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OF SOCIOCULTURAL CHANGE.

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RURAL NORTH KOREA UNDER COMMUNISM:
A STUDY OF SOCIOCULTURAL CHANGE

by

Mun Woong Lee

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis Director's Signature:

Edward Norbeck

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INTRODUCTION

This study describes and discusses cultural changes that have taken place in rural North Korea under Communism, giving special attention to social changes. What notable changes have actually occurred? To what extent does the traditional culture survive, overtly and covertly, and what effects has it had in shaping modern conditions? To what degree has the modern population accepted Communist ideology? What, if any, have been the problems of adjustment to Communist life? These are some of the questions to which this study is addressed.

The division of the Korean peninsula following World War II resulted in the replacement of a single, homogeneous sociocultural system by two different systems, Communism in the northern half and anti-Communist capitalism in the south. Communism in North Korea is now more than a generation old, and so far the new system has suffered no serious setback on its way toward construction of an "ideal society." Students of North Korean Communism generally agree that after a quarter of a century of intensive experimentation North Korea has emerged as one of the most radically changed and, at the same time, one of the most highly disciplined states in the world. Scholars have often asserted that fundamental, revolutionary changes have taken place in almost every aspect of the culture of North Korea. The precise nature of these changes is often not made clear or explicit, however, especially in matters of social relationships.

Certain changes that occurred after the introduction of Communism, such as the abolition of private ownership of means of producing goods,
are well known to the rest of the world. This change alone would seriously weaken the foundation of the traditional society, which was largely based upon kinship. Collectivization of agricultural land alone would similarly bring great changes, particularly in the realm of kinship. So also would mechanization of agriculture. We may reasonably assume that, sparked by economic and technological changes such as those cited above, a great many alterations occurred in the social order in general. We know, of course, that certain social changes were consciously planned. We may safely assume that many other changes have evolved without conscious planning—at least without farsighted planning—as the result of the interaction of old and new traits. This study thus necessarily concerns itself with economic developments, but its goals are broader. These goals may now be restated briefly as an investigation and interpretation of planned and unplanned cultural losses, gains, survivals, and adaptations that gives special emphasis to social changes, the subject about which our knowledge appears to be the smallest.

In order to discern what changes have actually been made in North Korea and to gain an understanding of the circumstances which have led to unplanned changes, we shall first describe traditional Korean culture and then turn to an examination of the contemporary culture of North Korea. These ethnographic data will help us to see how traditional elements and new traits have interacted. Some of the major features of Korean social organization that will be examined along the lines discussed above are described briefly in the following paragraph.

Traditional Korean society was familistic or kin-based. Kinship had been a dominant factor in all aspects of its social organization. Lineage members maintained strong solidarity, and when they shared an
ancestor of historic prominence solidarity was especially strong. Solidarity and integration of kin groups was supported particularly by property held in common. The Korean system of kinship relations had been strongly influenced by Chinese Confucianism. Kin terms were mainly derived from China, and the essence of Korean ancestor worship was prescribed by the Confucian ethical code. In traditional Korea, however, Confucianism was not the same as in China. Marked differences developed in the process of interaction with the native Korean culture. For example, in Korea the father-son relationship was the most highly valued among the five cardinal relationships. In China, however, all five relationships were ideally balanced, and, accordingly, the father-son relationship did not have preeminence over others. The emphasis in Korea on the father-son relationship and the allied development of exclusive lineages are obviously incompatible with a Communist revolution. One might expect, therefore, that under Communism these Confucian-derived elements would either be eliminated or substantially modified.

This study attempts to shed light on such questions regarding changes in social organization as are stated or implied in the preceding paragraph. In doing so, it deals mainly with rural North Korea, where we believe the traditional culture of pre-modern Korea was better preserved than in urban areas. Since the writer, a South Korean, could not conduct field research in North Korea, this study has depended principally upon information gathered from former North Korean Communists, people who once lived in North Korea under Communism, and from foreigners who have visited North Korea. Use was also made of documents. Thus research techniques employed in gathering information were a combination of interviews and library research.
The primary and probably most valuable source of information was informants who had lived in North Korea as Communists for many years. In addition to the millions of refugees who left North Korea in the period between the beginning of Communism and the end of the Korean War, hundreds of people later left for various reasons and now live in South Korea. These people may be divided into two groups: voluntary deserters and North Korean intelligence agents who subsequently surrendered to or were caught by South Korean governmental authorities and were allowed to live in South Korea after "rehabilitation." The writer conducted extensive interviews with five such informants during three and one-half months of field research in Seoul, Korea during the summer of 1972. Among the five informants, all of whom were male, two were voluntary deserters and three were formerly North Korean intelligence agents. All had been citizens of North Korea for many years until their defection, which occurred between 1961 and 1969. At the time of their interviews, the informants ranged in age from 37 to 50 years and varied in familial social status, education, and occupation. One had a college degree and another was graduated from a technical school of junior college level. The others had received less formal education. Their occupations had been schoolteacher, military service (two, as officers), farm security agent, and party functionary. Since all left their families behind in North Korea, the identity of these informants is kept anonymous here to avoid the possibility of any punitive action being taken against their relatives.

In addition to the information given by these five informants, I benefited from an interview with one of the latest arrivals from North Korea, an intelligence agent who was arrested in 1972 after six months
of underground activity. This informant was born in Seoul, where his parents still reside. He was able to provide information concerning the most recent trends in North Korea.

Selection of these informants was made on the basis of their knowledge of the North Korean countryside and their availability. One informant provided valuable assistance in arranging for interviews with others. Since he is knowledgeable about the personal backgrounds of many ex-North Koreans, his advice was a key in the selection of other informants. Interviews took place mostly in hotel rooms and, to a lesser degree, in informants' homes or at their places of work.

Secondary sources used in this study are documents available in the United States, Korea, and Japan. Most of the works in question were published in North Korea and were either released by North Korean Communist officials or reached the outside world through other channels. Some publications that were used are observations of foreign visitors to North Korea. The most important source of the documents was the North Korean collection in the Library of Congress, which is very extensive. Other sources include collections in the Tenri University Library, Tenri City, Japan, the Institute of Oriental Culture of Tokyo University, the Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo, the Diet Library of Japan, Tokyo, and the Asiatic Research Center of Korea University, Seoul.

A word of caution about my sources of information is useful. Since actual field work in North Korea was impossible, it was also impossible to verify firmly all of the information given here. The informants tended to identify themselves as anti-Communists, apparently in order to avoid any possible suspicion of their continuing to be
Communists. By serving as informants, they wished to express their loyalty to the South Korean government, which they felt had saved their lives. However, the nature of this study probably minimizes the possible bias of the informants. The interviews focused on factual ethnographic information on contemporary North Korea and gave little attention to ideological opinions, in which bias might expectably be strong. The main concerns of the interviews were the things and events which the informants had seen and experienced while in North Korea, and efforts were made to reduce or identify bias or exaggeration. When information seemed questionable, attempts were made to verify or correct it by asking other informants. Except for some unique personal experiences, however, the data given by the informants showed little difference or variety in local customs throughout North Korea under Communism. Hardly any fundamental disagreements were found in the information gathered from informants of different backgrounds. A high degree of cultural uniformity seems to exist in North Korea.

Obviously, North Korean official publications have built-in biases, since their primary objectives are to disseminate information and to educate the people along Communist lines. These publications show no particular interest in reporting what is; rather, they emphasize what should and ought to be done. In order to win the support of the people, the publications give emphasis to accounts of how well the system works, rather than focusing on the way in which it operates. Some ethnographic studies have been made by official North Korean ethnologists (e.g., Hwang et al., 1960), but even in these studies emphasis has been given to newly-emerged socialist elements of culture and to what is yet to be changed, that is, to the remnants of the traditional "feudal" society.
These ethnological studies provide governmental authorities with guidance for policy-making. When the Communist ethnologists conduct field research on rural society, they tend to choose either the most advanced cooperative farm or the most backward one. Describing the one extreme, they vaunt the "superiority" of the socialist system of cooperative economy, and in describing the other extreme they discern problems that remain to be solved. Of course, neither extreme is modal or typical of contemporary rural North Korean society. However, when we put information derived from Communist ethnological studies into the broad perspective of the full sociocultural system of North Korea, it can be properly understood.

Let us suppose, for example, that these accounts consist of an attack on the "rain-calling" ceremony. In the past, it was common practice for the peasants to perform this rite when droughts occurred. Their farming lacked adequate irrigation and was largely dependent upon rain, which they regarded as being under the control of supernatural beings. Although it is claimed by North Korean propaganda that farmers are no longer troubled by droughts because of the progress made in the development of irrigation systems, the attack on the rain-calling ceremony leads us to believe that this idea of supernaturalism is still alive. This interpretation does not necessarily mean that rain-calling actually or often happens in rural North Korea, but simply that the belief probably remains.

Thus, the information collected from the North Korean sources used in this study may not be entirely accurate. It is quite possible that the Communist authorities have exaggerated the effectiveness of their system. Those who have visited North Korea are primarily sympathizers with the regime, whose travelogues would hardly be objective. However, every effort has been made to verify information by use of different
sources. Interviews were directed largely toward information drawn from our preliminary library research. As noted earlier, no fundamental disagreement was found among the different sources. To some extent, it may be said that, in one way or another, every piece of information from these sources does reflect conditions in North Korea.
CHAPTER I
TRADITIONAL KOREA

Before we proceed with this account of the culture of contemporary North Korea, it is necessary to describe briefly some outstanding features of the culture of pre-Communist times as a frame of reference for understanding modern conditions. Knowledge of the pre-Communist culture of Korea is useful in another way, since, as later passages will show, the undesirable features of traditional life have been a center of attention in Communist North Korea. The deplorable conditions of former times have been thoroughly exploited as an aid in ideological indoctrination.

By "traditional Korea," we mean principally the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), which was followed by Japanese colonial rule until 1945. Although some important cultural traits including modern technology and social, economic, and political institutions were added during the period of Japanese control, innovations brought by the Japanese appear to have had little effect on the core of the traditional culture. The sketch that follows is based primarily upon early ethnographic descriptions made by Korean scholars and foreign missionaries.

During the reign of the Koryo Dynasty (935-1392), which preceded the Yi Dynasty, Buddhism provided the principal ideology for governmental operation. The state was dominated by warriors and Buddhist monks, and scholars were virtually eliminated from positions of political authority. The succeeding Yi Dynasty launched its reign as a reaction against political domination by Buddhism and by warriors. For the scholarly
class, which had long been alienated from political power, the founding of the Yi Dynasty was a great victory over the warriors and Buddhist monks. The new ruling class, largely consisting of scholars, enthusiastically adopted Confucianism as a political ideology, particularly Neo-Confucianism as revised by Chu Hsi of the Sung Dynasty of China, and called themselves subjects of the Emperor of the Ming Dynasty of China. Yi Korea became a tribute state of China. Although Confucianism was adopted as an antithesis of Buddhism, it penetrated deeply every aspect of the sociocultural system of Yi Korea. Buddhism declined greatly in importance. Following the loss of its material basis by the expropriation of vast areas of land owned by Buddhist temples and the concomitant growth of strong governmental opposition which lasted throughout the entire Yi era, Korean Buddhism lost the glory of its past and failed to maintain close relationships with the people in their everyday lives.

Yi Korea was a highly stratified society. Four social classes were formally recognized: yangban, chungin, sangmin, and ch'onmin. The term yangban, literally meaning "both classes," once denoted both military and civil officials. After political power came into the hands of the scholarly class, the term changed to mean the class of scholar-officials, which constituted the privileged, ruling class monopolizing governmental positions. The Yi Dynasty was created as a result of a military coup, and those who had actively taken part in the coup or helped afterward in founding the monarchy were given yangban status as well as governmental posts. People of lower social class were supposedly able to attain yangban status by passing civil service examinations, but this policy seems never actually to have been followed during the entire duration of the Yi Dynasty. Only descendants of yangban families were allowed to
take the various examinations.

Chungin, "middle men," is a general term for administrative functionaries at various levels of government. These included the professional clerical staffs of ministries and offices of the central government in the capital and elsewhere in the nation. Also included in this class were interpreters, astronomers, physicians, county clerks, and professional military officers. Although they were few in number, the chungin, in particular the county clerks (ajon), were very important in the people's lives since they were the means of communication between the rulers and the ruled, and, locally at least, were the rulers in fact.

About three-fourths of the population consisted of commoners, sangmin. Peasant cultivators were the largest single occupational group and sub-class. Merchants and artisans were also commoners, but their social status was below that of cultivators. The commoner class alone was subject to taxation and military service. At the bottom of the social strata were the ch'onmin, or "despised people." These were divided into two occupational categories, public and private. Ch'onmin in public service included public entertainers, court maidens, male servants in government service, servants in government travel stations and rest houses, jailkeepers, public slaves, fugitives from justice, and criminals. The private class included Buddhist monks and nuns, messengers, actors and entertainers, female shamans, professional mourners and keepers of memorial tablets, executioners, shoemakers, and an outcast group called paekchong. Among the despised classes, the paekchong were uniquely low, defiled, and defiling to others. They engaged in small handicrafts such as basketry, butchering, leatherworking, and straw-sandal making, and lived in segregated
In Yi Korea, Confucianism had served as the ideological support for the *yangban* class in ruling the people and justifying the social hierarchy, a subject that will later be discussed in detail. Neo-Confucian elements utilized by the *yangban* spread rapidly, principally because detailed knowledge of them constituted the core of the civil service examinations. Since these examinations, called *kwago*, were the only legitimate avenue to officialdom, young males of the *yangban* class devoted much effort to studying Confucian classics.

Confucian influence on the Korean culture of the time may be distinguished by two major aspects, Confucian metaphysics and Confucian ethics. Prominent Confucian intellectuals of Yi Korea engaged in endless debates on various philosophical subjects including human nature, "the supreme ultimate," man's place in the universe, and cosmological speculation. Confucian metaphysics provided rich resources for these intellectual exercises, particularly during the second half of the Yi Dynasty. Beyond having importance in factional disputes in Yi Korea's politics, however, these intellectual activities and pastimes seem to have had little direct importance to the nation as a whole and were exclusively a custom of the elite.

However, Confucian ethics were important to everyone and constituted the moral standards of Yi society. During the period of over 500 years of the Yi Dynasty, the Confucian system of ethics became institutionalized and firmly integrated into Korean culture. Confucian ethics concerned primarily rules and standards of human relations, among which the ideals of the "Five Relationships" constituted the core: the relationship between father and son, master and subject, husband and wife, the aged
and the young, and between friends. The ideals of privilege and obligation of the Five Relationships are said to have developed on the basis of the relatively egalitarian society of China, and all five precepts were organized into a harmonious whole. But, as our Introduction notes, when these precepts reached Korea they underwent various changes. Most notable among these is the great emphasis placed on the relationship between father and son, which became far more important in Korea than the other relationships. Filial piety became the supreme virtue of the Yi era, and all other relationships were believed to stem from it. For example, it was believed that loyalty to one’s master could not be achieved unless filial piety to one’s parents, especially to the father, had first been demonstrated. In cases of conflict between filial piety to parents and loyalty to the ruler, obligations to parents held pre-eminence. It was not uncommon in Yi Korea for an exemplary, filial son to be rewarded by the court in various ways, including exemption from taxes, the erection in his honor of monumental columns or temples, and even by appointment to public office (Dallet 1954:129). Moreover, upon the death of his father, a filial son was expected to resign from his government post and give himself over to mourning. In some cases, a son built near the tomb a small house in which he remained for several years, thereby acquiring high renown for saintliness and veneration (ibid.:136).

The marked difference that existed between the Japanese and Korean adaptations of Confucianism is worthy of note. As in Yi Korea, Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) adopted Neo-Confucianism as a state philosophy. Japan also accepted the idea of the Five Relationships. Among the five precepts, however, the relationship between master and subject was given supreme
attention, as expressed in the concept of chū, the sense of duty to the Emperor. As Ruth Benedict (1946:119) described the circumstances, when filial piety came into conflict with one's obligation to the emperor, chū stood first. The Japanese case provides a key toward gaining an understanding of the Confucianism of traditional Korea. Korea lacked the extremely nationalistic ideals of Japan and failed to integrate members of society into a national network. The Korean emphasis upon filial piety, coupled with the importance placed upon purity of lines of descent, discouraged social integration on the national level. Close unity in Yi society was confined to lineages sharing descent from prestigious ancestors.

The Confucian emphasis on legitimacy of birth was accepted and widely applied in Korea, chiefly in the matter of dynastic succession. Endless struggles over the transmission of political power during the Yi Dynasty centered on the question of legitimacy. On the family level, the emphasis on legitimacy resulted in strong social discrimination against illegitimate children. The stress on purity of descent, which was supported and justified by the principle of legitimacy, eliminated illegitimate children from succession in family lines, even when families lacked legitimate sons, and barred them from all avenues toward officialdom (Pak Chi-won 1957).

Korea accepted almost every ceremonial symbol of Confucianism, particularly those of Chu Hsi Chia Li (Chu Hsi's Family Rituals). Confucian ceremonies of marriage, funerals, later mourning rites, and other ceremonies related to ancestor worship were strictly observed without any substantial modification of their Chinese form. Rites of ancestor veneration were especially important in maintaining solidarity.
among kin, although these ceremonies otherwise had little importance in social unification.

The basic framework of Korean kinship terminology is that of Confucian Chinese culture. Koreans recognized a wide range of kin relationships with distinctive kin terms, the majority of which were of Chinese origin. Even today, native Korean terms exist only for close kin. The Chinese system of *wu fu*, or the classification of kin by five mourning costumes according to their degree of consanguineal relationship, was accepted in Korea without modification.

Since agriculture was the major and virtually the only source of state revenue in Yi Korea, it is useful to examine the landholding system of the time in order to understand the circumstances of life of most of the population. From the beginning, the Yi government took no steps to give ownership of land to its tillers. Although a statewide land survey was conducted at the outset of the Yi regime in an effort to gather accurate information on the area of arable land, the redistribution of land which followed reaffirmed the continuity of the old class system, leaving the vast majority of the population as tenant farmers. The only marked difference in land holdings as compared with circumstances under the Koryo Dynasty was that Buddhist temples ceased to be major landlords. The arable lands previously owned by the temples came into the hands of the *yangban* bureaucrats.

In Yi Korea, the state was the supreme landlord of the nation, and no private individual or kinship group could "own" land. This circumstance made the majority of the rural population subject to the manipulations of the *yangban*, who actually controlled the land. Cultivated land was divided into two categories, private land (*sachon*) and public land
(kongchon). The government controlled both types of land either directly or indirectly. "Private land" meant land to which private individuals were given the right of use but not of ownership. Civil servants were given fixed amounts of land according to their rank, the yields from which were regarded as payment for their services. A few people, called merit subjects (kongsin), were given land for distinguished service in the establishment of the Yi Dynasty. In addition, the monarch often granted land to people who excelled in service to the state by acts such as successfully completing diplomatic missions and providing information about rebellions. People who received land in this way were nearly always yangban. According to custom, the landholders did not themselves work as cultivators. Some tilled their land by using slaves or poor peasants as laborers, but the majority rented their lands. Thus, in the management of private land intermediaries existed between the supreme landlord (the state) and the actual tillers, but these intermediaries were the de facto landlords.

Civil servants were required to return their land to the state when they left their posts. Except for 43 "merit subjects" who were given land and slaves for their services in assisting to found the monarchy and were allowed to control their land permanently, holders of private land ideally kept the land only during their lifetimes. Upon death, the land was to be returned to the government. However, this rule was often violated by descendants with political power, who retained rights to the land as de facto private property.

Public land was utilized directly by the central government or its agencies, in order to finance governmental operations. Like private land, some of the holdings were cultivated by private individuals of
the peasant class on a rental basis. Otherwise, public land was cultivated by slaves, soldiers, and, to a greater extent, by corvee labor on the part of peasant tenant farmers. The income from public land went directly to the central government or its agencies. In this matter public land differed from private land since it involved no private individuals as intermediaries.

Tenant farmers cultivating private land paid in rental at least 60% of the total proceeds. Fifty per cent was paid in rent and 10% as agricultural tax (Pak Chi-won 1960:271). In addition, tenants paid other kinds of taxes, which at one time reached a total of 44 kinds (Ho Chong-ho 1965:81). As noted earlier, they were also required to contribute uncompensated labor in the cultivation of public land. Peasants similarly worked without compensation in various public construction projects, and occasionally they were required to pay tribute of local specialty products to the central government.

Monarchs of Yi Korea were characteristically weak, and the yangban bureaucrats actually ruled the people, giving little concern toward improving their conditions of life. As time passed, an increase in the yangban population and the limited number of official positions resulted in a long succession of factional disputes among the yangban class and corrupt government. The demoralization of Yi bureaucrats is well recorded in the monumental ethnographic works by the scholars of Silhak’p’a, the School of Practical Learning, such as Yu Hyong-won (1622-1673), Yi Ik (1682-1764), Pak Chi-won (1737-1805), Pak Chae-ga (1750-1805), and Chong Yak-yong (1762-1836). The ruling elite spent a good deal of its time in reciting poems and taking a part in philosophical discussions, neglecting official duties. In many cases,
the local clerks (ajon) were the actual rulers. As Chong Yak-yong (also known as Chong Ta-san) describes them, the ajon regarded the farmers as their land to till, people from whom they could extort money in the same way as the farmers till their soil for a livelihood (1969, Vol. I:269). Chong Yak-yong reports that it was not uncommon for the ajon to collect from the farmers as much as four times the amount of the agricultural taxes which they actually delivered to the Board of Taxation in the capital (ibid.:202-203). Serving as intermediaries, the ajon operated in their own political and financial interests, cheating their superiors and similarly manipulating and exploiting the farmers. County magistrates were quite often replaced because of pressures of factionalism, but the ajon usually remained indefinitely at the same posts because they had good knowledge of local circumstances that was valuable for administrative purposes. For the average farmer, the ajon were the class which was most hated and feared.

During the second half of the Yi Dynasty, the bureaucratic system had become so corrupt that its numerous official positions were overtly or covertly purchased. Oh Chi-yong (1940:98) states that appointment to a high public office was regarded as "going out to make money or to become a gold mine contractor." Since those who held such offices had invested a good deal of money in bribes to gain their appointments, it followed that they would seek prompt recovery of their investments by abusing their executive powers. Such impropriety on the part of officials was firmly institutionalized during the latter half of the dynasty. Yi Ik (1972:83) describes the conditions of the time in a way that appears to be somewhat exaggerated, stating that if bribery and extortion
were eliminated, the high officials and local clerks could hardly have survived for lack of food. Harassment of farmers by such ill-founded charges as "undutifulness to parents," "failure to maintain cordiality with close relatives and neighbors," "committing incest," and "failure to pay respect to the yangban," was one of the common means of extorting money (Oh Chi-yong 1940:99). The peasants' attitude toward the village yangban is well illustrated by their custom of frightening their children by telling them that the yangban is coming and otherwise menacing them with this evil being (Dallet 1954:104).

When impoverished families found it necessary to abandon their homes because of inability to pay taxes, their neighbors or relatives were expected to assume the responsibility of payment (Yi Ik 1972:101). It was not uncommon for poor villagers voluntarily to become slaves of the relatively few wealthy landlords to escape from the harshness of the yangban (Dallet 1954:115). Peasants worked out strategies to cope with governmental corruption. On the village level, communal funds to which all village households contributed were the most common way of meeting the extortive demands of ajon and yangban. Communal funds were also used to pay for public facilities used for marriages, burials, and the like, and they were also used for unforeseen expenses other than the extortions of the bureaucrats (ibid.:113). Some villages formed mutual aid associations called igye which functioned solely to bribe local government officials to reduce exorbitant taxes (Institute for Historical Research 1965:63). Landlords often initiated among their tenants the establishment of mutual aid associations called hogye to bear the responsibility for the payment of rents collectively when necessary. If a tenant failed to pay his rent because of a poor harvest,
the association took the responsibility (ibid.:63). Thus the incomes of the landlords were guaranteed, but the tenants had no such safeguards against misfortune of any kind.

The manner of political control of Yi Korea appears to have exerted strong influence on the nation's social organization and especially on its technological development. As noted earlier, among the yangban, the most vigorous years of the lifespan were devoted to preparation for the civil service examination. The agony of years of preparation was rewarded by the omnipotence of bureaucratic power, if the yangban succeeded in passing the examinations and was appointed to high office. The power of office could bring almost anything. Particularly, it brought wealth and prominence to one's lineage, which, in return, often brought high positions for the generations that followed. But the strong dominance by scholar-officials in Yi Korea seriously inhibited the growth of one of the essential forces of socio-cultural development, that is, the development of technology. According to the Chinese-derived occupational rating generally accepted in traditional Korea, scholar-officials (sa) had the topmost rating. They were followed in descending order by peasants (nong), craftsmen and artisans (kong), and merchants (sang). Far below, and apart from all others, were the ch'onmin, the despised people. The three categories of commoners composed a single class, but they were not treated equally. Although the merchants, who were mostly peddlers, had the lowest status among the commoners, they were relatively free from institutional exploitation by the yangban class. Toward the end of Yi Korea, these merchants acquired wealth and developed into a social class with great political power. The circumstances of craftsmen and artisans differed. To the end of the
Yi era, they were looked down upon and exploited by the members of the yangban class, who were not interested in encouraging them to improve their skill and often underpaid them. As a result, craftsmen and artisans took little pride in their work. The noted scholar Yu Hyong-won (1961 I:165-166) describes the circumstance under which this class of citizens lived during the second half of the 17th century. Whenever the court in the capital needed their services, they were brought in, but they were paid poorly on the grounds that the work was for the court. Local governmental authorities treated craftsmen and artisans in the same way, as did influential families that were not of the bureaucratic class. Under these circumstances, craftsmen and artisans were reluctant to do their work skillfully for fear of increased exploitation, and no stimulus toward improving performances and techniques existed.

Furthermore, local administrative officials tended not to care about technological innovations, since political activities at the capital were their major concern. Generally, the most important techniques of artisans and craftsmen were barely transmitted and preserved, without improvement, through patrilineal lines of succession as a means of gaining a livelihood. However, the unfavorable conditions under which the craftsmen and artisans worked resulted in the loss of various technological processes. The manufacture of ceramics is a noteworthy example. Korean ceramic techniques were greatly admired by the Japanese and were introduced into Japan in the latter part of the 16th century, when Japanese military forces under the command of Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea but were unsuccessful in establishing control of the nation. These techniques are generally regarded as a
great contribution toward the development of Japanese pottery making (Reischauer and Fairbank 1960:590; Moose 1911:139). However, the most advanced of these techniques did not survive in Korea. Henderson (1969:136) states, "It is fairly clear that the end of a brilliant ceramic industry which had lasted fifteen hundred years in Korea was motivated in important part by the fact that the potters were despised specialists in a society which, in 1883, was offering increasing mobility for those many within it who were not sharply identified as specialists."

The Confucian class system of Yi Korea resulted in still another condition fatal to economic and technological development, a distaste for manual labor. J. Robert Moose, an American missionary who spent ten years in Korea during the final stage of the Yi Dynasty, describes the yangban as follows (1911:99, 101):

The fact that he is a gentleman is sufficient ground for him to excuse himself from everything in the shape and form of common labor. He is born to rule -- that is to hold office and get his living by the labor of other men's hands. The passion to hold office and to rule seems to be one of the strongest in the breast of the yang-ban; to obtain worldly honor and power is the goal which has been placed for him, and toward the obtaining of this he bends whatever energy he may be disposed to use.

Our village gentleman yangban is strictly opposed to undertaking anything that looks like manual labor. He may be ever so poor -- yes, even dependent on others for his daily rice -- but to get out and work is out of his line of business. It is no disgrace for him to go hungry, but to engage in any sort of manual labor would at once lower his standing as a gentleman and ruin his prospects for future promotion along the lines which gentlemen only are supposed to travel.

In summary, Yi Korea may be described as a society which never achieved a high degree of integration and which contained various self-destructive features. The ancient Confucian ideal of the state as a family never materialized, and on the village level, the population
was exploited by the bureaucrats and the wealthy yangban families. The emphasis upon filial piety and ancestral worship helped to maintain solidarity among members of kin groups, but it made no contribution toward national integration and, if anything, served as a divisive force. Subordination of the economy to the interests of politics, the lack of prestige for technical skill, the yangban's distaste for manual labor, and the poverty and otherwise miserable conditions of life of the majority of the population appear to have invited the collapse of the social system.

In the pages which follow, as modern conditions of Communist life are discussed under topical headings, additional and more detailed information will be given on relevant social arrangements, associated customs, technological matters, and other cultural elements of traditional or Yi Korea. Innovations occurring during the years of Japanese control in the 20th century will similarly be discussed.
CHAPTER II
NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION

1. The Land Reform

Toward the end of Japanese rule, a wide gap existed in the size of lands held by peasants, who formed the majority of the rural population, and by landlords. According to a survey conducted by the Japanese in 1942 (quoted in Ko Sung-hyo 1971:2), the landlord households, which composed only 3.3% of rural households, owned 60% of the land under cultivation in Korea, composed of 68.3% of the highly productive irrigated lands and 52.4% of the less productive dry fields. About 80% of rural households either owned no land or held at least part of their land as tenants.

The size of the average landholding in Korea was 1.5 chōngbo (one chōngbo equals 2.45 acres) (Ko 1971:3). In 1938, among households which either lacked land or rented at least part of their land, over 60% held less than one chōngbo, and well over one-third held less than one-half chōngbo. The bulk of land under cultivation was held by a relatively small number of Korean and Japanese landlords and a handful of large Japanese corporations. According to 1936 statistics, 2,330 landlords and corporations held over 50 chōngbo each, of which 67.4% were Korean and 32.2% Japanese. The larger the scale of landholding, the higher the proportion of Japanese owners. For example, over half (52.8%) of the landlords with over 100 chōngbo and 78.7% of those with over 200 were Japanese. Twenty-five Japanese landlords held over 1,000 chōngbo each, whereas only ten Koreans owned that much. A few Japanese
corporations played the role of colonial agents in Korea; among these the Toyo Takushoku Company with 50,000 чонгбо, the Chosen Kogyo Company with 19,000, and the Chosen Shintaku Company with 9,000 had the largest holdings. The total area of land held by Japanese companies and individuals, and by the Japanese government, however, was only 11.3%.

Shortly after the Japanese formally took power in Korea, they conducted under the pretext of confirmation of land ownership a nationwide land survey, which was completed in 1918. Until the end of the Yi Dynasty all land had been nominally owned by the government, and only the right to collect revenue from crops had been recognized, for certain lands. The lands on which this right obtained were held by the Korean aristocracy, bureaucrats, and members of local privileged classes, and the Japanese allowed these people to keep their lands as private property. The land survey was conducted as a preliminary step before utilizing the remaining land to support the Japanese economy. However, the land survey and other Japanese colonial policies had little impact on the traditional Korean class system. The colonialists had carefully tried to avoid any confrontation with the ruling class in Korea. The former privileged class was thus allowed to retain its wealth, but the majority of the peasant population was left without land and remained as tenants.

The fact that the northern half of Korea alone went under Communist rule does not mean that the peasant life in northern Korea had been much harder than in the south. In fact, there is some evidence that the peasants in the north may have been somewhat better off: "In the north the dry fields prevail, while the south contains irrigated lands, the yields of which are almost double the yields of dry fields (Grajdanzev 1945:282)." Almost two-thirds of the dry fields of Korea were in the
north, whereas 73% of the irrigated lands were in the south. The high productivity in the south, in all probability, had led to more intensive exploitation of both lands and tenants by the landlords and Japanese colonialists. As compared with owner-households, the proportion of landless households, either tenants or agricultural laborers, was much smaller in the north (46.4%) than in the south (60.4%), whereas the proportion of households owning at least part of the land they cultivated was higher in the north (48.2%) than in the south (38.8%) (ibid). The size of landholdings was much larger in the north. According to Grajdanzev, during 1934-36 over one-fourth of the households in the south had less than one chŏngbo of land under cultivation versus 35% in the north. These data contrast sharply with statistics on middle- and large-size farms. Only 1.6% of the farming households in the south held more than 3 chŏngbo, whereas 15.1% of those in the north fell in the same class. Thus economic hardships experienced by peasants before the end of the Japanese rule in 1945 seemed to have been less acute in the north than in the south.

When the northern half of Korea became Communist, over 111,000 chŏngbo of its arable lands were owned by the Japanese government and Japanese nationals and corporations. For the Communists, one of the most urgent tasks in winning popular support from the vast majority of poor peasants who had lived so long under straitened circumstances was the land reform. Many of the landlords with large holdings, Korean as well as Japanese, were absentee owners who lived in the cities, especially the capital city of Seoul in the south, and collected rents through agents. Fearing the Communists, many fled south, even before the land reform actually began in North Korea. "After these landowners had gone,"
according to Washburn (1947:156), "the landless peasants in a number of places seized the discarded fields and divided them among themselves."

On March 5, 1946, the North Korean Interim People's Committee, adopting the proposal of land reform of the Peasants Federation, passed an ordinance on land reform. The major principle underlying the reform was "land to the tillers," entirely abolishing tenancy. According to the ordinance (for English text, see U. N. 1951:59, or Korea Today, 1972, No. 189:16-17), the following categories of land were subject to confiscation and were to be given without charge to peasants with little or no land: (1) land possessed by the government, civilians, and organizations of Japan; (2) land owned by national traitors, that is, those who collaborated with the Japanese colonialists; (3) land owned by those who fled after the liberation; (4) land owned by Korean landlords in excess of five chōngbo per farming household; (5) land owned by absentee landlords; (6) land rented out continuously for many years, regardless of size; and (7) land owned by churches, monasteries, and other religious organizations in excess of five chōngbo.

Land confiscated and redistributed to the peasants was to be "owned permanently." However, it should be noted that "permanent ownership" of redistributed land is quite different from "private ownership." The ordinance further stipulated that, after the redistribution, land could not be sold, rented, or mortgaged. The peasants were given certificates of land ownership for their newly acquired lands by the provincial government, that is, the Provincial People's Committee. These certificates did not recognize private ownership of the land, but were designed to guard against further transactions in land.

The land reform ordinance also extended to other major aspects of
the rural economy of pre-Communist Korea. All debts owed by peasants to landlords whose lands were subject to confiscation and redistribution as well as liabilities on such lands were annulled; cattle, agricultural implements, and houses formerly owned by these landlords were to be confiscated; orchards and fruit trees possessed by the Japanese and the Korean landlords were also to be confiscated; irrigation facilities owned by those whose lands were subject to confiscation were to be turned over to the state; and all forests, except small areas owned by peasants, were to be confiscated and turned over to the state.

Finally, the land reform ordinance stipulated that, under the guidance of the North Korean Interim People's Committee, the Provincial, County, and District (Myon, now abolished) People's Committees assume responsibility for enforcement of the land reform program on the different administrative levels. On the village level, responsibility was to be assumed by the Agrarian Committee, to be elected by a general assembly of agricultural workers, tenants, and independent peasants with little land.

Landlords were not only deprived of their land and all other private property related to agricultural production, they were also entirely eliminated from the executive body enforcing the land reform. If landlords desired to work land themselves, they could hold the same amount as peasants, but they were given land only "in other counties." This appears to be an attempt to take away the power formerly held by landlords, and also to avoid any possible conflict between landlords and their former tenants. It is difficult to determine how many landlords lost their lands. Official North Korean statistics list under the category of landlords with more than five chŏngbo per household
29,683 households whose lands were confiscated. However, the same source lists only 3,911 landlord households that moved into new localities and received land (see Tables I and II). These figures lead to a question about the fate of the vast majority of landlords deprived of their lands and other property who received no land at the time of redistribution. No clear data to answer this question are available. In all probability many took refuge in the south or were forced to move into urban areas as non-agricultural workers.

Instructions on the redistribution of confiscated lands provided that the size of allotments be based on the number of household members and their ability to work as determined by their age. Each member of a household to receive land was rated according to age. A rating of 1.0 point was given for men of 18 to 60 years and women of 18 to 50 years; 0.7 point for children of 15 to 17 years; 0.4 point for children of 10 to 14 years; 0.1 point for children under 10 years; and 0.3 point for men over 60 and women over 50. However, the value of a point was not the same in every locality or village, since the ratio of confiscated land to the number of eligible people varied according to locality. After the Agrarian Committee completed the confiscation of land and the tabulation of points for each household, the Committee determined the value of a point by dividing the total area of land available for redistribution by the total number of points per village. Therefore, the size of the allotment of each household was determined by the total number of points of the household multiplied by the value of a point. The productivity of land was taken into account in redistribution insofar as possible. As determined by these procedures, the changes brought by the land reform may be seen in Tables I and II.
Table I: Confiscated Land, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owners of Land</th>
<th>Total Area (chōngbo)</th>
<th>No. of** Cases</th>
<th>Average Area per Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese government and nationals</td>
<td>111,561</td>
<td>12,919</td>
<td>8.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National traitors and deserters</td>
<td>12,518</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords with over 5 chōngbo</td>
<td>231,716</td>
<td>29,683</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who rent all of their land</td>
<td>259,150</td>
<td>145,688</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who continuously rent their land</td>
<td>354,093</td>
<td>228,866</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churches, monasteries, and other religious groups</td>
<td>14,916</td>
<td>4,124</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Totals</td>
<td>983,954</td>
<td>422,646</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II: Redistribution of Confiscated Land, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Area (chōngbo)</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>Average Allotment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural laborers</td>
<td>21,960</td>
<td>17,137</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants without land</td>
<td>589,377</td>
<td>442,973</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants with little land</td>
<td>344,134</td>
<td>260,501</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords who relocated</td>
<td>9,598</td>
<td>3,911</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Totals</td>
<td>965,069</td>
<td>724,522</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reserved by the People's Committee</td>
<td>18,885</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total</td>
<td>983,954</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Orchards are excluded in this table.

**This may be households, corporations, or other social units.
As the figures in the tables indicate, approximately one-half of the 1,860,000 chōngbo of arable land in North Korea in 1946 was involved in the reform. Over 60% of the confiscated land came from peasant households with medium-size holdings which had owned no more than 5 chōngbo but had rented part or all of their land. As noted earlier, the proportion of land formerly possessed by Japanese was 11.3%. No comparable data are available for South Korea, but, as has already been suggested, it appears that North Korea was less exposed to exploitation by Japanese colonialists than southern Korea, probably due to its own geographical disadvantages of lower productivity, a lower proportion of irrigated to dry fields, and mountainous terrain.

It appears that "national traitors" and deserters were the largest category of landholders whose land was confiscated. The majority of those who had been classified as national traitors were Koreans who made large fortunes through collaboration with Japanese colonial authorities. The average size of holdings confiscated from national traitors and deserters was 9.09 chōngbo.

Nearly one million chōngbo of confiscated land were redistributed, and less than 2% was placed under state ownership. Each household received an average of 1.33 chōngbo of arable land. A close look at figures on average allotments by recipient classes (Table II) raises a question concerning the reasons for the marked difference in average allotments to former poor peasants and to landlords. Landlords were given almost twice the amount received by the average agricultural laborer. The official North Korean source of data on the land reform gives no explanation. Two factors may have influenced the amount of the allotments. Since the amount of land was based upon the point
system tabulated by the age and sex of each household member, differences in the average size of landlord and peasant households might explain the differences. Since the low income of the agricultural laborers could not support large households, they tended to have relatively small families. In pre-Communist times, it was not uncommon for poor but able-bodied men to leave their homes and families to seek employment as agricultural laborers in other localities. It was quite rare for agricultural laborers to form households larger than the nuclear family. Conversely, the families of the well-to-do tended to be relatively large and to include kin beyond the members of the nuclear family. The quality or productivity of land may also have been influential in determining the size of these allotments of land. The peasants remained in their native villages, but the landlord class had to move to new localities where the soil was of poor quality or, in many cases, virgin land. Larger allotments of inferior quality to the landlord class seem to have been balanced by the lower average allotments of land of higher quality to the former peasants. Regardless of differences in average allotments according to former socio-economic status, the size of average landholdings was small.

There is no doubt that the land reform substantially changed the social structure of North Korea. The former landless peasants were given land of their own and a strong voice in village affairs, whereas well-to-do families lost virtually all of the political power they had long exercised. Although the land reform brought about the abolition of the traditional class system, which was largely based upon the ownership of private property, it did not achieve a society that was truly egalitarian in economic opportunities, since it allowed differences in the
size of landholdings among peasant households in the same village. No ceiling in the size of land holdings was set forth in the reform program at this time. Since confiscation did not apply to land which was cultivated by its owners, a class of "new rich peasants" began to emerge a few years after the reform. Unlike the former landlords, the former middle-class peasants who owned more than five chōngbo of arable land but tilled it themselves were allowed to keep their land. The holdings of the former middle-class peasants were much larger than the average allotment of 1.33 chōngbo per household. Owner-farmers were also allowed to keep necessary means of production such as draft animals, ox carts, and other agricultural instruments. Landholders who now had relatively large plots of land of good quality—so-called munon-okdap, or fertile fields near their houses—undoubtedly held an economic advantage over others.

Although tenancy had been formally abolished by the land reform, there was still room for exploitation of poor peasants by the "new rich peasants." The owners of large holdings managed their farming through lending draft animals and agricultural instruments to poor peasants in exchange for labor, which had been common practice in pre-Communist years. In this way, it was still possible to operate large holdings without violating the ordinance prohibiting tenancy, but, since land was no longer subject to sale or purchase, no expansion of holdings was possible. Some well-to-do families practiced usury, loaning grain to poor peasants who were out of food well before the next harvest, under agreements that the latter return the same amount of grain plus substantial interest after harvest (Kajimura 1966a:305-306). An official North Korean statement tells us:
The land reform dealt a severe blow to rich peasants, but they still remained as a class. Accordingly, exploitation in various forms was to be seen in the countryside, and new rich peasants emerged, although small in number. Some peasants who became rich after the land reform would practice usury, hire workers instead of doing their jobs themselves, and indulge in the worst type of profit seeking (Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., 1958:16; also quoted in Chong-sik Lee 1962:13).

The activities of large landholders were somewhat restricted in late 1948. The North Korean Constitution, adopted and promulgated in September, 1948, provided that size of landholdings could not exceed five chōngbo in the plains or twenty chōngbo in mountainous regions (Article 6). A program of reexamination of landholdings then took place in rural North Korea and, in accordance with the new regulations, certificates of land ownership were withdrawn and reissued.

For most peasants, the initial land reform ordinance was not surprising at all. It was what they had expected after the Communist take-over. The mobilizing force was the Peasants Federation (nongmin tongmaeng), newly organized among the poor peasants toward the end of 1945. In order to carry out the land reform with the least possible disturbance and resistance, trained cadres were dispatched from the central government into each village. Although the reform had been executed in the name of peasants, these cadres supervised and directed the entire procedure. Confiscating the properties possessed by the Japanese presented no problem, but the land reform ordinance was met by strong resistance from the landlords and wealthy families. In order to minimize and weaken potential resistance, the regime encouraged each village to ostracize rich landlords. "Some landlords, who were besieged by excited peasants, deserted their native villages, and some opened their stores of grain to the peasants and begged the latter's pardon"
(Hwang et al. 1960:205). For example, three landlords in the Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative in Sangyang hamlet, whose confiscated lands each exceeded five chŏngbo and who were suspected of possible "reactionary influence," were ostracized and forced into relocating (ibid.:206).

The entire land reform of 1946 was reportedly completed throughout rural North Korea in only about 20 days. As a result, the geographic and social movement of the North Korean population apparently reached its peak during and shortly after this time. There was no reason for the poor peasants to leave their native villages since they had moved up to the status of a somewhat privileged class, economically and politically. But fear of the possible acts of the local Communist authorities and the former under-privileged class had led thousands of wealthy families to desert their homes. No doubt the majority of them fled to South Korea. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea estimated that 1,116,600 North Korean nationals had taken refuge in South Korea by the end of 1947 (U.N. 1948:I-23). Another report (Choson Unhaeng Chosa-bu 1948:I-9) gives the estimated number of refugees in South Korea during the same period as 803,434. Among these, 185,441 were reported to have left North Korea in 1946, and 165,074 in 1947.

From these reports it seems clear that the majority of refugees had already deserted their homes in North Korea and fled into the south well before the actual land reform started. The statistics of Table III help demonstrate the impact of the land reform ordinance on the flow of North Koreans to the south. As this table shows, the number of refugees greatly increased during the month of the land reform. The following month of April, 1946, saw the greatest flow of refugees during a single
month. From March through May, over 100,000 North Koreans took refuge in the south.

Table III: Estimated Number of Refugees by Month, 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>13,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>20,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>34,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>50,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>25,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>17,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>4,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>4,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total .......... 185,441


2. Cooperativization

Although the former landlord class had been largely removed from the scene by the land reform and the lot of poor peasants had improved, as we have earlier noted, North Korea was not yet an egalitarian society because the former middle class had gained economic strength. The land confiscated and redistributed in accord with the land reform ordinance was neither nationalized nor put into private ownership. To some extent, it can be said that the peasants' newly-acquired land was under de jure private ownership but de facto state ownership. The land reform had only cleared the way for further consolidation of rural economic organization; that is, the reform was the first step toward the "agricultural cooperativization" that was to follow. Since land could not be sold, the regime was in no hurry to conduct further reorganization of the rural economy and focused its attention next on increasing production.
The North Korean Constitution (Article 9), promulgated in 1948, provided that the cooperative management of rural economy be introduced and encouraged, but this did not materialize until after the Korean War (1950-1953).

A decree of December, 1949 provided for the formation of state farms. Absorbing the land reserved as state property during the initial land reform, the newly established state farms, provincial and central-governmental, were designed to demonstrate the "superiority" of collective management of rural economy. They served as forerunners for future cooperativization and experimentation with various other aspects of rural economy. During the Korean War, rural North Korea suffered a severe shortage of labor. All able-bodied men were mobilized for military service, leaving principally old men, women, and children in the villages. To meet the labor shortage, the government encouraged the peasants to organize a number of mutual aid groups. These were called chōnsŏn kongdong chakōptae (front joint work teams), pumasi-ban (mutual aid groups), sokyoli-ban (ox sharing teams), and puŏp hyopdong chohap (side-line or subsidiary cooperatives). The "front joint work teams" reportedly prevailed near the war front, especially in Kangwon Province, the eastern front. The members of these teams, which cultivated land cooperatively and also actively assisted at the war front, were composed principally of young people whose families had been evacuated to places of safety. Sizes of teams ranged from 50 to 200 persons (Kim, Han-ju 1958:14).

The pumasi-ban, or mutual aid group, had long been common in traditional rural Korea. As a temporary work organization among neighboring villagers, it was active during the peak seasons of
agricultural work, including seeding, rice transplanting, weeding, and harvesting. The "ox sharing teams" were planned to meet a shortage of draft animals. Subsidiary cooperatives not directly connected with agriculture were especially common in the coastal and mountain regions. Member households of these associations carried out their own farming on an individual basis, but jointly conducted projects such as livestock raising and handicrafts as subsidiary activities. These subsidiary cooperatives numbered seventy-one when the Korean War ended in July, 1953. The total number of cooperatives, including agricultural and subsidiary, in rural North Korea in July, 1953 reportedly reached 174, composed of 2,354 households (*Nongop hyopdongwha undong ui sungli*, 1958, I:4; and Kajimura 1966:300). These organizations may be seen as incipient forms of the agricultural cooperatives that were later developed.

The Korean War dealt a serious blow to the North Korean economy, both rural and urban. Property was damaged and a shortage of agricultural labor arose. Urban centers needed much manpower for post-war reconstruction and industrialization. War casualties and the southward flow of refugees reduced the North Korean population. When the war front moved to the northernmost part of Korea, many people in all parts of the country who opposed the Communist regime chose to leave North Korea for the south. However, the Korean War aided the Communist regime by helping to foster among its subjects a revolutionary ideology and by eliminating the so-called reactionary elements.

In August 1953, one month after the truce, the Communist regime called for a major reorganization of rural economy, the cooperativization of agriculture. During the following year, which was labeled by the
Communists as an "experimental stage," an intensive propaganda campaign for cooperativization was conducted throughout North Korea. First, each county (kun) was ordered to set up two or three cooperatives among the poor peasants, who were regarded by the Communists as loyal supporters well indoctrinated with Communist ideology. Establishment of these early cooperatives aimed to demonstrate the superiority of cooperative management of agriculture and to educate peasants in the operation of cooperatives. By the end of 1953, 1.2% of the peasant households in North Korea had been organized into 806 cooperatives. After this experimental stage, near the end of 1954 the regime launched a full-scale movement toward cooperativization. An existing trend toward giving preferential treatment to the cooperatives over individual farmers was intensified during this period. The government gave every possible form of assistance to the cooperatives, including preferential treatment by governmental "stations" which rented farm machinery, a reduction of taxes-in-kind, loans of grain to poor peasants, a supply of urban workers during peak periods in the agricultural cycle, and priority over individual farmers in access to seeds of high quality produced in state-owned seed farms.

With this strong support the number of cooperatives increased greatly after 1954. At the end of 1954, 31.8% of the peasant households were in cooperatives; in December, 1955 the number had risen to 49.0%; in December, 1956, to 80.9%; and at the end of 1957, over 95% of the peasant households no longer operated individual farms. By August, 1958 the entire rural population of North Korea was under the cooperative management system. There were then 13,309 cooperatives, with an average of 79 households and 134 chöngbo of arable land each (Choson chungang

Proclaiming "victory of cooperativization," the regime further consolidated rural economic organization by reducing the number of cooperatives and consolidating them into larger units during the fall of the same year. By this measure, 13,309 cooperatives had been reorganized into 3,843, each of which had an average of 275 households and 456 chōngbo of arable land. In pre-Communist times the 11 or hamlet was the smallest administrative unit of the nation. Under Communism the 11 was enlarged to include several neighboring hamlets and the "new" 11 coincided with the cooperative farms.

The merging in North Korea of agricultural cooperatives and the 11 occurred at the time of the completion of the reorganization of rural Communist China into People's Communes, and for this reason one might conclude that the Chinese development was "promptly echoed by North Koreans" (Lee, Chong-sik 1963:76). North Koreans were well aware of what was happening in Communist China, and they did learn much from this source about the collectivization of rural economy. Information about the "Great Leap Forward" and the commune movement in Communist China was widely dispersed through national propaganda channels. One of North Korea's scholars acknowledges that information about collectivization movements experienced by Soviet Russia, Communist China, and other Communist countries was utilized in the cooperativization movement in North Korea (Kim, Hanju 1958:73). However, we find it difficult to accept the notion that North Korea's establishment of cooperatives was an echo of the commune movement of Communist China. Statistical evidence (Chōsen Minshushugi Jinmin Kyōwakoku Kokumin Keizai Hatten Tokeishū, 1946-1960, 1961:62-63) shows that the size of cooperatives
in Korea had been consistently growing since the movement began, and a number of cooperatives had already grown beyond the size of the old 11 before the official merger of small cooperatives. The number of cooperatives with 101 to 200 peasant households each was 222 in 1954; 354 in 1955; 1,247 in 1956; 2,064 in 1957; and 1,074 in 1958. Twenty cooperatives with 201 to 300 households each existed in 1955; 103 in 1956; 137 in 1957; and 984 in 1958. Furthermore, cooperatives with 301 to 400 households numbered 34 in 1957, a year before the official merger of small cooperatives. Some of these had been organized as large cooperatives from the beginning, whereas others were later created by merging. From this evidence, it seems clear that the tendency toward forming large cooperatives had already begun in North Korea before Communist China launched its campaign of merging cooperatives into people's communes.

At the outset of the cooperativization movement, the North Korean regime had proposed three types of cooperative management of agriculture, identified as Type I, Type II, and Type III in North Korean documents. In fact, these are three stages of the evolutionary transformation from individual farming into cooperative management. The three types may be called mutual aid teams, semi-socialist cooperatives, and socialist cooperatives, and are characterized as follows (Kim Han-ju 1958:29-31, and Ko Sung-hyo 1971:49-51):

**Mutual aid teams (Type I):** Each household maintains absolute control over its private property including land, draft animals, and agricultural implements. Members of the team pool labor and use draft animals and agricultural implements communally, while retaining
individual management of private property. The amount of the contribution by member households is balanced by varied compensation to them in the form of produce and/or labor. Mutual aid teams are organized on a year-round basis.

Semi-socialist cooperatives (Type II): Member households still retain ownership of their land, but all the land possessed by member households except a few fruit trees and small garden plots are pooled and collectively managed. Draft animals and agricultural implements may be purchased by the cooperatives with communal funds. Distribution of crops depends on both labor and land contributed. When the crops are harvested, some of the produce is set aside for payment of taxes-in-kind, production costs including the cost of fertilizer and seeds, machinery rental, irrigation facilities, and as funds to be held as common reserves for emergencies and for socio-cultural purposes, such as recreation and education. The remainder is then divided among the member households, 80% or more being allocated on the basis of the labor contributed, and 20% or less allocated on the basis of the investment of land. If an owner of land contributes less than 120 work days in a year, his right to receive dividends for the investment of land is nullified. Income from the joint subsidiary projects is divided solely according to the amount of labor contributed.

Socialist cooperatives (Type III): Except for fruit trees,
private garden plots, livestock (non-draft animals), and bees, all property in land, draft animals and major agricultural implements is turned over to cooperative ownership, and all farm work and subsidiary production is done collectively. Private ownership of land is legally preserved, but it has no bearing on utilization of land and distribution of income, since member households are paid solely on the basis of labor contributed, after deductions for production costs, taxes-in-kind, common reserves, and funds for socio-cultural purposes.

These three types of cooperative mechanisms appear to have been consciously designed as evolutionary stages of rural social organization. The regime recommended that the peasants choose a type which would fit their local circumstances and regarded the third type as the "most advanced stage," toward which all people should eventually strive. The principle of voluntarism advocated by Lenin decades ago was said to have been strictly observed in accordance with the ordinance; however, a campaign promoting increased cooperativization was conducted. During the early stage, agricultural cooperatives were largely initiated by devoted party members and poor peasants, leaving the wealthier peasants as individual farmers. Evidence strongly suggests that there were clear differences in the people's attitudes toward cooperativization according to their socio-economic statuses (Hwang et al. 1960:216). Those who were in the lower economic strata after the land reform enthusiastically supported the formation of agricultural cooperatives from the beginning. These were largely poor farmers who had received some land during the land reform but whose income remained far below their needs and who had
little to lose by joining cooperatives. Many of the "new middle class" farmers also supported cooperativization. These consisted of formerly poor people who had become relatively self-sufficient after the land reform. Since their present condition of livelihood was almost entirely made possible by the policies of the Communist regime, their favorable reaction is understandable. Enthusiasm for cooperativization was also shown by the families who had lost members in the war and families which included war heroes. The new middle class farmers, who had survived the land reform with a goodly amount of their land and maintained living standards above those of the average family, generally hesitated and remained spectators. The most prosperous farmers strongly opposed cooperativization, since it would mean financial loss.

The formation of "mutual aid teams" was easily accomplished, since they do not interfere with individual farming, and Korean peasants were, in fact, well-acquainted to such organizations in their traditional mutual aid associations. Although the regime suggested three stages of cooperativization, little attention was paid to the formation of "mutual aid teams" during the active campaign toward cooperativization. This is evidenced by the fact that official North Korean statistics on the progress of cooperativization deals with only the second and third types, that is, semisocialist and socialist. Three evolutionary stages of transformation were, it seems, not observed in the majority of cases. In many cases, peasants were directly organized from the beginning into the most "advanced" type.

Documentary material concerning the actual process of cooperativization is abundant. The Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party compiled data on the experiences of cooperativization and the
operation of cooperatives in six volumes entitled *Nongŏp Hyopdongwha Undong Uي Sungli* (Victory of the Agricultural Cooperativization Movement), published in 1958 and 1959. These compilations contain about 90 case studies of individual cooperatives. The first volume deals particularly with the developmental process, describing twelve cooperatives. From this volume, we have chosen one case study to illustrate the process of transformation, the Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative (Volume I:153-186). This case study was chosen chiefly because the account is amplified by another work (*Hwang et al.* 1960), an ethnographic study of the same cooperative. Using these two sources, we give in the following pages a summary of the process, describing how the cooperative came into being, and how individual peasants were brought into the cooperative.

Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative (*Cho-Chung Ch'insŏn Nongŏp Hyopdongchohap*) is located in Taek'am-li of Sunan County in South P'yŏngan Province, a plains region north of P'yŏngyang. The cooperative originated in a small hamlet called Sangyang, and was known as Sangyang Agricultural Cooperative until late 1959. At the time of liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, there were 105 peasant households in Sangyang hamlet, including seven large landlords and seven middle peasant households. The majority of the village people lived by tenant farming. The land reform brought about some changes at once in the village social structure. Three of the large landlords were ostracized and moved to other communities (*Hwang et al.* 1960:206), but some of the wealthy families survived the land reform, having only their rented lands confiscated. Although agricultural laborers and tenants had received some land during the land reform, the majority of the people remained poor. At the time of
the truce in 1953, there were 103 households in the hamlet, among which fewer than 10 were self-sufficient and about 40 lived on grain loans from the government.

At the height of the movement toward cooperativization after the truce, the Li Party Committee, composed of devoted party members, organized a propaganda campaign. Committee members focused their attention on the poor, visiting them to explain party policy and the need for cooperatives, and extolling the superiority of cooperative management of agriculture. The campaign brought new hope for the poor people, but made the wealthy ones uneasy. As expected, the wealthy families opposed cooperativization. Since they were still running their large landholdings by seasonally employing poor villagers, the formation of cooperatives even among the poor would deal a serious blow to them, making it impossible to hire laborers and to rent draft animals and agricultural implements. The self-sufficient middle farmers also opposed cooperativization because membership in a cooperative on an egalitarian basis with poor families would mean a heavy financial loss.

Toward the end of 1953, when some signs of willingness to form cooperatives were seen, the Li Party leadership took the initiative, and with first 10 willing households and two immigrant households, set up Sangyang Agricultural Cooperative, the first cooperative of the socialist type to be established in South P'yŏngan Province. All of its members were poor. The County People's Committee immediately took every possible measure to support the cooperative. In order to boost the member's morale, grain, seeds, and needed funds were provided. The cooperative purchased an ox and agricultural implements with a loan from the Farmers' Bank. The unit of the Chinese People's Volunteer
Army which was then stationed near the hamlet also supported the cooperative by delivering 200 tons of horse manure directly to the fields in army vehicles. With this substantial support, the cooperative had a successful harvest at the end of its first year, producing an average of 2.4 tons of rice per chōngbo of paddy fields against an average of about 2 tons for the individual farms. The cooperative also produced an average of 1 ton of barley, wheat; and potatoes per chōngbo of dry fields versus about 700 kilograms for the individual farms. The propaganda networks picked up these figures as an important aid in advertising the "superiority of cooperative management of agriculture." Peasant households still engaging in individual farming carefully watched the operation of the cooperative throughout the year. At year's end, many of them, mostly poor and a few middle farmers, expressed willingness to join the cooperative. By now the tendency to favor cooperativization had become a serious threat to the wealthy farmers.

Realizing that there would no longer be a supply of labor if all the poor farmers joined the cooperatives, the affluent and some of the middle farmers sought a way to survive. They attempted to organize their own cooperative of the second or semisocialist type by recruiting poor families with many able-bodied members as a labor force that would allow them to continue conducting their farms under private ownership. About ten wealthy and middle farmers initiated this attempt to establish a new cooperative, promising loans of grain and cash to poor farmers if they joined. Signatures indicating willingness were given by about 20 poor farmers, and verbal promises to join were given by many others who were not members of the existing socialist cooperative. During this quiet campaign of recruitment, the recruiters concealed the fact that
the cooperative was to be semi-socialist rather than socialist. In mid-December, 1954, the organizers called a meeting to form the cooperative. About 60 people attended, during which they inquired as to the type of cooperative planned. As the discussion grew heated, it became clear that the organizers intended to take advantage of the poor farmers, since a semi-socialist cooperative takes into account in its distribution of earnings the amount of land invested by members. The majority of the people attending the meeting left before it ended and called at the office of the year-old Sangyang Agricultural Cooperative, expressing their willingness to join it. On the same day, the Sangyang Cooperative called a members' assembly and accepted 78 households as new members. The cooperative leaders also continued their attempts to persuade the rich and middle farmers to join, and after about two months of continuous effort, Sangyang Cooperative had grown to 100 member households. Although rich and middle farmers had joined, they were unhappy about their new status and continuously engaged in minor conspiracies to obstruct operations.

During 1955, more outside support was poured into the cooperative. At the time of rice transplantation, the county authority sent a labor-assistance team of 32 office workers and students. Later the central Party dispatched to the cooperative on a mission of "concentrated guidance" a group of 20 cadre members, who stayed in the village 15 days giving instruction in the cooperative management of agriculture. After the year's harvest, which reportedly brought the member households more than twice their earlier incomes, the remaining hold-outs, three households of old residents and eight of immigrants, also joined the cooperative. Sangyang hamlet was then completely cooperativized with
111 member households and 239 working members.

One year later, in the fall of 1956, the Sangyang Agricultural Cooperative merged with four neighboring cooperatives: Pubaek (established in the fall of 1954); Taekam (late 1954); Pongwhachae (fall of 1955); and Taegol (early 1956). Since all of these cooperatives were already full socialist types, the merger was easily carried out. The unit of the cooperative had now become identical with the administrative district or li. During the following two years, the cooperative expanded further, absorbing neighboring small-scale cooperatives; Sansong and Namch'ang of Ochung-li in late 1957, and Sachik-li Chae-il, Sachik-li Chae-i, and Yonsan Cooperatives in the summer of 1958. Over 460 households and 800 or more working members were brought into a single cooperative. In the fall of 1959, Sangyang Cooperative changed its name to "Korea-China Friendship Agricultural Cooperative," which was apparently named to honor the assistance given by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army during its early stage of cooperativization and Chinese Premier Chu En-lai's visit to the farm in February, 1958.

It should be noted that from its beginning this cooperative was heavily indebted for aid to the local and central governments. During the peaks of the agricultural cycle each year, labor forces in the county, including office workers, students, and military men and their families, were mobilized to assist the cooperative. The central government also introduced farm machinery, and its agricultural machine station carried out most of the heavy work formerly done by draft animals and human labor, such as plowing and transporting. Following its usual policy, during the early stage of cooperativization the regime loaned grain for food, seeds for planting, and funds; reduced taxes-in-
kind; and exempted the cooperative from repaying its grain loan. All of these measures undoubtedly helped inspire the members with zeal to increase production.

As we have seen from the foregoing case study, the Korea-China Friendship Cooperative did not go through the second stage of cooperativization, the semi-socialist, but changed directly from the stage of mutual aid team to that of socialist cooperative, even though only a small portion of the village households were involved at the outset. As noted earlier, this course of development appears to be fairly common for other cooperatives. According to official North Korean statistics (Agricultural Cooperativization in D.P.R.K., 1958:29, 64), the third type (socialist) was most common. As early as June, 1954 there were 1,091 cooperatives in North Korea, of which 54% were already of the third type. In December of that year the socialist-type composed 78.5% of the 10,098 cooperatives in North Korea. After two years of active campaigning, cooperativization had succeeded in bringing over 80% of the peasant population into cooperatives, 97.5% of which were of the socialist type by December, 1956. Although cooperativization was formally completed by the fall of 1958, the last two years were apparently spent strengthening the organization of the cooperatives and picking up remaining stubborn farmers, principally more or less wealthy households.

The problem of voluntary participation was solved largely by removing all possible conditions under which individual farming was possible, so that the farmers finally gave up their independence and joined. For the wealthy peasants, "voluntarism" consisted, in fact, of "surrendering" their farms. No doubt they resisted losing their
property, but as cooperativization progressed, they had no alternative. Large numbers of laborers were required to run their large landholdings, and such labor could no longer be obtained. They could no longer practice usury in loans of grain or cash in order to expand their wealth or to gain labor. As the formerly poor peasants in the new cooperatives improved their financial position, they obtained their own agricultural implements and draft animals instead of using those of the rich landowners.

One important technique used to influence farmers was to show them the "superiority" of cooperative management. In most cases, cooperatives were initiated by a small number of poor farmers. In the early stage, the members of cooperatives were undoubtedly poor as compared with the remaining independent farmers. Viewing the success of initial cooperatives as a building block to successful cooperativization, however, the regime gave them strong support. This procedure apparently worked well on the village level, and more and more families gave up their individual farms as the year passed.

The rapid development of cooperatives in North Korea may also be partially attributed to the fact that, through the land reform in 1946, the majority of land was not in fact at the owners' disposal. As we have already seen, the farmers were not allowed to sell, buy, or rent their newly-acquired land, even if they were issued ownership certificates. This circumstance certainly must have weakened their attitude toward private ownership of lands. As we have also noted, the land reform was a first step toward the agricultural cooperativization which followed. By giving them free land, the land reform helped to gain the support of the poor, who formed the majority of the rural population,
and the regime relied primarily upon these poor people during the initial stage of cooperativization. It is difficult to find record of any cooperatives which have been successfully initiated by the rich and middle-class peasants. We have seen an example in the case of the Korea-China Friendship Cooperative of an unsuccessful attempt by prosperous farmers to form their own semi-socialist cooperative. This case illustrates the wealthy farmers' attitude toward cooperativization. A similar example is reported from Sangpyông-li of Chasong County in Chagang Province (Nongông hyopdongwha undong ui sungli, 1958, Vol. I:290).

By the end of 1958, all of rural North Korea had been brought under the socialist economy. Since the early small cooperatives were generally units composed of families which might or might not be close neighbors, they had to cultivate widely scattered lands, an inefficient procedure. Now the ridges between small fields, which formerly served as footpaths and boundaries of individually-owned lands, were removed. Each cooperative considerably reduced the number of distinct units of arable land through readjustment of the fields in this way so that farm machinery could be used more effectively. The Red Star Agricultural Cooperative (Pulgun-pyol Nongông Hyopdong Chohap) (ibid.:217-250) may serve as an example to illustrate this point. During the early stage of cooperativization, two small cooperatives of socialist-type were formed in a small hamlet called Haboshi. Although cooperative members lived in the same village, they were divided into two cooperatives when they worked in the fields. Disputes often arose over priority in the use of irrigation facilities which the two shared. At least in two cases, disputes involved men who were cousins. Members of both cooperatives discovered that some work could be done with less manpower by merging, and they
eventually realized that relatives and neighbors were being estranged by the competition of the two cooperatives. In the fall of 1955 the two merged, adopting the name Red Star Agricultural Cooperative.

After the general amalgamation, the cooperatives of North Korea became giant corporations which handled all aspects of rural economy including distribution and exchange. Now the enlarged financial scale made it possible for cooperatives to purchase modern machinery, such as tractors and combines, for use in larger fields. Increased efficiency in the use of available labor and means of production improved the material benefits of the member households. Utilizing labor pools, cooperatives undertook large-scale irrigation projects and other construction projects, which further boosted production.

Until cooperativization was completed, the farmer was told to retain his land in private ownership so that he could be compensated for land invested in the cooperatives if he should wish to leave the village. However, even this nominal right of private ownership was taken away, and all land was placed under "cooperative ownership" of the members.

Since the amalgamation to form large units, little has changed in the organization of the cooperatives, although some measures have been taken to run them more efficiently. The official name of the cooperatives was changed, however. In early 1962 (January), the title Nongŏp Hyopdong Chobap (Agricultural Cooperative) became Hyopdong Nongchang (Cooperative Farm).

3. The Cooperative Farm

As the preceding pages suggest, the changes in agriculture under
Communist rule brought many other changes in rural life. The development of the cooperative farms may therefore be regarded as an important stage in a long process of transformation creating a Communist society. In theory, the land is under cooperative ownership. Members of the cooperative farms, who form the majority of the rural population, are neither independent farmers, like the traditional peasants, nor wage laborers, like the farmers of the state farms. Their income depends principally upon the joint results of the work in which they have participated. The effects of the establishment of the cooperatives on rural Korean life may be inferred by examining in greater detail their structure and modes of operation. We shall first give attention to the manner in which the farms are organized.

The average cooperative farm consists of about 300 farm households composed of 1,500 people and has 500 chŏngbo of arable land. As we have noted, the cooperatives correspond with the modern li or hamlet, a unit which has expanded under Communist rule to include several neighboring hamlets. As an administrative unit the old li played no important role in the social life of the villagers. Only the single hamlet, as a residential community, had been important in daily life. Unless there were some common concerns such as sharing irrigation facilities and neighboring fields, little contact existed with the people of neighboring hamlets. It was common for each hamlet to have its own tutelary god, and face-to-face relations with other people were ordinarily limited to the members of one's hamlet of residence. The merging of several neighboring hamlets into the modern li was more than an expansion of the administrative unit. This development strongly affected the traditional structure of the rural community. Far beyond the traditional
functional boundary of a hamlet, which was a residential cluster, the modern cooperative farm, is multifunctional. It controls and organizes agriculture and commerce, and also educational, social, political, recreational, and welfare activities. The geographically distinct hamlet may still exist in some places, but it is no longer an independent entity of social life.

In each cooperative, administrative affairs are carried out by a People's Committee, and all the other activities are handled by a Cooperative Farm Management Committee, which functions primarily to control agriculture. The highest legislative organ or decision-making body of a cooperative farm is the plenary session, which is attended by all active working members. A delegates' conference may substitute for the plenary session, where or when it is difficult to call the plenary session because of the distances between residential clusters within a farm. In this case, the delegates are elected from all segments of a farm. This legislative body is responsible for formulating rules governing the operation of a farm and also determines various farm policies. Matters handled by the plenary session or the delegates' conference include legislation concerning farm operations; work plans relating to production, construction, distribution, exchange, credit, education, cultural affairs, and health; an annual settlement of accounts and distribution of income; decisions on the size of common financial reserves and welfare funds, and the screening of persons to receive welfare funds; the organization of work teams and the determination of production targets by the teams; supervision of the farm's contracts with outside institutions such as the agricultural machine station; the conduct of hearings that concern the work of the Cooperative Farm Management
Committee and the Auditing Committee and the election of members of these two committees; supervision of the composition of farm cadres appointed by the Management Committee; control over admission to membership, and the withdrawal, punishment, and expulsion of members; and the conduct of hearings of reports of the Management Committee concerning farm property and financial matters.

The Cooperative Farm Management Committee is an executive organ of the farm concerned primarily with production. The committee is composed of 15 to 20 members, headed by one chairman and one or two vice-chairmen. The chairman also holds the chairmanship of the Li People's Committee, which concerns itself only with administrative affairs. The Management Committee carries out resolutions adopted by the plenary session or the delegates' conference and manages various farming activities. It calls the plenary session or the delegates' conference and appoints and dismisses executive cadres. The committee chairman calls at least two sessions of the committee each month to discuss the management of farm affairs and he represents the farm in outside relations.

Supervising the operation of the Management Committee is the Auditing Committee, composed of 5 to 15 elected members with a term of membership of one or two years. The Auditing Committee oversees all activities of the Management Committee including the management of farm property, accounting, readjustment of labor credits (workdays) in relation to the production target, the management of shops, and credit. It also receives and transmits to appropriate channels farmers' complaints concerning the work of the Management Committee. The Auditing Committee reports on its activities at least once every three
months and prepares a report of the examination of the annual settlement of accounts for the plenary session or the delegates' conference.

Each cooperative farm has operational staffs that specialize in various aspects of farm affairs. A chief technician is in charge of all aspects of agricultural technology. Usually a graduate of an agricultural college, he is primarily responsible for the introduction of advanced technology. Under the leadership of the chief technician are production guidance workers, agricultural specialists of various kinds, and a specialist in animal husbandry. Each farm usually has two production guidance workers who engage principally in administrative work. The agricultural specialists are concerned solely with technical guidance. Each agricultural production work team includes at least one agricultural specialist, who usually holds a certificate attesting to his proficiency that is issued by the state upon completion of a short training program in agricultural technology. Other staff members of a farm include a planner-statistician, two to four bookkeepers, one or two labor-statisticians, and one or two warehouse custodians. Each farm runs various facilities and institutions including a credit office, one or more dispensaries, a workers' school, a Democratic Propaganda Room, nurseries, kindergartens, and a club house. Also included are bath houses, which are set up in each residential cluster or for each work team. In some instances, a farm has its own cemetery.

The working members of a farm are organized into "work teams" or chakopban. In general, each cooperative farm has several "agricultural production work teams" (nongsan chakopban) and at least one animal husbandry work team" (ch'uksan chakopban). The former includes 50 to 100 members in each team, the latter 5 to 10 members. Besides these
two kinds of work teams, a farm may have other teams specializing in such matters as the raising of fruit and vegetables and sericulture. Each agricultural production work team is divided into about five small groups called "work sub-teams" (puncho), each of which generally has 10 to 20 members. Sub-teams of the animal husbandry work teams have only 2 to 5 members. Work teams may be further divided into specialties, such as dry-field sub-teams, paddy-field sub-teams, and pig-raising or rabbit-raising sub-teams.

The work teams and sub-teams are year-round organizations to which land, labor forces, livestock, agricultural implements, and draft animals are assigned. Seasonal work organizations called chakopcho, or "work groups" are also used. These groups are organized whenever it is necessary to divide the sub-teams still further in order to utilize them effectively for specialized tasks. The chakopcho of 5 to 7 members is organized among members of the larger puncho and includes at least one experienced farmer. For example, the chakopcho functions from January to early March in the making of bags and rope of straw and the construction of curtains around the seedbeds to protect them from cold temperatures. From mid-June to mid-October, various tasks that include weeding and harvesting are done by sub-units of the chakopcho, each of which takes charge of specified areas of fields. Some agricultural work, such as transplanting and threshing rice, requires the cooperation or pooling of all available labor, and these tasks are carried out by all workers, who are divided into sub-teams. In addition to promoting the effective use of labor, the chakopcho has proved to be advantageous in letting the farmers bear the responsibility for the results of their work, thus stimulating them to improve the quality of their efforts.
The chart (Figure I) which follows graphically summarizes the organization of a cooperative farm into formal units and shows its lines of administrative control.

In further illustration of the organization of the agricultural cooperative, we shall take as an example the Namgu Cooperative Farm in Yomju County (Nodong Sinmun, 1/26/66). This cooperative farm has nine work teams, including six agricultural work teams (nongsan chakopban), one animal husbandry work team (ch'uksan chakopban), one fruit-culture work team (kwasu chakopban), and one sericulture work team (yangcham chakopban). Each of the teams is divided into sub-teams (puncho), and the sub-teams may or may not be further subdivided. On this farm, where the paddy fields compose 80% of the arable land and the dry fields only 20%, each agricultural production work team is organized with several sub-teams of 20 to 25 members in charge of paddy fields and at least one sub-team specializing in dry fields. Each sub-team is in charge of the entire process of production on the lands assigned to it. One of the most difficult problems of the farm management committee is the allocation of lands to sub-teams. Such factors as the fertility of soil in each parcel of land, the distance from residential areas, work conditions, and the average yields during the past five years are taken into account. In order to maintain a balance between quality and quantity for all teams, good and poor parcels of land are judiciously allocated. Other necessities, such as draft animals and agricultural implements, are also equitably divided among the sub-teams. The draft animals are classified into four qualitative grades and those of high grade are given to the sub-teams in charge of unfavorable pieces of land.
Figure I: Cooperative Farm Organization

Central Agricultural Commission

Provincial Rural Management Committee

County Cooperative Farm Management Committee

- Agricultural Machine Stations
  - Irrigation Control Stations
  - Material Supply Agencies

Li People's Committee

Management Committee
(15-20 members)

- Chairman (elective)
- Vice Chairman (1-2)

Auditing Committee
(5-15 members)

Plenary Session

Delegates' Conference

Chief of Technician (1)

- Production Guidance Worker
  - Agricultural Specialist
  - Animal Husbandry Specialist

Planner-statistician (1)

- Bookkeepers (2-5)

Labor-statistician (1-2)

Warehouse custodian (1-2)

Credit Office

Dispensary

Workers' Middle School

Democratic Propaganda Room

Nursery

Kindergarten

Club House

Maintenance Unit

Agricultural Production Work Teams
(50-100)

- Work Sub-teams
  (10-20)

Agricultural Specialized Work Team

Animal Husbandry Work Teams
(3-10)

- Work Sub-teams
  (2-5)

Also reviewed and modified by our informants.
The animal husbandry work team is assigned lands for producing forage for its animals. The size and organization of its sub-teams are based on the number of animals and the conditions of forage production. The fruit-culture work team is divided into three sub-teams, each of which includes 16 to 23 members and is in charge of specified orchards. In composing each sub-team, the number of fruit-trees and their condition, including their age, are taken into account. The sericulture work team consists of three sub-teams, each of which includes 17 members. Each member of a sub-team is in charge of a certain number of silkworms, the number of which, in turn, depends upon the condition of, and the distances to, the fields of mulberry trees which provide food for the silkworms.

In general, the allocation of labor to work sub-teams is based primarily upon the members' ability to work. More than 85% of the farm laborers and over 90% of the total number of able-bodied members are in the agricultural production work teams. In other words, the majority of able-bodied men and women produce rice and other cereals, which requires relatively hard effort, especially the raising of paddy field rice. Except for a few able-bodied male core members, the sub-teams for dry fields and the specialized work teams for fruit-culture and sericulture are composed mainly of female members and the aged of both sexes. The allocation of labor is based upon actual experience and is fairly elaborate. For example, on the basis of the statistical knowledge that paddy fields require annually 400 workdays per chŏngbo and dry fields 244 workdays per chŏngbo, the farm authorities have figured that an average sub-team member is able to cultivate 0.8 chŏngbo of paddy field or 1.2 chŏngbo of dry field. Taking this figure into account,
the allocation is further adjusted so as to reflect the fact that an average member of the paddy field sub-team, which is composed mainly of able-bodied members, contributes annually 30 more workdays than an average member of the dry field sub-team. Every effort is made to insure that all able-bodied members and highly experienced farmers are equitably allocated among the teams and sub-teams in order to avoid possible variations in farmers' incomes other than those due to differences in the quality and quantity of the work contributed. When possible, members of individual households are assigned to the same sub-team.

As the above example shows, the organization of production units and the allocation of means of production are carefully worked out in order to mobilize all available human and material resources of the farm for efficient production. The Communist regime seems to be fully aware of the influence of the mode of organization upon the farmers' morale and their incentives to produce. Since morale would be seriously affected if two farmers in different production units who had contributed the same number of workdays received markedly different incomes, every effort is made to ensure equality in the conditions of production. Each year's experiences are carefully scrutinized with the aim of improving the manner of organization. At the end of each agricultural year, all the units of production and the manner of organization are reviewed and, if necessary, reorganized.

The circumstances at Namgu Cooperative Farm differ little from those described earlier. Depending upon the natural resources and the location of the cooperative farms, production is organized so as to maximize returns. Each work team is an independent unit in its
activities of production and has its own facilities for production. In principle, the same is true of each sub-team. However, sub-teams sometimes work cooperatively, a practice which, to some extent, may be seen as an extension of the traditional mutual-aid association called pumasi that formerly prevailed throughout rural Korea. Among sub-teams concerned with the same crops, inequalities may arise during the peaks of agricultural work because of heavy simultaneous demands for irrigation and transportation facilities and other farm machinery. In such case, the sub-teams organize a pumasi by means of which they exchange labor on a reciprocal basis. This kind of mutual aid among the sub-teams is reported to be extensively employed (Kajimura 1967:17).

All farms do not have all of the specialized work teams we have discussed. Many cooperative farms on the outskirts of urban centers raise principally cash-crops of vegetables. Farms in the plains areas tend to specialize in producing cereals. In mountainous areas, animal husbandry, fruit-culture, and sericulture are more common. At these cooperative farms, work teams called chonghap chakopban or "general work team" are multi-functional (Kajimura and Sakurai 1969:16). As its name implies, a general work team engages in various kinds of agricultural activities and produces a range of products, although its sub-teams may specialize. The general work team has apparently proved to be somewhat advantageous for effective year-round utilization of manpower, and, in recent years, a trend has developed toward an increase of general work teams.

The composition of the farm population shows some notable changes under the Communist regime. As industrialization and urbanization increased, the rural population substantially shrunk. We might
reasonably assume that those who left farms to engage in non-farming jobs in urban centers are primarily young able-bodied people, a development that would reduce the capacity for agricultural production for lack of young, vigorous workers. However, counter-balancing measures have been undertaken by the Communist regime. There is still a demand for additional farm labor, but the mechanization of agriculture, often referred to as the "industrialization of agriculture" has reportedly progressed substantially and has partially met the shortage. The use of weed-killing chemicals, for example, is reported to have led to considerable savings in manhours of labor, and the introduction of multi-functional tractors has similarly eased the problem. Today, it is quite common to see young women operating tractors, work that at first was regarded as suitable only for men.

Another measure that helped alleviate the farm labor shortage was a strong tendency to assign to cooperative farms soldiers who had completed their terms of service, even when they originally came from cities. Today, these discharged soldiers are said commonly to form core groups in the cooperative farms together with people of poor peasant origin. Since all of these former soldiers are members of the Korean Worker's Party and were well-disciplined through their military life, which has been called a "school of revolution," they are the most trusted and "revolutionary" class of people in rural North Korea. They are reported to play the leading role in bringing cultural innovations to the farms. The Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm (Hwang et al. 1960:212-213) serves as an illustrative example. In late 1959, of a total of 1,227 members, 129 were recently discharged soldiers and these men formed the core group of the work force on this farm. More than ten
of the soldiers served in key positions that included the chairmanship of the Socialist Working Youth League, the headship of work teams, and various positions of Party leadership on the farm level.

In connection with the composition of the agricultural labor force, a few words are necessary regarding the qualifications of membership in a farm. In principle, all able-bodied people over 16 years of age who reside within the boundary of a farm are qualified to be farmers. However, there are two classes of farmers; full members, called nongchangwon, and associate members, called nongchangwon hubo, literally meaning "candidates for farm membership." The latter category, associate membership, draws our special attention. Qualifications are based upon former social, economic, and political statuses. Associate members consist mostly of the class of people regarded as reactionaries or as politically "impure," including former landlords, "pro-Japanese," and "pro-American" elements. These associate members are denied some civil rights, including the right to vote and eligibility for elected office, and they are excluded from any decision-making body of the farm. Otherwise they have the same rights as full members. The associate members may become full members through devotion to farm and other social activities and through hard work. A full membership may be revoked, however, if one fails to observe the state ordinances or farm regulations or has brought substantial loss to the farm. The full member may be either degraded to associate membership or dismissed from membership.

Finally, let us briefly examine the way in which a cooperative farm is integrated in the broader national network of administrative control. Until early 1962, when a new administrative organ called
the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee which specialized in agricultural management and guidance was set up on the county level, cooperative farms in North Korea had been administered through the conventional administrative channel, that is, the People's Committees on the county, provincial, and state levels. The establishment of the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee marked the separation of the activities of agricultural production from the administrative sector. The state enterprises which serve the rural economy were placed under the direct control of the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee. These are agricultural machinery stations, agricultural machine factories, irrigation control stations, material supply agencies, and epizootic disease prevention centers. All individual cooperative farms within a county are directly controlled and supervised by the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee. This County Committee also gives direct technical assistance to the cooperative farms under its jurisdiction. For instance, most of the major agricultural machines used in farming, including tractors, combines, and trucks, belong to the agricultural machine stations run by the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee. The Committee assigns the agricultural machines and its operators to each farm on a year-round contract. Rental fees for the machines depend upon the quantity of work carried out with the help of the machinery and also the quality of the produce raised with the aid of the machinery.

Beyond the level of the county, the County Cooperative Farm Management Committees within a province are controlled and supervised by the Provincial Rural Management Committee, or To Nongchon Kyongli Wiwonhoe. In addition to the cooperative farms, the Provincial Rural
Management Committee directly runs the state farms or kugyong nongjang. At the top of the hierarchy is the Central Agricultural Commission, or Chungang Nongop Wiwonhoe. This is the supreme organizer of the entire operation of agricultural production in North Korea. Following the recent trend of decentralization of administrative organs related to agricultural production and guidance, the roles of the Central Agricultural Commission have been greatly reduced, thus heavily strengthening the roles of County Cooperative Farm Management Committees. The Central Commission retains chief responsibility for the advancement of agricultural production, running various agricultural research and experimental institutes. Activities under the Central Commission's charge include the improvement of farm machines, selection of seeds, improvement of soil fertility, the supply of fertilizers, animal husbandry, rural by-products, training of agricultural specialists, and large-scale "nature rebuilding" projects such as reforestation, establishment of shelter-belts, and bringing tidalands under cultivation (Kajimura and Sakurai 1069:21).

The numerous changes may be summarized briefly. The former independent peasants have become rural proletarians, under a national scheme of organization. The traditional division of labor has changed greatly. Each working member of the farm is now in charge of a specific portion of the farm work. A household does not exist as an independent unit of production; its members play various roles in farm affairs without reference to the households to which they belong. Unlike the traditionally loosely-organized village structure, it appears that the cooperative farm as a whole functions in the manner of a single large household.
4. Technological Innovations

The division of Korea in 1945 left North Korea with insufficient arable land to feed her population by use of the farming technology of the time. The mountainous terrain and unfavorably cold climate were serious handicaps. Under Communism, heavy emphasis was first placed upon industrial rather than agricultural development to save the national economy. The priority given to industrialization drew considerable manpower from the rural sector; and the additional shortages of arable land and manpower then strongly stimulated the development of agricultural technology. However, so long as land remained under private ownership, it was almost impossible for small-scale farmers to adopt modern technology. The state farms, however, could do so and they played the major role in furthering farming technology. It was only after cooperativization was completed that advanced technology, especially in farm machinery, became general in North Korea.

One of the most celebrated slogans in the economic development of North Korea was the phrase "technological revolution," which called for the successful completion of four basic tasks, the development of elaborate irrigation systems, the mechanization of farm labor, electrification, and "chemicalization" or the increased use of agricultural chemicals. Completion of these projects would have been impossible without great financial support from the central government. It is noteworthy that the goal of effecting a "technological revolution" has been officially interpreted to mean "industrializing agriculture" (Kim Il-song 1970, III:430).

An assessment of the state of "technological revolution" in 1969 concludes that the task of developing irrigation systems had then been
"basically" completed (ibid.:431). This project was carried out under the slogan "Task for the Rebuilding of Nature" and entailed a massive mobilization of labor. At first work was limited to the construction of an irrigation network of paddy fields, reservoirs, and dikes. Recently, efforts have been made to extend irrigation to some dry fields. Construction of reservoirs had long been one of the peasants' dreams in North Korea, where the average rainfall per year ranges from about 800 to 1,400 mm., of which about 60% falls during the months of July and August (Kawagoe 1970:108). The numerous reservoirs now existing in North Korea are effective against drought and in increasing productivity. A leading example of the modern irrigation systems is the much-celebrated Kiyang Suli Ch'aegye, or Kiyang Irrigation System, which pumps water from Taedong River into the Taesong Reservoir in two stages: first, by ten pumps through ten pipes of one meter in diameter and up to thirteen meters in height, and second, by ten pumps through ten pipes of .9 meter in diameter and up to 47 meters in height. Through dikes of about 1,000 kilometers, the Taesong Reservoir supplies water to approximately 51,000 hectares of land divided into 109 cooperative farms, in 26 counties and cities. Water is pumped to high lands at more than 300 pumping stations (Uchino 1968, No.1; See also Korea Today, No.86:21-23, July, 1963). The Yongsong Cooperative Farm, located in the suburb of P'yongyang, is one of the beneficiaries of the Kiyang Irrigation System. Water is pumped from the Taesong Reservoir to the highlands at a height of 150 meters through five stages of pumping (Uchino 1968, No.2). Today the Kiyang Irrigation System has become a symbol of the success of the "Task for the Rebuilding of Nature." The North Koreans are proud of their roles in changing nature, claiming
that "in the past, water flowed from top to bottom, but today it flows from bottom to top" (Uchino 1968, No.1; Kawagoe 1970:109).

The introduction of sprinkling devices known as punsusik kwangye ch'aegye is another example of efforts to save agriculture from drought and to promote productivity. Through pipelines installed deep in the ground, water is supplied to the fields, especially to vegetable gardens. Installation of this system was very expensive; however, its advantages in increasing production have been very great. Before the introduction of the sprinkler systems, 6,000 to 7,000 chongbo of land were required to supply vegetables to P'yeongyang City. Today, with the sprinkler system, only 2,000 to 3,000 chongbo of land are necessary. The resulting savings, in this urban area alone, come to some 4,000 chongbo of arable land, which is equal to the area of arable land in the average county (Kim, Il-song 1970, Vol. III:428).

Traditionally, oxen were the only draft animals used in Korean farming. Horses were rarely used. Except for plowing and the pulling of vehicles, farm work was done manually. In 1948 a very few tractors were imported into rural North Korea (Sakurai 1965:68). They proved to be impractical, since the lands were still under individual ownership and peasants found no need for the expensive machinery to replace their oxen. It was only on state farms and other state enterprises that tractors were then utilized. In early 1950, the Communist regime set up five Nonggigye Imgyongso or "Agricultural Machine-Hire Stations" with a total of seventy tractors to provide mechanical labor for needy farmers. During the Korean War (1950-1953), which cost rural North Korea heavily in manpower and oxen, the machine-hire stations appear to have become firmly established, and the number of stations and tractors
has since increased rapidly. When cooperativization was completed in late 1958, the number of stations had increased to seventy, with a total of 1,211 tractors. Two years later, in 1960, the number of tractors had reached 5,214, at 89 stations (Sakurai 1965:70).

The rapid increase in the number of tractors may be attributed to the fact that North Korea had begun active mass production of tractors with her own technology and materials in 1959. According to Sakurai, writing in 1965, North Korea had manufactured about 3,000 tractors of approximately 30 horsepower each year since 1960 (ibid.:73). This figure seems later to have been far exceeded, however, since Kim Il-song (1970, III:432-433) believes that by 1969 the capacity of tractor manufacture had reached 10,000 per year, with tractors still in great demand. Although rapid industrialization is primarily responsible for the increased supply of modern agricultural machinery, cooperativization of agriculture created the demand.

The impact of tractors on North Korean agriculture was tremendous. These machines have taken over most of the hard manual labor of former times. The tractors are especially designed for multiple use. Combined with various attachments, a single tractor does the plowing, seeding, weeding, harvesting, threshing, irrigation, pumping, silage cutting, sawing, and transporting. The consequently reduced need for labor undoubtedly helps explain the great reduction of the farming population. According to official statistics, only 42.8% of the total manpower in North Korea was engaged in farming (as members of agricultural cooperatives) in 1963, whereas 74.1% of the population had been peasant farmers in 1946. Thus, during this interval of 17 years, over 31% of the total labor force had left rural occupations (Chosen Minshushugi Jinmin
The use of tractors has its own limits, due to field conditions. In sandy fields and in mountainous areas where fields slope 15 degrees or more tractors cannot be used. Of 1.9 million chongbo of arable land in North Korea, a little over one-third (0.7 million chongbo) was apparently unsuitable for the use of tractors (Sakurai 1965:72). Improving techniques of transplanting rice, which requires much manual labor for a short period of time, has been one of the major tasks of agricultural technology in order to meet the manpower shortage. Mechanization now seems to be in sight. A recent report (Spurr 1974:49) states that North Korea has made good progress in designing rice transplanters, which were reported to be handling 30% of the crop in the spring of 1974. There is also some indication that Communist authorities have tried to experiment with direct seeding of rice without transplanting, but so far satisfactory techniques do not appear to have been developed (Kim Il-song, ibid.:432).

The number of trucks in use is impressive. According to a report in the Rodong Sinmun (11/10/70), during 1961-1969 the number of trucks in rural North Korea increased 6.4 times.

Mechanization of agriculture has, of course, reduced the importance of draft-animals in rural North Korea. However, oxen are still used fairly extensively, especially in areas where conditions of the land disfavor machines.

Among the four main tasks of the "rural technological revolution," the goal of electrification has been most successfully reached and electrification has possibly reached the level of that of other advanced nations (Rodong Sinmun, 11/3/70). In the spring of 1969, 91.2% of
North Korean farm households were reportedly equipped with electricity (Kawagoe 1970:108). In addition to improving conditions of daily life, electrification has been important in reaching toward the other goals of the "rural technological revolution," that is, the development of irrigation and mechanization in general. Without electric power, for example, the complex irrigation systems could not have been established. Today all farm work that is done at fixed sites, such as threshing, pumping, and silage processing, is carried out by electric power.

Considerable progress appears to have been made in reaching the goal of increasing the supply of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals. The use of fertilizer per chŏngbo, only 131 kilograms in 1949, was over 500 kilograms in 1969 (Chosen Minshushugi Jinmin Kyōwakoku Keizai Hatten Tokeishū: 1946-1963, 1965:21 and Kawagoe 1970:109). The supply of agricultural chemicals other than fertilizers, such as insecticides and weed killers, is reported to have increased greatly in recent years. In former times, weeding demanded much human labor.

In addition to the governmentally sponsored changes made under the name of the "technological revolution," a number of grassroots technological innovations also occurred and have become generally established. The technique of shifting soil to improve its fertility, known as hukgali, is one of these grassroots innovations. In order to revitalize the soil, farmers are encouraged to turn the topsoil over. This does not mean plowing, which can be easily done, but involves a complete turn-over of topsoil to a considerable depth once every few years so that the "exhausted" soil is replaced at the surface by rich soil. This job is largely done by human labor, and takes a considerable amount of manpower. It seems that the farmers do not mind the cost
of human labor if it results in better returns. Revitalization of the soil may also be achieved by mixing poor local soil with better soil brought from elsewhere. This type of revitalization of the soil, known as kaekt'o chagop, is especially common in areas where the native soil is too sandy to be suitable for rice farming; soil of high quality is brought in and a suitable mixture is created.

Changing the soil is not new, but since it requires much labor, it was seldom practiced in pre-Communist days. Today, under the cooperative management of agriculture, the practice has become common and is one of the techniques promoted by the agricultural campaign to improve soil fertility and produce better crops. This campaign takes place during the winter season between the end of harvest and the beginning of spring plowing, as part of the preparation for next year's farming.

Another technique to enrich the soil is known as sot'o chagop, literally, "soil-baking work," and seems to be based upon the same idea as slash-and-burn agriculture. The procedure is quite simple: soil is spread thinly on firewood, brush, or, more commonly, grain stalks, and the latter are ignited. This heat treatment is also done by putting small amounts of soil on the fire in the kitchen stove while preparing meals everyday, thus saving fuel and also accomplishing the treatment of the soil. The soil so treated is collected at regular intervals and spread on the fields. Outside baking is done chiefly during the slack winter season and the stove treatment continues throughout the year. The treatment is said to remove all harmful elements from the soil and to protect it from excessive acidification. To some extent, the baked soil functions like a chemical fertilizer, and is said to strengthen roots. Soil that has been treated in this way is reported to be
especially effective in the rice seed-beds and in raising corn. According to one source, the application of baked soil has been successful in increasing production. By capitalist standards, it may be difficult to find any notable advantages of these efforts to improve soil fertility, in terms of amount of labor input, but they undoubtedly increase productivity.

Other new agricultural techniques have developed or have been borrowed from other nations. Two examples are naengsangmo or "cold seed-bed" and myonwha yongyangdenchi kasikpop or "cotton nursery method," which are notable because they attempt to control the natural environment by technology. The "cold seed-bed" is used for rice. Traditionally, the cultivation of rice, the principal national food, had been concentrated chiefly in the south. The cold weather and a relatively short warm season had limited rice cultivation in northern Korea, which faced a severe rice shortage after the division of the nation. It is difficult to discern when this technique began in North Korea. It seems, however, likely that the technique had not been widely known to North Korean farmers until the mid-1950's. According to Kim Han-ju (1958:58-59), the cold seed-bed became widely introduced in North Korea by 1957, when it was used in 10.7% of total paddy field.

Preparation of the "cold seed-bed" requires considerable labor and material. In order to protect the seedlings from the cold, the seed-bed is covered with oiled paper or vinyl, which allows the seeds to be planted several weeks earlier than the old technique permitted. The seedlings are transplanted from the seed-bed into the fields in about one-and-a-half months. Transplanting is completed around the middle of May, which is a little over one month earlier than previously (Kim Ilch'ul 1959:11).
Use of the cold seed-bed has several advantages. It makes the seedlings strong and healthy, and provides additional time for growth, thus allowing successful cultivation in the northern climate. In addition, the method helps reduce considerably the amount of seed required. According to an informant who has had actual experience in rural North Korea, a seedling grown in the cold seed-bed grows after transplanting to have almost 90 stalks, a much larger plant than earlier practices yielded. Today, the use of the cold seed-bed is said to prevail throughout North Korea and is claimed to have resulted in greatly increased rice production.

The technique called "cotton nursery" began in the late 1950's. Except in a small region, the climate of North Korea is too cold for the cultivation of cotton. After the division of Korea, the shortage of cotton was acute in North Korea. One solution was the "cotton nursery" method of cultivation, which, unlike the conventional method of planting seeds in the fields, calls for the cultivation of seedlings for transplanting. The nursery is filled with humus and covered with oiled paper or vinyl for warmth. As compared with direct seeding, this new method also requires a considerable amount of additional labor. However, it is claimed that the method has not only proven to be productive, but has also enabled North Korea to expand its area of cotton cultivation to the far northern part of the country. Although recent developments in the synthetic textile industry may have considerably weakened the importance of cotton production, the innovation demonstrates the determination to increase production even when doing so requires added labor.

These two methods of cultivation are often called "the advanced productive farming methods" or sonjinjok tasuwhak nongpop, and both
require several times more labor than was needed by earlier methods. Since these tasks are done in the later winter well before the beginning of the heavier spring farm work, they utilize manpower that would otherwise be wasted and cause no conflict with other farming procedures. As these two methods well exemplify, the goal of increasing production has been a matter of great concern.

The circumstances described above lead us to believe that these innovations are chiefly concerned with making use of all potential resources, technological, material, and human, for the goal of increased production. It is true that much of the agricultural development in North Korea is due to the "rural technological revolution," but development has also been greatly spurred by utilizing all available human resources, in particular farm workers, who have exerted themselves to the utmost to increase productivity.
CHAPTER III

LIFE ON A FARM

1. Daily Life

In pre-Communist years, residences in rural Korea were commonly scattered widely in the fields in many small clusters. Under Communist rule, considerable effort has been made to reduce the number of residential clusters in order to put all aspects of farm life under direct control. Rural housing projects carried out by the government concentrate housing. The scale of these projects is not clear. However, it is illustrative that in 1969 Kim Il-song (1970 III:449) called for a campaign to build 150,000 new houses in rural North Korea each year for the next three to four years. Many cooperative farms include several residential clusters because of the large area of land under cultivation. In such cases, each hamlet serves as a production work team or chakopban. In the past, there had been little relationship between neighboring hamlets unless they shared the same irrigation system or cultivated adjoining fields. Relations of kinship involving matrimonial alliances were one of the major ties among neighboring hamlets, but they were all nevertheless socially discrete in matters of everyday life.

The center of a farm is the Cooperative Farm Management Committee. Its office is usually located in the heart of the farm. Each farm also has various cultural, educational, and service facilities. The clubhouse serves as a center of non-agricultural activities. It is equipped with various recreational facilities and also provides a place for socio-political meetings. The Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, with a
population in 1959 of 3,045 persons including 1,227 working members, had a clubhouse with a seating capacity of 700 people (Hwang et al. 1960:221). Unless there are scheduled events, farmers often spend their evening hours at the clubhouse engaging in recreational activities or at the "democratic propaganda room" reading books, newspapers, or magazines.

Each farm has at least an elementary school (first to fourth grades) and a middle school (fifth to tenth grades), so that children do not have to go outside the farm to receive the ten years of compulsory education (extended, in 1973, from nine years). Other educational programs include the Workers' Middle School (Kullocha Chunhaggyo), Mothers' School (Omani Haggyo), Cooking Lesson Circle (Yoli Circle), Children's Study Room (Adong Kyoyangsil), and Youths' Night School (Ch'ongnyon Yagan Haggyo). The farm dispensary is staffed with at least one doctor and two nurses. Other service facilities include a barbershop, bathhouse, sewing room, shop, and grain mill. Thus, for ordinary people on a farm, activities are virtually confined within the farm's boundary, and there are few chances to extend relationships outside the farm. Farmers sometimes go outside their farms on private business, however, which principally concerns the farmers' market, or nongmin sijang. Generally, each county has a farmers' market, held about three times a month. The dates of market are chosen by the county authorities and are usually holidays. Each farming household retains a small private kitchen plot of about 100 square meters, and may raise a small number of livestock, chiefly pigs and chickens, as private property. Surplus products so raised may be sold or bartered at the farmers' market. The purchase of good strains of such private livestock
as pigs and chickens is one of the important transactions which take
place in this market. Farmers may also sell or barter some of their
share of the products of the cooperative farms. According to our
informants, however, products at the market are chiefly those obtained
from these private endeavors. The farmers' market is not the same as
the traditional rural market. Prices are fixed by the central govern-
ment, and the market is not a gathering place for meeting friends from
neighboring farms. Markets are often open only during the morning,
and those who attend are said to be chiefly the aged of both sexes or
the other inactive members of the cooperative farms.

The tight regimentation of a farmer's daily life is affected in
part by various security and intelligence networks. The term anjonmang,
literally meaning "security network," refers to surveillance networks
as a whole. We have been able to discern three kinds of "security
networks" which directly affect the farmer's life. These are the
"intelligence network" (chongbomang) conducted by the "social security
agents" (sahoe anjonwon), "party member surveillance network" (tangwon
kamsimang) among the party members, and "mass surveillance network"
(kunchung kamsimang). The first two types are carried out covertly,
the last overtly.

The state's internal security is taken care of through the adminis-
trative channels of the Sahoe Anjonguk, or Bureau of Social Security,
which is approximately the equivalent of a police department elsewhere.
The Bureau has branches at each administrative unit of every level. On
each farm is a Social Security Agents' Room staffed with a "security
agent in charge," or ch'aegim anjonwon, and a few additional "security
agents," or anjonwon, who are, in fact, military men in active service.
Except on special occasions, they wear civilian clothes like those of other farmers. The "intelligence network" is operated by these agents, who secretly use ordinary farmers as operational aides. Even an aide does not know who the other aides are. Each aide reports directly to his agents the information he has gathered. The intelligence network is chiefly concerned with supporting the government's political and ideological lines and in handling dissidents.

Every effort is made by the agents to establish rapport with the farmers. Even though they are not ordinary farmers, they often join the farmers in working the fields in an effort to maintain close relationship with them. Sometimes they make a present of wine to elders on their birthdays. They have free access to all meetings and gatherings on the farm. In addition to this surveillance, the security agents play another important role which seems to have substantially reduced tension between agents and farmers. According to an informant who had served as a "security agent in charge" with the army rank of captain in a cooperative farm until he fled to South Korea in 1967, the agents are responsible not only for intelligence gathering but also for supervision over the implementation of various government policies and ordinances, including the introduction of advanced agricultural technology. For this reason, those who serve as security agents on the farm are in fact well-trained agricultural specialists, a circumstance which aids them in establishing rapport with the farmers and in maintaining active participation in farm affairs. The security agents may be described as "marginal men" who integrate the rural population with the nation.

The "party member surveillance network" is organized and operated
by the head of the farm's Party Committee. Selecting agents from the core Party members, the head directs surveillance, giving each agent a specific task. Information gathered by this network is reported upward through the channels of Party organization. Since the Party members form the nucleus of all social and political activities on the farm, close surveillance of their activities is regarded as necessary to establish and maintain the revolutionary cause.

The "mass surveillance network" includes the organizations of the Worker-Farmer Red Guards (Ronong Chogwidae) and the People's Associations (Inminban). In both cases, surveillance is an important but not the only part of its operations. The Worker-Farmer Red Guards were first organized in early 1959 in order to consolidate the national defense system, which was supposedly weakened by the withdrawal of the Chinese Army in 1958, after being stationed in North Korea since the Korean War (1950-1953). At the outset, the organizations were concentrated in cities, the vicinity of the Truce Line, and coastal areas. Today the Worker-Farmer Red Guards are organized in every sector of North Korean society and have become an integral part of the national defense system. Men of 18 to 45 years of age and women of 18 to 35 years qualify for the Red Guards, provided they are not regarded as politically "impure" or reactionary. A female Red Guard may be either married or single. When she gives birth to a child, however, she automatically retires from the Red Guards. On the cooperative farm level, the Red Guards are organized in line with the production organization: a farm becomes the unit of a company of the Red Guard, a work team a platoon, and the secretary of the Li Workers' Party Committee serves as the company commander. The Red Guards attend regular military training sessions held in the farm fields,
particularly during the agricultural slack season. Although their primary objective is to prepare a stronger national defense, the Red Guards also serve as an important mechanism in controlling people's lives. For instance, any information concerning "reactionary" activities taking place on the farm is reported to the higher authorities through the organizational channels of Red Guards.

Each farm has several neighborhood associations called Inminban or "People's Association," which have no direct reference to the farm's production organization. Membership is based upon residential proximity. These associations are further divided into smaller groups, each composed of an average of five households, which are called ogajo, or "five-household teams." The ogajo began in late 1958 as an organization by means of which a responsible and loyal cadre member of either sex takes charge of a number of neighboring households and serves as their counselor (Rodong Sinmun, 9/13/67; also quoted in Pak Kwan-su 1972:60. Until 1971, when its name was changed, the ogajo system was known as obo tamdangjae, or "five-household-in-charge system," and the leader of the group was called obo tandang sonjonwon, "propagator in charge of five households" (Rodong Sinmun, 5/19/71:6). Despite its name, the "five-household team" is not necessarily composed of five households; dependent upon circumstances, it may be six, seven, or more households. The team's leader oversees the daily activities of other members. Each day the leader is required to call on each member household and to give a team report to the head of the Imminban, who, in turn, reports information so obtained to the Li People's Committee chairman. The team members frequently hold meetings to discuss matters such as the prevention of accidents, contribution of "voluntary labor," and adjustment to
socio-political circumstances. According to a case study reported in *Rodong Sinmun* (5/19/71:6), however, the leaders of these groups attempt to "revolutionize the family life" by urging people to replace selfishness with the spirit of collectivism. In this case, the team's leader, a female middle school teacher, gave reading assignments to each member of a household of her team and asked them to hold a family meeting on every fifth day in which family members were to discuss the contents of their assignments in connection with their family life.

Under this systematic network of surveillance, personal problems are revealed to the farm authorities if they have any bearing on the affairs of the group as a whole.

Daily activities on the farm vary considerably in keeping with the agricultural seasons. The daily round of work always begins early in the morning, and during the busy agricultural seasons, begins very early. A long workday is the only way to perform necessary tasks with a limited labor force. Before breakfast, work consists of tasks connected with the kitchen garden, private livestock including pigs and chickens, and other domestic matters. After breakfast, around 8:30 a.m., farmers of both sexes gather at specified places into work teams. Members of specialized teams may gather at their workshops. The team's head issues instructions to sub-teams regarding the day's tasks and schedule, and the sub-team leader then leads the members to the field, like marching soldiers. Rest periods of ten to twenty minutes alternate with work periods of fifty minutes. Mothers of infants are allowed about one-half hour to breast-feed their children once in the morning and once in the afternoon. When mothers are engaged in field labor some distance from their residences, the children are brought to
the field for feeding by nursery workers. Sometimes, colored flags are set up in the fields to indicate where the mothers work so that the nursery workers may easily find them.

At noon, farmers may go to their houses for lunch. If their work is some distance from their homes, they usually take lunches with them. In pre-Communist Korea, it was common practice for the peasants participating in joint agricultural labor, or numasi, to be supplied with food and drink three times a day by the house for which they were working at the time. A full meal with rice wine was provided for lunch, and food and rice wine in smaller amounts for the other two meals. Since cooperativization, each farmer must arrange for his own lunch. Farmers today take no food during their breaks, and rice wine has been completely dropped from the farmers' menu during the working day.

In most cooperative farms, several "field propaganda houses," or p'ojon sonjonsil, are set up here and there in the fields to give shade from the hot summer sun and for shelter during heavy rains. One of their most important functions is to provide a place for various propaganda there purposes. Young farmers may form groups that sing and dance. During the busy agricultural seasons when total mobilization of labor is needed, the County Cooperative Farm Management Committee organizes mobile entertainment groups selected from the members of the county's cooperative farms. Each of several groups makes a tour of the farms, giving daytime performances in the field and evening performances at the farm centers. Farmers may find time for a short nap during the lunch hour, but breaks and the lunch hour are usually used for purposes of propaganda and education. Newspapers, magazines, or books are read aloud by the "agitators," or sondongwon. Domestic and international developments
are discussed, and advanced agricultural techniques introduced by experts. Loudspeakers, set up in the farm center or on hills, broadcast music, drama, and work instructions. Daily activities begin and end at the signal of a bell in the farm center. The bell rings at the beginning of work, at the beginning and end of the lunch hour, and at the end of the work day. The bell is also often used to awaken the farmers in the morning, especially during the busy seasons when they must arise especially early.

Women take part in all kinds of work done by men. However, they still hold their traditional roles in family life, which affects their farm work. Unless a grandmother or some other family member can take care of housework, particularly kitchen tasks, housewives are allowed to begin farm work a half-hour later and to return home one hour earlier than others.

Unless they are assigned to such positions as nursery or kindergarten teachers, all members of the farm participate in the farm work during the busy season. The daily routine of the chairman of a Cooperative Farm Management Committee as observed by a group of Japanese reporters (Ho-Cho Kishadan 1960:204-205) is illustrative. Around 9:00 each morning the chairman presides at a meeting of members of the standing committee, conducted in his office. The members are then assigned to the work units to supervise the day's work. The chairman spends some time inspecting conditions of health, the state of household facilities, the welfare of elders who remain at home, and the supply of fuel. He then joins the farmers in field work for a couple of hours. At the end of the working day, members of the standing committee hold an evening get-together to exchange opinions and observations on the
day's work, and to discuss work to be done by each production unit. After reviewing the next day's production plan, the chairman and committee members go home around 6:30 in the evening.

Immediately after the end of the day's work, members of each sub-team, hold a meeting called chagop ch'onghwa, "settlement of work," to evaluate the members' work. Each sub-team has a Work Evaluation Committee composed of three to five of its members. As judged by the committee on the basis of the quantity and quality of the work performed during the day, work points for each member are read aloud by the sub-team's head, and recorded in the Labor Notebook. This is the final stage of a day's work. Farmers then return home by sub-teams, again marching in line.

Evenings are filled with socio-political activities of indoctrination and education, and also are times for recreation. Political organizations such as the Socialist Working Youth League, Workers' Party Committee, Agricultural Workers' Union, Worker-Farmer Red Guard, and Democratic Women's League are the major organizers of the people's activities that are not directly related to farm production. Almost every evening at least one of these organizations holds a meeting. Occasionally, meetings are called by the people's associations or work teams to discuss administrative or work affairs.

The clubhouse is the center of all evening political, cultural, and recreational activities. It usually contains a study room, library, music room, technology propagation (education) room, public health (sanitation) propagation room, broadcasting room, recreational facilities, and a hall for mass meetings and cultural activities. Unless meetings are scheduled, the farmers gather at the clubhouse on a holiday or any
evening to take part in whatever group activities they like. Among the young, meetings of art circles in drama, music, and dancing are popular. The study room in the farm's clubhouse is called either "Revolutionary Activities Study Room" or "(Workers') Party History Study Room."

Although there is only one clubhouse, a large farm maintains several "study rooms" so that each residential cluster or work team has one.

The Mothers' School, organized by the Democratic Women's League, often holds sessions during the winter and, to a lesser extent, during other seasons. It provides housewives with general knowledge of such subjects as child care, public health, cooking, and how to treat the elders.

Almost every farm is equipped with a wire broadcasting system, which usually covers the entire farm and includes an amplifier for each dwelling. During the dinner hour, the farm headquarters broadcasts a daily report of the progress of the farm work, including statistics on the production of each work unit and the points earned by each person. Except for these reports on farm affairs, the system simply relays programs from Radio P'yongyang, in the capital. This broadcasting and the governmental control over publications give complete political control over news media.

2. Production Stimulation Campaign

Unless agricultural production could be increased, the "socialist transformation" of the rural economy would, of course, have been meaningless to the people, and the Communist regime seems to have been particularly intent upon producing evidence of such transformation. During late 1956 and early 1957, workers in the industrial sector were urged
to forge ahead at the speed of the "Ch'ollima" (Kim Ryongsik 1970:155), a legendary horse that could run one thousand 14 a day. As the completion of cooperativization approached, a "production stimulation campaign," better known as the Ch'ollima movement, gradually extended from the urban centers to rural areas.

The movement entailed a total mobilization of labor forces and the use of all other available means of production with the aim of reaching the goals of the Five-Year Plan (1957-1961) of national industrialization ahead of schedule. Under the banner of a goal called "production increase and austerity," farmers were called upon to join in the building of socialism. After the formation of the cooperative farms, the Ch'ollima movement was further accelerated in the rural sections. Numerous rural construction projects, especially irrigation systems, reclamation works, and projects of housing and land readjustment, were carried out during the early stages of the Ch'ollima movement. Since 1959, the movement has moved to a new stage, under the name "Ch'ollima work team movement," which uses the work teams as operational units in a drive for increased production. At the time that my field research was conducted, the movement was still active.

In rural areas, the Ch'ollima work team movement was organized by the Agricultural Workers' Union. In order to be a participant competitor, a work team needed to set an extraordinary production target described in detail by plans concerning production, procurement of necessary machines and materials, the organization of work, and political and ideological education. A work team submitted its proposal to the Agricultural Workers' Union, which examined the plan and decided whether or not the team should be accepted as a participant in the
Ch'ollima work team movement. At the end of harvest each year, the achievement of each participant work team was carefully examined by the Agricultural Workers' Union and compared with the original plan. When a work team received an exemplary rating for its yearly performance, it was given the honorific title of "Ch'ollima Work Team." There are at least four or five work teams on each cooperative farm, and when a team wins the title of Ch'ollima Work Team, the honor applies only to the individual team. The honorific title of "Ch'ollima Cooperative Farm" is awarded when all work teams of a cooperative farm have won the title of Ch'ollima Work Team. This title means that the team members receive material benefits in the form of an increased share of production, but the main importance of the award seems to be the recognition of their achievements by others and associated emotional gratification, which appears to be deep. Records of excellent performances are effectively utilized by propaganda channels, which urge others to emulate the exemplary teams. As the Ch'ollima movement became full-fledged, every cooperative farm throughout North Korea was turned into a "laboratory" in search of better ways to increase production. Through administrative channels, innovations at individual farms were quickly picked up and experimented with by other farms. New and seemingly advanced techniques appear always to be welcomed by the contemporary farmers.

As the North Korean Communists admit, the agricultural sector has always trailed the urban sector in speed and degree of socialist transformation. The Ch'ollima work team movement has also been relatively slow to develop among cooperative farms. One year (March, 1959 to February, 1960) after the actual launching of the movement, the number
of work teams in the nation participating in the Ch'ollima movement totalled 3,481, and 69,978 workers and 173 work teams had achieved the title of "Ch'ollima Work Team" (Sakurai, trans., 1963b:34-35). The majority of these were industrial work teams. Only 188 were agricultural and these are believed to have been in the state-owned farms, ranches, agricultural machine stations, and other agencies related to agriculture. It was not until the mid-1960's that the cooperative farms had generally entered the Ch'ollima work team movement, beginning with the well-publicized Ch'ongsan Cooperative Farm of Kangso County in June, 1960. By the end of 1960, 83 work teams from numerous cooperative farms throughout North Korea had joined the movement. During the following year, the movement spread with tremendous rapidity, and by the end of the year the number of its work units, including those in grocery shops, dispensaries, kindergartens, and nurseries as well as basic production work teams, had grown to 14,343, of which 374 units had won the title "Ch'ollima Work Team" (Hong Tal-sun 1971:128-131). At the end of March, 1962, 39.4% of the work units (of the total of 3,704 cooperative farms) had joined the movement (ibid.:130-131).

The Ch'ollima movement led to a rapid increase in the quantity of work done by farmers, who are given credits called noryogil, "work-day," according to the quality and quantity of their work. The work-days may be more or less than the actual number of days worked, and these are determined by a five-grade scale. One day of average farm work is 1.00 work-day; a day of heavy work is 1.50 work-days; and a day of very light work constitutes 0.5 work-day. Two intermediate grades are rated 1.25 and 0.75. Since the amount of labor required to earn a work-day is determined by piece-work, the number of work-days a farmer can earn in
a day by working harder than the standard or overtime may exceed the number of calendrical days. This procedure, of course, encourages farmers to work harder so they can earn greater income. According to Hong (ibid.:132), an average farmer in North Korea earned a rating of 301 work-days during the year 1959, the first year of the Ch'ollima work team movement, but cooperative farms had not yet joined the movement. The number of work-days increased during the following two years as the campaign swept through the cooperative farms. The average farmer contributed 345 work-days in 1960 and 359 in 1961. This means that in 1961 the average farmer accomplished as much work as he had previously done in about fourteen months.

Besides the honorific title of "Ch'ollima Cooperative Farm," another stimulus helps keep the farmers' zeal alive. This is an award called Sunhoe Usunggi or "Circuit Winner Flag," a flag that is awarded on a yearly basis to cooperative farms and counties which have made outstanding achievements. Rodong Sinmun reports in its issue of January 24, 1971 (p. 2) that in 1970 six County Cooperative Farm Management Committees and 55 cooperative farms throughout North Korea were awarded flags. Winners are not allowed to keep the flags permanently; if they do not win the award the following year, the flag is lost.

As an additional part of the campaign to attempt to stimulate revolutionary zeal for increased production, the regime has adopted a series of resolutions concerning a prize system by which workers and farmers who have demonstrated exemplary merit or made innovative contributions are awarded the title "Labor Hero" or a medal of merit. "Collective innovations" are also encouraged through honoring counties and cooperative farms for outstanding achievements of this kind (Kim
Han-ju 1958:53). Even before cooperativization was completed, production stimulation campaigns were general. According to Kim Han-ju (1959:31), the regime had at this time conducted the mobom nonghyop ch'angjo undong or "campaign for building an exemplary agricultural cooperative." Moreover, when organizational units of the cooperative farms exceeded their production quotas, members of the units had been rewarded by preferential treatment in the distribution of crops. If quotas were not met, members were punished by a reduction of their work-days.

The North Korean production stimulation campaign may be compared in many ways with a campaign of battle. Many of the terms used in the campaign are drawn from military vocabularies, for example, koch'i (heights, meaning planned goals), koch'i chomryong (capture of heights), togyoktae (shock troops or task forces), chont'u kaehoek (combat plan, meaning production plan), and sommyoljon (annihilation operations, meaning to carry out the production tasks one by one). The term chont'u or "combat" is often used to denote short tasks for which intensified labor is required; for instance, paegil chont'u or "100-day combat" is a campaign to push back in time the beginning of farming in the early spring and to complete the rice seeding by April 10th (Rodong Sinmun, 1/5/71, 1/10/71). Other terms have similar meanings, such as monaegi chont'u, "combat to carry out rice transplanting," and nongch'onjiwon sasibil chont'u, "40-day combat to support farmers," in which urban industrial and office workers and students assist farmers during the busy season of rice transplanting (ibid., 5/10/69, 5/11/70). Among these campaigns, the "40-day combat to support farmers" appears to be an extension of an earlier campaign of "25-day combat" (isiboil chont'u) reported in Rodong Sinmun (3/25/64:3-4). This campaign called for a
contribution of 25 days of work in support of farmers during the busy seasons by all able-bodied men and women not in agriculture.

The atmosphere under which farmers carry out their daily work tasks suggests the battlefield in other ways. Especially during the busy seasons, the fields are bright with numerous propaganda slogans calling for patriotic enthusiasm for work. Some of the slogans read: "Let's increase grain production from 0.5 to 1 ton per chŏngbo in the spirit of saving our brothers in the south (South Korea) (Rodong Simmun, 1/17/66:2); "Let's recompense our beloved leader (Premier Kim Il-song) for his benevolence and respond to his wishes by capturing once again the glory of winning the battle of weeding" (ibid., 7/15/68:3); "Let's each carry out the work of two or three men in weeding, in the spirit of fixing bayonets through the chests of the enemy American imperialists" (ibid.); and "Let's accelerate vigorously the task of rice transplanting in the spirit of destroying our enemy, American imperialism" (ibid., 5/12/69:3).

As the above examples show, the production stimulation campaign vigorously makes use of hatred against alleged enemies in order to foster enthusiasm. The Communist regime seems to be careful in choosing symbols of the campaign from incidents which have occurred in South Korea. According to an account of Rodong Simmun (1/23/66), farmers of Naechung Cooperative Farm of Yomju County during 1965 engaged in a popular, patriotic campaign of production stimulation to "save the farmers of Sangnam-myon of Ch'angwon County, Kyongnam Province" in South Korea, who reportedly were suffering from poverty. The campaign led to the production of an unprecedented yield, and the farmers' hard work was interpreted as saving the "poor South Korean farmers."
Well-known South Koreans who have opposed their own government have often been used in North Korean propaganda as symbols of the revolutionary cause, their names being utilized to bring about hatred-of-the-enemy converted into zeal-for-production. A North Korean electric locomotive plant, for instance, was named "Kim Chong-t'ae Electric Locomotive Plant" after a man who had been executed on a charge of anti-government activities in South Korea in July, 1969. The workers of the plant were reported to have enthusiastically adopted a resolution to build an electric locomotive, to be named "Hero Kim Chong-t'ae," with materials saved and "socialist labor" (meaning extra work contributed) (Rodong Sinmun, 7/30/69:1).

The name t'ongil p'ojon (unification fields) is another example of the techniques which have been frequently employed to promote incentives to work. This is a campaign to increase the productivity of poor land through increased labor. The cooperative farm chooses a piece of land with low productivity, naming it t'ongil p'ojon with the meaning that the improvement of its productivity will aid in the early unification of all of Korea. An example from P'yonghwa-li Cooperative Farm of Kapsan County illustrates how this technique has been employed (Rodong Sinmun, 6/15/66:2). This cooperative farm set aside 100 chōngbo of arable land as "unification fields." The farmers organized a labor intensification campaign to carry out "my own task of daily work in the morning and the same amount of work in behalf of our brothers in the south (South Korea) in the afternoon." Naechung Cooperative Farm of Yomju County reportedly set aside 290 chōngbo of arable land as "unification fields" and its farmers adopted a resolution calling for an increase of more than one ton of grain per chōngbo (ibid., 1/23/66:2). Since the
"increase of 500 kg. of grain output per chǒngbo" has been the most commonly used slogan in production stimulation campaigns throughout rural North Korea (ibid., 7/15/68:3; Pak Kwan-su 1971:72), the target of production set forth by the Naechung Farm may be quite unreasonable.

It appears clear that appeals to the farmers' patriotism through political and ideological indoctrination alone proved insufficient to maintain their enthusiasm. As earlier discussion has indirectly shown, measures to cope with this problem have been worked out. The reward system is one of these measures. Two additional inter-related and complementary types of systems of reward are currently employed: chakopban udaejae (work team preferential treatment system) and puncho kwalijae (work sub-team management system). Both reward production in excess of quotas. From the year's gross proceeds of the farm in cash and kind, production costs are deducted, including the cost of fertilizer, irrigation, and farm machinery, and contributions to social welfare funds. The remainder, or "distribution funds," is distributed to the members of the farm in proportion to the work-days that each has earned. The funds are divided into two parts: "basic distribution fund" and "work team reward fund." First, each work team sets aside as a "reward fund" the amount in excess of 90% of the production quota. Then the "basic distribution fund" is computed for the cooperative farm as a whole; this consists of proceeds for 90% of the production quota minus total production costs and contributions to the communal funds. If a work team fails to meet 90% of its quota, the team has no "reward fund" to distribute and its "basic distribution fund" is reduced by 5 to 15% of its deficit. Thus, under the "work team preferential treatment system," a farmer's income is drawn from both "basic" and "reward"
funds according to the number of work-days he has earned during the year.

This procedure, which has been in effect since 1960, makes work teams into the basic units of production, with their own production goals, and the work sub-teams are only operational units for the daily tasks. Since the large work team consists of 50 to 100 farmers, it turned out to be too large a production unit to hold the team members collectively responsible for a production quota. Under the rules of the "work team preferential treatment system," one's hard work would be fruitless unless all other members of the team also strived for a good crop. Stimulus for all to strive hard came through the creation of the "work sub-team management system," by which sub-teams became responsible for meeting production quotas. This system, originally known as puncho togubjae, or "work sub-team piece-work (contract) system," swept North Korea after 1966, following two years of experimentation on a small number of cooperative farms. Under this system, each sub-team is assigned a certain amount of arable land, draft animals, and agricultural instruments. The sub-team assumes responsibility for the entire procedure of cultivation, receiving its instruction from the farm authorities. At the end of each year, the sum of work-days earned by each member of the sub-team is re-evaluated on the basis of accomplishment of the sub-team's production quota. Thus farmers lose some of their work-days earned during the course of production if their sub-teams failed to meet their quotas, and they are rewarded for exceeding the quotas. This system is not an alternative to the "work team preferential treatment system" but supplements it. Thus, as an individual farmer, a sub-team member, and a team member, each farmer bears a responsibility to perform well. If his own sub-team does well but other sub-teams of his work
team fail to meet their goals, he receives no "reward" payment, and if other teams perform poorly he receives little from the "basic distribution fund." In order to increase his income, each farmer must obviously strive hard and cooperate fully with others.

The "honor system" is still another measure utilized to stimulate production. We have already dealt with part of the honor system in describing the "Labor Hero," "Ch'ollima Work Team," and "Ch'ollima Cooperative Farm." Various additional titles of honor are given to counties and farms with high production. A resolution (No. 116) adopted on July 20, 1961 by the North Korean Cabinet created seven titles of honor: Kaegwan (Crown of Laurel) 1st Class, Kaegwan 2nd Class, Kunwi (Royal Guards) 1st Class, Kunwi 2nd Class, Sonbong (Vanguard) 1st Class, Sonbong 2nd Class, and Pulgungi (Red Flag), listed in descending order of merit. These titles are awarded yearly. On the Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, Hwang et al. (1960:225) observed that the farmers are very proud of having a chairman of the farm management committee who won the title of "Labor Hero," and of the more than ten farmers who have won official commendations for meritorious service from the central government. The members have even called their farm "Hero Farm." The farm initiated its own honor system, giving public recognition to those cited as "model farmers." In 1959, the number of "model farmers" exceeded 70. The farm also set up an "Honor Bulletin Board" on which accounts of the merits of the "model farmers" are posted.

All of these production stimulation campaigns have a common underlying theme; all reflect an anthropocentric philosophy of free will expressed in the goal of building a model world. The farmers are told, and seem to believe, that they can control their destiny. They believe
that the future of their society is determined by their own will. Achievements are always attributed to those who carried them out. So far as we can discern from the North Korean publications available, the philosophy of free will seems to have been effectively utilized as a major ideological weapon. It has been of vital importance in leading the people to participate in socialist construction as "creators of history." An explicit expression of this philosophy of free will is given in a widely distributed Communist writing:

As Marxism-Leninism teaches us, the masses of the people are the creators of history. Socialism and Communism can be built only by the conscious, creative labor of the toiling millions. Therefore, in socialist construction it is most important to arouse to the utmost the creative power of the masses and bring their enthusiasm, initiative and talent into full play (Kim Il-sung 1971:46).

3. Social Welfare

Although the central government gives some direct material support to cooperative farms, each farm is encouraged to solve its own economic problems. Unlike the industrial and urban enterprises in which earnings are standardized on a national level, a cooperative farm may be regarded as relatively independent in its financial operation. The greater part of the expense of social welfare programs is borne by the farm itself. The Code of Cooperative Farms promulgated in January, 1959, provides for three kinds of "common reserves" for social welfare on each cooperative farm (Articles 44 and 47; Ko Sung-hyo 1971:225-226). These are the Common Savings Fund (Kongdong Ch'ukjok Pondu), Social-Cultural Fund (Sahoe Munhwa Pondu), and Relief Fund (Wonho Pondu).

Of the year's gross proceeds in kind and cash, all expenses for farm operations are deducted, including fees for the use of machinery,
irrigation facilities, and the cost of fertilizer, seeds, and feed for livestock. (The fund for rewarding work teams is not counted in the year's gross proceeds.) A portion of the remainder is set aside for the "common reserve”; 15% to 30% for the Common Savings Fund, 3% to 7% for the Social-Cultural Fund, and some portion for the Relief Fund. Each year, the exact proportion of common reserve is decided by the Plenary Session or the Delegates' Conference of the farm. If the farm has substantially increased its production and if increased funds are needed for its public services, the proportion of the common reserve may be high.

The Common Savings Fund is used for the purchase of items needed for agriculture and for construction projects related to agriculture and daily life. The fund may also be used for expenses in joint projects involving neighboring cooperative farms, such as irrigation works, waterways, roads, bridges, power-plants, and agricultural processing plants. The Social-Cultural Fund is set for training of cadres; educational and cultural programs; management of nurseries, kindergartens, and public welfare facilities; recreational programs, and health and sanitation programs. The Relief Fund provides support in the form of supplementary subsistence allowances and sums for the educational expenses of children to families which are in need, such as the bereaved families of the patriotic war dead lacking able-bodied workers, families of men in the People's Army (enlisted men), families of the aged, disabled, and the physically weak, and those which have suffered from natural disasters. The Code of Cooperative Farms (Articles 45 through 47) also specifies that the average living standard of the farm be guaranteed for families of the patriotic war dead and of men enlisted
in the People's Army.

The existence of the Relief Fund leads to a question of the existence of inequalities in incomes among the families of a farm. The abolition of private ownership of means of production does not mean that all the families have wholly uniform standards of living, although no wide gulf exists between high and low. Differences may be primarily attributed to the differences in the number of able-bodied workers among the households. Some households have a number of children and a shortage of working members, whereas others have more working members than children. Some differences in income reflect differences in the quality of performances at work, of course, and consequent but relatively small variations in shares of proceeds. The Relief Fund is available to families who lack productive members for any reason provided that the members have not neglected their duties in farm activities. As one of our informants puts it, "The cooperative farm does not force its members to work with an empty stomach."

In urban areas individuals who have reached the age of retirement receive pensions, but there is no compulsory retirement for the aged. A man may retire from active work at age 60 and a woman at age 55, but few people in fact do so. Monthly retirement pensions range between 50% and 80% of the average monthly wage of the last three working months. If people continue to work, they receive regular wages and also the pension (Terao 1961:161). Under this policy, the aged of both sexes tend to keep working well past the age of retirement as long as their health allows. However, this pension policy does not apply on the farms, where responsibility for the elders' livelihood is left solely to their descendants. If the dependancy of elders causes financial hardship,
some financial support is available from the Relief Fund on an individual basis. Numerous nursing homes throughout North Korea are operated by the state free of charge, but these homes are available only to those who have no children or immediate relatives to support them. Thus it appears that ancient Korean values still exist, that it is still unethical for aged parents to be put in nursing homes. These circumstances also apply in South Korea.

Since pensions for retirement do not exist among farmers, rural elders generally continue to work as long as they are able. When they can no longer work, they simply retire and remain at home, where they can be of help in the household in several ways. They then usually take charge of certain domestic affairs. Grandfather feeds the livestock and works in the kitchen garden; grandmother's work includes house cleaning and kitchen tasks. Traditionally, it would be unthinkable for the elderly woman to take charge of the kitchen, which is now the daughter-in-law's responsibility, and this custom appears still to be followed. If a grandmother is available, it is she who cares for the infants during much of the day. Although each work team (chakopban) of a cooperative farm has a nursery, people still prefer to leave their infants with grandmother, and placing children in the nursery is not compulsory. Otherwise, the elders spend their days visiting other elders of their neighborhood.

Thus, compared with their lives in traditional Korea, the daily life of the aged has become a bit harder, since they have taken over the greater portion of the domestic work previously done by their children and daughters-in-law and sometimes also work at communal tasks part-time. Today, it is the duty of the elders to support the able-bodied breadwinners
so that the latter can concentrate on their work on the cooperative farm. The grandmother's help in the kitchen, for example, obviously reduces the daughter-in-law's workload and it also reduces the loss of the daughter-in-law's earnings by freeing her from some of the domestic work. It is quite common in contemporary rural North Korea for a housewife to prepare breakfast, after which her mother-in-law cleans up; then the mother-in-law fixes dinner and the daughter-in-law does the washing-up. If the retired elders find time to do some farm work besides their household chores, the farm authorities give them light assignments so that they may earn supplementary incomes.

Marked progress has apparently been made in the field of public health. In pre-Communist years modern medicine had not been readily available to the rural population of Korea. A vast majority relied upon traditional folk medicine, including herbs, acupuncture, and the services of folk healers. Under Communist rule, medical practitioners relying upon presumed supernatural power have been prohibited from practicing. However, traditional folk medicine has been well preserved, and considerable effort has been expended toward the further development of traditional medicine, known in North Korea as Tonguihag (Eastern Medicine), in combination with modern medicine. Today, every hospital in North Korea is staffed with specialists in both fields.

As we have already noted, each cooperative farm has at least one dispensary, which is staffed with at least one doctor and two nurses. In a large cooperative farm, a dispensary reaches almost the size of a general hospital. Circumstances at Yongsong Cooperative Farm of South P'yongan Province are exempletive. In August, 1969, the farm's population was approximately 5,000, including about 2,400 working
members. There were two dispensaries with five branches. The farm's medical team of eleven doctors included specialists in internal medicine, surgery, obstetrics, gynecology, pediatrics, otorhinolaryngology, and radiology (Kawagoe 1970:123; Asahi Shimbun 11/17--12/6/73, reprinted in Ch'oe Yong-dok 1972:82-83). Although this medical team is perhaps small in ratio to the population, it may be safely said that substantial progress has been made in the fields of public health and medicine under Communist rule.

A farm's dispensary is primarily responsible for every aspect of the health of its residents. "People's Hospitals" with larger staffs and more elaborate facilities are maintained on county and provincial levels. Let us take an example from South P'yongan Province, which has a combined total of 23 counties and cities, excluding P'yongyang, the capital city. Each city or county has a hospital with 100 to 200 beds. Large factories also have hospitals. The farm dispensaries in this province number about 700. Patients for whom the dispensary is unable to provide appropriate treatment are sent to the County People's Hospital with which the dispensary is affiliated. If the county hospital is unable to solve the problem, it sends the patient to the provincial People's Hospital or to a specialized hospital. The South P'yongan Province Central Hospital (P'yongannando Chungang Pyongwon), in the city of P'yongyang, is the general hospital of this province. Divided into 23 specialized departments, it has 600 beds, 136 physicians, about 150 nurses and nurses aides, and over 100 management staff members (Kawagoe 1970:146). According to Yamaguchi's account (1972:116), 70 hospitals in the province have more than 200 beds; these include University Hospitals, a Red Cross Hospital, City or Workers' District Hospitals, and industrial hospitals
(factory hospitals).

In medical policy, it appears that emphasis is given to preventive medicine, although medical treatment for ailments certainly is not overlooked. The procedure known as "doctor's round system," or uisa kuyok tamdangjae, merits special attention. According to this system, one physician takes charge of problems of health of the residents within a specific zone, which is called ch'oso or "post" by the physicians in charge (Kawagoe 1970:145). This system reportedly covers the entire population, urban and rural (Yamaguchi 1972:116-121; Kawagoe 1970:143-147; and Ch'oe Yong-dok 1972:83 and 108-109), and emphasizes prevention of illness. The "doctor's round system" is carried out by doctors of the People's Hospitals on the county or city level, factory hospitals, and farm dispensaries. On the average, each doctor is responsible for about 600 residents (Ch'oe Yong-dok, ibid.:83). Physicians specializing chiefly in internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology take part, making rounds three or more times weekly to check on the problems of health of the residents of their post, give medical advice, and carry out various programs to improve public health and sanitation. A "medical examination troupe" (komjindaes) organized by the medical specialists of the provincial People's Hospitals also tours the province twice yearly to examine conditions of health of the residents (ibid.:108).

Each farm dispensary keeps "health cards" on every resident, on which information related to the individual's health from birth is recorded. Pediatricians regularly examine children under 15 years of age and specialists in obstetrics and gynecology conduct regular check-ups of pregnant women within their rounds. Theoretically, each household has a family doctor. When the household includes children and a pregnant
woman, however, it turns out that three doctors give service to the same household. One of the interesting features of the North Korean system of public health is that patients do not look for a doctor, as in most other countries; the physicians look for patients, visiting the people in their workshops. This policy is, of course, another instance of the general attempt to operate the social and economic system as rationally as possible. The doctor's round of visits to his clients tends to minimize loss of working hours due to medical examinations and treatment. As a Japanese visitor (Yamaguchi 1972:117) describes it, physicians with medical kits making their rounds by walking the footpaths between fields are a common part of the scene in the North Korean countryside, especially during the busy agricultural seasons. Colored flags are often used to help the doctor find people who need medical attention.

All medical and public health services are free. Of course, a nationwide free medical service entails great costs, which are described as being "paid by the government." Whether payment is interpreted as being made by the people or by the government, the people do not directly pay for medical service, and it is available to everyone equally. This "free medical service" has not only contributed toward the improvement of conditions of public health, but has also played a vital role in promoting patriotic enthusiasm and in building confidence in national leadership. The medical service has been one of the chief prides of the country, and the expensive medical service of non-Communist societies is often compared with the North Korean system as evidence of the superiority of their Communist society. As we have noted, every negative aspect of capitalist societies is exploited in an effort to enhance national unity.
Premier Kim (now President Kim) of North Korea has stated that "in a capitalist society, the doctor treats the patient with a stethoscope, not listening to his heart but to his pockets" (Yamaguchi 1972:118).

Obviously a medical service which covers the entire population requires a tremendous number of specialists, well beyond the number a country like North Korea with no long tradition of modern medicine could possibly produce. Under the Communist regime, North Korea seems to have made much progress in training medical specialists and in establishing modern medical facilities. A glimpse at medical statistics illustrates the circumstances. During the first 17 years under Communism, from 1946 to 1963, the number of hospitals increased from 85 to 585; the number of medical specialists from 1,009 to 18,241; and the average number of medical specialists per 10,000 persons from 1.1 to 15.8 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1965:36). The term "medical specialists" refers to both doctors and "associate doctors," or chunui. Associate doctors are trained for two years in medical high schools after finishing middle school.

It has been twenty years since free medical service was introduced in 1953, and during this period the incidence of diseases has declined markedly. The emphasis upon preventive medicine has contributed to the eradication of such epidemic diseases as cholera, encephalitis, and typhus. Venereal disease was reportedly eradicated in 1958. Today, cancer is the major cause of death, constituting about 50% of the fatal illnesses, followed by heart disease and high blood-pressure. The most interesting indicator of achievement in the field of public health seems to be the fact that in 1971 the average span of life had been lengthened about 26 years beyond that of pre-Communist years (Asahi Shim bun,
11/17-12/6/71; Reprinted in Ch'oe Yong-dok 1972:84). Infant mortality in 1959 had decreased 57% since 1944, the year before the Communists gained power (Terao 1961:160). No information is provided in these reports, however, on the total years of the lifespan or the actual rate of infant mortality.

Programs of physical exercise are today firmly institutionalized in the daily life of North Koreans as a means of promoting good health. The daily routine of physical exercise is illustrated by an example from Siksong-li Farm of Sangwon County, as reported in Rodong Sinmun (2/19/64:6). Early in the morning, at the sound of a bell, all able-bodied adults and schoolchildren of both sexes come out to take part in the morning physical exercises. Then the young adult farmers carry manure to the fields, and the elders and schoolchildren sweep the village streets and paths. These activities take place before breakfast. During the lunch hour, farmers take part in such recreational activities as running 100, 400, or 800 meters, Korean seesaw (nolttwigi), volleyball, skating, and exercises on exercise bars. Physical exercises known as opgan ch'aeojo, rest-time physical exercise, are also a part of the daily work schedule, wherever manual labor is involved. They are a conscious effort to relieve farmers and workers from exhaustion caused by ordinary labor. The intent of the exercise program is clearly evident in athletic contests, which are often conducted and are called saengsan ch'aeyuk kyonggi, "Production athletic contests." The kinds of contests also indicate the reasons for their establishment; for example, several production units compete in rice transplanting or in harvesting tasks. All of these activities may be included in the general category of "mass athletic activities," as Yamaguchi (1972:136) terms it.
According to official North Korean statistics (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1965:37), in 1963 there were 410 "rest houses" (hyuyangso) and "rehabilitation stations" (chongyangso) capable of providing service to 25,984 persons. Rehabilitation stations are for patients recovering from illness, and rest houses are primarily to relieve urban workers and farmers from the tedium of their work. Both services are operated on a year-round basis, and they are ordinarily used exclusively by farmers after the fall harvest until the beginning of spring plowing. Rest houses are not available to everyone. Guests are carefully selected from each production unit on the basis of performance, and the model farmers are awarded vacations in the rest houses. Since the entire expense of the vacation is paid by the central government, the vacation is, in fact, a compensation for physical hardship and a reward for excellence in work. To be awarded a vacation in the rest houses is one of the highest honors among the farmers. During their stay at the rest houses, which is generally for a couple of weeks, the vacationers undergo intensive indoctrination programs to prepare their minds and bodies for the tasks ahead. Since the guests tend to be zealous farmers with a variety of experience in the field of agricultural production, the exchange of knowledge during the vacation period appears to have made a contribution toward the development of various agricultural innovations.
CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

1. Courtship and Marriage

The barriers against free socialization of males and females that were formerly strongly maintained in all spheres of traditional life are fading out in the contemporary village. This change has much to do with the improved social status of women. Young females actively participate in farming and all other aspects of life on the farm, and socialization between young members of the opposite sex appears considerably freer than in the past. Activities in the farm clubhouse and of the Socialist Working Youth League, for example, provide excellent opportunities for young men and women to mingle. Such social gathering, especially for political purposes, take place almost every evening. Love affairs are said not to be uncommon, but the overt expression of affection in public is strongly disapproved. Pre-marital sexual affairs are unacceptable behavior, and cases that do occur are criticized in public sessions unless there is an intention to marry. In the past, village endogamy had been avoided as possible. The frequent social contacts between sexes today results in many marriages of residents of the same village or farm.

The "Law of Equality between Sexes" promulgated in 1946 specifies that males must be 18 years of age and girls 17 years before they may marry. This law relates to the old custom of very early marriage, which the law now prohibits. However, modern North Koreans seem to marry much later in life than the lawful minimum allows. According to one report (Hwang et al. 1960:159), men generally marry at 23 or
24 years of age, and women at 21 or 22. If we take into account the present system of military service, this information about males seems questionable. Enlisted men are called to service at 18 to 24 years of age. Once selected, they must serve until they are 28, regardless of when they entered service. Thus the duration of one's military service varies; the longest is ten years and the shortest four years. As a rule, during their entire military service, the men are not allowed to visit their families or take vacations outside the military camps. They may write to their families, but their whereabouts are kept secret. Married men must leave their wives behind during the entire period. Only the officers and professional servicemen are allowed to live with their wives and families. Military service therefore appears to have important bearing on the age of marriage; that is, the young men usually do not marry until they are past the age for military service or until their service had ended.

For the average young men, selection for military service is a great honor, since the regime carefully selects its soldiers. Personal traits and loyalty to the Party are the most important attributes, and physical qualifications seem to be a lesser, although necessary, factor. It is said that a bright future is open only to those who have completed military service. Therefore, the majority of North Korean girls are said to look for mates among men who have had military service. According to one informant who served in the People's Army for thirteen years, the vast majority of enlisted men are unmarried and "girls are not willing to marry a man who is not qualified for the military."

Those who are disqualified for service have difficulty in finding desirable mates. The same informant states that the average man marries
at about age 30, after establishing himself on a farm after his discharge from military service.

Women also enter military service, on a voluntary basis, where they serve in non-combat positions as nurses, clerks, telephone operators, and the like. Girls from 18 to 22 years of age are eligible and, once selected, serve until age 24. Since the number of women in military service is very small, it does not seem to have much influence on the average age of women at marriage.

The network of interpersonal relationships in rural North Korea hardly extends beyond the village or farm, a circumstance which fosters marriages among people of the same community. Some young people choose their mates themselves on the basis of mutual attraction, but the approval of their parents is required by custom. Love marriages between members of different farms are quite rare. Generally, the tradition of arranged marriages continues to be followed; people still rely upon the go-between to find mates. In the past, the go-between was generally an old woman. Farm leaders or members of the cadre now frequently play this role, and these are usually males. They maintain a wide range of social contacts that extend beyond the boundary of the farm, and they also tend to be more persuasive in arranging unions than the go-betweens of former times.

As young men and women approach marriageable age, their parents seek a reliable intermediary, who is usually male. The go-between, called maepa or chungmae chaengi, gathers information on the young man or woman whom he represents and on their families. He also gathers information on prospective spouses and their families, and then conducts negotiations that involve parents as well as the marriageable young
people. When both sides express interest in a match, a meeting between the prospective bride and groom and their parents is arranged, usually at the home of the prospective bride. On the day of meeting, the prospective bridegroom goes to the girl's house with one or both of his parents, the go-between, and possibly a few other relatives. The girl's house prepares fine food for the particular event, and since the purpose of the meeting is to take a close look at the prospective bride, she serves as hostess. The prospective groom and his party carefully observe the girl's appearance and manners as she serves the food. Sometimes she may simply be asked to give a cup of cold water to the prospective bridegroom. During the meeting, the prospective bride and her family similarly observe the prospective bridegroom and his parents.

A few days after the initial meeting at the girl's home, the prospective bridegroom's side sends word to the girl's house through the go-between regarding its view on the match. If both sides respond favorably to the first meeting, the go-between arranges a second meeting, this time at the prospective groom's house, so that all members of the girl's family may observe the prospective groom and his family. This visit is generally done by a group composed of one or both of the parents and other close relatives of the girl, but excludes the girl. Sometimes a trip of inspection is made secretly by one of the girl's relatives, who does not visit the prospective groom's family but inquires about it through their neighbors.

Family background is one of the most important factors in selecting spouses. No clearcut class distinctions exist today, but one class of people appears to be discriminated against in this allegedly classless society. These are, again, the former landlords and their descendants,
people who were pro-Japanese during the Japanese occupation, collaborators with the Allied Forces during the war, relatives of people who fled to South Korea, and other so-called reactionaries. People in this class face great difficulty in every aspect of social life. A matrimonial alliance with a socially unfavored family would endanger one's future and such marriages are avoided whenever possible.

An example of such a union, as given by an informant, illustrates the problems it incurs. (See also Appendix I.) The brother of the informant, a middle school principal, experienced trouble because of his wife's family background. His father-in-law had served as a policeman during the Japanese occupation, and was therefore regarded as a pro-Japanese reactionary. In 1948 the father-in-law was purged, and he died in 1957 in a forced labor camp. This man was described as a well-educated and capable, but he was never promoted to a position in which he could utilize his capabilities. The Party authorities even suggested that he divorce his wife, the mother of their six children. He had barely been able to hold his marriage together. According to the informant, his brother would say, even in the presence of his wife, "I am always watched by the Party because of her father."

In addition to family background, one's physical appearance, health, and educational background are also important in the selection of spouses. In describing a cooperative farm in a suburb of P'yongyang, Kim Sin-suk (1957:60) lists the following traits of a "good prospective mate": being a hard worker; having public confidence; trustworthiness; active participation in the Socialist Working Youth League and in circle activities; and having other special talents. The report adds that, above all, the prime consideration is the political aspect of the
prospective mate, which includes family background, participation in political activities, and loyalty toward the Party and the state.

Traditionally, the fondest dream of the average young woman was to marry a man in a city, and some rural girls did so. This was the only possible channel to escape the hard conditions of farm life, and young men in the city traditionally preferred to marry rural girls because they were said to be more dependable than city girls. During the early period of Communist rule, the trend toward such rural-urban marriages remained unchanged. In their study of the Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, Hwang et al. (1960:225) found that of the sixty-four girls at the farm who married in 1958, all except four moved to "cities," a term which might include the towns that were county seats as well as larger communities. However, the movement of the women away from agriculture seems to have made it difficult for rural males to find wives, a problem which the Communist regime tried to solve. According to our informants, when a man from the city marries a farm woman, the man is required to join his wife on the farm, which opposes a deeply-rooted custom of patrilocality. For a time unions resulting in such matrilocality, that is, marriages of urban males and farm women, were fairly common, but, according to our informants, the incidence of such unions later decreased considerably.

When agreement to marry has been reached, formal steps are followed. The groom's household prepares a formal letter giving the groom's name and birth date and proposing marriage, which is wrapped in a red cloth and taken to the bride's household by the go-between. The prospective bride's household sends back a responding letter expressing consent. This letter, also wrapped in a red cloth, is brought to the groom's
house by the bride's father or one of his relatives and the go-between. This traditional formality is still observed in many parts of rural North Korea. Although young people do not care to follow and may even ignore this Confucian formality, their parents still tend to cling to it, and, out of deference to them, the custom is still often observed.

The exchange of letters was traditionally followed by an engagement ceremony, which usually takes place on a holiday. The farm management staff and cadre of the farm and some of the village elders are invited to a feast at the expense of the groom's household, a ceremony which announces the engagement publicly. Today this engagement ceremony is generally not held, perhaps for economic reasons.

A couple of months before the wedding day, the groom's house customarily sends betrothal presents called vechang or napch'ae, usually including bedding and clothes for the bride. These items are often prepared by the parents long before the wedding, sometimes during the childhood of their sons. The groom's house selects from the villagers a virile man with many children to deliver the presents to the bride's house. The bride's household then busies itself in preparation for the wedding, and village women help make bedding and dresses for the bride. Gifts called pongsong that consist of clothing for the groom's parents and other family members are also prepared and presented on the bride's arrival at the groom's residence.

The wedding date is no longer a matter to be decided by a fortune-teller or a religious practitioner, who have reportedly ceased to exist in North Korea. A convenient day is simply chosen by mutual agreement of both parties, a selection that avoids the busy agricultural seasons and does not otherwise interfere with work. Holidays are highly
preferable. According to Hwang et al. (1960:165) most weddings are held during the months from late fall until early spring, that is, from the end of harvest until the beginning of spring ploughing, a circumstance that also reflects familial finances. By the nature of agricultural production, farmers are paid only once annually, near the end of the year. When a woman marries out, she is expected to take with her the share of annual payment which she earned the preceding year. Otherwise no other funds are available for her until the next annual payment. If a marriage takes place during mid-year, the bride's household gives her about half of her share for her previous year's work, and her earnings during the current year until the time that she joined her husband are given to her at the end of the year. A mid-year wedding involves various other inconveniences, such as the transfer to the bride of rice and other cereals and changes in work organization and production quotas. According to one informant, such weddings occasionally result in conflict between the bride and members of her family of birth or between the two households over the bride's share of earnings.

As we have noted, in-village marriage was formerly uncommon, and was generally limited to very poor people. Instead, it had been customary for a bride to begin a new life in a new community. Today, in-village unions tend to be encouraged by the farm authorities, since they involve no changes in the membership of production units. When in-village or in-farm marriages occur, the transfer of earnings is settled by a simple adjustment of the accounts of both households within the same cooperative farm.

Marriage ceremonies vary somewhat according to local custom and individual circumstances. The most common marriage ceremony is the
tangilch'gi, in which all wedding rites are conducted in one day and the bride moves to her husband's residence on that day. This ceremony is held when a woman marries a man in the same village or an adjacent village. When the bride's new home is farther away, the ceremony takes place at her home and she leaves about two days later. Traditionally it was common for a bride to move to her groom's home several months to a year after the first wedding ceremony, during which interval the groom might occasionally visit her at her natal home. This custom has died out. The old custom of conducting a wedding ceremony first at the bride's home and a second ceremony of equal importance upon the arrival of the bride at her groom's residence is still often observed in rural areas. Especially when in-village marriages occur, however, the weddings are now reduced to a single ceremony, usually held at the farm clubhouse.

On the day of the wedding, the groom goes to the bride's home accompanied by his father and some of his close relatives and friends. As in the past, those who accompany the groom are all males. If the bride's residence is not distant, they may walk; otherwise, a truck is provided by the farm authorities. Farm cadre members and village elders of both sexes are invited as guests, and even relatives living at a distance may attend the ceremony. The bride and, rarely, the groom may wear the native ceremonial wedding dress. Western-style clothing for the groom and a native-style plain dress for the bride are reported to be more common. Occasionally, the bride wears a veil. After the brief wedding ceremony, the groom and bride are given a ceremonial meal symbolizing the beginning of their married life, a feast in which all guests join. The most common food of the wedding feast is a dish made with noodles, which symbolize longevity.
If the ceremony observed is the *tangilch'igi* rite, the groom, bride, and their parties soon leave the bride's home after the ceremony and the feast that follows and go to the groom's home, where a second ceremonial feast is conducted. When a bride is from another village, a farm truck may be provided for the trip, since all the bride's belongings and wedding goods are to be moved to her new residence.

At the groom's home, the bride is introduced to each of the family members and relatives of the groom, and gives a full bow to all seniors in age among them. Soon a wedding feast begins, at which the guests eat only a dish prepared with noodles; other foods are wrapped and taken home (Kim Shin-suk 1957:63). On the evening of the day, young people of both sexes, especially members of the Socialist Working Youth League, gather for a wedding party at the groom's home. Both bride and groom usually join in the singing and dancing of the party.

In the *tangilch'igi* wedding, the newlyweds make a visit of a few days to the bride's native home on the third day following the wedding, usually bringing a gift that includes rice wine and a cooked chicken. For the members of the bride's native household and her relatives, this provides an opportunity to get acquainted with the groom for the first time. On the first day of the visit, the groom undergoes an ordeal called *tongsangrye*, an elaborate game which is thought to test his personality and intelligence. Generally the ordeal dramatizes a trial in which the groom is charged with abducting a young woman, namely, his bride. A judge orders his assistants to tie and beat the groom's feet if the groom is not responsive in telling about the "abduction," how he "abducted" her and what he then did with her. The severity of punishment depends upon the groom's response. He is forced to ask his mother-in-law
to bring more food for everyone and to ask his wife to sing. No malice is involved and the ordeal is looked upon as entertainment for everyone. This old custom is reportedly disappearing or becoming much simplified. It is being gradually replaced by a feast with singing and dancing held in the evening at the bride's home with members of the local Socialist Working Youth League in attendance. This new trend applies especially when the groom is from the same village or farm as the bride and already well acquainted with the members of the bride's family. After a few days the bride and groom return to their home.

Two more events are yet to come in connection with the wedding. A few months after the wedding, the bride's parents make a visit to their daughter's new home. This trip is for the purpose of taking a look at the new life of the couple and to wish them well. After a few months of married life, the bride visits her native home, accompanied by her parents-in-law or a few of her husband's relatives, but not by her husband. For women who have moved to distant communities and have not been married in accord with the tangilch'igi rite, this trip is the first visit to their native homes after their marriage. On this occasion, a bride prepares food to bring with her as a gift.

A modern marriage ceremony does not necessarily conform with all of the procedures described above. Today, according to our informants, a simplified ceremony has become common. Only a single ceremony may be held in one party's home, or in a public hall, usually the farm clubhouse, and it is not uncommon for two or more couples to have a single wedding ceremony. Such joint weddings occur especially when a number of discharged soldiers have been assigned within a short time to the same farm. Appendix I describes the marriage of an informant. His case may
be considered a variation of the standard type, since he was an army
officer who married a school teacher. However, the wedding was held in
a rural setting and generally accords with modern wedding customs of
rural residents.

Modern weddings and related customs have unquestionably changed,
but it is clear that they preserve in simplified form much that is old,
such as the services of the go-between, the meetings between groom's
and bride's families, the formal letters of proposal and acceptance,
gift exchanges, the wedding ceremony itself, the ordeal of the groom,
the parents' visit to their daughter's new residence, and, finally, the
bride's visit to her native home. Today, the eldest son and his wife
do not necessarily reside with his parents. One son, usually the
youngest, remains with his parents and is expected to take care of them
in their old age. Since there is no private ownership, the setting up
of a new household upon marriage is not a difficult problem. Kitchen
furnishings, clothing, and some personal belongings are all that are
taken from parental households upon the establishment of a new household.

Communality is also reflected in the modern criteria of desirable
spouses. One's health, ability to work and earn a livelihood, and
political circumstances are the primary criteria. In contemporary
marriages, the ancestral background of one's own family plays a role
exactly the reverse of that of the past. Descendants of formerly poor
families enjoy advantages, whereas descendants of the old elite today
suffer from their ancestor's past glory.

The choice of a prospective spouse is not made entirely by the
young people today, although they have a larger voice in selection than
in the past. Our informants agree that few rural people dare to marry
without their parents' approval.

In pre-Communist years, the wedding ceremony and banquet had provided for the households concerned an opportunity to demonstrate wealth. Among the poor, weddings were simple and involved few guests. Weddings of the rich were grand affairs that followed rules prescribed by the Confucian ethical code of Chu Hsi Chia Li, or "Chu Hsi's Family Rituals," and their wedding banquets were often enjoyed by the entire village. Today little difference due to financial reasons is seen among weddings taking place in the same locality, and, of course, elaborate wedding ceremonies and sumptuous banquets are no longer possible for anyone.

The old custom of giving mutual aid survives in diminished strength in connection with marriages. All people of marriageable age belong to the Socialist Working Youth League, and aid in conducting a wedding is usually arranged through the League. In addition to giving help in wedding preparations, this aid consists of small gifts of food to be consumed at the banquet and sometimes ryanggwon, food tickets, which are issued to authorized travelers, such as newlyweds proceeding to their home, by the County People's Committee in return for rice and other cereals and which may be used to secure food during travel. These gifts reduce the expense of a wedding. Relatives commonly give food produced in their private garden plots or chickens that are raised as private property.

In the past, Korean men held much higher social status than women. The concept of male dominance extended to marriage, and, in relations between the two families, the groom's family was regarded as having higher status than the bride's. This circumstance seems to apply even
in contemporary North Korea. In most arranged marriages, the groom's family plays an active role in the search for a prospective bride, and the bride's family responds only passively. With few exceptions, it is the groom's side that makes the first visit, the sonbogi. Only afterwards does the bride's family make an investigative trip to the groom's residence, if such a visit is thought to be needed, and the prospective bride is excluded from this trip. Upon her arrival at the groom's house, a bride gives each member of the groom's family a wedding gift, usually of clothing, but the groom gives no reciprocal gifts to the bride's family. When, as sometimes happens, the groom's family gives a wedding present to the bride's house, it is only for the bride, who takes it with her upon marriage.

Summarizing the above description and discussion, it may be said that the traditional ways of contracting marriages have survived under Communist rule, insofar as they do not conflict with Communist rules and customs. Modifications and simplifications are adaptations to changes in the socioeconomic structure under Communism.

2. Family

A common Western idea that the family has been destroyed in Communist societies seems to be untrue of North Korea, although the traditional family has lost some of its former roles. For example, the family has ceased to be an important unit of production and many of the tasks of child-care are now done by public facilities such as the nursery and kindergarten. Recreation is similarly no longer a family affair. Despite these changes and the demise of private property and the customs of succession and inheritance, the family continues to be a basic unit
of society. North Koreans now call the family a saepo, or cell, of society.

The Communist regime attempted, however, to bring about a "revolution in family life" as a first step toward revolutionizing the entire society. The abolition of private ownership of land and associated practices of inheritance appear to have been the events which affected the family most strongly. One change has been in the composition of the family. Lacking nation-wide statistical data, we are unable to give with assurance an account of national family composition. Fortunately, however, the ethnographic study of Hwang et al. (1960) of a cooperative farm near P'yongyang provides a picture of the North Korean family which may be representative. According to this study, the family is small. Table IV gives statistical data on the structure of the family in Taekam-li hamlet, which later became a part of the farm. The average household consists of 4.57 persons. Of 739 households, 508 (68.75%) were composed of from three to six persons. From this figure one might assume that the average household consists of two parents and two or three children, and one might question the relatively small number of children in a country where no serious attention has been given to birth control until recently. However, of the small households of four or less members, a total of 387, almost one half (191 or 49.4%), are headed by women. Undoubtedly the female heads are widows, a few women whose husbands are in military service, and eldest daughters who have taken charge of households following their parents' death. Since this survey was made in 1959, it seems highly probable that the Korean War might have contributed to the high proportion of households headed by women, that is, to the number of families headed by widows or by wives of men in active military service.
<table>
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<th>No. of family members</th>
<th>No. of families</th>
<th>No. of families headed by males</th>
<th>No. of families headed by females</th>
<th>No. of family members</th>
<th>%</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td><strong>471</strong></td>
<td><strong>268</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,384</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Hwang et al. (1960:147).

According to our informants, the number of war widows in North Korea is quite large.

Most households seem to include only the two generations of parents and unmarried children. Since it is customary that one son and his wife remain with his parents, however, households composed of three generations are not uncommon. Households of four generations are rare. Hwang
et al. (1960:149) found that among the 739 households in Taekam-li, about 19.2% (142 households) included one or both parents of the male head, and only seven families embraced four generations. The traditional practice of setting up separate households for younger sons was called punga, or division of the household, and it involved the difficult problem of dividing property. Today the punga is rare. As long as the parents can manage to gain a livelihood, their sons, and especially younger sons, leaves the parental home to set up separate households when they marry. Occasionally two married sons and their families lived together with their parents. These were generally households in transition, in which a newly married man and his wife temporarily lived with his parents, or in which young married males were away from home temporarily for study or military service, leaving their families behind with their parents.

The modern household rarely includes non-family members. In pre-Communist years, well-to-do families often employed agricultural laborers on a yearly basis who were members of their households, and some households included maidservants. A few aged people live with married daughters. Hwang et al. (1960:149) report six such cases in Taekam-li, which seemed to occur principally when the aged had no sons. The same authors report a new trend in which some of the aged live with their married daughters even when they have at least one married son. However, our informants knew of no such cases.

Parent-child relationships in the traditional Korean family were close, particularly between father and son. A son was supposed to revere his parents and care for them when they became old in everlasting reciprocity for what the parents had done for him. The obligations of parents to sons does not seem to have been much emphasized, however. As we have
earlier noted, the Confucian principle of filial piety had long been an important integrating mechanism in the traditional family. The hardship of obedience to parental authority was repaid by one's own children. The parental acts of giving birth and rearing a child were regarded as "receiving benevolence" (unhae) from the parents. One's entire life was traditionally devoted to repaying unhae to parents, that is, to filial piety, which had no limits in time or deeds. This traditional concept of filial piety is, of course, incongruent with modern conditions of life and has changed greatly. Parental authority has also weakened.

Despite the strong campaign against "familism" as a vestige of Confucianism, however, the Communist regime has never taken any strong measures to break the relationship between parents and children, and there are some indications that the idea of filial piety has survived to some degree. The official North Korean ethnological publication, Kogo Minsok (1966, Nov., No. 52:3), describes filial piety as one of the mipung ryangsok, "fine customs and virtues," that should be preserved as a cultural heritage. Describing maternal love for one's children, a woman writer likens a mother's love to "the height of a mountain and the depth of the ocean," which is precisely the expression used in Confucian teachings (Choson Yosong, Jan. 1962:22). It is still the moral duty of a son to respect his parents and care for them in old age. Any failure in this duty is still considered paeun mangkok, "a betrayal of the benevolence received, or a loss of gratitude" (Yi, Hong-jong 1958:67).

In order to fulfill the obligations of filial piety today, one does not necessarily reside with his parents. If he lives with his wife and children in a city, leaving his parents behind in the countryside, he should continue to revere them. Financial support of parents was common
in traditional Korea, and this custom may have survived in some measure. For example, in response to the questions of a newspaper reporter concerning the way in which the family savings were used, a housewife in P'yongyang stated that, among other expenditures, some were for the parents (her parents-in-law) in the country (Yomiuri Shimbun, 11/19/71). Emotional bonds between parents and children appear generally to be maintained despite geographical separation.

As we have seen, the head of a household is no longer the leader and chief organizer of its economic activities and each working member of a household participates in economic production individually, earning work points individually. However, when it comes to remuneration, the unit is not the individual farmer but the household. Each household is paid according to the total of work points earned by all its members. Individual members who move away, such as daughters who have married out, may claim their own shares of the total payment for the period of the year that they have worked. Generally the head of the household is in charge of the household income. These procedures of remuneration and income management appear to have helped maintain the household as a social unit and also the bonds between parents and children. Often old men officially represent their households, but their sons play the actual roles of household heads. Even when parents are too old to work it is common for their sons to allow them to "control" the cash income. Whenever the sons need cash, they consult with their parents about its use (Kwang et al. 1960:152). This may be interpreted as a dramatization of mutual trust between parents and children, but it is also considered good manners, a way of showing respect for one's parents.

The son's duty to his parents is no longer blind or absolute. Filial
piety can be justified only when it coincides with the interest of the people. Today merely giving birth to and rearing children are not sufficient reasons for filial piety. The young are taught to consider what their parents have done for the state in their lifetimes. A parent can be an enemy of society, "if he has been a reactionary" (Yi Hong-jong 1958:66). Our informants have observed some instances of sons publicly criticizing their fathers' conduct, principally the sons of men of the former privileged class. No matter how devoted a son is to his parents, he should not obey them if they are not wholly committed to the interests of the people.

The relationship between husband and wife appears to be so greatly changed that it is no longer a relationship of clearcut authority and submission. Love and mutual understanding are now greatly emphasized as desirable between husband and wife. These changes relate largely to the rise in women's social status. As noted previously, no marked differences now exist in the participation in production activities by males and females, and even before Communism the economic value of women's work probably differed little from that of males. However, in former times the work done by the women was hardly acknowledged, and all credit for household income went to the male head. Today, a wife earns work points and household income that is acknowledged and is little less important than that earned by her husband.

The traditional custom at marriage of a woman's joining her husband's family in a position of inferiority seems to be fading out. The most important asset for gaining a livelihood is the ability to work. Cooperation and solidarity between husband and wife are stronger than ever, and marital life based upon genuine "comradeship" is highly valued. An
authoritative, autocratic husband, the traditional stereotype, is seldom seen. Pressure from the Women's League and other national political groups may have helped to raise the status of women. Despite the trend toward equality, the ideal is that a husband's "love" for his wife be reciprocated by her "respect" for him (Kogo Minsok, 1966, No. 4:3). Thus, the relationship is not wholly equal and the traditional view of male superiority appears to exist in weakened form.

The relationship between mother and daughter-in-law has long attracted the attention of scholars studying the traditional Korean family. As J. R. Moose (1911:160) put it, a daughter-in-law was a "real slave" of the household into which she married. The mother-in-law ruled her with a "hand of iron and rod of steel" (p. 110). The strain between mother and daughter-in-law usually continued until the latter gave birth to a son. It took years for a newly married woman to become fully accepted, especially by her mother-in-law. Often, the birth of a child was the event which brought peace between the two.

Under modern conditions, the old relationship between these two women is strongly discouraged by economic circumstances and also by attitudes reinforced by political pressure. Some elderly women are said to try to follow the traditional customs in their relations with their daughters-in-law, but pressure groups such as the Women's League often take action to ridicule them. As the authority of mothers-in-law has weakened, brides appear to be taking fewer pains to become "full members" of their husbands' households. There is considerable emphasis on the "new" relationship in which the mother-in-law should treat the daughter-in-law as a daughter and the daughter-in-law should treat the mother-in-law with the same respect that she gives her mother. Mutual understand-
ing and cooperation between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law are explicitly valued in order to maintain a harmonious family life. A good part of the roles formerly performed by the daughter-in-law is now assumed by the mother-in-law. Domestic work and child care are tasks in which the mother-in-law can be of great help. During the busy agricultural season, it is not uncommon for the mother-in-law to get up early and prepare breakfast for the family, and she often also prepares dinner (Hwang et al. 1960:154). In general, the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in contemporary rural North Korea appears to be cordial and complementary, without much tension.

A similarly tension-free relationship is also found between daughter-in-law and her husband's younger, unmarried sister, a relationship that formerly had often been full of suspicion and hostility. It was common for an unmarried girl to say unkind things about her brother's wife that led to domestic discord. For this reason, the husband's sister was often called a "foxy girl," an uncomplimentary term. Today the two women appear to regard each other as sisters. This modern relationship should be understood in its connection with the communal group. Problems within the family affect the entire social group, and political pressures within the hamlet play an important role in fostering domestic harmony.

Among brothers, differences in age do not seem to be important until they marry. Their behavior toward each other is informal until the eldest brother marries, when younger brothers begin to use respectful language toward him. However, fraternal love is now emphasized more than ever. Problems of inheritance, which formerly often created much family discord, no longer exist, and the birth order of brothers has therefore lost most of its importance.
A married daughter maintains close ties with the household of her birth for some years after marriage. During this period, the young bride may visit her native household for important events, such as funerals and weddings. Married daughters often return to their natal families to give birth to their first children (Ch'ongnyon Saenghwal, July-Aug., 1965: 58; our informants also reported this custom). Although the mother-in-law is available to provide post-obstetric care, the new mother generally chooses to be with her own mother. Women generally do not return to their natal homes at times of subsequent childbirth. As time passes, the married daughter's ties to the family of her birth gradually loosen. As long as her parents are alive a nominal tie remains, but older women rarely visit their native homes once their parents have died.

Adoption is common today among families having no children of their own, and sometimes families lacking sons adopt them. In the past, adoption was also common but was limited principally to sons. The Korean War left a tremendous number of orphaned children, and the regime has waged a nationwide campaign to encourage adoption of both female and male children.

The adoption of male children of appropriate age from the same patrilineage had been the predominant custom in pre-Communist times. Since adoption was for the purpose of maintaining family lines, girls were seldom adopted. Adopted children were often nephews, sons of the foster father's brothers. If a boy was not available among close kinsmen, one of more distant relationship might be adopted. If a man died without leaving a male heir by birth or adoption, it was his kinsmen's responsibility to choose a boy as successor in order to keep the family line unbroken. In some cases, a couple with no son but having a daughter
arranged for her to marry a man who later inherited their property. This kind of son-in-law was called taeril sawii. Although he lived with his parents-in-law he retained his natal family name.

Thus, this kind of marriage and semi-adoption was not intended to preserve the family line of the bride, and was uncommon. If a couple lacking a son lived away from other kinsmen and did not want their daughter to marry out, the adoptive marriage might be acceptable as a way of providing for their old age. However, the taeril sawii or son-in-law who married into a family had always been looked down upon, and men married in this way only when their economic prospects were otherwise poor.

Some traces of these customs of adoption appear to have survived, but the concept of adoption has undergone change. Children of either sex are often now said to be adopted for the pleasure of rearing them, rather than to maintain the family line, and adoption is no longer the concern of a large kin group but only of the foster parents themselves. When a child is adopted from outside the circle of kinship, he continues to assume the family name of his foster father, but this practice appears principally to be a means of identification. There has been no truly radical turning from traditional customs, however. Sons are still more highly desired than daughters, since males are of somewhat greater economic value and sons who care for foster parents in their old age are economically and otherwise very important to their parents.

A woman's barrenness or failure to give birth to a son are no longer justifiable grounds for divorce. The concubine, who was a traditional solution to the problem of marriages that produced no sons, is unlawful and is said no longer to exist. The North Korean Criminal Law (Article 256) specifies that a man who has a concubine be sentenced to prison for
a maximum of two years or sentenced to a maximum of one year of indoctrination, which includes compulsory labor.

During the first decade under Communist rule, "freedom of divorce" prevailed in North Korea. Discontented couples were granted divorces by mutual consent, and the consent of the families involved was no longer required. Throughout North Korea a flood of divorces occurred during this period. The Women's League often intervened in support of women who were ill-treated or deserted by their husbands. Some politicians appear to have exploited the policy of "freedom of divorce" to abandon illiterate country-born wives and marry well-educated city girls, and the Women's League often supported these actions on the grounds that the attributes of the wives of political leaders should be appropriate for their husbands' statuses. The Korean War led to a large number of troubled or dissolved marriages. Many marriages were dissolved because of the death of one of the spouses. Many other marriages were dissolved because one of the spouses, usually the male, committed a political crime such as fleeing to the south, cooperating with the South Korean army or the Allied Forces, and engaging in reactionary activities. The other spouse often tried to eradicate the stigma of being reactionary and demonstrate loyalty to the Party and state by getting divorced.

Since the mid-1950's, divorce has been discouraged, and has been obtainable only through a People's Court. Couples seeking divorce must pay a high application fee, and the court generally tries to reconcile them unless a political crime is involved, when divorce can be obtained with relative ease and at a reduced fee. We have no reliable statistical data on the divorce rate; however, according to our informants, the actual number of divorces today is very small, especially in rural areas.
Widows or widowers may freely remarry. Widowers are more likely to remarry than widows, and they very commonly remarry within a few years of the deaths of their wives. Second wives may be widows or divorcees, but women who have not previously married are preferred. The circumstances for widows differ somewhat. If they are still young and have no children, they are generally encouraged to remarry. Few middle-aged widows with children remarry. Many widows never remarry and those who do usually marry widowers. There still appears to be a strong general distaste for a man's first marriage to be with a widow.

The modern household is a distinct unit of consumption but, as we have seen, it is not officially a corporate unit of production since its members may be in different work teams and the household head lacks authority over its members in communal activities of production. However, the household may serve as a production unit in a few activities such as those included in the campaign to increase the collection of organic fertilizers. Although North Korea produces much chemical fertilizer, the national policy has been to encourage the use of self-supplied organic fertilizers and keep the use of chemical fertilizers at the minimum. Night-soil, animal manure (including cow, pig, chicken, duck and rabbit), wood ash, grass, and the new fertilizer previously described, baked soil (soto), are the principal organic or partly organic fertilizers. Baked soil is believed to be the most effective fertilizer, even though its processing is arduous work. The fertilizer campaign is usually organized on the village level, but sometimes each household is responsible for collecting or producing a quota. The following case illustrates the organization of a household for these activities. Choson Yosong (Feb. 1962:29) describes a family on Yondong Cooperative Farm in Inhung County,
South Hamgyong Province composed of seven members, the household head and his wife, his mother, two sons, and two daughters. All except the mother, who has retired, and the second daughter, who attends elementary school, are working members of the farm. In their spare time, all seven collect or manufacture organic fertilizers, and each has assigned tasks. The elderly mother of the household head is supervisor or chief organizer of this family undertaking. In about two months, the family was reported to have collected 1.5 tons of soto, 1.5 tons of compost, 2 tons of a mixture of soil, night-soil, and waste kitchen water, and 200 kg. of animal manure. The joint effort is rewarded by additional work points for the family.

If the range of changes in familial composition and relationships is reviewed, it seems reasonable to conclude that almost every aspect has undergone considerable change correlated with the social and economic conditions of Communist life. It seems clear also, however, that these changes allow many elements of the past to survive, that the family, in altered form, continues to be a vitally important social unit, and that certain of the Communist policies have both fostered the maintenance of some of the traditional family bonds and have taken their form in part from ancient, deeply entrenched customs associated with the family.

3. **Kinship Organization**

In pre-Communist times, when primogeniture prevailed, a united group of related households often developed as time passed. The founding household of these complexes, which was headed by a succession of eldest sons, was generally called k'unjib, or main household. As younger sons married, they were sometimes set up as the heads of separate households.
called chagunjib, or branch households, which were usually near their parents' house. Residence after marriage was patrilocal, and, as noted earlier, villages tended strongly to be exogamous. The patrilineage thus tended to be primarily a local group. As time passed, the process of segmentation into main and branch households continued. Several generations after the establishment of a family in a new settlement a patrilineage composed of descendants of the first settler had usually formed. Outsiders might have moved into the village during this time and formed other lineages. Each lineage maintained solidarity. Formerly a village was generally composed of one lineage or a few lineages and some single families who had recently settled there. A large lineage might be scattered over two or more neighboring villages. The lineage provided socio-political and psychological security for its members. Unless there were special reasons to move away, younger sons and their wives tended to take up residence in or near the ancestral village.

Within a lineage were distinct groups of families, each of which maintained strong internal solidarity as well as ties with the entire lineage. These groups were called tangnae, "in group" or "close relatives." A tangnae was composed of the patrilineal descendants of a common male ancestor. It included all patrilineally related lineal kin and collateral relatives to the third patrilateral line. Within a village, there might be several such tangnae groups. According to Korean custom, apparently drawn from the Confucian ceremonial code, the main household was responsible for memorial ceremonies for patrilineal ancestors to the fourth ascending generation and several ancestors may be the subjects of the ceremonies. On memorial days, the tangnae gathered at the main household to perform the ceremonies. Similar ceremonies honoring
ancestors were performed by the tangnae on such occasions as New Year’s Day and Moon Festival Day. These ceremonies served to maintain the solidarity of the group as descendants of a common ancestor. For ancestors beyond the fourth ascending generation, patrilineal descendants performed a commemorative ceremony at the graveyard only once a year, after the fall harvest. Members of a tangnae wore mourning dress for a fixed period after the death of any member.

The largest unit of patrilineal kinship was the surname group. When the Koreans talk about a surname, they always identify it with a prefix called a bon, which indicates its origin, that is, the locality where the first ancestor is believed to have lived. For instance, Kimhae-Kim-ssi means Mr. Kim (or Kim lineage) of Kimhae, and Chonju-Yi-ssi means Mr. Yi (or Yi lineage) of Chonju. People with the same surname but different bon do not regard themselves as kin. Kim of Kimhae and Kim of Andong share the surname Kim, for example, but the two groups that are so named regard each other as totally unrelated. The same is also true for those who have different surnames but the same bon.

Each group of same-family-name-with-same-bon (tongsong tongbon) traditionally kept genealogical records going back to the first ancestor. Sometimes a patrilineage was divided into several branch lineages, each of which kept its own genealogical record. It is not clear how such segmentation of lineages came about. However, almost all branch lineages bore the names of famous and prominent ancestors, which suggests fission under a forceful leader. Genealogical records were valued as evidence of the prominence of ancestors and of relationship to famous people. Prominent and wealthy lineages highly valued their
genealogical records, and poor lineages gave little attention to theirs.

Since the number of members of large lineages is sometimes millions of people, no one is personally acquainted with all of his distant relatives. However, a convenient device identifies the generational status of distant relatives within a lineage. Generally, one's personal name is composed of two Chinese characters. One of these is the generational name, hangyolja, prescribed by the lineage, and it may be either the first or the second character of the personal name. Parents choose only the other character of a child's name. Within a lineage, all sons of the same generation are given the same generational name. (See C. K. Yang 1959a:89 for an account of similar Chinese customs, from which the Korean practices were partly derived.)

Korean custom prohibited the marriage of two members of the same lineage, no matter how distant their genetic relationship. Lineage exogamy was not a matter of law. Marriage within a lineage was regarded as incest, firmly sanctioned by custom but not by law, even if the lineage were very large. In any attempt to establish a marital union, the first thing to be cleared up in connection with qualifications of prospective mates was identification of their family names and their bon.

Ancestor worship was the main factor in maintaining lineage solidarity. The more wealthy and prominent the lineage, the more elaborate its ancestral worship. With few exceptions, wealthy lineages held political power, which was the foundation of wealth in the traditional Korean society. (See the similar Chinese case in Hsu 1948:286-287 and Fairbank 1958:43-44.) Once one rose to officialdom, sooner or later wealth followed. It was common to use a large proportion of the wealth to glorify ancestors, thereby strengthening the solidarity of the lineage.
The lineage generally had certain common properties, mostly arable lands and mountains, that also served as social binders. Among wealthy lineages, holdings of common property were large. The revenue from the common property, such as arable lands and mountain forests, was used primarily for rites honoring ancestors rather than for the welfare of future generations.

Under Communism, systematic measures were taken to break the old kinship networks and to turn the individual's loyalty toward the state. In the land reform of 1946, most of the lands held and rented by lineages were confiscated. However, the reform was carefully designed in its dealing with the lineage properties to avoid strong opposition. For instance, forests associated with graveyards were not subject to confiscation (see Article 22 of the Regulations Concerning the Application of the Land Reform Law issued March 3, 1946; Reprinted in Ko Sunghyo 1971:214). The most important changes in kinship were brought about by agricultural cooperativization, as the preceding discussion of the family has brought out. Individual families may now continue to perform memorial ceremonies for their immediate ancestors at their own expense, but the ritual activities on the lineage level have lost their financial ground and consequently have ceased.

In an effort to break the kinship system, the regime relocated people of some areas where kinship played an especially strong role in village affairs. Some families of dominant lineages were required to move out and unrelated families moved in. Generally the cadre of a farm came from outside communities.

The following is an example, provided by an informant, of such a transplanting. This informant was born as a member of an old lineage
which embraced most of the population of his village. After he had been
away from the village for over ten years, he returned while on a ten-day
military leave in 1964. It was no longer the village he had known. Many
of the families of the dominant lineage had moved away and all members of
the village cadre were from other localities. No social activities were
held exclusively by lineage members. Families of the lineage still
formed the majority of the village population, but their roles as farmers
had become more important than their lineage affiliation.

The People's Army has also been influential in weakening the strength
of kinship in its function as a school to train its young members as
revolutionary vanguards well-armed with Communist ideology. Upon comple-
tion of military service, most young men do not return to their home
villages but are assigned to farms in other rural communities, where
they generally marry local girls and remain. Since the parents have no
authority over the future of their sons, they usually do not expect them
to return home once they have left for military service or to receive
advanced education. In this way, kinsmen have become dispersed through-
out the country, cutting ties with their ancestral homes. The young
people may still maintain close ties with their parents and other
immediate family members, but the wider kinship networks hardly affect
them.

Some families may still keep genealogical records, but these are
no longer considered family treasures that demonstrate the past glories
of their lineage. The official titles enjoyed by their ancestors which
the accounts thoroughly recorded now have negative effects on their
descendants' lives. As might readily be inferred, some prominent ances-
tors turned out to be the "exploiters" (high officials, landlords, and
the like) whom the contemporary North Korean regime hates so much. Avoiding direct confrontation with deeply rooted tradition, the Communist regime has not undertaken any campaign against ancestral worship. Rather, the decline of ancestor worship may be described as the result of other changes brought by Communism. Large gatherings for ancestral worship that include residents of more than one village do not occur today. The annual graveyard ceremony honoring ancestors beyond the fourth ascending generation appears still to be held, as simply as possible, by a few descendants who reside near the graveyard. However, since many years have passed since the death of these ancestors, their descendants are usually widely scattered. If people attend such rites, they lose potential income, and the farm authority does not allow them to "waste" their time in such non-productive activities.

Before Communism, local administrative authorities had long kept family registers, called *hojok*, of all families under their jurisdiction. This record contained vital statistics and included information such as family names, their origins (*bon*), marital statuses, and information on the natal familial backgrounds of women who married in. The regime abolished this record on the grounds that it was a product of "feudal" society based upon a status hierarchy that had been utilized to foster and maintain destructive sectarianism based upon kinship. In its place, the Communist regime instituted the *kongminjing*, a civic registration or certificate of citizenship, which does not specify one's origin (*bon*).

The abolition of *bon* especially draws our attention, since it has important bearing on customs of marriage. If people who share the same family name are no longer identified by their *bon*, the question arises of whether or not marriage within the lineage, as traditionally defined,
is permissible. We find no clear answer in North Korean law, which appears to have no statute prohibiting such marriages. However, it appears that the deep-rooted tradition of lineage exogamy still exists. Informants state that the majority of parents want their children to marry people who do not have the same family name and same bon. A Korean scholar in Japan, Yi Byong-su (1968:41), describes letters occasionally coming from North Koreans to their relatives in Japan informing of the marriages of their sons and giving their daughters-in-law’s family backgrounds including family names and bon. Other letters from North Korean parents to the marriageable children residing in Japan inquire about similar information concerning the latter’s prospective spouses. It appears that young people do not care about the significance of bon but their elders still tend to cling to tradition.

Traditionally, among the wealthy and prominent families the lineage members had been particularly well organized on the basis of their relationship to prominent ancestors and had been firmly integrated. Unity was supported by abundant common property, and genealogical records were carefully maintained. Lineage members tended strongly to reside together. If a member achieved officialdom, he might move to a town or the capital city and make his way toward wealth. Later, he might retire in his ancestral community and, when he died, his remains would be buried in the ancestral graveyard. This pattern was the ideal for the yangban. For people of lower socio-economic status, life was quite different. In their search for a decent livelihood, they tended to scatter over a wide area rather than to form a residential group with their kinsmen. They could not afford elaborate ancestral ceremonies and they received little material benefit from their ancestors.
Accordingly, group consciousness and kinship solidarity were poorly developed.

Today almost all people in responsible positions, at least on local levels, are from the formerly poor class, who had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Their loosely-organized networks of kinship hardly conflicted with the revolutionary cause. Although their ancestors did little for the betterment of their present lives, they take pride in them today because they were not "exploiters of the people." Every aspect of the social life of the formerly elite class is now circumscribed overtly or covertly. An illustrative example, provided by one of our informants, concerns two unmarried sisters who barely escaped to South Korea in 1967 with the help of the informant who was then serving as a security (intelligence) officer at the cooperative farm where the elder sister lived.

The women were 27 and 23 years old when they reached South Korea in 1967. Their grandfather was a wealthy landlord in a village of Hwanghae Province, where the two sisters were born. After the Communists took power in northern Korea, the family of the women lost its wealth and suffered otherwise in the ways previously described for elite families. Some years later, the elder sister was ordered to move to a cooperative farm in Kangwon Province, near the southern border, and the younger sister, to a farm in Northern Hamgyong Province in northernmost Korea. Both were assigned to work as farm laborers. Since they were officially classified as pulsun-bunja, or "questionable elements," they lived under conditions of severe discrimination and continual surveillance. A directive reached the elder sister's farm in the summer of 1967 which required that "questionable elements" be moved to new settlements on
newly developed lands in the northernmost area. This directive aimed to move to remote areas all questionable people who lived near the southern border and thus prevent them from fleeing to South Korea. After several days of serious thought, the elder sister decided to flee, taking her sister with her. She was able to send a false emergency telegram informing her sister of her death, and a few days later her sister joined her to attend her supposed funeral. Together with a man who was the son of another wealthy family, they managed to escape to South Korea.

The social discrimination directed against "questionable elements" often extends to descendants of malefactors who cannot even recall their parents' or ancestors "wrongdoing." The two sisters described above grew up under Communist rule, and their only wrongdoing was their birth in an "impure" family. As the experiences of the two sisters suggest, once members of the former elite class had been removed from their ancestral home town, the able-bodied among them were often sent to still other localities. Ties of kinship have also been weakened by administrative surveillance of every aspect of the daily life of the people in general. It is almost impossible for kinsmen who live far apart to make direct unauthorized contact with one another.

The result of these conditions of modern life has been a weakening of traditional solidarity of kinsmen. There is no question that the role of family as an agent of socialization or child-rearing has been considerably weakened. However, the Communists still consider the family a major agent of socialization and a foundation for the formation of the personalities of children. According to Communist reasoning, children who grew up in families of "impure" elements tend to be
ideologically polluted and to become reactionaries. Those "impure" elements and their children must endure ordeals to prove their loyalty to the Party and state. When anyone commits an offense against the state or becomes known as a "questionable element," the solidarity of his kin group is weakened. Privately, kinfolk who live apart may wish to maintain close bonds, but fear leads to avoidance of direct contact with one another.

One of our informants has three elder sisters, the eldest of whom is a widow with one son. The son cooperated with the South Korean police corps for a short time when the Allied Forces had advanced to the northern part of Korea during the Korean War. After the war, these acts of the son were kept secret for several years but were then revealed by investigations of the intelligence agency and the man was executed. The informant, then an officer in the North Korean Army, visited his home village while on leave and saw his eldest sister for the first time in over ten years when she visited the old family home to attend his wedding. His elder sister cried very often and told him about her son and of the distressing life she had lived for many years. Since she was a "questionable element" under constant surveillance, his family had not maintained close contact with her even though she lived alone in a nearby village. The informant described the family reunion during his wedding, an event which should have been joyful, as a time when every member of his family including himself had been seized with fear.

It is quite understandable that families regarded as "questionable elements" do not wish to conduct rites honoring their ancestors. Village cadre members sometimes attend the memorial ceremonies of
individual families to conduct indoctrination sessions on the occasion of the kinsmen's gathering. Our informants believe that the majority of these people do not even perform most of the traditional religious services for their ancestors and seldom get together except for funerals and, to a lesser degree, mourning ceremonies. For some people, family background has now become the major obstacle in the way of a satisfactory social life and a successful political life. Networks of kinship beyond the immediate family appear to have survival value for no one.

As far as we could discern, traditional kinship nomenclature has largely survived in North Korea. Patrilocal residence after marriage continues to be preferred and, accordingly, many more patrilineal than matrilineal kin are distinguished by specific kin terms. Traditionally, as compared with terms of address, terms of reference were abundant and varied. Among people of the upper class, who ordinarily maintained bonds of kinship with many people, the variety of terms of reference was so great that some of the terms were unknown to those of lower social class. The use of rare kinship terms was often a symbol of prestige among intellectuals and Confucian scholars. Today, the special terms of the elite have been largely dropped and the use of kin terms seldom appears to reflect the speaker's socio-economic status. It may be said that kinship terms have been reduced in number and the entire terminological system has been simplified but otherwise follows tradition.

Fictive kinship, which was formerly fairly common among young men and young women, is strongly discouraged today, and, if it exists at all, is kept secret. The traditional custom of using the kin terms father, mother, uncle, aunt, grandmother, and grandfather in addressing people who are not relatives continues to be the general practice. It
has not been discouraged, probably because it is looked upon as fostering unity among the people. Details concerning Korean kinship nomenclature are given in Appendix II.
CHAPTER V
TOWARD A "SOCIALIST MAN"

1. Formal Education and Indoctrination

The Educational System

Education has been given much attention by North Korean leaders in their efforts to carry out the "socialist revolution." Reorganization of the educational system established by the Japanese colonial administration was necessary to meet an urgent need for trained leaders to carry out Communist programs and to educate the young in Communist ideology. After a series of changes in 1946, 1953, 1959, 1966, and 1972, North Korea in 1972 had a comprehensive general educational system called "universal compulsory ten-year senior middle school education." At the end of the Japanese occupation, primary education consisted of six years of school, called kugmin haggyo, or national school. Under Communism, the name "national school" was soon changed to inmin haggyo, or people's school. In 1946 elementary education was reduced by one year, and in 1953, after the Korean War, further reduced by one year to a period of four years. The old five-year middle school system of Japanese colonial times was divided in 1946 into two levels, three years of middle school (chung haggyo) and three years of high school (kodung haggyo). This system continued through the 1950's. Meanwhile, the four years of people's school education became compulsory in 1956. The reform in 1959, which was actually put into effect in September, 1960, changed the three-year high schools into two-year technical schools (kisul haggyo) and two-year senior technical schools (kodung kisul haggyo). No change
was made at that time in the middle schools. These changes in secondary
education should be understood in relation to the mobilization of man-
power for economic development during the early 1960's. Agricultural
cooperativization had been completed, and implementation of the first
five-year economic development plan (1957-1961) was under way. Skilled
laborers, junior technicians, and technical specialists were urgently
needed to meet the needs of various economic development programs, and
in 1959 the technical and senior technical schools were given the role
of training them. Thus, out of the pre-Communist secondary school, only
the first three years of middle school remained as an extension of
general education. Another educational change in 1959 was the establish-
ment of a "seven-year compulsory education system" which covers four
years of elementary school and three years of middle school.

In the 1966 reform, which was put into effect in April, 1967, the
three-year middle schools were merged with the two-year technical
schools to form five-year middle schools. Compulsory education was now
extended by two years to make a "nine-year compulsory technical education
system," covering four years of elementary education and five years of
middle school. Thus, technical education became an integral part of
compulsory education. At this time the two-year senior technical school
was renamed "high school" without significant change in its curricula.

Until the latest reform in 1972, to be described later, admission
to high school was more than a continuation of education. In most cases,
graduation from middle school was the turning point in the lives of the
young generation. They were formally eligible to work and earn an
income, and many received no additional formal education after middle
school. High school served as a preparatory institution for college
education, and those who were admitted to high school were almost assured a college education. Unless they were regarded as unqualified for advanced education, high school graduates were admitted to college.

High school graduates were not allowed to continue their higher education immediately. Instead, they were required to work on the farms or in factories and other industrial enterprises for a period of two years and to experience for themselves the farmers' and workers' life. There is no doubt that this policy was aimed primarily at integrating formal education with economic activities of production. From the economic standpoint no particular advantage is evident in the practical training that preceded college education. The experience did, however, help the young people to identify with the working people.

The 1966 reform had also created two kinds of institutions of technical education on the same level as the high school. These were three-or-four-year senior technical schools called kodung kisul haggyo, the old name for high school, and two-year vocational schools (chigop haggyo). The entrance requirements for either of the two kinds of technical schools is graduation from a five-year middle school. Both schools are designed to train middle school graduates as junior technicians or junior specialists in a shorter time than the regular six to seven years of advanced education combining high school and college.

At the end of 1972, North Korea carried out a fifth reform in its educational system, which extended the period of compulsory education by one year to a total of ten years. Children now enter elementary school one year earlier, at age six rather than seven, and remain in this school for four years. The five years of middle school have now become six years of "senior middle school" (kodung chunghaggyo), which
is divided into two stages of three years, called junior course (chunghagban) and senior course (kodungban). The old two-year high school was abolished. Those who are selected for higher education go from the senior course to college after two years of practical work experience. Thus, education before entering college has been reduced by one year to a total of ten years.

The revised system of primary and secondary education appears structurally identical with that existing during the period 1953-1959, except that the children now begin primary school one year earlier. However, through a series of reforms in content, technical education has been firmly institutionalized as a major part of secondary education, which is no longer merely an extension of primary education.

The latest educational reform brings substantial advantages to economic development, and eases the problem of labor shortage, since the newly-adopted educational system makes it possible for the young to complete their secondary education at age sixteen, two years earlier than under the old system. According to the North Korean Constitution as revised at the end of 1972 (Article 29), the minimum working age is set at 16, the age at which secondary education is completed. The system allows the mobilization at a youthful age of a substantial number of fairly well educated citizens for activities of production and provides a supply of young people, the graduates of the senior middle schools, with technological know-how.

In rural areas the compulsory educational system is run by the local authorities of the cooperative farms and, although it is called "free" education, is financed by the farms. Among the expenses, teachers' salaries take the lion's share. For about ten years beginning
in the late 1950's, three types of teachers were distinguishable on the basis of the sources of their support, those solely under the cooperative farms' funds, those who receive their food rations from the cooperative farms' funds and salaries from state funds, and those solely under state funds. Toward the latter part of the 1960's, however, financial and other responsibility for the operation of the primary and secondary educational system was transferred from the central government to local authorities, except for the assignment of teachers and the fixing of teachers' salaries, which are still handled by the central government. In other words, each cooperative farm absorbs the entire cost of its primary and secondary schools, including expenses for teachers' salaries and grain rations and management costs of school facilities. Although the duration of universal compulsory education has been substantially expanded since 1956, the expansion has cost the central government little in rural areas.

In the past the majority of peasant families had seldom been able to afford education for their children beyond primary school, but parents now bear no direct financial burden for their children's education. The fact that every child of school age is entitled to ten years of education seems to play an important role in convincing the farmers that the government is working for them. Paying little attention to the fact that they themselves pay for the universal compulsory education, the farmers appear to be very proud of the "benevolence" of their own socialist system of government and, in particular, of their leadership. This confidence in the merits of their system has been an important factor in the integration of the entire population.

College education covers either four or five years, depending upon
field of study. The present system still requires the taking of an
entrance examination for admission to college, but this examination
seems to be a mere formality. Recommendations submitted by the heads
of the workshops where the candidates work are the most important matter
in the selection of students. In general, these recommendations include
evaluations of personality, political behavior, political thought, and
work records. Family background is also important. Descendants of the
former well-to-do families of "reactionary" backgrounds are usually not
permitted to have advanced education unless they have proved themselves
to have become completely rehabilitated. Since all candidates are
required to have at least two years of practical work experience before
they apply for admission to college, this period allows careful examina-
tion of their loyalty toward the state and revolutionary zeal.

In addition to the general education system described above, there
are two supplementary systems, the special education and the adult
education systems. The special education system is run entirely by the
state government, that is, by the Communist Party. Its largest division
consists of schools to train specialists in the arts and foreign
languages. These specialized schools include in their curricula such
fields as painting, music, and the dance, and certain foreign languages.
The students of these specialized schools are selected while in kinder-
garten on the basis of judgments that they have "exceptional talent."
Once admitted to the special school they are trained in their fields
for eleven years, corresponding with the elementary and secondary
education of the general education system. Upon graduation, they serve
the state government, unless they are selected for advanced education
at the college or universities. Also included in the special education
system are schools for the bereaved children of deceased revolutionaries (hyôngmyông yujanyo hagwon) who had rendered distinguished service. The Communist regime regards these children as valuable assets for the future, and their special schools are designed to train them to become core elements to carry out the revolutionary cause.

Education for illegitimate children who have been abandoned by their parents draws our special attention. Although sexual intercourse outside marriage is strictly prohibited, North Korea has a problem of illegitimate children. It may be attributed partly to changes in social relationships between sexes; social contact between the sexes in daily life had never previously been so close, particularly among farmers and industrial workers. The traditional image of the young Korean woman as being shy, submissive, and faithful to her husband appears to be no longer accurate. As we have earlier noted, there is no question about a rise in the status of women. The campaign for women's rights, in which considerable effort was expended under the Communist regime, appears to have been influential in raising their status, but, as we have noted, the primary factor appears to have been their economic importance under the new conditions of life.

Children born outside wedlock, particularly by widows and unmarried women, were traditionally looked down upon, as were their mothers. In contemporary North Korea, unmarried mothers frequently give up their children and let the governmental agencies raise them and such children are welcomed by the government. According to one of our informants, such illegitimate children are given fairly good care. At the provincial level, special institutions take care of orphans and illegitimate children whose mothers do not wish to raise them. When an unmarried
pregnant woman decides not to raise her child she is advised to tell her superior at work of her decision well before the time of delivery. The latter arranges for her to "take a vacation" at the time of the birth, keeping the matter secret. The delivery usually takes place at the clinic of a state orphanage (yugawon). The clinic does not inquire into the identity of the child's father, and the clinic takes full responsibility for the mother's well-being while an obstetrical patient. After a period of post-natal care she goes back to work, leaving her child behind at the orphanage and having no further contact with the child. The child is raised at the orphanage for four years. Then, after three years at a special kindergarten known as aeyugwon, the child is transferred to an institution called yujanyo hagwon, a boarding school, for formal education up to the secondary level. Children brought up in this way are regarded by Communist authorities as a special and desirable kind of "socialist men and women," one of the most trusted classes of people. Illegitimate children and those abandoned in infancy by their parents have no sense of biological bonds with their parents, whom they do not even know, and orphans lack parents. It is quite conceivable that these children have complete faith in and loyalty to the state, which has raised and educated them. Upon graduation from the boarding school, their future is favored as compared with that of other children. They form a core element in any unit of social and political organization to which they are assigned.

A "campaign against illiteracy" has been vigorously pursued. Within a few years after liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the North Korean Communists had organized a national anti-illiteracy campaign. First, simple courses in reading, writing, and other subjects
were set up in every town, village, factory, mine, and other production and residential community in North Korea. School teachers of various educational levels and local government functionaries were mobilized as teachers, as were the village intellectuals and students. The schools, which were called "Korean language schools," were designed primarily to wipe out illiteracy among the working people who had failed to receive formal education under Japanese rule. No less than one-half of the entire working force in North Korea is believed to have been illiterate at the time Communism began. These people were taught to read and write the Korean language, other basic knowledge, and some politics in courses of instruction of two or three hours daily that were held after work hours, especially during the slack season of winter (Chang Sok-hun 1973:37).

These "language schools" soon evolved into a well-organized system of adult education consisting of "adult school" on the elementary level and "adult middle school" on the secondary level. An intensive program of additional primary education was conducted for a large number of graduates of these schools. This was a one-year program, divided into three classes, junior, middle, and senior, of four months each. As early as 1949, 160,000 working people reportedly had gone through the adult education program (ibid.).

In the 1958 educational reform, adult education was reorganized and further developed by setting up "workers' schools" (kulloja haggyo) and "workers' middle schools" (kulloja chung haggyo), each of which took two years to complete. These schools provided general education on the primary and junior middle school levels for those who lacked formal education without requiring that they leave their jobs. Thus
adult education in North Korea has gone beyond providing elementary literacy. Within a decade of actual operation, the workers schools on the elementary level reportedly became unnecessary and were subsequently abolished, in 1967 (ibid.:38). Today, workers' middle schools remain as institutions of adult education. Every village or residential cluster in the countryside has such a school. In addition to providing secondary education, these schools appear to play an important role in ironing out ideological problems through political lessons.

Whatever its content, adult education in North Korea during the past quarter-century appears to have made marked progress in removing illiteracy. Today, except for a small portion of the elderly, the entire population of North Korea is literate and has managed to raise its general knowledge up to at least that of primary school graduates.

Indoctrination

Education is conceived as the most important avenue toward revitalization of the socio-cultural system. According to the view of the North Korean leadership, people can be taught to create a satisfactory society in which to live, and man is conceived as the independent and willful creator of his own history. This anthropocentric view of culture prevails in every aspect of North Korean education.

The major theme of public education appears to be "how to serve the people and the state." Education is no longer a prestige symbol for the individual or his family. Acceptance in programs in advanced education is interpreted as being "called" by the state. The furthering of personal interests is entirely irrelevant to the educational system, which is systematically planned on a national scale to meet the demands
of the economy. The skilled workers, technicians, and scientists who are trained under the modern educational institutions are placed where needed and where they can perform to the best of their abilities. There can be no waste in the educational investment of the state.

For more than 500 years, Koreans had been captives of Chinese culture, particularly Chinese Neo-Confucianism. Although political leaders made effective use of the protection afforded by China, the average Korean was shackled by Confucianism, knowledge of which was the only avenue toward high position. Confucian education in Korea consisted largely of texts in Chinese. Although a Korean alphabet had been invented in 1443, it had never been popularly used among the Korean people during the Yi Dynasty. Almost all literary works by Korean scholars were written in Chinese script, which was adapted to the Korean language. A common scene in traditional Korea was the group of young pupils sitting in front of their teacher in a sodang, private school, loudly reciting the Confucian texts from memory. When a pupil failed to make progress, the teacher often used physical punishment in an effort to stimulate him. There was no alternative to the established Chinese interpretation of the Confucian classics.

Under Japanese colonial rule, these circumstances changed little. Teachers remained authoritative figures or disciplinarians. Cramming continued to prevail. The Japanese colonialists had no interest in promoting literacy among Koreans other than to train them to be "practical people" capable of performing their assignments well. Article II of the Educational Ordinance in Korea enacted and promulgated by the Japanese colonial government in August, 1911 includes the following statement: "The first principle of education is to cultivate loyal subjects in
accordance with the Imperial Rescript on Education" (quoted in Abe 1971:175). The task of remolding Koreans into loyal subjects of the emperor and of the Japanese Empire was something that could not be done easily. Coercive and cramming education proved to be the only way to educate the Koreans under the oppressive military rule. In order to carry out a policy of assimilation through education, students at all levels were forced to adopt Japanese cultural elements unquestioningly while Korean counterparts, notably the Korean language, were set aside or eliminated. With the goal of gaining quick reimbursement for educational investments, educational institutions of the Japanese were merely training agencies for producing practical people.

As we have noted, under Communism heavy emphasis is placed on education aimed at transforming the young into patriotic socialists responsible for carrying out the socialist reconstruction. Schools are regarded by the Communist authorities as the very basis of the "cultural revolution." The principles underlying education at all levels are the integration of "theory with practice" and "education with productive labor," and these principles are expressed in slogans such as "learn while working" and "work while learning." All students above the primary school level are required to participate in productive labor as a part of their regular school curricula.

One of the sharp distinctions from the past is found in teaching methods. Unlike the one-sided, passive, cramming education of the past, modern practices highly encourage students to participate actively. Classes are no longer simply a matter of lectures; the value of learning is seen to come in part through class discussion and participation. Classes are frequently divided into small groups so that students can
help each other, and to promote feelings of group responsibility and collectivism. Every indication leads us to believe that the North Korean educational system is designed to raise the level of knowledge collectively rather than to strive for excellence of a few.

Nationalism prevails in every aspect of North Korean education. Korean language and history are highly stressed. Chinese writings were completely banned at the outset of Communist rule. Young people brought up under Communism do not know Chinese characters and use only the native syllabary. In order to fill the gap left by the ban of Chinese characters, a number of Korean words have been invented by state linguists to replace the Chinese words formerly in use. It is noteworthy that a number of these words are quite unintelligible to South Koreans.

As noted earlier, the teaching of Korean history, particularly recent history, appears to be of vital importance in North Korean education, and every episode of class conflict and historical misery is exploited. Korea's history texts have been rewritten with a strong emphasis on the "negative aspects" of her cultural history and on "newly discovered" positive and nationalistic aspects. How landlords exploited their tenants, how powerholders abused their positions at the expense of the people, and how miserable the life of the poor had been--these and similar topics appearing in the rewritten history books appear to come up at practically every political and study meeting.

Comparison of present conditions with those of the pre-Communist years is the most common theme of education in class consciousness. But the darkness of the past is not the matter of sole concern. As we have also noted earlier, efforts have been made to use native
elements of culture as symbols of cultural identity, such as the native syllabary. Girls and women are encouraged to dress in native costumes in everyday life. (Because of its inconvenience, native clothing is not recommended for men except on special occasions outside working hours.) A notable example of "cultural reconstruction," previously noted, is the effort to "restore" traditional group dancing, which in the past had been limited to certain regions of the country. Ethnographers were assigned to reconstruct traditional dances and modify them to fit contemporary life in such a way as to stimulate collectivism. Kunjung muyong, group dancing, is an example. Males and females of any age form a circle holding hands, and dance while singing a song. This form of group dancing is taught in "cultural activity" sessions at schools of all levels, and is now institutionalized as a social and political activity throughout North Korea for people of all ages. This establishment of group dancing alone was important in fostering increased socialization between the sexes and in reducing the generation gap.

Teaching is highly practice-oriented. Rather than placing heavy dependence upon the teacher's lecture alone, methods of teaching require that students give lectures in class and participate in supplementary group study sessions. In science and technology classes, heavy emphasis is placed on experiments and practical training at factories. Sessions on social and political education often deal with actual events of history, calling attention to the shortcomings of the past and presenting sympathetically the side of the proletariat.

The most powerful technique of indoctrination of the young and the entire population in general appears to be what we have earlier called
"positive use of hatred of the enemy." It opposes entirely the Christian concept of loving one's enemies, which North Koreans find unacceptable, regarding it as an institutionalized means by which superiors, either individuals or groups, exploit their inferiors. Instead they try to teach the young how to retaliate effectively. The new ideology may be paraphrased as "whoever strikes you on the right cheek, strike him back on both." It is hoped that burning hatred for one's enemies will generate socialist patriotism and confidence in the existing system. Certain enemies, such as "Japanese militarism" and "U. S. imperialism" may be regarded as scapegoats or fictive enemies since they pose no direct threats. The following incident shows how "hatred for one's enemies" is used as a teaching tool in North Korean schools (Rodong Shinmun, 3/27/71, p. 6):

A woman teacher from the Tongch'ang People's School in P'anmun County encountered the same difficulty in carrying out the task of revolutionary education as is experienced by all other teachers in North Korea, where the new generation has grown up free of "exploitation" and "suppression." The school is located just north of the southern border, where tensions between North and South Korea have existed since the division of Korea. Although this location helped to maintain a feeling of hostility toward "enemies," the teacher found that the absence on the part of the young of actual experience in the "negative aspects" of the cultural history caused her difficulty in educating them in Communist ideology. She had tried lectures on such subjects as "How badly the landlords had exploited the peasants" and "U. S. imperialism: the unpardonable enemy of the Korean people." But her students did not seem to get the point.
At last, she found that her teaching was more effective when she made use of specially prepared paintings as references. One which proved to be most effective was a series of paintings entitled "Uncle Shin Chong-ch'ol's Yesterday and Today." It depicts a poor boy named Shin Chong-ch'ol who was made to slave for a landlord and who was often physically abused by his master. In addition, as part of the regular school curriculum, she often organized "meetings to curse the enemy, U. S. imperialism." At times, sham battles between two groups of students proved to be an effective way of developing a sense of hatred for external enemies and of promoting comradeship among the students.

Not even mathematics classes are free of hostility toward one's enemies. Students are asked to work out their mathematics lessons "in the same spirit as they curse their enemies," and are given questions such as the following (Rodong Shinmun, 3/27/71, p. 6):

After two hours of pursuit of a runaway spy, a member of Young Pioneers Corps who runs four kilometers per hour and a security agent who runs eight kilometers per hour arrested him. How far did the boy and the security agent run to catch the spy?

We find abundant evidence of hostility toward foreign powers, especially the United States. The most graphic is an eyewitness report of a 28-year-old South Korean Christian missionary who was among the passengers of a South Korean airplane hijacked in December, 1969 by a North Korean sympathizer who was reportedly a communist agent, and 65 days later was released in North Korea. The missionary reported that "Everywhere we went, we saw effigies of Uncle Sam with legs torn away. On the effigies were signs, 'Let's tear off the legs of U. S. imperialists!' At one time, I saw children bayoneting an effigy of an American
GI." And he went on to say, "It was a fearful society. Death to Americans! Death to South Koreans! That was the North Korea I visited" (quoted in Shim 1970:17). A similar observation is reported by H. Edward Kim (1974:271), a National Geographic staff member, who, on a visit to North Korea for 20 days in the fall of 1973, saw at a day-care center in Songnim a grim poster which depicted patriotic tots shooting a "U. S. imperialist monster."

According to the North Korean publication Kulloja (Workers) (October 1964, p. 6), the spirit of "hatred of class enemies" is inseparable from the passionate love for one's own people (comradeship) and the two together form the essence of "Communist humanism." The idea that people's awareness of their enemies, both within and outside their nation, can promote effective organization appears to pervade programs of education and indoctrination. It seems reasonable to say that criticism of alleged enemies has been firmly institutionalized as an essential part of the North Korean way of life as a way of validating the nation's path of revolution. One of the most difficult tasks in indoctrinating the younger generation in Communist ideology has already been noted in another context. Almost three decades have passed since the establishment of the Communist regime, and the new generation has had no actual experience with the conditions of pre-Communist years and of the period of the Korean War. Efforts have been made to preserve the wounds of the past and to use them in educating the young. Numerous museums and memorials have been established for this purpose, and these are an essential part of educational programs. Visitors to North Korea have been impressed by the efforts of this kind to preserve the past, often in exaggerated form. Examples include the Museum of the Korean
Revolution (Hyongmyong Pangmulgwan), Ethnological Museum (Minsok Pangmulgwan), Museum of Fine Arts (Misul Pangmulgwan), Museum of History (Yoksa Pangmulgwan), Memorial of the Foundation of the Korean Workers Party (Tang Ch'anggon Kinyomgwan), and Memorial of the War of the Liberation of the Fatherland (Chogug Haebangjonfaeng Kinyomgwan).

The Ethnological Museum serves as an illustration of the nature of these institutions (extracted from Choson Chungang Nyongam, or Korean Central Yearbook, 1973:264-266). This museum was founded in early 1956 and was reorganized in 1970 as a museum to record the "revolutionary and Communist way of life during the years of struggle for independence under Japanese colonial rule." Its exhibition rooms are divided into three parts, the first of which concerns the life of soldiers (guerillas). Detailed exhibits show the life of the guerillas, their quarters, military training, and other organized activities, and their ethical code. These exhibits use models, actual objects, photographs and paintings. Another room exhibits foods eaten by the guerillas and illustrates their problems of health. The third room consists of exhibits about the lives of boys and girls during that period.

In addition to the museums and memorials on the national level, numerous small institutions of similar kind have been set up throughout the country. Student tours are arranged to these places as part of the regular school curriculum. Each year, especially during summer vacation, the Young Pioneers Corps, which includes all children between 9 and 13 years of age, organizes camping trips to historical sites such as old battlefields and sites related to anti-Japanese guerilla activities. At these places, campers and other visitors are conducted on tours by professional guides, usually women, who explain the historic events in
rather detailed and often highly dramatized ways. A night meeting called udungbul-moim, or bonfire meeting, is often held during the camping trips, which consists of a politically oriented educational program, conducted while sitting around a bonfire. Usually the program consists of readings from an official text called "Memoirs of the Anti-Japanese Guerillas" and of patriotic poems, the singing of revolutionary songs, and listening to a lecture by an invited guest who relates experiences in opposing the Japanese. North Korean leaders appear to regard such education carried on outside the classrooms as making a great contribution to the campaign of indoctrination.

Efforts have been made to root out all possible sources of factionalism, which is regarded as one of the worst of the "enemies." It has been common in traditional Korea for graduates of the same school or persons from the same locality to form factions within larger groups. Seniors and juniors in schools then often formed factions, and under Japanese rule these conditions continued to exist. In secondary schools, juniors were expected to obey their seniors. When they passed on the street, they exchanged military salutes, initiated by the juniors. Failure to salute often led to informal disciplinary action by the seniors.

Under the modern system of compulsory education all young people attend school and there is no difference among students based upon seniority. Graduation from a specific school does not have any prestigious meaning, and dominance based upon seniority of age and class in school is discouraged. Students are to refer to each other as tongmu, comrade, and are to treat each other as equals. Students still wear badges identifying their school and their class; however, the student who first sees another
student, his junior or senior, is supposed to initiate a salute, which is now a gesture of comradely greeting. Students in junior middle school formally belong to the Young Pioneers Corps and have a distinctive salute, a raising of the right hand above the left side of the head while exchanging greetings with such phrases as "Be prepared (Chunbi-haja)" or "Be prepared at all times (Hangsang-junbi)," phrases that are reminiscent of the Boy Scouts. The phrases are taken from the Young Pioneers' oath of "Let's be prepared at all times to serve as the Communist second reservists." All students of senior middle school are members of the Socialist Working Youth League. Unlike the Young Pioneers, they use a military salute which is often accompanied by comradely verbal greetings such as Annyong-hasimmika (How are you?) or Tangyol-haja (Let us unite!).

As the preceding descriptions suggest, one of the underlying principles of North Korean education seems to be the fostering of interdependence or comradeship. From an early age, the young are brought up under chojig-saenghwal, or "organizational life." Beyond the family, a child is a member of a school, the Young Pioneers Corps or the Socialist Working Youth League, study groups, and other special activity groups. As a member of these groups, he is asked to strive toward the best interests of the group and the society as a whole. An individual's efforts in behalf of society are not simply respected but are glorified. North Korean school texts of the primary and secondary schools are filled with stories of revolutionary heroes and heroines, the self-sacrifices of patriots, and brave resistance to the Japanese colonialists.
2. Religion under Communism

Since the Communists assumed control in North Korea, a campaign against religion has been carried out systematically and vigorously that is not consistent with officially-declared policy with regard to religion. Freedom of religion is supposedly guaranteed by the North Korean Constitution, but numerous examples of anti-religious activities appear in official North Korean documents. Article 14 of the old Constitution, which was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly at its first session on September 8, 1948, states: "Citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall have the freedom of religious belief and of conducting religious services." Despite this constitutional provision, strong opposition to organized religion, especially Christianity, began very quickly and no freedom of religion has existed. As we saw earlier, for example, property owned by religious organizations was confiscated during the land reform.

An official interpretation of the Constitution delivered at the Kim Il-sung University (Hakwu Sobang 1960:55; also quoted in Cho 1965:11) puts the circumstances in this way: "The freedom of religion is the freedom to believe or not to believe in any religious creed or conduct any religious ceremony. It also includes the freedom to disseminate anti-religious propaganda (emphasis added)." Another excerpt from this text states: "At present, various religious groups engage freely in their activities without any interference. Religious people, like other ordinary people, participate in various fields such as government, politics, economy, and social life without discrimination (emphasis added)." Again, declaration and actual practice do not agree.

This de facto trend of opposition to religion was later formally
incorporated in the Constitution. Article 54 of the "Socialist Constitution" revised and adopted on December 17, 1972, reads: "Citizens have religious liberty and the freedom to oppose religion." (The latter was phrased as "the freedom of anti-religious propaganda" in its official translation.) The right to perform religious services of one's choice was in fact completely denied by the government authority. Church facilities were made into public nurseries and kindergartens, and in some cases were used as quarters to house local administrative bodies and political organizations.

The North Korean policy of opposing Christianity can be better understood if the history of Christianity in northern Korea is reviewed. Until the end of Japanese colonial rule, Christianity had grown more rapidly in northern Korea than in the southern half of the nation, where Confucianism had been much stronger. Wealth and power were concentrated in the south. There were numerous Confucian strongholds in the south, but only a few in the north. Thus, Christianity met strong resistance in the south but a relatively easy acceptance in the north. During pre-Communist years, P'yongyang, now the capital of North Korea, had been the most prominent center of Christianity in Korea. One-sixth of the city's population of 300,000 were Christians when northern Korea became a Communist state. The Christian churches had also been important in efforts to gain independence from Japan. Ironically, when Korea won independence from Japan, the Christians of the North had to face a much stronger struggle for survival. Some organized attempts were made by Christian groups to protest against Communist persecution; however, these activities were ruthlessly suppressed.
Christian missionaries introduced much Western culture to Korea, including innovations in formal education and in medicine. Since the missionaries had approached the Korean people largely by means of roles connected with education, many Korean intellectuals became Christians, especially in northern Korea. When northern Korea became Communist, its Christians became social outcasts. Since the majority were of the middle or upper class, their survival was immediately threatened because of their relative wealth and additionally threatened because of their religious identification. A great exodus of Christians to South Korea occurred during the first five years of independence, until the outbreak of the Korean War. This trend rose to a climax when the Allied Forces reached their most northerly point. Millions of northerners then fled to the south. Today, in South Korea most of the prominent figures of the Christian churches are of northern origin and the refugees form the core of the Christian groups.

The exodus of Christians from 1945 to 1953 appears to have been advantageous to the new regime. Christians soon became so few that organized resistance by them to Communist policies was not possible. Although numerous incidents of resistance from Christians did take place at the time of land reform before the war, the later cooperativization of agriculture was carried out with no notable signs of resistance from the remaining Christian population. How the Christians remaining in North Korea might have fared under Communist rule is unclear for lack of information. It is certain that the Christian population was very substantially reduced by movement to South Korea, but it is hard to believe that there are no longer any Christians in North Korea, as the North Korean propaganda repeatedly claims. According to our
informants, hardly any signs of the existence of Christianity are
evident in North Korea. Group activities of Christians were strictly
forbidden. However, our informants do think it possible that Chris-
itianity may survive secretly. When a Japanese visitor asked one of his
hosts in North Korea about the fate of Christianity in North Korea, he
received the following reply:

Certainly there is no Christian church in the city of P'yongyang. One can find not a single church anywhere in the country. There remain some Buddhist temples in the mountains, but they are expected to be gone soon. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, neither Christianity nor Buddhism is pro-
hibited. The freedom of religious belief is guaranteed. However, no matter how faithfully one prays to God, one cannot get food to eat and a dwelling to live in from him. When one works hard under the Guidance of Premier Kim Il-sung, there is not the slightest fear of scarcity of food, clothing and housing. For this reason, it is quite natural to see the decrease of Christians (Wada 1963:22).

North Korean Communism has had little trouble with Buddhism. Under
the shadow of the more powerful Confucianism during the era of the Yi
Dynasty, Buddhism in Korea never recovered the strength it had once
held, particularly during the Koryo (935-1392) era. Unlike the circum-
stances in other east Asian countries, Buddhism had never become deeply
entrenched in Korean life. Pushed to positions of obscurity by the
dominant Confucianism, most of the Buddhist temples in Korea are located
in the mountains, a sign of isolation from the daily life of the people.
Except for some faithful Buddhists who paid occasional visits to the
temples to pray, it was difficult to find Buddhism in community life
before the Communist era. Unlike Christianity, Buddhist identification
has not been always clear. Villagers, mostly women, did often attend
special ceremonial occasions in the temples and contribute a handful
of grain to Buddhist monks making pilgrimages. However, they did not
maintain close relationships with Buddhist temples in their daily lives,
and Buddhism did not concern the important events of their lifespans.

This weakened Korean Buddhism caused little stir when northern Korea came under Communist rule. The Buddhist temples were put to secular public use, except some famous temples that were designated as "cultural treasures." In many cases, the monks are allowed to remain at their temples as caretakers. The weakness of Korean Buddhism was also evident in the absence of Buddhist reaction when the temples were taken over. Except for information on the confiscation of landholdings of the temples, the North Korean documents have not recorded much information on the fate of Buddhism itself. It appears to have placed few social problems in the path of Communism.

Since the end of the Korean War, the North Korean government has given considerable effort to rooting out traditional religious elements from everyday life, beliefs and acts that might be called folk religion. Traditionally the majority of Koreans had believed in many gods, to which they appealed for aid in solving life's problems, and scientific interpretations of the universe were little known by the average person. Although suppression of the organized religions was carried out with relative ease, the task of "getting rid of the remnants of backward ideology" inherited from the old society has been more difficult. Accomplishing this task has been a target of the "ideological revolution," through the education system and propaganda networks. Indoctrination in the new view was conducted through publications, movies, plays, circle activities, and series of lectures.

The anti-religious campaign dealt a heavy blow to religious practitioners of all kinds, including fortune-tellers (chomjaeng'i) and sorceresses (mudang), who were formerly numerous. Members of the
Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, for example, were reported to include several former fortune-tellers and sorceresses who had left their old profession entirely (Hwang et al. 1960:209). The campaign against religion is carried out principally by the young, particularly through the organizational networks of the Socialist Working Youth League and the Women's League. According to one of our informants, some religious practitioners were earnestly requested to abandon their old profession by young members of their own families. During the early stage of the campaign, young people often destroyed the facilities and paraphernalia of the practitioners of supernaturalism in their villages.

Despite the energetic campaign, deep-rooted beliefs in supernaturalism were not erased so easily as the Communist leaders had expected. Documentary sources describe many instances in which elements of supernaturalism survived more than a decade of Communism. According to Chong (1959:28-31), in localities which suffered prolonged drought some people have performed rain ceremonies. Although dispensaries and hospitals were available, some people still took recourse to supernaturalism, performing traditional rites of curing that involved offerings. Such people were publicly criticized for wasting their property, and held to blame because their illnesses became worse or even fatal without the aid of scientific therapy. Chong states that a few people continue to believe in the "divine favor of God."

Traditionally, the cause of illness was often thought to be evil forces. Modern scientific theories of pathogenesis appear not to have been readily accepted by the aged. According to one informant who observed the circumstances he describes, until the early 1960's some elderly people who had suffered misfortunes such as illness among their
children prayed and made offerings to supernatural beings. The same informant, who had served as an intelligence officer on a farm, was once told that a sterile woman had secretly gone into the mountains and prayed to the "mountain god" for a child. Under Communist rule such magico-religious practices of medicine now appear to have almost been wiped out. The presence of specialists in modern medicine on each farm has brought to everyone modern medical knowledge which, together with the activities of the campaign against supernaturalism, have seriously weakened if not entirely obliterated the traditional beliefs.

In the past, rituals related to death were highly elaborate and complex, and were drawn chiefly from Confucianism. As might be expected, the degree of elaboration correlated with the socio-economic statuses of the families concerned. Today, these customs have been greatly simplified and changed in other ways that accord with modern conditions of life. Funerals were traditionally a matter of concern chiefly to the kin of the deceased. Various rites were performed exclusively by lineage members, and the roles of unrelated neighbors were only to contribute labor to aid the bereaved family for a fixed period of a few days and to attend the funeral to pay their respects to the deceased. Kinsmen tended to reside in the same village or neighboring villages, and funerals and later commemorative rites were important in bringing them together, thus promoting solidarity among lineage members. Today, kinsmen are spread widely over the country, and elaborate funerals are discouraged by many other circumstances that have already been described.

As we have observed, the new work organizations have taken over many of the traditional functions of kinship including observances at death. When one of its members dies, a work team performs such necessary
tasks as transporting the coffin and making a grave. Close relatives living in the same village are, of course, more actively involved in funeral activities than other people. However, relatives in other localities are not usually informed of the death and they are discouraged from attending the simple rites. In general, the traditional spirit of giving mutual assistance at times of death appears to remain intact and some of the old ceremonial events continue to be observed. Neighbors contribute to the household of mourning certain amounts of food, including cooked rice and rice-gruel mixed with red beans (pp'atjug), to be consumed by those who give aid in the funeral. Representatives of each family of the village make a visit of condolence to the bereaved family. The funeral is usually held on the second day after the death, as in the past. Many old ritual elements of the funeral have been either dropped or simplified. Traditionally, the funeral procession included a small sedan-chair, supposedly housing the soul of the dead, which was carried by two men proceeding ahead of the hearse. Today, no sedan-chair is used; instead a man walks ahead of the hearse carrying a framed photograph of the deceased; if no photograph is available, this part of the rite is omitted. The traditional funeral procession was headed by a man bearing a pennant on which the dead man's name was written. This pennant was followed by a number of others contributed by relatives and friends as expressions of condolence. Traditionally the number of pennants had been an index of the power and prestige of the family of the deceased. Only the pennant identifying the deceased is used today. Other deletions include funeral songs, which were formerly sung by the bearers of the hearse.

It is interesting to note, however, that the custom of consulting
a geomancer to determine a lucky location for a grave is still followed if a geomancer is available. There are no professional geomancers in North Korea today, but an elderly amateur who has some knowledge of geomancy may be consulted. How much credence is given to this geomancy is uncertain, but following the old custom clearly appears to provide some kind of psychological satisfaction.

Traditionally, the period of mourning was two years, during which the bereaved relatives should live austerely. During this period relatives of the deceased, usually the household of the eldest son, maintained an elaborate memorial room called pinso specially set up to house the soul of the dead, which was ritually brought back to the house after the burial of the corpse. The pinso has survived but in a very simple form. A framed photograph of the dead and two candles placed on the table are the only noteworthy items in the room, and elaborate offerings of food are no longer made. The memorial room is usually dismantled on the second day after the funeral. Thereafter, the family returns to normal life.

During the early part of the Communist rule, a campaign was waged against ancestral worship, primarily directed toward Confucianism. The campaign seemingly met strong opposition, and subsequently, in 1966, efforts to denounce ancestral worship ended. No efforts were made to encourage this practice, however. The Communist regime seems to have taken the position of letting the people cling to the tradition of ancestor worship, so long as it does not interfere with efforts toward economic development.

Various additional remnants of the elaborate ceremonial complex of traditional Korea also survive. The custom of holding commemorative
services is still observed by many people. On the first and second
anniversaries of a death, a mourning ceremony is held in the house of
the eldest son, where villagers, friends, and close relatives pay their
last respects to the dead. Those who attend the ceremony bring gifts,
usually a bottle of a non-alcoholic drink made of fruits. Close
relatives who live far away may not attend the first anniversary
ceremony, but they tend to join their relatives in the second, when
the mourning period formally comes to an end. The traditional wailing
of mourners is still heard during the mourning ceremonies and also at
funerals.

After the mourning period of two years, descendants of the deceased
perform a memorial ceremony each year. Unlike mourning ceremonies,
the annual memorial ceremonies are performed exclusively by kin, as in
the past. Most families perform the ceremonies only for the parents of
the male head of the family, but a few people continue to conduct rites
for ancestors of the household head as far back as great-great grand-
parents. Still other families perform no memorial ceremonies. It is
doubtful that the memorial ceremonies still function effectively to
promote unity among large groups of kin since participation by many
relatives is now difficult or impossible. However, some people arrange
to take their annual vacation of 14 days (in addition to the national
holidays) at times that allow them to attend family memorial ceremonies
as well as to see their relatives. Generally, however, memorial
ceremonies are performed by only small groups of kin who live near
each other.

No basic changes are evident in the procedures of the ceremonies.
Foods are still offered and the rites usually take place after midnight,
the traditional time. The ways in which ceremonial foods are placed on the table and the use of incense and candles is also basically the same as in the past. No incense is especially made for ceremonial use in North Korea today. The wood of the Chinese juniper, has long been burned as incense, however, and one of our informants states that since this wood is used in making pencils, obtaining it for ceremonial use is not a problem.

In the past the center of ritual observances of mourning and memorial ceremonies was an ancestral tablet, a piece of wood on which was inscribed information about the deceased including name, official title, and the date of death. During the first two years after death, the tablet was placed on a ceremonial table in the memorial room (pinso). Afterwards, the tablet was placed either in a closet in the living room or in the ancestor hall, a special room that was usually in the rear of the main building of the residence. Among prominent lineages, the ancestor hall was the symbol of power and prestige. At each memorial ceremony, the tablets of ancestors were brought to the ceremonial hall by the members of the family concerned. The average family did not have an ancestor hall, and the tablets for their ancestors were made of paper, prepared for each ceremonial occasion and burned after the ceremony. According to one informant, some people still use the paper tablets during the rites for ancestors. The inscription on the tablet is the traditional, written in Chinese and in the Confucian manner. The survival of this custom is surprising since, as we have noted, both Chinese writing and Confucianism were banned. Young people cannot write Chinese characters and the elderly prepare the tablets. So far as our informant knows, no ancestral tablets are inscribed with the Korean
syllabary.

It seems evident that even ancestor worship has been put to Communist use. As noted earlier, memorial ceremonies were exclusively kinsmen's affairs. (It should be noted in the passing that priests had no roles in funerals and memorial services.) However, the trend under Communism, which is still incipient, seems to put ancestor worship into a different mold. Village leaders and cadre members may attend the ceremonies, and, although the actual ceremonial acts are performed by kin of the deceased, these non-kin who attend participate in eating ceremonial foods after the formalized rites have ended. The gathering is then made into an opportunity for giving political education and ideological indoctrination. Of course, the subject of the meeting is reminiscences of the deceased; talk is said often to move to the topics of "the difficult life under the Japanese colonial rule," and "happiness under the present Communist rule." Anyone, kin or non-kin, who knew the deceased well presents eulogies. In doing so, an attempt is made to teach the young what went wrong in the past and what should be done in order not to repeat the "evils of the past." People whose ancestors have been classified as enemies of the people or the exploiting class do not conduct memorial rites, since they have been made to feel ashamed of what their ancestors have done. Instead, as we have early noted, many of these people try publicly to denounce and dissociate themselves from their ancestors. The new trend of participation in these rites by non-kinsmen may be summed up as a syncretic blend of the traditional ancestral worship and Communist ideological indoctrination that contributes toward the weakening of the importance of kin relationships and of solidarity among kinsmen.
The intrusion of non-kin into what had formerly been exclusively kin affairs is seen also in mourning customs. As noted earlier, mourning dress is worn by all tangnae members, that is, the common descendants of the great-great-grandparents, although there are distinctions in the elaboration of mourning costumes according to the degree of consanguineal relationship with the deceased. Today, our informants advise, mourning dresses are worn only by lineal descendants, that is, children and grandchildren, and not by collateral or affinal relatives, who may wear a mourning hat only. Close friends of the deceased also wear mourning hats at the funeral, a new custom. Since the local descent group is no longer an effective unit of social organization and relatives tend to be scattered geographically, bonds with the deceased are weak or do not exist among many of his kin. This circumstance may have made the nuclear family more important than formerly to any individual and also have made important the social networks among the non-kinsmen in daily life.

The traditional custom of songmyo, or visiting ancestral tombs, remains an annual event. On Moon Festival Day (August 15th of the lunar calendar), relatives get together and pay homage at their ancestral graves, cutting the grass in the graveyard and performing a simple ceremony. Since the visits take place on a fixed day, the government often provides transportation for the visitors, mobilizing all the vehicles available (Kawagoe 1970:152). There seems to be no intention on the part of the government to discourage or prohibit this traditional custom. Like Moon Festival Day, various other traditional ceremonies continue to follow the ancient lunar calendar. All other time reckoning follows the Gregorian calendar.

The efforts of the Communist government to sort out and preserve
native cultural elements extend to customs relating to the dead. In the past, the dead were usually buried. Cremation, a custom that apparently came with Buddhism, was not widely accepted until the era of Japanese rule, when numerous crematories were built. The Communists closed all the crematories and required interment of the bodies of the dead in cemeteries. Each local administrative unit has its own public cemetery. In some areas where no public cemetery is readily available the families of people who have died may choose sites for interment in the old ancestral graveyards. Unless they obstruct governmental plans for use of land, the old lineage graveyards are not disturbed without the approval of the descendants of those whose remains are buried there.

If all of the policies regarding religion of the Communist government are examined, a strong trend toward suppression of supernaturalism and organized religion is evident. This trend has strong bearing on values and customs concerning kinship, and these traditional ways have also been strongly discouraged insofar as they apply to large kin groups. Certain of the old customs associated with ancestors continue to be observed, with at least tacit official approval, apparently because they appear to be emotionally important to the people and do not oppose governmental aims. Other old customs have been used or modified to suit the ideology of Communism.

3. **Integration: A Family-State**

In totalitarian societies, people who do not accept leadership are generally subjected to ruthless persecution and a power struggle continues until a pecking order is established and one leader comes to absolute power. The political process in North Korea was not an exception. After
more than a quarter of a century of Communist rule, President Kim Il-sung rose to the position of "superstar" (Munthe-Kaas 1972:26-27). A Japanese visitor to North Korea (Wada 1963:23) stated, somewhat jokingly, that there is no need for other gods in North Korea, since they have their own god, Kim Il-sung. Economist Joan Robinson (1965:548), who visited North Korea in October, 1964, similarly stated that Kim Il-sung functioned as a "messiah rather than a dictator." Scholars of North Korea generally share this impression, seeing Kim as the center of a cult. To outside observers, the cult is often seen as a fanatic, conscious attempt to create strong leadership that is generated by a small inner circle of people holding political power. The extent to which the cult has effectively permeated people's lives in North Korea, however, leads us to believe that this interpretation is too simple, and that additional factors are involved.

It appears that the cult has evolved to the point where President Kim is literally worshipped by the people of North Korea. From the time a baby first begins to talk it is indoctrinated with the image of the "Great Leader Comrade Kim." Children are told by their teachers that the food they receive in the nursery is provided by him, and are explicitly taught to be thankful for his grace. At mealtimes, nursery teachers demand that each child say "Thank you, Great Leader" before food is given to them. Reinforcement of this image-building continues throughout the years of schooling. All tangible things that supposedly relate to Kim in the past are revered and are well preserved as historical objects. His birth-place, for example, has become the national shrine, and numerous statues of him have been erected throughout the nation.
An examination of North Korean documentary materials, particularly *Rodong Shinmun* (Workers' Daily), the organ of the North Korean Workers Party, shows that during the second half of the 1960's the Kim cult was gradually intensified. Idolatrous descriptions of Kim Il-sung began to appear at this time, of which the following are exemplificative: "the sun of the nation ... whom revolutionary people of the world adore so ardently as 'the hero of the 20th century produced by Korea'," and "the greatest, most respected and beloved leader produced by the whole world" (Munthe-Kaas 1972:27). In the 1960's, after the completion of agricultural cooperativization, Kim is reported to have made numerous personal, "on-the-spot" inspections of rural enterprises. One of the most publicized personal tours by Kim was made to Ch'ongsalli Cooperative Farm in February, 1960. This visit resulted in a new socialist system of economic management known as the "Chongsanri /Ch'ongsalli/ method" and the "Chongsanri spirit." In Kim's own words (1971:95), "The essence of the Chongsanri /Ch'ongsalli/ method lies in the facts that the upper organs help the lower, superiors help their inferiors, priority is given to political work, and the masses are roused to carry out their revolutionary tasks." The frequent contact between Kim and the farmers through his visits of inspection have doubtless been important in the development of the Kim cult. It is most likely that the events of any on-the-spot inspection by the President have been well planned so that the actual visit is only to play them out. These inspections have made a tremendous impact on the workers' morale, since personal contact with a supreme leader is a privilege of which they had never dreamed. If their farm operates well, the farmers undoubtedly develop a sense of loyalty to their leader and give him their support.
It is interesting to compare these modern circumstances with certain Confucian ideas of pre-Communist Korea. Among the five cardinal human relationships which form the core of Confucianism, the father-son relationship and the ruler-subject relationship draw our special attention. We have earlier noted that the father-son relationship had become the principal one and that the ruler-subject relationship was not a strongly integrative factor in Korean society. Considerable emphasis had been placed on the relationship among kin who were united in lines of descent from common ancestors. Among the members of the privileged class, identification with powerful lineages had been the key to success in life. Although Korea had always been a country of a single race and language for a millennium, it had long been socially divided into numerous nuclei of lineages, and no means of penetrating the walls of kinship existed that would integrate the entire population into a single, tight national network.

Under Communism, the father-son relationship continues to be important. We have noted that filial piety remains a virtue and that those who fail to serve their parents or parents-in-law properly are subjected to public criticism. The father-son relationship and other bonds of kinship have nevertheless been substantially weakened in line with economic and sociological changes, as earlier discussion of such subjects as property, inheritance, marital relationships, lineages, and economic activities has brought out. The weakening of kinship alone implies changes in the social order which are revolutionary.

However, the formerly weak relationship between ruler and subject has gained considerable strength under Communist rule in the form of the cult of personality centered around Kim Il-sung. A question that
arises is how was such a transformation possible in such a short period of time? This question may be answered if we consider the strengthening of the ruler-subject relationship as an extension of the father-son relationship. I shall suggest that the weakening of the importance of kinship, particularly the father-son relationship, would have caused serious social disturbance unless a strongly integrative mechanism were developed as a substitute. The use of the old as a model for the new has served effectively. The socio-political chaos and the sense of personal deprivation that came as an aftermath of the war and the many subsequent changes in ways of life paved the way for the rise of a messianic figure that united the people. Since the War North Korean society has been a closed system, sealed off from foreign cultural influences. The people were left with no feasible alternative than to adjust to changed conditions, and, for most people, the changes represented an improvement in living conditions, a circumstance which led them to give credit for the improvement to their leader.

Two of the most celebrated achievements under Communist rule are noteworthy in connection with the Kim cult. These are the abolition of the agricultural tax-in-kind, and the establishment of the ten-year program of compulsory education, which occurred in 1966 and 1972, respectively. The agricultural tax-in-kind was first imposed in 1946, as one of the major sources of internal revenue. With the abolition of this tax, farmers were freed of taxes. Profit from the industrial sector then supposedly became the sole source of internal revenue of the national government. Of course, there is no doubt that the government did indirectly collect revenue from the rural sector in the process of exchanging industrial goods for agricultural produce, but the formal
abolition of tax-in-kind itself had great impact on the farmers' morale. It may be noted that the policy regarding purchase and supply of rice has also been a factor in boosting the morale of both farmers and workers. According to Kim Il-sung, who was interviewed at P'yongyang by Governor Minobe of Tokyo (1972:50), the government procurement agency purchases rice from farmers at 65 chon (about 50 cents) per kilogram and supplies it to urban residents at 8 chon per kilogram. These figures were confirmed by our informants. There is no doubt that this policy brings about a sense of confidence in their government and its leaders among both producers and consumers. Similarly, the establishment of the ten-year system of universal compulsory education, which is far beyond what the peasant class could afford for its children in the past, has won for President Kim the popular support of the working people.

All the progress made under Communist rule has been interpreted as the result of President Kim's "wise leadership," an interpretation that resembles the pre-Communist custom of attributing personal success in life to one's ancestors. Any kind of state assistance is called a gift from the "respected and beloved leader" Kim, and it is common practice to speak of his deeds in terms of paternal love. The new strength of the ruler-subject relationship appears to be a projection of the old father-son relationship in a new social context. Without a long history of social arrangements in which kinship was vitally important, it seems unlikely that the modern conditions of integration based upon a sense of paternalism could have been achieved.

Kim Il-sung has in fact become a cultural hero who is referred to by the people as "father." The Confucian conception of filial piety referred to paternal love in terms of "indebtedness as high as a
mountain and deep as an ocean." It is interesting to note that recently the expression "indebtedness to the President Kim Il-sung as high as a mountain and deep as an ocean" is frequently seen in contemporary North Korean publications (Rodong Shinmun, 11/25/66, p. 3; 3/10/68, p. 2; 1/28/69, p. 2; 6/1/69, p. 2; 2/25/70, p. 5; and 2/12/71, p. 4). Young people increasingly tend to identify themselves as "sons and daughters of the Korean Workers Party and Marshal Kim Il-sung." The celebrated woman track athlete Shin Kom-dan publicly stated "how proud and happy she was to be a daughter of the Korean Workers Party and Marshal Kim Il-sung" at the time she won the 400 and 800 meter competitions of the International Track and Field Competition in Moscow (Choson Nyosong, August 1961:30). Her father lives in South Korea, where he fled during the Korean War.

What is important here is the fact that loyalty to the supreme leader supersedes the traditional concept of filial piety to biological parents. Farmers and other workers work harder today. Of course, material gain should not be disregarded as a motivating factor; however, it is noteworthy that participation in the socialist construction is interpreted as repayment of the indebtedness people owe to their "respected and beloved leader." In recent years, the North Korean mass media have carried an increasing number of accounts of exemplary activities of young people arising from their sense of duty to the state and the supreme leader. Feelings of loyalty to the modern leader seem, in fact, to be considerably stronger than the traditional virtue of filial piety. The very mode of integration through deification of the supreme leader leads us to believe that Confucianism, strongly denounced by the North Korean Communists, has survived in transmuted form. The
change is a shift in the principle of social organization from familism based on the father-son relationship to primacy of the ruler-subject relationship, so that integration extends beyond the boundaries of kinship. The nature of the relationship between the people and the head of state is so kin-like, however, that it seems appropriate to refer to modern Communist North Korea as a family-state.

Despite vigorous dissemination and practical implementation of Communist ideology, North Korean culture under Communism is thus distinctive and bears a strong imprint of Confucianism. The national goal is "creation of an ideal society based upon Marxist-Leninist ideology," and the nation has an "ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander" (Korea Today, 1972, No. 195:11), whose role is much like that of the head of a household in the traditional society. He is the absolute authority and the source of all wisdom about national affairs, and his management of the state resembles the management of a household. Material prosperity achieved under Communist rule is believed to be due to him. So far as we can discern, the present integration of the North Korean culture appears to be stronger than it has ever been before in the long Korean history. Principles underlying the operation of the family and the lineage in traditional Korea are now extended and applied on the national level, and traditional ancestor worship has survived in the Kim cult.

This pattern of transformation under Communism reminds us of the famous Confucian reformist Chu Hsi's dream of a new Confucian society "in which the ruler would act out of paternal love, as a father would, at the head of the centralized government and at the center of the nation, in which the people, his loyal subjects, would act, in turn,
with an inborn sense of duty. A person could thereby be a father to the family and at the same time a loyal subject of the ruler" (Kang 1971:277). What has happened in North Korea for the last quarter of a century may be summarized as a transformation into a new Confucian society or family-state that is well integrated as an extension of filial piety, expressed through strong loyalty to its leader. To some extent, then, it may be said that the society which Chu Hsi had dreamed about has materialized in Communist North Korea.

General improvement in the standard of living has helped to win a higher degree of confidence in the socialist system. People have seen that none of their leaders is working for his own interests and that their own efforts are not wasted. Administrative corruption has not been reported as occurring in any sector of North Korea under Communism, other than misdemeanors related to the heated competition in campaigns to boost production. A notable example of such misdemeanors is "percentage pyong," or the percentage syndrome, which refers to the practice of emphasizing the quantity of work over the quality, that is, overstating the amount of work done (Choson Nyosong, February 1962:24). Since farmers manage their farms, there is no room today for personal grievance regarding payments for work. An example of how today's farmers feel about their changed lives is provided by a North Korean reporter after a trip to the Red Flag Cooperative Farm, near Hamhung City. The reporter describes the life of a member of Work Team No. 3 of the farm, who had been a farmhand in pre-Communist years (Korea Today, 1972, No. 194:21):

Bitterly recalling his past life, hard pressed by the Japanese swine and the landlord, he related with deep emotion stories about free distribution of the land by the leader /Kim
Il-sung/, formation of the cooperative farm, and about his present happy life in the tax-free village. Now he lives in a cozy house provided by the state free of charge and does farming with the help of machines. He said with emphasis that his share of rice last year would be enough to last his whole family for three years.

Recent North Korean propaganda is loaded with such expressions as "the happiness of today." When the improved conditions of people's lives are repeatedly compared with those of the past, it undoubtedly generates a sense of indebtedness to the socio-political system in which they live. However, the strong human tendency toward anthropocentrism leads people to interpret the improvements in their conditions of life as the acts of a human leader.

The sense of indebtedness and loyalty to the leader, in turn, fosters unselfish devotion to the society. This seems to be what has happened in North Korea, where devotion is measured in part by occupations. Jobs involving manual labor are valued over clerical positions, according to our informants. Graduates of high school are assigned positions by the government, and those who are assigned to clerical positions are said to be ashamed of themselves. This circumstance seems to indicate change in the attitude toward work. Material rewards may have contributed to the change, since manual labor is generally better paid than clerical or white-collar jobs; however, the spirit of self-sacrifice and a desire for identification with working people seem to be more important factors. Innovative achievement and production that exceeds quotas are also viewed as demonstrations of loyalty to the leader. The unit of integration is not the family or lineage based upon biological relationship but North Korean society as a whole. The traditional virtue of filial piety has been replaced by loyalty on the national
level. Workers are called upon to fulfill their production quotas as given by the nation's leader, and to prove their loyalty to him. Public meetings of almost any kind of group have at some time passed resolutions that they should repay their indebtedness to the leader by hard work. The major slogan of the summer campaigns to increase agricultural production is "Let's repay the great indebtedness to the Party and the Leader by increased production" (Rodong Shinmun, 11/25/66, p. 3 and 11/26/66, p. 1).

The unification of North Korea was additionally favored by the exodus of anti-Communists that we have earlier described. Those who left were mostly Christians, intellectuals, and members of well-to-do families, and such people of these backgrounds who remain in North Korea are social outcasts who, more than other people, must give evidence of dedication to the interests of the state. The modern population of North Korea is much more homogeneous in social background than the population of former times, a factor which also fostered the development of a unified nation. Other circumstances that particularly favored Communism were the conditions of life of the majority of the people, who had little to lose under Communism and quickly saw that Communism bettered their lots.

Still other conditions were involved in the development of a tightly unified state. Among these has been the effective use of mass media of communication, which are under the firm control of the government. The news media consist principally of newspapers, magazines, radio, and, in recent years, television. Television sets are not yet available for every household, but they are well distributed throughout the nation so that every citizen sees broadcasts. Each work team or residential
cluster has a television receiver, for viewing educational and political broadcasts. Whenever some important program is broadcast, all villagers are summoned to their neighborhood receivers. Television broadcasts by President Kim are watched by most of the nation. According to our informants, the audience behaves as if it were actually meeting the leader personally. These broadcasts appear to be an important element in the development of the cult-like attitude toward him.

The state monopoly of media of communication appears to have served as the major boundary-maintaining mechanism in the integration of the sociocultural system. Foreign cultural traits are closely screened; strong emphasis is given to native cultural elements, and the communication networks carry little information other than some political news about the ways of living of other societies, so that the people live in cultural isolation. This isolation is strengthened by a campaign of opposition to foreign nations, as described earlier. Every effort has been made to create imaginary enemies. These attacks on alleged "foreign evils" have been important in generating ethnocentrism, nationalism, and unity in meeting the threats seemingly imposed by the enemies. As social scientists interested in the study of conflict have often contended, joint hostility toward a common foe may be seen as a powerful unifying force.

A chief function of the media of communication is educational, providing people with the latest scientific innovations and indoctrinating them in Communist ideology that has been synthesized with national goals. The impact of the propaganda campaign seems to be very powerful. Newspapers and periodicals are available everywhere, and farmers and industrial workers hold news-reading gatherings during lunch hours and
rest periods while at work or during study periods in the evening, when one member summarizes the important news of the day, at home and abroad, or reads aloud important items. Papers and magazines are full of stories about outstanding achievements of individuals or groups, and technological innovations that boost production are well publicized through every medium of propaganda. Each agricultural production unit operates like an independent experiment station. Whenever and whatever innovations are made by one unit become nationally known through the news media. Innovations are not always successful, of course. Judgment of their value has been practical, and practicality has meant congruence with other aspects of Korean culture. The establishment of mass dining halls serves as an example. The halls, it was claimed, reduced the work of women, who were traditionally responsible for preparing meals, and saved a good deal of labor by the use of centralized kitchens and small kitchen staffs of full-time personnel. The campaign to establish the halls throughout the nation lauded their effectiveness and advantages. Despite the intensive propaganda, however, within a couple of years of active operation the halls were found to cause inconvenience to farmers and to result in confusion. Once mass dining proved to be inefficient, no time was wasted in abolishing it.

The effective use of media of communication has resulted in a high degree of conformity in attitudes. In a sense, every North Korean is a spokesman for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Foreign visitors usually get the same answers to questions when these are asked of people in different localities. Through the various political activities in which they engage, the people, especially the young, are well trained in debating and they are "free" to express their own views at meetings.
However, once a resolution is adopted at the end of a debate, all who are involved are obliged to live up to it, regardless of what their own views might be. Otherwise, they would be regarded as deviants or reactionaries. It is worthy of note that views expressed in the meetings are not allowed to become the cause of blame after the meeting has ended or outside the meeting place. The same rule is applied to cases of personal verbal attack during meetings. At political meetings in which criticism of individuals and self-criticism take place, one person may criticize another for failure to be candid. The person criticized may defend his position, but the argument must not extend beyond the meeting. Later arguing or quarreling constitute a serious crime.
SUMMARY

As stated in our Introduction, this study has aimed to investigate the circumstances of cultural loss, addition, and adaptation in rural North Korea under Communism and to understand the processes of change. We began our discussion with a short account of traditional Korea, chiefly the culture of Yi Korea (1392-1910). The traditional social organization was based primarily upon kinship, and a high degree of integration was maintained among kin groups. This solidarity among kinsmen and the accompanying exclusiveness of lineages had served as a divisive force, however, so that close national unity did not exist.

Chinese Confucianism, chiefly Neo-Confucianism, had served as the principal ideological aid by means of which the ruling class of Yi Korea governed the people, and Confucian cultural elements permeated every aspect of Korean culture. However, the influence of Confucianism was ultimately disruptive. "Ethical generalists," scholars and officials who were well equipped with knowledge of Confucianism, held the highest prestige and were esteemed over technical and professional specialists. For lack of support from the Confucian scholar-officials in power, technological innovations were improperly rewarded and consequently died out. Manual labor was looked down upon and manual laborers were constantly exploited by the ruling class. Little social mobility existed, and, for the ordinary citizen, little incentive or opportunity existed to boost economic production beyond the subsistence level. Various traits of the culture of Yi Korea may thus be described as being self-destructive, of which the most important were the subordination
of the economy to the interests of politics, the lack of support for technology, the yangban's distaste for manual labor, and the poverty and otherwise miserable conditions of life of the majority of the population.

Exploitation by the Japanese then followed until 1945. At that time, most of the Korean population had experienced centuries of hardship. Against this background, the Communist revolution took place.

Soon after the Communists gained control they took a major step toward revitalizing the economy, the land reform. The formerly privileged class then became social outcasts and the formerly underprivileged rose above them, participating enthusiastically in the waves of "socialist construction." Past misery served as a major source of revolutionary zeal in the development of the national economy.

The land reform, however, was merely a first step in the reorganization of rural society. After the Korean War, the cooperativizing of the rural economy began as a second major step, and this reform was completed in 1958. Private ownership of the major means of economic production was thereby abolished. Although lands were supposedly put under the cooperative ownership of the members of cooperative farms, the farm workers became de facto landless proletarians. The cooperative farms were now giant corporations of the state which handled all important aspects of the rural economy including distribution and exchange. Households were no longer independent units of production except in their operation of small kitchen plots and other minor side activities such as collecting organic fertilizers and raising domestic animals.

The establishment of the cooperative farms opened the door for further agricultural development. It made possible the introduction of
modern technology to solve the problem of a shortage of arable land and--a matter of much greater economic importance at the time--the problem of a shortage of farm labor that had become acute because of deaths during the Korean War and the demands for labor by industry. If the land had remained under private ownership and the old boundary ridges between fields had been retained, the introduction of modern technology could not easily have materialized. The so-called "four technological revolutions"--the development of elaborate irrigation and drainage systems, the mechanization of farm labor, electrification, and "chemicalization", or the increased use of agricultural chemicals--were the next technological innovations of importance.

From all evidence available, North Korea appears to have made substantial progress in carrying out its "rural technological revolution" by means of mobilizing all potential resources, technological, material, and human. Technological innovations are highly valued and, through the various propaganda channels, are quickly transmitted to all rural areas. Each cooperative farm functions as an experiment station with regard to activities of production, and rural North Korea as a whole operates as a giant laboratory for agricultural development. No time is wasted in the general adoption of anything which proves to be advantageous in increasing production. Similarly, no time is wasted in dropping elements that prove to be disadvantageous.

Added to the technological innovations was a partly psychological campaign to stimulate production, which has been a notable feature of rural North Korean life since the late 1950's. This campaign had entailed the use of all available labor and means of production. An essential part of the campaign is the promoting of motivation to excel
in work, as individuals and, especially, as members of groups. Farmers who have demonstrated unusual merit or made innovative contributions are awarded titles of honor. Collective innovations are encouraged by honoring counties and cooperative farms for outstanding achievements of this kind. When organizational units of the cooperative farms exceed their production quotas, members of the units have been rewarded by preferential treatment in the distribution of crops. These and most other material rewards are only for organizational units as a whole, however, and not for individuals who excel. The conduct of the production stimulation campaign strongly suggests that its underlying theme is a philosophy of free will expressed in the goal of building a model world. The farmers seem to believe that they can control their destiny and that the future of their society is determined by their own will. This philosophy, which did not exist among the peasants of traditional Korea, seems to have been effectively utilized as an ideological tool in gaining the cooperation of the people.

As the preceding paragraphs already indicate, the social organization of North Korea has undergone many changes that are congruent with changes in its economic conditions. Certain social customs and institutions were allowed to remain, however, provided they did not conflict with Communist goals. For example, various customs relating to marriage have survived, although modifications and simplifications are evident in them. The traditional organization of kin clearly interfered with the goals of Communism and great changes were accordingly made. These may be summarized in the statement that kinship—both kin groups and the interpersonal relations among specific categories of kin—generally holds much less importance today in North Korean social organization.
and in daily life.

The family has lost many of its traditional roles, but it is regarded as vitally important as the basic unit or "cell" of the society. The abolition of private ownership of the principal means of production and associated customs of inheritance has altered familial functions and relationships. Large extended families appear to be rare, and relationships among family members are more egalitarian than they formerly were. The male household head is no longer the chief organizer of agricultural production and is instead a member of the farm, without special distinction because of his status in his household. Early child care is mostly a responsibility of parents, but such public facilities as nurseries and kindergartens now play major roles in the socialization of children. Filial piety, which had long been the dominant value in familial relations, continues to be a virtue, but only when it coincides with the common interests of the people. Love, cooperation, and mutual understanding are now greatly emphasized as desirable traits among members of a family. Adoption is no longer used as means of continuing family lines, since familial continuity has ceased to be a matter of organizational or economic importance, but childless couples sometimes adopt children. Although not truly common, illegitimacy is no disgrace, and illegitimate children and orphans are well cared for as special children of the state.

A son is still more highly desired than a daughter since males are of somewhat greater economic value and sons often continue to follow the old custom of caring for aged parents. In general, however, the social status of females has risen greatly, in large part because of their importance as active participants in economic and political
activities. This change in the relative social positions of males and females has been accompanied by a trend toward much greater freedom of association between unrelated males and females. Love affairs are reported to be common among unmarried people.

Although the family in altered form survives as a social unit of importance, the traditional lineage system has disappeared. Seen as a major obstacle in the path of reaching goals of reform, lineages were strongly oppressed. The land reform took away lineage properties, and other means were also used to break up lineages. Lineage unity was destroyed in villages dominated by kin groups by relocating formerly influential families and by replacing them with families from other communities. Once children leave their native villages for advanced education or military service, they do not often return, since they are usually assigned to new localities when their schooling or military service has ended. Through these means, kin have become dispersed throughout the country and kinship plays no notable role in village affairs. Gatherings of large groups of kin, formerly common at weddings and for the many rites honoring ancestors, are no longer possible.

The Communist regime has undertaken no nationwide campaign against ancestor worship, but large gatherings for this purpose are strongly disapproved. Today, rites honoring ancestors have become opportunities for indoctrinating young people in Communist ideology and promoting revolutionary fervor. For the members of the formerly elite families whose ancestors are regarded as exploiters of the people, rites honoring ancestors are indications of a lack of revolutionary zeal; the majority of these people perform no religious services of this kind. All other activities of the formerly elite class are also overtly and covertly
circumscribed.

Great progress appears to have been made in improving formal education. All children receive ten years of education under the system called "universal compulsory ten-year senior middle school education." Technical education is firmly institutionalized as a part of compulsory education, so that young people are well prepared to begin work when their ten years of required education have ended. For young people showing special aptitudes and abilities, advanced training at high school and college levels is provided and is extensively used, so that the number of highly trained specialists in agronomy, medicine, and other fields has grown greatly. A program of adult education appears to have done much to eradicate illiteracy and to have brought the level of education of the many previously uneducated citizens to at least that of primary school graduates.

Teaching methods have also changed. Students are encouraged to participate actively in class discussions rather than merely to memorize and follow unquestioningly the instructions of their teachers. In the spirit of collectivism, emphasis in education is given to raising the level of knowledge of all rather than striving to achieve excellence of a few.

Education includes much indoctrination, among the techniques of which the most powerful appears to be the "positive use of hatred of the enemy." Enemies are found both at home and abroad, and they are often drawn from the nation's own cultural history. This technique of promoting hatred for the enemy clearly appears to be wittingly planned as a way of achieving unity and of validating the nation's path of revolution. Efforts have been made to preserve in memory
the wounds and sufferings of the past inflicted by enemies, within or outside the nation, and these acts have similarly been a planned means of fostering patriotism and confidence in the existing system. In formal education, and in all other activities, self-sacrifice, comrade-ship, and working for the interests of one's group and the entire society are consistently glorified as ideal behavior.

Changes in religion have also been striking. Officially, religious freedom exists in North Korea but, in fact, a systematic and vigorous campaign has been carried out against both organized religions and informal beliefs and practices of supernaturalism. In pre-Communist years, Christianity was stronger in northern than in southern Korea. Although some organized attempts to survive were made by Christian groups, their efforts soon ended in failure. The apparent incompatibility of Christianity and Communism, the confiscation of church properties during the land reform, and the de facto denial of religious freedom led most of the Christian population to flee to South Korea soon after North Korea became Communist. This exodus essentially eliminated Christianity.

Buddhism did not present a difficult problem because it had been dominated by Confucianism and had never become deeply entrenched in Korean life. Properties of the Buddhist temples were confiscated and most of the temples were put to secular public use, as were the Christian churches. Some famous temples are preserved as "cultural properties," and the monks attached to them have been allowed to remain as caretakers, of what are now museum specimens.

Greater efforts were needed to eradicate deep-rooted folk beliefs and acts of supernaturalism. In the early stages of the campaign against
religion, the facilities and paraphernalia of folk practitioners were often destroyed. Changing the attitudes of the people was difficult, however, and it has been brought about principally by displacing supernaturalism by non-supernaturalistic interpretations and procedures that have been seen to be more effective. These include the presence of specialists in modern medicine at each farm, the introduction of modern farm technology, and the general increase of scientific knowledge that has come through the various educational channels. These innovations have greatly weakened if not entirely obliterated supernaturalistic folk beliefs and customs.

Opposition to Confucianism was not explicitly a part of the campaign against religion, presumably because, in Korea, Confucianism was not an organized religion and it was not, in fact, regarded as a religion. It lacked religious edifices and, except for scholar-administrators, also lacked specialists. The rites of ancestral veneration of the home might be called corollaries of Confucianism, but these rites were not performed by priests. Nevertheless, wherever Confucian-derived values and customs appeared to stand in the way, they also were consciously changed, as is illustrated by our previous discussion of rites honoring ancestors. In other instances, Confucianism appears to have undergone change that was essentially unplanned.

The religious-like cult surrounding Kim Il-sung, the President of North Korea, appears to be in large part an unplanned outgrowth of Confucian values placed in a new context. After more than a quarter of a century as the supreme leader, Kim has become a father figure who appears to be literally worshipped and who is often referred to as "father," particularly by young people. We suggest that the rise of the
Kim cult finds its roots in certain features of Korean Confucianism, that is, the emphasis formerly given to the father-son relationship as the supreme human virtue, associated ancestor worship, and the relative lack of importance of the relationship between ruler and subject.

Under Communism, the father-son relationship as well as other bonds of kinship were substantially weakened and the relationship between ruler and subject gained considerable strength. Our examination of trends of cultural change suggests that the Kim cult is comprehensible as an extension of the father-son relationship; that is, the cult is a syncretism that uses the old as a model for the new by extending the strongly affective aspect of the old father-son relationship to the ruler-subject relationship which, in Korea, had little or no emotional import. The chaos and the sense of personal deprivation that came as aftermaths of the war and the many changes in ways of life appear to have paved the way for the rise of a messianic figure. In the closed society of North Korea people were left with no feasible alternate than to adjust to the changed conditions. For most people the changes represented improvement, a circumstance which led them to see their leader as the prime mover in the reforms aimed at the betterment of life. Such specific innovations as the abolition of the agricultural tax-in-kind, the establishment of the ten-year educational system, and free medical service have been interpreted in North Korea as the results of Kim's wise leadership. The new strength of the ruler-subject tie thus appears to be a projection of the father-son relationship in a new social context: principles underlying the operation of the family and the lineage in traditional Korea are now applied on the national level, so that filial piety and ancestor worship survive in transmutated
form in the "Kim cult."

Much evidence indicates that North Korea has achieved a high degree of sociocultural integration and homogeneity. Basing our statements upon data presented in this study, we conclude that what has developed in North Korea after a quarter of a century of Communism may be appropriately described as the emergence of a new and well-integrated family-state that, in certain respects, resembles Confucian society. Integration is achieved in important part by an ethic of loyalty to the nation's fatherly leader. The society as a whole resembles in some degree a giant family, modeled after the traditional family.

But unity does not depend solely upon this transmuted version of familism. Many other factors that we have discussed, such as the state monopoly of media of communication, isolation from other societies, and the use of the idea of enemies, generate ethnocentrism, nationalism, and unity. These ideas, ideals, and policies are all powerful in maintaining firm cultural and social boundaries. Modern North Korea is one of the most culturally isolated nations of the world. The conditions of life of most of its citizens are now greatly improved over those of the past, a circumstance that came about while the nation was isolated and which, therefore, does not foster any movement toward ending isolation. This account of North Korea's developments as a Communist nation has brought out the importance of the native culture in influencing trends of change. If North Korea continues to maintain its isolation, we may expect that future changes will continue to be strongly influenced by past conditions and that trends of change will represent principally the interaction of indigenously developed traits
of culture. Isolation will never be complete, however, and at least some technological innovations will come from outside sources.
APPENDIX I: A Case Study of a Marriage

Mr. Pak Young-ho (a pseudonym) was born in rural northwest Korea. He was drafted into the People's Army at the age of 20, while working in a textile factory in P'yongyang. After serving eight years as a private he was made an officer in 1962. Like other common soldiers, he had no opportunity to visit his native home during his service as a private. Two years after becoming an officer he was granted a ten-day leave of absence to visit his home, where his mother lived with his elder brother's family. Long before taking his leave, he had made up his mind to get married during the visit. A couple of months before taking leave, he wrote his elder brother, a middle school principal, requesting that he find a suitable woman for him. Soon his brother wrote back, describing a woman teacher of the school where his brother worked, and suggesting that he write her a proposal of marriage. Before writing to her, Pak received a letter from her simply containing an expression of good will, to which he replied by making a proposal. A few weeks later, Pak received a second letter from her, informing him that she was unable to marry him because she was considering marriage to another man, a statement which Pak's brother later told him was not true. According to Pak's brother, the actual reason for the refusal was probably the result of investigations conducted by the woman's elder brother, who was a cadre member of high rank in the Provincial Party Committee. This man had thoroughly investigated Pak's family background, and Pak's brother believed that the family background of his own wife had adversely affected the attempted match. The wife in question (Pak's sister-in-law) was the daughter of a former policeman during the Japanese occupation whose job was considered reactionary and anti-revolutionary by the Communists. Pak's brother had already suffered in many ways because of his wife's family background.

Soon after the incident, Pak's brother found another candidate, a teacher at another school. He and the woman's elder brother, a deputy principal of a middle school, had agreed to proceed with the marriage if both young people showed mutual interest in marrying after one or more meetings that were to be arranged. When Pak returned to his old home, the woman was out of town to attend a teacher's training course and she returned on the third day of his ten-day leave. His brother hurried to arrange a meeting between the two young people. On the fourth day, Pak and his brother walked about ten miles to the home of the woman's brother for a meeting with her. Pak found himself satisfied with her as his prospective wife, and she and her brother were also satisfied with him. Thereupon both sides agreed to go ahead with the wedding.

The next step was to get approval of the union from the County Party Committee. Every marriage must be screened by the Party to prevent possible mismatches, especially on the basis of political aspects. The following day the two elder brothers went to the County Party Committee and asked the head of the Committee for approval of the marriage. The Committee disapproved on the grounds of the reactionary family background of Pak's brother, that is, the family background of Pak's sister-in-law. Pak was not questioned at all,
since he was an army officer and a member of the Workers Party. His brother now turned to the County Bureau of Education and talked with its chief, whom he knew in connection with his own profession. The chief was kind enough to volunteer to try to persuade the Party Committee head to give approval, asking "Why should a man suffer because of his sister-in-law's negative family background, since his blood had never been mixed with hers?" The bureau chief successfully persuaded the Party Committee head, and the latter called both of the elder brothers to give them official approval of the marriage. One day was spent in getting the approval. After setting the wedding date two days later by consultation with all concerned at the home of the bride-to-be, Pak's brother went back home to prepare for the wedding ceremony. However, Pak decided to spend the night with his prospective bride, an act which would certainly not have been approved by traditional standards. Today, however, when the wedding date has been set it is said not to be uncommon, or at least not a matter for criticism, for the prospective couple to have sexual intercourse.

The following day, preparations for the wedding ceremony began in both houses. A moderate amount of chickens, eggs, noodles made of corn, rice, and beans were purchased at the farm's shop. On his way to his brother's home, Pak dropped in at the homes of his three sisters, who lived in neighboring villages, to notify them of the wedding ceremony. Two sisters, both widows and older than Pak, arrived at his brother's home that evening. One elder sister brought a sack of rice with her as a wedding gift. The third sister arrived with her husband on the morning of the wedding, bringing a chicken with her.

On the morning of the wedding day, the groom and his brother left home for the ceremony at the home of the bride's brother. The ceremony was simple. The groom was in army uniform and the bride in native dress. The groom offered a full bow to each of the senior members of the bride's family and relatives. The new couple ate a ceremonial meal, usually called k'unsang, or "big table." When the groom was half-finished with a noodle dish from the table, the bride's brother intervened, telling him that he should not finish the dish and, taking the dish from him, handed it to the bride to finish. This ceremonial partaking of food signifies that the couple is married. In the afternoon, the groom and his brother returned to the home of Pak's brother, taking with them the bride accompanied by her elder brother. When the party arrived at Pak's brother's home, all preparations for the second part of the wedding ceremony had been completed. Several teachers from the school where Pak's brother worked joined the group. Sitting around a ceremonial table in the living room, one of the teachers presided at the simple ceremony, which consisted of formally announcing the establishment of the union. All in attendance were then served a ceremonial meal. In the course of the festivities, the couple was asked to sing a duet and did so, after which the wedding party participated in singing and dancing for about an hour, which brought the ceremony to an end. The following day, which was the eighth day of his ten-day leave, Pak returned to his military camp, asking his wife to join him in a couple of months.
APPENDIX II: Kinship Terminology

The description of kin terms and kin behavior which follows was drawn largely from a North Korean text entitled Kongsanju Ryeidodog Kyong (Text in Communist Ethics), published in 1964. Information derived from this book was checked and supplemented by our informants.

Terms of reference

1) Lineal and collateral kin: Lineal kin are always distinguished from collateral kin; that is, grandparents, parents, children, and grandchildren are distinguished from other kinsmen.

2) Generation: Persons of different generation are distinguished terminologically and, beyond general terms that mean kinfolk, no terms exist that embrace relatives of more than one generation. Korean names usually contain a letter indicating one's generational status in a lineage, which makes it easy to identify the generation of distant relatives.

3) Age within a generation: Differences in the ages of siblings and cousins are denoted by kin terms, as follows:

Male speaker:

Elder brother --- hyong, hyong-nim
Younger brother --- tongsaeng, nam-dongsaeng (male tongsaeng), au
Elder sister --- nuna, nui, nunim
Younger sister --- nui, nui-dongsaeng, yo-dongsaeng (female tongsaeng)

Female speaker:

Elder brother --- o'ppa
Younger brother --- tongsaeng, nam-dongsaeng
Elder sister --- on'ni, hyong-nim
Younger sister --- yo-dongsaeng

Terms for cousins vary similarly. The term nui is exceptional; a man may use this term for either or both elder and younger sisters.

4) Seniority of connecting persons: Terms denoting ego's father's brothers and their wives indicate the age relationship of the father and his brothers.

Father's brothers and their wives:

Father's elder brother --- kun-aboji (big father), kun-abonim, paekbu (-nim)
Father's elder brother's wife --- kun-omoni (big mother), kun-omonim, paekmo (-nim)
Father's younger brother --- chagun-aboji (small father), sukbu, sam-ch'on
Father's younger brother's wife --- chagun-omoni (small mother),
suk-mo, chagun-omonim

No analogous terms of reference are used for consanguineal and affinal
kin of similar relationship, such as father's sister, mother's brother
and mother's sister. The use of distinguishing terms only for father's
brothers and their wives reflects the custom of patrilocal residence,
which makes father's brothers and their wives members of a male ego's
residential group. The age of affinal relatives concerned (father's
brother's wives) is irrelevant to the kin terms for them. The terms
used for father's brother's wives are determined by the relative ages
of the male kin concerned. For example, father's elder brother's wife
may be younger than ego's own mother, but the former is addressed as
kun-omoni (big mother) regardless of her age.

5) Sex of relative: A few terms are applied to both sexes, for example,
tongsaeng means younger brother or sister; chok'a, nephew or niece; and
sa-ch' on means cousin of either sex (especially father's brother's
children). However, prefixes and suffixes that indicate sex are often
used. Some examples are:

\[\text{tongsaeng: nam-dongsaeng (younger brother)}\]
\[\text{yo-dongsaeng (younger sister)}\]

\[\text{chok'a: chok'a (nephew or niece, but chiefly used for nephew)}\]
\[\text{chok'a-tt'al (niece)}\]

\[\text{sa-ch' on: sa-ch'on-hyong (FaBrSo, but older than ego)}\]
\[\text{sa-ch'on-nam-dongsaeng (FaBrSo, but younger than ego)}\]
\[\text{sa-ch'on-nui (FaBrDa, but older than ego)}\]
\[\text{sa-ch'on-yo-dongsaeng (FaBrDa, but younger than ego)}\]

Otherwise, kin terms are all specific in indicating sex.

6) Sex of speaker: The sex of the speaker is denoted in terms for
siblings and cousins but not for collateral kin of ascending generations.
As we have seen earlier, male and female speakers use different sets of
terms to refer to brothers and to sisters, with the exceptions of the
terms tongsaeng or nam-dongsaeng (younger brother) and yo-dongsaeng
(younger sister) which are used by speakers of either sex.

7) Sex of the connecting relative: We are concerned here with collateral
relatives of the first ascending generation, related through father or
mother, and their children. The distinction between father's brother
and his children (paternal uncle and cousin) and mother's brother and
his children (maternal uncle and cousin) are discussed under heading 8.
Mother's sister and father's sister are terminologically distinguished
as are their children. The terms are:

\[\text{Paternal relatives}\]
\[\text{aunt: ko-mo (FaSi)}\]
\[\text{uncle: ko-mo-bu (FaSiHu)}\]
\[\text{male speaker's cousin:}\]
\[\text{kojong - (sa-ch'on-) hyong (FaSiSo)*}\]
\[\text{kojong - (sa-ch'on-) dongsaeng (SaSiSo)**}\]
kojong - (sa-ch' on-) nuna (FaSiDa)*
kojong - (sa-ch' on-) nui (FaSiDa)**

female speaker's cousin:
kojong - (sa-ch' on-) opp'a (FaSiSo)*
kojong - (sa-ch' on-) (nam-) dongsaeng (FaSiSo)**
kojong - (sa-ch' on-) onni (FaSiDa)*
kojong - (sa-ch' on-) dongsaeng (FaSiDa)**

Maternal relatives
aunt: i-mo (MoSi)
uncle: i-mo-bu (MoSiHu)
male speaker's cousin:
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) hyong (MoSiSo)*
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) dongsaeng (MoSiSo)**
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) nuna (MoSiDa)*
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) nui (MoSiDa)**

female speaker's cousin:
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) opp'a (MoSiSo)*
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) (nam-) dongsaeng (MoSiSo)**
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) onni (MoSiDa)*
ijong - (sa-ch' on-) dongsaeng (MoSiDa)**

* elder than the speaker.
** younger than the speaker.

Thus, the Korean scheme of classifying relatives of the first ascending generation may be labeled a "bifurcate collateral system." Lineal relatives are distinguished from collateral relatives, and the maternal relatives are distinguished from the paternal counterparts. Korean kinship terminology also distinguishes children of the sisters and brothers of the parents, that is, cousins. Four types of cousins are distinguished by the addition of prefixes to the terms for siblings.

Terms of reference for first cousins

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of cousin</th>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) FaBr's children</td>
<td>sa-ch' on-</td>
<td>(sibling terms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) FaSi's children</td>
<td>kojong - (sa-ch' on-)</td>
<td>(sibling terms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) MoBr's children</td>
<td>oe-sa-ch' on-</td>
<td>(sibling terms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) MoSi's children</td>
<td>ijong - (sa-ch' on-)</td>
<td>(sibling terms)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to designate a cousin, the suitable prefix of the four different kinds is selected and added to the proper sibling term, which is determined by two components, the difference in age and in sex of the speaker and the cousin.
8) Distinctions between paternal and maternal relatives: Except relatives related through parents' sisters, maternal and paternal relatives are distinguished by the prefix oe-, literally meaning "outside," before the terms for maternal kin; otherwise the terms are almost identical. This custom also reflects the custom of patrilocal residence; as members of ego's own residential group, paternal relatives compose a "we-group," and maternal relatives (mother's patrilineage) are an "outside group." Following are some of the terms for paternal and maternal relatives of the same degree of relationship.

**Paternal relatives**

grandfather: halaboji (FaFa)

grandmother: halmoni (FaMo)

uncle: paek-bu (FaElBr)
    suk-bu (FaYoBr)

aunt: paek-mo (FaElBrWi)
    suk-mo (FaYoBrWi)

male speaker's cousin:
    sa-ch'on-hyong (FaBrSo)*
    sa-ch'on-dongsaeng (FaBrSo)**
    sa-ch'on-nuna (FaBrDa)*
    sa-ch'on-nui (FaBrDa)**

female speaker's cousin:
    sa-ch'on-opp'a (FaBrSo)*
    sa-ch'on-dongsaeng (faBrSo)**
    sa-ch'on-onni (FaBrDa)*
    sa-ch'on-yo-dongsaeng (FaBrDa)**

**Maternal relatives**

grandfather: oe-halaboji (MoFa)

grandmother: oe-halmoni (MoMo)

uncle: oe-suk-bu, or oe-samch'on (MoBr)

aunt: oe-suk-mo (MoBrWi)

male speaker's cousin:
    oe-sa-ch'on-hyong (MoBrSo)*
    oe-sa-ch'on-dongsaeng (MoBrSo)**
    oe-sa-ch'on-nuna (MoBrDa)*
    oe-sa-ch'on-nui (MoBrDa)**

female speaker's cousin:
    oe-sa-ch'on-opp'a (MoBrSo)*
    oe-sa-ch'on-(nam-)-dongsaeng (MoBrSo)**
    oe-sa-ch'on-onni (MoBrDa)*
    oe-sa-ch'on-yo-dongsaeng (MoBrDa)**

Note: Fa: father, Mo: mother; Br: brother; Wi: wife; So: son;
Da: daughter; El: elder (for example, FaElBr means "father's elder brother"); and Yo: younger.

*elder than the speaker.
**younger than the speaker.

In the preceding examples, only one term was selected for each kin relationship in the paternal and maternal lines. Other kin terms for these relationships also exist. For instance, father's father may be referred to as cho-bu; mother's father, as oe-cho-bu; father's mother, as cho-mo; mother's mother, oe-cho-mo; etc. Father's elder brother may be referred to as kun-aboji (big father) and father's younger brother as chagun-aboji (small father). However, the mother's elder and younger brothers are not distinguished by specific kin terms but are referred to by the same term, oe-suk-bu or oe-samch'on. Their wives are called father's brother's wife and mother's brother's wife. These terms indicate, as we have earlier noted, that "we-group" (paternal relatives) are more complex and make use of one more component (age differences between father and brother) than do terms for the "outside group" (maternal relatives).

The distinction between paternal and maternal relatives extends to the grandchildren of both male and female lines. Since daughters marry out and become members of other families or "outside groups," the children of daughters are not members of the "we-group."

**Terms for grandchildren**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Son's children:</th>
<th>SoSo --- sonja</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SoDa --- sonnyo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daughter's children:</th>
<th>DaSo --- oe-sonja</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DaDa --- oe-sonnyo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** So: son; Da: daughter

Today, it is said that in some families having only daughters, parents generally choose to live with a married daughter's family rather than adopt a son, either by moving into the daughter's home or by having her and her husband live with them. If this is done, the daughter's children may become de facto members of the "we-group" of the parents, even though they have different family names. Parents often refer to their maternal grandson and granddaughter as sonja and sonnyo, without adding the prefix, oe- (outside). If there is any reason to identify the exact relationship, they may refer to them as oe-sonja and oe-sonnyo. If it is necessary to distinguish the son's children from the daughter's children, the prefix ch'in-, meaning "of their own," may be added: ch'in-sonja for the son's son and ch'in-sonnyo for the son's daughter.

9) The distinction of consanguineal and affinal kin: The affinal kin may be grouped into three categories: (1) relatives through one's wife, (2) relatives through one's husband, and (3) spouses of consanguineal relatives. In-laws are designated by the terms used by the speaker's spouse, with the prefix ch'o- (wife's) or si- (husband's). Regardless of the speaker's relative age, terms for affines in these two categories reflect only the relationship of the speaker's spouse to the affines.
### Terms for affines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affines related through wife</th>
<th>Affines related through husband</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WiGFa*: ch'o-jobu</td>
<td>HuGFa*: si-halaboji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiGMo**: ch'o-jomo</td>
<td>HuGMo**: si-halmoni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiFa: kasi-aboji, chang-in</td>
<td>HuFa: si-aboji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiMo: kasi-omoni, chang-mo</td>
<td>HuMo: si-omoni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiFaBr: ch'o-suk, ch'o-sam-ch'on</td>
<td>HuFaBr: si-suk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiFaBrWi: ch'o-sukmo</td>
<td>HuFaBrWi: si-sukmo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiBr: ch'o-nam</td>
<td>HuElBr: si-hyong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiBrWi: ch'o-nam-daek</td>
<td>HuYoBr: si-dongsaeng, si-au</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiElSi: ch'o-hyong</td>
<td>HuBr Wi: tongso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiYoSi: ch'o-jae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiSiHu: tongso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WiBrCh: ch'o-joka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: GFa for grandfather; GMo for grandmother; Fa for father; Mo for mother; Wi for wife; Br for brother; Si for sister; El for elder (brother or sister); Yo for younger; and Ch for children.

*paternal grandfather.

**paternal grandmother.

Thus the term of reference for the affine related through wife or husband is generally composed of the prefixes ch'o- or si- and the term for the class of relative. Two kin terms are exceptional. The prefix ch'o- is not used for the wife's parents; instead the prefix kasi-, meaning "wife's," is used (kasi-aboji for wife's father and kasi-omoni for wife's mother). A husband may refer to his wife's father as chang-in, and wife's mother, chang-mo. The prefixes kasi- and chang- are not applied to other affines related through wife. The term tongso is used for the affinal relatives concerned when two persons of the same sex marry siblings of the same family, the wives of brothers and the husbands of sisters. A woman refers to her elder brother and younger brother by different terms, opp'a for the former and (nam-)dongsaeung for the latter, as previously indicated. However, her husband does not terminologically distinguish her elder brother from her younger brother. Instead, he calls his wife's brothers by the single term ch'o-nam, regardless of differences of age of his wife and her brothers. The wife of a wife's brother is referred to as ch'o-nam-daek (literally, wife's brother's house). The elder and younger sisters of a woman's husband are similarly merged terminologically (si-nui). Thus, a man distinguishes between his elder and younger brothers and his wife uses separate terms for his brothers according to differences of age of her husband and his brothers, but a wife uses a single term for her husband's sisters. The following two kinship charts (Figures II and III) depict graphically the relationships and kin terms of affinal relatives related through husband and wife:
Traditionally, the relationship of a man and his wife's sisters was one of marked avoidance, whereas his relationship with his wife's brothers was intimate and friendly. Intimacy with the wife's brothers, as opposed to formality and seniority, appears to be reflected in the use of the single term ch'ong. The relationship of a woman with her husband's sisters is also one of marked intimacy. She may behave toward them with a high degree of informality, even though traditionally the relationship between a woman and her husband's sisters, especially younger sisters, was frequently stressful. For example, a girl might play the role of "watchdog" for her brother's wife and report findings to her mother. A wife addresses her husband's elder and younger sisters by separate terms, but she need not distinguish them by terms of reference. Her relationship to her husband's elder brother differs, and she should treat him with respect. Her relationship with her husband's younger brothers is, however, informal. Since the difference in age between first and last children often formerly was nearly a generation, it was not uncommon for a married woman to assume a mother's role in her relationship with her younger brothers-in-law. Today, these behavioral patterns, it appears, have changed. The relationship between a man and his wife's sisters is intimate and friendly, and the relationships between sexes among close kinmen are no longer ones of formality and avoidance. The kin terms, however, are unchanged.
Now let us examine the terms for the spouses of consanguineal relatives. Here we will not deal with maternal affines, since the reference terms for them are generally the same as for the paternal affines in corresponding relationship, except for the prefix, _o_ (outside). Mother's sister, who is referred to as ko-mo, is the exception. The following table lists terms for the consanguineal relatives and their spouses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Consanguineal relative</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Terms for relative (in column A)</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Terms for spouse of relative (in column A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FaElBr</td>
<td>kun-aboji</td>
<td>kun-omoni</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FaYoBr</td>
<td>chagun-aboji</td>
<td>chagun-omoni</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FaSi</td>
<td>ko-mo</td>
<td>ko-mo-bu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Male speaker**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ElBr</th>
<th>hyong</th>
<th>hyong-su</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YoBr</td>
<td>au, tongsaeng</td>
<td>chae-su</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElSi</td>
<td>nuna</td>
<td>mae-hyong, cha-hyong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YoSi</td>
<td>nui</td>
<td>mae-bu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Female speaker**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ElBr</th>
<th>opp'a</th>
<th>olk'ae</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YoBr</td>
<td>(nam-) dongsaeng</td>
<td>olk'ae</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ElSi</td>
<td>onni</td>
<td>hyong-bu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YoSi</td>
<td>(yo-) dongsaeng</td>
<td>chae-bu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So</td>
<td>adol</td>
<td>myonuri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da</td>
<td>tt'al</td>
<td>sawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSo (grandson)</td>
<td>sonja</td>
<td>sonja-myonuri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDa (granddaughter)</td>
<td>sonnyo</td>
<td>sonja-sawi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Persons related to a speaker through marriage to consanguineal relatives of the speaker are referred to by terms composed of the terms for the speaker's consanguineal relatives plus a suffix indicating the speaker's status, i.e., husband (-bu or -sawi) or wife (-su or -myonuri). However, for the father's brother's wife, the term for father's brother is modified by sex and role; that is, the wife of father's elder brother, kun-aboji or "big father," is referred to by the term kun-omoni or "big
Figure IV: Degrees of consanguineal relationship

Generations removed | Number of links (ch'on)
--- | ---
+4 (great-great-grandfather) | 4 ---- 6
+3 (great-grandfather) | 3 ---- 5 7
+2 (grandfather) | 2 ---- 4 6 8
+1 (father) | 1 ---- 3 5 7 9
0 (ego's own generation) | Ego ---- 2 4 6 8 10
-1 (son) | 1 3 5 7 9 11
-2 (grandson) | 2 4 6 8 10 12
-3 (great grandson) | 3 5 7 9 11 13

Note: Straight line indicates father-son relationship, and broken line indicates sibling relationship.

Numbers indicate the degree of consanguineal relationship in terms of "number of links (or ch'on)."

The circled numbers are in use as kin terms.

+: ascending generation (i.e., +2 means the second ascending generation).

-: descending generation (i.e., -2 means the second descending generation).

In order to show the underlying principle of the ch'on system, we have included a range of consanguineal relatives in the table which includes relatives for which such kin terms are not used. In many instances the number of links is combined with other kin terms specifying the status with reference to the speaker. The eight terms of the ch'on system are:

3 links: sam-ch'on ------------ father's younger brother
4 links: sa-ch'on- (sibling terms) ---- first cousin*
4 links: sa-ch'on-halaboji -------- grandfather's brother
5 links: o-ch'on-ajosi ------------- father's male cousin*
5 links: o-ch'on-joka -------------- male cousin's child
6 links: yuk-ch'on- (sibling terms) ---- second cousin*
7 links: ch'IL-ch'ON-ajoSI ------------ father's second cousin*
8 links: p'al-ch'on --------------- third cousin*

Note: *Cousin who is related to the speaker through the male line only.

As the table shows, the term sam-ch'on (father's younger brother) is used without an added suffix. In other relationships, the terms indicating the number of links are combined with other terms specifying the status of the person identified. For example, o-ch'ON-ajoSI is a term designating father's male cousin. The suffix -ajoSI means "uncle," and o-ch'on means five links. As designated in the kinship chart, relatives of o-ch'on relationship also include father's male cousin (FaFaBrSo) as well as FaFaFaBr, FaBrSoSo, BrSoSoSo, and so on. Combining the two terms, o-ch'on and ajosi, o-ch'on-ajoSI specifically designates the speaker's father's male cousin, who is related to the speaker through the male line. However, for cousins (first, second, and third), the terms indicating the number of links (sa-ch'on, yuk-ch'on, and p'al-ch'on) may be used without an added suffix, if the identification of cousin's status is not necessary. Otherwise sibling terms based upon differences in sex and age are added to the terms indicating the number of links between the speaker and the cousin. For example, the term yuk-ch'on-hyong designates a male second cousin who is older than the male speaker, and the term p'al-ch'on-opp'a is a male third cousin who is older than the female speaker.

In this connection, the term sa-ch'on draws our special attention, since this is also applied to cousins other than paternal first cousins (father's brother's children). Since we have already noted the four kinds of first cousins in our discussion under heading 7, we will simply illustrate the relationship between speakers and their cousins by a kinship chart (Figure V).

Figure V: Four types of cousin

Among these four categories of first cousins, only father's brother's children are in fact of the ego's own lineage, or "we-group." Cousins of other categories are related to the speaker through 4 links (or sa-ch'on). However, they are distinguished from the father's brother's children, who are members of the ego's own group, by terms specifying the connections by marriage: kojong-sa-ch'on for the father's sister's line, ijong-sa-ch'on
for the mother's sister's line, and oe-sa-ch' on for the mother's brother's line. Like the term sa-ch'on, these terms are used either without an added suffix (i.e., oe-sa-ch'on for the mother's brother's children) or in a combination using sibling terms as suffixes, according to relationship between the speaker and the cousin based upon differences in sex and age.

It is not surprising that most of the traditional kin terms of reference are still in use in contemporary North Korea. The only change has been that the system of kinship terminology has been somewhat simplified. Uncommon terms or those used only among upper class people have gone out of use. No new terms have been added.

Terms of address

Terms of address differ somewhat from terms of reference. One principle applies to all terms of address. Consanguineal relatives younger than the speaker are addressed by personal name; seniors are addressed by kin terms which are the same as those used in reference or are modifications of the terms of reference. Personal names may be used as a prefix for terms of reference, such as (Thomas)-a josi, or "Uncle (Thomas)."

1) Grandparents' generation: All relatives of the grandparental generation are divided into two categories based upon sex: each of the male relatives of the second ascending generation is addressed by the same term as the speaker's own grandfather, halaboji, and the female relatives by the term for grandmother, halmoni. Maternal grandparents may or may not be distinguished from paternal grandparents by the prefix oe-; oe-halaboji or halaboji for the maternal grandmother.

2) Parents' generation: Unlike the grandparents' generation, parents are addressed differently from all other relatives of the same generation, using the terms of reference, aboji for father and omoni for mother. Father's brothers and their wives are also addressed by the terms used in reference: kun-aboji for father's elder brother and kun-omoni for his wife; chagun-aboji or sam-ch'on for father's younger brother and chagun-omoni for his wife. All other relatives of the parental generation are generally addressed either as ajosi (uncle) or a jumoni (aunt). They may also be addressed by such specific terms as ko-mo (FaSi), i-mo (MoSi), and oe-sam-ch'on (MoBr). Parents-in-law, whether wife's parents or husband's, are addressed by the same terms as one uses for one's own parents. A man may address his parents-in-law as changin-olun (WiFa) or changmo-nim (WiMo), but a woman should not distinguish her parents-in-law from her own parents in terms of address.

3) Ego's own generation: Consanguineal relatives of one's own generation older than oneself are addressed by terms used for siblings, ignoring exact relationships. Some of the terms of address may be combined with the suffix -nim, expressing respect: hyong-nim (male speaker's elder brother), nu-nim (male speaker's elder sister), and orabo-nim (female speaker's elder brother). Such prefixes as sa-ch'on- (father's brother's children), oe-sa-ch'on- (mother's brother's children), kojong-sa-ch'on- (father's sister's children), ijjong-sa-ch'on- (mother's sister's children), yuk-ch'on- (paternal second cousin related through male line), and p'al-ch'on- (paternal third cousin related through male line) are not used in address. The affinal relatives of ego's own
generation are generally addressed by specific terms, as the following table shows.

**Terms of address for affinal relatives**

**Male speaker**
- **ElBrWi** ------- hyongsu-nim, ajumoni, ajumo-nim
- **YoBrWi** ------- chaesu-nim, ajumoni
- **ElSiHu** ------- mae-hyong, hyong-nim
- **YoSiHu** ------- mae-bu

**Female speaker**
- **ElBrWi** ------- hyong-nim
- **YoBrWi** ------- olk'ae, (nephew or niece's name) + omma
- **ElSiHu** ------- ajosi
- **YoSiHu** ------- ajae, ajosi

As the table shows, affinal relatives are addressed by terms which are slight modifications of the terms of reference for siblings. Some of the terms of address for affinal relatives of the same generation "violate" distinctions by generation; for example, the terms ajosi and ajae mean "uncle," and the terms ajumoni and ajumo-nim designate "aunt," and these are used to address a sister's husband and a brother's wife. The point of reference for the speakers in using these terms appears to be that of their children, to whom the relatives in question are of the age or generation of aunts and uncles.

If a speaker does not think it appropriate to address younger but adult relatives by their personal names, such as times when they are addressed in the presence of children, they may be addressed by teknonymous terms, for example, "father of (name of child)" and "mother of (name of child)." A son-in-law may be addressed by his personal name, but a daughter-in-law is seldom so addressed; instead such terms as i-ae or aga (both meaning "child") are used to address her. It reminds us of the traditional Korean custom in which a married woman had hardly been identified by her personal name, but by her natal family name; in any genealogical record, a married-in woman was identified by her family of origin, without reference to her personal name which had gone out of use upon her marriage. As far as family life is concerned, a married woman is still identified by her child's name (i.e., "mother of (name of her child)"), not by her personal name. In social life outside the family circle, however, women are identified by their personal names, which must be considered unprecedented in Korea.

**Terms of address and reference of spouses**

Terminology of address between husband and wife draws our special attention since the relationship had traditionally been one of mixed expression, with overt avoidance and covert affection. Such English expressions of endearment as "sweetheart," "honey," and "darling" were
totally unknown to the Koreans, and traditional Korean kinship terminology includes no terms of address for use between husband and wife. Except for two terms of reference, namp'yon (husband) and anhae (wife), all terms used by spouses in addressing each other are, in fact, not kin terms at all. From the North Korean text referred to earlier (1964:149-150), we have been able to draw information on the terms now in use, which do not differ from those of pre-Communist times except for the addition of one term of reference.

**Terms of reference and address between spouses**

**Terms for Husband:**

**Terms of reference**

1. When the addressee is older than the speaker:
   - ku-i (that man)
   - cho-i (that man)
   - ae-aboji (child's father)
   - abi (father)
   - pakk'at-salam (man of the outside, meaning a man in charge of external affairs)
   - namp'yon (husband) (husband's name) + tongmu (comrade)

2. When the addressee is of same age as, or younger than the speaker:
   - agi-aboji (child's father)
   - chuin (master)
   - pakk'aeso (the outside)
   - ryonggam ("the old man"; the term also means "your Excellency.") (nephew or niece's name + sam-ch'on (uncle)

**Terms of address**

yobo (look; hello; hey)
yobosaeyo (look; hello; hey)
cho-jom-bosaeyo (Would you look at me?)

**Terms for Wife:**

**Terms of reference**

1. When the addressee is older than the speaker:
   - ch'o (wife)
   - chib-salam (person in my house)
   - ae-omi (child's mother)
   - an-salam (person of the inside) (wife's name) + tongmu (comrade)

2. When the addressee is of same age as, or younger than the speaker:
   - ch'o (wife)
   - anhae (wife)
chib-salam (person in my house)  
an-salam (person of the inside)

Terms of address
yobo (look; hello; hey)  
na-jom-bo (look at me)  
na-jom-bobsida (look at me)

All of the terms and expressions described above are the same as those of traditional Korea, with one exception. Especially on formal or public occasions, today one may refer to a spouse by personal name and the suffixing term -tongmu or "comrade." Despite the changes in family life in connection with active participation in production activities by women, the husband is still referred to as "a man in charge of external affairs of the family" (pakk'at-salam, pakk'aeso, and chuin), and the wife as a "woman in charge of domestic affairs" (chib-salam and an-salam). One may refer to his wife as uli-manura (our wife) or uli-nyop'yonnae (our woman), but these two terms are today somewhat discouraged, since they are to some extent expressions demeaning to women. (The use of the pronoun "our" instead of "my" here may sound awkward to those who are not familiar with the Korean custom. Use of the possessive pronoun "my" has not been well developed in the Korean language.)

Formalized and informal fictive kinship

Some kin terms are often used in addressing and referring to people who are not relatives. The terms halaboji (grandfather), haimoni (grandmother), ajosi (uncle), and ajumoni (aunt) are widely used. The young address elders of their grandparents' age by the terms halaboji or haimoni and adults of their parents' age by the terms ajosi or ajumoni. These terms are generally considered to be expressions of respect. These kin terms may be used together with the personal name, or with the official title or position, such as inmin-gundae (People's Army) -ajosi, anjomwon (security agent) -ajosi, or rodongja (laborer) -ajosi. Among young women, the term onni (female speaker's elder sister) is popular in addressing older female companions. Seniors address juniors by their personal names, and the latter address the former by personal names plus the term onni or by their statuses plus the term onni, i.e., Kyongsuk (name) -onni or panjang (work team head) -onni. Hwang and others (1960:240) report an unusual instance of fictive kinship in their study of Korea-China Friendship Cooperative Farm, a brotherhood relationship among adolescents. Fictive brotherhood and sisterhood is ancient in Korea and may involve two or several persons. Seniors in age assume roles of elder brothers or sisters (hyong-nim, "elder person") and juniors the roles of younger brothers or sisters (chagun-i, "younger one"). The relationship may apply between or among people of the same sex or of different sex. No formalized ritual is involved in entering into this relationship except an oath. The participants address each other as hyong-nim or chagun-i and maintain relations like those of brothers and sisters to which they have bound themselves by the oath. Under Communism, this relationship has been strongly criticized as a vestige of "feudalistic and bourgeois ideology." According to the report (ibid.), five members of the Korea-China Friendship Farm had been charged on the count that
until recently they had maintained kyolui-byongjae kwangye (fictive brother relationship) which they had contracted in earlier times. It is interesting to note that the fact was revealed by members of their families.

In view of the strong attack that the North Korean Communists have undertaken against kajogiui, or "familism," the survival of the traditional custom of extending kin terms to non-kinsmen may be puzzling. There is no doubt that the regime has striven to remove the influence of kinship in matters that go beyond family life, and the use of kin terms for non-kinsmen is, of course, one of the familistic elements to be found in social life. As we saw earlier in the cases of "People's Army uncle" inmin-gundae-ajosi) and "security agent uncle" anjonwon-ajosi), however, this custom turns out to be of positive value even under the changed social circumstance of Communism. The use of kin terms helps to bring non-kinsmen closer and maintain solidarity among them, and is thus in accord with the Communist effort to integrate the people into a national network with a common national goal. Consequently, no attempt to discourage the use of kin terms for non-kin other than for fictive brothers has been undertaken so far.
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