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THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT
AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
1910-1917
VOLUME I

by

JAMES PARKER MARTIN

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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PREFACE

In the years after 1900, reform was a paramount concern in the United States. And while the thrust for reform had many facets, each calling for political, social, humanitarian changes, a strong interest in the betterment of the condition of mankind underlay the movement. Interest in peace reform or the reform of international relations inevitably found expression in these years. For of all changes, the one that would seem to convey the greatest benefit to the most human beings was the elimination of war and the promotion of peaceful relations among nations.

Pacifism, or the attitude of mind opposing all war and advocating the settlement of international disputes entirely by peaceful means, has not emerged to any extent in American historical literature as the logical extension of the progressive movement.¹ The reason, perhaps, is the

dominant view of William Leuchtenburg that progressives were entirely committed to the defense of national honor, preparedness, and Americanism. Such an interpretation would appear to exclude any type of progressive-pacifism. Another explanation, one much broader and involving the whole course of United States history, is that culturally peoples celebrate what they value. And traditionally American authors have not regarded pacifism as a popular cause, one worth high esteem. Whatever the reason, the continued omission of the consideration of pacifism in the United States is not a pursuit worthy of support, particularly for the period comprising the first two decades of this century.


3 Two illustrations come to mind. In the first place, most college textbooks mention only lightly, if at all, the pacifist struggle against intervention in World War I, and generally fail to develop the idea that pacifism does comprise a part of our heritage. Studies of frustration and failure are rarely popular, but that does not make them any less true. Secondly, A Guide to the Study of the United States of America, published by the Library of Congress, does not even contain the category of "Pacifism" in its Table of Contents. Nor is there any reference to the subject in the Index. As a sub-title this guide curiously carries: "Representative Books Reflecting the Development of American Life and Thought." Are we to believe then that opposition by Americans to militarism and war is unrepresentative?
The present study is an attempt to restore something of a balanced outlook to these years. Its thesis is that the American peace movement in its approach to international affairs was part of the overall reform impulse known as progressivism. To elucidate this correlation between progressivism and pacifism, certain aspects of the progressive movement are introduced for the purpose of a quick review, with an emphasis directed to the inherent dichotomy within early twentieth-century American reform of "elitism" versus the "popular will."

This dichotomy is analyzed with special attention given to the nature of the pre-1914 peace movement (Chapter I); a general analysis of the problem of pacifism before and after 1914 (Chapter II); the paralysis and virtual collapse of that movement after 1914 (Chapter III); the regrouping of certain peace advocates, led by the non-elitist segments and their 1914-1917 efforts for peace through agitation for mediation (Chapter IV); anti-preparedness (Chapter V); and, finally, a referendum on the question of United States intervention (Chapter VI). This study attempts to demonstrate that the advocates of peace shared the same optimism, used the same techniques, and were mired in the same post-1914 confusion as the advocates of domestic reform. As Peter Filene has commented in describing the World Peace Foundation, one of the organiza-
tions in the American peace movement, "The history of this peace society provides for the historian a laboratory in which the central themes and problems of early twentieth-century American liberalism were tested in compressed and intensified form. The peace movement was ... in almost every respect, the international counterpart of Progressivism." 4

INTRODUCTION

Progressivism was not all of one fabric. And while there are numerous outstanding accounts which describe it, including some praising its achievements, all have fallen short of a comprehensive definition of what the progressive movement essentially comprised. This is an understandable difficulty when confronted with a movement of such broad dimensions. While it is not our purpose to offer a definition in this space, certain general considerations of progressivism form an integral background to a study of early twentieth-century pacifism.

ONE

The decade and a half prior to the United States' intervention in the First World War saw Congress pass a host of reform legislation on a number of national problems too large to be dealt with effectively in the states. The basis for effective railroad regulation was established by the Hepburn Act, then reinforced by the Elkins Act and the Physical Evaluation Act. Continuous surveillance over the railroads was provided by the Interstate Commerce Commission, much strengthened by the Mann-Elkins Act. The Underwood Tariff was enacted and the loss of revenue was compensated by the initiation of a graduated income tax. The Federal Reserve Act permitted the government to expand the currency
by making it a function of commercial and industrial credit and also provided a measure of unity and government control through twelve regional reserve banks and a central Federal Reserve Board. A Federal Trade Commission was established to enforce the antitrust laws. Conservation work had taken millions of acres of timber, grazing, and mining land away from the private exploiters and turned them into government reserves. The nation had achieved rural free delivery and a postal savings bank. The Pure Food and Drug Act was fairly effective legislation.

Moreover, certain groups had been particularly successful in achieving some of their desired reforms on a national level. Organized labor, for example, which had already achieved some relief from the antitrust laws and from the abuse of the injunction through special provisions of the Clayton Act, also received the Seaman's Act which protected the rights of merchant sailors, a child-labor law, and the Adamson Act which guaranteed the eight-hour day for railroad workers. Commercial farmers of the South and Midwest won their demands for their special credit needs through Farm Loan Banks which enabled them to secure loans against farm lands and buildings and through a Warehouse Act which made loans available against stored farm products.

On the state and local levels, there had been significant political changes. The direct primary was intended
to put the choice of political candidates in the hands of
the people, and thus raise the level of political leader-
ship. The initiative made it possible for citizens' organi-
zations to propose legislation, while through the referen-
dum voters could pass on state laws. The short ballot was
adopted to make it easier for the voter to perform his func-
tion intelligently by the separation of local from national
elections. The recall of public officials was widely adopted
and the recall of judges advocated as a means of removing
corrupt or incompetent officials. In addition, there was a
myriad of labor and welfare legislation. The state move-
ment for social justice succeeded in limiting women's work-
ing hours, in promoting the welfare of children by estab-
lishing juvenile courts and children's playgrounds and by
adopting compulsory school laws and effective child-labor
laws, and in protecting men as well as women by enacting
workmen's compensation laws and by governing factory working
conditions. Other important forms of social legislation
gave aid to the aged poor, the disabled, and the retarded.
Mothers' assistance laws were passed to help divorced,
widowed, or deserted mothers with dependent children. Stan-
dards for tenement houses were established in the name of
public health. Reform was also urged in prison conditions
as well as in the care of the infirm and the insane.

No one group or party could possibly have been
responsible for all of this diversity. There was no mono-
lithic philosophy of progressivism. As Thomas H. Greer has stated, "Here was a social reform movement with no set leadership, no single platform, no disciplined organization, and no planned means of action."\(^1\) The impulse for twentieth-century reform was both derived from and executed by a multiplicity of sources and agents.

Understandably, no historian to date has been able to satisfactorily account for this myriad of legislation.\(^2\) Attempts to construct a truly definitive interpretation, one which will account for the variety as well as the unity of the period have been quite diverse. A nucleus of historians is calling for a different approach. "The Progressive movement was nothing if not pluralistic and its very diffuseness should be a warning against a narrow conception of it."\(^3\) In suggesting some of the assumptions which a

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synthesis or a new interpretation consider, Buenker writes of the necessity to attend "to the complex problems which faced America at the turn of the century." The problems themselves should be the point of focus, problems which affected individuals and interest groups in a variety of ways. "Because none of these interest groups constituted more than a significant minority of the population, no single one could possibly hope to gain control of any segment of the government by itself. This necessitated the formation of coalitions in order to accomplish anything of note." It is through coalitions that the vast body of diverse legislation was adopted, coalitions which were made effective by the cooperation of agrarian radicals, displaced younger generation aristocrats, middle class intellectuals, social welfare workers, organized labor, politicians, businessmen, unskilled laborers, Socialists, and urban wage earners.

Coalitions in past reform efforts had been so common that it is surprising that their use has been under-stressed in considerations of the progressive movement. Agrarian reform, for example, was and still is, subject to manipulation by a variety of influences. During the Populist

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upheaval, leadership frequently came from the merchant, the farm editor, and the politician—those whose interest in farming was secondary. While not themselves farmers, in many cases they took the initiative in agrarian reform. Moreover, during the early twentieth-century, agitation for scientific agriculture arose from urban groups that had a stake in agricultural prosperity.

The following two examples will illustrate the widespread acceptance of coalitions during the progressive era. Housing reformers had long attacked substandard housing because among other ills it generated disease, but they lacked support from medical authorities. When after 1900, however, the housing reformers based their claims upon the scientific confirmation of the germ theory of disease, their efforts were strengthened through the assistance of the public health movement. The struggle against tuberculosis cemented this alliance between health and housing reformers. Similarly, the Eastern Rate Case of 1910–1911 produced an alliance between the railroad owners and their union workers. While both sides could otherwise find little to agree on, the railroad workers supported the demands of the owners

for a rate increase, for "whoever opposes fair returns for railroad investments tampers not only with the railroads but with their employees."\(^6\)

The need for coalition in order to attain one's goal is a highly useful approach for the consideration of the early twentieth-century peace movement in the United States. Agitation for peace, as will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow, had much broader support than the typical nineteenth-century pacifists who decried the evil of war on religious and humanitarian grounds. Indeed, the movement could nowhere have flourished if it had continued to depend solely on such single-interest reformers. Instead the peace movement is a supreme example of an amalgam of diverse interests. For like the progressive interest groups, pacifists were a minority who to get support had to take it wherever they found it. In the founding of the Woman's Peace Party, for instance, besides an interest in peace shared by women, Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt wanted to take advantage of "the various national organizations of

women who have standing peace committees...." Another example is the Chicago Emergency Federation of Peace Forces, which in its very name expresses the concept of coalition. In a true spirit of cooperation, peace workers frequently

7 Jane Addams to Mrs. Fannie Fern Andrews, December 28, 1914, Jane Addams Correspondence, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Among those invited to participate were: The National Federation of Women's Clubs, the World Peace Foundation, the National Socialist Women's Committee, The National Intercollegiate Alumnae Association, The National Woman's Christian Temperance Union, The National Suffrage Association, The National Women's Trade Union League, The National League of Teachers' Organizations, The Young Women's Christian Association, The Daughters of the American Revolution, The International Congress of Farm Women and the Mothers' Congress. Also expected to participate in the founding meeting were delegations from the Church Peace Union, the World Peace Foundation, the American Peace Society, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—the established peace organizations.

shared their headquarters and other facilities. And within the individual peace organizations themselves there was a coalition of all types and classes of people: educators, clergymen, settlement workers, politicians, businessmen, suffragettes, Socialists, and journalists. All felt bound to each other in a cooperative effort to achieve the "ultimate reform."

Moreover, peace advocates joined in coalition with other groups whose immediate interest was something other than peace. A most provocative illustration is that of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, five of whose trustees were members of the Navy League, a coalition which reflected a belief in international harmony that is preserved by a strong naval arm capable of maintaining a

9 In Chicago the Woman's Peace Party shared its headquarters at 116 South Michigan Avenue with the Church Peace Union and the Chicago Peace Society, an affiliate of the American Peace Society. In New York City, the same building at 70 Fifth Avenue housed as many as seven different pacifist organizations at the same time. Cf., Donald Johnson, The Challenge of American Freedoms, World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union, Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1963, 3. Again in Chicago, quarters were given in the home of Mr. Charles R. Crane, a leading Republican progressive, for the Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy which offered courses in international relations under joint auspices with the Chicago Peace Society. Cf., The Survey, XXXIV (June 26, 1915), 283.
respectable balance of power. Also actively allied with the pacifists was a group of internationalists—those whose interest was essentially a reform of international relations—that is, they were primarily internationalists and pacifists only incidentally. However fragmented into arbitrationists, legalists, generalists, world federationists, sanctionists or some other variety of advocate for an organized world, all were in agreement on their final goal—international harmony.

As the countless numbers of coalitions agreed to work for (or against) a particular measure, the keystone for success was their cooperation—even if for dissimilar reasons. Such cooperation hinged upon tactics or the debate over methods and steps to be adopted in the struggle for improving society. In the case of the peace advocates, all the pre-war societies desired international harmony. There was even some general agreement on how to achieve it

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and a sense that a "peace breakthrough" was imminent. But the days of tranquility were different from a time of trial, and as this study will attempt to demonstrate, after the outbreak of World War I the established societies became confused as to how to attain their goal. Cooperation broke down as agreement on tactics could not be met, programs waned for lack of support, and new organizations emerged as peace workers reshuffled their coalitions.

TWO

More important, perhaps, than the formation of coalitions was the overall attitudinal framework of the progressive movement. For, it was into this framework that the peace movement, indeed the whole thrust for early twentieth-century reform, was cast.

As already indicated, the problems which so aroused the consciences of the reformers merit the central focus: how to restore a sense of human dignity to the urban poor, how to make government more efficient and more responsive to the new social demands, and how to redirect the nation's economy to better serve the various interests in the community. These problems were broad and not everyone looked upon them from the same point of view. In the quest for solutions, disagreement upon aims, methods, and tactics was frequent. But whether one supported most of the proposals
being agitated at the time and was in some sense a "generic" reformer, or was merely a one-issue person who worked to advance this or that reform while remaining quite indifferent to the others, all were progressives.\textsuperscript{11} As Richard Hofstadter has stated, "Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Progressive Movement was that it became so pervasive, that so many people could, at the same time and on the same issue, be called Progressive."\textsuperscript{12}

All progressives accepted change. They did not, however, accept each change advocated nor did they think each would be salutary. In other words, while all were Darwinians, accepting the notion of struggle and competition, not all were in agreement as to the limits of its application to society. This basic difference can be highlighted by consideration of the trust fight in which all sides participated.

Some progressives were modified Spencerians, confident that the best would and should go right to the top.

\textsuperscript{11} It is in this sense that Nicholas Murray Butler, Elihu Root, Theodore Marburg, and James Speyer -- individuals not readily identified with the crusade for domestic reform -- can be included within the entire progressive movement. As internationalists their commitment was to a single reform, the search for world order.

They felt that competition was the best way, the natural way, the most efficient way, the way of greater good for the majority. The attack upon the trusts by this group of progressives -- while surprising from some aspects since the trust defenders also championed competition and survival of the fittest -- was founded on the belief that the trusts did not allow fair competition. As Wilson said in his first campaign for the presidency:

Now, the real difficulty in the United States ... is not the existence of great individual combinations -- that is dangerous enough in all countries -- but the real danger is the combination of the combinations, the real danger is that the same groups of men control chains of banks, systems of railways, whole manufacturing enterprises, great mining projects, great enterprises for the developing of the natural water power of this country, and that threaded together in the personnel of a series of boards of directors is a community of interest more formidable than any conceivable combination in the United States...13

Certain individuals through their use of the trusts had destroyed competition. They had tricked and cheated the free enterprise system. Furthermore, the trusts were inefficient. Their huge profits were more the result of control of the market than of efficiency in production and marketing. They had to be regulated and made to join the

interests of civilization. For these critics of the trusts
bigness was simply a condition, it was not a crime.

For other progressives, however, bigness was im-
moral and just as the physical energies of the nation had
been expanded to the fullest to create the trusts, so now
they felt, the moral energies of the nation could no longer
be dormant in bringing them under control. It was impera-
tive to check such expressions of gross individualism
asserted at the expense of others. These reformers were
anti-Spencerians, believers in a Reform Darwinism.

These progressives were set apart from the others,
not only by their attitude towards the trusts, but by their
most audacious belief in the possibility of abolishing
poverty. Campaigns for better housing, public health,
stricter child-labor and compulsory-education laws, more
adequate protection for employed women, compensation for
work accidents, more stringent regulation of the liquor
trade, and a host of other measures were all parts of this
broad attack on the problem of poverty. Humanitarian con-
cerns could no longer suffer neglect.

A pronounced kinship with the "other half" of
humanity was apparent, especially among the early social
workers. Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, Robert A. Woods, and
others in their descriptions of settlement work frequently
referred to their "sisters" or to the settlement as a "household." Structure and bureaucracy were minimized. The virtues of all men, of all nations, of all classes, and of all income groups were respected in the effort to foster a community. That there was among these progressives identification neither with any class nor with any ideology is significant for the subsequent history of the anti-war movement in the United States. Attention was centered on the deprived individual, not as he was part of a class, but as he was part of all humanity, part of the world community.

Accordingly, the assistance they attempted to render was not based on altruism, but on justice. These progressives felt that charity could never do the work of justice, hence their effort to gain a voice in the institutions which avowedly were theirs. The government must be given back to the "people." Faith must be restored in the ability of the "people," given the power and means to express themselves, to act in the best manner. Emphasis increasingly was directed toward political reforms (advocacy of ballot reform, voting machines, direct primaries, initiative, referendum, and recall) as the entering wedge to involve the public in decision-making at all levels.

Some progressives heralded these efforts; coalitions and alliances worked and agitated to achieve the desired reforms. Yet, even though these reformers steered clear of
radicalism and continued their support of private property and a modified competitive capitalism, fear spread among some segments of the progressives who felt that certain traditional values and institutions were becoming endangered. Certain areas of reform were felt to be too sensitive to be left exclusively in the hands of reformers. There was in particular a fear for the future of representative government.

Louis Brandeis, whose progressive credentials are beyond question, was among the first to call for a brake upon this drift toward direct democracy. He accepted neither Robert M. LaFollette's program of direct government nor Theodore Roosevelt's recall of judicial decisions. Others, such as William H. Taft, were disturbed by the effort to limit representative government and regarded the attack on the judiciary as an attack on the very foundation of American institutions. Herbert Croly was openly cynical of some of the popular pieces of progressive legislation. He felt civil service reform hurt efficiency by enabling employees to become independent of their superiors.

14 Haber, Efficiency and Uplift, 78-9.
He did not believe that majority rule should be always morally or nationally binding and pleaded for escape from the tyranny of the democratic tradition. Other reforms such as the secret ballot, direct government by the people, and more frequent elections might only damage democracy by making it less workable.16

The call for order in the advocacy of reform became widespread, and centered on the need for efficiency and leadership, especially in politics. Samuel Hays has captured this mood:

The broadening scientific and technical horizons of the Progressive Era nourished a generation of men who glimpsed what could be done if both private and public decisions were made more efficiently. They looked upon the current political system -- conflicts among pressure groups as well as partisan strife -- as slipshod; they equally distrusted greater popular participation in making decisions about complicated and technical questions. Efficient action required freedom from these pressures of self-interest which might lead to decisions different from those required by scientific and technical knowledge. A government of expanded functions in which the power of decision lay in the hands of experts could transcend the "petty" bickerings of political strife, rise above a welter of grassroots interests, and produce the greatest good for society as a whole.17


17 Response to Industrialism, 156-7.
Works such as Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life*, Walter Weyl's *The New Democracy*, and Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Politics* and *Drift and Mastery* pointed to the crucial need to apply the lessons of efficiency in a realistic manner. Political problems came not from corruption and dishonesty but from the lack of intelligence. If leadership were entrusted to the educated and the competent, control of capitalism would be established and social harmony result. In certain cases the efficiency of harmonizing the interests of employer and employee had already been demonstrated with the resultant elimination of class conflict. This was done through a scientific manager who represented neither management nor labor, but with his intelligence and expertise could envision the best interests of all. In brief, government, society, world affairs -- the public and private business of the nation -- were increasingly regarded as matters of expert administration. Human organization depended upon the leadership of exceptional individuals.

This was a clear call for elitism, pure and simple. The expert was a trained individual who would not compromise the integrity of his work. Neither would nor could he be distracted by the profit motive. He would, in the purest sense of the phrase, be a public servant working for the general good in a disinterested manner. He was the epitome of efficiency -- working like a machine, impersonal, not
swayed in any direction by sympathy, totally professional. "The practical man knows how, the scientific man knows why. The expert knows how and why." 18

One enthusiast celebrated the attainment of this goal in Wisconsin, where "...wealth is sanctified by commonwealth and the people of the State willingly let University professors write their laws and administer their departments." 19 The "Wisconsin idea" -- the marriage between academe and politics -- symbolized the hopes of many of these progressive reformers. So did Colonel Edward M. House who argued the case for professionalism in his Philip Dru, Administrator, a novel in which the problems of society were represented as failing of settlement because of a lack of efficiency. Whether President Wilson ever read or was influenced by the book, he was certainly affected by the author. He, however, had his own reasons for his high regard for professionalism. While he was convinced that everyone should have a fair chance, he, like so many other progressives, was not one to believe that leadership could be put in the hands of the mob on important questions. They would just vote their whim. That was not the real

18 Haber, 105.

meaning of democracy. He held to the belief that the most could be done for the public by a leadership of those with the greatest ability and intelligence. Wilson's attitude, as well as House's and the other elitists' active in the peace movement, was of the greatest significance in confronting the question of the United States role vis-a-vis the European War.

The progressive movement, therefore, had an underlying dichotomy within it. This dichotomy consisted of a pattern of rivalry between elites and democrats, between those who, in their opinion, knew what is in the best interest for the "people" and those who believed that the "people" should be the ones to decide what is in their best interests. This rivalry was not such as to exclude cooperation in all situations, but it accentuated the weakness of the coalitions because of the divergent and often conflicting aims of their member groups.

Because of its significance to the present study, this dichotomy merits a more detailed examination. 20

20 For this interpretation of the progressive movement I have been largely dependent upon Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959; idem, The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914; and Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift.
Although progressive leaders represented the "people" (the exploited small businessman, office workers, laborer, immigrant, and farmer) against the "interests" (the powerful business corporations that dominated political as well as economic life), these reformers were not consistent in the amount of faith that they placed in the "people." There was a strong strain of elitism in the assertion of their own leadership and their dependence upon the expert. Progressive reformers marched with the "people," but they marched at their head. They wanted to bring government to the "people," but they still kept it at a distance.

Many political reforms, such as direct primary elections, the initiative, referendum, recall, the short ballot, voting machines, longer terms for administrative offices, city managers, and smaller legislative bodies, were urged in the name of efficiency as a means of extending democracy. At the same time, however, they were used to oust entrenched political systems in the name of "enlightened" leadership.

Support for change, therefore, was more than a grassroots movement. It came from a more complex source than the "people." Moreover, situations abound in which the "people" opposed particular reforms. The help rendered urban bosses by immigrant voters in defeating municipal reforms and the distrust of urban reformers by farmers are examples frequently cited. Another outstanding example of
a reform urged in the "people's" name but not with their support is the conservation movement. "The historian," as Samuel Hays has stated, "cannot understand conservation leaders simply as defenders of the 'people' ... The political implications of conservation...grew out of the political implications of applied science rather than from the conflict over the distribution of wealth. Who should decide the course of resource development? Who should determine the goals and methods of federal resource programs?" 21

By way of summary, therefore, within the progressive movement alongside the well-known campaign for direct democracy was a less publicized but equally significant campaign to carve out an area of expertise in American government. At times, both these aims attracted the same men. But frequently the consequences of government by the people were found to be too unsettling. The call for efficiency and the expert was a way to resist the leveling tendencies in the principle of equality. It was a way of controlling and directing the rate of change in areas of politics, economics, and social work deemed too crucial to be left in the hands of the unenlightened. In other words, the progressive movement was not just a matter of destroying and rooting up accumulated evils, but of managing, controlling, and regulating for the future good of all. Reform

21 Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, 3-4.
increasingly became a technical question, in which consider-
erations of efficiency were most important. Who would con-
trol the rate and direction of change?

THREE

Most writers admit to the strains and stresses, indeed the contradictions, within the progressive movement. These were present from the very beginning. The formation of coalitions and the call for professionalism were merely means of strengthening the internal weaknesses of the re-
form movement so as to enable it to push forward success-
fully.

It is in this context that both are advanced in this study—as analytical tools to assist in understanding the American peace movement, particularly during the con-
fusion of the 1914-1917 years. Kept together by coalitions
dominated by elitists during the pre-war years, the peace organizations shared the fate of all structures with simi-
lar foundations. The war ruptured the cracks and forced a regrouping. New coalitions were formed, only this time with a difference. Elitists kept to theirs; democrats, to theirs. For the duration of the war, at least, a breach had been created too broad to be crossed.
Finally, the effort to place the peace movement in the context and spirit of the progressive movement is an attempt to make the struggle for world order appear less as an isolated or utopian reform, while domestic reforms are represented as realistic and practical. On the contrary, the thrust for international harmony is integral to attain a complete picture of the reform movement whether during the progressive era or during previous periods in United States history where broad reform movements were advanced. Moreover, such an approach is useful because in addition to placing the study of pacifism in its historical setting, it brings light to focus on the larger movement of progressivism from still another direction.
CHAPTER I
PACIFISM--ITS FINEST HOUR

If there is one single characteristic which could describe the peace movement within the United States in the pre-war period, it would be optimism. In the years after 1900 it seemed that the efforts and patience of pacifists, indeed their wisdom, were destined for success. International accord enjoyed much contemporary interest and was the subject for discussion at numerous meetings in Europe and across the United States. The ranks of those who were outspoken for the betterment of international relations swelled; the number of organizations dedicated to peace increased; converts to the cause multiplied. A feeling of optimism prevailed that now was the moment for the battle on behalf of international harmony to be won.

ONE

Such optimism was in direct contrast to the traditional lack of esteem which pacifism enjoyed over the centuries. Pacifism had never been in any large measure a popular belief since it seemed to deprive man of certain moments of his greatest glory. It had remained, however, a tenet adhered to by its own faithful. It was adhered to because pacifists regarded themselves as possessive of a
true philosophy of life and, secure in their outlook, they would suffer no discouragement. For, until the late nineteenth-century the ideology of American peace work was based upon the ideal of Christian brotherhood. War was entirely opposed to the example and teaching of Christ. Furthermore, it came from man's dark side and was based on his sins of pride, avarice, and revenge.¹

The earliest divisions within the peace movement arose over the question of how to cope with other men's sins. One side counseled non-resistance (opposition to all war); another group distinguished between aggressive wars and those fought in self-defense. As long as the peace movement remained at such a basic level, however, it was destined to remain at the periphery of American life, and not attract many adherents. Moreover, as long as the solution to the problem of war was dependent upon the depth of one's religious convictions, the problem would not be solved. A different, if not broader, base had to be found.

Many, no doubt, shared the belief of Rufus M. Jones: "For one who has found his way through Christ to the full meaning of life, to the real worth of man, war is simply

impossible." But Christian principles were no longer the sole foundation blocks used to construct opposition to war. Just as religious sentiment had not proved adequate to check past domestic abuses and spark the reforms to correct them, twentieth-century peace movement reflected the same secular background that had achieved success where religion had failed.

New leadership began to see the world in a different way. A shrinking world necessitated the cooperation of mankind and helped create a change in pacifism, which at the same time received new life. The increased international contact, national rivalries, and imperialism of the post-1870 period emphasized the urgency of searching for effective and accepted means to reduce tensions. Instead of attacking war as the scourge of mankind, pacifists strove to create specific political machinery which would end war: arbitration, disarmament, conciliation, a world court, and world federation.

None of these proposals was new in the absolute sense. They had been expressed in rudimentary form even

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before the 1850's.\textsuperscript{3} Arbitration had long been advocated as the rational effort to settle disputes. It was a "rudimentary form of judicial procedure...(which) relied upon a judge or judges who rendered a decision which the parties to a dispute had previously agreed to accept."\textsuperscript{4} Arbitration, however, had certain shortcomings:

1) There was no permanent body of judges, that is, the court was not fixed. Third parties had to be found to act as judges each time controversies arose.

2) Solutions, usually were not decided by right, but by splitting the monetary or territorial differences. Thus, arbitration spoke of compromise and offended the sensibilities of legalists whose highest value was international justice.

3) Disputes to be arbitrated were subject of only voluntary submission.


\textsuperscript{4} Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 23.
In spite of such obvious defects, most pacifists during the 1890's continued to see arbitration as the way to world peace. They labored to improve the functioning of arbitration and ease the shortcomings, particularly the fact that the court was not fixed and there was no obligatory submission of disputes.

The twin brothers, Alfred and Albert Smiley, humanitarians, successful businessmen, and philanthropists, originated the Lake Mohonk Conferences on Arbitration in 1895 to create public sentiment favorable to arbitration and an international court. In the first of twenty-two annual meetings, the delegates agreed that arbitration would take precedence over other subjects in their discussions. Proposals, however, had to be realistic. Accordingly, the delegates agreed that the general acceptance of the obligatory submission of all disputes would have to be gradual. In this vein, they enthusiastically supported the Olney-Paulefote Treaty of 1897, a general obligatory treaty to arbitrate pecuniary and territorial disputes for a five-year period. This treaty was defeated by the Senate, but the delegates at Lake Mohonk continued to urge similar model treaties which recommended the obligatory submission of disputes, believing particularly that the two English-speaking countries should continue to lead the way. At the same time they pressed the need for a
fixed international court, and hailed the First Hague Peace Conference which established the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The decade which began with a great interest in the reform of arbitration but only the hope of a court in one's life-time ended with the meeting of a world-wide assembly at The Hague. The results did not satisfy all pacifists -- those who advocated disarmament were especially disappointed -- but a start had been made. A feeling was developing that the progress toward peace was irreversible. 5

The Hague conferences represented the first practical effort of the nations to restrict the tools of warfare and set up institutions for the rational settlement of international disputes. Pacifists thought that these two conferences in 1899 and 1907, and the definite scheduling of a third for late 1914 or early 1915 for the consideration of arms control, were beginning to have a

subtle effect upon the mind of the world. These conferences stimulated the age-long desire for peace and set a new and vigorous pace for the long-established peace societies to follow. New peace groups were multiplying, and together with the established organizations, urged their governments to go forward with the modern plans for world organization. So impressive were these events, coming in this dramatic sequence, that it seemed that a new line of progress in the conduct of international affairs was imminent. Many people looked forward to an unbroken continuation of what came to be called "The Hague Spirit."

The "Hague Spirit" was a belief that nations were willing to cooperate as equals in foreign affairs and that nationalist emotions were to some extent being checked. Pacifists could point to these positive results: the anticipated creation of an international prize court, the prohibition of the use of force in the collection of debts among nations, the improvement of arbitration procedures, the removal of certain excesses in the conduct of warfare, that is, provision for women and children, better care of prisoners, and the giving of quarter.


Across the United States growing numbers of citizens put their faith in this "Hague Spirit" and were willing to work toward the consolidation of this new departure in world affairs. For example, Andrew Carnegie, the former steel baron and the nation's leading philanthropist, gave enthusiastic support to the idea of arbitration. He provided suitable quarters where nations could meet over their disputes: the Pan-American Union Building in Washington, D.C., the Central American Court of Justice in Cartago, Costa Rica, and "The Temple of Peace," a palace erected at The Hague through his $13,000,000 contribution and dedicated on August 28, 1913. Moreover, "The Hague Spirit" provided the basis for discussion for numerous conferences throughout the United States. National Peace and Arbitration Congresses were convened beginning with the first in New York City in 1907, and biennially thereafter in Chicago, Baltimore, and St. Louis. Plans were also underway for celebration of the Centennial of United States--Great Britain Peace, 1815-1915, to commemorate the end of the War of 1812 and the hundred years of peace between the United States and Great Britain.


9 At the Third National Peace Congress, William H. Taft delivered an address. This was the first time that any President had ever appeared before a pacifist gathering. The peace workers, attaching great significance to this, believed that the government now approved their work and were greatly encouraged.
Arbitration still remained the key to peace for many American peace workers, and from 1900 on they wanted the United States to take the lead in the arbitration movement. These pacifists urged the government to submit its disputes with other nations to The Hague Court. Progress, however, was uneven. The first case was submitted by President Theodore Roosevelt only in 1902.10

The United States continued to lag behind until 1908-1909 when it negotiated twenty-five treaties providing for arbitration, twenty-two of which were ratified. But these treaties were not clear victories for the peace workers since each provided that before arbitration could commence the Senate had the power to specify each issue in the dispute. Most arbitrationists, however, regarded even this advance as better than none.

President William H. Taft's March 22, 1910 address re-awakened interest in arbitration. In this address President Taft suggested that all disputes, without exception, be settled by arbitration. Taft then negotiated two model treaties with Great Britain and France, and, according to their provisions, all justiciable disputes were to be

arbitrated and all other questions were to be referred to a six-man joint high commission of inquiry. This commission would decide whether the case was judicial in nature and hence subject to arbitration or whether it should be settled in some other way. The Senate, however, emasculated these treaties with amendments, and eventually Taft withdrew them.\textsuperscript{11}

Not all arbitrationists lost heart. Some continued to be encouraged by Bryan's "cooling-off" treaties. As early as 1905 Bryan had introduced the "cooling-off" idea, which as Secretary of State he later incorporated into thirty of his treaties. His idea was to overcome the obstacle presented by the unwillingness of nations to arbitrate all disputes. Where nations continued in such refusal, he suggested that the disputes, not excepting questions of national honor, should be sent to a special permanent commission of investigation which would make its recommendations only after a year-long period, during which the resort to arms was forbidden. The assumption was that by the end of a year national tempers would have cooled and an omnipotent world opinion would have marshaled reason and morality behind a peaceful solution.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Kuehl, \textit{Seeking World Order}, 137-143.

While the treaties were roundly celebrated in many quarters, and Bryan himself regarded them as his greatest achievement, this was only the favorable comment. Actually reaction was mixed. Arbitrationists themselves saw the treaties as a setback. In the first place, the treaties contained no reference to arbitration. Secondly, there were no provisions for enforcement or even agreement to abide by the eventual decision awarded. Dissatisfaction was widespread, therefore, not only among arbitrationists but also among other pacifists who felt there had to be another way to attain world peace.13

Actually, after the First Peace Conference at The Hague, and certainly after the Second, dissatisfaction was common either with arbitration itself as a solution or with the conservative gradualism of the Lake Mohonk proposals. Some insisted that a new foundation of law be added to the peace movement. Others saw the need for vigorous new approaches through the assembly of more frequent international congresses. These advocating periodic gatherings proposed nothing very specific. Because of their general approach to world order they can be categorized as generalists. Still others recommended world federation. Each approach merits comment.

13 Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 160.
For the legalists the problem of world peace was a judicial one. They felt that a start had been made towards the proper solution by the two Hague Congresses, but the Permanent Court of Arbitration still had too many weaknesses. Basically, "(i)t was not a judicial body, it was not truly permanent, decisions did not have to be based upon a code, it had no authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and it lacked power to enforce its decrees."14 The legalists had two goals: 1) to establish a truly judicial world court composed of trained judges, appointed for life and sitting in continuous session, and 2) the formulation of an international code of law upon which the court would base its decisions. Both of these improvements would remove the uncertainty and element of compromise in the arbitral awards and create a precision generated by the realm of law.15 This precision was based on justice, for, in the words of Elihu Root, "peace can never be except as it is founded in justice."16

14 Ibid., 77; David S. Patterson, "An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement 1898-1914," American Studies, XIII(1), Spring, 1972, 34-35.

15 The American Society for International Law, founded in 1906, grew out of the Lake Mohonk discussions. It was devoted to the establishment of international law as distinct from international arbitration. James Brown Scott, the State Department Solicitor, was the leader of this society as well as two others dedicated to the creation of a judicial world court: the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, founded in 1910, and the Division of International Law within the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

16 Elihu Root as quoted in Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 143.
Legalists were confident that nations would learn to accept rules impartially and justly administered. For the legalists, therefore, disarmament was a minor question which would settle itself once nations formulated a body of international law. This absence of conflict in viewpoints between legalists and members of the Navy League is a possible explanation of how they could work together in coalition.

Other internationalists felt, however, that the basis for peace could be even more clearly specified, for in the words of Hamilton Holt, "Peace follows justice, justice follows law, law follows political organization."17 The cooperative spirit expressed by both governments and private organizations in their meetings on commerce, agriculture, sanitation, copyrights, money, the Red Cross, and other matters during the nineteenth-century encouraged thinking on the possibility of world organization. Internationalists, however, wanted something beyond the economic considerations of lowered tariffs and reciprocity treaties, and pointed to a higher level of cooperation necessitated by the mutual interdependence of nations and the need to eliminate all points of abrasive contact. After the First

Hague Conference, which many saw as an enormous first step foreshadowing the eventual political union of the world, various schemes began to evolve.

Benjamin F. Trueblood, the secretary of the American Peace Society, presented his concept in The Federation of the World.18 Hayne Davis, an attorney from New York City, wrote a long series of articles on the inadequacies of The Hague Court in view of the world's needs and advanced his proposal for the establishment of an international government with three branches and the power of sanction to maintain peace.19 Detailed analysis of these and other suggestions for world federation go beyond the scope and space of this study.20 The writings of Davis, however, did have a significance beyond their actual content in that they converted two important supporters: Representative Richard Bartholdt (Republican, Missouri) and Hamilton Holt, the managing editor of The Independent.


19 Kuehl, Hamilton Holt, 69.

Holt became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the world federationists. The Independent was the leading weekly for this group of internationalists. The federations shared the conviction that peace lay in world organization and every other objective was secondary to this goal. Disarmament for them, as for the legalists, was a minor question which would be resolved easily once the machinery to keep the peace was established. Accordingly, like the legalists, they could work in coalition with other peace groups as long as the long-range perspective of world federation was kept in view.

The movement for world organization became vitalized with the founding of the New York Peace Society in 1906. The society was one of many which were engendered at the Lake Mohonk Conferences. It was formulated by individuals who wanted to go beyond annual discussions to a more regular schedule, and especially, beyond the conservative attachment to arbitration associated with the conferences at the Catskill resort. Agitation for international organization was strong during 1909-1910 as Holt delivered his lecture, "The Federation of the World," across the country. Under the presidency of Holt the World Federation League affiliated with the larger and more prominent

21 Kuehl, Hamilton Holt, 82-83.
New York Peace Society. It was at this time too that Theodore Roosevelt cautiously endorsed world organization in his 1910 Christiania, Norway address. There was no doubt about the leadership of the United States in the effort to organize the world. 22

There was, however, considerable question as to how this organization would come about and what role force would play in it. It was the matter of sanctions, the ironic use of force to attain peace, which provided the deepest split within the internationalists. Some were quite content to continue to rely upon the moral force of public opinion and the honor of nations to maintain peace (once some type of world organization was created); others, such as Edwin Ginn and Mrs. Lucia Ames Mead, argued that power was a reality of international life and should be used positively to work for peace. 23 There was agreement, of course, that any military force should function under a system of law and justice, but sanctionists could not agree on how the police agency should operate, when it should be applied, and how it should be made up. Actually, this split was never reconciled. It remained one of the many fissures within the peace movement.

22 Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 119, 124-127.
23 Ibid., 118.
But in their finest hour pacifists did not concentrate on their differences or the lack of consensus in the movement. Moreover, setbacks were but springboards for more intensive future efforts and successes. The failure of the arbitration treaties had to be counterbalanced by the fact that neither the recurring crises in the Balkans nor the ambitions of the Great Powers in Africa had been able to precipitate a general European war. The longer peace prevailed, the stronger was the conviction that permanent peace was here. In the words of Andrew Carnegie,

We have past the stage of barbarism when there was constant danger, and hence heroism in the profession of arms — all this has gone. The safest occupation in the land today, either in Britain or America, is that of a soldier, who rarely or never sees a battle or fires a hostile shot, but marches from youth to age in perfect safety, unmolested... The military age is rapidly passing. We cannot imagine that many students who have received years of precious education will hereafter dedicate themselves deliberately to this profession...24

So universally popular did the pre-war cause of peace seem, and so near did victory seem, that young college idealists regretted they had been born too late to devote their lives to the work which was being so successfully carried on about them. The dawn of peace

24 Quotation is cited in Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 1005-6.
could not be far off, if it was not already at hand. At the end of his tour of the United States, the noted French author, diplomat, and pacifist, Baron Paul Henri D'Estournelles de Constant, announced, "The year that has passed since... August, 1911, is living testimony to the fact that the peace movement is more virile today than at any time since men and women first began to think it possible to substitute judicial settlement for war in international disputes." Jane Addams echoed the same optimism late in 1913 during a Carnegie Hall address, "There was rising in the cosmopolitan centers of America a sturdy and unprecedented international understanding which in time would be too profound to lend itself to war."  

TWO

After The Hague Conferences pacifists believed they were a force in world politics, based on the conviction that "the people who counted" had finally turned their


attention to replacing war with peace-keeping institutions.\textsuperscript{28} The increasing involvement of businessmen and their practical influence in making peace work more efficient proved to be one of the most basic reasons for the pre-war optimism. This admiration for efficiency is very apparent in the founding statements by Edwin Ginn and Andrew Carnegie, both businessmen of extraordinary acumen, who in 1910 founded million-dollar organizations to help establish permanent peace. The need to organize -- "organize or perish" -- was recognized as one of the best means to become efficient.\textsuperscript{29} The vitality expressed in the attempt to organize was most heartening. On the eve of World War One there were from 37 to 63 different groups devoted to the cause of peace.\textsuperscript{30} These groups encompassed a broad variety as to strength and structure, but three of them -- the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Peace Society -- contributed most to the pre-war optimism and deserve detailed attention.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[30] Curti, \textit{Peace or War}, 201.
\end{footnotes}
As of 1910, the American Peace Society remained the largest as well as the oldest of the anti-war groups, numbering about 2,800 dues-paying members in ten affiliated branch societies. Its monthly organ, the Advocate of Peace, maintained the most comprehensive coverage of peace activities. Edited by Benjamin Trueblood, the magazine had increased its circulation to 11,000 and was the leading peace publication in the United States.

31 The American Peace Society had been organized in New York City on May 8, 1828, as a synthesis of a number of peace societies existing at that time. Known as the Apostle of Peace, William Ladd exercised an extremely able leadership of the Society. After his death in 1841, however, the APS enjoyed only a moderate growth and success. It followed no consistent program for building a peaceful world, but by the opening years of the twentieth-century a gradual but definite change had occurred within the Society. It had shifted its fundamental position from a religious outlook which condemned the immorality of war as an infraction of God's will and counseled non-resistance to a broad commitment to international arbitration. The significance of this new commitment was that it encompassed an abundant range of views and had the effect of opening membership in the Society to all who opposed war, regardless of how they might qualify their opposition. Cf., "The Purpose of Peace Societies," Advocate of Peace, LX (April, 1898), 77-78; LXII (June, 1900), 133, 136; LXXXI (February, 1909), 36. Cf. "Annual Report, 1900-1901," Advocate of Peace, LXII (June, 1901), 119-123.

Despite its success and long history, however, the APS had not been able to make itself the unifying center for emerging groups concerned with peace. Indeed, one of the largest local groups, the New York Peace Society, remained unaffiliated, and of the new prestigious organizations, such as the American Association for International Conciliation, the American School Peace League, the American Society of International Law, and the Mohonk Conference, none had formal ties with the American Peace Society.

This lack of coordination and concentration of peace sentiment into a centrally organized and efficiently managed effort was pointed out repeatedly at the annual Lake Mohonk Conferences.\(^{33}\) Edwin Ginn, the successful Boston textbook publisher and philanthropist, had participated in these Mohonk Conferences for many years and, after much reflection upon the problem of peace, he was convinced that he knew the answer. As far back as 1901 he was asking: "We spend hundreds of millions a year for war; can we afford to spend one million for peace?"\(^{34}\)


\(^{34}\) *Seventh Mohonk Conference, Report*, 1901, 22.
In January, 1907 he had suggested to Andrew Carnegie that they raise ten million dollars for a permanent peace organization. Ginn was prepared to pledge one half to one million out of his somewhat modest fortune.\(^{35}\) Carnegie was not ready, and Ginn made a public appeal to other men of wealth to pool their money and talent for a vast program of education against war.\(^{36}\) When the money and support of others was not forthcoming, Edward Ginn became the first American to endow and organize peace work on a large scale.

His first thought was to establish an international school of peace. He had already founded his International Library through which he hoped to sell peace literature at a price low enough for the general public to afford. In September, 1905, while addressing the International Peace Congress, held in Lucerne, Switzerland, he publicly expressed his inclination:

Naturally... my thoughts turn toward the educational side of the question, and the greatest educational forces are the schools, the press and the pulpit... This work of education needs to be carried on systematically and continuously, and I have thought that it might be well to establish a School

\(^{35}\) Ginn to Carnegie, January 19, 1907, Carnegie Correspondence, Carnegie Papers, Library of Congress.

of Peace, with a Board of Trustees selected from those who have shown great originality and executive ability in carrying on large business enterprises.  

In that same year his firm, Ginn and Company, began a series of reprints to serve as textbooks for the peace school. Later, after no allies chose to join him in response to his article in The Nation, he abandoned his peace school idea in favor of an endowed agency which could put greater emphasis on the profitable study of the organization of peace.

Ginn's endowment, created on July 29, 1910, guaranteed to his International School of Peace an annual income of $50,000 with the provision that such income

37 Ginn, An International School of Peace (Address delivered at the International Peace Congress at Lucerne, September, 1905), n.p., 3-4.

38 Among these publications were William Ellery Channings' Discourses on War, Charles Sumner's Addresses on War, Jean de Bloch's The Future of War, H. E. Warner's The Ethics of Force, Walter Walsh's The Moral Damage of War, David Low Dodge's War Inconsistent with the Religion of Jesus Christ, and Raymond L. Bridgman's World Organization. At the same time his firm began to publish a series of shorter pamphlets, beginning with Count Leo Tolstoy's Bethink Yourselves!, Andrew Carnegie's rectorial address at the University of St. Andrews entitled A League of Peace, and Lucia Ames Mead's Patriotism and the New Internationalism: a Manual for Teachers. Cf., Arthur N. Holcombe, "Edwin Ginn's Vision of World Peace," International Organization, XIX (1965), 1-19. Mr. Holcombe was a trustee of the Ginn estate.
would be permanent until his death, when a fund of one million dollars, a full third of Mr. Ginn's fortune, would be turned over to the School. So sanguine was he over the achievement of world peace in the not-too-distant future that his trustees were instructed at what point they should gradually begin transferring the endowment fund to another of his favorite philanthropies. 39

On February 1, 1911, the name was changed to the World Peace Foundation with headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts. According to its constitution, the Foundation's policy was to be controlled by a board of directors having in general the same relation as that of the faculty of a university, while a separate board of trustees should look after the funds. The directors were to be salaried and conduct the daily activity of the Foundation, while the trustees would be unsalaried and attend to general policy. 40 Both directors and trustees had strong representation from the fields of education and business.

39 Holcombe, "Edwin Ginn's Vision of World Peace," 1. The philanthropy was the Charlesbank Homes.

40 "Minutes of the Meetings of the Board of Trustees, 1910-1914" (hereinafter cited as "Minutes"), 68. World Peace Foundation Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Cf. also, Moritzen, The Peace Movement in America, 290-304.
It is also apparent that many of these men had a background of reform work long before the creation of the Foundation. 41 Edwin Mead's whole life, for example, was dedicated to reform, and David Starr Jordan was internationally known as a staunch opponent of military and naval spending. 42 Neither hesitated to identify those he considered to be enemies of peace: the armament lobbies, the Navy League, and similar groups. While Mead contacted Congressmen urging them to oppose battleship appropriations, Jordan thundered against the "Syndicates of War." 43 The vigorous activity of these two pacifists gave the World Peace Foundation much of its style and flavor, and they soon became in the pre-war period the dominant figures within the organization.

But Mr. Ginn had his own formula for peace. He was an internationalist who had been convinced as early as

41 Filene, "World Peace Foundation," 482-485.

42 Jordan explains his appointment: "on May 3, 1909 at the annual National Peace Congress held in Chicago, I spoke along the line of the argument in my book entitled 'The Human Harvest' published the year before. My address made a favorable impression upon Mr. Edwin Ginn. He therefore appointed me chief director of the World Peace Foundation..." David Starr Jordan, Days of a Man, Yonkers on Hudson, New York, World Book Co., 1922, II, 290-291.

1905 that arbitration alone could not cure the evil of war. He advocated eventual world federation and as a beginning step suggested an International Guard of Police Force, estimating that five or ten percent of the money spent on armaments would be sufficient to establish such a force. Such an appeal to reason would have its own rewards, he felt, for

(w)hen the nations see that this international police force is ample to insure them all their rights, they will be unwilling to bear the present excessive burden for armament, and disarmament, or at least nine tenths of it, will come as a natural and inevitable result of a perception of the obvious uselessness of armament. 44

National security would require that such a police force be kept under control, and efforts to establish that control would unfold new developments beneficial to international harmony:

The establishment of an international power would be the natural beginning of a world congress, and the more complete development of the international court would follow. Until these three branches of international organization are perfected there will continue to be great loss of life and property, which should be devoted to the natural, peaceful development of the human race. 45

44 Ginn, "International School of Peace," The Nation LXXXIX (September 23, 1909), 276.

As committed as he was to finding a substitute for the expense and danger of nations continuing to supply their own defense, he was even more determined to make a business-like operation of peace work — an effort so characteristic that it prompted one colleague to remark that he dealt with the promotion of peace in the same way he promoted the sale of textbooks.\footnote{G. W. Anderson to Ginn, November 21, 1912 as quoted in Filene, 480.} The task of the World Peace Foundation was two-fold: to expand upon his ideas through further research into the ways and means of ensuring world peace by the organization of suitable international institutions, and "to bring constantly before the people the advantages of cooperation... and adopting an international army and navy."\footnote{Ginn, World Peace Foundation, 8.} He was convinced that educators, especially educational administrators, would be most helpful in directing such studies.\footnote{Businessmen who had already proved their capacity for success would bring to the Foundation their ability to sell to the public the bold idea that nations should no longer rely primarily on national}
military and naval forces for their safety but they should rather rely on an international police force. 49

Business efficiency was apparent from the first meetings. "We recommend the organization of work into departments, as far as practicable, and such assignment of special duties to the several members of the staff as will fix responsibility and make for economy and efficiency." 50

The Foundation's annual budget, three times that of the largest existing peace organization, was to be utilized according to definite methods. Primarily, since Ginn himself was a publisher and adamant believer in the strength of the written word, there was to be the distribution of peace literature. He made his feelings and intentions very clear at the founding:

The most effective influence against the military spirit would be the wide circulation among our people of the best international books condemning the methods of force and inculcating the methods of reason in the settlement of the differences between nations. To meet this great need thoroughly will be one of the primary concerns of the international School of Peace. A hundred books

49 The strong business element was represented by Ginn himself as president, and the two trustees, George A. Plimpton, an executive in Ginn and Company, and Samuel Capen, a rug manufacturer.

50 "Minutes," 58, World Peace Foundation Papers. These departments were: Department of Finance, Buildings and Equipment; Department of Publication and Propaganda; Department of Business Organizations; and Department of Colleges, Universities and Schools.
and pamphlets should be in every library, in every newspaper office, in every minister's study, on every teacher's table, in the hands of every man and woman who shapes public opinion; and they should serve the peace societies and supplement the efforts in school and church and business.\textsuperscript{51}

Books printed in inexpensive editions as well as pamphlets and leaflets, brief enough to be read in a few minutes, were circulated particularly among young people through the American School Peace League and the Cosmopolitan Clubs, both of which the WPF now sponsored. During its first year the WPF distributed over 300,000 copies of assorted peace literature.\textsuperscript{52} Another mode of propaganda was excerpts from articles and speeches which Mead regularly distributed to newspapers. As he explained to Ginn, "One can often bring down game with three hundred words, where three thousand would not pierce the skin."\textsuperscript{53}

The WPF also used to advantage the popularity of the lecture circuit. The directors were only too willing to take the opportunity to address organizations already in existence to develop an interest in peace work among them and win their support for the condemnation of armament

\textsuperscript{51} Speech by the Director of the World Peace Foundation, n.d., WPF Papers, SCPC.

\textsuperscript{52} The Advocate of Peace, LXXIV (January, 1912), 22; Cf., Curti, 202.

\textsuperscript{53} Mead to Ginn, June 16, 1913, as quoted in Filene, 486.
spending. Mead and Jordan were most active in touring and speaking before women's clubs, religious groups, labor organizations, Chambers of Commerce, and many other groups. In 1913, the WPF persuaded Normal Angell to make a lecture tour in the United States under its auspices. Naturally, the Foundation shared in the general "good feeling" of all the peace workers during the pre-war period, particularly the appointment of the pacifist, William Jennings Bryan, as Secretary of State and his great success in negotiating his numerous "cooling-off" treaties.

THREE

When Andrew Carnegie was informed of Ginn's determination to go ahead with his decision for endowment of an organization dedicated to solving the problem of war, he remarked, "You cannot do much with $50,000 a year."\(^5^4\) Mead tried to bring together the work of the two philanthropists but in spite of his best efforts, each went his separate way. Both had differing viewpoints and their inability to cooperate would be reflected in their widely

\(^5^4\) Carnegie to Ginn, December 8, 1909, Butler-Mead Correspondence, Butler Papers, Columbia University.
divergent choices for trustess. 55

After a year of hesitation marked by much pleading and beseeching, Carnegie selected a board of trustees and on December 14, 1910, announced the founding of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Speaking before the trustees assembled at the Carnegie Institution Building, Washington, D. C., he declared:

I have transferred to you, as Trustees of the Carnegie Peace Fund ten million dollars of five per cent first mortgage bonds administered by you to hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civilization. Although we no longer eat our fellow men, nor torture prisoners, nor sack cities killing their inhabitants, we still kill each other in war like barbarians. Only wild beasts are excusable for doing that in this, the Twentieth Century of the Christian era, for the crime of war is inherent, since it decides not in favor of the right but always of the strong. The nation is criminal which refuses arbitration and drives its adversary to a tribunal which knows nothing of righteous judgment. 56

Carnegie, like Ginn, had been interested in the peace movement for some time. His underwriting the costs for the Peace Palace at The Hague has already been remarked upon. He at times expressed his admiration for Bryan and


his efforts in saving the nation "from the entanglements of the wars of Europe."\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, he could see no reason for the United States to be spending 65\% of the national income on wars: past, present, and future.\textsuperscript{58} Carnegie, as indicated earlier, roundly supported arbitration of differences between nations and urged that this be the course of the CEIP. Convinced of the success of such an approach, he, in a manner not dissimilar to that of Ginn, expressed his optimism,

When civilized nations enter into such treaties as named, and war is discarded as disgraceful to civilized man, as personal war (duelling) and man selling and buying (slavery) have been discarded within the wide boundaries of our English-speaking race, the Trustees will please consider what is the next most degrading remaining evil or evils whose banishment ... would

\textsuperscript{57} Carnegie to Bryan, December 15, 1898, and December, 1898, William Jennings Bryan Papers, Library of Congress.

\textsuperscript{58} Burton J. Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1932, II, 320. Merle Curti remarks in discussing the CEIP that Carnegie was a "retired iron manufacturer, who made part of his fortune by the sale of naval armor plate." Peace or War, 203. Curti also finds substantial irony and contradictions in Bryan's pacifism: "he fought in one war, was responsible, with President McKinley, for fastening on the country a treaty which inaugurated our imperialism, sister of war and mother of navies; and, at his own request, was buried with military honors in the national cemetery at Arlington." "Bryan and World Peace," l13.
most advance the progress, evaluation and happiness of man, and so on from century to century without end. My Trustees of each age shall determine how they can best aid man in his upward march to higher and higher stages of development... 59

The trustees were left the widest possible latitude. Carnegie declined to set down any particular policies to be followed, asking only their promise that the one end they should keep in view was the speedy abolition of international war. He preferred not to be a member of the board to better permit the trustees a free hand.

In the selection of trustees, two areas of representation were excluded from the Endowment. First of all, no clergymen were chosen, though a number of them were prominent in the peace movement, and secondly, no individuals who had national reputations as full-fledged pacifists were chosen, men such as Hamilton Holt, Samuel Train Dutton, Edwin Mead, or David S. Jordan. Nicholas Murray Butler, to whom, it would soon appear, the strongest and most influential voice within the CEIP belonged, had in effect made sure that there was no one chosen as a trustee who could be termed "irresponsible."

The CEIP was designed to be based on scholarship and a non-emotional appeal to the intellectual elite of all

59 "First Meeting of the Board of Trustees," CEIP Papers.
nations. It would be an authoritative repository of information to which the world's press and eventually world opinion would look as the arbiter between fact and sensationalism. A research library at the Endowment's headquarters in New York City was a basic ingredient in this program, as was the sponsorship of non-controversial publications written by acceptable individuals, who by their style, reasoning, and general knowledge could reach those whom the emotional peace crusade left untouched.

The attitudes and aspirations of the trustees also left their imprint on the Endowment. For, of the entire group who had been selected to administer Carnegie's gift, it was Butler who had devoted the most thought to the kind of institution it should become. Accordingly, when the CEIP decided upon its division of responsibilities, it was the Division of Intercourse and Education headed by Butler that enjoyed the widest latitude. With all the divisions soon at work it was Butler who soon boasted that his division was kept informed of international policies and

60 The work of the Endowment was apportioned in three divisions: Economics and History, headed by the Columbia economist, John Bates Clark; International Law, under the direction of James Brown Scott; and the third, the Division of Intercourse and Education, presided over by Butler.
conduct everywhere.\textsuperscript{61} It was also Butler's idea to maintain the confidential nature of certain communications, keeping them from the knowledge of everybody except the trustees. Each copy was numbered and each member was responsible for that copy.\textsuperscript{62}

Elihu Root, who, in Mr. Carnegie's words, was "rendered immortal as the man whose name is appended to more treaties of peace than any man who ever lived," took the lead in preaching caution to his fellow members from his office as CEIP President.\textsuperscript{63} He wanted to see the Endowment undertake a large-scale scientific study of the causes of war. This meant assembling numbers of scholars to write treaties in history, economics, and international law, rather than organizing campaigns opposing armaments and other manifestations of militarism. In fact, Root did not envision the Endowment as a participant in any peace acti-


\textsuperscript{62} "Meeting of the Board of Trustees," December 12, 1912, CEIP Papers.

\textsuperscript{63} "First Meeting of the Board of Trustees," CEIP Papers.
vities, but rather as a promoter of activity on the part of other groups by dispensing money to them.

The whole question of financial support to other organizations cannot be exaggerated. For years Carnegie had sustained many peace groups by annual contributions which he estimated at $50,000.00.\textsuperscript{64} Before 1911 he had underwritten the total budget of the American Association for International Conciliation. In addition he had contributed to the American Peace Society, the New York Peace Society, the Intercollegiate Peace Association, and the American School Peace League. With the establishment of the Endowment, Carnegie, understandably, notified them that his personal contributions would cease. Thus, the Endowment constituted an institutionalization of what had hitherto been the largest individual source of peace donations.

It fell to Butler's division to recommend the allocation of funds to other groups in the United States and abroad which were judged to be furthering the aims of peace. For the first year the Endowment simply duplicated Carnegie's donations of the previous year.\textsuperscript{65} At the same time, however, discussions were underway to arrange for future changes.

\textsuperscript{64} "Meeting of the Board of Trustees," March 9, 1911, CEIP Papers.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
Although two distinct problems were involved, both were solved in a similar manner. With regard to the continued granting of funds to organizations in other countries, as was Carnegie's practice, recognition was made of the possible risk of offending national feelings. To obviate the problem, Butler proposed making one annual subvention to the International Peace Bureau at Berne, Switzerland, which served as a clearing house for peace and arbitration groups in Europe. This central body could then allocate funds to national groups as it saw fit. 66

The second problem concerned organizations within the United States and the continuation of Carnegie's support to them. The trustees felt that it was their function as guardians of the fund to see to it that duplication of effort and the inefficient use of funds through the lack of harmony among the groups be eliminated. In making his proposal, Butler stated:

66 Carnegie Endowment, Yearbook, 1911, 53, 187. A total of $24,000 was granted for the year ending June 30, 1913. This represented 91.5 percent of the International Peace Bureau's income. Butler's aim was to eventually reduce this to about 25 percent. However, in 1912 his division established its own European Advisory Council. He then proposed that this body make the subventions to the national peace societies of Europe, thus by-passing the International Peace Bureau. CEIP Yearbook, 1912, 65.
It has been the wish ... to bring about a saving of duplication by the best possible organization of the work and the utilizing of the services of the men who for thirty or forty years ... have been, in season and out of season, carrying on this work without funds, at great sacrifice, and with the greatest zeal and courage. The assistance which is offered to these organizations or which is proposed to be offered to them, comes like manna to people who have wondered whether the day of their hope was ever going to dawn.67

In a very impersonal and businesslike manner, the trustees chose a plan similar to the one adopted for Europe. Instead of individual subventions, the reorganization of the American Peace Society was proposed. Once

67 "Meeting of the Board of Trustees," December 14, 1911, CRIP Papers. Oddly, when Alfred H. Love who had been the strongest block of resistance to U.S. intervention in the Spanish-American War solicited help, all he received for his Universal Peace Union was a photograph of Andrew Carnegie! Love, who would seem qualified to head the list, was deemed unqualified to share in any funds. Based on the religious foundation that war is a sin against God, opposed to the best interests of mankind, and never to be sanctioned under any circumstances whatever, the UPU was apparently too old-fashioned for the streamlining and progressive efforts of the CEIP. Moreover, in 1911 the UPU was moribund. It had only 400 active members, with between 3000 to 4000 sympathizers; its publication, the Peacemaker, never exceeded a subscription list of 650. After Love's death, the UPU virtually died with him. The Peacemaker was discontinued, and the "Minutes" of the organization chronicle a sad tale of dwindling finances and meetings attended by only two or three people. Cf. Curti, 205; Brock, 926-931; "Minutes," University Peace Union Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
reorganized, it would receive an annual appropriation for redistribution so as, in Butler's words, "to increase the effectiveness of the peace movement in the United States and to subject it to a centralized direction."\(^{68}\)

Effective January, 1912, therefore, support to the New York Peace Society, the American School Peace League, and individual leaders in the peace movement was discontinued, and the whole of the United States' peace work was dealt with through the American Peace Society. It was left to the APS both to decide what work it wanted furthered and to continue subventions in support from the $31,000 appropriation granted by the CEIP. Moreover, at the same meeting, the Endowment refused to cooperate with the WPF in its youth work and support of the Cosmopolitan Club, in the interest of avoiding conflict as well as any duplication of effort.\(^{69}\)

This singling out of the American Peace Society as the funnel for funds inevitably sharpened some of the rivalries that had previously existed among peace groups. Nevertheless, reorganization took place along the lines proposed by the Endowment. Headquarters were moved from Boston to

\(^{68}\) CEIP Yearbook, 1911, 187.

\(^{69}\) "Meeting of the Board of Trustees," December 14, 1911, CEIP Papers.
614 Colorado Building, Washington, D. C. The APS activities were expanded nationwide by the creation of five departments, with a salaried director at the head of each. By 1914 the American Peace Society had an increase of almost one thousand members for each year of the reorganization. 70 It summarized its work in 1913 as having printed over thirty original pamphlets and twenty other documents and having delivered over 1500 addresses by 150 different lecturers. It felt justified in its boast that

all of the National Peace Congresses in America have been initiated, and in considerable part directed, by the American Peace Society. It has cooperated in unreportable ways with the government, and it knows that it has influenced legislation and policies relating to arbitration and international justice. Tons of literature to writers, speakers, schools, colleges, and libraries are distributed each year in a continuous and increasing stream...Over fifty peace pamphlets and as many books are constantly on sale at the Society's headquarters. 71

It seemed that the APS was returning to its first fervor of over eighty years previous. The trustees of the Endowment were pleased, and peace workers generally were encouraged by the vitality instilled into the Society.

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70 Arthur Deerin Call, *Some Recent Developments of the Organized Peace Movement in America*, n.d., n.p., 1-3. This is an eight-page pamphlet, abridged from an address delivered by Mr. Call at the Mohonk Arbitration Conference, May 28, 1914 and can be found among the American Peace Society Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

71 Ibid., 5.
In summary, the creation of the two million-dollar foundations and the expectation of what their influence would have on peace work across the United States formed an integral part of the optimism which seemed to characterize the peace movement on the eve of World War I. A. D. Call, the acting director of the APS, could hardly contain himself in describing the change:

This reformation springs from a rapidly growing public realization that the stupendous military burdens of the world are cruelly unnatural, wicked, and futile. Every intelligent person has a part to play in this impressive movement, this upward climb away from savagery and barbarism to human right, reason and justice. His part is to look squarely at the facts, to refurbish his sword of right thinking, and to go forth to street, shop, office, church, school, and there to do his part toward slaying this dragon, this monstrous, devastating dragon of war. Such, I conceive to be the duty and the privilege of each and of all. If the duty is to be effectively performed, the organized collective effort already begun must continue and expand until its high purpose is achieved.  

And even with the first news of the fighting in Europe -- with all the real and possible dangers, optimism still prevailed. The war itself would be an instrument in bringing about the ultimate triumph of the cause of peace. A. D. Call could see no other outcome as he wrote:

72 Some Recent Developments, 7-8.
My general thesis is that militarism is receiving its death blow at last. There seems no other interpretation of Europe's Armageddon. Armies and Navies have risen mightily on the faith that thus and thus only could peace be preserved. And now, in a flash of an eye, seven of the most civilized nations of Europe are at war, there are others on the war footing, more may follow. We now see militarism stripped and as it is. The institution has itself convicted itself. But more, it has vindicated a century of misunderstood and misinterpreted pacifists. It has done this adequately, conclusively. Militarism, stupendous in its vanity, turgid in its egotism, hypocritical, ungodly, insane, a reversion to and perpetuating of all that is savage, barbaric, a system as vicious as it is unnatural, illogical, self-condemned, cancerous, an international cretinism most loathsome and most pathetic.\(^73\)

And a week later his optimism remained undaunted, as he continued,

The situation world-wide seems as terrible as can be. I do not forget the great reaction following Napoleon, however. With all the work done by our peace workers since, the reaction vs. war ought to be even more effective -- and let us pray, final. Burton (the President of the American Peace Society) sees a great peace wave coming...\(^74\)

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\(^73\) A. D. Call to Benjamin F. Trueblood, August 16, 1914, American Peace Society Papers.

\(^74\) A. D. Call to Benjamin F. Trueblood, August 24, 1914, American Peace Society Papers.
CHAPTER II
PACIFISM -- A REFORM ANALYZED

In the search for a common denominator among progressives, hundreds of well-written studies on the whole progressive reform movement or segments of it have revealed certain features which appear time after time both in statements by the principals themselves as well as in the literature generally. In their struggle for domestic reform and in their confrontation with the issue of World War I these early twentieth-century liberals were characterized by certain attributes: their trust in reason and the efficiency of education, their belief in progress and their exuberant optimism, their quest for efficiency and a resort to administrative and legislative solutions, their faith in democracy and the "mission" of the United States, and finally, their humanitarian spirit which marked the movement in two ways -- an enthusiasm for "crusades" carried forward with a strong moral flavor or righteousness whether in their speeches or writings, and a belief in conspiracy which maintained that a few individuals were all that stood in the way of citizens' rights and justice. 1 The search for

international harmony can be identified as a captive of the spirit of the times since it shared many of these same features. While, naturally, not all such characteristics are manifest among the members of the established peace societies, they share enough to put them well within the progressive tradition.

The great optimism which characterized the pre-war movement has already been discussed. Attention is now directed to those other characteristics as they are applied to the reform of international relations: the belief in the "mission" of the United States, the trust in reason, the efficacy of education, and the quest for efficiency. The resultant elitism is analyzed, revealing among certain reformers a grave mistrust of too much involvement of the "people." This elitism engendered the eventual collapse of established societies' peace work and the formation of new coalitions of activists.

ONE

The pre-war schemes for international harmony shared in common the importance of having the United States exert its moral leadership to create a better world. The theme of the "mission" of the United States can be traced by a continuous thread to the minorities who first settled these
shores from Europe. During the latter part of the nineteenth-century, however, the possibility of the United States fulfilling this destiny by continuing to remain aloof was subjected to serious revision. The belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority remained as strong as before, and was even reinforced by the frequent comments of certain American internationalists. Theodore Marburg, for example, believed that only the western nations were the agents of progress, that liberty went with English expansion, that world federation was possible only under the beneficient leadership of the Anglo-Saxon.

Late nineteenth-century internationalists, therefore, placed their hopes for world peace in a union of English-speaking peoples, and labored for an Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty as the initial step towards this long-range goal. After 1900, peace workers, greatly encouraged by the success of the First Hague Conference, took advantage


3 For a brief summary of the pre-1900 intellectual atmosphere see Michael A. Lutzker, "The 'Practical' Peace Advocates," 34-101. Cf., especially, 66-69 where Nicholas Murray Butler comments on the influence upon him of John W. Burgess' discussion of the duty of the United States to the rest of the world.


5 Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 33-34.
of the position of the United States as morally superior, in their minds, to other Anglo-Saxons and called for a more diversified approach to the establishment of international harmony. If the world was to be organized in peace, who could better set the example than the United States, in the words of Dr. Edward Everett Hale, "the greatest peace society that God's sun ever shone on."6

The destiny of America and that of all mankind were frequently linked. A certain crusading spirit to make the world over in the moral image of the United States' institutions characterized the peace movement. The Supreme Court of the United States was hailed as an example of a model institution capable not only of ruling on issues between states but on deciding questions between states and the federal government as well.7 Spokesmen for world federation repeatedly indicated the necessity of modeling any projected international organization after the United States. In fact, during 1905-1920, a period in which leadership for world organization rested exclusively with the United States, the consensus developed that national rivalries would persist until foreign leaders came to

6 Seventh Mohonk Conference, Report (1901), 102.
7 Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 53-54; Curti, Peace or War, 123.
adopt American values and institutions and implemented them into some international political structure. 8

The founding of the WPF and CEIP reflected this sense of leadership in the quest for world peace which seized the United States. But perhaps even more representative was the League to Enforce Peace. The founding of the LEP represented the culmination of the dream of the eventual imposition of order upon the world by the "civilized nations." Peace and justice were to be guaranteed by Anglo-Saxon principles. This promise of the future of international peace was made to rest on the participation of the United States in such a post-war international league. And eventually, it was on this promise that President Wilson agreed on May 27, 1916 to support the LEP's general faith in a post-war League of Nations.

The belief in a national "mission" led in time from an attitude of "uplift democracy" at home to an interventionist position abroad. The war would accelerate the pace of change at home as well as institute constructive reforms abroad in the name of democracy. Viewed from this Mount Olympus, the defeat of autocratic Germany was imperative. The lawlessness of Germany and dangers attendant upon her

8 Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 64-65, 68-69, 74,
victory became a theme among the "war liberals." Eventually President Wilson cast the United States' declaration into this mold as the way to save democracy.9

Not all peace advocates, however, shared the internationalist approach to fulfillment of the national "mission." As Professor Link summarizes, "(T)he great majority of progressives... believed that America's unique mission was to purify herself in order to provide an example of democracy triumphant over social and economic injustice and a model of peaceful behavior."10 In other words, they enjoyed the certainty that of all the nations in the world, only the United States was pure, democratic, and free from militarism. For, the nation had organized itself into a "Garden of Eden" on the basis of the rights of man and the dignity of common humanity; it had a destiny as a teacher to the world. Indeed, this leadership was a "mission" given by God. International organizations did not speak for those who shared this sentiment. Hence it was natural and easy for them to break away from the coalitions when 


something better came along, something more representative of their ideas and more meaningful to their lives.

But for the peace advocate within internationalist organizations, this isolationist attitude was misguided. Example was felt to be too sentimental an approach and certainly outmoded. The United States must exert a more aggressive leadership in the search for peace. While arbitration represented the limit of international activity for some, others advocated ideas which they felt reflected the spirit of the twentieth-century: disarmament, a world court to which nations would be obliged to submit their disputes, an international law-making body, and eventual world federation.  

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11 John Milton Cooper, Jr.---to whom "idealists" means "progressive"---has ingeniously reconciled these two opposing concepts of "mission," both originating among progressives:

American opinion on foreign policy during the First World War and for a long time afterward can be compared to a circle split along both its vertical and horizontal axes. One division lay between isolationism and internationalism, over the question of overseas commitments. The other division separated idealists from ultranationalists. Idealists believed that the purpose of American foreign policy was to promote peace, freedom, and justice in the world; ultranationalists held that power, prestige, and security were the only legitimate ends for foreign policy. The two divisions overlapped, with isolationists and internationalists falling into both the idealist and ultranationalist camps.

In summary, among the coalitions of peace organizations, in addition to the serious splits as to peace program, there was also a substantial doubt as to the value of any international program which departed from the example of model institutions displayed by the United States for the benefit of the world.

TWO

In addition to the belief in the "mission" of the United States, other attributes attended the peace-progressive movement during the pre-war years: a trust in reason and education, a belief in progress, the quest for efficiency, and a sweeping optimism. None is intended as a clear distinction and some overlapping of each feature is understandable. As the progressives attacked vice and corruption, they established an atmosphere for creating a better world through enlightened individuals and reasonable programs. The striving for peace flourished in such an atmosphere, as did the belief in its eventual attainment.

The inherent contradiction to man's reason expressed by war was to many pacifists a truth in no way requiring demonstration. War with its killing, maiming, and destroying was irrational. Between man and man, resort to murder was not allowed. Why not among nation states? Only there
did murder receive a final sanction and preparation for it became a main concern of the state.

Exposure of the horrors of war had been the traditional educational approach, but it was now felt that such continued emphasis did not reflect the positive and practical image these twentieth-century pacifists wanted to project. Because of its obvious shortcomings, pacifists were counseled to restrain their desire for the unconditional arbitration of all disputes not settled by negotiation. It was not rational to expect states to surrender their vital interests before the arbitration process was improved upon—if indeed then. Absolute pacifists lost control of the movement to the men who wished to accommodate programs to the national interest. Only then could peace work be judged positive, practical, and rational.12

Pacifism, therefore, can be said to parallel progressivism in a secular faith that "men are rational creatures who, when educated, can be relied upon to act morally, whether in their personal lives or in their roles as citizens. On such premises, the pacifists confidently argued that wars are the consequence of misguided thinking, of

12 Sondra Herman, Eleven Against War, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1969, 16-17.
ignorance rather than malice." Accordingly, belief in education became a hallmark of the new pacifist, just as it did of the reformer; education was to be as much a twentieth-century key for peace as it was believed to be the remedy for many of the nation's domestic ills.  

For Elihu Root and the other internationalists who comprised the new leadership in the peace movement, the problem of war was a matter of ignorance of international law. "The more clearly the people... understand their own international rights, the less likely they are... to fight for something to which they are not really entitled."

Developing a respect for international law was an essential element of good citizenship. It was imperative that Americans learn that wars... had come from "mistaken opinions as to national rights and national problems."

Some wars, of course, represented a clash of vital interest, but for the most part, the causes of war were


14 LaFollette founded his progressive magazine in 1909 and dedicated it with a quotation from St. John: "Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free."

felt to be minor enough that men could settle disputes if only they could correct misunderstandings before the popular imagination was aroused. Belligerency was regarded as a product of the deeply rooted ignorance of the masses. It was part of the survival of man's heritage from his earliest years in the cave and adopted as a technique for survival, as explained in the current Darwinian biology. "The spirit of the people is inclined toward war," grieved James Slayden. Holt echoed the same sentiments, "...the great mass of men and women almost prefer war to peace." 16

The situation, however, was not hopeless. For, while all men were belligerent, some were less so than others. After all, governments generally tried to settle disputes by diplomacy. But frequently even during such peaceful efforts emotion has seized the masses who became uncompromising and insisted on their own rights. In such cases, the masses would have greatly benefited had they followed the instructed and competent leaders in all questions of foreign policy, particularly those involving national rights. 17

16 Twelfth Mohonk Conference, Report (1906), 60; quotation of Holt is cited in Patterson, "An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement," 40.

17 Herman, Eleven Against War, 38-39.
The efforts of Ginn and Carnegie to help in the effort to educate the masses have been treated above. Two other examples merit special mention. The American School Peace League defined its purposes and scope as follows:

The method of the League is to secure the interest of teachers in the broad idea of international good will, and to stimulate their study of the events in world politics which affect the political status of the United States in international affairs. All this is founded on a deep-rooted sentiment against the ineffectiveness and the unreasonableness of war in settling international difficulties, and on the substitution of judicial procedure. This, in turn, has developed a new point of view in the interpretation of historical events, which places the emphasis in history teaching on the causes and results of wars rather than on the details of battles and military campaigns...

Mrs. Andrews believed that teachers had a great responsibility to promote the aims and aspirations of the United States in working with other nations to make a higher world civilization. Her organization supplied the elementary teachers with material -- plays, music, poems, and books --

18 Fannie Fern Andrews, Memory Pages from My Life, New York, 1940, 40. The American School Peace League had been organized in Boston in 1908 by Mrs. Fannie Fern Andrews, a reformer and teacher. Initially established as a headquarters where teachers could come for information, the League's focus soon shifted into becoming a distribution center for pacifist literature, emphasizing the uselessness of wars because of their harmful effects and the importance of the cultivation of the internationalist spirit. Edwin Ginn, impressed by the ASPL focus on education, had funds appropriated beginning in 1911. By 1915 the annual subvention had reached $2500.
aimed at inculcating good will as a principle of citizenship to be taught at all grade levels.

Special attention was directed to May 18 of each year as a special "Peace Day," in recognition of the opening date of the First Hague Conference, May 18, 1899. The ASPL also felt that the teaching of history should be used as a tool to create good citizens. Two defects at the time were thought to be 1) too much emphasis on military detail, and 2) not enough teaching of the later foreign relations of the United States, an obvious reference to the neglect of the contemporary effort at international reform such as The Hague Conferences and other examples of international cooperation.\(^\text{19}\)

Another organization was the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs, founded at the University of Wisconsin in 1903 as a friendship society of foreign and United States students. In 1907, it became an organized movement which sought to promote better understanding between peoples. These words of Louis Lochner, a student and future leader in the peace movement, succinctly illustrate both the elitism and the international spirit of the clubs:

\[\text{19} \quad \text{Andrews, Memory Pages from My Life, 35-36.}\]
(W)here many organizations aim at the prevention of war, our endeavor is first and foremost the promotion and upbuilding of friendship. When our members from so many different countries -- and be it remembered that our foreign students are for the most part picked men, men coming from the best and most influential families, men in many cases sent by their governments and designed to become leaders of public opinion -- when, I say, these young men at the most impressionable and formative periods of their lives learn by close contact to know each other's characteristics, idiosyncrasies, and viewpoints, they cannot help but return to their native countries apostles of international good will, or world brotherhood.20

Western literature abounded with amplifications of the thesis that war was irrational. Such writings can be categorized into two types: those that supported the new institutions and recommended specific solutions to the problems of war, and those general treaties by writers, both amateur and professional, who tried to show in a variety of ways why wars were becoming increasingly illogical and (falling victim to their own fallacious reasoning) demonstrated future conflicts to be "impossible." This study is not concerned with citing all the authors, but three men were generally regarded in the pre-war period as outstanding by virtue of the widespread circulation of their publications.

Jean de Bloch, a Pole, reasoned in his *The Future of War* that modern warfare had become so terrible -- its horrors so much greater than those of past years -- that men no longer could face them. The strength of the human spirit had its limits and modern warfare called for an excess of the available strength. Therefore, man, by having made war so terrible, also made it no longer possible.

Norman Angell, the influential English author and pacifist, based his belief for the collapse of war on economics. In several works, notably *The Great Illusion*, he stated that war had become so costly that it was now no longer profitable. He did not reason away wars from any *a priori* assumptions, but simply predicted that war would no longer pay. The victor would lose as well as the vanquished, for as costs continued to increase, so would the compounding of financial loss to both sides. Secondly, the international character of commerce and credit invalidated the possibility that war could be successfully waged for profits. Nations would continue to trade after the war, regardless of the altered frontiers. War had simply become outdated in a world bound by an interdependent economy. This was an idea already shared and warmly endorsed by pre-war business-

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21 Jean de Bloch is the *nom de plume* of Ivan Stanislavovich Blokh. He published a six-volume treatise on war in 1899. The work cited here is the final volume of the set and bears the full title, *The Future of War, in Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations*, Boston, Ginn and Company, 1903.
men. Man, therefore, having made war so expensive, also made it no longer possible.22

David Starr Jordan, the president of Stanford University and a consistent foe of war, in The Human Harvest asked

How long will the Republic endure?... Just so long as the blood of its founders remains dominant in the blood of its people... It is a free stock that creates a free nation. Our Republic shall endure so long as the human harvest is good, so long as the movement of history, the progress of science and industry, leaves for the future the best and not the worst of each generation.23

Dr. Jordan argued that warfare did not make for the survival of the fittest nor most virile. Just the opposite

22 Actually the subtitle of this work fairly well hints at Sir Norman Angell's message, A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910. In a briefer fashion, he presented his ideas in a pamphlet for the American Association for International Conciliation, entitled The Mirage of the Map, April, 1912, No. 53. Sir Angell summarized that for a modern nation to add to its territory in no way added to the wealth of such a nation. A modern nation was strong by its capacity for trade and industry -- a capacity which aggression destroyed rather than enhanced.

23 David Starr Jordan, The Human Harvest, A Study of the Decay of Races Through the Survival of the Unfit, Boston, American Unitarian Association, 1907, 6. This little book contains the substance of two essays by Dr. Jordan. The first entitled "The Blood of the Nation" was delivered at Stanford University in 1899, and the second, "The Human Harvest," was read at Philadelphia in 1906.
was true. Using the South after the Civil War as his research base, Dr. Jordan in his Eugenics and the Civil War, instead of finding support for Darwinism in war, concluded that there was a "reverse selection of the fittest." The bravest were the first to fall; the second best, and then the third best were similarly sacrificed until few were left but weaklings and defectives to become breeders of the next generation.24

The first commencement of the Rice Institute, in June, 1916, was one of numerous occasions in which Dr. Jordan vividly set forth his eugenic argument:

I was in London when the war came. I saw the men from Oxford and Cambridge, fine upstanding fellows, every athlete included, and men of wisdom and power ... I saw the men from the other universities, the "picked half-million," those who "command while the world must obey." ... Around these as they marched in London parks, lying on the grass and smoking cigarettes lay the young men of London whom the war could not use... loose-jointed, knock-kneed, suffering from adenoids and pyorrhea, saturated with gin and shot through with vice, the army had no use for them.25

War was, therefore, too costly for mankind in other ways besides material considerations and the horrors it

24 N.d., n.p., copy in David Starr Jordan Peace Correspondence.

brought to the human spirit. War was a threat to any chance of passing on the ideas of free men and free states to future generations. Jordan did not stand alone in this view of war, but found support among other learned colleagues. 26

From these three general treatises, and others of a similar kind, the pursuit of war was proved to be outside the bounds of reason by virtue of its horrors, its costs, and its threats for future society. If reason could once be triumphant, wars would be impossible. It was the same attitude as the progressives experienced and which prompted one to remark, "I was confident that we liberals had the truth. If we talked it enough and wrote it enough, it would undoubtedly prevail... (M)ind and facts would save the world." 27

THREE

Norman Angell's conclusions were not lost on the business leaders of America. The business community as such had no specific peace program, nor did there exist a specific peace organization for businessmen. Yet their acceptance of the advantages of peaceful conditions for trade purposes


27 Frederic C. Howe, Confessions of a Reformer, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925, 323.
made businessmen highly desired coalition members in the search for international harmony.

After the turn of the century businessmen and business groups were frequently found in coalition with peace advocates. After 1903 the business interest was strongly represented at the Lake Mohonk Conferences and attention was increasingly directed to the theme of the commercial and financial interdependence of peoples. Wars disrupt such economic interdependence and should -- for the self-interest of the businessman, at least -- be avoided. Recognition was made of the fact that economic rivalry was a frequent cause of past wars and discussion repeatedly focused on how to remove the sources of friction, possibly by the expanded policies of free trade or the removal of artificial trade barriers by "most favored nation" agreements. Other suggestions for controlling wars so business could continue in normal fashion included: government supervision of banks in peace as well as in war to insure complete financial neutrality, and government action to secure the neutralization of recognized sea lanes in order that commerce might freely cross the oceans without the need for an ultimate appeal to

28 Curti notes the number of businessmen behind the movement against war and the fact that the Chicago Peace Society was dominated by the city's leading businessmen. Cf., Peace or War, 214.

arms to protect it. 30

Businessmen found a sympathetic chord in the appeals to reason by leading pacifists. As indicated earlier, the appeal for efficiency and the elimination of waste was a recurring theme in the literature of protest. Wars were wasteful; the reasonableness of the elimination of such waste was self-evident. If good business depended on avoiding waste, peace was good for business. 31 David Starr Jordan in his War and Waste developed this theme even further in blaming the high cost of living on the senseless waste of war.

Businessmen turned this crusade against waste inward and brought the efficiency of business techniques to the peace movement itself. The use of card-indexes and mailing lists was accepted, and was the employment of efficient and salaried promoters. Pacifists were no longer content to depend upon the "good will" of the public. They strained every nerve to win a wider hearing and stimulate public opinion. They grew fond of large scale advertising and


publicized their regular meetings, as well as national
demonstrations and the visits of distinguished European and
American "friends of peace." Whatever was done was of
larger proportions than before.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, under the influence
of businessmen not only the waste of war itself was criti-
cized, but the waste of pacifists' time, money, and energies
through outdated practices.

The importance of being efficient in the eyes of
businessmen can hardly be exaggerated. Efficiency was in
line with the economic self-interest of all.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover,
arbitration was suitable to businessmen as an efficient
method since it was one they were familiar with. Arbitra-
tion was the spirit of the times, being present particularly
in solving labor disputes, and was found to be a satisfactory
means of strengthening bonds between employers and employees.
Why would it not be an effective method for international
harmony too?

\textsuperscript{32} Curti, \textit{Peace or War}, 206.

\textsuperscript{33} The importance of efficiency as a hallmark of the pro-
gressive era has been discussed before. It is curious
that the two million-dollar peace organizations were
founded in the same year as the efficiency "craze" be-
gan with the Eastern Rate Case of 1910. In that case
Dr. Louis D. Brandeis argued that railroads had not
proved their need for additional revenue. And even if
they had, the solution was not to be found in granting
higher rates but in making the railroads run more effi-
ciently, thus saving a million dollars a day. Haber,
52-55. Moreover, the idea of efficiency bringing good
to all mankind was current in much of the fictional
literature of the pre-war period. Haber, 46, 74.
Businessmen were believed to possess sufficient leadership to convince public opinion on the importance of arbitration of disputes. After all, businessmen were not weak-kneed theorists or academicians, but were men who had achieved, who had gotten things done. Here was an additional reason for the appeal of the peace movement to the businessmen; not only was it a crusade to end the waste of war, but it was a movement in which businessmen were given recognition. At the Mohonk Conferences they were acclaimed as the peacemakers of the twentieth-century; they were advised that they could do more than others to convince their fellow citizens that war was out of date in the modern world. The fact that over seventy boards of trade and chambers of commerce endorsed the Mohonk Conference resolutions on arbitration was no small reason for the pre-war optimism, and their opinions and endorsements continued to be sought.\footnote{Seventh Mohonk Conference, Report (1901), 14-19; Ninth Mohonk Conference, Report (1903), 74-79.} Businessmen represented the practical thinkers of peace advocacy. They were respected for their solid achievements in their own fields and were sought after to bring the dimension of success to peace work as well.

Another group which represented the hard-line thinking was the international lawyers. The international lawyer was the international expert who sought the solution to war
in the abilities of trained lawyers and judges. As indicated earlier, he believed that anarchy would continue to exist until the world was organized for the administration of justice. In his practical approach he praised the "judicial temperament" and the self-control of the judicial mind which could rise above individual prejudice and forebear the cry of the mob. Like the efficiency expert, he was dedicated and uncontaminated by pressures from either side.

The international lawyer believed in change, but not that the law should be the active agent of change. Neither the domestic ills nor the world's problems would benefit by hasty proposals. Such efforts would only create disorder which would make matters worse. Not all agreed. In the case of the 1911-1912 treaties, the international lawyers were split. President Taft whose high regard for law was beyond question was on one side, and on the other, the majority of lawyers who saw no present good in the treaties and only serious harm in the long run. The international lawyers refused to believe that every treaty moved the world to a more complete state of cooperation and a greater degree of justice and respect for law.


36 Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 159; idem, Hamilton Holt, 85-86.
In their dislike of the "emotional" peace societies, lawyers and businessmen shared one of their common bonds. Carnegie felt that the peace movement had too many sentimentalists, and Ginn's views have been noted earlier. Even the businessmen attending their first Lake Mohonk Conferences wanted to keep their identity distinct. It was the coalition of businessmen and international lawyers -- Carnegie, Root, Butler, Ginn and others like them -- who gave the pre-war movement its tone. This tone, of course, which became one of consummate elitism within the established societies, is of crucial importance for understanding the collapse of the coalitions.

FOUR

After 1900, peace work, much like other reform work, became respectable. The founding of the WPF and CEIP with the promise of financial aid and a "no nonsense" approach were an indication of the badge of respectability which now attached to peace work. But along with respectability, the new leadership brought an inchoate professionalization to peace advocacy, much in the same way that reform work in


38 Herman, Eleven Against War, 18-19.
general was being professionalized.39

Peace work had moved past the point where it simply represented the resistance to war. Reform in international relations was not just a matter of destroying and rooting up, but of managing, controlling, and regulating. Accordingly, it was considered too important to be left to the poet, preacher, and writer. Maturity of mind, not youthful enthu-

39 Jane Addams was particularly vocal in commenting about the lack of spontaneity and direct emotional response among the newer social workers. Instead of enthusiasm which united reform impulses, she saw a growing professionalism which dissipated reform energy. Welfare activities became rationalized into systems of fund-raising and standardization. The Playground Association of America, for example, wanted to establish professional standards for the training of playground leaders, and the question of whether school authorities or a special park board should control city parks increasingly absorbed the association's time and effort. Other areas of reform activity seemed bogged down with similar questions involving administrative details. In lobbying for federal support for industrial education, the National Society for the Promotion of Industrial Education concerned itself with the establishment and definition of professional teaching goals. As Lawrence Cremin notes, "as professionalism moved inexorably forward, fewer men and women like Jane Addams, Jacob Riis, Theodore Roosevelt, and Walter Hines Page concerned themselves directly with educational reform..." The Transformation of the School, New York, Knopf, 1961, 194. Roy Lubove has also remarked upon the increased professionalization of the social reformer and its effects. Cf., Roy Lubove, The Urban Community, 140; Jerry Israel, Building the Organizational Society; and, John C. Farrell, Beloved Lady, A History of Jane Addams' Ideas on Reform and Peace, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
siasm, was a requisite condition for pre-war peace work. Elihu Root himself was impressed at the great change come over the personnel of the peace societies during these years. Rather than finding them composed exclusively of a small cult of visionaries, he was impressed that many had become popular organizations with lawyers, financiers, editors, statesmen, educators, and clergymen as their supporters. It was this support of businessmen and international lawyers that affected the peace movement in the most critical manner, insofar as it tended to create a reliance upon experts for their opinion and influence. Blinded by their characteristic optimism, convinced of the national mission and of Anglo-American superiority, and confident of their own self-righteousness and expertise, the coalitions worked for international reform through only specific channels which grew narrower and narrower. The prominence given to businessmen reinforced the elitist tendencies already within the peace movement, and confirmed the idea that inclusion of the working classes as active members was not necessary. Leadership by the few, if practical and efficient, would be sufficient to uplift the rest.


The international lawyers revealed a similar elitist attitude. Their literature spoke of the desire to have the guilty nations appear "before the bar as suitor," just like lowly individuals. Their dislike for other methods and organizations is clearly manifest throughout the pre-war and 1914-1917 period. The attitude of Nicholas Murray Butler, President of the American Association for International Conciliation and the controlling voice in the CEIP, especially merits closer attention. Butler wrote Root soon after the establishment of the AAIC that he was anxious "to keep this undertaking free from the absurdities and extravagances of some more or less professional advocates of peace who in reality do injury to the national promotion of good feeling between nations." Later Butler was reluctant to have the Endowment identified with the rest of the peace movement. Of crucial importance was his and Root's concern that the Endowment not "be regarded as a glorified peace society rather than as an institution for scientific research..."


43 Butler to Root, January 21, 1907, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers.


It was the dominance of the businessmen and the international lawyers within the established societies with their fixed code of elitism which paralyzed the organizations into groups of like-thinking men.

Sondra Herman has found in this elitism of the American peace movement a striking parallel to the elitism among many domestic progressive reformers. Once again a dichotomy between elites and democrats revealed itself, this time in the matter of international reform. There was no question as to the inevitability of such international harmony nor that the people themselves would eventually be entrusted with maintaining it, but the rate of progress to that eventual take-over was still subject to control. The new leadership in the peace movement was sincerely interested in stopping war, but believed war was too serious an affair to be left in the hands of an unenlightened people. It was the function of the enlightened class to educate and prepare those who would eventually succeed. And any educational campaign to enlighten the people about the questions of war and peace should be entrusted exclusively to those who themselves were enlightened and educated. While this preparation was underway, the important decisions should still remain with

46 I have been dependent throughout this section on Sondra Herman, Eleven Against War, particularly her presentation of the nature of the CEIP under Butler and Root, 22-54, and the WPF in its support for the League to Enforce Peace, 55-78.
those who possessed the expertise to handle them. Meanwhile, the masses should be content to learn their international rights and obligations, and follow the lead of their betters. Butler and Root represented outstanding examples of this feeling. They were afraid that diplomacy, which had always been a prerogative of the upper class, might fall into the hands of the democratic impulse if the nation should continue in international matters on the same course being followed in domestic affairs toward a more direct democracy.

Both Butler and Root shared the belief that men were controlled by feeling and that for any reform to be successful it had to begin with a reform of the individual. A personal regeneration of each individual was the only solid basis upon which to construct any reform effort. Fundamental to such regeneration insofar as it applied to international reform was the creation of the international mind. The formation of such a mind was crucial, and it fell to the international lawyers and other enlightened individuals to create this international mind. For, as Elihu Root stated, "Unless the popular will responds to the instructed and competent leadership of opinion upon the vital questions of our foreign relations, the worst impulses of democracy will control." 47

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Accordingly, the proper international attitude was the unique possession of the educated few. They were in favor of education, but only if controlled by them. It is for that reason that they stressed the importance of the study of international law. The CEIP became a kind of international fact-finding bureau and its peace literature was given a consistent legalistic slant.

The elitism of the international lawyers became apparent when confronted with Germany's apparent lawlessness. The elitist character as well as the legalistic bent of the organized peace societies seriously prejudiced their approach to the mediation movement as well as predisposed them to a justification of the need for a moderate American preparedness. The elitism of the leaders of pre-1914 pacifism directed their organizations within preconceived channels and toward accepted goals. Their approach was narrow, limited by concerns of national sovereignty, and characterized by an exclusivity of membership. The established peace societies grew conservative and inflexible in their approach to peace much as their counterparts in domestic reform movements became professionalized and inflexible, able to work only within the limitations and confines they had set for themselves.
By and large, however, progressives who came from a social reform background were more flexible than others. It is their influence which came to dominate the peace movement after August 1914--largely by default and through the defection of the established peace organizations. These newer groups of pacifists, or better -- newer coalitions in sympathy with pacifist goals -- were less elitist than the established peace societies although they were still dominated by their belief in the immense potential for change inherent in a few dedicated experts. This elitism can be represented by a sliding scale ranging all the way from Butler and Root at the extreme far end to the Socialists at the other. Wilson shared this elitist attitude in his rejection of complete or even enlarged democratization of foreign diplomacy which he saw as a goal in the mediation movement. Even the mediation workers themselves were in one sense elitists who constructed their mediation effort on the hopeful application of the "Wisconsin idea."

There were still other groups ranging from those less elitist to the Socialists, who saw no limit to the extent in which people should not only share in but also administer the benefits of a reformed society both at home and in the world at large. There were differences, to be sure, among the programs of the social justice reformers, but all essentially agreed on the fundamental principle that the people
who did the work at home as well as those who did the fighting and dying in war should have a direct voice in their destiny.

Sondra Herman has found a correlation. Those groups which were the most elitist were also the most conscious of their national sovereignty, while the less elitist groups were more cosmopolitan and concerned about the interests of all men. Borrowing from the German sociologist, Ferdinand Tonnies, Ms. Herman has reduced these two modes of thought to the twin concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft:

Gemeinschaft was a natural community of family, friends, and fellow villagers. Intimate and warm, it was valued for its own sake. Gesellschaft was the impersonal type of association that was rapidly over-taking the community in the Western World. It was represented by businesses, by organizations, by government itself -- in fact by all forms of public life which individuals created for the sake of some object external to their relationship. "In a most general way," Tonnies observed, "one could speak of a Gemeinschaft comprising the whole of mankind,...(b)ut Gesellschaft is conceived as mere coexistence of people independent of each other."48

In using these concepts as analytical tools, Ms. Herman fits the attitudes of the international lawyers, the CEIP as controlled by Butler and Root, and later on, the

48 Herman, Eleven Against War, 7-8.
activities of the WPF in its support for the League to Enforce Peace, into the concept of Gesellschaft. Inasmuch as certain progressives wanted to prevent too much disorder in the domestic reform movement, so these international reformers wanted to remove the disorder within the peace movement. They believed in competition and struggle between both individuals and nations, but within the bounds of efficiency and reason. International harmony was the best condition for that, but it had to be created properly. They upheld the right to individualism at home and the right to the sovereignty of nations abroad. They looked to government, and advanced the policies of government as their mode of working for peace. They believed in protecting and insuring the growing pre-eminence of the United States which, in their view, would make the world a better place in proportion to the nation's involvement in world affairs.

The adherents of Gemeinschaft, however, rejected the morality of national interests, just as they rejected the morality of domestic unchecked individualism. They found nationalism destructive and antagonistic; they believed in and fostered the idea of the humanitarian and cultural community of all men, an attitude they found lacking among the international lawyers.

Jane Addams summed up this attitude in stating that it was her belief that the appeal to patriotism as the summit
of one's social duties was not sufficient. That appeal
could and should go further toward international coopera-
tion, just as there had been individual cooperation among
the nineteen nationalities that lived around Hull House.
The real tragedy of war, she felt, was that it made any step
toward international understanding impossible. At least
during peace there was hope for such understanding.49

In summary, on the eve of World War I the peace
movement had fallen into the hands of like-thinking men,
men who held control of their organizations and exercised
control over others through the distribution of subventions.
Their elitism neither represented nor allowed much articu-
lation of the views of more ardent pacifists. These would
surface after the collapse of the old order.

49 Newer Ideals of Peace, Chautauqua, N.Y., The Chautauqua
Press, 1907, 113-115.
CHAPTER III
COLLAPSE OF THE OLD ORDER

The eruption of war in August, 1914 created a shock in the United States, and indeed throughout the world. Europe had generally been successful in solving its problems, but now for the first time in almost a hundred years it found itself in a general conflict. Dismay was universal. Alongside a reaction of horror and disbelief, however, most Americans felt gratified that the New World was free of the militarism and nationalist rivalries which had sparked so many of the Old World's past wars and probably this latest one as well. ¹ Wilson, rather than leading, was merely echoing the sentiments of most American citizens when on August 19 he called upon them to be "impartial in thought as well as in action."² Americans basically did not want to get involved. Newspapers which headlined the story in early August very shortly gave prominence to other matters.

¹ Perhaps the most characteristic reflection of the American attitude was that of the Wabash (Indiana) Plain Dealer: "We never appreciated so keenly as now the foresight exercised by our forefathers in emigrating from Europe," as cited in Mark Sullivan, Our Times, the United States 1900-1925, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, V (Over Here), 1931, 142. For a brief collection of similar initial reactions, see Cooper, Vanity of Power, 19.

² Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, III, 157-159.
Virtue, however, or what generally is accepted as virtue, in one man can come to be regarded as vice in another. And so it was with non-involvement. While non-involvement was termed praiseworthy by the President himself, it posed problems for the organizations dedicated to peace. To profess a commitment to the goal of international harmony while at the same time to stand along the sidelines as a major war raged across a continent seemed to be a living contradiction for many pacifists. Some of the younger membership could not understand the indifference or apparent indifference of the established leadership in not wanting to take some action relative to, in the President's words, the "performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one nation holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation,... fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world."3

Action was asked of the peace societies. The time of reckoning had come for all who had supported the cause of peace. To support peace in a time of peace was not particularly demanding. But now in a time of conflict, when international harmony had been clearly disrupted, the peace societies were called upon to offer some guidance. What

3 Ibid.
could they say? What counsel would they give those Americans who desired a Europe, indeed a world, without war and who were willing to work for that purpose?

The sad short fact is that the established and reputable peace societies had little to say. Once the hostilities began and seemed destined to last for some time, organized pacifism collapsed amid the strains and torments of selecting a practical course of action. The optimistic picture of imminent world harmony was smashed by the reality of a wartime situation.

It is important to remember that the subject is primarily one of organizations, not personalities. But like persons, organizations have a life design all their own. They have a birth, a period of youthful fervor, a prosperous middle-age, and ultimately, a period of growing old. Some, however, never die. There is no determined time span for this life design, either its entirety or any particular segment -- it could spread over hundreds of years, or be condensed into a few short months.

And so it was with the established American peace organizations. They appeared strong and robust before being challenged by the outbreak of the European war. Then all of a sudden they were old -- even those which had been born only
a few years previous. They no longer professed so fervently their earlier goals. These were abandoned to be furthered by newer men. The old order had collapsed.

The collapse had many causes and the following pages are devoted to their examination. In the first place, attention will be directed to the virtual breakdown in leadership which occurred at about the same time as the outbreak of the war. The compromised war-time activities of the three dominant organizations will be considered next. And, finally, the dissatisfaction of certain elements within these organizations and their appeals for change will conclude the chapter.

ONE

As indicated earlier, by the eve of World War I the organized movement of peace in the United States had come under the control of a number of like-thinking men. And while their search for peace was not a unified one, they shared a basic agreement on the importance of excising the sentimentalism and softness commonly associated with the peace movement, and of making the advocacy of international harmony a serious and efficient enterprise. The dominance of this viewpoint was reinforced rather than weakened by a crisis in leadership which roughly paralleled the outbreak of the European War.
Death played a prominent role in this crisis and attendant confusion. The year 1913 claimed two of the inspirational leaders from an older generation: Samuel B. Capen, the president of the Massachusetts Peace Society, died in January and Alfred H. Love, the president of the Universal Peace Union, followed on June 29. On January 21, 1914 Edwin Ginn, the founder of the World Peace Foundation, died in his home in Winchester, Massachusetts.4

Edwin Mead became Chief Director of the World Peace Foundation and devoted himself to the organization's goals with such a fervor that he became overly exhausted. The Foundation suffered a dual misfortune when Mead eventually had a nervous breakdown and suspended all his efforts on the WPF's behalf. He was voted a full year of rest from April 1, 1915, without dimunition of salary in the hope and belief that this would enable him to return to his work in complete health and vigor. In the meantime, the World Peace Foundation lost its momentum and gradually its independence. It called no directors' meetings after November, 1914.5

Sickness and death were likewise significant factors

4 Minutes of the Board of Trustees, 1910–1914, 74. World Peace Foundation Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.  
5 David Starr Jordan, Days of a Man, II, 292.
for the American Peace Society which Benjamin F. Trueblood had guided for so many years. To him belonged the credit for the success of the Advocate of Peace and for much of the progress of the APS reorganization. But on the eve of the war, Trueblood was a sick man and was forced out of the role of leadership into that of General Secretary. It was finally from this office that he retired on May 7, 1915, on an allowance of $100.00 a month. He died on October 26, 1916.

While there is some question as to the nature of Trueblood's original illness in 1913, it is more than probable that his relapse was brought on by depression over the war. Mead's breakdown seems to be largely psychosomatic, induced by his reaction against the horrors of the war as well as by his growing conviction that the peace organizations were not responding adequately to those same horrors. Carnegie's collapse and death in 1919 was felt by his wife to be directly related to the fighting in Europe. In the preface to Carnegie's Autobiography while speaking of how he

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6 "Secretary Trueblood's Retirement," Advocate of Peace, LXXII (May, 1915), 105.


8 Cf., Patterson, "The Travail of the American Peace Movement," 380-81; idem, "An Interpretation of the American Peace Movement," 43. For an example of the severity of Mead's depression see Mead to Jordan, December 2, 1914, Jordan Peace Correspondence, Hoover Institute on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University.
was engaged in writing his memoirs when the news of Germany's invasion of Belgium arrived, she explained.

These memoirs ended at that time. Henceforth he was never able to interest himself in private affairs. Many times he made the attempt to continue writing, but found it useless. Until then he had lived the life of a man in middle life -- and a young one at that -- golfing, fishing, swimming each day, sometimes doing all three in one day. Optimist as he always was and tried to be, even in the face of the failure of his hopes, the world disaster was too much. His heart was broken. A severe attack of influenza followed by two serious attacks of pneumonia precipitated old age upon him. 9

Whether their organizations would have been markedly different had these men continued their association is, of course, speculative. Many of their supporters felt their presence, particularly that of Trueblood and Love, would have been significant. 10 Certainly, it is fair to assume that these two along with Mead, Ginn, and Carnegie would have made their views known. Their past record indicates this. 11 And while it is too much to say that their presence would have completely altered the course of the established societies, it is entirely possible that they would have made


11 For Love's renowned record in opposing the Spanish-American War, cf., Curti, Peace or War, 169-170; Patterson, "The Travail of the American Peace Movement," 77-85.
those societies take a more positive stand and even lend support to the mediation effort, the fight against preparedness, and the campaign for a war referendum.

Their removal did have one definite effect which can be stated without equivocation. By their absence the voice of dissatisfaction within their organizations was made weaker and, eventually, was quashed. It is hard to imagine Mead or Trueblood, men known for their humanity and sensitivity, allowing critics and dissenters to be either forced into resignation as in the case of Louis Lochner or bludgeoned into compliance as was the experience of Mrs. Fannie Fern Andrews of the ASPL. By way of summary, the loss through death or sickness of such strong personalities strengthened the similarity of viewpoint within the CEIP, APS, and WPF -- a viewpoint which bespoke a harmony of inoffensiveness, control, and passivity.

TWO

Ironically, because of Carnegie's attitude at the founding, the one organization which maintained a continuity into the war without suffering any leadership crisis was the

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12 On Lochner's resignation see below, Chapter Four, Section One; on Mrs. Andrews, see below, Section Four.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yet neither peace work in general nor the CEIP's activity was greatly benefited thereby. The war years, rather than being seized as an opportunity, were regarded as a period of marking time, an unfortunate interlude until peace would come again.

The policy of the CEIP which called for a certain streamlining of the peace movement had been set since the early organizational meetings. In fact, scarcely one year after the Endowment had brought about the reorganization of the American Peace Society and agreed to channel appropriations through it, the trustees began to express doubts about the advisability of providing subventions to peace societies at all. Peace societies both in Europe and the United States were repeatedly warned that they should prepare themselves for a substantial reduction in the amount of future financial assistance. Retrenchment and conservation were characteristics of the CEIP before 1914, and the war, rather

13 Carnegie preferred not to be a member of the Board of Trustees stating, "It is not well in my opinion that the giver of a gift should be continuously a member of a Board that administers it. It places him in a very awkward position... You would be under embarrassment. You would think, 'Oh well, we can't go contrary to Mr. Carnegie'." "First Meeting of the Board of Trustees," December 14, 1910, CEIP Papers.

14 Scott to John Bates Clark, January 15, 1913, Division of Intercourse and Education, I, 1913, 355, CEIP Papers.

than enabling the trustees to see things differently, strengthened their resolve to continue within the limits they had set for themselves.

Accordingly, the CEIP simply cut out the funding of any peace propaganda in foreign countries. The International Peace Bureau and those other European organizations which had enjoyed subsidies were told they they could no longer count on the support of the Endowment.\textsuperscript{16} These European societies, abandoned for the duration by their American benefactors, all but ceased to exist. The bitterness engendered by this desertion remained long after the war was over.\textsuperscript{17} Requests for help from two newly founded organizations devoted to fostering international understanding even as the war raged, the Union for Democratic Control and the Vaterland Neues Bund, were outrightly refused.\textsuperscript{18}

Similarly, the CEIP refused any new subsidies for peace propaganda at home. The appeal for financial aid from the Pacific Exposition Committee was denied, as was the request for an allotment of $25,000 to publish and distribute the reports of the Central Committee for a Durable

\textsuperscript{16} LaFontaine to J. B. Scott, September 29, 1914; Butler to LaFontaine, October 22, 1914, CEIP Papers.

\textsuperscript{17} Curti, \textit{Peace or War}, 205, 229.

\textsuperscript{18} David Starr Jordan to Henry Pritchett, November 23, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
Peace. The refusal of similar requests reinforced the general impression that the Endowment was cutting back on many of its activities. Even the $31,000 subvention to the American Peace Society which was maintained, nevertheless, was threatened from time to time, particularly during the early months of 1917. At its February 23 meeting, the Endowment recommended that the subvention be omitted from the budget and that disbursements to the APS should be made only from an emergency fund.

In offering an explanation for these cutbacks, Butler stated, "No other course was possible. To continue ... peace propaganda in the face of the war that raged was to make ourselves ridiculous." Butler and the trustees were much taken with the importance of preserving the image of the Endowment. Even though "the way was opened for a well-organized and systematic education of public opinion throughout the civilized world" and "(p)roposed plans of work were... finally approved,... when the Great War broke, 

19 Henry Haskell to David Starr Jordan, April 20, 1915; Haskell to Jordan, December 27, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

20 Charles Levermore to Pauline Follansbee, April 7, 1915, Levermore Correspondence folder, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers.


22 Butler to Weardale, January 12, 1915, Nicholas M. Butler Papers.
...the Endowment could not go forward with its work as outlined." The CEIP program had to wait until peace was reestablished. Butler felt that "nothing of importance could be done until the war should come to its end."23

In spite of repeated petitions, the CEIP chose to avoid all living issues connected with the war. Even calls for assistance on matters which could not be construed as peace propaganda went unheard. When urged, for example, to send to Belgium a neutral group like the Balkan Commission of Inquiry to investigate alleged atrocities, the trustees ignored the suggestion.24 Subsequent appeals to the Endowment to support the movement for mediation or to counterbalance the misinformation about European conditions being circulated by the preparedness advocates met the same consistent refusal. Similarly, the effort to get the CEIP to help clarify the contemporary issues of neutrality was unsuccessful, as was the attempt to have the Endowment support the creation of a systematic course of studies on the history of international relations and on international law.25 This latter failure is highly indicative of the wartime collapse of the CEIP because these same trustees acting through the American Society of International Law had in April, 1914

23 Butler, Across the Busy Years, II, 90-91, 111.
24 Jordan, Days of a Man, II, 643.
25 Jordan to Pritchett, November 23, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
sponsored a conference to consider the feasibility of such a course of studies and the steps required to introduce such a course to American institutions of learning. 26

In declining to appear ridiculous at home and possibly mischievous in attempting to influence Europe, the Endowment was engaged in more than a superficial face-saving and image preservation. The paralysis of the CEIP was the result of its legalistic framework which regarded wars as conflicts over legal rights best adjudicated by a court, providing the laws were precise and broad enough. Since such conditions did not yet obtain, that is, since the present conflict could not be converted into a case, these international legalists directing the course of the Endowment felt they could do nothing. They chose not to confront the crisis in any other way than in accordance with the program they had set for themselves.

Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the Endowment's wartime research and publications. It continued to emphasize legalistic aspects in its pamphlets and books, and it continued to gather information. But not one of its

26 American Society of International Law, Conference of American Teachers of International Law, Washington, D. C., 1914. The conference was held in Washington, D. C. on April 23-25, 1914. The goals of the conference were set forth in preface remarks by James Brown Scott.
scholarly interpretations on the causes of war or on the issue of neutrality was concerned with the war then underway. In none of the five categories under which the CEIP published was there any direct reference to the then raging conflict. While it announced that it was expanding its program for the study of war, the Endowment simply reinforced its policy of waiting to act until the war was over. The CEIP was unwilling to jeopardize channels of possible future support by adopting controversial or unfavorable positions in its publications.

Granted this compromised position, the Endowment surprised no one within the peace movement by its increasingly pro-Ally viewpoint. Eventually, Root joined the National Security League and advocated preparedness and

27 A list of the Endowment's publications covering 1914 to October 1, 1917 is contained in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, South American Opinions on the War, Washington, D. C., 1917, 28-32. The five categories comprise the publications of the three CEIP divisions (Intercourse and Education, Economics and History, and International Law), the pamphlet series, and the translations of the classics of international law. Only the pamphlet series and the publications of the Division of International Law attended to immediate issues of war and peace. There was much explanation of The Hague Conventions and the Declarations of 1899 and 1907. When the question of neutrality was treated, it was only in the historical context of the controversy between the United States and France in 1797-1800.

an unconditional allied victory. While Butler did not go quite so far, both joined together in blaming Germany as the aggressor and proclaiming that there could be no lasting peace till Germany was crushed.

The effect that this brief history of the CEIP had on the American peace movement was much graver than the simple loss of a supporting coalition member. The significance of the Endowment's collapse is compounded because of its prominent position and the influence which accompanied such prominence. Such influence and prestige which attended the size of Carnegie's gift had the effect of drying up other sources of revenue for peace work. Butler could well boast that the Endowment saved $400,000 a year. The decision on the part of the CEIP trustees to conserve as much of their budget as possible meant that of the $500,000 annually available during 1914-1917, only $31,000 was directed to the peace societies. And even this amount was subject to strict conditions and eventually endangered. The bulk of funds that were spent went to publishing material which had no direct focus on the then raging conflict.


31 See below, Section Three.
dissatisfied with the CEIP's fiscal policy, were driven to cultivate other sources of income.

The deleterious effects of the CEIP's conservatism are most forcefully illustrated by the wartime history of the American Peace Society. The APS fell totally under the spell of the Endowment and became a virtual hostage to its annual subvention.

THREE

On August 19, 1914, the American Peace Society joined with the American Association for International Conciliation, the Church Peace Union, the German-American Peace Society, the New York Peace Society, and the World Peace Foundation in a memorial ceremony thanking President Wilson for offering mediation to the warring European powers. Later, in 1914, the APS signed a manifesto against the war. But by and large, the APS appeared content to continue with as little meaningful confrontation with the war as possible. While it continued to issue the Advocate of Peace, and even increased circulation to 11,000 subscribers, nothing in


the magazine went beyond general and inoffensive state-
ments.\(^{34}\) If the APS did moderately stiffen against prepared-
ness, it never clarified its position. The Society continued
to publish and distribute pamphlets. During 1915 it issued
eight new titles bringing the total number of selections
published by the APS to sixty.\(^{35}\) But not one served to edu-
cate the American people on neutral rights in wartime, on
the legality of loans to belligerents, or on any subject
which directly involved the controversial issues stirred up
by the war.

Increasingly, the APS appeared more involved with
the esoteric interests of its own organization than with the
efforts to re-establish world peace. Several examples illus-
trate the Society's concern in serving itself and/or out-
side controlling interests. During 1915 there was consider-
able agitation within the Society over making the Advocate
of Peace a more effective magazine.\(^{36}\) It was to be enlarged
and its name changed to American Internationalism. The CEIP

\(^{34}\) Cf., "Can Ye Not Discern the Signs of the Times," Advocate of Peace, October, 1914, 197; "Another Year,"
January, 1917, 2. Cf. also, Advocate of Peace,

\(^{35}\) Eighty-Eighth Annual Report of Directors of the Ameri-
can Peace Society, 1916, 12, American Peace Society
Papers.

\(^{36}\) "Minutes," June 28, 1915; September 24, 1915; October
29, 1915, American Peace Society folder, Fannie Fern
Andrews Papers.
was to be petitioned through James Brown Scott for a larger appropriation. Scott's leadership in this activity for change in the magazine and Butler's dislike for the use of the word "peace" testify to the ongoing influence of the CEIP over the APS as the Endowment attempted to transform the Society into a tool for peace reform according to its own version of internationalism. Opposition to the change was registered in a series of letters from Trueblood who felt that the changing of the title which had successfully been used since 1835 was needless and possibly self-defeating. He further felt "that the proposed new title seems to me to have no characteristic fitness for a journal whose great theme has always been Peace, that is, the destruction of war and the establishment of permanent international concord. The term 'American Internationalism' might equally as well be applied to a half-dozen or more international organizations now in existence as to the peace movement." The matter was finally tabled.

37 A. D. Call to Benjamin F. Trueblood, July 22, 1915 and July 31, 1915, American Peace Society Papers.

38 Benjamin F. Trueblood to A. D. Call, July 27, 1917, APS Papers.
Another illustration of internalization concerns a decision of the American Peace Society to revise its constitution. A committee of Dr. George W. Kirchwey, Jackson H. Ralston, and Dr. James Brown Scott was appointed to draft such a revision.³⁹ While the choice of timing may be regarded as unfortunate, the rewriting of a constitution can be regarded as a wholesome exercise even though it is essentially devoted to self-preservation. On the whole, the matter seems of small weight -- unless one considers what was involved in the revisions. The new constitution had to have the approval of the Society's various branches. And it is important to reiterate the fact that the American Peace Society held control over its various branches by virtue of the Society's ability to grant or withhold subventions. In fact, during the fall of 1916 the Secretary of the APS reported that the usual subventions to the various branch societies had not been paid, pending the action of the individual societies on the new constitution. It was suggested that the advisability of granting the subvention prior to the acceptance of the Society's constitution be studied.⁴⁰ But there is no evidence either of the report of such a study or of a change in policy. The question of withdrawing support was a club to help keep the


more enthusiastic branches in check. Presenting a united front, keeping the Society from being fragmented, these goals were more important than taking the vanguard in the pacifist movement.

Curiously, the fact that many state organizations disintegrated at this time and that subsections of the Society melted away, has been interpreted and, indeed misrepresented, as a waning of pacifist feeling within the country. 41 Quite a different interpretation, however, is entirely possible. In the first place, the Delaware Society, largely Quaker, certainly one of the staunchest segments of American pacifism and unlikely to be thought of as unsupportive of good programs, withdrew from the American Peace Society. 42 This withdrawal from such a sincere group as the Quakers can only indicate a general dissatisfaction either with the performance of the American Peace Society or with its new constitution and the fact that such a critical hour was chosen to present it. Secondly, the new APS constitution called for abandonment of autonomous branches. The New York Peace Society, which had a long history of its own, felt itself threatened if this provision would be accepted without amendment and refused to approve the constitution. To pressure compliance, the American


Peace Society, with the help of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, found a way to cut out the financial underpinnings of the NYPS. The Executive Committee of the Carnegie Endowment recommended to the Trustees "that the subvention of the American Peace Society and the New York Peace Society be omitted from the budget, with the thought that any money granted to the American Peace Society be taken from the emergency fund of the Endowment." In effect, the American Peace Society still could function in its accustomed manner while holding the purse strings of the subvention for the NYPS -- strings that would remain tightly drawn until the New York Peace Society ended its own autonomy.

In response, the New York Peace Society felt that "the recent change in the Constitution of the American Peace Society has virtually separated us (NYPS) from it, (since the) autonomous branches no longer exist and we have not accepted any new relation to the Society." The NYPS was waiting to "determine whether any amendments of the constitution of the American Peace Society will make it desirable for us to resume our former relation."


While the trend toward internalization was one element, there were other reasons for dissatisfaction with the American Peace Society, as Clark further indicated,

Personally I think that more than a formal change of constitution will be necessary before it will be desirable for us to connect ourselves with the American Peace Society. There is something in the spirit of the organization which is out of harmony with the spirit of ours. In so far as the few articles I have read in the Advocate of Peace express the spirit of the Washington organization, the expression is one that we should not like to send out as representing our society. 45

The feelings expressed in this letter were not unique, as will be made clear below from the comments of others dissatisfied with the lack of meaningful activity on the part of the American Peace Society. From the very beginning of hostilities in Europe a cautious course was urged upon the American Peace Society by its own leadership, especially by Secretary A. D. Call and Theodore Burton, the APS president. 46 These men directed the American Peace Society to its conservative stance. They were, however, aided and perhaps critically influenced by outside advisers, notably James Scott of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who in a June 16, 1915 letter to A. D. Call,

45 Ibid.

46 Arthur D. Call served as Executive Director of the APS during Benjamin F. Trueblood's illness. When Trueblood resigned as General Secretary effective May 7, 1915, Call was elected as General Secretary and the office of Executive Director was abolished.
urged that the APS follow its traditions within the peace movement and not strike out on any new roads. In other words, the Society should look to its own survival and not jeopardize the continued existence of the organization by innovative ideas which were in disfavor elsewhere within the peace movement.

Indeed, one wonders if there were really much choice in this matter. For the significant fact about the peace societies is that they were dramatically dependent upon a financial pecking order. This financial dependence has been noted above in the instances of cutbacks or threatened cutbacks of funds. But the most outstanding example concerns the American Peace Society itself and its $31,000 annual subvention from the CEIP. There was generally some preoccupation whether the support would be renewed. Could the APS have taken a position too far out of line from that of the Endowment in view of its dependence on the CEIP for over 70% of its total receipts? And if it had had the courage to take another stand, would this not have amounted to the suicide of the organization?

47 James Scott to A. D. Call, June 16, 1915, Advocate of Peace, LXXVII (November, 1915), 239-241.

In addition to the pressure from James Scott and the Carnegie Endowment, Theodore Burton urged a cautious course for the pacifist membership. Call himself lamented the APS President's do-nothing stance and the fact that Burton "has not been able to lift an ounce for us. If only we could get a good man who could devote some time to our work it would be a great service." Burton at this time had plans to indulge his aspirations to become President of the United States. He intimated his intention of resigning as president of the American Peace Society during the summer of 1915. Early in the fall he officially resigned, and was off to seek his own fortunes, leaving behind not the most amicable of feelings.

While on the one hand, the resignation of Burton left the APS with the serious problem of finding a successor, at the same time it provided the Society an opportunity for rebirth, a chance to exert a strong voice once again for the issue of peace in the United States. Call favored William Jennings Bryan, the ex-Secretary of State, for the office. One can only speculate on what might have transpired had Bryan been able to use the prestige of the nation's oldest peace organization as a forum to carry out his opposition to the increasing American involvement in the war. There

49 A. D. Call to Benjamin F. Trueblood, July 30, 1915, American Peace Society Papers.
were several objections to Bryan, the most significant being that his pacifism tended toward arbitration while the controlling interests of the APS favored a form of internationalism. Bryan could not be made to fit this mold. His selection was rejected and the search for Burton's successor continued.\(^{50}\)

To assist in the search the efforts of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace emerged fully into the open. The Endowment favored Dr. George Kirchwey for president of the Society, but he was not the choice of the APS leadership, especially A. D. Call who had come to favor Dr. David Starr Jordan for the office. Call, however, made a most significant admission as to how the choice was eventually resolved when he wrote, "Butler favors Kirchwey and Mammon may therefore have a controlling voice in the situation."\(^{51}\) Kirchwey was elected president on December 12, 1915.

As Dean of the Columbia Law School, Kirchwey had the prominence to lead the American Peace Society. As one of the pioneers of the American Society for International Law, he shared the international-legalist outlook of Butler and Root and was acceptable to the CEIP. On the day after his

\(^{50}\) A. D. Call to Benjamin F. Trueblood, September 29, 1915, APS Papers.

\(^{51}\) A. D. Call to Benjamin F. Trueblood, October 30, 1915, APS Papers.
election, however, Kirchwey expressed indecision about taking the office because of the press of other duties.\textsuperscript{52} For over a year he neglected to exercise his office, delaying until December 29, 1916 the moment when he first presided at a meeting of the American Peace Society.

It had been hoped initially and certainly in late 1916 when Dr. Kirchwey did finally take up his work as president and devoted his entire time to it that he would revitalize the Society. He called for a meeting on January 20, 1917 at which "the whole question of the program of the American Peace Society in the light of the present war will be a part of the agenda."\textsuperscript{53} But by this time the entire peace movement across the country was in extremis. It was too late to reverse the militarist thrust by speaking against preparedness. What was needed was support for emergency measures such as a referendum on the question of a declaration of war against Germany. But this was too radical an idea for the American Peace Society and it was rejected. More significant is the fact that Kirchwey had already lost interest in the APS and finally resigned in May, 1917.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} The New York Times, December 13, 1915, 8:3.

\textsuperscript{53} A. D. Call to William I. Hull, January 3, 1917, APS Papers.

\textsuperscript{54} John Mez to David Starr Jordan, March 1, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence, Hoover Institution; Advocate of Peace, LXXIX (June, 1917), 265.
Ironically, it was during early 1916 while waiting for Kirchwey to assume his office and possibly in anticipation of the quickening he was going to give the organization, that some changes were noticeable in the American Peace Society. The American Peace Society briefly entered the preparedness controversy by planning a series of debates between accredited advocates of a juridical settlement of international disputes and the advocates of increasing military forces to assert national interests. The Society felt that

until there is more education of public opinion regarding the international principles and rights for which the country ought to stand and until there is a clearer definition of American policy, there can be no intelligent decision on what military preparedness may be necessary. So far, the military theorists have not announced their opinion regarding actual interpretations of the policies which might lead to conflict. Until this issue is joined in open discussion of these important questions, the real significance of any increase in the army and navy cannot be certain, either at home or abroad. ...The Society proposes the following question for debate: 'What national rights, foreign policies, or international principles, which the nation ought to be prepared to maintain, require the increases in the army and navy now so widely advocated for the United States'?55

A list of speakers to be challenged was circulated with the debate announcement. Outstanding members of the American Peace Society were asked to participate and counter

the view of the preparedness proponents. Shortly thereafter, three APS members, Call, Samuel Dutton, and Malcolm W. Davis, testified before the House of Representatives on March 13, 1916 against increases in spending for naval armaments.

This APS opposition to preparedness could in no way be mistaken for a crusade. It was an exercise controlled by its internationalist overseers, much in keeping with the tone

56 Ibid. The list is an enclosure of the letter cited here, and contained the names of the following opponents: Theodore Roosevelt; S. Stanwood Menken, President National Security League; Hudson Maxim, Maxim Munitions Company; Henry A. Wise Wood, Director National Security League; George von L. Meyer, Ex-Secretary of the Navy; Charles J. Bonaparte, Ex-Secretary of the Navy; Lindley M. Garrison, Ex-Secretary of War; David Jayne Hill, Former Ambassador to Germany; Col. Robert M. Thompson, President Navy League; Arthur H. Dadmun, Secretary Navy League; Seth Low, President National Civic Federation; Talcott Williams, Director Pulitzer School of Journalism; John Grier Hibben, President Princeton University; Prof. Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard University; Prof. Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia University; Senator Lodge of Massachusetts; Senator Phelan of California; Senator Chamberlain of Oregon; Rep. Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts; Rep. Nicholas Longworth of Ohio; Rep. Mann, Republican House Leader; Frederic L. Huidekoper, Writer on naval armament; Rev. Charles A. Eaton, New York City; Frederic R. Cardinal, Lawyer, New York City, National Security League; James M. Back, Lawyer, New York City, Former Assistant U. S. Attorney General.
of previous APS outbursts against arms and arms spending.\(^\text{57}\)

According to the prevailing internationalist thought within the CEIP and APS, the search for peace could not be based on military means. The American Peace Society, along with the Endowment, refused to support the League to Enforce Peace on the same grounds.\(^\text{58}\)

Opposition to preparedness was an effort easily characterized -- "too little, too late." It could not absolve the Society from the charge of slacking. Nor could it prevent the membership from a general impatience with the Society and an attitude of querulousness with its executive committee.\(^\text{59}\) The simple truth was that the Society was willing to waste the spirit of activism within a segment of its membership as it consistently refused to confront the reality of the war and the need for an organization dedicated to peace to do something about a currently raging conflict.


\(^\text{59}\) See below, Chapter Four, Section One.
During its December, 1914 meeting the board of directors passed a series of resolutions calling upon President Wilson to call a conference of neutral powers for the purpose of safeguarding neutral rights and influencing the settlement of the differences between the belligerent powers, at the close of hostilities (author's italics). In 1916, the Society requested "the President of the United States to take the initiative at the earliest opportunity in tendering, in conjunction with other neutral governments, his good offices for the purposes of establishing peace." Yet, when asked to endorse the issue of mediation as it was being agitated during most of 1915, it refused its support.

Eventually, the American Peace Society capitulated entirely stating that the way to peace was "by giving to the Government our unqualified and unwavering support in its military aims. The way to peace which we crave -- the peace for which we have so long striven, the only peace worth striving for -- is now through war." Hand in hand with President Wilson, who was a member of the APS, the Society marched into war.

60 "Resolutions Adopted at the Mid-Winter Meeting of the Board of Directors of the American Peace Society (1914)," APS folder, Pannie Fern Andrews Papers.


62 Trueblood to Jane Addams, April 3, 1915, APS Papers.

The American Peace Society had survived. When asked for direction it used its energies only for its own self-preservation. More was asked of those who rallied under the banner of the advocacy of peace.

FOUR

Under the guidance of David Starr Jordan and Edwin Mead, the World Peace Foundation drew up the first pronouncement of its kind made in America after the war began. It pleaded for a European concert, with a representative council in place of entangling alliances and ententes. It further urged the drastic reduction of armament, an international police to protect all nations alike from outlaws and pirates, and an open and democratic control of treaties and foreign policies. It also demanded as a matter of justice that no territory should be transferred without the consent of its people. 64

The Jordan/Mead leadership, however, suffered a severe challenge at the first wartime meeting of the trustees. A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard, who had shown but slight interest in the Foundation's operation prior to August, 1914, led off with a vigorous attack on the worth of

64 Jordan, Days of a Man, II, 649.
its pre-war efforts. He suggested that the WPF take "no steps for immediate action," for the coming of the war had invalidated all the assumptions upon which Mead and his associates had been working. Lowell concluded that all the Foundation's activities should cease except, perhaps, for an effort to quietly pursue the study of war and the reprinting of documents. 65

Mead was terribly distressed by the meeting. He wrote that Lowell's attack and the entire meeting was the worst experience he had ever endured. 66 Not long afterward, Mead suffered a complete nervous breakdown, was wholly incapacitated for a number of years, and carried the effects of his illness with him until his death in 1937. 67

Meanwhile, Charles Levermore, ex-president of Adelphi College, was appointed acting Chief Director of the Foundation during Mead's illness. The accession of Levermore is significant in marking the beginning of retrenchment of the WPF. In an effort to rededicate the Foundation to the goals of its founder, a report was submitted to the board of

65 Ibid.; Mead to Jordan, December 2, 1914, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

66 Mead to Jordan, December 2, 1914.

67 Peter Filene, "The World Peace Foundation," 499; Lucia Mead to Jordan, August 24, 1918, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
trustees which stated in part,

When we started out, the Carnegie Endowment and the Church Peace Union did not exist; but their existence and the things which they exist to do make our proper service much less varied and miscellaneous than at times we thought of, relieve us of certain responsibilities which they have definitely undertaken with greater resources than ours, and enable us to concentrate in the way which makes us most useful at the same time that it conforms to the two duties upon which Mr. Ginn laid the chief emphasis. He was a publisher and an educator (italics original in the report); and it was upon publications, the press, and the schools and colleges that he placed his chief reliance.68

In this effort of rededication the Foundation adopted a conscious policy of retrenchment. All programs not in conformity with the founder's original ideas were to be rigorously excised. Our early example of this retrenchment was the elimination of the work of Dr. MacDonald. Because his work was largely among the churches, it was felt that "the Church Peace Union should now be requested to assume, either directly to Dr. MacDonald or through this office, responsibility for the allowance previously made to him by this foundation."69 In 1915 the WPF disbanded its Department of Business Organizations since most of that work was now done by the National Chamber of Commerce. In addition, the

68 Report to the Board of Trustess, n.d., World Peace Foundation Papers.

office of business manager was left unfilled when Albert B. Bryant died. Apparently, the trustees no longer felt the need for a separate work coordinator within the foundation. Moreover, the department of women's clubs was discontinued as was the separate appropriation for lecturers. 70

Initially, the money saved by the WPF was to be used in its central area of focus. As the trustees explained, "The Foundation cannot concentrate its energies upon the educational field and at the same time a corps of lecturers to meet popular demands of all kinds." 71 Accordingly, the elimination of all duplication of effort appeared no more than a wholesome efficiency move, or at most the triumph of the forces of "thrift" within the WPF. For many, retrenchment appeared as the culmination and resolution of a half decade of struggle between Ginn and Mead over expenditures. 72 With Ginn dead, Mead ill, and the forces of Lowell in command, retrenchment and thrift were celebrated as extensions of Ginn's original plan.


71 Ibid.

72 For details of the struggle and an elaboration on Ginn's attempt to have the public prove their interest in peace advocacy by investing some of their own money, cf., Patterson, "Travail of the American Peace Movement," 294-297; Filene, "The World Peace Foundation," 486-491.
Since activity among the schools and colleges was traditional, it was continued, but with a different emphasis. Whereas previous work in the colleges and universities had been a recruiting effort to gain supporters, the wartime WPF effort, as directed by George W. Nasmyth, stressed the theme of internationalism. Speakers, literature, and outlines for study and debate upon international subjects were furnished by the WPF. News items to be published in student publications, college dailies, and other organs continued to be distributed. The Foundation made an effort to contact all 200,000 students in the 596 American colleges and universities. Its educational program also involved intercollegiate conferences and meetings for discussions of international subjects as well as efforts to have courses relating to internationalism adopted in college curricula. 73

But nowhere did the World Peace Foundation in its educational campaign directly confront the issue of war. Efforts continued to be directed toward cultivating the internationalist spirit, with instruction on neutral rights in the wartime notably absent. In the summer of 1915, however, the Foundation's unclear program of internationalism shifted to an almost exclusive support of world organization

and sanctionism, as exemplified by the League to Enforce Peace.

The founding of the League to Enforce Peace has been detailed in other studies. Suffice it here to re-iterate some essential points of its background and final program. Shock over World War I and its revealed horror solidified certain individuals on both sides of the Atlantic into a firm resolve of not permitting another war. International violence had gone too far and the time had come for the creation of a permanent group charged with the maintenance of peace. Accordingly, the League benefited from the abundance of ideas and programs on arbitration, internationalism, world organization, and sanctionism which had existed in the pre-war years. Development of the League moved from a seminar of intellectuals through four organizational dinners to its official convention at Philadelphia's Independence Hall on Bunker Hill Day, June 17, 1915, a highly publicized effort to emulate the nation's Founding Fathers.


Essentially a bundle of compromises among the arbitrationists, world federationists, and sanctionists, the LEP's program called for a removal of most aspects of voluntarism in the settlement of international disputes. Members were compelled to submit justiciable questions to a judicial tribunal before going to war. If any member refused, force was to be used against him in an effort to prevent war. The force was not an international police force constantly in the field as desired by certain sanctionists, but an unspecified array of member armies and navies adequate to compel the recalcitrant member into a "cooling-off" period. Thus prevented from warring, the members' only alternative was submission of the question at issue to the tribunal. 76 It was in this sense that Theodore Marburg, one of the League's founding fathers, had previously spoken of the need to "impose justice." 77 As A. Lawrence Lowell explained, the force envisioned by the League was realistically a threat of force whose purpose was to prevent the actual use of force. 78

Since the LEP program rested on certain assumptions and uncertainties, the members agreed to meet from time to

76 Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 36-37.

77 Marburg, "The Backward Nation," The Independent, LXII (June 20, 1912), 1365-1370.

78 Lowell, "The International Policeman," The Independent, LXXXII (June 14, 1915), 460-1.
time for purposes of clarification and to formulate and codify rules of international law. The League in its posture of compromise represented the culmination of both the movement toward a World Court and the effort to establish a World Federation dedicated to international harmony. It also gave promise to becoming a body for the periodical drafting of international legislation.

Lowell was overwhelmed with enthusiasm. In his capacity as chairman of the executive committee of both organizations he lost little time in transforming the slumbering potential of the WPF into all-out support for the LEP. As early as July 12, 1915 the adoption of the program of the League to Enforce Peace was debated by the Foundation trustees. Presented by Lowell and his followers as a new peace initiative, the League was thought to be the best method of opposing excessive preparedness—one that required public endorsement by the WPF. While not everyone agreed that the League's program was the best method of fighting preparedness, all objections were overruled and support in the name of the World Peace Foundation of the principles and policy of the League to Enforce Peace was voted upon and passed.79

As a concession to those who were unsettled in the wisdom of this support, it was unanimously voted that "steps at once be taken to ascertain whether President Emeritus Eliot is able and willing to prepare a concise statement of the effective answers to the Preparedness propaganda; with a view to its circulation by the Foundation..." The appeal to Eliot was made on the basis "that no one can state as effectively as ...(he) can, the case against the propaganda which aims to put the country on a war footing." That Eliot would decline the invitation did little to diminish either the initial victory of the LEP supporters or their future prospects which rapidly unfolded.

Within a few months, it was unanimously recommended that the WPF cooperate directly with the League to Enforce Peace. The sum, not to exceed $10,000, was voted to the executive committee to be expended in cooperation with the LEP. All details were left to the discretion of the executive committee. To further help the LEP, the WPF "obtained permission to reprint an article contributed by Lowell to The Atlantic Monthly for September, and issued it, in the same month, as one of ...(its) serial pamphlets under the

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80 Ibid., 91.

81 Ibid., 92. This is a letter, Charles W. Eliot to E. Cummings, July 15, 1915, entered into the "Minutes."

82 Ibid., 115.
title 'A League to Enforce Peace'." The first edition numbered 30,000 copies. Moreover, the WPF hired speakers from the League and paid for their tours to American colleges. In addition to its direct financial support, the Foundation let its headquarters in Boston be used by the Massachusetts branch of the League to Enforce Peace, and "(all) the correspondence of that branch is handled here at our expense."84

In the interest of a more rigid economy whose benefits the League was certain to enjoy, the WPF threatened to undermine several programs which the Foundation had traditionally supported. The most notable of these was the American School Peace League.85 In a special report, Charles Levermore, the Chief Director and close friend of Lowell, while praising the virtues of the ASPL, suggested that the time had come for it either to seek incorporation and an endowment of its own, or to place itself upon some other existing foundation. Various explanations were offered


85 With the outbreak of the European War the ASPL had become increasingly activist. It cooperated with the women's anti-war march, the Women's Peace Party, and the call for a conference of neutral nations. Furthermore, it became one of the vigorous opponents of preparedness, campaigning against arms spending and military training in the schools. By mid-1916 the ASPL had definitely run afoul of the WPF program. The Survey, XXXIV (April 17, 1915), 59; (June 19, 1915), 262.
for raising the question of ASPL support, including the anomalous and untidy relationship between the two organizations and the revelation that Mr. Ginn at some point had desired terminating the ASPL appropriation. But perhaps the most important consideration was the fact that "the WPF is not informed whether the School Peace League is in accord with the principles of the League to Enforce Peace, to the support of which this Foundation is now committed."\textsuperscript{86}

This was a familiar situation for Mrs. Andrews, who ever since the outbreak of the war had her appropriation periodically called into question.\textsuperscript{87} This was the first time, however, that the withholding threat was based on failure to support the League to Enforce Peace. Levermore had earlier tried to get her endorsement of the LEP and refused to publish any ASPL material which did not reflect such endorsement.\textsuperscript{88} But by the summer of 1916 the threat was accompanied by the statement that all future appropriations should "be considered as specific, and not be regarded as involving any obligation of renewal."\textsuperscript{89} The American


\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.; Fannie Fern Andrews to George A. Plimpton, January 5, 1915, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers.


\textsuperscript{89} "Minutes, 1915-1920," 128, WPF Papers.
Peace Society, to keep itself viable, a contingency which depended on the CEIP subvention, followed the internationalist-legalist line for the duration of the war. Much the same terms were now being put to the American School Peace League vis-a-vis the World Peace Foundation. It was an enactment of the ageless adage, "He, who pays the piper, calls the tune."

Mrs. Andrews, however, refused to become ruffled by the furor. She insisted in maintaining her independence and declined incorporation as a wing of the WPF. She continued her work among the schools, emphasizing its importance in a lengthy letter asking for a continuance of her subvention. But in no way did she bend to accept the subvention on the terms indicated by the Foundation. Eventually, the WPF withdrew its conditions and voted the appropriation.

Mrs. Andrews was not the only one who resisted the LEP and the dominance its supporters exercised over the WPF. A. E. Pillsbury had early expressed his dissatisfaction over the LEP program and eventually resigned. David Starr Jordan was expelled from the WPF for his open disagreement. W. H. P. Faunce, the President of Brown University and WPF

90 Fannie Fern Andrews to George A. Plimpton, November 1, 1916, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers.

trustee, had serious misgivings by the fall of 1916 as the LEP printed the word "enforce" in blood red letters, thus transferring the emphasis from "peace" to "force."92

In summary, by the autumn of 1916 the League to Enforce Peace advertised itself as a society with a post-war plan, emphasizing in its letterhead, "The L.E.P. does not seek to end the present war." The WPF by virtue of its undiluted support had merely become an administrative agency or financial font for the League. Like the APS and CEIP, the WPF, for any practical purpose of opposition to the war, had collapsed.

FIVE

Dissatisfaction with the established peace societies was not long in coming. Criticism at their collapse and do-nothing stance with regard to the war originated from within and without their organizations. It may be noted, however, that those who criticized too vociferously from within soon found themselves among the group attacking from without.

This dissatisfaction found expression in two streams. The first involved the more activist elements within the established societies who in disgust either resigned their memberships or had themselves ousted. They thereupon joined in coalition with others -- largely of a social reform cast -- who agitated for a more positive and firm response to the challenge of war. Accustomed to roles as activists in other reform work, they urged the United States to take the lead in mediation efforts, opposed the 1915-1916 drift to militarism, and lobbied for a referendum on the eve of the United States' declaration of war. Their efforts in the peace movement can be found in Chapters Four, Five, and Six of this study.

The established societies, as we have seen, took a dim view of such activism. But that is no indication that the WPF, the CEIP, and APS enjoyed an unruffled wartime unanimity. Quite the contrary, as far as the League to Enforce Peace is concerned. The CEIP refused to countenance the fundamental platform of the League. This unacceptance generated another source of criticism which, however minor, confirmed what activists had been saying for some time, namely, the established peace movement had collapsed.

Both leaders of the Endowment, Root and Butler, were invited to join the executive committee of the LEP. Both, however, refused. Both men remained unconvinced that the
very existence of a strong league would be the surest deterrent to aggression.\(^93\) Butler in particular rejected the partial triumph of the sanctionists which the LEP represented by challenging the assumption that the first aggressor can always be determined.\(^94\) Writing under the pseudonym, "Cosmos," he further attacked the LEP's reliance on the automatic application of force rather than the rule of law. Moreover, he felt that the progress achieved by The Hague Conferences was being scrapped.\(^95\)

James Brown Scott, agreeing with Butler, summed up the feeling of international lawyers who found the LEP unacceptable because 1) it would reorganize the world on political and not judicial lines, and 2) it would also compromise the non-entanglement position of the United States and its national freedom of action.\(^96\) In short, not having been based on law in the first instance, the LEP could only be considered "idealistic" and foredoomed to failure. The international lawyers preferred the World's

\(^{93}\) Bartlett, *League to Enforce Peace*, 43-44.


\(^{95}\) Ibid., passim, 69-95; Kuehl, *Seeking World Order*, 207-208.

Court League formed at a convention in Cleveland, May 12-14, 1915 and dedicated to the program of judicially organized world.

Reduced to the spectacle of fighting among themselves about issues which would assume importance as a basis for world peace sometime in the future, the established societies disintegrated into separate interest groups. The optimism of the pre-war coalitions of lawyers, judicialists, federationists, generalists, and others had in terms of immediate war issues been replaced by a "wait and see" attitude. None of the internationalists and those others who had assumed control of the American peace movement felt that anything could be done about the war. Thus the structure which most pacifists had supported through all the variations of opinion proved barren in time of crisis. None would act. The LEP, the one group which took a positive step to organize after the conflict through a system of sanctions, could not afford shelter to those pacifists who rejected the employment of an enforcing agent. They turned to newer groups.
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Volume II
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JAMES PARKER MARTIN

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CHAPTER IV
MEDIATION

Dissatisfaction with the performance of the established peace societies did not arise overnight, and it did not affect every section of the country with equal intensity. It characterized different people in a variety of ways. If there was any consistency to the dissatisfaction, it could be simply stated that it increased from the late autumn of 1914 to the spring of 1917. The dissatisfaction with the established peace societies did not become a self-satisfying goal in itself. Nor did the outrage at the outbreak of the European war by those individuals and groups, more sensitive than others perhaps to human suffering, end in perpetual rhetoric. The dissatisfaction and outrage were creative and gave a stern impetus to actively seek out a solution to the war. Not content merely to lament and complain about the non-performance of others, they possessed a commitment to action, a predisposition which led them to become dissatisfied in the first instance. How they attempted to implement that commitment and fill the void created by the established peace organizations' passivity is the subject of the remainder of this study.

ONE

Leading voices of dissatisfaction from within the established peace societies came from Louis P. Lochner and
David Starr Jordan. Lochner, the secretary of the APS branch in Chicago, was virtually forced to resign. Jordan freely criticized all three societies, particularly the CEIP and his own WPF from whose board of directors he was eventually removed. Within a few months after the war's outbreak, Lochner perceived that the American Peace Society was not doing all it could to try to end the conflict. He began to comment on the slowdown within the APS and the lukewarmness of the executive committee.\footnote{1} To compensate for the lack of activity or meaningful instruction, Lochner set about reorganizing the APS in the Midwest.\footnote{2} He began to promote the movement for mediation and was instrumental in organizing the National Peace Conference in Chicago.

Appeals to the Carnegie Endowment for financial assistance were refused. Moreover, in accordance with its "wait and see" attitude, the Endowment took an increasingly dim view of such activism.\footnote{3} It strongly urged a prescription of caution upon the American Peace Society, which in the words of

\footnote{1} Louis P. Lochner to Benjamin F. Trueblood, November 16, 1914, American Peace Society Papers.

\footnote{2} Jenkin Lloyd Jones to Jordan, January 22, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence; Advocate of Peace, LXXVII (March, 1915), 68-9.

\footnote{3} Scott to Jane Addams, December 31, 1914, Woman's Peace Party Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; Lochner to Butler, January 4, 1915, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers.
of James Brown Scott was to "withdraw within itself...during the present war, to consider carefully what can best be done in the future..."\(^4\)

Exasperated by the repeated examples of conservatism and indifference, Lochner lost patience and attacked the Endowment in a November interview with the Detroit News. He called the CEIP "one of the pitiable and deplorable facts of the peace movement in America." He attacked Scott as one "inoculated with the virus of inertia."\(^5\)

Lochner's independence and impatience earned him a stern reprimand from A. D. Call, the APS executive director, who found his public condemnation of the Carnegie Endowment to be "subversive."\(^6\) Within the week, Lochner resigned, citing 1) that in the mind of the executive committee "my activities in the peace cause were harmful to the American Peace Society, and that the programs for action which I advocate are utterly absurd and impossible," and, 2) "I have no intention whatever of being a hindrance to the American Peace Society, especially not if its policy is to be --

\(^4\) Advocate of Peace, LXXVII (November, 1915), 239-41. This is a reproduction of the letter, Scott to Call, June 16, 1915.

\(^5\) Detroit News, November 20, 1915, 1:1, 2:4, 5.

\(^6\) Call to Lochner, November 22, 1915, Louis P. Lochner Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
broadly speaking -- that outlined by Doctor James Brown Scott." 7 By this time, however, Lochner was totally involved in the Ford Peace Ship project and the effort to win President Wilson's support for mediation.

Lochner's assessment of the Endowment was echoed in other quarters. Richard Bartholdt, the former Missouri Congressman stated, "I do honestly believe that the cause of peace has been retarded rather than helped by Mr. Carnegie's millions. ...(A)s to those who administer the trust, the less said the better! ...(N)ot a word of protest is uttered by the Carnegie people either against the unholy traffic in arms or against the preparedness craze." 8 Jordan had traditionally supported Lochner, calling him "one of the best of all our bunch," and once again endorsed his criticism. 9 In a confidential letter to Henry S. Pritchett, one of Carnegie's closest advisors in the founding of the CEIP, he indicted the Endowment for its cowardice and incompetence and found it an obstruction rather than a help in the cause. 10 Benjamin F. Trueblood, laboring under the burden of ill-

7 Lochner to Call, November 28, 1915, Lochner Papers.
8 Bartholdt to Lochner, November 24, 1915, Lochner Papers.
9 Jordan to John Mez, February 18, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
10 Jordan to Henry S. Pritchett, November 23, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
health, found the strength to lament the do-nothing stance of the APS.\textsuperscript{11}

Dominated by its need for funds, as explained earlier, the APS did little to establish an independent identity. When the expected quickening of Dean Kirchwey's appointment as president fell short, dissatisfaction was expressed from deep within the APS. "(H)ow does it happen that you are not attending any of our Executive Committee meetings?", Call inquired of W. I. Hull late in 1916.\textsuperscript{12} Hull's reply provides an excellent critique of the APS position:

\textit{...(I)n these critical times, no society can merely stand for a programme: it must be engaged in the liveliest kind of activities. Now, frankly, the fine old Society has been regarded by most Americans in recent months as either moribund or quiescent.}\textsuperscript{13}

Dissatisfaction was not limited to the Carnegie Endowment and the American Peace Society. The growing conservatism of the World Peace Foundation was both duly marked and commented upon. Complaints within the Foundation

\textsuperscript{11} John Mez to D. S. Jordan, December 9, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{12} Call to Hull, December 9, 1916, American Peace Society Papers.

\textsuperscript{13} Hull to Call, December 18, 1916, APS Papers. For other comments on the split within the APS, cf. Mez to Andrews, January 30, 1916, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers.
involved the difficulty of having anything done which was not directly related to the WPF support of the LEP.\textsuperscript{14} Jordan continued to receive letters of disgruntled members within the WPF, commenting upon its "reactionary attitude"\textsuperscript{15} or idleness since it "could not agree on any helpful work."\textsuperscript{16}

In a succession of letters to his wife, Jordan lamented the "stuck in the mud" attitude of the WPF and the need to undertake the whole organization from the beginning.\textsuperscript{17} He bluntly summarized his feelings on the established societies on the eve of United States intervention in the war, "...(T)he War Hawks have confiscated the WPF and the Carnegie Endowment... The drivelling (American) Peace Society has gone out of commission."\textsuperscript{18}

Criticism originated not only from within the established societies or from those associated with them but also from interested individuals with no direct connections.

\textsuperscript{14} Andrews to Mez, December 7, 1915, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers.

\textsuperscript{15} Samuel Dutton to Jordan, December 13, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{16} Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 18, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{17} Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 30, 1914, October 26, 28, 1915, November 6, 18, 1916, all in Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{18} Jordan to Jessie Jordan, April 1, 1917, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
The Reverend Charles Francis Dole found the peace societies to "have all been at sea and without knowing which way to steer." His criticism was even more direct in his memoirs,

What were the Peace Societies and Foundations doing in this critical period? As usual, they were least helpful when needed most. Their directors perhaps aimed at peace a long way off, but not nearby. They were opposed to war, but not to this war. How could they hold back impending war while they stood half-prepared to accept it, and to retire from peace activities when war should be declared?

The sharpest attack upon the established societies came from Oswald Garrison Villard, who along with his mother, Frances Villard, resigned in protest from the New York Peace Society. Villard claimed that the peace movement was a moral movement which would not thrive in an atmosphere of half-heartedness. Ridiculing the fearfulness of the peace organization, he charged the CEIP as the prime example of moral cowardice.

Take the Carnegie Peace Foundation. Its income is $639,000 during the current year. It might as well have had nothing. Read its latest year book -- not one thrilling or stirring word, not one reference to the moral iniquity of what is going on, not one single evidence of a profound passion for peace... A thousand studies on

19 Charles Francis Dole to Jordan, July 7, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

international law, a thousand inquiries as to the history of the war, a thousand banquets to visiting foreigners, will not stir a single soul to rise in protest at any cost.

He found the Endowment without moral inspiration. He was, however, not surprised, for when Carnegie entrusted the CEIP to such men as Elihu Root, Joseph H. Choate, Robert Bacon, and Charles W. Eliot, "he largely destined it to ineffectiveness." These men, Villard charged, were "not the stuff of which reformers are made. ...It is only the extremist and fanatic who make a cause successful." 21

By attacking the inactivity of the established peace societies, Lochner and Jordan, Dole and Villard were exposing the paralysis of the organized peace movement. Theirs, however, was not a sterile criticism. Their dissatisfaction was not to remain static, but led to the formation of new coalitions in an effort to stop the war -- an activism which was thought to be the proper course for any organization dedicated to peace.

This dissatisfaction with the performance of the established peace societies was soon to be voiced by many as they called for a new order to arise upon the collapse of the old. Paul Kellogg was such an individual. For years he had given direction and encouragement to the movement for social justice as editor of The Survey, the leading publication for social workers. He now called upon Jane Addams, possibly the best known woman of her day and certainly the most outstanding social worker, to record her reactions to the war in a series of editorials which would at the same time urge a plan for joint action by social workers and peace advocates.  

Kellogg found fault not only with the existing peace organizations but with the extremely negative attitude

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22 Paul Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 11, 1914, Jane Addams Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
toward the war adopted by the Wilson administration. Kellogg was convinced in light of President Wilson's inadequate policy that Americans ought to express themselves affirmatively. Among his suggestions for a positive response was a call for a meeting of outstanding Americans who would issue a message to the Old World -- a message of democracy "to challenge... dynasties, armaments, and commercialism." This meeting, like Lincoln at Gettysburg, would proclaim a conception of liberty and self-government which might become the foundation of international relations.

This was the project that Kellogg early in September asked Jane Addams to initiate editorially, suggesting that her home city, Chicago, become the headquarters of a strategy board made up of both men and women. Within a

23 President Wilson adopted a traditional United States position regarding the Old World -- neutrality. On August 18, 1914, he made his appeal for impartiality in the conflict, resting his policy on the unique place and mission of America in the world: "America should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a Nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action...fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world." Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodds, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, III, 158-159.

24 Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 11, 1914, Jane Addams Papers.

25 Ibid.
few days after making the proposal, Kellogg was suggesting that a meeting take place on September 29 at Lillian Wald's Henry Street Settlement in New York City. This location would form an ideal "old time retreat," where interruptions would be few. Out of the meeting might come "a fairly clearly formulated plan of action." At least those in attendance might find "their own ideas clarified by brushing against those of others." Kellogg felt that only five or ten people should be at the meeting. Each of these, however, should be an American prominent enough to evoke an effective response to an appeal for a national conference in three weeks' time. Kellogg, revealing the pervasiveness of the progressive attitude which ranked elitism as the gauge of efficiency, stressed to Miss Addams the importance of getting "name" people to attend the preliminary meeting. He was sure that a letter from her to a distinguished American would be more effective than a letter from him, however well-written.26 But distinction was not

26 Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 15, 1916, Jane Addams Papers. Miss Addams' reputation as a peace advocate was based on her book, Newer Ideals of Peace, Chautauqua, New York, The Chautauqua Press, 1907. Miss Addams believed that the work for social justice was a moral equivalent to war. By extension of the suffrage to women, she argued, women could accelerate the pace at which social justice would be achieved. Since reform was a method of displacing war, women's rights were essential in eliminating the war spirit. Cf., 107 and 110.
to be the only criterion for selection. The group must also be young in spirit.  

This meeting was the first instance among many of individuals acting on their own rather than with the established peace societies. Dr. Edward Devine, Kellogg's assistant at The Survey, recommended that "the more obvious peace people (should) not be included." He was suspicious of their conservatism, feeling that they were committed to an outmoded, long-standing program which clearly would make their contribution less valuable than that of those who had an open mind.

Devine's attitude was shared by many other social workers. They held the same opinion that the policy of the

27 For this meeting Kellogg suggested specific individuals: Rabbi Stephen Wise, Edward Devine, Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, Dr. Eliot, William Kent, Charles R. Crane, Colonel T. Roosevelt, Thomas A. Edison. Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 15, 1914, Jane Addams Papers. This list was later expanded to twenty-six by Lillian Wald, the large number obviously allowing for the possibility that not all would be able to attend. Those invited were: Professor Felix Adler, Miss Emily Balch, Mr. Ernest P. Bicknell, Mr. Louis Brandeis, Mr. Charles R. Crane, Dr. Edward T. Devine, Mr. Thomas A. Edison, President Eliot, Mr. John Gavit, President Coolidge, Rcv. John Haynes Holmes, Mr. Mornay Williams, Mr. Hamilton Holt, Mr. William Dean Howells, Mrs. Florence Kelley, Mr. Paul U. Kellogg, Congressman William Kent, Dean Kirchwey, Miss Julia Lathrop, Dr. Samuel McCune Lindsay, Mr. Owen B. Lovejoy, Judge Julian Mack, Professor Graham Taylor, Provident Van Hickle, and Rev. Stephen S. Wise. Lillian Wald to William Howells, September 22, 1914, Jane Addams Papers.

28 Kellogg to Jane Addams, September 15, Jane Addams Papers.
administration did not go far enough; that it must be more positive; that certain things in Germany and the German civilization should be preserved even if the Germans were completely beaten. The theme of admiration for notable German reforms would be frequently asserted by American social workers who felt that the conflict was setting back the cause of reform in all the warring countries. To people who had been active in various reform movements there was a special feeling of outrage at the waste of war, not only the waste of lives and material resources, but also the waste of social progress. Jane Addams caught this feeling in a conversation with a woman social worker during the summer of 1915. This woman had labored for years in one of the belligerent countries on the problems of delinquent children. She had said:

Gradually through the months, when always more of the people's food supply and constantly more men were taken by the government for its military purposes, when I saw the state institutions for defectives closed, the schools abridged or dismissed, women and children put to work in factories under hours and conditions which had been legally prohibited years before, when the very governmental officials who had been so concerned for the welfare of the helpless were bent only upon the destruction of the enemy at whatever cost to their fellow-citizens, the State itself gradually became for me an alien and hostile thing.

29 Ibid.; Wald to Howells, September 22, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.

American social workers were quick to react. Miss Addams herself cited one of the war's dire effects in a Harper's Weekly editorial: "Measures inaugurated for the prevention of infant mortality were slowly spreading from one country to another. All that effort has been scattered to the winds by the war... This war is destroying the home unit in the most civilized countries of the world to an extent which is not less than appalling."\textsuperscript{31} She felt that a long twilight was about to fall upon the entire field in which social workers had been making headway on a worldwide scale. Lillian Wald shared the same feeling, "War is the doom of all that it has taken years of peace to build up."\textsuperscript{32} Among others, John Haynes Holmes, a liberal New York clergyman, also felt that the war threatened the end of the social movement:

We are three thousand miles away from the smoke and flame of combat and have not a single regiment or battleship involved. And yet who in these United States is thinking at this moment of recreation centers, improved housing or the minimum wage? Who is going to fight the battle of widows' pensions, push the campaign against child labor or study exhaustively the problem of unemployment?\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Harper's Weekly, September 22, 1914.

\textsuperscript{32} Robert L. Duffus, Lillian Wald, New York, 1938, 148.

\textsuperscript{33} "War and the Social Movement," The Survey, XXXII (September 26, 1914), 630.
But in the same article, Rev. Holmes indicated what the course for the social worker should be now. He took it upon himself to set the mood on the eve of the Henry Street meeting with a stirring appeal that social reformers make the end of the war their most immediate crusade: "From this moment on, every lover of civilization and servant of human kind -- the social worker first among them all -- must be a peace fanatic. He must seek for nothing before this, care for nothing above this, strive for everything through this." Even after the war he held little hope for social progress since attention would be devoted to social survival: "feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, cleaning the streets of debris." Because in Holmes' view "not for generations will the world's life again be normal," the war must be stopped in the shortest possible time, and attention returned to domestic priorities once again, priorities not only for the United States, but for the world community -- priorities which the war was threatening to devastate for generations to come. Holmes emphasized the urgency of immediate direct action for the social worker:

He must fight war as Cato fought Carthage, as Voltaire fought L'infame (sic), as Garrison fought slavery. Nor must he be content to urge this fight in the dilettante, academic pink-tea, high-brow way too much practiced hitherto by the organized peace movement. He must join forces, without apology or reserve with Labor, and strike straight and sure not
so much at war, as at the things which make war -- first, militarism, second, political autocracy, and third, commercialism. The axe must be laid at the roots of the tree -- which are armaments, dynasties, and exploitation.34

The guests met on September 29, 1914 for luncheon, remained in discussion through the afternoon, and reassembled for dinner. Though not a member of the group, George Nasmyth in the role of expert on the peace movement was invited by Kellogg to set before the round table some of the definite accomplishments and practical proposals of those already active in the cause of peace. Kellogg had provided a list of subjects for Nasmyth to comment upon. This list in embryonic form outlined the future directions, demands, and purposes of the new pacifist groups formed during 1914-1917:

1) Steps taken and proposed for retirement of international disputes.

2) Charting of the brakes of war: prohibition of the private manufacture of arms, prohibition of secret treaties, and the requirement of a full vote of the people, a referendum, as a prerequisite of war.

3) Steps taken to lessen the barbarities and sufferings incident to war: prohibition of dumb-dum bullets and concern that social insurance

34 Ibid.
funds, especially in Germany, not be scuttled by war.

4) Steps on a colonial policy which would commend itself to civilization and not be used for further commercial exploitation.

5) Social reaction to war and the spread of military toys. 35

Kellogg was not sure what would come out of the meeting. At the very least, it would be "merely a clarifying of a few peoples' minds; possibly some presentation or message to the public; possibly some larger deliberate national meeting." He did clearly reveal in his concern over the war the leading characteristics of those who struggled for social justice: the conviction that one cannot be neutral in the face of human suffering, that one must be optimistic, and that reasonable efforts can evoke change. Nasmyth was invited to bring along any documents he felt pertinent to the discussion and to accept the Henry Street meeting as "a group friendly to the peace movement." 36

35 Kellogg to Nasmyth, September 24, 1914, Jane Addams Papers.

36 Ibid.
As for the meeting itself, beyond proposing a few principles denouncing war and agreeing to serve as a nucleus around which anti-war sentiment might unite, the members of the group could not decide on any specific course of action. Rather than recommend a definite program, the social workers were content to listen as Jane Addams made a preliminary statement summarizing the feeling of those members who were at the meeting and were inspired by the discussions there. She framed her statement within a context of social work depicting the great harm that would befall humanitarian causes as a result of the war. On the day after the meeting, she was quoted in an interview as saying: "All the social gains of the past would experience a setback, and the cause of the social worker must languish for years... All organized social welfare activities are put back for years... We have to work up public opinion anew..." 37

37 Miss Addams commented further on the human loss which would accompany the war: "When a million men are suffering in trenches wet and cold and wounded, what are a few children suffering under hard conditions in factories. Take old age pensions, upon which England, France and Germany have been working. With widows and fatherless children numbered by the thousands in each of those countries, what are a few old people more or less? It will be years before these things are taken up again... Infant mortality is one of the things which we are just beginning to deal with. We are trying to learn why such numbers of little children under two years of age die. In Germany, the nation's statemanship was challenged in the Reichstag because, out of approximately 2,000,000 children annually born in that country, some 500,000 or one-fourth, die. But what are half a million children in comparison with such a slaughter -- the hideous, wholesale slaughter of thousands of men a day?" New York Evening Post, September 30, 1914, "As Jane Addams Sees the War," Jane Addams Papers.
A broader statement containing the feelings and conclusions of the Henry Street group was published as an article, "Towards a Peace that Shall Last." Once again the humanitarian viewpoint was emphasized: the war had brought blights, injuries, wrongs, and other sufferings to the European nations, yet eight million natives of those same warring countries were able to live at peace in the United States.\footnote{38}

By these two statements, Jane Addams imprinted the new peace movement with the social reform stamp. She and others among the new peace organizations reflected the progressive feature of reform: confidence in the moral force of public opinion. "We believed in those days that if we could only get our position properly before the public, we would find overwhelming response."\footnote{39}

The new peace organizations, therefore, emerged as an extension of the social justice movement, adopted much of the ideology of that movement, absorbed much of its fervor, and employed many of the same techniques that had

\footnote{38} \textit{The Survey}, XXXIII (February 27, 1915), part 2. This article was printed and bound in such a manner that it could be detached from the body of the magazine and could circulate as a separate pamphlet.

\footnote{39} Jane Addams, \textit{The Second Twenty Years}, New York, Macmillan, 1930, 37.
resulted in the substantial and sometimes spectacular accomplishments of the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{40} In short, the fight against the war was an emergency extension of the fight for women's rights, for workingmen's benefits, and against child labor. Only by preventing setbacks caused by the war could the present social gains be maintained.

Sparked by the enthusiasm of this first meeting, and doubtlessly by the several others that followed, the gathering known originally as the Henry Street Group, adopted for a time the title of Anti-Preparedness Committee (APC), and then in April, 1916, became the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM).\textsuperscript{41} Other anti-militarist groups also arose, influenced, however remotely, by the first

\textsuperscript{40} One of the more outstanding techniques employed by settlement workers was the use of the exhibit. Cf. Allen F. Davis, \textit{Spearheads for Reforms}, Oxford University Press, 1967, 71-72. The new peace advocates used the exhibit to display the evil effects of militarism and horrors of war.

\textsuperscript{41} The fact that out of these Henry Street meetings evolved the AUAM has been widely advertised, helped, doubtlessly, by the prominence of the ACLU, originally a committee within the AUAM but which under the inspiration of Roger Baldwin developed its own identity as a separate unit. Cf. Davis, \textit{Spearheads for Reform}; Donald Johnson, \textit{The Challenge of American Freedoms}. Other pacifist organizations which were inspired by this early meeting at the Nurses' Settlement have remained less known -- partly because of their lack of success in achieving their declared ends, partly because they were unable to convert their energies to other causes once the United States intervened in the war.
Henry Street meeting: American League for the Limitation of Armaments (ALLA) and the Association to Abolish War (ATAW). Some organizations inspired by this meeting directed their efforts toward shortening the war by mediation. The Woman's Peace Party (WPP) and the Chicago Emergency Federation of Peace Forces offered the leadership in this effort to achieve a negotiated end to the war. Their founding was largely the result of the impact of the early months of the war upon women.

THREE

Rosika Schwimmer, a Hungarian journalist and suffrage worker, had begun organizing anti-war sentiment almost as soon as the conflict broke out. She circulated a petition calling for neutral mediation under the leadership of President Wilson. Armed with that petition, full of several hundred thousand signatures of women from thirteen belligerent and neutral nations in the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, she arrived in the United States on September 6, 1914. Carrie Chapman Catt, an officer of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, arranged an interview for Mrs. Schwimmer with President Wilson and both met with him for twenty minutes on September 18. Wilson, however, was noncommittal. Having done as much as she could in Washington, Mrs. Schwimmer set out on a speaking
tour to enlist the support of American women in a worldwide protest against the war, and to demand the vote so that they could make their protests more effective. 42

Late in October, Mrs. Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, a suffrage worker from Great Britain, came to the United States to urge a special women's protest against the war. She indicated the failure of governments run by men to preserve the peace. Extolling women as the "natural custodians of the human race" and "the bedrock of humanity," she predicated women's suffrage and full citizenship as the essential ingredient for world peace. 43

The wide publicity given Rosika Schwimmer and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence impressed Mrs. Catt who responded with a call to found a new organization -- one that would bring new adherents to the suffrage movement by linking equal suffrage with the woman's fundamental interest in pacifism. Mrs. Catt, however, felt that she needed an American ally,


43 Mrs. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence, "Motherhood and War," Harper's Weekly, XIX (December 5, 1914), 542.
one who had been prominent in the peace movement and at the same time commanded recognition in the movement generally across the nation. Such an ally was none other than Jane Addams, who had already earned her reputation as a peace advocate, particularly as one who stressed the important relationship between women's rights and world peace. Miss Addams agreed to unite with Mrs. Catt in calling together a number of women's organizations to meet in Washington, D. C. on January 10, 1915 to consider the formation of a National Peace Committee of Women. In effect, recognition was being given to the prominent place women had held in the work for international harmony. Echoing the charges of Mrs. Schwimmer and Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, Miss Addams' and Mrs. Catt's appeal was based on the revolutionary belief that, whereas all previous pacifist organizations had been under the control of men and wars still had not ceased, perhaps the time was ripe for women to combine their separate efforts for peace into one great organization which would

44 Farrell, Beloved Lady, 146.
exert a more telling impact. The Woman's Peace Party was
to be the first effort by women acting in a body for sepa-
rate action on the question of peace.

Accordingly, on the afternoon of January 10, 1915,
in the Grand Ballroom of the New Willard Hotel in Wash-
ington, D. C., three thousand women gathered to consider the
war and found the Woman's Peace Party (WPP). Mrs. Anna
Garlin Spencer set the tone of the meeting in her opening
comments:

Therefore, as the mother half of humanity, we
demand that our right to be considered in the
settlement of questions concerning not alone
the life of individuals but of nations be
recognized and respected.

We demand that women be given a share in deci-
ding between war and peace in all the courts of
high debate; within the home, the school, the
church, the industrial order, and the state.46

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45 Women's involvement in peace movement had a long his-
tory. In 1914 women were a large part of the member-
ship of the established peace societies. Certain women
had even risen to positions of importance within those
societies, e.g. Belva Lockwood in the Universal Peace
Union, Lucia Ames Mead in the American Peace Society,
and Fannie Fern Andrews of the American School Peace
League. In addition, certain women's organizations
boasted large enrollments: Federation of Women's Clubs
- 800,000 members; Council on Mothers - 100,000 members;
WCTU - 325,000 members. All these groups professed paci-
fism and it was hoped that a groundswell of opinion
against the war organized into an adequate program
would help bring the conflict to a quick end. Cf.,
Marie Louis Degen, The History of the Women's Peace
Party, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1939, 14-16.

46 The meeting is described in The Survey, XXXIII (January
23, 1915), 433-34.
The program called for the abolition of all war, aggressive as well as defensive hostilities. Among the platform planks was a call for a convention of neutral nations to arrange an immediate armistice in the interest of an early peace.\(^47\) This plank was essentially the peace plan of Rosika Schwimmer and featured the uniting of neutral nations in the insistent demand to all belligerent powers to call an immediate armistice until a just settlement was reached.

The WPP was most proud of its proposal -- a proposal initiated by women -- for immediate action to mediate the conflict, while those proposals by men had urged no action until the end of the war.\(^48\) Had earlier action toward mediation been taken, Turkey and Italy could perhaps have been prevented from entering into hostilities. The WPP wanted to make a lie out of the objection that "Nothing can be done until the war is fought to a finish."\(^49\)

\(^{47}\) All planks related to the war directly except for woman suffrage, which though relating indirectly, was regarded by the delegates as a prerequisite for permanent peace.

\(^{48}\) In the final session, Mrs. Catt touched on the disillusionment of women with the established pacifists: "... When the great war came, and the women waited for the pacifists to move, and they heard nothing from them, they decided all too late to get together themselves and to try to do something at this eleventh hour." Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party, 51.

\(^{49}\) Lochner to Wales, April 15, 1915, Julia Grace Wales Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
During the first year, the most immediate importance was attached to those steps undertaken by the WPP to secure the cessation of hostilities. To gain favorable notice for their program, the WPP decided to present its platform to all the embassies in Washington, to form a legislative committee to lobby for bills and resolutions in Congress, and to support the Crosser bill.\(^{50}\) Crucial to any success which the WPP hoped to enjoy was the ability of the party to influence public opinion. To further this end mass meetings were held throughout the country to discuss the program of a conference of neutral nations insisting that the belligerents take steps to have the conflict mediated. The party attempted to work with the press and artists to create favorable publicity. Its initial propaganda activities called for the setting of the poem "Five Souls" to music, and the production of Euripides' "Trojan Women" to arouse the nation to the horror of war.\(^{51}\)

The first ambitious step toward mediation was the attempt to federate all national organizations favoring peace. Without the federation of all peace groups, there was little chance of fulfillment. Accordingly, after open-

\(^{50}\) The Crosser bill called for government manufacture of military and navy equipment. It forbade the export of privately produced munitions of war.

\(^{51}\) *The Survey*, XXXII (January 23, 1915), 434.
ing its headquarters in Chicago on January 19, 1915 with Jane Addams as National Chairman, the WPP, working along with the Chicago Emergency Federation of Peace Forces, communicated with every public organization in the United States whose constitution contained a recognition of the desirability of international peace. The result of these efforts was the National Peace Conference of February 27 and 28.

The call for a National Peace Conference to be held in Chicago had been issued on January 17 by the Emergency Federation of Peace Forces. This group represented a great achievement for Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, who persuaded Jane Addams and Louis Lochner to lend their aid and advice in an organized effort to bring pressure upon the governments of the world to halt the war. The general object of the federation was to organize all peace, civic, labor, religious, social, and scientific groups into adopting a minimum program for constructive peace, so that an intelligent public opinion could direct the terms of settlement of the war with a view to insuring permanent peace. Lochner expressed the "hope that this national conference

52 Degen, History of Woman's Peace Party, 57.
may be truly representative of the best thought in America, and that the platform then adopted may stand as the expression of the unofficial mind of America on the issues of the present world war."54 Meanwhile, the base of that platform and the impetus for the future thrust of mediation was being formed just 140 miles to the north in Madison, Wisconsin.

To Julia Grace Wales, a Canadian-born instructor of English at the University of Wisconsin, war seemed a denial of all Christian principles. She frequently spoke of "the horrors of the war which sickened her physically," and, yet like Jane Addams, she referred to "the currents of hidden energy that need in some way to be liberated, combined and made active."55 Miss Wales determined to find "some possible exit from the entanglement in which she felt the world had been unwittingly plunged."56

Was it not possible, Miss Wales increasingly wondered, that the nations now at war had been paralyzed by a

54 Lochner to Jennie Beckley, February 1, 1915, Louis Lochner Papers.
55 Julia Grace Wales to Dr. Graham Taylor, September 14, 1914, Wales Papers.
conventional mode of thinking and were mistaken in suppos-
ing that they were helpless in the face of calamity which
they had brought upon themselves? Might there not be some
human and simple solution to the difficulty if we could
sufficiently think out the problems. Sometime during the
university's 1914 Christmas recess, Miss Wales wrote the
first draft of her plan -- a proposal whose idea was em-
bodied in the title "Continuous Mediation Without Armistice."

In essence, Miss Wales' plan as it was finally
evolved urged that the United States call a conference to
which each of the then thirty-five neutral nations of the
world would send delegates. The conference would mediate
-- hopefully during an armistice -- but in such a way as
not to endanger the neutrality of any nation. It would
constitute a center of continuous mediation, the members of
which were to have a scientific rather than a diplomatic
function, that is, the members were present as an inter-
national commission of scholars. Cast in the role of
expert advisers, they might originate, receive, and
circulate peace proposals, but they were to be without the
power to commit their respective governments. Miss Wales'
plan called for an application of the progressive
"Wisconsin Idea" -- the alliance of scholar-politician for
reform -- to the area of international relations.57

57 Julia Grace Wales, Continuous Mediation Without Armis-
tice, Madison, 1915.
Thus Miss Wales' plan, as she conceived it, was not in itself an actual plan for peace, since it lacked any specific indication of the precise areas to be mediated, such as indemnification, boundary disputes, or colonial settlements. Rather it was a proposal for the creation of machinery whereby thoughtful proposals could be formulated and them communicated to all the belligerents. Each proposal would be based on two principles: that peace must not mean humiliation to any nation, and that it must not involve compromise which might later result in a renewal of the war. Such a conference would exert every possible effort to prevent any of the neutral nations from being drawn into the conflict.

Miss Wales presented her plan to the Wisconsin Peace Society. The society not only adopted it, but took upon itself the printing and circulation of the plan, sending copies to various influential figures prominent both in public and private life. From early 1915, Continuous Mediation Without Armistice was known as "The Wisconsin Plan." David Starr Jordan, after having read a copy of the pamphlet wrote, "It seems to me the most forceful and practical thing I have yet seen." On the next day he again declared, "Among the many documents, averaging several a day, suggesting plans of disposing of the war, I don't know of anything better than this essay..." Jordan was so enthusiastic that he suggested that the Wisconsin Plan be
presented in Chicago at the end of February and asked Lochner to secure a copy of the pamphlet for himself.\textsuperscript{58}

Both Lochner and Jane Addams took to the Wisconsin Plan warmly and worked in its behalf throughout the war. Julia Grace Wales preferred not to let it be known that she was the plan's creator, offering among other reasons the explanation that her ideas would receive more careful consideration if they were believed to have originated with a man.

As the three hundred guests gathered in the LaSalle Hotel for the February 27-28 conference, Lochner, with the intent of striking at "the first meeting a constructive note that will keep the rest of the meetings on a high level," arranged to have the Wisconsin Plan put on the program for the first session.\textsuperscript{59} The plan won instant acclaim, was unanimously approved, and embodied in the platform of the conference. The members were particularly impressed by the immediate advantages of the plan which from the

\textsuperscript{58} David Starr Jordan to John K. Bonnell, February 16, and 17, 1915; night letter, Jordan to Bonnell, February 18, 1915, Wales Papers.

\textsuperscript{59} Lochner to Louise Phelps Kellogg, February 25, 1915, Wales Papers. A Colonel Anderson was originally to have presented the plan to the delegates but the actual presentation was made by the United States District Attorney John A. Aylward of Madison.
point of view of the neutral nations were 1) that it avoided the necessity of securing an armistice or the permission of the warring powers to mediate; 2) that it avoided the necessity of passing judgment on the past; 3) that it endangered no one's neutrality; 4) that it gave an opportunity to ascertain the attitude of the belligerents by an appeal to the future; 5) that it promulgated a radical plan free from the evils resulting from compromise -- a plan which, if it could shorten the present war, would tend to prevent similar wars in the future. The conference felt that "the minimum gain would be the lifting of the program of pacifism into the realm of serious political consideration." 60

In addition to the Wisconsin Plan, the National Peace Conference urged a discussion on the following principles which in the months to follow formed the backbone of the pacifist ideology. First, foreign policy should be aimed not at a balance of power, but at the establishment of a concert of nations with an international court to settle disputes, an international congress with legislative and administrative powers over international affairs to replace the present secret diplomacy, an international police force, and economic sanction to enforce international

60 Continuous Mediation Without Armistice, 1915, passim.
obligations; secondly, there should be a gradual reduction and final abolition of armaments; and thirdly, the manufacture of armaments for private profit should be prohibited. 61

Acceptance of the Wisconsin Plan resulted in a resolution being adopted by the National Peace Conference: "We ... urge that the government of the United States immediately call a conference of the neutral nations of the world." A copy of the platform was sent to President Wilson and a delegation was appointed to carry the resolution to him and to the Congress of the United States. 62

President Wilson refused to meet with the delegation, explaining in a letter to Jane Addams that because he had received more such requests than he could comply with he had decided to see no delegations at that time. 63 Miss Wales' reaction to the President's refusal is characteristic of the optimism among those peace advocates who shared the struggle,


62 New York Times, March 1, 1915. The delegation appointed to carry the resolution to the President and Congress was composed of Miss Jane Addams of Illinois, Mr. John A. Aylward of Wisconsin, Mr. Morris Hillquit of New York, Dr. George W. Nasmyth of Massachusetts, and Miss Jane Thomson of Missouri.

63 Woodrow Wilson to Jane Addams, March 8, 1916, Jane Addams Papers; Lochner to Wales, March 11, 1915, Wales Papers.
I think we need not be depressed by the fact that we have not obtained an audience with the President as yet. The thing to be desired is that the President be induced to think about our plan. The very fact that he has been obliged to refuse so powerful a delegation may bring the matter as fully to his attention as a brief formal interview would do. Let us use every effort to bring our arguments indirectly to his notice.  

Despite the initial setback, advocates of the Wisconsin Plan gained a steady stream of support. Hamilton Holt wrote several editorials in his Independent, attempting to popularize the plan. Numerous press notices were secured, as well as favorable resolutions in state legislatures. Miss Wales received many letters of encouragement and congratulations, all taking an optimistic view of the plan's future. Nasmyth mentioned the possibility of reprinting the pamphlet as an issue in the WPF pamphlet series. Active support for mediation, however, was not, as noted below, to be found in the established peace societies, but came almost exclusively from the Woman's Peace Party.

64 Wales to Lochner, March 17, 1915, Wales Papers.

65 Hamilton Holt to Julia Grace Wales, March 6, 1915, Wales Papers.

66 George Nasmyth to Louise Phelps Kellogg, April 23, 1915, Wales Papers.
While Jane Addams was presiding at the National Peace Conference, she received an invitation to an international peace congress of women from both neutral and belligerent countries. The invitation was signed by Dr. Aletta Jacobs of the Netherlands, a leader in the international suffrage movement. Because the biennial suffrage meeting to be held in Berlin in 1915 had been canceled, Dr. Jacobs proposed a peace meeting, "The International Congress of Women." Jane Addams was asked to chair the session at The Hague. Both she and Mrs. Fannie Fern Andrews were asked to be the two American members of the executive committee of the congress. Jane Addams, inviting Miss Wales to attend the congress, wrote, "It might be the one opportunity to push forward your plan."

In another letter, she remarked on the "certain aspect of moral adventure" which the congress had, but she felt that the women were absolutely sincere in their search for a solution and that perhaps by their being "willing to fail" they might succeed in breaking through "that curious hypnotic spell" which prevented the neutral nations from considering mediation.

67 Jane Addams to Julia Grace Wales, March 25, 1915, Wales Papers.

68 Jane Addams to Lillian Wald, March 26, 1915, Wald Papers, New York Public Library.
The WPP accepted the invitation and on April 13, forty-two women, to be joined by five more American women already in Europe or on their way on other liners, set sail for The Hague on the Dutch-American liner Noordam. Louis Lochner, who spoke German as well as he spoke English, accompanied the group as Miss Addams' secretary. Since the National Peace Conference in Chicago, he had spent most of his time organizing support for mediation. During the voyage, he lectured the delegates on various peace problems and upon completion of these lectures the delegates decided to revise the proposed program of the congress. In place of the suggested truce idea the delegates urged adoption of the Wales plan for continuous mediation without armistice.  

With 1,136 women present representing twelve neutral and belligerent nations, the congress convened between April 28 and May 1 to formulate its resolutions on the problems of war and peace.  

69 Degen, 74.  

of a permanent peace the women endorsed national self-determination, the settlement of international conflicts by arbitration and conciliation, the application of social, moral, and economic pressure on aggressor states, democratic direction of foreign affairs, and woman suffrage. The congress also supported the formation of a society of nations, disarmament, freedom of the seas, and the education of children in the goals of peace. 71

On the last day of the congress, the Wisconsin Plan was unanimously accepted by all the women delegates. The adopting resolution stated that the congress would appeal to the neutral governments to form at once among themselves a conference for continuous mediation which would invite suggestions for settlement from and simultaneously submit to each of the belligerent nations reasonable proposals as a basis of peace. The American delegation had secured its objective

Also on the final day of the congress, Rosika Schwimmer proposed that a delegation be sent to the states-

men of neutral and belligerent nations to persuade them to endorse the program. The delegates were divided into two groups, each of which traveled to different parts of Europe talking on behalf of continuous mediation. The difficulties of travel and the various receptions given the delegates when visiting the European capitals have been described elsewhere. What remains of significance from the visits is the conviction expressed in the manifesto issued by the envoys that the Europeans were sympathetic to continuous mediation:

> Our visit to the war capitals convinced us that the belligerent governments would not be opposed to a conference of neutral nations; that while the belligerents have rejected offers of mediation by single neutral nations, and while no belligerents could ask for mediation, the creation of a continuous conference of neutral nations might provide the machinery which could lead to peace.

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72 This proposal provided considerable division among the delegates before it was adopted. Jane Addams, believing it would bring adverse publicity to the seriousness of the Congress, was opposed until convinced by the European delegates. Cf. Farrell, Beloved Lady, 155-6.


74 Text of the Manifesto Issued by the Envoys to the International Congress of Women at The Hague, October 15, 1915, 15, in the Wales Papers. See also Louis P. Lochner, Always the Unexpected, 51, and Jane Addams, "The Revolt Against War," in The Survey, XXXIV (July 17, 1915), 355-359.
Furthermore, it was the impression of these women that efforts for mediation on the part of the United States, with or without the cooperation of other neutral nations, would not be unwelcome and might prove successful. Indeed, the manifesto argued that the United States with its wide mixture of peoples and democratic prestige should take the initiative. Jane Addams, not one to be satisfied with words, obtained from each foreign secretary she visited a guardedly favorable statement of his attitude toward her efforts to secure continuous mediation. The American women returned home to work along with the WPP in urging President Wilson to act for mediation.

Lochner had returned earlier to the United States and was particularly active in the pacifists' commitment to arouse public opinion in favor of mediation. He wrote several letters to Wilson attempting to show him from the evidence of the women delegates' interviews that both Sir Edward Grey and the Germans were not against talk of peace,

75 Emily Balch to Louis Lochner, June 1, 1915, Ford Peace Plan Papers, Library of Congress.

76 Mimeographed copy of "Extracts from the Report of the Delegates' Interviews with the Governments," 1915, Jane Addams Papers. Not all of the statesmen visited, however, were so sure that the United States should be the nation to initiate a conference on mediation by the neutrals. Von Jagow's comment exemplifies such an attitude: "When asked if he thought the United States should take the first steps to invite the neutrals, he asked whether the United States was neutral."
but that it had to be the neutral nations to initiate action. He appealed to the President: "Whether you as head of the largest neutral nation call a halt to the war, or whether it be done by joint action of a number of neutrals, is immaterial." 77 Beginning in July, Lochner, with Jordan's consent, circulated this petition: "David Starr Jordan to members of the Faculties of universities and colleges of the United States, July 12, 1915: 'We the undersigned believe that the time is ripe for an active and friendly mediation on the part of the United States either alone or in connection with other neutral and law-abiding nations, with the view of bringing the present war to an immediate end'." 78 It was the purpose of the petition to give the President as much support as possible since it was felt that the time was ripe for positive action on his part.

Perhaps the public opinion campaign took hold, for during the summer President Wilson reversed his earlier position and began to meet with several of the more outstanding peace activists. He wanted to meet with Jane Addams almost immediately after her return from Europe, but

77 Lochner to Wilson, June 2, 1915; Lochner to Wilson, June 25, 1915, Ford Peace Plan Papers. See also Lochner to Tumulty, June 22, 1915, Lochner Papers.

78 A copy of this petition with 220 signatures can be found among the Ford Peace Plan Papers.
changed his mind and asked Colonel House to see her first. This interview with House created two significant results. In the first place, Jane Addams left the interview with the impression that the President would not act until he felt the time was more suitable. The second result of the interview was that House prevailed upon Wilson to meet with her on July 22 in an effort to make the diplomatic complications of the situation clear to those who were agitating for him to act. At the conclusion of the Wilson interview, Jane Addams was convinced that "no amount of pressure" would have any influence on the President. She began to think in terms of a conference of neutrals on mediation, but without "official" sanction. As president of the International Congress of Women, however, she felt committed to the "official" commission proposal as favored particularly by the second group of envoys to the European capitals.

Emily Balch had been among the envoys of the second group and met with President Wilson on August 18. She talked for about an hour and "he said definitely that he


would not wait to be asked to mediate, if he saw any opportunity to be of use he would take it." On the question of "official" versus "unofficial" mediation, Wilson cautioned that "...the natural persons to be members of such a body .../were/...perhaps not quite well fitted to serve successfully." Miss Balch, uncertain of herself at the interview, ended up agreeing with the President that neither the present time nor the "unofficial" commission were suitable for action on mediation. Miss Balch attempted to arrange an interview for Dr. Aletta Jacobs to discuss the mediation idea further. Wilson protested that he could not meet with a foreigner, but finally agreed to consider the matter further. 82

Wilson still had not budged. His noncommittal attitude for the length of the summer kept the peace advocates in confusion. Interviews with other administration officials were equally disheartening and futile. Louis Lochner was among the first to remark that the public was continually urged "to stand behind the president," but "nobody knows where the President is standing, or what he is making us stand for, or what his policy is." 83 Mrs. Carrie Chapman

82 E. G. Balch to Jane Addams, August 19, 1915, Jane Addams Papers. Originally this meeting with the President was to include Miss Balch and Dr. Aletta Jacobs, but Dr. Jacobs did not arrive in the United States until the 25th of August.

83 Lochner to Wales, July 26, 1915, Wales Papers.
Catt found that she could not "agree with the ordinary view that Wilson had done well. He should have had more backbone at the beginning."\(^84\)

The relationship with Wilson was a frequent topic at the Henry Street meetings where many of the original group gathered from time to time to discuss the progress of the mediation effort. Convinced of the reliability of the report of the women's visit to the capitals, the members believed in the necessity for mediation by the neutral nations. But even the Henry Street group could not evolve a consensus. While most -- but not all -- agreed that the United States should lead in the calling of the neutral conference, divisions over the role of Wilson became acute. While many of the pacifists had wanted to work with the administration, they were growing impatient at the delay. In the words of Hamilton Holt, with "millions of men dying every day" the world could not "sit supine and do nothing." He felt that since continuous mediation was an idea entirely new and had never been tried, it was worth a trial effort. If that meant furthering mediation on an "unofficial" basis, so be it.\(^85\) By the end of the summer, Jane Addams had reached this same position of favoring the "unofficial"

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84 Carrie Chapman Catt to Jane Addams, August 15, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.

85 Minutes, July 20, 1915, Wald Papers, Columbia University.
continuous mediation, as had many others in the group. After all, they reasoned, whenever Wilson decided to make a move, their efforts could at that point be made "official."

Though shaken, the majority's faith in Wilson persisted. These peace advocates realized from their experience in social reform that nearly every effort to create change called upon the role of the President and Congress. Their consensus was that even the proposal for "unofficial" mediation should not proceed without the sanction of the administration in order to go before the belligerent powers with the greatest merit and "clearly express the earnest desire of the whole American people to be of service." Oswald Garrison Villard remained overwhelmingly impressed with Wilson's diplomacy. He felt "Americans may be proud of their country as that which, more than any other, is an example of a guiding star to all mankind." For Villard, Wilson was the "man who without rattling a sword, won (PEACE?) for civilization." Jane Addams, likewise, retained her unlimited faith in Wilson, and remained convinced that he would eventually adopt the plan of continuous mediation.

86 Minutes, September 27, 1915, ibid.
87 Minutes, July 20, 1915 and August 10, 1915, ibid.
88 Villard as quoted in Michael Wreszin, Oswald Garrison Villard, 52-53.
mediation. After their meeting on September 27, however, in which Dr. Aletta Jacobs' interview with Wilson was discussed, these social reformers looked at their mediation efforts a little more differently.

Dr. Jacobs, the first Vice-Chairman of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, arrived in the United States on August 25 and was granted an interview with the President on September 15. In an effort to reaffirm the mediation effort, she delivered this message to President Wilson:

Our Dutch government wants to know unofficially the attitude of President Wilson concerning the Congress of neutral governments. Most of the five European neutral governments want that the Dutch Government should take the initiative to call the five European neutrals together and that they together shall ask President Wilson and other neutrals to join them. But our government wants to know, before it takes any step in that direction, if perhaps President Wilson likes to take the lead and if not is willing to join the

89 Degen, 115.

90 For a time, it was felt that perhaps Dr. Aletta Jacobs should be briefed as to what manner of man the President was so that her interview would have the greatest effect. But upon meeting her and learning of her mission there was a marked disinterest in any preliminary interview. Dr. Jacobs had been most impressive. "I think myself her path is so clear sent as she is to ask specific questions unofficially for the Dutch minister." E. Balch to J. Addams, August 26, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.
European neutrals in sending representatives of the U.S. to such a conference. Our Premier ... believes that such a question should be asked and answered in the same unofficial way as we got the other statements.91

Her interview is best described in her own words.

I saw the President at noon. I told him what I had to say and asked him several questions. He was very kind and manlike as well as gentlemanlike. His answers were very diplomatique (sic). In short, it was: "The United States were now in such great difficulties with the belligerents that a definite answer in one way or another is impossible." The President was very thankful for the informations (sic) I brought, but about his attitude toward peace he could not say a word. Every day that attitude could be changed, according to the circumstances and even a quite unofficial statement in one way or another could bind him in a certain degree. He wants to remain free to act in the best way as he sees the things himself.92

Her mission a failure, Dr. Jacobs sailed back to Holland on October 5, 1915.

Wilson's attitude in the face of such a clearcut call for action exacerbated the division within the Henry Street group. Many felt it was no longer wise to rely on the activity of the administration and the ambassadors. Having been content in their faith in eventual official

91 Aletta Jacobs to Jane Addams, August 26, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.

92 Jacobs to Jane Addams, September 15, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.
action, they had bred their own inaction. They had become prisoners of fixed channels, guarded in their statements to the public and deferential in their approach to the administration. Kellogg felt that the public did not have "sufficient data to combat the assumption that the Government (had) done all that it could." From this meeting on, Kellogg and his followers undertook a more aggressive posture to create a national demand for mediation and in this manner "bring pressure" upon the White House. 93

In order to influence public opinion the women delegates began to make known some of the contents of their interviews at the European capitals. 94 The Survey carried the entire text of the Manifesto of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace. 95 The Manifesto was published in the newspapers as well, thus making public the various resolutions presented during May and June to

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93 Minutes, September 27, 1915; Paul Kellogg to Lillian Wald, October 5, 1915; Wald to Balch, October 2, 1915, Wald Papers, Columbia University.

94 One of the first attempts toward creating this public demand for mediation was Miss Balch's article, "The Time to Make Peace," The Survey, XXXV (October 2, 1915), 24-25. She stressed the stalemate in the war, and the danger that regular civil government could be overridden by military authorities. "There is thus every reason to believe that a vigorous initiative by representa-
tives of the neutral powers of the world could at this moment begin a move toward negotiations."

95 This committee grew out of the Women's International Congress at The Hague.
foreign ministers at their several capitals. Selections of conversation, formerly marked "strictly private and confidential" and in certain cases containing the signature of the minister who thereby showed that his views were accurately represented, were offered to the entire body of American citizens to read.\footnote{Jane Addams to K. Courtney, October 14, 1915, Jane Addams Papers. Prime Minister Grey of Great Britain, Prime Minister Viviani of France, and Foreign Minister D'Avignon of Belgium signed.} The campaign to bring Wilson to act was fully underway. Avoiding specificity, these delegates proclaimed their belief "that of the five European neutral nations visited three are already to join in such a conference, and that two are deliberating the calling of such a conference...." Moreover, in their opinion the excruciating burden of responsibility for the hopeless continuance of the war no longer rested on the will of the belligerent nations alone, but on those neutral governments which refused to cooperate with others in mediation.\footnote{The \textit{Survey}, XXXV (October 16, 1915), 60-61.}

Emily Balch took aim directly at the White House with her statement, "If ... we see that the United States was dilatory when it might have helped to open a way to end bloodshed and make a fair and lasting settlement we shall have cause for deep self-reproach."\footnote{"The Time to Make Peace," \textit{The Survey}, XXXV (October 2, 1915), 25.}
In the effort to influence public opinion pacifists took advantage of the Fifth International Peace Congress meeting at San Francisco, California, October 10-13. The delegates to this conference, having accepted the outcome of the women's recent visits, claimed there was abundant evidence of peace sentiment and that those charged with the administration of the foreign policies of the warring nations would welcome, or at least not oppose, affirmative action by a neutral agency to bring about a peace based on international justice. They endorsed the Wisconsin Plan with the following resolution:

This Congress, therefore, respectfully urges the President of the United States to cooperate with other neutral governments in calling a conference of neutral nations, which would constitute a voluntary court of continuous mediation, would invite suggestions of settlement from each of the warring nations, and in any case, submit to all of them simultaneously, reasonable proposals as a basis for peace.99

Copies of the platform were submitted to the members of the United States Congress, the Cabinet, and the Governors of the States. David Starr Jordan, the president of the Congress, was commissioned by the delegates to be the medium of a personal message to President Wilson with special instructions to persuade him to call or agree to participate

in a neutral conference. Jordan had endorsed the Wisconsin Plan some months earlier, and now the fact that he was willing to present it to the President in person greatly cheered the peace activists. Their faith both in the plan and in Wilson's support for it were once again renewed. Lochner was particularly optimistic: "I just feel that you have it in your power to sway Mr. Wilson, and I simply won't be shaken in that faith."  

To support Jordan's interview, the campaign of pressure was continued and, indeed, intensified. The National Peace Federation, an ad hoc organization composed of the Chicago Emergency Federation of Peace Forces, the Chicago section of the Woman's Peace Party, and other local pacifist groups, scheduled a series of simultaneous demonstrations throughout the country for November 8th. Packets of literature containing instructions on how to stage such a mass meeting were mailed to peace groups of every major city, college, and university. The purpose of the demonstrations was to stir up the large numbers of citizens who felt and thought as the peace advocates into storming the White House with their letters and telegrams. Circulars were enclosed containing sample telegrams addressed to

100 Ibid.; D. S. Jordan, Days of a Man, II, 676.

101 Lochner to Jordan, October 23, 1915; November 2, 1915; November 5, 1915, Lochner Papers. The quotation is from the November 2 letter.
President Wilson imploring him to adopt continuous mediation. What was wanted was that each person at the mass meeting send a personal message to the President at the same time, Monday evening, November 8th. Moreover, each of these demonstrations was designed to create such a burst of fervor that the mass meeting as a body would endorse the resolution. November 8th was selected to allow the demonstrations and telegrams to have their proper impact on the President before Dr. Jordan would present the resolution for continuous mediation to Wilson on Friday, November 12.102

Jordan himself addressed the demonstration at Madison, Wisconsin. Bolstered by the enthusiasm displayed there and by the reports of innumerable other meetings, he then proceeded to Washington, accompanied by Louis Lochner. There was a definite note of urgency surrounding the anticipated interview -- an atmosphere of "showdown," particularly in light of the recent shift in Wilson's position as portrayed in the pro-preparedness comments of his Manhattan Speech of November 4. Lochner, however, generously endowed with an ability for positive thinking, felt that the speech gave the peace advocates a good hold to urge their project, and "we can take him at his own words." Since Wilson had

102 Lochner to Jordan, November 2, 1915; Lochner to Elizabeth G. Evans, November 5, 1915; Lochner to Chicago Herald, November 6, 1915, Lochner Papers.
stated in Manhattan that peace could not be assured by military victory, Lochner was convinced that the President's only other alternative was adoption of the neutral conference. Furthermore, Lochner supplied constant encouragement to Dr. Jordan that his "immeasurable superior international experience" gave him an advantage over the President who "looks from only the viewpoint of America" and "shows a peculiar failure...to grasp the international aspects of the world problem." Lochner assured Jordan of the "ultimate triumph of it all." 103

Both men met with President Wilson for forty minutes. Dr. Jordan formally presented the resolutions of the San Francisco Congress and then proceeded to lay before him the case for continuous mediation. He laid particular stress on the unofficial sources of information which he and other peace advocates had gathered: his own experience in Europe and his correspondence with friends who continued to write him; Mr. Lochner's experience; their contacts with a Dutch group working for mediation; and finally, the confidential statement of the various ministers to Jane Addams and the other women delegates. Dr. Jordan's presentation contained frequent reference to the liberal factions within the warring countries, citing in particular comments

103 Lochner to Jordan, November 5, 1915, Lochner Papers.
from a German Army officer who was tired of the war. Dr. Jordan concluded by saying, "You no doubt know a great deal more than we do about the situation, but our information is from a different angle." He most earnestly attempted to impress upon the President that the European neutrals were ready and anxious to call the conference, and that they probably would call it even if the United States would refuse to join.

Wilson countered Jordan's presentation with three objections: "1) The neutrals in Europe in several cases have governments out of sympathy with their peoples; 2) one side (the Allies) might object to mediation as a partisan measure; 3) that therefore America might be out-voted by the other neutrals, and more harm than good be done." Both men attempted to disabuse the President of these objections, repeating many of the arguments they had made before. Dr. Jordan felt that it would be a shame if Sweden and Holland went ahead and called the conference and the voice of the United States not be added as that of the most influential neutral. That would lay the country open to the charge that "we were getting rich at Europe's expense." The interview tended to drift off to a discussion of Christmas as a most suitable time to initiate mediation efforts. Wilson nodded gravely.

Beyond such nods, Wilson did not commit himself. Pleading the pressure of a Cabinet meeting, the President
ended the interview with "I assure you gentlemen that you have done me real good." This encouraged Lochner to ask, "Then may I take a message with me that you will act?" Wilson, however, said, "No, that is for me to say when the right moment, in my judgment, arrives." When pressed further by Jordan's comment, "At least you will not refuse, should Sweden or Holland or some other neutral country invite you." Wilson merely smiled and shook hands a final time. 104

Both men departed with somewhat different reactions. Jordan felt the interview was very satisfactory. As he wrote his wife, "I feel sure that we have 'put it over', the plan of 'Continuous Mediation'. If it succeeds, it will make Miss Wales the 'Joan d'Arc' of the war." He found Wilson very attentive and earnest. 105

In interviews with Joseph E. Davies, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and William Jennings Bryan, he found both men to express considerable interest in the plan. He refused to be disheartened when Secretary of State Lansing only spared him and Lochner a seven-minute interview in which he frankly stated that he did not favor continuous media-


105 D. S. Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 12, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
tion because he thought the plan would be unacceptable to the Allies. 106

Lochner had mixed emotions as he summed up his reactions: "The two days in Washington have further convinced me that the president is playing a lone hand, and that nobody really knows (unless it be Mr. Lansing who is inscrutable) what the President has in mind." He further felt that the President had no alternative plan outside of a fight to the finish. He remained convinced, however, that Wilson "was decidedly interested in our presentation" and "may yet be won." The key to winning, however, was to organize "the November 8th demonstrations many times over." 107

FIVE

After Wilson's cautious reaction to the Lochner-Jordan meeting, the nerve center of the mediation effort shifted from the Henry Street group and the WPP to the person of Henry Ford. Ford had made his first statement on the war in the middle of August. While being interviewed


107 Ibid.
by a young reporter from the *Detroit Free Press*, Theodore Delavigne, Ford, deploring the waste of war, stated, "I'd give all my money -- and my life -- to stop it." From this statement Delavigne elaborated Ford's views on the war, militarism, and preparedness to include a world-wide campaign for universal peace.\(^{108}\) Granted national coverage for his public position, Ford was deluged with suggestions, proposals, and plans on how to stop the war. Efforts were made to have Ford preside at the Detroit Peace rally; in fact, as one of the organizers wrote, "We will plan the meeting so Ford will be in town..."\(^{109}\) Lochner sent a packet of literature to Ford urging him to send a telegram to the President, emphasizing, "A wire from you would be of tremendous value."\(^{110}\) But by the middle of November, Henry Ford had not made a definite commitment to any particular program for peace.

Lochner returned from the interview with President Wilson full of recommendations and resolutions, all of them based on securing with the greatest possible haste the


\(^{109}\) Rebecca Shelly to Lochner, October 21, 1915, Lochner Papers. The Ford Peace Plan Papers contain numerous letters full of suggestions for peace, as well as other "inventions" which Ford might be interested in and, of course, a large number of letters of solicitation.

\(^{110}\) Lochner to Ford, November 6, 1915, Lochner Papers.
support of Henry Ford. In the first place, he felt that Ford would be able to furnish the unlimited funds which would make "possible an overwhelming series of demonstrations in favor of neutral mediation." Secondly, Ford's financial support would enable "Rosika Schwimmer and others who know the insides of the Scandanavian situation to depart at once for northern Europe and to persuade the neutrals there to finally inaugurate continuous mediation on the assurance that we shall raise a tremendous demand in our country that President Wilson accept the invitation and select a commission from this country to participate."

Finally, Lochner felt that if the neutral governments would not act, Ford could finance a meeting at Berne "in such a way that the best men and women of the neutral delegations could resolve themselves into a Continuous Court of Voluntary Mediation." This last alternative would lack official government approval, but perhaps it would provide the final ounce of pressure to convince Wilson "that it is up to him to either get into the game or be forever left out."

The significance of Henry Ford's support appealed to others besides Louis Lochner. Rosika Schwimmer arrived in Detroit on November 15 with the avowed intention of

converting Ford to the plan of continuous mediation. 112

After some difficulty, she was granted a luncheon interview which led to another conference with the automobile manufacturer. During both meetings, Madame Schwimmer explained the program of continuous mediation, the Women's Congress at The Hague, and the visits to the capitals. Moreover, she explained the documents and resumes which these women had received during their visits. She conveyed to Ford the impression that foreign governments were inclined to the idea of mediation. Ford was impressed.113

Meanwhile, Lochner had received a telegram from Rosika Schwimmer stating that an appointment had been made for him with Henry Ford. The "appointment," however, did not exist. Nevertheless, Lochner did meet Ford that after-

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112 Rosika Schwimmer had returned to the United States with Crystal Macmillan late in August, 1915, to raise funds for the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, which was conducting the international campaign for continuous mediation. Their September-October activity was apparently disapproved of by the International Committee, and they offered to resign. Perhaps, it was the desire for approval of her activist methods as well as the ultimate success of continuous mediation that galvanized Madame Schwimmer into seeking at long last the interview with Ford. Cf., Hubhouse to Jacobs, August 21, 1915; E. Balch to Jane Addams, August 26, 1915; Jacobs to Jane Addams, September 8, 1915, September 13, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.

noon as he concluded his visit with Madame Schwimmer. Both were invited to Ford's home for lunch the next day, November 19.\textsuperscript{114} According to Lochner, who was asked by Ford to comment privately upon the worth of Rosika Schwimmer's suggestions, Ford was persuaded before luncheon to come to New York to meet the rest of those working for mediation and then to proceed to Washington in an attempt to convince the President to support mediation by offering "to bear the expense of maintaining a commission abroad until such time as Congress might make the necessary appropriation."\textsuperscript{115}

Events moved rapidly thereafter. The next day, November 20, Ford announced that he would visit the President concerning the conference of neutral nations.\textsuperscript{116} On November 21, he left with Lochner for New York City. On November 22, Ford met other supporters of continuous mediation, Jane Addams, George W. Kirchwey, Paul U. Kellogg, and Oswald Garrison Villard. Rosika Schwimmer was also present at the meeting which urged the sending to Europe of a mediation commission, "by official appointment if possible, by private initiative if necessary." Two separate courses

\begin{footnotes}

\footnote{115} \textit{Ibid.}, 13-14; Lochner to Jordan, December 20, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\footnote{116} For the remainder of the discussion on Henry Ford, I am using the chronology of Degen, \textit{Woman's Peace Party}, 131-137.
\end{footnotes}
of action were prepared. Official support would still be sought, while at the same time steps would be taken to bring about the neutral conference through private initiative. In accordance with the second course of action, Ford began inquiries the afternoon of the 22nd on steamship sailings and by evening made arrangements with the Scandana-vian-American Line to charter the Oscar II, scheduled to leave New York on December 4 for Christiania (Oslo), Norway. 117

At the same time, the effort to obtain official support was continued with a visit to Colonel House, then visiting New York. House's diary entry best describes that visit:

Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer, called by appointment. He also came to the role of pacifist. He brought with him David Starr Jordan's secretary (sic), a young man who did most of the talking, despite the fact that I indicated very clearly that I wished to talk with Mr. Ford. Ford's views regarding peace were so crude and unimportant that I endeavored to lead him into a more fruitful field; but just as soon as I got him discussing his great industrial plant at Detroit and the plans for the uplift of his workmen, the young man would break in and turn the tide of conversation into another channel. Ford, I should judge, is a mechanical genius ... who may become a prey to all sorts of faddists who desire his money. 118

117 Lochner, America's Don Quixote, 19-20.
118 Charles Seymour, ed., Intimate Papers of Colonel House, II, 96-97.
Achieving little by way of success with House, Ford and Lochner took the train that evening for an interview with Wilson on November 23.

Meanwhile, efforts to influence Wilson to adopt mediation and officially support a neutral conference continued. Mrs. Ford along with Mr. Ford had been converted to the idea of a neutral conference. She sent a check of $2,000 to Jane Addams "to be used in your peace campaign," and further suggested that "if more is needed soon, Mr. Ford is where you can reach him."\footnote{119} The peace advocates continued their mass demonstrations which endorsed the resolution that the President call a conference of neutrals.\footnote{120} Thousands of letters and telegrams were sent to Wilson to coincide with a series of interviews he held towards the end of November.\footnote{121}

\footnote{119} Mrs. Henry Ford to Jane Addams, November 22, 1915, Jane Addams Papers. Both Marie Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party, 123, and Mercedes Randall, Improper Bostonian, 205, mention that on November 19th Mrs. Ford contributed $10,000 to make possible a telegram campaign from the mothers of America, which resulted in 12,000 telegrams in three days. Curti, Peace or War, 243, mentions 10,000 telegrams.

\footnote{120} Jane Addams to Mrs. Edith Boyer, November 23, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.

\footnote{121} Wilson also met with Rosika Schwimmer and Mrs. Snowden on November 26, but refused support for the neutral conference.
Wilson apparently was unmoved by the telegram barrage. Nor was he converted by the Ford-Lochner interview in spite of Ford's offer of complete financial support. Wilson seemed inclined toward mediation but was not prepared to commit himself to any specific proposals. When Ford suggested that he would proceed to send a group of private citizens to Europe without governmental participation, Wilson wished him success. The interview ended as it had begun with Wilson uncommitted to the idea of a neutral conference and Ford impetuously agitating for one.  

On November 24 Ford announced that he had chartered a ship and the publicity from his peace ship would "...get the boys out of their trenches and back to their home by Christmas Day." This announcement was front page copy in the following day's newspapers. Ford had obtained his publicity, but it grew increasingly unsympathetic. Ford, of course, in making his announcement built on a foundation laid by the Woman's Peace Party, which as noted earlier, had come by early fall to favor an unofficial conference of neutrals as the only means to begin mediation talks. That is to say, if the neutral governments themselves, whether led by the United States or not, would hesitate to call a

122 Lochner, Don Quixote, 22-25.
conference, the women of the Woman's Peace Party would attempt that objective without government sponsorship. After November 25, however, the supporters of the neutral conference were faced with a cruel dilemma. As much as they wanted financial support and publicity, did they want to receive such from Henry Ford?

Initially, Ford was a prize catch for the recruiters for the peace cause. He represented the solution to many problems of peace advocacy. In the first place, after the foundings of the WPF and CEIP, funds for peace work from other less wealthy sources than Ginn and Carnegie tended to dry up. And when these established societies, as noted earlier, refused to share their largess during 1914-1915, the new peace groups were hard pressed. Ford's support represented the solution of how the campaign for mediation was to be funded.

Ford was also a desirable recruit to the peace movement because of his value as a symbol. He was the man who had doubled the worth of a man's labor by increasing the wage paid in his factories to an unprecedented $5.00 a day. He stood before the world as a man who shared his wealth and had concern for humanity. He fitted in well with the progressive image of the enlightened and efficient indus-

124 Degen, 128-132.
trialist, who could also qualify as social reformer. Ford's trademark was efficiency. Was he not practically the father of the assembly line idea of mass production? Had he not defied the old line of economics and established the new principles of higher wages to increase the workers' buying power? If he had been so creative and efficient in these areas, could he not be equally successful in defying the old ways of statesmanship?

Lochner thought so. He could hardly contain his exuberance over the conversion of Henry Ford. It was at this time that he attacked the CEIP and was forced to resign as Secretary of the Chicago branch of the APS.\textsuperscript{125} Lochner's optimistic outlook was shared by many others who joined the Peace Ship. It did not, however, find favor with all.

While welcoming a national figure of Ford's stature and the publicity which would attend his support, several peace workers expressed an early fear of Ford's penchant for publicity and the possible danger that could come to the mediation movement as a result. Jane Addams also disliked the idea of the ship. And so, during the ten days preparatory to sailing, serious decisions had to be made.

\textsuperscript{125} Cf. above, Section One.
whether to support the Peace Ship or, in the belief that Ford was doing more harm than good, not go along.

David Starr Jordan had very early shied away from Ford's involvement with the proposal for a neutral conference. Jordan, whose name had been associated with the idea of mediation since February, was one of the peace leaders who refused to leave with the ship. In spite of pleas from both Ford and Lochner directed to him as "the original champion of the Peace Plan," Jordan refused. He felt the enterprise was organized in too much of a hurry and that not enough of those committed to the ship's sailing were acquainted with the conditions in Europe. Moreover, he could not reconcile peace through mediation with peace through publicity. As he confided to his wife, "Nothing can be done with a whoop -- not even backed with ten million dollars." While he preferred official government sanction, he stated that he could "resign...to (continuous mediation) without such sanction, as a slow and doubtful process still worth trying. But that would involve a select group..." In his mind, the Oscar II was to be a fiasco. Not much could be expected from "a council for continuous

126 Henry Ford to Jordan, November 25, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

127 Jordan to Atherton Brownell, December 27, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

128 Jordan to Jessie Jordan, November 26 and 29, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
mediation elected by a shipload of people." He also correctly prophesized the lack of harmony which would develop among those who did depart.\textsuperscript{129} He even saw fit to warn President Wilson, "...(A) wholly unexpected change has come over the plan for 'Continuous Mediation'. While I have much sympathy with the purposes of Frau Schwimmer and much respect for Mr. Ford, I could not see my way at all to joining the expedition."\textsuperscript{130}

Jane Addams was likewise torn by the decision over the Peace Ship. She had disliked the idea of the ship since it was first broached on November 22. She asked Lochner to try to keep Ford and the enterprise in hand, but Lochner thought the publicity was good for the peace movement.\textsuperscript{131} She disliked the Ford slogan as well, and she particularly disliked the character of the personnel in the Ford peace party.\textsuperscript{132} She felt that these embarrassments were a high price to pay for Ford's support. Unlike many others, however, who in concern over their own dignity

\textsuperscript{129} Jordan to Jessie Jordan, December 1, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{130} Jordan to Woodrow Wilson, December 20, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.

\textsuperscript{131} Degen, 133, 135.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 135.
begged off, Miss Addams was determined to go. Ford's way may not have been hers, but at times showmanship did have its merits. After all, the method would turn out to be of minor consequence should a conference of neutrals ever get established. On December 1, however, she fell ill in Chicago and the Oscar II sailed without her.

There was considerable dissatisfaction over Ford's effort because the documents of the women envoys to the capitals said nothing about an unofficial mediation carried out by the citizens of neutral countries, that is, without any official sanction. This effort to bypass diplomatic channels appeared as too radical an extension of the pro-

133 Ford Peace Plan Papers contain many letters of excuses from governors and outstanding citizens in explanation of why they could not join the Peace Ship. Among those traditionally associated with pacifism were Hamilton Holt, Anna Garlin Spencer, and Lucia Mead. Holt to Ford, November 26, 1915; Anna Garlin Spencer to Ford, December 1, 1915; Lucia Mead to Lochner, November, 1915. At the same time, Ford was besieged with offers of solicitation: insurance to cover the trip, requests for business deals, commercial gimmicks (seals and postcards to commemorate the trip), a movie picture of the trip, songs, cartoons, clipping services, as well as a wholesome representation of lawyers willing to defend him.

134 Degen, 136-138. Miss Addams has been charged with a "diplomatic" illness on this occasion. Cf., Walter Millis, The Road to War, America 1914-1917, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935, 244, and Sullivan, Our Times, V, 171. According to both her nephew-biographer, James Linn, and Degen she developed tuberculosis of the kidney and was a semi-invalid for almost a year. Degen, 138.
gressive spirit and direct democracy. It also proved costly to the mediation movement by providing, on the one hand, a basis for the erosion of supporters, and on the other, the opportunity for almost unbounded ridicule. Moreover, Lochner was the only individual with any long-standing experience in the peace movement. Thus, once again, a working coalition of peace advocates was shattered. In its refusal to endorse the Peace Ship the WPP and the Henry Street group denied support to the idea they had so long espoused and corroborated the "wait-see" attitude of the established peace societies.\footnote{135}

The story of the sailing of the \textit{Oscar II} has been told and retold. Historians have been quite harsh in treating the idea of the ship, though a few concede that some good was done by the Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation in session as a permanent body based in Stockholm.\footnote{136} At a different level, however, three serious questions arise. Why would Wilson not mediate? What

\footnote{135 Jane Addams felt required to clarify her support for the ship as proceeding from herself as an individual and not representative of Woman's Peace Party or the International Committee of Women. Degen, 140-2. Aletta Jacobs to Jane Addams, December 4, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.}

\footnote{136 Mark Sullivan charged that the Ford Peace Ship discredited the entire movement. \textit{Our Times}, V, 1933, 183. Merle Curti in his \textit{Peace or War} felt that, however, chaotic the initial steps, the Neutral Conference Commission once established conducted itself with merit. \textit{Cf.}, 243-245.
happened to the idea of mediation in the United States after December 1915? And, what effect did the enlarged profile of pacifism during 1915 and the eventual Ford fiasco have on the movement for international harmony? Each question will be separately treated in the following sections.

SIX

Why would Wilson not mediate? Many historians have addressed themselves to that question and among them is Merle Curti who believes that Wilson missed his chance:

It now appears that had Wilson moved in this direction (mediation) on one or two occasions in 1915 or early in 1916, he might have brought the war to an end under circumstances that would have furthered a more durable peace than the one finally made at Versailles. When at length, he did what Jane Addams and Bryan had long urged him to do, it was too late.137

Wilson was sincerely interested in re-establishing peace and, from the very outbreak of war, both he and Secretary of State Bryan wanted the United States to take the leadership in any projects of mediation. "The hope of leading hostile statesmen to the conference table burned brightly in both men during the first months of the war, and, in

137 Curti, Peace or War, 243.
part justified a posture of resolute neutrality."138

Within less than two months, however, Wilson managed to exclude Bryan from any participation in efforts toward mediation and shifted control of a major aspect of the nation's foreign policy to Colonel Edward M. House. The reason for the change was the serious difference in the thinking of Wilson and Bryan about the timing and purposes of American mediation. Bryan was concerned only about stopping the fighting. He felt that the horrors of war compelled the American government to do everything that it could to end the war as soon as possible. Over and over he pleaded for bold action on the part of the President -- that he call a conference of all neutral and belligerent nations in Washington.139

This conference would discuss methods which would mitigate the hardships wrought on the neutral countries by the war. Bryan was sure the belligerent powers would not object to this proposal if they received assurances that any measures formulated by the conference would be subject to their approval. He then attempted to show how such a conference could lead to mediation in an oblique manner,


139 Ibid., 200.
for it would give you an opportunity to make an address of welcome which might be helpful in advancing the cause of mediation without directly referring to it. ...(T)he coming together of these representatives, even for the consideration of questions growing out of the war and yet not involving the subject of mediation, might lay the foundation for some coming together of the belligerent nations.140

The President, however, did not respond positively to Bryan's proposal. Wilson could neither agree with Bryan's support for the Wisconsin Plan nor could he sympathize with the Great Commoner's urging "that it is this nation's duty to make, not a secret but a public appeal for the acceptance of mediation."141 He felt that the time was not ripe and that "(t)o insist now would be futile and would probably be offensive. We would lose such influence as we have for peace."142

In this answer to Bryan, Wilson mentioned that he was basing his decision on the advice and information supplied by Colonel House. Wilson, therefore, in making the shift from Bryan to House, supplied himself with an


141 Bryan to Wilson, April 23, 1915, The Lansing Papers, I, 379.

142 Ibid., 380.
advisor who "was neither so obsessed by the dream of mediation or so hopeful of its prospects." He was also perhaps attempting to be a realist, as he unconsciously followed an earlier recommendation by the Colonel: "...Do not let Mr. Bryan make any overtures to any of the Powers involved. They look upon him as absolutely visionary, and would lessen the weight of your influence if you desire to use it yourself later..."144

After Bryan's resignation in June, 1915, the elements which comprised Wilson's position became clearer. He was not against mediation—indeed, he was for it, provided certain conditions were met. Among these conditions were the consideration of timing, the importance of secrecy, the preference for a pro-Allied settlement, and the necessity of the United States acting alone.

On the question of timing, before December 1916 Wilson never felt the time was ripe to mediate. This was his most frequent objection to the efforts for mediation on the part of the pacifists. He would at times praise the Wisconsin Plan as the best yet formulated, but he still withheld his commitment because, until other factors were

144 Seymour, ed., Intimate Papers of Colonel House, I, 279.
right, the timing was not suitable.

Among those other factors was the need for secrecy. Wilson balked at a mediation conference which met in public session, drafting proposals and submitting them to the belligerents. While he respected the role of an expert, he was not willing to include the realm of foreign affairs as a portion of direct democratic participation. His preference was toward secret negotiations as the two missions of Colonel House in April 1915 and again in January 1916 underlined. They were undertaken at the same time as the two public invasions of Europe by American pacifists.

Another precondition for the correct timing was the attitude of the Allies toward mediation. Attempts to mediate the conflict, whether on the part of distinguished private citizens, President Wilson, or other neutral countries, were doomed as long as either side believed that complete victory was possible. And, after the departure of Bryan, Wilson was dependent on the advice of Lansing and House, both of whom were committed to an Allied victory. As long as the military situation was either uncertain or unfavorable, neither France nor Great Britain would accept mediation. Both Lansing and House continually advanced the importance of Allied support for any mediation proposal, and at the same time indicated that such Allied support was
as yet not forthcoming. According to Ray Stannard Baker, the basic cause for Wilson's hesitation in acting publicly for peace was the advice of Lansing and House that the United States "must keep our influence strong by never moving toward mediation until success was guaranteed." In other words, Wilson's position would remain strong provided he did not commit himself prematurely and allow his efforts to fail.

In any event, Wilson was not going to mediate. However much he was advised, the final decision was his. Wilson played a "lone hand." He listened to his advisors and at times his opinion on matters and their advice coincided. In such circumstances he might appear to be taking advice. Wilson's disposition, however, was not one to either take advice from or give credit to the proposals of others. Wilson's nature was not one to cooperate. He had no eagerness to work with others. He must not only lead; he must act alone. This attitude was quite manifest in Wilson's dealings with the pacifists. Aletta Jacobs, for example, summarized the results of her meeting as follows, "He want (sic) to remain free to act in the best way as he sees the things himself." This disinclination of

145 R. S. Baker, ed., Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, VI, 122-123.

146 Aletta Jacobs to Jane Addams, September 15, 1915, Jane Addams Papers.
Wilson to cooperate conflicted with the cooperative features of the Wisconsin Plan. Wilson's position was to shy away from all projects where the United States and other neutral states would work in concert. He felt the United States would of necessity shoulder "the principal responsibility for any action taken." 147

The influence of Lansing and House upon the decisions of Woodrow Wilson has been a subject of broad comment and speculation. While it remains uncertain what effect their remarks to the President might eventually have had, it is certain that Wilson did listen to them, and it is also fairly certain what they felt about the new peace activists and their call for a conference of mediation. Both men believed that the United States must eventually enter the war on the side of the Allies. While Wilson did not share this conviction, he agreed with their view that any mediation effort must have the advance approval of the Allies. Wilson's efforts during 1915 and early 1916 were directed through the secret negotiation of House to obtain such approval, thus virtually surrendering to the Allies the initiative for mediation. Consequently, House found himself at considerable advantage as a counterweight to the opinions of the women envoys to the capitals and he was not reluctant to tailor this advantage to his own point of view.

147 Baker, Woodrow Wilson, V, 300.
Pacifists never fully grasped the importance of House and Lansing. While they wisely attempted to convert them, they had no concept of the magnitude of such an effort. Nor did they perceive the depth of hostility toward them. It is at this point that the miscalculations of pacifists were most grievous. Apparently, the peace workers were not concerned with the fact that they were being undermined by Lansing and House by contradictions to their positions put forth after their departure. Yet it is at this juncture that House and Lansing carried considerable weight with Wilson inasmuch as he was not permitted to reflect on the pacifist proposals before being confronted with offsetting views.

The danger in the mind of these two advisers was not that Wilson would be converted and support a conference for neutral mediation, for Wilson would continue to play his lone hand. But the question became for how long would he continue to play it. House and Lansing were for intervention on the side of the Allies. Any encouragement to Wilson to play a mediatory role as an impartial mediator delayed the evolution of a policy which the two advisers believed to be in the best interest of the United States.

It must also be stated that during 1915, the attitude and actions of the German government were such as to reinforce the positions of House and Lansing, rendering all work for mediation much more difficult. In any event, during 1915, Wilson would neither adopt the Wisconsin Plan, nor would he agree to any plan for mediation. Endorsement of the Ford Peace Ship was, of course, out of the question, and the President officially disassociated the United States government from it.

During 1916, however, circumstances changed. After the Sussex Pledge tensions with Germany were relaxed. By May, 1916, Wilson rejected the position of Lansing and House that Allied approval was a prerequisite for mediation. In the words of Ernest R. May, Wilson "had concluded that the Allies were no more eager than the Germans to make peace. He had come, moreover, to be almost as suspicious of Britain's future intentions as of Germany's." Wilson indicated his scuttling of the House-Grey Memorandum in a series of addresses beginning with the "League to Enforce Peace" speech on May 27, 1916. Wilson offered to initiate mediation at any time if the belligerents agreed to join a universal association of nations to maintain freedom.

of the seas and prevent war. Convinced of his righteous course by election to a second term, Wilson repeated his plea for a mediated solution to the conflict. In a December 18 speech, he requested the belligerents to publicly state their peace terms. In his "Peace Without Victory" speech on January 22, 1917, he made a further appeal to have peace guaranteed by a community of nations.

Rather than having abandoned mediation after the Ford mission, Wilson began to adopt it. During late 1916 he desired to be impartial and act as a genuine neutral mediator. Wilson's efforts, however, were too late. Germany had already decided on January 9, 1917 that unrestricted submarine warfare would resume at the end of January.

SEVEN

Meanwhile, certain of those pacifists who didn't join the Ford Peace Ship, while recognizing the severe blow given the mediation movement, confirmed their efforts


to keep the idea of a neutral conference viable. Jane Addams and the Woman's Peace Party attempted to influence the President to appoint an official neutral commission. Miss Addams met with Wilson in early January, 1916. But once again he refused to commit himself, though, in commenting upon the resolutions of the Women's Congress at The Hague, he allowed, "I consider them by far the best formulation which up to the moment has been put out by anybody." At its convention in January the Woman's Peace Party once more endorsed the immediate calling of a conference of neutral nations. Pacifists persevered in their hope that Wilson was seriously interested in mediation, that he had never closed the door to the idea of a neutral conference, and that he should be encouraged to resolve the conflict in the interests of a just and orderly peace.

One of the most important manifestations that mediation was not dead with the American Neutral Conference Committee (ANCC). Formed in June, 1916, the ANCC under the inspiration of Rebecca Shelley and Lella Faye Secor reestablished connections with the European groups which had worked in concert with the Ford mission. Other supporters of mediation also joined the ANCC and soon there developed within

152 Jane Addams as quoted in Patterson, "Wilson and the Mediation Movement," 549.
the organization a "Committee of One Hundred," that is, one hundred prominent Americans seeking mediation of the conflict.\textsuperscript{153}

Attempting to use the assertions of the belligerents, namely, that their purpose was to make future wars impossible, the ANCC repeatedly stated that the guarantee to end all wars would best be secured by a neutral conference. The committee worked to bring before the public the advantages to this idea, irrespective of peace platforms, preparedness, and the terms of the war settlement. Beginning in August the ANCC published a monthly bulletin containing news of the work for mediation as well as lists of suggestions on how to further the neutral conference campaign in individual communities.\textsuperscript{154} Just as the focal point of mediation workers in 1915 was the President, so too, the efforts of the ANCC were directed at the administration. The Committee circulated petitions, seeking to marshall

\textsuperscript{153} Included in the "Committee of One Hundred," were Jane Addams, Hamilton Holt, Frederick Lynch, Paul Kellogg, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Emily Balch, Irving Fisher, and William I. Hull.

\textsuperscript{154} Copies of the American Neutral Conference Committee Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Cf., also in these papers a packet of information for distribution, "What Do We Stand For?", which contains an extended list of suggestions for making the ANCC meaningful on the local level.
a strong public opinion in support of Wilson's efforts 
which, the Committee optimistically felt, would ultimately 
result in his call for a conference of neutral nations.

On August 30, Wilson met with twenty members of the 
ANCC. Through its main spokesmen, Dr. Jordan, Professor 
Irving Fisher, and Dr. Mary E. Woolley, the committee 
presented arguments for the calling of a neutral conference 
which would offer joint mediation to the belligerents by 
proposals calculated to form the basis of a permanent peace. 
That the delegation was received cordially all accounts 
agree. Because the interview was confidential, however, 
not all reports specify Wilson's objections beyond his 
statement that "practical considerations stood in the way 
of his calling a conference of neutral nations."155 Other 
accounts substantiate that Wilson objected to the neutral 
conference idea on the grounds that members of that con-
ference would eventually sit at the peace table. He ended 
the interview before allowing rebuttal to this specific 
objection.156

Although Wilson misinterpreted the intentions of 
the ANCC, he revealed his perception of the reformist char-

155 Rebecca Shelley to W. I. Hull, September 9, 1916, 
ANCC Papers.

acteristic contained in the idea of a conference of neutral nations. The democratic strategy of public negotiations of peace terms could be the entering wedge for the eventual popular participation in diplomacy. Wilson was not willing to sponsor, let alone witness, the marriage of the "Wisconsin Idea" to international relations. Wilson created the feeling among the delegation that "single efforts by our government will be more effective than mediation by a conference of neutral nations." 157

Obviously shaken by the August 30 interview, the ANCC adopted certain changes. While Holt, Fisher, and Lynch were appointed in a subsequent meeting to draft a letter to the President to answer his objections, the ANCC agreed to modify its approach to mediation, resolving to support the general idea, but no specific method. ANCC propaganda took a new emphasis which stressed the "messenger" aspect of the neutral conference, charged with the role of "delivering the viewpoint of the one belligerent to the other." Moreover, the point was again clarified that "delegates to the neutral conference should be given full power to act without binding their respective governments." 158 More attention was given in their petitions to the principles upon which mediation would guarantee peace:

158 "What We Stand For," ANCC Papers.
1. Repudiation of military conquest as a means of territorial expansion.

2. Recognition of the right of each people to determine its own social, political, and economic development.

3. World organization for the development of international cooperation and the settlement of international disputes.159

In emphasizing the reforming basis of the mediation idea, the ANCC hoped to broaden its base of support, to create a larger voice of public opinion by activating the humanitarian concept of the "American mission," and finally, to answer the charge of the United States' indifference to the wartime suffering of millions. Rebecca Shelley and Emily Balch captured much of this new feeling on the part of the committee. Miss Shelley wrote that America could "hope for no position of leadership in the new world order, if the highest expression of (its) national life is found merely in gratitude for its own security."160 Miss Balch believed that Europe resented America's indifference, and in the effort to refute "this cynical

159 ANCC Petition, copy in ANCC Papers.

160 Rebecca Shelley to Emily Balch, November 10, 1916, Emily Greene Balch Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
interpretation of our passivity, any expression of an American desire to see the war end (would be) a definite patriotic service. As the ANCC increased its propaganda, it continued to rest on the expectation that Wilson would eventually act.

Finally, as indicated above, through Wilson's peace note on December 18, the long vigil came to an end. Peace workers were ecstatic and intensified their efforts to further stimulate public opinion and offer every encouragement possible to the President's initiative. In a barrage of propaganda they took out advertising and distributed handbills stating, "We ask you to join us in assuring President Wilson that he has the mass of the American people with him in every effort to help Europe to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, that is, settlement conceived in the interests of all peoples and of world peace."

Simultaneous demonstrations in support of Wilson's note were held across the nation on New Year's Eve, accenting the theme, "Ring Out the Thousand Wars of Old, Ring In

161 Balch to correspondents of the Neutral Conference Committee, n.d., November, 1916. Ibid.
162 Handbill, copy in ANCC Papers. Cf. also handbills of the California Branch of the ANCC, Ibid. The California Branch conducted a campaign to obtain 600,000 signatures on its petitions. New York Tribune, November 26, 1916.
the Thousand Years of Peace." In the promotion of these demonstrations the ANCC, hoping to attract large crowds, featured prominent speakers. Just as at a church service, leaflets with the proper responses and cheers were passed out to participants so that each could follow along. The following pledge was also circulated:

We, the undersigned citizens of the United States of America, are gratefully conscious of the importance of the steps already taken in the direction of the negotiated peace. We earnestly urge our government to use all available means towards the speedy establishment of a just and enduring peace which shall promote the common interests of all mankind.

The signed pledges were then collected and forwarded to the President along with this New Year's Greeting:

To the President of the United States:

Citizens here assembled send New Year greetings. The year is dawning brighter throughout the world because you have dared to speak to the warring governments in the name of peace. The repressed

163 Twenty-five thousand people were expected to attend the major Washington Square demonstration. Other demonstrations were planned for the campus of Columbia University, Orchestra Hall in Chicago, as well as in the cities of Denver and San Francisco.

164 At the Washington Square demonstration Dudley Field Malone was the principal speaker. Others very prominent in the celebration were Harry Barnhardt who led the singing, Dr. Washington Gladden, and Socialist Congressman Meyer London. In Chicago, the principal speakers were Mr. Francis Neilson, Jane Addams, and Dr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones.

165 Copy in ANCC Papers.
peoples of the war-ridden nations in the trenches and in countless homes are thinking of you this day. We are with you heart and hand in your stand for peace. We pledge ourselves to support your further effort toward international good will and liberty for all nations.  

During the opening weeks of 1917, optimism among peace workers grew apace. The ANCC could only applaud Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" speech and sent him notes of further encouragement. In the meantime, the committee considered additional steps to achieve mediation. Among these proposals was the desirability of a national convention of all peace forces, a renewal of simultaneous mass demonstrations all over the country, and a nationwide speaking tour which would constitute a whirlwind

166 Ibid.

167 As an example of this optimism, Hamilton Holt looking to devote his efforts to guarantee the permanence of peace, resigned on December 27, 1916, with the statement, "...[T]he object for which the American Neutral Conference Committee was formed is now on the way to be accomplished through the initiative for peace by one of the belligerents and by the action of the President of the United States." He resigned to devote full time to the League to Enforce Peace. At the same time, Emily Greene Balch consented to leave her other work in order to devote her entire time to the work of the ANCC. Report of ANCC, December 30, 1916, ANCC Papers.

168 Addams to Lochner, January 23, 1917, Lochner Papers; Shelley to Wilson, January 25, 1917, ANCC Papers; Wald et al. to Wilson, January 24, 1917, American Union Against Militarism Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
campaign to place American public sentiment solidly behind the President.\textsuperscript{169} Requests for an interview to confer with the President on these questions and listen to his position were being drafted when Germany announced the resumption of submarine warfare.

Thunderstruck by such a dramatic reversal to their prospects, the ANCC issued a manifesto delineating eight alternatives to war.\textsuperscript{170} Within the next few weeks, however, emphasis was directed to only one alternative, the referendum. Eventually, the ANCC suspended its operations and totally gave its support, both financial and physical, to the Emergency Peace Federation.\textsuperscript{171}

In conclusion, in light of the above section, the judgment of those historians who saw the Ford fiasco as

\textsuperscript{169} Shelley to ANCC members, January 4, 1917, ANCC Papers.

\textsuperscript{170} These alternatives called for 1) postponement of the settlement of all disputes which could not be settled by peaceful means; 2) prohibition of American citizens sailing on belligerent ships; 3) refusal to allow clearance to all ships carrying passengers and contraband on the same vessel; 4) repudiation of responsibility for American citizens continuing the work as seamen on vessels carrying contraband; 5) observations of the war zones; 6) a referendum on the declaration of war; 7) the calling of a neutral conference; 8) a direct offer of mediation.

\textsuperscript{171} See Chapter Six below.
the end of the mediation movement must be considered over-
drawn. That the idea was given a severe blow, yes. It
had not been, however, mortally wounded.

EIGHT

As to the third question, "What effect did the
Ford fiasco have on the peace movement in general?" an
answer can be formulated in two parts: 1) the effect on
the activity and morale of the peace workers themselves,
and, 2) the effect on the climate within which peace work-
ers carried on their activity. While, as indicated above,
the mediation movement itself continued, the peace adv-
crates did some reshuffling. In the first place, an unset-
tling feeling had begun to appear among certain pacifists
that they were being outflanked. Their concentration on
mediation was permitting the preparedness movement to cir-
culate its propaganda unchecked. Rather than abandoning
mediation, these pacifists could be considered as having
chosen to confront the danger of militarism closer to home.
In fact, Bryan was already fighting preparedness and used
it as an excuse not to join the Peace Ship.

172 Paul Kellogg to Lochner, November 9, 1915, Ford Peace
Plan Papers; George Nasmyth to Jordan, November 10,
1915, ibid.

173 Peter G. Tuttle, "The Ford Peace Ship: Volunteer Dip-
ломacy in the Twentieth Century," unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Yale University, 1958, 83.
Other pacifists obviously embarrassed by the Ford Peace Ship, notably David Starr Jordan, felt mediation should have been separated from it and devoted much time to a cooperative effort with Europeans interested in the permanent reform of international relations. The Dutch Anti-War Council sponsored a conference at The Hague, April 7-12, 1915. Out of this gathering which featured thirty-one representatives of parliamentary, scientific, political, and pacifistic associations of ten countries was formed the Central Organization for A Durable Peace. The first meeting of the American branch was held on December 20, 1915. The essence of this organization was its Minimum Program, a list of nine principles which would form the basis of any future peace settlement. The organization published


175 These principles were: 1) No annexation or transfer of territory contrary to the interests and desires of its inhabitants, 2) guarantees of civil and religious liberty, as well as the free use of their language to the nationalities of each territory, 3) equal trading rights for all nations, 4) a permanent peace organization headquarterd at The Hague, 5) submission of all disputes to pacific procedure, 6) sanctions against nations refusing to submit disputes to a judicial decision, 7) reduction of armaments, 8) guarantee of freedom of the seas, 9) secret treaties to be judged null and void. Cf., Andrews, Memory Pages, 112.
Recueil des Rapports, and in the very first issue of this journal Jordan had a lead article in which he delineated the importance of the Minimum Program and its first point regarding the annexation of territory. 176

Jordan hoped to use his participation in the April, 1916 meeting of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace at Berne, Switzerland as a forum for a personal movement towards mediation. 177 This meeting, however, was postponed because of the drive at Verdun. Ideas of the Minimum Program found frequent mention in his speeches during 1916. The principles of the Minimum Program comprise much of the ideology for establishing a permanent peace through a negotiated or mediated settlement without the need for war. Wilson later incorporated many of these same principles into the peace settlement obtained by war.

With regard to the second part of the question, as a result of the Ford Peace Ship the climate in which pacifists made their proposals and went about their work became increasingly hostile. Of course, criticism had never been completely absent. Since September, 1914 Theodore Roosevelt, relegated to "innocuous desuetude," to use former

177 Jordan to Jane Addams, January 19, 1916, Jane Addams Papers; Jordan to a group of correspondents, January 20, 1916, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
President Taft's phrase, was chafing at the bit, restless and anxious to get into this war that promised to be as exciting as the Cuban adventure of 1898. Roosevelt had already in August adopted his concept of this being a holy war. And to Lord Bryce, Roosevelt dispatched in late March, 1915, an elaborate essay on one group of pacifists whom he felt were not willing to redress the Prussian invasion of Belgium. Apparently basing his criticism on traditional reputations rather than actual performance, he wrote

The pacifist crowd here, the men like Nicholas Murray Butler, with whom you have been corresponding, and above all, Carnegie, have to my mind occupied a peculiarly ignoble position. They have been clamoring in season and out of season for all kinds of measures, mostly preposterous, in the interests of peace; but when Germany broke the peace, when she brought the frightful calamities of war and subjugation upon Belgium, these same men have been afraid of uttering one word of condemnation; ... and their entire denunciation of war and praise of peace have taken such shape as to amount almost as much to denunciation of Belgium for defending herself as of Germany for attacking her... They cry continually for peace and not at all for righteousness.

178 "The war is not merely one of race against race. This is the war of a modern people against a medieval autocracy." The Outlook, CVII (August 15, 1914), 892-893. Also quoted in Link, Wilson, III, 9. See also, "Blaming Germany for the War," Literary Digest, XLIX (August 22, 1914), 292-295; "The Real Crime Against Germany," The Nation, XCIX (August 13, 1914), 181-182; Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality, 1914-1917," American Historical Review, XLIII (July, 1938), 775-90.

Roosevelt roundly condemned the pacifist position. Avowing he had never adhered to abstractions like "peace, peace," he refused to begin to do so. In characteristic fashion, Roosevelt typed the sailing of the Noordam and the efforts of the women delegates: "Pacifists are cowards, and your scheme is both silly and base." Responding to the Lusitania incident, Roosevelt condemned Wilson's policy and asserted that the President was responsible for the disaster to the liner. In Roosevelt's eye America was shirking its duty and allowing "hideous wrongdoing (sic) at the expense of the helpless and the innocent," and Jane Addams, Andrew Carnegie, David Starr Jordan, and Nicholas Murray Butler, along with Wilson and Bryan were the naive leaders taking the American public down the wrong road. Doubtlessly, Roosevelt had been impressed by the pre-war efforts of Carnegie and Butler to include them in his general charge, but he was equally struck by the numbers of those from a reform background. He wrote, "A really lamentable thing to me in our party during the past year has been the revival of the pacifist spirit in exactly the same shape it took among the Copperheads of 1864. It is


181 Theodore Roosevelt to Albert Bushnell Hart, June 1, 1915, Morrison, Roosevelt Letters, VIII, 927.
lamentable to see how many Progressives have gone into the movement." 182

Roosevelt was not alone in his verbal assaults on peace activists, but up until the *Lusitania* incident such attacks were not widespread. The July 5 return of Jane Addams, however, and the speech she gave at Carnegie Hall signaled the beginning of a broad attack on her and on pacifists generally. 183 Already under attack from the *New York Times* because "her effort aided the war," Jane Addams started quite a controversy when in her very first speech on July 9, she charged that the conflict was an "old man's war" and that the soldiers were being artificially stimulated. 184 She was quickly accused of defaming the courage of English and French youth—that there was no need for their being drugged and doped to go into combat. It did not matter that she was misunderstood about the "artificial stimulation" charge (she meant men are too sensitive to kill without a beclouding of the senses in whatsoever manner this may come about). The attack by the


183 The *Survey*, XXXIV (July 10, 1915), 527; XXXIV (July 17, 1915), 353-355.

press was her "baptism of fire." More than a personal attack, however, her statements were used to broaden the effort at making pacifism unpopular. 185

The Ford Peace Ship therefore provided an opportunity for intensification of anti-pacifist feeling. 186 Pacifists were already characterized as a "Fools' Paradise" because of their frantic activity and apparent disorganization. 187 They were further represented as the destroyers of national unity during the bitterly fought anti-preparedness campaign.

185 New York Times, July 12, and July 13, 1915. For a description of the entire episode and how Miss Addams regarded it, cf. James Linn, Jane Addams, 313-314. An interesting account of an early conflict with the "media" was summarized in a supporting letter to Miss Aldams, "Of course, the press simply selected, willfully selected I might say, the portion they wanted merely to make trouble." Cornelia Bradford to Jane Addams, January 17, 1916, Jane Addams Papers.


187 The phrase was first used by General George Wingate, New York Times, January 31, 1915. Samuel Gompers also helped popularize it.
CHAPTER FIVE
ANTI-MILITARISM

Soon after the outbreak of World War One certain individuals and organizations began to call for an investigation of the defenses of the United States. A rash of new groups, issuing propaganda and lobbying for increased defense spending, military training in the schools, and other manifestations of the militarist spirit, put forth the vague but unified call for preparedness. "Preparedness for What?" responded the pacifists as they formed their own organizations in opposition. The struggle against preparedness involved challenging each of the ideas set forth by the new militarist organizations and their spokesmen.

ONE

The progressive movement, involved in the reform of all aspects of American life, did not leave the armed services untouched. Efforts to update the Army and Navy had been underway since the Spanish-American War. The results, however, from the viewpoint of these military reformers had been far from satisfactory. At the outbreak of the European War, the United States Army was little more than an 80,000 man constabulary, which, exclusive of coastal
defense and supply troops, was spread over forty-nine army posts in twenty-nine states. This dispersion of troops allowed an average of about 600 men per post with no reference to their tactical usefulness.\(^1\) Smaller than the Bulgarian Army, let alone the huge conscript armies of the major European powers, the United States Army was as low in pay as it was in public esteem. The Navy was equally unimpressive. In light of the dreadnought revolution in ship design, the naval lobby felt that the Anglo-German race to create a modern Navy had rendered the United States' first line vessels and their auxiliaries obsolescent.\(^2\)

Within the armed forces reformers were not lacking. Both General Leonard Wood, the Army Chief of Staff, and Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War under President Taft, emphasized the weakness of the nation's defense position. Sharing the idea of public service and a faith in the importance of an informed public, both men, shocked by the inefficiency of the Army and Navy, appealed for change. Both men felt it was time for the United States to take lessons from foreign armies and adopt some variation of the European reserve system. Instead of trying to keep soldiers in the ranks for as long as possible, the Army should discharge

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1 Leonard Wood, as interviewed by George K. Turner, "Why We Have No Army," McClure's, XXXVII (April, 1912), 667-683.

its troops as soon as they had become proficient in military skills, and then proceed to recruit new men to be trained. In this way the nation would have a large pool of trained manpower which could be called upon in an emergency.

This call had met little success by the time Stimson stepped down as Secretary of War after the election of Wilson and General Wood completed his term as Army Chief of Staff in April, 1914. Neither within nor without the armed services was there much enthusiasm for their reform. Both the Congress and the nation at large appeared indifferent to the weakness of the nation's defenses and needed to be informed about the dangers which such weakness created. It had become apparent to the would-be reformers that the idea of a modern army would have to be sold to the American people. The search for civilians who could agitate in a way which might prove indiscreet for officers was well underway at the time of the outbreak of the European War.

The initial clamor for preparedness was simply an appeal for an investigation of the state of the United States' defenses. From this resolution the movement gathered supporters from pre-war reformers as well as among the growing number of those who felt after 1914 that the United States would be too vulnerable in the post-war world without a respectable defense capacity. The preparedness movement was further swelled and complicated by the added
support of those who shared the belief that the inchoate softness of America in face of a world-wide struggle could be arrested and the entire nation uplifted by a return to the military arts, a spartan life best realized by military training for all members of society—universal military training.

The preparedness movement during the period of American neutrality was anything but static. It unveiled new facets almost monthly as it maneuvered to win public support. At the end of two years, however, it had fully manifested itself. By that time it had achieved a shifting of focus away from the inevitable tragedy of continental militarism and European rivalries to the presentation of the war as an exclusively Prussian attempt at world domination. War instead of being evil in itself—a position which pacifist groups felt had attained general acceptance—was shifted in the present case to a war between good and evil. The story of that shift can be told briefly, while the efforts of pacifists to prevent public opinion from being swept along by wartime hysteria and military misrepresentation is the subject of the balance of this chapter.

The European War created a favorable climate for preparedness. Since the war did not end quickly as had been the widespread expectation, politicians and citizen groups,
hitherto uninterested, began to express concern about the state of United States' defenses. On October 15, 1914 Congressman Augustus P. Gardner (Republican, Massachusetts) made the opening move in the preparedness campaign with his introduction of House Joint Resolution 372. This resolution provided for the formation of a National Security Commission empowered to thoroughly investigate the preparedness of the United States for war. 3 Gardner's resolution received a favorable hearing in the press. 4 Several magazine editors also became convinced of the need for preparedness and lent the editorial pages of their publications to the campaign. 5 The movement was beginning to find its needed civilian allies.

Two such allies were Hudson Maxim and Frederick L. Huidekoper. Both men contributed to an overall total of some sixty titles relating to national defense which were

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5 Among these were George Harvey of The North American Review and Lawrence F. Abbott of the Outlook.
published between 1915 and the United States decision for intervention in the war in early 1917. Maxim, the brother of the machine-gun maker, published *Defenseless America* in early 1915, predicting that war was inevitable and that in its present state the United States could only hope to be overrun. Huidekoper, a well-bred Washington lawyer and dilettante military historian, became one of the principal civilian helpers. He had been busy proving the United States' unpreparedness for war since 1906.\(^6\) In addition to founding the Army League to lobby for reform, he published the conclusions of his decade of research in 1915 in the copiously footnoted *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*.

In addition to the press, perhaps the most influential support for the preparedness campaign came from civilian defense societies, founded to give financial assistance and mobilize a friendly public opinion. By the summer of 1915, these civilian defense organizations included the Navy League, the Army League, the American Defense League, the American Legion, and the National Security League.\(^7\) The Navy League had existed for over a

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\(^7\) By late 1915 and early 1916 the number of preparedness organizations had further increased, several of which became quite prominent, such as the Aero Club and the American Rights Committee.
decade as a lobby for naval expansion and modernization and published its own journal, Seven Seas. The Army League was still in the development stage, but the American Defense League, proudly carrying Theodore Roosevelt's name at the top of its letterhead, called for an enlarged army and navy as well as the need for all Americans to be trained in the use of the rifle.

The two most controversial of the civilian defense societies were the American Legion and the National Security League. The American Legion, established on February 26, 1915, proposed to enroll volunteers into a reserve based on the past military experience of its members. According to its own statement the Legion office asserted that 20,000 applications for enrollment were received during its first two weeks of incorporation. Playing on the virtue of pure Americanism (which excluded all hyphenated Americans from its rolls), the enthusiasm for military service, and its conviction of the need to police America, the Legion soon

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8 During the summer of 1915 the Navy League boasted an increase of 11,000 members, and developed a Woman's Section. Cf., Armin Rappaport, The Navy League of the United States, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1962, 49-50.

9 Paxson, I, 289.
claimed to have the force of a million.\(^\text{10}\)

The National Security League (NSL) was not so extreme either in its ambitions or its propaganda. It was founded in December to back the resolution of Congressman Gardner. The NSL called for a Council of National Defense which would have full authority to direct expenditures for the army and navy. As an ostensibly nonpartisan lobby the National Security League aimed to become a vehicle of public opinion with the purpose of demanding Congressional action in favor of greater preparedness. The creation of a National Security Commission and its subsequent investigation would be expected to demonstrate the sad state of United States defenses and prompt the necessary steps toward modernization. The League established its permanent headquarters on New York's Pine Street and boasted an impressive roster of honorary directors. Its major committees were headed by civilian experts long identified with the cause of army and navy reform. Henry L. Stimson, for example, chaired the League's Army Committee. This arrangement insured that the NSL, as essentially a civilian body, would follow the lead of military professionals and

\(^{10}\) *New York Times*, March 7, 1915. The claim was an obvious exaggeration. Time alone prohibited the processing of membership applications with such rapidity. The claim, however, was sufficient to scare pacifist groups into organizing in opposition to the American Legion, especially on grounds of its divisive propaganda which accentuated the potential danger of impure and hyphenated Americans.
their expert opinion rather than commit itself to self-devised schemes of questionable validity.

The civilian preparedness advocates thus had leadership, organization, and above all, the highly dramatic European War itself to accent their campaign. Slowly the attention given preparedness in the press, among the business and professional classes, and among the long-standing army and navy reformers created a situation for the Wilson Administration which demanded a response. Preparedness was manifesting a growth which could no longer be ignored.

President Wilson first responded to the preparedness agitation begun by Congressman Gardner in his annual State of the Union message delivered on December 8, 1914. He stated that the conflict in Europe was "a war with which we have nothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affords us opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should make us ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation for trouble." He reaffirmed America's dedication to peace and granted she was not prepared to field a nation of men trained in arms. America would continue to refuse to undertake preparation for war and thus avoid turning the nation into a military camp in disregard of our traditional policy against large

11 Baker and Dodd, Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, III, 226.
standing and reserve armies. Defense would be provided by a citizen army of volunteers which in the past always provided a reliable protection for "national peace and safety." At the time, there was little doubt that the President reflected the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the country.

The advocates of preparedness, however, were not to be easily put off. They continued their agitation for investigation and reforms in the Army and Navy. Their incessant pressure gave rise in some quarters to the fear that the specter of militarism was beginning to seize the land. Pacifist groups organized in opposition.

TWO

Many pacifists revealed their progressive reform heritage in thinking that war was the result of secret machinations of armaments manufacturers and international bankers using governments to promote their selfish economic interests. They advocated arbitration to settle international crises, and they believed that the government should


13 Link, Wilson, the Struggle for Neutrality, 140; Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, VI, 6.
undertake the construction of ships and guns, thus curtailling the power of Wall Street and avoiding expensive waste. The charge of conspiracy was actually the revival of a long-standing accusation, the outcry against the "merchants of death."\textsuperscript{14} John Bates Clark spoke of his fear of wars promoted by the arms interests before the outbreak of the European conflagration.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Cf., Agnes A. Trotter, "The Development of Merchants of Death Theory of American Intervention in the First World War, 1914-1937," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1966, 4-40. Several Congressmen pointed to the link-up of the steel industry and the powder trust with elements of the Navy to create war scare rumors at the time of the annual appropriations. These charges themselves were the background for advocacy of government-owned munitions and armor plate factories to eliminate the waste and inflated profits of armorer's who bid on government contracts. Not much was made of these charges at the time.

Ms. Trotter's conclusions about Dupont's difficulties with Congress differ significantly from those of Robert Seager, II, "The Progressives and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1917," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, 1956. Seager casts progressives into the expansionist-racist-exploitive mold as outlined in the Leuchtenburg article and finds that the image of war mongering munitions-maker was absent before 1914 and that the Dupont gunpowder monopolists had no evil motives imputed to them.

\textsuperscript{15} John Bates Clark and Sir George Paish, "A Proposed Standing Committee of the Powers," in Twentieth Lake Mohonk Conference, Report (1914), 121-123.
Hamilton Holt also shared this devil theory of war when, after the crippling of the arbitration treaties in 1911, he felt that the cause of international organization was being eroded by special interests such as the arms manufacturers, the idle rich, and statesmen with personal stakes in the status quo.\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps the pre-war mind of the progressive-pacifist was best expressed by Moses H. Clapp, the liberal Republican senator from Minnesota, in a speech at Gettysburg on Memorial Day, 1914. The senator declared that wars were the products of "an impersonal spirit" trying "to dominate humanity for its own aggrandizement," and that this spirit was similar to the selfish forces operating in American business to deny industrial justice.\textsuperscript{17}

Actually, the pacifistic progressive feared the link-up of war and business for two reasons. Basically, he believed that America's problems came from big business.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} M. E. Clapp, "Memorial Day Address" as cited in Walter Allan Sutton, "The Command of Gold--Progressive Republican Senators and Foreign Policy, 1913-1917," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas, 1964, 121.
\end{itemize}
But in addition to the disgust at profit-making on armament manufacture and the dangers to which satiation of that appetite might lead, he feared that with a war banks and corporations, somewhat placed under control by 1914, would burst loose again. The American ideal of democracy would again be in serious danger of pervasion. In this context, President Wilson's own quotation provides an apt summary:

> Every reform we have won will be lost if we go into this war. We have been making a fight on special privilege. War means autocracy. The people we have unhorsed will inevitably come into the control of the country, for we shall be dependent on the steel, oil, and financial magnates. They will run the nation.18

Wilson, of course, later came to change his views, while others continued to argue against the special interests until the very eve of intervention.

In combating the thrust of militarism and the dangers of armament spending four pacifist organizations were particularly active: the Woman's Peace Party, the American League for the Limitation of Armaments, the Association to Abolish War, and the American Union Against

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Militarism. The Woman's Peace Party's founding and early activity has been introduced elsewhere. Attention here is centered on the other three.

The American League for the Limitation of Armaments (ALLA) was organized on December 18, 1914 to offset the propaganda of the National Security League. Its aim was to combat militarism and the spread of the militaristic spirit in the United States. It attempted to use its influence "to promote a sane national policy for the preservation of international law and order with the least reliance upon force, and to secure the efficient use of moneys appropriated for the purpose."19 The organization took up quarters at 43 Cedar Street in New York City and opened its membership rolls to any person who could pay the one dollar dues.

The ALLA was not pacifist in the strict sense, that is, it believed in the use of force for purposes of defense and to maintain order. Nevertheless, it occupied an important place among the new reforming pacifist groups which arose to challenge the rising sentiment of American militarism. Taking their cue from the tone of Nicholas Murray Butler's organizing speech in which Butler stated, "I do

not conceive of this gathering in terms of protest, I con-
ceive it rather in terms of an offering of constructive
leadership in a great forward movement," the leaders of
the ALLA conceived of themselves as a counterweight to the
elaborate propaganda of those who were beginning to agitate
for more armament spending. As the ALLA stated, "The mili-
tarists have had control all through the world's history
and have brought the world to the worst situation in which
it has ever been. Pacifists could not possibly do any
worse, so why not give them a chance?" The League urged
America to give the world moral leadership by setting an
example of military restraint.

The ALLA received strong support from former Secre-
tary of the Navy, John D. Long, who in a statement reminis-
cent of the reforming sentiment of many members of the ALLA
wrote

Would not the Kaiser who by a turn of the finger
could have prevented the present ghastly horror
of mutilation and death, have inaugurated it if
his war preparation had been no greater than our

20 This speech was later circulated as an eight-page pamph-
lett by the ALLA, entitled The Preparedness of America,

21 Memorandum of Points in Opposition to the Increase of the
Army and Navy of the United States At the Present Time,
n.d. Copy of this pamphlet is in ALLA Papers.
own? And would not Germany, with its splendid people, have been all these later years as well, if not better off commercially, industrially and socially, and in every other good thing true to modern civilization? 22

Moreover, the ALLA was inspired by the September-October meetings of the Henry Street group. Lillian Wald, in fact, was one of the original organizers, although actual leadership was in the hands of H. Hollingsworth Wood, the ALLA secretary. Oswald Garrison Villard was perhaps the most enthusiastic ALLA member, vigorously attacking in his speeches and through the pages of the New York Evening Post of which he was the editor, the barrage of propaganda being spread by the National Security League. In addition to wanting a strict accounting of all funds spent for armament, the ALLA was the original organization opposing both the summer military camps and the charges of inadequate United States' defenses.

Villard and the ALLA felt secure in the early months of 1915 that the President was against increased armament spending. Rumor circulated through the summer of 1915, however, that Wilson was about to switch to a program of moderate preparedness. Villard tried to have an interview for himself and other members of the ALLA, but was refused. Villard's bitterness and sharpness of attack both upon Wilson and the militarists during 1916 and 1917 can be attri-

22 Leaflet, ALLA Papers.
buted to Wilson's apparent breach of faith when he reversed himself on the armaments program.23

Another group which arose in 1915 to express a current of repulsion against the preparedness movement was the Association to Abolish War (ATAW). This association was founded in Boston by Charles F. Dole, a retired Unitarian minister, and Wilbur Thomas, executive secretary of the Friends Service Committee. Membership grew slowly, and, although the ATAW was national in its plans, its major activities were generally limited to the Boston area.24

Patterning itself on the English peace societies, the ATAW hoped to draw its support from the educated middle and professional classes. It despaired of attracting many adherents from the working masses as it was convinced that these groups, following the lead of the churches, had been converted to preparedness.25 The avowed aim of the founders of the ATAW was to fill the gap created by the defection of the older established peace societies and to

23 The Survey, XXXIII (January 9, 1915), 394-395; Wressin, 49, 56.


25 Walter Walsh to C. F. Dole, June 30, 1915, ATAW Papers.
form a rallying point for those still committed to work for non-resistence. C. F. Dole, chief spokesman for the society, argued strongly that the greatest danger which faced the American public was the latent imperialism which resided in preparedness. This imperialism would cause the United States to place its chief priorities on foreign enterprises rather than on the promotion of domestic social welfare.\textsuperscript{26}

In an effort to cultivate the spirit of pacifism the ATAW urged its members to supply all town libraries, public reading rooms, and local papers with free copies of its literature. Pamphlets were to accompany every letter written to women's and men's clubs, Senators, and Congressmen.\textsuperscript{27} In an effort to fully saturate the Boston area, the executive committee resolved to frequently advertise its aims and appeal for membership on the front pages of the nation's newspapers.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Journal of Race Development}, VI (April, 1916), 410.

\textsuperscript{27} These pamphlets range in size from simple one page flyers to multi-page brochures. The most popular type was a sheet folded into a four-page leaflet. The titles themselves reveal the anti-preparedness effort of the ATAW: "Nietzsche at his Best," "War Fallacies," "The Only Hope for World Peace," "The Missing Note," and "What Gain is There in War?" "Report of the Executive Committee," June 20, 1915, ATAW Papers.
As indicated above, during 1915 the focus of pacifism was on mediation. Only in the closing months of that year did any proportion of peace advocates sense that they were being outflanked. The efforts of the ALLA and the ATAW were far from adequate to oppose the preparedness forces, now bolstered by the commitment of the President in his November 4 Manhattan speech to a preparation for defense. In light of the imminent debacle of the mediation campaign, a large number of peace workers—many of them linear descendants of the Henry Street meetings—decided to regroup in a concentrated confrontation with the rising tide of United States militarism. On December 21, 1915, the Henry Street council adopted the name Anti-Militarism Committee. A few weeks later it changed its name to the Anti-Preparedness Committee. Four months later it changed its name again to the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) in an effort to enlarge the scope of the organization and to include numerous other nationwide groups which sought affiliation. 28

The AUAM was put together just as the preparedness agitation reached its crest and when the arrival of Henry Ford on the peace scene seemed to hold out the promise of ample financial backing for any organization that would

resist the currents of militarism. Kellogg had talked to Louis Lochner and Lochner indicated that there might be a chance of getting Ford money. The automobile manufacturer had promised a subsidy to the Woman's Peace Party and might be even more willing to support an organization with a large complement of men. 29 Little money, however, was forthcoming. The bulk of contributions to the AUAM came in small amounts, much of it from the Society of Friends. The Union was not a broad cross-section of America, but a mixed collection of women, social-uplift progressives, radical clergymen, and Socialists. It remained small and poor, essentially a New York group headed by Lillian Wald. It did, however, strategically locate its headquarters in Washington, and found a highly gifted executive director in Charles T. Hallinan, a Chicago publicity man who had formerly worked with the National American Women's Suffrage Association. 30

The AUAM established the only active nation-wide press service available to the forces fighting militarism. It sent frequent bulletins and stories to 1,601 newspapers all over the country, to farm and labor weeklies as well as dailies. During the summer of 1916 it distributed over 600,000 pieces of propaganda, varying from multi-paged pamphlets to simply composed telegrams suitable for mailing.

29 Minutes, November 29, 1915, AUAM Papers.

to one's Congressman and carrying the message that "the road to war is paved with preparedness." Since the AUAM was basically oriented to influence Congress, flyers asking citizens to write their Senators and Representatives were commonplace.

During the summer of 1916 the AUAM attempted to broaden its base by opening its membership rolls to 6000 members and associates, and established local committees in twenty-two states. In its anti-militarism campaign the AUAM opposed the vast sums of money which were to be allotted for increasing the nation's military and naval establishments on the grounds that this money could be more constructively used for bettering social welfare. The AUAM also linked preparedness to the menace of imperialism. It argued that military training in the schools would destroy critical thinking in American youth. Finally, the AUAM held that militarist values were unenlightened and based on primitive emotions of fear and greed. The avowed purpose of the Union was not to supercede any existing anti-militarist organization, but to serve as a vehicle by which public pacific opinion could be efficiently marshalled and utilized to influence the thinking of Congress.

Choosing as its symbol of preparedness the dinosaur—"all armor-plate and no brains"—the AUAM conducted a massive and often witty campaign.

As the AUAM went about its work, it was involved in close contact, whether in the sharing of mailing lists or in the sharing of ideals, with co-operating peace societies, the Farmers' Grange, labor unions, women's clubs, Quaker meetings, college faculties, and organizations like the Inter-collegiate Socialist Society, the American Bar Association, the American Library Association, and the National Educational Association. Able to derive support from such a wide variety of individuals and organizations, not to mention the legislative support in Congress from about fifty Representatives, particularly from the rural districts, of the South and the West, the AUAM and the peace movement in general developed into a new coalition. 32 It was a coalition which comprised many of the pre-war pacificist idealists who believed in the immortality of war and the need to settle international crises by arbitration. To this number were added those coming from a social activist background who saw war as destructive of their achievements, a threat to future goals, and corrosive of the larger

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mission of America. In their eyes militarism could only stain America's honor and compromise her destiny.

As this progressive-pacifist coalition against the thrust of militarism developed, a sense of *deja vu* appeared both with regard to most of the participants and to many of their public statements and propaganda. Increasingly, the struggle came to resemble that conducted since the 1890's against big business and the trusts. Financiers with money to lend and industrialists with markets to win and products to sell appeared as the chief promoters and beneficiaries of war. The progressives' old opponents to reform at home—the large corporation heads, the bankers, the old big Navy advocates, the munitions-makers, and armor-plate monopoly—appeared solidly arrayed behind the preparedness movement. Even the fundamental symbolism, reaching far back to the time of the Populist agitation, appeared the same: West versus East, the wronged western and southern farmers resenting eastern industrial and financial control.33

Moreover, certain progressives and pacifists could act in coalition against preparedness for other ideological reasons. Militarism was believed to threaten much of the value system which had become accepted in America. The

tradition of no large standing army and reliance upon citizen volunteers for defense in time of emergency was being undermined by the preparedness propaganda. Accordingly, the progressive-pacifist coalition--the ALLA, ATAW, WPP, AUAM, and other co-operating societies and individuals--organized in opposition to the three major manifestations of 1914-1917 militarism: 1) increases in the defense appropriation bills for the purpose of armament spending, 2) increases in the size of the Army and Navy, and 3) advocacy of conscription and universal military training. The pacifist opposition to each of these preparedness programs will be treated separately in the following sections.

THREE

Convinced of the unmilitaristic character of America and its mission to bring the ultimate reform of peace to the world, American pacifists saw the cause of the European War in militarism. Most of them therefore, could only view with dismay the shift of public sentiment away from the disdain of the cult of militarism to the cry for increased armament spending as a means to remain strong and not be humiliated by weakness, as happened in Belgium. Gradually, criticism of militarism focused only on the Prussian variety, and conveniently overlooked that of
France and the navalism of England.\textsuperscript{34} It was this about-face in the public mood--militarism was needed to defeat militarism--which most shocked pacifists.

As the various resolutions to investigate the state of United States' defenses and to increase military and naval appropriations mounted in Congress, pacifists and their supporters reacted strongly. Nicholas Murray Butler, though he later altered his view, challenged the state of mind behind preparedness. In a stinging speech later circulated as \textit{The Preparedness of America}, he stated:

\begin{quote}
I should welcome a properly conducted inquiry into the military and naval expenditures made by the government of the U.S. in recent years, because I believe that the first result of such inquiry would be to show that under better administrative conditions and under more business-like management, we should have gotten much more for the money spent--or, to put it in another way, we should have gotten what we need for less money.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

This theme of wastefulness found frequent expression in the halls of Congress. Clyde Tavenner (Democrat, Illinois) warned of the current squandering of money on the Army and Navy, and yet the country was still unprotected. Before the outbreak of the European War, Britain had spent

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Harold C. Peterson, \textit{Propaganda For War}, Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1939, 46-48.
\item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{The Preparedness of America}, n.p., n.d., unpaged. Copy in ALLA Papers.
\end{itemize}
$135,000,000 a year to get 255,000 regular and 450,000 territorial troops. During the same period the United States had managed to pay out $104,000,000 for an army of only 85,000 men. 36 Warren Worth Bailey (Democrat, Pennsylvania) repeated the claim of wastefulness when he charged that preparedness advocates "want more money spent under precisely the same methods that have prevailed during the last fifteen years, with results which they themselves admit to be in the last degree unsatisfactory." 37

Pacifist organizations seized upon these statements and, combining them with the results of their own research, circulated them in a very effective pamphlet, Seven Congressmen on Preparedness. In his article in the pamphlet Congressman Claude Kitchin is quoted:

For the ten years preceding the European War we had expended on our Navy over $300,000,000 more than Germany or any other nation (except Great Britain) had expended on its Navy! And yet the metropolitan press, the magazine writers, the "Patriotic Societies" and the jingoist and war traffickers would frighten the country into the belief that we have a little, puny eggshell of a Navy! 38

36 Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, 273.


Moreover, in fighting the Navy Bill of 1916 the AUAM circulated flyers containing the following comparison to illustrate the proper management of existing funds on the part of the services: "$217,658,173 is the amount asked for this year. During five years before the war Germany in her utmost attempt to overtake Britain spent only $546,454,803 on her navy—about one half of what we plan to spend. Yet the U.S. during the same period spent $653,869,371 more than Germany." 39 Pacifists, apart from their opposition to militarism, wanted a proper accounting for the money already expended in the defense budget—a simple, traditional progressive reform which called for the efficient management of public funds.

Furthermore, pacifists were shocked by the call for additional appropriations because the money would give to the rich without benefiting the poor. "We protest against the effort being made to divert public funds, sorely needed in constructive programs for National health and well being, into the manufacture of engines of death." Florence Kelley wrote, "...it seemed to me a very menacing symptom that in a republic so poor it can spend only $167,000 a year for a Children's Bureau..." In view of the 72% of existing appropriations going to pensions and armament, the ALLA unanimously passed the following resolution:

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39 Handbill, AUAM Papers.
Resolved, that the true policy of this country is not to increase its land and sea forces, but to retain for productive and humanizing outlay the vast sums demanded for armaments, and to waitsteadfastly for the day when we may offer our disinterested aid in helping the nations of Europe, crippled and prostrate by excess of militarism, to free themselves and the world from the waste and the terror of heaped up instruments of destruction.\textsuperscript{40}

Butler summed up this theme for all members of the antimilitarist coalition, "...Are we to arm to the teeth and draw our resources away from that needed social and industrial improvement which thrusts problems upon us on every hand in order to expend them upon useless armaments against nobody?"\textsuperscript{41}

As time went on, reasoned argument against preparedness and armament spending appeared to be of no avail. The contest became one of growing bitterness. References to a linkage between munitions makers and the preparedness agitation became more common.\textsuperscript{42} Bryan, after his resignation, called for increased opposition to the big-business type of preparedness advocated by Theodore Roosevelt and the National Security League.\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[40] Press release, n.d. (but early in 1916), AUAM Papers; Florence Kelley to the House Committee on Military Affairs as quoted in Seven Congressmen on Preparedness, 14, AUAM Papers; \textit{The Survey}, XXXIII (January 9, 1915), 394.
\item[41] \textit{The Preparedness of America}, unpaged, copy in ALLA Papers.
\item[42] \textit{Cf.}, \textit{The Survey}, XXXIII (January 9, 1915), 395.
\end{footnotes}
As the sharpness of debate heightened, cries of conspiracy were directed at the preparedness advocates, accused of calling for war for the sake of private profit. Senator Robert M. LaFollette was only one among many pacifistic Americans to allude to the conspiracy of the "War Trust." He condemned munitions makers for profiting from the "business of wholesale murder" and for causing increased expenditures for armaments. Amos Pinchot, a prominent pacifist, and Albert Cummins, progressive Senator from Iowa, were also troubled by the link between war and profits. Frederic C. Howe, the advocate of civic revival, expressed the same idea in his *Why War?* and *The Only Possible Peace*. Howe took the old "robber baron" idea of economic exploitation by railroad tycoons, cast it into a setting of European imperialism and explained for himself the cause of World War I. George Norris, the fighting liberal from Nebraska, felt that the sentiment for intervention had been whipped up by "munition manufacturers, stockholders and bond dealers" who would make enormous profits. He concluded his speech against the declaration


of war with "I would like to say to the war god: 'You shall not coin into gold the lifeblood of my brethren! ...I feel we are about to put the dollar sign upon the American flag."47

Both pacifists and their Congressional supporters had agreed with LaFollette's sarcasm:

Enlist, enroll yourselves under the banners of the munition makers and financial organizations that want great armies, commit yourselves to putting into the waters of our seaboards a Navy to match England, and forever and forever, unless there be a revolt, you have changed the destiny of this country.48

The changing of that destiny was especially apparent to the anti-preparedness opposition in the threats they saw in the creation of 1) a large-standing army and 2) universal military training.

FOUR

The exact point of Wilson's conversion to preparedness and his commitment to an expansion of the nation's standing army and an acceleration of naval construction is uncertain. Some students of his career find evidence of


48 Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, 11342.
his support for preparedness prior to the sinking of the Lusitania. Others emphasize the political pressures being brought upon Wilson to take over the leadership of the preparedness movement, or at least make some compromises in this direction; failure to act was expected to give the Republican Party exclusive control of a highly attractive issue in the national election of 1916. Another explanation for Wilson's reversal on preparedness was his conviction of Germany's intent to dominate the continent of Europe. In light of the threat to peace which Germany was creating by her submarine warfare and the unsatisfactory settlement of the Lusitania incident, the President saw evidence of a possible German victory and eventual involvement of the United States. Creating adequate defenses was simply a matter of prudent foresight.


51 Notter, 431-432.
In any event, by July 1915 Wilson ordered Secretaries Garrison and Daniels to draw up preparedness programs for the Administration. As indicated earlier, the President announced his conversion to preparedness at the Manhattan Club in November, and in addressing the opening session of the Sixty-Fourth Congress introduced his National Defense Bill. This bill called for an increase in the regular Army to 142,000 men, the establishment of a Continental Army of 400,000 to be raised in three annual increments of 133,000 each, and increased federal recognition of and support to the National Guard. Wilson also called for the construction over the next five years of ten dreadnought battleships, six battle cruisers, fifteen fleet submarines, eighty-five coast submarines, four gunboats, one hospital ship, two ammunition ships, two fuel-oil ships, and one repair ship.52

The plan for the Army, known as the Garrison Plan, which Wilson accepted and backed, was essentially a compromise of a report submitted by the General Staff. Based on the hypothesis of what it would take to repel a hostile European army from landing and overrunning the United States, the General Staff program called for a mobile force of 1,500,000 men. This would include an active Regular Army

of 281,000 men plus reserves which would add up to a total of 500,000. Not content to rely upon citizen armies and militia as in the past, the report called for an innovation, the creation of a "Continental Army" of part-time trainees to be ready for combat within ninety days and eventually number 500,000. The third increment of 500,000 was to be raised to replace casualties as effectives. There was no provision made for the National Guard's role in the General Staff's report. 53

Garrison's Plan was obviously moderate by comparison with the General Staff's report. Nevertheless, his concession of federal recognition and pay was not enough to pacify the angered and ruffled feelings of the National Guard. Preparedness advocates were disappointed in the weaknesses of the program which they saw cut to a third of their designs. On the other hand, pacifists were alarmed by the program for increased militarism, especially by such a break in tradition as that represented by the Continental Army which carried with it the threat of a standing army. 54

53 Millis, 217-218; Link, Wilson, Confusions and Crises, 15-18.

54 Even the Army realized it was going against tradition. It recognized the "Anglo-Saxon prejudice against standing armies as a dangerous menace to liberty." Cf., Emery Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, Washington, 1917, ix.
Confronted with impassioned anti-militarist opposition, a livid National Guard lobby which had the ear of Congress, as well as embittered numbers of preparedness advocates who castigated his "do nothing" attitude, Wilson decided to go before the country on a tour to arouse public opinion in support of his plan for moderate preparedness. At this junction, pacifists used the opportunities presented them to generate a two-pronged attack. They testified at the hearings on the National Defense Bill and, after Wilson's return from his tour, organized a counter-tour.

The House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs held hearings from January 6 to February 11, 1916. It was apparent from the beginning that the Continental Army would have rough sledding—especially after the specter of conscription was raised. Congress was dubious enough of the Continental Army, but when it was presented as a paving stone for conscription, Congress shied away even more. James Hay (Democrat, Virginia), chairman of House Military Affairs Committee, told Wilson that the committee opposed the Garrison Plan. Moreover, Hay himself would not support it and made plans to draw up one of his own. 55

face of such opposition Wilson left on his "swing around the circle" on January 27.

During the hearings pacifist groups had ample opportunity to present their opposition to increased militarism. Pacifists had petitioned for a hearing on the preparedness question ever since August 1915 when rumors began to circulate that Wilson was shifting his position. At that time they wrote that the first step toward Prussian militarism and British navalism was for military men to shape military programs without consultation with citizens and taxpayers. They affirmed the need for hearings so that some influence of civilian groups on national policy could be maintained.⁵⁶

In the House hearings Jane Addams attempted to summarize the anti-militarist position. She emphasized the fears from an "exhausted Europe" and a "hypothetical enemy." While she did not ridicule these fears as pacifists did in their demonstrations, she was particularly perceptive in indicating the government's need to speak of military preparations in terms of defense. "Every war is a defensive war," she said, ..."(T)he people will not back up the Government in making an aggressive war." Miss Addams did not carry her pacifism to the point of advocating total and immediate disarmament. She appreciated the need to keep

the Army and Navy at reasonable strength, but she saw no reason to commence the build-up on the scale indicated in the current bill. Moreover, she refused to concede any value to military training in the schools. She urged the United States to lead the world toward disarmament and the permanent solution to the scourge of war.  

Lillian Wald in her testimony attacked the perniciousness of militarist propaganda, and how it served to produce a national atmosphere of hatred. Other testimony came from representatives of farmers' cooperatives, labor, business, education, and the churches.  

It would be wrong to state that this testimony caused the defeat of the Garrison Plan. It helped, but the National Guard lobby was perhaps the most telling factor. In any case, apart from that of Jane Addams, most anti-militarist testimony came too late--some during the final days of the hearings. By that time a decision on the fate of the Continental Army had been reached.  

Wilson returned from his tour on February 4. Chairman Hay saw him the following day, and informed him that the feeling in the House was overwhelmingly against the Garrison

57 United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Military Affairs, To Increase the Military Establishment of the United States, II, 201-213. Quotation is from 204.

58 Ibid., 1269-73; 1317-1365.
Plan. Secretary Garrison who had staked his prestige on
the bill's passage resigned the day before the close of the
hearings. The Continental Army was dead. The pacifists,
indeed the whole coalition of opponents, rejoiced. The AUAM
circulated a witty black-bordered postcard inscribed as
follows:

Requiescat in Pace

In Memory of

The Continental Army (Little Lindley) and
Compulsory Military Service (Little Theodore)

Twin offspring of Dame Europe and General Prepared-
ness,
Died from exposure to Congress and a tour through
the Middle West, February 11, 1916, despite the
"expert" attention of the General Staff and the
Army War College. 59

Only the first round, however, had been won. Both
Wilson and Hay agreed on the need for a defense plan on the
part of the Administration and set about supporting a less
controversial program. Known as the Hay-Chamberlain Bill,
it went through many amendments and variations before final
passage as the Army Reorganization Bill, the core of the

Meanwhile, the focus of opposition shifted from
Congress to public opinion. The catalyst for this shift
had come from President Wilson who very much wanted some

59 Copy in AUAM Papers.
type of Democratic preparedness program. During his cross-
country tour he had challenged his preparedness opponents
to hire halls and take their case to the people. Shortly
after Hay opened debate on his bill, the AUAM took up
Wilson's challenge and launched its "Truth About Prepared-
ness" campaign. At first, the Union held mass meetings in
Carnegie Hall, addressed by an assortment of speakers,
comprising urban radicals as well as Congressmen Clyde
Tavenner, Oscar Calloway, and Martin Dies. Then a "flying
squadron" of Union speakers toured ten cities of the Midwest,
preceded by a giant paper-mache armored and brainless dinosau
saur named "Jingo" and a trained parrot called "General
Wood" which incessantly shrieked, "Preparedness."61

In the "Truth About Preparedness" campaign much of
the essence of progressive-pacifism became apparent. Many
of the techniques used against militarism were the same used
by social workers in their fight against slums. In New
York city, for example, the AUAM spent several thousand dol-
lars in producing a "War Against War" exhibit. They then
reproduced it in poster form and offered it for sale for
$8.00. The exhibit attempted to set forth graphically and
pictorially the stupidity and futility of the whole war sys-
tem. It was devised simple enough for a child's understand-

60 Baker, New Democrats, I, 117.

61 The Survey, XXXVI (April 1, 1916), 37; (April 22, 1916),
95-6.
ing, yet so comprehensive that it made the idea of world organization seem a practicable reality. The WPP conducted the exhibit for the AUAM. It ran for six weeks, drawing crowds of five to ten thousand daily.\(^{62}\) Jane Addams had used a similar idea years before in Chicago to draw attention to the need for improved housing among the city's poor.

The prominence of women in the "Truth About Preparedness" campaign reflected the strong support they gave both to pacifism as well as to domestic progressive reforms. Lillian Wald was chairperson of the campaign committee. Mrs. Mary Ward Dennett was the organizer for the eastern cities, while Mrs. Anna Louise Strong, the first person to organize a child welfare exhibit in St. Louis, was the organizer in the western cities.

Other techniques used at various times in reform drives were either revived or intensified at this time. Among the most common was the use of plays and literature to help win over public opinion. This technique was the particular strength of the WPP which frequently used readings and scenes from plays in its peace rallies. War Brides by Marion Craig Wentworth was a favorite produc-

\(^{62}\) The Survey, XXXVI (April 1, 1916), 37; (April 22, 1916), 95-96.
Pacifists hoped that their plays and dramatic readings would have the same effect upon preparedness as Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had upon slavery. In their continued effort to combat militarism, pacifists freely promoted their slogans: "Mobilize Against Militarism in America," "Cripple War by Curbing its Creator--Armament," "War--Against--War," "Go Slow On Preparedness," "Louvain and the Lusitania were the deeds of militarism. Will you do nothing about it?" The peace groups also encouraged the anti-war songs, "I Didn't Raise My Boy To Be A Soldier" and "Uncle Sam It's Up To You."

During the "Truth About Preparedness" campaign pacifists used their demonstrations and rallies to launch a cogent verbal attack on the evil effects of preparedness on the country. Union speakers like Amos Pinchot stressed the dangers of increased militarism upon domestic progressivism. In six addresses, he urged Americans to make their first attack upon domestic problems like poverty, social injustice, and unemployment, achieving thereby a "real prepared-

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63 The Survey, XXXIV (April 17, 1915), 59. The Woman's Peace Party was particularly fond of the writings of Katrina Trask, especially her *The Mighty and the Lowly*. This was a popular work on peace which the WPP attempted to dramatize.

64 Slogans taken from flyers both ALLA Papers and AUAM Papers.

ness," or economic democracy at home. Pinchot and others in the tour opposed the idea that America was anywhere near invasion. Opposition, of course, continued to center on the bills before Congress which called for an enlarged Regular Army and advances in naval construction.66

In attacking militarist reasoning pacifists pointed out that preparedness was based on primitive feelings not suitable for the sophistication needed for the progressive era. They emphasized the idea, "No foreign foe can touch our liberties but the militarist in our midst with his allies--Ignorance, Prejudice and Fear--can utterly destroy them."67 Militarism was a step backward, calling up primitive feelings of fear and greed. Moreover, preparedness was felt to be anti-democratic. In light of the five-year program for the navy, the AUAM questioned the right of the present Congress to commit its successors to a naval program. The Union suggested that the anti-democratic character of the proposed naval program found a perfect parallel in the course chosen by the German Emperor in forcing the adoption of a twenty-year program. Furthermore, in an effort to remove the element of greed, the Union advocated that any increased expense for armament be met by income and inheri-


tance taxes and not by taxes which placed an additional burden on the poor. Also, the government should manufacture all arms to remove the temptation of private wealth at the expense of commonwealth. 68

The main argument of the Union speakers, however, suggested that preparation for war led logically and inevitably to war. To prepare for war was to invite it. This was a repetition of the traditional anti-militarist position. Training in arms and the possession of armaments were not a mere vacuous exercise. The temptation was always present to use the weapons. The pacifists felt that a large military establishment had to justify its existence by finding work to do. It was an axiom that nations which spend huge sums on armament tried to solve complex social and political problems by force. This was the great danger of preparedness, as Jordan had earlier stated,

War is simply the denial of all law, and law is the basis of civilization and progress. A nation, like a man, should not wantonly throw up the law to engage in a rough and tumble fight, for any trifling provocation. There are things worse that (sic) war, and most of them can be conquered without war. A nation makes a sorry figure if its sole defense or even the chief one is a "big stick". Thus far "big sticks" have been used, if at all, mainly for aggression. 69

68 Statement of early AUAM program, AUAM Papers.

69 Jordan to C. H. Chase, July 29, 1915, Jordan Peace Correspondence.
The Union felt that their "Truth About Preparedness" campaign had been eminently successful. Moreover, it felt that a suitable finale to such a successful tour would be an interview with the President to point out the large amount of anti-military sentiment in the country. Lillian Wald asked for and received an appointment with the President for a six-member AUAM delegation on May 8.

The delegates urged the President to uphold American anti-militarist traditions, expose the sordid motives behind preparedness, declare against compulsory military service, and make clear he had no intentions of building the world's greatest Navy. Wilson's response was polite, but very unsympathetic. He did not see the increase in the size of the military as extravagant nor the growth of the Navy as abnormal. He also felt that the delegates should distinguish between military training and military service. When the delegates pointed out that the training would lead to service as it had in Europe, Wilson shifted his direction and insisted that his program was needed to keep the United States out of war. "If you say, 'We shall not have any

70 Crystal Eastman to AUAM members, August 3, 1916, AUAM Papers.
war,' you have got to have the force to make that 'shall' bite." 71 Prior to the interview the delegates felt that Wilson had been pressured into a program for preparedness. They left disconsolately, convinced that the President was sincere in his desire for military and naval increases. Naturally, the pacifist delegation was disappointed with Wilson's reaction. But, more significantly, they felt that he seriously underestimated the dangers inherent in preparedness.

Their disappointment with the President was shortly coupled with another setback. On June 3 the President signed the National Defense Act, thus incorporating the Hay-Chamberlain Bill into law. Under the terms of the act the Regular Army was increased to 206,169 men with provision for further expansion by presidential order to 254,000 men. Additional provision expanded the strength of the National Guard to 425,000 and authorized its federalization whenever the use of troops in excess of those in the Regular Army was called for. At that time persons so drafted were no longer members of their state militia but were liable for whatever federal duty would be required. The act also called for the

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71 A full report of the May 8, 1916 meeting and a transcript of the statements made are in the AUAM Papers. A copy of Miss Wald's statement is in Wald Papers, New York Public Library. Cf. also, "The President on Militarism," The Survey, XXXVI (May 20, 1916), 198-199; Wald, Windows on Henry Street, 303.
construction of a nitrate plant to cost not more than $20,000,000. There were three other provisions: introduction of the ROTC program in the colleges, recognition and funds provided for the Plattsburg camps, and the authority to draft men into service during wartime in order to bring the Regular Army to authorized strength.  

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While pro-preparedness forces felt that the Act was insufficient the reaction among pacifist groups and their supporters was mixed.  

73 Some, such as Congressman Claude Kitchin, felt the bill was a victory. Others regarded the new, federalized National Guard, though less offensive to pacifists than the Continental Army, as a militaristic device. Crystal Eastman feared the militia pay feature. She argued that if it was put into operation, it would fasten on the country a great greedy military-political machine with endless power. Others saw danger in possible political activity of the Guard and questioned whether the constitutional safeguards over the Regular Army would also apply to the new army of guardsmen. Large armies increased the possibility of militarism and war; thus, the menace of a great standing army, which pacifists felt they had successfully avoided with the defeat of the Continental

72 Link, Wilson, Confusions and Crises, 229-332.

73 Ibid., 332.
Army, might become a reality after all. 74

An additional setback took place with the approval of the Naval Appropriations Bill on August 29, 1916. This bill was more than Wilson called for, but pacifists had never feared navalism as much as militarism. 75 Powerless to defeat the bill, the adversaries of the naval building program forced the inclusion of a provision stating that the United States approved in principle the reduction of armaments. This was the idea set forth in the Hensley


75 The Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 made available the naval expenditure of $315,000,000 for the following programme: ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty torpedo boats, destroyers of the greatest practicable speed and radius of actions, nine fleet submarines, fifty-eight coast submarines, one specially equipped submarine, three fuel ships, one repair ship, two destroyer tenders, one fleet submarine tender, two ammunition ships, and two gunboats. It created an important Naval Reserve, a Naval War Staff, and a Naval Flying Corps. It allowed $705,611 toward the construction of a projectile plant, $11,000,000 for armor plate, $18,223,523 for ammunition, $480,000 for torpedo nets, $1,000,000 to begin new dry docks, $1,600,000 to extend old ones, $500,000 for coal and oil, $1,500,000 for research, $3,500,000 for aviation, and about $1,500,000 for a naval militia. Cf., David P. Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920, I, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Page, 1926, 181.
Resolution amended to the Naval Appropriations Bill. As finally agreed upon by Congress, the resolution stated:

the President is authorized and requested to invite at an appropriate time, not later than the close of the war in Europe, all the great governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of formulating a plan for a court of arbitration, or other tribunal to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for adjudication and peaceful settlement, and to consider the question of disarmament.\textsuperscript{76}

Pacifists rallied behind the Hensley Amendment and claimed success for their efforts in behalf of mediation and arbitration. The resolution provided that even new naval construction authorized in the bill might be rendered unnecessary should the main purpose of the resolution be achieved. Thus the amendment provided that in the event of such success, the President could order suspension of further naval expenditures "inconsistent" with any agreements made by the proposed international tribunal or conference. Encouraged in their disarmament and anti-preparedness battle, pacifists immediately worked to implement the Hensley Resolution.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{76} "The Hensley Clause," pamphlet (unpaged) in Emergency Peace Federation Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.

\textsuperscript{77} Lillian Wald, "The Hensley Clause and Disarmament," The Survey, XXXVII (December 16, 1916), 308; Crystal Eastman, "War and Peace," ibid., XXXVI (December 30, 1916), 363. An important step in the disarmament movement, this resolution was the final precedent for the later congressional authorization of a disarmament conference which met in Washington in 1921.
In summary, the preparedness agitation had created some difficulties for pacifists during 1916. The military and naval establishment of the nation had been increased. But in the increases compromises achieved in debate over the bills had spoken well for the anti-militarist spirit. Pacifists cheered their successes: defeat of the Continental Army, reduction in size of the Regular Army over original requests, establishment of government-owned nitrate and armor plate factories, and the adoption of the Hensley Amendment which at any moment could cause the cessation of the long-range armament program. Resolved to build on these concrete achievements, the peace advocates attempted to reverse their defeats by attacking conscription and the idea of universal military training.

FIVE

Just as increased armaments had its attractions for the steel, shipbuilding, and munition industries, an expanded military establishment had its attractions for the soldiering class. The mass military system, however, appealed to others besides the Army and Navy officer class. Preparedness was for some an inspired idea—to uplift America at a critical time. There was something in it for everyone. It provided much of the excitement and hoopla of war, yet promised to keep the country out of the fighting. It offered a practical training in arms under the guise of the highest
form of patriotic service. Herbert Croly, the editor of the *New Republic*, recognized the need in America for uplift and stimulation. While admitting the dangers inherent in increased militarism, Croly declared, "The American nation needs the tonic of a serious moral adventure." Preparedness would generate this "tonic effect." Others at the *New Republic* offices had earlier called for military, mental, and moral preparedness. Their support now, however, was presented as a useful national adventure. According to Charles Forcey, the *New Republic* men admitted by 1916 that nationalism had failed as a stimulus for domestic reform. The editors decided to follow the bent of their own nationalism toward diplomatic and military adventures. Frustrated as domestic reformers, they hoped that nationalism would prove a guiding principle for foreign affairs. In joining the advocates for preparedness, the *New Republic* editors and others who shared their views emerged as "war liberals," pointing to the dangers of a German victory and admitting the possibilities of United States intervention in the European War.


80 Forcey, *Crossroads of Liberalism*, 221-272.
For the pacifists, militarism and the drift to war could not be approached with such equanimity. They repeated their list of objections using the example of Europe with its history of wars and the preparation for such wars. They pointed out the inconsistency of castigating European militarism while not recognizing the same phenomenon here at home. They rejected the arguments of both the preparedness advocates and the "war liberals" on the benefits of universal military training.

Pacifist opposition focused on two areas, military training in the schools and compulsory military service. Objection to military training had been raised even before the outbreak of the war. Exponents of military drill had wished to see the federal government provide funds for such training. Educators, however, remained hostile to the idea. Physical fitness educators were particularly hostile. Dudley Allen Sargent, Director of the Hemenway Gymnasium at Harvard and a leader in the movement for physical education, devoted much of his life to refuting the claims made for military drill.81 Sargent's conclusions were used by pacifists in their campaign of opposition. The benefits of military training as an ideal physical exercise were dismissed as being able to be attained by other means: the

gymnasium, out-door games, and athletics. The regulations generally used in military drill were prepared for adults and not for boys. Moreover, girls were felt to be in great need of physical development, but the military training system ignored them. 82 The American School Peace League issued the pamphlet "Should Our School System Include...?" which actively opposed militarism in the public schools and repeated many of the above objections. Another popular pamphlet was "Do We Want Rifle Practice in the Public Schools?"

The main objection to military drill in elementary and secondary schools focused on the effects of such drill. Military training was felt to develop a blind, unthinking obedience. Military training repressed individuality and self-initiative at the very times when these qualities in boys should be developed. Military drill was felt to prepare boys to be mere imitators and automatons instead of self-reliant leaders of their fellow men. 83 The question of military training was particularly acute for the Massachusetts Peace Society, and directors of the organization carried on an active correspondence on the subject. The society used its solicited testimony in several public statements against military drill. "As long as we believe

82 "Military Training in Our Public Schools: Twelve Objections" by Robert Cromwell Root, flyer in American Peace Society Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

83 Ibid.
in war, we shall have war. To the high school boy, the introduction of military training would be convincing evidence that we believe in war, and he would come to believe in it himself.  

"84 In speaking for the Society, Charles Haskins wrote, "I think that military drill is a bad thing, because it inculcates wrong ideas regarding international relations and tends to warp the boy's attitude during his most susceptible years. We want men and women to have "the international mind: that is, the ability to consider all sides of international questions as they come up."  

Military drill would definitely corrode this "international mind." It placed emphasis on might and not right. "It would very strongly imply that might should be the first instead of the last line of defence. ...Military training in the public schools fosters a spirit of suspicion and distrust of other nations."  

In sum, military drill was attacked by pacifists as uneducational. They freely circulated the quotation of John Dewey who called it "undemocratic, barbaric, and scholastically wholly unwise."  


85 Haskins to Charles B. Ames, November 15, 1915, ibid.  


87 Curti, Peace or War, 225.
Pacifists transferred the same concepts of impracticality and subversion of American traditions to the Plattsburg Training Camp Association for adult men from both college and business. As part of his effort to demonstrate the need for efficiency in the army, General Leonard Wood, as Chief of Staff, had in 1913 organized a number of voluntary citizens' training camps. For Wood the military tradition represented the highest expression of American patriotic ideals, particularly the virile strength of manliness and the stern, unflinching performance of duty. A good soldier would develop into a good citizen. Accordingly, Wood made much of his early appeal to the idealistic youth in American colleges, although later the backbone of the Military Training Camp Association was young businessmen.

As the Plattsburg Training Camp Movement spread by virtue of its appeal to patriotism and uplift for America, opposition developed on the very campuses where Wood and his supporters expected success. The Collegiate Anti-Militarism League, centered largely at Columbia, attacked the camps as impractical through its publication, War?:

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No wonder that the students thought they were tasting the hardships of war. Of course they were doing no such thing. They were going through about as much hardship as the average football candidate expects, while an exceedingly considerate enemy was careful not to push them too hard. 89

For the Collegiate Anti-Militarism League, hiking and trudging for hours with a pack was not finding out about what war was really like.

Aside from the publication of *War?* the League conducted nationwide student mass meetings for advocacy of sane thinking on the causes of war and the means for its abolition. It sent representatives to state and national hearings and petitioned the government for caution in its military and naval expenditures. It also extended aid upon application to secondary schools threatened by or saddled with military training.

The League, whose motto was "Above all nations is Humanity", polled some seven hundred students representing over one hundred and fifty institutions who attended the camps during 1916 asking them one question, "What effect

did the summer training camp have on your international mind?" The amount of resentment to such a question more than proved the League's and other pacifist groups' point that the camps were mainly centers of propaganda. Their purpose was not to make real soldiers but to turn out propagandists for preparedness. Otherwise, the League reasoned, what was the purpose of exhibiting at the camps Hudson Maxim's "Battle Cry of Peace" which capitalized on the ravished wife or sweetheart argument to motivate individuals who otherwise felt no inclination to war? The Collegiate Anti-Militarism League continued its opposition to the camps and to compulsory military training until the U.S. intervention. It reiterated its beliefs that 1) military training was a peril to enlightened education which appreciated other nations, 2) a menace to individual and social development, and 3) a potential force for the enthronement of military ideals and militaristic institutions.

The Anti-Enlistment League founded by Jessie Wallace Hughan and Tracy Mygatt also focused on the college man. The membership card of this League carried its statement of purpose:

In view of the fact that the advocates of armament are gathering in leagues of defense those who hold themselves ready to serve their country

90 Ibid.
by killing other men, it seems that the time has come for a roll-call of those of us who are prepared to serve our country by a refusal to engage in or endorse the murder called war. The establishment of a new peace society is not contemplated, but rather the banding together in a personal policy of those whose opposition to war has become unconditional. Women as well as men are invited to enroll...91

In spite of pacifist opposition, preparedness made considerable headway during 1916. As indicated above, the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916 gave official recognition to the camps and provided some funds for them; it also created an ROTC program for colleges, and conscription in time of war. Pacifists had lobbied against the Hay-Chamberlain Bill since it was first introduced in December, 1915. The eventual successes of preparedness legislation were laid to the effectiveness of this bill and the militarist lobby. The Chamberlain version of the bill, Senate 1695, provided for the training in the use of arms of all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of twelve and twenty-three:

From the ages of twelve to fourteen the boys—enrolled officially as members of the Citizen Cadet Corps—shall have ninety hours of calisthenics, without arms, each year. From fourteen to sixteen they have ninety hours of military training, including gallery practice with the rifle; from sixteen to eighteen they continue, adding ten days in military camp. After eighteen the boys are enrolled in the Citizen Army or the Citizen Navy up to the age of twenty-three,

91 Membership card, copy in Jessie Wallace Hughan Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
when they pass automatically into the Citizen Army Reserve, to be mobilized for war at the call of the President.92

Although the worst features of the bill were removed in debate before the compromise defense act was passed, pacifists were seriously disturbed by the perverse motives of the bill's proponents. Pacifists saw the bill not as a serious attempt at legislation— it never could have passed either house of Congress— but as a propaganda measure. In their minds, it furnished some of the Washington correspondents with texts for special articles on compulsory military training. Ideas which normally never would have been breached did not now seem out of the ordinary. Knowledge of the bill's provisions provided opportunity to speak on any or all of those provisions and thereby sow the seeds of acceptance— always, of course, within the legal fiction of not endorsing the provisions of Senate 1695.

After the Act was signed, pacifists criticized those who attempted to justify conscription as "the only democratic method." They asked the American people to closely observe the operation of the draft in Russia, Germany, France, and even Switzerland and see how productive of democracy it was. Pacifists shuddered at the juxta-

position of Jeffersonian concepts and militarism. This was regarded as another propaganda technique, the rape of America's best phrases as the military machine attempted to reduce the opposition to silence by the use of language respected since the founding of the Republic.

In the concluding months of 1916 pacifists continued to protest compulsory military training and conscription. Their efforts, particularly after the November election, were not as intense as might be expected because of a revived faith in Wilson and their greatly increased hope for peace during December 1916 and January 1917. At the end of January, however, these hopes were dramatically shattered by Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. Pacifist groups thereafter directed their efforts to the prevention of United States intervention.
CHAPTER VI
WAR REFERENDUM AND EMERGENCY ACTION

Prior to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany in early February 1917 the idea of a referendum had been proposed as one of several means to forestall United States belligerency. By the end of March it was the only alternative to war which the pacifists still possessed. Their ranks were now depleted by defections and splits within their coalitions, yet they refused to be swept along by the war hysteria and advocated the use of the referendum as an emergency measure to keep America out of the war.

ONE

The Socialists had championed the proposal for a referendum since 1915. Allan L. Benson, the Socialist candidate for President in 1916, ran on a platform which included the war referendum plan. Both his candidacy and his books, which advocated the referendum and other reforms for America, fell short of widespread acceptance by the American people.¹ As noted earlier, the newer activist peace organizations supported the idea of a war referendum,

¹ Benson was the author of A Way to Prevent War, and Inviting War to America.
but it was only one among many plans to confront the issue of war and bring it to resolution. Neither in 1915 nor in 1916 was it ever a single-minded approach to foreign affairs from any group other than the Socialist Party.

Both Socialists and the pacifist groups were encouraged in those years by the liberal political support which the war referendum idea had in Congress. Such support came from Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin and Congressman Clyde Tavenner of Illinois. William Jennings Bryan, who in spite of his resignation was never far outside political circles, also championed the war referendum idea.

LaFollette introduced his resolution on April 29, 1916, proposing an advisory war referendum upon any break in diplomatic relations with a European country. The immediate background for the resolution was the Sussex crisis when Wilson addressed the Congress concerning his April 18 note to Germany, threatening a break in relations. Within ten days LaFollette introduced his bill.

His bill provided, in the event of a break in diplomatic relations, an advisory referendum on the question of war. Unlike other such bills offered in Congress or pro-

2 Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, April 29, 1916, 7018.
posed by private individuals outside of Congress, LaFollette's resolution was unusually detailed in its provision of machinery for taking the referendum. An advisory vote would proceed only after one per cent of the qualified electors of twenty-five states petitioned the Bureau of the Census for such a vote. This agency of the government then would conduct the referendum by mail and report the results to Congress.  

Under LaFollette's proposal for an advisory public referendum, responsibility in deciding for war would lie not solely with Congress but with Congress and the people. LaFollette's viewpoint was a result of pressures by organized pacifism, his German-American constituency, and his genuine belief that a great majority of Americans at that time were opposed to American entry into the European war.

The LaFollette war referendum bill was referred, due to its title and the sponsor's request, to the Committee on the Census, of which LaFollette was a member. On May 3 and again on May 5, Senator William Stone of Missouri attempted to discharge the Census Committee from consideration of the bill and have it referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. But the Senate took no further action

3 Congressionall Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, May 5, 1916, 7452.
on either the S'tone transfer motion or LaFollette's war referendum bill. It died in committee. 4

LaFollette's insistence upon the war referendum plan, both as a democratic reform and as an emergency peace measure, did not end with this defeat. In a signed editorial in the next issue of his magazine he predicted that it would not be long before the people would have the final say on their destinies:

They themselves are going to decide whether they shall spill their blood out upon murderous battlefields. They themselves shall decide what questions of 'defense,' of 'aggression,' or of 'national honor' may be involved, compelling enough to make them desire to kill and be killed. They who do the fighting and dying shall do the deciding. 5

Within a month, Bryan renewed his proposal for a war amendment to the Constitution. In a Lake Mohonk address on May 18, 1916 he attacked the concept of the League to

4 Ibid., May 5, 1916, 7453-7456. During the debate Senator Clapp of Minnesota paid tribute to those societies that were active in a search for peace, but stressed that permanent peace could come about only when:

the great broad equation of humanity, composing the nations of the earth, shall declare whether there shall be peace or war, and when that broad equation includes not only those who must bare their breasts to the battle storms on the battlefield, but shall include the womanhood of the nations who must bear their share of the burden and the sacrifice of war.

5 LaFollette's Magazine, May 1916, 1.
Enforce Peace, charging that it violated the Constitution in transferring the war-declaring powers from Congress to foreign nations. He stated further, "If we are to change the Constitution from what it is now I am in favor of putting the declaring of war in the hands of the people, to be decided by a referendum vote of the American people."\(^6\)

Bryan was unable to have the referendum installed as a plank of the 1916 Democratic platform. Nor, despite Wilson's frequent suggestion that wars were brought on by rulers, not peoples, was the President ever able to endorse a war referendum. Important groundwork had been laid, however, for the eventual time when the war referendum would emerge from a theoretical reform to an emergency proposal.

TWO

The severing of diplomatic relations with Germany shocked pacifists into the realization that war, for the first time in their long months of struggle, was an immediate threat. In a supreme effort to avert such disaster new groups were organized and an effort was made to bring all peace forces under one banner to cope with the emergency and more effectively lobby for peace. That banner was the

\(^6\) Twenty-Second Mohonk Conference, Report (1916), 144-146, especially 146.
plan for a referendum. Three groups merit special consideration in the final months of the pacifist drive: The Committee for Democratic Control (CDC), The Emergency Peace Federation (EPF), and The Emergency Peace Committee of Washington.

The Committee for Democratic Control would provide "democratic control" of the "ultimate decision" and assure the peace necessary for continuation of the social, political, and cultural reforms then underway. This New York organization included Max Eastman of the American Union Against Militarism, Winthrop D. Lane, editor of The Survey, and Margaret Lane and Crystal Eastman of the Woman's Peace Party. More representative of the CDC's aims, however, were Amos Pinchot and Randolph Bourne.

Both Pinchot and Bourne were gravely moved by the fear of the war's impact upon all future social reform and were convinced that only continued neutrality could preserve a creative America. Bourne, only five years out of college in 1917, based his anti-war and pro-referendum stand on the danger involved in the indefinite postponement of

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7 In this summary of the Committee for Democratic Control I am indebted to Ernest C. Bolt, "War Referendum Approach to Peace in the Twentieth Century," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia, 1966, 75-82.
democratic reconstruction. In his later fight against the war liberals, especially John Dewey, Bourne attacked war as a threat to pragmatism, a threat which denied all chance for choice and creativity. Acting upon his conviction, "There is work to be done to prevent this war of ours from passing into popular mythology as a holy crusade," he supported the referendum as an alternative course to war.\(^8\) The referendum would assure choice in wartime, effectively preserving both pragmatism and reform.

The Emergency Peace Federation represented a search for unity among the active peace groups in New York City, combining in common purpose the intent of such organizations as the American Neutral Conference Committee, the Woman's Peace Party, The Socialist Party, and the American Union Against Militarism.\(^9\) The EPF was the outgrowth of a "Keep Out of War" meeting on February 2, 1917 at which William Jennings Bryan, the principal speaker, reiterated his appeal for a war referendum. The meeting took place the day after the public learned of Germany's intention to

\(^8\) Untimely Letters, New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919, 45.

\(^9\) An indication of its broad representation from the outstanding active peace groups can be gathered from its stationery letterhead which listed its officials as follows: Chairman, Mrs. Henry Villard; Vice Chairmen, Emily Greene Balch, Louis Lochner, Ella Flagg Young, Philip S. Florence; Treasurer, Dr. Frederick Lynch; Secretary, Lella Faye Secor; Field Secretary, Rebecca Shelly.
resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Given such an emotional setting, Bryan's appeal for "giving to the people, except in case of actual invasion, a referendum on a declaration of war," set the tone for pacifist activity during the remaining weeks, and helped establish the special stress upon the war referendum. 10

United around the slogan "NO WAR WITHOUT REFERENDUM," the EPF organized nearly one hundred local federations. Members were secured in practically every congressional district. The membership was open to all in sympathy with the objectives of the Emergency Peace Federation, upon payment of one dollar annual dues. Other organizations which declared their substantial agreement were invited to federate with the EPF. The EPF program was stated explicitly on the letterhead of its stationery: to urge the government 1) to defer settlement of any international conflicts affecting America until the present war is over, 2) to keep Americans out of the danger zone, and 3) to consult the people by referendum before declaring war.


11 Historical sketch by Emily Greene Balch, June 8, 1940, Emergency Federation Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Friends Historical Library of Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
The Emergency Peace Federation served as an effective clearing house for organized pacifism. Although it ultimately failed to prevent intervention, its efforts through February, March, and early April focused attention on the question of a referendum and generated greater cooperation among pacifist groups. By its campaign--mass meetings, lobbying pressures upon congressmen, paid advertisements, and Washington peace demonstrations--the war referendum program was given a widespread presentation. Unfortunately, such airing of the plan came at a time of crisis.

The stalwarts within the peace movement continued to be the Woman's Peace Party and the American Union Against Militarism. Their membership provided much of the direction to the Emergency Peace Federation. A third group, however, the Emergency Peace Committee of Washington, was formed in response to Bryan's call at a local meeting of February 5 to keep the country out of war through the war referendum proposal. The Emergency Peace Committee of Washington, dominated by Washington ladies and in cooperation with the EPF in New York, developed considerable importance in lobbying efforts. It made the most of its advantage of physical closeness to the local scene to direct war referendum pressures upon Congress. In all of its war referendum work, however, the Emergency Peace Committee of
Washington stressed it as an emergency measure, a peace panacea to meet an international crisis which, the women believed, threatened domestic liberalism. 12

THREE

The activity of the Emergency Peace Federation and its intensity was determined by the increasing crisis of world events. There were four phases to that activity for pacifists:

1) pre-February 2, 1917, 2) February 2 to February 28, comprising the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany to the knowledge of the Zimmermann Telegram, 3) March 1 to March 31, the period of the armed ship bill crisis, and 4) April 1 to April 6, the last days.

Pacifist activity prior to February 2, 1917, as discussed earlier, lacked that note of urgency which became characteristic after that date. As each of the remaining phases was entered into, the note of urgency intensified until, in the final days of early April, violence occurred on several occasions.

From February 2 to February 28, the Emergency Peace Federation used several tactics to win both popular and Congressional support for a referendum. It organized two mass demonstrations, generated a mass advertising campaign, and conducted several straw polls. The first demonstration of February 12, Lincoln's Birthday, involved 200 pacifists who made speeches at the Capitol, at several conferences in committee rooms, at hotels, and at the White House. Wilson was "out" when the delegation came to present resolutions to him. Tumulty received them instead, and Norman Thomas recited the EPF program, stressing that "neither honor nor glory could be gained by warring against a nation that is driven to desperation after thirty months of war." 13

In a general letter the EPF explained its purpose in staging such a mass meeting and demonstration that it was offering the means through which the voice of the American people could be heard. The particular focus of the special train of delegates was to demonstrate support for House Bill 5796. 14 This was LaFollette's April, 1916 bill on a war referendum which was still locked in committee. In the meantime, LaFollette had made no changes in his resolution which had applied to the existing electorate only in its call for


14 February 8, 1917, EPF Papers.
an advisory vote. The Emergency Peace Committee of Washington, however, found certain aspects of the bill unsatisfactory, particularly its reliance upon state petitions to originate the referendum plus its complicated conduct by the Census Bureau. Not only did the Washington women find it cumbersome and inapplicable for emergency needs, but it also lacked the crucial elements of reform which had provided much of the motivation for the ladies' referendum support. The ladies' referendum vote would have included not only men but also women, and it would have allowed everyone over the age of eighteen to participate.  

A delegation of the Washington Emergency Peace Committee met on February 9 with three sympathetic Congressmen. All agreed on the importance of introducing several referendum bills in Congress and the three Congressmen expressed appreciation, though non-commitment, to the reform portions of their version of the LaFollette bill.  

In the meantime, however, the initiative was taken away from the Washington delegation.

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15 Woman's Peace Party, Legislative Committee Minutes, February 9, 1917, Woman's Peace Party Papers.

Within the next two weeks nine different resolutions calling for a referendum were introduced into Congress. The first came on February 9, the very day that the delegation was meeting, from Oscar Callaway (Democrat, Texas), and was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Callaway's bill was the basis for four other proposals within the week. These were introduced by Warren Worth Bailey (Democrat, Pennsylvania), Isaac R. Sherwood (Democrat, Ohio), Frank Buchanan (Democrat, Illinois), and Walter L. Hensley (Democrat, Missouri). Since Callaway's text provided the inspiration for the other resolutions, it merits a closer examination.

Callaway had perceived the complicated machinery needed to implement the LaFollette bill. Yet unlike the Washington Emergency Peace Committee, he would avoid the cumbersome disadvantages of that bill and resist the temptation to do too much. There was no attempt to provide a vote for women or to lower the age requirement to eighteen. Callaway's resolution, House Resolution 492, provided:

That no declaration of war by Congress and no act of war by the executive branch of the Government of the United States of America shall be taken, except to suppress insurrection or repel invasion, as provided by the Constitution of the United States, until the question at issue shall be submitted to a referendum of the voters of the United States.17

Within a week after the introduction of the five resolutions a hearing was held on that of Callaway. It lasted 45 minutes! Testimony was taken from only six witnesses who advanced their belief that munitions makers and the press were moving the country toward war and that America should only go to war in case of invasion. Barring this eventuality, the President was to be prevented from going down the road to war without direct and immediate advice from the people, which would come from a referendum. Callaway was not even present at the hearing, but in Chicago addressing a February 18 gathering of 10,000 at the Coliseum. Neither Callaway's bill nor any of the other resolutions ever came out of committee.\textsuperscript{18}

After the superficial Callaway hearing three other resolutions were introduced by Charles A. Lindbergh (Republican, Minnesota), James H. "Cyclone" Davis (Democrat, Texas), and Isaac Sherwood (Democrat, Ohio) who made this his second effort for a war referendum. This time all three were based on LaFollette's text which provided an immediate advisory referendum rather than a permanent reform through a constitutional amendment such as Bryan had earlier recommended. But like the other proposals, these too died in

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
the Foreign Affairs Committee. A ninth resolution introduced February 16 by Henry T. Helgeson (Republican, North Dakota) was quite original in its text and did not receive the organized pacifist interest accorded Callaway or LaFollette. It met, however, the same fate as the others.

Meanwhile, both of the original champions of referendum in 1916 remained steadfastly behind the idea. LaFollette, although he did not re-introduce his bill, continued to work for an advisory referendum. His strategy called for a roll-call vote on the issue at which time he planned to make his proposal an amendment to any appropriate bill. Bryan also remained faithful in his devotion to the war referendum plan. As a pacifist, Bryan saw nothing shameful in not insisting on all one's rights. "It is no surrender of a right to postpone enforcement of it."22

19 Congressional Record, 64th Congress, Second Session, February 20, 1917, 3734; ibid.; February 23, 1917, 4064.


21 LaFollette, LaFollette, I, 599.

22 "Efforts of American Pacifists to Avert War," Literary Digest, LIV (February 24, 1917), 452.
Encouraged by the intensified political agitation for the referendum, the Emergency Peace Federation planned a second demonstration for February 22. More acutely attuned to the importance of public relations, the EPF added several elements of sophistication and efficiency to its effort. A special catalogue of members of Congress was prepared, "based on their willingness to put the question of war to a referendum vote." Delegates were equipped with maps of the United States Senate Building as well as cards of introduction requesting an interview with their senator or representative. In a more general way, the EPF took advantage of the opportunity for extensive advertising prior to its demonstration by stressing mass meetings, rather than organizational views, as a means of popularizing the war referendum.

Members of the EPF were supplied with a mailing list of newspapers in New York City to be written to daily. Members were recommended to go down the list taking one paper a day, "Cost: thirty minutes of time and a two-cent postage stamp." Believing that democratic control of foreign affairs was eventually assured, the EPF felt that repeated demonstrations would stiffen war referendum sentiments, and accelerate what was remote to the more immediate future.


24 Memorandum, EPF Papers.
Making the most of their propaganda techniques, the EPF delegates began their February 22 demonstration with a "kickoff" breakfast at the Raleigh Hotel. Representatives from fifty colleges and universities were present for this day and many were given maximum exposure in an effort to manifest the breadth of support for the stand that America should not be allowed to be drawn into the war without a popular referendum.25

After the breakfast the delegates marched to the Capitol to attend a special hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. In a statement headed "Columbia for a Referendum" delegates from Columbia University reported that their local poll indicated 64 percent in favor of an advisory referendum. Those students who testified before the Committee attempted to impress on the Congressmen the hypocrisy of allowing the public to elect him to office yet at the same time denying that same public the right to vote on a referendum.26


A delegation also met with Senator William J. Stone, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and read a statement calling for "a calm self-restraint" as the best means to preserve the honor of the United States. And, in their belief of what was the best guarantee of that restraint, the delegates recommended that "war should not be declared until the people have had an opportunity to express themselves on the issue by advisory referendum." 27

Meanwhile, in another effort to actualize the possibility of an official referendum, Walter Fuller, the husband of Crystal Eastman, organized a "post card" referendum of 100,000 cards sent to all sections of the country, beginning on February 7. Two brief questions appeared on the cards:

I. Should we enter the war in order to uphold our legal right to go into the war zone?

II. Do you believe that the people should be consulted by referendum--in any event short of invasion--before Congress declares war?

A negative response was desired for the first question; a positive for the second. To assure those results, the sponsoring officials suggested how one should vote. An explanatory note, carried on the card, read: "A national

27 Statement to Senator William J. Stone, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 22, 1917, EPF Papers.
ADVISORY referendum is not unconstitutional and could be carried out by the census bureau, through the postmasters, in twenty-five days."\textsuperscript{28}

This test referendum was co-ordinated by the American Union Against Militarism, but its results were used by all the forces in the referendum campaign. At the Union's headquarters, over fifty volunteer workers addressed thousands of postal cards from prepared lists of co-operating peace groups and congressional sponsors. Gradually those receiving the postal referendum cards returned them to the peace organizations or sent them directly to the congressmen, as requested on the card. Not overlooking any available mass media device, the referendum promotion included newspaper advertising, resolutions and petitions to Congress, letters to editors, and mass meetings.

Within a week, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had received numerous petitions in favor of the war referendum. Some specifically endorsed the Callaway resolution, but there was no mass outpouring of support sufficient to have a bearing on the hearing.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Minutes, February 5, 1917, Executive Committee, American Union Against Militarism, AUAM Papers.

\textsuperscript{29} United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Petitions, Referendum on the Question of Declaring War Against the Central Powers, 1917, 64th Congress, 2nd Session, National Archives.
On February 28, a delegation from the AUAM obtained an appointment with President Wilson which, it was anticipated, would climax the postal referendum and other emergency efforts to win an advisory referendum. The delegates planned to concentrate on the test referendum activity and its results. The purpose of the meeting was to get the President "to declare in favor at least of the principle of a referendum on war and peace." 30

The Union's delegation on February 28 included Paul U. Kellogg, Max Eastman, Lillian Wald, Charles T. Hallinan, and Amos Pinchot. Speaking for the group, Miss Wald reported 100,000 postal cards mailed out and replies that were overwhelmingly favorable to a national advisory referendum. The Union's poll, according to Miss Wald, reflected primarily public sentiment from five congressional districts in Pennsylvania, Colorado, Ohio, Missouri, and Texas. 31

30 Minutes, February 27, 1917, Executive Committee, American Union Against Militarism, AUAM Papers.

31 Minutes, February 28, 1917, AUAM Papers. Five congressional districts were circularized using congressmen's precinct lists of registered voters regardless of party. A manufacturing district in Pennsylvania voted 6:1 for a referendum, 10:1 against war; a fruit growing district in Colorado, 3:1 for referendum, 4:1 against war; a municipal district in Ohio, 4:1 for referendum, 4:1 against war; a rural town in Missouri, 11:1 for referendum, 11:1 against war.
There is no indication, however, that the AUAM's war referendum efforts influenced the President any more than similar pressure tactics had in the past. As in the case of the campaign for mediation and the conference of neutral nations he had agreed to meet with the peace groups, but never indicated any effect of such meetings. Moreover, Wilson as a result of the not-yet-publicized Zimmermann Telegram, had already on February 26 requested of Congress emergency powers to arm American merchant ships. 32

The AUAM delegation was the second on February 28 to urge an advisory referendum upon the President. Earlier he had met with a delegation from the Second Conference of Peaceworkers. 33 The delegation included five members:


33 The Second Conference of Peaceworkers was a meeting of nineteen national peace societies which met on February 22-23 at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. This meeting was the outgrowth of the First Conference of Peaceworkers, October 26-27, 1916. Both had been called by the American Peace Society in an attempt at unity, though perhaps in more of an attempt to reassert its influence over the current peace agitation. The APS lost out, however, when the EPF delegates captured the meeting and overruled by a voice vote all opposition to the war referendum plan. Cf., New York Times, February 23, 2:6-7; February 24, 9:1. See also Degen, 184-187; "Overruling Veteran Pacifists," The Survey, XXXVII (March 3, 1917), 646-647.
Jane Addams and Emily Balch of the Woman's Peace Party, William I. Hull of Swarthmore College and two labor leaders. The group presented to President Wilson the results of the New York Conference as "Eight Alternatives to War," including the advisory war referendum. Professor Hull, a former student of Wilson's, presented, in the words of Jane Addams

a brief resume of what other American presidents had done through adjudication when the interests of American shipping had become involved during European wars; notably George Washington during the French Revolution and John Adams in the Napoleonic War, so that international adjudication instituted by Chief Justice Jay became known in Europe as "the American Plan."  

Wilson, however, brushed aside all talk of referendum and adjudication. In a mood described by both Miss Addams and Professor Hull as stern, a mixture of great indignation and determination, he spoke of various grievances against Germany and stressed his conviction of the impossibility of further peaceful dealings. 

Wilson was obviously thinking of the Zimmermann Telegram which he made public later the same day. When Congress expressed doubt as to its authenticity Zimmermann obligingly volunteered that he had, indeed, written the note.


Congress thereupon undertook the passage of the Armed Ship Bill. Opponents of the bill, however, managed to filibuster during the debate until the 64th Congress, Second Session, expired on March 4, 1917.\textsuperscript{36}

Pacifists had failed to convince the President of the importance of a referendum. They had also failed to get favorable indication for any of their other proposals. And meanwhile, confronted with the fact that events had overtaken their efforts to influence national policies, they were conscious of the serious erosion developing among their supporters.

\textbf{FOUR}

Ever since the break in diplomatic relations with Germany peace advocates had another obstacle placed in the way of their efforts. A patriotic hysteria, fairly well kept in check through January, began to sweep the country after the news of Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. The peace workers lost some of their heretofore most reliable supporters.

At the beginning of February Henry Ford announced his decision to make munitions in the event of war. He also announced the dismissal of Lochner and the entire Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. All funds were to be cut off as of March 1. Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, captivated by the possibility of women achieving emancipation through war service, pledged the National Council of Women to offer its services to the federal government in case of war. Mrs. Catt had generally expressed misgivings about compromising the suffrage movement by attaching it to peace reform and had expressed a marked coolness to the more dramatic leaders of the Woman's Peace Party. By her February move of expediency she clearly established herself outside the peace movement.

Other defections included the war referendum pacifist General Isaac Sherwood. The Kansas Governor Arthur Capper also declared the need for the United States to defend itself. Mrs. J. Malcolm Forbes, a majorcontri-

37 Lochner to Ferdinand Leipnik, February 7, 1917, Louis P. Lochner Papers.


39 Link, Wilson, Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 416; Curti, Peace or War, 249.
butor to the AUAM and president of the Massachusetts branch of the WPP refused to support any further demonstrations. 40 Rabbi Stephen Wise also resigned in February to the complete surprise of all members of the AUAM.

The pacifist position was further eroded by the publication of Professor Carleton J. H. Hayes' article which called for constructive action by the United States, rejecting the extreme positions of pacifist non-belligerency and full-fledged American belligerency. The fact that it was published in The Survey indicated Kellogg's support for Hayes' appeal for an armed neutrality. Lillian Wald, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Amos Pinchot of the Committee for Democratic Control also endorsed it. But once again, as with the case of League to Enforce Peace, Hayes' proposal was based on the threat of force, however modified by limited-war and limited-defense concepts. 41 The Emergency Peace Federation opposed armed neutrality because it was believed to be the first step in a virtual state of warfare, which could be brought about without an open declaration of war. 42


42 General letter from Lella F. Secor, March 14, 1917, EPF Papers.
Meanwhile, Wilson hesitated for most of February in his decision to arm American ships. According to Link, he felt the course of defensive neutrality was too dangerous unless he had the eager and ready support of the majority of the American people. 43 This is in marked contrast to his later attitude of "I do not care for popular demand. I want to do right whether popular or not." 44 After March 1 and the public knowledge of the Zimmermann Telegram, Wilson felt he had the necessary popular support. Circumventing the effects of the filibuster, he armed ships by executive order.

Pacifists, nevertheless, continued to oppose Wilson's decision. The EPF, which now dominated the anti-war effort, sustained a fervid pace of activity. It combined the distribution of handbills and other literature with its own advertising campaign to offset that of the American Rights Committee. 45

43 Link, Wilson, Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 312-3.

44 E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, March 20, 1917 entry.

45 The American Rights Committee demanded an immediate declaration of war in a series of newspaper advertisements from January 31 to February 3. Cf., Link, Wilson, Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 303.
We urge that if no accommodation with the German government be found possible, we shall refuse to be drawn into anything but a strictly defensive position: that only in the event of a direct attack on our coast shall we resort to military or naval force: that for injuries resulting to our shipping or even to American lives, we shall content ourselves with such protests as circumstances demand and with claims for damages and reparation to be enforced after the war by The Hague Tribunal.

We urge that Congress shall advise citizens of the United States to exercise a hitherto uncalled for forebearance and to exhibit the profoundest example of patriotism in all history, by imposing upon themselves a self-denying ordinance, not to travel on the seas except upon the most pressing exigencies and then only on American vessels and we respectfully urge that the state department issue no passports, except in such an exigency and only to passengers who signify their intention of travelling on American ships.46

This was the cornerstone of EPF policy. Pacifists saw nothing shameful in postponing the settlement of international difficulties until cooler heads prevailed. In a sense, they were willing to walk away from a fight. Louis Lochner, who after being dismissed by Ford went to work for the EPF, summarized this attitude on the part of pacifists.

46 General letter to members, March 14, 1917, EPF Papers. Among the multi-page leaflets and handbills distributed by the EPF were "The Emergency Peace Federation," "To All Americans," "Peace Demonstration in Washington," "Why We Oppose Armed Neutrality," "Standing Behind the President," "Invoking the Hensley Clause," "An Open Letter to the President (March 8, 1917)," "Some Reasons Against War with Germany." Toward the end of March two others were issued: "The America Plan of a Joint High Commission" by William I. Hull and "The Armed Ship Bill Meant War" by Senator Robert LaFollette. Copies of all are in EPF Papers.
(I)f there is a fight on the corner I have the right to walk by that corner, of course. But if I am sensible I'll not make my rights the paramount consideration... and will go out of my way a bit so as not to pass by that particular corner. It may be inconvenient, it may anger me; it may try my patience. But nobody will say that I am losing my honor by avoiding the fray. Honor is something that none can take away from me except I myself. If I descend to the level of the mob at the street corner, and mix in the fight there is not very much of my honor left... In the present situation, the real patriot to my mind is he who says to himself, "I refuse to be a possible factor in bringing on war..."\textsuperscript{47}

For taking positions which opposed what was now official government policy, pacifists were labeled, taking a phrase from one of Bryan's earlier speeches, "peace at any price" men.\textsuperscript{48} Pacifists found it hard to get or hold an audience. Meetings were broken up.\textsuperscript{49} David Starr

\textsuperscript{47} An open letter from Louis P. Lochner, n.d. (but clearly during March, 1917), EPF Papers.


\textsuperscript{49} Paxson, The Pre-War Years, 414. One letter to which was attached a clipping about the breaking up of a pacifist meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts contained the following sentiments:

Just hearing (sic) that you to make a demonstration on Monday (April 2). I will say that you are a dirty lot of traitors and if I was able to go to Washington I would take a basket of rotten eggs and start the ball a rolling. I hope the troops in Washington will turn their machine guns on you. You are to (sic) cowardly to live in a free country. A shameless set of hoodlums who ought to be deported from the country. (signed) S. W. Morris. If the cutthroat (sic) Germans in this country should blowup buildings in N.Y. I hope you will be the first to get the benefit. S. W. Morris to EPF, March 28, 1917, Louis P. Lochner Papers.
Jordan was booed into silence. What audience the pacifists could not capture they tried to buy through advertising. But this effort too was attacked on the editorial pages of the same paper. Even Wilson made no effort to conceal his contempt for pacifists. In continuing to urge an advisory war referendum the peace advocates made themselves targets of some of the most severe abuse. They were accused of being part of a conspiracy to gain time for Germany to achieve ultimate victory in Europe.

In the face of the mounting war hysteria, pacifists were concerned that the movement was losing its momentum.

50 Paxson, The Pre-War Years, 414; Jordan, Days of a Man, II, 718-9, 727, 729. Jordan described a meeting in Baltimore on April 2, where after the news came that Wilson had asked for a declaration of war, a mob invaded the hall and demanded the meeting be stopped. Jordan was prevented from speaking. Fights broke out; twenty people were injured, one man hospitalized. Finally, the manager asked the pacifists to leave. As Jordan walked out the front door the mob hissed and shook their fists, chanting, "We'll hang Dave Jordan on a sour apple tree." Cf. also, H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1957, 4.

51 Curti, Peace Or War, 252.

Moreover, they felt that the movement was being overtaken by a rapid sequence of events over which they had no control, and that there was a need for a dramatic new thrust to the peace agitation.

An official commission was called to meet at the Holland House, New York City, from March 19-24, 1917, to "devise ways and means of a peaceful solution to the international crisis." David Starr Jordan came expressly from California to help organize the commission along with Miss Balch, Professor Hull, Mrs. Villard, and Louis P. Lochner. All week the commission heard from witnesses, various persons versed in international affairs or specially equipped to technical matters. Among these witnesses and experts were Professor J. McKeen Cattell, Amos Pinchot, Paul U. Kellogg, James P. Warbasse, Darwin J. Meserole, Professor Franz Boas, and Charles T. Hallinan. Most were well known figures in the peace movement and still active in it.

53 Other members of the Holland Commission included: Joseph D. Cannon, long identified with the Western Federation of Miners, Colorado; Edward P. Cheyney, professor of European history at the University of Pennsylvania; Stoughton Cooley, editor of The Public; John F. Moors, broker, Boston, Massachusetts; H. A. Overstreet, professor of philosophy, College of the City of New York; Arthur Le Sueur, legal adviser for farmers' organizations, North Dakota; and, Winter Russell, attorney and publicist, New York.
The commission published its findings in a pamphlet, "Alternatives of War," which was divided into six sections: a plea for clarification of the issues, joint commissions of inquiry and conciliation, mediation, a conference of neutrals, consequences of entering the war, and the referendum. The plea for clarification of issues was published separately as an open letter to the President, March 23, in which Wilson was called upon to answer certain questions of policy so that, in the event of war, Congress would be aided in making its decision. Some of these questions were the following:

Should the United States form an alliance, informal or formal, with the Entente Allies, or enter the war without any understanding with them, or how should it proceed? Shall this country enter the war to establish the right of neutrals to defend by force of arms their commerce with belligerents? Should this country enter the war for the purpose of underwriting foreign bonds, as is now urged by officers of the Federal Reserve Bank? What precisely and clearly, is the purpose of war, if war comes, and on what terms would we consent at any time to a settlement?

Many of the other prescriptions for peace were the same as those which pacifists had been advocating since 1915. The Joint High Commission, an idea which had been

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55 Ibid., 2-3.
presented to the President by Professor Hull in the February 28 meeting in which he explained the "America Plan," was developed further by the Holland Commission. The Joint High Commission would be a meeting of representatives from the German Reichstag and the United States Congress to discuss mutual grievances. Emphasis was directed to the fact that "(i)n the nineteenth century alone, 247 disputes between nations have been settled by such a commission. Should two nations in the twentieth-century not be able to adjust their difficulties by negotiation?" Moreover, the President had the authority to call such a conference according to the Hensley Clause of the 1916 Naval Appropriation Act. 56

To offset the great interventionist rally on Thursday, March 22, the Holland Commission climaxed its week-long study with a rally of its own in Madison Square Garden on Saturday night, March 24. Speakers included David Starr Jordan and Benjamin C. Marsh, a New York radical who distinguished himself by praying for the happy deaths of Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt. 57 Once again the need for an advisory referendum was emphasized, as in this excerpt from the speech of Rabbi Judah L. Magnes,

If a declaration of war is to be made by this country, the people should first be asked to express their will. The President and the Congress must be petitioned that before declaring war they submit the question to an advisory referendum of all the people. 58

If pacifists need any additional motivation to intensify their efforts, Wilson provided it. On the third day of the Holland Commission hearings, the President moved the date for the Special Session of the 65th Congress from April 16 to April 2. Wilson's decision for full `belligerency came between his inauguration on March 5 and a March 20 Cabinet session. It is not clear just why Wilson decided to reject armed neutrality, after having decided on it in late February. Factors in his decision included Germany's sinking of four American ships from March 12 to 18 (three on the weekend of March 16-18), unanimous Cabinet approval of a war resolution, and the Russian Revolution. Link believes Wilson, having completely lost confidence in Germany, had concluded that America could not defend itself against submarine warfare without acting as a belligerent. If there was to be a swift end to the war and a dominant American voice at the peace conference, America had to intervene. 59

58 Magnes' speech was later published as a pamphlet, "The People Do Not Want War," Emergency Peace Federation, New York, 1917, copy of EPF Papers.

59 Link, Wilson, Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 409-414.
Wilson's decision on intervention was, of course, still unknown to those outside his immediate circle. Many pacifists, especially some within the AUAM, believed that the President was not about to declare war on April 2, but was to request a "sonorous, patriotic, slightly bellicose resolution" which called for "armed neutrality."\textsuperscript{60} As late as March 25 Amos Pinchot, Paul U. Kellogg, and Lillian Wald spoke with Colonel House and left the meeting grateful that Wilson continued to work "earnestly" for peace.\textsuperscript{61}

Other pacifists, however, especially those of the EPF who did not support armed neutrality, no longer trusted Wilson.\textsuperscript{62} These activists put their faith in the people themselves and the influence of an all-out letter and telegram campaign to influence Congress upon whose shoulders the ultimate war decision would rest. Results of straw votes continued to come to the EPF headquarters. They were sent on to Congressmen for the appropriate districts in the expectation of creating a sympathetic disposition toward the referendum. The Emergency Peace Committee of Massachusetts canvassed 12,000 voters in sixteen of the state's Congressional districts. It reported 62 per cent against inter-

\textsuperscript{60} AUAM Bulletin, No. 74, "The President and the War Party," (March 29, 1917), AUAM Papers.

\textsuperscript{61} Millis, Road to War, 424.

\textsuperscript{62} Cf., "Notes on the First Session of the Holland House Meeting," EPF Papers.
vention. 63 War referendum partisans in the WPP conducted a straw vote in Monroe, Wisconsin. Results demonstrated 900 out of 1000 polled were against intervention. 64

Bryan begged support from all the Democratic Party elected officials with whom he felt he retained any influence. On March 28, he delivered a speech to Congress. Citing Wilson's own words that the American people do not want war, Bryan asked Congress to employ the idea of a peace plan contained in his "cooling-off" treaties—the investigating all disputes by an international tribunal before resort to war. "If," he continued in the speech which was later circulated as a handbill, "you reach the conclusions that nothing but war will satisfy the nation's honor, is it too much to ask that, by a referendum, you consult the wishes of those who must, in the case of war, defend the nation's honor with their lives?" 65

Believing, as Bryan did, that the majority of people did not want war, pacifists were determined to demon-


65 Curti, Peace Or War, 250. Quotations are from Bryan's speech taken from the one page printed handbill. A copy is in the Lochner Papers.
strate to Congress the accuracy of that belief. On March 29, after an American Rights League advertisement urged Wilson to ask for a declaration of war, the EPF purchased an entire page of the *New York Times* to solicit an emergency fund of $200,000 to offset the call for war. It announced at the same time plans for a massive peace delegation to Washington to appeal for Congressmen's votes against war. The campaign of advertising featured the other alternatives which pacifists had been suggesting for the past two months, but it stressed the importance of the advisory referendum.\footnote{New York Times, March 28, 29, and 31. The March 31 advertisement, "WAR IS NOT NECESSARY," which once again listed the alternatives was particularly impressive.}

**FIVE**

The demonstration was to occur on Monday, April 2, the date which Wilson had set for a convening of the 65th Congress and the swearing in of new members. A parade of pacifists marching from the White House to the Capitol was scheduled, but by the time the eleven train-cars of demonstrators had arrived from New York, police had banned the parade.\footnote{"War Journal of A Pacifist," Sarah Cleghorn Papers. The best historical accounts of the demonstration and related incidents are Millis, *The Road to War*, 432-5; Curti, *Peace Or War*, 252-3; Paxson, *The Pre-War Years*, 414, and Link, Wilson, *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*, 419-431.} Moreover, pacifists were refused a hearing before either President Wilson or Vice-President Marshall.
Despite such setbacks, the delegates attempted to implement their plan of visiting their senators and congressmen. Each delegate was equipped at EPF headquarters, 1221 Pennsylvania Avenue, with cards of introduction requesting an interview. They were also equipped with maps of the Senate Building, with red, white, and blue armbands, and special cards to be presented at the interview appealing for a vote against war, or at least, for an advisory referendum. These cards, testifying to the pacifists' approval of Wilson's course until his severing of diplomatic relations, bore the inscription, "He kept us out of war. Let us not go in now." 68

It was during one of these interviews that an incident of dubious distinction to the pacifist cause occurred. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was confronted in the corridor of the Senate Office building and asked for his vote in favor of an advisory referendum and against war. According to Lodge's statement—which was the one published in the press—the delegation became very violent and abusive. Alexander Bonnwart, a Princeton athlete, called Lodge a damned coward; Lodge called him a liar. There is some doubt as to which of them struck first, but both exchanged blows. Lodge at the

68 "Program for April 2, 1917 Washington Demonstration," EPF Papers. These papers also contain the mimeographed instruction sheet to each delegate and armbands.
age of sixty-five emerged from the fracas and proceeded to the Senate Chamber "no worse for his encounter." Lodge later wrote, "...I am glad that I hit him. The Senators all appeared to be perfectly delighted with my having done so." 69

Pacifists were instructed to complete their interviews by noon since that was the time scheduled for the convening of Congress. Moreover, pacifists had arranged for their own meeting to come to order at two o'clock. It was announced that since Senator LaFollette had failed to obtain the formal permission for a Capitol demonstration, the delegates would not be permitted upon the Capitol steps. They resolved, however, to go ahead with their plans for a demonstration, albeit a silent one. Wilson had asked to address Congress that very evening rather than wait, as was expected, till the following day. 70 Since Wilson was expected to leave the White House after three, the meeting was a short one to allow a representative number of demonstrators to gather. 71


70 Park, Front Door Lobby, 72-3.

At the meeting, which ironically was held at Convention Hall in the National Guard Armory, 5th and L Streets, N.W., resolutions were adopted which summarized most of the important points of the effort since 1914 to keep the United States at peace. Among these resolutions was an appeal for a renewal of the mediation effort and support for a conference of neutral nations. There was also the call for an advisory referendum. Moreover, the delegates—sensing, no doubt, that their cause was lost—restated much of the anti-preparedness argument and demanded that a chief incentive for war be removed, namely, the opportunity to make private profit. The delegates called for the government to take over the railroads, all natural resources, especially mines and oil wells, and all food storage warehouses so that these would not be allowed to operate for private gain during wartime. Furthermore, a resolution was approved calling for the conscription of all wealth over $100,000 to finance the war and a "Pay As You Go" plan so as not to defer the cost of the war upon future generations.72

The meeting adjourned close to three o'clock, and the majority of delegates repaired to the Capitol to await the arrival of the President in silent protest. It was a long vigil, for Wilson, escorted by a troop of cavalry,

72 "Resolutions adopted at the Mass Meeting for Peace," April 2, 1917, EPF Papers.
did not leave the White House until 8:20. He entered the
House of Representatives at 8:32 to deliver his war
message.  

In his address Wilson plainly stated his reasons for
going to war with Germany.  

The character of German submarine warfare violated the rights, not just of Americans,
but of all men, of all humanity. War was the only way to
protect those rights and principles which were the basis of
international life. It was the mission of America to defend
those sacred rights and principles which gave her birth and
happiness and peace. "God helping her, she can do no
other." 

Little suspense was associated with the outcome of
Wilson's request. Resolutions were submitted in both Houses
that very evening. The Senate debated on Tuesday the 3rd
for thirteen hours, finally approving a declaration of war

73 "War Journal of a Pacifist," Sarah Cleghorn Papers; 
Link, Wilson, Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 
423.

74 The speech is analyzed in Notter, 643-651. Wilson's war
message was later edited with footnotes giving point to
every general statement in the text. The address became
a textbook for supporters of the war, and eventually
reached a circulation of nearly two and a half million
copies.

75 Public Papers, V, 16. On this same theme cf. Cronon, 
The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-1921, 
126: "All Sins require blood atonement. Abraham offering
Issac, the Passover in Egypt, the Crucifixion--is
America to make sacrifice for the good of the world?"
on the 4th, 82-6. The House took up debate on the issue on the 5th. It debated seventeen hours, imposing in the late afternoon a five-minute rule (limiting all speeches to not more than five minutes). 76 It did not adjourn till the early hours of the 6th, Good Friday, when the resolution passed 373-50. Later in the day Wilson received the joint resolution by which Congress formally declared the existence of a state of war between the United States and Germany. President Wilson at once proclaimed that state of war.

The efforts of pacifism had failed to prevent United States' intervention. Most attempts to further influence what many believed was a foregone conclusion had ceased with the silent demonstration on April 2. There were, however, several diehard efforts. Bryan in a telegram urged once again the use of a referendum to ascertain the public will. 77 A meeting of the executive committee of the EPF issued a statement urging the United States Congress to appeal over the head of the German Government directly to the German people. This appeal cited the fact that such a proposal had already been made within the Reichstag, namely, that the German people were

76 Park, 75-6.

brought into the war on the plea that German civilization must be protected against Russian czardom. Now the czardom is no more, and the liberals and social democrats in Germany are beginning to demand the overthrow of the last remaining autocracies, those of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs.\textsuperscript{78}

The appeal failed to achieve any ripple of recognition by Congress. Another last minute proposal also failed because of lack of money and time to implement it. Eugene Debs conceived of multiple delegations of farmers, "the real backbone of the republic," to arrive in Washington by train from all parts of the nation until their numbers reached 1000 or 1500. They would demand a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and insist on two things 1) no hostilities to be begun until Germany actually invaded the United States, and 2) that, in any event, the matter of a declaration of war be submitted to a vote of the people.\textsuperscript{79}

Pacifists accepted the decision for war. Some in the spirit of good losers and in a burst of patriotism swung over to support the war effort. Others went home to regroup and begin their opposition to the more grievous manifestations of the war-time hysteria: conscription, harassment of conscientious objectors, and infringement of civil rights.

\textsuperscript{78} Executive Committee Report, April 4, 1917; "Appeal to the German People," April 5, 1917, Emergency Peace Federation Papers.

\textsuperscript{79} Eugene V. Debs to Louis P. Lochner, April 5, 1917, Louis P. Lochner Papers.
As for the issue of the referendum itself, if, and its failure to be given a valid test, it must be stated that the effort on its behalf was too poorly and hastily organized. The propaganda for an appeal to the people smacked of the same hysteria which issued from the militarist camp. Moreover, in the final days of debate, it was considered not on its own merits, but as an excuse to register one's protest against the declaration of war. La Follette spoke of "the poor being called--without their own voice--to rot in the trenches." Senator Vardaman of Mississippi declared he could not vote for sacrificing a million men without first consulting the people to be sacrificed. These appeals were, however, too much of an emergency setting and were to no avail.

Several historians maintain--but can't prove--that the sentiment for peace was as strong as the war sentiment, and that, if a referendum had been taken, there would have been no intervention. It was with a similar spirit of

80 Quotation is cited in Curti, Peace Or War, 251253, as coming from La Follette's: four hour speech in Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 223-234. In the House debate Ernest Lundeen of Minneapolis spoke in favor of a referendum. Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 362. Representative Sherwood entered into the Record a letter of Emily Greene Balch that many Congressmen were not voting according to the will of their constituents. Congressional Record, ibid., 138.

righteousness that Lochner, anticipating the outcome of the Congressional debate, summarized his feelings. In an April 1 letter to Bryan, he wrote, "...(W)e shall have to say probably what Norman Angell said to us..., 'We were not successful, we were merely right'."82

82 Lochner to Bryan, April 1, 1917, Louis P. Lochner Papers.
CONCLUSION

The collapse of the pre-1914 peace organizations and the failure of reorganized groups to attain all their goals, especially the prevention of United States intervention, compel a closer look at the significance of the correlation between peace advocacy and the progressive movement. This study respects the continued identity of a progressive movement, but submits that as a term it is too general. In the progressive movement there was really nothing which distinguished it from the spirit of the times. It was a forward-thinking, forward-looking, and forward-moving—hence "progressive"—era. What constituted the forward movement, at what rate, and under whose control are subjects for deeper consideration.

The point is that the movement for international reform was part of this overall progressive milieu. Understandably, it shares the weaknesses and confusion as well as the positive attributes of that time. Of the greatest significance, perhaps, was the inherent elitism of progressivism. The coalition structure did not permit a sharing of the idea that direct democracy had a place either in all areas of domestic reform or in the establishment of international relations. Because of this elitist dominance of the international lawyer and the conservative
businessman within the peace movement, a specific approach to the achievement of the ultimate reform was seriously prejudiced. As a result, peace advocacy lost its flexibility and was in a poor position to react to World War I. The climate for the international mind was destroyed and the belief that war was bad for business was undermined. The subsequent paralysis rendered the organized peace societies unresponsive to innovative proposals and hostile to new groups.

Even these new peace groups which opposed the war for its destruction of gains in social welfare had their own limitations created by elitism, especially during the mediation movement. The belief that a good idea, shared by the "best" people, and supported by experts, could not fall short of success was apparent throughout that campaign. The handicap proved too great to be overcome.

In other areas, however, the efforts of the peace advocates were creative. The attempt to put more efficiency and democracy into the military establishment took root in the progressive movement, while at the same time the fear was expressed of the corrosive effects of the military spirit and universal military training.
Finally, peace advocacy during early 1917 remains a graphic example of the effort to give the people a direct voice in the war-making machinery. It was clear, however, that a referendum allowing the majority to directly decide for or against war could not gain approval during a time of crisis. It would remain for the future to reveal whether, with the emergency setting removed, such an ultimate reform—the culmination in many respects of direct democracy—could ever be achieved.
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