INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
FRENEY, Michael Aloysius, 1938-
THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN MILITARY EXPERTISE.

Rice University, Ph.D., 1976
Political Science, general

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Copyright
Michael Aloysius Freney
1976
PLEASE NOTE:

Pages 109 and 177 are lacking in number only. No text is missing. Filmed as received.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.
RICE UNIVERSITY

THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN MILITARY EXPERTISE

by

Michael Aloysius Freney

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis Director's Signature:

Houston, Texas

May, 1976
The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.

Sir William Butler
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

What merit exists in the work which follows proceeds directly from the support and encouragement I have received from many persons, some of whom are named here. Any shortcomings are strictly my own.

I am indebted to four officers and former officers in the United States Air Force who acted as Chairmen of the Department of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, and who provided me with the opportunity to pursue the PhD degree. Dr. Charles R. Coble, Jr., Dr. Edward E. Bozik, and Dean Richard F. Rosser, all of whom have now left the Air Force, had confidence enough in me to select me to pursue the degree. Colonel Richard J. Daleski allowed me a year after my comprehensive examinations to build a research design, gather data, and begin data analysis.

It was Colonel Daleski, as well, who as Visiting Professor at the National War College in 1974, provided me with the initial entrée which allowed the current research to be accomplished. He and his predecessor as Visiting Professor, Dr. Bozik, discussed with me and helped me to refine the research design for the dissertation itself, and assisted me in obtaining permission to visit both the British and Canadian schools. Further, both officers were involved in introducing me to Major David Roe and Colonel Peter Dawkins, principal investigators for the Committee on Excellence in Education, an organization
commonly referred to as the Clements Committee, since it was conceived and put into operation by Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements. Major Roe and Colonel Dawkins, both Rhodes Scholars, both officers with incredible energy and genuine concern for the future of their profession, not only arranged to defray the cost of travel associated with my research, but provided me with many ideas and insights which they had gleaned from their own study of U.S. professional military schools. They used a portion of the analysis in Chapters II and III of this dissertation in their reports to the Clements Committee.

I am also indebted in no small measure to Colonel Perry M. Smith, USAF, who supported my candidacy for a degree program and recommended me to the Clements Committee. Conversation with him about the nature of senior professional military schooling and the connections between that schooling and the shape of the military profession was an early factor leading to the selection of the topic treated here. Research by Colonel Smith while he served as a Visiting Professor at the National War College was also of great value to me in formulating the terms of reference for my study.

I am especially grateful to the Commandants of the three senior professional military schools who not only gave permission to examine their curricula and talk with their staffs, faculty, and student bodies, but also talked enthusiastically and frankly with me about the schools on more than one occasion. They are Air Chief Marshall Sir John Barraclough KCB CBE DFC AFC, Commandant, Royal College of Defence Studies, London, England; Major General Gerrard J. J.
Edwards DFC CD, Commandant, National Defence College, Kingston, Ontario, Canada; and Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne, Commandant, National War College, Washington, D.C.

Among the staffs and faculty at the various schools, certain persons went to great length to assist me in my research. In Britain, Major General Anthony E. Younger DSE OBE MA, and Brigadier Geoffrey H. W. Howlett OBE MC patiently answered innumerable questions; led me through the various records available at the schools; provided me with the opportunity to visit seminars and syndicates; to attend lectures; and to work in comfortable surroundings even when the school was officially closed. Brigadier T. I. G. Gray, Retired, Secretary of the Royal College of Defence Studies was also very kind in arranging details of my visit, and in providing assistance from his willing, friendly, and cooperative staff. Mr. John Crump, a United States Foreign Service officer and former colleague assigned as a student at the school, provided flawless hospitality, inside insights, and practical assistance.

In Canada, Major Ray Webber, Administrative Officer of the National Defence College, showed me great courtesy and warm hospitality, even to the extent of tracking me down in Kingston on a snowy night to bring me to his home and fill me in on the general layout of the school. Colonel J. Riffou spent a long afternoon orienting me on the school's position in the Canadian military profession, and on the nature of the activities within the school, and in arranging for access to various documents and files. Miss M. C. O'Connor, Librarian at the National Defence College, and the school's institutional memory personified,
not only provided assistance with archival materials but endured my many questions and helped fill my special requests. Miss Anne Smith of the library staff was consistently cheerful and helpful.

At the National War College, Colonel Daleski supplied a perfect blend of hospitality, assistance, and encouragement. Captain Marvin G. Alexander, head of the Department of Curriculum Development, not only encouraged and guided me in my research, but was kind enough to provide detailed comments on an early draft of descriptive materials. George W. Stansfield, Librarian and Archivist at the National War College, provided me with valuable early background on the school, and in view of his lengthy association with it, was able to assist me in developing a longitudinal perspective on events. Mr. Robert Ferguson, Classified Librarian, was also very cordial and helpful. Mrs. Maxine Pole, now Head of the Speakers Bureau, Miss Randis, Mrs. Dodge and Mrs. Gilmore were not only hospitable but extremely helpful in finding files and in providing me with places to work.

In addition to those mentioned above, several officers and civilians who were serving or had served at the three schools as staff members, faculty members or students provided both detail and direction which aided my research. Those left unnamed will remain so either at their own request or because discretion demands it.

Ms. JoAnn Verdin, Data Analysis Services, Houston, Texas; Captain Perry Cole, Computer Center, United States Air Force Academy; and George C. Gibson, Department of Political Science and Philosophy, United States Air Force Academy, were especially generous and helpful in assisting me with various problems associated with manipulating and
presenting my data. Ms. Jaquie Ehlers, Chief of Staff of the Political
Science Department at Rice was a welcome source of administrative
direction and distraction from beginning to end of the Rice program.

Lieutenant Colonel Cy Williams, Lieutenant Colonel Don Mans-
field, and Captain John Casciano, among others of my colleagues at
the Air Force Academy, were both indulgent and bureaucratically
flexible during the last few months of data presentation and analysis.
Mrs. Dode Jones is responsible for the exceptionally fine job of final
typing. Her combination of good humor, common sense, accuracy and
speed is much appreciated. I claim credit for any errors still
present.

I consider myself to have been exceptionally fortunate in hav-
ing had the opportunity to be associated with Rice University. I met
there a group of dedicated, talented scholars who proved as generous
as they are insightful. Professors John Deegan and Charles Doran in
Political Science and Professor Steven Klineberg in Sociology led me a
merry chase through literature to which I had never been exposed.
Professor Joseph Cooper in Political Science, with a combination of
good humor and acrimonious comments, led me to a new understanding of
the difficulty of and necessity for broad theorization in Political
Science. Professor Chandler Davidson, a sociologist with very differ-
ent views from my own, combined tolerance, insight and irreverence in
overseeing a semester of work on the professions, and helped me to
see how interrelated the social sciences necessarily are. Professors
Ambler, Dix, and von der Mehden led me through what must be one of the
most cohesive and most rewarding programs in Comparative Politics
available in a U.S. university.

I owe a special debt to Drs. Ambler, Davidson, and von der Mehden who helped me from inception through final defense to understand the strengths and liabilities of the dissertation project. To Dr. Ambler, Chairman of the Dissertation Committee, a demanding mentor and expert guide to thought on modern military professions, who combined patient and thoughtful guidance with a well placed kick at the right time, I wish to extend both personal and professional thanks.

Personal friends in Houston and in Colorado were particularly important in my ability to complete this work. Andrés and Margarita Moréno, Fred and Charlotte Weekley, and Matt and Jemmie Riddell not only consoled and encouraged me, but showed the utmost kindness, consideration and hospitality to my family.

It is to my family, of course, that I owe the greatest debt. My daughter Gillian and my son Byron essentially went without a father for prolonged periods, but provided only encouragement and affection in return for my absence. It was during a rare but enjoyable dinner conversation with them that I received an unsolicited bit of encouragement. Gillian asked me how many universities I had attended. When I replied, "Seven.", Byron asked, "What's the matter, Daddy? Can't you pass?"

I am most indebted to my special friend, Sally. Through fifteen years of post-graduate education, she helped with basic research, typed every one of my papers, and tolerated my irascibility. During the last two years, she kept house and home together and still
found time to type this entire dissertation twice. But more impor-
tantly, her determination and drive, her equanimity in the face of
imminent disaster, her optimism and perceptiveness, her tenacity and
tenderness, were constant sources of example and encouragement.
"Indebted" is the wrong word. A gift freely given can never be repaid.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  .................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION  .......................................................... 1

Overview
A Note on Sources and Methods
The Shape of the Dissertation

Chapter
I. THE MILITARY PROFESSION  ........................................... 11

The Soldier and the State
The Professional Soldier
Perspectives on the Military Profession:
  Britain, Canada, and the United States
The Political Element in Military Expertise

II. POLITICO-MILITARY EDUCATION:
AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON ................................... 38

The Three Schools
Common Factors
Unique Factors
  Royal College of Defence Studies
  National Defence College
  The National War College

III. EVOLUTION OF EMPHASES IN CURRICULAR CONTENT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  ............................................ 96

Cross-Sectional Comparison: 1975
  Royal College of Defence Studies
  National Defence College
  The National War College
Comparative Longitudinal Analysis
  The Search for Patterns and Trends
    Trends
      Royal College of Defence Studies
      National Defence College
      The National War College
Comparison by Dimension
  The International Environment
  The Domestic Environment
Chapter

Policy, Strategy, and Decision-Making
Conflict
Area Studies
An Interim Summary

IV. POLITICAL–MILITARY EXPERTISE:
ATTITUDES OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALS .................. 166

Attitudes on Curricular Emphases
General Attitudes Regarding the Schools
Perspectives on the Military Profession
An Interim Summary

V. THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN MILITARY EXPERTISE:
A THEORETICAL REASSESSMENT .............................. 204

Summary of Findings
Caveats of Interpretation
Theoretical Relevance

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................... 224
LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER II--POLITICO-MILITARY EDUCATION:
AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON

Table
2.1 A Typical Day In Each of the Schools ............ 50
2.2 Royal College of Defence Studies:
Student Body Composition .................. 59
2.3 Royal College of Defence Studies:
Student Body Composition (Civilian) .......... 60
2.4 Royal College of Defence Studies:
Student Body Composition (Foreign) .......... 62
2.5 National Defence College:
Student Body Composition .................. 73
2.6 National Defence College: Student Body
Composition (Governmental Civilians) .......... 75
2.7 National Defence College: Student Body
(Non-Governmental Civilians) ................ 76
2.8 National Defence College Trips ............... 80
2.9 National War College: Student Body
Composition (Civilian) ..................... 83
2.10 National War College:
Euphemisms for Trips ....................... 91

CHAPTER III--EVOLUTION OF EMPHASSES IN CURRICULAR CONTENT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

3.1 Royal College of Defence Studies:
Curriculum Outline ......................... 99
3.2 Royal College of Defence Studies: 1975 Course .. 101
3.3 National Defence College: Curriculum Outline .. 103
3.4 National Defence College: 1974/75 Course .......... 104
3.5 National War College: Prescribed Courses .......... 106
3.6 National War College: Electives ............... 108
3.7 National War College Curriculum 1974-1975:
Prescribed Course Program .................. 109
3.8 Dimensions of Curricular Emphasis: Royal College
of Defence Studies--Britain 1955-1974 ........ 115
3.9 Dimensions of Curricular Emphasis: National
Defence College--Canada 1955-1974 ............ 118
3.10 Dimensions of Curricular Emphasis: National
War College--United States 1955-1974 .......... 121
CHAPTER IV--POLITICAL-MILITARY EXPERTISE:
ATTITUDES OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALS

Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Rank Ordered Preferences: Curricular Emphasis National War College Alumni Survey, 1969</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Preferred Curricular Emphasis: National War College Alumni Survey, 1974</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Preferred Curricular Emphasis (Supervisors) National War College Alumni Survey, 1974</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 National Defence College: Graduates' Evaluation of Impact National War College Alumni</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6 National Defence College: Summary Evaluation by Alumni National War College Alumni</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 Increased Professional Effectiveness: National War College Alumni</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8 Attributes of Graduates Most Important for Future Assignments: National War College Alumni</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9 Attributes Affected Most of National War College Experience: National War College Alumni</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.10 Value of Experience: National War College Alumni</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11 Value of Experience: National War College Alumni</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparative Attitudinal Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.12 Effectiveness of Civilian Control</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.13 Types of Military Advice</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.14 Civilian Consideration of Military Views</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.15 Military as Interest Group or Lobby</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.16 The Military Mind</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.17 Desirability of Military Mind</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.18 Anti-Intellectualism</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.19 Preference: Integration/Isolation</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.20 Ineffective Military Resulting from Accommodation</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.21 Perceived Trend: Integration/Isolation</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF SCATTERPLOTS

Scatterplot

Britain

1. International Environment: Britain ................ 128
2. Domestic Environment: Britain .................. 129
3. Policy, Strategy and Decision-Making: Britain ... 130
4. Conflict: Britain .................................. 130
5. Area Studies: (Britain) ............................ 131

Canada

7. International Environment: Canada ................ 139
8. Domestic Environment: Canada .................... 139
9. Policy, Strategy and Decision-Making: Canada ... 141
10. Conflict: Canada .................................. 141
11. Area Studies: Canada ............................. 142

United States

15. Conflict: United States ............................ 151
16. Area Studies: United States ....................... 151

Comparative Plots

18. International Environment: Britain, Canada, United States .......................... 157
19. Domestic Environment: Britain, Canada, United States .......................... 157
20. Policy, Strategy and Decision-Making: Britain, Canada, United States .......... 159
21. Conflict: Britain, Canada, United States .......... 161
22. Area Studies: Britain, Canada, United States .......... 162
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between political authorities in a democracy and the military establishment which serves them has been a matter of great interest to students of politics since Aristotelian times. Reasons for continuing interest in the topic are all too easy to find. The evolution of nuclear diplomacy, the persistence of ideological cleavage and the continued employment of force to resolve both domestic and international political questions are three of the most basic.

Another set of reasons evolves from reflection on the tremendous demands on national resources inherent in maintaining a modern, capable, and responsive military force. Defense expenditures in the United States in 1974 exceeded 90 billion dollars, a figure representing more than a quarter of all government expenditures and more than 6% of the gross national product. Even in Britain, a nation with declining global responsibilities, more than ten billion dollars were expended, with that amount representing more than 10% of government spending and roughly 5% of that nation's gross national product. In Canada, a nation increasingly concerned with internal problems and a nation which perceives itself as "protected" by its great power neighbor, more than 10% of government spending in 1974 was devoted to defense.¹ These

figures, impressive enough by themselves, acquire even greater significance when one reflects on the universal increase in demand for and cost of government services in modern democracies.

The political implications of these defense expenditure levels in the scarce resource environment surrounding democratic governmental activity are numerous and complex. Questions of size, shape, utility and cost effectiveness of military forces and weapons systems are but the tip of the iceberg. In-depth consideration of those implications involves a complex of variables extending from birth rates and family structures to the ultimate utility of punishment and destruction as persuasive devices in the interaction of human collectivities. As time passes and knowledge grows, both the variables and the problems appear to increase in numbers and complexity.

Overview

There are, however, some perennial issues among which one stands out as having critical importance in modern democratic societies. That issue is subordination of the military to civilian control. Two lines of thought are prominent in the literature discussing both continuation and termination of military subordination. The first of these, perhaps stated most clearly by Samuel Huntington, emphasizes a "military ethic" and a set of military values distinct from civilian values as one primary factor in continued subordination, and the presence of viable and effective political institutions as the other. The second track, presented over several years by Morris Janowitz and his associates, emphasizes the necessity for an overlap in civilian
and military skills as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of military institutions, and a commonality of values and interests among military and civilian leaders as the best insurance against failure of civilian control.

Scholars associated with both of these conflicting views agree upon conceptualization of the professional military in terms of the officer corps, and both perceive an elite within the officer corps which not only achieves high rank, but dominates planning, policy and strategy within the military establishment. But when it comes to characterization of the type of expertise required of the military professional in modern industrialized societies, substantial disagreement among scholars and other analysts is evident. In particular, the political element in military expertise is a matter of considerable controversy.

The research which follows includes a review of the various theoretical arguments on the nature of the military profession in democracies, with special attention to the nature of the political element within the professional expertise of the modern military man. This review reveals that although there is abundant prescription with regard to what the modern military man should know, there is a paucity of research, especially comparative research, dealing with the political element of military expertise. The research reported upon here was designed not to support assertions on what military expertise should be, but rather to deal with what the nature of the political element in military expertise has been over a twenty year period in three western democracies: Britain, Canada, and the United States.
A Note on Sources and Methods

There were a number of possible avenues of approach to that subject. Content analysis of the military journals was one that was considered. But, after preliminary research, it became evident that most of what passed for analysis of politically related subjects in these journals was prescriptive rather than descriptive or explanatory.

Survey research was another apparently desirable possibility. But restrictions on survey research within the military establishments in the three countries are severe. Prior clearance of all questionnaires distributed to military persons is required in each country, and approval of the results would have been one of the conditions facing the author, since he himself is a member of the military establishment in the United States. These factors, combined with limits on time and funds available for research, and most importantly with consideration of the high time sensitivity of results from cross-sectional attitudinal research made this option undesirable.

A third possibility involved examining institutional indicators of professional preferences on the type of political knowledge required by military professionals. This tack was especially attractive because schools exist in Britain, Canada and the United States which deal specifically and for all practical purposes almost exclusively with politico-military subjects. Those schools, The Royal College of Defence Studies in London, The National Defence College in Kingston, Ontario, and The National War College in Washington became the focus of investigation. The initial assumption was that a systematic, synthetic comparative examination of their curricular content would allow insight
into the nature of the political element in military expertise, allow
testing of theoretical hypotheses on the nature of the military pro-
fessional knowledge, and increase understanding of the nature of the
military profession itself.

An initial approach was made to Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne,
Commandant of the National War College in Washington. Admiral Bayne,
when he had been informed of the general nature of the research con-
templated, endorsed the project, and allowed the author access to
staff, faculty, students, files, and the library of the college. He
also was kind enough to place the original research proposal before
the Commandants of both the British and Canadian schools. These
officers, Air Chief Marshall Sir John Barraclough and Major General
Gerrard J. J. Edwards, also responded favorably to the proposal and
were kind enough to allow the author access to their staff, to
students, and to a variety of files which they determined would be
helpful in the research. Research and data collection were accom-
plished at the National War College in Washington during October and
November, 1974; at the National Defence College in Canada during
December of that year; and at the Royal College of Defence Studies,

Access to historical and curricular materials of the schools
was essentially unlimited except in cases where the materials were
classified. These instances were extremely few, and at the level of
generalization at which the research was undertaken, did not prove an
impediment. In the second and particularly in the third chapters of
the dissertation, there is detailed discussion of the nature of the
various sources used.

The initial research design included a proposal for limited survey research among the staff, faculty, and student bodies of the various schools. In each case, the Commandant of the school questioned that particular aspect of the proposal on the basis that it might not only disrupt day-to-day activities, but also could be interpreted as the kind of research which required prior approval from the Department or Ministry of Defense. The collection of attitudinal data was therefore undertaken in existing files at the schools and, on a limited basis, among staff, faculty and students, using personal interview techniques.

Staff and faculty members at each of the schools were especially cordial and helpful. They responded to a variety of questions, some structured and some not, with great good humor and frankness. They provided information on a variety of subjects ranging from the day-to-day activities of a staff member to detailed descriptions of the fortunes of various graduates of the schools.

Commandants of the schools were both gracious and generous with their time. Incumbent Commandants at each of the schools were interviewed at the beginning and at the end of the author's on-site research. They provided answers to specific questions, outlined their perceptions of the general pattern of growth of the schools, and commented in detail on the overall value of the school experience. In addition, three former Commandants were interviewed. They discussed their own tenures in office and answered the same kinds of questions as the incumbents. In all cases, the Commandants and former Commandants
provided frank and thoughtful replies to the questions asked. Since each of the former Commandants asked that portions of their remarks be non-attributable, they will remain unidentified.

A skeptical reader will, of course, question whether officers involved directly in day-to-day activities of running the schools or officers attending them might not be inclined to provide highly self-serving answers to questions about the general nature and quality of the school experience. Judgments with regard to the perceptiveness and veracity of respondents are necessarily subjective ones, and are all the more subjective in this case because there was only one interviewer involved in the research. What follow are personal impressions.  

In all but one case, interviewees were courteous, friendly, and showed no evidence of being defensive. The interviewer's overall opinion of the quality of answers was that they were thoughtful and forthright. Of course, the interviewer was considered an outsider operating with approval of the Commandant, and as such was perhaps less likely to pick up some of the day-to-day gripes which are a part of all educational experience. Overall, evidence obtained from

---

\(^2\)Prior to beginning dissertation research, the writer had nine years of almost daily experience in interviewing both friendly and trained and untrained hostile respondents.

\(^3\)In only one instance was any hostility shown. That hostility came from a normatively oriented scholar and author who was a student at one of the schools. He was critical of the general nature of this research as being "too mathematical, and not issue-oriented enough." In spite of preliminary remarks to that effect, he responded to a series of questions described in the chapter under attitudes in a fashion which could best be described as frank if somewhat annoyed.
the author observed a process of continuing critical self-evaluation in all of the schools. Evidence in documents and files, attitudinal surveys, and interviews showed that both the administrations of the schools and the student bodies were interested in making sure that the schools themselves, and their curricula in particular, were pertinent and timely. On the less positive side, there appeared to be a lack of longitudinal depth in the institutional memories of the schools, especially with regard to curricula. That lack, combined with the relatively short tours of the various officers in the schools, made it difficult for incumbents to distinguish between change and progress. Hopefully, those officers and their successors will find the kindness and cooperation they displayed during this research repaid in some small measure in the form of lengthened perspectives on institutional and especially curricular developments.

The Shape of the Dissertation

The chapters which follow are designed to lead the reader from consideration of some of the principal theoretical points existing in literature on the military profession through the political-military educational institutions described, through the evolution of the curricular content of the institutions, through a consideration of attitudinal material available on professional military officers at senior levels, to reevaluation of the theoretical propositions with which the entire discussion began. A brief description of the chapters
is offered here.

Chapter I is a theoretical discussion of the literature on the military profession in Britain, Canada, and the United States which attempts to synthesize the principal points raised regarding military expertise in general, and regarding the political element in military expertise in particular. The theoretical discussion establishes the focus of the research.

Chapter II contains a detailed, comparative, descriptive analysis of mission, faculty, student body, and methodology of each of the three professional military schools which deal specifically with political-military subjects. This expanded comparative description is provided both because it gives the reader a better picture of the milieu in which professional military education takes place, and because there is a dearth of descriptive material on the schools in the political science and sociology literature.

Chapter III sets forth detailed comparative analysis of curricular content and trends during the twenty year period 1955 through 1974. The chapter begins with detailed cross-sectional description of the curricula in the three schools experienced by the classes graduating in 1975. That description is followed by a discussion of the techniques and sources used in building the subsequent trends.

Chapter IV is composed of results of a variety of attitudinal research efforts, some of which were conducted by the author. Other data were obtained from existing survey results and from school files. The chapter explores the perspectives of senior professional military
officers on politico-military topics and politico-military education.

Chapter V places research results in the context of existing theory. Findings are summarized. Strengths and weaknesses in the foregoing analysis are examined. Finally, an argument for modification of existing theory is presented.
CHAPTER I

THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The military profession has been referred to in the vernacular as the world's second oldest. Whatever the normative undertones of such a description, there is a factual base of arguing that the military is a profession and an old one. Max Weber, writing in the late nineteenth century, regarded the emergence of a citizen military and the financial arrangements to support it as the original source of bureaucracy. He characterized military officers as beamte or professional servants of the state and commented upon the accumulation of technical knowledge within the military, as well as upon its tendency toward secrecy. He also used the military as an example when comparing bureaucratic and pre-bureaucratic authority structures.¹ But Weber's observations were apparently largely lost in the detail of his accompanying argumentation.

Meanwhile, historians noting changes in pattern of officer recruitment and changes in relationships between the military and government put forth a series of volumes tracing the professionalization of the military officer corps in several nations. These studies,

which contain a great richness of detail and a paucity of concepts, include Colby on the United States, Girardet on France, Gorlitz on Germany, Lewis on the British navy, and Alfred Vagts on professionalization of European militaries in general.\textsuperscript{2} 

While occupational sociology developed in the decade after World War II, and while academic discussion of the nature of true professionalism continued within sociology, there was practically no systematic conceptual consideration of the military as a profession.\textsuperscript{3}


\textsuperscript{3}See Janowitz' Introduction and very slim Bibliography in Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1959), pp. 7-10, 109-12. In addition to the work cited by Janowitz there was, of course, commentary by sociologists, especially C. Wright Mills, on the pernicious nature of the military. See for example, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), especially Chapters 8 and 10. The only attempt at systematic analysis this investigator has found is Anreski's 1954 volume. It, like Mills' work, takes the Mosca view that social class compatibility of political, military and other leaders insures military support of a ruling elite. But the concept of profession is never used. Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and K. Paul [1954], 1968). See also Stanislav Andreski, "Conservatism and Radicalism of the Military," Archives Européennes de Sociologie, II, No. 1 (1961), pp. 52-56. Carr-Saunders and Wilson specifically exclude "the Army" from their consideration of professions "because the service which soldiers are trained to render is one which it is hoped they will never be called upon to perform,"
The first extensive attempt at theorization, which utilized sociological concepts related to professions, came from an historically inclined political scientist, Samuel Huntington.  

The Soldier and the State

In his influential volume, The Soldier and the State, Huntington defines officership as a profession based upon its possession of three "essential characteristics of a profession"; namely, expertise, social responsibility and corporateness. The core professional task is specified as management of violence.  


in terms of this single task, and is acquired by long training and immersion in the professional milieu. Social responsibility proceeds from society's dependence upon the military for security from external harm and involves a tradition of subordination. Corporateness results from the sense of shared expertise and shared social responsibility, construed in strict functional terms as relating only to the "core task."6 This reasoning leads to conceptualization of the officer corps as an "autonomous social unit" with bureaucratic characteristics including hierarchy of rank and hierarchy of office.7

The "professional" portion of the military bureaucracy is narrowly defined. Enlisted men are dismissed as lacking true professional skills and reservists are dismissed as lacking full time commitment to the professional task. Regular career-officers are the professionals.8

Huntington sees the military professional bound to his profession by an ideal-typical military ethic "shaped by functional rather

---

6 Huntington, Soldier and the State, Chapter 1. Elsewhere, Huntington notes, "While bureaucracy is a characteristic of the officer corps, it is, however, a secondary, not an essential characteristic," p. 469fn. He does not elaborate on the reason for or the significance of that observation. For a carefully developed brief statement of an opposite position, see Jacques van Doorn, "The Officer Corps: A Fusion of the Profession and Organization," Archives Européennes de Sociologie, VI, No. 2 (1965), esp. pp. 262-64, 270-74.

7 Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 16.

than societal imperatives" and imbuemed in him by his long training, by
service traditions and by the hierarchy of his professional organiza-
tion. Loyalty to this ethic insures both reliability and predictabili-
ty and of the professional in his dealings with outside forces.

Huntington summarizes this ethic in a fashion worth quoting at length:

The military ethic emphasizes the permanence, irrationality,
weakness, and evil in human nature. It stresses the supremacy
of society over the individual and the importance of order,
hierarchy, and division of function. It stresses the continuity
and value of history. It accepts the nation state as the highest
form of political organization and recognizes the continuing
likelihood of wars among nation states. It emphasizes the impor-
ance of power in international relations and warns of the dangers
to state security. It holds that the security of the state
depends upon the creation and maintenance of strong military
forces. It urges the limitation of action to the direct inter-
est of the state, the restriction of extensive commitments,
and the undesirability of bellicose or adventurous policies. It
holds that war is the instrument of politics, that the military
are the servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is
essential to military professionalism. It exalts obedience as
the highest virtue of military men. The military ethic is thus
pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-
oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrument-
alist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief,
realistic and conservative.  

One additional quotation makes Huntington's view of an ideal
military professional clear: "Like Shakespeare's soldier in Henry V
[the military professional] believes that justice of the cause is more
than he should 'know' or 'seek after'."  

Huntington's ultimate purposes in developing what he has

---

9 Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 62.
10 Ibid., p. 79.
11 Ibid., p. 73.
described as "an historically based, functionally oriented, ideal typical model"\textsuperscript{12} of the military profession are two-fold. First, he is attempting to specify in an exclusive fashion what characteristics allow the military profession to be set aside from other professions. Second, he is trying to relate the military profession to the state, or to the polity. In order to accomplish both of these tasks, he has based his analysis extremely heavily upon his own conceptualization of military expertise. That conceptualization proceeds from his assertion that the core task of the military is the management of violence, or more specifically, in his own words, "The function of a military force is successful armed combat... The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the officer."\textsuperscript{13} From this narrow functional definition of expertise, Huntington develops the concept of responsibility. He notes that an officer's expertise "imposes upon him a special social responsibility" and that responsibility is ultimately to the state alone.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, with regard to corporateness, Huntington argues that the core task, management of violence, makes it necessary that the officer corps be an autonomous social unit, which "normally lives and works apart from the rest of society."\textsuperscript{15}

This asserted group of peculiar characteristics of the military

\textsuperscript{12}Samuel P. Huntington. Interview, Rice University, Houston, Texas, 9 April 1975.

\textsuperscript{13}Huntington, \textit{Soldier and the State}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 14-16.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 15-16.
profession led Huntington to conceptualize two forms of relationships between the profession and the society. The first form, subjective civilian control, in which the military is rendered "politically sterile and neutral"\textsuperscript{16} by emphasizing the ethic previously posited, is the form Huntington argues is essential in a democratic society. The ethic is reinforced by ensuring separation of the military from contaminating liberal influences in society.\textsuperscript{17}

As Huntington develops his framework, the great difficulty in maintaining the emphasis upon a functionally distinct profession while simultaneously advocating a responsive profession becomes more and more apparent. For example, although Huntington asserts that the ethic he describes is, in fact, "concrete, permanent, and universal,"\textsuperscript{18} he stresses "the methods of organizing and applying violence at any one state in history are intimately related to the entire cultural pattern of society" and merge "into history, politics, economics, sociology and psychology."\textsuperscript{19} Further, the responsibility of the military officer is ultimately, of course, to the state. Huntington advocates that he should exercise that responsibility as an expert advisor who, first, explains to his client the client's needs; second, advises the client on how to meet these needs; and thirdly, aids his clients in implementing decisions.\textsuperscript{20} Of course, decisions of the state are by definition

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 90-91, 153-55, and especially pp. 463-66.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
political, and yet Huntington asserts: "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence."^21

Among subsidiary functions which Huntington advocates should be filled by a military professional are: a representative function, that is representing claims of military security; secondly, an advisory function in which the military professional analyzes and reports on implications of alternative courses of state action; and finally, an executive function in which the military professional implements state decisions. ^22 Although the military man is called upon to "recognize that a wide number of conceivably purely military decisions also involve politics,"^23 his competence is limited to military matters. His advice should be confined to military factors, and "instantaneous and loyal obedience" is to be the key to his behavior. ^24 In short, Huntington sees military expertise as ideally purely military. He summarizes the point succinctly:

Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them a mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. ^25

or, even more directly:

The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics. ^26

---

^21 Ibid., p. 71.
^22 Ibid., p. 72.
^23 Ibid., p. 73.
^24 Ibid.
^25 Ibid., p. 83.
^26 Ibid., p. 71.
There are, of course, a number of objections that can be raised about any ideal type, including Huntington's. His is particularly vulnerable to criticisms of narrow functionalism, structural determinism, and a strong tendency toward prescriptive theorization. In spite of weaknesses, however, Huntington has performed a major service in illustrating, although not really thoroughly exploring, the great complexity and difficulty in specifying what political components exist in the expertise of the military profession in a democratic society.

The Professional Soldier

A more balanced and informative approach to a theory of the military as a profession is contained in the work of Morris Janowitz. In his book The Professional Soldier he did not reject historical scholarship, but he concentrated upon statistical analysis of demographic data, patterns of officer recruitment, characteristics of the military organization and its environment, and finally questionnaires.


28 See especially Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. viii, 73-74, Chapter 16.

29 Throughout The Soldier and the State. See especially the Preface, the stringent "must" in the development of the "ideal type" in Chapter 3 and the rambling and atheoretical series of assertions in Chapter 17.

and interviews to obtain an in-depth picture of the military profession in the United States.

Janowitz' basic contention is that the complexity of modern arms and the development of technical specialization are causing military roles and organizational structures to become more and more similar to their civilian counterparts. His volume contains basic empirical investigation supporting this contention, as well as a number of carefully developed analytical insights and policy recommendations.

Janowitz dealt specifically with the nature of professional knowledge in several places. He avoided Huntington's narrow functionalism, and stressed that the skills required of a professional in a modern military organization involve much more than ability to triumph in combat.

He identified two types of military leaders: the heroic leader, "the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor," and the military manager, "the professional with effective links to civilian society." He also identified a third type of officer, the military technologist, who "must modify his skills and outlook" to become a leader.31

Janowitz argued that the knowledge these officers require and apply is broad, varied, and very much akin to knowledge in parallel civilian occupations. Moreover, it necessarily involves a significant political element because of the politico-military nature of deterrence, arms control and defensive alliances; because manning, arming

31Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 21-22.
and supplying the military establishment involves competition for scarce national resources; and because stationing and employment of military forces, at home or abroad, have important political and economic repercussions. Janowitz took his position without denying the limits to "civilianization" imposed by combat requirements. But his emphasis was clearly and properly placed on the interconnection rather than the separation of military and civilian sources of knowledge. The importance of this insight becomes evident when one reflects upon current estimates showing only ten percent of U.S. military officers in directly combat oriented roles.

Janowitz paid specific attention to the political content of military thinking. His investigation confirmed some of Huntington's suspicions about conservatism, but Janowitz drew rather different conclusions regarding the nature of military professionalism. In a survey of 576 Pentagon officers, Janowitz found that fewer than 5% described themselves as liberal. But in a careful analysis he argues, first, that the commitment to conservatism is not evidence of the rigid feudalistic dogmatism one might expect from Huntington's

---

32 Ibid., especially pp. 70-71. Ginsburg and Rocap call attention to additional factors like the impact of improved communications for civilian command and control; political implications of military education, race relations, and drug programs; and the military role in riot control and disaster relief. Robert N. Ginsburgh and Pember W. Rocap, "The Changing Role of the Military Profession," Air University Review, XXII, No. 3 (March-April 1971).

33 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, especially p. 33.


"ideal type" military professional. On the contrary, Janowitz concluded from analysis of answers to policy questions in his survey that "conservative" military officers maintained "a critical attitude toward contemporary institutions such as would be expected from any effective professional group."\textsuperscript{36} Janowitz argued that such a development in military thinking is inevitable and essential. He continued along the Weberian line that rationality and industrial efficiency, necessary components of a military establishment which is adaptive, weaken traditional authority. As Janowitz put it, "The growth of rationalism means the growth of a critical attitude, not only in technical and administrative matters, but toward the purposes and ends of one's own career."\textsuperscript{37}

Janowitz' views on the connection between professionalism and political knowledge on the part of professionals proceeded from his fusionist perspective. He saw the 1960 military professional "... with opinions on many political, social and economic subjects to which ... he was expected to be indifferent in the past."\textsuperscript{38} He described the 1960 military environment and the military professional's relationship to it in the following statement:

"... (T)he "political warfare" dimension has come to permeate almost every type of military operation in a "no war-no peace" period. Military managers can be judged on the basis of whether they are sensitive to these political consequences."

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 255.
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 13.
The more technical-minded officers are a hazard to the conduct of foreign policy. The more political-minded require more elaborate direction than is supplied by traditional forms of civilian supremacy.  

Huntington and Janowitz have, over time, hewed rather closely to the arguments presented in their book-length studies. Huntington has continued to emphasize the interdependent nature of the relationship between the military and the rest of society. He has argued in a number of forms and contexts that it is essential to recognize the political-military nature of policy making in the modern world, and to take conceptual account of the need for political-military expertise within the military profession.  

---

39 Ibid., p. 342.

40 Various pertinent works of Huntington and Janowitz are listed in the Bibliography. Huntington showed some signs of weakening in his position on separatism in an article called, "Functions of the Military Establishment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 406 (March 1973), 1-16. For example, he acknowledged, "A major function of U.S. military forces is thus not only to deter future aggression but also to support current diplomacy. This requires increased responsiveness of military forces and programs to political and diplomatic needs," p. 8. He deplored the "erroneous and dangerous effort to separate military goals from political goals," p. 11. Finally, he praised at length efforts of military officers to come to grips with such problems as Europeanization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nuclear proliferation, ways of minimizing possible military intervention overseas, and the political uses of military forces. These remarks, contained in a largely policy oriented paper, show how Huntington's views have altered since he deplored the establishment of institutions such as the National War College because "they would enable military officers to arrive at their own conclusions concerning political and economic issues," Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 352.
Perspectives on the Military Profession: 
Britain, Canada, and the United States

In the wake of the landmark studies by Huntington and Janowitz, a number of pieces have appeared in Britain, Canada, and the United States which consider the nature of the military profession, and more specifically the nature of military expertise. The great bulk of these studies have been prescriptive in nature rather than conceptual, and there has been a tendency to rely rather heavily on the argumentation of either Huntington or Janowitz or both.

In Britain, for example, the eloquent series of lectures by General Sir John Hackett relied very heavily on the Huntingtonian terms of reference. Sir John provided his own functional description of the fundamental task of the military, "the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem" and alluded to the existence of an "unlimited liability clause" in the soldier's contract with the state which sets the military professional apart from civilians. ⁴¹ Interestingly, however, as Hackett applied his modified Huntingtonian framework to the task of tracing the emergence of the military profession in Western society, he arrived in the final analysis at a position regarding the modern military which is much closer to Janowitz'. For example, he argued that "what a society gets in its armed forces is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a

country looks at its fighting forces, it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one, the face that it sees there will be its own."\(^{42}\)

As he looked to the future, Hackett saw the chief function of armed forces becoming the containment of violence rather than winning wars. He observed, "In the prevention of total war, whatever means are chosen, the state will rely heavily upon professional agencies in the military sphere. Neither a working system of arms control nor an effective state of general disarmament is possible without the military agent."\(^{43}\)

The distinguished British military historian Sir Michael Howard shared Huntington's concern with subordination of the military to civil authority,\(^{44}\) and cautioned that in political dealings "... decisiveness, clarity of view, and strength of will which lead men to success in the armed forces can be positively harmful unless tempered with patience, shrewdness, moderation and tact."\(^{45}\) But he went on to observe, "The age of the purely technical military specialist which reached its climax in the days of von Schlieffen is now over."\(^{46}\) Howard saw the necessity for Anglo-American military leaders who would be "as skilled at organizing a service in a complex team of varied talents and nationalities as any business operative or political

\(^{42}\) *Ibid.*, p. 34.


\(^{44}\) See, for example, his "Introduction" in *Soldiers and Government*, edited by Michael Howard (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), pp. 9-24.


boss.  He continued, "Military specialists can rarely concern themselves with technical matters alone. They have also to take into account such variables as the political and military intentions of potential adversaries and the morale and political stability of friendly or neutral states..." He summarized by observing "... (T)here can be few areas of the world or of national activity where a purely military assessment can sanely be made."

Another British analyst, Philip Abrams, painted a rather dismal picture of the status of the British military profession in the mid-sixties. Using the Huntingtonian variables, expertise, corporateness and responsibility, Abrams argued basically that the British military profession is a receding profession. He saw its monopoly of military skills being eroded by civilization and by a level of specialization which interfered with corporateness. Responsibility was problematical because political leadership was failing to provide needed guidance. Within the military profession, a hard-core "obsolete" elite allegedly refused to see that there was an ever-growing functional irrelevance to "traditional military skills." Although Abrams goes to great lengths deploiring specific aspects of the general situation described above, he offers very little in the way of constructive suggestions. In particular, he has nothing specific to say about the nature of military expertise required in the modern environment, nor does he

\[^{47}\text{Ibid.}\]

\[^{48}\text{Ibid.} \text{. p. 41.}\]

\[^{49}\text{Ibid.} \text{. p. 44.}\]
specify how "traditional" and "modern" skills differ.  

Canadian attention to the nature of the military profession has largely been couched in terms borrowed from Huntington or Janowitz. Professor R. B. Byers had produced an impressive, synthetic conceptual treatment of both Huntington's and Janowitz' positions and related them to Canadian literature and Canadian problems. In Byers' piece, and in most of the rest of the articles contained in his edited volume, emphasis is upon expertise, corporateness and responsibility. But, once again, Byers and his fellow Canadians have come to conclusions much more akin to the Janowitz position than to Huntington's separatist vision. Byers argued that the Canadian armed forces must be involved not only in military problems but also in the increasing social and economic problems faced by the country, and that quasi-military and non-military roles must be carried out in conjunction with traditional military roles. In order to accomplish these roles, such things as protection of sovereignty, maintaining democratic institutions, controlling social unrest, and contributing to economic development are identified as necessary military professional tasks.


Richard Preston, a long time student of military and Canadian affairs now at Duke University in the United States, has noted "the paradox of modern warfare," that armed forces must be prepared to fight but must not fight. He views the modern Canadian military as a multi-functional body and emphasizes that the flexibility and knowledge that its military officers must possess are "tremendously demanding and tremendously broad."\(^53\)

T. C. Willett was more specific in listing the various roles the military in Canada might adopt. He put them into four categories: the first of which is "to defend the Canadian homeland; the second, to participate with allies in the maintenance of world peace; the third, to aid the civil power at home in what he calls social defense; and the fourth, to assist in the development of Canada.\(^54\) The gist of Willett's sociologically and politically sound contention is that the existence of a profession depends not just on internal esprit and various other Huntingtonian characteristics, but also upon acceptance of the profession by outside society.\(^55\) He argued that preoccupation with the traditional military tasks would lead to emasculation of the Canadian armed forces and destruction of its professionalism.\(^56\) This


\(^{54}\) T. C. Willett, "Military Roles in the 70's," in Canadian Military Professionalism, ed. by Byers and Gray, p. 50. Willett lists twelve roles which could provide the Canadian military with social viability and real utility. Ibid., p. 55.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., pp. 50-54.

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 59 passim.
interesting argument, however, contains no specification with regard to the nature of expertise required of the military professional.

Adrian Preston, a Canadian scholar who has written about his nation's military for some time, has dealt more directly, if prescriptively, with professional military expertise. He observed that any future Canadian military professionalism would necessarily be "less concerned with operational readiness and efficiency than with military diplomacy abroad and order and prosperity at home." He continued, "A thorough understanding of the complexities and irrationalities of decision-making, of the implications of military technology, of the strategic doctrines and principles of the domestic and regional constraints of modern conflict and international politics" is a necessary element in the intellectual equipment of the military professional. 57

Interestingly, although the Canadian academic literature would lead one to believe that there is a veritable consensus on a fusionist version of a proper role for the military profession, a group commissioned by the Canadian government to investigate the nature of professionalism in the Canadian military reported, using a distinctly Huntingtonian framework, that "as a distinct social group with specific and unique responsibility to the state, the military in Canada can quite accurately see itself as set apart from the rest of society."58

This position was reiterated in one of the few articles on the nature

---


of the military profession in Canada contained in its professional military journals. 59

There is an interesting undercurrent in the Canadian discussion which is perhaps most succinctly stated by Adrian Preston. He argued, "A distinguishable Canadian military philosophy . . . based on a corpus of strategic analyses of the unique conditions of Canada's national and international environment . . . is the single most urgent corollary to the new nationalism of Canada's second century." 60

This point appears repeatedly in the broad literature on roles of the Canadian military and underlies a considerable amount of discussion in Hector J. Massey's edited volume, The Canadian Military: A Profile. 61

The preoccupation with a peculiarly Canadian military philosophy, essentially a corollary to Canadian concern for maintaining full sovereignty while dwelling in the shadow of a superpower, is discussed in detail further on.

59 R. F. Barnes, "The Profession of Arms in Canada Today: A Specialist Officer's View," Canadian Defence Quarterly, I, No. 1 (Spring 1972), 57. See also Byers who notes the tendency of Canadians to accept "conceptual frameworks and hypotheses developed for the American environment" and notes further that contributions by members of the armed services on these subjects in Canada has been minimal since "neither the government nor senior officers have encouraged such practices." Byers noted a reversal in that trend beginning in about 1968 and his analysis contains several citations of works by Canadian military personnel. Byers, "The Nature of Military Professionalism," p. 10.


In the United States, both within the academic community and within the military profession, the great bulk of analysis of the military profession has proceeded from the Janowitz perspective both with respect to a broad view of military responsibilities and functions and with respect to the inevitability of civil-military fusion, although there is little agreement on the degree of "fusion" which will take place. Considerable emphasis has been placed upon the increasing requirement for a broader range of skills within the military profession. In particular, there has been extensive attention to the need for political-military expertise. 62

Even among those in the United States who follow the Huntingtonian line more closely, there has been little attention to Huntington's separatist argument or to his concept of "objective civilian control." Where military expertise has been a major object of consideration, it has been raised as a problematical area not because the military's version of expertise was too broad, but because civilians

were making incursions upon certain key areas which the military regard as necessarily their own private preserve. Civilian influence on strategy and especially on employment of forces in the field during Vietnam were vehemently deposed.  

63 Lt. Colonel Frederick Brown, U.S. Army, has stated the position most clearly:

The problem at the moment does not appear to be military isolation from the civilian community. It is precisely the reverse. . . . The danger to national security and the military profession is that the unique characteristics and capabilities of the profession may be eroded beyond repair.  

In all three countries, Britain, Canada, and the United States, the tendency has been to take the concepts developed by Huntington and Janowitz and to use them to build prescriptions for what the nature of military professional expertise should be in light of the clearly changing roles being forced upon the military in a modern age. The


64 Brown, "The Army and Society," p. 15.
prescriptions have usually been quite broad and have seldom gotten to the level of specific recommendations for types of information to be conveyed to the military professional to help him cope with his environment.

The Political Element in Military Expertise

With respect to politico-military expertise, the tendency has been merely to assert that more of it is necessary in view of such factors as the emergence of deterrence, peacekeeping roles, counter-insurgency, domestic police operations, and the like. Michael Howard has noted that emphasis in military education should be "on political and economic problems, and even on organizational skills" and should be designed to counter the isolation young officers allegedly encounter in military education. 65 Richard Preston has emphasized, "There must be . . . an increasing emphasis on the humanities in military education," to prepare the officer corps to face the paradox that "armed forces must be prepared to fight but must not fight." 66 Adrian Preston called for a "more protean approach to the functions of military professionalism and military education" 67 since the military professional should possess "a thorough understanding of the complexities and irrationalities of decision-making, of the implications of military technology, of the strategic doctrines and principles, and the domestic and regional constraints of modern conflict and international

conflict."68

Although there has been no scarcity of commentary on what the nature of military expertise should be, there has been a surprising paucity of systematic analysis of the components of military expertise which have existed within the military professions in Britain, Canada, and the United States. The multiplicity of tasks undertaken by military professionals in modern times, increasing levels of specialization and interdependence within military forces, and the pervasive nature of political concerns in these organizations designed to permit the effective application of legally sanctioned violence all serve to complicate the task of identifying and describing the nature of military expertise in general, and in particular in defining and describing the nature of the political element in military expertise. In spite of these difficulties, an understanding of the military profession requires analysis of the generalized and systematic knowledge possessed by its members. In particular, it would seem desirable, especially in view of the interest in and controversy surrounding the political element in military expertise, to have a clear picture of the political element in military professional knowledge. A logical and convenient place to look for evidence of the nature of that knowledge is in the schools which the military, like other professions, rely on to develop, preserve and transmit specialized knowledge.

Formal schooling in the military organizations of Britain,

68Ibid., p. 213. See also Adrian Preston's "The Higher Study of Defence In Canada," previously cited.
Canada, and the United States differs substantially from the formal schooling in other professions. In law and medicine, the transmission of professional knowledge is undertaken almost exclusively at the entry level, with initial emphasis on general knowledge and with higher degrees of specialization as time passes. In the military, a hierarchy of schools spans the entire length of a military professional's career. Development of the generalized systematic knowledge in the profession itself is a process which begins with more specialized and technical knowledge and proceeds to the more general knowledge deemed by the profession to be necessary for professionals performing in policy-making positions. In addition to transmitting professional knowledge, the schools convey a sense of group identity or professional belonging to new members of the profession, inculcate a common set of professional standards, and cultivate the special commitment to professional aims necessary to carry out military tasks.

Although there has been only one comprehensive study of a military educational system linking that system to the nature of military professionalism, there is a growing body of literature dealing with a variety of structural and functional facets of professional military education. This literature reveals some attention to

69 J. W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and Military Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). This landmark study of military education in the United States has no British or Canadian counterpart. Pertinent portions are discussed further on.

political subjects at all levels of military schooling in the three countries. At a minimum, there is continuing stress on the necessity of subordination of the military to civilian control.

But the focus of the research here is not so broad as to either include entire systems of military education or all elements of professional military knowledge. Instead, the analysis will deal specifically with the controversial political element in military expertise. An attempt will be made to gain insight into that element by conducting a systematic comparative analysis of three institutions designed specifically to increase the ability of military professionals to understand and deal with politico-military affairs. First, the institutions themselves will be described. Next, a detailed comparative examination of their curricula will be undertaken. Attitudes of

military professionals toward politico-military subjects will be explored. Finally, existing theory regarding political aspects of the military profession will be reevaluated.
CHAPTER II

POLITICO-MILITARY EDUCATION: AN INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON

The essence of the argument to be presented in this paper is that the political element of military expertise can be perceived at least partially within the content of the curricula of professional schools that deal specifically with that subject. For reasons that will become apparent as this chapter continues, it is necessary to take a close look at the institutions responsible for educating military officers in the political aspect of their military professional knowledge. This type of analysis can be rather complicated because politics appears in many guises at many levels in the military educational system. However, as just mentioned, there are three schools in the three countries of concern which deal specifically and for all practical purposes almost exclusively with political-military subjects. Examination of the milieu in which this political-military education takes place helps one to understand the impact of schooling on the military officers who attend. More importantly, the evolution of the institutions themselves provided certain insights into the development of political-military expertise within the military profession in the three countries discussed.

With these thoughts in mind, and with due consideration to the dearth of descriptive materials available on the three institutions in
the political science or sociology literature, this chapter will concentrate upon developmental comparative description of the institutions themselves. A brief sketch of the origins of the three institutions will be followed by an equally brief description of their current location and physical facilities. Next, the mission or purpose of each of the schools will be outlined; the nature of superordinate guidance to the Commandants of the schools will be discussed; the shape of student bodies will be described; membership and qualifications of directing staffs or faculties will be outlined; and a brief characterization of instructional methodologies will be presented. Of course, the content of the curricula at the three schools is a critical variable in understanding the nature of political-military expertise. The evolutionary development of curricula will be analyzed and discussed in detail in the chapter which follows.

The Three Schools

The three professional military schools to be discussed here are: The Royal College of Defence Studies, known until 1971 as The Imperial Defence College, located in London, England; The National Defence College, located in Kingston, Ontario, Canada; and The National War College, located in Washington, D.C. The Royal College of Defence Studies and The National Defence College are both clearly at the pinnacle of an extensive structure of professional military schooling in their respective countries. The National War College is primus inter pares among five schools in the United States which exist at the highest level of professional military education. The remaining four are: The Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama; The
Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; The Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island; and The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, collocated with The National War College at Fort McNair in Washington. Although each of the five schools in the United States deals to some degree with political-military subjects, only at the National War College are these subjects the primary focus of the educational activity.

The Royal College of Defence Studies was founded as the Imperial Defence College in January of 1927, as a direct result of discussions involving Sir Winston Churchill some five years prior. Mr. Churchill and his compatriots on a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence reported in May 1923 that a definite need existed for "the establishment of a joint college for the training of officers of the navy, army, and air force . . . in order to create a common doctrine in regard to defence policy and to produce a body of officers trained to look at the problem of war as a whole."¹ The school has operated continuously since that time, with the exception of the six year hiatus during World War II. It is presently located in a lovely nineteenth century mansion in the fashionable Belgravia district of London just behind Buckingham Palace.

and its predecessor changed very little over the years. As set forth in the Handbook for students in the class of 1975, the purpose is:

To give selected senior officers and officials of the United Kingdom the opportunity to study, in company with representatives of Commonwealth and allied countries, problems of national and international strategy and security, international relations as a whole, and those aspects of public policy which are related to defence and security.  

The Canadian National Defence College was founded in 1947, and its first class met in 1948. It has been housed since its beginning in historic Fort Frontenac, now more than 300 years old. The school, founded in the wake of World War II, was clearly modeled after the Imperial Defence College, and the first Commandant of the Canadian school, General Sir J. F. M. Whiteley, was a British exchange officer who came to Canada directly from the Imperial Defence College.  

As in the case of the British school, the mission or purpose of the National Defence College changed very little over the years. As set forth in the National Defence College Brochure for Incoming Students in 1975, it is:

To help prepare course members for appointment to positions of higher responsibility by enabling them to study together, in the atmosphere of an advanced graduate school, those aspects of national and international affairs which determine or

---


3 Mary C. O’Connor, "The National Defence College," Canadian Defence Quarterly, I, No. 2 (Autumn 1971), 41-44. See also Adrian Preston, "Military Education and Canadian Defence Policy," who notes that Canadian officers had previously attended the Imperial Defence College, and who essentially deplored British influence upon Canadian defense policy during the period when the National Defence College was founded and since.
significantly affect the security and development of Canada.\textsuperscript{4}

The National War College, at lovely, tree lined Fort McNair, is situated at the confluence of the Washington ship channel and the Potomac River in southwest Washington, D.C. It exists on the site of what was, prior to World War II, the Army War College. The National War College began operation in August 1946 and was one of a series of institutions emerging from the governmental reorganization which occurred in Washington shortly after the wake of World War II.\textsuperscript{5} Initially, the National War College was conceived as a school "... Concerned with grand strategy in the utilization of national resources necessary to implement that strategy."\textsuperscript{6} Today, the mission of the school is:

To conduct a course of study of those agencies of government and those military, economic, scientific, political, psychological, and social factors of power potential which are essential parts of national security, in order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces and the State Department for the exercise of joint and combined high-level policy, command, and staff functions for the planning of national strategy.\textsuperscript{7}

Statements of mission or purpose have changed infrequently over the years. What changes have occurred have been largely cosmetic and semantic, with no appreciable alteration in substance, tenor, or

\textsuperscript{4}The National Defence College (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: National Defence College, 1974).


\textsuperscript{6}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 6.
emphasis evident. Of course the very generality of these statements
allowed considerable latitude within the structure of the various
curricula, and there are discernible trends in change of emphasis
within the course structures of the three schools. Those are discussed
in the following chapter.

Common Factors

With two exceptions, the Commandants of each of the schools
have been officers of general or flag rank with considerable expertise
in combat, command, and high level staff positions. The Commandant's
position is rotated among the three principal services in each of the
countries.

The Commandants of the three schools are responsible to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his equivalent. Each provides
at least one relatively formal presentation about the operation of "his"
school to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and in many cases to the
Joint Chiefs collectively, on at least an annual basis. Guidance to the
Commandants from above has traditionally been both general and minimal.

---

8 The two exceptions both occurred in Britain where civilians
were named to become Commandant of the Imperial Defence College. The
first, Sir Robert Scott, was a distinguished policeman who held the
position of Chief Commissioner before becoming Commandant of the Im-
perial Defence College. He served in 1960-61. The second, Professor
Alistair Buchan, a dynamic and distinguished academician with a back-
ground in strategy and the history of warfare, made a major impact upon
the college and was, among other things, responsible for the change of
name from the Imperial Defence College to the Royal College of Defence
Studies. He served from 1969 until 1971. His contributions to the
evolution of the Royal College of Defence Studies are discussed in the
next chapter. The Imperial Defence College Register, 1927-1970 (London:
Royal College of Defence Studies, 1971), pp. 42-44; H. W. Pout, "Im-
perial Defence College," p. 144; E. J. Risness, "The End of the Imperial
They are permitted to innovate and operate the schools in the fashion that they see fit. 9

In Britain and in the United States, with the schools located at the seat of government, there have been occasional problems when senior officers outside the school sought to alter curriculum emphasis or to try to press into service the considerable reservoir of talent which the student bodies of the schools represent. The Commandants indicated that this problem was not really a serious one, although it appears to have been a recurring one. With some exceptions, the tendency has been to attempt to protect students from attempts to draw them into staff-officer type duties while they are enrolled in the school. 10

In Britain and the United States, the Commandants are advised by Boards of Consultants composed of distinguished military men, many of them retired; senior academics; governmental officials from a variety of agencies; and members of the business community. The members of the Boards of Consultants are selected by the Commandants themselves, and provide outside commentary and advice at the request of the Commandants. This advice has varied greatly in both depth and quality over the years, but has seldom been the source of major initiatives taken by the

9 Interviews with Commandants and former Commandants in each of the three countries. Also, perusal of Commandant's Reports in the United States and similar memoranda and correspondence in Britain, Canada and the United States.

10 Interviews with Commandants and former Commandants. In the United States and Britain, students engaged in research have, on occasion, tackled current policy problems using terms of reference from staff agencies. In Canada, some faculty research has answered queries from Ottawa.
Major changes in the schools have been stimulated either from within or as a result of governmental bodies or commissions other than Boards of Consultants.

There are unique aspects of the composition of the student bodies at each school. However, there are several common factors. At each, the allocation of student positions is a joint decision involving school authorities; highest level military leaders; officials of the Foreign Office, State Department or Department of External Affairs; and officials of the Ministries or Department of Defense. Military officers from each of the services are included in approximately equal numbers with Marine Corps officers counted against Navy quotas. A significant element in the student body of each school is composed of civilians from a variety of agencies discussed in greater detail under Unique Factors below. The allocation of positions has been on the basis of ad hoc cooperation among various agencies rather than as a result of any rigid committee procedure. Selection of individual students, however, has been accomplished by the air, land, and sea services and by the various civilian organizations represented. Criteria for selection include past performance, potential for policy-making responsibility, 

---

11 Commandants Reports, Boards of Consultants Reports, and associated memoranda and correspondence, at the U.S. school. Also interviews with Commandants and former Commandants at both schools.

12 These changes which include the major alterations at the Royal College of Defence Study instituted by Alistair Buchan, the short-lived disruption of the program in the National Defence College as a result of the Milligan Report, and the changes at the National War College in the wake of The Calhoun Board, are discussed in greater detail in the chapter which follows.
and, of course, organizational affiliation. Air, land, and sea services are equally represented numerically in each of the schools. Navies have, interestingly, the least regularized procedures for nomination of students, the lowest promotion rates among graduates, and the least positive view of the school among personnel officers and potential students.  

Students at the schools have generally distinguished themselves in some fashion prior to attendance, and many distinguish themselves afterwards. They tend to be in their 40's, and military students tend to have served in both command positions and in high level staff assignments. Their experience is regarded as a major asset at each of the schools, and emphasis is placed upon the beneficial impact of the interaction of these experienced military and civil servants, both because of its educational impact and because the cross-socialization which occurs is regarded as a device for oiling the wheels of bureaucracy through informal contacts on the job after graduation.

Operation and administration of the schools is carried out by what are referred to as Directing Staffs in Britain and Canada, and Faculty in the United States. These organizations are composed of both military officers and civilian officials. Among the military, air, land, and sea services are equally represented. At least one senior

---

13 Interviews with Commandants, staff and faculty members, and students. Examination of unpublished statistics and memoranda at National War College.

14 Student biographies and alumni registers at each school.

15 Interviews with Commandants, former Commandants, staff and faculty at all three schools.
diplomat is assigned to the staff in each of the three schools, and in Canada and the United States, that person serves as Deputy Commandant. Other diplomatic officers also are frequently included in Britain and the United States. Department of Defense civilians are also represented on the Directing Staff in Britain and on the faculty in the United States. Turnover among Directing Staff and faculty members is quite high. The normal tenure of these officials, be they military or civilian, ranges from two to four years.  

In the British and Canadian schools, there is emphasis upon the fact that the Directing Staffs are not faculties in the conventional sense of that word. Their principal duties are administrative in nature, and although these officers are responsible for shaping the curriculum, they do not teach. In the United States the role of the faculty is more equivocal. Until recently, the same administrative emphasis existed in the United States as was observed in Britain and Canada. However, since 1971 the faculty at the National War College has become more active, both in leading discussions and in conducting elective courses. The principal duties of members of the Directing Staff and faculty include: determining the topic emphases during the course of study; the development of course outlines; the preparation of written introductions to various subjects; the selection and acquisition of readings dealing with the various subjects emphasized; the

16 Examination of Manning documents, handbooks, yearbooks, etc.; also interviews with staff and faculty at all three schools. At the U.S. school, there are two Deputy Commandants, one military and one a diplomat.

17 These developments are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
screening, selection, invitation, and escorting of lecturers; the administration of student assignments, including rotation of students among various seminar sized groups; the administration of field trips; and the provision of counsel and assistance to students doing individual research. 18

Each of the schools is remarkably self-conscious about the quality of the course of study conducted. Each has an elaborate system of self evaluation which involves, among other things, a daily commentary on the adequacy of speakers; solicitation of student and faculty opinions regarding the quality of individual portions of the course; and summary evaluation devices administered at the end of the course and, in the case of the United States, to alumni. The Directing Staff and faculty administer these programs, poll the results, and make detailed recommendations for improvements where appropriate. 19

Further, the administrations at the schools make an attempt to maintain contact with their alumni as well as with influential persons in academia, business and government who have shown interest in the school. Communication among and gathering of alumni are encouraged by the schools, and not infrequently the schools initiate brief reunions. Comments by alumni on changes in the schools' curricula or procedures are taken seriously, and comments on the quality of recent graduates

18 Interviews with staff and faculty; memoranda and correspondence; Commandants' Reports in the United States.

19 Interviews, memoranda, and the reports themselves, the last of which are not public documents.
are both solicited and listened to with care.\textsuperscript{20}

There are many similarities in the educational methodology of the three schools. Table 2.1 shows the shape of a typical day spent in-house at each of the schools.

Lectures are the principal source of information in each. These are conducted on an almost daily basis when students are not involved in travel. Speakers enjoy a "privileged platform"; that is to say, no quotations of material provided during lectures is permitted without the specific prior approval of the speaker.\textsuperscript{21} The speakers themselves are experts in a variety of fields. They include both active and retired government officials, frequently from the very highest levels; both active and retired military leaders; academics with a wide variety of backgrounds and specialities; both home country and foreign diplomats; journalists; and leaders of business, labor and religious organizations.\textsuperscript{22}

Although there are some variations, the basic format at each of the schools is a morning lecture followed by a question and answer period. Speakers are encouraged to be forthright and most frequently are. Questions from the student body vary in quality but tend in

\textsuperscript{20} Interviews with Commandants, staff and faculty; also memoranda at the U.S. school. Both the National Defence College and the National War College have attempted survey research into these topics. The instruments and the results are discussed in the chapter on attitudes.

\textsuperscript{21} Interviews with Directing Staffs and faculty; course handbooks; internal correspondence and memoranda.

\textsuperscript{22} A longitudinal analysis of speakers' origins, etc., is undertaken in the following chapter.
**TABLE 2.1**  
A Typical Day in Each of the Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal College of Defence Studies</th>
<th>National Defence College</th>
<th>National War College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Kingston, Ontario</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1030 Lecture</td>
<td>1000 Lecture</td>
<td>0900 Lecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1120 Coffee</td>
<td>1100 Coffee and informal discussion</td>
<td>0945 Coffee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130 Question and Answer Session</td>
<td>1130 Question and Answer Session</td>
<td>1000 Question and Answer Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1215 Continued Informal Discussion; Sherry</td>
<td>1230 Lunch</td>
<td>1030 Seminar meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 Lunch</td>
<td>1300 Occasional syndicate meetings. Free time for group discussion, research, preparation of group papers.</td>
<td>1130 Athletics and lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400 Free time for reading, research, syndicate meetings, writing.</td>
<td>Lectures are sometimes held in the afternoon to accommodate travel schedules of visitors.</td>
<td>1530 Same. Elective courses meet about twice weekly. Each student takes two in the fall semester and two in the spring semester.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lectures, seminars, syndicates, etc., are discussed in detail individually by school later in this chapter. A longitudinal statistical analysis of lecturers' backgrounds, and topics is contained in the next chapter.
general to be thoughtful, and are sometimes quite pointed and argumentative.23

Each of the schools also organizes seminars or syndicates of students. These groups spend afternoons discussing the morning lecture and related topics; engaging in joint problem solving and simulations; or in listening to and criticizing joint and individual research products produced by the student bodies. The groups, which vary in size from eight to approximately eighteen, are designed to facilitate maximum interaction among class members and to provide maximum exposure to differing views. In some cases, visiting lecturers or faculty will either participate in or lead student discussions. Students are rotated from group to group as the course progresses in order to maximize cross-socialization.24

Socialization processes are intensified during field trips.25 Students at each of the three schools make a series of trips to local military, governmental and business organizations and facilities; to various areas of the countries in which they are located; and to a variety of countries abroad. These trips are designed primarily to supplement the information students acquire from in-house lectures, seminar discussions, and readings. The trips tend to be extremely tightly scheduled and demanding. Their value is enhanced by the

---

23 Handbooks; interviews with faculty, staff, students; attendance at lectures and questions and answer sessions.

24 Interviews with staff and faculty; visits to seminars.

25 As One Canadian military student put it, "After you've been armpit to armpit with these guys for ninety days, there isn't much that you don't know about most of them."
academic preparation prior to departure and by after-action reporting.

The amount of travel in the three countries varies greatly. But, officials at all three schools share concern that trips, which they regard as an important element in both the education and socialization processes within the schools, will be looked at askance by governmental officials concerned with budget cutting. A distinct effort is made to point out that the trips are not boondoggling. School authorities connect the trips rather directly to area studies portions of the curricula, and are quick to point out that far more time on the road is spent at formal lectures, seminar discussions, and in individual exchanges with officials in the field than is spent at cocktail parties or sightseeing.²⁶

Reading and research are encouraged at all three schools. Each maintains a significant library designed to service the needs of students, and each produces lists of recommended readings with respect to the various topics emphasized during the course. At the National War College, certain readings are required as preparation for seminars.

Readings were originally regarded as a probable source of interesting information on patterns and trends in the curricula of the three schools. In fact, examination of syllabi and reading lists revealed that heterogeneity rather than consistency was the rule. Until recently, heavy emphasis was placed upon currency, factuality and brevity in the materials recommended or assigned to students. These

²⁶ Review of curricular outlines, internal memoranda and correspondence, and interviews with Directing Staff and faculty members. More detail on trips is provided under the discussion of unique factors which follows.
selection criteria continue to operate in large degree, but in both
the British and the American schools since 1970, there has been an
increasing tendency to attempt to expose the student to theoretical
concepts underlying the various topics studied. At the Royal College
of Defence Studies, recommendations of whole books on various topics in
the curricula have become the rule. Recommended reading lists include
sources which take a variety of positions on the subject being examin-
ed, and students report with some pleasure and satisfaction that they
consume about a book a week. Many stressed that the relaxed atmosphere
at the college, so foreign to persons who have spent long careers en-
gaged in "putting out fires," is not only conducive to, but is an in-
centive toward reflective reading in depth on the course topics. At
the Canadian school, entire volumes do appear in recommended reading
lists, but emphasis continues to be upon the kind of short, current
factual sources mentioned above. At the U.S. school, conceptual
materials are included but frequently are lifted piecemeal from a
variety of academic texts and other sources. In addition, there con-
tinues to be heavy emphasis on current factual material.\footnote{The
information contained here and in subsequent discussion of
breadth vs. depth is culled from examination of course handbooks,
syllabi, and similar documents; from interviews with Directing Staff
and faculty; from interviews with Commandants and former Commandants;
and from internal discussion papers and memoranda.}

\footnote{Interviews with students, Directing Staff and faculty members
as well as from student questionnaires described in detail in Chapter
V.}
The absence of patterns and trends in reading selections and assignments reflects the high turnover among Directing Staff and faculty. But more importantly, it reflects a basic schism which appears over time in all three schools. There is continuing disagreement within Directing Staffs and faculty over whether greater emphasis should be placed upon current factual information about the various topics studied in the curricula or whether there should be greater emphasis upon analysis of current situations which employs a greater element of theoretical and conceptual thinking. To put it more succinctly, and to a degree oversimplly, the argument has been between those favoring greater breadth in the curriculum and those favoring greater depth. The former group tend to emphasize the necessity of exposing future military decision-makers to a view of the global environment which emphasizes the interrelatedness of current problems facing the government of the country in which the school is located. Proponents of the latter view emphasize the great time sensitivity of "current events" and "issue-oriented" materials, and point to what they regard as an absolutely unavoidable superficiality in any course which attempts to treat all of the world's problems in less than a year. The conceptually inclined argue that exposure to analytical tools in the social sciences which have applicability in a variety of situations and locations is, in the long run, a far greater contribution to the capability of the students who will serve in policy-making positions.29

29 In its most acrimonious and illogical form, the argument of the currency-breadth school is stated as, "There is no way that you can teach a 40 year old man with twenty years experience how to think." The equally short-sighted, but less frequently encountered extreme view of
Although it is dangerous to generalize about the identity of persons adopting either of these positions, examination of somewhat fragmentary evidence in the forms of letters, memoranda, internal reports and interviews at the three schools reveals that proponents of currency and breadth tend to be officers with less formal education who have spent the majority of their time in line assignments. Proponents of greater theoretical emphasis tend to be officers with higher levels of education, many of whom have spent a considerable amount of time in policy, planning, and high level staff assignments.

As one might expect, the debate over breadth vs. depth has created more heat than light. Neither school of thought has become predominant in any of the schools. Although the Canadians tend to emphasize breadth, not only in readings but in the course as a whole, they attempt to compensate by bringing in lecturers from academic institutions who deal in some detail with theoretical considerations. In the British school, especially since Alistair Buchan’s reign as Commandant, there has been continuing emphasis on some of the fundamental political and economic questions which recur and which continually impinge upon military concepts, plans, and operations. In the United States, particularly since 1970, there has been greater attention to concepts and theory than in previous years. But considerable breadth and considerable emphasis on currency continue to be characteristic.

The debate over breadth versus depth is raised at this point because of its significance in explaining the lack of patterns and

those with theoretical preferences is, "Good analytical models are neither time sensitive nor limited in applicability because of geography."
trends in reading assignments. Implicit within the debate are a number of assumptions and assertions which bear very directly on the nature of political-military expertise itself. These are discussed in detail in the context of curricular development in the next chapter, in the context of attitudes in the chapter following that, and in the final chapter containing theoretical reevaluation. At this point, however, it is necessary to return to detailed description of the educational milieu at the three schools.

In addition to the readings, undertaken in connection with daily activity, students at all three schools are encouraged to investigate at least one subject in somewhat greater depth. Requirements for research have varied at all three schools over the years. The Canadian approach has been to encourage group projects and group products with an eye toward providing experience in the types of committee procedures frequently encountered at high decision-making levels. In Britain and the United States, individual research has been alternately encouraged or required. 30

Contravening positions regarding reporting of research are observable at various times in each of the three schools. One is that the best way to assure that students get maximum benefit from the time for research and reflection during the course is to require them to submit a formal paper synthesizing views on a particular topic. The alternative view is that it is a waste of time to force the officers enrolled in the courses to draft and type the ideas that are already in their

30 Course Handbooks, syllabi, interviews with Directing Staff and faculty members.
heads. At the present juncture, at both the British and American schools, the former view prevails. Both schools require a formal individual research paper which reflects both familiarization with the existing literature on particular subjects, and views of the authors on those subjects. In the British case the papers are reviewed by academics outside of the Royal College of Defence Studies. At the National War College papers are reviewed by faculty members. Although the Canadian school encourages individual essays, the only research reporting requirement is a presentation of results of group efforts at analyzing a national problem. Although grades are not assigned in the sense that they are in a university, comments from the reviewers are considered in the overall evaluation of students' performance in the course. 31

Simulation is employed in all of the schools. The degree of sophistication and the frequency of use of this technique varies considerably. At the present time, computer simulation is used only at the National War College, but similar techniques have been employed from time to time at the Royal College of Defence Studies. Simulations of committee action surrounding decision-making, or simulations of an actual decision-making process, with emphasis on crisis decision-making, are the most common forms. Modeling of the type employed in universities is absent from curricula of the three schools.

Although officials at all of the schools recognize the importance of allowing students to relax after many years of hectic military
service, there is also broad concern that the heavy emphasis upon lectures makes the learning experience largely passive in nature. Each of the schools has been making an effort to overcome that problem. At the Royal College of Defence Studies the size of seminar groups has been reduced in order to facilitate greater participation. At the Canadian school, emphasis has been placed on lively debate of the merits of the various group papers and group problem solutions produced by students. At the National War College, in addition to attempting to improve participation in seminars, an elective program has emerged in which students are required to engage not only in discussion but also in individual research. These features are treated in more detail in the following discussion of unique factors at the three schools.

Unique Factors

Although the three schools are designed to accomplish similar tasks, and although the Imperial Defence College provided the initial basic model for both the Canadian and American schools, there are distinguishing characteristics of each school. Some of these, like the membership of the student bodies at the three schools, provide important

---

32 Interviews with Commandants, Directing Staff and faculty members; memoranda and correspondence.

33 In the Canadian case, the connection is prima facie as previously indicated. In the American case, the direct connection between the British model and the National War College has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of some historians. Mr. George Stansfield, Historian at the National War College, is presently engaged in a search of documents and private papers of individuals who were in decision-making positions at the time that the National War College was founded, with a view toward clarifying connections between the two schools.
insight into the nature of the political-military educational process, and are useful evidence in a discussion of the nature of politico-military expertise. Other characteristics, like details of trips, shapes of seminars, etc., are marginally less valuable in that pursuit, but are presented because of the paucity of systematic descriptive materials concerning the three schools.

Royal College of Defence Studies

The course of study at the Royal College of Defence Studies is twelve months in length, as was the course at its predecessor institution, the Imperial Defence College. At the present time the student body numbers approximately seventy-five. Some seventeen nations are represented including some previously affiliated with Britain at the time of empire and through the Commonwealth, some who are allies, and several neutral and non-aligned countries. Slightly more than half of the enrollment is British, with the remainder coming from other countries. The breakdown is as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{34}\)When the college opened the size of the student body was twenty-five. It quickly grew to thirty, and remained at thirty until World War II. During that period students were exclusively from Britain or from Commonwealth countries. Course size was expanded when the college reopened in 1946. The United States sent its first three students that year, and South Africa sent a student the following year. The Imperial Defence College Register, pp. 2-31. The discussion of later developments in text and Tables 2.2 through 2.4 are based on information from the Register supplemented from unpublished books of student biographies for the years 1970-1974.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Body Composition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Civilian)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth Relations Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign &amp; Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Overseas Development</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport &amp; Civil Aviation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Aviation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Aviation &amp; Supply</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Trade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Supply</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour &amp; National Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Power</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Post Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Public Building &amp; Works</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Technology</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Employment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Trade &amp; Industry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds City Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland Civil Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent &amp; Burk Constabulary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military students at the college are serving in the grades of colonel or brigadier or their naval and air equivalents. They are generally in their late to mid forties, and most have had exceptionally successful careers marked by experience in command positions, in high level staff positions, and frequently in combat. About half of the military hold a bachelor's degree or higher. Few had advanced degrees. Civilian students are all in government service, and British civilians are drawn primarily from departments related to defense and foreign affairs. The British civil servants tend to be very slightly younger than their military counterparts. Most hold a bachelor's degree or higher. A few have doctorates.

Among the British civilians, there has been fairly consistent representation of the Ministry of Defence and of the various offices associated with foreign affairs. Table 2.3 shows the distribution of civilian participants. Until 1966 the Ministry of Transportation and Aviation under its various incarnations, was regularly included. Other civilian representation shows no particular pattern until 1970 when the inclusion of a distinguished policeman became a regular occurrence. This latter fact is of some significance when viewed in conjunction with increasing curricular emphasis on domestic considerations discussed in the next chapter.

The pattern of representation from foreign countries is also interesting. Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United States have been regularly represented. Inclusion of a variety of other states affiliated with Britain at one time or another began
TABLE 2.4
Royal College of Defence Studies
Student Body Composition
(Foreign)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Rhodesia &amp; Nyasaland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| United Kingdom | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
with the South African representation in 1947. It has continued. In 1970 a variety of what are referred to as "continental powers" began to make appearance in the student lists. Non-European states, among them Ethiopia, Japan, Jordan, and Iran have been included in recent classes as shown in Table 2.4.

The composition of the student body at the Royal College of Defence Studies provides significant insight into the rationale underlying the politico-military education taking place there. First, the Directing Staff of the school recognizes clearly that the allocation of spaces to non-military organizations and to representatives of foreign countries comes at the expense of sending British military people into those same spaces. This decision is based upon the view that there are a limited number of positions in the Ministry of Defence and in the various joint and service staffs requiring the high levels of political-military expertise which the school is designed to help produce. There is neither recrimination nor apology with regard to the somewhat "undemocratic" character of an allocation process which guarantees that an extremely small fraction of British officers ever will have the opportunity to attend the school. This is an interesting contrast with the situation in the United States where every effort is made to allow as many officers as possible to attend professional military schooling at the War College level.35

With this said, however, it is clear that the principal emphasis at the school is to improve the qualifications, knowledge base,

35 Interviews with Commandants, Directing Staff and faculty at the three schools.
analytical skills, and insight of the British military officers attending. Students from other countries and other walks of life are regarded as a major leavening device in the learning process. A quick look at the eclectic nature of representation, both in the case of British civil servants and in the case of foreign students, shows that over the twenty year period analyzed in detail, there has clearly been a broad view of the nature of desirable inputs to professional military learning. There is also clear evidence that as decline of empire progressed, a decline of interest in world affairs or in the affairs of those nations previously affiliated with it, has apparently not occurred among senior British military and diplomatic professionals. Analysis of trends in curricular emphasis in the following chapter provides further evidence on that point.

The Directing Staff at the Royal College of Defence Studies is both small and senior compared to the Directing Staff at the Canadian school and the faculty at the National War College. The Commandant of the British school is a general officer of four star rank and is most frequently an officer who has had a distinguished career at the highest levels of military command and responsibility. His senior staff includes three officers of two star rank representing the air, land, and sea services and an ambassador or equivalent civil servant. He also is assisted by a Junior Directing Staff composed of four lieutenant colonels or their naval or air equivalent, and one civilian of

36 Of course, as previously noted, decisions on allocation of spaces are made jointly by college authorities and advisors from both The Ministry of Defence and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, as with all exchange programs, motivations of those offering spaces are usually neither simple nor entirely altruistic.
approximately equal rank from either the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Commonwealth Office, or the Defence Ministry.  

Senior Directing Staff members have usually had high level command and staff experience; were nominated individually by their parent service or organization; and were approved by the Commandant. The normal tour for members of the Senior Directing Staff is two years, with departures staggered to provide some continuity. Members of the Senior Directing Staff review, discuss, and sometimes alter both curricular content and methodology. In addition they act as chairmen of seminars, perform protocol functions associated with addresses by distinguished visiting speakers, and prepare informal evaluations of students from their respective services and organizations. Most Senior Directing Staff members are not promoted after their tour at the school. Many of the military officers retire.  

The Junior Directing Staff members personally accomplish the great bulk of both the administration and the operation of the course. Their selection is an intensive process involving nomination of extremely promising officers from respective services; selection of one

---

37. The Imperial Defence College Register, interviews with Commandants, Directing Staff members.

38. Ibid. Also, unpublished books of biographies for the years 1970-1974.

39. This information was compiled mainly through interviews of Directing Staff members. No statistical evidence on these points is known to exist, nor do school authorities see any necessity or desirability in its compilation. British Directing Staff members and students displayed a startling familiarity with the details of the careers of their predecessors, conveying the strong impression that those persons who pass through the school are indeed an elite, cohesive, if informally organized group.
military officer from each service accomplished by an interservice board of eight officers of two star rank; and approval of each selection by the Commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies. Officers selected to fill Junior Directing Staff positions have tended to have had both experience in positions of command and considerable exposure to high level staff problems in their individual service staffs. Some have had joint and international staff experience. An indication of the quality of the officers selected is that almost all air and land officers and many of the naval officers who have served as Junior Directing Staff members are eventually promoted to general or flag officer. Civilians also have an impressive promotion record.  

Junior Directing Staff members normally serve a two year term, although one military officer will be selected to stay a third year and act as coordinator of the Junior Directing Staff. During their tenure, members of the Junior Directing Staff attend lectures, participate in seminars, and receive credit for course completion. More importantly, however, it is they who prepare the introductory material for each particular topic in the curriculum, who organize the curriculum as a whole, who recommend readings, and who organize and administer the lecture program. Bachelor's degrees among these officers are common, but master's degrees are not.  

Seminars at the Royal College of Defence Studies are groups of

---

40 See the preceding footnote.

41 Interviews with Directing Staff members. Review of Imperial Defence College Register and subsequent unpublished biographical data.
approximately nineteen students who meet to discuss the various topics covered during the course. One of the attempts to avoid the passive nature of a course dominated by lectures was instituted by Alistair Buchan in 1971 and has carried through. Instead of having one speaker on each day as had been the custom, the Royal College of Defence Studies now attempts to find experts who are willing to stay at the school for four days. These experts may begin with a common address to the student body as a whole. From then on, however, they rotate among the four seminars in an attempt to provide students with a greater opportunity for interaction, discussion and frank questioning. Seminars begin with an approximately one hour presentation by the guest speaker, who is then questioned, in some cases quite pointedly and vigorously, by seminar members. Discussion is moderated by a member of the Senior Directing Staff and varies in quality. Staff members have observed that the students frequently possess extensive experience or knowledge related to subjects under discussion, and that they become more open and in fact more voracious as the course progresses. Speakers in general are quite frank and perfectly willing to put up with the kind of free give and take which is most conducive to effective seminar learning.  

In addition to the seminars, syndicates composed of half a seminar meet occasionally on afternoons. These groups are student led, and the emphasis during syndicate meetings is upon committee type procedures and group problem solving. The problems themselves are usually posed by members of the Junior Directing Staff in form of a short paper.  

---

42 Interviews with Directing Staff members. Also, personal observation.
The problems relate to the topics being covered in the mornings by speakers and in seminars. Occasional reports of syndicates to larger groups are another device designed to make the student more active and to enhance their views.\(^{43}\)

In addition to attendance at lectures and participation in seminars, students are required to prepare a major individual research paper twenty-five to forty pages in length, on a topic to which the student had not previously been extensively exposed. Students receive guidance from the Senior Directing Staff and in some cases from outside academic experts. The objective of the papers as originally conceived by Professor Buchan was to provide a reservoir of material from which the best pieces could be published. In general, because of the insistence upon dealing with an unfamiliar subject, most papers have not been of publishable quality.\(^{44}\)

Students are also occasionally involved in simulations. These simulations usually take the form of simple decision games although computer simulation has been attempted in the past. Time required for familiarization and logistical problems involving transportation of students are the principal reasons why computer simulations have not been continued.\(^{45}\)

The Royal College of Defence Studies is presently experimenting with elective courses designed to make the learning process more active and to allow some tailoring of the program to individual initiatives

\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) Ibid.
\(^{45}\) Ibid.
and needs. Voluntary electives were offered using both in-house and external academic expertise during the course graduating in 1975. Formalization and extension of an elective program is anticipated during the course ending in 1976. 46

An important element in the Royal College of Defence Studies program are trips which students make in conjunction with assigned subjects of study. 47 For example, during the curricular blocks on economics and on management, two or three days are set aside in each block to allow students to interact with knowledgeable persons in these fields. In addition, each class has the opportunity to travel about Britain. This travel, in addition to being a socializing device, is, of course, an important input to the knowledge of those students who come from other countries, and several British students commented about the fact that during these tours they were able to visit areas of the British Isles that they themselves had never seen. The tours within the British Isles are hardly pleasure jaunts. Meetings and briefings are scheduled throughout, with local officials in a variety of specialties including: municipal government; labor management relations; business and industry; and police agencies. 48 These trips within

46 Letter, Major General Anthony E. Younger, formerly a member of the Senior Directing Staff, Royal College of Defence Studies.

47 The information on trips is based upon interviews of Directing Staff members, and upon statistical data kindly compiled and provided by Brigadier T. I. G. Gray (Retired), Secretary of the Royal College of Defence Studies.

48 These regional tours began in 1968, just prior to the expansion in the range of countries invited to send students. The origin of the idea for the inter-Britain trip is not clear. However, there was extensive communication between the British and the Canadian schools
Britain are supplemented by visits of one or two days duration to a variety of military facilities within the country.

Except for a brief hiatus between 1957 and 1959, the Royal College of Defence Studies students have travelled together to Europe for familiarization and orientation at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, and at facilities of the British army of the Rhine. These trips which have been roughly one week in duration have now been modified to include attention to the European Economic Community headquarters in Brussels and to include a visit to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

In addition, the students at the Royal College of Defence Studies divide themselves into seven groups of approximately twelve people for an annual "world tour." Each group goes to a different area of the world and visits a number of countries. The "world tours" are approximately twenty-five days in length. Areas visited include: Europe, the Middle East, the United States and Canada, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia, the Far East, Africa, and occasionally Latin America. Again, the tours involve an extremely demanding travel schedule and a heavy dose of meetings and briefings with officials in the countries visited. From all indications, the groups of students and their accompanying Directing Staff members are extremely well received, even in countries where reminiscences of the British raj or ideological differences might lead one to predict a less than enthusiastic welcome. In fact, the groups are frequently met by heads of

during 1967-68, in the wake of the Canadian military reorganization period. The Canadians had been using in-country trips successfully for some time.
state and hosted by highest level governmental officials.49

Preparation for the trips involves reading, lecture, and discussion on the principal difficulties present in the area to be visited, a careful familiarization with itineraries, attention to personalities and other important features of the countries to be visited, and preparation of a list of subjects to be explored while on the road. At the conclusion of the trips, roughly ten academic days are set aside for writing trip reports, and another several days are utilized by groups exchanging information on areas visited.50

Overall, the students at the Royal College of Defence Studies spend about one-tenth of their course time travelling together. In addition to the information they gather on these trips and the contacts they may make in a variety of countries, they obviously are forced to get to know one another fairly well. The exchanges of views which take place on trips seem to have had as great an impact upon students as any exchange of views which may have taken place in the more formal academic atmosphere of the school itself.51

The preceding description of unique factors in the Royal College of Defence Studies' program represents an attempt to convey the atmosphere or milieu in which political-military education in Britain takes place. In view of the degree of detail, it seems useful at this point

49 For example, one group visiting Eastern Europe recently was welcomed and personally entertained by President Ceausescu of Rumania.

50 Course handbooks, weekly schedules, interviews of Directing Staff members.

51 Documentation and discussion of this point is included in the chapter under attitudes.
to summarize some of the more significant unique factors. First, the student body at the Royal College of Defence Studies has become more and more broadly international in character over the years. Secondly, the student body has tended to be more senior, both in terms of military rank and experience, than the student bodies in the Canadian and United States schools. Thirdly, the unique Junior and Senior Directing Staff arrangement in Britain combines the insight and initiative of fast burning younger officers with the judgment and breadth of view of officers more senior than those found outside the command elements of the Canadian and U.S. schools. Fourth, a broad range of host country and foreign civilian participation is considered an important element in the political-military education process, even to the extent that two civilians have served as Commandant. Lastly, it is worth noting that Commandants and Directing Staffs at the Royal College of Defence Studies have placed considerable emphasis on keeping a significant amount of student time unstructured. This tack is justified on the basis that free time for reading and reflection is an important element in the educational process. The discussion which follows will illustrate that emphasis upon this particular aspect varies in Canada and the United States.

National Defence College

The Canadian National Defence College is different in many respects from its British and U.S. counterparts. The program of instruction is eleven months in length, a month less than the British school and a month more than the U.S. The Student body numbers approximately forty. The students are referred to as course members, and are
drawn from Canadian, Australian, British, and U.S. military and civilian organizations. Table 2.5 is a rough profile of the student body.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Defence College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student Body Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canadian and U.S. military officers tend to be in their early or mid forties and tend to be serving in the grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, and naval equivalents. Australian and British military students are generally somewhat older and British officers are most often of brigadier rank. Except among U.S. military students, college or university degrees are a rarity. A majority of the military students have had either command or high level staff experience. Selection to the school is regarded as an honor and a harbinger of further career prospects. Although no statistical data exists on percentages of graduates promoted to general or flag officer, the perception of staff officers and students at the school is that promotion chances are improved considerably by attendance at the school, and that approximately half of previous graduates achieved general officer status.

---

52. The National Defence College (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: National Defence College, 1974).

53. Compiled from biographies, lists of course members, memoranda, in National Defence College files.

54. Ibid.

55. Interviews with Commandants, former Commandants, Directing Staff, and students.
One striking characteristic of the Canadian school is the very substantial portion of the student body made up of civilians. Canadian civilians outnumber Canadian military officers in the course by about three to two, and in a feature not imitated in either Britain or the U.S., the Canadians invite non-governmental civilians, particularly from industries associated with the development of Canada, to attend the course. Federal civil servants make up the bulk of the civilian population at the school, and are drawn from both foreign and domestically oriented agencies. Provincial civil servants have been included in recent years. Among the non-governmental civilians representatives of labor, church groups, and universities are now included on a regular basis. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 demonstrate graphically the eclectic nature of the civilian portion of the Canadian student body. The increase in the number of national governmental civil servants from agencies concerned almost exclusively with Canadian domestic problems reflects the tendency within the Canadian military and within the Canadian government at large to regard the military as an instrument of domestic development as well as an instrument of foreign policy. This tendency was mentioned in the Canadian theoretical material in Chapter II, and is discussed in greater detail under curriculum emphasis and attitudes in the two chapters which follow.

The Directing Staff at the Canadian school is small, with only five members including the Commandant. The Commandant is an officer in the rank of Major General or its naval equivalent. His deputy is an

---

\[56\] Compiled from biographies, memoranda in National Defence College files.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.6</td>
<td>National Defence College</td>
<td>Student Body Composition (Governmental Civilians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2.7
National Defence College
Student Body Composition
(Non-Governmental Civilians)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Canadian Broadcasting Company**
**Canadian Pacific Railroad Company**
**Imperial Oil Limited**
**British Amoco Oil Co., Ltd.**
**Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.**
**Canadian Industries Limited**
**Dupont of Canada, Ltd.**
**United Aircraft of Canada**
**Northern Electric Co.**
**Swall Canada, Ltd.**
**Union Carbide Canada, Ltd.**
**Canadian National Railroad**
**Trans-Canada Pipelines**

**Clergy**
**University Faculty & Administrators**
ambassador and a career diplomat. One brigadier and three colonels, one each chosen from the land, sea, and air branches of the Canadian Armed Forces round out the staff. Directing Staff members are almost always graduates of either the British or the Canadian Defence College. Few hold academic degrees with the exception of the diplomats. Masters and doctorates are very rare. The normal tour of duty for the Commandant of the Canadian school is two years. Other Directing Staff members tend to serve three or four years, and their departures are staggered so as to provide some continuity. 57 Until recently, most military persons serving on the Directing Staff were promoted to higher rank subsequent to their tour at the National Defence College. Within the last few years, the number of retirements from the staff has increased. 58

Members of the Directing Staff function in a largely collegial fashion. They have no teaching duties as such, but are responsible for shaping the curriculum: selecting, inviting, and escorting speakers; preparing written introductory materials for various phases of the course, and recommended reading lists which accompany those comments; organizing and accompanying trips; and for preparing course end evaluation of the students. 59

Lectures are the principal source of information at the Canadian 

57 Biographies and related materials.

58 Interviews and letter, Mary C. O’Conner, Librarian, unofficial archivist, and institutional memory of the National Defence College.

59 Interviews with Directing Staff members.
school. The lectures are organized around themes identified in the curriculum outline. These themes are discussed in the next chapter. In addition to lectures, however, the student body is divided into six groups varying in number from six to eight students, and referred to as syndicates. These seminar type groups are student led and work together to perform research on problematical areas of the various themes. The syndicates generally meet in the afternoon following lectures, and, based upon the research done by individual members, write a group paper making recommendations regarding policy implications of the various topics being studied. These group "solutions" are presented to a gathering of students outside the preparing syndicate and are critiqued. They are not graded in any normal academic sense. Students are rotated among syndicates as the course progresses in order to provide for maximum cross-socialization. The rotation of students, together with the small size of the student body itself, makes it likely that each student will become quite familiar with all of his contemporaries during the eleven months that they spend together.

Socialization is also enhanced by trips which are considered a critical element in the National Defence College program. More than one hundred days out of the eleven month curriculum are spent "on the road." The class normally travels together on one military aircraft. Approximately thirty days are spent traveling within Canada, and approximately seventy days are spent traveling outside. A profile of

---

60 Various National Defence College documents.

61 Interviews with Directing Staff members, students, Miss O'Conner.
National Defence College travel is contained in Table 2.8. The heavy emphasis on travel within Canada is another indicator of the internal orientation of both the school and the Canadian military profession. Trips are made to a variety of Canadian military installations, but also to remote areas in Canada, especially to the Arctic. Students are given first hand exposure not only to the strategic implications of Canada's geographic position, but also to the nature of the many difficult problems associated with the development of Canada. Trips outside of Canada include one of approximately a week's duration to the United States, and three others totaling more than two months to various areas of the globe, including Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The terminology on the left border of Table 2.8 is the terminology used in the Course Handbooks on the National Defence College over the years. The term "field study" used in recent years is really a more accurate description of the type of activity undertaken than the word "trips." As in the British case, travel schedules are intense. Briefings, meetings, protocol functions are numerous and very time consuming. Time for sightseeing and recreation is limited. The student body frequently is received by host country officials of significant stature. It is not uncommon to have the group greeted by or at least received by the Chief of State. This has been true in countries in all

---

62 Compiled from National Defence College course handbooks and other uncirculated documents.

63 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trips</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada - U.S. Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western &amp; Northern Canada Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Canada Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Study - Eastern Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Study - Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Study - Europe &amp; the Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American &amp; African Tour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Study - Pacific Rim &amp; Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean &amp; Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Study - World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal 32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2.8**

National Defence College
Trips
areas of the world, including communist countries.  

Preparation for trips involves some attention to the principal problems of the countries and areas being visited. After-action reporting is less detailed and intensive than in the United States and Britain since all students in the Canadian course participate in the same trips, whereas in the latter two countries, particularly on the longer trips, smaller groups of the student body visit different areas.

Individual research is not required of students in the Canadian program. Although each student must take a hand in preparation of group papers, emphasis is placed upon cooperation and consensus, rather than upon individual excellence.

Computer simulations are not used in the Canadian program. There is a crisis management exercise run without computer aid designed to provide insight into crisis decision-making. Again, stress is placed upon cooperative planning and analysis.

In summary, the large number of civilians in the Canadian student body, especially civilians from governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned primarily with Canadian domestic problems, and the devotion of substantial time to travel within Canada are factors which indicate that the Canadian military profession may indeed be very intimately involved with Canadian domestic as well as with Canadian

---

64 Course Handbooks, after-action reports, and associated correspondence and memoranda in National Defence College files.

65 Interviews with Commandants, former Commandants, Directing Staff members at the National College of Defence Studies. Also, course handbooks.

66 Ibid.
foreign concerns. With regard to educational methodology, the heavy Canadian emphasis upon travel and upon group problem solving and consensus, sets the Canadian program somewhat apart from its British and U.S. counterparts.

The National War College

The National War College program, shortest of the three schools, lasts approximately ten months. In addition, the National War College is the largest of the schools with an enrollment of approximately 140 students annually. All of the students are U.S. citizens employed by the Executive Branch of the government. Seventy-five percent of them are military, and twenty-five percent are civilian. The civilians are entirely federal civil servants and are almost entirely from foreign and defense policy oriented organizations. Table 2.9 shows the distribution of civilian spaces. 67

Military officers are drawn in equal numbers from air, land, and sea services, with the marines included under sea services. All serve in the grades of lieutenant colonel or colonel (and naval equivalents), with the bulk of the students being lieutenant colonels. Most military students are in their very early forties and most hold a master's degree or higher. The great bulk of the remainder hold bachelor's degrees. Military students tend to have had experience in command and/or high level service staff or joint staff positions. All have distinguished service records, and about half of those attending

67 Compiled from biographies, course lists, and various other documents from National War College files.
| TABLE 2.9 |
| National War College |
| Student Body Composition |
| (Civilian) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Information Agency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Operations Agency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Control &amp; Disarmament Agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Treasury</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of the Budget (Office of Management &amp; Budget)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Emergency Planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the National War College can expect to make general or flag rank.68

The term Directing Staff is not used at the National War College. There is a command element composed of the Commandant of the school who is an officer serving the rank of lieutenant general or vice-admiral and two deputy Commandants, one a diplomat of ambassadorial rank and the other a military officer in the rank of major general or rear admiral. The Commandant and the military Deputy Commandant positions are rotated among air, land, and sea services. There are also several military officers who serve in a variety of administrative capacities ranging from secretary of the school to security officer.69

The actual management of the curriculum is in the hands of a group of twelve military officers, eight federal civil servants or former civil servants, and two civilian academicians. This group of approximately twenty-two persons is referred to at the National War College as faculty. In addition to the duties performed in the British and Canadian schools with regard to shaping the curriculum, inviting and escorting speakers, and the like, the faculty at the National War College is involved in the preparation of considerably more extensive written material dealing with course topics. This material, which sets forth the rationale for inclusion of various specific subjects, and which includes lists of required and recommended readings and other details, forms the basis for student activity throughout the year. In


69 National War College Organizational Charts and related documents.
addition, in recent years, the faculty has become involved in leading
some seminar discussions and in conducting elective courses which are
now required of all students at the National War College. 70 Electives,
syllabi and other course related materials are discussed in further
detail in the next chapter.

The faculty members are divided into departments, each of which
is responsible for preparing a certain portion of the curriculum. The
three academic departments are the Department of Curriculum Development;
the Department of Military and National Security Affairs; and the De-
partment of International Relations and Area Studies. There is military
hierarchial organization both within the individual departments, and
between the departments and the command elements. In spite of the
formal organization, and in spite of the fact that one faculty member
is usually assigned to be responsible for the content of each of the
principal areas of the curriculum, there is a collegial atmosphere
within the departments and informal cooperation, both within and among
departments, is the rule. 71

In addition to those officers considered as faculty, there is a
group of officers assigned to what is called the Strategic Research
Group, an organization of military and civilian research fellows who are
assigned to the National War College and who engage in intensive policy
oriented research. These officers and civilians are available to

College, 1975); syllabi and other course related materials; interviews
with faculty.

71 National War College Organizational Charts. Interviews with
faculty members.
assist the faculty per se, and participate in both prescribed and elective courses. The Strategic Research Group is an organization of considerable interest as a relatively new concept in the role of war colleges, but lies largely outside of the educational milieu being discussed here, and therefore will not be treated further.\textsuperscript{72}

Military officers serving on the National War College faculty are usually in the grades of lieutenant colonel, colonel, or their naval equivalents. Most are in their middle or late forties and most have held command or high level staff positions. Until recently, many were graduates of war colleges prior to joining the faculty. Many still are. Roughly one-third of the military officers serving on the faculty hold doctoral degrees, usually in the social sciences. Most of the rest hold master's degrees. Their normal tour of duty at the National War College is three or four years. Few of the military officers are promoted after serving at the school. About a third retire directly from their assignments there.\textsuperscript{73}

Civilian faculty members are of two types. One group is composed of civil servants provided principally by the Department of State, but also including persons from the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, and similar externally oriented organizations. The second group, numbering only one or two a year, are civilian academicians who come to the National War College for a one or two year

\textsuperscript{72}Interviews with faculty members, Strategic Research Group members.

\textsuperscript{73}National War College Alumni Register (Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1974); and interviews of faculty members.
stint as a visiting professor.\textsuperscript{74}

Governmental civilians serving on the faculty tend to hold a master's degree or higher. About a third have possessed a PhD degree. They tend to be in their early fifties and most have had extensive experience abroad. Few are promoted after serving at the school, and about half retire directly from their faculty positions. Their normal tour varies from one to three years. Two have become permanent faculty members.

All but one of the visiting civilian academicians have held a PhD degree. Early in its history, the War College made serious attempts to draw highly renowned scholars as visiting professors. A combination of low salaries and the short tenure of the assignment served to make it difficult to attract these persons. Since 1955, the tendency has been to hire civilians with specialities in economics, history, or political science, with preference given to scholars in those disciplines who have an area speciality. A few of the professors who came to the War College were well known in their fields. The majority were established scholars but generally not widely renowned. Most of the civilian scholars have been in their late 40's or early 50's, and most returned to academic life within two years.\textsuperscript{75}

Recently, the National War College has changed its policy with regard to civilian academicians and is attempting to hire young scholars who have demonstrated promise in teaching and research, and who have

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75}Internal memoranda; interviews with past and present faculty members; data compiled from National War College biographies.
published. These scholars, who are required to hold a doctorate, and who possess knowledge in policy relevant disciplines, are hired for one year with extension a prerogative of the National War College. Their salaries are concomitant with what they would be receiving in civilian life. 76 The younger professors seemed to be less bothered by the short tenure of the position at the National War College and tend to enjoy the give and take with the students at the school, who tend to be about their age. 77

Lectures are the principal source of information for students attending the National War College. These lectures, very similar to those presented in Canada and Great Britain, are given by speakers from a broad variety of organizations and backgrounds and are discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Faculty members and occasionally students address classes from time to time. 78

In addition to attending guest lectures en masse, students are divided into nine groups of approximately sixteen, referred to as seminars. These discussion groups are led by faculty members in the early months of the program, but in the later portion are frequently student led, although faculty sit in. Occasionally a visitor or outside expert will join a seminar. In most cases, discussion in the seminars is concentrated upon topics currently being discussed within the

76 Interviews with Commandant, school secretary, and faculty members.

77 Interviews with civilian academicians on the faculty in 1974 and 1975. Also personal observation.

78 National War College Handbook – 1975; personal observation; interviews with faculty.
curriculum and upon material covered in reading or lecture. Students are rotated through the seminars so that there is maximum cross-socialization. discussion varies in quality, but tends to be lively and, in view of the occasional substantial pertinent experience of some participants, sometimes quite pointed and acerbic.

As in the case of the British and Canadian schools, travel is considered an important part of the educational and socialization processes at the National War College. At the present time, the National War College spends about ten days traveling within the United States, with roughly a third of that time spent at the United Nations, a third at U.S. Armed Forces military installations, and a third at a variety of other sites of interest. Approximately twenty days are spent outside the country. Trips outside the country are taken in small groups and a variety of areas of the world are visited simultaneously. Each student makes one trip abroad. Travel is by commercial or military aircraft.

Great care is taken to connect trips to the academic curriculum. Preparation is undertaken both in the area studies portion of the course required of all students, and also in elective courses on area studies which are discussed in greater detail further on. A student who visits Latin America, for example, is required to take the Latin

---

79 Ibid.

80 Personal observation; interviews with faculty members and students.

81 National War College Handbook - 1975; interviews of faculty members.
American Studies elective.  

As in the British and Canadian cases, the National War College travel schedule is hardly one which emphasizes rest and recreation. Briefings, visits, and protocol functions involving National War College students with dignitaries from their host nations are numerous and tightly scheduled. Visits with U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in the various countries are also included. Although the National War College has not, as of this writing, visited any of the communist countries, reception of visitors from the various classes in a variety of countries on all continents has tended to be very cordial in spite of some forced jocularity about the name of the institution from which the visitors come. The travelers are frequently received by the very highest level officials in the countries they visit. Discussions with the heads of state are not uncommon occurrences.  

There has been continual attention to protecting trips from the budget ax. The evolution of euphemisms used for trips in National War College documents can be construed as evidence of this sensitivity, as Table 2.10 illustrates.

Individual research is required at the National War College. Each student must prepare a twenty to twenty-five page paper reflecting research in depth on a topic of policy or theoretical interest. In

---

82 Ibid.

83 Interviews with faculty members; internal after-action reporting on trips. Boards of Visitors and Commandants Reports at the National War College abound with grave discussion about changing the name of the institution. So far, none of these efforts have managed to slip by vigilant "old boys" interested in preserving "the tradition of the institution."
addition, an individual research project may be undertaken as an alternative to elective courses. This research project must be reported upon in a paper fifty or more pages in length. In addition, shorter papers on course topics are prepared both individually and in groups. Faculty members are involved in approving topics, providing guidance, assisting in research, and reviewing the final products. In view of the fact that more than half of the students possess advanced degrees, and that many of the faculty possess doctorates, it is not surprising that much of the research is of high quality. 84 But, as discussed further on, the time students spend at the National War College is rather heavily structured. As a result, it is difficult to polish much of this research to the point where it is publishable. The faculty chooses the best papers for publication in National War College Forum.

84 Interviews with faculty; instructions to students on individual research; perusal of individual research papers.
the school's journal. These and others are passed to government agencies. Still others are presented orally, either to the entire class or to seminar groups. 85

Basic simulations without the aid of a computer are employed throughout the course. The simulations, which are of a variety of types, deal in general with international relations, decision-making processes and procedures, and, in some cases, with group problem solving. In addition, there is a computer aided budget simulation dealing with defense budgeting procedures. 86

As previously noted, certain readings are required of the students at the National War College. Syllabi are prepared for each of the various courses within the curriculum, both required and elective. These syllabi include daily reading assignments selected from a variety of sources which are designed to point up principal issues related to the topic under discussion. Faculty members select the readings and attempt to provide a variety of sources as well as viewpoints. Most of the readings are excerpts or short pieces. 87 Bibliographies of recommended readings are provided to class members before they even reach the school, and before each area of emphasis is treated. 88 The nature of the various courses is discussed in the next chapter.

---

85 Interviews with faculty; review of National War College Forum.
86 Interviews with faculty; reviews of Course End Reports prepared by faculty members at the close of each block of instruction.
87 Review of syllabi and related materials. Interviews of faculty.
In addition to the readings, lectures, seminars, simulations, and trips at the National War College, there is now a requirement for students to participate in an elective studies program. Elective courses were first introduced at the school in 1967 on a voluntary basis and became a part of the regular program in 1971. The elective courses are conducted during afternoons and meet about twice weekly. There are just in excess of twenty electives offered. They are designed to provide the opportunity for individual intensive study of an area or topic dealt with in greater generality in the prescribed course program.\textsuperscript{89}

Electives are taught by faculty members at the National War College or by outsiders who are experts in the particular area under consideration. Students are required to take four elective courses or to substitute tutorial or research programs which involve approximately the same amount of effort. School officials estimate that approximately twenty percent of total academic time is spent on elective programs.\textsuperscript{90} Topics vary widely and are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Although evaluation of students is a subjective process in which neither tests nor grades are employed, students at the National War College are evaluated at the end of each of the ten blocks of instruction in the curriculum as well as at the close of the course. In short, there exists an atmosphere of pressure more akin to that in a

\textsuperscript{89}National War College Handbook – 1975; review of curricular materials and internal memoranda on elective courses; interviews with faculty members.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.
conventional academic environment. This type of pressure appears to be essentially absent from both the British and Canadian schools.91

The program at the National War College, especially when compared with the British and Canadian programs, seems to provide new evidence of the tendency of Americans to be extremely intense about everything they do. The entire course of instruction is highly structured, and demands upon the students' time are great.92 Where the emphasis in the British and Canadian schools seems to be upon opportunities for contemplation and reflection, the Americans emphasize the importance of intensive individual research.93

In addition to its sheer size and the highly structured atmosphere at the National War College, the school stands out from its counterparts because it is composed entirely of U.S. nationals.94 The British and Canadians tend to emphasize the beneficial cross-leavening that takes place as a result of the presence of foreign students.95

---

91 National War College Handbook - 1975; interviews with faculty members and students.
92 See Table 2.1, page 50.
93 This is a perception shared by Commandants, former Commandants and Directing Staffs at the British and Canadian schools. Several National War College faculty members observed that the British and Canadian schools are "too relaxed."
94 British and Canadian observers attended the National War College in its very early years, but were last included in 1950. A move was afoot during the Kennedy Administration to renew the invitation to the British, but reportedly did not materialize because other NATO allies got wind of it and requested that they too be included. Interview with Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Royal Air Force, Retired, who was involved in the negotiations. London, England, 3 February 1975. Also, Register of Alumni, National War College, 1974.
95 Interviews with Commandants and former Commandants of both schools.
National War College response is merely to reiterate there would be heavy demand for slots from a variety of countries; that there would be negative diplomatic repercussions when some countries were not included; and that every slot which goes to a foreign student would be a slot the school would be unable to use for a U.S. student. The latter position is a reflection of the determination in U.S. military circles to provide as broad as possible an opportunity for military officers to profit from senior military education.

Comparative description of the Royal College of Defence Studies, the National Defence College, and the National War College is intended to convey to the reader a sense of the atmosphere in which political-military education takes place in the three democracies under discussion. It is apparent that each of the countries perceives a need for officers who have had the opportunity to study in an organized fashion a variety of subjects relating military considerations to broader considerations of public policy. In order to understand the political element in military expertise, however, it is necessary to proceed at this point directly to a systematic and detailed analytical comparison of the subject matter which the three institutions consider most important to the military professionals and others who attend the schools.

---

96 Interview with the Commandant, National War College.
CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF EMPHASES IN CURRICULAR CONTENT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The statements of purpose or mission of The Royal College of Defence Studies, The National Defence College, and The National War College, when combined with the continued existence of these institutions and the strong support they receive from both alumni and from civilians in government, make a prima facie case for the fact that both military professionals and civilian officials in government regard political-military expertise an essential element of the military profession. The question that has not been systematically examined in either sociology or political science literature is "What is the nature of that political-military expertise?" The analysis which follows is designed to examine a facet of that question in detail on a comparative basis.

The first portion of the discussion briefly sets forth the content of the curricula of the three schools as experienced by the classes graduating in 1975.\(^1\) This basic orientation is followed by an

---

\(^1\) That brief discussion is based upon synthetic description of the curricula of the three schools contained in official documents, most of which are publicly available. In the British case, the principal document is entitled, The Royal College of Defence Studies (London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 1975), a pamphlet issued to each student at the school which orients him to the program he will
in-depth twenty year trend analysis of the curricular content of the three schools covering the period 1955 through 1974. Because of the complexity of any attempt at synthesis of the information contained in the curricula of the various schools over a twenty year period, the sources and methodology used in constructing variables are discussed in some detail.

CROSS-SECTIONAL COMPARISON: 1975

Royal College of Defence Studies

The principal emphases or areas of interest in the curriculum of the Royal College of Defence Studies are succinctly stated in the college's own words as follows:

The policies and relationships of the Soviet Union and the United States; the balance of powers; the basis of modern

undergo. This pamphlet was titled Royal College of Defence Studies Handbook until 1974, and is still referred to as such. Information on the National Defence College is obtained from a document entitled, National Defence College: Canada (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: National Defence College, 1974). In addition to use of that publication, some material is synthesized from a document referred to as National Defence College of Canada Course Handbook 1974-1975, which is not in the public domain. The principal source of information for a description of the National War College course is a document entitled "The National War College: Tentative Outline of the Year's Work, 1974-1975," an internal planning document that is available in the National War College library. The information taken from that publication will be available in condensed form in the near future as Rotunda--75 (Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1975), a yearbook-like document which provides synthesized accounts of various events transpiring during the attendance of the class of 1975. Although none of the sources identified are "classified information," they are not published and circulated in the fashion that catalogues of universities are.

2 The years referred to here are the years in which classes graduated. For example, data for 1955 describe the material presented to those persons entering the National War College in August 1954 and graduating in June 1955.
strategy, including the control of armaments.

The place of Britain in the balance of power; British domestic and external interests; British strategic and defence policy.

The nations of Europe, East and West; Britain's relations with them; defence and deterrence in Europe.

The policies and interests of the Commonwealth countries.

The strategic, political, and social concerns of the nations of the developing world.

The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and order.

The international economic system, including trade and monetary questions; the British economy.

Developments in modern science and the implications of technological advance.

The techniques of modern management with emphasis on their relevance to defence management.

Contemporary social problems, including the place of armed forces in society.  

The curriculum is divided into four terms, each of which has a theme. The first three terms are, in turn, divided into what are referred to as phases, each of which emphasizes a particular aspect of the term theme. Table 3.1 on the following page shows in outline form the structure of the Royal College of Defence Studies course.  

The economics and management portions of the first term and all of the second term focus very heavily upon the situation in Great 

---

3 The Royal College of Defence Studies, 1975, pp. 1-2.

4 The titles furthest left are the titles assigned to the four terms. The subtitles are the subtitles applied by the school to the various phases with the exception of those listed under Europe. The fall term devoted to Europe is not divided into phases as are the other three. The subtitles under Europe in the outline are taken from a narrative description of that particular term contained in The Royal College of Defence Studies Handbook 1975.
TABLE 3.1

Royal College of Defence Studies
Curriculum Outline

The Elements of Power

Great powers
Modern Strategy
Economics
Management

The Modern Environment

Britain
Modern society
Protest and revolutionary conflict
Science and technology

Area Studies

Middle East
Africa
Asia
Canada: Latin America

Europe

Principal countries and organizations
Internal organization
Relationships with the super powers
Evolution of a European security system
American view of Europe
Economic relations
British view of European defense
Future of Europe
Britain. The fourth term, devoted entirely to Europe, is an innovation introduced at the college by Professor Alistair Buchan during his term as Commandant. Buchan was anxious to turn from the previous emphasis on empire to the more modern reality of the close relationship between Great Britain and Europe. The latter emphasis has survived his departure. The College states in the handbook, "The Continent (is) where Britain's main strategic and political interests now lie."  

The overall structure of the Royal College of Defence Studies curriculum is perhaps seen most easily in diagrammatical form. Table 3.2 on the following page shows the relationships of the various terms and phases as well as the place of trips in the curriculum.

National Defence College
Canada

The National Defence College curriculum is designed to "Promote awareness and understanding of the domestic and external realities which influence the formulation and implementation of national policies in Canada. Political, economic, military, social, cultural, and scientific developments in Canada and abroad come under close scrutiny in the academic atmosphere in advanced graduate schools." The central themes

---

5 Review of course materials, interviews with Directing Staff members.


7 The Royal College of Defence Studies--1975, p. 5.

8 The table is a reproduction of Annex D to The Royal College of Defence Studies--1975.

9 National Defence College: Canada, p. 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST TERM</th>
<th>SECOND TERM</th>
<th>THIRD TERM, LEAVE AND TOURS</th>
<th>OCT 27 – NOV 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAN 7 – 10 INTRODUCTION 4 DAYS</td>
<td>MAR 10 – 14 BRITAIN 4 DAYS</td>
<td>SEP 8 – 12 PREPARATION FOR TOURS AND PAPERS 5 DAYS</td>
<td>19 DAYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 13 – 23 GREAT POWERS 9 DAYS</td>
<td>MAR 17 – 21 REGIONAL TOURS 8 DAYS</td>
<td>SEP 16 – OCT 10 TOURS 19 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAN 24 – FEB 11 MODERN STRATEGY 13 DAYS</td>
<td>MAR 24 – 27 BRITAIN (cont) 4 DAYS</td>
<td>DEC 1 – 5 EUROPE (cont) 5 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 12 – 24 ECONOMICS 10 DAYS</td>
<td>APR 14 – 18 BRITAIN (cont) 5 DAYS</td>
<td>DEC 8 – 12 FINAL WEEK 5 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB 25 – MAR 7 MANAGEMENT 8 DAYS</td>
<td>A PR 21 – MAY 5 MODERN SOCIETY 11 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 6 – 20 PROTEST AND REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT 11 DAYS</td>
<td>AUG 14 – 21 ASIA 7 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 21 – JUN 13 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 13 DAYS</td>
<td>AUG 22 – 28 WEEK END 5 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUG 28 – 29 BANK HOLIDAY 4 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUG 30 – 90 ASIA (cont) 4 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SEP 1 – 5, CANADA, LATIN AMERICA AND AID EX 5 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
identified in National Defence College literature involve considera-
tion of "sovereignty and independence, peace and security, social
justice, economic growth, quality of life, and harmonious national
environment." 10

The curriculum at the National Defence College is divided into
four terms, which are in turn divided into "studies." The studies in-
volve both activity within the college itself and trips both within
and without Canada which are referred to as field studies. The
principle themes in various terms identified in the National Defence
College: Canada pamphlet are presented in outline form on the following
page as Table 3.3. 11

In view of the fact that students at the Canadian school
spend almost 100 days of their time in school travelling, it is useful
to orient the reader to the relationship between the in-house treatment
of the various topics just outlined and the field travel connected with
the topics. Table 3.4, which follows Table 3.3, provides a graphical
overview of the shape of the curriculum. 12

10 Ibid., p. 5.

11 In constructing the table, the titles of the terms were taken
from National Defence College documents verbatim. The subtitles are
taken from narrative material contained within the pamphlet. It is
worth noting the very heavy emphasis on relating broader topics
directly to Canada herself. This factor will be discussed in more
detail when analyzing the evolution of the curriculum.

12 Table 3.4 was prepared using information contained in "The
National Defence College of Canada Course Handbook 1974-1975," Appen-
dix A. As previously noted, this document is not available for general
circulation.
TABLE 3.3

National Defence College
Curriculum Outline

Canadian Studies--The Internal Scene

- Process of government
- Influences on government
- Senior administration
- Policy advice
- Canada as a federal entity
- Current Canadian scene (Socio-Political issues)

Canadian Studies--External Influences

- International relations and developments
- Population growth
- Racism
- Poverty
- Area Studies

Strategy and Canadian Defence

- Elements of strategic thought
- Major military forces in the world
- Role of the military in Canada

Final Review and Final Problem

- Formulation and implementation of effective domestic, defence and foreign policy
- Forecasting methods
- Computer concepts and programming
- Planning/budgeting/systems analysis
- Preparation and presentation of a group analysis of a national problem, including policy recommendations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Term</th>
<th>Second Term</th>
<th>Third Term</th>
<th>Fourth Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 3 - 6</td>
<td>Nov 17 - 28</td>
<td>Feb 27 - Mar 7</td>
<td>Apr 28 - May 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COURSE ORIENTATION</td>
<td>WORLD ENVIRONMENT PHASE I</td>
<td>MILITARY STRATEGY</td>
<td>FINAL REVIEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 DAYS</td>
<td>2 DAYS</td>
<td>7 DAYS</td>
<td>&amp; FINAL PROBLEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 9 - 10</td>
<td>Nov 29 - Dec 13</td>
<td>Mar 9 - 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS</td>
<td>LATIN AMERICAN &amp; CARIBBEAN TOUR</td>
<td>NORTHERN CANADA TOUR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td>15 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 13 - 17</td>
<td>Dec 16 - 20</td>
<td>Mar 17 - Apr 11</td>
<td>May 20 - Jun 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORONTO TOUR</td>
<td>WORLD ENVIRONMENT PHASE II</td>
<td></td>
<td>AREA STUDIES PHASE III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 DAYS</td>
<td>7 DAYS</td>
<td>10 DAYS</td>
<td>(EUROPE &amp; THE MIDDLE EAST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 18 - 24</td>
<td>Dec 21 - 5 Jan</td>
<td>{ }</td>
<td>{ }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECONOMICS</td>
<td>CHRISTMAS LEAVE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 DAYS</td>
<td>MILITARY STRATEGY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 22</td>
<td>{ }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTTAWA MEETING TOUR</td>
<td>{ }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 DAY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 24 - Oct 2</td>
<td>{ }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS</td>
<td>{ }</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 3 - 11</td>
<td>Jan 6 - 22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 3 - 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTERN CANADA TOUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EASTERN TOUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 15 - 23</td>
<td>Apr 14 - 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS</td>
<td>AREA STUDIES PHASE II</td>
<td>CANADIAN DEFENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 DAYS</td>
<td>(THE WORLD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 24 - Nov 3</td>
<td>Jan 23 - Feb 19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN CANADA TOUR</td>
<td>13 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 4 - 11</td>
<td>Jan 20 - 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS</td>
<td>10 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 13 - 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK/WASHINGTON TOUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 21 - 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTTAWA SANDWICH TOUR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 25 - 28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 20 - 28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA STUDIES PHASE III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PRESENTATIONS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 DAYS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National War College

The National War College describes its approach to politico-military education succinctly, albeit in terms that would make even the most jaded slinger of social science jargon cringe. The school attempts to "present a constructive, issue-centered, future-oriented, theme-related course of study of U.S. national security." The central theme is an exploration of the relationships between "the motivations of man, society, and the nation state and the planning of national strategy and the conduct of national security affairs." Emphasis in the curriculum is placed upon:

- Analysis of the nature and interdependence of the several factors of national power in the United States and other nations;
- Study of the integration of military and foreign policy;
- Study of the role of the United Nations and other means designed to avoid armed conflict between nations;
- Determination of the influence of the possession or deficiency of economic, scientific, political, psychological, and social resources upon national security;
- Study of the national interests and objections of significant nations with respect to their international relations, areas of disagreement and conflict, and policies designed to prevent war;
- Study of the military force necessary to implement national policy in peace and war;
- Strategy and war planning;
- The impact of science and technology upon the armed forces;
- Departmental and interdepartmental problems which concern the national security; and

---

14 Ibid.
The employment of joint and combined forces as related to national and coalition objectives and policies.\textsuperscript{15}

Clearly, with a bill of fare like the one described, organization is a critical element in the ten month National War College program. The National War College does not use "terms" as methods of dividing the curriculum. Instead, its topical divisions are referred to as courses. There are both prescribed courses and elective courses at the National War College. Table 3.5 below outlines the prescribed courses which must be taken by all students.

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{National War College: Prescribed Courses}
\begin{tabular}{l}
Foundations of National Security \\
U.S. Domestic Environment & National Security \\
U.S. National Security Strategy \\
U.S. National Security Decision-making Process \\
\quad Introduction to Area Studies--Selected Global Issues \\
\quad Canada, Europe, and the USSR \\
\quad East Asia & the Western Pacific \\
\quad South Asia, The Middle East, & Africa \\
\quad Latin America \\
National Security Analyses \\
Reassessment of National Security Policies
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The courses, composed principally of lecture but also involving seminar and reading activity, are roughly the equivalent of a phase in the British terminology, or a study in the Canadian. The last course, "Reassessment of National Security Policies," involves preparation of a twenty to twenty-five page research paper by each of the students.

Students at the National War College are required to participate in an elective course program which is somewhat akin to the kind

of graduate seminar one finds in an American university. These courses, which lasted approximately a month and which met twice weekly in the afternoons during the 1975 course,\textsuperscript{16} cover a variety of topics. Table 3.6 on the following page shows those elective courses offered to the class of 1975.\textsuperscript{17}

Students are required to take the area studies elective which corresponds with the area of the world they will visit during their overseas trips. In addition, a provision exists for individual students to voluntarily substitute tutorial research and writing or tutorial reading for an elective.

The relationship among the prescribed course program, the elective course program, and field trips and other activities is perhaps best seen graphically. Table 3.7 combines these activities in easily readable form.\textsuperscript{18}

This summarization of the curricula of the three schools allows the reader to orient himself with regard to their shape and emphasis. Of course, it also demonstrates the catholicity of interests among the senior military professionals who run the schools and, if one grants that the term "professional military school" is literally and properly applied to the three institutions, demonstrates again that within the

\textsuperscript{16} According to a faculty member, the 1976 elective program will probably extend the length of each elective course to twelve two hour sessions spread over twelve weeks.

\textsuperscript{17} Table 3.6 was prepared from a similar table provided by the National War College.

\textsuperscript{18} "Tentative Outline of the Year's Work, 1974-1975," p. 10-1.
TABLE 3.6

National War College
Electives

**Principles of Economics**  
**National Security Theories: Methods of Analysis**  
**Futuristics**

**Management in the Department of Defense**  
**Vietnam: A Beginning Assessment**  
**Strategy of Arms Control**  
**National Security & Problems of International Law**

**U.S. Society & National Security**  
**Problems of the Developing Countries**  
**The Energy Issue & Resource Scarcity**  
**Current Issues in Defense Policy**

**European Area Elective**  
**Far East Area Elective**  
**African Area Elective**  
**Middle East Area Elective**  
**Latin American Area Elective**

**Economics of National Security**  
**Strategic Thought**  
**Professional Ethics**  
**Geography, Technology & the Interconnected World**  
**Computer Aids for the National Security Manager**

**Tutorial Research & Writing**  
**Tutorial Reading**
military profession there is demonstrable concern over highly political subjects.

A more difficult and more important question, however, is, "Is it possible to gain insight into the nature of the political elements of military expertise by discovering patterns and trends existing over time in institutions designed specifically to deal with politico-military subjects?" The process of inquiry associated with answering that question in a systematic comparative way proved rather complicated. Because the reader must understand the process to effectively evaluate the merit of tentative conclusions offered, a brief discussion of the sources and methods used in the search for patterns and trends is presented next.

**COMPARATIVE LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS**

The Search for Patterns and Trends

Three factors associated with the programs at the three colleges made the task of identifying regularities in the emphases of the curricula formidable at best. The first was the sheer range of topics treated in the curricula of each of the three schools. Second, the schools tend to use a variety of terms to mean the same thing and sometimes use the same terms to mean a variety of things. The third factor is the heavy dependence in all the schools upon individual experts who usually lecture once, answer questions, and leave.

Investigation at all three schools revealed that from the end of World War II until approximately 1954, the connections among the various lectures attended by the students during the course were
tenuous at best. The organizing devices which presently exist, such as terms, phases, studies, and courses, did not exist. In all three schools the only attempt at cohesion existed in the form of "a problem" or "problems" drawn up by members of the Directing Staff or faculty and designed to allow students to at least attempt to deal with what they had learned in lecture in some synthetic way.

In 1954, however, at all three schools, for reasons that are not evident, there was a turn towards attempting to organize the order of appearance of speakers and to label different blocks of the course. "Problems" continued to be used as cohesive devices. However, there emerged themes identified by titles which showed the emphasis of the series of lectures being grouped together. These themes, initially evident in lecture schedules and subsequently elucidated upon at some length in introductory documents or syllabi, provide a device for seeing some order among the various speakers brought to the schools. The names of the themes, problem statements associated with them, examination of lists of lecturers and their topics, perusal of introductory material and syllabi, and examination of required and recommended reading lists allow a judgment to be made about the overall content of the particular segment of the course identified under any one title, and allow some insight into which titles were euphemisms and which titles accurately described the theme treated.

Finding a way to identify themes in the curricula was, of course, the first step in any attempt to identify patterns and trends. The next step obviously had to be discovery of some measure of relative emphasis upon particular topics within the curricula. Here, the
methodology in the three schools became a tool rather than a hindrance. Each of the three schools depends very heavily upon lectures as a principal source of information. A day in camera at all of the schools involves a series of activities revolving around the day's lecture. Each day of the curriculum, therefore, could be regarded as a "topic day" or a single quantitative unit of attention to the particular theme to which the lecture applied. The number of topic days devoted to any particular theme therefore became an absolute indicator of emphasis upon the theme within the curriculum. 19

Some difficulty existed in dealing with the recent Royal College of Defence Studies practice of keeping an expert for four days. Since there normally would be four experts in a week, all dealing with essentially the same subject and all rotating among the four seminars, it is possible to consider each of the lecturers as having taken a topic day. In other schools, occasional panel discussions were evaluated on the basis of how many days the panel actually sat at the school. In most cases, the panel would sit only one day and only one topic day on that theme would be credited.

Using the topic day as a unit of analysis, absolute measures of emphasis were built for each of the problems, themes, courses, etc., at each of the schools for the classes graduating in the years 1955 through 1974. This twenty year span was chosen for two reasons. First, by 1955 each of the curricula showed clear evidence of themes.  

19 Activity associated with electives at the National War College was discussed previously. Field studies or trips are excluded. These occupy approximately 50 calendar days in the British school, 100 days in the Canadian school, and 40 days in the U.S. school.
Secondly, the basic research itself was undertaken during the fall of 1974 and the spring of 1975, at which time the classes of 1974 had graduated and the classes of 1975 were just beginning their program.

As the process of building indicators progressed, it became evident that the problem of euphemisms had hardly been solved, and that any analysis based largely upon the names of various courses, problems, or themes would not allow perception of trends over long periods. Further, perusal of lecture lists, problem statements, reading lists, and syllabi showed that there was in fact continuity in a number of places where the names of courses would indicate that there was none. Courses which had similar emphases were therefore sorted and placed in categories which allowed examination of quantitative indicators in conjunction with course title. This step placed in relief the continuity that existed.

Once the process of sorting was completed and a matrix of absolute indicators had been built for each of the three countries, a new problem surfaced. Even with the aid of problem statements, syllabi and other descriptive materials regarding each of the themes, studies and courses, it became apparent that individual themes, studies and courses frequently did not correspond with one another in timing or in certain matters of perspective or emphasis. It came as a matter of little surprise that the view of politico-military matters from each of the three countries was different. One nation was a strong but declining power whose principal involvements, previously scattered throughout the world, were becoming increasingly oriented toward Western Europe. One had only recently emerged from its status
as dominion and existed in the shadow of its great power neighbor. The third was a superpower.

The challenge was to find some way of organizing the various themes, courses and studies in such a way that comparison among the three schools would be facilitated, but not in such a way as to violate the fundamental logic of the curricula of the three schools over time. A series of combinations of the groupings previously described were undertaken, initially individually by school, and subsequently these groupings were compared. What emerged were patterns of persistent attention to certain topics which pervaded the bulk of the activity at each of the schools during the twenty year period. The common areas of emphasis which facilitated the grouping of courses were: the international environment; policy, strategy and decision-making in the country in which the school was located; the nature of conflict; and area studies. Attention to political, economic and social factors in the broader context of the domestic environment was a fifth factor common to both the British and Canadian schools.  

Using these five areas of common emphasis, which will be referred to as dimensions, groupings of courses were rearranged and a cumulative indicator reflecting relative emphasis on the five dimensions was built. Tables 3.8 through 3.10 show the internal structure of the dimensions for the British, Canadian and U.S. schools. Titles on the left side of the tables are taken from various documents.

---

20 In the United States, attention to domestic factors was, until very recently, subsumed in consideration of policy, strategy and decision-making. The first cohesive course devoted to the domestic environment was conducted in 1974.
| TABLE 3.8 |
| DIMENSIONS OF CURRICULAR EMPHASIS |
| Royal College of Defence Studies—Britain |
| 1935—1974 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Allied Command Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size &amp; Shape of Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Military Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrent Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Equipment &amp; Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Strategy &amp; Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI Future Allied Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Forward Look</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Strategy in the 70's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Strategy - The Forward Look</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Size &amp; Shape of R.K. Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII Modern Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII Deterrence &amp; Defence in Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence in Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Defence &amp; Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV Modern Methods of Decision-Making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 17 | 11 | 78 | 85 | 22 | 33 | 35 | 20 | 46 | 44 | 39 | 41 | 43 | 55 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 16 | 17 |
TABLE 3.8—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XVII Major War</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII Limited War</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII Western Europe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII EEUR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX Near East</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX Near East</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX The Americas</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table continues with similar data for other regions and topics.
| TABLE 3.9 |
| DIMENSIONS OF CURRICULAR EMPHASIS |
| National Defence College--Canada |
| 1955--1974 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT |

| THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT |

| THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT |

| II Canadian Government |
| Citation Government & Defence Organisation |
| Government in Canada |
| Form of Government and Government Organisation in Canada |
| Political Process |
| Public Service Organisation |
| Public Service and Political Responsiveness |
| Canadian Environment |
| Canadian Studies |
| II Canadian Economy |
| Economics and the Canadian Economy |
| Economics |
| Canadian & Theoretical |
| International |
| General II & III |

| 20   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 15   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 15   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
| 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   | 13   |
TABLE 3.9—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project, Strategy, Doctrine**

**VI Security of Pacific Area**
- Future War
- Joint and Combined Planning
- Combined Planning
- Canadian Defense Policy
- The Response of the West
- Western Foreign Policy
  - Canadian Foreign Policy
  - Foreign, Defense, and Related Policy Reviews
  - Strategic & Military Studies
  - Canadian Objectives, Requirements & Constraints
  - Canadian Defense Studies

**V Conducting Defence (Mainly Analytical Methods)**
- Internal U.G.W.
  - 72
- External U.G.W.
  - 50
- C2
  - 44
- 42
- 43
- 31
- 30
- 29
- 28
- 26
- 24
- 22
- 20
- 19
- 18
- 17
- 16
- 15
- 14
- 13
- 12
- 11
- 10
- 9
- 8
- 7
- 6
- 5
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1

**VI Major War**
- Kinetic Weapon & Methods of Warfare
  - Methods of Warfare & Weapon Systems
  - Application of Military Power
  - Conduct of Military Operations
- Capabilities & Limitations of Armed Forces
- Internal W.
  - 72
  - 24
  - 22
  - 21
  - 20
  - 19
  - 18
  - 17
  - 16
  - 15
  - 14
  - 13
  - 12
  - 11
  - 10
  - 9
  - 8
  - 7
  - 6
  - 5
  - 4
  - 3
  - 2
  - 1

**CONFLICT**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.9—Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA STUDIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIU Russia and Communism Today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist &amp; the Communist Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR, Eastern Europe &amp; China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Countries of the Western World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN member states (in LDC's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Asia &amp; Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Asia, Africa &amp; Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; the Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa, Middle East, &amp; Latin America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Data Studies—World</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 3.10**

**Dimensions of Curricular Emphasis**

**National War College—United States**

1955–1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme 1: International Environment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 2: Domestic Environment</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme 3: National Security</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV: Domestic Environment and National Security</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V: National Security and Decision-Making</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII: Defense Management</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.10—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VILL Anatomy of International Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tensions and Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict and Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and Warfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capabilities and Strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Strategy &amp; Strategic Posture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX Counterinsurgency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of Subversive Insurgency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of Modernization and Internal Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization and Internal Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges of Modernization and Internal Stability in Developing Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial VII &amp; IX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTA STUDIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X Area Studies Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI Free World Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free World Allies and Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Free Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada, Europe and USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII Communist State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII In-between Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncommitted Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncommitted &amp; Contested Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa and Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Western Pacific</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia, Middle East, Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External, D, E, XII, &amp; XIII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AREA STUDIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial VII &amp; IX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
describing or introducing the various phases, studies, or courses. Groupings within dimensions show continuity which existed in the content of particular phases, studies or courses even when titles changed. The unit of analysis is the "topic day" described previously.

Phases, studies, or courses were placed under the international environment dimension when their principal emphasis was upon either global balance of power considerations or upon conceptualizations of the international system. In all three schools, especially in the earlier years, emphasis was placed upon the East-West balance. In more recent years, especially in both the British and American schools, emphasis was on a more broad systemic conceptualization.

Phases, studies or courses placed under the dimension "The Domestic Environment" showed clear emphasis upon conditions within the home country of the particular school. In the British case, until 1969, there was relatively heavy emphasis within this category on the Commonwealth. Clearly, it would have been possible to place consideration of the Commonwealth in the international environment or policy categories. However, emphasis within the British school was upon the nature of Commonwealth ties, upon the importance of these ties in relation to the quality of life in Britain, and especially upon what could or should be done in London to maintain those Commonwealth relationships which continued to exist. Also, within the domestic environment dimension in Britain, there has been heavy emphasis upon economics throughout the twenty year period analyzed. Further, there has been attention to both science and technology, and to problems of modern society. Both of these phases of activity in the British
school have emphasized the peculiarly British dimension of these particular problems. Canadian attention to domestic factors has involved careful attention to both the organization of Canadian government as a whole and attention to the Canadian economy. Problems associated with Canadian industrial and resource development have been emphasized.

As previously noted, in the United States no separate course dealing with the domestic environment existed until 1974. The course which began then has evolved somewhat, and is basically concentrated upon connections between the domestic environment and national security questions or problems.

Phases, studies and courses placed under the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension all emphasized processual aspects of national security problems. In the British case, phases dealing with British policy-making procedures, both British and allied strategy, the nature of deterrent philosophy, and management considerations within the British policy-making environment were placed under policy, strategy and decision-making.

In the Canadian case, early courses dealt with the decision-making procedures needed in incipient or actual nuclear confrontation situations. Across the entire twenty year span in Canada, there has been significant attention as well to both the planning and policy-making procedures within the Canadian government. In recent years, the concluding review in the Canadian course has dealt mainly with analytical methods used in the policy-making environment. Courses emphasizing each of these three were placed under the dimension policy, strategy and decision-making.
In the U.S. school, early courses emphasized the procedures for formulating national estimates, and the actual content of those estimates. In addition, throughout the entire period, at least one course has been devoted to the policy and strategy formulation processes and one has been devoted to the evolution of national security policies, plans, and programs. Since 1968, there has been as well a course emphasizing managerial techniques useful in the defense policy-making environment. All of these courses were placed under the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension.

Phases, studies and courses placed in the conflict dimension tended to emphasize description of the various types of warfare likely to be encountered in the international system; the relationship between and among those types of warfare; tactics to be used in each; and the nature, availability, and desirability of various weapons systems to be used. From 1960 forward in the case of Great Britain, and from 1963 forward in the case of the United States, considerable specific attention was given to the nature of conflict in the developing world and to counterinsurgency. This emphasis was not present in the Canadian course. In the British case in particular, there has been a clear shift in emphasis from conflictual topics related to the high end of the spectrum of violence to conflictual topics at a much lower level. For example, protest has been a major concern in the conflict dimension in Britain since 1970, but has received scant attention in either the Canadian or the U.S. schools. As one might expect, attention to conflict at the high end of the spectrum of violence has occupied a substantial portion of the U.S. courses within the conflict
dimension. Interestingly, in Canada a separate study devoted to the nature of conflict and the conduct of military operations has not existed since 1971. Of course, aspects of these two topics have been subsumed into other studies.

The area studies dimension contains phases, studies and courses which adopt a primarily regional perspective, as opposed to a global or more broadly international perspective characteristic of courses under the international environment dimension. Area studies in the British school have been clearly regional throughout the course of the twenty years examined. In both the Canadian and the U.S. schools, there was an evolution from attention to categories like Communist states, free world bloc, etc., to the more conventional regional groupings. Even within those broader categories of free vs. Communist world, problems were approached on the basis of their regional commonality rather than purely on ideological grounds.

Trends

Because of the differences in length among the courses, and because of the different emphasis placed upon travel in each, it was necessary to use percentages of time spent in-house as comparable indicators of relative emphasis on each of the five dimensions. The topic days spent on each dimension within the curricula experienced by each graduating class were therefore summed. Percentages were then calculated and plotted. What emerged were a series of trends and anomalies within each of the schools. These are discussed initially
school by school, and subsequently comparatively by dimension.  

Royal College of Defence Studies

In terms of cumulative emphasis over the twenty year period examined, the principal emphasis at the Royal College of Defence Studies has been on area studies, with 28% of the topic days devoted to that dimension. Attention to the domestic environment received almost as much emphasis with 27% of topic days devoted to that dimension. Twenty-two percent of topic days were devoted to considerations of policy, strategy and decision-making. Studies of conflict consumed 12% of curricular time and attention to the international environment dimension occupied 11%.

These measures of central tendency are, however, not nearly as interesting as the variation in attention to each of the given dimensions over time. As Scatterplot 1 illustrates, attention to the international environment dimension in the British school has varied in largely sinusoidal fashion with a low of 5% in 1968. A relatively steady increase occurred beginning in 1969, with 16% of the curriculum devoted to the international environment in 1974. A linear regression approximation designed to show trend over twenty years has practically no slope, and a standard error of estimate of 3.5%. The plot shows relatively steady attention to the international environment across the twenty year period with increasing emphasis in the 1970's. The marked jump in the 1970's is the first indicator of several reflecting the

21 Years on the abscissa of plots and in discussion refer to "the graduating class of ____."
reorientation and reorganization of the curriculum accomplished by Professor Alistair Buchan during his tenure as Commandant. Professor Buchan's changes are discussed in more detail further on.

Scatterplot 2 reveals considerable variation in emphasis upon the domestic environmental dimension within the British school. A regression approximation across the twenty year period shows a positive slope of .38, but the standard error of estimate is 6%. Further, it is apparent that there is much greater emphasis on the domestic environment during the 1970's, beginning with the first year of Professor Buchan's tenure and declining since. In 1974 30% of the curriculum was devoted to the domestic environment dimension.
Professor Buchan's hand is also evident in the pattern of emphasis on policy, strategy and decision-making in the British school. Scatterplot 3 on the following page shows that from 1955 until 1969 there was a steady increase from 15% to 35% of the curriculum devoted to those subjects. Professor Buchan induced a radical reduction in attention to policy, strategy and decision-making as items of separate consideration. During his first year, 18% of the curriculum was devoted to those subjects, and although there was a 4% increase in his second year, there has been a steady decline since. At the present time, 13% of the curriculum is devoted to policy, strategy and decision-making.
Scatterplot 3
Policy, Strategy and Decision-Making
Britain

Scatterplot 4
Conflict
Britain
Scatterplot 4 reveals that much of the increase in attention to policy, strategy and decision-making up until 1969 was at the expense of attention to conflict. Conflict disappeared completely as an individual phase in 1969 but was resurrected in 1970 and has increased steadily since then from 5 to 10% of the curriculum.

Scatterplot 5
Area Studies
Britain

Scatterplot 5 shows attention to area studies increased relatively steadily across the first fifteen years examined, and a linear approximation for the twenty year period of analysis has a positive slope of .3, although the standard error of estimate of 4.3% is considerable. Once again, Professor Buchan induced a change in trend in 1970 by reducing emphasis on area studies from 33% to 23%. In his second year, however, Professor Buchan allowed area studies to occupy
28% of the curriculum. In 1974 they occupied 30%.

Trend analysis of the in-house curriculum at the Royal College of Defence Studies reflects at every turn the effect of Professor Buchan's arrival in 1970. The appointment of a civilian as Commandant of the senior military professional school in Great Britain is an aberration which requires some exploration and discussion, especially in view of the fact that the focus here is upon military professional expertise.

As previously mentioned, the first civilian Commandant of the British school was Sir Robert Scott. His appointment in 1960 broke a chain of military Commandants which began with the founding of the school in 1927. The reasons for his appointment were sought unsuccessfully in interviews and in examination of documents at the Royal College of Defence Studies. Examination of curricular documents and of trend lines discussed above revealed no evidence of major change within the school during Sir Robert's tenure.

Professor Buchan, on the other hand, arrived at the College equipped with a rather thoroughgoing knowledge of its development and operation and equipped as well with a mandate from the highest levels of government to make major changes within the curriculum. How this situation developed is a matter of considerable pertinence and interest.22

In 1968 several recent graduates of the Imperial Defence

22 The information on this topic was obtained during interviews with Professor Buchan in Washington, D.C. on 20 February 1975 and with two British officers who were working in the Ministry of Defence in the late 1960's and were privy to developments involving the Imperial Defence College.
College, assigned to positions in the Ministry of Defence, gained the ear of Minister of Defence Denis Healy. They reportedly informed Mr. Healy that in their view the program at the Imperial Defence College had evolved to the point where the emphasis was upon relaxation and any productive activity associated with the course was largely accidental. This type of commentary, together with some negative perspectives on the operation of the College from distinguished senior Britons both in government and retired, caused Mr. Healy to contact a distinguished academician, Professor Sir Michael Howard, and to request his assistance in having a close and evaluative look at activities at the school. Professor Howard, in turn, contacted Professor Buchan who at that time was director of the prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies. Professor Buchan began an examination of the composition of the student body and the curriculum at the Imperial Defence College. He found the school relaxed indeed, and perceived that the curriculum was locked in what he described as a "decline of empire syndrome."

In discussions with Professor Howard and with Mr. Healy, Professor Buchan related his views to the effect that the curriculum should be overhauled, and that the student body composition should be altered to include representation from Europe, where Professor Buchan felt Britain's long term interests lay. Professor Buchan was also concerned about the relatively passive nature of the lecture method of instruction. He observed that in addition to the fact that lectures were "a dying art form," the limited opportunity for students at the school to meet and exchange views in small groups was a major deficit. Further, although he was concerned that there be preservation of at least some
leisure for reading and research, he felt that it was necessary to create a vehicle for self-expression by the students and suggested that a requirement be levied upon each of them to produce a research paper of about 15,000 words in length which would be prepared and evaluated with the assistance of an outside advisor from either the academic world or from government.

Professor Buchan's views were well received, and Mr. Healy decided to offer him the opportunity to put them into effect personally. Professor Buchan accepted the challenge and became Commandant of the school in 1969. The changes he wrought, which are discussed in various places herein, can be summarized briefly. With respect to the composition of the student body Professor Buchan included ten representatives of various European countries in addition to the rather wide range of Commonwealth and post-Commonwealth countries previously included. Although France was not represented the first year, it was the second. With respect to methods, Professor Buchan modified the lecture format by inviting four representatives to discuss one particular subject for a period of a week. On the first day, these four appeared together in a panel. Thereafter, they divided themselves among four seminar groups of approximately nineteen students for more intensive discussion. In addition, Professor Buchan divided the seminar groups in half into what are called syndicates. 23 Discussion in these groups was designed to provide further opportunity for interaction among the students.

---

23 Professor Buchan visited the National War College in Washington during the fall of 1969. The changes he made were modeled after procedures at that school. Interview with Professor Buchan, 20 February 1975.
themselves. Further, Professor Buchan implemented his plan with respect to papers. Students were required to produce a paper, originally 15,000 words in length, but since reduced to 10,000 words, on a subject of their own choosing. Finally, Professor Buchan persevered in the face of considerable opposition from alumni and other "old boys," and changed the name of the school from Imperial Defence College to Royal College of Defence Studies.

Adjustments to the curriculum have been discussed in part above. Professor Buchan altered the overall structure of the curriculum by increasing the number of terms from three to four. Extensive attention to the Commonwealth was eliminated, and the fourth term was devoted to relationships with Europe. As previously noted, time spent on service and bureaucratic organization was sharply reduced (as reflected in the trend in policy, strategy and decision-making), while attention to domestic considerations, especially those related to social problems within Britain, increased. With these general observations made, however, it is instructive to reexamine in retrospect the changes which Professor Buchan fashioned.

The name change, representation of Europe in the student body, the organization of seminars and syndicates, the structuring of the curriculum in four terms rather than in three, and the paper requirement, have all survived.

Within the curriculum itself, Professor Buchan's changes to the international environment dimension appear to have stimulated an already existing upward trend which began in 1968. We see a 10% net increase in attention to that dimension from 1968 until 1974.
In spite of the shift away from attention to the Commonwealth, emphasis on the domestic environment dimension sharply increased during Professor Buchan's first year. But that change has been followed by a resumption of the downward trend that existed prior to his arrival.

The policy, strategy and decision-making dimension, which Professor Buchan deemphasized, has shown a relatively steady decline since 1970. This decline is a clear reversal of the previously existing trend. That dimension, which in 1969 occupied about a third of course emphasis, presently comprises slightly more than half of that proportion.

Professor Buchan restored specific attention to the nature of conflict and the employment of forces. A relatively steady increase in attention to that dimension has occurred from a low of no attention at all in 1969 to 10% of course time in 1974.

Professor Buchan's initial 10% reduction in area studies only temporarily interrupted the upward trend in attention to that dimension. Attention to area studies jumped some 5% between Professor Buchan's first and second years as Commandant. In 1974, area studies occupied 30% of curricular time. The pre-Buchan level was 33%.

At the close of the period analyzed, 43% of the curriculum at the Royal College of Defence Studies was devoted to the British domestic environment, to formulation of policy and strategy, and to decision-making procedures. Forty-six percent was devoted to the international environment and to area studies, with heavy emphasis on Europe. Ten percent was devoted to the nature of conflict. The
variations in the five dimensions leading to this division are graphically represented in Scatterplot 6.

National Defence College
Canada

For the twenty year period analyzed, cumulative emphasis in the curriculum of the National Defence College has been roughly equal on the domestic environment; policy, strategy and decision-making; and area studies. The cumulative percentages are, respectively, 25%, 26%, and 27%. Attention to the international environment has occupied 14% of curricular time, and studies emphasizing the nature of conflict in the employment of forces have occupied 8%. But once again, the variations in the trend lines are of considerably greater interest than the cumulative percentages.

Scatterplot 7 shows a relatively steady pattern of attention to the international environment dimension in the National Defence College until 1968, in which year a rather dramatic downward trend in emphasis began. The overall trend for the twenty year period analyzed is downward. A regression approximation shows a negative slope of .4. But the latter years show a more precipitous decline, with only 4% of curricular time in the 1974 course devoted to that dimension.

Scatterplot 8 shows an inverse pattern in attention to the domestic environment up until 1968, at which time a series of fluctuations began. Overall, across the twenty year period analyzed, the regression approximateion reveals a positive slope of .45. But of greater interest is the pattern of fluctuation beginning in 1968. We see that in the curriculum experienced by the class of 1969 the
general upward trend in attention to the domestic political environment begins to reverse itself. By 1970 emphasis upon that dimension had declined from 30% of the curriculum to 20%. In 1971, the downward trend sharply reversed, with attention to domestic factors occupying a third of the curriculum. Both the decline in attention to the domestic environment in 1969 and 1970, and the precipitous rise in 1971 are first indicators of two critical events which have heavily influenced the curriculum at the National Defence College. Examination of trends in the remaining three dimensions reinforces the perception of turbulence within the school during the period 1969 through 1971.

Scatterplot 9 reveals that in 1969 a reversal of a sharp and rather steady downward trend in attention to the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension began. A dramatic increase in attention to that dimension continued for the next four years. From a low of 15% in 1968, attention to that dimension rose to 47% in 1973.

The remaining two scatterplots contribute further insight into the nature of changes within the school. In 1971, attention to the conflict dimension (Scatterplot 10), which had been declining rather steadily, suddenly dropped from 8% of curricular time to zero.

As Scatterplot 11 shows, the area studies dimension which had shown a steady increase over a period of fifteen years, suddenly was dramatically deemphasized in 1971. By 1973, a decline from 40% of emphasis within the curriculum to less than 20% had occurred.

Two situations, one external to the college and one internal to it, bear directly on the fluctuations that occurred in the period since the class of 1968 graduated. The first, the unification of
Scatterplot 9
Policy, Strategy and Decision-Making
Canada

Scatterplot 10
Conflict
Canada
Canadian military forces which occurred in 1968 and the major reorganization of the Department of National Defence which followed, must certainly be considered a circumstance affecting the dramatic increase in attention to the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension.

The second situation is related to the first but directly involves the National Defence College as an institution. According to sources familiar with operations at the school in 1969, authorities learned early in the year that the Public Services Commission had undertaken a study of the feasibility of establishing a national service university or a public service institute in Canada. During the

---

24 Information on this situation was provided by several persons close to events at the National Defence College in 1969, 1970, and 1971. They do not wish to be identified.
same period, authorities at the school became aware of the fact that an
administrative commission, which had examined the school's operation
during the previous year, had reported to the government in Ottawa in
a most uncomplimentary fashion their opinion that activities at the
National Defence College were much more conducive to rest and relaxa-
tion than to any kind of productive enterprise. The author of the
report, a young aggressive civil servant named Milligan, proposed that
the National Defence College be subsumed by a national service univer-
sity type of establishment. The Public Service Commission was to be
the overseer and director of the latter, and the military apparently
was envisioned as caretaker of the Public Service Commission's stable.

Initially authorities at the school, although irritated by the
tenor of the report, were not particularly apprehensive because they
took a dim view of the possibility that the report would be taken
seriously in Ottawa. Nonetheless, they made minor adjustments in
the curriculum of the class of 1970 which emphasized the importance of
attention to the international environment, conflict, and area studies
in the curriculum. Additional attention to these areas came at the
expense of attention to the domestic environment.

By the late spring of 1969, however, authorities at the school
learned that the Milligan report had indeed been taken seriously. In
fact, there was concern that a serious move was afoot to disestablish
the college. A call was put out to friends and alumni of the college
to exercise what influence they could in Ottawa to prevent its demise.
The call was answered, and an eleventh hour effort was successful in
preserving the college and keeping it under Ministry of Defence control.
But the challenge from the Public Service Commission had not been completely overcome. A decision was made to institute a Senior Executive Development Course at the National Defence College in the fall of 1971. A group of sixteen civil servants were assigned to the school for a three month period during the fall of 1970, and a select number of those were chosen to continue with the 1971 National Defence College course. In addition, two civil servants friendly to Mr. Milligan's views were assigned to "assist the Directing Staff" in assuring that the needs of the "senior executives" were met.

The impact of their "assistance" is evident in the scatter-plots which show that the class entering in September 1970 and graduating in July 1971 found a curriculum in which attention to the domestic environment occupied 35% of curricular time, a jump of 15% from the previous year. Attention to the international environment dropped from 13% to 10%. Area studies, which comprised 39% of the curriculum for the class of 1970, occupied only 29% of the curriculum for the class of 1971, and the conflict dimension disappeared altogether.

The Senior Executive Development Course created considerable disruption throughout the fall of 1971. The "regular" course members were apparently rather resentful about the grafting on of the short course. Further, the competition among the short course members to see who would remain for the full ten months created friction and

---

tension. These factors, combined with continued lobbying by friends and alumni of the College, resulted in the entire exercise being declared a marriage of inconvenience. The class of 1972 was composed entirely of persons assigned to the National Defence College for the full eleven month course, although the number of civilian members of the course has remained somewhat higher than in classes prior to 1971.26

Patterns of emphasis in the curriculum, however, still bear evidence of the 1968 reorganization and of the 1971 disruption. Although the percentage of curricular time devoted to the domestic environment returned to approximately pre-1970 levels (27% in 1974), attention to the international environment decreased steadily to 4% of the curriculum for the class of 1974, and the conflict dimension has not returned to the curriculum. Attention to area studies continued to decline precipitously until 1973. A slight increase in attention to area studies in 1974 was apparently made at the expense of attention to the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension.

In the broader view, the most striking aspect of curricular patterns at the Canadian school is the overall decline in attention to international factors during the 1970's, and the overall increase in attention to the domestic environment and to policy making. Table 3.11 shows the situation rather clearly.

26 This has occurred primarily at the instigation of Commandants of the school. The idea of a national service university continues to receive serious attention, but the viability of the National Defence College as a separate institution is no longer in question.
Scatterplot 12 makes this point graphically, and also shows the evolution of the five dimensions over the twenty years analyzed.

The National War College

In terms of overall emphasis over the twenty year period analyzed, the curriculum at the National War College has been clearly dominated by area studies. Analysis of cumulative percentages reveals that 36% of curricular time has been spent on them and, at the close of this analysis with the curriculum of the class of 1974, area studies comprised 42% of the National War College curriculum.27 Next in terms of cumulative emphasis came the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension, which occupied 27% of in-house time. The international environment received somewhat less attention, with 20% devoted to that subject. Conflict received 17%. As previously noted, specific

---

27 Faculty members at the National War College have reported some reduction since 1974.

Once again, the cumulative indicators do not reveal as much information as the trend lines. In the case of attention to the international environment, Scatterplot 13 shows that, after some irregularity in early years, there is a relatively steady downward trend until 1968. A regression approximation shows a negative slope of .34 for the twenty year period, with a standard error of estimate of 3.2%. In the period from 1968 forward, however, there is considerable variation in attention to the international environment dimension. By 1974, emphasis on that dimension had declined to 12% of curricular time. A portion of the decline in attention to the international environment in that year can be attributed to the inclusion of specific attention to the domestic environment which occupied 14% of curricular emphasis in that year.

Scatterplot 14 shows attention to policy-making, strategy and decision-making in the U.S. school has been considerable, as one might expect in view of the sheer size of the foreign and defense policy-making apparatus in that country. A regression approximation for the twenty year period has an almost imperceptible slope, but a substantial standard error of estimate of 4.35% reflecting again considerable turbulence from the year 1968 forward. In that year, attention to the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension jumped from a 22% level to 35% of curricular emphasis, and remained there through 1969. A downward trend began in 1970 and continued through 1974. The leap in attention to policy, strategy and decision-making factors in 1968 was,
as shall be subsequently discussed, made at the expense of area studies. At the present time policy, strategy and decision-making occupy 19% of curricular time at the National War College.

Scatterplot 15 shows attention to the conflictual dimension increased steadily from a low of 5% in 1956 to a high of 25% in 1968. Again, a reversal of trend took place at that point. An irregular decline followed. In 1974, conflict occupied 14% of curricular emphasis.

Attention to area studies, as previously mentioned, dominated the National War College curriculum. Scatterplot 16 reveals that the trend from 1955 to 1967 was relatively steady, with an almost imperceptible downward slope. In 1968 a precipitous decline from 35% of curricular attention to 25% occurred. This lower figure held through 1969, but by 1970 area studies again occupied 36% of curricular emphasis, and there has been a rough but ultimately upward trend since that time. As previously mentioned, in 1974, 42% of curricular time was devoted to area studies.

The turbulence in curricular emphasis beginning in 1967 is a matter of some interest. Vice-Admiral Fitzhugh Lee, U.S. Navy, served as Commandant of the National War College from 1965 through 1967. During his tenure, he commissioned an extensive in-house study of the curriculum at the War College. Admiral Lee's motivation for commissioning the study is connected in no small measure to some rather stinging criticism of the war colleges in general and particularly the National War College by then Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., who took the war colleges to task for a "breadth
view as an educational objective (which) is so overriding that it virtually precludes depth of view of any subject included in the syllabus."\[28\] Katzenbach also deplored the situation in which faculty members themselves were really not qualified to teach on the graduate level. Mr. Katzenbach put the point rhetorically. "Is it not close to the truth to say that the basic reasons why the war college faculties do not now teach is that the war colleges do not really provide professional instruction?"\[29\]

The principal effect of the study commissioned by Admiral Lee was to direct the attention of the faculty at the war college to the very difficult question of how much breadth and how much depth were desirable in the curriculum. In the short term, the most evident effect of the study was a sharp decrease in emphasis upon area studies, which occurred in 1968. This decrease was justified on the basis of the high time sensitivity of area studies and of the necessary shallowness of attention to all of the areas of the world in a course that lasted less than a year. In addition to the decrease in attention to area studies, a distinct effort was made to increase the conceptual content of courses on the international environment, and to pay more specific attention to the substance of policy, strategy and decision-making. Further, a dialogue was begun with the service academies in an attempt to attract the National War College faculty

---


\[29\] Ibid., p. 41. Emphasis in the original.
officers who had both the military and the academic credentials to actually teach.\footnote{30}

The reduction in attention to area studies amounted to a bureaucratic coup, since the great bulk of both governmental civilians and visiting civilian academics on the National War College faculty were area specialists. Nonetheless, the changes were made, and General Andrew Goodpaster, who succeeded Admiral Lee in late 1967, agreed with their tenor.

Curriculum changes instituted by Admiral Lee continued through General Goodpaster's one year term as Commandant.\footnote{31} But, by the time the class of 1970 entered, a bureaucratic counter-coup had taken place within the National War College faculty, and area studies again began to occupy more than 35\% of curricular time while attention to policy, strategy and decision-making resumed a downward trend. The pattern of evolution of these dimensions and of the others discussed earlier, is presented graphically in summary fashion in Scatterplot 17.

Contrary to what one might imply from the trend lines themselves, the impact of the searching questions raised by Dr. Katzenbach and addressed by the in-house group commissioned by Admiral Lee has continued to be felt. There has been a consistent attempt to increase the amount of conceptual material in the National War College curriculum at the expense of material which is broad, shallow and time

\footnote{30}{Internal memoranda in National War College files and interviews with persons involved in National War College-service academy discussions.}

\footnote{31}{General Goodpaster was called to Europe to become Supreme Allied Commander in the spring of 1969.}
sensitive. In addition, the academic credentials of military faculty members have improved consistently. At the present time, more than a third hold doctoral degrees and almost all hold masters degrees. Further, faculty members are now more active. They teach electives, moderate seminars, and occasionally lecture. More detailed discussion of their present duties and status is inappropriate here. The current state of affairs is described in the preceding chapter.

Analysis of curricular trends in the three schools has revealed some interesting internal dynamics. But at this point it is necessary to turn to more directly comparative analysis.

Comparison by Dimension

The picture which emerges from the preceding analysis is one of three institutions concerned with a wide but varying range of political subjects. Further, in each of the schools the curricula have been modified rather stringently in an attempt to present to the students the type of information that policy makers, both civilian and military, felt were germane to the activities of the military professional entering high level command and staff positions.

Inspection of the various scatterplots previously presented reveals a pattern of minor fluctuations on all of the dimensions treated. Seldom is there uniformity across several years in the percentage of curriculum devoted to the various dimensions. The generous would be willing to attribute these changes to a healthy self-consc- ciousness within the schools, while the more skeptical might be in- clined to invoke images of bureaucratic fluctuation. In point of fact,
both factors are operable, and the very large number of very small changes in emphasis in all three schools does reflect the effect of an "innovation ethic" fortified by the relatively rapid turnover of Directing Staff and Faculty members. More significant than the short term changes, however, are the overall trends in the five dimensions analyzed.

The International Environment

The international environment dimension has been present in the curricula of all three schools across the twenty years analyzed. In general, the National War College has paid more attention to that factor than either of the other two schools. This fact is not surprising in view of the superpower status of the United States. The variations at the British school have been discussed in some detail previously. The most important aspect of the pattern in the British school is the rising trend in attention to the international environment dimension from 1970 forward. At the Canadian school, the overall decline in attention to the international environment dimension is rather marked and one of several indicators of an intensifying interior orientation in the Canadian school. Scatterplot 18 shows the patterns.

The Domestic Environment

Specific attention to the domestic environment has been

---

32 This situation is clearly recognized at all three schools. Interviews with members of Directing Staffs and Faculty left the impression that individual members were constantly concerned with "making this year's course better than the last one." Several individuals expressed frustration at the fact that their tour would not allow them to make "lasting changes" in curricular emphasis.
characteristic of both the British and Canadian schools throughout the twenty year period analyzed. The trend lines in Scatterplot 19 show that between 20 and 30% of the curriculum at each school was devoted to consideration of domestic factors. One of the surprising aspects of this comparative analysis is the absence of specific attention to the domestic environment dimension in the United States until 1974. Even at that point the United States wasdevoting proportionally less than half as much curricular time to the domestic environment dimension as were the British and Canadian schools. Interestingly, the Vietnam war lies within the period analyzed.

It would be an unfortunate overstatement to allege aloofness or unconcern as being characteristic of the National War College. Courses in the policy, strategy and decision-making dimension deal in at least passing fashion with domestic considerations. At least one lecture during the curricula for 1970 through 1974 dealt with topics like "The Role of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs." On the other hand, the absence of an organized portion of the curriculum dealing with domestic situations and problems certainly indicates considerably less sensitivity to those problems in the United States school than in its British and Canadian counterparts during the twenty year period analyzed. Scatterplot 19 on the preceding page shows the patterns.

Policy, Strategy and Decision-Making

The policy, strategy and decision-making dimension showed the greatest overall variation in all of the three schools. In this dimension, contemporaneity is at a premium and in-depth study very
difficult to undertake. We see a generally downward trend in both Britain and the United States in the 1970's. In the Canadian school, however, we see the sharp rise in attention to this dimension discussed in the previous section. This increase in attention to contemporary problems in the Canadian decision-making environment reflects once again the increasing inward orientation evident in the Canadian school since the impact of defense reorganization was felt in 1968.

Interviews and reviews of various documents at the British and American schools revealed that the decrease in attention to this dimension is largely the result of attempts by Directing Staff and faculty members to use time at the schools as an opportunity to expose students to more analytical concepts and techniques. The general
consensus at both schools was that students receive ample opportunity, both before and after their schooling, to experience the procedures and pressures inherent in the policy, strategy and decision-making processes. The school is seen as a vehicle for providing them with a better equipped bag of analytical tools to take with them into that environment. The Canadian school is sensitive to this reasoning as well, and spends the bulk of its "Concluding Review" on analytical techniques of a variety of sorts.

Conflict

There is also considerable variation in attention to the nature of conflict, availability of forces and weapon systems, and other topics related to employment of forces and weapon systems. In the United States, there was until 1968 relatively heavy emphasis on the hardware dimension of the balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, throughout the sixties, the National War College, in response to presidential direction, spent a considerable amount of time discussing the nuts and bolts of guerilla warfare. Attention to these topics has diminished and more time is now spent on the problems surrounding the nuclear threshold, use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the viability of conventional forces, particularly in Europe. British emphasis has also been on these latter factors, from the time of Professor Buchan's arrival forward. Most surprising, of course, is the disappearance of the conflict dimension from the course of study at the National Defence College in Canada. There is, of course, sporatic attention to the nature of conflict and to the
problems of employment of various types of weapon systems in the curriculum of the Canadian school. Further, in each of the three countries, there are staff colleges which deal specifically with the problems surrounding employment of forces as well as with planning for their employment. Most of the military students at the three schools have experienced staff college training. Lastly, most of the military students have had personal experience either in planning for employment of forces or weapon systems or in their actual use.

Area Studies

Attention to the area studies dimension has been considerable in all three schools across the twenty year period. Members of Directing Staffs and faculty at all three schools are sensitive to the
shallowness that is inherent in attempting to treat the problems and prospects of all areas of the globe within the relatively short time that students have at the schools. In the seventies there has been an irregular and gradual rise in attention to area studies in both the British and the United States schools. In the Canadian school a relatively sharp drop in emphasis upon that dimension is yet another indicator of the tendency of the Canadian school to look inward. Of course this factor should not be overplayed, since students at the Canadian school spend considerably more time travelling in foreign countries than do those at either of the other two.

A logical argument can be made for exposing the students at the three schools to the nature of an area specialist's perspective on
events; the advantages and liabilities of that perspective; and information on where area expertise can be found in government, in academia, and elsewhere. But at all three schools, there was a tendency to stress the interconnections between the area studies portion of the curriculum and the trips which the student bodies make, rather than to defend area studies on their own merits. Directing Staff and faculty make the point that area studies and travel combined are designed to present the student with a sensitivity to the complexity and scope of the problems being dealt with around the globe.

One other factor concerning area studies is worth mentioning at this point. The governmental departments in each of the three countries dealing with foreign affairs are organized on an area basis. Further, representatives of these departments hold responsible positions in the Directing Staffs and faculty at the three institutions. In short, it appears that internal bureaucratic factors as much as any intellectual rationale motivate the schools to continue to pay a considerable amount of attention to area studies.

An Interim Summary

The preceding analysis, which has focused primarily on describing and explaining the patterns of change in the curricula of the three schools, points up the apparent diversity in approaches to political-military education in Britain, Canada, and the United States. There are, of course, dangers involved in reading the trends presented. Indeed the trends are more safely regarded as indicators of orientation and intention than as narrowly definitive descriptors. With the trends
interpreted in that fashion it can be argued that, unless one assumes the three schools are completely out of touch with "professional reality," a military professional headed for positions of high responsibility is expected to develop political knowledge of the international environment; the domestic environment in his own country; the complexities and intricacies of the policy, strategy and decision-making processes; the nature of conflict and problems involving the employment of military forces in conflict; and some knowledge of or sensitivity to the wide range of problems in specific areas of the world. The dimensions themselves become useful as synthetic collective indicators of the nature of the political component of military professional expertise.

In view of the longitudinal dimension of the analysis and its comparative character, one is certainly led to question whether any characterization of the military professions in these three countries oriented by a narrowly functional interpretation of "management of violence" is not as much an illusion or an anachronism as an ideal type. But before joining that theoretical fracas, there are some important qualifying points to be made about the analysis presented.

First, it should be noted here again that the officers who arrive at the three schools are in their early or late forties. They have had extensive experience in a variety of facets of military life. They come to the schools with a personal perspective on their chosen profession and on the expertise it entails. Obviously, the schools are not writing on a professional *tabula rasa*.

Second, as any academic knows well, there is absolutely no
guarantee that material presented in a school environment will penetrate, much less influence, the minds of the individuals attending. Of course, one hopes that at worst there is a certain osmotic effect.

Third, the military officers who attend the three schools are hardly a cross-section of the officer corps of the countries discussed. Selection for attendance at the three schools presages assignment to positions involving policy-making responsibilities.

These thoughts lead to reflection on the desirability of examining the perspectives held by the British, Canadian and U.S. military professionals in the schools on the nature of politico-military expertise. A synthesis of attitudinal data on military professional perspectives is the task undertaken next.
CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL-MILITARY EXPERTISE:
ATTITUDES OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALS

Analysis to this point has been undertaken utilizing a largely institutional perspective. The institutions examined, existing as they do at the pinnacle of the professional education within the military, have been assumed to represent the collective outlook of military professionals especially chosen to occupy positions involving high level decision-making responsibilities.

Ideally, the connections between activities within the schools and the perspectives of individual military professionals would be best examined by matching the twenty year analysis of curriculum with a twenty year sequence of attitudinal studies of individuals who have attended the various institutions. Unfortunately, as in most social science research, ideal conditions did not prevail. Attitudinal data on the military profession, and especially on the elite group represented at the schools examined, is scarce. Further, time and other resources necessary to conduct such in-depth survey research were not available to this investigator. Thirdly, regulations exist in each of the three countries which seriously circumscribe survey research. Some of these strictures are discussed in the first chapter.

With these factors in view, an attempt was made to exploit
existing attitudinal data drawing on universes associated with the
schools, and to fill in with original interview data collected from
students at the schools during the period 1974–1975. What emerges is
certainly not an attitudinal portrait of the schools over the twenty
year period. Instead, a synthesis of available data, both original
and secondary, produced what might be best described as an attitudinal
pastiche which allows insight into the attitudes of persons associated
with the school toward the curricula, toward the schools themselves,
and toward the military profession.

The data used in building this partial picture are uneven in
both availability and quality. Attitudinal data independent of the
present study were essentially not available in Britain. In Canada, a
survey of alumni conducted by the National Defence College in 1970 was
made available. That survey, made up of sixteen items but containing
several substantial difficulties because of its structure, is nonetheless the source of some interesting and pertinent information. In the
United States, two surveys of the alumni of the National War College
were made available. The first of these was conducted in 1969, and
the second in the fall of 1974. In both cases, summary results of the
surveys were provided, although access to the actual data was not. In
addition, again in the case of the National War College, summaries
collected from students about to graduate from the school in the years
1970 through 1974 were provided. Finally, Professors Lyman B. Kirk-
patrick, Jr. and Harry D. Latimer, political scientists at Brown
University, kindly provided partial results of a series of interviews
they conducted at the National War College and at other war colleges
within the United States in the fall of 1973. Their exceptionally broad interview schedule included ten questions of particular pertinence to the undertaking at hand. With their permission, these questions were extracted and an interview schedule constructed for use in both Britain and Canada which replicated a portion of their study.

Strengths and weaknesses of the various data sources are discussed in detail as the analysis progresses. Pertinent information from each is clustered around three principal foci herein. The first is attitudes of students toward the various curricular emphases in the three schools. The second is upon student or alumni attitudes and opinions related to the schools themselves. The third focus is more general and deals with the outlook of students on the relationship of the military profession to society and on the role of the profession in governmental affairs.

Attitudes on Curricular Emphases

Systematic statistical data on student attitudes with respect to the various emphases in the curricula were available only in the United States.¹ Data with regard to the U.S. students' perspectives on

¹Student opinions on the appropriateness of curricular emphasis in the British school have apparently been solicited, at least since the time when Alistair Buchan was Commandant. These data are considered by authorities at the British school as both sensitive and private and were not made available. The Canadian alumni questionnaire previously referred to contained a question asking which of the twelve topic areas in the curriculum should receive more emphasis. Responses to the question were solicited in prose rather than in statistical format. It is unclear whether these prose statements were ever compiled in any quantitative fashion. Attempts to obtain a summary of the remarks in response to that question and attempts to locate the actual questionnaires themselves were unsuccessful.
the curricula at the National War College were available in three forms. First, consolidated data were obtained from course end questionnaires of students. Second, consolidated results of the 1969 alumni survey were provided. The third source of data was the 1974 alumni survey. Again, consolidated results were provided. The picture which emerges from the three sources is rather consistent. Each will be described briefly.

Course end questionnaires have been distributed to all students about to graduate from the National War College in the classes from 1970 forward. A summary of student responses on a variety of items ranging from overall satisfaction with the course to adequacy of the coffee shop are summarized each summer and provided to the Commandant in memorandum form with faculty commentary already added. The questionnaires from which the data are taken are designed as an internal evaluative mechanism, and student opinions are treated with guarded respect. Faculty comments have occasionally been self-servinng and defensive, but appear, on the whole, objective.

One recurrent note of caution in these comments pertinent to subsequent discussion here is that student opinion of the value of various courses is heavily colored by the "entertainment value" of speakers within the courses, rather than by the actual substance available. The bulk of faculty members interviewed at the National War College in 1974 and 1975, while accepting the felicitous effect of good platform performances in student rating of courses, expressed satisfaction that students could and did differentiate among courses on the basis of substance.
With regard to evaluation of curricular emphases, course end critiques for the National War College graduating classes from 1970 through 1974 included a question labeled "Course Balance." The question read:

(a) Which two courses do you consider most valuable to you?

(b) Which two courses do you consider least valuable to you?

Trips, which are considered a course at the National War College,\(^2\) clearly were regarded as the most valued single element in the curriculum. Roughly a third of each graduating class listed trips as one of the two "courses considered most valuable." Among those courses conducted at the National War College over the five year period, those relating to the international environment and to policy, strategy and decision-making were clearly regarded as the most valuable by the students. Courses related to the area studies dimension were by far the least valued.\(^3\) But, interestingly, a direct question on the value of area studies was included in the 1974 course end critique. That question read:

What is your preference regarding emphasis on area studies? Should the area studies curriculum:

(a) receive current emphasis
(b) be reduced
(c) be increased

\(^2\)See Table 2.10 above for the various course titles applied to trips.

\(^3\)Officials at the National War College constructed rank orders of courses by subtracting the total number of "least value" responses from "most value" responses, and using the result directly as an indicator of student opinion on the value of the course. More often than not, area studies courses received negative total scores, and all were in the lower half of rank orderings.
Two-thirds of those responding indicated that area studies should receive current emphasis. The bulk of the remainder suggested reduction. There is an apparent anomaly here, with students in the class of 1974 essentially arguing that area studies should continue to receive about 40% of curricular attention even though those courses were regarded as "least valued." A possible partial explanation could lie in very high level of overall satisfaction with the curriculum discussed in the next section. A more probable explanation for the apparent anomaly may relate to the heavy emphasis placed upon the connection between trips and area studies during the matriculation of the class of 1974. In short, the reduction option may have been read to apply to trips as well as in-house area studies.

The National War College Alumni Survey conducted in 1960 was a sixteen item mail survey which solicited responses from 2,765 living graduates from all graduating classes. Analysis was based upon 1,295 of 1,400 replies received. The base was determined to be representative of the alumni in terms of both class and service or organizational affiliation. That survey contained a more general question on curricular emphasis. Respondents were asked:

Based on your National War College course and your experience since graduation, how much emphasis should be placed on the study of the following areas in the curriculum?

The areas listed and the percentage of responses on each are contained in Table 4.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National security policy making processes: operations and objectives of departments and agencies primarily involved</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power potential of the United States and other major nations, including analysis of the major factors involved in determining national power</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National strategy, including integration of military and foreign policies</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study of international relations, including UN and other means to avoid, discourage or resolve conflicts between nations</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic area studies; interests, objectives and policies of significant foreign nations</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Communist nations' threat</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military strategy and force requirements to implement national policy</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capabilities and plans</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of joint and combined military forces</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Defense resources</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of science and technology on national security policy and the armed forces</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By subtracting the less emphasis and no emphasis answers from the much more and some more emphasis answers, a rank order of topics was constructed, as shown in Table 4.2.

**TABLE 4.2**

**Rank Ordered Preferences**  
**Curricular Emphasis**  
**National War College Alumni Survey, 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL RANK</th>
<th>TOPIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National strategy, including integration of military and foreign policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Impact of science and technology on national security policy and armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National security policy-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Management of Defense resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Power potential of the US and other major nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Military strategy and force requirements to implement national policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>International relations including UN and other means to avoid, discourage, or resolve conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Geographic area studies; interests, objectives and policies of foreign nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nature of communist countries' threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Military capabilities and plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Employment of joint and combined military forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That table shows the area studies and conflict dimensions identified in Chapter III were regarded by the bulk of the alumni as requiring less
attention than either the policy, strategy and decision-making or the international environment dimensions. Note that the domestic environment dimension is not present in the question as stated, nor was it present as a separate entity in the National War College curriculum until 1974. An internal memorandum analyzing the 1969 survey reflects that a substantial (but unspecified) number of respondents wrote in comments to the effect that separate study of domestic issues, social issues or internal problems should be a portion of the curriculum.

The 1974 National War College Alumni Survey is the basis for information reported in a document entitled, "The National War College Experience and Its Utilization: A Study Among Graduates of the National War College and Supervisors of Graduates," prepared by Response Analysis Corporation, Princeton, New Jersey. This document is based upon survey instruments forwarded to alumni of the National War College and to supervisors of military alumni in September 1974. The survey sample included all graduates in the classes 1965 through 1973, and half of living and identifiable graduates from the classes 1947 to 1964. Alumni returned 1,827 of 2,221 questionnaires, of which a balanced sample of 1,801 responses were used. The adjusted response rate for the sample used in analysis was 81%. Supervisors of active duty military personnel were also queried, and the adjusted response rate in that group was 40%.

Among the twenty-five questions in the survey instrument for graduates were two which related directly to curricular emphasis. The first dealt with the appropriateness of time and emphasis on curriculum areas. Respondents were requested to choose from among the options indicated in Table 4.3 the term which best described their opinion of emphasis on the six issues listed on the left side of that table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis and understanding of national security issues</th>
<th>About right</th>
<th>Too much</th>
<th>Not enough</th>
<th>No opinion, Don't remember</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field trips</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security decision-making processes</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic area studies</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military strategy and force structuring</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic (e.g., economic, political) influences on national security planning</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the results presented in Table 4.3 indicate, there was a great degree of satisfaction among the respondents with regard to curricular emphasis, although a substantial minority (39%) desired more emphasis on domestic factors. Once again the area studies and conflict dimensions received lowest priority, although some increase in the amount of
attention to military strategy was clearly desired.5

Analysis of responses from 356 supervisors of military graduates, presented in Table 4.4 on the following page, shows roughly the same priorities, with area studies again receiving lowest priority.

The preceding analysis provides significant attitudinal substantiation for the importance of the five dimensions of the political element in military expertise developed in the previous chapter, at least among military professionals in the United States. Since comparable data are not available for either the British or Canadian schools, it is now necessary to turn to evaluation of more general data on overall acceptance of patterns of emphasis in the three schools.

General Attitudes Regarding the Schools

Once again, systematic data on attitudes of students and alumni toward the Royal College of Defence Studies were not made available. Requests for these data were met with a friendly but rather vague response the essence of which was, "We are not really into figures like that. We have a pretty clear picture of how well we do as a result of the feedback we receive on a regular basis from our graduates here in London and from various persons in responsible positions who

5 Figures in the analysis include both military and civilian graduates. The analysts note U.S. Army personnel seem much more concerned with an increase in the amount of time spent on strategy, while foreign service officers evidenced more concern for attention to domestic factors. Figures on the degree of disproportionality were not provided. "The National War College Experience," p. 21.
hire our graduates." It would be easy to interpret this type of reply at best as avoidance of an issue and at worst as genuine resistance to the type of inquiry being undertaken. Neither of these interpretations appears to be justified. Members of the Directing Staff at the Royal College of Defence Studies displayed a remarkable knowledge of both the career patterns and the successes and failures of graduates over a substantial period of time. Not only did many of the Directing Staff know their predecessors and the school's alumni personally, but they were also able to provide amazing amounts of detail regarding their postings and performance. The discomfiture exhibited when specific requests for statistical materials were pressed seemed to emanate not so much from any reluctance to be helpful, but rather from a sense of bemusement that the inquirer could not understand how well and how tightly the "old boys" from the Royal College of Defence Studies kept track of each other. In response to direct questions about the overall effectiveness of the school, the tendency among the Directing Staff was merely to provide a rather astonishing recitation of the successes of graduates, along with a variety of anecdotes to emphasize how well these graduates were regarded by their supervisors. No statistical data regarding the attitudes of alumni or the attitudes of the employers were forthcoming.

At the Canadian school, the reaction to questions regarding the overall effectiveness of the program were greeted on the whole less

---

6 Although responses were very courteous and contained no hint of patronization, the events leading to Alistair Buchan's assumption of the position of Commandant of the school came sharply to mind.
sanguinely. Initial reaction tended to be that promotion of graduates of the school was the best measure of effectiveness and that indeed, roughly half of the military graduates were promoted to flag or general officer rank. Several Directing Staff members evinced concern that this situation might not obtain, especially in view of the increase in the number of civilians attending the school and the drawdown in the size of Canadian forces. Fortunately, however, information on the effectiveness of the school was not limited entirely to personal opinions of Directing Staff. A mail survey of graduates conducted by the National Defence College in the fall of 1970 contained a five part question designed to explore the reaction of graduates to the overall effectiveness of the school. This question was phrased, "Do you consider that NDC was of assistance to you in: . . . " and the format in Table 4.5 was provided. Respondents were asked to check off appropriate responses. Replies of Canadian military graduates are summarized in the body of Table 4.5. The right hand column of the table is added to facilitate interpretation.

There are, of course, problems with the question presented to the respondents. Not only is there parallelism among the responses, but a careful review of the available options leads one to conclude inevitably that there is only one response category that could be seen as really favorable, that being "significantly positive." In spite of these difficulties, it is apparent from the percentage of "significantly positive" responses that the overall opinion of the performance of the National Defence College among its graduates was favorable. The school was seen as having contributed to awareness and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you consider that NDC was of assistance to you in:</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Marginally Positive</th>
<th>Significantly Positive</th>
<th>Proportion Significantly Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Enhancing your ability as an individual in self-expression, in debate, etc.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Increasing your ability to understand and grasp the operations, problems and objectives of those with whom you came in contact</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Contributing, in a direct way, to your understanding of, and your ability in your employment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Contributing to your awareness and understanding of your function within a broad organizational context</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Achieving promotion</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Achieving more challenging work</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other (please specify): (Responses not provided)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
understanding of the functions of individuals within a broad organizational context and, especially, as having increased individuals' ability to understand and grasp operations, problems and objectives. Inclusion of "marginally positive" responses as truly positive would lead one to believe that the overall attitude toward the pertinence and desirability of materials within the National Defence College curricula is also favorable.

In a subsequent, rather confusing question, graduates were asked to comment on whether or not the National Defence College course was "interesting, but not relevant to subsequent responsibility." The question took the form illustrated in Table 4.6. Responses of Canadian military graduates are set forth in the body of that table. The double negative in responding to the first option undoubtedly created confusion, but it is clear from the proportion of "significant positive" responses that the overall opinion of the National Defence College course was again very favorable. This impression is reinforced by a third question offering the same response options involving the nature of the broadening experience within the course. Four out of five respondents to that question chose the "significant positive" response to describe that aspect of the experience.

---

7 The very low "significant positive" response on promotion and on the related question dealing with achieving more challenging work is not surprising. It brings to light once again the question, "Are promotions really the result of training or education within the war or defense colleges, or are promotions 'inevitable' since the selection of personnel to attend these schools is an indicator of an overall superior record?" The latter alternative could be the consideration governing responses to the promotion-related options.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How would you sum up your attendance at NDC:</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Marginally Positive</th>
<th>Significantly Positive</th>
<th>Proportion Significant Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Interesting but not relevant to subsequent responsibility</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Interesting and relevant to subsequent responsibility</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Invaluable broadening experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall reaction of students at the U.S. school was tested in a number of different ways. In critiques completed just before graduation by the classes of 1971 through 1974, the question was asked, "Using the mission statement in the student manual, how well do you feel the school accomplished its mission?" Three options were provided. They were: very well, rather, well, and poorly. Four out of five military respondents chose "very well" as the proper term to describe how well the National War College is carrying out its mission. The remainder, with the exception of two individuals over the four year period, responded "rather well."

Course end questionnaires issued to National War College graduates in the years 1972, 1973, and 1974 contained the question, "How well do you feel the National War College improved your professional knowledge and effectiveness?" The responses offered were: very well, well, and poorly. Two out of three military respondents in 1972 and 1973 chose "very well" and three out of four in 1974 chose that response. The remainder, save one individual, chose "well."

The 1969 National War College Alumni Survey contained the question, "To what degree did the National War College course increase your professional effectiveness?" Four responses were offered: major, appreciable, minor, and not at all. Twenty-seven percent of the respondents indicated there was a major increase in their professional effectiveness and 63% replied that their professional effectiveness had been improved to an appreciable degree.

---

8 Set forth in Chapter II above.
The same question was repeated in the 1974 alumni survey. Five options were provided, as shown in Table 4.7. Responses are set forth in the body of that table.

**TABLE 4.7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increased Professional Effectiveness</th>
<th>National War College Alumni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Appreciable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The National War College 1974 Alumni Survey also included a more detailed, two question probe. The question format was as shown on the following page. The same question was also asked in the survey of supervisors of military graduates conducted in 1974. Results are summarized in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. These tables verify once again, both in terms of overall emphasis among graduates and supervisors, and in terms of rank order of priorities, the critical importance of political factors in military professional expertise. Beyond that, the school itself is seen as a principal factor in developing the expertise required.

In summary, available data indicate that alumni of the Canadian and U.S. schools regard these schools themselves as highly creditable sources of political information and political sensitivity, both of which are considered pertinent to the performance of military officers in positions of high responsibility. Supervisors and military graduates of the National War College tend to agree.
Aside from curriculum content, here are other attributes which may be related to the effectiveness of NWC military graduates. Please read the list and in the column next to the list circle the numbers of the two attributes which you feel are most important to higher level national security assignments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIRCLE THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subordinating one's own parent service to overall strategic requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to appreciate and allow for political considerations in defense planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing effectively with higher-level civilians within and outside of the national security establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping appropriate arm's-length perspective on defense industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A perspective which sees the military role as only one factor, and sometimes not even a major factor in considerations of national security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now please go over the list of attributes again. This time circle the numbers next to the two factors which you think the NWC experience seems to affect the most.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIRCLE THE TWO NWC AFFECTS THE MOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subordinating one's own parent service to overall strategic requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to appreciate and allow for political considerations in defense planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing effectively with higher-level civilians within and outside of the national security establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping appropriate arm's-length perspective on defense industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A perspective which sees the military role as only one factor, and sometimes not even a major factor in considerations of national security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4.8

#### Attributes of Graduates Most Important for Future Assignments
National War College Alumni

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to appreciate and allow for political considerations in defense planning.</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A perspective which sees the military role as only one factor, in considerations of national security.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinating one's own parent service to overall strategic requirements.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing effectively with higher level civilians within and outside of the national security establishment.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping appropriate arm's-length perspective on defense industries.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Supervisors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to appreciate and allow for political considerations in defense planning.</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A perspective which sees the military role as only one factor, in considerations of national security.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinating one's own parent service to overall strategic requirements.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing effectively with higher level civilians within and outside of the national security establishment.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping appropriate arm's-length perspective on defense industries.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But before passing to analysis of data dealing with broader considerations, two additional pieces of attitudinal data with regard to the general milieu in the Canadian and American schools should be noted. In the survey of the graduates of the Canadian National Defence College, respondents were asked to evaluate the following statement: "Interchanges between varied course members and the acquaintances made were pleasant and helpful." Four evaluations were suggested: negative, neutral, marginally positive, and significantly positive. Four out of five military respondents chose "significantly positive" as the appropriate response, and the remainder, with the exception of two individuals, chose "marginally positive."

In the 1974 National War College Alumni Survey, respondents were asked to estimate the value of each of the following aspects of the National War College experience. They read:

- Just the fact of being an NWC graduate;
- Being in an academic environment away from every day routine and stress;
- Association with other students;
- Overseas study trips;
- Individual research projects;
- Prescribed course work;
- Elective courses;
- Opportunity to listen to and meet with authorities in various fields.

Six responses were suggested. They were: very high value, high value, some value, little value, not sure, and finally, not part of my academic year. Unfortunately, complete results of responses to the question were not provided. Collapsed responses for all graduates, military and civilian, are presented in Table 4.10. The high value figures include responses of "very high" or "high," while the "some value"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to listen to and meet with authorities in various fields</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations with other students</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas study trips</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being in an academic environment, away from everyday routine and stress</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribed course work</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just the fact of being a NWC graduate</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual research project</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elective courses</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
figure includes responses "some" or "little."

More detailed analysis of the "very high" value response was provided, and Table 4.11 shows a breakdown of "very high" value responses by military graduates. What emerges from these fragments of data from the Canadian and American alumni is statistical evidence supporting the contention raised in Chapter II that the professional socialization which takes place within the environment of the schools is an important element in their programs. It is apparently considered as important by alumni of the schools as it is by Directing Staffs and faculty. Interviews with the Directing Staff at the British school in 1975 and with a sample of British military students in that school during the same year revealed similar perceptions of the substantial beneficial character of the professional socialization experience within that school. As previously noted, interviews with Commandants and former Commandants at all three schools revealed their emphasis upon the salutary effects of the professional socialization process.

The data discussed thus far deal rather specifically with the schools themselves. More broadly focused cross-sectional data on attitudes of military professionals at the three schools is also pertinent.

Perspectives on the Military Profession

Data were also gathered in an attempt to explore the attitudes of military professionals within the three schools dealing with the relationship of the military profession to society at large. It would have been eminently desirable if this research could have included a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value of Experience</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to listen to and meet with authorities in various fields</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations with other students</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas study trips</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being in an academic environment, away from everyday routine and stress</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescribed course work</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just the fact of being a NWC graduate</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual research project</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elective courses</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
broad cross-sectional survey of attitudes on a wide range of subjects pertinent to these two relationships. Unfortunately, as explained in the Introduction, survey research was not feasible. However, in the course of research at the National War College, it was discovered that Professors Kirkpatrick and Latimer had, during the previous year, conducted a small number of extensive interviews with students dealing with subjects pertinent to this research. As previously indicated, they kindly granted permission, not only to replicate questions within their survey, but also to use preliminary results of their work. The discussion which follows is based upon the Kirkpatrick-Latimer results from the National War College, and upon results of my interviews with British and Canadian officers.

The data presented here should be interpreted with great care. The Kirkpatrick-Latimer universe from the class of 1974 consisted at most of twenty individuals, but in no case less than twelve. Interviews conducted at the Royal College of Defence Studies involved nine person-to-person, sixty to ninety minute sessions, and one written reply to the same questions kindly provided by an officer with whom an interview could not be arranged. The sample at the British schools was composed of three randomly selected officers each from the air, sea and land services and one Marine officer. These officers represented one-third of the British officers attending. At the Canadian school, of the twelve Canadian officers assigned to the National Defence College as students, all were contacted. Six officers were interviewed personally at the college. Six others were requested to
reply to the same questions in writing. Four of the six officers from whom written replies were requested were able to complete the questionnaire. The respondents to the interviews and to the questionnaires were guaranteed anonymity, but in the Canadian case written replies frequently included a note from the respondent indicating his pleasure at cooperating in the research. These notes allowed a determination that three officers each from air, sea and land services were represented in the Canadian sample. The tenth officer's service is not identifiable.

Respondents indicated they found the questions thought provoking, and the responses appeared, across the board, both thoughtful and frank. The results are discussed in two categories. First, a set of questions designed to explore the relationship of the military profession to government are set forth. Next, responses to questions dealing with relationships of the military profession with society at large within the three nations are examined.

Each of the respondents was asked, "Do you consider civilian control effective and adequate?" Table 4.12 shows the replies.

---

9 Due to unforeseen interruptions in the schedule of the investigator and a very busy period at the National Defence College itself, the written forms were a necessity. Replies were both thoughtful and extensive, and revealed no significant differences from results obtained during interviews.
TABLE 4.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness of Civilian Control</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both the British and Canadian schools, there was difficulty with the two adjectives used in the question. Although all the British and Canadian respondents agreed that civilian control was effective, the word "adequate" raised a number of semantic questions not really pertinent to the investigation. The negative responses in the Kirkpatrick-Latimer interviews came from officers who felt there was too much military autonomy in certain procurement and development activities.

The following rather lengthy question provoked considerable reflection and discussion. Respondents were asked, "Some believe that military men should provide purely military advice to civilian decision-makers. Others believe they should include economic, political, diplomatic, and other considerations in their advice. What is your view of pure versus mixed advice?"

TABLE 4.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Military Advice</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 4.13 indicates, the British officers divided evenly on the desirability of pure versus mixed advice. The discussion revolved principally around whether an officer could provide advice that was in fact purely military. The consensus even among the officers favoring "pure" advice was that although advice might be primarily military, it should never be uninformed in the sense that economic, political or diplomatic factors should not be matters of concern. Among those who favored "mixed" advice, the consensus was that purely military advice which excluded economic, political, and diplomatic considerations was not a possibility. The Canadian officers to a man agreed with the latter position, whereas the respondents in the United States were again divided evenly.

Respondents were asked, "Do civilian superiors give adequate consideration to military views?" The results are set forth in Table 4.14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian Consideration of Military Views</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Experience</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Negative respondents in both the British and Canadian cases indicated that the principal limitation to "adequate consideration" by civilian superiors was the inability of the military to make a case for itself,
although one Canadian officer made it quite clear that especially on issues related to unification of forces in that country, civilian decision-makers had refused to listen to the military. 10

The questions, "Do you consider it accurate to view the military as an interest group or lobby? Is it much different from other interest groups or lobbies?" provoked considerable consternation among both British and Canadian officers over the meanings of the terms interest group and lobby, and the distinctions between them. Table 4.15 contains the breakdown of results.

TABLE 4.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military as Interest Group or Lobby</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the American respondents, that difficulty apparently did not exist. The bulk of the British and Canadian officers, whether answering positively or negatively, stressed the fact that the military was not a lobby in the sense that it was out for any private or personal gain. Doctors Kirkpatrick and Latimer received the same kinds of qualifications to the positive responses from U.S. officers. In all three countries, respondents pointed out that the military can and does advocate its organizational interests within governmental circles.

A rather pointed question was put with regard to "the military

10 One British officer replied, "When they agree with me, they've given adequate consideration. When they disagree, they haven't." His response was coded as negative.
mind." Respondents were asked, "There is a contention that there is a military mind. Do you agree? Is it helpful or harmful to the country?" Table 4.16 contains a summary of the responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Military Mind</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exists</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn't</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially it was feared that the question might make the respondents defensive. It did not. In fact it was fielded with great dexterity, and there was clear evidence that the subject had been considered previously by most of the respondents. Those who argued that there was a military mind indicated that it was merely a mental set which one accumulated over a period of professional experience, rather than a set of blinders or a confining mental outlook. Persons responding negatively indicated that there was no more a military mind than there was a mind of a lawyer, a doctor, etc.

The second portion of the question created considerable discussion in all three samples.
TABLE 4.17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesirability of Military Mind</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helpful</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmful</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither/Don't Know Doesn't Exist</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, certain qualities of the military mind were regarded as helpful to performance in public service. Among these were: forthrightness, selflessness, and decisiveness. On the negative side, one Canadian officer indicated that he regarded military officers in general as over-trained, too assertive, and too quick to find an easy solution. U.S. officers describing the military mind as harmful did so for two principal reasons. First, several officers commented that there is a "can do" mentality in the military profession which causes situations to evolve in which optimism overcomes both good judgment and common sense. Secondly, two Americans and one British officer commented that dogmatism and stubbornness were negative characteristics of some officers.

Finally, in a question related to the idea of a military mind, respondents were asked, "Do your countrymen see the military as anti-intellectual? Do you think it is?" Table 4.18 sets out the replies.
TABLE 4.18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Intellectualism</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Seen by Public as Anti-Intellectual</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military View of Itself as Anti-Intellectual</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly half of the British and half of the Canadian respondents immediately invoked the image of the bumbling and bemused cartoon character Colonel Blimp as a response to the question. The gist of the argument in both countries was that the military once was widely considered a haven for tradition-bound anti-intellectuals, but cannot, in this era of rapid change and high levels of technology, afford to be anti-intellectual. In the U.S. sample, a few army officers with advanced degrees expressed frustration at resentment of academic expertise among superiors.

Three questions dealing with the relationship of the military profession to society were broached with the respondents. All solicited thoughtful replies, and once again it was evident that the subject matter under discussion was not new to the respondents. The first question posed was, "In considering the place of the military, an authoritarian body in a liberalizing society undergoing rapid social change, two alternatives have been offered: isolation of the military from civilian society; integration with and adaptation to civilian
society. Which do you prefer? Why?" Responses to the first part are set forth in Table 4.19.

TABLE 4.19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference Integration/Isolation</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither/No Reply</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two Canadian officers objected to the question on the basis that certain portions of the military could be quite tightly integrated with society while other portions would necessarily be isolated. Three U.S. officers took the position that permissive trends in U.S. life endangered military discipline and hampered the ability of the services to accomplish the training and education necessary to assure troop reliability. Overall, however, there was clearly an overwhelming preference for integration.

The next question, "Will accommodation to change in civilian society result in an ineffective military?" was generally read as antithetical to the first, although once again a small number of Canadian officers made it clear that some deleterious effects of integration could be experienced, including erosion of military esprit. Results are shown in Table 4.20.
TABLE 4.20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ineffective Military Resulting From Accommodation</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erosion of Effectiveness</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Erosion</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third question, "Is the current trend in (your country) toward convergence or divergence?" evoked unanimous responses that convergence was the trend in both Britain and Canada.

TABLE 4.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Trend Integration/Isolation</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preponderence of U.S. respondents also took that tack. However a substantial minority of U.S. respondents saw danger of isolation of the U.S. military, largely as a result of the perceived negative public sentiment toward the military in the wake of the Vietnam war.

The results obtained from interviews of students attending the three schools produced evidence of military professionals who regard isolation of the military as both unlikely and undesirable, and
civilian control as largely adequate and unquestioned. Students see military advice as necessarily containing some consideration of political, economic, and diplomatic and other variables, and perceive that advice as generally received well by civilian decision-makers. Questions regarding the military mind and anti-intellectual tendencies within the military generally produced equivocal information, although there is widespread agreement that the military is not, in fact, anti-intellectual. Further, the terms "lobby" and "interest group" were deemed in large measure inappropriate when applied to the military in Britain, and of questionable value when applied to military in Canada. In the United States, however, the terms were seen as clearly correct.

Once again, however, great caution should be used in attempting to extrapolate from the irregular and small sample used to compile these results. A major effort to survey attitudes on similar questions has been undertaken in the United States under the direction of Professors Kirkpatrick and Latimer. A large survey in Britain and Canada is not contemplated at this point.

An Interim Summary

The picture that emerges from the diverse types of attitudinal data presented is one of a modern military officer in the three democratic societies who considers himself, first, rightly and properly concerned with a number of highly political subjects impinging upon the performance of his professional duties. Second, he feels that the type of training and education to which he is exposed at the apex of a system of professional military education prepares him well to
participate in a meaningful fashion in decisions that are not only military but also political. Thirdly, he feels at home in his own society, and appears confident that he will be able to carry out required military tasks within the confines of the values of that society. Civilian control of the military is a reality that is accepted essentially without question.

With these general observations made, however, it is necessary at this time to turn to the task of placing the findings of this research in the context of existing theory. Clearly any move in that direction requires an evaluation of the pertinence, viability, and extensibility of the findings in larger contexts. These subjects are the focus of the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER V

The Political Element in Military Expertise:

A Theoretical Reassessment

All of the professions tend to rely heavily upon an educational system to perform a number of necessary tasks. The development of a sense of group identity or professional belonging, the inculcation of a common set of professional standards, and the cultivation of a special commitment to professional aims are three of these tasks undertaken in most professions in the earliest phases of professional schooling, and reinforced in day to day practice. Finally, of course, professional schools have as their basic function, "The transmission of a generalized and systematic knowledge that is the basis of professional performance."¹ In most professions, the transmission of professional knowledge is undertaken almost exclusively at the entry level, with initial emphasis on general knowledge and with higher degrees of specialization as time passes. In law and medicine, for example, formal schooling in later career is something which is undertaken on the basis of individual initiative, and without organizational pressure or direction from within the profession itself.

The educational system within the military profession is

¹ Bernard Barber, "Some Problems in the Sociology of the Profession," Daedalus, XCII, No. 4 (Fall 1963), p. 672.
considerably different. Although there certainly is a very strong inculcation of professional perspectives at the entry level, a hierarchy of schools spans the entire length of a military professional's career, and the development of the "generalized systematic knowledge" in the profession itself is a process which begins with more specialized and technical knowledge and proceeds to the more general knowledge deemed by the profession as necessary for its performance.

The research reported upon in the preceding chapters was based on the assumption that detailed examination of professional schools would yield systematic information regarding the type of generalized knowledge considered essential by the military professions in three Western democracies and would as well yield insight into the attitudes of military professionals toward that knowledge.

The focus of the research, however, was not so broad as to attempt to encompass or describe the entire scope of professional military knowledge. Instead, emphasis was placed upon a facet of professional military expertise which has been both extremely controversial and, in large measure, unexplored. Focus upon that facet, the political element in military expertise, led to concentration upon the three schools in Britain, Canada, and the United States, which are and have been concerned primarily with providing political knowledge deemed necessary for professional performance by military officers in policy making positions.

Summary of Findings

In view of the peculiar nature of these schools, whose students
are mature professionals with fifteen or more years experience, and in view of the dearth of information about the schools in the academic literature of either political science or sociology, an attempt was made to investigate and to describe in some detail the institutional structures and the educational methods and procedures of the schools themselves. There are a number of similarities among the schools. Statements of mission or purpose emphasize attention to the connections among a variety of factors related to national security. The three schools enjoy considerable autonomy in structuring their curricula, but all three have been influenced significantly by the views and activities of civilians concerned with national security affairs. Student bodies at all three schools contain a variety of civilians and in some cases foreign professionals whose presence is deemed to have a desirable broadening, sensitizing, and leavening effect on home country military professionals. The schools emphasize cross-socialization among the military professionals themselves and among the civilians attending the schools. Authorities at the schools consider contributions that the experienced students can make to the education of their peers significant. All three schools emphasize the importance of maintaining a relatively relaxed atmosphere in which the students can avoid the fire brigade atmosphere characteristic of day to day military service, and have time for reflection and intellectual growth.

Finally, all three schools employ an assortment of educational methods in their attempt to convey political knowledge to the students. The principal method in all schools is exposure of the students to lectures on pertinent subjects by highly qualified experts drawn from
academia, business, government, and the military itself. Seminar discussions and field trips are valued both for informational purposes and for their cross-socializing effect. Individual study and research are present in all three schools but not emphasized. Directing Staff and faculty, at least until very recently, have been concerned with organization and administration rather than with teaching per se.

It is within this milieu that the military professional is exposed to the political considerations which his profession regards as a proper part of his specialized knowledge. A detailed systematic investigation of the nature of those considerations was undertaken in order to gain insight into the internal structure of the political element in professional military expertise. From the patterns and anomalies in curricular emphasis over twenty years emerged a picture of five basic dimensions in the political education of the elite groups of military officers. These five dimensions, the international environment; the domestic environment in the individual countries; policy, strategy and decision-making processes; the nature of conflict; and area studies, received varying degrees of emphasis in the three countries during the period analyzed. In Britain, the pattern of emphasis evolved by the 1970's to the point where attention to the British domestic environment and to the policy, strategy and decision-making processes occupied roughly half of the curricular time, while the other half was devoted mainly to the international environment and to area studies, with heavy emphasis on Western Europe. In addition, some 10% of curricular time in Britain was devoted to the nature of conflict.
In the Canadian school, the curriculum had evolved in the 1970's to the point where three-quarters of the time spent in-house was occupied with consideration of the domestic environment in Canada and with policy, strategy and decision-making. The remaining quarter was devoted to study of the international environment and area studies. The conflict dimension had passed completely out of the program by 1971.

In the United States the domestic environment failed to receive attention as an independent political factor in the curriculum until 1974. Until that year the combination of attention to the international environment and area studies occupied not quite 60% of curricular time. Attention to the nature of conflict occupied in excess of 15% of the curriculum, while attention to policy, strategy and decision-making processes occupied between a quarter and a third.

In short, from curricular emphases we see that the education of the military professionals in the three countries studied reflects the realities of the nations' positions in the world. British military professionals who, in the early portion of the period analyzed, received heavy exposure to the problems associated with Commonwealth-home country relations are now more concerned with domestic conditions within the British Isles and with the relationship of their nation to the community of Western European nations. Canadian military professionals are intensely concerned with internal factors, especially national unity and national development, which appear to predominate in the minds of the Canadian political decision-makers. Military professionals in the United States, a great power, continue to be
significantly concerned with the changing nature of conflict in the modern international environment, with the structure of the international political system, and with the great complexity of the policy, strategy and decision-making processes in the United States. In all three countries, however, significant attention to area studies reflects sensitivity to growing interdependence within the international political system.

Available attitudinal data reflect general satisfaction among senior professional military students with the school experience. They perceive the political components of the curricula as proper and profitable additions to their professional knowledge. They feel basically at home in their own societies, and appear confident that they will be able to carry out their required professional tasks. Civilian control of the military is taken as given.

Caveats of Interpretation

With these general findings reiterated, it is necessary to turn to considerations of the constraints and liabilities inherent in the methodology used in research as well as to limitations of the findings themselves. First, the cross-sectional descriptive portion of this research in which the structure and methods at the three schools are described, although considered necessary for understanding the milieu in which political military education takes place, is highly time sensitive. At the National War College, for example, the electives program has been substantially expanded within the last few months, and at the Royal College of Defence Studies, a mandatory
electives program has been instituted. Further, at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, another professional military school collocated with it, have been combined. Overall, however, the cross-sectional information is valuable in that it allows the reader to understand how the curricular materials fit into the various other activities associated with a student's tenure at one of the schools.

The longitudinal analysis used to identify the dimensions within the political element of military expertise is less time sensitive, but involves a relatively high level of generalization. As previously noted, the trends are more safely and more profitably regarded as indicators of orientation and intention within the profession rather than as definitive descriptors.

A considerable portion, but not all, of the attitudinal data is also highly time sensitive. Further, those data were gathered from an irregular and in many cases quite small elite sample. The very fact that more than half of the officers who attend the schools examined eventually reach the rank of general officer makes them a very select group indeed. In fact, in the United States, less than 10% of the officer corps at any given time has had the opportunity to attend a senior service school, and, although similar statistical information is not available in the British and Canadian cases, estimates by Directing Staff members at their two schools place the number of graduates in the officer corps at any given time below 5%
of the officer corps.\textsuperscript{2}

Overall, then, extension of the interpretation of the data contained here and findings based upon that data to a universe outside the higher levels of military command and staff operations is at this juncture unwarranted. Discussion of theoretical relevance which follows must therefore be regarded as dealing with elites in the military profession in Britain, Canada, and the United States.

Theoretical Relevance

As noted at some length at the end of Chapter I, academics and other students and observers concerned with the military profession have for some time been calling for a broader definition of military expertise. These analysts have largely ignored developments at schools concerned directly with development of that particular facet of military professional knowledge. The research previously reported upon is aimed directly at filling the gap between prescription and factual knowledge of the nature of that facet in three Western Anglo-Saxon democracies.\textsuperscript{3}

With the caveats previously stated in mind, it is possible to comment on some general theoretical points regarding the military

\textsuperscript{2}In 1974, the British and Canadian schools estimated number of home country military students in each class as .05 and .5 per million national population respectively. S. Mathwin Davis, "A Comparative Study of Defence Colleges," M.A. Thesis, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 1974, Table I, p. 24a.

\textsuperscript{3}This qualification is not intended as a slight of French Canadians, but as recognition of the Anglophile characteristics of Canadian government and military leadership during most of the period analyzed.
profession. With regard to the professional tasks of the military, Samuel Huntington, in a recent policy oriented piece, has modified his concept of "management of violence" to acknowledge proper professional military involvement in political matters. He states, "A major function of U.S. military forces is thus not only to deter future aggression but also to support current diplomacy. This requires increased responsiveness of military forces and programs to political and diplomatic needs." He argues against "erroneous and dangerous efforts to separate military goals from political ones,"\(^4\) and goes on to take note of the dearth of young civilians interested in strategic concepts. He argues, "In the absence of a new generation of civilian strategists (the military) will have to take the lead in adapting U.S. military doctrine and strategy to the changes in the domestic and world environment of the 1970's.\(^5\) These positions are difficult to reconcile with Huntington's earlier arguments for an isolated military establishment set forth in *The Soldier and the State*. It is difficult, as well, to understand Huntington's omission of any mention of the professional military schools designed to deal with the problems he raises except to denigrate what he labels a "war college image" of the relations among military and political concerns. According to Huntington, military professionals are led to believe:

\[\ldots\] that military forces and deployments were the products of national strategy, which, in turn, were shaped by national


\(^5\)Ibid., p. 11.
policy, which, in turn, reflected a carefully codified and formulated set of national purposes.\(^6\)

The preceding research should make it clear that Huntington's remarks are more a patronizing caricature of the intellectual atmosphere in the three schools examined than an accurate portrayal of the scope of interest or understanding of the military elite students attending. The breadth of concern within the three professional military schools most clearly reflected in Tables 3.8 through 3.10 is evidence of the fact that the elites in the British, Canadian and U.S. military professions have been trying for at least two decades to grapple with the complex, shifting, and multicausal relationships connecting political and military considerations, and have been striving to equip the members of the profession who serve in policy-making positions with a kind of broad perspective called for by most scholars.

In fact, there is strong evidence in the preceding analysis that Huntington's ideal-typical military professional described in *The Soldier and the State*\(^7\) was, at least with respect to the military elite in the United States, a far cry from reality when that work was published in 1957. It has become increasingly less useful as a model for military officers in the nuclear age. The senior professional military schools exist to erode the kind of narrow "Balaclava" type of


\(^7\) Discussed in detail in Chapter I above.
mental outlook for which Huntington previously argued.

It is important to note, as well, that the evolution of professional knowledge described in the foregoing analysis took place in all three countries in an era of what could best be described as professional crisis. Philip Abrams describes the situation in Britain succinctly:

Public opinion in Britain has shown a steady decline of interest in all defence and foreign policy issues over the past fifteen years. Even military success is liable to be met by political repudiation—conspicuously in the case of the Suez expedition, of course. Withdrawal from empire, the social consequences of thermonuclear war, the modest but ideologically charged development of international police in peace keeping agencies, and above all the spread of a mode of revolutionary guerilla warfare which denies the distinction between military and political action, and mobilizes civilians and soldiers indiscriminately, have all encouraged doubt and debate about the possible role of national military establishments. It is hard to think of a single military operation which the British Armed Forces could now undertake without incurring the ridicule or condemnation of some significant section of the British public. 8

Adrian Preston shows that although there were differences in the situation in Canada, the picture was equally bleak. He characterizes the era from 1964 to 1970 as one in which "marked socio-cultural alienation, political disinvolvement, and strategic disengagement" were the characteristics of Canadian defence policy. He continues:

The new mood of impatient nationalism that is abroad in the country and the acute internal challenges to federal authority that have been posed by Western regionalism, maritime unionism, and Quebec separatism; the growing disenchantment with the practical results of international aid in peace-keeping; the introspective intellectual aversion to organized and uniformed

violence, to foreign military adventurism, and to short-sighted engineering disciplines that made them all possible (sic) . . . all have tended to confirm the Trudeau administrations' overriding concern for continental and constitutional issues.9

D. Stairs summarizes the effect of these developments on the military as follows:

In an atmosphere . . . of international stability--some might even say detente--the importance of Canada's military capabilities seemed slight, and the consensus which has supported their development in previous years had long since evaporated. The outcome was a reduction in the volume of forces stationed overseas, a diminution of the "real" resources allocated for use by the military establishment, and an increased emphasis on the performance of non-military, surveillance, and small scale tactical support roles.10

Compounding the difficulties facing the Canadian military profession was the traumatic unification under the direction of Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer which led to what many Canadian military officers saw as an undermining of morale and erosion of efficiency among Canadian forces.11

In the United States, the situation facing the military profession has been equally problematical. The erosion of United States' nuclear superiority and the failure of U.S. military efforts in Vietnam have led to a situation in which, according to Huntington himself, "The domestic basis for American foreign policy has

9 Adrian Preston, "The Profession of Arms in Canada," p. 211.


11 These developments, which included the resignation of some of Canada's most able and experienced senior officers, are described in detail by R. B. Byers in "Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither Civilian Control?" in The Canadian Military: A Profile, ed. by Hector J. Massey, pp. 197-229.
disintegrated" and in which he sees "fundamental changes in American culture and opinion in an anti-military direction." Janowitz, describing the decade 1960-1970, observes, "Military effort during a period of domestic social and political tension produced the most violent anti-militarism in modern United States history and profoundly exacerbated the cleavages in the American political system." Stephen Ambrose characterizes the impact of these situations on the U.S. military:

The professional soldier has had to operate under unprecedented restraints and interferences at the same time that he has become the target of unparalleled criticism, vituperation, and even hatred.

In view of the internal dissension and either noncommittal or negative attitudes toward the military profession and its concerns evident in the three countries, military professionals motivated by the traditional values and attitudes advocated by Huntington in The Soldier and the State might well be expected to see their profession threatened with eradication and their native lands headed for perdition. Indeed, perceptions of these types among French officers in the post-war era have been described as one cause of the revolt of the military in France in 1958 and much less threatening conditions have led to

---

12 Huntington, "Functions of the Military Establishment," p. 4.


15 See especially John Steward Ambler, Soldiers Against the State: The French Army in Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), especially pp. 399-404.
military takeovers in less developed nations.  

In spite of uncomfortable if not outrightly hostile environmental conditions, there is no evidence in the senior military professional schools in Britain, Canada or the United States or in the scholarly media at large that members of the military elite sought to interfere in non-military political processes. There is no evidence, for example, that in any of the three countries examined, military professionals sought to manipulate or exploit differences within the party structure of the three democracies. Nor is there evidence of any instrumentalist orientation designed to place military difficulties in the context of electoral or partisan politics.

Instead, there appears to have been, certainly within the schools and apparently in the military professions, focus upon the wide range of factors in both domestic and international environments which would impact upon the performance changes in both the domestic and international environment of the military and the shape of the profession. Effort was directed at understanding the potential consequences of decisions by civilian policy-makers. In no case was there evidence of any attempt by the military to evade these consequences, or to defy direction. Even in Canada, where events surrounding unification evoked strong emotional responses, resignation was the most serious act undertaken by a military professional, and the National

---

Defence College maintained a pained but acquiescent position of observer, rather than assuming an institutional role as advocate.\textsuperscript{17}

Evidence available suggests that, even when professional organizational interests were challenged, and when situational variables, both at home and abroad, indicated the development of serious corporate disadvantage for the military profession, members of the military elite who were systematically exposed to a broad range of political subjects were able to maintain respect for and responsiveness to civilian control. The legitimacy of civilian political institutions and the authority of civilian leaders were not challenged, even in the face of what must have been regarded as a major challenge not only to professional expertise but to professional autonomy. In short, qualities such as loyalty, flexibility, and a tendency toward informed cooperation seem to be every bit as much characteristic of politically aware professionals within the military elite as characteristics such as pessimism, collectivism, and instrumentalism. One can imply, indeed, that the behavior of the officer corps in each of the three countries was shaped much more by societal imperatives than by any narrowly conceived functional ones.\textsuperscript{18}

It is important to recognize at this point that there was no reason for the military profession in any of the three societies to

\textsuperscript{17}See Byers, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{18}cf. Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State}, "Any given officer corps will adhere to the ethic only to the extent that it is professional, that is to the extent that it is shaped by functional rather than societal imperatives." Huntington, \textit{Soldier and the State}, pp. 61-62.
question the support of the general populace for the institutions in which civilian control lay. The respect for these institutions within the military profession itself, even in a time of severe challenge, can be interpreted as further evidence of the integration of the members of the profession with the society from which they are drawn.

It is also evident that the process of déformation professionnelle inherent in prolonged periods of military service must have an impact. Janowitz has argued:

Professional socialization is a gradual process that works mainly by negative selection of those who are unfit or uninterested in a military career, and only to a much lesser extent by the positive molding of attitudes and perspectives.\textsuperscript{19}

This observation certainly has validity at the entry level of the profession and in the years immediately thereafter. But evidence from this study indicates that the process of socialization continues through the senior professional military schools, where one of the elements of socialization is causing the military professional who is about to assume policy-making responsibilities to reflect not only upon the complexity but also upon the interrelatedness of the problems faced by high level political decision-makers throughout government. Further, attitudinal data show that students who have attended the senior professional military schools have commented favorably on the value of the school experience in terms of exposure to other professionals, military and civilian, and the opportunity to review and renew professional commitment.

Evidence on Janowitz' subsequent argument that the military

comprises a unique pressure group made more effective by a sense of corporate identity fostered "especially in its higher schools".更能说明问题。Attitudinal data indicate military professionals themselves have difficulty identifying their profession as a "pressure group." Curricula at the schools, with their emphasis on the complexity and fluidity of conditions and problems, would appear ill-suited to the task of building a cohesive single-mindedness among military professionals. Indeed, the mission statements and methodologies in the schools emphasize the broadening of individual perspectives rather than marshalling support for narrow professional orientations.

With that said, it would be nonsensical to deny that the camaraderie within the schools does not lead to some homogenization of views and to some intensification of a sense of corporate identity. Indeed, when one considers the great similarity of backgrounds among students and the fact that the great bulk of military students are not only essentially self-selected but also highly successful professionals when they enter the schools, one might wonder that there is any disagreement or discussion within the schools. The most suspicious might wonder that the school experience hasn't led to conspiratorial cabals. Surely, any observer haunted by Laswell's nightmare of a garrison state would hardly sleep better if these were the only factors he considered.

As previously noted, however, there is disagreement and controversy within the student bodies of the schools, and there has been no

\[20\text{Ibid., p. xlvii.}\]
evidence of cabals. Instead, the combination of concerned, mature, experienced students and a curricula which emphasizes both the complexity of problems facing modern societies and the limited role of conflict in them seem to lead the student to respect the views of his various peers, be they military or civilian, without feeling any compunction to accede to a common line.

The facts are that within the elites of the military professions in three modern democracies, there has been systematic attention to a broad range of highly political subjects. These subjects have been considered clearly within the purview of the military professional. Furthermore, there appears to be near consensus among civilian policy-makers, among members of the military elite, and among scholars concerned with the development of the military profession that, in the nuclear age in modern industrialized society, informed inputs to governmental processes involving decisions on resource allocation, national strategy, and foreign policy proceed from political knowledge, not just among civilian decision-makers, but also among those members of the military profession charged with the responsibility of providing informed advice on any of those subjects.

These requirements for political knowledge have existed in times of great crisis for the military profession. Yet there is no evidence of breakdown of civilian control. Indeed, it would appear that the best guarantee of civilian control of the military in a crisis environment lies in the continuing development of productive relationships among military professionals and other servants of the people who hold responsible positions in government. At the heart of
this productive relationship must be a mutual respect for both shared and specialized aspects of knowledge held by individuals participating in the policy-making process. The informed military professional who gives and receives that respect will have no need to challenge the ultimate subordination of military considerations to political ones. Indeed, both he and his civilian counterparts will serve better because they are no longer burdened, misinformed or misdirected by an artificial separation between military and political considerations.

The pressing problem connected with development of political knowledge within the military profession in modern democracies is not the increased likelihood of challenges to civilian control. The basic questions facing senior military professionals concern the practicality or indeed the possibility of a person possessing substantial expertise in the management of violence while simultaneously developing and maintaining a depth of knowledge regarding the issues which bridge the politico-military gap. Herein lies the fundamental challenge to the senior military professional schools dealing with political subjects.

Of course, the schools themselves depend for the ultimate quality of their product upon the timber they receive. If the entering military professional is a person with a narrow mind focused on application of violence, who holds a set of values distinct from those values which predominate in the society he allegedly serves, who uses his corporate identity as a cocoon, it is highly unlikely that the school experience will allow him to develop the breadth of perspective and sensitivity necessary for him to earn the respect of the civilian policy-makers to whom he is exposed. If, on the other hand, the
military professional entering the school is an individual who, while possessing expertise in depth in management of potential violence, holds values similar to those of the society in which he serves, and is sensitive to the complex and conflictual nature of the value structure of a modern society, he will profit from his school experience and will approach his policy-making responsibilities with a sense of humility and renewed commitment to the ideal of service which lies at the base of military professionalism. These qualities, together with determination and open-mindedness, are most likely to earn for him the respect of his civilian colleagues and the opportunity to best fulfill his complex and frequently highly political professional responsibilities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


"Armed Forces and Society in Western Europe." Archives Européennes de Sociologie, VI, No. 2 (1965).


Chegwidden, T. S. "The Imperial Defence College." *Public Administration, (Great Britain), XXV, No. 1 (1947), 38-41.*


Girardet, W. *La Société Militaire dans la France Contemporaine.*


Huntington, Samuel P. Private interview at Rice University, Houston, Texas, April 1, 1975.


The National War College Experience and Its Utilization: A Study Among
Graduates of the National War College and Supervisors of

College, 1975.

College, 1974.

O'Connor, Mary C. "The National Defence College." Canadian Defence
Quarterly, I, No. 2 (1971), 41-44.

Palen, John J. "The Education of the Senior Military Decision-Maker."
Sociological Quarterly, XII, No. 2 (1972), 147-60.

Parsons, Talcott. "Professions." International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, XII. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1968,
536-46.

Parsons. "The Professions and Social Structure." Social Forces,

Pout, H. W. "Imperial Defence College: A Personal Impression."
Journal of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, XV, No. 4
(1960), 142-45.

Preston, Adrian. "The Higher Study of Defence in Canada." Journal of
Canadian Studies, III, No. 3 (1968), 17-28.

Preston. "Military Education and Canadian Defence Policy." Army
Quarterly and Defence Journal, XCVI, No. 2 (1968), 166-74.

Preston. "The Organization of Defence Studies in Canada: A Compara-
tive Analysis." Brassey's Annual. London: W. Clowes and
Sons Limited, 1967, 224-38.

Political Authority as a Military Problem." World Politics,
XXIII, No. 2 (1971), 190-214.

Preston, Richard A. "The Potential of the Military for Contributions
to Conventional Deterrence in the 1970's." Canadian Military
Professionalism: The Search for Identity. Edited by R. B.
Byers and Colin S. Gray. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of

Report of a Study of Professionalism in the Canadian Forces. Ottawa:
Department of National Defence, April 1972.


van Doorn, Jacques. "The Officer Corps: A Fusion of the Profession and Organization." Archives Européennes de Sociologie, VI, No. 2 (1965), 262-82.


Vought, Donald B. "Soldiers Must Be Statesmen." Military Review, XLVIII, No. 10 (1968), 79-84.


