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THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTEREST GROUPS:
THE CASE OF COLOMBIA

by

Andrés Moreno

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis Director's Signature:

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April 1976
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CHAPTER I

A RESEARCH DESIGN

This study analyzes the Colombian pressure group system. It reports the findings and conclusions of a research project designed to test a set of relationships between variables depicting organizational structure, and a number of political processes involved in the interaction of interest groups and government, and in particular indirect tactics of influence, the organizations' ability to promote access to the public sector, and effectiveness in influencing public policy. The independent variables measure structural configuration, both social and physical. Three intra-organizational dimensions are explored: administrative centralization and span of control indicating hierarchical structure, size and dispersion indicating physical structure, and technological sophistication and specialization of tasks indicating levels of structural complexity. Additional independent factors of either environmental or developmental nature will be occasionally introduced in the discussion, but only to provide a broader context of analysis. We are aware that limiting ourselves to organizational variables will preclude us from either building a comprehensive model of the deter-
ominants of styles of influence and levels of performance, or even from tracing the sequences and causes of the formation of organizational structure.

These limitations, in a sense, make this paper somewhat different from the main stream of research in the field. Breaking with the Weberian sociological tradition which emphasized organizational structure, the bulk of recent analysis of political organization in the comparative field has focussed upon environmental variables, and in particular societal structure, political culture, and developmental circumstances. Leon Epstein's work on parties in the industrialized nations of the West epitomizes this shift of level of analysis: he implicitly contradicts Duverger's theory about the role of power distributions in party management, the significance of existing links among the various components of the party structure, and the importance of internal structural arrangements, i.e. caucuses, branches, and cells, upon the configuration of the party system, and in particular the number of parties, their size, location, etc. Instead, he hypothesizes that lines of social division (religion, race, ethnicity, etc.), the level of central-

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ization of the State apparatus (central versus federal), and the timing of the enlargement of the suffrage are the best predictors of the number of parties and other features of the party system. This same trend is predominant in the work of other political scientists as well: Lipset and Rokkan give great emphasis to the expressive, instrumental, and representative functions of political organizations. These, they argue, are tools for the translation of contrasts, strains, and cleavages in the societal and cultural structures into pressures for action or inaction. Sartori creates a matrix in which the combination of various variables portraying polarization and the level of pluralism present in the societal system determines the structural formats of entire networks of political organizations. Other scholars have tried to link the emergence and evolution of political institutions to developmental crises. La Palombara and Weiner contend that social pressures for expanded integration, participation, and legitimacy, give rise to increasingly organized parties and pressure groups, especially when cliques and individuals can no longer perform such functions.

Pressure group theorists have concentrated their efforts on trying to trace how pressure group systems have evolved both in terms of their structure and outputs within a political environment that is conceived as the main
initiating force.\textsuperscript{3} Eckstein argues that both the channels of action upon which groups concentrate, and the character of their relations with governmental organs are mainly determined by the structure of the decision making process and the distribution of power within the governmental apparatus. He attributes, however, some explanatory value to a few internal structural factors, such as centralization of authority: he notes, for example, that the propensity of the members of British voluntary associations to delegate inordinately wide powers to leaders and spokesmen is definitely related to performance, although in the end he views structure as a reflection of the governmental bodies which groups seek to influence. An equally modest role is reserved to organizational structure in La Palombara's seminal work on Italian groups, in Schmitter's comprehensive analysis of Brazilian associations, and in Almond's comparative framework. "It will not be necessary to try to specify the ways in which the groups surveyed differ in their formal organizational structures. Such differences often appear to be slight and of no apparent

importance," declares La Palombara.\(^4\) The social and economic context, the political culture, and the structure of government are given primacy. Schmitter's book is organized along similar lines, although he introduces developmental variables for the first time in this type of analysis. He attempts, among other things, to demonstrate how various dimensions of development, including industrialization, urbanization, literacy, and voting participation have affected syndical and rural membership of pressure groups.\(^5\) Almond concludes in a similar vein that "a good research job on interest groups . . . must examine the interest group system in its relations with the social structure and culture, on the one hand, and the other parts of the political structure on the other."\(^6\) In another context, Huntington referring to a common variety of political influence by an institutional pressure group, namely military intervention by the armed forces of developing nations, sums up what could generically


be labeled the "environmentalist" approach to interest group research: "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society."\(^7\)

In the context of Latin American politics, there has been the tendency to link social class with the modalities of penetration practiced by different categories of pressure groups and their ability to influence the political process. Néstor Campiglia, a student of Uruguayan interest groups, suggests that social stratification and social mobility are the two main factors determining access. When the social class of public officials corresponds to the group's predominant social origin, claims Campiglia, no problems of communication with government can arise.\(^8\) In a similar vein, Carlos Astiz rejects Almond's well-known typology of interest groups as inapplicable to Latin America where chronic interclass struggles and tensions make it necessary to distinguish

\(^7\)Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 194.

primarily between upper, middle, and lower-class representative associations.\textsuperscript{9}

Environmental analysis lends itself to intriguing arguments, but so far has lacked two key ingredients of a productive theory: first, despite the pervasive use of illustrations as a documenting device, little hypothesis testing has been done, making it difficult to fully transcend the impressionist stage of analysis. This problem has arisen from difficulties in operationalizing global concepts, the reluctance to intermix quantitative techniques with qualitative analysis, and to a lesser extent the inexistence of appropriate data. With regard to pressure organizations, few analysts have attempted to operationalize significant concepts. Schmitter's attempt at measuring access and influence of interest groups in Brazilian politics is one of few efforts in that direction worth mentioning. His tack consisted in extending concepts from previous research in the field of international integration and applying the reputational approach to the measurement of influence. He also applied quantitative methods of research, and in particular longitudinal cor-\textsuperscript{9}

relation analysis, in an attempt to assess the effect of developmental factors upon the growth of the interest group network in Brazil.

The comparative analysis of political organizations has lacked applicability in a practical social context. At some point, scientific findings must be converted into a functional body of knowledge, a technology that can guide both the creation of repertoires of action and the adoption of policy alternatives in real situations. Little or nothing has been said by environmentalism about how pressure groups should be managed or will evolve under the influence of global pressures. We have been told that development will inevitably take place in many backward societies, or that institutional decay and anomie are now occurring; but seldom has it been said when thresholds will be reached or what should specifically be done to institutions in order to make them function as expected. Forecast and policy design are the real acid tests of a theory.

Part of the problem is that analysis at the macro level obscures significant variations within the network of organizations considered. Although few have resisted the temptation of paying lip service to formal organizational features, the tendency has been toward considering pressure groups in a given network as basically alike. It has not been possible, therefore, to establish how given administrative mechanisms affect performance. Political
institutions, like business organizations, can be properly managed, or mismanaged. Often, original solutions must be devised for coping with internal and environmental problems. Pressure groups, like any other organization, need to promote loyalty and induce participants to comply with duties and obligations; they must find which procedures, operations, and routines are more productive in terms of stated goals; they have to establish stable channels of communication and insure adequate exchanges of resources with their clients and relevant portions of the environment; they must foresee institutional changes in order to avoid decay. A productive endeavor for political science in this domain could be to provide specific answers to these and other related questions. In more specific terms and concretely with regard to pressure groups, the ideal would be to provide guidelines as to the requirements involved in their daily operation, including the forecast of needs in terms of personnel, professionals, and technology; and an evaluation of expected effectiveness in penetrating and influencing potential targets, optimum strategies, and probable levels of receptiveness to the organization's actions in government circles. Moreover, decision making processes in the public sector should be dynamically analyzed in order to forecast at which stages could influence be successfully exerted. Environmental shifts, i.e. the technocratization of the State, the
expansion of popular participation, the emergence of new power contenders, should also be monitored and its effects upon organizational performance asserted. Finally, it should be determined what hierarchical configurations and distributions of power are best suited to maintain efficient functioning and at the same time minimize possible conflict among actors—and in particular affiliates, professionals, and administrators—with regard to the control of the group's decision making apparatus.

The analysis that follows is an attempt to apply concepts developed in organization theory to the analysis of pressure groups. In its more general formulation, it is intended to explore empirically how changes in internal distributions of power and hierarchical configurations, physical structure, and technological complexity, affect the political behavior of a sample of interest associations, and in particular their effectiveness in gaining access to government and influence public policy. In the process we will attempt to show, that in addition to existing typologies, it is also possible to categorize interest groups on the basis of organizational features. We will also briefly explore the tactics adopted by the associations to achieve their political goals, and in particular the use of public relations campaigns, links with political parties, patterns of inter-group alliances, and the co-optation of bureaucratic entities.
Jean Meynaud and David Truman among others have focussed upon the internal organization of pressure groups. Their emphasis, however, has been primarily upon the relative distribution of authority, and the opportunities for participation of adherents. Meynaud concludes that despite formal rules that guarantee extensive participation for all members, in fact apathy and control from the top of the hierarchy characterize the operation of representative associations in France.\(^{10}\) His argument, of course, is reminiscent of Michels' belief that the tactical and technical necessities which result from the consolidation of every political aggregate will contribute to the formation of independent goals, which will be pursued by an oligarchic leadership for the benefit of a restricted bureaucratic circle.\(^{11}\) Truman focusses upon the same phenomenon in American interest associations. He concludes that despite democratic expectations by the society in general and formal arrangements within the organization for the maintenance of democratic management procedures,


an active minority possesses the largest share of power. He views the managerial skills and the knowledge about the system acquired by the active minority as the principal factors contributing to excessive concentration of power.\textsuperscript{12}

**The Parameters of Analysis**

The dependent variables are strategies of influence, and effectiveness in gaining access to governmental targets and influencing public policy. The independent variables consist of a set of structural factors representing both the social and physical arrangements prevalent within pressure organizations, and in particular power distributions, vertical span of control, horizontal differentiation, technological sophistication, physical size, and territorial dispersion. Twenty seven empirical indicators of the dimensions described above were developed, and measurements collected for a final cross-section of fifteen pressure groups in two major Colombian cities, Bogotá and Medellín. Actually more than twenty headquarters of representative associations were visited, but one fifth of the sample was dropped during the statistical portion of data processing. Difficulties in pursuing

interrupted interviews, and intentionally vague responses by some organization officials made it impossible to gather a processable twenty case data matrix.

The sampling procedure consisted, first, in an attempt to delineate a workable population of interest groups in Colombia. Admittedly, this task was performed somewhat arbitrarily. Indeed, the identification of the universe of interest groups in any given society creates almost unsurmountable theoretical and practical problems. The boundaries of the notion of group are elusive and difficult to grasp conceptually. In its more general formulation, the concept of group can be extended to almost any kind of stabilized, shared, non-random interaction. As Bentley has pointed out, men came together because of a common activity which produced a mass of purposeful action or a group.13 As Latham has indicated, the chief social values cherished by individuals in modern society are realized through groups: the whole structure of society is associational.14

It seemed that the most appropriate procedure to delineate a population of interest associations from which


sampling units could be selected was not to attempt to delineate the total universe of groups, but simply to define a population on the basis of arbitrary choices from conventional sub-categories. It was decided not to consider institutional interest groups, such as political parties, the legislature, the army, the bureaucracy, and the church. These groups, although they make demands from government and often have members with special responsibility for lobbying, are not primarily concerned with interest articulation and aggregation.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, anomic interest groups were also left out of the sample for technical reasons: the episodic character of their existence and lack of durable structural components eliminates for all practical purposes the possibility of collecting data related to social and physical structure. Finally, within the category of associational groups—which includes labor unions, chambers of commerce and business associations, ethnic associations, associations organized by religious denominations, and civic groups\textsuperscript{16}—we chose to focus upon organized urban and rural labor (and in particular the major confederations and some federations), and business groups related both to industry and agriculture.


\textsuperscript{16}Ibid, p. 77.
Labor unions and business groups in Colombia are usually more than groups; they tend to be among the better organized collectives in the political system. They are structured bodies designed to channel specific demands toward government and achieve explicit objectives that are part of the broader political and social processes. Interaction within these organizations is formalized and routinized: it involves "the acceptance by the participants of a particular division of labor--forms of leadership, distributions and responsibility, and methods of determining policy." Formalization, however, is not only an internal phenomenon, but it has also been extended to the organization's exchanges with its environment; in many cases, regularized and legalized procedures have been established between interest associations and their affiliates to insure a stable flow of resources. A similar phenomenon has generally taken place with regard to interaction with the public sector, where there is an expectation of political intervention on the part of the associations. Finally, pressure organizations have developed memory devices, in the form of files and records, which

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17 This definition has been adapted from the general definition of formal organizations by Koya Azumi and Jerald Hage, *Organizational Systems: A Text-Reader in the Sociology of Organizations* (Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath, 1972), p. 7.

will help them to evaluate future alternatives on the basis of past performance.

The second step in the sampling procedure consisted in passing from the population in general to a concrete sampling frame. Two recent lists of business groups were located: one had been compiled by the National Association of Manufacturers (ANDI),\textsuperscript{19} the other by the National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF).\textsuperscript{20} According to ANDI's figures there were, in 1975, eighty business groups in Colombia; ANIF's data which had been collected at the end of the same year identified 124. With regard to labor, it was decided to attempt to visit all four confederations of urban workers—whose identification of course posed no problems—and the major peasant associations, which were identified with the help of the Ministry of Agriculture. No effort was made to gather data about the local unions themselves.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19}Asociación Nacional de Industriales, "Lista de Gremios de la Producción," Medellín, n.d. (Mimeographed.)

\textsuperscript{20}Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras, no title, Bogotá, n.d. (Mimeographed.)

\textsuperscript{21}According to one author there were in Colombia, in January, 1973, 684 unions in the agricultural sector, 67 in the mining sector, and 1,051 in the manufacturing sector. Source: Jaime Tenjo, "Monografía sobre Sindicatos y Salarios," Bogotá, 1973. (Mimeographed.)
Individual observation units were selected on the basis of two different criteria: the intensity of the group's political activity, and the possibilities of access offered by each group. An effort was made to exclude from the sample interest groups which did not appear to interact actively with the public sector. The importance of the organizations' political role was assessed on the basis of their reputation among a number of political figures and other elites, informally contacted. The final sample is quite representative since it comprises approximately twenty or twenty-five percent of the universe of business groups, depending upon which figures are used as the percentage base; and most labor confederations. It is also representative in the sense that it includes a great variety of different groups: workers and peasants' confederations, associations of financial institutions, manufacturers, merchants, farmers, cattle growers, etc. are part of the sample.

The selection of Colombia as the setting for the research was due to a combination of factors, among which its level of political and economic development is most important. The pressure group network is characterized by the coexistence of loosely-organized interest groups; heavily bureaucratized associations; and typically modern, post-Weberian, pressure organizations. This richness of structural formats that only nations at intermediate
stages of development seem to have is an invaluable asset for this type of research because it allows the analyst to observe vividly how different organization systems respond and adapt to the political environment in which they function. The nature of the political environment is also an important consideration: Colombia has been described as a near-polyarchy, which is a type of political system that not only allows the opportunity to formulate and signify preferences but also provides institutionalized mechanisms for participation. The analysis that follows will provide evidence about how and to what extent interest associations participate in the formulation of public policy.

Other considerations were also taken into account, among which strong possibilities of access to organization top officials, and the status of existing research on the subject are most important. If research on pressure groups has tended to become less attractive in recent years, it is certainly not because these organizations lack important political roles, or have been so thoroughly examined that further research is unwarranted; but because in many cases, a critical aspect of their relations with the environment is to engage in strategies that encourage

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insulation and secrecy. To our knowledge, relatively little scientific evidence, even of a descriptive nature, has been gathered specifically about pressure group behavior in Colombian politics; although significantly more material has been produced about the role of institutions such as the church or the military in government decision making.  

The methodology we have adopted is primarily quantitative. A great deal of attention was given to the statistical properties of indicators. Nineteen out of the twenty seven variables are at least interval measures (usually ratio); most of the remaining being ordinal. Of course, this is encouraging because it implies that parametric statistics--mostly correlation and multiple regression--can be used for hypothesis testing. In addition, we tried to minimize both measurement and stochastic error

by selecting indicators collectible from records, financial statements, reports from boards of directors, and conclusions from congresses. This way, reliability and reproducibility are greatly improved. Other data, such as evaluations of number of visits per year to government officials, for example, was gathered by personal interviewing, always conducted by the author. Interviews lasted an average of four hours; the maximum being six-hour sessions during two or three days. Interviewed officials were always at the top of the organization's hierarchy; they were either members of the board of directors, presidents, vice presidents, general managers, or secretaries general.

From an analytical standpoint, there has been a strong tendency among analysts of interest group behavior to operate at a level of analysis higher than the organization, concentrating on interest group networks and therefore minimizing internal differences. Since we are attempting to establish how variations in the organization's structure affect patterns of influence and levels of performance, we will adopt the opposite strategy. First, instead of using culture, societal structure, and patterns of governmental decision making as variables, we shall assume them as contextual constants. Second, we will attempt to minimize the homogeneity within the network of pressure groups, and maximize inter-organiza-
tional variance. The unit of analysis, of course, is the organization.

The next section will consist primarily of a description of the dependent variables, namely tactics of influence, and levels of performance. Special attention will be given to some important dimensions of the concepts, a number of indicators will be discussed, and some operationalizations will be proposed.

The Dependent Variables:
Tactics of Influence and Performance of Interest Organizations

**Tactics of Influence**

The concept of political influence is broad and complex. One manner of approaching it is to consider influence as an ordinary process of communication, and divide the problem into limited areas that represent two major loci of the process namely, the channel of transmission of demands and the target of influence. The remaining locus, the emitting structure is, of course, our independent variable and will be treated separately.

First, channels of influence vary as to their orientation and degree of fluidity (see table 1). Second, at the target level, tactics differ with regard to the locus of application, both in terms of the agency concerned and the area of decision making upon which pressure is exerted.
TABLE 1

TWO DIMENSIONS OF TACTICS OF INFLUENCE
OF PRESSURE ORGANIZATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channels of Influence</th>
<th>Loci of Application</th>
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<td>Orientation: direct vs. indirect</td>
<td>Type of governmental target</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fluidity: fluid vs. structured</td>
<td>Phase of the decision process</td>
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The orientation of influence is not necessarily direct; interest groups often rely on tactics that involve indirect attempts to control certain aspects of the political process. Taking advantage of an innumerable variety of means of access to government that a number of individuals and groups have at their disposal, interest organizations substantially enlarge their own network of channels of influence (see figure 1).

Besides the potential influence that can be exerted through affiliates and members, the conspicuous attempts to manipulate public opinion via campaigns sponsored by cooperative newspapers, and the support of political parties with ideological affinities, interest organizations have developed less obvious channels of access to government. In Italy, as La Palombara has pointed out,
it is not unusual for a ministry to make an approach to another governmental agency on behalf of an important confederation; in fact, the well-known notion of clientela refers in part to the cooperative role of specific bureaucratic entities. Pressure organizations also find an invaluable source of political strength within the pressure group network itself. Truman has described various strategies that involve the use of political services and power resources of other pressure groups, usually in order to improve the visibility and significance of their demands. The two main forms of collaboration are alliances and logrolling. The alliance implies the creation of a common tactic in pursuit of a common goal; logrolling involves receiving support for purposes unrelated to the donor's objectives, and vice versa.  

The concept of fluidity defines the degree to which the most prevalent tactics of interest groups become structured. High levels of durability, rigidity, and coherence usually indicate that stable expectations have emerged, both within the organization and the public sector, as to the content of legitimate norms of interaction. Fluidity is pivotal to La Palombara's theory of interest groups.

24 Truman, Governmental Process, p. 363.
It serves as the basis for one of his major concepts, namely the notion of clientela:

... what I call the clientela relationship between interest groups and the bureaucracy illustrates and helps to understand the notion of structured access. Briefly put, the clientela relationship exists when an interest group, for whatever reasons, succeeds in becoming, in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the natural expression and representative of a given social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or reference point for the activity of the administrative agency.25

In the Brazilian case, as Schmitter has pointed out, despite the large number of autonomous agencies, the low motivation of civil servants, and the special status accorded to syndicates, there are few policy areas in which a government agency confronts a single, authoritative, pressure group. The main reason, he argues, is that most Brazilian representative associations simply have too little to offer the administration.26

With regard to Colombia, there are a variety of factors that should be considered before accepting or rejecting the existence of clientela relations. First, as Dix has pointed out, traditionally there have been in the country three powerful interest groups--the Federation of Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE), the Manufacturers Association (ANDI), and the National Federation of Merchants (FENALCO).

This suggests that there is a possibility that a limited number of organizations may have excessive articulative and aggregative powers vis à vis the bureaucracy. Second, a large portion of positions in the bureaucracy are divided equally between the two major political parties, creating the possibility that civil servants may feel obliged to grant preferential status to certain groups as a result of political alignments and ideological affinities. On the other hand, executive dominance and the heavy concentration of planning authority in a few, tightly insulated, bureaucratic organs may create obstacles for the establishment of preferential relations with regard to critical states of decision making.

Fig. 1. Channels for the Transmission of Influence Exerted by Interest Organizations
Loci of influence can be conceived at two levels: in terms of the identity of the governmental organ with which interaction occurs, and also at the level of the decision making process during which pressure is exerted. A great variety of potentially effective arenas exist in Colombia, although probably not to the same degree as in federalist systems where local governments provide additional opportunities for diffusing governmental authority. Although the system clearly leans toward executive dominance, and a great deal of decision making power has converged toward the office of the presidency, the principle of separation of powers remains sufficiently institutionalized and legitimized to allow Congress and the Supreme Court to oversee the policy making process. Also important is the fact that the executive depends upon an increasingly gigantic and dispersed bureaucracy. The emergence of a myriad of so-called decentralized institutes and semipublic agencies has given rise to internal pressures for the creation of multiple centers of authority capable of semi-autonomous planning and approval of policies. It can be expected, as Schmitter found to be the case in Brazil, that representative associations find it increasingly possible to appeal to a multitude of decision making centers (at least during certain phases of decision making), because of the great deal of dispersion that characterizes the policy process. Finally this network of multiple
lines of access suggests that policy goes through a variety of stages of elaboration. Among these, detection, initiation, drafting, consultation, approval, and regulation seem to be particularly applicable to our analysis (see table 2).  

Performance

While pressure group analysts have been relatively successful in analyzing patterns of influence of interest associations, the whole question of performance and success remains almost totally unexplored. References to performance are not rare, but the bulk of them focus on broad determinants of effectiveness without attempting to define the concept or clarify a significant number of still unsolved theoretical and measurement problems. Not even organization theorists have yet agreed upon a unified definition of performance, although the concept of effectiveness has slowly emerged as the primary dimension. Effectiveness has tended to become a generic variable that portrays performance with regard to a number of conceptually distinct psychological and social phenomena occurring both within the organization and with regard to exchanges with actors located in its environment. Effectiveness has been identified with productivity, morale, 

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27 Schmitter, *Interest Conflict*, p. 245.
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<thead>
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<td>Annual expenditures in public relations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Annual contributions to political parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Number of former ex-government officials hired in past years for middle-executive positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Frequency in providing government agencies with personnel and/or material never/rare/occasional/frequent/permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequency of alliances with one or more interest groups never/rare/occasional/frequent/permanent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase of the decision making process</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Detection/initiation/drafting/consultation/approval/regulation</td>
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</table>
efficiency, adaptation, etc. Effectiveness is also often utilized as a concept that embraces accomplishment with regard to organizational goals. This conception is of course closely related with the previous one, and emerges from the assumption that organizations are purposive systems that strive toward multiple, simultaneous, usually conflictive, and more or less tangible objectives. As Perrow points out: "organizations are established to do something; they perform work directed toward some end. We must examine the end or goal if we are to analyze organizational behavior." 28

As to effectiveness in a purely organizational context, two major conceptions have emerged: the goal view and the system resource approach. James Price, a strong defender of the former, equates effectiveness with levels of goal attainment. In contrast, Katz and Kahn, some of the first researchers to formalize the latter view, define it as the ability of an organization to control its supply of energetic inputs (labor, materials, and others) and insuring environmental absorption of the organizational product. 29 As one analyst has noted, regardless of the profound


divergences that in practice separate the two schools, "the notion of goal still exists in the system resource approach, but it has become implicit--the goal becomes the successful exploitation of the environment for purposes of system maintenance and growth."³⁰

In our view, three parameters must be specified before valid operationalizations can take place: the subject or the organizational actor to whom levels of effectiveness are being attributed; the object of the nature of the goal that serves as substantive frame of reference for identifying performance; and the juncture or the stage in the developmental process in which measurement is applied. First, a decision about where to set the boundaries of inclusion of subjects is problematic. An organization is essentially a tool for the attainment of goals of a number of actors. A great variety of individuals and groups at different levels, including the societal level, may serve as the basis for measuring effectiveness. The obvious question is: whose effectiveness are we trying to define? Because of the systemic nature of the organization, and in particular the interrelations that exist between actors at different levels, any analysis of global effectiveness that focusses primarily on the goals of too few subjects,

³⁰Patricia Hurley, "The Concept of Organizational Effectiveness," Rice University, 1974. (Typewritten.)
disregarding influential power contenders instrumental in the process of goal setting and goal attainment, is inadequate. When the decision of adopting the objectives of one subject as a substitute for the goals of the organization is taken--Price, for example, has proposed to focus on what the major decision makers actually pursue--it should become clear that one is no longer measuring global organizational effectiveness but a specialized dimension of a far more complex phenomenon.

A second parameter that should be specified is the closely related question of the object of performance. Even after a choice has been made as to from who's standpoint is effectiveness going to be conceived, the selection of the organizational goals to be used as points of reference still remains to be made. Disagreement as to the nature of this parameter has been one major source of disaccord between the system resource approach and the goal view. No immediate solution exists to this problem, which penetrates into the still obscure and debated domain of organizational functions. However, if the concept of effectiveness is going to have any scientific meaning at all, it cannot go alone: an organization is not effective per se, it is effective at performing some specific task or tasks. Again, measuring effectiveness in performing a given function is widely different from measuring overall effectiveness.
The third parameter is longitudinal; although goals tend to reach high levels of stability, environmental, structural, and psychological variations may force alterations in existing arrangements, usually by inducing shifts in the emphasis attributed to various categories of goals. This phenomenon has been well documented by Perrow, who, because of the emphasis that he has given to the historical character of organizations, has been able to show with particular sensitivity how, in a number of instances, organizations have felt the imperious need to redefine or abandon objectives that had been considered fundamental for significant periods of time. Our attempt to measure interest group effectiveness will start then by specifying these three parameters.

We are adopting the organizational level of analysis, avoiding any explicit attempt to establish how possible societal goals are implemented through interest groups. No analysis will be pursued as to how pressure groups may serve as instruments for the expression of individual goals originating either from class bases or from purely psychological sources. This, however, should not preclude us from using perceptions of leaders, spokesmen, and representatives of groups as supporting evidence. Furthermore, since adequate longitudinal data will not probably be available, we will not be able to trace shifts in goals over time in a meaningful fashion. However, we
will try to be as sensitive as possible to major variations in this domain.

With regard to the goals to which effectiveness will be attributed, a choice has to be made among a variety of objectives simultaneously pursued by interest groups. Perrow's typology provides a useful frame of reference for the analysis of goals in the case of representative associations.\(^{31}\) Perrow distinguishes between five categories of goals that he labels output, system, social, product, and derived. Output goals refer to the general sector of the society toward which the organizational output is directed. Interest groups interact with a number of actors, among which government and the affiliates are predominant. To that interaction correspond numerous functions, which in turn are intimately linked with output goals. Political scientists have generally concurred in assuming that the main task of pressure groups is the articulation and channeling of demands toward the public sector. The corresponding goal—what is to be achieved—is to alter government decision making and/or generate public policy regarded as advantageous to the association and its members. With regard to output oriented toward

members and affiliates, the corresponding functions and goals involve technical assistance, training and education, and a number of additional services.

System goals, as Perrow points out, refer to the state or manner of functioning of an organization, rather than to the output it produces. Pressure groups, in addition to the emphasis they may give to growth, stability, and modes of functioning, have system goals inextricably linked with their political functions. They generally emphasize the creation and maintenance of channels of access to government targets, autonomy vis-à-vis the State, and representativeness vis-à-vis their membership.

Social goals involve the fulfillment of societal needs; their referent is society in general. Objectives of this kind are of critical importance for pressure groups, which perform an ideological function and are involved in the presentation or change of the existing socio-political order; and intend to generate or maintain cultural values such as the ones inherent in the democratic creed, socialism, communism, the system of private enterprise, etc.

Product goals refer to the characteristics of the output produced. Product goals, in the context of the political behavior of pressure groups, deal with the substantive content of demands (taxation, land reform, domestic security, and so on), whether demands are narrow or universalistic, micro or macro, etc.
Derived goals refer to the uses to which the organization puts the power it generates in the pursuit of other goals. A typical example is the direct participation of some pressure groups in campaigns for public office. It should be noted that if electoral functions became predominant, the pressure group in question would change its identity. Redefinition of goals by interest organizations is not a rare phenomenon; many have become minor or even major political parties. But in all cases they have ceased to be and ceased to be labeled interest groups. As Eckstein puts it:

... Pressure group politics involves something less than an attempt by the group to become itself the government, or even to seize for itself certain political offices which are vitally concerned with its goals. That, at any rate, is how we generally differentiate pressure groups from parties, or political movements, or purely political "associations." 32

Figure 2 is a partial list of typical goals of pressure organizations. They are placed in the context of a simplified representation of the conventional flow model of the political process according to which interest groups (and other intermediary institutions) transmit and generate sector demands that later become the inputs of the governmental system. This model has the advantage of providing a political frame of reference to the previous

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32 Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics, p. 412.
Fig. 2. Principal Goals of Interest Organizations in the Context of Exchanges with the Public Sector and Affiliates
typology of pressure group goals. By locating the specific phase of the political process to which a given goal tends to correspond it becomes easier to get a clearer image of the functioning of this type of organization and of some of the links that may exist among different objectives.

In the analysis that follows we will concentrate upon two goals, namely political influence and access of pressure organizations to government targets. We will also pay some attention to product goals and social goals when we describe the content of the campaigns conducted by representative associations in Colombia. We will focus on a narrow dimension of influence; narrower than Truman's, for example, who incorporates in his definition of interest groups any attempt to make "certain claims upon other groups in the society."\(^{33}\) We shall only consider effectiveness in directly influencing public policy at various stages of its formulation, but no reference will be made to success achieved via indirect channels, or to campaigns directed at non-government targets.

An index of effectiveness will be built in the following manner: first, the organization spokesmen will be asked to identify all concrete political campaigns in which the group has been involved in recent times, both independently and in combination with other groups.

\(^{33}\)Truman, \textit{Governmental Process}, p. 33
Second, the same top officials will be asked to describe the principal features of each campaign, that is, the key modifications that were made to original projects, who initiated them, etc. Third, on the basis of these explanations, they will be asked to evaluate what percentage of what the group asked was actually granted by government, and what was included or excluded from the final version of the project. Finally, a score of influence will be built by calculating the average percentage obtained in negotiations.

In addition, we will try to establish whether or not different categories of organizations have had differing results in institutionalizing and formalizing influence. A variety of relatively stable patterns of governmental response to the campaigns of interest groups tend to emerge. They reflect the intensity of governmental compliance to the affiliates' demands. Influence is greater when government has an explicit policy of negotiating with interest organizations, virtually subjecting sizeable portions of its public policy to their veto. Intermediate levels of influence are achieved whenever a system of consultations tends to become the dominant pattern of group/government interaction. "Consultations occur when the views of the organizations are solicited and
taken into account but not considered to be in any sense decisive."\textsuperscript{34} Influence is minimal when interest groups are simply notified about governmental actions that were taken under closed doors.

Access, a system goal, corresponds to an instrumental function of pressure organizations, since the preservation and development of adequate channels of penetration are normally necessary conditions for the application of pressure, but have little political significance in themselves. Access, argues one author, "becomes the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups. The development and improvement of such access is a common denominator of the tactics of all of them."\textsuperscript{35} Access will be measured through a number of variables indicating the frequency of interaction of pressure organizations with government targets (see table 3). The targets considered are the President of the Republic, the ministries, a number of bureaucratic entities (decentralized institutes, semi-public agencies, etc.), and Congress (individual congressmen and congressional committees). Since a certain proportion of the contacts that representative associations have with the bureaucracy involve the

\textsuperscript{34} Eckstein, \textit{Pressure Group Politics}, p. 411.

\textsuperscript{35} Truman, \textit{Governmental Process}, p. 264.
<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Average percentage obtained from government in political campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Evaluation by appropriate group executives of government propensity to either negotiate, consult, or inform the organization about decisions directly involving its activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Access</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yearly frequency of interaction with the President of the Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yearly frequency of nonroutine interaction with the ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Yearly frequency of interaction with congressmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yearly frequency of interaction with congressional committees</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Yearly frequency of routine interaction with the bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yearly frequency of nonroutine interaction with the executive branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Organizational representation to boards of directors of official entities</td>
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handling of business related with specific services provided to affiliates and are not important policy matters in a political context, interaction was subdivided into two further categories: nonroutine contacts, that is those involving consultations and negotiations at top levels of the bureaucracy (ministers, vice-ministers, and directors of public entities); and routine interaction which refers to contacts and requests at lower levels.\textsuperscript{36}

The second variable measuring access is the official representation of pressure groups, indicated by the number of members representing the association in boards of directors of public entities, commissions, work groups, etc.

The Independent Variable: The Structure of Interest Organizations

As rates of industrialization, social mobility, and political participation accelerated, complex interest organizations emerged, and like any other type of organization they had to face problems of coordination, control, and direction of work flow. Finding suitable solutions for those problems implies in part imitating practices long since established in other social and political areas, and in part innovating, as a result of having to face genuinely new problems intrinsic to their specialized field of endea-

\textsuperscript{36}See table 3 for indicators of performance.
vor. Interest groups adopt through time formulas of interaction which if exhibited persistently give rise to patterns of distribution of power within the organization, and to peculiar configurations of tasks according to which positions are stratified. These two factors constitute a social structure. Parallel to social developments, physical development also occur. A physical structure is established; it is constituted primarily by the size and location of buildings and equipment, and the scale of operations. Finally, both social and physical structures vary as to the degree of internal formation or structuring. Tasks, as conceived within various organizations can be more or less complex, formalized, flexible, and standardized.

**Centralization and span of control**

As mentioned earlier, the core of a social structure is constituted by the internal distribution of power that prevails during the decision making process. Of particular importance in describing power distributions within organizations are two variables: centralization and span of control. Truman probably has given greater emphasis to centralization of control in interest groups than any other political scientist, although Meynaud, Schmitter, and Lavau, among others, have also dealt with
this question.\(^\text{37}\) Truman's analysis, which covers at least half a dozen cases, including the American Federation of Labor, the United Mine Workers of America, the American Medical Association, and the Chamber of Commerce, depicts sharply, the symptoms of centralized control characteristic of modern large-scale business organizations. One of Truman's main contributions on the subject is the description he makes of actual distributions of power in American interest organizations, which strongly contrast with formal structures that reflect, in addition to the peculiarities of the groups, attitudes that are too widely held in society to be ignored.

The attitudes themselves are vague, but they usually involve approval of such devices as periodic elections of key officials, broad participation by the membership in the group's policy making, either directly or through a system of elected representatives, written constitutions and the like. . . .

\[\ldots\]

Despite these arrangements, centralized control is rather explicitly provided for in the or-

ganization. The board of directors, which has "full authority to effectuate the purposes and policies of the association" exercises the most extensive powers. It elects the president of the organization, chooses its own chairman (by custom the past president), and appoints an executive committee of about two dozen. . . .

The concept of centralization as we are conceiving it is more inclusive than Truman's. Instead of focusing upon the elective or appointive powers of certain individuals and groups, we want to include also a decisional dimension which deals with the daily administration of the organization. This is why we selected a more general definition of centralization:

Centralization is the degree to which power is concentrated in a social system. In an organization, for example, the maximum degree of centralization would exist if all the power was exercised by a single individual; conversely, the minimum degree of centralization would exist if all the power was exercised equally by all the members of the organization. 39

Although a definition of centralization as the degree of concentration of power has a great deal of face validity, such an approach is far from being universally adopted. Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, and Turner, for example, have conceived it instead in terms of the locus of decision making. They argue that the last person whose assent must be

38 Truman, Governmental Process, pp. 129 and 137.
obtained before legitimate action is taken will identify the level in the hierarchy where executive action would be authorized, and therefore will also describe how centralized the organization is.\(^{40}\) We believe that such an inference is partially unwarranted because it focusses principally on one aspect of decision making, namely that of "authorizing," and neglects less formal sources of power such as those held by technicians and other lower participants who frequently "obtain, maintain, and control access to persons, information and instrumentalities."\(^{41}\) But more important is the fact that even assuming that authorizing is very close to actually deciding, the identification of the various locations where a number of categories of decisions are taken is only a first step in determining how centralized power really is.

At the empirical level, centralization has proved to be difficult to measure. Aiken and Hage, Pugh et al., Williams et al., etc. have collected their data by means of questionnaires and interviews relying on perceptions of power by managers, department heads, supervisors, etc.


as being reliable indicators of centralization.\textsuperscript{42} The reliability of the control graph and other indexes and scales of influence of this type cannot be denied a priori, as many opponents of reputational methods pretend. It varies significantly, depending on sampling procedures and the psychological atmosphere that prevails during measurement. If researchers are forcing their access, if struggles for power are taking place, or discontent resulting from either autocratic rule or lack of leadership prevail within the organization, the likelihood is high that actor perceptions will be biased. In order to avoid some of the complications inherent in this approach, some researchers have shifted to behavioral indicators. Whisler has used ratios based on monetary compensation paid by companies to their employees as indicators of effective influence; Blau found that multiple levels in a hierarchy are associated with decentralization, suggesting that the former could be used as an indirect indicator of the latter.\textsuperscript{43} This takes us to span of control, the second key variable in social structure.

\textsuperscript{42}Lawrence K. Williams, Richard L. Hoffman, and Floyd Mann, "An Investigation of the Control Graph: Influence in a Staff Organization," \textit{Social Forces} 37 (March 1959), pp. 189-95.

Span of control is the number of units (departments, sections, etc.) and/or individuals subordinated to a chief executive. Span of control can be either vertical or horizontal; the former is simply the number of levels in a structure of power, the latter is "the number of members managed by the average administrator."44 This notion has been popular in organization theory for two reasons: first, there are no great difficulties in counting levels; the notion is so straightforward that its quantification is far simpler than that of equivalent concepts. Second, span of control, which by itself has little political significance, has been repeatedly used as an indirect measure of concentration of power.45 The problem is that while few doubt the existence of both a substantial and statistical association between the two, there is still no complete agreement as to its direction.46


In addition to span of control, distributions of power are indicated by the following items: first, the percentage of decisions in eleven areas (see table 4) taken by the chief executive (president or general manager or executive committee). Second, the percentage of decisions that are taken at lower echelons without prior consultation with the chief executive. Third, the percentage of decisions that are taken or that must be ratified by committees and/or other higher councils or by the membership at large through elections or referendums. Although no guidelines have yet been established for specifying the items of decision making in interest groups to be used as referents for an index of centralization, the work of Bakke and Pugh et al., which contains a description of activities typical of organizations in general, has considerable utility in orienting us in the designation of general areas of decision making directly applicable to representative associations.47

The physical structure: size and dispersion

Size is the dimension of the physical components of the organization. Price defines it as "the scale of oper-

ations in a social system."\textsuperscript{48} This operationalization does not capture the phenomenon as a whole because it does not take into account that a very large organization may be operating transitorily or permanently at a scale well below its actual capacity. The two concepts, of course, are conceptually related but nevertheless distinct. We propose the following three indicators: the number of executive personnel as described in the official payroll print-out;\textsuperscript{49} the amount of total assets;\textsuperscript{50} and the amount of total yearly expenditures, which taps the actual scale of operations.

Merton's definition of dispersion (sometimes called ecology), namely "the degree to which the membership of a social system is spatially distributed"\textsuperscript{51} is similar to the one that Price and others have adopted. The number of operating sites is, under normal circumstances, and appro-


appropriate indicator. One should nevertheless, as Price points out, be aware of the fact "that an organization could have many sites, but still have nearly all its members located at a single site."  

**TABLE 4**

**FUNDAMENTAL AREAS OF DECISION MAKING IN PRESSURE ORGANIZATIONS**

- a. Producing the budget
- b. Selection of political tactics
- c. Appointment of officers and staff
- d. Promotions of officers
- e. Dismissal of personnel
- f. Expenditure of unbudgeted money
- g. Specification of job procedures
- h. Creation of a new position and/or department
- i. Taking disciplinary measures against non-compliant members
- j. Initiating political campaigns
- k. Authorizing the release of public statements

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Structural formation: complexity and specialization

Complexity, a likely by-product of structural evolution, can be conceived in terms of the formation of both physical and social structures. We are dealing primarily with two dimensions of complexity, namely technological sophistication and horizontal differentiation. Technical complexity, a most critical variable in the process of goal attainment of interest organizations, is considered in this analysis only from a human standpoint, leaving aside the entire question of mechanization. The indicators are the number of professionals with university degree employed by each interest group, and the yearly number of technical studies produced for organization use by its technical staff or subcontractors. Horizontal differentiation is indicated by the number of sections in the largest vertical layer. If the structure of a given organization was a perfect pyramid, for example, the number of departments at its base would then be the measure of horizontal differentiation (see table 5).

Other Relationships

Conceiving variables as dependent or independent performs useful analytical functions; it provides a general frame of reference about what kind of relationships are central to the analysis, and indicates that there is a theoretical expectation about a given direction of causal-
<table>
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<td>Centralization</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Percentage of decisions in eleven areas that are taken at lower echelons without prior consultation with the chief executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Percentage of decisions in eleven areas that are taken by the chief executive without prior consultation with the board or directors and/or other higher councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Percentage of decisions that must be ratified by committees and/or by the membership at large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Span of control</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Vertical; the number of levels in the structure of power</td>
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<td>Physical</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Number of executive personnel as described in the official payroll printout</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Number of non-executive personnel</td>
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<td>Variable</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Assets</td>
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<td>Dispersion</td>
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<td>Total yearly expenditures (scale of operations)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Number of operation sites</td>
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<td>Structuring</td>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Number of specialists with university degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuring</td>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Yearly number of technical studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuring</td>
<td>Specialization</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Horizontal differentiation: the number of sections in the largest vertical layer</td>
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ity with regard to the phenomena under consideration. Although the main objective of this project is to explore the effect of organizational structure upon the effectiveness of representative associations to penetrate government and influence public policy, there are significant theoretical reasons for not limiting the analysis exclusively to relationships between dependent and independent variables.

Interrelations among dependent variables are important. It can be expected, as most analysts of interest groups have noted, that there is a substantively important link between the ability to penetrate government and effectiveness in influencing its policy output. Furthermore, the analysis of correlations between frequencies of interaction with various targets will provide additional evidence as to why different categories of representative associations maintain open their channels of communication with given public entities and not with others; indirect tactics, such as alliances with other pressure groups and public relations campaigns are probably also related to performance.

It would also be inappropriate from a conceptual standpoint to view organizational structure--the independent variable--in terms of its structural components in isolation. The notion of structure refers to the interrelation of parts in a complex entity, which conceptually
is substantially more than the parts themselves. We are conceiving organizations, not as random social and physical formations, but as coherent networks of elements interrelated in such a way that changes in one variable bring about modifications in the other variables. The following chapter, an analysis of structure in Colombian pressure organizations, is an effort to examine how the different structural components of interest groups covary; and whether or not distinct structural arrangements have emerged.
CHAPTER II

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF PRESSURE ORGANIZATIONS

Paradoxically, although a significant amount of knowledge has been accumulated about structural configurations in bureaucracies, political parties, military establishments, etc., relatively little is known about the internal structure of pressure groups. Such knowledge is important in the analysis of the political behavior of this type of organization because acquired patterns--and in particular power distributions, size, and complexity--restrict and regulate the perception and meaning of inputs originating in the environment; the adoption of programs, standards, and procedures, necessary to process the workflow; and the choice of alternatives and courses of action in every domain. Social and physical structure are in part a reflection of the manner in which a number of tensions and dilemmas arising both internally and in the environment have been faced, stabilized, and/or solved by the members of a group. In the case of representative associations, significant variations in terms of the emphasis given to various functions (political representation, ideological indoctrination, regulation of conflict...
among affiliates, technical services, and so on), the
nature of the affiliates socio-economic activity (indus-
try, commerce, agriculture, labor, etc.), the level of
control exerted by the membership, and the degree of
ideological affinity with successive political regimes,
are some of many factors that make it unlikely that pres-
sure groups could develop similar structural configura-
tions.

The analysis that follows is a description of
measures of dispersion and central tendency for a dozen
indicators of structure of pressure groups in Colombia.
We will also examine a number of statistical associations
between structural components, in order to determine em-
pirically how and to what extent these are interrelated.
Implicitly or explicitly many organization theorists
have made systemic assumptions about the configuration of
internal components of complex organizations, but the em-
pirical link has been somewhat elusive. In particular,
it is not exactly known how the distribution of authority
is related to either complexity and technological sophis-
tication, or whether or not functional relationships estab-
lished in one context apply to the other kinds of orga-
nizations. Pugh et al. found empirical evidence that
tends to support the hypothesis of an association between
centralization and complexity. Thompson's hypothesis
about the presence of conflict between specialists
and administrators has been partially substantiated by Hage, Blau and Scott, and others.\textsuperscript{54} Also important is the relationship between vertical span and centralization. Meyer, and Blau, among others, have introduced empirical evidence that tends to support the idea that the existence of few levels in the hierarchy—equivalent to wide span of control—is associated with decentralization and flexibility of response.\textsuperscript{55} The relationship between physical configuration and social structure also deserves attention, and in particular whether or not larger organizations tend to be more decentralized and complex than smaller ones.

Finally, on the basis of obtained statistical covariations among variables indicating structure, and further analysis of the distribution of absolute scores of structural components in the sample, we will delineate a number of categories of representative associations in Colombia.

Centralization

The picture that emerges from the statistical analysis of Colombian pressure organizations, in terms of


internal distributions of power, is rather clear: as figure 3 indicates, only an average of eleven percent of the decisions in eleven decision making areas (see table 4) are taken at lower echelons without prior consultation with the chief executive. The remaining decisions are shared between the chief executive on the one hand, and boards of directors (and other high councils such as general assemblies) on the other. Power, however, is heavily concentrated in the chief executive's office, where close to seventy five percent of all the decisions are taken; while ratification by boards of directors, general assemblies, etc., involves close to thirty percent.

This type of distribution of power could be expected to characterize Colombian pressure groups, because they have been traditionally presidential systems: typically, general policy is designed by a national directive council of which the group's president is a member. The daily application of these policies is carried out by the president himself, who normally has a great deal of autonomy during all execution phases. The board of directors has a counseling function. Since board members are usually in prominent positions in their respective communities,

56 Figure 3 should be read as follows: the numbers in the top row indicate the maximum value recorded for each variable; the numbers on top of the striped bars represent the average value of the corresponding variable, for the organizations in the sample.
Fig. 3. Structural Profile of a Hypothetical Average Pressure Organization in Colombia

a= maximum values  
b= minimum values
and possess a great deal of fresh information about the general functioning of the environment and the political system at various levels, they are in position to evaluate the impact of political tactics with great ease and accuracy. In addition, they formally represent the interests of affiliates: those of federations and unions in the case of labor; and departmental committees, associations, and firms in the case of the private sector.

The president uses the board as a source of support. Many of his decisions are bound to be controversial, and therefore, a test of acceptance at the membership level may be critical to avoid endangering his own position as a leader. The fact that the primary mechanism of control exerted by affiliates upon the internal functioning of representative associations is generally a board elected by a congress, of which only the president (or a restricted executive committee) is normally a member, tends to greatly increase his leverage among middle-level participants and professionals in the context of daily management, and indirectly contributes to centralization. Being a power broker and possessing the majority of the information about the expectations of affiliates in terms of political demands and the strategies to their implementation, considerably increases the president's administrative power. Furthermore, membership representatives tend to insist that their policies be carried out effec-
tively and authoritatively, thereby tending to discourage decentralization. They are reluctant to accept possible mistakes, or any sort of interference by middle-level executives; in their eyes, only the president counts. In general, middle-level officials are regarded as administrative pawns with service functions only. In other words, they are not supposed to interact with top government officials, or notables from represented sectors. This administrative pattern is reinforced by factors that will be analyzed later, such as levels of structural complexity and technological development inside the organization.

Methods of selection of chief executives also contribute to presidentialism. Presidents, general managers, and executive committees are formally selected by congresses that meet once every two or three years. In the Federation of Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE), the National Congress of Coffee Growers elects the general manager of the federation on the basis of three candidates selected by a national committee composed of eleven members among which five are ministers and represent government, and six are elected by the congress itself. At ANDI, the Manufacturers' Association, the presidents and vice-presidents of the branches are members of a general council (Junta de Dirección General) and elect the president of the association. In the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC), the
election of the executive committee is a two stage process: a congress elects the members of the National Board of Directors, which a week later selects the president, vice president, and the remaining members of the executive committee.

In all three cases, despite apparent opportunities for extensive participation of the membership at large in the election process, the role of these congresses is more or less ritual and the outcome is rarely surprising.**57** Bargaining among a few powerful contenders--large affiliated firms, highly representative unions, prestigious leaders, etc.--tends to become the predominant feature. The result is that chief executives usually enjoy considerable support and rarely base their administrative actions upon weak coalitions.

Recruitment criteria of the associations' presidents also have an effect upon internal distributions of power and the administrative predominance of the president. Two strategies are preponderant: some group leaders are ex-government officials with intense knowledge about the mechanics of the political process and tight links with lower and medium-level bureaucrats, as well as high officials in ministries and all types of decentralized institutes. They are hired essentially because of their pen-

57 Interviews Nos. 15, 20, and 13.
etorative abilities. Others are prominent leaders in the sector they will represent: industrialists, merchants, and syndical leaders with decades of experience in their respective fields. They will be accepted in high governmental spheres in their own right. Their personal support, the corporate contributions they manage, their votes and political power at regional levels—and often at national levels also—are all sources of support that politicians do not want to fail to exploit. In addition, they are experts in all the financial and economic intricacies related with the demands that will later be channeled toward government. As technologically sophisticated as it may be, the Colombian Planning Department, we were told, still tends to be weak in its ability to gather micro-economic data. Superiority in this field, probably one of the few left to the private sector in Colombia today, is an invaluable asset for the private sector in negotiations that tend to get tougher and tougher, and more economically oriented than ever before.

The above patterns of chief executive selection are far from being mutually exclusive. Very commonly pressure group leaders in Colombia tend to play during their lives active roles both in government and the private sector. As one interest group president put it:

... the ruling class is small, and ministers come from the business sector, although there are
also some independents. There is a great deal of reciprocity within an homogeneous establishment; but it seems that this trend will not continue for long. The new generation has gone to government first, and there are no indications that it plans to enroll with the private sector in the near future.\footnote{58}

Undoubtedly, as levels of bureaucratization increase, and the resulting structures become more complex, a far greater number of opportunities for advancement will emerge within government itself, making it unnecessary for public officials to switch sides over and over.

A traditionally high rate of exchange of top officials between the public and the private sectors is not paralleled at low echelons: less than seventy five percent of the organizations in the sample admitted any tendency to hire ex-government employees, and in most cases the number of such individuals was fewer than five percent of all personnel.\footnote{59} The reasons for not doing so are not moral but tactical: the idea that ex-government employees may have a negative input on those routine matters in which they are commonly involved with the bureaucracy is quite prevalent. These persons, we were told, often leave

\footnote{58}Interview No. 29.

\footnote{59}The question as stated said: is there a tendency within this organization to hire former government employees to fill intermediate or low executive positions? If yes, how many of these employees have been hired annually, on the average, during the last five years?
their jobs after being submitted to all the humiliations of being fired and unemployed. They are called funcionarios de desecho or funcionarios quemados which literally means "debris" or "burned" officials. The two main exceptions to this rule are to be found either in labor federations and land tenant associations belonging to the opposition, or in unions that in addition to their purely political activities are also engaged in providing a number of non-political services to their affiliates. An example to the former case is the National Association of Land Tenants (ANUC) in which the offering of positions to selected officials, fired because of alleged communist militant actions within the Ministry of Agriculture, is viewed as an award for distinguished political actions and a monetary compensation for losing their job. Despite the good intentions, however, ANUC's yearly budget is so reduced that it can absorb only very few of these individuals. Growers associations, for technical reasons, also hire ex-government officials, and in particular agronomists to work in their service departments.

Out of our three indicators of centralization, the percentage of decisions taken at lower echelons without previous consultation with the chief executive is in fact a measure of decentralization, and might be negatively correlated with the percentage of those taken by the chief executive itself. The correlation coefficient (see table 6)
between the two variables has the expected sign but is statistically insignificant (r = -0.14), indicating that no covariation for the population as a whole should be safely inferred. This small correlation coefficient may also be interpreted as an indication that losses of power by lower-echelon officials do not correspond to gains by the chief executive, leading us to believe that boards of directors or general assemblies are the chief beneficiaries. It can be observed that there is a moderate negative association between decentralization and control by adherents, indicated by the proportion of decisions needing ratification by affiliates (r = -0.38).

It would be tempting to regard the process of ratification of decisions by affiliated members as having a decentralizing effect upon the administrative apparatus of pressure groups. In one respect there is at least some kind of numeric diffusion of power, since a larger number of people are involved, in theory at least, in the decision making process when levels of needed ratification are high. In addition, the fact that board members can be considered, to a certain extent, as outsiders to the group implies some additional loss of administrative autonomy that contributes further to decentralization. On the other hand, even a radical distribution or diffusion of power between the chief executive and higher-level committees does not constitute fantastic administrative decentraliza-
tion simply because it still takes place at the top of the hierarchy, and outside the realm of organizational daily life. According to our figures, whenever the chief executive becomes less powerful, a corresponding increase in prerogatives of higher-boards takes place, without significant gains for group officials different from the chief executive. A correlation coefficient of -0.69 between the percentage of decisions taken by one, and that of those taken by the other tends to support this fact.

**TABLE 6**

**MATRIX OF PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS**

FOR THREE MEASURES OF CENTRALIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% at lower echelons</th>
<th>% by the chief executive</th>
<th>% needing ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at lower echelons</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by the chief executive</td>
<td>- .14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of decisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>needing ratification</td>
<td>- .38*</td>
<td>- .69**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*significant at the 0.080 level
**significant at the 0.002 level
In summary, the key features about distributions of power within the administrative system in Colombian pressure groups are, first, that they are very highly centralized; second, that lower-level executives usually lack power; and third, that the primary exchanges of influence occur between the chief executive and higher-level committees.

**Vertical Span of Control and Horizontal Differentiation**

A second analytical dimension that describes a social structure is span of control. It has been hypothesized that wide vertical span of control—equivalent to few levels in the hierarchy—is a good indicator of decentralization. The argument is that in organizations with many levels each superior controls few people and therefore diffusion of power is necessarily low. However, it should be noted, as Perrow points out, that the alternative view—although rarely stated as a principle—has also been defended:

This principle said that if a man had a lot of people reporting to him, he was centralizing power and would not want to give it up. Such a man should establish an intermediate level in order to give his subordinates some leeway. A wide span of control meant reluctance to delegate, rather than delegation. 60

60 Perrow, *Complex Organizations*, p. 38.
Our data does not tend to support the latter hypothesis. None of the indicators of centralization is even remotely associated with vertical differentiation. This, however, may be in part a consequence of the fact that most pressure groups sampled tend to be rather "flat" organizations; the maximum span is seven, the lowest three (see figure 3).

Horizontal differentiation, which in our view is a good measure of some aspects of task specialization, is somewhat positively correlated with lower-echelon decentralization \( r = 0.24 \), and negatively associated with chief executive centralization \( r = -0.13 \). From a substantive standpoint, there is a weak indication that simpler, less specialized social structures are more prone to centralization. While pressure groups in Colombia are relatively flat organizations, their structures can be rather wide; the average number of departments in the sample is nine, the maximum is forty six. Vertical and horizontal differentiation tend to go somewhat together \( r = 0.37 \). This tends to support the idea that very modern, specialized, and decentralized pressure groups are not as flat, vertically, as one would expect; they still

\[61\] During repeated sampling, however, in ten and thirty percent of the cases respectively, the relationship would be due to chance.
continue to be organized along complicated vertical schemes typical of the more traditional Weberian bureaucracies.

Size

The descriptive analysis of physical structure shows that the Colombian pressure group system is composed by organizations of relatively modest size. The average group, according to our profile, employs slightly more than a dozen full-time executives and twenty seven employees in clerical or lower positions. Its assets amount to $300,000 and its annual expenditures (scale of operations) reach, in average, the quarter or a million dollar level. Historical and tactical factors underlie this apparent slow rate of growth of the individual organizations composing the pressure group network.

Traditionally, both entrepreneurs and workers have tended to think that the primary function of a pressure group is not the articulation of interests, which is a function that implies a minimum degree of integration of demands on the part of representative associations, but the direct representation of purely individual and narrow demands on their behalf at the governmental level. In theory, in later stages of development, the representative role of interest groups tends to evolve. The pressures

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62 Figures are expressed in dollars, unless otherwise specified.
of institutionalization, the need to share the financial burden of supporting entire organizations, the demands of group executives for greater autonomy, the frequently devastating competition for political influence and representativeness created by emergent associations, are but few of the factors responsible for the expected shift in roles; a shift toward genuine articulatory functions.

Interest articulation is by no means the final role of interest groups, as ideally viewed by many of their top officials. As the base expands, divergences with regard to immediate political objectives among affiliates may increase, negotiations with government become more complex, and opportunities for executive autonomy grow stronger. Newly acquired autonomy tends to generate a second shift in organizational roles, this time toward the selection of semi-aggregatory functions. At this stage, pressure organizations tend to get involved in macro-political, macro-social, macro-economic analysis and discussion with government, often refusing to openly represent narrow interests.

The necessary condition for this to occur is, we believe, that the physical growth of the organization is not hampered. One could imagine that economic expansion combined with a dangerously growing public sector may constitute sufficient incentives for affiliates to allow the superimposition of general over particularistic
goals. It should be noted that once such a superimposition takes place, it is the interest of both--group officials and affiliates--to minimize narrow expressions and dramatize those of aggregative nature. A former president of the National Association of Manufacturers (ANDI), when interviewed, insisted that ANDI during the 1960s, under his administration, had supported even against the wish of many industrialists the creation of a sales tax similar to the one recently enacted and adamantly opposed by a cartel of pressure groups; all this in the name of the public good. As he indicated, "our criteria of action were national in scope; our internal duty was to gain support for generalistic policies, even though they contradicted sector interests."\(^{63}\)

In most cases, as our data indicates, organizational growth has not taken place to the extent to which the shift to aggregative or even articulative roles has been triggered. Affiliates have generally chosen a different path; that of maintaining tight control in order to guarantee a generous amount of private services for themselves, simultaneously accepting the disadvantages of close competition and sometimes lower political influence. Some businessmen seem to somewhat scorn interest groups,
anyway. As one influential member of the board of directors of a pressure group puts it:

... these representative organizations are considered as a complement to private action; they are mainly tribunes for the expression of general interests. Although this would not be easy to document, heads of enterprises have a great deal more trust in their individual capacity for defense. The financial corporations, for example, did not have an association for sector representation, but nevertheless have obtained a great deal more, have attracted credit, and created a mystique, indeed a very favorable image.\textsuperscript{64}

The result, in terms of the system as a whole, is that it has evolved toward a pervasive atomistic structure. Very probably, a cross-national comparison of the number of pressure groups, controlling for country size, would indicate that Colombia is well above the average for developing nations.

From a statistical standpoint, as expected, all three indicators of size (number or executive personnel, assets, and annual expenditures) are strongly interrelated. The number of executives, an indicator that points to the amount of human resources employed by the group, and the yearly budget—which indicates the scale of operations—have a correlation coefficient of 0.7. With regard to centralization, as pressure groups adopt greater budgets, lower-level executives have a somewhat greater input in decision making ($r = 0.35$). As indicated before, it should

\textsuperscript{64} Interview No. 2.
be expected that organizations that have been allowed to
grow, specialize, and expand their range of activities,
would also acquire greater autonomy vis à vis higher coun-
cils representing the affiliates. The correlation coeffi-
cient between the percentage of decisions needing ratifi-
cation by a board of directors or a national assembly,
and both budget and the number of executives, are respec-
tively -0.13 and -0.11. These coefficients have the ex-
pected sign, but because of the modest size of the sample
are not statistically significant, and inferences to the
entire population are not warranted.

Specialization of tasks and size do covary strongly;
the correlation coefficient is 0.89. This relationship
reflects two distinct relationships: on the one hand we
have the almost tautological association between inflated
budgets and larger number of personnel needed to manage
structures that cover a wide variety of distinct fields.
In this case, the number of sections--horizontal differ-
entiation--is both an indicator of specialization and dis-
ersion of activities. ANDI is a good example: horizont-
tally, its structure has been composed since the mid-60s
of about fifty so-called sector committees organized along
industrial lines (textile, cotton, leather, metals, bank-
ing, etc.) which cover a number of semi-independent cate-
gories of economic activity. On the other hand, we have
the case of organizations in which specialization has
increased, but at the same time have not expanded their field of activity. A typical example is the Banking Association which has refused, until very recently, to give membership even to other categories of financial institutions such as financial corporations and warehouses which are in fact divisions of the banks themselves. Only after the creation of the National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF) started to pose some problems, did the banks modify the statutes of their association and accept new members. The key point, however, is that despite the very narrow range of activities, as the Banking Association has grown, its structure has become increasingly specialized. It is composed of more than twenty committees dealing with all aspects of banking, ranging from internal security to macro-economic questions, such as the money supply, interest rates, etc.

**Territorial Dispersion**

The second variable of physical structure is territorial dispersion. The statistical analysis indicates that high physical dispersion is symptomatic of structural underdevelopment. Decentralization ($r = -0.19$), specialization ($r = -0.15$), and size ($r = -0.24$) are all negatively correlated with physical dispersion. Although these coefficients are not statistically significant, the fact that they all have the same sign tends to support the hypo-
thesis. In addition, it is a fact that labor groups, both urban and rural, have to cope with a vast amount of union problems that must be solved locally and requires significant dispersion of resources, which is detrimental to structural modernization. Similarly, farmers associations face political, technical, and marketing problems that require local assistance, and only very primitive structures.

Technological Complexity

Technological complexity, an indicator of structuring is the last variable of structure to be considered in this study. The two indicators, the number of full time professionals, and the annual production of technical studies do correlate fairly well \( r = 0.81 \). The former variable has the advantage of measuring both internal and external production of technical material. Most labor federations, for example, do not have sophisticated technical staffs, nor do they employ large numbers of graduates. However, with the cooperation of outside professionals (mainly lawyers, sociologists, and economists) they are able to produce a relatively substantial number of studies per year.

Technological complexity is also negatively related to physical dispersion \( r = -0.28 \), adding some evidence to the notion that concentration of resources, in the case
of pressure groups, facilitates the development of sophisticated organization structures. Technological complexity and specialization have a great deal of affinity. It can be expected that organizations with large number of specialized sections may also have separate research departments in a variety of areas, whose main function is to gather and analyze data that later on will be used by the chief executive to support the group's positions and demands. In addition, specialization always contributes in some degree to subtract a number of individuals from the main workflow, the daily routine, and put them in a position to innovate. The coefficient of association between the two variables is 0.93.

In practical terms, however, the main determinant of technological complexity is the existence of financial resources to undertake costly analyses. According to our data, small pressure groups with modest budgets almost always have low rates of annual production of technical material. Although by measuring the number of studies it is not possible to make inferences about the quality of the analysis done, it tends to be true that even very capable pressure group directors, without reasonably large technical staffs, simply lack the time to concentrate on this type of activity. In most cases, affiliates are aware of this crippling handicap and provide, on a case to case basis, technical personnel from their own staffs.
Technological complexity and annual expenditures have a correlation coefficient of 0.93.

A Structural Typology of Pressure Organizations

The statistical analysis of ten structural variables indicates that in most cases individual measures are sufficiently dispersed, statistically, to allow the delineation of a meaningful typology of pressure groups, based on structural features. The standard deviation of values (see table 7) shows considerable average deviation from the mean in all variables, except vertical span of control where it is only 1.2 (the range is four). Three clear types of pressure groups emerge from our previous discussion of structure.

First, the most common by far, is usually a business pressure group, operating in no more than four or five cities but giving far greater emphasis to its Bogotá headquarters. Administrative functions are performed by no more than half a dozen executives, but real power is concentrated in the hands of its president or general manager. Meetings of the board of directors are frequent, and all decisions taken there are of the foremost importance in determining future positions, public statements, and political tactics. Levels of specialization tend to be low; internal departments are solely intended to separate political and public relations functions from the internal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of lower level decisions</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of chief executive decisions</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of decisions needing ratification</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical span of control</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technological complexity</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of technical studies per year</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of executives with university degree</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of executive personnel</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical dispersion</strong></td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
administration of the organization (payroll, accounting, etc.). Services to affiliates of a non-political nature are usually minimized. Annual budgets vary substantially; in smaller groups they are large enough to pay the rent and the salaries of a president, his secretary and a mail boy; in a few cases enough is left to create a small reserve fund. Levels of technological complexity are medium-low to medium, depending on the availability of outside technicians. Emphasis is given to the analysis of economic and financial raw data provided by affiliates; this data is sometimes included in an internal publication. More important, the main technical function of the chief executive is to analyze governmental legislative projects and existing laws that affect the sector in question.

Little macro analysis is performed; the ability to identify loopholes and possible excesses is what determines the group's chances to affect the legislative process, and the sector's capabilities to preserve a favorable and viable socio-economic position (see type 'a' in figure 4).

The second type of organization usually tends to be one representing either agricultural or workers' interests. This category of structure is by far the most traditional, and in many cases also the most primitive. Levels of centralization are as high as they can be. In the case of labor unions, for example, the charisma of many of their leaders, their experience in the labor field,
Fig. 4. A Structural Typology of Colombian Pressure Organizations
and the legitimacy granted to them, contribute to their inflated power. In addition, experience in labor questions is the only path by which a union leader can emerge; other channels of access to high positions of leadership, commonly available to young professionals in other types of pressure groups, are simply not available. Most confederations have serious difficulties in attracting full-time lawyers and economists, principally because of obvious budgetary restrictions. Being an active career union leader is usually a pre-requisite for seeking election to a confederate top position.

The drive of popular organizations toward democratic forms of administration does not offset these centralizing tendencies, and in fact, paradoxically, might slightly contribute to increase them. Typically, a congress, which is in theory the highest authority of a confederation, elects through secret ballot a large board of directors (sixty five members in the case of the Colombian Workers Union-UTC), from which a more restricted executive committee is selected (twenty three members in the UTC). Both committees are too large to insure proper participation of all members in administrative processes. The board of directors of the UTC, for example, meets only twice a year and is therefore forced to either face more than one ex post facto situation, or limited to formulating vague guidelines for future operations. The executive
committee has greater power. It nominates one-fifth of the members of the board; and is in charge of more than twenty administrative functions, including handling new admissions, making public statements, creating new branches, authorizing the expenditure of unbudgeted money, etc. But in the final analysis, since many of its members have full-time jobs elsewhere, most of this authority is directly transferred into the hands of a restricted group of full-time administrators, namely the president, the vice president, and the secretary general. Vertical span of control tends to be higher than normal, basically because of all the intermediate organs through which tasks are distributed before administrative viability is reached. Specialization of tasks is mediocre, although the vertical structure is cross-cut by a number of secretariats overlapping most types of economic activity (mining, textiles, food, etc.). Levels of technological complexity for this group of organizations ranges from very low to medium. The UTC, which is the largest labor confederation in Colombia, employs one full-time statistician specialized in measuring the cost of living, and has developed a more or less permanent relationship with ten other lawyers and economists. But other confederations and some farmers associations have virtually no technical capabilities, except those required to maintain a moderate volume of customer services of non-political nature. Finally, in order to insure
adequate coverage, operations are widely dispersed geographically (see type 'b' in figure 4).

In contrast with the previous type, there is yet a third category of pressure group, which fits in many respects with recent descriptions of advanced structures in organizations. Levels of centralization still remain high, in absolute terms, but are far lower than in any other of the two previous types. Presidentialism is projected toward the boundaries of the organization—its affiliates, and political targets—instead of becoming a typical pattern of intra-group relationships. As one top official put it:

In order to avoid unnecessary leaks and contradictions on the part of our executives that government could take advantage of, there are strict orders to the effect that the president—not the president of the board of directors—is the only spokesman. The press always calls upon newly appointed vice presidents to induce them to make mistakes, to speak more than they are supposed to.65

The fact that group presidents are invariably outsiders, and must work in a specialized and technologically sophisticated organization, is a key contributing factor to decentralization. As we were told:

Because presidents have not been career officers, they become very independent upon their advisors, who are extremely well trained. Presidents have difficulties in imposing their ideas, mainly because they have in mind an administrative structure oriented toward the production of goods,

65 Interview No. 8.
while this organization produces results vis-à-vis the public sector. While he learns it is already time for his successor to take over.66

Specialization is no longer based exclusively on slices of economic activity; it is of the more advanced sort, that which implies multiple division of tasks within one line of work. Structures of this type tend to be flat and wide, implying that within each section, executives have a great deal of relative autonomy. Technology is as sophisticated as it can be. Luxurious publications, and a staff filled with snobbish-looking technocrats help to create an air of sober professionalism and competence that obviously does not harm the association's image. Finally, territorial dispersion is unnecessary. Most of these pressure groups represent powerful urban interests that are concentrated in a few large cities.

Summary

The network of representative associations in Colombia comprises a wide variety of organizations, ranging from small-sized groups characterized by primitive structures to large scale organizations. We delineated three distinct categories of pressure groups: the first type is a highly centralized; poorly differentiated both vertically and horizontally; operates on the basis of restricted

66 Interview No. 8.
human and physical resources, but is capable of importing sufficient technology and manpower to carry out complex technical tasks related to its interaction with government agencies and the processing of demands. The second type is characterized by extensive vertical differentiation, low diffusion of authority, moderate to low specialization of tasks, medium to low technological complexity, and higher territorial dispersion. The third type of association is obviously modern. Although it shares with the other two categories of groups an insufficient propensity to diffuse power, professionals are often allowed to participate in decision making. Presidentialism is still one key administrative feature, but is essentially a device designed to insulate the organization from unwanted external inputs and control interaction with high public officials and the mass media.

With regard to the sample as a whole, the statistical associations among different structural dimensions provided significant evidence as to how the articulation of various structural components takes place in this type of political organization. Centralization of authority appeared to be negatively linked with specialization of tasks and technological complexity. Physical size, and in particular the availability of financial resources seems to be a necessary prerequisite for the sustained evolution toward advanced and complex configurations. The revenues
arising from internal services are rarely sufficient to generate growth. There are several explanations for the high correlation between concentration of power, and technological development and specialization. First, the relative absence of experts, typical of primitive structures, discourages centralization, since the gap in expertise between the manager and his subordinates is so wide that few incentives for diffusing power are available to him. Second, the process of adaptation of experts to an organizational environment such as the one defined in pressure groups where demands to government are the principal product and tasks are often performed on the basis of personal connections, inevitably gives rise to internal conflict with regard to how should political tasks be carried out, and who is more qualified to do so. The regulation of such conflict, in turn, usually gives rise to a compromise according to which labor is more specifically divided, internal operations are substantially decentralized, experts enjoy greater autonomy, but also extensive control from the top is exerted in terms of exchanges with government, adherents, and society in general.
CHAPTER III

INDIRECT TACTICS
OF PRESSURE ORGANIZATIONS

The analysis that follows focusses upon indirect tactics of pressure organizations, and in particular the utilization of public relations campaigns, links with political parties and the bureaucracy, and patterns of alliances within the network of interest groups. We will explore the relationship between the propensity of representative associations to engage in direct strategies, and internal structural factors. With regard to the relations of pressure groups and the bureaucracy, we will make some inferences about the presence of clientela relations, on the basis of organizational capabilities.

Public Relations

Public relations are defined in this study as activities designed to promote government acceptance of pressure group demands and ideological orientations, and to increase the acceptance of the group in the political community in which it functions. Put another way, public relations campaigns serve a double purpose. On the one hand, there is a diffuse socialization function which consists of inducing perceptions of moral authority and some-
times also political power in the eyes of the general public and elites. On the other hand, and usually to the extent to which the organization reaches reasonable levels of institutionalization, it can seriously proceed to perform its primary political task, that of influencing public decision making.

A common underlying assumption for engaging in public relations campaigns is that whenever pending government action affects people directly and significantly, it is possible to induce a public reaction of support or opposition that will significantly influence decision makers. The role of pressure groups is to insure favorable predispositions, and interpret government intentions and group positions in such a way that the identification between the interests of affiliates and the so-called public interest is maximized.

Undoubtedly, Colombian pressure groups today constantly make use of public campaigns. This is achieved through a variety of means, among which intense use of the mass media, private publications, and strikes and demonstrations are the most common. Our indicator of intensity of public oriented tactics is the annual budget for public relations. It should be noted that this indicator does not capture the entire spectrum of public relations activities: most pressure groups, for example, show expenditures for only a small fraction of the real coverage they
are able to get from the press. The reasons for this are both tactical and financial. It is widely felt that the net effect of paid advertisements on the general public and government officials is negative, that such a practice would be interpreted as crude, illegitimate pressure. A system of "natural" coverage is far more elegant, and is almost always practiced. It consists in establishing a close economic liaison with the principal newspapers and radio stations. At top levels, dependency is assured through the manipulation of the supply of purely commercial advertisement by group affiliates. Whenever, in the judgement of the group's board of directors, insufficient flow of news is reaching the public, retaliatory measures may be taken by related firms. In addition it should be noted that at least in the case of business groups, a natural ideological affinity with all large Colombian newspapers has developed over time.67

At lower levels, it is not uncommon to give reporters various kinds of compensation for providing press coverage of the group's comuniQUÉs, and activities such as congresses and conventions. Even some prominent newsmen have signed in the past secret contracts with large pressure groups to include favorable comments in their

67 See, for example, Marco T. Rodríguez, La Gran Prensa en Colombia (Bogotá: Ediciones Minerva, 1953).
editorials (more than one pressure group representative mentioned such a practice). In financial terms, as one organization executive pointed out, making a habit out of paying space has obvious economic disadvantages; and the rate of paid material increases, the propensity of newspapers to publish interest group related news steadily diminishes.68

In absolute terms, the annual expenditures for public relations are not impressive. The highest budget in the sample is around $50,000 for 1974, but nine out of eighteen organizations spent $3,000 or less per year in this type of activity; the average being $10,000.

In this respect, the position of workers confederations and land tenant associations is far more precarious. Restricted budgets, and the general animosity of the press has caused them to become rather disillusioned. Not only are they usually obliged (when absolutely necessary) to pay for the space they need in newspapers, but in their own view they are the object of systematic distortion by newsmen. Their relations with the radio can be better, since the opposition owns some radio stations, but their access to television is zero. In view of the lack of success in this area, syndicates rely heavily on their own internal bulletins and newspapers. The UTC, for

68 Interview No. 2.
example, publishes a newspaper in color, Justicia Social, which has a circulation of some 15,000 copies.

In most unions it is widely felt that the political coverage that internal publications provides them is far too narrow, that confederal newspapers are primarily a mean of informing adherents about the activities that take place within the confederation itself. Many union leaders are convinced that government will not pay sufficient attention to their demands unless they are able to stage some type of show of strength.\(^6^9\) In the absence of mass media support, they resort to demonstrations, lock-outs, and even politically-oriented strikes. Recently it was contended that the main purpose of the long strike in the cement industry by workers belonging to the communist Syndical Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC) was not to obtain material gains--it seems that they actually got less than they were initially offered--but to indicate that the newly recognized confederation was able to affect social stability, and slow down economic production. In the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) we were told

\[^6^9\]The conception that labor unions should bargain with government on the basis of strength and often resort to violence is not unique to Colombia. Payne, in an analysis of the political behavior of Peruvian unions observed a similar pattern. See James L. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru: The System of Political Bargaining (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).
that close to fifty percent of the budget for public relations is spent in agitation-related activities.

Is the propensity to engage with greater intensity in public relations campaigns related to structural factors within the organization? Size, one could imagine, definitely should affect the group's ability to allocate funds for this type of activity. Indeed total budget size and annual expenditures for public relations covary quite well \((r = 0.60)\). It can also be observed that these expenditures are not without some cost; operational reserves for those groups with higher levels of spending in public relations are somewhat lower than those with smaller budgets. The relationship, although not statistically significant \((r = -0.26)\) is suggestive of the possible negative consequences of high spending, in terms of financial autonomy. Physical dispersion, which was shown to be symptomatic of structural underdevelopment in pressure groups, actually is conducive to wider campaigns \((r = 0.49)\); the same is true when the organization hires more professionals \((r = 0.47)\), and is more specialized \((r = 0.49)\).

It should be expected that the ability to establish close links with the mass media, to engage in publishing sophisticated magazines, to stage large demonstrations, etc. is a function of the amount of human resources available for such tasks. But it is not only a matter of quantity of resources; structurally modern pressure organiza-
tions, i.e. those with lower levels of centralization, higher levels of specialization, and greater technological development, seem to be better equipped to handle more extensive campaigns of this sort. The correlation coefficient between decentralization and intensity of public relations campaigns is 0.32. There are many plausible explanations for this phenomenon, although in situations where power is excessively concentrated, it is almost natural that greater emphasis be given to person to person strategies, avoiding the indirect ones, which are those that demand higher levels of internal coordination, and constant initiative throughout the whole structure.

Political Parties

The Colombian two-party system, which was amalgamated into a monolithic National Front for almost two decades has been remarkably homogeneous.\(^7\) The relative

\(^7\) The National Front was a coalition between the Liberal and Conservative Parties that lasted during the three presidential terms included between August 7, 1962 and August 7, 1974. Four general principles were at the root of the National Front: alternation, bipartisanship, parity, and the formula of the two-thirds majority for the approval of measures in all elective bodies. Very briefly, alternation meant that in the three constitutional terms included between August 7, 1962 and August 7, 1974, only those candidates belonging to the two traditional parties, exclusively and alternatively, were eligible for the presidency. Bipartisanship referred to the virtual monopoly that Liberals and Conservatives were to exert, together, on the Colombian political process for almost two decades. Parity introduced a complicated system designed to equalize the distribution of government positions among Liberals and
absence of cleavages at the elite level has made it unnecessary for most pressure groups to seek alignment with particular parties. In the absence of historical factors that have led parties and pressure organizations in other nations, particularly in Europe, to become inextricably intermixed, Colombian business associations have profited tremendously from the absence of cleavages; since fragmenting the pressure group system by having both a Liberal and a Conservative association for each line of economic activity would contribute further to difficulties in raising funds, many organizations have included in their statutes clauses designed to avoid partisan activities within the group. The Federation of Coffee Growers has gone as far as requiring that executives keep their party affiliation secret, and prohibiting them from participating in partisan ceremonies. The idea, of course, is to insure that existing or potential affiliates will not be frightened away by the political overtone of some pressure group activities.

At the macro-political level it is a fact that only very exceptionally has there been any real threat to

Conservatives, including all those in the "public corporations" (the Senate, the Chamber of Representatives, Departmental Assemblies, and Municipal Councils), Cabinet Offices and the Supreme Court. Finally, for all legal purposes, most decisions in the "public corporations" needed a two-thirds majority for their approval.
the political domination of the Liberals and Conservatives. As one group executive puts it: "Colombia has always lived under governments of center-right, and therefore, it has never been urgent for us to interfere in politics." 71 
In those rare cases where the status quo has been temporarily jeopardized, as during the 1930s when the Revolución en Marcha sponsored by President Alfonso López Pumarejo created a strong reaction among the entrepreneurial class against State interventionism—which in turn gave rise to the highly politicized Employers' National Economic Association (APEN) in 1934—, 72 or during the 1970 campaign in which the populist National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) headed by Rojas Pinilla was very close to winning the presidential election (it supposedly lost by only fifty thousand votes), many firms anticipating a possible victory made sizeable contributions to the corresponding parties. But the rule seems to be that pressure groups do not interfere with the internal organization of parties. Contributions in both directions are kept to a minimum,

71 Interview No. 1.

72 As Dix has indicated, one of the formal objectives of APEN was: 
"To impede the triumph in Colombia of the doctrines of abolition of property and of the eradication of capital, industry, and agriculture as individual rights, for the purpose of coverting them into the exclusive activity of organized collectivities controlled by the State." Cited by Dix, Colombia, p. 356.
and even during electoral periods most of them do not contribute, as associations, to political campaigns. Contributions of affiliates are not normally handled by pressure groups.

Pressure groups, however, are far from being apolitical entities, although, typically, most executives of representative associations seemed genuinely convinced of the opposite. First, a significant number of such executives have been government officials at one time or another; it is not uncommon that members of the board of directors of a group hold positions in Congress. Harvey Kline, in his analysis of Colombian legislative behavior, reports that close to ten percent of those congressmen interviewed admitted belonging to one of ten pressure groups. 73

Second, although the links with political parties are not well institutionalized, i.e. meetings tend to be informal, occasional, and non-structured, whenever interesting projects come up, contacts with party national directorates are frequently established. Moreover, pressure group officials frequently hold positions at the top of party structures and sit in party committees, on a personal basis. One may legitimately wonder whether it is really

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possible to preserve that delicate separation between activism and organizational neutralism.

Differences in the kind of relation that various organizations are able to develop with parties at the regional level affect the attitude of members of Congress toward certain pressure groups. For example, while the manufacturers generally complain about the propensity of regional representatives to demonstrate political independence by putting down their associations, cattlemen benefit from the obvious fact that local politicians tend also to be the large land-owners. As one top official of a pressure group said: "the cattlemen are the regional caciques, they are the políticos; we have for example six senators in our board of directors..." 74

Labor confederations are also deeply involved in partisan politics. The affinities between the Syndical Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC), the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC), and the Union of Colombian Workers (UTC) on the one hand, and the Communists, the Liberals, and the Conservatives, on the other, obeys a relatively long historical tradition of alignments. During the 1930s President López Pumarejo encouraged the creation of a multitude of unions, and in 1936 he backed

74 Interview No. 3.
the constitution of the first Colombian labor confedera-
tion, the Syndical Confederation of Colombia, which later
should become the CTC. This labor union was decidedly
pro-Liberal, and always intended to defend the social
reforms promoted by López.

After 1938 began a cycle of inter-syndical cleav-
gages characterized by severe losses of control by CTC of
its unions. Disunity accompanied by wildcat strikes be-
came more and more common during this period, principally
as a result of the increasing loss of support López had
to endure within his own party, and the resulting inabili-
ty of the executive branch to continue playing its tradi-
tional role of social arbiter. Many politicians started
thinking seriously, for the first time, that the creation
of an opposition labor confederation was feasible; and
both the Conservatives and the Gaitanista faction cherished
the idea.⁷⁵ Although later President Alberto Lleras Ca-
margo desperately attempted to block any such move by
enacting a law that prohibited syndical parallelism,
another confederation, the UTC, was formally legalized in
1949, under the tutorship of a Conservative government,

⁷⁵ Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was the leader of the left wing of the Liberal Party and a presidential candidate in the 1946 elections. For a discussion about Gaitán's pro-
gram see: Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Las Mejores Oraciones de Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 1919-1948 (Bogotá: Jorvi, 1958).
the blessing of the church, and the support of regional industrialists.

... the creation of the UTC produced a greater alignment of syndicalism with the political parties. Important personalities of the Conservative party write in the newspaper Justicia Social; the new union reiterates its support for the Ospina Pérez government, and soon the attacks against the Liberal party and the CTC reach the same degree of belligerency of other Conservative organizations. ... Finally, when Gaitán is murdered, it proposes to proceed immediately to dissolve the "Communist" CTC responsible for the tumultuous events of April. ... Of course, for the presidential elections of 1949, the UTC officially supports Laureano Gómez, the only candidate.76

With the emergence of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship in 1953, and the National Front in 1957, which virtually excluded all non-traditional parties for almost two decades, the left became even more alienated. In 1964 the Liberals finally broke all remaining ties with the Communists, and the latter formed a third confederation, the CSTC. Cleavages between the pro-Moscow and the pro-Mao factions subsequently gave rise to a fourth de facto confederation, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). Both were given legal recognition in 1975, by the administration of President Alfonso López Michelsen.

The following quotations are extracts from our interviews with top officials at the three largest confederations:

76 Pécaut, Sindicalismo en Colombia, p. 224.
Relations with political parties are good: we have influence. Our members have been authorized to intervene in politics; in directorates at the barrio level and in lists for public corporations. We have eighty councilmen, ten deputies, two representatives, and one senator. But we do not contribute money to parties, and they do not contribute either.77

We maintain serious and cordial relations with Liberals and Conservatives, but the institution per se is not formally involved with the parties. Although partisan activity is prohibited by law, as you well know, members of our union participate in conventions, recommend lists . . . take the chance.78

We have no relations whatsoever with the two traditional parties. They are not invited to our meetings; there is absolute separation, because they represent interests different from the workers'. We maintain some relations with ANAPO, but our main links are those with the Communist party. We are independent of each other, but our programs and statements converge. Many Communists serve in the syndicates. We fight so that the candidacies of the party become acceptable to the workers; we introduce Communist candidates as labor representatives. But again, there is no direct economic help to finance salaries.79

Despite the undeniable existence of close links between political parties and the unions, these statements reflect a trend toward less rigid alignments. Although the following figures are probably exaggerated, while in 1946 the UTC's representativeness was eleven percent compared to eighty four for the CTC, in 1971 the UTC had increased to sixty eight percent, while the CSTC and CTC

77 Interview No. 14. 78 Interview No. 13.
79 Interview No. 16.
shared the remaining percentage. This massive transfer of Liberal union support to only one federation has been a key factor in breaking any exclusive relationship that Conservatives and the UTC might have. In the 1974 presidential elections, for example, the UTC did not instruct its affiliates to vote one way or another. Moreover, the National Front by, virtually eliminating inter-party competition, undoubtedly contributed further to creating an atmosphere of syndical cooperation with all governments, regardless of party. This, of course, is accentuated by the strong pro-status quo tendencies of the big confederations, which up to this point have proved unable to show any significant degree of autonomous power: their bargaining capabilities are strictly conditioned by the willingness of the State to provide them with access and legitimacy. However, as birth rates remain uncontrolled, and urban migration and unemployment continue to increase, labor unions will play an increasingly important role in channeling what could become an uncontrollable flow of raw popular demands, and providing palliatives for the dissatisfaction and frustration of people.

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To conclude, it is important to emphasize the critical importance of political parties as instruments of syndical strategies. While business groups are an integral part of the ruling elite, and have guaranteed access to top government structures at all levels through a number of notables—the ex-ministers, the lawyers, the cattlemen, the ex-governors, the merchants, etc.—most union leaders are treated in a condescending fashion, either as representatives of rather amorphous and servile entities or as agents of radical groups threatening to disrupt social stability.\footnote{Mario Latorre, Elecciones y Partidos Políticos en Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 1974), p. 257.} As a rule, they are received in government only reluctantly, and to the extent that they represent the key to continued control of potentially unstable social groups, and/or significant sources of votes. In those cases where they have shown sufficient electoral strength, their congressmen must still rely heavily on bi-partisan support in order to see their bills pass. Unless they decided to choose the hazardous road of direct confrontation and general strike, political parties will still be the best hope for syndical political influence.

Relations with the Bureaucracy

The notion of preferential relations between interest groups and a government body refers, in its most
extreme formulation, to the presence of an exclusive relationship between the two. Put another way, a given administrative agency invariably becomes the preferred first target of a given pressure group, and similarly the pressure group is perceived by it as the natural representative of a given social sector. In less intensive forms, preferential relations are formed whenever multiple poles for the expression and reception of demands become the normal pattern of interaction, instead of a monolithic system of exchanges. Intense preferential relations are unlikely to exist under a system where pressure groups interact simultaneously at various places of the government structure, and/or when all interest groups belonging to a given socio-economic sector have similar access to the same public bodies. There are, of course, all kinds of mild expressions of clientela relations from which few systems are free, and which include a variety of benevolent exchanges and petty corruption on both sides.

The questionnaire we used was not designed to measure bureaucratic perceptions. The only aspect of the problems we wanted to examine was whether or not pressure organizations considered that in order to gain access and influence they tended to establish monopolistic relationships with public bodies. The unanimous response was that, unfortunately, it is simply not possible in today's
political context to induce top government officials to accept a stable set of norms conducive either to insure that a given agency will play the role of channeling demands on behalf of interest groups, or that the assumed recipient will tolerate constant external interference by other bureaucracies.\textsuperscript{82} One third of the respondents, however, mentioned that they did occasionally use a bureaucratic structure with which they had frequent interaction as a "bridge" or instrument to modify decisions that they thought were unfair and irrational. It is interesting to note that in nearly half of the instances where this type of preferential relationship was reported, pressure groups had actually used their connections with a ministry different from that with which they had closest ties. For example, an association of land tenants did on one occasion resort to a minister of the interior to attempt to produce a shift in the attitude of the ministry of agriculture, with regard to the deplorable situation of the Indian community; although that particular association has its headquarters in the building of the ministry of agriculture, and conducted daily business with it.

\textsuperscript{82}The question as stated said: is there a tendency in this organization to consistently use a given public corporation to transmit requests, and in general, to influence decision making processes within other bureaucratic entities that are deciding matters of interest to this group?
In general, interaction with the public sector tends to be direct; pressure groups go where they have to. The principal reason for this is that the Colombian bureaucracy, in contrast with its European counterparts, is unstable, compartmentalized, and undivided by party cleavages. Bureaucratic instability has resulted, of course, from the fact that a large percentage of all positions in government are purely political. During each election candidates exchange promises of employment for the protégés of the caciques, in exchange for a certain number of votes. Those who receive these corbatas, as these jobs are called, well know that their power is short-lived. The tendency is to obtain as much as possible in the shortest possible time. This is done usually through corruption. But in order to maximize its benefits, it is necessary to insure reasonable levels of discretion; the rule is that each one minds his own business.

Moreover, compartmentalization is not jeopardized, as in Italy for example, by parentela relations. Political parties have not socialized their members in such a way that once a bureaucratic sector is captured, a flow of demands originating from other party-dominated structures is immediately directed toward it. As a matter of fact, Colombian parties--despite the importance of party affiliation for attribution of positions in the bureaucracy--do not even dominate the daily operation of specific bureau-
cratic structures. Moreover, since the onset of the
National Front, the formula of parity has been re-edited:

According to the parity system, the positions
in the public corporations corresponding to each
electoral circumscription are granted in equal
proportions to the Conservative and Liberal
parties. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . the President has total autonomy and
freedom in the choice of his ministers, department
heads, and directors of public institutes; with
only one limitation while the National Front lasts,
that is, that equal representation be given to
Conservatives and Liberals. 83

The López Michelsen administration, the first since the
National Front ended—in agreement with the Conservative
party—, has maintained the parity system, probably aware
of the consequences for internal stability of interrupt-
ing it.

In addition to parity and the absence of partisan
affiliation by entire public bodies, compartmentalization
has also resulted from two phenomena within the bureaucracy
itself. First, the tremendous growth of the public sector
in recent years has induced specialization, which in turn
contributes to compartmentalization. There is today an
average of fifteen specialized, semi-autonomous institutes
ascribed to each ministry. Second, as the bureaucracy has
modernized the newer structures (such as the Planning
Department and the Junta Monetaria, equivalent to the

83 Latorre, Partidos Políticos, pp. 234 & 236.
Federal Reserve Board) hire, largely on the basis of merit, an unprecedented number of university trained technicians who undoubtedly help to create an air of pragmatism and autonomy conducive to even greater insulation and compartmentalization.

Although little evidence was found that government agencies in Colombia are intensively utilized as indirect instruments of access by pressure groups, it yet remains to be seen whether or not certain groups have been able to monopolize the political representation of entire socio-economic sectors. Zariski's description of the clientela rapport between the Italian General Confederation of Industry, and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, is a priori comparable with the case of the Manufacturers' Association (ANDI), the Farmers' Society (SAC), or the Federation of Merchants (FENALCO) in Colombia. 84

The fact that both ANDI and SAC are second degree organizations, that is, they accept as affiliates other representative associations in addition to regular members (sixteen associations are federated within SAC) is a first symptom. Although SAC's board of directors includes representatives of most associations in the agrarian sector (coffee, rice, cotton, cereals, sugar cane, etc.) it does

not seem to have any preferential status vis-à-vis the executive. Although Law No. 46 of 1909 gave SAC the status of advisory body for agrarian matters, its relations with the ministry of agriculture are roughly comparable to those of other agrarian pressure groups. On the Advisory Board of Cattle and Agrarian Policy, which is the formal forum where interaction with the agro-public sector takes place, there are six delegates of the private sector among which only one represents SAC. Its real influence is in Congress, where thirteen congressmen hold or have held positions in the organization; although the same is true for FEDEGAN, the Federation of Cattlemen. In addition, SAC faces strong competition by other agrarian pressure groups with better organization, larger budgets, and greater access; the most obvious one being the Federation of Coffee Growers (FEDECAFE), which is perceived by many as a state within the State. While SAC

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85 See Kline, Grupos de Presión, p. 343.

86 Although FEDECAFE is a private entity, it enjoys many prerogatives of a semi-public organ, and in particular the collection and management of taxes arising from coffee exports (Law No. 26 of 1927). In the mid 1930s, during the López Pumarejo administration, there were some pressures to transform the Federation in a State organ, and although the attempt did not fully materialize, government was given direct representation in the administrative apparatus of the association and various ministers became members of the national committee.
barely collects $25,000 per year in membership dues plus additional $50,000 in services, FEDECAFE manages the huge National Coffee Fund (which is a multi-million dollar tax to the entire coffee sector). FEDECAFE's budget in 1971 was close to twelve million dollars.

A second association that seems to be losing any preferential status it might ever have had is FENALCO. It fits rather well La Palombarra's formal description of clientela, since it is undoubtedly the natural representative of the mercantile sector. Moreover, since it is also monopolistic at the membership level, and faces no competition within its sector, it is necessarily true that no other organization is in a position to articulate the demands of merchants. But the fact is that FENALCO does not have the organizational capability or density to maintain and/or develop monopolistic ties of the type described by La Palombarra, with a government agency. An annual budget of $125,000 is simply not enough for such a task. Besides, FENALCO allocates a sizeable portion of its resources in providing non-political services to affiliates: it was instrumental in the creation of the Commerce Bank and the Mercantile Insurance Co.; today it provides medical and odontological care, practical education, etc. to the employees of its affiliates. 87

ANDI's case is certainly more complex. This association has many of the characteristics that could be thought of as being the organizational pre-requisites for establishing a clientela relationship with a government agency. Its very wide horizontal structure, divided into dozens of committess that penetrate every imaginable type of industrial activity; its enormous physical and human resources,\(^{88}\) and even its physical location, in the heart of Antioquia, are solid indicators that it is certainly able to achieve a preponderant role in articulating and even aggregating the demands of the manufacturing sector.\(^{89}\)

But ANDI is far from being the only association of manufacturers: there are dozens of others such as FEDEMETAL, ACOPLASTICOS, or ACOPI (Colombian Association of Small Manufacturers); which implies that significant differences in objectives constantly arise, making it unattractive for many manufacturers to rely on ANDI's political actions and orientations. More important, ANDI's access to government is generalized, and not exclusive to

\(^{88}\)ANDI requested that some of the data it provided be used for statistical purposes only.

\(^{89}\)There are various reasons that make it politically significant that ANDI has chosen to locate its headquarters in Medellín, and in particular the opposition of the Antioqueño elites to State interventionism and bureaucratic centralization in Bogotá, and the presence of a substantial pro-federal movement.
any particular agency. Our data indicates that it sustains frequent contacts at all levels and all over the public sector.

To conclude, it seems that the relations between representative associations and the bureaucracy are not characterized by extensive clientela links. Two critical ingredients seem to be lacking for the establishment of large-scale, monopolistic, political ties between pressure groups and given bureaucratic organs. First, despite the fact that some influential federated associations--ANDI in particular--have the organizational capability to become the natural representative of an entire sector, they face stiff competition within the pressure group network for the representation of the interests of affiliates. Moreover, ANDI has gone further than establishing monopolistic ties with a given ministry in representation of a narrow and well defined segment of adherents; it has systematically expanded its spectrum of affiliates--even the Banking Association is a member of ANDI--and enlarged its network of communication with government to the point where its political role has transcended the narrowness of representation inherent in the concept of structured links. ANDI has adopted semi-aggregatory functions, while many of the interest groups with which it maintains close links are more oriented toward articulatory activities.
Second, those associations that do not face significant competition for the representation of the interests of a given socio-economic sector—the Merchants' Association for example—do not have the organizational capabilities to justify total receptivity on the part of a given government agency.

Patterns of Alliances

One of the principal characteristics of patrimonial states is the relative absence of horizontal contacts among associations representing the various socio-economic sectors. In the so-called paternalistic political systems vertical contacts predominate; the State seeming to be the perennial arbiter of social conflict. At least in this respect, our data shows that the Colombian political process does not entirely fit the patrimonial pattern. As figure 5 shows, sixty percent of the respondents indicated that they engaged frequently in alliances with other representative associations in the system, and thirty three percent selected a frequency in the scale lower than "frequent". It should be noted also

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91 The question as stated said: how often does this organization engage in significant alliances with other pressure groups? Never/rarely/occasionally/frequently/permanently.
Fig. 5. Histogram of Alliances among Pressure Organizations in Colombia
that the "never" option was not selected at all. When respondents were asked to describe the kinds of cooperative behavior that constituted the normal pattern of alliances with other pressure groups, three major characteristics emerged.

First, as expected, alliances take place mostly within similar types of socio-economic activity: industrialists do not tend to become involved with farmers, or labor unions with employers. There are however some examples of comprehensive efforts to create a united front vis à vis government. Virtually all interest groups participated in the sabotage of the Rojas dictatorship. In May, 1957 the UTC issued the following communiqué:

... the banks, industry, and commerce have initiated a closeout of activities. ... It is indispensable to make the necessary rectifications, and in a common action by the industrialists, the government, the workers, and with all people of good faith, to search for the formulas that will guarantee the return of normality.92

Such a statement reflects the potential ability of pressure groups to coordinate united action, whenever there is a substantial convergence of interests. The norm, though, is the absence of any such incentives. The sixty or seventy most important groups in Colombia emerged

92 Quoted in Justicia Social, No. 387, May 1957, cited by Pécaut, Sindicalismo en Colombia, p. 256.
because of functional reasons which, later on, also became primary reasons for conflict: the struggle between suppliers and clients was the origin of FENALCO; it was a reaction to price-fixing, delays in supplying the merchandise, and lack of quality controls, which have been constant problems that commerce faces in Colombia.\textsuperscript{93} Significant difficulties have arisen between the Millers' Association which favors large imports of foreign grain, and the Rice Growers' Association which is in favor of the protective interventionism the State can provide.\textsuperscript{94} Cotton growers and the fabric producers have had a long history of conflict with regard to price-fixing, which according to Gilhodes, has been a constant strategy of the manufacturers.\textsuperscript{95} The Association of Small Manufacturers (ACOPI) was born, in part, as a populist reaction intended to neutralize important industrial interests, and directly to debilitate ANDI. The quota system and the affiliation costs applied by the large manufacturers do not compensate for the services, either too general or too restricted, that ANDI provides. Large doses of informal power are held within ANDI by a restricted group of directors of large corporations--the so-called "sacred cows"--which make it

\textsuperscript{93}Interview No. 1.

\textsuperscript{94}See Gilhodes, \textit{La Question Agraire}, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid, p. 164.
increasingly difficult for small enterprises to get any real access to the power centers of ANDI.

As a matter of fact, many of ANDI's policies are even harmful for significant portions of the industrial sector. For example, ANDI attempts to obtain for the large corporations the same fiscal benefits that collective and limited societies have traditionally received in Colombia; or it intends to promote a policy of increasing the benefits of workers; something that smaller corporations claim they cannot financially afford.

A second characteristic of the inter-group alliances in Colombia is the level at which they take place. While common secret strategies are constantly developed, the execution of programs is carried out independently. ANDI, for example, has conducted business with government on a common basis only once in recent years (communiqués and visits to public officials were carried out jointly with the Mining Association). However, the tendency to meet and discuss the possibility of common strategies is well institutionalized. The presidents of the fifteen most important business groups (excluding the coffee growers) meet every month to analyze government measures, and decide how the private sector should react. Once an alternative is chosen, the load is distributed in such a way that each organization can work independently. It seems that many
of the projects undertaken in those meetings are of national scope, and deal with government measures that affect all groups roughly in the same manner; thereby making compromise possible. For example, the so-called regional funds of social capitalization (Fondos de Cesantía) whose creation implied a massive transfer of accumulated workers benefits from individual firms to a government fund, were appealed successfully to the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), as a result of decisions taken in one of these meetings. The content and consequences of the labor reforms, and the tax reforms are also constantly examined in the same context.

Labor confederations have a similar approach to alliances. They have what they call "units of action", which are ad hoc commissions usually intended to stage protests or even general strikes. Even the Communist CSTC was included, at least until 1972, when after promoting a general strike to protest against soaring prices, it skillfully refused at the last minute to grant its support to the other two confederations, causing massive lay-offs of syndical leaders and suspensions of operation permits. Lately, committees have tended to become bilateral (CTC-UTC), and as a result of the constant losses of affiliated syndicates on the part of the CTC, it seems unlikely that cooperation will be interrupted. Joint communiqués in which unity is stressed are now more and more common:
... beyond any personal or political consideration or stingy interests is the future and well-being of the Republic and the Colombian working people. Therefore, we consider syndical unity today as a social need for syndical integration; toward having in the country a great unified workers union, which not only can constitute a guarantee in the replevining struggles of the Colombian people, but can serve as a medium to provide to the national consciousness a policy inspired in social justice and the well-being of the economically weak social classes.\textsuperscript{96}

The third characteristic of inter-group alliances is the reluctance of small organizations to engage in cooperative behavior with large organizations. ANDI, one of the largest pressure groups in Colombia, is seriously studying the possibility of becoming a third degree organization (\textit{Organización Cúpula}) similar to CONFECAMARAS in Venezuela. But there are three major obstacles: ANDI applies a regressive system of dues, and since the federations have no money, individual firms would attempt to affiliate indirectly, thereby evading high dues payment. Moreover, jealousies and fears of assimilation, plus the very real possibility of unnecessary duplication of tasks, make it unattractive for smaller groups to support the creation of such an organization.

\textsuperscript{96} Joint communiqué by Tulio Cuevas, President of the UTC, and José Raquel Mercado, President of the CTC, quoted in Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia CTC, \textit{XVII Congreso Nacional del Trabajo} (Medellín: Sección de Impuestos y Publicaciones del Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal, 1972), p. 34.
It is widely felt among executives of small interest groups that government officials feel more confident by talking to them than they do when ANDI's representatives knock at their doors. In addition, affiliates are accustomed to exert tight control over their association and to receive specific services that cannot be provided to them by a large organization. Import licenses, tax exemptions, government declarations of illegality of strikes, etc., are matters that a third degree organization with definite aggregative tendencies would not be inclined to deal with.

Our statistical analysis shows a moderately strong covariation between frequency of alliances and structural variables. The Spearman correlation coefficient between frequency of alliances and concentration of power in the hands of the chief executive is -0.55; degrees of needed ratification by higher councils are also negatively related to frequency of alliances ($r_s = -0.56$). A higher degree of needed ratification by higher councils, being an indication of the tightness of administrative control that some affiliates exert on their representative associations, is symptomatic of a tendency to use pressure groups as narrow instruments of corporate representation, and the corresponding low propensity to engage in alliances. Moreover, intensive concentration of power in the hands of chief executives, which may or may not result from lack of control
by boards of directors and/or national assemblies, definitely gives rise to patterns of administrative behavior based on lack of trust about delegation of power to lower-level participants. Administrative systems which are rigidly structured to avoid diffusion of responsibilities inside, obviously have a hard time generating it toward the outside.

Other structural factors, different from mechanisms of internal control, may be responsible for the relative inability of certain organizations to engage in alliances. The Spearman correlation coefficient between horizontal differentiation, which indicates the level of specialization, and frequency of alliance is 0.45; technological sophistication and frequency of alliances are also strongly correlated ($r_s = 0.60$). It seems then, that organizations with less sophisticated structures have a lower propensity to form an alliance. The reason for this is strategic: it is widely believed among top executives of pressure groups that a system of multiple demands is more effective than a single, coordinated package backed by a cartel of organizations. The alliance is a technique to be considered only when there are technical reasons to justify it.

Particularly in those cases where government is initiating interactions by presenting comprehensive new legislation, it can become very difficult for a single group to analyze
its consequences for the sector it represents, and make solid suggestions to legislators. Groups that lack the necessary technological skills to play significant roles in the alliance are simply not invited, or if called tend to become dependent upon the more technocratized organizations. Associations that lack the necessary degree of administrative specialization have difficulties in promoting the adequate levels of compartmentalization of tasks needed to conduct, simultaneously, the daily routine, plus all the new tasks that an alliance involves.

Summary

In general our findings on indirect tactics indicate that there is a link between the structural configuration of pressure groups, and the intensity of involvement in public relations campaigns and the frequency of formation of alliances. Internal power distributions, and especially a low propensity of chief executives to allow significant participation in decision making to medium and lower-level executives, is detrimental to the organizations' ability to conduct joint political operations with other representative associations, or to stage wide range public relations campaigns. Organizational complexity, and in particular technological sophistication and specialization of tasks, are conducive to more frequent alliances and the extensive utilization of the mass media. Significant dif-
ferentials in physical size and the availability of experts tend to discourage smaller associations from engaging in alliances with larger groups.
CHAPTER IV

PRESSURE GROUP EFFECTIVENESS IN
GAINING ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING
STRUCTURES

Access is a critical goal of pressure organizations. In many respects, the different structural arrangements adopted by pressure groups are organizational responses to the constant need for devising more adaptative means of penetration to government decision making structures. Hiring criteria, the distribution of power within the group, the amount of resources allocated to technological development, must all somehow be congruent with similar factors at the bureaucratic level. Our next task consists in exploring which structural factors are more closely related with more effective access.

Technology seems to be a variable of critical importance, because of its possible impact upon government responsiveness. The development of sophisticated structures able to outdistance the technological capabilities of government planners, or at least to close any existing gap, may well prove to be the best chance pressure organizations have of maintaining open the channels of communication with the State. A bureaucracy that possesses
independent sources of statistical data, scientific guidelines for the evaluation of demands, and a coherent conception of economic and political development is less dependent on the pressures of representative associations.

Technology, however, seems to be inextricably linked with other structural elements, making it sometimes undesirable from an administrative standpoint to promote high levels of technocratization in interest groups. Many still believe in the relative superiority of particularistic methods of gaining access, and prefer to rely upon technically primitive, personalistic, and more centralized organizations in which most authority is given to politicians who supposedly still maintain sufficient connections to guarantee desirable levels of access to their colleagues in power.

Closely related to the question of technology and centralization is the entire problem of the internal distribution of tasks. Centralization for one thing invariably requires that the workflow converges to the top of the hierarchy, giving rise to structural arrangements different from those expected when tasks are significantly specialized, and/or a modern structure based upon autonomous decisions by competent professionals has been created. Parsons, Weber, and others, have also pointed out the existence of possible conflicts between line and staff. These are re-
miniscent of the mounting pressures for participation in the political and economic transactions with government that many young technocrats are exerting upon the chief executive of their respective groups.

Five dimensions of structure, namely centralization, span of control, size, dispersion, and complexity, will be statistically related to the indicators of access. These relationships, if significant, may have some practical implications both for government and the associations. We shall also explore the relative effect of various structural components upon access. Using multiple regression techniques it will be possible to begin searching for the structural configurations that best contribute to effective penetration.

Two dimensions of access will be evaluated: frequency of interaction with the public sector, and formal participation of pressure groups in the administrative apparatus of public entities. Frequency of interaction is a concept almost totally lacking in any intrinsic political significance. It does not refer to the content, significance, or effect of exchanges between interest groups and government. For that same reason, it is particularly useful in describing access, a notion that does not as such refer either to the level of political influence that may be generated when penetration takes place.
The second type of access to be considered is direct organizational representation on boards of directors of public entities. This indicator touches one of the most formal and institutionalized means for gaining access available to pressure groups today, and could be a useful tool not only in describing the level of legitimized penetration of interest associations in the system, but also to some extent the degree of dependence of government upon interest groups.

Finally, we will examine possible relationships between various forms of access. This analysis may help us to discover whether or not the availability of sufficient direct access to appropriate government targets inhibits practicing indirect strategies such as public relations campaigns through the mass media, etc. Another possible set of findings deals with the question of the overlap between different forms of direct access. Do groups with adequate access to the executive lose interest in interacting with Congress? Or do contacts with top officials in government make it unnecessary to contact low level bureaucrats? Also, by comparing the different modes of access prevalent in various categories of pressure groups, it will be possible to visualize which categories of associations, if any, are deprived of adequate linkage with the public sector.
The Interrelation between Various Modalities of Access

Frequency of interaction with government agencies, as an indicator of access, poses some definitional problems that will be discussed before evaluating possible interrelations between the various dimensions of penetration.⁹⁷

A sizeable portion of the contacts established between pressure groups and government are not directly related to political representational functions, but are routine services that groups provide to affiliates on an individual basis. The lack of significance which these transactions may have with regard to the formulation of public policy makes their presence somewhat undesirable as part of an indicator of access based upon the number of contacts with public officials. On the other hand, it is not desirable either to eliminate service-related contacts because, although these requests normally do not affect legislation per se, they can have a definite impact upon the meaning attributed to it in government circles. It is customary for affiliates to contact their association once

⁹⁷The term interaction as understood in the analysis that follows, refers to written, telephone, or personal contacts with public officials at all levels, with the primary purpose of handling any aspect of the processing of requests and/or applications filed by an interest association in its own name, or on behalf of one or more of its affiliates.
they have failed to obtain from the bureaucracy whatever was requested, and it is therefore implicit that pressure groups will use their political contacts and their representational status to modify governmental decisions and/or the interpretation given to the law by public servants.

For measurement purposes, we decided to adopt the level at which the contact is made as the criterion to separate routine from nonroutine transactions. Interaction with a given ministry, for example, is conceived as involving nonroutine contacts, defined as those involving the minister, the vice minister, and/or the secretary general. Routine contacts, on the other hand are those involving public officials at lower levels. As shown in figure 6, which describes the formal administrative hierarchy of Colombian ministries, besides the offices attached to the secretary's office there are four principal levels at which routine transactions can be conducted, namely the so-called directorates, divisions, sections, and groups.

The reason for using hierarchical levels as the basis for separating routine from nonroutine interaction with government, is that contacts at the top of the hierarchy are not those related to service operations on behalf of affiliates. Moreover, it seems that it is not easy for pressure groups to routinize their interaction with top officials; appointments must follow protocolary requirements, and only urgent and important matters are normally
Fig. 6. Organization Chart of Colombian Ministries and Administrative Departments

Source: "Derecho Administrativo I," Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes, 1975. (Mimeographed.)
discussed.

A number of measures of frequency of contacts were developed. The general procedure consisted of establishing, on the basis of estimates provided by appropriate executives during the interviewing in each association visited, the frequency of interaction with the President of the Republic, each ministry, a number of bureaucratic entities—including decentralized institutes such as the Colombian Institute of Foreign Trade (INCOMEX), the Colombian Institute of Social Security (ICSS)—, and Congress. This data was then broken into six categories of access. The frequencies of interaction with the President of the Republic and top officials in the ministries constitute the first two categories. The third and fourth categories are formed by contacts with individual congressmen and congressional committees. The fifth category represents the sum of all nonroutine contacts with the bureaucracy. Finally, all contacts at lower levels were added to calculate the yearly routine interaction with the bureaucracy.

In absolute terms, the histograms of frequency of interaction (see figures 7 to 13) indicate that representative associations in Colombia conduct a relatively large amount of daily business of all types with government entities. Interaction, however, is far from being homogeneously distributed among all categories of targets. Most pressure groups are quite ineffective in gaining access to the
presidency: eighty six percent of the sample declared that it interacted less than twice a year with the President (see figure 7); many do not interact at all with him. In fact, protocolary motives and the expression of open manifestations of political support seem to be the most common reasons for requesting a presidential audience. The Society of Colombian Farmers (SAC), for example, has visited President López only once, and the occasion--to give him a book about the agricultural question--was rather trivial. Other seemingly influential organizations, such as the Banking Association, have similar difficulties in contacting the President. Labor unions are in even worse shape: they all complain about the lack of presidential responsiveness to their efforts to gain access to his office.

The National Association of Manufacturers (ANDI) seems to be one exception. Because of its virtual role as spokesman of a large segment of the private sector, it enjoys the rights of aggregative political organizations usually not reserved to pressure groups. Moreover, ANDI's chief executive is definitely perceived in the presidential palace as an influential member of the powerful Antioqueño entrepreneurial community to which few Colombian presidents are willing to deny access. The chief of State and ANDI's president meet personally, or talk by telephone at least a dozen times per year. The topics of conversation range
Fig. 7. Histogram of Yearly Frequency of Interaction of Pressure Organizations with the President of the Republic

Mean = 1.73
Std Dev = 2.99
from broad socio-economic questions such as the decline of the stock market, or the need to control domestic stability, to narrower questions such as the degree to which the textile industry has been affected by the world economic recession and the possibility that the President might directly intervene to support government measures aimed at contributing financially to its recovery.

The finding that the overwhelming majority of Colombian pressure groups today lacks access to the office of the presidency is significant. The reason is not only, as Schmitter has pointed out with regard to Brazil, that the President is the center of an enormous patronage system and a gigantic communication network, but that the balance of power in modern Colombia has clearly shifted toward the executive. The 1968 constitutional reform, in particular, marks the beginning of a new era of executive-legislative relations, characterized by an unprecedented loss of congressional authority. The main purpose of the 1968 reform was not, however, to alter the balance of power among the branches of government. The shift was the indirect result of a much more profound change in the conception of the role the State should play in the development of a modern society. State interventionism and centralized planning were viewed at the time as the key instruments of modernization. Since there were grave doubts
about Parliament's ability to carry out effectively the
economic and political tasks involved in centralized plan-
ning--and much of the authority related to such functions
was in the hands of Congress--it was imperative to devest
this body of many of its legislative functions and rein-
force the role of the planning agencies from which the
President draws substantial technical advice. The consti-
tutional reform implied the transfer to the executive of
the power to legislate in all matters related to the na-
tional budget, public spending, as well as the management
of the nation's foreign trade and the national debt. 98
The bureaucratic structure was reorganized in such a way
that the linkage between the National Planning Depart-
ment--the agency in charge of producing the plan--and the Pre-
sident and his ministers, became the function of the Na-
tional Council of Social and Economic Policy (CONPES), an
entity that symbolizes the tremendous concentration of
power in the executive branch.

In view of the relative ineffectiveness of interest
 associations to obtain access from the president, success
in contacting cabinet members becomes the best hope they

98 Jaime Vidal Perdomo, Historia de la Reforma Cons-
titucional de 1968 y sus Alcances Jurídicos (Bogotá: Bi-
blioteca Jurídica Contemporánea, Publicaciones de la Uni-
versidad Externado de Colombia, 1970).
have to channel political demands to the top of the hierarchy in the executive branch. As indicated in figure 8, it can be estimated that pressure organizations have an average of seventeen contacts per year with ministers or vice ministers, compared to an average of one or two with the President.\textsuperscript{99} A large proportion of the sample, close to 47\%, reported that they contacted cabinet members more than once a month, usually every two weeks.

The fact that pressure groups have been successful in maintaining a moderate level of frequency of interaction at the very top of the ministries and some decentralized institutes does not necessarily imply that access is adequate, or that penetration is smooth. On the contrary, a climate of confrontation and the gradual but distinct deterioration of access seem to be pervasive by-products of the relationship between representative associations and the executive. There are several factors that have contributed to this communications gap.

From a purely tactical standpoint, interest associations have tended to create consciously a climate of

\textsuperscript{99}These figures are roughly comparable, because although there are thirteen members in the cabinet, interest groups tend to interact mainly with one minister; peasant associations with the minister of agriculture, and business groups with the ministers of the treasury and public credit, and economic development.
Fig. 8. Histogram of Yearly Nonroutine Frequency of Interaction of Pressure Organizations with the Ministries

\[\text{Mean} = 17.4\]
\[\text{Std Dev} = 9.56\]

- 53.3% at 0-15
- 40% at 16-30
- 6.7% at 31-45
crisis during the presentation to government of many of their demands, most of which are economic: business groups constantly request new credit lines, moratoriums on payments, and governmental action to lower production costs; labor and peasant associations strive for much of the same, plus an agrarian reform, lower inflation, higher wages, etc. They all are aware that the Colombian government, like many other governments in developing nations, operates under a chronic shortage of human and financial resources, and only takes action in critical cases. They know that this implies a deliberate propensity of public officials to block the channels of access to a considerable number of demands, in an effort to minimize the inevitable opposition and erosion of confidence ensuing from official rejection. Literally, the bureaucracy has become a labyrinth with the peculiar function of sorting the input of the political system. The procedures, requirements, and regulations involved in the transactions with the public sector are deliberately irrational, cumbersome, and tortuous. The processing of demands is so slow that the system is virtually always overloaded; which is tantamount to generating a mechanical device for controlling the passage of input to government decision making centers. Paradoxically, system overload, one key source of stress in political systems, according to Easton, can be interpreted in
this context not as a systemic failure but as a "gatekeeping" instrument; one more defense mechanism designed to avoid or postpone unpopular output dysfunctional to the system. 100

Pressure groups, therefore, would like to direct their efforts at the top of the hierarchy and directly contact ministers and chiefs of institutes, in an almost vain effort to bypass the tremendous obstacle that a complex bureaucratic apparatus represents for them. Group executives tend to present their cases rather dramatically, normally arguing that their problem is urgent, that the situation tends to be hopelessly catastrophic; they constantly show convenient figures that supposedly confirm or at least support their arguments.

In addition, government planners seem less and less receptive to the ideological principles and rationalizations explicit or implicit in most group demands. Neither the total lack of government regulation and planning advocated by some representatives of the private sector, nor the dictatoship of the proletariat or the classless society to which many labor unions aspire, appear to be compelling developmental models for government. It is not unlikely, instead, that the creation of a giant State could

become the basic solution from the standpoint of an emerging class of technocrats and their political leaders. Even Conservative presidents, who had been traditionally sympathetic to business groups have shown some signs of independence in the last decade. Presidents Guillermo León Valencia, and Misael Pastrana Borrero developed the habit of severely curtailing individual conversations with group presidents, and instead opted to meet with them collectively; making sure that opposing groups were present simultaneously and thereby minimizing the presentation of demands that might appear as too narrow or crude.

Pressure organizations have found it increasingly difficult to penetrate some of the new bureaucratic organs. The entire phenomenon of the transfer of power to the executive and the creation of technocratic structures, from which the President and his cabinet get their advice, have become a formidable obstacle for the maintenance of access. Moreover, the great importance attributed to centralized planning in the design of public policy has undoubtedly contributed further to isolate government from the representative associations and even the private sector as a whole. As one analyst has pointed out:

The plan has been designed by a group of technicians, on the basis of the guidelines provided by the National Council of Social and Economic Policy, but without the necessary previous consultations
with the politicians, the *gremios*, labor unions, universities.**101**

Even some presidents of influential interest associations have been forced to resign because of their growing inability to communicate with certain government offices. The creation of the *Junta Monetaria* (similar to the Federal Reserve Board) and the National Planning Department has put more than one pressure group on the sidelines of political action. While in the past, the Colombian Banking Association (ASOBANCARIA), for example, used to dictate monetary policy, it now faces the hermetic *Junta Monetaria* which is not the least interested in consulting with it concerning the measures it plans to enact. In 1973, ASOBANCARIA's president, Jorge Mejía Palacio was able to obtain legal consultative status for his association in the Bank of the Republic (the central bank), and three members of the bank's board of directors are now nominated by the association.**102** This campaign, which normally should have institutionalized the organization's access to an organ instrumental in designing monetary policy in Colombia, came too late. It had little practical significance because the Central Bank had already become an instrument of the *Junta*

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**102** Conferred by Article 10, Decree 2617 of 1973.
Monetaria. The private banks are frequently caught by surprise, and none of their efforts to regain access have so far proved successful. Not long ago, for example, they attempted to establish a technical liaison with the Junta Monetaria; but the effort was a total failure. Nevertheless, the complexity of banking and the unexpected effects of monetary measures largely taken in a vacuum makes it imperative for the Junta Monetaria to have some minimum interaction with the banking community. Its solution to this need, however, has been to by-pass the Banking Association, and instead secretly to consult reputable bankers on an individual basis. These are often ex-post facto consultation oriented not so much to alter the substance of adopted policies, but to make implementation possible.

It is likely that the redistribution of powers that has characterized the political process in Colombia during recent years would be conducive to changes in the types of targets which pressure groups would choose in order to apply political pressure. It could be expected that organizations with better access to top officials in the bureaucracy would tend to minimize interaction with Congress. In absolute terms, however, both interaction with individual congressmen (see figure 9) and congressional committees (see figure 10) are far from being extinct; more than half the organizations in the sample report
Fig. 9. Histogram of Yearly Frequency of Interaction of Pressure Organizations with Individual Congressmen
Fig. 10. Histogram of Yearly Frequency of Interaction of Pressure Organizations with Congressional Committees
having either occasional, frequent, or permanent interaction with congressmen. One-third of the groups in the sample are frequent or even permanent visitors of congressional committees.

The reason for the relative attractiveness of Congress as a target for pressure groups is that despite the substantial loss of legislative functions it has suffered, and in particular the fact that it is rarely involved in the initiation and drafting phases of decision making, legislative approval of bills of executive origin is generally required. The absence of congressional involvement in policy making is specially acute in the domain of planning. Although the 1968 reform provided for congressional involvement in the supervision and control of economic planning through the so-called Comisión de Plan, the commission was never formed. However, less formal links have developed over time between Congress and the Planning Department; the most obvious example being the Bipartisan Parliamentary Commission for Urban and Regional Planning, which has been involved in the drafting of a dozen or so projects usually of secondary importance. But the progressive evolution toward greater executive dominance has not meant a stagnation of congressional activity. A longitudinal analysis of congressional efficiency carried out by Leal et al. clearly indicates that although the
volume of legislation approved by Congress after 1968 has tended to decrease, the socio-economic impact of the laws passed is far greater for the 1968-1974 period than in previous decades.103

It is debatable whether or not Congress has been ineffective in maintaining sufficient decision making autonomy vis-à-vis the executive. Leal et al. have concluded that Congress responds with relative automatism to the executive's requirements. It seems inappropriate, nevertheless, to assume that Congress has become a rubber stamp. In 1975, for example, a comprehensive package of labor legislation drafted by members of Parliament representing the labor unions—which included features such as more than ten percent interest on unpaid benefits (cesantías), the continued payment of wages to workers on legal strike, and a substantial redefinition of retirement terms—was being debated, and some of its articles had been approved in early 1976. Congress has also successfully opposed some executive initiatives. Since presidents have traditionally insisted that the decrees enacted with the special powers conferred through the state of siege (Article 121) and/or the state of economic emergency (Article 122) be promptly

replaced by ordinary laws, Congress, in addition to its regular legislative faculties, has had the opportunity to develop significant blocking powers. As Dix has pointed out, "it is more effective at obstruction that at positive action. For the most part, its power to enact legislation is a power to formalize what has been decided elsewhere." 104

Almost naturally, pressure groups, and in particular the business associations, have seen in Congress an appropriate instrument for hindering executive action but rarely as a tool for the implementation of their own policies. Most of the pressure in this regard is applied to the presidents of committees in order to impede the nomination of chairmans or reporting committees (ponentes), or if the strategy fails, to induce the ponentes to delay indefinitely the submittal of recommendations and findings. This tactic is frequently combined with additional pressure upon prominent committee members, designed to induce them to vote in tacit representation of the group's interests and/or introduce modifications to the bills regarded as favorable to the association. The lack of interest many business organizations have shown in utilizing Congress as a tool to promote their own projects is of course due to the fact that legislators are often perceived as censors

104 Dix, Columbia, p. 174.
without political strength. The Manufacturers' Association, for example, apparently has never brought a single bill to the legislature. The Merchants' Association has been actively involved with Congress only four times in the last five years. Most large organizations, however, do not neglect Congress: in addition to common cases of overlap between parliamentary and corporate functions, many associations have personnel specifically in charge of supervising congressional action. Moreover, occasionally, groups of congressmen are invited to meetings sponsored by the associations in which points of view are exchanged; such seminars, however, tend to be rather protocoly. Only rarely do chief executives of interest associations personally intervene in parliamentary debates, although they are never insensitive to requests by the President of the Republic for special economic powers, or bills designed to modify the labor code introduced by the unions through sympathetic members. Both types of measures are systematically opposed by the private sector.

Labor unions on the other hand, do rely heavily on parliamentary action. To a certain extent, this tendency is the product of the circumstances in which organized labor was given an institutionalized role in the polity, and the intimacy of the relationship between the political parties and the confederations. The mobilization of
workers, the expansion of participation of the lower classes, and in particular the passage from oligarchic praetorianism to radical praetorianism—to use Huntington's terminology—involved the adoption by the traditional parties of the role of channeling and structuring the inclusion of labor in the political process. Parties, to a great extent, defined the boundaries of the political role the labor confederations were expected to play in the system; and the confederations (particularly the CTC and the UTC), in turn, were led to view the legislature, which is one favorite arena of political parties, as a natural target to institutionalize their own access to the system. It should also be remembered that one of the principal factors involved in the political strength of labor is their potential electoral capabilities, which result from the direct control the confederations exert upon the worker's vote. Not only is the legislature a realistic instrument for the achievement of labor representation in the public sector, but the fact that confederal leaders are able to obtain official, stable, and institutionalized representation in a State organ, is by itself a powerful instrument for inducing affiliated unions to channel their demands through the confederations. The drive toward congressional representation, in other words, is not only an instrument of access to government but also a critical
mechanism of internal control.

It should be noted that only pro status quo confederations such as the CTC and the UTC, which have strongly tended toward officialism and are aligned with the traditional parties have proved to be capable, consistently, of developing the electoral strength necessary to achieve direct representation in Congress. The more pro-revolutionary and combative the unions become, the lower their ability to achieve direct representation. The National Association of Land Tenants (ANUC), a leftist group, reports having few contacts with either the committees themselves or individual congressmen. The Syndical Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC), although constantly attempting to improve its relations with members of Parliament belonging to all parties, has so far got a rather cool reception from Liberal and Conservative congressmen; and only legislators representing the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO), the populist opposition party, seem to be inclined to establish regular links with the leaders of the CSTC.

More generally, our findings indicate that in the Colombian case, most forms of access, direct or indirect, are positively interrelated. The interaction with top personnel in ministries, for example, is far from being inversely related with the frequency of contacts with con-
gressional committees. A Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.4, on the contrary, indicates that both variables run in somewhat similar directions. This phenomenon, very probably, is an indirect consequence of the relative ineffectiveness most pressure groups have experienced in penetrating the newly-created structures upon which the executive bases the formulation of public policy. Under the circumstances, it is obviously worthwhile for them to maintain other links, and focus upon phases of decision making different from policy formulation. The stage of legislative approval, during which a pliant Congress is centrally involved; and the implementation phase, where the contrast between the new and the old bureaucracy is more evident, are two key arenas for additional political action. It should be noted that in some nations, the inability of pressure groups to affect social and economic planning has led to a more or less generalized loss of interest on the part of representative associations in preserving active links with government planners in charge of designing public policy--instead of the expansion of the spectrum of penetration that we have observed in Colombia. For example, von der Mehden has concluded that the Malaysian interest organization is fundamentally concerned "in influencing the output rather than the input functions of government, i.e., it seeks to determine how laws and regulations already
formulated will effect the organization. Thus, influence is directed more at the implementation of output by the administrative elements of government." 105

Pressure groups are aware that by gaining access to seemingly unimportant public officials, a critical first step in future attempts at influencing decision making is made. Laws are far too general. Later on, the procedures, requirements, proofs, deadlines, and terms must be defined. This is precisely the task of medium-level officials. The considerable amount of routine contacts shown in figure 11 includes many deliberate attempts to exert pressure at the implementation stage. The corresponding histogram indicates that more than fifty three percent of the groups in the sample contact public officials at lower levels between 50 and 250 times a year; this implies that some of them interact with them on a daily basis. These figures contrast sharply with high level contacts: only thirteen percent of the sample interacts between 80 and 150 times a year with top officials in government (see figure 12). The new government structures at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy are and will continue to be, numerically, only a minority with regard to the public sector as a whole.

105 Fred. R. von der Mehden, "Interest Groups and Government Policy in Malaysia," Program of Development Studies, Rice University, 1975, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)
Fig. 11. Histogram of Yearly Routine Interaction of Pressure Organization with the Bureaucracy

Mean = 187.3
Std. dev. = 137.6
Fig. 12. Histogram of Yearly Nonroutine Interaction of Pressure Organizations with the Bureaucracy

Mean = 36.5
Std. dev. = 40.4
No matter how comprehensive or imperative their decision may be, policy implementation will continue to involve the intervention of the traditional segment of the bureaucracy and lower-level bureaucrats.

**Formal Representation in Public Entities**

Formal representation in boards of directors is the most obvious mechanism to insure the long range maintenance of access to government targets. A relatively high turnover of ministers and directors of public institutes constantly creates the danger of a sudden drop in the level of access. Personal antagonisms and ideological differences have been known to temporarily weaken the political participation of pressure groups. The institutionalization provided by formal representation therefore introduces elements of legitimacy, legality, and tradition not necessarily found in other forms of penetration. From a numeric standpoint, it appears that the Colombian pressure group network has not completely lost all of its representational status vis à vis the State: the organizations in the sample participate in an average of three to four boards of directors of public entities and/or governmental councils.

Membership on boards of directors of government entities and advisory councils can be either direct or
indirect. In the direct type, pressure groups are given the opportunity to make up their own list of candidates (usually composed of three names) from which the President of the Republic makes a final choice. In the indirect type, representation is not granted to a pressure group per se, but to an entire sector, such as the private sector, for example. The relevant interest associations meet and agree upon a list, which is then submitted to the chief of State for final selection. Although, unquestionably, both methods provide innumerable opportunities for channeling associational demands, the main function of this system of access is merely the transmission of information about government plans and policies which may affect the group. In this regard, indirect representation is not nearly as attractive to the associations as direct forms, since they may not be completely familiar with the candidate that is finally selected, and may have some difficulties in having him report to them.

Official representation of pressure groups on boards of directors of public entities is the area in which the erosion of access to decision making centers is more visible. In the late 1960s, during the administration of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a shift of emphasis took place with regard to the nature of the involvement representative associations should have in the formulation of public policy. The participation of interest groups in
boards of directors of public entities was drastically curtailed. The National Agrarian Federation (FANAL), a peasant organization associated with the UTC, lost most of its participation in 1967, and today has only one member on a regional committee of the National Training Service (SENA). Pressure groups, aware of the implications this trend has in terms of access to critical decision making structures, have bitterly complained:

A fact that the Colombian public opinion has been ignoring, and which has to be highlighted in the present report, is the loss of representation of the agrarian movement "FESTRACOL"-"CTC" on the board of directors of INCORA*. In a particularly reprehensive manner, the National Government by Decree No. 755 of March 3, 1967 deprives us, with no explanation whatsoever, of this representation, which serves as an effective mean to exert some influence in the organ that is in charge of agrarian reform policies. . ,106

The loss of representation in bureaucratic entities with decision making authority was compensated by providing representative associations with formal representation on advisory committees attached to government agencies. Existing councils were strengthened, and new ones were created in order to institutionalize the new role the private sector and labor should play in the system of public adminis-

*Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform.

106 XII Congreso Nacional del Trabajo (Medellín; Sección de Impresos y Publicaciones del Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal, 1972), p. 27.
tration. First, an already existing organ, the National Council of Salaries, was made stronger; and a similar entity, the National Council of Labor was created in order to rationalize the wage system and conduct the necessary negotiations to establish and readjust the minimum salary.\textsuperscript{107} Second, in 1969 were created the so-called sector committees in the Ministry of Economic Development, whose main function is to advise the ministry in matters of economic planning related to the development of a number of sectors, and especially the petrochemical, metal-mechanic, cement, and auto industries. Third, a number of regional committees, such as the Comité de Desarrollo Regional del Valle del Cauca, the Comité Turístico de Cartagena, and the Comité de Desarrollo Regional del Departamento del Atlántico, were created to link the regions to central planning.\textsuperscript{108} Many of these boards and councils meet only rarely, some once a year, reducing even further any real chance for active consultation. It should be noted that, in addition to the public organs already mentioned, pressure groups are typically represented in the Institute of Social Security, the National Railways, the

\textsuperscript{107} Crispín Villazón de Armas, "Discurso de Instalación del XVII Congreso Extraordinario de la Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia CTC," XVII Congreso de la CTC, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{108} Reveiz, "Planeación Concertada," p. 25.
the Colombian Institute of Electric Energy, etc. The presence of representative associations on the boards of directors of these public entities, however, lacks political impact in terms of public policy formulation, and is mostly intended to link the users of public services to the administrative problems of State enterprises.

One of the most comprehensive efforts by any administration to institutionalize status of representative associations came during the early days of Alfonso López's presidency, with the establishment during the early 1970s of the Comité Intergremial, which was supposed to become the main instrument of the "concerted policy"—a fundamental element of López's political platform. The committee has met only once so far, and was unanimously boycotted by interest groups when they realized that this channel of access was in fact a dead end. Previous efforts in the same direction have also been a failure, despite the initial interest of pressure groups. During the administration of President Lleras Restrepo an attempt was also made to create a conference, the so-called Tripartite Conference, which was supposed to encourage the dialogue between government, labor, and the employers. But as Tulio Cuevas, president of the UTC, rightfully points out:

For a long time, Mr. President, we have been preaching the need of maintaining an open relationship between governmental forces, capital, and labor; we defend the idea of a permanent Tripartite
Conference as the mean to establish a constant vigilance over the processes of reform in today's social and economic circumstances. Last year we attempted to develop this idea, but we ended up meeting to be informed about a bill that the Minister of Labor wanted to introduce in order to modify the labor legislation, at a time when no one was requesting it. . . . Therefore, clearly, the Minister frustrated an important historic moment in the development of this policy. 109

It could be argued that government is the real beneficiary of the consultations it conducts with the associations. Not only does it obtain information about which projects are likely to be politicized, thereby allowing government officials to forecast reactions and prepare appropriate strategies, but it conveys the impression of actively sponsoring an open and democratic political process, when in fact many of these consultative organs are only pro forma committees. The Regional Committees, the National Council of Salaries, and the National Council of Labor, to cite just three examples, are primarily surrogate political institutions, pseudo-arenas designed to buffer the impact of conflictive demands upon the system by isolating real decision making structures.

As it stands at present, formal participation in government committees is only a supplement to direct interaction with ministers and other high level officials. Most

109 Tulio Cuevas, Por una Democracia Social, (Bogotá: Populibro, 1970), p. 47.
forms of access are cumulative: organizations having reached a high degree of effectiveness in one category of penetration also tend to be successful with regard to other targets, at various levels. This is particularly confirmed statistically by the substantial correlation existing, for example, between the number of boards to which associations have obtained direct membership, and the number of yearly nonroutine contacts with high level officials in the executive branch \( r = 0.48 \). The size of financial resources allocated for public relations campaigns, and formal participation are also moderately correlated \( r = 0.47 \). It should be noted, nevertheless, that neither frequency of interaction with congressional committees \( r_s = 0.10 \) nor routine contacts with the executive branch \( r = 0.20 \) are significantly associated with formal participation on boards of directors.

Access and Pressure Group Structure

Not enough is known at present about how access of pressure groups to government decision making centers is determined. In particular, we do not know the relative explanatory value of internal organization factors versus environmental factors such as shifts in the balance of power among the branches of government, the bureaucratization of the State, the technocratization of the mechanisms of public administration, prevalent ideological beliefs,
and so on. It seems even more difficult to attribute definitive causality to variables at various levels of analysis, due to the complexity of the linkages that develop between pressure organizations and the political institutions; between internal structural mechanisms at the organizational level, and political elements at the environmental level.

Although it has generally been recognized that the ability to contact appropriate public officials and to select government targets is largely dependent upon norms, practices, and events originating at the level of political institutions, it is frequently overlooked that the behavior of pressure groups, including the choice of tactics of penetration and structural arrangements, often trigger profound reforms in the institutional system and the political process. The 1968 constitutional reform can be interpreted as an effort to curtail the decision making authority of a Congress viewed by a modernizing president as too malleable, and too accessible to pressure groups and other narrow clienteles.

Moreover, there are valid theoretical reasons that make us expect that representative associations have the ability to trigger government responses or output. The flow models and the entire functionalist approach, controversial as they may be, have led political scientists to
assume that interest groups are instrumental in transforming expectations, interests, preferences, and ideological principles into processable demands that will later flow to government. Interest groups can therefore be expected to actively shape demands; and structural factors, which represent the most durable patterns upon which the processing of demands is based, can legitimately be expected to generate the choices, alternatives, and capabilities required for political action.

The results obtained from correlating structural variables with various indicators of penetration leave little doubt about the influence of organizational development on effectiveness in gaining access, at all levels. As both the number of technically competent personnel working full time for an association, as well as the production of technical material, increase all three variables of access considered (see table 8) also tend to increase in a similar direction. This is the case for interaction related to routine matters ($r = 0.66$ and $0.56$ respectively), nonroutine contacts ($r = 0.85$ and $0.83$), and participation in consultative boards of public entities ($r = 0.40$ and $0.55$). Coefficients are significantly higher in the case of high-level contacts, reflecting the crucial role of technological competence in transactions involving ministers and other leaders in the executive branch, who make constant
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Routine interaction (low-level contacts)</th>
<th>Nonroutine interaction (high-level contacts)</th>
<th>Participation on boards of public entities</th>
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<td><strong>Vertical Span</strong></td>
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<td>0.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.86</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Amount of personnel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Technical material</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
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</tr>
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**TABLE 8**

Correlation Coefficients Between Access to Government and Organizational Structure
use of the new bureaucracy, where the influence of modernizing technocrats is more visible.

The strategy of hiring large numbers of university-trained individuals for executive positions in order to keep pace with similar trends in the public sector, in addition to its direct effect on access, has resulted in more efficient organizational procedures, which in turn provide the necessary drive for better access at lower levels. The generalized use of qualified executive personnel improves significantly the capabilities of the structure, enabling it to process an increasing volume of demands, inflating the number of requests and attempted contacts with public officials, and in the end, creating strong pressures for greater receptivity and access to the organization's demands. The greater use of advanced technology is a strong inducement for affiliates to transfer the processing of both routine business and the more sensitive kinds of transactions, to their corresponding representative associations.

In addition, it could be expected that technocrats have a greater propensity, compared to the average politician, to integrate demands into broader contexts and policies seemingly beneficial to larger sectors of the economy, or at least compatible in tone and terminology with governmental proposals. This seems to be one of the few trends
that can reverse the conviction, common among government decision makers, that the average pressure group is not a convincing interlocutor.

Size is also a critical structural variable in pressure group politics. Size is the most visible feature of an organization and a powerful frame of reference for the perception and interpretation of political demands by policy makers. Large organizations are usually viewed as strong organizations. Size and technocratization, as indicated before, are linked, although it is not clear if one induces the other, or if they simply go together as a response to a third force. The economic wealth of a social sector, an industry, etc. may well be the basic requirement for accelerated growth. Historically, entrepreneurs have had more resources available to engage in expansion programs than blue-collar workers, for example, although it has not been necessarily true that the development of large pressure groups has automatically followed the emergence of financially powerful sectors. Financial institutions such as the Colombian Financial Corporation, and innumerable regional financial groups, have not traditionally relied on representative associations to channel their demands. As we have noted, probably a majority of powerful interests have chosen to adhere to the axiom that small, easily controllable groups are better than large, complex organiza-
tions; one exception being, of course, the manufacturing sector.

It is remarkable how substantial investments in the development of large representative associations seem to have paid off in terms of improvement of penetration. Budget size and the number of executive personnel are significantly correlated with all three indicators of access. These results consistently show that larger pressure groups can and do interact with government entities more often than smaller ones. Although smaller organizations may also require less access to government because of lower representative responsibilities and fewer demands to process, they are in fact in a relatively disadvantageous position because of their inability to benefit from economies of scale, the broader spectrum of penetration, and the greater range of demands and services that larger groups can generate. Moreover, they certainly do not have the cumulative impact upon public officials that large pressure groups do, which result from their constant use of a broad range of channels of access. Our research indicates that ANDI, the largest group, has regular contacts with a much greater variety of public offices than any other of the smaller, more restricted associations.

Moreover, independently of the absolute number of contacts, institutionalized representation in government,
i.e. the number of official boards of directors to which they appoint a representative, is consistently better for organizations with more personnel \( r = 0.73 \), and larger budgets \( r = 0.38 \).

An interesting finding from an administrative standpoint is the superiority of specialized organizations with predominantly horizontal stratifications over primitive groups with "tall," vertical hierarchies. Indeed, specialization, measured by the horizontal length of the structure in its wider segment, is a much better predictor of all three modes of access than vertical span. This can be interpreted as meaning that if pressure groups with similar volumes of demands to be processed were compared, the vertically structured organizations would be considerably less effective in channeling demands, in gaining access to expected targets, than those that have divided labor along horizontal lines. An explanation could be that when specialization of tasks is combined with professional expertise, constant supervision, approval, and coordination of labor by the chief executive can be minimized. This, in turn, increases considerably the volume of demands processed per unit of time. With regard to representation on boards of directors of public corporations, the higher correlation between representation and horizontal stratification also indicates the greater in-
ternal autonomy and trust given to professionals in specialized organizations. Vertical structures, on the other hand, not only are conducive to many decisional pressures on the chief executive, thereby reducing his capability to engage in activities outside the organization, but may also create doubts about his attractiveness as a government consultant when he is compared to seemingly less politicized experts available in specialized associations.

Control is a critical variable in the choice of structural arrangements adopted by pressure groups. Requirements of control are the heart of any explanation of the structural evolution or representative associations. The degree of technocratization, physical growth, and specialization are inextricably linked with control. Pressure groups like any other organization are tools designed, willingly or unwillingly, to promote individual and corporate interests. They constantly serve as arenas in which participants try to maintain or expand their share of power.

Centralization, defined as high concentration of power, usually at the top of the hierarchy, is the variable that best portrays existing arrangements among actors with regard to control. The relationship between centralization and access is an important indication of the degree to which high concentration of power is incompatible with
penetration. It should be noted first that, although centralization is negatively correlated with effectiveness in gaining access to governmental targets, its impact is considerably lower than that of the other structural factors; and in some cases, correlation coefficients are not statistically significant. Routine interaction, in particular, is not affected by centralization. This, of course, reflects the fact that most routine services are mechanically dealt with by lower-level employees independently of the sources of control.

High concentration of power in the hands of the chief executive is detrimental to both high-level contacts and participation on boards of directors of public organs. Decentralization is the best predictor among the three indicators (decentralization, centralization, and ratification of decisions by boards of directors and/or general assemblies) but the moderate size of the correlation coefficients supports the hypothesis that it is still profitable for affiliates to continue practicing strategies of penetration based upon centralization, personalism, and politization. There is no definite evidence that highly developed structures are the only effective forms of organization to promote access in today's Colombia. It is not even clear whether or not any kind of organization is needed to channel demands to the public sector. As Dix
Many of the older, more informal means of urging demands upon government of course linger. It is even probable that these continue to be cumulatively more important than organized, associational interests. Personal, family, and client relationships still carry much of the burden of channeling claims to government. Even where an interest group has been constituted to perform such a function the personal connections of its president with officials of the government, or their common membership in a social club, may be the determinant of whether the views of the group received due consideration.\(^{110}\)

The gradual conversion of the top decision making structures of government into modern formats of organization has nevertheless largely restricted the use of personalistic tactics to those political institutions that have resisted change. Contacts with Congress, in particular, are not affected by structural factors. No statistical evidence was found to support the hypothesis that pressure groups with advanced structures have any significant advantage over traditional groups in creating links with Congress. Only insignificant associations exist between frequency of contacts with congressional committees, and budget size \((r_s = 0.07)\), number of professionals employed by the group \((r_s = 0.23)\), or the production of technical material \((r_s = -0.01)\). More important, diffusion of power, which seems to symbolize the breaking with powerful

\(^{110}\) Dix, *Colombia*, pp. 322 & 323.
and personalistic chief executives in interest groups is, for the first time in this analysis, negatively correlated with an indicator of access: the coefficient of association between decentralization and frequency of contacts with congressional committees is -0.32. Moreover, the higher the proportion of decisions needing ratification in a group, which reflects the degree of direct control of the organization by affiliates, the higher also the frequency of interaction with Congress ($r_s = 0.32$).

In an effort to determine the relative contribution to access of some of the principal structural factors analyzed, and the combination of variables that better predicts access to government, a number of multiple regression equations were explored. Due to the relative abundance of both dependent and independent variables, and the innumerable possible combinations to which they give rise, we decided to discuss only one function which is particularly representative.

The equation we selected measures the influence of centralization, specialization, and technology on nonroutine frequency of interaction with the bureaucracy. This equation indicates that close to eighty percent of the variation in nonroutine contacts with the bureaucracy ($R^2 = 0.797$) is statistically explained by these three variables operating jointly. The less powerful predictor,
as expected from our previous findings, is centralization which explains four percent of the total variance.\textsuperscript{111}

The influence of centralization is diminished when the confounding effects of specialization and technology are controlled: the regression coefficient for the centralization/frequency of interaction relationship is -0.008, compared with a much higher simple correlation of -0.209. By inspecting the standardized regression coefficients it becomes clear that specialization has the highest relative importance (beta = 0.50), technology comes second (beta = 0.43), and centralization is last (beta = 0.04). From an inferential standpoint, in order to extend findings that specifically apply to our sample of fifteen organizations, to the entire population of pressure groups, we performed one-sided tests of significance for the three regression coefficients in the equation. As figure 13 indicates, only specialization is statistically significant at the five percent level.\textsuperscript{112} Since the statistical evidence is

\begin{equation}
Y = 6.385 - 0.008 X_1 + 1.920 X_2 + 1.222 X_3
\end{equation}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
X_1 & centralization \\
X_2 & specialization \\
X_3 & technology \\
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{112}It can be observed from figure 13 that $t_2$ is the only $t$ coefficient in the rejection zone of the null hypothesis (that is, that the coefficients are equal to zero). However, $t_3 = 1.59$, the coefficient corresponding to technology is very close to the critical $t$ at the 5% level (with 13 degrees of freedom), and is significant at the 6% level.
Fig. 13. Hypothesis Testing for the Regression Coefficients
Describing the Effect of Centralization, Specialization,
and Technology upon Frequency of Nonroutine Interaction
of Pressure Organizations with the Bureaucracy

Null
hypothesis

True b
unknown

\[ t_{0.05} = 1.771 \]

Distribution of
estimators \( \hat{b}_1, \hat{b}_2, \text{and} \hat{b}_3 \)

5%

Original
values of \( \hat{b} \)

Reject \( H_0 \)

\( t_1 = \) Centralization
\( t_2 = \) Specialization
\( t_3 = \) Technology

Hypotheses

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<th>Sample size = 15</th>
<th>Regr. d.f. = 3</th>
<th>Residual d.f. = 11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( b_1 ) 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b_2 ) 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>( b_3 ) 0</td>
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</table>
consistent with our prior beliefs, we reject the null hypothesis with regard to specialization, i.e. that there is no relationship between access and specialization of tasks. We are not inclined, however, to accept the null hypothesis with regard to specialization and technology, because there is a theoretical expectation of the existence of a relationship between these two variables, and access to government.

The Evolution of the Organizational Structure of Pressure Groups and the Technocratization of the State

Although at present the more technocratized segment of the bureaucracy has overrun the organizational capabilities exhibited by the network of representative associations as a whole, historically it was in part the structural superiority of interest groups over government which induced the great access Colombian pressure groups have traditionally enjoyed. First, before the trend was reversed, pressure organizations, with the exception of labor, have had an undisputed technical superiority over government. As Dix has indicated:

... The government has found it desirable, even necessary, to link more closely to it many of the gremios,* which often outdistance the

---

*"Literally meaning guild, the term gremio is used in Colombia to denote any group organized to defend its economic interests, particularly trade and professional associations."

relevant agencies of government in technical expertise and administrative capacity. Some interest associations have by law been granted official consultative status with particular ministries or government agencies. . .113

In each type of economic activity the know-how was the monopoly of each association and the government necessarily had to rely on borrowed technology to legislate; the coffee growers were the undisputed masters of all technical problems involved in controlling the domestic production and the international marketing of the produce; the Banking Association inherited from the international banks, through their Colombian subsidiaries, all the principles and details of banking. The agency that regulates banking in Colombia, the Superintendencia Bancaria, instead has been dominated by lawyers who are seen in the banking community as too inclined to conceive technical matters in legal terms. Moreover, the Colombian bureaucracy has been painfully slow in creating independent sources of information, and constant struggles between the National Planning Department and the National Statistical Administrative Department (DANE) have partially deprived policy makers of this vital input. The result has often been that the data provided by the associations have become the sole figures available for constructing aggrega-

113 Dix, Colombia, p. 326.
tive indicators.

Second, during the forties and fifties, despite their relative technical superiority, most associations relied on rather primitive structures which proved to be rather adaptative in the short run. Pressure groups were able to benefit from their lack of structure because, in the context of a primitive political system and an underdeveloped economy, the atomization of the pressure group network implied reduced organizational requirements in terms of diffusion of responsibilities, size, volume of the workflow, dispersion, coordination of tasks, etc.

In a general environment of laissez faire, the associations had little work to do. The technology was readily available, and well known leaders easily dominated any potential power contender within the organization. Pressure groups, in view of the personalism that characterized the executive branch, also adopted personalistic administrative methods with few routinized procedures, programs, or fixed norms. High levels of centralization predominated; it was necessary to provide the organization with a respected chief executive who could match the political stature of the President of the Republic, and simultaneously control the group. Equally important, the absence of a formal and rigid structure made it always possible to adapt the hierarchy to sudden changes of regime, by simply removing
one person. New presidents, compatible with the politicians in power, could be easily brought in.

But the basic social and political parameters upon which these fragile organizational forms and also the whole stability of the political system depended were gradually changing, making it impossible to preserve intact, over the long run, existing organizational arrangements both in the bureaucracy and the pressure group network. Probably during the decade of the sixties, unprecedented socio-political elements triggered institutional alterations that significantly reduced the traditional accessibility of the public sector for the pressure groups.

Possibly a combination of factors at various levels was responsible for this shift in government receptivity to narrow demands. In the last thirty years, accelerated population growth and social mobility had induced substantial urban unrest, forcing the central government to provide some minimal services and opportunities to the large displaced segments of the population that were in search of stable patterns of urban membership. Since industrial and commercial growth by themselves were not sufficient to provide the needed resources, it rapidly became clear that some kind of redistribution of material resources and power would have to take place if large scale deprivation and aggression were to be avoided. In 1948, the murder of
Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the leftist political leader, and the reaction to his assassination which lead to mass riots in Bogotá and several thousand deaths, symbolized the advanced social erosion and institutional disintegration that were taken place. From then on instability spread to the countryside in epidemic proportions. The violencia, as this phenomenon has been called, cost some 150,000 lives between 1948 and 1964. The violencia was not exactly the mass revolution that might have been predicted from Huntingtonian theory, but it undoubtedly contributed to unprecedented institutional alterations. Cleavages were dealt with at the elite level: the military took over in 1953, and final accommodation was reached during the National Front. But the Rojas dictatorship tended to exclude some traditional institutions from the political process long enough to institutionalize their exclusion. The traditional two-party system was put aside for a number of years and Congress was partially disabled. When stability was restored, institutional reconstruction was initiated, but reconstruction did not imply the complete revival of old institutions. Instead, new technocratic structures were superimposed on the traditional bureaucracy, and additional powers were given to the presidency.

An attempt was made to shield the new bureaucracy from external influences. Technical expertise became, in
addition to inevitable particularistic criteria, a necessary hiring requirement. A predominantly horizontal hierarchy that could allow creativity and autonomy replaced the traditional authoritarian structure. Strategic flexibility and absolute loyalty to the President of the Republic were insured by imposing a system of high mobility of technicians who are obliged to "migrate" each time a director is removed. Secrecy became a predominant feature: the directors of these organs tend to report directly and exclusively to CONPES, the National Council of Economic and Social Policy, which is composed of the President of the Republic, the ministers of economic affairs, foreign affairs, labor, and the director of the Colombian Institute of Foreign Trade. The units composing the structure were to a great extent isolated from each other to insure independence from outside influences. An effort was made to establish rigid decisional criteria that would minimize the so-called political considerations in decision making. Finally, government solved for the years to come its recruitment problems by investing large sums in international fellowships to be given to students who were ready to work for government after graduation.

The net effect has been the establishment of a mixed, somewhat contradictory institutional system. On the one hand there is a decaying bureaucracy and a pliant
Congress with which the traditional structure of pressure groups fits rather well. On the other, reformist presidents and new agencies aspiring to technocratic purity have attempted to brake the channels of communication with the interest associations. Personalistic structures, clearly, are no longer congruent with the new bureaucratic patterns.

The principal obstacle to access is of technical nature. The sudden technocratization of decision making agencies has created an unprecedented gap that requires the modernization of the structures of interest groups as well. Government planners have discovered that the political system and the economy are far more elastic than believed. Negotiations and transactions must now be based upon reliable or at least convincing figures; economic advice can no longer be expressed in emotional or vague terms. The creation of an effective technical staff on the part of pressure groups, however, has proved to be relatively incompatible with existing structures. The high levels of centralization to which most adherents are accustomed are not congruent with technocratization. There seem to be two main types of incompatibilities: generational and financial. Traditional political figures, and the representatives of affiliates who play the role of liaison officials with the associations, have a natural distrust
for the academician. Technocrats, on the other hand, have not always been ready to internalize the values inherent in political pressure and sector representation. The beliefs acquired during their academic training are rationalistic and universalistic; the expectations of a traditional pressure organization are narrow and particularistic. The successful accommodation of their social sensitivity to the principles implicit in the defense of narrow interests inevitably gives rise to organizational conflict and change.

Agrarian organizations, either peasants' unions or planters' associations, have generally failed to make the transition to modern organizational forms. As indicated earlier, this structural type is still at an embryonic stage characterized by low complexity and low technological sophistication (see part 'b' of figure 4). They have not yet adapted to the technocratization of the State. Peasant associations, as we mentioned before, do not have the necessary financial resources to engage in viable recruitment programs that would solve the problems posed by the lack of technicians. The National Association of Land Tenants (ANUC) has been one of the hardest hit, and tends to rely on the basic training courses it provides as the main mechanism for recruiting the local leaders that will later be in charge of devising the association's proposals
to the agrarian institutes, and evaluating the effect of their policies. The National Agrarian Federation (FANAL), because of its intimate ties with the church since its creation in 1944, has benefited from the technical assistance provided by the Jesuits. Nationally known priests such as Fathers Federico Vieira and Vicente Andrade, supported by the staff of professors of the Universidad Javeriana (the Jesuit school) have sought to provide, at least at the national level, some minimal technical advice. But the infiltration of the peasant movements by the leftist ideologues has tended to be the rule, radicalizing their goals and making communication with government technocrats even more difficult. Unsurprisingly, peasant associations do not have access to the planning departments, and are only marginally involved in the making of an agrarian reform that in any case ranks rather low in today's priorities.

Planters' associations such as the Federation of Rice Planters, the Federation of Cotton Producers, or the Association of Sugar Cane Producers (ASOCANÁ) have represented the aristocratic families of the Colombian provinces as well as a progressive middle class of newcomers. This has been a happy combination from which have emerged remarkably stable organizations, directed by the influential regional political figures; and which have found a great
deal of government receptivity. But the associations have become politically passive and have tended to emphasize purely professional activities related to the services they provide. This type of technology, however, is hardly an adequate substitute for the kind needed to influence an agrarian policy which is more concerned with macro-social, political, and economic variables, than with herbicides or fumigation. Moreover, as the central bureaucracy becomes more and more isolated, it is doubtful that these regional figures can indefinitely continue playing a linkage between the associations and the technocrats in government. The danger exists that, because of the pressing need to maintain some form of access, they will be reduced to interacting with the more traditional bureaucratic entities, thereby risking identification with anti-reformist sources.

The second type of association (see part 'a' of figure 4) which was also found to be highly centralized, has adapted to bureaucratic technocratization in a peculiar way. In order to avoid any loss of control, affiliates have not allowed any significant structural modifications over time; organizations of this type still maintain their small size, are located in the capital city, and have avoided specialization. But they have greatly reinforced their technical staffs by temporarily transferring qualified technicians from the firm to the association.
This way it has been possible to displace any problem of training and socialization to the firm, which is obviously a more self-contained environment than the association. For duties related to demands channeled through a pressure group, chief executives have the habit of appointing close advisors thoroughly informed about the specifics of negotiations with government thus avoiding possible contradictions between the goals of affiliates and those that the associations may independently generate.

This practice, however, cannot be taken as a permanent solution applicable to all types of pressure groups. It implies restricted membership, with no significant divergences among affiliates. Should this prerequisite not be present, the absence of a formal and solidly structured representative association drastically curtails the group's efficiency in articulating interests, and inevitably results in the projection to the outside of an image of chaos. Whenever a strong, large, stable, and well defined structure is lacking, government officials tend not to take the group seriously, preferring to give access and information to other associations.

The third type of pressure group, which had been found to possess many of the ingredients that characterize modern organizations (see part 'c' of figure 4) has kept the pace of government technocratization. It is the only
type to have gone far enough in the transition to have actually modified its structure significantly. A great deal of emphasis is given to research, and all the necessary efforts have been made to insure the production of high quality data: large technical staffs and unusual mechanization characterize internal operations. In addition, these organizations have allocated large amounts of money to the sponsoring and participation in symposiums, conventions, and meetings.

Conclusion

Flow models of the political process normally conceive the production of governmental output or public policy as the product of functions and operations dependent upon an input originating in the periphery of the system. "Before policies or goals can be chosen, says Almond, individuals and groups in the society must decide what their interests are." Pressure groups are viewed as structures whose main function is the elimination, combination, and modification of interests, expectations, and preferences into processable demands. This theoretical framework typifies to a certain extent the importance attributed in Western democracies to autonomous interest articulation.

114 Almond, *Comparative Politics*, p. 8.
After all, one necessary condition for democracy is that any individual or group—including marginal segments of the society and the minorities—be left free to develop the means, not only to formulate and express his own interests and preferences, but also to be heard by decision makers.

In the developing world, political systems in which the articulation of interests is based exclusively upon the free action of those who have invested enough resources to promote sufficiently organized representative associations would hardly be conducive to democracy. The unequal distribution of power prevalent in the system would in practice hinder the creation and growth of organized interest groups by marginal segments of the society. If democratic practices are to be promoted, means have to be devised to insure the participation of excluded groups. Marginal social strata can rarely be given public resources to achieve autonomous representation, because of the fear that a sudden inclusion in the system and their lack of knowledge about the practices involved in competitive politics would destabilize the governmental process, serve as the basis for the expansion of radical ideologies, and ultimately defeat democracy. The solution has often been to attempt to grant marginal groups tacit and indirect representation through the State. The goal has been to
build a more decisive State increasingly conscious of the critical choices that political development implies, and less permeable to blocking influences that for so long have neutralized even minimal reform.

Such a solution implies that the growth of the governmental apparatus will be balanced in such a way that the unrepresented be taken into consideration in the formulation of public policy, thus correcting some of the imbalances present in the system, and simultaneously avoiding the stagnation of existing interest articulation by representative associations. A second assumption, and a doubtful one, is that the State can and will exclusively play the role of power broker among political actors, thereby avoiding the tendency to invest the resources entrusted to it in achieving the goals a complex bureaucracy independently generates.

If the rate of expansion of the State apparatus is too low, the prospects that a political system responsive to the disfranchised can emerge is dim. If the rate of bureaucratic growth and technocratization surpasses the rate of formation of large scale, complex, and technocratic interest associations, the political system may evolve toward authoritarianism. Our findings indicate that there is a link between the ability of pressure groups to contact public officials and transmit the
demands of affiliates, and organizational factors. Technology proved to be strongly related to better access, both in terms of the volume of interaction and the level of formal representation in public bodies; so was specialization of tasks within the organization. Both factors, of course, constitute important components of advanced structures. Size, the physical element of a structure, proved to be consistently conducive to better representation in the public sector, and to a larger volume of interaction.
CHAPTER V

THE EFFECT OF TACTICS OF ACCESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE UPON THE CAMPAIGNING EFFECTIVENESS OF PRESSURE GROUPS

Effectiveness in approaching public officials should be expected to have a positive influence upon the success pressure organizations will have in influencing government decision making, although the intensity of such an effect should not be overestimated. A common fallacy, according to Meynaud, consists in assuming total victory for those groups that have been able to gain access to governmental decision making centers, when in fact the ability to talk to governments and being heard by them is by no means sufficient to insure a favorable verdict.115 Carlos Astiz, a student of pressure groups in Peruvian politics, believes that in its negative formulation, however, the hypothesis should hold true:

... obviously, the articulation of demands does not guarantee a positive response from the political system, but it is clear that the inability to make certain interests or desires known eliminates even the possibility of a response.116

115 Meynaud, Nouvelles Etudes sur les Groupes de Pression, p. 235

116 Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites, p. 189
We do expect to find a positive relationship between access and influence. The reason is not that the mechanisms of communication of demands in themselves include the elements that will later on determine the outcome of negotiations with government, but simply that the same organizational features that have been conducive to effectiveness in gaining access, should also operate during the negotiation phase. It would be inaccurate, however, to conceive access as an intervening variable only and assume a priori that the degree of penetration is a sufficiently accurate predictor of influence. Both phenomena are analytically distinct: levels of access to a given target tend to remain constant for each organization, independently of the nature of the requests being channeled toward government. A general assessment of influence, on the other hand, depends upon the results obtained with regard to each demand, and can be legitimately attributed to the group only after a balance of success is made for a given period of time.

Access has been conceived throughout this analysis as a multidimensional variable decomposable into various categories, depending upon the type of target toward which interaction is focussed, and the level in the bureaucratic hierarchy at which contacts are established. We will focus on the effect of each type of penetration on overall political influence. Pressure groups seem to have a very
clear image about which government structures are influential, and which are not; but they are also aware that the most powerful offices also tend to be less accessible. It is not clear then which combination yields more influence: high interaction with a secondary governmental structure, or low penetration to a very influential one. The statistical associations between frequency of interaction with various targets and influence will provide some valuable information in this respect.

Indirect tactical factors can also be expected to play a significant role in the degree of influence given groups can exert over the political process. Alliances and public relations campaigns, for obvious reasons may cause stress in government decision making centers by projecting an image of generalized opposition, and can be instrumental in generating submissiveness to the group's demands. The fragmentation of the pressure group network, on the other hand, is likely to provide government with extra room to maneuver and seek for external support. A similar relationship between support and public relations campaigns can be hypothesized; demands that have been politicized and made highly visible through the mass media, strikes, and demonstrations, are more likely to be the object of favorable reception by public officials.
Internal structural features of pressure groups play a central role in the group's ability to induce modifications in policies proposed by the State, and/or its success in initiating legislation acceptable to government. Technology can be expected to be instrumental in strengthening the group's position in consultations with government by improving the quality of its argumentation, and convincing public officials of the accuracy of the information provided to back demands. Size, again, may prove related to the organization's ability to become the focus of negotiations. Government may tend to attribute to larger groups more access, information, and legitimacy in the hope that smaller associations will follow in their footsteps; thereby significantly reducing the number of contenders involved in the process of consultation. The effect of internal distributions of power on organizational effectiveness in influencing government decision making is complex. Should existing levels of centralization prove to be incompatible with the acceptance and internalization by professionals of the organization's principles and procedures, and/or the adoption of complex technologies, its effect upon influence can be expected to be negative. Moreover, centralization may give rise to inadequate distributions of the workflow, preventing the organization from responding on time to government output. On the other hand, the lack of cohesion that can result from
the simultaneous development of multiple centers of authority, which in part is the reflection of a similar lack of unity among affiliates, can become a serious obstacle to the group's ability to reach agreement as to the appropriate alternatives to face governmental policy. The fait accompli, later deplored, is the product of hesitations in coordinating organizational response.

It is not realistic, however, to expect that structural variables can be as equally productive in terms of influence as they were in terms of access. In most cases, government benefits tremendously by providing access in a social environment where democratic values and ideals are strongly rooted. Only extremist pressure groups who constantly attack the basic rules and principles of existing regimes could eventually be legitimately excluded from the political process. The effect of any possible influence pressure groups could exert upon the public sector, on the other hand, is frequently interpreted as detrimental to the so-called public interest. Moreover, governments by definition have the tendency to govern; it is unrealistic to expect that pressure groups can supplant or compete with the State in the field of policy making.

So far, we have deliberately viewed the problem of access exclusively from the standpoint of the associations; we have focussed upon their capabilities to initiate contacts and maintain institutionalized representation in
official consultative organs, avoiding the question of government's propensity to involve interest groups directly in its decision making processes. The modalities used by public officials to communicate its policies are in most cases a good barometer of the degree of influence pressure organizations will generally be allowed by the system. We asked the associations in the sample, first, to estimate which of three modes of communication with government (negotiations, consultations, or simple information) were most frequently used by the authorities to acquaint them with decisions directly related to the group's representative function; and second, to evaluate the percentage of cases in which each modality of communication was practiced. The results obtained should be quite indicative of the climate in which the talks between interest groups and government take place.

The Dependent Variable: the Performance of Pressure Organizations in their Political Campaigns

The involvement of pressure groups in the decision making apparatus of the Colombian State covers a wide spectrum of activities. The measure of performance we have developed with regard to political influence focusses primarily upon one type of activity, namely the campaigns of pressure organizations. From an organizational standpoint, campaigns have distinct characteristics; they tend
to be characterized by extensive organizational involvement: numerous internal operations are generated, and a large proportion of the units or sections of the organization tend to participate. In terms of the interaction with government, a campaign is characterized by the definitive intensification of the frequency of contacts with high level officials in government. These parameters exclude from consideration the so-called campaigns of principle, which merely imply taking stand with regard to politicized issues currently discussed in the political arena. These campaigns are rarely conducive to any specific action besides the simple manifestation of support or discontent.

The second parameter of the measure is that it refers primarily to institutional campaigns, whose main purpose is to promote or oppose legislation initiated either by the executive, Congress, or the interest group itself. The term is locally used, and is intended to distinguish this from other categories of campaigns such as campañas de agremiación, whose main purpose is to build local associations in order to improve the representativeness of national federations; or educational campaigns which are attempts to provide practical and ideological training to the membership. It should be noted that educational and formation campaigns may involve important efforts to promote legislation. The creation of labor unions, for example, is conditioned to the existence of laws that
guarantee the right to organize, and the establishment of incentives that induce the formation of unions, such as the limitation of documentation to legalize newly-formed unions and protection of union leaders (fuero sindical). This dimension, of course, belongs to the domain of institutional campaigning.

The evaluation of the levels of success pressure groups have been able to achieve in their campaigns with government involves a number of measurement problems that should be understood in order to visualize the degree of reliability and validity of the findings that will be presented later on. The measurements consist of sets of scores for each organization in the sample of the proportion of concessions obtained in each political campaign in relation to the total demands. The procedure followed consisted, first, in requesting the respondent in question to describe each campaign in which the organization had been involved during 1974 and 1975; second, to obtain an evaluation of performance in the form of a single percentage for each campaign; and third, to have the respondent explain in concrete terms what was specifically obtained or denied and why that represented the percentage selected. The final score of effectiveness entered is the average of the scores corresponding to all the campaigns described.

This method, despite the fact that it involves a certain dose of subjectivity and arbitrariness certainly
does not lack validity. It is difficult to find any single actor better informed about the status of a campaign than the chief executive of a pressure group. The first question, of course, is whether or not the respondent is willing to disclose the real outcome of a campaign. Meynaud strongly believes that good faith errors and tactical motivations make it very unlikely that accurate results can be obtained.\textsuperscript{117} It is indisputable that some bias should be expected. In order to minimize it, respondents were assured that their individual scores along with any other disclosure they would consider confidential would not figure individually or be made public, but used for statistical treatment only as part of a large sample. In exceptional cases where a sincere rapport could not be established and the interview was not convincing, it was dropped. In general, though, top officials of Colombian interest groups perceive their endeavor as legitimate, and once the scientific nature of the project was understood, they had no objections to discussing the content, history, and actual results of most of their political campaigns. Moreover, they consistently introduced written evidence such as letters, telegrams, proposed legislation, etc., for purposes of documentation.

\textsuperscript{117}Meynaud, \textit{Nouvelles Etudes}, p. 304.
The delimitation of a campaign is also problematic. In the case of the 1974 tax reform, for example, certain isolated successes such as obtaining a reduction of the sales tax for certain items could be interpreted either in the context of the sales tax articles themselves, or in the terms of the entire code. The former alternative would yield a higher score. The problem is more acute when one enters the domain of chiliastic campaigns. Workers' and peasants' union leaders aspiring to a comprehensive systemic reform to tend to perceive many of their achievements in global, non-pragmatic terms. The modest program of land redistribution under way, for example, is often viewed as grossly deficient and is bound to produce emotional reactions likely to distort estimates of effectiveness in campaigning. Agrarian associations that advocate land seizures fall into this category. The following statement from ANUC is indicative of the frame of reference upon which spokesmen of these groups are likely to base their evaluations of organizational performance:

Land seizures are nothing different from the awakening of peasants motivated by the unjust situation of land tenure, and result from an inhuman situation of misery and poverty.

The consciousness of the Colombian peasantry made it discover the tricks of the oligarchy, who believing that the rural community was naive, pretended to organize it in order to defend its farce of an agrarian reform; to this, consciously,
the peasant ended up saying: stop there mister oligarchs! our patience and resignation have been exhausted.118

From a measurement standpoint in a system such as the Colombian where social structures are remarkably stable, campaigns designed to profoundly alter existing macro-social arrangements are bound to be evaluated by the promoters themselves as near failures, although in absolute terms significant results may have been obtained. The problem then is to insure that a confusion will not arise between real organizational failure and the association's systematic criticism of the system and of existing administrations which supposedly have failed in their reformist missions. This problem, however, became rapidly evident and was faced by inducing respondents to evaluate performance specifically, in the immediate and narrower context of short range demands.

Another problem is that all groups may not have equal chance to achieve aims, as a result of ideological distortions. In terms of an ideological spectrum, it could be hypothesized that as the distance between the position of an interest group and that which prevails in an existing regime increases, the greater the reaction of the authorities in power against the attainment of the

group's goals. Interest associations whose position is far apart from the officialist line, which are radically against the conventional ideological principles espoused by the majority, or at least by the establishment, are particularly vulnerable to this effect.

In the context of this particular research project, the underlying effect of ideological factors is not expected to distort significantly the measurement of performance, for a number of important reasons: first, the conformation of the sample is such that only two associations in fifteen fall within the radical portion of the spectrum. These are the National Association of Land Tenants (ANUC) and Syndical Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC). Other labor unions included in the sample have openly chosen to operate within the existing social system. They endorse candidates running for the traditional parties, conduct a high rate of interaction with a wide range of government agencies, are or have been officially represented in numerous consultative organs and public entities, and defend the same basic principles groups belonging to the private sector stand for.

The second reason is more subtle. For strategical reasons there is a bifurcation in the ideological stands of radical interest groups: vis à vis their membership and the public, leaders can be virulently anti-establishment. Their relationships with public officials, instead,
tend toward ideological neutrality, instrumentalism, and pragmatism. Extremism can be a source of the vicious circle that consists in low achievement in terms of access and participation, because of the organization's inability to channel demands acceptable to public officials. Rejection, in turn, generates a new round of radicalization, until the group is virtually excluded from the political system. This is a danger that neither government nor pressure groups have taken lightly. Radical associations are aware that de-ideologizing their own demands, as they are converted into campaigns designed to reach specific government targets, is a prerequisite for exerting pressure through conventional channels. The National Association of Land Tenants (ANUC), for example, despite ideological stands that may seem revolutionary to many, made in its Third Congress held in September 1974, a conscious effort to overcome the communication gap that a typically Leninist and Maoist terminology had created.119

Government officials, on the other hand, aware that excluding pressure groups from the political system implies losing control over the process of conversion of demands, have created mechanisms to insure the political participation of radical labor unions. By law, legally

recognized labor confederations, qualify for yearly subsidies: ninety percent of ANUC's budget comes from governmental sources; ten percent of the CSTC's budget is the product of subsidies. Furthermore, the Minister of Labor is usually a figure sympathetic to the social problems faced by the working class, and is receptive to their demands.

In synthesis, the fact that radical groups may have a lower chance to achieve ultimate goals than status quo-oriented associations—and this is merely a truism in a capitalist society—does not imply that they are prevented for ideological reasons to conduct campaigns and exert pressure on government.

The fourth problem in measuring organizational effectiveness in influencing public policy is what could be labeled the band-wagon effect: may pressure groups inevitably identify themselves with seemingly successful campaigns in which they played only a minor role. Even in cases in which a number of groups have been legitimately involved in a given campaign, it is not always easy to assess the relative contribution of each one to overall success. This problem is not easily solved, but was partially controlled by distinguishing between exclusive and non-exclusive campaigns, and in the latter case by trying to establish whether some significant division of labor among the groups involved had taken place, and if the
results claimed by a given organization in fact corresponded with its campaigning efforts and its specific interests. In addition, supportive material was constantly requested in order to obtain the most objective basis of evaluation possible. Only when the organization's involvement in a given campaign was apparent enough would the corresponding score be kept in the sample.

Finally, it should be remembered that the indicator used throughout the analysis, i.e. the average percentage obtained from government in relation to the pressure group's political demands as expressed in a campaign, is intended solely to measure one dimension of influence. The overall impact interest associations have upon public policy as a whole is an extremely complex question difficult to capture through a strictly cross-sectional design. Only by introducing longitudinal measurements in the analysis of a political campaign would it be possible to uncover the long range influence the group's action exerted upon the system. The following equation by Meynaud is indicative of possible gaps between formal concessions, or the lack of concessions obtained in a campaign, and overall political influence: performance equals adoption plus execution plus persistence of a decision. Between the moment in which government formally takes a decision and the consistent application of the measure there may be ups and downs that can affect the
group's performance in different directions.\textsuperscript{120} As much as a decision may seem beneficial to the group, it may never be implemented, eventually triggering a new round of demands. The same is true, of course, for seemingly detrimental measures. In a sense aggregate analysis, in the context of a cross-sectional design, is a somewhat disappointing tool to measure influence per se. Case study analysis would probably do a better job in describing the process involved in the interaction between pressure groups and government; although its many flaws in terms of inference and external validity, and the insufficient explanatory value that can reasonably be expected from it make it unsuitable for our purposes.

Effectiveness in Campaigning: The Pattern of Influence

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the decisional context in which the campaigns or pressure groups are conducted. First, as Schmitter has indicated, the process of decision making at the government level involves a number of sequences and cycles; and the effectiveness of interest groups depends to a great extent upon their relative strength and weakness in specific decisional forums:\textsuperscript{121} formulation, detection, approval,

\begin{enumerate}
\item[{\textsuperscript{120}}] Meynaud, \textit{Nouvelles Etudes}, p. 308.
\item[{\textsuperscript{121}}] Schmitter, \textit{Interest Conflict}, p. 334.
\end{enumerate}
implementation, etc. Second, the existence of patterns of communication between public officials and the associations describe the climate in which campaigns evolve, and, by inference provide information about the nature of the political involvement of pressure groups in the system.

The Formulation of Public Policy

The origin of public policy is a first indicator of the nature of the involvement of pressure organizations in the political process. High control of the decision making apparatus of the State is likely whenever a large proportion of the plans and projects upon which policy output is based have been drafted by representative associations. Low levels of control tend to occur when the process of generating public policy is initiated by government agencies, and approval of decisions is the product of deliberations under closed doors.

The interviews we conducted both among public officials and interest groups executives indicate that government is, to a large extent, in control of policy formulation in Colombia. Its activity conditions the intensity of the attempts by pressure groups to influence decision making. The decision making cycle itself is dominated by public officials. Pressure groups are involved in the formulation of public policy only to the extent that their
support or opposition may have a significant impact upon the maintenance of the regime and/or its success in implementing its programs. Government plans, intentions, and specific projects are often successfully kept secret even at advanced stages. During the initiation phase, the best pressure groups can hope for is that their own independent efforts at detecting national problems and searching for solutions will not remain unheard. But this strategy belongs more clearly to the domain of long range, intangible efforts than to that of concrete tactics applicable in the daily interaction with the public sector. Top officials of pressure groups seemed disillusioned about the opportunities for participation provided by the regime, and complained about the excessive secrecy and insulation of government officials. Their sense of efficacy appeared to be low, and a fear of disturbing a political environment considered as increasingly turbulent and even hostile seemed common.

Nevertheless, the ability of government planners to monopolize the initiation of public policy and the formulation of legislation should not be overestimated. First, the separation of powers, which is not only a constitutional provision but an active norm, has provided pressure groups an additional medium of involvement. Second, business associations' primary mode of intervention is not
the formulation of policy, but the obstruction and retardation of measures that may jeopardize the existing status quo. The implication is that even though the executive branch may be able to generate in isolation a majority of policy formulations, it must still overcome the opposition pressure groups may express during subsequent stages of decision making.

We asked pressure group officials to evaluate the frequency of organizational involvement during the initiation phase. Significant differences emerged between the behavior of business associations and that of organized labor: while the private sector as a whole appeared to be singularly uninterested in generating policy, all the major labor confederations reported to be continuously engaged in lobbying the passage of legislative proposals they had drafted. The National Agrarian Federation (FANAL) was on the verge of obtaining Congressional approval for a new package of labor legislation.\textsuperscript{122} The Union of

\textsuperscript{122}The gist of FANAL's request is the lowering of the hierarchical level at which peasant labor conflicts are decided, and the reduction of requirements for the formation and functioning of peasant unions. In particular they have requested that departmental labor inspectors be given the faculty to issue personerías jurídicas (legal recognitions), and that the inspectors of peasant affairs be allowed to pronounce verdicts in minor cases. In addition, they want the simplification of accounting systems and financial reports, plus the complete exoneration from reporting to government in case of internal reorganization of a union. Finally, they demand the reduction of the
Colombian Workers (UTC) and the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) were, at the time, engaged in a similar endeavor.

The lack of involvement of business groups in the initiation stage of decision making can be explained in great measure by the threat-oriented nature of their political activities. As Wilson points out with regard to American business associations:

... existing trade associations were able to form, not because firms believed that good conditions could be made better through collective action, but because they realized that difficult conditions might become worse without it.123

This same formation mechanism undoubtedly operated in the Colombian case as well, and may have contributed to generate the passivity many associations have shown in initiating policy.

Historically, besides a few cases of very early formation such as the Society of Growers, which emerged in 1871, and the Society of Engineers formed in 1887, the working day in the country side to eight hours; the expediting of a labor code specifically for peasants; the creation of certain controls on employers, such as the registration of number of employees and hours worked; and the banning of subcontractors which constitute a convenient loophole employers use to evade paying benefits to the workers. Source: Federación Agraria Nacional, "Proyecto de Ley por el cual se Adopta para los Trabajadores del Sector Primario el Estatuto Oficial del Regimen Prestacional," Bogotá, n.d. (Typewritten.)

real boom of pressure group formation in Colombia began during the 1930s and reached its peak in the mid 1940s: the Colombian Federation of Coffee Growers was founded in 1927, ANDI in 1944, FENALCO in 1945, the Federation of Rice Growers in 1947, etc. Undoubtedly, the essential characteristic of this period is the sudden acceleration of State interventionism, particularly during the administration of President Alfonso López Pumarejo, who asserted from the beginning that a system of Concertación Nacional (concerted policy) was not appropriate for a society that needed to comply with the dynamics of renovation.124 This statement obviously referred not only to the diminished political role which the Church and the Conservative party were to play in the modernizing society he would attempt to build, but also that of the private entrepreneurs and the pressure groups that represented them, who were expected to oppose the reform.

A most intriguing phenomenon in this respect is the concrete steps that López took to free his government from unwanted pressure: believing that an integrate opposition would be easier to control, he consistently promoted the creation of representative associations. The most significant birth was ANDI's, which epitomized López's

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efforts to give rise to a unified opposition. As Pécaut points out:

... in ANDI's case, it emerged to a great extent as a result of the personal initiative of Alfonso López, in order to overcome the resistance that, in a scattered fashion, the entrepreneurs were exerting upon his policies.125

Paradoxically, the great reformist, in an effort to stimulate the role of the State in the polity, resorted to mechanisms that directly countered his goals. It is clear that the development of pressure groups in Colombia was not primarily self-induced, but was a classic reaction against the unprecedented growth of the State's functions. The climate of creation of the Merchants' Association is indicative in this respect:

In the first months of 1945, the government of President Alfonso López exerted a severe control over distribution and prices, as a result of the economic troubles produced by World War II. The National Price Control Office, as the organ in charge of such functions was called, recklessly sanctioned the merchants without meditating about the equity of its decisions, and legislated severely about controls over mercantile activity. Came Resolution 292 which established an exaggerated regime of sanctions on commerce, especially for the trade of metallic tiles, barbed wire, hobnails, wire netting, and paving tile.

Resolution 292 exasperated the merchants. The affected businessmen decided to use the services of a prestigious lawyer to enter an action against the said resolution. ... After long deliberations it was decided to elect a Provisional Committee for

125 Pécaut, Sindicalismo en Colombia, p. 81.
the Defense of National Commerce, and to create an organization to represent it. . . . The Committee, already integrated, was formally set up in the offices of Dr. Enrique Moreno Quevedo. That day emerged the name of the National Federation of Merchants with the abbreviation of FENALCO.126

This pattern of distrust and interventionism that characterized the interaction between the government and the entrepreneurs seems to have remained more or less intact during the following decade, which to a lesser extent was also a prime period of pressure group formation: the Association of Cotton Producers was formed in 1956, and the Association of Sugar Producers ASOCAN) in 1959, only to cite two examples. At that time State interventionism was already institutionalized, and government organs were competing with private entities for the regulation of economic activity, the solution of conflict among entrepreneurs, and in many ways the promotion of specific interests. The Institute of Cotton Development (IFAP), a State organ, for example, had the leading role in storing cotton, collecting taxes both from producers and consumers, and financing the growers, at least until 1958 when it was replaced by the Institute of Agricultural Marketing (IDEMA).

The threat-oriented nature of Colombian business associations has inevitably led to emphasize political

strategies based upon opposition and veto, instead of proposals and formulations drafted by group officials. Typical in this regard is the reaction of the Manufacturers' Association to the bill of labor reform introduced in Congress by the UTC in 1975: ANDI has conducted a vigorous campaign through the press to sensitize the upper and middle sectors about the effect this legislation will have upon the productivity of the private sector. This campaign, however, has not been an open campaign and ANDI has avoided being publicly linked to it. Moreover, the association sought presidential intervention in this matter, and its attempts so far have proved successful: President López has already announced that there was a need for compromise, and that the executive had the intention of fully examining the economic impact of any new labor legislation.

Another common ground for opposition to government initiatives is obviously land reform. In general, SAC has tended to become the principal representative of landowners in this field. Despite the common assumption that the Farmers' Society has become the bastion of anti-reformism with regard to land redistribution, its strategy has consisted primarily in supporting globally the various projects of land reform proposed, but at the same time systematically introducing counter-proposals that it feels are more beneficial for the system. In 1959 SAC declared
it was "ready to cooperate with government for the intensive, calm, and thoughtful study of an agrarian reform;" in 1961, Oliverio Lara, its president, declared regarding Law 135 of Agrarian Reform that "it is not a threat to authentic workers, but on the contrary a corrective to old and grave irregularities." In addition to this general strategy, it has also resorted to delaying tactics such as blocking pending decrees regarding the expropriation of large estates on the basis of futile legal pretexts, or resorting to the Supreme Court or the State Council to rule on the constitutionality of some of INCORA's projects.

The Approval Phase of Decision Making

In the context of decisions taken within the executive branch, the approval phase of decision making has been the object of obstinate attempts of insulation on the part of government planners and presidential advisers. Final decisions are often taken behind closed doors, and public officials are very sensitive about the possibility

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127Revista Nacional de Agricultura, 647 (March 1959), cited by Gilhodes, La Question Agraire, p. 39.


129Gilhodes, La Question Agraire, pp. 44-45.
that the public or even the pressure groups themselves may perceive that illegitimate, external influence may have been exerted upon the State. Regardless of how receptive government officials may seem about the arguments presented by the private sector or labor, final decisions rarely emerge from meetings with interest groups.\footnote{Interview No. 8.}

Taxation and monetary policy are two fields in which the deterioration of influence is intense. Decision making with regard to taxation illustrates rather well the conception of public officials about the limits of involvement of specialized interests in the approval of public policy. Representative associations, aware of the critical impact added taxes may have upon the profits and expansion prospects of the firms they represent, have proved able to coordinate their actions better than in other areas, primarily by dividing the work and coordinating the timing of demands. Pressure groups successfully campaigned in 1969 against the attempt by a commission of tax reform headed by Professor Musgrave to apply the concept of presumptive income, upon which taxes were to be paid, regardless of real profits and losses. The Colombian Farmers' Society (SAC), in particular, protested against an assumed yearly profit of ten percent for farming and proposed a counter-
project based upon the concept of a single territorial tax. In September 18, 1974, President López surprised both the private sector and labor with a comprehensive package of tax reform which reorganized income taxes (Decree 2053 of 1974), sales taxes (Decree 1988 of 1974), and inheritance taxes (Decree 2143 of 1974). The reaction was immediate. The Colombian Association of Insurance Companies (ASECOLDA) in a letter dated October 8, 1974, rebuked the definition of indemnities arising from life insurance as occasional profits taxable up to forty six percent. A few days later the Minister of Economic Development replied informing the association's executive president that "the council of ministers had analyzed both their arguments and those presented by various cabinet members and decided to exempt life insurance from income tax and occasional profits." 

The Colombian Federation of Cattlemen (FEDEGAN) in a letter addressed to President López protested the suppression of tax exemptions for cattle breeding, the concept

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131 Gilhodes, La Question Agraire, p. 34.


of a presumed income, and the proposed system of considering as occasional profits the gains derived from differences between acquisition and sale prices in land negotiations. The letter included a hypothetical profitability analysis for three different cases, in which the association supposedly demonstrated that the new legislation severely curtailed the attractiveness of this type of investment, and that cattle growers would be forced out of business.\textsuperscript{134} The Farmers' Society (SAC) also expressed strong doubts about the wisdom of assuming fixed profit levels in agriculture, since floods, droughts, and plagues are so widespread that farmers often lose entire crops. Government proved to be somewhat receptive to this argument and agreed to postpone the application of the system of presumed profits in proven cases of \textit{force majeure}.

Virtually no pressure group remained indifferent to the tax reform, but very few obtained significant results. It is widely believed among presidents of pressure groups that government purposely included a few extreme measures on which it rapidly agreed to produce changes in order to control the intense reaction it expected, thus projecting an image of responsiveness that was far from being present. Negotiators described government experts

\textsuperscript{134} Eduardo Matuk Morales, President of FEDEGAN, to Alfonso López Michelsen, President of the Republic, Bogotá, October 18, 1974.
as totally unreceptive to even the most obvious observations, and as being quite satisfied about the procedure adopted by the chief executive to enact the measures.

We noted with regard to patterns of access a gradual evolution toward the abolition of direct representation in deliberative bodies (which produce binding decisions), and the propensity to link the process of interest articulation to the political system by granting representative associations formal representation in consultative organs. This trend simply reflects the emergence of new political norms that intend to create stable and legitimate expectations about the involvement of independently organized interests in public policy. We asked the organizations in the sample to evaluate which of three modes of interaction, i.e. negotiations, consultations, or simple information, characterized the transactions originating at government level. As shown in figure 14, 40% indicated that consultations had become the prevalent form of communication, 60% felt that public officials simply notified them and none of the respondents thought that government had recently shown an intention of negotiating. Moreover, it was widely felt that a decreasing trend of pressure group influence had somehow emerged in the last decade, and that each successive government had attempted a little harder to express its independence from pressure groups.
Fig. 14. Frequency Distribution of Modes of Interaction of Pressure Organization with the Administration
The lack of institutionalized participation of interest organizations in the formulation and approval of governmental decisions is not necessarily synonymous with lack of influence. The systematic insulation of key decision making structures in the executive branch is not by itself a factor capable of avoiding the destabilizing effect that the substantive content of government actions can cause; the impact of certain measures may be such that policies can be rendered non-implementation, and may even induce the sudden collapse of the regime. The reform of Bogotá's urban transportation network illustrates this phenomenon of indirect influence in the absence of direct involvement during policy formulation and/or approval. Close presidential advisors are convinced that the rationalization of the existing mass transit system in the capital city can be achieved by simply redesigning existing bus lines, thus avoiding the costly investment the construction of a subway system or a similar solution implies. Such a plan, however, is constantly postponed because of the expected reaction the transportation associations and the bus drivers' associations may have, and especially the spectre of a transportation strike.\footnote{135} At a general level, the

\footnote{135} Interviews Nos. 19 and 22.
implementation of public policy, as Schmitter has pointed out, depends on the active and voluntary support of the affected parties. "Open refusal to cooperate, recourse to semilegal means of avoidance, or simple passive resistance can render government initiatives ineffective or raise the cost of implementation to prohibitive levels."\textsuperscript{136}

Anatomy of a Negotiation: the Code of Natural Resources and the Forestal Question

We will end our discussion on the involvement of interest associations in governmental decision making by focussing upon the forestal reform, which gave rise to an interesting campaign, both with regard to its implications, which are typical, and its representativeness in terms of the actual political process.

In 1973, President Misael Pastrana Borrero, making use of special powers granted by Congress through Law 23 of 1973, enacted the National Code of Renewable Natural Resources and Protection of the Environment. This event marked the culmination of intense lobbying on the part of pressure groups and a new chapter in the growing determination of government officials to insulate decision making from external influence. It is important to note at the outset that the private sector was not involved at all during the initiation phase; the National

\textsuperscript{136}Schmitter, \textit{Interest Conflict}, p. 353.
Institute of Natural Resources (INDERENA) with the cooperation of foreign technicians (probably American) was completely in charge of preparing the initial project. Also important is the fact that the President felt that special powers were needed to avoid future mutilations to the code, and took as many steps as possible to bypass Congress.

Why did government create the code in the first place? At the philosophical level, it was widely felt at the time that the growing difficulties that industrialization generates and in particular the emergence of a society traumatized by noise, by pollution, and in which the natural environment had suffered grave deterioration, made it necessary to issue a set of norms that could restore the natural order.\footnote{Gonzalo Moreno, "Política y Legislación Forestal en Colombia: 1829-1974" (Thesis, Universidad del Rosario, 1975), p. 86.} At the economic level, at least with regard to the situation in the forests it was clear that a chaotic process of colonization by settlers unaware of the grave consequences of their primitive methods of exploitation was giving rise to losses estimated at 1.2 million acres of forest destroyed per year, with an approximate value of four billion pesos, roughly equivalent to forty percent of the nation's annual
Moreover, past governmental legislation designed to regulate the timber and lumber industries had proven to be partially ineffective. Producers operate on the basis of concessions called "permits of persistent exploitation," which have a normal duration of thirty years. The essential characteristic of these contracts is that they oblige the grantee to completely renew the resources exploited. But traditionally, as a result of the absence of precise inventories, government limited itself to accept information provided by the timber industry on volumes exploited and existing wood varieties on the basis of its face validity. The producers themselves do not have complete information about all the variables involved in the process of reforestation, and in particular know little about growth rhythms of many varieties and whether or not they are even plantable in the tropical forests. This situation has given rise to the chronic inability of producers to fulfill their obligations vis à vis government, which in turn, has adopted a pragmatic position based upon the acceptance of obtained results without resorting to the cancellation of contracts in case of non-fulfillment.

The code is an obvious effort to tighten the

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138 Moreno, "Legislación Forestal," p. 139.
timber industry and regulate all activities related to the exploitation of woods and reforestation. Its main features are: first, the classification of forestal areas into different categories some of which cannot be exploited. INDERENA, a public entity, is given the authority to determine to which type a given area belongs. Second, it establishes that corporations with greater proportions of domestic capital will be given priority for the granting of concessions and permits. Third, it gives government the faculty to carry out the obligations established in a concession at the grantee's cost, in case of non-fulfillment on his part. Fourth, it enables government to intervenes in matters of quality control, marketing, exports, etc., and limit practically at will the exploitation of forests.

Once the first project was completed, INDERENA contacted the producers' associations and made copies of the documents available to them indicating it was open to suggestions. A parliamentary commission was also created in order to link the legislative branch, at least superficially, to executive decision making.

There was little interest among the associations contacted in working together, either in the analysis of the project's implications, or in terms of a common strategy to face government. Essentially, there was literally
no convergence of interests: the Colombian Association of Timber Producers (ADEMACOL), in its role as representative of raw materials producers, who largely depend upon the system of concessions and substantial purchases from settlers, was opposed to any limitation of the exploitation rights; and intended to defend the status quo of its foreign affiliates and avoid the transfer of financial obligations from government to the private sector. ADEMACOL's affiliates perceived the problem as critical since they were the concession owners and had become the potential targets of the reform. This resulted in a substantial individualization of positions among affiliates and the softening of the associations' stand. Indeed, as it became obvious that government was determined to intervene in this matter on the basis of clear and peremptory policies, it was feared that a frontal attack would compromise the association's future ability to maintain access and influence decision making. Fragmentation among affiliates took the form of polarization with regard to which policies should be followed. The choice consisted in either passively withstanding the reform and acting during the implementation phase when the real weaknesses of the governmental apparatus would emerge, or maintaining alive the principle of constant participation in government decision making of all sides
concerned, despite the risk of being later on identified with the opposition. After the usual deliberations, it was decided to maintain unity among affiliates, and adopt the soft position.

The second type of association to be consulted was a group of forestal corporations such as the Forestal Corporation of Cundinamarca, which are semi-public entities whose main function is to plant new forests. Since INDERENA is an important stock holder in many of these entities, consultation was more or less a pro forma measure intended to improve the institute's image by allowing it to argue publicly that it had conducted wide range consultations before enacting the code. It was obvious from the beginning that these corporations were not sufficiently autonomous to adopt an activist stand.

Finally, ANDI was also consulted. Very skillfully the Manufacturers' Association rapidly perceived that it would be extremely difficult to induce modifications to the code at the ministerial level: it was clear to them that there would be stiff opposition to any such move among the technocrats involved in the project. Moreover, the arguments presented by government technicians, that is, the general conception of the code and its individual articles, were so well grounded technically that a direct confrontation with the technocratic segment of government was not desirable. Instead, ANDI was inclined
toward a frontal attack directed at the President of the Republic. Such a strategy was appealing to ANDI's officials because, taking into account that the producers did not want to jeopardize the effectiveness of their own association, a victory might well boost its influence in the timber industry. A loss did not seem that important, since it could be easily counterbalanced with so many victories the association had already accumulated.

The decision was finally taken to direct all efforts at the president, a Conservative, who was clearly the only one who could soften INDERENA's tough stand. With the assistance of its own legal staff and the advice of forestal technicians provided by affiliates, ANDI prepared a number of dramatic telegrams to be sent to President Pastrana. Those messages emphasized the unattainability of INDERENA's goals, the excessive State interventionism inherent in the code, and a number of legal limitations not taken into account by the authors. The gist of ANDI's argument was, first, that INDERENA simply did not have the necessary manpower or physical resources to carry out the responsibilities attributed to it in the code. Second, that it was improper for government to transfer its own responsibilities in terms of education, housing, etc. to the producers, in the form of binding obligations. Third, that it was illegal in terms of existing legislation to undermine the position of foreign
corporations with regard to their requests for concessions. Finally, it complained that the code was more a set of sanctions than anything else, and that it included very few incentives to increase production. ANPI was particularly dissatisfied with the perspective of seeing the producers invest large sums in forestal planning which once concluded and paid for by a private company would not imply an acquired right or improve the company's position in terms of a future concession. Moreover, it objected to government's right to deliver any given forestal analysis to a company different from that which had originally conducted the research.

Despite the validity of many of its arguments and the intensity of its efforts to obtain a favorable response from the chief executive, President Pastrana remained relatively insensitive to ANDI's demands. The association estimates it obtained no more than twenty five percent of what it requested--essentially minor trimmings--and was totally ineffective in having the project sent to Parliament for congressional reevaluation.139 ADEMACOL's president resigned, and his successor initiated a new round of negotiations oriented to involve government in the technical and social programs

139 Interview No. 8.
implied in the code. He negotiated the creation of the National Corporation of Forestal Research (CONIF), a mixed entity financed in equal proportions by the State and the private sector. The main function of this institute will be to establish a scientific base for the definition of a forestal technology directly adapted to the specific needs of tropical climates, and involve government in financing forestal projects and the creation of educational centers, housing projects, and other services near operation sites.

In summary, the principal features of the exchanges between public officials and the associations, in the context of the previous case study, are as follows: first, whenever government takes the decision to legislate it does so swiftly and decisively. To insure the autonomy of policy makers, secrecy is widely practiced during the drafting of legislation, and the approval of decisions is depoliticized by converting political issues into technocratic issues; a common result is that pressure groups are often caught off guard. Second, even the most politicized governmental positions, where role players are most likely to yield under pressure--including Conservative presidents--have shown increased independence vis à vis labor and business organizations. Third, both the consultative and supervisory role of Congress has dimi-
nished in importance. Fourth, policy makers appear to be aware of the inadequacy of the bureaucratic apparatus as a whole with regard to implementation functions. The strategy to confront this weakness, and thus insure a relative control over the sectors, groups, or firms the State intends to regulate is the establishment of rules and standards so broad and/or rigid that the affected actors are always technically violating the law, and therefore may be liable to reprisals. This mechanism of legal control, although does not necessarily alter actual practices, is a strong negative incentive to discourage deviant behavior. Fifth, the drafting phase usually culminates with a period of consultations designed to maintain the appearances of an open political process.

Performance in Campaigning, Access, and Organizational Structure

Effectiveness in obtaining concessions from government depends to a great extent upon the adaptability of the internal structure of interest associations to the requirements inherent in the political campaigns. The capacity for structural adaptation, in the immediate context of campaigns, is both a function of organizational capabilities, and the nature of the target upon which influence is exerted. The executive branch and the planning agencies attached to it, for example, appear to be less responsive to external pressure than Congress, a less autonomous
body. Goal attainment, in other words, is rendered more difficult when the organizations in charge of articulating interests have less control over the decision making processes from which policy output emerges.

First, although the decision to initiate a campaign is taken by pressure group officials, the content and/or timing of operations are largely the product of exogenous factors. Although in Colombia it may still be possible in some measure to forecast the general orientation of an administration by analyzing its political platform and past performance, it is highly improbable that pressure groups can forecast with enough precision the nature and implications of specific programs planned by the executive branch. The proportion and subgroups of affiliates affected by future policies, the nature and quality of the information utilized by government technocrats, the project's substantive range, and the importance attributed to it in official circles, etc. elicit different structural arrangements within the pressure organizations concerned. Levels of centralization may vary substantially depending upon the extent of the expected impact of government policies on the membership, and the corresponding disintegrative or unifying reactions that may follow. The use by government of advanced technology calls for the adoption by the group of similarly advanced knowledge. The project's range certainly affects optimum
degrees of task specialization and the size of resources affiliates are willing to invest in this type of collective enterprise.

Second, the political campaigns conducted by pressure groups, regardless of what the associations themselves would like to think, are only an accessory to the integral operation of the State's apparatus. At least in today's Colombia, key stages of decision making tend to be kept as insulated as possible from the inputs pressure groups can provide. Policy output is in great measure the product of structures within the public sector's domain and the human and institutional factors related to them. By widening its own base of support, by expanding popular participation and social mobility, recent regimes have created a new social climate not propitious to generalized expressions of narrow interests. The institutional base of pressure groups in Colombia may have eroded. It is highly improbable that peasants, workers, students, and even the middle sectors who so far lack significant associational representation, will be willing to legitimize the political action of pressure groups, or support a similar move by the State. Representative associations in Colombia, as a whole, have not adapted to the political expectations of the society in which they function. They have been largely unwilling or unable to make the necessary compromises between their affiliates' goals, those
they generate by themselves, and those emerging from an increasingly self-assertive State.

The lack of information about government operations and the increased autonomy of governmental structures are factors that affect primarily the campaigns involving the executive branch. Campaigns conducted in Congress, on the other hand, usually evolve in conditions of full information, since the groups themselves are often the authors of proposed legislation. Moreover, the frequent overlap between membership in Congress and membership in the governing organs of representative associations, particularly in the case of landowners' associations and organized labor, creates a climate of political dependence.

We measured the effect of different types of access on the proportion of concessions obtained by representative associations in their campaigns. Access to the legislature and routine contacts with lower echelon bureaucrats are the two types of penetration that rank higher in terms of achieved influence (see table 9). This pattern is probably the result of the greater control pressure groups can exert over these two categories of actors. The statistical evidence also indicates that contacts with top officials in the executive branch are also a significant source of concessions ($r = 0.39$). The only indicator of access insignificantly related to organizational
effectiveness in influencing public policy is formal participation of pressure groups in government boards \((r = -0.06)\). The apparent absence of any link between formal representation and performance pinpoints, in part, the ritual character of these meetings, and corroborates that their real function is not exactly to apply pressure oriented to modifying pending government decisions.

**TABLE 9**

**CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS IN CAMPAIGNING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pressure Group's Access to the Governmental Apparatus</th>
<th>Proportion of Obtained Concessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of nonroutine interaction with the executive branch</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of routine interaction with the executive branch</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation on government organs</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of interaction with congressional committees</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The link between performance in penetrating different targets in the public sector and effectiveness in obtaining concessions from government is symptomatic of the type of internal structural arrangements that can be
expected to be functional with regard to goal attainment. First, it can hypothesized that organizations that depend heavily upon the membership in Congress of members of their board of directors to promote the group's interests may not require the same degree of technological complexity, specialization, or physical size, as organizations that interact with the more technocratic sectors of the bureaucracy. Although advanced structural configurations may not be indispensable for exerting pressure on Congress, the importance of organizational capabilities should not be underestimated. La Palombara, in the context of Italian politics, found that legislators often turn to the research office of the associations for vital technical information and studies concerning proposed legislation. 140 Harvey Kline provided a sample of Colombian congressmen with a list of eight tactics practiced by pressure groups, and a significant majority considered the presentation of technical studies the most effective strategy. 141 Second, pressure organizations that are predominantly engaged in campaigns that involve the technocratic segments of the bureaucracy should benefit from advanced, decentralized structural formats.

The statistical results indicate that decentralized, large scale, and complex pressure organizations generally tend to obtain a larger proportion of concessions than interest groups which have remained structurally underdeveloped. As table 10 indicates, concentration of powers in the office of the chief executive or representative associations appears to be detrimental to the group's ability to succeed in its political campaigns ($r = -0.30$). This finding of course is consistent with previous results which linked ineffectiveness in gaining access to the organization's inability to diffuse power and transcend primitive administrative patterns based upon paternalism and subordination.

The requirements of political campaigns have dramatically increased in the last decades, creating the need for a new management technology specifically suited for political organizations of this kind: first, the time bracket at the associations disposal for designing responses to government output and executing the political maneuvers necessary to promote the acceptance of its demands has been severely curtailed. This phenomenon has resulted directly from the lack or participation of pressure groups in the initial phases of decision making, and in particular during the drafting of government projects. Public officials are aware that by lowering the lapse of time the so-called consultation phase is allowed to last,
substantial administrative stress is likely to be imprinted on the group's decision making centers; second, the vocabulary used by government technocrats to express public policy has become increasingly abstruse and specialized, creating severe problems of input-absorption and articulation of internal communications in those organizations in which high levels of centralization have reinforced the tendency to assign the primary role of channeling messages from and to the political system to generalists and politicians.

TABLE 10

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN CAMPAIGNING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion of Obtained Concessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical span</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialization</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size: budget executive personnel</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology: professionals technical material</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The lack of participation in policy design, and the low response intervals allowed by government have profoundly altered the organization's workflow. While in the past it tended to be relatively monotonic, it is now both cyclical and irregular. Cycles have intensified following more or less faithfully the rhythm of activity implicit in the four year presidential term: low levels of activity characterize the last portion of the term, and a peak is reached somewhere in its middle. More important, during the periods of consultation, pressure groups face abrupt increases in the intensity of the workflow, which require the full utilization of resources and in many cases the importation of manpower and know-how from affiliates.

Centralized, hierarchical management systems are grossly inappropriate for stressful situations. Conditions are far too dynamic to allow standard routinization to take place. Moreover, the fiction about the omniscience of the chief executive, or a high concentration of knowledge about both the specifics and the general context of negotiations at the top of the hierarchy can no longer be maintained if the organization expects to respond effectively to government output. Any kind of organic system, to use Burn's expression, seems to be better suited to modern political action by interest associations, than
traditional organizational formats based upon rigid
hierarchies and centralization. Finally, since sudden
transfers of technology, manpower, and physical resources
are likely to take place, high levels of specialization of
tasks seem to be beneficial to the group, particularly in
large organizations with large numbers and kinds of
affiliates. If operations were not subdivided, the neces-
sary channels of communication with affiliates would be
difficult to establish and maintain, making it hard to
persuade them to invest their own resources in campaigning,
instead of attempting direct action.

The physical growth of pressure groups, their
evolution toward increasingly sophisticated structural con-
figurations, and the adoption of a superior technology are
also related to effectiveness in influencing public policy.
Without exception, all five indicators of structure imply-
ing organizational development are positively correlated
with group effectiveness in campaigning: the association
coefficients for physical size, indicated by yearly budgets
and the number of executive personnel employed, are re-
spectively 0.25 and 0.20. The coefficients for technology,
indicated by the yearly production of technical material,
and the number of professionals working full time for the

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142 Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of
113-125.
organization are 0.15 and 0.37. Finally, specialization, indicated by the maximum number of sections in any given level of hierarchy has a correlation coefficient of 0.15 with political influence. It should be noted that some of these coefficients are not statistically significant and by themselves do not constitute definitive evidence. But taking into account that the results form an obvious pattern, there do not seem to be sufficient grounds to reject the hypothesis. Finally, in order to determine the relative contribution of some of the structural factors considered we regressed the indicator of influence, namely the average percentage of concessions obtained from government during the group's campaigns, upon centralization, ratification, size, and technology. The resulting multiple regression equation explains close to 43% of the variance.

In general, any device that can increase, even temporarily, the visibility and capabilities of a pressure group seems to increase also its ability to influence governmental decision making. An obvious mechanism to increase the size of the group is to engage in an alliance with other pressure organizations in the network. Our results indicate that there is a Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.44 between the propensity of the group to engage in alliance and its performance in institutional campaigns. Public relations campaigns, which are suscep-
tible to modify the perception of public officials of the group's political strength, are also significantly correlated with the influence exerted by the organization \( r = 0.42 \).

Conclusion

Colombian representative associations do not seem to be particularly influential in public decision making; they have been excluded from some of its critical stages and reduced to emphasize peripheral phases not directly relevant to the actual process of deciding. Pressure groups are active in attempts at converting diffuse demands into nation-wide political issues, but despite the heavy use of internal publications and the mass media, top officials in the executive branch and government planners have remained somewhat insensitive to efforts of this kind, and have not relinquished their policy making authority. On the contrary, as marginal social sectors have adopted more active political roles and have provided support to recent regimes, there has been an intensification of governmental autonomy vis à vis some traditional political actors such as labor, the entrepreneurial community, and the large landowners. The rationalization of decision making, however, has not yet reached the level where all policy making phases are invulnerable to pressure group action. Implementation still remains in the
hands of a large and traditional bureaucratic apparatus. Its insufficient degree of bureaucratization, and in particular the predominance of ascriptive and personalistic criteria in decision making, the relative inability of officials at the top of the hierarchy to control lower-level personnel, and the absence of a stable corps of bureaucrats who have decided to make a career based upon achievement in the public service, make it an ideal target for pressure groups eager to imprint their own political orientations and objectives upon the system. A second institution that has resisted change is Congress. As Alberto Lleras has pointed out:

... the Colombian Congress not only has not modernized itself, but in comparison with other State organs, and in particular the executive, is one of the most archaic and obsolete tools ever.  

Its intimate links with organized labor and the owners of large estates has converted it in a virtual representative of special interests. Paradoxically, it is a bastion of anti-reformism with regard to land reform, and a favorite instrument for labor reform. The question then becomes to what extent are these pliant, backward, and personalistic structures—which are also by far the most likely to

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be influenced--responsive to the type of political pressure that correspond to modern organization formats adopted by certain types of pressure groups? Is it necessary or even productive for interest associations that interact predominantly with personalistic actors in the public sector to evolve toward structural modernity?

The ever increasing predominance of the executive and the corresponding gradual loss of power of the remaining public entities has made it possible for government technocrats to impose their own rules and procedures upon decision making processes; today's leitmotif is scientism. Congressional dependence upon the executive branch has made it very unlikely that the principal mechanisms upon which Parliamentary action are based can escape executive interference. The medium range survival of Congress as a significant political actor may be dependent upon its adaptation to technocratic principles. The legislature may become a prime recipient of the technology provided by those interest groups interested in its political action. Technology has been superimposed to traditional requirements of political activity and has become an indispensable medium of exchange, a language practiced all over the political system.

A number of pressure groups, however, have been unable or unwilling to evolve structurally in such a way
that the internal functioning of the organization can adapt itself to the requirements of an expanded production of technologically-oriented output. Affiliates and presidents of representative associations have often preferred diminished influence to the diffusion of authority that frequently accompanies the inclusion of technocrats at all levels of the hierarchy.
CHAPTER VI

A SUMMARY AND SOME IMPLICATIONS

The conclusion that follows summarizes the principal findings in the previous analysis, and attempts to integrate them with theoretical conclusions on the same subject provided by other researchers in the field. In the past, political scientists have not been overly concerned about the internal structure of interest associations, and since this analysis has focussed in part upon dynamic aspects of the interrelationship between the structural components of pressure groups and how they affect political performance, the theoretical implications of our findings will sometimes have to be assessed in the context of research carried out by organization theorists on non-political organizations.

The network of representative associations in Colombia was found to be composed by organizations that can vary significantly with regard to structural formats. We identified, in particular, significant variations with regard to distributions of power, division of tasks, technological sophistication, physical size, and territorial dispersion. Three broad types of pressure groups tend
to be predominant in the system: the most common is by far a small-sized association, located in the capital, and lacking any elaborate administrative scheme, and in particular a formalized body of rules and procedures designed to face political tasks in a routinized fashion. The daily management and execution of operations is virtually monopolized by a chief executive who, in turn, shares with the members of the board of directors the decision making power to select political strategies and adopt the proper course of action with regard to economic matters. It is probable that technical roles are subdivided: presidents, who often have previous and extensive experience in the public service, and are familiar with the mechanisms of penetration of government structures and the exertion of influence, tend to dominate the formulation of political strategies. Simultaneously, their experience in technical matters related to the entrepreneurial activities of affiliates allows them to participate in the formulation of economic strategies and the evaluation of the financial effect of legislative actions. The economic aspect of demands, however, is predominantly the domain of specialists belonging to the affiliates' own staff.

The second type of association is frankly primitive: this time the main feature is democratic ritualism in the context of excessive formal bureaucratization. Conferences and associations representing the political
interests of large numbers of geographically dispersed affiliates—usually growers, peasants, dwellers, and urban workers—have given obsessive attention to the formal participation of their membership in decision making. Elaborate ideological platforms and cumbersome hierarchical configurations have led associations of this type to invest considerable human and material resources in the performance of internal functions directly related to the maintenance of democratic ideals. Actual distributions of power, however, differ considerably from the formal social structure: paradoxically, the actual concentration of power is the highest among the three types, and charismatic leaders surrounded by restricted executive committees tend to dominate the administrative apparatus, often during entire decades.

The third type of pressure group is typically modern. Associations in this category tend to emphasize high quality technology and a large volume of operations. They tend toward a more extensive diffusion of power than previous groups, although the channels of communication with government are still greatly centralized in the office of the presidency. Decentralization, physical growth, and the emphasis upon technology are closely related to another typical feature of this type, namely the mutation from "tall," vertical hierarchies to broad, specialized stratifications.
Levels of concentration of power by a restricted elite were found to be rather high in all classes of representative organization in the typology. This finding supports Michel's hypothesis on the oligarchic tendencies of large scale political organizations; it is also consistent with the American and French experiences as described by Truman and Meynaud. It should be noted, however, that in the case of labor confederations, the ability of executive committees to control local federations and unions may be greater than that of its American counterparts. As Truman points out, the fear of losses to the treasury tends to weaken the confederations' chances of taking disciplinary measures against non-compliant members. In Colombia, on the other hand, the government provides automatically, by law, a number of subsidies to the labor confederations, which increase their ability to maintain cohesion, and preserve a certain autonomy vis à vis their affiliates. High levels of centralization in the administration of pressure groups does not seem to be a phenomenon restricted to Colombia, but may well be characteristic of other Latin American nations as well. Burnett, for example, paid some attention to organizational features of labor groups in Chile, and has noted the absence of any excessive dedication of executive committees to "go

by the book," and the pervasive propensity to modify statutory features. ¹⁴⁵ Chilean urban business groups, in general, seem to have a similar problem in diffusing power within the administrative apparatus. Menges, in his analysis of organized business in Chile found that executive councils were given a great deal of formal and actual policy making authority.¹⁴⁶ He does not distinguish, however, between executive committees and boards of directors, and therefore, completely avoids the question of possible conflict and power struggles between the permanent staff and the affiliate's representatives formally appointed to the board of directors.

Wilson's description of organized labor in America, is frankly ambivalent with regard to centralization. First, he notes an important difference with regard to power distributions between industrial and craft unions:

An industrial union was, of necessity, centrally led. . . . Funds within such a union go, in substantial measure, to the national office to supply the needs of a staff originally recruited to assist in organizing drives but which, as these drives are complemented, is maintained for


other purposes. ... An AFL craft union, by contrast, vests most authority in the local, and the chief hired officer. ... 147

It should be noted that Wilson's remark about the emphasis upon diffusion of authority and local autonomy in craft unions is overshadowed by the fact that after the merger of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1955, the nationally-oriented and centralized style of decision making characteristic of the CIO tended to predominate. 148

Moreover, the remarkable continuity of leadership within the AFL (... "since its founding in 1886, has had, except for a brief interlude, only three presidents."), 149 and the personalistic style of Samuel Gompers' leadership, 150 are factors rarely associated with decentralization. Second, despite his observation about how concentrated power is within the industrial union, Wilson concludes that "organized labor remains essentially a decentralized structure." 151 To support his statement, he refers to the case of the Committee of Political Educa-

147 Wilson, Political Organizations, p. 135.
148 Ibid, p. 136
151 Ibid, p. 137.
tion (COPE),\textsuperscript{152} which, according to Bok and Dunlop,\textsuperscript{153} does not have any formal authority to control the endorsements of candidates by local labor confederations, or to oblige them to contribute financially to the Committee. These decentralizing features, as Wilson implicitly recognizes, are nevertheless offset by certain powers COPE's officials have acquired, and in particular the tendency to persuade the unions to endorse the candidates it supports and to establish fund-raising quotas.\textsuperscript{154}

Our approach consisted in distinguishing between three principal categories of decisions in a pressure organization, namely decisions taken at lower and middle levels, decisions taken by the chief executive, and decisions needing ratification by the board of directors or a higher assembly. By analyzing the covariations between the percentage of decisions taken by each in eleven de-

\textsuperscript{152}COPE is the political action arm of the merged AFL-CIO.


\textsuperscript{154}Wilson's book is not fundamentally concerned about social structure in labor organizations; it focuses primarily on the question of why people come together into organizations, on the methods by which their loyalties are retained, and the consequences of these methods for political activities of these organizations.
cision making areas\textsuperscript{155} it was found, first that decreases in the decision making authority of lower and middle level executives tended to be associated with increases of control by affiliates, not by the chief executive. Second, variations in the decision making power of the chief executive also appeared to be inversely correlated with the authority given to affiliates. This suggests that the primary exchanges of power occur between affiliates and the remaining actors, implying that the need for control by the membership is very probably one of the main obstacles to decentralization of the administrative system in pressure organizations. Further support to this hypothesis was provided by the results of the interviews of top executives in interest associations, many of which pinpointed the distrust on the part of influential affiliates of the political and administrative skills of subordinates, and their unwillingness to allow significant autonomy.

The distribution of power within the administrative apparatus of representative associations was found to be

\textsuperscript{155}The preparation of the budget, appointment of executives and staff, promotion of personnel, dismissal of executives, expenditure of unbudgeted money, specification of job procedures, creation of new positions and/or departments, taking disciplinary measures against non-compliant members, selection of political tactics, initiation of political campaigns, and authorizing the release of public statements.
of critical importance in the organization's ability to perform its political tasks successfully. Performance was evaluated with regard to two functions, namely access, or the ability shown by the group to contact appropriate government targets; and influence, or the ability to modify through institutional campaigns government decisions, and/or induce public officials to generate policy regarded as favorable to the group and its members. With regard to access, a significant link was found between decentralization, and the group's participation in boards of public entities and frequency of nonroutine interaction with State organs ascribed to the executive branch. Moreover, concentration of authority in the chief executive appeared to be inversely associated with all indicators of access to the executive branch. The direction of the relationship was generally the same with regard to the second type of dimension of effectiveness, namely the ability to influence public policy.

These findings do not seem to support the general hypotheses of either Hage or Price, two organization theorists who have attempted to summarize major findings in the field of organizations. Hage, in his axiomatic theory argues that performance is directly related to centralization, although it is not clear whether he is referring to individual or organizational production. To support his hypothesis he quotes, among others, the findings of Morse
and Reimer who discovered that higher rates of production took place when centralization was experimentally increased in a department of a given firm; and those of Blau and Scott who concluded that "group decision making (low centralization) is slow and highly inefficient." It should be noted, first, that decentralization does not necessarily imply collective decision making and therefore Blau's and Scott's evidence does not exactly support his hypothesis; and second, that Morse and Reimer seem to be concerned about the psychological phenomenon of productivity, and therefore their findings are not comparable to global measures of organizational performance, which belong to a higher level of analysis.

The second deductive proposition is the one by Price who concludes that "organizations which have the maximum degree of centralization . . . are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organizations that do not have the maximum degree of centralization." 

156 Nancy C. Morse, and Everett Reimer, "The Experimental Change of a Major Organizational Variable," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 52, pp. 120-29.


159 Price, *Organizational Effectiveness*, p. 60.
This seemingly simple statement, however, becomes more and more complex as Price constantly shifts the substantive frame of reference upon which effectiveness is evaluated, to the point where any favorable phenomenon occurring in an organization seems to be equivalent to effectiveness. In general, it is doubtful that global propositions are a great help in assessing effectiveness with regard to political tasks, or that findings related to one or more types of organizations can be freely extrapolated to other kinds of groups. More evidence concretely related to interest associations, and in particular their management mechanisms, will have to be collected before it becomes possible to ascertain with minimal reliability and validity how diffused should authority be in pressure organizations in order to maximize political effectiveness.

A second aspect of Price's analysis involves the effect of complexity upon the relationship between power distribution and effectiveness. Price basically argues that an exception to the hypothesis about centralization inevitably leading to high performance, is the presence of high levels of complexity. Unfortunately it is not exactly clear whether he is referring only to technological complexity or if he includes other dimensions of the concept as well, and especially the complexity of the configuration of the social structure. In the context of pressure groups, our position is that centralization does
not tend to be compatible with either technological complexity (and in particular the professionalization of the associations) and/or specialization of tasks, indicated by horizontal differentiation. With regard to the professionalization of interest groups, the incompatibility arises, first, from difficulties involved in integrating the expert to the system of formal rules typical of bureaucracies, or the irrationality inherent in personalistic types of decision making. In both cases professionals will demand greater participation in all phases of the decision making process. Second, there is the question of integrating the knowledge and technical production of professionals to the political interaction of pressure groups with the public sector. This problem may be an important source of conflict: if a chief executive is a politician, not a technocrat (which is usually the case in Colombian interest associations), friction may arise with regard to the determination of the professional's sphere of competence. A common outcome is a tendency to isolate the expert in a research section, and exclude him from the daily administration; simultaneously utilizing the technical material he produces as evidence to support the demands made to government. Another possibility is the gradual accommodation of politicians and technocrats, which gives rise to a rational division of labor according
to capabilities, from which open cooperation may even emerge.

With regard to horizontal differentiation, the incompatibility between centralization and complexity arises as a result of problems of coordination or the integration of the various parts of the organization. One possible source of diffusion of power in horizontally differentiated pressure organizations is that, since specialization of tasks in interest groups is strongly associated with professionalization, as new sections are created, constant supervision by the chief executive is unnecessary, given the high level of competence of the executives in charge of managing each section. Since horizontal differentiation usually coincides with the expansion of the types of entrepreneurial activity represented by interest associations, a second possibility is that as new sections are created, the president has to involve additional executives in maintaining the links with the new categories of affiliates. Due to the fact that the chief executive can no longer monopolize information originating at the membership level—but on the contrary is partially dependent upon the knowledge of participants better informed about the problems and demands of affiliates—he is induced to diffuse power.

High concentration of power in the case of Colombian pressure groups is not an isolated managerial feature,
but an important element of an integral conception of the administration of political organizations. High centralization is inextricably linked with the broader phenomenon of personalism and charismatic leadership, which is so widespread in underdeveloped nations. As a result of having to interact with a political environment in which paternalism, elitism, and personal ties have traditionally determined the ability of political groups to contact government and maintain solid ties with public officials, and the existence of cultural traits that reinforce ascription instead of achievement and established status instead of vertical social mobility, it is not surprising that many representative associations have also tended to adopt undifferentiated structures based upon the strong action of charismatic and semi-authoritarian leaders. With regard to the three structural types of pressure groups previously delineated, it seems that chronic organizational underdevelopment has given rise to two distinct categories of interest associations: groups in the first type are undifferentiated, unspecialized systems in which the emphasis is given to the individual, not roles or positions. What counts in terms of daily management, is simply the ability of a president to tightly control his

subordinates. Groups belonging to the second type, as mentioned earlier, have adopted excessively formalized structures typical of the Weberian bureaucracy, but without its substantive content in terms of actual functioning.

Excessive centralization and personalism is simply the organizational equivalent of the relative absence of differentiation between the personal, social, and political spheres so prevalent in underdeveloped societies in general. 161 Colombia, a developing nation, is already characterized by the superimposition of modern over primitive organizations, and therefore offers the possibility of evaluating the relative political effectiveness of both types. The previous findings which described centralized and personalistic representative associations as less effective in gaining access to the executive branch and influencing public policy than decentralized and differentiated organizations are consistent with the following hypothesis by Price:

Organizations which primarily have a rational-legal type of decision making are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organizations which primarily have a charismatic type of decision making. . . . Charismatic decision making may be defined as the degree to which a social system allocates decision making to specific individuals. 162


162 Price, Organizational Effectiveness, p. 55.
It should be stressed, however, that the validity of such hypothesis depends to a great extent upon the social configuration of the environment in which the organization functions, particularly when effectiveness is evaluated with regard to tasks performed outside the organization's boundaries. The comparison of performance in contacting and influencing different targets in the public sector is indicative of the degree to which structural and cultural factors at the environmental level can affect organizational effectiveness. Personalistic leadership appeared to be much better adapted to the interaction with Congress, while decentralized and differentiated structures were by far more effective in maintaining access and influencing the executive branch. Diffusion of power, for example, which symbolizes the breaking with managerial systems based upon the action of personalistic chief executives was found to be inversely associated with access to Congress; while on the contrary, all variables meaning decentralization were positively related to both access and influence. These findings are particularly significant if it is taken into account that relatively deep structural and cultural cleavages separate the executive from Congress in Colombia. The former emphasizes rationality, depoliticization, and universalism; the latter personal influence and provincialism.
Diffusion of power and specialization of tasks were found to be closely linked with the physical size of representative organizations. The relationship between size and other structural characteristics has not been clearly established by empirical analysis of organizations, although Caplow, Grusky, and Zelditch and Hopkins, among others, have hypothesized that large organizations have to be necessarily more complex and stratified than small organizations. The statistical link, however, has been elusive. As Hall et al. have pointed out:

In short, there is agreement that size affects structure, but there is no agreement on the relative importance vis à vis other aspects of organizational structure. Empirical studies using size as a major variable also have come to rather contradictory conclusions.163

Their own study based on data from seventy five organizations, did not find a statistical association between the number of divisions and size. They concluded that enough deviant cases existed to cast serious doubts on the assumption that large organizations are necessarily more complex than small organizations, or even on the broader hypothesis relating size to structure.

Our findings indicate that, at least in the specific case of pressure organizations, there are strong indi-

cations that large political organizations are also significantly more complex. The Pearson correlation coefficients between size indicated by the level of annual expenditures and the number of executive personnel, and complexity indicated by the number of sections, exceeded 0.8 in all cases. Moreover, equally large statistical associations were found between size and technological sophistication indicated by the annual volume of production of technical material and the number of professionals employed full time by the group. Significantly, as pressure organizations in Colombia grow, they tend to adopt functionally specialized, wide, and flat structures, instead of hierarchically oriented, "tall," and vertical stratifications.

The structural development of interest groups has profound political implications, particularly if interpreted in the context of broader political processes typical to Latin America. As Anderson has pointed out, groups which seek to institutionalize their acceptance to the political arena, or at least to have their demands implemented through the State machinery, must demonstrate definite power capabilities.\textsuperscript{164} Only large and organized groups are capable of such actions with sufficient inten-

sity and consistency. We found moderately large correlation coefficients between organizational size and structural complexity, and the group's ability to stage public relations campaigns through the mass media, demonstrations, alliances, etc. In a second phase, according to Anderson, the process is characterized by manipulation and negotiation among power contenders with reciprocally recognized power capabilities. At this stage, the internal structural format of the groups included in the bargaining process is, in our view, a critical factor in determining the form and content of the future patterns of political interaction likely to emerge out of this process of negotiation and manipulation. Relatively transient, unstructured, technologically primitive, small, and personalistic interest groups—although sufficiently powerful in absolute terms to be considered as nominal political contenders—are very likely to either be unable to agree upon stable and institutionalized norms for the regulation of conflict, or fail to maintain any real political autonomy vis-à-vis the State.

The first alternative is commonly known as praetorianism, and arises when both associational and institutional political groups lack coherence, complexity, and adaptability. The result is a political process in

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which social forces confront each other nakedly, and each interest group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities.\textsuperscript{166} Silvert and Payne, among others, have illustrated the consequences of praetorianism upon political processes in two Latin American nations. Silvert, referring to what he calls the costs of anti-nationalism, has described Argentinian politics as simple and structurally weak. The interaction of interest groups and the State is characterized by the inability of the latter to establish itself as the arbiter of public life, and the unwillingness of political actors to obey the law.\textsuperscript{167} Payne, referring to a milder form of praetorianism which he labels "the politics of structured violence," has depicted Peruvian politics as prone to chronic instability and intense political conflict. Political bargaining, or the expression of the group's own power capabilities, he argues, has replaced collective bargaining among interest groups and the State.\textsuperscript{168}

Loss of autonomy is likely to be the second major by-product of structural underdevelopment in interest

\textsuperscript{166} Huntington, Political Order, p. 196.


groups. This phenomenon is commonly known as corporatist-authoritarianism, and is in great measure the result of cultural factors and the superior organizational ability of a military establishment or a party from which an authoritarian State draws its support and resources. Schmitter, Steppan, and Roett, among others, have described this phenomenon in Brazil. Corporatism, they say, implies the heavy penetration of interest groups by the State; the hierarchical differentiation of the various political groups, with the military establishment at the top of the hierarchy; and the attempt to depolitize and de-ideologize the political process. 169

In a non-military context, Mexico has also tended toward an authoritarian-corporatist format of government. A tightly knit elite usually headed by the President of the Republic and composed by spokesmen from commerce, industry, federal agencies, the military, etc., control decision making and the articulation, aggregation, and communication of interests. 170 The institutional structure through which political functions are performed is

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bipolar. On the one hand there is a formal political apparatus, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, which is a federation of sectors—labor, agrarian, and popular—whose primary purpose has become the pacification and social control of "lower class elements that might otherwise be inclined to be restive because of the primarily business-oriented development policies of the government." 171 Rural and urban labor federations such as the National Corporation of Peasants (CNC), the Corporation of Mexican Workers (CTM), and the National Corporation of Workers (CNT), appear to be unable to channel the necessary resources to promote the development of the sectors they represent. As Padgett has indicated the main function of these federations may be one of communication and promotion of consensus.

On the other hand, there is a second power structure composed by influential pressure groups which, although not represented in the PRI, are systematically consulted by the government and have reached semi-official status. 172 Among these, the Confederation of Industrial


Chambers of the United States of Mexico (CONCAMIN), and the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO) have benefited most from the developmentalist approach practiced by the Mexican State.  

The Colombian political system undoubtedly shares a few elements with both models, and in particular a slight tendency toward anomic behavior in the form of demonstrations and rural instability; but it would be inappropriate to label it praetorian or corporatist. The relationship of interest groups and the State is closer to what could be described as a pre-polyarchic system in which, despite the acceptance of values consistent with the democratic creed and the nominal inclusion in the political process of a number of ideologically disparate actors, the bulk of interest aggregation takes place among selected members of a small elite that has proved its ability to organize.  

The difference from other semi-polyarchic nations in Latin America is that the top segments of the bureaucracy have been converted into large scale, complex, and technocratic institutions, and have gradually superseded tradi-

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tionally influential interest groups to the point where the notion of central planning has been superimposed to the process of interest aggregation. Although pressure groups are still engaged in articulating interests, it is doubtful that the resulting demands have a definite influence upon public policy, or even reach desirable targets in time. Government has developed its own ideological principles and communication channels to ascertain the nature of the so-called people's needs. It tends to interpret economic regulation in a broader national context far removed from that provided by labor or business associations. The modernization of top bureaucratic segments, however, has not spilled over to lower levels of the bureaucracy or other institutions, thereby leaving ample room for political manoeuvres by pressure groups, particularly during Parliamentary approval, when required, and during the implementation phases of decision making.

The functioning of the system obviously reflects the ideological inclinations of major power holders. The technocrats, in charge of guiding the system through a number of possible developmental paths, have been able to imprint their own cultural values upon the political process; they have been successful in promoting scientism, a new language, if not an integral solution to modernization. Their conception of decision making certainly
does not include the participation of interest groups. Our findings indicate that despite an appearance of pluralism most pressure groups, and in particular the less organized, lack appropriate access and formal representation to the executive, and are only superficially consulted by policy makers. Their influence is restricted, and their victories seem pyrrhic or insignificant. The creation of technocratic, large scale, and complex pressure organizations is required, if specialized interests intend to establish a productive dialogue with government and participate in public policy.
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