In Iceland, in 1968, hard line, pro-Soviet elements defected from the PA to form the Organization of Icelandic Socialists. The Communist Party of West Germany faces opposition from numerous left-wing splinter groups. In Austria, the KPO is threatened by a tiny Maoist party. A number of small ultra-left movements have attracted youths from the Danish Communist Party. In Finland, a pro-Peking party exists, but, as we have seen, most dissidents remain in the SKP itself. Finally, although some pro-Maoist sentiment exists, the Communist Party of Luxembourg has avoided splits and factionalism. 66

As with the socialist people's parties, the ultra-left parties have plagued the communists by draining away voters and members. Although not all of the ultra-left groups have functioned as electoral entities, where they have, they have inevitably split the communist vote costing the regular communist party local and national
offices. More seriously, however, the ultra-left parties have drawn their adherents disproportionately from among young people. Consequently, the communists have lost many of their most vigorous cadres as well as much of a generation of future leaders to their leftist challengers. In Belgium, for example, Jacques Grippo's Peking-oriented faction proved particularly adroit at recruiting among students. In Norway, the entire youth affiliate of the NKP broke with the parent party in 1967 to join a Marxist-Leninist party.

Not only do the ultra-left parties threaten the communists' hold on voters and cadres, but they also threaten the established parties' positions in unions and party auxiliary groups. In addition to the Norwegian case, communist youth affiliates throughout Western Europe have been subverted by leftist parties and groups. Leftist organizations have also made inroads into communists' union strength. In Britain, for example, the CPGB's position in the trade union movement is under very serious attack.

In a number of Western countries, the ultra-left parties have harmed the communists by actions which reflect unfavorably on the left as a whole. In Italy, although the PCI has deplored extremist-inspired terrorist violence, its Christian Democrat opposition has attempted to use the ultra-left violence to discredit the communists. Although the French Communist Party was among the leftist
revolutionaries' severist critics in May-June, 1968, the Gaullists succeeded in saddling the PCF with much of the blame for the disorders and decisively used the issue against the communists. Similarly, in Britain, the CPGB has had to share the blame, often unfairly, for political strikes inspired by the communists' ultra-left rivals.

Standing as a spectre on the left, ultra-left parties tend to prevent the communists from straying too far from Marxist orthodoxy, particularly if there are large groups in the party not unsympathetic to the leftists' appeals. Since too bold a move away from Moscow or too bold a move against the Chinese could alienate either camp's supporters driving them to pro-Soviet or pro-Peking parties, the Dutch Communist Party, for example, has been careful to observe neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split. In other parties, communist leaders have moved to modernize their parties only cautiously for fear of seeing their conservative cadres exit en masse to a Marxist-Leninist rival.

On the other hand, ultra-left parties have been blessings in disguise for Western communist parties because they have siphoned-off dissident elements from the parent party thus preventing internal friction and schisms and, consequently, giving the communist leaders more freedom of action. Ultra-left parties are a far greater check
on the main line parties as potential homes for Maoist or Stalinist dissidents than actual homes. After the Maoists and Stalinists have defected, the communist parties are free to act. In Iceland, for example, the departure of pro-Soviet cadres to form the Organization of Icelandic Socialists freed the PA's leaders to pursue their independent foreign policies. Throughout Western Europe, ultra-left parties have tended to bring a measure of stability to the communist parties by siphoning off individual dissidents and groups of recalcitrants. In countries such as Finland, where, except for a miniature Maoist party, ultra-left parties have not taken root, and countries such as the Netherlands, where most dissidents have remained in the party rather than defecting, communist party leaders must walk a tight rope or see their parties torn by factionalism.

Finally, the presence of ultra-left parties in the political system can make communist parties more acceptable to middle class voters and potential alliance partners. In contrast to the revolutionary rhetoric and actions of many of the ultra-left groupings, the communist parties appear almost austere and conservative and, consequently, more acceptable to many voters, and to other parties as coalition partners. In places such as Italy where the PCI has gone out of its way to cultivate an image of moderation, the contrast with the extremist parties may be
quite beneficial to the communists.

The Party System

One of the major features of a nation's political system is its party system. For the communist parties of Western Europe, the party system plays a direct role in determining their political strength and an indirect role in shaping their policy positions. In this, three factors work together: (1) the size of the communist party; (2) the number of parties in the party system; and (3) the polarity of the party system.

As very minor parties in essentially two party systems, the communist parties of Great Britain, Austria, and West Germany find themselves in particularly disadvantageous positions, both electorally and in their alliance prospects. Although the electoral effect of a two party system is not all-determining, it does tend to work against minor parties. Potential supporters generally opt for one of the major parties rather than wasting their votes on a party which they believe cannot win. At least in part, it is for this reason that communism in Britain, Austria, and under the Bonn Republic in West Germany, has failed to make significant inroads against social democratic parties. In these countries, the two party system also tends to frustrate the alliance ambitions of the communists. Because of the two party nature of the system, one
of the parties usually wins a parliamentary majority requiring no coalition partners. Finally, because of their usual distance from the seats of power, the communists feel few restraints in shaping their policy positions.

As major parties in multiparty systems, the communist parties of Iceland, Finland, and Luxembourg do, however, have incentives to modify their domestic positions and their postures toward the Soviet Union. Since no one party usually wins a parliamentary majority, it is necessary for governing coalitions to be formed and as a major party, the communists are important potential coalition partners. Consequently, the communists have incentives to modify their positions so as to appear more palatable to potential partners. Once in a governing coalition, the communists are further pushed toward policy modification due to the realities and pressures of office.

The French and Italian Communist Parties, as major parties in polarized multiparty systems, have strong incentives to modify their positions. Insofar as they are regarded as the first party of the left (clearly so for the PCI, now much less clearly so for the PCF), they have an incentive to moderate their domestic policies to appear as a realistic alternative to the right. Because of their major status in a polarized system, the communists also benefit from support from voters who may not be strongly inclined toward them, but see the communists as the chief
opponent of the right. Their prominent position on the left also makes the communist parties of Italy and France prime partners for electoral alliances and governing coalitions at the local and regional level. At the national level, however, the communists, barring a left-wing majority, are less likely to be included in a coalition government because of the polarity of the system (a polarity which the PCI is trying to soften).

The position of the Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Belgian, Swiss, and Dutch communist parties as minor parties in multiparty systems is one of contradictory impulses. Because of the multiplicity of parties, the communists are pulled toward forming policies that are differentiated from their left-wing rivals. On the other hand, since the multiparty system makes coalitions and alliances advantageous, and sometimes necessary to form a government, the communists are propelled toward policy moderation if they seek alliance. Finally, the multiparty system may help to isolate the communists if, as in Denmark, parliamentary parties across the political spectrum oppose it, or, it may give the communists disproportionate strength, as in Sweden, if they find themselves holding the balance of power in a closely divided parliament. An important variable that tends to influence the direction of impulses for a minor communist party in a multiparty system is the degree of polarization in the system. In a highly polar-
ized system, there will be relatively fewer willing possible coalition partners than in a less polarized system; so, the communists will have fewer incentives for policy adaptation. On the other hand, in a relatively unpolarized system, there will be a comparatively greater chance of the communists being accepted as an alliance partner; so, there will be greater incentives for policy modification.

In sum, then, the importance of the party system for the communist parties of Western Europe lies in its effects on their political success and on their policy postures. In part, the electoral fortunes and the success of the alliance strategies of the Western European communist parties depend on the party system. A predominantly two party system virtually assures a parliamentary majority for one of the major parties. For a minor communist party, this means the loss of possible voters to a major left-wing party with a better chance to win and the probable failure of alliance strategies since a party with a parliamentary majority will have no need of partners. A multiparty system offers the communists better prospects. On the one hand, since the likelihood of any single party winning a majority is small, the strength of even small parties can be important. Thus, voters will be less likely to desert the communist party. On the other hand, a multiparty system often rewards electoral alliances and frequently requires governing coalitions thus improving the prospects
of success for alliance strategies.

The party system also affects communist party policy positions. In general, characteristics of the communist party (particularly size) that would further communist party leaders' perceptions of their party's nearness to office act as incentives toward policy modification and moderation. On the other hand, if the combination of these characteristics offers little hope for an early ascension to office, there will be little incentive toward policy modification. Thus, communist parties that are major parties in polarized or unpolarized multiparty systems and parties that are minor parties in unpolarized multiparty systems have incentives to moderate their programs. There are fewer incentives, however, for minor communist parties in predominantly two party systems or polarized multiparty systems.

Party Auxiliaries

Throughout Western Europe, communist parties maintain or attempt to maintain networks of auxiliary organizations, including children's groups, young peoples' groups, students' groups, women's federations, farmers' cooperatives, workers' organizations, pensioners' unions, peace groups, and friendship societies for the USSR and Eastern Europe. For the communists, these organizations function as: socializing agents for party members and
potential members; occasional political weapons to be employed to further party goals; bodies that lend the movement respectability and legitimacy; training grounds for party leaders and cadres; and valuable sources of material and human resources.

In general, communist party auxiliaries serve as buffers to protect communist parties from the vagaries of a heterogeneous environment. By creating what Annie Kriegel calls a "countersociety" (although this is probably an overblown term for most of Western Europe), communist parties try to shape significant portions of their environment to conform to themselves.72 At the same time, however, these auxiliary groups that serve to insulate the party also serve to tie the party ever tighter to the political system in which it functions.73 Consequently, the nature and strength of these auxiliaries as well as the communist party's relationship to them considerably affect the positions, policies, and alliance strategies of the parties. For illustrative purposes, we will concentrate on two of the more important areas where communists attempt to establish auxiliaries—unions and youth groups.

Unions.

The communists' power in the trade union movement is both a reflection and a cause of their national political strength. One of the most important factors in deter-
mining the importance of union position for communist policies is the degree to which their strength is concentrated in a single union federation or union stronghold. In France, the PCF is firmly in control of the nation's largest trade union federation, the CGT, with more than half of the top union officials being communists or closely tied to the party. Although not all workers' unions are communist controlled in France, in the CGT, the party shares power with no one. As in France, communist union strength in Sweden is secure, but unlike France, it is far more restricted, being confined to a few strongholds, particularly the Norbotten region. In Italy, Finland, Luxembourg, and Iceland, communist union strength is broad, as in France, but not exclusive in that communist parties in these countries share union power within union federations. The Italian Communist Party shares strength with the Socialists and other leftist groups in the CGIL, (see Table 1) while the Finnish SKP is competing with the Social Democrats for union control. In Luxembourg, the PCL shares control of the United Federation of Free Trade Unions with the Socialists. Similarly, in Iceland, the PA is entrenched along with the Progressives in the leadership of the Icelandic Federation of Labor. The union strength of the British Communist Party is similar to the overall strength of communism in Swedish unions, but it is far more dispersed. In the rest of Western Europe,
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however, communist union strength is quite minimal.

Union strongholds whether broadly based as in France or narrowly confined as in Sweden act as a conservative influence on communist party policies. Solidly entrenched trade unionists tend to be veteran cadres for whom old policies have been successful. Consequently, they tend to oppose innovations in domestic policies and positions toward the Soviet Union. In Sweden, for example, the primary opposition to Hermansson's reforms comes from unionists, 80 while the PCF's unionists are among that party's more conservative elements. On the other hand, in Italy, where communists cooperate with Socialists and sometimes Christian Democrats at the union level, or in Iceland, where communists and members of the Progressive Party cooperate, the unionists play a moderating role. Because communist trade union leaders must compromise to maintain union cooperation, they are not wedded to orthodoxy. Finally, in countries such as Britain where the communists' union strength is moderate but dispersed, unionists are often among the party's more innovative cadres. Because of their precarious union position, CPGB unionist leaders find flexibility a virtue.

Trade union experience with other parties also influence the nature and success of alliance strategies. Cooperation at the union level can provide a training ground for cooperation at the electoral or governmental
level. In Iceland, for example, the coalition government between the PA and the Progressive Party was preceded by cooperation at the union level. Similarly, cooperation between Italian Communists and Socialists in the CGIL is paralleled at the level of regional and local government. On the other hand, a tradition of conflict in the labor movement can carry over to hinder cooperation at the governmental level. In Finland, the relations between the SKP and the Social Democrats have waxed and waned in the union movement, but, in general, they have been conflicting. Partially because of this experience, many of the SKP's union leaders have been among those more opposed to coalition with the Social Democrats.

Youth Organizations. 81

The primary purpose of youth auxiliaries is to train young sympathizers to be capable and loyal cadres. Ironically, in much of Western Europe, communist youth organizations have withered away or, worse, become hotbeds of opposition to the party. In Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Austria, communist youth affiliates have steadily declined in the face of competition from numerous new left groups. 82 In other countries, the communist youth affiliates have expressed some notably independent attitudes and, in some cases, been captured by ultra-left rivals of the communists. After 1968, the
Swedish Communist Party lost control of its youth affiliate to pro-Chinese rivals. In 1973, the VPK began a new "loyal" youth auxiliary. Before 1958 in France, the Communist Students of France (UEC) was a reliable school for communists, but after that, the PCF began to lose control. In 1963, pro-Italians took control and revisionism was au courant. By 1964, however, Bernstein ceded to Trotsky and Rome was replaced by Peking. In 1965, the PCF purged the UEC, retaking control. In the process it emasculated the organization as the brightest and most energetic young people defected to ultra-left groups. In Norway in 1967, the NKP's youth affiliate broke with the party in support of a party faction that had been purged. Since then, a reconstituted youth auxiliary has failed to grow.

One result of the malaise among communist youth organizations has been a decline in the number of capable young cadres entering party ranks and a shortage of vigorous young volunteers for routine party activities.

Secondly, because of their formal attachment to the main line communist party, renegade youth affiliates can bring the party into disrepute. Although the PCF deplored the students' and workers' riots of May-June, 1968, the attachment of the various student (and worker) groups with the PCF, at least in the minds of many voters, worked against the communists.
Finally, because they received their political socialization in youth affiliates that were often quite flexible and occasionally critical of the parent party, many younger generation party cadres and functionaries come to positions of leadership with attitudes more reflective of "new left" sentiments than their elders. In a study of PCI functionaries in 1969, Hellman finds that younger cadres who were militants in the Italian Communist Youth Federation during a period in which it displayed a measure of independence toward the PCI, are considerably different from older recruits who were socialized into a closed party. Younger members, Hellman discovers, tend to be more freely critical of the Soviet Union and more inclined toward a "revolution from below" approach than their older colleagues. 86

Political Culture

In Chapter IV, we saw that social cleavages, although they do not determine the success or failure of communist parties in Western Europe, can furnish the soil in which communism can either grow or whither. Similarly, communist parties find fertile ground for potential growth in political cleavages. Indeed, as Greene argues, communist voters are more readily differentiated from noncommunist voters on the basis of their political beliefs rather than their socioeconomic status. 87 As with social cleavages, the
mere presence or relative absence of political cleavage neither guarantees nor precludes communist success. Their importance for communist party strength (and their indirect influence on party policy positions) depends on how well the communists can exploit them.

For historical and ideological reasons, communist parties are particularly equipped to deal with alienated or politically disaffected workers. Consequently, in Italy, France, and Finland, countries with large, historically alienated working classes, there are opportunities for communist party success. On the other hand, countries with less worker disaffection such as Ireland, Great Britain, Sweden, and Iceland, provide less opportune circumstances for communist advancement.

A number of studies have pointed to the communists' identification with workers' political interests in explaining communist party success. In France, Ranger reports that in 1966, 41 percent of the PCF's electors identify the party primarily as the "party of the working class." According to a 1963 survey in Italy, a majority of the PCI's supporters favor that party's pro-working class posture. Similarly, Pesonen discovered in his examination of the 1958 parliamentary election in Tampere, Finland, that 68 percent of the SKDL's voters pointed favorably to the communists' pro-labor activity.

By no means are communist opportunities limited to
workers' cleavages and disaffections. Rather, a whole range of economic and political issues lend themselves to communist exploitation. Throughout Western Europe, such issues as Common Market participation, NATO membership, American imperialism, the abuses of multinational corporations, unemployment, and inflation have received considerable attention from communists and often with electoral rewards.

Universally, much of the communists' appeal is the result of protest voting. As McInness states in regards the French Communist Party:

The PCF has espoused the cause not only of workers, wage-earners, and pensioners of every condition but of fishermen, professional footballers, yachtsmen, handicapped children, small shopkeepers, motorists, comic opera artists, refugees from colonies, over-taxed managers, engineers and technicians, expropriated landowners, and even bouilleurs de cru, small-time bootleggers. As Galli says of the PCI, a party that is always complaining about everything will attract all those who have a complaint.91

Georges Lavau argues that the French Communist Party fulfills an important function in the French political system by expressing the malcontentments, denouncing the abuses, and organizing the protests of a significant part of the French political community.92 Similarly, Tarrow attests that the Italian Party profits from a large protest vote,93 Huggett says the same about the Belgian Communist Party,92 and Kendall echoes the statement in regards to the British Communist Party.95
In a number of cases, communist parties have garnered some success by appealing to essentially unique characteristics of the political culture of their respective nations. Historically, the people of Iceland, a small, insular country, have jealously guarded their sovereignty and highly valued their independence from the affairs of Europe and North America. Very adroitly, the Communist Party of Iceland has won support by presenting itself as the champion of Icelandic sovereignty and independence and by vigorously opposing the United States defense base in Keflavik and championing the national cause in the "cod war" with Britain. Also, the PA's notably independent policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is very much in keeping with Icelandic political values.\(^96\)

Although it has not won the national support its Icelandic counterpart has, the Dutch Communist Party's policies have also reflected national political attitudes. Historically, as a buffer country, the Netherlands has been cautious about foreign influences. Consequently, the CPN's highly independent, even isolationist posture toward the international communist movement strikes a particularly Dutch chord.\(^97\)

Not only do communist parties attempt to mold their programs and policies to the national political environment, but they also try to shape that environment to respond to their appeals favorably. Through the control
of various agents of socialization—unions, press, and various auxiliary structures, the communist parties act to insure the loyalty of their partisans and attract new supporters. 98

Finally, unique aspects of the political cultures of various nations act to disadvantage communist parties in their search for political influence. In West Germany, for example, the past Nazi experience and present Soviet control of East Germany have combined to make West Germans particularly wary of any political party that can be labeled "extremist." 99 As the only Western nation outside of the Soviet bloc that experienced a period of Russian occupation after World War II, Austria has not offered fertile soil for the growth of indigenous communism. 100
Notes


5 Ibid.


7 Ibid., 334-335.

8 Sworakowski, *op. cit.*

9 Wohl, *op. cit.*, 218.


13 Sworakowski, *op. cit.*


15 Upton, *op. cit.*


17 Cammett, *op. cit.*

18 Upton, *op. cit.*

20 Sworakowski, op. cit.

21 Ibid.


31 Annie Kriegel, "The Present Theory of Power of the French Communist Party," Government and Opposition,


33Upton, *op. cit.*

34*YICA*, 1972.


43Ibid., 29-30.


45Ibid.


50"Recent Political Developments: Norway," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, I (1966), 239.


53 Economist, 27 April 1974, 44.


55 YICA, 1975. In France, the P.S.U. (Parti Socialiste Unifié) has a similar political position to Scandinavia's socialist people's parties. Its political impact, however, has been marginal.

56 YICA, 1970.

57 Johansen, op. cit., 357.


59 YICA, 1967.

60 YICA, 1974.


63 YICA, 1975.


66 YICA, 1975.


69 Johansen, op. cit.


71 One must not place too much stock in the role of the party system in shaping communist party positions. Other factors including leadership, the party's membership and electorate, and the international environment are often far more important.


73 McInnes, op. cit., 12.

74 Gerard Adam, "Elements d'analyse sur les liens entre le PCF et la CGT," Revue française de science politique, XVIII (June, 1968), 524-539.


76 Upton, op. cit., passim.

77 YICA, 1968.

78 YICA, 1966.

79 Ferris, op. cit.


81 For ideological reasons, some communist parties prefer adding youths to the regular party organization rather than a specialized youth affiliate. (After all, it is argued, young people should have the same objective class interests as their elders.)

82 YICA, 1975.

83 YICA, 1975.

84 Johansen, op. cit., 44-81.
YICA, 1975. Unfortunately for the communists, the problems of communist youth affiliates also affect other communist front organizations. Since the Sino-Soviet rift, communist front organizations have been beset by factionalism as groups of various ideological persuasions have battled for control. McInnes, op. cit., 13-16.


Ranger, op. cit.


McInnes, op. cit., 163-164.


Tarrow, op. cit., 160.


100 Sworakowski, op. cit.
CHAPTER VI

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A final part of each Western European communist party's domestic political environment is the constitutional framework within which it must operate. Perhaps the most manipulable of all the sectors of the parties' environment, the constitutional structure affects the political position of the communist parties by granting or denying them legality, and through the workings of the electoral laws. The structures of government provide communist parties with opportunities for establishing strongholds of political power while, at the same time, communist participation in government in levels and positions below that of national leadership serves to tie them to the established political order. Finally, the constitutional structures of government may find their parallels in the organization of the communist parties.

Illegality

Today, communist parties operate freely and legally in every Western European democracy, but many of the parties have experienced past periods of illegality. Following the Finnish civil war of 1918, the Finnish Communist Party was proscribed and only achieved legality in 1944 as an implicit part of the agreement ending Finland's war with the Soviet Union. In Italy, the PCI
fell victim to fascist repression as early as 1926 and was forced to remain underground until 1944. In 1933, the communist parties of Austria and Germany were dissolved by Nazi decree and remained illegal until the end of World War II. The French Communist Party was outlawed in 1939 for opposing the war effort. In Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, communist parties were banned by the Germans during their countries' occupation in World War II and neutral Switzerland's prohibition of pro- and anti-Nazi groups in November, 1940, led to the dissolution of the Swiss Communist Party. Finally, the West German KPD from 1956 to 1968 lived under a decree of unconstitutionality until it re-emerged in 1968 under a new name.¹

Although the goal of those who ban communist parties is to destroy them as a political force, the results of illegality on Western European communism have been mixed. Electorally, while illegal communist parties cannot field candidates under their own name, they can resort to front parties. In Finland, the communists operated for several years under the Socialist Workers Party label. It, too, however, was banned in 1923.² In general, constitutional proscription means electoral ruin, at least during the period of illegality.

In extra-electoral matters, illegality may not mean the end of communist influence in many cases. In Finland,
the SKP in the wake of its ban by the government moved to reach workers and other potential supporters through an active participation in public organizations. In mid-1919, the communists won control of the Social Democratic Youth League and, in September of that year, the SDP's Helsinki organization came under communist domination. By the end of 1920, the communists had won a firm foothold in the trades union movement.³

Neither did proscription by the Nazis during the occupation end communist influence. In much of Western Europe, the communists with their superior organization moved to the forefront of resistance activities. In France, for example, communist influence rose during the war because, for the first time, the PCF was squarely on the side of the Republic.

Prolonged unconstitutionality, particularly if it is coupled with repression and persecution, can weaken communist parties by drying up domestic sources of financial and human resources. The German KPD was virtually wiped out by Hitler's Gestapo and, even though the Bonn government was far more benign, the KPD's postwar period of illegality left it almost totally dependent on East Germany for funds and as a headquarters in exile for its leaders.⁴ During its long fugitive period, the Italian Communist Party too was reduced to an underground core, most of whose leaders were exiled in France or in the
Despite its obvious disadvantages, illegality has not led to the demise of communism anywhere in Western Europe. Although the German Communist Party has been badly weakened by two long periods of illegality, elsewhere parties have come back from fugitive status with renewed vigor. At the hands of the Nazis and Fascists, illegality proved to be something of a blessing for many parties. Because of the persecution, communist parties were stripped of all but their most faithful followers who were forced to develop a careful, efficient organization to survive. More importantly, the communists' suppression at the hands of the hated Nazis and Fascists cast the communists in the role of national patriots, a role that proved electorally advantageous to them after the defeat of the Axis. Also, as an outlawed party, the communists are in a position from which they can take maximum advantage of governmental failures. Because of their illegal status prior to 1944, the Finnish Communist Party was in an opportune position to criticize the failures of Finnish foreign policy that led to two major wars with the Soviet Union in five years. Consequently, after their return to legality in 1944, they shared no formal blame for past governmental errors. Similarly, unlike the Republicans and Liberals, the Italian Communists did not bear the stigma of cooperation with the Fascists.
and consequently faced no postwar backlash.

Electoral Systems

Contrary to Duverger's thesis, the electoral system does not rigidly determine the contours of a party system. Rather, it is the creation of the dominant political forces in the system who design it to their own benefit. Consequently, the electoral system is often designed to advantage its architects and disadvantage other parties. As perennial outsiders, usually outside of the government, sometimes outside of the system, communist parties have often been the victims of electoral tinkering by noncommunist and anticommmunist parties.

In France, the electoral system "has been treated as a weapon in the struggle between different political camps and between different political forces for the control of State and society." Under the Fifth Republic, the system of proportional representation employed under the Fourth Republic was discarded and France returned to a second ballot plurality system designed to reward second ballot alliances and thus weaken the then isolated communists. In this, the Gaullist system proved immediately successful. Under the Fourth Republican system in 1956, the PCF won 147 seats based on 25.9 percent of the vote. In 1958 with the new system, however, the communists' vote percentage slipped to 19.2 but their total
of seats won plummeted to only 10. Although the electoral fortunes of the PCF have improved since 1958, they are still woefully underrepresented, winning in 1973, at their best showing under the Fifth Republic, only about one-seventh of the seats with more than one-fifth of the popular vote.

Another effect of the modern French electoral system has been to provide a significant incentive to the communists to form electoral coalitions. For the 1958 election, the communists' stood alone with disastrous results, but in 1962, after reaching an agreement for second ballot withdrawal with the Socialists, the PCF won 41 seats on 21.8 percent of the popular vote. Thus, the electoral payoffs for the communists (and Socialists) in forming electoral alliances are relatively great.

In Italy, too, the electoral system has been used as a weapon in the political battle between the communists and their bourgeois opponents. Before the 1953 parliamentary election, the Christian Democrats enacted legislation awarding two-thirds of the legislature's seats to any party or list that won 50 percent or more of the popular vote. Then, the Christian Democrats proceeded to line up alliances with other center and right parties to insure the isolation of the left. The Christian Democrat coalition fell .3 percent short of 50 percent, however, and subsequently the "swindle law," as the communists'
called it, was repealed.\textsuperscript{10}

Although in many countries the electoral system has not been used as an explicit weapon against the communists, as smaller parties, as most Western European communist parties are, the communists find themselves disadvantaged to one degree or another by every electoral system in use in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{11} In Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, and Norway, a party must register a certain minimum percentage (as low as 2 percent in Denmark, as high as 5 percent in West Germany) in order to receive representation. Consequently, weak communist strength, even if it is concentrated in a few districts, is insufficient to win any parliamentary seats. Although the single seat district as in Britain would benefit parties whose support is geographically concentrated, Britain's plurality system strongly handicaps minor parties. Even under a system of proportional representation and multi-member districts, which, Rae argues, produce most nearly proportional results, communist parties are disadvantaged when they are minor parties.\textsuperscript{12}

What are the long-term effects of electoral laws on the communist parties of Western Europe? For the dwarf parties, "first-past-the-post" systems and minimum percentage requirements act as barriers to electoral growth. For minor parties, these relatively mild barriers are insufficient to prevent the communists from maintaining
a parliamentary foothold. For the major parties of Iceland, Luxembourg, Italy, and Finland, the electoral system acts as no handicap and occasionally favors the communists. In France, the Fifth Republican electoral system has consistently short-changed the PCF, but it has failed to destroy the communists as a major political force.

While an electoral system can be used to keep a weak communist party weak and to hamper a strong communist party, in the long run, the strength of communism is determined by other factors. Under no electoral system would weak communist parties such as that in Britain win more than a few seats and even the highly disadvantageous French system has failed to wreck the electoral prospects of the PCF. What an electoral system can do, however, is to maximize trends already present in the political system be that the maximization of communist weakness as in Britain or the maximization of Gaullist strength vis-à-vis the communists as in France.

Restrictive electoral systems can also act as incentives for communists to seek electoral alliances. As we have seen, under the Fifth Republic in France, there are strong dividends for electoral cooperation for both Socialists and Communists. Additionally, electoral systems requiring a party to win a minimum percentage of the vote in order to gain representation make electoral alliances
very attractive to small parties who would otherwise face being shut out of parliament. In Norway, for example, the NKP has been able to surmount the two percent barrier and return to parliament only in alliance with two other left-wing groups.

Since restrictive electoral systems place premiums on alliance, small communist parties in such systems will be encouraged to modify their policies in order to woo possible alliance partners. Unfortunately for the communists, their bids for electoral alliance have only been accepted by other, small left-wing parties who are also disadvantaged by the electoral system. In Norway, the NKP, emphasizing its independence from Moscow, has succeeded in forming a leftist electoral coalition with the Socialist People's Party and a group of left-wing Labor Party dissidents. It has not won cooperation with the dominant Labor Party itself, however. Elsewhere, in Sweden, West Germany, and Denmark, other countries with electoral systems penalizing small parties, communists have failed to win electoral cooperation from larger social democratic parties who would have little to gain from such an alliance.

Constitutional Structures and Communist Participation

Political systems with constitutionally established local and regional governments provide opportunities for
communist parties to secure political office at levels beneath the national government. In virtually all of Western Europe (excepting Ireland), communists hold at least a few minor local offices. In Luxembourg and Iceland, communist parties share control of major cities and in other countries, the communists hold at least a few local offices. It is in Italy and France, however, where the communists have their most secure footings in local and regional governments.

In France, there are nearly 38,000 communes each of which is administered by a municipal council of nine to 37 members and the communes are combined into 90 departments each administered by a Conseil General. In 1971, the PCF controlled 1100 of the communes with 787 communist mayors.

Because of governmental centralization, municipal government in France has no constitutional autonomy beyond the right of existence. All the powers local government exercises are granted by the central government and decisions of locally elected officials can be annulled by prefects who represent the central government. This does not, however, condemn local officials to passivity. Rather, the mayor bargains incessantly with authorities of the state for approval of municipal actions.

Although as Kesselman contends, the general pattern for local government in France is one of nonpartisanship
and consensus-building,\textsuperscript{17} this is generally not the communist approach. The PCF seeks to run its municipalities in an openly partisan manner. It consciously attempts to politicize local government and to subordinate local officials to party discipline and tries to avoid letting its municipalities become dependent on the services of the prefect. In administration, the communists try to present themselves as efficient public servants responding to the needs of the people, particularly the working class.\textsuperscript{18}

To finance their social welfare programs, communist officials bargain with the prefect and other representatives of the state. Although relations between the two are generally cordial, it is not unusual for the governmental savings bank, the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, to refuse a loan or, for the prefect to deny permission for communists' taxing proposals.\textsuperscript{19} In practice, however, local government exercises considerable power in local matters.\textsuperscript{20}

The Italian Communist Party also enjoys power in local government. Alone or with its allies, the communists control the municipal governments of 28 cities including Bologna and Genoa.\textsuperscript{21} In 1967, 18.8 percent of all Italian communes were administered by left-wing alliances and 27 percent of the provincial councillors were communists.\textsuperscript{22} What is more, the establishment of regional governments in 1970 provided new opportunities for the communists
to win office. Initially, the PCI with support from other leftist parties won control of 3 of the 15 regional councils. Then, in the June, 1975 regional elections, the PCI recorded spectacular gains winning nearly a third of the vote.

As in the case of its French counterpart, however, the local Italian communist governments are limited by central government control particularly in areas of borrowing, taxation, and spending. Each commune in Italy is administered by a mayor and an executive council, each of which is chosen by the common council (consiglio comunale) which is popularly elected. But, as in France, the mayor is both the executive of the commune and an agent of the central government and each commune is under the supervision of the prefect who has virtual veto power over many local actions. It is not unusual for prefectoral controls to be exercised in a partisan manner, often severely against leftist administrations. Nor is it unusual for the central government to discriminate in the granting of state subsidies and loans which are often necessary because of the communes' inadequate system of taxation.

The relationship between the central government and communist administration in Italy is generally one of tight but not suffocating supervision. Because of central government control over deficit financing, communist administrations generally follow quite conservative fiscal
policies. Budgets are balanced, borrowing is limited, and fiscal responsibility is the norm. Iron­ically, the politically discriminatory financial scrutiny by the central government of left-wing communes has helped to make them the best governed in Italy.

Political power at the local and regional level affects communist parties in several ways. In the first place, local office is a training ground for national party leaders to learn the skills of exercising power and bargaining with other power holders. In Italy in 1963, for example, nearly 70 percent of PCI party officials had held public posts as communal councillors. The result of this is the moderation of communist practice. In both Italy and France, the communist municipal governments stress efficiency, honesty, and sound administration rather than revolutionary upheaval.

Secondly, political power at the local and regional level provides a ready source of patronage with which to reward the party faithful. In Italy, the PCI is the greatest political employer in the country for all those posts below the level of national government. In Bologna alone in 1956, the communists appointed 42 civil servants.

Thirdly, local governmental office can serve as a showcase for communist programs in action. In France, communist municipal administrators carefully accent reformist, social welfare policies. Similarly, the Italian
communists strive mightily to make local and regional
governments under their control showplaces for honest,
efficient administration.

Finally, local and regional governments serve as
redoubts of communist strength. The Red Belt regions
of Italy and France and communist strongholds in Finland
and elsewhere stand firm for the party even in the face
of national electoral setbacks. In communist-con-
trolled cities and towns, the party press reaches its
densest readership and the local administration is quick
to credit the party for all manner of local improvements
and to blame the bourgeois central authorities for all
setbacks.

In general, local government in Italy, France, and
other countries of Western Europe provide communists with
enough political power to exploit for electoral and other
"legitimate" political purposes, but not the leeway to
create a base for revolution (even if such a base were
desired by the communists). While local administrations,
particularly communist ones, are carefully circumscribed
in the exercise of power, the day-to-day activities of
local government are their responsibilities and, in this,
local administrations are required to bargain with various
institutions of the political order—the central govern-
ment, the courts, the central bank, and the like. Conse-
quently, power in local government acts to socialize
communist leaders and bureaucrats into an understanding and, to an inevitable degree, an acceptance of the established political system. Thus, political power at the local level tends to have a moderating influence on communist parties. On their part, the communists have responded by using local power in quite moderate, democratic ways.

Another institutional tie between communist parties and the political system is the parliament. Although at times communist parties have played an obstructionist role in parliament (as did the French Communist Party during the 1950s), in general, communists have played by the rules of the parliamentary game. In Iceland and Finland on several occasions and in much of Western Europe in the immediate postwar years, communist parties participated in governing coalitions. What is more, during the Popular Front in France, the PCF lent its support to the government without joining the government and in Sweden in recent years, the VPK has used its votes to keep the Social Democrats in power.

Even in opposition, communists have frequently cooperated with other parties in parliament. In committee in the Italian parliament, the PCI cooperates with the governing Christian Democrats often in exchange for acceptance of communist amendments. Galli reports that between 1948 and 1968, the PCI ended up voting in favor of three-fourths of the laws enacted. Additionally, in both France and
Italy, communists participate in parliamentary comissions. 38

For the communists, parliamentary participation provides a number of benefits. First, the floor of parliament is an excellent forum for communists to publicize their policy positions. Second, the emoluments of office including patronage and members' salaries supplement the party's material resources. Third, parliamentary office provides individual communist leaders with personal prestige and stature beyond that which they would receive otherwise.

The effect of parliamentary participation for communist parties is to tie them to the established order. The more secure the communist party's position in parliament, the more tangible benefits it will receive from that position and the more committed it will become to the general political framework. What is more, participation in the affairs of parliament serves as a socializing agent for communist leaders, training them in the skill of practical politics.

The net effect of communist participation in the institutions of government, then, be they local, regional, national, parliamentary, or bureaucratic, is to make the communist party a de facto member of the system and, the larger and more successful the party is electorally, the greater the party's ties to the political system.
Ironically, then, it is those communist parties with the
greatest potential for political disruption or even in-
surrection that have the greatest incentives to stay
within the system.

Organizational Variations

Finally, the organizational structure of communist
parties tends to vary from the norm of democratic cen-
tralism as a reflection of decentralized variations in
the structure of Western European governments. In Ire-
land, for example, the communist party's central committee
has a dual structure paralleling that country's division.
Similarly, the Swiss Communist Party is organized on a
cantonal basis mirroring that country's federal structure.39
Notes


4Loss, op. cit.


6Hodgson, op. cit., 200 ff.


12Ibid., 138.

13Ehrmann, op. cit., 82-83.


16 Ehrmann, op. cit., 81-93.
17 Kesselman, op. cit.
18 Tiersky, op. cit., 349-363.
19 Ibid., 360-361.
20 Ehrmann, op. cit., 86 ff.
22 P. A. Allum, The Italian Communist Party Since 1945 (Reading: University of Reading Graduate School, 1970), 39.
26 Ibid., 35-39.
29 Galli and Prandi, op. cit., 158.
32 Evans, op. cit., 103.
33 Tiersky, op. cit., 349-364.

35 Tiersky, op. cit., 357-359; Evans op. cit., 35-39.

36 Tiersky, op. cit., 177-181.


RICE UNIVERSITY

THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

R. Neal Tannahill

VOLUME II
CHAPTER VII

LEADERSHIP

Leadership is one of the most important factors in determining the policies and postures of the communist parties of Western Europe, but, at the same time, it is one of the most difficult concepts to grasp in generalizable form. A political party is not an organismic entity functioning automatically or instinctually in response to environmental stimuli. Rather, much depends on the individuals and groups of men and women composing the party's leadership who perceive and interpret the meaning of the stimuli and, within constraints imposed by the environment and the internal workings of the party itself, define and choose among responses to the stimuli. In that different individuals have different perceptual lenses, different priority orderings, and different capacities for decision-making and implementation, party behavior varies.

In application, however, the seemingly idiosyncratic behavior of individual leaders does not readily lend itself to generalization. How does one account for the stubborn, unimaginative loyalty to the Soviet Union of Maurice Thorez? or the pragmatic intellectualism of Palmiro Togliatti? or the heavy-handed direction of the Luxembourg party's ubiquitous Urbani family? or the free-
wheeling openness of C. H. Hermansson of Sweden's VPK? Undoubtedly, much of the variation in party leadership must be left to biographers and the authors of case studies to explain on the basis of unique individual personality characteristics. Nevertheless, many leadership characteristics (and consequently much of the variation in party behavior) can be explained on the basis of a number of generalizable characteristics including the backgrounds of the party leaders, the generation of the top leadership, the position of the party leadership vis-à-vis the political system, and the leaders' personal relationship to the Soviet Union.

**Backgrounds**

Those who become leaders of Western European communist parties are not a mass of interchangeable individuals, but rather come to their positions of leadership from varying social and career backgrounds. In that different backgrounds provide leaders with varying perspectives with which to perceive party problems, they provide a foundation for different behavior. Consequently, leaders from different social and career milieus will tend to differ in their approaches to their leadership roles.

**Proletarian.**

Communist leaders with proletarian backgrounds tend to be followers of the Soviet model both in their inter-
national postures and in their domestic policies. Lack-
ing intellectual sophistication, working class leaders rely on Moscow for Marxist formulae and ideological justifi-
cations. Since they lack the ideological skill to fashion and justify their own policies with Marxist-Lenin-
ist teachings, proletarian leaders are tied to some external source of ideological verities almost by default. For the communist leaders of Western Europe, because of psycho-
logical, financial, and other ties, that external source tends more often to be the Soviet Union rather than Peking or Havana.

Throughout Western Europe, bolshevization, the pro-
cess whereby the fledgling communist parties were made subservient to Soviet wishes, was accompanied, not coinci-
cidentally, by leadership changes from middle class and pet-
ty bourgeois leaders to new leaders with working class backgrounds. In France in 1921, the PCF, continuing the old organizational style and structure of the Socialist Party, was led by a 32-member directing committee only 4 of whom could be classified as workers.\(^1\) By origin, the party leadership was solidly bourgeois and intellectual.\(^2\) After 1924, with the Trotskyist struggle in the background, the Soviet Union moved to purge the Western parties of recalcitrants and to compel them to adopt "everything in Russian bolshevism that has international significance."\(^3\) In France, this was accomplished with a vigorous measure
of anti-intellectualism and an exultation of the cult of the proletariat, so that by 1929, fully 70 percent of the central committee of the French Communist Party were workers. Under the leadership of Maurice Thorez, a mine-worker who Franz Borkenau characterized as "the very type of the completely colourless true-blue 'proletarian' party bureaucrat who could be trusted to carry out orders without thinking too much;"4 Benoit Frachon, a laborer; Gaston Monmousseau, a railroad worker and union leader; and Jacques Duclos, an apprentice pastry cook; the PCF became a faithful servant of Soviet policy.5

Like its French counterpart, the early Communist Party of Great Britain was largely social democratic in organization and leadership.6 Throughout the 1920s, however, Moscow moved to strengthen its influence in the CPGB by bolshevizing its organization and purging a number of independent-minded intellectual leaders including Sylvia Pankhurst. By 1929, a new, predominantly working class leadership came to power in the CPGB including Harry Pollitt and William Galacher. Thereafter, the party was reduced to slavish submission to Moscow.7

Similarly, in its early days, the Dutch Communist Party suffered from internal divisions as the largely bourgeois leadership composed of former social democrats quarreled among themselves and with the Comintern over party policy. In the late 1920s, the International intervened
to assert control and in 1930 named a new, younger leadership less tied to the social democratic past. The new head of the party was a 31 year old skilled worker named Paul de Groot who led the party in strict alignment with Moscow. (At least for the time being. More about M. de Groot below.)

In Sweden, the intellectual and bourgeois leadership of Zeth Höglund and later Karl Kilbom was anything but submissive to Comintern wishes. Repeatedly, the Swedish Communist Party took independent positions, but the last straw came when in 1929, Kilbom sought a rapprochement with the Social Democrats rather than pursuing the International's class against class line. Subsequently, the party split and Moscow switched its support to a more compliant, proletarian leadership headed by Hugo Sillén and Sven Linderrot who led the party down more compliant lines.

More recently, in 1953, a debate developed within the Italian Communist Party about the leadership of Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI's intellectual secretary-general, and his *Via italiana al socialismo*. Attacking Togliatti and calling for a more conservative "collective leadership" were a group of left-wing working class members and apparatchiki led by Pietro Secchia, a former factory clerk. The left-wing challenge was quickly beaten back by Togliatti and his supporters, however, and in 1955 Secchia
was removed from his position as party vice-secretary. 11

Currently, working class leaders are among the more conservative, more pro-Soviet communist party leaders in Western Europe. In Sweden, the hard line opposition to Hermansson's liberal policies has centered around working class cadres from the north of Sweden led by Hilding Hagberg, a former mine worker, 12 and his son, Harry. 13 Similarly, the "internal opposition" within the Finnish Communist Party is led by Aimo Aaltonen, a one time construction worker who Devlin calls a "hard line dogmatist," 14 and Taisto Sinisalo, also of working class origins.

Petty Bourgeoisie.

Western communist leaders with petty bourgeois backgrounds tend to be more independently minded and more attuned to national conditions than their proletarian counterparts. Relatively more educated than their working class brethren, lower middle class leaders are less dependent on Moscow for ideological underpinnings and thus more likely to vary from Soviet dictates. Secondly, possessing a relatively higher status in their own societies, lower middle class leaders are less likely to feel alienated and, consequently, to attach themselves psychologically to Moscow. Finally, in their own policy decisions, middle class leaders generally lacking sophisticated intellectual credentials tend to follow pragmatic courses rather than
develop their own ideological systems.

In France, Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, many of the less pliable communist leaders who fell victim to bolshevization purges were petty bourgeois or middle class in origin. In France, for example, Marcel Cachin was the son of a policeman and taught high school before rising to leadership in the newly formed French Communist Party.15 After bolshevization, however, he no longer played a leading role.16 Another early French Communist leader was Albert Treint, a school teacher by profession. Like Cachin, he fell from power during the mid-1920s.17 In Britain, a number of middle class Central Committee members fell victim to tightening Soviet authority including Albert Inkpin, Andrew Rothstein, Arthur Horner, and Tom Bell.18

Currently, in at least some of the communist parties of Western Europe, middle class individuals enjoy prominent positions in the party hierarchy. In Italy, the middle class has risen to numerical dominance in the party hierarchy. From Tables 1, 2, and 3, we can see that the middle class has steadily increased among party leaders. What is more, McInnes reports that 62 percent of official posts at the level of party organization in the PCI are held by middle class individuals and that among the party's parliamentarians, those from middle class backgrounds outnumber ex-workers three to one.19 Similarly, in France,
<table>
<thead>
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<th>1947</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
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<td>1029</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>1557</td>
<td>1725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm worker</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>210</td>
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<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>266</td>
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<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2925</td>
<td>3075</td>
<td>3930</td>
<td>4246</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SES Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower middle</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3. PERCENT UNIVERSITY GRADUATES IN PCI LEADERSHIP, 1946-1963.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in 1962 of the PCF's 41 deputies, only 18 had been workers. Of 73 in 1973, a mere 27 were former workers. 20

Although many positions in the middle level hierarchy of both the French and Italian Communist Parties are held by individuals of middle class origin, the pattern in the top leadership is not so similar. In the relatively conservative French Party, the top of the party hierarchy, the Maurice Thorez, Georges Marchais, and Waldeck Rochets, have been from working class backgrounds. In the more progressive PCI, the Palmiro Togliattis and Enrico Berlinguers have come from bourgeois backgrounds. (Luigi Longo's family were peasants. 21)

Intellectual.

Although communism in Western Europe has made consistent and strenuous efforts to gain the support and cooperation of intellectuals, 22 as party leaders, intellectuals tend to be the least dependable allies of the Soviet Union and the most innovative in devising domestic programs and strategies. By definition, intellectuals have the training and predisposition to interpret Marx and Lenin for themselves rather than relying on Moscow's version of the truth and, consequently, intellectual leaders often find themselves at odds with Moscow's simplistic Marxism.

Historically, Moscow has found more than a few intellectual party leaders to be less than compliant servants
of Soviet commands. In Britain, Sylvia Pankhurst of the famous suffragette family was expelled from the CPGB because of her independent views.23 Boris Souvarine and L.O. Frossard were among France's intellectual communist leaders who proved unresponsive to Moscow's demands.24 Zeth Höglund, Karl Kilbom, and other intellectual founders of the Swedish Communist Party left it in the middle 1920s because they did not care to submit blindly to the Comintern's wishes.25

Presently, intellectual communist party leaders are far from submissive to Soviet dictates. Prominent among Western Europe's intellectual communist leaders is C. H. Hermansson, the head of Sweden's VPK. After joining the Swedish Party in 1941, Hermansson, who held both high school and university degrees, began to write for Ny Dag, the party newspaper. By 1959, he rose to the post of editor, a position which he parlayed into party chairman in 1964.26 Under Hermansson's leadership (and with strong support from intellectual circles at Stockholm university27), the VPK has embarked on a remarkably innovative course in both domestic and international policies.28

Two of Western Europe's historically more independent parties vis-à-vis Moscow and more moderate in regards to domestic policies have had traditions of intellectual influence. The Icelandic Communist Party's first chairman was Brynjoflur Bjarnason who earned a degree from the
University of Copenhagen and taught in Iceland before rising to party leadership. Another of the party's founders and past presidents was Einar Olgeirsson who studied at the University of Reykjavik and the University of Berlin. Later, he taught in Iceland and edited the party organ, Thjodvildjinn.29 Finally, Regnar Arnalds, the current chairman of the PA, is a Swedish-educated lawyer.30

Intellectuals have long held prominent positions in the Italian Communist Party. Antonio Gramsci, the party's political and spiritual founder, has a solid reputation as a fresh and original Marxist theoretician whose works are still widely read in leftist intellectual circles.31 Along with Gramsci in the leadership of the early PCI, were Togliatti, Tasca, and Terracini, all graduates of the University of Turin and all intellectuals in their own right.32 As Table 3 indicates, the PCI has long had a large proportion of university graduates in its leadership hierarchy (43.5 percent in 1963).33 Urged forward by the great number of intellectuals in its leadership, as Timmermann argues, the PCI has pursued policies of ideological, political, and even organizational openness.34

In a number of cases, moderate, revisionist challenges to hard line communist leadership have been led by intellectuals. In Austria, the progressive minority that lost a power struggle to pro-Stalinists following the furor surrounding the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
was led by such intellectuals as Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, the editor of *Weg und Ziel*, the party's theoretical journal.\textsuperscript{35} In 1961 in Finland, a group of intellectuals broke with the SKP to found, along with a group of Social Democrats, the journal *Tilanne* which became a josting ground for "noncomformist" communists, socialists, and leftists.\textsuperscript{36} Similarly, in Belgium, a mildly revisionist group that broke with the CPN in 1958 was led by a group of intellectuals who founded the journal *De Brug*.\textsuperscript{37}

Not all intellectual opponents of Soviet orthodoxy have been revisionists or progressives. By their nature, intellectuals are neither revisionists nor dogmatists per se. They are more difficult to discipline. Consequently, they may be more dogmatic than the party line demands rather than more progressive. Throughout Western Europe, ultra-leftist parties have sprung up led, in many cases, by intellectuals. In Italy, for example, the *Il Manifesto* group is directed by a group of dissident intellectuals including Rossana Rossanda, Luigi Pintor, and Aldo Natoli.\textsuperscript{38} In Belgium in 1963, Jacques Grippa whose former tenure on the faculty of a school for cadres gives him some credentials as an intellectual theoretician, led a group of dissidents out of the PCB to launch a pro-Chinese party.\textsuperscript{39} In France, too, many of the Maoist and anarchist groups opposing the PCF are led by intellectuals.\textsuperscript{40}
Individual intellectuals, too, have often dissented against communist policies. In France, such well-known intellectuals as Roger Garaudy, Simon de Beauvoir, Jean Paul Sartre, Claude Roy, Louis Aragon, and others have first embraced the party and then repudiated it. Another intellectual, Louis Althusser, is among the PCF's foremost left-wing critics. Yrjö Leino, a former agronomy professor who served as a communist member of Finland's postwar cabinet, broke with the party after separating from his wife, Hertta Kuusinen. In Britain, too, individual intellectuals have left the CPGB to become some of its strongest critics.

**Apparatchiki.**

Communist party leaders whose entire careers have been in the party tend to develop strong attachments to the party as an institution. Unlike many of their intellectual and proletarian counterparts, apparatchik leaders eschew rigorous orthodoxy be it pro-Soviet or otherwise in favor of policies and practices designed to insure the organizational well-being of their party. Consequently, apparatchik leaders opt for uninnovative, pragmatic policies which they believe will maintain and enhance their party's social and electoral position, policies which may or may not follow the Soviet line depending on the leaders' perceptions of advantageous positions. Thus, apparatchik leaders of the Western European parties tend enthusiastic-
ally to endorse Moscow's policy of international détente, for example, because of its value domestically. On the other hand, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 is regarded by many Western party leaders as an electoral albatros.

An excellent example of an apparatchik communist leader in Western Europe is Enrico Berlinguer, the current secretary-general of the Italian Communist Party. The son of a Sicilian lawyer, the serious, pipe-smoking Berlinguer has been a member of the PCI's apparatus all of his adult life. In his policy positions, Berlinguer has concentrated on policies designed to further his party's political position rather than promote Soviet policy aims or further the cause of Marxist revolution. While Berlinguer has endorsed Soviet policies that enjoy domestic popularity such as détente, he has been quick to put his party on record against Russian policies that are unpopular in Italy such as the Czechoslovakian intervention and Soviet social policies.

Luigi Longo, Berlinguer's immediate predecessor at the head of the PCI, was also very much the organization man. A longtime deputy of Palmiro Togliatti, Longo virtually grew up within the party and, like his successor, he was an ideologue neither of Stalinism nor of revisionism, but pragmatically desirous of enhancing his party's domestic political position. An organizer rather than
a thinker, as Caldwell describes him, Longo continued along the path outlined by his predecessor toward party autonomy. 47

Similarly, Waldeck Rochet, who led the French Communist Party from 1964 until prolonged illness forced him to turn over the reins of leadership to Georges Marchais in 1971, was an individual totally devoted to the party apparatus. As party leader, Waldeck Rochet lacked innovative brilliance, but excelled at keeping the party together through his organizational skills and emphasis on conservative, but nonrevolutionary policies acceptable to the party's large constituency. 48 Georges Marchais, Waldeck Rochet's successor, is also very much an organization man. He, too, behaves as a man more concerned with his party's institutional posture than with either political dogma or Soviet foreign policy interests.

Trade Unionist.

Communist leaders with trade unionist backgrounds bring perspectives characteristic of their union experience to their leadership roles. Because of the differing nature of unions in different countries and the varying positions of communist parties vis-à-vis the union movement in different countries, communist union leaders' perspectives vary. In Britain, the CPGB's long experience of trying to increase their influence within gener-
all nonrevolutionary unions has produced such pragmatic, flexible unionist party leaders as John Gollan, John Tocher,49 and Gordon McLennan, the party's newly appointed general secretary.50

Similarly, in Italy, where the PCI's union strategy has long been one of cooperation and compromise with the Italian Socialists and other left-wing parties,51 the communist trade union leaders tend to be moderates on domestic policy and autonomists in matters concerning the international communist movement. Labor unionist leaders Bruno Trentin and Sergio Garavini are advocates of decentralization and democracy in the PCI and Agostino Novella and Luciano Lama, the past and present secretaries-general of the CGIL, are associated with Giorgio Amendola's group of moderate party reformers.52

In countries where communist union strength is concentrated in a single union or a single area, whether broadly as in the CGT in France or narrowly as in Norway and Sweden where the communists dominate a few locals in certain regions of the country, unionist party leaders cling to conservative politions. In Sweden, where the union strength of the communists is concentrated in the Norrbotten region, trade union leaders are among Hermansson's more conservative opponents. In Norway, opposition to transforming the left-wing electoral alliance into a united party comes from hard liners many of whom are in
union posts.\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, trade union leaders in France are generally among the PCF's more conservative members.\textsuperscript{54}

In Finland where the communist union experience has alternated between conflict and cooperation with the Social Democrats, communist unionists are found among the ranks of hard liners and progressives both. Although many of those who oppose SKP coalition with the Social Democrats are unionists, some of the progressives are also trade unionists (including Arvo Aalto\textsuperscript{55}).

Regardless of whether communist union militants tend to be conservative and pro-Soviet as in France or progressive and independent-minded as in Britain, they all tend to be nonrevolutionary. In part, this is because union status gives these leaders a measure of prestige in the system as it is, a prestige they may not wish to risk. Secondly, union leaders tend to have experience bargaining with governmental authorities (and, in some cases, union leaders of other political persuasions) and this tends to socialize them into the political process. Finally, as Galli suggests, because of their proximity to the day-to-day struggle for bread and butter reforms, union leaders tend to lose interest in revolutionary goals.\textsuperscript{56}

Generational Differences

Communist leaders from different generations vary
in their approaches to their roles because they differ in their political socialization experiences. Older leaders who acquired their political knowledge and beliefs before 1956 were socialized in a period during which the Soviet Union was revered as a bastion of anti-fascism and the USSR's place at the head of the communist movement was secure. On the other hand, younger leaders earned their political spurs in a period in which the Soviet myth of infallibility was shattered. The Soviet's moral leadership of the communist world was threatened by the revelations of Stalin's crimes and the crisis of Hungary. Moscow's political leadership was challenged first by Yugoslavia and, then, more seriously, by China. Consequently, older leaders tend still to look to the Soviet Union for leadership in international questions and for guidance in domestic politics while younger leaders tend to be more independent in their international and domestic policies both.

In Austria, the conflict between moderates and hard liners precipitated by the Czechoslovakian crisis was in many respects fought along generation lines. In general, the progressives in the Austrian Communist Party were young, many of them intellectuals. On the other hand, the KPÖ leaders who stood most firmly behind the Soviet Union were veteran communists. Similarly, the deep division between pro-Soviets and progressives in the
Finnish Communist Party has generational overtones and in Sweden, too, older leaders tend to be among the opponents of Hermansson's reforms. Also, in the latter country, Hermansson's emergence as party leader in 1964 came largely as a result of his youthful supporters.

Remarkably, the Communist Party of Luxembourg has been led by the same team of leaders for decades avoiding splits and purges. Its chairman, Dominique Urbani, rose to a position of leadership before World War II and with the aid of his family (ten of whom hold positions in the party machine), continues to exercise tight control over the party. For Urbani and, not coincidentally, the PCL, the infallibility of the Soviet Union and the truth of orthodox Marxist doctrine remain very real.

The Danish and Norwegian Parties both have relatively veteran leadership. In 1965, the NKP dealt with a major internal crisis by replacing the Stalinist veteran Emil Løvlien with Reidar Larsen as party chairman. To a large extent, however, the change was more cosmetic than real as Larsen, too, had a Stalinist past and even though he was relatively young at 41, he did not represent the younger generation of Norwegian communists. The Danish Communist Party, also, is in the hands of veteran Stalinist leadership. Although Knud Jespersen, the party leader, is capable, behind him stands the hard line presence of old-line veteran Ib Nørlund.
In contrast, the top leadership of the more forward-looking Italian Communist Party is in the hands of younger men. Berlinguer, for one, is in his early 50s. When the founders of the PCI were being arrested by the Fascists, Berlinguer was only an infant. Another Western party with younger generation leadership is the moderate Icelandic Communist Party. Its chairman, Regnar Arnalds, is only in his thirties.

Although there are some notable exceptions (Togliatti, Axel Larsen, and others), veteran party leaders tend to become wedded to past policies. In several countries, for example, veteran communist leaders only reluctantly accepted destalinization and hesitated to enact reforms in their own parties. Holland's veteran leader Paul de Groot, for example, totally refused to accept destalinization. Ironically, this refusal was one of the factors that led de Groot to take his party out of the international movement.

In several other cases, it took the ascension of new, younger leaders to bring about change. In France, for example, communist leaders saw destalinization as contrary to many years of training and Thorez, in particular, saw it as a threat to his personal position. Not until Thorez passed from the scene in 1964 did the PCF begin a transformation. Then, in the interpretation of Annie Kriegel, Waldeck Rochet, the new party secretary, took
a series of wide-ranging and decisive steps designed to lead his party away from Stalinism. In this effort, Waldeck Rochet was supported by Roger Garaudy, at that time the party's resident intellectual, and some younger members of the politburo, including Gaston Plissonnier, Roland Leroy, and René Piquet. The opposition, which Kriegel argues, carried the day, were led by such veteran politburo members as Jacques Duclos, Etienne Fajon, François Billoux, Raymond Guyot, and Jeannette Vermeersch-Thorez. In recent years, the French party's new leader, Georges Marchais, who is twenty years younger than his predecessor, has led new assaults on the PCF's "neo-Stalinism," as Kriegel calls it, but with little more success, as yet, than Waldeck Rochet.

In several Western communist parties, the change of line during the 1950s from Cold War rigidity to united front tactics was accompanied by a leadership turnover. In Belgium, in 1954, the PCB's Eleventh Congress not only adopted a new unity of action program, but shuffled the leadership turning to two younger men to head the party, Ernest Burnelle, a former schoolteacher and René Beelin, a worker. In Great Britain, Harry Pollitt resigned as general-secretary of the CPGB on the same day that the party acknowledged the seriousness of Stalin's crimes. Before that, the party had glossed over the controversy.
Position Vis-à-Vis the Political System

The personal position of individual communist party leaders in relation to the political system is an important part of their individual political socialization. In general, the experience of holding political office tends to moderate communists' domestic and international attitudes and to increase their acceptance of alliances with noncommunist parties. As office holders, communist politicians develop an appreciation of the limits of practical politics and of the necessity of cooperation with office holders from other parties. Additionally, communist leaders with long tenure in governmental office tend to develop an institutional allegiance to the system. Thus, they develop a stake in the established political order.

A collateral effect of office holding that can be particularly important for the more successful parties of Western Europe is that the occupation of office tends to raise the objective class status of its occupants. Although communist parties typically require office holders to remit all of their pay above the level of the salary of a skilled worker, the privileges and accoutrements of governmental office that cannot be valued monetarily serve to raise the status of communist parliamentarians, mayors, and other officials above the lower class. In Finland, for example, Naponen reports that although two-thirds of
the communist delegation in 1964 came from working class homes, the largest group among them was middle class, objectively speaking. The effect of this upward social mobility on communist incumbents may well be a tempering of overt dissatisfaction with the political system.

In Italy, the leaders of the respectably moderate PCI are represented in local and regional government offices in large numbers. According to Prandi and Galli, in 1963 nearly 70 percent of communist party officials had held the post of municipal councillor, 20 percent as mayor, nearly 30 percent provincial councillors, and 14 percent communal magistrates. Also, many of the PCI's upper echelon leadership are experienced members of parliament. What is more, the more revisionist elements of the PCI are found in areas where the party is strongly entrenched in local and regional government (Tuscany, Emilia). Party officials in the Red Belt, for example, enthusiastically endorsed the "compromesso storico." In Iceland, communist leaders have shared national power as part of a left-wing coalition government as well as holding some offices in municipal government. Similarly, in Finland, many SKP leaders hold seats in parliament and a number have had governing experience during the periods of SKP participation in coalition governments. Notably, those communist leaders who participated in the governing coalition tended to be more supportive
of continued communist participation in the government than those who were removed from power. As Schöpflin contends, participation in power separated those party leaders who placed ideological purity above the compromise necessitated by day-to-day politics. In France, the communist party has long held numerous local offices and its leaders for the most part are experienced parliamentarians. Mendel, among others, attributes the PCF's conservative, nonrevolutionary postures in part to the comfortable position of its leaders. In Luxembourg, the PCL leaders have held parliamentary seats and some offices in local government, but despite the party's size have been excluded from national power.

In contrast, the leaders of the West German Communist Party have not only been excluded from political office, but from 1957 to 1968 bore the burden of heading an outlawed party. It is not surprising, then, that the DKP dissociates itself from the reformist approach and still speaks seriously of revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Similarly, the leaders of the relatively hard line Austrian and Irish Communist Parties for the most part hold no national political positions and in Denmark and Norway, communists have won seats in parliament only within the last few years. In Britain, although the leaders of the more moderate CPGB have been excluded from parlia-
ment, their participation in union affairs and in union negotiations with the government tends to tie them to the system.

Personal Relationship to the Soviet Union

A final part of an individual communist leader's political socialization experience that shapes his behavior as a party leader is his personal relationship to the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries. In general, the closer an individual leader's personal ties to Moscow, the more likely his personal policy decisions will support Soviet interests.

Leaders of the West German Communist Party have strong personal attachments to East Germany and the Soviet Union. During the party's fugitive period, they depended upon the German Democratic Republic for shelter and financial support. They were carefully selected by Moscow for party leadership and literally they owe their careers to the Soviets and East Germans. Consequently, their loyalty to the international positions of the Kremlin is hardly surprising. 79

A number of Western Europe's communist leaders are personally tied to Moscow by virtue of training. Johann Kopelnig, a founder and long-time secretary-general of the Austrian Communist Party, was trained in the Soviet Union. Later, as a party leader, he followed the Soviet line
faithfully. 80 Karl Tomann, another of the founders of the Austrian Communist Party, learned his Marxism while a prisoner in Russia during World War I. 81 On several occasions, Maurice Thorez journeyed to Moscow for training and instructions. 82

Other communist leaders developed ties to Moscow while living there in exile and, when the exile experience coincided with training, the result was often the development of a firm allegiance to the USSR. This was the case with the Norwegian Communist Party's Emil Løvlien. 83 For others, however, exile in the Soviet Union was a sobering, even fatal experience. Ironically, after the Finnish Communist Party regained legality in 1944, the only available communist leaders were those who had languished in bourgeois prisons in Finland. Most of the émigré leaders (along with untold numbers of other East and West European communist leaders in exile) fell victim to Stalin's purges. 84 For others, such as Palmiro Togliatti, the exile experience (as well as his experience as a high functionary in the Comintern Executive) bred an appreciation of the Soviets' raw power, but also an awareness of their ruthlessness. Throughout his career as leader of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti was pro-Soviet, but not blindly so. 85 In the last years of his life, in particular, when Soviet authority was being challenged on the global level from several quarters, Togliatti led his
party in open and active resistance to some aspects of Soviet policy. 86

There are a number of other personal ties between individual communist leaders and Moscow. Edgar Woog, the postwar head of the Swiss Communist Party, was buttressed in his loyal support for the Soviet Union by his long tenure as a high functionary in the apparatus of the Third International. 87 Additionally, psychological ties, as we have seen, can be quite strong, particularly for veteran leaders.

Communist leaders without strong personal ties to the USSR have, in many cases, demonstrated considerable independence from Moscow. It is no accident that a number of West European communist party leaders who went underground during the Nazi occupation rather than fleeing to Moscow, later were purged or split with the party. While underground, they were generally cut off from instructions from Moscow and thus cultivated the talent of making policy decisions on their own with little outside guidance. Furthermore, the resistance experience taught them skills in bargaining and cooperation with other political groups thus giving them closer ties with their own political systems. In Denmark, Axel Larsen, who broke with the DKP to found the Danish Socialist People's Party, spent the war in Denmark organizing the resistance until captured by the Germans. 88 Paul de Groot, the long-time
leader of the Communist Party of the Netherlands who in
the 1960s led his party out of the Soviet orbit, was a
resistance leader. Similarly, Peder Furobotn, who led
the Norwegian resistance against the Germans, was purged
from leadership in the NKP in 1949 as a "Titoist."

Finally, many of Western Europe's more independently-
minded communist leaders lack strong personal ties to the
Soviet Union. Sweden's Hermansson, Iceland's Arnalds,
and Italy's Berlinguer, among others, have none of the
more obvious links to Moscow (financial, training, past
residence).

Although, as we have seen, there is more than a coin-
cidental relationship between background variables and
the decision-making behavior of the leaders of the com-
munist parties of Western Europe, we must be cautious not
to push the conclusions of this chapter too far, even
within the constraints imposed by the theoretical model
of our study. First, even if we adopted the philosophical
position of environmental determinism, who is to say that
only certain aspects of a communist leader's background--
his social origins, occupation, generation, and personal
position vis-à-vis the political system and the Soviet
Union--shape his behavior? Other, perhaps idiosyncratic
factors, may be important also.

Secondly, for purposes of discussion, we have con-
sidered and illustrated each of the background variables
in separate sections, but, in reality, we could present a matrix of background variables for each leader. Dominique Urbani of Luxembourg's PCL, for example, is a veteran party militant from a working class background who was active in the resistance and a parliamentarian since 1944. He also has close personal ties to Moscow. How does one decide which of the background variables or what combination of variables are most important for each individual?

The most important point to be made about background variables is not that they determine communist leaders' behavior. They do not. Rather, they are one group of factors among many that affect communist elites' actions.
Notes


8 Sworakowski, op. cit.


10 Ibid., Sworakowski, op. cit.


15 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit.

16 Wohl, op. cit., 429.
17 Ibid., 426.
18 Pelling, op. cit., 52.
20 Ibid., 67.
22 Caute, op. cit., 34-35.
23 Pelling, op. cit., 20.
24 Wohl, op. cit.
25 Sworakowski, op. cit.
26 YICA, 1966.
27 Economist, 16 Nov. 1974, 61.
28 Daniel Tarschys, "The Unique Role of the Swedish CP," Problems of Communism, XXIII (May-June, 1974), 36-44.
29 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit.
30 YICA, 1969.
33 Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Frandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 158.


41 Timmermann, op. cit., 262.

42 Caute, op. cit.

43 Johnson, op. cit., 58 ff.

44 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit.


47 Caldwell, op. cit.


49 YICA, 1971.


56 Galli, *op. cit.*, 326.

57 Devlin, "Czechoslovakia and the Crisis of Austrian Communism," *op. cit.*

58 Devlin, "Finnish Communism," *op. cit.*

59 Tarschys, *op. cit.*


61 YICA, 1971.


64 Levi, *op. cit.*

65 McInnes, *op. cit.*, 118.


68 Timmermann, *op. cit.*, 261.

69 Kriegel, *op. cit.*, 381-382.
70 Sworakowski, op. cit.

71 The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Commu-
nism, Russian Institute (New York: Colombia University
Press, 1956).

72 Martti Naponen, Kansanedustajien sosiaalinen tausta
Suomessa (Porvoo-Helsinki: WSOY, 1964), quoted in Jaakko
Nousiainen, "Research on the Finnish Communism," Scandi-
navian Political Studies, III (1968), 243-251, 249-250.

73 Galli and Frandi, op. cit., 158.

74 Galli, op. cit., 316.

75 See statement of Guido Fanti, the communist presi-
dent of the region of Emilia, Il Mundo, 29 Nov. 1973; and
that of the mayor of Bologna, Renato Zangheri, Ibid.,

76 George Schöpflin, "Finnish Communists in Disarray,"
World Today (June, 1969), 231-234, 231.

77 Arthur P. Mendel, "Why the French Communists Stopped
the Revolution," Review of Politics, XXXI (Jan.,
1969), 3-27, 4. See also, Georges Lavau, "Parti et societe:
Les communistes francais," Critique, XXV (Dec., 1969),
1083-1094; Denis Berger and Paul-Louis Thirard, "Un parti
social-democrate de type nouveau," Les temps modernes,
XXVI (Mar., 1970), 1446-1471; Michel Winock, "La contra-
diction du P.C.F.," Esprit, XXXVIII (May, 1970), 881-
897; and Annie Kriegel, "Le parti communiste francais et
la Ve Republique," Contrepoint, IX (1973), 159-172.

78 Richard Loss, "The Communist Party of Germany

79 Ibid.

80 Sworakowski, op. cit.

81 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit. After losing a
factional struggle in the KPO, Tomann deserted the party
and in World War II acted as an official for the pro-Nazi
regime. When the Red Army swept through the area, he was
arrested and shot.

82 Robert A. Wohl, "Maurice Thorez," 3-16 in Swearingen,
op. cit.

83 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit.


86 Blackmer, op. cit., 330-331.

87 Sworakowski, op. cit.; Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit.

88 Rohde, op. cit., 13-16.

89 Lazitch and Drachkovitch, op. cit.

CHAPTER VIII

PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND ELECTORATE

Although the leadership of Western communist parties is of considerable importance in determining party behavior, that leadership does not function in a vacuum, but rather is constrained by a number of factors in the party's external and internal environments. Externally, as we have seen in Chapter III, the party's ties to the Soviet Union and other communist countries and parties, as well as the dynamics of the international communist movement, provide party leaders with problems, possibilities, and opportunities that tend to limit and channel the party's actions. In Chapter IV, we found that the social structure sets other bounds on communist party action and, in Chapter V, that the same was the case for the political system in which each party must function. Then, in Chapter VI, we examined the various ways in which the constitutional framework acts as a constraint and a shaping force on the communist parties of Western Europe and, at the same time, their leaders.

Not all constraining factors influencing the actions of communist party leaders are imposed by the party's external environment or by the personal characteristics of the individual leaders themselves (as we examined in Chapter VII). Other constraints arise from the internal
composition and nature of the party itself including the nature of the party's membership and electorate which we will examine here, and certain characteristics of the party's historical experience, which we will explore in the next chapter.

Although in general parlance we speak of a political party's members and voters as if they were two distinct, well-defined groups, it is more accurate to picture an individual's relationship to a political party as a continuum based on that individual's psychological and behavioral involvement in the party. In Figure 1, such a continuum has been constructed with labels attached less to indicate clearly differentiated categories than to suggest names for the relative intensities of involvement and attachment to a party that individuals may possess. The least degree of positive association to a party is held by an individual who votes for the party on a more or less regular basis. At a level of greater involvement, is the individual who self-consciously identifies with the party occasionally donating his resources to the party's use. Moving further up the involvement continuum, we find the individuals who more properly may be called party members. These individuals form the nucleus of each of the party's basic groups. They are the unpaid volunteers who collectively flesh-out the party's organizational framework and actively participate in election campaigns.
**FIGURE 1. PARTY INVOLVEMENT.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>supporter</th>
<th>upper leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>elector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active member</td>
<td>intermediate leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Above these in involvement and participation are the leadership. Intermediate leaders tend to see party work as more vocational (at least potentially) than avocational. Near the higher end of the involvement continuum are the upper leadership and at the highest level of involvement and commitment are the top leadership including a relatively small number of individuals or perhaps only a single leader.

In this chapter, our interest is concentrated on the left half of the involvement continuum—those who vote, join, and work for the party. Although in our analysis we will employ terms like member and voter as if they were clearly distinct groups, we must keep in mind the nature of the qualitative distinction between them and the difficulty of drawing a precise line between two groups in the party.

The individuals and groups who compose the electorate and membership of a Western European communist party are important to the party because it is they, for the most part, who provide the party's primary resources. It is they, particularly the activists, who contribute time, money, votes, and effort in an election campaign. It is they who work for the party in the countryside, the union hall, and the legislature. It is they who contribute the ideals, ideas, and insight that come to comprise the party's program.
Potentially, a party's membership and electorate can act as a powerful restraint on the party's actions. First, a displeased membership may choose to cease contributing their physical and material resources to the party thus precipitating financial and manpower shortages. They may choose to withhold their electoral support or, worse, vote for a rival thus reducing the communists' domestic political strength. Secondly, discontented militants may opt to support an internal opposition to reverse party policies, creating or enlarging an internal schism. Finally, unhappy members can withdraw from the party in order to create a rival Marxist party.¹

In general, the more active and better informed the participants in the party, the greater the check they impose on party behavior. More active members contribute more to the party; so, the withdrawals of their services is a greater blow than the abstention of relatively passive individuals. Further, more aware individuals will be a more potent constraint, at least potentially, because they are more alert to a broader range of party activities. Consequently, a communist party's electorate, because of its lesser awareness of internal party decisions and relatively lesser contribution to the party's success, is generally a relatively weaker constraint than the party's militants.

We see, then, that a communist party's participants--
voters, members, militants—can place boundaries on the party's leaders. The nature of these boundaries depends on the character and nature of the membership and electorate of the parties.

Several generalizations can be drawn about the membership and electorate of the communist parties of Western Europe. First, communist party voters and members throughout Western Europe tend to support the communist party in its "fonction tribunitienne," as Lavau terms it. The party fulfills this tribune function, Lavau argues, by expressing the malcontentments, denouncing the abuses, and organizing the protests of the plebian masses it represents.\(^2\) And, to be sure, the empirical evidence indicates that the "plebian masses" who support the communist party do tend to be malcontents. In general, they tend to oppose bourgeois incumbents and support proposals for political reform. Based on a survey of industrial workers in France and Italy in late 1955 and early 1956, Cantril reports that many workers (more than 60 percent in each country) see a great deal of injustice around them and that many see the communist party as the most effective means of making themselves heard by the government.\(^3\) "The interviews," Micaud argues, "made it clear that to a large extent the communist vote expresses protest against the political system...."\(^4\)

In more recent surveys, in France in 1968, when asked
why people vote communist, 35 percent of the PCF's electors replied that it was because the party represents a useful opposition force and another 38 percent said that the PCF translates general discontent. In 1973, the I.F.O.P. (Institute Francaise de l'Opinion Publique) asked supporters of the different French political groupings their attitudes on a series of governmental policies and institutions. As we can see from Table 1, on almost every question, the communist voters favor "a great deal of change" in greater proportions than any other political group. Finally, based on his interviews with PCF delegates at a federation conference in the department of l'Isere in 1974, Derville reports that these activists see the party's task as that of relieving the misery of men.

Tarrow reports that the Italian Communist Party benefits from a large bloc of protest voters that differs from other voters largely on the basis of attitudes toward the established government. According to a 1963 survey, only 15 percent of the communists' supporters favored the then current government of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Republicans.

In other countries, too, communist voters tend to differ from noncommunist supporters on the basis of their attitudes toward the political system. In the Netherlands, Stapel and de Jonge report that in 1947, 79 percent of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>PCF</th>
<th>Soc. &amp; Rad.</th>
<th>Reformateur</th>
<th>Majority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax System</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function of Justice</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of Social Policy</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Information Policy</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalities</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Parliament</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of Economic Policy</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Trade Unions</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of European Policy</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of President</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the CPN's voters felt the national income distribution was unjust, while only 50 percent of the whole sample agreed. In Great Britain, Newton reports that on the basis of selected interviews with party members, British Communists are not political fanatics, but rather "pragmatic, tentative, idealistic, humanitarian, and sometimes surprisingly cautious in their opinions." In Finland, Allardt reports that when asked what is wrong with Finnish society, 51 percent of the communist supporters said inequalities, a far greater proportion choosing that answer than in any other party.

While communist voters support their party's role as a tribune for the discontented, there is solid evidence that they would not endorse an overtly revolutionary role by the communists. According to Cantril, when asked if the political situation would be changed by evolution or revolution, only 19 percent of the French workers and 16 percent of the Italians said the latter. In 1968, an I.F.O.P. poll asked Frenchmen how they characterized the PCF and only 1 percent of communist electors described the party as "wanting revolution." Two years later, Frenchmen were asked the following: "Agree or disagree, if the situation seemed favorable to it, the PCF would be ready to seize power by revolution." Of the PCF's electors, 21 percent agreed, but 57 percent disagreed. Similarly, Newton and Crozier report that British com-
munists are not revolutionaries. That banner, they argue, is being carried by the ultra-left in Britain.\textsuperscript{14}

As was the case with individual communist leaders, socioeconomic characteristics tend to predispose communist militants and supporters toward favoring certain types of political behavior by the party and opposing other types. Although individual militants have different programmatic predispositions that depend, in large part, on unique personal characteristics, some generalizations can be drawn. First, along generational lines, a dichotomy between cadres socialized before 1956 and those socialized after 1956 exists parallel to that between older and younger leaders. During their politically formative years, older members lived in a period in which the international prestige of the Soviet Union was preeminent. For younger militants, however, the gloss had faded both from Moscow's world leadership and from her domestic infallibility. Consequently, older cadres tend to be loyal to the Soviet Union while younger militants are more likely to emphasize the domestic needs of their own party rather than those of the Soviet Union. A party with a large core of veteran militants will thus be constrained to adhere to traditional allegiance to Moscow and to continued "orthodox" Marxist approaches to domestic problems. On the other hand, if the party's cadres are predominantly younger, leaders will be free (if not encouraged) to pursue a more "national-
istic" line and to adopt more pragmatic and flexible domestic policies.

In no Western European communist party are veteran militants more firmly entrenched than in the Austrian Communist Party. During the Soviet occupation of Austria from 1945 to 1955, pro-Soviet militants were firmly established in the KPÖ's organization. Because of the party's inability to attract younger members, the KPÖ has aged (60 percent are over 60 years old) and the veteran Stalinists have remained in place.

Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the initial reaction of the party's "centrist-progressive" leadership headed by Franz Muhri was one of explicit condemnation. Although the leadership was enthusiastically supported and encouraged by an intellectual and youth minority led by Franz Marek and Ernst Fischer, the bulk of the party's militants, trained in the comforting simplicities of the Stalinist years, were in no mood for change.16 At the KPÖ's Twentieth Congress in January, 1969, the veteran conservatives flexed their muscle by ousting several progressives from the central committee. Ernst Fischer was excluded from the party and the Congress voted to cut off funds from the youth movement. Only Muhri's energetic efforts at compromise and conciliation prevented a formal split.17

The result of the KPÖ's Twentieth Congress was,
eventually, a complete victory for the veteran militants. Although Marek and other progressives noisily continued the debate, the overwhelming strength of the Stalinists was made apparent to everyone including the "centrist" leadership who quickly perceived that the party's real center was quite conservative. Thereafter, Franz Muhri sided more frequently with the conservatives who, recognizing their own strength, asserted themselves decisively at the party's Twenty-First Congress in May, 1970, purging progressives from the politburo once and for all and re-entrenching the party's pro-Soviet stand. Subsequently, the KPÖ moved away from its relatively moderate position of the early 1960s opting for unabashedly hard line, pro-Soviet international and domestic policies.¹⁸

The Czechoslovakian crisis and the SKP's reaction to it led to revolt by veteran militants in Finland, too, but with different results. In Austria, the strength of the old-timers was overwhelming, but in the more dynamic and younger Finnish Party (whose average age of 49 in 1969 indicates a closer division between older and younger militants),¹⁹ the conservsatives were only a minority. As in Austria, the Finnish Communist Party condemned Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and this condemnation spurred Stalinist cadres to action. With the crisis over Czechoslovakia, an already simmering division between progressives and hard liners came to a boil as the
conservatives walked out of the stormy Fifteenth Congress in April, 1969, to establish a shadow organization. 20

As in Austria, the SKP was divided into progressive and conservative blocs with much of the leadership trying to play a moderating, centrist role. Unlike the Austrian case, however, in Finland, veteran militants did not win the day. Voting at the Fifteenth Congress proved that the hard liners were only a minority, although a large minority. Progressives were able to elect many of their own to party posts and in a subsequent compromise, progressives control majorities on the party's major decision-making bodies. Consequently, although a stubborn minority of veteran cadres and leaders struggle for control of the party, the SKP, unlike its Austrian counterpart, has not retreated from its criticism of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia nor from its moderate domestic line. 21

In contrast to the cases of the Finnish and Austrian Communist Parties, there was comparatively little furor in the Italian Communist Party over that party's outspoken attacks on Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. One reason for this is that all but a small minority of Cold War Stalinists had been ousted from positions of importance and replaced by individuals more loyal to the party's Via italiana al socialismo. 23 Although, as Hellman discovered, older cadres in the PCI are reticent about criticizing the Soviet Union, Stalinism is weak. 24 Addition-
ally, a majority of the PCI's cadres are relatively young with more than half of the party's 1970 membership being less than 40.25

In France, although the PCF is relatively young, it is apparently aging and veteran cadres exercise considerable power in the party.26 According to the party's own reports, in 1966, 57 percent of the party's members were over 40.27 At the Nineteenth Congress in 1970, 85 percent of the Central Committee had become members of the PCF before 1953, the year Stalin died. So, despite a relatively young electorate (31 percent between 20 and 34, only 15 percent over 65 in 1973, see Table 2), the party itself is controlled by relatively older militants.

Background Factors.

The class and career backgrounds of party militants also act as constraints on party leaders. In general, for militants as for leaders, proletarian backgrounds tend to make for allegiance to the Soviet Union, particularly in country's where class consciousness is relatively high and the working class is relatively alienated. This is because workers, denied political participation in their own country, identify with the USSR both as a model for the development of their own society and as the fatherland of the international working class. For older workers, of course, this is particularly likely to be true.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-34</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

For middle class cadres, however, this is less the case. They are likely neither so alienated nor so disadvantaged as their working class cousins. Consequently, their identification with Moscow is less. It is not surprising, then, that the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 precipitated greater defections in the British Communist Party, for example, among middle class supporters than among workers. 28

Intellectuals, too, will, in general, have fewer ties to Moscow. In times of international crisis--Hungary, Czechoslovakia--they tend to lead the way in criticism of the Soviets (not always, of course, in moderate, revisionist directions) and they also tend to author national plans for policy reform. Almost by definition, intellectuals are more aware of and sensitive to policy changes. Consequently, they react in greater proportions and more dramatically to policy shifts than other party members do. Throughout Western Europe, the unsettling events of 1956 were felt most strongly by communist intellectuals. In Britain and Italy, for example, the effect of the crisis of 1956 was particularly pronounced precipitating a policy change in the CPGB and an acceleration of trends toward international autonomy in the PCI. In France, where, unlike Italy and Britain, intellectuals play no decision-making role in the party, 1956 created only minor internal problems. 29
Finally, militants with trade union backgrounds tend to hold to perspectives reflecting the union conditions in their particular countries, particularly on the question of alliance strategies. Where communist unionists are dispersed and must be flexible to win any concessions, they tend to support the party's flexibility and alliance goals. Also, where the communists share union power with other parties, communist union activists will have backgrounds that tend to make them supportive of alliance strategies. On the other hand, where communist union strength is heavily concentrated within a single federation or a group of locals, the party's union militants will be more conservative in regards to alliance strategies. Finally, where there is a history of intense competition between communist unionists and socialist rivals, the communist cadres may be quite hostile to alliances.

In Britain, then, where the CPGB is about 25 percent middle class and the rest working class, there are relatively few conservative constraints on the party's leadership. The middle class cadres tend to welcome the leadership's independent policies and, despite the presence of a core of hard line militants, the union experiences of many of the proletarian activists predispose them to relative moderation.

More than 40 percent of the French Communist Party
are workers, many of whom are associated with the CGT, the union federation controlled by the Communist Party. French workers are both relatively class conscious and relatively prudent and, as we have argued, the PCF is most successful representing the legitimate interests of the workers rather than endorsing revolution. At the same time, because of their class consciousness and historical exclusion from political power, French workers tend to have positive attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Consequently, the mass of workers in the PCF tend to constrain the leadership in its domestic political strategies and its international positions. Domestically, because of their union experiences and historical political isolation, French working class communists tend to be reserved about extending alliances. Notably, in the spring, 1976 cantonal elections, the PCF was forced to discipline four local party organizations who refused to withdraw candidates in favor of better-placed Socialists. On the other hand, their innate political conservatism or, perhaps, caution, makes them unlikely foot soldiers for a revolution. Internationally, their traditional allegiance to the Soviet Union supports continued strong ties between the PCF and the CPSU.

While workers compose the largest single group of party members in France, other groups make up a significant portion of the membership. About one-fourth of
the members are retired individuals (often retired workers) or housewives, with another ten percent being intellectuals.\textsuperscript{35} For the most part, however, these groups are not in positions to greatly affect party policies in a positive sense. Housewives and retirees are likely only to be a conservative drag on the party while intellectuals have historically had notoriously little input into PCF policies either directly or indirectly.\textsuperscript{36}

In Italy, the Italian Communist Party has a somewhat broader base than its French counterpart. About one-half of its membership are industrial workers, one-third artisans, technicians, and technical workers, one-tenth agricultural workers, peasants, and tenant farmers, and 3 percent intellectuals.\textsuperscript{37} Although Italian workers are traditionally relatively class conscious, their union experiences of cooperation with other leftist parties in the CGIL predisposes communist working class cadres to support alliance strategies and relatively moderate programs. Additionally, the PCI's large number of middle class members and its retinue of intellectuals, who have historically been far more influential in the PCI than the PCF, tend to support the party's internationally independent postures. Consequently, the membership of the PCI provide few constraints on its leaders' domestically reformist, internationally independent policies.

The membership of the Icelandic Communist Party is
also one that tends to be supportive of its leadership's liberal policies. Although the party has a large number of working class adherents, their union experiences of cooperation with the Progressives in the Icelandic Federation of Trade Unions tends to make them relatively undogmatic. Also, the PA has attracted a relatively large number of generally moderate teachers and intellectuals as well as a number of fishermen and fish processing workers whose interests are largely economic. In general, then, the membership of the Icelandic Communist Party is one that would tend not to oppose its leaders' progressive, autonomist policies.

In contrast, the membership of the Swedish Communist Party is divided in its support of Hermansson's policies. Supporting Hermansson's progressive positions are a number of student and intellectual members centered in the universities, while the opposition comes largely from a core of veteran working class militants concentrated in communist strongholds in the northern provinces. The leadership of the VPK, then, faces the constraints of not going so far with the reforms as to precipitate an open split such as the one that occurred in Finland's SKP, but at the same time not retreating too much from the party's independent policies that have won it some electoral success. The VPK's new and somewhat radical "Program of Principles" adopted in October, 1972, is a response by
the party leaders to this dilemma.

In Finland, the SKP has a relatively heterogeneous composition. According to the World Marxist Review, 58.5 percent of the SKP in 1972 were workers, 6.6 percent white collar and service personnel, 7.2 percent peasants, 2.3 percent artisans and small producers, 3 percent students and intellectuals, 12.7 percent pensioners, and 9.7 percent housewives. Considering the strength of workers in the party and the relatively small number of active nonproletarian cadres (more than 20 percent of the party are pensioners and housewives), it is little surprising that there has been opposition to the party's break with the USSR over Czechoslovakia.

A number of Western European communist parties that are closely aligned with Moscow have large proportions of workers in their ranks. Three-fourths of the West German Communist Party is working class. In Ireland, 90 percent of the small CPI are working class and 80 percent of Luxembourg's Communist Party are workers.

Although veteran cadres and working class militants tend to be relatively conservative and younger members, middle class supporters, and intellectuals more progressive, especially in attitudes toward Moscow, it would be overstating the case to say the socioeconomic distribution of a party's membership in and of itself determines policy. In the first place, the socioeconomic distribu-
tion of a party's membership is, in part, the result of party policy. A rigid, Stalinist party will tend not to attract young adherents or intellectuals thus insuring the dominance of veteran militants and proletarian cadres. Conversely, a progressive party may be quite successful in recruiting young, middle class, and intellectual members thus guaranteeing at least a sizable group of these in the ranks. Secondly, by definition, a party's militants do not set policy, but rather act as potential or actual constraints on party leaders. In Austria, the constraining force of a mass of Stalinist activists proved decisive in setting party policy; in Finland, however, the Stalinists were too few to dominate the party. In Italy, there is little resistance in the ranks to progressive policies, but in France, there is a considerable measure of potential and actual resistance to liberalization from well-placed veteran working class activists. For example, while there is considerable open and latent resistance in the PCF to collaboration with the Socialists, Sani, in 1972, found the large majority of Italian Communists endorsing a PCI coalition with the Christian Democrats. (See Table 3.)

The importance of a communist party's socioeconomic distribution is that it provides a possible constraint on the leadership. If the party's militants are older workers and heavily pro-Soviet, the leadership will be
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>PCI</th>
<th>DC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

forced (to avoid splits and desertions) to soft-pedal reforms and international autonomy. If cadres are younger, intellectual, or middle class, less firmly tied psychologically to Moscow, leaders will be free, even encouraged, to be more national in domestic positions.

**Stability and Homogeneity of the Electorate.**

In large part, the validity of a communist party's electorate as a check or constraint on the actions of the party's leaders depends on its homogeneity and stability. In general, the more homogeneous a party's electorate, the easier it is for the leadership to make policy decisions that will not alienate large portions of it. For example, the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968 provided a major dilemma for the communist parties of Western Europe. All of the parties had, to varying extents, a core of working class supporters, both activists and voters, whose psychological attachment to the Soviet Union would dictate support of Moscow no matter the occasion. For most of the parties, however, there existed in their electorates significant numbers of supporters whose views about the Soviets' actions in Czechoslovakia were far less sanguine. Consequently, for the party to condemn the invasion would be to alienate the former group, while endorsing the invasion would disaffect the latter. For the heavily working class Communist Party of Luxembourg, however, the
dilemma was much less severe. Since most of its supporters were pro-Soviet industrial workers, the party's leaders hesitated not at all in fully endorsing Moscow's actions.\textsuperscript{48}

With a heterogeneous electorate, however, communist leaders must search for positions designed not to alienate any major sector of it. For the Italian Communist Party, this means satisfying large numbers of industrial workers, agricultural workers, and even middle class supporters.\textsuperscript{49} (See Tables 4 and 5.) For the Icelandic Communists, it means pleasing working class and intellectual supporters as well as workers from the fishing industry. Even for the French Communist Party, it means satisfying large numbers of workers from both the public and private sector, agriculture workers, and some middle class tradesmen, artisans, and white collar employees.\textsuperscript{50} (See Table 6.) With such heterogeneous electorates, what types of issues can these communist parties stress that would appeal to all their diverse groups of support without alienating any of them? Economic, bread and butter issues. Precisely those types of issues generally stressed in electoral campaigns by the PCI, PCF, and PA. While it would be an exaggeration to argue that these communist parties have become umbrella parties of the social democratic type, it is not unfair to say that the heterogeneous bases of support for these parties tend to constrain their leaders toward emphasis of relatively moderate
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workers</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rinascita, 3 Nov. 1972.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrialists, landowners, executives, professionals</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar workers</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisans, shopkeepers, small businessmen</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small farmers</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers and unskilled workers</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not ascertainable</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE 6. PCF ELECTORATE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>Adult population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactives</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20,000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-100,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;100,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

policies. At the same time, the leaders of parties with homogeneous electorates such as the German, Irish, and Luxembourg parties, feel fewer such constraints.\textsuperscript{52}

A major dilemma for many of the communist parties of Western Europe is that their militants, in general, tend to be more working class, more pro-Soviet, and often older than their electorates and potential electorates. Consequently, party leaders often find themselves searching for a balance that will enhance their party's electoral position while not adversely affecting the loyalty of the bulk of militants. Inevitably, for the Western communist parties with large working class memberships and more heterogeneous electorates, the issue on which this balance has been most difficult to achieve is that of position \textit{vis-à-vis} the Soviet Union. In periods in which the position of the Soviets and that of the respective Western European nations coincide, there is little problem of balance. When their interests clash, however, such as during the Cold War period or during the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, party leaders face the unenviable task of adopting a policy that will likely either antagonise pro-Soviet militants and voters, or alienate more nationalistic cadres and voters.

Another factor influencing the importance of communist electorates in shaping party policy is the stability of the party's electorate. In general, the more stable
a communist party's electorate, the more it reinforces the policies of the leadership and the more likely the leaders will feel secure in extending those policies. On the other hand, leaders of a party with a relatively unstable electorate will tend toward caution. Not being sure of their electorate's firm support, they will tend to approach new issues and adopt new policies only cautiously.

Illustrative of this phenomenon are the cases of the French and Italian Communist Parties. Considering electoral stability in aggregate rather than individual terms, since World War II the national electorate of the Italian Communist Party has been remarkably stable with the variations that are present being in an upward direction. Consequently, this pattern tends to reinforce the PCI leaders' moderate policies and to give them confidence to push ahead on their political course. In contrast, the electorate of the French Communist Party has demonstrated more volatility. The party's gains have been sporadic and uneven and in both 1958 and 1968, the PCF suffered electoral declines, particularly in 1958. Additionally, under the electoral system of the Fifth Republic, even minor electoral slippages for the PCF tend to be translated into major setbacks in the number of parliamentary seats won. Even though, as survey data show and ecological analysis indicates, the PCF has a solid core of loyal supporters, the relative volatility of its vote in con-
trast with that of the PCI tends to induce caution among its leaders.
Notes

1 While this latter possibility can lead to resource shortages for the original party and an increase in external competition, it can also be, as we have seen (Chapter V, supra), a blessing in disguise in that it removes an internally divisive element from the party.


4 Charles A. Micaud, Communism and the French Left (New York: Praeger, 1963), 149.

5 Le nouvel observateur, 6-21 Feb. 1968.


7 Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 159-160.

8 Jean Stapel and W. J. de Jonge, "Why Vote Communist?" Public Opinion Quarterly, XII (Fall, 1948), 390-398, 394.


11 Cantril, op. cit., 105.

12 Sondages, 1966.

13 Ibid., 1968.

15 YICA, 1974.


17 Ibid., YICA, 1970.

18 YICA, 1971.

19 YICA, 1970.


24 Ibid.


30 Newton, op. cit., 72.


35 Harkel, op. cit.


37 YICA, 1969.


40 YICA, 1971.

41 A source that should be accepted only with reservations.


43 Ibid., 126-127.

44 Ibid., XVII (Apr., 1974), 140.


A subsequent election in December 1968, proved the correctness of their perceptions.


Olmstead, op. cit.


The question of which comes first, the heterogeneous electorate or the electoral emphasis on bread and butter issues, is answered by the statement that they both come at generally the same time with one reinforcing the other.

The latter can only be definitely measured by survey data. Additionally, the aggregate figures are more important for leadership perceptions than innumerable individual perturbations. See, William Ascher and Sidney Tarrow, "The Stability of Communist Electorates: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate Data," American Journal of Political Science (Aug., 1975), 475-500.

CHAPTER IX

HISTORY

A final factor in shaping the differences in policies and postures among Western European communist parties is history. For a political party, history is the collective memory of the past contained in official records, ideology, sacred writings, traditions, myths, written chronicles, and the memory of the party's older participants. Just as men turn to their personal past experiences to guide them in their actions, so do political parties, at the hand of their leadership, turn to their history for guidance in dealing with present contingencies. For a political party, then, as for a man, the past that shapes its present actions is the past as the party perceives it rather than objective history. How, then, does the party's perception of history affect its behavior?

No political party exists in a steady state, but rather innumerable perturbations from the environment act on it forcing it to seek some response. Internationally, for a Western communist party, there may be a change in Soviet policy such as destalinization or a change in the international communist movement. Domestically, subtle changes in the social structure may be occurring such as the emergence of a highly skilled working class or there may be a change in the national political system such as the formation of a socialist people's party.
Constitutionally, a new electoral law may be promulgated as under France's Fifth Republic.

In the face of such environmentally-imposed contingencies, communist party leaders look for responses, but, as we have seen, party leaders are not unrestrained in their search. On the one hand, their search is constrained by international factors, and domestic political, constitutional, and social factors. On the other, their own personal characteristics and backgrounds, and the character of the party's membership and electorate act as constraints. A final constraint, however, is history.

In arriving at courses of action to deal with problems, party leaders turn first to repertories of action programs developed through the party's prior experience.\(^1\) Action programs are courses of action that are perceived as having once been successful in dealing with party problems. Originally, they develop from the complex interaction of environmental stimuli and constraints and the internal structure of the party. If once successful (or at least perceived to be so), they tend to be maintained in the collective memory of the party to be summoned forth in the future in response to new, similar contingencies. Thus, through time, a party develops certain patterns of behavior that tend to persist. Rather than developing new approaches, \textit{sui generis}, to new problems, a communist party through its leaders tends to turn to
old approaches and to rely on standard operating procedures developed through years of experience. Within the constraints which we considered in Chapter III through Chapter VIII, a party's past lives in its action programs to shape its present and future behavior, almost by organizational inertia.

Western communist party policies and postures differ, as we have seen, because the external and internal constraints on them differ, but also because their histories and, hence, action programs, differ. When a party is young, it has no history, no previously developed action programs to which to look as guides for action. Rather, its behavior is a function of the various internal and external constraints imposed upon the party by its environment and the party itself. Since for each party these constraints differ, action programs differ. In later years, a party's actions are shaped by more than just the internal and external contingencies of the environment and the party itself, but also by history, in the form of action programs.

The undogmatic, adaptable character of the Italian Communist Party is, in large part, a reflection of the PCI's historical experience. The importance of intellectuals and intellectualism in the party is a result, in part, of the early importance of Antonio Gramsci, the intellectual and political father of Italian Communism,
and his intellectual entourage. More important than Gramsci's actual role in the party's early days (which was considerable), is the general perception in the PCI of his importance and the reverence accorded him and his works in the party. Togliatti turned to Gramsci repetitively to justify the various turns of party policy and by doing so, hallowed both Gramsci and the concept of an Italian interpretation of Marx, a concept that has served well in supporting the party's revisionist stance. For example, following the startling events of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, Togliatti launched his party more boldly along the way of an Italian road to socialism by evoking the aura of the Gramscian heritage:

The search for an Italian road to socialism has been our constant preoccupation. I believe that I am able to affirm that it has already been the preoccupation of Antonio Gramsci, who in all his political actions, particularly in the latter period of his life, aimed to translate into Italian terms the teachings of the Russian Revolution.

In part, the PCI's predilection for flexibility in cooperating with other political forces that has been reflected in its relations with the Italian Socialists, the Church, and the European Economic Community, as well as the overtures made in the party's proposed "compro-messo storico," is a legacy of the long period of fascist illegality. Born in 1921, the PCI was only a fledgling party when driven underground by Mussolini in 1926
along with the other opposition parties. While illegal, particularly after 1935, the PCI and other antifascist parties and groups found themselves cooperating both to survive and, eventually, to overthrow the fascists and their German cohorts. In the face of the exigencies of fascist persecution, there was no place for either communist or anticommunist dogma as both communist and bourgeois worked together during the resistance. Subsequently, the patterns of action and psychological conditioning resultant from the collaboration with bourgeois parties carried into the postwar period to help shape later PCI behavior.

For a number of Western European communist parties, an early independence toward the Soviet Union has served as a model for contemporary attitudes toward Moscow. In Norway, the Labor Party joined the Comintern in 1920 virtually intact, but after several years of uneasy relations between the two, the Labor Party broke with the Third International in November, 1923, leaving only a small pro-Moscow rump to form the Norwegian Communist Party. Despite this, the NKP continued to show sporadic signs of deviation from the Kremlin line, both because of a lack of ideological sophistication and willful disobedience. Far from the most important party in the International, the NKP often enjoyed a kind of benign neglect on the part of the Comintern Executive that allowed it
considerable leeway\(^7\) and although the NKP was in the Soviet orbit, it was a distant orbit. Within the last fifteen years, the early maverick nature of the Norwegian left has flowered again in the NKP as it has moved to a position of independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Another Western party with an early tradition of autonomy that has reasserted itself is the Swedish Communist Party. Throughout the 1920s, the Swedish Party split and split again over its relations with the Comintern and the Social Democrats.\(^8\) With no apparent financial ties to the International,\(^9\) the recalcitrant Swedes proved hard to bolshevize. While faithful to Moscow, the party's leaders were no copycats\(^{10}\) and only by the 1930s was bolshevization reasonably complete.\(^{11}\) Since the early 1960s, the Swedish Communists have returned to their early posture of international independence.

In Iceland, the communists have always been rebellious children of the Comintern. Although the party was formed in 1930 under the watchful guidance of the International, the Icelandic Communists, physically far removed from the centers of European communism, soon asserted their independence, withdrawing from the Comintern in 1938 to absorb a group of left-wing social democrats. Except for a period after 1949 when pro-Moscow cadres gained temporary ascendance in the party, the PA has progressively moved to a position of international autonomy.\(^{12}\)
For other communist parties, however, history has provided a legacy of subservience to the Soviet Union. Although all Western parties have some historical ties to Moscow, for some, these ties are quite strong. The Irish Communist Party, for example, was created at Moscow's initiative. Since then, except for a momentary deviation over Czechoslovakia in 1968, the CPI has cultivated a persistent pattern of loyalty to the Soviet Union.13

In Luxembourg, too, the communist party has continued and strengthened its ties to Moscow. From the beginning, the PCL was a loyal supporter of the Soviets and continues to be so, even supporting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In different parties, the legacy of the past is continued through different media—myths, norms, writings—but in the PCL one primary vehicle has been the person of Dominique Urbani, the party's veteran leader, and his family, in whom the party's tradition of lock step loyalty to the USSR is personified.14

Despite an organizational foundation of democratic centralism, a number of Western Europe's communist parties have traditions of factionalism that serve to legitimize current dissension. In Sweden, the division in the VPK has its antecedents in repeated splits and purges in the early Swedish Communist Party.15 Similarly, the Finnish Communist Party has a heritage of division as two groups
of leaders, one centered in Sweden and Finland, the other in Soviet Russia, contested for leadership of the SKP during its illegal period before World War II.\textsuperscript{16}

In the Netherlands, a history of factionalism and the memory of its past ill effects on the party helped to launch the CPN on a course of isolation in the international communist movement. With the beginnings of a serious division between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, the Dutch Communist Party was still reeling from a domestic party split of the late 1950s. In 1958, the \textit{De Brug} group, a mildly revisionist coterie of militants bolted the CPN to form an oppositionist party and in the parliamentary election of 1958, the new party won .6 percent of the vote, apparently all at the expense of the CPN whose parliamentary delegation fell from 4 to only 7 members.\textsuperscript{17} For the leadership of the Dutch Communist Party, then, the spectre of another schism over the issue of the Sino-Soviet conflict was a calamity to be avoided at all costs. Within the party were both a large group of unreconstructed Stalinists and a sizable pro-Peking faction; so, any position the party took on the issue would be sure to alienate one group and perhaps precipitate another disastrous party split. In the face of this, Paul de Groot, the party's leader, elected to steer a neutralist course on the Sino-Soviet conflict and in time, de Groot found that the best way to remain neutral
was to stay aloof. Consequently, the CPN's move toward international autonomy was precipitated, at least in part, by its recent experience with factionalism.

The historical relationship between communists and socialists has tended, in many countries, to shape action programs that affect the current relationships between the two parties. In Luxembourg, for example, the Socialists and Communists together win a majority of the popular vote, but their long history of enmity works against any parliamentary alliance. In contrast, in Italy, the experience of cooperation under Fascism between the PCI and other parties has promoted postwar cooperation particularly at the local and regional level between communists and socialists, and in recent months, Christian Democrats as well.

In Finland and France, communists have experienced long periods of sometimes bitter conflict with socialists, but, at the same time, have achieved their greatest political success in cooperation with them. Consequently, both communist parties, the SKP and the PCF, have developed styles of suspicious cooperation with the socialist parties in their respective countries.

In Finland, the pre-1944 illegality of the Communist Party was supported by the Social Democrats and the two parties struggled tenaciously for control of the labor movement. During the Winter War and the Continuation
War, the Social Democrats and Communists clashed again over foreign policy. Although the two parties repeatedly came into conflict after 1944, the SKP found that gains were to be made through at least a measure of cooperation and before the 1945 elections, the SKP was taken into the government for the first time in its history, in alliance with the Social Democrats and the Agrarians. At the same time, the two parties came close to forming an electoral alliance (with the Social Democrats narrowly rejecting the proposition). Later, in 1948, the Communists left the government not to return until 1966, again with the Agrarians and Social Democrats (as well as the Socialist League). In the interim, the two parties often found themselves at odds, but, also, on several occasions, came to the brink of electoral and governmental cooperation. In late 1975, the Finnish Communists and Social Democrats once again found themselves coalition partners as the two parties entered a broad-based national emergency coalition government.

On the union front, too, the relations between the Finnish Communists and Social Democrats waxed and waned between cooperation and conflict. In the early postwar years, both parties were represented in SAK, the major union federation in Finland, but their relationship was often stormy as each party tried to undercut the other's support. During the Cold War, the division between
the two among workers became formal as the Social Democrats established their own union federation, the SAJ. In 1969, however, cooperation again became the byword as the two union federations agreed to merge along with a large number of independents. Although the parties had achieved formal unity on the union front, a sometimes fierce power struggle continued between the two parties at the local and the national levels.¹⁹

In both the electoral arena and the union front, the relationship between the Communists and Social Democrats has historically been one of alternate cooperation and recrimination. At least in part, this historical pattern explains the suspicious reluctance on the part of many in the SKP to reenter the government with the Social Democrats and to continued cooperation in the unions.²⁰

In France, too, a history of sometimes conflict, sometimes cooperation between Socialists and Communists has helped to make the present alliance between the PCF and the Socialist Party an often uneasy one. At the outset, the French Communists' attitude toward the Socialists paralleled that of the Third International reflecting the Comintern's united front tactics. By 1928, however, internal changes in the USSR itself (the beginnings of forced industrialization and the liquidation of the Kulaks) necessitated a policy change; so, class against class became the official position and the PCF fell into
line. As Bukharin argued, no longer were the Socialists the right wing of the labor movement, but rather the left wing of the bourgeoisie. With the rise of Nazi Germany, international conditions changed and the Kremlin opted to return to a popular front policy in the interest of its own foreign policy. Subsequently, in France in 1936, the Communists supported without joining a Socialist-Radical government led by Socialist Leon Blum. It proved to be a stormy marriage as the Communists' support for the front was only ambivalent and in late 1938, the Popular Front collapsed. Although short-lived, the PCF's experience at the threshold of power proved highly profitable to it as, in Brower's phrase, it accepted the Jacobin role of defender of French liberties, thus presenting itself as a truly French party.

Not long after the fall of the Popular Front, the PCF and the Socialists again found themselves at odds. After the Soviet attack on Poland, the French Communists, following the international line, rallied behind the Soviet-Nazi Pact. Subsequently, the government, with Socialist support, withdrew legality from the party.

After the German invasion of Russia, Communist-Socialist relations in France took another turn as the two became Resistance partners and after liberation, the partnership continued into the formation of a tripartite government including the Socialists, Communists, and the Mouvement...
ment Républicain Populaire (MRP). By late 1947, however, the coalition had foundered on Cold War tensions and another period of antagonism between French Socialists and Communists was begun. 24

In the early years of the Fifth Republic, after a period of isolation for the PCF, there were harbingers of a reintegration of the Communists into the system. The success of the Gaullists and the machinations of the new electoral system made cooperation between the two major parties of the left advantageous, but each was reluctant to join hands. The first step was made in 1962 when the two agreed on a second ballot electoral alliance that was extended into the 1965 presidential election in which the PCF backed the candidacy of Socialist Francois Mitterrand. Again, in 1967, the two agreed on a second ballot withdrawal and, in 1968, there was talk of the formation of a common program. In 1969, however, cooperation collapsed over Deferre's presidential candidacy, but soon revived. Communists and Socialists achieved some degree of syndicalist cooperation in the early 1970s, and, notably, the two parties finally arrived at a common program in June, 1972. 25 In 1973, the two again cooperated electorally in parliamentary elections and in 1974 came within a hairbreadth of electing Mitterrand president of France. 26

Historically, the relationship between French Com-
munists and Socialists has been ambivalent. Seemingly, each needs the other to win political power, but, at the same time, each has a tradition of distrust towards the other. In part, this explains the difficulties between the two parties in their present alliance. Even if there were no real issues between the two (and there are), each side would be suspicious of the other. As it is, the two alliance partners are engaged as much in mutual criticism as in cooperation.

In sum, virtually all aspects of a communist party's present position and posture are affected by the party's history. Past party policies, both international and domestic, past alliance strategies, past organizational patterns, and past modes of decision-making tend to persist in the collective memory of the party and to be reflected in currently operative action programs.

While a party's history affects a party's present because it establishes patterns of behavior that tend to be retained, it does not, however, determine the present. These historically established patterns, these action programs, are not immutable. First, changing environmental constraints can cause modifications in behavior patterns. For example, new electoral systems or laws in several countries have placed a premium on alliances thus increasing the payoffs for cooperation between communists and other leftist parties. Internationally, destaliniza-
tion and the Sino-Soviet rift have opened the door to the possibility of greater autonomy for the communist parties of Western Europe. For a number of parties, however, the inability to recruit young people has increased the proportion of older cadres in the party ranks thus making the assertion of such autonomy more difficult. In a final example, the failure of bourgeois and social democratic governing parties in several countries has provided opportunities for communists to enhance their electoral position through protest votes.

Secondly, changes in leaders can lead to breaks with past behavior. Individuals with long tenure in the party apparatus and at its head, such as Luxembourg's Urbani, are veritable repositories of historical patterns themselves. When they die, retire, or are replaced, the way is open for new leaders to introduce new patterns of behavior. In France, for example, Thorez's replacement by Waldeck Rochet led to a relaxation of the PCF's rigidity, a relaxation that has gone further under Georges Marchais. C. H. Hermansson's ascension to leadership in the Swedish Communist Party heralded the beginning of a more liberal approach by the VPK.

Thirdly, the dramatic failure of past patterns of behavior can lead to the adoption of new positions. For a number of communist parties, the twin crises of de-stalinization and Hungary provided the backdrop for just such
a departure. In Britain, the shattering events of 1956 led to rising discontent among the CPGB rank and file and mass resignations from intellectuals in particular.\textsuperscript{28} No longer did the traditional pattern of alliance to Moscow benefit the party. Subsequently, autonomous forces in the party gained ascendance and the British Communist Party moved away from its blind allegiance to the Soviets. Similarly, in Italy, Hungary was one of the catalysts that spurred the PCI to quicken its pace toward independence from the Soviets.\textsuperscript{29}

While the failure of communist policies tends to lead to their change, the best guarantee of the persistence of a policy is its success. In Italy, the electoral success of the PCI has reinforced that party's flexible, autonomist line. On the other hand, the French Communist Party's often uncertain efforts toward policy liberalization are, in part, the result of the setbacks of 1958 and 1968. In Iceland, the electoral success of the PA tends to support that party's brand of communism, while the hard line policies of the Luxembourg Communist Party receive endorsement from the PCL's success.
Notes

1 See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), esp. 139 ff. For a specific consideration of organizational theory and political parties, see R. Neal Tannahill, "An Organizational Theory Approach to Political Parties."


11 Ibid., 69.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.
Sparring, in Upton, op. cit., 64-68.


Upton, op. cit.


YICA, 1975.


Ibid., 104-163.

Ibid., 235-265.


PART THREE

Conclusions and Prospects
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

We began this examination of the communist parties of Western European democracies by considering their similarities and differences. In Chapter I, we compared them in terms of domestic policies and postures focusing on the size and strength of the parties, their alliance strategies, domestic programs, and organization. In Chapter II, we examined the relationship between the parties and the Soviet Union comparing the strength and nature of their ties to Moscow and the international movement.

After outlining the diversity in the Western European communist parties in Part One, we turned in Part Two to the question of why. Why should such allegedly similar parties be so dissimilar? The answer, as we have seen in Part Two, lies in the complex interaction of a multiplicity of factors whose importance varies at different times and in different parties. To simplify some of the complexity, we created a model for the explanation of the behavior of the communist parties of Western Europe based on seven sets of variables, four of which are external to the party, three internal.

Turning first to external variables, in Chapter III we considered international factors and their effects
on the policies and postures of Western Europe's communist parties. Specifically, we looked at the psychological, financial, geographic, and other ties between the parties and the Soviet Union as well as the international communist movement as a whole. Additionally, we explored the impact of events in the international arena (destalinization; Hungary, 1956; the Sino-Soviet split; Czechoslovakia, 1968) on the parties.

In Chapter IV, we focused on the domestic social structure exploring the relationship between it and the electoral success or failure of communist parties. Then, we turned to the impact of social structure on party policies. Finally, we considered organizational modifications induced by salient aspects of the social structure.

We explored the importance of political factors in shaping party behavior in Chapter V. In particular, we examined the impact of other political parties on the communist parties, including social democratic parties, socialist people's parties, and ultra-left parties. Then, we turned to the role party auxiliaries and potential auxiliaries play in influencing party behavior, concentrating on unions and youth groups. Finally, we considered various aspects of the political culture as important factors in shaping the positions of the parties as well as influencing their success.

In Chapter VI, we examined the impact of constitu-
tional factors on the communist parties. We considered the effects of illegality, the electoral system, and communist participation in institutions of government such as parliament and local and regional administration.

Turning to internal variables, in Chapter VII, we focused on leadership as a factor in determining the policies and postures of the Western communist parties. Specifically, we explored the role of party leaders' career and socioeconomic backgrounds, generation, position vis-à-vis the political system, and personal relationship to the Soviet Union.

Chapter VIII dealt with various characteristics of the communist parties' membership and electorate as constraints affecting party behavior. In particular, we considered the political attitudes and beliefs of communist party members and voters and their effects on party behavior. We examined the impact of a party's socioeconomic distribution on party postures. Then, we explored the effects of a communist party electorate's homogeneity and stability on party policy.

Finally, in Chapter IX, we examined the ways in which past patterns of behavior influence present party behavior by examining the role of history. We considered how action programs and standard operating procedures are developed and maintained by a party and how, in a contemporary context, they interact with present contingencies
and constraints to shape current policy and behavior.

In the above chapters, we systematically examined each of the factors impacting on the postures and policies of Western European communist parties, illustrating them with examples and data from the various parties. In this chapter, however, our purpose is to reverse the process, systematically focusing on each party. Our purpose here is not to recapitulate the previous nine chapters or to present a detailed analysis of the determinants of the policies and positions of each of the communist parties of Western Europe—that would entail a chapter length study of each party—but rather to illustrate the approach. In so doing, we will briefly note some of the more important aspects in the evolution of each party's domestic and international positions. Then, we will turn to the four sets of external and three sets of internal factors briefly listing some of the effects each has on the postures and policies of the parties.

Austrian Communist Party (KPO)

Electorally, the Austrian Communist Party has been unable to win representation in parliament save for a ten year period following World War II.¹ In domestic policies, the early KPO, despite some doctrinal factionalism, took a rather radical posture, but in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the party modulated its program to accept the
"peaceful road to socialism" and pressed for a popular front with the Socialists. Recently, however, the KPÖ has retreated from this position denouncing collaboration with the Socialists. Internationally, despite some early deviations, the Austrian Party was among Moscow's more loyal supporters until its record was slightly marred by criticism of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trials and then shaken as the KPÖ roundly criticized the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Following a major split over the issue, however, the party returned to unreserved support of the Soviet Union.

**International Factors.** The KPÖ's traditional pro-Soviet orientation is largely the result of strong psychological ties to the USSR. The proximity of the Soviet Union to Austria has increased the salience of the Soviet model to Austrian Communists and the Soviet occupation of Austria from 1945 to 1955 saw the entrenchment of pro-Moscow cadres throughout the party. At the same time, however, the proximity of Austria to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (as well as the memory of the Soviet occupation) has harmed the party with nationalistic Austrian voters, particularly after the Hungarian crisis in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

**Domestic Social Structure.** Despite the presence of a relatively radical working class and a relatively intense Catholic-Socialist cleavage, communism has been
unable to gain more than a foothold in Austria. The presence of a large Catholic population has affected the party in that it has tried, generally unsuccessfully, to promote a Catholic-Communist dialogue.

**Political System.** The long-term failure of communism in Austria is in large part the result of the preeminence of the Socialist Party on the political left and in the labor movement. Consequently, the KPÖ has never been able to present itself as a viable left-wing alternative. Further weakening the party has been the recent emergence of a number of splinter left groups that have hampered recruitment.

**Leadership.** The early factionalism of the party was in large part the consequence of leaders with diverse ideological backgrounds. Later, the emergence of Moscow-trained Johann Koplenig as party leader helped insure loyalty to the Soviet Union. Franz Muhri, the party's present leader is much the party bureaucrat, who, since 1968, has followed the lead of a conservative majority in the party toward a staunchly pro-Moscow posture.

**Membership and Electorate.** The party's veteran, pro-Moscow rank and file asserted themselves in 1968 and 1969 to compell the party leadership to move to more pro-Soviet positions, especially on Czechoslovakia.

**History.** The party's early ties to Moscow and collaboration with the Soviets during the Russian occupation
of Austria have built some very pro-Soviet patterns into the party's standard operating procedures. The leadership's early criticisms of the Czechoslovakian intervention served to arouse veteran party members to reaffirm the old ways.

Belgian Communist Party (PCB)

Except for the early postwar election of 1946, the Belgian Communist Party has never won more than 10 percent of the vote and since 1950 has not gathered even 5 percent. In domestic policies, the party took an early hard line position that has since softened into acceptance of the peaceful road thesis. Like most other Western European communist parties, the PCB's early alliance strategy followed the Comintern line. Recently, the party has advocated a common front with the Socialists. In the international arena, with the exception of an early Trotskyist deviation, the PCB was closely allied with Soviet policies until the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the Hungarian invasion. Since then, the party has moved to a position of critical support, differing with Moscow on a number of international issues.

*International Factors.* Pressure from the Comintern accounted in large part for the PCB's early allegiance to Moscow. Since 1956, however, the direct ties to the USSR and the indirect psychological ties have lessened
opening the door to an assertion of some independence by the Belgium Party.

**Domestic Social Structure.** The relatively intense Flemish-Walloon cleavage has led to the bifurcation of the party organization and many of the party's policies are addressed specifically to the Walloon constituency who supply most of the party's votes.

**Political System.** The presence of a strong socialist party both electorally and in the labor unions helped prevent the PCB from gaining more than a foothold in Austrian politics. Currently, a number of dissident left-wing groups and parties have sapped much of the PCB's electoral strength. At the same time, however, they have siphoned off many of the party's more hard line members and leaders.

**Leadership.** After purging some Trotskyists from the party's leadership, the Comintern received loyal support from its selected leaders in the PCB. In part, however, the party's recent more moderate domestic and international positions are the creations of the party's middle class, somewhat intellectual leader, Ernest Burnelle, a former school teacher. (He was president of the party until his death in 1968.)

**Membership and Electorate.** The departure of many of the veteran, hard line cadres to ultra-left groups has left the rank and file of the PCB more receptive to moder-
ating change.

History. Much of the party's behavior is a reflection of its early allegiance to Soviet policy and practice. Recent deviations towards party autonomy came only after these past patterns were shaken by the crises of world communism and the emergence of new, postwar leaders.

Danish Communist Party (DKP)

In its history, the Danish Communist Party has won more than 5 percent of the vote only twice, in the two immediate postwar elections of 1945 and 1947. Before 1932 and between 1960 and 1973, the DKP won no seats at all in parliament, but recently the party has enjoyed an electoral resurgence. After considerable early factionalism, the DKP under Axel Larsen's leadership pursued a relatively pragmatic line, but after Larsen's ouster in 1958, the party moved to a more hard line position. In alliance strategies, the early DKP only halfheartedly obeyed the Comintern's class against class policy and after the war, the party worked for collaboration with the Social Democrats. Since 1958, however, the DKP has come to oppose alliance with the Social Democrats. Internationally, the Danish Party, though tied to Moscow, was no puppet with the biggest break coming over Yugoslavia. With Larsen's removal, however, the party began to edge
back toward Moscow and since 1969 has been firmly in the Soviet camp.

**International Factors.** Direct intervention by the Comintern helped settle the party's early disorder. The dithyrambs of Soviet policy on Yugoslavia, however, precipitated a party split in which Moscow supported the removal of Larsen and his replacement by more pro-Moscow leaders.

**Political System.** In the beginning, the DKP was unable to make much headway against a firmly entrenched Social Democratic Party either electorally or in the unions. The party's recent electoral gains, however, are in large part a result of the malaise in the Social Democratic Party. Axel Larsen's Socialist People's Party has also greatly affected the DKP. Electorally, it robbed the Communists of nearly two-thirds of their voters, depriving them of parliamentary representation. Just as significantly, it took from the DKP its most moderate, progressive members and leaders thus leaving the party dominated by conservatives. Many of the party's youths have also been lost to small ultra-left groups. Recently, the demise of the SF, the decline of the Social Democrats, and governmental failures have produced a large protest vote that has returned the DKP to parliament.

**Constitutional System.** The electoral requirement of a 2 percent minimum to win representation kept the party
before 1973 from seats it would have won under a strictly proportional system.

**Leadership.** The party's behavior has been greatly affected by the personality of Axel Larsen. Although he was a former worker and gained his ascendancy in the DKP through Comintern assistance, he proved to be a man of broad intellect and ability. Several times before the War, he deviated from Moscow's policies taking a more pragmatic line. Then, after the war, he broke with the Soviets over their policy on Yugoslavia. Since Larsen's removal in 1958, the party has fallen under the control of conservatives.

**Membership and Electorate.** When Axel Larsen left the party in 1958 he took with him a considerable retinue of the party's more moderate members including many of the intellectuals. Consequently, the party was left largely in the hands of veteran, pro-Soviet working class cadres. Recently, however, the party's hard line stance has attracted a number of radical left-wing intellectuals back to the party.

**History.** Up until 1958, the history of the DKP was one of relative moderation in domestic policies and cautious alignment to the USSR. After the purge of Larsen and his followers, however, the old patterns were broken.
Finnish Communist Party (SKP)

The Finnish Communist Party is one of the largest in Western Europe. Although illegal from 1918 to 1944, since then it has averaged about one-fifth of the vote and one-fifth of the seats in parliament. Although the party in exile took a relatively hard line, its Finnish front groups refrained from advocating violence as in large part, the party concentrated on maintaining its political strength and union position. Then, after entering the early postwar government as a legal party, the SKP failed to push revolutionary positions, agreeing to a very moderate government program and even after leaving the government, the election manifestos of the SKDL, the party's electoral front, were far from revolutionary. Presently, in domestic policy, the SKP is a party of radical democratic reform which in government has been willing to accept only moderate, piecemeal programs. In alliance strategies, the party has had an ambivalent relationship with the Social Democrats. It has welcomed left-wing Social Democrats' support, campaigned for electoral agreements, and joined with the Social Democrats in union actions. At the same time, however, the Social Democrats have been the targets of communist animosity for collaboration with bourgeois parties before and during World War II as well as fierce electoral and trade union competitors. In international matters, the SKP has historically been strongly
tied to Moscow, but a major break with the Soviets came over Czechoslovakia in 1968. Since then, the party has held to its criticisms, but otherwise generally supported Moscow.

**International Factors.** Geographically and psychologically, the close proximity of the Soviet Union has helped to shape the SKP's ties to the USSR. At the same time, the less attractive aspects of Soviet policy, particularly the Czechoslovakian intervention, disadvantage the party electorally. What is more, Czechoslovakia was also the catalyst for a party split.

**Domestic Social Structure.** The SKP pitches many of its policies to appeal to various social groups such as isolated farmers, lumbermen, and the like.

**Political System.** The SKP was able to establish itself because the Social Democrats had failed to monopolize either the political left or the labor movement. Also, the Second World War served to discredit the Social Democrats among many leftist voters. While Finland's large and radical working class provides a base for the communists, it also serves to moderate their policies. Time and again, Finnish workers have refused to strike for political reasons. Consequently, the party makes its strongest appeals along economic lines. The SKP's often stormy relations with Social Democrats on the union front have handicapped efforts toward electoral alliance
and coalition with that party.

**Leadership.** The early leadership of the party was split into two groups: a more orthodox, radical one quartered in Soviet Russia, and a more pragmatic group operating from Stockholm and Finland. After Stalin liquidated the former, the more pragmatic group came to dominate the party and sponsored programs designed to increase the party's electoral position rather than maintain ideological purity. The present leadership that has continued the moderate domestic line as well as broken with Moscow over Czechoslovakia is also relatively young with the hard liners in the leadership tending to be veteran party members.

**Membership and Electorate.** Generational and other divisions in the membership have split the party over the issues of support for Moscow and participation in the government. The diversity of the party's electorate helps to steer the party toward moderate policies and the stability of that electorate tends to reinforce those policies.

**History.** The party's illegal period tended to reinforce its ties to Moscow and to develop a pattern of on-again, off-again cooperation with the Social Democrats in the unions, a pattern that has carried over into relations between the parties in parliament. Since World War II, the party has developed a steady pattern of pro-
posing radical, but nonrevolutionary reforms domestically and generally loyal support of Moscow internationally. In 1968, when the SKP's domestic electoral interests were perceived to conflict with the party's traditional allegiance to the Soviet Union, the party opted to pursue the former.

French Communist Party (PCF)

The French Communist Party is one of the largest in the Western world. Since World War II, the PCF has generally won between one-fifth and one-fourth of the popular vote and, in terms of membership, it is the largest party in France. Domestically, the party has rhetorically long championed radical, even revolutionary changes in French society, but its actions have generally been far more conservative. The party's present Common Program with the Socialists is, however, relatively tame. In terms of alliances, the party religiously followed the Comintern line before World War II, alternately courting and condemning the Socialists. Since the end of the Cold War, the PCF has strongly pursued and achieved an electoral alliance, and, more recently, an agreement on a common program with the Socialists. The relationship between the two is, however, often quite stormy. Internationally, the PCF has doggedly adhered to the Soviet Union dissenting only over Czechoslovakia and then only hesitantly. Recently,
however, the party has shown signs of pursuing a more independent line internationally.

**International Factors.** From its founding, the PCF was tied directly and indirectly to the Comintern and the Soviet Union receiving instructions on several occasions directly from Moscow. Since 1956, at least, the primary ties to the USSR have been psychological, but they have remained strong.

**Domestic Social Structure.** France's large, politically alienated working class has provided a strong base for communism in France, a base that the PCF has consolidated by means of a large number of secondary organizations. Anticlericalism has also provided ground for communist growth. The PCF's domestic policies are designed to appeal to this working class and to other socioeconomic groups as well including farm workers and some members of the middle class.

**Political System.** The Socialists' lack of electoral or union dominance allowed the PCF to establish itself as a political force in France. The alienated, but prudent working class in France has helped the party to build its strength, but also has generally failed to support political strikes or revolutionary action. Consequently, the PCF has responded with economic appeals rather than revolutionary action. Numerous left-wing groups have siphoned off many leftists from the party, but their often
adventurous actions have at times (May-June, 1968) brought the PCF into a bad light.

Constitutional System. The electoral system has been used as a frequent political weapon in France with the result of the often severe underrepresentation of the communists in parliament. The system presently in use advantages second ballot alliances thus providing incentives for coalition with the Socialists. Additionally, the present major party status of the PCF in a political system polarized between left and right also acts as an incentive to the party to moderate its positions to gain the extra support needed to take power in a left-wing coalition. Also, France's extensive network of local and regional government provide French Communists with opportunities to share in power while not giving them substantial national authority. The result is a moderating, conservative effect on the PCF.

Leadership. The early middle class, intelligentsia leadership of the PCF proved highly recalcitrant to Soviet instruction. Their replacement by proletarians led by Maurice Thorez, however, insured the party's loyalty to Moscow. Since Thorez's passing, his replacements, who have been generally career organization men, have acted somewhat more fully in accordance with the organizational well-being of the party.

Membership and Electorate. The membership has a
large core of pro-Soviet, veteran working class militants who act as conservative constraints on the party. At the same time, it and the party's electorate are heterogeneous enough to oblige the party to offer broad-based appeals. Also, the relatively prudent nature of each offers little support for revolutionary action while the relative volatility of the PCF's electorate reinforces cautious approaches by the party.

**History.** The party's checkered history of first cooperation, then conflict with the Socialists has colored their recent relationship. Internationally, the party has been quite slow to move from an historical subservience to Moscow. Domestically, the party has long maintained the pattern of avoiding revolutionary action in favor of radical economic reform proposals.

**West German Communist Party (DKP)**

Once one of Europe's major communist parties, the German Communist Party was outlawed by the Nazis in 1933, returned to legality under the Bonn Republic, and then outlawed again in 1956. In 1968, the party was reborn under a new name, but with much the same leadership and organization. Electorally, the DKP has been a failure although it has registered some successes in recruiting young people and workers. In domestic policies, the reconstituted party accepted the peaceful road thesis in
the late 1950s, but since its continued legality has been assured by the rapprochement between the USSR and West Germany, it has somewhat dissociated itself from the reformist approach emphasizing euphemisms for revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. After returning to legality, the DKP sought alliances with the Social Democrats. Internationally, the party parrots the Soviet line and is a big defender of East Germany.

**International Factors.** The virtual complete dependence of the West German Communist Party on East Germany and the Soviet Union for financial support and refuge for its leaders during the outlaw period and the party's continued financial ties to the East Germans in large part account for the identity of international positions. Moscow's insistence on the continued constitutionality of the DKP as a condition of the West German-Soviet rapprochement freed the German communists to be more radical in their pronouncements.

**Political System.** The strength of the Social Democrats electorally and in the unions hampers the development of the DKP. A number of ultra-left groups and terrorist organizations have competed with the party for support and helped to discredit it among many West Germans.

**Constitutional System.** As a minor party in a two-party dominant system with an electoral law requiring a party to win 5 percent of the vote to attain representa-
tion, the DKP faces severe handicaps in establishing itself as an electoral force. Additionally, the threat and actuality of illegality have long hung over the party. For several years after 1968, the recycled party was careful to avoid revolutionary sentiments in its manifestos for fear of again being declared unconstitutional.

**Leadership.** The present leadership's personal fugitive history and association with the East Germans while in exile make them both relatively hostile to the political system and closely tied to the positions of East Germany. The continued importance of old-line veteran communists such as Herbert Mies and Max Reimann in the leadership make for hard line positions.

**Membership and Electorate.** Although the party has added a large number of radical leftists to its ranks, its hard core remains from the fugitive period, a hard line pro-East German group. Additionally, the vocally radical, hard line approach of the party tends to attract radical new recruits to the ranks thus reinforcing this posture.

**History.** The German experience with the Nazis and the Soviet occupation of the East, make West Germans wary of "extremist" movements. Together with the Nazi persecution and illegality under Bonn, this largely accounts for the present weakness of the DKP. The 1956 to 1968 period of illegality also served to cement ties between the DKP
and East Germany.

British Communist Party (CPGB)

Electorally, the minuscule British Communist Party has never won as much as 1 percent of the vote, although it has wielded some strength in the unions. In domestic policies, the party in the first part of its history was a proponent of industrial militancy, but more recently, its militancy has become rather tame as it stresses radical economic reform. In terms of alliances, the CPGB has long sought a united front, but whether that front was to be among individual workers or workers' organizations depended on the Comintern line before World War II. In recent years, the communists have generally campaigned for cooperation with Labour on electoral and union matters. In international affairs, despite some early divergences, the party became closely tied to Moscow. After 1956, however, those ties weakened to the point where the party barely hesitates to criticize the Soviet Union.

International Factors. In the early days of the CPGB, the financial and psychological ties to the Comintern were strong with the latter intervening directly into party affairs on several occasions. After 1956, however, the crises of international communism shattered those ties to a large extent.

Domestic Social Structure. Britain has a large, class
conscious, but unrevolutionary working class. Unable to win much support advocating revolution, the party is now endorsing economic reform policies. A significant portion of the party's support has traditionally come from the "Celtic fringe" and from other groups without established ties to British society including immigrants and Jews.

**Political System.** The dominance of Labour both on the electoral left and in the labor movement has effectively kept the communists from growing beyond a small sect. The nonrevolutionary nature of Britain's working class has forced the communists to downplay revolutionary appeals to win their support. Recently, a number of ultra-left parties have flanked the CPGB on the left discrediting it by apparent association and hindering the communists' efforts to recruit young people. The party's union position tends to encourage political flexibility.

**Constitutional System.** Britain's party system and electoral system severely handicap the CPGB's efforts to gain even a toehold in parliament.

**Leadership.** The party's early deviations from the Soviet line were engineered by generally middle class, intellectual leaders. After the International intervened to replace them with "safe" working class leaders, the party proved loyal to Moscow. More recently, young, working class leaders with experience dealing with the
government and other parties in the unions have steered the party along more moderate, more independent lines.

**Membership and Electorate.** The party's working class and middle class membership is pragmatic enough to support the leaderships' flexible policies. In 1956, however, it was the membership's extreme displeasure over Hungary in particular that accelerated the party's movement toward independence.

**History.** The party's long history of union work and dealing with the dominant Labour Party in the union arena has conditioned it to flexibility. The party's early pattern of subservience to Moscow was broken by the shattering events of 1956.

**Icelandic Communist Party (PA)**

After its founding in 1930, the Icelandic Communist Party grew slowly and then quickly as it emerged as a major party in Iceland's multiparty system, averaging just short of one-fifth of the popular vote. Domestically, the party has generally concentrated on peculiarly Icelandic issues throughout its history, particularly since 1938. In terms of alliances, the party has welcomed individual leftists into its ranks and on two occasions participated in coalition governments. In the union arena, the PA has cooperated with the Progressive Party. Internationally, the party began to sever its relatively loose
ties to the Comintern in 1938 so that today the party emphasizes international autonomy.

**International Factors.** Iceland is far distant from Moscow, not beyond the reach of the long arm of the Comintern, but beyond its firm grasp. After 1938, there were few ties between the PA and Moscow other than psychological ones which wore very thin, particularly after 1956.

**Domestic Social Structure.** Iceland is a small, relatively consensual country that provides little fertile ground for revolutionary Marxism. Consequently, the PA prospers by appealing to the economic interests of workers, intellectuals, fishermen, and the middle class.

**Political System.** Iceland's conservative Social Democratic Party has left a great deal of room on the left for the PA and on several occasions leftists have deserted the Social Democrats to join the communist electoral front. The consensual, nonrevolutionary, fiercely independent nature of Icelanders has tended to predispose the party toward moderate, autonomist postures. Cooperation in the union federation with the Progressives laid the groundwork for cooperation in coalition.

**Constitutional System.** As a major party in a multi-party system, the PA has strong incentives to make itself a palatable coalition partner by moderating its policies. Additionally, coalition experience in municipal government and in the national government has helped to inte-
grate the party into the system.

Leadership. The PA's internationally independent, domestically pragmatic posture is largely the work of an intellectual, middle class leadership. Many of the leaders are young. Also, personal experience by some of the leaders in government coalitions at the national and municipal level help to socialize them into the political system. The ouster of Stalinists from positions of leadership in the party in 1962 helped accelerate the movement away from Moscow.

Membership and Electorate. The heterogeneity of the party's membership and electorate, including workers, intellectuals, fishermen, and others constrains the party from rigid dogma. Also, the nationalistic, nondogmatic character of much of the party's membership and electorate reinforce the party's policies. What is more, the walkout in 1969 of Stalinist cadres and members to launch their own party helped insure the continuance of the party's liberal line.

History. Patterns of peculiarly nationalistic domestic and foreign policies have long been part of the PA's standard operating procedures.

Irish Communist Party (CPI)

Formed at the initiative of the Comintern in 1933, the Irish Communist Party has never been a political force
of any significance. The CPI's early domestic line was relatively radical, but in the late 1950s the party accepted the idea of a peaceful transition to socialism. Recently, the party has promoted cooperation with the Socialists, but with no success. Internationally, the CPI, with the exception of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, has firmly supported the Soviet Union throughout its history.

**International Factors.** The Comintern had a major hand in the party's formation and, consequently, controlled its early policies. Apparently, there are still strong financial as well as psychological ties between Moscow and the CPI.

**Domestic Social Structure.** A heavily Catholic country with no strong tradition of anticlericalism, Ireland offers inhospitable soil for communism. Additionally, the division between North and South, Protestant and Catholic, has complicated the party's efforts at forming national policy. Also, the division is reflected in the party's organization.

**Political System.** There is little support in Ireland for radical leftist politics.

**Constitutional System.** Organizationally, the CPI is divided into two branches paralleling the political division of Ireland.

**Leadership.** The early leaders of the CPI were selec-
ted by Moscow largely on the basis of their loyalty to the USSR and the present leadership may well be financially dependent on the Soviet Union.

**Membership and Electorate.** The party's heavily working class membership (about 90 percent) is pro-Moscow and supports the party's domestic and international postures.

**History.** The party's early allegiance to Moscow established a pattern that has generally continued to the present.

**Italian Communist Party (PCI)**

The most successful communist party in Western Europe, the Italian Communist Party, has steadily built its electoral strength winning more than one-fourth of the popular vote in the last parliamentary election in 1972. Domestically, the PCI has moved toward pragmatic, even revisionist positions. In alliances, the party has long cooperated with Socialists and other leftist parties in local and regional administrations, and, at the national level, the party has indicated a willingness to join with other parties in a broad national coalition. Internationally, the PCI has moved cautiously, then boldly away from early ties to the Soviet Union.

**International Factors.** In its early years, the PCI was tied to the Comintern psychologically, financially,
and as a refuge for much of its exiled leadership. Since 1944, however, primarily psychological ties remain and these have lessened, particularly since 1956. The Sino-Soviet dispute served as an opening for the Italians to assert their autonomy. Finally, events in Chile in 1973 helped form the policy of the "compromesso storico."

**Domestic Social Structure.** The party found its original base among a large, relatively alienated working class. What is more, a tradition of anticlericalism has offered soil for communist entrenchment. Since 1944, however, the party has broadened its appeal to include farm workers, intellectuals, and members of Italy's middle class. Additionally, the party has found it necessary to attempt to reach an understanding with the Church. The diversity in the social structure between Northern and Southern Italy is reflected in the different approaches of the party in the two regions and in the party's organization.

**Political System.** The party's posture of cooperation with other left parties in the unions and in local and regional government has prepared both sides for a possible national coalition. Ultra-left parties have siphoned off some of the PCI's most militant members without harming it electorally. The weakness and division of the Socialists has enabled the PCI to dominate the left in Italy. Finally, the failure of the governing Christian Democrats
to solve Italy's economic problems has provided the PCI with an opening for electoral progress.

**Constitutional System.** Italy's large network of local and regional administration presents the party with grounds in which to stake out for itself a position in the system. What is more, the party's presence in parliament gives it a base to exercise some national influence.

**Leadership.** The PCI's pragmatic, progressively independent positions are in part the result of a largely intellectual leadership. Recent leaders, Longo and Berrlinguer, have been less intellectual than apparatchiki desirous of insuring the institutional success of their party, a success which they have felt can best be achieved through moderate "Italian" policies. Additionally, governmental experience by many of the PCI's leaders serves to integrate them into the political system.

**Membership and Electorate.** The early party's membership was psychologically attached to Moscow and thus constrained in its international positions. In later years, as the membership has grown and diversified to include several social groups and come to include a large number of younger individuals, this constraint has weakened considerably. Additionally, the diversity of the party's electorate tends to compell the party to offer broad-based policies and the electorate's stability reinforces those positions.
History. The party's experience of cooperation with bourgeois parties during the years of fascist repression molded it into patterns of compromise and flexibility that have persisted into postwar years. Also, the party's history of cooperation with other parties and the central government in the unions and in local government have helped integrate the PCI into the political system.

Luxembourg Communist Party (PCL)

From humble beginnings, the Communist Party of Luxembourg since World War II has become a moderately large party in one of Europe's smallest nations, averaging more than 10 percent of the popular vote. In domestic policies, the PCL took a very hard line, even revolutionary approach in its early years. In later years, however, the party turned more toward radical economic reform and in 1965 adopted a program advocating the peaceful transition to socialism. In alliance strategies, the PCL before World War II adhered closely to the Comintern line. Presently, the party emphasizes unity of action with the Socialists. In international policy, the party has never missed a beat in its allegiance to the Soviet Union.

International Factors. The PCL has long maintained strong ties to the Soviets with the early party receiving directions and support from Moscow. Currently, psychological ties remain relatively strong and there is evidence
of continued financial aid from the Kremlin.

**Domestic Social Structure.** The PCL has laid its foundation among workers, particularly among miners in the south. Because of the large Catholic population, the PCL has attempted to foster a Catholic-Communist dialogue.

**Political System.** The historic inability of the Socialists to win national political power or dominate the labor movement provided the PCL with an opportunity to establish itself. The nonrevolutionary nature of the working class helped turn the party toward less radical domestic policies. Also, the party's participation in the union federation with the Socialists and cooperation with them in local government tend to integrate the communists into the system.

**Constitutional System.** The PCL's position as a moderately large party in a multiparty system offers incentives to it to moderate its programs to make itself more attractive to potential alliance partners.

**Leadership.** Militating against changes in the party's positions is the PCL's veteran leadership headed by the Urbani family.

**Membership and Electorate.** The relatively homogeneous working class membership tends to support the party's hard line, pro-Soviet stance.

**History.** A legacy of allegiance to Moscow is preserved by the veteran leadership.
Dutch Communist Party (CPN)

From its beginnings, the Dutch Communist Party has never been a major electoral force only once winning as much as 10 percent of the vote (in 1946). Recently, it has done well to gather 4 percent of the ballots. After some early factionalism, the CPN settled down to a generally hard line Marxist program. By the early 1960s, however, the party had accepted the parliamentary, peaceful road and adopted a more nationalistic approach to Dutch issues. In terms of alliances, the early CPN closely followed the Comintern line. Presently, the party advocates unity of action with other parties, particularly the Socialists. After some early deviations, the Dutch Party's international position was firmly pro-Soviet. Since the early 1960s, however, the party has moved to a position of independence and international isolation.

**International Factors.** Direct intervention from the Comintern brought an end to the early CPN's independent behavior. Later, the ties between the CPN and Moscow were largely psychological. The Sino-Soviet split provided the impetus for the party's recent autonomist posture.

**Political System.** A relatively strong Socialist Party hinders the CPN's efforts to win much union or electoral strength and in the late 1950s, the party was harmed by the formation of a competing communist party. The
relatively nonrevolutionary, independent-minded Dutch give little support to "extremist" parties with foreign ties. The party's new isolationist posture is in keeping with Dutch values.

**Leadership.** Early factionalism was ended with the ouster of intellectual leadership. Many of the party's more recent innovations in domestic and foreign policy are the work of Paul de Groot, a veteran leader of lower middle class or skilled worker background. His early leadership was quite orthodox, but since 1960 he has engineered or endorsed the party's new line.

**Membership and Electorate.** In the late 1950s, the party was harmed by the departure of the De Brug group. In the early 1960s with the Sino-Soviet rift, the threat of a new split over that issue led the leadership to seek neutrality, a neutrality that exploded to isolation.

**History.** The failure of more than a small group of Socialist leaders and members to support the Communist Party in 1918-1919 prevented the party from firmly establishing itself and subsequent factionalism condemned the party to impotence. The history of factionalism and the harshness of its consequences spurred the party's leaders to take action to avoid another split in the early 1960s. Consequently, the CPN turned to an internationally independent posture.
Norwegian Communist Party (NKP)

Like its Dutch counterpart, the Norwegian Communist Party has never been a major political force winning as much as 10 percent of the ballots only in 1945. Since 1957, the NKP has held no more than one parliamentary seat at a time. After its split from the Labor Party in 1923, the NKP maintained a generally hard line posture domestically, but since the Cold War the party has accepted the peaceful road doctrine. In terms of alliances, before World War II, the NKP followed (although at times half-heartedly) the International line. Recently, the party has alternately reproached and appealed to Labor for unity of action. Before the 1973 election, however, the party did reach an electoral agreement with two other leftist parties (not including the Labor Party) that may be extended into a merger. In international positions, the party, with some variations, followed the Soviet line until the late 1950s when it moved boldly to assert its independence.

**International Factors.** Direct intervention by the Comintern to split the Labor Party in 1923 insured the early support of Moscow by the communist rump. The relative insignificance of the Norwegian Party in the eyes of Soviet leaders allowed the NKP room for maneuver, however. Recently, the crises of international communism have shaken the party's ties to the Soviets and opened
the door to an assertion of autonomy and the Sino-Soviet split precipitated a party division. In part, the successful modernization of the Swedish Communist Party offered a model for some of the NKP's more recent policy modifications.

Domestic Social Structure. A large, relatively radical working class seemingly provided an early base for Norwegian communism...

Political System. But the large Labor Party totally dominated the unions and the electoral left-wing. In recent years, the NKP has been threatened by competition from an SF party and several ultra-left groups. Popular disenchantment with the ruling Labor Party has provided an opening for the communists and their allies to make electoral inroads. Also, the close division in the parliament gives the party disproportionate strength.

Constitutional System. An electoral law requiring a party to win a minimum percentage of the popular vote in national elections to gain representation disadvantages the small NKP, but also acts as an incentive for it to reach alliances.

Leadership. In the beginning, the NKP's generally pro-Soviet policies were engineered by working class leaders many of whom had been trained in Moscow. After World War II, Moscow supported the purge of Furobotn, the resistance leader, who was seen by hard liners as being
too independently minded. The replacement of veteran Stalinist Emil Løvlien in 1965 by Reidar Larsen accelerated the party's move toward autonomy.

**Membership and Electorate.** The 1923 split left the party with a small, generally pro-Soviet membership. Growth of the party during and after World War II broadened the party base, but purges and defections to ultra-left groups and the SF party have left the NKP with a much smaller membership. The purge of hard liners following the 1967 dispute over condemnation of China secured the leadership's independent policy. The losing faction was composed predominantly of older cadres who were schooled in the Stalinist tradition and continue to assert residual influence opposing the proposed merger with other leftist parties.

**History.** The early history of the Labor Party and then the NKP in the Comintern was one of deviation. Later, the party was reduced to a more compliant core, but inattention from the Comintern Executive allowed the party considerable leeway. A tradition of independence was begun that has sporadically reasserted itself and since 1956 has emerged as the dominant characteristic of the NKP's international position.

**Swedish Communist Party (VPK)**

The Swedish Communist Party has won between 3 and 7
percent of the popular vote in every election since its founding with the sole exception of the 1944 election when it received 10 percent of the ballots. After extended power struggles within the party including several splits and purges, the Swedish Party finally adopted a hard line, Stalinist posture in the late 1930s. By the 1950s, however, the party was groping its way toward the peaceful road. Then, in the 1960s, the party adopted a "new left" type program and liberalized its party structure. In terms of alliances, the early party campaigned for unity with the Social Democrats even against Comintern wishes. After its Bolshevization, however, the Swedish Party followed the Comintern line. The present policy of the VPK favors unity of action with the Social Democrats. Internationally, the Swedish Party only fell under Moscow's control in the mid-1930s. Then, again, after the Cold War, the party asserted its independence moving in the 1960s to a posture of autonomy.

**International Factors.** Direct intervention of the Comintern was required to bring the party to heel in the 1930s. After 1956, in particular, the crises of international communism weakened the party's psychological ties to Moscow. Apprehension over the possible emergence in Sweden of an SF party such as the one in Denmark (as well as that party's early success) helped motivate the party's policy renovations.
Political System. The dominance of the Social Democrats both electorally and in the unions prevented the early party from establishing itself. Presently, the close party balance in the Riksdag gives the party an opportunity to exercise disproportionate influence. The party's small, but concentrated union strength acts as a drag on its modernizing policies. Sweden's relatively consensual population offers poor soil for the growth of a radical party. Ultra-left groups have competed with the party in its efforts to recruit young members.

Constitutional System. As a small party in a closely balanced political system, the VPK has the opportunity to exercise political influence beyond its size. Consequently, it has incentives to make itself attractive as a possible coalition partner. The necessity of winning 4 percent of the popular vote to remain in parliament places a burden on the party to maintain its current electoral strength.

Leadership. The early party's intellectual and middle class leadership proved difficult for the Comintern to discipline, but their replacement by safe working class leaders insured greater loyalty. In large part, the party's recent modernization is the result of the leadership of C. H. Hermansson and his young, intellectual support. On the other hand, Hermansson's greatest opposition comes from veteran, working class leaders in the
North.

Membership and Electorate. The division in the party is between youths and intellectuals who support the VPK's modern policies and older, working class militants who tend to be pro-Soviet hard liners. The party's recent electoral upturn tends to reinforce its new policies.

History. The pattern of independence from Moscow and support of united front action developed in the early years of the party has recently reemerged.

Swiss Communist Party (PdA)

The Swiss Communist Party has been only a marginal political force winning as much as 5 percent of the popular vote only once in its history in 1947. In domestic policies, the Swiss Party pursued a revolutionary Marxist program until banned in 1940 along with other extremist parties. After the war, the party returned to legality and continued a relatively hard line posture. By the 1960s, however, the party moved to adopt the peaceful road theme. Currently, the party is taking a relatively non-doctrinaire approach. In alliance strategies, the early party closely followed Comintern directives. Currently, the PdA campaigns for a tactical alliance with the Socialists. In international policy, the party closely followed Soviet wishes. Only after the end of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split were there signs of cracks
in the PdA's pro-Soviet posture and in 1968, the issue of Czechoslovakia brought a major dissent from the Swiss. Subsequently, the party has maintained a generally pro-Soviet stance, but has not retracted its criticisms.

**International Factors.** Close psychological ties to the Soviet Union and occasional direct Comintern intervention helped bind the Swiss Party to Soviet policies in its early decades. Since the early 1960s, however, the remaining psychological ties have lessened and the PdA's strong bilateral ties to the Italian Communist Party are a moderating force. Finally, the salience of the Soviet intervention in nearby Czechoslovakia placed the PdA leaders in a dilemma between opting for the policy designed to lessen the impact on the party's domestic fortunes or choosing to keep their traditional position. They chose the former.

**Domestic Social Structure.** The multilingual character of the Swiss people is reflected organizationally in the PdA. Also, the bulk of the party's support comes from French-speaking cantons.

**Political System.** The large Socialist Party's left-wing political power and dominance of the union structure helped prevent the communists from gaining much of a political foothold in Switzerland. Recently, several ultra-left groups and parties have hampered the party's recruitment of new members.
**Constitutional System.** The organizational structure of the PdA parallels the federal nature of the Swiss state.

**Leadership.** The PdA's long allegiance to Moscow can in part be explained by the personal ties of its leaders to the Soviet Union. Karl Hofmaier, for example, was Moscow-trained and Edgar Woog was a long-time official of the Comintern. Notably, the party did not begin to ease its doctrinal rigidity until near the end of Woog's leadership.

**Membership and Electorate.** The large number of industrial workers and older cadres tend to support the party's pro-Soviet stance. Radical leftist groups have in recent years tended to drain pro-Chinese and revolutionary elements from the party.

**History.** Early in its history, the party developed a pro-Soviet international policy and a hard line domestic policy. Time and events have modified each, but only grudgingly.
Note

1 The sources for the data in this chapter are cited in earlier chapters and are listed in the bibliography.
CHAPTER XI

THE FUTURE AND PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES
OF WESTERN EUROPE

One cannot conclude an examination of the communist parties of Western Europe's democracies without indulging in some informed speculation about their future. With the events in Portugal (although the party there is outside the universe of this study), the recent entry of the Finnish Communist Party into a national emergency coalition government, and the apparent proximity of the communist parties of Italy and France to national political power, the topic is a timely one. Also, communism and communist parties are subjects that traditionally fascinate Westerners. More importantly, we cannot leave our model of the factors that shape the policies and postures of Western European communism without applying to the task of prediction. Of course, many of the variables that conceivably could influence the course of communism in Western Europe are unknown and many of these are unknowable; so, no prediction is foolproof. On the other hand, many factors are known and others can be anticipated by the extrapolation of present trends. We will turn first to an examination of two of the least likely possibilities for the future of Western Europe's communist parties: that they will launch an armed revolution, and
that they will simply disappear.

Since World War II (and well before in most cases), no communist party in Western Europe has engineered a revolt, rebellion, revolution, or anything resembling one. Moreover, in a number of cases, the communists have ignored or tried to stabilize some potentially disruptive situations. In Finland in early 1948, at a time of extreme tensions, the best evidence indicates that rather than attempting a coup, the SKP had no designs on an illegal seizure of power.\(^1\) After the liberation in France, Thorez ordered the communist maquis to disband and in 1958, the PCF was among the Fourth Republic's last defenders. Finally, May-June, 1968, saw the French Communist Party trying to act as a stabilizing force rather than playing the role of *provocateur*. In Italy, in 1948, after an assassination attempt on Togliatti, the PCI moved swiftly to calm a potentially explosive situation.

If armed revolution is their aim, why did the communists of France, Italy, and Finland allow these apparent opportunities to slip through their fingers? Although cynics may argue that the communists have been cleverly lulling everyone into a false sense of security in anticipation of some future uprising, this seems highly unlikely. First, most of the parties have firmly established non-revolutionary patterns of behavior that will not be easily broken. Not only have the communists refrained from
launching a revolution, but, for the most part, their spokesmen persistently disavow any revolutionary intentions. In rhetoric, at least, most of the Western European communist parties have accepted the peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism for more than a decade. Can it be that the communists have spent decades trying to convince their countries' electorates of their benign intentions and not convinced themselves?

Secondly, there is little evidence that most communist militants would support an illegal attempt to seize power and much evidence that they would not. In France, Finland, Italy, and elsewhere, survey evidence indicates that many communist supporters are drawn to the party for relatively undogmatic, certainly nonrevolutionary, economic reasons. Protest voters are not the stuff from which a revolution is made. Further, survey evidence from France, at least, indicates that communist voters do not consider the PCF to be revolutionary. In 1966, only 1 percent of the party's electors described it as "the party that wants revolution" and in 1968, only 23 percent agreed while 57 percent disagreed that the PCF would be ready to seize power by revolution if the situation seemed favorable to it. It seems very unlikely that communist leaders supposedly clever enough to disguise a revolutionary intent for decades would launch a takeover effort with such unprepared supporters.
Thirdly, the prospects for international aid are slight. Considering the distance of many of the nations of Western Europe from Soviet borders, the Soviet interest in preserving détente, and the possibility of Western retaliation, there is little probability of Soviet troops marching into Paris or Rome to climax a communist-led insurrection. Far more likely would be NATO support for established governments in quashing the uprising.

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Soviets are not interested in a communist regime in Western Europe and certainly not one resulting from an illegal seizure of power. Such a regime would likely be an economic burden and a sometimes embarassment to the Soviets, as was Allende's regime in Chile. The evidence of the Helsinki Conference of 1975 and Soviet actions preceding the French presidential election of 1974 (when the Soviet ambassador seemed to favor Giscard over the left's candidate) indicates at least a temporary satisfaction on the part of the Soviets with the status quo in Europe.

Fourthly, to launch a revolution and fail would mean the likely loss for the communists of established positions in national legislatures, bureaucracies, regional governments, and local administrations along with all the perquisites of office that go with them. Although the miniature Irish Communist Party would have little to risk, the larger parties such as the Italian, French,
and Finnish would have much to lose indeed. At the very least, an abortive coup would mean the loss of any immediate chance at electoral power, a major reduction in elective offices held, and, consequently, losses in patronage and influence on policy. More likely, however, a communist party guilty of leading an unsuccessful uprising would be proscribed and thus lose its position in the political system and perhaps in the labor movement as well. For individual communist leaders, the risks would be just as great. As the heads of legal, "democratic" parties, Berlinguer, Marchais, and Saarinen enjoy considerable personal prestige and power that go beyond the boundaries of their own parties. As the leaders of defeated revolutionary forces, however, they would likely face jail or exile.

Finally, barring widespread social disorder, a communist-led seizure of power would have very little chance of success. In most of Western Europe, communist parties are simply too small, too poorly organized, and with militants too poorly placed to be a real threat to seize an established government. Even in France, Italy, and Finland, where the communist parties are mass parties, only the support or neutrality of the armed forces would enable the communists to have a realistic chance of winning power.

The leaders of the communist parties of Western
Europe are simply too conservative, too tied to the establishment, and too sagacious to embark upon the course of revolution. Its chances of success would be slim; its risks great; and, at the same time, most Western communist leaders show no predisposition for anything so adventurist as an illegal attempt to seize power. The real revolutionaries in Western Europe are found in the ultra-left movements such as the Baader-Meinhof gang in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy, and the established communist parties regard them as just as much a menace as the bourgeois authorities do.

If the worst fears of anticommunists are unfounded, so are their greatest hopes. While the communist parties of Western Europe may not be in the vanguard of revolution, they are not about to wither away and disappear either. Many in the West once believed that economic growth, social reform, and the integration of the working class into the political process would mean the end of communism in the West. Of course, it has not happened. Neither the evident decline of ideology nor widespread economic growth following World War II have led to the demise of Western European communism. After summarizing much of the more recent empirical research on communist electorates, Greene offers this conclusion:

Little is to be gained by qualifying the communist electorate as made up of protest voters who can be weaned away from their partisanship by a
change, even a major change, in their material conditions of life. 8

Historically, once established, communist parties have been remarkably resilient and there is no reason to expect otherwise in the future. Only in Ireland where the party founded in 1921 died, has a communist party vanished entirely and there it was refounded in 1933. In Italy, Finland, and West Germany, communist parties survived long periods of illegality to emerge as formidable parties in Italy and Finland, and with at least a base of support in West Germany. Elsewhere, communist parties have survived long periods of electoral drought, political isolation, and internal divisions.

As for the future, in France, Italy, Finland, Iceland, and Luxembourg, communist parties are established parts of the political system with large numbers of loyal adherents and supporters. One cannot imagine a political cataclysm so severe as to lead to their destruction. In other countries, communist parties are far smaller and less significant in their respective political systems, but, nevertheless, they have shown a remarkable staying power. Each has a core of true believers and apparently many can still call on Moscow for financial aid in time of need. Although the parties of Ireland (which is quite small and poorly established) and Austria (which is aging at an alarming rate) may eventually pass from the scene,
communist parties will likely be a part of the Western European political panorama for at least the near and middle future.

Assuming the continued presence of communism as a political force in Western Europe, what is the likelihood of a communist party winning political power through constitutional means? For even the major parties, winning an outright majority is very unlikely. The Italian Party has enjoyed the greatest electoral success among the Western parties, but even in its finest hour, in the June, 1975 regional elections, the PCI fell just short of one-third of the popular vote. The French, Icelandic, Luxembourg, and Finnish parties have seldom gathered more than a quarter of the vote and in other countries, communist parties are too small even to dream of electoral majorities.

For the larger parties of Western Europe, however, the prospects of participating in a governing coalition are much brighter than they have been since the early postwar era when communists participated in governing coalitions in much of Western Europe, and in Finland and Iceland, such an event has already happened (from 1966 to 1971, and since late 1975 in Finland; 1956 to 1958, and 1971 to 1974 in Iceland). In France, the Socialists and Communists nearly succeeded in electing a presidential candidate in 1974. The PCI in Italy may soon join
the government in a sort of Grand Coalition with the Christian Democrats or may come to power through a coalition of Communists, Socialists, and left-wing Christian Democrats. In Luxembourg, the PCL is large enough so that it together with the Socialists could form a left-wing majority if an agreement between the two could be reached. Finally, it is not unthinkable that moderately small communist parties in Sweden and possibly other countries may enter a future cabinet as minor partners.

For most of the smaller parties, while prospects of leading or participating in a ruling coalition are rather slight, the chances of holding the balance of power in a closely balanced legislature are far better. Already, in Sweden and Norway, communist parties have found their positions augmented by just such a situation. Everywhere communists hold even a small number of seats, the possibility of that number being the balance of power exists. For other parties, however, the British, Irish, Austrian, and perhaps the West German, with neither parliamentary seats nor much real hope of winning any, even such a modicum of parliamentary power is beyond their reach.

With the increased probability of communist participation in the governments of several Western European nations, what will be some of the likely results of such participation? Considering first the consequences of a coalition with communist participation but not domi-
nance, we can turn to recent communist coalition experience in Finland and Iceland as well as early postwar coalitions in several nations of Western Europe. In general, the consequences of government participation for the communists was that rather than using their foothold in government to achieve their own ends, in large part, the communists found themselves being taken advantage of by their coalition partners. Lacking governmental experience, communist parties in Finland and Iceland, particularly in the former country, won only modest concessions from their partners in terms of foreign and domestic policy, but paid the price of sharing the blame for both unpopular governmental decisions and for inaction.

The consequences of entering a Western government as a junior coalition partner are not necessarily all to the communists' advantage, then. Certainly, the standard rewards of governance--patronage, effect on policy, enhanced legitimacy--would accrue to communist parties as they do others, but there are also disadvantages. As junior partners, their impact on policy has been historically small and will likely continue to be limited. While some of the communists' more moderate economic reforms, including some nationalizations, may well become government policy, it is unlikely that dominant coalition partners will accede to demands for massive nationalizations or a fundamental realignment in terms of foreign
policy.

At the same time, by becoming part of the government, the communist party loses much of its freedom to criticize. No longer can the bourgeois parties be solely to blame for unfavorable wage conditions, unemployment, inflation, corruption, and other national problems, but the communists must share in that responsibility. As minor partners, communist coalition partners have often found themselves lacking the power to enact their own solutions to problems, but sharing the blame for those problems.

Another dilemma for the communist party playing the role of junior government partner is that of being flexible and moderate enough to maintain the coalition, but not so pragmatic as to alienate the party faithful. In Finland, for example, the SKP as part of the government found itself in a position of endorsing wage settlements that its union militants found unacceptable. As the SKP discovered, the consequences of such a dilemma can sometimes be a party schism.

With such a mixed bag of benefits and problems, communist parties may not necessarily be eager to enter a government as a junior coalition partner, particularly if there is a possibility of becoming a dominant partner in some future coalition. In Italy, for example, the PCI has indicated its reluctance to jump into a coalition
that could do it more harm than good electorally. For the French Communist Party, the problem of satisfying its militants while tempering its policies to cooperate with the Socialists could prove extremely difficult indeed. In Finland, Iceland, and Luxembourg, the communists can realistically hope for no more than junior party status in a governing coalition; so, they must choose for a small share of governmental power or none at all.

For the Western political systems themselves, what will communist participation in government mean? As we have discussed, communist parties as junior government partners will not be able to institute sweeping changes against the will of their partners. They will, however, likely win some concessions in terms of economic policies favoring the working class, some nationalizations, and, in foreign policy, perhaps a weakening of ties with the United States.

Just as importantly, government experience at the national level will serve to change the perceived political position of the communist party. On the one hand, since the anticommunists' worst fears will not be realized (for most people in Finland and Iceland, communist participation in the government did not directly affect their lives one way or the other), their status will be legitimated as political participants. Both in the eyes of the electorate and for the communists themselves, government
participation will help to integrate the communist party into the system. On the other hand, government participation will denigrate the chiliastic myths communists like to foster about their future rule. Inevitably, communist performance, particularly as junior partners in a coalition, will fall short of the expectations of their most enthusiastic followers. Consequently, the aura of the communist party, both as a threat and as a panacea, will diminish. For better and for worse, communist participation will more fully integrate them into the political system.

For two of Western Europe's communist parties, those of Italy and France, the possibility of entering the government as the dominant partner of a left-wing coalition is very real. In Italy, the PCI is clearly the foremost party of the left and the possibility of it heading a future government with Socialist and even left-wing Christian Democrat support is not at all unthinkable. In France, the Communists and Socialists together may be very close to commanding a majority of the voters between them. Whether the PCF could dominate a popular front coalition in France now that the Socialist Party has experienced such a rejuvenation, however, is questionable.

What would be the consequences of a communist dominated government in Western Europe? In foreign policy, a communist government would likely establish close ties to
the Soviet Union, but not necessarily enter a formal alliance with the Soviets and certainly not steer the country toward satellite status. As nonruling parties, the French and Italian parties pay a certain amount of homage to Moscow, more so for the French than the Italian, but are far from Moscow's obedient servants, especially in the Italian case. What is more, the surest way for the PCF or PCI to alienate their government partners, presumably the Socialists, and precipitate a government crisis, would be by moving too close to Moscow.

The major foreign policy changes enacted by a communist-led government would be less in regard to the East as to the West. While many Western European communists have become chary about too close ties to the Soviet Union, they are downright hostile about close ties, particularly military ties, to the United States. This does not mean a severing of relations with the United States or even a withdrawal from NATO, at least not precipitously. It does mean that communist-dominated governments in France and Italy would be more reserved in their relations with the United States, more critical of American foreign policy, and, in the long run, likely to withdraw from mutual defense arrangements.

In terms of domestic economic policy, a Western European communist government would likely increase the number of nationalizations, but, again, the sensitivities
of coalition partners would likely prevent the communists from doing too much too soon. As for agricultural policy, there would probably not be a vast collectivization since that policy has not worked well in communist bloc countries and notably, no Western communist party now recommends such a policy.

As for domestic social policy, ruling communists would likely champion reforms designed to advantage lower and lower middle classes by reforming the tax structure, building public housing, extending welfare and pension benefits, providing public employment, and the like. At the same time, however, Western European communist parties have not been renowned for authoring creative social reform programs, particularly the French Party which has consistently opposed social reform measures at their outset as "reactionary conspiracies."

From a Western democratic standpoint, the most threatening aspect of a communist-dominated government involves possible encroachments on civil liberties and the democratic process. In communist-run municipalities and regional administrations in Italy and France, there have been no widespread abuses of civil liberties, but this does not guarantee that a communist party with the reins of the central government in its hands would not move to consolidate its position by restricting opposition parties and silencing critics. The record of communist govern-
ments in Eastern Europe and elsewhere is hardly confor-
ing. Both the Italian and French Communist Parties, the
only ones with a real chance of acceding to power in
Western Europe, pay lip service to democratic freedoms.
The PCI, however, has a longer history of pledging res-
pect for democracy and civil liberties than the PCF and
in its internal affairs has been less autocratically
rigid than its French counterpart.

Regardless of the communists' motives, there are
several factors preventing at least widespread early
abuses against democratic freedoms. First, coalition part-
ners are certain to be very sensitive to communist actions
that would undercut the democratic process, and, conceiv-
ably, threaten the existence of opposition parties. Even
if the communists are bent on subverting the democratic
system, they dare not move too far too fast before their
position is secure. Secondly, a communist-dominated
government embarking on a policy of erosion of civil
liberties would meet resistance from both the rank and
file and its electorate. In both France and Italy, most
members joined and grew up politically in a party pledging
its support for democracy. As the extraordinarily high
figures of membership turnover show, communist members
are not automatons who confortably change positions with
the party line. Finally, efforts to restrict opposition
parties and limit civil liberties could well precipitate
action by the military.

Consequently, the dangers of an early end to democracy in a communist-led Western state are slim. Rather, the threat is one of subtle erosion. Through administrative appointments and regulatory actions, a communist-led administration could slowly undermine democratic freedoms. Philosophically predisposed to a highly interventionist government, a communist government could stumble almost incidentally into an enlargement of governmental controls of individuals and groups that many would regard as threats to civil liberties. Whether a communist government will make its conscious policy one of undercutting democratic freedoms and individual liberties to insure its own persistence in power, however, cannot be easily determined.

A number of factors would shape a ruling communist party's predisposition to restrict civil liberties. Considering international factors first, a communist government in Italy or France that made it its policy to undermine democratic freedoms would face the threat of reduced trade from the United States and the rest of the Common Market in exchange for an uncertain increase in trade from the communist world.

Other factors affecting the communist party's actions would be its membership and electorate. How firmly indoctrinated into the democratic system are they? How likely
are they to challenge leaders' policies with which they disagree? On both counts, the younger, more heterogeneous membership and electorate of the Italian Communist Party would be more likely to remain loyal to the democratic system than their older, sometimes sectarian French cousins.

Another major factor to consider is leadership. Are Georges Marchais and Enrico Berlinguer confirmed democrats or disguised autocrats or something in between? Perhaps even they do not know. Each has risen to power in a democratic political system, but through a highly undemocratic party structure. Each is a member of the younger generation of leaders in whose political lifetimes party slogans about the dictatorship of the proletariat have been supplanted by phrases about "advanced democracy." Each is personally conservative.

A final factor involves history. Traditionally, the PCI has been more open, more flexible and accommodating in dealing with other groups and institutions—the Church, other parties, the EEC—than the PCF. Also, the PCI, because of its long-held cooperative position in the CGIL and in local and regional governments has perceived itself as being part of the political system longer than the PCF which has had a tendency to feel (and to be) isolated. Consequently, one would be more inclined to trust the preservation of democracy to the hands of the
Italian Communists than their French comrades.

What will be the effect of a communist-dominated government on traditional Western civil liberties and democratic freedoms? Likely, there will not be an early, massive abuse of democratic freedoms. At the same time, because of increased governmental activity, there will be some concomitant increase in governmental regulations and restrictions, but whether the communists will consciously set out to undercut democratic freedoms depends on several factors. International factors would likely militate against such action in both Italy and France. The internal variables of the parties' membership and electorate would likely be more supportive of democratic norms in Italy than in France. Perhaps the most important but least measurable variable is leadership. Both the PCF and PCI are headed by men renowned for their conservatism. Because of historical reasons, one would expect the Italian Communist Party to be less of a threat to democratic freedoms than the French Party.

Regardless of the intentions of future communist heads of government in Western Europe, they will face certain limiting factors restricting them in the execution of domestic and foreign policies. First, as we have seen, even as heads of a coalition, the communists will not be free to act irrespective of their allies' sensitivities. To maintain their government, communists will have to
compromise their policy differences with coalition partners.

Secondly, assuming the communists intend (or are compelled) to continue the democratic system, they must, like other politicians, keep an eye to pleasing their electorates and mass memberships. Just as the diversity and nonrevolutionary character of each has constrained communist parties to offer economic, nonrevolutionary, even pragmatic (especially in Italy) approaches while out of power, in power, they will constrain the communist governors from adopting revolutionary solutions necessitating considerable sacrifice and hardship for the masses.

Thirdly, as the lesson of Allende's Chile has taught, too heavy a dose of socialism applied with too little planning on too broad a scale can wreck an economy, at least in the short run. No head of state, be he communist or bourgeois, wants to preside over an economic collapse.

Fourthly, lurking in the background is the military. Should a communist-led government move too precipitously in either foreign affairs or domestic policy, the danger exists of an intervention by the more conservative military.

Finally, communist regimes face many of the same sorts of resource and time limitations that other regimes face. Economic problems caused by international economic conditions, scarce resources, unbalanced domestic econo-
mies, poorly trained labor, and the like are not amenable to quick, easy solutions and, as Eastern European experience has shown, nationalization is far from a panacea. In power, communists will likely find many of their nation's economic, political, and social problems as intractable as their bourgeois predecessors found them. As Mussolini allegedly remarked about the problems of governance, "It's not that it's so difficult to govern Italy, but that it's useless."

For most of the communist parties of Western Europe, however, the practical problems of government are of little immediate worry because they lack the size to win political power at the head of a governing coalition or as junior partners in a government. The best they can hope for is to find themselves in the propitious position of holding the balance of power in a closely divided parliament. In the last several years, both the Communist Party of Norway and the Swedish Communist Party have held the balance of power in their respective parliaments and in any country where the communists are strong enough even to win a few seats the possibility exists.

How much impact can a communist party in such a position have? Very little. The lesson of the Swedish VPK's experience is that the communists can exercise only marginal influence at best. In the first place, only on certain issues will the parliament be polarized along
socialist-bourgeois lines. On matters upon which the two major blocs can agree, communist votes are not needed. Secondly, voting against the government means throwing it out of office, but the communists may find this an unacceptable alternative. In Sweden, to vote against the government on a major bill meant tossing the Social Democrats out and installing a bourgeois government—something the communists were loath to do. Thirdly, if the communists become too demanding, the government can strike an agreement with another party. In Sweden, the Social Democrats finally freed themselves from any reliance on the communists by enticing the Liberal Party into giving the government its support. Finally, holding the balance of power is a position of weakness in that its continuance depends less on the performance of the party holding the balance than on the fortunes of the other parties. Very likely, the next election will send the communists back into the parliamentary wilderness.

Turning to the question of political posture, where is communism in Western Europe going? Are the communist parties of Western Europe likely to remain outposts for Moscow? While the West German, Austrian, Irish, and Luxembourg parties are closely tied to the Soviet Union, the other parties, including the continent's major communist parties, enjoy a vigorous measure of autonomy. Also, the long-run trend is in the direction of greater
independence for the parties of the West. Centrifugal forces set in motion by the Twentieth CPSU Congress in 1956 and accelerated by the Sino-Soviet rift have worked to free many of Western Europe's communist parties from Soviet domination. The larger parties are not forced to rely on Moscow for financial aid and as time eliminates the older, pro-Soviet militants and leaders, psychological bonds will be reduced, too. Barring a major increase in international tensions, the bonds that have historically tied the Western parties to the Soviet Union will continue to relax and the domestic interests of each party rather than the foreign policy interests of Moscow will be foremost in the minds of younger leaders and cadres.

If the trend is toward greater autonomy, why is it that the parties of West Germany, Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg have resisted that trend? In each case, the historical bonds remain powerful as veteran, pro-Moscow militants hold significant positions in the organization in each party with much of the leadership of the Austrian, West German, and Luxembourg parties being from the older generation. Also, at least three of the parties, the West German DKP, Luxembourg's PCL, and Ireland's CPI, are apparently receiving financial assistance from Moscow. What is the prognosis for each of these parties? In terms of membership, the DKP is young and growing. Potentially, it likely can support itself financially and as older
cadres and leaders die or retire, younger replacements may well lead the party along a more independent path. In Luxembourg, too, the PCL is large enough to survive without international aid, but the entrenchment of the Urbani clan in the leadership makes the prospects for a more internationally independent party uncertain. Much depends on the character of the successor to the party patriarch, Dominique Urbani. In Ireland, however, both the short and the long run are likely to see the CPI closely allied to Moscow. Without international aid, the CPI would likely disappear. Being so small, however, the CPI faces the possible danger of being infiltrated and taken over by ultra-left groups. Finally, the future is cloudy for Austria's KPÖ. Because of its unreconstructed pro-Moscow stance, progressives have fled the party ranks and recruitment of young people has declined precipitously. As a result, the party is shrinking and aging giving pro-Soviet militants an even greater voice proportionately. Consequently, the policies that are leading to the KPÖ's decline are being reinforced by the very process of that decline. For the short run, at least, the KPÖ will likely shrink to the status of a small, politically impotent sect, a status to which it is fast approaching now.

If, in the long run, traditional ties to Moscow are lessening for most communist parties of Western Europe, are the parties evolving in the direction of becoming
social democratic parties? Yes, say Berger and Thirard. Speaking specifically of the French Communist Party, they argue that the PCF can be compared to the social democratic parties as they existed before 1914: representing the working class, opposed to the current government, but tied to the society by organization and function.\textsuperscript{11}

On the other hand, Annie Kriegel argues that "one has seen communist parties collapse and disappear...or make changes of strategy, tactics, policy, size, language, leaders, or allegiance, but one has never seen them become social-democratic parties."\textsuperscript{12} The French Communist Party, she contends, is not a social democratic party "like the others" because of its organizational structure and liaison with the USSR.\textsuperscript{13}

Although there is considerable question, as Kriegel notes, about the proximity of the PCF to social democracy, other parties are less closely tied to the Soviet Union and more relaxed organizationally--the Swedish, Icelandic, and perhaps, also the Italian Party. If international détente continues and major economic crises are avoided in Western Europe, the already present trends toward international autonomy and flexible domestic policies will likely continue, too.

Does this mean, however, that the communist parties of Western Europe are evolving toward social democracy? Not necessarily. If the communist parties of Sweden,
Iceland, and Italy are forerunners of late Twentieth Century communism throughout Western Europe, that communism will not be a "social democratic" communism. While Italian, Swedish, and Icelandic Communists are no mere agents of the Kremlin or even, necessarily, consistent supporters, their international postures are far more in accordance with those of the communist world than those of the West. No social democracy here. What is more, the domestic policies of even the most "progressive" communist party are more radical than those of the social democratic parties. While not revolutionary in the orthodox Marxist sense, the programs of the Communist Parties of Sweden, Iceland, and Italy call for nationalizations and radical economic reforms that go beyond those sponsored by the social democrats in Western Europe.

Where, then, is communism in Western Europe going? For the past two decades, forces have been at work in Western Europe that are making for a new era for Western European communism, a new era that is already emerging. First, the decline of Soviet authority in the communist world that began in 1956 and accelerated with the Sino-Soviet split is continuing apace. While the communist parties of Western Europe once looked to Moscow for direction in both foreign and domestic matters, increasingly they look to themselves and to each other for direction. As the PCI-PCF common declaration published on November
18, 1975, and the two parties' independent stance at the Twenty-Fifth CPSU Congress indicate, polycentrism has become a reality in Western Europe.

Secondly, with the passing of older communist militants who were socialized politically during an age of Soviet-directed internationalism, the ranks of the Western parties are becoming dominated by individuals more attuned to Italian or British or Swedish issues rather than Soviet issues. Also, with the emergence of a more highly educated, technically-oriented working class, communist parties will be compelled to speak to their concerns to secure their votes. Consequently, international communism is being replaced by a national communism throughout Western Europe.

Thirdly, nothing breeds imitation quite like success and the electoral success of the pragmatically-oriented parties of Italy, Iceland, and Sweden is bound to foster imitation elsewhere. Indeed, the French and Swiss parties have moved to more progressive positions in recent years at least partially in response to the success of their Italian comrades and the Norwegian Party has tried to duplicate at least some of the positions of its neighbor party in Sweden.

Finally, new leaders are emerging more attuned to national, domestic issues and to the institutional needs of their own parties rather than the foreign policy re-
quirements of the Soviet Union. International autonomy
is good politics domestically and increasingly, the com-
munist leaders of Western Europe are looking to the political
interests of their own parties rather than those of the
Soviet Union. Dominique Urbani is an anachronism as younger
men such as Georges Marchais and Berlinguer accede to
power.

What these changes are leading to is the growth and
extension (because it already has emerged) not of a re-
cycled social democracy, but of something new in Western
Europe--national communism. It is a communism that looks
more to domestic conditions than Soviet interests in
shaping its policies and it is a communism that is loosely
dogmatic, proposing radical democratic reforms rather than
revolutionary solutions.

In its international postures, Western European com-
munism is moving out of the shadow of Soviet foreign pol-
icy. Although the communist parties of Western Europe
generally continue friendly relations with Moscow, the
time is fast passing when Soviet interests could dictate
domestic policies and when the Soviets could count on the
Western parties for uncritical support of their foreign
policies. What is more, the changes now at work in West-
ern Europe and in the communist world can only further
this trend. While it is unlikely that any of the Western
parties will adopt an anti-Moscow posture such as the
Albanians have, it is very likely that more and more the Western parties will assert their independence and autonomy.

This does not mean, of course, that Western European communist parties will become pro-United States or pro-NATO. Although, following the lead of the Italians, the Western parties will increasingly come to terms with the realities of Western European politics—the Common Market in particular—their attacks on American foreign policy are not likely to abate. Looser ties to the East do not mean stronger ties to the West, at least not to the United States.

The ties that will be stronger are domestic ones. With Czechoslovakia in 1968, most Western parties determined that their domestic political interests were more important than Soviet foreign policy interests. With the changes in the Western parties and in the international movement that we have outlined, the Western party leaders increasingly will look to the institutional interests, especially electoral interests, of their own parties rather than Soviet international interests in determining their parties' postures.

Domestically, the Western parties are evolving toward less dogmatic positions. With changes in the membership and electorate (both generational changes and increasing heterogeneity in many parties), parties will continue
and extend their pattern of calling for radical democratic and social reform within the parliamentary system. The Western parties will continue to endorse genuinely radical reforms—not the radicalism of the ultra-left parties that call for a Marxian transformation of society outside of the parliamentary process—but a radicalism that has become enrooted in the parliamentary process.

Western European communism is the offspring of two ill-sorted partners—European parliamentary socialism and Russian Bolshevism. After some early growing pains, it was Bolshevik in organization, Russian in foreign policy, and, in domestic policies, Marxian and generally parliamentary. After more than fifty years, Western European communism has matured, but it is still much the product of its heritage. Organizationally, it is developing a style of its own in much of Europe, but it still reflects its bolshevik background. Internationally, it is increasingly asserting its own interests rather than looking abroad for direction. Domestically, it has revised revolutionary Marxism and adapted it to the parliamentary process calling for radical social and economic reform, but within the democratic political system.
Notes


9 Upton, op. cit., 351.


APPENDIX

Size and Electoral Strength
of Western European Communist Parties
1. Austrian Parliamentary Election Results (Nationalrat)

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### Estimated Membership, Danish Communist Party (DKP)

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5. French Parliamentary Election Results (Chamber)

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<th>Total seats</th>
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<td>9.8</td>
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<td>522</td>
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<td>146</td>
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<td>28.6</td>
<td>166</td>
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* = constituent assembly

Sources: Mackie and Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History; Yearbook on International Communist Affairs.

Estimated Membership, French Communist Party (PCF)

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<td>275,000</td>
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Sources: Annie Kriegl, The French Communists: Profile of a People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; and World Strength of Communist Party Organizations.
6. West German Parliamentary Election Results (Reichstag)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election date</th>
<th>KPD %</th>
<th>Seats won</th>
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<td>491</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>577</td>
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<td>89</td>
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<td>6 Nov 1932</td>
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<td>402</td>
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<td>17 Sep 1961</td>
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<td>19 Sep 1965</td>
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Source: Mackie and Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*.

Estimated Membership, German Communist Party (DKP)

- 1962 - 35,000
- 1967 - 7,000
- 1968 - 7,000
- 1969 - 7,000
- 1971 - 22,500
- 1972 - 33,400
- 1973 - 35,000
- 1974 - 40,000

Sources: *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, World Strength of Communist Party Organizations*. 
7. Icelandic Parliamentary Election Results (Althing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election date</th>
<th>PA %</th>
<th>Seats won</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
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<td>5 Jul 1940</td>
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<td>18 Oct 1942</td>
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<td>23 Oct 1949</td>
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Sources: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; Mackie and Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History.

Estimated Membership, Icelandic Communist Party (PA)

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Sources: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; Sworakowski, World Communism; World Strength of Communist Party Organizations; Lazitch, Les partis communistes.
8. Italian Parliamentary Election Results (Chamber)

<table>
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<th>Total seats</th>
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* = in coalition with Socialist Party

Source: Mackie and Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History.

Estimated Membership, Italian Communist Party (PCI)

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Sources: World Strength of Communist Party Organizations; Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
9. Luxembourg Parliamentary Election Results (Assembly)

<table>
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Sources: Mackie and Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History; Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. * = partial election

Estimated Membership, Communist Party of Luxembourg (PCL)

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<td>1974</td>
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<td>1968</td>
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Sources: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; Sworakowski, World Communism; World Strength of Communist Party Organizations; Lazitch, Les partis communistes.
10. Dutch Parliamentary Election Results (Lower House)

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<td>3 Jul 1929</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>26 May 1937</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>17 May 1946</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>150</td>
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Source: Mackie and Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*.

Estimated Membership, Dutch Communist Party (CPN)

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11. Norwegian Parliamentary Election Results (Storting)

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<td>11</td>
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* = Total for Socialist Electoral Alliance

Sources: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; Mackie and Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History.

Estimated Membership, Norwegian Communist Party (NKP)

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<td>1974</td>
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Sources: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs; World Strength of Communist Party Organizations; Lazitch, Les partis communistes.
12. Swedish Parliamentary Election Results (Riksdag)

<table>
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Sources: *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*; Mackie and Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*.

Estimated Membership, Swedish Communist Party (VPK)

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<td>1939</td>
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13. Swiss Parliamentary Election Results (Lower House)

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Estimated Membership, Swiss Communist Party (PdA)

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<td>1962</td>
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### 14. British Parliamentary Election Results (Commons)

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Sources: Mackie and Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History: Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*.

### Estimated Membership, British Communist Party (CPGB)

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A. General

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_New York Times_

_Times of London_

_World Marxist Review_

B. Communist Party Publications

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   _Volksstimme, Weg und Ziel_

2. Belgium
   _La Drapeau Rouge, Cahiers Marxistes_

3. Denmark
   _Land og Folk_

4. Finland
   _Kansan Uutiset, Kommunisti_

5. France
   _L'Humanité, France Nouvelle, Cahiers de communisme_

6. Great Britain
   _Morning Star (nee Daily Worker)_

7. Iceland
   _Thjodviljinn_

8. Ireland
   _Unity_

9. Italy
   _L'Unità, Rinascita_

10. Luxembourg
    _Zeitung_

11. Netherlands
    _De Waarheid_
12. Norway
   Friheten

13. Sweden
   Ny Dag

14. Switzerland
   La Voix Durviere

15. West Germany
   Unsere Zeit

II. Articles and Books.

A. General


[Note: The reference text is not provided in the image.]


B. Austria


C. Belgium


D. Denmark


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_____ and Onni Rantala, "Current Election Studies in Finland," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, II (1967).


F. France


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H. Iceland


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I. Ireland


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J. Italy


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*The Italian Communist Party Since 1945: Grandeur and Servitudes of a European Socialist Strategy*. Occasional Publication no. 2 of the University of Reading Graduate School of Contemporary European Studies. Reading: University of Reading, 1970.

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——. "National Communism versus the National Way to Communism: An Italian Interpretation," Western Political Quarterly, II (Sept., 1958), 660-672.


J. Luxembourg


K. Netherlands


L. Norway


M. Sweden


N. West Germany

