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KING LEWANIKA AND THE EXPANSION OF BRITISH RULE
IN BAROTSELAND: 1890-1923

A Study of British Policy in Barotseland and Northern
and Southern Zambesia in General

by

John Indakwa

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Thesis Director's Signature:

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KING LEWANIKA AND THE EXPANSION OF BRITISH RULE

IN BAROTSELAND, 1890-1923

A Study of British Policy in Barotseland
and Northern and Southern
Zambesia in General
INTRODUCTION

According to Oliver and Mathew, the early immigrants into Central Africa from the northeast were usually cattle herders as well as agriculturalists. They probably came through Tanzania, along the west side of Lake Malawi and westward to the Luangwa river.¹ One group from the north-east settled in Malawi, where their descendants are the Tonga and Timbuka. Some Shona groups including the Karanga, crossed the Zambezi River and settled in Mashonaland (Rhodesia) before the fifteenth century, while the Hungwe (Makonis) seem to have stayed north of the river moving south some two hundred years later. Migrations from the west into Central Africa probably began about the sixteenth century when some groups broke away from the Luba of the Kongo basin and moved eastward to settle on the western side of Lake Malawi and the Shire River. They established the Marawi Kingdom which included Nyanja, Chewa, and Nzenga ethnic groups. During the sixteenth century to the eighteenth centuries further groups broke away from the Luba Kingdom of Mwata Yamvo which had developed in the Kongo basin northwest of Luapula River. They came in successive waves to settle in what is today the Republic

of Zambia, sometimes displacing the earlier groups or sometimes conquering and assimilating them.

One of these groups was the Lozi who after conquering the earlier inhabitants, established their hegemony in the Zambesi Valley, and whose later ruler, Lubosi Lewanika, is the subject of my research. My study will attempt to find out how and why Lewanika, whose reign spanned the period of European expansion and early colonization in Africa was able to survive the onslaught of European imperialism. What was the British Policy in Barotseland? Many good anthropological researches have been conducted in Barotseland. Max Gluckman’s extensive study approaches the history of the Lozi kingdom in anthropological setting, playing down the critical years and decisions made by Lewanika during his long rule. Neither Gluckman’s Seven Tribes of Central Africa, nor Politics, Law and Ritual, nor The Economy of the Central Plains, deals adequately with the question of this study.

Caplan’s The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969 comes close to a good study of the problems that confronted the ruling classes of Barotseland from the late eighteen seventies to the late nineteen sixties. He discusses how the various kings of Barotseland attempted to solve their internal and external problems during the ninety and one years of the Lozi history. It is thus a general analysis of the political development emphasizing the struggle for power among the Lozi elites. The volume discusses only in passing Lewanika’s encounter with the British and therefore
does not directly answer the question of this research.

Thus, there is yet no literature fully devoted to the relationship of King Lewanika and the various competing British and other European interests during the era of European expansion in Central Africa. My research will therefore attempt to fill this gap in the history of Barotseland and hopefully bring about a clearer understanding of the history of Central Africa. The study will emphasize British policy for Barotseland and political and diplomatic activities of the king during that critical period of African history and de-emphasize the roles played by European agents. Most scholars have tended to write African history as "tribal" or cultural area rather than the history of definable states that existed before the arrival of the Portuguese in Central Africa during the fifteenth century.

There is much racist interpretation of the history of Central Africa by many scholars who have done research in the area. This racist interpretation is still kept alive by white settlers of Southern Africa and Rhodesia. It is a well known fact that the great stone ruins of Zimbabwe in Rhodesia were built by Bantu-speaking Africans, but most

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white settlers however, still believe that Africans could not have built them. They speculate that Arabs, Phoenicians, Indians, or Chinese must have built them.

My research will thus be conducted with the awareness that many of the sources I have to investigate are biased and hope that my research will result into an objective historical account of the role played by King Lewanika and his African advisors prior to the signing of the Lawley Treaty of October 17, 1900, at Victoria Falls at which Barotseland ceased to be an independent kingdom and henceforward became a British protectorate administered by the British South Africa Company. I will attempt to find out why neither the Portuguese, nor the Germans, nor the Belgians were able to lay claims on Barotseland, what influence if any was played by missionaries in the political life of Barotseland during the reign of Lewanika, and whether this missionary influence was decisive in his decision to seek British "Protection."  

\[3\] Many writers on the history of Barotseland have alluded to the fact that it was the missionaries led by Francois Coillard who advised Lewanika to seek British protection. Please see Mackintosh, C. W., Coillard of the Zambesi, Clay, G., Your Friend Lewanika, and Hole, H. M., The Making of Rhodesia.
CHAPTER I

THE LOZI KINGDOM OF BAROTSELAND

The Nature of the Barotse Political System

Barotseland is today a province of the Republic of Zambia centered on and extending outwards from the flood plains of the upper Zambesi River. Its name derives from the dominant people of the area, the Lozi or Rozi. According to a study by Stokes and Brown, Mwambwa, a Lunda princess, with a small party broke away from the Lunda Kingdom of Mwato Yamzo and came wandering until they reached the Zambesi plain, the present territory of Barotseland, during the latter half of the seventeenth century. This broad conclusion is supported by Caplan, on the basis of his research of the Lozi oral tradition. 4

Despite their small number they conquered the original inhabitants of Nhulu or Bulozi in Barotseland. The people they had defeated labeled them Luyi or foreigners, a name they maintained until they were themselves conquered by the Makololo people in 1836. On the upper Zambesi, Princess Mwambwa and her people, now called Luyi, built a settlement at Sifuti. They later moved down to Imuba or

the great Mound. Once the Lozi were settled in the new territory, the immediate task facing them was the consolidation of their political power. Mboo, the first male ruler after Mwambwa, conquered and brought under Lozi rule the Ma-Kwambakoma, Manyengo, ba Imilunga, and Mambumi or Mishulundu.  

It is however, believed in Barotseland that it was the fourth ruler, King Ngalama who extended their hegemony beyond Seshekhe on the Zambesi River near the modern town of Livingstone. But serious analysis would seem to indicate that it was actually the fifth ruler after King Mboo, named Ngombala, who extended the Lozi Kingdom beyond Seshekhe. He conquered the Mashanjo, ma-Subiya and Matotela. Other ethnic groups like the Mashi began to submit to Ngombola's rule as soon as they heard of his prowess. They paid tribute or tax to him of their own accord. Barotseland continued to grow in size until the late nineteenth century when the Kingdom comprised more than seventeen major ethnic groups or tribes besides the Lozi themselves. Thus what became of the Barotse nation was composed of diverse peoples requiring diligent and

5Stokes and Brown, The Zambesian Past, p. 244.

6Max Gluckman, Economy of the Central Barotse Plain (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia, 1941) pp. 14-15.

7C.O. 879/57, 8745 No. 257, pp. 323-325. Also see Gluckman, Economy of the Central Barotse Plain, pp. 14-15. His estimates and those of Caplan, on the number of tribes comprising Barotse Kingdom, seem inaccurate.
flexible administration. From Imuba, the capital, Luyana or Lozi power radiated to distant parts of the country. Members of the royal family were sent out to rule parts of this expanding Kingdom. The town of Nalolo was the southern or second capital of the nation.

From the beginning of the Lozi State, it was the custom of the Barotse Kings to permit their sisters' participation in the governance of the kingdom. Sometimes even the King's mother was given political functions. This tradition had developed to such an extent that by the eighteenth century, the Queen of Nalolo, the King's sister, had her own court, her own band of musicians, and surrounded herself with the ceremonial usage at the King's own court. She was saluted like the King with salutations reserved for royalty alone. People had to prostrate themselves before her, no one had the right to sit in her presence, not even her husband (the son-in-law of the nation), who was considered only a servant, and could be dismissed at her pleasure.

On the one hand, the extremely complex structure of this highly centralized state produced considerable cohesion and stability; on the other hand, it created conditions whereby, as the Lozi themselves say, the state is always on the verge of revolt. The Kingship was the mystical symbol

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8 Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, p. 3. Also see Francois Coillard, On The Threshold of Central Africa: A Record of Twenty Years' Pioneering Among the Barotse of Upper Zambesi (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1902) pp. 213-214.
of national unity, but the choice of King was not rigidly fixed. Any male descendant in the partrilineal line of the first legendary King was eligible to succeed, thus giving rise to intense competition for succession in Barotseland. Similarly, any commoner could aspire to become not only an induna (a judge and councillor) but the chief councillor or Ngambela. The King could appoint any commoner to any office in the established hierarchy of council titles or to the Ngambelaships. This both augmented and diminished the power of the King for while his subjects depended on him for promotion, he was perpetually open to threat that if alienated, they would rally behind a prince whom they would attempt to substitute for the incumbent. But the induna's freedom of action was also circumscribed.

The rewards and perquisites attached to the various titles were considerable in terms of status, land, cattle, followers and further opportunity for promotion; moreover, the more senior the title, the greater were the perquisites. It was therefore in their interests to prove themselves loyal to the King, who alone could promote and demote them.\(^9\)

Since the Ngambelaship was the highest post in the Kingdom to which a commoner could aspire, it was the obvious object of every ambitious councillor; the Ngambela was

\(^9\)Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland*, p. 3.
therefore greatly dependent on the King's favour. Constitutionally, he was the mouthpiece of the King to the nation as well as representative of the nation to, and if necessary against, the King. This was a difficult position for anyone to hold. The Ngambela was expected to oppose the King who ruled unjustly. He thus acted as Prime Minister in the Parliamentary system and always sat on the King's right; next to him sat the Commander-in-Chief of the Barotse Army.  

Colonel Colin Harding of the British South Africa Company Police, who travelled through much of Lewanika's Kingdom during the year 1901 as a guest of the King and as a prelude to the actual Company occupation of the territory, described his experience in a book titled In Remotest Barotseland. The book is full of exaggerations and inaccuracies on Barotseland and shows that Harding and other Europeans who visited the Kingdom did not understand fully the nature of its political system. Harding found that the Barotse King held court daily between the hours of nine to twelve to listen to complaints of his subjects, settled their disputes, punished the guilty, by fines, and banishment, promulgated laws, repealed others and in fact carried on "the office of Chief Justice, Secretary of Foreign Affairs

and Secretary of the Treasury all rolled into one.\textsuperscript{11}

The fact of the matter is, the Barotse King did not possess all that power Harding claims he had. The truth is that he shared power with his councillors many of whom were always opposed to the King's judgment in matters of state. There was the Supreme Council of the Barotse Kingdom which was divided into three parts or "mats": On the right of the King in Council sat all commoner indunas arranged according to their seniority. To his left sat, first his stewards, who were responsible for his property and represented his interests, and secondly, princes of the royal family, who represented interests of the royal family, if necessary against the King. Those indunas who sat on the left during Lewanika's reign were usually loyal and would support him through thick and thin. But they were not usually in the majority in the Supreme Council.

Moreover, the complicated nature of the Barotse political system can be seen in the structure of the National Council. It was divided into three subcouncils: the Katengo, comprising minor indunas of the right and the stewards; the Saa, which included all other members of the Council except the Ngambela and the Natamayo (the "Minister of Justice or Sanctuary"); and the Sikalo, which consisted of Ngambela, the Natamayo, and the senior indunas of the Saa. Each of these subcouncils was considered to represent a

\textsuperscript{11} Harding, \textit{In Remost Barotseland}, pp. 24-27.
different interest: the Sikalo, the King and the Ngambela; the Saa, the indunas; and the Katengo, the mass of the people.¹²

The King did not have absolute power in Barotseland. Thus on issues of importance to the nation, these subcouncils assembled separately and then reintegrated into the full council for further discussion before the King was called upon to give final decision. Even though it was difficult for the council to unite against the King because of the different interests into which all these members of the ruling class were divided, it was risky for any king to adopt an opposing view if the council had reached a consensus of opinion. The meetings of the National Council were held irregularly, and usually to decide matters of extreme importance, such as the granting of the concession to the British South Africa Company or the selection of a new King. Otherwise, business and Court cases were handled by the Kuta, a smaller body on which representatives of all the three mats sat.

Before the invasion of Barotseland by the Makololo in 1836, the Barotseland Political system was organized into Silalo and Makolo. The Silalo were territorial divisions but without the usual administrative function of such divisions. The Makolo were non-territorial political sectors. Their purposes were for jurisdiction, organization for

war, and labor conscription. Each sector centered in an important title at the capital, and every Lozi was attached to a sector. But the people in one village of kinsmen, would be members of different political sectors, and members of any given sector were widely dispersed over the country. As a consequence, no councillor or prince had accruing to his title a strong and loyal localized bloc of supporters, with whom he could either break away from the country or oppose the King.¹³

The Makolo system brought about extreme centralization of the political system in the capital and consequently a further reason why power struggles were confined to it. The system also precluded segmentation from the larger unit of a dissident bloc under an induna or prince, thereby preserving the territorial integrity of the Lozi State. According to Caplan, the Makolo political system may have been brought about by the phenomenon of the annual floods in the Barotse Valley. The flood Plain of the Upper Zambezi floods every year between February and July, compelling in the earlier times the people to move from the plain to the higher ground during this period. This he believes may have prevented the establishment of territorial segments whose leaders with their armies could dominate national politics.¹⁴

¹³Gluckman, Economy of the Central Barotse Plain, pp. 94-101; and Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969, pp. 4-5.

The greater part of Barotseland internal economy as well as the trading system of the larger Kingdom were determined by the annual floods. The ritual voyages of the King from the plain capital to the higher capital in March, and the return in July, were dependent on the annual floods and the flood plains. It was the flood plain which the Lozi themselves considered Barotseland proper and within this area, there was the northern capital of the King at Lealui and the southern capital at Nalolo.

The local and national politics were also directly affected by the complex and relatively developed economic system which was organized on the substructure of the flood plain. Fishing, cattle and agriculture were the main elements in the local economy, which produced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a higher standard of living in the Barotse Valley than in most other areas of Central Africa.  

These elements in turn were determined by the control of the many though limited mounds which dotted the plain. Although the King was owner of the land, his rights of ownership were strictly circumscribed since certain mounds were attached to councillor's names and members of the royal family. When a man was appointed to a title, he acquired temporary control of the highly productive mounds attached to that title. This system augmented the King's power since it was he who selected his own indunas, including the senior

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ones. The more senior indunas had the greater amount of land, wealth and status. At the same time the disappointed councillors became enemies of the King.

After the Lozi had completed the conquest of the Barotse Valley during the latter half of the seventeenth century, they established their State centered on flood plain. They began then to extend their hegemony from the plain in a wide-ranging trading system with its center at the Lozi capital. The plain produced goods which were different from the products of the surrounding areas and thus making the Valley and outlying regions mutually dependent. This gave some stability to the Kingdom which further enhanced the ruling class that controlled the heart of the network of the economic system. Moreover, at all seasons, except the full flood when only an occasional dugout canoe crossed the waters, people on business passed continuously along the plain roads and the higher ground, known as the margin routes, particularly toward the capital. They carried fish, tobacco, meat, mats, etc. for trade and returned home with other goods.16

The control over political and economic resources was reflected in social status, a fact of importance among a people as conscious of class as the Lozi were and are. All the Lozi felt superior to all their subject peoples, while the ruling-class Lozi regarded their poorer kin

with contempt. 17

Following the death of King Mulambwa around 1836, Barotseland was plunged into a civil war caused by a success dispute between his sons, Mubukwanu and Sulumelume. Mubukwanu had just won and was on his way north to take over the throne when the Makololo who were led by their King, Sebitwane, invaded the Barotse Kingdom from the South. 18 The Makololo were a group of Sotho peoples from near the Vaal River in South Africa. The generally unsettled political conditions in Southern Africa caused by the Zulu revolution forced Sebitwane to lead his people northward to the Zambezi Valley. He entered Barotseland and settled there after routing the Lozi in a succession of campaigns. The Makololo campaign made it impossible for the various political factions involved in the succession dispute to resolve their differences and as a consequence the Lozi split into three groups. 19 One faction led by the successful candidate Mubukwanu stayed in the valley and tried to fight it out with the invaders. The two remaining groups fled the country one going to Lukwakwa near Kabombo, where they made Sinyama Sikufule, a nephew of Mubukwanu, their King. The remaining faction fled to Nyengo, where

they selected a young brother of Mubukwanu, Imbua, their King.\textsuperscript{20}

However, in the Barotseland Valley, Bulozi proper, the Barotse power was completely destroyed and the Makololo as a group formed the small proud aristocracy, treating the conquered people as slaves. Sebitwane became King of Barotseland. The Kololo language became the lingua franca of the Kingdom. The political system was reformed.\textsuperscript{21}

For the purpose of administration one or two Makololo families lived in each village as lords of the land. The villages were grouped into provinces or districts under the rule of Makololo princes. For instance, Sebitwane himself ruled the country from Linyati, where most of the Makololo people finally settled, his daughter, Mamochisane, ruled one province from Nalolo; and an induna called Morantisiane was in charge at Sesheke. Sebitwane's nephew, Mpololo, was put in command of the northern region and lived at Naliele. The governors and administrators had control over large numbers of subject peoples who were made to render certain services and to cultivate the land. The Makololo King had the power of life and death over his subjects, but was usually influenced by his councillors. All cases were heard and decided in the full council; and both the King's advisors

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., p. 126.


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and members of the public, whatever their station in life, were permitted to express their opinions. The King, after feeling out of the general sentiment, would make the final judgment.\textsuperscript{22}

Unlike the Lozi rulers, the Makololo King was accessible to everyone, however poor, and mingled freely with his subjects. The Lozi rulers were divine and did not allow free intercourse between the King and his subjects. Thus, the new ruler, Sebitwane, was a more popular war leader. Unfortunately for the Makololo conquerors, Sebitwane died in 1851, and his people soon fell on evil days in Barotseland. There developed serious dissensions amongst them for his successors were of inferior caliber. The Makololo power structure suffered therefore greatly.\textsuperscript{23} Sebitwane's son, Sikeletu, who had succeeded him was very suspicious of his advisors and lacked the impartiality that had won Sebitwane the affection and respect of all factions. Following Sikeletu's death in 1863, the administration of the Kingdom, which had been in decline for many years, collapsed completely. The country became infested with plots and counterplots and the Makololo power became weakened. The Lozi and Batoka rose simultaneously to cast off their yoke. Sipopa, one of the remaining Barotse princes,

\textsuperscript{22} Op. cit., p. 127.

\textsuperscript{23} Fagan, A Short History of Zambia, p. 127, and Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 21.
fled to the north where the Makololo had been unable to penetrate. He then raised a new army; and the Makololo were finally defeated in 1864, and the Barotse hegemony was established once more. 24

However, the old differences between the various factions involved in the Mulambwa succession dispute had not disappeared. Moreover, Sippopa's despotic rule did not help the situation much. He became increasingly cruel and arbitrarily set aside the customary law, and as a result there was a rebellion late in 1876. The King escaped the rebels but was shot by a trusted follower; he made his way down river by the canoe to the Chobe mouth and then overland to Victoria Falls, in an attempt to reach safety at Pandamatenga. But he became too ill to travel and shortly afterwards died of the wounds. Mamili, the Ngambela who had raised the rebellion against Sippopa put Mwanawina, a grandson of Mulambwa, on the throne, taking the title of Mwanawina II.

The main problem in Barotseland political circles was to find a King who would be acceptable to all political factions. Mwanawina II, had hardly been in power for two years when factionalism reappeared. There was further rebellion and Mwanawina was driven out and forced to flee across the Kafue River in March 1878, where he attempted

\[24\] Ibid., pp.127-128, and Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, pp. 20-21.
unsuccessfully to raise support from some slave traders to the east. Mwanawina was replaced by Lubosi, another grandson of Mulambwa in March 1878. In 1884 Lubosi was driven into exile and his cousin, Akafuna Tatila, was chosen in his place. However, after a short interregnum Lubosi fought his way back to power and took the name of Lewanika, becoming the greatest King of Barotseland.25

George Westbeech and Blockley were the first white men after Livingstone to ascend very far the upper Zambezi, and until King Kipopa's death they were the only whites permitted to enter Barotseland and travel freely there. Sipopa had given Westbeech and his partner permission to hunt elephants anywhere in the country and the Englishmen sent ten to fifteen tons of ivory to Europe every year until the King's death in 1876.

According to Westbeech, Lewanika was shrewd and a capable King. He restored order and regained ascendancy over the subject peoples and Barotseland continued to expand, until its powers finally extended as far north as the Lovale country, deep into what is today eastern Angola, and as far as the Kafue River. But the extent of the area which may legitimately be considered the Kingdom of Barotseland was not easy to ascertain. According to Westbeech's Diary,

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Lewanika ruled an area larger than France during the late 1880's. The question became of critical importance in the history of Barotseland between 1890 and 1905, when Portugal and Britain clashed over the proper boundaries between Angola and Northern Rhodesia, a solution requiring the two powers to agree upon the western frontier of the Barotse Kingdom since its ruler Lewanika, had granted concession to the British South Africa Company. Cecil Rhodes, head of the said company, was reported to have said gleefully that by the stroke of a pen he had added 250,000 square miles to his new territory.\textsuperscript{26} The Zambezi River was dominated by the Barotse war canoes, and the crossing of the river was strictly controlled. The fertile Barotse Valley maintained a relatively complex economy based on cattle keeping, fishing, and agriculture. Barotse wealth was further increased by taxes from their subject peoples, who in exchange received gifts, loans of cattle, and protection from their enemies and criminals. The Barotse too carried out expeditions for cattle and manpower, and in times of trouble liquidated their political enemies.

According to Gann, the Barotse people were more politically realistic in Central Africa. They understood the complex balance of power which then existed in Central Africa. They seem to have been flexible and to have had

ability to adjust themselves to new conditions, which profoundly affected the subsequent course of history in Central Africa. These new conditions in Barotseland were: the return of emigres after the liberation of the Kingdom from the Makololo, the rights of land, reconstruction of the political system, struggles for the throne and for senior indunaships, the continuing threat of Matabele, and not least, the issue of how to deal with white traders, hunters, and missionaries who were starting to seek access to the Kingdom. In the struggle to come to grips with these problems, inevitable disagreements and disputes amongst the Barotse leaders over the following three decades certainly endangered the stability of the state.

The year 1878, when Lewanika became King, is considered in Barotseland history as the beginning of the modern historical period. Lewanika was born in the year 1846 and at the time of his birth, his father, Litia, son of the great King Mulambwa, was taking refuge from the Makololo invaders. During the year 1856, Litia decided to ally himself with the Makololo, and he returned with his family to the Valley to join Sekeletu, King of Barotseland. Litia was among the Lozi royalties later killed by Sekeletu, but his son, Lubosi, later to be known as Lewanika was spared. On Sipopa's accession to the throne, he accepted the young man as a member of the royal family, and adopted him as part of his

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27 For more details of this policy see Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: 1878 to 1969, p. 15.
personal entourage, perhaps because Lewanika was one of the few remaining descendants of King Mulambwa.\textsuperscript{28}

When Sipopa was overthrown by Mwanawina in 1876, Lewanika was forced to flee the country. After ruling the country for a little over two years, Mwanawina was deposed and Lewanika was selected by the Barotse National Council (BNC) to succeed him; and in August, 1878, the young prince --then only thirty years old--was formally installed as King.\textsuperscript{29} Serpa Pinto, a Portuguese army officer who reached Lealui, the capital, which Lewanika was in the process of reconstructing, very shortly after his accession to the throne, was struck by Lewanika's regal bearing and his regalia.

However, Lewanika was fully aware that he was the third King of Barotseland within a period of three years and soon took steps that he believed would preserve him from the fate of his two predecessors. The most immediate threat to his position came from Mwanawina, who had fled the country after his deposition and now tried to raise support from slave merchants on the east coast. He also refused permission to Francois Coillard, a French missionary, to enter the country at this time because of the political instability in Barotseland. The King appointed his known supporters to the important offices in the Kingdom. He asked the Council


\textsuperscript{29}Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969, p. 20.
to replace Ngenda as the Ngambela because he had supported former King Mwanawina. His own supporter, Simbulu, was appointed Ngambela (Prime Minister). His sister Matauka was appointed as the governor at Nalolo, and a number of commoners were made minor indunas.  

One of the chief advisors to Lewanika soon after he became King was an old induna by name Nalabutu. He was old and conservative induna who had supported Lewanika for the Kingship in the hope of gaining influence over the young man. The old man was successful because he offered the new King the kind of advice he was anxious to have. It was Nalabutu who now inspired Lewanika to institute reforms in the Kingdom. These reforms were: first, the reintroduction of the Makolo system which had been ignored by both Sipopa and Mwanawina. The Makolo system insured extreme centralization of the political system at the capital and thus precluding segmentation of the government. Secondly, Lewanika introduced a plan to have indunas undertake physical exercises in the form of labor, arguing that it is bad policy for indunas to raid other tribes for slaves to till their fields; that they should rather cultivate their own farms to increase self-respect and physical fitness.

The King even demanded that members of his personal bodyguard, which included a number of well known war heroes,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{30} Op. cit., p. 20.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 21.}\]

-23-
till the land. One may believe, if he will, that self-respect and physical fitness were not Lewanika's true aims; more realistically, it was only a way of discouraging large numbers of armed indunas from making frequent visits to the capital.

Those were then the means by which the new King believed he could achieve both of these two interwoven goals, his own survival and the preservation of his Kingdom from outside attack. He was therefore convinced that a series of alliances or treaties with outside powers was necessary, even though this would bring an end to the Lozi policy of isolation.\(^{32}\) The Lozi foreign policy at the time of Lewanika's early rule was in general, based on the assumption that the greatest external threat to the Kingdom would come from the Matabele Kingdom to the south, and that the only potential allies of Barotseland would be the Ngwato rulers of Bechuahaland (in modern Botswana). The contact between rulers of Barotseland and Bechuanaland were begun shortly after Sipopa became King and were continued under Lewanika.

Lewanika came to believe that there were no fewer than four alien sources, two European and two African, which offered themselves as allies. Those were the Ngwato of Bechuanaland, the Matabele, who now began to send powerful emissary to Lewanika with presents, and inviting him to

\(^{32}\)Ibid., pp. 21-22.
become an ally of the Matabele in resisting the invading white man, the Portuguese as well as the British in South Africa, who, the Barotse King knew had allied themselves with the Ngwato ruler, Khama, in 1865 against the Boers.\footnote{Caplan, \textit{The Elites of Barotseland 1878-1969}, p. 22.}  

It became also evident to Lewanika that his decision on which of these powers to ally with would depend on which power would provide maximum protection from external interference with minimum infringement of the King's own sovereignty. He now began to assume that a foreign ally might support him against internal as well as external attacks, and the question therefore became one of the potential conflicts between the faction of the ruling class supporting the King and the one which arose wishing to see his deposition. The King's councillors were suspicious of white allies and distrusted the Matabele, their ancient enemy. These councillors were jealous of their country's sovereignty and partly because of fear that white men would create a balance of power in the country in favor of the King. To Lewanika, access to European arms would strengthen not only the security of his nation but also augment his own position in Barotseland. To this effect he was eager to do business with the first European to enter the Kingdom after his succession, Serpa Pinto, a Portuguese Army Officer. But pressure from the Council and the Ngambela forced the King to ask Pinto to leave the country.\footnote{Caplan, \textit{The Elites of Barotseland 1878-1969}, p. 24.}
Lack of firm Barotse foreign policy at this time seems to show that neither the King nor his council understood the need for uniform policy in dealing with white men. While Lewanika was actually interested in securing weapons and ammunition from the Portuguese, the aristocracy feared the loss of their influence as the King's personal power would certainly have increased by acquisition of modern weapons. The need to share power with them would have been reduced as well. However, Lewanika had realized the futility of a confrontation with the Kuta at this early stage of his rule, when his position was relatively weak, and therefore agreed to expel Pinto from Barotseland.
CHAPTER II

THE SCRAMBLE FOR CENTRAL AFRICA

I

Explorers, Missionaries, Traders, and Concession Seekers in Barotseland

The expulsion of Pinto from Barotseland did not deter Lewanika's interest in seeking foreign support in his effort to secure his position and modernize his country. Similarly, foreigners with interest in the Kingdom and the surrounding countries did not lose interest and courage and continued to visit Barotseland. However, a fuller understanding of what transpired in Barotseland from the time Pinto left the country to the time when Lewanika signed the Lochner Treaty of 1890, is only possible after a discussion of earlier work done by groups of men sent out by various parties in Europe who had taken an interest in Central Africa and Barotseland in particular.

For nearly fifteen hundred years, from the founding of the Phoenician colonies in North Africa round about the eighth century B.C. until the Arab conquest of the area during the seventh century A.D., nearly all the Africans living north of the Sahara actually belonged in one way or another to Mediterranean civilization. However, the hinterland of Africa south of the Sahara was hardly pene-
trated by outsiders until the latter part of the nineteenth century. This vast area was popularly considered an unknown continent. Furthermore, this region was denied history and discounted culturally by most of the nineteenth century social scientists who claimed erroneously that its people were just beginning the rudiments of civilization. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, therefore, European impact on Africa was minimal. With the exception of South Africa and a few scattered Portuguese plantations, there was not an attempt at establishing permanent settlements. Slave trade had been replaced by private merchants who engaged in legitimate trade. Christian missions had also been set up in a few isolated places. In any case, both of these institutions were not officially supported by their governments.¹ These institutions invested little capital in Africa and almost always depended upon the cooperation of the friendly African rulers.

EXPLORERS AND MISSIONARIES

Portuguese explorers were the first Europeans to take great interest in Africa as a means of reaching India where they believed existed rich sources of trade. Therefore the routes to India and the eastern world had to be protected from the interlopers. Moreover, interest in Central Africa was aroused by the information obtained by Vasco da Gama and other Portuguese explorers during the early sixteenth century concerning the existence of gold trade in the area. Thus, although other Europeans became interested in Africa, the Portuguese were again the first Europeans to penetrate Southern and Central Africa.

Many factors seem to have been responsible for attraction of European States to Africa. With industrialization of Europe merchants began to believe that Africans could be encouraged to buy their products and at the same time supply industrialists with raw materials such as palm oil, cotton, gum, ivory, gold, etc. which had become essential commodities for European industry. Moreover, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 seems to have given impetus to commerce.

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with East Africa and this in turn brought about an added interest in Central Africa, both commercial and spiritual. Missionaries were seeking souls to convert and Africa at this time appeared to be full of them.\(^3\)

The first European to visit Central Africa and indeed modern Zambia was Antonio Fernandez during the sixteenth century. Another Portuguese, Dr. Francisco Jose Maria de Larecda e Almeida, attempted to consolidate Portuguese trade interests in the interior of Central Africa. In 1795, Larecda planned a transcontinental journey from Tete on the Zambesi River to Angola on the west coast. Having foreseen that other Europeans would take an interest in Central Africa, he was anxious to secure Portuguese interests there. Larecda died on October 18, 1798 while traveling to the west coast.\(^4\)

Thirty years after Larecda's death, a more determined Portuguese named Antonio Ferreira da Silva Porto, settled in Angola. There he became famous as a trader and a frontiersman, and in 1848 visited the Kingdom of Barotse-land during the Makololo rule. Between 1847 and 1848, Porto

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traveled along the upper Zambesi and visited the Barotse Valley. He was impressed by trade possibilities on this region for both ivory and slaves and from that time on Barotse Valley was frequented by Portuguese traders from Angola. In an attempt to seek greater influence in Central Africa, Silva Porto undertook a greater journey in 1852 by joining the African traders from Zanzibar who had already made a crossing from Zanzibar to Banguela on the west coast and were about to return. The Party took the difficult upper Zambesi route as far as Lealui the capital of Barotseland. Silva Porto was exhausted and could not go on and so remained at Lealui, while his agents continued eastwards with the African traders.\(^5\) After crossing the Luangwa and the Shire rivers south of Lake Malawi, they then followed the Rovuma River to the east coast. Meanwhile, Porto spent some time in Barotseland capital and later wrote a book in which he described the people of the Valley. While there, he met David Livingstone and gave him valuable information about the country to the west through which that Scottish explorer hoped to travel. Thus, in 1856, Livingstone managed to criss-cross the territory between Angola and Mozambique, becoming the first British explorer to do so. He came across the falls on the Zambesi River which then was named Victoria Falls.

Men of varying backgrounds of European society came to Central Africa as explorers and missionaries. These men

\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 84-85.
often had no knowledge of the African people and their culture. The missionaries who came to Africa believed in converting the poor at home, in improving their condition by self-help, and by frugal way of life rather than by a collective revolutionary action. At the same time missionaries wished to render similar services to the "natives" abroad whom, in a sense, they mistakenly identified with the poor in metropolitan Europe. The nineteenth century missionaries, many of whom sprung from the intellectuals of the lower middle class, tended to regard middle class morality as absolute. In Africa they confused European morality and values with Christianity. They therefore identified themselves with the views of their business supporters at home. To them the African systems of life which encouraged collective action for the benefit of the whole group and the African nobility system with its corresponding obligations to society seemed morally wrong.

It is surprising that even a man of European peasant stock like Francois Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Mission in Barotseland believed that the Barotse way of life was immoral because it was not similar to that of Europe. It never occurred to him that he was dealing with people whose cultural beliefs were different from those of France and Europe generally. If he really wished to save souls as he claimed, then he needed first, a thorough knowledge and understanding of African culture and secondly, be in a position to apply this knowledge in his effort of converting
the Barotse to Christianity. Coillard showed his lack of understanding when he wrote to his supporters in Europe observing that "The Barotse are treacherous and suspicious —no savages feet are swifter than theirs to shed blood. The least provocation, the most groundless suspicion, envy, jealousy, and vengeance, justify the most atrocious crimes."\textsuperscript{6} He was proud of having persuaded Lewanika to forbid the brewing of intoxicating liquor in the capital when liquor was consumed in greater quantities in the western societies. He claimed that the African society's weakness of character was suspicion, when this is actually a human trait and not necessarily confined to Africa. These missionaries set out to condemn African habits, customs and beliefs and lied to Africans when expedient required without shame. Thus those missionaries who worked in (Northern Rhodesia) Zambia, acted swiftly to destroy inimical practices by preaching a new doctrine of sin. African dancing and singing which offended missionaries' wives were prohibited. To these white missionaries, dancing and other traditional African ways of expressing joy seemed sinful and were forbidden within the confines of the mission stations.\textsuperscript{7}

Africans were unwilling in most cases to discard their traditional ways and were therefore generally reluctant to

\textsuperscript{6}Rotberg, \textit{Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia}, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{7}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 39-41.
listen to the Gospel. Missionaries wished to educate Africans because they believed Africans could not understand the word of God until they could read. But the pupils themselves wanted specialized education that would enable them more readily to come to terms with the impact of the western ways of life. Therefore, the early years of missionary activity in Northern Rhodesia were largely unsuccessful. The "starving multitudes" did not cry out for the Gospel, but for gun powder, guns, cloth and technical assistance.\(^8\) The Paris Evangelical Mission was backed by French Protestants. The Roman Catholic Church which had sent the first missionaries to Central Africa in the sixteenth century, took up again its missionary work by sending both Jesuit and White Fathers to Central Africa. At a later date other Protestant denominations such as the Methodists, Plymouth Brethren and the Dutch Reformed Church, also joined the missionary scramble for Central Africa.\(^9\) Within a few years after Livingstone's death in 1873, a number of missionary societies began work in the area he had opened up for them.

Since this research deals mainly with the Kingdom of Barotseland, only those missionary activities connected with this Kingdom will be discussed. First, it should be understood from the beginning that all Central African

\(^8\text{Rotberg, pp. 41-54.}\)

rulers and their advisors were not interested in the mission work for the sake of "civilizing" their people as the missionaries themselves believed. Rather the African rulers of Barotseland, as in Botswana and Lesoto, conceived of Christianity as serving the needs of the aristocracy and not for the masses of their people. The African nobility saw a need for the white man's skills, especially the art of reading, writing, and speaking a foreign language. In Barotseland, the missionaries were called upon to give advice on matters of secular diplomacy as well as on clerical doctrines. David Livingstone who had offered himself to the London Missionary Society, was the first British missionary to work in Barotseland. Dr. Livingstone had embarked for Africa in December, 1840, to join another missionary, Robert Mofatt who had opened a mission station in Krumar, in the Matabele Kingdom. Within a few months after his arrival, Livingstone traveled widely through the regions north of Krumar. He visited various rulers of these regions and thus laid the foundations of knowledge and understanding of their language and customs which was to prove invaluable for his later work. Later he received permission from the directors of the London Missionary Society to open a Mission Station at Mabotsa, some 200 miles northeast of Krumar.

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10 Gann, Central Africa, p. 76.

But Livingstone, being restless about missionary work, joined a wealthy hunter by the name of William Cotton Oswell, in adventure and exploration of Lake Ngami north of the country. Livingstone acted as his scientific advisor in 1849. He sent a detailed account of the trip to the Royal Geographic Society, and this won him a first recognition as an explorer. More important, it decided Livingstone's next setp; he became determined to open up a route to the densely populated area to the north of Lake Ngami. In this region of Barotseland the Makololo Kingdom had been established by Sebutuane after his conquest of the Lozi Kingdom. Livingstone's first attempt to reach King Sebutuane in 1850 failed. But in April, 1851 with the support of Oswell, he set off again, accompanied this time by his wife Mary and their three children. They reached Linyati, the capital and met the King whom Livingstone described as intelligent and kind. Unfortunately, King Sebutuane died of pneumonia two weeks after their arrival. From Linyati, Livingstone saw the first signs of slave trade, for the Makololo sold slaves they had captured in wars to Arab or Portuguese traders. The party departed again for a journey to Seshekehe, the Barotse Capital and were accompanied by the new King Sekeletu. Livingstone wrote that on this trip, Sekeletu had an entourage of one hundred and sixty attendants. Some of these men were of course body-

\[12\] Ibid., p. 88.

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guards for the new King. The British missionary wrote a vivid description of what he saw on their northward journey between Linyati and Seshekhe. He found that Barotseland had a great abundance of wild animals of all sorts, and people also cultivated sugar cane, besides other crops. Skeletu assisted Livingstone in getting supplies and men which made it possible for him to explore other parts of the Kingdom. In 1860, Sekeletu asked Livingstone and his family to remain and live with his people because the King believed this would prevent the Matabele's attack on his kingdom. Livingstone's father-in-law, Rev. Robert Mofatt, was a friend and favorite missionary of King Mzilikazi of Matabele and Mashona Kingdoms.\footnote{Caplan, Gerald L., The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia's Western Province (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970) p. 11, and David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (New York, Harper and Brothers, Publishers 1876) pp. 221-228.} For this reason, Sekeletu had already tried to use Livingstone as his emissary to the Lozi noblemen living in exile in the north. But this use of a missionary as an ambassador proved futile as a result of serious internal conflicts which had broken out in both Makololo and Lozi camps between 1855 and 1860. Livingstone, who was visiting Seshekhe in August, 1860 could record that the country was suffering greatly and that Sebituane's empire was crumbling.\footnote{Fagan, Brian M., A Short History of Zambia: From Earliest Times Until A.D. 1900 (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 127.} If he had been observant enough he
could have known that the Makololo conquest and rule had not been fully accepted in Barotseland and this was the root cause of the problem. While traveling and living in Barotseland Livingstone saw the Zambesi. Instead of confining himself to Christian work, he now thought he had seen the chance of ending the slave trade by the introduction of western commerce to this area. He felt called upon to explore Central Africa in the belief that the ordinary work of Christianity could be done by others.  

Even though the Portuguese had explored the same region earlier and indeed Silva Porto had even helped him with some useful information, Livingstone now felt himself to be the chosen one to open new regions, reveal slave trade and replace it with Christianity and honest trade. This he called his missionary objective. A political and commercial exploration of Central Africa seems to be a more accurate description of this objective which became the dominant passion of his life. In 1853, Livingstone traveled from Barotseland assisted by the Makololo and Lozi men to Luanda in Angola in the hope of opening up a new trade route with the west coast. After twenty months' journey he returned with his African companions to Barotseland, which he again reached toward the end of 1855.

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When the news of his travels reached Britain, Livingstone was bestowed with honors by the British public which was hungry for news from Africa and this set in motion a series of events that eventually resulted in the introduction of commerce and missionary work into the areas he was credited to have explored. The ultimate result of Livingstone's exploration was partition of Central Africa during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Livingstone appealed for religious reinforcements and full-scale attack upon slave trade and this tactic seems to have captured the public sympathy for his work. He again reveals that his true motives in the exploration of Central Africa was not Christianity, in a letter to Dr. John Kirk, a member of Zambesi expedition which was sent by the British Government, headed by Livingstone himself. Livingstone told Kirk among other matters that he should improve his acquaintance with the inhabitants of East and Central Africa, and engage them to apply their lands with a view to the production of raw materials to be exported to England in return for British manufactures. Moreover, in a famous speech at Cambridge University he said, "I know that in a few years I shall be cut off in that country which is now

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open. I go back to Africa to try to make an open path for
Commerce and Christianity. Do you carry out the work which
I have begun. I leave it with you." 17 At any rate,
Livingstone's work could be considered as having opened up
the heart of Central Africa, including Barotseland, to
white missionaries, traders, settlers, and colonial govern-
ments. Livingstone was not the only British missionary to
take an interest in Barotseland. After his death, Reverend
Frederick S. Arnot, a Plymouth Brethren Missionary was per-
mitted to live in Barotseland between 1882 and 1884 during
the reign of Lewanika. Since the departure of Pinto,
Lewanika had allowed an English trader named George West-
beech to continue doing business in his kingdom. Westbeech
had by 1882 become a personal friend of Lewanika and the
trader now used his influence to persuade the King to permit
Arnot into Barotseland. The missionary stayed at Lealui for
twenty months and his account of the period reveals clearly
why Lewanika was prepared to let him remain. It was ex-
plained to Arnot that his missionary function was to teach
the children of the ruling class to read and write and to
know arithmetic. For this purpose, Arnot was allowed to
open up a small school, which was attended by a small num-
ber of boys and young men, including the King's eldest son
Litia (who later became King Yetta), one of his nephew's and

17 Sedwick (Rev.) and Monk, William (Rev.), Dr. Living-
stone's Cambridge Lectures (Cambridge, Deighton, Bell, and
Company, 1858) p. 24, and Froskett, p. 40; Rotberg, Chris-
tian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, p.
Litia's close friends, Mokamba, son of the late Ngambela Njekwa and later himself Lewanika's Ngambela. Only practical subjects were permitted to be taught at Arnot's school. The King strictly forbade him to preach the gospel which Lewanika clearly considered irrelevant to Barotseland needs. "Don't teach them the word of God, we know quite enough about God, and we are not going to die yet."  

Since Arnot had not proved useful enough as a missionary, Lewanika was still desirous of welcoming any other Europeans, whether missionary or trader, into his kingdom. Reverend Francois Coillard was now officially welcomed to Barotseland. The King was also busy at this time courting friendly African rulers who would come to his assistance in time of need. In May 1884, Lewanika had sent letters to the Botswana King, Khama, asking for friendship and one of his daughters in marriage. He also said, "The one we are looking for is M. Coillard, and I ask you, as a favor, to help him that he may come here as quickly as possible."  

Coillard, as well as Arnot, were seen by Lewanika as representatives of a distant white power structure which made the King believe that the missionaries' presence might act as a psychological deterrent to any action that his enemies

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may contemplate. At this period of Barotseland history, Lewanika's welcoming the missionaries should be understood only in terms of the political situation then prevailing in the country. The King's desire was for security of his throne and person. Each decision he had taken to ensure his safety between 1878 and 1884 had only created more enemies. Both Arnott and Coillard seem to allude to the fact that the King was extremely nervous and was afraid of being overthrown by his rivals. It is unfortunate that neither of these missionaries fully understood Lewanika's predicament.

Both of them therefore were of no assistance. Lewanika's policy then was to seek external allies who would not only assist him in strengthening his position in the country but also bring modernization to the nation. However, he seems to have been careful not to antagonize the ruling class, the majority of which was against permitting white men to enter Barotseland. There was some fear among Lewanika's enemies that with the support of the white power, they would be unable to depose him.

The King was in need of someone to teach his people to manufacture guns and powder, for this would strengthen his

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position. Thus, it can be understood why, to Lewanika, it seemed a mockery for the missionaries to bring mere words to one who needed strong friends.\textsuperscript{22} Even though Lewanika desired King Khama's friendship among the African rulers, things were so bad in Barotseland that the King even considered befriending the ancient enemy of Barotseland, the Matabele. Lobengula the Matabele King, was at that time also busy looking for African friends because of the problems he was experiencing with white men in his country. He sent Lewanika offers of friendship, with various presents, and asking him to join the Matabele ruler in opposing the advance of the white man from the south. Lobengula's diplomats were treated with great hospitality and sent away with many presents for their King, but Lewanika seems to have preferred the friendship of a lesser ruler like Khama who would not endanger his throne.

CIVIL WAR IN BAROTSELAND

Therefore, it was during these troubled times for Lewanika in Barotseland that Francois Coillard, his wife, and their Basuto evangelists set out from Basutoland in January, 1884. They reached Leshona near the right bank of the Zambezi on July 26, 1884 and there they were halted. The great bend of the river here formed the natural frontier to the Barotse Kingdom and no one was allowed to cross ex-

\textsuperscript{22}Mackintosh, \textit{Coillard of the Zambesi}, p. 314.
cept at the well guarded ford of Kazungula. The Party was sent to Seshekhe, the residence of twelve to fifteen Barotse princes who were governors of the subject tribes in the Kingdom and formed a council under a chief governor, called the Morantisiane of Seshekhe. All communications were in their hands and it is they who forwarded Coillard's letter to the King announcing his arrival. On receiving the letter the King sent instructions that the missionary and his party should be brought to Lealui at once and the canoes were sent to Seshekhe three hundred miles away, to expedite their passage.

The Seshekhe governors, however, being aware of the impending trouble at the capital, delayed to comply with the King's instructions. While they were traveling toward the capital, they received urgent orders to return to Seshekhe immediately. A revolution had broken out in the Valley and the King was reported to have fled. The rumor of an impending Matabele invasion had swept through the Valley creating panic throughout the Kingdom. The canoes that were transporting the Coillard party to Lealui were now laden with ivory to buy powder from Mr. Blockley, a partner of Mr. Westbeech, the English trader. Although the Matabele invasion did not occur, the panic had brought diversion of regular activities of the King and much of Barotseland and so Lewanika's enemies took advantage of the situation to organize a revolution against him. Led by indunas Mataa and Numwa, the rebels succeeded in overthrowing
the King in late August, while the Coillard party was journeying to the capital.\textsuperscript{23}

Since Mataa was a commoner induna it was necessary that he find someone with royal blood to occupy the throne. He seems to have made a mistake by selecting a boy named Tatila Akafuna, a grandson of Mulambwa and the son of Imbua, from Lukwakwa where he had been ruler of a small community of Lozi refugees. Akafuna who lived outside Barotseland lacked land and dependants which were essential elements for Kings of Barotseland. This meant that Akafuna had no independent power base in the country and therefore would be completely dependent on Mataa, the leader of the revolution, whom he made his Ngambela. Those who had not fled with Lewanika and were known to be his supporters were liquidated.

Once the machinery of the government had been re-established, Akafuna, like his predecessor, miscalculated the resources and ability of the missionaries to assist them against their enemies. He now urgently sent for Coillard who had been waiting in a camp at Leshona. Akafuna the puppet whom the revolutionaries had installed hoped that Coillard might be able to give him not only good advice but help him and Mataa to remain in power. Thus, on reaching Lealui in early 1885, Coillard and his party were welcomed.

by a grand official reception organized by the new ruler.

Mataa, the new Prime Minister welcomed the missionaries warmly: "You are welcome, servants of God. It is with joy that we see your faces, and to hear you say that you have come, not merely to visit us, but to live among us with your families. We do not ask for your presents; we do not seek your goods if you have any. What we ask is your teaching ......the nation is weary; it sighs for peace, it languishes. Here it is we place it before you; save it. You see the King is only a child; be his father; uphold him with your counsels."  

The visitors were brought gifts of honey, milk, fish, fruit, and other dainties.

Mataa then accompanied Coillard and his party to Sefula village, a distance of twenty miles south of Lealui, where he offered a site for a mission station which Coillard accepted. The Paris Mission therefore founded its first station on the edge of the Barotseland plain by the Sefula River. A school was started and a church was built, but response was slow to come.  

The missionary himself lived in Lealui, the capital. Coillard, like Frederick Arnot,
did not understand at that moment the factors which had led to his warm welcome to Lealui by the new rulers. Mataa was not speaking of the peace brought by the gospel as Coillard believed. He rather thought as Lewanika had done before that the missionary represented the entire white power structure which was capable of helping him retain power in the Kingdom. This appeared so to both King Akafuna and his Prime Minister Mataa, especially when Coillard's coming had been sponsored by Khama who sent his own ambassador to accompany the party on their journey to Lealui. Moreover, the Coillard party was also composed of Sotho evangelists. The Barotse and their subjects still spoke the language of Basutoland which their conqueror, King Sebituane, had imposed upon them as a lingua franca during the 1830's. The stability of the government seemed uncertain even to the missionary Coillard. Six months after the new regime had come to power, Coillard noted that a new revolution was being hatched.26 Discontent was already making itself felt. Some regretted the expulsion of the former King. The missionaries in this case again proved valueless to King Akafuna and his government. Mataa's ambition and blatant manipulation of the young King, who was brought up in exile seems to have alienated influential men in the country. Moreover Akafuna's inability to speak the local language made him a stranger among the people he was supposed to rule.

This further seems to have made him unacceptable even to the common people.

It is not surprising, therefore, that by March 1885, Lewanika's supporters had organized their forces which returned to the Valley to face Mataa's army. The fighting continued from March until the 4th of November when Lewanika's forces won, after defeating Mataa's men. With the aid of Mambari traders Lewanika had been able to defeat the usurper's troops and reclaim his throne. By January 1886, the King had succeeded in dislodging from their position of power and influence in the Valley and at Sesheke, all those men and women who had supported his usurpers during the Civil War. All these were replaced by his own supporters. He was naturally resentful of and suspicious of Coillard who had befriended Mataa and Akafuna during the Civil War. Coillard had been willing to accept Akafuna and Mataa's rule because he believed that political disputes were none of his concern as a missionary. He obviously did not know that his warm welcome by the new King and Mataa was a political rather than religious act.

Even though the Coillards enjoyed one advantage which very few pioneer missionaries have possessed, namely, a thorough knowledge of the language, acquired beforehand, and some knowledge of the people's thinking and ways of life, it is probable they would have been executed were it not for the assistance of Mr. Westbeech, the trader. Westbeech went to Lealui in February 1886, and seems to have
succeeded in reassuring Lewanika that Coillard was not a supporter of Mataa. He had succeeded because Westbeech himself had supported Lewanika during the Civil War though he had been careful to keep as good terms as possible with everyone.\footnote{Coillard, \textit{On the Threshold of Central Africa}, pp. 324-325; in Tabler, \textit{Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland}, pp. 8-9, and Caplan, \textit{The Elites of Barotseland 1878-1969}, pp. 40-42.} It was Westbeech who first inspired the Barotse with confidence in white men and in the English. After his restoration, Lewanika had sent a message to Coillard to come to visit him. When he reached Lealui on March 23, 1886, he was formally presented to King Lewanika in the presence of Mr. Westbeech, his sponsor. The King received him graciously even though still suspicious of Coillard's role in the past crisis. In order to show Coillard that he was still displeased with his behavior during the Civil War, Lewanika apparently ordered that Coillard be accommodated in a filthy and dilapidated house. The following day, Lewanika asked the missionary, "How did you like your quarters?" "I think that Lewanika is a great King, but that he does not know how to receive a guest," was the reply from Coillard.\footnote{Mackintosh, \textit{Coillard of the Zambesi}, p. 327.}

The following Sunday, the Gospel was preached to a large assembly, in the King's presence, and the Ten Commandments were read. Coillard reported that he felt specially upheld and thrilled with emotion, when he exalted his Savior...
in the presence of the Barotse. But this discourse seemed to have had little effect as far as the Barotse were concerned. Indeed, after twenty years, very, very few Barotse had heeded it.\textsuperscript{29}

The King and Coillard had an interesting conversation a few days after the sermon. The conversation went something like this: "Moruti (missionary), you are old; give me counsel how I shall rule my country, and strengthen my government."

"First put away your assagai, and let it sleep, and renounce vengeance once and for all. Set yourself to win the confidence of your people, and inspire the smallest with a feeling of perfect security. Punish theft; and, above all, accept the Gospel for yourself and for the nation," replied Coillard.

The King said, "What are the riches of a Country? The riches of mine is ivory. But it diminishes every year and when all the elephants in the country are exterminated, what shall I do?"

Coillard replied by pointing out that Barotseland was a fertile country and if the chiefs would give up themselves to cultivation of cotton, tobacco, coffee, sugar cane, etc. they would soon find that it would be an exhaustible source of riches for them.

Lewanika then questioned him about Lobengula, King of Matabele. Did he have missionaries? Were there believers

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 328.
in his country? Was Lobengula himself a believer like
Khama? Why was he not a Christian? "Is it true that Khama,
who is a Christian still makes war; and invades other
peoples' countries?"

Coillard replied, "I could not say, for Khama is only
a man; and then he does not govern alone—the council of the
tribe is there." Lewanika asked, "Is it wrong to make war?"
"Not to defend one's country." The King then said, "But if
I find myself engaged in a warlike enterprise, would you
accompany me?" "No. Our mission is a mission of peace."
"At least you would lend your guns, and give me ammunition."
Coillard replied, "No. That would still be taking part in
it." Lewanika said, "What! And you live in my country, are
my father! And if you have been here when Mataa revolted
against me, what would you have done? When you heard guns
firing, would you have not run to my defense? And if I had
sent back for arms and ammunition, would you have refused
me?" "Yes, but I would have prayed for you."
"Oh, yes," the King said laughing, "and while that was going
on Mataa would have killed me. That would have been a fine
way of helping!'"\textsuperscript{30}

The outline of the above conversation shows that
Lewanika was all the time thinking of political power in
Barotseland, the power he had just secured again after de-

\textsuperscript{30}Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, pp. 328-329,
222-223.
feating a serious rebellion. His overriding need, which Coillard failed to comprehend, was for friends who could provide him with guns and manpower with which to maintain his position in the Kingdom. If Khama was a Christian who also made wars, and Lobengula was not a Christian but also made wars, and both were powerful in their respective countries, then Lewanika was implying that he wished to resemble both if doing so would help him maintain his power in the Kingdom. In other words, Christianity per se was irrelevant to the King.

Thus when Coillard was moved to say that "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and all else shall be added to you,"\textsuperscript{31} after Prince Litia had publicly proclaimed Christianity, in Lewanika's case, this would have been more appropriate, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of Barotseland and all else shall be added to you."\textsuperscript{32}

In a nation like Barotseland where the King shared power with the council and where there was already a strong African religious tradition, Coillard was attempting the impossible task of convincing Lewanika to embrace Christianity. The majority of the ruling class was also against the King or any member of that class accepting Christianity. This was the time when African Kings were still rulers of their people. Even after Lewanika had travelled to England and

\textsuperscript{31}Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, p. 376.

\textsuperscript{32}Author's analysis.
returned in 1902 he still refused to embrace this strange religion. However, after signing the Lochner Treaty of 1890 which placed Barotseland under British Protection, Lewanika seems to have decided to allow his son and heir, Litia, to become a Christian. The young prince embraced Christianity publicly on Sunday, October 18, 1891.33 Until then there had been no conversion, and no sign of one, outside the missionaries' compounds. Litia's friend Mokamba also accepted Christianity afterwards.

In spite of the effort by other itinerant preachers, missionaries were for the most part discouraged by their lack of evangelical success. Although Africans occasionally came to Sunday service, they usually refused to acknowledge the relevance of the Christian message or forego their "heathen" customs.34 Missionaries in Barotseland had apparently mistaken initial African curiosity for Christianity for its acceptance. Coillard and his fellow missionaries would have been more successful if they had first shown the Africans the material benefits that would flow from conversion to Christianity. The missionaries mistakenly believed that Africans were living in a spiritual vacuum. What Africans desired most at this time was Western goods, education and technology. Christianity which seemed

33 Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, pp. 345-374.
34 Rotberg, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1888-1924, p. 137.
to have been based on western values was incompatible with the African culture and therefore could not be accepted so readily.

TRADERS AND CONCESSION SEEKERS IN BAROTSELAND

Apart from explorers and missionaries, European traders were also interested in searching for business opportunities in the Zambesi Valley. However, most of the European traders who crossed the Zambesi River from Matabeleland or Bechuanaland during the 1870's went to the Lozi Kingdom of Barotseland. In the 1860's British traders attempted to follow the footsteps of Livingstone and Oswell. As we have seen above, these were explorers who had in the 1850's journeyed far into the interior of the Zambesi Valley. British traders wished to do business with the Makololo who were then ruling the Zambesi Valley including Barotseland. It has also been noted that Portuguese traders from Angola had visited the Barotse before their conquest by the Makololo, and at the time, the people of Barotseland traded with the Mambari merchants who sold them European goods.

The Mambari sold cheaper goods and had a shorter distance over which to transport them while the British traders had a long distance and were mistreated and usually not allowed to go beyond the line of the Chobe and Zambesi Rivers. Except for Livingstone, who visited the Makololo again in 1860, British influence north of the Zambesi and
the Chobe Rivers was non-existent. European goods seem to have entered the Zambesi Valley at the time only through the Portuguese and their Mambari associates.

The person responsible for establishing a British foothold in Barotseland was an Englishman named George Westbeech. He was a trader with connections in South Africa. Westbeech has been mentioned above in connection with his assistance to the missionaries who sought permission to enter and live in Barotseland. In 1862, Westbeech migrated to Natal and two years later made a trading journey to Matabeleland, when another trader named George Phillips was also visiting the Kingdom. The two men formed a partnership. While Westbeech operated the business from the Zambesi Valley, Phillips lived in Matabele Kingdom and managed the branch of the business enterprise from there until his retirement to London in 1890. These two men who began trading with the Matabele in the 1860's seem to have gained the confidence of the old King Mzilikazi and the future King, Lobengula. They were able to do this apparently through their business integrity. In January 1870, they attended Lobengula's coronation and in March, Westbeech and another trader, George Blockley, traveled south to Hopetown to obtain trading goods.

While missionaries had a difficult time converting souls in Barotseland these traders appear to have been

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35Tabler, Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland, pp. 4-5, and Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa, p.100.
welcomed there, when they arrived at the Chombe-Zambesi confluence sometime in 1870. They had wagons full of merchandise. They were met by King Sipopa of Barotseland who welcomed the white strangers to his country. Westbeech became the King's friend.

These traders stayed for one year and one half in the Kingdom. When they left, the King filled their wagons with ivory and Westbeech made a profit of about £12,000 on this journey. He therefore became determined to continue as a trader in Barotseland. He returned to the Valley in 1872, with another assistant, Dr. Benjamin F. Bradshaw, who was interested in natural history. He became manager of Westbeech's trading station at Pandamatenga. Bradshaw and Blockley became well known as knowledgeable men on the Zambesi affairs who extended their hospitality and help to all white travelers. 36

Westbeech and Blockley seemed to have been the first Englishmen after Livingstone to ascend the upper Zambesi, and until Sipopa's death they were the only whites permitted to enter Barotseland and travel freely there. The King gave his friend Westbeech standing permission to hunt elephants anywhere in the country. Westbeech like other white traders then and in the future misused their privileges and went to the extremes. He sent from ten to fifteen tons of ivory every year to South Africa and hence

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to Europe. This process continued every year until the death of King Sipopa in 1876. It is doubtful that Westbeech and friends brought into the country an equal amount of wealth.

In 1873, Westbeech traveled to Barotseland and remained as Sipopa's guest until June 1874, and did not return South again until the end of 1875. He returned to Barotseland again in 1876 doing business and visiting with the King. He lived there most of the year of 1877. During the winter of 1882, Westbeech assisted Reverend Frederick Arnot, a Scottish missionary to get permission to enter Barotseland. Westbeech who had made the Barotse erroneously believe that he had adopted Barotseland as his country was recognized by both the Barotse and the Matabele as headman of Pandamatenga. He was even made a member of the Barotse National Council by King Sipopa.37

Westbeech seems to have succeeded where others, whether missionary or trader had failed, partly because he seems to have been a well educated Englishman. He had excellent manners and many cultural qualities and therefore popular with everyone both black and white alike. More importantly, he had learned a number of local languages, such as Sesuto, Sechuana, and Sindebele and was

37 The Barotse aristocracy came to look upon him as their official advisor on European affairs. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953, p. 42.
able to converse with Africans of this area with ease. He was on good terms with both Sipopa and Lewaniya who later became King of Barotseland. The trader was liked by these leaders for obvious reasons. Revolt and assassinations were ever present in Barotseland politics. These leaders did not trust any of their people and therefore someone who could be depended upon to give disinterested advice and keep a secret was welcome. Most white men and Mambari traders from Angola could not meet these requirements nor could they be relied on not to take part in the conspiracies. There was no doubt about Westbeech's integrity and complete personal honesty as he was even able to have notes accepted by Africans in payment for merchandise and services. He and his agents faithfully redeemed the notes and thus established for themselves a credit system. Westbeech was one of the few white men who became close friends of Lobengula, King of the Matabele and the Mashona people. However, Westbeech seems to have exaggerated the amount of influence he had with Lobengula when he claimed to have prevented the Matabele invasion of Barotseland in 1884, through his advice to Lobengula against invasion. He could not possibly have done it since no white men participated in the Matabele war council where a decision for such an invasion could have been made. It was unfortunate that the Barotse believed Westbeech

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had prevented the invasion of their country. This of course added to Westbeech's stature and acceptance there. The trader then used his influence with both Kings Sipopa and Lewanika to prevent Jesuits from getting a foothold in Barotseland because he preferred Protestant to Catholic missionaries. Moreover, he seems to have promised also to assist Francois Coillard on the same basis. With the trader's assistance Coillard was able to establish his mission station in the Kingdom.\textsuperscript{39} Westbeech died of the disease of the liver at Kalkafontein, Transvaal in July 1888.

\textsuperscript{39}Tabler, \textit{Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland}, pp. 6-7, 38-39. Coillard's biographer and editor, C. W. Mackintosh does not report any assistance the missionary may have received from Westbeech. See \textit{Coillard of the Zambesi}, pp. 314-315.
EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN AFRICA AND THE SCRAMBLE
FOR CENTRAL AFRICA

II

The discussion in part two of this paper above seems to show that in Central Africa and Barotseland in particular, explorers, missionaries, hunters and traders must have formed the advance guard of white influence. It was only during the latter half of the nineteenth century that Europeans began to stake effective political claims to the interior of the continent. However, before a discussion of imperialism and the scramble for Central Africa which took increasing intensity during the latter part of the nineteenth century, it seems necessary that we define the term imperialism.

Imperialism according to Webster's New International Dictionary (unabridged) "is the policy, practice or advocacy of seeking or acquiescing in, the extension of control, domination, or empire of a nation; as (a) by the acquirement of new territory or dependencies, especially when lying outside the nation's natural boundaries or by the extension of its rule over other races of mankind, as when commerce demands the protection of the flag, (b) by closer union of more or less independent parts for war, copyright, internal commerce, etc."\(^{40}\) Why were Europeans interested

\(^{40}\)Cited in Louis Synder, Imperialism Reader: Documents
in staking out political claims in Africa during the latter decades of the nineteenth century? A shift in the balance of power was getting underway then as the United States and European powers began to consolidate their unity. Italy had become a politically unified country by 1860 and Germany had entered the ranks of great powers in 1871. France was attempting to rebuild her prestige after a humiliating defeat by Germany during the Franco-German War of 1870. The changes taking place in these and other countries of Europe seem to have been linked to a transformation in the economic field, which saw Great Britain gradually losing her industrial supremacy. By the late eighteen eighties, the British also appear to have realized that the era of free trade was coming to an end. A movement for acquisition of new tropical colonies now began to make headway in British politics as other countries started to protect their own industries behind the tariff laws. 41 Moreover, a country like France had begun a policy of protecting her merchants in Africa by the eighteen fifties and by the seventies it appears that a broad line of imperial expansion in Africa had been deter-

minded. The French Realized very early that economic control of African territories required political control as well. The blueprint for the creation of a Sudanese empire had been drafted by M. Faidherbe, Governor of Senegal based on the Algerian model. It is interesting to note that both Admiral Jean Jaureguiberry, Minister of the Marines and M. Charles Freycinet, Minister of Public Works, believed in the Sudan economic potential and were convinced, long before the era of the scramble, that a race for Africa had begun. They used their official influence to bring about a new policy in French expansion: the belief that the French State should use all the resources at her command to establish French influence over a major portion of the African continent. From 1880, the French government began to assist in the construction of the Senegal Railway with the purpose of tapping the trade of the interior of the Niger Basin. The total cost of the line, from Dakar to Saint-Louis, Medine and the Niger, was estimated at 120,000,000 francs, of which 54,000,000 francs were to be borne directly by the State.42


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Therefore the fascination for African wealth, fear of foreign rivalry and the demand from the commercial interests for protection of markets, combined to bring about a new policy for French expansion. This new policy aimed at formal control of the territories claimed by France. The new policy seems to have been forged between 1879 and 1880.

While France was engaged in the foundations of her future Colonial Empire in Africa, Germany had begun by 1879 a policy of high tariffs in Europe as her policy at that time was not one for overseas expansion. During the eighties, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy all increased duties on foreign manufactured goods, while the United States became one of the world's most highly tariff protected nations. Even though Britain was still ahead of the other nations in maritime and financial services to the major portion of the world, she found herself losing ground as the world's chief manufacturer. This position of finance exporter was beginning to be challenged by other industrialized countries such as the United States, Germany and later Japan. The gradual realization of the weakening of the British position relative to those of other world powers seems to have been reflected also in the world of naval supremacy. Strategic questions now began to be interwoven with economic ones. The years 1884-1885, when there was a scramble for African lands, seem to have also created a concern on the part of the British Government for the protection of her empire in India. The British seemed con-

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cerned during these years that French and German interest in Africa would threaten British routes on the east African coast and thereby endanger the British routes to India.\textsuperscript{43} In later years Britain seemed adding extensively to her empire in Africa and actively participated in the division of China. These actions would tend to reveal that the British empire had become weak rather than strong. It may be interesting to note that the antislavery groups and other humanitarians who had been advocating for the British Government's support in bringing "civilization" to Africa since the seventies without success were now receiving the assistance of the government. It seems that it was economic problems that made the British Government realize that the country needed expansion in Africa. The depression and unemployment of 1884-1885 were attributed to foreign competition and tariff discrimination in overseas markets. Joseph Chamberlain seems to have analyzed the problem earlier than most British politicians and businessmen. As President of the Board of Trade during that decade he must have realized that British trade had been depressed for several years, especially in coal, iron and machinery. He

seems to have concluded that old days of Britain's unchallenged supremacy was over and that the demand for labor had not kept pace with the growth of population. He now began to demand that the Foreign Office organize and search for new outlets for the surplus power of production. 44

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the causes of depression of the mid-eighties came the conclusion that commercial and industrial groups were anxious to acquire new markets and sources of raw materials. "Increasingly after 1884 protectionism seemed to be shutting out British trade and investment from regions open hitherto to all nations; and the acquisition of further dominions began to seem the only assurance of United Kingdom prosperity and employment." 45 At this same time there came a discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand area of South Africa. This seemed to have induced speculation in African minerals and added to the keenness of British political leaders' interest in the acquisition of African lands for their economic value. Dilke expressed the vision of Africa's future when in 1880 he described the Niger territories as "the New Indias of the next generation" and the Central African countries as potentially "Twentieth Century


The promoters of new imperialism now used bread and butter issues to win support for their cause. They justified their demands in terms of employment for the British worker, markets for manufactured goods and "civilization and freedom for the African tribes"; what these advocates of imperialism never realized was the fact that African people were free and did not need Englishmen to free them. "For Philanthropy plus five percent" proved too expensive a price for freedom for the African of Central and Southern Africa.

By 1888, the two chief builders of the British African empire, Salisbury and Chamberlain had become ardent advocates of British Occupation of Egypt for commercial development through railways and public works. They were now determined to hold that country for unforeseeable future. Salisbury apparently had now been sold to the idea of an African empire because it was good for the commercial needs of Britain and because of international rivalry for expansion in the same area. For a man who earlier had seen no value in possessing African lands, he now accepted the concept of British scramble for an African empire because of

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"the dynamic force of adventure and colonization, and a great civilizing Christian force." Chamberlain, on his part now urged that areas of Africa that were of commercial value to the British should be occupied. These were Egypt, West Africa and South-Central Africa which he considered vital to British industry and commerce. Therefore the forces of imperial expansion must have been fortunate when this very Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary in 1895 and began a full program of tropical imperialism. Both Salisbury and Chamberlain worked vigorously for British expansion in Africa, Salisbury confirmed this policy in a speech to the House of Lords when he said among others, "It is Government business in all these countries to make smooth the paths for British commerce...for the application of British capital, at a time when...other outlets for the commercial energies of our race are being gradually closed."49

Thus, during the depression years of the early eighteen nineties, when industrial and commercial leaders of British clamored for imperial expansion as the only solution to the economic depression, the government seemed to pay heed and ready to assist. It now made sense to the government when these industrial leaders argued that resources of new territories under British rule would give


opportunities and security for government sponsored loans and private investment, development of railways, minerals, and agriculture would stimulate markets for British industry.

The desire for colonial expansion was simultaneously taking place in Germany, one of England's rivals for overseas expansion. But the desire seems to have been dormant as far as the German government policy was concerned until the years 1884-1885. This does not mean that German commercial groups were not putting pressure on their government to do what the French and British governments were doing for their trading companies. The pressure for German overseas expansion seems to have been generated by several Hamburg and Bremen firms which had been well established at various locations on the West African coast and later in Zanzibar. These trading interests feeling the impact of protectionist tariffs overseas, began to put pressure on Bismarck to acquire overseas possessions. Up to 1878, Bismarck seems to have rejected all appeals for colonial expansion because he thought that German energies could well be expended at home. What made Bismarck change his policy during 1884 and 1885? British agents in Berlin during these years reported inaccurately that Bismarck had become interested in the colonial issue in order to increase his party majority in Parliament during the elections of 1884 and also that the Chancellor was trying to provoke a quarrel with England in order to draw France to her side. The main reasons for Bismarck's change of policy seem to have been brought about
by the German government's realization that if other powers were allowed to occupy the non-European world, German nationalists trading in these areas would be at their mercy. Germany had also awakened to the fact that without territorial possessions of her own overseas, she would be unable to obtain for her subjects through reciprocity agreements. She therefore seemed to have decided to enter the colonial expansion race in Africa. Now public opinion in Germany began to demand displacement of Britain as a power whose world wide position seemed everywhere to stand across Germany's path.  

Bismarck, who seemed to hold a balance of power in Europe during the mid-eighties, now began to believe that British Foreign Secretary Grenville was trying to "promote dissention between him and France and that every point at which Germany had endeavored to found a colony England had closed in, making new acquisitions so as to restrict Germany's power of expansion." Bismarck, who up to the 1880's had been reluctant to enter the colonial field, now became convinced of the necessity for German possession overseas. "It was a complex of economic and political

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50 Avery, L. S., German Colonial Claim (London, W & R Chambers, Ltd., 1939) p. 59. The author seems to present very convincing pro-German views against Britain in their rivalry for colonial expansion; Gifford, Louis, R. W. and Smith, Alison, Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967) pp. 4-52.

51 Cited in Gifford, Louis, and Smith, Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, p. 9.
considerations that brought Bismarck to reconsider his position." The mid-eighties was an era of the scramble for African territories. Every European nation of any importance became busy in trying to acquire or lay claim to a piece of an African territory. Germany must have realized that she was running late for the colonial race when Britain and Portugal concluded a treaty in 1884 with regard to the Congo Basin which would restrict her expansion in Central Africa and as a consequence she began to enter the race by annexation of large pieces of land in Southwest Africa, in West Africa, as well as in East Africa. As a result of Franco-German entente in Europe, a conference was called at Berlin for November, 1884, to discuss the future of the African continent. With the scramble for African territory having taken on high intensity there rose a feeling among the interested powers that some agreement be established on "the rules of the game." All the major European powers met together with the United States and Turkey present at the conference. As a result of their discussion the General Act of the Berlin Conference was signed on February 26, 1885. The General Act deals mainly with these specific subjects which were the source of rivalry:

(1) freedom of trade in the Congo Basin;
(2) slave trade;
(3) neutrality of territories in the Congo basin;

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Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 202-209.
(4) navigation of the Congo;
(5) navigation of the Niger; and
(6) rules of future occupation of the coasts of the African continent.

The important agreement seems to concern the exchange of information with one another in case of a fresh act of taking any portion of the African coast. The Berlin Act gave the first reference to the obligations incurred with "spheres of influence." The unfortunate fact concerning the discussion of how to occupy African lands is that none of the African leaders whose countries were the subject of the Berlin Conference seem to have been invited. It seems to me that wars of conquest that raged in Africa from 1885 to 1914 would have been avoided if leaders of major African states had participated in the conference.

The settlement of the Congo question appears to have been disliked by the Portuguese because it apparently constituted a heavy blow to their ambitions in Central Africa. It brought about friction between Britain and Portugal in that general area. The treaty signed between them in 1884 had recognized Portuguese claims on the Congo, but also provided for free navigation on both the Congo and the Zambesi, while stating that Portuguese claims on the Shire River should not extend beyond the Ruo River. The British

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Government seems to have acted in order to forestall French and German influence in the Congo Basin, the main fear being that Germans might threaten British interests in South Africa if they purchased the Portuguese strategic port of Delgoa Bay.\textsuperscript{55} This threat seemingly was connected with British expansion northward toward the Nile Valley as well as the protection of the East Coast routes to India. But the treaty was not ratified and was finally killed by the opposition of Germany and France who saw it as enhancing British influence in the Congo Basin and indeed the whole of Central Africa. The consequence of this Franco-German action was that the question of Portuguese claims to the territories "discovered" by Bacarro and Larceda was opened once more.\textsuperscript{56} This encouraged Portuguese determination to revive again their previously unsuccessful scheme of a transcontinental empire. The Portuguese apparently had ignored the fact that they were now a third rate power whose claims could only be made good if they served the interests of one of the great powers involved in the scramble.

Since Barotseland lay between this proposed transcontinental empire it was bound to suffer the consequence of the struggle for control of the area between Portugal and the two powers, Britain and Germany. Even though the British foreign policy for the mid-eighties was one of


\textsuperscript{56} Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia}, p. 54.
making concessions to Germany in colonial matters in order to receive her support for British policy in Egypt, it was now Bismarck who in January 1889, offered to accommodate Britain on colonial questions in return for an Anglo-German entente in Europe. This in turn seemed to have made Salisbury become interested in settling the question of control of Nyasaland. In this area there was continuous struggle between the Arabs and the British commercial company called the African Lakes Company on one hand, and the company and British missionaries against the Portuguese on the other. Salisbury now decided to intervene in Nyasaland in order to maintain Nyasaland as a country open to British commerce for fear that the British would be shut out if another power took possession of this territory.\(^{57}\)

More importantly, commercial interests in South Africa led by Rhodes had accepted to pay all the expenses for maintaining British control in the area. The government had become convinced of the importance of securing for her colonial interest in South Africa free communication with Central Africa. The area was thought to contain rich mineral resources.\(^{58}\) Missionaries' pleas alone would not have convinced the prime minister that Britain should intervene to protect them. Secondly, as it has been briefly


\(^{58}\)C. O. 879/29 No. 358 Serial No. 49, p. 59.
discussed above, Germany was willing to support British colonial claims in the area. In July 1888, Britain apparently disregarded Portuguese claims there and declared it an exclusive British sphere of influence.⁵⁹

Because of British isolation in Europe, Salisbury seems to have been willing to negotiate with the Portuguese on their claims on the Zambesi. The plan for a fair settlement between the two countries appears to have been frustrated by British commercial interests in South Africa. These commercial groups based in that colony knew more than Salisbury and his officials in the Foreign Office of the vast rich resources south and north of the Zambesi. The Colonial Office was convinced of this as well as men like Rhodes, Jameson, Johnston and others who felt that control of the whole of the Zambesia would serve as a link between Egypt and the Cape. This belief seemed attractive to railway and mineral interests in both South Africa and Britain. It is apparent that due to pressures from commercial interests, strategic requirements and the need to maintain his power in the House of Commons where many leading Unionists were urging British expansion in Africa, Salisbury began to engage in imperial expansion in Africa from 1888 to 1892. The strategy was based on the concept of forestalling foreign advances in the Nile Valley and in East and Central Africa, by diplomacy and through support

of the commercial companies that were able to relieve the government of heavy financial expenditure and diplomatic embarrassment. The strategy seems to have succeeded partly because of British accommodation to German imperial interests and partly because the commercial companies had not yet by this time, become too large and powerful and therefore, were effectively controlled by the Government. Gone were the days when Britain could rely on indirect influence in Africa to maintain her imperial interests.

As this new concept of imperial expansion in Africa, the government agreed with Rhodes' schemes in South Africa and the Zambesia. Rhodes' South Africa Company was now granted a charter on October 29, 1889, over other rival companies in order to be able to secure the Matabele and Mashona Kingdom and the regions north of the Zambesi River, which included Barotseland and Nyasaland. This company was favored mainly because Rhodes had promised to construct telegraph and railway lines through Bechuanaland to Matabeleland and beyond at the cost of £30,000 besides taking care of the administration expenses for those territories. Lord Knutsford, the Colonial Secretary, believed such a company "may to some considerable extent relieve Her Majesty's Government from diplomatic difficulties and heavy expenditure."60 Moreover, companies such as the B.S.A.

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Company were seen as bringing immense advantages to British commerce and safeguarded British strategic interests because they were permitted to seek concessions, agreements, and sign treaties with African rulers on behalf of the British government and thus were instruments of expanding the Queen's empire. The British policy at that time would seem to have relied heavily on chartered companies as a means of expansion into the interior of Central Africa. The government also appeared determined not to allow Germany to have predominant influence in the Transvaal through her indirect influence on Portugal. This would have seemingly threatened British strategic position in South Africa and therefore her routes to East Africa and India.

As the British became determined to secure control of Central Africa, the Portuguese now published maps showing that the whole of the Zambesi Basin south of the Rovuma River, and including Nyasaland and Matabele and Mashonaland as Portuguese territory. The portuguese seem to have thought they had a strong diplomatic position making such a claim. A recent treaty between Germany and France had recognized Portuguese sovereignty in the territory between Angola and Mozambique, provided the rights of "other powers" were respected. However, the Portuguese apparently were unaware of the fact that Britain was at that time bent on

aligning herself diplomatically with Germany on colonial issues in order to win Germany’s support on European issues. "As long as Germans were not threatening British interests, Salisbury was willing to buy German friendship by way of colonial questions."\textsuperscript{61} As far as the Foreign Office was concerned France seemed to be a worse threat to British imperial and strategic interests in Africa. For this reason Bismarck seemed to have assisted the British to block French expansion in the Congo basin, in West Africa and in the Nile Valley during the Conference of Berlin, 1884–1885.\textsuperscript{62} For fear that the British would forestall them in the disputed area and then try to negotiate the Portuguese began to send military expeditions in August 1888 into Mashonaland and Nyasaland. The expedition to Nyasaland was led by Serpa Pinto who was ordered to occupy the Shire Highlands and the lands north of it. The British replied by a declaration that "the Makololo country and the Shire Hill commencing at Ruo River have been placed under Her Majesty’s protection" and political intervention now became an accomplished fact. However, by this time, the drive for the struggle with the Portuguese now came from South Africa. As we have seen above, the British commercial interests in

\textsuperscript{61}Gifford, Louis, and Smith, Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, pp. 11-12; The Cambridge History of the British Empire, pp. 171-176.

\textsuperscript{62}Gifford, Louis, and Smith, Britain and Germany in Africa, pp. 9-22; Betts, The "Scramble" for Africa, pp. 23-29; Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 163-203.
South Africa had by the beginning 1880's become extremely interested in expanding their operations north of the Zambesi. Since the British Government lacked the financial resources necessary for the achievement of imperial expansion in the interior of Central Africa, the project was now undertaken by the Company which received diplomatic support in return for its financial backing of the new imperialism. This new power center in South Africa for the propagation of imperial interests seems to have come into existence in 1867 when diamonds were discovered at Kimberley. This event made South Africa move into the forefront of the world's economic stage. Cecil Rhodes and his partners managed to secure control of the industry and by 1880, the De Beers Mining Company had been formed.

Rhodes seems then to have decided to use his financial success as a means of achieving his political and financial ambitions in South Africa, Central Africa and beyond.\(^{63}\) In 1886, Rhodes also strengthened his economic power in South Africa when gold was discovered at Witwatersrand which became an economically wealthy enterprise for him. By 1887, the Gold Fields of South Africa, a company which was controlled by Rhodes worked the gold mines. The name of the company was later changed to Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa which soon became a huge trust company with

shares in deep level Rand mines and added considerably to Rhodes' standing. The following year Rhodes acquired complete control over the Kimberly mining industry. By then he was looking beyond the Limpopo River and even to the Zambesi. Travelers and explorers from the north of the Zambesi gave glowing reports of gold riches supposedly buried under the savana; the popular fancy imaginative works such as Henry Rider Haggard's novel, King Solomon's Mines played their part, while scholars with racial bias and ignorance proved to their satisfaction that Zimbabwe had been built by Semetic settlers who exploited Zambesia's boundless riches in the past. Rhodes must have taken all these reports seriously and indeed seemed to have been convinced that a second Rand must lie somewhere north of Limpopo.64

What one must understand is that all these reports seem to have fitted nicely in Rhodes' schemes of occupying this region of Africa, from the Cape to Egypt. The fact that minerals were reported to exist there made the area even more attractive to Rhodes, his supporters at home, and the British Government. Perhaps the story of the old Boer who said "there were no minerals in the moon because if there were the British would have taken possession of it long ago," was closer to the truth of the matter. In any

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case, here Rhodes meant to assume undisputed control and establish a huge African empire stretching from Cape to Cairo, while at the same time pushing white settlement inland and uniting Boer and Britain in a common task. The fact that millions of Africans who lived in this region and the Afrikaner farmers to the south of them may not have been interested in Rhodes' scheme did not seem to bother him.

Having amalgamated with other rival companies, Rhodes then began to persuade and pressure both the Foreign and Colonial Offices that his South African Company should be granted a charter. He assured the Foreign Office that his proposed company would make available £10,000 a year, for several years, for the development of the Administration of Nyasaland. In these circumstances, it is easy to see, as we have seen above, why the Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, could readily recommend the granting of a charter to Rhodes' company. The government felt justified in doing so as an attempt to secure for Britain a reasonable amount of political influence over those countries of Central Africa "not" claimed by Germany, Portugal, and the Congo Free State.\(^{65}\) North of the Zambesi the Company would keep large African territories open to British influence at a time when the British Treasury officials erroneously believed that a chartered company would be more subject to

imperial control than a body of private capitalists who might bring about diplomatic complications for the government. Therefore the Royal charter was granted to the most financially and politically powerful company in South Africa and signed on October 29, 1889. The definition of the charter's field of operation was left deliberately vague, and comprised "the regions of South Africa lying immediately north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic and west of the Portuguese dominions." 66

The Company was obligated to preserve peace and good order and accordingly permitted to maintain a police force, and native civil law was to be respected and freedom of religion was to be observed. On the whole, the government must have made a great mistake by leaving the Company unto itself to develop Northern Zambesia as it saw fit. The Colonial and Foreign Offices seem to have established no mechanism to ensure that the Company honored its agreements with the African rulers and their people in the areas the Company was to operate. Within a year, Rhodes had used all kinds of tricks on King Lobengula of the Matabele and Mashona Kingdoms, while at the same time deceiving the Colonial Office officials of the true aims of his activities in northern Zambesia. He had sent out a small

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privately paid and well equipped army which he called the pioneer column, which he forcibly used for occupying Mashonaland, a portion of the Matabele Kingdom. This was in violation of his treaty agreement with Lobengula. In less than four years Rhodes forces had occupied the whole Kingdom after a series of battles with Matabele army units which ended in the defeat of the King's forces. While the Matabeleland and Mashonaland were being occupied, Rhodes looked further to the north and his financial policy now became entwined with political affairs north of the Zambesi. Therefore, it was Rhodes, supported by white public opinion in the Cape Colony who brought about an entirely new scheme for north Zambesi. This scheme which was compatible with British imperial policy of the eighteen eighties of creating new outlets for British industry and commerce, preserving the Nile Valley, and protecting the routes to India, made it possible for the British Government to claim the territories north of the Zambesia instead of conceding them to another power. Salisbury seems to have agreed with Rhodes' plans partly because communication northward was needed by the British South Africa Company. This company now had knowledge that the area was rich in mineral resources and promised to assist British expansion in this vast area by colonizing it at no cost to the British Government. More-

67 A more detailed discussion of Rhodes' activities in the Matabele and Mashona Kingdoms is found in Samkange, ORIGINS OF RHODESIA, pp. 123-358; also see Mitchell, The Life of the Right Hon. Cecil Rhodes, pp. 83-100; Jameson, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 318-359.
over, it seemed to the government, that the company would be in a position to rescue the African Lakes Company and their Christian Missionaries in Nyasaland who otherwise would be in danger of falling under the Portuguese control.

The question of placing Barotseland under company rule had been discussed during the final negotiations of the charter to cover southern Zambesia. Besides offering to pay for the police and administration of Nyasaland, Rhodes had also requested permission to put Barotseland under the South Africa Company Administration. By this period, 1890 Rhodes' interests seemed to have become dominant in the British colonies of South Africa, politically as well as commercially. He was wealthy; he had his charter and was also the Prime Minister of Cape Colony. Rhodes used these sources of power to wield a big influence in the British government's future policy for South Africa and this policy now came to depend on the developments north of the Zambesia. Therefore, in April 1890, Rhodes and his associates pressured Salisbury to bring into the British sphere of influence the entire Barotse Kingdom, together with the regions covered by Johnston's treaties. The British High Commissioner to South Africa, Henry Loch, who was Rhodes' protege, as will be seen later, supported this demand and urged among other things that Salisbury take

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68 Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, pp. 244-245.

Barotseland, so as to ensure an alternative route to Lake Tanganyika, in case the Portuguese claims to the lands between the Lower Zambesi and Lake Malawi had to be conceded. Moreover, Barotseland had become essential in the scheme of things because the Company now claimed to have received important concessions there.

Fortunately, for Rhodes' plans, Salisbury was able to conclude an Anglo-Portuguese Convention on August 20, 1890, which put much of northern Zambesia west of Lake Malawi, as far as the Congo Free State and Angola borders, together with Shire Highlands, under the British sphere of influence. Only part of Barotseland seems to have been included in the British sphere, a fact which left Rhodes dissatisfied with the arrangement. Nor was Rhodes the only person unhappy with Anglo-Portuguese convention regarding the article on Barotseland. On September 8, 1890, Sir Henry Loch wrote the Colonial Secretary in support of Rhodes' plans for Barotseland. He argued that since Barotseland had been ceded to the Company as of June 27, 1890, the Anglo-Convention was conceding to the Portuguese the territory that actually belonged to the Company. He urged Knutsford to support British interests and suggested the question should be reconsidered before ratification. Fortunately

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71 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854, p. 13, No. 8; C.O. 879/75 No. 8854, p. 14, No. 9; C.O. 879/32 Serial No. 218, p. 237, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, June 28, 1890; C.O.
for Rhodes, the Portuguese Cortes refused to ratify the
convention and in the final agreement with Portugal of June
11, 1891, Salisbury once more yielded to Rhodes' interests
by obtaining all of Barotseland and Manicaland plateau for
the Company, in exchange for Portuguese salient north of
the Zambesi and west of the Shire Highlands. But the exact
extent of the Barotse Kingdom was not known at this time
and so the frontiers were defined as the territory under
the power of the Barotse King. Since the Company was
making plans to move into the Kingdom, the Anglo-Portuguese
agreement provided for provisional boundaries which were to
be respected until it was possible to reach a definite de-
cision on the exact boundaries of Lewanika's Kingdom. 72
Moreover, in July 1890, under the Zanzibar-Heligoland
Treaty with Germany, Salisbury had managed to assist Rhodes'
schemes by securing the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau to the
trans-Zambesian sphere obtained from the Portuguese.
Britain, however, conceded to Germany access to the head-
waters of the Zambesi, the so-called Caprivi Strip on the
borders of Barotseland. But the B.S.A. Company now had
gained territorial access to the Lake Tanganyika for the
Company. Salisbury also seemed to have succeeded in barring
Germany from the Nile Valley and Uganda by the Anglo-German

879/32, Serial No. 293, p. 319, Dispatch from Loch to Lord
Knutsford of C.O., Sept. 7, 1890.

72 C.O. 879/57, Serial No. 229 A, p. 323; Robinson,
Gallagher, and Denny, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 247-
248.
Agreement of 1890. Britain also received Zanzibar and Pemba Islands and the Witu area. In the government's view, this treaty was necessary if Britain wished to maintain her friendship and alliance with Germany on European affairs. This alliance seemed to be in danger of collapse if delayed any longer especially after the fall of Bismarck from power. Fortunately for Britain, German foreign policy under Caprivi did not differ much from that of Bismarck. It was geared to making Germany a great European power and to reaching an accommodation with England in Africa and Europe. After succeeding to exclude Germany and France from the Nile Valley, Britain began to work hard to stop French expansion in West Africa. In this endeavor, Britain also needed Germany's support.\(^7^3\) For commercial and political purposes, Britain appears to have handed over northern Zambesia to the British South Africa Company which in 1891, received a supplemental charter extending its administration to include this area.

However, because of the opposition of African Lakes Company, missionaries and British planters in Nyasaland to Rhodes' Company, the area was excluded from the Company's sphere of operations. The government thus had no alternative but to administer it as a protectorate beginning in 1891, even though its revenues were still subsidized by the


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B.S.A. Company. Moreover, Johnston, a protege of Rhodes, was appointed Commissioner over this territory now called British Central Africa Protectorate. This action appeared to be in line with new policy of imperial expansion. This policy appears to have been based on the concept that whenever private enterprise wished to occupy a region, the empire would support it politically and diplomatically. On this principle Rhodes' plans and ambitions for Central Africa became compatible with Salisbury's imperial expansion policy.

Before the conclusion of the Anglo-Portuguese and Anglo-German treaties discussed above, we have seen that the Company had been busy since 1889, making preparations for the occupation of Barotseland. Their link in Barotseland was the French Evangelical Mission led by Francois Coillard who by this time had become firmly established in the country. Rhodes' agents seem to have erroneously reported that Coillard had acquired great influence over the Africans. As it has already been mentioned above, Lewanika and his advisors were at this time seeking allies and therefore Coillard merely appeared to the King as someone who could be used to establish this alliance. Coillard and his fellow missionaries seem to have worked hard to bring Barotseland under British influence because Portuguese control would have meant the coming of Catholic missionaries who would have been unwanted rivals to Coillard's mission which was Protestant. Coillard and his colleagues therefore preferred the British government.
After George Westbeech's death, a number of concession seekers began to pour into Barotseland seeking permission to look for minerals in the country. Lewanika's position as King over most of what would in the future become known as northwestern Rhodesia made him a leading figure in the events by which the area was eventually brought under British influence. As it has been briefly mentioned above, Lewanika found himself actively involved in the scramble for Central Africa during the late nineteenth century. He seems to have been aware of rival European ambitions, for in 1885 a German protectorate had been established in Southwest Africa, which touched the southwestern borders of his Kingdom. He knew through his emissaries that the British government had also acquired one protectorate in Bechuanaland during the same year. The constant threats and unrest at home, the fear of the Matabele invasion from the south and Portuguese advances from the east and west, or possible infiltration of white prospectors from the south, must have made Lewanika start thinking whether British protection might save his Kingdom from all these threats.  

It is possible Lewanika may have believed that British protection would secure his position as King of Barotseland.

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While he was still analyzing the alternatives available to him he seems to have stood firm, determined to make no agreements with any concessionaires until he had sufficient information regarding the implication of British protection. This is revealed in his letter of 1887 to King Khama of Bechuanaland, who was not only his ally but also his friend. Khama had accepted British protection in 1885 and probably understood the advantages of British alliance which was apparently meant to safeguard the Bechuana people forever against their enemies, the Matabele and the Boers. King Khama did not reply to Lewanika's letter until July 17, 1889. However, on January 8, 1889, Lewanika wrote another letter to Sidney Shippard, then the administrator of British Bechuanaland requesting protection of the British government. The letter was meant to be forwarded to Queen Victoria for consideration of extending protection to Lewanika and his people. This letter was written at the time when Rhodes was still negotiating for a royal charter for his company. It is curious that Lewanika's letter took seven months to reach England. It was received there in August 1889, when apparently all the necessary clauses in the charter had been completed and ready for official approval. Rhodes must have

known the content of Lewanika's letter and had it held in abeyance by Shippard until almost all the necessary negotiations on the charter had been completed.

The Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, was certainly setting a stage for future British colonial policy for Central Africa when he "sent a vaguely encouraging answer to Lewanika and passed the application for protection over to Rhodes." 76 Meanwhile, Lewanika's situation was not improving at all as rumors circulated in the Kingdom that the Matabele army planned to invade Barotseland during that year. These rumors appear to have been generated by white concession seekers who must have known of the King's desire for protection and meant to use this tactic as a means of forcing Lewanika to grant mineral concessions to them. Consequently, on June 27, 1889, Lewanika granted a limited concession outside the Lozi Kingdom proper to Henry Ware, a Kimberly businessman who had told Lewanika that he was a representative of the Queen. He was granted exclusive mineral rights over Batoka country in return for mineral royalties and a subsidy of $1000.00 (£200.00) per year. The concession was granted for twenty years. 77 Probably, for lack of knowledge concerning the value of a British pound, it would seem that Lewanika received almost nothing for his concession to Ware. He might have thought that

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76 Hall, Zambia, pp. 64-65.

77 C.O. 879/32, No. 392 Serial No. 161; also see Hall, Zambia, pp. 64-65.
"protection" of the British government was worth more than the small sum of money he would receive.

When Rhodes heard that he had been forestalled in Barotseland by Henry Ware and that Lewanika had already granted the Ware concession, he quickly acted for his organization. This organization, British South Africa Company, which had received a royal charter on October 29, 1889, made Rhodes to believe that he had been given absolute right to make British concessions north of the Zambesi. He was therefore eager to gain influence over Lewanika's Kingdom as he had done in Matabele and Mashona Kingdom. He therefore bought out the Ware concession and decided at once to send a delegation to the Barotse King. The Ware concession was bought for £9,000 ($45,000) in cash plus ten thousand shares of the British South Africa Company. This gave Rhodes' company legal rights to search and dig for minerals in certain parts of the Barotse Kingdom. Rhodes then persuaded the British government to accede to Lewanika's request for protection. Meanwhile, Rhodes selected Frank Lochner, a former officer of the Bechuanaland Police as leader of the mission to Lewanika. Lochner was to negotiate with the King for a more comprehensive agreement than the limited Ware Concession of 1889, as a basis for carrying out the Charter's provisions. 78 Thus from the

78 C.O. 878/30 Serial No. 163, p. 156, especially Section 6 of the Charter, which empowered the Company to acquire powers of government and administration in the territories north of Zambesi; see also Hole, The Making of Rhodesia,
time of the granting of the Charter to the B.S.A. Company in October 1889, the initiative for British policy in Barotseland and Rhodesia as a whole lay with the Company.

CHAPTER III

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN LEWANIGA AND THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY

In order to understand the diplomatic activities that took place before Barotseland became a British Protectorate and British policy toward this kingdom, one needs to note there were three forces at work all at the same time that tended to converge toward this objective. First, a desire on the part of Lewanika and his intimate advisors for protection against internal and external enemies, secondly, Cecil J. Rhodes' business interest in Barotseland, and, finally the British Government's reaction to the first two forces which brought about international complications in Central Africa concerning Portugal, Britain and Germany.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Lewanika had written to his friend and ally, King Khama of Botswana in 1887 seeking some advice on protection. The letter to Khama reveals that although Lewanika desired protection he was uncertain of what it involved. He wrote:

"I understand that you are now under the protection of the Great Queen. I do not know what it means. But they say there are soldiers living in your place, and some headmen sent by the Queen to take care of you and protect you against the Matabele. Tell me as a friend. Are you happy and quite
satisfied? Tell me all. I am anxious that you should tell me plainly, your friend, because I have a great desire to be received like you under the protection of so great a ruler as the Queen of England." 79

Khama's reply to the above letter did not come until July 17, 1889. By then as we have seen Lewanika had decided to grant a limited concession to Harry Ware which permitted him to search for minerals in one section of Barotseland only. But Khama's reply seems to have encouraged and solidified even more of Lewanika's desire for British protection. He advised Lewanika to decide for himself what he wanted. Khama enjoyed the British protection..... "I have the people of the Great Queen with me, and I am glad to have them. I live in peace with them, and I have no fear of the Matabele or the Boers any longer attacking me; that is the thing which I know and can tell you....." 80

Therefore when Rhodes' mission to Lewanika arrived in Barotseland in March 1890 the King was disposed toward reaching accommodation with Lochner. While the Lochner mission was journeying towards Lealui during the latter


80 Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, p. 382.
part of 1889, Rhodes was reported to have written the Board of the British South Africa Company supporting Lewanika's request for protection. The Board sent this request to the British Government. Since Barotseland was in a disputed area, it seems that the British Government was reluctant to form any definite policy for countries north of the Zambesi. Another factor which appears to have contributed to this reluctance at this time was that the Charter for the British South Africa Company had not officially been approved by the time Lewanika's letter arrived at the Colonial Office in August. For these two reasons it appears that the Colonial and the Foreign Offices played a waiting game and thus it was decided to send Lewanika a vague letter by the Colonial Office through the British High Commissioner for South Africa. The Foreign Office concurred with Lord Knutsford's reply to Lewanika of September 14, 1889, in which the Barotse King was told that "Her Majesty's Government regarded him with friendly feelings, and would use whatever influence they had to prevent the Matabele from raiding his country." This means the British Government expected the B.S.A. Co. which was going to receive the royal charter the following month to settle matters with Lewanika. The High Commissioner's telegram to the Colonial Office on April 7, 1890, clearly shows that the Company now held the initiative in British policy.

81 Hall, Zambia, p. 65.

82 C.O. 897. 8854. Enclosure I in No. 69, p. 83.
north of the Zambesi. Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner telegraphed his superiors at the Colonial Office to say that "Rhodes informs me that his Board is urging that Barotse country, and Consul Johnson's concessions (further east), be included in British sphere of influence. I concur, and urge that continuous connection to Nyasa and Tanganyika be secured."\textsuperscript{83} This was communicated to the Foreign Office on April 12, 1890. The above telegram was followed by a dispatch dated April 21, enclosing a concession of the mining rights over a portion of the Barotse country to Harry Ware, dated June 27, 1889, and a deed of cession of those rights to the British South Africa Company. The Ware Concession had given those he represented exclusive right to search for minerals in the eastern portion of the country for twenty years in return for a subsidy of £200 plus a royalty of four per cent on the total output of minerals.\textsuperscript{84}

Once the Charter for the British South Africa Company had been approved, other would-be concession seekers and rivals to Rhodes' interests in the territory covered by the Charter were put at a disadvantage. On November 28, 1889, with the approval of the British Government through the

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid., p. 83. Discussion of Company acquisition of territory in the rest of Rhodesia is covered in Section II of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{84}For detailed discussion and agreements included in the Ware Concession, see Appendix I.
High Commissioner for South Africa, the Administrator of British Bechuanaland, Sir Sidney Shippard made a proclamation which declared invalid all alleged concessions, monopolies and privileges at variance with the Royal Charter of the British South Africa Company. The Proclamation seems to reveal British support for the B.S.A. Company against their rivals which leads to the conclusion that Britain had begun at this time and in later years to rely on Rhodes' Company to carry out imperial expansion in Southern and Central Africa. Section 2 of the Proclamation invalidated any concessions "purporting to have been granted by any native chief, with or without the consent of his headmen and people, on or before October 29th, 1889, in any territory within the scope of the Royal Charter." Only those concessions that were valid would be those which shall have been granted or acquired or recognized by the British South Africa Company or those that had been registered with or sanctioned by the government of British Bechuanaland before that date.

Meanwhile, Lochner with his three companions, Captain Armstrong and Messrs. Bagley and Fraser, who had left Kimberley in early October 1889, arrived at Lealui, the capital of Barotseland in March 1890. Rhodes had apparently selected Lochner for the mission because he was a

85 C.O. 879/30 Serial No. 203, p. 195. For other groups who put forward claims of concession in Barotseland, see C.O. 879/30 Serial No. 135, p. 133 and C.O. 879/31 Serial No. 179, p. 213.
friend of King Khama and thus Rhodes meant to use this connection to secure a concession from Lewanika. Lochner and his companions were welcomed by Mr. Coillard, who took them to his comfortable house at Sefula. After Ware's departure, the faction of indunas who were opposed to the granting of concessions to white men began to criticize Lewanika more constantly. In addition, they were told by Mr. Middleton who worked for a rival company to B.S.A. Company that Lewanika had been deceived in granting the Ware Concession. Lewanika himself was coming to believe that he had been deceived. At the first meeting, Lochner was informed that no negotiations could take place until the return of the principal indunas whose presence was necessary in any important political discussion such as this could take place. These indunas were away on war expedition against the rebellion in Mashukulumbwe.

Despite the opposition of those who were apprehensive he might be misled into parting with his country, Lewanika seems to have been as anxious as ever for a British Protection. He was thus quite prepared to treat with Lochner mission if he was satisfied that it represented the Queen. We have noted above that Lewanika had been assured by King Khama's letter of July 17, 1889, and in addition, in September 1889, he had received an encouraging, though

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vaguely worded letter from the Colonial Secretary. Under these circumstances, Lewanika seemed to be determined to secure British protection which would strengthen him against the Matabele raids. He would be secured against the Portuguese from the West as well as against the revolution at home.

It appears that most of the councillors (indunas) were strongly opposed to the British Protectorate, and would rather have deposed Lewanika than accept it. Their objections were based on the fact that British protection would strengthen the King and restrict their power. 88

Coillard seems to have played a behind-the-scenes role in helping Lochner to secure the concession. Lochner lived at Coillard's house while the negotiation took place and the missionary acted as interpreter. Rhodes seems to have requested Coillard's aid by offering him the position of British resident in Barotseland in October 1889, and although the missionary had rejected the offer, he was willing to assist Rhodes' interests. "You inquire of me whether I can accept the residency. Well, I cannot serve two masters. But if without any official title I can be to your company of any service as a medium of communication, and until you can get a proper man, I willingly place myself at your disposal." 89 Barotseland was little known at that time and

88 C.O. 879/30 Serial No. 120, p. 116 and in Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, pp. 381-385.

89 C.O. 897/32 Enclosure in No. 320, pp. 341-342 and in
therefore Lochner seems to have miscalculated beforehand the King's power and importance and the size of the Kingdom. Lochner found out that Lewanika was a much shrewder politician than he had expected. Even with Coillard's support, Lochner still found it difficult to negotiate with Lewanika and his councillors. This seems to have made him decide to achieve his goal by offering gifts to Lewanika's aides who appeared delighted to take everything offered without being gullible as Lochner imagined. Lewanika himself refused to accept any presents from Lochner. Instead he showed Lochner and his party the traditional African hospitality by giving them fourteen oxen to slaughter.  

In these circumstances, Lochner seems to have decided to convince the King and his council that he represented royal authority from which the charter emanated. He began to tell lies to the King and his councillors. He told them "he was an Ambassador from the Queen and had been sent to offer her protection for Barotseland. He was not merely seeking concession, but an alliance between the Barotse nation and the government of Her Brittanic Majesty."  

Included in the deception was some fireworks during May 24, the Queen's birthday, which wound up other activities Lochner had launched at Lealui for the enjoyment of the King.

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Hall, Zambia, p. 67. This is also discussed in Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, p. 383.

90 Hall, Zambia, p. 67.

and his noble men. The assembled multitude was impressed by the sports and fireworks in the evening.

When the army returned from the war expedition in Mashukulumbwe, the King and his Councillors were called. Since full notice of the meeting had been given, representatives of many of the subject peoples came into Lealui to attend. A full Council therefore met on June 26, 1890 to consider the issue of the Lochner concession. The full proposals of the concession were laid before this council. The council was at first divided as suspicious. For a long time it seemed that those who were opposed were in the majority and their views would prevail and vote against granting the concession. "Trouble was sown by three European traders, Sell Wabers, a Boer, and Middleton, the agent of a Mafeking firm, who told the Barotse leaders that Lochner was a mere adventurer like Ware, that his mission was a bogus one, and that if the Barotse gave him what he wanted they would soon not have enough ground to sit upon." 92

Although the above statements were stoutly denied by Mr. Coillard and his colleague Mr. Jalla, they seemed not to have been able to convince the hard thinking indunas whose suspicion led them to the conviction that Lochner was not a representative of the Queen. Even Coillard himself later stated that he and Jalla were careful to bring out

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92 Cited in Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, p. 380. This same information is found in Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, p. 218.
clearly the perpetual character of the concession to the Barotse leaders, during their interpretation of the treaty for the King at the negotiations.\textsuperscript{93} It must have been clear in the eyes of most councillors that missionaries led by Coillard were interested in the British Protectorate and therefore his services as an interpreter could not have been impartial. His letter to Rhodes dated April 8, 1890, noted above and the fact that Lochner stayed at his house during the whole time of his stay in Barotseland would tend to support that view.\textsuperscript{94}

When Lochner realized that despite the support of missionaries, the council was going to reject the treaty, Khama's services were brought in. "At the critical moment of the negotiations, when the safety as well as the success of Mr. Lochner's mission was trembling in the balance, Khama's Ambassador, Mokoatsa, entered the lekhotla (kuta) with his suite, and delivered the message from his master ..."\textsuperscript{95} Mokoatsa had been sent specifically by King Khama to urge the acceptance of Lochner's proposals. Mokoatsa seems to have been well instructed on what to say to the council. He repeated the message from his master to the council in the following words: "Barotsi, I have tested

\textsuperscript{93}Hole, \textit{The Making of Rhodesia}, p. 218.

\textsuperscript{94}Mackintosh, \textit{Coillard of the Zambesi}, pp. 382-383 and in Hall, \textit{Zambia}, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{95}Mackintosh, \textit{Coillard of the Zambesi}, p. 385 and in Hole, \textit{The Making of Rhodesia}, pp. 218-220.
a delicious dish" (i.e., British protection), and I have
shared it with you. What have you done with it? Today, I
hear that you speak again of revolutions. Take care,
Lewanika is my friend, and if you dare to make attempts
against his life and power, I am Khama. You will see me
with your eyes and hear me."96 He concluded his speech by
repeating the lie that Lochner had given earlier, that
Rhodes' mission was composed of the Queen's representatives.

This appeal from fellow Africans seemed to have con-
vinced the indunas, and by unanimous vote, the council
accepted the treaty. Lewanika now turned his attention
to the details of the treaty concerning such matters as the
compensation, powers of the company and its methods of
operation. Lochner being a white man of South African
origin with little appreciation of black men's ability,
was surprised by Lewanika's "business-like comprehension of
these details."97 The terms of the agreement were ulti-
mately concluded and Lewanika, his son Litia, together with
the Ngambela and thirty-nine councillors and provincial
rulers signed the document which became known as the Lochner
Concession on June 26, 1890. The agreement brought within
the British sphere of influence a territory as large as
Germany. 98

96Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi, p. 385.
98See Article 111 of the Anglo-German Agreement cited in C.O. 879/32 Serial No. 195, p. 222, and in Hole, The
As it was noted in Chapter II, the date of signing the Lochner Concession anticipated by four days only the signing of the Anglo-German agreement, which guaranteed Germany access to the Zambesi from the West Coast of Africa by means of a narrow strip of land known as the Caprivi Strip, extending from the north of Namagualand to the junction of Linyati River with the Zambesi. This agreement was reached before the Anglo-Portuguese Convention which had assigned to Portugal everything west of the Zambesi. This division had in fact split Barotseland into half of its normal size. But we noted above that this treaty was rejected by the Portuguese Cortez (parliament) which seems to have given Rhodes the chance to reassert Lewanika’s rights which he now considered falling under his sphere of operations.99

The Barotse concession gave the Chartered Company full mining and commercial rights in Barotseland. According to this document, Lewanika, with the consent of his advisors agreed to give Frank Elliot Lochner, a representative of the British South Africa Company, all the rights and power to carry on any manufacturing, commercial and otherwise. Further, the Company was granted the right to search and dig for diamonds, gold, coal, oil and all other precious metals

found in the Kingdom. In consideration for this concession, the Company agreed to pay the King and to his successors in perpetuity, an annual sum of (£2,000) two thousand pounds sterling, or its equivalent in trading goods, at the option of the King.\textsuperscript{100} The Company further undertook and agreed to protect the King and his nation from all outside interference and attack; but it could not interfere in any matter concerning the King's power and authority over his subjects. They also agreed to appoint and maintain a British residence with a suitable suite and escort, to reside permanently with the King.\textsuperscript{101} For the discussion of the entire text of the Barotse Concession see Appendix 2.

It's apparent from the discussion that this comprehensive agreement between the Company and the Barotse King could not have been made possible without the assistance of Khama's ambassador, who finally seems to have convinced the Barotse councillors to consent to British protection. Mr. Coillard also assisted the Company in more than one way toward this agreement. In a letter written in Lealui to the Secretary, British South Africa Company, Lochner informed him that Lewanika had accepted the offered protection of the Company, and that the agreement of Concession had been signed by the King and his chiefs. "I can assure you the way has been well paved for future success; the King

\textsuperscript{100}\textsuperscript{C.O. 879/32 Enclosure in No. 320, p. 342.}

\textsuperscript{101}\textsuperscript{C.O. 879/32 Enclosure in No. 320, p. 342.}
and chiefs had the Charter most thoroughly explained to them, and they will recognize the governing and also the administering powers of the Company."^{102} He went on to say that the Barotse people understood that they would be ruled through their King still, with Company as head, the King's powers over them not to be interfered with; all that was needed was some really good man as British resident.

Lochner then described how he and Coillard had an anxious time before the Pisto came off: They knew that a trader in the country, who had a good deal of influence, and two others by the names of Weber and Sell were doing their best to upset the minds of the people in Sesheke and other districts, by misinterpretation, and telling people that their country would be sold and that Lochner did not come from the Government. Messrs. Middleton, Weber, and Sell seem to have been right in telling the Barotse people that Lochner did not represent the British Government. Neither Lochner nor Ware were representative of the British Government as they claimed.

Fortunately, for Rhodes, there was a month to wait after Lochner arrived before the Pisto took place, giving him time to solicit Khama's support and plan his moves with the advice of Coillard. Lochner tells the Secretary of the Company in his letter that Makoatsa, Khama's messenger, was of the greatest possible help—to him, as of course the

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Barotse listened to him more readily than they did to Lochner. Mokaotsa made an excellent speech in convincing them.\textsuperscript{103} Lochner had promised Mokaotsa a good present if he were successful in his effort, and therefore he hoped that the Company would give him a wagon as his reward. Lochner was certain that the Company would not be overpaying him for the job he had done.

In his report to the Secretary, Lochner again shows that Coillard played a behind-the-scenes role in securing the concession. "I am sure the Company owes as much, if not more, to Mr. Coillard than myself in having secured the Barotse country; his heart and soul is with the Company, and there need never be any fear of things going wrong as long as he takes the same interest in the Company's work as he has done heretofore."\textsuperscript{104} Lochner urged the Company to help the mission in their greatest difficulty, transport of their mail and goods into Barotseland. This could relieve Mr. Coillard and his brother missionaries of their great trouble and anxiety.

Coillard's support for the Company is denied by his biographer, Mackintosh, when she states that "owing to his broken health, Mr. Lochner remained as the Coillsards' guest more or less during the time of his stay in the Barotse Valley.... And as a matter of fact, apart from his services

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 340. See also Mackintosh, \textit{Coillard of the Zambesi}, p. 385.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 341.
as interpreter to both sides impartially, the only action Mr. Coillard took was to secure as far as possible the interests of the natives and the rights of the King and his chiefs. Miss Mackintosh cannot be excused for stating that it was not easy to make Barotse understand the role of the Company in the whole business of protection. Lewanika and his people were led to believe that they were dealing with representatives of the British Queen and not of the Company. Lewanika was seeking direct protection of Her Majesty's Government, not that of the Company. Thus, as soon as Lochner had left the country, people who were opposed to the concession and who were suspicious of the whole deal began to find out the truth and therefore, the missionaries were rightly blamed for creating this misunderstanding and deception.

When diplomacy is conducted between men of different cultures there is bound to be a misunderstanding of what may be the motives of each party. After the signing ceremony had been concluded, King Lewanika presented Lochner with two large elephant tusks (ivory) as a token of friendship and were to be sent to the Queen, whose agents he thought he was dealing with. These tusks of ivory weighed two hundred and seven pounds a pair. But the reports from Rhodes to the Colonial Office indicated that Lewanika gave these elephant tusks to the Company as a sign of his

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105 C.O. 879/32 Enclosure in No. 320 and also in Clay, Your Friend Lewanika, p. 77.

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submission to it.\footnote{106}

At this point, it is necessary to go back and look at the reaction of the British Government with regard to the affairs of Barotseland. It was mentioned earlier that the roots of Rhodes' interests in that Kingdom were based on the purchase of the Ware Concession. Sir Henry B. Loch, the High Commissioner, sent a letter to Lord Knutsford as early as April 21, 1890, enclosing a copy of that document and deed of concession for the Colonial Secretary's approval under Section III of H. M. Charter to the British South Africa Company of October 29, 1889.

The reply to that dispatch seems to reveal that the British Government policy for Barotseland would be somewhat different from that of other areas which collectively came to be called Rhodesia. Since Barotseland was located north of the Zambesi which had been recognized by Germany and France as subject to the influence of Portugal, the High Commissioner was informed by Knutsford that it was necessary to consult the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, as to whether there was any objection to expressing approval of the concession. He also indicated that the validity of Mr. Julian's claims in Barotseland had to be decided before the Colonial Secretary would approve the Ware Concession.\footnote{107}

\footnote{106}C.O. 879/32 Enclosure in No. 320 and also in Clay, \textit{Your Friend Lewanika}, p. 77.

\footnote{107}C.O. 879/32 Serial No. 195, p. 222, and in C.O. 879/23, Enclosure in No. 358, Serial No. 135. A letter had -109-
On June 28, 1890, of the same year, the Colonial Office informed the Foreign Office of the importance of securing the Barotse territory eastward of the Zambesi. The possession of that territory was now considered essential for securing alternate routes of communication to Lake Tanganyika, and that the British South Africa Company claimed important concessions there.

Even though the Lochner Concession or Agreement had been signed toward the end of June, it was not until September 8, 1890, that Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner, officially communicated the matter to the Colonial Secretary. The High Commission stated that Rhodes had informed him that the Barotse Protectorate Agreement had been signed on June 27, 1890. He added that it was evident, therefore, that the above agreement had been made before the signature of the Portuguese Treaty which divided the territory that already had been ceded to the British South Africa Company. "If the Portuguese Agreement has been signed cannot the question be reconsidered before ratification? Please bear in mind this with a view to supporting British interests." 108

been sent to the Colonial Office by Mr. Dawson Duncan of Kimberley, putting forward on behalf of Mr. Julian, a claim to large and indefinite rights in connection with the "Barotse empire," stated to be founded on concessions and grants from King Lewanika.


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The above communication was followed on the same day by another confidential information in which Sir Henry enclosed a letter he had received from the Secretary to the Company, reporting that Lewanika had placed himself under British protection. It is evident that a large portion of territory claimed by Portugal has been ceded to England by the lawful sovereign of the country.\textsuperscript{109} This communication seems to show that the initiative for the struggle for control of northern Zambesia was now placed in the hands of the Company.

The Barotse boundary dispute seems to have developed as a consequence of the Barotse Concession of June 26, 1890, to the British South Africa Company, later referred to as the Lochner Concession. This dispute and other misinterpretations by the Company of the rights and authority ceded by Lewanika to them, combined to complicate the problems for Lewanika as well as the British Government. In confidential information sent to the High Commissioner on September 5, 1890 by Mr. F. Rutherford Harris, the Company Secretary in South Africa tends to reveal the problem the Company was creating for the government. Mr. Rutherford Harris enclosed a report from Lochner which claimed that the King, his chiefs and nation had accepted a protectorate of the Chartered Company and understood the right of the

\footnote{C.O. 879/75, No. 8854, Serial No. 10, p. 14, High Commissioner Sir Loch to Lord Knutsford.}
Company to govern people and country through the King and chiefs. There is no such understanding in the document of June 26, 1890. Lewanika's constitutional power or authority as King of the Barotse was not affected by the agreement nor did the Company have the right to any other land than for mining and trading purposes only.\textsuperscript{110} It was from this report sent by Lochner that the Company and the British Government began to realize that Barotseland was much larger than was supposed.

The Barotse boundaries were sketched by assistance of Mr. Coillard and were included in Lochner's report to the British Government.

They were:

1. On the south of the Zambesi, the Chobe and Lomba Rivers to 20th degree east longitude.

2. On the west, the 20th degree of east longitude to where the Lumdigi crosses it.

3. On the north, the watershed of the Zambesi to the confluence of the Lunga and Kafue Rivers (roughly where the 27th meridian of east longitude is crossed by the 12th parallel of south latitude).

4. On the east the whole of the Mashukulumbe country was taken in.

The chiefs of that country are submitting themselves to Lewanika... The country cannot be less than 225,000

\textsuperscript{110}C.O. 879/32 Enclosure in No. 320, pp. 342-343.
square miles. Ware's concession is about a fifth of the country. While here a Portuguese arrived from the east with one servant. He stopped while Pisto went on, and left the next day. I am unaware of what he wanted. He told me elephant hunting is profitable." 111 Mr. Harris drew attention of Her Majesty's Government to that fact if the government had given the Portuguese up to the Zambesi River from the west coast, they had given away four degrees of Lewanika's country which had been previously ceded to the Company. This Company view concerning Barotse boundary was apparently reinforced by a communication from Loch to the Colonial Office, of October 13, 1890, to the effect that Lochner Concession bore a date anterior to that of the Portuguese Agreement and that "it will be observed that the British title to the land, embraced within the boundaries described, rest on the substantial ground of actual cession by the legitimate owners." 112

The British Government seems to have been slow in formulating any policy for Barotseland. The Barotse concession had not yet been approved by the Government. They apparently preferred to place the initiative for imperial expansion here in the hands of the Company since this area was also claimed by Portugal. By December 1890, the Company had done nothing since the granting of the concession to show

111 879/75, No. 8854, Enclosure in No. 10, p. 15.
Lewanika that he was under the Queen's protection. By November of that year Lewanika seems to have realized that the Company had used the Queen's name in order to get his consent and that he was dealing with a commercial organization rather than her Majesty's Government. The King therefore bitterly resented having conceded his country to a trading organization and tried to repudiate the agreement.\textsuperscript{113}

This prompted the High Commissioner to write to the Colonial Office urging Lord Knutsford to send Lewanika a reply to his letters of January 8, 1889 and of November 1, 1890. In the first letter Lewanika had requested that Her Majesty's protection be extended to him and his people whereas in the second letter the King had asked for clarification of the relationship between the British South Africa Company and the British Government.\textsuperscript{114}

The reply of the Colonial Office to the communication from the High Commissioner reveals that the British Government planned to let the Company initiate policy with regard to Barotseland. On August 23, 1891, the High Commissioner was authorized to inform Lewanika that the British South Africa Company was recognized by Her Majesty as acting on her behalf under the Royal Charter and that engagements entered into by them will be fulfilled as long as they are faithfully observed by the other parties to them. It was

\textsuperscript{113} C.O. 879/75 No. 8854, Serial Nos. 15, 16, and 17, pp. 23-25.

\textsuperscript{114} C.O. 879/75 No. 8854, Serial No. 16, pp. 23-24.
explained to the King that "the company is not empowered to shut the door against other traders and merchants, but that the authority which represents the crown, whether it be a company or an officer of the crown, may regulate the conditions under which the trade is to be conducted." 115 Lewanika was assured that Mr. Johnston, who had been sent to Central Africa as the Queen's Commissioner, would visit Barotseland as soon as he could do so. The Barotse King was to be encouraged to communicate with Johnston in the future on all questions affecting his country. It is apparent that the Foreign Office was reluctant to allow the Company to exercise the powers of government in Barotseland than the Colonial Office which seems to have been more friendly to the Company's interests. Lord Knutsford had recommended that the Prime Minister concur on the approval of the Barotse concession under Section 3 of the Charter. In a communication from the Foreign Office of August 12, 1891, P. W. Currie, Lord Salisbury's assistant, observed that "Lord Salisbury thinks that it is unnecessary to express any such approval. Section 4 of the Charter merely requires it before the Company can exercise powers of government or administration, and in this instance, it is proposed that such powers should be exercised by Her Majesty's Commissioner, not by the Company." 116 The Foreign Office


seems to have been hesitant to give much authority to the Company when negotiations for Anglo-Portuguese Convention had not been concluded. But the reply to Lewanika of August 23, 1891, seems to suggest that the Company had the authority to regulate commerce in his country.

By the beginning of 1892, the British stated policy of making Barotseland a protectorate had not been put into effect. The expected visit from Johnston, Her Majesty's consul for Central Africa, had not taken place and Lewanika was at a loss to understand why the government was delaying in sending a resident to Barotseland. The King began to be suspicious even of communications from the High Commissioner. This is confirmed by a letter Reverend Coillard sent the High Commissioner on April 12, 1892. The Missionary advised Loch that "The arrival of Her Majesty's Commissioner alone (Mr. Johnston) could have set at rest Lewanika's mind. Unfortunately, nothing has been heard of his movements or of the probable time of his coming. In spite, also, of the Company's promises, no regular postal communication has been established with this country." 117

It had become a regular habit of the High Commissioner to forward all letters from Barotseland to the Colonial Office and copies to Mr. Rhodes. Coillard's letter was therefore forwarded to the Colonial Secretary and a copy to Mr. Rhodes. The Company's reaction to this letter reveals

117 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 20, p. 27.
Rhodes had neglected Barotseland possibly because he was busy attempting to conquer the Matabele Kingdom and secondly perhaps the prospects of immediate minerals in the country had not been determined. The Company's promise to both Lewanika and the Missionaries to arrange for regular postal service between South Africa and Barotseland via Bechuanaland seems to have been neglected. Mr. Rhodes now promised again to take some action on this matter when the Company's Secretary, Mr. Harris, wrote the High Commissioner to say among others that "Mr. Rhodes has requested me not only to forward the Reverend Coillard's communication to Mr. H. H. Johnston at Mozambique, but also to Dr. Jameson, for his report as to whether it would not be possible to open up communication with the missionaries from Salisbury, so as to let Mr. Coillard feel he is not being forgotten, and he is in touch with what we are doing in Mashonaland."\(^{118}\) This goes to show that the Company had so far failed to fulfill its agreements with Lewanika. In England the receipt of Coillard's letter seems to have brought an exchange of letters between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office regarding the government's confused policy for Barotseland. The Earl of Rosebery was now the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs while Lord Ripon had become Colonial Secretary in the new Liberal Party Government. The exchange of letters between the officials of the two departments shows

\(^{118}\)C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 20, p. 28.
that Liberal Government was more realistic in its approach to Lewanika's country. Ripon advised the Foreign Office that because of the scarce resources of Colonial Office and the great distance of Barotseland from centers of Colonial authority neither he nor the High Commissioner of South Africa could exercise any useful influence in relation to the affairs of Barotseland. Ripon seemed to be putting responsibility for Barotseland in the hands of the Foreign Office and its representative in Central Africa, Mr. Johnston. This would seem to have been a change of policy which had previously relied on the Colonial Office to initiate recommendation for dealing with Barotseland affairs. This new approach was apparently accepted by the Foreign Office.

Mr. Currie of that department writing on behalf of his chief, Lord Rosebery, told the Colonial Office that Rosebery "has telegraphed to Mr. Johnston to report as soon as possible whether he considers it desirable to dispatch an envoy or letter to Lewanika and in the former case, whom he would propose to send."\(^{119}\)

While the Foreign Office was attempting to find out whether Consul Johnson could shoulder responsibilities for Barotseland, Coillard wrote the High Commissioner Loch to inform him that the situation had improved a little in Barotseland. He reported that the King had quarrelled with

\(^{119}\)C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure 4 in Nos. 21 and 22, p. 29. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, August 26, 1892. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, September 3, 1892.
the men who had nearly succeeded in having them expelled from the country. Lewanika at that time professed to be friendly with the missionaries but he was still suspicious and bitter toward the British South Africa Company. "He does not trust in the Protectorate of the British Government through the British South Africa Company, and he firmly believes that such a protectorate is a blind and falsehood. Rumors have reached the country of the Company's strange doings in other lands, and of their resolve of appropriating boundless rights over land and people, and of breaking their engagement to give Lewanika and his descendants even that annuity of £2,000, which has been presented to him as a shameful trifle and a robbery."\(^{120}\) Coillard's long letter shows that British policy for Barotseland up to this time had not been effective at all as far as Lewanika was concerned. It also reveals that Lewanika had not been told the whole truth by both Lochner and Coillard during the negotiations for the concession. "The King insists that he wanted to be, like Khama, under the immediate and sole Protectorate of Her Majesty the Queen, and he cannot make up his mind to be at the mercy of a grasping Company."\(^{121}\) Lewanika seems to have shown his frustration by dealing harshly with foreigners and even the missionaries. He constructed a large village at Kazungula in order to watch the fort, and to control the

\(^{120}\) C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 23, p. 30.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p. 31.
crossing of any strangers into Barotseland. To make sure that no undesirable foreigners who had caused so much mischief lately could enter undetected, Lewanika ordered that a number of canoes be destroyed all along the river below Seshekhe. Even the missionaries' servants and any chief who sold them canoes were ill treated by the King's agents. Lewanika seems to have felt that all foreigners and their employees could not be trusted and especially those who had participated in the process of granting the Concession. Coillard wrote that the state of affairs in Barotseland then had to be attributed to the fact that in the eyes of the King, as well as Coillard's, the Company was defacto the British Government. The Concession of mining rights was secondary, and held in the shade. He urged the High Commissioner to speed up the sending of a resident representative of Her Majesty's Government. Unless this was done, the missionary felt there was bound to be uneasiness and suspicion which would breed a lot of trouble for the future.

On December 17, 1892, a reply to Coillard's letter was sent by Mr. Graham Bower, Imperial Secretary, on behalf of the High Commissioner. The letter clearly shows that the High Commissioner and his Colonial Office superiors did not understand the gravity of the situation in Barotseland. Lewanika seemed to have become tired of promises from the British Government which had no effect on the problems facing him. These problems included what to do with an
influx of white men into Barotseland, the Portuguese intrusions, the Matabele raids, plus the political instability created as a result of the granting of the Lochner concession. In addition Lewanika failed to understand why the British Government could not send a resident to Barotseland as they had done in Bechuanaland and in Matabeleland. No satisfactory explanation seems to have been given to the King so far to make him feel that he was indeed under the British protection. Instead of treating with Lewanika honestly, Mr. Bower wrote Coillard that "I am directed by His Excellency the High Commissioner to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st of September last, respecting postal communication with Barotseland, and the discontent shown by Lewanika owing to the agitation of opponents of the British South Africa Company.

As the British South Africa Company have not as yet exercised any influence in Barotseland, the discontent cannot have any foundation on existing facts."122 This display of unconcerned attitude by the High Commissioner again shows lack of firm British policy for Barotseland. It only indicates that the policy had been usurped by the Company. Since the Company was at this time occupied in the preparations for the conquest of Mashonaland and Matabeleland,123

122 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure 2 in No. 23, p. 31.

the government seemed to have made no positive policy or played any positive role with regard to Barotseland. Both Colonial Office and the Foreign Office seemed powerless so long as the Company was not yet ready to occupy Barotseland. Mr. Bower seems to have taken Lewanika for a fool when he promised to forward Lewanika's letter to the Company, and to the Secretary of State for the colonies. He apparently never realized that the King had received these promises since 1889 and no positive action had yet been taken to fulfill these promises. Despite this, Mr. Bower advised Coillard to inform Lewanika that he should not believe the stories put in circulation by unscrupulous persons or rival concession seekers, and that when in doubt he should seek advice from Consul Johnston, whose promise to visit Lewanika had not been forgotten.

On February 7, 1893, Lewanika wrote another letter to Sir Henry Loch. In it Lewanika seemed to be saying that he had not yet seen what British protection had done for his country. He reminded Loch that the British Government assurances of 1891 against the Matabele pillage of Barotseland had not been fulfilled as they still continued. He challenged the High Commissioner's faith by reminding him of his letter of September 19, 1891, to Lewanika in which Loch had informed him that he was under the protection of the Queen, and as a proof of it, a representative of Her Majesty was being sent to him. But ever since nothing had been heard of him. Lewanika's letter also reveals that the
King misunderstood European bureaucratic system of government and diplomacy. Since he wrote the first letter to the Queen in January 1889, the King had been expecting to receive a letter directly from Queen Victoria so that letters which he received from the Colonial Office as replies to his letters did not seem to satisfy him. An African King would have sent the reply by special messengers but, alas, Lewanika always received letters through the High Commissioner and in addition these letters had proved until now that they could not be dependent upon.... "The Queen has never sent him any message, Her Government have opened no communication with him and have showed no interest whatever in his welfare and that of his people.... The nation accuse him of having deceived them by holding before their eyes the shadow of the protectorate of Her Majesty the Queen; they say there is no such a thing as a Queen of England, it is a lie invented for the purpose of taking the country." 124

To the above communication Loch replied on October 19, 1893, in a more friendly tone, although he never answered satisfactorily the most pressing needs of King Lewanika, the protection of Her Majesty's Government. Loch regretted that it had been so long before he wrote Lewanika, but as the monthly post had now been established between Lealui

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124 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 26, pp. 36-37. From Rev. F. Coillard, to His Excellency the High Commissioner, Cape Town, February 7, 1893.
and Palapye, future communication would be more frequent and rapid between them. Concerning the Matabele raids into Barotseland, Loch seemed to have lied openly to Lewanika when he told him that Lobengula had been informed that his raiding impis (soldiers) would no longer be permitted. Lewanika was further informed that at that time large white impis were attacking the Matabele to put a stop to the disorder caused by Lobengula's disregard of life and property.\textsuperscript{125} Loch was not being honest with Lewanika when he wrote "Acting under the Great Queen's authority, I am taking active measures to restrain the cruelties of the Matabele, and I trust you and your people may in the future live in peace under the Protection of the Great Queen." In reality, Rhodes' forces were engaged in the war for liquidation of the Matabele Kingdom in violation of the treaty agreement with Lobengula. Furthermore, these troops were in the employ of the Company and commanded by the British Government officers.\textsuperscript{126} Moreover, the High Commissioner seemed not to have realized that Lewanika would know of this from his own sources. In a letter to the High Commissioner of November 27, 1893, Lewanika informed Loch that he had learned that there was war between the Matabele and the

\textsuperscript{125} C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure 2 in No. 26, p. 37. For detailed discussion of the High Commissioner's lies concerning Matabele, see Samkange, \textit{Origins of Rhodesia}, pp. 166-197, 198-208 and 230-256 and in Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia Early Days to 1953}, pp. 82-90.

Queen's Government and the Company. He wanted to know why he had not been informed by Loch or the Company. This apparently made Lewanika concerned for the security of his country. Loch was therefore informed that Lewanika was mobilizing a large army to watch over fords near the junction of the Kafue and Zambesi Rivers, to prevent the Mata-bele from crossing. By this action Lewanika seemed to have indirectly told the High Commissioner that since the Queen's Government was unable to protect him from his enemies, he had to do it himself. Lewanika seemed to have put not much faith in the letters he was receiving from the High Commissioner or from England.

As the British Government experienced difficulties in sending a resident to Barotseland, Lord Kimberly, the Foreign Secretary seems to have decided that the best course was to invite the Company to try to arrange a treaty with Lewanika that would confer on the Company the necessary powers for bringing administration of Barotseland under proper control, it being understood that the Company would try to keep Barotseland affairs in their hands. 127

The Company responded to the April 14th letter on April 26, telling the Foreign Office that the Managing Director in South Africa had been authorized to take the necessary steps to obtain powers of administration and control requisite to enable the Company to establish a settled

127 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 69, p. 85.
government in Barotseland. Again to show that the Company actually made British policy for Barotseland, on July 2, 1894, the Company informed the Foreign Office that Mr. Rhodes proposed to postpone the expedition to Barotseland until he had conferred with the High Commissioner as to whether Barotseland could be more conveniently administered as a portion of Northern Zambesia or in connection with Matabeleland and Mashonaland. To this request Lord Kimberley agreed. On inquiry as to who was responsible for Barotseland, the High Commissioner Loch was informed by the Colonial Office on December 7, 1894, that he should inform Lewanika that his Kingdom was now administered by the Company. An agreement to that effect, having, in November 1894, been entered into between the Foreign Office and the Company.

Since nothing had yet been done to show Lewanika he was under protection of the British Government, he had written a letter on October 30, 1894, which reached the Foreign Office the following year. Sir Henry Loch only forwarded it on January 3, 1895, and asked how the question of the Lochner Concession stood and what arrangements had been made by the Colonial Office for administration of Barotseland. In the Foreign Office reply of February 25, 1895, Loch was informed that a copy of the agreement signed with Rhodes concerning Barotseland had been sent to him. The agreement signed with Rhodes on November 23, 1894, had stipulated that the Company would undertake the direct administration of the portion of the British sphere north
of the Zambesi over which its Charter was extended in 1891; and the Foreign Office therefore suggested that the High Commissioner should confer with Rhodes as to the policy to be adopted toward Lewanika.

THE BAROTSE BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY

It has been pointed out above that the granting of the Lochner Concession on June 27, 1890, anticipated by only four days before the signing of the Anglo-German Agreement which gave Germany access to the Zambesi from the West Coast by means of a narrow strip of land, which extended from Namagualand to the junction of the Linyati River.

This agreement was executed before the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement which assigned to Portugal everything west of the Zambesi down to Katima and Malibo Rapids. But it was subsequently rejected by the Portuguese Parliament, thus giving Cecil Rhodes the chance to reassert his interests by claiming Lewanika's rights up to the 20 East Longitude.

We have seen that in a message of September 8, 1890, Loch had officially informed Lord Knutsford, the Colonial Secretary, that Lewanika, King of the Barotse nation, had been placed under British Protection and that it was evident that a large portion of territory claimed by Portugal had been added to England by lawful sovereign of the country. This message and other similar dispatches from the High Commissioner and the British South Africa Company were the
beginning of the Barotse boundary dispute that brought Lewanika into the international diplomatic tension between Britain and Portugal.

In the Treaty of June 11, 1891, between Great Britain and Portugal, Article IV provides that, "The Western line of division separating the British from the Portuguese sphere of influence in Central Africa shall follow the center of the Channel of the Upper Zambesi, starting from Katima Rapids, up to the point where it reaches the territory of the Barotse Kingdom. That territory shall remain within the British Sphere, its limits to the westward, which will constitute the boundary between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence, being decided by a Joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission, which shall have the power, in case of difference of opinion to appoint an umpire."\(^{128}\) The Article also stipulated that it was understood on both sides that nothing in that Article would affect the existing rights of any other state. Subject to that reservation, Britain would not oppose the extension of Portuguese Administration outside the limits of Barotse country.

When the Treaty of 1891 was signed, the exact boundary of the Barotse seems not to have been known by Europeans. The other frontiers of the British Sphere of influence were defined by reference to geographical lines and to natural

\(^{128}\) C.O. 879/57 No. 8745 Serial No. 229 A. The Marguess of Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, p. 323.
features; but no such a definition was possible in the case of the territory under the power of the Barotse King, it being defined as "the Barotse Kingdom that is, the country in which Lewanika King of the Barotse is Paramount ruler."\(^{129}\)

It was therefore official policy of the government to deem it expedient to assign to the British Sphere of influence provisional boundaries which would be respected until it was possible to ascertain more exactly what were the true limits of the Barotse King's dominions. These boundaries were described in the MODUS VIVENDI established in May–June, 1893, between the Earl of Rosebery, the new Foreign Secretary, and M. de Soevel, the Portuguese Foreign Minister. Even though the Liberals had replaced the Unionists (Conservative-Unionists) in the government, the policy on Barotse boundary dispute seems to have been continued. This policy was aimed at settling the dispute peacefully between the two countries. Therefore in Article V of the Modus Vivendi of May–June, 1893, it was agreed that pending the delimitation of a boundary line as laid down in Article IV of the Treaty of June 11, 1891, the line formed by the course of the Zambesi from the cataracts at Katima up to its confluence with Kabombo River and thence by the course of the Kabombo, was to be the provisional boundary between the prospective spheres in that region, and the provisions of Article VIII of the Treaty above referred to were to be

applicable to the territories separated by the provisional boundary until a definitive boundary was substituted in its stead.\textsuperscript{130}

Article VII of the Modus Vivendi provided for the mutual abrogation of all concessions or rights acquired in the territories adjudged by the definitive demarcation to either power, subsequently to the June 11, 1891, and Article VIII stipulated that no act of the authorities of either power or concessions acquired subsequently to June 11, 1891, in such a territory could be used as a motive for demanding the ratification of the boundary under Article VII of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{131}

The British policy for Barotseland whether under the Liberals or the Unionists (Conservatives and Liberal Unionists) was directed by the reactions of the British South Africa Company. It seems that it was the preservation of the Company's interests that was the cornerstone of British policy. This is revealed by a letter dated May 6, 1895, from Lord Kimberly the Foreign Secretary to the Portuguese Minister to England Mr. Machando. The Portuguese had protested to the British Government for allegedly allowing the British South Africa Company to occupy the Barotse Kingdom. In the letter to the Portuguese, Kimberly seems to depend on information supplied by the Company. He informed the

\textsuperscript{130}C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 38, p. 50.\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., p. 50.
Portuguese Minister that he had learned from the British South Africa Company that no expedition was being sent to Barotseland by them as the Portuguese had expressed fear that the Company was going to occupy the Kingdom. 132
Kimberly further indicated that it was still the aim of the government to settle the matter peacefully. He suggested that the government would have no objection to proceed at once to the delimitation of the Barotse territory contemplated in the notes exchanged between the Earl of Rosebery and Mr. de Soveral of May–June, 1893.

The British Government too seems to have harbored complaints against the Portuguese concerning the situation in Barotseland. Kimberly alluded to the exchange of letters between Mr. de Soveral and Sir Percy Anderson in which Anderson of the Foreign Office had informed the Portuguese Minister that the British Government apprehended the news that Portuguese settlers would occupy the territory claimed by the King of Barotseland. The British Foreign Secretary brought to the attention of the Portuguese Ambassador a pamphlet published in Paris, which contained a text of concession granted to the Portuguese Company called the "Compagne de Mossamedes." In Kimberly's views, it appeared

132 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 38, p. 50. It is interesting to note, however, that the British Government had approved sending Major Forbes a Company representative to Barotseland arguing that the Company had the right to do so. See C.O. 879/75 Enclosure in Nos. 39 and 50, p. 51.

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that the above company had prejudged the result of the delimitation which it was supposed to carry out, and invited the outlay of capital under its conditions in territory which was still the subject of discussion. Kimberly informed the Portuguese official that Her Majesty's Government was unaware of any warning having been given to the Portuguese Company as to the risk of their proceedings and of the fact that the Barotse Kingdom had been claimed to extend as far west as the 20th meridian. He suggested that such a warning should be given and attention of that Company should be called to the provisions of Article VII of Modus Vivendi. Kimberly seems to have encouraged the British South Africa Company to send expeditions into Barotseland while at the same time informing the Portuguese that if their government accepted views expressed in his letter and "undertook to give notice to the Mossamedes Company, and other Portuguese settlers who may propose to enter the country affected by the delimitation, I shall lose no time in making a similar notification to the British South Africa Company."\textsuperscript{133} Meanwhile, on June 6, 1895, the Foreign Office wrote the Colonial Office on the subject of Barotseland. The Foreign Office sent the Secretary of State for the colonies copies of communication that had been addressed to the Portuguese Minister to England and the British South Africa Company, respectively. Sir Piercy Anderson of the

\footnote{C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in 38, pp. 50-51. -132-}
Foreign Office apparently wanted the Colonial Office to instruct the High Commissioner to make sure that British interests in Barotseland would not be undermined by the Portuguese activities there. The Commissioner was to be entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the Portuguese would respect their obligations under the Modus Vivendi of 1893. "I am to request that the High Commissioner may be instructed to take such steps as he may think necessary to call attention to the provisions of the 7th Article of the arrangement with Portugal of June, 1893, relating to claims in the territory which is to be delimited by the Mixed Commission." The Barotse boundary dispute seems to have brought the active participation of the Foreign Office in the formulation of the overall British policy for the Kingdom. In one communication with Portugal of June 6, 1895, the Foreign Office acknowledged the receipt of the Portuguese note of May 31, 1895, in which the Foreign Office was informed that Portugal was to address a letter to the Mossamedes Company warning them that the occupation of territory referred to in the Modus Vivendi of May and June the previous year could only be of temporary nature, and on condition that the British Government made a similar notification to the British South Africa Company. The Portuguese seemed also to be willing to appoint delegates to carry out the delimitation of the Barotse boundary as soon

134 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure No. 41, p. 52. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, June 6, 1895.
as the British Commission for the same purpose had been nominated. The Foreign Office apparently agreed and notified the Colonial Office that the necessary notification had been sent to the British South Africa Company and that the British delegates to the Boundary Commission were being considered without delay.

In another note on June 6, 1895, the Foreign Office official informed the Colonial Office that "With reference to the recent correspondence on the subject of Barotseland, I am directed by the Earl of Kimberley to inform you that the Portuguese Government have made proposals for the immediate delimitation of the frontier of that territory, respecting which the Modus Vivendi, agreed to in June, 1891, is now in force, and that they have been accepted by Her Majesty's Government."

Mr. Anderson of the Foreign Office informed the Secretary of the British South Africa Company during the same month of the information sent to the Colonial Office. In addition, he wrote the Company's Secretary that Lord Kimberley's proposals had been agreed to by the Portuguese Government on the understanding that H. M. Government would give similar warning as regards to British claims in the territory affected by the delimitation. "I am accordingly to request that the directors will take measures to ensure that the provisions of the 7th Article are clearly understood.

\[135\] C.O. 879/75 No. 8854, Enclosure 2 in No. 41, p. 52.
by the British subjects who may seek to acquire or may claim
to have acquired since June 11, 1891, rights in that
territory."\textsuperscript{136}

On December 18, 1895, Lord Salisbury, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs informed the Colonial Office on a
note he had received from the Portuguese Charge d'Affairs in
London, M. Machando, who had informed the British Government
that due to unforeseen circumstances it would not be possible
to finish the delimitation of the Barotse boundary before
the date of the termination of the Modus Vivendi of May and
June 1893, and requested prolongation for a further period
of two years from the date of its termination. This meant
that the boundary issue could not be negotiated before July
1898. The Portuguese Minister believed that if the British
Government concurred with his proposal, it would have the
most favorable effect on relations that happily existed be-
tween the two countries. Machado informed Salisbury that
his government would await the nomination of the British
delegates in order to appoint Portuguese delegates.\textsuperscript{137}

In his letter dated December 5, 1895, to the British
South Africa Company, Mr. T. H. Sanderson of the Foreign
Office informed the Company of note from Portugal on the
subject of the Barotse boundary Commission. The Company was
informed that H. M. Government was ready to appoint delegates

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 53.

to the Boundary Commission and it was not possible to complete the delimitation before July next, when the Modus Vivendi of May and June, 1893, came to an end. The government proposed to prolong the Modus Vivendi for a further term of two years, until July 1, 1898, should the work of delimitation not be finished before that date. Lord Salisbury wanted to know if the Company concurred to this proposal before he replied to the Portuguese.

This note and the government plan to prolong the delimitation proceedings were accepted by the Company in their letter to the Foreign Office, dated December 11, 1895. Herbert Canning, Secretary of the Company, wrote to say that his directors had no objection to the proposal and suggested that the appointment of British delegates should be delayed until the Company's Resident Commissioner would have had time and opportunity to collect in the country itself the necessary evidence as to the actual boundaries of the Barotse Kingdom. 138

The prolonged solution to the boundary issue and the determination of the British Government to deal with Lewanika through the Company seems to have convinced Lewanika that he should do business with the Company. He began to write to the British representative in the Chartered Company territories of Mashonaland and Matebeleland, Dr. L. Star Jameson, on the subject of the fulfillment of the Treaty agreements.

138 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosures 2 and 3 in No. 46, pp. 61-62.
Jameson who had begun as Rhodes' friend in South Africa had by the 1880's become a personal representative of Rhodes in his schemes for the expansion north of the Limpopo River. It was Jameson who organized the first white settlers who invaded and occupied Mashonaland against the King of Mata-bele's wishes in 1890. In 1891, Jameson was appointed "Chief Magistrate of the Territory" by the High Commissioner. The title of Chief Magistrate seems to have been disregarded by the directors of the Company who authorized Jameson to assume the title of "Administrator," which was accepted by the British Government in 1894.\textsuperscript{139} It has been noted above that in July of 1892, Lewanika had been encouraged to communicate with the Company through its representative at Bulawayo, Dr. Jameson. During the year 1895, Lewanika had sent an undated letter to Jameson to say he had been convinced by the assurance of the High Commissioner that the British South Africa Company's Commissioner was, indeed, the representative of Her Majesty's Government. He intended to abide by the agreement. Lewanika had learned that many white people were coming to Barotseland through Bulawayo. He would be ready to welcome all those who came in the name of the British South Africa Company but could not grant this permission to anyone else to carry on business in the country. The King wanted to know if what he had learned was true. Were all

\textsuperscript{139} Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, p. 277. For more detailed discussion of the conquest of Matabele and Mashonaland, see Section II of this chapter.

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those who were coming registered with the Company in Bulawayo? He wondered how they could be registered since the Company had agreed that "the country will not be thrown open for immigration without the consent of the King and his people." 140

In realization that he was soon losing control of his country, Lewanika wrote that he had learned that some of those white people intended to enter the country and cross the Zambesi River at different places in violation of his agreement with the Company. The agreement called for Europeans to enter Barotseland by the drift at Kazungula only, exception to that had to be by the consent of the King. Lewanika, therefore, asked Jameson if the Company intended not to keep its agreement. To this exchange, Jameson, then as British South Africa Company's Administrator in Bulawayo, Matabeleland, replied to Lewanika on August 13, 1895.

Jameson's reply to Lewanika clearly reveals that British Government whether Conservative or Liberal, depended on Rhodes and his company to make policy not only for Barotseland but also for the rest of the territory that came to be called Rhodesia. James informed Lewanika that the matter of sending a British Resident to Lealui was being considered by Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Rhodes and that "it was hoped that a representative of Her Majesty's Government would go up this year accompanied by a represen-

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140 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 42, pp. 53–54. -138-
tative of the British South Africa Company. This, I hope, may still be carried out this year; if not this year, it will certainly be next year." 141

As many white prospectors began to enter Barotseland in large numbers claiming to have been sent by the Company, Lewanika became more anxious to receive the long overdue representative of the British Government with whom he could consult on how to deal with the explosive situation then prevailing in the Kingdom. A letter from Lewanika to Jameson of July 3, 1895 and subsequent replies from the Company show again that the Company made British policy for Barotseland. Lewanika wished to know the Company's policy and that of the British Government toward his country. Lewanika's letter in reality explains what the British Government policy for Barotseland had been from 1890 to 1895. The King wrote that the High Commissioner's dispatches, "maintains that the British South Africa Company, is indeed, in this country the representative of the Queen's Government. I am slow of understanding the ways of white people, but I have submitted myself, and I have waited to see what would be done. The agreement of the 27th June 1890, distinctly declares that the Company undertakes and agrees to appoint and maintain a Resident Magistrate with a suitable escort to reside permanently with me. In his dispatches also, His Excellancy, Sir H. Loch, again and again promises that first

141 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 42, p. 54.
a Mr. Johnston and then some other officer appointed by the Queen would be sent to me; these have all been promises. Five years have now passed and I have strained my eyes to welcome him in vain, and now before he has come, my country is invaded by Europeans, who seem bent on mischief. Who shall be responsible for the consequences?"142

The situation had gone from bad to worse so that even Coillard felt it necessary to write Dr. Jameson in order to reinforce to him what Lewanika had been saying. Lewanika seemed to be willing to welcome those Europeans who were entering the country but the general population resented it. He informed Jameson that the impression was spreading among the people that those pioneering white men were being brought in order to excite the people, provoke and foster disturbances which would bring on war, so that the country could be conquered from the King and his people. This is exactly what had happened in Matabeleland before its occupation by white settlers under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes.

Coillard's letter also reveals that the Company had been dishonest with Lewanika and so was the British Government. "Although the King is very friendly disposed and anxious to be on good terms with the Company, the impression, I believe, has never been entirely removed from his mind that he has not been fairly and honestly dealt with in the Company's transactions with him. It is much to be

142 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 42, p. 55.
regretted that, unintentionally though it be, anything should be done so as to confirm such pretensions."143 Coillard's letter further reveals that white men did not honor their dealings with African rulers of the late nineteenth century. Other rulers of Central Africa such as Kings Lobengula and Khama seem to have found themselves signing agreements which turned out to be hollow pieces of paper which were then used as the basis for occupation of their countries for the benefit of the particular European country or company.144 Even though the British South Africa Company had bound itself to place and maintained a resident with King Lewanika, nothing seems to have been done since the signing of the agreement earlier. The Company appears to have started asserting its authority in Barotseland by sending in parties of prospectors and diggers even before they had a representative to control them and protect the African population from the consequences of this intrusion. Neither the British Government nor the Company apparently thought it necessary to inform Lewanika about their coming and yet those prospectors seem to have had the Company's permission. This is revealed by Jameson's letter of August 13, 1895 to Lewanika in which he said among others, "Mr. Burnham is no way a representative of the British South

143 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 42, p. 56.

144 For detailed information on occupation of Matabele and Mashona Kingdoms and Bechuanaland, see Samkange, Origins of Rhodesia, pp. 68-183; Cloete, African Portraits, pp. 194-238; Jameson, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 210-214, 280-282, 285-286.
Africa Company, but has been sent up, with the permission of the Chartered Company, by some English people to report on the mineral and other prospects...."\(^{145}\) This was clearly in violation of treaty agreement with Lewanika.

In a letter of September 5, 1895 to Rev. Coillard, Jameson again shows that the Company policy for Barotseland until that time was one of sending out parties of prospectors in order to ascertain the sources of minerals. As to the coming of the British Resident, the Company seems to have taken no action to speed up the matter since 1891. Jameson informed Coillard that parties of prospectors led by Burham and Ingram had nothing whatsoever to do with his company, but were sent up by the Bechuanaland Exploration Company, with his permission, "to simply report upon prospects of the country, and they were especially instructed on no account to interfere with natives. In the future, any prospecting parties proceeding to Barotseland, with the permission of the Company, will be furnished with a letter of introduction to Lewanika from the Company."\(^{146}\) These incidents only go to show that the Company was still attempting to ascertain the availability of mineral resources in Barotseland before it could start fulfilling its treaty obligations to Lewanika. Moreover, the Company on which the British Government depended on administering the affairs

\(^{145}\) C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 43, pp. 53-54.

\(^{146}\) C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 42, p. 57.
of Barotseland seems to have been slow in sending a Resident because the expected discovery of gold and other minerals in large quantities in the north had not yet been realized. Deep level mining in the Transvaal in 1894 had brought about a boom which clearly indicated the true sources of gold in South Africa. Hence, the white settlers and other commercial groups whose interest would have generated Company operations in the north now seemed interested in going to the Transvaal.\(^{147}\) Rhodes and his friends now seemed to have turned their attention to the means of getting control of the Transvaal in order to ensure imperial domination. "Rhodes and Jameson talked openly of capturing the Republican Citadel to free the Uitlanders. There were rumors of risings and fears of civil war on the Rand. The High Commissioner, Loch, looked to a reoccupation of the Transvaal as the quickest way to reassert supremacy."\(^{148}\)

Part II

ACQUISITION OF OTHER TERRITORIES IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN ZAMBESIA

While Rhodes' British South Africa Company was being considered for a charter in March 1889, Rhodes met Johnston, British Consul in Mozambique and handed him a check for £2,000 for treaty making in the interior of Central Africa


\(^{148}\)Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, p. 419.
on behalf of the Company.\footnote{Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia}, p. 61.} The Foreign Office, however, decided to pay for Johnston's treaty making expenses in Malawi. Outside Malawi, Johnston was permitted to make use of Rhodes' finances for expansion of British influence. This treaty making in Central Africa at that period was aimed at giving Britain a claim to the territory between the Zambesi and Lakes Malawi and Tanganyika. It has been noted above that the High Commissioner for South Africa recommended that the Government secure northern Zambesia so as to secure a continuous link between the Cape Colony and Lakes Malawi and Tanganyika. Lord Knutsford, the Colonial Secretary, then urged the Foreign Office to extend the proposed British South Africa Company's field of operations north of the Zambesi in order to alleviate the Government of financial burdens and diplomatic complications.\footnote{C.O. 879/28 Enclosure in No. 538 Serial No. 49, p. 59. See also Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, \textit{Africa and the Victorians}, pp. 227-229.} Rhodes had offered to bear the expenses of administration of these territories besides those for treaty making with African rulers in the Lakes Malawi and Tanganyika region. Johnston sent out other British agents to make treaties in territories lying to the east and northeast of Barotseland. It should be noted also that Rhodes' business and political interests were based in South Africa and therefore in his northward expansion he seems to have needed no interruption if his
schemes for railways and telegraphs were to be realized. Since 1887, Rhodes had become interested in acquiring Matabeleland for the development of his company. He was aware that Portugal, the Transvaal as well as Germany were interested in the same territory. Acting through British officials in South Africa, Rhodes managed to get John Moffat, Assistant British Administrator in Bechuanaland, to secure a treaty from Lobengula, King of the Matabele and Mashonaland, on February 11, 1888. In the treaty, Lobengula allegedly agreed to "refrain from entering any correspondence or treaty with any Foreign State or power or to sell, alienate or cede, or permit or countenance any sale, alienation or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under the chieftainship or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa." The British Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, endorsed this treaty on behalf of his government. The Foreign Office then used this treaty as a basis for keeping out Portugal, Germany and the Transvaal from Matabeleland and Mashonaland. During the same year, working through Reverend C. D. Helm, a missionary highly trusted by King Lobengula, Rhodes secured the Rudd Concession from the King. The Rudd Conces-


152 Cited in Samkange, Origins of Rhodesia, pp. 57-58. This treaty seems to have been necessary for Rhodes in order to counteract the treaty the King had made in 1887 with the Transvaal Republic, the Grobler Treaty. For more details, see pp. 56-63.
sion was secured by Mr. Charles Dunnell Rudd, leader of the
delegation sent by Rhodes to Matabeleland for the purpose
of obtaining a concession from Lobengula. As it was later
done in Barotseland, deceit and trickery were used in ob-
taining this treaty in 1888. Reverend C. D. Helm, the
Senior Missionary in Matabeleland who was highly trusted
by King Lobengula, advised him to grant the concession to
Rhodes' group over other rival concession seekers. What
the King did not know was that Helm was himself in Rhodes' pay.153 Rudd, on behalf of Rhodes agreed to pay Lobengula
and his heirs £100 per month, one thousand rifles together
with one hundred thousand rounds of ball cartridges, and
also a steamboat with guns suitable for defense on the
Zambesi. In return, Lobengula allegedly granted to Rudd
"the complete and exclusive charge over all metals and
minerals situated and contained in my Kingdoms, principali-
ties and dominions together with full power to do all things
that they may deem necessary to win and produce the same and
to hold, collect and enjoy the profits and revenues...I do
hereby authorize the said grantees, their heirs, representa-
tives and assigns to take all necessary and lawful steps
to exclude from my Kingdom, principalities and dominions all
persons seeking land, metals, minerals or mining rights
therein..."154 The white men employed in mining would be

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154 This concession is cited in Samkange, pp. 77-79. The King later denied having granted such a concession. See
pledged to assist in the defense of the country from invasion.

After Rudd and his party had left the country a German speculator seemed right when he asked the Matabele King, "Do you know what you have done King? You have sold your whole country. It is not gold Rhodes wants, it is your land. Thousands will come. They will rob your cattle, and your women."\textsuperscript{155} Despite Lobengula's attempt to repudiate the allegations that he had granted a concession to Rudd by even sending a deputation to the Queen with a letter for that purpose, Rhodes' camp discredited the King's contention. Worse than that the Colonial Office accepted Rhodes' version of the story. In doing this Knutsford showed once again that British Policy for South Africa, and north and south of the Zambesi was controlled by Rhodes. Robinson seems to have put it more correctly when he asserts that "whatever Rhodes and the company did, it would be difficult indeed for imperial government to affront South African opinion and take away his charter--and he knew it. Henceforward, he was able to act as if he were an independent power in South Africa."\textsuperscript{156} Moreover, Rhodes' financial

\textsuperscript{155}Cloete, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{156}Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, \textit{Africa and the Victorians}, p. 244. Moreover, Rhodes seems to have made sure that important British officials in South Africa were his proteges. For example, the High Commissioner Robinson, 1893–1897, Sir Sidney Shippard, Administrator of Bechuanaland since 1888, and his assistant, John Moffat, were all Rhodes
resources would seem to have been helpful in imperial expansion in this region of Africa. After 1889, Rhodes' schemes for Southern and Northern Zambesia appear to have become connected with his plans for South Africa as it has been noted above. Rhodes himself gave this reason for wanting to acquire concessions, "I want the power to go to the north to carry out expansion there, and I think the Company might assist me in the work. I believe everything they give will be returned: but even if it were lost, it is a very fair case for the doctrine of ransom."\(^{157}\)

After receiving the support of the British Government over the dispute with Lobengula, Rhodes now decided to pay £88,000 to Mr. Frank Johnston to equip an army of invasion of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. When all was ready Rhodes asked for the sanction of the British Government through the High Commissioner. Even though local British officials recommended that the home government should permit an invasion of Lobengula's territory, because of alleged Portuguese and Boer movements afoot to occupy Mashonaland, the Secretary of State seems to have rejected the idea of sanctioning the idea of sanctioning the invasion of either Mashonaland or Matabeleland without Lobengula's consent.\(^{158}\) It is interesting to note that a few days later in February 1890, the


\(^{158}\) Samkange, pp. 172-174.

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High Commissioner reported to the Colonial Secretary that he had received a telegram from Rhodes claiming that King Lobengula had accepted the Company's occupation of Mashonaland. The High Commissioner again played Rhodes' game by informing the Colonial Secretary that due to the threatened Boer trek into Mashonaland, he had sanctioned the expenditure for the British South Africa Company for five hundred police instead of two hundred and fifty. He requested the authority to sanction the movement of the Company forces if necessary.\footnote{Samkange, pp. 174-175.} This request was not granted for fear that the sanctioning of Company forces might lead to a war with the Boers.

Again the British government policy seems to have been made for them by Rhodes. Even though the Colonial Secretary had rejected all requests so far for permission to occupy Mashonaland or Matabeleland without Lobengula's consent, Rhodes decided to engage Khama's men to assist in the construction of the road to be used in the invasion of the country. By convincing the Government that both the Portuguese and the Boers were sending settlers into Mashonaland, Rhodes received the Foreign Office's sanction for advance of the Company's armed police force into Mashonaland. The Colonial Secretary therefore advised the High Commissioner that he was authorized to exercise discretion as to the advance of British South Africa Company into Lobengula's territory. The Colonial Secretary also advised his repre-
sentative in South Africa that it was important to obtain from the King a promise to afford assistance to the Company, if needed, against the Boers from the Transvaal. Rhodes appears to have been able to get this way also by informing the High Commissioner that Lobengula had consented to the advance of Rhodes' forces into his Kingdom. Even though this was not true, the High Commissioner agreed. If he had independently checked with Lobengula he would have learned the truth. But he seems to have trusted Rhodes' words more. Thus with British Government approval Rhodes' "pioneer" settlers, semi-military in character, were accompanied by five hundred well equipped police force in the invasion of Lobengula's territory on June 27, 1890, the very day Lochner had obtained a concession from King Lewanika of Barotseland. Among the white settlers were people from the United States and every part of the British empire. The worst characters that one could imagine, some of whom were white savages like Johann Colebrander who took part in the invasion of a peaceful Kingdom. Rhodes seemed to have planned a war with Lobengula which came in a few years again with the sanction of Her Majesty's

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161 Ibid., p. 182.

162 Cloete, African Portraits, pp. 236-237; Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, pp. 75-77, and 97-99.
Government. This was achieved by provoking Lobengula. The King at this time told one of the trusted white men this, "I gave Ulodzi and Dakatela leave to dig for gold--Ulodzi was the African pronunciation for Rhodes, and Dakatela meant Doctor James--"yet they have brought up an army and the land is full of young men who call it their own. Am I then no longer King? Is Dakatela King? Why do they do these things in my country"? It seems that Rhodes had promised the white pioneer settlers land, gold, loot and other advantages to those who would come to Mashonaland. The British Government seems to have been unaware of this promise to white settlers. Rhodes believed that once the King of the Matabele had been crushed, the Matabele gold will be available to the Company which would be bound to make a profit because the expenses for defense would be unnecessary. The Company then claimed that their telegraph wires had been cut by the Mashonas and then it began to impound the King's cattle in the area. Lobengula had to send his impis (soldiers) to recover his cattle and punish the wire thieves. These impis were shot down by the Company men and this provocation led to the war

163 Samkange, Origins of Rhodesia, pp. 198-257; Cloete, African Portraits, pp. 238-256; Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 71.


166 Cloete, African Portraits, p. 245.
with the Matabele. The Matabele war of 1893 resulted in the defeat of Lobengula's army and to his death. Lobengula had done everything possible to avoid war but Rhodes' Company was bent on his destruction.167 After the conquest of the Matabeleland and Mashonaland, "the capital of the Company was increased from one to two million pounds by an issue of a million new shares. No wonder Rhodes was pleased with his settlers."168 Under the Matabele Order in Council, 1894, the Company's rights were defined in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland by the Colonial Office; it provided for an appointment of an Administrator and Council by the Company, subject to the Colonial Secretary's approval. Thus very extensive powers were placed in the Company's hands. This seems like a good example of the Company being given the initiative in the formation of British policy for Central Africa. Rhodes seems to have been master of this policy.

Rhodes continued to expand his economic and political power northward while plans for Lobengula's destruction were being implemented. The year 1890 was extremely important for Rhodes. In July of that year he became Prime

167 Hole, p. 132; Mitchell, Cecil Rhodes, pp. 84-89. For Lobengula's efforts to avert a war with the white men, see Samkange, pp. 243-265 and Cloete, pp. 243-254.

168 Cloete, pp. 254-255. The same idea is discussed in Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, pp. 251-253, and in Mitchell, Cecil John Rhodes, pp. 130-133.
Minister of the Cape Colony which made the British Government pay attention to all his schemes for imperial and economic expansion northward. As we have noted above his aims for northern Zambesia were to keep a continuous line of communication to the Lakes Tanganyika and Malawi. We have noted that in the Lake Nyasa (Malawi) area the African Lakes Company supported by Scottish missionaries had been fighting with the East Coast traders for political and economic control there. Rhodes now agreed to subsidize the African Lakes Company by £20,000 which led to its subsequent absorption by the British South Africa Company. Rhodes' company also agreed to spend money for the purpose of maintaining law and order north of the Zambesi and for the protection of the mission stations there.169 Nyasaland (Malawi) itself as we have seen was placed under imperial administration because the missionaries had objected to being placed under Company rule. The rest of northern Zambesia was left in the hands of the Company. This Company seems to have been given the initiative in the policy formulation by the agreement of 1891. In February that year, the Company and the British Government agreed that the Company would pay £10,000 a year for the police force which was to be controlled by Her Majesty's Commissioner for Central Africa, Mr. Harry H. Johnston.170 Moreover, the

169 Cited in Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 69 and in Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, pp. 94-95.

170 Gann, pp. 69-70; Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, p. 249; Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, p. 381.

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police could be engaged in either Micasaland proper or in the Company's territory at his discretion. Even though administrative control over the Company's territories was to be exercised by Her Majesty's Commissioner, the Government seems not to have had the policy initiative because Johnston was required to exercise his authority on behalf of the Company rather than for the Government and had no power to veto the appointment of Company officers in its territory. Justice was to be administered in accordance with the Africa Order in Council, 1889, by which judicial powers could be granted to consular officers in specified parts of Africa.\footnote{171} Mr. Harry Johnston was appointed Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul General for the territories under British influence north of the Zambesi.

In July 1891, the British sphere of influence beyond the Zambesi was constituted as a local jurisdiction under the Africa Order in Council, 1889, for which the Supreme Court of Cape Colony became the highest court of appeal. In November 1894, a new agreement was reached between the Company and the Foreign Office. Control of the chartered Company sphere north of the Zambesi was withdrawn from Johnston's control and transferred to the Company beginning June 30, 1895. The treaties made by the Company with African rulers were sanctioned by the Government. The British Central Africa Protectorate became the responsibility

\footnote{171}Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia}, p. 70; Hole, \textit{The Making of Rhodesia}, pp. 381-385.
of the Foreign Office.\textsuperscript{172} The Protectorate authorities in Nyasaland began a systematic conquest of the area in Northeastern Zambia. Johnston's defeat of the East Coast traders who had been established at the North end of Lake Malawi seems to have cut off supplies from the east for those African communities that had become strong and dependent on free communication from the East African coast. This in turn helped to weaken the power of the Bemba rulers to the north and the Lunda of the Luapula river basin. The Bemba whose country was poor, dry, and unproductive depended on trade and war in order to get supplies. This had made it possible for them to become partners of the East Coast traders. Thus the destruction of the Bemba economic system apparently brought about facionalism among the Bembas and further weakened them when what they needed was to unite against the encroaching missionaries and the Company agents who went about making treaties with various rulers in the area which established the Company in the region of the upper Kafue River which subsequently became the economic heartland of Zambia (Northern Rhodesia). By 1899, the Bemba power had been destroyed by the B.S.A. Company.\textsuperscript{173} The Lunda

\textsuperscript{172} Gann, p. 74 and in Hole, pp. 384-385.

ruler was therefore isolated after the destruction of the Bemba and the Muslim power. The Company brought in its troops and by October 1899, the ruler Kazembe was defeated. This left only the Ngoni Kingdom led by King Mpeseni as free African community in the area not under any European influence. Mpeseni seems to have known that British Protection only meant loss of his power. The Ngoni ruler therefore refused to make any treaties with the Company agents, Joseph Thompson and Alfred Sharpe, and tried to negotiate with the Portuguese. But when in 1897 Johnston informed the Foreign Office of the importance of Mpeseni's country for the strategic continuous link with Tanganyika, Mpeseni's independence was short lived.\textsuperscript{174} Moreover, he was the only African ruler in Central Africa who had not accepted British "protection." An expedition was organized against him by the Company and supported by the Central African Protectorate Administration on December 29, 1897. Even though the Ngonis managed to mobilize 10,000 men to face the Company's forces equipped with modern weapons, they were defeated by February 1898 because they used outmoded weapons.\textsuperscript{175} This brought all of Northern Zambesia under the British South Africa Company influence.

\textsuperscript{174}Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia}, p. 88; Hall, \textit{Zambia}, pp. 29-30, 81-82, and 89-91.

\textsuperscript{175}Gann, pp. 87-92; Hall, pp. 89-91.
BRITISH POLICY AFTER 1895 FOR BAROTSELAND
AND RHODESIA GENERALLY

The year 1895 was one that brought many changes in South Africa as far as the British policy was concerned and especially its policy toward Barotseland and Rhodesia in general. Sir Henry Loch's term of office as High Commissioner ended that year. He seems to have been frustrated in his duties especially when he found himself on many occasions overruled by the Colonial Office in favor of Rhodes' schemes. In 1893, for instance, Sir Henry had asked for authority to control the Company's dealings with Lobengula which he felt might lead to war with the Company. Knutsford rejected the request\(^{176}\) and instead allowed the Company to have a free hand in making the policy for Matabeleland. Thus when his term expired in that year Sir Henry left South Africa immediately without even waiting for the arrival of his successor, Sir Hercules Robinson. Loch had seemingly angered Rhodes who seems to have had control of British policy for South Africa and northern Zambesia and therefore disliked imperial control which Sir Henry had tried to exercise. The selection of Loch's successor reveals once more that Rhodes was the master of British policy for Southern and Central Africa. Rhodes' nominee

\(^{176}\) Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, pp. 252-253.
for the position, Sir Hercules Robinson, was appointed High Commissioner. This seems to have been done against even the wishes of Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, and several of her Cabinet Ministers. Lord Ripon, the Colonial Secretary explained: "...More especially Mr. Rhodes has very much to be taken into account. The position between him and Sir H. Loch is now greatly strained...Sir Robinson would be acceptable to Mr. Rhodes, in fact, the latter asked for him..."\(^{177}\) This appointee, Sir Hercules, would be expected to make Rhodes' policy the official British policy for any given territory in this region. He seems to have been a protege of Rhodes since the late eighteen eighties when as High Commissioner he supported Rhodes' commercial interests in Matabeleland against those of his rivals. Moreover, in his communications to the Colonial Office during his tenure of office, Robinson seemed to expound the line of policy advocated by Mr. Rhodes. He was known to object to the policy of northern expansion from the Cape Colony under direct British responsibility because this would have interfered with Rhodes' political and economic interests.\(^{178}\) In a public banquet before leaving England to assume the position of High Commissioner for South Africa in 1888, Robinson declared

\(^{177}\) Cited in Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, p. 253.

\(^{178}\) For a detailed discussion of Sir Hercules Robinson's policy in South Africa, see Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, pp. 235-274, and pp. 423-427 and also, Garvin, Volume 2, pp. 138-143 and pp. 465-467.
that imperialism ought to be regarded as "a diminishing quantity."\textsuperscript{179}

Another important event that affected British policy for South Africa and Central Africa was that on June 28, 1895, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary. Chamberlain was considered the leader of new imperialism and a firm believer in British expansion in tropical lands. He seems to have had an intense interest in Colonial expansion for as early as 1888, he was writing Miss Mary Endicott, his future wife, on the issue of South Africa. "The whole question of the Government of South Africa and our relations with native tribes is very interesting and difficult. I mean some day to be Colonial Minister and to deal with it, and I should much like to pay a visit to the Cape--but shall we ever get time for this...."\textsuperscript{180} He appears to have convinced many people in England that Britain should remain in Egypt in order to protect her honor and economic and strategic interests. It was apparently from this period, 1890, that he began to be considered as the leader of the new imperialism. When he became Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain embarked on his forward policy by which he meant an attempt to develop and expand crown estates, draw the self-governing colonies to Britain, increase imperial trade, and above all, to save British hegemony in

\textsuperscript{179}Cited in Garvin, Volume 2, pp. 465-466.

\textsuperscript{180}Garvin, \textit{The Life of Joseph Chamberlain}, Volume 2, p. 347.
South and Central Africa. When Chamberlain assumed the post of Colonial Secretary, he found that Germany was working hard to keep Britain isolated in the world. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, and Chamberlain seem to have based their diplomacy therefore on the goal of breaking this German policy. Chamberlain found that Germany was established on both sides in Southern Africa and as he saw it, it was the question of who would control Central and Southern Africa. Because of the discovery of the gold fields and other minerals in the area, Chamberlain believed that Britain must do her best to ensure control of Southern Africa. He was afraid that Germany would move in if Britain shrunk from her responsibility. "There is only one alternative and that is that we should frankly face our obligations and responsibilities. We should maintain firmly and resolutely our hold over the territories that we have already acquired and we should offer freely our protectorate to those friendly chiefs and peoples who are stretching out their hands towards us.... We have suffered much in this country from depression of trade. We know how many of our fellow subjects who are at this moment unemployed. Is there any man in his senses who believes that the crowded population of these islands could exist for a single day if we

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were to cut a drift from the great dependencies which now look to us for protection and which are the natural markets for our trade...."182 Moreover, Chamberlain's belief in imperialism is revealed by his speech to an audience in Birmingham in 1895, before he became Colonial Secretary. He said, "It was not enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world's surface unless you can make the best of them, unless you are willing to develop them. We are landlords of a great estate; it is the duty of the landlord to develop his estate...in my opinion, it would be the wisest course for the Government of this country to use British capital and British credit in order to create an instrument of trade (i.e., railways) in all...new important countries...."183 He believed that in doing all this would give impetus to British Commerce and industry in the manufacturing of machinery which in the long run would earn for Britain large economic rewards. When Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary he must have been aware that in order for his Southern Africa policies to succeed he would have to deal with Cecil Rhodes, who as we have noted was considered the master of South Africa and its policies.184 As

183 Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism, p. 68.
184 Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. 3, p. 31 and my previous discussion of the British policy above; I have attempted to show that Rhodes made policy for the British Government as far as South and Central African affairs were concerned.
head of the British South Africa Company, Rhodes seems to have created an autonomous empire within the British empire, for his territories north of the Transvaal were larger than France and Germany combined. While in South Africa proper he was by 1895 the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and he overshadowed the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, the man he had nominated for that position. He was a member of the Privy Council and the late Liberal Government of Lord Rosebery had promised him a large territorial increase by transfer to the Company of the Bechuana territory that stretch between the Cape Colony and Rhodesia.  

Rhodes who was used to getting his policies approved by the home government without hesitation is reported to have been horrified to learn that Chamberlain had become Colonial Secretary. He would have preferred a weaker Secretary like Lord Knutsford or Ripon. Chamberlain seemed a strong personality to be easily manipulated by Rhodes.

On July 9, 1895 Rhodes took the initiative to write Chamberlain to congratulate him and make demands on the new Colonial Secretary. Instead of asking that the promised piece of territory in Bechuanaland be handed over to his Company, Rhodes now demanded that the whole of Bechuanaland Protectorate be handed over at once. "...You will find if you look at correspondence that Protectorate is promised to Charter, it is merely questions when you will hand over

\[185\text{Op. cit., p. 32}\]

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Chamberlain's reply of July 31, 1895 seems conciliatory but not satisfactory to Rhodes. "...I am very glad to have your letter of 9 inst. and do not doubt that we shall be able to co-operate cordially for the mutual interests of the Colony and the United Kingdom. As far as I understand your main lines of policy I believe that I am in general agreement with you, and if we ever differ on points of detail I hope that as sensible men of business we shall be able to give and take, and so come to an understanding. Your letter reached me after my assent to the Bechuanaland annexation had been given in terms of what I think you will consider reasonable and which will not, I think hamper your operations. I could not now—even if I were disposed—pretend to impose further conditions—either as to customs or to native rights." Rhodes had demanded the whole Protectorate which covered about 275,000 square miles but Chamberlain had approved only the promised strip of land in that territory of about 25,000 square miles. In this action Chamberlain seems to have tried to regain initiative in British Policy for Southern Africa from Rhodes. Chamberlain seems to have decided not to transfer the whole Protectorate to Rhodes' company until he had studied the matter fully because the Khama and other chiefs in the Protectorate objected to their territory being transferred.

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to the Company. They had realized what the Company had done in Matabele and Mashonaland. 188 After much discussion between the Colonial Secretary and Rhodes' agents in London, it was agreed to transfer to the Company about 100,000 square miles of the Protectorate territory. This was to be used by the Company for railway construction from Mafeking to Rhodes' territories in the north. Administrative rights over this ceded territory was also acquired by the Company based on the High Commissioner's recommendation. 189 Rhodes apparently had plans for the Transvaal and wanted to control Bechuanaland to provide a link with his territories in Matabele and Mashonaland. The railway zone from Mafeking was from six to ten miles wide and adjoined the Transvaal frontier. But Rhodes' main reason for acquiring the strip of land for railway construction seems to have been his intent on destroying the government of the South African Republic or the Transvaal which he would then make part of the federation of South Africa under British influence. Had he not succeeded in destroying the King of the Matabele and Mashona people. His plans were therefore to use this Bechuanaland territory for nourishing and supplying the Uitlanders in the Transvaal who were expected to rise against the Kruger regime in the Transvaal in 1895. 190 Thus by now


190 Lewis, Cecil John Rhodes, pp. 134-138. Garvin, Vol. -164-
the Company had acquired a base on the Transvaal frontier and it also controlled police in its other territories and had received from Chamberlain control of police in this Bechuana base.

Therefore when Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary South African situation had become the most pressing issue for the Colonial Office. From the raid on Transvaal of 1895 which was organized by Rhodes' company to 1914, South Africa "was the focus of empire in British politics, and its challenge was concentrated, severe and decisive." 191 This combined with Chamberlain's belief that the imperial government should support private enterprise in fostering for mineral and commercial development which would reinforce the imperial factor, meant that the Government's policy for Barotseland would be left at the initiative of the Company just as the previous governments had done.

Moreover, leaving the policy initiative in the hands of the Company meant control of this policy by a man who did not believe in protecting the rights of African rulers and their people. Cecil Rhodes' company from which the policy for Barotseland and Rhodesia generally originated until 1895, believed that the government should sleep while he consolidated his gains in the north and southern Zambesia. He believed that Africans existed for supplying the white man

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with labor,\textsuperscript{192} and therefore he taxed them in order to
induce them to seek employment in South African and Rho-
desian mines. Rhodes agreed wholeheartedly with the view
of the Boers regarding Africans. He saw them as others did,
as the source of all labor in Africa, and realized the
necessity of creating a labor pool from which natives
could be drawn when needed by means of taxes that they had
to work to earn, and by encouraging at least a partial
civilization which created wants previously unknown and,
equally, necessitated money to satisfy them. This idea of
creating a labor pool even included arming of natives,
first as a means of tempting them to work and next as an
excuse for breaking them and reducing them to the status
of serfs.\textsuperscript{193} Rhodes regarded the 10,000 African laborers
who had helped him acquire wealth in diamond mines as adult
children. It seems to be that this type of man with his
racist beliefs should not have been relied upon to treat
Africans as human beings whether rulers or common laborers.
Yet the British Government entrusted him with the welfare
of Africans in Central Africa. Moreover, Rhodes who believed
he was a valuable instrument for the cheap extension of the
empire seems to have felt that the home government had no
right to control his activities with Africans and their

\textsuperscript{192}Mitchell, The Life and Times of Cecil John Rhodes,
Vol. 2, pp. 118-121; Cloete, pp. 275-276.

\textsuperscript{193}Cloete, African Portraits, pp. 275-276. This view
is also discussed in Mitchell, The Life and Time of Cecil
John Rhodes, pp. 118-120.
leaders in Central Africa. He seemed to have had a misconceived notion that Africans had no international importance or rights even though they were the owners of the land containing the minerals he coveted.

It is my contention that British policy in Barotseland would have been effective and progressive in terms of developing the economic well-being of the African people there if the British Government had realized that Rhodes and his Company were not interested in Africans' welfare as they professed but were merely interested in the acquisition of land and mineral rights which they meant to exploit by use of African labor. The British Government attitude in Southern and Central Africa seems to have been influenced by the advice and recommendations of its officials in Southern Africa who as we have noted believed that Rhodes' policies represented imperial interests. This became possible because both the Foreign and Colonial offices seemed to have lost the initiative in the policy formulation for Southern Africa to Mr. Rhodes. In the British expansion in the West and East Africa under almost similar circumstances of using chartered companies as instruments of imperial expansion, the Government seemed nevertheless to have developed a more progressive policy with regard to the welfare of the African inhabitants of those territories.194

194For more detailed discussion of the British expansion in the West and East Africa please see, Crowder, M., *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (Evanston, Northwestern
Moreover, having the Southern and Central African policy at the mercy of the Company was bound to land the Government into international complications. We have noted above that after July 1895, Rhodes had acquired all the necessary conditions for his invasion of the Transvaal which he put into effect on December 28, 1895, but failed miserably because of poor planning. Dr. James, Administrator of Matabele and Mashonaland, had been appointed by Rhodes as leader of the Company forces and Bechuanaland police which were used for the invasion of the Transvaal. But because of poor coordination and logistics the Company troops were defeated and most of them were captured or killed. Jameson himself became a prisoner of the Transvaalers.\textsuperscript{195} Chamberlain found himself involved in the raid because he had believed Rhodes' explanation that the plan would succeed. Encouraging messages had been received from London implicating Chamberlain. "Chamberlain sound in case of interference by European powers, but have special reason to believe wishes you to do something about it immediately." And another telegram for Rhodes from England said, "Delay dangerous sympathy now complete, but will depend very much upon action before European powers

given time to enter protest which as European situation considered serious might paralyse Government. General feeling on stock market very suspicious." 196 When the plan failed Chamberlain found himself protecting Rhodes in order to protect himself and other officials in the Colonial Office and in South Africa. Thus in a speech in Parliament Chamberlain denied his involvement in the affair. "I say again to the best of my knowledge and belief that everybody, that Mr. Rhodes, that the Chartered Company, that the Reform Committee of Johannesburg, and the High Commissioner were all equally ignorant of the intention or action of Dr. Jameson." 197

Even though it had become obvious to many people that the Company had exceeded its powers not only in its action in the Transvaal, but also in Matabele and Mashonaland as well as north of the Zambesi, Chamberlain was still not willing to heed to the demand that the Company's charter should be revoked. "I say that in the interests of this country, in the interests of the development of these new estates—it would be fatal if they were handed over to the control even of the department which I have the honor to represent.... I am perfectly sure that if the persons responsible for the development of these territories had to


go, as I have to go, over and over again, to the Treasury, to ask for their assent to an expenditure of £5 (laughter) it would have been perfectly impossible for them, or for anybody in my position—to make railways, to make hundreds of miles of roads, to do everything to bring into rapid occupation the territories which have been submitted to their rule...."198 This again reveals that Chamberlain was still willing to leave the initiative for British policy in territories north and south of the Zambesi to the Company.

There seems to have been no change in policy as far as Barotseland was concerned. The situation in South Africa seems to have made Chamberlain want to rely more on the Company to carry out British expansion in the above territories. This once more reveals the fact that the Colonial Office accepted wholeheartedly the Company's nominee for the position of resident Commissioner in Barotseland, Mr. Hubert J. A. Harvey, former Magistrate at Bulawayo, Matabeleland. The Company merely informed the Colonial Office on September 26, 1895 of their plan and nominee. In reply to the Company's letter, Mr. Edward Fairfield of the Colonial Office accepted the appointment of Mr. Harvey on behalf of Mr. Chamberlain. The Foreign Office was then informed by the Colonial Office that two letters had been received from Lewanka and Coillard complaining that the

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Company had done nothing so far in Barotseland in fulfillment of its obligations. Mr. Fairfield also informed the Foreign Office that Major Gould-Adams, who was formerly in command of Bechuanaland police, had been sent to Bechuanaland to work out boundaries of protected chiefs, and suggested that after his duties, he could be employed on the Barotse Delimitation Commission. The Colonial Office hoped that Lord Salisbury would endeavor to get the boundary question settled the following year.

It was unfortunate for Lewanika that the man selected by the Company to go to Lealui as Resident Commissioner and obtain administrative powers from Lewanika died in August 1896, in Matabeleland during the uprising by Africans in that territory against Company rule. On May 15, 1896, unaware of Harvey's death, Lewanika sent a letter to the High Commissioner expressing pleasure at hearing that a British Resident was on his way to Barotseland. One of the pressing problems for Lewanika at that time seems to have been the problem of Portuguese settlers who continued to establish themselves within the western portions of his Kingdom. He therefore found it necessary to write a letter of protest to the Portuguese Commandant of the Portuguese force at Kakenge in March 1895. Lewanika claimed that all the land east of 22° meridian had since 1890 been put by him under the protection of the Queen through the officers of

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the Chartered Company.

Lewanika complained to the High Commissioner of white people entering his country from all sides, and not by the way of the Kazungula Drift as stipulated by the agreement with the Company. Copies of the letter Lewanika had written to the Portuguese Commandant were sent to the High Commissioner and to Dr. Jameson, the Company Administrator in Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The British South Africa Company authorized on August 5, 1895, by telegram, Lord Grey, the Assistant Administrator of their affairs in Matabele and Mashonaland to send a messenger to Lewanika with promise of support against the Portuguese. But when the British Government realized the implication of such a promise to Lewanika, the Foreign Office requested that Lord Grey should be instructed not to act on the telegram as Lord Salisbury thought that Lewanika should not be encouraged by promises of support to take any steps which might lead into collision with Portugal. The Government had been engaged in negotiations with Portugal since 1889 for possible lease or purchase of the important Port of Lourenco Marques in the Delgoa Bay, which the British Government had seemingly realized was important as an outlet for their colonies in

\[200\] C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 69, p. 86.


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South and Central Africa. From this port, also ran the shortest railway route from the sea to Johannesburg and Pretoria in the Transvaal. Therefore this port was also the only outlet for Transvaal and she was determined to see that Britain did not get control of it. The Transvaal Government was backed by Germany which by 1895 had become openly committed to the support of the Transvaalers against British interference.202 France also appeared to have sided with Germany on this issue and therefore the Foreign Office seems to have been concerned about letting the Company handle this explosive issue of Barotse western boundary.

As a consequence of Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal in December 1895, the British Government seemed to have realized that her policy in Central Africa should not be left in the hands of the British South Africa Company. The Government decided to suspend the assumption by the Company of further administrative responsibilities. The Colonial Office now felt that the Company could not then be invited to send up a British Resident to negotiate a treaty with Lewanika for administrative purposes. That had to be suspended until the Select Committee of the House of Commons which was investigating the Company's activities had issued its report.203 The Colonial Office suggested that if a

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British Resident should go to Barotseland, he was to go simply to redeem a promise of six years' standing made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and to keep order among the whites in the Kingdom. 204

BRITISH POLICY FOR THE YEARS 1896 AND 1897

It appears that during the latter part of the year 1896, Lewanika had begun to feel the pressure of both the Portuguese incursions into the territory he claimed as his, and the difficulties brought in by the influx of white prospectors into his Kingdom. The Foreign Office as well as the Colonial Office did not prove of much help to the King at this time since the former was more interested in being on friendly terms with Portugal, while the latter had become sensitive to the affairs of the Company, recently disgraced by its implication in the Jameson raid of the Transvaal.

On November 26, 1896, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain wrote Lord Salisbury to pass on information he had received from the High Commissioner in connection with Barotseland. Lewanika was still anxiously waiting for the promised British Resident, whom he had been expecting for the past six years. Chamberlain also explained to Salisbury that from the information he had received in a personal interview with Coillard who was then visiting London, serious trouble was expected from the prospectors and others in

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204 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 69, p. 86. -174-
in Lewanika's Kingdom, contrary to his agreement with the Company and without his consent. In these circumstances, Chamberlain suggested to Salisbury that the Company should be invited to select one officer to be sent to Barotseland without delay. The Colonial Secretary believed that the treaty made on behalf of the Company with Lewanika was sanctioned in accordance with the memorandum of November 24, 1894, and that it was sanctioned on the understanding that the Company would carry out part of the agreement in paying to Lewanika £2,000 a year in return for the rights conceded to them under the treaty. It seems that in this communication with the Foreign Office, Chamberlain seems for the first time willing to question the sincerity of the Company's dealings with Lewanika. He suggested to Salisbury that the Company should be asked to explain their position with regard to the agreement to pay Lewanika £2,000 per year before they could be invited by the Government to take any rights under the treaty. The Foreign Office seemed to concur with Chamberlain's suggestions and sent a letter to the Company in December 1896, requesting if they had selected another person in replacement of the late Mr. Harvey.

In view of the circumstances surrounding the Company after the Raid of 1895, the Colonial Office suggested that Company operations should be properly supervised by the Government. The Colonial Office stated as new policy that it was incumbent upon the Government, (1) to approve the Resident, and (2) to know and agree to the instructions
issued to him. According to the concession, he was to go up with a suitable escort, which the Colonial Office presumed would include a few policemen. In order to ensure that the Company would not ignore its obligations, the Colonial Office suggested that the policemen should be taken from Captain Nicholson's force in North Zambesi territories and the best arrangement in Mr. Chamberlain's view in those circumstances was that the officer selected to go up to Barotseland as Resident should be an Imperial Police Officer. The Colonial Secretary apparently believed that sending such an officer was less liable to criticism in view of the decision that the Company should not be allowed to incur any further administrative responsibilities until the Select Committee of the House of Commons had reported. 205

The Colonial Secretary stated that it was important that the Imperial Police Officer go on that mission, seeing that the Resident was needed to keep order among whites, and in view of the promise that all the police should be under Imperial control. He thought Lord Salisbury would probably prefer such an officer on account of possible friction with the Portuguese. 206 All the Colonial Office's proposals for British policy in Barotseland seemed to lack one essential element which I believe would have made this

205 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 69, pp. 82-83, 87.

206 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure I in No. 69, pp. 83, 87-88.
policy effective. This missing element was the Government's reluctance to assume direct control of the policy for Barotseland. This officer would still be nominated by the Company and his compensation would be born by the Company. How could the Imperial Government expect such an officer not to carry out Company policies which might be in conflict with the stated policies of the Imperial Government?

In formulation of policy on Barotseland the Colonial Office suggested that relations with Barotseland should be conducted through Palapye and Bulawayo, from where the Company was expected to deal with the affairs of Barotseland. Her Majesty's Government was expected to conduct Barotseland affairs through the High Commissioner for South Africa. These views seem to have been based on the recommendations of Mr. Harry Johnston to the Foreign Office when Johnston was serving as Her Majesty's Commissioner for Central Africa. He had recommended in 1895 that "Whatever future arrangements may be made about the administration of the territories North of the Zambesi, I think it will be found best and most practicable that the Barotse country should be attached to the South African system. The ruling caste, the Barotse, are a people of South African origin, and a part from this, the country is most easily and readily reached from our South African possessions."207

207 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 69, p. 88.
According to the Foreign Office it was felt that the Order in Council of May 1891 should be extended to Barotseland to bring that country under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner; its affairs would then be controlled by the Company from Bulawayo, and supervised by the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office.\textsuperscript{208}

It would be necessary to summarize the position of Lewanika with regard to both Her Majesty's Government and to the Company. King Lewanika had been informed by the High Commissioner that he was under Her Majesty's protection and that the British South Africa Company represented the Queen. Under the Lochner Concession, by which Lewanika abided, the Company had promised him protection against attack from outside, and not to interfere with him in internal affairs, and to pay him £2,000 per year, and a certain royalty for their mining and other rights. The Concession had not been sanctioned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the grounds that it did not convey administrative rights, and the intention apparently was to accept it in silence. At the same time it appeared that the terms of the original concession could not be allowed to come into full effect as the stipulations were in conflict with section 20 of the Company's charter which forbade the Company from setting up or granting any monopoly of trade. But Provision A of the concession purported to confer on the Company, "the sole absolute exclusive and perpetual right and power to carry

on any manufacturing, commercial, or other trading business."\textsuperscript{209}

The Company was in possession of the Lochner Concession, which had not hitherto been carried out. So far the chief value had been to enable Her Majesty's Government to keep Portugal out of the Barotse Kingdom. Under the concession the Company was entitled to send up a British Resident, and Her Majesty's Government was still anxious that the Company should do so. The Resident was to have gone up with the view of negotiating a treaty giving the Company administrative powers. The treaty would have been submitted to Her Majesty's Government for approval, and when it was sanctioned and the Company's position normalized by a North Zambesi Order in Council, the Company would have been in a position to exercise jurisdiction in Barotseland. But action on the North Zambesi Order in Council had been suspended pending the inquiry into the administration of the Company, and the Company had been told they could not negotiate for administrative powers over Barotseland pending the inquiry.

The Company thought it "undesirable that Her Majesty's Government should intervene directly in Barotseland,"\textsuperscript{210} since that would have made Lewanika become suspicious by a change of front on the part of the Company. This would appear to have been an unfair statement on the part of the

\textsuperscript{209}C.O. 879/75 Enclosure I in No. 69, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{210}Op. cit., p. 87.
Company since Lewanika had desired from the beginning to deal with Her Majesty's Government itself and not through the Company.

Her Majesty's Government position was that it had to approve the Resident and to know and agree to the instructions issued to him. As it has been noted above, in December 1896, the Foreign Office sent a letter to the company relating to the dispatch of a representative of the Company, in place of Mr. Harvey, to assume the post of Resident with Lewanika, King of the Barotse, under the June 1890 agreement with the Company. Salisbury also wished to know if the Directors of the Company had selected a gentleman for that purpose, whether he had started for his post with a suitable escort as provided in the agreement. His Lordship further inquired whether the terms of the agreement had in other respects been hitherto carried out, and if not, whether the directors were prepared to take immediate steps for their fulfillment, especially those clauses relating to the control of immigration and the route by which the King's territory could be entered. He told the Company that it was understood that for the present, the Company could not negotiate with Lewanika for a concession to them of administrative powers.\(^\text{211}\) On February 1, 1897, the Foreign Office notified Chamberlain that Lord Salisbury concurred with his views on the question of the appointment of the Company's Resident with Lewanika.

\(^{211}\) C.O. 879/75 No. 8874 Enclosure II in No. 69, p. 88.
THE AGREEMENT FULFILLED

On February 9, 1897, Lewanika received a letter from the High Commissioner for South Africa, Hercules Rosemead, in which Rosemead acknowledged the receipt of Lewanika's letter of October 22, 1896. He informed the Barotse King that he had forwarded his letter to England. The Commissioner could not understand how it was that Lewanika claimed he had not received answers to his former letters. Rosemead told Lewanika that when Sir Henry Loch was still High Commissioner, in January 1895 he had sent the King two letters. He thanked Lewanika for the attention he had shown to Major Goold-Adams, who had been sent by the "Queen" to find out the true boundaries of Lewanika's country, so that the boundary could be determined between Barotseland and the Portuguese territory. He further informed Lewanika that "In a few months' time I hope that another of the Great Queen's officers will be sent to live in your country, but on this matter I shall write you again."\(^{212}\)

Meanwhile the British Government in determination to solve the dispute concerning Lewanika's western boundary, had sent Major Goold-Adams to Barotseland to ascertain the effective boundaries of the Barotse Kingdom and the extent of the Portuguese intrusion into Lewanika's territory. Goold-Adams reached Lealui on October 4, 1896. As requested

\(^{212}\) C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure 2 in No. 79, p. 98.
by the High Commissioner, Lewanika helped Goold-Adams with men to show him the country to the west of the Zambesi. Goold-Adams also learned from Lewanika that he dreaded having as Resident with him a man like Mr. Lochner, who because of his South African origin, showed little respect for a man with a black skin. This would lower Lewanika, the King, in the eyes of his people.\textsuperscript{213} Yet neither the Foreign nor the Colonial Office seemed to show any understanding for the sensitivities of Africans in South and Central Africa. Lewanika seems to have wanted a Resident who would sympathize and interest himself in the King and his people. Goold-Adams wrote to the High Commissioner that with the exercise of certain amounts of ordinary tact the future Resident would have no difficulty in maintaining thoroughly friendly relations with Lewanika and the nation.\textsuperscript{214}

The exchange of communication between the Foreign and Colonial Offices in early months of 1897 reveal once more that despite what had happened in Matabeleland and Mashonaland now called Southern Rhodesia, the British Government still wanted to leave the initiative for policy decisions concerning Barotseland in the hands of the Company. On March 24, Salisbury wrote Chamberlain with regard to the appointment of a Resident with Lewanika. He transmitted a draft of

\textsuperscript{213}C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 70, pp. 89-90.

\textsuperscript{214}Ibid., pp. 89-90.
the letter which he had proposed, with an agreement of Mr. Chamberlain, to address to Mr. R. T. Coryndon, who had been suggested to Salisbury by the Company as a fitting person to hold the post, and whose appointment had been concurred by Chamberlain.

During the same month, Lord Salisbury wrote to Mr. Coryndon the following letter of appointment as British Resident with Lewanika,

"Sir,

"I have received from the Directors of the British South Africa Company a letter recommending you to fill the post of British Resident with Lewanika, the King of the Barotse, under the terms of the Agreement signed between the Company and the King on the 26th June, 1890, of which a copy is enclosed. I have accepted the recommendation, and the following instructions will indicate the position which you will occupy toward Her Majesty's Government and will serve for your guidance."215

Salisbury informed Coryndon that the British sphere north of the Zambesi was defined in the treaty with Portugal of June 11, 1891. Article IV of that treaty dealt with the Barotse Kingdom, the territory which remained within the British sphere, its western boundary was subject to the decision of a Joint-Anglo-Portuguese Commission. The situation was further described in Articles V and VII of the

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Modus Vivendi of 1893, which was prolonged by an exchange of notes in August 1896, until July 1, 1898.\textsuperscript{216} Government attitude towards Barotseland is also revealed in further instructions to Coryndon. He was told that the position of the Company in Barotseland was subject to the obligations of the Charter granted to them in December 1889, which extended over the territory under the British Sphere of influence north of the Zambesi and south of the territories of the Congo Free State and the German Sphere by the Agreement of February 1891. This Agreement was supplemented in November 1894, by the Memorandum signed by Sir Pierce Anderson and Mr. Rhodes on November 24, 1894. Copies of both were enclosed in the letter to Mr. Coryndon.

The Foreign Office seems to have become aware that the Company's Administration of its territories without proper safeguard might lead to war with Africans as events in Mashonaland and Matabeleland had proved. It was therefore clearly explained to Coryndon that British South Africa Company had no rights of Government in Barotse Country as some of its officials pretended they had.\textsuperscript{217} The administration of justice to the British subject in Barotseland was regulated by the Africa Order in Council, 1889. A warrant appointing him to be a judicial officer under Section 19 of that order was sent to him, together with a copy of the

\textsuperscript{216}Ibid., p. 102.

\textsuperscript{217}C.O. 879/32 No. 392 Enclosure in No. 320.
order. He was instructed to pay particular attention to a strict compliance with the terms of the order in any proceedings which he would find necessary to take under the authority conferred upon him by the warrant. He was further informed that arrangements had been made with the Company for the establishment of an Imperial Police force in their territories north of the Zambesi. 218

The relations of the Company to Lewanika were based on the Agreement of 1890, and Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to maintain friendly relations with him. Coryndon was instructed not to attempt to obtain any administrative powers for the Company from the King. He was to explain to Lewanika that he had been sent by Her Majesty's Government to redeem a long standing promise made on behalf of the Company, and to assist him in maintaining order among the people who were subject to Her Majesty's jurisdiction. He was to do his best to keep on the most friendly terms with the King and all those with whom he might come in contact in Lewanika's Kingdom. 219

The instructions connected with the interpretation of the Lochner concession revealed that the Foreign Office had become sensitive to Lewanika's views concerning that Agreement. The King had objected to some of Lochner's pro-

218 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in 83 (No. I), pp. 102-103.

ceedings and to some portions of the Concession. Lord Salisbury therefore instructed Coryndon that the monopoly of trade allegedly granted under the Lochner Concession was illegal under clause 20 of the British South Africa Company's Charter and this would have to be eventually amended. Since the Company had not even carried out a portion of its Agreement under which they were to pay Lewanika a subsidy of £2,000 a year, the Government instructed Coryndon not to urge Lewanika to the immediate fulfillment of the Concession Agreement. No amendments in the existing concession and no new concession of any kind, whether to the Company or others, could, however, be made by Lewanika without Salisbury's consent.

Coryndon was to inform Lewanika that his request for the Queen's protection had been granted by his appointment, and that the King and his country were definitely under the British protection. One reason why the Foreign Office took this active involvement in Lewanika's Kingdom seems to be the fact that this Kingdom was in disputed territory and the Foreign Office appeared determined not to let Rhodes' company complicate matters for the Government. The Government was at the time engaged in negotiations with Portugal which involved the possible Portuguese concessions to Britain in Delgoa Bay. The importance of these negotiations can be seen in a letter Milner wrote to Chamberlain from South Africa the following year that "...I look on the possession of Delgoa Bay as the best chance we have of
winning the great game between ourselves and the Transvaal for the mastery of South Africa without a war...."220
Germany's attitude on these negotiations and interest in the Transvaal seems to have been another indirect reason why the Foreign Office was sensitive to events in Barotseland.221 Coryndon was therefore instructed to impress upon Lewanika the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the Portuguese, and avoiding any action which might possibly lead to disturbances on the western frontier of his territory.

Since the Company did not have administrative powers in Barotseland under the Agreement of 1890, and Mr. Coryndon was going to bear the title of Resident in Barotseland, it was necessary that he receive a definite post to mark his position under Her Majesty's Government. He was accordingly attached to the British South Africa Police Force, Northern Division, as Staff Officer of Division, with a local rank equivalent to that of Major. He was thus enabled to carry out the duties entrusted to officers of the force as set out in the instructions to Captain Nicholson, Commanding Officer of the above mentioned force.222

222C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in 83 (No. I) p. 103 and in Clay, p. 108.
Coryndon's instructions further reveal that Barotseland was to be ruled directly by the Foreign Office in contrast to other territories in the Company's sphere like Southern Rhodesia which were supervised by the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office. The Barotse boundary dispute with the Portuguese would seem to have been the main reason why the Foreign Service wished to maintain control of this territory. Captain Nicholson had been instructed that owing to the difficulty of communication it was necessary that Coryndon have freedom of action with regard to the police force in Barotseland. But Coryndon was instructed to keep the Captain informed of the movements and the state of its efficiency. In all matters in which he was in doubt, Coryndon was instructed that in case he was unable to contact the Foreign Office in time, he was to seek advice of the High Commissioner for South Africa at Capetown. His general correspondence on all matters of Imperial interest was to be sent in numbered series and under seal through the High Commissioner addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from whom he would receive instructions, and whom it was Coryndon's duty to keep fully informed on all subjects. On matters involving expenditure and dealing solely with his relations to the Company, he was given the freedom to correspond directly with the Company's representatives. 223 While in Capetown before he embarked on a journey to Lealui, Coryndon saw

223 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 83, pp. 103-104. -188-
Rhodes and was instructed fully by him as to the policy to be followed with Lewanika. On May 18, 1897, Sir Alfred Milner, who had recently become High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony, informed Lewanika that Major Coryndon had been selected as British Resident for Barotseland. He told Lewanika that Coryndon had been selected by the Company as their representative and his appointment had been approved by Her Majesty's Government. He was therefore responsible for his actions through the Company, to the "Great Queen," and all communications between Lewanika and the Company or the Government had to be sent through him. Milner further explained that he had heard from Major Goold-Adams that the King wished to alter the concession he had granted the Company in order to preserve for his own use all the large trees in the country as well as a further area of land within which prospecting could not be allowed. Milner advised Lewanika that on all these issues, Coryndon had been instructed to confer with him.\textsuperscript{224} This letter might have confused Lewanika somewhat because according to African diplomatic system of the day, a King communicated with another directly but not through so many officers.

While Coryndon was on his way to Barotseland, an exchange of communication took place between the Foreign and Colonial Offices concerning reports of Lewanika's anxiety.

\textsuperscript{224}C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure 2 in No. 89, pp. 112-113.
concerning the western boundary of his Kingdom and his future dealings with the Company in matters of land. The presence of the Portuguese at the town of Kakenge, in which he himself had installed its chief, was a violation of Barotse's independence. Secondly, Lewanika seems to have especially dreaded the possibility that the British South Africa Company might make land grants to white settlers to which the Company had no rights.\footnote{C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Serial No. 114, p. 17; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, June 16, 1897.} The events in Matabeleland and Mashonaland had been well reported to the King and he was determined to use all diplomatic channels to ensure that the Company would not repeat their wicked performance in Matabeleland and Mashonaland. In the exchange of letters between Salisbury and Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary seemed to have clarified one essential point which the Company had violated in Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Chamberlain pointed out that even though Barotseland was included in the territories covered by the Charter, the British South Africa Company had no land rights to make land grants, unless they obtained from Lewanika the power to do so. Chamberlain emphasized that the concession given by Lewanika to Lochner, on behalf of the Company on June 26, 1890, promised land to the Company for trading and mining purposes only, and did not entitle them to make grants of land to white settlers.\footnote{C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 93, p. 116; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, September 29, 1897.} This interpretation of Company rights
seems to have saved Lewanika from the predicament of his fellow African leaders in Matabeleland who had granted similar concessions which were then interpreted by the Company as giving them the right to make land grants to white settlers. The entry and proceedings of white prospectors had begun to cause much disgust among the Barotse people and yet Lewanika had no means of controlling them since neither the British Government nor the Company had established an effective administration in the country.

Two days after his arrival, Coryndon gave Lewanika a letter, which expressed the good will of the British Government, and informed him that he was now under British protection. On the same day, the new Resident addressed the Council of the Barotse noblemen, and the common people assembled, and delivered the same message to the same effect and assured them of the good wishes of Her Majesty's Government. On the boundary question, as it has been noted above, the Resident had been instructed by the Foreign Office to avoid encouraging Lewanika to intervene with his own army for fear that complications with Portugal might arise. Coryndon reported that Lewanika seemed gratified by the token presents and especially the portrait of Queen Victoria. Lewanika wrote Milner to thank him for the picture. Coryndon, on his part moved quickly to remove Lewanika's anxieties concerning land, by advising him in a letter of October 25, 1897, that he had not sold his country as some people had led him to believe. He also confirmed in
writing what he had told Lewanika and Councillors, that he had been authorized by the British Government to inform Lewanika that he was now definitely under British protection. Coryndon sincerely hoped that friendly relations would always be maintained between the Government of Her Majesty the Queen and Barotseland, and between the Company and Lewanika's country. It seems to me that Coryndon could not be expected to serve two masters faithfully and in the long run the Company would find itself making policy for Barotseland and not the Government. This was bound to create the same problems experienced in Southern Rhodesia since the interests of a trading corporation could not be expected to be compatible with those of Barotseland. The British would seem to have made a fundamental mistake in the arrangement of a Resident to serve both the Company and the Government.

It is rather strange that during this period of intense diplomatic correspondence between Lewanika and both the British Government and the Company, Rhodes with the sanction of the Foreign Office took upon himself the liberty to change the name of Lewanika's Kingdom, without his consent, to that of Northern Western Rhodesia. By July 19, 1897, the Company's territories north of the Zambesi were officially named Northern Rhodesia, and the name of Rhodesia

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for the whole of the Company's territories, north and south of the Zambesi. Lewanika's Kingdom thus became officially known as Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia.

By the end of the year 1897, despite the presence of a British Resident, the Government policy appears to have created many problems for Lewanika as a consequence of the influx of white men into the country and the Portuguese problem. Lewanika wrote a letter which reveals that he was not yet satisfied with the arrangement so far made by the Government. He informed the High Commissioner that he hoped that the Portuguese would not attempt to take part of his country, saying he wanted to be under the British Protection with all his people. The second matter that seemed to bother Lewanika even more was the introduction of brandy and other intoxicating spirits into Barotseland. He requested the High Commissioner to stop these liquors from entering his country. He informed Milner that twelve years back he had stopped the brewing of African beer in Barotseland. He further told the High Commissioner that he could not say much about the Resident who had recently arrived in the country. He would give a better assessment of Coryndon in the future, and he seemed a good man.

Milner replied immediately to Lewanika's note saying among other things that he regretted that no final settlement had been reached with the Portuguese Government, but as soon as that agreement had been arrived at, Lewanika would be informed. He wanted Lewanika to rest assured, that

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it was going to take a little time before matters could be settled. He added that during the negotiations Lewanika's interest would not be neglected by Her Majesty's Government. Milner apparently never thought that the introduction of liquor into Barotseland was a serious matter meriting his reply. It is also possible that Lewanika was paying too much attention to the missionaries who might have advised him to write to Milner on the subject. It seems to me that the Colonial Office from which instructions for the High Commissioner emanated was unwilling to engage into conflicting policies with the Colonial authorities in Southern and Central Africa on questions regarding African development and welfare.\textsuperscript{228} The Colonial Office on which Lewanika and other former rulers in Central Africa looked to for protection permitted the Company to initiate taxes in Southern Rhodesia as an inducement to labor and even allowed oppressive compound systems\textsuperscript{229} to be set up in Southern Africa for African laborers from the northern territories. This is the same policy that was advocated by Rhodes as we noted above.

THE LAWLEY TREATY, 1898, AND BRITISH POLICY

In May 1898, Lewanika was informed by the Company that Captain Lawley, Administrator of Matabeleland, was journey-

\textsuperscript{228} Kubicek, *The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office*, pp. 34-37.

ing to Victoria Falls in order to meet with the King to discuss matters concerning the Concession which Lewanika desired to modify. The Company wished to get administrative rights which would not only enable them to control the movements of white men who had begun to enter the country toward the Zambesi, but would also give authority to the Company to grant lands to white settlers in the Barotse Kingdom. Moreover, the Colonial Office had made it clear to the Company that they had no right to make land grants to white settlers in Barotseland unless they obtained from Lewanika the right to do so. The Lochner Concession did not entitle the Company to make grants of land to white settlers or anyone. 230

So that this was one of the main reasons for the Company wishing to modify the concession inasmuch as Lewanika himself wanted the same for different reasons. Lawley was determined, therefore, to meet Lewanika in person and try to obtain a more accurate definition of the Company's rights and also make certain modifications to the Concession which had been asked by Lewanika himself and his people. On June 17, 1898, Lewanika arrived at the Falls with an entourage of one thousand. This number did not include the younger indunas who had opposed the King's going to the Falls because they disliked the growing influence of white men in Barotseland. Lewanika overruled Lawley's suggestion that

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230 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 in Enclosure No. 93, p. 116; Colonial Office to Foreign Office, September 29, 1897, and Appendix I.
he call them too to participate in the discussion. The
time had not yet come when European officials could give
orders to African Kings, and especially, those like
Lewanika, who were still effective rulers of their people.

On the last day of the discussion, June 25, 1898, the
whole of the new concession was read and interpreted clause
by clause to Lewanika and his counselors, who expressed
themselves perfectly satisfied with its terms, but for some
unknown reason it was not signed.\(^{231}\) However, before leaving
for Lealui, Lewanika wrote to Lawley that he and his people
wished a clause to be added to the concession. This clause
would reserve from prospecting the whole of what was re-
garded as the Barotse proper to the east of the Zambesi River
together with the Kasempa tributary. The clause also pro-
vided that this reservation would be withdrawn if payable
gold was not discovered in the rest of the country.\(^{232}\) The
Lawley Treaty granted the Company absolute and perpetual
right and power to search and dig for minerals, to construct
railways, roads, to manufacture and import arms and in addi-
tion, the Company received administrative authority in
Barotseland. In return for granting of the Lawley conces-
sion, the Company agreed to pay Lewanika and his successors
in perpetuity an annual sum of £850 (eight hundred and fifty

\(^{231}\) Clay, Your Friend Lewanika, p. 112.

\(^{232}\) Ibid., p. 112, and in C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure
in No. 116, p. 169. More detailed discussion of Lewanika's
letter follows discussion of Treaty in Appendix 3.
pounds sterling) or the equivalent in trading goods at the option of the King. The Company further agreed to aid and assist in the education and modernization of the country by the establishment, maintenance and endowment of schools and industrial establishments, telegraph and postal services, and transport communications. The detailed discussion of this Treaty is found in Appendix 3. The Foreign Office's reaction to this agreement of 1898 was to send a letter to the Colonial Office for their consideration and answer to the Company which had requested the sanction of the Foreign Office for this treaty.\textsuperscript{233} While the Company was trying to receive the sanction of the Foreign Office for the Lawley Treaty which would give the Company administrative authority and as well as the right to make land grants to white settlers with Lewanika's consent, a debate was going on between the Foreign and Colonial Offices regarding the future Administration of Northern Rhodesia. The Select Committee of the House of Commons which had inquired into the James Raid had also been charged with the duty of investigating the Company Administration of its territories. In 1897, when the Committee reported its findings, it stated that it had failed due to lack of time to inquire into the Company's administration of the territories under the Charter.\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{233} C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 116, p. 167; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, October 31, 1898.

\textsuperscript{234} For other finds of the committee, see Mitchell, Cecil John Rhodes, pp. 212-213 and Cloete, African Portraits, pp. 382-384.

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However, the Committee stated that the Government should take such steps as might be necessary to reform and regulate the Company's administration. The reforms required in the Company's administration south of the Zambesi were embodied in the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1898. The occupation and conquest of Mashonaland and Matabeleland had been done by the Company with little regard for African human life. The Company had disregarded African laws and rights even though these rights had been expressively guaranteed in the Company's Charter, Article 14, and in the orders in Council of 1889, 1891, and 1894. Milner was the first British High Commissioner to realize that the Company had not observed its obligations under the Charter and had not even practiced what they claimed in their reports to the Government. In his report to Chamberlain in 1897, he told him that among the administrative reforms of the Company, they should have one that would give the imperial representative proper authority to supervise Company affairs. Milner found that the Administration of African Affairs by the Company was performed by people who were largely unfit for such responsibilities. Therefore, he recommended that a new order in council should be passed for Southern Rhodesia. Therefore, when a new Order in Council was passed in 1898, the High Commissioner had reserved powers in it.

\[235\] C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Serial No. 110, p. 193.


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and a legislative council was created with a few members elected by the white settlers and a close supervision of native affairs. A Resident Commissioner had a seat in the legislature although he had no vote. The Resident Commissioner was as an imperial officer took precedence after the Administrator of the territory and was therefore of adequate seniority to observe Company activities. Moreover, control of police and supervision of African interests were made the most important imperial interests in Southern Rhodesia under the new Order in Council of 1898.\textsuperscript{237} But the damage to African human rights seems to have been done already by the Company.

It was not until 1907, that the Company came to the realization that gold was available only in modest terms in Southern Rhodesia and it was only then that the Company officially now declared as its stated policy to concentrate on the exploitation of the land resources of the territory. This was to be achieved by encouragement of white settlement, especially along the railway line. European population seems to have increased as a consequence of this policy from 14,000 in 1907 to 23,600 by 1911.\textsuperscript{238} However, in all this development of Southern Rhodesia, African contribution in taxation, labor, production of crops and in cattle which was always substantial, was not even recognized by white


\textsuperscript{238} Op. cit., p. 685.
settlers at all. In addition to this omission, the impact of European administration on African social system and institutions was ignored as no one seemed much concerned about the government of Africans.\textsuperscript{239} With the exception of the imperial official, the Resident Commissioner, there seems to have been no mechanism devised by the Colonial Office even after the 1898 Order in Council to effectively protect African interests as none were represented in the Legislature or in the Executive Council of the territory. Again this seems to have been in line with Rhodes' stated policy and beliefs concerning Africans as we have noted above. The Colonial Office is to blame for this oversight because they had the opportunity to rectify matters when reforms were being made for the Company administration before the 1898 Order in Council was passed. The Colonial Office apparently still left the policy initiatives in the hands of the Company. Why is it that the African land rights safeguarded in the 1894 Order in Council were not even put into effect by the Company and the British Government until 1920? By this time it was already too late to rectify the damage of so many years of neglect on the part of both the Company and the British Government.

In the same year that the 1898 Order in Council was passed for Southern Rhodesia, Chamberlain was recommending to the Foreign Office that in the establishment of adminis-

\textsuperscript{239}The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 8, p. 692 and in Cloete, African Portraits, pp. 238-256.
tration north of the Zambesi, the same restrictions on the Company in Southern Rhodesia should be applied in order to secure the same amount of control to the crown.\textsuperscript{240} Meanwhile, Milner on his part wrote a long letter to Chamberlain on April 21, 1899, urging the Government to act fast in the establishment of the administrative authority in Barotseland without waiting for the settlement of the western boundary question. He argued that this had become necessary due to an increase in the number of white people who were going north from Southern Rhodesia. This necessitated the establishment of magistrates to settle disputes among the white population and also between them and the Africans.\textsuperscript{241}

Even though Milner had already exercised his powers under the Order in Council of 1891 to prevent certain undesirable white men from entering Barotseland, the High Commissioner apparently had no effective authority to stop the influx of white people into Barotseland. After one crossed the Zambesi the High Commissioner seemed to have no means of controlling him. Similarly, the Company possessed no power to control men who came to Barotseland claiming to have their permission. It was also at this time that the Government was contemplating a division of the Company's territories north of the Zambesi into two for the purposes of effective administration. The eastern parts of Northern

\textsuperscript{240}C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Serial No. 110, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{241}Ibid., p. 193.
Rhodesia which adjoined the British Central Africa Protectorate would be administered for the Company by Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General in the Protectorate, and the Western parts, which included Barotseland, were to be administered by the Company under the general control of the High Commissioner. 242

In these circumstances, Milner appeared to desire that the imperial Government should exercise more authority over Company territories. He recommended to the Colonial Office that any police power in Northern territory "should be under the Commandant-General and the High Commissioner, whose powers under the Order in Council of 1891, should be extended to the whole country north of the Zambesi." 243 He urged that the legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia should not have power to make laws for any portion of Northern Rhodesia, because he seems to have erroneously believed that Southern Rhodesia was part of the South African System and would in the future join self-governing British South Africa. Milner seems to have believed also that since northern Zambesia was tropical in climate, it would never attract enough white population which would need self-government. He therefore recommended that the territory should be under imperial control and that it should be left open for future establishment of imperial administration.


when the Company left the scene. Milner preferred the Foreign Office control for northern Zambesia to Colonial Office one, suggesting that development in the area should follow the line of development in Uganda and the Niger Protectorate rather than Zululand and Transkei. 244

Milner showed as much anxiety as the Company regarding the affairs of Barotseland and advocated that more authority be granted to the High Commissioner in the administration of Northern Rhodesia. "At present, however, as it seems to me, the officers of the Company have no legal power, nor has anybody else, to prevent white people entering Barotseland or to carry out the promise to Lewanika. If the High Commissioner were placed in the same position with regard to the countries south of the Zambesi, he could, no doubt, impose restrictions by proclamations upon entry of white, and confine immigrations to persons having certificates from a recognized officer of the Company.... The Commissioner would thus be in a position to carry out the bargain which they have made with the King as regards to white immigration, and which he no doubt regards as an undertaking on the part of Her Majesty's Government." 245

Milner seems to have been determined to take part in administrative reforms to insure that Rhodes and his friends connected with the Company would not be able to take the


245 C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Serial No. 114, p. 206. High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner to Mr. Chamberlain, April 21, 1899.
initiative away from the imperial Government again, but rather he preferred them to be used in the creation of his own design for Southern Africa. 246 "All police forces in Rhodesia would be in imperial hands and administrators were to be 'the eyes and ears' of the High Commissioner and Her Majesty's Government and not the Company's tool." 247 In these circumstances, Milner rejected Chamberlain's suggestion that the High Commissioner be relieved of his Rhodesian duties by giving it to a separate Commissioner in order to improve efficiency in administration of Southern Africa. Milner seemed to have felt that this would weaken the High Commissioner's prestige which was the only important factor on the imperial side in Southern and Central Africa.

While the Colonial and Foreign Offices were exchanging ideas on the type of administrative authority to be established in Northern Rhodesia, Lewanika was finding it difficult to control the influx of white people into his Kingdom. Some of these men were Boers who had taken part in the Matabele War of 1896 and felt they had the right to enter Barotseland without Lewanika's permission. Many of these men were able to treat with minor chiefs in the Kingdom who where not loyal to Lewanika's authority. 248 Since Coryndon


248 C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Enclosure I, in Serial No. 114, pp. 204-205.
was powerless to do anything about these lawless whites, Lewanika found it necessary to write Milner to complain about the slowness of the British Government in establishing an effective protectorate. What seems to have disturbed Lewanika even more was that some of the white men who went to Barotseland began to meddle with African women and this he felt would usually cause trouble between African men and white men. It was creating social problems for the King while the British Representative could only reassure him that there was a law proclaimed by the High Commissioner to prevent such undesirable white men from coming to Barotseland. Coupled with these problems, the King had received no relief from the British Government with regard to his boundary on the West of the Kingdom.

Milner replied to Lewanika's complaints by assuring him that he had issued a proclamation to stop Dutchmen who came across the Zambesi and tried to get concessions from minor rulers in his Kingdom. He informed Lewanika that the Government would only allow white men to go to Barotseland in accordance with the Lawley Treaty, adding that all white men going to Barotseland would be subject to the Queen's law.\footnote{C.O. 879/57 No. 574, Enclosure 2 in No. 114, p. 205.} Milner seems to have neglected to inform Lewanika that the Lawley Treaty had not been approved by the Government. With regard to Lewanika's concern about the consequences of white men meddling with African women, the High
Commissioner seems to have failed to suggest the best solution. He merely advised Lewanika and his chiefs to stop Barotse women from associating with white men, something that was impossible since Lewanika's administration had no mechanism for such control. Milner seems to have encouraged the association of African women and white men by saying that if it was free association then the Queen's law could do nothing about it. "It is against the Queen's law that any man should take a woman against her will and those who do so shall be severely punished. But if a woman goes away of her own accord and lives with a white man, then the matter is more difficult."\textsuperscript{250}

Concerning Lewanika's boundaries to the west, Milner seems to have been dishonest with Lewanika when he told the King that "The Queen has made a treaty with the King of Portugal, by which the whole of your country is under the Queen. Portugal has nothing to do with it. But there has been and is some dispute as to the exact point to which your country extends to the west."\textsuperscript{251} Milner appeared to have ignored the fact that according to Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 1891, and the Modus Vivendi of 1893, that was still in force, Lewanika's Kingdom was cut into half.\textsuperscript{252} Even though Coryndon was now Resident in Lewanika's country, the

\textsuperscript{250}C.O. 879/57 No. 574, Enclosure 2 in No. 114, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{251}Ibid., p. 205.

\textsuperscript{252}C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 38, pp. 50-51 and in C.O. 879/75 No. 686, Enclosure 2 in No. 94, p. 135.
British policy for Barotseland which seems to have been based on the needs and interests of the British South Africa Company, was complicated with the boundary disputes on the western portions of the Kingdom. These complications plus the influx of white men into the country from Southern Rhodesia seem to have created mounting difficulties for Lewanika. The British Administration to which Lewanika looked for assistance in solving these problems appeared slow in establishment. Moreover, every communication concerning policy in Barotseland had to be cleared through the Foreign Office or the Colonial Office and the Company and this arrangement would seem to have slowed the flow of dispatches and decisions concerning Barotseland.

In addition Coryndon did not have adequate police force to support the decisions and policies that both the government and the Company told Lewanika they had established for his Kingdom. While Coryndon was on his way to take up the position of Resident the Foreign Office seems to have decided to transfer responsibility for Barotseland to the Colonial Office.²⁵³ Lord Salisbury seems to have felt that since the Company had assumed the administration of Northern Rhodesia, the Colonial Office was a more convenient department, to handle the correspondence coming from and going to Barotseland. The old arrangement whereby the British Commissioner and Consul General for Central handled the corres-

²⁵³C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Enclosure 2 in No. 94, p. 138; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, October 28, 1897.

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ponente relating to the British Sphere of influence north of the Zambesi now appeared unnecessary and Salisbury now believed that it was to the public convenience and advantage to have the Colonial Office have the official control of the whole of the Company's territories. Matters affecting the Protectorates were transferred to the Foreign Office. Meanwhile, the Colonial Office was considering the idea of establishing a native police force in Barotseland which would be used to keep law and order in the territory. This force would gradually replace the small white police force that at the time was being used seemingly without satisfactory results for Barotseland, partly because of its small size and secondly because Lewanika seems to have disliked the idea of white police officers, who tended to undermine his prerogative and authority. But the Colonial Office appears to have been cautious and concerned that Colin Harding who had been recommended by the Company as a replacement for Mr. Coryndon who was going on leave, might move too fast with the establishment of the native police without Lewanika's consent. The High Commissioner, Milner, seems to have been instructed to warn both Coryndon and Harding on this matter. Milner sent a telegram to Chamberlain on December 15, 1899, to inform him that he had "issued most explicit instructions to both Coryndon and Harding to proceed most circumspectly in this, and to do nothing without

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254 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 130. Annexure 5. Administration, North-Western Rhodesia, No. A I, p. 208. -208-
the full consent and approval of the King. Your Excellency may rest assured that your instructions and those of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs shall be adhered to most strictly in this matter." Lewanika who had request-
ed British Protection and now had received it in the form of Company Protection seems to have viewed the establish-
ment of an African police force as a threat to his own authority. If he could not control it he seems to have been right in feeling that his authority would be weakened. The Company had planned to establish this force under the command of white officers. There seems to have been a mis-
take in this arrangement since no shrewd ruler like Lewanika would have failed to see that his authority with the people would be undermined by this force. Harding reported to the Secretary to the Administrator in Bulawayo on December 22, 1899, that Lewanika was not interested in the scheme of establishing an African police force in his Kingdom. But he managed to get him to agree reluctantly to establishment of a small force after Harding assured him that police would only be trained in the Valley and then be sent to Batoka province, where it was impossible for Lewanika's power to extend with enough influence to maintain order. He had also assured him that the few police who would be maintained in the Valley would not interfere or lessen his authority or undermine his right to directly deal with the

\textsuperscript{255} C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Enclosure 2 in No. 304, p. 518.
people. 256

"With these assurances, he was content, and has promised to get forty or fifty recruits, but I am convinced that his consent was not given spontaneously, and, with that view before me and a likelihood of Angonis relieving the white police in the Batoka, I did not press the subject further. The gist of the whole indaba was that the King, whilst only too glad for native police, Barotse or others, to relieve the white in the Bateke Country, disliked the suggestion of having a force in the Barotse Valley, except under his control." 257

Even though the British Government had not yet approved the new treaty with Lewanika, that is, Lawley Treaty of 1898, the Company seems to have been busy at work through the Resident formulating labor policy for Northern-Western Rhodesia. We have seen above that Chamberlain had sanctioned the Company labor policy for Southern Rhodesia where Africans were now considered only as a source of labor supply for South African and Southern Rhodesia mines and factories. In Barotseland, Harding reported to the Company in 1899 that even though Lewanika and his advisors discouraged young men from going to Southern Rhodesia, there was labor available for work in the South. There were various unauthorized recruiters from Southern Rhodesia who often maltreated recruits especially during the journey of the South.

256 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 130 Annexure 5. Administration, North-Western Rhodesia, No. Al, p. 211.

257 Ibid., p. 211. -210-
Many of the recruits died on the way and only a small percentage arrived in Bulawayo in a healthy condition. Many
of those who reached Bulawayo would desert afterwards and return to their homes where they would prejudice the potential recruits.\textsuperscript{258} Harding therefore recommended that an organized bureau he established for recruitment of labor for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. "Up to now it has been impossible to keep an authentic record of the exportation of native labor from this country in any way, but I am of the opinion that a far greater number migrate south of the Zambesi than is generally imagined, and it only requires an organized bureau to enable the Barotse country to play a greater part in the supply of native labor for Southern Rhodesia."\textsuperscript{259} In addition, he urged that a Company official or police officer should be stationed at each of the principal drifts, such as Kazungula, Victoria Falls, and Walker's Drift, to stop the entry of unauthorized agents, and to keep a record of all the young men who leave Barotseland and their destination, and at the same time persuade the indunas and chiefs to send in young men who wish to work.\textsuperscript{260}

During the years 1899 to 1902, the High Commissioner and other imperial officials in South Africa and in London

\textsuperscript{258} Op. cit., p. 211.
\textsuperscript{259} C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Enclosure in No. 130 Annexure 5. Administration of North-Western Rhodesia, No. AI, p. 208.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., p. 208.
spent a major portion of their attention on the Boer War. Therefore, the British Government spent less time on political problems of Barotseland. Captain Lawley wrote to the Duke of Abercon, Chairman of the British South Africa Company on April 1, 1899, to urge upon him and his directors the advisability of obtaining, speedily, the ratification of King Lewanika's agreement with the company entered in June of the previous year. It was apparently becoming difficult for the Company to control the political and social problems caused by the influx of white traders, prospectors and settlers not only in Barotseland but in the whole of Northern Rhodesia. Therefore, Lawley reminded his directors of the trouble which had been caused by the Boers the previous year and had only been stopped by the issuance of a proclamation to enable the Administration to prevent small parties of white men from crossing the Zambesi. Once they had crossed the Zambesi their actions were beyond the Company control. Even though there were a few police outposts in Barotseland, there were reports of illegalities committed by white men, and even if they were caught, they could not be brought to justice because officials had no jurisdiction. This condition appeared most unsatisfactory to both the Company and Lewanika. Lawley wrote that the prestige of the white man was constantly being injured and degraded by the conduct of the unscrupulous white men, who were beginning to think that Barotseland was a lawless country, and consequently the difficulties of the Company would be in-
creased when the moment arrived for the establishment of its administration in the country. Lawley claimed that the would-be trekkers to the north were drawn from the most undesirable class of adventurers. The powerlessness of the Company to control immigrants to Northern Rhodesia was becoming more apparent.\footnote{C.O. 879/57 No. 574 Serial No. 172, p. 263.}

The establishment of Company administration was apparently delayed by the Colonial Office's approval of the Lawley Treaty of 1898. The treaty as we have noted gave the Company the power of administration in the country.

During the same month Milner wrote Chamberlain to pressure the Colonial Secretary to speed up the settlement of the western boundary issue. The High Commissioner told Chamberlain that he was convinced that Western Barotse boundary lay far to the west of the Modus Vivendi line and it would create trouble to delay the settlement because Lewanika expected the Queen's Government to defend his rights and failure to do so would lead to trouble with him. The High Commissioner similarly discussed the same problem that Captain Lawley had touched on in his letter to the directors of the Company as it has been noted above. The number of white people going north from Southern Rhodesia was increasing and there was bound to be trouble if the white population increased without a proportional increase in the magistrates to settle disputes between them. It seems
to me that the question of law and order in Barotseland would have been solved if the Company had used its authority under 1898 Order in Council for Southern Rhodesia to prevent would-be immigrants to the north from crossing the river on the Southern Rhodesia side. But the Company apparently permitted these white men to cross the Zambesi into Northern Rhodesia as another means of putting pressure on the Colonial Office to approve the 1898 agreement with Lewanika. Lewanika was not permitted to make use of his administrative apparatus to control the influx of white people into his territory for fear he might also use his army to fight the Portuguese encroachments from the west. The Company seems therefore to have encouraged immigration to the north knowing full enough that they had no powers of government there until the 1898 agreement had been approved by the Colonial and Foreign Offices. Moreover, the British Government policy for Barotseland at that time appears to have been confused by the diplomatic complications with Portugal and Germany. Anglo-German friendship seems to have increased by 1898 because both of them desired to extract advantages from each other. 262 As far as Central Africa was concerned, both powers were interested in Portuguese holdings and claims in the area. Learning that Britain was planning to secure control of Portugal's Delgoa Bay in return for a loan to the Portuguese Government, the Germans protested and de-

262 Cambridge History of the British Empire, pp. 514-516. 
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manded a share in the loot. Control of Delgoa Bay and in Portuguese East Africa meant control of the outlet for the Transvaal and the Boers were bound to find it difficult to import arms and other commodities that they needed for an impending war with Britain. Germany therefore informed Britain that she would collaborate with France to block British control of Delgoa Bay. As a result Britain and Germany signed an Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. The two powers agreed to make equal and simultaneous loans to Portugal, if Portugal approached either side for assistance. It also contained a second and secret clause which stated that, if Portugal defaulted on her loans and it became impossible for her to control her colonies, they would oppose intervention of a third power and the two powers would divide and share the Portuguese territories. Germany would receive half of Portuguese East Africa and Central Angola and Britain would get the Southern half of Portuguese East Africa and northern and southern Angola.263

However, the Portuguese seem to have learned about the secret clause in the Anglo-German treaty of 1898, for they rejected the loan. Germany's attempt to pressure Portugal to accept the loan brought about British protest on behalf of Portugal. When Britain found herself in impending diffi-

263 Cited in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 6, pp. 515-516 and also discussed in Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. 3, pp. 308-314. The treaty seems to have meant official German abandonment of the Boers whom they had pledged to assist since 1895.
culties with the Transvaal, "Portugal having refused to stop the passage of arms to the Transvaal unless Great Britain guaranteed the integrity of her colonies, Salisbury accepted in October 1899, a secret Anglo-Portuguese declaration." In this secret treaty, Britain reassured Portugal she would maintain the integrity of Portuguese possessions under the ancient treaties, in return for a Portuguese promise not to let arms pass through the Port of Lourenco Marques and not to declare neutrality in the South African War and thus allow British ships to coal in that port. This agreement with Portugal and the one with Germany reveals that the British policy was in a confused state and she was desperately attempting to please both Germany and Portugal at the same time.

For these reasons, the British policy in Barotseland at this time appeared cautious reflecting the need to be on friendly terms with Portugal. It was not until July 1899, that the Colonial Office began to consider making any definite policy for the administration of Barotseland. Milner

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265. The ancient treaty was signed at Whitehall, June 23, 1661. Secret Article: "that his Majesty of Britain...shall promise and oblige himself as by this present Article he doth, defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present...." Cited from Chamberlain's copy of treaty by Garvin, Vol. 3, pp. 310-311.

266. The Cambridge History of the British Empire, p. 516.
received a confidential dispatch from Chamberlain on the subject of assisting Lewanika with the European problem. Chamberlain transmitted to Milner copies of correspondence with the Foreign Office and informed him that Salisbury was looking into the fact that since the boundary was still unsettled, it was not considered desirable that the Company (B.S.A. Company) should be entrusted with the Administration of Barotseland. The draft Order in Council which was promulgated to permit the administration of Barotseland and give jurisdiction in cases between white people, was accordingly modeled upon the Order in Council of May 9, 1891. The High Commissioner for South Africa would be responsible for the Administration. Chamberlain wrote that it was not necessary nor was it intended, that the powers and authority of Lewanika should be infringed under the draft order any further than those of Khama and other Bechuana Chiefs were infringed under the Order in Council of May 9, 1891. The Colonial Secretary referred in particular:

(1) The power to impose a house-tax which was conferred upon the High Commissioner among other things in Clause 8 did not imply that any house-tax should be imposed on Lewanika's subjects without his consent.

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267C.O. 897/57 No. 574, Serial No. 203, p. 293. Colonial Secretary Mr. Chamberlain to High Commissioner Sir Alfred Milner, July 1, 1899. Some of the problems Lewanika faced as a result of white influx into the country are discussed in Clay, p. 115.
(2) If and when the agreement between Lewanika and the Company was signed, the Company would enjoy extensive rights in the country it had therefore been considered proper to arrange that they should be responsible for the cost of administration, and they would be allowed to nominate the officers employed for the territory.

(3) Clause 16 of the proposed Draft Order in Council, provided that the law of England would be applied throughout Northern Rhodesia.

Thus, the Colonial Office issued a Draft Order in Council for Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia, on November 28, 1899, which came to be known as Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia, Order in Council, 1899. The Order was to apply to Lewanika's territory. The High Commissioner was on Her Majesty's behalf to exercise all powers and jurisdiction within the limits of the order, in the interest of Her Majesty's service, subject to instructions from the Secretary of State.

Clause 6 of the Order empowered the High Commissioner to appoint an Administrator for Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia and as many judges and magistrates and other officers as he may from time to time think necessary for the administration of the affairs of Barotseland. He was further empowered to define from time to time the districts within which such officers would respectfully discharge their functions. He could also on his motion or at the
request of the Company, suspend or remove any administrator
or other officers appointed.

If the articles that we have discussed above were meant
to protect Lewanika's interests and to preserve the imperial
control of policy, the next two articles would seem to have
undermined the policy aims. In Article 7, the Company was
permitted to nominate any officers for appointment by the
High Commissioner for service in Barotseland, while Article
8 gave the High Commissioner authority to issue proclama-
tions to provide for the administration of justice, the
raising of revenue by imposition of taxes (which could in-
clude a tax in the respect of native houses) and customs
duties or otherwise, and generally for the peace, order, and
good government of all persons within the limit of the Order,
including the prohibition and punishment of acts tending
to disturb the public peace. The High Commissioner was to
have regards to any suggestions or requests made to him in
respect thereof by the Company.

Article 9 stipulated that the High Commissioner in
issuing proclamations would give respect to any African laws
or customs by which the civil relations of any African
chiefs, tribes, or populations under Her Majesty's protection
were then regulated, if this did not conflict with due exer-
cise of Her Majesty's power and jurisdiction. Article 13
of the Order in Council seems to have given the Company much
financial authority. It provided that the Company would have
to approve the expenses of the Administration of Barotseland-
North-Western Rhodesia. If in any year the revenue raised were insufficient to provide for the payment of expenses of administration, the Company would make good the deficiency, and if in any year the revenue raised was more than the payment of such expenses, the surplus would become the property of the Company. And finally, as it has been noted above, Article 16 provided that the law of England would apply to and be in force within Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia. Her Majesty could from time to time revoke, alter, add to, or amend the order.\(^{268}\) Milner was instructed by the Colonial Office not to publish this order and bring it into operation until the Company had entered into contract required under Section 13, binding them to their financial responsibilities under the order. He was not to publish the order in "Gazette" until he had received instructions from Chamberlain. Thus, it had been agreed between Salisbury and Chamberlain that the area of Northern Rhodesia, designated in the Draft Order in Council as Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia, should be administered under the control of the Colonial Office by the High Commissioner for South Africa, while the North-Eastern portion, which had close relations with the British Central Africa Protectorate, would continue to be under the control of the Foreign Office, and would be administered directly by the British South Africa Company, under a separate Order in Council. This somewhat confused

\(^{268}\) C.O. 879/57 No. 8745 Enclosure in No. 284, pp. 495-497.
policy for Northern Rhodesia would seem to have been caused by the facts connected with the question of the boundary between North-Western-Rhodesia and Portuguese Colony of Angola, which had not yet been settled. This seems to have made the British Government feel it inadvisable that direct administration of Barotseland should at that time be in the hands of the British South Africa Company. On the other hand, in view of the extensive rights which the Company had acquired in the country, which was within the scope of their Charter, the Government seems to have decided that they should defray the expenses of administration so far as these were not covered by the revenue raised.269

On March 10, 1900, the Treasury Department sent a letter to the Colonial Office submitting to them the form of draft instrument they had prepared for Mr. Chamberlain. This draft instrument which bound the British South Africa Company in regard to their financial responsibilities under the Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia Order in Council of 1899, had been amended to meet with the approval of the Colonial Secretary. It was now drawn as an indenture and the Colonial Office was thus advised that it should take that form. This draft instrument was accepted by the Company in writing, by a letter to the Colonial Office of March 22, 1900.270

269 C.O. 879/57 No. 8745, Enclosure in No. 284, p. 494.

270 C.O. 879/68 No. 656, Serial No. 20, pp. 28-29 and Serial No. 26, pp. 31-32.
In a telegram dated September 13, 1900, Chamberlain authorized Milner to gazette the Order-in-Council and then inform him of the date of its publication. The Company was then asked to formally nominate to Milner by telegraph officers for the administration of Barotseland, under Section 7, of the Order in Council. The estimates were to be submitted formally to the Company under Section 14. With regard to legislation Chamberlain told Milner, "it seems desirable that proclamations should be drafted by you, after consultation with Coryndon. Bechuanaland precedents seem to be applicable. See section 8 of Order in Council." So long as the Company was still permitted to nominate officials for the administration of Barotseland, the Colonial Office policy would seem to have differed little from the previous policies when Rhodes nominated senior officials for imperial service in South Africa and thereby controlled the initiative for British policy. In the case of Barotseland, the Company and Rhodes in particular were put in a position to initiate policy for the Government and Lewanika still would be at the mercy of the Company. While still on leave in England Coryndon had made proposals for the administration of North-Western Rhodesia. The country was to be divided into three districts consisting of the Barotse District, the Victoria Falls District, and the Batoka District.

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271 C.O. 879/68 No. 656, Serial No. 121, p. 193; telegram from Mr. Chamberlain to H. C. Alfred Milner, September 13, 1900.
Thus on September 20, 1900, the Colonial Office informed the British South Africa Company that Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia Order in Council had been gazetted at Capetown on September 15, 1900. They were further informed that it was now necessary under Section 7 of the Order for the Company to formally nominate to the High Commissioner, Mr. Coryndon to be Administrator, Mr. F. N. Worthington to be District Commissioner, Batoka District, Mr. F. Atkins to be District Commissioner, Lealui District, and Mr. Gifford Moore, to be accountant and controller. The nominations were to be made through the Colonial Office, and the Company was asked to acquaint the Colonial Office of their desire to nominate the above mentioned gentlemen to the High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, by telegraph. 272

With regard to the approval of the Lawley Treaty of 1898, Mr. Chamberlain seems to have been more cautious than his predecessors who usually would have approved such agreement if the Company recommended. He seemed to have aimed at protecting Lewanika and the imperial Government rights in future if the Company were to violate them. The Colonial Secretary sent a telegram to the High Commissioner on April 19, 1900, to inform him that the terms of the Agreement of 1898 seemed to be out of date in view of the Order in Council. He emphasized that the rights conveyed in Section (a) and

272 C.O. 879/68 No. 656, Serial No. 127, p. 196; Colonial Office to British South Africa Company, September 20, 1900.

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perhaps those in (d) were inconsistent with Charter clause 20 and could not be approved. Those in (c) and (f) were functions of administration, but in peculiar circumstances perhaps first mentioned could be allowed to stand. Grant of administration and judicial rights by Lewanika, and promise of protection by the Company, with maintenance of British Resident, together with description of Agreement as treaty with the British Government seemed now to be unnecessary, and could be regarded as inconsistent with the Order in Council. Chamberlain wanted to have Milner's views on the whole document before he would recommend its approval by the Government.

On September 14, 1900, the Colonial Secretary had written the British South Africa Company in reply to their letter of July 17, 1899, in relation to approval of the concession. Chamberlain maintained that until Lewanika had signed the new concession and it was submitted to the Secretary of State in a completed form, he did not consider it necessary for him to express any further opinion in regard to its terms, beyond what he had told the Company on May 8, 1900.

Chamberlain seemed to have become aware that criticism might be leveled against him in the future if he allowed the Company to take advantage of Lewanika and his people. He seems to have also wanted to insure that Africans were protected legally in the transaction. In his May 8, 1900 letter to the Company, he had explained to them that it would be
necessary that the concession be signed by the King in full Council, and should be signed and witnessed by the chief representatives of Barotseland, as was done in the case of the Lochner Concession.\textsuperscript{273} The Company therefore decided to request Mr. Coryndon, who was then on leave, in England to proceed to South Africa to procure the signature of the concession. The Company had informed the Colonial Office on July 17, 1900, of the procedure it had taken to secure the signature, and the draft of the concession proposed to be submitted to Lewanika was forwarded for consideration of Mr. Chamberlain with a request that the Directors might be informed if its terms expressed accurately the terms which the Secretary of State would be prepared to approve when the signature of Lewanika had been obtained to the instrument.

The Draft Concession which had been submitted to the Colonial Office with the Company's letter of July 17, 1900, merely embodied, in legal language, without alteration in substance, the agreement arrived at by Sir Arthur Lawley with King Lewanika, including the additional terms set out in Lewanika's letter of June 25, 1898. As we have seen above, Chamberlain had refused to express any opinion as to whether the legal drafting had been accurately done. The Board of Directors of the Company in order that no

\textsuperscript{273} C.O. 879/68 No. 656 Serial No. 22, p. 194:
Colonial Office to British South Africa Company, September 14, 1900.
question might arise later in regard to it, instructed Mr. Coryndon to attempt to procure the signature of the concession into alternative forms (A) being the terms in the exact form in which they were originally agreed upon, with the King's letter of January 25, 1898, annexed, as forming part of them; (B) being the improved version previously submitted to the Colonial Office.²⁷⁴

The form (B) was subsequently modified slightly in South Africa on the instructions of Mr. Rhodes, so as to eliminate the clause granting a monopoly trading to the British South Africa Company. In this struggle with the Colonial Office regarding the ratification of the concession, the High Commissioner and his staff seem to have been helpful to the Company for in a letter to Coryndon of January 1900, the Imperial Secretary in South Africa informed him that "The Concession marked "A" appears identical in its terms with the draft concession obtained by Captain Lawley in 1898, with the addition of the reservation stipulated by Lewanika in his letter of the 25th June, 1898. His excellency sees no objection to the immediate ratification of the concession subject to the reservations laid down in the letter from the Colonial Office to the British South Africa Company of the 8th May, 1900, and he is expressing that view in a dispatch to the Secretary of State."²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ C.O. 879/76 No. 8910 Enclosure I in No. 6, pp. 4-6.
Mr. Coryndon travelled to Barotseland and succeeded in obtaining the signature of Lewanika in full Council to the new concession in the alternative forms "A" and "B," on October 17, 1900, as directed by the Colonial Secretary's letter of September 14, 1900. He forwarded copies of the concession to Sir Alfred Milner and reached England with the original documents in January 1901. The Company's Board of Directors forwarded to the Colonial Secretary the original concession signed by Lewanika and Coryndon, on February 8, 1901, requesting that it might be ratified in one or the other of the forms "A" or "B." It was also stated that the Company was prepared to assent in a formal document to the conditions stated in the sixth paragraph of the Colonial Office letter of May 8, 1900.

During the long negotiations for the ratification of the new Concession, the Colonial Office seemed to have moved cautiously in a manner that reveals that Chamberlain had regained authority to initiative policy for Central Africa from the Company. The Colonial Office appears to have used this policy initiative to ensure that the Company followed directives of the Colonial Office and not as before when the Government based its policy on the recommendations of the Company and Mr. Rhodes.

During the months of April, May, and early June 1901, no reply was received by the Company to their letter of February 8, 1901. Mr. H. Wilson Fox, the Manager of the British South Africa Company had several interviews toward
the end of May with Mr. Just of the Colonial Office, and pressed for an early answer. Mr. Just informed him that certain information would be required as to the circumstances under which the concession was signed.

The points raised by Mr. Just were practically those set in the letter from the Colonial Office to the Company of June 17, 1901. This letter asked the Board of Directors to obtain a new concession in terms to be approved by the Colonial Office before their submission to Lewanika, and pending the execution of this concession to state, that "Mr. Chamberlain has no objection to the Company exercising the rights embodied in the agreement between Lewanika and Captain Lawley in June, 1898, within that part of Lewanika's dominions which lie within the British sphere as defined by the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of 1893, and subject, of course, to the limitations laid down in the letter from his department of 8th May 1900."276

During the first week of June, Mr. Fox called upon Mr. Just at the Colonial Office upon certain matters and at the end of the conversation, Mr. Just again referred to the subject of Lewanika's concession. He mentioned the points raised in the Colonial Office letter of June 17, 1901. He pointed out to Mr. Fox that it was on the representation of the Company that it might unsettle Lewanika's mind to present to him a new concession for signature; that

276 C.O. 879/76 No. 8910, Enclosure I in No. 6, p. 7.
Mr. Chamberlain had approved the course set out in the letter from the Colonial Office of May 8, 1900; that the concession as actually signed, some variations from the original form had been introduced that it would appear from this that more might be done in this direction if the Company so desired; and that it would be preferable to obtain a new concession in a form which could be ratified in its entirety, than to follow the course laid down in the letter of May 8, 1900. Mr. Just further suggested that if the Company's rights were limited to purely commercial rights the approval of the Colonial Office to the Concession would not be necessarily required.277 Mr. Fox of course pointed out that the Company had done all that it was required to do under the Colonial Office letter of May 8, 1900, and that it was therefore entitled to claim immediate ratification of the concession as signed. However, Mr. Just informed Mr. Fox that the Colonial Office was not therefore, prepared to ratify immediately the concession recently obtained by Mr. Coryndon in terms of the Colonial Office letter of May 8, 1900.

On the 13th of August, 1901, the Company wrote to the Colonial Office expressing the acceptance generally of the conditions upon which it was proposed to approve the Concession. The Company, however, suggested modification in the form of Condition (3), with the object of bringing into

277 Ibid., p. 7.
close conformity with the terms of paragraph 8 of the Company's letter to the Colonial Office dated June 29, 1900. Mr. Clegg, the Company's Assistant Secretary explained that Condition 3 as then drafted, the Company might be hampered in the exercise of its commercial rights by the necessity of securing the formal consent of the Secretary of State prior to land alienation, a contingency which they understood not to be intended. He proposed a form of words as an alternative. In reply to the above letter, Mr. C. P. Lucas of the Colonial Office writing on behalf of the Secretary of State on September 14, 1901 pointed out in paragraph 2, that the alternative to Condition 3, proposed by the Company would be superfluous, as the exercise of protective and administrative rights was provided for in Conditions 1 and 2, and that Condition 3 was intended to relate to such commercial or industrial functions as were usually exercised by the Administration in a British Colony. Mr. Lucas, therefore, informed Mr. Fox of the British South Africa Company that Mr. Chamberlain was not prepared to depart from the wording already proposed, but that all reasonable consideration would be given to the wishes of his company in regard to any action under Section 3.\textsuperscript{278}


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Company wished. They therefore apparently decided that the best course to take was to accept the conditions imposed by Chamberlain to have the concession approved and then they would carry out their obligations in a way that suited the Company interests in Barotseland. This they must have assumed they were capable of doing since all officials of the Administration of Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia were nominated by the Company. Apparently with this in mind the Company replied to the Colonial Office letter of September 14, 1901, on October 22 stating that they were prepared to accept the conditions demanded by Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Clegg, writing on behalf of the Company stated that in view of the explanation afforded in paragraph 2 of the Colonial Office letter above referred to, he was prepared to state that the Directors would not press further for a modification of clause 2 of the endorsement; they noted with satisfaction the assurance conveyed in paragraph 3 that all reasonable consideration would be given to the wishes of the Company in regard to any action under Condition 3. Clegg enclosed Concession A, in which had been enclosed the form of approval for signature by a Secretary of State as requested in the Colonial Office letter of August 8, 1900.279

Finally, Mr. Graham of the Colonial Office replied to the Company's letter of October 22, 1901, on November 23,

1901, returning to the Company the Concession marked A, granted by King Lewanika to the British South Africa Company on October 17, 1900, approved by Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, subject to the conditions endorsed upon it.

The foregoing concession was approved by the Colonial Office on November 23, 1901, subject to the following conditions:

First, the Company was informed that they could not exercise any rights under the concession that were inconsistent with the provisions of the Barotseland Northwestern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1899. Moreover, nothing in the concession was to be considered as curtailing the exercise by the Government of any rights and powers for the Administration of Barotseland. Thirdly, there was a stipulation that the Company was to seek permission of the Government before they could alienate any of the privileges purportedly conferred by the concession. This requirement was inapplicable in cases where the Company alienated its privileges in search for minerals. Pending the settlement between the Portuguese and the British Government with regard to the Barotseland western boundary, the Company was forbidden to exercise their rights under the concession in the disputed territory. Finally, the Company was further required to preserve from mining operations the portion of the Kingdom that Lewanika had asked for the exclusive use of himself and his people in his letter to the
Colonial Office of October 18, 1900, unless payable gold was not discovered in the remainder of the country. 280

In order to soothe the fears of the Foreign Office that the approval of the concession would create complications for them with Portugal, the Colonial Office communicated to Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, on December 13, 1901. The Colonial Office enclosed in their letter all copies of the correspondence with the Company respecting ratification of the concession granted to them by King Lewanika. Chamberlain informed Lord Lansdowne that in approving this concession he had reserved all questions affecting that part of Barotseland territory which had been provisionally assigned to Portugal by the "Modus Vivendi" agreement of 1893. Furthermore, Chamberlain had made it as a condition for approval that a certain area on the Portuguese side of the "Modus Vivendi" line was to be reserved for the Africans in certain circumstances if the result of the ongoing delimitation proceedings were to assign it to the British sphere. 281

The approval of the concession by the Colonial Office thus brought to a conclusion the desire of King Lewanika for British protection as well as Rhodes' desire to bring the Barotse Kingdom under the sphere of his Company's operations. Even though the boundary of the Kingdom on the west

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was still unresolved, Lewanika must have felt with some satisfaction that he was definitely under Her Majesty's protection. The form of the concession marked "B" was returned to Lewanika through the British resident in Barotseland. Meanwhile, Mr. Chamberlain requested the Company to send him as soon as possible a statement of their proposals for the development of the country.

The Colonial Office's approval of the concession seems to show that the British Government had not learned a lesson from the events in Southern Rhodesia and the experience of the Jameson Raid. Only direct assumption of the administration of Barotseland would have assured Lewanika of the protection from his enemies who were now the Company. But instead the Government decided to entrust the country's welfare to the hands of the Company knowing well enough that this very company was engaged in maladministration of Southern Rhodesia and that the African inhabitants there were being treated like slaves. Chamberlain must have known that Rhodes and his agents in Central Africa could not be trusted in matters dealing with African welfare and this negligence or cooperation with the Company was bound to increase problems for the Government and Lewanika in the future.

BRITISH POLICY IN BAROTSELAND FROM 1902-1916

One of the problems that began immediately after the establishment of the Company Administration in Barotseland
was that of maintaining law and order. We have noted above that Lewanika had reluctantly permitted the recruitment of African police which would eventually replace the white policemen in the country. Therefore, in 1901 the white police force was replaced by a black one which came to be known as the Barotse Native Police, of which Colin Harding became the first Commandant. This force began its operations with five white officers and seventy-one African policemen. Later the number was increased to a few hundred men under white non-commissioned officers. By 1904, the force had increased to five hundred men and was structured along military lines.\textsuperscript{282} Under this arrangement, King Lewanika and his Queen and their son, Litia, each had six to ten men of the African police who acted as their security. The establishment of this force would seem to reveal that the Company was bent on reducing Lewanika's authority in the whole country. In his report to the Company Secretary, Harding, then Acting British Resident, wrote that during his journey to the Batoka country, a distant district of the Kingdom, he was astounded to see the number of guns in the possession of different Africans with whom he came in contact. Every man he met had a firearm of some description.\textsuperscript{283} Even though these guns were used by the Barotse

\textsuperscript{282}Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{283}C.O. 879/75 Enclosure in No. 130, Annexure 5. Administration of North-West Rhodesia, No. A I, pp. 210-211.
for shooting game, Harding believed that in the event of a crisis, the Africans in all probability would use them for extermination of white people.

The extent of the Company's monopoly of mineral rights was bound up with the extent of Lewanika's authority so that the Company was obliged to acknowledge his formal influence over the whole of Northwestern Rhodesia and press his claims in the disputed territory west of the Zambesi. In August 1901, Harding was writing the High Commissioner forwarding a copy of correspondence between him and Lewanika, regarding the continual raiding of the Machokwe chief, named Musilindi, on Mabungu and Katongo, who were Barotse subjects, residing near the junction of Kumbeli and Kwando Rivers, some 200 miles west of Lealui. Harding had been asked by Lewanika for advice on what to do about the serious situation. The Acting Resident informed the High Commissioner that he had advised Lewanika to wait until Coryndon returned before taking any action himself. "As Major Coryndon will soon be here, and as he comes straight from the High Commissioner, he will know more about the ultimate settlement of your boundary on that side of the river than I, and until I know what is your country and what is the Portuguese, I cannot take action. I know it is very hard for you to sit still and see your people killed, and it is hard for me, your friend, but we must not rash, and do things that may hereafter hinder the ultimate satisfactory settlement of your boundary."
I must ask you my friend, not to take any action against Mosilindi, the Machoke Chief till I write again.  

On October 18, 1901, Lord Milner communicated with Mr. Chamberlain transmitting a letter, with enclosure, which he had received from Major Goold-Adams respecting Lewanika's desire to visit England. Milner also wanted to know if any progress had been made in the negotiations for settling the Western Boundary of Barotseland. Milner felt strongly that the sooner some definite arrangements were arrived at, the better. He requested to be authorized, on behalf of His Majesty's Government to communicate to Lewanika some assurance which would quiet his mind on the subject of Portuguese encroachments. This could be more effective if it could be accompanied by an undertaking on the part of the Portuguese not to push their occupation further into the disputed territory.  

On his part, Major Goold-Adams who had been detailed by the Foreign Office during the years 1896 and 1897 to go to Barotseland for the purpose of investigating and reporting upon the territorial limits of that Kingdom, had sent Milner among others the following message: ..."Prior to my leaving Barotseland I obtained a verbal pledge from Lewanika that he would not take any steps to forcibly eject any Portuguese subjects who might have already or

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285 C.O. 879/75 No. 166, High Commissioner Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain, p. 331.
thereafter encroached upon his territory unless he had received special permission from the Government to do so."

The Major reported that he had extracted that promise from the Barotse King in order to avoid any chance of peaceful negotiations between Portugal and England being complicated by disturbances, and perhaps bloodshed, taking place between the Barotse and Portuguese troops or their subjects. Having extracted this pledge from Lewanika, Goold-Adams felt that he was, to a certain extent responsibility to Lewanika to see that he did not suffer in consequence, which was easily possible if the boundary issue was not settled within a reasonable time. This was a certainty, if during the interval, all sorts of people were to acquire occupation, mining, trading and other rights without any active opposition or remonstrate on the King's or the government's part. Goold-Adams expressed his interest in the matter and wished that His Majesty's Government take steps to have it settled without any further delay.

"I cannot help thinking that our Government have failed to realize the very exceptional character of King Lewanika, the power that he wields and the absolute necessity, if we wish to retain control of the Upper Zambesi, of making sure that we retain him as a friend. He is utterly unlike any other native chief with whom I have been

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\[286\] C.O. 879/75, Enclosure in No. 166; Major Goold-Adams to High Commissioner, September 1901, p. 332.
thrown in contact, including Khama and Batheon; I consider him far and away the most intelligent native I have ever met, alive to everything that is happening, keenly conscious about the welfare of his country and people, and at the same time excessively jealous of interference with his rights." 287

Goold-Adams seemed to have been able to understand well Lewanika's intentions in all this business of British protection. The Major informed Milner that Lewanika was led to believe, and properly so, that his interests could be safely entrusted to the British Government, and that he could look forward to immediate steps (back to 1897) being taken to have boundaries definitely settled. By 1901, Lewanika was still anxiously waiting to hear the result of the promised negotiations between England and Portugal. Referring to the letter from Lewanika to the High Commissioner which has been mentioned above, Goold-Adams reported that the letter clearly showed how Lewanika's anxiety had reached such a pitch that he desired to proceed to England to lay his case personally before His Majesty's Government. Goold-Adams suggested that it would be a good thing if Lewanika were to go himself accompanied by the then Barotse Resident, Mr. Coryndon. 288

All this British interest in Lewanika's Western Boundary can be better comprehended by the fact that the extent


288 C.O. 879/75, Enclosure in No. 166; Major Goold-Adams to High Commissioner, pp. 332-333.
of the Company's monopoly of mineral rights was bound up with the extent of Lewanika's dominions which meant that the Company was obliged to acknowledge the King's sovereignty over the whole of Northwestern Rhodesia, plus his claims in the disputed territory west of the Zambesi. For the administration of North-West Rhodesia, the example of Bechuanaland was adopted. In that territory, the 1891 and 1896 Bechuanaland Proclamations gave the white officials comprehensive judicial powers but reserved to the African courts all cases of murder or those in which an administrative officer might decide to intervene in the interests of order. This indirect rule or overlapping territorial and functional division of authority was obviously considered appropriate for conditions of the Upper Zambesi where King Lewanika had conceded to the Company the right to settle white farmers in the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe-land.289

From the start, the Company regarded Barotseland proper as possessing little economic value and because of this, Coryndon recommended acceptance of Lewanika's request for further enlargement of the reserved area. He had come to believe that western and northwestern provinces were unlikely to have much importance. But he considered the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe highlands healthy and were in

good geographical position for they lay across the proposed railway to Tanganyika. The administrative headquarters of the Company was to be erected in this area or northeast across the Kafue River. Thus this geographical separation of Lewanika's capital from the headquarters of the Company Administration was bound to create conflict and hasten the political separation that Coryndon set up.

It seems to me that Lewanika must have felt that he was misunderstood or that the Company officials distorted what he had agreed to in the treaties he had signed with the Company and the Government. This would appear to have been his main motive in wishing to visit England so he could discuss the treaties with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He still wanted to be under direct imperial control since the situation had not improved at all by the establishment of Company administration. Thus, when he reached England in 1902 to attend the Coronation of Edward VII, he was able to arrange a meeting with Chamberlain. Even though the Colonial Secretary assured Lewanika that the boundary issue would be settled soon and the proposed house tax would not be imposed by the Company without Lewanika's consent, Lewanika was still left in the hands of the Company. Chamberlain informed the King that the concession he had granted to the Company could not be amended and that the British Government would safeguard Lewanika's interests.²⁹⁰ This shows again that Chamberlain had

²⁹⁰Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969, p. 82 and in Clay, p. 126.
failed to understand the problems that Barotse were en-
countering as a consequence of the Company Administration.
The British Government could not possibly safeguard Lewani-
ka's interests because they did not effectively control
Company administration in Northern Rhodesia. Lewanika must
have realized then the destiny of his country had passed
from his grip and that of the Barotse ruling class. From
then on, as we shall see, the Company gradually began to
whittle his powers until the King was left with little
authority. When Lewanika returned from England around the
end of 1902, as far as the people were concerned he was
still King in the real sense of the word. But this power
was short-lived as the Company was determined to be the
real King of Northern and Northwestern Rhodesia. By that
time white farmers, especially Boers, were increasingly
moving into the country in large numbers and began to ac-
quire huge farm lands in the highlands in the Batoka Dis-
trict between Kalamo and Mazabuka. 291 By 1905 the railway
line from Southern Rhodesia had reached the town of
Livingstone and the Victoria Falls Bridge was under
construction.

I have previously noted that the British Government
seems to have disappointed Lewanika by permitting the
Company to establish its operations in his country and
other communities in Northern Rhodesia. I have also alluded
to the fact that Rhodes' interests were not necessarily

291R. A. Luck, Visit to Lewanika: King of the Barotse,
p. 46.
compatible with those of Africans since he saw them as a source of cheap labor only. In these circumstances it was not to be expected that the Company would be interested in assisting Lewanika and other African leaders in northern Zambesia to modernize their countries; rather, the Company's major aims were to make use of the people for exploitation of the land and its resources for the benefit of the Company and its shareholders. The Company's report which was issued on July 15, 1903 reveals the true aims of the Company for Northern Rhodesia. After reporting on the progress the Company was making in the construction of a railway and roads, the Duke of Abercorn, President of the British South Africa Company added, "We intend soon to throw the country open, and I think I am safe in predicting that a very large number of new discoveries will then be made. The area of our territory is so great, and the number of persons by whom it has been entered is so limited, that it is really surprising that so much wealth should have been reported in Northern Rhodesia. We have been informed of the discoveries of gold, copper, lead, zinc, and coal, and those who have had the best means of knowing have expressed themselves as fully satisfied and given practical proof of their faith by subscribing large sums of money for development." "We are satisfied that we shall not in the north have to incur the risks and the expense which attended the occupation of Southern Rhodesia and it is a great satisfaction to us to feel that there is
now every prospect of our being able to turn to account your valuable commercial interests in Northern Rhodesia with a comparatively limited preliminary outlay (cheers)." 292 With that kind of plan for Northern Rhodesia, Lewanika had no chance of retaining his power and authority in the country for long. Thus, between 1904 and 1909, the Barotse King yielded complete control of all land outside Barotseland proper to the Company, to be available to white settlers.

The ineffectiveness of British Government's safeguards for the protection of Lewanika and his people is revealed by the struggle between the Company and Lewanika concerning who had authority to tax the people. The Colonial Office insisted that the Company should first obtain Lewanika's consent. Coryndon seems to have wanted to start levying the house tax as early as 1902 so as to pay for the expenses of administration. At that time only a small revenue was being collected from stamps and licenses. 293 The Mashukuluumbwe and Tonga peoples had shown signs that they did not care for the white man's taxes and Coryndon realized that he could not begin the task until his police had been increased to 500 men. He also learned one fact which many European officials in other colonial territories learned

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292The British South Africa Company: The Directors' Report, 1899-1900; 1900-1903, July 15, 1903, p. 8. Also some discussion of the Company plans for N. Rhodesia is found in Hall, Zambia, p. 95.

293Stokes, The Zambesian Past, p. 275.
the hard way, that the local ruler's cooperation was essential. Lewanika's cooperation in this endeavor was a necessity if the tax collection were to be carried out peacefully. "Lewanika accepted the idea of house tax with alacrity; it promised him a substantial increase in his own revenue, and he wished to extend the area under tax more rapidly than even the administration thought prudent. But the matter was to become one of bitter dispute."294

The King of the Barotse was the first person to realize that the replacement of tribute by house tax outside the Barotse Valley also meant that his recognition as ruler of those provinces and other outlying areas was at stake. While visiting London in 1902, Lewanika had approached the board of the British South Africa Company on the tax collection question. He had asked for a percentage on the revenue collected and wished to be allowed to collect taxes through his own Barotse administrative system. He wanted it clearly understood he wished to have power to collect taxes from his people, not only in the Barotse Valley, but in the whole country, and then hand over the revenue to the Company administration. He could not see why he should not do it since he used to get tribute from all his subjects before the coming of the Company administration.

The Company's board in London did partially agree with Lewanika's request that he would be allowed to collect taxes on behalf of the administration to whom he was to hand it.

294 Ibid., p. 276.
over. But it was also clearly understood that in this request Lewanika was acting under authority and supervision of the Company administrator and the tax was to be collected only in those districts where authority was sufficient to ensure peaceable payment. Coryndon did not agree with the Company board in giving Lewanika authority to collect tax on behalf of the European administration, even though the concession was quite humiliating and restrictive to a man like Lewanika who had invited white men to his Kingdom ten years earlier. Coryndon was definitely opposed to honoring the London agreement. He believed that Lewanika should not be allowed to collect taxes outside the Barotse Valley. At the time Coryndon seems to have decided to destroy Lewanika's authority in North-Western Rhodesia. He was now administering the territory through five districts, each under a District Commissioner with control over most of the areas of law and order.

Moreover, Lewanika's desire to participate in the collection of taxes from his people was frustrated by Coryndon who argued that Lewanika's administrative system would be unable to function in the districts outside the Valley. Coryndon seems to have conveniently ignored the fact Lewanika had collected tribute (tax) from the same districts before the advent of the Company Administration.


Coryndon rejected the agreement Lewanika had made in London regarding tax and instead made his own policy on this matter by pressuring Lewanika to consent to Coryndon's tax collection plan which only made use of transitional participation of Barotse indunas.\footnote{297 For the detailed discussion between Lewanika and the Company on the establishment of tax, see Stokes, pp. 275-280 and in Caplan, pp. 85-87.} The Company Directors in London, the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner, Alfred Milner, all accepted Coryndon's policy on tax authority, which goes to prove again the hollowness of Chamberlain's assurances that Her Majesty's Government would protect Lewanika's interests. An assurance which had been renewed in 1902 when Lewanika met with the Colonial Secretary in London.

Lewanika fought hard for a 50% share of the receipts. He wrote directly to the High Commissioner and to the Directors of the Company in London, arguing that receiving less than 20% which Coryndon considered as proper would destroy his authority in the country. The High Commissioner however recommended that Lewanika's share should be set at 10% and this was accepted by the Colonial Secretary Lyttelton. Even this he was not to receive. The Company Directors recommended that Lewanika should receive only 5% of the receipts. In the end, the Colonial Office decided that the figure would be 10% of the house tax of which no more than £1,200 was to be given directly to him; this sum

\footnote{297 For the detailed discussion between Lewanika and the Company on the establishment of tax, see Stokes, pp. 275-280 and in Caplan, pp. 85-87.}

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was to be in addition to the £850 per annum he was receiving from the 1900 agreement. If the ten percent totalled more than £1,200, as it was expected to do, the difference would be paid into a fund for public works in Barotseland, and Lewanika and his advisors would decide on the projects to be funded subject to the administrator's supervision. The Company was making money in the country from minerals, land and trading but it seems to have been unwilling to invest even a single penny in the development of the country. This seemed unfair to Lewanika and his people. This final decision from the Colonial Secretary was strictly enforced by the Company administration. The King and his councillors never forgave the British Government for this sell-out to the Company.²⁹⁸ Moreover, by 1905, many of the masses in Barotseland had begun feeling the burdens of house tax as the Company officials led by Colin Harding used harsh methods in the collection of this tax. They burned down houses of people who defaulted in their tax payments. During this time Harding was dismissed from the Company administration because of his maltreatment of Africans during the tax collection duties.

The imposition of house tax seems to have been devised by the Company in order to force Africans from Northern Rhodesia to go to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa to work in the mines, plantations and factories in order to

²⁹⁸ For more detailed discussion of the issue see Caplan, pp. 85-87; Clay, pp. 134-135 and Stokes, pp. 279-282.
earn money for the house tax. By the end of 1909, thousands of young men were recruited\textsuperscript{299} by the Southern Rhodesia Labor Bureau which had been sanctioned by the Company administration in line with the earlier recommendation of Coryndon which I have alluded to above. The span of Company rule in Northern Rhodesia before the Government took over responsibility of Administration was the same as in Southern Rhodesia; but from 1891 to 1911 when separate administrations of North-East and North-West Rhodesia were merged, and indeed until 1924, when Company rule ended, Northern resources were used for developing the South. Pioneer white settlers were encouraged to occupy land mainly along the railways and only a few company officials seem to have been deployed in Northern Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{300}

In November 1904, the Company persuaded Lewanika to agree to transfer his powers of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Africans except in the reserved area. Within this area Lewanika was allowed to retain jurisdiction but cases of murder and any offenses against the laws of England, were to be tried directly by the administrator. This authority that Lewanika lost had been guaranteed by the British Government by their Order in Council of 1899. According to Section 8 of this order, any proclamations dealing with justice, the administration was to respect any

\textsuperscript{299} Gann, \textit{A History of Northern Rhodesia}, pp. 105-111; Caplan, p. 88 and Stokes, p. 283.

\textsuperscript{300} \textit{The Cambridge History of the British Empire}, Volume 8, pp. 696-697.
native laws or customs, except if this was incompatible with
the due exercise of Her Majesty's power and jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{301}
The Company action therefore seems to have been in clear
violation of the 1899 Order in Council. Yet the Colonial
Secretary and the High Commissioner did not disapprove this
violation of the Barotse basic law guaranteed by the 1899
Order in Council.

The British Government seems to have attempted to slow
the Company's increasing acquisition of power and authority
in North-Western Rhodesia especially on the land issue.
Lewanika had carelessly granted authority to the Company
administration to issue land grants to white settlers in
1906. Since the agreement had not been witnessed by the
Ngambela and other councillors, the Colonial Office voided
it. But Coryndon again used his tricks to have Lewanika
sign a formal deed of cession which was witnessed by the
Ngambela and other councillors on January 23, 1909. This
cession gave the Company authority to dispose of land to
settlers, on whatever terms they considered just, and the
money received from the land was to be retained by the
Company.\textsuperscript{302} It was in this case of land concession that
the Colonial Office appears to have realized that the con-
cession by Lewanika amounted to a land grant in the whole

\textsuperscript{301}C.O. 879/57 Enclosure in No. 284, pp. 495-497,

\textsuperscript{302}Stokes, pp. 283-284; Caplan, p. 88; Clay, p. 135;
Gann, pp. 221-223.
of North-Western Rhodesia except the Barotse Valley. Even Lewanika himself realized the seriousness of this cession and in 1910 repudiated any intention on his part of authorizing the Company to sell land and this claim was continued by his son and successor, Litia, in 1921. But it was already too late to undo the damage.

It was unfortunate for Lewanika that in the struggle to maintain his power in the country against the increasing control by the Company administration the British Government represented by the Colonial Office and its officials in South Africa almost always sided with the Company against Lewanika. When in 1907 the Company administrator acting through the Secretary for Native Affairs arbitrarily ordered Lewanika's representatives from Mashukumbwe and Batoka provinces in order to establish direct company control over the people there, Lewanika protested strongly this action and wrote the High Commissioner to that effect: "Now I also ask your Excellency what is the meaning of the expulsion of all my representatives from Mashukumbwe and Matoka districts? . . . . You can see that I have been accused without any reason at all. I have always done all in my power to keep the peace in all my country and to have all my people submissive to the Company. I am sorry to see

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303 We have noted in Chapter I above that in the Barotse system of government before the Company rule, the King's representatives were stationed in each district and province for the purposes of administration and collection of taxes. They heard court cases in these districts and ran the administration of the district.
they have so little confidence in me. And why allow such false reports to spread... I feel it keenly. Oh! that we were granted to pass directly under the Government of King Edward." 304 Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner refused to intervene apparently because the interests of the Company and that of the government were compatible. Selborne instead proposed that in order to save the remnants of Lewanika's power, the country should be partitioned so that Lewanika would retain his authority only in the Barotse Valley. He advocated renunciation of all Lewanika's claims outside the Valley in return for direct protection of the reserved area on the lines of Basutoland, another clear violation of the agreement of 1900.

The Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin, rejected such a proposal as impracticable but still agreed with the Company's action against Lewanika. His letter to Selborne regarding this issue reveals the long run British Government policy for Central Africa and the thinking of the Colonial Office behind this policy. He wrote Selborne on August 10, 1907, and said the following: "The Company has been placed in possession of assets of a wide area in consideration of the administration of the area without expense to the British taxpayer, and successive Secretaries have steadily refused to permit any infringement of this arrangement in spite of the good reasons which have from time to

304 Cited in Caplan, p. 84 and in Stokes, p. 289.
time been urged for placing this or that part of the interior under direct imperial control."305 Beginning in 1906, Lewanika and his advisors began to utilize the techniques of petitions from submitting their grievances to the British Government. Prince Imwiko of Barotseland engaged Mr. Peregrino, a Charian, who had gone to South Africa and had become a leader of the Colored Peoples Vigilance Committee of South Africa. Peregrino became agent of the Africans in North-Western Rhodesia in making complaints to the British Government. Peregrino stated that, "The path of the native is difficult. I am a black man and have acted for years between the Black man and the Government in the Cape Colony with much success." Thus, it appeared natural that this was the type of man who could assist the Barotse ruling elites to fight the Company's encroachment of their power.

After his arrival in Barotseland, he prepared for the King petitions showing what British policy in Barotseland had done for the Africans. The petitions set out the major Barotse grievances. These were: first, the boundary award of 1905 which we shall discuss below; secondly, the payment of house tax; and thirdly, the fact that the Company had not fulfilled its agreements to "establish and maintain" schools, while its payment of Lewanika's share of the house tax had been made only partially. The petition deal-

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305 Cited in Stokes, p. 290.
ing with taxes said this: "Now we have been deprived of the yearly tributes that were brought into our capitals from all the tribes that are under our power; our former slaves feel no more obliged to help their headmen; we have to pay for the least service they render us; how are we to live? £1200 would be hardly sufficient for the King's large family: Are all the headmen to give up their duties as rulers and judges of the nations in order to dig their gardens and build their houses with their own hands? We are sometimes caused to feel as if we were a conquered nation, while we have made an agreement which was said to be just like an alliance between our nation and the imperial Government. When we say so, those of the British South Africa Company ask "Do you want to be conquered." The above petitions were signed by Lewanika, Litia, and the Ngambela.

Moreover, in a personal meeting between the High Commissioner Selborne and Lewanika at Bulawayo in October 1906, the Barotse King repeated the same complaints he and his councillors had raised in the Peregrino petition. Selborne rejected all the complaints, claiming that most of the complaints had been invented by Peregrino. Selborne was thus refusing to consider the serious problems Lewanika was encountering as his influence had been reduced tremendously.

by the Company. The complacency and neglect of the Government's obligations to Lewanika seemed to reflect the failure of the British policy for Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia as a whole. The British officials in London and in South Africa, together with those of the Company seemed to have failed completely to recognize the extent to which their actions had destroyed the power and authority of proud African rulers and their people who had invited white men to come to Barotseland to "protect" them in 1890.

If Lewanika had failed to get any justice from the 1900 agreement between him and the Company, he must have been even more disappointed with the British Government's handling of the Barotse Western boundary controversy. The British Government and the Company seemed to have merely been using Lewanika to win as much territory as possible for Britain in Central Africa. On July 7, 1899, the Colonial Secretary informed the Foreign Office that it was important for Britain to make good the claim to the northern part of Barotseland so that the British territory may stretch to Lake Dilolo and from there join the boundary of the Congo Free State. He believed that since the Portuguese had established a fort at Kakenge, Lewanika was prevented from exercising his legitimate influence to the north and this Portuguese action might influence the decision of an arbitrator when the matter came to be arbitrated. The

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Portuguese also seemed to be determined to maintain their claims in Lewanika's territory. On July 14, 1899, they had given notice of the proposal to the Government by a private Portuguese company to construct a railway from Tiger Bay to Barotseland. This company's proposal was now before the Ministry of Marines for consideration. 308

On receiving news of this proposal by the Portuguese, Sir H. MacDonell, the British Ambassador to Lisbon, was instructed by the Foreign Secretary Salisbury to remind the Portuguese Government of their treaty obligations. The controversy was brought about by the fact that when the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1891 was signed, the exact extent of the Barotse Kingdom was unknown by these powers. 309

That treaty as we have noted above provided that "the western line of division separating the British from the Portuguese sphere of influence in Central Africa shall follow the centre of the Channel of the Upper Zambesi, starting from the Katima Rapids, up to the point where it reaches the territory of the Barotse Kingdom. That territory shall remain within the British Sphere, its limits to the westward, which will constitute the boundary between the British and the Portuguese spheres of influence, being decided by a Joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission, which shall have power,

308 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854. Enclosure in Serial No. 124, p. 182; Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

309 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Serial No. 125, p. 183. The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, August 11, 1899.
in case of differences of opinion, to appoint an
Umpire.”310 It was understood that Britain would not
oppose Portuguese expansion outside the limits of Barotse-
land. By the proposed railway construction, the Portuguese
were apparently not abiding by their agreement of 1891.

The British Government had sent Major Goold-Adams to
Barotseland to investigate the exact boundaries of
Lewanika's Kingdom especially to the west and report back
to the Government back in 1896-1897. His report reveals
why Lewanika was unsatisfied with the handling of this
problem by the British Government. Major Goold-Adams
reported that Lewanika's Kingdom was comprised of seventeen
major ethnic groups or tribes.311

The whole country occupied by ten of the tribes lay
to the west of the boundary laid down provisionally by the
Modus Vivendi, 1891. This meant that Lewanika stood to
lose half of his territory if this provisional boundary
became permanent. This report was challenged by the Por-
tuguese and was therefore unacceptable to them.

310 Ibid., p. 183.

311 C.O. 879/75 No. 8854 Serial No. 125, p. 184.
These major ethnic groups were as follows: 1) the country
occupied by the Barotse themselves, the main part being to
the west of the Zambesi as far as the Kuando River; 2) the
country of the Bampukush; 3) the Bamarashi; 4) that part
of the Mambunda, the tribe living to the east of the Water-
shed between Kuito and Kuando Rivers; 5) the Bamacoma;
6) the Mabuyenji; 7) the Mamboe; 8) the Balovale; 9) the
Balunda; 10) the Balekwakwa; 11) the Makonya; 12) the
Bamashasha; 13) the Bakwanga; 14) the Matotella; 15) the
Basubia; 16) the Batoka; 17) the Bashukumbwe.

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Salisbury was however, willing to accept Goold-Adams' report and forego the process of arbitration if the Portuguese would accept the findings and agree to settle the boundary along these lines. Sir H. MacDonell was therefore instructed to communicate these views to the Portuguese Foreign Office. He was also instructed to protest any extension of the Portuguese Administration into the Barotse Kingdom, and to ask them to accept that the view that the boundary findings of Goold-Adams and the Modus Vivendi line should be regarded as neutral land as between the two Governments, until a decision had been given on the issue by an arbitrator. While these diplomatic exchanges were taking place Lewanika was not allowed to directly participate. We have noted previously that Goold-Adams had obtained a pledge from Lewanika back in 1897 that he would not use his army to eject any Portuguese subjects from territory unless he had received special permission from the British Government. The Government had feared Lewanika might create diplomatic complications for them and so destroy the peaceful negotiations which were underway between the two countries not only on the Barotseland boundary question but also on the whole question of Portuguese claims and possessions in Central Africa plus the international situation and its connection with British Commercial interests and security in that region of Africa. This must have left Lewanika in frustration that he could not defend his

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\[312\] *Ibid.*, p. 185. -258-
sovereignty when the British seemed slow in handling the matter. Even Goold-Adams testified to Lewanika's frustration in his report to the Government, "Lewanika was led to believe, and properly so, that his interests could be safely entrusted to the British Government, and that he could look forward to immediate steps (in 1897) being taken to have his boundaries definitely settled."[^313] The British reinforced its acceptance of Goold-Adams' findings by sending Major Gibbons, a member of the British Military Intelligence in July 1899, disguised as a geographer sent out by the Royal Geographical Society of London, to map the upper Zambesi. Gibbons sent his report to the Director of Military Intelligence on August 31, 1899 in which he concluded that in his journey to the northeast to the Kwando River, every chief acknowledged Lewanika's authority, and, according to them his country extended to about 14°4' south latitude on the Kwito River in the north. "Therefore Lewanika's actual boundary, irrespective of districts over which his influence merely extends, may be said to be definitely bounded on the west by the Kwito River from its confluence with the Okavango to where 14°40' south latitude cuts its course, and indefinitely bounded on the north by a line taken from 14°14' south on the Kwito to 13°10' south on the Kwando."[^314]

[^313]: C.O. 879/57 No. 8854 Enclosure in Serial No. 310; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, December 30, 1899.

issue was sent to an impartial arbitrator and both countries accepted the King of Italy as the Arbitrator.

The Portuguese presented their argument against Britain by claiming that the dispute showed nothing but a continual system of intrigues by Britain in Barotseland. They argued that from 1890 to 1900, these intrigues were inspired if not carried out by the British Government officials, the Company, its agents or agents of the British Government.³¹⁵ The Portuguese believed that the Company obtained a concession from Lewanika with the aim of adding to the British dominions, by means of it, vast regions to which Lewanika had no rightful claim; British agents constantly incited him to put forward imaginary claims, assistance being afforded to enable him to do so.³¹⁶ The Portuguese seemed to have been correct when they accused Coillard as one of the secret agents of the British South Africa Company who advised Lewanika to grant the Lochner concession. The British of course denied all these Portuguese allegations by claiming that apart from Mr. Goold-Adams who had been sent to Barotseland on the mission of inquiry in 1896, they had never sent any agents there after 1897. The Government even denied that Major A. St. H. Gibbons' activities had anything to do with the boundary dispute, but were willing to present his findings to the Arbitrator

³¹⁵ C.O. 879/83 Nos. 740 and 742; Barotseland Boundary Arbitration, March 1904.

³¹⁶ C.O. 879/83 No. 742, p. 4; Barotseland Boundary Arbitration, March 1904.
in support of the British case. He was represented a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society whose exploring work and maps of the upper Zambesi were considered accurate and whose opinion the Society valued.  

In July 1905, this dispute between Lewanika's country and the Portuguese Colony of Angola was finally arbitrated by the King of Italy. He simply made a compromise between the claims of Portugal and Britain. The Portuguese had argued that the Upper Zambesi was the legitimate western boundary of Barotseland, while Britain, the Company, and Lewanika claimed the 20 meridian east of Greenwich. The King of Italy divided the disputed area evenly making the 22nd parallel as Barotseland's western boundary. This award was disappointing to Lewanika as it robbed him of a large tract of country whose inhabitants had been his subjects and those of his forefathers from time immemorial. This action had resulted in the reduction of Barotseland to about 180,000 square miles, just a little larger than the size of France. The Barotse Kingdom before July 1905 had been as large as France and Germany together. Therefore, Lewanika seemed justified when he wrote to Coryndon of his

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317 C.O. 879/83 No. 740 Serial Numbers 13 and 14; Colonial Office to the President of the Royal Geographical Society and the reply to Colonial Office, January 26, 1904.
319 Hole, p. 301; Caplan, p. 88.
reaction to the award, "...It is not quite a good boundary, is only to make us much disappointed; how a boundary can go like zig zag, to cut Imilangu tribe in half, Mazengo tribe in half, Bamokowa tribe half, Mambunda tribe half... is not a boundary only a joke indeed... . How shall we do, all Barotse indunas, their villages and cattle will be outside, also my sons, nephews and cattle will be outside... . How shall we do, sir, to be cutted half and half." 320

One may speculate that if this decision had come during the years when Lewanika's power was intact he would have fought the Portuguese and possibly the British South Africa Company in order to defend the integrity of his Kingdom. It seems that the British sacrificed Lewanika's interests in order to be on friendly terms with the Portuguese because they apparently felt this was more important to British interests in Europe and Central Africa. Where was the protection that Lewanika had sought from the British Government in 1889? Where were the assurances he had been given by the British officials including Coryndon since 1897 when as we have noted above, Lewanika was informed that he was definitely under British protection. This was one of the worst failures of British Policy in Barotseland and tends to show dishonesty on the part of the Colonial and Foreign Offices' officials when it came to dealing with African affairs, where African interests were involved.

320 Cited in Caplan, p. 89.
In 1907, Robert Codrington, who had replaced Coryndon as Administrator of Northwestern Rhodesia, humiliated Lewanika and his people even more than the arbitration award of 1905 by arbitrarily designating him merely as a "Paramount Chief" of the Lozi. The title of King as applied to Lewanika and prince to his son, Litia, were to be discontinued. This unilateral decree by a Company official who did not seem to have the courtesy to consult and discuss the matter with Lewanika and his Council before his decision, seemed a great blow to the prestige and status of Lewanika. This action appeared to have reduced Lewanika, a former King of Barotseland to the level with those of tribal chiefs in Northern Rhodesia. In this action Codrington seemed to have ignored the fact that chiefs in this region had been minor rulers or had been conquered by the Company agents as we have discussed above.

The 1909 land concession by Lewanika to the Company noted above seems to have cleared the way for the Company to merge Northwestern and Northeastern Rhodesia, an object the Company was eager to secure for reasons of economy since the railway and roads now connected the two regions. The Colonial Office through its High Commissioner supported the merger. Selborne now claimed that by 1909 concession on land Lewanika had given up all his claims and interests outside the Valley. Selborne encouraged the merger of the

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\[321\] Caplan, p. 100.
two regions and recommended the passing of an order in Council for this purpose. He also wrote Lewanika to inform him that in future Northwestern and Northeastern Rhodesia would be amalgamated and that it would have one Administrator, appointed by the Company and approved by the Colonial Secretary.\footnote{322} This order was proclaimed on August 17, 1911 and came to be known as Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911.\footnote{323} The Company was given authority for general administration of affairs within the limits of the Charter and the provisions of the Order. Section 7 of the Order authorized the Secretary of State to appoint a Resident Commissioner who was to represent imperial interests in Northern Rhodesia. As in Southern Rhodesia he was to take precedence next after the Administrator. The Resident Commissioner would receive instructions from the Colonial Secretary through the High Commissioner. Section 9 authorized the Company to exercise the power of administration through an administrator appointed by the Company and approved by the Secretary of State, while Section 13 of this order permitted the Company to appoint a Council which would assist the Administrator and the Resident Commissioner in the administration of Northern Rhodesia.

This order once more reveals that the British failed to protect Africans in the country by authorizing the

\footnote{322} Stokes, p. 292; Clay, p. 147.

\footnote{323} C.O. 743/1 X/J 1002; Northern Rhodesia, No. 1 of 1911.
Company to exercise both legislative and executive powers without safeguards for African participation. Only Section 18 of the order, seems to have some safeguards for them.

"The High Commissioner in issuing proclamations shall respect any native laws or customs by which the civil relations of any native chiefs, tribes or populations under His Majesty's protection are now regulated, except so far as the same may be incompatible with the due exercise of Her Majesty's power and jurisdiction."\(^{324}\) We have noted above that these kinds of safeguards had not so far protected Lewanika's rights against the Company interests. The Company administrator and his agents as we have noted made decisions that were in the best interests of the Company and if these interests conflicted with those Africans, the Africans had to give way. The struggle with Lewanika over taxes and land are cases in point. There were two further safeguards for African rights in Sections 40 and 44. Section 40 provided that the Company could not alienate land from Lewanika and his people in the reserved area which was protected under the 1900 and 1909 agreements. For the rest of the people in Northern Rhodesia, the Company was required to assign to African inhabitants sufficient land for their occupation, and Section 44 provided that "No native shall be removed from any kraal or from any land assigned to him for occupation, except after full inquiry

\(^{324}\)C.O. 743/1 X/J 1002; Proclamation by His Excellency the High Commissioner; Northern Rhodesia, No. I of 1911.  
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by, and by order of the Administrator approved by the High Commissioner."\textsuperscript{325} Clause 3 of Section 44 stated that nothing in 44 contained would limit or affect the exercise by Lewanika of his authority in tribal matters. From the discussion of the Company administration so far, it seems that these were safeguards that could be ignored by the Company if the need arose. It was Section 42 that Lewanika and his councillors seemed to have objected to very strongly because the Company had already used the 1909 land cession to sell land to white settlers against Lewanika's wishes.\textsuperscript{326} The 1911 Order in Council seems to have been brought the final destruction of Lewanika's authority as King or Paramount Chief over Northwestern Rhodesia, and Barotseland's separate and original treaty with the Company and the British Government became insignificant as Lewanika became one of the chiefs of Northern Rhodesia, possessing little power and only in the Barotse reserve. The chiefs including Lewanika were now made civil servants of the Company Administration.\textsuperscript{327} Their duties were increased by the 1916 Proclamation which was specifically passed by the High Commissioner on the recommendation of the Company administration because the First World War had apparently made

\textsuperscript{325} C.O. 743/1 X/J 1002; The Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911.

\textsuperscript{326} Stokes, pp. 292-293.

\textsuperscript{327} See Section 47 of the 1911 Order in Council.
necessary to have an efficient administration of Africans as they were needed for the support of the British war effort in East and Central Africa. Sections 5 and 14 defined the duties of chiefs who now held office during good behavior and at the pleasure of the Company, while Section 6 gave the Company administration power to dismiss or suspend any chief from service. The heart of the Proclamation was Section 7, which authorized the Administrator, with the approval of the High Commissioner, to call upon chiefs to supply men for the defense of the territory and for the suppression of disorder and rebellion. Moreover, the unfortunate thing about this proclamation as far as the Africans were concerned, was its restriction of their movements inside and outside the territory. Section 16 authorized the Native Commissioner to prohibit establishment of new villages or construction of new houses or cultivation of new gardens where such activities may not be in the interest of the Company. He could assign lands for houses or farms to anyone in any subdistrict in which he resided without the consent of the Native Commissioner.

Lewanika died during that very year when African rights had become restricted by the Company Administration and one may say that Africans in Northern Rhodesia had lost

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328 Proclamation by His Excellency, the High Commissioner; Northern Rhodesia No. 8, 1916.
329 See Section 16 of the 1916 Proclamation; Northern Rhodesia No. 8 of 1916.
their independence since the turn of the century while those in Southern Rhodesia had lost theirs as early as 1893. It was unfortunate for Lewanika to have died without seeing his country become under direct control of the Government. This was achieved in 1924, when Northern Rhodesia became a British Protectorate under the control of the Colonial Office, while Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing Colony where only a minority of white people had the right to vote. Here is another example of the failure of British policy in Central Africa.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Critical Analysis

In the preceding discussion of British policy for Barotseland and Rhodesia in general, two factors seem to stand out clearly, that this policy was generally influenced by the world economic and diplomatic situation in which Britain found herself in during the late nineteenth century and by the need to satisfy British commercial interests based in South Africa which were controlled by Cecil Rhodes. In the late eighteen eighties, the British economic supremacy which had been based on the control of free world-wide markets found itself challenged by the new emerging states of western Europe and North America. Countries like Germany, France, and the United States of America were not only beginning to outproduce Britain in certain basic commodities for industry such as iron, coal and machinery; they had become themselves industrialized and therefore began to pass laws to protect their developing industries and markets from foreign competition. These protective tariffs were applied not only in the home markets but also in the developing areas under these countries' influence. British industry and commerce became sluggish and these economic depressions began to create unemployment.
and this in turn put pressure on commercial and political leaders to find outlets for British industry and commerce. The depression and unemployment of 1884-1885 were attributed to foreign competition and tariff discrimination overseas. The British seemed concerned during those years and after, that French and German interest in Africa would threaten her routes to India. It was during those same years that strategic and economic questions became connected in British foreign policy formulation. In the latter years of the eighteen eighties, Britain seemed to be adding extensively to her empire in Africa and Asia, which tends to reveal that the empire had become weakened by the economic challenge of other industrialized countries.

It was during these hard times for British industry and commerce that the public began to lose interest in the free world market system and began to advocate for British imperial expansion in tropical lands as a means of finding markets for industry and investment. Since protectionism seemed to be shutting out British trade and investment from regions hitherto open to all nations, the acquisition of further dominions began to appear the only assurance of Britain's prosperity and employment. Joseph Chamberlain seems to have been one of the early politicians and businessmen to advocate imperial expansion as an economic cure for Britain. Lord Salisbury later came to accept the same view and the two men began to work for British imperial expansion more aggressively than the previous governments.
except that of Disraeli. Chamberlain became the leader of the new imperialism which began to justify this policy in terms of employment for the British worker, markets for manufactured goods and "civilization" for the African tribes.

Therefore, for economic and strategic reasons Britain began to expand its holdings in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa and during the scramble for African lands, British diplomacy seems to have been directed toward preserving what she held and acquiring more in those regions thought to be of economic and strategic value. Since the Treasury was unwilling to support this overseas expansion, the Government's foreign policy became that of making "smooth the paths for British Commerce...for the application of British capital at a time when...other outlets for the commercial energies of our race are being gradually closed."330 This policy seems to have been continued by successive governments after Salisbury and Chamberlain left the scene. It was therefore natural that as a consequence of this policy the British Government began to work in cooperation with Cecil Rhodes' commercial interest in South Africa and began to rely on this man and his company for maintenance of British supremacy there and use of the Company as agent of imperial expansion into the interior.

For many years that followed British policy was formulated in the best interests for these commercial groups and

their recommendations for policy were always accepted by London. Even high British officials in South Africa were nominees of Rhodes. In October 1889, the British Government recognized Rhodes' influence in Southern and Central African affairs by granting a royal charter to his British South Africa Company so as to block German and Portuguese expansion which if allowed to continue would have barred British economic and strategic interests in South Africa from linkage with those interests in East Africa and Egypt. The Company was practically given blanket support for its operations north of Bechuanaland Protectorate.

It was during this time, that is, the late eighteen eighties, that African Kings in Central Africa began to seek protection from European States because the intense European scramble for Africa had reached Central Africa and had made these rulers insecure as they attempted to search for methods of dealing with the influx of white traders, missionaries and concession seekers. It was not only the British South Africa Company that desired to acquire concession rights, there were also German and Portuguese colonial interests and agents busy trying to obtain similar trading and concessions for their respective countries in Central Africa. Moreover, the Boers too were finding out that they had been hemmed in by the British to the South and Southeast and by the Portuguese to the East and North and when the Boers tried to expand northward or eastward they clashed with both these powers and the African rulers as well.
The British South Africa Company had been active in Mata-
beleland and Mashonaland since the late eighteen eighties
when they had obtained the Rudd Concession from King
Lobengula in 1888 which permitted them to trade and search
for gold in Mashonaland. Later the Company used this con-
cession to seize all of Lobengula's territory by force.

Barotseland which was across the Zambesi River from
Matabele Kingdom, had a King, Lewanika, who for the sake
of external and internal security was looking for pro-
tection. He knew that further south in Bechuanaland, King
Khama had obtained British protection and seemed satisfied
as the British protected him not only from the Boers and
the Matabele but also from the greedy British South Africa
Company.

Lewanika, therefore, requested British protection in
January 1889 by writing to Sir Sidney Shippard, the British
Administrator for Bechuanaland Territory, who, instead of
sending the letter on to the Queen to whom Lewanika had
addressed it, turned it over to Rhodes. Rhodes was at that
time negotiating for a royal charter for his Company and
delayed sending the letter to the Colonial Office. Rhodes
sent his agent Frank Lochner to negotiate with Lewanika for
a concession which would cover the whole country.

In the negotiation for a new concession, Lochner de-
ceived Lewanika and his councillors that he and his dele-
gation were representatives of the Queen and her Government.
This deceit was confirmed by Coillard of the Paris Evangeli-
cal Missionary operating in Barotseland and was supported by King Khama's ambassador who had been sent by the Company when Lochner realized that the Barotse National Council was going to vote against the granting of the concession. Khama's ambassador working in the interest of the company managed to convince the Barotse Councillors that Lochner and his men were representatives of Her Majesty the Queen, whose protection Lewanika had requested. Therefore, the concession was granted by Lewanika on the belief that he was dealing with the British Government and not a trading Company as it later turned out to be. After he had learned that he had granted the Concession to the Company, Lewanika tried to repudiate it but was assured by the Colonial Office that the Government regarded him with friendly feelings and advised him to deal with the Company which he was informed represented the Government because it had been granted a royal charter by the Queen.

Thus, from the beginning of his dealings with the British people, Lewanika began to realize as Lobengula had already realized that the British Government's protection was going to be different from that accorded the Bechuana King Khama. For Barotseland and Matabeland and Mashonaland plus the rest of the territories later called Northern Rhodesia, British protection meant reliance on the Company. Both Lewanika and Lobengula soon found out that the Company's major concern and interests were incompatible with those of the African rulers and their people. Lewanika as
well as Lobengula began direct correspondence with the British Government in order to correct erroneous Company claims in their respective countries in the Company's sphere of operations. By 1897 these countries began to officially be called Southern and Northern Rhodesia. The British Government continued to encourage Lewanika to communicate to them through the Company and for a long time the Barotse King was not convinced that the Company could represent the Government. It was not until 1895 that he seemed to have been convinced that the Company represented the Government.

The British policy for Barotseland and Rhodesia as a whole came to reflect the wishes and interests of the Company headed by Cecil Rhodes. Moreover, Rhodes had become a highly powerful individual by the 1890's and the successive British Governments began to defer to his wishes and recommendations as to what policy to follow in Barotseland or any other part of Central Africa. The Government began to rely on Rhodes more and more as an instrument of maintaining British supremacy in Southern Africa against the encroachment by the Boers, Germans, and the Portuguese. This dependence on Rhodes seemed to have become essential as minerals had been discovered in this region and made the area more appealing to British commerce in addition to the strategic requirements of protecting routes to East Africa and beyond. The Government seemed to have relied on Rhodes' Company also for their imperial expansion into the interior of Southern Africa and as the scramble for African lands
became intensive the British diplomacy was used to protect the Company's aggressive expansion north of the Zambesi. In their desire to maintain a continuous link with their possessions in East Africa and Egypt, British policy became interwoven with that of Rhodes who now dreamed of building a Cape to Cairo railway. Thus, one finds that the Company interests became fused with those of the Government; the former supplied the necessary finances for expansion while the latter defended the expansion by diplomatic means.

Reliance on Rhodes' company to uphold its policy in Southern Africa created problems for the Government as the Company began to hatch conspiracies against the Transvaal Government and King Lobengula of the Matabele and Mashona people. The Company too began to make illegal claims in Barotseland where they had no administrative powers. In these activities the Government soon realized that control of its policy in Southern and Central Africa was in the hands of Rhodes and his company. Rhodes who had built an autonomous empire within the British empire seemed to regard British Government questing of his activities as unnecessary interference. Moreover, control of British policy in this region by the Company seems to have been continued even after Rhodes' death in 1902. When Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary in July 1895, British commercial interests in Southern Africa seemed to have found a friend who believed in the expansion of the empire and encouragement of commercial development, which would reinforce the
imperial factor. Therefore, from the outset, his policies and those of Rhodes were compatible even though Rhodes at first appeared apprehensive about Chamberlain becoming Colonial Secretary. The Colonial Secretary seems to have supported Rhodes' schemes for the destruction of the Transvaal Republic and when this failed, he covered his own involvement in it and fought hard against those who urged that the Company's charter could be revoked after the 1895 raid on the Transvaal. Chamberlain as other Colonial Secretaries before him seems to have been convinced that it was in the best interests of Britain to support the British South Africa Company's policies in Central Africa. This support of the Company operations and activities in Central Africa was found necessary partly because the successive Governments had also realized that control of that policy had slipped out of their hands since the late eighteen nineties. The Government seemed to have had no mechanism for checking to see if the company adhered to its professed policy of fulfilling its obligations to the African people. The Company had promised African leaders to bring western civilization to Africans in Southern and Northern Rhodesia but instead it brought destruction of these rulers and their people. The mass of the African people instead of advancing economically and educationally became laborers in the white man's factories, firms and mines. This policy of exploitation of Africans as a source of cheap labor had been advocated by Rhodes since the 1880's. It was therefore un-
fortunate for Africans that Chamberlain sanctioned it for Northern and Southern Rhodesia.

African Kings like Lewanika and Lobengula seem to have sought British Government protection against outside attack but instead they received the protection of the Company which as we have noted was not interested in their welfare but in making profit by use of cheap African labor. The Company also was interested in exploitation of mineral resources and land which put them in conflict with both Lewanika and Lobengula because land was the base of the African power structure in the two Kingdoms. Soon the Company used trickery and wars to take over all power in Barotseland and Matabeleland respectively. In the case of Lobengula, where the Matabele and Mashona army was stronger and better organized, they and the Company fought it out resulting in the death of Lobengula in 1893 and the destruction of his Kingdom which subsequently became Southern Rhodesia. During the Company's activities in Matabeleland and Mashonaland, it was clear that the Company violated their treaty agreement of 1888 with Lobengula but when Sir Henry Loch, the High Commissioner, attempted to intervene in order to preserve British stated policy, he was disapproved by both the Colonial Office and Mr. Rhodes. He was soon retired from office because he fell out of favor with Mr. Rhodes, the real Colonial Secretary as far as policy for Southern and Central Africa were concerned.

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As for Lewanika, matters developed differently. He had realized that the granting of the 1890 concession had not brought peace and protection for his Kingdom but instead it had created problems on two fronts: first, his boundaries on the west were disputed as the Portuguese claimed more than half of his Kingdom; secondly, the Company and the British Government took more than six years to fulfill their agreement to establish a British Resident in the country. Even after this had been done Lewanika had still felt insecure since his army was not as strong as that of Lobengula had been and therefore when the Company began to send prospectors and white settlers into his Kingdom without his assent; he seemed to be at a loss of what to do. He appears to have avoided doing something drastic that might have provoked the company to conquer his Kingdom as they had done in Southern Rhodesia. He therefore engaged in continuous correspondence with the Colonial and Foreign Offices through the High Commissioner.

Until 1905, when the western boundary dispute was solved, the foreign office seems to have actively participated in the policy formulation for Barotseland. This policy seems to have been aimed at strict supervision of the Company's responsibilities there in order to avoid war with the Barotse or clash with the Portuguese in the disputed area. Moreover, the first British Resident there, Mr. Coryndon, was instructed by the Foreign Office to dissuade Lewanika from the temptation of taking arms against
the Portuguese in defense of his sovereignty. The foreign office was at this time involved in negotiations with the Portuguese on matters which included not only the Barotse western boundary dispute but also the whole question of the future of the Portuguese Colonies in Central Africa and Britain's desire to have free access to the Delgoa Bay Port of Lourenco Marques. This port had become necessary as an outlet for British Central Africa and was on the strategic route to the East. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the Transvaal Republic desired the same outlet and her claims were supported by Germany.

Thus, the maintenance of British supremacy in Southern Africa which had become the cornerstone of British policy since the eighteen sixties and the basis of the Government's support of Rhodes' schemes, was linked with the policy for Barotseland. This linkage was unfortunate for Lewanika because all he had desired from the beginning was British protection. He seemed to have been unaware of the fact that his western boundary had created international diplomatic complications for the other parts of Central and Southern Africa. When the decision of the King of Italy came, Lewanika found out that he had been let down by the British Government because they had permitted half of his country to become Portuguese territory. The settlement reduced Barotseland to about 130,000 square miles. Before that decision Barotseland had been as large as the size of France and Germany together. This settlement thus
had reduced Lewanika's territory to a size a little larger than France. This was not the protection that Lewanika had expected from Britain. British policy in Barotseland seems to have failed also to grasp the fact the Company could not be depended upon to protect Lewanika and his people from exploitation. The Company's main interest seems to have been to use Barotseland as a source of cheap labor for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Moreover, due to the Government's reliance on the Company imperial expansion, successive Colonial Secretaries encouraged the Company in a few years of their administration in Barotseland to erode Lewanika's authority on taxation, land, and internal administration that by 1910, the King had become a little more than a tribal chief. All this destruction of Lewanika's power was done in clear violation of the 1900 Agreement. In 1911, the Company amalgamated Northeastern and Northwestern Rhodesia into one territory called Northern Rhodesia. Here again, the Company was supported by the Colonial Office in diminishing Lewanika's authority as ruler of Northwestern Rhodesia. In the new arrangement, Lewanika became a Paramount Chief of the Barotse reserve and was reduced to a position of the Company's civil servant who would now serve at the Company's pleasure and could be dismissed for "misconduct."

Why did the successive British Governments consistently support the Company even when it became evident that their actions were in clear violation of their treaty agreements
and therefore against African interests? The answer seems to lie in the statements of policy expounded by three different Colonial Secretaries, Lord Knutsford, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, and Lord Elgin. Knutsford who was Colonial Secretary when Rhodes applied for a royal Charter for his company seems to have supported Rhodes in the belief that such a company "might to some considerable extent relieve Her Majesty's Government from diplomatic difficulties and heavy expenditure." 331 Knutsford further explained that this Company was "incorporated for trading and mining purposes in the first instance, and is empowered to assume subject to the control and supervision of Her Majesty's Government through the High Commissioner, such administrative functions as by cessions of territory or delegation of powers from the Native Chiefs, as may hereafter devolve upon it..." 332 In arguing against the revocation of the British South Africa Company's Charter after the Jameson Raid of 1895, Chamberlain revealed once more that the Colonial policy under his direction was still basically the same as that expounded by Knutsford in 1889. He stated that the existence of that Company was in the best interests of Britain since the Company had made it possible for the empire to expand in Central Africa at no expense to the

332 C. O. 879/31 No. 382, November 4, 1889.
Finally, in 1907, when Lewanika protested the curtailment of his authority outside the reserved area by the Company, Lord Elgin, the Colonial Secretary, supported the Company's decision on the same basis, arguing that "the Company has been placed in possession of assets of a wide area in consideration of administration of the area without expense to the British taxpayer, and successive Secretaries have steadily refused to permit any infringement of this arrangement in spite of good reasons which have from time to time been urged for placing this or that part of the interior under imperial control." Therefore this long-range Government policy for Barotseland seemed to have suited well the interests of the Company and the British Government. But the policy was an utter failure as far as the interests of Africans were concerned. It failed because it did not protect the African rulers and their people who had invited the British Government in the first place to protect them against their enemies who included white traders and their companies. The British Government had accepted this responsibility when they had instructed Coryndon in 1897, to inform Lewanika that his request for the Queen's protection had been granted. But instead of

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carrying out this obligation themselves, they entrusted it to the British South Africa Company which was unsuited for the responsibility of governing Africans. Men with medieval racial attitudes like Rhodes' and his associates who formed the core of the Company's administration should not have been entrusted with the welfare of Africans in the territories supposedly under the British Government protection.
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mistakes during their rule. My paper hopefully, will improve on what Hole has written about the handling of Lewanika by the Company.

In the third volume, *The Jameson Raid*, Hole's analysis takes the argument that Rhodes was not personally involved in the conspiracy and that he acted honestly throughout this whole business. This was the view taken by the Company. The book is useful in that it reveals the real forces behind the Company's effort to overthrow the Transvaal Republican Government.


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JOURNALS


APPENDIX I

THE WARE CONCESSION GRANTED BY LEWANIKA TO HENRY WARE IN JUNE 1889

"A"

AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEWANIKA, KING OF THE BAROTSI, AND HENRY WARE
Know all men who it may concern:

That I Lewanika, King of the Barotsi nation, acting on the advice and with the assistance of my headmen and councillors, who have together with me executed these presents and for myself and on behalf of my people of the Barotse nation, do hereby for valuable consideration received and still to be received by me in terms of agreement this day entered into by that behalf with Henry Ware and his assigns the sole absolute and exclusive right to dig mine and quarry for precious stones gold, silver and all other minerals and metals of whatever description for the term of twenty years with option of renewal at the expiration of this agreement in terms to be agreed upon between myself or my successors and the said Henry Ware or his assigns the whole of my country east from the river Majile the boundary to the north to be the cattle path leading to the Mashikulumbe, the boundary to the south to be the Zambesi river together with the following rules and privileges to wit:

1. The right to as much wood and water as shall be required by the said Henry Ware or his assigns for mining and building purposes and for the construction of any works or conveniences whatsoever requisite thereto.

2. The right to as much land as shall be required by Harry Ware for the erection of dwelling houses, stores and other buildings and machinery.

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3. The right of grazing throughout the said territory for as much cattle, sheep, horses, and mules as shall be required for the purpose of this concession.

4. The right to construct and lay trainways, railways, and roads and to cut and make channels aqueducts.

5. The right of free access to any and every part of the ceded territory and the right of way for the purpose of conveying into, through and from the territory all stores, machinery, building material, ores, minerals and in general for carrying out and developing the rights and privileges granted.

Lewanika agreed in addition that all profits of whatever nature arising from the exercise of these rights and privileges by Harry Ware shall belong exclusively to him or his assigns, provided the rent and royalty as agreed on be duly paid. Lewanika further agreed to give all the protection in his power to Mr. Ware, his employees and goods.

Thus, given under his hand and seal at Lealuyi, on the 27th day of June 1889.

(signed) Lewanika, King of the Barotsi

Litia, Lewanika’s son and heir

This agreement was countersigned by Masaoruka, the Gambella, in his capacity as the Prime Minister, and all the important noblemen and councillors of the Kingdom. The Queen Mokwae, the King's sister and ruler of the Southern half of the Kingdom together with her councillors also fixed their marks on the document. These signatures were witnessed by Francois Coillard, Seatjika, and Karumba.

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN HARRY WARE AND LEWANIKA,
KING OF THE BAROTSE

1. In return for the above concession from Lewanika, Harry Ware agreed to pay the King of the Barotse or his successors two hundred pounds sterling per annum payable in advance for the mining concession.

2. To pay King Lewanika or his successor a royalty of four per cent on the total output of any minerals or precious stones won by him in the granted territory.

3. Harry Ware agreed that he would in no way trespass or injure any cultivated land in the granted territory without permission from the local chief and without compensation agreed upon between the owner of the land himself. He also agreed not to carry on any mining operations within 500 yards of any African Village.

4. He or any of his employees were not allowed at any time to hunt or shoot any elephant in or out of the conceded territory.

5. He agreed to give the King Lewanika or his successors or any person authorized by him free access at any time to the books and to the works of the company.

6. Harry Ware further agreed not to bring any intoxicating liquors into the country, to introduce only men of good character and to do all in his power to give effect to all laws, rules, and regulations of the King Lewanika or his successors.

Signed at Lealuyi on 27th day of June 1889

(signed) Harry Ware

Witnesses: F. Coillard
           Seatjika
           Litia
APPENDIX II

A 4

THE Bapotse CONCESSION OF JUNE 26, 1890
(Also known as the Lochner Concession)

Know all men whom it may concern that I, Lewanika, Paramount Chief or King of the Barotse nation or people, for myself and my heir and successors, and for my people, with the advice and consent of the Council of my nation at a full meeting held at Lealui on the 26th day of June 1890, have agreed and do hereby agree, for the considerations mentioned below, to give to Frank Lochner, as a representative of the British South Africa Company or its assigns, the sole, absolute, and exclusive and perpetual right and power to do the following acts free of any royalty or deduction, over the whole of the territory of the said nation, or any future extension thereof, including all subject and dependent territory:

A. To carry on any manufacturing, commercial or other trading business.

B. To search for, dig, win, and keep diamonds, gold, coal, oil, and all other precious stones, minerals or substances.

C. To construct, improve, equip, work, and manage public works, railways, trainways, roads, bridges, water works, lighting, and all other works and conveniences of general or public utility.

D. To carry on the business of banking in all its branches.
E. To buy, sell, refine manipulate, mint and deal in precious stone, specie, coin, and all other metals and minerals.

F. To manufacture and import arms and ammunition of all kinds.

G. To do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the exercise, attainment, or protection of all or any of the rights, powers, and concessions hereby granted.

And I further agree and bind myself, and my successors and nation, not to give or enter into any agreement, concessions, treaty or alliance with any person, company, or state, it being understood that this agreement shall be considered in the light of a treaty between my said Barotse nation and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty Queen Victoria, but nothing written in this agreement shall otherwise affect my constitutional power or authority as chief of the said nation, or give the Company the right to any other land than for mining and trading purposes, or to interfere with any towns, cattle post, gardens, or fountains belonging to me and my people. And in my consideration of the above, I, Frank Elliot Lochner, on behalf of the said Company, hereby undertake and agree to protect the said King and nation from all outside interference and attack; but the Company shall not be obliged to interfere in any matter concerning the King's power and authority over any of his own subjects. The Company further agrees that it will aid and assist in the education and civilization of the native subjects of the King, by establishment,
maintenance, and endowment of schools and industrial establishments, and by extension and equipment of telegraphs, and for regular services of postal and transport communication, and, as a sign of amicable relations between the King and the Company, the Company hereby undertakes and agrees to appoint and maintain a British Resident with a suitable escort, to reside permanently with the King.

The Company stipulates that no official or employee of theirs will be allowed to hunt elephants, or game of any description, without the consent of the King; that the elephants in the country are the exclusive property of the King: provided always that the above clause will not interfere with the right of any officials or employees of the Company to shoot game for the purpose of food, always excepting elephants.

The Company further agrees that the country will not be thrown open for immigration without the consent of the King and his people.

The Company acknowledges the right of the natives to iron found in the country, and that the iron mines which are already worked by them will be their exclusive property, viz., Kachenge, Kakaoke, Lezowe, Motondo, Kataba, Kamoengo, Dundi, Salala and Mosintisi. This, however, does not mean that the natives have the exclusive right to all the iron found in the country with the exception of previously mentioned.
The Company binds itself to recognize the right of King Lewanika to the royalty agreed upon by him and Mr. Ware, on the part of the country known as Ware's Concession or Batoka country, until such time as some amicable agreement is come between the King and the Company for its abolition.

I, Lewanika, do promise to continue my endeavors for the suppression of slavery and witchcraft in my country, and will aid and assist the Company in their efforts for same object.

And the Company undertakes and agrees to pay to the said Chief or King, and to his successors in perpetuity, an annual sum of (£2,000) two thousand pounds sterling, or the equivalent thereof, in trading goods at the option of the King.

And the Company binds itself to respect the feelings of the people by not commencing mining operations in that country between the Wagggon road and the river from Seshekhe and Lealui without the consent of the King.

WITNESSES:

F. Coillard, V.D.M.
A. Salia, V.D.M.
Frank Elliot Lochner
Lewanika
Litia, the King's eldest son and heir

Their
MOAWINKA, X Ngambela or Prime Minister
AKAFUNA, X First Councillor
MOKULOA KASIKI, X Minister
GALIBO TSEE, X Minister
BEUNYA, X King's brother-in-law
KARONGA, X King's son-in-law
NALISHUA, X Councillor
INAMUNDA, X headman or chief
INGA NGOANA, X headman or chief of King's household
LUCHANANA MOWANA, X headman or chief
IMASEKOANA, X headman or chief
SEKOTA, X headman or chief
ALISHEKE, X headman or chief
MOLETA, X Chief of Libonda
MONONO, X headman or chief
ISHEKWANDA, X headman and husband of Queen of Nololo, the King's sister
SAMBI, X headman and Ngambela, Prime Minister of the Queen of Nololo, the King's sister
MOKOAKOA, X headman or Minister of the Queen
IMBOA, X headman or Minister
LAYOA, X Minister of the Queen
SAMBA, X a chief of Nalolo
MAMUNDA, Chief of Nalolo
MOKOTA, X Chief of Nalolo
RATAU, X a chief of Sesheke
KATUKARA, X Chief of Sesheke
TAHALIMA X Chief of Sesheke
MOANA MAOLI, X Chief of Sesheke
MALISHA, X Chief of Sesheke
MOLIFI, X Chief of Sesheke
LIKU, X Chief of Monzoa, at Swanks
MOKUMBA, X a chief of Kazungula
KUENANE, X Chief of Linyati District
MOKUABLELA, X Chief of Linyati District
SEKOMBOA, X Chief of Sesheke
NAWA, X headman
MOSIALILA, X King's brother
MONOKAYAMBOA, X King's brother
LIKOKOANE, X King's nephew
LEATIYIKA, X King's secretary
(Marks)

We the undersigned do hereby certify that his document has been faithfully translated and fully explained to the King of the Barotse, his councillors, chiefs, the headmen,
and the Public Assembly of the nation.

Lealui, 27th June 1890

(signed)

F. Coillard,

A. Salla,

of Paris Evangelical
Mission Society.
APPENDIX III

A 10

THE TREATY OF 1898 (Later termed "Concession "A")

Know all men whom it may concern, that I Lewanika, Paramount Chief or King of the Barotse Nation or people, for myself, my heirs, and successors, and for my people, with the advice and consent of the Council of my nation, at a full meeting held at Victoria Falls on the 25th day of June, 1898, have agreed and do hereby agree, for the considerations mentioned below, to give to Captain the Honorable Arthur Lawley, representing the British South Africa Company, or its assigns, the sole, absolute, and exclusive perpetual right and power to do the following acts free of any royalty or deduction over the whole of the territory of the said nation, or any future extension thereof, including subject and dependent territory.

A. To carry on any manufacturing, commercial, or other trading business.

B. To search for, dig, win and keep diamonds, gold, coal, oil, and all other precious stones, minerals, or substances.

C. To construct, improve, equip, work, and manage public works, railways, tram ways, road, bridges, lighting, water works, and all other works and conveniences of general or public utility.

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D. To carry on the business of banking in all its branches.

E. To buy, sell, refine, manipulate, mint, and deal in precious stones, specie, coin, and other metals and minerals.

F. To manufacture and import arms and ammunition of all kinds.

G. To do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the exercise, attainment, or protection of all or any of the rights, powers, and concessions hereby granted, and to grant to the British South Africa Company administrative rights to deal with, and adjudicate upon, all cases between natives shall be left to the King to deal with and dispose of. Lewanika further agrees to bind himself and his successors and nation not to give or enter into any agreement, concession, treaty, or alliance with any person, company, or state, it being understood that this agreement shall be considered in the light of a Treaty or Alliance made between his Barotse Nation and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, Queen Victoria. But nothing written in the agreement would otherwise affect Lewanika's constitutional power or authority as Chief of the said nation, or give the Company the right to any other land than for mining and trading purposes, but the British South Africa Company would have the right to make grants of land for farming purposes in any portion the Batoka or Mashukulumbe
country to white men approved by the King. The Company undertakes and agrees that native lands, villages, cattle posts, gardens, and fountains would be in no way, interfered with, and, in consideration of the above, Arthur Lawley, on behalf of the Company, thereby undertakes and agrees to protect the King Lewanika and his nation from all outside interference or attack, but the Company would not be obliged to interfere in any other matter concerning the King's power and authority over any of his own subjects.

The Company further agrees that it would aid and assist in the education and civilization of the native subjects of the King, by the establishment, maintenance, and endowment of schools and industrial establishments, and by the extension and equipment of telegraphs, and regular services of postal and transport communications. As a sign of the amicable relations between the King and the Company, the Company undertakes and agrees to appoint and maintain a British Resident, with a suitable suit and escort, to reside permanently with the King. The Company undertakes to prevent, as far as possible, white men from entering the country by any drifts other than those known as Kazungula, Victoria Falls, and Wankies, and prevent the entry of any persons across the river Zambesi above Kazungula. The Company further agrees that no official or employee of theirs would be allowed to hunt elephants or game of any description without the consent of the King, that the ele-
phants in the country were exclusive property of the King, provided always that the above clause would not interfere with the rights of any official or employee of the Company to shoot game for the purpose of food, always excepting elephants. The Company further agrees that the country would not be thrown open for immigration without the consent of the King and his people. It also acknowledges the rights of natives to iron found in the country, and the iron mines which were already being worked by them would be their exclusive property, viz., Kachenge, Kaboko, Lozowe, Kataba, Dunda, Salala, and Mosinbisi; however, this does not mean that Africans have exclusive right to all iron found in the country with the exception of mines previously mentioned.

The Company agrees to reserve from prospecting for exclusive use of the King and his people, a strip of country on the left or east bank of the Majili River, known as the Luangula Simatauga and Lonzi forests.

The Company further agrees to reserve from prospecting and devote to the exclusive use of the King and his people, that portion of the Barotse Valley proper stretching from a point on the Zambesi River, known as Mboe Hill, about 40 miles above Lealui on the north, to Sinonga on the south, and bounded on either side by the Mosito or Sand Belts. The Company further agrees to reserve for the use of the King and his people all trees suitable for canoe building
on the banks of the rivers running into the Zambesi River on its left (northern) bank between the Nugwesi and Kabompo Rivers inclusive.

The Company further agrees to grant to the King and his people the right to take for their own use, and without any restrictions whatsoever, such pieces of white siliceous granite as are requisite as anvils in the working of iron or other metals.

The Company agrees to use its best endeavors to preserve all game in the district known as Kiowa, lying north-west of Lealui, on the right (west) bank of the Zambesi River, and south of the Lower Lungwi-Bungo River, also the Lechwe, Sitatunga, Pookoo antelope in the Barotse Valley proper. The Company further agrees to protect, as far as possible, from interference, the natives living on either bank of the Luanginga and Nyengo Rivers, within 40 miles of Lealui, and also the natives living in the country between the Za Majiji and Luena Rivers, and between the Zambesi River and the Wagon road.

Lewanika, on his part, promises to continue his endeavors for the suppression of slavery and witchcraft in his country, and would aid and assist the Company in their efforts for the same object.

And the British South Africa Company undertakes and agrees to pay King Lewanika and to his successors in perpetuity an annual sum of £850 (eight hundred and fifty
pounds sterling) or the equivalent thereof in trading goods at the option of the King, such a subsidy to be in satisfaction and inclusive of the royalty agreed upon by the King and H. M. Ware on the part of the country known as Ware's concession, or the Batoka country.

The Company binds itself to respect the feelings of the people by not commencing mining operations in the country between the Wagon road and the river from Shesekhe and Lealui without the consent of the King.²

However, on June 25, 1898, Lewanika and his advisors had some new ideas regarding the concession just concluded. As it had been referred to above the King wrote to Lawley a letter in which he said he and his councillors who were present at the discussion of the Treaty, clearly understood that which was written in the new concession. They and the King were perfectly satisfied with everything that was written in the new concession, and they were ready to change it for the one that was in existence, that is, "The Lochner Concession," provided that a clause be added to the following effect, namely: "..."The British South Company agrees to reserve for prospecting the area of the country within the following boundaries:

"Northern Boundary—from the headwaters of the Dongue Rivers, along the Dongue and Kabombo Rivers to the junction

of the Kabombo and Zambesi Rivers. Western and Southern Boundary--from the junction of Kabombo and the Zambesi Rivers to its headwaters, along the Zambesi River to its junction with the Majili River.

"Eastern Boundary--from the junction of the Zambesi and Majili Rivers, along the Majili Rivers to its headwaters, thence northward, along the line of the watershed, to the headwaters of the Dongue River, as per map attached.

"Such a reservation to be withdrawn in the event of payable gold not being discovered in the country referred to in the concession as being within my dominion and outside the above specified area.

"Such a reservation does not imply exclusion of traders and other travelers."\(^3\)

APPENDIX IV

A 17

DRAFT ORDER IN COUNCIL FOR BAROTZILAND-
NORTHWESTERN RHODESIA, 1899

WHEREAS the territories of Africa situated within the
limits of this order, as hereinafter described, are under
the protection of Her Majesty the Queen:

And whereas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, and
other lawful means, Her Majesty has power and jurisdiction
in the said territories:

Now, therefore, Her Majesty, by virtue and in exercise
of powers by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or
otherwise in Her Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with
the advice of Her Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby
ordered, as follows:

1. This order may be cited as the Barotziland-
Northwestern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1899.

2. In this Order, unless the subject or context
otherwise requires: "Her Majesty" includes Her
Majesty's heirs and successors.
"Secretary of State" means one of Her Majesty's
principal Secretaries of State.
"High Commissioner" means Her Majesty's High
Commissioner for the time being for South Africa.
"The Company" means the British South Africa
Company.
"Charter" means Her Majesty's Charter of the 29th
day of October, 1899, incorporating the Company
(as amended by any supplemental Charter).
"Administrator" means an Administrator appointed
under this order to administer affairs within the
limits of this Order, or within any parts of such

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limits, and includes an Acting Administrator. "Gazette" means the Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette.
"The Colony" means the Colony of Cape of Good Hope. "Native" means any person not of European or American descent who is a native of Africa. "Person" includes corporation. The plural includes the singular, and the singular the plural, and the masculine the feminine.

3. The limits of this order are parts of Africa bounded by the River Zambesi, the German Southwest African Protectorate, the Portuguese possessions, the Congo Free State, and the Kafukwe or Loengi River. Such limits further include so much of any territory belonging to the Bashukulumbwe tribe as may lie east of the Kafukwe or Loengi River. The territory within the limits of this order shall be known as Barotziland—Northwestern Rhodesia.

4. (1) A Secretary of State may from time to time by notice published in the Gazette, and in the London Gazette, declare that any parts of Africa north of the River Zambesi, and under the protection of Her Majesty, shall be included within the limits of this Order, and from the date of such publication in the Gazette this Order shall apply to the parts named therein.

(2) A Secretary of State may from time to time by the like notice declare that any part of Africa for the time being within the limits of this Order shall, until otherwise directed, be excepted from the application of this Order; and from the date of the publication of such notice in the Gazette, the part named therein shall be excluded from the limits of this Order.

5. The High Commissioner may on Her Majesty's behalf exercise all powers and jurisdiction which Her Majesty, at any time before or after the date of this Order, had or may have within the limits of this Order, and to that end may take or cause to be taken all such measures, and may do or cause to be done all such matters and things within the limits of this Order as are lawful, and as in the interest of Her Majesty's Service he may think expedient, subject to such instructions as he may from time to time receive from Her Majesty or through a Secretary of State.
6. The High Commissioner may appoint an Administrator for Barotziland-Northwestern Rhodesia, and so many Judges, Magistrates, or other officers as he may from time to time think necessary for the administration of the affairs of Barotziland-Northwestern Rhodesia, and may define from time to time the districts within which such officers shall respectively discharge their functions.

Every such administrator or other officer may exercise such powers and authorities as the High Commissioner may from time to time think fit to give him. The appointment of such officer shall not abridge, alter, or affect the right of the High Commissioner to execute and discharge all the powers and authorities hereby conferred upon him.

The High Commissioner may either, of his own motion or at the request of the Company, suspend or remove any Administrator or other officer so appointed.

7. Whenever the appointment of an Administrator, Judge, Magistrate or other officer is necessary the Company shall nominate to the High Commissioner a fit and proper person for the office. If the High Commissioner does not approve of such a person he shall so inform the Company, and the Company shall thereupon nominate another person and so on as often as occasion shall require, but if the Company has not within six months from the date of occurrence of a vacancy or in the case of a new office from the time when the High Commissioner shall have notified to the Company his intention to appoint a person to such office nominated some person whom the High Commissioner approves the High Commissioner may approve a person who has not been so nominated.

8. In the exercise of the powers and authorities hereby conferred upon him, the High Commissioner may, amongst other things, from time to time by Proclamation provide for the Administration of Justice, the raising of revenue by the imposition of taxes (which may include a tax in respect of native huts) and customs duties or otherwise, and generally for the peace, order, and good government of all persons within the limits of this Order, including the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb the public peace.
Provided that the High Commissioner before issuing any such Proclamation shall, whenever possible, have regard to any suggestions or requests made to him in respect thereof by the British South Africa Company.

Provided further that no Proclamation concerning the raising or appropriation of revenue shall be made unless the assent of the Company has previously been given thereto. Such assent may be signified by telegraph.

9. The High Commissioner in issuing such proclama-
tions shall respect any native laws or customs by
which the civil relations of any native chiefs,
tribes, or populations under Her Majesty's protec-
tion are now regulated, except so far as the same
may be incompatible with the due exercise of Her
Majesty's power and jurisdiction.

10. Every Proclamation of the High Commissioner shall
be published in the Gazette, and shall, from and
after a date to be mentioned in such Proclamation,
and thereafter until disallowed by Her Majesty or
repealed or modified by any subsequent Proclama-
tion, have effect as if contained in this Order.

11. Her Majesty may disallow any such Proclamation
wholly or in part, and may signify such disallow-
ance through a Secretary of State, and upon such
disallowance being publicly notified by the High
Commissioner in the Gazette the provisions so dis-
allowed shall from and after a date to be mentioned
in such notification cease to have effect, but
without prejudice to anything therefore lawfully
done thereunder.

12. Subject to any Proclamation made under this Order
any jurisdiction exercisable otherwise than under
this Order, whether by virtue of any statute or
Order in Council, or of any Treaty, or otherwise,
and whether exercisable by Her Majesty, or by any
person on Her behalf, or under any Charter granted
by Her Majesty, shall remain in full force.

13. Such estimates of the expenses of the administra-
tion of Barotseland-Northwestern Rhodesia as may
from time to time be necessary shall be submitted
to the Company for approval and, after the approval
of any such estimates by the Company, if in any
year the revenue raised and in pursuance of the
provisions of this Order shall be insufficient to provide for the payment of the said expenses, the surplus remaining after the payment of such expenses shall be paid to and become the property of the Company.

14. The Administrator shall be accountable to the Company for all revenue raised in pursuance of the provisions of this Order, and for all expenditure for the purposes of the administration of Barotziland-Northwestern Rhodesia, in such manner and subject to such instructions or rules as may from time to time be described by the High Commissioner at the request of the Company.

15. No customs duties levied on any articles produced or manufactured in any part of Her Majesty's dominions or in any British Protectorate, and imported into Barotziland-Northwestern Rhodesia, shall exceed in the amount the duties levied on such articles according to the tariff in force in the South African Customs Union, at the date of the coming into operation of the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1898, or the tariff contained in the Customs Union Convention, concluded between the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, the Orange Free State, and the Colony of Natal, in May, 1898, whichever are higher.

16. Subject to the provision of this Order and of any other Order in Council for the time being in force, and to the provisions of any proclamation made under the provisions of any such order such as aforesaid, so much of the law of England for the time being, as is applicable to local circumstances, shall apply to and be in force within Barotziland-Northwestern Rhodesia, subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary.

17. Judicial notice shall be taken of this Order and of the commencement thereof, and of any proclamation made under this Order and published in the Gazette.

18. This Order shall be published in the Gazette, and shall thereupon commence and come into operation; and the High Commissioner shall give directions for the Council, publication of this Order, at such places, and in such a manner, and for such a time or times, as he thinks proper for giving due publicity thereto.