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THE ELECTORAL BASIS OF CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE

by

Patricia Ann Hurley

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis Director's Signature:

[Signature]

Houston, Texas

May 1976
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

This thesis addresses the question of why some individual Congresses are productive - in the sense of generating significant policy outputs - while others are relatively undistinguished in these terms. Despite the fact that this question appears especially relevant to current scholarly concern with the determinants of public policy outputs, little previous research bears directly on this issue. In general, historical comparisons of the legislative process are relatively rare. More specifically, no research has examined those Congresses which are generally considered to have been highly significant in our terms: having passed legislation which had an important impact on the development of society or the evolution of public policy. It is this gap which we seek to fill in the present research.

Because no previous research has addressed directly the question posed here, it is somewhat difficult to identify existing scholarship which would be critical to our concerns. Nevertheless, there are a number of works on the Congress and the larger political process which provide material relevant to the research question. In the following pages we will review these various works, extracting from them concepts and hypotheses useful for our interests.

One study has addressed the quantitative dimensions of Congressional performance.\(^1\) Farnsworth and Fleming rank the twentieth century Congresses according to the number of public laws enacted during the tenure of each. They find that the two variables most highly associated with the number of public laws passed are the percent of Congressmen in each body belonging to the majority party in the electorate, and the per-
percentage of the President's popular vote. The utility of this approach is limited since there may be no relationship between the quantity and the quality of Congressional performance. Additionally, secular trends in the number of bills introduced and passed, as well as the use of omnibus bills make the dependent variable unreliable. These difficulties aside, the finding that "electoral mandate" variables are associated with any measure of Congressional performance is interesting.

Farnsworth and Fleming's perspective on the Congress is unique. Other studies which may offer potential insights into Congressional performance focus on the internal or external environment of the Congress. The bulk of the relevant literature is limited to analysis of the House of Representatives.

One body of literature which might provide useful ideas and material is that which examines the internal distribution of power in the House -- focusing directly on the Congressional committees. Richard Fenno is the most prominent scholar in the study of Congressional committees and his style of analysis is typical of the bulk of the committee literature. He considers the committee as a discrete unit of analysis, and assumes it to be quite powerful and highly autonomous. This particular analytic focus leads to the implicit conclusion that committees and the committee system are the sole determinants of policy output by the Congress.

Fenno is primarily interested in what goes on in the committees themselves, particularly the Appropriations Committee. The internal workings of the committee are seen as the key to its effectiveness, defined as success on the House floor. The most important variable in determining this success is integration. Fenno defines integration as mutual support
among roles and subgroups, or the degree to which expected and actual behavior converge. Integration in the Appropriations Committee, and presumably in other committees as well, is facilitated by the consensus on the goal of the committee, committee attractiveness, and adherence to the norms of nonpartisanship, subcommittee unity, specialization, and reciprocity, all of which are perpetuated through the proper socialization of newcomers.

Fenno considers a rather vague set of variables to be the determinants of the committee decision or success on the House floor. These determinants are divided into three broad groups - member goals, environmental constraints, and strategic premises. Member goals and committee goals are not necessarily the same. For example, members of the Appropriations committee agree that the goal of the committee is to guard the federal treasury, yet individual member goals may be the quest for power, prestige, and influence. Environmental constraints are considered as groups of relevant outsiders and may be the parent House, the Executive Branch, various clientele groups, or political parties. Relevant outsiders are not continuous across committees, but rather differ with respect to the subject matter with which the committee deals. Strategic premises, or decision rules, are committee behavioral norms which facilitate (or obstruct) integration. Again, strategic premises differ from committee to committee.

For those who, like Fenno, consider the committee system as an important determinant of policy output, these three vague sets of independent variables become the determinants of that output. But do they really explain policy outputs, or why the work of some Congresses is significant while the work of others is undistinguished? The answer is
no because the focus of the committee studies is disproportionately on
the internal distribution of influence in the House. As a result, change
in House membership, turnover in committee membership, and change in
policy desires and needs of the electorate are not explained. While
Fenno's analysis is quite good as a description of the committee system
and how it facilitates the flow of work in the House, it is insufficient
as an explanation of significant legislative output.

Since the focus on Congressional committees offers a limited basis
for explaining significant Congressional performance, we turn to an ap-
proach which is slightly broader in scope. This is the study of party
leadership in Congress. One of the most comprehensive works on this topic
is Ripley's Party Leaders in the House of Representatives.4 In document-
ing the techniques of contemporary leaders, Ripley notes that they confine
their activities to floor business, and rarely attempt to influence the
work of committees. Ripley argues that since the 1920's, leadership re-
sponsibility has been for facilitating the flow of legislation rather than
for the specific content of legislation. Additionally, party leadership
is responsible for maintaining some element of party discipline. The
sanctions at the disposal of the party leadership are informal, but mem-
bers of both parties agree that isolation or poor committee assignments
may result if members fail to stick with the party position. Thus it
would seem that party leadership is potentially important in passing
significant legislation, but the impetus for that legislation is external
to the leadership structure. Ripley also notes that a highly centralized
leadership structure may be more conducive to legislative success than a
decentralized one, although it is by no means a guarantee. This interest-
ing generalization will be examined in more detail subsequently.
The literature on presidential leadership also provides testable hypotheses for this research. The role of the Executive in the legislative process has increased markedly in the twentieth century, and a number of scholars discuss the President's function as "chief policy maker" or "initiator." Their conclusions are similar. The President's legislative requests serve to set the policy agenda for Congress. He is expected to present a coherent legislative program to the House and Senate. Particularly when the President and the majority in Congress are of the same party, his endorsement of policies being considered and the control over resources afforded him by his office can provide critical leverage for the legislative leadership.

There is also consensus among scholars on the typical congressional response to presidential initiatives. With remarkable uniformity, the literature suggests that the Congress' typical response to presidential proposals is negative. More often than not, negative majorities will form to "water down," if not completely block the executive program. It is the exceptional President who can get the majority of his program through Congress.

Several authors note that when the President is very successful in getting his program passed it is often due to the influence of factors in addition to superior presidential leadership. Polsby suggests that luck and circumstances play a part in presidential success. Woll notes that "the president cannot significantly innovate unless there is substantial support both within and without the government for such action." He attributes Roosevelt's success with the New Deal to the large scale discontent of the electorate with Hoover's policies, the general demand for any sort of change in policy focus, and the realignment of the 1930's, as
well. Cooper and Bombardier suggest that Lyndon Johnson's success with programs which failed under the Kennedy administration was due primarily to a large influx in Northern Democrats who supported the liberal programs rather than to Johnson's superior leadership skills.8

This body of literature is limited in insights for this research since it focuses primarily on instances when the legislative branch obstructs a package of Executive-initiated legislation. The concern here is with the circumstances under which Congress will pass an important package of legislation. A second problem is that no insights are offered in regard to the determinants of packages of significant policy proposals by the President. Polsby considers the opportunities under which a President may innovate in the policy arena, but his focus is too narrow to be of utility here.9 He is concerned with the instance of one innovative policy proposal rather than a package of them.

The literature does suggest that skillful or strong presidential leadership is more conducive to success in Congress than weak leadership. This hypothesis will be tested in a subsequent chapter. Additionally, the notion that demands from the electorate or electoral change such as party realignment have an effect on presidential success is interesting. For this reason, we turn next to the literature on party and constituency influence in Congress, and then to the literature on party realignment.

The literature on party and constituency is broader in scope than either the party or presidential leadership studies. This literature seeks to explain party responsibility, or more often, the lack of responsibility in the House of Representatives by assessing the relative impact of party and constituency factors on the roll call voting decisions of individual Congressmen. The focus on constituency factors is an improvement on the
committee and party leadership literature discussed above because it acknowledges the fact that voting decisions may have causes which are external to the House. The concern with party, however, still draws attention to the internal distribution of influence within the House.

This literature cannot directly address the question of what causes significant legislative output because its primary concern is with the voting decision made by a congressman on any given roll call. In order to determine causes of significant legislative output one must investigate the overall pattern of voting which defines the legislative output of any Congress. The party and constituency literature, however, could provide insights into those forces which influence a congressman's vote and in so doing may yield information about those variables which influence the pattern of voting in the House.

Perhaps the best summary of this literature is provided by W. Wayne Shannon, who reviews the work of Lowell, Turner, MacRae, and Truman. Lowell, in comparing the relative influence of party in the British House of Commons, the United States Congress, and several other legislatures, concluded that party was a far less significant influence in the United States than in England, and that the occurrence of party votes depended a great deal on the issue at hand.

Julius Turner, in 1951, was the first to attempt to measure the relative effects of party and constituency on a congressman's vote. While Turner concludes that party is a significant determinant of legislative voting behavior, Shannon notes that his data may not support this. Shannon attributes the Turner findings to methodological tests of significance which are inappropriate to the question, as well as to standards of party voting which are really too lax to adequately measure the effects of party.
MacRae used Guttman scaling to locate Congressmen on policy dimensions, as well as census data on the various constituencies. The constituency variables were then cross tabulated with the scale scores. In Shannon's words, the results were interesting if confusing, with constituency characteristics related to scale scores for some of the Congressmen some of the time. MacRae's analysis is limited to only the 81st House, which may explain some of the confusion in his findings. On the whole, they do not appear very different from the fruits of others' research in this area.

Truman also used a technique for clustering roll calls, although his analysis is less sophisticated than MacRae's. This analysis revealed two blocks of Democrats based on a North-South regional split. For the Republicans, an East-West split was discerned, although the results are not as clear as are those for the Democrats. No attempt is made to systematically investigate the effects of constituency variables.

In addition to those works reviewed by Shannon, a number of other scholars have investigated the effects of party and constituency on legislative voting behavior. Shannon himself finds party differences among three major groups: Republicans, Northern Democrats, and Southern Democrats. An examination of constituency characteristics and voting leads him to conclude that constituency characteristics clearly account for deviation from party voting in rural, low blue collar districts in Midwestern and Border states. Shannon's analysis is based on an examination of data from the 86th and 87th Congresses.

Lewis Froman examines the thesis that voting behavior of a Congressmen should "vary with, and be dependent upon, the type of constituency from which he comes."12 Five constituency variables are considered: race, socio-economic status, residence (%urban), population density, and
competitiveness of the district. An examination of roll call data showed important constituency differences for Northern Democrats and Republicans on the first four variables. Froman also examines the effect of a particular incumbent on voting behavior and finds that effects vary by party, by region, and by competitiveness of the district. He concludes that competitiveness of the district has some effect on voting behavior: specifically that in the middle ranges of competitiveness Republicans are more conservative and Democrats are more liberal, but that these differences disappear at the very highest ranges of competitiveness.

Miller and Stokes seek only to investigate the impact of constituency on roll call voting. They do not test the impact of constituency versus party, but rather ask if the Congressman votes his own attitude, his constituency's attitude, or his perception of his constituency's attitude. The test is carried out on three issue areas: foreign policy, social welfare, and civil rights. Using data from a 1958 survey of legislative candidates (both incumbent and aspiring legislator) and constituents in 116 districts, they find that in the area of civil rights the legislator is most likely to vote his perception of constituency attitude. In the social welfare area, the legislator is more likely to vote his own opinion, although Miller and Stokes note that for this issue area, representatives' opinions are likely to conform to the accepted party line. In the foreign policy area, legislators are less likely to vote either their own or their constituency's attitude. Rather, they tend to respond to the position of the executive branch of the government.

A somewhat different approach to Congressional voting behavior is taken by Aage R. Clausen, although his findings overlap those of Miller and Stokes. Objecting to such traditional classifications of Congressmen
as liberal, moderate, or conservative, he contends that a different classificatory scheme will lend more insight into legislative voting behavior. Clausen pinpoints a legislator's position on a policy dimension. Five major policy dimensions are identified: civil liberties, international involvement, agricultural assistance, social welfare, and government management of the economy. Clausen finds these dimensions in both the House and in the Senate, and considers them to be stable and continuous over time. In what is perhaps the most useful chapter of the book, Clausen relates party and constituency to these five dimensions. Unlike many other writers, he explicitly notes the difficulty of pinpointing party and constituency factors, but proceeds with the analysis. Essentially, he varies party while holding constituency constant by looking at districts over time. Three conditions are considered: the same representative remains in office, a new representative of the same party gets the seat, or a new representative of the opposite party gets the seat. By examining any subsequent change in policy focus for the district, he attempts to get at party and constituency factors. The results suggest that constituency appears strongest on the international involvement dimensions (although later analysis suggests that presidential pull is more important here), and on the civil liberties dimension. The influence of party increases on the dimensions of agricultural assistance, social welfare, and government management, respectively.

Clausen's analysis is more sophisticated than the others reviewed here. While many of his ideas are not new, he manages to identify areas where constituency factors are influential and others where party is more important, in a reasonable and convincing manner.
The literature on party and constituency lacks clarity and consistency findings. With the exception of Clausen, few analysts seem to be cognizant of the fact that the influence of party and constituency is difficult to measure, or that the two may be intertwined so closely that it is impossible to measure the relative effects of either. For example, none of these analysts has noted the fact that the demographic variables used to measure constituency influence are often fairly good predictors of political party as well. There probably are not independent effects of either party or constituency, but rather party simply functions as an intervening variable.

Another reason which may account for these divergent findings is that none of these analyses covers a significant time span. Clausen's ten year period from 1953 to 1964 is the most extensive covered here, but ten years is a short time in the nearly two hundred year history of the House, or even the history of what is known as the modern House, which dates back to the early 1890's. It could be that under conditions which are not considered in the analyses discussed above either party or constituency may have a greater effect on the vote decision of a Congressman. If the effect is systematic across Congressmen, it may affect the pattern of voting in the House, and hence the output of the Congress.

A final body of literature which may be helpful in assessing the determinants of significant legislative output is that dealing with electoral realignment. Most of the realignment literature focuses solely on distributions of influence external to the Congress: specifically, the distribution of partisan indentification in the electorate. The distribution of partisan preference may be viewed as a determinant of policy output in that it affects the election of those who make public
policy.

The first work on realignment was done by the late V.O. Key, Jr., and appeared in 1955. Key defined a critical election as one in which the voters are "unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate." He notes that the concept of realignment is central to the definition of a critical election in that the electoral cleavage which results is of a durable nature. Hence, critical elections and realignment are concepts which must be discussed together, but they are not exactly synonymous, a point lost on many students of realignment.

Key's analysis of critical elections centered on the impact in New England of Alfred E. Smith's 1928 presidential candidacy. While the analysis is statistically crude, based only on a comparison of means without significance tests, he succeeded in proving his point as well as starting a trend in voting research. Key ends his article with a series of questions regarding the impact of critical elections and realignment on public administration, the legislative process, and the public order. A simpler set of questions asks what are the correlates of this pattern of electoral behavior, and what characteristics give rise to realignments? Twenty years later, only this second, simpler set of questions has been answered. It is possible, however, that these answers may provide a clue in answering questions regarding the impact of realignment on public policy and the legislative process.

Walter Dean Burnham is currently the foremost researcher on realignment. In what may be considered the definitive work on the topic,
Burnham describes the characteristics of partisan realignments: they are associated with short lived but intense disruptions of traditional voting behavior, they are high intensity elections, frequently with chaotic convention behavior, they appear with a uniform degree of periodicity, they are often preceded by major third party activity. Burnham succeeds in identifying critical elections by applying statistical tests far more sophisticated than those used by Key.

In a series of articles\textsuperscript{17} Burnham presents research based on aggregate voting data which show that the relevant political universe in the United States is shrinking; that is, turnout is dropping relative to the size of the population. Turnout has also declined in off-year elections. There has been an increase in "roll-off" or the tendency to vote for "prestige" but not lesser offices on the same ticket, as well as in split ticket voting. These phenomena indicate what Burnham calls the "decline-in-party," a theme which he has developed at considerable length.

Only in Burnham's latest essay\textsuperscript{18} is the question of Congress considered directly. While in earlier work he states that realignments result in significant changes in public policy,\textsuperscript{19} little analysis is done on the mechanisms which effect this change in policy. In the new essay, Burnham expands his decline in party argument to cover elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. He notes that presidential "coattails" no longer have an effect on the election of incumbent Congressmen, and further that the percentage of competitive Congressional seats has declined from 24.3\% in 1952 to 14.4\% in 1972.\textsuperscript{20} Additionally, the proportion of incumbents running for office has increased from five-sixths in 1952 to seven-eights in 1972. As voters find the party label increasingly meaningless, they seek other cues as the basis for their voting decisions. The
most relevant cue, identified by Miller and Stokes, is incumbency. Hence, the decline in party phenomenon helps increasing numbers of incumbents to be returned to the House. The decline in the infusion of new blood in an era of rapid social change "implies a constantly growing gap between a self insulated House and the needs of the country at large." We may infer from this that the House will find it difficult to respond to the demands of social and technological change with innovative legislation. It is possible that as the problems of society become more and more intense and the House becomes more and more ossified a new party with the capacity to govern innovatively will arise and precipitate a critical realignment, which in turn may trigger Congressional action.

This sort of electoral response is suggested in James L. Sundquist's work on realignment, Dynamics of the Party System. In what is perhaps the clearest treatment of the subject on record, the realignment process is described as a result of the rise of a new set of issues which cross-cuts the electorate in such a way as to make the existing electoral alignment obsolete. Five variables are seen as determining the scope and extent of the realignment: the breadth and depth of the underlying grievance, the capacity of the proposed remedy to provoke resistance, the motivation and capacity of party leadership, the division of the polar forces between the parties, and the strength of the ties that bind voters to the existing parties. Sundquist's analysis makes it clear that the factor which determines the form of the realignment is the policy positions taken by the parties, and particularly the leadership, on the new set of cross-cutting issues. These positions serve as the poles around which voters cluster. While Sundquist clearly draws the implications of realignment for policy change, he does not go into detail about the means by which this policy
change is legitimated. The party leadership is viewed as instrumental, but it is unclear whether the party leadership effects the policy change from the White House, from Capitol Hill, or from some other vantage point. It seems that Executive leadership would be necessary but insufficient without a Congress willing and able to endorse policy innovation.

Clearly, the bulk of realignment literature does not directly address the question of the impact of critical realignment on policy outputs. It merely suggests that policy change is a consequence of realignment; it does not explain how, or even why policy is changed in a very specific fashion. This body of literature is instructive, however, in that it describes fairly accurately a set of electoral conditions, external to the institutions of government, which are correlates of policy innovations. What is lacking in a precise statement of how these external conditions, in spite of, or in conjunction with conditions internal to government institutions, are related to significant policy outputs.

David Brady, however, has specifically addressed the question of the effects of critical realignment on clusters of policy change. He has demonstrated that the realigning elections of the 1890's and 1930's brought about conditions in the House of Representatives which were conducive to the passage of significant legislation. Specifically, an infusion of switched seat members led to an unusually high degree of committee turnover, thus changing the policy focus of the committees. Additionally, a rise in the level of party voting insured that majority party programs would be passed. He concludes that during realigning periods "a case for responsible party government can be made."

Despite the obvious relevance of Brady's findings to this work,
his research focused on a different question than that examined here. He is concerned only with the effects of realignment on policy change, while the question here is broader in that we seek the general determinants of significant Congressional output. It would be naive to assume that significant Congressional output occurs during periods of critical realignment, and clearly Brady does not make this assumption. He does offer, however, several interesting hypotheses for this research. Notable among them are that large numbers of switched seat Congressmen, high levels of party voting, and homogeneity of the constituency bases of the parties are conducive to significant policy output. These hypotheses will be tested in a subsequent chapter.

In order to derive generalizations about the determinants of significant Congressional output a comparative case study approach will be utilized. Three Congresses which passed significant legislation will be studied, and three Congresses whose work was more typical of general Congressional performance will be employed as a control group. A control group is necessary since factors common to significant Congresses may also be present in undistinguished Congresses.

In order to select significant Congresses, some criteria for significance must be established. For purposes of this research, significant legislation will be defined as legislation which had a definite impact on the character of U.S. society and the role of government within it. In so doing, such legislation brings about a change in policies and issues sufficiently substantial to affect the types of issues considered by later Congresses. Most Congresses, of course, do not pass this sort of legislation. Rather, they continue to pass laws which are not different in character from policies of previous Congresses. Policy change is
generally incremental. When extensive policy change is brought about swiftly through legislation, Congressional performance has been significant.

Using this definition, three Congresses were selected for study because of their high levels of significant legislative output. They are the 55th (1897-99), and 73rd (1933-35), and the 89th (1965-66). The 55th Congress passed legislation dealing with economic standards, tariff policy, and imperial expansion. The 73rd Congress enacted the first of the New Deal legislation. The 89th will be remembered for its innovative education and civil rights legislation. Of course, these three are not the only significant Congresses in the history of that institution. They were purposely selected from the pool of significant Congresses because they met at very different periods in the structural development of the Congress. This allows one to test the hypothesis that certain Congressional rules or norms decisively impact Congressional output. The implications of this point will be expanded in a later chapter.

The three control group Congresses were also selected in order to have one from the same three periods in Congressional development. Their legislative output ranges from relatively undistinguished to poor. This group includes the 59th (1905-07), the 67th (1921-23), and the 87th (1961-62) Congresses.

Analysis in these six Congresses will be limited to the House of Representatives. The primary reason for this limitation is manageability. A large number of data must be collected and analyzed, and to do so for both bodies of six Congresses would be difficult. Moreover, previous research which offers testable hypotheses suggests that constituency or electoral factors may be related to Congressional performance. Since the
entire membership of the House is elected every two years it is conceivable that electoral impacts would be more discernible here than in the Senate. The conclusions which are derived from the analysis of the House should also be suggestive and amenable to testing in the Senate.

With these definitions and limitations in mind, we proceed to a chapter outline of this study.

PLAN OF ANALYSIS

Chapter two is a detailed examination of the six Congresses selected for study. The history of the Presidential election as well as the work of each House is included. This narrative is intended to place the legislation of these Congresses in historical perspective and to justify the categorization of significant and undistinguished Houses.

Chapter three sets forth a number of single variable explanations for the passage of important legislation in any House. These variables are operationalized at an aggregate level and the six Houses are analyzed in a comparative fashion. None of these variables works as a univariate explanation for significant output, although several hypotheses are given substantial, if not complete, support. Given this finding, chapter four examines the same set of variables simultaneously in order to determine which combinations of variables are common to the significant Houses. On the basis of this aggregate analysis, a theoretical formulation of the determinants of significant policy output, and a dependent variable which indexes the House potential for policy change, are presented.

Chapter five is an attempt to provide further support for the theory using aggregate data for the 51st to the 90th Houses (1888-1968). The connections between the external factors, electoral turnover and ideologi-
cal polarization, and the internal variable developed in chapter four will be examined using multiple regression techniques. On the basis of this analysis it will be possible to draw some conclusions about the way in which factors external to the Congress affect the work and output of the House, which will be summed up in chapter six.
NOTES


6 Polsby, Congress and the Presidency, p. 68.

7 Woll, Public Policy, p. 147.


19 Burnham, Critical Elections, p. 10.


CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SIX TEST CONGRESSES

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine briefly the history of the six Congresses which have been selected for study. These are the 55th, the 59th, the 67th, the 73rd, the 87th, and the 89th Congresses, elected in 1896, 1904, 1920, 1932, 1960, and 1964, respectively. Each of these years was also a presidential election year, and a brief examination of the candidates, the campaigns and the issues is helpful to the understanding of the work of these Congresses. The histories presented here are intended as a concise overview of the elections and the Congresses under scrutiny. As such, the narrative which follows is necessarily superficial and episodic, but its purpose is simply to explain and support the classification of the Congresses.

The Congresses have been divided into two groups: the significant Congresses and the undistinguished Congresses. The significant Congresses, the 55th, 73rd, and 89th, have been so classified on the basis of the impact of the legislation passed while they were in session. In each case the legislation had a direct impact on the character of U.S. government and society. The work of the 55th ensured the future of the U.S. as an industrial nation and world power; the 73rd enacted policies which changed the shape of social and political thought about the role of the federal government in the lives of its citizens; and the 89th enacted legislation which set new purposes for the federal government in education, health, and welfare policy.

In contrast, the 59th, 67th, and 87th Congresses passed no legis-
lation which had this sort of impact. These three Congresses are not intended as a direct opposite to the significant Congresses. Rather, the legislation passed while these three Congresses were in session did little to change politics or policies. Moreover, the Congresses frequently tended to obstruct innovative legislation which was suggested by the President in favor of the more familiar policies of the past. Their legislative records range from undistinguished to poor.

The distinction here, then, is not between the "greatest" and the "worst" Congresses ever elected, but rather between three outstanding and three average Congresses. Within this context, the electoral and legislative history of these six Congresses are examined.

THE SIGNIFICANT CONGRESSES

The Election of 1896

The election of 1896 is considered by students of the subject to be a critical election.\(^1\) The depression of 1893 and the general decline in farm prices had brought many people to a state of desperation and panic. Political sentiments were especially intense. More than a decade of discontent and hard times had led to the creation of the People's Party, or Populists, which ran a presidential candidate in 1892 and won three Senate seats, eleven House seats and elected three state governors.\(^2\) Such a strong showing by a third party forced the two major parties to take notice.

The Campaign and the Issues

The free silver issue overshadowed the campaign, despite early attempts on the party of William McKinley, the Republican Presidential nomi-
nee, to emphasize the tariff question.³ The Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, spoke only on the financial issues (frequently repeating the same speech according to The Nation), occasionally referring to other issues only to say they were unimportant. The tone of the campaign was feverish. The money question became a moral issue, and the Republican position was supported avidly by the clergy. Press support was overwhelmingly for McKinley; Democratic newspapers went over to the Republican side en masse.

Even before the campaign opened officially, the press pointed out the importance of the Congressional, as well as the Presidential races. McKinley in the White House facing a Democratic Congress would not be able to cope with the issues. "What is absolutely essential is a majority in the House which cannot be inveighed or bulldozed by the protected interests into a surrender to the silverites."⁴ Later in the campaign The Nation reported, "the sound money men in both parties are becoming thoroughly aroused to the importance of securing a House of Representatives which can be depended upon in the next Congress."⁵ A strategy of Republican candidates deferring to sound money Democrats in Democratic districts and vice versa was suggested, in order to ensure the needed majority of sound money Representatives in the House.

On election day, voters turned out in unprecedented numbers to elect McKinley by a safe margin of 600,000 votes. He received 271 votes in the Electoral College to Bryan's 176.⁶ Republican Congressional candidates fared equally well. The next House was to be comprised of 215 Republicans, 123 Democrats, and 19 "third party" members. The Senate would contain 46 Republicans, 34 Democrats, and 10 others of various radical affiliations.
Party differences, as reflected in the campaign issues of 1896, centered on economic policy. The Democrats favored the free coinage of silver at 16 to 1 parity with gold. In so doing, they represented the rural, agricultural interests of the South and some parts of the West. Farmers, debt ridden due to the decline in farm prices, saw this inflationary policy as the means by which they could pay their debts and avoid financial ruin. The Republicans declared strictly for sound money based on the gold standard and were supported by the urban and industrial centers of the East and North.

The second major issue was the tariff. Republicans favored their usual policy of a high protective tariff for the purposes of developing domestic industry, as well as generating revenue for the government. While such a tariff would contribute to higher prices, it also meant higher wages for labor. Democrats pursued their customary policy of lower tariffs for revenue purposes only.

The third major issue was U. S. foreign policy, or expansion. Party differences of this issue were more a matter of degree, the Republicans espousing a larger role for the U. S. in foreign affairs. Republicans felt that the U. S. should actively intervene in the Cuban struggle for independence, as well as annex various insular territories, build a Nicaraguan Canal, and a larger Navy to protect U. S. interests. Many Democrats felt that imperialist sentiments were at odds with the principles on which the United States Constitution was founded. 7

The central question for this research is did the 55th Congress establish itself as significant by acting to resolve the critical issues of 1896? Although there is often little relationship between campaign issues and subsequent acts of Congress, during times of critical realign-
ment the party in power is obliged to deal with critical issues or lose its base of support. For this reason it is safe to assume that the campaign issues of 1896 would be placed on the legislative agenda, although not necessarily acted upon by the legislature.

While the financial issue was foremost during the campaign, the Congress first met in special session, at the request of President McKinley, to deal with the tariff question. A tariff bill had been drafted by the Ways and Means Committee during the holdover session of the 54th Congress. Speaker Thomas Reed, who was expected to retain this position in the 55th House, had let it be known that Nelson Dingley would continue as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and that this committee would remain largely unchanged. Hence, Dingley promptly introduced the bill to the House three days after the special session convened. Debate was cursory, and the House passed the bill in less than two weeks. Rigid party discipline assured that the bill would be passed without amendment. The bill then went to the Senate Finance Committee which favored lower rates on some items than those proposed in the House. The Senate, however, ignored the recommendations of the committee and kept the higher House rates, as well as adopting even higher rate schedules for some items, particularly wool. The higher rates schedules were retained by the Conference Committee, and the amended bill quickly passed both houses of Congress, and became law on July 24, 1897.

Tariffs, which had been lowered during the Democratic administration, were returned to the levels of the Tariff Act of 1890, which passed under Republican auspices. The imposition of higher duties on wool, as well as on most other textiles except cotton, and on sugar, aroused much public comment. The Dingley bill, as finally passed, went further than
many felt necessary. Although "for once the Republicans had solid popular support for upward revision" when the House convened, the press felt the bill was "ultraprotectionist." The bill also contained a reciprocity clause which allowed the President to negotiate lower rates on some items in return for reductions on American goods. McKinley expected the high rates to provide the impetus for reciprocal trade agreements.

The 55th Congress also passed a number of bills dealing with the issue of expansion. Resolutions to recognize the independence of Cuba were introduced in both Chambers on April 13, 1898. After a series of amendments and substitutions, a joint resolution was finally approved by a House vote of 311 to 6, and in the Senate by a vote of 43 to 35. Directly following the recognition of the independence of Cuba came the declaration of war with Spain. On April 25, President McKinley recommended a declaration of war, and a joint resolution passed both the Senate and the House unanimously on the same day. It declared that a state of war had existed since April 21, one day after the approval of the recognition of the independence of Cuba.

The much discussed question of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was settled in July 1898. Since the U. S. had been at war with Spain the islands had been used as a naval base. While a treaty of annexation was pending, a joint resolution for annexation was introduced in the House and was finally passed on June 15 by a vote of 209 to 91. The Senate debated the issue until July 6, when it was passed by a vote of 42 to 21.

Additionally, the Treaty of Paris, which was ratified by the Senate in February 1899 extended the U. S. presence in the Pacific and the Atlantic. The Treaty, which secured peace with Spain, ceded to the U. S. 
the island of Puerto Rico as well as other formerly Spanish governed island in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippine Islands. Hence as a direct or indirect result of House action, the United States' presence was extended considerably during the 55th Congress. The new territories added significantly to the new states of the U. S., providing area for naval installations, as well as new markets for U.S. goods.12

The final issue of importance before the 55th Congress was the gold-silver question. Here Congress, and particularly the House, took steps to ratify the electoral decision. The House passed a number of bills supportive of the Republican position on the issue, although a recalcitrant Senate did not always concur in the House decision. For example, H.J. Res 81 authorized the creation of a monetary commission and provided for its expenses. The proposed commission would have studied currency alternatives. That it was intended to come up with a plan sympathetic to Republican interests is confirmed by the fact that an amendment, proposed by Edward W. Carmack (Democrat, Tennessee), to have the commission proceed according to the provisions of the Democratic plank on finances, and return to a system of bimetallism, was defeated. The Senate failed to pass the resolution.

The House also passed a currency bill which explicitly affirmed the gold standard although the Senate did not concur. The bill, reintroduced and passed as H. R. 1 in the 56th House, was "to define and fix the standard of value, to maintain parity of all forms of money issued and coined by the U. S., and to refund the public debt, and for other purposes."

In other important cases, the Senate did accept the House lead.
Both Houses passed H. R. 6251 (approved, Jan. 28, 1898) primarily a bill to provide urgently needed appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 20, 1898). H. R. 6251 contained an important clause which reaffirmed the gold standard. This section authorized the government to pay the cost of transporting gold bullion to the mints. Democrats were strongly opposed on the grounds that it capitulated to the monied interests at public expense. Attempts to remove the section were defeated.\textsuperscript{13}

Additionally, numerous pro-silver bills were killed in both the Senate and the House. For example, in the first session seven silver bills were introduced in the Senate and nine were introduced in the House. During the second session three such bills were presented to the Senate, while House committees received fifteen pro-silver bills. The third session of the 55th Congress saw one pro-silver bill in the Senate, and four more in the House. All of these bills were referred to the appropriate committees and none were reported out.\textsuperscript{14} Thus the electoral decision of 1896 was reflected in Congressional action and the currency question was settled. From this Congress on, the gold-silver debate was dead.

The settling of the currency question was an important accomplishment of the 55th Congress. Monetary policy had fluctuated since the issue of "greenbacks" to remedy the currency shortage during the Civil War. Silver was omitted from the listing of American coins in the Sherman bill which passed Congress in 1873, virtually without notice. By 1876 however the notion of free silver had replaced that of greenbacks as "soft money" and had a considerably larger following. With the resumption of specie payments in 1879 and a return of prosperity quieted
the money question temporarily. The return of hard times in 1888 and
the general depression of the 1890's revived the currency question a-

gain. Throughout the 1890's, the gold-silver debate was an emotionally
charged moral and social issue. The 55th Congress may be credited
with ending the question.

The tariff question, too, had wavered back and forth in the latter
quarter of the nineteenth century. The Republicans utilized the tariff
in the 1880's to cement the party, and eventually it helped them build
a national majority. They were wise in their use of the issue. "As an
economic doctrine, protection reached out to all segments of American
society. While stressing the encouragement that the tariff offered to
developing industries, Republican orators also carefully underlined the
benefits to workers of higher wages under protection." Tariff policy
depended on which party was in office. The Republicans had triumphed
with the McKinley bill of 1890, but the Wilson-Gorman tariff of 1894 sub-
stantially lowered or eliminated many duties. The passing of the ex-
tremely high Dingley tariff of 1897 marked the end of the era of waver-
ing tariff policy and victory for the protectionists.

As a result of the tariff and expansion both domestic and inter-
national markets expanded. The annexation of the various territories
provided the U.S. with places for military installations, new markets,
and new ports. The stature of the nation was increased in international
affairs, bringing it recognition as an important power.

As the election of 1896 approached, the people of the United States
were faced with a choice. Would the U.S. continue as a rural, agri-
cultural nation or would urban industrial interests take precedence?
The election polarized the voters on this set of issues, and changed
the nature of the political parties. Bryan's attempt to build a farmer-labor coalition failed and the 55th Congress, through the dominance of the Republican party, set the U.S. firmly on the course of industrialism.

The Election of 1932

The presidential contest of 1932 is also regarded as a critical election. The realignment of the 1930's was the result of a single event—the Great Depression. All the issues of 1932 were direct results of the Depression, and the inadequacies of the responses of the Hoover Administration. Hard times made a Democratic victory almost inevitable.

Despite various "stop Roosevelt" factions, Franklin D. Roosevelt was nominated at the Chicago Democratic Convention with votes to spare. Breaking tradition, he flew to Chicago to make his acceptance speech at once to the assembled delegates. This speech contained the seemingly insignificant phrase, "the new deal," a phrase that came to be associated with policies that changed a nation.

While many critics felt that Roosevelt would be a weak President, and his campaign speeches were often contradictory, Leuchtenburg points out that many New Deal policies were foreshadowed in those campaign speeches. Other scholars adhere to the conviction that during the 1932 campaign, the New Deal policies had not yet begun to take shape in Roosevelt's mind. Regardless of which view is correct, Roosevelt did convey to the electorate that he, as President, would take positive action to overcome the ill effects of the Depression. A number of Republican progressives were attracted to the Democratic side. While it was a foregone conclusion that the Democrats would be victorious in the
November election, few expected its landslide character. The popular vote was 22,821,857 for Roosevelt to Hoover's 15,761,781. The Socialist and Communists received 884,781 and 102,991 respectively. The landslide was even more apparent in the Electoral College where Roosevelt received 472 votes and Hoover, 59.  

The Democratic victory extended also to the Senate and the House of Representatives. The composition of the Senate was 59 Democrats, 36 Republicans and 1 Farmer-Labor, while the House seats were filled by 313 Democrats, 117 Republicans and 5 Farmer-Labor.  

The Legislation of the 73rd Congress

The 1932-33 winter proved to be the worst of the Depression. During that winter, Americans became increasingly hostile to bankers and businessmen as those who bore the responsibility for the national plight. The mood of the nation ebbed. It was a grim day when Roosevelt took office on March 4, 1933.

On March 5, Roosevelt called Congress into a special session to convene on March 9, and proclaimed a national bank holiday. The emergency banking bill, which Roosevelt's staff had hastily drafted in the few days since the inauguration, was read to the House within one hour of the start of the session. Members had no copies of the bill which provided for government assistance to private bankers, gave the President control over gold movements, penalized hoarding, provided for the issue of Federal Reserve notes and the reopening of the banks. After thirty-eight minutes of debate, the bill passed the House unanimously, without a roll call. The same evening the Senate approved the bill 73-7, and an hour later, the President signed it. Banks reopened Monday,
March 13, with deposits exceeding withdrawals.  

Roosevelt next sent to Congress his economy act which provided for reductions in veteran's benefits and the pay of federal employees. Although approximately ninety Democrats did not support the economy measure, it passed the House as well as the Senate, and FDR signed it on March 30.  

Table 2-1 provides an outline of the significant legislation passed during the first session of the 73rd Congress, a period which has come to be known as "The Hundred Days."

The second session of the 73rd Congress (January 3, 1934 to June 18, 1934) was less unified than the first. President Roosevelt became less "dictatorial" in this session, leaving it to Congress to work out the specific details of his general proposals. This policy had the effect of causing disagreement among rival factions within each House, where the Conservative Coalition was just beginning, as well as causing friction between the two chambers. As a result, Roosevelt increased his direction of Congress upon return from his vacation in April, although forced to compromise when "clear group or regional interests was infringed."

Despite various compromises, some important legislation was passed in form virtually unchanged from that suggested by the President. The Gold Reserve Act (approved January 30, 1934) authorized reevaluation of the dollar at 50 to 60 cents in terms of its gold content. The Reciprocal Tariff Act (approved June 12, 1934) authorized the President to negotiate trade agreements for three years without Senate approval, and the Stock Exchange Act (approved June 6, 1934) regulated securities exchanges and set up a special commission for this purpose. The
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>March 9</td>
<td>the Emergency Banking Act</td>
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<td>March 20</td>
<td>the Economy Act</td>
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<td>March 22</td>
<td>the Beer-Wine Revenue Act, provided for a tax of $5.00 on barrels</td>
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<td>of beer and wine, and retracted portions of the Webb-Kenyon Act</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to protect those states whose laws prohibited sales of liquor of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>more alcoholic content than 3.2% by weight</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 31</td>
<td>establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>abandonment of the gold standard</td>
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<td>May 12</td>
<td>the Federal Emergency Relief Act setting up a national relief system</td>
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<td>May 12</td>
<td>the Agricultural Adjustment Act, establishing a national agricultural</td>
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<td>policy, with the Thomas Amendment conferring on the President</td>
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<td></td>
<td>powers of monetary expansion</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, providing for the refinancing of</td>
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<td>farm mortgages</td>
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<td>May 18</td>
<td>the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, providing for the unified</td>
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<td>development of the Tennessee Valley</td>
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<td>May 27</td>
<td>the Truth in Securities Act, requiring full disclosure in the issue</td>
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<td>of new securities</td>
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<td>June 5</td>
<td>the abrogation of the gold cause in public and private contracts</td>
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<td>June 6</td>
<td>National Employment System Act, provided for cooperation with state</td>
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<td>agencies and federal appropriations to states with employment</td>
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<td>services, as well as creating a national employment system</td>
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<td>June 10</td>
<td>Insurance Company Loan Act authorizing the RFC to subscribe to</td>
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<td>insurance company preferred stock and to make loans on it as well</td>
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<td>as to make loans to state workmen's compensation funds</td>
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### TABLE 2-1: Continued

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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
<td>Kick-Back Racket Act, making it illegal for contractors working on public works to force workers to return part of their wages</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 13</td>
<td>the Home Owners Loan Act, providing for the refinancing of home mortgages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>the National Industrial Recovery Act, providing both for a system of industrial self-government under federal supervision and for a $3.3 billion public works program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>the Glass-Steagall Banking Act, divorcing commercial and investment banking and guaranteeing bank deposits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>the Farm Credit Act, providing for the reorganization of agricultural credit activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>the Railroad Coordination Act, setting up a federal coordination of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16</td>
<td>the Gasoline Tax and Postage Rate Act provided for federal taxes on gasoline and electrical energy and gave president the power to modify postage rates</td>
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Communications Act of 1934 (approved June 19, 1934) set up a federal commission to regulate interstate and foreign communications by telegraph, telephone, cable and radio. These statutes were among the legislation passed directly as the President had recommended. The second session of the 73rd Congress also passed a number of relief and regulatory measures for agriculture, banking, and labor as well as welfare and crime legislation.

Historians and political scientists agree that the legislation of the 73rd Congress is among the most important Congressional works of the twentieth century. It was the first of the stream of New Deal legislation that continued in the 74th and 75th Congresses. The policies succeeded in giving the Democratic party a new national majority comprised primarily of the underprivileged. These policies were the first that gave the federal government the legal right to regulate affairs of the citizens of the United States to such an extent. The federal government "assumed the responsibility for guaranteeing every American a minimum standard of subsistence."

Roosevelt and the New Deal also changed the character of the American Presidency. While Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had been strong Presidents, the office now became the "focus of all government." The legislative functions of the President assumed new proportions under Roosevelt. He cultivated and manipulated the party leadership in the legislative branch. Schlesinger, however, is quick to point out that the 73rd was not a "rubberstamp" Congress—"it played a vital and consistently underestimated role in shaping the New Deal." Roosevelt's legislation might not have fared so well had Congress itself not been responding to pressure from constituencies, or
without the majority of 313 Democrats in the House. Relationships of these variables will be explored further in later chapters. Here it is sufficient to say that the 73rd Congress passed legislation which changed American politics and economy.

Schlesinger describes the impact of the New Deal in the following passage:

Perhaps the best evidence of the extent to which the New Deal reshaped American ideas about society is to be found in the evolution of Republican platforms from 1932 to 1948. Perhaps the best evidence of the extent to which it healed the depression failure of nerve is to be found in the swift recuperation of the striken American productive machine: a net national income which had fallen below 40 billion dollars in 1933 reached 74 billion in 1937 and 203 billion in 1947.35

The Election of 1964

Scholarly opinion is divided on whether or not 1964 was a critical election year.36 Certainly the 1964 election was unusual. The nomination of Senator Barry M. Goldwater as the Republican candidate for President was perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the exceptional nature of the election. Goldwater, an arch-conversative, represented a minority of Republican opinion,37 but through skillful organization and perpetration of the notion that voters would turn out in full force to elect a Republican candidate who offered them "a choice not an echo," garnered enough support to win his party's nomination on the first ballot.

Conservative Republicans also controlled the platform writing process in 1964. The platform produced by the convention in San Francisco was one of the most conservative in recent Republican history.38 Moderate Republicans, whose ideas had been beaten in the Platform Committee, unsuccessfully attempted to amend the document by taking their
ideas to the convention floor. The final document put before the voters called for a more limited role for the federal government, took a hard line on communism, and condemned the acts of the Democratic administration over the past four years. The fight over the platform, Goldwater's selection for a running mate of William E. Miller, the Republican National Chairman, and his acceptance speech in which he stated that "extremism in defense of liberty is no vice... and...moderation in pursuit of justice is no virtue," succeeding in alienating the moderate faction of the Republican party and cost the Goldwater ticket millions of votes in November.

President Johnson, the incumbent due to the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, did not enter the primaries held in the Spring of 1964. Alabama's Governor George Wallace did run in those primaries, attempting to appeal to racist sentiment among white voters. In June Wallace announced that he would run as a third-party candidate, but the nomination of Goldwater was sure to erode a large portion of Wallace's support, and he withdrew several days after the Republican convention adjourned.

With Wallace out of the running, the only real choice for the Democratic convention was that of a vice-presidential candidate. Johnson announced to the assembled delegates that his choice was Hubert Humphrey, Senator from Minnesota. Humphrey was nominated by acclamation. The Democratic platform produced in Atlantic City set forth the new program of President Johnson, the Great Society.

The Campaign, the Issues, and the Election

The campaign in 1964 was based on a number of issues, although
the candidates failed to confront one another head-on to debate them. Goldwater's positions were known to many from his past writings. The Democrats chose to attack these stands, and he could not shake them.

Goldwater's hard line on communism and image as potentially frivolous with nuclear weapons cost him much support. A statement which was misconstrued to mean that he favored giving control over the use of such weapons to field commanders worried many voters. Successive attempts to explain his position succeeded in getting him into more and more trouble. His political difficulties on the issue of the role of the federal government were similar. Goldwater, of course, favored a much more limited role for the national government than that which was exercised in 1964. He had, at one time or another, spoken against farm subsidies, the Tennessee Valley Authority, rural electrification, the National Labor Relations Board, the bureaucracy, and the Supreme Court. The Democrats attacked him on only one specific manifestation of this general principle -- that of social security. Well before he was nominated Goldwater had mentioned making social security payments voluntary, which opponents argued would destroy the system. Many Americans feared that Goldwater's election would mean the end of their benefits.

Finally, the issue of civil rights was a dangerous one. Neither candidate directly addressed this issue, although their positions were well known. Goldwater had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it came before the Senate. Johnson, on the other hand, had been President of an administration which had fostered the passage of that act. The difference between the candidates on this issue, as well as on every other, was clear.
The Johnson campaign was a cleverly designed response to Goldwater's. While Goldwater got himself into deeper electoral trouble with every speech, Johnson appealed to the voters in an apparently nonpartisan fashion. Goldwater was rarely mentioned, and when he was, it was with a reference to "the temporary Republican spokesman." He appealed to the voters on the record of the past Democratic Administration—one of peace and prosperity. His aim was to be President "of all the people."\textsuperscript{42}

The issues and the choice confronting them were clear to the voters.\textsuperscript{43} On election day they voted for Lyndon B. Johnson in overwhelming numbers, returning him to office with one of the largest majorities in American electoral history. Johnson received 61.4\% of the two-party popular vote, carrying forty-four states and the District of Columbia. The electoral votes was 486 to Goldwater's 52. The Democratic party in Congress fared equally well in this election. The House gained 38 new Democrats for a total of 295 Democrats to 140 Republicans. The Senate gained two Democratic seats, putting the new partisan balance at 68 Democrats and 32 Republicans. The Democratic Party victory was complete.

The 89th Congress

The 89th Congress has been heralded by journalists, scholars, and even President Johnson himself as one of the most productive and significant in the nation's history.\textsuperscript{44} The first session enacted major legislation with such speed as to compare favorably with the 73rd Congress, and to cause a number of Republicans to complain that it was simply a "rubber-stamp" Congress. Two of the major bills passed by
this Congress, Medicare and Aid to Education, had long been on the
Democratic agenda, but until the 89th Congress, their fate had been to
die in the House Committees. These bills were only a small part of the
significant legislation passed in 1965-66, however. Table 2-2 gives
a summary of major bills passed by both the House and the Senate, and
signed by the President.

Journalistic analyses of the 89th Congress have given nearly all
the credit for this stream of major legislation to the skills of Lyndon
Johnson, acquired through long experience on Capitol Hill. While there
is some truth in this view, Johnson's legislative skill was not the
sole determinant of this productivity. Congress was not merely a
rubber stamp. In fact, two of Johnson's pet projects suffered defeat.
The House failed to pass a bill guaranteeing "home rule" for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and repeal of section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley Act
(a clause permitting state laws prohibiting the union shop) was blocked
by a Senate filibuster.

Johnson went out of his way to "court" Congress, and was careful
about the timing of his various proposals, but occasionally the Demo-
cratic leadership surprised him. An example, told by Johnson himself,
concerns Wilbur Mills and the medical care for the aged proposals. On
March 2, 1965 Mills' Ways and Means Committee spent the day reviewing
all the health bills before the committee. At the end of the session
Mills suggested a new bill combining three features--universal hospital
care, a supplemental program for the indigent, and a voluntary sup-
plemental plan to cover doctors' bills (a Republican proposal). Mills
moved so quickly that Republican committee members were amazed. Further,
he demanded that the bill be drafted during the night so he could push
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill Number</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Signed by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR6675</td>
<td>Medical Care, Social Security</td>
<td>July 30, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S596</td>
<td>Regional Medical Programs</td>
<td>October 6, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Appalachia Assistance</td>
<td>March 9, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1648</td>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td>August 26, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR2362</td>
<td>Elementary-Secondary Education</td>
<td>April 11, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR9567</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>Nov. 7, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Water Pollution Control</td>
<td>October 2, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S306</td>
<td>Air Pollution Control</td>
<td>October 20, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR7984</td>
<td>Omnibus Housing</td>
<td>August 10, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR6927</td>
<td>Department of Housing</td>
<td>Sept. 9, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR2580</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>October 3, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR8283</td>
<td>Anti-Poverty Amendments</td>
<td>October 9, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR7750</td>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>Sept. 6, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJ Res 1</td>
<td>Presidential Continuity (Constitutionality Amendment cleared for State approval)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S974</td>
<td>Manpower Amendments</td>
<td>April 26, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1564</td>
<td>Voting Rights</td>
<td>August 6, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1483</td>
<td>Arts and Humanities</td>
<td>Sept. 29, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR2</td>
<td>Drug Controls</td>
<td>July 15, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR3818</td>
<td>Gold Reserves</td>
<td>March 3, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR9811</td>
<td>Omnibus Farm Program</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR8371</td>
<td>Excise Tax Reductions</td>
<td>June 21, 1965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 2-2: Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill Number</th>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Signed by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR13161</td>
<td>Elementary School Aid</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR14644</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER1511</td>
<td>Poverty Amendments</td>
<td>Nov. 8, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S985</td>
<td>Truth in Packaging</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR13196</td>
<td>Health Manpower</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>Cold War GI Bill</td>
<td>March 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR15750</td>
<td>Foreign Aid Authorization</td>
<td>Sept. 19, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR14929</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
<td>Nov. 11, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR15963</td>
<td>Transportation Department</td>
<td>October 15, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3005</td>
<td>Auto Safety</td>
<td>Sept. 9, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3052</td>
<td>Highway Safety</td>
<td>Sept. 9, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR12752</td>
<td>Tax Program</td>
<td>March 15, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR17607</td>
<td>Investment Tax Credit</td>
<td>Nov. 8, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR13712</td>
<td>Minimum Wage</td>
<td>Sept. 23, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3708</td>
<td>Demonstration Cities</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2947</td>
<td>Water Pollution Control</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(SOURCE: Adapted from "What Congress Did," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 21 (1965), 64; and "What Congress Did," Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 22 (1966), 68.)
it in the morning. Here it is clear that the Democratic leadership played a significant role.

**Significance of the 89th Congress**

The 89th Congress has been described in the following passage:

"The scope of the legislation was even more impressive than the number of major new laws. Measures which, taken alone, would have crowned the achievements of any Congress were enacted in a seemingly endless stream." Indeed, the direction of the legislation passed in 1965 and 1966 represents an important break with previous legislation since World War II. While Medicare, Aid to Education, Housing and Poverty Programs did not put the U. S. in a welfare state class along with Sweden, or even Great Britain, they reflected a new turn in the social policy of this country. While proponents of the thesis that current American politics exhibit extreme stability would argue that the 1964 election and subsequent legislation of the Johnson Administration were merely an extension of those policies which grew out of the New Deal realignment with the dimension of civil rights appended, this is not an adequate description. The social policies enacted by the 89th Congress were more liberal and far reaching than those passed in the 1930's, and perhaps are even more significant because they were passed, not in a desperate era of depression, but rather in one of prosperity.

The productivity of the 89th Congress has been attributed to three factors: overwhelming Democratic majorities, Johnson's personal skill, and legislation designed to obtain the optimum number of supporters. These factors perhaps account for Johnson's passing the bulk of his programs (Congressional Quarterly Almanac calculates
the percentage of Congressional approval for LBJ programs as 68.4, the highest to that date) yet they do not account for the social direction of those programs. Johnson had defeated the most conservative Republican presidential nominee since the Depression. He could have called for programs far more conservative than those he endorsed, and still have been to the political left of Barry Goldwater. Undoubtedly the three factors cited above were necessary but not sufficient conditions for the legislation. Further determinants of the innovative policies passed by the 89th will be analyzed in subsequent chapters of this research.

THE UNDISTINGUISHED CONGRESSES

In this section the three undistinguished Congresses will be examined. Once again, the discussion will include both the presidential campaign and the work of the Congresses. The legislation which actually passed, as well as items on the legislative agenda which were not enacted in the 59th, 67th, and 87th Congresses will be examined.

The Election of 1904

While not of the magnitude of Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 victory, or Lyndon Johnson's in 1964, the election of Theodore Roosevelt to his second term was a landslide victory. The electoral vote was 336 for Roosevelt and 140 for Alton B. Parker, his Democratic opponent. Yet the campaign which led to this victory was peculiarly colorless.

Prior to the Republican convention, Roosevelt's only threat of opposition had come from Mark Hanna, Senator from Ohio and former campaign manager to William McKinley. Long before, however, Roosevelt had begun a campaign to consolidate his strength within the party,
and by the time of the Ohio Republican Convention in 1903 had forced
Hanna to go along with the endorsement of Roosevelt's candidacy by
that convention. 49 Hanna's opposition ended with his death early in
1904. Roosevelt won the nomination by acclamation at the National
Convention in Chicago in June, 1904. Important planks of the Re-
publican platform pledged to enforce anti-trust laws, called for a
larger navy, a larger merchant marine, civil service reform, inter-
national arbitration, equal laws for labor and capital, as well as
extending reciprocity (with regard to trade), and, despite Roosevelt's
wishes to the contrary, an enquiry into Negro enfranchisement. The
platform also reaffirmed the long standing Republican policies of tariff
protection and the gold standard. 50

The Democratic party was in disarray. Bryan was the only can-
didate who had the sort of appeal for the people which characterized
Roosevelt, but his defeats in 1896 and 1900, as well as the effects of
urbanization, had caused him to lose credibility with the party. He
clung to his principles of 1896, thus deepening divisions within the
party. When Democratic party reorganizers' appeals to Grover Cleveland
and Richard Olney (a former cabinet official) were refused the re-
organizers' tuned to Alton B. Parker, chief judge of the New York State
Court of Appeals. Parker was a sound money Democrat. The only opponent
was publisher William R. Hearst. At the chaotic St. Louis convention,
Parker won the nomination over Hearst on the first ballot. 51

The campaign has been described as an "anti-climax." Roosevelt
ignored his original intention to remain aloof rather than be put on
the defensive by Parker's accusations. Roosevelt defended himself,
and "on issue after issue deferred to all that was conventional, all that
was safe and reassuring.\textsuperscript{52} Parker criticized Republican tariff policy without reference to the Democrat's position, lamented the plight of Filipinos who could not vote, and stated that there was no need for anti-trust policy. The chief issues reflected in the campaign were Philippine independence, imperialism, and anti-trust policies. The campaign failed to stir the electorate.\textsuperscript{53}

On election day the victory was overwhelmingly Republican. The popular vote was 7,623,486 for Theodore Roosevelt and 5,077,971 for Parker.\textsuperscript{54} The victory was more striking in the Congress. The 90 member Senate was comprised of 58 Republicans and 32 Democrats, while 250 Republicans and 136 Democrats were sent to the House of Representatives. This was the largest Republican majority in the House since Reconstruction.

The 59th Congress

Historical accounts of the legislative record of the 59th Congress are mixed. While an occasional historian may be found who adheres to the view that the Roosevelt administration fostered some of the most important legislation at that point in the nation's history,\textsuperscript{55} the more general view seems to be one of damning the Congress with faint praise. According to the editors of the \textit{Nation}, "the final verdict upon this session of Congress will be largely favorable. It was marred by no great scandals; it passed few profligate bills; it resisted the ship-subsidy clamor; it saw the freedom and power of debate rise to unaccustomed heights..." or, at the close of the second session, "the Fifty-ninth Congress...has in three particulars broken all records. It had a larger Republican majority in both House and Senate than any
of its predecessors since the Reconstruction period; it appropriated more money...and it talked more, filling over 17,000 pages of the Congressional Record with its verbal output."56

In fact, three measures of some importance were passed by the 59th Congress: the Hepburn Act regulating railway rates, the pure food law, and the meat inspection law. Many other progressive measures were proposed in Roosevelt's various messages to the Congress, but few were acted upon favorably. It will be remembered that the campaign of 1904 avoided mention of progressive issues, sticking rather to that which was conventional. Failure to mention these issues during the campaign made it difficult for Roosevelt to appeal to the Congress on the basis of a popular mandate for progressivism. Congressional leaders had nothing to add to Roosevelt's program; in fact most were conservative men who preferred the Republican policies of the late 1890's to any new legislation. The few Roosevelt-sponsored bills passed by this Congress exacted a price: they were enacted in order to keep other issues off the agenda.57 Even then, Roosevelt's limited success with domestic legislation was not easily obtained. The Hepburn bill was not passed until after a bitter fight in the Senate, and Roosevelt was forced to defer to the wishes of the Congress on three points which he considered essential to the meat inspection law: the payment of cost by the packers themselves, dating the labels on canned meats, and making the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture final.58

The legislative record of the first session of the 59th Congress is presented in Table 2-3. As is apparent, most of the President's proposals were either refused or ignored. The second session was no better
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Was Asked</th>
<th>What Was Done</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of overcapitalization by corporations</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation of railway rates</td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting hours of labor of railway employees</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer's liability</td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting injunction against labor union</td>
<td>refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal regulation of insurance</td>
<td>declared unconstitutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy of Appropriations</td>
<td>increase of $60,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of elastic currency</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of campaign contributions by corporations</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal naturalization law</td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship subsidies</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration law to keep out &quot;the lazy&quot; etc.</td>
<td>failed in conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision of copyright laws</td>
<td>nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure food law</td>
<td>passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of tariff on Philippine goods</td>
<td>denied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship for Puerto Rico</td>
<td>refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Statehood</td>
<td>granted in different form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Panama Canal</td>
<td>settled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protectorate over Santo Domingo</td>
<td>refused</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in terms of significant legislation. Roosevelt had a limited success in that campaign contributions by corporations were outlawed, and weak legislation was passed regarding the right of appeal in criminal cases, the number of hours railroad employees could work consecutively, and authorized investigations into the conditions of women and children in the labor force.

Although Roosevelt had a few limited successes with domestic legislation, Congress refused to grant any of his request regarding U. S. island dependencies and Central and South America. In both his annual messages to Congress he requested legislation conferring U. S. citizenship on citizens of Puerto Rico, and for a reduction of tariffs imposed on goods from the Philippines. Both requests were denied. His policy to make Santo Domingo a U. S. protectorate was also refused. As The Nation pointed out, "These defeats indicate pretty plainly the line of least resistance just now in Congressional lawmaking. Large and generous legislation and unrepresented colonists can be compassed only with great difficulty."

Despite the passage of the pure food and railway regulations, the 59th Congress did not leave a distinguished record. Roosevelt privately doubted the wisdom of this Congress because of its refusal to grant most of his requests. Had more of Roosevelt's recommendations been acted upon, the 59th would have started the nation on a new course of government regulation for the benefit of the citizens. Congress, with such Conservative leaders as Joseph Cannon and Nelson Aldrich, among others was not ready for these types of measures. Many of these measures were passed in the 63rd Congress, elected in 1912, which enacted most of the significant legislation associated with the
Progressive Era.

The Election of 1920

The election of 1920 was also a landslide, the overwhelming victory going to the Republican ticket of Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. But like the campaign of 1904, the campaign of 1920 was devoid of enthusiasm. Both Presidential candidates were dark horses who had been nominated after endless balloting at the respective national conventions, and neither Harding nor James M. Cox, the Democratic nominee and then Governor of Ohio, was well known outside his home state. Harding had been elected to the U. S. Senate in 1914, but the war years had not given a junior Senator a chance to make a distinguished record for himself.

While Cox and Franklin Roosevelt, the Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee, toured the nation, furiously making speeches, Harding chose to conduct a "front porch" campaign in the style of McKinley. Many visitors came to Marion to hear the candidate speak. The chief issues of the campaign were Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. Cox was unavoidably connected with Wilson and was forced to endorse the League. Harding vacillated on the subject, depending on his audience. Both pro-League and anti-League Republicans claimed that Harding supported their position. Finally, when the tide of public opinion seemed to be against joining the League, Harding declared against it.

On election day the uninterested electorate went to the polls. Turnout was low, partly due to the fact that many newly enfranchised women failed to vote. Harding's overwhelming victory has been described by one as "a mandate rather than a tribute to Harding. The country had
made its choice, not that it loved Harding more, but Wilson less...In-
sensate hatred for the broken man in the White House piled up those
ballots."62

Harding and Coolidge won by a popular vote of 16,181,289 to
9,141,750 for Cox and Roosevelt. The electoral vote was 404 to 127.
The huge Republican victory extended to the Congress, with 301 Re-
publicans in the House and 59 seats in the Senate. Membership in the
House was filled out with 132 Democrats and one Socialist, and in the
Senate, 59 Republicans, 36 Democrats, and one Republican and Progres-
sive.

The 67th Congress

Harding's campaign theme had been a "return to normalcy." Per-
haps it is too much to expect a President elected on such a note to
have a cohesive program to present to Congress. Further, Harding be-
lieved that it was not the job of the Executive to coerce Congress into
legislating. When the necessity for a hard line became apparent it was
too late: Harding's "tough on Congress" pose had no credibility.

The legislative record of the 67th Congress is poor. Four
sessions were held, two of which were special sessions called by the
President. The first of these convened, on April 11, 1921, to con-
sider tariff legislation and a revision of the tax laws. A tax revision
proposal passed the House quickly only to be held up for weeks in the
Senate. When it finally passed, few were satisfied with it. Harding
had been soundly beaten since his proposal to lower the surtax rate
on large incomes was ignored. Action on the tariff was postponed.63

According to the Literary Digest, "more brick bats than bouquets"
would be thrown at Congress at the close of its second session. While Republican newspapers were forced to combine apologies with their praise of the session, Democratic and even independent newspapers condemned it. Judgments such as "the Sixty-seventh Congress will not stand high in legislation history," and "this Congress has been a failure because it has been without true leadership and without consistent character," were not uncommon. 64

The third session was almost a farce. A special session, called to consider the ship-subsidy issue, it proved to be a waste of time and public finances. The House passed two public bills: one dealing with the expense of the special session, and one authorizing a public park in Pennsylvania. The Senate, held up by filibusters, did nothing.

The fourth session of Congress also did nothing of note. Bills were passed and approved relating to immigration, associations of agricultural producers, narcotics, and a minor amendment to the Federal Reserve Act. The Naval Scrapping Act, the classification Act of 1923, the Fordney Tariff Bill and the Foreign Debt Funding Act were passed. Harding vetoed the controversial soldiers Bonus Bill, and a pension bill.

Throughout the entire period of this Congress, more important bills failed to pass both Houses. Usually, they failed in the Senate. Among these were the ship subsidy bill, an anti-lynching bill, railroad refunds, bills regulating standards for fruit and vegetables and preventing the marketing of adulterated foodstuffs.

Most analysts blame the failure of the 67th Congress on President Harding. His original refusal to lead make it impossible for him to do so when the necessity for Executive direction of the legislature
became apparent. Additionally, the structure of leadership in the House and the Senate made it difficult for the President. The pattern of House leadership was collegial and thus made it more difficult than previously for one strong legislative leader to assure the President that his program would be passed. In the Senate, the agriculture bloc rather than the Republican party controlled the course of much legislation. Moreover, relations between the two chambers were not cordial.65

Harding promised a return to normalcy. Indeed, the issues before the Executive and the legislature were of the past -- ship subsidies, anti-lynching bills and so forth were remnants of Theodore Roosevelt's era. With emphasis on a return to simpler times, and a lack of executive or legislative leadership, the work of the 67th Congress did not prepare the U. S. for the years ahead. Perhaps the most apt judgment on the 67th Congress was that printed in the independent Democratic New York World:

There have been other Congresses that were bad; there have been other Congresses that were derelict in their duty; there have been other Congresses that were incompetent and leaderless; but by common consent the Sixty-seventh Congress has been the worst bungler of them all. It has become a Congress practically without friends. Republicans not only refuse to defend it, but they join eagerly with Democrats in condemning it. It has proved itself incapable of evolving either foreign or domestic policies to meet the needs of the country. It has ceased to be representative in the very essentials of representative government. It has become a thing apart from the life of the people, unable to help in the solution of their problems, and making a bad matter worse by its dull-minded interference.66

The Election of 1960

The presidential election of 1960 was characterized by the highest voter turnout since World War I, and the closest vote of the
twentieth century.\footnote{67} Considering these factors, it is curious that the issues presented to the electorate were not more momentous in nature. The Democratic nominee was John F. Kennedy, running on a ticket with Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas. Kennedy was nominated on the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles. He had entered a series of primary elections in order to prove his vote getting ability and to dispel the notion that his Roman Catholicism would hurt his chances of being elected.

The Republicans nominated Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, the logical successor to President Eisenhower, who had served two terms in the White House. U. N. Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, was chosen as the Vice-Presidential candidate.

One of Kennedy's main campaign themes was the decline of United States power and prestige. He claimed that the U. S. image in foreign policy had declined relative to that of Soviet Russia, that the country was behind in defense, education and economic growth. He promised strong presidential leadership to restore U.S. power and prestige. Nixon, on the other hand, accused Kennedy of disparaging the U. S., and even tried to call a moratorium on such remarks during a visit of Premier Khrushchev to this country, which Kennedy ignored.\footnote{68} Nixon praised the record of the Eisenhower administration, and continually brought up the issues of Kennedy's youth and lack of experience in politics. The famous television debates helped to dispel this image of Kennedy.

One overwhelming issue of the 1960 campaign seems rather trivial in retrospect. This is the issue of Kennedy's religion. While Nixon chose not to attack Kennedy on these grounds, a Protestant group
led by Dr. Norman Vincent Peale charged that a Catholic President would be under extreme pressure from the Vatican. Kennedy, speaking in Houston before members of the Protestant clergy, emphatically denied that this would be the case. The subject continued to be debated by the clergy and the electorate, if not the politicians. Baptist groups came out against a Catholic in the White House, while the New York Board of Rabbis and other prominent clergy of the Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Episcopal and Methodist faiths declared that religion was not a sound basis for political choice. 69

On November 8, 1960, Kennedy was elected by a popular vote plurality of only 112,803 votes. The electoral vote total was more decisive, with 303 votes for the Democratic candidates to 219 for the Republican challenges. One electoral vote which should have been cast for Nixon went to Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia, who received a total of 15 electoral votes in an unsuccessful attempt to throw the election into the House of Representatives.

Contrary to the usual pattern in presidential years, the losing party on the presidential ticket made gains in the Congress. Although Democrats were still a majority in both Houses, the Republicans recovered somewhat from their heavy losses in 1958, especially in the House. The new House figures were 263 Democrats to 174 Republicans, while the Senate had 65 Democrats and 35 Republicans. 70

The 87th Congress

Relations between President Kennedy and the 87th Congress were not successful. At the opening of the session, two rule changes were attempted to help Kennedy legislation in the Congress. Only one was successful. This was the attempt to enlarge the House Rules Committee,
for years a stumbling block to liberal legislation. After a bitter
fight in the House, Speaker Rayburn's plan to enlarge the committee
from 12 to 15 was adopted by a five vote majority. One conservative
Republican, Katherine St. George of New York, and two Democratic moder-
ates, Carl Elliot of Alabama and B.F. Sisk of California, were added
to the committee.71

The unsuccessful attempt to remove an obstacle to liberal
legislation in the Senate was aimed at Rule 22, which made the filli-
buster possible by requiring a two-thirds majority to invoke cloture
on debate. A fight on Rule 22 was averted when majority Leader
Mansfield claimed that the Senate rules committee would report out,
in 1961, a proposal to change the controversial rule. This tactic was
approved by a 50-46 vote, and proponents of a liberalized Rule 22 aban-
donned hope of achieving their goal. When the Rules Committee finally
reported out a motion, it failed by a vote of 37-43.72

Many of Kennedy's "New Frontier" programs were defeated or water-
ed down due to the influence of the Conservative Coalition, a combina-
tion of Republicans and Southern Democrats who were opposed to liberal
legislation. The presence of this coalition nullified the seeming nu-
merical advantage enjoyed by the Democrats in both Houses.

Prominent among the failures of the Kennedy administration in
the 87th Congress were Federal Medical Aid for the Elderly, which the
House Ways and Means Committee failed to report out during the first
session, and which the Senate rejected during the second session.
Another failure was Federal Aid to Education, a proposal which liberal
Democrats had been trying to pass since World War II. When the admin-
istrative board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference announced against the Kennedy proposal to aid public elementary and secondary schools, two liberal Democrats on the Rules Committee, who were also Roman Catholics voted with the conservatives, thus defeating one purpose of the committee's enlargement. The Rules Committee also held up bills for mass transit, construction and loan funds for medical schools, and aid to migrant workers. The House Ways and Means Committee refused extended unemployment payments, both houses rejected the creation of an Urban Affairs Department. The House voted down funds for college construction and student loans. Other disappointments for Kennedy included a diluted tax revision bill, failure to include standby authority in the public works authorization, foreign aid cuts in the second session, and failure to act on a Youth Conservation Corps and an urban service corps. The controversial civil rights issue was not even brought before the Congress.

Successes included federal aid to depressed areas for the purpose of creating new jobs in areas of chronic unemployment, an increase in the minimum wage to $1.25, and an omnibus housing proposal. The President, however, was forced to accept compromises on the depressed area and minimum wage bills. During the second session the postal rate increase and federal pay increase managed to pass as well as the diluted tax revision and public works bills mentioned above. The Communications Satellite bill was also approved.

Clearly the most sparkling successes of the Kennedy administration were in the realm of foreign affairs, an area in which the modern House is often said to defer to the President. Congress appropriated large sums for defense spending as well as foreign aid (some of which
was cut in the second session). The Peace Corps was authorized. The Berlin crisis probably gave impetus to the increased defense spending, and the necessity for such appropriations was no doubt reinforced by the continuing Cuban Crisis in the second session. The timely occurrence of this incident may have helped the Democrats in the midterm elections, where they gained four Senate seats, and lost only two in the House. 73

While the 87th Congress cannot be called a "do-nothing" Congress, it certainly failed to deliver the promise of the New Frontier. The most socially innovative and far reaching legislation (which passed several years later in the 89th Congress) was that which Congress refused to pass. The chief deterrent to the passage of the Kennedy legislation was a recalcitrant House of Representatives. The Senate, traditionally the "graveyard of liberal legislation," was far more receptive to Kennedy's programs. In the end, the House had its way more often than the Senate, the result being that the New Frontier was severely compromised, or simply failed to be enacted at all.

Various reasons have been cited as the explanation for the behavior of the House, among them Kennedy's lack of skill in pushing his programs, the force of the Conservative Coalition, and district boundaries which gave disproportionate weight to rural constituencies. The reasons for the failure of the 87th Congress will be examined more fully in subsequent chapters.

CONCLUSION

The electoral and legislative histories of the six Congresses selected for study have now been examined in brief. These summaries
are intended to explain and support the classification of the Con-
gresses as significant or undistinguished. The primary factor which
determines whether a Congress merits inclusion in the significant
category is whether or not the legislative output of that Congress
had an impact on the character of United States society and government.
The contention is that the work of the Congresses classified as
significant here did change the parameters of U. S. social, economic,
and/or foreign policy.

With this historical information as background, environmental
and institutional factors common to these six Congresses will be
examined in chapter three in order to assess their effects, if any,
on the output of significant legislation.
NOTES


2Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, pp. 92-123.


Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 280


Brady, Congressional Voting, pp. 47-50, and pp. 52-53.

See entries under "Coins and Coinage" in the Congressional Record, Index to Vol. 30, Index to Vol. 31, and Index to Vol. 32, and the subsequent entries under the appropriate bill numbers.


Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 280.


Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 130, p. 183.

Most of Hoover's responses to the Depression worked to aid business. Notable among them was the creation of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which loaned money to business. Generally, Hoover's response to depression-created problems was to appoint a committee to study the matter. He steadfastly refused to support federal relief, calling for state and local relief effects, financed and staffed by volunteers. See Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); and Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage Books, 1948), ch. 11.

Harold G. Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1953), p. 120.


Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, p. 328, is one example of this point of view.


Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 45; see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), pp. 8-11.


31. For a complete description see Hacker, A Short History of the New Deal, Appendix 1.


33. Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Deal, p. 332.

34. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, p. 554.


40. Pierce, Politics in America, p. 56.

41. Ibid., p. 57.


43. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity," esp. 424-426.


45. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 215-216. This is Johnson's view of Mill's action. Evans and Novak report that the President was irritable with Congressional leaders when they tampered with his legislation, and that he was angry that Mills, by rewriting the Medicare bill, was getting credit for the measure from the press. Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: Signet Books, 1966), p. 522.

46. Pierce, Politics in America, p. 62.

47. Ibid.


51. For a complete account, see Harbaugh, "Election of 1904," pp. 1973-84.


53. Ibid., p. 1984-85.
Minor party candidates received the following portion of the vote: 402,283 for Debs the Socialist, 258,536 for Seallow of the Prohibition Party, 117,183 for Watson, the People's Party Candidate, and 31,249 for Corrigan of the Socialist Labor Party. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. XX, entry under Roosevelt, n. p.

For praise of the Roosevelt administration, see Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947) p. 194.


Ripley, Majority Leadership, p. 23, n. 5; Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 209.

Harding did not do well on the first ballots, with most votes going to front runners General Leonard Wood, and Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois. After much haggling Harding was nominated on the tenth ballot, and Calvin Coolidge, governor of Massachusetts, was name as the vice-presidential candidate. In San Francisco, Cox was nominated on the forty-third ballot, and Franklin Roosevelt was chosen as vice-presidential candidate. Donald R. McCoy, "Election of 1920," in History of American Presidential Elections, p. 2359, p. 2365.

63. The Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 was also passed during the first session of the 67th Congress. Although this bill, which required the President to submit a formal budget to Congress annually, was very important, the 67th Congress cannot be credited with its formulation. The bill originally passed in 1919, but President Wilson vetoed it due to the provision which denied the President the right to remove the chief accounting officer. The bill enacted by the 67th Congress allowed removal by joint resolution or impeachment. President Harding signed this bill on June 10, 1921. See Daniel T. Selko, The Federal Financial System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1940), pp. 101-102.

64. The Philadelphia Public Ledger and the Baltimore Sun, quoted in "Bricks and Roses for Congress," The Literary Digest, October 7, 1922, p. 15.

65. Ripley, Majority Leadership, pp. 89-103. For more on the 67th Congress see also Lindsay Rogers, "The First (Special) Session of the Sixty-Seventh Congress: April 11, 1921- November 23, 1921, American Political Science Review, 16 (February, 1922), 41-52; and Lindsay Rogers, "The Second Third and Fourth Sessions of the Sixty-Seventh Congress," American Political Science Review 18 (February, 1924), 79-95.

66. Quoted in "Bricks and Roses for Congress," The Literary Digest, October 7, 1922, p. 15.


69. Ibid., pp. 68-69

70. Subsequently, the Senate balance became 64 Democrats to 36 Republicans after John Tower won Lyndon Johnson's vacated Senate seat.


CHAPTER 3: TESTING SINGLE FACTOR EXPLANATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE

INTRODUCTION

In chapter one major bodies of literature on the Congress were reviewed in order to identify factors which may affect the nature of Congressional output. The purpose of this chapter is to examine these factors individually with reference to the six Houses under study. In addition to the factors identified in chapter one, certain other variables suggested by literature more peripheral to the research question than the reviewed earlier will also be evaluated. An attempt will be made to determine whether or not any of these factors can stand alone as an explanation for significant versus undistinguished Congressional output.

The factors are grouped into four categories according to the primary concept to which they refer. The first is coalition or majority related factors. This category includes the absolute size of the majority party as well as the type of majority. The second category is leadership variables, which includes Presidential leadership, Congressional leadership, and the leadership structure of the House. A third category is made up of variables which reflect generational and electoral change. This category includes the percent of freshmen and the percent of switched seat members in a House, as well as the type of election which sent those members to Congress. The final category is party-related factors, which includes the level of party voting, the level of party cohesion as measured by the Rice Index, and the level of party unity for the party in Congress. Also included in
this grouping are measures of intra-party homogeneity and inter-party ideological conflict for the party in the electorate.

MAJORITY RELATED FACTORS

Political scientists have long been interested in the study of coalitions as a means of deciding who gets what. William Riker has devoted a book to the topic.\(^1\) Using a game-theoretic perspective, Riker posits a model to be used in analyzing real world political behavior. Two assumptions must be granted for acceptance of the model: individuals concerned behave rationally, and the outcome of the "game" leads to a zero-sum condition; that is, gains of one side exactly equal the losses of the other. The chief conclusion derived from the model is the "size principle" which states that "in social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger."\(^2\)

The utility of the "size principle," or the concept of the minimal winning coalition has been investigated by various political scientists with specific reference to the legislative process. Koehler has endeavored to show the relative usefulness of the size principle.\(^3\) He found the median size of winning coalitions to be 62% over the eleven House sessions studied. While admitting that 62% is too high to be considered minimal, Koehler found that by considering the size of the coalition relative to the total membership rather than relative to the number voting, the median size of coalitions drops to 52.8%. Koehler offers this as strong evidence in support of the theory of minimal win-
ning coalitions in the House.

Two other works, by Hinckley and by Murray and Lutz, suggest the lack of utility of the size principle in legislative situations. Hinckley analyzes data from ten Congresses which substantially overlap the time period studied by Koehler. Using the somewhat different and perhaps more appropriate criterion of party votes as a guide for selection of roll calls to be studied, winning coalition size was calculated on the basis of total House membership. As percent majority party increased, the size of winning coalitions also increased, the correlation between the two being .69.

Murray and Lutz, seeking to limit their analysis to those situations which most closely conformed to the assumptions of Riker's model, looked only at redistricting decisions in state legislatures as well as in the Congress. Redistricting most closely approximates the zero-sum condition: what one district gains another must lose. Of 348 self redistricting decisions studied, only 69 fell into the most minimal category. On the basis of extensive analysis, they conclude that Riker's ideas are of little use in the usual legislative situation.

As Hinckley points out, the "seriality" of the legislative situation renders Riker's theory irrelevant. Roll calls may be viewed as a series of games. "Winning" on a consistent basis is more likely to require strategies which call for maximizing coalitions. In Hinkley's words, "the size of the winning today may determine entry and the subsequent distribution of resources tomorrow...A resounding House vote for one bill may encourage legislators to try for harder bills." Additionally, the conditions of open entry and consensual norms help to increase coalition size.
The most logical basis for a coalition in Congress is party ties. Coalition builders (that is, the party leadership) are expected to seek the support of members of their own party on roll call votes. The cost of approaching members of one's own party is less than the cost of trying to sway the votes of the opposition. Hence, if we accept party as a reasonable basis for coalitions, we can expect the size of winning coalitions to vary as a function of majority party strength. In fact, Hinckley's data confirm this expectation for the period from the 81st through the 91st Houses. The larger the majority party in the House, the easier it should be for the leadership to make a winning coalition, for it has a greater pool of resources from which it can draw.

Cooper and Bombardier suggest that larger partisan majorities may be instrumental in pushing a legislative program through the House. This research focused on two of the Congresses of interest here, the 87th and 89th, and was concerned with the question why Johnson was successful in getting his programs through the 89th House, while Kennedy failed to make any progress on similar programs in the 87th House. Popular explanations held that Johnson's success was due to superior legislative skills, an explanation which lacks credibility if one looks at Johnson's record in the 90th House. Using roll call data, Cooper and Bombardier have shown that the chief factor in Johnson's success was the increased size of the Democratic majority in the House as a result of the 1964 elections. The size of the Democratic majority increased from 263 in the 87th House to 294 in the 89th, from 60 to 68 percent of the total House membership. Hinckley's data show that the mean percentage of House members in the willing coalition in-
creased from 60 to 62 in this time period.

If majority party size makes it easier to form a winning coalition which can pass significant legislation, we would expect to find that the majority party was disproportionately large in the 55th, 73rd, and 89th Houses, and that the margin of party control was relatively slim in the 59th, 67th and 87th Houses. Table 3-1 presents the size of the two major parties (in percent) in the six Houses and the mean size of the majority for the 50th to 90th Houses, as well as a neutral zone around the mean. This zone was constructed in an effort to avoid arbitrarily identifying a value as high simply because it is above the mean or low simply because it is below the mean. The size of the neutral zone is based on the value of the mean. The zone encompasses an interval on either side of the mean which is equivalent to five percent of the mean itself. Thus the formula for the neutral zone is:

\[ \bar{X} \pm 0.05\bar{X} \]

where \( \bar{X} \) = the mean. For example, if the mean were 50, the neutral zone would be 50 plus or minus 2.5, or 47.5 to 52.5. Any value falling within this zone would be classified as neutral. A value above the neutral zone is classified as high, while any value falling below the range is classified as low.

While a number of variables to be examined subsequently have shown secular trends in their values, the mean size of the majority has remained relatively constant from the 50th to the 90th Houses. Hence, we are considering the absolute size of the majority in the six
Houses in relation to the mean absolute size of the majority in the House from 1887 to 1968.

An examination of Table 3-1 shows the absolute size of the majority party in the significant Congresses to be 61 percent in the 55th House, 73 percent in the 73rd House, and 68 percent in the 89th House. The majorities for the 73rd and 89th are disproportionately large, but the size of the majority in the 55th falls into the neutral zone. A look at the percentages for the undistinguished Houses, however, shows that they, too, tend to be very high. The size of the majority is 65 percent, 70 percent, and 60 percent, for the 59th, 67th, and 87th Houses, respectively. The 60 percent in the 87th Houses is in the neutral range. Clearly, the 65 percent and 70 percent majorities in the 59th and 67th Houses are disproportionately large and compare favorably in size with the 73 percent and 68 percent majorities in the 73rd and 89th Houses. Thus the hypothesis that a large majority alone is a sufficient determinant of significant policy output is not confirmed. The three undistinguished Congresses had House majorities which are comparable in size to the majorities in the House of the significant Congresses. On the basis of this evidence, size of majority may be rejected as a single factor explanation of the House's ability to pass important legislation.

If the absolute size of the majority party in the House cannot be accepted as an explanation of significant legislative output, the type of majority may be more useful as an explanatory factor. Ripley has identified four types of majorities which may appear in the House based on the characteristics of the majority to which the President and the House leaders must appeal for support. If the required strategy
### TABLE 3-1: Distribution of Partisan Strength in the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th># of Democrats</th>
<th>% of Democrats</th>
<th># of Republicans</th>
<th>% of Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant Houses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>32&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>61&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undistinguished Houses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean % Majority Party 50-90th Houses 5% Neutral Zone

| 59.6 | 2.98 | 56.62 - 62.58 |

<sup>a</sup>Percentages do not sum to 100% due to presence of third parties.

...is to appeal only to the majority party, the majority is classified as "presidential-partisan." If leaders must appeal to members of both parties for support, the majority is "presidential-bipartisan." A third category combines either partisan or bipartisan appeal with a passive role for the President. In this case, we have a "congressional majority." In all three of these cases, the majority in the House and
the President share the same party affiliation. The fourth type of majority, "truncated," occurs when the party affiliation of the majority of house members differs from that of the President. In this instance, the President may be either active or passive, and the leaders may appeal for either partisan or bipartisan support.

The hypothesis that significant legislative output would occur when the majority is presidential-partisan seems reasonable. In this case the House has the chance of voting on the legislative programs sponsored by the President and the party, and the absolute size of the majority is large enough that appeals to the opposition are unnecessary. In order for the hypothesis to be confirmed, the three significant Congresses should all have House majorities which are classified as presidential-partisan. The undistinguished Congresses may be expected to fall into any of the other three categories. Table 3-2 gives Ripley's classification for the six Congresses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3-2: Types of Majorities in the Six Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>House #</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Houses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undistinguished Houses</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The hypothesis is partially supported. Two of the three cases of significant Congresses do exhibit presidential-partisan majorities, while none of the undistinguished Houses fall into this category. The 55th House and the 67th House are both classified as congressional majorities, yet differences between the two Houses are great in terms of significant output. Additionally, the 59th and 87th Houses are both classified as presidential-bipartisan. We might expect that a presidential bipartisan majority would be more successful than either a congressional or truncated majority since it has greater leadership resources. Yet in one case, a congressional majority passed more significant legislation than either of these presidential bipartisan Houses. This suggests that presidential-partisan majorities may be helpful in passing significant legislation but that the presence of such a majority is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the passage of such legislation.

Additionally, there is a problem with these classifications of majority types. The classification is not based on a description of the characteristics of the majority alone, but also includes characteristics of the leadership, both congressional and presidential. The characteristics of the leadership may be more important as determinants of significant legislation than are the characteristics of the majority. We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the effects of leadership on the passage of significant legislation.

**Leadership Variables**

In the twentieth century, the policy initiation role has become more and more a function of the Executive Branch. "The President pro-
poses, the Congress disposes," is the often heard maxim. If this is the case, the President, rather than the Congress, may be the determinant of innovative public policy. Strong presidential leadership may be the essential factor in getting the House to pass significant legislation.

Strong presidential leadership is a composite of various sources of power. Neustadt has suggested that presidential power is the power to persuade, which is derived from three basic sources:

...first are the bargaining advantages inherent in his job with which to persuade other men that what he wants of them is what their own responsibilities required them to do. Second are the expectations of those other men regarding his ability and will to use the various advantages they think he has. Third are those men's estimates of how his public views him and of how their publics may view them if they do what he wants. In short, his power is the product of his vantage points in government, together with his reputation in the Washington community and his prestige outside.9

Charles O. Jones has rated the Presidents of the twentieth century according to the Neustadt criteria and their style.10 Bargaining advantages, others' estimate of public view, others' view of his ability, and style have been evaluated as definite, partial, or limited sources of power with respect to each President. These have been combined to yield an overall rating of the individual Presidents which is useful in testing the hypothesis of whether or not strong Presidential leadership accounts for significant policy output. The classification for each of the six Presidents under study is displayed in Table 3-3.

The hypothesis is not supported by the Jones' classification. While two of the three "productive Presidents," Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, are rated as strong, and the third, William McKinley, is
TABLE 3-3: Type of Presidential Leadership for the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant Houses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>W. McKinley</td>
<td>Moderately Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>R. Roosevelt</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>L. Johnson</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undistinguished Houses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>T. Roosevelt</td>
<td>Moderately Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>W. Harding</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>J. Kennedy</td>
<td>Moderately Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rated as moderately strong. Theodore Roosevelt and John Kennedy, two men who held the office while undistinguished Congresses were in session, are also rated as moderately strong. Only Warren Harding, elected to office with the members of the unproductive 67th Congress, is rated as a weak President. The presidential rating variable does not discriminate between significant and undistinguished Congresses.

Some may object to this conclusion on the grounds that a strong President is not necessarily an innovative one. This objection may be partially overcome by looking at the style criterion employed by Jones, which partly measures the approach of the man to the office. A President whose style is a source of power is one concerned with leaving his mark on the office. His view of his role as President is an active
one; he is more likely to attempt innovation vis-a-vis legislation than a President who takes a less aggressive view of his role in office. Hence, we may hypothesize that when Congress passes significant legislation it will be under a President whose style is a source of power, and when Congress is unproductive or undistinguished, the President is less likely to exhibit a strong style. Table 3-4 shows the classification of the six Presidents on the style variable. An examination of the table shows that the style variable discriminates no better than does the overall presidential rating. McKinley's style was not a source of power, yet the 55th House produced significant policy changes. Conversely, Theodore Roosevelt and John Kennedy both rate strongly in terms of style, yet were unable to get the 59th and 87th Houses, respectively, to pass major policy changes. On the basis of these results, we may conclude that strong presidential leadership alone is insufficient as a determinant of important policy change in the House.

TABLE 3-4: Presidential Style as a Source of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Style a Source of Power?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant Houses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>F. Roosevelt</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>L. Johnson</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undistinguished Houses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>T. Roosevelt</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Harding</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If presidential leadership does not explain such legislative success, it may be that Congressional leaders are more important in helping significant legislation to pass. The most visible of House leaders, if not the most important, is the Speaker of that body. Ripley has classified the behavior of the individual Speakers in terms of both style of leadership and use of powers.¹² "Style" may be either personal, collective, or figurehead. Personal style describes the behavior of a Speaker who makes his own legislative decisions, sometimes in conjunction with the President. Collective style occurs when decisions are made jointly with other members of the party leadership, and figurehead describes the style of a Speaker who does not make major legislative decisions. The "use of powers" variable refers to whether or not the man expanded, contained, or lost power while in office, and is coded innovative, conservative, or retrogressive, respectively. While the leadership behavior of the Speaker is an extremely crude index of the behavior of the entire House leadership, we may use it at least as a partial index of leadership behavior. We would expect that a House ruled by a Speaker whose leadership style is personal and innovative would be more likely to pass significant legislation than a House under speaker leadership. Once again the troubling assumption that the legislative program of the House leadership is innovative must be granted. The assumption must be questioned seriously only if the data support the hypothesis.

The data, presented in Table 3-5, do not support the hypothesis. In only one important Congress, the 55th, does the leadership pattern of personal and innovative occur. Speaker Rainey in the 73rd House combined a figurehead style of leadership with a conservative use of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Style of Leadership</th>
<th>Use of Powers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>Figurehead</td>
<td>Innovative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Retrogressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>T. Reed</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>H. Rainey</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(J. Byrnes)(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>J. McCormack</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant Houses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>屋 #</th>
<th>設者</th>
<th>领导形式</th>
<th>使用权力</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>T. Reed</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>H. Rainey</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(J. Byrnes)(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>J. McCormack</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Undistinguished Houses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>屋 #</th>
<th>設者</th>
<th>领导形式</th>
<th>使用权力</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>J. Cannon</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>F. Gillet</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>S. Rayburn</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(McCormack)(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Speakers Rainey and Rayburn died during these Congresses and were replaced by Speakers Byrnes and McCormack. The leadership pattern is changed slightly in the 87th House only.

powers. His successor in the 73rd House, Byrnes, continued in the same pattern. The style of McCormack in the 89th House was collective and conservative. In three significant Houses, all three possible styles of leadership, and two of three uses of power occur. The undistinguished Houses exhibit a similar pattern. All three styles of leadership and all three uses of power are found. Joseph Cannon in the 59th House combined a collective leadership style with an innovative use of powers. Gillet in the 67th was a figurehead leader and used the powers of the Speaker in a retrogressive fashion. Rayburn in the 87th House used a personal style and was conservative with his powers. When he was succeeded by McCormack in the second session, the pattern became collective and conservative.

The variations in mode of leadership are great, and not related in any systematic fashion to the type of legislation passed in the six Houses. Even though the measure is extremely crude, variations would be much less random if the hypothesis were correct.

Behavioral variations in informal leadership structure do not appear to determine the type of output. Variation in the formal and party structures may have a greater effect on the work of the House. These structural characteristics of the House are not fixed, but have evolved over time. From approximately 1886 to 1915 or the 50th through the 63rd House, the formal structure of the House concentrated power in the hands of the Speaker. Moreover, this formal structure was supported by a strong party structure. Leadership was centralized, with top party and committee positions being held by the same men. From the period 1916 to 1939, or the 64th through the 75th Houses, the formal structure was less rigidly centralized. Leadership was more collective
and power was diffused. The party caucus, a once powerful entity, met only sporadically. In the modern era, 1940 to 1968, or the 76th through the 90th Houses, the House was organized on a more decentralized basis. Seniority rather than party loyalty has been the criterion for committee assignment. Decline in the Speaker's formal powers combined with the atrophy of party mechanisms served to produce both a highly fragile or tenuous process of majority construction and a highly permissive style of leadership.\textsuperscript{13}

It is tempting to hypothesize that strong centralized leadership structures lead to important legislative output, and that Houses organized on a less centralized basis are less likely to pass significant legislation. Such a hypothesis is not supported by reality. One important House and one undistinguished House occurred during the tenure of each phase of organizational evolution. Table 3-6 shows which Houses fall into each of these categories. While formal leadership structure has been shown to affect levels of party voting, it appears to have no effect on the type of output of the House.\textsuperscript{14}

On the whole, the type of leadership of the President and the Speaker, as well as the formal and party leadership structures do not affect the passage of important legislative programs. They may act to strengthen party discipline, but strong party discipline without an innovative party program is insufficient as a determinant of social and political change through national legislation.
### TABLE 3-6: Structural Characteristics of the Leadership of the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th>Strong Centralized</th>
<th>Transitional</th>
<th>Decentralized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant Houses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undistinguished Houses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### GENERATIONAL AND ELECTORAL CHANGES

Many students of Congress conclude that the potential for social change via legislation is a function of the newly elected members. In Clausen's words, "the main impetus for change in the overall policy posture comes in the new membership." Weinbaum and Judd reach a similar conclusion: "mandates are roughly measured by the number of freshmen seated rather than by the Congressional attitudes changed." Freshmen members tend to adhere to the party positions more often than do the more senior House membership for several reasons. Due to their inferior status, freshmen are more dependent on the leadership for advancement and for favors for their districts. Party position is the voting cue...
most readily available to them, and it is often used when the vote is on legislation with which they are unfamiliar. If they were elected in a presidential election year, they may owe their presence in the House to the President's coattails, and hence be more supportive of his position.

If, indeed, freshmen House members are the mechanism through which policy changes are effected, we may expect to find a relatively large proportion in the significant Houses, and a relatively small number of freshmen in the undistinguished Houses. Table 3-7 gives the mean percent freshmen for three time periods in the history of the House, as well as the neutral zones around the means. As Polsby has demonstrated, the number of freshmen elected to the House has declined throughout the history of the House. 16 In other words, the percent of freshmen exhibits a secular trend. For this reason, meaningful interpretation of the data in Table 3-7 requires comparing the percent freshmen in each of the six Houses to the mean percentage for the appropriate time period. Relative, not absolute means are being examined here. The percent freshmen in the 55th and 59th Houses is thus compared to the neutral zone for the 50th - 63rd Houses, which ranges from 31.35 to 34.65 percent. The 55th House is above this range with 38 percent of the total membership being freshmen. The 59th House, with 31 percent freshmen, is very slightly below the neutral zone for this time period. The 67th and 73rd Houses with 24 and 37 percent freshmen, respectively, are both above the neutral zone for the 64th - 75th Houses, a finding which does not support the hypothesis. The figure for the 73rd Houses is in the expected direction, being 15
TABLE 3-7: Proportion of Freshmen in the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>% Freshmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean % Freshmen</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63rd Houses = 33</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>31.35 – 34.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75th Houses = 22</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>20.90 – 23.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90th Houses = 18</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>17.10 – 18.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

percent higher than the average. The mean percent freshmen in the modern House is 18 percent. The 89th House, with 20 percent freshmen is slightly higher than the neutral zone of 17.1 to 8.9 percent, with the 87th House, with 14 percent freshmen, falls below this range as expected.

The figures give substantial support to the hypothesis. With the exception of the 67th House, elected in 1920, all the percentages fall into the expected categories. Due to this exception, however, an examination of other related variables also appears necessary and may prove enlightening.

The most closely analogous variable is the percent of switched seats in a House. Switched seats are those which change their party representation in the House as a result of an election. Brady and Lynn have shown that switched seat representatives tend to be stronger in
their support of the party and the President's policy positions than non-switched seat freshmen. For this reason, the percentage of switched seats may be a theoretically more important variable in explaining clusters of policy change. The hypothesis is substantially similar to that regarding the percent freshmen; that is, the significant Houses should have a higher proportion of members from switched seat districts than do the undistinguished Houses. Once again, the percentages will be compared to the mean percentage of switched seat districts for the appropriate historical period since the percent of switched seats, like the percent freshmen, has shown a secular decline. The results, shown in Table 3-8, are nearly identical to those for the proportion of freshmen. The 55th House had 19.2 percent representatives from switched seat districts, slightly above the zone of 17.05 to 18.95 percent for the period from the 50-63rd Houses. The 59th House had 11.8 percent of these representatives, well below the neutral range. The neutral range for the 64-75th Houses is 12.25 to 13.55 percent. The 73rd House, with 20.9 percent switched seats is well above this, yet the undistinguished 67th House, with 15.4 percent switched seats is also above the neutral zone. In the modern era, the mean percentage of switched seats has dropped slightly to 11 percent and the neutral zone is 10.45 to 11.55 percent. The 89th House is slightly above these figures with 13.3 percent switched seats, and the 87th House falls into the low category with only 8.4 percent switched seats.

Once again, with the exception of the 67th House, the data lend support to the hypothesis. Both the percent freshmen and the percent switched seat districts appear to be good candidates for a single-variable explanation of significant policy outputs. The objection may
TABLE 3-8: Proportion of Representatives from Switched Seat Districts in the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>% Switched Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean % Switched Seats</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses = 18.0</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>17.05 - 18.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses = 12.9</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>12.25 - 13.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses = 11.0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>10.45 - 11.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

be raised however, that the gross percentages of freshmen and of switched seats are inadequate measures in that they yield no information about the partisan direction of the change. If the change favored the minority party it is unlikely that this is an adequate explanation for significant policy output.

Without going to an individual level of analysis, it is possible to infer the direction of the change from the type of election which sent the members to the House. Landslide elections, or those in which the victorious presidential candidate won with an extremely large percentage of the vote, tend to produce larger than usual majorities in the House of Representatives. In this instance, the freshmen and switched seat members tend to come disproportionately from the newly elected majority party. In other types of elections, partisan gains and losses
may roughly cancel one another out, or the direction may favor the minority party, especially if it is a close election. With this knowledge, we may hypothesize that significant Houses are those elected during a presidential landslide, and that the undistinguished Houses should not follow landslide elections. Table 3-7 shows the classification of elections on the landslide dichotomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>Election Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This distribution of landslide elections does not parallel the findings on the percent freshmen and percent switched-seat variables, thus giving some doubt as to whether the changes in these variables benefited the majority party in the 55th and 87th Houses, the only two which were not elected in landslides. Two significant Houses (73rd and 89th) and two undistinguished Houses (59th and 67th) were all elected in landslides. The lopsided 1920 victory undoubtedly accounts for the anomalous findings on the 67th House, reported above, and the landslide of 1904 accounts for the fact that the figures for the 59th House are so close to the mean. The findings also cast doubt on whether or not gross percent freshmen and percent switched seat representatives
elected are adequate explanations of policy change. Landslide victories do not necessarily give Congress a clear mandate for policy change.18

One type of election which theoretically does give Congress a mandate for policy change is a critical election. The concept of a critical election was first identified by V.O. Key in 1955. A critical election is defined as one in which "voters are...unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of voting reveal a sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate."19 Actual elections are rarely pure types which fit this definition perfectly.

Burnham has argued that critical elections may be interpreted as a mandate for policy change. In his words, they "emerge directly from the dynamics of [the] constituent-function supremacy in American politics...[the] they are intimately associated with and followed by transformations in large clusters of policy."20 If critical elections may be interpreted in this fashion, we would expect the significant Congresses to immediately follow elections which are classified as critical. In no instance should we find an undistinguished Congress preceded by a critical election. Table 3-10 shows the classification of the elections preceding the six Congresses according to whether or not they were critical elections. The hypothesis that significant Congresses follow critical elections is given substantial support. In no case does an undistinguished Congress follow a critical election. Two significant Houses, the 55th and 73rd, were definitely preceded by critical elections. The election of 1964, which sent the members of the 89th House to Washington, has not been classified with any degree of certainty. Burnham and Pomper have argued that 1964 was a critical
election, while Sundquist classifies it as a deviating election, a temporary aberration of normal voting patterns. With scholarly opinion divided, the election of 1964 cannot be placed in either the critical or not critical category. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that this election exhibited enough traits common to critical elections that several leading theorists are willing to place it in this category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>Election Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evidence, then, suggests that characteristics of critical elections may be a determining factor in causing significant Congressional output. Large numbers of freshmen and switched seat members also may have some impact, although they are not sufficient as an explanation of significant House performance since the undistinguished 67th had a large percentage of both. Moreover, the mere presence of these types of members cannot be the determining factor. What is crucial is their behavior as party members. For this reason, we turn to an examination of indices of behavior of the party in Congress and the party in the electorate.
PARTY-RELATED FACTORS

American scholars frequently lament that political parties in the United States are not responsible in the sense that British parties are.\textsuperscript{22} Those who support government by responsible parties argue that such party government is necessary in order to provide adequate solutions for political problems. Responsible political parties will "bring together masses of voters behind meaningful party programs and loyal to them and then hold the elected candidates to the obligation of carrying those programs into public policy."\textsuperscript{23}

In general, American parties do not exhibit responsible party behavior. At times, however, party behavior may approximate the responsible model. We might expect that in the Houses which passed significant legislation the Congressional parties manifested characteristics of responsible party behavior. In these situations, the parties should have definite legislative programs which are distinctly different from one another. Party loyalty among the individual House members should be higher.

A number of widely used indices tap dimension of responsible party behavior in the Congress. These include the level of party voting, the Rice Index of cohesion, and the party unity index. All three show secular trends, although the decline in party voting is more apparent than the declines in cohesion and unity. Therefore, comparisons of these three variables will be made to relative rather than to absolute means.

The most direct indicator of responsible party behavior is the level of party voting. The more responsible the Congressional parties,
the higher the level of party voting in the House should be. We may hypothesize that in Houses which passed important legislation, party voting should be much higher than usual, and in the undistinguished Houses, the levels should be low or near average. Table 3-11 shows the level of party voting in the six Houses. The measure of party votes used here is simply those votes on which a majority of one party opposed a majority of the other party. The mean levels and neutral zones of party voting exhibited in the three eras of House history are also presented in Table 3-11. Clearly the hypothesis is not supported. Party voting was unusually high in two significant Houses, the 55th and 73rd, but it was also above the neutral zone in the undistinguished 59th and 67th Houses. The two Houses in the modern era both fall slightly below the mean level of party voting and into the neutral range for this time period. A point that is crucial in rejecting the hypothesis is that party voting in the 89th House was even lower than the level found in the 87th House, albeit only one percentage point. High levels of party voting alone are not sufficient cause of important Congressional output.

Another commonly used measure of party behavior in Congress is the Rice Index of Cohesion. The index is used as a measure of party strength, or the degree to which members of a political party vote together. If party strength in Congress facilitates the passage of significant legislation, we would expect that the levels of cohesion for the majority party would be higher in the significant Houses than in the undistinguished Houses, while minority cohesion might be lower in the significant Houses. Table 3-12 shows the levels of cohesion as measured by the Rice index for both parties in the six Houses. These are summary
TABLE 3-11: Levels of Party Voting in the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>% Party Votes&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>79.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>70.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>47.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean level of Party Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>% Party Votes&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63</td>
<td>66.64%</td>
<td>63.31 - 69.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75</td>
<td>55.65%</td>
<td>52.87 - 58.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90</td>
<td>49.50%</td>
<td>47.02 - 51.98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>A party vote is defined as a roll call on which a majority of the members of one party opposed a majority of members of the opposite party.

scores obtained by averaging the index of cohesion for each roll call for each party. The mean levels of cohesion and the neutral range for the three eras are also presented. The figures do not lend support to the hypothesis that high majority cohesion necessarily fosters the passage of important legislation. In five of the six Houses, the cohesion score for the majority is above the neutral zone. In the undistinguished 59th, the cohesion score is in the neutral category. In only one case, the undistinguished 87th House, does the minority score fall below the neutral category, and this is contrary to the hypothesis. In all three significant Houses, and the remaining two undistinguished Houses, the cohesion scores for the minority are in the neutral range.
### TABLE 3-12: Levels of Cohesion as Measured by the Rice Index in the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Mean levels of Democratic Cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses</td>
<td>71.66</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>68.08 - 74.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses</td>
<td>64.50</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>61.27 - 67.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses</td>
<td>65.30</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>62.03 - 68.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Mean levels of Republican Cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses</td>
<td>77.85</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>73.96 - 81.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses</td>
<td>69.53</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>66.05 - 73.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses</td>
<td>68.19</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>64.78 - 72.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Underscore denotes majority party.
One possible reason for the failure of these scores to support the hypothesis is that the Rice Index is insensitive to inter-party conflict. In other words, both parties may exhibit high levels of cohesion, but they may both be voting the same way on the issues. For this reason the percentage of unanimous votes works to inflate the level of cohesion. An examination of Table 3-12 shows that the percentage of unanimous votes is much higher in the 59th and 67th Houses than in the 55th and 73rd Houses. The unanimous vote explanation, however, does not work for the last pair of Houses. The percentage of unanimous votes was lower in the 87th than in the 89th House, yet the cohesion score is lower in the 89th House.

One way to get around this difficulty with Rice's cohesion scores is to employ a somewhat less common index, the party unity score. The party unity score simultaneously taps intra-party cohesion and inter-party conflict by measuring the degree to which party members vote together on those roll calls on which a majority of one party opposed a majority of the other. If the failure of the data to support the hypothesis is simply a function of the difficulties associated with the Rice Index, we would expect the party unity score to overcome this problem. The restated hypothesis is that majority party unity scores will be higher than average and minority scores lower in the significant Houses. The undistinguished Houses should exhibit scores below or near the mean level of party unity for the appropriate era.

Table 3-13 gives the party unity scores for the Democratic and Republican parties in the six Houses. The data do not support the hypothesis. All six Houses have majority party unity scores which fall into the neutral range, indicating that the test is inconclusive. This
may seem a counterintuitive finding in some cases. For example, in the significant 55th House, the majority party Republicans have a unity score of 93.24. Surely this is a high score, yet it falls into the neutral range. The reason is that the mean Republican unity score for the 50th to the 63rd Houses is 89.10. Since the neutral zone is relative to the value of the mean, a neutral zone around a high mean is much larger than a neutral zone around a low mean. This is appropriate, however, since we are looking for higher than normal values to be predictive of significant output.

The minority party unity scores do not support the hypothesis either. All except the score for the minority Republicans in the 73rd House fall into the neutral range. The minority in the 73rd House had a unity score above the neutral range. This does not accord with the hypothesis since the minority party is expected to have a lower than average score in the significant Houses. In view of the fact that most of the tests were inconclusive, we may conclude that high majority party unity may help to pass significant legislation, but high party unity alone is an insufficient determinant of important Congressional output.

Party voting, cohesion, and unity are indicators of responsible party behavior which is internal to the House. The behavior of the party in the electorate, an external factor, is to some extent a determinant of party behavior in the House. If external factors have a decisive impact on the behavior of the parties in the House, they may ultimately have an effect on the type of legislation passed in the House. Two variables are of particular importance. They are intra-party homogeneity, and intra-party ideological distance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th></th>
<th>House #</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>89.28</td>
<td>93.24(^a)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>92.48</td>
<td>88.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>85.47</td>
<td>88.53</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>85.90</td>
<td>88.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>80.35</td>
<td>80.72</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82.95</td>
<td>80.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean level Democratic Party Unity</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses = 86.69</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>82.36 - 91.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses = 82.52</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>78.39 - 86.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses = 80.19</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>76.18 - 84.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean level Republican Party Unity</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses = 89.10</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>84.64 - 93.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses = 84.88</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>80.64 - 89.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses = 82.14</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>78.03 - 86.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Underscore denotes majority party.
Party homogeneity is the degree to which the party is alike across districts; that is, does one Democratic district look like another Democratic district, and do similar conditions hold for the Republicans? Brady suggests that when the parties become more homogeneous in this way, responsible party behavior results and helps to pass significant legislation.24 At the House rather than the district level, only crude measures of this concept are possible. For the Democratic party, the concept can be indexed by the regional split between Northern Democrats, and Southern and Border Democrats. When one of these two regional factions becomes dominant (that is, its membership exceeds 50 percent of the Democrats in the House), then Democratic constituencies become more similar, since Northern and Southern Democratic districts, over time, have exhibited more differences than similarities. As the size of the dominant faction increases, the party becomes more homogeneous.

For the Republicans, party homogeneity is more difficult to measure. Regional cleavages are less well defined than for the Democrats, and the party is split into more than two blocks. Therefore, defining a dominant faction is difficult. Various research suggests, however, that the North Eastern wing has tended to be the dominant faction of the Republican party. Turner and Schneier note that the "general pattern in the Republican party is clear despite year to year fluctuations. The east north central region as remained consistently loyal, at the heart of the party."25 Although the percentage of Eastern Republicans is frequently under 50, they may be classified as the dominant faction since the regional split is not simply East versus non-East, but East
versus various other regional blocks. As the present of Eastern Republicans rises, the party becomes more homogeneous.

The hypothesis is that the more homogeneous the majority party, the easier is will be for Congress to pass important legislation, since party-constituency cross-pressuring will be reduced. Table 3-14 shows the levels of party homogeneity in the six Houses, and the neutral zones for the dominant factions of both parties for the three periods. For all three undistinguished Houses, the hypothesis is supported. The majority party had much lower than average homogeneity in the 59th and 67th Houses, while the 87th ranks in the neutral category.

The results are less clear for the significant Houses. In the 55th and 89th Houses, the figures support the hypothesis. Both Houses had dominant factions which were much larger than usual. The 73rd House, with 57 percent dominant faction, is below the neutral zone. Thus party homogeneity does not appear to be a necessary condition for significant legislation.

In view of these findings on party homogeneity, it may be instructive to consider the variable of inter-party ideological distance, or the degree to which the parties exhibit opposing viewpoints on the important issues of the day. As the parties become more polarized and the issues become more intense, it is more likely that the majority party will offer and pass an innovative solution to the problems facing the nation.

Benjamin Ginsberg has derived a number of indices of party conflict over time, based on a content analysis of party platforms. His index of critical conflict reflects the degree of conflict on an issue cluster as well as the differential salience of the issues. By
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>Homogeneity&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>43 (Republicans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>57 (Democrats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>63 (Democrats)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean % Dominant Faction Democrats</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses = 61</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>57.95-64.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses = 62</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>58.90-65.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses = 55</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>52.25-57.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean % Eastern Republicans</th>
<th>5%</th>
<th>Neutral Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50-63 Houses = 38</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>36.10-39.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64-75 Houses = 42</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>39.90-44.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-90 Houses = 35</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>33.25-36.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Measured in percentages

differential salience Ginsberg means that the issues were more important to one party than to the other. It is under conditions of high critical conflict that we might expect legislation which will settle these issues and in the process set the nation on a new political course. The party which is overly concerned with the issue need not be the advocate of the new legislation - the other party may pass such legislation in order to resolve the issue and still the voice of opposition.
Table 3-15 presents the scores for critical conflict for the years in which the six Congresses were elected, as well as the mean levels of critical conflict from 1886-1968. Since the levels of critical conflict have shown no secular trends in the time span covered by Ginsberg, it is appropriate to compare the scores to the absolute mean on this variable. The figures partially support the hypothesis. In 1896 and 1932 the scores for the capitalism issues were extremely high relative to the mean. In 1964 the score is high for the international cooperation issues. In the elections 1904, 1920, and 1960 all three capitalism scores are low, but in 1904 the score for international cooperation is more than twice as high than the comparable figures for 1964, hence the parties exhibit high scores for critical conflict during the three significant Congresses, but the platforms also show a high degree of critical conflict for 1904, the year in which the undistinguished 59th Congress was elected. Critical conflict may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for legislative output.
TABLE 3-15: Critical Conflict for the Six Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Capitalism Issues</th>
<th>International Cooperation Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant Houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Undistinguished Houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean          | .019              | .008                             |
| 1884-1968     |                   |                                  |
| 5%            | .00095            | .00040                           |
| Neutral Zone  | .01805 - .01995   | .0076 - .0084                    |


CONCLUSION

The major finding of this chapter was that no single factor explanation of significant Congressional output proved adequate. Neither size nor type of majority discriminated between the two sets of Houses.
Presidential and Congressional leadership also appear to be poor predictors of type of Congressional output. The generational factors, percent freshmen and switched seat members, discriminate among Congresses somewhat, although they do not provide a comprehensive explanation of significant output. Neither did the closely related electoral variables provide such an explanation. Party-related indicators did not provide the solution. Indices of Congressional party behavior bore no relationship to type of output in these six Houses. Indices of party behavior in the electorate appeared to have a better relationship to type of output, although neither intra-party homogeneity nor inter-party ideological conflict was an adequate explanation, predicting with complete accuracy to significant output.

A number of single factor explanations have now been examined and rejected. While some explanations proved to be considerably more plausible than others, none was a necessary and sufficient condition for significant Congressional outputs. It is possible, however, that a multivariate explanation of Congressional output, based on some combination of these independent variables, would provide a satisfactory explanation of the output of the Congresses under study.

In the next chapter, these variables will be examined simultaneously in order to determine which cluster together in the significant Houses, but not in those that were undistinguished. On the basis of this analysis, a multivariate explanation for important Congressional output will be derived.
NOTES


2 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

3 David H. Koehler, "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," in Probability Models of Collective Decision Making, ed. by Richard C. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 149-164. Koehler studied eleven sessions of the House, from the 83rd to the first session of the 90th, using only roll calls on which there was a least 15% opposition.


5 Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress," 199.

6 Hinckley omits the Republican 83rd House from her analysis.


18. Weinbaum and Judd, "In Search of a Mandated Congress," report a similar finding.


27 It is unclear whether or not there exist secular trends in the size of the dominant faction which would make comparisons to the means for the 50th to the 90th Houses inadequate. However, the analysis was also done this way. The mean percent dominant faction for the Democrats from the 50th to the 90th Houses is 59, and the neutral zone ranges from 56.05 to 61.95 percent. The comparable figure for the Republicans is 38, with the neutral zone running from 36.1 to 39.9 percent. When the figures for the six Houses are compared to the overall mean, all three undistinguished Houses have low party homogeneity, while the 73rd House moves into the neutral zone. Measured this way, the 55th and 89th Houses still have high homogeneity. Given the neutral finding on the 73rd, the hypothesis is still not confirmed.

CHAPTER 4: THE DETERMINANTS OF SIGNIFICANT CONGRESSIONAL OUTPUT

INTRODUCTION

In the last chapter a number of single variable explanations for significant Congressional output were examined and rejected. The purpose of this chapter is to examine those variables as a group in order to determine if there exists a combination of factors which explains Congressional performance.

If there is a group of actors common to the three significant Houses, this may indicate a theoretical explanation which would specify the set of conditions necessary for significant Congressional output. In this chapter we will specify such an explanation after examining the co-occurrence of single variable conditions in the several Houses. We will then operationalize the components of this explanatory model and propose how it can be tested further.

COMBINATIONS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The first step in identifying factors common to the three significant Houses is to examine the array of independent variables. In order to do this, for each House, the values of the independent variables are arranged into three categories. The three categories are yes, no, and neutral. The neutral category, as explained in chapter three, is an interval on each side of the mean which is equivalent to five percent of the mean itself. This category is only used for variables which are measured on an interval scale. The variables measured in this fashion are size of the majority party, percent freshman, percent switched seats, party voting, party cohesion, party unity, intra-party homoge-
niety, and inter-party polarization. The yes category is reserved for values of a variable which may be considered predictive of significant output. Houses with high or strong values in relation to the mean of the variable under consideration are placed into the yes category. The no category contains low or weak values of a variable in relation to its mean. A House is placed in the no category when a variable did not exhibit a high value in that House.

Table 4-1 presents the independent variables for each of the six Houses in cross-tabular form. The values of an independent variable which are considered predictive of significant House output are listed vertically to the left of the table. The House numbers are listed horizontally across the top of the table. The cells of the table contain the yes, no, or neutral responses. The intent is to locate conditions which are common to the three significant Houses alone. A common factor has been located when the columns under the 55th, 73rd, and 89th Houses contain "yes" responses. If the columns contain a "neutral" response, the test is inconclusive. If there exists a group of conditions which is present in all three significant Houses, this group may be the set of conditions which is necessary for significant output. It is not essential that each element of the group be missing from the undistinguished Houses. One or more elements of the group may be found in an undistinguished Congress. All of the elements of the group, however, must not co-occur in an undistinguished House.

Several conditions are common to all three significant Houses. Each of these Houses had a large proportion of freshmen and switched
| Variable                        | Significant Houses | | | | | | Undistinguished Houses | | | | | | 55 | 73 | 89 | 59 | 67 | 87 | | | | | | Large Majority | Neutral | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Neutral | | | | | | Strong Type of Majority | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | | | | | | Strong Presidential Leadership | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | | | | | | Strong Congressional Leadership | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | | | | | | High Percent Freshmen | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | | | | | | High Percent Switched Seats | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | | | | | | Landslide Election | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | | | | | | Characteristics of Critical Election | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | | | | | | High Party Voting | Yes | No | Neutral | Yes | Yes | Neutral | | | | | | High Majority Party Cohesion | Yes | Yes | Yes | Neutral | Yes | Yes | | | | | | High Majority Party Unity | Neutral | Neutral | Neutral | Neutral | Neutral | Neutral | Neutral | | | | | | High Party Homogeneity | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | Neutral | | | | | | High Ideological Polarization | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No |
seat members. Each House was elected in a critical election, or an
election which exhibited some characteristics common to critical elec-
tions. There is high consensus among election scholars that the elec-
tions of 1896 (55th House) and 1932 (73rd House) were critical elec-
tions. While there is much less agreement about 1964 (89th House)
some consider it to be the beginning of a critical realignment phase. ¹

The important point here is that these three elections share traits
which characterize critical elections. Additionally, all three of
these elections had a high degree of ideological polarization as
measured by the Ginsberg index. The final condition which is common
to the significant Houses is a high degree of majority party cohesion
as measured by the Rice index. These five variables appear to con-
stitute a group of election-related phenomena common to the distinguis-
ed output Congresses.

The importance of this group of independent variables will be
confirmed if high values for the set of five variables are not found
in the three undistinguished Houses. We turn, then, to an examination
of the right hand side of Table 4-1 for those Congresses. An important
initial observation is that only one condition which is common to all
these significant Houses is entirely absent from all three undistinguish-
ed Houses. This is the critical election variable. Students of realign-
ment are in agreement that the elections of 1904, 1920, and 1960 were not
critical elections.

On two other independent variables, percent freshmen and per-
cent switched seats, high values are not found in two of the three un-
distinguished Houses. Low numbers of freshmen and switched seat members
were elected to the 59th and 87th Houses. The landslide election of
1920 brought high numbers of both freshmen and switched seat Congressmen to the 67th House. Similarly, in the case of ideological polarization, low values are found in two of the three control group Houses. A low degree of ideological polarization characterized the elections of 1920 and 1960. The election of Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 did exhibit a high degree of ideological polarization.

The final element of the group of conditions common to the significant Houses is high majority party cohesion. Two of the three undistinguished Houses also exhibit a high level of cohesion, while the 59th House falls into the neutral category. One plausible explanation is that high party cohesion is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the passage of innovate legislation.

A second group of variables shares another interesting pattern—each has "yes" and "neutral" codings across the significant Houses, but no "no" responses are found here. These variables are size of the majority, unity of the majority, and the level of party voting. In all three control Houses these variables exhibit high or neutral values, as well. This group of variables must be interpreted with caution. They may be helpful in passing important legislation, but are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions in their own right.

On the basis of this examination of independent variables, a primary group of conditions is apparent in the significant Houses. The factors common to these three Houses are large numbers of freshmen, large numbers of switched seats, critical elections, high ideological polarization, and high majority party cohesion. While large numbers of freshmen and switched seat members and high cohesion scores were present in the 67th House, it is lacking in ideological polarization
and was not elected in a critical election. Hence, it does not have all the essential elements of the group of conditions common to the significant Houses. A similar conclusion is in order for the 59th House, where parties were ideologically polarized but high scores on the other variables are missing. Thus the entire combination of conditions common to the three significant Houses is not found in any of the three undistinguished Houses. In each control House several elements of the group are missing.

The variables of this group of common conditions may be considered reflective of electoral factors. As explained in the previous chapter, switched seats, freshmen, critical elections, and high ideological polarization are indicators of electoral change: change which is external to the House. Party cohesion is the only element of the group which is an indicator of a phenomenon internal to the House. Since party cohesion is high in two of the control Houses, and neutral in the third, we may conclude that high cohesion only become instrumental in passing important legislation in the presence of electoral change.

The three variables falling into inconclusive range—large size of the majority, high party unity, and party voting—reflect one external and two internal factors. Size is reflective of electoral factors in that voting behavior determines the size of the majority. Party voting and party unity are, like cohesion, indicators of behavior internal to the House. Large size and high levels of party voting and party unity may act to facilitate passage of significant legislation, but they are not essential for success.

The most significant point about the group of five conditions
which is common to the significant Houses is the importance of electoral phenomena. Together, these variables create the conditions under which the House can pass innovative legislation. What remains to be specified are the linkages which transform electoral change into innovative Congressional output. A theory is necessary to identify these linkages and the manner in which they operate.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In the preceding section it has been argued that factors external to the House have a decisive impact on its legislative performance. Specifically, a high incidence of ideological polarization and electoral change is positively related to the passage of important legislation. A causal order is implied here since changes in these electoral forces precede the output of the House. These electoral changes, however, cannot be the sole, or even the immediate, determinants of significant legislation. Both the proposed policy changes and the votes necessary to enact them come from within the national government. The function of electoral change is to create the conditions under which the House can pass significant legislation. In this section, two internal conditions which are imperative if the House is to pass important legislation, and the linkage from mass electoral changes to conditions in the House, will be specified.

The first necessary condition is that the House must have an innovative or significant program on which to vote. Unless such a program is brought before the House, its members are powerless to enact significant legislation. The origin of the program is not impor-
tant—it may be initiated by the Executive Branch or by the party leadership in Congress. In the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, programs of legislation were generally formulated by the Congressional party leadership. In the later twentieth century, the members of Congress have come to expect the Executive Branch of the government to provide policy leadership, particularly when the President and the Congress share the same party affiliation.

In order to provide a complete specification of the policy process it would be important to account for the source as well as the existence of a significant legislative program. In effect, what would be required is some index of the policy leadership provided by the President or the Congress. Unfortunately, no adequate index of this notion is readily available and the construction of such a measure is beyond the practical scope of the present study. Given the specific intent of this research, it is possible to proceed with only a measure of the existence or non-existence of an innovative program. Therefore, few inferences will be made regarding the role of leadership in the formulation of a significant program.

A second condition is also necessary if the House is to enact significant legislation. The previous section of this chapter suggests that electoral change, as measured by a group of factors external to the House, is the antecedent of innovative policy output. We have noted that factors external to the House cannot be the only determinants of such legislation. The mechanism through which policy change is effected must, of necessity, be internal to the House of Representatives. The most common activating mechanism is: sustaining majority. A sustaining majority is simply a number of House members which is large
enough to pass a bill despite minority opposition. Generally, a sustaining majority will be comprised of members primarily from one party. Bipartisan majorities may form, but are generally negative, or against some piece of legislation. An example of a bipartisan negative majority would be Southern Democrats voting with Republicans to form the Conservative Coalition. When a partisan majority is sufficiently strong to provide the basis for rule, its members are living up to the tenets of the responsible party doctrine.

The second condition or activating mechanism, then, is internal to the House. External variables, however, establish the conditions under which the sustaining or partisan majority can pass innovative legislation. Specifically, the most important variables for creating these conditions are inter-party ideological polarization and systematic changes in mass voting behavior, of which critical elections are extreme cases. These variables are interactive, and both must be present in order to create the conditions for legislative innovation. Ginsberg has shown that "while periods of critical electoral realignment are marked by high amounts of inter-party conflict, a number of other periods, too, exhibit unusually high amounts of conflict." As was demonstrated in chapter three, a high degree of ideological polarization is not necessarily followed by significant legislative output. Periods of ideological polarization combined with the characteristics of critical elections, or high levels of electoral change, are however, conducive to Congressional activity. Critical elections occur when societal tensions build sufficiently, and have been associated with clusters of policy change. Critical elections and inter-party ideological polarization are by no means the same phenomenon, however.
Ideological polarization reflects the political parties, as organization, taking opposing viewpoints, while critical elections (or electoral change) are the response of the electorate to the clear-cut choices offered by the parties' candidates. Thus both the stimulus (party polarization) and the response (critical election or electoral change) are part of the process which leads to important policy change.

The direct link between critical elections and the House of Representatives can be demonstrated. During critical (and landslide) elections large numbers of freshmen and switched seat members tend to be elected to the House.5 As Clausen has noted, and we have stated earlier, "the main impetus for change in the overall policy posture of the Congress comes in the new membership."6 The immediate effect of critical elections or change is to create a great deal of membership turnover in the House of Representatives.

The secondary and more important effects of critical elections are several. First, most freshmen and switched seat representatives sent to the House during critical realigning periods are members of the majority party. Often the majority is new—that is, it had been the minority in the Congress prior to the election. Thus a large number of switched seats can shift the balance of power. Or, if the majority remains the same, a large number of switched seats can increase its margin of control. In this manner, critical elections have an impact on the size of the majority in the House.

Secondly, Brady and Lynn have shown that switched seat members (who are all freshmen) exhibit higher party support scores than other House members.7 The party support score measures the percentage of times a representative voted with this party on roll calls which were
party votes (a majority of one party opposed a majority of the other). Representatives with high party support scores contribute to their party's score on the Rice Index of Cohesion. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 show the extent to which switched seat members contributed to party support in the 55th, 73rd, and 89th Houses. The data clearly show that switched seat members voted in a manner which increased party support. Since high party cohesion has been posited as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for significant legislation, the linkage of electoral change (represented by switched seat districts) to increased party support is an important one.

One must remember, however, that high majority party cohesion was also present in two of the control Houses, the 67th and the 87th, and neutral in the third, the 59th. High majority party cohesion alone is not sufficient as the internal mechanism for passing important legislation. The cohesion and activity of the minority is equally important. Important legislation can only be passed when the partisan majority is sufficiently strong to override minority opposition. Programs which are innovative or unusual in nature need a great deal of support from the party that proposed them since members of the minority party may not vote with the majority as readily as they would on more familiar types of legislation. Hence a partisan majority is needed which is able to mobilize substantial support for its legislation programs despite active minority opposition.

The ability of the majority to mobilize such support is a function of two components: its cohesion (or unity), and its size. These two components are interactive—combined they represent gross majority strength. If either becomes very small, the other must
### TABLE 4-2: High Levels of Party Support by Types of Districts (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Support Level</th>
<th>55th House Republicans</th>
<th>89th House Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Districts</td>
<td>Switched Districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 80 percent</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 90 percent</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 4-3: A Comparison of Party Support Between Switched and Non-Switched Seat Democrats in the 73rd House

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Support Scores</th>
<th>Switched Seat Representatives</th>
<th>Non-Switched Seat Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Above Party Mean⁵</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Below Party Mean</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Support Scores ⁶</td>
<td>75.02</td>
<td>67.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁵Mean Democratic Support Score = 69.8
⁶t-test for difference of means significant at .05 level

increase to compensate in order for the majority to sustain support for its programs. Both may be large, in which case the majority mobilizes support for its programs with no difficulty.

The ability of the minority to muster opposition is also based on the interaction of minority size and cohesion (or unity). Unless majority party cohesion is 100 percent (a situation which real world Congresses rarely, if ever, approximate), the minority may be able to block the legislation, aided by the dissenting members of the majority. In fact, the larger and more cohesive the minority, the more likely it will be actually to get the votes of majority members who are not totally committed to the proposed policy change. Chances of a negative victory are positively related to the size and cohesion of the minority. As these two factors become larger, dissenting majority members become aware that if they join the minority in a "no" vote, the likelihood of a negative victory is enhanced. If the minority is not united against the legislation, dissenting majority members realize that a negative victory is impossible and may vote with their party simply to avoid sanctions. Minority size and cohesion (or unity), then, are extremely important factors affecting the ability of the majority to sustain support for significant legislation. The smaller and less cohesive the minority, the easier it will be for the majority to pass such legislation.

We turn now to an operationalization of these conditions in the six Houses under study.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONDITIONS
FOR SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATION

As stated above, one necessary condition for significant legislation is an innovative party program. Obviously, without such a program on which to vote, the House cannot pass an important package of legislation. Quantifying a normative variable of this sort is difficult, if not impossible. For purposes here, perhaps the best measurement is simply a dichotomy: the legislation program presented to the House is, or is not, innovative and important.

Chapter two documents in detail the types of programs on which the six Houses under study voted. The significance of the programs before the 55th, 73rd, and 89th Houses has already been demonstrated. In undistinguished Houses, however, the program may be significant even though the final output of the House is not, or the House may not have been presented with any important legislation on which to vote. In fact, both of these situations occur in the three control group Houses under consideration. In the 59th Congress, the legislation proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt was progressive in nature. Had more of Roosevelt's proposed measures been enacted, the 59th Congress would merit inclusion in the significant category. Most analysts consider Wilson's first Houses, the 63rd, to have been a landmark Congress due to the number of progressive measures which were put into effect. Roosevelt's proposals certainly foreshadowed the work of the 63rd Congress. Undoubtedly, the House of Representatives had an important program which could have been enacted during the 59th Congress: instead they chose to block or "water down" the progressive legislation.

The 87th House, under President Kennedy, also could have been
distinguished by a record of important social legislation. The "New Frontier" legislation held the promise of social change, but for the most part was outrightly refused by a recalcitrant House of Representatives. Over and over, Southern Democrats and Republicans joined forces to defeat the liberal Kennedy programs. Similar legislation, Johnson's "Great Society" programs (which included civil rights legislation, not proposed in the 87th House) passed several years later in the 89th House, which has been characterized as an important House. Lack of a program was not the cause of the 87th House's failure.

The 67th House, on the other hand, is a prime example of a Congress with no program. Warren Harding, the man who campaigned on a "return to normalcy" platform, proposed next to nothing to the House. When it did become apparent to him that the Congress needed guidance, it was too late—his proposals carried no weight in the House. Further, the Congress itself had no leadership capable of devising an innovative program for the problems facing the nation at the beginning of the 1920's.

In summary, five of the six Houses under study had a significant legislative program to consider. The origins of the programs varied—in the 55th House, proposals were generally initiated by the members of the Congress themselves, whereas later Congresses were more likely to receive Executive-initiated proposals. Only the undistinguished 67th House received no guidance from the President or from its own leadership.

The second condition necessary for a House to pass significant legislation is the ability of the majority to mobilize support for the programs despite opposition from the minority party. This concept
is far easier to operationalize than the innovative legislative program variable. This variable, which shall be referred to as the Legislative Potential for Policy Change (LPPC), is constructed from readily available indices which are commonly used to describe legislative voting behavior. The majority mobilization score is constructed from the size of the majority and the cohesion of the majority. Size is measured simply as the percentage of the total House membership which is made up of members of the majority party. Cohesion is the mean score on the Rice Index. The score is computed by summing the cohesion scores for the majority party on each roll call and dividing by the number of roll calls in each House.

As stated above, size and cohesion are interactive. Therefore, to get the majority mobilization score, majority size and cohesion are multiplied together. Majority mobilization scores for the six Houses are displayed in Table 4-4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-4: Majority Mobilization Scores for the Six Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significant House #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, these scores do not discriminate between Houses. In fact, the mobilization scores for two undistinguished Houses, the 59th and
the 67th, are higher than all three of the significant Houses.

The scores fail to discriminate because they do not account for minority party activity. Specifically, a strong, well organized minority has the potential to disrupt majority party activity through strong opposition. Therefore, a similar score was constructed for the minority. Minority party size (in percent) was multiplied by the minority score on the Rice Index of Cohesion. The results are presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4-5: Minority Potential for Opposition in the Six Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significant Houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lower the score of the minority, the more likely the majority is to be successful in its mobilization attempts. A high score for the minority indicates a body with sufficient numbers and organization to block majority sponsored legislation. Table 4-5 shows that the minority was the smallest and the least cohesive in the 73rd House. The scores for the minority in the other two significant Houses are also low, as well as the score for the undistinguished 67th House. Minority scores alone, however, do not tell us enough about the overall organization of each House. The majority mobilization and minority potential for opposition scores must be combined to yield
one simple index which characterizes each House.

To combine the figures into such an index, the minority score is subtracted from the majority score. The resulting figure indicates the ability of the majority to mobilize support despite the minority potential for opposition. These figures are displayed in Table 4-6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>LPPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>2606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>3161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>2547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of the 67th House, the three significant Houses have uniformly higher scores than the undistinguished Houses. This indicates that the 55th, 73rd, and 89th Houses, as well as the 67th, all had the ability to sustain support for majority sponsored legislation despite minority opposition. Thus, four of the six Houses have realized the second condition for significant legislative output.

One objection which may be raised in regard to this measure of legislative potential for policy change is the typical problem involved when using the Rice Index of Cohesion. That is, the Rice Index gives no information about whether or not the two parties are opposed.
Both may be entirely cohesive and voting exactly alike. If this is the case, the minority potential for opposition may actually be working to favor the majority. This objection, which is purely theoretical, only becomes a serious problem when the level of party voting drops below the 50 percent level. As long as party voting remains relatively high the two parties are opposed and the LPPC scores accurately reflect majority-minority relations in the House.

Since in two of the Houses under consideration, the 87th and the 89th, the level of party voting drops slightly below the 50 percent level (48.7 percent and 47 percent, respectively), a correction for this shortcoming of the Rice Index must be introduced. The correlation is the same employed in chapter three—using the party unity score, which measures the percentage of members voting together on party votes. Thus, the party unity scores do reflect the degree of cohesiveness with the parties, as well as opposed parties. Table 4-7 shows the results of the LPPC index utilizing unity rather than cohesion scores.

**TABLE 4-7: Adjusted Legislative Potential for Policy Change Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant Houses</th>
<th>Adjusted LPPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House #</td>
<td>Majority Size X Majority Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>5687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>6239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>5463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undistinguished Houses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>5764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>6168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>4977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The adjusted LPPC index adds support to the argument that the signifi-
cant Houses were successful in passing the innovative programs before them due to the interactive effects of majority and minority size and unity. The two Houses with questionable scores on the original LPPO index move in opposite directions; that is, the 89th receives a higher score, and the score for the undistinguished 87th House drops even lower. Additionally the score for the undistinguished 67th drops in relation to the score for the 73rd House, the first New Deal Congress. Since the party unity score is only calculated on party votes, and party voting has declined during the twentieth century, within period comparisons may be more appropriate than absolute, or across period comparisons. Thus, the 59th House is compared to the 55th, the 67th to the 73rd, and the 87th to the 89th House. In each instance, the significant House exhibits a higher score than the undistinguished House for the same historical era.

**SUMMARY OF RESULTS**

In the preceding section, the innovativeness of party programs, as well as the Legislative Potential for Policy Change have been operationalized. The argument has been made that these two elements are essential for a Congress to produce significant output, and that the co-occurrence of these two conditions is facilitated by party realignment. Realigning periods result in a large influx of new members in the House, and these new members are the linkage between electoral behavior and policy output in the House.

Table 4-8 provides a summary of the presence of these two conditions in the six Houses.
### TABLE 4-8: Conditions for Innovative Output in the Six Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House #</th>
<th>Innovative Program</th>
<th>LPPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant Houses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undistinguished Houses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In only the three Houses which are characterized as significant here do both conditions occur together. In the undistinguished 59th and 87th Houses, where an innovative program was put before the House, Congressional support was lacking. These findings are also substantiated by Jones: "During the 59th, the energetic president was somewhat thwarted by lack of crisis and mood, intra-party divisions, and the fact that 'Congressional government' (in Woodrow Wilson's words) was still very much alive."\(^{11}\) Of the 87th House, Jones notes that, "Democrats still had a commanding majority...but with probable Democratic disunity on some measures, Republicans could expect some success in building negative majorities so as to defeat the president's proposals."\(^{12}\)

The undistinguished 67th House, on the other hand, had both the numbers and sufficient party cohesion to pass an important program. Harding, however, failed to provide the Congress with a program, pre-
ferring instead to follow what he interpreted as a mandate for doing nothing.\textsuperscript{13} Perhaps the 67th House would not have rated such a high score on the LPPC index if they had been confronted with a program of some note. Jones has characterized the majority Republicans as weak and the minority Democrats as restricted. The real power of the Republicans in the 67th House was primarily a function of their numbers—the 70 percent majority was overwhelming. An innovative and controversial program might have introduced a degree of divisiveness into the Republican ranks that would have been sufficient to lower the LPPC score, unless of course, the 300 Republicans had been elected on such an innovative platform. All this is merely indulging in speculation. The fact remains that the Republicans were powerless to enact a program in the early 1920's because no program, of either executive or congressional origin, was forthcoming.

CONCLUSION

These results lend support to the theory which specifies the internal conditions necessary for significant legislation. The combined effects of majority and minority size and unity act to facilitate the passing of innovative legislation. The chief determinants of this Legislative Potential for Policy Change, according to the theory, are the new members who are elected to Congress during periods which exhibit characteristics of critical realignment. The evidence for the linkage of electoral change and ideological polarization needs further support, however. Here we have only noted that high levels of both these variables preceded significant output in three Houses. If high incidences of
change and polarization lead to increased potential for policy change, and conversely, low incidences of change and polarization precede Houses with low potential, then this connection should be apparent over time.

In chapter five we seek to demonstrate that this linkage of electoral change and ideological polarization to the potential for policy change does in fact exist over time. If this evidence can be provided, the usefulness of the theory which states that electoral factors determine Congressional potential will be enhanced.
NOTES


4 Burnham, *Critical Elections,* p. 10; Brady, "Critical Elections, Congressional Parties and Clusters of Policy Changes."


7 Brady and Lynn, "Switched-Seat Congressional Districts."

8 David L. Farnsworth and James S. Fleming, "Quantitative Dimensions of Congressional Performance in the Twentieth Century," *Quality and Quantity,* 9 (September, 1975), 265.

9 Third party size and unity are omitted from the calculation of the LPPC index. Data on third party cohesion are unavailable, and, in most instances, third party size is negligible.

10 The party unity scores were not used to create the original LPPC index because high party unity did not cluster in the significant Houses.


CHAPTER 5: THE ELECTORAL BASIS OF CONGRESSIONAL PERFORMANCE

INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter it was indicated that the likely importance of several internal variables for significant output can be indexed by the Legislative Potential for Policy Change (LPPC) measure. The components of this measure include majority size and unity, as well as minority size and unity.¹ The size and unity of each of the parties have an interactive influence on the size of the LPPC score for a given Congress. In order for the LPPC to be high, the interaction score for the majority, or majority mobilization, must be considerably higher than the interaction score for the minority, or minority potential for opposition. High scores on the LPPC indicate Houses which can pass important legislation.

Analysis of this measure in the preceding chapter was limited to the internal dimension of each of the six Houses under study. The connection of the external or electoral variables to the LPPC was inferred from the presence of high ideological polarization, large percentages of freshmen and switched seat members, and the association of critical elections with the three significant Houses.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the connection between external variables and the Legislative Potential for Policy Change. The hypothesized electoral connections are demonstrated graphically in Figure 5-1.
FIGURE 5-1: Connections Between External Factors and the Legislative Potential for Policy Change

Ideological polarization, as used throughout this work, represents the degree to which the political parties take opposing positions on the issues of the day. Electoral change is the general category of which freshmen, switched seats, and critical elections are representative. The LPPC indexes the internal condition which facilitates the passing of significant output.

The hypothesis is that the most important linkages in Figure 5-1 are those between ideological polarization and electoral change, and between electoral change and the LPPC. As ideological polarization increases, the indicators of electoral change, percent freshmen and percent switched seat Congressmen, should also increase. This rise in new members should have a positive effect on the LPPC scores since new members contribute to party support. Thus the most important effects of ideological polarization on the LPPC scores should be channeled through the new members. If strong enough, ideological polarization will also affect the incumbent members of the House. These effects,
while not indirect, are secondary in importance to the direct effects of ideological polarization on the new members.

If these linkages can be demonstrated, using not only the six Houses under study here, but data from a much larger set of Houses, then the generality and worth of the theory which states that electoral factors have an impact on the work of the House will be supported.

METHOD AND DATA ANALYSIS

In order to analyze the importance of the linkages hypothesized in Figure 5-1, we will employ a time series analysis across a large number of Houses. When employed for a sufficiently large number of cases, this technique should produce accurate estimates of the relationships among ideological polarization, electoral change, and the LPPC. Additionally, the use of a large number of Houses will demonstrate whether the hypothesized linkages are stable over time.

The time period of the analysis covers the 51st to the 90th Houses, or 1888 to 1968. Data have been collected on ideological polarization, electoral change, and the components of the LPPC index, majority and minority size and unity for these forty Houses. Using these variables, multivariate analysis techniques will be employed to test the relationships sketched in Figure 5-1.

Operationalization

The independent variables to be used in the analysis were operationalized in the same manner discussed in chapter three, where variables were treated independently of one another.

The ideological polarization variables is the Ginsberg index for
critical conflict on the issue of capitalism. This measure indexes the level of conflict between the two parties on this issue dimension and the differential salience of the issue for the two parties. That is, differential salience refers to the extent to which the issue was more important to one party than to the other.

Electoral change is operationalized as the percent freshmen and percent switched seat Congressmen. These two classes of House members represent membership turnover, or the infusion of "new blood," which indicates electoral change. Critical elections also represent electoral change but cannot be operationalized successfully for a time series of this sort, since only three Houses of forty under consideration were elected in critical elections. Since membership turnover and ideological polarization increase during critical elections, these two variables should adequately reflect the dimensions of critical elections which are related to voting patterns in the House.

The dependent variable is the Legislative Potential for Policy Change index. An LPPC score was calculated for each House using the data on majority and minority size and unity. Majority size was multiplied by majority unity. The same calculation was performed for the minority, and the quantity was subtracted from that obtained for the majority. The resulting figure is the LPPC score.²

Analysis

The first step in analyzing these data is an examination of the Pearsonian correlation coefficients. These correlations are presented in Table 5-1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent Freshmen</th>
<th>Percent Switched Seats</th>
<th>Ideological Polarization</th>
<th>LPPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent Freshmen</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Switched Seats</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Polarization</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPPC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The correlations lend support to the hypothesized relationships described in Figure 5-1. The correlation between ideological polarization and percent freshmen is .51, and ideological polarization is correlated with percent switched seats at .44. The magnitude of these correlations indicates that ideological polarization and electoral change, as measured by percent freshmen and percent switched seat members, are highly and positively related. The implications for this research are that as the level of ideological polarization increases, larger numbers of freshmen and switched seat members are elected to the House. This is consistent with the theory articulated in chapter four which states that the rise in ideological polarization during critical realignment periods leads to an increase in the number of new members sent to the House.

Both ideological polarization and the measures of electoral change are positively related to the Legislative Potential for Policy
Change index at a moderate level. The correlation between ideological polarization and the LPPC is .31. This indicates that a rise in ideological polarization is related to a rise in the LPPC. The percentage of freshman members elected to the House is positively related to the LPPC index with an r of .34. The percentage of switched seat members, a subset of the percent freshmen, is correlated with the LPPC at .32. These correlations demonstrate that the LPPC covaries with the rate of electoral change.

Since both the ideological polarization and electoral change variables are positively and fairly highly correlated with the index of the Legislative Potential for Policy Change, correlation analysis has provided empirical support for the model presented in Figure 5-1. The correlation analysis alone, however, is deficient in that it yields no information about the form of the relationships between these variables, or the amount of variance in the LPPC index which can be explained in a multivariate situation. Multiple regression analysis will be utilized to provide this important information. Multiple regression analysis is a particularly useful tool in this situation because it provides estimates of the relative effects of the independent variables.

The dependent variable is the LPPC index. The LPPC scores were regressed on the independent variables, ideological polarization and electoral change, for the 51st - 90th Houses. Two regressions were performed. One utilized the percentage of switched seat members as the indicator of electoral change, while the other utilized the percentage of freshmen House members as the measure of electoral change. The results of these two regressions are presented in Table 5-2.
TABLE 5-2: Regression Results: Impact of Ideological Polarization and Electoral Change on the LPPC, 51 - 90th Houses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable = LPPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Switched Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R = .36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2 \times 100% = 13%$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ideological Polarization  | 4.31 | .09 | 8.98 |
| % Freshmen                | 49.64 | .37 | 24.12 |
| (Constant)                | 450.77 |    |      |
| Multiple R = .42          |    |      |      |
| $R^2 \times 100\% = 18\%$ |    |      |      |

In the top panel of the table, the results for the regression of the LPPC on ideological polarization and percent switched seats are found. We observe that the beta for switched seats is larger than the beta for ideological polarization. Additionally, the estimate of the coefficient for ideological polarization is somewhat unstable, as can be observed from the large standard error. 8.6, relative to a raw B of 9.2. The coefficient for switched seats is somewhat more stable. These results are in the direction predicted by the hypothesized model. The overall accuracy of the prediction, however, is not impressive. The multiple R is .36, which means only 13% of the variance in the LPPC can
be explained by ideological polarization and switched seats. Since this equation is a poor predictor of the LPPC scores, we turn to another regression equation, substituting percent freshmen for percent switched seats as a measure of electoral change.

The lower panel of Table 5-2 shows the results for this regression. These results are particularly interesting. Percent freshmen is a considerably better predictor of the LPPC than percent switched seats. The beta for percent freshmen is .37 and the standard error is approximately half the size of the raw B, thus indicating that the estimate is more accurate than that obtained for percent switched seats. The results for the ideological polarization variable are less satisfactory. In the presence of percent freshmen as a measure of electoral change, ideological polarization becomes a much poorer predictor of the LPPC scores. The beta weight is .09, and the standard error is approximately twice as large as the raw B, thus indicating an estimate that is not statistically significant. Since we are not working with a sample, and since this research is exploratory, we are more interested in the substantive significance of these results.

The results support the model pictured in Figure 5-1. Electoral change, as measured by percent freshmen, makes the largest contribution to the explained variance in the LPPC. Ideological polarization makes a much smaller contribution, although its effect is diminished in the presence of the electoral change variable. This is precisely the result expected. The chief effects of ideological polarization are channeled through the freshmen members of the House; the correlation between these two variables is .51. The direct, although secondary, effect of ideological polarization on the Legislative Potential for Policy
Change is small.

While the beta weights obtained from this model are quite satisfactory, the value of the multiple R is disappointingly low at .42, indicating that only 18 percent of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained on the basis of a linear combination of ideological polarization and percent freshmen. That only two variables can explain even this much variance indicates that electoral factors do have an effect on this internal mechanism. The fact is not surprising, however, that these two factors do not explain all the variance. One chief problem is that while the number of freshmen generally favor the majority party, this proposition does not hold in 100 percent of the cases under consideration. It is a generally accepted fact that in off year elections the majority party often, but not always, loses seats in the House. Thus in some one third of the cases under consideration here, the gross percent freshmen favors the minority.

The implications of this for our regression model are important. Only numbers of freshmen favoring the majority party should be positively related to the LPPC. That is the LPPC should rise due to a large influx of majority freshmen. If the freshmen favor the minority, however, they tend to contribute to minority party unity and thus lower the value of the LPPC. This means that by only using the gross percent freshmen in our regression, we are obscuring variance which can be explained on the basis of electoral factors. Additionally, by omitting a "direction of change" variable, we have misspecified the equation and thus the coefficients are subject to bias introduced by specification error.4
In order to avoid these difficulties a new variables was introduced into the regression equation. The variable is a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the majority gained seats. Dummy variables are binary in nature, taking on a value of one if a condition is met, and zero if it is not. Hence, the majority gain variable equals one if the majority gained seats, and zero if it did not. The effects of a variable such as this on the regression will be to add an increment equivalent to the raw B for the dummy variable to the prediction of the LPPC when the majority gain seats. When the majority did not gain seats the increment will drop out of the equation since the raw B is multiplied by the actual value of the variable, which in this case will be zero. The addition of the dummy variable for majority gain adequately compensates for the direction of change problem. The results of this new analysis are displayed in Table 5-3.

These results clearly indicate that the addition of the majority gain variable significantly improves the predictive capacity of the regression model. The top panel of Table 5-3 shows the regression results using the percentage switched seats as the indicator of electoral change. The results will support the hypothesized model in Figure 5-1, and the multiple R has increased to .58, indicating that this equation explain 34 percent of the variance, compared to the earlier model using switched seats, which could only account for 13 percent of the variance in LPPC scores. The beta for switched seats is .29, indicating that this variable makes a larger contribution than ideological polarization, which has a beta of .22. Majority gain has a large beta, .46, but this may be interpreted as part of the indicator of electoral change. Thus a large beta is in accord with the hypothesized model.
TABLE 5-3: Regression Results: The Effects of Ideological Polarization, Electoral Change and Majority Gain on the LPPC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Switched Seats</td>
<td>51.76</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>27.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Polarization</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>7.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Gain (Constant)</td>
<td>1143.90</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>338.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .58
$R^2 \times 100\% = 34\%$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Freshmen</td>
<td>44.41</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>21.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Polarization</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>8.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Gain (Constant)</td>
<td>1032.40</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>335.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-124.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .59
$R^2 \times 100\% = 35\%$

The model using percent freshmen as the measure of electoral change yields a slightly better prediction of the LPPC scores. The multiple R is .59, indicating that 35 percent of the variance is explained. Once again, the beta weights move in the same direction when freshmen are substituted for switched seats. The beta for percent
freshmen is large, .34, but ideological polarization becomes less important when this measure is used. The beta for ideological polarization is .16, but the estimate is unstable as indicated by the size of the standard error relative to the raw B. As in the model using percent switched seats, the beta for majority gain is large, although in this case it is .42. Once again, majority gain may be interpreted as a component of electoral change.

In general, then, these regressions using time series data from the 51st to the 90th Houses indicate that electoral factors do have an effect on the legislative potential for policy change. The best prediction of LPPC scores were obtained with the independent variables ideological polarization, percent freshmen, and the dummy variable, majority gain. Only a slightly inferior estimate is obtained by using percent switched seats rather than percent freshmen. Although these results are quite satisfactory in themselves it would be interesting to note which Houses' LPPC scores are not well predicted by these regression equations. Special factors or conditions may sometimes be in effect which modify the effects of electoral factors. In order to isolate such cases, we turn to an examination of regression residuals.

**Residual Analysis**

In order to locate the Houses in which the LPPC scores were grossly overpredicted or underpredicted - the "outliers" - the residuals from the above regressions were calculated. The residuals were then standardized and plotted against the sequence of Houses under study. The resulting plot yielded information on how well the regression equation predicted each particular House in terms of standard deviations from the predicted score. This information was used to con-
struct Figure 5-2. Upon examination of Figure 5-2, four "outliers" are immediately apparent. One is a House which had a much lower LPPC score than the model predicted, the 58th House, while the 67th, 74th, and 75th Houses had much higher scores than predicted. In each of these Houses, the effects of certain events mediated the effects of electoral factors specified in the regression model.

The 58th House, elected in 1902, actually exhibited a much lower LPPC score than predicted. The prediction is high because a large number of freshmen were elected to that House, 31 percent. These freshmen were not elected as a result of electoral change, but as a consequence of a change in the election law. The House was reapportioned on the basis of the 1900 census and the number of Congressional districts was increased from 357 to 391. Thus 34 new seats were added to the House which were necessarily filled by freshmen members. As a result of this, a large number of freshmen entered the House, the bulk of which favored the Democratic minority. Since some of these new members favored the majority, however, and as a result of the absolute increase in the number of districts, the majority gained seats. Thus both our measures of electoral change, majority gain and percent freshmen, were high, but as a consequence of changes in election laws rather than any true change in the voting populace. For these reasons, the effect on the House was minimal, and the observed LPPC is low.

The 67th House, elected in 1920, exhibits a much higher LPPC score than the equation predicts. The unusual aspects of the 67th House have been discussed in previous chapters of this work. The size of the majority was so large in this House, 70 percent, that the LPPC is one of the highest in the group of Houses under consideration.
FIGURE 5-2: Distribution of Regression Residuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Houses with lower LPPC scores than predicted</th>
<th>Houses with higher LPPC scores than predicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than -1.0</th>
<th>within</th>
<th>within</th>
<th>within</th>
<th>Greater than 1.0</th>
<th>Less than 2.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater than -2.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>+ or - 1.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STANDARD DEVIATIONS
While there were large numbers of freshmen and the majority did gain seats in this House, ideological polarization was very low and does not add to the prediction.

The final two Houses with LPPC scores much higher than predicted are the 74th and 75th, two New Deal Congresses elected in 1934 and 1936, respectively. The three Houses which passed the New Deal legislation, the 73rd, 74th, and 75th, have the three highest LPPC scores. In the first of these, the 73rd, the percent freshmen is so large that the predicted score is also high. In the 74th and 75th the percent freshmen drops from the 37 percent in the 73rd down to 23 percent for both subsequent Houses. The majority party, however, continued to increase in size, thus contributing to high LPPC scores. Additionally, the momentum which began in the 73rd House continued into the 74th and 75th, also causing a high LPPC, although the electoral factors were not as strong. Essentially, the effects of the electoral factors present in 1932 were still impacting the Houses elected in 1934 and 1936, and thus the scores which are predicted on the basis of the subsided electoral factors are too low.

The presence of four outliers like these is likely to significantly decrease the predictive capacity of the regression model. Additionally, biased estimates of the true coefficients are likely to result from attempting to fit the model to such data. Therefore, the regressions were redone, omitting these four Houses.\textsuperscript{6} The results are found in Table 5-4.

The improvement in the predictive capacity of both the model employing percent switched seats and the model employing percent freshmen is immediately apparent. The explained variance has increased roughly
### TABLE 5-4: Regression Models Omitting Outliers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Gain</td>
<td>930.44</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>271.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Switched Seats</td>
<td>57.29</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>21.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Polarization</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .67
$R^2 \times 100\% = 45\%$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Gain</td>
<td>805.54</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>266.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Freshmen</td>
<td>51.21</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>17.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Polarization</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>6.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-259.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .69
$R^2 \times 100\% = 47\%$

12 percent for both models, resulting in the model account for nearly half the total variance in the LPPC. Additionally, the coefficients are now more intuitively pleasing. The top panel of the table displays the results for the regression using percent switched seats. We see that the beta for switched seats has become much larger relative to
majority gain than in the earlier equation. Also, the beta for ideological polarization has increased slightly to .27, and the standard error has decreased, indicating that ideological polarization makes a statistically more significant contribution to this equation. The chief effects of ideological polarization, however, are still on the number of switched seats. The correlation is .46.

The model using percent freshmen is also more pleasing. The beta for freshmen is now .48, while the beta for majority gain is .40. This indicates that percent freshmen makes a statistically more important contribution to the explained variance. In our opinion, it is theoretically more important as well. The contribution of ideological polarization is roughly the same as in the previous equation with a beta of .17, although for the first time the standard error is slightly smaller than the raw B. The estimate is still fairly unstable, however, given the size of the standard error. Once again, the primary impact of ideological polarization is on the measure of electoral change, percent freshmen. The correlation is .53, indicating that the impact of ideological polarization is fairly sizeable.

These last two regression models most accurately describe the hypothesized relationships. They indicate that electoral factors have an impact on the Legislative Potential for Policy Change, and that the electoral factors alone can account for nearly half the variance in this measure of the House's ability to pass important legislation.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have attempted to show the connection of
electoral factors to the work of the House using time series data from the 51st to the 90th Houses. This larger time period was chosen in order to enhance the generality of the theory developed on the basis of the six Houses discussed in the previous chapters.

Correlation and multiple regression techniques were utilized to analyze the relationships. Correlational analysis indicated that ideological polarization and electoral change as measured by percent switched seats and percent freshmen are highly related. The regression analysis indicated that ideological polarization, percent switched seats of freshmen, and majority gain, another electoral change indicator, were related to the internal measure of the House's ability to pass important legislation, the LPPC. An examination of the regression residuals was undertaken in order to isolate any Houses in which scores were grossly under or over-predicted. Four such Houses were located. The regression analysis was performed omitting these four cases. The result was a significant increase in the percent explained variance, and coefficients for the independent variables which are substantively more pleasing.

This analysis has shown that electoral factors do have an impact on the work of the House, and that electoral factors alone can explain nearly half the variance in the LPPC scores. The implications are that the theoretical framework used to explain the output of the six Houses under intensive study has general relevance, and there is a connection between elections and the policy changes legitimized by the House of Representatives.
NOTES

1. The Legislative Potential for Policy Change was originally computed in chapter four using the Rice Index of Cohesion rather than the party unity scores. Only the index using unity scores will be discussed in this chapter. This does not change the results of the analysis or its implications; the two versions of the LPPC index are correlated at .95.

2. As in chapter four, third parties are not considered in the calculation of the LPPC scores. This omission is primarily methodological. Data on third party cohesion or unity are unavailable. Additionally, in most instances where a third party is present, its size is so small that the omission has little impact on the LPPC scores.

3. The regressions were also done using the LPPC index computed with Rice cohesion scores. The regression results were unchanged.


5. One objection to these regressions is that they may be subject to bias introduced by serial correlation in the error terms, a common problem with time series data. In order to test for this, a Durbin-Watson statistic was computed for each regression. In each case the value of the statistic fell between $D_L$ and $D_U$, indicating that the test was inconclusive. With an inconclusive test, introducing data transformations to offset the serial correlation is not justified. See *Ibid.*., pp. 136–146.

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The intent of this thesis was to identify the determinants of significant Congressional output. More specifically, the question was why some Congresses enact a number of significant or innovative laws, while others enact few or none. Since this question is relatively novel in the area of Congressional research, it required new conceptualization and an exploratory research strategy.

The conceptual difficulties center around a precise definition of significant legislative output. The only previous work which considered the question of Congressional performance used the number of public laws enacted as a dependent variable. For purposes of this study, such a variable was of little use, since the determinants of quality, not quantity, are sought here. Hence a definition of significant legislation which was amenable to empirical investigation, but not ready quantification was offered. Significant legislation was defined as legislation which has a profound impact on the character of society and government. Such legislation affects issues and politics. This definition has as its key element the notion of change.

In order to isolate the determinants of such legislation a comparative analysis of six Congresses was undertaken. Three of the Congresses, the 55th, 73rd, and 89th, comprised the test group. They were selected because of the significant legislation passed during their tenure. The second three Congresses include the 59th, 67th and 87th, and constitute the control group. In contrast to the test group, the impact of the legislation enacted by these Congresses is undistinguished. The analysis, for purposes of manageability, was limited to
the House of Representatives.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

In chapter three a number on single variable explanations taken from the literature of Congress were examined. These variables were grouped into four categories: coalition or majority related factors, leadership factors, generational and electoral change factors, and party related factors. After examination of the values of these variables across the six test Houses, we concluded that none of them alone was adequate as an explanation of significant House output. It was the case, however, that some of these approximated single variable explanations—with the critical election measure being the most satisfactory. Two of the three significant Houses, the 55th and 73rd, were elected in critical elections, while the status of the third, the 89th, has been disputed by students of the critical elections. None of the undistinguished Houses was elected in a critical election. Characteristics of critical elections appeared to play a significant role in determining significant legislation. The most prominent characteristics of critical election periods is the high incidence of electoral change. The findings on two other variables confirm the incidence of electoral change in the significant Houses. A large proportion of the membership of all three significant Houses was switched seat or freshmen representatives. Only one undistinguished House, the 67th, had a large proportion of these types of representatives. One other factor was common to the three significant Houses and missing from two of the control group Houses. This was a high degree of inter-party ideological polarization.
The election of the undistinguished 59th House in 1904 was characterized by a high degree of ideological polarization but the elections of 1920 (67th House) and 1960 (87th House) was not. Ginsberg has noted that high levels of inter-party ideological polarization are also a characteristic of critical elections.¹

These findings suggested that while no one factor clearly led to significant legislation, a group of conditions might facilitate the passage of such legislation. Consequently, in chapter four the values of the variables discussed in chapter three were arrayed and examined simultaneously. From this inspection, a group of conditions that occurred in all three significant Houses was apparent. This group included characteristics of critical elections, high percentages of freshmen and switched seat representatives, high levels of majority party cohesion, and a high degree of inter-party ideological polarization. In some instances, elements of this group appeared in the undistinguished Houses, but none of the undistinguished Houses had a high value for all five of these variables. The occurrence of this particular group points to the importance of electoral change in causing significant legislation.

While the preceding results indicate only electoral factors as co-occurring in the distinguished Houses, it is clear that electoral forces do not result directly in policy change. Since policy changes are effected largely through new legislation, some mechanisms internal to the House must mediate the influence of electoral phenomena on policy outputs. The mechanism which links electoral change to significant legislation is the impact of freshmen or switched seats,
and ideological polarization on the distribution of partisan strength in the House. Partisan strength, which is required to pass significant legislation, is a function of both majority and minority size and cohesion or unity. For both parties, size and cohesion are interactive. A measure of the total strength of each party was obtained by multiplying these two components. A measure of the overall strength of the majority in the House was obtained by subtracting the minority potential for opposition from the majority mobilization score. The resulting index, referred to as the Legislative Potential for Policy Change (LPPC), provides a useful and readily available measure of the House's ability to legislate broad policy change.

In addition to a high score on the LPPC index, one other condition must be satisfied if the House is to pass innovative legislation. This is simply that an important package of legislation must be presented to the membership. Without important policy proposals on which to vote, high potential for change as measured by the LPPC index is useless. This point is clearly illustrated by the case of the 67th House. This House exhibits an extremely high LPPC score, surely large enough that any majority supported program should have been easily passed. No program, of either Congressional or Executive origin, was presented to this House, and its legislative record is poor. The remaining two undistinguished Houses, the 59th and 87th, were both presented with innovative programs of Executive origin. Yet, both of these Houses have relatively low scores on the LPPC index. The three significant Houses all exhibit high LPPC scores and each had an innovative program on which to vote.

The major findings of chapter four were that the necessary internal
mechanisms—a high LPPC score, and a significant legislative program, as well as a high incidence of electoral change and inter-party ideological polarization co-occur in the three significant Houses. This lends support to the theory that certain electoral conditions create the conditions for broad policy change through legislation.

In order to provide further support for this theory, and to demonstrate its general utility, a time series analysis of forty Houses were undertaken in chapter five. The time period covered in 1888 to 1968. Multiple regression analysis was used to test the model specified by the theory. The results indicated positive relationships between the independent variables ideological polarization and electoral change, and the dependent variable, the LPPC scores. Using these two measures of electorally related phenomena, nearly half the total variance in the LPPC index is explained. This is an important result. The implication is that there is definitely a connection between mass voting behavior and the House potential for activity. Since many previous scholars have argued that no such connection exists,\(^2\) this is a major finding. While the potential for policy change is only greatly and positively affected by a large influx of new majority members, this should not be considered as the only instance in which voting results are related to the House performance. Rather, the normal pattern of continuity of voting behavior may be viewed as linked to the normal pattern of policy output in the House—the pattern of incremental policy change. When the electorate sends a clear and consistent (across districts) message by electing large numbers of freshmen and switched seat members, these representatives have the potential to translate that message into policy
action on the issues of the day. While the electorate does not give the House a specific mandate, sweeping electoral change can be interpreted as a general demand for policy change. Conversely, when the electorate sends a message of contentment—that is, it returns incumbents to office and thus maintains continuity of the party balance and organization structure (committees, House leaders) in the House, the returning members have been told to continue with politics and policies as usual. Such an interpretation implies that the electoral connection is not only in effect during eras of critical realignment or even in times of less durable change, but is more pervasive. The most important result of this study is its characterization of the nature of this electoral connection.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT HOUSE

While the preceding remarks provide a general, theory oriented discussion of the implications of the findings, it is also possible to interpret the activities of individual Congresses in light of these results. As an illustration of the latter approach, it should be useful to examine briefly the characteristics of the current House (the 94th) and its legislative record to date.

The 94th House, elected in 1974 and currently in session, contains 21 percent freshmen, nearly all of them majority party Democrats. The margin of control is huge—291 Democrats to 144 Republicans, or 67 percent to 33 percent. Yet at the end of the first session, no legislation satisfying our definition of significant has been enacted.

Several factors help account for the results of the first session of the 94th House, and probably will remain in effect through
the second session. The first of these concerns the divisions within
the House Democrats. While party cohesion or unity scores comparable
to those used in earlier chapters of this study are not available,
certain evidence indicates that they may be lower than the average
scores for the modern House. The 75 freshmen Democrats are a mixed
lot. While many of them adhere to a liberal, activist philosophy,
others were elected from very conservative, often previously Re-
publican districts. Thus the freshmen of the 94th House are themselves
less cohesive than groups of freshmen in the 55th, 73rd, and 89th
Houses. In the 89th House, the bulk of the freshmen were liberal
Northern Democrats united behind Johnson's Great Society program. The
group of freshmen in the 94th House, however, are hampered by certain
difficulties not present in the 89th House.

Their first problem is, in some respects, self imposed. At the
beginning of the session, the group was sufficiently united to play
an important role in deposing three powerful committee chairmen, not
including Wilbur Mills of Ways and Means. This represents a challenge
to the seniority system and illustrates the enlarged role of the
Democratic Caucus. The results, however, have not been as expected
and have caused difficulties unforeseen by the freshmen. Caucus election
of chairmen combined with caucus action increasing the power and independ-
ence of subcommitteess have limited the power of chairmen and led to what
the Congressional Quarterly Quide describes as "a power vacuum at the
top." Additionally, the newcomers, as well as some more senior members,
complain that the formal House leaders such as Speaker Carl Albert
(Democrat, Oklahoma) and Majority Whip John J. McFall (Democrat,
California) are weak and unsuccessful in their attempts to marshall
the Democratic vote.\(^5\) The joint effects of weak leadership and a number of independently minded freshmen have lead to low Democratic unity. This has been particularly apparent in attempts to override presidential vetoes. Despite the two-thirds majority, many override attempts have failed.

The second problem concerns the role of the Executive and its effect on Congressional potential. The situation which characterizes the 94th Houses did not occur in any of the six test Houses, and its implications have not been considered in this research. This is the situation of divided control. The Republicans have the Presidency, but the majority in Congress is overwhelmingly Democratic. Even a Congress with a high score on the LPPC index may not be able to produce significant legislation under these conditions. In this situation the partisan majority is often a negative majority, uniting to defeat an Executive proposal. Additionally, any majority sponsored legislation is subject (and has been in this Congress) to presidential veto. Mobilizing majorities to override a veto is more difficult than mobilizing to support a bill. Every vote is crucial and the Democrats in the 94th cannot count on getting every vote.

A third and major problem is that of an innovative program of legislative proposals. We have noted the requisite conditions for passing a significant program. Several are clearly present in the 94th House. Sheer majority size alone is likely to give this House a high LPPC score. The 21 percent freshmen members is also high. Yet no innovative program, by our definition, has been presented to this House. The Ford Administration solutions for energy and economic ills do not differ markedly from past policies, and the majority
party in the House cannot formulate an innovative program. A lack of agreement on policy goals divides the majority, and the organizational power of the leadership is decentralized to the point that its integrative capability is impaired. Without a President of the same party, the House leadership is missing a critical source of leverage that could increase party unity and lead to the formulation and passage of a package of important legislative proposals. Like the case of the 67th House, the current situation illustrates the point that House potential for policy change is useless without a program.

This brief discussion of the activities of the 94th House highlights the applicability of the research findings to an understanding of single Congresses. At the same time, the discussion indicated that the most persistent obstacles to significant output in the 94th House center around factors not analyzed in detail in this study. In the next section, we suggest the need for further research on the effects of these and other factors.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The most pressing need for further research is on the concept of an innovative program or package of legislation. The theory developed in this study specifies the need for an innovative program if Congressional output is to be significant, but does not identify the determinants of such programs. In the area of program formulation, leadership is likely to play a more vital role than it does in getting such programs passed.

Leadership, however, does not play the only role. Polsby suggests
that there are two general types of policy initiation (which he equates with innovation)—acute and chronic. Policy innovation which falls into the acute category comes from within the government. On the other hand, policy initiatives which are responses to a chronic need are likely to originate outside the government. Polsby argues that the innovators in this case are typically professors or interest group experts.

This dichotomy of types of policy initiation is useful, although the concept of policy origin needs expansion. Polsby's definition of "within" government is too broad, and of "outside," too narrow. Innovative policy responses to crisis situations are most likely to originate in the Executive Branch of government. This is particularly true of the modern House, where the leadership structure is decentralized, as opposed to the House of 1890-1910 period, when the strong, centralized leadership structure facilitated policy formulation by House leaders. Thus, in the post 1920 era, innovative responses to crisis situations generally come from the President. A good example of this is Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal programs. Congress enacted these policies into law, but their origins were in the Executive. On the other hand, innovative policy responses to long term needs may be formulated by a broader range of groups than the professors or interest group experts suggested by Polsby. Still, in the modern era, solutions to long term problems must find their way to the Executive agenda if they are to have a good chance of passage. A case in point is the Great Society programs passed by the 89th House. Included in this Executive-initiated package
were policies, such as federal aid to education, which had been 
brewing within the Democratic party for years.

This does not tell us what determines an innovative program. 
Thinking about innovations as responses to either acute or chronic 
situations does lend some insight into the problem. Innovation in 
response to crisis is easier, and therefore perhaps more likely. In-
novation in response to long term situations involves a more far-
sighted perspective, and must wait, as in the case of the Great 
Society programs, until the time is right. This suggests that the 
origin of innovative programs, like their enactment, is a response 
to change, albeit change of a far more subtler type. Crisis-formulat-
ed programs are a response to immediate change, while long-term policy 
innovation is a response to anticipated change.

Isolating the determinants of innovative policy formation is 
surely the most difficult area for further research. Additional in-
sights may also be gained from several less complicated endeavors. 
First among these would be to develop a better measure of electoral 
change than that used in chapter five. Instead of using gross numbers 
of freshmen or switched seats and the dummy variable for majority gain, 
a more precise measure of change could be used. This would involve 
calculating the net advantage accrued to either party as a result of 
the election of freshmen and switched seats. This net percentage of 
freshmen or switched seats could be coded either positive or negative 
to account for the direction of the switch. Using a more refined vari-
able measured in this fashion in a regression analysis would undoubtedly 
increase the explained variance in LPPC scores.

Secondly, other variables than ideological polarization and
electoral change must be specified. Two such variables might be particularly useful. One is simply a measure of divided control. If the President and the majority in the House do not share the same party affiliation, the LPPC is likely to be negatively affected. We have noted this difficulty in regard to the 94th House. Additionally, the effects of committee turnover could be studied. Brady has suggested that the high level of committee turnover in the 55th and 73rd House played a role in passing significant legislation. The role of committee turnover might be profitably investigated through a comparison of levels of such turnover in significant and undistinguished Houses.

Finally, the utility of the concepts presented in this research could be tested by applying them to the Senate. The Legislative Potential for Policy Change in the Senate should also be a function of the relative size and unity of the majority and minority parties. As in the House, this potential should be determined in large part by electorally-related phenomena. As inter-party ideological polarization and electoral change increase, the Senate potential for policy change also should increase. If this could be demonstrated over time, then the accuracy of the concepts developed through analysis of the House would be externally validated.
NOTES


5 Ibid., p. 3.


8 Ibid., pp. 227-228.

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